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ОСНОВЫ ГЕОПОЛИТИКИ



В год 1999-й через семь месяцев (1)
с небес снизойдет великий Король Ужаса (2)
чтобы воскресить великого Короля Ангулемского (3)
после того, как Марс изрядно повластвует (4)
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FOUNDATIONS OF GEOPOLITICS

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The history and fate of geopolitics as a science is paradoxical. On the one hand, the concept itself seems to have become familiar and is actively used in modern politics. Geopolitical magazines and institutions are multiplying. The texts of the founders of this discipline are published and republished, conferences, symposia are organized, geopolitical committees and commissions are created.

But, nevertheless, until now geopolitics has not been able to get into the category of conventional generally recognized sciences. The first geopolitical works of the German Ratzel, the Swede Kjellen and especially the Englishman Mackinder were met with hostility by the scientific community. Classical science, which fully inherits the hypercritical spirit of early positivism, believed that geopolitics pretended to be over-generalized and, therefore, was only a kind of "charlatanism."

In a sense, the sad fate of geopolitics as a science was also associated with the political side of the problem. The opinion was established that the war crimes of the Third Reich were expansion, war, deportation, etc. were to a large extent theoretically trained by German geopoliticians who allegedly provided Hitler's regime with a pseudoscientific base. (I meant, first of all, Karl Haushofer, a German geopolitician who at one time was quite close to the Fuehrer.)

However, at the theoretical level, German geopolitics was essentially no different from Anglo-Saxon geopolitics (Mackinder, Mahan, Speakman), French (Vidal de la Blache), Russian "military geography" (Milyutin, Snegarev), etc. The difference lay not in Haushofer's specific views, which were completely logical and adequate to the discipline itself, but in the methods by which a number of his geopolitical positions were implemented. Moreover, the specificity of Germany's international politics in the 1930s and 1940s in its most repulsive manifestations sharply contradicted the ideas of Haushofer himself. Instead of a "continental bloc" along the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, an attack on the USSR, instead of an organicist (in the spirit of Schmitt's theory of "peoples' rights") understanding of the Lebensraum doctrine, "living space" vulgar nationalism and imperialism, etc. It should also be noted that the Haushofer school and his magazine "Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik" were never elements of the official Nazi system. Like many intellectual groups of the so-called. "Conservative revolutionaries" in the Third Reich, they led an ambiguous existence, they simply tolerated, and this tolerance varied depending on the current political situation.

However, the main reason for the historical oppression of geopolitics is the fact that it too openly reveals the fundamental mechanisms of international politics, which various regimes often prefer to hide behind vague rhetoric or abstract ideological schemes. In this sense, we can draw a parallel with Marxism (at least in its purely scientific, analytical part). Just as Marx more than convincingly reveals the mechanics of production relations and their connections with historical formations, so geopolitics exposes the historical demagogy of foreign policy discourse, showing real deep levers influencing international ones.

interstate and interethnic relations. But if Marxism is a global revision of classical economic history, then geopolitics is a revision of the history of international relations. This last consideration explains the ambivalence of society towards geopolitical scientists. The scientific community stubbornly refuses

them into their midst, harshly criticizing, and most often not noticing, while the authorities, on the contrary, are actively using geopolitical calculations to develop an international strategy. This, for example, was the case with one of the first geopoliticians, the true founding father of this discipline, Sir Halford Mackinder. His ideas were not accepted in academic circles, but he himself directly participated in the formation of English politics in the first half of the 20th century, laying the theoretical basis for England's international strategy, intercepted by the United States by the middle of the century and developed by the American (more broadly, Atlanticist) followers of Mackinder.

The parallel with Marxism, in our opinion, is apt. The method can be borrowed and mastered by different poles. The Marxist analysis is equally important for the representatives of Capital and for the fighters for the emancipation of Labor. Likewise, geopolitics: it instructs representatives of large states (empires) on how best to maintain territorial domination and expand, and their opponents find in it the conceptual principles of the revolutionary theory of "national liberation". For example, the Treaty of Versailles was the work of the Mackinder geopolitical school, which expressed the interests of the West and aimed at weakening the states of Central Europe and suppressing Germany. Mackinder's German student Karl Haushofer, proceeding from the same premises, developed the opposite theory of "European liberation",

The latter considerations show that even without being accepted in the commonwealth of classical sciences, geopolitics is extremely effective in practice, and its importance in some aspects surpasses many conventional disciplines.

Be that as it may, geopolitics exists today and little by little it is gaining official recognition and the corresponding status. However, not everything is smooth in this process. Quite often we are faced with the substitution of the very concept of "geopolitics", which is more and more widespread as the use of this term becomes commonplace among laymen. The emphasis shifts from the full-fledged and global picture developed by the founding fathers to particular regional issues or geoeconomic schemes. At the same time, the initial postulates are geopolitical dualism, competition of strategies, civilizational differentiation, etc. they are either ignored, or hushed up, or even denied altogether. It is difficult to imagine something similar in any other science. What would become of classical physics if, in terms of "mass", "

The purpose of this book is to present the main geopolitics objectively and impartially, beyond preconceptions, ideological sympathies and antipathies. No matter how we relate to this science, we can make a definite opinion on its account only after getting acquainted with its principles, history and methodology.

INTRODUCTION

The definition of "geopolitics"

The works of numerous representatives of geopolitical schools, despite all their differences and often contradictions, add up to one general picture, which allows us to speak of the subject itself as something complete and definite. These or those authors and dictionaries differ in the definition of the main subject of study of this science and the main methodological principles. This discrepancy stems from historical circumstances, as well as from the closest connection of geopolitics with world politics, power problems and dominant ideologies. The synthetic nature of this discipline presupposes the inclusion in it of many additional subjects of geography, history, demography, strategy, ethnography, religious studies, ecology, military affairs, history of ideology, sociology, political science, etc. Since all these military men, Since natural and human sciences themselves have many schools and directions, it is not necessary to speak of any rigor and unambiguity in geopolitics. But what is the definition of this discipline, so vague and at the same time expressive and impressive?

Geopolitics is a worldview, and in this capacity it is better to compare it not with sciences, but with systems of sciences. It is on the same level as Marxism, liberalism, etc., i.e. systems of interpretations of society and history, highlighting as a basic principle a single most important criterion and reducing all the other countless aspects of man and nature to it.

Marxism^{one} and liberalism are equally based on the economic side of human existence, the principle of "economy as fate." It does not matter that these two ideologies draw opposite conclusions Marx comes to the inevitability anti-capitalist revolution, and the followers of Adam Smith consider capitalism the most perfect model of society. In both the first and second cases, a detailed method of interpreting the historical process is proposed, a special sociology, anthropology and political science. And, despite the constant criticism of these forms of "economic reductionism" from alternative (and marginal) scientific circles, they remain the dominant social models, on the basis of which people not only comprehend the past, but also create the future, i.e. plan, design, conceive and carry out large-scale activities that directly affect all of humanity.

The same is the case with geopolitics. But unlike "economic ideologies", it is based on the thesis: "geographic relief is like destiny." Geography and space act in geopolitics in the same function as money and production relations in Marxism and liberalism, all fundamental aspects of human existence are reduced to them, they serve as the basic method of interpreting the past, they act as the main factors of human existence, organizing all the rest around themselves. sides of existence. As with economic ideologies,

^{one}A clear analogy between geopolitics and Marxism was pointed out in 1943 by Karl Korsch in his book *Historical Views of Geopoliticians*: "(...) the new materialism of geopolitics has the same critical, activist and idealistic (in the traditional sense of the word) character as in the early periods of the so-called historical materialism of Marx ... Just as Marxism today strives for conscious control over the economic life of society, so today's "Haushoferism" can be defined as an attempt to political control over space." Cit. from *New Essays*, 6 vol., 1943, p. 817.

geopolitics is based on approximation, on reductionism, reducing the diverse manifestations of life to several parameters, but despite the deliberate error that is always inherent in such theories, it impressively proves its harmony in explaining the past and extreme efficiency in organizing the present and designing the future.

If we continue the parallel with Marxism and classical bourgeois political economy, we can say that, like economic ideologies that assert a special category of "economic man" (*homo economicus*), geopolitics speaks of a "spatial man," predetermined by space, formed and the relief, landscape due to its specific quality. But this conditionality is especially clearly manifested in large-scale social manifestations of a person in states, ethnic groups, cultures, civilizations, etc. The dependence of each individual on the economy is evident in both small and large proportions. Therefore, economic determinism is understandable both for ordinary people and for the authorities operating with large social categories. For this reason, perhaps, economic ideologies became so popular and performed a mobilizing function up to revolutions based on personal engagement in the ideology of many individuals. Human dependence on space, the main thesis of geopolitics is seen only with some distance from the individual. And therefore, despite the preconditions, geopolitics did not become an ideology itself or, more precisely, "mass ideologue to her." Its conclusions and methods, subjects of study and main theses are intelligible only to those social authorities that are engaged in large-scale problems of strategic planning, reflection global social and historical patterns, etc. Space manifests itself in large quantities, and therefore geopolitics is intended for social groups dealing with the generalized realities of countries, peoples, etc.

Geopolitics is the worldview of power, the science of power and for power. Only as a person approaches the social top, geopolitics begins to reveal its meaning, its meaning and its benefits for him, whereas before that it was perceived as an abstraction. Geopolitics is a discipline of political elites (both actual and alternative), and its entire history convincingly proves that it was engaged exclusively by people actively participating in the process of governing countries and nations, or preparing for this role (if it was about alternative, oppositional ideological camps removed from power due to historical conditions).

Without pretending to scientific rigor, geopolitics at its level itself determines what is of value to it and what is not. The humanities and natural sciences are involved only when they do not contradict the basic principles of the geopolitical method. Geopolitics, in a way, itself selects those sciences and those directions in science that seem useful to it, leaving everything else without attention. In the modern world, it is a "short guide to the overlord", a textbook of power, which gives a summary of what should be considered when making global (fateful) decisions such as the conclusion of alliances, the outbreak of wars, the implementation of reforms, the restructuring of society, the introduction of large-scale economic and political sanctions, etc.

Geopolitics is the science to edit.

Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy

The main law of geopolitics is the assertion of a fundamental dualism, reflected in the geographic structure of the planet and in the historical typology of civilizations. This dualism is expressed in the opposition of "tellurocracy" (land power) and "thalassocracy" (sea power). The nature of this confrontation is reduced to the opposition of a commercial civilization (Carthage, Athens) and a military-authoritarian civilization (Rome, Sparta). In other terms, the dualism between "democracy" and "ideocracy".

Already initially, this dualism has the quality of hostility, the alternative of its two constituent poles, although the degree may vary from case to case. The entire history of human societies, thus, is considered as consisting of two elements "water" ("liquid", "fluid") and "land" ("solid", "constant").

"Tellurocracy", "land power" is associated with the fixity of space and the stability of its qualitative orientations and characteristics. At the civilizational level, this is embodied in settled life, in conservatism, in strict legal norms, which are subject to large associations of people of the clan, tribes, peoples, states, empires. The hardness of Sushi is culturally embodied in the hardness of ethics and the sustainability of social traditions. Land (especially sedentary) peoples are alien to individualism, the spirit of entrepreneurship. They are characterized by collectivism and hierarchy.

"Thalassocracy", "sea power" is a type of civilization based on opposite attitudes. This type is dynamic, mobile, prone to technical development. His priorities are nomadism (especially navigation), trade, and the spirit of individual entrepreneurship. The individual, as the most mobile part of the team, is elevated to the highest value, while ethical and legal norms are eroded, becoming relative and mobile. This type of civilization develops rapidly, actively evolves, easily changes external cultural characteristics, keeping unchanged only the internal identity of the general attitude.

Much of human history unfolds in a situation of limited scope for both orientations, with the global domination of "tellurocracy." The element of the Earth (Land) dominates the entire ensemble of civilizations, and the element "Water" (sea, ocean) appears only fragmentarily and sporadically. Up to a certain point, dualism remains geographically localized on the sea shores, estuaries and river basins, etc. The opposition develops in different zones of the planet with different intensity and in different forms.

The political history of the peoples of the earth demonstrates a gradual growth of political forms, becoming more and more ambitious. This is how states and empires arise. This process at the geopolitical level means the strengthening of the factor of space in human history. The nature of large political formations of states and empires expresses the duality of the elements more impressively, reaching the level of more and more universal civilizational types.

At a certain moment (the ancient world), a fairly stable picture is formed, reflected in the "Mackinder's map". The tellurocracy zone is steadily identified with the inland expanses of northeastern Eurasia (in general terms, coinciding with the territories of tsarist Russia or the USSR). Thalassocracy is getting clearer

is designated as the coastal zones of the Eurasian continent, the Mediterranean area, the Atlantic Ocean and the seas washing Eurasia from the South and West.

This is how the world map acquires geopolitical specifics:

- 1) Intracontinental spaces become a "fixed platform", a heartland ("the land of the core"), a "geographical axis of history" that steadily preserves the tellurocratic civilizational specifics.
- 2) "Inland or continental crescent", "coastal zone", rimland represent a space of intensive cultural development. The features of "thalassocracy" are evident here. Although they are balanced by many "tellurocratic" tendencies.
- 3) The "outer or island crescent" represents "uncharted lands" with which only sea communications are possible. For the first time it makes itself felt in Carthage and the commercial Phoenician civilization, influencing the "inner crescent" of Europe from the outside.

This geopolitical picture of the relationship between thalassocracy and tellurocracy comes to light potentially at the beginning of the Christian era, after the era of the Punic wars. But it finally acquires meaning during the period of England's becoming a great naval power in the 17th and 19th centuries. The era of great geographical discoveries, which began at the end of the 15th century, entailed the final formation of the thalassocracy as an independent planetary entity, torn away from Eurasia and its shores and fully concentrated in the Anglo-Saxon world (England, America) and the colonies. The "New Carthage" of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and industrialism took shape into something unified and integral, and from that time on, geopolitical dualism acquired clearly distinguishable ideological and political forms.

The positional struggle of England with the continental powers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany and Russia was the geopolitical content of the 18th-19th centuries (+ the second half of the 20th century), and since the middle of this century, the United States has become the main stronghold of the thalassocracy.

In the Cold War of 1946 - 1991, the age-old geopolitical dualism reached its maximum proportions, thalassocracy was identified with the United States, and tellurocracy with the USSR.

Two global types of civilization, culture, meta-ideology have resulted in complete geopolitical outlines, summarizing ^{the whole} geopolitical history opposition of the elements. it is striking that these forms of the complete With geopolitical dualism on ideological level corresponded to two equally synthetic realities the ideology of Marxism (socialism) and the ideology of liberal capitalism.

In this case, we can talk about the implementation in practice of two types of "reductionism": economic reductionism was reduced to opposing the ideas of Smith and the ideas of Marx, and geopolitical to the division of all sectors of the planet into zones controlled by the thalassocracy (New Carthage, USA) and tellurocracy (New Rome , THE USSR).

The geopolitical vision of history is a model for the development of planetary dualism to maximum proportions. Land and Sea extend their original opposition to the entire world.

Human history is nothing more than an expression of this struggle and a path to its absolutization.

This is the most general expression of the main law of geopolitics of the law of dualism of the elements (Land versus Sea).

Geopolitical teleology

Until the final victory of the United States in the Cold War, geopolitical dualism developed within the originally specified framework, it was about the acquisition of maximum spatial, strategic and power volume by thalassocracy and tellurocracy. In view of the build-up of nuclear potential by both sides, some geopolitical pessimists seemed to have a catastrophic outcome of this entire process, since, having fully mastered the planet, the two powers either had to endure the confrontation out of the earth (Star Wars theory), or mutually destroy each other (nuclear Apocalypse).

If the character of the main geopolitical process of history, the maximum the spatial expansion of thalassocracy and tellurocracy is obvious for this discipline, its outcome remains in question. There is no determinism in this respect.

Consequently, geopolitical teleology, i.e. comprehension of the goal of history in geopolitical terms only reaches the moment of globalization of dualism and stops here.

But, nevertheless, at a purely theoretical level, it is possible to isolate several hypothetical versions of the development of events after it will be possible to ascertain the victory of one of the two systems of thalassocracy.

1st option. The victory of the thalassocracy completely abolishes the civilization of the tellurocracy. A homogeneous liberal democratic order is being established on the planet. Thalassocracy absolutizes its archetype and becomes the only system of organization of human life. This option has two advantages: First, it is logically consistent, since in it one can see the natural completion of the unidirectional (as a whole) course of geopolitical history from the complete domination of Land (the traditional world) to the complete domination of the Sea (the modern world); and secondly, this is exactly what happens in reality.

2nd option. The victory of the thalassocracy ends the cycle of confrontation between the two civilizations, but does not extend its model to the whole world, but simply completes the geopolitical history, canceling its problematics. Just as the theories of postindustrial society prove that the main contradictions of classical political economy (and Marxism) have been removed in this society, so some mondialist theories argue that in the future world the confrontation between Land and Sea will be completely removed. This is also "the end of history", but only the further development of events does not lend itself to such a rigorous analysis as in the first version.

Both of these analyzes view the defeat of the tellurocracy as an irreversible and fait accompli. The other two options treat this differently.

3rd option. The defeat of the tellurocracy is temporary. Eurasia will return to its continental mission in a new form. This will take into account the geopolitical factors that led to the catastrophe of the continentalist forces (the new continental block will have maritime boundaries in the South and in the West, that is, the "Monroe Doctrine for Eurasia" will be implemented). In this case, the world will return to bipolarity again. But already of a different quality and a different level.

4th option (which is a development of the previous one). Tellurocracy wins in this new confrontation. It seeks to transfer its own civilizational model to the entire planet and "close history" on its own chord. The whole world will typologically turn into Land, and "ideocracy" will reign everywhere. The anticipation of such an outcome was the idea of a "World Revolution" and the planetary domination of the Third Reich.

Since in our time the role of the subjective and rational factor in the development of historical processes is greater than ever, these four options should be considered not just as an abstract statement of the likely development of the geopolitical process, but also as active geopolitical positions that can become a guide to actions on a global scale.

But in this case, geopolitics cannot offer any deterministic version. Everything here comes down to only a set of possibilities, the implementation of which will depend on many factors that no longer fit into the framework of a purely geopolitical analysis.

Rimland and "border zones"

The entire methodology of geopolitical research is based on the application of the principles of the global geopolitical dualism of Land and Sea to more local categories. When analyzing any situation, it is the planetary model that remains the main and fundamental one. Those relationships that are characteristic of the general picture are repeated at a more particular level.

After identifying the two basic principles of thalassocracy and tellurocracy, the next most important principle is rimland, "coastal zone". This is a key category underlying geopolitical research.

Rimland is a composite space that has the potential to be a fragment of either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. This is the most complex and culturally rich region. The influence of the sea element, Water, provokes active and dynamic development in the "coastal zone". The continental mass presses, forcing to structuralize energy. On the one hand, the rimland passes into the Island and the Ship. On the other hand to the Empire and Home.

Rimland is not reduced, however, only to an intermediate and transitional medium, in which the reaction of two impulses takes place. This is a very complex reality that has an independent logic and greatly influences both thalassocracy and tellurocracy. It is not an object of history, but its active subject. Fight for rimland

thalassocracy and tellurocracy are not a competition for a simple strategic position. Rimland has its own destiny and its own historical will, which, however, cannot be resolved outside the basic geopolitical dualism. Rimland is largely free in choice, but not free in the structure of choice, since apart from thalassocratic or

tellurocratic way of the third is not given to him.

In connection with this quality, the "inner crescent" is often generally identified with the area of distribution of human civilization. In the depths of the continent conservatism reigns, outside of its limits the challenge of mobile chaos.

By their very position, "coastal zones" are faced with the need to give an answer to the problem proposed by geography.

Rimland is a border zone, belt, strip. At the same time, it is a border. This combination leads to a geopolitical definition of the border.

Unlike borders between states, geopolitics understands this term differently, starting from the original model, in which the concrete historical, geographic and cultural concept of rimland is the primary border or archetype of all borders.

The spatial volume of coastal zones is a consequence of looking at the mainland from the outside, "from the perspective of sea aliens." It is for the "forces of the sea" that the coast is a strip extending inland. For the mainland itself, the coast opposite is the limit, the line.

The border as a line (and this is how it is understood in international law) is a rudiment of "land jurisprudence" inherited by modern law from ancient traditions. This is a purely land view.

But the gaze of the sea, external to the mainland, sees coastal territories as potential colonies, like strips of land that can be torn off from the rest of the continental mass, turned into a base, into a strategic space. At the same time, the coastal zone never becomes "own" to the end; if necessary, you can board a ship and sail home, to the "island". The coastline becomes a strip precisely due to the fact that it is unsafe for aliens from the sea to go deep into the continent only for a certain distance.

Since geopolitics combines both views of sea and land space, rimland is understood in it as a special reality, as a border-strip, and its qualitative volume depends on which momentum dominates in this sector, land or sea. The gigantic and quite navigable oceanic coasts of India and China are lines, strips of minimal volume. The respective crops have a land orientation, and the volume of the coastal strips tends to zero, to become just the end of the mainland. In Europe, and especially in the Mediterranean, coastal zones are broad strips extending far inland. Their volume is maximum. But in both cases, we are talking about a geopolitical border. Consequently, it is a variable category that varies, depending on the circumstances, from line to band.

Geopolitics projects this approach to the analysis of more specific problems associated with borders. She views the borders between states as "zones of variable volume". This volume of its contraction or expansion depends on the general continental dynamics. Depending on it, these zones change their shape and trajectory in the given

limits. The concept of a "geopolitical border" can include entire states. For example, the British idea of a "cordon sanitaire" between Russia and Germany assumed the creation of a "no-man's" (semi-colonial and British-oriented) zone, consisting of the Baltic and Eastern European states.

The continentalist policy of Russia and Germany, on the contrary, tended to turn this zone into a line (Brest-Litovsk, Rappalo, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact). The Atlantist Thalassocrates sought to expand it as much as possible, creating artificial "cushion states" (etats-tampons).

At the same time, a complete and perfect thalassocracy (England, USA) applies in this case a double standard: the borders of their own Islands, the thalassocrates strive to reduce to a line, and the coastal zones of Eurasia to expand as much as possible. For continental geopolitics, it is logical to use exactly the same principle in the opposite direction: the borders of Eurasia are lines, the borders of America are stripes.

The analogy with the historical rimland as the "cradle of civilization" shows the critical importance of "border zones" in more particular cases. Free from the need to bear the burden of the geographic charge of history, "border zones" often direct their energy to cultural and intellectual spheres. And the skillful use of this "light" geopolitical potential is the art of the geopolitical strategy of the opposing sides.

At the same time, it was the "naval forces" that mastered this to perfection, since they were always based on the principle of maximum and speedy extraction of benefits from the colonized territories. This distinguished them from the land conquerors, who, after seizing the territory, immediately began to consider it their own, and, therefore, were not in a hurry to squeeze everything out of it.

Geopolitics as destiny

The laws of geopolitics are extremely useful for analyzing political history, history of diplomacy, and strategic planning. This science has many intersections with sociology, political science, ethnology, military strategy, diplomacy, the history of religions, etc. Indirectly, but sometimes very clearly, it is also connected with economics, to the extent that some geopolitics suggested founding a new science, geoeconomics. In any case, in some aspects of the geopolitical method, an appeal to economic realities is necessary.

At the moment, with the gravitation of all types of sciences towards synthesis, towards fusion, towards the creation of new inter-scientific macrodisciplines and multidimensional models, geopolitics reveals its significance both for purely theoretical research and for practical steps in managing complex civilizational processes on a planetary scale or on the scale of individual states or blocs of states. This is the science of the future, the foundations of which in the very near future will be taught not only in special higher educational institutions and academies, but also in simple schools. With the help of geopolitical analysis, one can easily comprehend entire epochs of the historical development of countries and peoples. With the expansion of information zones characteristic of our time, the emergence of such simple and visual reductionist methodologies is inevitable,

Geopolitics is an invaluable aid in matters of education. Its structure is such that it could become the pivotal discipline at a new stage in the development of the school.

At the same time, the role of geopolitics in the broad social sphere is becoming more and more obvious. The level of information development, the active involvement of an ordinary person in events unfolding on the entire continent, the "monadialization" of the mass media, all this brings to the fore the spatial thinking in geopolitical terms, which helps to "sort" peoples, states, regimes and religions into a single a simplified scale so that the meaning of even the most elementary television or radio news is at least approximately clear. If we apply the simplest geopolitical grid of heartland, rimland, World Island to any message on international events, we immediately build a kind of clear interpretation model that does not require additional highly specialized knowledge. "NATO's Eastward expansion" in this approach means "

And finally, about the impact of geopolitical methodology on domestic and foreign policy. If the geopolitical meaning of certain steps of political parties and movements, as well as power structures is obvious, it is easy to correlate them with the system of global interests, and, consequently, to decipher their far-reaching goals. For example, the integration of Russia with European countries (especially with Germany) is a step of the tellurocratic forces (Eurasians), from which one can automatically predict the strengthening of "ideocratic" ("socialist") tendencies within the country. On the contrary, the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington means submission to the thalassocratic line and inevitably entails a positional strengthening of the "market people", and so on. In the same way, in the light of the laws of internal geopolitics, one can easily interpret the internal political processes of separatism of peoples within Russia, bilateral or multilateral agreements of various administrative entities and regions among themselves. Each event in the light of geopolitics acquires a clear meaning. This geopolitical meaning cannot be regarded as the ultimo ratio of the event, but in any case it always turns out to be highly expressive and useful for analysis and forecasting.

The absence of any textbook on this topic today prompted us to write and compile this book, which is an introduction to geopolitics as a science.

PART I THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF GEOPOLITICS

Chapter 1. Friedrich Ratzel States as spatial organisms

1.1 Education: German "organic school"

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) can be considered the "father" of geopolitics, although he himself did not use this term in his writings. He wrote about "political geography". His main work, published in 1897, is called *Politische Geographie*.

Ratzel graduated from the Karlsruhe Polytechnic University, where he attended courses in geology, paleontology and zoology. He completed his education in Heidelberg, where he became a student of Professor Ernst Haeckel (who was the first to use the term "ecology"). Ratzel's worldview was based on evolutionism and Darwinism and was colored by a pronounced interest in biology.

Ratzel takes part in the war of 1870, where he goes as a volunteer and receives the Iron Cross for bravery. In politics, he gradually became a staunch nationalist, and in 1890 joined Karl Peters' Pan-Germanist League. He travels extensively in Europe and America and adds ethnological research to his scientific interests. He became a teacher of geography at the Technical Institute of Munich, and in 1886 transferred to a similar department in Leipzig.

In 1876 Ratzel defended his thesis on "Emigration in China", and in 1882 his fundamental work "Anthropogeography" was published in Stuttgart. ("Anthropogeographie"), in which he formulates his main ideas: the connection between the evolution of peoples and demography with geographic data, the influence of the terrain on the cultural and political formation of peoples, etc.

But his most basic book was *Political Geography*.

1.2 States as living organisms

In this work, Ratzel shows that the soil is a fundamental, unchanging given, around which the interests of peoples revolve. The movement of history is predetermined by soil and territory. What follows is the evolutionary conclusion that "the state is a living organism," but an organism "rooted in the soil." The state is formed from the territorial relief and scale and from their understanding by the people. Thus, the State reflects an objective geographic reality and a subjective nationwide understanding of this reality, expressed in politics. Ratzel considers a "normal" state to be one that most organically combines the geographic, demographic and ethnocultural parameters of the nation.

He's writing:

"States at all stages of their development are considered as organisms that necessarily maintain a connection with their soil and therefore should be studied from

geographic point of view. As ethnography and history show, states develop on a spatial basis, more and more mating and merging with it, extracting more and more energy from it. Thus, states turn out to be spatial phenomena, governed and animated by this space; and geography should describe, compare, measure them. States fit into a series of phenomena of the expansion of Life, being the highest point of these phenomena (" Political Geography "2).

It is clear from this "organicist" approach that the spatial expansion of the state is understood by Ratzel as a natural living process, similar to the growth of living organisms.

Ratzel's "organic" approach is also reflected in his attitude to space itself (Raum). This "space" passes from a quantitative material category into a new quality, becoming a "life sphere", "living space" (Lebensraum), a kind of "geobiological environment". This is where Ratzel's other important terms "spatial meaning" (Raumsinn) and "vital energy" (Lebensenergie) follow. These terms are close to each other and denote a certain special quality inherent in geographical systems and predetermining their political design in the history of peoples and states.

All these theses are the fundamental principles of geopolitics, in the form in which it will develop somewhat later among the followers of Ratzel. Moreover, the attitude to the state as a "living spatial organism rooted in the soil" is the main idea and axis of the geopolitical methodology. This approach is focused on the synthetic study of the entire complex of phenomena, regardless of whether they belong to the human or non-human sphere. Space as a concrete expression of nature, the environment, is considered as a continuous vital body of an ethnos, this is the space of the inhabitant. The structure of the material itself dictates the proportions of the final work of art.

In this sense, Ratzel is the direct heir to the entire school of German "organic" sociology, the most prominent representative of which was Ferdinand Tönnies.

1.3. Raum the political organization of the soil

How Ratzel saw the relationship between ethnicity and space can be seen from the following fragment of Political Geography:

"The state develops as an organism tied to a certain part of the earth's surface, and its characteristics develop from the characteristics of the people and the soil. The most important characteristics are size, location and boundaries. Soil types, along with vegetation, irrigation and, finally, relations with the rest follow. conglomerates of the earth's surface, and first of all, with adjacent seas and uninhabited lands, which, at first glance, are not of particular political interest. The totality of all these characteristics make up a country (das Land). But when they talk about "our country", this everything that man has created is added,

² See Friedrich Ratzel, Politische Geographie, 1887, Einleitung.

and all earth-related memories. This is how the initially purely geographical concept turns into a spiritual and emotional connection between the inhabitants of the country and their history.

The state is an organism not only because it articulates the life of the people on motionless soil, but because this connection is mutually reinforced, becoming something unified, inconceivable without one of the two components. Uninhabited spaces, incapable of feeding the State, this historical field is fallow. Inhabited space, on the contrary, contributes to the development of the state, especially if this space is surrounded by natural boundaries. If the people feel naturally on their territory, they will constantly reproduce the same characteristics, which, originating from the soil, will be inscribed in it. "³

1.4 Law of expansion

The attitude to the state as to a living organism presupposed the rejection of the concept of "inviolability of borders". The state is born, grows, dies, like a living being. Consequently, its spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes associated with its internal life cycle. Ratzel in his book "On the Laws of Spatial Growth of States" (1901) identified seven laws of expansion:

- 1) The length of the States increases with the development of their culture;
- 2) The spatial growth of the State is accompanied by other manifestations of its development: in the spheres of ideology, production, commercial activity, powerful "attractive radiation", proselytism.
- 3) The state expands, absorbing and absorbing political units of lesser importance.
- 4) The border is an organ located on the periphery of the State (understood as an organism).
- 5) Carrying out its spatial expansion, the State seeks to cover the most important regions for its development: coasts, river basins, valleys and, in general, all rich territories.
- 6) The initial impulse for expansion comes from outside, since the State is provoked to expand by a state (or territory) with a clearly inferior civilization.
- 7) The general tendency towards the assimilation or absorption of weaker nations pushes for an even greater increase in territories in a movement that feeds itself^{four}.

It is not surprising that many critics reproached Ratzel for writing a Catechism for the Imperialists. At the same time, Ratzel himself did not at all seek to justify German imperialism by any means, although he did not hide the fact that he adhered to nationalist convictions. It was important for him to create a conceptual

³ See Ibidem

^{four} See Friedrich Ratzel "Ueber die Gesetze des räumlicher Wachstum der Staaten", 1901.

a tool for an adequate understanding of the history of states and peoples in their relation to space. In practice, he strove to awaken the "Raumsinn" ("sense of space") among the leaders of Germany, for whom most often the geographical data of dry academic science seemed to be a pure abstraction.

1.5 Weltmacht and the sea

Ratzel was greatly influenced by his acquaintance with North America, which he studied well and to which he devoted two books: *Maps of North American Cities and Civilization* (1874) and *The United States of North America* (1878-1880). He noted that the Americans' "sense of space" is highly developed, since they were faced with the task of developing "empty" spaces, having behind them a significant "political and geographical" experience of European history. Consequently, the Americans consciously carried out what the Old World came to intuitively and gradually. So in Ratzel we are faced with the first formulations of another important geopolitical concept of the concept of "world power" (Weltmacht). Ratzel noticed

Consequently, sooner or later, geographic development must approach its continental phase.

Applying this principle, derived from the American experience of the political and strategic unification of continental spaces, to Germany, Ratzel foretold her the fate of a continental power.

He also anticipated another major topic of geopolitics, the importance of the sea for the development of civilization. In his book *"The Sea, the Source of the Power of Nations"* (1900)^{five} he pointed out the need for each powerful power to especially develop its naval forces, since this is required by the planetary scale of full-fledged expansion. What some peoples and states (England, Spain, Holland, etc.) carried out spontaneously, the land powers (Ratzel, naturally, had Germany in mind) should do meaningfully: the development of the fleet is a necessary condition for approaching the status of a "world powers" (Weltmacht).

The sea and the "world power" in Ratzel are already connected, although only in the later geopolitics (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, especially Schmitt) this theme will acquire completeness and centrality.

Ratzel's works are a necessary basis for all geopolitical research. In a minimized form, his works contain almost all the main theses that will form the basis of this science. The Swedes Kjellen and the German Haushofer based their concepts on Ratzel's books. His ideas were taken into account by the Frenchman Vidal de la Blache, the Englishman Mackinder, the American Mahan and Russian Eurasians (P. Savitsky, L. Gumilev, etc.).

It should be noted that Ratzel's political sympathies are not accidental. Almost all geopolitics were marked by a pronounced national feeling, regardless of whether it was clothed in democratic (Anglo-Saxon geopolitics Mackinder, Mahan) or "ideocratic" (Haushofer, Schmitt, Eurasianists) forms.

^{five} See Friedrich Ratzel "Das Meer als Quelle der Voelkergroesse", 1900.

Chapter 2. Rudolf Kjellen and Friedrich Naumann "Central Europe"

2.1 The definition of a new science

The Swede Rudolf Kjellen (1864-1922) was the first to use the concept of "geopolitics".

Kjellen was professor of history and political science at the Universities of Uppsala and Gothenburg. In addition, he actively participated in politics, was a member of parliament, distinguished by an emphasized Germanophilic orientation. Kjellen was not a professional geographer and considered geopolitics, the foundations of which he developed, starting from the works of Ratzel (he considered him his teacher), as part of political science.

Kjellen defined geopolitics as follows:

"This is the science of the State as a geographical organism, embodied in space"⁶.

In addition to "geopolitics" Kjellen proposed 4 more neologisms, which, in his opinion, should have constituted the main sections of political science: ecopolitics ("study of the State as an economic force");

demopolitics ("the study of dynamic impulses transmitted by the people to the State"; analogue of Ratzel's "Anthropogeography");

sociopolitics ("study of the social aspect of the State");

kratopolitics ("the study of forms of government and power in relation to the problems of law and socio-economic factors")⁷.

But all these disciplines, which Kjellen developed in parallel to geopolitics, have not received widespread acceptance, while the term "geopolitics" has firmly established itself in a wide variety of circles.

2.2 The state as a form of life and the interests of Germany

In his main work "The State as a Form of Life" (1916)^{eight} Kjellen developed the postulates laid down in Ratzel's work. Kjellen, like Ratzel, considered himself a follower of German "organicism," which rejected the mechanistic approach to the state and society. The refusal to strictly divide the subjects of study into "inanimate objects" (background) and "human subjects" (actors) is a distinctive feature of most geopoliticians. In this sense, the very title of Kjellen's main work is indicative.

Kjellen developed Ratzel's geopolitical principles in relation to the specific historical situation in contemporary Europe.

⁶ See Rudolf Kjellen "Die Staat als Lebensform", 1916.

⁷ See Ibidem

^{eight} See Ibidem

He brought to a logical conclusion Ratzel's idea of a "continental state" as applied to Germany. And he showed that in the context of Europe, Germany is the space that possesses axial dynamism and which is called upon to structure the rest of the European powers around itself. Kjellen interpreted the First World War as a natural geopolitical conflict that arose between the dynamic expansion of Germany (the "Axis countries") and the opposing peripheral European (and non-European) states (the Entente). The difference in the geopolitical dynamics of growth, descending for France and England and ascending for Germany, predetermined the main alignment of forces. At the same time, from his point of view, the geopolitical identification of Germany with Europe is inevitable and inevitable, despite the temporary defeat in the First World War.

Kjellen reinforced the geopolitical maxim outlined by Ratzel that the interests of Germany (= the interests of Europe) are opposite to the interests of the Western European powers (especially France and England). But Germany is a "young" state, and Germans are a "young people". (This idea of "young peoples", which the Russians and Germans were considered to be, goes back to Fyodor Dostoevsky, often quoted by Kjellen.) "Young" Germans, inspired by the "Central European space", should move towards a continental state of a planetary scale at the expense of territories controlled "the old peoples" the French and the English. At the same time, the ideological aspect of the geopolitical confrontation was considered secondary by Kjellen.

2.3 Towards the concept of Central Europe

Although Kjellen himself was a Swede and insisted on a rapprochement between Swedish and German politics, his geopolitical ideas about the independent integrating significance of the German space exactly coincide with the theory of "Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa) developed by Friedrich Naumann.

In his book "Mitteleuropa" (1915)^{nine} Naumann gave a geopolitical diagnosis identical to that of Rudolf Kjellen. From his point of view, in order to compete with such organized geopolitical formations as England (and its colonies), the USA and Russia, the peoples inhabiting Central Europe should unite and organize a new integrated political and economic space. The axis of such a space will naturally be the Germans.

Mitteleuropa, in contrast to pure "pan-Germanist" projects, was no longer a national, but a purely geopolitical concept, in which the main importance was not given to ethnic unity, but to a common geographic destiny. Naumann's project implied the integration of Germany, Austria, the Danube states and, in the long term, France.

The geopolitical project was also confirmed by cultural parallels. Germany itself as an organic formation was identified with the spiritual concept of "Mittellage", "middle position". Arndt formulated this back in 1818: "God has placed us in the center of Europe; we (Germans) are the heart of our part of the world."

^{nine} See Friedrich Naumann "Mitteleuropa", 1915.

Through Kjellen and Naumann, Ratzel's "continental" ideas gradually acquired tangible features.

Chapter 3. Halford Mackinder "The Geographical Pivot of History"

3.1 Scientist and politician

Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947) is the most prominent figure among geopoliticians.

Trained in geography, he taught at Oxford from 1887 until he was appointed director of the London School of Economics. From 1910 to 1922 he was a member of the House of Commons, and in between (1919-1920) the British envoy to southern Russia.

Mackinder is known for his high position in the world of British politics, on whose international orientations he was very significantly influenced, as well as for the fact that he owns the most daring and revolutionary scheme for interpreting the political history of the world.

Mackinder's example illustrates the typical paradox inherent in geopolitics as a discipline. Mackinder's ideas were not accepted by the scientific community, despite his high position not only in politics, but also in the scientific community itself. Even the fact that for almost half a century he actively and successfully participated in the creation of British strategy on international issues based on his interpretation of the political and geographical history of the world, could not compel skeptics to recognize the value and effectiveness of geopolitics as a discipline.

3.2 Geographical axis of history

Mackinder's first and most striking speech was his report "The Geographical Pivot of History"¹⁰, published in 1904 in the *Geographic Journal*. In it, he outlined the basis of his vision of history and geography, developed in subsequent works. This text by Mackinder can be considered the main geopolitical text in the history of this discipline, since it not only summarizes all the previous lines of development of "political geography", but formulates the basic law of this science.

Mackinder argues that the most advantageous geographic location for the State would be the middle, central location. Centrality is relative and can vary in any given geographic context. But from a planetary point of view, in the center of the world lies the Eurasian continent, and in its center is the "heart of the world" or "heartland". Heartland is the concentration of the continental masses of Eurasia. This is the most favorable geographical base for control over the whole world.

¹⁰Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geographical Journal", 1904. Russian translation in journal "Elements. Eurasian Review", 1996, No. 7, pp. 26-31.

Heartland is a key area in a more general context within the World Island. In the World, Mackinder Island includes three continents Asia, Africa and Europe.

Thus, Mackinder hierarchizes planetary space through a system of concentric circles. In the very center is the "geographical axis of history" or "pivot area". This geopolitical concept is geographically identical to Russia. The same "axial" reality is called heartland, "the land of the heart."

Next comes the "inner or marginal crescent". This is a belt that coincides with the coastal spaces of the Eurasian continent. According to Mackinder, the "inner crescent" is the zone of the most intensive development of civilization. This is consistent with the historical hypothesis that civilization originated initially on the banks of rivers or seas, the so-called. "potamic theory". It should be noted that the latter theory is an essential point of all geopolitical structures. The intersection of water and land spaces is a key factor in the history of peoples and states. In the future, this topic will be specially developed by Schmitt and Speakman, however, it was Mackinder who was the first to deduce this geopolitical formula.

Next comes the more outer circle: the outer or insular crescent. It is an area entirely external (geographically and culturally) to the mainland mass of the World Island.

Mackinder believes that the entire course of history is determined by the following processes. From the center of the heartland to its periphery, there is a constant pressure of the so-called. "sushi robbers". This was especially vividly and vividly reflected in the Mongol conquests. But they were preceded by the Scythians, Huns, Alans, etc. Civilizations that flow from the "geographical axis of history" from the innermost spaces of the heartland have, according to Mackinder, "authoritarian", "hierarchical", "undemocratic" and "non-commercial character". In the ancient world, he was embodied in a society similar to Dorian Sparta or Ancient Rome.

Outside, from the regions of the "island crescent", the so-called pressure is exerted on the World Island. "robbers of the sea" or "island dwellers". These are colonial expeditions emanating from a non-Eurasian center, seeking to balance the overland impulses emanating from the continent's inner reaches. For civilizations "external crescent" are characteristic "trade" character and "democratic forms" of politics. To the antiquity was distinguished by such a character Athenian state or Carthage.

Between these two polar civilizational and geographic impulses is the "inner crescent" zone, which, being dual and constantly experiencing opposite cultural influences, was the most mobile and, thanks to this, became a place of priority development of civilization.

History, according to Mackinder, geographically revolves around the continental axis. This story is most clearly felt in the space of the "inner crescent", while "frozen" archaism reigns in the heartland, and in the "outer crescent" there is a kind of civilizational chaos.

3.3 Russia's key position

Mackinder himself identified his interests with the interests of the Anglo-Saxon island world, i.e. with the position of the "outer crescent". In such a situation, he saw the basis of the geopolitical orientation of the "island world" in the maximum weakening of the heartland and in the maximum possible expansion of the influence of the "outer crescent" on the "inner crescent." Mackinder emphasized the strategic priority of the "geographical axis of history" in all world politics and formulated the most important geopolitical law in this way:

"The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Isle; the one who dominates the World Isle dominates the world." ("Democratic Ideals and Reality")^{eleven}

At the political level, this meant recognizing the leading role of Russia in a strategic sense. Mackinder wrote:

"Russia is in the whole world in the same central strategic position as Germany in relation to Europe. It can carry out attacks in all directions and be subject to them from all directions except the north. The full development of its railway capabilities is a matter of time." ("Geographical axis of history")¹²

Proceeding from this, Mackinder believed that the main task of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics is to prevent the formation of a strategic continental alliance around the "geographical axis of history" (Russia). Consequently, the strategy of the forces of the "outer crescent" is to tear off the maximum amount of coastal spaces from the heartland and put them under the influence of the "island civilization".

"The shift in the balance of power towards the" pivot state "(Russia A.D.), accompanied by its expansion into the peripheral spaces of Eurasia, will make it possible to use huge continental resources to create a powerful navy: this is not far from a world empire. The threat of such a development will force France to enter into an alliance with the overseas powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will become coastal bases where flotillas of external powers will moor in order to spray the forces of the "axial range" in all directions and prevent them from concentrating to spend all their efforts on building a powerful military fleet. " ("Geographical axis of history")¹³

The most interesting thing is that Mackinder not only built theoretical hypotheses, but actively participated in organizing international support of the Entente for the "white movement", which he considered an Atlanticist tendency aimed at weakening the power of pro-German-minded Eurasian Bolsheviks. He personally consulted the leaders of the White Cause, trying to obtain the maximum support from the British government. It seemed that he prophetically foresaw not only the Brest Peace, but also the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact ...

In 1919, in his book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, he wrote:

^{eleven} H. Mackinder, "Democratic ideals and reality", New York, 1919.

¹² See p. 31 in *Elements*, no. 7, op. cit.

¹³ See page 31 in "Elements", no. 7, op.cit.

"What will become of the forces of the sea if one day a great continent unites politically to become the backbone of an invincible armada?"^{fourteen}

It is easy to understand what it was Mackinder who laid in the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, which became the geopolitics of the United States and the North Atlantic Union half a century later: to obstruct by any means the very possibility of creating a Eurasian bloc, the creation of a strategic alliance between Russia and Germany, geopolitical strengthening of heartland and its expansion. The persistent Russophobia of the West in the 20th century has not so much ideological as geopolitical character. Although, given the connection highlighted by Mackinder between the civilizational type and the geopolitical nature of certain forces, it is possible to obtain a formula according to which geopolitical terms are easily translated into ideological terms.

Outer Crescent Liberal Democracy; "geographical axis of history" undemocratic authoritarianism; the "inner crescent" is an intermediate model, a combination of both ideological systems.

Mackinder participated in the preparation of the Versailles Treaty, the main geopolitical idea of which reflects the essence of Mackinder's views. This treaty was drafted in such a way as to secure for Western Europe the character of a coastal base for naval forces (the Anglo-Saxon world). At the same time, it envisaged the creation of limitrophic states that would separate the Germans and the Slavs, in every possible way preventing the conclusion of a continental strategic alliance between them, so dangerous for the "island powers" and, accordingly, "democracy."

It is very important to trace the evolution of the geographical limits of heartland in the writings of Mackinder. If in 1904 and 1919 (respectively, in the article "The Geographical Axis of History" and in the book "Democratic Ideals and Reality") the outlines of the heartland coincided in general outline with the borders of the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, then in 1943 in the text "Round planet and conquest of the world"^{fifteen} he reconsidered his previous views and removed from the heartland the Soviet territories of Eastern Siberia, located beyond the Yenisei. He named this sparsely populated Soviet territory "Russia Lenaland" after the Lena River.

"Lenaland's Russia has 9 million inhabitants, 5 of whom live along the transcontinental railway from Irkutsk to Vladivostok. The rest of the territories are home to less than one person per 8 square kilometers. The natural resources of this land, timber, minerals, etc., are practically untouched." ("The Round Planet and the Conquest of the World")^{sixteen}

Removal of the so-called. Lenaland from the geographical boundaries of heartland meant the possibility of considering this territory as a zone of the "inner crescent", ie. as a coastal space that could be used by the "island" powers to fight against the "geographical axis of history." Mackinder, who took an active part in organizing the Entente's intervention and the "white movement", apparently considered the historical precedent of Kolchak, who resisted the Eurasian center, sufficient grounds for considering the territories under his control as a potential "coastal zone."

^{fourteen} See HM "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

^{fifteen} See Halford Mackinder, "The Round Planet and the winning of the Peace", 1943.

^{sixteen} See Ibidem

3.4 Three geopolitical periods

Mackinder divides the entire geopolitical history of the world into three stages¹⁷:

- 1) Pre-Columbian era. In it, the peoples belonging to the periphery of the World Island, for example, the Romans, live under the constant threat of conquest from the forces of the "heartland". For the Romans, these were the Germans, Huns, Alans, Parthians, etc. For the medieval ecumene, the golden horde.
- 2) Columbian era. During this period, representatives of the "inner crescent" (coastal zones) set out to conquer unknown territories of the planet, meeting no serious resistance anywhere.
- 3) Post-Columbian era. Unconquered lands more not exists. The dynamic pulsations of civilizations are doomed to collide, drawing the peoples of the earth into a universal civil war.

This periodization of Mackinder, with the corresponding geopolitical transformations, brings us close to the latest trends in geopolitics, which we will consider in another part of the book.

¹⁷See HM "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

Chapter 4. Alfred Mahan "The Might of the Sea"

4.1 Sea Power

The American Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), unlike Ratzel, Kjellen and Mackinder, was not a scientist, but a military man. He did not use the term "geopolitics", but the methodology of his analysis and the main conclusions exactly correspond to a purely geopolitical approach.

An officer in the American Union Navy, he taught Navy History since 1885 at Naval War College in New Port (Road Island). In 1890, he published his first book, which almost immediately became a classic text on military strategy. "Naval Forces in History (1660-1783)"^{eighteen}. Other works follow with a small interval: "The Influence of the Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire (1793-1812)"^{nineteen}, "America's Interest in Sea Power, Present and Future"^{twenty}, "The problem of Asia and its impact on international politics"²¹ and "Sea Power and Its Relationship to War"²².

Almost all of the books were devoted to one topic, the theme of "Sea Power", "Sea Power". Mahan's name has become synonymous with this term.

Mahan was not only a military strategy theorist, but also actively involved in politics. In particular, he had a strong influence on politicians such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, if we look back at the American military strategy throughout the 20th century, we will see that it is being built in direct accordance with Mahan's ideas. Moreover, if in the First World War this strategy did not bring tangible success to the United States, then in the Second World War the effect was significant, and the victory in the Cold War with the USSR finally consolidated the success of the Naval Force strategy.

4.2 Marine civilization = commercial civilization

For Mahan, trade is the main policy tool. Military action should only provide the most favorable conditions for the creation of a planetary commercial civilization. Mahan looks at the economic cycle in three ways:

- 1) production (exchange of goods and services through waterways)
- 2) navigation (which implements this exchange)
- 3) colonies (which circulate commodity exchange at the world level)²³.

^{eighteen} See Alfred Mahan "The influence of Sea Power in history" (1660 - 1783) ", 1890; in Russian A. Mahan"

The influence of sea power on history (1660-1783) ", M.-L., 1941.

^{nineteen} See Alfred Mahan, "The influence of sea power upon the French revolution and empire (1793 - 1812)",

Boston, 1892; A. Mahan "The influence of sea power on the French Revolution and Empire (1793 - 1812)", M. - L., 1940.

^{twenty} See Alfred Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power," 1897.

²¹ Alfred Mahan "Problem of Asia and its effects upon international politics", 1900.

²² See Alfred Mahan, "The Sea Power in its relations to the war," Boston, 1905.

²³ See Alfred Mahan, "The influence of Sea Power in history (1660 - 1783)", op. cit.

Mahan believes that analyzing the position and geopolitical status of a state should be based on 6 criteria:

- 1) The geographical position of the State, its openness to the seas, the possibility of sea communications with other countries. The length of land borders, the ability to control strategically important regions. The ability to threaten enemy territory with your fleet.
- 2) "Physical configuration" of the State, i.e. configuration of sea coasts and the number of ports located on them. The prosperity of trade and strategic security depend on it.
- 3) The length of the territory. It is equal to the length of the coastline.
- 4) The statistical number of the population. It is important for assessing the State's ability to build and maintain ships.
- 5) National character. The ability of the people to engage in trade, since sea power is based on peaceful and extensive trade.
- 6) The political nature of the government. The reorientation of the best natural and human resources to create a powerful sea power depends on this. ²⁴

Already from this listing it is clear that Mahan builds his geopolitical theory based solely on the "Sea Force" and its interests. For Mahan, the model of Sea Power was ancient Carthage, and closer to us historically England of the 17th and 19th centuries.

The concept of "Sea Power" is based for him on the freedom of "sea trade", and the navy serves only as a guarantor of ensuring this trade. Mahan goes even further, considering "Sea Power" a special type of civilization (anticipating the ideas of Karl Schmitt) the best and most effective, and therefore destined for world domination.

4.3 Conquest of the world USA manifest destiny

Mahan's ideas were accepted around the world and influenced many European strategists. Even land and mainland Germany, represented by Admiral Tirpitz, took Mahan's theses into account and began to actively develop its fleet. In 1940 and 1941, two books by Mahan were published in the USSR.

But they were intended primarily for America and the Americans. Mahan was an ardent supporter of the doctrine of President Monroe (1758-1831), who in 1823 declared the principle of mutual non-interference between the countries of America and Europe, and also made the growth of US power dependent on territorial expansion into nearby territories. Mahan believed that America had a "sea destiny" and that this "Manifest Destiny"²⁵ consists at the first stage in the strategic integration of the entire American continent, and then in the establishment of world domination.

²⁴ Ibidem

²⁵ See Albert K. Weinberg "Manifest Destiny", Baltimore, 1935.

We must give credit to Mahan's almost prophetic vision. In his time, the United States had not yet become one of the leading world powers, and moreover, even their "marine civilizational type" was not obvious. Back in 1905, Mackinder, in his article "The Geographical Pivot of History," referred the United States to the "land powers" that were part of the "Outer Crescent" only as a semicolonial strategic continuation of naval England. Mackinder wrote:

"The United States has just become an Eastern power. They influence the balance of power in Europe not directly, but through Russia."²⁶

But already 10 years before the appearance of Mackinder's text, Admiral Mahan predicted exactly America's planetary destiny, becoming a leading maritime power, directly influencing the fate of the world.

In America's Interest in Sea Power, Mahan argued that in order for America to become a world power, it must fulfill the following points:

- 1) actively cooperate with the British maritime power;
- 2) discourage German maritime claims;
- 3) vigilantly monitor the expansion of Japan in the Pacific Ocean and oppose it;
- 4) coordinate joint actions with the Europeans against the peoples of Asia²⁷.

Mahan saw the fate of the United States in not passively participating in the general context of the peripheral states of the "outer crescent", but in taking a leading position in economic, strategic and even ideological terms.

Independently of Mackinder, Mahan came to the same conclusions regarding the main danger to the "sea civilization". This danger is the continental states of Eurasia, first of all, Russia and China, and secondly Germany. The fight against Russia, with this "uninterrupted continental mass of the Russian Empire, stretching from western Asia Minor to the Japanese meridian in the East", was the main long-term strategic task for the Naval Force.

Mahan transferred to the planetary level the "anaconda" principle applied by the American General McClellan in the 1861-1865 North American Civil War. This principle consists in blocking enemy territories from the sea and along coastlines, which gradually leads to the strategic exhaustion of the enemy. Since Mahan believed that the power of a state is determined by its potential for becoming a Sea Force, in the event of opposition, the number one strategic task is to prevent this formation in the enemy's camp. Consequently, the task of America's historical confrontation is to strengthen its positions on 6 main points (listed above) and weaken the enemy on the same points. Its coastal expanses must be under control, and the enemy's corresponding zones must be torn away from the continental mass by any means. And further: since the Monroe Doctrine (in its part of territorial integration) enhances the power of the state, the creation of similar integration formations should not be allowed.

²⁶ See Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History", op. cit.

²⁷ See Alfred Mahan, "The Interest of America in Sea Power", op. cit.

the enemy. On the contrary, the enemy or rival in Mahan's case, the Eurasian powers (Russia, China, Germany) should strangle the continental mass in the rings of the "anaconda", squeezing it due to the coastal zones taken out of its control and blocking, if possible, the exits to the sea spaces.

In World War I, this strategy was implemented in the support of the Entente to the white movement along the periphery of Eurasia (as a response to the conclusion of peace with Germany by the Bolsheviks), in World War II it was also turned against Central Europe, and in particular, through naval operations against the Axis countries and Japan. But it is especially clearly visible in the era of the Cold War, when the confrontation between the United States and the USSR reached those global, planetary proportions with which geopolitics have been operating at the theoretical level since the end of the 19th century.

In fact, the main lines of the strategy of NATO, as well as other blocs aimed at containing the USSR (the concept of "containment" is identical to the strategic and geopolitical concept of "anaconda") ASEAN, ANZUS, CENTO are a direct development of the main theses of Admiral Mahan, who on this basis can be called the intellectual father of all modern Atlanticism.

Chapter 5. Vidal de la Blache "France against Germany"

5.1 The picture of the geography of France

Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) is considered the founder of the French school of geography. A professional geographer, he was fascinated by Ratzel's "political geography" and based his theories on this source, although he severely criticized many aspects of the German geopolitical school.

In his book *A Picture of the Geography of France* (1903), he turns to soil theory so important to German geopoliticians:

"The relationship between soil and man in France is marked by the original character of antiquity, continuity (...). In our country, you can often observe that people have lived in the same places since time immemorial. Sources, calcium rocks initially attracted people as convenient places for living and protection. We have a faithful student of the soil. Studying the soil will help to find out the character, customs and preferences of the population.²⁸

But, despite such a completely German attitude to the geographical factor and its influence on culture, Vidal de la Blache believed that Ratzel and his followers clearly overestimate the purely natural factor, considering it decisive.

Man, according to de la Blache, is also "the most important geographical factor", but at the same time he is also "endowed with initiative." He is not only a piece of the scenery, but also the main actor of the play.

5.2 Possibilism

This criticism of the excessive exaltation of the spatial factor in Ratzel led Vidal de la Blache to develop a special geopolitical concept of "possibilism" (from the word "possible" "possibility"). According to this concept, political history has two aspects: spatial (geographic) and temporal (historical).

The geographical factor is reflected in the environment, historical in the person himself ("the bearer of the initiative")²⁹. Vidal de la Blache believed that the mistake of the German "political geographers" is that they consider the relief to be the determining factor in the political history of states. Thus, according to de la Blache, the factor of human freedom and historicity is belittled. He himself proposes to consider the geographic spatial position as "potentiality", "opportunity", which may become actualized and become a real political factor, or may not be actualized. This largely depends on the subjective factor of the person who inhabits the given space.

This approach was also taken into account by the German geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, who considered de la Blache's criticism to be quite reasonable and important. In this case, the role of ethnic or racial factor obviously increased when considering political

²⁸ Vidal de la Blache "Tableau de la Géographie de la France", Paris, 1903.

²⁹ See Vidal de la Blache "Principes de géographie humaine", Paris, 1921.

history of states, and this resonated with the general surge of racial issues in Germany in the 20s.

De la Blache's "Possibilism" was perceived by most geopolitical schools as a correction of the rigid geographic determinism of previous geopolitical authors.

5.3 France for "Sea Force"

Vidal de la Blache paid particular attention to Germany, which was France's main political opponent at the time. He believed that Germany is the only powerful European state, the geopolitical expansion of which is deliberately blocked by other European developed powers. If England and France have their vast colonies in Africa and around the world, if the United States can move almost freely to the south and north, if Russia has Asia, then Germany is squeezed from all sides and has no outlet for its energies. De la Blache saw this as the main threat to peace in Europe and considered it necessary in every possible way to weaken the development of this dangerous neighbor.

This attitude towards Germany logically entailed the geopolitical definition of France as part of the common front of the Sea Force, oriented against the continental powers. De la Blache's position was not the only one among French geopoliticians, since in parallel there also existed the opposite Germanophilic direction, represented by Admiral Laval and General De Gaulle.

In 1917, Vidal de la Blache publishes the book "Eastern France", in which he proves that the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine were originally French and that German claims to these areas were invalid. At the same time, he appeals to the French Revolution, considering its Jacobin dimension to be an expression of the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, striving for the unification and centralization of their State through geographic integration. He also explains political liberalism through people's attachment to soil and the natural desire to get it into private property. Thus, Vidal de la Blache, in his own way, connects geopolitical realities with ideological realities: the spatial policy of Western Europe (France) is inextricably linked with "democracy" and "liberalism."

De la Blache's choice of "nautical orientation" fits perfectly into this scheme.

Chapter 6. Nicholas Speakman "Mackinder's Revision, Centrality of the Rimland"

6.1 Serving America

Dutch American Nicholas Speakman (1893-1943) is a direct successor of Admiral Mahan's line. Speakman was professor of international relations and later director of the Institute of International Relations at Yale University. For him, unlike the first geopoliticians, geography itself was not of great interest, and he was even less worried about the problems of connecting the people with

soil, the influence of relief on national character, etc. Spykman viewed geopolitics as the most important instrument of concrete international politics, as an analytical method and a system of formulas that make it possible to develop the most effective strategy. In this sense, he harshly criticized the German geopolitical school (especially in the book "Geography of the World"^{thirty}), considering the concept of "fair or unjust boundaries to be metaphysical nonsense."

Like Mahan, Speakman is characterized by a utilitarian approach, a clear desire to come up with the most effective geopolitical formula with which the United States can quickly achieve "world domination." This pragmatism determines the structure of all his research.

6.2 Mackinder Correction

Speakman, who carefully studied Mackinder's works, proposed his own version of the basic geopolitical scheme, somewhat different from Mackinder's model. Speakman's main idea was that Mackinder allegedly overestimated the geopolitical significance of heartland. This reassessment affected not only the current position of forces on the world map, in particular, the might of the USSR, but also the original historical scheme. Speakman believed that the geographical history of the "inner crescent", rimland, "coastal zones", was realized by itself, and not under the pressure of "Land nomads", as Mackinder believed. From his point of view, heartland is only a potential space that receives all cultural impulses from coastal zones and does not carry any independent geopolitical mission or historical impulse in itself. Rimland,

Mackinder's geopolitical formula "The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island; the one who dominates the World Island dominates the world." who dominates rimland dominates Eurasia; whoever dominates Eurasia holds the fate of the world in his hands. "³¹

In principle, Speakman did not say anything new with this. And for Mackinder himself, the "coastal zone", "outer crescent" or rimland was a key strategic position in control of the continent. But Mackinder understood this zone not as an independent and self-sufficient geopolitical entity, but as a space of confrontation between the two impulses "sea" and "land". At the same time, he never understood control over heartland in the sense of power over Russia and the adjacent continental masses. Eastern Europe is an intermediate space between the "geographical axis of history" and rimland, therefore, it is precisely in the balance of forces on the periphery of the heartland that the key to the problem of world domination lies. But Speakman presented the shift in emphasis in his geopolitical doctrine regarding Mackinder's views as radically new. In fact, it was only about a certain nuance of concepts.

^{thirty} Nicholas Spykman "Geography of peace", 1942.

³¹ Ibidem

6.3 Power rating scale

In his books "American Strategy in World Politics"³² and "Geography of the World"³³ Speakman identifies 10 criteria on the basis of which to determine the geopolitical might suggested by a state. It is development criteria, for the first time Mahan. They are as follows:

- 1) Territory surface
- 2) The nature of boundaries
- 3) Population size
- 4) The presence or absence of minerals
- 5) Economic and technological development
- 6) Financial strength
- 7) Ethnic homogeneity
- 8) Level of social integration
- 9) Political stability
- 10) National spirit

If the total result of assessing the geopolitical capabilities of a state according to these criteria turns out to be relatively low, this almost automatically means that this state is forced to enter into a more general strategic alliance, sacrificing part of its sovereignty for the sake of global strategic geopolitical protection.

6.4 Middle Ocean

In addition to reassessing the importance of rimland, Speakman made another important addition to the geopolitical picture of the world, seen from the position of "sea power". He introduced the extremely important concept of the "Midland Ocean". At the heart of this geopolitical view is the emphasized analogy between the Mediterranean in the history of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in antiquity, and the Atlantic Ocean in the recent history of Western civilization. Since Speakman considered precisely the "coastal zone", rimland, the main historical territory of civilization, the Mediterranean area of antiquity seemed to him an example of a culture that subsequently spread inland (the cultivation of the barbarians of the Land) and to remote territories that are attainable only through sea routes (the cultivation of the barbarians of the Sea).

³² N. Spykman "America's Strategy in World Politics" (1942).

³³ Op. cit.

The "Midland Ocean" becomes, in this perspective, not a separating factor, but a unifying factor, the "inner sea" (mare internum). Thus, Speakman outlines a special geopolitical reality, which can be conditionally called the "Atlantic continent", in the center of which, like a lake in a land region, the Atlantic Ocean is located. This theoretical "continent", "new Atlantis" is linked by a common culture of Western European origin, ideology of liberal capitalism and democracy, unity of political, ethical and technological destiny.

Speakman especially insisted on the role of the intellectual factor in this "Atlantic continent." Western Europe and the belt of the East Coast of North America (especially New York) are becoming the brains of the new "Atlantic community". The nerve center and power mechanism is the United States and its trade and military-industrial complex. Europe turns out to be a mental appendage of the United States, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line become the only and dominant for all Western powers. The political sovereignty of European states should also be gradually reduced, and power should be transferred to a special authority that unites representatives of all "Atlantic" spaces and is subordinate to the priority supremacy of the United States.

Speakman anticipated the most important political processes of the creation of the "North Atlantic Alliance" (NATO), the decrease in the sovereignty of European powers in the post-war world, the planetary hegemony of the United States, and so on.

6.5 The Architect of the American Victory

Speakman made the basis of his doctrine not so much a geopolitical understanding of the place of the United States as a "Sea Power" in the whole world (like Mahan), perhaps because this has already become a fact, as the need to control the coastal territories of Eurasia: Europe, Arab countries, India, China, etc. led to the ultimate victory in a duel between continental and naval forces. If in Mackinder's painting planetary duality was viewed as something "eternal", "irreducible", then Speakman believed that perfect control of the rimland by the "sea powers" would lead to a final and irrevocable victory over the land powers, which from now on would be completely under their control.

In fact, this was the ultimate development of the "anaconda tactics" that Mahan had already argued. Speakman finished the whole concept.

The victory of the United States as a "Sea Force" in the Cold War demonstrated the absolute geopolitical correctness of Speakman, who can be called the "architect of the world victory of liberal-democratic countries" over Eurasia.

At this point, it seems that Speakman's theses regarding the strategic supremacy of the rimland and the importance of the "Middle Ocean" are proven by history itself. But it is also too early to completely discard Mackinder's theory of the permanent striving of the center of Eurasia for political revival and continental expansion.

On the other hand, some of Speakman's ideas (especially his follower Kirk, who developed the rimland theory in even more detail) were supported by some European geopoliticians who saw in his high strategic assessment

"coastal territories" an opportunity to bring Europe back to the list of those countries that decide the fate of the world. But for this it was necessary to discard the concept of the "Middle Ocean".

Despite this theoretical course of some European geopoliticians (which, however, remains very ambiguous), Spykman belongs, without any doubt, to the brightest and most consistent "Atlantists." Moreover, he, together with Admiral Mahan, can be called "the father of Atlanticism" and "the ideological inspirer of NATO."

Chapter 7. Karl Haushofer "Continental Block"

7.1 War and Thought

It was Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) who geopolitics owes much to the fact that it for a long time was considered not simply as "pseudoscience", but and as "misanthropic", "fascist", "cannibalistic" theory.

Karl Haushofer was born in Munich into a family of professors. It decided to become professional military and served in the army as an officer for over twenty years. From 1908 to 1910, he served in Japan and Manchuria as a German military attaché. Here he became acquainted with the family of the Japanese emperor and with the highest aristocracy.

Poor health forced Haushofer to leave a rather successful military career, and he returned to Germany in 1911, where he lived until the end of his life. He took up science, receiving the title of "Doctor" at the University of Munich. Since that time, Haushofer has regularly published books on geopolitics in general, and in particular, the geopolitics of the Pacific region. His first book was "Dai Nihon"³⁴, dedicated to the geopolitics of Japan.

Through his student Rudolf Hess, Haushofer met Hitler immediately after his imprisonment following an unsuccessful putsch. There is an unconfirmed opinion by historians that Haushofer took part in the writing of "Mein Kampf" in places dedicated to certain geopolitical categories. But conceptual analysis reveals a significant difference between Haushofer's geopolitical views and Hitler's simplistic racist propaganda passages.

For 20 years, starting in 1924, Haushofer published the most important geopolitical journal of great international importance "Geopolitik", later renamed to "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik".

He published most of his texts in this particular edition. Haushofer's relationship with Nazism was complicated. In some points his views converged with the views of the National Socialists, in others they radically diverged. Haushofer's position in the Third Reich also changed depending on the periods of Nazi rule and on personal relationships.

Until 1936, he was favored (especially the patronage of his younger friend Hess), later the cooling began. After Hess's flight to England, Haushofer fell out of favor, and after the execution of his son Albrecht on charges of participating in the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, Haushofer himself was considered almost an "enemy of the people."

Despite this ambiguity in his position, he was ranked by the allies as "prominent Nazis." Unable to withstand so many blows of fate and the collapse of all hopes, Karl Haushofer, together with his wife Martha, committed suicide in 1946.

³⁴ Karl Haushofer "Dai Nihon", Munich, 1913.

7.2 New Eurasian Order

Haushofer carefully studied the works of Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Vidal de la Blache, Mahan and other geopoliticians. The picture of planetary dualism "sea forces" against "continental forces" or thalassocracy ("power through the sea") against tellurocracy ("power through the land") was for him the key that opened all the secrets of international politics, to which he was directly involved way. (In Japan, for example, he dealt with those forces that made the most responsible decisions regarding the picture of space.) It is indicative that the term "New Order", which was actively used by the Nazis, and in our time in the form of "New World Order" by the Americans,

The planetary dualism of "Sea Power" and "Land Power" presented Germany with the problem of geopolitical self-identification. The supporters of the national idea, and Haushofer was undoubtedly one of them, sought to strengthen the political power of the German state, which implied industrial development, cultural upsurge and geopolitical expansion. But the very position of Germany in the Center of Europe, the spatial and cultural Mittellage, made it a natural enemy of the Western, maritime powers of England, France, and in the future the USA. The "thalassocratic" geopoliticians themselves also did not hide their negative attitude towards Germany and considered it (along with Russia) one of the main geopolitical opponents of the maritime West.

In such a situation, it was not easy for Germany to count on a strong alliance with the powers of the "outer crescent", especially since England and France had historical claims of a territorial order against Germany. Hence the future national Greater Germany lay in a geopolitical confrontation with the West and especially the Anglo-Saxon world, with which Sea Power was actually identified.

The entire geopolitical doctrine of Karl Haushofer and his followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine is the need to create a "continental bloc" or axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo. There was nothing accidental in such a bloc; it was the only full-fledged and adequate response to the strategy of the opposite camp, which did not hide the fact that the creation of a similar Eurasian alliance would be the biggest danger for it. Haushofer wrote in his article "The Continental Bloc":

"Eurasia cannot be stifled as long as its two largest peoples, Germans and Russians, are doing their best to avoid an internecine conflict like the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics."³⁵

In the same place he quoted the American Homer Lee. "The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will strike when the Germans, Russians and Japanese will unite."

Haushofer carried this idea in different ways in his articles and books. This line was named Ostorientierung, i.e. "Orientation to the East", since it assumed the self-identification of Germany, its people and its culture as a Western continuation of the Eurasian, Asian tradition. It is no coincidence that the British during World War II

³⁵ Karl Haushofer "Kontinentalblocke: Mitteleuropa-Eurasia-Japan" in "Ausgewählte Texte zur Geopolitik", Boppard am Rhein, 1979; in Russian in "Elements" no. 7, op. cit, pp. 32-36.

the wars pejoratively called the Germans "Huns". For the geopolitics of the Haushofer school, this was quite acceptable.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that Haushofer's concept of "openness to the East" did not at all mean "the occupation of the Slavic lands." It was about a joint civilizational effort of the two continental powers, Russia and Germany, which would have to establish a "New Eurasian Order" and restructure the continental space of the World Island in order to completely withdraw it from the influence of the "Sea Power". The expansion of the German Lebensraum was planned by Haushofer not through the colonization of Russian lands, but through the development of gigantic unpopulated Asian spaces and the reorganization of the lands of Eastern Europe.

7.3 Compromise with Thalassocracy

However, in practice, everything did not look so straightforward. Haushofer's purely scientific geopolitical logic, which logically led to the need for a "continental bloc" with Moscow, collided with numerous tendencies of a different nature, also inherent in the German national consciousness. It was about a purely racist approach to history, with which Hitler himself was infected. This approach considered racial affinity to be the most important factor, not geographic or geopolitical specificity. The Anglo-Saxon peoples of England and the United States were seen in this case as natural allies of the Germans, since they were closest to them ethnically. The Slavs and especially the non-white Eurasian peoples turned into racial opponents. To this was added the ideological anti-communism, which was mixed in many ways on the same racial principle, Marx and many communists were Jews, which means that

National Socialist racism came into direct conflict with geopolitics or, more precisely, implicitly pushed the Germans towards a reverse, anti-Eurasian, thalassocratic strategy. From the point of view of consistent racism, Germany should initially have entered into an alliance with Britain and the United States in order to jointly resist the USSR. But on the other hand, Versailles' humiliating experience was still too fresh. All the ambiguity of the Third Reich's international policy follows from this duality. This policy was constantly balancing between a thalassocratic line, outwardly justified by racism and anti-communism (anti-Slavic mood, attack on the USSR, encouragement of Catholic Croatia in the Balkans, etc.), and a Eurasian tellurocracy based on purely geopolitical principles (war with England and France, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and etc.).

Since Karl Haushofer was engaged, to some extent, in solving specific political problems, he was forced to adjust his theories to political specifics. Hence his contacts in the higher spheres of England. In addition, the conclusion of the Anticomintern pact, i.e. the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, Haushofer outwardly welcomed, trying to present it as a preliminary step towards the creation of a full-fledged "Eurasian bloc". He could not help but understand that the anti-communist orientation of this alliance and the emergence of a peninsular secondary power belonging to the rimland instead of the center of heartland (Moscow) is a contradictory caricature of a genuine "continental bloc."

Nevertheless, such steps, dictated by political conformism, are not indicative of the entire set of Haushofer's geopolitics. His name and ideas

They were fully embodied precisely in the concepts of the "eastern destiny" of Germany, based on a strong and long-term Eurasian union.

8.1 Conservative revolutionary

German Karl Schmitt (1888-1985) is known as an outstanding lawyer, political scientist, philosopher, historian. But all his ideas are inextricably linked with geopolitical concepts, and his main work "Nomos of the Earth"³⁶, "Land and sea"³⁷ etc. are devoted precisely to the comprehension of geopolitical factors and their influence on civilization and political history.

Karl Schmitt was close to the German representatives of the Conservative Revolution, a paradoxical trend that combined national-conservative and social-revolutionary elements. The fate of Schmitt is the fate of his books, his school of law and philosophy. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, his relationship with the National Socialist regime was ambivalent. On the one hand, his theories certainly influenced Nazi ideology. His political science books "Political Theology" enjoyed particular success.³⁸ and "The concept of the political"³⁹, in which Schmitt gave a detailed criticism of liberal law and the idea of a "rule of law". These texts have already given the outlines of all subsequent intellectual work of Schmitt, they show the utmost political realism, the desire to free political science problems from humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, and social demagoguery. This was in keeping with the National Socialist spirit.

At the same time, Schmitt's entire concept was based on the fundamental idea of "the rights of the people" (Volksrechte), which he contrasted with the liberal theory of "human rights". In his understanding, every nation had the right to cultural sovereignty, to preserve its spiritual, historical and political identity. The same approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, who consider this ideology universal and applicable to all peoples of the earth. But it was pan-Germanism, based on chauvinism and a narrowly nationalist approach, that became the dominant line of the regime. Therefore, Schmitt, with his theory of "the rights of peoples", was subjected to sharp criticism, especially from the ideologues of the SS (in 1936, an aggressively threatening article against him was published in the SS organ "Schwarze Korps").

Schmitt's ideological formation took place in the same atmosphere of ideas of "organicist sociology" as that of Ratzel and Kjellen, but he was also influenced by the romantic theories of the "Light of the North" (Nordlicht), according to which socio-political forms and state formations are not rooted in mechanical the functioning of atomic personalities, united in mathematical conglomerates, but in mythology, in the sacred world of "elements and spirits"⁴⁰. There is a paradoxical combination of "political romanticism" and "strict rationalism" everywhere in Schmitt's theories. A refined mental apparatus is used to express spiritual mythologemes.

³⁶ Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", Koeln, 1950.

³⁷ Carl Schmitt "Land und Meer", Leipzig, 1942.

³⁸ Carl Schmitt "Politische Theologie", Munchen-Leipzig, 1922.

³⁹ Carl Schmitt "Das Begriff des Politischen", Berlin-Grunewald, 1928; in Russian Karl Schmitt "The concept of political" in "Questions of Sociology", Moscow, 1992, volume 1, no.

⁴⁰ Carl Schmitt "Theodor Daueblers "Nordlicht ". Drei Studien ueber die Elemente, den Geiste und die Aktualitaet des Werkes", Muenchen, 1916.

At the Nuremberg Trials, an attempt was made to classify Karl Schmitt as a "war criminals" on the basis of his collaboration with the Hitler regime. In particular, he was charged with "theoretical substantiation of the legitimacy of military aggression." After a detailed acquaintance of the judges with the essence of the case, the charge was dropped. Nevertheless, Schmitt, like Heidegger, Jünger and other "conservative revolutionaries", became persona non grata in the world scientific community, and his work was completely ignored.

Only in the 70s, thanks to the colossal influence on the legal thought of some left, socialist thinkers, works to be rehabilitated. Schmitt gradually became

He is currently recognized as a classic of political science and jurisprudence.

8.2 Earth Nomos

Schmitt, completely in the spirit of the geopolitical approach, asserted the initial connection of political culture with space. Not only the State, but the entire social reality and especially the law derive from the qualitative organization of space.

From here, Schmitt deduced the concept of "nomos". This Greek term "nomos" means "something taken, formed, ordered, organized" in the sense of space. This term is close to the concepts of "relief" by Ratzel and "locality" by the Russian Eurasians (Savitsky). Schmitt shows that "nomos" is a form of organization of being that establishes the most harmonious relationships both within a social ensemble and between these ensembles. "Nomos" is an expression of a special synthetic combination of subjective and objective factors, organically manifested in the creation of political and legal systems. In "nomos" the natural and cultural characteristics of the human collective are manifested in combination with the environment.

In the book "Nomos of the Earth", Schmitt shows how the specificity of this or that earthly space influenced the cultures and states that developed in it. He compares various historical "nomos" with each other, especially emphasizing the fundamental dualism between the attitude of nomads and sedentary peoples to space.

But the most important conclusion from the analysis of the "nomos of the earth" was that Schmitt came close to the concept of a global historical and civilizational confrontation between the civilizations of the Land and the civilizations of the Sea. While exploring the "nomos" of the Earth, he encountered its qualitative, essential opposite to the "nomos" of the Sea. This led him to create a special geopolitical methodology for understanding the political history of the world.

8.3 Land and Sea

In 1942, Schmitt published the most important work "Land and Sea"⁴¹. Together with the later text "Planetary tensions between East and West and the confrontation between Land and Sea"⁴² this constitutes the most important document of geopolitical science.

The meaning of the opposition of Land and Sea in Schmitt boils down to the fact that we are talking about two completely different, irreducible and hostile civilizations, and not about variants of a single civilizational complex. This division is almost exactly the same as the picture drawn by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives the main elements of thalassocracy (Sea Power) and tellurocracy (Land Power) an in-depth philosophical interpretation associated with basic legal and ethical systems. It is curious that Schmitt uses the name "Behemoth" for the "forces of the Land", and for the "forces of the Sea" "Leviathan", as a reminder of two Old Testament monsters, one of which embodies all land creatures, and the other all water, sea ...

"Nomos" of the Earth has existed with no alternative throughout most of human history. All varieties of this "nomos" are characterized by the presence of a strict and stable legal (and ethical) form, which reflects the immobility and fixity of the Land, the Earth. This connection with the Earth, a space in which easily lends itself to structuralization (fixed boundaries, constancy of communication paths, invariability of geographic and relief features), gives rise to essential conservatism in the social, cultural and technical spheres. The totality of versions of the "nomos" of the Earth constitutes what is commonly called the history of "traditional society".

In such a situation, the Sea, Water are only peripheral civilizational phenomena, without intruding into the sphere of "ethical" (or invading occasionally). Only with the discovery of the World Ocean at the end of the 16th century did the situation change radically. Humanity (and first of all, the island of England) begins to get used to the "sea existence", begins to realize itself as an Island in the middle of the waters, a Ship.

But the body of water is sharply different from the land. It is impermanent, hostile, alienated, subject to constant change. The paths are not fixed in it, the differences in orientations are not obvious. "Nomos" of the sea entails a global transformation of consciousness. Social, legal and ethical norms become "fluid". A new civilization is being born. Schmitt believes that the modern era and the technical breakthrough that opened the era of industrialization owe their existence to the geopolitical phenomenon of humanity's transition to the "nomos" of the sea.

Thus, the geopolitical confrontation of the Anglo-Saxon world of the "outer crescent" acquires a socio-political definition from Schmitt. "Nomos" of the sea is a reality hostile to traditional society. The geopolitical confrontation between land powers and sea powers acquires the most important historical, ideological and philosophical meaning.

8.4 Grossraum

Schmitt developed another important geopolitical theory, the theory of "large space" (Grossraum). This concept examines the process of development of states

⁴¹ Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", op. cit.

⁴² Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-III" von prof. Piet Tommissen, Brussel, 1991; in Russian see Carl Schmitt "Planetary Tensions Between East and West" in "Elements", 1997, no. 8.

as a desire to acquire the largest territorial volume. The principle of imperial integration is an expression of the logical and natural human desire for synthesis. The stages of the territorial expansion of the state, therefore, correspond to the stages of the movement of the human spirit towards universalism.

This geopolitical law applies to both the technical and economic spheres. Schmitt shows that, starting from a certain moment, the technical and economic development of the state requires a quantitative and qualitative increase in its territories. This does not necessarily mean colonization, annexation, or military invasion. The formation of the Grossraum can also take place under other laws on the basis of the adoption by several states or peoples of a single religious or cultural form.

According to Schmitt, the development of the "nomos" of the Earth should lead to the emergence of the Continental State. The stages of movement to the Continent State run from city-states through the states of the territory. The emergence of a land-based continent State, the mainland grossraum, is a historical and geopolitical necessity.

In the 1940 text "Space and Large Space in the law of peoples"⁴³ Schmitt defined "Big Space" as follows: "The sphere of planning, organization and human activity, rooted in an actual and voluminous trend of future development"⁴⁴. Refining this somewhat vague formulation, Schmitt pointed to the implementation of the American Monroe doctrine as an example of the volitional creation of a "Great Space".

Although Grossraum can, in a certain sense, be identified with the State, or rather with the Empire (das Reich), this concept goes beyond the ordinary state. This is new the form supranational associations, founded on the strategic, geopolitical and ideological factor.

In contrast to Hitler's unification pan-Germanist model and from the Soviet Schmitt's Grossraum internationalism is based on cultural and ethnic pluralism, on broad autonomy, limited only by strategic centralism and total loyalty to the highest authority. At the same time, Schmitt emphasized that the creation of a new "Great Space" does not depend on the scientific value of the doctrine itself, nor on cultural competence, nor on the economic development of the constituent parts or even the territorial and ethnic center that gave impetus to integration. Everything depends only on the political will that recognizes the historical necessity of such a geopolitical step.

Schmitt in this doctrine anticipated the main lines of modern integration policy.

8.5 Total war and the "partisan" figure

Geopolitical motives are discernible in Schmitt in almost all the topics that he considers. In particular, he investigated the connection between the three concepts "total enemy, total war, total state." From his point of view, the "total state" is

⁴³ Carl Schmitt "Raum und Grossraum im Volkerrecht", 1940; cit. by Julien Freund "Les lignes de force de la pensee politique de Carl Schmitt" dans "Nouvelle Ecole", no. 44, Paris, 1987.

⁴⁴ Ibidem

the most perfect form of the state of the traditional type, i.e. the peak of the development of the land "nomos". Despite the possibilities of the historical evolution of such a state up to the scale of the Grossraum, the essential quality remains unchanged in it. The "total state" excludes the principle of "total enemy" and "total war", since the idea of the enemy, the "enemy" (and Schmitt attached great importance to the formulation of the concepts "friend" / "enemy", amicus / hostis) it builds on the basis of itself itself, and therefore, puts forward the concept of "war of forms", in which Jus bellum operates and only limited contingents of professional military personnel participate. The civilian population and private property, in turn, are protected by law and eliminated (at least

The liberal doctrine, which Schmitt unambiguously associated with the New Age and, accordingly, with the "sea civilization", with the "nomos" of the sea, denying the "total state" thereby opens the way for "total war" and the concept of "total enemy". In 1941, in his article "State Sovereignty and the High Seas," he wrote:

"The war on land was subordinated to legal norms, since it was a war between states, that is, between the armed forces of warring states. Its rationalization was manifested in its limitation and in the desire to bring civilians and objects of private property beyond its borders. War at sea on the contrary, it is not a war between strictly defined opponents, subject to legal norms, since it is based on the concept of a total enemy."⁴⁵

The general geopolitical picture described by Schmitt was reduced to a tense civilizational dualism, to the confrontation between two Anglo-Saxon Grossraums (England + America) and a continental European, Eurasian one. These two "Great Spaces", the thalassocratic and the tellurocratic, are waging a planetary battle with each other to take the last step towards universalization and move from continental to world dominion. At the same time, Schmitt was pessimistic about the possibility of reducing this conflict to some kind of strict legal basis, since the civilizational macroconcepts of both "Great Spaces" are based on mutually exclusive "nomos" "nomos of the Earth" and "nomos of the Sea". The last destructive element is introduced by the development of aeronautics, since "air space"

At the end of his life, Schmitt focused his attention on the figure of the "partisan". This figure, according to Schmitt, is the last representative of the "nomos" of the Earth, remaining true to its original vocation despite the "dilution of civilization" and the dissolution of its legal and cultural foundations. The "partisan" is connected with his native land by informal ties, and the historical nature of this connection dictates to him the foundations of the ethics of war, which are sharply different from more general and abstract standards. With the universalization of the "maritime model" and "trade ethics", which naturally encompass the sphere of military operations, the figure of the "partisan" acquires, according to Schmitt, increasing civilizational significance, since the "partisan" remains the last character in history, who protects (by all means) "

⁴⁵ Carl Schmitt "Staatliche Souveränität und freies Meer" in "Das Reich und Europa", Leipzig, 1941.

Chapter 9. Pyotr Nikolaevich Savitsky "Eurasia Middle Earth"

9.1 The fate of the Eurasian

Petr Nikolaevich Savitsky (1895-1968) is perhaps the first (and only) Russian author who, in the full sense of the word, can be called a geopolitician. An economist by education, a student of V. Vernadsky and P. Struve. Before the war, he was close to the cadets. After the revolution he emigrated to Bulgaria, then moved to Czechoslovakia. In 1921, together with Prince N.S. Trubetskoy, he headed the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors played a central role. It was Savitsky who was most of all Eurasianists interested in geopolitics.

The worldview of Savitsky, like most other Eurasians, was shaped by the works of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. It was a kind of revolutionary Slavophilism, coupled with the central idea of the specificity of the historical identity of the "Great Russians", which cannot be reduced to either religious or ethnically Slavic essence. In this aspect, they were closest to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated the most important thesis "there is Slavism, there is no Slavism", that is, "the ethnic and linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis to talk about their cultural and characteristic unity." The Eurasian movement on a set of favorite themes and concepts was surprisingly close to the German conservative revolutionaries. Just like the conservative revolutionaries Eurasians sought to combine loyalty to the origins with a creative impulse into the future, rooted in the Russian national tradition with social modernism, technical development and politics of non-traditional forms. This is also the basis of the cautiously positive attitude of the Eurasians towards the Soviet State and towards the October Revolution.

Despite the sympathy for the Soviets, which was characteristic not only of the openly pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasians (the Parisian circle that published the newspaper "Eurasia"), with which Savitsky officially broke off relations, but also for the most moderate and "conservative" elements. After the capture of Prague by Soviet troops in 1945, Savitsky was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in labor camps. In the camps, he met the son of the poet Nikolai Gumilyov, Lev, who became his student, and later one of the best modern Russian ethnographers and historians.

In 1956, Savitsky was rehabilitated and returned to Prague, where he died 12 years later.

9.2 Russia-Eurasia

Savitsky's main idea is that Russia is a special civilizational entity, defined through the quality of the "middle". One of his articles "The Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism" (1933) begins with the words "Russia has much more reason than China to be called the" Middle State "⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ Petr Savitsky "Geographical and geopolitical foundations of Eurasianism" in "Elements" No. 3, pp. 51-54

If the "middle" of Germany, Mittellage, is limited to the European context, and Europe itself is only the "western cape" of Eurasia, then Russia occupies a central position within the entire continent. For Savitsky, the "middleness" of Russia is the basis of its historical identity; it is not a part of Europe and not a continuation of Asia. It is an independent world, an independent and special spiritual and historical geopolitical reality, which Savitsky calls "Eurasia".

This concept does not mean a continent or a continent, but an idea reflected in Russian space and Russian culture, a historical paradigm, a special civilization. Savitsky from the Russian pole puts forward a concept that is strictly identical to Mackinder's geopolitical picture, only abstract "land robbers" or "centrostatic impulses emanating from the geographical axis of history" acquire from him a clearly defined outline of Russian culture, Russian history, Russian statehood, Russian territory. Savitsky portrays Russia-Eurasia in the same light as Ratzel's Raum and, more precisely, Schmitt's Grossraum.

If Mackinder believes that a mechanical push comes from the deserts of the heartland, forcing the coastal zones ("inner crescent") to create culture and history, then Savitsky argues that Russia-Eurasia (= Mackinder's heartland) is a synthesis of world culture and world history, deployed in space and time. Moreover, the nature of Russia participates in its culture.

Savitsky understands Russia geopolitically, not as a national state, but as a special type of civilization, formed on the basis of several components of the Aryan-Slavic culture, Turkic nomadism, and the Orthodox tradition. All together creates a kind of unique, "middle" formation, which is a synthesis of world history.

Savitsky considers the Great Russians not just an offshoot of the Eastern Slavs, but a special imperial ethnic formation in which Slavic and Turkic substrates are combined. This moment brings him to the important topic of Turan.

9.3 Turan

The appeal to Turan as a positive orientation was scandalous for many Russian nationalists. Thus, Savitsky indirectly justified the Mongol-Tara yoke, thanks to which "Russia gained its geopolitical independence and retained its spiritual independence from the aggressive Romano-Germanic world." This attitude towards the Turkic world was intended to sharply separate Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its fate, to substantiate the ethnic uniqueness of Russians.

"Without Tatar, there would be no Russia" this thesis from Savitsky's article "Steppe and Settlement"⁴⁷ was the key formula of Eurasianism. Hence the direct transition to a purely geopolitical statement:

"Let's put it bluntly: in the space of world history, the West European sensation of the sea, as an equal, albeit polar, is opposed by the only Mongolian

⁴⁷P.N. Savitsky "Steppe and Settlement" in "On the Ways: The Approval of the Eurasians", Berlin, 1922, pp. 341-356

a sense of the continent; meanwhile, in the Russian "explorers", in the scope of Russian conquests and explorations, the same spirit, the same sense of the continent."⁴⁸

And further:

"Russia is the heiress of the Great Khans, the successor of the cause of Chingiz and Timur, the unifier of Asia. (...) It combines both the historical" sedentary "and" steppe "elements."⁴⁹

The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape, its division into Forest and Steppe, was noticed by the Slavophiles. For Savitsky, the geopolitical meaning of Russia-Eurasia appears as a synthesis of these two realities of the European Forest and the Asian Steppe. Moreover, such a synthesis is not a simple imposition of two geopolitical systems on top of each other, but something integral, original, with its own measure and methodology of assessments.

Russia-Eurasia is not entirely reduced to Turan. She's more than that. But with regard to Europe, which considers everything that goes beyond its "coastal" consciousness to be "barbarism", the self-qualification of Russians as "carriers of the Mongolian spirit" is a provocation that reveals the historical and spiritual superiority of the Eurasians.

9.4 Location

In Savitsky's theory, the concept of "local development" plays an important role. This term is an exact analogue of the concept of Raum, as it is interpreted by Ratzel's "political geography" and German geopolitics (+ Chellen) in general. This concept reflects the "organicism" of the Eurasians, exactly corresponding to the German "organicist" school and in sharp contrast to the pragmatism of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics. If Speakman was familiar with Savitsky's writings, then his resentment about "metaphysical nonsense" would have been even stronger than in the case of Haushofer. So, Savitsky in the text "Geographical Review of Russia-Eurasia" writes:

"The socio-political environment and its territory" must merge for us into a single whole, into a geographic individual or landscape "^{fifty}.

This is the essence of "local development", in which the objective and the subjective merge into an indissoluble unity, into something whole. This is a conceptual synthesis. In the same text, Savitsky continues:

"Synthesis is needed. It is necessary to be able to immediately look at the socio-historical environment and the territory it occupies."⁵¹.

In this, Savitsky is close to Vidal de la Blache. Like the French geopolitician, who substantiated the indivisibility of France by the unity of a cultural type, regardless of the ethnicity of the inhabitants of Alsace-Laure Rin, Savitsky believes that

⁴⁸ Ibidem

⁴⁹ Ibidem

^{fifty} P.N.Savitsky "Geographical overview of Russia-Eurasia" in the collection "The World of Russia - Eurasia", 1926, pp.

219 - 232

⁵¹ Ibidem

"Russia-Eurasia is a" locality ", a single whole ", a" geographic individual ", at the same time a geographic, ethnic, economic, historical, etc., etc., a" landscape "⁵².

Russia-Eurasia is such a "local development", which is an integral form of the existence of many smaller "local development". This is Schmitt's Grossraum, consisting of a whole hierarchy of lesser Raums.

Through the introduction of the concept of "local development", the Eurasians avoided the positivist need to analytically split historical phenomena, decomposing them into mechanical systems as applied not only to natural, but also to cultural phenomena. The appeal to "locality", to the "geographic individual" allowed Eurasians to avoid too specific prescriptions regarding national, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological problems. Intuitively felt by all the inhabitants of the "geographical axis of history", the geopolitical unity thus acquired a new "synthetic" language, not reducible to inadequate, fragmentary, analytical concepts of Western rationalism.

This also revealed Savitsky's continuity of the Russian intellectual tradition, which always gravitated towards understanding "wholeness," "conciliarity," "total unity," and so on.

9.5 Ideocracy

A very important aspect of Savitsky's theory is the principle of "ideocracy". Savitsky believed that the Eurasian state should be built, starting from the initial spiritual impulse, from top to bottom. Consequently, its entire structure should be built in accordance with the a priori Idea, and a special class of "spiritual leaders" should be at the head of this structure. This position is very close to the theories of Schmitt about the "volitional", "spiritual" impulse, which stood at the origins of the emergence of Grossraum.

Ideocracy assumed the supremacy of a non-pragmatic, non-material and non-commercial approach to the state structure. The dignity of a "geographical personality", according to Savitsky, consists in the ability to rise above material necessity, organically including the physical world into a single spiritually-creative impulse of global historical activity.

Ideocracy is a term that encompasses all forms of undemocratic, illiberal rule based on non-materialistic and non-utilitarian motivations. Moreover, Savitsky deliberately avoids clarifying this concept, which can be embodied in theocratic sobornost, and in the people's monarchy, and in the national dictatorship, and in the party state of the Soviet type. This breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical horizons of Eurasianism, which cover huge historical and geographic volumes. This is an attempt to most accurately express the intuitive will of the continent.

It is clear that ideocracy is the exact opposite of the pragmatic-commercial approach that dominated the doctrines of Mackinder, Mahan, and Speakman. Thus, the Russian Eurasians brought ideological terms to the final clarity, in which

⁵² Ibidem

manifested historically the confrontation between the Sea and Land. The sea is a liberal democracy, "trading system", pragmatism. Dry land ideocracy (of all varieties), "hierarchical government", domination of the religious ideal.

Savitsky's views on ideocracy resonate with the ideas of the German sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, who divided all social models and types into two general classes "heroes" and "merchants." At the geopolitical level, the term "hero", "heroism" loses its metaphorical, pathetic meaning and becomes a technical term to denote the legal and ethical specifics of ideocratic rule.

9.6 USSR and Eurasianism

The role of Peter Savitsky and, more broadly, of Russian Eurasianism in the development of geopolitics as a science is enormous. And it's strange how little attention is paid to this direction in Western textbooks. In Savitsky, we have a completely conscious, responsible and competent geopolitician who fully and reasonably expresses the position of the heartland, starting from the deepest Russian regions. Savitsky's geopolitical doctrine is a direct antithesis to the views of Mahan, Mackinder, Speakman, Vidal de la Blache and other "thalassocrates". Moreover, only in this case we are talking about a complete and detailed presentation of an alternative doctrine, which examines in detail ideological, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. If we use the terminology of Karl Schmitt, then Savitsky and the Eurasians are the spokesmen for the "nomos of the Earth"

Anglo-Saxon Grossraum.

Comparison of Russians' ideas Eurasians from theories German geopoliticians continentalists (Haushofer, Schmitt, etc.), who also tried to build their own geopolitical theory as the antithesis of the strategy of the "Sea Power", shows that the Germans have traveled only half the way in this direction, while the Russians (first of all, Savitsky) we are dealing with a complete and consistent, full-fledged picture of the world. In this sense, a certain law can be derived: "The closer the views of the German continentalists to Russian Eurasianism, the more fully they accept the Ostorientierung, the more consistent and logical their doctrines, the more effective their political projects, created on a geopolitical basis."

In this sense, the closest to Savitsky came the German National Bolsheviks, in particular, Ernst Nikisch, who were well aware of the duality geopolitical position of Germany, whose "middle" is relative and secondary in comparison with the absolute cultural and continental "middle" of the Russians. From this they concluded that Germany cannot claim to be a geopolitical synthesis, that it must make a choice between southwestern, Slavophobic, Catholic and, in some aspects, "thalassocratic" (bourgeois) Germany (together with Austria) and north-Eastern German-Slavic, socialist, Russophile, Protestant and Spartan Prussia. Nikisch owns the famous geopolitical thesis "Europe from Vladivostok to Flessing ga", and only this approach on the part of the Germans harmoniously fits into the consistent continental Eurasianism. Naturally, the line of the Austrian Catholic,

historical existence as a result of a nightmarish defeat inflicted by precisely those forces, "eternal alliance" with which alone could provide the Germans with complicity in the world domination of the tellurocracy.

Soviet reality in a geopolitical sense largely coincided with the concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasians, although there is no reliable data on their direct influence on the Soviet leadership. In many respects, the Smenovekhists and National Bolsheviks close to the Eurasians, especially Nikolai Ustryalov, clearly influenced the Bolsheviks and especially Stalin, although they never held high posts and often ended their lives in the camps. Part of the Eurasians Efron, Karsavin, etc. cooperated openly with the USSR, but also did not receive gratitude. However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy right up to the beginning of perestroika leads to the conclusion that it constantly followed the Eurasian course, never declaring it openly.

And here one can only speculate: either there was some unknown organization within the Soviet regime, which was guided by Savitsky's ideas, adapting them to current political realities and putting them in the official "Marxist" vocabulary, or the objective position of the heartland forced the USSR by inertia to do those steps that a geopolitically conscious continental state of Eurasia should have taken.

Chapter 10. Geopolitics as an instrument of national policy

10.1 Planetary dualism is the basic law of geopolitics

Summing up a brief acquaintance with the ideas of the founders of geopolitical science, several general conclusions can be drawn.

Несмотря на разнообразие точек зрения мы имеем дело все же с некоей единой картиной мира, которая может быть названа геополитической. Эта картина мира стремится включить в анализ исторических процессов, международных и межгосударственных отношений сразу несколько дисциплинарных подходов географический, политологический, идеологический, этнографический, экономический и т.д. В этом состоит основная характеристика всех геополитических доктрин стремление к междисциплинарному синтезу.

The most common methodological formula shared by all geopoliticians is the assertion of a fundamental historical dualism between Land, tellurocracy, "nomos" of the Earth, Eurasia, heartland, "middle earth", ideocratic civilization, "geographical axis of history" on the one hand, and the Sea, thalassocracy, Sea Power, "nomos" of the Sea, Atlantic, Anglo-Saxon world, commercial civilization, "outer or island crescent", on the other. This can be seen as the main law of geopolitics. Outside the postulation of this dualism, all other conclusions lose their meaning. For all the discrepancies in particular aspects, none of the founders of geopolitical science questioned the fact of such a confrontation. In terms of its significance, it is comparable to the law of universal gravitation in physics.

10.2 A geopolitician cannot but be engaged

Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant political engagement. No, practically, not a single geopolitician who would be barred from participating in the political life of his state. Hence the obvious bias of all, without exception. A geopolitician, embarking on scientific research, must definitely determine his own place on the map of geopolitical poles; the angle of view from which he will analyze all world processes will depend on this. In the entire history of geopolitics, we do not meet a single author who would be indifferent to the fate of his state and his people, would not share its basic ethical and historical orientation. This is especially evident at the extreme poles. Anglo-Saxon authors impeccably and unambiguously follow the logic and value system of Sea Power, thalassocracy, formulating their theories from the standpoint of unconditional supporters of Atlanticism; Russian Eurasians are just as consistent in their loyalty to the ideals of the heartland, and they do not even question the absolute ethical and historical superiority of ideocracy and Russia-Eurasia.

The situation is more complicated with the French, who have a theoretical choice of self-identification, either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. In the first case, there follows solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, with Sea Power, in the second Germanophilia. Both options imply unconditional national sympathy. Theoretically, both of these tendencies are present among French geopoliticians, but the most harmonious

the geopolitical concept was developed by a group of "Atlantists" who were followers of Vidal de la Blache, who remains the central figure in this area. From a theoretical point of view, its geopolitical antipodes Laval and De Gaulle are significantly inferior to him.

Germany also has a twofold situation. If, on the whole, its geopolitical thought is oriented predominantly continental and "Eurasian", this orientation is limited by a complex relationship to the Slavic world, to Asia, and especially to Russia. This limitation is so significant and Germany's attempts to voluntarily equate its mid-European position with the mid-Eurasian, thereby ignoring the historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, are so persistent that in both world wars Germany was forced to fight not only against the thalassocratic powers, but also against its logical Eurasian ally Russia (USSR). We can say that German geopolitics is characterized by "non-Eurasian" continentalism.

The need for a geopolitician to initially determine his own position on the geopolitical map of the world and its belts (Mackinder's scheme in this sense is a very clear illustration) influenced the fact that this science developed almost exclusively among representatives of major powers with ambitions to become "world power" (Weltmacht), "superpowers", achieve planetary dominance.

Americans Mahan and Speakman, Englishman Mackinder represent the "island crescent". They are the "speakers" of Atlanticism, thalassocracy.

Vidal de la Blache (and his school) represent Atlanticist France. Laval and De Gaulle lean towards continentalism, "Europeanism," anti-Atlanteanism. Hence their mutual Germanophilia, which geopolitically brings them closer together despite the fact that they belonged to two hostile camps: Laval was the head of the Vichy collaborationist government, and De Gaulle was the head of the anti-fascist French army.

The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, Schmitt identify Germany with the axis of the Land, the tellurocracy, and seek to create a "Great Space" out of Germany, which should oppose the Anglo-Saxon thalassocracy. They are joined by the Swede Rudolf Kjellen, who, however, thinks more like a representative of Central Europe, the German European space, and not as a "narrow Swedish" nationalist. The most radical continentalists are Ernst Nikisch, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Bruck, etc. go even further and believe the future of Germany is only in strategic integration with Eurasian Russia.

Finally, the Russian Eurasians (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) express the most complete version of continentism, expressing the most radical position of the "nomos" of Sushu, the tellurocracy.

The absence of at least some outstanding names among the geopolitics of other countries (although there were such names in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania, Holland, etc.) is explained by the fact that the fundamental geopolitical dualism concerns minor states only indirectly, their influence on the course of the global confrontation is insignificant, and, consequently, the very essence of geopolitics, its acuteness, its relevance, its "fateful" dimension are completely irrelevant for them.

10.3 The fate of scientists the fate of powers

The citizenship of geopolitical scientists in the most direct way affects their views. The connection is obvious here. Geopoliticians, in essence, are those people who, with the greatest insight and responsibility, are able to recognize the historical trends of global development in the spatial sphere, understand the place of their state and their people in this context and formulate a reasonable and most effective project for the future. Therefore, they so often directly or indirectly affect world history, which is carried out, however, by completely different forces, groups, parties, leaders, acting under completely different, momentarily relevant slogans.

But one more pattern is also interesting. The degree of direct influence of geopoliticians on power, the feedback between scientific developments and the political course in international relations of the respective states differs sharply.

Mahan, Speakman and Mackinder held high positions in their states, their political activity had the most immediate results, their direct influence on Anglo-Saxon politics is obvious and enormous. Despite some friction with the scientific world of their countries and some (tactical) concealment of the significance of their ideas for the entire "sea civilization" as a whole, they were honored during their lifetime, they were provided with all kinds of support, their fate and career were demonstratively successful.

The situation is different with continental geopolitics. Vidal de la Blache was considered only a geographer seeking to expand his field of research to a political scale. The attitude of the government towards him is respectful, but on the whole indifferent, although many practical principles (especially those set forth in "Eastern France") have been adopted. He does not enjoy the same prestige as the Anglo-Americans, but his theoretical legacy is taken into account.

For the Germans, especially with Haushofer and Schmitt, the situation is already more serious. Both in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, attitudes towards them are changing in waves, moving from a certain attention of the authorities to direct repression. Compared to the "thalassocratic" geopolitics, their fate is tragic, their careers are zigzagging, and at certain moments they become victims of even those regimes whose national goals generally coincide with their own. There is no longer honor and respect, but hysterical attention, alternating with persecution.

For the Eurasianists, the picture is even more tragic. There is no direct attention here, not a single mention in official sources, only camps, links, arrests, persecutions with complete disregard. And although until a certain point in Soviet history it seems that the main decisions at the international level are made by the followers of Pyotr Savitsky, who check every step with the publications of the Eurasianists, the turning point comes in 1989 when it turns out that no one in the Soviet leadership is able to coherently explain the logic of traditional foreign policy. and as a result, there is a lightning-fast destruction of the gigantic Eurasian organism, created with such tension by three generations, having endured wars, deprivation, suffering, and unbearable hardships.

The role of the personality of geopoliticians in terms of their influence on power is sharply reduced along the West-East axis. The respect for Mahan and Speakman is contrasted with the constant threats to Schmitt from the SS and the persecution of Haushofer (his son was shot), and even more so from the camps of Savitsky and Karsavin. It amazes that in the end

it was those countries that most of all listened to their geopolitics and appreciated them, achieved amazing results and came close to finally achieving the one-man world domination. Germany paid for the inattention to Haushofer's theses about the "continental bloc" by the fact that it dropped out of history for half a century, suffered a monstrous defeat and fell into political oblivion. The USSR, which did not pay attention to the works of the most responsible, deep and perspicacious Russian patriots, without a fight and resistance found itself in almost the same situation as post-war Germany, world influence came to naught, the space was sharply reduced, the economy and social sphere turned into ruins.

Part II MODERN GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES AND SCHOOLS (second half of the twentieth century)

Chapter 1. Overview

The development of geopolitical thought in the second half of the 20th century generally followed the paths outlined by the founders of this science. The story of Haushofer and his school, over which hung an ominous shadow of intellectual cooperation with the Third Reich, forced the authors involved in this discipline to seek roundabout ways so as not to be accused of "fascism". Thus, the American Colin S. Gray generally suggested using two words to denote geopolitics: the English "geopolitics" and the German "Geopolitik". The first should denote the Anglo-Saxon and pragmatic version of this phenomenon, i.e. the writings of those authors who follow the approach of Mahan, Mackinder and Speakman, and the second "continental option", the legacy of the Haushofer school, taking into account some "spiritual" or "metaphysical" factors.

The American and, more broadly, the Atlanticist (thalassocratic) line in geopolitics developed practically without any breaks with tradition. As the projects of the Americans on becoming a "world power" were being implemented, postwar geopolitics-Atlanticists only refined and detailed particular aspects of the theory, developing applied spheres. The fundamental model of "sea power" and its geopolitical prospects has turned from scientific developments of separate military-geographic schools into the official international policy of the United States.

At the same time, the emergence of the United States as a superpower and entry into the last stage, preceding the final planetary hegemony of thalassocracy, forced American geopoliticians to consider a completely new geopolitical model, in which not two main forces participated, but only one. Moreover, there were fundamentally two options for the development of events, either the final victory of the West in a geopolitical duel with the East, or the convergence of two ideological camps into something single and the establishment of a World Government (this project was named "Mondialism" from the French word "monde", "peace"). In both cases, a new geopolitical understanding of this possible outcome of the history of civilizations was required. This situation gave rise to a special direction in geopolitics "geopolitics of mondialism". Otherwise, this theory is known as the doctrine of the "new world order". It was developed by American geopoliticians since the 70s, and for the first time it was loudly announced by US President George W. Bush at the time of the Gulf War in 1991.

European geopolitics as something independent after the end of World War II practically did not exist. Only during a rather short period of 1959–1968, when the "continentalist" Charles de Gaulle was President of France, the situation changed somewhat. Beginning in 1963, De Gaulle undertook some clearly anti-Atlanticist measures, as a result of which France withdrew from the North Atlantic Alliance and made attempts to develop its own geopolitical strategy. But since this state alone could not resist the thalassocratic world, the question of the intra-European Franco-German

cooperation and strengthening ties with the USSR. Hence the famous Gaullist thesis "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was born. This Europe was conceived as a sovereign, strategically continental entity, quite in the spirit of moderate "European continentalism."

At the same time, by the beginning of the 70s, when geopolitical research in the United States became extremely popular, European scientists also began to get involved in this process, but at the same time, their connection with the prewar geopolitical school in most cases had already been interrupted and they had to adapt to the norms of the Anglo-Saxon approach. Thus, European scientists act as technical experts of international organizations such as NATO, the UN, etc., engaging in applied geopolitical research and not going beyond narrow specific issues. Gradually, these studies turned into something independent in "regional geopolitics", rather developed in France ("Yves Lacoste school", publisher of the magazine "Herodotus"). This "regional geopolitics" abstracts from the global schemes of Mackinder, Mahan or Haushofer,

The only continuous tradition of geopolitics that has survived in Europe since pre-war times was the property of rather marginal groups, more or less associated with post-war nationalist parties and movements. In these narrow and politically peripheral circles, geopolitical ideas developed, directly going back to "continentalism," the Haushofer school, and so on. This movement is collectively called the European "new right". Until a certain moment, public opinion simply ignored them, considering them "vestiges of fascism." And only in the last decade, especially thanks to the educational and journalistic activities of the French philosopher Alain de Benoist, serious scientific circles began to listen to this trend as well. Despite the considerable distance, separating the intellectual circles of the European "new right" from the authorities and their "dissidence", from a purely theoretical point of view, their works represent a huge contribution to the development of geopolitics. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, a situation arose that the official European geopolitics (most often from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the "new right", their works, translations and research to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture.

Finally, Russian geopolitics. Officially recognized as "fascist" and "bourgeois pseudoscience", geopolitics as such did not exist in the USSR. Its functions were performed by several disciplines: strategy, military geography, theory of international law and international relations, geography, ethnography, etc. And at the same time, the general geopolitical behavior of the USSR on the planetary arena betrays the presence of a rather rational, from a geopolitical point of view, behavior model. The USSR's desire to strengthen its positions in southern Eurasia, in the "coastal zone", penetration into Africa, destabilizing actions in South America (designed to split the space controlled by the North American States according to the Monroe Doctrine) and even the invasion of to cut the American "anaconda" striving to bring the strategic borders of "thalassocracy" close to the southern borders of the "geographical axis of history"), etc. Such a consistent and geopolitically grounded policy of the USSR indicates the existence of some kind of "center of decisions" where the

the results of many traditional sciences and on the basis of this "information", "synthesis" to take the most important strategic steps. However, the social localization of this "crypto-geopolitical" center appears to be problematic. There is a version that it was about some secret department of the Soviet GRU.

Actually, geopolitics has evolved exclusionary but marginal "dissident" circles. The most prominent representative of this trend was the historian Lev Gumilyov, although he never used the term "geopolitics" or the term "Eurasianism" in his works, and, moreover, tried in every possible way to avoid direct reference to socio-political realities. Thanks to this "cautious" approach, he managed to publish, even under the Soviet regime, several books on ethnographic history.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, geopolitics became relevant again in Russian society. The abolition of ideological censorship made it possible, finally, to call a spade a spade. It is not surprising that the first to take part in the revival of geopolitics were national-patriotic circles (Den newspaper, Elements magazine). The methodology turned out to be so impressive that some "democratic" movements also took over the initiative. Soon after perestroika, geopolitics became one of the most popular topics of the entire Russian society.

Associated with this is the increased interest in the Eurasians and their heritage in modern Russia.

Chapter 2. Modern Atlantism

2.1 Followers of Speakman D.W. Meinig, W. Kirk, S.B. Coen, K. Gray, G. Kissinger

The development of the American, purely Atlanticist line in geopolitics after 1945 was largely a development of the theses of Nicholas Speakman. Just as he himself began developing his theories with Mackinder's corrections, so his followers mostly corrected his own views.

In 1956, a student of Speakman D. Meinig published the text "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History". Meinig specifically emphasizes that "geopolitical criteria should take special account of the functional orientation of the population and the state, and not just the purely geographical relationship of the territory to the Land and Sea"⁵³. This is clearly the influence of Vidal de la Blache.

Mainig says that the entire space of the Eurasian rimland is divided into three types according to their functional and cultural predisposition.

"China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (including Prussia), the Baltic and Karelia areas, organically gravitating towards heartland.

South Korea, Burma, India, Iraq, Syria, Yugoslavia are geopolitically neutral.

Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand are inclined to thalassocratic block.⁵⁴"

In 1965, another follower of Speakman, W. Kirk, published a book⁵⁵, reproducing the title of Mackinder's famous article "The Geographical Pivot of History". Kirk developed Speakman's thesis regarding the centrality of rimland to the geopolitical balance of power. Based on Meinig's cultural-functional analysis and his differentiation of "coastal zones" in relation to "tellurocratic" or "thalassocratic" predispositions, Kirk built a historical model in which coastal civilizations play the main role, from which cultural impulses come with a greater or lesser degree of intensity inward continent. At the same time, the "higher" cultural forms and historical initiative are recognized for those sectors of the "inner crescent", which Meinig defined as "thalassocratically oriented".

American Saul Cohen in *Geography and Politics in a Divided World*⁵⁶ suggested introducing an additional classification into the geopolitical method based on dividing the main geopolitical realities into "nucleus" and "discontinuous belts." From his point of view, each specific region of the planet can be decomposed into 4 geopolitical components:

- 1) "external sea (water) environment, depending on the merchant marine and ports;

⁵³ DWMeinig "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History" in "West Politics Quarterly", IX, 1956 pp. 553-569

⁵⁴ Ibidem

⁵⁵ W.Kirk "Geographical Pivot of History", Leicester Universal Press, 1965

⁵⁶ SB Cohen "Geography and Politics in a divided world", New York, 1963

- 2) the continental core (nucleus), identical to "Hinterland" (a geopolitical term meaning "inland regions remote from the coast");
- 3) a discontinuous belt (coastal sectors oriented either inward or away from the continent);
- 4) regions geopolitically independent from this ensemble. ⁵⁷

The concept of "discontinuous zones" was taken up by leading American strategists such as Henry Kissinger, who believed that the US political strategy for "discontinuous" coastal zones was to unite the fragments into one whole and thereby ensure full control of Atlanticism over Soviet Eurasia. ... This doctrine is called "Linkage" from the English "link", "link", "link". For the "anaconda" strategy to be completely successful, it was necessary to pay special attention to those "coastal sectors" of Eurasia, which either remained neutral or gravitated towards the interior of the continent. In practice, this policy was carried out through the Vietnam War, the intensification of US-China relations,

As in previous eras, the post-war American Atlanticist geopolitical school constantly maintained a feedback loop with the authorities.

The development of geopolitical views in relation to the "nuclear era" we find in another representative of the same American school, Colin Gray. In his book "Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era"⁵⁸ he gives an outline of the military strategy of the United States and NATO, in which he makes the planetary location of nuclear facilities dependent on the geographic and geopolitical characteristics of the regions.

2.2 Atlantists won the Cold War

The geopolitical development of Atlanticism reached its climax by the beginning of the 90s. The "anaconda" strategy demonstrates absolute effectiveness. During this period, one can observe the almost "prophetic" correctness of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians Mackinder and Mahan, corrected by Speakman.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR heralds the triumph of the orientation of the Atlanticist strategy that was pursued throughout the 20th century. The West is winning the Cold War with the East. Sea Power celebrates its victory over heartland.

Geopolitically, this event is explained as follows:

The confrontation between the Soviet bloc and NATO was the first ever pure and unalloyed form of opposition between Land and Sea, Behemoth and Leviathan. At the same time, the geopolitical balance of power reflected not only ideological, but also geopolitical constants.

The USSR as a heartland, like Eurasia, embodied the ideocracy of the Soviet type. Geographically, it was a fairly integrated "Big

⁵⁷ Ibidem

⁵⁸ Colin S. Gray "The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era", NY, 1977

A space "with colossal natural resources and developed strategic weapons. The main advantage of the USSR was the" cultural and functional "inclinations of the population living in its vast expanses or adjacent to Soviet territory, and the presence of hard-to-reach inland spaces that would make it possible to create reliable defense and technological footholds. Moreover, on both sides, from the North and East, the USSR had sea borders, which are much easier to defend than land ones.

Due to the centralized economy, the USSR achieved commodity and food autarky and the military status of a superpower. As far as possible, he strove to extend his influence to other continents.

But the Eastern Bloc had several fundamental geopolitical flaws. The most important thing was the enormous length of the land borders. If from the South the borders coincided with the ridge of the Eurasian mountains, from Manchuria to the Tien Shan, Pamir and the Caucasus, then in the West the border passed in the middle of flat Europe, which was a strategic bridgehead of Atlanticism, while its central base was on the western bank of Sredinny Ocean "(Midland Ocean). But even in the southern direction, the mountains served not only as protection, but also as an obstacle, closing the way for possible expansion and access to the southern seas.

At the same time, the Eastern bloc was forced to concentrate military-strategic, economic, intellectual, production forces and natural resources in the same geopolitical center.

This situation was in sharp contrast to the geopolitical position of the West and the center of the United States. (This is especially important, since the position of Western Europe in this alignment of forces was very unenviable; it got the role of a US ground base, adjacent to the borders of the opposite camp, a kind of "cordon sanitaire"). America was completely protected by "maritime borders". Moreover, by strategically integrating its continent, it gained control over a huge part of the Eurasian coast, the rimland. From Western Europe through Greece and Turkey (NATO member countries), Atlanticist control extended to the Far East (Thailand, South Korea, strategically colonized Japan), and this zone smoothly passed into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the most important military bases on the island of San Diego, in the Philippines , and further, in Guam, the Caribbean and Haiti.

At the same time, the Atlanticists have created a complex differentiated system of geopolitical distribution of power "cores". The United States directly provided military and strategic power. Intellectual, financial and industrial structures, as well as centers for the development of high technologies, were concentrated in Western Europe, free from the burden of ensuring its own military security (except for the maintenance of the police and purely decorative armed forces).

Natural resources came from economically underdeveloped regions of the Third World, from where cheap labor came to a large extent.

Maintaining the status quo immediately after World War II was an offensive position, since, according to the predictions of Atlanticist geopoliticians, such a situation would inevitably lead to the depletion of the continental block.

doomed to complete autarchy and forced to develop all strategic directions simultaneously.

Heartland had only two choices in this situation. The first to carry out a military expansion to the West with the aim of conquering Europe to the Atlantic. After this effort, the USSR could secure calm sea borders and industrial, intellectual and technological potential. In parallel, a similar effort had to be made in a southerly direction, in order to finally reach the warm seas and break the "anaconda ring" of Sea Power. This is a tough path that, if successful, could lead to a stable continental peace and, in the short term, to the collapse of America, deprived of rimland.

Another way was, on the contrary, in the withdrawal of the USSR and its Armed Forces from Eastern Europe in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Western Europe and the creation of a single, strictly neutral European Bloc (possibly with a limited "dissociative" nuclear potential). This option was seriously discussed in the De Gaulle era.

The same could have been done with Asia. Agree to renounce direct political control over some Central Asian republics in exchange for the creation with Afghanistan, Iran and India (possibly China) of a powerful strategic anti-American bloc oriented inland.

Finally, it would be possible to combine these two options and go peacefully in the West and forceful in the East (or vice versa). It was only important to start both of these geopolitical actions simultaneously. Only in this case it would be possible to hope for a change in the planetary balance of forces from the obvious positional loss of Sushi to its gain. It was necessary at any cost to break through the "containment" by this term during the Cold War, the geopolitical tactics of "anaconda" were called.

But since the USSR did not dare to take this radical geopolitical step, the Atlanticist powers had only to reap the results of their strictly calculated and geopolitically verified long-term positional strategy.

The autarkian Soviet power could not stand it and fell from the all-round overstrain. And the military invasion of Afghanistan without a parallel strategic step in Western Europe (peaceful or non-peaceful), instead of saving the case, finally aggravated the situation.

2.3 Aerocracy and Aetherocracy

Traditional Atlantic geopolitics, placing Sea Power at the heart of its concept, is the "geopolitics of the sea." A global strategy based on this geopolitics has led the West to establish planetary power. But the development of technology led to the development of airspace, which made the development of "air geopolitics" urgent.

In contrast to the "geopolitics of the sea," a complete and fully developed, full-fledged "geopolitics of the air" does not exist. The aeronautics factor is added to the general geopolitical picture. But some correlations in the actualization of the air environment and new types of weapons of strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons associated with it have changed significantly.

The development of airspace has to some extent equalized Land and Sea between themselves, since for aircraft and missiles the difference between these spaces is not so significant. (A particularly important step was the creation of aircraft carriers, since this finally severed the air bases from the Land, making them independent of the quality of the earth's surface.)

At the same time, the development of aviation has changed the proportions of the planetary scale, making the Earth much "smaller" and the distances "shorter". At the same time, rocketry and the development of strategic aviation largely relativized the traditional geopolitical factors of sea and land borders, inland bases, etc.

The transfer of weapons to Earth's orbit and the strategic exploration of outer space were the last stage in the "compression" of the planet and the final relativization of spatial differences.

In addition to Land and Sea, current geopolitics has to take into account two more elements, air and ether (outer space). At the military level, these elements correspond to nuclear weapons (air) and the "star wars" program (space). By analogy with tellurocracy (power of the Land) and thalassocracy (power of the Sea), these two newest modifications of geopolitical systems can be called aerocracy (power of Air) and ethericcracy (power of Ether).

Karl Schmitt gave a sketch of these two new spheres. At the same time, his most important and fundamental remark is that both "aerocracy" and "etherocracy" represent the further development of the "nomos" of the Sea, the advanced phases of precisely "thalassocracy", since the entire technical process of mastering new spheres is being led away "liquefaction of the environment, which, according to Schmitt, is accompanied by the corresponding cultural and civilizational processes, a progressive departure from the "nomos" of Sushi not only in the strategic, but also in the ethical, spiritual, socio-political sense.

In other words, the development of air and space environments is a continuation of purely thalassocratic tendencies, and therefore can be considered as the highest stage of a purely Atlantic strategy.

From this perspective, the nuclear confrontation between the blocs in the Cold War is presented as competition in the conditions imposed by the "naval Force" on the heartland, which is forced to accept the terms of a strategic positional duel dictated by the opposite side. Such a process of active "liquefaction of the elements", coupled with the logic of the development of the Western world in the technological and strategic sense, is parallel to the offensive position of the Atlanticists in their policy of separating the coastal zones from the continental center, in both cases there is an offensive initiative of one geopolitical camp and a defensive reaction of the other. ...

On the intellectual level, this is expressed in the fact that the Atlanticists at the theoretical level are developing "active geopolitics", engaging in this science openly and systematically.

In the case of the West, geopolitics acts as a discipline that dictates the general contours of international strategy. In the case of the Eastern bloc, it has not been

officially recognized, existed and still continues to exist as a "reaction" to the steps of a potential adversary. It was and is "passive geopolitics" responding to the strategic challenge of atlantism more by inertia.

If in the case of nuclear weapons and aviation (in the sphere of aerocracy) the USSR was able, at the cost of exerting all internal resources, to achieve relative parity, then at the next stage, in the field of etherocracy, a structural breakdown occurred, and competition in the field of technologies associated with "Star Wars" led to the ultimate geopolitical loss and to defeat in the Cold War.

To understand the essence of geopolitical processes in the nuclear world and in the conditions of the development of orbital spaces, Karl Schmitt's remark that aerocracy and ethericcracy are not independent civilizational systems, but only the development of the "nomos" of the Sea, is fundamental.

2.4 Two versions of the latest Atlanticism

The victory of the Atlantists over the USSR (heartland) meant the entry into a radically new era that required original geopolitical models. The geopolitical status of all traditional territories, regions, states and unions changed dramatically. The comprehension of planetary reality after the end of the Cold War has led Atlantist geopoliticians to two fundamental schemes.

One of them can be called "pessimistic" (for Atlanticism). It inherits the traditional Atlanticist line of confrontation with heartland, which is considered incomplete and not removed from the agenda along with the fall of the USSR, and predicts the formation of new Eurasian blocs based on civilizational traditions and stable ethnic archetypes. This option can be called "neoatlantism", its essence boils down, ultimately, to the continuation of considering the geopolitical picture of the world from the perspective of fundamental dualism, which is only nuanced by the allocation of additional geopolitical zones (except for Eurasia), which may also later become hotbeds of confrontation with the West. The most prominent representative of this neo-Atlanticist approach is Samuel Huntington.

The second scheme, based on the same original geopolitical picture, on the contrary, is optimistic (for Atlanticism) in the sense that it views the situation that has developed as a result of the West's victory in the Cold War as final and irrevocable. This is the basis of the theory of "mondialism", the concept of the End of History and One World, which asserts that all forms of geopolitical differentiation are cultural, national, religious, ideological, state, etc. are about to be finally overcome, and the era of a single universal human civilization based on the principles of liberal democracy will come. The story will end along with the geopolitical confrontation that initially gave the main impetus to history. This geopolitical project is associated with the name of the American geopolitician Francis Fukuyama, who wrote a programmatic article with the expressive title "The End of History". This mondialist theory will be discussed in the next chapter.

Let us analyze the main provisions of the Hunting Tone concept, which is an ultra-modern development of Atlanticist geopolitics, traditional for the West. Significantly, Huntington constructs his Clash of civilization policy paper as a response to Fukuyama's The End of History. It is significant that on

At the political level, this controversy corresponds to the two leading political parties in the United States: Fukuyama expresses the global strategic position of the Democrats, while Huntington is the mouthpiece of the Republicans. This quite accurately expresses the essence of the two newest geopolitical projects, neo-atlantism follows a conservative line, while "mondialism" prefers a completely new approach in which all geopolitical realities are subject to a complete revision.

2.5 Clash of Civilizations: Huntington's Neo-Atlanticism

The meaning of the theory of Samuel P. Huntington, director of the Institute for Strategic Research. John Olin at Harvard University, formulated in his article "The Clash of Civilizations"⁵⁹ (which appeared as a summary of the large geopolitical project "Changes in Global Security and American National Interests"), boils down to the following:

The visible geopolitical victory of Atlanticism on the entire planet disappeared with the fall of the USSR the last stronghold of continental powers is actually a slice of only superficial reality. NATO's strategic success, accompanied by ideological design, the rejection of the main competitive communist ideology, does not affect the deep layers of civilization. Huntington in spite of Fukuyama argues that a strategic victory is not a civilizational victory; Western ideology of liberal-democratic democracy, the market, etc. became uncontested only temporarily, since soon civilizational and geopolitical peculiarities, an analogue of the "geographical individual" that Savitsky spoke of, would begin to appear among non-Western peoples.

Rejection of the ideology of communism and shifts in the structure of traditional states, the disintegration of some formations, the emergence of others, etc. will not lead to an automatic alignment of all mankind with a universal system of Atlanticist values, but, on the contrary, will make deeper cultural layers, freed from superficial ideological clichés, relevant again.

Huntington quotes George Weigel: "Desecularization is one of the dominant social factors at the end of the 20th century." And consequently, instead of rejecting religious identification in the One World, as Fukuyama speaks of, peoples, on the contrary, will feel their religious affiliation even more vividly.

Huntington argues that along with the Western (= Atlanticist) civilization, which includes North America and Western Europe, one can foresee the geopolitical fixation of seven more potential civilizations:

- 1) Slavic-Orthodox,
- 2) Confucian (Chinese),
- 3) Japanese,
- 4) Islamic,
- 5) Hindu,

⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington "Clash of civilizations" in "Foreign Affairs", summer 1993, pp. 22-49

6) Latin American

and possibly 7) African⁶⁰.

Of course, these potential civilizations are by no means equivalent. But they all agree that the vector of their development and formation will be oriented in a direction different from the trajectory of Atlanticism and the civilization of the West. So the West will again find itself in a situation of confrontation. Huntington believes that this is practically inevitable and that even now, despite the euphoria of mondialist circles, it is necessary to take as a basis a realistic formula: "The West and The Rest"⁶¹.

The geopolitical conclusions from this approach are obvious: Huntington believes that the Atlanticists should in every possible way strengthen the strategic positions of their own civilization, prepare for confrontation, consolidate strategic efforts, curb anti-Atlantic tendencies in other geopolitical formations, and prevent them from joining into a continental alliance that is dangerous for the West.

He makes the following recommendations: "The West should

to ensure closer cooperation and unity within the framework of their own civilization, especially between its European and North American parts;

integrate into Western civilization those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, whose cultures are close to Western ones;

ensure closer relations with Japan and Russia;

prevent the escalation of local conflicts between civilizations into global wars;

limit the military expansion of Confucian and Islamic states;

suspend the curtailment of Western military power and ensure military superiority in the Far East and Southwest Asia;

use difficulties and conflicts in relations between Islamic and Confucian countries;

to support groups oriented towards Western values and interests in other civilizations;

strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimize Western interests and values, and ensure the involvement of non-Western states in these institutions."⁶²

This is a concise and succinct formulation of the doctrine of neo-Atlanticism.

⁶⁰Ibidem p. 25

⁶¹Ibidem p. 39

⁶²Ibidem p. 49

From the point of view of pure geopolitics, this means strict adherence to the principles of Mahan and Speakman, and the emphasis that Huntington puts on culture and civilizational differences as the most important geopolitical factors indicates his involvement in the classical school of geopolitics, which goes back to the "organic" philosophy, for which initially it was typical to view social structures and states not as mechanical or purely ideological formations, but as "forms of life."

Huntington points to China and the Islamic states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.) as the most likely opponents of the West. This is directly influenced by the doctrines of Meinig and Kirk, who believed that the orientation of the countries of the "coastal zones", rimland and the "Confucian" and Islamic civilizations geopolitically belonged to predominantly rimland is more important than heartland's position. Therefore, unlike other representatives of neo-Atlanticism in particular, Paula Wolfowitz, Huntington sees the main threat not in the geopolitical revival of Russia-Eurasia, heartland or some new Eurasian continental entity.

In the report of the American Paul Wolfowitz (Security Adviser) to the US government in March 1992, it is said about "the need to prevent the emergence on the European and Asian continents of a strategic force capable of resisting the United States."⁶³ and further explains that the most likely force that is meant here is Russia, and that a "cordon sanitaire" should be created against it on the basis of the Baltic countries. In this case, the American strategist Wolfowitz is closer to Mackinder than to Speakman, which distinguishes his views from Huntington's theory.

In all cases, regardless of the definition of a specific potential adversary, the position of all neo-Atlantists remains essentially the same: victory in the Cold War does not negate the threat to the West emanating from other geopolitical formations (present or future). Consequently, it is premature to talk about the "One World", and the planetary dualism of thalassocracy (strengthened by aerocracy and ethericcracy) and tellurocracy remains the main geopolitical scheme for the 21st century as well.

Huntington's *The West and The Rest* becomes a new and more general formula for such dualism.

⁶³ Cit. by "Monde Diplomatique" 1992, annual compilation

Chapter 3. Mondialism

3.1 Prehistory of Mondialism

The concept of "mondialism" arose long before the final victory of the West in the Cold War.

The meaning of mondialism boils down to postulating the inevitability of full planetary integration, the transition from a plurality of states, peoples, nations and cultures to the uniform world of One World.

The origins of this idea can be seen in some utopian and chiliastic movements dating back to the Middle Ages and, further, to deep antiquity. It is based on the idea that at some climax in history there will be a gathering of all the peoples of the earth in a single Kingdom, which will no longer know the contradictions, tragedies, conflicts and problems inherent in ordinary earthly history. In addition to the purely mystical version of the mondialist utopia, there were also rationalistic versions of it, one of which can be considered the doctrine of the "Third Era" of the positivist Auguste Comte or the humanistic eschatology of Lessing.

Mondialist ideas were characteristic most often of moderate European and especially English socialists (some of them were united in the "Fabian Society"). The communists also spoke about a single World State. On the other hand, similar mondialist organizations were created from the end of the 19th century by major figures in world business, for example, Sir Sacil Rhodes, who organized the Round Table group, whose members were supposed to "promote the establishment of a system of free trade throughout the world and the creation of a single World Government. . ." Often socialist motives were intertwined with liberal-capitalist ones, and the communists coexisted in these organizations with representatives of the largest financial capital. All were united by the belief in the utopian idea of uniting the planet.

It is significant that such well-known organizations as the League of Nations, and later the UN and UNESCO were a continuation of precisely such mondialist circles that had a great influence on world politics.

During the twentieth century, these mondialist organizations, avoiding unnecessary advertising, and often even of a "secret" nature, changed many names. There was a "Universal Movement for a World Confederation" by Harry Davis, a "Federal Union" and even a "Crusade for a World Government" (organized by British parliamentarian Henry Usborne in 1946).

As all conceptual and strategic power over the West was concentrated in the United States, it was this state that became the main headquarters of Mondialism, whose representatives formed a parallel power structure consisting of advisers, analysts, and centers of strategic research.

This is how the three main mondialist organizations developed, the very existence of which the Western public became aware of only relatively recently. In contrast to formal structures, these groups enjoyed significantly more freedom.

design and research, since they were exempted from the fixed and formal procedures governing the activities of the UN commissions, etc.

The first "Council on Foreign Relations" (abbreviated CFR). Its creator was the largest American banker Morgan. This unofficial organization was engaged in the development of an American strategy on a planetary scale, with the ultimate goal being the complete unification of the planet and the creation of a World Government. This organization arose back in 1921 as a branch of the Carnegie Endowment for Universal Peace, and all of its high-ranking politicians shared Mondialist views on the future of the planet. Since most of the CFR members were also high-ranking dignitarians of Scottish Freemasonry, it can be assumed that their geopolitical projects also had some kind of humanistic-mystical dimension.

In 1954, a second mondialist structure, the Bilderberg Club or Bilderberg Group, was created. It brought together not only American analysts, politicians, financiers and intellectuals, but also their European colleagues. On the American side, it was represented exclusively by CFR members and was seen as its international continuation.

In 1973, the third most important mondialist structure, the Trilateral Commission, was created by activists of the Bilderberg Group. It was led by the Americans, members of the CFR and the Bilderberg Group, and had, in addition to the United States, where its headquarters is located (345 East 46th street, New York), two more headquarters in Europe and Japan.

The "Trilateral" Commission is named for fundamental geopolitical reasons. It is designed to unite under the auspices of Atlanticism and the United States three "large spaces" leading in technological development and market economy:

- 1) American space, which includes North and South America;
- 2) European space;
- 3) Pacific Space controlled by Japan.

At the head of the most important mondialist groups in Bilderberg and Trilateral is a senior CFR member, the largest banker David Rockefeller, owner of Chase Manhattan Bank.

In addition to him, the constant analysts, geopolitics and strategists of Atlanticism Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissind Ger are at the very center of all Mondialist projects. It also includes the famous George Ball.

The main line of all mondialist projects was the transition to a unified world system, under the strategic domination of the West and "progressive", "humanistic", "democratic" values. For this, parallel structures were developed, consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts, etc., who were supposed to prepare the ground before this mondialist project of the World Government could be widely publicized, since without preparation it would have come across to the powerful psychological resistance of peoples and states that do not want to dissolve their originality in the planetary melting pot.

The Mondialist project developed and implemented by these organizations was not homogeneous. There were two main versions of it, which, differing in methods, should theoretically lead to the same goal.

3.2 Convergence theory

The first most pacifist and "conciliatory" version of mondialism is known as the "convergence theory". Developed in the 1970s in the depths of the CFR by a group of "left" analysts led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, this theory assumed the possibility of overcoming the ideological and geopolitical dualism of the Cold War through the creation of a new cultural and ideological type of civilization that would be intermediate between socialism and capitalism. between pure Atlanticism and pure continentalism.

Soviet Marxism was seen as a barrier that could be overcome by moving on to its moderate, social democratic, revisionist version by rejecting the theses of "dictatorship of the proletariat", "class struggle", "nationalization of the means of production" and "abolition of private property." In turn, the capitalist West would have to restrict the freedom of the market, introduce partial state regulation of the economy, etc. A common cultural orientation could be found in the traditions of the Enlightenment and humanism, to which both Western democratic regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softened social democratic versions) are being raised.

The World Government, which could appear on the basis of the "theory of convergence", was conceived as an admission of Moscow to the Atlantic administration of the planet jointly with Washington. In this case, the era of universal peace would begin, the cold war would end, the peoples would be able to relieve the burden of geopolitical tension.

It is important to draw a parallel here with the transition of technological systems from "thalassocracy" to "ethericracy": Mondialist politicians began to look at the planet not through the eyes of the inhabitants of the western continent surrounded by the sea (like traditional Atlantists), but through the eyes of "astronauts in space orbit." In this case, their gaze was really One World, One World.

The Mondialist centers also had their correspondents in Moscow. The key figure here was Academician Gvishiani, director of the Institute for Systems Research, which was something like a branch of Trilateral in the USSR. But their activities were especially successful among the extreme left parties in Western Europe, which for the most part embarked on the path of "Eurocommunism" and this was considered the main conceptual basis for global convergence.

3.3 Planetary victory for the West

Convergence theories were the ideological foundation to which Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers who carried out perestroika referred. At the same time, a few years before the beginning of Soviet perestroika, a similar project began to be implemented in China, with which representatives of the Trilateral Commission established a close relationship since the late 1970s. But the geopolitical fates of the Chinese and Soviet "perestroika" were different. China insisted on a "fair" distribution of roles and appropriate shifts in

ideology of the West towards socialism. The USSR took the path of concessions much further.

Following the logic of the American mondialists, Gorbachev began the structural transformation of the Soviet space towards "democratization" and "liberalization." First of all, this affected the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and then the republics of the USSR. Strategic arms reduction and ideological rapprochement with the West began. But in this case, attention should be paid to the fact that the years of Gorbachev's rule fall on the period of the presidency in the United States of the extreme Republicans Reagan and Bush. Moreover, Reagan was the only president in recent years who consistently refused to participate in all mondialist organizations. By convictions, he was a tough, consistent and uncompromising Atlanticist, liberal-market, not inclined to any compromises with the "left" ideologies of even the most moderate democratic or social democratic persuasion. Consequently, Moscow's steps aimed at convergence and the creation of a World Government with a significant weight of representatives of the Eastern Bloc in it, at the opposite pole had the most unfavorable ideological obstacles. The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed The Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not followed the corresponding concessions from Sea Power, and the West made neither geopolitical nor ideological compromises with self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO did not dissolve, and its forces did not leave either Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology has further strengthened its position.

In this case, mondialism appeared not as an independent geopolitical doctrine that was realized in practice, but as a pragmatically used tool in the Cold War, the logic of which, based on the theses of Mackinder and Mahan, was not abandoned by the United States.

3.4 "End of History" by Francis Fukuyama

After the collapse of the USSR and the victory of the West, Atlanticism, the mondialist projects had to either die out or change their logic.

A new version of mondialism in the post-Soviet era was the doctrine of Francis Fukuyama, who published the programmatic article "The End of History" in the early 90s. It can be viewed as the ideological basis of neo-mondialism.

Fukuyama offers the following version of the historical process. Humanity from the dark era of the "law of power", "obscurantism" and "irrational management of social reality" moved to the most reasonable and logical order, embodied in capitalism, modern Western civilization, market economy and liberal democratic ideology. History and its development lasted only due to irrational factors, which little by little gave way to the laws of reason, the general monetary equivalent of all values, etc. The fall of the USSR marks the fall of the last bastion of "irrationalism". Connected with this is the end of History and the beginning of a special planetary existence, which will take place under the sign of the Market and Democracy, which will unite the world into a harmonious, rationally functioning machine.

Such a New Order, although based on the universalization of a purely Atlantic system goes beyond the framework of Atlanticism, and all regions of the world are reorganize by centers. beginning a new model, around its most economically developed

3.5 "Goeconomics" by Jacques Attali

There is an analogue of Fukuyama's theory among European authors. Thus, Jacques Attali, who for many years was the personal adviser to French President François Mitter, and also for some time the director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, developed a similar theory in his book "Horizon Lines".

Attali believes that at the moment the third era of the "era of money" is coming, which is the universal equivalent of value, since, equating all things with material digital expression, it is extremely easy to manage them in the most rational way. Attali himself associates this approach with the onset of the messianic era, understood in the Judeo-Kabbalistic context (he develops this aspect in more detail in another book specially devoted to messianism, "He will come"). This distinguishes him from Fukuyama, who remains within the framework of strict pragmatism and utilitarianism.

Jacques Attali offers his version of the future, which "has already arrived." The dominance of a single liberal-democratic ideology and market system on the entire planet, together with the development of information technologies, leads to the fact that the world becomes unified and homogeneous, the geopolitical realities that have dominated throughout history recede into the background in the "third era". Geopolitical dualism is canceled.

But the united world still receives a new geopolitical structuralization, based this time on the principles of "goeconomics". For the first time, the concept of "goeconomics" was proposed to develop by the historian Fritz Roerig, and it was popularized by Fernand Braudel.

"Goeconomics" is a special version of mondialist geopolitics, which prioritizes non-geographic, cultural, ideological, ethnic, religious, etc. factors that make up the essence of the geopolitical approach itself, but a purely economic reality in its relation to space. For "goeconomics" it does not matter at all what kind of people lives there and there, what is its history, cultural traditions, and so on. It all boils down to where the centers of world exchanges, minerals, information centers, and large-scale industries are located. "Goeconomics" approaches political reality as if the World Government and a single planetary state already existed.

Attali's goeconomic approach leads to the identification of three most important regions, which in the One World will become the centers of new economic spaces.

- 1) American space, which finally united both Americas into a single financial and industrial zone.
- 2) The European space that emerged after the economic unification of Europe.

3) the Pacific region, a zone of "new prosperity", which has several competing centers of Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.⁶⁴

According to Attali, there will be no special differences or contradictions between these three mondialist spaces, since both the economic and ideological types will be strictly identical in all cases. The only difference will be the purely geographical location of the most developed centers, which will concentrically structure around themselves the less developed regions located in spatial proximity. So concentric

restructuring can only take place at the "end of history" or, in other terms, with the abolition of traditional realities dictated by geopolitics.

Civilizational-geopolitical dualism is canceled. The absence of a pole opposite to Atlantism leads to a radical rethinking of space. The era of geoeconomics is coming.

In the Attali model, the ideas that formed the basis of the "Trilateral Commission" found their complete expression, which is the conceptual and political instrument that develops and implements such projects.

It is significant that the leaders of Trilateral (David Rockefeller, Georges Bertouin, then the head of the European department and Henry Kissinger) visited Moscow in January 1989, where they were received by the President of the USSR Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, and other high-ranking Soviet leaders, Medvedev, were also present at the meeting. Falin, Akhromeev, Dobrynin, Chernyaev, Arbatov and Primakov. Jacques Attali himself maintained personal contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

One thing is certain: the transition to geoeconomic logic and neo-mondialism became possible only after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasian USSR.

Neo-mondialism is not a direct continuation of historical mondialism, which initially assumed the presence of left-wing socialist elements in the final model. This is an intermediate option between mondialism proper and Atlanticism.

3.6 Professor Santoro's Post-Catastrophic Mondialism

There are more detailed versions of neomondialism. One of the most striking is the futurological geopolitical concept developed by the Milan Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) under the guidance of Professor Carlo Santoro.

According to Santoro's model, humanity is currently in a transitional stage from a bipolar world to a mondialist version of multipolarity (understood geoeconomically, like Attali's). International institutions (UN, etc.), which for Fukuyama's optimistic mondialism seem to be sufficiently developed to become the nucleus of the "World Government", Santoro, on the contrary, appear to be ineffective and reflect the outdated logic of bipolar geopolitics. Moreover, the whole world bears the stable imprint of the Cold War, the geopolitical

⁶⁴Jack Attali "Lignes d'horizon", Paris. 1990

the logic of which remains dominant. Santoro foresees that such a situation cannot but end with a period of civilizational catastrophes.

He goes on to outline the alleged scenario of these disasters:

- 1) Further weakening of the role of international institutions
- 2) The growth of nationalist tendencies among the countries that were part of the Warsaw treaty and in the Third World. This leads to chaotic processes.
- 3) Disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not affect the Europe) and progressive disintegration of existing states.
- 4) The beginning of the era of wars of low and medium intensity, as a result of which new geopolitical formations are formed.
- 5) The threat of planetary chaos forces various blocs to recognize the need to create new international institutions with huge powers, which actually means the establishment of a World Government.
- 6) The final creation of the planetary state of international authorities (World Government)⁶⁵ under the auspices of new

This model is intermediate between the Mondialist Fukuyama Francis's optimism and the Atlanticist pessimism of Samuel Huntington.

⁶⁵ See Prof. Carlo Santoro "Progetto di ricerca multifunzionale 1994 - 1995 - I nuovi poli geopolitici", Milano

Chapter 4. Applied Geopolitics

4.1 "Internal geopolitics" the Yves Lacoste school

The geopolitical renaissance in Europe is associated with the activities of the geographer Yves Lacoste, who in 1976 founded the magazine "Herodotus", where for the first time in post-war Europe geopolitical texts began to be regularly published. It should be especially emphasized that the head was a person close to left-wing political circles, while until that moment only rather marginal right-wing, nationalist circles were engaged in geopolitics in Europe.

In 1983, the journal "Herodotus" introduces the subtitle "Journal of Geography and Geopolitics" into its title, and from that moment begins the second life of geopolitics, now officially recognized as a special political science discipline that helps in a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Yves Lacoste strives to adapt geopolitical principles to the current situation. Lacoste himself does not share the "organicist approach" characteristic of continental school, nor a purely pragmatic and mechanistic geopolitical utilitarianism of Sea Power ideologues. From his point of view, geopolitical considerations serve only to "justify the rival aspirations of the authorities in relation to certain territories and the people inhabiting them."⁶⁶. This can apply to both international relations and narrowly regional problems.

For Lacoste, geopolitics becomes only an instrument for analyzing a specific situation, and all the global theories that underlie this discipline are reduced to relative, historically determined concepts.

Thus, Lacoste offers a completely new definition of geopolitics, in fact a new discipline. This is no longer continental thinking based on a fundamental planetary civilizational-geographical dualism and coupled with global ideological systems, but the use of some methodological models that were present in traditional geopolitics in a general context, but taken in this case as something independent. This is the "deglobalization" of geopolitics, reducing it to a narrow analytical method.

This geopolitics is called "internal geopolitics" (la geopolitique interne), since it is often concerned with local problems.

4.2 Electoral "geopolitics"

A kind of such internal geopolitics is a special technique developed to study the relationship between the political sympathies of the population and the territory in which this population lives. The forerunner of this approach was the Frenchman André Siegfried (1875-1959), a politician and geographer. He made the first attempts to investigate "internal geopolitics" in relation to the political sympathies of certain regions. The first formulations go back to him

⁶⁶ Yves Lacoste "Dictionnaire Geopolitique", Paris, 1986

patterns that formed the basis of the "electoral geopolitics" of the new Ives school Lacoste.

Siegfried wrote:

"Each batch or, more precisely, each political trend has its privileged territory; it is easy to see that just as there are geological or economic regions, there are also political regions. The political climate can be studied in the same way as the natural climate. I noticed that, despite the deceptive appearance, public opinion, depending on the regions, remains a certain constancy. Under the ever-changing landscape of political elections, deeper and more permanent trends can be traced, reflecting the regional temperament."⁶⁷

In the Lacoste school, this theory was systematically developed and became a familiar sociological tool that is widely used in political practice.

4.3 Mediocracy as a "geopolitical" factor

Yves Lacoste set himself the task of bringing into geopolitics the latest criteria inherent in the information society. The greatest value among information systems that directly affect geopolitical processes are possessed by the mass media, especially television. In modern society, it is not the conceptual-rational approach that dominates, but the brightness of the "image" ("image"). Political, ideological and geopolitical views are formed in a significant part of society solely on the basis of telecommunications. The mediatic "image" is an atomic synthesis in which

some approaches ethnic, cultural, ideological, political. The synthetic quality of "image" brings it together with the categories that traditionally operates geopolitics.

A news report from some hot spot, about which nothing is known, for example, a resident of a capitol, should, in the shortest possible time, present the geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural, ethnic profile of the region, as well as place accents in accordance with a narrowly defined political purpose. Thus, the profession of a journalist (especially a television journalist) approaches the profession of geopolitics. The mass media in modern society no longer play a purely auxiliary role, as before, but are becoming a powerful independent geopolitical factor capable of exerting a strong influence on the historical destinies of peoples.

4.4 History of geopolitics

There is another direction in the general process of the "revival" of European geopolitics, the history of geopolitics. It is not geopolitical in the full sense of the word, since it sets as its task the historical reconstruction of this discipline, work with sources, chronology, systematization, bibliographic data, etc. In a sense, this is a "museum approach" that does not pretend to any conclusions and generalizations in relation to the current situation. Such a historical line

⁶⁷ Andre Siegfried "Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisieme Republique", Paris, 1913

represented, first of all, by the works of Pierre-Marie Gollois and such authors as Hervé Couteau-Begary, Gerard Chalyan, Hans-Adolphe Jacobsen, etc.

As part of this initiative, the texts of the historical geopolitics Mackinder, Mahan, Challen, Haushofer, etc. are being published and republished.

Historical studies of this kind are often published in the French journal Herodotus and the new Italian geopolitical journal Limes, published by Lucho Caracholo and Michel Corenmann with the participation of the same Lacoste.

4.5 "Applied geopolitics" is not geopolitics

Applied or "internal geopolitics" developed by Yves Lacoste, as well as other prominent specialists, Michel Korenmann, Paul-Marie de la Gors, etc., is characteristic of modern European political science and deliberately avoids conceptual generalizations and futurological developments. This is the fundamental difference between this entire trend, especially developed in France and Italy, from the proper Atlanticist and Mondialist schools located in the United States and England.

Applied geopolitics retains much fewer ties with historical, pre-war geopolitics than Atlanticism and Mondialism, not to mention the "continentist" tradition. This is a purely analytical, political science, sociological methodology and nothing more. Therefore, a distinction should be made between it and the planetary global projects of the geopolitics proper. In essence, we are talking about two disciplines, which are brought together only by terminology and some methods. Ignoring geopolitical dualism, considering it either overcome, or insignificant, or simply going beyond the frames of the main subject of study, "applied geopolitics" ceases to be geopolitics in the proper sense of the word and becomes just a kind of statistical-sociological methodology.

Real geopolitical decisions and projects related to the fate of Europe and the peoples inhabiting it are being developed in other instances associated with the strategic centers of Atlanticism and Mondialism. Thus, the project of European integration was developed exclusively by the efforts of intellectuals who collaborated in the "Trilateral Commission", i.e. in a mondialist supranational organization that has neither a strict legal status nor political legitimacy. The Frenchman Jacques Attali developed his geopolitical theories based on the data of this very organization, of which he was a member, and not on the basis of the "applied" geopolitics of the modern European school.

Chapter 5. Geopolitics of the European "new right"

5.1 Europe of one hundred flags. Alain de Benoist

One of the few European geopolitical schools that has retained a continuous connection with the ideas of the pre-war German geopolitical continentalists is the New Right. This trend originated in France in the late 60s and is associated with the figure of the leader of this movement, the philosopher and publicist Alain de Benoist.

The "new right" is sharply different from the traditional French right-wing monarchists, Catholics, Germanophobes, chauvinists, anti-communists, conservatives, etc. on almost all counts. "New Right" supporters of "organic democracy", pagans, Germanophiles, socialists, modernists, etc. At first, the "left camp", traditionally extremely influential in France, considered this a "tactical maneuver" of the ordinary right, but over time, the seriousness of evolution was proved and recognized by everyone.

One of the fundamental principles of the ideology of the "new right", analogues of which soon appeared in other European countries, was the principle of "continental geopolitics." In contrast to the "old right" and classical nationalists, de Benoist believed that the principle of the centralist State-Nation (Etat-Nation) was historically exhausted and that the future belonged only to the "Great Spaces". Moreover, the basis for such "Great Spaces" should be not so much the unification of different States into a pragmatic political bloc, but the entry of ethnic groups of different scales into a single "Federal Empire" on equal grounds. Such a "Federal Empire" should be strategically united and ethnically differentiated.

The "Big Space" that interested de Benoist the most was Europe. The "new rightists" believed that the peoples of Europe have a common Indo-European origin, a single source. This is the principle of the "common past". But the circumstances of the modern era, in which the tendencies of strategic and economic integration are active, necessary for the possession of genuine geopolitical sovereignty, dictate the need for unification in a purely pragmatic sense. Thus, the peoples of Europe are doomed to a "common future." From this, de Benoist concludes that the main geopolitical principle should be the thesis "United Europe of a hundred flags"⁶⁸. In this perspective, as in all the concepts of the "new right", there is a clear desire to combine "conservative" and "modernist" elements, i.e. "right" and "left". In recent years, the "new right" has abandoned this definition, believing that they are "right" as much as the "left".

De Benoist's geopolitical theses are based on the affirmation of the "continental fate of Europe." In this he fully follows the concepts of the Haushofer school. From this follows the opposition of "Europe" and "West" characteristic of the "new right". "Europe" for them is a continental geopolitical entity based on an ethnic ensemble of Indo-European origin and having common cultural roots. This concept is traditional. "West", on the contrary, is a geopolitical and historical concept associated with the modern world, denying ethnic and spiritual traditions,

⁶⁸ Alain de Benoist "Les idées à l'endroit", Paris, 1979

putting forward purely material and quantitative criteria for existence; it is a utilitarian and rationalistic, mechanistic bourgeois civilization. The most complete embodiment of the West and its civilization is the USA.

This constitutes the concrete project of the "new rightists". Europe should integrate into a "Federal Empire" opposed to the West and the United States, and regionalist tendencies should be especially encouraged, since regions and ethnic minorities have retained more traditional features than megacities and cultural centers affected by the "spirit of the West." At the same time, France should be guided by Germany and Central Europe. Hence the interest of the "new right" in de Gaulle and Friedrich Naumann. At the level of practical politics, since the 1970s, the "new right" has been advocating a strict strategic neutrality of Europe, withdrawal from NATO, and the development of a self-sufficient European nuclear potential.

Regarding the USSR (later Russia), the position of the "new right" has evolved. Starting with the classic thesis "Neither the West, nor the East, but Europe", they gradually evolved to the thesis "First of all Europe, but better even with the East than with the West." On a practical level, the initial interest in China and the projects of organizing a strategic alliance between Europe and China to counter both "American and Soviet imperialism" have been replaced by a moderate "Sovietophilia" and the idea of an alliance between Europe and Russia.

The geopolitics of the "new right" is oriented radically anti-Atlantic and anti-mondialist. They see the fate of Europe as the antithesis of Atlantist and Mondialist projects. They are opponents of "thalassocracy" and the concept of One World.

It should be noted that under the conditions of the total strategic and political domination of Atlanticism in Europe during the Cold War, de Benoist's geopolitical position (theoretically and logically flawless) contrasted so much with the "norms of political thinking" that it simply could not get any widespread dissemination. It was a kind of "dissidence" and, like any "dissidence" and "nonconformism," it had a marginal character. Until now, the intellectual level of the "new right", the high quality of their publications and editions, even the large number of their followers in the European academic environment contrast sharply with the negligible attention paid to them by the authorities and analytical structures serving the authorities with geopolitical projects.

5.2 Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin. Jean Thiriard

A somewhat different version of continental geopolitics was developed by another European "dissident", the Belgian Jean Thiriard (1922-1992). Since the beginning of the 60s, he was the leader of the all-European radical movement "Young Europe".

Thiriard considered geopolitics to be the main political science discipline, without which it is impossible to build a rational and far-sighted political and state strategy. A follower of Haushofer and Nikisch, he considered himself a "European National Bolshevik" and the builder of the "European Empire". It was his ideas that anticipated the more developed and sophisticated projects of the "new right".

Jean Thiriard based his political theory on the principle of "autarchy of large spaces". Developed in the middle of the 19th century by the German economist Friedrich List,

this theory asserted that a full-fledged strategic and economic development of a state is possible only if it has a sufficient geopolitical scale and great territorial potential. Thiriard applied this principle to the current situation and came to the conclusion that the world significance of the European states would be completely lost if they did not unite into a single Empire opposing the United States. At the same time, Thiriard believed that such an "Empire" should not be "federal" and "regionally oriented", but extremely unified, centralist, corresponding to the Jacobin model. It should become a powerful unified continental State-Nation. This is the main difference between the views of de Benois and Thiriard.

In the late 70s, Thiriard's views underwent some change. An analysis of the geopolitical situation led him to the conclusion that the scale of Europe is no longer sufficient to free itself from the American thalassocracy. Consequently, the main condition for "European liberation" is the unification of Europe with the USSR. From a geopolitical scheme that includes three main zones, the West, Europe, Russia (USSR), he moved to a scheme with only two components, the West and the Eurasian continent. At the same time, Thiriard came to the radical conclusion that it was better for Europe to choose Soviet socialism than Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

This is how the project "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin" appeared.⁶⁹ It almost prophetically describes the reasons that should lead the USSR to collapse if it does not take active geopolitical steps in Europe and the South in the very near future. Thiriard believed that Haushofer's ideas regarding the "Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo continental bloc" are highly relevant to this day. It is important that Thiriard set out these theses 15 years before the collapse of the USSR, absolutely accurately predicting its logic and reasons. Thiriard made attempts to bring his views to the attention of the Soviet leaders. But he failed to do this, although in the 60s he had personal meetings with Nasser, Zhou Enlai and the highest Yugoslav leaders. It is indicative that Moscow rejected his project of organizing underground "detachments of European liberation" in Europe for the terrorist struggle against "agents of Atlanticism."

The views of Jean Thiriard lie at the heart of the now intensifying non-conformist movement of the European National Bolsheviks ("Front for European Liberation"). They come close to the projects of contemporary Russian neo- Eurasism.

5.3 Thinking continents. Jordis von Lohausen

The Austrian general Jordis von Lohausen is very close to Thiriard. Unlike Thiriard or de Benoit, he does not participate in direct political activity and does not build specific social projects. He takes a strictly scientific approach and limits himself to purely geopolitical analysis. His initial position is the same as that of the National Bolsheviks and the "new right", he is a continentalist and a follower of Haushofer.

Lohausen believes that political power only has a chance to become durable and stable when the rulers think not in momentary and local categories, but

⁶⁹Jean Thiriard "L'Empire Eurosovietique de Vladivostok jusque Dublin", Brussell, 1988

"millennia and continents". His main book is called *Courage to Rule. Thinking Continents*.⁷⁰

Lohausen believes that global territorial, civilizational, cultural and social processes become understandable only if they are seen in "farsighted" perspective, which ^{is he} contrasts historical "myopia". Power in the human historical ^{is he} the society on which the choice depends path and the most important decisions, ^{is he} must be guided by very general schemes that make it possible to find a place for this or that state or people in a huge historical perspective. Therefore, the main discipline required to determine the strategy of power is geopolitics in its traditional sense, operating with global categories, abstracting from analytical particulars (and not the "internal" applied geopolitics of the Lacoste school). Modern ideologies, the latest technological and civilizational shifts, of course, change the topography of the world, but they cannot cancel some of the basic laws associated with natural and cultural cycles, calculated for millennia.

Such global categories are space, language, ethnos, resources, etc.

Lohausen offers the following formula for power: "Power = Strength x Location" He specifies:

"Since Power is Power multiplied by location, only a favorable geographic location provides an opportunity for the full development of internal forces."⁷¹

Thus, power (political, intellectual, etc.) is directly linked to space.

Lohausen separates the fate of Europe from the fate of the West, considering Europe to be a continental entity temporarily under the control of the thalassocracy. But for political liberation, Europe needs a spatial (positional) minimum. Such a minimum is obtained only through the unification of Germany, the integration processes in Central Europe, the restoration of the territorial unity of Prussia (torn between Poland, the USSR and the GDR) and the further folding of the European powers into a new independent bloc, independent of Atlanticism. It is important to note the role of Prussia. Lohausen (following Nikisch and Spengler) believes that Prussia is the most continental, "Eurasian" part of Germany, and that if the capital of Germany were not Berlin, but Königsberg, European history would have gone in a different, more correct direction.

Lohausen believes that the future of Europe in a strategic perspective is unthinkable without Russia, and vice versa, Russia (USSR) needs Europe, since without it geopolitically it is incomplete and vulnerable to America, whose location is much better, and therefore, whose power sooner or later is much ahead of the USSR. Lohausen emphasized that the USSR could have four Europeans in the West: "a hostile Europe, a subordinate Europe, a devastated Europe and an allied Europe." The first three options are inevitable if the course of the European policy that the USSR pursued during the Cold War is maintained. Only the desire to make Europe "allied and friendly" at any cost can correct the fatal geopolitical situation of the USSR and become the beginning of a new stage in geopolitical history - the Eurasian stage.

⁷⁰Jordis von Lohausen "Mut zur Macht. Denken in Kontinenten", Berg, 1978

⁷¹Ibidem

Lohausen's position is deliberately limited to purely geopolitical statements. He omits ideological questions. For example, the geopolitics of Boyar Russia, Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union represent for him a single continuous process, independent of a change in the ruling system or ideology. Russia is geopolitically a heartland, and therefore, whatever the regime in it, its fate is predetermined by its lands.

Lohausen, like Thiriard, predicted in advance the geopolitical collapse of the USSR, which would be inevitable if he followed his usual course. If the Atlanticist geopoliticians viewed such an outcome as a victory, Lohausen saw in this rather a defeat of the continental forces. But with the nuance that the new opportunities that will open after the fall of the Soviet system can create favorable preconditions for the creation of a new Eurasian bloc, the Continental Empire, in the future, since certain restrictions dictated by Marxist ideology would be removed in this case.

5.4 Eurasian Empire of the End. Jean Parvulesco

A romantic version of geopolitics is presented by the famous French writer Jean Parvulesco. For the first time, geopolitical themes in literature arise already in George Orwell, who, in his dystopia "1984", described futurologically the division of the planet into three huge continental blocks "Eastasia, Eurasia, Oceania." Similar themes are found in Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, Raymond Abellio, etc.

Jean Parvulesco makes geopolitical themes central in all his works, thus opening up a new genre of "geopolitical fiction".

Parvulesco's concept in short is⁷²: the history of mankind is the history of Power, power. For access to central positions in civilization, i.e. to Power itself, various semi-secret organizations strive, whose cycles of existence far exceed the duration of ordinary political ideologies, ruling dynasties, religious institutions, states and peoples. These organizations, acting in history under different names, Parvulesco defines as "the order of the Atlanticists" and "the order of the Eurasians". There is a centuries-old struggle between them, in which popes, patriarchs, kings, diplomats, major financiers, revolutionaries, mystics, generals, scientists, artists, etc. take part. All socio-cultural manifestations are thus reducible to primordial, albeit extremely complex, geopolitical archetypes.

This is a geopolitical line brought to its logical limit, the premises of which are clearly traced even among the completely rational and alien to "mysticism" founders of geopolitics as such.

The central role in Parvulesco's stories is played by General De Gaulle and the geopolitical structure he founded, which remained in the shadows after the end of his presidency. Parvulesco calls this "geopolitical Gaullism." This "geopolitical Gaullism" is the French counterpart to the continentalism of the Haushofer school.

⁷²Jean Parvulesco "Galaxie GRU", Paris, 1991

The main task of the supporters of this line is the organization of the European continental bloc "Paris Berlin Moscow". In this aspect, Parvulesco's theories merge with the theses of the "New Right" and "National Bolsheviks."

Parvulesco believes that the current historical stage is the culmination of a centuries-old geopolitical confrontation, when the dramatic history of the continental-civilizational duel comes to an end. He foresees the imminent rise of the gigantic continental structure of the "Eurasian Empire of the End" and then a final clash with the "Empire of the Atlantic." This eschatological duel, which he describes in apocalyptic terms, he calls "Endkampf" ("Final Battle"). It is curious that in Parvulesco's texts, fictional characters coexist with real historical figures, with many of whom the author maintained (and still maintains with some) friendly relations. Among them are politicians from De Gaulle's inner circle, British and American diplomats, the poet Ezra Pound, the philosopher Julius Evola,

Despite the fictional form, Parvulesco's texts are of great geopolitical value proper, since a number of his articles, published in the late 70s, strangely accurately describe the situation in the world only by the mid-90s.

5.5 Indian Ocean as a path to world domination. Robert Stoykers

The complete opposite of Parvulesco's "geopolitical visionary" is the Belgian geopolitician and publicist Robert Stoykers, publisher of the two prestigious magazines *Orientation* and *Vuloir*. Stoykers approaches geopolitics from a purely scientific, rationalistic standpoint, striving to free this discipline from all "accidental" strata. But following the logic of the "new right" in the academic direction, he comes to conclusions that are strikingly close to the "prophecies" of Parvulesco.

Stoykers also believes that the socio-political and especially diplomatic projects of various states and blocs, in whatever ideological form they may be dressed, are an indirect and sometimes veiled expression of global geopolitical projects. In this he sees the influence of the "Earth" factor on human history. Man is an earthly being (created from the earth). Consequently, the earth and space predetermine a person in his most significant manifestations. This is a prerequisite for "geohistory".

Continental orientation is a priority for Stoykers; he considers Atlanticism hostile to Europe, and connects the fate of European prosperity with Germany and Central Europe⁷³. Stoykers is a supporter of active cooperation between Europe and the countries of the Third World, and especially with the Arab world.

At the same time, he emphasizes the enormous importance of the Indian Ocean for the future geopolitical structure of the planet. He defines the Indian Ocean as the "Middle Ocean" located between the Atlantic and Pacific. The Indian Ocean is located exactly in the middle between the east coast of Africa and the Pacific zone, which includes New Zealand, Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina. Indian Ocean maritime control is key

⁷³ Robert Steukers "La Russie, L'Europe et L'Occident" dans "Orientation" No. 4 nov.-dec. 1983

position for geopolitical influence on the three most important "large spaces" Africa, the South Eurasian rimland and the Pacific region. This gives rise to the strategic priority of some small islands in the Indian Ocean, especially Diego Garcia, which is equidistant from all coastal zones.

The Indian Ocean is the area on which the entire European strategy should focus, since through this zone Europe will be able to influence the United States, Eurasia, and Japan, Stoikers argues. From his point of view, the decisive geopolitical confrontation, which should predetermine the picture of the future XXI century, will unfold in this very space.

Stoikers is actively involved in the history of geopolitics, and he owns articles about the founders of this science in the new edition of the "Brussels Encyclopedia".

5.6 Russia + Islam = salvation of Europe. Carlo Terracciano

An active geopolitical center of continental orientation also exists in Italy. In Italy, after the Second World War, the ideas of Karl Schmitt spread more than in other European countries, and thanks to this, the geopolitical way of thinking became very common there. In addition, it was in Italy that the "Young Europe" movement of Jean Tiriard was most developed, and, accordingly, the idea of continental National Bolshevism.

Among the numerous political science and sociological "new right" journals and centers dealing with geopolitics, Milanese "Orion" is of particular interest, where over the past 10 years, geopolitical analyzes of Dr. Carlo Terracciano have been regularly published. Terracciano expresses the most extreme position of European continentalism, closely adjacent to Eurasianism.

Terracciano fully accepts the picture of Mackinder and Mahan and agrees with the strict civilizational and geographical dualism they emphasized. At the same time, he unequivocally takes the side of the heartland, believing that the fate of Europe entirely depends on the fate of Russia and Eurasia, on the East. The Continental East is positive, the Atlantic West is negative. Such a radical approach on the part of a European is an exception even among continental geopolitics, since Terracciano does not even emphasize the special status of Europe, believing that this is a secondary moment in the face of the planetary confrontation between thalassocracy and tellurocracy.

He fully shares the idea of a single Eurasian State, a "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin," which brings him closer to Thiriard, but at the same time he does not share the "Jacobinism" and "universalism" characteristic of Thiriard, insisting on ethno-cultural differentiation and regionalism, which brings him closer, in turn, to Alain de Benoit.

Terracciano's emphasis on the centrality of the Russian factor is side by side with another curious point: he believes that the most important role in the fight against Atlanticism belongs to the Islamic world, especially clearly anti-American regimes: Iranian, Libyan, Iraqi, etc. This leads him to the conclusion that the Islamic world is in the highest degree the exponent of continental geopolitical interests. At the same time, he regards the "fundamentalist" version of Islam as positive.

The final formula that summarizes Dr. Terracciano's geopolitical views is:

Russia (heartland) + Islam vs USA (atlantism, mondialism)⁷⁴

Terracciano sees Europe as a springboard for the Russian-Islamic anti-mondialist bloc. From his point of view, only such a radical formulation of the question can objectively lead to a genuine European revival.

Other employees of Orion and the intellectual center working on its basis adhere to views similar to Terracciano (prof. Claudio Mutti, Maurizio Murelli, sociologist Alessandra Kolla, Marco Battarra, etc.) , social democratic, communist and anarchist circles in Italy, the newspaper "Umanita", the magazine "Nuovi Angulatsioni", etc.

⁷⁴ Carlo Terracciano "Nel Fiume della Storia" in "Orion", Milano, No. 22-30, 1986-1987

6.1 Eurasian passion Lev Gumilev

The brightest student of the Eurasian Savitsky was the famous Russian scientist historian Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev. He did not touch upon geopolitical topics in his works, but his theory of ethnogenesis and ethnic cycles clearly continues the line of the "organicist" approach and, in part, "geographical determinism", which constitute the essence of geopolitics already in Ratzel, Challen, Haushofer, etc.

Especially important are Gumilyov's research in relation to the ancient periods of the ethnic map of Eurasia, the steppe, nomadic peoples and their civilizations. His works form a completely new vision of political history, in which the Eurasian East appears not just as barbaric lands on the periphery of civilization (equated to Western civilization), but as an independent and dynamic center of ethnogenesis, culture, political history, state and technical development. The West and its history are relativized, the Eurasian culture and the constellation of Eurasian ethnic groups are revealed as a multidimensional and completely unexplored world with its own scale of values, religious problems, historical patterns, etc.

Gumilyov develops and brings to the logical limit the general Eurasian idea that ethnically Great Russians, Russians are not just a branch of the Eastern Slavs, but a special ethnos formed on the basis of the Turkic-Slavic fusion. This indirectly implies the validity of Russian control over those Eurasian lands inhabited by Turkic ethnic groups. The Great Russian civilization was formed on the basis of the Turkic-Slavic ethnogenesis, which was realized on the geographical plane as a historical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe. It is the geopolitical combination of the Forest and the Steppe that constitutes the historical essence of Russia, predetermining the nature of its culture, civilization, ideology, and political fate.

Gumilev, following Spengler and Toynbee, singles out the cycles of civilizations and cultures, as well as the corresponding ethnic groups. From his point of view, the ethno-cultural formations of the nation, state, religious communities are like living organisms in everything. They go through periods of birth, adolescence, maturity and aging, and then disappear or turn into the so-called. "relics". This again clearly shows the influence of the "organicist philosophy" common to all continental geopolitical schools.

Gumilev's theories about the causes of ethnogenesis are extremely interesting, i.e. birth of a people or state. To describe this process, he introduces the term "passionarity" or "drive impulse"⁷⁵. It is an inexplicable synchronous surge of biological and spiritual energy that suddenly sets in motion the sluggish historical existence of "old" peoples and cultures, capturing various established ethnic and religious groups in a dynamic rush spatial, spiritual and technical expansion, which leads to conquests and the fusion of heterogeneous residual ethnic groups into new active and viable forms. High and full-fledged passionarity and the dynamic process of ethnogenesis normally lead to the emergence of a special super-ethnos, which corresponds not to

⁷⁵L. Gumilev "Ethnogenesis and biosphere of the earth", Leningrad, 1990

as much a national-state form of political organization as an empire.

Passionarity is gradually decreasing. "Passionism" (for Gumilyov this is a positive category, which he equates with "heroism", with the ethical striving for disinterested creation in the name of fidelity to the national tradition) is being replaced by "actualism", that is, concern only with the present moment, divorced from tradition and without regard to the fate of future generations. In this phase, a "passionary breakdown" occurs and ethnogenesis enters the negative stage of conservation and the beginning of decay. This is followed by the "futuristic" phase, in which the type of powerless "dreamers", "dreamers", "religious escapists", who lose faith in the environment around them and seek to escape into the "otherworldly," dominate. Gumilev sees this as a sign of final decline. Ethnicity is degrading

This situation continues until a new "passionary impulse", when a new fresh ethnos appears and provokes a new ethnogenesis, in which the remnants of old structures are melted down. Moreover, some ethnic groups remain in a "relict" state (Gumilev calls them "chimeras"), while others disappear in the dynamics of a new ethnogenetic process.

Especially important is Gumilyov's assertion that the Great Russians are a relatively "fresh" and "young" ethnos, rallying around themselves the "super-ethnos" of Russia-Eurasia or the Eurasian Empire.

Gumilyov's Eurasianism suggests the following geopolitical conclusions (which he himself did not draw for understandable political reasons, preferring to remain strictly within the framework of historical science).

- 1) Eurasia is a full-fledged "local development", a fertile rich soil of ethnogenesis and cultural genesis. Therefore, it is necessary to learn to consider world history not in unipolar optics "West and all the rest" (as is characteristic of Atlanticist historiography), but in multipolar, and northern and eastern Eurasia are of particular interest, since they are an alternative to the West source of the most important planetary civilizational processes ... In his writings, Gumilev gives a detailed picture of Mackinder's thesis on the "geographical axis of history" and endows this axis with specific historical and ethnic content.
- 2) The geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, which underlies the Great Russian statehood, is a key reality for the cultural and strategic control over Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, such control would contribute to a harmonious balance of East and West, while the cultural limitations of Western civilizations (Forest), with its striving for domination, accompanied by a complete misunderstanding of the culture of the East (Steppe), leads only to conflicts and upheavals.
- 3) Western civilization is in the last descending stage of ethnogenesis, being a conglomerate of "chimerical" ethnic groups. Consequently, the center of gravity will necessarily shift to younger peoples.
- 4) It is also possible that in the near future some unpredictable and unforeseen "passionary push" will occur, which will dramatically change the political and

the cultural map of the planet, since the domination of "relict" ethnic groups cannot last long.

6.2 New Russian Eurasians

Gumilyov himself did not formulate geopolitical conclusions based on his picture of the world. This was done by his followers during the period of the weakening (and then the abolition) of the Marxist ideological censorship. This trend in general has received the name "neo-Eurasianism", which, in turn, has several varieties. Not all of them inherit Gumilyov's ideas, but in general, his influence on this geopolitical ideology is colossal.

Neo-Eurasianism has several varieties.

The first (and the most basic and developed) is a complete and multidimensional ideology, which was formulated by some political circles of the national opposition, opposing liberal reforms in the period 1990-1994. We are talking about a group of intellectuals united around the newspaper Den (later Zavtra) and the magazine Elements⁷⁶.

This neo-Eurasianism is based on the ideas of P. Savitsky, G. Vernadsky, Vol. Trubetskoy, as well as the ideologist of Russian National Bolshevism Nikolai Ustryalov. The analysis of historical Eurasians is recognized as highly relevant and quite applicable to the present situation. The thesis of a national ideocracy of an imperial continental scale is opposed simultaneously to both liberal Westernism and narrow ethnic nationalism. Russia is seen as the axis of the geopolitical "large space," and its ethnic mission is unambiguously identified with imperialism.

At the socio-political level, this trend unequivocally gravitates towards Eurasian socialism, considering the liberal economy a characteristic feature of the Atlanticist camp. The Soviet period of Russian history is viewed from the Smenovekhov perspective as a modernist form of the traditional Russian national aspiration for planetary expansion and the "Eurasian anti-Atlantist universalism." Hence the "pro-communist tendencies of this version of neo-Eurasianism.

Lev Gumilyov's legacy is accepted, but at the same time the theory of passionarity is coupled with the theory of the "circulation of elites" by the Italian sociologist Wilfred Pareto, and Gumilyov's religious studies are corrected on the basis of the school of European traditionalists (Guénon, Evola, etc.).

Traditionalist ideas "crisis modern the world", "degradation West", "desacralization of civilization", etc. are an important component of neo-Eurasianism, complementing and developing those moments that were presented by Russian authors only intuitively and fragmentarily.

In addition, European continentalist projects (Haushofer, Schmitt, Nikisch, "new rightists", etc.) are thoroughly studied, due to which the horizons of the Eurasian doctrine extend to Europe, understood as a potentially continental

⁷⁶ Françoise Thome "Eurasisme et Neo-Eurasisme" dans "Commentaire", etc 1994, no. 66.

force. This is a motive completely alien to the historical Eurasian emigrants, who wrote their main works in a situation when the United States did not yet have an independent geopolitical significance, and the thesis about the difference between Europe and the West had not yet received proper development. Neo-Eurasianism, listening to European continentalists, recognizes the strategic importance of Europe for the geopolitical completeness and usefulness of the Eurasian "Greater Space", especially considering that it was the factor of the unstable division of the geopolitical map of Europe that led to the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.

Another feature of neo-Eurasianism is the choice of Islamic countries (especially mainland Iran) as an important strategic ally. The idea of a continental Russian-Islamic alliance underlies the anti-Atlantic strategy on the southwestern coast of the Eurasian continent. At the doctrinal level, this alliance is based on the traditional character of the Russian and Islamic civilizations, which unites them in opposition to the anti-traditional, secular-pragmatic West.

In this direction of neo-Eurasianism, the picture of all geopolitical projects in relation to the current situation is being completed to its completeness, since ideologically, strategically, politically, and positionally, the neo-Eurasian project is the most complete, consistent, complete and historically justified opposition to all varieties of Western geopolitical projects (both Atlanticist and mondialist).

Mondialism and Atlanticism express two varieties of the geopolitical ideology of the Far West. Europeanism and moderate continentalism of European geopoliticians represent an intermediate reality. And finally, the neo-Eurasianism of The Day and especially of The Elements expresses a radically anti-Western point of view that merges with all other alternative geopolitical projects from European National Bolshevism to Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamic "socialism") to national liberation movements in all corners Third World.

Other varieties of neo-Eurasianism are less consistent and represent the adaptation of the entire complex of the above ideas to the changing political reality: either we are talking only about pragmatic economic "Eurasianism" designed to recreate the economic interaction of the former republics of the USSR (project of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev), or about justification expansionist theses (the "great-power" project of V. Zhirinovskiy), or about a purely rhetorical appeal to the "Eurasian community" to preserve the unity of Russian and national minorities (mostly ethnic Turks and Muslims) within the Russian Federation (project of some government officials of Boris Yeltsin), or about a purely historical interest in the heritage of the circle of Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Suvchinsky, Karsavin, etc. in emigration. But all these versions are necessarily artificial, fragmentary, inconsistent and cannot pretend to be an independent and serious geopolitical ideology and methodology. Therefore, it does not make much sense to dwell on them in more detail.

We only note that any appeals to Eurasianism and Eurasia, no matter how limited meaning those who use them put into these concepts, refer directly or indirectly to that neo-Eurasian project that was developed in opposition circles and formalized in the works of the authors of The Day "and" Elements", since it is only in this context that the use of the word "Eurasianism" is justified by the continuity of the Russian

the geopolitical school, and the correlation with the general fan of geopolitical projects on a planetary scale that exist outside of Russia.

6.3 Towards a new bipolarity

Neo-Eurasianism, in addition to its intellectual heritage and the general principles of continental geopolitics, faces the latest problems posed in the form of the latest geopolitical projects of the West. Moreover, this geopolitical direction acquires significance precisely to the extent that it is able not only to explain geopolitically the logic of the historical events taking place, but to develop a coherent futurological project that can resist the projects of the West.

The West's victory in the Cold War conceptually means the end of the bipolar world and the beginning of the unipolar world. At the same time, if pure Atlantists (Huntington) assume that this unipolarity will be the relative victorious West (The West) will be forced to constantly settle the growing intercivilizational conflicts with "the rest of the world" (The Rest), then the Mondialists (Fukuyama, Attali) see a problem-free domination The West needs the entire planet as something that has already happened. Even the most controversial version of Professor Santoro presupposes, in the end, the establishment of a World Government.

These are projects of geopolitical winners who today have undeniable advantages and strategic initiative that must be reckoned with to the highest degree. All of them agree on one thing: sooner or later, Western-type universalism should triumph on the planet, i.e. the Atlanticist, thalassocratic value system must become dominant everywhere. The bipolar world of the Cold War is considered to be completely overcome. There is simply no place for Eurasia and Eurasianism in such a picture. All this is logical and follows directly from the works of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians, who sought to weaken the forces of the Land in every possible way, undermining their power and restraining their development by various strategic methods, especially the "anaconda" strategy, i.e. tight control over more and more rimland sectors.

Neo-Eurasianism cannot, while remaining itself, recognize the legitimacy of such a state of affairs and is doomed to seek opportunities to reverse all these processes. And it starts from the very central question with the question of unipolarity. Unipolarity (domination of Atlantism in any form, both in its pure form and through mondialism) dooms Eurasia as a heartland to historical oblivion. Neo-Eurasianism insists that this unipolarity must be opposed.

This can be done only through a new bipolarity.

This requires clarification. There is a point of view that after the end of the confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the world itself will move to a multipolar order, China will rise, demographic processes will bring Islamic countries to the category of geopolitically central ones, the Pacific region will declare its competitiveness with Europe and America, etc. All this is possible, but it does not take into account that such a new multipolarity will take place under the sign of the "Atlanticist system of values", i.e. will represent only the territorial varieties of the thalassocratic system, and in no way a genuine geopolitical alternative. The challenge from the West, the market and liberal democracy is universal. After the victory of the heartland, all the attempts of the peoples and

states to follow some other path, except for the western one, have lost their main support. Both the pro-Soviet regimes and all the "non-aligned" countries that insisted on the "third way" existed only due to bipolarity, due to the gap that existed between the West and the East in their positional geopolitical struggle. The modern victorious West will henceforth dictate ideological and economic conditions to all who claim to be a developed region. Therefore, any multipolarity while maintaining the status quo will be fictitious and mondialistic.

This is well understood by Western strategists, who are well aware that the main geopolitical task of the West at this stage is to prevent the very possibility of forming a large-scale geopolitical block of continental volume, which could be comparable in one way or another with the forces of Atlanticism. This is the main principle of the US military-political doctrine, which is formulated in the report of Paul Wolfowitz. In other words, the West most of all does not want a return to bipolarity. It would be deadly for him.

Neo-Eurasianism, proceeding from the interests of the "geographical axis of history," asserts the exact opposite of the West. The only way out of this situation can be only a new bipolarism, since only in this direction Eurasia could acquire the prospect of true geopolitical sovereignty. Only the new can subsequently open the way to such a multipolarity, which is the framework of the thalassocratic liberal-democratic system, the multipolarity of the world, where every nation and every geopolitical bloc could choose its own system of values, has a chance to be realized only after liberation from the global Atlantic domination through a new planetary confrontation.

At the same time, it is important that the Eurasian continental block cannot become a simple recreation of the Warsaw Pact. The disintegration of the former geopolitical continental structure is irreversible and is rooted in its very structure. The new continental alliance should either include all of Europe up to the Atlantic and several important sectors of the southern coast of Eurasia, India, Iran, Indochina, etc., or ensure the friendly neutrality of these same spaces, i.e. take them out of the control of Atlanticism. A return to the old bipolarism is impossible for many reasons, including ideological ones. The new Eurasian bipolarism must proceed from completely different ideological premises and be based on completely different methods.

This theory of "new bipolarism" is sufficiently developed in neo-Eurasian projects, being a theoretical basis for all non-conformist geopolitical theories of Europe and the Third World. Just as heartland is objectively the only point capable of being a foothold for a planetary alternative to thalassocracy, so neo-Eurasianism is the only theoretical platform on the basis of which a whole fan of planetary strategies can be developed that deny the world domination of Atlanticism and its civilizational system of values: the market, liberal democracy, secular culture, philosophy of individualism, etc.

PART III RUSSIA AND SPACE

Chapter 1. Heartland

Russia, from a strategic point of view, is a gigantic continental mass that is identified with Eurasia itself. After the development of Siberia and its integration, Russia unambiguously coincided with the geopolitical concept of Heartland, i.e. "Central Earth" continent. Mackinder defined the Russian Big Space as the "Geographical Axis of History". Geographically, landscape, linguistically, climatically, culturally and religiously, Russia is a synthetic union of the Eurasian West and the Eurasian East, and its geopolitical function is not limited to summing up or mediating Western and Eastern trends. Russia is something Third, independent and special, neither East nor West. Culturally comprehending the "middle" position of Russia, Russian Eurasians spoke about the special culture of the "Middle Empire",

opposites are removed in a spiritual, vertical synthesis. From a purely strategic point of view, Russia is identical to Eurasia itself, if only because it is precisely its lands, its population and its industrial and technological development that have sufficient volume to be the basis of continental independence, autarky and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which in geopolitical laws must happen to every "island", including the "World Island" itself, i.e. with Eurasia.

In relation to Russia-Heartland, all other Eurasian states and lands are coastal, Rimland. Russia is the "Axis of History", since "civilization" revolves around it, creating its most catchy, expressive and complete forms not in its life-giving continental source, but in the "coastal zone", in the critical zone, where the land space borders on the water space, sea or ocean. From a strategic point of view, Russia is an independent territorial structure, whose security and sovereignty are identical with the security and sovereignty of the entire continent. This cannot be said about any other major Eurasian power, not about China, not about Germany, not about France, not about India. If, in relation to its coastal neighbors or to the states of other "Islands" or continents, China, Germany, France, India, etc. can act as continental forces, then in relation to Russia they will always remain "coastal strips", Rimland, with all the corresponding strategic, cultural and political consequences. Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with full geopolitical justification. Only its strategic interests are not just close to the interests of the continent, but are strictly identical to them (at least at the current stage of the development of the technosphere, this is the case).

Chapter 2. The Rimland Problem

The attitude of Russia to the neighboring continental civilizations of the Romano-Germanic in the West and the three traditional civilizations in the East (Islamic, Hindu and Chinese) has at least two planes, which in no case should be confused with each other, since this will inevitably lead to a multitude of misunderstandings. First, the cultural and historical essence of Russia, its spiritual self-determination, its

"identity" is undoubtedly determined by the formula "neither East nor West" or "neither Europe, nor Asia, but Eurasia" (as the Russian Eurasians put it). Russia is spiritually something Third, something independent and special, which has no expression either in terms of the East or in terms of the West. At this level, the highest interest of Russia is to preserve its uniqueness at all costs, to defend its uniqueness in the face of the challenge of the culture of the West and the traditions of the East. This does not mean complete isolationism, but still limits the range of possible borrowings. Historical realism requires us to courageously admit that the affirmation of "ours," "ours," always goes parallel to the denial of "alien," "not ours." Both affirmation and denial are fundamental elements of the national, cultural, historical and political independence of the people and the state. Therefore, the denial of both the West and the East is culturally a historical imperative for Russia's independence. In this issue, of course, there can be a variety of nuances and discussions, while recognizing the originality, some believe that it is better to open more to the East than to the West ("Asian direction"), others, on the contrary ("Westernizers"), others prefer a complete rejection of all dialogue ("isolationists"), the fourth presuppose equal openness in both directions (some directions of "neo-Eurasianism").

At the strategic and purely geopolitical levels, the situation is completely different. Since Russia-Eurasia at the present historical stage as its planetary opponent has not so much "coastal civilizations", Rimland, as the opposite "Island", Atlanticist America, the most important strategic imperative is the transformation of "coastal territories" into its allies, strategic penetration entering the "coastal" zones, concluding a common Eurasian pact, or at least ensuring the complete and strict neutrality of as many Rimlands as possible in the positional confrontation with the transatlantic West. Here the strategic formula of Russia must be unambiguously the formula "both East and West", since only the continental integration of Eurasia with the center in Russia can guarantee to all its peoples and states real sovereignty, a maximum of political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: maximum political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: maximum political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, a single opposition is relevant today: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: or continentalism (division of the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist: or continentalism (division of the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Russia needs Rimlands to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical power. At the moment, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, no other, non-continental, sovereignty simply cannot exist:

"ethnocratic", purely "isolationist" projects for solving the state problem of Russia in the strategic sphere yield results strictly in line with the mondialist plans for total control over the planet and for the complete strategic, political and economic occupation of Eurasia and Russia.

It is obvious that the transfer of the cultural and historical problems of Russia to the strategic or geopolitical level (that is, endowing the formula "neither East nor West" with a purely geopolitical meaning) is nothing more than a political sabotage aimed at strategically disorienting Russia's foreign policy. Whatever underlies the "narrow-ethnic", "racial-nationalist"

"chauvinistic" models of Russian statehood ignorance, naivety or deliberate work against their people and their independence, the result is complete identity with mondialist goals. Without turning Russia into an "ethnic reservation," the United States will not be able to gain complete control over the world.

The Rimland problem is posed in this way only today, when the entire strategic history of the bipolar world and the planetary Cold War of the USSR and the USA remains behind us. At the time of the peak of the political activity of the Russian Eurasians, the strategic situation was completely different, and very few could look into the future. Therefore, some geopolitical projects of the Eurasians should be viewed with caution. In particular, the Rimland problem was interpreted by them in a cultural rather than a strategic aspect. All this must be taken into account in order for Russia to develop a serious and substantiated geopolitical program, realistic and promising, at the forefront of which should be placed the main geopolitical imperative of independence, sovereignty, independence, autarky and freedom of Great Russia.

Chapter 3. Gathering the Empire

One of the main tenets of geopolitics is the assertion that the geopolitical position of a state is much more important than the features of the political structure of this state. Politics, culture, ideology, the character of the ruling elite, and even religion are viewed in geopolitical optics as important but secondary factors in comparison with the fundamental geopolitical principle of the relationship of the state to space. Often (especially in Russia) this specificity of geopolitics as a science is considered almost "cynicism" or even "anti-national" approach. This is, of course, completely wrong. It's just that geopolitics does not at all pretend to be the only and supreme authority in determining the state and political interests of the nation. Geopolitics is one of several basic disciplines, allowing to adequately formulate the international and military doctrine of the state along with other equally important disciplines. Just as physics, in order to be an exact science, must abstract from chemistry and its laws (this does not mean that physics denies chemistry), so geopolitics, in order to be a strict discipline, must leave aside other, non-geopolitical approaches, which can and should be taken into account in the final conclusions regarding the fate of the state and the people, along with geopolitics.

One of the most pressing geopolitical demands of Russia is "collecting the Empire." No matter how we relate to "socialism", the USSR, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries, etc., no matter how we assess the political and cultural reality of one of the two superpowers, from a geopolitical point of view, the existence of the Eastern Bloc was definitely a positive factor. for a possible Eurasian unification, for continental integration and the sovereignty of our Greater Space. It was precisely the geopolitical logic that made the Belgian theorist Jean Thiriard talk about the need to create a "Euro-Soviet empire from Vladivostok to Dublin." Only the Eastern Bloc could become the basis for the unification of Eurasia into an Empire, although the division of Europe and the inconsistency of Soviet policy in Asia were serious obstacles to achieving this goal. According to many modern geopoliticians, the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. the collapse of the USSR was largely due to its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled the Rimland of the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, in the end, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states.

The imperative of Russia's geopolitical and strategic sovereignty is not only to restore the lost regions of the "near abroad", not only to renew allied relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but also to include in the new Eurasian strategic bloc the states of the continental West (first of all, the Franco-German bloc, which gravitates towards liberation from the Atlanticist tutelage of the pro-American NATO) and the continental East (Iran, India and Japan).

The geopolitical "gathering of the Empire" is for Russia not only one of the possible paths of development, one of the possible relations of the state to space, but a guarantee and a necessary condition for the existence of an independent state, and, moreover, an independent state on an independent continent.

If Russia does not immediately begin to recreate the Large Space, i.e. to return the temporarily lost Eurasian expanses to the sphere of its strategic, political and economic influence, it will plunge into catastrophe both itself and all the peoples living on the "World Island".

The course of possible events is easy to foresee. If Russia chooses some other path than "the path of gathering the Empire", new powers or blocs of states will begin to take on the continental mission of Heartland. In this case, the vastness of Russia will be the main strategic goal for those forces that will declare themselves a new "citadel of Eurasia." This is absolutely inevitable, since control over the continent is inconceivable without control over the space of the "geographical axis of History". Either China will make a desperate rush to the North to Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia, or Central Europe will move to the Western Russian lands of Ukraine, Belarus, western Great Russia, or the Islamic bloc will try to integrate Central Asia, the Volga and Ural regions, as well as some territories of Southern Russia. This new continental integration cannot be avoided, since the very geopolitical map of the planet opposes its unipolar, Atlanticist orientation. In geopolitics, the sacred law "a holy place is never empty" is quite legitimate. Moreover, it is not "territorial egoism" or "Russophobia" that will push other Eurasian blocs to expansion into Russian lands, but the inexorable logic of space and Russia's geopolitical passivity. In the sphere of continental strategy, it is foolish to expect that other peoples will stop before territorial expansion into Russian lands just out of respect for the "uniqueness of Russian culture." In this area, only power territorial impulses and positional advantages operate. Even the very fact of hesitation in the question of the immediate "gathering of the Empire" is already a sufficient challenge, a sufficient reason for so that alternative geopolitical Great Spaces would move into Russian borders. This, naturally, will provoke a reaction from the Russians and entail a terrible and unpromising intra-Eurasian conflict; unpromising because it will not even have a theoretically positive solution, since in order to create a non-Russian Eurasia, it is necessary to completely destroy the Russian people, and this is not only difficult, but in fact impossible, as history shows. On the other hand, such a conflict will pave the front line between neighboring states of continental and anti-Atlantic orientation, and this will only strengthen the position of the third force, i.e. USA and their colleagues on mondialist projects. The lack of action is also a kind of action, and behind the delay in "gathering the Empire" (not to mention the possible rejection of Russia's geopolitical expansion), a lot of Eurasian blood will inevitably follow. Events in the Balkans provide a gruesome example of what can happen in Russia on an incomparably grander scale.

The reunification of the Eurasian territories under the auspices of Russia as the "axis of history" today is fraught with certain difficulties, but they are insignificant in the face of the catastrophes that will inevitably come if this "gathering of the Empire" does not begin immediately.

Chapter 4. Warm and cold seas

The process of "gathering the Empire" should initially be guided by a distant goal, which is Russia's access to the warm seas. It was thanks to the containment of Russian expansion in the southern, southwestern and northwestern directions that Atlanticist England was able to maintain its control over all the "coastal spaces" surrounding Eurasia. Russia was geopolitically a "complete" power in the East and North, where its political boundaries coincided with the natural geographic boundaries of the Eurasian continent. But the paradox was that these coasts are adjacent to cold seas, which is an insurmountable barrier to the development of navigation to the extent that it would seriously compete on the seas with the fleets of the Western Island (England, and later America). On the other hand, the eastern and northern lands of Russia were never sufficiently developed due to natural and cultural characteristics, and all projects for the integration of Russian Asia, from those proposed by Dr. Badmaev to the last Emperor to the Brezhnev BAM, according to some strange pattern, collapsed under the influence of spontaneous or controlled historical cataclysms.

Be that as it may, access to the cold seas of the North and East must be supplemented by access to the warm seas of the South and West, and only in this case Russia will become geopolitically "complete". For this, in fact, numerous Russian-Turkish wars were fought, the fruits of which, however, were reaped not by the Turks and not by the Russians, but by the British, who bled the last two traditional empires out of three (the third is Austria-Hungary). The last spurt to the South, which is vital for Russia, was the unsuccessful expansion of the USSR into Afghanistan. Geopolitical logic unambiguously shows that Russia will definitely have to return there again, although it would be much better to come as a loyal ally, defender and friend than as a cruel punisher. Only when the coastline becomes the southern and western borders of Russia, it will be possible to speak about the final completion of its continental construction. This does not necessarily have to be about conquests, expansion or annexations. A strong anti-Atlantic parity strategic alliance with the continental European and Asian powers would be sufficient to achieve this goal. Access to warm seas can be obtained not only through a bloody war, but also through a reasonable peace, beneficial to the geopolitical interests of all continental powers, since the project of Eurasian strategic integration will enable all these powers to become really sovereign and independent in the face of an alternative Atlantic Island. , united, in turn, by the strategic doctrine of Monroe. Straits and warm seas were inaccessible to Russia when such an obvious Atlantic factor as the United States, threatening the interests of all of Europe and all of Asia, did not yet exist, and the various powers of the mainland challenged each other for primacy in confronting England and leadership in the matter of territorial strategic unification. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America has highlighted the entire geopolitical significance of Russia, and therefore the alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism and therefore an alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism and therefore an alliance with Russia has become a self-evident imperative for all realistic geopoliticians of the mainland in whatever political forms it may be embodied depending on the circumstances. The Threat of Mondialism and Atlantist Globalism

theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through the self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against the overseas invaders.

PART IV THE GEOPOLITICAL FUTURE OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1. The Need for a Radical Alternative

In our society today there are two fundamental projects concerning the Russian future. To one degree or another, they affect all aspects of national life, economy, geopolitics, international relations, ethnic interests, industrial structure, economic structure, military construction, etc.

The first project belongs to radical liberals, "reformers" who take Western society, the modern "trading system" as an example, and fully subscribe to the "end of history" projects developed in the famous eponymous article by Francis Fukuyama. This project denies values such as people, nation, history, geopolitical interests, social justice, religious factor, etc. Everything in it is based on the principle of maximum economic efficiency, on the primacy of individualism, consumption and the "free market". The liberals want to build a new society in place of Russia, which has never existed historically, in which the rules and cultural coordinates will be established by which the modern West, and especially the United States, lives. This camp can easily formulate an answer to any questions regarding a particular aspect of Russian reality based on models already existing in the West, using Western liberal terminology and legal norms, as well as relying on the developed theoretical structures of liberal capitalism as a whole. Some time ago, this position almost dominated ideologically in our society, and even today it is the most famous one, since it coincides in general with the general course and fundamental logic of liberal reforms.

The second project of the Russian future belongs to the so-called. "national-patriotic opposition", which is a diverse and multifaceted political reality, united by rejection of liberal reforms and rejection of the liberal logic preached by the reformers. This opposition is not just national and not just patriotic; it is "pink and white", ie. it is dominated by representatives of the communist statesmen (who have largely departed from the rigid Marxist-Leninist dogma) and supporters of the Orthodox-monarchist, tsarist type of statehood. The views of both components of the "united opposition" are quite significantly different, but there are similarities not only in the definition of a "common enemy", but also in some mental, ideological clichés shared by both. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the patriotic "opposition" consists of figures from the pre-perestroika system, who bring elements of a purely Soviet mentality even to the "white", "tsarist projects", to which they most often had no historical, family or political relationship before the beginning of perestroika, feeling great in Brezhnev's reality. Be that as it may, the opposition project can be called "Soviet-tsarist", since it is based on some ideological, geopolitical,

administrative archetypes that objectively bring together the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods (at least within the XX century). The ideology of patriots is much more contradictory and confused than the logical and complete constructions of liberals, and therefore it often manifests itself not in the form of a complete concept or doctrine, but fragmentarily, emotionally, inconsistently and fragmentarily. Yet this grotesque conglomerate of intermingled Soviet-tsarist mental debris possesses

some integrity, which, however, is sometimes not easy to structure rationally.

Both of these projects, the liberal and the Soviet-tsarist, are essentially dead ends for the Russian people and Russian history. The liberal project generally presupposes a gradual erasure of the national characteristics of Russians in the cosmopolitan era of the "end of history" and the "planetary market", while the Soviet-tsarist era is trying to revive the nation and the state precisely in those historical forms and structures that, in fact, gradually led the Russians to collapse.

On the other side of both the liberalism of the "reformers" and the Soviet-tsarism of the "united opposition" there is an urgent need for a "third way", for a special ideological project that would not be a compromise, not "centrism" between the two, but a completely radical innovative a futuristic plan that breaks with the hopeless dualistic logic "either the liberals or the opposition" where, like in a labyrinth without an exit, the current public consciousness of Russians rushes about.

It is necessary to cut the Gordian knot and establish a true alternative opposed to both. A great nation is at stake, its interests, its destiny.

Chapter 2. What are "Russian national interests"?

2.1 Russians today have no State

In the present political situation, it is impossible, strictly speaking, to talk about the "strategic prospects of Russia." Moreover, it is impossible to propose any projects regarding the foreign and domestic policy of Russia, since the main question is what is Russia today? remains not only unresolved, but also not taken seriously.

The rapid changes in the entire political, geopolitical, ideological and social order that took place in the former USSR completely overturned all existing legal and political criteria and norms. The collapse of the unified socialist system and later the Soviet state created a field of complete uncertainty in the former Soviet territories, in which there are no clearer guidelines, no strict legal framework, or concrete social prospects. Those geopolitical structures that were formed "automatically" by inertia after the collapse of the USSR are random, transient and extremely unstable. This applies not only to the republics seceding from Moscow, but, first of all, to Russia itself.

In order to make plans regarding the "interests of the state", it is necessary to have a clear idea of what kind of state we are talking about. In other words, it makes sense when there is a clearly defined political entity. In the present situation, there is no such subject in the case of Russians.

The existence of Russia, understood as the Russian Federation (RF), clearly does not meet any serious criteria for determining the status of a "state." The confusion in assessments of the status of the Russian Federation in international politics clearly testifies to precisely this state of affairs. What is RF? Heiress and successor to the USSR? Regional power? Mono-national state? Interethnic Federation? Gendarme of Eurasia? A pawn in American projects? Areas destined for further fragmentation? Depending on the specific conditions, the Russian Federation plays one of these roles, despite the absolute inconsistency of such definitions. At some point, this is a state with a claim to a special role in world politics, at another it is a secondary regional power, in a third field for separatist experiments.

The Russian Federation is not Russia, a full-fledged Russian State. It is a transitional entity in a broad and dynamic global geopolitical process and nothing more. Of course, the Russian Federation may become a Russian State in the future, but it is not at all obvious that this will happen, and it is also not obvious whether one should strive for this.

Be that as it may, it is impossible to talk about the "strategic interests" of such an unstable and temporary phenomenon as the Russian Federation in the long term, and it is all the more ridiculous to try to formulate a "strategic doctrine of the Russian Federation" based on the current state of affairs. The "strategic interests of the Russian Federation" can become clear only after it appears,

the political, social, economic and ideological subject of these interests will be formed and defined. So far this has not happened, any projects in this direction will turn out to be momentary fiction.

The Russian Federation has no state history, its borders are random, its cultural landmarks are vague, its political regime is shaky and vague, its ethnic map is heterogeneous, and its economic structure is fragmentary and partly decomposed. This conglomerate is only the result of the collapse of a more global geopolitical entity, a fragment torn from the whole picture. Even in order to create something stable on this skeleton of the Empire, a real revolution would be needed, similar to the revolution of the Young Turks, who created modern secular Turkey from a fragment of the Ottoman Empire (although the question arises again: is it worth striving for?).

If the Russian Federation is not a Russian State, then the CIS is not. Despite the fact that almost all the territories of the CIS countries (with rare exceptions) were part of the Russian Empire, and therefore were once part of the Russian State, today the CIS countries have a sufficient degree of autonomy and are de jure independent political entities. In relation to these countries, it can be argued (and with even greater grounds) the same thing as in relation to the Russian Federation, these formations do not possess any serious signs of true statehood, are devoid of the attributes of actual sovereignty and represent more of a "territorial process" than stable and definite geopolitical units. Even if we ignore the growing nationalism of the CIS countries, which is often anti-Russian, unnatural, unstable and contradictory fragments themselves, it is not possible to put together a harmonious picture. Belgian geopolitician Jean Thiriard made one precise comparison on this matter. "The USSR was like a bar of chocolate, with marked borders of the slices-republics. After the slices are broken off, it is no longer enough to put them together to restore the entire slab. From now on, this can only be achieved by melting the entire bar and re-stamping."

"The strategic interests of the Russian Federation" is the same empty figure of speech as the "strategic interests of the CIS countries." This has a very indirect relation to the "strategic interests of the Russians".

2.2 The concept of "post-imperial legitimacy"

Despite the non-existence of the Russian State in the full sense, certain legal principles operate throughout the post-Soviet space, on which both the Western reaction to certain actions of the Russian Federation and the momentary logic of the steps of the Russian leadership are based. It is these principles, at first glance, that keep the Russian Federation and, more broadly, the CIS from total chaos. It is about the doctrine of "post-imperial legitimacy". In order to understand the essence of today's geopolitical processes in Eurasia, it is necessary to briefly outline the main theses of this concept.

"Post-imperial legitimacy" is a set of legal norms closely related to the immediately preceding phase of the political development of the region, i.e. with "imperial legitimacy" ("legacy of empire"). The empire (at least the "secular" liberal or socialist) is most often guided in the territorial structure of its colonies by purely administrative and economic features, without taking into account ethnic, religious or national factors. Administrative boundaries within the Empire are rather arbitrary, since they inherently represent

are conditional barriers created only for the convenience of centralized control of the metropolis. During the period of its existence, the empire forces the other powers to recognize their internal administrative system as legitimate. But with the collapse of the Empire, "zones of legal uncertainty" always arise, since the structure that legally regulated the status of its constituent parts ceases to exist.

In the process of "postcolonial" transformations, an international legal concept was formulated, which formed the basis for the classification of the legitimacy and incompetence of post-imperial territorial-political formations. This is the concept of "post-imperial legitimacy". Its meaning boils down to the fact that, despite the absence of the Empire as a whole, its purely administrative components receive a full-fledged legal status, regardless of whether this entity meets the criterion of a full-fledged state or not. This approach is based on the secular liberal idea of the arbitrariness of any state formation as a historical accident. According to this logic, ethnic, religious, cultural and social components are insignificant and insignificant, since the population is understood here as a simple set of economic and statistical units. This reflects the inertia of the "imperial", "colonial" approach, which is used to considering "colonies" and "provinces" as something secondary and

irrelevant, "additional" within the general context.

As a rule, "post-imperial formations" never (or almost never) become full-fledged states and continue to exist as economic and political appendages of the former (or new) metropolis. Almost always, the ruling elite in them is the direct heir (often a protégé) of the colonial administration, the economy is entirely dependent on external factors, and the political and social structure adapts to the model of the former center. The preservation of such "post-imperial legitimacy" often leads to the fact that one and the same autochthonous ethnic group inhabits the territories of different post-imperial states, and several ethnic and religious groups live within one state. In fact, the relative balance of interests is maintained in such cases only by an appeal to an external factor, most often to the explicit or latent power of the former metropolis (or that developed state that may replace it). It is quite indicative that at the last stages of the "liberation" of Africa, the Pan African Congress decided to apply the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" to all newly formed states, although many large African peoples, in particular, the Bantu, Zulus, etc. turned out to be living in two or three states at once. This was done under the pretext of avoiding ethnic, tribal and religious wars. In fact, it was about the desire of the leaders of the post-imperial administration to keep their artificial elites in power, preventing the creation of new representatives of the organic national hierarchy in the process of the national rise. Given the strategic and socio-economic backwardness of Africa and the lack of fresh and vital state traditions, this approach worked quite successfully.

The principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" is now applied to the countries that emerged from the ruins of the USSR. In the former "union republics," almost everywhere in power are the heirs of the "colonial administration," the compartments of a unified administrative structure that has been broken into pieces, formed entirely in the imperial Soviet context. This elite is alienated from the national and cultural traditions of their peoples and by inertia is oriented towards the preservation of economic and political dependence on the metropolis. The only exception is Armenia, where the logic of the "post-imperial

legitimacy "was violated (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh), and where, accordingly, purely national political forces have greater weight than in all other CIS countries. In addition, Armenia is the only monoethnic republic of the CIS countries.

At first glance, one might get the impression that the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" plays into the hands of the Russian Federation and Moscow, since it creates the preconditions for maintaining the influence of the Russian Federation in the "near abroad" and simplifies political and economic relations with geographic neighbors. But in reality, everything is somewhat more complicated. As in the case of the "decolonization" of the Third World countries, the collapse of the Empire weakens the geopolitical power of the metropolis, and some of the colonies and dominions come under the implicit control of another, stronger power, which uses the system of "post-imperial legitimacy" for its own purposes. A striking example of this is the United States, which actually seized under its influence most of the former British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch colonies during the process of "decolonization". In this way,

On the other hand, "post-imperial legitimacy" puts the Russian Federation itself on a par with other CIS countries, since in this case the national-cultural, religious and ethnic interests of the Russian people, falling under the abstract norms of "post-imperial", purely administrative law and scattered over alien pseudo-state and quasi-national formations. The remains of the imperial administration within the Russian Federation (party-bureaucratic apparatus) turn out to be just as alien to the national context of Russians as in other republics, since the system of the Empire itself was built on other, purely administrative and economic, rather than national and cultural principles. Russians, "freed" from the republics, do not receive freedom and independence, but they lose a significant part of their national community, maintain a dependent position on the remnants of the former nomenklatura and, in addition, are exposed to a new danger of falling under the influence of external political forces of more powerful powers. This last danger was not so close during the period of the Empire's existence, but as a simple "regional power" the Russian Federation is fully exposed to it.

All these considerations call into question the usefulness of the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" in the current conditions, since this is largely contrary to Russian national interests.

But what criteria should be followed in defining what constitutes "Russian national interests"? Whom should we take as the main subject in relation to which it would be possible to determine what is beneficial and what is not profitable? In what categories should one comprehend Russia today?

2.3 The Russian people are the center of the geopolitical concept

The collapse of the Soviet Empire, the fragility and insolvency of the state of new political formations on its territory (including the Russian Federation) force us to look for a more specific category for understanding "Russian national interests." The only organic, natural, historically rooted reality in this matter can only be the Russian people.

The Russian people is a historical community that has all the features of a full-fledged and stable political entity. The Russian people are united ethnically, culturally, psychologically and religiously. But not only this is the main reason for placing him at the center of the geopolitical concept as a subject of political and social strategy. The Russian people, unlike many other peoples, has developed as the bearer of a special civilization that has all the distinctive features of an original and full-fledged planetary-historical phenomenon. The Russian people is that civilizational constant, which served as an axis in the creation of not one, but many states: from the mosaic of the East Slavic principalities to Muscovite Russia, Peter's Empire and the Soviet bloc. Moreover, this constant determined the continuity and connection between formations, so different politically, socially, territorially and structurally. The Russian people did not just provide an ethnic basis for all these state formations, they expressed in them a special civilizational idea, unlike any other. It was not the state that formed the Russian nation. On the contrary, the Russian nation, the Russian people experimented in history with different types of state systems, expressing in different ways (depending on the circumstances) the specifics of his unique mission.

The Russian people undoubtedly belong to the messianic peoples. And like any messianic people, it has a universal, all-human meaning that competes not just with other national ideas, but with types of other forms of civilizational universalism. K. Leontiev and Russian Eurasians have developed this idea quite fully.

Regardless of the troubles, transition periods and political cataclysms, the Russian people have always retained their messianic identity, and therefore, have always remained a political subject of history. After another state upheaval, one and the same ancient and powerful Russian force created new political structures, clothed its spiritual impulse in new geopolitical forms. Moreover, as soon as the state structures developed to a critical point, beyond which the final loss of the connection between the political form and the national content dawned, crises and disasters set in, followed by a new geopolitical and social construction, investing the civilizational mission of the Russian people in new images and political constructions.

And in the current transitional period, it is the Russian people that should be taken as the main political subject, from which the scale of geopolitical and strategic, as well as socio-economic interests of Russia should be postponed. The Russian people is Russia today, but not as a clearly outlined state, but as a geopolitical potential, real and concrete on the one hand, but has not yet defined its new state structure, nor its ideology, nor its territorial limits, nor its socio-political structure. ...

Nevertheless, "potential Russia" today has much more fixed characteristics than the ephemeral Russia or the CIS. These characteristics are directly related to the civilizational mission, the implementation of which is the meaning of the life of the Russian people.

Firstly, the Russian people (= Russia) are no doubt responsible for control over the northeastern regions of Eurasia. This Russian "Drang nach Osten und Norden" constitutes the natural geopolitical process of Russian history in recent centuries, which did not stop under any political cataclysms. Mackinder called

Russia is the "geopolitical axis of history," and this is completely true, since the Russian people really traditionally gravitated towards the civilizational development of all those inland Eurasian spaces that are located in the very center of the mainland mass. From this we can conclude that the strategic interests of the Russians inseparable from the vastness of North-Eastern Eurasia. The this is fundamental principle in determining real prospects geopolitics of Russia (of the Russian people).

Secondly, the Russian people (= Russia) are endowed with a special type of religiosity and culture, which are sharply different from the Catholic-Protestant West and from the post-Christian civilization that developed there. As the cultural and geopolitical antithesis of Russia, one should take precisely the "West" as a whole, and not just one of its constituent countries. Modern Western civilization is universalistically oriented: in all its compartments there is a special cultural unity based on a specific solution to the main philosophical and worldview problems. Russian universalism, the foundation of Russian civilization, is radically different from the West in all major respects. In a sense, these are two competing, mutually exclusive models, opposite poles. Hence,

Thirdly, the Russian people (= Russia) have never set as their goal the creation of a mono-ethnic, racially homogeneous state. The mission of the Russians had a universal character, and that is why the Russian people systematically went in history to the creation of an Empire, the boundaries of which were constantly expanding, embracing an ever larger conglomerate of peoples, cultures, religions, territories, regions. It is absurd to regard the planned and pronounced "expansionism" of the Russians as a historical accident. This "expansionism" is an integral part of the historical life of the Russian people and is closely linked with the quality of its civilizational mission. This mission carries a certain "common denominator" that allows Russians to integrate the most diverse cultural realities into their Empire. However, the "common denominator"

Fourth, the Russian people (= Russia) proceeds in their being from an even more global, "soteriological" perspective, which in the limit has a general planetary meaning. This is not about the boundless expansion of the "living space" of Russians, but about the establishment of a special "Russian" type of worldview, which is accented eschatologically and claims to be the last word in earthly history. This is the supreme super task of the nation as a "God-bearing people."

Consequently, theoretically, there is no such people on the planet, such a culture or such territory, whose fate and whose path would be indifferent to the Russian consciousness. This is manifested in the unshakable faith of Russians in the final triumph of Truth, Spirit and Justice, and not only within the framework of the Russian state, but everywhere. To deprive the Russians of this eschatological faith is tantamount to their spiritual emasculation. Russians care about everything and everyone, and therefore, in the final analysis, the interests of the Russian people are not limited to either the Russian ethnos, or the Russian Empire, or even the whole of Eurasia. This

The "transcendent" aspect of the Russian nation must be taken into account when developing a future geopolitical strategy.

Obviously, under the current conditions and with generally accepted Western, secular, quantitatively liberal norms of the legal approach, there is no objective opportunity not only to legally secure the status of the "Russian people" as an independent political entity, but even to introduce such a term into legal and diplomatic use. as "people". Modern international law (copying in its main features Roman law) recognizes only the state and the individual as full-fledged political subjects.

And therefore there is a code of "rights of states" and "human rights", while the very concept of "rights of the people" is absent. This is not surprising, since the secular and quantitative approach cannot take into account such cultural spiritual categories as ethnos, people, etc. A similar quantitative ratio characterized both the Soviet system and the "democratic" world. And since the Russian people in the current period are on the territory where either "post-imperial" or liberal-democratic principles of legitimacy operate, there can be no question of any automatic recognition of the political status of the "people". Consequently, the logic of clarifying and protecting "Russian national interests" requires serious changes in the existing legal practice, and moreover,

Such a transformation would be impossible if we were talking about some one people, underdeveloped and not technologically equipped. In the case of the Russians, this is fortunately not the case. Today, we still have the possibility of political transformations rather independent from the rest of the world, since the availability of strategic types of weapons in Russia makes it possible to resist the pressure of the West to a certain extent. And here everything depends only on the political will and determination of those persons who will take responsibility for the fate of Russia and the Russian people.

Be that as it may, the first step towards identifying the "national interests of the Russian people" is the recognition of this people as an independent political subject, who has the right to decide for himself what is beneficial to him and what is not, and to take geopolitical, socio-economic and strategists accordingly. steps.

3.1 The lack of a "nation-state" among Russians

Russia has never been an analogue of those "nation states" that are characteristic of modern Europe and whose model was projected onto Asia and the Third World as a whole in the colonial and postcolonial era.

The "nation-state" is based on administrative unity and bureaucratic centralism, which form a political community created by the state and closely related to the state. Without a doubt, the first model of the "state-nation" was formed in absolutist France, and then was consolidated in the Jacobin revolutionary model. The "nation-state" initially had an emphatically secular nature and was primarily a political unity. In this concept, the term "nation" was understood as a "totality of citizens" and not as a "people" or "peoples" in an organic, "holistic" sense. This type of state is based on ethnic, confessional and class leveling of the population,

into account neither regional, nor religious, nor racial features. Nominally "state-nation" can be monarchical, democratic and socialist. The essential element is political devices, but understanding states as administrative- it is not specific a centralist authority placed over all socio-ethnic and cultural-religious differences. It should be emphasized that "nation" in this case has a purely and exclusively political meaning, which is sharply different from that which the nationalists put into this concept.

The "nation-state" historically arose in Europe during the period of the final disintegration of imperial unity as a result of the destruction of the last remnants of the imperial system, preserved in the form of feudal regional structures. The "state-nation" is essentially associated with the domination of profane, bourgeois values, which reduce qualitative social differences to a simplified quantitative administrative structure. The "nation-state", as a rule, is ruled not by a "divine idea" (like a theocracy or the Holy Empire), not by a "heroic aristocratic personality" (like a feudal system), but by a "dictatorship of the law" ("nomocracy"), which gives tremendous power lawyers and legal bureaucracy. In fact, the "state-nation"

In Russian history, a "nation-state" never emerged. When this particular model began to take root in Europe since the 18th century, Russia desperately resisted it by any means. The tsarist regime sought to keep the imperial structure as intact as possible, although some concessions to the European model were made constantly. Despite the pro-European Petrine reforms, the Russian Empire retained both theocratic elements and the aristocratic principle, and the transfer of priests and representatives of the nobility to the category of state bureaucrats was never fully implemented in practice (unlike in the countries of Western Europe). The national element opposed such a degeneration of the Empire into a "state-nation", which regularly generated waves of spontaneous or conscious reaction from both the people and

sides of the elite. Even under the same sovereign, reformist and reactionary sentiments often changed in Russia, and from liberal reforms they often turned to mystical restorationist projects (this was most clearly manifested in the reign of Alexander I, the founder of the Holy Union).

Only at the beginning of the 20th century did Russia come close to realizing a "nation-state" on the European model. However, this time too, the process was thwarted by a revolutionary outburst, which absorbed (albeit unconsciously) a deep national protest against a type of state structure in which there would be no place for the manifestation of the people's spiritual mission. Behind the modernist rhetoric of Bolshevism, Russians dimly recognized their own eschatological ideals as the triumph of Idea, Justice, Truth. The Soviet state was perceived by the people as the construction of a "New Empire", "Kingdom of Light", "abode of the spirit", and not as the creation of the most rational device for administering and managing quantitative units. The tragedy and fanaticism of the Bolshevik cataclysms was caused precisely by the "ideality" of the task, costly organization of human resources.

The USSR did not become a "nation-state", national traditions, clothed ^{is he} in purely extravagant external forms and opposed to the later tsarist model, sliding towards ordinary bourgeois society, to the "dictatorship of the law." The Soviet Empire, like any political structure, knew three stages of the "revolutionary stage" of building a unique system (Lenin's youth), a stable stage of strengthening and expanding the state (Stalin's maturity) and a stage of collapse and decrepitude (Brezhnev's old age). Moreover, it was precisely the late Brezhnev period that gave birth to a political and administrative structure that most closely resembles the bureaucratic centralism of a typical "nation-state." During perestroika, the life cycle of this entire Soviet formation ended. At the same time, another stage in the national history of the Russian people ended.

It is important to note that there is such a pattern in Russian history: when it comes to the transformation of Russia into a "state-nation", catastrophes follow, and on a new round the nation finds another (sometimes rather extravagant) way to escape the seemingly inevitable transformation. Russians strive to avoid such a turn of events at any cost, since their political will is incompatible with the narrow norms of rational and average quantitative existence within the framework of a bureaucratic efficient mechanism. Russians are ready to make unthinkable sacrifices and hardships, if only the national idea, the great Russian dream, is realized and developed.

And the nation sees the boundaries of this dream, at least in the Empire.

3.2 Russian people of the Empire

Not a mono-ethnic state, not a nation-state, Russia was almost from the beginning a potentially imperial state. Starting from the unification of the Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes under Rurik and up to the gigantic scale of the USSR and the territories under its influence, the Russian people steadily followed the path of political and spatial integration, empire building and civilizational expansion. At the same time, it should be emphasized that Russian expansion had precisely a civilizational meaning, and was by no means a utilitarian pursuit of colonies or a banal struggle for "living space

It was not the lack of this "living space" and the economic necessity that prompted the Russian people to expand their borders more and more to the East, South, North, and West. Lack of land has never served as the true reason for Russian imperialism. mission, the geopolitical projection of which consisted in a deep awareness of the need to unite the gigantic territories of the Eurasian continent.

The political integrity of the Eurasian space has a completely independent meaning for Russian history. We can say that Russians feel responsible for this space, for its condition, for its connection, for its integrity and independence. Mackinder rightly considered Russia to be the main land power of our time, inheriting the geopolitical mission of Rome, the Empire of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, etc. This is the "geographical axis of history", which simply cannot but fulfill its geopolitical purpose, regardless of external and transitory factors.

The Russian people are so connected with geopolitical reality that space itself, its experience, its awareness, its spiritual perception has shaped the psychology of the people, becoming one of the main definitions of its identity, its essence.

Real earth space is not a purely quantitative category. The climate, landscape, geology of the area, waterways and mountain ranges are actively involved in the formation of an ethnic and, more broadly, a civilizational type. From the point of view of geopolitics, civilization and its specificity are generally strictly determined by geography and necessarily obey special qualitative laws. Russians are land, continental, North Eurasian people, while the cultural specificity of the nation is such that its "soul" is maximally predisposed to "openness", to the implementation of an "integrating" function, to a subtle and deep process of developing a special continental, Eurasian community.

The cultural factor is a natural complement to Russia's purely geopolitical predetermination. The geopolitical mission is perceived at the cultural level, and vice versa, culture comprehends, shapes and activates the geopolitical impulse. Space and culture are the two most important components of the Russian people as an empire-building people par excellence. It was not blood, not race, not administrative control, and not even religion that made of a part of the Eastern Slavs a special, incomparable community of the Russian people. It was precisely the endless Eurasian expanses and the utmost cultural and spiritual openness that made it. Ethnic, political, ethical, and religious aspects were rethought under the sign of "space and culture". The Russians took shape, developed and matured as a nation precisely in the Empire, in the heroism of its construction, in the exploits of its defense, in campaigns for its expansion. The rejection of the imperial-building function means the end of the existence of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a refusal is national suicide.

Unlike Rome (the first Rome), Moscow, Russia have a deep teleological, eschatological meaning in their imperial impulse. Hegel developed an interesting concept that the Absolute Idea in an eschatological situation should manifest itself in a final, "conscious" form in the form of the Prussian state. However, on a planetary scale, Prussia, and even Germany, taken separately, are geopolitically insufficient for this concept to be taken seriously. Russia, the Third Rome, religiously, culturally, spatially, and strategically fits perfectly

a similar teleological view of the essence of history and clearly seeks to fulfill this very mission. In the case of Russia, the Absolute Idea of Hegel is the spiritual root of Russian imperialism, which gravitates towards the civilizational development of the continent, Eurasia. It is absurd to apply such serious Hegelian criteria to a "nation-state" which obviously assumes next to itself other "nation-states" with their own goals, myths and interests. To impart a quality of absolute significance to such a relative structure is rather absurd. But in the case of a gigantic Empire based on specific, in many respects paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clarified principles, a completely different matter, and it is no coincidence that the ancient Empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness"

The Russian people moved step by step towards this very goal. At each stage of the expansion of their state, the Russians passed to the next stage of messianic universalism, first by rallying the Eastern Slavs, then including the Turkic stream of the steppes and Siberia, then moving to the South, into deserts and mountains, and finally forming a giant political bloc that controlled the Soviet period, literally, half the world. If we realize that the Russian people in their essence is this imperial building process, the strong-willed geopolitical vector of the creation of the "state of the Absolute Idea", it will become quite obvious that the existence of the Russian people directly depends on the continuation of this process, on its development, on its intensification. By cutting or suppressing this vector, we will strike the Russians in the very heart, deprive them of their national identity,

3.3 The "regional power" trap

The Russian people, with their civilizational and geopolitical mission, has traditionally been (and is) a serious obstacle to the widespread spread of a purely liberal Western model on the planet. Both the tsarist and Soviet regimes, obeying an inexorable national logic, hindered the cultural and political expansion of the West to the East, and especially deep into the Eurasian continent. Moreover, the seriousness of the geopolitical confrontation has always been reflected in the fact that Russia federated in itself and around itself different countries and peoples into a powerful strategic imperial bloc. It was as a continental Empire that Russia participated in world politics and defended its national and civilizational interests.

At present, after the collapse of the USSR, the West seeks to impose on Russia a different geopolitical function, to turn Russia into a political structure that would be unable to directly participate in world politics and have a broad civilizational mission. In a 1992 report by Paul Wolfowitz to the US Congress, it was unequivocally stated that "the main strategic task of the United States is to prevent the creation of a large and independent strategic entity in the territory of the former Soviet Union capable of pursuing a policy independent of the United States." It was on the basis of such an urgent need of the West that Russia was offered the role of a "regional power".

"Regional power" is a modern geopolitical category that characterizes a large and fairly developed state, whose political interests, however, are limited only to areas directly adjacent to its territory

or included in it. For example, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China, etc. are considered regional powers. The specificity of a regional power is that it has more political weight than an ordinary ordinary state, but less weight than a superpower or an empire. In other words, a regional power has no direct influence on planetary civilization and global geopolitical processes, being subordinate in the main strategic lines to the balance of power of more powerful Empires. At the same time, a regional power has a certain freedom in relation to its immediate (weaker) neighbors and can exert political and economic pressure on them (naturally, only in those cases when this does not contradict the interests of the superpowers).

The status of a "regional power" proposed (imposed) on Russia by the West today is tantamount to suicide for the Russian nation. The point is to artificially and under strong external influence to reverse the vector of Russian national history, in the opposite direction, to interrupt the coherent process of the geopolitical formation of Russians as an Empire. Russia as a regional power will be a rejection of that deep impulse of the nation, which underlies its highest and deepest identity. The loss of an imperial scale for Russians means the end and failure of their participation in civilization, the defeat of their spiritual and cultural system of values, the fall of their universalist and messianic aspirations, the devaluation and debunking of the entire national ideology, which revived many generations of the Russian people and gave strength and energy for feats, creation ,

Taking into account the specifics of the national imperial self-identification of Russians, it becomes quite obvious that the acceptance of the status of a "regional power" by Russia cannot become the last line of defense. In this case, the blow inflicted on the national consciousness of Russians will be so strong that the matter will not be limited to the framework of the Russian Federation or a similar territorial space. Having lost their mission, Russians will not be able to find the strength to adequately assert their new, "diminished" identity in a "regional state," since the assertion of this identity is impossible in the state of the passion that logically arises when a nation loses its imperial scale. Consequently, the processes of disintegration are likely to continue in the "regional power"

Even in order to fix the "regional status" of post-imperial Russia, it will be necessary to awaken a powerful wave of nationalism, moreover, a completely new, artificial nationalism based on energies and ideas that have nothing in common with the traditional and only genuine and justified Russian imperial tendency. You can compare this with the small, "secular" nationalism of the Young Turks, who, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, created modern Turkey, a "regional power" through the "national revolution". But the nationalism of the Young Turks had nothing to do with the geopolitical and religious nationalism of the Ottoman Empire, and in fact, today's Turkey, both spiritually, ethnically and culturally, is a completely different reality than the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the century.

The same, if not worse, threatens Russia, and most likely attempts to gain a foothold as a "regional power" that has abandoned its civilizational mission and universalist values will give rise to politicians of the "Young Russian" type (by analogy with the Young Turks), who are very likely , will profess a special sectarian ideology that has nothing in common with the main line of the Russian national idea. Such Russian "non-imperial" nationalism, secular and artificial, will

geopolitically play only into the hands of the West, since it will secure a "regional" status for Russia, lead to an illusory and short-term internal stabilization and, at the same time, lay the foundation for future internal Russian ethnic and religious conflicts. But if Turkey has two or three large ethnic communities capable of actively opposing Young Turkish centralism, then hundreds of peoples live in the Russian Federation, who got along well in the imperial model, but did not fit into the framework of "small Russian nationalism." The conclusion is obvious: Russia will gradually be drawn into an endless chain of internal conflicts and wars, and, in the end, will disintegrate.

This will be a natural result of the loss by the Russians of their imperial mission, since this process cannot be limited to a relative shrinking of territories and must necessarily reach its logical limit to the complete destruction of the Russian nation as a historical, geopolitical and civilizational entity.

3.4 Criticism of Soviet statehood

The last form of imperial organization of the Russian people was the USSR and the geopolitical area that depended on it (the countries of the Warsaw Pact). During the Soviet period, the Russian sphere of influence expanded geographically to previously unthinkable limits. Land development and military campaigns included huge territories in the geopolitical zone of the Russians.

In a spatial sense, such expansion, it would seem, should represent the highest form of Russian statehood. And it is impossible to deny the fact that the axial structure of the Soviet Empire was precisely the Russian people, who embodied their specific universalism (at least in part) in the Soviet ideological and socio-political model.

Today, at first glance, it seems that the prospect of genuine Russian national development under current conditions should coincide with the restoration of the USSR and the re-creation of the Soviet model and Soviet statehood. This is partly true and logical, and in this case, the neo-communist movement advocating the re-establishment of the USSR is closer to understanding the geopolitical interests of the Russian people, more clearly and clearly represents the essence of its strategic and civilizational aspirations than some neo-nationalist circles inclined to "Young Russian" (by analogy with the "Young Turk") model of "small", "stripped down", "ethnic" nationalism. Certainly geopolitical restorationism neo-communists are justified, and their nationalism is more organic and "national" than the romantic and irresponsible in form (and subversive in the results) narrow nationalist projects of the Slavophil, Orthodox-monarchist or racist wing of patriots. If the choice lay between the reconstruction of the USSR and the construction of a mono-ethnic or even monocultural Great Russian state, then in the interests of the Russian people it would be more logical and correct to choose the project of the USSR.

However, the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire require an objective analysis, which in no case can be reduced to identifying external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influences, i.e. to the "conspiracy theory". The external pressure of the liberal-democratic West on the USSR was really enormous, and the activities of "subversive elements" inside the country are extremely effective and well-coordinated. But both of these factors became decisive only in such a situation when the existence

The Soviet Empire entered the stage of an internal crisis that has deep and natural causes rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without an understanding of these internal causes of the collapse and their analysis, any attempts to restore the USSR (and even more so to create a New Empire) will be futile and futile. Moreover, any purely inertial conservatism in this matter can only further worsen the state of affairs.

Let's identify several factors that led the Soviet Union to geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

First, at the ideological level, during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional, spiritual elements were never introduced into the general complex of communist ideology. Being in many respects de facto national-communist, it never transformed into such a de jure, which hindered the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, generated a double standard and ideological contradictions, undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, "enlightenment ethics", etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people in general. In practice, these provisions borrowed from Marxism (by the way, and in Marxism itself, which are rather arbitrary elements of some kind of tribute to the old-fashioned positivist humanism in the style of Feuerbach) were perceived by the Russian communists in the key of folk-mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspirations, and not as rationalistic fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of National Bolshevism, which could have found more adequate, more Russian terms for the new social and political system, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later, the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory structure should have had a negative impact. This especially made itself felt in the late Soviet period, when senseless dogmatism and communist demagoguery finally suppressed all ideological life in society. Such "freezing" the ruling ideology and the stubborn refusal to introduce organic, national and natural components into it, resulted in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologues of both the "progressive" and "conservative" wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and practically destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also meaningless, since even hypothetically, this will reproduce the same premises that have already led to the destruction of the state. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologues of both the "progressive" and "conservative" wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and practically destroyed by the communists. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology is now not only impossible, but also meaningless, since even hypothetically, this will reproduce the same prerequisites that have already led to the destruction of the state.

Secondly, on the geopolitical and strategic level the USSR was uncompetitive in the long run for resisting the Atlanticist Western bloc. From a strategic point of view, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (the number of border troops, the cost of military equipment, the use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After the Second World War, the USSR found itself in an unequal position in terms of compared with the capitalist bloc of the West, grouped around the United States. The United States had a gigantic island base (the American continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the United States controlled almost all coastal zones in the South and West of Eurasia, creating a gigantic threat to the USSR while remaining practically out of reach for potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. Division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only

complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential adversary, moreover, in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who found themselves in the position of hostages in a geopolitical duel, the meaning of which was not clear to them. The same took place in the southern direction in Asia and in the Far East, where the USSR had direct neighbors or controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Khomeinist Iran) or rather hostile powers with a non-Soviet socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could acquire relative stability only in two cases: either by rapidly advancing towards the oceans in the West (towards the Atlantic) and in the South (towards the Indian Ocean), or by creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia, not under the control of any of the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was tried by Stalin, and after his death, Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too big and too small at the same time. The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only The preservation of the status quo only played into the hands of the United States and Atlanticism, since at the same time the military, industrial and strategic potential of the USSR was increasingly worn out, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern Bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the reconstruction of the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc is not only

almost impossible, but also unnecessary, because what is it even in case (practically incredible) success will only lead to a to revival deliberately doomed geopolitical model.

Third, the administrative structure The USSR was based on a secular, purely functional and quantitative understanding of intrastate division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account either the regional, much less ethnic and religious characteristics of the inner territories. The principle of leveling and purely economic structuralization of society led to the creation of such rigid systems that suppressed, and at best "preserved" the forms of the natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian people themselves. The territorial principle was in effect even when nominally it was about national republics, autonomies or okrugs. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling became more and more distinct as the entire Soviet political system was "aging", which towards its last stage was more and more inclined towards the type of the Soviet "nation-state" rather than the Empire. Nationalism, which largely contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, in the end became a purely negative factor, since excessive centralization and unification began to generate natural protest and discontent. Atrophy of the imperial principle, ossification of bureaucratic centralism, striving for maximum rationalization and purely economic productivity gradually created a political monster from the USSR, which lost its life and is perceived as a forced totalitarianism of the center. Certain communist theses of literally understood "internationalism" are largely responsible for this. Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, operating not with a specific ethnos, culture, or religion, but with abstract "population" and "territory" should not be revived in any case. On the contrary, it is necessary to get rid of the consequences of such a quantitative approach as soon as possible, whose echoes so tragically affect today the issue of Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc.

Fourth, the economic system in the USSR was based on such a "long" socialist cycle that gradually the return of society to a particular person ceased to be felt at all. Ultimate socialization and detailed control of the state over all economic processes, down to the smallest, as well as

the delegation of the functions of redistribution only to a centralized, purely upper, instance gave rise to a climate of social alienation, apathy, and disinterest in society. Socialism and all its advantages became unobvious, imperceptible, receded into the background before the gigantic construction of a bureaucratic-state machine. The individual and the concrete collective were lost before the abstraction of "society", and the cycle of socialist distribution lost touch with reality, turned into an inexplicable, alienated and seemingly arbitrary logic of a soulless machine. It is not socialism itself that is responsible for this state of affairs, but that version of it that has historically developed in the USSR, especially in its later stages, although the origins of this degeneration should be sought in the doctrine itself, in the theory itself. Totalitarian state socialism deprived the economy of flexibility, people of enthusiasm and a sense of complicity in the creative process, contributed to the instilling of a parasitic attitude towards society, which is now absolutized in the mafia-librarianist attitude. The communists are also responsible for this post-Soviet excesses, who were unable to reform socialism in relation to the national element and maintain a dignified life in it.

These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors behind the collapse of Soviet statehood, and they are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is quite natural that with a hypothetical reconstruction of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this regard and the causes that have once historically doomed a great nation to a state catastrophe should be completely eliminated.

However, if the restoration of the USSR will take place under the banner of an ideology that has rejected materialism, atheism, totalitarianism, state socialism, Soviet geopolitical space, and administrative structure, internationalism, centralism, etc., is it generally legitimate to talk about "USSR" or "Soviet state", about "communism", "restoration", etc.? Wouldn't it be more correct to call this the creation of the "New Empire"?

3.5 Criticism of the tsarist statehood

Today, calls for a return to the tsarist, monarchical model can be heard more and more often. This is quite natural, since the discrediting of Sovietism forces Russians to turn to those forms of statehood that existed before the communist period of Russian history. This model has some positive and some negative aspects. Regardless of the incredible difficulty of restoring the pre-communist state system, this project is being discussed more and more seriously.

Considering the historical logic of the geopolitical development of the Russian nation, it makes sense to talk about the later periods of the Romanov rule, when Russia reached the borders of its maximum territorial imperial volume.

The most positive in this project is the ideological basis of Tsarist Russia, where (albeit nominally) loyalty to the national spirit (Nationality), religious truth (Orthodoxy) and the traditional sacred political structure (Autocracy) was declared. However, according to the just remark of the Russian Eurasians, the Uvarov formula (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Narodnost) was in the last periods of tsarist Russia rather an idealistic slogan than a real one.

the content of political life and social structure. Russian Orthodoxy, shaken by the secular reforms of Peter, in this period was quite far from the ideal of "Holy Russia", being in fact subordinate to state control and largely losing its sacred authority and harmony of the Orthodox symphony. Having lost spiritual independence, the Russian Church was forced to compromise with the secular power embodied in the Synod subordinate to the tsar, and thus was limited in freedom of genuine confession of unearthly Truths.

The autocracy, for its part, increasingly lost its sacred meaning, becoming involved in the solution of purely political problems, sometimes forgetting about its highest mission and religious destiny. Although the desacralization of the tsarist power never, up to the abdication of the last Emperor, in Russia did not reach the level of that empty parody, into which the European monarchies, first of all, the French and English, had turned, still the influence of Europe in this area was very great.

And finally, the "nationality" of the famous slogan was rather purely declarative, and the people themselves were deeply alienated from political life, which manifested itself, for example, in general indifference to the February and later October revolutions, which radically destroyed the monarchical model.

A direct appeal in our conditions to the restoration of this triad will most likely lead to the restoration of that skinny and to a greater extent demagogic compromise, which in practice was hidden behind these three principles in the late Roman era (in which they were, by the way, formulated). Moreover, given the absence of unequivocal contenders for the Russian throne, the unstable and uncertain state of the present Orthodox Church, as well as the abstract meaning of the term "nationality" (which is often understood as just a superficial, folklore style or even a fake for a people of fantasizing intellectuals), it is not difficult to foresee that a return to Uvarov's ideology would be an even greater parody than the pre-revolutionary tsarist regime.

In addition, the tsarist model has a very serious geopolitical flaw, which led to the collapse of the Russian Empire in the same way as the USSR did seventy years later.

A return to the tsarist and, consequently, the "Slavophile" geopolitics in general, is fraught with a terrible threat. The fact is that in the last half century of the reign of the Romanovs, the foreign policy of the ruling house was determined not by the Eurasian traditions of Alexander I and the prospects of the continental Holy Union (based on the alliance of Russia and the powers of Central Europe), but by pro-English and pro-French projects, for the sake of which Russia was drawn into suicidal conflicts on to the side of their natural geopolitical adversaries and against their natural geopolitical allies. Support for Serbian demands, the irresponsible myth of the "Bosphorus and the Dardanelles", the involvement of French masons in the European anti-German intrigues, all this forced Russia to fulfill a political role, not only not characteristic of it, but directly destructive for it. Trying to settle in Eastern Europe on a Slavophil basis and constantly getting involved in a conflict with the Central European powers (natural allies of Russia), the tsarist regime systematically undermined the foundations of the Russian state, and straightforwardly led Russia to geopolitical suicide. This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural This includes the Turkish wars and the war with Japan. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural

a Eurasian mission and seek an alliance with all similar (both politically and spiritually) conservative and imperial regimes. The Slavophil geopolitical utopia cost Russia the Tsar, the Church and the Empire, and only the arrival of the Eurasian-oriented Bolsheviks saved then the country and people from total degradation, from turning into a "regional power".

An attempt to follow such a late-Roman, "Slavophil" line in our conditions cannot but lead to a similar result. And even the very appeal to pre-revolutionary Russia carries potentially suicidal political motives, much more dangerous for the Russian people than the projects of Soviet restoration.

There is one more factor that is extremely dangerous in the case of monarchist tendencies. We are talking about the capitalist form of the economy that was inherent in Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Although this was a variation of national capitalism, constrained by state, social and cultural boundaries, rather than a "wild" free market, the economic alienation inherent in any capitalism was extremely strong. The Russian bourgeois firmly took the place of the state and military aristocracy, the clergy, squeezing out the bureaucracy and employees. This type of Russian bourgeois (rather different from the representatives of the traditional, pre-capitalist, feudal merchants) actually opposed the cultural, social and ethical norms that were the essence of the system of Russian national values.

pseudo-patriarchy, which has lost all its vital, sacred content. It was Russian capitalists (and very often of a nationalist, "Black Hundred" orientation) who became the first conductors of English and French influences in Russia, natural agents of the Atlantist trading model that developed and took shape in Anglo-Saxon and French societies.

The late-Roman state system is a combination of a desacralized monarchist façade, a suicidal Slavophile geopolitics and an Atlantist-oriented market capitalism. In all cases, national rhetoric was only a screen and a figure of speech, behind which stood political and social tendencies, not just far from the true interests of the Russian people, but directly opposite to these interests.

Another element of this model is rather dubious, this is the principle of the provincial administrative division of the Russian Empire. Although in practice this did not interfere with the free development of the peoples that were part of the Russian Empire, and in the normal case, the Russians only helped ethnic groups to form and develop their specific culture, the legal non-recognition of cultural-ethnic and religious autonomies, some rigid state leveling centralism were not the best methods of involving nations in a unanimous and free continental imperialism. Elements of the "nation-state" manifested themselves in the last periods of the Romanovs in the same way as in the last decades of the USSR, and the effect of this was very similar to the alienation of ethnic groups from Moscow (St. Petersburg) and the Russians, separatist sentiments, a surge of "minor nationalism", etc. .d. And as a response

the reaction followed the degeneration of the great Russian messianic will into banal national chauvinism.

In monarchical Russia, it was precisely the cultural and religious side, the nominal fidelity to sacred traditions, the memory of the ideal of Holy Russia, the Holy Kingdom, and Moscow, the Third Rome, which was positive. The Orthodox Church as a bulwark of dogmatic Truth, the symphony of Autocracy, the awareness of the historical mission of the God-bearing Russian people are the spiritual symbols of the true Russian Empire, which have archetypal, enduring value, which, however, should be cleared of formalism, demagoguery and pharisaic taint. But unnatural geopolitics, malleability to capitalization, underestimation of the ethnic and religious factor in small of the intra-imperial peoples, the anti-German, anti-Japanese and anti-Ottoman orientation of the Empire of the late Romanovs, all this should be understood as a dead-end political path that has nothing to do with the true interests of the Russian people, which was proved by the historical collapse of this model.

3.6 Towards a new Eurasian Empire

Based on the previous considerations, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the prospects of the coming Empire as the only form of a worthy and natural existence of the Russian people and the only opportunity to complete its historical and civilizational mission.

1. The coming Empire should not be a "regional power" or "state-nation". It is obvious. But it should be especially emphasized that such an Empire will never be able to become a continuation, the development of a regional power or a nation-state, since such an intermediate stage will cause irreparable damage to the deep national imperial tendency, will involve the Russian people in a labyrinth of insoluble geopolitical and social contradictions, and this, in its turn, will make it impossible to systematically and consistently, logical imperialism.

2. The new Empire should be built immediately as an Empire, and full-fledged and developed purely imperial principles should already be laid in the foundation of its project. This process cannot be attributed to the distant future, hoping for favorable conditions in the future. There will never be such conditions for the creation of the great Russian Empire, if even now the people and political forces striving to speak on its behalf do not consciously and clearly affirm their fundamental state and geopolitical orientation. An empire is not just a very large state. This is something completely different. This is a strategic and geopolitical bloc that surpasses the parameters of an ordinary state; this is a Superstate. Almost never did an ordinary state develop into an Empire. Empires were built immediately as an expression of a special civilizational will, as a super-goal, as a gigantic impulse for the world. Therefore, today one should definitely say: not the Russian State, but the Russian Empire. Not the path of socio-political evolution,

3. The geopolitical and ideological contours of the New Russian Empire should be determined on the basis of overcoming those moments that led to the collapse of the historically preceding imperial forms. Consequently, the New Empire should: be not materialistic, not atheistic, not economically centric;

a) have either maritime boundaries or friendly blocs on adjacent continental territories;

b) have a flexible and differentiated ethnoreligious structure of the internal political and administrative structure, i.e. take into account local, ethnic, religious, cultural, ethical, etc. peculiarities of the regions, giving these elements a legal status;

c) make the participation of the state in the management of the economy flexible and affect only strategic areas, sharply shorten the social cycle, achieve the organic participation of the people in distribution issues;

(These first four points follow from an analysis of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Empire.)

d) fill the religious-monarchical formula with truly sacred content, lost under the influence of the secular West on the Romanov dynasty, to carry out the Orthodox "conservative revolution" in order to return to the origins of the true Christian worldview;

e) transform the term "nationality" from a Uvarov formula into the central aspect of the socio-political structure, make the People the main, fundamental political and legal category, oppose the organic concept of the People to the quantitative norms of liberal and socialist jurisprudence, develop a theory of "rights of the people";

f) instead of Slavophil geopolitics, turn to Eurasian projects rejecting Russia's anti-German policy in the West and anti-Japanese policy in the East, and end the Atlanticist line disguised as "Russian nationalism";

g) to prevent the processes of privatization and capitalization, as well as the stock market game and financial speculation in the Empire, to focus on the corporate, collective and state control of the people over the economic reality, to discard the dubious chimera of "national capitalism";

h) instead of the provincial principle, move to the creation of ethno-religious areas with the maximum degree of cultural, linguistic, economic and legal autonomy, strictly limiting them in one political, strategic, geopolitical and ideological sovereignty.

(These five points flow from criticism of the tsarist model.)

The builders of the New Empire must actively resist the "Young Russian" tendencies in Russian nationalism, striving to consolidate the status of a "nation-state" for Russia, as well as with all the nostalgic political forces that contain in their geopolitical projects an appeal to those elements that already led the Empire to disaster.

The existence of the Russian people as an organic historical community is inconceivable without an imperialist, continental creation. The Russians will remain a people only within the framework of the New Empire.

This Empire, according to geopolitical logic, this time should strategically and spatially surpass the previous version (USSR). Consequently, the New Empire should be Eurasian, highly continental, and in the future Worldwide.

The battle for Russian world domination was not over.

4.1 Land and sea. Common enemy

The new Empire, which is to be created by the Russian people, has its own internal geopolitical logic, inscribed in the natural structure of the geographic space of the planet.

The main geopolitical law, formulated most clearly by Mackinder, states that in history, a constant and basic geopolitical process is the struggle of land, continental powers (with a natural form of ideocratic political structure) against island, maritime states (commercial, market, economic system). This is the eternal opposition of Rome to Carthage, Sparta to Athens, England to Germany, etc. Since the beginning of the 20th century, this confrontation between two geopolitical constants began to acquire a global character. The sea, trade pole, drawing all other countries into its orbit, became the USA, and Russia became the land pole. After World War II, the two superpowers finally assigned their civilizational roles. The United States strategically absorbed the West and coastal territories of Eurasia, and the USSR united around itself a gigantic continental mass of Eurasian spaces. From the point of view of geopolitics as a science, the ancient archetypal confrontation between Sea and Land, plutocracy and ideocracy, the civilization of merchants and the civilization of heroes found expression in the Cold War (the dualism of "heroes and merchants," in the words of Werner Sombart, the author of the book of the same name).

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and then the USSR, upset the relative geopolitical balance in favor of Atlanticism, i.e. Western bloc and market civilization in general. However, geopolitical tendencies are an objective factor, and it is not possible to abolish them in a voluntaristic, "subjective" way. Land tendencies, continental impulses cannot be undone unilaterally, and therefore, the creation of a new land, eastern, continental Empire is a potential geopolitical inevitability.

The Atlantic, sea, trade pole of civilization today is certainly extremely strong and powerful, but objective factors make the continental reaction of the East almost inevitable. The land empire potentially always exists and seeks only convenient circumstances to realize itself in political reality.

The New Empire must be built on a clear awareness of this geopolitical inevitability. In this Empire, it is the Russians who will have a natural key function, since they control the lands that are the axial ones in the Eurasian continental mass. The new Empire cannot be any other than the Russian one, since both territorially, and culturally, and civilizational, and socio-economically, and strategically, the Russians naturally and organically correspond to this planetary mission and go to its implementation throughout their national and state history. Mackinder called the Russian lands "the geographical axis of history", i.e. the space around which the coastal civilization of Eurasia was created (often identified with "civilization" in general) under the influence of the dialectical opposition of sea (external) and land (internal) cultural and political impulses. Some other people or some other country

will be able to act as a pole of the Eurasian continental Empire, only by seizing control over the aggregate of Russian lands, and for this it is necessary to fulfill the almost incredible condition of destroying the Russian people, wiping out the Russian nation. Since this seems unlikely, the Russians need to recognize, realize and take on once again the complex role of the center of the Eurasian Empire.

The geopolitical structure of this Empire should be based on the fundamental principle of the "common enemy" principle. The denial of Atlanticism, the rejection of the strategic control of the United States and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, market-liberal values is that common civilizational base, that common impulse that will open the way for a strong political and strategic alliance, will create the pivotal backbone of the coming Empire. The overwhelming majority of Eurasian states and peoples have a continental, "land" specificity of national history, state traditions, and economic ethics. The overwhelming majority of these states and peoples perceive American political and strategic influence as an unbearable burden that alienates the nations from their historical fate. Despite all the internal civilizations,

Differences in the regional interests of the Eurasian states, in religious, ethnic, racial and cultural orientations are all important factors that cannot be ignored. However, they can be talked about seriously and fully only when the stifling economic and strategic influence of the "common enemy", imposing the model that is alien to practically all Christians, socialists, Muslims, national capitalists, Buddhists, and communists and Hindus. As long as the US dominance persists, all intra-Eurasian conflicts and contradictions are artificial, since such a clarification of relations makes sense only in the absence of a more global factor that, in practice, organizes and controls these conflicts in order to maintain disunity and fragmentation in Eurasia. In this sense, everything "

The "common enemy", Atlanticism, must become the connecting component of the new geopolitical structure. The effectiveness of this factor is beyond doubt, and all the arguments against this consideration either naively do not take into account the objective seriousness and totality of the Atlanticist domination, or deliberately divert geopolitical attention from the only responsible and realistic perspective in favor of secondary regional problems that do not have any solution at all without taking into account the global disposition. forces.

Eurasia is predetermined geographic and strategic unification. This is a strictly scientific geopolitical fact. Russia must inevitably be at the center of such a union. The driving force behind the unification must inevitably be the Russian people. The civilizational mission of the Russians, their universalist ideal, and the logic of the historical formation of the nation and state are in complete harmony with this mission. The new Eurasian Empire is inscribed in a geographic and political predetermination

world history and world geopolitics. It is pointless to argue with this circumstance. The interests of the Russian people are inseparable from the construction of such a continental structure.

The Eurasian geopolitics of the New Empire is not simply a geographic abstraction or an expression of a hypothetical will for unlimited expansion. Its principles and main directions take into account both geopolitical constants, and the current political situation, and really existing international trends, and the strategic balance of forces, and economic and resource patterns. Therefore, the Eurasian imperial project simultaneously carries several dimensions of cultural, strategic, historical, economic, political, etc. It is important to emphasize from the outset that in this or that "pivot" geopolitical alliance, when creating an Empire, we are talking about a completely different degree of integration, depending on the level. In one case, there may be cultural or ethnic rapprochement, in another religious, in the third economic. These questions have a special solution in each specific case. The only universal integrating reality in the future Eurasian Empire will be the categorical imperative of strategic unification, i.e. such a geopolitical alliance, which will allow in all strategic directions to effectively resist Atlantic influences, American geopolitical pressure and political and economic dictatorship.

The strategic unification of the continent in question should ensure control over the maritime borders of Eurasia in all cardinal directions, continental economic, industrial and resource autarchy, and centralized control of the Eurasian armed forces. All other aspects of intra-Eurasian integration will be decided on the basis of flexible, differentiated principles, depending on each specific case. This fundamental consideration must be constantly borne in mind in order to avoid unfounded doubts and objections that might arise if, instead of a strategic alliance, someone mistakenly believes that the matter concerns a political, ethnic, cultural, religious or economic association. By the way, such a substitution with

representatives of "minor nationalism" of all peoples will be quite consciously carried out by the necessity, reproaching the Eurasians and continental empire builders for wanting to dissolve their ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and so on. in a new "internationalist utopia". The Eurasian project in no way leads to the leveling of nations, on the contrary, it proceeds from the need to preserve and develop the identity of peoples and cultures, only in this case it is not about irresponsible romantic dreams of "small nationalists" (which in practice only lead to chauvinism and suicidal ethnic conflicts), but about a serious and objective understanding of the current situation, where this goal can be achieved only under the condition of a radical undermining of the global influence of the Atlanticist West with its market, liberal ideology,

Now it remains only to find out the specifics of this continental project, taking into account the negative factors that thwarted the implementation of this grandiose civilizational plan in previous periods.

4.2 Western axis: Moscow Berlin. European Empire and Eurasia

In the West, the New Empire has a strong geopolitical foothold, which is Central Europe.

Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as Germany, Prussia and part of the Polish and Western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally been a consolidating force in Central Europe, uniting this geopolitical conglomerate under its control.

Central Europe, for natural-geographical and historical reasons, has a pronounced "land", continental character, opposed to the "sea", "Atlantic" spaces of Western Europe. In principle, the political influence of Central Europe could spread further south to Italy and Spain, for which there were many historical precedents. It is most logical to regard Berlin as the geopolitical capital of Central Europe as a symbol of Germany, which, in turn, is the symbol and center of this whole entity. Only Germany and the German people possess all the necessary qualities for the effective integration of this geopolitical region with a historical will, a well-developed economy, a privileged

geographical location, ethnic homogeneity, consciousness of their civilization mission. Land and ideocratic Germany traditionally opposed the merchant-maritime England, and the specifics of this geopolitical and cultural confrontation markedly affected European history, especially after the Germans finally managed to create their own state.

England is geopolitically the least European state, whose strategic interests are traditionally opposed to the Central European powers and, more broadly, continental trends in Europe. However, in parallel with the strengthening of the role of the United States and their seizure of almost complete control over the British colonies, the strategic role of England has significantly diminished, and today in Europe this country acts more as an extraterritorial floating base of the United States than as an independent force. Be that as it may, within Europe, England is the most hostile country to continental interests, the antipode of Central Europe, and therefore, the New Eurasian Empire has a political, ideological and economic enemy in its person. It is unlikely that it will be possible to change the civilizational path of this specific country by will which at one time created a gigantic trade-colonial empire of a purely "sea" type and so contributed to the emergence of the entire modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will necessarily take place not just without taking into account British interests, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. type and so contributed to the emergence of all modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will necessarily take place not just without taking into account British interests, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. type and so contributed to the emergence of all modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and the stock market game. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore England will inevitably become a "scapegoat" in the Eurasian project, since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain. and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a "scapegoat", since the European processes of continental integration will inevitably take place not just without taking British interests into account, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a significant role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, up to encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of Great Britain.

France is another controversial geopolitical entity. In many ways, French history was of an Atlanticist character, opposed to continental and Central European trends. France was the main historical enemy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in every possible way supported the fragmented state of the German principalities, gravitating towards "progressivism" "centralism" anti-traditional and the point and an unnatural type. In general, from the of view of undermining the European was in continental tradition, France has always the vanguard, and in many cases French politics was identified with the most aggressive Atlanticism. At least

At least, this was the case until the United States assumed the planetary function of the main pole of Atlanticism.

In France, there is also an alternative geopolitical trend that goes back to the continental line of Napoleon (whom Goethe still perceived as the leader of the overland integration of Europe) and was vividly embodied in the European policy of de Gaulle, who was looking for an alliance with Germany and the creation of a European confederation independent of the United States. In part, this line also inspired Mitterrand's Franco-German projects. Be that as it may, hypothetically, one can imagine such a turn of events that France recognizes the supremacy of the Central European factor and voluntarily joins in a geopolitical European bloc with an anti-American and continental orientation. The territory of France is a necessary component of the Eurasian bloc in the West, since control over the Atlantic coast directly depends on this, and, accordingly, security of the New Empire on the western frontiers. In any case, the Franco-German alliance is the main link in Eurasian geopolitics in the continental West, provided that the interests of Central Europe, namely, its autarky and geopolitical independence, will be of priority here. Such a project is known as the "European Empire". The integration of Europe under the auspices of Germany as the basis of such a European Empire fits perfectly into the Eurasian project and is the most desirable process in the matter of more global continental integration.

All tendencies towards European unification around Germany (Central Europe) will have a positive meaning only if one fundamental condition for creating a strong geopolitical and strategic axis Moscow-Berlin is observed. By itself, Central Europe does not have sufficient political and military potential to gain effective independence from US Atlanticist control. Moreover, in the current conditions it is difficult to expect a genuine geopolitical and national awakening from Europe without the revolutionary influence of the Russian factor. The European Empire without Moscow and, more broadly, Eurasia, is not only incapable of fully organizing its strategic space with a shortage of military power, political initiative and natural resources, but also in a civilizational sense does not have clear ideals and guidelines, since the influence of the Trade System and market liberal values deeply paralyzed the foundations of the national worldview of European peoples, undermined their historical organic value systems. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarky. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarky. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarky. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a straight and vital axis with Moscow.

The Eurasian impulse should come exclusively from Moscow, transferring the civilizational mission (with appropriate adaptation to European specifics) of Russians to Berlin, which, in turn, will begin European integration according to principles and projects inspired by a deep geopolitical continental impulse. The key to the adequacy of the European Empire lies in the unambiguous predominance of Russophile tendencies in Germany itself, as the best German minds understood this, from Müller van den Bruck to Ernst Nikisch, Karl Haushofer and Jordis von Lohausen. And as a continuation of such geopolitical Russophilia, the rest of Europe (and first of all, France) should follow the Germanophil

orientation. Only under such conditions will the western vector of the Eurasian Empire be adequate and durable, strategically secured and ideologically consistent. But it must be admitted that no other unification of Europe is simply impossible without deep contradictions and internal divisions. For example, the current unification of Europe under American, NATO control will very soon make it possible to feel all its geopolitical and economic contradictions, and therefore, it will inevitably be either disrupted, or suspended, or spontaneously acquire an unexpected, anti-American (and potentially Eurasian) dimension that was foreseen Jean Thiriard.

It is important to immediately emphasize that the unification of Europe around Germany must take into account the major political miscalculations of previous attempts, and first of all, the failure of the epic of Hitler and the Third Reich. The geopolitical unification of Europe around Central Europe (Germany) should in no way imply the ethnic domination of the Germans or the creation of a centralized structure of the Jacobin type in the form of a giant German State. According to Tiriard, "Hitler's main mistake was that he wanted to make Europe German, while he should have tried to make it European." This thesis remains absolutely relevant at the present stage, and in general can apply to all neo-imperial processes, including in Russia. The European Empire, organized around Germany, must be precisely European, free from ethnic and linguistic domination of any one people. To be the geopolitical heart of Europe, Germany must acquire a supernational, civilizational, and imperial character proper, abandoning contradictory and impossible attempts to create a racially homogeneous "state-nation." European peoples must be equal partners in building the western foothold of Eurasia and adapt the common imperial impulse to their own national and cultural identity. The European Empire should not suppress European nations, not subjugate them to the Germans or Russians, but, on the contrary, liberate them from the yoke of quantitative, consumer, market civilization, awaken their deep national energies, return them to the bosom of history as independent, living and full-fledged political actors

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire presupposes several serious steps towards the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "cordon sanitaire" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France strove to destabilize the Eastern European peoples in every possible way, to instill in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences. In addition, the diplomatic potential of the Atlantists by any means sought to strengthen Russophobic sentiments in Germany and German-Phobic in Russia, in order to involve both of these powers in a local conflict over the division of spheres of influence in the intermediate spaces in Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, etc. The current NATO strategists are pursuing the same line, putting forward the idea of creating a "Black Sea - Baltic federation" of states, which would be directly related to Atlanticism and potentially hostile to both Russia and Germany.

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis presupposes, first of all, the disruption of the organization of the "cordon sanitaire" in Eastern Europe and an active fight against the carriers of Russophobia in Germany and

Germanophobia in Russia. Instead of being guided by regional interests in the zone of mutual influence and unilaterally supporting the politically and ethnically close peoples of this region, Russia and Germany should resolve all controversial issues jointly and in advance, having developed a common plan for redistributing the geography of influence in this region, and then toughly suppress all local initiatives of the East European nations to revise the Russian-German plans. The main thing to strive for is the categorical elimination of any semblance of a "cordon sanitaire," the deliberate dispelling of the illusions of intermediate states regarding their potential independence from geopolitically powerful neighbors. It is necessary to create a direct and clear border between friendly Russia and Central Europe (Germany), and even in the prospect of creating a single strategic bloc along the Berlin-Moscow axis, this border should retain its geopolitical significance as a limit of cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity in order to knowingly exclude ethnic or confessional expansion in border areas. Russian-Ukrainian, Russian-Baltic, Russian-Romanian, Russian-Polish, etc. the relationship should initially be viewed not as bilateral, but as trilateral with Germany's participation. The same applies to relations between Germany and the Eastern European countries (peoples); they should also be of a triple character with the obligatory participation of the Russian side (and with the exception in all cases of outside, Atlanticist, American intervention). For example, German-Ukrainian relations must necessarily be German-Russian-Ukrainian; German-Baltic German-Russian-Baltic; German-Polish German-Russian-Polish etc.

The Moscow-Berlin axis will help solve a whole range of major problems that both Russia and Germany are facing today. Russia in such an alliance gets direct access to high technologies, to powerful investments in industry, acquires the guaranteed complicity of Europe in the economic development of the Russian lands. At the same time, economic dependence on Germany will by no means come, since Germany will participate in Russia not as a charitable party, but as an equal partner, receiving in return from Moscow a strategic cover that guarantees Germany political liberation from US domination and resource independence from energy reserves of the Third World, controlled by Atlanticism (this is the basis of the energy blackmail of Europe by the United States). Germany today is an economic giant and a political dwarf. Russia is exactly the opposite of a political giant and an economic cripple. The Moscow-Berlin axis will heal the ailment of both partners and lay the foundation for the future prosperity of Great Russia and Great Germany. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole. And in the long term, this will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire, the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the well-being of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole.

As preliminary steps in the formation of the Moscow-Berlin axis, it makes sense to thoroughly cleanse the cultural and historical perspective of mutual relations from the dark sides of the past history of the Russian-German wars, which were the result of the successful subversive activities of the Atlanticist lobby in Germany and Russia, and not an expression of the political will of our continental nations. In this perspective, it is advisable to return the Kaliningrad region (East Prussia) to Germany in order to abandon the last territorial symbol of the terrible fratricidal war. In order to prevent this action from being perceived by the Russians as another step in geopolitical surrender, it makes sense for Europe to offer Russia other territorial annexations or other forms of expanding the strategic zone of influence,

especially among those states that stubbornly strive to join the "Black Sea-Baltic Federation". The issues of restitution of East Prussia should be inextricably linked with the territorial and strategic expansion of Russia, and Germany, in addition to preserving Russian military bases in the Kaliningrad region, should, for its part, contribute diplomatically and politically to strengthening Russia's strategic positions in the Northwest and West. The Baltic countries, Poland, Moldova and Ukraine as a potential "cordon sanitaire" should undergo geopolitical transformation not after the restitution of Prussia, but simultaneously with it, as elements of the same process of final fixing of the borders between friendly Russia and Central Europe.

Bismarck's words "Germany has no enemy in the East" should once again become the dominant feature of German political doctrine, and the opposite maxim should be accepted by the Russian rulers "on the Western borders, Russia has only friends in Central Europe." However, in order for this to become a reality, and not just good wishes, it is necessary to ensure that it is geopolitics and its laws that become the main basis for making all significant foreign policy decisions both in Germany and in Russia, since only from this point of view it is necessary and inevitable the closest Russian-German alliance can be realized, understood and recognized totally and to the end. Otherwise, an appeal to historical conflicts, misunderstandings and disputes will frustrate any attempt to create a solid and reliable base for the vital Moscow-Berlin axis.

4.3 Axis Moscow Tokyo. Pan-Asian project. To the Eurasian Trilateral Commission

The new Empire must have a clear strategy regarding its eastern component. Therefore, the eastern borders of Eurasia for this Empire have the same strategic importance as the problems of the West.

Proceeding from the fundamental principle of "common enemy", Russia should strive for a strategic alliance with precisely those states that are more burdened than others by the political and economic pressure of the Atlanticist superpower, have a historical tradition of geopolitical projects opposite to Atlanticism, and possess sufficient technological and economic power to become the key geopolitical reality of the new bloc.

In this perspective, the need for maximum rapprochement with India, which is our natural geopolitical ally in Asia in terms of racial, political and strategic parameters, seems absolutely unconditional. After decolonization, India sought to avoid by any means entering the capitalist bloc and in fact led the movement of "non-aligned countries" seeking in the narrow "no man's" geopolitical space for opportunities to adhere to the "Third Way" policy with undisguised sympathy for the USSR. Today, when tough communist dogma has been abolished in Russia, there are no obstacles at all for the closest rapprochement with India.

India is a continent in itself. The sphere of its geopolitical influence is limited, however, by Hindustan and a small zone in the Indian Ocean, located south of the peninsula. India will inevitably become a strategic ally of the New Empire, its southeastern outpost, although it should be borne in mind that the Indian

civilization is not prone to geopolitical dynamics and territorial expansion, and besides, the Hindu tradition does not have a universal religious dimension, and therefore this country can play an important role only in a limited part of Asia. At the same time, the rather weak economic and technological development of this country does not allow relying on it in full, and therefore, the alliance with it at this stage will not solve any problems of the New Empire. India will be able to serve as a strategic outpost of Eurasia, and this is where its mission is actually exhausted (if we do not take into account its spiritual culture, familiarity with which can help to clarify the most important metaphysical landmarks of the Empire).

India is an important ally of Eurasia, but not the main one. Two geopolitical realities, China and Japan, claim the role of the true eastern pole of Eurasia in today's world. But there is a deep geopolitical antagonism between these countries, which has a long history and corresponds to the typology of the two civilizations. Therefore, Russia must choose one thing. The problem cannot be posed in this way: both China and Japan at the same time. A choice is needed here.

At first glance, China is a land mass, its civilization has a traditional authoritarian (non-commercial) character, and the very preservation of communist ideology during liberal reforms in modern China, it seemed, should finally contribute to the choice of China, as opposed to the capitalist, island Japan. However, history shows that it was China, and not Japan, that geopolitically was the most important base of Anglo-Saxon forces on the Eurasian continent, while Japan, on the contrary, supported an alliance with Central European countries of the opposite orientation.

In order to understand this paradox, one should carefully look at the map and mark on it the geography of the last two world wars. In the northern hemisphere, one can conditionally distinguish four geopolitical zones corresponding to the main participants in world conflicts (countries or blocks of states). The Far West, Atlanticism, unites the United States, England, France and several other European countries. This zone has a completely definite geopolitical orientation, unambiguously identical to the "sea", "Carthaginian" line of world history. This is the space of maximum civilizational activity and the source of all anti-traditional, "progressive" transformations.

The second zone is Central Europe, Germany, Austria-Hungary. This space, directly adjacent to the Atlanticist bloc from the East, from a geopolitical point of view, has all the signs of an anti-Atlantic, continental, land-based orientation and geographically gravitates towards the East.

The third zone is actually Russia itself, which lies in the center of gravity of the continent and is responsible for the fate of Eurasia. The land-based and illiberal, "conservative" essence of Russia is obvious.

And finally, the fourth zone is the Pacific area, where it is Japan that is endowed with a central role, developing rapidly and dynamically and possessing at the same time a rigid system of traditionalist values and a clear understanding of its geopolitical role. At the same time, Japan is oriented essentially anti-Western and anti-liberal, since its value system is something directly opposite to the ideals of the "progressive" Atlanticist humanity.

The Western world (Atlanticism), represented by its deepest ideologues (Mackinder, Mahan, etc.), understood perfectly well that the biggest threat to planetary Atlanticism would be the consolidation of all three zones of Eurasia, from the Central European to the Pacific, with the participation and central role of Russia against the Anglo-Saxon and French "progressivism". Therefore, the main task of the Atlanticist strategists was oppose the three Eurasian zones to their immediate neighbors and potential allies. Both the Russian-German and Russian-Japanese conflicts were actively provoked by the Atlanticists, who acted both inside the Eurasian governments and outside, using diplomatic and power levers. Opponents of Atlanticism, starting with Haushofer, finally came to the conclusion that effective opposition to Atlantism is possible only if the logic imposed on the three Eurasian zones is rejected, i.e. with the categorical refusal of the Russians from German and Japanese phobia, and the Japanese and Germans from Russophobia, no matter what historical precedents the supporters of these "phobias" may resort to.

At the same time, it is Japan, as a symbol of the entire Pacific space, that is of paramount importance in these anti-Atlantic projects, since the strategic position of Japan, the dynamics of its development, the specificity of its value system make it an ideal partner in the planetary struggle against the civilization of the West. China, for its part, did not play a special role in this geopolitical picture, being deprived at first of political independence (British colonization), and then of geopolitical dynamics. It was only during the period of active Maoism that a purely soil-based, Eurasian tendency manifested itself in China itself, when the projects of "peasant socialism", all-Chinese nationalism and a pronounced Sovietophilia prevailed. But this state did not last long, and China, under the pretext of disagreeing with the development of the Soviet model, again returned to fulfilling the dubious geopolitical function of destabilizing the Far Eastern interests of Eurasia and escalating conflicts with Russia. There is no doubt that the Chinese perestroika, which began in the 1980s, was the final turn from the Maoist period to the pro-Atlanticist model, which should have finally consolidated China's break with the USSR and its orientation towards the West. At the same time, the "atlanticization" of modern China was much more successful than in Russia, since economic liberalism without political democratization allowed China to become dependent on Western financial groups without conflict, while preserving the totalitarian system and the semblance of political independence. Liberalism was implanted in China by totalitarian methods, and that is why the reform was a complete success. To the political power of the party oligarchy was added the economic power of the same oligarchy, which successfully privatized the people's industry and national wealth and fused with the international cosmopolitan elite of the Trade System. China's economic successes represent a rather ambiguous reality, since they were achieved at the cost of a deep compromise with the West and are not combined with any clear geopolitical concept that could serve as a guarantee of political independence and independence. Most likely, the new liberal China, which has two serious competitors next to it, economically powerful Japan and strategically powerful Russia, will again, as many times in history, return to a purely Atlanticist function in the Far East, combining for this the political dictatorship and the potential of capitalist development. Moreover, from a purely pragmatic point of view, the strategic alliance of Russia with China to create a single bloc will immediately alienate Japan from the Russians and, accordingly, again make hostile the key Pacific region, on whose participation in the common Eurasian project the final geopolitical success of the confrontation between Land and Sea depends. ...

In the New Empire, the eastern axis should be the Moscow-Tokyo axis. This is a categorical imperative of the Eastern, Asian component of Eurasianism. It is around this axis that the basic principles of the Asian policy of Eurasia should take shape. Japan, being the most northerly point among the Pacific Islands, is located in an extremely advantageous geographical location for strategic, political and economic expansion to the South. The Federation of the Pacific Space around Japan was the main idea of the so-called. "Pan-Asian project", which began to be implemented in the 30s and 40s and was interrupted only because of the defeat of the Axis countries in the war. This pan-Asian project must be revisited today in order to undermine the expansion of American influence in the region and deprive the Atlanticists as a whole of their most important strategic and economic bases.

The Pan-Asian project is the center of the eastern orientation of the New Empire. An alliance with Japan is vital. Axis Moscow Tokyo contrary to Axis Moscow Beijing is priority and promising, opening for continental empire building such horizons, which finally will make Eurasia geopolitically completed war, and the Atlanticist empire of the West will be weakened to the utmost, and perhaps, and will destroy completely.

The anti-Americanism of the Japanese, who perfectly remember the nuclear genocide and clearly understand the shame of the political occupation that has lasted for several decades, is beyond doubt. The principle of the "common enemy" is evident here. In the book by American Serge Friedmann, "Coming war with Japan" (the book is called "Coming war with Japan") seems inevitable. The economic war between Japan and the United States is already underway. Russia, building the Eurasian Empire, cannot have a better ally.

Axis Moscow Tokyo also solves a number of major problems in both countries. First, Russia is acquiring an economic giant equipped with highly developed technology and enormous financial potential as its allies. However, Japan lacks political independence, a military-strategic system, and direct access to resources. Everything that Japan lacks, Russia has in abundance, and everything that the Russians lack, the Japanese have in abundance. By combining efforts to build a continental Empire, the Japanese and the Russians could quickly create an unprecedentedly powerful geopolitical center covering Siberia, Mongolia, Japan itself and, in the future, the entire Pacific region. In exchange for strategic protection and direct access to Eurasian resources, Japan could quickly and effectively help the Russians in the technological development and development of Siberia, laying the backbone of an independent regional organism. Japanese technological and financial assistance would solve many problems in Russia.

In addition, Russia and Japan together could restructure the Far Eastern part of continental Eurasia. Indicative in this respect is the constantly increasing intensity of Mongolian-Japanese contacts based on the unity of origin, racial closeness and spiritual and religious kinship. Mongolia (possibly even Inner Mongolia and Tibet, which are currently under Chinese occupation), Kalmykia, Tuva, Buryatia form a Eurasian Buddhist enclave, which could serve as a strong connecting element between Russia and Japan, provide intermediate links in the Moscow-Tokyo axis. On the one hand, these regions are closely and inextricably linked with Russia, and on the other, culturally and racially close to Japan.

The Buddhist bloc could play a crucial role in creating a solid geopolitical structure in the Far East, which would be the continental link of the Pacific Pan-Asian Union. In the event of aggravation of relations with China, which will inevitably occur at the beginning of the implementation of the Moscow-Tokyo axis, the Buddhist factor will be used as a banner of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Tibet and Inner Mongolia for the expansion of the proper Eurasian continental spaces to the detriment of pro-Atlantic China.

Generally speaking, China has every chance of becoming the geopolitical "scapegoat" in the implementation of the Pan-Asian project. This can be done both by provoking internal Chinese separatism (Tibetans, Mongols, the Muslim population of Xinjiang), and by playing on regional contradictions, as well as with active political support of anti-Atlanticist, purely continental forces of a potential Buddhist (and Taoist) lobby inside China itself, which in the long term may lead to the establishment of such a political regime in China itself, which will be loyal to the Eurasian Empire. In addition, China should be offered a special vector of regional geopolitics, directed strictly to the South towards Taiwan and Hong Kong. Southward expansion compensates in part for the loss of China's political influence in the North and East.

China in the eastern regions of the New Empire should be compared in the West not to England, but to France, since in relation to its Eurasian Empire it will be guided by two criteria in the event of active opposition to Eurasian projects, China will have to be treated as a geopolitical adversary with all the ensuing consequences, but if it succeeds create a powerful pro-Japanese and pro-Russian simultaneously political lobby inside the country, then in the future China itself will become a full-fledged and equal participant in the continental project.

Axis Moscow Tokyo together with the western axis Moscow Berlin will create a geopolitical space that is directly opposite to the main model of Atlanticist ideologists, whose supreme authority today is Trilateral, the Trilateral Commission. The "Trilateral Commission", created by the American circles of the highest political establishment, assumes as a new configuration of the planet the strategic unification of three geopolitical zones, exactly corresponding to the three geopolitical elements of the four, which we discussed above. The three sides of this commission, which seeks to fulfill the functions of the "World Government", correspond to:

- 1) American zone (USA, Far West, pure Atlanticism),
- 2) European zone (continental Europe, Central Europe, but under the auspices of France and England, not Germany)
- 3) the pacific zone (united around Japan).

Thus "Trilateral" seeks to construct a geopolitical model in which Eurasia proper (= Russia) will be surrounded on both sides by reliable geopolitical partners of the United States; three out of four zones covering the northern regions of the planet come under the direct control of the United States. At the same time, between the potential Eurasian adversary of the Atlanticists (Eurasia) and the very center of Atlanticism (USA) there are two service geopolitical spaces (Europe and Japan). It is also important to note that the restructuring in China in the early 80s was started precisely with the filing of the representatives of the Trilateral Commission, who sought to finally return China to the Atlanticist policy.

The Eurasian project proposes something exactly the opposite of Trilateral's plans. The New Empire is the anti-Trilateral, its reverse, inverted model. This is the union of three geopolitical zones centered in Russia, oriented against America. By the same logic, according to which the United States is seeking to geopolitically keep Europe and Japan under its control, realizing all the strategic benefits for American power in such an alignment of forces, Russia, while building a New Empire, should in every possible way strive to create a strong strategic alliance with Europe and Japan, so that achieve their own geopolitical stability, power and guarantee political freedom to all Eurasian peoples. In principle, we can talk about the creation of its own Eurasian "Trilateral Commission" with Russian, European and Japanese branches, in which, however, not Atlanticist and pro-American politicians will participate, but intellectual and political leaders of national orientation who understand the geopolitical logic of the current state of affairs in the world. At the same time, naturally, unlike the Atlanticist Trilateral, the Eurasian Trilateral Commission should have a German, not a Frenchman, as the main representative of Europe.

Taking into account the strategic necessity of the Japanese factor in the Eurasian project, it becomes quite clear that the issue of restitution of the Kuriles is not an obstacle for the Russian-Japanese alliance. In the case of the Kuril Islands, as in the case of the Kaliningrad region, we are dealing with the territorial symbols of the Second World War, alliances and the entire course of which was a complete triumph of the Atlantists, who dealt with all their opponents simultaneously through the extreme exhaustion of the USSR (when such a geopolitical position was imposed on it, which in the long term could not but lead to the collapse of perestroika) and the direct occupation of Europe and Japan. The Kuril Islands are a reminder of the absurd and unnatural fratricidal massacre of the Russians and the Japanese, the earliest possible oblivion of which is a necessary condition for our mutual prosperity. The Kurils must be returned to Japan, but this should be carried out within the framework of the general process of the new organization of the Eurasian Far East. In addition, the restitution of the Kuril Islands cannot be carried out while maintaining the existing alignment of political forces in Russia and Japan. This is the business of only Eurasian, imperialist-oriented politicians who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now. who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now. who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical necessity of restitution of the Kuriles among the Eurasian elite should be present already now.

4.4 Axis Moscow Tehran. Central Asian Empire. Pan-Arab project

The policy of the Eurasian Empire in the southern direction should also be oriented towards a firm continental alliance with a force that satisfies both strategically, ideologically, and culturally, the common Eurasian tendency of anti-Americanism. The principle of "common enemy" should be a decisive factor here too.

In the South of Eurasia, there are several geopolitical formations that could theoretically act as the south pole of the New Empire. Since India and China should be attributed to the East zone and connected with the prospect of pan-Asian integration, only the Islamic world remains, stretching from the Philippines and Pakistan to the Maghreb countries, ie. West Africa. In general, the entire Islamic zone is a naturally friendly geopolitical reality in relation to the Eurasian Empire, since the Islamic tradition is more politicized and modernized than

most other Eurasian denominations are well aware of the spiritual incompatibility of Americanism and religion. The Atlantacists themselves consider the Islamic world as a whole as their potential adversary, and therefore the Eurasian Empire has in its person loyal potential allies striving for a common goal of undermining and, in the future, completely ending American, Western domination on the planet. It would be ideal to have an integrated Islamic world as the southern component of the entire Eurasian Empire, stretching from Central Asia to West Africa, religiously united and politically stable, basing its policy on the principle of loyalty to tradition and spirit. Therefore, in the long term, the Islamic Empire in the South ("new caliphate") can become an important element of New Eurasia along with the European Empire in the West,

However, at the moment the Islamic world is extremely fragmented and within it there are various ideological and political tendencies, as well as geopolitical projects that are opposite to each other. The most global are the following currents:

- one) Iranian fundamentalism, anti-Atlantist type, anti-american, geopolitically active),
- 2) Turkish secular regime (Atlantist type, accentuating pan-Turkist line),
- 3) pan-Arabism preached by Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, partly Egypt and Saudi Arabia (quite diverse and contradictory projects in each case),
- four) Saudi Wahhabi type of fundamentalism (geopolitically in solidarity with Atlanticism),
- five) various versions of "Islamic socialism" (Libya, Iraq, Syria, models close to pan-Arabism of the "left" persuasion).

It is immediately clear that the purely Atlantacist poles in the Islamic world, be they "secular" (as in the case of Turkey) or Islamic (in the case of Saudi Arabia), cannot fulfill the functions of the south pole of Eurasia in the global project of the continental Empire. What remains is "Iranian fundamentalism" and "pan-Arabism" (left wing).

From the point of view of geopolitical constants, Iran, of course, has a priority in this matter, since it satisfies all Eurasian parameters; it is a major continental power, closely connected with Central Asia, radically anti-American, traditionalist and emphasizing at the same time the "social" political vector (protection of "mustazafs", "disadvantaged"). In addition, Iran occupies such a position on the map of the mainland that the creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis solves a huge number of problems for the New Empire. By including Iran as the southern pole of the Empire, Russia would instantly have achieved the strategic goal to which it had (by wrong paths) access to the warm seas for several centuries. This strategic aspect, Russia's lack of such an exit, has been the main trump card of Atlantacist geopolitics since the time of colonial England, which completely controlled Asia and the East, taking advantage of Russia's lack of direct access to the southern shores of the continent.

areas of Eurasia, where the British reigned supreme, who easily suppressed any attempts of Russian expansion through control over this coastal zone. However, even if Russia succeeded in doing this, Atlanticist control of Gibraltar would always remain an obstacle to truly large-scale maritime operations and prevent Russia from undermining British power. Only Iran, continentally adjoining Russia and going directly to the Indian Ocean, both then and now, could and can be a radical solution to this major geopolitical problem. Having received strategic access, first of all, naval bases on the Iranian shores, Eurasia will be completely safe from the strategy of the "anaconda ring", i.e. from the implementation of the traditional Atlanticist plan to "strangle"

The creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis at once cuts the "anaconda" in the most vulnerable place and opens up unlimited prospects for Russia to acquire more and more new footholds inside and outside Eurasia. This is the most essential point.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the former Soviet Central Asia, where today three geopolitical tendencies "pan-Turkism" (Turkey, Atlanticism), "Wahhabism" (Saudi Arabia, Atlanticism) and "fundamentalism" (Iran, anti-Atlanticism) compete. For quite understandable reasons, there can be no "pan-Arabism" among the Turkic-speaking peoples of the majority of Central Asia. The presence in parallel with this of a powerful pro-Russian orientation should also be taken into account, but it is difficult to imagine how these Islamic regions, with their awakening national self-awareness, can again join Russia bloodlessly and painlessly. It is quite obvious that among the "non-Promos" tendencies, the New Empire can only rely on a pro-Iranian orientation, which will take this region out of the direct or indirect control of the Atlanticists. At the same time, the strong axis Moscow Tehran will remove all contradictions between Russophilism and Islamism (of the Iranian type), make them one and the same geopolitical trend, oriented towards both Moscow and Tehran at the same time. Parallel to this, such an axis would automatically mean the end of the civil conflict in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which are fueled only by the geopolitical uncertainty of these formations, torn apart contradictions between the Islamic-Iranian fundamentalist vector and gravitation towards Russia. Naturally, against the background of such a contradiction, petty ethnic tensions are aggravated, as well as the activities of Atlanticist "agents of influence" who, directly or indirectly (through Turkey and Saudi Arabia) seek to destabilize the intra-Asian spaces in their key centers, are facilitated.

Geopolitically Iran is Central Asia, just as Germany is Central Europe. Moscow, as the center of Eurasia, its pole, should, within the framework of the New Empire, delegate to Tehran the mission of guiding the "Iranian peace" (Pax Persica) in this space, the organization of a strong Central Asian geopolitical bloc capable of resisting Atlanticist influence in the entire region. This means that the pan-Turkist expansion, as well as the financial and political invasion of the Saudis, will be abruptly interrupted. Traditionally hostile to both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran will fulfill this function much better than the Russians, who will solve their geopolitical problems in this complex center only with the help of strategic support from the Iranian side. But here, as in the case of Germany, we should not talk about the creation of an Iranian Empire or the Iranization of Central Asia.

strategically homogeneous, but ethnically and culturally diverse Islamic formation, inextricably linked with the interests of the entire Eurasian Empire.

In the Moscow-Tehran axis issue, the Armenian issue occupies an important place, since it traditionally serves as a center of destabilization in the Transcaucasus. It should be noted that the Armenians are an Aryan people, clearly aware of their Japhetical nature and kinship with Indo-European peoples, especially Asian ones, i.e. with Iranians and Kurds. On the other hand, the Armenians are a Christian people, their Monophysite tradition fits precisely into the general mood of the Eastern Church (although it is recognized by Orthodoxy as a heretical trend), and they are very vividly aware of the geopolitical connection with Russia. The Armenians occupy lands of extreme strategic importance, as the way from Turkey to Azerbaijan and further to Central Asia lies through Armenia and Artsakh. In the Moscow axis Tehran Yerevan automatically becomes the most important strategic link, additionally connecting Russia with Iran, and cutting off Turkey from the inland spaces. With the possible reorientation of Baku from Ankara to Tehran, the joint Moscow-Tehran project will quickly resolve the Karabakh issue, since all four sides will be vitally interested in the immediate establishment of stability in such an important strategic region. (Otherwise, if the pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan is preserved, this "country" is subject to dismemberment between Iran, Russia and Armenia.) Almost the same applies to other regions of the Caucasus, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Dagestan, etc. which will remain zones of conflict and instability only if the geopolitical interests of Atlanticist Turkey collide with Eurasian Russia. Connecting the Iranian geopolitical line here will instantly deprive the content of the appearance of a collision between "

In this project for the reconstruction of Central Asia, it should be noted that Russian ethnic interests can be protected in the best possible way, since the Central Asian Empire will be built not on the basis of artificial political constructions, fictitious "post-imperial legitimacy", but on the basis of national homogeneity, which implies a peaceful transition to the direct jurisdiction of Moscow of all territories of Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan), compactly populated by Russians. And those territories whose ethnic composition is controversial will receive special rights on the basis of Russian-Iranian projects within a particular Empire. Consequently, through a Eurasian geopolitical project, the Russians will be able to achieve what appears to be the goal of "minor (ethnic) nationalism," but which this nationalism itself will never be able to accomplish.

It is also important to take into account the need to impose on Turkey the role of a "scapegoat" in this project, since the interests of this state in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not be taken into account at all. Moreover, it is probably necessary to emphasize the support of Kurdish separatism in Turkey itself, as well as the autonomist demands of the Turkish Armenians, in order to wrest the peoples ethnically close to Iran from the secular-Atlanticist control. As compensation, Turkey should be offered either development in a southern direction to the Arab world through Baghdad, Damascus and Riyadh, or provoke pro-Iranian fundamentalists in Turkey itself to a cardinal dimension of the geopolitical course and to enter the Central Asian bloc in the long term under an anti-Atlantic and Eurasian sign. ...

The Moscow-Tehran axis is the backbone of the Eurasian geopolitical project. Iranian Islam is the best version of Islam for entering the continental bloc, and it is this version that should be supported by Moscow as a priority.

The second line of the Eurasian alliance with the South is the Pan-Arab project, which covers part of Asia Minor and North Africa. This block is also vital to continental geopolitics, since this zone is strategically important in terms of control over the southwestern coast of Europe. That is why the British and later American presence in this region is a historical and strategic constant. By controlling the Middle East and North Africa, the Atlanticists have traditionally kept (and keep) continental Europe under political and economic pressure.

However, the integration of the pan-Arab project with the common Eurasian Empire should be entrusted to purely European forces, returning to the projects of Euro-Africa, which, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is not two continents, but one. The European Empire, vitally interested in the deepest penetration into the south of the African continent, should in the long term fully control, relying on the pan-Arab bloc, Africa up to the Sahara, and in the future try to strategically penetrate the entire African continent. In the Euro-African perspective, the Mediterranean Sea is not a true "sea", but only an internal "lake" that does not represent either a barrier or a defense against Atlanticist influence. A detailed polyethnic project should be developed outside Arab Africa, which would help restructure the black continent along national, ethnic and cultural lines, instead of the controversial postcolonial conglomerate that modern African states are. A nuanced pan-African (non-Arab) national project could become a geopolitical addition to the pan-Arab integration plan.

Considering that the model of a purely Iranian fundamentalism is unlikely to become universally acceptable in the Arab world (largely due to the specificity of the Shiite, Aryan version of Iranian Islam), the pan-Arab project should strive to create an independent anti-Atlantic bloc, where Iraq, Libya would become the priority poles. and liberated Palestine (under certain conditions also Syria), i.e. those Arab countries that more clearly understand the American danger and more radically than others reject the market-capitalist model imposed by the West. At the same time, in the pan-Arab project, the "scapegoat" will be, first of all, Saudi Arabia, too rooted in Atlantic geopolitics to voluntarily enter a pan-Arab bloc friendly to Eurasia. For Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, the situation is somewhat different, since the ruling pro-Atlantic forces in these states do not express national tendencies, do not fully control the situation and rely only on American bayonets and American money. With the start of a pan-Arab liberation war at a sufficiently intense level, all these regimes will fall in one hour.

But it is necessary to clearly understand that the most harmonious structure of the pan-Arab space is not so much a matter of Russia, but of Europe, Central Europe, Germany, and more precisely, the European Empire. Russia (more precisely, the USSR) intervened in Arab problems only when it alone represented a Eurasian state in the face of Americanism. In the presence of a powerful European base of the Eurasian orientation, i.e. after the creation of the Moscow Berlin axis, this function should be delegated to Berlin and Europe as a whole. Russia's immediate concern in the Islamic world should be

namely Iran, on the alliance with which the vital strategic and even narrowly ethnic interests of the Russians depend.

Iran, which controls Central Asia (including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the remains of Turkey or "Turkey after the pro-Iranian revolution") together with Russia, is the center of Moscow's priority interests. At the same time, the traditional influence of Russia among the "left" regimes of a pan-Arab orientation (primarily Iraq and Libya) should be used to bring the Arab countries closer to Iran and soon forget the artificial Iranian-Iraqi conflict inspired by the Atlantists.

4.5 Empire of many Empires

The new Empire, the construction of which would correspond to the global, planetary civilizational mission of the Russian people, is a super-project that has many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have a complex differentiated structure, within which there will be varying degrees of interdependence and integration of individual parts. It is quite obvious that the New Empire will not be either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Empire ..

The main integrating moment of this New Empire will be the fight against Atlanticism and a tough rebuff to the liberal-market, "maritime," Carthaginian civilization that is embodied today by the United States and the planetary political, economic and military structures that serve Atlanticism. the creation of a gigantic geopolitical continental bloc, united strategically.

integrating factor of the New Empire. This Empire will be a single and indivisible organism in the military-strategic sense, and this will impose political restrictions on all internal sub-imperial formations. All the blocs that will be part of the New Empire will be politically limited in one categorical prohibition to serve Atlanticist geopolitical interests, withdraw from the strategic alliance, and harm continental security. At this and only at this level, the New Empire will be an integral geopolitical entity.

At the next lower level, the New Empire will be a "confederation of Greater Spaces" or secondary Empires. Of these, four main European Empires in the West (around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the East (around Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the Center (around Russia) should be immediately distinguished. It is quite logical that the central position is the main one in such a project, since it is on it that the territorial coherence and homogeneity of all other components of the giant continental block depends. In addition, separate independent Large Spaces will exist in addition to the indicated blocs India, the pan-Arab world, the pan-African union, as well as, possibly, a special region of China, whose status is still difficult to determine even approximately. Each of the secondary Empires will be based on a particular racial, cultural, religious, political, or geopolitical integrating factor, which may be different in each case. The degree of integration of the Empires themselves will also be a variable, depending on the specific ideological base on which this or that Empire will be created.

Within these secondary Empires, the confederal principle will also operate, but this time it will be applied to smaller ethnic, national and regional

units to what, with greater or lesser approximation, can be called a "country" or "state". Naturally, the sovereignty of these "countries" will have significant limitations, first of all, strategic (arising from the principles of the entire continental New Empire), and secondly, associated with the specifics of those Great Spaces, which they will be part of. And in this matter, the principle of extremely flexible differentiation will be applied, taking into account the historical, spiritual, geographic, and racial characteristics of each region.

The Great Russians, for example, can be considered as a separate people or even a "country" within the Russian Empire, along with Ukrainians, Belarusians, possibly Serbs, etc., but at the same time they will all be closely related to the jurisdiction of the Slavic-Orthodox type embodied in a specific state system. At the same time, the Russian Empire will depend on the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, whose strategic interests will be placed above the national, racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs.

The same can be said, for example, of the French, who will remain a people or "country" within the European Empire, along with the Germans and Italians, associated with them by the common European imperial tradition, Christian religion and belonging to the Indo-European race. But the European Empire itself, in turn, will obey the strategic imperatives of the entire great continental New Empire.

The same will be the case in Central Asia, and in the Pacific, and in the Arab world, and in black Africa, and in India, etc.

At the same time, at the global level, the construction of the planetary New Empire will be the main "scapegoat" of the United States, the undermining of its power (up to the complete destruction of this geopolitical structure) will be implemented systematically and uncompromisingly by all participants of the New Empire. In this respect, the Eurasian project assumes Eurasian expansion into South and Central America in order to withdraw it from the control of the North (here the Spanish factor can be used as a traditional alternative to the Anglo-Saxon one), as well as provoking all types of instability and separatism within the borders of the United States (possibly relying on the political forces of African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula "Carthage must be destroyed" will become the absolute slogan of the Eurasian Empire,

The specifics in clarifying the status of this or that people, this or that "country", this or that "Empire of Large Spaces" within the framework of a common continental bloc will become relevant only after geopolitical unification, after the creation of the necessary axes, and only then the Eurasian peoples and states will be able to resolve their internal problems completely freely, without pressure from the Atlanticist forces, which are fundamentally interested in only one thing to prevent peace, harmony, prosperity, independence, dignity and the flowering of Tradition in Eurasia.

5.1 Geopolitical magic for national purposes

Russian national interests can be considered at several levels at the global, planetary, geopolitical, civilizational (this was discussed in the previous sections) and at the narrowly national, specific, socio-political and cultural (this will be discussed in this part). How do the macro-projects of continental imperialism and the ethnic line of the Russian people relate to each other? Something has already been said about this. Here you should consider this problem in more detail.

"Imperial-building orientation", "continentalism", "Eurasianism", all these terms and corresponding projects often frighten off those Russians who are poorly familiar with the symbolism of Russian history, do not delve into the meaning of the historical tendencies of the nation, are used to operating with banal everyday clichés when understanding what are the people and what are their interests. This gives rise to many misunderstandings among the nationalists themselves, provokes empty discussions and empty polemics. In fact, the specificity of Russian nationalism lies precisely in its globality; it is associated not so much with blood as with space, with soil, earth. Outside the Empire, Russians will lose their identity and disappear as a nation.

However, the implementation of the Eurasian plan should by no means lead to the ethnic erosion of the Russians as the "axial" ethnos of the Empire. The Great Russians also need to maintain their ethnic identity, without which the center of the continent will lose its civilizational and cultural certainty. In other words, within the framework of the supranational geopolitical Empire itself, there should be special norms (including legal ones) that would ensure the preservation of ethnic identity for Russians. The specificity of the New Empire should be that, given the central role of Russians in geopolitical integration, this should not be accompanied by a "Russification" of non-Russian territories, since such "Russification", on the one hand, would distort the meaning of the Empire, reducing it to the level of a giant "state-nation" and on the other hand,

With regard to the Russian people within the continental bloc, it should be emphasized that its role will not be "isolationist" (despite the projects of "minor nationalism") and not ethno-expansionist (despite the "ethnic imperialists" and, in part, Slavophiles). Of these two projects, it is necessary to take separate sides, discarding others. At the strategic level, it will really be about "expansionism", but not of an ethnic, but of a geopolitical nature, which deliberately excludes any form of Russian or Slavic racism. On the purely ethnic level, on the contrary, the "isolationist" variant should be realized to some extent, while rejecting the political and state isolationism. Russians will exist as a single national community in the space of a supranational imperial complex. Ethnic reality will be consolidated within the people, and the super-ethnic mission will be expressed within the Empire. Only with such a combination can we simultaneously achieve both the preservation of a healthy national core and the maximum expansion of geopolitical influence. In other words, the national factor will be determined on the basis of a completely new combination of ethnic and political

state history of Russians. Ethnic homogeneity existed in Russia only in the early stages of statehood within rather limited territories. The Tsarist model was based on the principle of a certain "Russification", while the Soviets, expanding the geopolitical boundaries of Russia, on the contrary, neglected the ethnic quality of the Russian people. In the New Empire, these factors should appear in a new proportion, corresponding to modern geopolitical and ethnographic conditions, as well as necessary to establish a stable ethnopolitical balance in the Russian people.

Russians in the New Empire play two roles simultaneously:

- 1) as one of the great nations that are political subjects of the Federal Empire of Nations,
- 2) as the initiator of continental integration into this Federal Empire of Nations.

Consequently, the Russians find themselves in a privileged position, since, from the ethnic side, being one of several more or less equal ethnic components of the Empire, they are geopolitically at the center of the entire political process. Such a dual function allows, in the course of the implementation of one and the same imperial-building action, to simultaneously increase its extra-ethnic influence and consolidate intra-ethnic forces. Imperialism is the only way to preserve, strengthen and unite the Russian ethnos, without resorting to interethnic conflicts, wars, and revision of political boundaries. All political borders of Eurasia in the process of building the New Empire will be gradually canceled as political borders, and instead of them natural, organic ethnic borders will arise, not having the strictly dividing meaning, as is the case in the case of state borders. These ethnic borders will have nothing to do with what is meant by the word "border" in the modern situation, since they will be based on ethnocultural, confessional lines, not

assuming political domination over minorities for the very reason that these ethnic formations will not have full-fledged political sovereignty, being limited by the strategic interests of the entire Empire, which, in turn, is vitally interested in maintaining peace and harmony within its borders. In other words, the Russians, within the framework of such an Empire, will not acquire their own national state as a political expression of an ethnic community, but they will acquire national unity and a gigantic continental state, in the administration of which they will receive a central role.

The very promotion of such a project immediately removes the threat of those potential conflicts that are ripening due to the division of Russians at the present time in various newborn "states" within the CIS. The imperial-building vector instantly translates the problem of the ratio of Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, or Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, or Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan, into a completely different plane than the ethnic one. This ratio ceases to be a political and state problem, which can be resolved only if certain political and territorial damage is inflicted on one side or another (for example, ethnic division of Kazakhstan, separatism within the Russian Federation, military suppression of Chechnya, confessional and national fragmentation of Ukraine, the problem of Crimea, etc.), and becomes a question of the coexistence of different ethnic groups within a single political space. And in this case, the ethnic consolidation of, say, Russians in Kazakhstan with Russians within the Russian Federation will not be considered as an undermining of political sovereignty.

of the "Kazakh national state" in favor of the "Russian national state", but will become an organic cultural and ethnic process that does not infringe upon, but does not elevate either side, for the reason that no "Kazakh national state" or "Russian national state" is simply will not exist. The Soviet model was somewhat similar to this project, but with one important caveat, the concept of "ethnos" was viewed in it as a kind of rudiment, as a historical atavism, deprived, moreover, of the status of an internal political subject. Within the framework of the New Empire, on the contrary, the ethnos, having no direct state expression, will be recognized as the main political value and the supreme legal entity in all internal imperial issues.

Summarizing this question, we can say that operations with global geopolitical projects, at first glance, have nothing to do with the achievement of the narrow ethnic goals of the Russians, in fact, will lead to the best satisfaction of these specific national goals. Refusing insufficient and too small ("the Russian state within the Russian Federation"), not trying to increase this small by conquests and annexations in a bloody, fratricidal war, offering the peoples of Eurasia the construction of a continental bloc on equal terms, Russians will be able to acquire that large and worthy of them. that would otherwise remain forever an unattainable dream.

By giving up the nation state, we will find the unity of the people and the Great Empire. Under current conditions, this is the only way and no other way to save the Russian people from political weakness and ethnic degeneration, to awaken it in all its grandiose volume for planetary achievements and to finally give it back what it really deserves.

5.2 Russian nationalism. Ethnic demography and empire

The Russian people, in a narrow ethnic sense, are in a difficult demographic situation. In the long term, this threatens with dire consequences both for the nation itself and for the future Empire, since the replacement of the Russians as the main carrier of continental unions by some other nation will inevitably lead to the deviation of the continental block from its natural civilizational mission, generate chaos and conflicts in Eurasia. , will deprive the geopolitical structure of the most important cultural and political component.

Such a weak demographic position of Russians is especially alarming in comparison with the demographic growth of the Eurasian South, which, on the contrary, is rapidly developing in quantitative terms. If these tendencies continue in the existing proportion, the Russians will inevitably be driven out of the central positions in the Empire, the homogeneity of the nation will erode and either the ethnic group will be absorbed into the sea of southern peoples, or it will turn into a relict remnant worthy of existence only on a reservation. To this should be added the absence of a compact settlement by Russians of significant Eurasian spaces, which they control only politically and administratively.

This problem should be solved immediately, but it should be especially emphasized that its solution should not precede the creation of the Empire and not follow this creation. The implementation of geopolitical plans from the very beginning must be synchronously accompanied by actions aimed at the demographic growth of Russians and their ethnic regrouping in order to compactly master the fullness of the "living space" of the nation. This goal can be achieved exclusively by political methods, which should both lead directly to the desired result and predetermine economic measures in this area.

A political solution can only be one highlighting the concepts of Russian nationalism. This nationalism, however, should use not state, but cultural and ethnic terminology with special emphasis on such categories as "nationality" and "Russian Orthodoxy". Moreover, this Russian nationalism should have a completely modern sound and avoid any attempts to directly restore those forms that have historically exhausted themselves. It is the nationalism of the populist, ethnic, ethical-religious type, and not "statehood" and not "monarchism" that should be the priority in this situation. It is necessary to instill in all Russians the basic idea that the personal self-identification of each individual person is a secondary, derivative value from the national self-identification. Russians must realize that, first of all, they are Orthodox, secondly Russian and only thirdly people. Hence the hierarchy of priorities in both personal and public life. Above all is the Orthodox self-consciousness of the nation as a Church, then a clear understanding of the indivisibility, integrity, totality and unity of the Russian ethnic organism, consisting not only of the living, but also of ancestors and future generations, and only then, in the last place, the experience of a particular personality as an independent atomic unit.

In practice, the implementation of such nationalism in politics should mean the total churching of Russians and the transformation of all cultural institutions into a continuation of the One Church, not in organizational and administrative, but in spiritual, intellectual and ethical terms. Such churching should deprive culture and science of their profanity detachment from existential foundations, involve them in the process of spiritual economy, turn pragmatic and decentralized technical development into the implementation of the central providential covenant of the Church, into a subordinate instrument of the supermaterial plan. Only in this radical way can Russians be really returned to the bosom of the Church, which lies at the basis of their historical national existence and which in its main outlines has shaped what is called Russian in the highest sense. It is the total restoration of the Orthodox worldview with all the consequences that follow from it that is capable of returning the people to its spiritual source. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrow confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external rituals will be ineffective. It is not individuals who are subject to churching within the framework of Russian nationalism, but the whole of Russian culture, science, thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective self-consciousness of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrow confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external rituals will be ineffective. It is not individuals who are subject to churching within the framework of Russian nationalism, but the whole of Russian culture, science, thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective self-consciousness of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion.

The next level is actually ethnic self-awareness, the idea of the people as a single body and a single soul. Moreover, the existence of this single organism should be understood as something super-temporal, not limited by either spatial or temporal categories. Russian nationalism should appeal not only to the present of the nation, but also to its past and its future, taken simultaneously, as

the totality of a single spiritual being. This "being" of the great Russian people in its supra-historical totality should be recognized by every Russian and recognized in himself. The fact of belonging to the Russian nation should be experienced as being chosen, as an incredible everyday luxury, as the highest anthropological dignity. The propaganda of this national exclusivity (without the slightest touch of xenophobia or chauvinism) should become the axis of the political education of the people. First of all, the demographic surge will be provided ideologically, culturally and ethically. The people should be indoctrinated with the idea that by giving birth to a Russian child, each family participates in the national mystery, replenishing the spiritual and mental wealth of the entire people. Children should be understood as a national asset, as a physical expression of the inner energy of a great people.

Taking into account the difficult demographic state of today, it is necessary to start national propaganda as soon as possible and use any political and ideological methods. At the same time, it is necessary to push nationalist tendencies to the limit, provoking a dramatic and rapid awakening of a great and powerful ethnos.

It should be noted that no economic measures by themselves will ever give a positive demographic result without appropriate religious, ethical and ideological support. The demographic decline can be stopped to zero, and then the reverse process can be provoked only with the help of an appropriate ideology, which would focus on changing the consciousness of the people, on transforming their thinking, on introducing hundreds and thousands of symbols into the everyday sphere, explicitly or implicitly orienting people to national interests. Within the framework of the Russian ethnos, Russian nationalism should be the only and total ideology that can have its own different versions and levels, but always remains constant in everything that concerns the setting of the category of "nation" over the category of "individuality." In the end,

This political orientation towards nationalism must also be supported by measures of a purely economic nature, since purely material instruments are also needed to achieve the national goal. Support will be provided to mothers, large families, and social conditions will be provided for a working man in a large family. But this economic component will have an effect only under the condition of the domination of the national ideology, which should not only economically support the demographic growth of Russians, but in general orient the economy in a purely national way, put the material interests of the ethnic group above the individual interests of the individual. In other words, economic support for fertility is a special case of a general trend in the economy, which should be derived from national interests as a whole.

At first glance, an appeal to nationalist ideology should have provoked ethnic conflicts, worsened interethnic relations between Russians and neighboring ethnic groups, and engendered many insoluble contradictions. This, indeed, would have happened if Russian nationalism extended its claims to statehood in the classical sense of the concept. Representatives of other ethnic groups and confessions would hardly want to live in a Russian nationalist Orthodox state. But to live next to the Russian Orthodox people,

professing a national ideology, within the framework of a single continental Empire, united geopolitically and strategically, but flexible and differentiated in the internal structure, on the contrary, does not present any difficulties for anyone, since there will always be a higher authority in front of which ethno-religious the communities have equal status and which is guided by the impartial principles of imperial harmony and justice. The project of the New Empire at the ethnic level consists precisely in the fact that not only the Russian people should triumph and establish a pronounced national-religious ideology, but this also applies to all other peoples that will become part of the Empire. Thus, a conglomerate of "positive nationalisms" with a common denominator of vertical imperial orientation will emerge.

It is important that only in this way the most radical Russian nationalism can be fully realized, since the main obstacles to its development in this case will be removed, none of the neighboring peoples will feel humiliated or oppressed by the Russian nation, since cultural and ethnic and the confessional boundaries between the peoples of the Empire will have no political significance. Russians will live in their national reality, Tatars in theirs, Chechens in theirs, Armenians in theirs, etc. even if we are talking about ethnic enclaves or national minorities among other people. Nationalism, free from the problem of statehood and borders, will only strengthen the mutual understanding of nations, giving them both freedom of contact with each other and freedom of ethnic isolation.

For the survival of the Russian people in the current difficult conditions, for the demographic rise of the Russian nation, to improve its hardest situation in ethnic, biological and spiritual senses, it is necessary to turn to the most radical forms of Russian nationalism, without which all technical or economic measures will remain powerless. But this nationalism will be possible only in organic unity with the principle of the geopolitical continental Empire.

5.3 Russian question after the coming Victory

Apparently, from a theoretical point of view, one should consider the position of the Russians in which they will find themselves after the possible victory of the Eurasian Empire over Atlanticism. Of course, this is such a distant prospect that it is almost pointless now to seriously analyze the problems that will arise in this case. However, it should be borne in mind that the collapse of Atlanticism can occur almost instantly at any stage of Eurasian empire building, since the geopolitical stability of the West is based solely on the correct and skillful handling of geopolitical categories, and by no means on real industrial, economic or military power. The Atlanticist structure is in fact extremely fragile, and one has only to knock out of it one of the strategic axes, for example, Central Europe, the Pacific area or the Eurasian continental South, how the entire gigantic edifice of Atlanticism, so powerful and stable at first glance, will collapse. At the moment when the geopolitical strategy of the Trilateral Commission is at least to some extent blocked by the alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and precipitously, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world. will be at least to some extent blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and landslide, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world. will be at least to some extent blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, one can expect a serious disruption in the functioning of the entire Atlanticist complex, and further events can unfold rapidly and landslide, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlanticism is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantist world.

First of all, it should be emphasized that the geopolitical defeat of the United States will pose many problems for the Eurasian Empire itself. At this moment, the main factor that underlies the project of geopolitical unification of nations and peoples into the New Empire will disappear, the principle of "common enemy" will disappear. This consolidating energy will lose its significance, and even the very meaning of the further existence of the Eurasian Empire will be questioned. In such a situation, a transition from a new bipolar order of the world Eurasia against the Atlantic to a multipolar model may begin. At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the multipolar model will become possible only after the victory over Atlanticism, and not earlier. As long as Atlantism exists as a force claiming universality, there can be no talk of any multipolar structure. Only within the framework of the New Empire, within the framework of a global Eurasian project and in the course of a strategic confrontation with Atlanticism, objective prerequisites for the emergence of a more or less balanced multipolarity can emerge and not before that. The embryos of multipolarity will be formed only with the implementation of that differentiated imperial model, which will affirm the status of a political subject for some organic, cultural and spiritual categories of people, ethnos, religion, nation in spite of the currently existing dominant system, where it is only about the legal status of states and individuals ("human rights"). The "clash of civilizations" (in the words of Huntington) in a multipolar world will be a reality only if these civilizations can establish themselves and win their right to exist in the context of an anti-Atlantic strategic alliance. At the present time there is only one "civilization" Atlanticist, Western, liberal-market, opposed to all other historical organic cultural models.

The collapse of Atlanticism will put the peoples of the New Empire, its individual sectors in front of a serious problem: whether to continue to maintain geopolitical unity or to consolidate large civilizational blocs within the Empire as an independent geopolitical reality? But in any case, the national differences of peoples and confessions will come to the fore.

In this case, the best option would be to preserve the imperial structure as the most harmonious system for resolving all internal contradictions. By analogy with the once existing doctrine of *Jus Publicum Europeum*, i.e. "Civil European Law" common to all peoples of Europe, the Eurasian Empire in the post-Atlantic era could be based on a similar, but expanded doctrine of *Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum*. Having lost its military-strategic importance, the imperial continental complex could act as the highest legal authority, which would remove the tension between the Eurasian nations, whose ties will inevitably weaken after the victory over the "common enemy". This would be ideal.

But one can also assume the disintegration of continental unity and the formation in the Eurasian spaces of several civilizational blocks of the Russian-Slavic (broader Orthodox), European, Far Eastern, Central Asian, Islamic, etc. The relationship of each of them with the others, and even their boundaries and structures, now, naturally, cannot be foreseen. However, in such a hypothetical perspective, the project of the structure of the Russian nation should already include a model that takes into account in the distant future (and only after the end of Atlanticism) the independent participation of Russians in world history, which returned to its organic and natural course after a long period of the Atlanticist anomaly. In this case, the Russian nation must be ready for the creation of its own statehood, or

to the formation of a wider natural ethno-state formation, sealed by the unity of tradition, culture, religion, fate. The question of the Russian state may arise in full, but this applies exclusively to the post-Eurasian period, which itself is problematic and hypothetical.

But already at the present moment, the Russians should throw all their strength into national consolidation, the spiritual, cultural and religious revival of the people, on its final formation and full-fledged awakening so that in the future (if necessary) it can defend its national Truth not only from enemies, but also from allies in imperialism, with their own historically predetermined national outlook. Russians not only have to preserve their identity in the imperial context, they have to assert it, inflame it and deepen it to the limit. And in the long run, after the collapse of Atlanticism, Russians need to be ready to defend their own civilizational mission, to defend their universal providential national path.

Be that as it may, the Russians will in any case find themselves in a strategically central place in the Eurasian imperial space, and therefore, in terms of the civilizational priorities of the Empire in the post-Atlantist period (if the Empire nevertheless survives), they will find themselves in a privileged position. Consequently, to some extent, this entire Empire will be associated with the Russian Idea, which, indeed, is eschatological and universal by definition, merged with gigantic spaces and cosmic feeling. If the continental bloc begins to disintegrate into its components, the Russians, who have recovered their strength thanks to the nationalist period and the vigorous process of imperialism, will again find themselves in a geopolitically advantageous position, occupying a central position among the liberated peoples and states of the continent, which will make a possible Russian State.

Both of these possibilities should be considered today.

6.1 Priority of nuclear and intercontinental capabilities

In the military-strategic sense, the New Empire can be really created only if the nuclear power of the former USSR, as well as all types of strategic and space weapons, remains in the hands of the Eurasian bloc. This is the main condition not only for the viability of the upcoming continental entity, but also for its very creation, since the integration of states and "large spaces" around Russia, the establishment of the main axes of Eurasia are realized only if Moscow has a strategic potential, which will be the main guarantor of the seriousness of the entire project. ... It is the preservation of the strategic balance between Atlanticism (NATO) and Russia (the military-strategic heir to the USSR and the pole of the new Eurasian bloc) that makes the political plans of the New Empire serious and practically achievable.

At the moment, the strategic potential of the former USSR still retains its proportional comparability with NATO in the field of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, some military space programs, and strategic aviation. As soon as this balance is unequivocally shifted in favor of the Atlantists, the Eurasian Empire will become impossible, Russia will finally turn into a simple "regional power" and, consequently, will sharply reduce its territory and scale of influence. After that, no geopolitical axes and political projects can change anything. Only at this stage, while the balance of power of the Cold War in the strategic sphere has not yet changed irreversibly, the geopolitics and policy of Russia really have decisive importance and continental weight. Actually, the possibility of free and independent geopolitical design directly depends on the preservation of the strategic comparability of Russian and Atlanticist potentials. As soon as this proportion is sharply violated, Russia will turn from a subject of geopolitics into its object. In this case, the Russians will only have to maneuver in a situation imposed from the outside, choosing roles and priorities in an essentially "not their" game.

This state of affairs makes the Eurasian project directly related to the quality and potential of the Russian (former Soviet) army. And automatically from this it is possible to conclude that the army in such conditions should in no case depend on the momentary political situation in Moscow. On the contrary, the very quality of the army (naturally, first of all, in the matter of strategic weapons) is the basis of all Russian policy, its axis, and therefore, the structure of the army should predetermine the general contours of this policy, assert purely political guidelines. As long as the strategic balance is maintained to some extent, the army will remain the most important factor in Russian politics, since the country's political status, its weight, its capabilities and its future in such a situation directly depend on the Armed Forces.

At the moment, under the pressure of Atlanticism, a very dangerous process of reorientation of the entire military doctrine from the continental-Soviet structure to the regional-local one is taking place in the Russian army. This means that not the United States and NATO countries, but the countries bordering on Russia, as well as the internal regions of the Russian Federation, which may turn to separatism, are no longer considered as Russia's "potential adversary". This turn of the new military doctrine is actually completely opposite to the only reasonable, from a geopolitical point of view, the position of the Armed Forces, since the "potential

the real opponents "in this case are precisely those countries that should logically have become natural" allies "of the Russians. In other words," potential allies "are viewed as" potential adversaries ", while the main geopolitical" potential adversary "of Russia is the Atlantic bloc is generally discounted.

The military issue is directly dependent on the geopolitical choice. If Russia thinks of its future as an Empire, as an integrator and pole of a new continental bloc, its Armed Forces must, with the need to prioritize, focus on nuclear and strategic weapons to the detriment of more local forms of weapons. The main military operations in the imperial plan will develop in the perspective of the "war of the continents", and therefore, intercontinental missiles (primarily with nuclear warheads), strategic aviation, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, as well as all forms of space military programs acquire a special role. developed as an alternative to SDI. The priority of just such types of weapons would be the best way to promote continental integration and make an alliance with Russia attractive and fundamental for the rest of the Eurasian blocs and countries. It is these types of weapons that are directly related to the ability of Russia to play the geopolitical card at the continental level, and, consequently, on a more specific plan, to solve simultaneously economic problems on the basis of cooperation with the developed regions of Central Europe and Japan. It should not be forgotten that it was precisely the nuclear factor, presented by the United States as a "guarantor of the protection of the West and democracy from Soviet totalitarianism," that was the main driving force of the American economy in the post-war period, when the economic strengths, but the politically and militarily weak Western countries (and Japan) were forced to subsidize the American economy and industry in exchange for the strategic tutelage of Pax Americana. In a sense, Russia already at the moment can offer something similar to both Europe and Japan, with the addition that it is in Russia's interests to promote the political maturation of these two "potential Empires", and not to weaken and tightly control them, as is the case in the case of American, Atlantic domination. Even at a purely pragmatic level, overcoming the economic crisis in Russia is only possible with the active geopolitical use of the strategic factor and appropriate types of weapons. To get "more good goods", it is easier not to repurpose the military-industrial complex for the manufacture of pots, but to continue and intensify the manufacture of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. With appropriate political support, several submarines can bring whole countries with developed industries to Russia, and in a purely peaceful way, while by rebuilding military factories for the production of washing machines, Russia will cause irreparable economic damage to itself.

The redeployment of the army as a whole in a "regional" manner means the development of all non-strategic, conventional types of weapons. If such a military reform is carried out reasonably and consistently (which is hard to believe in our conditions), then the Russians will get an effective mobile army, ready for combat in continental conditions and capable of successfully and smoothly resolving military conflicts on the scale of Afghanistan, Tajikistan or Chechnya. The ineffectiveness of Soviet troops in local conflicts, which could be observed in the Afghan war and in the perestroika conflicts, was the result of the strategic priority in the construction of the USSR Armed Forces, which was focused on a global nuclear conflict, and not on local wars of low and medium intensity. This is natural. Restructuring in the army with the priority of "regional orientation", i. E.

will inevitably lead to the destruction of strategic weapons, since not a single army today, even in the richest and most economically developed country, for example, the United States is able to effectively conduct its construction in two directions at once, strategic and regional. (The incapacity of the Americans in local conflicts has been demonstrated more than once, starting with Vietnam and ending with Yugoslavia and Somalia.) Therefore, at first glance, the "positive" transformation of the army, supposedly in keeping with the spirit of the times, in the long run means the end of the strategic security of the Russians, the loss of some or serious guarantees of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the complete impossibility of somehow improving its geopolitical state in the future.

Russian national interests today lie in preserving their strategic potential at the intercontinental level at any cost, i.e. to remain a "superpower", albeit in a truncated, reduced version. To ensure this condition, everyone can be sacrificed to make any political, geopolitical, economic and territorial compromises. While maintaining strategic potential, any concession today will be renegotiated in favor of the Russians tomorrow. As long as everything remains the same, all the political steps of the Russian leadership in favor of the West remain theoretically reversible.

The fate of the Russians and their grandiose future today lies not in how many Russians have ended up outside the Russian Federation, and not in our political or economic situation at the moment, but in whether we will have a sufficient level of weapons in order to defend its independence militarily from the only and natural "potential enemy" of Russia from the United States and the North Atlantic bloc. All other questions follow from here. This is also the basis for an unambiguous determination of whether the implementation of the global Eurasian imperial project is still possible or not.

6.2 What kind of armed forces does the great Russia need?

The hierarchy of the development of the military complex in the perspective of the creation of the Eurasian Empire clearly follows from the main geopolitical provisions:

- 1) Priority is given to space weapons, which have such a potential scale of territorial impact that the traditional forms of ensuring the military security of a state or a bloc of states retreat before them, completely losing their effectiveness and importance. The development of the Russian version of SDI is of central importance here. Also extremely important are the development of "atmospheric" weapons and experiments with unorthodox types of weapons associated with the impact on the human mental component. This costly and knowledge-intensive sphere of weapons, practically inapplicable in this case in local conflicts, in fact, is the most important axis of the true security of the state and the nation. Without these studies and the corresponding results, the people are practically unprotected in the face of "

- 2) Next comes nuclear weapons on air carriers, missile potential and strategic aviation. This intercontinental weapons sphere, aimed at a potential conflict with the Atlanticist pole, poses a constant threat to those regions that are reliably protected by sea borders from all others.

forms military invasion. Not by chance, exactly development Soviet rocket science caused such a panic at one time in the United States, and it was the successes in this area that allowed the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to survive for so long after World War II, despite the extremely unfavorable geopolitical situation with land borders. Only intercontinental types of weapons made the USSR, in some approximation, a "continent", which gave certain grounds for strategic parity with the real continent of the United States.

- 3) The next level of importance should be considered the Navy. This type of weapon, like intercontinental missiles and strategic aviation, is designed to carry out global military missions in a collision with the "potential adversary" N1 of the United States. At the same time, in the prospect of creating a continental block, the Russian Navy should become the starting point for creating a gigantic system of strategic ports both in the South and in the West (which Russia and the USSR were traditionally deprived of). Aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are paramount in this. The navy should be structurally oriented towards the conduct of combat operations in sea conditions and in coastal zones, i.e. in the space as far as possible from the land base. This should become a priority form of warfare in a potential military conflict, since the main imperative of a successful strategy is, as you know, in the conduct of hostilities either on the territory of a potential enemy, or on neutral territory. At the same time, it is necessary to foresee in advance the geopolitical and strategic specifics of adapting the existing model of the Navy to the conditions of the southern seas and oceans, as well as to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia. and also to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia. and also to the western Atlantic. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, since they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the formation of which in itself is tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia.

Therefore, control over the Indian Ocean and Atlantic is much more important for the continental block than secondary ports, easily closed by straits or a narrow isthmus between the Baltic and the North Sea. The navy as a whole should be guided, rather, by the Far Eastern and North Sea models, the analogues of which Russia should be ready to reproduce when the time comes, in India, Iran and Western Europe, since these territories are the true geopolitical borders of the imperial (and not regional!) Russia.

- 4) The ground forces are of the least importance in the imperial perspective and are called upon to play the role of "internal troops" rather than a really important strategic size. In a real intercontinental conflict, ground forces should perform only an auxiliary function, and this determines their place in the hierarchy of military development. The only exceptions in this matter are the airborne troops and special forces, which, due to their mobility and lack of connection with land continental bases, can take an active part in serious intercontinental operations. Accordingly, the Airborne Forces should be given priority over other land sectors of the army.

Such a structure of the Armed Forces of Russia and the future New Empire, in general terms, reproduces the purely Soviet model of the army in the post-war period. The latter was the result of a natural geopolitical process, which was most clearly understood precisely

the army leadership, which gave an adequate answer to the very geopolitical logic of history, while political and ideological clichés did not allow the party leaders of the USSR to act in accordance with the only logic of the state and strategic development of the Soviet State that naturally suggested itself. The prospect of geopolitical and strategic expansion is inscribed in the very fundamental structure of Russia's geographical position, and it was the army that understood this more fully and clearly than others. Therefore, the USSR Armed Forces, in a general sense, were moving in a completely correct direction both in defining a "potential enemy", and in choosing the priorities for the development of certain types of weapons, and in equipping the army with the latest technologies. In this case, however,

The actual restructuring of the army, proceeding from the concept of "Russia is a regional power", in fact reverses the hierarchy that should exist in the New Empire and that existed in general terms in the USSR Armed Forces.

In the "regional" army of the Russian Federation, priority is given to the ground forces, although the Airborne Forces are also somewhat isolated from the rest of the combat arms.

This is followed by the Navy, and the conversion and reduction are carried out, first of all, at the expense of aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, and around the Black Sea Fleet, which is practically devoid of strategic importance, a scandal arises between Moscow and Kiev, which does not have any outcome at all, since the original terms and the goals are fundamentally wrong.

Even less attention is paid to aviation and rocketry, and strategic aviation and intercontinental missiles are being destroyed altogether. In parallel, the renunciation of nuclear weapons is being implemented.

Programs for the deployment of space weapons, which are completely redundant in regional conflicts, are frozen and curtailed, since in a narrow
In the "regional" perspective, they represent only a gigantic senseless item of and state budget expenditures that has no justification.

Comparing the two models of army building priorities, we see that the o are two nor opposites.

One army (the first continental option) is intended to defend the continental bloc, Eurasia, and Russia in its true geopolitical scope from the "potential adversary," which the United States and the Atlanticist bloc have been and remain. Such an army is focused on ensuring the true interests of the Russians and is the guarantor of national independence and freedom. In addition, such an army makes it possible to effectively implement a global Eurasian project, which alone is capable of making Russia's geopolitical position in the world stable and secure, as well as solving major economic problems.

The second army (of the "regional" type) is needed by Russia, understood only as the Russian Federation and interested only in solving local and internal political problems. Such

the army cannot be a true guarantor of national security. Its initial orientation towards a potential conflict with neighboring countries and peoples makes the Russians constantly await a blow from the "hostile neighbor" ("former brotherly people"). Its structure deprives Russians of the opportunity to enter into adequate geopolitical relations with Central Europe and Japan, since it will clearly not be enough to protect these geopolitical formations from potential US aggression in the future. Moreover, such a structure forces the Russians to classify all three participants in the future geopolitical axes of Eurasia, Berlin, Tehran, and Tokyo as "potential adversaries," and, accordingly, provokes the same attitude of these countries towards Russia. And it doesn't matter at all that the army's restructuring will be accompanied by pacifist assurances. In geopolitics, and it stands above purely political considerations when making the most responsible decisions, the nature of the weapons of a country speaks much more expressively than the official and unofficial statements of diplomats and political leaders.

7.1 Technological deficit

One of the reasons for the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War is its serious technological lag in comparison with the countries of the opposite geopolitical camp. The fact is that the technological leap of the Atlanticists was ensured by an effective distribution of roles among the NATO member countries. On the one hand, the United States concentrated in itself a purely military, strategic pole, leaving other capitalist countries to develop their trade, financial and technological aspects, not caring about direct investments of "new high technologies" in the military-industrial complex. The United States often only used ready-made high technologies in relation to its military-industrial complex, and they were created and developed in Europe, Japan and other countries. Countries under the US "tutelage" paid the patron "technological tribute" for geopolitical protection. The USSR, for its part, radically centralized all technological developments almost exclusively within the framework of its military-industrial complex, which made research and newest projects a more complicated matter; they were, as it were, initially prepared in a centralized administrative body and focused on planned goals, and this sharply narrowed the sphere of technological innovation. In other words, the same centralized structure was charged with two tasks at once, a huge effort to create a planetary military strategic complex and the technological support of this complex along with the development of science-intensive industries in parallel spheres. The whole area of high technologies, information programs, computers, etc. was strictly associated with the military-industrial complex, and this deprived it of the sometimes necessary flexibility and independence.

The technological lag of the USSR was inevitable. And today, Russians are fully experiencing the consequences of the failure of the USSR in this area, since the dependence of Russian industry and economy on Western patents, know-how, etc. is getting worse every day. Meanwhile, a certain level of technological development is absolutely necessary for any state striving to have weight in international politics and have an effective, competitive internal economic structure. If we talk about the imperial perspective of the Russian nation, then a high technological level is all the more necessary to ensure all the strategic and geopolitical factors on which any

geopolitical and economic expansion. So, the question is posed: moving in which direction, the Russians could catch up and overcome the technological lag inherited from the USSR, despite the fact that at present it is not decreasing, but on the contrary increasing (brain drain, reduction of state funding for scientific activities, conversion, decline and restructuring in the military-industrial complex, etc.)?

There are three hypothetical possibilities. The first is that Russia renounces all its geopolitical claims to independence, completely surrenders to Atlanticism, and as a "reward" for obedience, it receives from the hands of the Americans access to some "high technologies" that are somewhat outdated and not strategic secrets. This path has actually been tested on the example of some Third World countries, which thus

indeed were able to make an economic, financial and industrial leap (the so-called "Asian" or "Pacific tiger"). In the case of Russia, the United States will be much more cautious than in relation to the countries of Europe or the Third World, since the geopolitical and historical scale of Russia is so great that economic prosperity and technological breakthrough may at some point again make it a powerful "potential enemy" USA. It is natural to expect that Russians' access to "high technologies", even under conditions of complete surrender and total dismantling of the strategic aspects of the military-industrial complex, will be hampered and sabotaged in every possible way. This path seems to be a dead end.

The second path, typical of supporters of "small nationalism", is to make a technological leap with the utmost effort of internal resources without the help of outside forces. This presupposes the extreme, almost totalitarian, mobilization of the entire people and a sharp deterioration in relations with the West. If at the same time everything is limited to the volume of the Russian Federation and Russia, understood as a "regional power", then such attempts are doomed to failure, since the same problems will arise as in the case of the USSR, the Russians will have to simultaneously defend themselves from the superpower as a "potential adversary." and develop such subtle areas as high-tech research ourselves. Since the stable and strictly organized USSR did not cope with this, the crisis, destabilized RF will not cope with this, even more so. Moreover, in this case it will be necessary to introduce elements of "totalitarianism", which will inevitably cause a deep internal protest. Hence, this path should also be discarded.

The last option is that high technologies are borrowed from developed European and Asian countries (but not from the United States) in exchange for a strategic alliance and access to Russian resources. There is every chance of success here, and this path will keep the Russians a certain independence from the United States and at the same time will avoid overstrain of the nation, dictatorship and tough measures. Although such a process will immediately arouse rage on the part of the United States, threats to Russia and, most importantly, to its "unfaithful vassals", some countries may go for it if the strategic power of Russia is still comparable to that of the American, and Russian ideology is not overtly imperialist or communist). In addition, high technologies in this case will be exchanged for the most important component of resources for Germany, Japan and other developed countries, access to which is tightly controlled by the United States around the world. Russian resources, Central Asia, Siberia, etc. are vital for these countries, since the United States as a whole is quite independent in this matter. Minerals, raw materials, energy sources, plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. because the United States as a whole is quite independent in this matter. Minerals, raw materials, energy sources, plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. energy sources plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here. energy sources plus powerful strategic military protection, this combination may well persuade some developed countries to go to the closest cooperation in the field of high technologies and provide the Russians with the highest achievements in this area (along with installation and production organization). In the future, the national direction in these issues would also gradually be adjusted, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed here.

This third way is wholly and completely fits into the general Eurasian project, being its concretization at a more practical level. In fact, it means that the creation of the geopolitical axis Berlin Moscow Tokyo is not just a political and geographical plan, but also the best solution to the problem of the technological lag of the Russians.

7.2 Russian resources

Russia is a natural supplier of resources to other countries. This state of affairs has a rather long history and has become, in many respects, the determining factor in the geopolitical status of Russia. Let us consider in more detail the geopolitical significance of the export of resources and the role of resource provision in general.

There is some inequality in the global distribution of resources on the planet. Two zones of the four developed sectors of the North have access to resources and are capable of providing resource autarky, if necessary (USA and Russia), and two are experiencing an acute resource deficit (Europe and Japan). Thus, to a large extent, control over the two resource-poor zones is determined by the relationship with the other two. At the same time, there is another feature of the United States seeks to control the resources of colonial or semi-colonial territories and, with their help, influence developed countries. The United States is trying to save its own resources for themselves and spend them extremely carefully, although, if necessary, it will not be a big problem for the United States to create a resource autarky for itself without a colonial strategy in this area. Russia, on the other hand, traditionally manipulates the export of its own resources. This difference in the position of the two powers has, on both sides, both pluses and minuses. The United States constantly has an inviolable strategic reserve, but at the same time, the colonial resource bases always theoretically have a chance to get out of control. Russia, for its part, can be confident in resource provision, since the resources are located on its territory, but at the same time, exporting them, it always spends its own strategic reserves.

This objective state of affairs in the prospect of creating a continental bloc can be used for the benefit of the Russians in the following way. At the initial stage, Russia can offer its resources to potential partners in the East and West as compensation for the aggravation of relations with the United States, which will inevitably occur already at the first stages of the implementation of the Eurasian project. This will be possible also because a direct land connection can be established with Europe and Japan, independent of the maritime and coastal control, which is the main trump card in the geopolitical strategy of Atlanticism. Naturally, such exports will not be unilateral assistance, since this process should be included in the general geopolitical plan, which presupposes active financial and technological participation of Europe and Japan in the strategic development of Russia itself,

In the future, however, one should focus on ousting the United States from Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific region with a corresponding redistribution of resource-rich territories in favor of the Eurasian partners and Russia itself. This plan is the direct opposite of the "anaconda plan" on the part of the Atlanticists, which provides for strict US control over the South Eurasian, African and Pacific areas in order to prevent the organization of autarkian economic zones for its geopolitical competitors. When the "anaconda" of Atlanticism can be driven back to the American continent, the entire "poor South" of Eurasia will become a natural complement to the more developed Eurasian North. Arabian oil, African minerals and resources of the Pacific will be able to flow directly to the countries of the Eurasian bloc, bypassing the United States. In this case, Russia will not only be able to start accumulating resources for itself, but will also receive new areas in the southern direction. Eurasian Europe will move South to become Euro-Africa, and Japan will establish that "new order" in the Pacific Ocean,

which she planned to implement in the 30s. Russia itself, using the technological experience that it either already has or will acquire during the period of supplying resources to its technologically advanced partners in the bloc (at the first stage of continental construction), will be able to take an active part in the development of new fields in Central and East Asia and gradually will freeze those deposits that are vital to ensure its own strategic future.

In terms of resources, the plan for the creation of an "anti-Trilateral" (Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo bloc), both in the near and distant prospects, seems to be highly realistic, since the transition period for the Western and Eastern axes (for Berlin and Tokyo), which will experience the most severe pressure from the United States will be softened by the resource potential of Russia, which is capable of creating all the conditions necessary for a full-fledged political and strategic revival of Europe and Japan with its exports of minerals during the transition period. And after that, these "large spaces" themselves will be able to intensify their economic and political expansion in the direction of the North-South. It is especially important that during this transitional period Russia will be able, in turn, to obtain effective technological equipment for field development and to test moving along the easiest way, developed methodology and technical models delivered from the European West and the Japanese Far East. And this factor in the long term will significantly strengthen the strategic autarchy of the Russians, regardless of how events unfold in the future.

Naturally, at the moment the problem of Russian resources is being solved in any way, just not in the way that would be beneficial to Russia. Russians today sell resources at dumping prices, for fictitious money, and foreign goods, either directly to the United States or through their intermediary (American monopoly companies or TNCs implicitly controlled by Atlantists) to the countries of Western Europe. As an alternative, the "nationalists" put forward a generally unrealistic demand to completely stop the export of resources and completely leave for Russia both their development and their consumption. The latter project will require such an exertion of all national forces that it can be realized only under the conditions of a political dictatorship, which is almost unbelievable in the present situation. Here the situation is the same as in the case of high technologies. Only the "third way"

And again, everything rests on the political need for the early creation of a continental Eurasian bloc.

Chapter 8. Economic aspects of the "New Empire"

8.1 Economics of the "third way"

Industrial restructuring in Russia is ripe. There is a significant grain of truth in what the "reformers" say about the inevitability of economic transformations in Russia. The Soviet system, although it was to a certain extent effective and competitive, gradually became so rigid and rigid that it simply could not fail to collapse, and, unfortunately, many effective and positive aspects of socialism as such were buried under its rubble.

The logic of economic transformations in Russia, which began during perestroika, was based on a dualistic approach to economics. On the one hand, there was the existing model of rigid centralist state socialism, "total dirigism", when the state intervened in the slightest nuances of production and distribution, suppressing any private initiatives and excluding all market elements. Such structural rigidity not only made the entire economic system cumbersome and unwieldy (hence the gradual loss in competition with capitalism), but also perverted the basic principle of socialism, which presupposes the effective participation of society in economic process. In economic and philosophical manuscripts, a warning about such a degeneration of the socialist system can be described as "alienation under socialism." Marx is which can

The criticism of such a centralized economy, however, very quickly went to the opposite extreme, i.e. to the absolute apotheosis of the liberal capitalist system with its "laws of the market", "invisible hand", "free trade", etc. Liberal reformers (albeit only in theory) decided to move from super-centralization to super-liberalism. If Soviet socialism at its later stages weakened state autarky in its competition with the opposing geopolitical bloc, then market reforms entailed the real destruction of this autarky, which can only be qualified as a "betrayal of national interests." Reforms were necessary, but the dualistic logic of either Soviet socialism or capitalist liberalism put the question on a completely wrong plane from the very beginning, since the dispute acquired a purely theoretical character, and considerations of Russia's geopolitical autarky were pushed into the background. The proposed liberal reforms in the style of the Chicago Boys programs and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was about a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane. and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was a question of a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane. and von Hayek's theories dealt a devastating blow to the economy. However, the restorationist economic programs, on which the "conservative" opposition insisted to one degree or another, were not much better. In both cases, it was about a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the issue of "Russian national interests" was somewhere on the second or even third plane.

This was quite logical, since, due to the specifics of their education, Soviet economists were accustomed to dealing with only two economic models, dogmatic Soviet socialism (which they defended for the time being) and liberal capitalism (which they criticized for the time being). Both of these models, in the form in which they were studied and developed, have never been correlated with such a criterion as the "geopolitical interests of the country", since this topic (albeit in a different form) was a priority of the army and ideological structures (especially the GRU and the KGB) ... Shifting the main focus to the economy, the leaders of perestroika

put the question of "national and state security and power" outside the brackets. And as soon as this happened, the country fell into the trap of an incorrectly formulated problem, any solution to which in the given terms was obviously a dead end.

Strictly speaking, the people had to choose not between liberal capitalism and Soviet socialism, but between liberal capitalism, Soviet socialism and a special economic doctrine combining market elements and planning elements, submitting to the main imperative of national prosperity and state security (the "third way"). This "third way" in economics is by no means a compromise, not a syncretic combination of dissimilar elements of two other economic models, but a complete and independent doctrine with a long history and many examples of its implementation in practice. However, this "third way" was practically not mentioned in the framework of public disputes at all. The result of a stubborn refusal to seriously consider such an option is obvious: a ruined and weakened country, a collapsed economy, the growing parasitic dependence of Russia on the Navy and the International Bank, the disintegration of economic and industrial ties, etc. At the moment, there is neither socialism, nor the market, and it is unlikely that something can be corrected, remaining within the framework of the logic that has become dominant in solving the most important economic issues.

The "third way" in the economy is not identical to either the Swedish or the Swiss model, contrary to what some politicians think, who are beginning to realize that the situation is deadlocked. Neither Sweden nor Switzerland are full-fledged geopolitical entities and do not have serious strategic sovereignty, and, consequently, a huge part of the state, the industrial and military sectors necessary to ensure real autarchy are generally absent in these states. A certain compromise between the socially oriented structure of society and the market economy has indeed been reached in these countries, but here we are talking about a purely artificial model, which was able to emerge precisely due to the complete depoliticization of these countries and a deliberate rejection of an active role in the geopolitical alignment of forces in Europe. Russia will never be able to become "the second Sweden" or "the second Switzerland" in terms of its scale, since its very geopolitical position requires an active role; neutrality in this case is simply impossible. Therefore, it makes no sense to refer to such examples.

The second illusion characteristic of those who intuitively seek models of the "third way" for Russia is China and its reforms. However, even in this case, there is "optical illusion" explained by the lack of objective information about the essence and course of the Chinese reforms. Chinese economic transformations only superficially resemble the "third way" model. In fact, we are talking about the transformation of a society that is generally similar to the Soviet one into a purely liberal system, but without democratic reforms in politics, i.e. while maintaining totalitarian control of the ruling elite over the political situation. The point is that the political totalitarianism of the communist nomenclature smoothly turns into economic, monopoly totalitarianism of the same nomenclature, which at the same time seeks from the very beginning to cut off any possibility of economic competition from below. One model of the "alienation society" smoothly turns into another model of the "alienation society", and political exploitation imperceptibly turns into the economic exploitation of one and the same social group.

It is significant that this type of reform was developed precisely by the "Trilateral Commission", whose representatives have already agreed with the Chinese nomenclature on

the inclusion of China in the future in the mondialist zone of influence with the granting of it the status of a "regional power". To a large extent, this move of the Atlantists was conditioned by the Cold War strategy against the USSR, but at the same time by the desire to support Japan's traditional rival in the Far East and limit the economic expansion of the latter.

The true "third way" in economics found its classic embodiment in the works of Friedrich List, who formulated the principles of "economic autarchy of large spaces." This theory proceeds from the fact that the economic development of capitalist societies is uneven and from the logical consequence of economic colonization by the "richer" countries of the poorer ones; moreover, for the "rich" in such conditions "free trade" is beneficial, and for the "poor" on the contrary. From this, List concluded that at certain stages of the economic development of society, it is necessary to resort to protectionism, dirigism and customs restrictions, i.e. to limit the principle of "freedom of trade" at the international level, in order to achieve the level of national and state independence and strategic power. In other words, it was obvious to List that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. that the economy should be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of the rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately sets clear boundaries in which the "market" principle should operate, and in which the "socialist" one. It is interesting that Rathenau, the author of the German "economic miracle," and Witte, Lenin, and even Keynes formulated their economic principles on the basis of the doctrine of Friedrich Liszt, although they used a language that was closer to or purely capitalist. or communist vocabulary. is only a cover for the economic (and subsequently political) expansion of the rich states to the detriment of the poorer, and the subsequent enslavement of the latter. This approach immediately

The economic hierarchy built by Liszt can be reduced to a simple formula: those aspects of economic life that are comparable in scale with the interests of a private person, an individual, should be governed by market principles and based on "private property". We are talking about housing, small production, small land holdings, etc. As the importance of this or that type of economic activity grows, the form of production should acquire the features of collective ownership, since in this case "private property" and the individual factor may come into conflict with collective interests; there must be a "cooperative" or "corporate" criterion. Finally, economic spheres directly related to the state and its strategic status should be controlled, subsidized and managed by state authorities, since we are talking about interests of a higher level than "private property" or "collective benefit". Thus, in such an economic structure, it is not the elite, not the market and not the collective that determine the economic, industrial and financial appearance of society; it is formed on the basis of the specific interests of a particular state in specific historical conditions, and accordingly, in this model, no dogma cannot exist in principle. as the geopolitical status of the state changes and due to historical and national conditions, the proportions between the volume of these three levels of the economic hierarchy can change significantly. For example, in times of peace and prosperity, the private sector can grow with the collective sector, and the state to decline. Conversely, in difficult periods of national history, when the independence of the entire people is under attack, the powers of the state sector are increased at the expense of some collective economic entities, and these, in turn, squeeze out private entrepreneurship.

It is very interesting that it was the Friedrich List model that was used by historically developed capitalist countries in times of crisis. Thus, even the United States, the radical defenders of the principle of "free trade", periodically resorted to protectionist measures and state subsidies to the industrial sector when periods of "economic depression" began. It was precisely such a period that was the stage of implementation of the New Deal, when the Americans almost literally reproduced the principles of List, although they submitted them in a relaxed version of Keynes, the author of the theory of "economic insulation", which, in general, is nothing but a new name for the theory of "economic autarky of large spaces ". By the way, List himself lived in the United States for a long time and observed the process of capitalist construction in the early phases. Based on these observations, he formulated the basic principles of his theory in relation to Germany. But, of course, the most ambitious results were given by the implementation of List's doctrine in National Socialist Germany, when his ideas were implemented totally and without any liberal or Marxist amendments.

The doctrine of economics "third way" has another important aspect of the ratio of financial and production factors. It is obvious that early capitalism and Soviet-type socialism placed the main emphasis on the development of production, assigning a secondary, subordinate role to the financial system. Developed capitalism, on the other hand, tends to domination of finance capital over production, which, in turn, becomes a secondary issue. The domination of the principle of "labor" sooner or later leads to political violence, the domination of "capital" to economic violence. In the first case, labor is autonomized and divorced from concrete values, in the second, money is autonomized, also losing its connection with value and turning into a credit-interest fiction. "The third way" insists on a cruel link between labor and value (for example, gold reserves and, more broadly, resources), assigning a subordinate, secondary, purely instrumental role to the sphere of consumption and circulation of goods. This combination of labor and value is dictated in this case by the same considerations for ensuring "national power" and state sovereignty as the entire structure of this economic doctrine. You can simplify this idea by the formula "neither luxury, nor poverty", "contentment with a reasonable minimum." This means a more flexible and free approach to work than under Soviet socialism, but more limited opportunities for personal enrichment than under capitalism. This model allows the nation to be independent in strategic areas from other states and economic systems,

It is this version of the "third way" economy that is the only alternative in today's Russia, which is opposed at the same time to rampant liberalism and restorationist projects of neo-communists who do not want to seriously correct outdated and proved ineffective dogmas. If it were not for the instantly emerging associations with the Hitler regime, one could call this project "socialism of the national type." The very fact of putting forward List's theory (developed, however, by such famous economists as Sismondi, Schumpeter, Dumont, etc.) in the context of the current economic situation in Russia would be a great achievement, since here you can find answers to the most pressing questions and put an end to the dead-end dualism of "reformers and anti-reformers" at once. Moreover, the positive aspects of both liberal transformations and structures still preserved from socialism could be perfectly involved in this economic project. But all this will have a positive effect only in the context of a conscious and theoretically worked out doctrinal corpus, and not as pragmatic moves made from case to case.

occasion. The economy of the "third way" should have its own unambiguous political expression, comparable to the "party of liberals" or "party of communists". Any inertial centrism, pragmatism and compromise will certainly be doomed to failure. Friedrich List and his ideas should become the same symbols as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. The "third way" needs such carriers of this ideological dogma, which would be comparable in terms of preparedness, conviction and awareness with liberals and communists. The principles of "third way" economics are as strict and unambiguous as those of the other two ideologies. All the necessary secondary consequences and applications can be derived from them in a natural and organic way.

The economic tendency of the "third way", the principle of "autarchy of large spaces" presupposes the maximum volume of the national-state formation where this model is applied. List insisted on the impossibility of realizing these theories in states with insufficient demographic, resource, industrial and demographic scope, since autarky in this case would be a simple fiction. On this basis, he once put forward the imperative "Zollverein", "customs integration", which was designed to unite Germany, Prussia and Austria into a single industrial and financial bloc, since only in such a space could one speak of effective competition with the developed colonial powers of that time by England and France.

At the present stage, the standard of a sovereign state is the United States and the political and economic space that is part of the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. continental aggregate of the Americas controlled by the United States. It is obvious that today only its continental counterpart in Eurasia can fully compete with such a transatlantic "large space". Consequently, the economy of the "third way" already in its theory presupposes geopolitical integration, in which the subject is not the "state-nation", but a modern analogue of the Empire. Otherwise, the nation will either overstrain its forces (the cause of the collapse of the USSR), or become dependent on a more powerful and independent neighbor (Europe, Japan, etc.). This consideration shows that for all the logic and self-sufficiency of this theory, the success of its implementation directly depends on a more general geopolitical project, i.e. from the beginning of the creation of the New Empire. Only on such a scale and in such a volume will the "third way" in the economy give maximum results. In addition, the advancement of such an economic model will be the best theoretical denominator for all potential participants in the continental bloc, since even liberal authors (for example, Michelle Albert in the book *Capitalism vs. Capitalism*) emphasize the fundamental difference between the Rhine-Nippon model (which has many features of the "third way" economy) from the Anglo-Saxon. If Russia also takes this path, the Eurasian chain will be closed in the most natural way. In this case, it will be possible to nominate a new version of the Zollverein,

8.2 Economic regionalism

The Soviet economy was based on the principle of centralism. The highest authority for making all important, less important and completely unimportant decisions was in Moscow, from where regulations and directives came. Such centralism made the economy

clumsy, did not contribute to the development of regional initiatives, restrained the natural growth of the economic potential of the regions. In addition, the Soviet economy everywhere reproduced the standard model of the structure of production and financial relations, taking into account neither regional, nor ethnic, nor cultural characteristics of different regions or districts. Such a rigid system was one of the reasons for the backwardness and economic collapse of Sovietism.

The liberals who replaced the communists, despite their theoretical projects, essentially retained the old state of affairs, only from now on centralism was not planned, but market-based. But, as before, the main economic decisions are carried out centrally, and the main economic routes pass through Moscow, where the liberal government tightly controls the general course of reforms in the regions. One form of abstract reproduction of a given pattern everywhere has been replaced by another, but the principle of centralism in the economic structure remains the same. Incidentally, the failure of market reforms is largely due to precisely this inertial centralism, when Moscow government officials strive to tightly control the economic development of the regions.

A sober analysis of this state of affairs and a comparison of the Russian situation with the most developed economic systems (first of all, the Rhine-Nippon type) lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to radically move away from such an economic approach and turn to an economic model based on a purely regional, regional, local basis. The economic interconnection of all regions of the USSR with each other was an artificially created structure. This relationship, based more on planned-voluntaristic methods than on the principles of maximum efficiency, often held back the autonomous development of the regional economy. The absolute plan also played a role in this. With the breakdown of such a common network and the coming to power of the liberals, many sectors of industry were generally left to themselves and doomed to degradation and extinction, and all the emphasis was placed on the priority development of resource-extracting industries, the products of which could be immediately sold abroad. And Western goods received by the monopoly pseudo-market structures of the liberals of Moscow are again were distributed centrally across regions. Thus, the regional economy suffered even more, and its dependence on the center, paradoxically, only increased with the departure of the communists.

The implementation of the plans of the "third way economy" should be based on completely different methods. Centralism here should be primarily strategic and political, but by no means economic, since the Empire can achieve the maximum economic effect only when all its components have economic autonomy and develop in the most free and natural way. Just as in the context of the entire continental project as a whole, each of its parts should strive to be as independent and self-sufficient at its level as possible, so within the framework of Russia, an extremely flexible regional economy should be created, built not taking into account the interests of the center or planning requirements. but on the most organic development of those economic potentials that most correspond to the given region.

Based on cultural, ethnic, religious, geographic, climatic, etc. conditions of a particular region, it is necessary to differentiate as much as possible not only the economic or industrial orientation, but also the economic structure itself. Up to the point that on the territory of the Empire there may be regions with a different economic order from the maximum market to almost communist. Those peoples who reject the banking system (Muslims) should design their financial models excluding interest financing of industry, while in other regions, on the contrary, banks can develop and prosper. The most important thing in this project is to reach such a level when each region or oblast will become self-sufficient in meeting the most urgent needs of residents, first of all, we are talking about housing, food, clothing and health. At the same time, one should first achieve regional autonomy in providing the most necessary things, and only then build projects to improve living standards, to improve technologies, and to develop technical and industrial development. Each region must have an elastic and flexible system of self-sufficiency, so that at any moment and under any circumstances and possible crises it has guarantees of a decent minimum for the entire population, regardless of interregional relations or the economic situation in the center.

The strategic global aspect of the economy should be considered in complete isolation from the regional structures working for the self-sufficiency of the population. The state of this population should in no way depend on the priority development in a given region of one or another strategic industry. In other words, the principle "there is always a necessary minimum of life and regardless of anything" must be observed, and the concentration of the region's efforts on one or another strategic global industry can only take place with control over the preservation of independent economic structures that do not in any way come into contact with this industry. In this case, the re-profiling of one or another type of production, abandonment of outdated or ineffective production, territorial relocation of enterprises or reorientation to imports that are profitable in all respects will in no way affect the general living standard of the region, which will be initially and fundamentally guaranteed.

In the competence of the center, only strategic production and planning will remain, which will be implemented not as an axis of the economy, but as an imposition of some kind of global superstructure on an already existing autonomous economic regional network, while both spheres should not influence each other in any way. Housing, social protection or food supply can in no way depend on the economic efficiency of an industrial or strategic enterprise located in a given area (as is the case now). It is necessary to achieve such economic independence of individual regions, even the smallest ones, that all the most pressing economic problems should be solved in isolation from the participation of the population in strategic production. This principle should become dominant in strategic planning,

Regionalism should also be projected onto the financial system, taking, for example, the experience of regional and land banks in Germany, where small financial structures, often limited to one or several villages, demonstrate a miracle of efficiency in the development of the economy, since in such a volume control over loans (which makes the fiscal service redundant), and the volume of loans, interest and repayment periods are determined based on specific organic communal conditions and represent not a quantitative, abstract mechanical, but a vital, ethical element of the economy.

education. In general, the regional financial system can have the most original form, adapting to the logic of the ethnocultural and geographical landscape. The most important thing is to avoid the centralization of capital, to disperse it as much as possible among the autonomous regional financial structures, to make it serve the economy, and not vice versa, to make the economy dependent on it.

It is even possible to introduce two parallel and non-overlapping financial systems, two "currencies": one intended for equipping the strategic imperial sphere, the other for regional needs. In the first case, there will be strict state planning based on specific principles.

financing and production, in another regional market and regional financial fund. State capital and regional capital. Private property should be an atomic component of the regional, regional capital, while state capital, in principle, should not have any common measure with private property. Only in this case will a strict line be drawn between the state, the public and the personal, and, consequently, the stability, flexibility of the internal structure and autarchy of the Empire will be maximized.

On the whole, the economy should be guided by the fundamental principle of ultimate strategic centralism plus extreme regional pluralism and "liberalism."

Chapter 9. Conclusion

The attempt made to sketch in the most general outline a continental project, to highlight the most global and axial moments of Eurasian geopolitics for Russia and the Russian people, of course, needs the most thorough development, which will require colossal work to clarify, argumentation, and illustrate various points and aspects of this topic. For us, however, it was extremely important to present the most approximate version of the only model of the geopolitical future of the Russian people, which, on the other side of the obviously dead-end paths, could bring it to the planetary and civilizational level, corresponding to its mission, its national, spiritual and religious claims. ... Much of this project may seem new, unusual, unusual, even shocking. But the need to touch upon all the most important aspects of the future of the nation made us neglect explanations, refutations of possible criticism, avoid long quotations, listing names and columns with numbers. All of this will be done as needed. In the meantime, it is most important to point out the general outlines of the "third way", the only path that can lead our great people and our great state out of the abyss of chaos and fall to the shining heights of the Russian Heavens.

PART V INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1. Subject and method

1.1 Domestic geopolitics of Russia depends on its planetary function

A geopolitical analysis of Russia's internal geopolitical problems cannot be carried out without taking into account a more general, global picture of Russia's place in the geopolitical ensemble. Only by keeping in mind the planetary role and importance of Russia can one effectively and consistently disassemble and describe its internal geopolitical structure. Unlike the European school of "internal geopolitics" (Yves Lacoste, etc.), which tends to isolate local and regional problems from taking into account the disposition of forces on a planetary scale, in the case of Russia, one cannot abstract from its global significance, and therefore, all private, its internal problems are adequately formulated (not to mention their solution) only within the framework of a more general, integral geopolitical field.

Russia is not just one of the mainland countries. She is a category that belongs to the basic principles of all geopolitics. Russia heartland, "geographic axis of history", Land. Russia is Eurasia. This value does not depend on blocs, ideology, political orientation, and the specifics of the regime: continentality, its historical, geographical and geopolitical fate. In the case of Russia, the question cannot be raised about the choice between "Atlanticism" and "Eurasianism". It is a Eurasian force and cannot but be. Russia's refusal to fulfill its role in the ensemble of the planet is possible only in the event of its complete geographic destruction, since if the Russian state refuses to fulfill this mission while maintaining the Eurasian continental mass, sooner or later, a new political entity will inevitably arise in the same borders, which will assume the functions of the "geographical axis of history." As long as Russia exists, it remains the axis of the Eurasian vector on a planetary scale.

This character predetermines the angle of consideration of its internal geopolitical problems. These problems stand only in the following vein: how and on what natural (or artificial) geopolitical volume of Russia, if possible, internal geopolitical factors so that the possibility of planetary geopolitical expansion?

This formulation of the problem in itself sets the conditions for the analysis, it is necessary to emphasize and priority research:

- 1) the possibilities of the centripetal tendencies of the regions;
- 2) the possibility of expanding the spatial influence of the center to the periphery and beyond.

This presupposes a clear identification of two basic criteria for the concepts of geopolitical center and geopolitical periphery. The relationship between them is the essence of the study of the internal geopolitics of Russia.

1.2 Internal geopolitics and military doctrine

The military-industrial complex plays a huge role in the geopolitical organization of Russian spaces, since in many (especially sparsely populated) territories, civilian settlements are tied to military camps and bases. The location of the most important industrial centers, also associated with the needs of the so-called. "Defense industry". The entire geopolitical configuration of Russia depends on the model of military doctrine.

This military doctrine, in turn, has two components. The political orientation of the leadership (which can change depending on domestic and foreign policy factors) and geopolitical constants that establish the framework within which variations in the political course are possible. This second component (the geopolitical position of Russia) unambiguously affirms the continental significance of the Russian Armed Forces, the orientation towards the fact that the main "potential enemy" of Russia is precisely the Atlanticist bloc. And this automatically entails a continental orientation of the entire military doctrine, an unconditional priority of strategic types of weapons, an orientation toward a global conflict of a planetary scale. At the same time, it does not matter at all what the political formation of the regime will be. Geopolitical confrontation will not necessarily be duplicated by ideological confrontation. It depends on the specific situation and can influence the verbal formulation of the political course, softening or, on the contrary, accentuating the geopolitical confrontation that persists under any circumstances. Without pretending to be the ultimate formula of military doctrine, geopolitics sets its framework, the violation of which immediately entails a total socio-political crisis and the territorial disintegration of the state.

Even in the case of a complete ideological understanding with Atlanticism, Russia's military doctrine should still identify the United States and the Western camp as a potential enemy number 1, and build the entire structure of the Armed Forces only on the basis of this principle. And this, in turn, will affect the overall structure of Russia's internal geopolitics in a broader sense.

The military doctrine of Russia must be absolutely Eurasian. Only in this case and from this point of view can we responsibly analyze the internal geopolitics of Russia and outline the priority vectors of development. Without this, any analysis will only predict the catastrophic degradation of Russian regions, territorial disintegration, a chain reaction of destruction and geopolitical self-liquidation. Theoretically, such a turn of events cannot be ruled out, and the modern "military doctrine" of the Russian Federation, which does not mention the US and NATO among its "potential adversaries", but includes them among Russia's potential geopolitical allies in the Eurasian bloc, gives many reasons for this. However, from a more general historical and geographical perspective, this condition should be considered as a "temporary anomaly" which will soon be eliminated under any political regime as the kurtosis of a difficult transition period. It is possible to describe a scenario of "geopolitics of catastrophes" that would highlight the phases of disintegration of the "geographical axis of history." But this position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance which would highlight the phases of the disintegration of the "geographical axis of history." But this position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance analyzing the current and future situation, proceeding from the normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, you should make a tolerance

(even if at the moment this is not yet the case) that Russia's "military doctrine" corresponds to the general continental logic and is based on strict geopolitical constants.

This circumstance should be borne in mind in the course of the further presentation.

1.3 Center and periphery

Heartland's historic center is not a constant geographic area. The current capital of Russia, Moscow, inherits both the line of the Slavic capitals (Kiev, Vladimir) and the line of the steppe headquarters of Chingiz. As a geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, Russia has two historical and geopolitical traditions at once, the totality of which forms the basis of the originality of the Russian way.

The Petersburg period was also associated with territorial expansion, although the Baltic location of St. Petersburg embodies the European orientation of the state, "geopolitical Westernism". In the Petersburg period, the territorial expansion of the Russians was less organic and more artificial than before. The nature of the synthesis was not so obvious, although many Eurasian peoples of Asia and Siberia accepted the rule of the "white king" based on the most ancient continental traditions.

Geographically, Moscow most of all meets the Eurasian mission of Russia. It is equidistant from all the main geographic zones that make up the originality of the Russian landscape. Distances to the polar north, east European west, steppe and subtropical south and taiga east are approximately the same. Therefore, it should be considered the "normal" (from a geopolitical point of view) Eurasian capital, continental center. In this respect, the current state of affairs coincides, in general, with geopolitical constants. Moscow is the natural capital of heartland.

At the same time, a cursory cartographic analysis of Russia immediately reveals a certain asymmetry in this situation. The fact is that beyond the Urals (which, however, is not any natural internal Russian border due to the low altitude of the mountains and the homogeneity of the climate on both sides of the ridge), a fairly homogeneous taiga zone extends thousands of kilometers into Siberia, thus turning Moscow into the center is only "European Russia". This purely quantitative view is counterbalanced, however, by other geopolitical considerations.

First, Siberia does not represent the climatic and relief structural diversity that characterizes pre-Ural Russia. From this point of view, all this gigantic space is only a disproportionate extension of the eastern landscape, the scale of which is much larger than the zonal picture of Russia proper. Thus, in the landscape sense, a gigantic spatial volume is reduced to a limited climatic quality.

Secondly, the same disproportion exists at the demographic level as well. Behind the Ural ridge lives the same number of people, which is typical for each of the landscape zones of European Russia clearly distinguished by nature.

Third, the development of this region in terms of communications, cities, communications, etc. also incomparable with its spatial volume.

Therefore, in the current situation, the geopolitical role of Siberia cannot be considered in proportion to its space. This is a special, "reserve space", which is the last "undeveloped" part of the Eurasian continent.

Thus, given the special quality of Siberia, Moscow is indeed identified with the geopolitical center of the "geographic axis of history". Note: it was the undeveloped state of Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) that forced Mackinder to include "Lenaland" in his later works. The space lying east of the Lena River, into a special geopolitical formation that does not, strictly speaking, belong to the heartland.

But already Spengler noted that moment that Siberia is a geographic space, the role of which may become clear gradually and turn out to be decisive in the historical process. He foresaw that it was from Siberia that a special unique culture could develop, which would put an end to the "decline of the West" and its "Faustian" civilization. The same idea was supported by the Russian "Asians", an extreme offshoot of the Eurasianists, who believe that the East (Asia) is more important not only the West, but also Eurasia itself (as, in particular, V. Ivanov and some "pacificists", Pazifikier, the Haushofer school, Kurt von Beckmann, etc.). Thus, in the long term, which implies a change in the demographic and informational state of the development of Siberia and its equalization with the rest of the Russian (or European) regions, it can be assumed that

But at the moment this should be taken into account only as a futurological perspective. (More on this in the chapter on the Russian East).

From the center (Moscow), rays can be directed to various regions of the peripheral Russian lands. These rays are not segments, as their length is not fixed. Centrifugal and centripetal forces affect regions with variable magnitude, depending on many historical factors. Moreover, the physical distances from the geopolitical center (Moscow) do not always correspond to the "geopolitical distances". These distances depend not only on the quantitative, but also on the qualitative side of ties, on the independence of regional formations, their form, and their cultural and ethnic specifics.

All these rays, converging towards the center, can be reduced to four main categories or "inner axes":

- 1) Moscow-Vostok
- 2) Moscow-West
- 3) Moscow-North
- 4) Moscow-South

On the other hand, the corresponding peripheral spaces are "zones" or "stripes", each of which has specific characteristics and a particular structure. These bands can be called, respectively, "Russian East", "Russian West", "Russian North" and "Russian South". The definition of "Russian" is

In this case, not ethnic, but geopolitical meaning, emphasizing the connection of the region with the central "continental axis" Moscow.

The main content of the topic of "internal geopolitics" of Russia will be to clarify the geopolitical structure of these four "peripheral zones" and the quality and nature of the "rays" connecting them with the center. The structure of the zones will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The nature of the rays, in the most general terms, can be seen now.

1.4 Internal axes ("geopolitical rays")

Four geopolitical rays link Moscow with the periphery of the "Russian space". These beams are of different quality.

They can be divided into two pairs of beams Moscow West and Moscow South, on the one hand, and beams Moscow East and Moscow North, on the other.

The first two rays, from a geopolitical point of view, are "unfinished", "open". They run into a complex geopolitical system of significant territorial volume, which separates the continental mass of Russia from the ideal border of the coastline. The southern and western borders of Russia, from a geopolitical point of view, are broad belts separating the central part from the coastline. In this respect, these two rays represent the most vulnerable directions for Russia, and the entire geopolitical dynamics along these axes is extremely tense, complex, having many levels and dimensions.

The axes Moscow West and Moscow South combine both internal and foreign policy aspects, since here the regions of Russia-Eurasia proper are smoothly moving into zones under the control of other states, and some of these states belong to the opposite planetary block, to the camp thalassocracy.

The second two rays: the axes Moscow North and Moscow East differ sharply from the first pair. Here the border of Russia coincides with the coastline, there are no "laying states", and therefore the political dynamics in these directions is confined to domestic political themes. In the North and East, Russia has complete geopolitical borders. And the main task in this case is to maintain the status quo.

Moreover, the North and East, precisely due to the oceanic borders, are the reserve and perfectly protected rear areas of the "geographic axis of history," where at critical moments it is always possible to create additional spatial platforms for geopolitical and strategic restructuring.

The difference between the West and South axes and the North and East axes is not a historical accident. The geographical landscape itself, and later the ethnic and cultural map of the corresponding regions, is a matrix that, as political history progresses, was filled with specific state content. In the western and southern outskirts of Russia and in the adjacent territories of neighboring countries, developed inflorescences of cultures, states and ethnic groups have developed, with their own political and spiritual traditions, statehood, etc. This is a zone with one side of the rimland. Objective and

artificial prerequisites for "separatism", and that, in turn, on a planetary scale is identified with the thalassocratic strategy.

The North and East of Russia, on the contrary, are extremely landscape homogeneous, and are not densely populated by peoples that do not have developed political and state traditions or have long lost the historical initiative of imperialism (for example, the Altai Turks, Buryats, etc.). Here, Moscow has free access to the seas, but the quality of the seas is appropriate. They are poorly navigable, cold, covered with ice for a significant part of the year, cut off from the central part due to poor communications, their ports are underdeveloped. Certain strategic advantages are offset corresponding disadvantages.

Two pairs of beams give complete geopolitical symmetry. The length of the northern and eastern coasts of Russia is associated with demographic discharged communication underdevelopment. The western and southern borders are land-based, densely populated, varied in landscape and represent voluminous strips of a significant area.

The geopolitical relations between the center and the periphery in Russia are thus divided into two types: purely internal axes with oceanic linear boundaries (North, East) and semi-internal axes with land boundaries of "strip" ("zonal") quality (West, South). The dynamics "South and West" implies entry into the sphere of international relations, diplomacy, and so on. The dynamics of "North and East" is limited by internal political problems. However, a purely geopolitical approach makes this picture somewhat relative. Where the "independent" state is currently located, the geopolitician sees a "future province", and vice versa, the coastal part of the territory of one state at some point may become a coastal bridgehead of an alternative geopolitical force (i.e. a new "sovereign" state).

The rays going from the center to the periphery, the "impulses of continental expansion", constantly collide with the opposite force pressure. The Atlantic bloc seeks to limit the centrifugal energy of Moscow, using the "separatist" tendencies of the outlying peoples or neighboring states, while relying on those coastal zones that are already under the confident control of the thalassocracy. In the South and in the West, this opposition is quite distinguishable in concrete political reality. In the North and East, the opposition is less obvious and less obvious. But, nevertheless, it exists in the form of a strategic military presence of the Atlanticists in the oceanic coastal zone (especially nuclear submarines),

2.1 Analysis model

The geopolitical ray Moscow North in a large approximation splits into a whole spectrum of rays radiating from a single center along the entire length of the coast of the Arctic Ocean. Thus, we get a complicated model, in which three problems arise:

- 1) the ratio of the sectors of the North to each other;
- 2) their relationship with the Center (Moscow);
- 3) correlation with other areas of the Russian space (South, East, West)

Geopolitical analysis is split into several sectors and issues at once. At the same time, the main task is not to lose sight of the general complex of the "internal geopolitics of Russia" and an even wider planetary context, taking into account the regional specifics and details as much as possible.

The geopolitical imperative of the Center in relation to the North is to strengthen the strategic control over these areas as much as possible. Given the sparsely populated territories located in the Arctic Circle, and the lack of developed political and state traditions of ethnic groups living there, cultural and political aspects here recede into the background. The most important aspect is military control over the coast (military, air force and naval base), information new message, energy supply and provision of food and housing abundance.

2.2 Geopolitical nature of the Russian Arctic

The climatic character of the northern territories assumes a point, and not "strip", its settlement. Hence, the role of centers increases, acquiring the most important and becoming, to some extent, the equivalent of what is defined in other regions as "territory". This identity of the "center" and "territory" in the North is maximal, since the intermediate spaces are not only of little use for living, but the tundra, cold, lack of villages, paths, etc. are deadly.

Thus, geopolitically, the North is a system of points located in the Arctic zone, a constellation of discrete settlements scattered over a fairly homogeneous (climatically and relief) space. The vast majority of northern lands are tundra, i.e. northern desert with rare vegetation (lichens). This is a permafrost zone.

The nature of the northern space is somewhat close to the "water element". In it, the boundaries between territories have practically no serious significance, since control over a particular land does not provide any special advantages. Given the sparsely populated population, the question of "competition for nomads" among reindeer-herding peoples is automatically removed.

The population of the North is a variety of the most ancient Eurasian ethnic groups that lived in these territories for thousands of years without any special cultural, migration or ethnic dynamics. It is curious that it is in the north of the western border of Russia that the division takes place along ethnic lines: the north of Europe Scandinavia, Germany, Denmark up to England, Ireland and Iceland are inhabited by "developed" peoples of Indo-European origin (young ethnic groups); and starting from Finland and Karelia and up to Chukotka, the Russian North is inhabited by ethnic groups much more ancient and archaic than the population of the European North (Ugrians, archaic Turks and Paleoasians of the Chukchi, Eskimos, etc.). Moreover, as we move east along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, the archaism of ethnic groups increases. Younger Indo-Europeans (or Turks),

From west to east: after the Karelians and Finns (who were still quite actively involved in modern history, albeit in secondary roles), the more archaic Nenets and Komi, then the Khanty and Mansi, Dolgans, Evenks, and then the Chukchi and Eskimos. A huge sector of Eastern Siberia is occupied by Yakutia (Sakha), but the Yakuts themselves (one of the offshoots of the Turks) live much south of the Arctic Circle, and the north of the region itself is almost uninhabited.

From the Ugrians to the Eskimos, the space of the Russian North shows us the historical time slices of civilization.

The notion "Russian North" is a trapezoid repeating the outlines of Eurasia as a whole. It narrows to the west and expands to the east. On the Russian-Finnish border, this territory covers approximately 10 degrees along the meridian, while Chukotka and Kamchatka already cover 20 degrees. But this spatial expansion has little effect on the geopolitical character of the territory; In terms of demographic characteristics, the degree of development, and the quality of communications and the frequency of settlements, this geographically expanding trapezoid to the east gives a mirror picture, since the "narrow" western flank of the northern sector is developed and populated more than the opposite eastern flank.

If Siberia is the geopolitical "reserve" of Russia, then the North, and especially the Siberian North, is the "reserve" of Siberia itself, being the most distant region of Eurasia from civilization. It is an icy, unexplored land, formally described in maps, but not representing any historical sign, having no global cultural dimension (at least within the foreseeable historical limits of the available study of the past). This situation contrasts strangely with the role that "north" plays in the mythologies of many peoples. There he is endowed with the quality of a "great ancestral home", "promised land", "ancient paradise". At this historical moment, it is rather something opposite, cold, inhospitable, hostile to people, an alienated space with rare interspersing of artificial centers of civilization.

2.3 North + North

Administratively, most of the northern lands are autonomous regions of the Russian Federation, except for Karelia, Komi and Yakutia, which have a more independent political status (republics). Politically, the regions are located as follows (from west to east): Karelia, north of the Murmansk region, Arkhangelsk region, the Komi Republic and

Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), northern sectors of Yakutia, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Magadan Territory, Koryak Autonomous Okrug and Kamchatka.

The similarity of the geopolitical quality of all these territories is a sufficient basis for them to form a certain territorial-strategic block based on certain integration structures. All these areas face typologically similar problems; their development follows the same trajectories. This natural similarity, so vividly manifested even in the most cursory geopolitical analysis, shows the need for some consolidation. This consolidation, a kind of pact of the "Arctic lands", can have several levels from spiritual and cultural to practical and economic.

You can initially outline the general directions of such a block.

Its cultural base can be a purely Eurasian theory of rethinking traditional civilization as a positive model of a social structure that has retained the memory of cosmic proportions. This means that the archaism of the peoples of the North (underdevelopment, lagging behind, primitiveness, etc.) is not a minus, but a spiritual plus. Ancient ethnic groups are not only not subject to "re-education" and inclusion in "modern civilization", but, on the contrary, need the conditions of their existence to be as close as possible to their traditions. Moreover, the concern for these traditions should be partially transferred to the state, which seeks to secure strategic control over these lands.

Parallel to this, the "mythological" aspect of the North as the most ancient homeland of mankind should be adopted, and the project of the "spiritual revival of the North" would then acquire a worthy historical scale. At the same time, the emphasis should be made on the seasonal specifics of the Arctic year, the polar day and the polar night, which were considered by the Hindus and ancient Persians to be the "days of the gods". Existence in arctic conditions (common to the entire Eurasian North) returns a human being to conditions of a special cosmic rhythm. Hence the spiritual and therapeutic significance of the Arctic zones.

At the material level, and especially in relation to the living conditions of migrants from the South, i.e. mostly Russians, it is necessary to unite the efforts of all northern centers in the development of optimal models of cities and villages, taking into account the climatic specifics. This aspect requires the use of the latest technologies of unconventional energy sources (solar energy, wind farms, etc.), construction know-how for permafrost, communication and transport systems, the development of interregional air transport, etc. Initially, there should be a project for the general Arctic development, the development of a single and most effective formula that would make it possible to modernize settlements in the shortest possible time, make their existence more dynamic and interconnected.

Given the importance of this problem, it would be logical to provide its solution to the Arctic regions themselves, providing state support for the entire project as a whole from the center. The development of an "Arctic formula" is up to the northerners themselves.

Since the North is a geopolitical "reserve of reserves" of Russia, its regions should be prepared for a possible active migration of the population from the South. This concerns the other side of the problem of a new settlement in the North. Sooner or later, given the demographic

processes, it will become necessary, and it is better to start creating structural prerequisites for this now.

The military aspect should be highlighted. The North is a gigantic strategic military zone of Russia, the most important belt of its security. Many missile and strategic aviation bases are concentrated here; Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are the largest naval bases in Russia. This situation is not a consequence of the arbitrariness of the ideological confrontation between the two camps during the Cold War era. The strategic importance of the North in the military sense remains for Russia in any case, since we are talking about the observance of the interests of Eurasia, the heartland. The meaning of the military presence in the North of Russia stems from the continental nature of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and from the natural awareness of oneself as a continental camp opposing the "forces of the sea." The main importance of these military facilities is to protect the coastal zone from possible sea and air incursions and to provide, if necessary, a nuclear strike on the American continent through the North Pole. This is the shortest distance from Russia to the United States. For the same reason, this territory is a priority zone for the development of missile defense.

At present, the North accounts for a huge percentage of the total industrial product of Russia. At the same time, its central importance in the military-industrial complex is not taken into account. Many minerals in particular, salt, nickel, etc. are mined mainly in the subarctic regions. But there is a huge gap between such industrial development of the North and the lag in other areas of development. Geopolitical logic requires active leveling of the situation. Moreover, it is most convenient to do this within the framework of the "Arctic Pact". In this case, it would be necessary to designate the capital (or several capitals) of the North, in which the intellectual and technological potential would be concentrated, where the main economic, financial and engineering levers would be reduced. This would give the North significant independence from the center, freedom from control in detail,

At all these levels, the need for the integration of the North is clearly emerging. This is important in the spiritual, ethnic, cultural, military-strategic, industrial, social, financial terms. The result of such a multi-level integration (so far existing only potentially) would be the creation of an entirely new geopolitical reality, in which a significant increase in autonomy and regional independence would not weaken the strategic connection with the center. The development of the North would become a path to the future, a springboard for a completely new (based on geopolitics) understanding of space in the long term.

Severnaya Zemlya from a barren desert would once again turn into a polar paradise, strengthening the planetary weight of the continent and creating a model of a society for a "Eurasian future" based on a combination of tradition and development, loyalty to roots and technological modernization.

2.4 North + Center

The first approach to the geopolitical analysis of the North (North + North) is based on separating the "polar trapezium" into a single connected region, which can be considered as an independent spatial figure. This vision of the North allows us to work out the most flexible model of its development, since the most stable

a geopolitical structure is one that consists of self-sufficient autonomous-autonomous (in a limited sense) elements. But even such a relative autarchy requires a certain territorial scale. The "trapezium" of the Russian North meets all the necessary conditions for forming into an independent internal Russian "large space". Moreover, such integration autonomy can largely compensate for the inevitable strategic centralism for the state.

The second geopolitical approach is to analyze the systemic functioning along the Center-North axis. This axis was and in many respects remains the only and main one in the administrative organization of the northern territories. Certain regions and centers of the North were directly subordinate to Moscow, which controlled all the main vectors of the development of these territories. Such unambiguous centralism did not allow developing the internal geopolitical potential of the North as efficiently as possible, and deliberately made the specialization of regions one-sided and focused on the scale of the entire country. This made it possible to maintain a regime of strict centralism, but significantly hampered the opening of internal possibilities.

Geopolitical logic dictates that the issue of correlation between Center and Periphery (and in our particular case, Moscow in the North) should be deliberately divided into two components:

- 1) strict centralism in the field of macro-policy and strategic subordination;
- 2) the maximum emancipation of internal capabilities due to the ultimate cultural and economic autonomy.

In other terms: strategic centralism + cultural and economic regionalism.

In order to develop the most effective model for such a geopolitical distribution of roles, the question of the "capital of the North" arises again, which could serve as an intermediate instance between the Center and all regions. All military communications from bases, military units, ports, etc. would converge to this point. In addition, there could be a "government of the North", a flexible instance of political coordination of all parts of the "polar trapezium", subordinate directly to Moscow, but acting in front of it on behalf of the entire North. This could be the "parliament of the peoples of the North" and the corresponding executive structures. In this case, the most important thing would be to achieve a harmonious combination of military leadership with regional representatives, since the centralist nature of strategic control would then be coupled with the expression of the regional will of the northern lands. The tandem of the military representative of Moscow with the civilian representative of the "peoples of the North" in such a geopolitical capital could become the ideal prototype for the most efficient and operational, flexible, but tightly connected with the center of the organization of the entire Eurasian space. At the same time, interethnic and cultural friction between the peoples of the North in such an integration process will be minimal due to historical and geographic reasons for the fragmentation and mosaic nature of settlement and the small number of ethnic groups.

It is in the North that this model of space reorganization, based on purely geopolitical premises, should be tested. In this case, all the conditions for such a project are evident that all regions of the North belong to Russia, territorial and demographic dissociation, an urgent need for restructuring industrial and economic systems, some of which have dropped out of the general system of national "distribution of labor", demographic crisis, critical situation

with the peoples of the North, the collapse of energy supply systems and communications, the necessary reform of the Armed Forces, etc.

The attitude of Moscow to the North directly depends on the general integration of the northern regions into a single block and for one more reason. Russia has a latitudinal geographic structure, it is elongated along the parallel. The main tendencies of its development had precisely latitudinal dynamics. The Russian State was built on the integration of spaces along latitudes. For this reason, the main communications and systems of ties within Russia were formed in accordance with this model. The latitudinal process was especially clearly expressed in the development of Siberia and the "dash to the Ocean". Therefore, the stability of the internal structure of Russia directly depends on the completeness and dynamics of latitudinal integration. If we take Russia as a whole, then development along the North-South axis is necessary for its continental strategic usefulness. This applies primarily to expansion beyond its borders, since any geopolitical organization of space vertically gives the maximum degree of strategic autarchy. But within Russia itself, such a complete autarchy is completely inappropriate. Here, on the contrary, one should insist on extreme strategic centralism, on the interconnection of regional spaces with the Center. Therefore, a geopolitical law can be formulated: within Russia, the priority is the West-East integration axis, outside Russia, the North-South axis. (In a more nuanced way, this law is formulated as follows: the areas strictly ethnically and politically controlled by Russia and the Russians require latitudinal integration, while the internal Russian lands, compactly populated by other ethnic groups with historically fixed traditions of political separatism, on the contrary, need integration along the meridian basis.) The dynamics along the meridian makes a political entity independent of its neighbors to the left and to the right. This is necessary for the country as a whole, but unnecessary for certain sectors of this country. The dynamics along the parallel, on the contrary, rigidly binds the Center with the periphery; this is useful for the internal political organization of the state, but it leads to conflicts and imbalances at the interstate level.

On the basis of this pattern, one should insist on the latitudinal integration of the Northern regions, given their belonging to a single climatic and relief zone, and not their purely geographic (and even in some cases ethnic) proximity to other (southern, eastern, or western) regions. The latitudinal unification of the North will contribute to its cultural and economic development, but hinder the creation of prerequisites for potential political and strategic sovereignty. Only such a structure will solve the problems of the Periphery Center in the most positive, from a geopolitical point of view, key.

2.5 The Finnish Question

The only international problem associated with the Russian North is the problem of Karelia (and Finland). The Karelian ethnos is close to the Finnish one and is connected with it by cultural and historical unity. If we proceed from the logic of latitudinal integration, the Karelian question seems, at first glance, an anomaly. Two approaches are possible here.

The first is to absolutize the Karelian-Finnish border geopolitically and offer the Karelian Republic to integrate along the North-South axis with the primordially Russian regions around Lake Onega, Ladoga. Such a vector of development is unnatural and should be resorted to only in the worst case, since the artificial rupture of ethnic unity along the administrative line is purely

the political border never gives geopolitical stability to the region. The matter is aggravated by the fact that the Karelian-Finnish border is an easily passable forest and swampy relief and has a huge length; it is extremely difficult, cumbersome and expensive to reliably defend such a border.

The second approach involves the creation of a Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, culturally and partly economically united, but representing a strategic pillar of the Eurasian Center. In European languages, there is the term "Finlandization", which appeared during the Cold War. It is understood as a nominally neutral state with a capitalist economy, but strategically leaning towards the USSR, i.e. to heartland. Finland as a state is a highly unstable and far from autarchy formation, naturally and historically included in the geopolitical space of Russia. This manifested itself at various stages in history. The center could agree to broad autonomy of the Karelian-Finnish unification with the only condition of strategic control over the Gulf of Bothnia and the deployment of Eurasian border troops on the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian border. The length of the border would be cut in half, despite the fact that the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders are much less homogeneous and easily passable in relief than the Karelian-Finnish ones. In addition, Russia would be able to control the Baltic from the North.

The second approach is preferable in all respects, and it is this tactic that should be used by the Continental Center in all ethnically and culturally mixed zones on the borders of the state. A split ethnic unity automatically means the instability of the border zone, the instability of the borders. The Atlantist adversary will sooner or later try to take advantage of this circumstance in order to carry out ethnic integration for his own purposes, i.e. increase control over rimland and weaken heartland. Therefore, continental forces should actively and aggressively use similar tactics and not be afraid to concede cultural and even economic sovereignty to border peoples in exchange for a strategic presence and political loyalty.

When stable borders cannot be achieved through direct military or political expansion, an intermediate flexible option should be used, which in the anti-Eurasian sense is constantly and successfully used by thalassocracy.

2.6 North and Non-North

The specificity of the geography of the Arctic coast of Russian Eurasia reduces the problem of the correlation of the regions of the North with other regions to a more simplified North-South formula, since latitudinal problems (namely, with the West) arise only in the case of Karelia. The only exception is the problem of Yakutia, which stands apart here, since Yakutia has, although an extremely artificial, but still historically recorded tradition of political separatism. This aspect is reflected in the later classification of Eurasia by Makinder, where he singled out "Lenaland", "the land of the Lena River," and Yakutia (Sakha) forms the axis of this region, stretching from the Laptev Sea to the Amur Region and Altai in the south. But the case of Yakutia must be considered separately.

Let's start with the western part of the "northern trapezium". The Kola Peninsula, Murmansk and the Karelian Republic stand out here. Together with Finland, it all forms one

the geographical and geopolitical sector, which would be most efficiently integrated into an independent and complete system, in which the Murmansk region and Murmansk itself would have the strategic priority and quality of the military center of decisions, and the Karelian-Finnish space would be endowed with broad cultural and economic sovereignty. In this case, the Murmansk region could be increased at the expense of the northern regions of Finland, Finnish Lapland. The balance between Murmansk (the strategic projection of Moscow) and the Karelian-Finnish space would be a concrete expression of the Eurasian arrangement of the continent as an example of "new Finlandization" in the post-Cold War conditions.

We will consider further movement to the south of this block in the chapter devoted to the Russian West. It should be noted that in any case, the fundamental strategic axis in this case will be the Murmansk - Moscow axis.

Next: Arkhangelsk Territory. An exception to the general rule should be made here and the importance of integration not only along the North North latitude, but also along the meridian should be emphasized. The fact is that the Arkhangelsk Territory is located strictly above the Central European part of Russia, and therefore, the very idea of the possible sovereignty of this vertical sector from the White Sea to the Black Sea in relation to Russia is generally ruled out, since this region is actually Russia. Therefore, Arkhangelsk and the Arkhangelsk Territory are in the strategic position that is most consistent with the principle of strategic integration of the North in the interests of the Center. The Moscow-Arkhangelsk axis is the only one of the entire spectrum of internal "geopolitical beams" and is not just a military-strategic structure. Here it is necessary to achieve maximum and multifaceted integration with the South, all the way to Moscow, try to create a smooth transition from (relatively) densely populated areas of the Vologda Oblast to the point settlements of Pomorie. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic Pact". The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic Pact". The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic Pact". The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. therefore, it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic Pact". The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration. therefore, it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic Pact". The development of the Moscow Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact" will depend on the quality and dynamics of this unique (from the entire North) meridian integration.

To the east, the northern zone includes two administrative formations, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Komi Republic. The integration of these spaces with each other has no contraindications, especially when taking into account the insignificant population of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The proximity to Arkhangelsk allows the most active and priority development of this region within the framework of a common project. The development of the islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land is of particular importance. These Arctic lands are of colossal strategic importance in the context of intercontinental confrontation. These are the Russian territories closest to the Pole and, accordingly, to the United States, which are used as military strategic bases. As in the case of Karelia and Murmansk, the northernmost areas are controlled by mainly by the military, while the civil administration is more developed to the south. The whole region as a whole has the center of Vorkuta, to which the main communications and communication routes converge.

Vorkuta is a large industrial and strategic center, which is located not far from the Yamalo-Nenetsky district, where there is no center of a similar scale. Consequently, Vorkuta could also control the gigantic territory of the Kara Sea coast.

up to the mouth of the Yenisei and the basin of the Ob estuary. In this area, the Yamalo-Nenets Okrug is geographically close to the Khanty-Mansiysk Okrug, and both of them are part of a single geopolitical sector.

It should be emphasized that the southern border of the "Northern Trapezium" in the case of the Komi Republic has a very important geopolitical significance. In this case, the integration processes of this North Ural region with the rest of the Urals (and the northern Volga region) are not only unreasonable, but frankly harmful, since Tatarstan is located to the southwest (beyond the Permian Komi District), where separatist tendencies have a long history. Being placed in the middle of Russian lands, Tatarstan does not pose a particular danger, but in all similar cases, "separatist logic" forces us to seek access to the seas or foreign territories, and any vertical integration processes in this case may sooner or later turn out to be extremely dangerous. Here we should go the opposite way (rather than in the case of the Arkhangelsk region) and try to tear off the entire North Ural region and its neighboring sectors in the east and west from the Volga region and the Urals as much as possible. In this case, the "northern trapezium" must be strictly separated from the entire continental space located to the south.

To the east lie the lands of the Yenisei Basin, which administratively fall into the Taimyr and Evenk Autonomous Okrugs and the northern part of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the former Turukhansk Territory. In this area, Norilsk stands out, which can be defined as the center for this entire gigantic region. In this case, the meridian dynamics along the North-South axis is not excluded, since South Siberia from Omsk to Lake Baikal is densely populated by Russians, and integration in this direction cannot pose any particular danger. This whole block lies in the intermediate territory, where the zone of more or less uniform settlement of the territory ends and Mackinder's Lenaland proper, the "no man's land", begins. This zone and all the more eastern territories are a gigantic continental desert, lifeless tundra in the north and impenetrable taiga in the south. This is "potential space". From the south, it was partially developed by both the Russian and ancient Turkic-Mongol peoples with a relatively developed political culture. But in the North itself it represents "no man land". This situation cannot be changed quickly and in one leap, and, therefore, the gigantic region centered in Norilsk for a certain time will represent the "internal border" of continental Russia in the northeast, a strategic outpost of the Center in the North. This logically leads to the need to especially develop specifically Norilsk, which has an extremely important geopolitical significance. It bears the function of control over Taimyr (and Severnaya Zemlya Island) in the north and the Yenisei basin in the south, and in addition, a smaller zone should start from this point, i.e.

Lenaland Mackinder includes Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka, Magadan Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region and Primorsky Territory, Sakhalin Island and the Kuriles. The entire space is divided into two geopolitical regions - a fragment of the "northern trapezium", on the one hand, and South Yakutia, Priamurye, Primorsky Krai and the southern half of Khabarovsk Krai, on the other. Both spaces are qualitatively completely different. The southern part, especially the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, is relatively densely populated, has ancient political traditions, and is home to quite active Eurasian ethnic groups. From the point of view of technical development and, at the same time, in the climatic sense, this southern sector is an extension of Southern Siberia.

The exact opposite is the northern part of Lenaland. This is the most undeveloped and "wildest" part of Eurasia, a giant continental stratum, with rudimentary infrastructure and virtually no population. The only major center of the entire region is Magadan, but it is a port very weakly connected with the vast continental expanses of Kolyma and Northern Yakutia. Anadyr in Chukotka is also not a center in the full sense of the word and is also not connected with the continent. This sector is a separate continent, brilliantly protected by sea borders, possessing numerous minerals, but at the same time completely undeveloped and undeveloped, which is in a potential state. This part of Siberia is taken out of the scope of history, and it is to her that Spengler's futurological prophecy about the "coming Siberian civilization" is more related. This unique sector of the Old World, which has not yet said its word in the history of civilizations and has not shown its geopolitical function in any way.

Such underdevelopment of this region is explained on the basis of the so-called. "Potamic theory of civilization", according to which the cultural development of a region occurs much faster in cases where the main river beds in it are not parallel to each other, but intersect. Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) is a classic confirmation of this principle, since in it all large rivers flow in the same direction, without crossing. However, developmental delay is not a purely negative characteristic. The historical lag helps to accumulate (on the basis of a rational understanding of the history of other territories and nations) the most important historical experience. Under certain circumstances, this can be a guarantee of an unprecedented takeoff.

The northern half of lenaland, from a purely geographic point of view, involves consideration as a single geopolitical complex. And here a very important question arises. Around what center can this future geopolitical formation be formed? What orientation will it adhere to? The very fact of Mackinder's doubts about whether or not lenaland should be included in the "geographical axis of history" indicates the possibility of alternative solutions to the situation. This is enough for the continental strategy to pay particular attention to this sector.

It is clear that the maximum task is to include this area in the "Arctic Pact" under the control of the Center (Moscow) and to correlate with other, secondary centers of the Northern Belt. But there are two obstacles here:

- 1) the absence in the center of this region of some major strategic point around which integration systems could be built;
- 2) the axial position of Yakutia (the Republic of Sakha) in this region, which is especially complicated by the presence of even nominal, but historically recorded "separatism" among the Yakuts.

In this case, the ratio of the northern half of the "Arctic trapezium" to the South for the first time acquires a truly dramatic character, since Yakutia has such a strategic location that provides all the prerequisites for becoming an independent region, independent from Moscow. This is ensured by the long coastline, and the meridian structure of the republic's territories, and its technical isolation from the rest of the Siberian regions. Under a certain set of circumstances, it is Yakutia that can become the main base of the Atlanticist

strategy, starting from which the thalassocracy will restructure the Pacific coast of Eurasia and try to turn it into a classic rimland, controlled by "sea power". The increased attention of Atlanticists to the Pacific area and the highly indicative allocation by Mackinder of Lenaland in a special category, and then the inclusion of this territory in the rimland zone in the maps of Atlanticists Speakman and Kirk, all this indicates that at the first opportunity all this is weakly associated with the center of the region, anti-continental forces will try to withdraw from the Eurasian control.

In this regard, the following measures should be taken:

- 1) Sharply limit the legal political sovereignty of Yakutia.
- 2) Divide Yakutia into two or more regions, and it is most important to administratively separate the region of the coast of the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea from the continental basin of the Lena River. It is also important to maximize the zone separating the borders of Yakutia from the Pacific coast and strengthen strategic control over these coastal zones.
- 3) Establish special strict control over this entire territory by the representative of Moscow.
- 4) Organize the industrial and financial integration of Yakutia into non-Yakut regions, make the region as dependent as possible on the Center or on its projections in the North and South of Siberia.

These steps presuppose such a reorganization of this territory, which would create here a completely new geopolitical structure, a new center and new radial ties. In other words, without waiting for the reorganization of Lenaland according to the Atlanticist scenario, as long as this region remains part of Russia, we should immediately proceed to the construction of continental Lenaland according to the Eurasian model.

The problem of the North-South ratio has a special solution for this sector, here not only it is necessary to limit contacts along this axis, but to reorganize the entire northern space anew, tearing off its polar and coastal zones from the continental spaces of Yakutia. This is not only a preventive geopolitical move, it is a geopolitical attack, a positional war for Lenaland, for the future of Siberia, for its continental, Eurasian destiny. So far, this issue may have domestic political significance. It must not be allowed to acquire international significance and become foreign policy.

2.7 Summary

The northern belt of the Eurasian continent, which is part of Russia, is the most important geopolitical reality, the importance of which will steadily increase with the development of general planetary dynamics. At the same time, this region is especially important for Russia to assert its global geopolitical status. "Geographical axis of history".

Only when defining atlantism, thalassocracy as its main of the geopolitical enemy, the entire system of the North acquires real strategic content. If one refuses to recognize geopolitical dualism at the level of military doctrine or international politics, the whole topic instantly loses its meaning. Wherein

not only the rapid degradation of the Russian North is inevitable, but also in the long term its fragmentation and even the rejection of certain regions from Russia.

The general rhythm of geopolitical processes at the present time is such that the issue of geopolitical reorganization of the North in accordance with the above geopolitical constants is highly topical and urgent. Even in order to maintain the status quo, it is necessary to immediately begin the geopolitical reorganization of all these spaces.

The fate of Russia is directly linked to the geopolitical fate of the North. This law is the basis for her future geopolitics.

The North is the future, this is fate.

3.1 "Inner East" (scope of the concept)

Analyzing the geopolitical problems of the Russian East, we will apply the same method as in the case of the North, dividing the issue into three components:

- 1) Center - East
- 2) Links of the sectors of the East with each other
- 3) The links of these sectors with other regions and geopolitical zones of Russia.

But first, it is necessary to define what is meant by "Russian East". We must immediately emphasize the difference between the East as a purely geographical concept and the cultural, civilizational, historical East. So, in the cultural East it is customary to include all territories of North Africa, the Middle East, Western Asia, Central Asia up to Pakistan and further to the Philippines (Islamic world) and India, while it is customary to apply the concept to China and Indochina, as well as to the countries of the Pacific region "Far East". From a Russian perspective, geographically, all of this represents the South, stretching from the far Maghreb West to the Pacific Far East.

On the other hand, within the framework of Russia itself, the "East" is completely different geographic and geopolitical realities - this is a territory stretching from the Volga region (Tataria) through the Urals, Siberia, right up to the Pacific Ocean. This geopolitical category can be called "Russian East" or "Inner East". Studying the internal geopolitics of Russia, one should take as the "East" precisely this second concept, the "inner East", the geographical territories lying to the East of the Center (Moscow).

In this case, the Caucasus and Central Asia will fall into the category of the "South" and will be considered in the corresponding chapter.

Considering that we consider the internal geopolitics of Russia as an "open system" that does not coincide with the administrative borders of the Russian Federation, proceeding from the method of "geopolitical rays", the allocation of geopolitical zones often falls on the territory of neighboring states, in the event that there is a geopolitical, ethnic and geographical and landscape unity. For this reason, the "inner East" of Russia should include both the South Urals and North Kazakhstan from Aktyubinsk to Semipalatinsk at approximately 50th latitude. In addition, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria are geopolitically part of the South sector in relation to Russia. Consequently, all of South Siberia, Altai, Tuva, Buryatia, Priamurye and Primorye (plus the southern half of the Khabarovsk Territory) are included in the strip of the "Inner East" together with the Central Siberian regions,

Thus, the "inner East" should be considered a rectangle stretching from Kazan and the Urals to the Pacific Ocean.

3.2 Belt of "Russian Siberia" (structure)

Climatically, the Russian East differs sharply from the North. This is an area with a temperate continental climate. In the Volga region and in the Urals, as well as in Siberia and Primorye, the forest zone is mainly located. A narrowing wedge of steppes goes from Northern Kazakhstan to Lake Baikal. Altai and Amur region are massifs of low mountains. Most of the territories are quite densely populated and represent reliefs favorable for living and economic management.

The ethnic composition of the inner East of Russia is as follows: the overwhelming majority are Russians, scatteredly living in the national republics and compactly in most of the Siberian lands. Several ethnic zones can be distinguished, coinciding in general terms with the corresponding autonomies and republics.

Tatarstan is located in the Volga region, a fairly monolithic ethno-national entity that preserves the traditions of political independence and a certain rivalry with Russia. This is the most vulnerable (from the point of view of maintaining the integrity of Russia) region, since the national identity of the Tatars is very developed. The most important factor that makes the problem of "Tatar separatism" still secondary is the geographical location of Tatarstan in the middle of the continental space without sea borders or proximity to a non-Russian state. As long as this geopolitical situation persists, this does not pose a particular danger to Russia. But in any case, the historical tradition of the Tatars requires increased attention to this region and the implementation of such a policy of the Center in relation to Kazan, thanks to which the geopolitical system of Tatarstan would be connected with purely Russian regions (perhaps not territorially adjacent). At the same time, on the contrary, integration processes with Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Mordovia and Mari-el should be hindered. In addition, it makes sense to accentuate the territorial division of Tatarstan according to cultural and ethnic characteristics, since the Tatars are an ethnic group both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic. since the Tatars are an ethnic group, both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic. since the Tatars are an ethnic group, both in terms of racial and cultural and religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic.

Tatars are Turks and Muslims, and this makes them a geopolitical part of the Turkic-Islamic world. In this respect, the Center faces a problem that dominates the entire geopolitics of the South (which will be discussed in the corresponding chapter). The complete separation of Tartary from this reality is impossible either through assimilation or through active geographic isolation. Therefore, the "Tatar question" is included as a separate article in the broader problem of Russia and Islam. The common denominator in solving all similar situations is the search for a geopolitical balance of interests between the "geographical axis of history" and the Islamic world. In this respect, anti-Atlanticism is, in all cases, without exception, the common denominator that makes it possible to establish a long-term planetary alliance.

More broadly, the Eurasian power of Russia is based on a combination of Slavic and Turkic elements, which gave rise to the Great Russian ethnos itself, which became the axis of the "continental state" identified with the heartland. Therefore, in the future, these two ethnic groups, Slavs and Turks (+ Ugrians and Mongols) remain the pillars of Eurasian geopolitics. Their future is in the development of political and ethnic integration,

and therefore the accentuation of ethnocultural differences, and especially the desire to give these differences a political form, contradict the logic of the historical fate of both Russians and Tatars. This topic should become the axis of relations between Moscow and Kazan, and it is possible that this will require the creation of a special "geopolitical lobby" expressing the interests of Eurasia also politically (or metapolitically).

Almost the same considerations apply to Bashkiria, located south of Tatarstan. It is also home to a Turkic ethnos professing Islam. The only difference is that the Bashkirs do not have such a manifested separatist tradition and such a developed national identity as the Tatars, who were the most active and "advanced" ethnic group in the entire Volga region. For this reason, the Tatar-Bashkir ties can in no way contribute to geopolitical stability in this sector of the "inner East" of Russia, and the Center must do everything possible to integrate Bashkiria into the South Ural regions inhabited by Russians and tear it away from its orientation toward Kazan. ... At the same time, it makes sense to emphasize the originality of the purely Bashkir culture, its uniqueness, and its difference from other Turkic-Islamic forms. The strengthening of geopolitical ties between Tatarstan and Bashkiria is extremely dangerous for Russia, since the southern administrative border of Bashkiria lies not far from Northern Kazakhstan, which (with the most unsuccessful development of the geopolitical situation) could theoretically become a springboard for Turkic-Islamic separatism. In this case, the most terrible thing threatens the heartland to be torn apart by a Turkic (pro-Turkish, i.e. pro-Atlantic) wedge right in the middle of the continental space. In this sense, the orientation of Tatarstan to the south, attempts to integrate with Bashkiria, and even the rapprochement of Bashkiria with the Orenburg region are extremely negative tendencies, which the continental policy of the Center must prevent at any cost. Bashkiria should strengthen latitudinal ties with Kuibyshev and Chelyabinsk, while meridian contacts with Kazan and Orenburg should, on the contrary, weaken.

Further, from the Southern Urals (Chelyabinsk) to Krasnoyarsk stretches a strip of lands actively populated and developed by Russians. From west to east, a geopolitical axis clearly looms, which historically corresponded to the path of the Russians conquering Siberia: Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk Tomsk Kemerovo Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk. This entire belt is a developed industrial zone, and a city like Novosibirsk is also the largest intellectual center. Moreover, in an ethnic sense, this is almost a purely Russian zone. A similar situation is repeated on the eastern side of Lake Baikal, where along the Baikal-Amur Mainline from Chita to Khabarovsk and further south to Vladivostok, there is a continuation of the same strip starting in the South Urals. The only deviation is Buryatia,

Directly south of this purely Russian belt lies a parallel zone with a significant admixture of the Turkic (east of the Mongolian) population. It begins in Northern Kazakhstan, from Aktyubinsk reaches through the territory of Kazakhstan to Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk and continues on Russian territory in Altai (the cradle of the Turkic ethnic group), in Khakassia, Tuva and Buryatia. At the same time, from Altai to Transbaikalia (Chita), this Turkic-Mongolian belt landscape and, to a large extent, ethnically smoothly passes into Mongolia, with which no obvious geographical border actually exists. From a geopolitical point of view, this entire lower belt is an integral part of the strategic space of "Russian Siberia", and therefore it should be viewed as a continuation of the "Russian East" to the south.

located from the eastern border with Mongolia to the Ussuri River. Logically, it should have been strategically controlled by Russia, since otherwise it would inevitably become a pretext for positional collisions between the "geopolitical axis of history" and territories geopolitically included in rimland, and China undoubtedly belongs to the category of rimland (in this neither which geopolitician never had a shadow of doubt).

The same geopolitical principle is valid for the named strip of "Russian Siberia": this entire territorial sector must be actively integrated into a single geopolitical field, and the priority direction here will be latitudinal integration along the long axis Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk (the meridian short axis Khabarovsk-Vladivostok is a continuation of this line in a special geopolitical sector). All this space of gigantic length constitutes the main strategic advantage of Russia as a truly Eurasian power. Thanks to this South Siberian corridor, Russia gets the opportunity to firmly connect the regions of the Center with the Pacific coast, thereby providing a potential highway for the full development of Siberia and the final exit of Moscow to the Pacific Ocean. This strip is the control lever of the entire Eurasia, including Europe, since the organization of a high-tech continental connection from the Far East to the Far West allows in this way to restructure planetary reality, so that thalassocratic control over the oceans from the outside will lose its key importance. The resources of Siberia will connect in the future with the high technologies of continental Europe and developed Japan, and when this can be realized, the planetary domination of the thalassocracy will come to an end.

The latitudinal integration of Siberia (the Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk axis) is the most important strategic advantage that only Russia has. With the development of this area, the entire geopolitical history of the future can begin, and in this case Spengler's prophecies will come true.

In a narrower, "internal" sense, the development of the integration of "Russian Siberia" makes it possible to expand geopolitical control along the meridian as well. The southern "Turkic-Mongolian" belt will be associated with more northern purely Russian territories, while the broadest ethnocultural autonomy will be accompanied by economic integration and strategic domination of the Russian Chelyabinsk-Vladivostok axis. Moreover, this process should include such administratively heterogeneous entities as Kazakhstan, autonomous okrugs and republics on the territory of the Russian Federation, Mongolia and, possibly, some regions of Chinese Manchuria.

At the same time, a similar meridian vector is assumed in the northern direction, where the situation differs only in that the autochthonous non-Russian population is much more discharged, politically less developed and has no fresh historical experience of political sovereignty. In the Khanty-Mansi and Evenk districts, as well as in the Khabarovsk Territory, the limit of the northern expansion of the belt of "Russian Siberia" is set by a parallel process of internal integration of the "northern trapezium". This integration, in contrast to the complex geopolitical function of "Russian Siberia" (the Chelyabinsk - Khabarovsk axis), which has three vectors of development (latitudinal, northern and southern) and in a number of cases collides with established and rather independent political forms (states), has a simple purely latitudinal character.

to the north and the overall integration of the "northern trapezoid" will depend on unpredictable factors.

All these geopolitical vectors of development are not, in fact, something new and unexpected, since they turn out to be only a continuation of the large-scale historical processes of Russia's movement to the east and the formation of a Eurasian power. The Russian way to the Pacific Ocean is not accidental, and the territories of the Russian development of Siberia also follow a clear geographical logic. This path corresponds to the relief border of the Forest and the Steppe, on the geopolitical synthesis of which the Russian State itself is based. The Russian conquerors of Siberia moved along the "edge" of the northern taiga forests bordering the steppe (or forest-steppe), settling on the lands most suitable for habitation and agriculture. From Chelyabinsk to Baikal, this landscape sector is a tapering wedge. And from Baikal to the Pacific coast it is a continuous zone of northern forests, gradually and imperceptibly turning into tropical forests. At the same time, the percentage of highlands and mountain ranges increases.

This zone from Lake Baikal to the mouth of the Amur again returns to the Lenaland problem, which already arose when we were dismantling the Yakut sector of the northern trapezoid.

3.3 Positional battle for Lenaland

As in the case of Yakutia (when analyzing the geopolitics of the Russian North), when approaching Eastern Siberia, stretching east of the Yenisei, we are faced with a number of geopolitical problems. Looking ahead, we note that for the third time we will face difficulties even when we come to the analysis of the easternmost sector of the "Eurasian South".

Already from a purely geographical point of view, behind Lake Baikal, a serious change in the relief begins in comparison with all more western sectors of Eurasia. There, between the continental forests in the north and tropical (mountain) forests in the south, there were necessarily steppe zones, which created a natural symmetry, with the allocation of the central region, the first (steppe) peripheral circle and border reliefs of tropical forests and mountains. This picture persists from Moldova to Altai, to the north, the steppe layer simply disappears. In the case of Eastern Siberia, we are dealing with a completely new geopolitical and landscape region that requires different positional solutions. Parallel to the unexpected landscape "challenge" (smooth transition of continental forests to tropical forests against the background of mountains, hills and hills) reveals an extremely unfortunate ethnopolitical picture of the presence in the region of several internal and external national formations, whose geopolitical loyalty to Russia is not so obvious. Against the background of the extremely weak population of the entire Lenaland region by Russians, the geopolitical picture becomes extremely alarming.

First, the territory of Buryatia. It breaks the continuity of the Russian Siberian belt proper, protruding far to the north from Lake Baikal. Buryats are Lamaists, and at critical moments in Russian history they tried to establish an independent theocratic state on their territory, oriented towards Mongolia and Tibet. In itself, this still does not give grounds for concern, but a new problem arises here: the territorial proximity of the southern borders of Yakutia to the northern borders of Buryatia. The Yakuts belong to the Turkic group, are significantly Christianized, but they often preserve ancient shamanic traditions. At the same time, some groups also profess Lamaism. Given the access of Yakutia to the sea and the border of Buryatia with Mongolia, all this represents

there is a danger of the emergence of a potential geopolitical bloc, which would have more prerequisites for relative geopolitical independence than Tatarstan or some of the North Caucasian peoples, whose separatism is obvious. If we add to this the proximity of the Pacific coast, which is extremely sparsely populated by the Russians, then the danger is doubled due to the possible control of the thalassocracy over coastal zones (or sectors of zones, potential corridors from Lenaland'a to the Pacific Ocean). And finally, the matter is further aggravated by the fact that a rather thin strip of the Amur Region separates the south of Yakutia from the northeastern border of China, which gives grounds for opening a direct geopolitical corridor from the southern Chinese shores of the Indian Ocean to the Laptev Sea in the North.

All these potential geopolitical configurations are extremely alarming. There is no doubt that such a picture cannot but seem extremely tempting to Atlanticist strategists, since Lenaland, the richest in land, resources and unique in terms of strategic opportunities, finds itself in a very vulnerable geopolitical point of view, position, and any weakening of Russian control over this region can immediately cause the irreversible rejection of a giant piece of the Eurasian continent from the very geographical axis of history. To prevent these events, it is not enough just to strengthen the military contingent located in the Far East or in the Amur region. It is necessary to take large-scale geopolitical steps, since this is nothing less than a potential positional war. What you should pay special attention to:

- 1) It is important to strengthen the strategic presence of representatives of the Center in the south of Yakutia. This is achieved through directed migration and systematic "colonization" of lands by peoples from more western regions.
- 2) The same should be done with the lands lying to the north of Lake Baikal. In this case, dangerous boundaries will be pushed apart.
- 3) At the same time, it is necessary to intensively develop the north of the Irkutsk region and the entire Amur region, implementing a plan for the purposeful "colonization" of these territories.

These three measures need to be backed up by an increased military presence in the designated zone and an intensification of strategic, economic and technological expansion to the west and east. All this is intended to smooth out the dangerous narrowing of the "Russian belt".

- 4) It is necessary to intensify positional pressure on northeastern China, to take preventive pressure on this area, which would initially prevent any geopolitical inclinations of China towards northern expansion.
- 5) It is necessary to strengthen as much as possible demographically and strategically the sector located between the cities of Blagoveshchensk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Khabarovsk, in order to create a massive shield here from potential thalassocratic (from the sea) or Chinese (from land) geopolitical aggression.
- 6) It is important to back all these measures by maximizing the intensification of Russian-Mongolian relations, since the barren and otherwise unattractive Mongolia for the geopolitics of this region is a key and most important territory. Massive Russian military presence along the entire Mongolian-China

border, and especially on its eastern part, would minimize the geopolitical risk of rejection of Lenaland.

Let us recall that the geopolitics of the North intended to concentrate special efforts in the same sector only from the north, from the coast of the Arctic Ocean. The combination of both geopolitical strategies and their parallel implementation will allow Russia to lay a positional foundation for the distant future, when the importance of these lands will be so obvious that the planetary significance of Eurasia as a whole will depend on control over them.

The geopolitical battle for Lenaland should begin now, although widespread attention will be drawn to the region at a later date. But if you do not lay down the correct geopolitical and strategic model in the first place, it will be much more difficult to resolve the conflict after it starts, and maybe it will turn out to be impracticable.

In geopolitics, major battles are won long before they turn into an open form of political or international conflict.

3.4 Capital of Siberia

The Siberian integration project raises the question of the geographic center of this process, i.e. about the point that could become the plenipotentiary representative of Moscow beyond the Urals and serve as an attraction for all other regions. Novosibirsk is most suitable for this role, which is not only the largest city in all of Siberia, but also the most important intellectual center of the all-Russian scale.

From Novosibirsk, the western axis goes to Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals, and the eastern axis goes to Irkutsk, then Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Thus, the most important function of communication of the entire "Russian belt of Siberia," in which it is the main link, falls on Novosibirsk. Axis Moscow Novosibirsk is becoming the most important power line of the "internal geopolitics" of Russia, the main "ray" along which the reciprocal process of exchange of centrifugal energy flows from the Center and centripetal from the periphery is carried out.

It makes sense to close the Ural region with the center in Yekaterinburg directly to Moscow, and not make it an intermediate instance in communication between the central part of Russia and Siberia. The geopolitical position of Novosibirsk is so important that this city and the regions adjacent to it should have a special status and special powers, since it is from here that secondary geopolitical rays should diverge throughout Siberia to the north, south, east and west.

It makes sense to make an exception from such secondary centralization only for the Primorsky Territory and the southern sectors of the Khabarovsk Territory. This is a very special area, tightly connected with Lenaland issues and the positional struggle for control over it. In this regard, special status should be granted to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and they should be directly linked to Moscow (like Yekaterinburg).

It is convenient to organize additional strategic axes Novosibirsk Norilsk and Khabarovsk Magadan to interact with the "northern trapezium". Thus, the East will be strategically linked to the North.

The East, like the North, is a springboard for the geopolitics of the future. Here lies the fate of Eurasia. At the same time, the favorable climate of "Russian Siberia" makes it more predisposed to start the grandiose project of creating a new continental model from here. New cities and highways should be built here, new lands and deposits should be developed and new military bases created. At the same time, it is important to initially lay in the project a harmonious combination of the two principles of relief, landscape, ethnocultural factor, and finally, ecology, on the one hand, and technical and strategic criteria, on the other. Archaic traditions should be combined with the latest technological developments. It is necessary to take into account the places of the most ancient human settlements in these lands and correlate with them the choice for the development of industries and military bases.

This logic leads to the open prospect of the emergence of a new center in Siberia, which has not yet been manifested or conceived. And with the development of the entire Russian East, with the actualization of the Pacific Ocean as the "ocean of the future", it is possible that the question will arise of transferring the capital of all Eurasia to these lands, to the unprecedented and not yet existing brilliant capital of the New Millennium.

The time will come when Moscow will lose its "middle" significance, become insufficient in the geopolitical sense, too "western". And then the question of the New Capital in Siberia will receive not just a nationwide, but a general continental, global significance.

However, it should not be overlooked for a moment that such a prospect is only possible if the positional struggle for Lenaland is won, without which the geopolitical revival of Eurasia is unthinkable.

Chapter 4. New geopolitical order of the South

4.1 The "new geopolitical order" of the South

The geopolitics of the southern regions (as well as the western ones) is connected with the planetary mission of Russia-Eurasia to an even greater extent than the problems of the North and the East. If even when considering the North and East, geopolitically belonging to the internal Russian territories, the foreign policy factor arose constantly, then in the case of analyzing the problems of the South (as well as the West), it simply does not make sense to talk only about the "internal geopolitics" of Russia, since all internal Russian realities so connected here with foreign policy that their separation is simply impossible without completely violating the severity of the overall geopolitical picture.

With regard to the South, the "geographical axis of history" has only one imperative - geopolitical expansion all the way to the shores of the Indian Ocean. This means the centrality and uniqueness of meridian development, the unambiguous dominance of the North - South axis. From a geopolitical point of view, the entire space separating Russian territory from the southern coastline of Eurasia is a strip whose area must be reduced to zero. The very existence of a rimland, which is not a line but a stripe, is an expression of a thalassocratic influence that is opposite to the basic impulse of continental integration. If the rimland of Eurasia in the north and east of Russia is reduced to zero volume, and the continent here is geopolitically complete (the only thing that remains is to maintain the positional status quo, anticipating the possibility of the line becoming a strip under the influence of the thalassocratic impulse), the rimland in the south (and west) is an open problem. In the east and north of Russia, rimland has an actual line, but a potential line, and in the south and west, on the contrary, a current line, but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall "offensive" strategy. but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall "offensive" strategy. but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of the state of affairs and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, an overall "offensive" strategy.

In the South of all Eurasia, Russia must establish a "new geopolitical order" based on the principle of general continental integration. Therefore, all the established political formations of the South, Islamic countries, India, China, Indochina, should be considered as a theater of continental positional maneuvers, whose ultimate task is to strategically rigidly connect all these intermediate regions with the Eurasian Center with Moscow.

This gives rise to the concept of "open rays" going from the Center to the periphery, which do not stop at the Russian borders proper, but must be drawn all the way to the southern ocean coast. Those segments of "rays" that fall on Russian territories are relevant, for those countries that are strategically in solidarity with Russia, are semi-relevant, and for those states that follow their own geopolitical path or (in the worst case) are included in the zone of direct Atlanticist control. nym. The general logic of Eurasian geopolitics in this direction boils down to making the entire length of the rays actual or semi-actual.

On this basis, the entire coast of the Eurasian continent from Anatolia to Korea should be viewed as a potential "Russian South".

4.2 Zones and mountain-boundaries

The imperative of geopolitical expansion in the southern direction also predetermines the structure of the composition of those regions that are included in the administrative borders of Russia or in the states allied with Russia (CIS). Therefore, the analysis of the periphery of actual and semi-actual geopolitical rays should not for a moment be distracted from the initial trend dictated by the laws of geopolitics.

The "Russian South", in a more limited sense, are the following zones:

- 1) North of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria;
- 2) Moldova and South and East Ukraine;
- 3) Rostov region and Krasnodar region (port of Novorossiysk);
- 4) the Caucasus;
- 5) Eastern and northern coast of the Caspian Sea (territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);
- 6) Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
- 7) Mongolia.

Continental strategic control has been established over these zones. But all of them should be viewed as bases for further geopolitical expansion to the south, and not as "eternal" borders of Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the presence of coastal strips not controlled by the heartland is a constant threat to the reduction of even those territories that are currently quite tightly connected to the Center of Eurasia. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent political entities based on the former Soviet republics provide an impressive example of how the refusal to expand outward to the southern shores of the continent (the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan) inevitably entails a rollback of Moscow's reliable borders far to the north, deep into the continent. But the weakening of the continental presence never creates a vacuum or an increase in the sovereignty of the "liberated" territories, since their provincial status deliberately excludes their geopolitical autarchy. The tellurocratic influence of Moscow is automatically replaced by the thalassocratic influence of Atlanticism (in one form or another).

Consequently, the structure of the entire inner belt of the "Russian South" should initially be viewed as a potential offensive bridgehead.

However, the matter is complicated by the fact that practically all border territories are in mountainous (often high-mountainous) areas.

In the north of the Balkan Peninsula, these are the Balkan Mountains, east of the Caucasus, then the Kopetdag and Hindu Kush ridge, then the Pamir, Tien Shan, Altai. The mountainous relief of the southern border of Russia-Eurasia, which largely predetermined the entire history of the East, is currently one of the most important geopolitical trump cards of Atlanticism. The ancient Indo-Europeans divided the entire Eurasian East into two components of northern Turan

(everything above the Eurasian ridge) and southern Iran (lying below this ridge). In fact, this division strictly corresponds to the modern geopolitical terms heartland (Turan) and rimland (Iran). Several millennia later, the southern front of Russia poses the same geopolitical problem that was characteristic of the dialectic of the relations "steppe nomads against the settled farmers of Persia."

But in this case, the situation radically changed in the sense that a settled Slavic northern Forest was added to the steppe Turan, balancing and fixing the dynamics of the Turanian nomads. The sedentary Indo-Europeans (Slavs) closed the steppe from the north with cultural forms, in many respects repeating the archetypes of the Iranian south. Russia as Eurasia, as a synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, is qualitatively superior to Turan, and therefore the problem of Iran (wider than non-Russian Central Asia) acquires a different civilizational and geopolitical meaning. This is especially evident since the moment of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which radically broke with the atlantist thalassocratic politics of the shah's regime.

All these geopolitical aspects suggest the need for a radically new approach to the problem of the "Eurasian mountains", which should lose the function of a strategic border, become not an obstacle on the path of continental integration, but a bridge to it.

The need to change the function of the mountains in southern Russia (and its strategic area) is a pillar of the future Eurasian geopolitics. Without such a preliminary operation, Eurasia will never achieve real world domination, moreover, it will never even come close to a genuine equal dialogue with thalassocracy.

4.3 Balkans

Since most of the southern lands of Russia and its strategic area fall on lands that are racially, culturally and religiously different from the civilization of the Russians (except for the Balkans and Ukraine), then geopolitically the axes should be strictly meridian. Hence the conclusion: one should promote all vertical (longitudinal) integration processes and prevent all horizontal (latitudinal) ones, i.e. in a sphere that is ethnically and politically different from the actual Russian spaces, the principle should be applied directly opposite principle, dominant in conditions ethno-cultural uniformity.

We outline the main forms of geopolitical structure "Russian South" (in a wide sense), taking turns examining all local geopolitical systems from west to east.

Balkan Peninsula. There are four special areas here:

- a) Bosnian-Croatian (the most western and Atlantic oriented, pure rimland);
- b) Serbian (located to the east and clearly Eurasian-oriented);
- c) Bulgarian (even more eastern, with elements of the "Levantine version rimland", this model is most clearly represented by Turkey and the continental Eurasian synthesis);

d) Greek (Orthodox, but part of the Atlantic bloc).

The "new geopolitical order" (continental and Eurasian) in this area (as elsewhere) is based on encouraging all integration processes along the North – South axis. This means that we should maximize the strengthening of ties between Belgrade Athens and Sofia Athens. Since the entire Balkan region is a mosaic and extremely complex configuration, the project of an all-Slavic southern federation consisting of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbian Bosnia, which would be a theoretically ideal solution, is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. Moreover, it presupposes a dangerous process of latitudinal integration, which in such ethnically complex regions is always problematic. Let us recall, for example, the fierce Balkan wars of the beginning of the century between the Orthodox states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and the constantly arising problem of Macedonia, which is a "bone of contention" within the potentially continental and Eurasian Orthodox powers. Therefore, the example of the medieval Serbian "empire" of Nemanjić can be taken as a positive geopolitical paradigm. Moreover, all the significant successes of Greece in global geopolitical projects (in particular, the conquests of Alexander the Great) were fed by the energies coming from the north of the Balkans, the Macedonian dynasty, and earlier the Dorian type of Indo-European Sparta. Within the framework of the small model of the entire Balkan Peninsula, the Serbs (and, in part, the Bulgarians) represent a Eurasian impulse, act as carriers of the idea of a heartland. Situated to the south, Greece is geopolitically stretched between this northern continental impulse and a strong historical identity with rimland.

intracontinental impulses, which could be based on confessional closeness with Orthodox Russia.

If in the long run one can imagine a common Balkan Federation, Eurasianically oriented, then the geopolitical program at least can be formulated as the creation of an irregular rhombus Sofia Moscow Belgrade Athens (and again Sofia), in which two rays, Russian-Serbian and Russian-Bulgarian, emanate from the Center. and they converge in Athens. At the same time, the issue of Macedonia could be resolved by granting it a special status in order to remove the stumbling block between all three Orthodox Balkan and potentially Eurasian (to varying degrees) states. This logically follows Moscow's vital interest in the Macedonian problem.

If you look at the whole picture from the opposite point of view, from the position of the Atlantists, it will immediately become obvious that it is important for the thalassocracy to give all geopolitical processes exactly the opposite character.

First, it is important for the "sea power" to support the pro-Atlantic forces in the north of the Balkans (Croats and Muslims), and in addition, to tear Serbia and Bulgaria away from the geopolitical union with Greece. For this, it is most convenient to use Macedonia, which can destroy all continental projects in this region. And if Turkey is connected to the Bulgarian problem, i.e. contribute to the improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian relations to the detriment of the Bulgarian-Russian, then the entire Eurasian continental policy will fail here. This should be taken into account by the geopoliticians of Eurasia.

4.4 The problem of sovereign Ukraine

Next comes the Ukrainian question. The sovereignty of Ukraine is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it can easily provoke an armed conflict. Without the Black Sea coast from Izmail to Kerch, Russia gets such an extended coastal strip, really controlled by someone unknown, that its very existence as a normal and independent state is called into question. The Black Sea does not replace access to the "warm seas" and its geopolitical significance drops sharply due to the stable Atlanticist control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but at least it makes it possible to secure the central regions from the potential expansion of Turkish influence, being extremely convenient, reliable and an inexpensive border.

Ukraine, as an independent state with some kind of territorial ambitions, poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia, and without a solution to the Ukrainian problem, it is pointless to talk about continental geopolitics at all. This does not mean that the cultural, linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited, and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to some extent, was the case in the tsarist empire or under the USSR). But strategically, Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow in the south and west (although more details about possible models of restructuring will be discussed in the chapter on the West).

The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow along its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhazian territories. It is possible to divide this entire zone on an ethno-cultural basis as much as you like, granting ethnic and confessional autonomy to the Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc., but all this only with absolute control of Moscow over the military and political situation. These sectors must be radically divorced from the thalassocratic influence coming from the west and from Turkey (or even Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea should be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow.

4.5 Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea

The Caucasus itself consists of two geopolitical levels: the North Caucasus and the territory of the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The entire region of Russian lands from Taganrog to Astrakhan adjoins this sector, i.e. all Russian lands located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, which also includes a wedge of Kalmykia.

This entire region is an extremely important strategic junction, since the peoples inhabiting it have enormous social dynamics, ancient geopolitical traditions, and it itself directly borders on Atlanticist Turkey, strategically controlling, for its part, the border zone, which, from the point in terms of relief, belongs to a single space of the Caucasus mountain range.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of the Russian geopolitical space, and it is no coincidence that these territories have traditionally been the arena of brutal military operations.

between Russia-heartland and rimland countries Turkey and Iran. Control over the Caucasus opens, as a first approximation, access to the "warm seas", and every (even the most insignificant) movement of the border to the south (or north) means a significant gain (or loss) of the entire continental power, tellurocracy.

Three horizontal strata of this entire region - Russian lands, the North Caucasus as part of Russia and the Caucasus proper - also have their potential continuation even further south. This additional, purely potential belt, located beyond the borders of not only Russia, but also the CIS, consists of South Azerbaijan (located on the territory of Iran) and the northern regions of Turkey, which are largely inhabited by Kurds and Armenians. This entire region presents the same ethno-cultural problem for Turkey and Iran as the Caucasian ethnic groups that are (or were) part of Russia. Consequently, there are all objective prerequisites for the expansion of continental influence deep into the Caucasian area.

So, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, four levels or strata are distinguished, suggesting a differentiated approach from the side of the Center.

The first layer, the Russian one, should be maximally connected in latitudinal orientation, creating a rigid structure Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan. This is the most important link in the Russian space as a whole, since to the north it rests on the central part of Russia, and even further north on Arkhangelsk, the most important northern port and the potential capital of the "northern trapezium". Due to the relatively close distances from the Central European part and due to the demographically dense population and technical development, the Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan triangle is the most important outpost of Russia in the South. This is a kind of replacement for the Eurasian Center itself, a secondary center connected by a continuous territory with deep spaces. That is why this region should become the geopolitical core of the entire Caucasian strategy of Eurasia, and for this it should be strengthened technologically, strategically and intellectually. It is desirable to create a special cohesive Russian zone here, administratively and politically integrated.

At the same time, some problems arise with the northern regions of Kalmykia, which, however, are rather poorly populated. It makes sense to include these northern steppe regions into a common integration belt, geopolitically "stretching" them directly between Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan in order to close the triangle from below with the top in Volgograd. Thus, geographically and geopolitically, the borders of ancient Khazaria, which controlled this entire region at the beginning of the first millennium, will be reproduced. You can conditionally call this geopolitical formation the "Khazar triangle".

In the transition from the purely Russian zone of the "Khazar triangle", which should follow a latitudinal (horizontal) logic, although closely connected with the north and with the Center itself (Moscow), the vector of integration radically changes its character. The entire North Caucasus and everything that lies to the south of it must obey exclusively the meridian orientation. The strategic centers of the "Khazar triangle" should develop independent geopolitical chains, deploying strictly to the south. From Rostov through Krasnodar to Maikop, Sukhumi and Batumi. From Stavropol to Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze, Tskhinval and Tbilisi. From Astrakhan to Makhachkala.

Any latitudinal delimitation of ethnic regions of the Transcaucasus should be supported, while longitudinal integration, on the contrary, should be strengthened. So, it is important by any means to tear off the active separatist Chechnya from Dagestan (and Ingushetia), closing the access to the Caspian Sea.

If we leave Chechnya only Georgia, which lies in the south, then it will be geopolitically controlled from all sides, and it will be possible to control it also from the Orthodox Georgia. Dagestan and Ingushetia should also be tied to Georgia, in part, which could lead to the creation of an autonomous North Caucasian zone, economically developed, but strategically fully controlled by Russia and Eurasianically oriented. A general redistribution of the North Caucasus could also solve the Ossetian problem, since new ethnic formations (for example, united Ossetia) would lose the meaning of national-state formations, acquiring a purely ethnic and cultural, linguistic and religious meaning. Following the same meridian logic, it is important to link Abkhazia directly with Russia.

All these steps are aimed at one geopolitical goal of strengthening the Eurasian tellurocratic complex and preparing its planetary triumph in a duel with Atlanticism. Therefore, this whole plan can be called "the new geopolitical order in the Caucasus." It presupposes a rejection of the traditional approach to existing political entities as "nation-states", i.e. strictly fixed administrative formations with constant boundaries and a complete power structure. The "new geopolitical order in the Caucasus" presupposes a complete redistribution of the currently existing political realities and the transition from the model of state-state or nation-nation relations to a purely geopolitical system Center-periphery, and the structure of the periphery should be determined not by political, but by ethno-cultural differentiation.

This can be done through a plan to create a "Caucasian Federation", which would include both the three Caucasian republics of the CIS and internal Russian autonomous formations. At the same time, the center would yield to the entire region of cultural and economic autarky, but would ensure the most severe strategic centralism. This would lead to an extremely flexible system that would be based not on violence, occupation or uniformization of the Caucasian diversity, but on the awareness of the unity and commonality of the continental destiny.

Armenia, which is Russia's traditional and reliable ally in the Caucasus, plays a special geopolitical role. Armenia serves as the most important strategic base for preventing Turkish expansion to the north and east into the regions of the Central Asian Turkic world. And on the contrary, in the offensive geopolitical aspect, it is important as an ethnocultural community, continuously continuing to the south, to the territory of Turkey, where a significant part of ancient Armenia and its main shrine is Mount Ararat. Racial and linguistic kinship ties Armenians to Kurds, another major ethnic factor that can be used to provoke geopolitical upheavals within Turkey. At the same time, it is extremely important to create a land corridor crossing the entire Caucasus and reliably connecting Armenia with the "Khazar triangle".

Armenia is important in another sense as well. Based on the historical and ethnic closeness with Iran, it is Armenia that could serve as one of the most important links for the spread of the Eurasian impulse from the Center to the Iranian rimland. This means the creation of the Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran axis.

Azerbaijan should also be tied to Iran (and by no means to Turkey), accentuating Shiism, ethnic affinity with Iranian South Azerbaijan and historical ties. Thus, the most important strategic beam Moscow Tehran through Yerevan would be duplicated by the beam Moscow Baku Tehran, forming a rhombus, in many respects

symmetrical to the Balkan rhombus. In general, there are many geopolitical parallels between the Balkans and the Caucasus. And the most important thing: it is here that the action of the most important geopolitical law is most clearly manifested; latitudinal processes provoke terrible conflicts, longitudinal ties lead to stability and stability. This is especially expressive in the Yugoslav war and in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh problem itself is somewhat similar to the problem of Macedonia. And therefore, in order to stabilize the entire region, Moscow should establish the most direct ties with Karabakh in order to make this territory a point of balance for the entire Caucasian geopolitical system. For this, the Karabakh negotiations should have four sides optimally: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Iran with the exclusion of all Atlanticist participants,

4.6 New geopolitical order in Central Asia

Central Asia is considered to be a huge piece of Eurasian land, stretching from the North Kazakh steppes to the coast of the Arabian Sea. From the former Soviet Central Asian republics, this zone, through the Kopet Dag and Pamir ridge, extends south to flat Iran and southeast to Afghanistan. Central Asia is the geopolitical space that, rather than anyone else, can lead the heartland to the cherished goal of the Indian Ocean. If Moscow managed to win a positional war with thalassocracy in this direction, many parallel issues would be automatically resolved: integration into the continental block of India, Iraq's strategic support against Turkey, a direct corridor to the Middle East, etc. All this makes this area central to the issue of geopolitical restructuring of the Eurasian South.

Note that Central Asia is divided by a ridge of mountains not only politically and geopolitically, but also racially. The former Soviet zone of Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) is inhabited by the Sunni Turks, the heirs of Turan, many of whom continue to predominantly engage in nomadism and animal husbandry. "Non-Soviet" Central Asia Iran, Afghanistan (and even ethno-culturally related Pakistan) is inhabited by sedentary Indo-Europeans. Thus, geopolitical unity has a distinct racial boundary.

This entire area is divided into three parts:

- 1) Central Kazakhstan (south of the 50th parallel, since the lands included in the "Russian East" are located to the north of it);

- 2) Desert Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and mountainous Kyrgyzstan

(these are purely Turanian lands);

- 3) Iran Afghanistan Pakistan India (this is Iran in the extended sense of "Ariana", "land of the Aryans").

The new Eurasian order in Central Asia is based on linking all these lands from north to south with a rigid geopolitical and strategic axis. At the same time, as always in such cases, it is important to structure the space exclusively in the meridian direction, contributing to the longitudinal convergence of individual regions.

Starting from the north, we are talking about the connection of the whole of Kazakhstan with the Russians in the South Urals and Western Siberia. This connection should serve as the supporting structure of the entire Central Asian area. The consistent and thoughtful integration of Kazakhstan into a common continental bloc with Russia is the basis of all continental politics. At the same time, the most important point is initially the task of rigidly interrupting any influence of Turkey on this region, preventing any projects of "Turanian" integration emanating from Atlanticist Turkey and proposing a purely latitudinal geopolitical development of the former "Soviet" Central Asia, opposed to the Indo-European North (Russia) and the Indo-European South (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India). Turanian integration is a direct antithesis of geopolitical Eurasianism and consists in the splitting of tellurocratic forces into three components: western (European Russia), eastern (Russian Southern Siberia and the Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). Such "Turanism" is intended to split the racial and geopolitical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe, which gave rise to both the Russian State and the Great Russian ethnos, and in relation to Iran and Afghanistan, it tears apart the religious unity of the Islamic world. Proceeding from this, heartland should declare a tough geopolitical positional war on Turkey and the bearers of "pan-Turanism" in which the Islamic Aryan Iran will be Russia's main ally. Central Asia should be "stretched" vertically between the two global Indo-European realities between the Russians and the Persians. At the same time, one should strive in every possible way to highlight local autonomist cultural tendencies throughout the Turkic space, to support regionalist forces in the autonomous regions, to aggravate tensions between clans, tribes, "ulus", etc. Everywhere in this area, one should try to close territories, districts, industrial complexes, economic cycles, strategic objects in the territory located outside the Turkic area, or in a strictly meridian direction. So, for example, Karakalpakstan in the west of Uzbekistan should be territorially integrated not in the eastern direction (Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent), but in the northern (Kazakhstan) and southern (Turkmenistan). On the same principle, the border areas between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Samarkand should be restructured, The Fergana Valley is historically and ethnically connected with the Tajik territories no less than with the Uzbek ones. The same is true for southern Kyrgyzstan.

Geopolitical hinge throughout Central Asian geopolitical strategy tellurocracy should be Tajikistan. This area combines the most important aspects of the whole Russian "Drang nach Süden", "dash to the South". Tajiks are Muslims of Indo-European origin, ethnically close to Iranians and Afghans. Those. they represent in this region a fragment of the "Iranian" world. At the same time, Tajikistan was part of Russia and the USSR, i.e. was integrated into the continental proper, Eurasian geopolitical system. Therefore, the fate of this small mountainous country, ancient Sogdiana, symbolizes the success (or failure) of establishing a new Eurasian order in Central Asia.

The de facto border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan should not be taken as a strict line. This is not a historical fact, but a geopolitical task, since in the interests of the heartland it would be generally to abolish any strict restrictions here, moving the strategic line far to the south, and rebuilding the entire intermediate region on the basis of ethnocultural, tribal and regional boundaries. Afghanistan does not have a tradition of a complete centralized statehood. It is inhabited by many nomadic and sedentary tribes (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.), connected more by religion (Islam) than by statehood and politics. Therefore, the geopolitical return of Russia to Afghanistan is inevitable and predetermined by the

geography. The only thing is that it is necessary to rely not so much on military power as on a well-thought-out geopolitical strategy, on the preparation of a conscious and voluntary strategic alliance on both sides, caused by the need for a common confrontation between the thalassocracy, the "forces of the West," Muslims. In this process, Tajikistan plays the role of the main base, and its territory becomes a geopolitical laboratory in which two oppositely directed impulses converge, the Islamic impulse of the Indo-European Eurasian South and the Russian geopolitical impulse coming from the heartland from the north. Here, in Tajikistan, in Dushanbe or in another city, a joint Russian-Islamic strategy for the reorganization of the more northern "Turan" should be worked out.

Thus, it is logical to draw another ray from the Eurasian Center: Moscow Dushanbe Kabul Tehran, along which an unprecedented geopolitical reality should develop.

Part of Tajikistan Gorno Badakhshan is located very close to Pakistan and India, which converge almost to the same point together with China (Xinjiang). Despite the fact that these zones are almost impassable, as they are located very high in the Pamir mountains, the Gorno-Badakhshan region itself has a deep geopolitical meaning. It is inhabited by the Ismailis, an Islamic heretical sect that is an expression of the most extreme Shi'ism, i.e. the most Indo-European (from a spiritual point of view) version of Islam. Badakhshani Ismailis are settled close to the regions of Pakistan, and this state (although officially Sunni) is ethnically Hindus converted to Islam. And this indicates that they, of course, are closer to Indo-European tendencies within the framework of this religion, if not frankly "Shiite", then "Cryptoshiite". Not so far away is Indian Kashmir, which is also inhabited by Hindu Muslims and Shaivists. Uighur Muslims also inhabit the Xinjiang region in China. Therefore, the religious specificity of Badakhshan and its strategic position makes it possible for the heartland to actively participate in solving the most important geopolitical problems that converge precisely in this area, the Pakistani-Indian wars, the potential Uyghur Islamic separatism in China, the national liberation struggle in Tibet, the Sikh movement in slightly more southern Punjab, etc. All the threads of this critical Asian knot converge in Tajikistan, or rather, in Badakhshan. Hence, an additional and independent axis Moscow Khorog (the capital of Badakhshan) suggests itself. Moreover,

This entire complex area should be restructured under the most active influence of the "geographic axis of history" of Russia on the basis of the tellurocratic model, i.e. contrary to the plans that the thalassocratic Atlantic elements have in this regard. It is known that it was England that supported the separatist movement of Indian Muslims, which led to the secession of Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani conflicts are also beneficial to the Atlanticists, as it allows them to strengthen their political and economic influence in both regions, taking advantage of geopolitical contradictions and

making the entire region dependent on the military-strategic presence of the Americans and the British. At the moment, Pakistan, India, and China are steadily part of the rimland controlled by the Thalassocrates. The geopolitical role of Tajikistan and Badakhshan is to radically change this state of affairs and organize a Eurasian system of continental integration throughout this space. At the same time, in the ideological sphere, it is extremely important to take into account the slightest ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic nuances, and in the military-strategic sphere, it is necessary to strive for rigid and uncontested centralism.

In a political sense, the anti-Americanism of fundamentalist Iran and the strict "neutrality" of India give serious grounds for the success of the Eurasian strategy. The rest depends on the geopolitical will of Moscow and, more broadly, Russia-Eurasia.

4.7 The Fall of China

China is Russia's most dangerous geopolitical neighbor in the South. In some ways, its role is similar to that of Turkey. But if Turkey is a member of NATO frankly, and its strategic Atlanticism is obvious, then with China everything is more complicated.

China's geopolitics was initially ambivalent. On the one hand, he belonged to the rimland, the "coastal zone" of the Pacific Ocean (on the eastern side), and on the other hand, he never became a thalassocracy and, on the contrary, always focused on continental archetypes. Therefore, there is a stable political tradition to call China the "Middle Empire", and this term characterizes just continental tellurocratic formations. At the same time, China is separated from the Indian Ocean by the Indochina Peninsula, on which an inflorescence of states with a frank thalassocratic orientation is located.

In the course of the development (colonization) of the East by the West, China gradually turned into a semi-colony with the marionette of the exact pro-English government of the last generations of the Qing dynasty emperors. From the beginning of the 19th century until 1949 (the victory of the CPC over the Kuomintang), China's geopolitics followed purely Atlanticist tendencies (while China acted not as an independent thalassocracy, but as a Eurasian coastal base of the West). The victory of the Communist Party changed the state of affairs, and China for a short time (1949-1958) reoriented to a Eurasian pro-Russian policy. However, due to historical traditions, the Eurasian line was soon abandoned, and China preferred "autarky". It remained to wait for the moment when the Eurasian orientation weakened so much that the potential Atlanticism and geopolitical identity of China as a rimland would become evident. This happened in the mid-1970s, when China began active negotiations with representatives of the Mondialist Trilateral Commission. This meant a new entry of China into the structure of Atlanticist geopolitics.

Without denying the possibility of China, under certain circumstances, to re-enter the path of the Eurasian Alliance, one should not particularly count on this. Purely pragmatically, contacts with the West are much more profitable for China than with Russia, which will not be able to contribute to the technological development of this country, and such "friendship" will only bind China's freedom of geopolitical manipulation in the Far East, Mongolia and Southern Siberia. In addition, the demographic growth of China poses the problem of "free territories" to this country, and the lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia (almost unoccupied) seem to be extremely attractive in this perspective.

China is dangerous for Russia for two reasons, as a geopolitical base of Atlanticism and in itself, as a country of increased demographic density in search of "no-man's spaces". In either case, heartland has in this case a positional threat, the location of which is extremely dangerous China occupies the lands located south of Lenaland.

In addition, China has a closed racial and cultural specificity, and in historically foreseeable periods it has never participated in the Eurasian continental building.

All these considerations, regardless of political specifics, make China a potential geopolitical adversary of Russia in the South and East. This should be recognized as a geopolitical axiom. Therefore, the geopolitical task of Russia in relation to the easternmost sector of its "inner" southern belt is to maximize its zone of influence to the south, creating the widest possible "border zone". In the future, Eurasia should extend its influence all the way to Indochina, but it is almost impossible to achieve this through a mutually beneficial union. And this is the fundamental difference between China and Islamic Asia (with the exception of Turkey) and India. If the Eurasian alliance with other southern sectors of Eurasia should be based on consideration of mutual interests, i.e. be the result of a conscious and voluntary union, based on the awareness of the commonality of the geopolitical mission, in the case of China we are talking about power positional geopolitical pressure, provocation of territorial disintegration, fragmentation, political and administrative redistribution of the state. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to cause harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to reveal the commonality of geopolitical goals.

It is now easy to deduce the priorities of Russia's "internal geopolitics" in the space from Badakhshan to Vladivostok.

The main model here is the separation of northern Thai territories from more southern lands. Geopolitical analysis immediately provides a strong basis for this. China's northwest lies in Xinjiang, an ancient country with a long history of political autonomy. Numerous states have historically existed here, replacing each other. Moreover, at the moment these lands are inhabited by the Uighurs of the Turkic ethnic group professing Islam. The Chinese maintain control in these areas through direct forceful pressure, direct colonization, oppressing the local population and suppressing all their attempts to defend religious and ethnic autonomy. The ideas of the annexation of Xinjiang to Russia already existed among the Russian emperors as part of the project for the development of Siberia. We should return to this line. South of Xinjiang stretches Kun-Lun and Tibet, where we again face a similar situation Tibet is a separate country with a special population, specific religion, ancient political and ethnic traditions. Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on outright violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in starting an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical because neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical because neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the tellurocracy belt. This will be the most positive geopolitical

decision and will create reliable protection for Russia even if China does not abandon its anti-Eurasian geopolitical projects. Without Xinjiang and Tibet, China's potential geopolitical breakthrough into Kazakhstan and Western Siberia becomes impossible. Moreover, not only the complete liberation of these territories from Chinese control, but even the first stages of destabilizing the situation in these regions will already be a strategic gain for Russia.

To the east is the Mongolian sector of Russia's strategic ally. Here it is important to act preemptively and to prevent the very possibility of an increase in the pro-Chinese factor in Mongolian politics. Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect South Siberia from China. At the same time, Mongolia's ties with Xinjiang and Tibet should be intensified in order to create the prerequisites for a new configuration of the entire region with an orientation towards the gradual ousting of China and its geopolitical influence. For this purpose, it is possible to put forward a project of the Mongol-Tibetan Federation, which could also include Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia and the Altai Republic. The unity of the Lamaist tradition of these peoples for Moscow is an important tool for the anti-Chinese geopolitical strategy.

The last zone of the southern belt is Manchuria, a territory located in northeastern China. And here we are faced with a weak (for China) geopolitical link. Ancient states with a tradition of political independence also existed on this territory. Already in the 20th century, Japan again recreated the Manchu state with its capital in Harbin, which was a continental foothold for Japan's invasion of China. For Russia, the existence in Manchuria of a special political state not controlled by China is highly desirable. Since Japan itself is one of the potential geopolitical allies of Eurasia, efforts could be combined in this matter.

Tibet Xinjiang Mongolia Manchuria together constitute the security belt of Russia. The main task in this region is to make these lands controlled by the heartland, using at the same time Russia's potential geopolitical allies India and Japan, as well as the local population suffering from the Beijing dictate. For China itself, this belt is a strategic foothold for a potential "dash to the North," to Kazakhstan and Siberia. These are lands adjacent to Lenaland from the south, around which a geopolitical positional confrontation of the leading world forces will inevitably unfold. Russia must tear this bridgehead away from China, throw China southward and offer it, as geopolitical compensation, the development along the North-South axis in the southern direction of Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia.

4.8 From the Balkans to Manchuria

Eurasia should "press" on the South throughout the entire space from the Balkan Peninsula to Northeastern China. This entire belt is a strategically important security zone for Russia. The peoples inhabiting different sectors of this space are different ethnically, religiously and culturally. But all of them, without exception, have elements that bring them closer to the geopolitical formula of heartland. For some, this is Orthodoxy, for others, historical belonging to a single state, for others, ethnic and racial closeness, for the fourth, a common enemy, for the fifth, a pragmatic calculation. This diversity of the South dictates the need for extremely flexible geopolitics and extremely developed argumentation justifying the need for

ties, alliances, etc. None of the criteria is a priority here, you cannot rely only on one of the factors ethnos, religion, race, history, profit, etc. In each case, you should act differently. The highest criterion in this case remains geopolitics and its laws, which should subordinate all other considerations, and not become only an instrument of foreign (or domestic) policy based on some separate and independent principles. Only in this case will Eurasia be able to achieve stability, and Russia will reliably ensure its continental security and fulfill its tellurocratic mission.

5.1 Two West

The problem of organizing space in the West of Eurasia is the theme that forms the basis of all geopolitics as a science. Western Europe is the rimland of Eurasia, and the rimland is the most complete, unambiguous and historically identifiable. In relation to Russia itself as a heartland, the West as a whole is the main planetary enemy that sector of "coastal civilization" that has fully assumed the function of a complete thalassocracy and has identified its historical fate with the sea. England was at the forefront of this process, but all other European countries that took up the baton of industrialization, technical development and the value standards of the "commercial system" also sooner or later entered this thalassocratic ensemble.

During the historical formation of the final geographical picture of the West primacy from the island of England passed to the continent especially to the USA. of America, thus, the NATO bloc became the maximum So in its strategic, embodiment of thalassocracy in ideological, economic and USA and controlled cultural aspects.

This ultimate geopolitical fixation of planetary forces places the pole of Atlanticism and thalassocracy across the Atlantic, on the American continent. Europe itself (even Western, including England itself) from the center of thalassocracy becomes a "buffer zone", "coastal belt", "strategic appendage" of the United States. Such a transfer of the thalassocratic axis across the ocean somewhat changes the geopolitical configuration. If a century ago Europe (England and France) was the main enemy of Russia, then after the Second World War this region lost its independent strategic importance, turning into a strategic colony of the United States. This transformation is strictly consistent with the "view from the sea", which characterizes the typically colonial attitude towards the mainland of any thalassocracy. Whereas previously the "coastal" nature of Europe was a potential characteristic, activated by a special geopolitical entity "the Isle of England", now this exactly corresponds to the current picture of the distribution of forces. The United States, a geopolitical reality that emerged from Europe as its almost artificial projection, has become a completely independent pole, the West in the absolute sense of the word, turning Europe from a metropolis into a colony. All this is in full accordance with the classical logic of thalassocratic geopolitics.

Thus, at present, the geopolitical problem of the planetary West, in the broadest sense, is breaking up for Russia into two components, the West as America and the West as Europe. From a geopolitical point of view, these two realities have different meanings. The West, like America, is a total geopolitical adversary of Russia, the pole of the opposite trend to Eurasia, the headquarters and center of Atlanticism. A positional geopolitical war with America has been and is the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics since the middle of the 20th century, when the role of the United States became apparent. In this regard, the position of the heartland is clear, it is necessary to oppose the Atlanticist geopolitics of the United States at all levels and in all regions of the earth, trying to weaken, demoralize, deceive and, ultimately, defeat the enemy as much as possible.

internal American reality, encouraging all kinds of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements, extremist, racist, sectarian groups, destabilizing the internal political processes in the United States. At the same time, it makes sense at the same time to support isolationist tendencies in American politics, the theses of those (often right-wing republican) circles that believe that the United States should confine itself to its internal problems. This state of affairs is highly beneficial for Russia, even if "isolationism" is carried out within the framework of the original version of the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. if the US limits its influence to two Americas. This does not mean that Eurasia should at the same time abandon the destabilization of the Latin American world, seeking to bring certain regions out of US control. All levels of geopolitical pressure on the United States should be involved simultaneously, just as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive decay up to complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive disintegration to the point of complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of regionalization of Russia, carrying out its progressive disintegration to the point of complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and reasonable. All this is the central task of Russia's "foreign geopolitics" relative to the United States, therefore a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

The second reality, also called the West, has a different meaning. This is Europe, the geopolitical meaning of which has changed dramatically over the past decades. Traditionally the metropolis for other parts of the planet, Europe for the first time found itself in the situation of a strategic, cultural, economic, political, etc. colony. American colonialism differs from the more explicit and harsh forms of the past, but its meaning remains the same. Europe at the moment does not have its own geopolitics and its own geographic will, its functions are limited to the fact that it serves as an auxiliary base for the United States in Eurasia and the site of the most probable conflict with Eurasia. This situation automatically leads to the fact that the anti-American line becomes a common geopolitical alternative to European states, uniting them in a single project, which never existed before. The unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as a whole and independent organism, claiming to regain its historical significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be either Russian or American. After the end of the Cold War, this will has manifested itself in full force.

Now the question arises: what, in general terms, is the attitude of Eurasia to its western peninsula?

From a purely geopolitical point of view, Eurasia is clearly interested in taking Europe out of the control of Atlanticism, the United States. This is a priority. In the West, Russia should have sea borders; this is a strategic imperative of the geopolitical development of Eurasia. It was the absence of such borders, the presence of a land line instead of them, crossing Europe in the middle, artificially and violently, that ultimately led to the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Therefore, the task is not to repeat mistakes and to correct the situation. Eurasia will only be free from Sea Power when its strategic borders in the North, East, South and West become oceans, just as in the case of America. Only then will the duel of civilizations proceed on equal terms.

Therefore, Russia has two options, either the military occupation of Europe, or such a reorganization of the European space that will make this geopolitical sector a reliable strategic ally of Moscow, while preserving its sovereignty, autonomy and autarky. The first option is so unrealistic that it should not be seriously discussed. The second option is difficult, but feasible, since half a century spent by Europe in the position of an American colony left a serious mark on the European consciousness.

A friendly Europe as a strategic ally of Russia can emerge only if it is united. Otherwise, the Atlantic adversary will find many ways to split and split the European bloc, provoking a conflict similar to the two world wars. Therefore, Moscow should contribute to the European unification as much as possible, especially by supporting the Central European states, first of all, Germany. The alliance between Germany and France, the Paris Berlin axis (de Gaulle's project), is the backbone around which it is most logical to build the body of New Europe. Germany and France have a strong anti-Atlanticist political tradition (both right-wing and left-wing political currents). Being for the time being potential and hidden, she will at some point declare herself loudly.

Moscow's task is to wrest Europe from the control of the United States (NATO), to promote its unification, to strengthen integration ties with Central Europe under the sign of the main foreign policy axis Moscow Berlin. Eurasia needs an allied friendly Europe. From a military point of view, it will not pose a serious threat on its own (without the United States) for a long time to come, and economic cooperation with neutral Europe will be able to solve most of the technological problems of Russia and Asia in exchange on resources and strategic military partnership.

Based on this external geopolitical tasks, should analyze and the internal political situation of Russia in its western regions.

5.2 Destroy the "cordon sanitaire"

The main formula for the analysis of the geopolitics of the "Russian West" is the principle: "European for Europe, Russian for Russia". Here, in general, one should act in the same way as in the case of the Islamic world, new borders are inevitable, some regions should be divided anew, but in all cases the main task is to create friendly-neutral formations in the West, with maximum ethnocultural, economic and social freedom. but with strategic dependence on Moscow. The task is to "finlandize" the whole of Europe at the most, but it is necessary to start with the reorganization of the spaces adjacent directly to Russia.

A complex problem immediately arises here: the "cordon sanitaire". Atlanticist geopoliticians are well aware of the strategic danger of an alliance between Russia and Europe (especially Germany) and traditionally seek to prevent this in every possible way. The most effective method of thalassocracy is the "cordon sanitaire", i.e. a strip of several border states hostile to both the eastern and western neighbors, and directly related to the Atlanticist pole. Poland and Eastern European countries traditionally act as such a "cordon sanitaire" located south of Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc. The idea of such a "cordon" was developed by geopolitician Mackinder and was very successfully implemented at the beginning

century and before the Second World War. Moreover, in both cases, the goal was achieved in the end, between the two continental powers, Russia and Germany, a conflict ensued, as a result of which strategic victories went to the Atlanticists. America owes its place at the head of the West precisely to two world wars that bled Europe and especially weakened Germany and Russia (the main rivals of Atlantism).

It is obvious that such a "cordon sanitaire" will arise even now, created from small, embittered, historically irresponsible peoples and states, with maniacal claims and servile dependence on the thalassocratic West.

We are talking about the emergence of a geopolitical strip between the Baltic and the Black Sea, consisting of states that cannot enter Europe as a full-fledged component, but are strenuously pushing away from Moscow and Eurasia. Applicants for members of the new "cordon sanitaire" are the Baltic peoples (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians), Poland (including West Prussia), Belarus (this idea is being lobbied by the Catholic anti-Eurasian minority), Ukraine (especially the Western Uniato-Catholic), Hungary, Romania (also influenced by the Uniates), Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the same time, it is clear that almost everywhere we are talking about the Catholic sector of Eastern Europe, which traditionally belonged to the zone of influence of the West. At the same time, we are dealing with the same countries that more than once in geopolitical history acted as levers of destruction of the continental formations of the Russian Empire,

The task of Eurasia is to prevent this cordon from existing. This is in the interests of both Europe and Russia. These formations themselves, if we consider them as state ones, are bankrupt, ethnically and confessionally contradictory, strategically and economically underdeveloped, deprived of resources. In other words, these fictitious states make sense only as strategic zones artificially supported by Atlanticism. Everywhere there are factors that tie them to Eurasia (either Orthodoxy, or the awareness of Slavic kinship, or the presence of a Russian population, or historical closeness, or several components at once, etc.), but there are also opposite factors that bring them closer to the West (Catholicism, Uniatism, ethnic otherness, political traditions of sovereignty, etc.). While these formations are something whole, they cannot prefer either of the two orientations, and that is why they become in the full sense of the word "cordon sanitaire". Integration with the East is hindered by some elements, integration with the West by others. Hence the constant internal and external instability provoked by these countries, which plays into the hands of thalassocracy and is a constant obstacle in the way of Eurasian geopolitics and the continental block.

The only way to eliminate the "cordon sanitaire" is to completely redistribute new state structures on the basis of purely geopolitical factors. This does not have to automatically mean the annexation of territories to other states. We can talk about the creation on the spot of states of federations or several states, whose geopolitical orientation will, however, be unambiguous. It will be easier for small formations, united both ethnically and culturally and confessionally, to integrate into large geopolitical blocs, and in the presence of strong allied relations between Russia and Europe, new borders will not mean a real threshold, a rupture. Moreover, only the absence of a "cordon sanitaire" can make these common Eurasian relations normal, turn the space from "Dublin to Vladivostok" into a zone of Eurasian cooperation,

5.3 Baltic Federation

Let us consider in more detail the entire western belt adjacent to Russia. The entire space is divided into several sectors. The Scandinavian belt, which runs from Norway to Finland, lies farthest to the north. With regard to Finland, we will discuss the general geopolitical project in the chapter on the North. Here we are talking about the creation of a Karelian-Finnish ethno-territorial entity with maximum cultural autonomy, but strategic integration into the Eurasian bloc. Norway and Sweden, as well as the Baltic republics, belong to a different geopolitical context, broader than the Karelian-Finnish issues.

Here we are faced with a more general theme of the geopolitics of the Baltic and Scandinavia. The most convenient thing in this case would be to follow the Swedish geopolitician Rudolf Kjellen (who invented the term "geopolitics") and consider the entire Baltic region as a northern extension of Central Europe, structured around Germany. Kjellen believed that Scandinavian geopolitics could not have any other development than a strategic union with Germany based on ethnic, cultural and geographic community. But the connecting element of the whole structure should be Prussia, the German state with the dominance of the Protestant denomination, common to the Scandinavians. The Protestant-Scandinavian bloc should be a northern extension of Prussia, Berlin. Therefore, all this space, having begun to realize itself as a single whole, cannot do without the geopolitical restoration of Prussian unity. At the moment, Prussia does not exist, its lands are distributed between Germany, Poland and Russia. Consequently, the most important prerequisite for the creation of a "neutral" politically and Moscow-friendly Baltic Federation is missing. Hence the practical impossibility of organizing this region in accordance with Eurasian principles.

On a purely theoretical level, the problem is solved in two stages:

- 1) A new ethno-confessional space is being recreated within the boundaries of historical Prussia. Moscow and Berlin are the initiators. From this follows the loyalty of the named axial figure in relation to Russia, which will give life to this formation, having ceded part of the Prussian lands acquired during the Second World War (the Kaliningrad region).

- 2) Around Prussia, the process of strategic unification of the Baltic states into a single bloc begins. The block includes Norway, Sweden, Germany, Estonia, Finland-Karelia, Denmark, possibly Holland. The special status is delegated to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. A prerequisite is the withdrawal of all countries from NATO and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Baltic. In the future, strategic control will be transferred to Moscow and the Armed Forces of "neutral" Europe, i.e. to the Eurasian defense complex.

The only weak elements in this system are Poland and Lithuania, where Catholicism is the predominant denomination. These lands were the main lever of thalassocratic geopolitics against Eurasia and the possibility of creating a continental bloc. Moreover, there is a precedent in history of significant political independence of the Polish-Lithuanian principality, and some historians (in particular, Spengler) even spoke about the existence of a special "Baltic civilization", geographically coinciding, in general terms, with historical borders

Poland and Lithuania. Only certain historical conditions did not allow this civilization to develop completely and made it "abortive" (Spengler's term). It must be admitted that this problem does not have a positive solution at all, since it is formulated as follows: either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle on the path of the pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with the axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocs, while it itself will be dismembered and crushed in the bud. Any integration on a Catholic basis in this region will create tension both in relation to the East (Moscow), and in relation to the North (Protestant world of Scandinavia), and in relation to the West (Germany). Hence,

Protestant, Orthodox religious circles, ethnic minorities. Moreover, ethnic tensions in Polish-Lithuanian relations are an extremely valuable element that should be exploited and, if possible, exacerbated.

If the re-creation of Prussia would solve, for the most part, the problems with Poland, which in such a situation would only have a path to the south (since the Baltic region would be under German-Russian control), then the situation with Lithuania is even more complicated, since it is the northernmost fragment of the Catholic world, it has a long coastline in the Baltic and separates the Russian space from the northern tip of Central Europe, not belonging to either world. Obviously, Atlanticist geopoliticians will not fail to take advantage of this circumstance and will try to make Lithuania the cause of discord and the main obstacle to the reorganization of Europe. It is possible to limit the negative consequences of Lithuania's geopolitical location for the Eurasian project only partially,

5.4 Catholics-Slavs enter Central Europe

Going down to the south, we find ourselves in the Slavic-Catholic or Uniate region, which stretches from Poland through Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Volhynia, Galicia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Croatia and Slovenia in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. This space is geopolitically adjacent to Hungary, Austria and Bavaria, inhabited by Catholics, Hungarians and Germans, respectively. The Uniate Church also exists in Orthodox Romania. This predominantly Slavic space, despite its ethnic and racial kinship with Russia, has never identified itself with the East Slavic statehood, and even less so with the Eurasian empire of Moscow. Ethnic kinship in this case is not a sufficient basis for geopolitical integration.

Culturally Slavic Catholic peoples formed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and ethnic tensions with it, which led to the disintegration, arose only when Vienna itself lost the idea of its supranational imperial geopolitical mission and became more and more identified with ethnic "Germanism" ... The only exception is only Bohemia, Moravia and Bosnia, where the Slavs were initially aware of their spiritual difference from the German-Catholic beginning, which was expressed in

the Hussite wars, reformation fermentations and outbursts of sectarianism (in the case of the Bosnian Bogomil Serbs). From a geopolitical point of view, all these peoples belong to Central Europe and should be structured around the Central European Center, which naturally is Germany. Direct impact on these areas of Moscow can never become a priority, since ethnic proximity only emphasizes cultural, historical and spiritual and confessional differences.

Based on these considerations, Russia needs to relinquish direct control over the countries of Eastern Europe, leaving them to German control. At the same time, Moscow should not only passively wait for this to happen by itself, but actively promote organic processes in this area in order to become, together with Berlin, the initiator and implementer of the entire process, thereby acquiring a geopolitical share in solving all delicate problems. At the same time, it will be necessary to abandon domination over some regions of Western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, densely populated by Uniates and Catholics. The same applies to some regions of Belarus. Refusing direct political domination over some territories, in return Moscow should receive the right of a strategic presence on the westernmost borders of the entire Central European region. This is the essence of the whole reorganization of Eastern Europe. Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning, having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon"). Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning, having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon"). Moscow should agree to provide the entire Catholic-Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone according to the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons that we have already mentioned, so that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West of thalassocracy, since otherwise this entire belt will acquire the opposite meaning, having turned into a "cordon sanitaire" (although it is created precisely to prevent the emergence of such a "cordon").

5.5 Unification of Belarus and Great Russia

The map, which takes into account the confessional structure of Eastern Europe, clearly shows how, as it moves south, the Orthodox population is shifting more and more to the west, crowding out the Catholic. Some Serbian lands reach the Adriatic coast, and in addition, there is a certain percentage of Orthodox Christians among the Albanians (the founder of independent Albania was the Orthodox priest Fan Noli).

These territories, which include Belarus, the central part of Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria, have a dual geopolitical nature; geographically, they belong to the southern sector of Central Europe, and culturally and confessionally to Russia-Eurasia. The spiritual identity of these peoples was formed from the opposition to Islam in the south and Catholicism in the west, their national idea is inseparably linked with Orthodoxy. In such a situation, Moscow can neither fully delegate geopolitical control over the region of Germany, nor declare its direct political influence on these countries. Moreover, not everything is going smoothly in Russian-Moldovan and Russian-Romanian relations (not to mention Ukraine). Russia has the closest historical contacts with Serbia, but it is impossible to build on them the tactics of integrating the entire region, since Serbia has traditionally rather strained relations with its Orthodox neighbors. In addition, we highlighted the general picture of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Balkans in the chapter on the South. Here it is necessary to more specifically consider the territories occupied by Belarus, Ukraine and Romania (with Moldova).

With regard to Belarus, the geopolitical picture is quite clear. With the exception of a small part of the Polonized Belarusians (Catholics and Uniates, as well as Poles), the overwhelming majority of the population definitely belongs to the Russian space and should be considered as a subject of the central Eurasian ethnos, i.e. as "Russians" in cultural, religious, ethnic and geopolitical senses. Linguistic specificity, some ethnic and cultural peculiarities do not change the overall picture. Therefore, Moscow should integrate with Belarus in the most close way, not forgetting that the promotion of the cultural and linguistic identity of Belarusians is an important positive moment in the entire system of Eurasian integration. In relation to ethnic groups belonging to a single state, this principle should be observed just as strictly, as in the case of border peoples or neighbors. The only painful step in Belarus that needs to be taken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category, up to granting them significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. which needs to be undertaken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category until they are given significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. which needs to be undertaken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies is the allocation of some areas densely populated by Catholics and Uniates into a special administrative category until they are given significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. densely populated by Catholics and Uniates until they were granted significant autonomy, sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties. densely populated by Catholics and Uniates until they were granted significant autonomy, sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire at all costs to keep Belarus as a whole under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that both in it and on the part of its western neighbors Russia will have the smoldering coals of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all interested parties.

Belarus should be viewed as a part of Russia, and therefore integration with it should be carried out along the West-East axis, which is a priority in all cases of the internal organization of an ethnically homogeneous space. The real western border of Russia should run much further to the west, therefore, in a full-fledged geopolitical picture, the Belarusian lands are more likely to belong to the central region than to the western outskirts.

5.6 Geopolitical decomposition of Ukraine

The question of Ukraine is more complicated, although the model of the geopolitical composition of this state is very similar. Here, however, an important role is played by the geopolitical scale of Ukraine, which is a gigantic territorial entity that exceeds in volume many major European powers. Separatism and the tendencies of political sovereignty are incomparably more active in Ukraine. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has neither a special cultural message of universal significance, nor geographical uniqueness, nor ethnicity. exclusivity. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name "Ukraine", i.e. "Outskirts", "border areas". In the era of Kievan Rus, the territories of present-day Ukraine were the center of statehood of the Eastern Slavs, for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts ("Ukraine"), and Novgorod was the northern. But as Russia turned from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the largest centers radically changed their meaning. Moscow became the capital of the empire, and Kiev turned into a secondary center where Eurasian and Central European influences converged. There could be no question of any synthesis of cultures. Most likely, the more archaic, purely Russian Orthodox strata were subjected to a dynamic more

The "modernist" impact of Western Europe, especially through Poland in the west and Austria-Hungary in the southwest. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian culture and language are peculiar and unique, but they lack any universal meaning. Cossack settlements, which formed, to a large extent, the Ukrainian ethnos, were distinguished by their independence, a special ethical, economic and social order. But all these

elements are not enough for geopolitical independence, and the Potamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc.) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

For this reason, the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its present-day borders) can only make sense as a "cordon sanitaire", since elements opposite in geopolitical orientation will not allow this country to fully join either the eastern or the western bloc, i.e. neither to Russia-Eurasia, nor to Central Europe. All this dooms Ukraine to a puppet existence and geopolitical service of a thalassocratic strategy in Europe. In this sense, the role of Ukraine is similar to the role of the Baltic republics. On this basis, at one time, the project of creating a "Black Sea-Baltic federation" was seriously discussed. a typical "cordon sanitaire" of a subversive geopolitical entity that serves to provoke instability in Eastern Europe and to prepare the prerequisites for a series of armed conflicts.

The further existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones, corresponding to the gamut of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities.

- 1) Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. This entire territory is undoubtedly close to Russia, culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously connected with it. This well-developed, technically advanced region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridian integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) of the Russian territories proper and the spread of the structure to the south.
- 2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity, traditionally characterized by ethnic mosaicism. Little Russians, Great Russians and Crimean Tatars settled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and represent three geopolitical impulses that are quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are oriented emphatically pro-Moscow (more aggressively than the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, on the contrary, are extremely nationalistic. In general, Crimean Tatars are oriented more towards Turkey and are rather hostile to Russia. Taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars is out of the question, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical adversary of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either. Direct annexation of Crimea to Russia will cause an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and create problems of integrating this peninsula into the Russian system through the Ukrainian territories, which is hardly realistic at all. Leaving Crimea to "sovereign Ukraine" is also impossible, since this creates a direct threat to Russia's geopolitical security and generates ethnic tension in Crimea itself. Taking into account all these considerations, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control of Moscow, but with

taking into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethnocultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.

- 3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another complete region, where the Little Russian ethnos and language dominate ethnically, but Orthodoxy is the predominant confession. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and certainly part of the Eurasian geopolitical system.
- 4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North it is Volyn, a separate region, south of the Lviv region (Galicia), even south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Bessarabia. All of these regions are fairly independent areas. Volyn is dominated by Uniates and Catholics; this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. The picture is almost the same in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southerly lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are inhabited by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians are interspersed with Romanians and Moldovans. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt, obliquely leaving from Great Russia to the Balkans to Serbia. The entire sector Bessarabia to Odessa follows Attributed to from the Central Ukrainian geopolitical space, so his it would be more logical to include in the meridian left-bank belt of the Dnieper, the western border of which stretches from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk along the North-South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.

Thus, Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of this concept, consists of three regions of Volyn and Galicia and Transcarpathia. Being geographically close, they differ in relief (Transcarpathia is a mountain range, like Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These regions, which today actively influence the general political atmosphere of Ukraine, actively pursuing an anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be granted a significant degree of autonomy (up to political) in order to tear these "subversive" territories from the Orthodox and generally pro-Russian all-Ukrainian space as a central one. and eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the location of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border. This strategic border should run much to the west, at least at the western tip of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the entire geopolitical

restructuring of this region, since, acting as the initiator of geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition of removing this entire region from under Atlanticist control and creating in this place a complex of the Eurasian continental defense, consisting of military-strategic cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole.

Volyn, Galicia and Transcarpathia can form a common "Western Ukrainian federation", the degree of integration within which can be set arbitrarily, depending on specific circumstances. Here, the most important thing is to draw a cultural and confessional border between Central Ukraine (actually

Kiev land) and Western Ukraine in order to avoid disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on Orthodox territories.

The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable point in the western belt of Russia. If in other places the danger of destroying the geopolitical consistency of the heartland is potential, and the positional struggle for the Eurasian geopolitical system sets itself only preventive goals, the fact of the existence of a "sovereign Ukraine" at the geopolitical level is Russia's declaration of a geopolitical war (and this is not so much Ukraine itself, how much Atlanticism and Sea Power). The point is not that Ukraine itself deliberately chooses the role of the Atlanticist "cordon sanitaire", although in some cases this cannot but be a deliberate step, but that in practice it begins to fulfill this role,

The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow. If the problems of the North and the "polar trapezium" are connected with the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are important for the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy of reorganizing the Asian South has an urgent but preventive value for Russia, the geopolitics of the West and the center of this geopolitics, the "Ukrainian question," requires Moscow to immediately respond, since it is a question of delivering a strategic strike to Russia already in the present, to which the "geographical axis of history" simply has no right not to respond.

Considering that simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not provide a stable geopolitical system, even if this happens despite all objective obstacles, Moscow should be actively involved in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian space according to the only logical and natural geopolitical model.

5.7 Romania and Moldova integration under what sign?

Romania and Moldavia are two parts of a single geopolitical region, inhabited by a single Orthodox ethnos, the descendants of the Dacians, who speak the language of the Latin group and have largely absorbed the cultural, linguistic and racial elements of the Slavic environment. From a geopolitical point of view, the integration of Romania and Moldova is inevitable, but at the same time Moscow should strive to carry out this unification for its own purposes in order to include this space in the zone of its direct strategic control. The culture of Romania is, on the whole, a typical Orthodox model, directly linking these lands with Eurasia. The only obstacle to the perfect integration of these lands into Russia is the language factor and geopolitical proximity to Catholic regions. Moreover,

Through Romania, Moldova and Central Ukraine, there is a continuous strip inhabited by Orthodox peoples, connecting the lands of Russia with Serbia, the outpost of Eurasia in the Balkans. It is in the interests of Eurasia to turn this entire region into a single strategic and cultural region, in fact, into one country. This requires Moscow to initiate the Moldovan-Romanian integration, the sign of which should initially be defined as Orthodox and Eurasian. At the same time, it is important that the Romanian Orthodox enclave from the east and from the west is closed by the Slavic Orthodox peoples, Ukrainians and Serbs, thus ensuring

continuity of territorial integration based not so much on ethnicity as on confessional and cultural kinship. At the same time, such an "Orthodox bloc" from the Dniester to Montenegro, in the center of which a united Romania should be located, should be formed in cooperation with Berlin, which is given the more western part of Central Europe from Prussia through the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Hungary and Austria, and then to Croatia, i.e. to the Adriatic. If we add to this the eastern protrusion of Poland and East Prussia, which goes to Germany to the north, then the natural continuation of Russia to the west in the Balkan region would be logical and acceptable, not violating the geopolitical balance of Central Europe, which geopolitically belongs to the sphere of influence of Germany.

5.8 Condition: soil, not blood

All these actions follow from the general picture of European geopolitics, in which the regions of Central Europe (under the auspices of Germany) and Western Europe in a narrow sense are clearly distinguished. Russia has no points of direct contact with Western Europe, so the implementation of the Eurasian strategy in this region (of which France is a key element) depends on the construction of a pan-European structure along the Berlin-Paris axis. But the Eurasian factor in Western Europe cannot be Moscow's line. Moscow comes out here only through Berlin, and the Eurasian continentalist and anti-Atlanticist tendencies are here described by one term "Germanophilia". For the French, one cannot demand a more distinct "Eurasianism" than "Germanophilia", since Western Europe comprehends the problems of heartland through German continentalism.

However, this does not mean that Russia should be indifferent to Western European problems. It is in its interests to withdraw the whole of Europe from under the Atlanticist influence, which means that Moscow should actively promote the alignment of Western Europe with Central Europe, i.e. to Germany.

At the same time, Germany itself should initially put forward a fundamental requirement: all integration processes in Central Europe, where Berlin's geopolitical domination is frank, as well as all transformations in Western Europe, aiming to orient the European powers towards Germany, should exclude the principle of ethnic domination of Germans in cultural, political, confessional or ideological area. Europe should be European, and Central Europe should be Central European, i.e. the entire linguistic, ethnic and spiritual identity of the peoples of Europe must flourish and be encouraged by Berlin, whose priority must be exclusively geopolitical and social, and by no means racial. Moscow is also responsible for many Central European ethnic groups due to racial kinship with them (Slavism). Moreover, it is ethnocentrism and national the racial arrogance of the Germans has more than once led to bloody conflicts in Europe. Throughout the entire geopolitical reorganization of Europe, Russia must act as a guarantor that Berlin will strictly separate geopolitics and race, "soil and blood" in order to knowingly rule out tragedies like Hitler's adventure. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages. Any signs of German nationalism in matters of the geopolitical reorganization of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must take place on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages.

Moscow must make the same demands on itself and on its allies. The ethnic origin should be encouraged and actively supported by the geopolitical center only in a positive aspect, as an affirmative reality, as national self-identification. Of course, one cannot expect the complete disappearance of interethnic tensions and the manifestation of negative aspects of national self-assertion, but it is precisely at this moment that the principle of geopolitical centralism should actively come into play as the supreme supra-ethnic arbiter, deciding internal problems, proceeding from the vital political and strategic interests of the Eurasian whole.

This principle is universal for all regions in which the New Eurasian Order should be established, both internal to Russia and external. But in the case of the West, Europe, this is especially important, since ethnic problems in these spaces are at the heart of all the most terrible conflicts that rocked the 20th century.

PART VI EURASIAN ANALYSIS

Chapter 1. Geopolitics of Orthodoxy

1.1 East and West Christian ecumene

The most essential point in determining the geopolitical specifics of Orthodoxy is that we are talking about the Eastern Church. Within the boundaries of the Christian world, before the discovery of America, which geographically coincided with the northwest of the Eurasian continent, the Middle East and North Africa, a demarcation line is clearly traced between the Orthodox space and the Catholic space. This division is certainly not a historical accident. The Orthodox world is spiritually and qualitatively related to the East, while Catholicism is a purely Western phenomenon. And if this is so, then the theological formulations themselves, which underlay the final division of the churches in 1054, must contain elements of a geopolitical nature.

The dispute about the "filioque", i.e. about the procession of the Holy Spirit only from the Father or from the Father and Son⁷⁷, in theological terms anticipates the future of Christian and post-Christian civilizations

individualistic Western and mystical-collectivist	development of two types
	rationalistic
	eastern. Adoption

In the West, amendments to the Nicene Creed with respect to the "filioque" finally consolidated the orientation towards the rationalistic theology of the so-called "subordinationism", that is to the introduction into the Divine reality of hierarchically subordinate relations that belittle the mysterious and superintelligent nature of the Trinity.

In parallel with the question of the "filioque", an important point of disagreement was the idea of the supremacy of the Roman throne and the highest theological authority of the Pope. This was also one of the consequences of the Catholic "subordination", which insists on a strict straightforward hierarchy even in those matters that are under the sign of the providential action of the Holy Spirit to save the world. This position completely contradicted the idea of linguistic autonomy of local Churches and, in general, the ultimate freedom in the field of spiritual realization, traditional for Orthodoxy.

And finally, the last most important aspect of the division of the churches into Eastern and Western was Rome's rejection of the patristic doctrine of the Empire, which is not just a secular administrative apparatus, rudely subordinate to the church authorities, as the popes wanted to present it, but a mysterious soteriological organism actively participating in the eschatological drama. as "an obstacle to the coming of the Antichrist", "catechon", "holding", as mentioned in the Second Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians.

The superintelligence of Divine action (the primacy of apophatic mystical theology), the spiritual and linguistic freedom of local churches (dating back to the glossolalia of the apostles on the day of Pentecost) and the doctrine of the sacred role of the Empire and emperors (the theory of Orthodox symphony) are the main points that determine the specifics

⁷⁷Let us recall that the Orthodox believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father (although it is expelled by the Son), while the Catholics maintain that from the Son, filioque in Latin means "and from the Son".

Orthodoxy, in contrast to Catholicism, in fact denies these aspects of Christianity.

All these differences are noticeable long before the final rupture, but it was possible to maintain a certain balance until 1054. From that moment on, the geopolitical dualism of the Christian ecumene was completely determined, and both the Orthodox and Catholic worlds went their own ways.

Until 1453 (the date of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks), the Orthodox Church was geopolitically identified with the fate of the Byzantine Empire. The world of Catholicism covered Western Europe. Until that time, Rome and Constantinople were two Christian "large spaces" (if expressed in geopolitical terminology) with their own geopolitical, political, economic and cultural interests, as well as with clearly fixed and unambiguous theological specificity, reflecting and predetermining the difference between churches from all intellectual dogmatic unambiguity and logical interconnection. The West was based on the rationalistic theology of Thomas Aquinas, the East continued the line of mystical theology, apophaticism and monastic cleverness,

Palamas versus Thomas Aquinas is a theological formula that reflects the essence of the geopolitical dualism of the Christian East and the Christian West. The mystical contemplation of the Tabor light, the symphony of the authorities and the liturgical glossolalia of the local churches (Orthodoxy) against rationalistic theology, papal diktat in worldly affairs of European kings and the domination of Latin as the only sacred liturgical language (Catholicism). There is a geopolitical confrontation between the two worlds, which have differently directed cultural orientation, psychological dominant and different, specific political structure.

This is the most general outline of the foundations of Orthodox geopolitics. Obviously, in such a situation, the main task of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church was to preserve their structure, protect the limits of their political and spiritual influence, and defend their independence. Moreover, Orthodoxy in such a situation had two main geopolitical opponents:

- 1) the non-Christian world, whose pressure was manifested both in the raids of the barbarians on the outskirts of the empire, and in the massive pressure of the Islamized Turks;
- 2) the Christian world of the West, considered not just as the land of "Latin heresy", but also as a world of apostasy, apostasy, as a country of people who knew the truth and salvation, but rejected them and betrayed them.

In such an initial and complete picture of the geopolitical place of Orthodoxy, it is very easy to discern all the geopolitical problems that will worry the Eastern Church and the Orthodox states for many centuries after the collapse of Byzantium. The Byzantine emperors at some point faced the double threat of "Turkish turban or Latin miter". Taking into account the peculiarity of theological attitude towards the West and Rome, it is easy to understand those Orthodox who made a choice in favor of the "Turkish turban" in those cases when the third was not given. By the way, many Orthodox Christians perceived the fall of Constantino Pole as God's punishment for the geopolitical step of Byzantium, which tried to get closer to Rome by adopting the "filioque" in the so-called.

"Union of Florence" (although this recognition was denounced upon the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople).

1.2 Post-Byzantine Orthodoxy

After the fall of Constantinople, the entire geopolitical picture changed dramatically. Despite the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the head of the Orthodox Church, the harmony of the entire structure was broken. Let us recall that one of the cornerstones of Orthodoxy was the doctrine of the soteriological function of the Empire, and since the Orthodox Empire (and, accordingly, the Orthodox Emperor, Basileus) no longer existed, the Church was forced to enter a new, special and rather paradoxical period. its existence. From that moment on, the entire Orthodox world is divided into two parts, which have deep differences not only from a geopolitical, but also from a theological point of view.

The first sector of the post-Byzantine Orthodox world is represented by those Churches that found themselves in the zone of political control of non-Orthodox states, especially in the Ottoman Empire. Until the collapse of this empire, these Churches were administratively included in the so-called. the Orthodox Millet, which included Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Arabs. The supreme figure among these Orthodox was considered the Patriarch of Constantinople, although along with him existed the Patriarch of Alexandria (the archpastor of Orthodox Greeks and Arabs living in Egypt) and the Patriarch of Antioch (the head of the Orthodox Arabs in the territory of modern Syria, Iraq and Lebanon). The small Jerusalem Patriarchate, as well as the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Mount Sinai, had a special status.⁷⁸The Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in the Phanar quarter, and from this word comes the collective name of the Greek clergy subordinate to this Patriarchate "Phanariots". Note that since 1453 this sector of the Orthodox world has been in an ambiguous position both at the geopolitical and theological levels, since the absence of Orthodox statehood directly affects the eschatological vision of Orthodox political history and means the Church's stay in the world as in a "sea of apostasy". where nothing prevents the mystical arrival of the "son of perdition". The inevitable rejection of the Orthodox symphony of powers turns the Greek Orthodox Church (and other churches associated with her political fate) into something other than what she was originally. It means, that its theological and geopolitical orientations are changing. Its sacred nature is also changing.

A clear understanding of the relationship between theology and politics in a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine forced Russia to embark on the path that it has been following since the 15th century, and which is closely connected with the theory of the "Moscow of the Third Rome." Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church is the second sector of post-Byzantine Eastern Christianity, which has a completely different geopolitical and even spiritual nature.

The establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia and the proclamation of Moscow as the "Third Rome" is directly related to the mystical fate of Orthodoxy as such. Russia after the fall

⁷⁸ Separately, we should consider the Georgian Orthodox Church, which has retained its relative independence from the Turks.

Constantinople remains the only geopolitical "large space" where both Orthodox politics and the Orthodox Church existed. Russia becomes the successor of Byzantium both for theological reasons and at the geopolitical level. Only here were preserved all three main parameters that made Orthodoxy what it was, in contrast to both the Latin West and the political domination of non-Christian regimes. Consequently, along with the mystical status of "an obstacle to the arrival of the son of perdition," Moscow inherited the entire completeness of the geopolitical problems of Constantinople. Just like Byzantium, Russia faced two hostile geopolitical realities with the same "Latin miter" and the same "Turkish turban". But in this case, all the fullness of historical responsibility fell on the Russian tsars, the Russian Church and the Russian people. The fact that this responsibility was transferred to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople endowed the whole situation with a special eschatological drama, which was reflected not only in the psychology of Russians in the last five centuries, but also in the specifics of the geopolitical orientation of the Russian state and the Russian Church. Parallel to this, the concept of the Russian people as a "god-bearer" was formed.

But at the same time, a new problem arose: relations with the Orthodox world outside of Russia and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople in relation to the Patriarch of Moscow. The fact is that the non-Russian Orthodox faced a dilemma: either to recognize Russia as the "ark of salvation," a new "Holy Land," a "catechon," and, accordingly, to submit to the spiritual authority of Moscow, or, on the contrary, to deny the possibility of the existence of an "Orthodox kingdom" as such and treat Moscow as an illegitimate usurpation of the Byzantine eschatological function. According to this choice, Moscow had to build its relations with the rest of the churches. We can say that, in fact, from that moment on, the Orthodox world was divided into two parts, differing both geopolitically and theologically. It is known that in the Constantinople sphere of influence the anti-Moscow line won, which means that the Phanariote clergy adapted the Orthodox doctrine to those conditions when there was no question of political projection. In other words, Greek Orthodoxy changed its nature, turning from an integral spiritual and political teaching into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople. into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople. into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between two versions of Orthodoxy, a full-fledged one, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced one, in the case of Constantinople.

Moreover, changes in the quality of Greek Orthodoxy brought it closer, in a sense, to the line of Rome, since one of the three main points of dogmatic contradictions (the question of "catechon") disappeared by itself. The spiritual rapprochement of the Phanariots with the Vatican was accompanied by their political rapprochement with the Turkish administration, in which many Orthodox Greeks traditionally held high positions. Such a bifurcated existence, coupled with rivalry with the Russian Church for influence over the Orthodox world, in fact, deprived Greek Orthodoxy of its independent geopolitical mission, made it only one of the secondary geopolitical factors in a more general non-Orthodox context of political intrigues of the Ottoman authorities and papal legates.

Be that as it may, since the 15th century the term "geopolitics of Orthodoxy" has become almost identical to the term "geopolitics of Russia."

At the same time, it would be wrong to view the entire non-Russian Orthodox world as controlled by the Phanariote policy. In various parts of it, there were

opposing sentiments, which recognized Orthodox Russia as theological and eschatological primacy. This was especially true of the Serbs, Albanians, Romanians and Bulgarians, in whom Russophile and Phanariot geopolitical tendencies traditionally competed. This was manifested with all its might in the 19th century, when the Orthodox peoples that were part of the Ottoman Empire made desperate attempts to restore their national and political independence.

1.3 Petersburg period

But between the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of the struggle for the independence of the Orthodox Balkan peoples, an event took place that is of great importance for Orthodoxy in the broadest sense. We are talking about the Russian schism and the immediately following reforms of Peter the Great. At that moment, a qualitative change in the status of Orthodoxy took place in Russia, and henceforth the dogmatic foundations of the Eastern Church, which had remained unshakable for about 200 years, were shaken. The fact is that the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg and the abolition of the Patriarchate together with the establishment of the Synod meant that Russia ceased to be a dogmatically legitimate Orthodox Empire in the theological and eschatological sense. In fact, a transition was made from a strictly Orthodox geopolitical model to a kind of Protestant state. From now on, Russian Orthodoxy has also turned into a kind of ambiguous reality, which only partially coincides at the geopolitical level with the Russian State. But although the dogmatic background was openly shaken, the general logic of Russian geopolitics continued the original line, albeit at a different level, since secular and purely political interests began to unambiguously dominate the religious and eschatological issues. In parallel, in the West itself, the traditional Catholic model also gave way to the strengthening of purely national-political formations, nation-states, so that theological problems there, too, were erased and faded into the background in the face of more practical, mercantile and narrowly political interests. However, the geopolitical alignment, predetermined dogmatically in the schism of the churches, remained in total the same,

Protestantism is geopolitically divided strictly into two sectors - Prussian Lutheranism and Anglo-Swiss-Dutch Calvinism. With the outward similarity and synchronicity of both outbursts of protest against Rome, Lutheranism and Calvinism have almost polar opposite meanings. The Lutheran camp, concentrated in the Prussian state, was founded both dogmatically and mystically on the criticism of the Vatican from the point of view of radicalization of the premises of the "New Testament", and in general terms this reproduced the traditional claims of Orthodoxy towards Catholicism. Lutheran Prussia was geographically located between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Western Europe. Calvinism, which became the state religion of England (and later greatly influenced the political system in the United States), was based, on the contrary, on the emphasized Old Testament approach and criticism of Rome from these positions. It is no coincidence that both geographically Calvinism and the sects following from it gravitated towards the extreme West both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic.

The post-Petrine Russia of the Romanovs was closer to the Prussian model, i.e. departing from Orthodox dogma proper, it stopped halfway to Catholicism, which, moreover, was gradually losing ground to the nation-states. At the same time, the main geopolitical tension was concentrated between Russia, on the one hand, and the Austrian Empire and the British Empire, on the other. On a religious level, it is

was the opposition of Orthodoxy to Catholicism (Austria) and Calvinism (England). Absolutist, and then revolutionary France played a special role in all this, striving to spread republican ideas and the Enlightenment. At the same time, it is important to note that if Russia had some common geopolitical interests with Austria (in particular, the confrontation with Turkey), then the strategy of England was in almost everything opposite to the strategy of Russia up to the support of the British by us in the Ottoman Empire.

Be that as it may, even post-Petrine Russia inherited the main features of Byzantine geopolitics, although the dogmatic completeness of the "Third Rome" concept was violated. From now on, it was only possible to speak of an inertial continuation of what was once a full-fledged and theologically grounded path of the "God-bearing people" in history. In parallel with this transformation, material and narrowly political interests began to play an increasing role in foreign policy, and religious factors themselves were often used as a pretext for one or another political move focused exclusively on the welfare of the state in its secular aspect.

1.4 National liberation of Orthodox peoples

In the 19th century, many Orthodox peoples were Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, etc. began to actively free themselves from the political control of the Turks. The religious factor played a significant role in this, turning into one of the main motives of the national liberation struggle.

The emergence of new Orthodox states and the destruction of the Ottoman empire was the result of several geopolitical and ideological factors:

- 1) The degradation of the political power of the Turks allowed the development of the national feeling of the Greeks and other Balkan peoples, which, in turn, was facilitated by the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment; France, the cradle of "modernist trends", played an important role in this.
- 2) Russia, as a geopolitical adversary of Turkey, actively used the situation to undermine its enemy from within; Russian agents in Greece and the Balkans focused their efforts on supporting the demands of the Orthodox, which was accompanied by external geopolitical pressure from Russia.
- 3) A kind of religious renaissance of the Orthodox peoples began, and the idea of the struggle for political and national independence was accompanied by messianic presentiments of an eschatological nature.

During this period, the political and ideological concepts of Greater Greece (or Great Idea, Megale idea), Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia ("drawing"), Greater Romania, etc. were formed.

1.5 Megale Idea

Supporters of Magna Graecia strove for the complete conquest of Greek territories from the Turks and the re-establishment of the "New Byzantium", the restoration of royal power and the return of the Patriarch of Constantinople to his leading role in all Orthodox

the world. As a result of a fierce struggle and a national uprising, the Greeks were able to conquer a small independent state for themselves in 1830 around the Peloponnese and Morea, which, after the Balkan Wars in 1913, actually doubled its territory. At the same time, the implementation of the "Great Idea" collided with the geopolitical interests of other Orthodox peoples, since the Greeks demanded the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and other territories, which were also claimed by the Bulgarians and Serbs. The culmination of this plan was the liberation of Constantinople (Istanbul) from the Turks. But the whole project ended in disaster after the defeat of Greece in the war with Turkey Ataturk, who defeated the Greeks and forced the Greek population of Anatolia to massively move to Greek lands.

It is very important to note that the national liberation struggle of the Greeks was in no way welcomed or inspired by the Phanariot clergy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, who were in political solidarity with the Ottoman Empire rather than with Russian geopolitics or the Balkan peoples striving for freedom. Moreover, the collapse of the Turkish Empire was a disaster for the spiritual supremacy of the Phanariots in the Orthodox world outside of Russia. Therefore, Greek nationalism and the Great Idea, although distinctly Orthodox in character, were initially promoted by some special secret organizations of the Masonic type, in which the most important role was played by Russian agents of influence and at the same time supporters of the French Enlightenment. In other words, The Orthodox idea in Greece during the critical period of its liberation from Turkish rule was the property of some kind of parallel religious structure associated with the Greek diaspora in Russia and other Mediterranean regions. It is also curious that the Greek aristocracy, genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible. genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, it focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible. genetically and politically connected with the Phanariots, after gaining independence, it focused more on Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in whose midst the "Great Idea" matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. In this, again, a certain solidarity of the official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible.

1.6 "Inscription"

The idea of a Greater Serbia, based on the historical precedent of a huge Balkan state created in the 14th century by the Serbian dynasty of Nemanjić, was revived again during the Serbian liberation struggle. At first, the rebellious Serbs liberated a small territory, Shumadiya, from Ottoman rule, and after that they began a struggle to create an independent Slavic state in the Balkans, with the domination of Serbs and the Orthodox dynasty. Since 1815 years the Serbs have achieved independence, which, however, carried with myself some two different geopolitical orientations embodied in two Serbian dynasties Obrenovi whose and Karadjordjeviches. Obrenovichi, although were Orthodox, focused on close to Austria, and an important role in this issue was played by the activity of some political and intellectual circles from Vojvodina, the territory closest to Austria. The Karageorgievich, on the other hand, gravitated exclusively towards Russia. In 1903, not without the participation of Russian special services, the Obrenovic dynasty was overthrown, and Serbia turned to the pro-Russian line. By 1920, Yugoslavia, a huge Balkan state, which united many Balkan peoples under Serbian rule, including Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Macedonians, Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians, was created under Karageorgie Vici. In addition, in the north of Yugoslavia, the Catholics-Hungarians came under Serbian control. However, this geopolitical structure turned out to be unstable, since the non-Orthodox peoples of Yugoslavia (not without

assistance of Austrian and Turkish agents of influence) began to oppose the ethnic domination of the Serbs and the religious primacy of Orthodoxy. This confrontation reached particular intensity during the Second World War, when pro-German Croatia and Bosnia actually carried out genocide of Orthodox Serbs.

1.7 Greater Romania

The Greater Romania project also appeared in the Orthodox environment, and it was not only about complete liberation from Turkish control (although Moldova and Wallachia were never officially part of the Ottoman Empire), but also about opposing the policy of the Phanariots, who sought to subordinate the Romanian clergy to their influence. In this current, anti-Turkish and anti-Phanariotic sentiments were supported by Russia, which was facilitated by the belonging to the Russian territories of Bessarabia, inhabited by Romanians. At the same time, Uniate tendencies intensified in Romania since the 18th century. Uniatism is the idea of subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Vatican while preserving the Orthodox rituals, but, in fact, in this approach, the Vatican alone wins geopolitically, while Orthodoxy is unequivocally losing. It is no coincidence therefore, that Uniatism was viewed by the Orthodox as a tactical move of Catholicism, seeking to expand its missionary, political and spiritual influence in the East at the expense of Orthodox peoples. And in Romania itself, Uniatism, which was widespread especially in Transylvania, was initially accompanied by cultural tendencies of Romanization, the glorification of the Romanesque essence of Romania, the Latin roots of the language, etc. Uniatism in Romania was based on Catholic Austria, and Orthodoxy was supported, of course, by Russia. It is indicative that the Greek Orthodox, Phanariots, pursued in Romania, in fact, a pro-Turkish policy that contradicted both Austro-Catholic and Russian-Orthodox geopolitical interests. The idea of Greater Romania had an unambiguously Orthodox subtext, and under this banner the Romanians fought for national independence. It is important that

In the confessional sphere, Uniatism, coupled with an orientation towards Latin culture, gravitates towards Rome and Western Europe, while Romanian Orthodoxy follows the pro-Moscow line. Interestingly, after the Sovietization of Romania in 1948, the formally atheistic communist regime took the unambiguous position of Romanian Orthodoxy, subordinating the Uniate confessions to it and subjecting the Catholic minorities to certain repressions.

1.8 Great Bulgaria

The beginning of the movement of the Orthodox and at the same time the national revival of the Bulgarians can be dated to 1870, when, under pressure and with the support of Russia, the Bulgarian Exarchate was created, which aimed to unite the Orthodox living in the Balkans into a geopolitical bloc, politically hostile to the Ottoman Empire and spiritually opposing the Patriarchate of Constantinople and domination of Phanariots.

In parallel with gaining geopolitical independence, Bulgaria developed a nationalist project "Bulgaria of the Three Seas", which implied the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and Constantinople. Traditionally being Russophile, Bulgarian Orthodoxy at some points in history deviated from this line in order to achieve narrowly national goals, and, like the Uniates of Romania, the Obrenovich dynasty in

Serbia, the Greek aristocracy and some other Eastern European forces sided with Central Europe, acting as an ally of Austria-Hungary against Russia.

Interestingly, as new Orthodox states emerged in the Balkans, their geopolitical orientation constantly fluctuated between Russia and Austria, i.e. between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Moreover, the formal reason for such a stable dualism was some controversial territories and, first of all, Macedonia. Because of Macedonia, friction constantly arose between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, and Russia's support for one side or the other in this conflict automatically threw the other side into the arms of Austria.

1.9 Orthodox Albania

The settlement of the Albanians was the traditional border between the Byzantine and Catholic worlds. In this people, there are 4 confessions, Sunni Albanians (Turkic Albanians), Bektashi Albanians (members of a Sufi organization, which, as in some exceptional cases, has a clan, and not only initiatory character), Catholic Albanians and Orthodox Albanians. Despite the fact that Orthodox Albanians are a minority, it was this group that stood at the center of the national liberation struggle, and the independent state of Albania arose thanks to the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli, who became the first Albanian ruler in 1918. Fan Noli was an unequivocal supporter of Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy actively supported him in all his endeavors. Orthodox Albanians united under their control the entire nation, regardless of denomination, but their main opponents and rivals were not so much the Catholics as the Greek Orthodox clergy, traditionally rooted in Albania! And again, using the example of Albania, we are faced with geopolitical dualism in the post-Byzantine Orthodox world, where the geopolitical interests of the Greek and Russian Churches are opposed.

Fan Noli retained his pro-Russian orientation after the October Revolution, for which he was overthrown by Ahmed Zog, the future king of Albania. During the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy, the Albanian Orthodox were persecuted by the pro-Catholic authorities, but after the "Sovietization" the Orthodox Church again received state support, now from the communist authorities. Only in 1967, during the "cultural revolution" and the Maoist deviation, Soviet Albania declared itself "the first exclusively atheistic state in the world" and began direct persecution of believers of all confessions.

1.10 Geopolitical lobbies in Orthodox countries

A general overview of the geopolitical tendencies of the Balkan Orthodox countries reveals the most important regularity: in each such state there are at least two geopolitical lobbies, the nature of which is associated with certain religious characteristics.

First, there is a pro-Russian lobby everywhere, oriented towards the geopolitics of the Russian Orthodox Church, which in turn inherits (albeit with reservations) the Moscow Third Rome line. This lobby is oriented against Rome and any rapprochement with it (which means against Austria, Hungary and Catholic Germany, i.e. against the Catholic sector of Central Europe), but at the same time, stands on

anti-Turkish and anti-"Phanariot" positions, opposing themselves to one degree or another to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In some cases (as, for example, in Greece itself) this lobby includes not only Orthodox circles, but also some secret societies of the Masonic type.

Secondly, in the same countries there is an opposite lobby, which, whether or not being Orthodox, sympathetically relates to the rapprochement with Rome, to the orientation towards Central Europe, Austria, and ultimately towards Uniatism or even Catholicism.

Thirdly, everywhere there are traces of Turkish influence, which was supported by England in this region, which means that Anglo-Saxon geopolitics in this case has a southern orientation and is based on Phanariotic tendencies in modern Orthodoxy in the Balkan countries, traditionally associated with the Ottoman administration.

The breakup of Yugoslavia gives us an example of the geopolitical alignment in the Balkans. The Russophile line is embodied in the position of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia and Slovenia are guided by Central Europe, and the Anglo-Saxons (USA and England) actively support the Bosnian Muslims, the heirs of the Turks. At the same time, the question of Macedonia arises again, about which again disputes arise between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Albanian problem, in particular, in Kosovo, is making itself felt with renewed vigor. The Transnistrian tragedy and anti-Russian sentiments in present-day Romania and Moldova again force us to pay special attention to the Uniate and pro-Catholic lobby, which alone can be the bearer of anti-Moscow sentiments and Latin tendencies in these areas.

1.11 Russian Orthodox Church and Soviets

The relationship between Orthodoxy and the Soviet regime is an extremely difficult question. On the one hand, there is a point of view that the Soviet period, in spite of everything, inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a geopolitical line that strictly coincides in the most important aspects with the geopolitics of the Russian Church. It can be conditionally defined as "sergianism" after the name of the Patriarch of Moscow Sergius, who formulated the famous thesis, which became the starting point of internal church disputes that have not subsided even today: "Your successes are our successes" (in an appeal to the atheistic anti-Christian regime of J. Stalin). This "Sergian" formula is far from being as paradoxical and monstrous as Orthodox conservatives want to present it. The fact is that the Bolshevik Revolution entailed such changes in the church life of Russia, which amaze with their symbolism. The Patriarchate was simultaneously restored, the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous acquisition of the "Sovereign" icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked the return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred years of St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous acquisition of the "Sovereign" icon in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked the return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred years St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after the two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after the two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. In parallel, the spiritual renewal of the Church proceeded, through persecution and suffering that restored the forgotten fieryness of religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ. marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of the royal power, restored in its supernatural dimension after the two hundred year St. Petersburg period. At the same time, the Bolsheviks inherited the entire Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders.

The second point of view considers Soviet Russia as a complete antithesis of Orthodox Russia, and considers "Sergianism" to be conformism with the Antichrist and apostasy. This approach excludes the possibility of considering the Soviet period as a continuation

geopolitics of Orthodoxy. The bearer of such an ideology in its most distinct form is the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the sectarian True Orthodox Church, whose positions stem from the eschatological identification of Bolshevism with the coming of the Antichrist. It is curious that such an approach denies Orthodoxy in the political dimension and typologically coincides with the position of the Phanariots, who deny the need to correlate the Orthodox Church with politics, which is the basis of a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine. At the same time, this approach is combined with sympathy for the "white" movement, which was geopolitically based on the support of the Entente, Western European and, especially, the Anglo-Saxon countries. And it is no coincidence that the center of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is located in the United States. Geopolitically so "Orthodox"

1.12 Summary

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the geopolitics of Orthodoxy was deprived of the unambiguous theological and eschatological function that it had in the era of the "millennial kingdom" from the 5th to the 15th centuries. Two hundred years of "Moscow of the Third Rome" adjoin this "holy" period, which for the Orthodox consciousness is not identical to the period of a full-fledged Tradition. After the split and Peter's reforms, a more ambiguous period begins, throughout which Russia nevertheless follows, in the most general terms, the former geopolitical line, while losing doctrinal rigor. The entire post-Byzantine period is characterized by dualism within the framework of Orthodoxy itself, where Russian Orthodoxy is directly related to the geopolitics of the Russian States, opposes the Greek-Phanariotic line of Constantinople, which embodies Patriarchy, the type of Orthodoxy, strictly separated from implementation and political performing instrumental functions in the general structure of the Ottoman system.

Russia itself is adopting the Byzantine tradition of confrontation with the "Latin miter and Turkish turban" and is forced to defend the interests of Orthodoxy alone at the geopolitical and state levels. This line forces Russia to participate in Balkan politics, where it faces a range of geopolitically hostile tendencies, including persistent "Phanariotic" anti-Russian influence.

And finally, in the Soviet period, geopolitics, paradoxically, continues the general planetary strategy of the Russian State, expanding the spheres of influence of Russia at the expense of countries and peoples traditionally hostile to Orthodoxy. Of course, there can be no question of the dogmatic continuity of the Soviets in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, but one should not forget that the dogmatic evidence was hopelessly lost already under Peter, but shaken during the period of schism. And if we take the point of view of "sergianism", we can consider the geopolitical successes of the Soviet superpower, which conquered half of the world, traditionally hostile to Russian Orthodox Christians and our state, as successes of the Russian Church and Orthodox geopolitics. This last thesis is, without a doubt, highly controversial, but just as controversial is, strictly speaking, post-Petrine Russia with a truly Orthodox state. Although in the first and second cases, there is a clear geopolitical continuity.

In our time, when there is neither tsarist nor Soviet Russia, but there is a dying and crippled country, plundered and sold to the West, our eternal enemy, a country, we are able to comprehend the entire geopolitical history of Orthodoxy impartially and objectively and identify its constants, which should be outlined on the tablets of the new statehood, the authorities wishing to be called "Russian".

Chapter 2. State and territory

2.1 The Three Most Important Geopolitical Categories

Most of the controversy surrounding the new geopolitical picture of the world is centered around three fundamental categories:

- 1) "state-nation" ("Etat-Nation"), i.e. traditional historically established centralist state (such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.);
- 2) region, i.e. an administrative, ethnic or cultural space that is part of one or more nation-states (Etat-Nation), but at the same time has a significant degree of cultural and economic autonomy (for example, Brittany in France, Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque country in Spain, etc.);
- 3) Large Space, "commonwealth" or "community", which unites several nation-states ("Etat-Nation") into a single economic or political block.

Many "Europeanists", both left and right, believe that the category of "nation-state" (Etat-Nation), i.e. the traditional centralist state has generally outlived its usefulness, and that emphasis should be placed on the other two modalities on regionalism and even autonomy, on the one hand, and on the continental unification of regions into a single block, on the other hand. It is indicative that the points of view of polar political spectra converge here: the "new left" consider Etat-Nation too "right", too "totalitarian" and "repressive", too "conservative", which should be abandoned in the name of progress, and "the new right", on the contrary, the same state-nation (Etat-Nation) is referred to as too "modernist", too anti-traditional stage of European history, when the truly traditional European Empire was destroyed by the nihilistic and secular French absolutism. In addition, the "new right" sees in regionalism a return to ethnic traditions and to the principle of ethnocultural differentiation, which is the axis of the entire "new right"

thoughts.

With another on the contrary, On the other hand, there is a fairly broad category of politicians who defend the values of the "nation-state" (Etat-Nation). And again adherence to state centralism can unite both "right" and "left". But, as a rule, this position is not taken by the "new", but by the "old" right and left. Characteristically, in France, the opponents of European unification were three political forces: the Le Pen National Front (far right), the Marchais communists (far left) and the socialist-centrists with national sympathies of Jean-Pierre Schevenman. It follows from this that the most distant ideological and political sympathies can be combined within the framework of one and the same geopolitical project.

And, nevertheless, each political force has its own understanding of the three fundamental versions of the geopolitical structure of modern society. It would be interesting to construct a diagram of how all three projects are evaluated in the perspective of their own ideologies by different forces. For clarity, we will say

about extreme positions, which, naturally, become overgrown with nuances and shades as we approach the political center.

2.2 Regionalism of right and left

The general complex of leftist ideologies is focused on weakening the influence of the state, administrative and political structures on public life. This presupposes the principle of decentralization, a gradual evolution from one center of power to several and, in the long term, to a large number of them. At one time, this theory was developed by the famous anarchist Proudhon. The left seeks to weaken and gradually abolish totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government, which means that their geopolitical orientation is directed against the preservation of the traditional state, with its borders, bureaucratic apparatus, repressive bodies, etc. All this stems from the main ideological orientation of the left towards "humanism", towards the value of the atomic individual, and not towards some super-individual structures that limit his freedoms.

This liberal tendency of the left denies to the limit the very notion of "state", and itself concept "nation" as historical relic. This principles opposed to the "humanistic" idea of "human rights", ceased to which has long been be an abstract philanthropic slogan and became ratified in pretty an aggressive ideological complex openly directed against the traditional forms of collective existence of people as members of a nation, people, state, race, etc. Hence, the emphasis on regionalism is logical for the left, since the administrative independence of the territorial parts of the state, from their point of view, brings the value standard closer to the individual, removes the aura of unconditional authority and control functions from broad social categories.

Obviously, this tendency of the left contradicts the national-state ideologists, i.e. "statists" and "nationalists", for whom it is the historical and political unity of the people, embodied in Etat-Nation, that seems to be the highest value. The confrontation between statist nationalists and liberal regionalists is a constant of stormy polemics regarding the main geopolitical projects in practically all countries where political processes are developing actively and dynamically.

But there is also "right-wing regionalism" closely related to the problem of tradition and ethnicity. Such a regionalism is based on the premise that the modern centralist state is only a tool for the cultural and ideological leveling of its members, that it has long lost its sacred functions and turned into a repressive apparatus oriented against the remnants of genuine cultural, ethical and ethnic traditions. "Right regionalists" see decentralization as an opportunity to revive, in part, the ritual, cult form of life of peoples, traditional crafts, to restore such forms of government that were characteristic of traditional civilization before the advent of a purely modern world. In fact, such "right-wing regionalism" exactly corresponds to the concept of "soil-cultivation". Basically,

Thus, a second line of political confrontation is emerging: "right-wing regionalists", who often appeal to ethnic and racial purity, and "left-wing statist," who believe that the best way to introduce "progressive", "liberal" values into society is state centralism, which protects society from possible restoration of survivals "overcome by progress".

2.3 The New Big Space: Mondialism or Empire?

With regard to supra-state integration, there is also a pretty contradictory political layout. On the one hand, there is a "mondialist project" that implies the complete abolition of traditional states and the creation of a planetary civilizational field controlled from a single center, which can be conditionally called a "world government." In principle, such a project is the logical conclusion of liberal trends seeking to destroy all traditional social structures and artificially create a single

a "common human" space, consisting not of peoples, but of "individuals", not of states, but of technocratic associations and industrial laborers. It was in this light that the mondialist stamps of the beginning of the century, the United States of Europe, dreamed of by both the capitalist liberals (Monet, Coudenoff-Calegri, etc.) and the communists (Trotsky, etc.), were seen in this light. Later, these same ideas inspired both the designers of Maatstricht and the ideologists of the "new world order".

But parallel to such a mondialist perspective, there is an alternative, advocated by non-conformist political forces. We are talking about the theorists of the New Empire, who consider modern nation-states to be the result of the tragic disintegration of traditional empires, which alone can fully correspond to the truly sacred organization of society based on qualitative differentiation, on spiritual hierarchy, on a corporate and religious basis. This understanding of the "New Big Space" follows not from a purely quantitative approach to integration (as in the Mondialists), but from a certain spiritual and supranational principle that would be transcendental in relation to existing historical formations and could unite them in a higher sacred synthesis. As the case may be, the "imperial project"

Consequently, here, too, there are two opposing political poles, which see similar geopolitical realities, but in a reverse perspective.

	LEFT (Democrats)	RIGHT (conservatives)
small space	<i>regionalism, separatism</i>	<i>ethnicism, traditionalism, soil cultivation</i>
average space	<i>enlightened centralist the state</i>	<i>nation-state, "statism", nationalism</i>
big space	<i>mondialism</i>	<i>Empire</i>

So, we have identified in each of the geopolitical projects two radically different, opposite approaches, which together predetermine all the main possibilities of the ideological struggle around fundamental issues. Thanks to this scheme, it is possible to classify various political alliances between forces that are quite distant from each other.

2.4 Geopolitics of Russia

The general problem of the geopolitical structure of the modern world is directly related to Russia, where we are meeting with the same basic geopolitical projects. The three categories of regionalism, the nation-state and the Big Space have direct analogs in our geopolitical reality.

Regionalism corresponds to separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation, both in the case of national republics and districts, and in the case of claims for full autonomy of purely territorial entities (projects of the Siberian, Ural and other republics).

The centralist-state model is defended by the supporters of the geopolitical project "Russia within the Russian Federation".

Those who advocate the restoration of the USSR, the re-establishment of the Russian Empire within the USSR, or the creation of the Eurasian Empire belong to the category of ideologists of the New Big Space.

As in the general scheme, the supporters of a particular project do not necessarily have the same political convictions. Moreover, each project can have two polar signs, which are conventionally defined as "right" and "left".

Let's try to outline the positions of the "right" and "left" in Russian political life in their attitude to the three geopolitical options.

The separatist tendencies on the extreme "left" flank are exploited by the forces that also stood behind the collapse of the USSR. Considering the Soviet state a bulwark of "reactionism" and "totalitarianism," Russian liberals have long put forward the ideas of "Russia within the 14th century," etc., which implied the fragmentation of Russian territories into separate fragments, both on ethnic and purely geographic lines. For such "leftists" the unity of the Russian nation and the power of the Russian state not only do not represent any historical value, but, on the contrary, are viewed as an obstacle on the way to universal human "progress." This regionalist project is defended by some extreme liberals who openly want the disintegration of the Russian Federation.

This ultraliberal version is consonant with some of the ideas of a certain part of the opposite, extremely nationalist camp, which believes that the Russians need to create a compact monoethnic state based on the principles of racial purity and ethnic isolationism. This is the idea behind the creation of the "Russian Republic". Among the non-Russian ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of the Russian Federation, there are essentially similar projects for the creation of independent mono-national states.

The "left" version of the national-state program within the Russian Federation embodied the post-Gorbachev Russian leadership, convinced that it is most profitable to use centralist methods to carry out reforms, subjugating all Russian

regions of Moscow's hard line. State centralism, according to these forces, is the best and fastest way to transform the socio-political reality of Russia in such a way as to bring it to "universal", "progressive", and, in fact, "Western" and "Atlanticist" standards. In regionalism, "left" centralists naturally see a danger for the implementation of their goals, since decentralization and autonomization of regions can contribute to the creation of regimes that would reject the logic of liberal reforms and propose other, alternative (conditionally "right") socio-political projects. Imperial expansion is also unacceptable for these forces, since the restoration of the USSR could entail corresponding ideological consequences.

The movement of "right-wing" statist exists and is actively gaining strength. These are patriots who have resigned themselves to the collapse of the USSR and believe that the creation of a powerful centralized Russian state from the Russian Federation will serve to unite the nation, organize a powerful independent autarchic space. The "right" statesmen reject both separatism and imperialism, believing that the fragmentation of the Russian Federation means the loss of the territories belonging to them by the Russians, and the imperial expansion will introduce many foreign elements and threaten the national domination of the Russians.

There are also two poles among the theorists of rebuilding the Empire. The "left" Russian mondialists, who are mainly guided by Gorbachev and his lobby, consider it necessary to create a "single democratic space" as soon as possible, both on the territory of the CIS and more broadly, within the framework of the Eurasian space.

The "right" understanding of the New Big Space was embodied in the political programs of the opposition, irreconcilable towards the regime. Most representatives of this opposition, both national communists and traditional imperialists, believe that Russia within the Russian Federation is not only a territorially insufficient geopolitical entity, but a fundamentally false decision in the issue of protecting the strategic interests of Russia as a great power. "Right" Eurasianism proceeds from a purely imperial understanding of the historical mission of Russia, which must either be an independent autarkian "continent" or deviate from its historical and geopolitical predestination.

So, we can bring all the options for geopolitical projects regarding the future of Russian statehood into one scheme, taking into account the ideological orientation certain forces.

	Russian conservatives, patriots	Russian liberals, reformers
Russian regionalism	<i>"Russian Republic"</i>	<i>"ethnic republics", separatism within the Russian Federation</i>
Russian centralism	<i>patriots within the Russian Federation</i>	<i>"liberal reforms under an authoritarian center"</i>
Eurasian Big Space	<i>"Eurasian Empire", "restoration of the USSR"</i>	<i>"left mondialism", "united democratic space"</i>

Chapter 3. Geopolitical problems of the near abroad

3.1 Laws of Large Space

The fundamental law of geopolitics is the principle of Large Space, outlined by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Karl Schmitt. According to this principle, the national sovereignty of a state depends not only on its military strength, technological development and economic base, but also on the size and geographical location of its lands and territories. The classics of geopolitics have written hundreds of volumes, proving that the problem of sovereignty directly depends on the geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, and autarchy of the region. Those peoples and states that really strive for sovereignty must first of all solve the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our era, such self-sufficiency can only be enjoyed by very large states located in regions

During the period of confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the need for blocks, Large Spaces was obvious. No one doubted that a country could be "non-aligned" only at the cost of its elimination from the sphere of planetary geopolitics through marginalization and shifting to the periphery. In addition, all the "non-aligned" still made a choice in favor of one camp or another, although less radical than the direct supporters of socialism or capitalism. The destruction of one superpower certainly seriously changes the geopolitical space of the earth. But at the same time, the principle of Large Spaces by no means loses its strength. On the contrary, today the geopolitical project of "mondialism" is becoming more and more widespread, the meaning of which is reduced to the transformation of the entire surface of the earth into One Big Space, controlled from the American center.

3.2 Pax Americana and the geopolitics of mondialism

The project of a pro-American, "Atlanticist" Great Space, creature planetary Pax Americana or the establishment of a "new world order" with a single "world government" are, in fact, geopolitical synonyms. It is such a plan that is being developed and implemented today in the international policy of the West, and first of all, the United States. It is obvious that the mondialist concept of the Big Space completely excludes any form of genuine state and political sovereignty of any peoples and states. Moreover, the bipolar world gave incomparably more degrees of freedom (sovereignty) to states included in the sphere of influence of one of the two Great Spaces than is planned in the mondialist project, if only because the planetary confrontation forced not only to suppress the satellite states, but also bribe them.

The current situation confronts each state and each people (and especially before the states and peoples that previously belonged to the geopolitical bloc opposite to the Atlantic West) a vital alternative, either integration into a single Big Space under the leadership of the Atlanticists, or the organization of a new Large Space capable of resisting the last superpower ... The issue of true geopolitical sovereignty is directly related to this alternative, but at the same time, there can be no complete sovereignty for an individual people or state in either of the two cases. When adopting the mondialist model, any sovereignty is deliberately excluded altogether, since the "world government" becomes an uncontested and the only center of power, and in this case only the planetary pseudo-empire of the "new world order" is sovereign. All of its parts become colonies. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model. since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will enter this bloc will be able to rely at least on ethnocultural sovereignty and on direct participation in the creation and development of a new macrodeology, while the mondialist version of the "new world order" is already ideologically complete and elaborated and is proposed to all peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model.

3.3 The paradox of Russia

The peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is that the initiative to destroy the Eurasian Great Space, which until recently existed in the form of a socialist camp, came from the very center of this camp, from the capital of Eurasia, Moscow. It was the USSR, represented by Gorbachev, who initiated the inclusion of the Eurasian bloc in the mondialist project. The ideas of "perestroika", "new thinking", etc. at the geopolitical level, it meant full acceptance of the model of a single Big Space and a conscious transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar one. First, the socialist camp was destroyed, the Eastern Bloc was curtailed. Then the geopolitical self-liquidation was continued and those regions that are now commonly called the "near abroad countries" were thrown away from Russia.

Be that as it may, Russia, as the heart of the Eurasian Island, as the Heartland, in the current geopolitical situation, better than all other regions could resist the Atlanticist geopolitics and be the center of an alternative Great Space. But the fact of her geopolitical self-liquidation forced her to leave for a while (hopefully, for a short time) from her central roles in the geopolitical confrontation. Therefore, it is necessary to examine other possibilities of creating an alternative Great Space so that states and peoples that refuse the mondialist project can take some independent steps without waiting for Russia's geopolitical awakening. (By the way, these steps could only hasten this awakening).

3.4 Russia remains the "Axis of History"

The geopolitical choice of an anti-mondialist alternative outside the temporarily paralyzed Russia should still take into account the key strategic and geographic function of precisely the Russian lands and the Russian people, and hence the opposition to modern mondialists, which to some extent control the Russian

the political space should not turn into general Russophobia. Moreover, the fundamental geopolitical interests of the Russians, culturally, religiously, economically, and strategically, coincide with the prospect of an alternative anti-mondialist and anti-Atlanticist Great Space. For this reason, the national tendencies of the political opposition within Russia will inevitably be in solidarity with all anti-monetary projects of geopolitical integration outside Russia.

3.5 Mitteleuropa and the European Empire

One of the possible alternatives to the new Great Space is Europe, which certain political and ideological circles oppose the West to the Anglo-Saxon world, and first of all, the United States. Such an anti-Western Europe is not a pure utopia, since such a project has been repeatedly implemented in history, although each time with certain errors or distortions. So, in the XX century, the Axis countries represented the backbone of just such a Europe, although the Anglophilia and Francophobia of certain circles in the German leadership (along with other circumstances) prevented the full implementation of this project. After World War II, a similar attempt was made by De Gaulle, and France owes this policy to the fact that it is not officially a member of NATO today. Be that as it may, the idea of anti-Western, traditional, imperial Europe is becoming more and more relevant today, when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a "Soviet threat" and takes on the character of an open American occupation. According to the level of its technical and economic development, Europe is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. Europe, in terms of its technical and economic development, is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing. Europe, in terms of its technical and economic development, is a serious adversary to America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the mondialist and pro-American elite of European states may retreat, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. The tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Large Space are increasing.

3.6 Germany the heart of Europe

The European Great Space should be formed around the most continental of the European powers around Germany, or more precisely, around Mitteleuropa, i.e. Central Europe. Germany's geopolitical interests have traditionally been opposed to the Atlanticist tendencies of the West. This applied to both continental and colonial aspects geopolitics. Germany always was adversary Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests and sought to create a continental ubo land, autarkian civilization, founded on the traditional, hierarchical and soil values. Mitteleuropa, represented by the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburgs, was the last European trace of the Great Roman Empire, to which the roots of European civilization in its state and social aspect go back. As a matter of fact, the Roman Empire was a Great Space that united Western and Central Europe into a single geopolitical organism. And today the idea of a European Empire is directly related to Germany and the countries within the zone of German influence.

One important geopolitical conclusion can be drawn from these theses. For all Western countries of the "near abroad" (both the Baltic republics and Ukraine and Moldova), an anti-mondialist geopolitical union is possible only by joining

a bloc of Central Europe (if, of course, the situation in Russia itself does not change) while focusing on Germany. In this case, the western regions of the USSR will have a chance to become the eastern border regions of the European Greater Space and will be able to possess some semblance of sovereignty (although much less than within Russia or in a possible new Eurasian Bloc centered in anti-mondialist Russia).

The European Empire will be able to guarantee these regions a certain cultural, linguistic and economic autonomy and save them from the leveling mondialist System, which destroys even hints of difference, autarchy and the preservation of national identity in a liberal-market, plutocratic structure. However, there will be no question of any political or state independence. Moreover, the European Empire with a German center will always be under the threat of an outbreak of German nationalism, although this is fraught with its collapse, as Hitler's "pan-Germanism" was fraught with defeat.

3.7 "Join Europe"

Most of all, this prospect is close to Western Ukraine and Estonia, since only these areas, in fact, belong historically and religiously to Western culture and consider their geopolitical interests to be identical with those of Central Europe. As for other "near abroad countries", Belarus and the eastern and central regions of Ukraine politically and culturally belong to the zone of Russia-Eurasia, and if there is a cultural difference in something, then it can be reduced to particular details, by no means that does not imply a change in the geopolitical bloc from the East to the Central (Central Europe) and can be settled within the framework of ethno-cultural (but not state!) autonomy. Lithuania, for its part, has always played a special role in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, performing a double function in relation to Russia, she acted as the bearer of Western culture, in relation to Central Europe, on the contrary, together with Poland, she manifested herself as an eastern force defending Balto-West Slavic independence from German pressure. From a geopolitical point of view, in recent centuries Lithuania has become either German or Russian, and the only thing that it has long been (and cannot be) is Lithuanian, since it does not have sufficient geopolitical prerequisites to meet the conditions sovereignty put forward by modernity.

Partly the same can be said about Latvia, although, unlike Lithuania, it has never played any independent role in geopolitical history at all, being the periphery of outside influences in the Baltic.

As for Moldova, this territorial entity also never had its own statehood, and any independent political and state tradition among the Romanians, as well as among the Moldovans, is completely absent. However, historically, Romania (including some lands of Moldova) was part of the geopolitical bloc of both Russia-Eurasia and Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary), therefore, Romania had a certain precedent for an alliance with Central Europe. Although the Orthodoxy of the overwhelming majority of Moldovans and Romanians brings them closer to the East and Russia.

3.8 Boundaries of "freedom" and lost advantages

The prospect of the western countries of the "near abroad" entering the European Empire and their adhesion to Central Europe is possible and historically justified, although in almost all cases (excluding Estonia as the colonial lands of the Teutonic Order, inhabited by the descendants of silent and obedient autochthonous Finno-Ugric workers, and Western Ukraine) The Eastern bloc of Russia-Eurasia, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is many times preferable, since culturally these regions are more connected with the East than with Central Europe. Thus, the alliance of the Western "near abroad countries" with Central Europe can serve as an intermediate variant of an anti-mondist geopolitical orientation if Russia continues to abandon its integration mission.

It should be noted that, of course, these countries will not receive any political sovereignty in the event of joining the hypothetical "European Empire", since the Big Space, providing geopolitical, economic and military protection, requires its subjects, in turn, to renounce political - national independence, from the right to pursue their own ideological or diplomatic policy that runs counter to the interests of the Empire. No matter how it affects the representatives of "small nationalism", in our situation only superstates, continental Empires, taken as a whole, can be sovereign.

3.9 "Sanitary cordon"

The geopolitical problem of the Western "near abroad countries" has one more aspect - the Atlantic factor, acting directly and imposing on these countries political moves beneficial to mondialism and Americanism. There are several levels in this matter. Let's start in order.

The United States has the prospect of real world domination only if there is no other Great Space on the planet anymore. Hence, it follows that American geopolitics has as its main goal the destruction of a potential geopolitical strong bloc and the creation of obstacles to its formation. In history, we have a precedent for such a policy in the person of England, which has always sought to create a "cordon sanitaire" or "cordons sanitaire" on the continent. The "cordon sanitaire" is the territory of states and peoples, which is located between two large geopolitical formations, whose union or mutual entry into the Great Space could pose a dangerous competition to the interested power (formerly England, today the United States). The countries of the "cordon sanitaire" as a rule, they are simultaneously the cause of conflicts between the two continental powers, and their geopolitical independence is de facto impossible, and therefore they are forced to seek economic, political and military support on the side. The essence of the policy of the third major geopolitical force in this situation is to make a "cordon sanitaire" a zone of tension between two close Great Spaces, provoking an escalation of the conflict through diplomatic influence on the governments of "intermediate" countries. The most radical version of the "cordon sanitaire" is a situation in which the "intermediate" country strives for complete independence from both continental neighbors, which in practice means becoming a colony of a third "distant" power.

The most famous example of the "cordon sanitaire" was at the beginning of the century the countries located between Russia and Germany and controlled by England. They broke up the Great Space of Central Europe and the Great Space of Russia-Eurasia, serving as direct agents and satraps of the countries of the European West. The same move was repeated many times in other more local situations. In our time, the United States, by virtue of a direct geopolitical necessity, is forced to make the "cordon sanitaire" the main instrument of its foreign policy. In the report of the American security adviser Paul Wolfowitz to the US government (March 1992), it was explicitly stated about "the need to prevent the emergence of a strategic force on the European and Asian continents capable of opposing the United States," and in this sense it was indicated that the countries "

3.10 Transformation from province to colony

The policy of the "cordon sanitaire" can be expressed in the formula "independence from the near and dependence on the far." It should be clearly understood that there can be no talk of any genuine independence or sovereignty here, although short-sighted "petty nationalism" can temporarily identify such "colonial dependence on a third power" with the success of "national liberation struggle ". It should also be recalled that in the case of small states in our perfectly governed world there can be no victory, but also no full-fledged, unanimous struggle.

The countries of the "near abroad" that got out of Moscow's control due to various geopolitical circumstances, among which their internal struggle for independence played an insignificant role (if any), have every chance of becoming a "cordon sanitaire" of the US mondialist policy on the continent, and it means losing the confidence of your neighbors and incurring the curse of "double betrayal." Moreover, in this case, they will turn from provinces into colonies. What will happen in this case with their national culture is generally scary to imagine, since mondialism will offer instead a universal colonial surrogate, cultural "co-colonization". The "cordon sanitaire" will have puppet overseers as rulers.

Thus, for the countries of the "near abroad" the prospect of becoming a "cordon sanitaire" means the loss of any geopolitical independence, since the "pug" itself will pay for the possibility of a "sanitary pug" to tease the "continental elephant" with complete political, cultural and economic slavery from overseas chiefs "new world order" (and plus, a completely natural reaction of the "elephant" in the very near future).

The prospect of a "cordon sanitaire" in relation to the Western countries of the "near abroad" is obvious. Its formula is "neither Germany, nor Russia" (ie, "neither Central Europe, nor Eurasia"). Since Germany as an independent geopolitical force today is a pure potential, it is fair to assume that behind the concept of "independence" ("sovereignty") of Western countries of the "near abroad" should be seen just a transition to

service to mondialism and Americanism. At least this is the current geopolitical picture. In other words, the Western countries of the "near abroad", which are really striving for "independence" (and not "doomed to independence" by the treacherous policy of Moscow), are most likely consciously choosing the role of a "cordon sanitaire" in the service of the United States. This is especially true for those "countries" which traditionally had rather hostile relations with Germany.

The countries of the "cordon sanitaire" from the "near abroad" are entering into an alliance with the West (with Western Europe), bypassing Central Europe, and this is the clearest sign of their Atlanticist, mondialist orientation.

In principle, the same is true for the eastern countries of the "near abroad". However, in order to adequately understand their geopolitical prospects, it is necessary to dwell in more detail on the geopolitical forces of the East.

3.11 Asia before a choice

In the East, there are the following potential geopolitical forces that can claim to become Large Spaces: China, Iran, Turkey and the Arab world. Let us analyze briefly the specifics of each of these Great Spaces in relation to the eastern countries of the "near abroad".

It must be said that China's geopolitics is a special topic that cannot be covered in a few lines. Since the "near abroad" of the East is a region of the spread of Islam, the prospect of forming a single Big Space with China fades into the background before the possibilities of Islamic geopolitical coalitions. At least, this is the situation at the moment, which does not exclude, however, a sharp activation of the Chinese factor as an integrating factor in the near future.

Within the framework of the Islamic world proper, three geopolitical factors that have global prospects are relevant for the eastern countries of the "near abroad", and each of these factors has its own pronounced ideological characteristics. This is continental Islamic, revolutionary Iran; secular, atlantist, profane-nationalist Turkey; and the Arabic "Saudi" theocratic version of Islam. Of course, there are other geopolitical opportunities in the Arab world (Iraq, Syria, Libya), but none of them at the moment can claim to be an integrating Great Space in relation to the countries of Central Asia. Generally speaking, an orientation toward Saudi Arabia can be conditionally and geopolitically equated with an orientation toward "Arab (non-socialist) Islam."

Eastern countries of the "near abroad" have the prospect of three possible geopolitical integrations within the Asian bloc.

3.12 Continental Perspectives of the "Islamic Revolution"

Iran is today a unique country that plays the role of Central Europe in the West in Asia. It is characteristic that the Iranians themselves sharply distinguish themselves both from the West and from the East, understanding by the "West" the "profane mondialist civilization of Europe", and by the "East" "India, China and ... Russia."

Iranian Islam is a dynamic and powerful force that has a vivid anti-mondialist orientation and claims to the global World Islamic Revolution. In the geopolitical sense, Iran is a purely continental power that has, strategically, economically and ideologically, every chance of becoming the core of a large Eurasian bloc.

The orientation of the Central Asian republics towards Iran (and, first of all, Azerbaijan with its oil and giant nuclear Kazakhstan) could well create preconditions for true continental sovereignty. A pro-Iranian coalition would be a Central Asian analogue of Central Europe (compare: Central Asia Central Europe), since historical precedents, ideological principles, and cultural and religious homogeneity of these continental regions are sufficient grounds for the strength and effectiveness of such a union.

It is important to note that the pro-Iranian Big Space potentially includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this, in turn, opens a strip of territorial continuity with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has direct borders with Turkmenistan.

3.13 The "Pan-Turkism" Trap

The orientation towards Turkey is of a completely different character, often accompanied by "Pan-Turkism" (since the Central Asian peoples of the "near abroad" are predominantly "Turkic").

Turkey as a state arose on the site of the Ottoman Empire not as its continuation, but as a parody of it. Instead of a polycentric imperial multinational Islamic structure, Kemal Ataturk created an eastern version of the French Etat-Nation, the State-of-the-Nation, with a secular, atheistic, profane and nationalist system. Turkey was the first state in the East to abruptly break with its spiritual, religious and geopolitical tradition. In fact, Turkey, being a NATO member today, is an eastern outpost of Atlanticism and mondialism, a "cordon sanitaire" between the Asian East and the Arab world. The geopolitical model that Turkey is proposing is integration into the Western world and an atheistic, mondialist civilization. But since Turkey itself, striving to enter "Europe", so far only "

Turkey's path is the path of serving the Atlanticist superpower and adopting the mondialist model of a planetary Great Space controlled by the "world government. "It may be objected that the card of" pan-Turkism "played by Turkey has an outwardly traditionalist character. This is partly true, and the projects of" Great Turkey from Yakutia to Sarajevo "are really actively developed by Turkish propaganda. It should be noted that the seriousness of these projects could only give a radical change in the political, ideological and economic course

today Turkey, and this presupposes nothing less than a Revolution and a 180-degree turn of geopolitical interests. Without excluding such a possibility, it should be noted that there is still a small probability of such a course of events in the near future. But at the same time, such a prospect, promoted in the present, can lead to a very specific geopolitical result - the turn of the eastern countries of the "near abroad" from Iran, to the choice of a secular, atheistic model of society, to gradual integration into the pro-Atlantist "cordon sanitaire". "Pan-Turkism" is as ambiguous as "Pan-Slavism" or "Pan-Germanism", i.e. like all ideologies that put a national attribute above geopolitical, spatial and religious interests of peoples and states.

3.14 Oil dollars and mondialism

Saudi Arabia, the stronghold of purely Arab Islam and the Islamic theocracy, on the ideological level is a special "Wahhabi" model authoritarian, moralistic and "purist" Islam, typologically very close to Protestant forms of Christianity. East Asian contemplation, asceticism and religious passion are replaced here by ritualism and the domination of an almost secular ethics. According to Islamic fundamentalist Heydar Jemal, "Saudi Arabia in its current state is the direct opposite of the world of" continental Islam. "Geopolitically, the interests of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia quite coincide with a certain version of the Mondialist project, since the economic and military well-being of this country is based on the support of the United States, who protect the dynastic interests of Saudi kings in the military and economic spheres Example of military support war against Iraq Economic "support" is as follows. The entire economy of Saudi Arabia is oil. All Arab oil traditionally enters the world market through Anglo-American hands. The development of Eurasian deposits and their development could theoretically compete with the Saudis, enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests. enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests. enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent from the United States. Thus, the United States, which controls the European economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have the same interests.

The Saudi Wahhabi theocracy many times acted as an obstacle to the creation of an Arab Great Space proper, since this contradicted both the interests of the dynasty and the interests of the Atlantists. The Saudis have even more reason to fear the Eurasian continental Islamic Great Space. Revolutionary Iran is generally considered the Saudis' number one ideological enemy. Thus, the geopolitical interests of Saudi Arabia in the eastern countries of the "near abroad" are directly opposite to the emergence of the Asian Islamic Big Space. This means that the path to Arab-Islamic integration under the "Wahhabi" banner for the Asian republics will in fact also be included in the Mondialist project, but not in the secular-nationalist version of "Pan-Turkism", but in the moral-theocratic version. In a sense, this path is also nothing more than inclusion in the "cordon sanitaire". Only in this case, the "temptation" is not nationalism, but the religious factor (and money).

Summing up all these considerations, we can say that the eastern countries of the "near abroad" have only one positive way of creating a new Great Space, this is the way of the "Islamic Revolution" with an orientation towards Tehran. In this case, it can be solved

national conflicts and the restoration of religious tradition and religious order has been carried out. At the geopolitical level, this will mean the creation of a powerful continental bloc, fully capable of withstanding the mondialist projects in these regions. Moreover, even the first steps taken in this direction will cause a chain reaction in the Arab world, which threatens the mondialists with the loss of control in the entire Islamic ummah. In addition, such a geopolitical alliance will inevitably awaken the anti-mondialist forces of Central Europe (Iran's natural and main ally in the West) and Russia-Eurasia.

3.15 At least two poles or ... death

In the modern geopolitical situation, the question is extremely acute: either a planetary "new world order" led by the United States, where all states and peoples will be impersonal and obedient "cogs" of the mondialist a technocratic, atheist-commercial "Disneyland" cosmopolitan model, or the immediate creation of geopolitical opposition to Atlanteanism and mondialism and the organization of potentially anti-mondialist, traditional and soil peoples and states into an alternative block (or several blocks). Today the situation is so critical that it is almost unimportant how and under what sign an alternative Large Space may arise. If it does arise, and if it really resists mondialism, then this alone will be enough to expand, diversify and multiply geopolitical alternatives in order to increase the internal degrees of freedom within the anti-mondialist opposition. It should always be remembered that for the United States "

The situation today is so serious that there is no need to choose between "good" and "best". If Russia can restore geopolitical independence and get rid of the Atlanticist leadership, great. In this case, the countries of the "near abroad" will have a wonderful opportunity to re-enter Russian Eurasia, this time devoid of the ideological negativity of ambiguous Marxism. In addition, the voluntary and conscious return of the present "near abroad" will be the guarantor of the coming cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, and even, perhaps, political (but not state) autonomy. This would be the simplest and best option. Moreover, the exposure of the true colonial goals of the mondialists in this catastrophic transition period will, of course,

If this does not happen, then another Big Space, or Central Europe under the flag of Germany, or a united Central Asia under the sign of the "Islamic Revolution" may become the detonator of the anti-monetary geopolitical project. In principle, there remains the prospect of an anti-mondialist uprising in the Arab world and in Latin America, although militarily these potential Great Spaces are not sufficiently equipped to compete with the Superpower.

For the countries of the "near abroad" the problem of the Large Space is central and vital. The entire future of the nation, religion, culture, freedom, prosperity, and security depends on the choice of geopolitical orientation there. The question is extremely acute. Today, all responsible people should understand that the adoption of the mondialist model means nothing more and less than the complete and final destruction of the identity, identity, the historical face of their states and nations, the end of their national history.

Chapter 4. Perspectives of the Civil War

4.1 National interests and the mondialist lobby

The problem of a possible civil war in Russia is becoming more and more urgent, and today it is necessary to study this terrible issue from an analytical point of view on the other side of both alarmist emotions and pacifist exhortations. Worst of all (if a civil conflict in Russia nevertheless breaks out) to be completely unprepared for it, lost in a complex and contradictory alignment of forces, capable of misleading even the most astute and ideologically consistent patriots.

In this issue, as in all other important aspects of the political life of the nation and the state, we must begin by recalling the fundamental points that determine the general contours of the current state of the geopolitical situation. The main imperative for the existence of the state and the nation is the principle of sovereignty, independence and political freedom. And it is precisely the requirements of national sovereignty that are synonymous with national interests. Russia and the Russian people have in the context of the political history of the world their unique place, their mission, their role, and the free and full-fledged fulfillment of the national state purpose is the main meaning of the very existence of the people as an organic community.

But we live in a special era when the internal national policy of the state is inextricably linked with the foreign policy context, and perhaps never in history has external pressure on national and state formations been so strong and persistent. Moreover, almost the most important doctrine in the modern political establishment of the West has become the theory of mondialism, i.e. such an organization of people's lives all over the world, in which there should be no national-state formations, no sovereignty, national interests. The mondialist world community is to be headed by the cosmopolitan elite, who governs not societies but the mathematical sum of atomic individuals. Consequently, the mondialist vector is initially oriented against any nation-state formations,

The mondialist factor is, of course, directed not only against Russia (other nations and states are also obstacles for it), but it was Russia, as a powerful geopolitical entity, that until recently was the main bastion preventing the gradual spread of mondialist control from the West to the whole world. Of course, the Soviet system in certain aspects also possessed Mondialist features, and one of the projects of the Western Mondialists consisted precisely in the gradual, "evolutionary" inclusion of the USSR into the general planetary system of the "new world order". This famous theory of convergence was most likely the main reference point for those forces that began perestroika. But the soft version of Russia's "mondialization" did not "work" for one reason or another, and then the mondialist policy towards Russia took the form of aggressive pressure and openly subversive activity. The hard and super-fast collapse of the USSR deprived convergen

tions of "levers of control, and the mondialist policy passed to openly aggressive, Russophobic forms.

The Mondialist vector is an extremely important point for understanding the current situation in Russia. If earlier external influence on our country was exerted by other national-state formations seeking to weaken the power of the Russian state or win it over to their side in certain international conflicts; If earlier potential adversaries of Russia (overt and secret) were geopolitical forces, on the whole comparable in structure to itself, now the main external factor has become a special form of pressure, which does not have any clear national-state or geopolitical outlines and represents is a supranational, global utopian socio-political project, behind which are invisible manipulators with enormous economic and political power. Of course traditional

foreign policy factors also continue to operate (the mondialist project has not yet been fully implemented), but their significance and weighty pale in comparison with the totality of mondialist pressure, fade into the background. For example, Russia's relations with Germany, Japan or China today are not a matter of two parties, but of at least three Russia, another state and the world mondialist lobby, acting both directly and through their "agents of influence" in political formations. clarifying bilateral problems among themselves. Moreover, it is precisely the "third force," mondialism, that most often turns out to be decisive, since its means of influence and structures of influence are incomparably more debugged and effective than the corresponding mechanisms of "archaic" national-state formations.

Thus, in Russia, both in domestic and foreign policy, two fundamental elements can be distinguished behind the adoption of certain decisions, behind the organization of certain processes, behind the determination of certain orientations of Russian political and socio-economic life. : these are mondialist "agents of influence" and groups guided by national and state interests. Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that both poles are opposite to each other in the most important thing: some seek to minimize the sovereignty and independence, autarky of Russia (up to its complete abolition in the mondialist cosmopolitan context of the "new world order"), others, on the contrary, are focused on assertion, strengthening and expansion of national-state sovereignty, to maximize the withdrawal of the nation from the planetary Mondialist structure, hostile, by definition, to the existence of any full-fledged autarkian society. Of course, in real politics, these two poles almost never meet in their pure form, most power structures are mixed systems where both tendencies are present, but, nevertheless, these two poles determine the main power tendencies, which are in constant and rigid counteraction, veiled by compromises, naivety, narrow-mindedness or corruption of "uninitiated" extras from politics.

So, we have identified two poles in the current political picture of Russia. They correspond to two different points of view on the possibility of a civil war in Russia. And it is these two forces that will ultimately be the main subjects of a potential conflict, the main opponents, the main parties, although their confrontation may be hidden under a more private and confused distribution of roles. The example of the first civil war in Russia shows that in this case the national and anti-national forces did not act under their own banners, but

under a complex and contradictory system of social, political and ideological orientations that hide the true geopolitical motives and tendencies. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, it is necessary to objectively analyze the terrible prospect of a new civil war, on the other side of political or ideological sympathies.

4.2 Variants of the alignment of forces

Let's highlight the main plots of the civil war in Russia, define the acting forces and immediate motivations, outline its hypothetical variants.

- 1) The first (and most unlikely) variant of a civil war could develop along the line of confrontation: *nation-state forces* vs *mondialist lobby*.

Indeed, such a division of roles would be quite logical, given the complete incompatibility of the main orientations of both. The Mondialists are striving in every possible way to weaken Russia's sovereignty, undermine its economic and political independence, make it dependent on the cosmopolitan mondialist establishment, and deprive it of the ability to freely carry out its national mission. On the contrary, nationalists and statesmen want to strengthen autarky, to achieve maximum political independence and economic and social self-sufficiency. Naturally, it is impossible to peacefully combine these two tendencies, since they contradict each other in everything in general and in particular.

However, such a version of a civil war ("cosmopolitans against nationalists") cannot become national and global at all, since the mondialist ideology is fundamentally incapable of instilling fanaticism in the masses and raising any significant part of the population to defend their ideals. In peaceful conditions, of course, inertia, indifference and general passivity can be auxiliary factors for mondialists, but in the event of a bloody conflict, shooting and murder, an appeal to the deeper layers of the human psyche is necessary, fanaticism and sacrifice are necessary. On the contrary, nationalists can easily count on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in the event of an open and widespread armed confrontation with the mondialists, if, of course, the conflict acquires a national character,

In other words, a civil war according to the "mondialists-nationalists" scenario in any case will not become a real and total civil war, since the mondialists in their pure form do not and will not have a strong ideologically cohesive and politically active basis capable of organizing the masses to resist the nationalists. If such a conflict flared up, then its outcome would be swift and unambiguous: the national - state forces would quickly deal with the anti - national lobby, designated as such and facing the people who rose up for the patriotic idea. In principle, such a civil war would be almost bloodless and very brief, and after the destruction of the Mondialists, the internal source of conflict would be eliminated, and the political and social life of the state would develop strictly within the boundaries of national interests.

But the mondialist lobby hardly does not understand its true position and the suicidal nature of such a scenario, which means that it will try to avoid such a turn of events at any cost. That is why this option is almost unbelievable.

- 2) The second variant of the civil war is determined by the formula: *RF against one (or several) of the republics of the near abroad*. Such a situation can easily arise due to the extreme instability of the new state formations on the territory of the former USSR. These states, the overwhelming majority of which do not have any more or less stable state and national tradition, created within completely arbitrary boundaries that do not coincide with either ethnic, socioeconomic or religious territories of organic societies, will inevitably be thrown into deep internal and external crisis. In principle, they will not be able to acquire any genuine sovereignty, since their strategic capabilities do not allow them to defend their independence without resorting to external assistance. The collapse of the political, social and economic systems in them is inevitable, and naturally,

In this case, most likely, it is from their side that a challenge will be thrown to Russia, to which the Russian Federation will be forced to respond with varying degrees of aggressiveness. This process is likely to be of a chain nature, as the explosion of interethnic or territorial conflicts affecting Russia and the Russians will inevitably echo in other former Soviet republics.

Obviously, the national interests of the Russians and the orientation of the mondialist lobby within Russia (and within the new republics), in this case, will not clash directly and openly with each other. For the Russians, the main enemy in such a war will be their immediate neighbors. At the same time, it is absolutely not necessary that the mondialist lobby will play to defeat the Russian Federation in this case. Such a conflict, called by American strategists "wars of low intensity" (or even "medium (!) Intensity"), may well satisfy the interests of the mondialist lobby if it destabilizes the strategic and geopolitical situation in Russia and, more broadly, Eurasia, becoming a local, protracted and ambiguous. In this case, Russian national interests will not necessarily be fulfilled either, even if the civil war will be held under patriotic and nationalist slogans. As in the case of Afghanistan, Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only weaken Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy. Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only lead to a weakening of Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy. Russia's armed conflict with neighboring regions will only lead to a weakening of Russian influence in these states and undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of the neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (first of all, Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy.

Thus, this version of the civil war is contradictory and ambiguous. Russian national interests, the imperative of sovereignty, will not necessarily be strengthened in such a development of events, and the mondialist, Russophobic lobby, for its part, may even benefit from this, creating a belt of "low intensity wars" around the Russian Federation, discrediting Russians at the international level and undermining and so the precarious socio-economic stability of the state. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should not act as a defender

Russian and pro-Russian-oriented peoples in the near abroad. But in doing all this, it should be especially concerned about expanding its geopolitical and strategic influence. Even if the Russians manage to win back a part of the primordially Russian lands from their neighbors, the price for this may be the emergence of new hostile states, which will be thrown back into the camp of Russia's main opponents, i.e. mondialists, and in this case, the new imperial integration that Russia needs will be postponed indefinitely.

- 3) The third option is similar to the first in its structure, only here the civil war can begin *within the framework of the Russian Federation itself between representatives of the Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups*⁷⁹. The scenario may be similar to the previous one: the Russian population is subjected to aggression by foreigners in any national district or internal republic; ethnic solidarity encourages other Russians to take part in the conflict; other national non-Russian regions are drawn into armed confrontation on ethnic grounds; the civil war takes on the character of a "low-intensity war." In this case, it is even more dangerous for Russia, since the result may be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or, at least, provoking ethnic hostility towards the Russians of foreigners where they can be "suppressed". At the same time, other state and national entities will inevitably be drawn into the conflict against the Russians, which can make it protracted and long-term.

This version of the civil war generally contradicts the national interests of the Russians, since in it, in fact, the further disintegration of the Russian space into ethnic components will be legalized, which in the future will reduce the geopolitical quality of the once imperial people to a purely ethnic, almost "tribal" level. For a tough Russophobic mondialism aimed at undermining Russian national-state autarchy, such an option would be sufficient attractive, since it presupposes instilling in Russians not a state, but a narrowly ethnic self-identification, which will inevitably narrow the strategic scope of Russia. On the other hand, in this case, too, there is a certain risk for the mondialists, since the explosion of ethnic self-awareness can hit the "agents of influence" as well. For Russian patriots, however, such a conflict is unprofitable from any side.

- 4) The fourth option is also internal Russian, but is not based on ethnic hatred, but *on regional, administrative-territorial contradictions*. Moscow's centralist policy on political, economic and social issues cannot but cause a powerful confrontation between the regions, which in the general process of disintegration are striving to obtain maximum autonomy. Here, as in the case of ethnic tensions, the collapse of the Soviet empire deprives the centralist and integrative idea of its legitimacy, evidence, and attractiveness. In addition, the current policy of the center, having adopted the command totalitarian style of the previous system, actually abandoned the second half of the center-region relations, which consisted in assistance and social administrative support.

⁷⁹ Note that this text was written in December 1993, i.e. a year before the start of the Chechen war.

The center wants to take and control as well as before, but now it actually gives nothing in return. Economically, the regions only lose from this, since the field of their possibilities is narrowing and depends on the center. But to this is added the political peculiarity of the regions, where the anti-national character of the mondialist reforms is felt much more painfully than in the cosmopolitan megalopolises of the capitals.

The first steps towards separatism by the regions have already been made, although these attempts were thwarted by the center. However, it is highly likely that at some point Russians in southern Russia, Siberia, or elsewhere will want to create an "independent state" free from the political and economic dictatorship of Moscow. This may be based on purely economic expediency, the sale of regional resources or locally produced goods bypassing Moscow in some cases can dramatically improve the local situation. On the other hand, a "regional revolution" can also put forward political tasks, for example, rejection of the extreme liberal policy of the center, preservation of social guarantees, strengthening of the national aspect in ideology. All this makes the possibility of civil conflict at this level quite real.

This version of the Civil War is no less ambiguous and contradictory, like the previous two. Indeed, on the one hand, the demands of the regions wishing to isolate themselves from Moscow, the center of reforms, have some features of patriotism and nationalism, and meet the interests of the people; The mondialist forces of the center, opposing the regions, will at the same time defend not national, but anti-national interests, since the control of the liberals over the entirety of Russian territories is beneficial, first of all, to the designers of the "new world order." But, on the other hand, regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of Russian state territories, weaken the nationwide power, prepare the fault lines within the single Russian people. The Mondialists can deliberately go to the provocation of such a conflict if their control over Russia is weakened,

National forces should act on this issue proceeding from exactly the opposite logic. As long as the power of the center is strong, one should solidarize with the regional demands, supporting their desire for autonomy from the center. But at the same time, from the very beginning, the need for strategic and political integration of all regions should be emphasized on the basis of the prospects for the restoration of the empire. As the mondialist lobby in the center weakened, patriots should smoothly change their orientation, insist on the inadmissibility of civil conflict and call on the regions to unite.

Be that as it may, a civil war on a regional basis can in no way correspond to national interests, as well as the two previous scenarios.

The following point should be specially mentioned. The fifth version of the civil war also suggests itself, in which forces would be distributed not according to ideology, nationality and territoriality, but according to socio-economic criteria, for example, "new rich" versus "new poor". In principle, such an option is not excluded, and in the future all the prerequisites for it may arise. But in the current state of society, the purely economic factor is obviously not dominant. Despite the terrible economic cataclysms, the general impoverishment of labor

layers and grotesque enrichment of the "new Russians", Russian society has not yet formulated its demands in economic terms. Geopolitical, national, ideological aspects are incomparably more effective and relevant. It is they who are able to bring the masses into the square and make them take up arms. The economic crisis serves as an excellent background for civil conflict, it can in certain cases serve as an impetus for cataclysms, but other non-economic theses will be the main lines of force. Appeals to the nation, ethnos, patriotism, freedom today are capable of relativizing the purely material side of life, making it secondary. But even in the case where the material side turns out to be dominant, due to the discrediting of Marxist and socialist doctrines, will not be able to express its demands in the form of a consistent and fiery political ideology. Most likely, the economic factor in possible conflicts will be a concomitant rather than a defining category.

4.3 Summary of the analysis

Unfortunately, a civil war in Russia is possible. The fundamental contradictions between national-state interests and the plans of mondialism can hardly be resolved peacefully and amicably. In order to seriously talk about a "consensus" or "truce" between these forces, it is necessary either to completely destroy the carriers of national-state tendencies (and this is possible only together with the destruction of the Russian state and the Russian nation itself), or to do away with the representatives mondialist lobby.

That is why the unleashing of a civil war in Russia or the creation of a belt of "low-intensity wars" on its territory can at any time become the main project of the mondialist lobby. At the same time, there is no doubt that representatives of this lobby will try to do everything possible to remain in the shadows themselves, speaking under some other banner (both separatist and centralist).

Three variants of the civil war of the Russian Federation against the near abroad, the Russian population of the Russian Federation against foreigners, the regions against the center are fundamentally unacceptable for all those who are really concerned about the national and state interests of Russia and the Russian people. All these three options are fraught with a further split in the geopolitical and strategic space of Russia, even if certain territories come under Russian control. Therefore, the civil war in these three scenarios, the patriots must prevent in any way. Not to mention the fact that from a moral point of view, it is not beneficial to them. And since this is so, it is logical to assume that it is the mondialists who will have a hand in provoking such conflicts (if they begin to flare up).

For the mondialist lobby, something like the civil war in Russia may be beneficial for several more reasons. The beginning of a military conflict with the direct participation of the Russians would allow liberals from the center to:

- 1) introduce a political dictatorship under the pretext of "saving the fatherland" and forcibly get rid of political opponents;
- 2) write off the economic collapse for the war and force the economy to function under the direct control of the center;

- 3) to divert public attention from the activities of the "reformers", which is becoming dangerously obvious today;
- 4) knowingly suppress a possible future alliance of Russians with neighboring national-state Eurasian and European formations under the sign of continental solidarity against the Atlanticist domination of the West and mondialist projects.

All this makes one believe that the bearers of a tough version of mondialism in Russia will sooner or later resort to a "civil war," especially if the position of the liberal regime becomes more and more precarious. At the same time, it is important to note that in this case, a "restructuring" will inevitably occur within the mondialist lobby itself, and part of it will come out under patriotic, and perhaps even nationalist and chauvinist slogans.

It is difficult to say exactly when the first explosions might occur. It depends on many spontaneous and artificial factors. But even if nothing like this happens for some time, the potential threat of such a turn of events will be more than relevant, since the mondialist lobby not only exists in Russia, but also controls the most important levers of state and political power.

Only the first version of the "civil war" of the mondialists against the nationalists could be short, almost bloodless and beneficial for the patriots, for Russia. Moreover, a direct clash of the nation with its internal enemies would inevitably give victory to the national forces. In fact, it would not be a "civil war" in the full sense of the word, but a short outburst of active confrontation, as a result of which the possibility of a full-fledged civil war, if not completely destroyed, would be postponed indefinitely. But for this it is necessary to provoke the mondialist lobby to appear under its own banners, and patriotic forces should also rally on behalf of the clearly defined and precisely named Russian national state interests. This is certainly not easy (almost impossible) to do. On the one hand, the mondialists themselves are not so naive as to speak publicly about hatred of the country in which they operate and about their desire to destroy it, and on the other hand, representatives of national-state forces are often unable to intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time, concisely and convincingly, to formulate the foundations of their ideological position. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc. representatives of national-state forces are often unable to formulate the foundations of their ideological position intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time succinctly and convincingly. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc. representatives of national-state forces are often unable to formulate the foundations of their ideological position intelligibly and consistently, but at the same time succinctly and convincingly. This is hindered by adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignorance of the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc.

Genuine civil peace cannot be based on a compromise if the two sides of this compromise are in all direct opposites. As long as the mondialist system of values is dominant, all its flanks, right, left, centrists, with all their differences, do not question their general orientation. Yes, in such a situation "peace" is possible, but at the cost of the death of the state and the radical exclusion of national forces from the dialogue. If the national-state system of values becomes dominant, then it will be possible to talk about the search for a compromise between national capitalists, national socialists, national communists, national monarchists or national theocrats, but in this case, anti-national, mondialist, Russophobic forces will be excluded from the dialogue, placed ideologically outside the law.

Our society is fraught with terrible civil conflict. If we still have the ability to influence the course of events, to choose, then we must choose the lesser of evils.

Chapter 5. Geopolitics of the Yugoslav conflict

5.1 Symbolism of Yugoslavia

It is well known that Yugoslavia is the territory in Europe from which the most serious and large-scale European conflicts begin. At least this was the case in the twentieth century. The Balkans is a knot where the interests of all major European geopolitical blocs converge, and that is why the fate of the Balkan peoples symbolizes the fate of all European peoples. Yugoslavia is Europe in miniature. Among the peoples inhabiting it, you can find exact analogs of the largest continental forces.

Serbs represent Orthodox Russia (= Eurasia) in the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes of Central Europe (i.e. Germany, Austria, Italy, etc.). Muslim Albanians and Bosnians are remnants of the Ottoman Empire, which means Turkey and even the Islamic world as a whole. And finally, the Macedonians are a mixed Serbo-Bulgarian ethnos, which is a symbol of the Great Orthodox Yugoslavia (based on the unification of Serbia and Bulgaria), which did not manage to develop historically, despite the Serbo-Bulgarian projects that existed at the beginning of the century.

5.2 Three European powers

In the most general terms, we can say that the geopolitical map of Europe is divided into three fundamental areas.

First the area is the West. The continental West proper is represented, first of all, by France and Portugal. In a broader sense, it includes England and the transatlantic non-European United States. Although there may be internal contradictions between the continental West (France), the insular West (England) and the overseas West (America), in relation to the rest of the European geopolitical formations, the West most often acts as a single geopolitical force.

Second the area is Central Europe (Mitteleuropa). It includes the states of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, the former lands of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, etc. Central Europe is characterized by a geopolitical confrontation with both the European West and the East.

Finally, *third* the area is Russia, which acts in Europe not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of all the Eurasian peoples of the East.

Generally speaking, a fourth Islamic geopolitical area from the Maghreb countries of North Africa to Pakistan and the Philippines could be distinguished, but this geopolitical bloc is non-European, and in addition, in the 20th century, its geopolitical influence on Europe was not very significant, although it is possible that in the future, the Islamic world will again (as it was in the Middle Ages) become an important component of European geopolitics.

Three geopolitical European formations create permanent zones of tension on the continent, which run on the conditional and constantly changing borders between the European West and Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), on the one hand, and between Central Europe and Russia-Eurasia, on the other.

A certain number of geopolitical alliances or, on the contrary, confrontations, which constitute the constants of European international politics, can be outlined.

The European West can confront Central Europe as its closest neighbor to the East. This geopolitical tendency is most clearly embodied in the confrontation between absolutist France (Etat-Nation) and imperial Austria-Hungary. Later, this contradiction was expressed in numerous Franco-German conflicts. On the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility of a Franco-German geopolitical alliance, the ideas of which inspired both Vichy and de Gaulle. It is significant that the West can sometimes, in the struggle against Central Europe, enter into an alliance with the European East (Russia-Eurasia). In other cases, it is Russia that becomes the main geopolitical enemy of both the European West and Central Europe.

Central Europe (Germany) also in relation to its eastern geopolitical neighbor can be both in a state of confrontation (which is always directly or indirectly beneficial to the European West) and in a state of union (which always creates a danger for the West).

And finally, Russia's geopolitical preferences in European politics can be oriented both in an anti-German way (France, England and even the United States logically become allies in this case), and in an anti-Western one (then a Russian-German alliance is inevitable).

These are, in a rough approximation, the main geopolitical factors of European politics. It is absolutely necessary to take them into account when analyzing the Balkan problem, since all these three tendencies collide with each other in the Yugoslav conflict, creating a potential threat of a new big European war.

5.3 True Croats

Croats (as well as Slovenes) were traditionally part of Austria-Hungary, an ethnic group fully integrated into the Catholic sector of German Central Europe. Their natural geopolitical fate is linked precisely with this European bloc. Therefore, the gravitation of the Croats towards Germany and Austria is by no means an accidental opportunistic arbitrariness, but following the logic of the historical existence of this people. The collapse of Austria-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia were the result of the long struggle of the European West against Central Europe, and this explains the pragmatic support of the Serbs by the French. (Option: West together with East against Central Europe). Those Croats who welcomed the creation of Yugoslavia went, in a sense, against their geopolitical and religious tradition, and it is no coincidence that most of them, through Masonic institutions, were guided precisely by the "Great East of France" and its geopolitical projects aimed at the triumph of the forces of the West in Europe. During the creation of Yugoslavia, as well as in the entire alignment of forces during the First World War, the dominance of precisely the Western tendency can be traced, successfully using the forces of the East (both Serbia and greater Russia) against Central Europe.

During the creation of Yugoslavia, the Croats became the first victims of such a policy, and it is not surprising that they later met the Germans as liberators (as, indeed, the Ukrainian Catholics and Uniates, who always gravitated towards the zone of Central European influence). But the support of the Western forces by France for the Serbs (by the way, this support was also carried out, first of all, through Masonic channels) was very ambiguous, since the Serbs themselves, in turn, became hostages of such a geopolitical entity in the Balkans, the integrity of which could be preserved only through force control.

With the actual crisis of the eastern bloc (i.e. the entire zone of influence of Russia-Eurasia) during the perestroika period, the integration forces in Yugoslavia weakened somewhat, and the Croats (along with the Slovenes) were not slow to declare their geopolitical alienness in relation to Serbian Yugoslavia, understood in two ways and as an artificial creation of the West, and as an outpost of the East in Central Europe.

Thus, the Croats at the geopolitical level defend the principle that Central Europe remains itself, i.e. an independent, independent and territorially united European region. Although it should be noted that the idea of Croatia's transformation into an independent ethnically homogeneous dwarf Balkan State-Nation (Etat-Nation) of the French model is already deliberately laying a mine under the geopolitical unity of the Central European space, which can harmoniously exist only as a flexible, but integral structure, and not as a fractional conglomerate of selfish microstates. In other words, the geopolitical trend of the Croats will be full only in the case of its supranational orientation, and this also presupposes a peaceful solution to the problem of the Serb minority in Croatia. Croatian nationalism,

5.4 The truth of the Serbs

The geopolitical perspective of the Serbs has an unambiguously pro-Russian, Eurasian character. Through the religious and ethnic factor, Serbia is directly adjacent to Russia, being its geopolitical continuation in the south of Europe. The fate of the Serbs and the fate of the Russians at the geopolitical level is one and the same fate. Therefore, in order for the Serbs to return to the origins of their European mission, they need to turn to the East, to Eurasia, to understand the meaning and goals of Russian geopolitics. At the same time, it is not naive and artificial Pan-Slavism, the inconsistency of which the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontyev has perfectly demonstrated, but the project of Great Eurasia with the axis of Russia, a kind of ecumenical-continental Orthodox neovyzantism, should be the guiding star of truly Serbian geopolitics.

One constant trend can be traced in the geopolitical history of Europe, the clarification of which will help to understand what is a positive decision for Serbia. This tendency is as follows: the alliance of the East and Central Europe against the West is always beneficial to both sides. Equally beneficial to the continental West (France), an alliance with Central Europe (Germany) against the West, insular and overseas (Anglo-Saxon world). In other words, the priority given to geopolitical

The East (even relative to the East, after all, Central Europe, for example, is the East in relation to France) is almost always beneficial not only to the East itself, but also to the Western member of this union. Conversely, a geopolitical alliance with the priority of the Western trend (France with England and the United States against Germany, France with Germany against Russia, etc.) ties the knots of more and more European conflicts and wars.

Taking these considerations into account, we can say that the geopolitical orientation of the Serbs should turn as a reference point to the Bulgarian geopolitics, which almost always combined Russophilia with Germanophilia, creating in Southern Europe a space of political stability and harmony, which could gradually open up Central Europe access to the Muslim south, which means putting an end to the domination of the Atlanticist West in this region. Moreover, Serbia must realize the ambiguity of the support that the West once gave it, and the price of which is clearly visible in the anti-Serb sanctions of Western countries. Only geopolitical unity with other Orthodox Eastern European peoples (and, first of all,

As in the case of the Croats, the idea of a purely Serbian State-Nation will also not solve any problems if this Serbian state perceives its Germanophobia and orientation towards the West from the Yugoslavia created by the Freemasons.

5.5 The truth of Yugoslav Muslims

Bosnia's Yugoslav Muslims and Albanians represent the Islamic, "Ottoman" geopolitical factor in Europe. It is important to note that Turkey, whose influence is most felt among the Yugoslav Muslims, is undoubtedly the exponent of extreme Western, Atlantic tendencies in Europe. If the West, trying to use the European East (Russia) against Central Europe, still could not completely suppress the independent geopolitical self-manifestation of this continental region and often faced, on the contrary, the expansion of Russia-Eurasia (either through the Russian-German alliance, or directly through the creation of the Warsaw bloc), then secular pseudo-Islamic Turkey became a reliable instrument in the hands of Atlanticist politicians. And more broadly, the Atlanticist influence on the geopolitics of Islamic countries is extremely great. Therefore, the anti-Serb demonstrations of Yugoslav Muslims mark an incomparably more global continental conflict of Northern Eurasia (Russia and its geopolitical area) with the South. It is important to note that such a conflict contradicts the interests of the South itself, since in this case it becomes the same instrument in the hands of the Atlanticist West, which was the Eurasian East (represented by the Serbs) against Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary and its representatives, the Croats).

The only logical way out for the Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians would be to turn to Iran and the continuity of its policy, since only this country is currently pursuing a geopolitics focused on independence, independence and continental harmony, acting in accordance with its own logic, regardless of the interests of the Atlanteans. stay in this region. By turning to Iran, Yugoslav Muslims will be able to gain a proper geopolitical perspective, since a radically anti-Western, continental and traditionalist Iran

is a potential ally of all eastern-oriented European blocs from Russia-Eurasia to Central Europe. Moreover, the orientation towards Iran of the European Eastern Great Spaces could dramatically change the state of affairs in the entire Islamic world and dramatically weaken American influence there, which would not only play into the hands of the Europeans, but would also free the Islamic peoples from the economic and military dictatorship of the Anglo-Saxon Atlantists.

Only with such an orientation of the Yugoslav Muslims, their geopolitical presence in Europe could become harmonious, logical and conflict-free. We can say that this problem is divided into three stages. First stage: reorientation of Muslims from Turkey to Iran. The second stage: strengthening the geopolitical union of Central Europe with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. And the third stage: the geopolitical Eurasian alliance of the East and Central Europe. Moreover, these stages can take place in parallel, each at its own level. It is especially important to understand here that the problem of the small Balkan people cannot be geopolitically solved without the most serious and global geopolitical transformations. It should never be forgotten that it is with small in size, but gigantic in symbolic significance, local conflicts that all world wars begin.

5.6 Truth of the Macedonians

The Macedonian problem of modern Yugoslavia is rooted precisely in the artificiality of the really existing "Yugoslavia", which was the "state of the South Slavs" in name only. The Macedonians, who are an ethnos intermediate between Serbs and Bulgarians and professing Orthodoxy, should have entered, as a natural component, into the real Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Bulgaria. But the existence of two Slavic states of the Jacobin type in the Balkans instead of one federal, "imperial", Slavic state of the Eurasian orientation led to the fact that the small Macedonian people found themselves on the border between two political regions with rather different political specifics.

At the present moment, the matter is further aggravated by the fact that Jacobin nationalism is growing in present-day Bulgaria, which has more than once pitted the Orthodox Balkan powers against each other and prevented them from turning to the only true neo-Byzantine geopolitics. Initially, the Atlanticist lobby (both Catholic and English) was actively involved in this process, which makes itself felt in modern Bulgaria, albeit in different forms.

In essence, Western tactics remain the same here as at the beginning of the century. Then, having destroyed Austria-Hungary, the West did not allow the creation of a large Slavic community, playing the card of "Balkan nationalisms" of Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian, etc. Today, the same geopolitical forces of the West are again dealing a double blow to Central Europe and to Yugoslavian unity, provoking Croatian separatism in the West and Macedonian in the East.

In the case of Macedonia, as in all other Balkan conflicts, a way out can be found only through the global integration process of organizing the European Large Spaces, and not through straightforward separatism and the creation of dwarf pseudo-states. The accession of Macedonia to Bulgaria will also in no way solve the problem, but will only prepare a new, this time really interstate, inter-Slavic conflict.

5.7 Priorities of the Yugoslav War

Deeply symbolic and extremely significant, the Yugoslav conflict requires every country, every European political and geopolitical force to determine and define its priorities in this matter. Here we are talking not only about the sentimental, confessional, historical, ethnic or political inclinations of certain people, peoples and states. We are talking about the future of Europe, about the future of Eurasia.

The supporters of the priority of Central Europe and the Germanophiles initially took a pro-Croatian position. This choice was based on a geopolitical analysis of the reasons for the creation of Yugoslavia, on the rejection of the Masonic policy of France in Central Europe, on the understanding of the need to naturally recreate a single Central European space after the end of the Yalta era, during which Europe was artificially divided into two, not three geopolitical camps. This explains the presence of many European national revolutionaries among the Croats.

But the logic of preference for Central Europe did not take into account one very important consideration. The fact is that, in addition to the instrumental role of the geopolitical East in the execution of the West's plans against Central Europe, there has always been a fundamental, deep and soil-based proper Eurasian geopolitics of this Great Space, the geopolitics of Orthodox Russia, oriented towards its own continental interests, and in the distant future, on a new Sacred Union. When, in the process of a fierce internal conflict between Serbs and Croats, the Serbian self-consciousness was fully awakened, when the blood of the Serbian people once again aroused from the unconscious depths the most ancient geopolitical, national and spiritual archetypes, when the idea of Great Serbia, Spiritual Serbia became relevant, the instrumental mission of Yugoslavia ended

While the Serbs fought Central Europe (represented by the Croats), the Atlanticists from Paris to New York applauded Federal Yugoslavia everywhere, or at least reproached the Croats for "nationalism" and "pro-fascism." As soon as the Serbs crossed a certain line, and their struggle took on the character of a struggle against the very idea of the West, against Atlanticism, Serbia was immediately declared the main obstacle to building a "New World Order", and harsh political and economic sanctions followed against it.

To make the final choice, it is necessary to turn again to the geopolitical law already formulated by us above, according to which continental harmony is real only with the priority of the East, with the choice of Eurasia as a positive orientation, since even the idea of Central Europe, which is positive in itself, is opposed to Russia. Eurasia is becoming negative and destructive, as it was clearly revealed in the deep and tragic mistake of Hitler, who began an anti-Eastern, anti-Russian expansion, which, in the end, turned out to be beneficial only for the Western, Atlantic bloc, destroyed Germany and gave rise to the embryos of a crisis in Russia. Therefore, in the Yugoslav conflict, geopolitical priority should be given to the Serbian factor, but, naturally, to the extent that the Serbs follow the Eurasian, pro-Russian geopolitical tendency,

Europe and facilitating the establishment of a German-Russian alliance against the West. Serbian Germanophobia combined with Masonic Francophilism, no matter how plausible pretexts they hide behind, will never be able to give grounds for a positive solution to the Yugoslav problem.

In other words, the greatest preference is **must be given away** Serbs traditionalists rooted in the Orthodox **faith** conscious of their Slavic spiritual heritage and focused on the creation of a new harmonious pro-Russian geopolitical structure with a uniquely anti-Western and anti-Atlantic orientation.

On the other hand, one should carefully consider the demands of the Croats and their attraction to the Central European region. If they have anti-Atlantic tendencies, the Croats can in the future become a positive intra-European force.

The Bosnian factor in the reorientation of Yugoslav Muslims from Turkey to Iran must also be taken into account in order to "turn poison into medicine" on this basis to initiate a completely new European policy in the Islamic world, directly opposite to the US economic and military imperialism in Islamic countries.

And finally, the Macedonians, instead of being the bone of contention for the southern Orthodox Slavs, should become the embryo of Serbo-Bulgarian unification, the first step towards the creation of a true Great Yugoslavia.

An impartial geopolitical analysis of the Yugoslav problem leads to such conclusions. Of course, in the horror of a fratricidal war, it is difficult to preserve common sense, the streams of blood awaken in hearts only rage and a desire for revenge. But sometimes, perhaps, only a cold, reasonable analysis, taking into account historical roots and geopolitical patterns, can offer the right way out of the dead end of a fratricidal war, while emotional solidarity with one or another will only aggravate the hopelessness of a bloody nightmare. In addition, such an analysis clearly shows that the true enemy, provoking the entire intra-Slavic genocide, remains in the shadows, behind the scenes, preferring to watch from afar how one Slavic people destroys another, sowing discord, closing the possibility of union and fraternal peace for many years, destroying Bolshoi The spaces of the most powerful

The true initiators of the Yugoslav massacre are the Atlanticist forces of the West, guided by the principle "in the camp of the enemy one must set one against another and in no case should unity, union and fraternal unity be allowed." This must be understood by all the participants in the complicated Yugoslav war for Europe so that it does not finally become a war against Europe.

5.8 Serbia is Russia

The importance of the Yugoslav events also lies in the fact that, on the example of a small Balkan country, the scenario of a gigantic continental war that could break out in Russia is being played out. All geopolitical forces participating in the Balkan conflict have their counterparts in Russia, only in an incomparably larger spatial volume. Croats and Slovenes, striving to enter Central Europe, have their geopolitical synonyms for Ukrainians, although the affinity of these latter with Great Russia dates back not several decades, but several

centuries, and confessional friction, except for the Uniates and Ukrainian Catholics, does not exist here. Be that as it may, judging by certain tendencies, some forces in Kiev are beginning to "gravitate toward the Russian East" and seek to get closer to the European space, economically controlled by Germany. Russians and other nations living in Ukraine may become hostages of the "mid-European" policy of these republics, in which case their fate will be similar to that of the Serbs in Croatia.

This comparison, among other things, shows that in geopolitical and diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia should be guided by their fundamental understanding of the problem of Central Europe, i.e. first of all, Germany. To be realistic in this matter, one should proceed in its solution not from pathetic slogans about "the unity of the blood brothers of the Slavs" (how this "unity" happens can be seen from the example of the Serbo-Choir massacre), but from a deep analysis of the logic of Russian-German relations, since both Ukraine and even Poland are not independent geopolitical formations, but only border regions of the two Great Spaces of Eurasia - Russia and Central Europe. We must not forget that the conflict in this border zone is extremely beneficial for another geopolitical force in the West. It is no coincidence that Anglo-Saxon diplomacy has always considered all territories from Romania to the Baltic states as a "sanitary belt"

The Serbo-Muslim conflict is an analogue of a possible Russian-Islamic confrontation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and it is important to note that in this case, too, the Muslim republics that were part of the USSR are a zone of competitive geopolitical influence of Turkey and Iran. As in the case of the Yugoslav Muslims, this comparison shows that the republics oriented towards Iran are more likely to come to geopolitical harmony with the main Russian bloc of the Eurasian continent. On the contrary, the geopolitical factor of Turkey, which is currently playing the role of a conductor of Atlanticist policy in this region, is inevitably associated with dramatic and conflict situations.

The example of Yugoslavia shows what threatens Russia in the event of a similar course of events, and the fact that these events are really unfolding in the same channel, today no one doubts anymore. The only difference is in the speed, which is the greater, the smaller the space and the fewer peoples. In order to prevent a gigantic "Yugoslavia" in Russia, a bloody massacre monstrous in scale and consequences, it is necessary to give an answer to fundamental geopolitical questions in advance, to determine the Russian continental strategy, which should be guided by knowledge of the Russian political tradition and understanding of the main geopolitical tasks of Russia-Eurasia, " Geographical Axis of History ". At the same time, inertia, passive following the fatal course of events will not only be destructive for the entire system of continental security,

Chapter 6. From sacred geography to geopolitics

6.1 Geopolitics is an "intermediate" science

Geopolitical concepts have long been the most important factors in modern politics. They are built on general principles that make it easy to analyze the situation of any particular country and any particular region.

Geopolitics in the form in which it exists today is unquestionably secular, "profane" and secularized science. But, perhaps, it is she, among all other modern sciences, that has retained the greatest connection with Tradition and with traditional sciences. René Guénon said that modern chemistry is the result of the desacralization of the traditional science of alchemy, and modern physics is magic. In the same way, we can say that modern geopolitics is a product of secularization, desacralization of another traditional science of sacred geography. But since geopolitics occupies a special place among modern sciences, and it is often referred to as "pseudosciences", its profanation is not as perfect and irreversible as in the case of chemistry or physics. The links with sacred geography are clearly visible here. Therefore, we can say

6.2 Land and sea

The two initial concepts in geopolitics are land and sea. It is these two elements, Earth and Water, that lie at the heart of a person's qualitative understanding of earthly space. In the experience of land and sea, land and water, man comes into contact with the fundamental aspects of his existence. Dryness is stability, density, fixity, space as such. Water is mobility, softness, dynamics, time.

These two elements are the most obvious manifestations of the material nature of the world. They are outside of man: everything is solid and liquid. They are inside him: body and blood. (It's the same at the cellular level.)

The universality of the experience of earth and water gives rise to the traditional concept of the Heavenly firmament, since the presence of the Upper Waters (a source of rain) in the sky also presupposes the presence of a symmetrical and obligatory element of earth, land, and heavenly stronghold. Be that as it may, the Earth, the Sea, the Ocean are the main categories of earthly existence, and humanity cannot but see in them some basic attributes of the universe. As the two main terms of geopolitics, they retain their meaning both for civilizations of the traditional type and for purely modern states, peoples and ideological blocs. At the level of global geopolitical phenomena, Land and Sea gave rise to the terms: thalassocracy and tellurocracy, i.e. "power through the sea" and "power through land".

Every state, every empire bases its strength on the preferred development of one of these categories. Empires are either "thalassocratic" or "tellurocratic". The first assumes the presence of a metropolis and colonies, the second the capital and provinces on the "common land". In the case of "thalassocracy", its territories are not united in one land space, which creates a discontinuity factor. The sea is and

strong and weak point of "thalassocratic power". Tellurocracy, on the other hand, has the quality of territorial continuity.

But geographic and cosmological logic immediately complicate the seemingly simple scheme of this division: the pair "earth - sea", when its elements are superimposed on each other, gives the ideas of "sea land" and "earth water". Sea land is an island, i.e. the basis of the naval empire, the pole of thalassocracy. Earth water or land water are rivers that predetermine the development of the land empire. It is on the river that the cities are located, and therefore the capital, the pole of the tellurocracy. This symmetry is both symbolic and economic-economic and geographical at the same time. It is important to note that the status of the Island and the Continent is determined not so much on the basis of their physical size, but on the basis of the specifics of the typical consciousness of the population. Thus, the geopolitics of the United States is insular in nature, despite the size of North America,

Another detail is also important: historically, thalassocracy is associated with the West and the Atlantic Ocean, and tellurocracy with the East and the Eurasian continent. (The above example of Japan is explained, therefore, by a stronger "attraction", the influence of Eurasia.)

Thalassocracy and Atlanticism became synonymous long before the colonial expansion of Great Britain or the Portuguese-Spanish conquests. Even before the wave of sea migrations began, the peoples of the West and their cultures began to move eastward from the centers located in the Atlantic. The Mediterranean was also developed from Gibraltar to the Middle East, and not vice versa. And on the contrary, excavations in Eastern Siberia and Mongolia show that it was here that the most ancient centers of civilization existed, which means that it was the central lands of the continent that were the cradle of Eurasian mankind.

6.3 Landscape symbolism

In addition to the two global categories Land and Sea, geopolitics also operates with more specific definitions. Among the thalassocratic realities, marine and oceanic formations are distinguished. Thus, the civilization of the seas, for example, the Black or the Mediterranean, is very different in quality from the civilization of the oceans, i.e. island powers and peoples inhabiting the shores of the open oceans. A more frequent division is also river and lake civilizations associated with continents.

Tellurocracy also has its own specific forms. Thus, one can distinguish between the civilization of the Steppe and the civilization of the Forest, the civilization of the Mountains and the civilization of the Valleys, the civilization of the Desert and the civilization of Ice. Varieties of landscape in sacred geography are understood as symbolic complexes associated with the specifics of the state, religious and ethical ideology of certain peoples. And even in the case when we are dealing with a universalist ecumenist religion, anyway its concrete embodiment in a particular people, race, state will be subject to adaptation in accordance with the local sacred-geographic context.

Deserts and steppes are the geopolitical microcosm of the nomads. It is in the deserts and steppes that the tellurocratic tendencies reach their peak, since the "water" factor is minimized here. It is the empires of the Desert and the Steppe that should logically be the geopolitical foothold of the tellurocracy.

The empire of the Steppe can be considered the empire of Genghis Khan, and the typical example of the empire of the Desert is the Arab Caliphate, which arose under the direct influence of the nomads.

Mountains and mountain civilizations are most often archaic, fragmentary formations. Mountainous countries are not only not sources of expansion, but on the contrary, victims of the geopolitical expansion of other tellurocratic forces are drawn to them. No empire has mountainous regions as its center. Hence the so often repeated motif of sacred geography: "the mountains are inhabited by demons." On the other hand, the idea of preserving the remnants of ancient races and civilizations in the mountains is reflected in the fact that the sacred centers of tradition are located in the mountains. One could even say that in the tellurocracy mountains are associated with some kind of spiritual power.

The symbolism of the hill became the logical combination of both concepts of mountains as an image of the priestly and the plain as an image of the royal. low to medium elevation. The hill is a symbol of royal power, rising above the secular level of the steppe, but not going beyond the state interests (as is the case in the case of the mountains). The hill is the seat of the king, duke, emperor, but not a priest. All the capitals of large tellurocratic empires are located on a hill or on hills (often seven according to the number of planets; five according to the number of elements, including ether, etc.).

The forest in sacred geography, in a sense, is close to the mountains. The very symbolism of the tree is related to the symbolism of the mountain (both denote the axis of the world). Therefore, the forest in tellurocracy also performs a peripheral function; it is also a "place of priests" (druids, magi, hermits), but at the same time it is a "place of demons", i.e. archaic remnants of a vanished past. The forest zone also cannot be the center of a land empire.

The tundra is the northern counterpart of the steppe and desert, but the cold climate makes it much less important from a geopolitical point of view. This "peripherality" reaches its apogee in ice, which, like mountains, are zones of deep archaism. It is significant that the shamanic tradition of the Eskimos presupposes a lonely retreat into the ice, where the other world is revealed to the future shaman. Thus, the ice is a priestly zone, the threshold of another world.

Given these initial and most general characteristics of the geopolitical map, it is possible to define different regions of the planet in accordance with their sacred quality. This method is also applicable to local features of the landscape at the level of a particular country or even a separate area. It is also possible to trace the similarity of ideologies and traditions among the most seemingly different peoples in the event that the indigenous landscape of their habitat is the same.

6.4 East and West in sacred geography

The sides of the World in the context of sacred geography have a special qualitative characteristic. In different traditions and in different periods of these traditions, the picture of sacred geography can change in accordance with the cyclical phases of the development of this tradition. At the same time, the symbolic function of the Cardinal points often varies. Without going into details, we can formulate the most universal law of sacred geography in relation to the East and West.

The East in sacred geography on the basis of "cosmic symbolism" is traditionally considered the "land of the Spirit", the land of paradise, the land of fullness, abundance, the "homeland" of the sacred in its most complete and perfect form. In particular, this idea is reflected in the text of the Bible, which refers to the eastern location of "Eden". Exactly this understanding is characteristic of other Abrahamic traditions (Islam and Judaism), as well as many non-Abrahamic traditions of Chinese, Hindu and Iranian. "East is the abode of the gods," says the sacred formula of the ancient Egyptians, and the very word "east" (in Egyptian "neter") meant at the same time "god". From the point of view of natural symbolism, the East is the place where the sun rises, "rises", the Light of the World, the material symbol of the Divine and the Spirit.

The West has exactly the opposite symbolic meaning. This is the "land of death", "the world of the dead", "green country" (as the ancient Egyptians called it). The West is the "kingdom of exile," "the well of alienation," as the Islamic mystics put it. The West is the "anti-East", the country of "decline", decline, degradation, transition from the manifested to the unmanifest, from life to death, from completeness to poverty, and so on. West is the place where the sun sets, where it "sets".

In accordance with this logic of natural cosmic symbolism, ancient traditions organized their "sacred space", founded their cult centers, burials, temples and buildings, comprehended the natural and "civilizational" features of the geographic, cultural and state territories of the planet. Thus, the very structure of migrations, wars, campaigns, demographic waves, empire building, etc. was determined by the original, paradigmatic logic of sacred geography. Nations and civilizations were lined up along the East-West axis, possessing hierarchical characteristics, the closer to the East, the closer to the Sacred, to Tradition, to spiritual abundance. The closer to the West, the greater the decline, degradation and mortification of the Spirit.

Of course, this logic was not absolute, but at the same time, it was not secondary and relative, as many "profane" researchers of ancient religions and traditions mistakenly believe today. In fact, sacred logic and adherence to cosmic symbolism were much more conscious, meaningful and effective among the ancient peoples than is commonly believed today. And even in our anti-sacred world, at the level of the "unconscious", the archetypes of sacred geography are almost always preserved intact and awaken at the most important and critical moments of social cataclysms.

So, sacred geography unambiguously affirms the law of "qualitative space", in which the East is a symbolic "ontological plus", and the West is the "ontological minus".

According to Chinese tradition, East is yang, masculine, light, solar principle, and West is yin, feminine, dark, lunar principle.

6.5 East and West in modern geopolitics

Now let's see how this sacred-geographical logic is reflected in geopolitics, which, being a purely modern science, fixes only the actual state of affairs, leaving behind the scenes the sacred principles themselves.

Geopolitics in its original formulation by Ratzel, Kjellen and Mackinder (and later by Haushofer and the Russian Eurasians) proceeded precisely from the peculiarities of various types of civilizations and states, depending on their geographic location. Geopoliticians have documented the fact of a fundamental difference between the "insular" and "continental" powers, between the "western", "progressive" civilization and the "eastern", "despotic" and "archaic" cultural forms. Since the question of Spirit in its metaphysical and sacred understanding is never raised in modern science at all, geopoliticians leave it aside, preferring to assess the situation in other, more modern terms than the concepts of "sacral" and "profane", "traditional"

Geopoliticians record the fundamental difference between the state, cultural and industrial development of the regions of the East and the regions of the West in recent centuries. The picture is as follows. The West is the center of "material" and "technological" development. At the cultural and ideological level, it is dominated by "liberal democratic" tendencies, an individualistic and humanistic worldview. At the economic level, priority is given to trade and technical modernization. It was in the West that the theories of "progress", "evolution", "progressive development of history" first appeared, completely alien to the traditional world of the East (and those periods of the history of the West when a full-fledged sacred tradition existed in it, as, in particular, it took place in Middle Ages). Coercion at the social level in the West acquired a purely economic character, and the Law of Idea and Power was replaced by the Law of Money. Gradually, the specificity of the "ideology of the West" was molded into the universal formula of the "ideology of human rights", which became the dominant principle of the westernmost region of the planet of North America, and above all, the United States. At the industrial level, this ideology corresponded to the idea of "developed countries", and at the economic level, the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept but at the economic level the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept and at the economic level, the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of a purely military, strategic association of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the concept "Atlanticism". In the last century, geopoliticians talked about "Anglo-Saxon type civilization" or about the "capitalist, bourgeois "Atlanticist" democracy". In that type has found its purest embodiment formula "geopolitical West".

Geopolitical East presents by myself straight opposite geopolitical West. Instead of modernizing the economy, it is dominated by traditional, archaic forms of production of the corporate, guild type ("developing countries"). Instead of economic coercion, the state most often uses "moral" or simply physical coercion (the Law of Idea and the Law of Power). Instead of "democracy" and "human rights," the East gravitates towards totalitarianism, socialism and authoritarianism, i.e. to various types of social regimes, united only in the fact that in the center of their systems there is not an "individual", a "man" with his "rights" and his purely "individual values", but something extra-individual, extrahuman, be it "society", "nation", "people", "idea", "world outlook", "

"non-individualistic-power"). Typical forms of such anti-Western

civilizations were the USSR, communist China, Japan until 1945 or Iran Khomeini.

It is interesting to note that Rudolf Kjellen, the author who first used the term "geopolitics", illustrated the difference between the West and the East in this way. "The typical American sentence," Challen wrote, is "go ahead," which literally means "forward." This reflects the inner and natural geopolitical optimism and "progressism" of American civilization, which is the ultimate form of the Western model. Russians usually repeat the word "nothing." (in Russian, in the text of A.D. Kjellen) This is the manifestation of "pessimism", "contemplation", "fatalism" and "adherence to tradition" characteristic of the East. "

If we return now to the paradigm of sacred geography, we will see a direct contradiction between the priorities of modern geopolitics (concepts such as "progress", "liberalism", "human rights", "trading system", etc., have become positive today for the majority. terms) and priorities of sacred geography, assessing the types of civilization from a completely opposite point of view (concepts such as "spirit", "contemplation", "obedience to superhuman strength or superhuman idea", "ideocracy", etc. in sacred civilization were purely positive and still remain so for the peoples of the East at the level of their "collective unconscious"). Thus, modern geopolitics (with the exception of the Russian Eurasians, the German followers of Haushofer, Islamic fundamentalists, etc.) assesses the picture of the world in exactly the opposite way than traditional sacred geography. But at the same time, both sciences converge in describing the fundamental laws of the geographical picture of civilization.

6.6 Sacred North and Sacred South

In addition to sacred-geographical determinism along the East-West axis, the problem of another, vertical, axis of orientations of the North-South axis is extremely important. Here, as in all other cases, the principles of sacred geography, the symbolism of the cardinal points and the continents corresponding to them have a direct analogue in the geopolitical picture of the world, which either develops naturally in the course of the historical process, or is consciously and artificially constructed as a result of the purposeful actions of the leaders of certain other geopolitical entities. From the point of view of "integral traditionalism", the difference between "artificial" and "natural" is generally quite relative, since Tradition has never known anything similar to Cartesian or Kantian dualism, strictly separating "subjective" and "objective" ("phenomenal" and "noumenal"). Therefore, the sacred determinism of the North or South is not only a physical, natural, landscape-climatic factor (that is, something "objective") or only an "idea", a "concept" generated by the minds of certain individuals (that is, something "subjective"), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand. generated by the minds of certain individuals (ie, something "subjective"), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand. generated by the minds of certain individuals (ie, something "subjective"), but something third, surpassing both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other hand.

The most ancient and primordial layer of Tradition unambiguously affirms the primacy of the North over the South. The symbolism of the North refers to the Source, to the primordial Nordic paradise, from where all human civilization originates. Ancient Iranian and Zoroastrian texts speak of the northern country "Aryan Vaeja" and its capital "Vara", from where the ancient Aryans were expelled by glaciation, which was sent on them by Ahriman, the spirit of Evil

and the enemy of the light Ormuzd. The ancient Vedas also speak of the Northern Land as the ancestral home of the Hindus, of Sveta-dvipa, the White Land, lying in the far north.

The ancient Greeks spoke of Hyperborea, the northern island with the capital Tula. This land was considered the birthplace of the luminous god Apollo. And in many other traditions one can find traces of the most ancient, often forgotten and become fragmentary, Nordic symbolism. The main idea traditionally associated with the North is the idea of a Center, a Fixed Pole, a point of Eternity, around which not only space revolves, but also time, a cycle. The North is a land where the sun does not set even at night, a space of eternal light. Every sacred tradition reveres the Center, the Middle, the point where opposites converge, a symbolic place that is not subject to the laws of cosmic entropy. This Center, the symbol of which is the Swastika (emphasizing the immobility and constancy of the Center and the mobility and variability of the periphery), in each tradition was called differently, but he was always directly or indirectly associated with the symbolism of the North. Therefore, we can say that all sacred traditions are the essence of the projection of the United Northern Primordial Tradition, adapted to various historical conditions. The North is the side of the Light, chosen by the original Logos in order to manifest itself in History, and any subsequent manifestation of it only restored the original polar paradise symbolism.

Sacred geography correlates the North with spirit, light, purity, completeness, unity, eternity.

The South symbolizes something exactly the opposite of materiality, darkness, confusion, deprivation, plurality, immersion in the flow of time and becoming. Even from a natural point of view, in the polar regions there is one long half-year Day and one long half-year Night. This is the Day and Night of gods and heroes, angels. Even degraded traditions remembered this sacred, spiritual, supernatural side of the North, considering the northern regions to be the abode of "spirits" and "otherworldly forces". In the South, the Day and Night of the gods split into many human days, the original symbolism of Hyperborea is lost, and the memory of it becomes a factor of "culture", "tradition". In general, the South is often related to culture, i.e. with that sphere of human activity, where the Invisible and Purely Spiritual acquires its material, rough, visible outlines. The South is the realm of matter, life, biology and instinct. The South decomposes the northern purity of Tradition, but retains its traces in materialized form.

The North-South pair in sacred geography is not reduced to an abstract opposition of Good and Evil. Rather, it is a confrontation between the Spiritual Idea and its coarse, material embodiment. In the normal case, with the primacy of the North recognized by the South, there are harmonious relations between these sides of the world. The North "spiritualizes" the South, the Nordic envoys give the Southerners a Tradition, lay the foundations of sacred civilizations. If the South refuses to recognize the primacy of the North, a sacred confrontation begins, a "war of the continents", and, from the point of view of tradition, it is the South that is responsible for this conflict by its transgression of sacred norms. In the Ramayana, for example, the southern island of Lanka is considered the abode of the demons who kidnapped Rama's wife Sita and declared war on the continental North with the capital Ayodhya.

It is important to note that the North-South axis in sacred geography is more important than the East-West axis. But being more important, it relates to the most ancient stages of cyclical history. Great War of the North and South, Hyperborea and

Gondwana (ancient paleocontinent of the South) belongs to the "antediluvian" times. In the last phases of the cycle, it becomes more hidden, veiled. The ancient paleo-continent of the North and South are also disappearing. The confrontation relay passes to the East and West.

The change from the vertical North-South axis to the horizontal East-West, which is characteristic of the last stages of the cycle, nevertheless retains a logical and symbolic connection between these two sacred-geographic pairs. The North-South pair (ie Spirit-Matter, Eternity-Time) is projected onto the East-West pair (ie Tradition and Profanation, Source and Sunset). East is a horizontal projection of the North downwards. West is a horizontal projection of the South upward. From such a transfer of sacred meanings, one can easily obtain the structure of the continental vision inherent in the Tradition.

6.7 People of the North

The Sacred North defines a special human type, which may have its own biological, racial incarnation, but may not have it. The essence of "Nordism" lies in the ability of a person to raise every object of the physical, material world to its archetype, to its Idea. This quality is not a simple development of the rational principle. On the contrary, the Cartesian and Kantian "pure reason" is just not able to naturally overcome the fine line between "phenomenon" and "noumenon", but it is this ability that lies at the basis of "Nordic" thinking. A man of the North is not just white, "Aryan" or Indo-European by blood, language and culture. The Man of the North is a specific type of being endowed with the direct intuition of the Sacred. For him, space is a fabric of symbols, each of which points to the hidden Spiritual First Principle. A man of the North is a "solar man", *Sonnenmensch*, who does not absorb energy like a black substance, but releases it, pouring out streams of creation, light, strength and wisdom from his soul.

The purely Nordic civilization disappeared along with the ancient Hyperborea, but it was its messengers who laid the foundations of all existing traditions. It was this Nordic "race" of Teachers that stood at the origins of religions and cultures of peoples of all continents and skin colors. Traces of the Hyperborean cult can be found among the Indians of North America, and among the ancient Slavs, and among the founders of Chinese civilization, and among the Pacific aborigines, and among blond Germans, and among the black shamans of West Africa, and among the red-skinned Aztecs, and among the cheek-cheeked Mongols. There is no such people on the planet that does not have the myth of the "solar man", *Sonnenmensch*. The true spiritual, super-rational Mind, the divine Logos, the ability to see his secret Soul through the world are the defining qualities of the North. Where there is Sacred Purity and Wisdom, the North is invisibly present there,

6.8 People of the South

The Man of the South, the Gondwana type, is the exact opposite of the "Nordic" type. The man of the South lives surrounded by consequences, secondary manifestations; he is in the cosmos, which he reveres but does not understand. He worships the outside, but not the inside. He carefully preserves the traces of spirituality, its embodiment in the material environment, but is unable to move from the symbolic to the symbolized. A man of the South lives with passions and impulses, he puts the spiritual above the spiritual (which he simply does not know) and respects Life as the highest authority. The man of the South is characterized by a cult

Great Mother, matter that generates a variety of forms. The civilization of the South is the civilization of the Moon, receiving its light from the Sun (North), preserving and transmitting it for some time, but periodically losing contact with it (new moon). Man of the South Mondmensch.

When the people of the South are in harmony with the people of the North, i.e. recognize their authority and their typological (and not racial) superiority, civilizational harmony reigns. When they claim the supremacy of their archetypal relationship to reality, a distorted cultural type arises, which can be collectively defined as idolatry, fetishism, or paganism (in the negative, derogatory sense of the term).

As in the case of paleo-continents, pure northern and southern types existed only in ancient times. The people of the North and the people of the South confronted each other in the original eras. Later, entire peoples of the North penetrated into the southern lands, sometimes founding the pronounced "Nordic" civilizations of ancient Iran and India. On the other hand, southerners sometimes went far to the North, carrying their cultural type, the Finns, Eskimos, Chukchi, etc. Gradually, the initial clarity of the sacred-geographical panorama was dimmed. But in spite of everything, the typological dualism of "people of the North" and "people of the South" persisted at all times and in all eras, but not so much as an external conflict between two different civilizations, but as an internal conflict within the same civilization. The type of the North and the type of the South, starting from a certain moment in the sacred history,

6.9 North and South in the East and in the West

The type of people of the North could be projected to the South, to the East, and to the West. In the South, the Light of the North gave birth to great metaphysical civilizations, like the Indian, Iranian or Chinese, which in the situation of the "conservative" South for a long time preserved the Revelation entrusted to them. However, the simplicity and clarity of northern symbolism turned here into complex and varied intricacies of sacred doctrines, rituals and ceremonies. However, the further to the South, the weaker the traces of the North. And among the inhabitants of the Pacific islands and southern Africa, "Nordic" motifs in mythology and rituals are preserved in an extremely fragmented, rudimentary and even distorted form.

In the East, the North manifests itself as a classical traditional society based on the unambiguous superiority of the super-individual over the individual, where the "human" and "rational" are obliterated in the face of the superhuman and super-rational Principle. If the South gives civilization the character of "stability", then the East defines its sacredness and authenticity, the main guarantor of which is the Light of the North.

In the West, the North manifested itself in heroic societies, where the tendency to fragmentation, individualization and rationalization inherent in the West as such overcame itself, and the individual, becoming a Hero, went beyond the narrow framework of the "human-too-human" personality. The North in the West is personified by the symbolic figure of Hercules, who, on the one hand, frees Prometheus (a purely Western, godless, "humanistic" tendency), and on the other hand helps Zeus and the gods defeat the giants who rebelled against them (that is, serves for the benefit of the sacred norms and spiritual Order).

South, on the other hand, is projected into all three orientations in exactly the opposite way. In the North, it gives the effect of "archaism" and cultural stagnation. Even the northern, "Nordic" traditions themselves, under the influence of the southern, "Paleo-Asian", "Finnish" or "Eskimo" elements, acquire the character of "idolatry" and "fetishism". (This, in particular, is characteristic of the German-Scandinavian civilization of the "Skald era".)

In the East, the forces of the South are manifested in despotic societies, where the normal and just Eastern indifference to the individual turns into a denial of the great Superhuman Subject. All forms of totalitarianism in the East are both typologically and racially related to the South.

And finally, in the West, the South manifests itself in extremely coarse, materialistic forms of individualism, when atomic individuals reach the limit of anti-heroic degeneration, worshipping only the "golden calf" of comfort and egoistic hedonism. It is obvious that it is precisely this combination of two sacred-geopolitical tendencies that gives the most negative type of civilization, since in it two orientations are superimposed, already negative in themselves, the South vertically and the West horizontally.

6.10 From continents to meta-continents

If in the perspective of sacred geography the symbolic North unambiguously corresponds to the positive aspects, and the South to the negative, then in a purely modern geopolitical picture of the world, everything is much more complicated, and in some way, even vice versa. Modern geopolitics under the term "North" and "South" understands completely different categories than sacred geography.

First, the paleo-continent of the North, Hyperborea, has not existed on the physical level for many millennia, remaining a spiritual reality, towards which the spiritual gaze of initiates seeking the original Tradition is directed.

Secondly, the ancient Nordic race, the race of "white teachers" who came from the Pole in the primordial era, does not at all coincide with what is commonly called the "white race" today, based only on physical characteristics, on skin color, etc. The North of Tradition and its original population, "Nordic autochthons" have long ceased to represent a concrete historical and geographical reality. Apparently, even the last remnants of this primordial culture disappeared from physical reality several millennia ago.

Thus, the North in Tradition is a metahistorical and metageographic reality. The same can be said about the "Hyperborean race"; it is a "race" not in a biological, but in a purely spiritual, metaphysical sense. (The theme of "metaphysical races" was developed in detail in the writings of Julius Evola).

The continent of the South and the South as a whole Traditions have long ceased to exist in their pure form, as well as its most ancient population. In a certain sense, almost the entire planet became the "South" from a certain moment, as the influence on the world of the original polar initiatory center and its messengers decreased. The modern races of the South are the product of numerous mixtures with the races of the North, and skin color has long ceased to be the main distinguishing feature of belonging to one or another "metaphysical race."

In other words, the modern geopolitical picture of the world has very little in common with the fundamental vision of the world in its super-historical, over-temporal section. The continents and their populations in our era have completely moved away from those archetypes that corresponded to them in primordial times. Therefore, between real continents and real races (as the realities of modern geopolitics), on the one hand, and meta-continents and metaraces (as realities of traditional sacred geography), on the other hand, today there is not just a difference, but almost an inverse correspondence.

6.11 The "rich North" illusion

Modern geopolitics uses the concept of "north" most often with the definition of "rich", "rich North", as well as "developed North". This is understood as the entire totality of Western civilization, which focuses on the development of the material and economic side of life. The "rich North" is rich not because it is smarter, more intellectual or spiritual than the "South", but because it builds its social system on the principle of maximizing material benefits that can be derived from social and natural potential, from exploitation of human and natural resources. The "Rich North" is racially linked to those peoples who are white, and this trait underlies various versions of overt or implicit "Western racism." (especially Anglo-Saxon). The successes of the "rich North" in the material sphere were elevated to a political and even "racial" principle precisely in those countries that were at the forefront of industrial, technical and economic development, ie. England, Holland, and later Germany and the USA. In this case, material and quantitative well-being was equated to a qualitative criterion, and on this basis the most ridiculous prejudices about "barbarism", "primitiveness", "underdevelopment" and "subhumanity" of the southern (i.e., not belonging to the "rich North ") peoples. This "economic racism" was especially evident in the Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests, and later embellished versions of it entered the most crude and contradictory aspects of National Socialist ideology. Moreover, often Nazi ideologists simply mixed vague guesses about purely "spiritual Nordism" and "spiritual Aryan race" with vulgar, mercantile, biological-commercial racism of the English type. (By the way, it was this substitution of the categories of sacred geography with the categories of material and technical development that was the most negative side of National Socialism, which led it, in the end, to political, theoretical and even military collapse). But even after the defeat of the Third Reich, this type of racism of the "rich North" by no means disappeared from political life. However, it was primarily the United States and its Atlanticist collaborators in Western Europe that became its bearers. Sure,

In fact, the "rich North" geopolitically means those countries in which the forces that are directly opposite to Traditions, the forces of quantity, materialism, atheism, spiritual degradation and mental degeneration have won. "Rich North" means something radically different from "spiritual Nordism", from the "Hyperborean spirit". The essence of the North in sacred geography is the primacy of spirit over matter, final and total

the victory of Light, Justice and Purity over the darkness of animal life, the arbitrariness of individual preferences and the filth of low egoism. On the contrary, the "rich North" of mondialist geopolitics means purely material well-being, hedonism, a consumer society, a problem-free and artificial pseudo-swarm of those whom Nietzsche called "the last people". The material progress of technical civilization was accompanied by a monstrous spiritual regression of a truly sacred culture, and therefore, from the point of view of Tradition, the "wealth" of the modern "developed" North cannot serve as a criterion of true superiority over the material "poverty" and technical backwardness of the modern "primitive South".

Moreover, the "poverty" of the South at the material level is very often inversely associated with the preservation of truly sacred forms of civilization in the southern regions, which means that spiritual wealth is sometimes hidden behind this "poverty". At least two sacred civilizations continue to exist in the South to this day, despite all the attempts of the "rich (and aggressive) North" to impose their own standards and development paths on everyone. This is Hindu India and the Islamic world. There are different points of view regarding the Far Eastern tradition, as some see, even under the cover of "Marxist" and "Maoist" rhetoric, some traditional principles that have always been decisive for the Chinese sacred civilization. Be that as it may, even those southern regions

6.12 The Third World Paradox

The "Poor South" in mondialist projects is actually synonymous with the "Third World". This world was named "third" during the Cold War, and this very concept suggested that the first two "worlds", the developed capitalist and the less developed Soviet, were more important and significant for global geopolitics than all other regions. In principle, the expression "Third World" has a derogatory meaning, since, according to the very logic of the utilitarian approach of the "rich North", such a definition actually equates the countries of the "Third World" with "no man's" bases of natural and human resources, which should only be subjugated, exploited and used for their own purposes. At the same time, the "rich North" he skillfully played on the traditional political, ideological and religious characteristics of the "poor South", trying to put at the service of his purely materialistic and economic interests those forces and structures that in their spiritual potential far exceeded the spiritual level of the "North" itself. He almost always succeeded, since the very cyclical moment in the development of our civilization favors perverse, abnormal and unnatural tendencies (according to Tradition, we are now in the very last period of the "dark age", Kali Yuga). Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, the autochthonous traditions of the "non-white" peoples became for the material conquerors of the "rich North" only obstacles to the realization of their goals, but at the same time they often used certain aspects of the Tradition to achieve mercantile goals, playing on contradictions, religious characteristics or national problems. Such a utilitarian use of aspects of Tradition for purely anti-traditional purposes was even more evil than outright denial of the entire Tradition as a whole, since the highest perversion consists in making the great serve the insignificant.

In fact, the "poor South" is "poor" at the material level precisely because of its essentially spiritual orientation, which deviates to material aspects. existence is always a secondary and unimportant place. The geopolitical South in our era has retained, in general terms, a purely traditionalist attitude towards objects of the outside world, an attitude of calm, detached and, in the end, indifferent in direct opposition to the material obsession of the "rich North", despite its materialistic and hedonistic paranoia. People of the "poor South" in the normal case, being in Tradition, and still live fuller, deeper and even more luxurious, since active participation in the sacred Tradition endows all aspects of their personal life with that meaning, that intensity, that saturation that they have long been deprived of. representatives of the "rich North", tormented by neuroses, material fear, inner emptiness, complete aimlessness of existence,

It could be said that the relationship between North and South in the original times is polar opposite to the relationship between them in our era, since it is the South that still retains ties with Tradition, while the North has finally lost them. But nevertheless, this statement does not quite cover the completeness of the real picture, since the true Tradition cannot tolerate such humiliating treatment in relation to itself, which is practiced by the aggressive-atheistic "rich North" with the "Third World". The fact is that Tradition is preserved in the South only inertially, fragmentarily, partially. She takes a passive position and resists only defending herself. Therefore, at the end of time, the spiritual North does not fully move to the South; in the South, spiritual impulses that once came from the sacred North only accumulate and remain. In principle, an active traditional initiative cannot come from the South. Conversely, the mondialist "rich North" managed to strengthen its pernicious influence on the planet in such a way due to the very specificity of the northern regions, predisposed to activity. The North has been and remains a place of power for the most part, so geopolitical initiatives coming from the North are of true effectiveness.

The "Poor South" today has all the spiritual advantages over the "rich North", but at the same time it cannot serve as a serious alternative to the profane aggression of the "rich North", cannot offer a radical geopolitical project capable of disrupting the pathological picture of modern planetary space.

6.13 The Role of the "Second World"

In the bipolar geopolitical picture of the "rich North" "poor South" there has always been an additional component that had an independent and very important significance. This is the "second world". Under the "second world" it is customary to understand the socialist camp, integrated into the Soviet system. This "second world" was neither a truly "rich North", since certain spiritual motives implicitly influenced the nominally materialist ideology of Soviet socialism, nor a truly "Third World", since, in general, an orientation toward material development, "progress" and other purely profane principles were at the heart of the Soviet system. Geopolitically, the Eurasian USSR was also located both on the territories of "poor Asia" and on the lands of a rather "civilized" Europe. During the period of socialism, the planetary belt of the "rich North" was opened in the east of Eurasia, complicating the clarity of geopolitical relationships along the North-South axis.

The end of the "Second World" as a special civilization presupposes two alternatives for the Eurasian spaces of the former USSR either to integrate into the "rich North" (represented by the West and the United States), or to slide to the "poor South", i.e. turn into the "Third World". A compromise variant of the withdrawal of part of the regions to the "North" and part to the "South" is also possible. As always in recent centuries, the initiative to redistribute geopolitical spaces in this process belongs to the "rich North", which, cynically using the paradoxes of the "Second World" concept itself, draws new geopolitical boundaries and redistributes zones of influence. National, economic and religious factors serve only as tools for the mondialists in their cynical and deeply materialistically motivated activities. It is not surprising that, in addition to false "humanistic" rhetoric, almost openly "racist" arguments are used more and more often to instill in Russians a complex of "white" arrogance towards Asian and Caucasian southerners. Correlated with this is the reverse process - the final throwing away of the southern territories of the former "Second World" to the "poor South" is accompanied by a game on fundamentalist tendencies, on people's craving for Tradition, for the revival of religion.

The "Second World", disintegrating, breaks down along the line of "traditionalism" (southern, inertial, conservative type) and "anti-traditionalism" (actively northern, modernist and materialistic type). Such a dualism, which is only outlined today, but will soon become the dominant phenomenon of Eurasian geopolitics, is predetermined by the expansion of the Mondialist understanding of the world in terms of the "rich North" and "poor South". An attempt to save the former Soviet Large Space, an attempt to simply preserve the "Second World" as something independent and balancing on the verge between North and South (in a purely modern sense), cannot be crowned with success until the very fundamental concept of modern geopolitics, understood and conscious in its real form,

The "second world" disappears. It no longer has a place in the modern geopolitical picture. At the same time, the pressure of the "rich North" on the "poor South" is growing, which is left alone with the aggressive materiality of technocratic civilization in the absence of an intermediate instance that has existed until now of the "Second World". Some other fate than a total split according to the rules dictated by the "rich North" for the "Second World" is possible only through a radical rejection of the planetary logic of the dichotomous North-South axis, taken in a mondialist key.

6.14 Project "Resurrection of the North"

The "rich mondialist North" is globalizing its dominance over the planet through the split and destruction of the "Second World". In modern geopolitics, this is called the "new world order". The active forces of anti-tradition consolidate their victory over the passive resistance of the southern regions, at the cost of economic backwardness, preserving and protecting Tradition in its residual forms. The internal geopolitical energies of the Second World face a choice either to integrate into the system of the "civilized northern belt" and finally cut ties with sacred history (left mondialism project), or turn into an occupied territory with the permission of partial restoration of some aspects of tradition (right mondialism project).

As an alternative project, one can theoretically formulate a different path of geopolitical transformations based on the rejection of the mondialist North-South logic and on the return to the spirit of true sacred geography as much as possible at the end of the dark age. This is the project of the "Great Return" or, in another terminology, "The Great War of the Continents".

In the most general terms, the essence of this project is as follows.

- one) *"The rich North "is not opposed to the" poor South ", but to the" poor North "*.
 "Poor North" is the ideal, sacred ideal of returning to the Nordic origins of civilization. Such a North is "poor" because it is based on total asceticism, on radical devotion to the highest values of the Tradition, on complete sacrifice of the material for the spiritual. The "Poor North" geographically exists only in the territories of Russia, which, being, in essence, the "Second World", socially and politically opposed until the last moment the final acceptance of the mondialist civilization in its most "progressive" forms. The Eurasian northern lands of Russia are the only planetary territories not fully developed by the "rich North", inhabited by traditional peoples and constituting the terra incognita of the modern world. The path of the "Poor North" for Russia means a refusal both from incorporation into the mondialist belt, and from the archaization of its own traditions and from their reduction to the folklore level of ethno-religious reservation. The "Poor North" must be spiritual, intellectual, active and aggressive. In other regions of the "rich North", potential opposition from the "poor North" is also possible, which can manifest itself in radical sabotage on the part of the Western intellectual elite of the fundamental course. "
- 2) *"The Poor South ", unable to stand up to the" rich North "on its own, enters into a radical alliance with the" poor (Eurasian) North "and begins a liberation struggle against the" northern "dictatorship.* It is especially important to strike at the representatives of the ideology of the "rich South", i.e. by the forces that, working for the "rich North", advocate "development", "progress" and "modernization" traditional countries, which in practice will only mean more and more departure from the remains of the sacred Tradition.
- 3) *"Poor North "Eurasian Of the East together from the poor South ", circumferentially the whole planet, concentrate their forces in the fight against the "rich North" of the Atlanticist West.* At the same time, ideologically, an end is forever put on the vulgar versions of Anglo-Saxon racism, the glorification of the "technical civilization of white peoples" and accompanying mondialist propaganda. (Alain de Benoist expressed this idea in the title of his famous book "The Third World and Europe: We Are United in the Struggle" "L'Europe, Tiersmonde meme combat"; it naturally refers to "spiritual Europe", about "Europe of peoples and traditions ", and not about" Maatstricht Europe of merchants. ") The intellectuality, activity and spirituality of the true sacred North returns the traditions of the South to the Nordic Source and raises the " Southerners "to a planetary revolt against the only geopolitical enemy. Passive

the resistance of the "southerners" thus acquires a fulcrum in the planetary messianism of the "northerners", who radically reject the vicious and anti-sacral branch of those white peoples who have taken the path of technical progress and material development. A planetary supraracial and supranational Geopolitical Revolution breaks out, based on the fundamental solidarity of the Third World with that part of the Second World that rejects the project of the "rich North".

PART VII TEXTS OF GEOPOLITICS

Halford George Mackinder

*GEOGRAPHIC HISTORY*⁸⁰

When, in the distant future, some historian wants to investigate the times that we are now experiencing and present them in a summarized formula, as we do today with respect to the dynasties of ancient Egypt, then it is very possible that he will call the last four hundred years the "era of Columbus" and will say that it ended shortly after 1900. Today it has become downright commonplace to speak of geographical research as something practically completed. It is also believed that geography should be reduced exclusively to careful survey and philosophical synthesis. For four hundred years, objects on the geographical map of the world have received fairly accurate and accurate outlines, and even in the areas of both poles, the expeditions of Nansen and Scott significantly reduced the possibilities of new and incredible discoveries. At the same time, the beginning of the twentieth century is qualified as the end of a great historical era, and this applies not only to its achievements, no matter how great they may be. The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer, the miner and, finally, the engineer literally followed in the footsteps of the travelers, which is why we can confidently say that the world in its most distant limits was already open before we started talking about its actual political development. In Europe, North and South America, Africa and Australasia, there is hardly a place where you could drive pegs into the ground, presenting title to the site. This is possible only in the course of a war between civilized and semi-civilized powers. Even in Asia, we are probably becoming spectators of the last acts of a play begun by Ermak's horsemen, Vasco de Gama's Cossacks and sailors. For comparison, we can contrast the era of Columbus with the preceding centuries, citing as its characteristic feature the expansion of Europe, which met practically no resistance, while medieval Christianity was driven into the framework of a small region and was under the threat of an external attack by barbarians. From today onwards, in the post-Columbian era, we will have to deal with a closed political system, and it is quite possible that this system will have a global scale. Each explosion of social forces, instead of dissipating in the surrounding unexplored space and the chaos of barbarism, will echo loudly from the opposite side of the globe, so that in the end all the weak elements in the political and economic organism of the Earth will be destroyed. There is a big difference between when a projectile hits a pit; and when it falls into an enclosed space between the rigid structures of a huge building or ship. Perhaps at least a partial understanding of this fact will finally divert the attention of statesmen from territorial expansion and force them to focus on the struggle for a coordinated creation.

That is why it seems to me that in the present decade we are for the first time in a position where we can try to establish, with a certain degree of certainty, the connection between the broadest geographic and historical generalizations. For the first time, we can grope for some real proportions in the correlation of events taking place on the world stage, and find out a formula that in one way or another will express certain aspects of the geographical conditionality of world history. If we

⁸⁰ Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geographical Journal", 1904.

lucky, then this formula will acquire practical value and with its help it will be possible to calculate the prospects for the development of some competing forces of the current international political life. The famous phrase that the empire spreads to the west is only an empirical attempt of this kind. So today I would like to describe those characteristic physical features of the world, which, in my opinion, are very closely related to human activity, and also to present some of the main phases of history organically connected with them, even when they were still unknown to geography. I do not set myself the goal of discussing the influence of this or that factor or engaging in regional geography, but rather I want to show the history of mankind as a part of the life of the world organism. I admit that I can only reach one aspect of truth here, and I am not at all inclined to indulge in excessive materialism. The initiative is manifested by man, not nature, but it is nature that exercises control to a greater extent. My interest lies more in the study of the universal natural factor than in the study of the causes of universal history. It is quite clear that here one can only hope for the first approximation to the truth, and therefore I will accept with humility all the remarks of my critics.

The late Professor Freeman said that the only history to be taken into account is the history of the Mediterranean and European races. In some respects, this is, of course, true, for it was among these races that ideas arose that led to the fact that the descendants of the Greeks and Romans began to dominate the whole world. However, in another and no less important respect, such a limitation considerably constrains thought. Ideas that shape a nation as opposed to a simple crowd of human beings are usually accepted under the pressure of general unhappiness, or else when there is a general need to resist outside force. The idea of England was driven into the states of Heptarchy by Danish and Norman conquerors, the idea of France was imposed by the Huns on the Franks, Goths and Romans who were arguing among themselves at the Battle of Chalon and later, during the Hundred Years War with England; the idea of Christianity was born out of persecution in the Roman Empire and was brought to its logical conclusion during the era of the Crusades. The idea of the United States was only embraced by the local patriotism of the colonists during the protracted War of Independence; the idea of a German empire was adopted, and even then reluctantly, in southern Germany after its struggle with France in alliance with northern Germany. What I can describe as a literary conception of history perhaps unwittingly leaves out of sight the original movements, whose pressure played the role of a stimulating impulse in the atmosphere in which great ideas were grown. Some disgusting person performs some important social function in uniting his enemies, so that it was thanks to the pressure of external barbarians that Europe was able to create its own civilization.

The most important contrast visible on the political map of modern Europe is the contrast represented, on the one hand, by the vast expanses of Russia, which occupies half of this continent, and a group of smaller territories occupied by Western European countries, on the other. From a physical point of view, there is, of course, a similar contrast between the uncultivated lowlands of the east and the wealth of mountains and valleys, islands and peninsulas that together make up the rest of this region of the globe. At first glance, it may seem to you that in these familiar facts we have such an obvious connection between the natural environment and political organization that it is hardly worth talking about it, especially if we mention that on the Russian Plain, a cold winter is opposed by a hot summer, and

the conditions of human existence thus bring additional uniformity to life. And nevertheless, several historical maps, contained, for example, in the Oxford Atlas, will show us that the rough coincidence of the European part of Russia with the East European Plain is not accidental, and this did not happen in the last hundred years, but in earlier times. there was a completely different trend in political unification. Two groups of states usually divided this country into northern and southern political systems. The fact is that orographic maps do not express that special physical originality that until recently controlled the movement and settlement of a person on the territory of Russia. As the blanket of snow gradually recedes north from these wide plains, it is replaced by rains, which are especially strong in May and June on the Black Sea coast, however, in the Baltic and White Sea areas, they pour more often in July and August. A long dry summer reigns in the south. The consequence of this climatic regime is that the northern and northwestern regions are covered with forests, whose thickets are occasionally interspersed with lakes and swamps, while the south and southeast are endless grassy steppes, where trees can be seen only along the banks of rivers. The line separating these two regions runs diagonally to the northeast, starting at the northern end of the Carpathians and ending in the southern regions of the Urals rather than in its northern part. Outside of Russia, the border of these huge forests runs westward, passing almost in the middle of the European isthmus, whose width (that is, the distance between the Baltic and Black Seas) is 800 miles. Behind him, in the rest of European territory, forests occupy the valleys of Germany in the north, while in the south the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion of the Carpathians and extend as far as the Danube, where the Romanian cornfields now sway, and all the way to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of the forest, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped land relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, to a large extent smoothing out the difference that was so noticeable before. while in the south, the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion near the Carpathians and extend to the Danube, where the Romanian fields now sway, and up to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. while in the south, the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion near the Carpathians and extend to the Danube, where the Romanian fields now sway, and up to the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known among local residents as "Pashta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian Plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before. it is bordered by a chain of wooded Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In the west of Russia, with the exception of the Far North, the clearing of forests, the draining of marshes and the rise of undeveloped lands have relatively recently determined the nature of the landscape, smoothing to a large extent the difference that was so noticeable before.

Russia and Poland arose in forest glades. At the same time, from the 5th to the 16th century, an uninterrupted series of Turanian nomads headed here through the steppes from remote and unknown corners of Asia to the range formed by the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea: Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Khazars, Pechenegs, Cumans, Mongols, Kalmyks. During the reign of Attila, the Huns established themselves in the middle of the Pashta, on the most remote "Danube" islets of the steppe, and from there they struck north, west and south on the settled population of Europe. Much of modern history can be written as a commentary on the changes, directly or indirectly, as a consequence of those raids. It is possible that it was then that the Angles and Saxons were forced to cross the sea and found England in the British Isles. For the first time francs, the Goths and the inhabitants of the Roman provinces were forced to stand shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield at Chalon, with the common goal of fighting the Asians; thus they involuntarily constituted modern France. Venice was founded as a result of the destruction of Aquileia and Padua; and even the papacy owes its immense prestige to the successful mediation of Pope Leo in his meeting with Attila in Milan. Such was the result produced by a crowd of ruthless and culture-less horsemen who flooded the uncontrollable plains, it was a blow freely delivered by an Asian hammer to an unoccupied space. The Avars followed the Huns. It was in the fight against them that Austria was founded, and as a result of the campaigns of Charlemagne, Vienna was fortified. Then came the Magyars, and thanks to their incessant raids from the steppe camps,

The Bulgarians became the ruling caste in the lands south of the Danube, leaving their name on the map of the world, although their language disappeared into the language of their Slavic subjects. Probably the most long-term and effective settlement in the Russian steppes was the settlement of the Khazars, who were contemporaries of the great Saracen movement: Arab geographers knew the Caspian Sea or the Khazar Sea. But, in the end, new hordes came from Mongolia and for two hundred years the Russian lands located in the forests north of these territories paid tribute to the Mongol khans or "Steppe", and thus the development of Russia was delayed and distorted at that time. when the rest of Europe was rapidly striding forward.

It should also be noted that the rivers running from these forests to the Black and Caspian Seas run across the entire steppe path of the nomads, and that from time to time along the course of these rivers there were random movements towards the movements of these horsemen. Thus, the missionaries of the Greek Church ascended the Dnieper to Kiev, just as shortly before that the northerners of the Varangians descended the same river on their way to Constantinople. However, even earlier, the Germanic tribe of the Goths appeared for a short time on the banks of the Dniester, passing through Europe from the shores of the Baltic in the same southeast direction. But these are all passing episodes, which, however, do not negate broader generalizations. For ten centuries, several waves of nomadic horsemen left Asia through a wide passage between the Urals and the Caspian Sea, crossing the open spaces of the South of Russia and, having acquired permanent residence in Hungary, fell into the very heart of Europe, thus introducing in the history of the neighboring peoples a moment of indispensable confrontation: this was the case with the Russians, Germans, French, Italians and Byzantine Greeks. The fact that they stimulated a healthy and powerful reaction instead of destructive opposition under widespread despotism was made possible by the fact that the mobility of their power was due to the steppe itself and inevitably disappeared when mountains and forests appeared around them.

This mobility of the power was characteristic of the Viking sailors. Descending from Scandinavia to the southern and northern coasts of Europe, they penetrated deep into its territory, using river routes for this. However, the scope of their actions was limited, since, in all fairness, their power extended only to the territories directly adjacent to the water. Thus, the sedentary population of Europe was caught in the grip between the Asiatic nomads from the east and the brigands who were crushing on three sides. By their very nature, neither side could overcome the other, so both of them had a stimulating effect. It should be noted that the formative influence of the Scandinavians was in second place after the similar influence of the nomads, because it was thanks to them that England and France began a long journey to their own unification, while a united Italy fell under their blows. Once upon a time, Rome could mobilize its population using roads, but now Roman roads have fallen into disrepair and did not change until the eighteenth century.

It seems that even the invasion of the Huns was by no means the first in this "Asian" series. The Scythians from the stories of Homer and Herodotus, who ate the milk of mares, most likely led the same lifestyle and probably belonged to the same race as the later inhabitants of the steppe. Celtic elements in the names of the rivers Don, Donets, Dnieper, Dniester and Danube could probably serve as a definition of concepts among people with similar habits, although not from the same race, but it does not seem that the Celts came from the northern forests, like the Goths and Varangians of subsequent times. However, a huge wedge of population, which anthropologists call brachycephalic, pushed westward from brachycephalic Asia through central Europe all the way to France, probably took root between

northern, western and southern groups of the dolichocephalic population and, quite possibly, it comes from Asia.

Meanwhile, the influence of Asia on Europe is imperceptible until the moment when we start talking about the Mongol invasion of the fifteenth century, however, before we analyze the facts concerning all this, it is advisable to change our "European" point of view so that we can represent the Old Light in all its integrity. Since the amount of precipitation depends on the sea, the middle of the greatest land masses are climatically dry enough. That is why it should come as no surprise that two-thirds of the world's population is concentrated in relatively small areas along the edges of the great continents in Europe near the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian and Pacific Oceans in India and China. Across the whole of North Africa up to Arabia stretches a wide strip of land that is almost unpopulated due to the practical absence of rain. Central and South Africa for most of their history were as separated from Europe and Asia as America and Australia. In fact, the southern border of Europe was and is more the Sahara than the Mediterranean, since it is this desert that separates white people from black people. The vast lands of Euro-Asia, thus enclosed between the ocean and the desert, amount to 21,000,000 square miles, that is, half of all the lands on the globe, if we exclude the deserts of the Sahara and Arabia from the calculations. There are many remote desert areas scattered throughout Asia, from Syria and Persia northeast towards Manchuria, but there are no deserts among them that can be compared with the Sahara. On the other hand, Euro-Asia is characterized by a very remarkable distribution of river flows. In most of the north and center, these rivers were practically useless for the purposes of human communication with the outside world. Volga, Oaks, Yaxart flow into salt lakes; Ob, Yenisei and Lena to the cold northern ocean. There are six great rivers in the world. In these same areas there are many, albeit smaller, but also significant rivers, such as the Tarim and Helmund, which again do not flow into the Ocean. Thus, the center of Euro-Asia, dotted with specks of desert, is, on the whole, a steppe area, representing vast, albeit often scarce, pastures, where there are not so few oases fed by rivers, but it should be emphasized once again that its entire territory is yet not penetrated by waterways coming from the ocean. In other words, in this large area we have all the conditions to support a rare, but in the aggregate very significant population of nomads, riding horses and camels. In the north, their kingdom is limited by a wide strip of sub-arctic forests and swamps, where the climate is too harsh, with the exception of the western and eastern extremities, for the development of agricultural settlements. In the east, forests go south to the Pacific coast along the Amur River to Manchuria. It's the same in the West; in prehistoric Europe, forests occupied the main territory. Bounded thus in the northeast, north and northwest, the steppes run without interruption for 4,000 miles from the Hungarian Pashta to the Malaya Gobi in Manchuria, and, with the exception of the westernmost tip, they are not crossed by rivers flowing into the ocean accessible to them, so that we can ignore the recent efforts to develop trade at the mouth of the Ob and Yenisei. In Europe, Western Siberia and Western Turkestan, the steppe lies close to sea level, in some places even below it. Further east, in Mongolia, they stretch in the form of a plateau; but the transition from one level to another, over bare, flat and low areas of arid central lands, does not present significant difficulties.

The hordes that ultimately attacked Europe in the mid-fourteenth century gathered their forces 3,000 miles from there, in the steppes of Upper Mongolia. Devastation committed over several years in Poland, Silesia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia

and Serbia, were, nevertheless, only the most distant and at the same time fleeting results of the great movement of the nomads of the east, associated with the name of Genghis Khan. While the Golden Horde occupied the Kipchak steppe from the Aral Sea through the passage between the Ural ridge and the Caspian Sea to the foot of the Carpathians, another horde that descended southwest between the Caspian Sea and the Hindu Kush into Persia, Mesopotamia and even Syria founded the Ilkhan state. Later, the Third Horde attacked North China, capturing China. India and Mangi or South China were temporarily covered by the magnificent barrier of the Tibetan mountains, with whose effectiveness nothing in the world, perhaps, can be compared, unless, of course, you take into account the Sahara and the polar ice. But at a later time, in the days of Marco Polo in the case of Mangi, in the days of Tamerlane in the case of India, this obstacle was bypassed. It so happened that in this well-known and well-described case, all the inhabited regions of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive power of a mobile power that had arisen in the steppe expanses. Russia, Persia, India or China either paid tribute or took over the Mongol dynasties. Even the Turkish state, which was emerging in Asia Minor, endured this yoke for more than half a century.

Like Europe, records of earlier incursions persisted in other borderlands of Euro-Asia. China repeatedly submitted to the conquerors from the north, and India to the conquerors from the northwest. At least one invasion of Persian territory has played a special role in the history of all Western civilization. Three or four hundred years before the arrival of the Mongols, the Seljuk Turks, who appeared from the region of Asia Minor, spread here over vast spaces, which can be conventionally called a region located between the five seas of the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red and Persian Gulfs. They established themselves in Kerman, Hadaman, Asia Minor, overthrew the rule of the Saracens in Baghdad and Damascus. It became necessary to punish them for their treatment of the pilgrims who went to Jerusalem, which is why Christendom undertook a whole series of military campaigns, known collectively as the cross. And although the Europeans failed to achieve their goals, these events so excited and united Europe that we can well consider them the beginning of modern history. This was another example of the advancement of Europe, stimulated by the need to respond to the pressure exerted on it from the very center of Asia.

The concept of Euro-Asia, which we thus obtain, means extended lands encircled by ice in the north, riddled with rivers everywhere and covering an area of 21,000,000 square miles, i.e. more than three times the size of North America, whose central and northern regions are 9,000,000 square meters. miles, and more than double the territory of Europe. However, it does not have satisfactory waterways leading to the ocean, although on the other hand, with the exception of subarctic forests, it is generally suitable for the movement of all kinds of nomads. To the west, south and east of this zone are the border regions that make up a wide crescent and are accessible for navigation. In accordance with the physical structure, the number of these regions is four, and it is by no means unimportant that, in principle, they coincide, respectively, with the spheres of distribution of the four great religions of Buddhism, Brahmanism, Islam and Christianity. The first two lie in the monsoon zone, with one of them facing the Pacific Ocean, the other towards the Indian Ocean. The fourth, Europe, is irrigated by rains coming from the West, from the Atlantic. These three regions, totaling less than seven million square meters. miles, is inhabited by more than a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, which coincides with the zone of the five seas or, as it is more often called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to These three regions, totaling less than seven million square meters. miles, is inhabited by more than a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, which coincides with the zone of the five seas or, as it is more often called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to

its proximity to Africa and, with the exception of oases, is, accordingly, sparsely populated. To some extent, it combines the features of both the border zone and the central region of Euro-Asia. This zone is devoid of forests, its surface is dotted with deserts, so it is quite suitable for the life of nomads. The features of the border region are traced in it insofar as the sea bays and rivers flowing into the ocean make it accessible to the maritime powers, allowing, however, they themselves exercise their domination at sea. That is why here periodically there arose empires belonging to the "border" category, the basis of which was the agricultural population of the great oases of Egypt and Babylon. In addition, they were connected by waterways with the civilized world of the Mediterranean and India. But as you would expect, these empires fell into the zone of action of a series of migrations unprecedented hitherto, some of which were carried out by the Scythians, Turks and Mongols who were leaving Central Asia, while others were the result of the efforts of the peoples of the Mediterranean, who wanted to seize the land routes leading from the western to the eastern ocean. This place is the weakest link for these early civilizations, since the Isthmus of Suez, which divided the maritime powers into western and eastern, and the arid deserts of Persia, stretching from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, provided a constant opportunity for nomadic associations to get to the coast of the ocean that separated on the one hand, India and China, and on the other hand, themselves from the Mediterranean world. Whenever the oases of Egypt, Syria and Babylon fell into decay, the inhabitants of the steppes were able to use the flat plains of Iran as outposts, from where they could strike through the Punjab directly to India, through Syria to Egypt, and through the destroyed bridge of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to Hungary. Vienna stood on the main road to inner Europe, resisting the raids of nomads, both those who came by a direct road from the Russian steppes, and those who penetrated by winding paths that ran south of the Black and Caspian Seas.

So, we have illustrated the obvious difference between Saracen and Turkish control in the Middle East. The Saracens were a branch of the Semitic race, people who inhabited the valleys of the Nile and Euphrates and small oases in southern Asia. Taking advantage of the two opportunities provided to them by this land, horses and camels, on the one hand, and ships, on the other, they created a great empire. In various historical periods, their fleet controlled the Mediterranean Sea as far as Spain, as well as the Indian Ocean as far as the Malay Islands. From this central, strategic point of view, a position located between the western and eastern oceans, they tried to conquer all the border regions of the Old World, repeating in some ways Alexander the Great and anticipating Napoleon. They were even able to threaten the steppe. But the Saracen civilization was destroyed by the Turks, completely separated from Arabia,

Oceanic movement was a natural rival to the camel and horse movement seen inland. It was on the development of oceanic rivers that the Potamic stage of civilization was based: Chinese on the Yangtze, Indian on the Ganges, Babylonian on the Euphrates, Egyptian on the Nile. On the basis of the development of the Mediterranean Sea was based what is called the "sea" stage of civilization, the civilization of the Greeks and Romans. The Saracens and Vikings were able to control the oceans precisely because of their ability to swim.

The most important result of the discovery of the route to India around the Cape of Good Hope was that it had to link the western and eastern coastal shipping of Euro-Asia, even in such a roundabout way, and thus to some extent

neutralize the strategic advantage of the central position occupied by the steppe inhabitants by pressing them from the rear. The revolution, begun by the great sailors of Columbus's generation, endowed Christendom with an unusually broad mobility, which, however, did not reach the coveted level. The single and extended ocean surrounding divided and insular lands is, of course, the geographical condition that provided the highest degree of concentration of command at sea and in the whole theory of modern naval strategy and politics, as Captain Mahan and Mr. Spencer wrote in detail. Wilkinson. The political result of all this was to change the relationship between Europe and Asia. We must not forget that in the Middle Ages, Europe was squeezed between the impenetrable sands in the south, the unexplored ocean in the west, ice or endless forests in the north and northeast, and in the east and southeast, it was threatened by the extraordinary mobility of nomads. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. New Europeans were created on free lands, open among water spaces, and what Britain and Scandinavia used to be for Europeans, now America and Australia and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjoining Euro-Asia, are becoming. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are a ring of island bases for trade and naval forces out of reach of the land powers of Euro-Asia. and in the east and southeast it was threatened by the extraordinary mobility of the nomads. And now it has risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading its influence around the Eurasian continental powers, which until now have threatened its very existence. 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Nevertheless, the latter continue to exist, and well-known events have once again emphasized their importance. While the "sea" peoples of Western Europe covered the surface of the ocean with their ships, went to distant lands and in one way or another levied tribute to the inhabitants of the oceanic coast of Asia, Russia organized the Cossacks and, coming out of its northern forests, took control of the steppe, putting up its own nomads against the nomads -Tatar. The era of the Tudors, which saw the expansion of Western Europe in the sea, also saw how the Russian state moved from Moscow towards Siberia. The thrust of the horsemen across Asia to the east was an event as fraught with political consequences as the overcoming of the Cape of Good Hope, although the two events did not correspond to each other for a long time.

Perhaps the most striking coincidence in history was that both sea and land expansion of Europe continued, in a sense, the ancient confrontation between the Greeks and the Romans. Several failures in this area had far more far-reaching consequences than Rome's failure to Latinize the Greeks. The Teutons were civilized and adopted Christianity from the Romans, the Slavs from the Greeks. It was the Romano-Teutons who subsequently sailed the seas; and it was the Greco-Slavs who rode across the steppes, conquering the Turanian peoples. So the modern land power differs from the sea power even in the source of its ideals, and not in material conditions and mobility.

81.

Following the Cossacks, Russia appeared on the scene, calmly parting with its loneliness, in which it stayed in the forests of the North. Another change of extraordinary internal importance that occurred in Europe in the last century was the migration of Russian peasants to the south, so that if earlier agricultural settlements

⁸¹ This statement was criticized during the discussion that followed the reading of the report. As I revise this paragraph, I still think that it is basically true. Even a Byzantine Greek would have been different if Rome had subdued all of ancient Greece. Without a doubt, the ideals in question were more Byzantine than Hellenic, but they were not Roman, that's for sure. (author's note)

ended at the border with the forests, now the center of the population of all of European Russia lies south of this border, in the middle of wheat fields that replaced the steppes located there and west. This is how the unusually important city of Odessa arose, developing at a purely American pace.

A generation ago, it seemed that the steamer and the Suez Canal increased the mobility of maritime powers in comparison with land ones. Railways played mainly the role of an appendage of ocean trade. But now transcontinental railways are changing the state of land powers, and nowhere do they work more efficiently than in the closed central regions of Euro-Asia, in the vast expanses of which one cannot find a single suitable log or stone for their construction. Railways perform unprecedented miracles in the steppe, because they directly replaced the horse and camel, so that the necessary stage of development of the road was skipped here.

In a trade situation, it should not be forgotten that the oceanic route, although relatively cheap, usually drives the goods through four stages of the manufacturing factory, the shipper's shipyard, the recipient's shipyard and the retail warehouse, while the continental railroad leads directly from the factory. from the manufacturer to the importer's warehouse. Thus, intermediate ocean trade leads, all other things being equal, to the formation of a zone of penetration around the continents, whose internal border is roughly indicated by a line along which the price of four operations, ocean transport and rail transport from the neighboring coast is equal to the price of two operations and transport by continental rail road.

Russian railways run 6,000 miles from Verballen in the west to Vladivostok in the east. The Russian army in Manchuria is a remarkable testament to mobile land power, just as Britain is the example of a naval power in South Africa. Of course, the Trans-Siberian Railway is still the only and far from secure communication line, but this century will not end yet, as the whole of Asia will be covered with a network of railways. The spaces on the territory of the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so large, and their potential in terms of population, grain, cotton, fuel and metals is so high that it will undoubtedly develop its own, albeit somewhat remote, huge economic world, inaccessible for ocean trade.

Running such a quick glance over the main trends in history, do we not see clearly the consistency in terms of geography? Isn't this vast region of Euro-Asia, inaccessible to ships, but accessible to nomads in ancient times, which should now be covered by a network of railways, is not the pivotal region in world politics? Here there have been and continue to exist conditions promising (albeit limited by a certain factor) for the development of military and industrial powers. Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Its pressure on Finland, Scandinavia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, India and China replaced the steppe raids emanating from one center. In this world, it occupies a central strategic position, which in Europe belongs to Germany. She can strike and simultaneously receive blows from all directions, with the exception of the north. The final development of her mobility associated with railways is only a matter of time. And no social revolution will change its attitude to the great geographical boundaries of its existence. Soberly understanding the limits of their power, the rulers of Russia parted with Alaska, for for Russian politics it is, in fact, the rule

not to own any overseas territory, just like Britain is to rule over the oceans.

Outside this pivot area, there is a large inner crescent made up by Germany, Austria, Turkey, India, and China, and an outer one by Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada, and Japan. In the present state of balance, the pivot state, Russia, is not tantamount to the peripheral states, and here France can act as a counterbalance. The United States has just become the Eastern Power. They influence the balance of power in Europe not directly, but through Russia, and there is no doubt that they will build the Panama Canal in order to make the resources of the Mississippi and Atlantic available for pumping into the Pacific Ocean. From this point of view, the line of real separation between east and west should be sought precisely in the Atlantic.⁸²

The violation of the balance of power in favor of the axial state, expressed in its expansion into the border territories of Euro-Asia, makes it possible to use boundless continental resources for building a fleet. Thanks to this, a world empire will soon appear before our eyes. This can happen if Germany wants to join Russia as an ally. That is why the threat of such an alliance should push France into the embrace of the maritime powers, and then France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will form such a strong alliance in which the navy will support the army that ultimately force the Axis allies to deploy their ground forces, keeping them from the concentration of all power on the seas. To make a more modest comparison, it is reminiscent of what Wellington did during the fighting from the Torres Verdas base. And won't India, after all, be able to play the same role in the British Empire system? And is this the idea behind the concept of Mr. Amery, who said,

This system can be decisively influenced by the development of the vast capabilities of South America. On the one hand, they can strengthen the position of the United States, and on the other, if, of course, Germany can effectively challenge the Monroe Doctrine, they can separate Berlin from what I have described as Axis politics. Regional combinations of powers are irrelevant here. I argue that, from a geographic point of view, they make a kind of circular rotation around a pivot state, which is always great in one way or another, but has limited mobility compared to the surrounding border and island powers.

I spoke of all this as a geographer. The real balance of political power at any given moment is, of course, on the one hand, the result of geographic conditions (as well as economic and strategic), and, on the other hand, the relative size, courage, equipment and organization of the competing peoples. If we accurately calculate the amount of all this, then we can predict the outcome of the rivalry in advance, without resorting to the force of arms. Geographic indicators in calculations are more common and more constant than human ones. That is why we hope to find a formula that applies equally to past history and to today's politics. Social movements at all times have worn

⁸² This thesis of Mackinder was completely refuted in the coming decades. Already in the First World War, that is, after only ten years, the United States showed itself as a purely Western, Atlantic power, opposite to the Eastern, Eurasian, continental and Pacific vectors of geopolitics. The line of dividing the East and West runs strictly along the Pacific Ocean, and not in any way along the Atlantic (A.D.).

approximately the same physical features, for I doubt that the gradually increasing dryness of the climate, if it will be proved, has changed the environment in Asia and Africa in historical time. The movement of the empire to the west seems to me rather a short-term rotation of the frontier powers around the southwestern and western corners of the axial region. The problems of the Near, Middle and Far East depend on the unstable balance between internal and external powers in those parts of the border crescent where local states are hardly counted.

In conclusion, it should be noted that replacing Russian control with some new type of inland control will not reduce the significance of this axial position. If, for example, the Chinese, with the help of Japan, defeated the Russian Empire and conquered its territory, they would create a yellow danger to world freedom by adding oceanic expanses to the resources of the great continent, thus gaining an advantage that has not yet been received by the Russian master of this pivot region.

Peter Savitsky

GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF EURASISM⁸³

Russia has much more reason than China to be called the "Middle State" ("Zhong-go", in Chinese). And the further time passes, the more these bases will stick out. Europe for Russia is nothing more than a peninsula of the Old Continent, lying to the west of its borders. Russia itself on this continent occupies its main space, its torso. At the same time, the total area of European states, taken together, is close to 5 million square kilometers. The area of Russia, in the redistribution of at least the modern USSR, significantly exceeds 20 million square meters. km. (especially if we include the territory of the Mongolian and Tuvian People's Republics of the former "Outer Mongolia" and "Ryankhoi Territory", which are actually part of the Soviet Union at the moment).

With rare exceptions, Russian people of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. they forgot about the trans-Ural spaces (one of those who remembered about them was the brilliant Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev). Nowadays other times have come. The entire "Ural-Kuznetsk Combine", with its blast furnaces, coal mines, new cities for a hundred thousand other people, each is being built beyond the Urals. Turksib is being erected there. Nowhere is the expansion of Russian culture so widespread and so spontaneous as in another part of the Trans-Urals in the so-called. "Central Asian republics" (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan). The entire torso of the Russian lands comes to life "from the arrows of Negorely to the Suchan station". The Eurasians have their share of the credit for this turn of events. But at the same time, the nature of the Russian world, as the central world of the Old Continent, is clearly revealed. There were moments when it seemed that between the western periphery of Europe, which included the Russian Douralie ("European Russia" of the old geographers) and Asia (China, India, Iran) there is a void. The Eurasian attitude of Russian modernity fills this void with the beating of living life. Already from the end of the XIX century. the direct route from Europe to China and Japan lies through Russia (the Great Siberian Railway). Geography indicates with complete certainty that the roads from Europe (in any case, northern) to Persia, India and Indochina should be laid. These possibilities have not yet been realized. The Trans-Persian Railway, cutting through Persia from the Northwest to the Southeast and connected to the railway network of both British India and Europe (via the Transcaucasus, Crimea and Ukraine), was close to implementation on the eve of World War II. Currently, due to political circumstances, it has moved into the area of groundless projects. There is no connection between the railways of Russian Turkestan ("Central Asian republics") and India. There is no orientation of the Russian railway network towards transit European-Indian traffic. But sooner or later, such a movement will become a fact, be it in the form of railways. paths, car lines or air links. For these latter, the shortest distances given by Russia are of particular importance. The more weight will be acquired by air communications with the desire to fly in a straight line characteristic of this kind of communication, the clearer the role of Russia-Eurasia as a "middle world" will become. The establishment of transpolar lines can further enhance this role. In the far north, Russia is an enormous neighbor of America. With the opening of paths across the pole, or rather above the pole, it will become a connecting link between Asia and North America.

⁸³ GARF fund PN Savitsky № 5783 (ed.).

Subsequent articles speak of the desire of the Eurasians to give a spiritual synthesis of Eastern and Western principles. Here it is important to point out the correspondences that the field of geopolitics shows to this aspiration. Russia Eurasia is the center of the Old World. Eliminate this center and all its other parts, this whole system of continental margins (Europe, Western Asia, Iran, India, Indochina, China, Japan) turns into a "scattered temple", as it were. This world, lying to the east of the borders of Europe and to the north of "classical" Asia, is the link that solders them all into unity. This is obvious in the present, it will become more evident in the future. The connecting and unifying role of the "middle world" was reflected in history as well. For a number of millennia, the political dominance in the Eurasian world belonged to the nomads. Having occupied the entire space from the borders of Europe to the borders of China, contacting simultaneously with Western Asia, Iran and India, the nomads served as intermediaries between the scattered, in their original state, the worlds of sedentary cultures. And, say, the interactions between Iran and China have never been as close in history as in the era of Mongol rule (XII-XIV centuries). And thirteen or fourteen centuries before that, exclusively and only in the nomadic Eurasian world, the rays of the Hellenic and Chinese cultures crossed, as the latest excavations in Mongolia showed. By force of unavoidable facts, the Russian world is called to a unifying role within the Old World. Only to the extent that Russia - Eurasia fulfills this vocation, can the whole set of various cultures of the Old Continent transform into an organic whole, the opposition between East and West is removed. This circumstance is not yet sufficiently understood in our time, but the relationships expressed in it lie in the nature of things. The tasks of unification are, first of all, the tasks of cultural creativity. In the person of Russian culture in the center of the Old World, a new and independent historical force has grown to a unifying and conciliatory role. It can solve its task only in interaction with the cultures of all surrounding peoples. In this regard, the cultures of the East are as important to her as the cultures of the West. Such an appeal simultaneously and evenly to the East and the West is a feature of Russian culture and geopolitics. For Russia, these are its two equal fronts - western and southeastern. The field of view, covering equally and fully the entire Old World can and should be Russian, for the most part,

We return, however, to phenomena of a purely geographic nature. Compared to the Russian "torso", Europe and Asia are equally the outskirts of the Old World. Moreover, Europe, from the Russian-Eurasian point of view, is, according to what has been said, everything that lies to the west of the Russian border, and Asia is everything that lies to the south and southeast of it. Russia itself is neither Asia nor Europe. This is the main geopolitical thesis of the Eurasians. And therefore there is no "European" and "Asian" Russia, but there are parts of it lying to the west and east of the Urals, as there are parts of it lying to the west and east of the Yenisei, etc. The Eurasians continue: Russia is neither Asia nor Europe, but is a special geographical world. How is this world different from Europe and Asia? Western, the southern and southeastern margins of the old continent are distinguished both by the considerable indentedness of their coasts and by the variety of relief forms. The same cannot be said about his main "torso", which, according to what has been said, constitutes Russia-Eurasia.

It consists primarily of three plains (White Sea-Caucasian, West Siberian and Turkestan), and then of the regions lying to the east of them (including the low mountainous countries east of the Yenisei River). The zonal composition of the western and southern margins of the continent is marked by "mosaic-fractional" and not very simple outlines. Forested, in a natural state, the terrain is replaced here in a quaint sequences, on the one hand, steppe and desert regions, on the other

tundra regions (on high mountains). This "mosaic" is opposed in the middle plains of the Old World by a relatively simple, "flag-like" arrangement of zones. With this last designation, we indicate that, when plotted on a map, it resembles the outline of a flag subdivided into horizontal stripes. Desert, steppe, forest and tundra replace each other in the direction from south to north. Each of these zones forms a continuous latitudinal strip. The general latitudinal division of the Russian world is also emphasized by the predominantly latitudinal strike of the mountain ranges bordering the named plains from the south: the Crimean ridge, Caucasian, Kopetdag, Parapamiz, Hindu Kush, the main ranges of the Tien Shan, ridges on the northern outskirts of Tibet, In-Shan, in the Great Chinese wall. The last of the ridges we named, located in the same line as the previous ones, they border from the south an elevated plain occupied by the Gobi desert. It connects with the Turkestan plain through the Dzungar gate.

In the zonal structure of the Old World continent, you can notice the features of a peculiar east-west symmetry, which affects the fact that the state of the phenomena on its eastern outskirts is similar to the same situation on the western outskirts and differs from the nature of the phenomena in the middle part of the continent. Both the eastern and western oceans of the mainland (both the Far East and Europe) at latitudes between 35 and 60 degrees northern latitude in their natural state are forest areas. Here, the boreal forests are in direct contact and gradually transform into the forests of the southern flora. We do not see anything like this in the middle world. In it, forests of southern flora are found only in the areas of its mountain border (Crimea, Caucasus, Turkestan). And they never come into contact with the forests of northern flora or boreal, being separated from them by a continuous steppe-desert strip. The middle world of the Old World can be defined, thus, as an area of a steppe and desert strip stretching in a continuous line from the Carpathians to the Khingan, taken together with its mountainous frame (in the south) and areas lying to the north of it (forest and tundra zones). The Eurasians call this world Eurasia in the exact sense of the word (*Eurasia sensu stricto*). It must be distinguished from the old "Eurasia" by A. von Humboldt, covering the entire Old Continent (*Eurasia sensu latiore*).

The western border of Eurasia runs along the Black Sea-Baltic jumper, i.e. in the area where the mainland narrows (between the Baltic and Black Seas). Along this cofferdam, in a general direction from northwest to southeast, there are a number of indicative botanical and geographical boundaries, for example, the eastern border of yew, beech and ivy. Each of them, starting on the shores of the Baltic Sea, then goes to the shores of the Black Sea. West of the named borders, i.e. where the above-mentioned species grow, the strike of the forest zone along its entire length from north to south has a continuous character. To the east of them begins division into a forest zone in the north and a steppe zone in the south. This border can be considered the western border of Eurasia, i.e. its border with Asia in the Far East passes in the longitudes of the wedging out of the continuous steppe strip as it approaches the Pacific Ocean, i.e.

The Eurasian world is the world of "a periodic and at the same time symmetric system of zones." The boundaries of the main Eurasian zones are closely related to the occurrence of certain climatic boundaries. For example, the southern border of the tundra corresponds to a line connecting points with an average annual relative humidity of about 79.5% at 1 pm. (The relative humidity at 1 pm is especially important for the life of vegetation and soils.) The southern border of the forest zone runs along a line connecting points with the same relative humidity of 67.5%. The southern border of the steppe (at its contact with the desert) meets the same

relative humidity at 1 pm at 55.5%. In the desert, it is everywhere below this value. Here, attention is drawn to the equality of the intervals covering the forest and steppe zones. Such coincidences and the same rhythmic distribution of intervals can be established by other criteria (see our book "Geographical Features of Russia", Part 1, Prague 1927). This gives reason to speak about the "periodic system of the zones of Russia-Eurasia." It is also a symmetric system, but not in the sense of the east-west symmetries, which we spoke about in the previous one, but in the sense of the south-north symmetries. The treelessness of the north (tundra) here corresponds to the treelessness of the south (steppe). The calcium content and the percentage of humus in soils from the middle parts of the chernozem zone decrease symmetrically to the north and south. Symmetrical distribution of the phenomena is also noticed by the sign of soil color. It reaches its highest intensity in the same middle parts of the horizontal zone. Both to the north and to the south, it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the "northern-bearing" phenomena. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone. and to the south it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the "northern-bearing" phenomena. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone. and to the south it weakens (passing through shades of brown to whitish). On sands and stony substrates from the border between the forest and steppe zones, they symmetrically diverge: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extrazonal". The steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as a "yugoniferous" phenomenon, the island forests in the steppe are the essence of the "northbearing" phenomenon. The north-bearing formations of the steppe correspond to the south-bearing formations of the forest zone.

Nowhere else in the Old World are the gradual transitions within the zonal system, its "periodicity" and, at the same time, "symmetry" expressed so clearly as on the plains of Russia-Eurasia.

The Russian world has an extremely transparent geographic structure. In this structure, the Urals do not at all play the defining and dividing role that the geographic "wampuka" ascribed to it (and continues to attribute it). The Urals, "due to their orographic and geological features, not only do not separate, but on the contrary tightly connect" Pre-Ural and Trans-Ural Russia ", proving once again that geographically both of them together constitute one indivisible continent of Eurasia." The tundra, as a horizontal zone, lies both to the west and east of the Urals. The forest stretches on one side and the other. The situation is no different with regard to the steppe and desert (this latter borders both from the east and from the west the southern continuation of the Ural Mugodzhara). At the border of the Urals, we do not observe a significant change in the geographic situation. Much more essential is the geographic limit of the "intermorium", ie. spaces between the Black and Baltic Seas on the one hand, the Baltic Sea and the coast of northern Norway on the other.

The peculiar, extremely clear and at the same time simple geographic structure of Russia-Eurasia is associated with a number of important geopolitical circumstances.

The nature of the Eurasian world is minimally favorable for all sorts of "separatism", be they political, cultural or economic. The "mosaic-fractional" structure of Europe and Asia contributes to the emergence of small closed, isolated worlds. Here there are material prerequisites for the existence of small states, special cultural structures for each city or province, economic regions with great economic diversity in a narrow space. The situation is completely different in Eurasia. The wide-cut sphere of "flag-like" arrangement of zones does not contribute to anything like this. Endless plains accustom one to the breadth of the horizon, to the scope of geopolitical combinations. Within the steppes, moving on land, within the forests on the water of the numerous rivers and lakes here, people were here in constant migration, constantly changing their habitat. Ethnic and cultural

the elements were in intensive interaction, crossing and mixing. In Europe and Asia, at times it was possible to live only in the interests of one's own bell tower. In Eurasia, if it succeeds, then in the historical sense for an extremely short period. In the north of Eurasia, there are hundreds of thousands of square meters. km. forests, among which there is not a single hectare of arable land. How can the inhabitants of these spaces live without contact with more southern regions? In the south, in no less space, there are steppes suitable for cattle breeding, and partly for agriculture, while, however, that in an area of many thousands of square meters. km. there is not a single tree here. How can the population of these regions live without economic interaction with the north? The nature of Eurasia prompts people to a much greater extent the need for political, cultural and economic unification, than we see in Europe and Asia. It is not for nothing that it was within the framework of the Eurasian steppes and deserts that such a "unified" way of life existed in many respects, like the way of life of nomads throughout the entire space of its existence: from Hungary to Manchuria and throughout history from the Scythians to the modern Mongols. It is not for nothing that such great political unifying attempts as the Scythian, Hunnic, Mongolian (XIII-XIV centuries) and others were born in the vastness of Eurasia. These attempts covered not only the steppe and desert, but also the forest zone lying to the north of them and the more southern region "mountain bordering "Eurasia. It is not for nothing that the spirit of a kind of "brotherhood of peoples" blows over Eurasia, which has its roots in centuries-old contacts and cultural mergers of peoples of various races from the Germanic (Crimean Goths) and Slavic to the Tungus-Manchurian, through the links of the Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian peoples. This "brotherhood of peoples" is expressed in the fact that there is no opposition between "higher" and "lower" races, that mutual attraction is stronger here than repulsion, that "the will to a common cause" easily awakens here. The history of Eurasia, from its first chapters to its last, is solid proof of this. These traditions were adopted by Russia, in its main historical business. In the XIX and early XX centuries. they were at times clouded by deliberate "Westernism", which required the Russians to feel themselves "Europeans" (which in fact they were not) and to treat other Eurasian peoples as "Asians" and "an inferior race". This interpretation did not lead Russia to anything but disasters (for example, Russian Far Eastern adventure of the early XX century). It is to be hoped that by now this concept has been completely overcome in the Russian consciousness and that the last survivors of Russian "Europeanism," still hiding in emigration, are devoid of any historical significance. Only by overcoming deliberate "Westernism" opens the way to a real brotherhood of the Eurasian peoples: Slavic, Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian and others.

Eurasia has played a unifying role in the Old World before. Modern Russia, perceiving this tradition, must resolutely and irrevocably abandon the old methods of unification, belonging to the obsolete and overcome era of methods of violence and war. In the modern period, it is about the ways of cultural creativity, about inspiration, illumination, cooperation. The Eurasians are talking about all this. Despite all modern means of communication, the peoples of Europe and Asia are still, to a large extent, each sitting in his own cage, living in the interests of the bell tower. The Eurasian "local development", according to its basic properties, teaches one to a common cause. The appointment of the Eurasian peoples by their example to draw other peoples of the world along these paths. And then those ties of ethnographic kinship,

Indo-European relations of the Russians, the Near Asian and Iranian relations of the Eurasian Turks, those points of contact that exist between the Eurasian Mongols and the peoples of East Asia. All of them can be useful in building a new, organic culture, although the Old, but still (we believe) young, but fraught with a great future of the Light.

Jean Thiriard

SUPERHUMAN COMMUNISM

(Letter to a German reader)⁸⁴

Modern history will further operate with the concept of not a territorial, but a continental state. Already in 1962-1963, in my book "Europe, an empire with a population of 400 million," I described in some detail the ways of creating Europe "from Dublin to Bucharest." As a witness to the so-called "crusade" of 1941-1945, I already in 1963 emphasized that such a Europe would have to avoid conflict with the East at all costs, moreover, not even harbor antagonism towards it.

The acceleration of the course of history forces me to say today that now the talk should no longer be about peaceful coexistence between Western Europe and the USSR, but about the creation of a united Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin. It is necessary to understand that Russia is one of the European countries, and that it is the only European power independent of the world American empire.

Our historical thinking should be distracted from the type of ideology of the present USSR. Marxist communism is not something terrible, but something stupid. This ideology must disappear under the pressure of facts. It will disappear, because one fine day, which, apparently, is not far off, the Soviet leadership will become convinced that the endemic weakness of the USSR's economy is due precisely to Marxist dogmas. If the Soviet leadership wants to stay in power, and this depends on whether the Soviet Union survives, then it will have to turn towards the "historical way of thinking" and get rid of the dogmatism weakening it.

The Lubeck-Sofia line continues to be a historical absurdity. It inevitably reminds of the division of Germany in the middle of the 17th century, between Protestant and Catholic states, which, since the time of Richelieu and Mazarin, allowed France to delay the creation of the Second Reich by 250 years.

Just as the Treaty of Westphalia once enabled France to interfere in German affairs, so the Yalta Treaty allowed the United States to intervene in European affairs. Some Germans are now ready to obey the Americans unquestioningly. It is only worthy of contempt. Bonn has been emptying the State Department chamber pot for 30 years. In addition, there are two other tendencies in today's Germany: a tendency towards neutralism, on the one hand, and towards nationalism, on the other.

Let us first consider the question of German nationalism. Germany was not defeated in 1945. In a dramatic situation, her courage took on a Shakespearean character. Her martial prowess is undeniable. In June 1940, the French ruling class fled Paris without looking back. In April 1945, the German leadership was killed in battles on the streets of Berlin. In 1945 Germany was not defeated, but crushed. Finally. For only 12 years, Germany existed as a single formed state, while England, France, Spain have been such for centuries. But if Germany was crushed in 1945, then she herself strove for this. Hitler wanted to create a Germanic Europe. The idea of a "European" Europe was beyond his comprehension. An exceptional person in many

⁸⁴ December 1982 The text of this letter was handed over to A. Dugin directly by its author in 1992 (ed.)

relationship, he showed utter myopia on this issue. As a provincial from Central Europe, he was unable to appreciate the immense importance of the Mediterranean to geostrategy. In addition, he could not rise to the idea that other peoples could also have outstanding qualities. His contempt for the Russian man, for the Slav, was the reason for his underestimation of the courage of the Russian soldier. Goebbels' propaganda portrayed the Russians as a dubious cross between Tatars, Mongols, and Kalmyks. The photo services of the Propaganda Department and cameramen of the "RK" front tried to outdo each other in this area.

Today I subscribe to the magazine "Revue militaire sovietique" (Soviet Military Review). In contrast to the publications of Goebbels' propaganda, Soviet soldiers are portrayed here "with pretty faces, just like our guys": tall, with light, short-cropped hair and a "cheerful look." Dr. Goebbels did not tell us that they are descendants of the Varangians. Those Varangians who could freely join the SS troops. They fully corresponded to the racial characteristics by which candidates for these elite units of the Third Reich were selected.

Popular pictures also change with the change of the political system and the historical era. Today, the consolidated Tel Aviv-Washington propaganda department portrays the Soviet army as an army that in Afghanistan does nothing but rape, burn, and kill only children, women and the elderly.

When I was young, I had an acute experience of the failed Franco-German rapprochement in 1940-1942. Receiving Admiral Darlan at Berdechsgaden on May 14, 1941, Hitler was still under the impression of Hess's escape to England (May 11, 1941). Hitler was not generous, he was not capable of ensuring that the Franco-German conflict ended without a vanquished and France was not destroyed. The same France, which still owned African, especially Mediterranean colonies and an absolutely whole fleet. In alliance with France, Hitler could, passing through Syria, capture Iraq, thereby defeating England in the Mediterranean. The English fleet would then be forced to withdraw from the Mediterranean. "Everything was possible" the very next day after the Mers-el-Kebir massacre on July 3, 1940, when the British fleet dealt with the unarmed sailors of Admiral Zhanbul. In the week that followed, Hitler could easily have drawn France into his war against England. But for this it was necessary to have generosity and think in a European way. Hitler was not a great European. He was only a great German.

I have experienced and suffered all this. I took an active part in the events, but not on the side of Germany, but on the side of National Socialism. Many of us were then disappointed, and some also felt fooled. And yet we fought to the end on the side of Reich. Many of my comrades paid for this with their lives: some died on the Eastern Front, others were shot immediately after the end of the war in May 1945. Thanks to influential lawyers, I was able to easily get off with three years of ordinary prison, which was almost a gift. From this whole story, I concluded that nationalism that subdues, exploits and humiliates the vanquished, does incalculable harm. Hitler was unable to rise to a unifying nationalism.

German and French nationalisms have brought a lot of misfortune and harm. Therefore, today the slightest manifestation of German nationalism must be ruthlessly suppressed in the name of European interests.

Germany has nothing to complain about being defeated in 1945. She herself went for it, humiliating the Poles and Russians and despising the French.

Hitlerite Germany was mistaken in choosing Mussolini's Italy as an ally. This union cost her a whole series of follies and mistakes. Mussolini prevented the slightest rapprochement between France and Germany. That is why Germany and, in particular, a number of prominent Nazi Anglophiles made a mistake in choosing an enemy. Rudolf Hess unsuccessfully, too literally, applied the concepts of General Haushofer, whose adjutant he was during the First World War 1914-1918. In 1940, Germany's merciless enemy was not mainland France, but the naval power England. It is England that for the past five centuries has been the primordial and main enemy of Europe.

In 1945, the Third Reich suffered a complete collapse. But not only Germany lost this war. We all lost it. At first, the Dutch were expelled from their colonies. Then France and England and finally Belgium. After the shameful loss of Algeria in 1962, France finally ceased to exist as an independent power. We all lost this war together. Already from the end of 1941, the British began to oust the French from the countries of the Middle East (Syria). In retaliation, the French helped the Zionists expel the British from Palestine. Even before 1945, the British and French tried to deprive Italy of its African colonies. Finally, in 1960, at the behest of Washington, the Belgians left Congo, the richest country in all of Africa. Our nationalist feuds have led to the death of the whole of Europe, or at least multiethnic Europe. Now it's time to create a mono-national,

Combining Haushofer's clear geopolitical concepts with the might of the Soviet army, one must try, going from east to west, to accomplish what Hitler was unable to do, going from west to east. We need to rid communism of its ineffectiveness due to Marxist and Leninist dogmas. Communism of the Soviet type must be cleansed of Marxism, improved and mutated.

It is necessary to carry out a synthesis of non-Marxist communism with non-racist national socialism. I am against ineffective communism, but for an effective one. This is precisely the essence of national communitarism. This synthesis should reflect the ingenious understanding of the essence of empire by Alexander the Great and Caesar: the empire is an integrating, flexible nationalism. The defeated becomes a partner, assistant and, finally, a compatriot. I'm talking about "imperial communism", a kind of New Rome or "Great Prussia", about an empire that will express the idea of a state with a more perfect functional structure, about an empire, the right to join which will not be given to every state.

This does not exclude the danger of the emergence of classical Russian nationalism, which was a way of suppressing and exploiting other peoples. If the USSR tries to impose on us a Europe of the Russian type, then this attempt will fail even faster than the attempt of Hitler's Germany. On the contrary, if the USSR tries to apply the principles of "Soviet" nationalism of the imperial type, integrating nationalism, it will have a much better chance of success. The concepts of "Great Russia" and "Soviet empire" reflect two opposing concepts, namely, the concept of overwhelming and integrating nationalism. Suppressive nationalism engenders, strengthens and exacerbates the nationalism of neighboring states. He breeds his own

opponents, their antagonists. If the genocide he is carrying out fails, such nationalism is doomed to failure due to the internal contradiction inherent in it.

For the overwhelming majority of people, the change in the concept of "territorial" (overwhelming) nationalism to the concept of "continental" nationalism is imperial a difficult, if not impossible, mental operation.

Suppressive nationalism is reminiscent of evolutionary choices made arthropods. It works according to a hard-coded program. He set his own limit. In contrast, integrative nationalism, reflecting the "imperial concept," resembles vertebrates. In theory, its territorial expansion can be unlimited. Whether at the top level of concept or at the bottom level of ideology, the choice of arthropods as opposed to the choice of vertebrates can be found in a number of areas, from religion to the formation of nations, including the development of political theories. Thus, the Jewish religion, based on a racial approach, shares the fate of arthropods. From a demographic point of view, it has received only very limited distribution. On the contrary, the Christian and Islamic religions, not limited by either linguistic or racial criteria, have become widespread.

The expansion of Hitlerite Germany, limited by racial and linguistic boundaries, also followed the path of arthropods. It ended with a fatal indigestion inability to digest 200 million Slavs. Yesterday's "Derulede" and the current "Debre", as well as sighing on a helmet with a shishak or on a swastika, should also be enrolled in the class of arthropods. All of them are gripped by the shell of their rigid ideologies. As for European nationalism, it serves as an analogy for the evolution of vertebrates. It is a kind of open system. It is characterized by flexibility and integration ability. To understand it requires a level of thinking that is absolutely inaccessible to most "ordinary nationalists".

Here we come to the question of the eternal attempt to neutralize, "Finlandize" Germany.

Life is ruthless to the weak. The same can be said for history. Today's Europe, torn apart in May by narrow-minded nationalists (French, German, British, etc.), is a potential "battlefield." In this it is similar to Germany in the middle of the 17th century. As they once spoke of "Puppet Germany" pulled by the string by Richelieu and Mazarin, so today one can speak of "Europe manipulated by Washington."

All those who slavishly resign themselves to American domination in Europe (especially in West Germany, where it is completely overt) and are ready to go to the "Finlandization" of West Germany, can be called masochists from history. In 1840, when the best representatives of Germany were fighting for the unification of the Second Reich, such masochists extolled the virtues of the Peace of Westphalia (a two-hundred-year plan for the conclusion of a treaty). Thus, a certain Christoph Hack glorified the historical insignificance of Germany. This type of people willing to buy the world at the cost of historical castration is not new at all.

Today we need to look for rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It is necessary to negotiate first about rapprochement, then about unification and, finally, about merging with him. We are talking about completely frank negotiations. We don't need peace between a cat and a mouse.

West Germany must be entitled to equality and dignity within Western Europe. For this it is necessary to discard the Jewish-American theses of the "guilty people" and the original sin of the Germans. This is biblical nonsense. The image of inhuman Germany is carefully cultivated with the help of all media in France, England, Belgium, Holland, Italy. This propaganda aims to divide Western Europe, to prevent its unification, rearing old wounds.

The armed forces of West Germany, the Bundeswehr, are reduced today to the position of the colonial infantry (like the Senegalese in the 1914-1918 war) of the United States.

Today's Germany must muster up the courage to cast out the evil spirits and tell itself that National Socialism ultimately belongs to the past. In any case, Hitler committed no more crimes than those who stained their hands in blood by bombing Hamburg or aimlessly destroying Dresden in 1945, not to mention the 1,500 women, children and old people who were recently killed innocently in Lebanon. Everyone should be held accountable for their misdeeds, but in the end the time comes when these misconduct should be the subject of study not by politicians, but by historians. This time has come for Germany. Almost all the surviving participants in the 1939-1945 war. have already died. The new generation of Germans must not take on Hitler's legacy. On the one hand, Germany must not completely absolve itself of responsibility for war crimes, on the other hand, today it has the right to demand compliance with the principle of the statute of limitations in relation to itself. Germany must no longer accept its role as stepdaughter of the Common Market or NATO. A stepdaughter whose adoptive parents are "terrible".

Western Europe must strive for armed neutrality and avoid unarmed neutrality. Only masochists, naive people and eunuchs can advocate such neutrality. Europe should put out 400,000 American soldiers stationed there. The risk of war lies in the American military presence in Europe. The Pentagon, subordinate to the State Department and patronizing the State of Israel, could play "atomic poker" in Europe in response to Soviet actions in the Mediterranean or some other part of the world.

If nuclear weapons are in the hands of Europeans (including, of course, the West Germans), then the Soviet Union is at an incomparably greater risk of nuclear conflict than if it were in the hands of Americans stationed in Europe. Europe is an age-old battlefield, a testing ground. There is something to think about here. We learned the horrors of war both in Russia in 1941-1943 and at home in 1943-1945. Here they know what war is, and they decide on it only as a last resort. In Washington, the capital of a country whose shores have not seen an enemy gunboat for almost two centuries, they do not know what war is.

Europe must base its policy on an alliance with the East, an alliance driven by geopolitical considerations. Europe, stretching from west to east, cannot stop on the Lubeck-Sofia line. At the same time, the great Soviets, going from east to west, cannot stop at this artificially established line. Our distant future can be read on a geographical map. The border, which runs along the Lubeck-Sofia line, is a defense line that is extremely vulnerable in the event of a maneuver warfare. The presence of such a border is very dangerous from a geostrategic point of view. It is very difficult to protect her. This explains the importance that the USSR attaches to classic weapons. "Flank" Lubeck-Sofia is the only weak point of the Soviet defense on the distant approaches. From all

the other sides of the USSR are well defended thanks to their climate (in the north) and vast distances (in the south). In terms of classical military science, an American army based in West Germany might be compared to a single Soviet army stationed in Canada between Montreal and Winnip. In this purely hypothetical case, the bulk of the American ground forces would be located between Minneapolis and Boston.

The "natural" shores of the USSR (as opposed to the borders) are the Canary Islands, the Azores, Ireland, Iceland. The same applies to Western Europe.

A "cultured" or "economically developed" nation is inconceivable without relying on a "politically strong" nation. From 1648 to 1870 Germany was an example of a "cultured" nation, famous for its porcelain and musicians. At the same time, it served as a battlefield for anyone. There is no nation without an army, and today there is no army without nuclear weapons. Having lost their colonies, countries such as England and France are now only PARODIES for the great powers. From now on, nations with a population of less than 200-300 million have no international weight. History offers us two options to choose from:

- 1) the Soviet Union is conquering Western Europe, or it has to do it as a preventive war;
- 2) the war is avoided, and Western Europe, freed from Washington's political hirelings, goes to a political alliance with the East.

Collaboration, partnership, union and finally unification. Germany, which today stands with one foot in the West and the other in the East, is best able to cope with the role of mediator.

In Germany, there is a leftist nationalist movement that emerged in West Berlin during the break between the happening and the drug party. Father Brandt has already dishonored his country and his race. Now we can admire the romantic fantasies of his son Peter. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into a Yugoslav-style "National People's Army" is sheer fun. Even in the event of reunification (I admit such a hypothesis), Germany would become only a dwarf power, such as Mitterrand's France or Thatcher's England, boasting of their "independence" from the USA, USSR and China. Miserable young people, drawn to Peter Brandt, want to return to the days of romantic Germany before 1848, Germany before Fichte. In 1982, it is no longer just about Germany - the "battlefield", but the whole of Europe - the "battlefield".

The religious war between "Marxist communism" and "democracy" blinds most of these people, and this blindness prevents them from realizing geopolitical reality. To prevent Europe from becoming a "battlefield", it is necessary to shift the direction of a possible Soviet offensive to Gibraltar, Dublin and Casablanca. We must seek agreement with the Soviet Union and lay the foundations for effective cooperation right now. The site of a protracted war should be a part of Africa between latitude 20 degrees north and latitude 20 degrees south. Even if these zones are partially devastated, this will not greatly affect the future of humanity.

To avoid the destruction of Europe, we must deliberately go for close cooperation with the USSR, cooperation, and not a swindle offered by Hitler to the French in 1940-1942. Western Europe and the USSR must create a kind of "community of destinies" dictated by geography, a marriage of convenience, a forced marriage.

The USSR and Western Europe should work together as soon as possible to counterbalance the Monroe doctrine. Our Monroe Doctrine should be "... not a single soldier, not a single American soldier in the Mediterranean." European problems must be solved by the Europeans themselves. Russians are the same Europeans as the Germans, French, British and other European peoples.

We need to get Americans to leave Europe for more than just geopolitical reasons. Their presence in Europe can be compared to the Carthaginian conquest of Sicily by the side of the Roman Republic. By staying in Europe and increasing the risk of war, Americans will not be able to cope with the crisis in their society that is just beginning. We run the risk of getting infected from them. This crisis of society is due to the collapse of three spheres:

- 1) the technical and economic system,
- 2) politics based on persuasion, demagoguery, in a word, "democracy",
- 3) an obsessed culture.

The technical and economic system is a reflection of the materialistic world, the world of science, rationalism, foresight. The second sphere, the sphere of politics, defies any logical analysis, any rationalistic approach. Here the argumentation of persuasion prevails (in the first sphere, logical-experimental argumentation prevails). As for culture, today it should rather be attributed to the field of psychiatry. At least in the USA. Only a totalitarian system can balance these three spheres.

It is high time to introduce the concept of rationalism into politics. In my next work, *The Euro-Soviet Empire*, I will devote an entire chapter to the question of whether politics, metapolitics, should be based on power or pleasure (pleasure).

North America has made its final choice in favor of hedonism, and its entire policy is directed towards "the means of pleasure." Such a choice would lead humanity to a dead end. All that remains is to make the communists wiser and explain to them what the metapolitics would be, directed at the "means of action" or, in other words, at the means of force.

Hobbes has already shown that freedom rests on strength. In our era of scientific and technological revolution, we can add to this that power serves knowledge (space research, fundamental research in the field of physics), and knowledge gives strength.

If we want to create homo novus, then we have to make a choice between power and pleasure. Marx's dream was to give everyone what they need. Today, this dream can be easily fulfilled. Achieving abundance is a problem of planning and will. It would take no more than a quarter of a century to solve it. This abundance would lead either to the emergence of a hedonistic society, doomed to decline (USA), or to the transformation of an ordinary person into a homo novus.

Huxley and Orwell noted only the possible negative side of *Brave New World*. The positive side of it remained unknown to them.

Remember also Koestler's prophecy: "The thesis winners, the antithesis of the defeated, the synthesis of winners and losers become united citizens of a gigantic new Eurasian homeland."

I would change it: "The thesis is racist national socialism, the antithesis of Marxist communism, the synthesis of great European national bolshevism, in other words, elite imperial communism, which rejected Marx as an ideologist and Hitler as a limited short-sighted nationalist ... "

National Socialism was splendid school efficiency, that the most efficiency, which so n Marxist communism is not enough.

Ordinary communism needs to make a child so that an extraordinary offspring is born, a kind of "gifted monster", "superhuman communism."

As early as 1941, Koestler knew who should be his father.

Carl Schmitt

***PLANETARY TENSION BETWEEN EAST AND WESTERN LAND AND SEA
CONFRONTATION***⁸⁵

The confrontation between East and West, which is quite obvious today, includes contradictions of various kinds: economic interests, a qualitative difference between the ruling elites and the incompatibility of fundamental intellectual attitudes. All these contradictions are growing, mutually reinforcing each other. However, the connection between economic, sociological and spiritual tensions manifested itself in all the great wars of human history. The peculiarity of modern antagonism is that this tension has become global and encompasses the entire planet. Therefore, today it is absolutely necessary to adequately analyze the historical and geopolitical background on which this intense confrontation is based.

We are talking about the opposite of East and West. At the same time, it is obvious that we cannot talk only about geographical differences. In the course of our research, we will thoroughly analyze what kind of opposition is being discussed here, and show that there are two different types of intense confrontation: historical-dialectical and static-polar.

The opposite of East and West is not a polar opposite. The Earth has North and South poles, but neither East nor West. In the conditions of our planet, the geographic opposition of West and East is not something fixed and static; it is only a dynamic relationship associated with the daily "decay of light". Geographically, America is West in relation to Europe; in relation to America, China and Russia are the West; and in relation to China and Russia, the West is Europe. In a purely geographical sense, there are no clear poles, and therefore, based on geography alone, it is completely impossible to understand the really existing planetary hostile tension between East and West and to think about its underlying structure.

one.

You can follow the path of studying the historical, cultural and moral specifics of the present East and the present West, and thus isolate a number of antitheses, which, no doubt, are very important. Here I would like to use one term introduced into circulation by the geographer John Gottman in his brilliant work "La politique des Etats et leur géographie"⁸⁶: the concept of regional iconography (iconography of space) *iconographie régionale*. Different pictures of the world and ideas that have arisen as a result of different religions, traditions, different historical past, different social models form autonomous spaces. In this sense, not only paintings and works of plastic art belong to the iconography of a certain space, but also all visible forms of public and private life. The essential importance of art in this regard was recently pointed out by Luis Diez del Corral, in his book "The Rape of Europa", which can be called an encyclopedia of European iconography. The difference between understanding the form in those or

⁸⁵ Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-III" von prof. Piet

Tommissen, Brussel, 1991 (ed.).

⁸⁶ "The Politics of States and Their Geography" (fr.) (Ed.).

other cultural regions, and especially in the sphere of the structure of power and state structure, were investigated by Carlos Ollero. In the concept of "iconography of space", we can include, in addition to various forms of social life, also all other typical forms of manifestation of human existence, systems of characteristic implications, allusions, symbolic language of feelings and thoughts in the form in which they are characteristic for certain territories with a special unique culture.

This also includes images of the past, myths, sagas and legends, just like all symbols and taboos that are topographically localized in one definite space and only because of this acquire historical reality. Gottman speaks in this connection about the "circulation of iconography", i.e. about the dynamic influence of territorial cultures on each other over time. Thus, the famous theory of the "circulation of elites" by Pareto is replaced by the equally important theory of circulation of iconography.

The use of the word (and concept) "iconography" seems to me in this case quite appropriate and fruitful, primarily because this term most accurately reveals the essence of the confrontation between East and West. The attitude to the image, the icon reveals the essential qualities of the East and West in their deepest dimension:

The East traditionally acts as an opponent of visual images, paintings and icons, while the West, on the contrary, as a stronghold of veneration for icon painting and, more broadly, painting.

When it comes to iconoclasm or the prohibition on the image of God, an educated European recalls events from the history of Byzantium, about the struggle around the iconoclastic heresy of the time of King Leo (717-741) and about the recognition of icon painting by Charlemagne. The ban also comes to mind to depict God in the Old Testament and in Islam. Some have gone so far as to discover here an initial contradiction between verbal and visual expression, which they, in turn, elevate to an even more general contradiction between hearing and sight, acoustics and visuals, and the word and hearing are unambiguously identified with the East, and the image and sight with the West.

The use of the term "iconography", in the above-mentioned overarching sense, should save us from such simplifications. In reality, there is no geographical place where the visual dimension of reality is absent, and the image, image, icon and iconography are present everywhere. Therefore, only the opposite tendency is possible, denying the value of the visual image, i.e. iconoclasm in the broadest sense. Moreover, the problem of iconoclasm is by no means limited to Byzantium or Islam. The West also knows many and very aggressive forms of the iconoclastic spirit. Wyclifites and Hussites, sectarian Baptists and Puritans, religious modernists and rude rationalists, all these iconoclastic movements arose and developed in the West. This conflict is on a planetary scale, this main dispute in world history reached in the era of great geographical discoveries and the colonization of the New World, and outwardly it manifested itself in the struggle between two confessional forms of Roman Catholicism and northern Protestantism, the line of the Jesuits and the Calvinists. Let's try to consider the iconographic aspect of this conflict, which will lead us to a deeper understanding of its meaning.

The meaning of the Reconquista was to reclaim space on the Iberian Peninsula for the free veneration of the Image of the Most Pure Mother of God. Once I wrote that the Spanish sailors and conquistadors of the New World saw a symbol of their historical achievements in planting everywhere the image of the Immaculate Virgin Mary. Some readers got me wrong. One Catholic author even wrote on this subject:

"Schmitt talks about all the Christian accessories of the Conquest that can only mislead readers." For me, the icon of the Virgin Mary is not "all sorts of Christian accessories." Moreover, the veneration of the Icon of the Most Pure One is of great importance to me, which becomes clearer if we take into account the above considerations about the connection between the visual image, the icon, and the essence of the Western tradition. I undertake to assert that all the religious wars of Europe of the XVI-XVII centuries, including the Thirty Years War in German lands, were in reality wars for and against the medieval Catholic veneration of the icon of the Virgin Mary. Should the iconoclasm of the English Puritans be considered a purely Eastern phenomenon in this context, and the veneration of Bavarian icons, Spanish and Polish Catholics a sign of their Western spiritual nature? In the Byzantine controversies around the iconoclastic heresy, the theological level of the Christian dogma of the Trinity was touched upon. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic combination in the Deity of Unity and Trinity. But nevertheless, it would be wrong to strictly identify the Trinity dogma exclusively with the West, and abstract monotheism with the East. Of course, at certain points in history, this coincidence was almost complete. The Frankish monks supplemented the Christian Creed of the West with a formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the indignation of the Filioque Greek patriarchs led to a great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches.⁸⁷ Proceeding from this, one could consider that the Filioque was the action of the West against the East, but this is refuted, on the one hand, by the special teaching of the Trinity and the Mother of God of the Syrian Church Fathers, and on the other hand, by the views of the Western Arians, who generally denied the divine nature of Christ. Thus, the impressive iconographic difference between East and West in the matter of Trinity becomes less unconditional and absolute.

Traditional iconography is not static; new factors invade it. For example, the industrial invasion of technology. Modern psychoanalysis can also be viewed as a manifestation of the iconoclastic tendency. The Spanish psychoanalyst Juan José López Ibor has undertaken a very interesting study of this area, based on our iconographic approach to the problem. In addition, almost all modern painting, both abstract and preserved the remnants of objectivity, carries in itself the destruction of the traditional understanding of the image, visual image, icon. All three phenomena are related to technique, psychoanalysis and contemporary painting. If you undertake a study of this relationship, comparing it with the actual confrontation between East and West, you can come to amazing, sensational conclusions. The only obstacle on this path is the impossibility of strictly identifying the East with iconoclasm, and the West with icon veneration. To fully understand the structure of the world dualism West-East, we still need to proceed from other criteria.

2.

⁸⁷The Catholic Schmitt believes that the Filioque only emphasizes the Trinity of the Godhead and strengthens the iconographic orientation of Christian dogma, while the rejection of this innovation in the Orthodox Church seems to him to be an expression of the iconoclastic, Old Testament spirit. This is a completely incorrect thesis, refuted even by such a historical observation as the widespread distribution and veneration of icons among Orthodox peoples, and especially in Russia, where the icon still plays such a colossal role in religious practice, which it did not play even during the heyday of Catholicism in Europe. Moreover, the introduction of the Filioque was precisely the expression of that abstract monotheism and rationalistic theology that have nothing to do with the assertion of the fullness of the Trinity and the primacy of the Image. For more details on this, see A. Dugin "

The history of the planetary confrontation between East and West in its entirety can be reduced to the fundamental dualism of the elements: Earth and Water, Land and Sea.

What we call the East today is a single mass of solid land: Russia, China, India, a huge piece of Land, "Middle Earth"⁸⁸, as the great English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder called it. What we call the West today is one of the world's Oceans, a hemisphere containing the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The opposition of the sea and continental worlds is the global truth that underlies the explanation of civilizational dualism, which constantly generates planetary tension and stimulates the entire process of history.

At the climax of world history, clashes between the belligerent powers turn into wars between the elements of the Sea and the elements of Land. This was already noticed by the chroniclers of the war of Sparta and Athens, Rome and Carthage. However, until a certain time, everything was limited to the area of the Mediterranean Sea. People did not yet know huge spaces, great oceans, planetary conflicts. Immediately, we note that it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction between the elements of the Sea and the elements of the Ocean. Of course, there are partial parallels, and many refer in this sense to the famous passage from the first philippic of Demosthenes (38.41). I myself do not fully share the causticity of Plato, who said about the Greeks that "they sit on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea like frogs."

However, there is a significant difference between an inland maritime civilization and an oceanic civilization. That tension between East and West, that planetary formulation of the problem of conflict, which are characteristic of our period of history, have no analogues in the past. The confrontation between Land and Sea (like the Ocean) reaches the final world-historical volume only when mankind assimilates the entire planet.

The planetary nature of the battle between Land and Sea was first revealed during the wars of England against revolutionary France and Napoleon. True, then the division into Land and Sea, East and West was not yet as clear as it is today. Napoleon was ultimately defeated not by England, but by continental Russia, Austria and Prussia. "Nomos" of the Earth⁸⁹ still consisted then in the balance between the forces of the Land and the Sea; Sea alone could not achieve a decisive victory on its own. In 1812, when the clash reached its climax, the United States declared war not on Napoleon, but on England. Then there was a rapprochement between America and Russia, and both of these young states sought to distance themselves from both Napoleon and England. The contradiction between the Land and the Sea, between the East and the West is not yet

⁸⁸In the beginning Mackinder used the term "Pivot area", "Pivot area", later "Heartland", "Heartland".

(HELL.)

⁸⁹"Nomos" is a fundamental category of Karl Schmitt, the axis of his theory of history, law, geopolitics. "Der Nomos der Erde" is the title of his main work. Nomos in the Greek verbum occasionalis from the verb nemein meaning "to take, possess, divide, distribute, equip, etc." Etymologically, it corresponds to the German nehmen and Nahme, i.e. "take", "taken". Related to the word Nahme, i.e. "name". In the Russian language, this idea is most closely reflected by the word "have" and the Old Slavonic "imat" ("take"), from which "name", "property", "estate", from where "to raise", "take over", "take away", and even "understand" (compare the French saisir to grab, grasp, take, understand). In some ways close to the meaning of the words "divide", "It is possible to correlate the concept of "nomos" in Schmitt with the concept of "structure" in the French structuralists, and in this case one cannot exclude direct plagiarism (naturally, on the part of the French). It is known that Schmitt greatly influenced the largest European Hegelian Alexander Kozhev, who, in turn, was the teacher of Marcuse. (HELL.) It is possible to correlate the concept of "nomos" in Schmitt with the concept of "structure" in the French structuralists, and in this case one cannot exclude direct plagiarism (naturally, on the part of the French). It is known that Schmitt greatly influenced the largest European Hegelian Alexander Kozhev, who, in turn, was the teacher of Marcuse. (HELL.)

Crystals were then called into a pure confrontation of the elements, which happened only at the time of the conclusion of the Alliance in 1949.

But already at the time of Napoleon, the regularity of the political conflict, predetermined by the difference in civilizational elements, was quite clearly manifested, i.e. such a conflict, where it was necessary to choose between Land and Sea. In July 1812, when Napoleon was approaching Moscow, Goethe composed a panegyric supposedly to Queen Marie Louise, but, in fact, to her wife, the French emperor:

"Where thousands of people are confused, one person (Napoleon) decides everything."

The German poet continues, referring to the global aspect of the confrontation between Land and Sea:

"Where the twilight of the centuries gathers,

He (Napoleon) scatters them with the light of the spiritual gaze. All the

insignificant has disappeared

Only the Land and the Sea matter here. "("

Worueber trueb Jahrhunderte gesonnen Er

uebersieht's im hellsten Geisteslicht. Das

Kleinliche ist alles weggeronnen,

Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht. ")

Goethe was on the side of Napoleon. For him it was the side of Land, Earth. But Napoleon was also identified with the West. The West was then still Land and by no means the Sea. The German poet sincerely hoped that the West would remain the embodiment of land, continental power, and Napoleon, like the new Alexander, would conquer coastal territories from the forces of the Sea, and then "The land would come into its own."

So Goethe, a typical representative of the West, in the summer of 1812 made a choice in favor of Land, Land versus Sea. Of course, in accordance with his worldview, he understood the confrontation between the Earth and the Sea as a static, polar tension, and not as a dialectical unique historical moment. In this case, the difference between static polarity and historical dialectics, which we talked about at the very beginning of the article, is extremely important.

3.

Goethe thought in terms of static polarity. But the polar tension differs significantly from the historical-dialectical tension. The static of polar tension presupposes synchronicity, constancy, in which the interaction of opposite poles constitutes a fixed structure that remains essentially the same for all external changes arising from specific historical situations. It's kind of an eternal return.

Concrete-historical approach examines, on the contrary, the chain of logical and historical interconnection between the specifics of a particular question and the answer given to it. Question and answer provide a dialectic of the historically concrete and determine the structure of historical situations and eras. Such a dialectic does not have to be identified with the Hegelian logic of concepts or with a fatally given pattern of the natural course of events.

We are interested here, however, in the study of the structure of the planetary dualism concretely existing in our world (and not in the general theory of the historical process). Historical thinking is thinking in one-time, one-time historical situations and, therefore, one-time truths. All historical parallels serve only the best recognition of this uniqueness, otherwise they become only dead functional elements of an abstract system that simply does not exist in real life. It is absurd and unrealistic to make assumptions of this kind: what would happen if events took a different turn than they took in real history. For example, what if the Saracens had won the Battle of Poitiers? What if Napoleon had not lost the Battle of Waterloo? What, if winter 41/42 were not so cold? Such ridiculous assumptions, which can be found even among famous historians, are absurd already because they completely overlook the uniqueness and uniqueness of any historical event. The structure of polar tension is always actual, eternal, like an eternal return.

Historical truth, on the other hand, is true only once. It cannot be true more than once, since it is precisely in its singleness that its historicity lies. The disposability of historical truth is one of the secrets of ontology, as Walter Varnach put it. The dialectical structure of the question and answer, which we are talking about here, trying to explain the essence of history, does not in any way weaken or abolish the quality of the single-occurrence of a historical event. On the contrary, it only strengthens it, since we are talking about a unique concrete answer to an equally unique concrete question.

If the confrontation between Land and Sea, expressed in modern planetary dualism, were exclusively static polar, i.e. included in the chain of natural balance and eternal return, it would be only a fragment of a purely natural process. The elements in nature separate and reunite, mix and stratify. They replace each other and pass into each other in an incessant cycle of metamorphosis, which reveals more and more images and forms of the essence of the always identical polar tension. If the matter were reduced only to such a natural static dualism, the actual confrontation between East and West would be just a special form of expression of the eternal circulation of elites, a problem of iconography. Eternal return and eternal transformation does not know a specific truth, a unique situation, a historical moment. Static-polar

opposition excludes historical uniqueness. But in a concrete story, everything is different. In certain epochs, capable and powerful peoples and groups appear that seize and divide land in the process of friendly treaties or wars, manage their territory, graze cattle, etc. From this the Nomos of the Earth is formed. It is limited by its unique here and now, and the tension between the elements that we are talking about, between the Land and the Sea, only generates a natural, objective context in which this Nomos takes shape.

If we take the Earth and the Sea (and the creatures inhabiting them) as exclusively natural elements, then it is obvious that by themselves they cannot generate a hostile

confrontation, which would have a purely historical event meaning. The inhabitants of the Sea and the inhabitants of the Land cannot be absolute enemies by nature. It happens that land animals devour the sea, but it is absurd in this case to talk about some kind of enmity. The fish themselves quite often devour each other, especially the large small ones. And the inhabitants of Sushi do not treat each other much better. Therefore, it cannot be argued that there is a natural hostility between Land and Sea. Rather, in a purely natural state, these two elements exist completely irrespective of and indifferent to each other, and to such an extent that it is completely absurd to speak of such a specific and intense relationship as enmity. Every living being is in its element, in its environment. The bear is not inherently hostile to the whale, and the whale does not declare war on the bear. Even marine and land predators know their boundaries and the limits of their habitat. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such a natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such a natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. The bear does not encroach on the possessions of a lion or a tiger; even the most daring animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite the relationship of cats with dogs as an example of natural enmity only prove once again that such natural enmity is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. only once again prove that such natural hostility is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not. Being a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the existence of a cat and vice versa. only once again prove that such natural hostility is sharply different from human. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has a completely different meaning than human enmity. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the presence of the very human quality in their opponents, while animals do not.

However, it is significant that it is the fables from the life of animals that especially vividly illustrate specifically human political situations and relations. Generally speaking, from a philosophical point of view, the problem of animal fables is interesting in itself. Transferring purely human political situations to the animal kingdom, we demythologize, clarify them, deprive ideological and rhetorical veils. Precisely due to the fact that relations among animals have a completely different meaning than relations among people, such an allegorical device, when people act as animals, and animals as people, allows you to discover what is hitherto hidden through a conscious departure from straightforward and one-dimensional analysis. Reincarnation into a beast alienates a person from a human, but through such alienation, the human becomes only more distinct and convex.

When transferring the duality of the Land-Sea to humanity, it would seem that it should be a question of sea conflicts between the people of the Sea and land conflicts between the people of Land. In fact, the situation is completely different, starting from the moment when the historical planetary tension reaches a certain critical level. Unlike animals, humans and only humans are capable of waging war between the peoples of the Land and the peoples of the Sea. When the enmity reaches its climax, hostilities take over all possible areas, and war from both sides unfolds both on the Land and on the Sea. Each side is forced to pursue the enemy deep into the hostile elements. When the third, air element is mastered, the conflict is transferred to it, and the war becomes an air war. But the original subjects of the conflict do not lose their quality, therefore, it seems to me quite reasonable to speak precisely about the opposition of the element of the Earth and the element of the Sea. When the planetary-historical confrontation approaches its peak, both sides exert all their material, mental and spiritual forces to the limit. Then the battle extends to all space adjacent to the opposing sides. And the spontaneous natural difference between Land and Sea in this case turns into a real war between these elements.

Enmity between people has a special tension that is many times greater than the tension characteristic of hostility in the kingdom of nature. In man, all aspects of nature are transcended, acquire a transcendental (or transcendental, whatever you like) dimension. This additional dimension can also be called "spiritual" and recall Rimbaud, who said: "Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille des hommes"⁹⁰. Be that as it may, enmity between people can reach incredible degrees. This highest degree of hostility is clearly manifested in civil wars, when the enemy is so criminalized, morally, legally and ideologically, that in fact it is placed outside all human laws. In this, some kind of peculiar only to man, a purely supernatural element, transcendental in relation to his natural dimension, makes itself felt; this element generates incredible tension and transforms natural polarity into a concrete historical dialectic.

The word "dialectics" here expresses that special quality (peculiar only to humanity), which is cardinally different from all natural forms of polarity. The word "dialectics" indicates the "question-answer" structure, which alone can adequately describe a historical situation or a historical event. The historical situation can only be understood as a challenge to a person and his response to this challenge. Each historical action is a person's answer to a question posed by history. Every human word is an answer. Each answer gains meaning through the question to which it is intended to answer; for one who does not know the question, the word remains meaningless. And the meaning of the question, in turn, lies in the specific situation in which it was posed.

All of this is reminiscent of RJ's Question-Answer Logic. Collingwood, and in fact, that's what we mean. Collingwood used question-and-answer thinking to define the specific meaning of the story. He did this with brilliant precision, since for him this definition meant the crown of the philosophical path to overcome his own ahistorical natural-scientific positivism. Collingwood's idea was excellent, but the English scientist was too deeply affected by the English definition of science inherent in the 19th century to be able to overcome the psychological-individualistic interpretation of the question-answer problem. Only this factor can explain his painful, complex attacks of Germanophobia, which have spoiled his latest work. ⁹¹. But the great merit of his "question-answer logic"

⁹⁰ "Spiritual battle is as cruel as human war" (fr.).

⁹¹ Schmitt himself, in turn, could be accused of Russophobia based on equally untenable (by and large) prejudices, but stemming from another source: from his confessional adherence to Catholicism and the geopolitical absolutization of Central Europe. Armin Mehler in his brilliant book "The Conservative Revolution in Germany 1918-1932" convincingly showed how the geopolitical division of Europe into three zones Western Europe (England, France), Central Europe (Germany, Austria), Eastern Europe (Russia) is projected on the cultural assessments of its neighbors as inhabitants of these three zones. For the British and French, the Germans are barbarians who have just emerged from the forests, the "Huns", the wild descendants of Attila. For the Germans themselves, the Russians appear to be such barbarians. But for the Russians, the Germans, who seem to be barbarians to the French and British, are seen as soulless automata, bearers of a purely Western civilization and culture (i.e., as classical, exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially, Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt carriers of a purely Western civilization and culture (i.e., as classical, exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially, Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical typology of European ethnic groups predetermined the concept of "young peoples" (taken up by the German conservative revolutionaries from Dostoevsky), which recognizes as such Russians and Germans. In other words, accusations of barbarism could be interpreted in a positive way, as was the case in the Russophile (mainly Prussian, Protestant or pagan) camp of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, to which Arthur Müller van den Bruck, Oswald Spengler and, especially, Ernst Nikish and the national bol shevik. But despite his Russophobia, Schmitt exaggerated Europeans). The Germans themselves, for the lack of vitality and historical inspiration, reproach the French and the British. Incidentally, this geopolitical ty

patterns or statistical probability within a narrowly functional system is fundamentally wrong.

In reality, we are dealing only with one-off specific situations. And the specific situation of our own epoch is determined by the fact that in it the confrontation between East and West has acquired the character of planetary dualism, planetary enmity. When we try to figure out the nature of the dialectical tension generated by this dualism, we are not trying to derive a general law or statistical probability, let alone construct a system. When we use the word "dialectic", "dialectical", we run the risk of being misunderstood and ranked among the narrowly Hegelian school. This is not entirely true. The historical dialectic of Hegel, in fact, makes it possible to comprehend the disposability and uniqueness of a historical event, which is evident at least from Hegel's phrase that the incarnation of the Son of God is a central event in all of human history. This makes it clear that history for Hegel was not just a chain of objective laws, but also had a subjective dimension of active participation. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries. But in the general Hegelian systematization, historical uniqueness is often lost, and a specific historical event is dissolved in a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term "dialectic" and to prevent automatic enrollment in the Hegelians, which is quite typical for the "technical", automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries.

In addition to a misunderstanding of the essence of historical dialectics, characteristic of Hegelianism in general, one should also be wary of the mania typical of the 19th century for the formulation of laws and the discovery of laws. Almost all Western sociologists and historians, except for Alexis de Tocqueville, have suffered from this disease. The need to deduce from each concrete historical situation a general law of development has covered the scientific discoveries of even the most perspicacious thinkers of the last century with an almost impenetrable veil of vague generalizations.

The elevation of a concrete historical fact to some kind of universal human law was the price that the 19th century compensated for its scientific and natural positivism. Scientists simply could not imagine some kind of truth outside the universal, precisely calculated and measurable functional law. Thus, Auguste Comte, a modern historian endowed with a brilliant intuition, correctly defined the essence of his era, presenting it as the result of a development consisting of three stages: from theology through metaphysics to positivism. This was a perfectly correct observation, precisely defining the one-off, three-point step taken by Western thought from the 13th to the 19th century. But the positivist Auguste Comte could himself believe in the truth of the principle he formulated only after he declared, that the law of the three stages applies to all of humanity and throughout its history. Karl Marx, in turn, made a very accurate diagnosis of the state of affairs that was characteristic of the second stage of the industrial revolution in the middle of the 19th century in Central and Eastern Europe; but the trouble is that he elevated his considerations into a universal world historical doctrine and proclaimed a simplified thesis about the "class struggle", while, in fact, it was just a specific moment of the techno-industrial revolution associated with the invention of railways, telegraph and steam engine. Already in the 20th century, Oswald Spengler significantly limited the significance of his discovery regarding the deep historical parallels between the present era and the era of the Roman civil war and the period of the Caesars by

Industrialization and technical development are the fate of our land today. So, let's try to identify a one-off historical question, a great challenge and a concrete answer generated by the industrial and technological revolution of the last century. In doing so, we discard all the superficial conclusions that involve us in risky systems of causation. We have isolated from the general concept of tension a purely dialectical tension that is different from the polar-static one. But this concept of dialectical tension should not be understood as a banal product of Hegelianism, natural science or normative constructs. Toynbee's formula for "call-recall" should also be used only as a tool, since we need, first of all,

Here we will be helped by the text of Arnold Toynbee in 1953 with an expressive title: "The World and the West" ("The world and the West")⁹³. This work provoked fierce criticism and controversy, which we prefer to pass over in silence, since we are only interested in the confrontation between Earth and Land. Toynbee speaks of our era, singling out the West as a separate category, opposed to the rest of the world.

He sees the West as an aggressor who, for four and a half centuries, has been expanding its industrial and technical power to the East in four main directions: Russia, the Islamic world, India and East Asia. For Toynbee, it seems very important that this aggression was carried out through a technique freed from the norms of Christian tradition (entfesselte Technik). The fact that the East itself has begun to make widespread use of technology means for Toynbee the beginning of his active self-defense in the face of the West. True, in the 17th century the Jesuits made an attempt to preach the Christian religion to the Hindus and the Chinese not as the religion of the West, but as a universal religion, equally related to all people. Toynbee believes that this attempt, unfortunately, failed due to dogmatic differences between the various Catholic missions and the centralized Jesuit preaching network. The meaning of the October Communist Revolution, according to Toynbee, is that the East began to arm itself with European technology freed from the Christian religion. Toynbee calls this technique "a piece of European culture that broke away from it by the end of the 16th century." Let us note this most important, absolutely precise formulation.

Let us now clarify in the light of the "question-answer logic" what was the challenge and the response that historically manifested itself in our era through the industrial-technical breakthrough.

Where does the industrial revolution come from? The answer to what question is it? What are its origins and its homeland, its origin and its motivation? It comes from the island of England and dates back to the 18th century. Let's repeat the well-known dates 1735 (the first coke oven), 1740 (the first cast steel), 1768 (the first steam engine), 1769 (the first modern factory in Nottinge), 1770 (the first spinning machine), 1786 (the first mechanical loom), 1825 (first steam locomotive). The great industrial revolution comes with

⁹³ This formula "The World and the West" (and the geopolitical concept implicitly contained in it) clearly echoes the work of Samuel Huntington "Clash of civilizations", one of the chapters of which is similarly titled "The West and the Rest". The American conservative Huntington is clearly under the influence of Toynbee and, apparently, considers himself to be his successor. (HELL.)

the island of England, which has become the main industrial country in the world since the 19th century. This historical phenomenon, which we must constantly bear in mind, was already noticed by the first German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in 1842.

He wrote about this:

"Surprisingly and completely unexpectedly, at the same time that the ideas of freedom and equality are spreading in France, the first machines appear in England. Together with them, a completely new era opens up for the whole world in matters of welfare, production, consumption and trade. a truly revolutionary force in the material world, and from this material world subordinate to them, they began to spread their power deep into, into all spheres of the spiritual world. "

"Surprisingly and completely unexpectedly" and precisely "in England"! In these words, one can hear the surprise of a young German greedy for knowledge, who begins to realize the historical situation of his people and in Paris, Louis Philippe understands that the political revolution, spreading since 1789 throughout the European continent, is only a pale ideological epiphenomenon in comparison with the industrial one. a revolution spreading from England and representing a truly revolutionary force. Thus was born the remarkable phrase just quoted from the chapter under the significant title "Proletariat". In the same text, for the first time, a scientific understanding of the problem of the fundamental difference between labor and property is introduced into the European discussion.

So the industrial revolution comes from eighteenth-century England. What was the historical situation on this island at the time? England was an island that separated from the European continent in the 16th century and took the first steps towards a purely marine existence. This, from a historical point of view, is the most essential for us. Everything else is just a superstructure, a superstructure. Whichever external event we choose as the final step towards a purely marine existence, the capture of Jamaica by Cromwell in 1655, the final exile of the Stuarts in 1688 or the European peace in Utrecht in 1713, the main thing is the following: one European people from a certain point ceased count the island on which he lived, part of a somewhat remote European Land and realized it as a base for a purely marine existence and for sea domination over the world's oceans. Beginning in the 16th century, England entered the era of great geographical discoveries and began to conquer colonies from Portugal, Spain, France and Holland. She defeated all her European rivals not by virtue of moral or power

superiority, but only solely due to the fact that she made an	decisive and
irrevocable step from the solid land to the open sea, and in the	such a situation
conquest of land colonies was ensured by the control of spaces.	over sea

It was a one-time, unique, historical response to an equally one-time, unique historical challenge, to the great challenge of the century of European geographical discoveries. For the first time in human history as we know it, a challenge has arisen that is not limited to specific rivers, shores, or inland seas; for the first time it had a planetary, global character. Most European nations have grasped this challenge in continental, land-based terms. The Spaniards created their gigantic overseas empire; at the same time, it remained essentially land-based and was built on vast mainland masses. The Russians broke away from Moscow and conquered a gigantic

the country of Siberia. The Portuguese, despite their amazing achievements in navigation, also failed to move to a purely marine existence. Even the heroic epic of the era of Portuguese discoveries, Camões's *Lusiada*, speaks of the Indian Ocean in much the same way that Aeneas Virgilius speaks of the Mediterranean. The Dutch were the first to embark on global naval adventures and remained at the forefront for a long time. But the base was too weak, the rootedness in the politics of the land powers was too deep, and after the conclusion of peace in Utrecht in 1713, Holland was finally tied to the Land. The French entered a two-hundred-year war with England and, in the end, lost it. England was not particularly worried about the continent (the least hampered by the continent), and she finally and successfully moved to a purely marine existence.

The former European island threw away the traditional, land-based picture of the world and began to consistently view the world from the position of the Sea. The land, as a natural living space of a person, has turned into something else, into a coast stretching deep into the continental expanses, into a backland. Back in the 15th century, during the time of the Maid of Orleans, the English knights, like the knights of other countries, in a fair fight, got their own trophies. Until the 16th century, the British were sheep breeders who sold wool to Flanders, where it was made into fabrics. And this people turned into a nation of "sea lovers" and founded not only a sea, but an oceanic, world empire. The island ceased to be a separately located fragment of the Land and turned into a Ship anchored near the continent. In place of the old, land *Nomos* of the Earth, a new *Nomos* entered,

What fell away from European culture in the 16th century was, contrary to Toynbee, not a "technical splinter", but something completely different. The European island broke away from the European continent, and the new world of the Sea, summoned by the island, rose up against the traditional world of the continental Land. This peace of the Sea gave birth to a counterbalance to the world of Land, and the peace (*Frieden*, peace) on earth became like scales in his hands. This was an expression of a concrete response to the challenge of the opened World Ocean. And on this island of England, which took up the challenge and took a decisive step towards sea existence, the first machines suddenly appeared.

five.

The ship is the basis of the marine existence of people, just as the House is the basis of their land existence. The Ship and the House are not antitheses in the sense of static polarity; they represent different responses to different challenges of history. Both the Ship and the House are created with the help of technical means, but their main difference is that the Ship is an absolutely artificial, technical means of transportation based on the total domination of man over nature. The sea is a kind of natural environment that is sharply different from the land. The sea is more alienated and hostile. According to the biblical story, man received his habitat precisely through the separation of the Earth from the Sea. The sea remained fraught with danger and evil. Here we refer readers to the comments on the first chapter of the "Book of Genesis" in the third volume of "Church Dogma" by Karl Barth. Let us only emphasize that in order to overcome the ancient religious horror of the Sea, humanity had to make a significant effort. The technical effort made to overcome this is fundamentally different from any other.

technical effort. A person who dares to embark on a sea voyage, the word "pirate" originally meant someone who is capable of such a risk, should have, according to the poet, "triple armor on the chest" (aes triplex circa pectus). Man's overcoming of the inertial resistance of nature, which constitutes the essence of cultural or civilizing activity, differs sharply in the case of shipbuilding and the development of the Sea and in the case of cattle breeding and construction of dwellings on the Land.

The center and grain of land existence, with all its specific standards of dwelling, property, marriage, inheritance, etc. all this is Home. All these specific standards grow from the specifics of land existence and especially from agriculture. A fundamental legal institution, the *Dominium* property gets its name from the House, *Domus*. This is obvious and known to all lawyers. But many lawyers, however, do not know that the German word *Bauer* (*paganus*, peasant) does not come directly from the word "Ackerbau" (plowing), but from the word "Bau", "Gebaude", "aedificium", i.e. "building", "building", "house". It originally meant the person who owned the house. So, in the center of land existence is the House. In the center of marine existence, the Ship floats. Home is peace, Ship movement. Therefore, the Ship has a different environment and a different horizon. The people living on the Ship have completely different relationships both with each other and with the environment. Their attitude towards nature and animals is completely different from the people of *Sushi*. Land man tames beasts elephants, camels, horses, dogs, cats, donkeys, goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea. goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea. goats and "everything that belongs to him" and makes them domestic animals. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets, since the very idea of the House is alien to the sea.

In order to understand the bottomless difference between land and sea existence, we gave a cultural and historical example. Now we are trying to find an answer to the question why the industrial revolution, with its characteristic emancipation of the technical impulse (*entfesselte Technik*), originated in the conditions of the marine life. Terrestrial existence centered on Home has a completely different relationship to technology than marine existence centered on the Ship. The absolutization of technical progress, the identification of any progress exclusively with technical progress, in short, what is meant by the expression "liberated technical impulse", "liberated technology" all this could arise, grow and develop only on the basis of marine existence, in the climate of marine existence. Those that the island of England accepted the challenge of the opening world ocean and brought the transition to a purely marine existence to its logical conclusion, it gave a historical answer to the question posed by the era of great geographical discoveries. At the same time, it was both a prerequisite for the industrial revolution and the beginning of an era, whose problems we are all experiencing today.

Specifically, we are talking about the industrial revolution, which is our common destiny today. This revolution could not be realized anywhere and never, except in England of the XVIII century. The industrial revolution just means the emancipation of technical progress, and this emancipation becomes understandable only on the basis of the specifics of marine existence, in which it is, to some extent, reasonable and necessary. Technical discoveries have been made at all times and in all countries. The technical giftedness of the British does not exceed the giftedness of other peoples. It is only a question of how to use the technical discovery and within what limits; in other words, in which system of standards should this discovery be placed. Under the conditions of marine existence, technical discoveries are made more easily and freely, since

how they do not have to be built into the fixed structure of norms inherent in overland existence. The Chinese invented gunpowder; they were no more stupid than the Europeans, who also invented it. But in the conditions of a purely overland, closed existence of the then China, this led to its use exclusively for games and fireworks. In Europe, the same thing led to the discoveries of Alfred Nobel and his followers. The British, who made in the 18th century all their famous discoveries that led to the industrial revolution, coke ovens, steel production, a steam engine, a loom, etc., were no more genius than other peoples from other countries and other eras who lived on land laws and made similar discoveries independently of the British. Technical discoveries are not revelations of a mysterious higher spirit. They are largely dictated by time. But whether they are forgotten or develop, it depends on the human context in which they were made. I'll put it more specifically: the technical discoveries that underlie the industrial revolution will only actually lead to the industrial revolution, where a decisive step towards marine existence is taken.

The transition to a purely marine existence already carries in itself and in its direct consequences the emancipation of technology as an independent and self-sufficient force. Any development of technology in the previous periods of land existence has never led to the emergence of such a principle as the Absolute Technique. At the same time, it should be emphasized that coastal and inland sea forms of culture do not yet mean a transition to a purely marine existence. Only when the Ocean is explored does the Ship become the real antithesis of the House. An unconditional belief in progress (understood as technological progress) is a sure sign that the transition to a marine existence is complete. In the historically, socially and morally infinite space of marine existence, a chain reaction of an endless series of discoveries arises by itself. This is not about the difference between nomadic and sedentary peoples, but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea but about the contradiction between the Land and the Sea, two opposite elements of human existence. Therefore, it is wrong to speak of "sea nomads" on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea on a par with nomads on horses, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of mankind in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether we are talking about land or sea existence. From whatever position we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured power civilizational and cultural field; it should be noted that culture itself is more related to the Land, and civilization to the Sea the historical sense is radically different in all parameters

Two of the most important phenomena of the 19th century can be illuminated in a new light with the help of the theory of the specifics of marine life. We are talking about classical political economy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries and Marxism. As the industrial revolution developed, the revealed vastness provoked more and more new steps along the path of liberated technical progress. The so-called classical political economy was a conceptual superstructure developed from the first stage of the industrial revolution. Marxism, in turn, based its teaching on this superstructure of classical political economy. He developed it and developed a conceptual superstructure for the second stage of the industrial revolution. In this capacity, Marxism was adopted by the elite of Russian professional revolutionaries, who

⁹⁴ A clear allusion to Oswald Spengler, who opposed civilization and culture. (HELL.)

managed to make a revolution in the Russian Empire in 1917 and transfer the double superstructure to the conditions of their agrarian country. In all this, it was not at all about the practical implementation of pure teaching and about the logical implementation of the objective laws of historical development. It was about the fact that an industrially backward agrarian country felt the need to arm itself with modern industrial technology, since otherwise it was provided with the role of extraction for other more developed industrialized major powers. Thus, from an ideological superstructure of the second stage of the industrial revolution, Marxism has turned into a practical tool for overcoming the industrial and technical insecurity of a huge country, as well as for displacing the old elite, which clearly did not cope with the fulfillment of the historical task.

But the consistent bringing to the logical end of the principles of classical political economy was only one aspect of Marxist teaching. The roots of Marxism remained Hegelian. One place in Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law" in paragraph 243 contains the meaning of the whole problem. This is a famous place. This paragraph describes the dialectic of a bourgeois society, unhindered by its own laws, and emphasizes that "this society inevitably carries a progressive growth in population and industry." Hegel argues that such a society "with all its wealth will never be rich enough, that is, based only on its internal capabilities, it will never be able to prevent the growth of poverty and the increase in the number of the poor population." At the same time, Hegel openly refers as an example to the then England. In paragraph 246, he continues:

"According to this dialectic, a concrete bourgeois society is forced to go beyond its borders in order to look among other peoples who are lagging behind either in the level of development of industrial means or in technical skills, consumers of their products, and, consequently, means for their own existence."⁹⁵

Such are the famous paragraphs 243 246 of Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law", which received their final development in Marxism. But, as far as I know, no one has paid attention to the deepest meaning of paragraph 247, immediately following the one just quoted. It states the fundamental the opposition between Land and Sea, and the deployment of this 247 paragraph could be no less significant and important than the deployment of paragraphs 243 246 in Marxism. Here the link between industrial development and marine life is affirmed. This 247th paragraph contains the following crucial sentence:

"Just as for a marriage, the first condition is solid land, Land, since for industry, the Sea is the most vital element of its life."

Here I interrupt my exposition, and give the attentive readers the opportunity to see in it the beginning of the development of the 247th paragraph from Hegel's "Foundations of the Philosophy of Law", similar to how the deployment of paragraphs 243,246 created Marxism.

⁹⁵The main points of Lenin's theory of "imperialism as the highest stage of development of capitalism" and the fundamental principles of the concept of "autarchy of large spaces" (and more broadly, "economic nationalism") by Friedrich List are easily deduced from this position. It is curious that the German conservative revolutionaries drew practically the same conclusions from the development of List's theses as Lenin did from Hegel and Marx. In both cases, it was about a planetary anti-imperialist struggle for the "rights of peoples" against Anglo-Saxon thalassocratic colonialism. By the way, Karl Schmitt was the main theorist of "peoples' rights". The geopolitical application and development of this principle is characteristic of Haushofer. (HELL.)

Our analysis raises a new question and with it a new danger. The desire naturally suggests itself to pose the following problem: what is the actual challenge of history? And then there is a dangerous temptation to answer this question in the old way, adequate and correct in the previous era. People tend to cling to something that has proven to be true and effective. They categorically refuse to understand that on the part of humanity a new answer to a new question can only be a guess, and more often than not, as in the case of Columbus's travels, a blind guess. Man has an irresistible need to treat the last chronologically historical experience as something eternal. When we Germans invaded France in 1914, it seemed to us that events will henceforth develop as in 1870-71 until our decisive victory. When in 1870-71. the besieged French made a sortie from Paris, they were sure that everything would again go according to the scenario of the victorious revolution of 1792. When US Secretary of State Stimson in 1932 proclaimed his famous doctrine, the Stimson Doctrine, he believed that the situation as a whole resembled in an enlarged scale of 1861 and the beginning of the War of Independence.

A sense of history should protect us from such mistakes. Paradoxically, it is in those countries that have advanced further along the path of liberated technology that the opinion is widespread that from now on, with the help of technical means, a breakthrough into new endless spaces of space begins. Compared to this breakthrough into space, the five-hundred-year breakthrough of the era of great geographical and technical discoveries will seem an insignificant period of time. People are planning an attack on the stratosphere and flights to the moon. Our planet itself, the Earth, is gradually transforming into a spaceship floating in outer space.

This opinion seems to me to be a repetition of an old answer, a development of the answer that was given once to the challenge of the opened world Ocean. People see today's challenge as a massive repetition of the discovery of America. Psychologically, so to speak, this is understandable. Then new continents and oceans of the earth opened up. Today I do not see any opening of space, I do not hear any cosmic challenge. Let's not talk about flying saucers. Liberated technology can bite into space indefinitely and violently, and this will not result in a new historical challenge, and even less so as a response to such a challenge. Of course, liberated technique generates a monstrous impulse of power and the desire to overcome it. But this momentum is not the same as a challenge. It is true that modern technology gives rise to artificial needs all the time, but that only means

It is this ultra-modern development of the old answer that is historically unhistorical and anachronistic. However, it is quite natural that the victorious in the previous era completely ignores the new challenge of history. And how can a winner understand that his victory is a one-time truth? Who will teach him this? I came to the conclusion: it's already good if we refuse to give the old answer to the new question. It is already a lot if we comprehend the new world not according to the "new world" scheme that existed yesterday. Personally, I see a new challenge on the wrong side of the stratosphere. I notice that liberated technique limits people rather than opens up new spaces for them. Modern technology is necessary and useful. But today it is far from being the answer to any challenge. She only satisfies new ones, partly generated by herself, needs. As for the rest, it itself is being questioned today, which means that this is precisely why it cannot be the answer. Everyone says that modern technology has made our land ridiculously

small. New spaces, from where a new challenge will emerge, should therefore be on our earth, and not outside it in outer space. The one who is the first to succeed in enslaving the liberated technique is more likely to give an answer to the current challenge than the one who, with its help, will try to land on the Moon or Mars. The taming of liberated technique is a feat for the new Hercules. From this area I hear a new challenge, the challenge of the Present.

(translated from German by A.D.)

my daughter

LAND and SEA

contemplation of world history

one

Man is a terrestrial, terrestrial creature.

He stands on the ground, walks on the ground, he moves on its solid, unshakable surface. This is his self-standing and his soil; thanks to her, he acquires and has his own point of view; this determines his impressions and the very way of perceiving the world. Not only his outlook, but even the form of his gait and movements, his image and appearance, he acquires and retains as a being born and living on earth. Therefore, the celestial body on which he lives, he calls "Earth", although it is known that almost three quarters of the Earth's surface is water and only one quarter of the earth itself; however, even the largest land areas are just islands in the ocean of water. Ever since we know that the Earth is in the shape of a ball, we speak of the "Globe" as a matter of course. If you had to imagine a "sea ball" or "water ball"

All our existence on this side, joy and suffering, happiness and misfortune - is for us earthly life and, accordingly, heaven on earth and the earthly vale of sorrow. Thus, it is quite understandable that in the multitude of myths and legends in which peoples have preserved their most ancient experience and deepest memories, the Earth appears as the great mother of people. She is called the oldest of all deities. The sacred books tell us that man was taken from the earth and must again become the dust of the earth. The earth is his mother's womb, he himself is thus the son of the earth. In his neighbors, he sees earthly fellows, citizens of the Earth. Among the traditional four elements - Earth, Water, Fire and Air - the element of the Earth most of all determines a person and is predetermined for him. The thought of that of the four elements, some other than the earth can decisively shape human existence, at first glance looks like only a fantastic possibility. Man is not a fish or a bird, much less some kind of creature made of fire, even if we assume that such can exist.

Does it follow from what has been said that the essence of human existence and the very being of man is purely earthly, and all other elements are only additional elements of the second order? The matter is not so simple. The answer to the question of whether something other than the earth can constitute the hallmark of human presence in the world lies closer than we think. One has only to go to the seashore and look into the distance - and the grandiose sea surface along the entire horizon will capture your gaze. It is noteworthy that when a person stands on the shore, he naturally directs his gaze from the land side to the sea, and not vice versa, from the sea side to the land. In deep, often unconscious memories of people, water and sea are the secret root cause of everything. The myths and legends of most peoples contain memories not only of the land of those born, but also about the gods and people who came out of the sea. Everywhere is narrated about the sons and daughters of the seas and waters. Aphrodite, the goddess of feminine beauty, emerged from the foam of the waves of the sea. The sea gave birth to other creatures, and we will later get to know the "children of the sea" and the wild "captors of the sea", which bear little resemblance to the enchanting picture of the foam of the born female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses: little like a bewitching picture of the foam born of female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses: little like a bewitching picture of the foam born of female beauty. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of earthly firmament and land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists seek the beginning of all life in water, and Goethe proclaims in solemn verses:

Everything arose out of water,
Everything is preserved by water,
Ocean, grant us
your eternal protection!

The Greek natural philosopher Thales of Miletus (c. 500 BC) is most often called the founder of the doctrine of the origin of all living things from the water element. But this view is both younger and older than Thales. It is eternal. In the last 19th century, the great German scientist Lorenz Oken taught about the origin of people and all living things from the sea. And in the genealogical charts constructed by Darwinian naturalists, fish and land animals go side by side and one after the other in a different sequence. The inhabitants of the sea appear here as the ancestors of humans. The most ancient and ancient history of mankind, most likely, confirms this hypothesis about the origin of life. Authoritative researchers have discovered that along with the "autochthonous", that is, those born on land, there are also "autotassic", that is, exclusively by the sea, determined by the peoples, never travelers on land and did not want to know anything about the solid land, which was the border of their purely marine existence. On the islands of the Pacific Ocean, among the Polynesian seafarers, Kanaks and Samoa, you can still find the last remains of this kind of fish-people. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world. Kanaks and Samoa, the last remains of this kind of fish-people can still be found. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world. Kanaks and Samoa, the last remains of this kind of fish-people can still be found. All their being, the world of ideas, language took shape under the decisive influence of the sea. All our ideas about space and time, formed in the conditions of a solid land surface, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible as for us, the inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means a barely comprehensible other world.

In any case, the question arises: what is our element? Are we children of the earth or the sea? It is impossible to answer this question unambiguously. Prehistoric myths Natural science hypotheses of modern times and the results of a historical study of the era of the first written monuments leave both possibilities for an answer open.

2

The word "element" in any case requires a little additional explanation. Since the time of the aforementioned philosopher Thales, since the era of Ionian philosophy, that is, from about 500 BC, it is customary for European peoples to talk about the four elements or elements. Since then, this idea of the quaternary of elements - Earth, Water, Air and Fire - has remained alive and ineradicable to this day, despite all the scientific criticism. Modern natural science has abolished these four primordial elements; it distinguishes today more than ninety completely differently structured "elements" and understands by this word every source material, indissoluble and insoluble by the methods of today's chemistry. Thus, the elements studied today by natural science experimentally and theoretically, have only a common name with those four original primary elements. Not a single physicist or chemist will dare today to assert that any of the four primary elements is the only primary cause, the original material of the universe, as Thales of Miletus spoke about water, Heraclitus of Ephesus about fire, Anaximenes of Miletus about air, and Empedocles from Acragant taught about the connection of the elements, which he called "the roots of all things." The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion and Empedocles of Acragant taught about the combination of the elements, which he called "the roots of all things". The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion and Empedocles of Acragant taught about the combination of the elements, which he called "the roots of all things". The mere question of what exactly the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean here would lead us into a discussion an immense amount of physical, natural science, metaphysical and epistemological problems. For the needs of our historical contemplation, we can still

confine ourselves to the idea of this quaternary of elements, or elements. For for us these elements are simple and descriptive names. These are generalizing meanings indicating various kinds of fundamental possibilities of human existence in the world. Therefore, we have the right to use them even today, especially when we are talking about domination by sea and domination by land, about sea and continental powers, meaning the elements of water and earth.

Thus, the "elements" of the Earth and the Sea, which are discussed below, cannot be thought of only as natural-scientific quantities. In this case, they would immediately disintegrate into chemical components, that is, they would turn into historical nothing. Variants of historical fulfillment predetermined by these elements, especially sea or terrestrial forms of existence, also do not unfold with a mechanical predestination. If a person were a living organism, without a trace reducible to the effects of the surrounding world, he would be either an animal, or a fish, or a bird, or fantastic mixtures of these elementary forms, in accordance with the influence of natural elements. Pure type samples corresponding to the four elements, especially purely marine or purely terrestrial people, would have very little in common with each other, they would oppose each other in complete isolation, moreover, this isolation would be the more hopeless, the less impurities the given type would contain. Confusion would give good or bad types and generate sympathy or enmity like chemical affinity or contrast. The existence and destiny of man would be determined by a purely natural order, as is the case in the case of an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision. as is the case with an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision. as is the case with an animal or a plant. One could only state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision.

We know, however, that the human being is not reducible to a purely natural order. He has the gift of mastering his own being and consciousness in the process of historical accomplishment. He knows not only birth, but also the possibility of spiritual rebirth. In trouble and danger, when an animal and a plant helplessly die, he is able to be reborn to a new life through intellectual effort, volitional decision, confident analysis of the situation and inference. He has free space for his power and his historical power. He is given a choice, and at certain moments in history he is able to choose the element to which he adheres through his own deed and his own efforts, as to a new form of his historical existence, and in which he settles. In this sense, he learned well, as the poet says, "the freedom to choose the path,

3

World history is the history of the struggle of continental powers against sea powers and sea powers against continental powers. Admiral Castex, a French military scientist, prefaced his strategy book with a general heading: Sea against Earth, la Mer contie la Terre. Thus, he is in line with a long tradition.

The initial antagonism of land and sea was noticed for a long time, and even at the end of the 19th century, the then existing tension in relations between Russia and England was loved to be portrayed as a battle between a bear and a whale. The whale here stands for a huge mythical fish, Leviathan, about which we will hear something else, while the bear means one of the many representatives of land animals. According to the medieval interpretations of the so-called Kabbalists, world history is nothing more than a struggle between a powerful whale, Leviathan, and the equally powerful land animal Behemoth, which was imagined in the form of a bull or an elephant. Both names - Leviathan and Behemoth - are borrowed from the book of Job (chapters 40 and 41). So, Kabbalists claim that

The Hippopotamus tries to tear the Leviathan with its horns and teeth, while the Leviathan tries to clamp the mouth and nose of the Hippopotamus with its fins so that it cannot eat and breathe. This is the most graphic, which only the myth allows, depicting the blockade of a continental power by a naval power, which closes all naval approaches to land in order to cause famine. This is how the two belligerent powers kill each other. However, the Jews, - say the Kabbalists further, - then celebrate a thousand-year "feast Leviathan ", which is described in the famous poem by Heinrich Heine. In order to give a historical interpretation of this feast of Leviathan, the Kabbalist Isaac Abravanel is most often quoted. He lived from 1437 to 1508. at the time of great discoveries, he was the treasurer first to the king of Portugal, then to the king of Castile and died a respected man in Venice in 1508. Thus, he knew the white light and all the riches of the world and knew what he was talking about.

Let us cast a cursory glance at some events in world history from the point of view of this struggle between land and sea.

The world of Greek antiquity arose from the travels and wars of the seafaring peoples, "it was not for nothing that the sea god fed them." The dominant maritime power on the island of Crete drove the Persians out of the eastern Mediterranean and created a culture, all the inexplicable charm of which was revealed to us during the excavations of Knossos. A millennium later, in the naval battle of Salamis (480 BC), the free city of Athens defended itself from its enemy - "the Persians who rule all" - behind wooden walls, that is, on ships, and was saved thanks to this naval battle. His own reign was defeated in the Peloponnesian War by continental Sparta; the latter, however, precisely because of its continental character, was unable to unite the cities of Hellas and lead the Greek empire. Rome, on the contrary, which was from the very beginning an Italian peasant republic and a purely continental state, turned into a real empire in the process of fighting the maritime and commercial domination of Carthage. The history of Rome, as a whole, and especially during this period of the long struggle between Rome and Carthage, was often compared with other historical situations and cataclysms. Such comparisons and parallels can be instructive, but they often lead to strange contradictions. For example, parallels to the worldwide English empire are found now in Rome, now in Carthage. Comparisons of this kind are in most cases a double-edged sword that can be taken and turned on either side. Vandals, Saracens, Vikings and Normans snatched sea domination from the hands of the fading Roman Empire. After many unsuccessful attempts, the Arabs conquered Carthage (698 BC.) and founded the new capital Tunisia. Thus began their centuries-old domination over the western Mediterranean. The Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire, ruling from Constantinople, was a coastal empire. At her disposal was a strong fleet and a mysterious weapon of war - the so-called Greek fire. However, all this served exclusively for defensive purposes. In any case, in its capacity as a naval power, it could do something that the empire of Charlemagne could not afford - a purely all this served purely defensive purposes. In any case, in its capacity as a naval power, it could do something that the empire of Charlemagne could not afford - a purely

continental; Byzantium was a real "restraining", "catechon", despite its weakness, it "held" Islam for many centuries, thereby preventing the possibility of the conquest of Italy by the Arabs. Otherwise, the same thing would have happened to Italy as happened then to North Africa - the ancient Christian culture would have been destroyed, and Italy would have been swallowed up by the world of Islam. In the Christian-European area, a new maritime power subsequently emerged, which rose thanks to the crusades: Venice.

Thus, a new mythical name invades world history. For almost half a millennium, the Republic of Venice has been considered a symbol of maritime domination and wealth that has grown from maritime trade. She achieved brilliant results in the field of big politics, she was called "the most outlandish creature in the history of economics.

of all times ". Everything that prompted fanatical Anglomaniacs to admire England in the 18th and 20th centuries was already the reason for their admiration for Venice: enormous wealth; an advantage in diplomatic skill, with the help of which a naval power is able to cause complications in the relations of continental powers and to wage their wars with someone else's hands; an aristocratic basic law that gave the appearance of a solution to the problem of the internal political order; tolerance for religious and philosophical views; a refuge for freedom-loving ideas and political emigration. It also includes the enchanting splendor of sumptuous feasts and the beauty of the fine arts. One of these festivals especially captured the human imagination and contributed to the glorification of Venice in the world - this was the legendary "Betrothal to the Sea," the so-called *sposalizio del mare*.

Every year, on the day of the Ascension of the Lord, the Doge of the Republic of Venice went to the open sea on a luxurious state ship, and threw a ring into the waves as a sign of union with the sea. The Venetians themselves, their neighbors, as well as the peoples who lived far from Venice, saw in this a convincing symbol through which the power born of the sea and the wealth born of the sea acquired a mythical consecration. However, we will still have the opportunity to be convinced of how things really were with this beautiful symbol when we see it again in its original light.

This fabulous queen of the sea shone brighter and brighter from 1000 to 1500. In 1000, the then emperor of Byzantium, Nicephorus Phocas, could, with some reason, assert about himself: "Until now, you were in a marriage union with the sea, from now on it belongs to me." Between these two dates lies the era of Venetian maritime rule over the Adriatic, the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean. In this era, a legend arose that attracted an endless number of travelers and famous romantics of all European nations, poets and people of art, such as Byron, Musset, Richard Wagner, Barré, to Venice in the 19th and 20th centuries. Nobody can avoid the glamor of this legend, and least of all would like to temper the radiance of its glory. But if we ask if we are dealing here with a case of a purely marine existence and a genuine choice in favor of the sea element, then we will immediately see how constrained the sea power is, limited by the Adriatic and the Mediterranean basin, when one day the vast expanses of the world's oceans open up.

four

The German philosopher of geography Ernst Kasch, whose mind was entirely dominated by the vast world of Hegel's ideas, classified empires according to the factor of water in his *Comparative Geography* (1845). He distinguishes three stages of development, three acts of the great drama. For him, world history begins with the "Potanic" time, that is, with the culture of the river floodplains of the Near and Middle East in the Euphrates and Tigris two rivers and on the Nile River, in the Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian kingdoms of the East. This is followed by the so-called thalassic period of the culture of the inland seas and the Mediterranean basin, to which the Greek and Roman antiquities and the Mediterranean Middle Ages belong. With the discovery of America and the beginning of voyages around the world, the last and highest stage begins, the era of oceanic culture, the carriers of which are the Germanic peoples. To clarify the essence of the matter, we, however, will use a three-part scheme that distinguishes between a river, an inland sea and an ocean. Then we will see more clearly why the maritime domination of Venice remained entirely at the second, thalassic stage.

It is a holiday like the aforementioned "Betrothal to the Sea" that makes this difference clear. Such symbolic actions of connection with the sea are also found among other peoples dependent on the sea. For example, the Indian tribes of Central America, engaged in fishing and navigation, brought sacrifices to the deities of the sea.

in the form of rings and other jewelry, in the form of animals and even people. I, however, do not think that the same rituals were practiced by the real "captors of the sea". It does not follow that they were less prone to piety or less needy to conjure divine powers. But they did not think about the ceremony of betrothal or marriage to the sea precisely because they were real children of the sea. They felt identical to the elements of the sea. The same symbolic betrothal or marriages show, on the contrary, that the sacrificer and the sacrificed deity are different, even opposite, beings. With the help of such a sacrifice, a hostile element should be appeased. In the case of Venice, the ceremony makes it clear that the meaning of the symbolic act is not a product of the primordial maritime existence; to a much greater extent, there is a distinct style of holiday symbols created by the highly developed coastal and lagoon culture. Ordinary navigation and a culture based on the use of an advantageous seaside location are still something different than the transfer of all historical being from land to sea, the choice of the sea as an element of existence. The domination of Venice in the coastal zone begins in the year 100 with a sea voyage to Dalmatia. Venetian domination over the hinterland, for example over Croatia and Hungary, has always been problematic, just as naval domination over land can be. And in the field of shipbuilding technology, the Republic of Venice did not leave the Mediterranean and the Middle Ages until its decline in 1797. Like the peoples of the Mediterranean, Venice knew only a rowing ship, a galley. Shipping on large monuments came to the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean. The Venetian fleet was and remains a fleet of large galleys driven by rowing power. The sail was used only as an additional element in case of a favorable tailwind, as it was already in ancient times. A particular navigational achievement was the improvement of the compass to its modern form. Thanks to the compass, "the ship has acquired something reasonable, by virtue of which a person enters into communication and becomes related to the vehicle" (Kapp). Only now can the most remote areas of land on all oceans come into contact, so that the earth's circle opens up. But the modern compass, the appearance of which in the Mediterranean was earlier attributed most often to 1302 and to the Italian sea city of Amalfi, in any case was not invented in Venice.

As I said, and I repeat again, we do not want to diminish the radiance and glory of Venice. But we must understand the meaning of what is happening when the people, in the totality of their entire historical existence, makes a choice in favor of the sea as an alien element to themselves. The way of waging naval battles of that time most clearly demonstrates what is being discussed here, and how little can we talk about the elementary transfer of all human existence from land to sea in the then Mediterranean. In an ancient naval battle, rowing ships attack each other and try to ram and board each other. Therefore, naval combat is always close combat. "The ships grab each other like a pair of struggling men." In the battle of Milah, the Romans first took enemy ships on board, throwing the flooring from the boards and thus erecting a bridge, through which they could enter an enemy ship. The sea battle thus turned into a land battle on ships. On the ship's boards, they were cut with swords as if on a stage. This is how the famous naval battles of antiquity were played out. In a similar way, although with the help of more primitive hand weapons, the Malay and Indian tribes fought their naval battles.

The last major naval battle of this kind was at the same time the last glorious feat of Venetian history - it was the naval battle at Lepanto (1571). Here the Spanish-Venetian fleet met with the Turkish and won the most convincing victory at sea ever won by Christians over Muslims. Battle

took place in the same place, at Actium, where, shortly before the beginning of our era (30 BC), the flotilla of the East and West, Antony and Octavian, entered the battle. The naval battle of Lepanto was fought basically with the same naval-technical means as the battle of Actium one and a half millennia ago. In close combat on the ship's boards, selected foot units of the Spaniards, the famous third, fought with the Janissaries, the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire.

The change in the way of waging war at sea took place only a few years after the Battle of Lepanto, precisely during the defeat of the Spanish armada in the English Channel. The small sailing ships of the British showed their advantage over the large ships of the Spanish fleet. However, the leaders in the field of shipbuilding technology were not the British at that time, but the Dutch. During the period from 1450 to 1600, the Dutch invented more new types of ships than all other peoples. The mere discovery of new parts of the world and oceans was not enough to lay the foundations for dominance in the world's oceans and ensure the choice of the sea as the element of existence.

five

Not noble does on pompous ships, but wild adventurers and "froths of the sea", brave whale hunters plying the oceans and brave sailing ship drivers are the first heroes of a new marine existence. In the two most important areas - whaling and shipbuilding - the Dutch were at first far ahead of everyone else.

Here I must first give praise to the whale and the whale hunter. It is impossible to talk about the great history of the sea and about man's choice in favor of the sea element without mentioning the fabulous Leviathan and his equally wonderful pursuit. Of course, this is a huge topic. My feeble praise reaches neither the whale nor the hunter. How can I take the liberty of telling the two wonders of the sea in an appropriate way - oh the most powerful of all living beasts and the most courageous of all hunters of humanity?

I dare to do so only because I can rely on the authority of two great heralds and heralds of both these maritime wonders - the significant French historian Jules Michelet and the great American writer Herman Melville. In 1861, the Frenchman published a book about the sea - a hymn to the beauty of the sea and the world of its undiscovered wonders, to the riches of the seabed of all continents, which had not yet been seized and used by the "fierce king of this world", man. Melville is to the world's oceans what Homer is to the eastern Mediterranean. In the exciting story "Moby Dick" (1851), he described the story of the great whale, Moby Dick, and the captain Ahab hunting for him, thus creating the greatest epic of the oceanic element. I am certainly aware that, when on occasion I use here instead of the word "whale" the phrase "fish-whale" and instead of "hunter of a whale" sometimes say "hunter of whale fish", it will be considered an amateurish and imprecise word usage. They will start teaching me about the zoological nature of the whale, which, as any schoolchild knows, is a mammal, but not a fish. Already in the "System of Nature" published in 1776 by old Linnaeus, one could read that the whale fish is warm-blooded, breathes with lungs, and not with gills, like an ordinary fish; that the female whale gives birth to an already highly developed living cub and for almost a whole year lovingly takes care of him and feeds him with her milk. I in no way want to argue with scientists-specialists in the vast science of whales, with cetologists, but I just want to briefly, without any discussion, explain why I do not completely reject the old name "whale fish". It goes without saying that a whale is not a fish like pike or herring. Nevertheless, calling this strange monster a fish, I lay bare all the absurdity of the fact that such a warm-blooded giant is devoted to the elements of the sea, although he is not predisposed to this by his

physiological structure. Just imagine for a moment the opposite case: a huge creature breathing with gills is running on land! The largest, strongest and most powerful marine animal plows the world's oceans from the north to the south poles, breathes with its lungs and, being a mammal, gives birth to live babies in this sea world! It is also not an amphibian, but it is a real mammal, and yet at the same time a fish in its habitat. In the period we are considering, namely from the 16th to the 19th century, the hunters for this huge fish were true Hunters with a capital letter, and not just some banal "whalers" or "whalers". This is not indifferent for our topic.

The French whale eulogy Michelet, in his book on the sea, describes the love and family life of whales with particular insight. The male whale is an agile lover of the female whale, the most tender husband, the most caring father. He is the most humane of all living beings, he is more humane than a man who exterminates whales with barbaric cruelty. But how innocent the fishing methods were in those days, in 1861, when Michelet wrote about it! However, even then the steamers and guns violated the equality of whale and man and reduced the poor whale to a convenient target for shooting. And what would the humane friend of people and animal lover Michelet say when he sees today's industrial production of whale oil and the sale of whale carcasses! For what today, after the World War of 1914-1918, was formed and is increasingly being improved under the name of "pelagic", deep fishing, it is no longer possible to call it not only hunting, but even fishing. Today, huge ships with a displacement of up to 30,000 tons are sent to the South Pole of the Earth in the Polar Sea, equipped with electrical appliances, cannons, mines, aircraft and radio equipment, like floating food pans. The whale has disappeared there, and there the dead animal is processed industrially right on the ship. So poor Leviathan would soon disappear from our planet. In 1937-1938. In London, an international agreement was finally reached, which defines the well-known rules for whaling, establishes fishing areas, provides other conditions in order to protect at least the surviving whales from further unscheduled extermination.

The whale hunters in question were, on the contrary, true hunters, not trivial catchers, and certainly did not kill whales by mechanical means. They chased their prey from the waters of the North Sea or from the Atlantic coast on sailing ships and rowing ships across the vast expanses of the world's oceans, and the weapon with which they entered the battle with the mighty and cunning sea giant was a harpoon thrown by a human hand. It was a life-threatening battle between two living creatures, and both of them, not being fish in the zoological sense, moved in the elements of the sea. All the means at hand that a person used in this struggle were then still driven by the muscular power of the person himself: a sail, an oar and a harpoon, a deadly throwing spear. The whale was strong enough to to smash the ship and the boat to pieces with one blow of its tail. He could oppose human cunning with a thousand of his own tricks. Herman Melville, who himself served as a sailor on a whaling ship for many years, describes in his "Moby Dick" how between a hunter and his victim, one might say, a personal bond and an intimate relationship of friendship-enmity. Here, a person is increasingly immersed in the spontaneous abyss of sea existence, thanks to the struggle with other inhabitants of the sea. These whale hunters sailed from north to south of the globe and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. All the while following the mysterious paths of the whale, they discovered islands and continents without making a big fuss out of it. Melville has one of these navigators, having become acquainted with the book of the pioneer of Australia, Captain Cook, says the following words: this Cook writes books about things, which a whale hunter would not even enter in his logbook. Michelet asks: Who showed people the ocean? Who opened

oceanic zones and straits? In a word: Who discovered the globe? The whale and the whale hunter! And all this regardless of Columbus and the famous gold diggers, who are looking with great hype for what has already been found by the noble fishermen of the North, from Brittany and from the Basque country. Michelet says this and goes on: These whale hunters are the greatest manifestation of the human spirit. Without a whale, anglers would always be only on the coast. The whale fish lured them into the oceans and granted them independence from the coast. Thanks to the whale, sea currents were opened and a passage to the North was found. Keith led us.

Then, in the 16th century, on our planet, two different types of hunters were simultaneously at the mercy of the awakening of the elements. On the ground, those were Russian hunters for fur-bearing animals, who, following the fur-bearing animals, conquered Siberia and went overland to the East Asian coast; at sea, North and West European whale hunters who hunted all the world's oceans and, as Michelet rightly points out, made the globe visible. They are the first-borns of a new, spontaneous existence, the first real "children of the sea".

6

This change of eras marks the most important event in the field of technology. And here the Dutch are ahead of everyone. In 1600, they were the undisputed master of shipbuilding. They invented new sailing techniques and new types of sailing ships that abolished oars and opened up possibilities for navigation and navigation, corresponding to the size of the world's newly discovered oceans.

Around 1595, a new type of ship appears in North Holland from the West Frisian city of Hoorn. It was a boat with straight sails, sailing not only with a fair wind, like an old sailboat, but also to the side of the wind, which knew how to use the wind in a very different way than previous ships. Ship tackles and the art of sailing are now being improved to an unprecedented degree. "The shipping of the Middle Ages ends in a disastrous way," says Bernhard Hageborn, a historian of the development of ship types, about this event. This is a true turning point in the history of the relationship between the Earth and the Sea. This achieved everything that the material from which the ship and the rigging were made then allowed to achieve. A new turn in the technique of shipbuilding came only in the 19th century. "Like a revelation," says Hageborn, - it must have seemed to the sailors the moment when one day they left a large sail and saw how rich opportunities a small sail opens before them. " Thanks to this technical achievement, the Dutch became the "cabbies" of all European countries. They also inherited the trade of the German Hansa. Even the world power Spain was forced to charter Dutch ships to support its transatlantic transport.

In the 16th century, in addition, a new warship appears, and this opens a new era of naval military strategy. Equipped with guns, the sailboat is fired from the sides with volleys of the enemy. Thus, a naval battle becomes an artillery battle from a long distance, requiring great skill in sailing a sailboat. Only now can we really talk about a naval battle, for the battle of the crews of rowing galleys, as we have seen, is only a land battle on a ship. Associated with this is a completely new tactics of naval combat and warfare at sea, a new art of "evolutions" necessary before, during and after a naval battle. The first scientific, in a modern sense, book about this new art was published in Lyon in 1697 under the title "L'art des armecs navales ou trait des evolutions navales"; its author was a French Jesuit priest Paul Ost. It provides a critical overview of the naval battles and naval maneuvers of the Dutch, British and French during the war of Louis 14 with the Dutch. Subsequently, other French

research this issue. Only in the 18th century, in 1782, an Englishman, represented by Clerk d'Heldine, was included in a number of famous theorists of naval tactics.

All Western and Central European peoples have contributed to the common achievement of discovering a new land and resulting in worldwide European hegemony. The Italians improved the compass and created navigational maps; the discovery of America took place primarily thanks to the power of knowledge and the mind of Toscanelli and Columbus. The Portuguese and Spaniards equipped the first great exploration expeditions and sailed around the world. Great German astronomers and remarkable geographers contributed to the formation of a new picture of the world; the name "America" was invented in 1507 by the German cosmographer Waltzemüller, and the enterprise of foreigners in Venezuela was a great colonial start, which, however, could not cope with the Spanish resistance. The Dutch were leading whaling and shipbuilding techniques. France had especially wide opportunities both because of its geographical position on three coasts - the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel - and because of its economic potential and because of the penchant for navigation of the population of its Atlantic coast. The French Viking Jean Fleury in 1522 dealt the first tangible blow to Spanish world hegemony and captured two jeweled ships that Cortez sent from America to Spain; French discoverer Jean Cartier already in 1540 discovered Canada, the "new France" and took possession of it for his king. A particularly important part in the awakening of the sea energies of that era were the Huguenot corsairs, natives of La Rochelle. France for many decades surpassed England in the field of military construction of sailing ships in the 17th century,

The achievements of the British in shipping are, of course, also very significant. But English sailors began to sail south of the equator only after 1570. Only in the last third of the 16th century did the great awakening of the English corsairs to sail overseas and to America begin.

7

All kinds of "captors of the sea", pirates, corsairs, adventurers engaged in sea trade, along with whale hunters and sailing ship drivers, constitute the shock column of that spontaneous turn to the sea, which was carried out during the 16-17 centuries. Here we have the next brave kind of "children of the sea". Among them are famous names, heroes of sea stories and tales of robbers, such as Franz Drake, Heckwins, Sir Walter Rally or Sir Henry Morgan, glorified in many books; the fate of each of them was indeed quite rich in adventure. They took over the Spanish fleets of silver, and this one topic in itself is already quite intriguing. There is an extensive literature about pirates in general and about many great names in particular, and even a dictionary about them has been compiled in English under the funny title "The Pirate's Who's Who".

Whole categories of these brave sea robbers have indeed gained fame in history, for they struck the first blows at the Spanish hegemony throughout the world and at the Spanish monopoly in trade. Thus, the Huguenot pirates in the French naval fortress of La Rochelle, along with the Dutch sea guez, fought against Spain during the time of Queen Elizabeth. Then they were the so-called Elizabethan corsairs, who made a significant contribution to the defeat of the Spanish armada (1588). The corsairs of Queen Elizabeth were followed by those of King James I, among them was Sir Henry Mainvering, first one of the most notorious sea robbers, then pardoned by the king in 1616 and, finally, the winner of pirates, awarded with positions and honors. Next are filibusters and wild pirates, who set off on their distant voyages from

Jamaica and from the waters of the Caribbean, the French, Dutch and English, among them Sir Henry Morgan, who sacked Panama in 1671, was knighted by King Charles II and became the royal governor of Jamaica. Their last feat was the conquest of the Spanish naval fortress of Cartagena in Colombia, which they, together with the French Royal Navy, took by assault in 1697 and sacked in a horrific manner after the departure of the French.

In this kind of "captors of the sea" the sea element is manifested. Their heroic era lasted approximately 150 years, from about 1550 to 1713, that is, from the time the Protestant states began to struggle against the world domination of Catholic Spain and until the conclusion of the Utrecht Peace. Sea robbers have existed at all times and on all seas and oceans, starting with the pirates mentioned above, expelled by the Cretan state from the eastern Mediterranean many millennia ago, and up to the Chinese Junks, who captured and robbed merchant ships in East Asian waters back in 1920-1930 ... But the corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries still occupy a special place in the history of piracy. Their time ended only with the conclusion of the Utrecht Peace Treaty (1713), since then the system of European states was consolidated. The naval fleets of the naval powers could now exercise effective control, and the new world hegemony of England erected at sea for the first time became apparent. Nevertheless, even before the 19th century, there were corsairs who fought privately, with the permission of their governments. But the organization of the world progressed, the technique of shipbuilding and navigation improved, became more and more knowledge-intensive, and piracy is still, as one English expert in naval affairs put it, "the pre-scientific stage of naval wars." Having ceased to rely on his own fist and his own calculations, the pirate has now turned into a pitiful criminal. Of course, there have always been some exceptions. These include the French captain Misson, who in 1720 tried to create an outlandish kingdom of humanity in Madagascar. However, in general, after the Utrecht Peace, the pirate was pushed to the sidelines of world history. In the 18th century, he is just a dissolute subject, a rude criminal type, who can still serve as a character in fascinating stories, like Stevenson's "Mysterious Island", but no longer plays any role in history.

On the contrary, corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries play a very significant role in history. In the worldwide confrontation between England and Spain, they are active warriors. They were considered real criminals by their enemies, the Spaniards; they were hung up when they were caught. Likewise, their own government cold-bloodedly sacrificed them when they became uncomfortable or when it was dictated by considerations of a foreign policy order. Often it was only chance that decided whether such a corsair would end his life as a royal nobleman, a high-ranking dignitary, or a pirate sentenced to be hanged. In addition, various names, such as pirate, corsair, Privateer, Merchant-Adventurer, are difficult to distinguish in practice and are used one instead of the other. In the proper sense of the word, from a legal point of view, there is a big difference between a pirate and a corsair. For, unlike a pirate, The corsair has a document confirming his rights, the powers of his government, an official letter of privateer from his king. He has the right to fly the flag of his country. The pirate, on the other hand, swims without any legal reason. Only a black pirate banner suits him. But no matter how clear and clear this distinction may seem in theory, in practice it is easily erased. Corsairs often overstepped their rights and sailed with fake letters of marque, and sometimes with letters of attorney from non-existent governments. Something else is more essential than all these legal issues. All these Rochellois, sea gueuze and filibusters, had a political enemy, namely Spain, the great Catholic power. As long as they stay on their own for the most part they thoroughly rob only the ships of the Catholics and, with a clear conscience, regard this as a God-pleasing deed blessed by the Lord. Thus, they enter a huge

the world historical front, to the front of the struggle of the then world Protestantism against the then world Catholicism. The fact that they kill, rob and plunder, therefore, needs no justification. In the general context of this pivotal era, they in any case occupy a definite position and, thus, acquire their historical significance and their place in history.

eight

English kings - both Queen Elizabeth and Stuart James and Charles - and the English statesmen of this time did not have any other historical consciousness of their era, compared to most of their contemporaries. They pursued their policies, took advantage of the advantages provided, made profits and sought to hold any position. They used the right, if it was on their side, and indignantly protested against injustice and lawlessness, if the right was on the side of their opponents. All this is completely natural. Their ideas about God and the world, about justice and legality, their awareness of the historical development that had come into motion were - with such ingenious exceptions as Thomas More,

Queen Elizabeth is deservedly considered the great founder of English naval domination. She entered the struggle against the world hegemony of Catholic Spain. During her reign, the Spanish armada was defeated in the English Channel (1588); she inspired and honored heroes of the sea such as Francis Drake and Walter Rally; from her hands in 1600 the English East India Trade Campaign received trade privileges, which subsequently conquered all of India under British rule. During 45 years of her reign (1558-1603) England became a wealthy country, which it was not before. Earlier the British were engaged in sheep breeding and sold wool to Flanders; now fabulous trophies of English pirates and corsairs rushed from all seas to the English islands. The queen rejoiced at these treasures - they replenished her wealth. In this respect, all the time she was a girl, she did the same thing that did the many English nobles and bourgeoisie of her era. All of them were involved in a large mining business. Hundreds of thousands of British and British women then became "corsair capitalists", corsairs capitalists. This also applies to that spontaneous turn from land to sea, which we are talking about here.

The Killigrew family of Cornwall provides us with a perfect example of this flourishing of early pirate-booty capitalism. His views and way of life give us a picture of the dominant estates at that time and the real "elite" much more vital and accurate than many official acts and official documents conditioned by the era. These Killigrews are typical of their time in a completely different sense than most diplomats, lawyers and poets crowned with fame, and in any case, it should be noted that among the representatives of this family there are prominent intellectuals, and the Killigrew surname is still presented more than ten times in the bibliographic national lexicon of England. Let's spend some time in this society of the elite.

The Killigrew family lived in Arwenack in Cornwall, South East England. The head of the family during the time of Queen Elizabeth was Ser John Killigrew, Vice Admiral of Cornwall and hereditary royal steward of Pendennis Castle. He worked closely with William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, the Queen's first minister. Already the father and uncle of the vice admiral and the manager were pirates, and even against his mother, as the English chroniclers reliably tell us, a criminal case was opened on charges of piracy. One part of the family worked on the shores of England, the other in

Ireland. Numerous cousins and other relatives on the shores of Devon and Dorset. To this is to add friends and drinking companions of all kinds. They organized attacks and predatory raids, ambushed ships approaching their shore, watched over the division of booty, and traded in profit shares, posts and positions. The large house in which the Killigrew family lived in Arwenac stood in close proximity to the sea in a deserted part of Falmouth port and had a secret passage to the sea. The only building located nearby was the aforementioned Pendennis Castle, the residence of the royal steward. The castle was equipped with hundreds of cannons and served as a refuge for pirates in case of emergency. By the time the noble Lady Killigrew became a hardworking and skillful assistant to her husband, she was already helping her father, brilliant "gentleman pirate". She provided shelter for pirates in her house and was a hospitable hostess. In all local ports, shelters and lodging sites were provided.

The royal authorities rarely harassed the Killigrew family, or even more so, hindered her in her pursuits. Only once, in 1582, did it come to such an intervention, which I would like to briefly describe. A Hanseatic ship with a displacement of 144 tons, owned by two Spaniards, was carried by a storm to the port of Falmouth. Since England at that moment was not at war with Spain, the Spaniards fearlessly anchored, and just opposite the house in Arvenac. Lady Killigrew saw the ship from her window, and her trained eye saw at once that the ship was laden with precious Dutch cloth. On the night of January 7, 1852, Killigrew's armed men, led by a noble lady, attacked the unfortunate ship, killed the crew, threw the corpses into the sea, returned to Arvenac with valuable Dutch cloth and other booty. The ship itself is unclear how it ended up in Ireland. Both Spaniards the owners of the ship, fortunately, were not on the boat during the battle, as they spent the night in a small hotel on the shore. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwall. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwall. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. They filed a lawsuit in the local English court in Cornwall. After some research, the court concluded that the ship was probably stolen by unknown criminals, while other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment. But since the Spaniards had connections among politicians, they managed to transfer the case to a higher authority in London, so a second preliminary investigation was ordered. Lady Killigrew, along with her assistants, was brought to trial in another area. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment.

This is the true story of Lady Killigrew. Even in the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth's reign, most of the tonnage of the English fleet was involved in robbery or illegal trade, and the total displacement of ships that were in legal trade enterprises amounted to hardly more than 50,000 tons. The Killigrew family is a perfect example

of the patriotic front of the great era of sea robbers, in which an old English prophecy of the 13th century came true: "Lion cubs will turn into sea fish." So, lion cubs at the end of the Middle Ages bred mainly sheep, from whose wool they got cloth in Flanders. Only in the 16th and 17th centuries did this people of sheep breeders really turn into a people of "captors of the sea" and corsairs, "children of the sea".

nine

The British are comparatively late in achieving success in ocean voyages. The Portuguese began sailing a hundred years earlier, but they sailed mainly along the coast. Since 1492, the Spaniards begin the great Conquest, the conquest of America. They were quickly followed by French sailors, Huguenots and the British. But only in 1553, with the founding of the Muscovy Company, England began to pursue a transatlantic policy, with the help of which it succeeded in several

crowd out other great colonial powers. As mentioned above, it was only after 1570 that the British began to swim south of the equator. Almost the first evidence that England is beginning to acquire a new English world outlook is Hacklath's book *Principles of Navigation*; it came out in 1589. In whale fishing and shipbuilding, the teachers of the British, as well as of other peoples, were also the Dutch.

Nevertheless, it was the British who were the ones who in the end outstripped everyone, defeated all rivals and achieved world domination over the oceans. England became the heiress. She became the heir to the great hunters and sailboat drivers, explorers and discoverers of all other peoples of Europe. British rule over land through the sea absorbed all the brave exploits and achievements in navigation, committed by German, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish sailors. True, the great colonial empires of other European peoples continued to exist in the future. Portugal and Spain retained vast possessions overseas, but lost their maritime dominance and control over sea communications. With the landing and consolidation of Cromwell's troops in Jamaica in 1655, the general political world-oceanic orientation of England and the overseas victory over Spain were resolved. Holland, which reached the heyday of its sea power around 1600, a hundred years later, in 1700, became more of a land, continental country. She had to build strong field fortifications and defend against Louis XIV on land; its governor, William III of Orange, in 1689 becomes the king of England at the same time; he moved to the islands and was now pursuing not a Dutch proper, but an English policy. France could not stand that great exodus to the sea, which was associated with Huguenot Protestantism. She still belonged to the Roman spiritual tradition, and when, with the conversion of Henry IV to Catholicism and thanks to the St. Bartholomew's Night in 1572, the case was decided in favor of Catholicism, thus, in the end, the final choice was made not in favor of the sea, but in favor of land and land. True, France possessed a very large fleet and could, as we have seen, cope with England even under Louis XV. But after the French king dismissed his distinguished minister of trade and naval forces, Colbert, in 1672, it was no longer possible to reverse the choice in favor of land. The long colonial wars of the 18th century only confirmed this. Meanwhile, Germany lost all its power and strength in the wars of religion and because of the political failures of the then empire. Thus England became the heir, the universal heir to the great awakening of the European peoples. How could this be possible? This cannot be explained with the help of well-known analogies with previous historical examples of maritime domination, and nothing is given by parallels with Athens or Carthage, Rome, Byzantium or Venice. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution. Here we have a case that is unique by its very nature. Its originality, its incomparability lies in the fact that England carried out the transformation of the elements at a completely different moment in history, in a completely different way than the previous maritime powers. She really separated herself from the earth and founded her existence in the element of the sea. Thanks to this, she won not only many naval battles and wars, but gained the upper hand in something completely different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, in a unique revolution, in a planetary revolution. space.

10

What is this revolution of space?

A person has a certain idea, the idea changes under the influence of large

his "Spaces"; historical transformations.

this is

Equally diverse spaces correspond to different life forms.

Already within the same era, the everyday picture of the surrounding world of individual people differs depending on their profession. A resident of a large city thinks of the world completely differently than a peasant; the whale hunter has a completely different living space than the opera singer, and the pilot sees the world and life again not only in a different light, but also in different measures, depths and horizons. Differences in ideas about space will become even deeper and more significant if you compare entire peoples and different eras of human history. Scientific stories about space can mean a lot here, and very little. For centuries, scientists, who even then considered the Earth a ball, were held for the mentally ill and pests. In modern times, various sciences with growing specialization also developed their own special concepts of space. Geometry, physics, psychology and biology follow special, far from each other paths here. If you ask scientists, they will answer you that mathematical space is something completely different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is completely different from space in a psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen concepts of space. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. that mathematical space is something completely different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is completely different from space in the psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen concepts of space. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end. There is no wholeness here and the danger of dismemberment and chattering of an important problem in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. The philosophy and epistemology of the 19th century also do not provide any comprehensive and simple answer and practically leave us in a dead end.

But states and the forces of history do not wait for the data of science in the same way as Christopher Columbus did not wait for Copernicus. Every time, in view of a new attack of historical forces, through the release of new energies, new lands and oceans fall into the field of vision of all mankind, the spaces of historical existence also change. Then new scales and dimensions of political-historical action, new sciences, new dispensations, new life of new or revived peoples arise. This spread can be so intense and striking that not only the measures, scales and proportions change, not only the outer eye of a person, but also the very structure of the concepts of space. Then we can already talk about the revolution of space. However, with each historical change, in most cases, a modification of the picture of space is associated.

We can quickly clarify this general position for ourselves using three historical examples: the consequences of the conquest of Charlemagne, the Roman Empire in the first century AD and the influence of the Crusades on the development of Europe.

eleven

During the campaigns of conquest of Alexander the Great, a new huge spatial horizon appeared to the Greeks. The culture and art of Hellenism are its consequences. The great philosopher Aristotle, a contemporary of this change in space, saw that the world inhabited by people was increasingly closing in from the East and from the West. Aristarchus of Samos, who lived some time later (310 - 230), already assumed that the sun is a fixed star and stands in the center of the earth's orbit. Founded by Alexander, the city of Alexandria on the Nile has become a center of tremendous discoveries in the technical, mathematical and physical fields. Here taught Euclid, the founder of Euclidean geometry; Chiron carried out amazing technical inventions here. Here studied Archimedes of Syracuse, the inventor of large combat mechanisms and the discoverer of natural science, and the head of the Library of Alexandria, Eratosthenes (275 - 195), already at that time correctly calculated the location of the equator and scientifically proved that the Earth has the shape of a ball. This is how Copernicus's teaching was anticipated. And yet the Hellenistic world was not enough

vast for the planetary spatial revolution. His knowledge remained the lot of scientists, for he had not yet absorbed the world's oceans into his existential reality. When three hundred years later, Caesar, leaving Rome, conquered Gaul and England, the North-West appeared and the outlet to the Atlantic Ocean was opened. This was the first step towards today's concept of the European space. In the first century of the Roman era of the Caesars, especially, of course, in the time of Nero, the consciousness of the deepest change became so powerful and tangible that, at least in the prevailing state of mind, one could already talk about almost revolutionary changes in the picture of space. This historical moment falls on the first century of our era and therefore deserves special attention. The visible horizon has moved east and west, north and south. The wars of conquest and civil wars took place from Spain to Persia, from England to Egypt. Regions and peoples far removed from each other came into contact with each other and found the unity of a common political destiny. Soldiers from all parts of the empire - from Germany and from Syria, from Africa or from Illyria - could make their general the Roman emperor. The Isthmus of Corinth was cut through, ships bypassed the Arabian Peninsula from the south, Nero sent a scientific expedition to the sources of the Nile. The written evidence of this expansion of space is the map of the world of Agrippa and the geography of Strabo. The fact that the Earth has the shape of a ball was no longer realized only by individual astronomers or mathematicians. The famous philosopher Seneca, teacher, educator and: after all, the victim of Nero, then captured in wonderful words and poetic lines the almost planetary consciousness of that era. He pointed out with all clarity that it is enough for a small number of days to sail from the extreme coast of Spain with its own, favorable, that is, the easterly wind, in order to reach India located in the East on the way to the West. Elsewhere, in the tragedy *Medea*, he utters a striking prophecy in verse form:

Hot Indus and cold Araxes touch. The Persians
drink from the Elbe and the Rhine.
Thetis will reveal new worlds (novos orbis),
And Thule will no longer be the extreme limit of the Earth.

I have quoted these lines because they express that all-encompassing sense of space that was present in the first century AD. For the beginning of our era was really the border of epochs, with which was associated not only the consciousness of the fullness of time, but also the consciousness of the filled earthly space and the planetary horizon. But at the same time, the words of Seneca throw a mysterious bridge into modern times and in the era of discoveries; for they have survived and have come down to us through centuries of space twilight and through the shallowing of the European Middle Ages. They conveyed to thinking people a sense of greater space and universal space, and even contributed to the discovery of America. Like many of his contemporaries, Christopher Columbus knew the words of Seneca, they prompted him to set off on a brave voyage to the New World. He intended, sailing to the West, reach the East, and really reached it. The expression "new world," new world, *novus orbis*, which Seneca uses, was immediately applied to the newly discovered America.

The death of the Roman Empire, the spread of Islam, the invasions of the Arabs and Turks caused a century-long spatial twilight and the shallowing of Europe. Isolation from the sea, the absence of a fleet, and complete continental isolation are characteristic of the early Middle Ages and its system of feudalism. During the period from 500 to 1100, Europe became a feudal-agrarian continental massif; the European ruling stratum, the feudal lords, entrusted their entire spiritual culture, including reading and writing, to the Church and the clergy. The famous rulers and heroes of this era could neither read nor write;

for this they had a monk or chaplain. In a maritime empire, the rulers probably could not have remained illiterate as long as they were in such a purely material mass of land. However, as a result of the Crusades, the French, English and German knights became acquainted with the countries of the Middle East. In the North, new horizons opened up thanks to the expansion of the German Hansa and the spread of the German Knightly Order, a system of transport and trade communications, called the "world economy of the Middle Ages", arose here.

This spatial expansion was also a cultural transformation of the deepest kind. New forms of political life are emerging throughout Europe. In France, England and Sicily, centralized governing bodies are being created, in some way already anticipating the modern state. In upper and central Italy, a new urban culture is taking shape. Universities are developing, which teach theology and still unknown jurisprudence, and the revival of Roman law creates a new educated layer of lawyers, and undermines the monopoly of the clergy on education, typical of the feudal Middle Ages. In the new, Gothic art, in architecture, plastic art, in painting, a powerful rhythm of movement replaces the static space of the previous Romanesque art and places in its place a dynamic field of forces, space of movement and gesture. The Gothic vault is a device in which parts and elements are mutually balanced by their weight and hold each other. In contrast to the motionless, heavy masses of Romanesque buildings, there is a completely new spatial feeling. But even in comparison with the space of the ancient temple and the space of the subsequent architecture of the Renaissance, Gothic art reveals only its inherent strength and movement that transform space.

12

You can find other historical examples, but all of them pale in the face of the deepest and richest in consequences of changes in the planetary picture of the world in all the world history known to us. This change occurs in the 16th and 17th centuries, during the era of the discovery of America and the first circumnavigation of the world. Now, in the literal sense of the word, a new world, the New World, is emerging, and the general worldview of the first Western and Central European peoples of mankind is changing radically. This is the first true spatial revolution in the all-encompassing sense of the word, covering the whole earth, the whole world and all of humanity.

She is incomparable with any other. It was not just just a particularly extensive in quantitative terms, the spread of the geographical horizon, which naturally came about as a result of the discovery of new parts of the world and new oceans. Much greater changes in the overall perception of mankind have undergone the overall picture of our planet and thus the general astronomical view of the entire universe. For the first time in its history, a person could hold a real, whole globe like a ball. Thought about that. that the Earth should have the shape of a ball seemed to the man of the Middle Ages and even to Martin Luther as an amusing and frivolous fantasy. Now the globular image of the Earth has become a tangible fact, an irrefutable experience and an indisputable scientific truth. Now the earth, so stationary before, revolved around the sun as well. But even that was not yet the real thing to come, fundamental transformation of space. The breakthrough into space and the idea of an endless empty space were decisive.

Copernicus was the first to prove scientifically that the Earth revolves around the Sun. His work "De revolutionibus orbium coelestium" on the rotation of the celestial orbits was published in 1543. Although he thereby changed the whole picture of our solar system, he still firmly adhered to the opinion that the universe as a whole, space is a limited

space. Thus, the world has not yet changed in the global cosmic sense, and the very idea of space has not changed with it. Several decades later, the borders fell. In a philosophical sense, Giordano Bruno suggested that our solar system (in which the planet Earth revolves around the Sun) is just one of the many solar systems of an endless starry sky. As a result of Galileo's scientific experiments, such philosophical speculations acquired the status of mathematically provable truth. Kepler calculated the paths of motion of the planets, although he himself was seized with horror at the thought of the infinity of such spaces, where planetary systems move without any center. With the advent of Newton's doctrine, a new concept of space was firmly established in all free-thinking Europe. While,

Thus, people can imagine empty space, which was previously impossible, even if some philosophers talked about "emptiness". Before, people were afraid of emptiness; they suffered from the so-called horror vacui (fear of space). From now on, people have forgotten their fear and do not find anything more special in the fact that they themselves and their universe exist in emptiness. Such a scientifically proven representation of the universe in an endless, empty space even brought the writers of the 18th century Enlightenment, and above all Voltaire, into a state of special pride. But try to really imagine at least once a really empty space! Not only airless, but absolutely empty space devoid of any subtle and animate matter! Try at least once to really distinguish between space and matter in your mind, separate them from each other and think one without the other! You might as well try to conceive of absolute Nothing for yourself. The Enlighteners had a lot of fun about this horror vacui. But it was probably just a completely understandable fear of nothing and the emptiness of death, horror in the face of a nihilistic way of thinking and of nihilism in general.

This kind of change, which is present in the thought of an infinite, empty space, cannot be explained only as a consequence of the ordinary geographical expansion of the ecumene. It is so fundamental and revolutionary that it also allows us to say something exactly the opposite, namely, that the discovery of new continents and the first voyages around the earth were only external discoveries and consequences of deeper changes. This is the only reason why the landing on an unknown island could bring to life an entire era of discoveries. Newcomers from the West and the East often landed on the coast of the American continent. As you know, the Vikings from Greenland reached the shores of America for about 1000 years, and the Indians discovered by Columbus also migrated to America from somewhere. But America was "discovered" only in 1492 by Columbus. "Pre-Columbian" discoveries not only did not contribute to the planetary spatial revolution, but also had absolutely nothing to do with it. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have remained in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would appear in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and we would not open them, but, on the contrary, they would open us. For the space revolution to take place, it takes more than a simple landing in a previously unknown area. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries. For its accomplishment, it is necessary to change the ideas about space, which would cover all levels and areas of human existence. What this means allows us to understand the consideration of the unusual boundary of the eras that took place in the 16-17 centuries.

In these centuries of epoch-making changes, European humanity is gaining a new understanding of space in all forms of its creative spirit. Renaissance painting abolishes the space of medieval Gothic painting; artists now place the people and objects they have painted inside such a space that gives

perspective empty bottomlessness. People and things now rest and move from now on inside space. In comparison with the space of the Gothic painting, this really means a different world. The fact that artists now see differently, that their vision is changing, is filled with the deepest meaning for us. For great artists do not just portray something beautiful for someone. Art is a historical step in the awareness of space, and a real artist is a person who sees people and objects better and more correctly than other people, more correctly, first of all, in the sense of the historical truth of his own era. But it is not only in painting that a new space is emerging. Renaissance architecture creates its buildings completely different from the Gothic space with a classic geometric layout; its plastic freely places sculptures of human figures in space, while sculptures from the Middle Ages are located at the columns and in the corners of buildings. Baroque architecture is again in the dynamics of movement, aspiration and therefore retains some connection with the Gothic, but nevertheless it remains firmly chained in a new, modern space that arose as a result of the spatial revolution and was decisively influenced by the Baroque style itself. Music extracts its melodies and harmonies from old tonalities and places them in the sound space of our so-called tonal system. Theater and opera allow their characters to move in the empty depths of the stage space, which is separated by a curtain from the space of the auditorium. Thus, without exception, all the spiritual currents of these two centuries - Renaissance, Humanism, Reformation,

It would not be a great exaggeration to say that the new understanding of space embraces all areas of human life, all forms of being, all types of creative human abilities, art, science, technology. The enormous changes in geographic appearance of the Earth constitutes only the external profound transformation, aspect of the signified so promising and fraught many consequences collocation as "spatial revolution". Henceforth, inevitably comes what was called the rational superiority of the European, the spirit of Europeanism and "Occam's rationalism." It manifests itself among the peoples of Western and Central Europe, destroys the medieval forms of human society, forms new states, fleets and armies, invents new machines and mechanisms, enslaves non-European peoples and puts them in a dilemma: either accept European civilization or descend to the level of the common people of the colony.

13

Any habitual arrangement is an arrangement of space. The compilation, constitution of a country or part of the world is spoken of as its basic, primary ordering, its *nomos*⁹⁶.

So, the actual, true primary ordering is based in its most important essence on certain spatial boundaries and limitations, on certain measures and a certain division of the earth. At the beginning of every great epoch, therefore, there is a great seizure of lands. In particular, any significant change and

⁹⁶ The Greek noun *Nomos* comes from the Greek verb *Nemein*; like this verb, it has three meanings. First, *Nemein* means to take. Therefore, *Nomos* means, first of all, "capture", "capture". Just as the Greek *Legein-Logos* corresponds to the German *Sprechen-Sprache*, so the Greek *Nemein-Nomos* corresponds to the German *take-take, capture*. Seizure is at first the seizure of land, later also the seizure of the sea, the conquest of the sea, about which much has been said in our contemplation of world history, and in the field of industry it means the seizure of industry, that is, the seizure of industrial means of production.

a shift in the face of the Earth is associated with changes in world politics and with a new redivision of the world, a new seizure of land.

Such a striking, unprecedented spatial revolution, which took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, should have led to an equally unheard-of, unparalleled land grab. The European peoples, who then opened new, seemingly endless spaces and who rushed into the distance of these spaces, treated the non-European and non-Christian peoples they discovered as if they were ownerless goods, which became the property of the first European invader they came across. All conquerors, be they Catholics or Protestants, referred to their mission to spread Christianity among non-Christian peoples. However, such a mission could have been attempted without conquest and plunder. No other justification or justification was found. Some monks as, for example, the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, in his lecture on the Indians (De Indis 1532), argued that the right of peoples to their territory does not depend on their religion and defended the rights of the Indians with surprising frankness. This does not change anything in the general historical picture of the European colonial conquests. Later, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the task of the Christian mission turned into the task of spreading European civilization among uncivilized peoples. From such justifications arose Christian-European international law, that is, the community of Christian peoples of Europe opposed to the rest of the world. They formed a "community of nations", an interstate order. International law was based on the distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples, or, a century later, civilized (in the Christian-European sense) and uncivilized peoples. A people uncivilized in this sense could not become a member of this international legal community; he was not a subject. but only the object of this international law, that is, it belonged to one of the civilized nations as a colony or colonial protectorate. Of course, you should not think of the "community of Christian European nations" as a flock of peaceful sheep. They fought bloody wars among themselves. Yet this does not abolish the historical fact of the existence of Christian-European civilizational unity and order. World history is the history of colonial conquests, and with each land grab, the invaders not only negotiated, but also argued, often even through bloody civil wars. This is also true of most colonial conquests. Moreover, wars are waged with the greater intensity, the more value the object of conquest is. Here it was about the seizure of a new world, the New World. The Spanish and French throughout the 16th century slaughtered the indigenous population in the most brutal way, for example in Florida, and did not spare either women or children. The Spaniards and the British waged a century-long grueling war between themselves, in which the violence and atrocities that people are capable of against each other, it seemed, reached the highest possible degree. Moreover, they also did not feel any remorse from the fact that they used non-Europeans, Indians or Muslims as overt or secret assistants or even allies. Outbursts of hatred are extraordinary; each other was called murderers, thieves, rapists and pirates. There is only one single charge missing, which was usually willingly made against the Indians; Christian Europeans did not accuse each other of cannibalism. For the rest, all the richness of the language is used to designate the most evil, deadly enmity. And yet it loses all meaning in view of the all-conquering reality of joint European colonization of the new world, the New World. The meaning and essence of Christian-European international law, its initial ordering consisted precisely in the division and distribution of a previously unknown land. Among themselves, the European peoples were, without reasoning, united in that they considered the non-European territory of the land as a colonial territory, that is, as an object of their capture and use. This Christian Europeans did not accuse each other of cannibalism. For the rest, all the richness of the language is used to designate the most evil, deadly enmity. And yet it loses all meaning in view of the all-conquering reality of joint European colonization of the new world, the New World. The meaning and essence of Christian-European international law, its initial ordering consisted precisely in the division and distribution of a previously unknown land. 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the aspect of historical development is so important that the era of discoveries can just as well, and, probably, be even more accurately designated as the era of colonial conquests, the conquest of new lands. War, says Heraclitus, connects, and truth is a quarrel.

Secondly, Neimen means: division and distribution of what is captured (what is taken). Thus, the second meaning of Nomos: the main division and distribution of land, territory and the order of property rights resting on this.

The third meaning is: exploitation, that is, the use, processing and sale of the territory obtained during the division, production and consumption. Capture - Allocation - Use are, in this sequence, the three basic concepts of each specific sequencing. For more on the meaning of Nomos, see the book *Der Nomos der Erde*. Köln. 1950 (L. Auflage. Berlin. 1974)

fourteen

The Portuguese, Spaniards, French, Dutch and English fought among themselves for the division of the new land. The fight was fought not only by force of arms; it also took the form of a diplomatic and legal dispute over obtaining a more advantageous property right. In this matter, in contrast to the indigenous people, one could, of course, show exceptional generosity and magnanimity. They landed on the shore, erected a cross or carved the king's coat of arms on a tree, erected a pillar brought with them with an image of the coat of arms, or placed a coat of arms in a hole between tree roots. The Spaniards loved to announce with all solemnity to the crowd of natives who had fled that this country henceforth belonged to the crown of Castile. Symbolic takeovers of this kind were supposed to secure the acquisition of legal title to vast islands and entire continents. No government, be it Portuguese, respected the rights of natives and indigenous people on their own territory. Another question is the dispute between the European colonizing peoples. Here, everyone referred to any legal document that was in his hands at that moment and, if it turned out to be beneficial, then to contracts with the natives and their leaders.

As long as Portugal and Spain, the two Catholic powers, determined the state of affairs in the world, the Pope could act as the creator of legal acts, initiator of new colonial conquests and arbiter in the dispute between the colonial powers. Already in 1493, that is, almost a year after the discovery of America, the Spaniards managed to achieve the publication by the then Pope Alexander VI of an edict, in which the Pope, by the power of his apostolic authority, granted the King of Castile and Leon and his heirs the newly discovered West Indian countries in as the secular fiefdom of the Church. In this edict there was a definite line running across the Atlantic Ocean one hundred miles west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. Spain received from the Pope all the lands open to the west of this line into fiefdom. The following year, Spain and Portugal agreed in an agreement with Tordesillas that all land east of the line should belong to Portugal. So immediately the division of the New World begins on a huge scale, although Columbus had discovered by that time only a few islands and coastal regions. At that time, no one could imagine the real picture of the entire Earth, but the redistribution of the Earth began to be carried out in full measure and in accordance with all the rules. The papal dividing line of 1493 was at the beginning of the struggle for a new initial ordering, for a new nomos of the Earth. For more than a century, the Spanish and Portuguese have invoked papal authorizations (in their quest) to reject all claims of the French, Dutch and English who followed him. Brazil, discovered by Cabral in 1500, became, naturally, the property of Portugal,

ended up in the eastern, Portuguese hemisphere due to the later transfer of the dividing line to the West. However, the other colonizing powers did not feel bound by the terms of the agreement between Portugal and Spain, and the authority of the Pope was not enough to instill in them respect for the colonial monopoly of both Catholic powers. Thanks to the Reformation, the peoples who adopted Protestantism openly broke with any dependence on the Roman throne. So the struggle for the colonization of the new land turned into a struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, between the worldwide Catholicism of the Spaniards and the worldwide Protestantism of the Huguenots, Dutch and British.

fifteen

In contrast to the indigenous inhabitants of the recently opened countries, the Christian colonialists did not form a united front with each other, for in this case there was no common combat-ready enemy. The more fierce, but also more significant in the historical sense, the more pronounced and formalized was the now developing religious war between the Christian peoples - colonialists, a worldwide battle between Catholicism and Protestantism. Thus outlined and with these participants, it appears as a religious war, and in reality it also was. But that doesn't tell the whole story. In its true light, it appears to us in its entirety only when we, in this case, pay attention to the opposition of the elements and to the separation of the world of the open sea from the world of earthly firmament that was beginning at that time.

Some of the participants in this great religious struggle served as prototypes for stage characters for great writers. A favorite theme of playwrights was the confrontation between the Spanish king Philip II and Queen Elizabeth of England. Both of these characters are found separately in various tragedies by Schiller; their direct confrontation is repeatedly described in the same play. It serves as an excellent material for spectacular theater scenes. But in this way it is impossible to grasp the deep contradictions, the initial situations of friendship-enmity, the last elementary forces and confrontations of the elements. In Germany at that time there were no stage heroes for this. Only one single German of this era so poor in deeds in the life of Germany (1550-1618) became the hero of a significant tragedy: King Rudolph II. You've probably heard a little about him and really, it cannot be said that he continues to live in the historical memory of the German people. Nevertheless, his name belongs to this context and the great German playwright Franz Grillparzer rightfully places him at the center of the action of his tragedy "Fratricide in Habsburg". But the whole problematic and all the greatness of both Grillparzer's tragedy itself and his heroes lies precisely in the fact that Rudolf II was not an active hero, but a kind of delayer, a moderator. It had something of a "catechon," a concept already mentioned by us once in a different context. But what can Rudolph do in general in the situation in which Germany found itself then? The mere fact that he realized the absence of a foreign policy threat against Germany was already a lot, and the only achievement was that

The peculiarity of the position of Germany at that time was precisely in the fact that she did not decide on the choice of allies and could in no way take any side in this religious war. It included in itself the confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism, but this intra-German contradiction was something other than the worldwide confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism, decisive for the colonization of the New World. Germany was still the birthplace of Luther and the country of origin of the Reformation. But the struggle of the colonial powers long ago overcame the initial

the opposition of Catholicism and Protestantism, and, bypassing the intra-German problematic, reached a much more accurate and profound opposition of the teachings of the Jesuits and Calvinism. Now it was the distinction between friend and foe, serving as the yardstick for all world politics.

Lutheran German princes and estates, primarily the Protestant ruler of the empire, the Elector of Saxony, tried to remain faithful to the Catholic king. When, under the onslaught of the Calvinists, a military alliance of the Evangelical German estates, the so-called Union, arose, and the Catholic estates formed a counter front, the so-called League, the Elector of Saxony, a Lutheran by religion, did not know which side to side with. As early as 1612, negotiations were underway for him to join the Catholic League. The Lutheran hatred of Calvinists was no less than their hatred of the Papists, and no less than the hatred of Catholics for Calvinists. This is not only due to the fact that Lutherans in practice generally followed the principle of submission to authority more than the much more active Calvinists. The real reason is that Germany was at that time barred from participating in the European colonization of the New World and was forcibly drawn by external forces into the world clash of Western European colonial powers. At the same time, the advancing Turks threatened her in the South-East. The Jesuits and Calvinists of Spain, Holland and England presented Germany with alternatives completely alien to German development proper. Non-Jesuit Catholics and non-Calvinist Lutherans, such as the German princes and estates, tried to avoid participating in an internally alien dispute. But this required determination and enormous strength of our own. In the absence of such, they found themselves in a situation that was most accurately designated as "passive neutrality." The consequence of this was that Germany turned out to be a battlefield of internally alien transatlantic forces for colonies without real participation in this war. Calvinism was the new warlike religion; the awakening of the elements of the sea captured him as a proportionate faith to him. He became a faith of the French Huguenots, Dutch freedom fighters and English Puritans. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies. He was also the creed of the great Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a lot about naval battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere did not play a role in world politics unless they were associated with these marine energies.

All non-Calvinists were horrified by the Calvinistic doctrine, and above all, by the harsh belief in the chosenness of people from eternity, in "predestination to salvation." But in secular language, belief in predestination is just an extremely intensified consciousness of belonging to a different world than this one - condemned to death and depraved. In the language of modern sociology, this is the highest degree of self-awareness of the elite, confident in their position, confident that their time has come. To put it more simply, more humanely, this is the confidence that you are saved, and salvation is still the meaning of the whole world history that defines any idea. Filled with this confidence, the Dutch Gezi sang their lovely song:

"The land will become the sea, the land will become the sea, but it will be free."

When the elemental energies of the sea awakened in the 16th century, their effect was so strong that they quickly began to determine the political history of the world. At that moment, they had to speak the spiritual language of their time. They could no longer remain just whale hunters, fishermen and captors of the sea. They had to find a spiritual ally for themselves, an ally of the most radical and courageous, someone who would really do away with the images of the previous era. It could not have been the German Lutheranism of that time. The latter developed with a tendency towards territoriality and general shallowing. In any case, the decline of the Hansa and the end of German domination in the Baltic coincides as clearly in Germany with the era of Luther as the growth of the world power of Holland and the great decision of Cromwell - with the era

Calvinism. And something else comes to mind. Most of the previous historical research is still influenced by land study methods. They always mean only solid land and the development of states, in Germany even only territorial-state development, while often still limited in their subject of research to small states and small spaces. But as soon as we turn our gaze to the sea, we will immediately see a meeting, a coincidence in time, or, if I may say so, a world-historical brotherhood that connects political Calvinism with the awakening sea energies of Europe. Religious wars and theological slogans of this era also contain in their essence a clash of elemental forces that influenced the transfer of world-historical existence from land to sea.

sixteen

While on the coastal side of the historical achievement the process of seizing new lands was on a large scale, another, no less important part of the new limit of our planet was completed at sea. This was done through the English conquest of the sea. At sea, this was the result of the pan-European awakening of these centuries. He determined the main line of the first planetary ordering of space, the essence of which is the separation of the earth from the sea. The earth now belongs to a dozen sovereign states, the sea belongs to all or, finally, in reality, only one state: England. The arrangement of the earthly firmament, the land consists in the fact that it is divided into the territories of states; the open sea, on the contrary, is free, it means free from state formations and is not subject to any territorial supremacy. These are the decisive facts of the arrangement of space, on the basis of which Christian European international law has developed over the past three centuries. This was the basic law, the *nomos* of the land of this era.

It is only in the light of this primordial fact of the British conquest of the sea and the separation of the sea from the land that many famous and often quoted words and phrases take on their true meaning. This is, for example, the saying of Sir Walter Rally: "He who rules the sea dominates the world trade, and the one who rules the world trade owns all the riches of the world and in fact the world itself." Or: "All trade is world trade; all world trade is sea trade." This also includes the words about freedom, spoken during the heyday of the British sea and world power: "All world trade is free trade." It cannot be said that all this was so wrong, but all this refers to a certain era and to a certain international situation and becomes unjust then, when they try to make absolute and eternal truths out of it. But above all, the conflict between land and sea is revealed in the comparison of sea and land wars. Of course, war on land and war at sea have always differed from each other strategically and tactically. However, their opposite becomes from now on the expression of different worlds and opposing legal norms.

Since the 16th century, the states of the European continent have developed certain methods of waging land war, which are based on the idea of war as a relationship between states. On both sides of the front line there is state-structured, military power, and armies fight each other in open field combat. Only the troops participating in the battle confront each other as enemies, while the civilian population does not participate in hostilities. It is not an enemy and is not considered an enemy as long as it does not participate in a war. War at sea, on the other hand, involves the destruction of the enemy's trade and economy. The enemy in such a war is not only the belligerent enemy, but also any subject of a hostile state and, finally, even a neutral country leading

trade with the enemy and having economic relations with him. Ground warfare tends to be a decisive open field battle. Of course, even during a war at sea, the matter can reach a naval battle, but its typical means and methods are shelling and blocking the enemy's shores and capturing enemy and neutral merchant ships in accordance with the prize law. By their very nature, these means, typical of naval warfare, are directed against both military personnel and civilians. In particular, the food blockade, which condemns the entire population of the blockaded area to starvation equally, without distinguishing between military and civilian, men and women, old people and children.

In reality, these are not only two sides of the international legal order, but two completely different worlds. But since the British conquest of the sea, the British and the peoples dominated by English ideas have become accustomed to this state of affairs. The idea that a continental power would be able to exercise world domination over the entire globe was unheard of and unbearable for their perception of the world. Another thing is world domination, based on the world existence separated from the land and embracing the world's oceans. A small island on the northwestern side of Europe became the center of a world empire as it lifted off the ground and made the decisive choice in favor of the sea. In a purely marine existence, he found the means of world domination, extending to all ends of the Earth. After that, how the separation of the earth from the sea and the strife of both elements once became the fundamental law of the planet, on this foundation a huge framework of scientific opinions, arguments and scientific systems was erected, through which people substantiated the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, losing sight of the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. on this foundation a huge framework of scholarly opinions, arguments and scientific systems was built, through which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, losing sight of the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporal conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. by means of which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, overlooking the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and philosophers, and all of this seemed quite obvious to most of our great-grandfathers. They were no longer able to imagine any other economic science and other international law. Here you have the opportunity to make sure that the huge Leviathan also has power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing in its power. by means of which people justified the wisdom and rationality of this state of affairs, overlooking the primary fact of the British conquest of the sea and the temporary conditionality of this fact. Such systems were developed by great scientists, specialists in the field of political economy, lawyers and phil

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England is an island. But only by becoming the bearer and focus of a spontaneous exodus from the world of earthly firmament to the world of the open sea, and only as the heir to all the sea energies released at that time did she become the island that is meant when it is emphasized again and again that England is an island. And only having become an island in a new, hitherto unknown sense of the word, England seized the world's oceans and won at that first stage of the planetary revolution of space.

Needless to say, England is an island. But by one setting of this very little has been said about the geographical fact. There are many islands with completely different political destinies. Sicily is also an island, as are Ireland, Cuba, Madagascar, and Japan. How many contradictory tendencies in world history are combined in these few names, each of which names an island! In a sense, all continents, including the largest ones, are just islands, and the entire inhabited land is washed by the ocean, as the ancient Greeks already knew about. England itself has always been an island in the same geographical sense, with all the vicissitudes of historical fate, since it separated from the mainland many millennia ago - probably 18,000 BC. It was an island when it was inhabited by the Celts and when it was conquered for Rome by Julius Caesar, under the Norman

conquest (1066) and during the time of the Maid of Orleans (1431), when the British held most of France.

The inhabitants of this island had a sense of island security. From the Middle Ages, wonderful expressions and poetic lines have come down to us, in which England is compared to a fortified castle washed by the sea, like a defensive moat. In Shakespeare's poems, this insular sense of self found its most beautiful and famous expression:

"This second Eden, this crowned island, almost paradise,
This bastion built by nature itself,
This pearl in the setting of sea silver, Which serves
as a wall and a moat, protecting the house. "

It is clear that the British often quote such lines, and that especially the expression "this pearl in the setting of sea silver" could become winged ..
But this kind of expression of the English insular consciousness refers to the old island. The island is still regarded as a piece of land separated from the earth and washed by the sea. The insular consciousness still remains purely terrestrial, terrestrial and territorial .. It even seems that insular feeling manifests itself as a particularly pronounced territorial sense of the earth. It would be a delusion to consider any island inhabitant, any Englishman, even today, a born "captor of the sea". We have already seen the change in the fact that the people of sheep breeders became in the 16th century a people of the children of the sea. This was a fundamental transformation of the political and historical nature of the island itself. It consisted in the fact that the land began to be considered now only from the point of view of the sea, while the island from a separated land area became part of the sea, a ship or, more precisely, fish. It is difficult for an observer on the continent to imagine a consistently marine view of things, a purely marine perception of the earth. Our everyday language, in the formation of its meanings, naturally has the earth as its starting point. We saw this already at the very beginning of our contemplation. The image of our planet is the image of the earth; we forget that he can also be the image of the sea. In connection with the sea, we are talking about seaworthy routes, although there are no paths or roads here, as on land, but only communication lines. We imagine a ship on the high seas in the form of a piece of land that floats on the sea, in the form of a "floating section of state territory," as it is called in the language of international law. A warship appears to us as a floating fortress, and an island like England is a castle surrounded by the sea like a moat. Sea people consider all this to be completely false interpretations, the product of the fantasy of land rats. A ship is as little like a piece of land as a fish is like a swimming dog. In the eyes, determined exclusively by the sea, the earth's firmament, land is just a coast, a coastal strip plus "hinterland" (unoccupied territory). Even the whole land, considered only from the point of view of the open sea, proceeding from a purely marine existence, appears as a simple accumulation of objects thrown by the sea to the shore, an eruption of the sea. A typical example of such a way of thinking, striking for us, but typical for the people of the sea, is the statement of Edmund Bergs: "Spain is nothing but a whale washed ashore in Europe." All significant relations with the rest of the world, and especially with the states of the European continent, had to change from the fact that that England went over to a purely marine existence. All measures and proportions of British policy were henceforth incomparable and incompatible with those of other European countries. England became the ruler of the seas and erected a British world-wide empire that stretched to all ends of the world, based on English maritime rule over all the land. The English world thought of naval bases and lines of communication. What

it was for other peoples the soil and homeland, it seemed to this world a simple hinterland, an unoccupied territory. The word continental acquired the additional meaning of backwardness, and the population of the continent became "backward people," a backward people. But the island itself, the metropolis of such a world empire based on a purely marine existence, thereby loses its roots, is torn off from the soil. HE turns out to be able to sail to another part of the earth, like a ship or a fish, for it is still only the transportable center of a world empire scattered across all continents. Disraeli, a leading British politician during the reign of Queen Victoria, said in relation to India that the British Empire was more Asian than European. He was also the one who, in 1847, in his novel *Tancred*, put forward a proposal that that the English queen should settle in India. "The Queen must equip a large fleet, set out with her retinue and all the ruling class, and move her imperial seat from London to Delhi. There she will find a huge ready-made empire, a first-class army, and a lot of steady income. " Disraeli was Abravanel (cf. above) of the 19th century. Some of what he said about Judaism and Christianity and about race as the key to all of world history was diligently promoted by non-Jews and non-Christians. So he knew what he was talking about when he put forward such proposals. He felt that the island was no longer part of Europe. The fate of the island was no longer necessarily connected with the European fate. He could hit the road and change his place of residence as the metropolis of the world maritime empire. The ship could weaken and drop anchor in another part of the world. A huge fish, the Leviathan, could move and explore other oceans.

eighteen

After the Battle of Waterloo, when Napoleon was defeated in a 20-year war, the era of undisputed maritime rule of England came. This era continued throughout the 19th century. It reached its culmination in the middle of the century, after the Crimean War, which ended with the Paris Confederation of 1856. The era of free trade was also a time of free flowering for English industrial and economic supremacy. Free sea spaces and free world trade, a free market combined in the concept of freedom, the personification and guardian of which could only be England. In this era, admiration and imitation of the English example throughout the world also reached its climax.

The inner dimension touched the elemental essence of the huge Leviathan. However, then it still remained unnoticed. Quite the opposite, as a result of the tremendous upswing in the world economy, the positivist era, blinded by rapidly growing wealth, believed that this wealth would continue to grow and end in a thousand-year paradise on earth. However, the change that affected the essence of Leviathan was precisely the result of the Industrial Revolution. The latter began in England in the 18th century with the invention of machines. The first coke oven blast furnace (1735), the first cast steel (1740), the steam engine (1768), the spinning machine (1770), the mechanical loom (1786), all first in England - these are some examples that make it clear how great was the industrial superiority of England over all other peoples. The inventions of the steamboat and railroad followed in the 19th century. England was ahead of everyone here too. A huge maritime power became at the same time a huge machine power. Her dominion over the world now seemed final. We have already seen above how significant progress was in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle in the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against how significant was the progress in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle of the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against how significant was the progress in the development of maritime affairs in a short period from the battle of the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step forward was made in the period between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against

Russia in 1854-1856 and the American Civil War in 1861-1863, in which the northern industrial states conquered the agricultural South of the country. In the Crimean War, they fought with the help of sailing ships, the war for the secession of the South was fought with the help of armored steamers. Thus, the era of modern industrial and economic wars opened. England was in the lead here and almost until the end of the 19th century retained a huge superiority. But progress in this era meant at the same time a new stage in the elementary relationship between land and sea.

For the Leviathan has now turned from a huge fish into a machine. In fact, it was an essential transformation, unheard of in its kind. The machine has changed man's attitude to the sea. The brave type of personality, which until now determined the size of the sea power, has lost its old meaning. Brave exploits of sailors of sailing ships, high art of navigation, severe education and selection of a certain breed of people - all this has lost all meaning due to the reliability of a modern technical sea traffic. The sea was still strong. But the effect of that powerful impulse that turned the people of sheep breeders into pirates waned and gradually ended. The apparatus of the machine stood between the elements of the sea and human existence. Naval domination, based on the machine industry, is clearly something other than a naval power, growing daily in a fierce and direct struggle with the elements. A sailboat requiring only human muscular strength and a ship propelled by steam wheels represent two different ways of communicating with the elements of the sea. The Industrial Revolution turned the children of the sea into the manufacturers and servants of the machine. Everyone felt the change. Some lamented the end of an old age of heroes and took refuge in the romance of pirate stories. Others rejoiced at technological progress and rushed to compose utopias of a paradise constructed by people. With all the evidence we are establishing here the fact of an essential damage to a purely maritime existence, the secret of British world domination. But the people of the 19th century did not see this. For being a fish or a machine, Leviathan in any case grew stronger and more powerful, and his kingdom seemed to have no end.

nineteen

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the American admiral Mahan made a remarkable attempt to extend the previous situation of British domination over the sea into the era of the machine. Mahan is a significant historian, author of *Influences of the Maritime Power in History*. This is how he entitled his main work, which was also published in German and received recognition in the circles of the German navy, especially from its founder, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.

In one of his works, dated July 1904, Mahan talks about the possibilities of reuniting England with the United States of America. He sees the deepest basis for such a reunification not in a common race, language or culture. He in no way underestimates these considerations, which have so often been cited by other writers. But for him they are just desirable additional circumstances. Decisive for him is the need to preserve Anglo-Saxon domination of the world's oceans, and this can only happen on an island basis, by uniting the Anglo-American states. England itself has become too small as a result of modern development, so that it is no longer an island in the former sense. On the contrary, the United States of America is a true island in the modern sense. Because of their length - says Mahan - this is still not realized. But this is in line with today's scales and ratios of quantities. The insular nature of the United States should help ensure that naval dominance can be maintained and continued on a broader basis. America is the one

a large island on the basis of which the British conquest of the sea must be immortalized and continued on an even larger scale as Anglo-American domination of the world.

While a politician like Disraeli wanted to move the worldwide British empire to Asia, the American admiral was hatching the idea of being sent to America. This was characteristic of the type of thinking natural to the Anglo-Saxon sailor of the 19th century. The admiral felt epoch-making changes, saw tremendous changes in measures and sizes that inevitably came with the development of industry. But he did not see that the industrial revolution is just the most important moment - the elementary connection between man and the sea. Thus, it turns out that he continues to think in the old way. His larger island had to preserve, mothball, an inherited, obsolete tradition in a completely new situation. An old, too small island and the whole complex of sea and world domination erected on its basis must be taken in tow by a new island,

As significant as Mahan's personality is and as impressive as his construction of the larger island, she does not comprehend the true meaning of the new ordering of space. She is not a product of the spirit of the old seafarers. It proceeds from the conservative need for geopolitical security, nothing more remains in it from those energies of the awakening of the elements that made possible the world-historical union between brave sailing and the Calvinist faith in predestination in the 16th and 17th centuries.

twenty

Industrial development and new technology could not remain at the level of the 19th century. Progress did not end with the invention of the steamboat and the railroad. The world has changed faster than the prophets of the machine faith expected, and entered the era of electrical engineering and electrodynamics. Electrical engineering, aviation and radio have caused such a revolution in all ideas about space that a new stage of the first planetary spatial revolution, if not even the second, a new revolution of space has clearly begun.

In a short period of time from 1890 to 1914, Germany, a state of the European continent, caught up with and even surpassed England in the most important fields of activity, in mechanical engineering, shipbuilding and locomotive building, after Krupp already in 1868 demonstrated his advantage over the British in the field of production weapons. Already the World War of 1914 passed under the sign of a new one. Of course, the peoples and their governments entered it without being conscious a revolutionary era for the space, as if it were about one of the past wars of the 19th century, in which they participated. In highly industrialized Germany, English ideals of legislation still dominated, and English ideas were considered indisputable, while a huge agrarian country, such as tsarist Russia, entered the First World War and the Raw Material War in 1914, without having its own modern engine-building plant on its vast territory. ... In fact, the advancement from a steam vessel to a modern warship was no less than a step from rowing galleys to a sailing ship. Man's attitude to the elements of the sea has changed again in the most profound way.

When the plane appeared, a new, third dimension was conquered, added to the land and the sea. Now man has risen above the surfaces of earth and sea and acquired a completely new means of transportation and an equally new weapon. Measures and proportions have changed again, and the possibilities of human domination over nature and over other people have expanded to boundless limits. It is understandable why the Air Force was named "spatial weapon". For

the revolutionary changes they make in space are especially strong, immediate and visual.

But if, in addition, we imagine that the air space above the earth and the sea is not only plowed by airplanes, radio waves of stations of all countries at the speed of a second freely penetrate the atmospheric space around the globe, then there is every reason to believe that now not only a new, third dimension, but even a third element was added, air as a new element of human existence. Then to both mythical animals - Leviathan and Behemoth - it would be worth adding a third: the big Bird. But we shouldn't be so reckless in making such promising statements. For if we ponder over what technical and mechanical means and energies are used to exercise human domination in airspace and imagine the internal combustion engines that drive airplanes,

This is not the place to settle the question of two new elements added to the land and the sea. Here serious considerations and speculative reasoning, hypotheses and conjectures are still too tightly intertwined, for them there is still an immense field of possibilities. Indeed, according to one teaching of the times of antiquity, the whole history of mankind is only a path through the four elements. If we try to soberly follow our theme, we will be able to state two things with all the evidence and reliability. The first concerns the change in the idea of space, which took place in a new period of the spatial revolution. This transformation takes place with a depth no less than the already familiar change of the 16-17 centuries. Then people put the world and the universe in empty space. Today we no longer imagine space as simply a bottomless extension devoid of any conceivable content. Space has become for us a force field of human energy, action and result. Only today a thought, incredible in any other era, becomes possible for us; it was expressed by the German philosopher of our time: "The world is not inside space, but space is inside the world."

Our second rule concerns the original relationship between land and sea. Today the sea is no longer an element, as it was in the era of whale hunters and corsairs. Today's vehicle technology and media have made it a space in the modern sense of the word. Today, any ship owner can know at any time and day where his ship is located in the ocean. Thus, in contrast to the era of sailing, the world of the sea has radically changed for man. But if this is so, then comes the division of sea and land, on which the former connection of sea world domination was based. The very basis of the British conquest of the sea is disappearing, and with it the former nomos of the earth.

Instead, a new nomos of our planet is being formed uncontrollably and irresistibly. It is caused by the new attitudes of man to the old and new elements, and the changed measures and relations of human existence force his formation. Many will see this as only death and destruction. Some will think they are at the end of the world. In reality, we are only experiencing the end of the old relationship between land and sea. However, human fear of the new is often as great as the fear of emptiness, even if the new overcomes emptiness. Many see only senseless chaos where, in reality, a new meaning paves the way for an order commensurate with itself. The old nomos, of course, is leaving, and with it the whole system of inherited sizes, norms and relationships. But the future is not only lack of measure or hostile to Nomos nothing.

And here the gods are present and rule, Their
measure is great.

Leipzig, 1942.

Translated from German by Y.Korinets

PARTISAN'S THEORY

Intermediate remark on the notion of Political

Dedicated to Ernst Forsthoff on his 60th birthday 13 September 1962

Foreword

This essay on The Theory of the Partisan has its origins in two lectures I gave in the spring of 1962 - March 15 in Pamplona, at the invitation of the Estudio General de Navarra, and March 17 at the University of Zaragoza, as part of the Catedra Palafox events, at the invitation of its director, Professor Luis Garcia Arias. The lecture was printed in Catedra publications at the end of 1962.

Subtitle An interim note on the notion of the Political can be explained in terms of a particular moment of publication. The publisher is currently preparing to re-publish my 1932 text. In recent decades, numerous investigations have emerged on this topic. This essay is not such a consequence; this is an independent, albeit sketchy work, the theme of which inevitably translates into the problem of distinguishing between friend and foe. Thus, I only wanted to present this development of my lectures in the spring of 1962 in an unassuming form of an interim comment and thus make them accessible to all those who have so far followed closely the complex discussion of the concept of the political.

February 1963
Carl Schmitt

Introduction. A look at the original position 1808/13

The starting point for our reflections on the problem of the partisan is the guerrilla, which the Spanish people led in 1808-1813 against the army of a foreign conqueror. In this war, the people - the pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, pre-conventional people - first encountered a modern, well-organized, regular army, derived from the experience of the French Revolution. Thanks to this, new spaces of war were opened, new concepts of warfare were formed, and a new doctrine of war and politics arose.

The guerrilla fights in an irregular manner. But the distinction between regular and irregular struggle depends on the precision of the regular and finds its concrete opposite and thus also its concept only in modern organizational forms that arise from the wars of the French Revolution. At all times, humanity has fought wars and battles; at all times there were rules for waging war and rules for fighting, and as a result of this also breaking the rules and neglecting the rules. Especially at all times of decomposition, for example, during Thirty Years' War on German soil (1618-48), then in all civil wars and in all colonial wars in world history, phenomena that can be called partisan are again and again revealed. Only in this case it should be borne in mind that, for the theory of the partisan as a whole, the strength and significance of his irregularity is determined by the strength and significance of the partisan questioned by the regular. It is this Regular State, as well as the Regular Army, that acquires a new, precise definition both in the French state and in the French army thanks to Napoleon. Countless wars of white conquerors against the American Indians from the 17th to the 19th century, however, as well as

the methods of the Riflemen during the American War of Independence against the regular English army (1774-83) and the Vendée civil war between the Chuan and Jacobins (1793-96), without exception, all date back to the pre-Napoleonic stage. The new military art of Napoleon's regular armies arose out of a new, revolutionary way of waging war. To one Prussian officer of that time, the entire campaign of Napoleon in 1806 against Prussia was presented only as "One big politicking¹".

The 1808 Spanish guerrilla guerrilla was the first to dare to fight irregularly against the first modern regular armies. Napoleon defeated the regular Spanish army in the fall of 1808; the Spanish guerrilla proper began only after this defeat of the regular army. A complete, documented history of Spanish guerrilla warfare is not yet available.² This is, according to Fernando Solano Costa (in his cited footnote essay *Los Guerrilleros*) necessary, but also very difficult, since the general Spanish guerrilla was made up of about 200 regional small wars in Asturias, Aragonia, Catalonia, Navarre, Castile, etc., led by numerous fighters whose names are shrouded in many myths and legends, among them Juan Martin Diez, who, like Empecinado, became a terror to the French and made the road from Madrid to Saragossa unreliable. ³ This guerrilla war was fought by both sides with the most terrible brutality, and it is not surprising that many of the texts of the friends of the French are printed as works of guerrillas. However, no matter how myth and legend correlate, on the one hand, and documented history, on the other, the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteché at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers. - the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteché at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers. - the lines of our starting position are clear in any case. According to Clausewitz, often half of the total French military force was in Spain and half of it, namely 250-260,000 men, were drawn into guerrilla; their number is estimated by the Gomez de Arteché at 50,000; others offer much lower numbers.

The situation of the Spanish partisan in 1808 is characterized primarily by the fact that he dared to fight on his small native soil, while his king and the king's family did not yet know exactly who the real enemy was. In this respect, the legitimate government behaved then in Spain no differently than in Germany. In addition, the upper clergy and the bourgeoisie were everywhere *afrancesados* (friends of the French), that is, the situation in Spain is characterized by the fact that the educated layers of the aristocracy sympathized with the foreign conqueror. And in this respect, parallels come to light with Germany, where the great German poet Goethe created hymns to the glory of Napoleon, and where German education has never completely understood for itself which side it is on. In Spain, Guerrillero dared to fight a hopeless fight, poor man, the first typical case of irregular cannon fodder conflicts of political importance to the whole world. All this as an overture belongs to the theory of the partisan.

At that time, the spark came from Spain to the north. She did not stir up the same fire there that provided the Spanish guerrilla with its worldwide historical significance. But it had such an impact there, whose development today, in the second half of the 20th century, is changing the face of the Earth and humanity. She gave rise to the theory of war and enmity, which consistently reaches its climax in the theory of the partisan.

First, in 1809, during the brief war waged by the Austrian monarchy against Napoleon, a systematic attempt was made to imitate the Spanish example. The Austrian government in Vienna staged national propaganda against Napoleon with the help of famous publicists, among whom were Friedrich Gentz and Friedrich Schlegel. Spanish works were translated into German and circulated.⁴ Heinrich von Kleist hurried here and continued anti-French propaganda in Berlin after this Austrian war in 1809. During these years, until his death in November 1811, he became the actual poet of national resistance to a foreign conqueror. His drama "The Battle of Teutoburg" ("Die Hermannsschlacht") is the greatest partisan creation of all time. He also composed a poem to Palafox

(An Palafox), placing the defender of Zaragoza on a par with Leonidas, Arminius and Wilhelm Tell.⁵ That the reformers in the Prussian General Staff, above all Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, were deeply shocked by the Spanish example and tried to keep it in mind in their reorganizations, is known and will be dealt with below. In the world of ideas of these Prussian officers of the general staff of 1808-1813, there are also the seeds of the book *On War*, thanks to which the name of Clausewitz acquired an almost mythical sound. His formula about war as a continuation of politics contains already in a condensed form the theory of the partisan, whose logic was brought to the end by Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, as we will show below.

The real guerrilla war of the people, which should be mentioned in connection with our partisan problem, came only in Tyrol, where Andreas Hofer, Speckbacher and the Capuchin priest Haspinger were active. The Tyroleans became a powerful torch, as Clausewitz put it.⁶ However, this era of 1809 quickly ended. And in the rest of Germany, things did not come to a guerrilla war against the French. A strong national impulse, manifested in individual revolts and partisan detachments, very quickly and without a trace resulted in the path of regular war. The battles of the spring and summer of 1813 took place on the battlefield, and the outcome was realized in a battle face to face in October 1813 near Leipzig.

The Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815 re-established, as part of an overall restoration, the concept of the European law of war.⁷ This was one of the most striking restorations in world history. It was a huge success, so that the right of war of the guarded continental war on land as early as the First World War of 1914-18 determined the European practice of waging war on land. Even today, this right is called the classic law of war, and it deserves this name. For it knows clear distinctions, first of all, the distinction between war and peace, participants in war from non-participants in war, enemy and criminal. The war is waged between states as a war of regular, state armies, between sovereign carriers of *jus belli*, who in the war see themselves as enemies and do not discriminate against each other as criminals, so that peace is possible and even remains the normal, self-evident end of the war. In the face of such classical correctness - as long as it has real effective power - the partisan could only be a peripheral phenomenon, which he actually was during the entire First World War (1914-18).

The horizon of our consideration

When I speak about modern theories of the partisan on occasion, I must emphasize, in order to clarify the topic, that the old theories of the partisan, in contrast to modern theories, do not actually exist at all. In the classical law of war of the old European international law, there is no place for the partisan in the modern sense. He or - as in the war for dynastic reasons of the 18th century - the kind of light, especially mobile, but regular detachment, or he, as a particularly disgusting criminal, simply stands outside the law and *hors la loi*. As long as there was still something from the concept of duel and chivalry in the war, it could not be otherwise.

With the introduction of universal military service, of course, all wars become, in theory, people's wars, and then situations soon arise that are difficult and often even insoluble for the classical law of war, such as the situation of a more or less improvised *levee en masse*, or a volunteer corps or "free shooters". This will be discussed later. In any case, the war remains fundamentally guarded (*gehegt*), and the guerrilla is outside of this guarding (*Hegung*). Now even his essence and his existence is that he is outside any protection.

The modern guerrilla does not expect from the enemy no justice, no mercy. It turned away from the traditional enmity of a tamed and guarded war and moved into the realm of another, real enmity, which grows through terror and anti-terror to extermination.

Two kinds of war are especially important in the context of the guerrilla phenomenon and, in a sense, are even related to this phenomenon: civil war and colonial war. In the phenomenon of the partisan of our time, this relationship is downright specific. Classical European international law pushed these two dangerous forms of manifestation of war and enmity to the periphery. The *jus publicum Europaeum* war was an interstate war fought by one regular state army with another. Open civil war was considered an armed uprising that was suppressed by a state of siege by the police and regular army units. The colonial war did not escape the attention of the military science of European countries such as England, France and Spain. But all this did not question the state's regular war as a classical model.⁸

It is especially necessary to mention here Russia. During the entire 19th century, the Russian army waged many wars with the Asian highlanders and was never limited to an exclusively regular war of the armies, as the Prussian-German army did. In addition, Russian history knows the autochthonous partisan struggle against the Napoleonic army. In the summer of 1812, Russian partisans under military leadership prevented the French army from advancing towards Moscow; in the autumn and winter of the same year, Russian peasants killed the fled, frozen and hungry Frenchmen. All this lasted for a little over six months, but it was enough to become a historical event that had a huge impact, however, more because of the political myth and its various interpretations than because of its paradigmatic impact on the scientific theory of war. We must mention here,

Tolstoy was not an anarchist like Bakunin or Kropotkin, but his impact was all the more important. His epic *War and Peace* contains more myth-making power than any political doctrine or any documented history. Tolstoy elevates the Russian partisan of 1812 to the carrier of the elemental forces of the Russian land, which throws off the famous Emperor Napoleon along with his brilliant army as annoying harmful insect. Uneducated, only Tolstoy's illiterate man is not a stronger, but also more intelligent than everyone strategist and tactician, above all is more intelligent than the greatest commander Napoleon, who becomes a puppet in the hands of a historical achievement. Stalin took up this myth of the indigenous national guerrilla struggle during World War II with Germany and placed it in the very specific service of his communist world politics. This signifies a substantially new stage in the appearance of the partisan, at the beginning of which is the name of Mao Tse-tung.

Fierce partisan battles have been taking place over vast areas of the Earth for thirty years. They began already in 1927, before the Second World War, in China and other Asian countries, which later defended against the Japanese invasion of 1932-1945. During the Second World War, Russia, Poland, the Balkans, France, Albania, Greece and other territories became the arena for such wars. After World War II, the partisan struggle continued in Indochina, where it was especially productively organized against the French colonial army by the Vietnamese communist leader Ho Chi Minh and the winner of Dien Bien Phu, General Vo Nguyen Giap, then in Malaya, the Philippines and Algeria, in Cyprus by colonel Griwas,

and in Cuba by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Currently, in 1962, the Indo-Chinese countries of Laos and Vietnam are territories of guerrilla warfare, which daily develops new methods of defeating the enemy and deceiving the enemy. Modern technology supplies more and more powerful weapons and means of destruction, more and more advanced means of transportation and methods of transferring information, both for the partisans and for the regular army, which is fighting the partisans. In the diabolical circle of terror and anti-terror, the suppression of the partisan is often only a reflection of the partisan struggle itself, and again and again the old thesis, which is mostly cited as Napoleon's order to General Lefebvre of September 12, 1813, turns out to be correct: the partisan must be fought with partisan methods; *il faut operer en partisan partout ou il ya des partisans*.

Below it will be necessary to dwell on some special issues of international legal regulation. The main thing is clear as it is; application to specific situations of rapid development is controversial. In recent years, an impressive document of the will to total resistance has emerged, not only of will, but also of detailed guidance for specific execution: the Swiss manual for waging small wars for everyone (*Kleinkriegsanleitung für jedermann*), published by the Swiss union of non-commissioned officers under the title *Total resistance* and compiled by the captain H. von Dach (2nd ed., Biel, 1958). Over 180 pages, this work provides guidance on active and passive resistance to alien invasion, with precise instructions on sabotage, underground life, how to hide weapons, organizing putsches, escaping surveillance, etc. The experiences of the last decades have been carefully used. This modern guide to the conduct of war for everyone indicates that their "resistance to the highest degree" adheres to the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the four Hague Accords of 1949. This is self-evident. It is also not difficult to calculate how a normal standing army would react to the practical use of that local warfare instruction (eg, p. 43: silent assassination of a sentry with an ax) until it feels defeated.

The word and concept of partisans

A brief enumeration of some famous names and events, with which we began the first description of the horizon of our consideration, allows us to reveal the immense wealth of material and problems. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify some signs and criteria so that the discussion does not become abstract and limitless. We mentioned one such sign at the beginning of our presentation, when we proceeded from the assumption that the partisan is an irregular fighter. The regularity of the phenomenon is expressed in the soldier's uniform, which is more than professional attire as it demonstrates the dominance of publicity; along with the uniform of the soldier, openly and demonstratively carries weapons. A hostile soldier in uniform is the real target of the modern guerrilla.

The next sign suggests itself today is an intense political engagement, which characterizes the partisan in contrast to other fighters. The intensely political character of the partisan must be pointed out simply because he must be distinguished from the ordinary robber and malicious criminal, whose motives are personal enrichment. This conceptual criterion of a political nature has (in exact inversion) the same structure as that of a pirate in the face of international legal norms for waging war at sea. The concept of a pirate includes the non-political nature of the nasty lifestyle, including robbery and personal gain. Pirate possesses, as lawyers say, *animus furandi*. The guerrilla fights on the political front, and it is the political nature of his lifestyle that revives the original

the meaning of the word partisan. This word comes from the word party and indicates a connection with a somehow fighting, belligerent or politically active party or group. This kind of ties with the party is especially pronounced in revolutionary epochs.

A revolutionary war presupposes belonging to a revolutionary party and total coverage. Other groups and unions, especially the modern state, can no longer integrate their members and subjects as totally as a revolutionary fighting party embraces its active fighters. In the extensive discussion about the so-called total state, it has not yet become finally clear that today, not the state as such, but the revolutionary party as such is a real and, in fact, the only totalitarian organization.⁹ From the point of view of purely organizational, in the sense of the strict functioning of the order and it is even necessary to say that another revolutionary organization is superior to another regular army in this respect and that a certain confusion must arise in the international law of war, when the organization as such is made the criterion of regularity, as happened in the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. The partisan in German is called Parteigänger (party member), the one who goes with the party, and what this means specifically, differs at different times, both in relation to the party or front with which someone goes, and in terms of his accompaniment (Mitgehens), contiguity (Mitlaufens), comradeship (Mitkämpfens), and possibly fellowship (Mitgefängewerdens). There are parties waging war, but there are also parties of the trial, parties of parliamentary democracy, parties of opinion and parties of shares, etc. In Romance languages, the word can be used both as a noun and as an adjective: in French they even speak of a partisan of some opinion; in short, from the general, ambiguous designation suddenly turns out to be a word of great political importance. This suggests a linguistic parallel with such a general word as status, which can suddenly mean the state (Staat). In an era of decay, as in the 17th century during the Thirty Years' War, the irregular soldier becomes close to bandits and vagrants; he fights at his own peril and risk and becomes the character of a rogue novel, like the Spanish Picaro Estebanillo of Gonzalez, who took part in the Battle of Nördlingen (1635) and talks about it in the style of a soldier Schweik. You can read about this in Grimmelshausen's *Simplicius Simplicissimus*, you can see it on the engravings and etchings by Jacques Callot. In the 18th century, the "Parteigänger" belonged to the pandurs and hussars and other types of light troops who, as mobile troops, "fight separately" and wage the so-called small war. as opposed to a slow big war of the line troops. Here the distinction between regular and irregular is considered purely military-technical and in no way is equivalent to the opposition legal-illegal in the legal sense of international law and

state law. In the case of the modern partisan, both pairs of opposites (regularly-irregularly, legally-illegally) are mostly erased and intersect.

Mobility, speed and stunning alternation of attack and retreat, in a word: increased mobility is still a hallmark of the partisan today, and this sign is even enhanced by the introduction of technology and motorization. However, both opposites are eliminated by the revolutionary war, and there are numerous semi- and para-regular groups and formations. Fighting with weapons in the hands of the guerrilla, always remains dependent on cooperation with the regular organization. Fidel Castro's combat associate in Cuba, Ernesto Che Guevara, stresses this very persistently.¹⁰ As a result of this, thanks to interaction regular and irregular, some intermediate steps are obtained. This also happens in those cases when in no way a revolutionary government calls for the protection of national territory from a foreign conqueror. People's war and

small wars are intertwined here. In the regulations for such troops, since the 16th century, there has been a designation of partisans.¹¹ We will also get acquainted with two important examples of the formal regulation of the people's war and the *landsturm*, which are trying to regulate the guerrilla. On the other hand, a foreign conqueror also publishes instructions on suppressing enemy partisans. All norms of this kind are faced with a complex problem of international law, i.e. legal for both sides irregular regulation, regarding the recognition of the partisan as a participant in the war and his consideration as a prisoner of war, and, on the other hand, the observance of the rights of the military occupation authorities. We have already made it clear that there are some legal differences arising here. We will return to the dispute about the "free shooters" of the German-French war of 1870-1871, after as we take a look at the international legal situation (p. below). The tendency to change or abolish inherited concepts - classical concepts, as they like to say today - is universal and in the face of the rapid change in the world, it is all the more comprehensible.¹² The "classical" (if you can call it that) concept of the partisan did not remain aloof from this trend. In the 1961 book *Partisan*, which was very important for our topic, by Rolf Schroers, an illegal fighter of the Resistance movement and an underground activist becomes a type of partisan. as such deserves attention. Irregularity has been replaced by illegality, and military struggle has been replaced by resistance. This means, as it seems to me,

In some cases, the reinterpretation reaches the general symbol and the abolition of the concept. Then any individualist or non-conformist can be called a partisan, regardless of whether he even thinks about taking up arms.¹⁴ As a metaphor, this is perfectly acceptable; I myself used it to characterize spiritual and historical figures and situations.¹⁵ In a figurative sense, "to be human is to be a fighter," and a consistent individualist fights independently and at his own peril and risk. Then he becomes his own party. This kind of abolition of concepts is noteworthy signs of the times that require a separate research.¹⁶ But for the theory of the partisan, which is meant here, there must be some criteria so that the topic does not dissipate in abstract universality. These criteria are: irregularity, increased mobility of active combat and increased, increased intensity of political engagement.

I would like to adhere to one more, fourth characteristic of a true guerrilla, a characteristic that Jover Zamora described as a telluric character. This, despite all the tactical mobility and maneuverability, is important for the fundamentally defensive situation of the partisan, who changes his essence if he identifies himself with the absolute aggressiveness of the ideology of the world revolution or technicist ideology. Two interpretations of the topic that are especially interesting for us, the book by Rolf Schroers (note 13) and the dissertation by Jurg.H.Schmid on the international legal position of the partisan (p.), Completely coincide with this criterion. His rationale for telluric the nature of such a phenomenon as a partisan seems to me necessary in order to make defense obvious in terms of position in space, i.e. limiting hostility and warn against the absolute requirement of abstract justice.

With regard to the partisans who fought in Spain, Tyrol and Russia in 1808/13, this is already clear. But the partisan battles of World War II and subsequent years in Indochina and other countries, associated with the names of Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro, give an understanding of the fact that the connection with the soil, with the autochthonous population and with the geographical originality of the country - mountains, forest, jungle or desert - remains quite relevant. The partisan remains separated not only from

pirate, but also from the corsair to the same extent that land and sea remain separated as different elementary spaces of human work and military clash between nations. Land and sea have not only different ways of waging war and not only different kinds of theaters of military operations, but also developed different concepts of war, the enemy, and trophies.¹⁷ The partisan will represent a specifically terrestrial, land-based type of active fighter, at least for as long as possible anti-colonial wars on our planet. ¹⁸ The telluric character of the partisan will be more clearly outlined below in comparison with the figures that are typically maritime in legal terms (p.) and in the analysis of the spatial aspect (p.).

But even an autochthonous guerrilla of agrarian origin is drawn into the force field of irresistible, technical and industrial progress. His mobility is so enhanced by motorization that he is in danger of being completely deprived of any soil. During the Cold War, he becomes an invisible combat technician, saboteur and spy. Already during the Second World War, there were detachments of saboteurs with partisan training. Such a motorized partisan loses its telluric character and is only a transportable and replaceable instrument of a powerful center that creates world politics, which puts it into action for an explicit or invisible war and, as appropriate, turns it off again. This possibility also belongs to his present existence and should not be ignored in the theory of the partisan.

By these four criteria - irregularity, increased mobility, the intensity of political engagement, telluric character - and with reference to the possible consequences of the ongoing technicalization, industrialization and loss of the agrarian character, we, from a conceptual point of view, described the horizon of our consideration. It stretches from the Guerrillero of the Napoleonic era to the well-armed guerrilla of modern times, from Empecinado through Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh to Fidel Castro. This is a large area, constantly growing material in historiography and military science. We will use it as far as we can, and try to get some scientific conclusions for the guerrilla theory.

A look at the international legal situation

The partisan fights in an irregular manner. But certain categories of irregular fighters are equated with the regular armed forces and enjoy the rights and advantages of regular participants in the war. This means: their fighting is not illegal, and when they are captured by the enemy, they have the right to demand special treatment as prisoners of war and wounded. The legal status was found in the Hague Charter of Land War of October 18, 1907, a generalization that is now generally accepted. After World War II, this matter was developed in four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, of which the second regulates the fate of the wounded and sick in land war and naval war, the third - the treatment of prisoners of war, and the fourth - the protection of civilians in war. They have been ratified by many countries in the Western world and the Eastern bloc;

The Hague Land War Charter of October 18, 1907, under certain conditions, equated the militia, volunteer corps and combat comrades of spontaneous popular indignations with the regular armed forces. Later, when analyzing the Prussian differences with partisans, we will mention some of the difficulties and ambiguities of this regulation. The development that led to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is characterized by the fact that it recognizes ever more widespread weakening so far purely

state, European international law. All new categories of participants in hostilities are now considered participants in the war. And the civilians of the region occupied by the enemy's troops - that is, the partisan's own combat area fighting behind enemy lines - now enjoy greater legal protection than under the 1907 land war charter. Many comrades-in-arms who until now were considered partisans are now on an equal footing with regular fighters and have their rights and advantages. As a matter of fact, they can no longer be called partisans. However, the concepts are still unclear and hesitant.

The wording of the Geneva Conventions takes into account the European experience, but does not take into account the partisan wars of Mao Tse-tung and the later development of modern guerrilla warfare. In the first years after the date of 1945, it was not yet clear what such an expert as Hermann Foertsch realized and formulated: that military actions after 1945 took a partisan character, since the owners of the atomic bomb avoided its use for humanitarian reasons, and those who did not possess it could counting on these fears is the unexpected impact of both the atomic bomb and humanitarian considerations. The concepts of the Geneva norms that are important for the partisan problem are abstracted from certain situations. They are (as stated in the authoritative and all-important commentary of *Internationalen Roten Kreuzes*, Bd. 111, 1958, S.

There was no intention here to fundamentally change the 1907 land war charter of the Hague. Here, they even adhere in principle to four classical conditions for equalization with regular troops (responsible commanders, a permanent solid visible insignia, open carrying of weapons, observance of the rules and customs of the law of war). The Convention for the Protection of Civilian Population should, however, be valid not only for interstate wars, but also for all international armed conflicts, and so, for civil wars, uprisings, etc. But by doing so, it is only necessary to create a legal basis for humanitarian interventions by the International Committee of the Red Cross (and other non-party organizations). *Inter arma caritas*. Article 3 paragraph 4 of the Convention strongly emphasizes that the legal position, *le statut juridique*, conflicting parties are not affected by this (Pictet, *aaO*, 111, 1955, S. 39/40). In an interstate war, the occupying authorities of an area occupied by troops still retain the right to instruct the local police in that area to maintain order and suppress irregular hostilities, thus pursuing the guerrillas "no matter what ideas inspire them" (Pictet 1V,

1956, S. 330).

Thus, the distinction of a partisan - in the sense of an irregular fighter who is not equated with regular troops - is fundamentally preserved today. The partisan in this sense does not have the rights and advantages of the participants in the war; he is a common law criminal and can be rendered harmless by summary punishment and reprisals. This was also fundamentally recognized in the trials of war criminals after World War II, mainly in the verdicts of the Nuremberg trials against German generals (Jodl, Leeb, List), and it goes without saying that everything beyond the necessary suppression of the partisan brutality, terror, collective punishment or even participation in genocide remain war crimes.

The Geneva Conventions expand the circle of persons equated to regular fighters, first of all by the fact that they equalize members of the "organized resistance movement" and police officers and members of volunteer corps, and thus assign them the rights and advantages of regular participants in the war. Moreover, more than once the military organization is unambiguously made a condition (Article 13 of the Convention on the Wounded, Article 4 of the Convention on Prisoners of War). Convention for the protection of civilians

equates "international conflicts", which are resolved by force of arms, to interstate wars of classical European international law, and thus touches the core of the legal institution typical of the previous law of war, *occupatio bellica*. To such expansions and weakenings, which can only be cited here as examples, are added important transformations and changes that follow by themselves from the development of modern military technology and, with reference to partisan warfare, operate even more intensively. What does, for example, mean, for example, the provision on "open carrying" of weapons for a resistance fighter, who is instructed by the above-quoted "guide to guerrilla warfare" of the Swiss Union of NCOs (p. 33): "Move only at night and hide in the woods during the day! "Or what does it mean to require a visible insignia everywhere in a night battle or in a battle with the use of long-range weapons of modern military equipment? Many similar questions arise when the consideration is conducted from the point of view of the partisan problem and when the aspects identified below (p.) Are not overlooked changes in space and technical and industrial development.

The protection of civilians in a military-occupied area is diverse. The occupation authorities are interested in peace and order in the area occupied by their military. They adhere to the fact that the population of the occupied area is not obliged to be faithful, but, perhaps, is obliged to obey the orders of the occupation authorities permissible by the law of war. Even the employees - and the police themselves - must continue to work correctly and must be treated accordingly by the occupation authorities. All this is a difficultly balanced, difficult compromise between the interests of the occupying authorities and the interests of their military adversary. The guerrilla violates this kind of order in an occupied area in a dangerous way. Not only because his real combat area is an area in the rear of the enemy front, where he incapacitates transport and supplies, but also, moreover, if the population of this area more or less supports and hides it. "The population is your greatest friend" - is listed in the just cited "Guide to guerrilla warfare for everyone" (p. 28). Then the protection of such a population is potentially also the protection of the guerrilla. So it becomes clear why in the history of the development of the law of war, when discussing the Hague Charter of Ground War and its further development, a typical grouping, an alignment of forces took place all the time: large military powers, that is, potential occupation authorities, demanded strict maintenance of order in the region occupied by the troops, in while smaller states that feared military occupation - Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg - tried to achieve the fullest possible protection of the resistance fighters and the civilian population.

strongly suggests the question of whether there may be cases in which the population needs protection from the guerrilla.

Thanks to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, changes took place within the classic, precisely regulated and regulated legal institution of *occupatio bellica*, the consequences of which remain largely unforeseen. Resistance fighters, who were previously treated as guerrillas, are equated with regular fighters, if only they are organized. In contrast to the interests of the occupation authorities, the interests of the population of the occupied area are so strongly emphasized that - at least in theory - it has become possible to consider any resistance to the occupation authorities, including partisan resistance, as long as it arises from respectable motives, as not illegal. On the other hand, the occupying authorities must continue to have the right to repressive measures. The partisan in this situation will not act truly legally,

to act truly illegally, but he will act at his own peril and risk, and in this sense will act risky.

When the word risk is used and risky in a general, unspecified sense, then it is necessary to establish that in an area occupied by the enemy's military and saturated with partisans, it is by no means only a partisan who lives risky. In a general sense of insecurity and danger, the entire population of such an area is at great risk. Employees who, in accordance with the Hague Charter of Land Warfare, wish to continue to work correctly, face additional risks in terms of actions and inaction, and in particular the police officer finds himself at the point of intersection of dangerous, conflicting requirements: the enemy occupying authorities require him to obey while maintaining security and order which are violated by the partisan; his own nation-state demands loyalty from him and after the war will bring him to justice; population, to whom he belongs, expects loyalty and solidarity, which, referring to the activities of the police officer, can lead to completely opposite practical conclusions if the police officer does not dare to become a partisan himself; and finally, the guerrilla and the occupier will quickly enroll him in the diabolical circle of their repression and anti-repression. In the abstract, risky action (or inaction) is not a specific hallmark of the guerrilla.

The word risky acquires a clarified meaning due to the fact that the risky [subject] acts at his own risk and consciously resigns himself to the bad consequences of his action or inaction, so that he cannot complain about injustice if bad results overtake him. On the other hand, he has the opportunity - as far as we are not talking about illegal actions - to compensate for the risk by concluding an insurance contract. Insurance law remains the legal homeland of the concept of risk, its scientific and legal topos. A person lives among a variety of dangers, and to give a danger with legal consciousness the name risk means to make it and the person affected by it insured. In the case of the guerrilla, this would probably lead to the failure of the irregularity and illegality of his actions, even if they were prepared to

Reflecting on the concept of risk is essential for situations such as war and enmity. We have introduced this word into the international legal doctrine of war in the book by Josef L. Kunz "Kriegsrecht und Neutralitätsrecht" (1935, S. 146, 274). But there this word does not refer to war on land and does not at all refer to the partisan. These things are not mentioned at all in the book. If we do not remember insurance law as the legal homeland of the concept of risk and forget the imprecise and unclear uses of this word - for example, a comparison with an escaped prisoner who "risks" being shot - then we will find that a specifically fruitful use of the concept in the sense of the law of war J. Kunz's "risky" means only the maritime law of war and its typical figures and situations. War at sea is largely an economic war; in contrast to war on land, it has its own space and its own concepts of enemy and trophies. Even the improvement in the plight of the wounded in the Geneva regulation of August 1949 led to two, separate for land and sea, conventions.

Risky in this specific sense are two participants in the war at sea: a neutral blockade breaker and a neutral smuggling carrier. When referring to them, the word risky is clear and precise. Both kinds of participants in the war embark on "a very profitable but risky commercial adventure" (J. Kunz aaO, p. 277): they risk the ship and the cargo in the event of capture. At the same time, they do not have an enemy, even if they themselves are regarded as an enemy in the sense of international legal norms for waging war at sea. Their social ideal is a good deal. Their field of activity is the free sea. They do not think about how to protect their home, hearth and homeland from strangers.

invader, which refers to the prototype of the autochthonous partisan. They also enter into insurance contracts to compensate for their risk, and the hazard rates are correspondingly high and adapt to changing risk factors, such as submarine sinking: very risky, but reliable and expensively insured.

One should not withdraw such a successful word as risky from the conceptual field of the maritime law of war and dissolve it in a general concept that erases all clear outlines. For us, who insist on the telluric character of the partisan, this is especially important. If earlier I once called the marauders and lovers of the sea of the beginning of capitalism "partisans of the sea" (*Der Nomos der Erde*, S. 145), today I would correct this as a terminological inaccuracy. The partisan has an enemy and "risks" in a completely different sense than the blockade breaker and smuggler. He risks not only his life, like any regular participant in the war. He knows, and does not stop at the fact that the enemy puts him outside the law, outside the law and outside the concept of honor.

This, of course, is done by the revolutionary fighter who declares the enemy a criminal and declares all the enemy's notions of law, law and honor to be an ideological deception. Contrary to everything characteristic of the Second World War and the post-war period up to the present day, the combinations and mixtures of both types of partisan - defensive autochthonous defender of the homeland and aggressive on a global scale, revolutionary activist - the opposite remains. It rests, as we shall see, on fundamentally different concepts of war and enmity that are embodied in the different kinds of guerrillas. Where war is fought on both sides as a non-discriminatory war of one state against another, the guerrilla is a peripheral figure who does not explode the boundaries of the war or change the overall structure of the political process. However, if the war is waged against the criminalizations of the military adversary as a whole, if the war is waged, for example, as a civil war of a class enemy against a class enemy, if its main goal is to overthrow the government of a hostile state, then the revolutionary action of the explosion of criminalization of the enemy affects in such a way that the partisan becomes true war hero. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of *justa causa* war without *justus hostis* acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war. then the revolutionary effect of the explosion of the criminalization of the enemy is reflected in such a way that the partisan becomes a true hero of the war. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of *justa causa* war without *justus hostis* acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war. then the revolutionary effect of the explosion of the criminalization of the enemy is reflected in such a way that the partisan becomes a true hero of the war. He carries out the death sentence for the criminal and for his part risks being seen as a criminal or a saboteur. This is the logic of *justa causa* war without *justus hostis* acknowledgment. Thanks to her, the revolutionary partisan becomes a true central figure in the war.

However, the guerrilla problem becomes the best touchstone. Different types of guerrilla warfare can be so mixed and merged in the practice of today's warfare, they remain so different in their fundamental premises that the criterion of grouping into friends and enemies justifies itself when applied to them. Earlier, we recalled a typical grouping that was evident in the preparation of The Hague Charter of Land War: large military powers against small neutral countries. During the discussions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it was with great difficulty that a compromise formula was reached, equalizing the organized resistance movement and the volunteer corps. And here the typical grouping was repeated when it was a question of consolidating the experience of the Second World War in international legal norms. And this time the big military powers, potential occupiers confronted small states fearing occupation; however, this time with a modification as unusual as it was symptomatic: the largest land, continental power in the world, the most powerful potential occupier, the Soviet Union, was now on the side of the small states.

The rich material and well-documented work of Jurg H. Schmid "Die volkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege" (Zurcher Studien zum Internationalen Recht Nr. 23, Polygraphischer Verlag AG. Zurich, 1956) wants to put "under the guise of law" "Keeping guerrillas by civilians" - this refers specifically to Stalin's partisans (S. 97, 157). In this Schmid sees "the quintessence of the problem

partisan "and the legal creative achievement of the Geneva Conventions. Schmid would like to eliminate "certain reflections of the right of occupation" still left over from the previous understanding of occupation power, in particular, as he says, "the glorified duty to obey orders." For this purpose, he uses the doctrine of legal but risky military action, which he re-emphasizes as risky but illegal military action. Thus, he reduces the risk of the partisan, to whom he, at the expense of the occupation authorities, confers as many rights and privileges as possible. How he thinks to avoid the logic of terror and anti-terror, I do not see; the case is that he simply criminalizes the military enemy of the guerrilla. All this as a whole is an extremely interesting intersection of two different statuses juridiques, namely a war participant and a civilian, with two different types of modern warfare, namely open and cold war between the population and the occupation authorities, in which the Schmid partisan (following Mao) takes part a deux mains. Surprisingly, and here lies the true breakdown of the axis of the concept that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with a return to pure war of states of the Portalis-Rousseau doctrine, about which Schmid claims that it is only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157). This is how the partisan becomes insured. that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with the return to pure war of states of the Portalis-doctrine of Rousseau, about which Schmid claims that she only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157) ... This is how the partisan becomes insured. that this de-legalization of the Stalinist partisan at the expense of classical international law is simultaneously associated with the return to pure war of states of the Portalis-doctrine of Rousseau, about which Schmid claims that she only "in her children's shoes" prohibited a civilian from committing hostilities (S.157) ... This is how the partisan becomes insured.

The four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are the fruit of a humane mindset and humane development that deserves admiration. Assigning to the enemy not only humanity, but even legitimacy in the sense of recognition, they remain on the basis of classical international law and in line with its tradition, and such a work of humanity is not incredible. Their basis remains the state conduct of war and the defense of war built on this, with its clear distinctions between war and peace, military and civilians, enemy and criminal, war of states and civil war. However, by diminishing or even questioning these essential distinctions, they open the door to the kind of war that deliberately destroys those clear separations from one another.

Theory Development / Prussian Disagreements with Partisans

In Prussia, Germany's leading military power, the uprising against Napoleon in the spring of 1813 was filled with strong national sentiment. The great moment passed quickly; however, in the history of partisanship, it is so significant that we will have to discuss it in particular later.

First, we need to pay attention to an indisputable historical fact: the Prussian and Prussian-led German army from 1813 until the end of World War II provides a classic example of the organization of the army, which radically supplanted the idea of partisanism. Thirty years of German colonial rule in Africa (1885-1915) were not militarily important enough to seriously introduce the problem to the brilliant theorists of the Prussian General Staff. The Austrian-Hungarian army knew guerrilla warfare in the Balkans and had regulations for a small war. On the contrary, the Prussian-German army invaded Russia during World War II on June 22, 1941, without thinking about guerrilla warfare. She began her campaign against Stalin with the maxim: the military unit suppresses the enemy; marauders are rendered harmless by the police. Only in October 1941 were the first special instructions to suppress the partisans followed; in May 1944, a year before the end of the four-year

war, the first complete regulations of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces were issued.

In the 19th century, the Prussian-German army became the most famous, exemplary military organization of the then Eurocentric world. But she owed this glory solely to military victories over other regular European armies, especially over the armies of France and Switzerland. She met with irregular war only during the German-French war of 1870-1871 in France, in the guise of the so-called frontiers, who in German were called partisans (Heckenschützen) and mercilessly treated them in accordance with the law of war, as is, incidentally, any regular army did too. The stricter the discipline in a regular army, the more correctly it distinguishes between military and civilians and considers only the uniformed enemy as an enemy, the more sensitive and nervous it becomes. If, on the other side, civilians who are not wearing uniforms take part in the struggle. The military then react with harsh repressions, shootings, hostage-taking and destruction of settlements and consider this a fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. taking hostages and destroying settlements and consider it fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. taking hostages and destroying settlements and consider it fair self-defense against treachery and perfidy. The more respect a regular, uniformed adversary is treated as an enemy, and the more they do not confuse him even in the bloodiest struggle with a criminal, the more viciously the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. the more angrily the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal. the more angrily the irregular fighter is treated as a criminal. All this naturally follows from the logic of the classical European law of war, which distinguishes between military and civilians, war participants and civilians, and which mobilizes a rare moral strength - not to declare the enemy as such a criminal.

A German soldier learned of the franchisee in France in the fall of 1870 and the following winter of 1870/71, after an important victory he won over the regular army of the Emperor Napoleon III at the Battle of Sedan on September 2. If everything went according to the rules of the classical, regular war of the armies, then one would have to expect that after such a victory the war would be over and that peace would be concluded. Instead, the defeated government of the emperor was deposed. The new Republican government, led by Leon Gambetta, proclaimed a national uprising against the foreign invader, "Krieg a outrance". It very hastily recruited more and more armies and threw more and more masses of poorly trained soldiers onto the battlefields. In November 1870, it even achieved military success at Loire. Since they did not count on the long-term conduct of the war, the position of the German armies became threatening, and the foreign policy position of Germany was threatened. The French population fell into a state of patriotic unrest and began to participate in the struggle against the Germans in various forms. The Germans arrested respected persons and the so-called nobility (Notable) as hostages, shot frontiers who came across them with weapons in their hands, and put pressure on the population through all kinds of repression. This was the starting point for more than half a century of dispute between lawyers in the field of international law and the official propaganda of both sides for and against the frontier. The controversy flared up again in World War I as a Belgian-German dispute over franchises. Entire libraries have been written about this issue,

All of this is indicative of the guerrilla problem, as it shows that regulation - if it should, following the facts, comprehend the state of affairs and if it should not only issue glissando judgments about price and general restrictive conditions - is legally impossible. The traditional European preservation of an interstate war comes from the 18th century from certain concepts, which, although they were suspended by the French Revolution, were all the more effectively confirmed by the restoration of the Vienna Congress. These dating back to the era of the monarchy

ideas about a war to be guarded and about a legitimate enemy can be legalized between states only if the states of both sides waging a war adhere to them both in domestic and interstate politics in the same way, that is, if their internal and interstate concepts of regularity and irregularity, legality and illegality are substantively the same or, at least in some way, homogeneous in their structure. Otherwise, interstate rationing, instead of promoting the achievement of peace, will only supply pretexts and slogans for mutual accusations. This simple truth has gradually become clear since the First World War. But the façade of the inherited conceptual inventory is still very strong ideologically. For practical reasons, states are interested in using so-called classical concepts, even if these latter are otherwise dismissed as old-fashioned and reactionary. In addition, the jurists of European international law stubbornly pushed out of their minds the picture of the new reality that had been discernible since 1900.²¹

If all this is generally valid for the distinction between the European war of the old-style states and the democratic popular war, then all the more it applies to the impromptu national people's war a outrance, as proclaimed by Gambetta in September 1870. 1907 Hague Land War Charter

- not otherwise than all of his predecessors in the 19th century - did not try to reach a compromise, referring to the frontier. It requires certain conditions in order to recognize an improvised warrior, dressed in an impromptu uniform, a participant in the war in the international legal sense: responsible commanders, a permanent, far visible insignia and, above all, the open carrying of weapons. The ambiguity of the concepts of the Hague regulation and the Geneva Conventions is great and confuses the problem.²² The guerrilla is still the one who avoids openly carrying weapons, who fights from around the corner, who uses both the enemy's uniform and a stable or free insignia and any kind of civilian clothing as a disguise. Stealth and darkness are his strongest weapons, which he honestly cannot refuse without losing the space of irregularity, which means: without that, so as not to stop being a partisan. The military concept of a regular Prussian army was by no means based on a lack of education or ignorance of the meaning of the guerrilla. This is evident in an interesting book by a typical Prussian general staff officer who knew the war with the Frontiers in 1870-71 and who published his opinion in 1877 under the title "Leon Gambetta and his armies." The author, Baron Colmar von der Goltz, died during the First World War as the commander of the Turkish army as Pasha Goltz. With all objectivity and with great accuracy, the young Prussian officer discovers the decisive mistake of the republican warfare and states: "Gambetta wanted to wage a big war, and he fought it, to his misfortune; for for the German armies in France of that time, a small war, guerrilla, would have been much more dangerous."²³ The Prussian-German leadership of the ground forces, albeit late, but finally overtook the guerrilla war. On May 6, 1944, the High Command of the German Armed Forces published the already mentioned general directives on the fight against partisans. So the German army, before its end, still managed to get to know the partisan correctly. Meanwhile, the directives of May 1944 are recognized as excellent regulation and an enemy of Germany. The English brigadier Dixon, who published a comprehensive book on the partisan after the Second World War with Otto Heilbrunn, reprints the German directives in extenso as an example of the correct fight against the partisans, and the English General Sir Reginald FS Denning notes in his introduction to Dixon-Heilbrunn that the value of the German instructions for the fight against partisans in 1944 does not diminish from the fact

The two phenomena of the German end of the 1944-45 war need not be attributed to the German Wehrmacht; rather, they can be explained by a contradiction with him: the German Volkssturm and the so-called werewolf. Volkssturm was called up by decree of September 25, 1944, as a territorial militia for the defense of the country; people belonging to it, starting to act, became soldiers in the sense of the law on conscription and participants in the war in the sense of the Hague charter of land war. Their organization, armament, use, morale and losses are reported by the recently published work of Major General Hans Kissel, who was chief of the Deutscher Volkssturm headquarters since November 1944. Kissel reports that the Volkssturm in the West was recognized by the Allies as a belligerent detachment (military unit), while the Russians viewed it as a partisan organization and shot the prisoners. In contrast to this territorial militia, the werewolf was conceived as a youth guerrilla organization. The result is reported in a book by Dixon and Heilbrunn: "Some of the few aspiring werewolves were captured by the allies, and that was all." The werewolf was described as "an attempt to set free the war of the partisan children" (Kinderheckenschutzenkrieg).²⁴ In any case, we need not dwell on this in detail here.

After the First World War, the then victors liquidated the German General Staff and prohibited its restoration in any form in Article 160 of the Treaty of Versailles of June 28, 1919. The historical and international legal logic is that the victors in World War II, who in the meantime outlawed the Duellkrieg of classical European international law, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, after their common victory over Germany, also outlawed the Prussian state and destroyed his. Law No. 46 of the Allied Control Council of 25 February 1947 decreed:

The Prussian state, which for a long time had been the bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany, de facto ceased to exist. Guided by the idea of preserving the peace and security of peoples and wishing to restore political life in Germany on a democratic basis, the Control Council prescribes the following:

Article 1. The Prussian state with its government and all its administrative organs is liquidated.

The partisan as the Prussian ideal of 1813 and a turn to theory

Not a Prussian soldier or a career officer of the Prussian General Staff striving for reforms, but the Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck was the one who, in 1866, against the Habsburg monarchy and Bonapartist France, "wanted to take up any weapon that was released to us (entfesselte) a national movement not only in Germany, but also in Hungary and Bohemia, "so as not to be defeated. Bismarck was determined to set Acheron in motion. He willingly used the classic quotation Acheronta movere, but he attributed this, of course, more willingly to his internal political opponents. Both the Prussian king Wilhelm I and the chief of the Prussian general staff, Moltke, were far from the Acherontian plans; something like that must have seemed to them creepy and also non-Prussian. And for the weak attempts of the German government and the general staff to prepare a revolution during the First World War, the word acherontisch would be too strong. Of course, Lenin's trip from Switzerland to Russia in 1917 belongs to this context. But everything that the Germans could conceive and plan then, when organizing Lenin's journey, thanks to the historical consequences of this preparation for the revolution, so monstrously surpassed and turned upside down plans that our thesis about

the Prussian disagreement with partisanship is thus more likely to be confirmed than disproved. 25

Nevertheless, the Prussian state of soldiers (Soldatenstaat) once had an Acheron moment in its history. It was in the winter and spring of 1812-13, when the elite of the officers of the General Staff tried to free up and take over the forces. national hostility to Napoleon. The German war against Napoleon was not a guerrilla war. It can hardly be called a people's war; the latter does it, as Ernst Forsthoef accurately says, only "a legend with a political background." 26 It was quickly possible to direct those spontaneous forces into a solid framework of state order and regular struggle against the French armies. Nonetheless, this brief, revolutionary moment remains enduring to guerrilla theory.

Here they will immediately recall the famous masterpiece of military science - the book *On the War of the Prussian General von Clausewitz*. They will remember it quite rightly. But Clausewitz was then a young friend of his teachers and mentors Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and his book was published only after his death, after 1832. But there is another manifesto of hostility to Napoleon, dating back directly to the spring of 1813; it belongs to the most amazing documents in the entire history of partisans: the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 21, 1813. This is an edict signed by the King of Prussia, which was published in the Prussian code of laws in compliance with all the rules. There is no doubt that the Spanish *Reglamento de Partidas y Cuadrillas* of December 28, 1808 and the decree of April 17, 1809, known as the *Corso Terrestre*, served as a model for this edict. But these documents were not personally signed by the monarch. 27 You are amazed when you see the name of the legitimate king under this kind of call for guerrilla war. These ten pages of the Prussian Code of Laws of 1813 (pp. 79-89) certainly belong to the most unusual pages of all the laws of the world published. Every citizen of the state, as it is stated in the royal Prussian edict of April 1813, is obliged to resist the invading enemy with all types of weapons. Axes, pitchforks, scythes, and shot rifles are highly recommended (at # 43). Every Prussian is obliged not to obey any order of the enemy, but is obliged to harm him by all available means. Also, if the enemy wants to restore public order, no one should obey him, since this makes it easier for the enemy to conduct military operations. It says unequivocally, that the "riot of unbridled rabble" is less harmful than the state when the enemy can freely dispose of all his troops. Repression and terror for the protection of the partisan are promised, they threaten the enemy. In short, there is a genus of Magna Carta partisanship. Three places - in the introduction and ## 8 and 52 - explicitly refer to Spain and guerrilla as "a model and an example." The fight is justified as a fight within the confines of self-defense that "sanctifies all means" (# 7), as well as the release of total disorder.

I have already said that it did not come to the point of a German partisan war against Napoleon. The edict of the Landsturm itself, already three months later, on July 17, 1813, was changed and cleared of all partisan danger, of all Acheront dynamics. Everything that followed took place in the battles of the regular armies, even if the dynamics of the national impulse penetrated the regular detachment. Napoleon could boast that during the many years of French occupation on German soil, not a single German civilian had fired a single shot into a French uniform.

So, what is the special significance of that short-lived Prussian order of 1813? In the fact that it is an official document of the legitimation of the partisan of national defense, namely, a special legitimation that emerged from the spirit and philosophy that reigned in the then Prussian capital Berlin. The Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon, the Tyrolean uprising of 1809 and the Russian partisan war of 1812 were spontaneous, autochthonous movements of a devout, Catholic or Orthodox people whose religious tradition was not affected by the philosophical spirit

revolutionary France and was in this respect underdeveloped. Especially the Spaniards, Napoleon called in an indignant letter to his governor-general of Hamburg Davout (December 2, 1811) a killing from the corner, a superstitious people who are deceived by 300,000 monks - this people cannot be compared with the diligent, hardworking and reasonable Germans. On the contrary, Berlin in 1808-1813 was created and minted by a spirit that was absolutely entrusted with the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, so believed that he could feel grown up on it, if not surpassed it.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the great philosopher; such highly educated and genius soldiers as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz; such a poet as the previously mentioned Heinrich von Kleist, who died in November 1811, - they characterize the enormous spiritual potential of the Prussian intelligentsia, then ready for action at a critical moment. The nationalism of this Berlin intelligentsia stratum was the lot of educated people, and not of a simple or completely illiterate people. In such an atmosphere, when the excited national feeling was combined with a philosophical education, the partisan was philosophically open and his theory became historically possible. That the doctrine of war also belongs to this alliance is shown by a letter written by Clausewitz as an "anonymous soldier" in 1809 from Königsberg Fichte as "the creator of the Machiavellian essay." In this letter, the Prussian officer, with all possible reverence, instructs the famous philosopher that the doctrine of the Machiavellian war is too dependent on antiquity and that today "they gain infinitely more by the revitalization of individual forces than by an artificial form." New weapons and masses, says Clausewitz in this letter, are fully consistent with this principle, and, in the end, decides the courage of a loner to engage in close combat, "especially in the most beautiful of all wars that the people are waging on their own land for freedom and independence".

Young Clausewitz knew the partisan from the Prussian plans for the 1808/13 uprising. In the years 1810-1811, Clausewitz lectured at the Berlin Military School on the small war and was not only one of the most significant military experts in small war in the special sense of using light, mobile units. Guerrilla became for him, as well as for other reformers in his circle, "above all, in the highest sense, a political affair of a downright revolutionary character. Defending the arming of the people, uprising, revolutionary war, resistance and rebellion against the existing order, even if it is personified by a foreign occupation regime, is a new phenomenon for Prussia, something "dangerous" - something that seems to fall out of the sphere of the rule of law". With these words, Werner Hahlweg captures what is important to us. But then he adds: "True, the revolutionary war against Napoleon, as it appeared to the Prussian reformers, was not waged. It only went as far as a "semi-rebellious (halbinsurrektionellen) war," as Friedrich Engels put it. Nonetheless, the famous February 1812 memorandum remains important to the "inner impulses" (Rothfels) of the reformers; Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience Clausewitz composed it with the help of Gneisenau and Boyen before moving on to the Russians. It is "a document of sober political analysis made in accordance with the standards of the General Staff," he refers to the experience

Spanish People's War and wants to calmly bring matters to the point of "responding to cruelty with cruelty, to violence with violence." The Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 is already clearly recognized here.

It must have been hard for Clausewitz to be disappointed that everything he expected from the uprising "did not take place." 29 The People's War and the partisans - "party members" as Clausewitz says - he understood as an essential part of the "forces exploding in war" and inserted them into the system his doctrine of war. Especially in the 6th book of his doctrine of war (the amount of means of defense) and in the famous chapter 6b of the eighth book (war is an instrument of politics), he also recognized a new "potency". In addition, one can find surprising, profound individual remarks in him, such as, for example, a passage about the civil war in the Vendée: that

sometimes a small number of individual partisans may even “claim to be called an army.”³⁰ And yet, in general, he remains a reformist-minded career officer of the regular army of his era, who could not himself, until the last succession, blossom those sprouts that become visible here. This, as we shall see, happened much later and required an active professional revolutionary. Clausewitz himself still thought too much in classical categories, when in the “strange triplicity of war” he appropriated to the people only the “blind instinct” of hatred and enmity, to the commander and his army “courage and talent” as a free action of the soul, and to the government - purely rational manipulation of war as a policy tool.

In that short-lived Prussian edict on the Landsturm of April 1813, the moment is concentrated in which the partisan first appeared in a new, decisive role, as a new, previously unrecognized figure of the world spirit. Not the will to revolt of a brave, warlike people, but education and the intelligentsia opened this door to the partisan and gave him legitimacy based on a philosophical basis. Here he became, if I will be allowed to say so, philosophically accredited and gained access to the court. This was not the case before. In the 17th century, he sank to the level of a character in a rogue novel; in the 18th century, during the time of Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great, he was a pandur and a hussar. But now, in Berlin in 1808-1813, it was discovered and appreciated not only in the military-technical, but also in the philosophical sense. For at least one moment, he gained his historical position and spiritual initiation. It was an event that he could not forget again. This is decisive for our theme. We are talking about the theory of the partisan. Well, the political theory of the partisan, exceeding specifically military classifications, became, in fact, possible only thanks to this accreditation in Berlin. The spark, which came to the north from Spain in 1808, found in Berlin a theoretical form that made it possible to preserve its combustion and transfer it further to other hands.

True, at first in Berlin, the traditional piety of the people was also not under threat, as was the political unity of the king and the people. It seemed to be intensified rather than jeopardized by the affirmation of the oath and the glorification of the partisan. Acheron, who was released, immediately returned to the channels of state order. After the wars for the liberation of Germany in 1813-1815. in Prussia, Hegel's philosophy dominated. She tried to create a mediator between revolution and tradition.³¹ She could be considered conservative, and indeed she was. But it also preserved the revolutionary spark and, thanks to its philosophy of history, provided the developing revolution with a dangerous ideological weapon, more dangerous than the philosophy of Rousseau in the hands of the Jacobins. This is a historical philosophical weapon fell into the hands of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. However, both German revolutionaries were more thinkers than activists of the revolutionary war. Only thanks to the Russian professional revolutionary - Lenin - Marxism as a doctrine became the world-historical power (Macht), which it represents today.

From Clausewitz to Lenin

Hans Schomerus, whom we have already quoted as a specialist in the field of partisanship, gave one section of his (which became available to me in the manuscript) reasoning the title: From Empecinado to Budyonny. This means: from a partisan of the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon to the organizer of the Soviet cavalry, the leader of the cavalry of the Bolshevik war of 1920. An interesting military-scientific line of development shines through in this name. However, for us, having in mind the theory of the partisan, it is too strong

draws attention to military-technical issues of tactics and strategy of flexible (beweglichen) war. We must not lose sight of the development of the concept of the political, which takes a radical turn just here. The classical concept of the political, fixed in the 18/19 centuries, was based on the state of European international law and made the war of classical international law protected in the international legal sense, a pure war of states. Since the 20th century, this war of states with its protections has been eliminated and replaced by a revolutionary war of parties. For this reason, we have titled the following presentation From Clausewitz to Lenin. The truth here - in comparison with the military-special-scientific narrowing [of the topic] - is in a certain sense the opposite danger,

The partisan here is a reliable point of aiming for weapons, since he can save one from such general philosophical and historical genealogies and is able to lead back to the reality of revolutionary development. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have already realized that revolutionary war today is not an old-style barricade war. This was especially emphasized again and again by Engels, the author of many military scientific works. But he considered it possible that bourgeois democracy, with the help of universal suffrage, would give the proletariat a majority in parliament and thus legally transform the bourgeois social system into a classless society. Consequently, a completely non-partisan revisionism could appeal to Marx and Engels.

On the contrary, Lenin was the one who realized the inevitability of violence and bloody revolutionary civil wars and wars of states and therefore approved the partisan war as a necessary component of the general revolutionary process. Lenin was the first who quite consciously understood the partisan as an important figure in the national and international civil war and tried to turn him into an effective tool of the central communist party leadership. As far as I can tell, this happened for the first time in the article *The Partisan Battle*, published on September 30 / October 13, 1906 in the Russian magazine *Proletary*.³² This is a clear continuation of the knowledge about the enemy and hostility, which begins in 1902 in the essay "What is to be done?" first of all, with a turn against Struve's objectivism. From this "the professional revolutionary began consistently."³³

Lenin's article on the partisan deals with the tactics of the socialist civil war and is directed against the opinion widespread at that time among the Social Democrats that the proletarian revolution will by itself achieve its goal as a mass movement in parliamentary countries, so that the methods of direct use of force are supposedly outdated. For Lenin, guerrilla warfare refers to the method of civil war and, like everything else, concerns a purely tactical or strategic issue of a specific situation. Guerrilla warfare is, as Lenin says, "an inevitable form of struggle" that is used without dogmatism or pre-determined principles, just as other, legal or illegal, peaceful or violent, regular or irregular means and methods should be used, judging by the situation. The goal is the communist revolution in all countries of the world; then, what serves this purpose is good and just. As a result, the problem of the partisan is solved very simply: partisans led by the communist center are fighters for peace and valiant heroes; the guerrillas who shy away from this leadership are anarchist rabble and enemies of humanity.

Lenin was a great connoisseur and admirer of Clausewitz. He intensively studied the book *On the War* during the First World War in 1915 and entered into his Notebook extracts from it in German, marginal notes in Russian, with underscores and exclamation marks. Thus, he created one of the most ambitious documents in world history and the history of the spirit. From a thorough examination of these

extracts, marginal notes, underlines and exclamation marks, a new theory of absolute war and absolute hostility can be developed that defines the era of revolutionary war and the methods of the modern cold war.³⁴ What Lenin could learn from Clausewitz and what he thoroughly learned is not only the famous formula about war as a continuation of politics. This is further knowledge that the distinction between friend and enemy in the era of revolution is primary and paramount and determines both war and politics. For Lenin, only a revolutionary war is a real war, since it arises from absolute enmity. Everything else is a conditional game. Lenin himself especially emphasizes the difference between Krieg (war) and Spiel (play) in a marginal note to one place in Chapter 23 of Book 11 ("Schlüssel des Landes"). A decisive step is taken in the logic of this distinction, which breaks the safeguards that the war of the states of continental European international law in the 18th century managed to make, which were so successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 that they survived until the end of the First World War and which Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. which managed to make the war of the states of continental European international law in the 18th century, which were so successfully restored by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15 that they survived until the end of the First World War and which Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. that they survived until the end of the First World War and that Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating them. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. that they survived until the end of the First World War and that Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating them. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such an absolute enmity to the communist as Lenin, this kind of war should have seemed only a game in which, judging by the state of affairs, he participated in order to mislead the enemy, but which he essentially despised and found ridiculous. that they survived until the end of the First World War and that Clausewitz had never really thought about eliminating them. Compared to a war of absolute enmity, the guarded war of classical European international law proceeding according to recognized rules is no more than a duel between cavaliers who have the right to seek satisfaction. To such a

The war of absolute enmity knows no protection. The consistent implementation of absolute enmity gives war its meaning and justice. So, the only question is: is there an absolute enemy and who is it in concreto? Lenin did not hesitate for a minute about the answer, and his advantage over all other socialists and Marxists was that he took absolute enmity seriously. His concrete absolute enemy was the class enemy, the bourgeois, the Western capitalist and his social order in every country where he ruled. Knowing the enemy was the secret of Lenin's monstrous striking power. His understanding of the guerrilla rested on the fact that the modern guerrilla had become a truly irregular phenomenon, and thus the strongest denial of the existing capitalist order, and on the fact that he was called to be a genuine perpetrator of enmity.

The irregularity of the guerrilla today does not only refer to the military "line" as it did in the 18th century when the guerrilla was only a "light, mobile unit," and it also no longer applies to the proudly paraded uniform of the regular unit. The irregularity of the class struggle calls into question not only the line, but the entire edifice of the political and social order. In the person of the Russian professional revolutionary Lenin, this new reality comprehended itself to the point of philosophical awareness. The alliance of philosophy with the partisan, which Lenin concluded, released unexpectedly new, explosive forces. This alliance caused, at the very least, the undermining of the entire Euro-centrist world, which Napoleon hoped to save and who hoped to restore the Congress of Vienna. Preservation of interstate regular war and taming interstate civil war became so self-evident in the European 18th century that even the clever people of the old regime (Ancien Regime) could not imagine the destruction of this kind of regularity, even after the experiences of the French Revolution of 1789 and 1793. To do this, they found only the language of universal horror and insufficient, in fact, children's comparisons. The great, courageous thinker of the old regime (Ancien Regime), Joseph de Maistre, foresaw what was being discussed. In a letter written in the summer of 1811, 36 he considered Russia ripe for revolution, but he hoped that it would be, as he says, a natural revolution, but not an Enlightenment-European, like the French one. What he feared most was the educated Pugachev. So he put it to figuratively that he is correct

I knew it as Dangerous itself, precisely the union of philosophy with the elemental forces of rebellion. Who was Pugachev? We are the leader of the peasant and Cossack uprising against Catherine 11, who was executed in Moscow in 1775 and who posed as the queen's deceased husband. An educated Pugachev would be the Russian who "would start the revolution in a European way." This would have resulted in a whole series of terrible wars, and if things had gone this far, "I have no words to tell you what to fear then."

The vision of a clever aristocrat is amazing, both in what he sees, precisely the possibility and danger of connecting the Western mind with the Russian revolt, and in what he does not see. With its time date and place - St. Petersburg in the summer of 1811 - it is located not far from the Prussian military reformers. But it does not notice anything about its own closeness to the reform-minded cadre officers of the Prussian General Staff, whose contacts with the royal court in St. Petersburg were nevertheless quite intense. It is unaware of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz. If we combine their names with the name of Pugachev, then the crux of the matter would be fatally missed. The profundity of a significant vision disappears, and only a sharp word in the style of Voltaire or, if you will, Rivalor remains. If we also think about the alliance of Hegel's philosophy of history with the liberated forces of the masses, as the Marxist professional revolutionary Lenin consciously realized, then the formulation of the genius de Maistre dissipates to a small colloquial effect of the front Ancien Regime. The language and the world of the concepts of guarded war and measured enmity could no longer correspond to the onset of absolute enmity.

From Lenin to Mao Tse-tung

During the Second World War, the Russian partisans, after expert assessments, diverted about twenty German divisions to themselves and thereby made a significant contribution to the outcome of the war. Official Soviet historiography - such as Boris Semyonovich Telpukhovsky's book about the Great Patriotic War of 1941/45 - describes a valiant partisan who destroys the rear of enemy armies. On the vast expanses of Russia and with infinitely long fronts stretching for thousands of kilometers, each division was indispensable for the German military command. Stalin's main point of view regarding the partisan was that the partisan must always fight behind enemy lines, according to the well-known maxim: there are partisans in the rear, brotherhood at the front.

Stalin succeeded in linking the strong potential of national and domestic resistance - the essentially defensive, telluric force of patriotic self-defense against an alien conqueror - with the aggressiveness of the international communist world revolution. The combination of these two heterogeneous quantities dominates today's guerrilla warfare across the planet. At the same time, the communist element has so far been largely a winner thanks to its dedication and its reliance on Moscow or Beijing. Stalin cruelly sacrificed Polish partisans who fought against the Germans during World War II. The partisan battles in Yugoslavia in 1941/45 were not only a general national defense against an alien conqueror, but were also very brutal internal battles between communist and monarchist partisans.

The greatest practitioner of the revolutionary war of our time has become at the same time its most famous theorist: Mao Tse-tung. Some of his writings are "today

compulsory reading material in Western military schools "(Hans Henle). Since 1927, he has been collecting experiences of communist action and then used the Japanese invasion of 1932 in order to systematically develop all modern methods of simultaneously national and international civil war. The "Long March", from southern China to the Mongol border, which began in November 1934, 12,000 kilometers with huge losses, was a series of guerrilla achievements and guerrilla experiences that resulted in the Chinese Communist Party rallying into a peasant and soldier party, with the guerrilla as the center. A significant coincidence lies in the fact that Mao Zedong wrote his most important works in 1936-38, and so in the same years, when Spain in the national liberation war resisted the international communist outreach. In this Spanish civil war, the guerrilla played no significant role. On the contrary, Mao Zedong owes his victory over his national enemy, Kuo-min-tang and General Chiang Kai-shek, exclusively to the experience of the Chinese guerrilla war against the Japanese and Kuo-min-tang. The most important formulations of Mao Tse-tung for our topic are found in the 1938 work "The strategy of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese invasion." But it is necessary to involve other works of Mao in order to fully imagine the picture of the doctrine of war of this new Clausewitz.³⁷ In fact, we are talking about a consistent and systematically conscious continuation and development of the concepts of the Prussian officer of the general staff. Only Clausewitz, contemporary of Napoleon 1, could not yet have foreseen the degree of totality that today is self-evident for a Chinese communist with regard to a revolutionary war. The characteristic image of Mao Tse-tung is evident from the following comparison: "In our war, the armed population and the small war of the partisans, on the one hand, and the Red Army, on the other, can be compared with both hands of one person; or, to put it more practically: the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. " the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. " the morality of the population is the morality of an armed nation. And the enemy is afraid of this. "

"Armed nation": this, as you know, was also the motto of the career officers of the Prussian General Staff who organized the war against Napoleon. Clausewitz belonged to them. We saw that at that time the strong national energies of a certain educated stratum of the population were taken up by the regular army. And the most radical military thinkers of the time distinguished between war and peace and viewed war as a state of emergency clearly demarcated from peace. And Clausewitz could not, proceeding from his existence as a career officer in the regular army, bring the logic of partisanship to the end as systematically as Lenin and Mao did on the basis of their existence as professional revolutionaries. But Mao adds a specific point regarding guerrilla warfare, thanks to which he comes closer to the inner essence of the matter than Lenin and thanks to which he acquires the possibility of extreme ideological perfection. In short: Mao's revolution is more tellurically based than Lenin's. The Bolshevik vanguard, which, under Lenin's leadership, seized power in Russia in October 1917, shows great differences with the Chinese communists, who, after more than twenty years of war in 1949, got their hands on China. These differences are manifested both in the internal group structure and in the attitude towards the country and people that they have captured. The ideological controversy of whether Mao teaches true Marxism or Leninism becomes almost as secondary in the face of the horrific reality defined by telluric partisanship as the question of whether whether the old Chinese philosophers were already expressing something akin to Maoism. We are talking about a specific "red elite", minted and created by guerrilla warfare. Ruth Fischer clarified the essential - she points out that the Russian Bolsheviks of 1917 were a national minority "led by a group of theoreticians, the majority of which consisted of emigrants"; 1949 Chinese Communists led by Mao and his friends in

for twenty years they fought on their own national soil against the national enemy, Kuo-min-tang, on the basis of a terrifying guerrilla war. It may be that by their origin they were the urban proletariat, just like the Russian Bolsheviks were from St. Petersburg and Moscow; but when they came to power, they brought with them the minted experiences of severe defeats and the organizational ability to "plant" their principles "in the peasant environment and develop them there further in a new, unforeseen way." 38 Here we can see the deepest germ of "ideological" disagreements between the Soviet -Russian and Chinese communism. But here an internal contradiction is also revealed in the situation of Mao himself, combining in itself a deprived space, a globally universal, absolute world enemy, a Marxist class enemy, with a territorially capable of being limited, the real enemy of the Sino-Asian defense against capitalist colonialism. This is the contradiction of One World, the political unity of the earth and humanity, against the majority of large spaces, which are reasonably balanced within themselves and with each other. Mao expressed a pluralistic view of the new nomos of the Earth in the poem Kunlun, (German translation by Rolf Schneider):

If the sky were the dwelling place of the military, then I would draw my sword
And cut you into three parts:
One - as a gift to Europe,
one - for America,
But I would leave one part for China,
And peace would reign on Earth.

In the concrete situation of Mao, various types of enmity are encountered, which intensify to the level of absolute enmity. Racial hatred against the white, colonial exploiter; class enmity against the capitalist bourgeoisie; national enmity against the Japanese interventionist of the same race; the growing enmity against one's own, national brother in long, bitter civil wars - all this did not paralyze and did not question each other, as one might think, but was confirmed and intensified in a specific state of affairs. During the Second World War, Stalin managed to combine the telluric partisanship of the national native land with the class enmity of international communism. Mao was ahead of Stalin in this. Mao, in his theoretical consciousness, continued the formula about war as a continuation of politics, bypassing Lenin.

Thinking operation, basic in Mao, is just as simple as it is efficient. The meaning of war is enmity. Since war is a continuation of politics, politics always acquires, at least as an opportunity, an element of enmity; and since the world contains the possibility of enmity - which, unfortunately, is an experimentally confirmed fact - then it also contains a moment of potential enmity. The only question is whether enmity can be guarded and regulated, that is, whether it is a relative or absolute enmity. Only the belligerent itself can decide at its own peril and risk. For Mao, who thinks like a guerrilla, today's world is only a form of real enmity. It does not stop during the so-called cold war. The latter, therefore, is not half war and half peace, but it is a state-of-the-art participation of real enmity with other openly violent means. Only weak-willed people and dreamers can deceive themselves in this.

In practice, this raises the question of in what quantitative relation is the battle of a regular army in open war to other methods of class struggle that are not openly military. Mao answers this question with clear numbers: a revolutionary war is nine-tenths non-open, non-regular war, and one

tenth open war of the military. The German general, Helmut Staedke, on this basis derived the definition of the partisan: the partisan is a fighter of the nine-tenths of warfare, which provides only the last tenth of the regular armed forces. 39 Mao Tse-tung does not lose sight of the fact that this last tenth part is decisive for the end of the war. However, a European belonging to an old tradition needs to protect himself from using the generally accepted classical concepts of war and peace, which, if they talk about war and peace, are subordinated to the European protected war of the 19th century and, therefore, not absolute, but only relative and amenable guarding enmity.

The regular Red Army only appears when the situation is ripe for the communist regime. Only then is the country openly occupied by the military. This certainly does not apply to the conclusion of peace in the sense of classical international law. The practical significance of this kind of doctrine since 1945 has been very convincingly demonstrated to the whole world thanks to the partition of Germany. On May 8, 1945, the military's war against conquered Germany ended; Germany then unconditionally capitulated. Until now (1963) peace has not yet been concluded between the victorious allies with Germany; but to this day, the border runs between East and West exactly along the lines along which, 18 years ago, American and Soviet regular military units demarcated their occupation zones.

Both the ratio (expressed in numbers of 9: 1) of the cold war and open war of the military, and the deeper, world-political symptomatology of the partition of Germany since 1945 are just examples for us to clarify the political theory of Mao. Its core lies in guerrilla warfare, whose main feature today is real enmity. Lenin's Bolshevik theory recognized and recognized the partisan. Compared to the concrete telluric reality of the Chinese partisan, Lenin has something abstract and intellectual in defining the enemy. The ideological conflict between Moscow and Beijing, which has manifested itself more and more strongly since 1962, has its deepest source in this concretely different reality of true guerrilla warfare. Here, too, the theory of the partisan turns out to be the key to understanding political reality.

From Mao Tse-tung to Raoul Salan

French career officers brought the glory of Mao Tse-tung as the most modern teacher of warfare from Asia to Europe. In Indochina, the colonial war of the old style came into contact with the revolutionary war of our time. There they learned in their own skin the striking power of well-thought-out methods of destructive warfare, psychological mass terror and their connection with guerrilla warfare. Based on their experiences, they developed the doctrine of psychological, destructive and insurgency war, about which there is already an extensive literature.⁴⁰

We wanted to see this as a typical product of the mindset of career officers, namely Colonels, Colonels. There is no need to argue about this secondment to the Colonel here, although it might be interesting to ask whether a figure like Clausewitz as a whole corresponds more to the spiritual type of a colonel than a general. For us, we are talking about the theory of the partisan and its consistent development, and the latter is embodied in the sensational case of recent years, rather in the general than in the colonel, namely in the fate of General Raoul Salan. He (more than the other generals Jouhaud, Challe or Zeller) is the most important figure for us in this context. In the seconded position of the general, an existential conflict that was decisive for understanding the problem of the partisan was revealed, which should occur when a regularly fighting soldier not only on occasion,

war must withstand a battle with a fundamentally revolutionary and irregularly fighting enemy.

Salan, already as a young officer, recognized the colonial war in Indochina. During World War 1940/44, he was assigned to the General Staff of the colonies and remained in this capacity in Africa. In 1948, he arrived in Indochina as commandant of the French military units; in 1951 he became high commissioner of the French Republic in North Vietnam; he directed the investigation of the Dien-Bien-Phu defeat in 1954. In November 1958, he was appointed the highest commandant of the French armed forces in Algeria. Until now, politically, he could be ranked among the left, and back in January 1957, a dark organization, which in German can probably be called "Fehme" (Fehme), made a dangerous attempt on his life. But the lessons of the war in Indochina and the experiences of the Algerian partisan war influenced the fact that he learned the inexorable logic of partisan war. The chief of the then Parisian government, Pflimlin, gave him all the powers. However, on May 15, 1958, he helped General de Gaulle come to power at a crucial moment. During a public event in Algeria, he shouted Vive de Gaulle! But he soon became bitterly disillusioned with his expectation that de Gaulle would unconditionally defend France's constitutionally guaranteed territorial sovereignty over Algeria. In 1960, an open feud began with de Gaulle. In January 1961, some of Salan's friends founded the OAS (Organization d'Armee Secrete), whose declared chief Salan became, and he rushed to Algeria on April 23 to take part in the officer's coup. When this coup ended in failure on April 25, 1961, the OAS tried to undertake systematic terrorist actions, as against the Algerian enemy, and against the civilian population in Algeria and the population in France itself; systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. systematic in the sense of the methods of the so-called psychological warfare of modern mass terror. The terrorist enterprise suffered a decisive loss in April 1962 with the arrest of Salan by the French police. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances. The hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court in Paris began on May 15 and ended on May 23, 1962. The charge concerned the attempted violent overthrow of the legal regime and the terrorist acts of the OAS, and only covered the period from April 1961 to April 1962. He was not sentenced to death, but to life imprisonment (detention criminelle a perpetuite), since the court found the defendant in extenuating circumstances.

I briefly reminded the German reader of some dates. The history of Salan and the OAS does not yet exist, and we should not interfere with our assessments and judgments in such a deep, internal conflict of the French nation. We can only establish here some lines from the material as far as it is published⁴¹ in order to clarify our important question. There are many parallels here with regard to partisanship. We will return to one of them later, for purely heuristic reasons and with all the necessary caution. The analogy between the Prussian officers of the general staff of 1808/13, impressed by the Spanish guerrilla, and the French general staff of the 1950/60s, who experienced modern guerrilla warfare in Indochina and Algeria, is stunning. The big differences are also obvious and do not require a long exposition. There is an affinity in the main situation and in many individual destinies. But this should not be abstractly exaggerated in the sense that it is possible to identify all theories and constructions of the defeated military in world history. That would be nonsense. And in the case of the Prussian general Ludendorff, the situation is different in many essential points than in the case of the left-republican Salan. For us, it is only important to clarify the theory of the partisan.

During the hearing of the case by the Supreme Military Court, Salan remained silent. At the beginning of the hearing, he made a long explanation, the first words of which were: Je suis le chef de l'OAS. Ma respontabilite est donc entiere. In his explanation, he objected that the witnesses he had presented - including President de Gaulle - had not been questioned and that

the material of the trial was limited by the time from April 1961 (the officers' coup in Algeria) to April 1962 (the arrest of Salan), due to which his own motives were obscured and important historical processes were isolated, fenced off and reduced to the types and facts of the normal criminal code. He called the acts of violence of the OAS simply a response to the most hated of all acts of violence, which consists in the fact that people who do not want to lose their nation protect this nation. The explanation ended with the words: "I must give an account only to those who suffer and die because they believed in a broken word and in a devoted duty. Now I will be silent. "

Salan did maintain his silence throughout the entire hearing, in defiance of many, sharply insistent questions from the prosecutor, who considered this silence to be merely a tactic. The President of the Supreme Military Court, after briefly pointing out the "illogicality" of such a silence considered the behavior of the accused in the end, if not with respect, then at least tolerant and not as a contempt of court. At the end of the hearing, Salan replied to the chairman's question about whether he would like to add anything to his defense: "I will open my mouth only to shout out Vive la France !, and to the prosecution, I will simply answer: que Dieu me garde! "42

The first part of this concluding remark by Salan is addressed to the President of the Supreme Military Court, referring to the situation of the execution of the death penalty. In this situation, at the time of the death penalty, Salan would have shouted: Vive la France! The second part is addressed to the representative of the public prosecution and sounds somewhat mysterious, like the words of an oracle. However, the case makes it clear that the prosecutor - in a way that is not ordinary for the prosecutor of the still anti-clerical state - suddenly became religious. He not only declared Salan's silence arrogance and lack of repentance, in order to plead before the court against admitting extenuating circumstances; he suddenly began to speak, as he categorically put it, as "Christian to Christian", un chretien qui s'adresse a un chretien, and reproached the defendant for that, due to the lack of repentance, through his own fault, he lost the mercy of the merciful Christian God and incurred eternal damnation. To this Salan said: que Dieu me garde! One can see the abysses over which the wit and rhetoric of the political process are played. However, we are not talking about the problem of political justice.⁴³ We are only interested in clarifying a set of issues that, thanks to such mottos as total war, psychological war, subversive war, insurrectionary war, invisible war, have become confused and change the problem of modern guerrilla warfare.

The 1946/56 war in Indochina was "a model of a widespread modern revolutionary war" (Th. Arnold, aa O., p. 186). Salan learned modern guerrilla warfare in the forests, jungles and rice paddies of Indochina. He had learned from his own experience that Indo-Chinese rice farmers could have routed a battalion of first-class French soldiers. He saw the disaster of the refugees and recognized the underground organization organized by Ho Chi Minh that blocked and outplayed legal French rule. With punctuality and precision

General Staff, he set about observing and researching a new, more or less terrorist warfare. In doing so, he immediately faced what he and his comrades called "psychological" warfare, which, along with military-technical action, is characteristic of modern warfare. Here Salan could immediately adopt Mao's system of thought; but it is known that he also delved into the literature of the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon. In Algeria, he was at the center of a situation where 400,000 heavily armed soldiers fought against 20,000 Algerian guerrillas, with the result that France renounced its sovereignty over Algeria. The loss in human lives for the entire Algerian population was ten to twenty times greater than that of the French, but the material costs of the French were ten to twenty times higher than that of the Algerians. Shortly speaking,

existence as a Frenchman and a soldier in the face of an etrange paradoxe, in the logic of madness (Irrsinnslgik), which could exasperate and lead to an attempted counterattack of a courageous and intelligent person.⁴⁴

Aspects and concepts of the last stage

We try to distinguish four different aspects in a similar situation typical of modern guerrilla warfare in order to acquire some clear concepts: the aspect of space, then the destruction of social structures, then the interweaving in world-political contexts, and, finally, the technical-industrial aspect. This sequence is relative and can be changed. It goes without saying that in concrete reality there are not four independent areas that can be isolated from each other, but only their intensive interactions, their mutual functional dependencies reveal the general picture, so that any analysis of one aspect at the same time always contains references and implications of three other aspects and finally they all pour into the force field of technical and industrial development.

Aspect of space

Quite independently of the good or evil will of people, of peaceful or militant needs and goals, each increase in human technology produces new spaces and boundless changes in the inherited structures of space. This is true not only for the external, conspicuous increases in space of astronautics, but also for our old earthly spaces of habitation, work, worship and space of freedom of action. Today, in the era of electric lighting, gas pipelines, telephone, radio and television, the thesis "the house is inviolable" evokes a completely different type of protection than in the days of King John (King John the Landless) and Magna Charta (Magna Charta) in 1215, when the owner of the castle could raise the drawbridge. On the technical increase in human efficiency, whole systems of norms are broken, such as, for example, 19th century maritime war law. From the ownerless seabed, the space that is located near the coast emerges, the so-called continental shelf, as a new space for human action. Bunkers for radioactive waste are emerging in the unowned depths of the Pacific Ocean. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle. Industrial and technological progress, together with the structures of space, also changes the orders of space. For law is the unity of order and location, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of the relationship between regular and irregular struggle.

The modern soldier can be progressively optimistic or pessimistic about his personality. This is not so important for our problem. In military-technical terms, any general staff officer thinks directly, practically and meaningfully and rationally. In comparison with this, proceeding from the war, the aspect of space is close to him in theory. The structural difference between the so-called theater of war in land war and war at sea is an old theme. Airspace has been added as a new dimension since the First World War, which at the same time has changed the former Schauplatze of land and sea in their spatial structure.⁴⁵ In guerrilla warfare, a complexly structured new space of action arises, since the guerrilla is not fighting in an open field. battles and not in the same plane of open war of the fronts. Rather, he forces his enemy to enter another space. So he adds to the surface of the regular, ordinary theater

warfare is another, darker dimension, a dimension of depth⁴⁶ in which uniforms being worn on display become deadly. In this way he delivers in the terrestrial realm an unexpected, but therefore no less effective analogy with a submarine, which likewise added an unexpected dimension of depth to the surface of the sea on which an old-style naval war was fought. From underground, he interferes with the usual, regular play on the open stage. Based on its irregularity, it changes the dimensions of not only tactical, but also strategic operations of the regular armies. Relatively small groups of partisans can, through the use of soil conditions, bind large masses of regular troops. Earlier we mentioned "Paradox" on the example of Algeria. Clausewitz already clearly knew and accurately described this in the already quoted (above note 30) statement,

The concrete clarity of the concept is that we adhere to the telluric-earthly character of the partisan and do not name (and do not even define) him as a corsair of the earth. The pirate's irregularity has nothing to do with any regularity. On the contrary, the corsair gets spoils of war at sea and is supplied with a "letter" from the government of the state; his type of irregularity has something to do with regularity, and so he could have been a legally recognized figure in European international law before the Paris Peace of 1856. In this respect, both, the corsair of the naval war and the guerrilla of the land war, can be compared. A strong similarity and even identity is manifested primarily in the fact that the thesis "They fight the partisans only in a guerrilla way" and the other thesis a corsaire corsaire et demi basically mean the same thing. However, today's partisan is something different, than a corsair of a land war. For this, the elementary opposition of land and sea remains too great. It may be that the inherited differences of war, enemy and trophies, which until now have founded the international legal opposition of land and sea, will one day simply melt in the crucible of industrial and technological progress. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element. For now, partisan means still a piece of real soil; it is one of the last posts of the earth as a not yet completely destroyed world-historical element.

Already the Spanish guerrilla against Napoleon is fully revealed only in the important aspect of space, this opposition of land and sea. England supported the Spanish partisans. The naval power used the irregular land warrior for its large military endeavors to defeat the continental enemy. In the end, it was not England that forced Napoleon to lay down their arms, but the land powers of Spain, Russia, Prussia and Austria. An irregular, typically telluric form of guerrilla warfare entered the service of typically maritime world politics, which for its part ruthlessly disqualified and criminalized any irregularity at sea in the field of naval warfare. In contrast to land and sea, various types of irregularities are concretized, and only if we have in mind a specific feature, the aspects of space designated by the words land and sea in specific forms of their formation as concepts, only then are analogies allowed and fruitful. This is really primarily for the analogy, which is important for us here for the knowledge of the aspect of space. Namely: in a similar way, as the naval power of England, in its war against mainland France, took advantage of the indigenous Spanish partisan, who changed the scene of the land war thanks to irregular space; later, during the First World War, the land power of Germany used the submarine in its war with the naval power of England as such a weapon that added unexpected other space to the former space of war at sea. The then masters of the sea surface immediately tried to discriminate the new type of struggle as irregular, even criminal and pirate means of struggle. Today, in the era of nuclear-powered submarines

everyone sees that both - Napoleon's indignation at the Spanish Guerrillero and England's indignation at the German submarine - lay on the same plane, namely, in the plane of indignation of a low-value opinion in the face of uncalculated changes in space.

Destruction of social structures

A monstrous example of the destruction of social structures was experienced by the French in 1946-1956 in Indochina, when their colonial rule there ended in collapse. We have already mentioned the organization of the partisan struggle by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Laos. Here the communists also put a non-political civilian population at their service. They even supervised the domestic servants of the French officers and employees and the auxiliary workers of the French rear service. They collected taxes from the civilian population and carried out all kinds of terrorist acts in order to induce the French to anti-terror against the local population, thereby further inciting their hatred of the French. In short, the modern form of revolutionary war is leading to many new, unconventional means and methods, whose description alone would blow the frame of our image. Society exists as *res publica*, as a public, and it is called into question if a non-public space is formed in it, which effectively disavows this public. Perhaps this instruction will be enough to realize that the partisan, whom

pushed aside the professional military consciousness of the 19th century, suddenly found itself in the center of a new type of warfare, whose meaning and goal was to destroy the existing social order.

In the changed practice of hostage-taking, this becomes tangibly visible. In the German-French war of 1870/71, German troops, in order to protect themselves from *frantiers*, took the nobility of the village as hostages: the burgomaster, priest, doctors and notaries. Respect for such respected people and for the nobility could be used in order to exert pressure on the entire population, since the social authority of such typically bourgeois strata of society was practically beyond doubt. It is this bourgeois class that becomes the real enemy in the revolutionary civil war of communism. Anyone who uses such respected people as hostages is working, judging by the situation, on the communist side. For a communist, this kind of hostage-taking can be so expedient that he, if necessary, provokes - either to destroy a certain bourgeois stratum of society, or to attract it to the communist side. In the already named book about the partisan, this new reality is well known. In a guerrilla war, it says, effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the guerrillas themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. "Everyone is in uniform," says Rolf Schroers. effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the partisans themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. "Everyone is in uniform," says Rolf Schroers. effective hostage-taking is possible only in relation to the partisans themselves or to their closest associates. Otherwise, only new partisans will be created. On the contrary, for the partisans, every soldier of the regular army, every uniform wearer, is a hostage. "Everyone is in uniform," says Rolf Schroers.

- must feel threatened, and thus everything that the uniform represents as a motto must be threatened. "47

It is only necessary to fully think through this logic of terror and anti-terror and then transfer it to any type of civil war in order to see the destruction of social structures, which is in operation today. A small number of terrorists are enough to put pressure on large masses of people. To the narrow space of open terror are added further spaces of insecurity, fear and general distrust, the "landscape of treason" that Margret Boveri presented in a series of four exciting books.⁴⁸ All the peoples of the European continent - with a couple of small

exceptions - experienced it on their own skin during two world wars and two post-war eras as a new reality.

World Political Context

Likewise, our third aspect, interweaving in world-political fronts and contexts, has long captured the general consciousness. The autochthonous defenders of the native soil, who died *pro aris et focis*, national and patriotic heroes who went into the forest, everything that was the reaction of a spontaneous, telluric force against an alien invasion, meanwhile fell under the international and supranational central government, which helps and supports, but only in the interests of a completely different kind of world-aggressive goals, and which, according to the circumstances, defends or leaves to the mercy of fate. Then the partisan loses its essentially defensive character. He becomes a manipulated weapon of world revolutionary aggressiveness. He is simply sacrificed and deceived by all that

Somehow the guerrilla as an irregular fighter is always dependent on the help of a regular might. This aspect of the matter is always present and also recognized. The Spanish Guerrillero found its legitimacy in its defenses and in its accord with royalty and with the nation; he defended his native soil from a foreign conqueror. But Wellington also belongs to the Spanish guerrilla, and the fight against Napoleon was fought with the help of England. Full of rage, Napoleon often recalled that England was the real instigator and the one who benefited from the Spanish guerrilla war. Today, the connection is realized even more clearly, since the continuous strengthening of technical combat means makes the partisan dependent on the constant help of an ally who has technical and industrial resources,

If many interested third parties compete with each other, the guerrilla has free space for his own policies. This was Tito's position in the last years of the world war. In the partisan battles that were fought in Vietnam and Laos, the situation is complicated by the fact that the contradiction between Russian and Chinese politics has become urgent within communism itself. With Beijing's support, more guerrillas could be sent across Laos into North Vietnam; this would be a stronger help to Vietnamese communism than Moscow's support. The leader of the liberation war against France, Ho Chi Minh, was a supporter of Moscow. Stronger assistance will decide the outcome of the case, be it a choice between Moscow and Beijing or other alternatives in the current situation.

For such intense political ties, the above-cited book on the partisan by Rolf Schroers finds an apt formula; it speaks of an interested third party. This is an apt expression. For this interested third person is not some banal figure here, like the third laughing one from the saying. Rather, it relates essentially to the situation of the partisan and therefore also to the theory of the partisan. The powerful third supplies not only weapons and ammunition, money, material assistance and all kinds of medicines, he also creates the kind of political recognition that an irregularly fighting partisan needs in order not to sink, like a robber and like a pirate, into the Non-political, which means here: in criminal. With the expectation of the distant future, the irregular must gain legitimacy in the regular; and for this, the irregular has only two possibilities: recognition of the existing regular, or the implementation of a new regularity on their own. This is a brutal alternative.

To the extent that the partisan becomes motorized, he loses his soil and grows dependent on the technical-industrial means that he needs for his struggle. Thus, the power of the third party concerned also grows, so that it eventually reaches a planetary scale. All the aspects in which we have so far looked at today's guerrilla movement seem to dissolve into an all-encompassing technical aspect.

The technical aspect

And the partisan does not remain aloof from development, progress, from modern technology and its inherent science. The old partisan, in whose hands the Prussian Landsturm Edict of 1813 wanted to put a pitchfork for hay, seems ridiculous today. The modern guerrilla fights with machine guns, hand grenades, plastic bombs, and probably soon with tactical atomic weapons. It is motorized and connected to the information network, equipped with covert radio transmitters and radars. It is supplied by aircraft with weapons and food. But it, as it is today, in 1962, in Vietnam, is suppressed by helicopters and blocked. Both he himself and his enemies do not lag behind the rapid development of modern technology and its characteristic form of science.

One British naval expert called piracy the "pre-scientific stage" of the war at sea. In the same spirit, he should have defined the partisan as a pre-scientific stage in the conduct of a war on land, and declared this to be the only scientific definition. But even this definition of it immediately becomes scientifically obsolete again for the difference between war at sea and war on land itself falls into the whirlwind of technical progress and today appears to technicians as something pre-scientific, that is, exhausted. Dead people jump fast, and if they are motorized they move even faster. The partisan whose telluric character we adhere to, in any case it becomes a scandal for everyone pursuing rational goals and value-rational thinking person. The partisan provokes a downright technocratic affect. The paradox of its existence reveals the discrepancy: the industrial and technical imparting of weapons

the modern regular army of the kind of perfection; and the pre-industrial agrarian primitiveness of successfully fighting partisans. This already caused fits of rage in Napoleon in connection with the Spanish Guerillero and should have intensified accordingly with the progressive development of industrial technology.

While the partisan was only a "light detachment", tactically especially a mobile hussar or rifleman, his theory was a matter of a military scientific specialty. Only the revolutionary war made him a key figure in world history. But what will come of it in the era of atomic destruction? In a technically organized world through and through, old, feudal-agrarian forms and ideas about struggle, war and hostility are disappearing. It is obvious. Do therefore struggle, war and enmity disappear altogether, and are they reduced to social conflicts? When the internal, in the optimistic opinion, immanent rationality and regularity of a technically organized world through and through has been fully realized, then the partisan, perhaps, is no longer a troublemaker. Then it simply disappears by itself in the uninterrupted performance of technical and functional processes, not otherwise, than the dog disappears from the freeway. For a technically minded fantasy, then it is hardly still a police-transport problem, and by the way it is neither a philosophical, nor a moral or legal problem.

This would be one, namely the techno-optimistic aspect of a purely technical consideration. He expects a New World with a New Man. As is known, early Christianity came out with similar expectations, and two millennia later, in the 19th century,

socialism emerged as New Christianity. Both phenomena lacked all the destructive efficiency of modern technical means. But from pure technology, as always with such purely technical reflections, does not flow from the theory of the partisan, but only an optimistic or pessimistic series of pluralist propositions. value or lack of value. Value, as Ernst Forsthof aptly says, has "its own logic." 49 It is precisely the logic of the absence of value and the destruction of the bearer of this absence of value.

As for the predictions of widespread technicist optimism, it does not go into the pocket for the word, that is, behind it, the obvious assumption of value and lack of value. He believes that the irrepressible, industrial and technical development of mankind will by itself transfer to a completely new level all problems, all previous questions and answers, all previous types and situations. At this level, old questions, types and situations will be almost as unimportant as questions, types and situations of the Stone Age after the transition to a higher culture. Then the guerrillas will die out, like the hunters of the Stone Age, if they fail to survive and assimilate. In any case, they became harmless and unimportant.

But how will the human type, which previously supplied the partisan, manage to adapt to the techno-industrial world around it, use new means and develop a new, adapted type of partisan, say, industrial partisans? Is there any guarantee that modern means of destruction will always fall into the right hands and that irregular fighting will be unimaginable? In contrast to this optimism of progress, the pessimism of progress and its technical fantasies have a greater field of possibilities than they usually think today. In the shadow of today's atomic balance of world powers, under a glass bell, so to speak, of their enormous means of destruction, a free space of limited and guarded war could stand out, with conventional weapons and even with means of destruction. the dosage of which the world powers could agree openly or secretly. It could end up in a war controlled by one of these world powers, and it would be something like dogfight.⁵⁰ It would be a seemingly innocent game of precisely controlled irregularities and "perfect disorder", as perfect as they could would manipulate world powers.

Along with this, however, there is also a radically pessimistic tabula-rasa solution to technical fantasy. In an area treated with modern means of destruction, of course everything will be killed, friend and foe, regular soldier and irregular population. However, it is technically conceivable that some people will survive the night of bombs and missiles. In the face of this possibility, it would be practically and even rationally expedient to plan together the situation after the bombing and already today prepare people who will immediately occupy the bomb craters in the devastated zone and occupy the destroyed area. Then a new kind of partisan could add a new chapter to world history with a new kind of taking up space.

So our problem expands to planetary proportions. It even grows to be supra-planetary. Technological progress makes it possible to fly into outer space, and thus, along the way, immeasurable, new challenges for political conquest are opening up. For new spaces can and must be taken by people. The taking of land and sea of the old style, as the previous history of mankind knows them, will be followed by the taking of the space of the new style. However, taking is followed by division and use. In this respect, despite all other progress, everything remains the same. Technological progress will only bring about a new intensity of new taking, division and use, and will only reinforce old questions.

With today's contradictions between East and West, and especially in the gigantic competition for immeasurably large new spaces, we are primarily talking about political

power on our planet, no matter how small it may seem. Only the one who owns the seemingly so tiny Earth will take and use new spaces. As a result, these immeasurable areas are nothing more than potential spaces of struggle, namely the struggle for dominance on this Earth. Famous astronauts or cosmonauts, who until now have been appointed only as propaganda stars of the mass media, press, radio and television, will then have a chance to turn into space pirates and, perhaps, even into space partisans.

Legality and legitimacy

In the development of partisanship, we encountered the figure of General Salan as a representative, symptomatic phenomenon of the last stage. In this figure, the experiences and influences of the war of the regular armies, the colonial war, the civil war and the partisan struggle meet and intersect. Salan thought through all these experiments to the end, following the inevitable logic of the old thesis that the guerrilla can only be defeated in a guerrilla manner. He did this consistently, not only with the courage of a soldier, but also with the precision of a General Staff officer and the punctuality of a technocrat. The result was that he himself turned into a guerrilla and eventually declared civil war as his own supreme commander and his government.

What is the inner focus of such a destiny? Salan's main defender, Maitre Tixier-Vignancourt, in his big concluding speech to the court on May 23, 1962, found a wording that answered our question. He remarks about Salan's activities as chief of the OAS: I must state that the old militant communist, if he were at the head of the organization instead of the chief military chief, would have taken other actions than General Salan (S. 530 of the trial report). This guesses the decisive point: a professional revolutionary would do it differently. He would have taken a different position than Salan, not only in relation to the interested third party.

The development of the theory of the partisan from Clausewitz through Lenin to Mao moved forward through the dialectic of the regular and the irregular, career officer and professional revolutionary. Through the doctrine of psychological warfare, which the French officers - participants in the war in Indochina - adopted from Mao, development did not return in the ricorso genus to the beginning and to the origins. There is no return to the beginning here. The guerrilla can put on a uniform and develop into a good regular fighter, even a particularly brave regular fighter, perhaps, as the poacher is said to be a particularly skillful forest watchman. But all this is conceived in the abstract. The reworking of Mao's teachings by those French career officers actually contains something abstract and, as it was once said during the Salan trial, has something of an esprit geometrique.

The guerrilla is able to easily transform into a good uniform wearer; on the contrary, for a good career officer, a uniform is more than a suit. The regular can become an institutional profession, the irregular cannot. A career officer is capable of transforming into a great founder of the order, like Saint Ignatius of Loyola. Transformation into pre- or sub-traditional means something different. One can disappear in the dark, but turning the darkness into a war zone, on the basis of which the former arena of the empire collapses and a large stage of official publicity is taken out of the network - this cannot be organized with the technocratic intelligentsia. Acheron cannot be calculated in advance and does not follow every spell, even if it comes from such an intelligent head and even if it is in such a desperate situation.

It is not our task to calculate what the intelligent and experienced wartime coups in Algeria in April 1961 and the organizers of the OAS calculated, with reference to some very natural specific questions for them, especially regarding the actions of terrorist acts against the civilized European population or with respect to the above mentioned interested third. This last question is already quite meaningful as a question. We recalled that the partisan needs legitimation if he wants to stay in the political sphere and does not want to fall into the criminal sphere. The question is not limited to some that have become common today, cheap and frivolous antitheses of legality and legitimacy. For legality turns out to be precisely in this case the strongest legality - what it originally actually was for the republican,

progressive, uniquely modern, in one word: the highest form of legitimacy itself.

I would not like to repeat what I said more than thirty years ago on this still relevant topic. The reference to this belongs to the knowledge of the situation of Republican General Salan in 1958/61. The French Republic is a rule of law; it is its foundation, when it cannot be destroyed by opposing law and law and distinguishing law as a higher instance. Both the justice and the army are above the law. There is republican legality, and this is the only form of legitimacy in the republic. Everything else is sophistry hostile to the republic for a real republican. The public prosecutor at the Salan trial accordingly had a simple and clear position; he again and again referred to the "sovereignty of the law", which remains superior to any other conceivable authority or rule. Compared to this sovereignty of law, there is no sovereignty of law. It turns the irregularity of the guerrilla into a deadly illegality.

Salan, in spite of this, had no other argument than an indication that he himself, on May 15, 1958, helped General de Gaulle in achieving power [and in the struggle] against the then legal government, which he was then obliged to his conscience, his Pairs, his fatherland and before God and now, in 1962, he sees himself deceived in everything that was proclaimed and promised as sacred in May 1958 (report on the trial, p. 85). He referred to the nation as opposed to the state, to a higher kind of legitimacy as opposed to legality. And General de Gaulle used to often talk about traditional and national legitimacy and contrast them with republican legality. This changed with the onset of May 1958. And the fact that his own legality became certain only since the September 1958 referendum,

However, irregularity alone does not constitute anything. It just becomes illegal. However, today the crisis of the law and thus the crisis of legality is indisputable. The classical concept of law, the mere preservation of which is capable of maintaining republican legality, is called into question by the plan and the measure. In Germany, the reference to the law as opposed to the law and among the lawyers themselves has become a matter of course, which still hardly attracts attention. And non-lawyers today always speak just legitimately (not legally) if they want to say they are right. However, Salan's case shows that in the modern state, even questioned legality itself is stronger than any other kind of law. This is due to the decisionist power of the state and its transformation of law into law. We do not need to delve into this issue here.

the state will one day "wither away". So far, legality is an irresistible functional mode of every modern, state army. The legal government decides who is the enemy that the army must fight against. Anyone who undertakes to determine who the enemy is, claims his own, new legality, if he does not want to join the definition of the enemy by the previous legal rule.

The real enemy

A declaration of war is always a declaration of an enemy; it goes without saying; and when declaring a civil war, this is all the more implied. When Salan declared civil war, he was actually proclaiming two enemies: with regard to the Algerian front, the continuation of regular and irregular war; against the French government, an illegal and irregular civil war began. Nothing clarifies the hopelessness of Salan's situation as clearly as looking at this double declaration of the enemy. Every war on two fronts raises the question of who is the real enemy. Is this not a sign of an inner dichotomy - to have more than one single real enemy? The enemy is our own question as a gestalt. If one's own gestalt is unambiguously defined, where does the doubling of the enemy come from? The enemy is not something that for some reason must be eliminated and, because of its low value, destroyed. The enemy is in my own realm. For this reason, I must face him in the struggle in order to find my own measure, my own boundaries, my own image and appearance.

Salan considered the Algerian partisan to be an absolute enemy. Suddenly in his rear a much more nasty, more intense enemy arose - his own government, his own boss, his own brother. In his brothers of yesterday, he suddenly saw a new enemy. This is the crux of Salan's case. Yesterday's brother revealed himself as a more dangerous enemy. There must be confusion in the very concept of the enemy, which is closely related to the doctrine of war and which we will now deal with to clarify, at the end of our exposition.

The historian will find examples and parallels in world history for all historical situations. We have already outlined the parallels with the processes of 1812/13 in Prussian history. We also showed how in the ideas and plans of the Prussian army reform of 1808/13 the partisan found its philosophical legitimacy, and in the Prussian Landsturm Edict of April 1813 - its historical letter of credit. So now it should not seem strange, as it would be at first glance, if we take as an example the situation of the Prussian General York in the winter of 1812-1813 as an example. At first, of course, huge opposites are striking: Salan, a French of left-Republican origin and modern technocratic coinage, against a general of the imperial Prussian army in 1812, who definitely could not come to the idea of declaring civil war on his emperor and supreme commander. In the face of such differences of eras and types, it seems secondary and even accidental that York fought as an officer in the colonies of the East Indies. However, it is precisely the striking opposites that make it all the more clearly that the main question is the same. For in both cases it was about deciding who the real enemy was.

Decisionist precision reigns supreme in the functioning of every modern organization, especially in the functioning of every modern, regular state army. At the same time, the main question for the situation of today's general very accurately appears as an absolute Either-or. A harsh alternative to legality and legitimacy is only a consequence of the French Revolution and its collision with

restoration of the legitimate monarchy in 1815. In such a pre-revolutionary legitimate monarchy as the then royal Prussia, many feudal elements retained the link between command and subordination. Fidelity has not yet become something "irrational" and has not yet melted into simple, countable functionalism. Prussia was already a clearly defined state at that time; her army could not renounce the Friderician origin; Prussian army reformers wanted to modernize rather than return to any form of feudalism. Nevertheless, the situation and environment of the legitimate Prussian monarchy of that time may seem to today's observer and in a conflict case less acute and harsh, less decisionist-state. There is no need to argue about this now. The point is only that the impressions of the various garments of the epochs do not erase the main question, namely the question of the real enemy.

York in 1812 commanded the Prussian auxiliary corps, which, as an allied detachment to Napoleon, belonged to the army of the French General MacDonald. In December 1812, York went over to the side of the enemy, to the side of the Russians, and concluded the famous Taurogen Convention with the Russian general von Diebitsch. During the negotiations and at the conclusion of the convention, Lieutenant Colonel von Clausewitz took part as a mediator from the Russian side. The letter that York sent on January 3, 1813 to his king and supreme commander-in-chief became a famous historical document. This is true. The Prussian general writes with great respect that he expects the king to judge whether he, York, can fight "against a real enemy," or whether the king condemns the act of his general. He faithfully awaits an answer, ready, in case of censure,

The words about "the real enemy" are worthy of Clausewitz and get the point. The fact that the general is ready to "wait for the bullet on the battlefield" refers to the soldier who is responsible for his deed, not otherwise than General Salan was ready to shout out to Vive la France! in the Vincennes trenches before being shot. However, the fact that York, with all due respect to the king, reserves the right to decide who the "real enemy" is - gives his words a true, tragic and rebellious meaning. York was not a partisan and, perhaps, never would have become. But in the horizon of the meaning and concept of the real enemy, a step into partisanism would not be absurd or inconsistent.

Of course, this is only a heuristic fiction, permissible for a brief moment, when the Prussian officers elevated the partisan to an idea, that is, only at this turning point, which led to the edict of the Landsturm on April 13, 1813. A few months later, the idea that a Prussian general could become a partisan would even become grotesque and absurd as a heuristic fiction, and would remain so forever as long as the Prussian army existed. How was it possible that the partisan, who in the 17th century descended to Picaro (rogue) and in the 18th century belonged to a light, mobile detachment, on the eve of 1813, for a short moment, appeared as a heroic figure, so that in our time, more than a hundred years later, even become a key figure in international events? The answer to this question is clear from the fact that the irregularity of the partisan remains dependent on the meaning and content of the specifically regular. After the disintegration and disintegration in 17th century Germany, a regularity of wars for dynastic reasons developed in the 18th century. This regularity gave war such strong defenses that the war could be viewed as a game in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy as simply a conventional enemy became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in the 18th century, the regularity of wars for dynastic reasons developed. This regularity gave war such strong defenses that the war could be viewed as a game in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy as simply a conventional enemy became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy, as just a conventional enemy, became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular army in the fall of 1808. Here there was a difference with the Prussia of 1806-1807, which, after the defeat of its regular army, immediately concluded a humiliating peace. The Spanish partisan again restored the seriousness of the war, namely, in contrast to Napoleon, respectively on the side of the defense of the old European continental states, whose in which a light, mobile unit participated irregularly and the enemy, as just a conventional enemy, became a partner in the war game. The Spanish guerrilla began when Napoleon defeated the Spanish regular ar

the old regularity, which has become a convention and a game, has shown itself not at the height of the new, revolutionary charged, Napoleonic regularity. The enemy thus again became a real enemy, war - again a real war. The partisan defending the national soil from a foreign conqueror became a hero who really fought against a real enemy. It was a really important process that led

Clausewitz to his theory and doctrine of war. When then a hundred years later the theory of war such a professional revolutionary as Lenin inherited blindly destroyed everything the defenses of war, the war became the absolute bearer of war and partisans became absolute enmity against the absolute enemy.

From real enemy to absolute enemy

In the theory of war, it is always a question of distinguishing between hostility, which gives war its meaning and its character. Every attempt to preserve or limit war must be filled with the consciousness that - in relation to the concept of war - enmity is the primary concept, and that distinguishing between different types of war is preceded by a distinction between different types of enmity. Otherwise, all efforts to preserve or limit war are just a game that turns out to be untenable in the face of outbursts of real enmity. After the Napoleonic Wars, irregular warfare was driven out of the general consciousness of European theologians, philosophers and lawyers. Indeed, there were supporters of peace who saw in the abolition and elimination of the conventional war of the Hague Charter of Land War the end of the war in general; and there were lawyers who considered every doctrine of a just war to be something *eo ipso* just, because already Saint Thomas Aquinas taught about something similar. No one suspected what emancipation meant, the release of irregular warfare. No one thought about the consequences of a civilian victory over a soldier, when one day a citizen puts on a uniform while a partisan takes it off to continue fighting without a uniform.

Only this lack of concrete thinking ended the destructive work of professional revolutionaries. It was a great misfortune, because with those war protections, European mankind managed to achieve something rare: refusal to criminalize the enemy in war, thus relativizing enmity, denying absolute enmity. It is indeed something rare, even incredibly humane, to lead people to renounce discrimination and defamation of their enemies.

This is what appears to be questioned again by the partisan. His criteria include the extreme intensity of political engagement. When Che Guevara says: "The partisan is a Jesuit of war," he means the unconditional political application. The biography of every famous partisan, starting with Empecinado, confirms this. In enmity, what was illegally done seeks its right. In it, it finds the meaning of the case and the meaning of law, when the shell of protection and obedience, where it still lived, breaks down, or tears the fabric of the norms of legality, from which it could still expect rights and legal protection. Then the conventional, traditional game stops. But this termination of legal protection is not necessarily partisan. Michael Kohlhaas, whom the sense of right made a robber and murderer, was not a partisan, because he did not become politically engaged and fought exclusively for his own violated private right, not against someone else's conqueror and not for a revolutionary cause. In such cases, the irregularity is non-political and becomes purely criminal, since it loses a positive connection with the existing regularity somewhere. This is how the partisan differs from the noble or ignoble leader of the robbers.

When analyzing the world-political context (above p.), We emphasized that the interested third takes on an essential function when he enters into a relationship with the regular, which is necessary for the irregularity of the partisan in order to remain in the political realm. The core, the essence of the Political is not just enmity, but the distinction between friend and foe. The Political presupposes both, friend and foe. A powerful third person interested in the guerrilla can think and act selfishly; with his interest politically, he is on the side of the partisan. This results in political friendship and is a kind of political recognition, even if it does not come to public and official recognition as a belligerent party or as a government. Empecinado was recognized by his people, the regular army and the great English power as a political value. He was not Michael Koolhaas, and he was not Schinderhannes (nickname for the bandit leader who died in 1808), whose third concerned was the cover-ups of the criminals. On the contrary, the political situation of Salan was tinged with despair and tragedy, for he became illegal inside politics, in his homeland, and outside, in world politics, not only did he not find any interested third, but, on the contrary, ran into a solid enemy front of anti-colonialism.

So, the enemy of the guerrilla is a real enemy, but not an absolute enemy. This follows from the political character of the partisan. Another boundary of enmity is evident from the telluric character of the partisan. He protects a piece of land with which he is autochthonous. His main position remains defensive despite the increased agility of his tactics. He behaves exactly like Saint John of Orleans before the church court. She was not a partisan and regularly fought against the British. When the ecclesiastical judge asked her a question — a theological trap question — whether she would argue that God hates the English, she replied: "As to whether God loves the English or hates them, I do not know; I only know that they must be expelled from France." Such an answer would be given by every normal partisan - the defender of the national soil. With such a defensive character, the principled limitation of hostility is given. The real enemy is not declared to be an absolute enemy, and is not declared to be the last enemy of humanity in general.⁵²

Lenin shifted the conceptual center of gravity from war to politics, that is, to distinguish between friend and foe. This was rational and after Clausewitz was a consistent continuation of the idea of war as a continuation of politics. Only Lenin, as a professional revolutionary, seized by the idea of a world civil war, went further and made an absolute enemy out of a real enemy. Clausewitz spoke of absolute war, but still assumed the regularity of existing statehood as a condition. In general, he still could not imagine the state as an instrument of the party and the party that orders the state. With the absolute position of the party and the partisan became absolute and rose to the level of absolute enmity. Today, it is not difficult to see the ideological skillful technique that caused this change in the concept of the enemy.

For technical-industrial development has strengthened the armament of people to pure means of destruction. This creates a defiant disproportionate defense and obedience: one half of humanity becomes a hostage for the other half of the overlords, armed with atomic means of destruction. Such absolute means of destruction require an absolute enemy if they are not to be absolutely inhuman. After all, it is not the means of destruction that destroy themselves, but people destroy other people with these means. The English philosopher Thomas Hobbes grasped the essence of the process already in the 17th century (de homine 1X, 3) and formulated it with all precision, although then (1659) the weapons were still relatively harmless. Hobbes says: man

it is also much more dangerous for other people who, as it seems to him, threaten him than any animal, as human weapons are more dangerous than the so-called natural tools of the beast, for example: teeth, paws, horns or poison. And the German philosopher Hegel adds: the weapon is the essence of the fighter himself.

In concrete terms, this means: a supra-conventional weapon presupposes a supra-conventional person. It not only presupposes it as a postulate of the distant future; it rather admits it as an already present reality. So, the last danger lies not in the availability of means of destruction and not in the pre-rational evil of man. It consists in the inevitability of moral compulsion and violence. People who use those means against other people are forced to morally destroy these other people, that is, their victims and their objects. They must declare the opposite side as a whole criminal and inhuman, total inferiority. Otherwise, they themselves are criminals and monsters, inhumans. The logic of value and inferiority unfolds its entire destructive sequence and forces more and more new and deeper discrimination,

In a world in which partners thus mutually break into the abyss of total depreciation, before they physically destroy each other, new types of absolute enmity must arise. The enmity will become so terrible that it will probably no longer be possible to talk about the enemy or enmity, and both of these things, even with the observance of all the rules, will first be prohibited and damned before the work of destruction can begin. The annihilation will then be completely abstract and completely absolute. It is no longer directed against the enemy at all, but only serves the so-called objective realization of the highest values, for which, as you know, no price is too high. Only the denial of real enmity opens a free path for the cause of the abolition of absolute enmity.

In 1914, the peoples and governments of Europe, without absolute enmity, unsteadily on their feet, with dizzy heads, entered the First World War. Real enmity arose only from the war itself, which began as a traditional war between the states of European international law and ended in a worldwide civil war of revolutionary class enmity. Who will prevent the emergence of new types of hostility in a similar but still infinitely intensified manner, whose implementation will cause unexpected forms of manifestation of a new partisan?

The theorist cannot do more than preserve concepts and call a spade a spade. The theory of the partisan is poured out into the concept of the political, into the question of the real enemy and the new nomos of the Earth.

Translated from German by Yu. Corinth

Karl Haushofer

CONTINENTAL BLOCK: BERLIN-MOSCOW-TOKYO

There is no doubt that the most ambitious and important event in modern world politics is the prospect of the formation of a powerful continental bloc that would unite Europe with the North and East of Asia.

But projects of this scale are not born only in the head of this or that statesman, be he as great as the famous Greek goddess of war who had the ability to reincarnate. Informed people know that such plans take a long time to prepare. And it is precisely because of this circumstance that I willingly accept the proposal of our geographical school, which chose me from among the representatives of the older generation in science in order to provide evidence of the formation of continental Eurasian politics - after all, for many years, starting with the first risky attempts to establish friendly, and subsequently union relations, I undertake systematic research on this issue, which allowed me to constantly follow (sometimes directly present during the formation of these political associations) for the forge of fate,

First of all, it is necessary to learn one of the principles of geopolitics, which was first formulated in the distant times of the birth of the Roman state and has not lost its relevance since then: "Fas est ab hoste doceri" ("Learning from the enemy is a sacred duty").

Soon after the birth of important political formations, a potential adversary develops an instinct of an imminent threat, the very symptomatic feeling that the remarkable Japanese sociologist G.E. Vishara ascribes to his entire people and which allows the Japanese to see the approach of any danger from afar. Such a national characteristic is undoubtedly very precious. However, it was the British and American leaders who were the first to see the barely appeared on the horizon the possibility of creating a Eurasian continental bloc, fraught with a threat to world Anglo-Saxon domination, while in the Second Reich we did not have any idea of what could be learned from the connection of Central Europe and the mighty potential of East Asia across the vast Eurasia. Lord Palmerston, one of the toughest and most successful imperialist politicians, was the first to tell the prime minister who removed him from office during the government crisis: "Our relations with France may now become somewhat strained, but we must maintain them at all costs, for in the background we are threatened by Russia that can connect Europe and East Asia, and we alone will not be able to resist." This phrase was spoken in 1851 - in an era when victorious England was in all its splendor, when the United States, having survived a series of severe internal crises, first applied a harsh formula that we should forever inscribe on our tablets - the formula of "anaconda politics." A giant snake that strangles its victim, squeezing its rings around it until all the bones are crushed and breathing stops - the image is not pleasant. Trying to imagine this threat hanging over the political spaces of the Old World, one can understand what the size and power of these spaces would have become if the "policy of anaconda" failed. In addition, even during the prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can even during the period of prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can even during the period of prosperity of the victorious world empire, there was a warning from another imperialist - Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book about the decline of the Anglo-Saxons. In this book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can

read that the fateful day, the sunset of the gods may come for the world English-speaking empire on the day when Germany, Russia and Japan will become each other's allies. As long as the global British empire has thrived, there is this grim fear of a single alliance, which makes you foresee that sooner or later the forces of encirclement - this brilliantly and skillfully designed art that was mastered in the Middle Ages in Venice - might collapse. In modern times, the most astute warnings came from Sir H. Macindere, who wrote an essay in 1904 on the geographical axis of history. Axis is the great empire of the steppes, the center of the Old World, whoever ruled it - the Persians, Mongols, Turks, white or red kings. In 1919, Mackinder makes a new warning and proposes to once and for all divide the Germans and Russians by resettling the inhabitants of East Prussia to the left bank of the Vistula. Further, in the last days before the start of the blitzkrieg against Poland, the New Statesman accused a narrow circle of geopoliticians, including us, of looking for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain. in the search for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain. in the search for the most effective ways to fight the British Empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could really use these means for our defense, especially when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one can recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain.⁹⁷, who foresaw the danger that England might eventually throw Germany, Russia and Japan into each other's arms in their hopeless struggle to secure the necessary living conditions: that is why he proposed cooperation between England, Germany and Japan. The fear of German-Russian cooperation, even in 1919, when we were disarmed and made a completely harmless impression, was so strong that a proposal was born, at the cost of a grand resettlement of the inhabitants of East Prussia to the West, to limit the borders of Germany to the western bank of the Vistula - in fact, only for that so that Germany and Russia no longer have common borders. The Rapallo Treaty was a huge disappointment for Mackinder and his school. Thus, fear of possible potential consequences

Continental politics of the Old World for the world British Empire runs through its entire history. Perceptible from the beginning, this fear became clearer and clearer afterwards, as the rulers of the British Empire lost their former ability to see the situation as a whole and their once inherent art of looking facts in the face. And as you know, "fear and hatred are bad advisors." You can see a similar feeling in the United States. Thus, Brooke Adams, one of the most remarkable and perspicacious experts in the field of economic policy, pointed out, long before the acquisition of Qiao-Chao, the extent to which the increasing Anglicization of the world would be threatened. if a grandiose German-Russian-East Asian unification is achieved through the construction of an extensive railway transcontinental line with end points in Port Arthur and Qingdao - the only unification against which any attempts by the British, American or even a unified blockade will be powerless. So no one else. how our adversary gives us the confidence that a solid continental bloc will prevail over anaconda politics economically, militarily, maritimately and strategically — a confidence we happily noted in our second attempt to strangle the Old World.

Let's look at the prospect of the formation of the continental bloc through the eyes of the "winners" to whom such extensive plans were attributed already during the acquisition of Kiao-Chao. To our shame, we must admit that already at the turn of the century in Russia and Japan there were many more thinking heads who foresaw and explored the possibility of creating

⁹⁷In 1899 Haushofer had a personal conversation with Joseph Chamberlain, the British minister of the colonies and the spokesman for the extreme right, imperialist tendencies in English society. It was about the possibilities of forming an intercontinental geopolitical union of the British Empire-USA-Japan-Germany.

continental block than in Central Europe. Thus, it can be recalled that during the preparation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, from which England benefited much more than Japan, the Far Eastern island empire had the feeling that it was being drawn into an enslaving treaty. This agreement worried Japan, since it would have to ensure equal participation in the agreement of Germany, which would be a second counterbalance to the power of the British fleet. The negotiations dragged on for two years, during which repeated attempts were made to fully include Germany in the game. It seemed to the Japanese that Japan alone would not be able to remain on a par with the British naval power of that time, and the signed treaty would be enslaving.

"If the German and Japanese fleets cooperated with the Russian land army, the ocean agreement would cease to be an onerous deal with respect to England, turning into an equal treaty," such was the position of the shrewd Japanese with whom I spoke on this topic, and in this position they clearly stood much earlier. The Japanese ambassador in London, Ayashi, who published his memoirs, and John Hamilton, who published his memoirs of the Russo-Japanese war, provided a tremendous chance to study the diplomatic history of this issue. And if the first volumes were still published without the intervention of "organized pressure", then the second volumes of both authors could not but be censored, and both diplomats were threatened with disgrace. We can say that the first volumes of Ayasha and Hamilton appeared in the eyes of world public opinion as zealous trotters, while the second volume turned out to be like an obedient gelding. In any case, the first volumes did away with all the secrets of politics, and therefore an informed person could read them between the lines. So, for example, when the Japanese marquis Ito, trying to put the Japanese-Russian-German alliance on his feet, went through St. Petersburg to Germany, in order to neutralize his continental plans, an unscrupulous action was taken to change the code of dispatches coming from Japan. The Japanese visitors were going to counter the cunning of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in Friedrichsruhe, the country estate of Bismarck, the statesman who was especially worshiped by the Marquis Ito. Already in 1901-1902 they had a clear idea of the possibility of creating a continental union, and this possibility was studied in depth in Japan. They spoke quite frankly about her in 1909 and 1910. At that time we had an excellent intermediary for establishing contact with the highest Japanese realms - with the Marquis Ito. with his smartest successor, Count Goto, with Katsura, who was then chairman of the council of ministers, with the most influential figures in the circle of elderly statesmen. The fact is that the personal physician of the Japanese imperial family, a brilliant connoisseur of the Far East, the Württemberg Elvin von Baelz played a huge role here. But when this man, who possessed the unique trust of the highest Japanese spheres, wanted to make a report on the mental and physical characteristics of the Japanese at a congress of German doctors, the chairman of the congress told him that such a topic was not of interest. No doubt, that England would have behaved very differently with this man who belonged to the intimate circle of Mikado advisors. But for us, such statements have always clearly shown that the German imperial house, unfortunately, has an irresistible aversion to cooperation with the Far East. The slogan was still the formula of Wilhelm II: "Europeans, put your good above all!" But the young race threatened the freedom and equality of rights of Europeans to a much lesser extent than the representatives of the white race who seemed closer to us. Russia was an important link in this grandiose policy. There, the main advocate of the idea of the need for the formation of a continental block was Witte, a German by origin, the creator of the Trans-Siberian railway and one of the most important Russian financiers. During the war, he worked out the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany and in 1915 he died under strange circumstances. IN

Russia has always had a current that realized the benefits and opportunities that the German-Russian-Japanese cooperation contained; and when, after the war, one of our most prominent statesmen - Brockdorff-Rantzau, who had an iron character - wanted with my help to restore the thread of contacts, two Russian statesmen controlled this process and strove to favor its course. In truth, one should have agreed on anything, whatever, in order to achieve the goal of uniting the Japanese and Russians for the sake of the highest political interest, so that they could reasonably regulate the borders, thereby protecting their rear and getting the opportunity to deploy political activity in other directions. Each participant in this game had to endure all night long walks, after which the lawns were completely covered with cigarette butts and spilled tea, and in an atmosphere of extremely strange discussions, conducted with an ancient sophistication that added piquancy to each of these conversations. When, after two or three hours, it seemed that the whole question could be clarified, dialectics forced to start again from the very beginning, and again three hours of discussion and tired and irritated rivals.

We in the Second Reich were too loyal to British colonial policy to take advantage of tough and sober geopolitical

the possibilities of a continental union capable of bearing good fruit for a long time.

The Second Reich rejected this prospect, although the use of these opportunities implied the likelihood of double pressure on the enemy. And it was in this refusal that there was a great danger.

Today we know: it is possible to build rather daring steel structures, but only if there is a solid and solid foundation, if the main load-bearing supports are made of truly strong and elastic steel, if the structure of the structure is so strong that both the stone and steel joint. But such a steel structure gains special strength and resistance to world storms when, as in our new bridges, solid stone fortifications of a spatial block extending from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific Ocean are inserted into its very foundation.

Let us emphasize that we look at the possibility of Germany's participation in such a continental policy quite coolly. This opportunity was not realized by Prince Ito and Bismarck. Similar attempts were made, referring to Tirpitz, Admiral Kato. Chief of Staff of the Fleet in Tsushima, my modest efforts were directed in the same direction. For all of us working on this great agreement to save the entire Old World, the precondition was German-Japanese unification.

The Japanese statesman Goto told me: "Remember the Russian triple team - "troika". A special way of harnessing is used there: in the center is the most restive and strongest horse; and on the right and left, supporting the middle one, two more flexible ones run. With such a team, you can win a lot in speed and power." Looking at the map of the Old World, we state that three border seas are similar to such a triple team: firstly, the Baltic Sea with the Baltic space, which has recently become quite politically close to us; secondly, much less developed by its coastal inhabitants than the Baltic - us. Sea of Japan; and thirdly, under Italian domination and recently closed from the south of the Adriatic with the adjacent Eastern Mediterranean⁹⁸. All these frontier seas are located in the areas of Russia's most important exits to the free ocean, if one does not take into account the free Arctic Ocean, the use of which depends on the whims of its heating by the Atlantic waters of the Gulf Stream.

⁹⁸ Haushofer is referring to the April 1939 annexation of Albania by Italy.

The Japanese, obeying their strong instinct and following the tactics of controlling the sea, basically closed the zone surrounding the Russian outlet to the free ocean in the Vladivostok area, doing much more logical than the Germans did with the cradle of their race in the Baltic space.

Back in 1935, we inflicted endless damage on ourselves in Sweden by convincing the Social Democratic government of Stockholm, and then Oslo, to give up confidence in the protection of the League of Nations and take independent measures to protect our vast territory: we declared that such measures had been found we would have the most complete understanding. But, as you know, they have been waiting for the promised three years. The proposed non-aggression pacts were never adopted, and the space of the Baltic Sea thus began to look much less gratifying for us than the space of the Sea of Japan.

- for the Japanese. This is primarily to blame for the lack of a clear instinct tough geopolitical realities, which characterize mainly the social democratic ideology of the northern governments.

True, in Sweden only a minority understood the dangers and the opportunities that the future promised. Realizing that it would not find the necessary understanding in the competent government circles of Sweden Norway, Germany decided to unambiguously follow the main lines of continental politics, disregarding the interests of those whose friendliness was expressed only in loud phrases. We ?? could, because of several geopolitical outsiders, jeopardize the troika, which alone could wrest the Old World from the embrace of the anaconda.

However, the attempts of Russian-Japanese unification, which is another necessary condition for carrying out a full-fledged continental policy, are not news either. Frankly, these attempts began already in 1901-1902. Then they were undertaken again after the Russo-Japanese War, in 1909 and 1910, when I was in Japan — at that time Ito became the herald of such a policy. Then the United States made an original proposal to eliminate the main difficulties between China, Japan and Russia by buying all the railways in Manchuria and handing them over to the American capitalists; so they, against their will, forced the Russians and the Japanese to get closer.

Then, Italy began to make its own efforts towards the formation of the continental block. It was there that Ricardi did it, who inspired Mussolini to create an institute for the Middle and Far East. Thanks to this institute, there was a desire to carefully harness the precious cultural elements of Japanese and Chinese origin into the political and cultural harness. Large sums were not donated for this, but the premises of one of the majestic palaces, filled with the brilliant culture of the Renaissance, were provided. Rome possesses a powerful force that could be trusted. The Institute for the Middle and Far East is run by Senator Gentile, Archduke Tucci, Duke of Avarna, son of a former ambassador to the imperial court in Vienna. They did an excellent job with their duties, since, apparently, did not remain completely immersed in the world of philology,

As for the latest initiatives, the well-known Count Mushakoi and Baron Oshima should also play a huge role in the preparation of the continental union. As we know, throughout the war in China, Japan fought with only her left hand, since her right hand with a reserve military force was always at the ready in Manchuria. Such forces were concentrated there, which we did not even imagine. The border issue is now partly settled, and in an extremely clever way. For example, a treaty was signed in relation to Mongolia, where for five months the Russians and the Japanese fought serious battles, which resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Then at the same time from both warring parties, from Moscow and from Tokyo, received

proposals to end this struggle. Soon this was done, and the conclusion of peace was accompanied by a majestic picture of a general funeral ceremony for the souls of the dead soldiers in a purely Japanese manner on the former disputed territory. Despite the religious nature of this ceremony, as well as the fact that participation in it itself was quite difficult for ideological reasons, General Potapov was present at the ceremony. Ceremonies like this are of great psychological importance. At the head of the troops marching with banners unfolded, the old general approaches the altar of the dead. Every Japanese firmly believes that the souls of warriors are indeed in front of this altar to receive the emperor's message. The very impeccable behavior of the Soviet general and his officers in this rather lengthy ceremony honors their remarkable ability to culturally adapt. Since you cannot turn your back on the spirits, all the participants in the ceremony slowly approach the altar from a distance and step back. It would be blasphemy to turn your back on ancestral spirits who are seen as living. This ceremony, imbued with absolute religiosity, is very interesting and very convincing from the point of view of ethnopsychology; it made a deep impression on even the most sophisticated people from all over the world who were allowed to attend. After the ceremony, they could say to themselves: here all the people firmly believe in the transmigration of souls. He believes that during a short earthly existence it is possible, through commendable actions for the good of the Motherland, to win an exalted place in the otherworldly existence, otherwise dishonor awaits behind the grave. The feeling that the whole people, with the exception of a few skeptics-free-thinkers, is warmly inspired by this idea, gives this people strength, solidarity and readiness for exceptional sacrifice.

Finally, geopolitics, thanks to the unusually advantageous, from a political and spatial point of view, opportunities that it managed to realize (and still have to be realized), overcame the ideological obstacles in the matter of continental unification for the implementation of world politics - and a great contribution to this was made by the double the game of British politics that pushed this process. Apparently all the impotence of Lord Halifax trying to pursue a policy of European cooperation; a much stronger current, led by opponents of Chamberlain. prepared for war and hesitated only for appearance, until the rearmament process ended⁹⁹.

The opportunity for an objective and unbiased study of the geopolitical power of the Eurasian pact presented itself on December 7, when a conference began in Chita on the conclusion of a trade agreement between Japan and Russia. So, to the east of us stretches the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with political spatial mass of 21 352 571 sq. km. (excluding recent annexations), from 13,000 km. coastlines and 182 million inhabitants. Next is Japan, with an area of about 2 million square meters. km. (excluding territories located outside its immediate borders, as well as the territories of its powerful allies) with a very long coastline and 140 million people.

Of course, of this number, only 73 million inhabitants of the empire are literally its political and military support, but the workforce of 140 million people is quite

⁹⁹ Here we are talking about two currents among representatives of British foreign policy and the years preceding the outbreak of World War II. One of them (the so-called "Cliveden"), headed by the Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who became in my 1937, and his deputy Halifax, sought to "pacify" Germany, considered as a bulwark against Bolshevism, and proposed the conclusion of an agreement between England and Germany-France-Italy, which, in particular, was reflected in the signing on September 30, 1938 of the "Munich Pact" on the partition of Czechoslovakia. Another trend, led by the opposition leaders of the Conservative Party Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden (they entered the government after the outbreak of the war) and gained the upper hand, insisted on the need to fight Germany.

available. In the face of such a state of affairs in the East, although we are working to intensify our cultural and economic ties on the western flank of the bloc, nevertheless, from a political and spatial point of view, we do not act to the same extent as other partners. We have at our disposal a million sq. km. (as well as the right to another three million square kilometers in the colonies) and from 87 to 100 million people. An intermediate position due to the presence of both oceanic and continental conditions of existence is occupied by Italy, which has 250 thousand kilometers of coasts (which entails their vulnerability and the need to make major efforts to develop the fleet and aviation) and from 57 to 60 million human reserves. If we compare these figures with those on which the central powers were based during the World War, then, based on geopolitical data, we will see a noticeable difference between the state of affairs then and now. And if we manage to consolidate and support this brave and grandiose Eurasian continental policy until reaching its last great consequences, its enormous opportunities will emerge, in which, for example, the autonomy and independence of India will be simply one of the phenomena accompanying such a policy. The fact is that sometimes I have met among young and not so young people the opinion that India is trying to achieve only the status of dominion, remaining under the protection of British troops. All the efforts of those politicians and ordinary Indians with whom I have personally met prove the opposite: their ultimate and most firm goal is independence. They have always maintained the belief that we take ever increasing help seriously,

From the first minutes after the promulgation of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, we have seen an extraordinary upheaval in Indian public opinion. Prior to this, Anglo-Indian newspapers were filled with phraseology on the theme of strengthening democracy around the world; and it is for this that India had to exist. But as soon as the grandiose specter of European continental politics emerged, this opinion, like a sharp change in the weather, completely changed. The Indians now believe that the Soviet Union could certainly have caused the British significant trouble in India - for this it would be enough for it to intervene and move its armies through the passes.

The grandiose and so dazzling spectacle of the Eurasian continental policy in its entirety was prepared separately by many people. It was not an accidental throw into the unknown, but a conscious fulfillment of a great necessity.

(translation by A. Karagodin)

* the first part of an article written in 1940.

Fragments of the second part of the same article (generally devoted to narrower practical issues):

"Germany has been accused of pursuing a plan to incite colored peoples against their 'rightful' masters in India and Indochina, encouraging their desire for self-determination. But in fact, based on the robot of the Englishman Mackinder, we are promoting the idea all over the world that only a strong connection of states along the axis of Germany-Russia-Japan will allow us all to rise and become invulnerable to the methods of anaconda of the Anglo-Saxon world. When, 4 months after the start of the war, the famous English journalist put forward such a claim to me, I replied that if you are attacked in accordance with the tactics of the anaconda applied on a global scale, moreover, they are attacked by the powers that have been constantly repeating this practice anaconda, then you have every right in every way

to oppose this policy of the enemy, striving to grab more and more pieces of influence. Only the idea of Eurasia, being embodied politically in space, will give us the opportunity for a long-term expansion of our living space. " "Eurasia cannot be stifled as long as its two largest peoples are Germans and Russians.
- strive in every possible way to avoid an internecine conflict similar to the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics. "

"The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will strike when the Germans, Russians and Japanese will unite. This is what Homer Lee said. "

GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS OF MERIDIANS AND PARALLELS

There is a geopolitical term: Great Spaces (Grossraum). It originated in the ancient world, predetermined by the specifics of the Mediterranean, southern deserts and mountain ranges. The term, as it were, repeated the development trends focused on geographic sectors both along the parallels and on the East-West axis. This applied to temperate, tropical and subtropical zones. The exceptions were states located along the bed of large rivers flowing along the North-South line. River geopolitical formations, due to the special location of their vital arteries, experienced the pressure of the so-called "Torque" generated by expansion along the parallels. This constituted the actual geopolitical history of the "river states" until it was finally suppressed by the dynamics of the latitudinal expansion of the empires of Forward Asia and, to the east,

Starting from a certain point in history, successive waves of "latitudinal expansion" followed - Phoenicians, Hellenes, Romans, Arabs, steppe peoples, Franks, Iberians, etc. This gave rise to a global trend of geopolitical development, going from the Romanesque Mediterranean to the Caribbean Mediterranean. This tendency was exhausted after the Portuguese and Spaniards reached the borders of the first Great Space, striving for meridian development. This space was the Kingdom of China, which often changed its external form, but at the same time remained surprisingly constant in the cultural-racial sense. So, the East Asian - Chinese and Japanese - geopolitical structure, developing along the North-South line, was cut through by the Spanish colonial Empire, the first geopolitical "latitudinal kingdom". However, the Spaniards did not retain their monopoly for long - about 70 years. Their footsteps were followed by competitors who inherited the "latitudinal strategy" and sought to rob their predecessors and inherit their conquests. The British were the strongest among them. They managed to build their First and Second Empires, which generally followed a "latitudinal" orientation.

In the northern half of the continent, the Empire was constantly expanding to the East, first of the white, and then of the red kings. Buffer zones lay between the northern latitudinal Empire and the south. And only in the 40s of the XX century, two geopolitical macro-formations oriented along the meridian - the East Asian bloc and the Pan American bloc - almost simultaneously invaded the geopolitical field of latitudinal dynamics, forming a "frame" around the traditional layout of planetary forces.

This latest geopolitical event has a truly gigantic significance, since it predetermines a complete change in the "force field" of the earth's surface. It is this that gives reality to the Euro-African project, the attempts of the Soviet Union to move from its "latitudinal strategy" to the "strategy of warm seas" and India's plans to dynamize its policy towards the Pacific islands. The re-emerging geopolitical field is strikingly different from the picture outlined in 1904 by Halford Mackinder, who defined the center of the Old World as the "geographical axis of history", although in 1904 Mackinder's concepts were quite adequate to the real state of affairs.

It should be clarified that the Great Space of East Asia tends to be self-limited by its continental borders. The situation is different with the United States, which, having completed its plans for geopolitical pan-Americanism, considers its control over the entire American continent only the first step towards achieving world domination and is already intensifying its efforts in tropical Africa, Iran, India and

Australia. The United States is again orienting its geopolitical expansion along the West-East line, striving to make "latitudinal dynamics" the basis of its future world power. This will give them the opportunity in the near future to threaten their potential adversaries with the possibility of a Third World War. Thus, it is precisely the geopolitical expansion along the meridian that, upon completion, creates the basis for the most serious threat to the world, since it carries with it the possibility of the enslavement of the entire planet by the United States.

To defend its geopolitical independence, East Asia is already forced to strengthen its own cultural and political form and create buffer security zones on the periphery of its influence. In one generation, Europe will also need the same buffer zones, similar to those that the emperors Ito, Goto, and others sought to create against the expansion of the Russian tsars. The tendencies of latitudinal and longitudinal development in Africa are especially evident in Islamic geopolitical formations and in the process of liberating Asian countries from English rule. The southern trend of geopolitical expansion of East Asia along the natural route of sea and air communications falls precisely on the uninhabited regions of Australia, located between the thought sectors of concentration of the English-speaking population. In this case, there is a very real possibility for the colonies of Mackinder's "outer crescent" to "be washed into the sea". Europe, thus, instantly loses its strong connection with Africa, and the key point of potential confrontation with the "masters of latitudes" is shifted to the southeast.

The Soviets, this country, which has always been the "geographical axis of history," and the Axis countries that control the Inner Crescent, will only have to watch what is happening in the southeast. No matter how important the military-strategic space of the Black and Caspian Seas, abundantly mixed with soldiers' blood, is not important for the cultural life of Europe, for the future new redistribution of the geopolitical space it will be secondary. For the process of creation of new "meridian" Large Spaces begins, which will acquire a decisive strategic importance.

* * *

The planet's geopolitical future depends on whether the Anglo-American trend of expansion along the parallels can break through the resistance of the East Asian trend of expansion along the meridians. Whatever this confrontation ends, the United States believes that in any case it will be reliably protected by the remnants of the former British colonial empire, even if only tropical African colonies remain of it. And in any case, the United States can count on tropical America under its control. But will they consider insular India, the third largest mineral resource, and Iran and India, worthy of shedding blood for them and spending money on a military expedition? Will they consider it necessary to expend energy in order to to tear this piece away from the Asian Big Space? At the moment, this is the most important and painful question for the squandering money and other people's blood: after all, this is a very large production.

* * *

Between Nanjin and Zhongqin China today, as before, the most incredible, the wildest compromises are possible. Further dynamic development along the meridian of East Asia is becoming more and more possible, latent energies are maturing every day. These energies came into play and became evident in the right side of East Asia - in Japan, and especially in China. On the left, west side of this

They have not yet manifested in the Large Space. We can assume in this region a new war lasting from 10 to 50 years. In China, the civil war has been going on for 32 years. Japan has 12 years of ground fighting behind it, and Japan has fully proved how belligerently it is in relation to the Pacific region. The confrontation between geopolitical expansion along the meridian and expansion along the parallel requires both sides to be patient, since this problem will be resolved within a sufficiently long period of time and over vast territories. An example of this is the geopolitical processes that have been taking place in recent decades on both sides of the Pacific Ocean.

("Newspaper of Geopolitics", No. 8, 1943, Germany)

General Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen

VIENNA AND BELGRADE AS GEOPOLITICAL ANTIPODES

Southeast Europe of three types

If you look at the geographical map of Europe, then southeastern Europe emerges as an obvious unity. In the north and in the north-east it is covered by the Carpathians, in the north-west - by the Alps, in the south it is surrounded by six alternating seas. The only diagonally large river that flows is the Danube.

Vienna and Constantinople, in the same way located diagonally to each other, mark the entrance gates. In the center is Belgrade, the natural center of gravity (key point) of the entire area of southeastern Europe. This space splits into three distinct areas, one each west and east of the Iron Gate, and one Mediterranean area:

One area is formed by the Pannonian depression. In its middle lies the Hungarian lowland crossed by the Danube. This depression is an area remote from the sea, accompanied to the southwest, on the other side of the mountains, by the Dalmatian coast.

The Carpathians separate this depression from the second region, from the coastal landscapes of the lower Danube, from Wallachia, Moldavia (region in Romania), northern Bulgaria and from the Danube Delta. Like the East Elbe offshoot of the Sarmatian lowland, these four areas do not have a common name.

The Balkan mountains south of these four regions again separate them from the third region, from the south washed by the sea. Despite this natural unity, these southern four classical areas - Thrace, Macedonia, Hellas and Illyria - do not have a common name. Similarly, this common name is absent from the Illyrian mountains, stretching south from the Carpathians to the Alps. Ranges of mountains separate the coastal south from the Pannonian countryside, far from the sea.

Belgrade's key position in many respects

Within these three regions and the mountains separating them, Belgrade is located not only in their geometric center. It is also located close to their junction, then close to the Danube breakthrough, but at the same time at the Pannonian key point at the confluence of the five rivers Danube, Sava, Drava, Tisza and Mures.

The key point is not always the central point at the same time; see Paris - a geometrically precise central point located far from the capital Bourges - see also Moscow, see Lisbon or London. All of them are located at natural key points in their spheres of influence, but not in the central points of territories in a geometric sense. In southeastern Europe, the central point and the natural key point coincidentally - in Belgrade - coincide. Here, too, all routes from the north branch off, be they the routes to Sofia and Constantinople or to Thessaloniki and Athens, to Bucharest and to the mouth of the Danube.

Space of Thirteen Nations

The fact that Belgrade, nevertheless, has never achieved an equal political significance, let alone the cultural significance of Vienna or Constantinople, and even Budapest, is thus not geographic reasons - they cannot have ethnographic reasons. Southeast Europe is not a space for big nations. Namely, unlike all other natural landscapes of the European peninsula, for example, from Spain, Italy or from the Frankish large space, unlike Britain or Scandinavia, southeastern Europe does not include all of them, respectively, only one, but a large people and along with it at least one or two smaller people. On the contrary, this southeast of Europe contains ten peoples at the same time, namely ten exclusively from this space of peoples,

Thanks to such fragmentation, a great power could not arise here inside. For this, the basis of all these ten peoples was too narrow. No one here has ever been in such a position to take possession of this vast expanse. None of them managed to achieve the significance of the great Western European peoples that the Germans, French, Spaniards or Italians possessed - neither politically nor culturally - as it was in the case of the Greeks and Byzantines. Perhaps the Hungarians from the middle of the Pannonian depression could subjugate most of its marginal areas for a long time, from time to time even spread their influence to the Dalmatian coast, but this state never remained long.

Passarovitsky (Pozharevatsky) world

A great power could develop here only from the outside like the Turks who came from Asia Minor or Austria, which grew out of Germany. Accordingly, since the 16th century, there have been two great powers in southeastern Europe; the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire located vastly beyond Vienna, deployed at the entrance to the large Danube basin and after leaving it with their armies beyond Belgrade. Hungary was between them as a buffer.

And although later the emblem of the sultan's power was nevertheless carried twice to the gates of Vienna, the emperor's standards on the contrary - contrary to many far-reaching plans of Prince Eugene of Savoy - never reached the territory after Nis (Nissa), it is only 200 kilometers on the other side of Belgrade. Still, the brilliant victories of the prince in 1718, according to the Peace of Passarovitsky, brought Austria three jumps in the direction of Istanbul: in the west, the entire northern edge of Bosnia, in the east, Little Wallachia, in the middle, along with Belgrade, another 160 kilometers of Serbian land towards Thessaloniki. Even if it was a little, but the claims of Austria were nevertheless revealed: in the acquired Bosnian region, the claim to the remainder of this land; in Lesser Wallachia, the claim to Greater Wallachia, therefore, to the lower reaches and to the mouth of the Danube; in Belgrade and its hinterland, a claim to the rest of Serbia and a breakthrough to the Aegean Sea; in all three - the claim to liberate the Christian Balkan peoples from the embrace of the Turks.

Three double-headed eagles and a crescent

At the same time, one could expect a long dispute between both two-headed eagles, German and Russian, for the inheritance of the third, also two-headed eagle of Byzantium. However, they were still in an alliance with Russia and this alliance continued for another 130 years. So, with the known

conditions, while the Turks were still an enemy, a division was proposed: the Black Sea, that is, first Bulgaria, - the Russians, the Aegean Sea and, above all Serbia - Austria. However, in all scenarios of the future, the Russians had the advantage. They, perhaps, did not need to be sectioned at all, because from the very beginning they had two trump cards: 1) the kindred language of the Serbs and Bulgarians; 2) the identity of faith and ritual - all the Balkans were orthodox Orthodox.

But the Turk was still an enemy. The petty zeal of the churches did not play a role yet. Even if the generosity of Turkish rule in matters of faith called for caution, even if the Evangelical Christians of Hungary preferred Turkish rule to Habsburg for the best of intentions, Russia had an opportunity to play the card of orthodoxy and, after it, the card of Pan-Slavism in the next 19th century. In the meantime, in the 18th century, the Serbian patriarch Ipeka and the Bulgarian metropolitan of Ohrid expressed to the Kaiser general their desire to become, like the German archbishops, worldly masters of their vast dioceses and, as such, to join the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, while the Kaiser had the prospect of accepting the Serbian archbishops and in Vienna as their vassals! The wind was then blowing after 1718 in the banners of Austria and it was south of the Danube at that time,

However, then - Prince Eugene of Savoy died in the meantime - everything went differently. Already 1738 brought a catastrophe with it, and 1739 ended it; the disaster was caused by nothing more than a terrible inability and mediocrity. Its reasons were - where else? - in Vienna and she also spread to the front. It has never been corrected and it appears retrospectively in all its meaning comparable, perhaps, only to Hradec Kralove (Czech city).

1739 and 1866

Dominion in Germany, domination in the Balkans and along the Danube was at stake here. Difference: German Austria and after Hradec Kralove remained German, on the contrary, lost in 1739 in the southeast never again became Austrian again. Further: in 1866, all of Germany, even all of Europe, knew what was being discussed, in 1739 in Vienna they barely shrugged their shoulders about the loss they had suffered. There will be day, there will be food, the morning is wiser than the evening. But the morning never came. What came was the death of the Kaiser, the complete rejection of the Pragmatic Sanction, its own war for the order of succession, the Silesian wars — Vienna now had other concerns.

And one more difference: in 1866, the fate of Prussia, predetermined for this, won, in 1739, on the contrary, Turkey, which is historically, in fact, already in decline, but not thanks to any remarkable command or weapons, no, in no way a brilliant victory on the one hand, not a heroic defeat on the other; there is no hero like Benedek and no opponent like Moltke. Nothing in this event had a faint tinge of grandeur. In addition, the decision of 1866 for one hundred and thirty years was inevitable, but the decision of 1739 was recklessly challenged against the Russians.

There is hardly a more prominent contrast to the discussed primacy of politics over war. Those responsible for the front found themselves on the Spielberg and on the fortification of Graz, while in Vienna they remained in their chairs. Through French mediation - read intervention - all the concessions sanctioned by Count Neippberg to the Grand Vizier were once again solemnly confirmed in again Turkish Belgrade. Russia did not suffer any damage, France became the patron saint of all Christians living in the Turkish sphere of government.

The value of the Serbs

However, the lost Belgrade remained a spearhead pointing both north and south. The Turks knew why it was here that they built their headquarters, and the Hungarians also knew why they had fought for this city several times before, and Prince Eugene of Savoy knew exactly why he had to take this city - at any cost. However, with the expectation of the distant future, it was not only about Belgrade, not only about its confrontation with Vienna, about its unique location between the Balkans and the Hungarian lowlands, with the expectation of the distant future it was also about the Serbs as a people. Anyone who wants to conquer the southeast of Europe must support them and should not have them as his opponents. He must involve them in his empire as friends.

Like the Germans in a common European framework, the Serbs are also a middle people in their area. They border on six of the above-named ten peoples, with all except Slovenes and Slovaks, and are separated from the Greeks only by the disputed Macedonia.

Hungary - a subversive sword in the middle of the Danube basin

Only one more people in this space borders on the same number of foreign peoples: the Magyars; and together with the Serbs, they border on all eleven other peoples of southeastern Europe. The Magyars occupy the middle of the lowland. Nowhere except in the north does their closed settlement area reach the spurs of the mountains surrounding the Pannonian depression. Their strength comes from the plain, that western branch of the northern Eurasian steppe, from where the Huns and Avars undertook their predatory raids.

Before the Turks, but after the Bulgarians, the Turks conquered the Turkic people, who had advanced to southeastern Europe and here, the only settled Turkic people in the Danube depression. The conquerors and conquerors of the weaker outlying peoples such as the Romanians, the inhabitants of Transylvania, Slovaks and Croats, they used their middle position¹ until 1918. They gave a sense of the importance of their middle position before in personal union, when Austria after 1866, deprived of its German position, without Hungary was no longer a great power. In 1867, when they reached an agreement, they destroyed the necessary restructuring of the Danube monarchy. Thanks to their stubborn refusal of any self-determination to the Slavs in their submission,

Budapest was their geometric center and this key position, Vienna as such was located between Brussels and Belgrade, respectively, also between Frankfurt and Belgrade, but not between Passau and Belgrade. Free from its Western influence, it became burdensome to the east as the west, and thus, in contrast to Budapest, found itself at a disadvantage. From the position of then more than two-thirds of the Danube Basin of the Magyars who controlled (today it is hardly a fifth), Austria was more or less a marginal area, just a flaw in the great Hungarian landscape structure. Its gaps were gaping in the west and in the south, in front of Vienna and Belgrade, before the beginning and end of the Danube. The Germans and Serbs were guarding the entrance. If Serbia belonged to the Turks, they had the freedom to go north. If it was Austrian, the Austrians had access to the south.

Serbia retained the key to both this and that direction. Belgrade was more important than Budapest, the help of the Serbs was necessary for every organizer of the Danube space, an irrevocable counterbalance against the oppositional Magyar middle

land. In pre-Turkish times, despite repeated attempts, the Hungarians were never able to settle in Serbia - the people of horsemen against the people of the mountains. The invasion of the Turks threw both peoples back, the Serbs, however, incomparably tougher and for a longer time than the Hungarians. The Serbian dominant role was played, which cannot be said about the Magyars. Not least from here, precisely from their history, the current behavior of the Serbs is also explainable.

The tragedy of the Serbs

The penetration of the later recorded Slavs tribes to the entire Balkan Peninsula begins as a result of the migration of peoples, emancipated by the Huns, already under the Emperor Justinian. Its first waves move from the Germans, crossing the southeast of Europe to the south, mainly the Goths, but also the Alans and Gepids. Later they were Avars, in the north up to Bohemia, and here up to Illyria they partly spread, partly they went to other lands. Already in the 6th century, the Croats liberated - under the name Hervaren, possibly of German origin - such Slavs who had already reached the coast of Dalmatia from the hands of the Avar government. Just as voluntarily, like the Slavs, under the protection of the steppe people, who took the place of the Bulgarians in the lower reaches of the Danube and the Serbs, with their resettlement to the mountains of Illyria, find themselves under the rule of the East Roman imperial power (for a while, the Croats, but only those who settled on the coast).

Serbs only very rarely united by a tribal leader, as it was for a short time in the 9th century. They created their first real state at the end of the 11th century; it covered parts of Bosnia after two periods - first twenty years, then seventy years of Bulgarian domination. This happened in spite of repeated attacks by the now Magyars and in spite of strong Byzantine opposition. Ruler of Zeta receives the crown from the hands of the papal legate. The capital of the kingdom - far from Hungary, Bulgaria or Byzantium - is today the Albanian city of Skutari.

However, stable unity brings the Serbs only the twelfth century under the Nemanja dynasty, only without Bosnia, which in 1204, after a short freedom, was again under Hungarian rule. And its first king receives his royal dignity from the Roman curia, from Byzantium and, as a countermeasure, the recognition of the henceforth independent, Serbian Orthodox Church. Thus, an ecclesiastical decision was made, and on the one hand, the Balkans from the Black Sea to the Ionian Sea finally become Orthodox², but on the other hand, the Croats also completely fall out of this Balkan context. Like Hungary and Poland, and their country is becoming the foreground, the zone of attack of the West, the glacis of the West. This separation from the Serbs, who speak the same language, is later deepened by the powerful invasion of the Turks.

But before the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century become the golden age of Serbian history. Under the house of Nemanja, Serbia becomes the dominant state in the Balkans. Byzantine sovereignty is shaken. The Nemandyids themselves seek to obtain the throne of the emperor. Macedonia, later Thessaly, also half of Albania, were consistently subdued, Bulgaria was forced to join the union. Skopje becomes a royal city. The Republic of Ragusa comes under Serbian protection.

The shift of the political center of gravity to Seres, in the half-Greek south, is accompanied by the flourishing of its own court, which grew up on Byzantine examples of church art and culture. The right is ordered. Laws are issued that provide every inhabitant of the empire, regardless of origin or faith, freedom, life and property, and these laws are also truly incorruptible. Stefan Dusan, the penultimate of the Nemanid family, already calls himself "the emperor of the Raska and the Romans", he is already proposing - even in good time - to Emperor Charles IV and Pope Innocent VI a joint war with the Turks at the head, that is, he himself

proposes as supreme commander. The brilliance of his court becomes brighter than the brilliance of the Basileus court on the Bosphorus, but then, almost sixteen years after his death, a steep rise is followed by a rapid fall: a grandiose victory for the Turks. Already in 1371, the united troops at Matiza - this place is still called "the death of the Serbs" - suffered heavy damage, then June 15, 1389 in the decisive battle at Amselfeld again, but this time they suffered a crushing defeat and sacrificed all of the Serbian nobility.

At first the Turks were content with what they had achieved. Their army is in urgent need of reaching the Persian border. Serbs without a leader, obliged to continue to obey and pay tribute, no longer pose any danger. The fact that Hungary, which has now become a front-line state, supports the Serbs, Albanians and Vlachs who have fallen away from the Turks, cannot save their countries. Neither the Hungarian national hero Janos Hunyadi nor Skanderbeg, the hero of Albania, can do this. When it comes to the Battle of Amselfeld in 1448, the Turks are victorious. The fate of the Serbs is sealed. In 1453 Serbia was finally occupied. From that moment on, its history was completed for 400 years. Its development has been prevented, its future is to be under the Turks.

Bogomils

Bosnia suffered the same fate ten years later. Despite the crusades initiated by the Pope, the Bogomils fought against Hungary, Croatia, against the Serbs and against the Republic of Venice for their free statehood. It was with Stefan Trcko. He calls himself "King of Serbs and Bosnia", later "King of Bosnia and Dalmatia". During the simultaneous decline of Byzantine, Bulgarian and Serbian power, this power was the last in southeastern Europe to reach its heyday. It stretched along the coast to the city of Cattaro (now Kotor), but fell into disrepair with the death of Stefan Trcko. The enemies of the Bogomils once again conquered the country, but already in 1463 they were swept away by the Turks.

But the persecuted Bogomils - who were still spiritually related to the Sufis, as in the West with the Albigenses and in Bosnia with the Arian Visigoths - convert to Islam and avoid greater enmity towards themselves. Thus, a permanent ruling stratum remains here, when, for example, in Romania this stratum was replaced by Phanariots, which means the Byzantines, set by the Turks for the tasks of government.

Awakening and the wrong path

In Serbia, on the other hand, besides the Turks and local Orthodox priests, there were only peasants. The nobility was destroyed. However, it is among these Serbian peasants, like none of the other Balkan peoples, that the memory of the lost freedom has remained persistent and alive. In their far-flung mountain villages, for 400 years of captivity, they sang their proud past in songs and sagas and passed it on from father to son and from son to grandson. Finally, at the end of the 19th century, with the gradual gaining of state independence, from now on, the Serbian army and the rapidly emerging caste of politicians came under the influence of models alien to space, already in 1918, into a dead end of erroneous development calling itself "Yugoslavia", in a fragile prison of peoples in the long term, to build which again in 1945 was worth a huge loss of life.

Two capitals

Very late, shortly before World War I, after the first choice for the independent Serbian government of Nis, Belgrade eventually became the Serbian capital, a city that for a long time was hardly really Serbian. This city, called Singidunum, once served the Romans as a stronghold. This name remained later in Byzantium. In 583, it was conquered by the Avars, later it belonged to either Byzantium or Hungary. In 1456, Hunyadi liberated the army of the crusaders who were trapped in the city by the Turks. For the Serbs, Belgrade was then still a city on the outer border of their area of residence. However, Austria did not originate in Vienna either.

Both cities were eagerly awaiting the power, thanks to which they could become a springboard. For centuries Vienna was both a German border city and a Kaiser city. This is the reason for her increased danger and her claim to the possession of Hungary. On the contrary, the transfer of the capital of little Serbia to the Danube was an unequivocal challenge to Austria.

The seat of the capital may be an expression of retreat, as in 1917 the replacement of Petersburg by Moscow or in 1922 the replacement of Istanbul by Ankara, but in border capitals it is often an expression of the expected expansion territory, as in the case of Vienna and later Belgrade, but also at the time of Berlin. Its original location in the far west of Prussia prevented its later advance to the Meuse and Moselle in the 17th century.

But if we ask, returning to Vienna and Belgrade, about their most conspicuous geopolitical differences, we will notice that Belgrade is located twice in the center of gravity of a large space, and Vienna is between two, in fact, between almost three large spaces. precisely between Frankish or Western European and southeastern Europe, at the same time - through Moravia - it also borders on northeastern Europe. Its distinguishing feature is that it connects, looking for connection, but not rest in its own weight, in its own center of gravity of a large landscape. For its immediate surroundings - Moravia and eastern Lower Austria - are again only a small intermediate landscape between those three large spaces and, therefore, the absence of their own weight.

In this respect, Vienna is at a disadvantage not only in comparison with the centers of those large landscapes, such as, for example, in comparison with Paris or Berlin or with Belgrade, but also in comparison with such centers as Prague or Munich. Before 1866, this was not realized. And if a large German space was being built around Vienna, it was not a division corresponding to the landscape, but an ethnic guarantee. However, this factor is absent in the case of Belgrade, absent in the Serbs. For them alone, the Pannonian space is too large, like the entire southeast of Europe. They constitute a minority in these spaces among many nations.

And nevertheless, their irreplaceable, geopolitical position with a small number made them - their country, theirs and Belgrade - the preferred lever of powers alien to this space, which France and Russia first of all, but, of course, England always used against Vienna, against Germany. Serbs turned out to be convenient for inciting World War 1.

Shattered ellipse

With the retreat of the Turks, the Germans and Serbs are natural partners in the Pannonian space, but Vienna and Belgrade are still the centers of the ellipse. To turn this ellipse into a political unity was the geopolitical demand. it

the demand came from Austria, Prince Eugene of Savoy seemed to have fulfilled it. But what happened as soon as he died?

Completely unprepared they declared war, which in fact was the war of the Russians. Prince Eugene of Savoy strongly advised his kaiser to leave Maria Theresa a strong army ready for battle at any time. But Charles VI confidently - but, as we know in vain - invested all the money in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713. The army, its equipment and weapons fell into decay.

40,000 men were stationed in Hungary, but three corps were sent in three different directions - to Bosnia, Serbia, Wallachia - against the enemy; did not unite with 20,000 rebellious Serbs and Albanians; the latter were defeated by the Turks. The Kaiser's detachments, mistakenly sent into battle, were eventually to return from all three fronts.

The next year brings an inglorious ending. The new commander-in-chief, who clearly demands too much from his defeat, immediately retreats beyond the Danube due to an insignificant loss, simply abandons the bravely defended Belgrade to the mercy of fate and sends Count Neipperg to the Grand Vizier's camp in order to make peace. Peace is bestowed upon him for the concessions of all the regions reached by Austria in the Passarowitz peace. With one stroke of the pen, Serbia was donated.

"The hope of the Serbs to lead a dignified life under the Austrian scepter no longer took place." This is stated in the V11 volume of world history published by Spamers in 1894 in Leipzig. The continuation reads: "If the Austrians began to dispute the belonging of Serbia, then Austria would become the dominant power in the north of the Balkans and German culture would open up an endless field of opportunities there. From now on, all these grandiose prospects have been lost. " Piedmont this side of the Danube

These prospects were nevertheless not completely lost, because fifty years later, in 1789 - during the French Revolution - Belgrade in a now militarily successful war was again taken under the command of Laudon, but in 1790, according to the peace treaty between Austria and Turkey in Sistovo Leopold II restored the status quo ante bellum, this time as if under British and Prussian pressure. Since that time, no one has continued the work of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Once lost remained lost, remained so in 1878. Then, during the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, Moltke, the winner of Hradec Kralove, but now an ally, remarked that the victory would not be complete without taking all the other Serbian regions. He clearly understood that the Serbs were more important to Austria than any people of their monarchy except the Germans.

Satisfying this clear demand and preparing for its fulfillment - this path still remained, but it was not necessarily a military one. It is not just the sword that is conquered. The opportunity was created by the 17th and 18th centuries. Since then, as a result of the massive settlement of refugees in Banat and Sirmia, there has been a significant Serb minority on this side of the Danube.4 Unfortunately, this minority has never experienced a treatment commensurate with its importance. However, already Joseph I in 1706 and Charles VI in 1713 confirmed their old special rights dating back to 1690. Since Serbian self-government still always had a thorn in the eye in jealous Hungary, Charles VI soon canceled it again, as he depended on the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction by the Hungarian Reichstag.

The pragmatic sanction turned out to be a gigantic fallacious investment. However, the Serbs demanded their guaranteed rights. The Serbian National Congress protested and already in 1735 it came to a peasant uprising, which was suppressed in 1736. The Habsburgs made the wrong move again. It was about making the Serbs on this side of the Danube into a Serbian Piedmont.

Perhaps, such train of thought was at first alien to the 18th century, but in 1790, when Leopold II founded the Illyrian Chancellery at Court, they could no longer have a place.

The achievement of the Serbs on the military border, the unconditional reliability of these "border guards" and their descendants until 1914 justified the attempt to make them the vanguard of Serbian freedom. Why, in fact, did Prince Eugene of Savoy and Loudon go to the front? Why else did they create the prerequisites for their victory?

However, instead of causing inconvenience to the Turks or the Hungarians, they began to dig a hole for Russia in Vienna. Half measures cannot achieve anything, neither in relation to God, nor on earth.

Translated from German by Yu. Corinth

GULF WAR - WAR AGAINST EUROPE

Austrian general Jordis von Lohausen is the largest modern geopolitician, a direct successor of the geopolitical school of Karl Haushofer. The best known are his works "Courage to rule" and "Strategy of survival", where he sets out the foundations of his understanding of the history of Europe, its interests, and its future. Lohausen is a radical opponent of Atlanticist geopolitical concepts and has openly advocated the liberation of Europe from American occupation since the late 1960s. Lohausen is a supporter of the concept of "European Empire", first formulated by the Belgian Jean Thiriard.

It is enough to look at the map of the world to see the continents of our planet as three belts, covering it from north to south. The first, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, forms the New World, America. The second, from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope, is the continental part of the Old World, Euro-Africa. The third belt runs from Kamchatka to Tasmania through China, Southeast Asia and Indonesia and forms the eastern part, Australia-Asia.

In the center of the center

Between Euro-Africa and Australia-Asia (closer to the latter) there is the Russian-Siberian layer in the north, and the Middle East in the south. It forms the center of the Old World, the center at the heart of which is the Persian Gulf region. This region is the Achilles heel of the Old World, where a lime leaf fell on Siegfried's shoulder. And the question is not only about oil. Nowhere else do the oceans penetrate so deeply into the Afro-Eurasian continent: the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Between two oceans, equally distant from Africa and Asia, at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates is the ancient city of Ur. This is the "center of the center" that we will talk about - in all respects the most vulnerable place of the Old World. All earthquakes on the planet are reflected here. Since the forcible opening of Japanese ports during the war of 1854, it has been the policy of the United States to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards". Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. United States policy is to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards." Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. United States policy is to establish footholds on the shores of the Old World, as well as to create potential "island springboards." Thus, the Americans settled in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. Only after that did they go to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the actual subordination of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads are located in areas with a high level of development and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific oceans, i.e. oceans, washing the double Afro-Eurasian continent, and not, say, on such a fragile southern facade as the Indian Ocean. Only after that did they go to

The Persian Gulf region is located precisely in this vulnerable zone, at the intersection of large power lines connecting the Far East with Africa and Europe with India. Here, on the approaches to the gulf, the Islamic world is divided into Arab and Persian parts. Anyone who has settled in this area can create protection or threat in all directions on the flanks or rear of not only the Middle East, but also Europe, India and Africa. In addition, this arrangement suggests an attempt to create a third front against the Russian military power, still unconquered. The position in the Gulf also strengthens the rear of Turkey - an ally against Russia - and creates pressure on Egypt, Syria and Iran, as well as on Europe, all thanks mainly to oil. The latter, by the way, is also important for Japan.

The great illusion of the helpless

The Gulf War came in handy for America. After all, it is necessary that the billions invested in weapons over the decades finally become profitable, and the expected orders for the renovation of the military machine would quickly stimulate the economy in need of this. But especially so that small, obscure, without rank, defeated enemies of World War II or bloodless allies were not ready to overtake America in the economic sphere. But before dispelling their illusions, you can let them "play in the yard with the elders," and the war will help put them in their place. A war not directed directly against them, but rather aimed at one of the sources of their prosperity.

Control over mineral deposits increases the superiority of a well-armed economic power over others, less powerful. It can also be considered that the obvious advantage and safety net for the United States is the finding on its own territory of the most important resources for its survival and military capabilities. If necessary, countries rich in minerals, but obstinate will be forced to repent, either - under the influence of propaganda carried out on a global scale and supported by terrorist groups (underground or foreign), or under the pressure of an economic boycott, as has been the case for many years with South Africa. The fight against apartheid - the ideological cover for this campaign - came in handy. The target in South Africa was the ore needed in the military industry, or rather, termination of its natural monopoly. The economy of Western Europe, which began to develop after 1945, can no longer flourish without some of the metals found only in South Africa, as well as without Arab oil. The fall of black power in South Africa will unchecked the aforementioned deposits in the hands of powerful American groups.

The result achieved in the Persian Gulf, namely the growing rupture of ties between Europe and the Cape of Good Hope, is the undoubted success of American policy, and whatever may be said, a defeat inflicted on the Europeans. This is the price to pay for giving up power for the sake of consumption. Now, more than ever, the necessary minerals can only be possessed by using the services of an intermediary, the American one, of course.

Missed opportunities

However, after the two world wars, geographic rather than historical factors contributed to the economic union under the European leadership (on the principle of self-determination of peoples, and not on the American principle of "nation-building"), Africa and Europe, which became a natural complement to each other. The establishment in the eastern part of the Old World of the "Asian sphere of shared prosperity" envisioned by the Japanese was also defeated more because of the latter's intolerance of neighboring peoples than because of the American victory in the Pacific. Because of the petty squabbles of their leaders, the Arab countries are unable to expand the circle of their joint action. Confirmation of this is the Middle East, where, following the American invasion, one can expect the consolidation of borders or the repeated denial of the right to self-determination of peoples oppressed by religion, in the first row of which the Kurds appear. This is also the fault of the Europeans, both the French and the British, who renounced their domination over the Arab space, although after the First World War it was recognized for them. Thus, it was they who left behind the unfinished

business fraught with complications, as has happened more than once. Examples of this are the difficult birth of Yugoslavia and the departure of the British and French from Africa after 1945. So the Europeans should only blame themselves for everything that happened.

translation by L. Gogoleva

Jean Parvulesco

GEOPOLITICS OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

"India has long aspired to total political hegemony in the South

Asia. "

Jiang Zemin

Along with five nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in Baluchistan in response to five such tests carried out by India, South Asia suddenly burst into "big history": henceforth, the planetary political-historical existence of nations will be determined only by their ability to effectively metastrategic nuclear deterrence. Until recently, China was the only Asian nuclear power. And it is in comparison with China, and not with Pakistan, as it might seem at first glance, that India's metastrategic entry into the sphere of active continental geopolitics should be assessed. At present, the continental nuclear confrontation is taking place precisely between India and China, and Pakistan, despite all the claims and efforts, plays here an auxiliary role designed to strengthen China's anti-Indian camp.

Total geopolitics of the Great Eurasian Continent, revolutionary, avant-garde geopolitics, affirming the final imperial concept of integration within the framework of a common initial metahistorical destiny - Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, Great Siberia, India and Japan - clearly excludes China from the active definition of a great continental Eurasian union. In a sense, the progressive potential unification of the Great Continent is directed precisely against China, and India in this respect is clearly supported by the metastrategic continental potential of Russia and France. The process of great continental integration is a dialectical thing.

At the same time, the India-China nuclear confrontation in Southeast Asia requires Japan to make an immediate decision, an irreversible strategic choice that - as soon as it is implemented - will force it to join the great continental camp, whose regional pole in the Southeast is India. ... This decision must be made despite the understandable nuclear psychopathology of the Japanese. Everything goes to the fact that the Eurasian history of the near future will consist in the nuclear encirclement of China (including its strategic satellites) by an ensemble of great continental imperial powers that are part of the political line of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow-New Delhi-Tokyo axis.

The attitude to this demarche on the part of the United States is deliberately inscribed in the model of basic geopolitical correspondences, since the final and decisive battle - the beginning of which can already be considered established - between the Great Continent and The United States, corresponds to the main line of force of the fundamental ontological antagonism between "continental" and "insular" powers, and also there is no doubt that the appearance a politically united Europe (no matter how hindered by the shadow, behind-the-scenes forces actively working against this project) will at some point create an insurmountable obstacle to the final implementation of the US "grand plan" to establish planetary hegemony. The forceful appearance of Greater Europe in the dialectical game of asserting imperial planetary power will again return the United States to its status

a minor power, and thus finally destroy the notorious "American myth."

For this reason, the United States will join efforts to neutralize Greater Europe with China's aspirations to resist its continental encirclement. It is obvious will lead to a large Beijing-Washington alliance, in which China will offer the United States a giant foothold in the East of Eurasia, and the United States will provide China with access to the market spaces controlled by this ocean power.

At the same time, the aggressive anti-continental permanent geopolitics of the United States is acquiring today within the great continental space a new huge reservoir of subversive and conspiracy powers concentrated in the sphere of pro-Atlanticist versions of fundamentalist Islam (especially the Wahhabi or Taliban type), which along the entire length of the southern coast of Eurasia will join the activity of geopolitical fortress of China, the negative radiation of which internally destabilizes and blocks the Far Eastern link of the great continental integration that Japan should become.

A recent book by high-ranking French official Alexander Delval, *Islamism and the United States, Alliance Against Europe*, says everything necessary about the problem of the offensive metastrategic use by the United States of certain fundamentalist (Wahhabi) Islam in its struggle against the Great Continental European renaissance, which is currently undergoing a stage decisive assertion and revolutionary imperial self-determination.

In the condition of such planetary convergences, the special mission of France (or, more precisely, the Great Continental Carolingian pole of the France-Germany axis approved by General De Gaulle) is to ideological polarization and to unite on the basis of awareness of the common destiny of the entire ensemble of elements of the Eurasian Great Continent in the face of the aggressive challenge of the United States and China, as well as in the face of the subversive mission that the United States is assigning to the Atlanticist varieties of Islam fighting the great continental project.

The planetary pole of the Eurasian Great Continent, whose ultimate and secret goal is to choose a spiritual perspective, is opposed by the materialistic block of the Washington-Beijing axis, which is under the explicit or still latent beginning of the mondialist group in the United States, which, under the guise of establishing planetary economic hegemony, seeks to put an end to the ontological civilization of Being - our civilization, up to a change in the very status of a person who in our world is based on the inertial continuation of traditional European, Hindu and Japanese concepts, faithful to the mystery of the "light of being."

It also follows from this that in response to the active political and economic penetration of the United States into Africa, Europe should immediately undertake an offensive counter-intervention in Latin America, which in the geopolitical sense is for the United States what Africa is for Europe - a double continent associated with mainland by a chain of direct geopolitical reverberations.

European elements of deep political-revolutionary implementation are currently visible in Argentina and Chile, starting from which a large-scale offensive revolutionary integration of the entire South American continent should be launched.

In a sense, the problem of the nearest planetary identification of world history boils down to France's readiness to fulfill its secret, deep, bottomless destiny, which requires from her a new (final) initiative on metahistorical great continental integration, and it is France that must ensure that this integration is crowned his last imperial triumph. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary that a new, unexpected will awaken in France, capable of openly establishing the deep foundations of the providential

destiny of France, to mobilize them in a revolutionary way, becoming the pole of a total offensive strategy - and this will be a new beginning of French history, the history of Europe and the Eurasian Great Continent as a whole. In other words, secret France, parallel France must - as if by magic - reveal itself from under that miserable, insignificant state where it has fallen today, expel from itself the salutary breath of a new ascent to being, so that "everything will again enter the zone of higher attention" ... This is what "ours" have been waiting for and preparing since time immemorial - the coming of Secret France to the final political and historical power.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently stated that "India has long aspired to total political hegemony in South Asia." Chinese President Jiang Zemin was not mistaken at all. Indeed, India has long aspired to total political hegemony in South Asia, but only not on its own behalf, but in favor of the imperial great continental unity, the flame of which is kept by Secret France.

It is known that Russia is rejecting a real political dialogue with France taken separately. It does the same with Germany. But at the same time, Russia is completely predisposed to develop and strengthen a decisive political dialogue with the Franco-German axis taken in its entirety. The same is the attitude of India towards Western Europe, since on a confidential level India has long been ready to unconditionally support Russia in its great continental dialogue with France and Germany.

The shift of the critical center of gravity of modern great continental geopolitics from West to East is a sign of the fundamental metastrategic evolution of the current situation, whose content may seem ambiguous at first glance.

Any shift of the center of gravity to the East implies, proclaims and establishes the beginning of a new historical cycle. Today's division of Russia as a result of a failed Marxist adventure will pass as soon as the current millennium ends, and we will see the great sign of the birth of New Russia, which will directly affect the successful implementation of the political-historical great continental project. It is Russia that will then become the geopolitical saving "bridge from Europe to India".

The great continental engagement of the Carolingian Franco-German pole in favor of India and Japan is realized through Russia, through New Russia, whose total Eurasian development will reveal in all its fundamental meaning the heartland - "the highest and final core land" of the Great Continent.

At two opposite ends of the Eurasian Great Continent, India and France are attracted by two oceans - the Pacific in the East and the Atlantic in the West. Of particular importance in the case of France is the attraction to the South Atlantic - to South America and Antarctica. Because it is in Antarctica, as some of our people already know, that the supreme fate of the Eurasian Great Continent will be decided. This is the last secret of transcendental geopolitics, a secret that we now have to keep in mind.

The moment has come for France to cast aside the banality of its own insignificant modern history and open up to its last, secret, highest destiny.

World history is now approaching a decisive turning point, to the point of completion and a new beginning, the third millennium symbolizes a return to the origins. For the first time in ten thousand years, the peoples of the Eurasian Great Continent, from Europe to India, having seized the reins of the political and historical formation of the entire Eurasian ensemble in their own hands, will be able to restore that primordial unity of existence, high consciousness and common destiny that preceded their historical division ...

The great metahistorical cycle ends, closing in on itself, its end merging with its beginning. The end of one world heralds the beginning of another world.

Beyond external political circumstances, which in fact represent deceptive mirages of a complete and incurable catastrophe, the future reunification of the Eurasian Great Continent is transcendently inscribed in the logic of historical formation, and no one and nothing can prevent this. Having gained control over the poles, over the Arctic and Antarctica, the Eurasian Great Continent will gain decisive and total planetary dominion, passing into the state of Imperium Ultimatum, absolute power over the final history of this world. This will be an ontological domination over history and over that which is transcendently on the other side of history, being the "final goal". And all this has already been laid in the form of an embryo in a new convergence of active planetary geopolitics, the development of which we must control and direct. There is nothing but will. There is nothing but purpose. Everything becomes more risky day by day. In June 1998, Bill Clinton spent "nine days in China," thereby irrevocably and frankly laying the strategic basis for the final US-China offensive on the great continental Eurasian front, on its decisive geopolitical positions.

This also includes the announced joint US-China naval maneuvers - a sign of the decision on political and strategic positions, which are covered by the appearance of economic projects, and elements of democratic doctrine related to the observance (or non-observance) of "human rights" are easily sacrificed. All of this was finally approved at the time of Clinton's June visit to Beijing.

It is now clear that the blatant anti-continental conspiracy between China and the United States forces us to reveal a deep determination to rebuff this in the metastrategic key of the great continental line on the part of the protagonists of the Eurasian project - first of all, on the part of France and India. The determination of France, representing the extreme West of Eurasia, and India, representing its extreme East, should influence Russia in the issue of its radical and irreversible choice of the future path.

So, the geopolitical lines of force of future planetary outbreaks of the third millennium are marked. The rest depends on our will to survive, on the completeness of our awareness and mastery of the abyss of our own destiny.

Emrik Shoprad

BIG GAME

The end of the ideological confrontation within the bipolar system has led many analysts to the conclusion that the era of universal peace under the sign of "liberalism" and "democracy" has begun. But this approach, for some reason, does not take into account the following fact: most of these conflicts are based not on ideological, but on national contradictions, that geopolitics is the decisive factor in them. The world after the end of the Cold War is not only shaken by small regional conflicts based on the assertion of their national and cultural identities by different peoples, but - and most importantly - all such conflicts fit perfectly into the global confrontation between the great powers. This struggle is clearly manifested in the refusal of such great powers as Russia and China to recognize the dictate of American imperialism.

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Washington and its allies are playing a game against Russia, which is cut geographically. Everywhere in Eastern Europe, where NATO is moving, and in a giant battle for spheres of influence. which unfolds in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, Washington with its satellites - Germany, Turkey, Pakistan - seeks to undermine Russian influence. The wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are elements of a new Great Game that is unfolding between Russia and the American empire. Uzbekistan is a kind of terminal - in the very heart of Central Asia - where the path, free for the United States, from the Indian Ocean into the interior of the continent ends. At the same time, Turkmenistan is increasingly moving away from Moscow towards Turkey and the United States.

In Europe, the new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, is increasingly drawing closer to Russia, Greece, Romania and Cyprus, forming a sketch of an Orthodox bloc opposed to an unformalized alliance between the United States and Germany in this zone. This Atlanticist alliance includes the Turkish wing, including Bosnia. The Kosovo conflict, unfolding at the very center of what constitutes the identity pole for the historical identity of the Serbs, and fanned by the Albanians under the clear tutelage of the CIA, is another manifestation of the Great Game.

In the Near and Middle East, the strategy of American imperialism and its staunch ally Israel has led to the emergence of an alliance that until recently seemed impossible - to the rapprochement of Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran, although between these three geographically close states there are many serious regional contradictions.

Recovering from the first shock of the collapse of communist regimes on its traditional periphery, Russia is slowly raising its head. The gradual normalization of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Moscow's initiatives on the Iraqi issue clearly testify to this. Recall that Boris Yeltsin mentioned the possibility of the outbreak of a third world war precisely in connection with the Iraqi conflict ...

The other great power is less and less willing to accept the dictates of American imperialism. This is China. We have finally emerged from the era of the Russian-Chinese conflict, which during the period of bipolarity was explained by the desire for ideological

leadership in the socialist camp. The Moscow-Beijing axis is now opposed to the Washington-Tokyo axis. The new China seeks to acquire the same positions in Asia that it held before the arrival of Europeans in the 19th century. China's naval claims have already been unequivocally manifested in the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which brings us close to the beginning of the Sino-Indian conflict. A new factor - in order to strengthen its position against Japan, Beijing is trying to get closer to Hanoi.

The Great Game on a global scale is gradually increasingly leading to opposition between the pro-American imperialism of the "liberal democracies" and the "club of the damned": China, Iran, North Korea (which actively cooperates in the field of rocketry with Tehran), Cuba and Iraq ...

World conflicts arise only when there is a competition of interests on a global scale. The media commentaries give us the false idea that regional conflicts are private anomalies independent of the global context and stem from the provincial ignorance of the local population. In fact, geopolitics should be likened to the movement of tectonic plates. Giant platforms slide and collide with each other. At some points, the impacts are so strong that they generate earthquakes. But the very fact of an earthquake is not independent - invisible underground large-scale processes find their expression in it ...

(translated from French by A.D.)

Alexander Dugin

The Rest Against The West

1. Two types of mondialism

In the modern understanding of the strategic position of the West on the part of unconditional adherents of Western civilization, there are two main lines that see differently the state of affairs in the modern world and propose two opposite projects. It is important to note that both lines are united in that the interests of the West, understood as the highest and unconditional civilizational value, are at the forefront here. You can conditionally call these two intellectual camps among Westerners "left mondialism" and "right mondialism".

The term "mondialism" means, in the broadest sense, the concept of the integration of the planet under the leadership of the West, the creation in the distant future of a single World State with a single World Government. However, there are two opposite views on the achievement of this goal: conditionally "left" and "right".

Left mondialism proceeds from the premise that the conditions for planetary integration are already in place, and that the common denominator for such integration is the widespread tendencies towards the triumph of liberal democratic tendencies in the most diverse societies, the establishment of market regimes everywhere and the spread of the ideology of "human rights." "Left mondialism" tends to neglect the "remnants" of traditional societies, such as religion, ethnicity and race, social hierarchies, ethical norms, etc., believing that they themselves will soon fade away in a homogeneous technotronic-informational planetary a society without borders and nations.

The brightest exponent of such "left mondialism" (or otherwise "optimistic mondialism") is the American Francis Fukuyama, who entitled his programmatic work "The End of History". He argues that there are only a few years left before the emergence of a homogeneous planetary liberal-democratic society, modeled on the model of Western civilization and governed by the Western "elite". Fukuyama unambiguously identified the collapse of the Soviet system with the onset of the "End of History", understood as a total affirmation of the liberal-capitalist order with its logic, its controllability, its system. Fukuyama expressed a concentrated position that is generally characteristic of American Democrats. In Europe, similar projects were developed by Jacques Attali, adviser to former French President Francois Mitterrand (see "Elements" N2), while viewing the "end of history" in a mystical, Judeo-messianic perspective (which is formally absent in Fukuyama). (A propos, Attali recently published a new work, "He Will Come," in which current socio-political cataclysms are interpreted from the perspective of kabbalistic eschatology; here the meaning of the Moidialist understanding of the "end of history" is manifested even more frankly and clearly than before.)

The second line of mondialism, the so-called. "Right mondialism", on the other hand, views the current situation rather pessimistically, believing that the primacy of the West and planetary integration under its leadership of all the peoples of the world encounters a multitude of

the most serious obstacles, which do not even think to disappear, as the mondialists would like. "Right mondialists" point to the fact that the collapse of the main enemy of the West - the Soviet bloc - led not to genuine liberalization and democratization of the former Soviet world, but to the emergence of various religious and national entities in its place, which had no desire to abandon their political and cultural identity. Thus, the prerequisites for the "end of history" are not yet ripe, and before such an end really comes, the world will have to go through a difficult stage of civilizational conflicts based on newly formed spatial, political and cultural units. In this perspective, the "right-wing mondialists" believe that at this stage it is necessary to strengthen the Western world,

The most famous representative of this "right" line of mondialism is Samuel Huntington, whose statement of the programmatic article was given above. Huntington is the spokesman for conservative circles in the United States, and especially the Republican Party. His polemic with Fukuyama reflects much more global realities than the differences in the views of two specific analysts. This is a clash of two basic tendencies of mondialism, and therefore, both authors express positions that are vitally reflected in the destinies of all peoples of the earth, since in any case, the degree of influence of the West on the civilizational processes of the modern world is enormous. And the future of mankind will largely depend on whose line the West accepts for leadership - Fukuyama or Huntington.

Conventionally, on the basis of the main theoretical texts of Fukuyama and Huntington, two Mondialist projects ("left" and "right") can be designated as "The End of History" and "The War of Civilizations" (Clash of Civilizations).

2. Antimondialism and two projects

Mondialists consider the current state of affairs, naturally, based on their interests and weighing the pros and cons from their positions. For consistent and conscientious opponents of the West and its model, for all anti-mondialist forces, no matter what they start from - Orthodoxy, Islam, Confucianism, socialism, nationalism, tradition, etc. - it is quite logical to consider the current picture of the world in a reverse perspective, taking with a minus what the mondialists take with a plus, and vice versa. Consequently, all tendencies noted by mondialists as positive should be considered negative, and vice versa.

As an absolutely negative value, a perfect dystopia, one should take Fukuyama and his "ideal", which represents the worst thing that can happen for anti-mondialists. Thus, the thesis of the liberal End of History should be viewed as a radically hostile concept, as the principle of a "common enemy" in the face of which all anti-mondialist forces and tendencies must unite, regardless of their internal differences. The figure of Fukuyama and his theses must be taken from a radically Manichean perspective as Absolute Evil, as the teaching of the "children of darkness". The left mondialists themselves are also quite clearly aware of the fact that the coming of the end of history requires an abolition, i.e. destruction of what constituted the essence of history - religions, nations, races, traditions, cultures.

traditional values are incompatible. In this sense, the West becomes synonymous with pure Evil for anti-mondialists, which brings us back to the literal meaning of the ritual of Orthodox baptism, when the person baptized three times "denies Satan", turning his face to the West, to the symbolic "place of hell", opposite to the East, the symbolic "place of heaven."

Thus, leftist mondialism is a totally negative concept; its whole value lies only in the fact that it is so negative that it represents a very convenient model for the consolidation of all forces organically incompatible with the theory of the world liberal-democratic regime, total cosmopolitanism, One World. According to Fukuyama, as a litmus test, strategic allies and strategic opponents should be determined: if Fukuyama is approved, we are dealing with the absolute enemies of the traditional society, with the "children of darkness." Everything is obvious here. But with "right-wing mondialism", with the theory of "war of civilizations," with Huntington's concept, the situation is more complicated.

Huntington, in fact, is not an opponent of Fukuyama, his ideological opponent. He, like Fukuyama, agrees to recognize Western civilization as the highest value and is concerned about its domination over the world. But unlike Fukuyama's optimism, Huntington focuses not on describing the mondialist liberal utopia, but on highlighting those factors that currently hinder and will hinder its implementation in the future. In other words, if Fukuyama is inclined to ignore the residual aspects of the traditional way of life of peoples and states, believing that they are leveled out by themselves in the global market mondialist structure, then Huntington, on the contrary, carefully analyzes anti-mondialist, i.e. anti-Western tendencies and predicts that they are still destined to play an important role in the battle with the West.

In this sense, Huntington is more realistic and objective than Fukuyama. But this does not change anything in the system of priorities that he himself and the circles behind him are guided by.

For anti-mondialists, Huntington's analysis is very important because it identifies several specific factors that impede the realization of "The End of History." Consequently, it is precisely these factors that should be especially carefully studied and used by those forces that seek to thwart the Mondialist plans. But at the same time it is important to clearly realize that the "concessions" to traditional society that Huntington makes in his pessimistic (for mondialists) forecast, he himself considers as temporary obstacles. insurmountable at the moment, but doomed to defeat in the face of the universal and integration mission of the West. Therefore, true anti-mondialism must put forward its own third project, which would be the complete opposite of Fukuyama, but at the same time would radicalize anti-mondialist elements. which are allowed in the project "wars of civilizations" of Huntington. This requires some changes in the analysis of the situation that Huntington offers from his side.

3. Third project

First, it should be noted right away that the civilizations identified by Huntington are not equivalent systems that relate to each other in a similar way. Among them there are several civilizations that clearly have universalist claims and

historical teleology is understood in a very special way, that is, the meaning and purpose of human history. Other civilizations, despite their development, antiquity and spiritual usefulness, still have a local character, are not eschatologically sharpened and do not claim a universal mission on a planetary scale. This consideration introduces the first major division in the civilizational circles listed by Huntington.

Thus, Western, Islamic and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations clearly have their own universalist idea, believing that only they own the last word in the history of mankind. Whereas the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and potential African civilizations do not endow themselves with any global theological mission, or, if there are some attempts, we are talking about rather artificial and marginal theories. Thus, potential wars between civilizations initially acquire completely different semantic meanings.

The conflict between civilizations with claims to universality is one case that theoretically implies globality at its core.

The conflict between civilizations without messianic tendencies has a completely different meaning, limited to regional aspects.

Finally, we can consider the third case, when it comes to a potential clash of messianic and non-messianic civilizations. This clearly has a new, third meaning.

In other words, we can say that three messianically oriented civilizations are likely to dynamically provoke conflicts on the planetary scale, i.e. to act not just as ordinary civilizational subjects, but as carriers of the integral planetary ideology. Consequently, these civilizations - Western, Islamic and Orthodox - should be considered from the very beginning as the main participants in the ideological war regarding the meaning of history, into which they will try to involve other local civilizations.

There is another distinction to be made here. Among the three messianic civilizations, one is in an exceptional, privileged position. This is Western civilization. It is to her that the leading place in control over planetary reality belongs and all existing international institutions are subordinate to her. Thus, if the messianism of the Orthodox and Islamic worlds are potential tendencies, then the Western world, in fact, is on the verge of fully realizing its universalist claims, i.e. he almost succeeded in establishing his understanding of history and its end.

There is one more important circumstance that corresponds to this "chosenness" and "privilege" of the West. If all other civilizations, both messianic and non-messianic, are generally traditional, continuing, albeit in a modern form, the lines of development that precede the New Time, then the West bases its power precisely on the denial of Tradition, on the refutation of all aspects of traditional society, which it recognizes as "backward", "archaic", "undeveloped", "conservative", etc.

Hence follows the last consideration: the Western messianic anti-traditional universalist civilization alone opposes both the alternative messianic civilizations, Islam and Orthodoxy, and all other non-messianic traditional civilizations. Consequently, the main and fundamental line of the "war of civilizations" is unambiguously the line "the West against the rest", the West against the Rest. And from the position of opponents of mondialism, the opposite formulation "the Rest against the West", "everyone else is against the West" naturally suggests itself.

If the war of civilizations is destined to take place, then its main and central front will be the struggle against the West and its civilizations of all other countries. Moreover, in this struggle, the role of the Islamic and Orthodox worlds is obviously central and active. perhaps even aggressive and offensive, while other civilizations are assigned the role of passive and defensive, at the level of the national liberation struggle against Western influence.

All these considerations show that the third project, the anti-mondialist project, should take the following form.

In the planetary struggle of civilizations, the correct desired configuration would be the general unification of all countries and peoples in a geopolitical crusade against the West. This campaign should be based on an Orthodox-Islamic alliance, since it is for Islamic and Slavic-Orthodox civilizations that the Western version of messianism is a pronounced Manichean opposite of their own eschatological and teleological aspirations. If we take a closer look at the intellectual climate of the Islamic and Orthodox worlds, we will see that such a messianic consciousness continues to live among representatives of both civilizations, despite all the historical vicissitudes that have fallen to their lot: anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism are the common place of modern Islam and modern Orthodoxy.

The Slavic-Orthodox world, together with the Islamic world, represent the vanguard of the opposition of "the rest" (the Rest) to the West. The effectiveness of the anti-Western strategy on a planetary scale depends on the activity of such an alliance. It is important to emphasize that, of course, Orthodox and Islamic eschatologism represent different tendencies that cannot be reduced to a single doctrine, but in comparison with the anti-traditional line of the West, there are more similarities than differences between Islam and Orthodoxy. And already at a completely pragmatic level, it is obvious that a serious eschatological dispute between Islam and Orthodoxy can take place only if the third is excluded, i.e. only after brackeing Western civilization (and before that it is still so far away that even thinking about it is utopian) On the other hand, all the current frictions between Islam and the Slavic-Orthodox civilization are undoubtedly beneficial exclusively to the West, since as a result of tension, the West diverts the forces of its most important and dangerous historical and geopolitical opponents. The Orthodox-Islamic conflict is extremely beneficial to the West, and for this reason it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union. and for this reason alone, it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union. and for this reason alone, it is easy to understand that it is equally disadvantageous to Islam and Orthodoxy. Therefore, the anti-mondialist strategy should take as a starting point an unconditional and as strong and lasting as possible Orthodox-Islamic union.

Further, the anti-Western line should be actively pursued by the Orthodox-Islamic vanguard in other, less dynamic civilizations. In this sense, the Confucian-Islamic ties indicated by Huntington should only be welcomed. Moreover, any geopolitical and strategic cooperation between Russia and Islamic countries with

other civilizations is of tremendous importance in the overall anti-mondialist strategy. At the same time, tactically, one should reasonably distribute roles and concentrate Russia's efforts where Islam encounters certain problems, and vice versa.

So, for example, in India, Latin America and non-Islamic Africa, it is most reasonable to intensify the anti-Western line through Russia, while China, Japan and Islamic Africa will prefer to make contacts with Islamic countries. If, at the same time, the spiritual elite of the Orthodox and Islamic civilizations realizes in general terms the imperative of civilizational strategic cooperation in the face of a total enemy, then in the future it will be possible to speak of a fine coordination of all such efforts on a planetary scale. And the main goal of such coordination will be to transfer civilizational tensions into the channel of a single universal confrontation along the line of the Rest against the West. A common enemy minimizes contradictions within the various components of the "rest of the world."

And finally, the last crucial point of the anti-Western strategy is the vulnerability of Huntington's thesis about the unity of Western civilization, which includes Western Europe and the United States. If the United States is really and absolutely synonymous with the West, both in the geopolitical and in the historical, cultural sense - this country was initially based on the denial of traditions, on the artificial implementation of abstract humanistic-utopian liberal principles, then other European countries, in addition to the obvious Western component, have another potential traditional dimension. This is especially true for the countries of Central Europe and Spain, but certain aspects were preserved even in liberal and anti-traditional France. Some anti-American and traditionalist European intellectuals talk about the difference and even the opposite of the concepts of "West" and "Europe." "Europe", in their opinion, is something traditional associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while "the West" is a pure denial of the entire Tradition and an artificial civilization born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its denial, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. In their opinion, this is something traditional, associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while the "West" is a pure denial of the whole Tradition and an artificial civilization that was born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of the European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. In their opinion, this is something traditional, associated with religiosity, ethics, ethnic and national norms, while the "West" is a pure denial of the whole Tradition and an artificial civilization that was born during the period of the deepest European crisis, during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of the European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more. during the "Decline of Europe" not as a continuation of European history, but as its negation, its degeneration. Consequently, it is potentially possible to include anti-American and traditionalist movements in Europe itself in the anti-mondialist planetary front, which would make it possible to split the unstable unity of the West even more.

At least theoretically, it makes sense to include Europe, opposed to the United States, in the common front of planetary anti-mondialism, and this in practice means the need for geopolitical pressure on Europe from Russia and the Islamic world and the development of various geopolitical projects with a general tendency to cause maximum harm to the undivided dominance of the United States in the world ... And in this case, the key country is undoubtedly Germany. The ideal case would be the organization of Franco-German cooperation and the parallel transformation of Europe into an independent geopolitical sector independent of the United States as a space of an independent civilization different from the West. Such a European (Romano-Germanic) civilization in the future could play an independent role in the eschatological denouement of history,

4. Specific recommendations (Anti-Huntington)

Based on the main goal - the fight against the West and mondialism - and based on the theses of Huntington, it is not difficult to formulate a number of recommendations that will be the exact opposite of what Huntington himself advises the rulers of the West. The points:

- It is necessary to undermine American-European relations in every possible way, to encourage disharmony and conflicts in this area; it is necessary to emphasize in every possible way what separates the Old World and the New, and in every possible way to obscure what unites them. In this sense, it is useful to refer to the European geopolitical tradition of the so-called. "Continentalism" (Haushofer, Nikisch, Schmitt, Kurt von Beckmann, Leo Frobenius, etc.), where the anti-Western line was developed in detail. In a more actualized form, it is easy to find similar themes in contemporary European "New Right" (and some "New Left");
- It is important to hinder as much as possible the process of integration into the Western civilization of those countries Latin America, Eastern Europe and the East, which are striving for this. To this end, it makes sense to develop geopolitical projects in which these countries could receive certain benefits from cooperation with representatives of non-Western civilizations;
- Do everything possible to exacerbate and spoil relations with the United States Russia and Japan, resorting to any political and economic methods. The cooling of the US-Russian and US-Japanese relations will objectively force the very pro-American government in these countries to follow the national course;
- Try to translate local conflicts between civilizations into a single general planetary confrontation with the West, in whatever harsh form it may be expressed.
- In every way to encourage the military power of Orthodox, Islamic and Confucian states in order to destabilize the Western economy, forced to compete with several potential adversaries at once. It makes sense for Russia to sell weapons, including nuclear weapons, to Islamic countries - especially Iran and Iraq, as well as Libya. Nuclear atheism of the West must be opposed by nuclear Orthodoxy and nuclear Islam;
- In every possible way to encourage pacifist movements in the United States, using important factor of neo-religiosity and neo-mysticism. It makes sense to maintain and build up Russia's strategic armament in the Far East and, if possible, involve Japan in this (in exchange for high technology and financial support). Japan should be seen as Russia's main strategic ally in the Pacific against the United States in the very near future. It also makes sense to support China's political expansion southward;
- Eliminate and smooth over difficulties in contacts between Orthodox Christians. Islamic, Confucian and other countries belonging to non-Western civilizations, try to make compromises in order to prevent the ignition of internal conflicts within a potential anti-mondialist bloc;
- Identify and, if possible, suppress and persecute groups that are conductors of Western influence, especially in those countries whose geopolitical

the status is undefined. In addition, we should, whenever possible, oppress and marginalize those social strata that objectively impede the creation of a planetary anti-Western bloc and provoke conflicts among non-Western civilizations. This is especially true of anti-Russian and anti-Orthodox tendencies in Islam and anti-Islamic tendencies among Russians and Orthodox Christians.

- Sabotage, corrupt and discredit the activities of international institutions, implementing the interests of Western civilization, provoking or inspiring the withdrawal from them of the largest possible number of countries, and in the long term their dissolution or, at least, their transformation from universal to regional and local.

Unfortunately, at present, almost exclusively Huntington's theses are being implemented, and the opposite, anti-mondialist strategy has not even been formulated until now, let alone its implementation. The Yugoslav conflict (see "Elements" No. 2) is a mondialist provocation of the West to work out a clash between its civilizational opponents. A similar scenario is planned to be implemented on the territory of the former USSR, where the Islamic factor is consistently opposed to the Orthodox-Slavic, and the West-Slavic (pro-European) to Great Russian. In the interests of Islam too. both Orthodoxy and ethnic groups gravitating towards Europe, it would, on the contrary, be the conclusion of a strategic alliance and the closest interaction in the common Eurasian continental block.

Center for Special Metastrategic Research

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION (PART VIII)

THE APOCALYPSE OF ELEMENTS

(From geopolitics to philosophy of history reflections on the theory of elements by Karl Schmitt)

1.1 Civilization elements only two

The connection of the civilizational structure with the domination of one or another element of Land and Sea is the axis of the concept of Karl Schmitt and its most powerful and impressive side. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that we are talking not just about the abstract application of the sacred theory of 4 elements to cultural and historical analysis, but about the isolation of the fundamental historical (and not only natural) dualism of the two elements of Land and Sea, Earth and Water, and this dualism becomes really a historical factor only when it is recognized and intellectually experienced by human society. To clarify what, in fact, we mean, let us point out the absence of mention of the fire element and its philosophical, cultural and civilizational analysis by Schmitt (this will be discussed below). And regarding the air element associated with the era of aeronautics, Schmitt argues that it did not generate its own "nomos", its own civilizational type, being a technical continuation of the historical trajectory approved by the civilization of the Sea. Aerocracy and even more topical ethericracy, i.e. the aeronautical and space stages of the development of technology did not provoke such global changes in the course of human history, which brought with them the discovery of the World Ocean and its challenge.

Schmitt's ingenious intuition quite rightly told him that space carries neither a real challenge nor a historical response, and space exploration under the conditions of "ethericracy" only demonstrates the agony of an enslaving but not liberating technocratic civilization. At first glance, it seems that such an approach to the historical dialectic of the elements in Schmitt, if we take into account his implicitly anti-thalassocratic sympathies, should become the basis of a purely conservative doctrine with a pronounced ecological background. It is tempting to interpret the closing words of his article on "Planetary Tension Between East and West" in this way:

"New spaces, from where a new challenge will emerge, should be on our earth, and not outside it in outer space."

This is what Schmitt's followers do most often, taking into account his conservative views in politics. But, in our opinion, it would be too simple. If the new challenge is nothing more than a return to a land-based orientation after the revolutionary era of domination of "liberated technology" and oceanic civilization, even out of fear of a technological or ecological catastrophe, then the spiritual tension of the historical dialectic loses its dramatic dimension, it becomes almost a natural cyclism, is identified with that static-polar tension, on the overcoming of which, according to Schmitt himself, the entire purely human spiritual history is based. The land-sea civilizational dualism must be resolved somehow differently.

Schmitt is inclined to consider the transition to aerocracy and further, to ethericcracy, only as a natural development of the strategy of the Sea, and not as signs of new revolutionary eras. Thus, we can say that the element of Water in its universalistic expansion, carried out precisely at the expense of Land and the spaces traditionally subordinate to it, puts at its service two other elements air and ether (vacuum), which, from a physical point of view, are not nothing else but more and more discharged states of matter. In other words, the water element of the sea manifests itself through the subordinate elements of air and ether, continuing its civilizational tendency to "liquefy"; at the same time, we recall that it was this tendency that gave rise to the historical dialectic of "marine existence" and the associated liberation of technology and the stages of the industrial revolution.

How can one explain, in this case, the successes in the aeronautical and space spheres of such a land superpower as the USSR of the latest planetary expression of the geopolitical Behemoth, the forces of the continental masses and the land Nomos? In the same way as Schmitt himself brilliantly explained the historical function of Marxism in Russia: it was the conceptual arming of the doctrine of the second industrial revolution of the alternative elite, who managed to turn an archaic land country into a gigantic industrial and technical bastion, capable of successfully resisting multifaceted pressure for 70 years. oceanic civilization. The Eastern Bloc's use of aerocracy and ethericcracy was an extension of the Marxist strategy of the Industrial Revolution to resist the bourgeois civilization of the West.

So, one member of the historical dualism More included other elements in the process of its planetary affirmation. If at the time of Schmitt's writing of the article "Planetary Tension" in 1959 this process was in its infancy, then by the 80s it had become transparent and obvious to everyone. The sea has mastered Air and Space.

Here we come to the most important point in recent history, which is a touchstone for the overwhelming majority of ideologies and socio-political doctrines that were considered quite acceptable until very recently.

We mean the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and perestroika.

1.2 Specificity of the universal flood

This event is key to test the adequacy of Karl Schmitt's views. Reasoning in his terms, you can describe this event as follows.

The end of the Eastern bloc, which embodied in our century the planetary tendency of Land against the Sea, marks the end of the historical stage in which it was possible to effectively use the conceptual structure summarizing the second stage of the industrial revolution for global competition with the civilization of the Sea, with the West and the world that identified its own destiny with unlimited development of liberated technology. In other words, it was the end of the adequacy of Marxism. The forces of Sushi lost the defensive conceptuality that was effective until the conditions of the response that Marx gave to the challenge of European history that was contemporary to him changed completely and irrevocably.

One of the explanations for the collapse of the Soviet bloc is its lag in the field of technological competition, and the main point in this lag was the inability to adequately respond to the American SDI program. In other words, the Sea won a technological duel against Land in the sphere of high tech ethericcracy associated with strategic inventions in the space field.

What does this mean from the point of view of the dialectic of history?

First: the Sea, which gave rise to the impulse of a technical breakthrough and further technical civilization, nevertheless defeated Land, although it borrowed in a timely manner and effectively the latest (for its time) conceptual technology from the Sea itself. This process strictly coincided with the end of the second stage of the industrial revolution. On a theoretical level, this began to become clear from the beginning of the 70s in parallel with the rapid degeneration of communism and socialism in Europe. In practice, the end was put in restructuring. The third stage of the industrial revolution needed at least a new Marx and a new Marxism. It could have been European fascism, but this attempt turned out to be abortive both on a theoretical level and on a physical plane, Germany was defeated by a more civilizationally consistent land power (USSR), supported in this case by the Sea (as has happened many times in history from Napoleon to the First and Second World Wars). There was no new Marx, apparently, there could not and should not have been.

Second: The collapse of the Eastern Bloc means a real globalization of the Sea, which from the role of judge and controller is moving to the role of an autocrator (autocrat). This is mondialism, the civilizational integration of the planet under the auspices of the West. In the religious language for this event, there is only one name for the Flood, the end of the Earth's nomos, and the universal domination of the Sea's nomos. Let us also recall the apocalyptic beast coming out of the Sea.¹⁰⁰ This entails the final transition from the era of confrontation between the two elements to the era of the conquest of one element by the other, hostile to it. We can say that this is the beginning of the "universal world". Leviathan defeats Behemoth, Whale Bear. Moby Dick's triumph over the Russian Bear.

Third: the Sea is now subject to the rest of the elements of the conquered Land (the defeated enemy, Hostis), Air and Ether (natural allies, in solidarity with the water dialectics, Amicus) serve as ideovariations of the Sea, the helper of the elements of the planetary Ship, the World Island (World Island, and in terms of Speakman, not Mackinder). This is the era of One World, post-industrial society, the era of global informatization and automation. In the language of Marx's most avant-garde intuitions, this is called "real domination of capital"¹⁰¹. The time of the disappearance of ideologies, the time of postmodernism and the "end of history".

The challenge of the opened Ocean, accepted by the Anglo-Saxons, who gave the answer, which was embodied in a techno-industrial breakthrough, was molded into the modern Western

¹⁰⁰ It is interesting to explore the geopolitical meaning of the symbolism of a "false prophet" or "another beast." About him in the "Apocalypse" says the following: "And I saw another beast coming out of the earth" (Apocalypse 13, 11). Those. this "other beast" belongs to Suchet. But it also emphasizes that "he acts before him with all the power of the first beast" (Apt. 13, 12). In other words, we are talking about the "spirit of the Land", which went over to the side of the elements of the Sea, to the side of Leviathan. Just as the "beast coming out of the sea" itself is a representative of Satan, the dragon, his substitute (that is, Atlantism is a historical expression of world evil), so "another beast" or "false prophet" is, in turn, already a representative of the "beast from sea", ie its substitute.

¹⁰¹ See Jean-Marc Vivenza, From the Formal Dominance of Capital to Its Real Dominance, The Elements, No. 7.

civilization, subjugated the whole world and took on its final form in the global autocracy of America, the very continent from the discovery of which Columbus began the "modern world." This challenge completed its historical manifestation in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, in the restructuring and disintegration of the USSR. The liberated technique (entfesselte Technik) has overcome all external barriers. The Power of the Sea is now absolute. It is embodied in the hegemony of the technocratic West, the strategic primacy of the United States, the domination of fluid capital, and the complete blurring of traditional value structures. Property, inheritance, marriage, dwelling have all lost the meaning that they had in the era of land existence, in the era of the nomos of the Earth.

1.3 An overlooked element

Although Schmitt speaks of the disposability of truly historical events, preferring to avoid any form of determinism and systematization, nevertheless, being a Christian, he could hardly deny that history has an End and, therefore, some teleology. His rejection of the teleology of Hegel or Marx does not mean rejection of teleology in general. As an absolutely honest thinker (and in this sense he is similar to Heidegger), he does not want to limit either himself or others the free intuition of truth, believing that this is the highest human dignity and intellectual freedom, which are projected, in the end, into The Policy (das Politische) and in the Decision (die Entscheidung). All Schmitt's arguments implicitly contain eschatologism, normal for a Christian: he emphasizes the uniqueness of the New Time, which lies in its globalism, and in its attitude to "

Obviously, Schmitt realized the parallelism between the biblical story about the creation of Land as a result of the withdrawal of the Waters and the actual situation, which is something of a reverse offensive of sea existence on land, i.e. symbolic flooding of the Earth with Water. At the same time, it is important that the thalassocratic tendency, permanent in history, is only currently entering its oceanic phase, acquiring the maximum possible scale. The radiation of oceanic thalassocracy into the stratosphere and space only illustrates the limit of its victory.

But a logical retrospective question arises: why exactly the nomos of the Earth, Land became the matrix of human existence in the millennium of Tradition? And further, why did such a stable land structure of the traditional nomos (not overturned either by potamic (river), or limited thalassocratic or nomadic retreats) finally fell victim to the chaotic elements of the Ocean?

The Book of Genesis, asserting the existence of Waters before Sushu, hints at a certain primacy of Chaos in comparison with order, and Indo-European mythology confirms this in many plots. In a sense, it can be assumed (as is the case in the Hermetic tradition) that the Earth is condensed Water, and in terms of geography, that Land is the bottom of the Ocean, freed from Water. But this territory conquered from chaos, nomos, Land, Continent, Mackinder's Heartland, Mitgard of the ancient Germans, the fortress of Order, the historical Polis is not the cause of the traditional nomos, but the result of some transcendental influence, the trace of the Supernatural recorded in nature, the imprint of what is possible would be called the source of History. The Russian word for solid earth, das feste Land, die Erde, will allow us to get closer to this mysterious power. This word is Land. It etymologically contains an indication of the quality of dryness, which is absent in other languages. And this quality, in turn,

evokes an association with warmth, heat and Fire, that last forgotten element, the fifth element, which is familiar to ancient classifications, but for some reason is absent in Schmitt's civilizational and historical analysis.

And right there we remember Heraclitus, who, in spite of Thales of Miletus and other philosophers-thalassocratus, approved the revolutionary theory of the origin of the Universe from Fire. Fire is undoubtedly a transcendental element in relation to the elements of the earthly environment. If the Earth, Water and Air are internal in relation to our planet and its inhabitants, and even the cosmic vacuum surrounding the stratosphere can be considered as an inner quintessence (ether) in relation to the environment, then Fire, Heat, Light come to us from outside, from a shining sacrificial star, the Great Sun. Common elements are the elements of people. Fire is the element of the Gods, the substance of the spiritual Heaven. And the polarity of Fire in relation to all other elements does not fit into that static, purely natural, scheme that Schmitt rightly isolated, speaking of the natural tension between the Land and the Sea, and which he quite rightly separated from the tension inherent in the dialectic of human history. In fact, the tension provoked by Fire is the essence of dialectics, and if one can agree with Thales about the origin of Nature, then only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis. only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis. only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to people, the divine Fire brought to earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the agent invisible of alchemists, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus, unfolding through the centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, celestial gnosis.

The Transcendental Fire scatters the primordial Waters to create the Land. The Transcendental Fire is revered as the main Principle by the people of the Earth, they place it in the center of their Home (sacred hearth), in the center of their Temple (sacred altar), in the center of their body (reverence for the heart), in the center of their world (the sun, which gives orientation of space and dimension time). The terrestrial nomos of the Earth is a consequence of the subtle influence of Fire. Mankind responded to the challenge of the Transcendent with a land order, and thus entered History, rose above nature and became itself. Home is the answer to the Sun. Land and its civilization is a product of intellectually meaningful Fire.

As long as the connection between Fire and Earth was realized, the oceanic challenge did not exist. Thalassocracy was counterbalanced by tellurocracy, and the Roman Vesta triumphantly crushed the foam-born Carthage, whenever it encroached on the universalization of its cultural and civilizational message. When the sacred fire died out in the homes of people, in the hearts of people, in their temples, the apocalyptic roar of Liviathan was heard. And the Land, which had lost its meaning, its center, its power, was henceforth doomed to lose the eschatological duel to the Sea.

The restructuring and slaughter of the Behemoth became inevitable already at the moment when the Tradition became conservative, when the answer given to the challenge of the transcendental Fire finally obscured the question when the nomos of the Earth stopped checking its norms with the nomos of Heaven. Ultimately, all of human history is nothing more than an interlude between the First Flare of the magic star and the universal flood.

1.4 Icon and Land

Schmitt's remarks on iconography and his generalizations about the connection between the Image and the West are very interesting. This is directly related to the element of Fire, since the visual ability is an element of the light dimension of reality, which, in turn, is one of the aspects of Fire (along with heat). If we accept the genetic connection between Land and the Sun, revealed by us, then the connection between the Icon, the sacred visual image, and the nomos of the Earth will become clear. Naturally, spatial immobility, fixity, orderliness of the environment naturally gravitate towards expression in the image of a symbol, hieroglyph, picture. The fire, as it were, snatches from the fluid reality a certain fragment that is transformed into an Image, into an Icon, into something permanent. This, as it were, repeats the mystery of the origin of the original Land from the mass of water chaos. Nomos of the earth through the Icon constantly reminds of its source. In this sense, the worship of icons and, in general, the use of painting, is indeed a clear sign of traditional, earthly, continental existence.

This consideration helps to develop the comments that Schmitt made about Spain's historic mission. Catholic Spain, having planted the face of the Blessed Virgin on all the conquered lands, carried out an incredibly important mission of neutralizing the Ocean (and calling it) by means of Fire. In some ways, this planetary operation was analogous to the historical function of Marxism in Russia: in both cases, the challenge of the Sea was accepted in order, if possible, to neutralize its harmful consequences for the Earth's nomos and to try to turn the poison into medicine. The loss by Spain of the sea battle with the English pirates was fraught with terrible planetary consequences: on the transatlantic island, the Anglo-Saxons sowed the seeds of that apocalyptic civilization, which was destined to embody Leviathan in all its eschatological, final power. From the foam emerged the Continent Ship, superior in all respects to its European prototype. It was written to this monster to extinguish the sacred fire, smash the Image, establish its own "new world order" on the planet. Naturally, the dominant worldview of the newborn monster was the ideas of extreme Protestant sects, Baptists, Puritans, Mormons, etc., differing in the extreme degree of iconoclasm, church modernism and light of no hatred. The doomed Latin American guerrilla, based on a mixture of Marxism (sic!) And Catholic liberation theology (sic !!), is all that remains today of the ambitious planetary demarche of the Spanish conquistadors to disrupt the ecumenical flood.

But here one theoretical difficulty arises, which Schmitt has not fully analyzed. The fact is that he mentions the habit of identifying the visual Image and the veneration of icons with the West, and its negation, iconoclasm, with the East. Schmitt himself gives several examples that refute the unambiguous correctness of such an identification. Let's deal with this in a little more detail. Moreover, this closely touches on the most important problem for us, the historical meaning of Russia and its mission.

1.5 Absolute Amicus et Hostis portraits in time and space

Here we are dealing with a problem, the metaphysical meaning of which was understood in our other book ("Mysteries of Eurasia", chapter "Subconsciousness of Eurasia"). We are talking about the identification of their Tradition with the West, typical for European thinkers. At the same time, it is often not just about the West, but about the Northwest. Moreover, sometimes even three geographical concepts West, North-West and North merge. This is opposed by the South, Southeast and East, most often, also merging into one civilizational picture, represented by the Semitic cultural landscape of the Middle East,

most familiar to Europe historically. At the same time, this view is sometimes deduced from the Roman, and sometimes from the Christian heritage.

But this is, in fact, an optical illusion that Europeans owe to geography. Only the deepest minds and, first of all, René Guénon were able to move away from this confusion and look at things from a different, more adequate position. So, René Guénon quite rightly pointed out that, from the point of view of real (and sacred) geography, the continent-Eurasia is a huge mass of land, where Europe is only a western cape, a peninsula directed to the Atlantic. Indo-European peoples live all over the continent from Hindustan through Iran and Russia to Europe itself. Aryan India preserves the memory of the most ancient myths and intellectual views of the white race, and Orthodox Christianity spreads far beyond the Urals up to the Pacific Ocean, occupying spaces larger than Europe. However, historical narrowness and inculcated clichés do not allow Europeans to treat the Orthodox culture of Russia as a completely authentic Christian tradition, moreover, entrusted to the white Indo-European people. It is very significant in our context that it is in Orthodox Russia that the Greek name "icon" has survived as applied to the sacred image, and moreover, it is the Orthodox, Russian icon that today fully supports the truly Christian tradition, which has practically died out in the West.

René Guénon, reviewing the book "The Origin of Humanity" by German professor Hermann Wirth¹⁰², pointed out that it is necessary to distinguish between such concepts as the North Atlantic (north-western), Hyperborean (northern) and Atlantic (western) regions.

In fact, the worship of Fire and the land nomos of the Earth, carefully studied by Schmitt, is a distinctive quality of the Indo-European white peoples as a whole, who descended into Eurasia from the North, settled throughout its space from West to East and from East to West. Where there are Indo-Europeans, there is an Icon, sacred painting, worship of Fire and Light, solar myths, traditional hierarchy and the memory of Hyperborea. India abounds in sacred images. In Iran, even after Islamization, and Islam strictly forbids images of people and animals, miniatures and real paintings flourished. In the Russian Orthodox Church, not only icons, but also icon painters were revered, and the Orthodox hesychasm, the doctrine of the Uncreated Light, was the central life line of the Russian Church.

Dislike for the image, iconoclasm, is also characteristic not so much of the East as of the South. This is quite normal geographic symmetry, if we take into account the Hyperborean origins of the Indo-Europeans. If the race of the North worships fire and an image, then the opposing race of the South should worship the antithesis of Fire (for example, Water) and the antithesis of an icon (for example, sound). It is curious that Guénon himself correlates this cultural dualism with sedentaryism and nomadism: sedentaryism is associated with the figure of the biblical Cain, visually and time, while nomadism with Abel, verbalism and space¹⁰³. This fits perfectly into the duality of the elements, which Schmitt parsed. The marine existence (albeit strictly separated from nomadism) is such an extreme development of nomadism, which passes into a new quality at the moment when the path from

¹⁰² See j-l "Dear Angel" N 1, Moscow, 1991.

¹⁰³ See René Guénon "The Kingdom of Quantity and Signs of the Times", Moscow, 1994.

land nomadism through navigation on the mainland seas and up to a decisive exit into the open Ocean.

One more detail is also extremely curious: Guénon claims that the Semitic tradition is by no means an Eastern tradition, but an Atlantic, Western and at the same time nomadic tradition. Hence, according to him, and a positive attitude towards the cattle-breeder Abel in the biblical story. Moreover, Guénon points to the fact that the great architect was invited from among foreigners to build the Temple of Solomon, and proves that it was a representative of the Indo-European tradition, since it was characterized by the cultivation of sacred architecture, i.e. the construction of that House, which, according to Schmitt, underlies the nomos of the Earth, and the Semitic nomads themselves had a different social and sacred structure.

And finally, in relation to the East, Guénon argued that this side of the world is more than anyone else associated with Tradition, with the constancy of sacred archetypes, with fidelity to the origins. In the book "East and West" he elaborated on the argumentation in support of this thesis. We can say that Guénon unambiguously connects the East with the North, considering it the historical successor of the original Nordic Tradition. By the way, regarding the identity of the concept of the Light of the North and the Light of the East, brilliant passages can be found in the works of Henri Corbin, the best modern specialist in Iranian tradition and translator of the great Sohrawardi.

So, let's summarize our comments. The North is identified with the Indo-European tradition, sedentaryism, worship of Fire and the Image. In addition, the North is also sacredly connected with the East. It is these two orientations that should be taken as initial in the question of the history of the development of the Earth's nomos and its central lines of force. The defense of icon veneration in history, therefore, is by no means a western, but a northern or eastern tendency. This line is typical for all of Eurasia from India to Ireland. It coincides with the historical trajectory of the Light of the North, Nordlicht, and with the peoples and cultures that act as bearers of this Light. These are Doric Sparta, imperial Rome, Zoroastrian Iran, Vedic India, Byzantium, Orthodox Russia, Catholic Ireland and Spain. This is the camp of the nomos of the Earth.

At the opposite pole of history, accordingly, there are the South together with the West (!), Nomadic sevens, iconoclasts, the embryos of thalassocracy, commercial civilization and "technological breakthrough". Guénon would call this camp "the preconditions for an anti-traditional civilization" and "the builders of the Great Parody." It is also worth recalling the idea of the eschatological dissolution of the Egg of the World, "dissolution", set forth by Guénon in "The Kingdom of Quantity", which exactly and chronologically and typologically coincides with the triumph of the Sea analyzed by Schmitt. Guénon, like Schmitt, connects this dissolution with technological progress, liberal ideology and Western civilization of the New Time. The Anglo-Saxon world as a whole evoked in him a feeling of deep hostility and wariness.

And finally, the role of the Semitic factor, Western and nomadic, according to Guénon; southern, if we evaluate the distribution of the Semites from the standpoint of Eurasia; associated with trade and free exchange, characteristic of all thalassocracies (Carthage v. Rome); who stood at the origins of capitalism (criticized by both Marx and Sombart); iconoclastic and hostile to everything Indo-European in religious matters (Judaism and Islam); in solidarity with the Protestant movement in its Calvinist version (the spread of Calvinism in Holland, England, and later in America the oceanic powers for the most part); finally, especially active in the destruction of traditional

for Europe, the nomos of the Earth (about which Schmitt himself has repeatedly written) puts the last point in the chain of correspondences.

North + East, Icon, Indo-Europeans, Fire, Home, Settlement, Tradition and Land. These are the powers of the Earth's nomos. Supporters of culture and order, who responded to the challenge of the transcendental Fire with a fan of Aryan traditions up to Christianity.

South + West, Iconoclasm, Semitic peoples, Water, Ship, nomadism, modernism and the Sea. These are the forces of denial of the Earth, carriers of dissolution, apocalyptic energies of rational chaos, the nomos of the Sea. They responded to the Ocean challenge by taking its side against the Earth and against the most ancient, almost forgotten fiery Promethean question, which predates the earth's nomos and all of human history.

1.6 Nomos of Fire

The end of the Eastern Bloc signifies the complete victory of the Nomos of the Sea. All attempts to resist its logic and its structure with the help of its own technical means turned out to be untenable. The battle on ships was lost by Spain; economic-industrial, strategic and doctrinal resistance to the nomos of the Sea of National Socialist Germany (1933-1945), inspired in part by Haushofer's Eurasian project, was suppressed by the power and cunning of the West, which used the USSR for this purpose; technological rivalry, taking into account the lessons of Marxism, which lasted the longest, was lost in the 60s and 80s by the Warsaw Pact countries in parallel with the end of the second stage of the industrial revolution and the transition to a post-industrial society. The cycle of human history, having passed through the static polarities of nature, has come to an end,

We can state the absolute loss of Land, Behemoth, Eurasia, Earth's nomos. Of course, the very nomos of the Earth was only a trace of the solution by humanity to the open problem of Being put before it, but not by its essence. The external form of the Answer, but not the fiery element that gave rise to the Hyperborean Answer. The Earth can no longer respond to the challenge of the Nomos of the Sea, which has become global and unique. She is flooded with Waters, her Order is dissolved through the cracks in the World Egg. The end of the industrial revolution dispelled the illusion that entfesselte Technik could be competed at its own level. The etherocratic stage of absolute thalassocracy, a glance thrown at the Earth from space, makes all creatures swarming on it, fundamentally the same, their value is strictly pragmatic and equal to their usefulness. Life is calculated in the financial equivalent of the really dominant Capital. Genetic engineering is breeding chickens and human clones, just as the steam engine or the loom was invented yesterday. Technology has invaded humanity, reaching its center. In 1959, Schmitt might still have a spark of hope that something could suddenly change. By the end of the century, there is no such hope.

The Triumph of Water apocalyptically absorbed all the elements and all historical forms that he could not only destroy, but transmute in his civilizational geopolitical parodic alchemy. Gold (money), a universal solvent and the technical ingenuity of the forces of the Sea have turned humanity into a controlled biomass. But there is something left that is not subject to this global process.

The fire.

It is he who, cleared of his natural, cultural and socio-political layers acquired during his travel through history, is now in a privileged position in comparison with the compromise state in which he was, remaining only the nomos of the Earth, the land order. The structure of its initial challenge is only now being clarified, since only now is it manifested in its entire historical volume to which this challenge was thrown. The question is neither more nor less than a Human. To what extent was it historical? What is natural? To what extent did he succumb to the elements that make up his natural fabric (up to general rationality)? To what extent was he able to remain faithful to the unobvious transcendental dimension? How much fire did it end up with? Or is it all just Water?

GLOSSARY

(basic concepts and terms of geopolitics)

Anacondas strategy the geopolitical line of Atlanticism, aimed at tearing away from Eurasia as much of the coastal territories as possible in order to contain its geopolitical expansion.

Atlantism (related terms **Water, Sea, Thalassocracy, Sea Power**) complex geopolitical concept; combines in itself: historically the Western sector of human civilization, strategically the union of Western countries dominated by the liberal-democratic ideology, the military-strategic NATO member states, social focus on **"Trading system"** and Opposite **"Market values"** (model USA). to Eurasianism.

Aerocracy Greek "Power through air". The strength component of the strategy, based on the development of airspace and its use for **geopolitical expansion**. The development of aviation, in contrast to the development of navigation, did not generate its own nomos, becoming only the development of the thalassocratic principle.

hippopotamus other Heb. "Beast", "land monster" (in the Bible). Schmitt's term. Same as **continent, continentalism, Eurasianism**.

Berlin natural strategic capital of Central Europe.

Bipolar world (bipolarism or bipolarity) a natural geopolitical structure that reflects the main geopolitical dualism on a planetary scale **thalassocracy** vs **tellurocracy**.

Block the unification of several states, significantly changing their strategic and geopolitical quality, bringing them to a higher level of planetary activity. According to law **"Spatial progression"** the formation of blocks is an inevitable process.

Rich North the same as Atlanticism, the West and the liberal-democratic world.

Large Space (Grossraum) Schmitt's term. Consolidation of several powers into a single strategic entity. The emergence of Large Spaces is due to the theory **"Spatial progression"**.

Outer crescent (or **island crescent**) Mackinder's term denoting the totality of territories included in the zone **thalassocratic** influence. Parts of continents and islands gravitating towards **"Marine existence"**. Also a zone entirely controlled by strategic **atlantism**.

Inland sea (mare internum lat.) a term denoting a body of water enclosed within a land tellurocratic volume, and therefore is not a strategic or cultural boundary.

Inner ocean term meaning the same as **"Inland sea"**, only on a planetary scale. Also **Middle Ocean**.

Inner crescent (or continental crescent or rimland) Mackinder's term denoting the coastal territories of Eurasia located between "**Outer crescent**" and "**Axial area**".

Inner axis the quality of the geopolitical connection between the center and the periphery within a single strategic (or political) space. See also geopolitical ray and geopolitical segment.

Water (or Sea) a special term for "thalassocracy". Especially developed by Schmitt (das Meer) and Mahan (Sea, Sea Power).

East the same as the Second World.

Enemy (hostis lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept that denotes the totality of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities that stand in positions opposite to those of the strategic capital. It has no moral burden and can be dynamically transferred to various formations. Movable category. See a friend.

Second world the name of the socialist camp during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, it means Eurasia.

The geographical axis of history (or axial range or heartland) Mackinder's term denoting the inland Eurasian territories around which the spatial dynamics of historical development takes place. Coincides with the territory of Russia.

Geopolitics is a science, the main provisions of which are set out in this book.

Geopolitical dualism the basic principle of geopolitics, which asserts the opposition of thalassocracy and tellurocracy as the engine of the historical process.

Geopolitical ray vector of power (economic, strategic, cultural, economic, administrative, etc.) impact of the geopolitical pole on peripheral regions. The real political picture of the world in a static state operates with geopolitical segments. In geopolitics, it is customary to speak of rays as an open dynamic process of a constantly lasting impulse.

Geopolitical stretch a set of relations between a strategic capital (or geopolitical pole) with peripheral regions, considered at a specific historical moment without taking into account the general dynamics of political processes. See also geopolitical ray.

Geostrategy military aspects of geopolitical analysis.

Geoeconomics an offshoot of Atlantist geopolitics. Considers space in utilitarian-economic sense. One of priority disciplines "Thalassocratic" analysis.

State-Nation secular state with bright pronounced centralism. Political formation in which state forms lead to birth

ethnos and its culture. It differs from ethnic formation (community, people) and from the Empire.

The border in geopolitics, there are two types of borders: border-line and border-strip. A line boundary represents a maritime boundary. The border is a land lane. The task of a geopolitical bloc, claiming to act on a planetary scale, is to make border lines maximum for itself and minimum for an adversary, and vice versa.

Demopolitics Kjellen's term. Influence of demographic parameters on the structure of the state. Not widely used.

Discontinuous belt Cohen's term. Broken coastal zones with an indefinite, variable orientation, which can turn towards both the tellurocratic continent and the thalassocratic sea.

Friend (amicus lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept. denoting a set of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities, standing in positions that coincide with the positions of the strategic capital. Has no moral burden and can be dynamically transferred to different education. Movable category. See enemy.

Eurasianism complex geopolitical concept; combines in itself: historically eastern sector of human civilization, strategically relevant or a potential bloc of states and nations that refuse to recognize the imperative of liberal-democratic ideology, a strategically relevant or potential association in a military alliance of the eastern, "**Tellurocratic**" countries, socially oriented towards "**Ideocracy**" welfare state, non-capitalist economic system.

Eurasia the same as **continent, heartland, land, earth, tellurocracy**. In a more limited sense, it means geopolitical Russia.

One World (One World) see mondialism.

Living space Haushofer's term. The minimum territorial volume that allows the people to achieve the realization of their historical and political aspirations.

West synonym **thalassocracy, atlantism**.

Land (or **Land**) in geopolitics, a special term for "tellurocracy". The theory of "Earth", das Land, was developed especially in detail by Karl Schmitt.

Ideocracy gr. "The power of ideas, ideals." The term of the Russian Eurasians (N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky). Contrasted with the "power of matter", "market system", "**Trading system**". Under ideocracy, the hierarchy in society and the stimulation of labor proceed from non-economic principles.

Empire a superstate formation that unites several peoples and countries under the auspices of a universal idea of a religious, ethical or ideological nature.

Integration in geopolitics, it means various forms of combining several spatial sectors. Integration can be carried out both on the basis of military expansion and peacefully. There are several ways of geopolitical integration: economic, cultural, linguistic, strategic, political, religious, etc. All of them can lead to the same end result of an increase in the strategic and spatial volume of the block.

The colony territory controlled by a force, separated by a body of water. It is viewed as a temporary and external base, alienated from the general geopolitical space of the metropolis. Opposite **provinces**.

End of Story Fukuyama's term. Mondialist thesis about the total victory of thalassocracy and the liberal-democratic model on the whole planet. Cm. **mondialism, One World**.

Continent Eurasia, Land, tellurocratic principle.

Continentalism synonym **Eurasianism** in a narrowly strategic aspect. Concept close to concept **Dry land, Earth**. The Continentalist school of geopolitics is the only one in Russia, prevailing in Germany, present in France and impossible for the Anglo-Saxon countries. Opposite **atlantism**.

Kratopolitics Kjellen's term. Consideration of the state from the point of view of its power potential. Not widely used.

Leviathan Old Hebrew "Sea monster" (in the Bible). Schmitt's term. Same as **atlantism, Sea** etc.

Liberalism a worldview that combines the left (minimalist humanism, individualism, ethnic and cultural egalitarianism) components in the field of politics and the right (market, privatization, private property, capitalism) in the field of economics. The ruling ideology of the Atlanticist camp. The political expression of liberalism is **liberal democracy**.

Meridian expansion (expansion along the North-South axis) expansion of the sphere of influence (military, strategic, cultural or economic) along the meridian, also **longitudinal expansion**; the main condition for the territorial and strategic stability of the state.

Meridian integration (integration along the North-South axis) linking separate spatial sectors into a single whole along the meridian (also longitudinal **integration**). Positive in case of confident control over the northern and central regions. Negative if located in the north or in the center of geopolitical formations, whose loyalty **strategic capital** questionable or weak.

Location Savitsky's term. The same as a quality space or just **space** (in a geopolitical sense).

Minimal geopolitics an applied discipline that borrows some terms and methods from genuine geopolitics, but leaves aside the basic geopolitical dualism.

World Island Mackinder's term. Mackinder called them **Eurasia** and the geographical axis of history. In Speakman, this concept radically changed its meaning and began to denote the totality **thalassocratic** zones (**zones of the outer crescent**). Due to this discrepancy, it is better not to use the term broadly in order to avoid ambiguity.

Multipolar world at the present stage, a purely theoretical concept that presupposes the coexistence of several **Large Spaces**. Possible only after overcoming **unipolar world**.

Mondialism from fr. monde "peace" (meaning "world", not "peace"). A special ideology that presupposes the merger of all states and peoples into a single planetary entity with the establishment of a World Government, the destruction of racial, religious, ethnic, national and cultural boundaries. There is "right" mondialism and "left". The right one represents globalization **Atlanticism**. The left considers it necessary to include in the United State and **Eurasian** sector (on one or another basis).

Sea the same as **thalassocracy**,

Water. Moscow natural strategic capital **Eurasia**. The foundation axes any **continental integration**. Cm. **Eurasia**

Neoatlantism a modern version of Atlanticism that rejects mondialism (even right sense) as a premature and impracticable project in the given conditions. Considers that instead of **One World** will happen **clash of civilizations**.

New order a large-scale geopolitical reorganization project.

New world order the same as mondialism and projects for the creation of a World Government.

Nomos term by Karl Schmitt. The basic principle of organizing any space (geographic, social, political, economic, cultural, etc.). Synonymous with the concept of "order", "law", "way". Nomos Sushu = **tellurocracy**.
Nomos of Water (or Sea) = **thalassocracy**.

Society the result of the collapse of communal formations. Unlike a community, it is fundamentally divisible into atomic members (individuals).

Community the natural form of existence of people connected by organic ties. Opposes **society**, in which, instead of organic ties, the norms of a formalized contract between individuals dominate. Society is governed by Tradition.

the fire an element symbolizing a pure spirit. Transcendental principle.

Unipolar world the geopolitical model that emerged after the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War. The only dominant pole is Atlanticism and the United States.

Axis geopolitical union of two or more **geopolitical capitals**.

Partisan Schmitt's term, the symbolic figure of the defender of the "nomos" Sushi in a situation of triumph of the opposing geopolitical force.

Passionarity Gumilyov's term. Internal energy of an ethnos, the driving force of cultural, political and geopolitical creation.

Periphery spaces and lands that do not have an independent geopolitical orientation, remote from **strategic capital**, on whose behalf the main geopolitical decisions are made.

Political geography Ratzel's term denoting what after Kjellen came to be called "geopolitics" proper.

Possibilism from fr. possible, "possible". Vidal de la Blache's term. Designed to nuance geographic determinism, partly characteristic of geopolitics. Theory Possibilism claims that **space** does not predetermine history, but only predispose to one or another of its course.

Applied Geopolitics the term Lacoste. Using geopolitical toolkit applied to micro-issues of regional guiding principles. Also level excluding **minimal geopolitics**.

Provinces peripheral territories that are part of the main geopolitical formation and are considered as an integral part of the organic whole. Opposite **colonies**.

Space the basic concept of geopolitics. It is not a quantitative but a qualitative category. The structure of space predetermines the structure of history (first of all, political history). This is the main thesis of geopolitics as a science.

Spatial progression law formulated by Jean Thiriard. It sounds like "from states - cities through states-territories to states of continents ". Geographic the dynamics of the political stories relentlessly leads to an increase scale minimum social formations. Cm. also **"Vital space"**.

Spatial meaning Ratzel's term. The system of historical predeterminations embedded in the qualitative space. Cm. **space**.

Regionalism focus on autonomy **peripheral spaces**. It has several forms of economic, cultural, political and strategic.

Sacred geography the totality of the ancients' ideas about the qualitative space. Modern geopolitics is guided by a typologically similar understanding **space**, only expresses it in a rational natural science form.

Sanitary cordon artificial geopolitical formations serving to destabilize two large neighboring states that can form a serious bloc, which, in turn, will be dangerous for a third party. A classic move in the strategy of the Atlanticists in their opposition to the continental integration of Eurasia.

North in sacred geography (and in Doibler's) a symbol of spirit and ideal order. In modern geopolitics, it is synonymous with the concept **rich north**, which is something exactly the opposite, i.e. Atlanticism and Liberalism.

Sociopolitics Kjellen's term. Study of the social aspects of the state.

Middle Ocean (Midland Ocean) Speakman's term. Atlantic Ocean, if we consider North America and Europe as a single geopolitical space.

Central Europe space intermediate between Russia and the Atlantic the coast of Europe. Traditionally viewed as a zone of German predominantly influence.

Clash of civilizations Huntington's term. Theory permanence and irreplaceability of geopolitical conflicts at the civilizational level.

Strategic capital (geopolitical pole or source of geopolitical ray) center of geopolitical **integration** and an active figure in the large-scale geopolitical process. Links between strategic capitals form geopolitical **axis**.

Land cm. **Land**

Tellurocracy Greek "Power through the land" or "land power". Characteristics of powers with a clear land geopolitical orientation. See Eurasia, Heartland, ideocracy.

Thalassocracy - Greek "Power through the sea" or "sea power". Characteristics of states and nations dominated by navigation.

Tokyo natural strategic capital of the Pacific.

Trading system a type of society in which the hierarchy and stimulation of labor are based on economic principles. Market, liberal-democratic system. Opposite **ideocracy**.

Third World a common name for underdeveloped countries that belong primarily to the regions of the geopolitical South.

Turan the northeastern regions of the Eurasian continent, the steppe expanses of Eurasia.

Latitudinal integration (integration along parallels) is the most vulnerable and difficult moment of linking the geopolitical spaces controlled by the center. Should be carried out by the most peaceful and diplomatic means. It is based on the gradual joining of heterogeneous regions to the central part through the spatial hierarchy of the sectors most loyal to the center.

Latitudinal expansion (expansion along parallels) an aggressive geopolitical trend that invariably generates conflict situations, an offensive geopolitical strategy. Almost always fraught with military conflicts. is carried out only after the completion of the meridian expansion.

Ecopolitics Kjellen's term. Consideration of the state as an economic force. Not widely used.

Etherocracy Greek "Power by means of supra-atmospheric layers". Dominance of space weapons. Development of thalassocratic and aerocratic tendencies.

South in sacred geography, regions of disorder, confusion and degeneration. In modern geopolitics, the Third World is an underdeveloped country where liberal-democratic principles have not been established.

Heartland English "Core earth"; cm. **the geographical axis of history**. Mackinder's term.

Hinterland German "Back ground". Areas extending inland from the coastlines. A term specific to **thalassocratic** analysis of space.

Jus Publicum Europeum lat. "General European Law". Historical set of legal codes that governed interstate relations in Europe.

Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum lat. "General Eurasian Law". A draft international law that could regulate relations between Eurasian countries and peoples based on the recognition of the priority of continental **tellurocratic** values.

Lenaland English "Land adjacent to the Lena river basin". Mackinder's term. Indicates all North Eurasian territories lying east of the Yenisei River up to the Pacific coast. In his later works, Mackinder paid special attention to this area, believing that these lands did not belong to **tellurocratic**, but **thalassocratic** zones of influence.

Linkage Kissinger's term. **Atlantist** strategy by connection **discount belt** Eurasia into a continuous territory controlled by the West.

Mitteleuropa German the same as **Middle Europe. One world** mondialist

concept of the One World. See also End of History.

Pax americana lat. "American World". Same as **atlantism. Pax**

Euroasiatica lat. "The world in a Eurasian way". Same as **Eurasianism**.

Pax persica lat. "World in Persian". A project for the geopolitical reorganization of the Central Asian space under the auspices of Iran in alliance with Russia.

Rimland English "Coastal lands"; cm. **"Inner crescent"**. Mackinder's term.

Александр Дугин

ОСНОВЫ ГЕОПОЛИТИКИ



В год 1999-й через семь месяцев (1)
с небес снизойдет великий Король Ужаса (2)
чтобы воскресить великого Короля Ангулемского (3)
после того, как Марс изрядно повластвует (4)
- (Мишель Нострадамус)

Вместо «великого царя ужаса» 11 августа 1999 пришел Путин.
(Александр Дугин, «Новогоднее обращение Арктогеи», 31 декабря 1999 г.)

Геополитическое
будущее России

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А. Дугин

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От редакции

История и судьба геополитики как науки парадоксальна. С одной стороны, само понятие, кажется, стало привычным, активно используется в современной политике. Множатся геополитические журналы и институты. Издаются и переиздаются тексты основателей этой дисциплины, устраиваются конференции, симпозиумы, создаются геополитические комитеты и комиссии.

Но, тем не менее, до сих пор геополитика так и не смогла попасть в разряд конвенциональных общепризнанных наук. Первые геополитические работы немца Ратцеля, шведа Челлена и особенно англичанина Макиндера встречались научной общественностью в штыки. Классическая наука, наследующая в полной мере гиперкритицистский дух раннего позитивизма, считала, что геополитика претендует на чрезмерные обобщения, а следовательно, есть лишь разновидность "шарлатанства".

В каком-то смысле печальная судьба геополитики как науки была связана и с политической стороной проблемы. Утвердилось мнение, что военные преступления Третьего Райха экспансия, войны, депортации и т.д. были в значительной мере теоретически подготовлены немецкими геополитиками, которые якобы снабдили режим Гитлера псевдонаучной базой. (Имелся в виду, в первую очередь, Карл Хаусхофер, немецкий геополитик, одно время бывший довольно близким к фюреру.)

Однако, германская геополитика на теоретическом уровне по сути ничем не отличалась от геополитики англосаксонской (Макиндер, Мэхэн, Спикмен), французской (Видадь де ла Блаш), русской "военной географии" (Милютин, Снесарев) и т.д. Разница заключалась не в специфических воззрениях Хаусхофера, которые были совершенно логичны и адекватны самой дисциплине, а в методах, которыми осуществлялся ряд его геополитических положений. Более того, специфика международной политики Германии 30-х - 40-х годов в ее наиболее отталкивающих проявлениях резко противоречила идеям самого Хаусхофера. Вместо "континентального блока" по оси Берлин-Москва-Токио нападение на СССР, вместо органицистского (в духе шмиттовской теории "прав народов") понимания доктрины *Lebensraum*, "жизненного пространства" вульгарные национализм и империализм и т.д. Следует отметить и то обстоятельство, что школа Хаусхофера и его журнал "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" никогда не были элементами официальной нацистской системы. Как и многие интеллектуальные группы т.н. "консервативных революционеров" в Третьем Райхе они вели двусмысленное существование их просто терпели, причем эта терпимость варьировалась в зависимости от сиюминутной политической конъюнктуры.

Однако главной причиной исторического притеснения геополитики является то обстоятельство, что она слишком откровенно показывает основополагающие механизмы международной политики, которые различные режимы чаще всего предпочитают скрывать за туманной риторикой или абстрактными идеологическими схемами. В этом смысле, можно привести параллель с марксистом (по меньшей мере, в его чисто научной, аналитической части). Как Маркс более чем убедительно вскрывает механику производственных отношений и их связи с историческими формациями, так и геополитика разоблачает историческую демагогию внешнеполитического дискурса, показывая реальные глубинные рычаги, влияющие на международные, межгосударственные и межэтнические отношения. Но если марксизм есть глобальный пересмотр классической экономической истории, то геополитика пересмотр истории международных отношений. Это последнее соображение объясняет двойственное отношение общества к ученым-геополитикам. Научное сообщество упорно не допускает

их в свою среду, жестко критикуя, а чаще всего не замечая, при этом властные инстанции, напротив, активно используют геополитические выкладки для выработки международной стратегии. Так, например, обстоит дело с одним из первых геополитиков, подлинным отцом-основателем этой дисциплины сэром Хэлфордом Макиндером. Его идеи не принимались в академических кругах, но сам он прямым образом участвовал в формировании английской политики первой половины XX века, заложив теоретическую основу международной стратегии Англии, перехваченной к середине столетия США и развитой американскими (шире, атлантистскими) последователями Макиндера.

Параллель с марксизмом, на наш взгляд, удачна. Метод может быть заимствован и освоен разными полюсами. Марксистский анализ одинаково важен и для представителей Капитала и для борцов за освобождение Труда. Так же и геополитика: представителей больших государств (империй) она инструктирует в том, как лучше сохранить территориальное господство и осуществить экспансию, а их противники в ней же находят концептуальные принципы революционной теории "национального освобождения". Например, Версальский договор был делом рук геополитической школы Макиндера, выражавшей интересы Запада и направленный на ослабление государств Средней Европы и подавление Германии. Немецкий ученик Макиндера Карл Хаусхофер, исходя из тех же предпосылок, развил прямо противоположную теорию "европейского освобождения", которая была полным отрицанием логики Версаля и легла в основание идеологии нарождающегося национал-социализма.

Последние соображения показывают, что даже не будучи принятой в содружестве классических наук, геополитика чрезвычайно эффективна на практике, а ее значение в некоторых аспектах превосходит многие конвенциональные дисциплины.

Как бы то ни было, геополитика сегодня существует и мало помалу завоевывает себе официальное признание и соответствующий статус. Однако и в этом процессе не все гладко. Сплошь и рядом мы сталкиваемся с подменой самого понятия "геополитика", все более распространенной по мере того, как использование этого термина становится обычным явлением в среде непрофессионалов. Акцент переносится с полноценной и глобальной картины, развитой отцами-основателями, на частные региональные моменты или геоэкономические схемы. При этом изначальные постулаты геополитического дуализма, конкуренция стратегий, цивилизационная дифференциация и т.д. либо игнорируются, либо замалчиваются, либо вообще отрицаются. Сложно представить себе нечто аналогичное в какой-то иной науке. Что стало бы с классической физикой, если, оперируя с понятиями "массы", "энергии", "ускорения" и т.д., ученые начали бы неявно, постепенно отрицать закон всемирного тяготения, забывая о нем, а потом и просто признали бы Ньютона "не существовавшей в реальности мифологической фигурой" или "темным религиозным фанатиком". Но именно это, *mutatis mutandis*, и происходит с геополитикой в наши дни.

Цель этой книги изложить основные геополитики объективно и беспристрастно, по ту сторону предвзятых мнений, идеологических симпатий и антипатий. Как бы мы ни относились к этой науке, выносить на ее счет определенное мнение мы можем, только познакомившись с ее принципами, историей и методологией.

ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Дефиниция "геополитики"

Труды многочисленных представителей геополитических школ, несмотря на все их различия и зачастую противоречия, складываются в одну общую картину, которая и позволяет говорить о самом предмете как о чем-то законченном и определенном. Те или иные авторы и словари разнятся между собой в определении основного предмета изучения этой науки и главных методологических принципов. Такое расхождение происходит из исторических обстоятельств, а также из-за теснейшей связи геополитики с мировой политикой, проблемами власти и доминирующими идеологиями. Синтетический характер этой дисциплины предполагает включение в нее многих дополнительных предметов географии, истории, демографии, стратегии, этнографии, религиоведения, экологии, военного дела, истории идеологии, социологии, политологии и т.д. Так как все эти военные, естественные и гуманитарные науки сами по себе имеют множество школ и направлений, то говорить о какой-то строгости и однозначности в геополитике не приходится. Но какое же определение дать этой дисциплине, столь расплывчатой и одновременно выразительной и впечатляющей?

Геополитика это мировоззрение, и в этом качестве ее лучше сравнивать не с науками, но с системами наук. Она находится на том же уровне, что и марксизм, либерализм и т.д., т.е. системы интерпретаций общества и истории, выделяющие в качестве основного принципа какой-то один важнейший критерий и сводящие к нему все остальные бесчисленные аспекты человека и природы.

Марксизм¹ и либерализм равно кладут в основу экономическую сторону человеческого существования, принцип "экономики как судьбы". Не важно, что эти две идеологии делают противоположные выводы. Маркс приходит к неизбежности антикапиталистической революции, а последователи Адама Смита считают капитализм самой совершенной моделью общества. И в первом и во втором случаях предлагается развернутый метод интерпретации исторического процесса, особая социология, антропология и политология. И, несмотря на постоянную критику этих форм "экономического редукционизма" со стороны альтернативных (и маргинальных) научных кругов, они остаются доминирующими социальными моделями, на основании которых люди не просто осмысливают прошлое, но и создают будущее, т.е. планируют, проектируют, задумывают и осуществляют крупномасштабные деяния, прямо затрагивающие все человечество.

Точно так же обстоит дело и с геополитикой. Но в отличие от "экономических идеологий", она основана на тезисе: "географический рельеф как судьба". География и пространство выступают в геополитике в той же функции, как деньги и производственные отношения в марксизме и либерализме к ним сводятся все основополагающие аспекты человеческого существования, они служат базовым методом интерпретации прошлого, они выступают как главные факторы человеческого бытия, организующие вокруг себя все остальные стороны существования. Как и в случае экономических идеологий,

¹ На явную аналогию между геополитикой и марксизмом указывал в 1943 г. Карл Корш в своей книге "Исторические взгляды геополитиков": "(...) новый материализм геополитиков обладает таким же критическим, активистским и идеалистическим (в традиционном смысле слова) характером, каким обладал в ранние периоды т.н. исторический материализм Маркса. ... Как марксизм сегодня стремится к осознанному контролю над экономической жизнью общества, так сегодняшней "хаусхоферизм" может быть определен как попытка политического контроля над пространством." Цит. по New Essays, 6 т., 1943, стр. 817.

геополитика основана на приближенности, на редукцию низме, сведении многообразных проявлений жизни к нескольким параметрам, но несмотря на заведомую погрешность, всегда присущую таким теориям, она впечатляюще доказывает свою стройность в вопросе объяснении прошлого и предельную эффективность в организации настоящего и проектировании будущего.

Если продолжать параллель с марксизмом и классической буржуазной политэкономией, можно сказать, что, подобно экономическим идеологиям, утверждающим особую категорию "человек экономический" (*homo economicus*), геополитика говорит о "человеке пространственно-вещном", предопределенном пространством, сформированном и обусловленным его специфическим качеством рельефом, ландшафтом. Но эта обусловленность особенно ярко проявляется в масштабных социальных проявлениях человека в государствах, этносах, культурах, цивилизациях и т.д. Зависимость каждого индивидуума от экономики очевидна и в малых и в больших пропорциях. Поэтому экономический детерминизм понятен и обычным людям и властным инстанциям, оперирующим с большими социальными категориями. По этой причине, быть может, экономические идеологии стали столь популярными и выполняли мобилизационную функцию вплоть до революций, основанных на личной ангажированности в идеологии множества отдельных людей. Зависимость человека от пространства основной тезис геополитики видится лишь при некотором дистанцировании от отдельного индивидуума. И поэтому геополитика не стала несмотря на предпосылки собственно идеологией или, точнее, "массовой идеологией". Ее выводы и методы, предметы изучения и основные тезисы вняты лишь тем социальным инстанциям, которые занимаются крупномасштабными проблемами стратегическим планированием, осмыслением глобальных социальных и исторических закономерностей и т.д. Пространство проявляет себя в больших величинах, и поэтому геополитика предназначается для социальных групп, имеющих дело с обобщенными реальностями странами, народами и т.д.

Геополитика это мировоззрение власти, наука о власти и для власти. Только по мере приближения человека к социальной верхушке геополитика начинает обнаруживать для него свое значение, свой смысл и свою пользу, тогда как до этого она воспринимается как абстракция. Геополитика дисциплина политических элит (как актуальных, так и альтернативных), и вся ее история убедительно доказывает, что ею занимались исключительно люди, активно участвующие в процессе управления странами и нациями, либо готовящиеся к этой роли (если речь шла об альтернативных, оппозиционных идеологических лагерях, отстраненных от власти в силу исторических условий).

Не претендуя на научную строгость, геополитика на своем уровне сама определяет, что обладает для нее ценностью, а что нет. Гуманитарные и естественнонаучные дисциплины привлекаются только тогда, когда они не противоречат основным принципам геополитического метода. Геополитика, в некотором роде, сама отбирает те науки и те направления в науке, которые представляются ей полезными, оставляя без внимания все остальное. В современном мире она представляет собой "краткий справочник властелина", учебник власти, в котором дается резюме того, что следует учитывать при принятии глобальных (судьбоносных) решений таких как заключение союзов, начало войн, осуществление реформ, структурная перестройка общества, введение масштабных экономических и политических санкций и т.д.

Геополитика это наука править.

Теллуократия и талассократия

Главным законом геополитики является утверждение фундаментального дуализма, отраженного в географическом устройстве планеты и в исторической типологии цивилизаций. Этот дуализм выражается в противопоставлении "теллуократии" (сухопутного могущества) и "талассократии" (морского могущества). Характер такого противостояния сводится к противопоставлению торговой цивилизации (Карфаген, Афины) и цивилизации военно-авторитарной (Рим, Спарта). В иных терминах, дуализм между "демократией" и "идеократией".

Уже изначально данный дуализм имеет качество враждебности, альтернативности двух его составляющих полюсов, хотя степень может варьироваться от случая к случаю. Вся история человеческих обществ, таким образом, рассматривается как состоящая из двух стихий "водной" ("жидкой", "текучей") и "сухопутной" ("твердой", "постоянной").

"Теллуократия", "сухопутное могущество" связано с фиксированностью пространства и устойчивостью его качественных ориентаций и характеристик. На цивилизационном уровне это воплощается в оседлости, в консерватизме, в строгих юридических нормативах, которым подчиняются крупные объединения людей рода, племена, народы, государства, империи. Твердость Суши культурно воплощается в твердости этики и устойчивости социальных традиций. Сухопутным (особенно оседлым) народам чужды индивидуализм, дух предпринимательства. Им свойственны коллективизм и иерархичность.

"Талассократия", "морское могущество" представляет собой тип цивилизации, основанной на противоположных установках. Этот тип динамичен, подвижен, склонен к техническому развитию. Его приоритеты кочевничество (особенно мореплавание), торговля, дух индивидуального предпринимательства. Индивидуум как наиболее подвижная часть коллектива возводится в высшую ценность, при этом этические и юридические нормы размываются, становятся относительными и подвижными. Такой тип цивилизации быстро развивается, активно эволюционирует, легко меняет внешние культурные признаки, сохраняя неизменной лишь внутреннюю идентичность общей установки.

Большая часть человеческой истории разворачивается в ситуации ограниченного масштаба обеих ориентаций при глобальной доминации "теллуократии". Элемент Земли (Суша) довлеет над всем ансамблем цивилизаций, а элемент "Вода" (море, океан) выступает лишь фрагментарно и спорадически. Дуализм до определенного момента остается географически локализованным морские берега, устья и бассейны рек и т. д. Противостояние развивается в различных зонах планеты с разной интенсивностью и в разных формах.

Политическая история народов земли демонстрирует постепенный рост политических форм, становящихся все более масштабными. Так возникают государства и империи. Этот процесс на геополитическом уровне означает усиление фактора пространства в человеческой истории. Характер крупных политических образований государств и империй выражает дуальность стихий более впечатляюще, выходя на уровень все более и более универсальных цивилизационных типов.

В определенный момент (античный мир) складывается довольно устойчивая картина, отраженная в "карте Макиндера". Зона теллуократии устойчиво отождествляется с внутриконтинентальными просторами Северо-Восточной Евразии (в общих чертах совпадающими с территориями царской России или СССР). Талассократия все яснее

обозначается как береговые зоны евразийского материка, Средиземноморский ареал, Атлантический океан и моря, омывающие Евразию с Юга и Запада.

Так карта мира обретает геополитическую специфику:

- 1) Внутриконтинентальные пространства становятся "неподвижной платформой", heartland'ом ("землей сердцевины"), "географической осью истории", которая устойчиво сохраняет теллуократическую цивилизационную специфику.
- 2) "Внутренний или континентальный полумесяц", "береговая зона", rimland представляют собой пространство интенсивного культурного развития. Здесь очевидны черты "талассократии". Хотя они уравниваются многими "теллуократическими" тенденциями.
- 3) "Внешний или островной полумесяц" представляет собой "неизведанные земли", с которыми возможны только морские коммуникации. Впервые он дает о себе знать в Карфагене и торговой финикийской цивилизации, воздействуя на "внутренний полумесяц" Европы извне.

Эта геополитическая картина соотношения талассократии и теллуократии выявляется потенциально к началу христианской эры, после эпохи Пунических войн. Но окончательно она приобретает смысл в период становления Англии великой морской державой в XVII-XIX веках. Эпоха великих географических открытий, начатая с конца XV века, повлекла за собой окончательное становление талассократии самостоятельным планетарным образованием, оторвавшимся от Евразии и ее берегов и полностью сконцентрировавшимся в англосаксонском мире (Англия, Америка) и колониях. "Новый Карфаген" англосаксонского капитализма и индустриализма оформился в нечто единое и цельное, и с этого времени геополитический дуализм приобрел уже четко различимые идеологические и политические формы.

Позиционная борьба Англии с континентальными державами Австро-венгерской империей, Германией и Россией была геополитическим содержанием XVIII-XIX веков (+ вторая половина XX века), а с середины нашего столетия главным оплотом талассократии стали США.

В холодной войне 1946-1991 годов извечный геополитический дуализм достиг максимальных пропорций, талассократия отождествилась с США, а теллуократия с СССР.

Два глобальных типа цивилизации, культуры, метаидеологии вылились в законченные геополитические очертания, резюмирующие всю геополитическую историю противостояния стихий. При этом поразительно, что этим формам законченного геополитического дуализма на идеологическом уровне соответствовали две столь же синтетические реальности идеология марксизма (социализма) и идеология либерал-капитализма.

В данном случае можно говорить о реализации на практике двух типов "редукционизма": экономический редукционизм свелся к противопоставлению идей Смита и идей Маркса, а геополитический к разделению всех секторов планеты на зоны, подконтрольные талассократии (Новому Карфагену, США) и теллуократии (Новому Риму, СССР).

Геополитическое видение истории представляет собой модель развития планетарного дуализма до максимальных пропорций. Суша и Море распространяют свое изначальное противостояние на весь мир.

Человеческая история есть не что иное, как выражение этой борьбы и путь к ее абсолютизации.

Таково самое общее выражение главного закона геополитики закона дуализма стихий (Суша против Моря).

Геополитическая телеология

До момента окончательной победы США в холодной войне геополитический дуализм развивался в изначальных заданных рамках речь шла об обретении талассократией и теллурократией максимального пространственного, стратегического и силового объема. В виду наращивания обеими сторонами ядерного потенциала некоторым геополитикам-пессимистам исход всего этого процесса представлялся катастрофическим, так как, полностью освоив планету, два могущества должны были либо перенести противостояние за пределы земли (теория звездных войн), либо взаимно уничтожить друг друга (ядерный апокалипсис).

Если характер основного геополитического процесса истории максимальное пространственное расширение талассократии и теллурократии для этой дисциплины очевиден, то его исход остается под вопросом. В этом отношении никакого детерминизма нет.

Следовательно, геополитическая телеология, т.е. осмысление цели истории в геополитических терминах, доходит лишь до момента глобализации дуализма и здесь останавливается.

Но, тем не менее, на чисто теоретическом уровне можно вычленить несколько предположительных версий развития событий после того, как можно будет констатировать победу одной из двух систем талассократии.

1-й вариант . Победа талассократии полностью отменяет цивилизацию теллурократии. На планете устанавливается однородный либерально-демократический порядок. Талассократия абсолютизирует свой архетип и становится единственной системой организации человеческой жизни. Этот вариант имеет два преимущества: Во-первых, он логически непротиворечив, так как в нем можно увидеть закономерное завершение однонаправленного (в целом) течения геополитической истории от полной доминанции Суши (традиционный мир) к полной доминанции Моря (современный мир); а во-вторых, именно это происходит в действительности.

2-й вариант . Победа талассократии оканчивает цикл противостояния двух цивилизаций, но не распространяет свою модель на весь мир, а просто завершает геополитическую историю, отменяя ее проблематику. Подобно тому, как теории постиндустриального общества доказывают снятость в этом обществе основных противоречий классической политэкономии (и марксизма), так некоторые мондиалистские теории утверждают, что в грядущем мире противостояние Суши и Моря будет вообще снято. Это тоже "конец истории", но только дальнейшее развитие событий не поддается такому строгому анализу, как в первом варианте.

Оба этих анализа рассматривают поражение теллуократии как необратимый и свершившийся факт. Два другие варианта относятся к этому иначе.

3-й вариант . Поражение теллуократии явление временное. Евразия вернется к своей континентальной миссии в новой форме. При этом будут учтены геополитические факторы, приведшие к катастрофе континенталистские силы (новый континентальный блок будет иметь морские границы на Юге и на Западе, т.е. осуществится "доктрина Монро для Евразии"). В таком случае мир снова вернется к биполярности. Но уже другого качества и другого уровня.

4-й вариант (являющийся развитием предыдущего). В этом новом противостоянии побеждает теллуократия. Она стремится перенести свою собственную цивилизационную модель на всю планету и "закрыть историю" на своем аккорде. Весь мир типологически превратится в Сушу, и повсюду воцарится "идеократия". Предвкусением такого исхода были идеи о "Мировой Революции" и планетарном господстве Третьего Райха.

Так как в наше время роль субъективного и рационального фактора в развитии исторических процессов как никогда велика, то эти четыре варианта следует рассматривать не просто как отвлеченную констатацию вероятного развития геополитического процесса, но и как активные геополитические позиции, которые могут стать руководством к действиям глобального масштаба.

Но в данном случае геополитика не может предложить никакой детерминистской версии. Все здесь сводится только к набору возможностей, реализация которых будет зависеть от множества факторов, не укладывающихся больше в рамки чисто геополитического анализа.

Rimland и "зоны-границы"

Вся методология геополитического исследования основана на применении принципов глобального геополитического дуализма Суши и Моря к более локальным категориям. При анализе любой ситуации именно планетарная модель остается главной и основополагающей. Те соотношения, которые характерны для общей картины, повторяются и на более частном уровне.

После выделения двух основных принципов талассократии и теллуократии, следующим важнейшим принципом является rimland, "береговая зона". Это ключевая категория, лежащая в основе геополитического исследования.

Rimland представляет собой составное пространство, которое потенциально несет в себе возможность быть фрагментом либо талассократии, либо теллуократии. Это наиболее сложный и насыщенный культурой регион. Влияние морской стихии, Воды, провоцирует в "береговой зоне" активное и динамическое развитие. Континентальная масса давит, заставляя структурализировать энергию. С одной стороны, rimland переходит в Остров и Корабль. С другой стороны в Империю и Дом.

Rimland не сводится, однако, лишь к промежуточной и переходной среде, в которой протекает взаимодействие двух импульсов. Это очень сложная реальность, имеющая самостоятельную логику и в огромной мере влияющая и на талассократию, и на теллуократию. Это не объект истории, но его активный субъект. Борьба за rimland

талассократии и теллуократии не есть соперничество за обладание простой стратегической позицией. Rimland обладает собственной судьбой и собственной исторической волей, которая, однако, не может разрешиться вне базового геополитического дуализма. Rimland в значительной степени свободен в выборе, но не свободен в структуре выбора так как кроме талассократического или теллуократического пути третьего ему не дано.

В связи с таким качеством "внутренний полумесяц" часто вообще отождествляется с ареалом распространения человеческой цивилизации. В глубине континента царит консерватизм, вне его пределов вызов подвижного хаоса.

"Береговые зоны" самой своей позицией поставлены перед необходимостью давать ответ на проблему, предложенную географией.

Rimland является пограничной зоной, поясом, полосой. Вместе с тем это граница. Такое сочетание подводит к геополитическому определению границы.

В отличие от границ между государствами, геополитика понимает этот термин иначе, отправляясь от изначальной модели, в которой первограницей или архетипом всех границ является конкретное историко-географическое и культурное понятие rimland.

Пространственный объем береговых зон является следствием взгляда на материк извне, "от лица морских пришельцев". Именно для "сил моря" берег является полосой, простирающейся вглубь суши. Для самого материка, берег напротив, это предел, линия.

Граница как линия (а именно так она понимается в международном праве) это рудимент "сухопутной юриспруденции", унаследованный современным правом из древнейших традиций. Это взгляд сугубо сухопутный.

Но взгляд морской, внешний по отношению к материка, видит береговые территории как потенциальные колонии, как полоски земли, которые можно оторвать от остальной континентальной массы, превратить в базу, в стратегическое пространство. При этом береговая зона никогда не становится до конца "своей"; при необходимости можно сесть на корабль и уплыть на родину, на "остров". Полосой же берег становится именно за счет того, что пришельцам с моря небезопасно углубляться внутрь континента только на определенное расстояние.

Так как геополитика совмещает оба взгляда на пространство морской и сухопутный, то в ней rimland понимается как особая реальность, как граница-полоса, причем ее качественный объем зависит от того, какой импульс доминирует в данном секторе сухопутный или морской. Гигантские и вполне судоходные океанические побережья Индии и Китая суть линии, полосы минимального объема. Соответствующие культуры имеют сухопутную ориентацию, и объем береговых полос тяготеет к нулю, к тому, чтобы стать просто концом материка. В Европе и особенно в Средиземноморье береговые зоны суть широкие полосы, уходящие далеко вглубь материка. Их объем максимален. Но в обоих случаях речь идет о геополитической границе. Следовательно, это категория переменная, варьирующаяся, в зависимости от обстоятельств, от линии до полосы.

Такой подход геополитика проецирует и на анализ более частных проблем, связанных с границами. Она рассматривает границы между государствами как "зоны переменного объема". Этот объем его сокращение или расширение зависит от общей континентальной динамики. В зависимости от нее эти зоны меняют форму и траекторию в заданных

пределах. В понятие "геополитической границы" могут входить целые государства. Например, английская идея "санитарного кордона" между Россией и Германией предполагала создание "ничейной" (полуколониальной и ориентированной на Англию) зоны, состоящей из прибалтийских и восточноевропейских государств. Континенталистская политика России и Германии, напротив, тяготела к тому, чтобы превратить эту зону в линию (Брест-Литовск, Рапалло, пакт Риббентроп-Молотов). Талассократы-атлантисты стремились ее максимально расширить, создавая искусственные "прокладочные государства" (etats-tampons).

При этом законченная и совершенная талассократия (Англия, США) применяет в данном случае двойной стандарт: границы собственных Островов талассократы стремятся свести к линии, а береговые зоны Евразии максимально расширить. Для континенталистской геополитики логично использовать точно такой же принцип в обратном направлении: границы Евразии линии, границы Америки полосы.

Аналогия с историческим rimland'ом как "колыбелью цивилизации" показывает важнейшее значение "зон-границ" и в более частных случаях. Свободные от необходимости нести на себе тяжесть географического заряда истории "пограничные зоны" сплошь и рядом направляют свою энергию в культурно-интеллектуальные сферы. И умелое использование этого "легкого" геополитического потенциала составляет искусство геополитической стратегии противоборствующих сторон.

При этом именно "морские силы" овладели этим в совершенстве, так как всегда основывались на принципе максимального и скорейшего извлечения пользы из колонизированных территорий. Это отличало их от сухопутных завоевателей, которые после захвата территории сразу же начинали считать ее своей, а, следовательно, не очень спешили выжимать из нее все, что можно.

Геополитика как судьба

Законы геополитики чрезвычайно удобны для анализа политической истории, истории дипломатии и стратегического планирования. Эта наука имеет множество пересечений с социологией, политологией, этнологией, военной стратегией, дипломатией, историей религий и т.д. Косвенно, но подчас очень наглядно, связана она и с экономикой, вплоть до того, что некоторые геополитики предлагали основать новую науку геоэкономику. Во всяком случае, в некоторых аспектах геополитического метода обращение к экономическим реальностям необходимо.

В настоящий момент при тяготении всех видов наук к синтезу, к слиянию, к созданию новых междисциплинарных макродисциплин и многомерных моделей геополитика обнаруживает свое значение как для чисто теоретических исследований, так и для практических шагов в управлении сложными цивилизационными процессами в масштабе планеты или в масштабе отдельных государств или блоков государств. Это наука будущего, основы которой в самом ближайшем времени будут преподаваться не только в специальных высших учебных заведениях учреждениях и академиях, но и в простых школах. С помощью геополитического анализа легко можно осмыслить целые эпохи исторического развития стран и народов. При свойственном нашему времени расширению информационных зон, появление таких простых и наглядных редукционистских методологий неизбежно, так как в противном случае человек рискует окончательно потерять всякие ориентиры в многообразном и многомерном хаосе потоков разнородных знаний.

Геополитика бесценное подспорье в вопросах образования. Ее структура такова, что именно она могла бы стать осевой дисциплиной на новом этапе развития школы.

Вместе с тем все более очевидна роль геополитики в широкой социальной сфере. Уровень развития информации, активная вовлеченность обычного человека в события, разворачивающиеся на всем континенте, "мондиализация" масс-медиа все это выдвигает на первый план пространственное мышление в геополитических терминах, которое помогает "сортировать" народы, государства, режимы и религии по единой упрощенной шкале для того, чтобы смысл даже самых элементарных теле- или радио-новостей был хотя бы приблизительно понятен. Если применить простейшую геополитическую сетку heartland, rimland, World Island к любому сообщению относительно международных событий, сразу же выстраивается некая ясная интерпретационная модель, не требующая дополнительных узкоспециальных знаний. "Расширение НАТО на Восток" при таком подходе означает "увеличение объема rimland в пользу талассократии"; "договор между Германией и Францией относительно создания особых чисто европейских вооруженных сил" "шаг в сторону создания континентальной теллуракратической конструкции"; "конфликт между Ираком и Кувейтом" стремление континентального государства уничтожить искусственное талассократическое образование, препятствующее прямому контролю над береговой зоной" и т.д.

И наконец, о влиянии геополитической методологии на внутреннюю и внешнюю политику. Если геополитический смысл определенных шагов политических партий и движений, а также властных структур будет очевиден, легко соотнести их с системой глобальных интересов, а, следовательно, расшифровать их далеко идущие цели. Например, интеграция России с европейскими странами (особенно с Германией) шаг теллуракратических сил (евразийцев), отсюда автоматически можно прогнозировать усиление "идеократических" ("социалистических") тенденций внутри страны. Напротив, сближение Москвы с Вашингтоном означает подчинение талассократической линии и с неизбежностью влечет за собой позиционное усиление "рыночников" и т.д. Точно так же в свете закономерностей внутренней геополитики можно легко интерпретировать и внутривнутриполитические процессы сепаратизма народов внутри России, двухсторонние или многосторонние соглашения различных административных образований и областей между собой. Каждое событие в свете геополитики приобретает четкий смысл. Этот геополитический смысл не может рассматриваться как *ultimo ratio* события, но в любом случае он всегда оказывается в высшей степени выразительным и полезным для анализа и прогнозирования.

Отсутствие сегодня какого бы то ни было учебного пособия по этой теме подвигло нас на написание и составление этой книги, которая представляет собой введение в геополитику как науку.

ЧАСТЬ I ОТЦЫ-ОСНОВАТЕЛИ ГЕОПОЛИТИКИ

Глава 1. Фридрих Ратцель Государства как пространственные организмы

1.1 Образование: немецкая "органицистская школа"

Фридриха Ратцеля (1844-1904) можно считать "отцом" геополитики, хотя сам он этого термина в своих трудах не использовал. Он писал о "политической географии". Его главный труд, увидевший свет в 1897 году так и называется "Politische Geographie".

Ратцель окончил Политехнический университет в Карлсруе, где он слушал курсы геологии, палеонтологии и зоологии. Завершил он свое образование в Хайдельберге, где стал учеником профессора Эрнста Гекеля (который первым употребил термин "экология"). Мирозрение Ратцеля было основано на эволюционизме и дарвинизме и окрашено ярко выраженным интересом к биологии.

Ратцель участвует в войне 1870 года, куда отправляется добровольцем и получает Железный Крест за храбрость. В политике он постепенно становится убежденным националистом, а в 1890 году вступает в "Пангерманистскую лигу" Карла Петерса. Он много путешествует по Европе и Америке и добавляет к своим научным интересам исследования по этнологии. Он становится преподавателем географии в техническом институте Мюнхена, а в 1886 переходит на аналогичную кафедру в Лейпциге.

В 1876 году Ратцель защищает диссертацию об "Эмиграции в Китае", а в 1882 в Штуттгарте выходит его фундаментальный труд "Антропогеография" ("Antropogeographie"), в котором он формулирует свои основные идеи: связь эволюции народов и демографии с географическими данными, влияние рельефа местности на культурное и политическое становление народов и т.д.

Но самой основной его книгой была "Политическая география".

1.2 Государства как живые организмы

В этой работе Ратцель показывает, что почва является основополагающей, неизменной данностью, вокруг которой вращаются интересы народов. Движение истории предопределено почвой и территорией. Далее следует эволюционистский вывод о том, что "государство является живым организмом", но организмом "укорененным в почве". Государство складывается из территориального рельефа и масштаба и из их осмысления народом. Таким образом, в Государстве отражается объективная географическая данность и субъективное общенациональное осмысление этой данности, выраженное в политике. "Нормальным" Государством Ратцель считает такое, которое наиболее органично сочетает географические, демографические и этнокультурные параметры нации.

Он пишет:

"Государства на всех стадиях своего развития рассматриваются как организмы, которые с необходимостью сохраняют связь со своей почвой и поэтому должны изучаться с

географической точки зрения. Как показывают этнография и история, государства развиваются на пространственной базе, все более и более сопрягаясь и сливаясь с ней, извлекая из нее все больше и больше энергии. Таким образом, государства оказываются пространственными явлениями, управляемыми и оживляемыми этим пространством; и описывать, сравнивать, измерять их должна география. Государства вписываются в серию явлений экспансии Жизни, являясь высшей точкой этих явлений" ("Политическая география"²).

Из такого "органицистского" подхода ясно видно, что пространственная экспансия государства понимается Ратцелем как естественный живой процесс, подобный росту живых организмов.

"Органический" подход Ратцеля сказывается и в отношении к самому пространству (Raum). Это "пространство" переходит из количественной материальной категории в новое качество, становясь "жизненной сферой", "жизненным пространством" (Lebensraum), некоей "геобиосредой". Отсюда вытекают два других важных термина Ратцеля "пространственный смысл" (Raumsinn) и "жизненная энергия" (Lebensenergie). Эти термины близки друг к другу и обозначают некое особое качество, присущее географическим системам и предопределяющее их политическое оформление в истории народов и государств.

Все эти тезисы являются основополагающими принципами геополитики, в той форме, в которой она разовьется несколько позднее у последователей Ратцеля. Более того, отношение к государству как к "живому пространственному, укорененному в почве организму" есть главная мысль и ось геополитической методологии. Такой подход ориентирован на синтетическое исследование всего комплекса явлений, независимо от того, принадлежат ли они человеческой или нечеловеческой сфере. Пространство как конкретное выражение природы, окружающей среды, рассматривается как непрерывное жизненное тело этноса, это пространство населяющего. Структура материала сама диктует пропорции конечного произведения искусств.

В этом смысле Ратцель является прямым наследником всей школы немецкой "органической" социологии, наиболее ярким представителем которой был Фердинанд Теннис.

1.3. Raum политическая организация почвы

Какими Ратцель видел соотношения этноса и пространства видно из следующего фрагмента "Политической географии":

"Государство складывается как организм, привязанный к определенной части поверхности земли, а его характеристики развиваются из характеристик народа и почвы. Наиболее важными характеристиками являются размеры, местоположение и границы. Далее следуют типы почвы вместе с растительностью, ирригация и, наконец, соотношения с остальными конгломератами земной поверхности, и в первую очередь, с прилегающими морями и незаселенными землями, которые, на первый взгляд, не представляют особого политического интереса. Совокупность всех этих характеристик составляет страну (das Land). Но когда говорят о "нашей стране", к этому добавляется все то, что человек создал,

² См. Friedrich Ratzel, "Politische Geographie", 1887, "Einleitung".

и все связанные с землей воспоминания. Так изначально чисто географическое понятие превращается в духовную и эмоциональную связь жителей страны и их истории.

Государство является организмом не только потому, что оно артикулирует жизнь народа на неподвижной почве, но потому что эта связь взаимоукрепляется, становясь чем-то единым, невысказанным без одного из двух составляющих. Необитаемые пространства, неспособные вскормить Государство, это историческое поле под паром. Обитаемое пространство, напротив, способствует развитию государства, особенно, если это пространство окружено естественными границами. Если народ чувствует себя на своей территории естественно, он постоянно будет воспроизводить одни и те же характеристики, которые, происходя из почвы, будут вписаны в него."³

1.4 Закон экспансии

Отношение к государству как к живому организму предполагало отказ от концепции "нерушимости границ". Государство рождается, растет, умирает, подобно живому существу. Следовательно, его пространственное расширение и сжатие являются естественными процессами, связанными с его внутренним жизненным циклом. Ратцель в своей книге "О законах пространственного роста Государств" (1901) выделил семь законов экспансии:

- 1) Протяженность Государств увеличивается по мере развития их культуры;
- 2) Пространственный рост Государства сопровождается иными проявлениями его развития: в сферах идеологии, производства, коммерческой деятельности, мощного "притяжения излучения", протектизма.
- 3) Государство расширяется, поглощая и абсорбируя политические единицы меньшей значимости.
- 4) Граница это орган, расположенный на периферии Государства (понятого как организм).
- 5) Осуществляя свою пространственную экспансию, Государство стремится охватить важнейшие для его развития регионы: побережья, бассейны рек, долины и вообще все богатые территории.
- 6) Изначальный импульс экспансии приходит извне, так как Государство провоцируется на расширение государством (или территорией) с явно низшей цивилизацией.
- 7) Общая тенденция к ассимиляции или абсорбции более слабых наций подталкивает к еще большему увеличению территорий в движении, которое подпитывает само себя⁴.

Неудивительно, что многие критики упрекали Ратцеля в том, что он написал "Катехизис для империалистов". При этом сам Ратцель отнюдь не стремился любыми путями оправдать немецкий империализм, хотя и не скрывал, что придерживался националистических убеждений. Для него было важно создать концептуальный

³ См. Ibidem

⁴ См. Friedrich Ratzel "Ueber die Gesetze des räumlichen Wachstums der Staaten", 1901.

инструмент для адекватного осознания истории государств и народов в их отношении с пространством. На практике же он стремился пробудить "Raumsinn" ("чувство пространства") у вождей Германии, для которых чаще всего географические данные сухой академической науки представлялись чистой абстракцией.

1.5 Weltmacht u море

На Ратцеля в значительной степени повлияло знакомство с Северной Америкой, которую он хорошо изучил и которой посвятил две книги: "Карты североамериканских городов и цивилизации" (1874) и "Соединенные Штаты Северной Америки" (1878-1880). Он заметил, что "чувство пространства" у американцев развито в высшей степени, так как они были поставлены перед задачей освоения "пустых" пространств, имея за плечами значительный "политико-географический" опыт европейской истории. Следовательно, американцы осмысленно осуществляли то, к чему Старый Свет приходил интуитивно и постепенно. Так у Ратцеля мы сталкиваемся с первыми формулировками другой важной геополитической концепции концепции "мировой державы" (Weltmacht). Ратцель заметил, что у больших стран в их развитии есть тенденция к максимальной географической экспансии, выходящей постепенно на планетарный уровень.

Следовательно, рано или поздно географическое развитие должно подойти к своей континентальной фазе.

Применяя этот принцип, выведенный из американского опыта политического и стратегического объединения континентальных пространств, к Германии, Ратцель предрекал ей судьбу континентальной державы.

Предвосхитил он и другую важнейшую тему геополитики значение моря для развития цивилизации. В своей книге "Море, источник могущества народов" (1900)⁵ он указал на необходимость каждой мощной державы особенно развивать свои военно-морские силы, так как этого требует планетарный масштаб полноценной экспансии. То, что некоторые народы и государства (Англия, Испания, Голландия и т.д.) осуществляли спонтанно, сухопутные державы (Ратцель, естественно, имел в виду Германию) должны делать осмысленно: развитие флота является необходимым условием для приближения к статусу "мировой державы" (Weltmacht).

Море и "мировая держава" у Ратцеля уже связаны, хотя лишь у позднейших геополитиков (Мэхэн, Макиндер, Хаусхофер, особенно Шмитт) эта тема приобретает законченность и центральность.

Труды Ратцеля являются необходимой базой для всех геополитических исследований. В свернутом виде в его работах содержатся практически все основные тезисы, которые лягут в основу этой науки. На книгах Ратцеля основывали свои концепции швед Челлен и немец Хаусхофер. Его идеи учитывали француз Видаль де ля Блаш, англичанин Макиндер, американец Мэхэн и русские евразийцы (П.Савицкий, Л.Гумилев и т.д.).

Надо заметить, что политические симпатии Ратцеля не случайны. Практически все геополитики были отмечены ярко выраженным национальным чувством, независимо от того, облакалось ли оно в демократические (англосаксонские геополитики Макиндер, Мэхэн) или "идеократические" (Хаусхофер, Шмитт, евразийцы) формы.

⁵ См. Friedrich Ratzel "Das Meer als Quelle der Voelkergroesse", 1900.

Глава 2. Рудольф Челлен и Фридрих Науманн "Средняя Европа"

2.1 Дефиниция новой науки

Швед Рудольф Челлен (1864-1922) был первым, кто употребил понятие "геополитика".

Челлен был профессором истории и политических наук в университетах Уппсалы и Гетеборга. Кроме того, он активно участвовал в политике, являлся членом парламента, отличаясь подчеркнутой германофильской ориентацией. Челлен не был профессиональным географом и рассматривал геополитику, основы которой он развил, отталкиваясь от работ Ратцеля (он считал его своим учителем), как часть политологии.

Геополитику Челлен определил следующим образом:

"Это -- наука о Государстве как географическом организме, воплощенном в пространстве"⁶.

Помимо "геополитики" Челлен предложил еще 4 неологизма, которые, по его мнению, должны были составить основные разделы политической науки: экополитика ("изучение Государства как экономической силы");

демополитика ("исследование динамических импульсов, передаваемых народом Государству"; аналог "Антропогеографии" Ратцеля);

социополитика ("изучение социального аспекта Государства");

кратополитика ("изучение форм правления и власти в соотношении с проблемами права и социально-экономическими факторами")⁷.

Но все эти дисциплины, которые Челлен развивал параллельно геополитике, не получили широкого признания, тогда как термин "геополитика" устойчиво утвердился в самых различных кругах.

2.2 Государство как форма жизни и интересы Германии

В своем основном труде "Государство как форма жизни" (1916)⁸ Челлен развил постулаты, заложенные в труде Ратцеля. Челлен, как и Ратцель, считал себя последователем немецкого "органицизма", отвергающего механицистский подход к государству и обществу. Отказ от строгого деления предметов изучения на "неодушевленные объекты" (фон) и "человеческие субъекты" (деятели) является отличительной чертой большинства геополитиков. В этом смысле показательно само название основного труда Челлена.

Челлен развил геополитические принципы Ратцеля применительно к конкретной исторической ситуации в современной ему Европе.

⁶ См. Rudolf Kjellen "Die Staat als Lebensform", 1916.

⁷ См. Ibidem

⁸ См. Ibidem

Он довел до логического конца идеи Ратцеля о "континентальном государстве" применительно к Германии. И показал, что в контексте Европы Германия является тем пространством, которое обладает осевым динамизмом и которое призвано структурировать вокруг себя остальные европейские державы. Первую мировую войну Челлен интерпретировал как естественный геополитический конфликт, возникший между динамической экспансией Германии ("страны Оси") и противодействующими ей периферийными европейскими (и внеевропейскими) государствами (Антанта). Различия в геополитической динамике роста нисходящей для Франции и Англии и восходящей для Германии предопределили основной расклад сил. При этом, с его точки зрения, геополитическое отождествление Германии с Европой неизбежно и неотвратимо, несмотря на временное поражение в Первой мировой войне.

Челлен закрепил намеченную Ратцелем геополитическую максимум интересов Германии (= интересы Европы) противоположны интересам западноевропейских держав (особенно Франции и Англии). Но Германия государство "юное", а немцы "юный народ". (Эта идея "юных народов", которыми считались русские и немцы, восходит к Ф. Достоевскому, не раз цитируемому Челленом.) "Юные" немцы, вдохновленные "среднеевропейским пространством", должны двигаться к континентальному государству планетарного масштаба за счет территорий, контролируемых "старыми народами" французами и англичанами. При этом идеологический аспект геополитического противостояния считался Челленом второстепенным.

2.3 К концепции Средней Европы

Хотя Челлен сам был шведом и настаивал на сближении шведской политики с германской, его геополитические представления о самостоятельном интегрирующем значении германского пространства точно совпадают с теорией "Средней Европы" (Mittleuropa), развитой Фридрихом Науманном.

В своей книге "Mittleuropa" (1915)⁹ Науманн дал геополитический диагноз, тождественный концепции Рудольфа Челлена. С его точки зрения, для того, чтобы выдержать конкуренцию с такими организованными геополитическими образованиями как Англия (и ее колонии), США и Россия, народы, населяющие Центральную Европу должны объединиться и организовать новое интегрированное политико-экономическое пространство. Осью такого пространства будут, естественно, немцы.

Mittleuropa в отличие от чистых "пангерманистских" проектов была уже не национальным, но сугубо геополитическим понятием, в котором основное значение уделялось не этническому единству, а общности географической судьбы. Проект Науманна подразумевал интеграцию Германии, Австрии, придунайских государств и, в далекой перспективе, Франции.

Геополитический проект подтверждался и культурными параллелями. Сама Германия как органическое образование отождествлялась с духовным понятием "Mittellage", "срединное положение". Это еще в 1818 году сформулировал Арндт: "Бог поместил нас в центре Европы; мы (немцы) сердце нашей части света".

⁹ См. Friedrich Naumann "Mittleuropa", 1915.

Через Челлена и Науманна "континентальные" идеи Ратцеля постепенно приобретали осязаемые черты.

Глава 3. Хэлфорд Макиндер "Географическая ось истории"

3.1 Ученый и политик

Сэр Хэлфорд Дж. Макиндер (1861 1947) ярчайшая фигура среди геополитиков.

Получивший географическое образование, он преподавал в Оксфорде начиная с 1887 года, пока не был назначен директором Лондонской Экономической Школы. С 1910 по 1922 он был членом палаты общин, а в промежутке (1919 1920) британским посланником в Южной России.

Макиндер известен своим высоким положением в мире английской политики, на международные ориентиры которой он весьма значительно повлиял, а также тем, что ему принадлежит самая смелая и революционная схема интерпретации политической истории мира.

На примере Макиндера ярче всего проявляется типичный парадокс, свойственный геополитике как дисциплине. Идеи Макиндера не были приняты научным сообществом, несмотря на его высокое положение не только в политике, но и в самой научной среде. Даже тот факт, что почти полвека он активно и успешно участвовал в созидании английской стратегии в международных вопросах на основании своей интерпретации политической и географической истории мира, не могло заставить скептиков признать ценность и эффективность геополитики как дисциплины.

3.2 Географическая ось истории

Первым и самым ярким выступлением Макиндера был его доклад "Географическая ось истории"¹⁰, опубликованный в 1904 году в "Географическом журнале". В нем он изложил основу своего видения истории и географии, развитого в дальнейших трудах. Этот текст Макиндера можно считать главным геополитическим текстом в истории этой дисциплины, так как в нем не только обобщаются все предыдущие линии развития "политической географии", но формулируется основной закон данной науки.

Макиндер утверждает, что для Государства самым выгодным географическим положением было бы срединное, центральное положение. Центральность понятие относительное, и в каждом конкретном географическом контексте она может варьироваться. Но с планетарной точки зрения, в центре мира лежит Евразийский континент, а в его центре "сердце мира" или "heartland". Heartland это сосредоточие континентальных масс Евразии. Это наиболее благоприятный географический плацдарм для контроля над всем миром.

¹⁰ Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geographical Journal", 1904. Русский перевод в ж-ле "Элементы. Евразийское обозрение", 1996, №7, стр. 26 –31.

Heartland является ключевой территорией в более общем контексте в пределах Мирового Острова (World Island). В Мировой Остров Макиндер включает три континента Азию, Африку и Европу.

Таким образом, Макиндер иерархизирует планетарное пространство через систему концентрических кругов. В самом центре "географическая ось истории" или "осевой ареал" (pivot area). Это геополитическое понятие географически тождественно России. Также "осевая" реальность называется heartland, "земля сердца".

Далее идет "внутренний или окраинный полумесяц (inner or marginal crescent)". Это пояс, совпадающий с береговыми пространствами евразийского континента. Согласно Макиндеру, "внутренний полумесяц" представляет собой зону наиболее интенсивного развития цивилизации. Это соответствует исторической гипотезе о том, что цивилизация возникла изначально на берегах рек или морей, т.н. "потамической теории". Надо заметить, что последняя теория является существенным моментом всех геополитических конструкций. Пересечение водного и сухопутного пространств является ключевым фактором истории народов и государств. Эта тема в дальнейшем специально будет развита у Шмитта и Спикмэна, однако, первым вывел эту геополитическую формулу именно Макиндер.

Далее идет более внешний круг: "внешний или островной полумесяц" (outer or insular crescent). Это зона целиком внешняя (географически и культурно) относительно материковой массы Мирового Острова (World Island).

Макиндер считает, что весь ход истории детерминирован следующими процессами. Из центра heartland'a на его периферию оказывается постоянное давление т.н. "разбойников суши". Особенно ярко и наглядно это отразилось в монгольских завоеваниях. Но им предшествовали скифы, гунны, аланы и т.д. Цивилизации, проистекающие из "географической оси истории", из самых внутренних пространств heartland'a имеют, по мнению Макиндера, "авторитарный", "иерархический", "недемократический" и "неторговый характер". В древнем мире он воплощен в обществе, подобном дорийской Спарте или Древнему Риму.

Извне, из регионов "островного полумесяца", на Мировой Остров осуществляется давление т.н. "разбойников моря" или "островных жителей". Это колониальные экспедиции, проистекающие из внеевразийского центра, стремящиеся уравновесить сухопутные импульсы, проистекающие из внутренних пределов континента. Для цивилизации "внешнего полумесяца" характерны "торговый" характер и "демократические формы" политики. В древности таким характером отличались Афинское государство или Карфаген.

Между этими двумя полярными цивилизационно-географическими импульсами находится зона "внутреннего полумесяца", которая, будучи двойственной и постоянно испытывая на себе противоположные культурные влияния, была наиболее подвижной и стала благодаря этому местом приоритетного развития цивилизации.

История, по Макиндеру, географически вращается вокруг континентальной оси. Эта история яснее всего ощущается именно в пространстве "внутреннего полумесяца", тогда как в heartland'e царит "застывший" архаизм, а во "внешнем полумесяце" некий цивилизационный хаос.

3.3 Ключевая позиция России

Сам Макиндер отождествлял свои интересы с интересами англосаксонского островного мира, т.е. с позицией "внешнего полумесяца". В такой ситуации основа геополитической ориентации "островного мира" ему виделась в максимальном ослаблении heartland'a и в предельно возможном расширении влияния "внешнего полумесяца" на "полумесяц внутренний". Макиндер подчеркивал стратегический приоритет "географической оси истории" во всей мировой политике и так сформулировал важнейший геополитический закон:

"Тот, кто контролирует Восточную Европу, доминирует над heartland'ом; тот, кто доминирует над heartland'ом, доминирует над Мировым Островом; тот, кто доминирует над Мировым Островом, доминирует над миром." ("Демократические идеалы и реальность")¹¹

На политическом уровне это означало признание ведущей роли России в стратегическом смысле. Макиндер писал:

"Россия занимает в целом мире столь же центральную стратегическую позицию, как Германия в отношении Европы. Она может осуществлять нападения во все стороны и подвергаться им со всех сторон, кроме севера. Полное развитие ее железнодорожных возможностей дело времени." ("Географическая ось истории")¹²

Исходя из этого Макиндер считал, что главной задачей англосаксонской геополитики является недопущение образования стратегического континентального союза вокруг "географической оси истории" (России). Следовательно, стратегия сил "внешнего полумесяца" состоит в том, чтобы оторвать максимальное количество береговых пространств от heartland'a и поставить их под влияние "островной цивилизации".

"Смещение равновесия сил в сторону "осевого государства" (России А.Д.), сопровождающееся его экспансией на периферийные пространства Евразии, позволит использовать огромные континентальные ресурсы для создания мощного морского флота: так недалеко и до мировой империи. Это станет возможным, если Россия объединится с Германией. Угроза такого развития заставит Францию войти в союз с заморскими державами, и Франция, Италия, Египет, Индия и Корея станут береговыми базами, куда причалят флотилии внешних держав, чтобы расплыть силы "осевого ареала" по всем направлениям и помешать им сконцентрировать все их усилия на создании мощного военного флота." ("Географическая ось истории")¹³

Самое интересное, что Макиндер не просто строил теоретические гипотезы, но активно участвовал в организации международной поддержки Антанты "белому движению", которое он считал атлантистской тенденцией, направленной на ослабление мощи прогермански настроенных евразийцев-большевиков. Он лично консультировал вождей белого дела, стараясь добиться максимальной поддержки от правительства Англии. Кажется, он пророчески предвидел не только Брестский мир, но и пакт Риббентроп-Молотов...

В 1919 году в книге "Демократические идеалы и реальность" он писал:

¹¹ H.Mackinder "Democratic ideals and reality", New York, 1919.

¹² См. стр. 31 в "Элементы", №7, op. cit.

¹³ См. стр. 31 в "Элементы", № 7, op.cit.

"Что станет с силами моря, если однажды великий континент политически объединится, чтобы стать основой непобедимой армады?"¹⁴

Нетрудно понять, что именно Макиндер заложил в англосаксонскую геополитику, ставшую через полвека геополитикой США и Северо-Атлантического Союза, основную тенденцию: любыми способами препятствовать самой возможности создания евразийского блока, созданию стратегического союза России и Германии, геополитическому усилению heartland'a и его экспансии. Устойчивая русофобия Запада в XX веке имеет не столько идеологический, сколько геополитический характер. Хотя, учитывая выделенную Макиндером связь между цивилизационным типом и геополитическим характером тех или иных сил, можно получить формулу, по которой геополитические термины легко переводятся в термины идеологические.

"Внешний полумесяц" либеральная демократия; "географическая ось истории" недемократический авторитаризм; "внутренний полумесяц" промежуточная модель, сочетание обоих идеологических систем.

Макиндер участвовал в подготовке Версальского договора, основная геополитическая идея которого отражает сущность воззрений Макиндера. Этот договор был составлен так, чтобы закрепить за Западной Европой характер береговой базы для морских сил (англосаксонский мир). Вместе с тем он предусматривал создание лимитрофных государств, которые бы разделяли германцев и славян, всячески препятствуя заключению между ними континентального стратегического альянса, столь опасного для "островных держав" и, соответственно, "демократии".

Очень важно проследить эволюцию географических пределов heartland в трудах Макиндера. Если в 1904 и 1919 годах (соответственно, в статье "Географическая ось истории" и в книге "Демократические идеалы и реальность") очертания heartland'a совпадали в общих чертах с границами Российской Империи, а позже СССР, то в 1943 году в тексте "Круглая планета и завоевание мира"¹⁵ он пересмотрел свои прежние взгляды и изъял из heartland'a советские территории Восточной Сибири, расположенные за Енисеем. Он назвал эту малозаселенную советскую территорию "Россией Lenaland" по названию реки Лена.

"Россия Lenaland'a имеет 9 миллионов жителей, 5 из которых проживают вдоль трансконтинентальной железной дороги от Иркутска до Владивостока. На остальных территориях проживает менее одного человека на 8 квадратных километров. Природные богатства этой земли древесина, минералы и т.д. практически нетронуты." ("Круглая планета и завоевание мира")¹⁶

Выведение т.н. Lenaland из географических границ heartland'a означало возможность рассмотрения этой территории как зоны "внутреннего полумесяца", т.е. как берегового пространства, могущего быть использованным "островными" державами для борьбы против "географической оси истории". Макиндер, активно участвовавший в организации интервенции Антанты и "белом движении", видимо, посчитал исторический прецедент Колчака, сопротивлявшегося евразийскому центру, достаточным основанием для рассмотрения подконтрольных ему территорий в качестве потенциальной "береговой зоны".

¹⁴ См. Н.М. "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

¹⁵ См. Halford Mackinder "The Round Planet and the winning of the Peace", 1943.

¹⁶ См. Ibidem

3.4 Три геополитических периода

Макиндер делит всю геополитическую историю мира на три этапа¹⁷:

- 1) Доколумбова эпоха. В ней народы, принадлежащие периферии Мирового Острова, например, римляне, живут под постоянной угрозой завоевания со стороны сил "сердечной земли". Для римлян это были германцы, гунны, аланы, парфяне и т.д. Для средневековой ойкумены золотая орда.
- 2) Колумбова эпоха. В этот период представители "внутреннего полумесяца" (береговых зон) отправляются на завоевание неизвестных территорий планеты, не встречая нигде серьезного сопротивления.
- 3) Постколумбова эпоха. Незавоеванных земель больше не существует. Динамические пульсации цивилизаций обречены на столкновение, увлекая народы земли во вселенскую гражданскую войну.

Эта периодизация Макиндера с соответствующими геополитическими трансформациями подводит нас вплотную к новейшим тенденциям в геополитике, которые мы рассмотрим в другой части книги.

¹⁷ См. Н.М. "Democratic ideals and reality", op. cit.

Глава 4. Альфред Мэхэн "Морское могущество"

4.1 Sea Power

Американец Альфред Мэхэн (1840-1914), в отличие от Ратцеля, Челлена и Макиндера, был не ученым, но военным. Он не пользовался термином "геополитика", но методика его анализа и основные выводы точно соответствуют сугубо геополитическому подходу.

Офицер американских *Union Navy*, он преподавал с 1885 года Историю военного флота в "Naval War College" в Нью-Порте (Роуд-Айленд). В 1890 году он опубликовал свою первую книгу, ставшую почти сразу же классическим текстом по военной стратегии. "Морские силы в истории (1660-1783)"¹⁸. Далее следуют с небольшим промежутком другие работы: "Влияние Морской Силы на Французскую Революцию и Империю (1793-1812)"¹⁹, "Заинтересованность Америки в Морской Силе в настоящем и в будущем"²⁰, "Проблема Азии и ее воздействие на международную политику"²¹ и "Морская Сила и ее отношение к войне"²².

Практически все книги были посвящены одной теме теме "Морской Силы", "Sea Power". Имя Мэхэна стало синонимично этому термину.

Мэхэн был не только теоретиком военной стратегии, но активно участвовал в политике. В частности, он оказал сильное влияние на таких политиков, как Генри Кэбот Лодж и Теодор Рузвельт. Более того, если ретроспективно посмотреть на американскую военную стратегию на всем протяжении XX века, то мы увидим, что она строится в прямом соответствии с идеями Мэхэна. Причем, если в Первой мировой войне эта стратегия не принесла США ощутимого успеха, то во Второй мировой войне эффект был значительным, а победа в холодной войне с СССР окончательно закрепила успех стратегии "Морской Силы".

4.2 Морская цивилизация = торговая цивилизация

Для Мэхэна главным инструментом политики является торговля. Военные действия должны лишь обеспечивать наиболее благоприятные условия для создания планетарной торговой цивилизации. Мэхэн рассматривает экономический цикл в трех моментах:

- 1) производство (обмен товаров и услуг через водные пути)
- 2) навигация (которая реализует этот обмен)
- 3) колонии (которые производят циркуляцию товарообмена на мировом уровне)²³.

¹⁸ См. Alfred Mahan "The influence of Sea Power in history" (1660 -- 1783)", 1890; на русском А.Мэхэн "Влияние морской силы на историю (1660-1783)", М.-Л., 1941.

¹⁹ См. Alfred Mahan "The influence of sea power upon the French revolution and empire (1793 -- 1812)", Boston, 1892; А.Мэхэн "Влияние морской силы на Французскую Революцию и Империю (1793 - 1812)", М.-Л., 1940.

²⁰ См. Alfred Mahan "The Interest of America in Sea Power", 1897.

²¹ Alfred Mahan "Problem of Asia and its effects upon international politics", 1900.

²² См. Alfred Mahan "The Sea Power in its relations to the war", Boston, 1905.

²³ См. Alfred Mahan "The influence of Sea Power in history (1660 -- 1783)", *op. cit.*

Мэхэн считает, что анализировать позицию и геополитический статус государства следует на основании 6 критериев:

- 1) Географическое положение Государства, его открытость морям, возможность морских коммуникаций с другими странами. Протяженность сухопутных границ, способность контролировать стратегически важные регионы. Способность угрожать своим флотом территории противника.
- 2) "Физическая конфигурация" Государства, т.е. конфигурация морских побережий и количество портов, на них расположенных. От этого зависит процветание торговли и стратегическая защищенность.
- 3) Протяженность территории. Она равна протяженности береговой линии.
- 4) Статистическое количество населения. Оно важно для оценки способности Государства строить корабли и их обслуживать.
- 5) Национальный характер. Способность народа к занятию торговлей, так как морское могущество основывается на мирной и широкой торговле.
- 6) Политический характер правления. От этого зависит переориентация лучших природных и человеческих ресурсов на созидание мощной морской силы."²⁴

Уже из этого перечисления видно, что Мэхэн строит свою геополитическую теорию исходя исключительно из "Морской Силы" и ее интересов. Для Мэхэна образцом Морской Силы был древний Карфаген, а ближе к нам исторически Англия XVII и XIX веков.

Понятие "Морское Могущество" основывается для него на свободе "морской торговли", а военно-морской флот служит лишь гарантом обеспечения этой торговли. Мэхэн идет и еще дальше, считая "Морскую Силу" особым типом цивилизации (предвосхищая идеи Карла Шмитта) наилучшим и наиболее эффективным, а потому предназначенным к мировому господству.

4.3 Покорение мира США *manifest destiny*

Идеи Мэхэна были восприняты во всем мире и повлияли на многих европейских стратегов. Даже сухопутная и континентальная Германия в лице адмирала Тирпица приняла на свой счет тезисы Мэхэна и стала активно развивать свой флот. В 1940 и в 1941 году две книги Мэхэна были изданы и в СССР.

Но предназначались они в первую очередь Америке и американцам. Мэхэн был горячим сторонником доктрины президента Монро (1758-1831), который в 1823 году декларировал принцип взаимного невмешательства стран Америки и Европы, а также поставил рост могущества США в зависимость от территориальной экспансии на близлежащие территории. Мэхэн считал, что у Америки "морская судьба", и что эта "Manifest Destiny" ("Проявленная Судьба")²⁵ заключается на первом этапе в стратегической интеграции всего американского континента, а потом и в установлении мирового господства.

²⁴ Ibidem

²⁵ См. Albert K. Weinberg "Manifest Destiny", Baltimore, 1935.

Надо отдать должное почти пророческому видению Мэхэна. В его время США еще не вышли в разряд передовых мировых держав, и более того, не был очевиден даже их "морской цивилизационный тип". Еще в 1905 году Макиндер в статье "Географическая ось истории" относил США к "сухопутным державам", входящим в состав "внешнего полумесяца" лишь как полуколонии альное стратегическое продолжение морской Англии. Макиндер писал:

"Только что восточной державой стали США. На баланс сил в Европе они влияют не непосредственно, а через Россию"²⁶.

Но уже за 10 лет до появления текста Макиндера адмирал Мэхэн предсказывал именно Америке планетарную судьбу, становление ведущей морской державой, прямо влияющей на судьбы мира.

В книге "Заинтересованность Америки в Морской Силе" Мэхэн утверждал, что для того, чтобы Америка стала мировой державой, она должна выполнить следующие пункты:

- 1) активно сотрудничать с британской морской державой;
- 2) препятствовать германским морским претензиям;
- 3) бдительно следить за экспансией Японии в Тихом океане и противодействовать ей;
- 4) координировать вместе с европейцами совместные действия против народов Азии²⁷.

Мэхэн видел судьбу США в том, чтобы не пассивно соучаствовать в общем контексте периферийных государств "внешнего полумесяца", но в том, чтобы занять ведущую позицию в экономическом, стратегическом и даже идеологическом отношениях.

Независимо от Макиндера Мэхэн пришел к тем же выводам относительно главной опасности для "морской цивилизации". Этой опасностью является континентальные государства Евразии в первую очередь, Россия и Китай, а во вторую Германия. Борьба с Россией, с этой "непрерывной континентальной массой Русской Империи, протянувшейся от западной Малой Азии до японского меридиана на Востоке", была для Морской Силы главной долговременной стратегической задачей.

Мэхэн перенес на планетарный уровень принцип "анаконды", примененный американским генералом Мак-Клелланом в североамериканской гражданской войне 1861-1865 годов. Этот принцип заключается в блокировании вражеских территорий с моря и по береговым линиям, что приводит постепенно к стратегическому истощению противника. Так как Мэхэн считал, что мощь государства определяется его потенциалами становления Морской Силой, то в случае противостояния стратегической задачей номер один является недопущение этого становления в лагере противника. Следовательно, задачей исторического противостояния Америки является усиление своих позиций по основным пунктам (перечисленным выше) и ослабление противника по тем же пунктам. Свои береговые просторы должны быть под контролем, а соответствующие зоны противника нужно стараться любыми способами оторвать от континентальной массы. И далее: так как доктрина Монро (в ее части территориальной интеграции) усиливает мощь государства, то не следует допускать создания аналогичных интеграционных образований

²⁶ См. Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History", op. cit.

²⁷ См. Alfred Mahan "The Interest of America in Sea Power", op. cit.

у противника. Напротив, противника или соперника в случае Мэхэна, евразийские державы (Россия, Китай, Германия) следует удушать в кольцах "анаконды" континентальную массу, сдавливая ее за счет выведенных из под ее контроля береговых зон и перекрывая по возможности выходы к морским пространствам.

В Первой мировой войне эта стратегия реализовалась в поддержке Антанты белому движению по периферии Евразии (как ответ на заключение большевиками мира с Германией), во Второй мировой войне она также была обращена против Средней Европы, и в частности, через военно-морские операции против стран Оси и Японии. Но особенно четко она видна в эпоху холодной войны, когда противостояние США и СССР достигло тех глобальных, планетарных пропорций, с которыми на теоретическом уровне геополитики оперировали уже начиная с конца XIX века.

Фактически, основные линии стратегии НАТО, а также других блоков, направленных на сдерживание СССР (концепция "сдерживания" тождественна стратегической и геополитической концепции "анаконды") ASEAN, ANZUS, CENTO являются прямым развитием основных тезисов адмирала Мэхэна, которого на этом основании вполне можно назвать интеллектуальным отцом всего современного атлантизма.

Глава 5. Видаль де ля Блаш "Франция против Германии"

5.1 Картина географии Франции

Видаль де ля Блаш (1845-1918) считается основателем французской географической школы. Профессиональный географ, он был увлечен "политической географией" Ратцеля и строил свои теории, основываясь на этом источнике, хотя многие аспекты немецкой геополитической школы он жестко критиковал.

В своей книге "Картина географии Франции" (1903) он обращается к теории почвы, столь важной для немецких геополитиков:

"Отношения между почвой и человеком во Франции отмечены оригинальным характером древности, непрерывности (...). В нашей стране часто можно наблюдать, что люди живут в одних и тех же местах с незапамятных времен. Источники, кальциевые скалы изначально привлекали людей как удобные места для проживания и защиты. У нас человек верный ученик почвы. Изучение почвы поможет выяснить характер, нравы и предпочтения населения."²⁸

Но, несмотря на такое вполне немецкое отношение к географическому фактору и его влиянию на культуру, Видаль де ля Блаш считал, что Ратцель и его последователи явно переоценивают сугубо природный фактор, считая его определяющим.

Человек, согласно де ля Блашу, есть также "важнейший географический фактор", но при этом он еще и "наделен инициативой". Он не только фрагмент декорации, но и главный актер спектакля.

5.2 Позицилизм

Эта критика чрезмерного возвышения пространственного фактора у Ратцеля привела Видаль де ля Блаш к выработке особой геополитической концепции "позицилизма" (от слова "possible" "возможный"). Согласно этой концепции, политическая история имеет два аспекта: пространственный (географический) и временной (исторический). Географический фактор отражен в окружающей среде, исторический в самом человеке ("носителе инициативы")²⁹. Видаль де ля Блаш считал, что ошибка немецких "политических географов" в том, что они считают рельеф детерминирующим фактором политической истории государств. Тем самым, по мнению де ля Блаша, принижается фактор человеческой свободы и историчности. Сам же он предлагает рассматривать географическое пространственное положение как "потенциальность", "возможность", которая может актуализоваться и стать действительным политическим фактором, а может и не актуализоваться. Это во многом зависит от субъективного фактора от человека, данное пространство населяющего.

Такой подход был учтен и немецкими геополитиками школы Хаусхофера, которые считали критику де ля Блаша вполне обоснованной и важной. В таком случае, очевидно возросла роль этнического или расового фактора при рассмотрении политической

²⁸ Vidal de la Blache "Tableau de la Geographie de la France", Paris, 1903.

²⁹ См. Vidal de la Blache "Principes de geographie humaine", Paris, 1921.

истории государств, а это резонировало с общим всплеском расовой проблематики в Германии 20-х годов.

"Поссибилизм" де ля Блаша был воспринят большинством геополитических школ как коррекция жесткого географического детерминизма предшествующих геополитических авторов.

5.3 Франция за "Морскую Силу"

Особое внимание Видаль де ля Блаш уделял Германии, которая была главным политическим оппонентом Франции в то время. Он считал, что Германия является единственным мощным европейским государством, геополитическая экспансия которого заведомо блокируется другими европейскими развитыми державами. Если Англия и Франция имеют свои обширные колонии в Африке и во всем мире, если США могут почти свободно двигаться к югу и северу, если у России есть Азия, то Германия сдавлена со всех сторон и не имеет выхода своих энергий. Де ля Блаш видел в этом главную угрозу миру в Европе и считал необходимым всячески ослабить развитие этого опасного соседа.

Такое отношение к Германии логически влекло за собой геополитическое определение Франции как входящей в состав общего фронта "Морской Силы", ориенти рованной против континентальных держав. Позиция де ля Блаша была не единственной среди французских геополитиков, так как параллельно существовало и противоположное германофильское направление, представленное адмиралом Лаваллем и генералом Де Голлем.

В 1917 году Видаль де ля Блаш публикует книгу "Восточная Франция", в которой он доказывает исконную принадлежность провинций Эльзас-Лоррэн к Франции и неправомочность германских притязаний на эти области. При этом он апеллирует к Французской революции, считая ее якобинское измерение выражением геополитических тенденций французского народа, стремящегося к унификации и централизации своего Государства через географическую интеграцию. Политический либерализм он также объясняет через привязанность людей к почве и естественное желание получить ее в частную собственность. Таким образом, Видаль де ля Блаш на свой лад связывает геополитические реальности с реальностями идеологическими: пространственная политика Западной Европы (Франции) неразрывно связана с "демократией" и "либерализмом". Через такое уравнение легко сблизить геополитические взгляды де ля Блаша с Макиндером и Мэхэном.

Выбор де ля Блашем "морской ориентации" прекрасно вписывается в эту схему.

Глава 6. Николас Спикмен "Ревизия Макиндера, центральность rimland"

6.1 На службе Америки

Американец голландского происхождения Николас Спикмен (1893-1943) является прямым продолжателем линии адмирала Мэхэна. Спикмен был профессором международных отношений, а позднее директором Института международных отношений при Йельском Университете. Для него, в отличие от первых геополитиков, сама география не представляла большого интереса, а еще меньше волновали его проблемы связи народа с

почвой, влияние рельефа на национальный характер и т.д. Спикмен рассматривал геополитику как важнейший инструмент конкретной международной политики, как аналитический метод и систему формул, позволяющих выработать наиболее эффективную стратегию. В этом смысле он жестко критиковал немецкую геополитическую школу (особенно в книге "География мира"³⁰), считая представления о "справедливых или несправедливых границах метафизической чепухой".

Как и для Мэхэна, для Спикмена характерен утилитарный подход, четкое желание выдать наиболее эффективную геополитическую формулу, с помощью которой США могут скорейшим образом добиться "мирового господства". Этим прагматизмом определяется строй всех его исследований.

6.2 Коррекция Макиндера

Спикмен, внимательно изучивший труды Макиндера, предложил свой вариант базовой геополитической схемы, несколько отличающийся от модели Макиндера. Основной идеей Спикмена было то, что Макиндер, якобы, переоценил геополитическое значение heartland'a. Эта переоценка затрагивала не только актуальное положение сил на карте мира, в частности, могущество СССР, но и изначальную историческую схему. Спикмен считал, что географическая история "внутреннего полумесяца", rimland, "береговых зон", осуществлялась сама по себе, а не под давлением "кочевников Суши", как считал Макиндер. С его точки зрения, heartland является лишь потенциальным пространством, получающим все культурные импульсы из береговых зон и не несущим в самом себе никакой самостоятельной геополитической миссии или исторического импульса. Rimland, а не heartland является, по его мнению, ключом к мировому господству.

Геополитическую формулу Макиндера "Тот, кто контролирует Восточную Европу, доминирует над heartland'ом; тот, кто доминирует над heartland'ом, доминирует над Мировым Островом; тот, кто доминирует над Мировым Островом, доминирует над миром" Спикмен предложил заменить своей "Тот, кто доминирует над rimland доминирует над Евразией; тот, кто доминирует над Евразией держит судьбу мира в своих руках."³¹

В принципе, Спикмен не сказал этим ничего нового. И для самого Макиндера "береговая зона", "внешний полумесяц" или rimland были ключевой стратегической позицией в контроле над континентом. Но Макиндер понимал эту зону не как самостоятельное и самодостаточное геополитическое образование, а как пространство противостояния двух импульсов "морского" и "сухопутного". При этом он никогда не понимал контроль над heartland в смысле власти над Россией и прилегающими к ней континентальными массами. Восточная Европа есть промежуточное пространство между "географической осью истории" и rimland, следовательно, именно в соотношении сил на периферии heartland'a и находится ключ к проблеме мирового господства. Но Спикмен представил смещение акцентов в своей геополитической доктрине относительно взглядов Макиндера как нечто радикально новое. На самом деле, речь шла лишь о некоторой нюансировке понятий.

³⁰ Nicholas Spykman "Geography of peace", 1942.

³¹ Ibidem

6.3 Шкала определения могущества

В своих книгах "Американская стратегия в мировой политике"³² и "География мира"³³ Спикмен выделяет 10 критериев, на основании которых следует определять геополитическое могущество государства. Это развитие критериев, впервые предложенных Мэхэном. Они таковы:

- 1) Поверхность территории
- 2) Природа границ
- 3) Объем населения
- 4) Наличие или отсутствие полезных ископаемых
- 5) Экономическое и технологическое развитие
- 6) Финансовая мощь
- 7) Этническая однородность
- 8) Уровень социальной интеграции
- 9) Политическая стабильность
- 10) Национальный дух

Если суммарный результат оценки геополитических возможностей государства по этим критериям оказывается относительно невысоким, это почти автоматически означает, что данное государство вынуждено вступать в более общий стратегический союз, поступаясь частью своего суверенитета ради глобальной стратегической геополитической протекции.

6.4 Срединный Океан

Помимо переоценки значения rimland, Спикмен внес еще одно важное дополнение в геополитическую картину мира, видимую с позиции "морской силы". Он ввел чрезвычайно важное понятие "Срединного Океана" "Midland Ocean". В основе этого геополитического представления лежит подчеркнутая аналогия между Средиземным морем в истории Европы, Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки в древности, и Атлантическим океаном в новейшей истории западной цивилизации. Так как Спикмен считал именно "береговую зону", rimland, основной исторической территорией цивилизации, то Средиземноморский ареал древности представлялся ему образцом культуры, распространившейся впоследствии внутрь континента (окультуривание варваров Суши) и на отдаленные территории, достижимые только с помощью морских путей (окультуривание варваров Моря). Подобно этой средиземноморской модели, в новейшее время в увеличенном планетарном масштабе то же самое происходит с Атлантическим океаном, оба берега которого американский и европейский являются ареалом наиболее развитой в технологическом и экономическом смысле западной цивилизации.

³² N. Spykman "America's Strategy in World Politics"(1942).

³³ Op. cit.

"Срединный океан" (Midland Ocean) становится, в такой перспективе, не разъединяющим, но объединяющим фактором, "внутренним морем" (mare internum). Таким образом, Спикменом намечается особая геополитическая реальность, которую можно назвать условно "атлантическим континентом", в центре которого, как озеро в сухопутном регионе, располагается Атлантический океан. Этот теоретический "континент", "новая Атлантида" связан общностью культуры западноевропейского происхождения, идеологией либерал-капитализма и демократии, единством политической, этической и технологической судьбы.

Особенно Спикмен настаивал на роли интеллектуального фактора в этом "атлантическом континенте". Западная Европа и пояс Восточного побережья Северной Америки (особенно Нью-Йорк) становятся мозгом нового "атлантического сообщества". Нервным центром и силовым механизмом являются США и их торговый и военно-промышленный комплекс. Европа оказывается мыслительным придатком США, чьи геополитические интересы и стратегическая линия становятся единственными и главенствующими для всех держав Запада. Постепенно должна сокращаться и политическая суверенность европейских государств, а власть переходит к особой инстанции, объединяющей представителей всех "атлантических" пространств и подчиненной приоритетному главенству США.

Спикмен предвосхитил важнейшие политические процессы создание "Северо-Атлантического Союза" (НАТО), уменьшение суверенности европейских держав в послевоенном мире, планетарную гегемонию США и т.д.

6.5 Архитектор американской победы

Основой своей доктрины Спикмен сделал не столько геополитическое осмысление места США как "Морской Силы" в целом мире (как Мэхэн), возможно потому, что это уже стало фактом, сколько необходимость контроля береговых территорий Евразии: Европы, арабских стран, Индии, Китая и т.д. для окончательной победы в дуэли континентальных и морских сил. Если в картине Макиндера планетарная дуальность рассматривалась как нечто "вечное", "неснимаемое", то Спикмен считал, что совершенный контроль над *rimland* со стороны "морских держав" приведет к окончательной и бесповоротной победе над сухопутными державами, которые отныне будут целиком подконтрольны.

Фактически, это было предельным развитием "тактики анаконды", которую обосновывал уже Мэхэн. Спикмен придал всей концепции законченную форму.

Победа США как "Морской Силы" в холодной войне продемонстрировала абсолютную геополитическую правоту Спикмена, которого можно назвать "архитектором мировой победы либерал-демократических стран" над Евразией.

На данный момент представляется, что тезисы Спикмена относительно стратегического верховенства *rimland* и о важности "Срединного Океана" доказаны самой историей. Но теорию Макиндера о перманентности стремления центра Евразии к политическому возрождению и к континентальной экспансии тоже пока рано полностью отбрасывать.

С другой стороны, некоторые идеи Спикмена (особенно его последователя Кирка, развившего еще более детально теорию *rimland*) были поддержаны некоторыми европейскими геополитиками, увидевшими в его высокой стратегической оценке

"береговых территорий" возможность заново вывести Европу в число тех стран, которые решают судьбы мира. Но для этого пришлось отбросить концепцию "Срединного Океана".

Несмотря на этот теоретический ход некоторых европейских геополитиков (остающийся, впрочем, весьма двусмысленным), Спикмен принадлежит, без всяких сомнений, к самым ярким и последовательным "атлантистам". Более того, он вместе с адмиралом Мэхэном может быть назван "отцом атлантизма" и "идейным вдохновителем НАТО".

Глава 7. Карл Хаусхофер "Континентальный блок"

7.1 Война и мысль

Именно Карлу Хаусхоферу (1869-1946) геополитика во многом обязана тем, что она долгое время рассматривалась не просто как "псевдонаука", но и как "человеконенавистническая", "фашистская", "людоедская" теория.

Карл Хаусхофер родился в Мюнхене в профессорской семье. Он решил стать профессиональным военным и прослужил в армии офицером более двадцати лет. В 1908-1910 годах он служил в Японии и Манчжурии в качестве германского военного атташе. Здесь он познакомился с семьей японского императора и с высшей аристократией.

Слабое здоровье заставило Хаусхофера оставить довольно успешную военную карьеру, и он вернулся в 1911 году в Германию, где и прожил до конца жизни. Он занялся наукой, получив в Мюнхенском университете звание "доктора". С этого времени Хаусхофер регулярно публикует книги, посвященные геополитике в целом, и в частности, геополитике тихоокеанского региона. Первой его книгой была "Дай Нихон"³⁴, посвященная геополитике Японии.

Через своего ученика Рудольфа Гесса Хаусхофер знакомится с Гитлером сразу после заключения того в тюрьму вследствие неудачного путча. Есть неподтвержденное историками мнение, что Хаусхофер принимал участие в написании "Майн Кампф" в местах, посвященных некоторым геополитическим категориям. Но концептуальный анализ показывает существенную разницу между геополитическими воззрениями Хаусхофера и упрощенными расистскими пропагандистскими пассажами Гитлера.

В течение 20 лет начиная с 1924 года Хаусхофер издавал важнейший геополитический журнал, имевший огромное международное значение "Geopolitik", позднее переименованный в "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik".

Большинство своих текстов он опубликовал именно в этом издании. Отношения Хаусхофера с нацизмом были сложными. В некоторых пунктах его взгляды сближались с взглядами национал-социалистов, в некоторых радикально расходились. В зависимости от периодов нацистского правления и от личных отношений менялась и позиция Хаусхофера в Третьем Рейхе.

До 1936 года к нему благоволили (особенно сказывалась протекция его младшего друга Гесса), позже началось охлаждение. После полета Гесса в Англию Хаусхофер впал в немилость, а после казни его сына Альбрехта по обвинению в участии в покушении на Гитлера в 1944 сам Хаусхофер считался почти "врагом народа".

Несмотря на подобную двусмысленность его положения он был причислен союзниками к "видным нацистам". Не выдержав стольких ударов судьбы и крушения всех надежд Карл Хаусхофер вместе со своей женой Мартой совершили самоубийство в 1946 году.

³⁴ Karl Haushofer "Dai Nihon", Munich, 1913.

7.2 Новый Евразийский Порядок

Хаусхофер внимательно изучил работы Ратцеля, Челлена, Макиндера, Видаля де ля Блаша, Мэхэна и других геополитиков. Картина планетарного дуализма "морские силы" против "континентальных сил" или талассократия ("власть посредством моря") против теллурократии ("власть посредством земли") явилась для него тем ключом, который открывал все тайны международной политики, к которой он был причастен самым прямым образом. (В Японии, например, он имел дело с теми силами, которые принимали самые ответственные решения относительно картины пространства.) Показательно, что термин "Новый Порядок", который активно использовали нацисты, а в наше время в форме "Новый Мировой Порядок" американцы, впервые был употреблен именно в Японии применительно к той геополитической схеме перераспределения влияний в тихоокеанском регионе, которую предлагали провести в жизнь японские геополитики.

Планетарный дуализм "Морской Силы" и "Сухопутной Силы" ставил Германию перед проблемой геополитической самоидентификации. Сторонники национальной идеи, а Хаусхофер принадлежал, без сомнения, к их числу, стремились к усилению политической мощи немецкого государства, что подразумевало индустриальное развитие, культурный подъем и геополитическую экспансию. Но само положение Германии в Центре Европы, пространственное и культурное *Mittellage*, делало ее естественным противником западных, морских держав Англии, Франции, в перспективе США. Сами "талассократические" геополитики также не скрывали своего отрицательного отношения к Германии и считали ее (наряду с Россией) одним из главных геополитических противников морского Запада.

В такой ситуации Германии было нелегко рассчитывать на крепкий альянс с державами "внешнего полумесяца", тем более, что у Англии и Франции были к Германии исторические претензии территориального порядка. Следовательно, будущее национальной Великой Германии лежало в геополитическом противостоянии Западу и особенно англосаксонскому миру, с которым *Sea Power* фактически отождествилась.

На этом анализе основывается вся геополитическая доктрина Карла Хаусхофера и его последователей. Эта доктрина заключается в необходимости создания "континентального блока" или оси Берлин-Москва-Токио. В таком блоке не было ничего случайного это был единственный полноценный и адекватный ответ на стратегию противоположного лагеря, который не скрывал, что самой большой опасностью для него было бы создание аналогичного евразийского альянса. Хаусхофер писал в статье "Континентальный блок":

"Евразию невозможно задушить, пока два самых крупных ее народа немцы и русские всячески стремятся избежать междоусобного конфликта, подобного Крымской войне или 1914 году: это аксиома европейской политики."³⁵

Там же он цитировал американца Гомера Ли. "Последний час англосаксонской политики пробьет тогда, когда немцы, русские и японцы соединятся."

Эту мысль на разные лады Хаусхофер проводил в своих статьях и книгах. Эта линия получила название *Ostorientierung*, т.е. "ориентация на Восток", поскольку предполагала самоидентификацию Германии, ее народа и ее культуры как западного продолжения евразийской, азиатской традиции. Не случайно англичане в период Второй мировой

³⁵ Karl Haushofer "Kontinentalblocke: Mitteleuropa -- Eurasia -- Japan" in "Ausgewählte Texte zur Geopolitik", Boppard am Rhein, 1979; по-русски в "Элементы" №7, *op. cit.*, стр.32-36.

войны уничтожительно называли немцев "гуннами". Для геополитиков хаусхоферовской школы это было вполне приемлемым.

В этой связи следует подчеркнуть, что концепция "открытости Востоку" у Хаусхофера совсем не означала "оккупацию славянских земель". Речь шла о совместном цивилизационном усилии двух континентальных держав, России и Германии, которые должны были бы установить "Новый Евразийский Порядок" и переструктурировать континентальное пространство Мирового Острова с тем, чтобы полностью вывести его из-под влияния "Морской Силы". Расширение немецкого Lebensraum планировалось Хаусхофером не за счет колонизации русских земель, а за счет освоения гигантских незаселенных азиатских пространств и реорганизации земель Восточной Европы.

7.3 Компромисс с талассократией

Однако на практике все выглядело не так однозначно. Чисто научная геополитическая логика Хаусхофера, логически приводившая к необходимости "континентального блока" с Москвой, сталкивалась с многочисленными тенденциями иного свойства, также присущими немецкому национальному сознанию. Речь шла о сугубо расистском подходе к истории, которым был заражен сам Гитлер. Этот подход считал самым важным фактором расовую близость, а не географическую или геополитическую специфику. Англосаксонские народы Англия, США выделялись в таком случае естественными союзниками немцев, так как были им наиболее близки этнически. Славяне же и особенно небелые евразийские народы превращались в расовых противников. К этому добавлялся идеологический антикоммунизм, замешанный во многом на том же расовом принципе. Маркс и многие коммунисты были евреями, а значит, в глазах антисемитов, коммунизм сам по себе есть антигерманская идеология.

Национал-социалистический расизм входил в прямое противоречие с геополитикой или, точнее, неявно подталкивал немцев к обратной, антиевразийской, талассократической стратегии. С точки зрения последователя расизма, Германии следовало бы изначально заключить союз с Англией и США, чтобы совместными усилиями противостоять СССР. Но, с другой стороны, унижительный опыт Версаля был еще слишком свеж. Из этой двойственности вытекает вся двусмысленность международной политики Третьего Рейха. Эта политика постоянно балансировала между талассократической линией, внешне оправданной расизмом и антикоммунизмом (антиславянской настрей, нападение на СССР, поощрение католической Хорватии на Балканах и т.д.), и евразийской теллуократией, основанной на чисто геополитических принципах (война с Англией и Францией, пакт Риббентроп-Молотов и т.д.).

Поскольку Карл Хаусхофер был ангажирован, в некоторой степени, в решение конкретных политических проблем, он был вынужден подстраивать свои теории под политическую конкретику. Отсюда его контакты в высших сферах Англии. Кроме того, заключение пакта Антикоминтерна, т.е. создание оси Берлин-Рим-Токио, Хаусхофер внешне приветствовал, ссылаясь на представление его предварительным шагом на пути к созданию полноценного "евразийского блока". Он не мог не понимать, что антикоммунистическая направленность этого союза и появление вместо центра heartland'a (Москвы) полуостровной второстепенной державы, принадлежащей rimland'у, есть противоречивая карикатура на подлинный "континентальный блок".

Но все же такие шаги, продиктованные политическим конформизмом, не являются показательными для всей совокупности геополитики Хаусхофера. Его имя и идеи

полноценней всего воплотились именно в концепциях "восточной судьбы" Германии, основанной на крепком и долговременном евразийском союзе.

Глава 8. Карл Шмитт "Бегемот versus Левиафан"

8.1 Консервативный революционер

Немец Карл Шмитт (1888-1985) известен как выдающийся юрист, политолог, философ, историк. Но все его идеи неразрывно связаны с геополитическими концепциями, и основные его работы "Номос Земли"³⁶, "Земля и море"³⁷ и т.д. посвящены именно осмыслению геополитических факторов и их влияния на цивилизацию и политическую историю.

Карл Шмитт был близок к немецким представителям Консервативной Революции, парадоксальному течению, которое совмещало в себе национально-консервативные и социально-революционные элементы. Судьба Шмитта это судьба его книг, его юридическо-философской школы. Как и у многих других консервативных революционеров, его отношения с национал-социалистическим режимом были двойственными. С одной стороны, его теории, безусловно, повлияли на нацистскую идеологию. Особенным успехом пользовались его политологические книги "Политическая теология"³⁸ и "Понятие политического"³⁹, в которых Шмитт дал развернутую критику либерального права и идеи "правового государства". В этих текстах уже даны очертания всего последующего интеллектуального творчества Шмитта в них заметен предельный политический реализм, стремление освободить политологические проблемы от гуманитарной риторики, сентиментального пафоса, социальной демагогии. Это вполне соответствовало национал-социалистическому духу.

Вместе с тем вся концепция Шмитта была основана на фундаментальной идее "прав народа" (Volksrechte), которые он противопоставлял либеральной теории "прав человека". В его понимании всякий народ имел право на культурную суверенность, на сохранение своей духовной, исторической и политической идентичности. Такой же подход был характерен для некоторых национал-социалистов, считающих эту идеологию универсальной и применимой для всех народов земли. Но доминирующей линией режима стал именно пангерманизм, основанный на шовинизме и узко националистическом подходе. Поэтому Шмитт, с его теорией "прав народов", подвергался резкой критике, особенно со стороны идеологов СС (в 1936 в органе СС "Schwarze Korps" была опубликована агрессивно угрожающая статья в его адрес).

Идейное формирование Шмитта проходило в той же атмосфере идей "органицистской социологии", что и у Ратцеля и Челлена, но на него повлияли также романтические теории "Света Севера" (Nordlicht), согласно которым социально-политические формы и государственные образования коренятся не в механическом функционировании атомарных личностей, соединенных в математические конгломераты, но в мифологии, в сакральном мире "стихий и духов"⁴⁰. В теориях Шмитта повсюду наличествует парадоксальное сочетание "политического романтизма" и "строгого рационализма". Отточенный ментальный аппарат служит выражению духовных мифологем.

³⁶ Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", Koeln, 1950.

³⁷ Carl Schmitt "Land und Meer", Leipzig, 1942.

³⁸ Carl Schmitt "Politische Theologie", Munchen-Leipzig, 1922.

³⁹ Carl Schmitt "Das Begriff des Politischen", Berlin-Grunewald, 1928; по-русски Карл Шмитт "Понятие политическое" в "Вопросы Социологии", Москва, 1992, том 1, №1

⁴⁰ Carl Schmitt "Theodor Daueblers "Nordlicht". Drei Studien ueber die Elemente, den Geiste und die Aktualitaet des Werkes", Muenchen, 1916.

На Нюрнбергском процессе была сделана попытка причислить Карла Шмитта к "военным преступникам" на основании его сотрудничества с режимом Гитлера. В частности, ему инкриминировалось "теоретическое обоснование легитимности военной агрессии". После детального знакомства судей с сутью дела обвинение было снято. Но тем не менее, Шмитт как и Хайдеггер, Юнгер и другие "консервативные революционеры" стал персоной нон-грата в мировом научном сообществе, и его труды совершенно игнорировались.

Только в 70-е годы благодаря колоссальному влиянию на юридическую мысль некоторых левых, социалистических мыслителей, труды Шмитта стали постепенно реабилитироваться.

В настоящее время он признан классиком политологии и юриспруденции.

8.2 Номос земли

Шмитт, совершенно в духе геополитического подхода, утверждал изначальную связь политической культуры с пространством. Не только Государство, но вся социальная реальность и особенно право проистекают из качественной организации пространства.

Отсюда Шмитт вывел концепцию "номоса". Этот греческий термин "номос" обозначает "нечто взятое, оформленное, упорядоченное, организованное" в смысле пространства. Этот термин близок к понятиям "рельеф" у Ратцеля и "месторазвитие" у русских евразийцев (Савицкий). Шмитт показывает, что "номос" есть такая форма организации бытия, которая устанавливает наиболее гармоничные соотношения как внутри социального ансамбля, так и между этими ансамблями. "Номос" — выражение особого синтетического сочетания субъективных и объективных факторов, органически проявляющихся в создании политической и юридической систем. В "номосе" проявляются природные и культурные особенности человеческого коллектива в сочетании с окружающей средой.

В книге "Номос земли" Шмитт показывает, каким образом специфика того или иного земного пространства влияла на развившиеся в нем культуры и государства. Он сопоставляет между собой различные исторические "номосы", особенно подчеркивая фундаментальный дуализм между отношением к пространству кочевников и оседлых народов.

Но самый важный вывод из анализа "номоса земли" заключался в том, что Шмитт вплотную подошел к понятию глобального исторического и цивилизационного противостояния между цивилизациями Суши и цивилизациями Моря. Исследуя "номос" Земли, он столкнулся с его качественной, сущностной противоположностью "номосу" Моря. Это привело его к созданию особой геополитической методологии для осмысления политической истории мира.

8.3 Земля и Море

В 1942 году Шмитт выпустил важнейший труд "Земля и Море"⁴¹. Вместе с более поздним текстом "Планетарная напряженность между Востоком и Западом и противостояние Суши и Моря"⁴² это составляет важнейший документ геополитической науки.

Смысл противопоставления Суши и Моря у Шмитта сводится к тому, что речь идет о двух совершенно различных, несводимых друг к другу и враждебных цивилизациях, а не о вариантах единого цивилизационного комплекса. Это деление почти точно совпадает с картиной, нарисованной Макиндером, но Шмитт дает основным ее элементам талассократии (Морская Сила) и теллурукратии (Сухопутная Сила) углубленное философское толкование, связанное с базовыми юридически ми и этическими системами. Любопытно, что Шмитт использует применительно к "силам Суши" имя "Бегемот", а к "силам Моря" "Левиафан", как напоминая о двух ветхозаветных чудовищах, одно из которых воплощает в себе всех сухопутных тварей, а другое всех водных, морских.

"Номос" Земли существует безальтернативно на протяжении большей части человеческой истории. Все разновидности этого "номоса" характеризуются наличием строгой и устойчивой легислативной (и этической) формы, в которой отражается неподвижность и фиксированность Суши, Земли. Эта связь с Землей, пространств в которой легко поддается структурализации (фиксированность границ, постоянство коммуникационных путей, неизменность географических и рельефных особенностей), порождает сущностный консерватизм в социальной, культурной и технической сферах. Совокупность версий "номоса" Земли составляет то, что принято называть историей "традиционного общества".

В такой ситуации Море, Вода являются лишь периферийными цивилизационными явлениями, не вторгаясь в сферу "этического" (или вторгаясь эпизодически). Лишь с открытием Мирового Океана в конце XVI века, ситуация меняется радикальным образом. Человечество (и в первую очередь, остров Англия) начинает привыкать к "морскому существованию", начинает осознавать себя Островом посреди вод, Кораблем.

Но водное пространство резко отличается от сухопутного. Оно непостоянно, враждебно, отчуждено, подвержено постоянному изменению. В нем не фиксированы пути, не очевидны различия ориентаций. "Номос" моря влечет за собой глобальную трансформацию сознания. Социальные, юридические и этические нормативы становятся "текущими". Рождается новая цивилизация. Шмитт считает, что Новое время и технический рывок, открывший эру индустриализации обязаны своим существованием геополитическому феномену переходу человечества к "номосу" моря.

Так геополитическое противостояние англосаксонского мира "внешнего полумесяца" приобретает у Шмитта социально-политическую дефиницию. "Номос" моря есть реальность, враждебная традиционному обществу. Геополитическое противостояние сухопутных держав с морскими обретает важнейший исторический, идеологический и философский смысл.

8.4 Grossraum

Шмитт разработал еще одну важнейшую геополитическую теорию "большого пространства" (Grossraum). Эта концепция рассматривает процесс развития государств

⁴¹ Carl Schmitt "Der Nomos der Erde", op. cit.

⁴² Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-- III" von prof. Piet Tommissen, Brussel, 1991; по-русски см. Карл Шмитт "Планетарная напряженность между Востоком и Западом" в "Элементы", 1997, № 8.

как стремление к обретению наибольшего территориального объема. Принцип имперской интеграции является выражением логического и естественного человеческого стремления к синтезу. Этапы территориального расширения государства, таким образом, соответствуют этапам движения человеческого духа к универсализму.

Этот геополитический закон распространяется и на техническую и на экономическую сферы. Шмитт показывает, что начиная с некоторого момента техническое и экономическое развитие государства требует количественного и качественного увеличения его территорий. При этом не обязательно речь идет о колонизации, аннексии, военном вторжении. Становление *Grossraum* может проходить и по иным законам на основании принятия несколькими государствами или народами единой религиозной или культурной формы.

По Шмитту, развитие "номоса" Земли должно привести к появлению Государства-континента. Этапы движения к Государству-континенту проходят от городов-государств через государства территории. Появление сухопутного Государства-континента, материкового *grossraum*'а является исторической и геополитической необходимостью.

В тексте 1940 года "Пространство и Большое Пространство в праве народов"⁴³ Шмитт так определил "Большое Пространство": "Сфера планификации, организации и человеческой деятельности, коренящаяся в актуальной и объемной тенденции будущего развития"⁴⁴. Уточняя эту несколько расплывчатую формулировку, Шмитт указывал как на пример волевого создания "Большого Пространства" проведение в жизнь американской доктрины Монро.

Хотя *Grossraum* можно, в определенном смысле, отождествить с Государством, а точнее, с Империей (*das Reich*), эта концепция выходит за рамки обычного государства. Это новая форма сверхнационального объединения, основанного на стратегическом, геополитическом и идеологическом факторе.

В отличие от унификационной пангерманистской модели Гитлера и от советского интернационализма *Grossraum* Шмитта основывается на культурном и этническом плюрализме, на широкой автономии, ограниченной лишь стратегическим централизмом и тотальной лояльностью к высшей властной инстанции. При этом Шмитт подчеркивал, что создание нового "Большого Пространства" не зависит ни от научной ценности самой доктрины, ни от культурной компетентности, ни от экономического развития составляющих частей или даже территориального и этнического центра, давшего импульс к интеграции. Все зависит только от политической воли, распознающей историческую необходимость такого геополитического шага.

Шмитт в этой доктрине предвосхитил основные линии современной интеграционной политики.

8.5 Тотальная война и фигура "партизана"

Геополитические мотивы различимы у Шмитта практически во всех темах, которые он рассматривает. В частности, он исследовал связь трех концепций "тотальный враг, тотальная война, тотальное государство". С его точки зрения, "тотальное государство" это

⁴³ Carl Schmitt "Raum und Grossraum im Völkerrecht", 1940; цит. по Julien Freund "Les lignes de force de la pensée politique de Carl Schmitt" dans "Nouvelle Ecole", № 44, Paris, 1987.

⁴⁴ Ibidem

самая совершенная форма государства традиционного типа, т.е. пик развития сухопутного "номоса". Несмотря на возможности исторической эволюции такого государства вплоть до масштабов Grossraum, в нем сохраняется неизменным сущностное качество. "Тотальное государство" исключает принцип "тотального врага" и "тотальной войны", так как представление о противнике, "враге" (а Шмитт придавал огромное значение формулировке понятий "друг"/"враг", amicus/hostis) оно выстраивает на основании себя самого, а следовательно, выдвигает концепцию "войны форм", в которой действует Jus bellum и участвуют только ограниченные контингенты профессиональных военных. Мирное население и частная собственность, в свою очередь, находятся под охраной закона и устранены (по меньшей мере, теоретически) из хода военных действий.

Либеральная доктрина, которую Шмитт однозначно связывал с Новым временем и, соответственно, с "морской цивилизацией", с "номосом" моря, отрицая "тотальное государство" открывает тем самым дорогу "тотальной войне" и концепции "тотального врага". В 1941 году в статье "Государственный суверенитет и открытое море" он писал:

"Война на суше была подчинена юридическим нормам, так как она была войной между государствами, т.е. между вооруженными силами враждующих государств. Ее рационализация проявлялась в ее ограничении и в стремлении вывести за ее пределы мирное население и объекты частной собственности. Война на море, напротив, не является войной между строго определенными и подчиняющимися юридическим нормативам противниками, так как основывается на концепции тотального врага."⁴⁵

Общая геополитическая картина, описанная Шмиттом, сводилась к напряженному цивилизационному дуализму, к противостоянию двух Grossraum'ов англосаксонского (Англия + Америка) и континентально-европейского, евразийского. Эти два "Больших Пространства" талассократическое и теллутократическое ведут между собой планетарное сражение за то, чтобы сделать последний шаг к универсализации и перейти от континентального владычества к мировому. При этом Шмитт с пессимизмом относился к возможности свести этот конфликт к какой-то строгой юридической базе, так как цивилизационные макроконцепции обоих "Больших Пространств" основываются на взаимоисключающих "номосах" "номосе Земли" и "номосе Моря". Последний разрушительный элемент вносится развитием воздухоплавания, так как "воздушное пространство" еще менее поддается этико-правовой структурализации, нежели морское.

В конце жизни Шмитт сосредоточил свое внимание на фигуре "партизана". Эта фигура, по Шмитту, является последним представителем "номоса" Земли, остающимся верным своему изначальному призванию вопреки "разжижению цивилизации" и растворению ее юридически-культурных основ. "Партизан" связан с родной землей неформальными узами, и исторический характер этой связи диктует ему основы этики войны, резко отличающиеся от более общих и абстрактных нормативов. По мере универсализации "морской модели" и "торговой этики", которые, естественно, охватывают и сферу военных действий, фигура "партизана", приобретает, по Шмитту, все большее цивилизационное значение, так как "партизан" остается последним действующим лицом истории, которое защищает (всеми средствами) "сухопутный порядок" перед лицом тотального наступления талассократии. Отсюда вытекает его почти "сотериологическая" историческая функция.

⁴⁵ Carl Schmitt "Staatliche Souveranität und freies Meer" in "Das Reich und Europa", Leipzig, 1941.

Глава 9. Петр Николаевич Савицкий "Евразия Срединная Земля"

9.1 Судьба евразийца

Петр Николаевич Савицкий (1895-1968) пожалуй, первый (и единственный) русский автор, которого, в полном смысле слова, можно назвать геополитиком. По образованию экономист, ученик В.Вернадского и П.Струве. До войны был близок кадетам. После революции эмигрировал в Болгарию, затем переехал в Чехословакию. В 1921 году вместе с князем Н.С.Трубецким возглавил евразийское движение, в котором геополитические факторы играли центральную роль. Именно Савицкий в большей степени из всех евразийцев интересовался геополитикой.

Мировоззрение Савицкого, как и большинства других евразийцев, складывалось под влиянием трудов славянофилов, Данилевского и особенно Леонтьева. Это была разновидность революционного славянофильства, сопряженного с центральной идеей особенности исторической идентичности "великороссов", не сводимой ни к религиозной, ни к этнически славянской сущности. В этом аспекте они были более всего близки к Константину Леонтьеву, сформулировавшему важнейший тезис "славянство есть, славизма нет", т.е. "этническая и лингвистическая близость славянских народов не является достаточным основанием, чтобы говорить об их культурном и характерном единстве". Евразийское движение по набору излюбленных тем и концепций было удивительно близко к немецким консервативным революционерам. Так же, как и консервативные революционеры, евразийцы стремились сочетать верность истокам с творческим порывом в будущее, укорененность в русской национальной традиции с социальным модернизмом, техническим развитием и политикой нетрадиционных форм. На этом основано и осторожно позитивное отношение евразийцев к Советскому Государству и к Октябрьской революции.

Несмотря на симпатии к Советам, которые были характерны не только для откровенно просоветского крыла евразийцев (парижский кружок, издававший газету "Евразия"), с которым Савицкий официально порвал отношения, но и для самых умеренных и "консервативных" элементов. После взятия советскими войсками Праги в 1945 году, Савицкий был арестован и осужден на 10 лет лагерей. В лагерях он познакомился с сыном поэта Николая Гумилева Львом, который стал его учеником, а впоследствии одним из лучших современных русских этнографов и историков.

В 1956 году Савицкий был реабилитирован и вернулся в Прагу, где и умер спустя 12 лет.

9.2 Россия-Евразия

Основная идея Савицкого заключается в том, что Россия представляет собой особое цивилизационное образование, определяемое через качество "срединности". Одна из его статей "Географические и геополитические основы евразийства" (1933) начинается такими словами "Россия имеет гораздо больше оснований, чем Китай, называться "Срединным Государством"⁴⁶.

⁴⁶ Петр Савицкий "Географические и геополитические основы евразийства" в "Элементы" № 3, стр. 51-54

Если "срединность" Германии, *Mittellage*, ограничивается европейским контекстом, а сама Европа есть лишь "западный мыс" Евразии, то Россия занимает центральную позицию в рамках всего континента. "Срединность" России, для Савицкого, является основой ее исторической идентичности она не часть Европы и не продолжение Азии. Она самостоятельный мир, самостоятельная и особая духовно-историческая геополитическая реальность, которую Савицкий называет "Евразией".

Это понятие обозначает не материк и не континент, но идею, отраженную в русском пространстве и русской культуре, историческую парадигму, особую цивилизацию. Савицкий с русского полюса выдвигает концепцию, строго тождественную геополитической картине Макиндера, только абстрактные "разбойники суши" или "центры ремительные импульсы, исходящие из географической оси истории", приобретают у него четко выделенный абрис русской культуры, русской истории, русской государственности, русской территории. Россия-Евразия у Савицкого предстает в том же свете, как *Raum* Ратцеля и, еще точнее, *Grossraum* Шмитта.

Если Макиндер считает, что из пустынь *heartland'a* исходит механический толчок, заставляющий береговые зоны ("внутренний полумесяц") творить культуру и историю, то Савицкий утверждает, что Россия-Евразия (= *heartland* Макиндера) и есть синтез мировой культуры и мировой истории, развернутый в пространстве и времени. При этом природа России соучаствует в ее культуре.

Россию Савицкий понимает геополитически, не как национальное государство, но как особый тип цивилизации, сложившейся на основе нескольких составляющих арийско-славянской культуры, тюркского кочевничества, православной традиции. Все вместе создает некое уникальное, "срединное" образование, представляющее собой синтез мировой истории.

Великороссов Савицкий считает не просто ответвлением восточных славян, но особым имперским этническим образованием, в котором сочетаются славянский и тюркский субстраты. Этот момент выводит его на важную тему Турана.

9.3 Туран

Обращение к Турану в качестве позитивной ориентации было скандальным для многих русских националистов. Так, Савицкий косвенно оправдывал монголо-татарское иго, благодаря которому "Россия обрела свою геополитическую самостоятельность и сохранила свою духовную независимость от агрессивного романо-германского мира". Такое отношение к тюркскому миру было призвано резко отделить Россию-Евразию от Европы и ее судьбы, обосновать этническую уникальность русских.

"Без татарщины не было бы России" этот тезис из статьи Савицкого "Степь и оседлость"⁴⁷ был ключевой формулой евразийства. Отсюда прямой переход к чисто геополитическому утверждению:

"Скажем прямо: на пространстве всемирной истории западноевропейскому ощущению моря, как равноправное, хотя и полярное, противостоит единственно монгольское

⁴⁷ П.Н. Савицкий "Степь и Оседлость" в "На Путиях: Утверждение евразийцев", Берлин, 1922, стр. 341-356

ощущение континента; между тем в русских "землепроходцах", в размахе русских завоеваний и освоений тот же дух, то же ощущение континента."⁴⁸

И далее:

"Россия наследница Великих Ханов, продолжательница дела Чингиза и Тимура, объединительница Азии. (...) В ней сочетаются одновременно историческая "оседлая" и "степная" стихия."⁴⁹

Фундаментальную двойственность русского ландшафта ее деление на Лес и Степь заметили еще славянофилы. У Савицкого геополитический смысл России-Ев разии выступает как синтез этих двух реальностей европейского Леса и азиатской Степи. При этом такой синтез не есть простое наложение двух геополитических систем друг на друга, но нечто цельное, оригинальное, обладающей своей собственной мерой и методологией оценок.

Россия-Евразия не сводится целиком к Турану. Она нечто большее. Но в отношении Европы, которая все выходящее за рамки своего "берегового" сознания считает "варварством", самоквалификация русских как "носителей монгольского духа" является провокацией, открывающей историческое и духовное превосходство евразийцев.

9.4 Месторазвитие

В теории Савицкого важнейшую роль играет концепция "месторазвития". Этот термин представляет собой точный аналог понятию Raum, как оно трактуется "политической географией" Ратцеля и немецкой геополитикой (+ Челлен) в целом. В этом понятии отражается "органицизм" евразийцев, точно соответствующий немецкой "органицистской" школе и резко контрастирующий с прагматизмом англосаксонских геополитиков. Если бы Спикмен был знаком с трудами Савицкого, то его негодование относительно "метафизического нонсенса" было еще более сильным, чем в случае с Хаусхофером. Так, Савицкий в тексте "Географический обзор России-Евразии" пишет:

"Социально-политическая среда и ее территория "должны слиться для нас в единое целое, в географический индивидуум или ландшафт"⁵⁰.

Это и есть сущность "месторазвития", в котором объективное и субъективное сливаются в неразрывное единство, в нечто целое. Это концептуальный синтез. В том же тексте Савицкий продолжает:

"Необходим синтез. Необходимо умение сразу смотреть на социально-историческую среду и на занятую ею территорию"⁵¹.

В этом Савицкий близок к Видалю де ля Блашу. Подобно французскому геополитику, обосновывавшему неделимость Франции единством культурного типа независимо от этнической принадлежности жителей Эльзас-Лоррэн, Савицкий считает, что

⁴⁸ Ibidem

⁴⁹ Ibidem

⁵⁰ П.Н.Савицкий "Географический обзор России-Евразии" в сборнике "Мир России -- Евразия", 1926, стр. 219 -- 232

⁵¹ Ibidem

"Россия-Евразия есть "месторазвитие", "единое целое", "географический индивидуум", одновременно географический, этнический, хозяйственный, исторический и т.д. и т.п. "ландшафт»⁵².

Россия-Евразия есть такое "месторазвитие", которое является интегральной формой существования многих более мелких "месторазвитий". Это Grossraum Шмитта, состоящий из целой иерархии меньших Raum'ов.

Через введение понятия "месторазвитие" евразийцы уходили от позитивистской необходимости аналитически расщеплять исторические феномены, раскладывая их на механические системы применительно не только к природным, но и к культурным явлениям. Апелляция к "месторазвитию", к "географическому индивидууму" позволяло евразийцам избежать слишком конкретных рецептов относительно национальных, расовых, религиозных, культурных, языковых, идеологических проблем. Интуитивно ощущаемое всеми жителями "географической оси истории" геополитическое единство обретало тем самым новый язык, "синтетический", не сводимый к неадекватным, фрагментарным, аналитическим концепциям западного рационализма.

В этом также проявилась преемственность Савицкого русской интеллектуальной традиции, всегда тяготевшей к осмыслению "цельности", "соборности", "всеединства" и т.д.

9.5 Идеократия

Очень важным аспектом теории Савицкого является принцип "идеократии". Савицкий полагал, что евразийское государство должно строиться, отправляясь от изначального духовного импульса, сверху вниз. А следовательно, вся его структура должна созидаться в согласии с априорной Идеей, и во главе этой структуры должен стоять особый класс "духовных вождей". Эта позиция очень близка теориям Шмитта о "волевом", "духовном" импульсе, стоящим у истоков возникновения Grossraum'a.

Идеократия предполагала главенство непрагматического, нематериального и некоммерческого подхода к государственному устройству. Достоинство "географической личности", по Савицкому, состоит в способности подниматься над материальной необходимостью, органически включая физический мир в единый духовно-созидательный импульс глобального исторического делания.

Идеократия термин, который объединяет все формы недемократического, нелиберального правления, основанного на нематериалистических и неутилитаристских мотивациях. Причем Савицкий сознательно избегает уточнения этого понятия, которое может воплощаться и в теократической соборности, и в народной монархии, и в национальной диктатуре, и в партийном государстве советского типа. Такая широта термина соответствует чисто геополитическим горизонтам евразийства, которые охватывают огромные исторические и географические объемы. Это попытка наиболее точно выразить интуитивную волю континента.

Очевидно, что идеократия прямо противоположна прагматико-коммерческому подходу, доминировавшему в доктринах Макиндера, Мэхэна и Спикмена. Таким образом, русские евразийцы довели до окончательной ясности идеологические термины, в которых

⁵² Ibidem

проявлялось исторически противостояние Моря и Суши. Море либеральная демократия, "торговый строй", прагматизм. Суша идеократия (всех разновидностей), "иерархическое правление", доминанция религиозного идеала.

Взгляды Савицкого на идеократию резонируют с идеями немецкого социолога и экономиста Вернера Зомбарта, делившего все социальные модели и типы на два общих класса "герои" и "торговцы". На геополитическом уровне, термин "герой", "героизм" утрачивает метафорический, патетический смысл и становится техническим термином для обозначения юридической и этической специфики идеократического правления.

9.6 СССР и евразийство

Роль Петра Савицкого и, шире, русского евразийства в развитии геополитики как науки огромна. И странно, как мало внимания уделяется этому направлению в западных учебниках. В Савицком мы имеем совершенно сознательного, ответственного и компетентного геополитика, который полноценно и обоснованно выражает позицию heartland'a, причем отталкиваясь от наиболее глубинных русских его областей. Геополитическая доктрина Савицкого это прямая антитеза взглядам Мэхэна, Макиндера, Спикмена, Видаля де ля Блаша и других "талассократов". Причем только в данном случае речь идет о законченном и развернутом изложении альтернативной доктрины, подробно разбирающей идеологические, экономические, культурные и этнические факторы. Если использовать терминологию Карла Шмитта, то Савицкий и евразийцы являются выразителями "номоса Земли" в его актуальном состоянии, последовательными идеологами "теллуократии", мыслителями Grossraum'a, альтернативного англосаксонскому Grossraum'у.

Сравнение идей русских евразийцев с теориями немецких геополитиков-континенталистов (Хаусхофер, Шмитт и т.д.), которые также пытались построить собственную геополитическую теорию как антитезу стратегии "Морской Силы", показывает, что у немцев в этом направлении пройдена лишь половина пути, а у русских (в первую очередь, у Савицкого) мы имеем дело с законченной и непротиворечивой, полноценной картиной мира. В этом смысле, можно вывести некоторый закон: "Чем ближе воззрения немецких континенталистов к русскому евразийству, чем полнее принимают они Ostorientierung, тем последовательней и логичней их доктрины, эффективней их политические проекты, созданные на геополитической основе".

В этом смысле ближе всего к Савицкому подошли германские национал-большевики в частности, Эрнст Никиш, которые прекрасно осознавали двойственность геополитического положения Германии, чья "срединность" относительна и вторична по сравнению с абсолютной культурной и континентальной "срединностью" русских. Отсюда они делали вывод, что Германия не может претендовать на роль геополитического синтеза, что она должна сделать выбор между юго-западной, славянофобской, католической и, в некоторых аспектах, "талассократической" (буржуазной) Германией (вместе с Австрией) и северо-восточной германо-славянской, социалистической, русофильской, протестантской и спартанской Пруссией. Никишу принадлежит знаменитый геополитический тезис "Европа от Владивостока до Флессинга", и только такой подход со стороны немцев гармонично вписывается в последовательное континентальное евразийство. Естественно, что линия австрийского католика, антикоммуниста и славянофоба Гитлера как бы ни пытались корректировать ее некоторые намного более исторически ответственные консервативные революционеры и геополитики не могла не привести к тому, что Германия надолго утратила свое

историческое бытие в результате кошмарного поражения, нанесенного именно теми силами, "вечный союз" с которыми только и мог обеспечить немцам соучастие в мировом господстве теллуократии.

Советская реальность в геополитическом смысле во многом совпадала с концепциями Савицкого и других евразийцев, хотя об их прямом влиянии на советское руководство достоверных данных нет. Во многом близкие к евразийцам сменовеховцы и национал-большевики особенно Николай Устрялов явно влияли на большевиков и особенно на Сталина, хотя никогда не занимали высоких постов и часто оканчивали свою жизнь в лагерях. Часть евразийцев Эфрон, Карсавин и т.д. открыто сотрудничали с СССР, но также благодарности не получили. Однако анализ советской внешней политики вплоть до начала перестройки приводит к выводу, что она постоянно следовала именно евразийскому курсу, никогда не заявляя об этом открыто.

И здесь можно лишь строить предположения: либо существовала какая-то неизвестная организация внутри советского режима, которая руководствовалась идеями Савицкого, адаптируя их к актуальным политическим реальностям и облекая в официальную "марксистскую" лексику, либо объективное положение heartland'a вынуждало СССР по инерции делать те шаги, которые должно было бы делать геополитически сознательное континентальное государство Евразия.

Глава 10. Геополитика как инструмент национальной политики

10.1 Планетарный дуализм основной закон геополитики

Подводя итог краткому знакомству с идеями основателей геополитической науки, можно сделать несколько общих заключений.

Несмотря на разнообразие точек зрения мы имеем дело все же с некоей единой картиной мира, которая может быть названа геополитической. Эта картина мира стремится включить в анализ исторических процессов, международных и межгосударственных отношений сразу несколько дисциплинарных подходов географический, политологический, идеологический, этнографический, экономический и т.д. В этом состоит основная характеристика всех геополитических доктрин стремление к междисциплинарному синтезу.

Самой общей и разделяемой всеми геополитиками методологической формулой является утверждение фундаментального исторического дуализма между Сушей, теллуократией, "номосом" Земли, Евразией, heartland'ом, "срединной землей", идеократической цивилизацией, "географической осью истории" с одной стороны, и Морем, талассократией, Sea Power, "номосом" Моря, Атлантикой, англосаксонским миром, торговой цивилизацией, "внешним или островным полумесяцем", с другой. Это можно рассматривать как главный закон геополитики. Вне постулирования этого дуализма все остальные выводы теряют смысл. При всем расхождении в частных аспектах ни один из основателей геополитической науки не ставил под сомнение факта такого противостояния. По своей значимости он сопоставим с законом всемирного тяготения в физике.

10.2 Геополитик не может не быть ангажирован

Другой особенностью взглядов основателей геополитики является их неизменная политическая ангажированность. Нет, практически, ни одного геополитика, который был бы отстранен от участия в политической жизни своего государства. Отсюда вытекает очевидная пристрастность всех без исключения. Геополитик, приступая к научным исследованиям, обязательно должен определить свое собственное место на карте геополитических полюсов; от этого будет зависеть тот угол зрения, под которым он станет анализировать все мировые процессы. Во всей истории геополитики мы не встречаем ни одного автора, который был бы безразличен к судьбе своего государства и своего народа, не разделял бы его основной этической и исторической ориентации. Особенно ярко это проявляется на крайних полюсах англосаксонские авторы безукоризненно и однозначно следуют логике и ценностной системе Sea Power, талассократии, формулируя свои теории с позиции безоговорочных сторонников атлантизма; русские евразийцы столь же последовательны в своей верности идеалам heartland'a они даже не ставят под сомнение абсолютное этическое и историческое превосходство идеократии и России-Евразии.

Сложнее обстоит дело с французами, у которых есть теоретический выбор самоидентификации либо талассократия, либо теллуократия. В первом случае, следует солидарность с англосаксонским миром, с Sea Power, во втором германофилия. Оба варианта подразумевают безусловные национальные симпатии. Теоретически обе эти тенденции присутствуют среди французских геополитиков, но наиболее стройную

геополитическую концепцию выработала группа "атлантистов", последователем Видаль де ля Блаша, остающегося центральной фигурой в этой области. Его геополитические антиподы Лаваль и Де Голль с теоретической точки зрения значительно ему уступают.

У Германии тоже двойственная ситуация. Если в целом ее геополитическая мысль ориентирована преимущественно континентально и "евразийски", эта ориентация ограничивается сложным отношением к славянскому миру, к Азии и особенно к России. Это ограничение настолько существенно и попытки Германии волюнтаристски уравнять свое срединно-европейское положение со срединно-евразийским, игнорируя тем самым историческое значение России-Евразии, настолько упорны, что в обеих мировых войнах Германия вынуждена была воевать не только против талассократических держав, но и против своего логического евразийского союзника России (СССР). Можно сказать, что для германской геополитики характерен "неевразийский" континентализм. Такая установка резюмирует в геополитической формуле всю немецкую историю и предопределяет саму структуру германского национального сознания.

Необходимость для геополитика изначально определить собственную позицию на геополитической карте мира и ее поясах (схема Макиндера в этом смысле является предельно ясной иллюстрацией) повлияла на то, что эта наука развивалась почти исключительно у представителей крупных держав, имеющих амбиции стать "мировым могуществом" (Weltmacht), "сверхдержавами", достичь планетарного господства.

Американцы Мэхэн и Спикмен, англичанин Макиндер представляют "островной полумесяц". Они "спикеры" атлантизма, талассократии.

Видадь де ла Блаш (и его школа) представляют атлантистскую Францию. Лаваль и Де Голль склоняются в сторону континентализма, "европеизма", антиатлантизма. Отсюда их обоюдная германофилия, которая геополитически сближает их несмотря на то, что они принадлежали к двум враждебным лагерям: Лаваль был главой коллаборационистского правительства Виши, а Де Голль главой антифашистской французской армии.

Немцы Ратцель, Хаусхофер, Шмитт отождествляют Германию с осью Суши, теллуократии, и стремятся создать из Германии "Большое Пространство", которое должно противостоять англосаксонской талассократии. К ним примыкает швед Рудольф Челлен, который, однако, мыслит скорее как представитель Средней Европы, германского европейского пространства, а не как "узко-шведский" националист. Самые радикальные континенталисты Эрнст Никиш, Фридрих Георг Юнгер, Артур Мюллер ван ден Брук и т.д. идут еще дальше и полагают будущее Германии только в стратегической интеграции с евразийской Россией.

Наконец, русские евразийцы (Савицкий, Трубецкой и т.д.) выражают самую законченную версию континентализма, выражая самую радикальную позицию "номоса" Суши, теллуократии.

Отсутствие хоть сколько-нибудь выдающихся имен среди геополитиков иных стран (хотя такие были и в Италии, Испании, Бельгии, Румынии, Голландии и т.д.) объясняется тем, что второстепенных по масштабу государств основополагающий геополитический дуализм касается лишь опосредованно, их влияние на ход глобального противостояния незначительно, а следовательно, сама сущность геополитики, ее острота, ее актуальность, ее "судьбоносное" измерение для них совершенно не актуальны.

10.3 Судьбы ученых судьбы держав

Гражданство ученых-геополитиков самым прямым образом сказывается на их воззрениях. Здесь связь очевидна. Геополитики, в сущности, это те люди, которые с наибольшей проницательностью и ответственностью способны распознать исторические тенденции глобального развития в пространственной сфере, понять место своего государства и своего народа в этом контексте и сформулировать обоснованный и наиболее эффективный проект будущего. Поэтому так часто они прямо или косвенно воздействуют на мировую историю, которую осуществляют, однако, совсем иные силы, группы, партии, лидеры, действуя под совершенно иными, сиюминутно актуальными лозунгами.

Но интересна и еще одна закономерность. Степень прямого влияния геополитиков на власть, обратная связь между научными разработками и политическим курсом в международных отношениях соответствующих государств резко различается.

Мэхэн, Спикмен и Макиндер занимали высокие посты в своих государствах, их политическая активность имела самые непосредственные результаты, их прямое влияние на англосаксонскую политику очевидно и огромно. Несмотря на некоторые трения с научным миром своих стран и некоторое (тактическое) замалчивание значения их идей для всей "морской цивилизации" в целом, они пользовались при жизни почетом, им оказывалась всяческая поддержка, их судьба и карьера были показательно удачными.

Иначе обстоит дело с континентальными геополитиками. Видаля де ля Блаша считали лишь географом, стремящимся расширить сферу своих исследований до политического масштаба. Отношение к нему со стороны правительства уважительное, но в целом равнодушное, хотя многие практические принципы (особенно изложенные в "Восточной Франции") взяты на вооружение. Он не пользуется таким престижем как англо-американцы, но его теоретическое наследие учитывается.

У немцев особенно у Хаусхофера и Шмитта ситуация уже серьезнее. И в Веймарской республике и при Гитлере отношение к ним меняется волнообразно, переходя от определенного внимания властей к прямым репрессиям. По сравнению с "талассократическими" геополитиками их судьба трагична, их карьеры зигзагообразны, они в определенные моменты становятся жертвами даже тех режимов, национальные цели которых в общих чертах совпадают с их собственными. Здесь уже не почести и не уважение, но истерическое внимание, чередующееся с гонениями.

У евразийцев картина еще более трагичная. Здесь никакого прямого внимания, ни одного упоминания в официальных источниках, лишь лагерь, ссылки, аресты, преследования при полном игнорировании. И хотя до определенного момента советской истории создается впечатление, что основные решения на международном уровне принимаются последователями Петра Савицкого, сверяющими каждый шаг с публикациями евразийцев, наступает переломный момент 1989 год когда выясняется, что никто в советском руководстве не способен связно объяснить логику традиционной внешней политики, и в результате происходит молниеносное разрушение гигантского евразийского организма, создаваемого с таким напряжением тремя поколениями, выдержавшими войны, лишения, страдания, непосильные тяготы.

Роль личности геополитиков в смысле их влияния на власть резко сокращается по оси Запад-Восток. С почтением к Мэхэну и Спикмену контрастирует постоянные угрозы Шмитту со стороны СС-овцев и преследования Хаусхофера (его сын был расстрелян), а в еще большей степени лагерь Савицкого и Карсавина. Поражает, что, в конечном итоге,

именно те страны, которые более всего прислушивались к своим геополитикам и ценили их, добились потрясающих результатов и подошли вплотную к тому, чтобы окончательно достичь единоличного мирового господства. Германия же заплатила за невнимание к тезисам Хаусхофера о "континентальном блоке" тем, что на полвека выпала из истории, потерпела чудовищное поражение и впала в политическое небытие. СССР, не обративший внимание на труды наиболее ответственных, глубоких и прозорливых русских патриотов, без боя и сопротивления оказался почти в той же ситуации, что и послевоенная Германия: мировое влияние сошло на нет, пространства резко сократились, экономика и социальная сфера превратились в развалины.

Часть II СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ТЕОРИИ И ШКОЛЫ (вторая половина XX века)

Глава 1. Общий обзор

Развитие геополитической мысли во второй половине XX века в целом следовало путями, намеченными основоположниками этой науки. История с Хаусхофером и его школой, над которыми висела зловещая тень интеллектуального сотрудничества с Третьим Рейхом, заставляла авторов, занимающихся этой дисциплиной искать окольных путей, чтобы не быть обвиненными в "фашизме". Так, американец Колин С. Грэй вообще предложил использовать два слова, для обозначения геополитики: английское "geopolitics" и немецкое "Geopolitik". Первое должно обозначать англосаксонскую и прагматическую версию этого явления, т.е. труды тех авторов, которые преемствуют подход Мэхэна, Макиндера и Спикмена, а второе "континентальный вариант", наследие школы Хаусхофера, учитывающий некоторые "духовные" или "метафизические" факторы. Конечно, это деление весьма условно и служит лишь демагогическим ходом, продиктованным соображениями "политической корректности".

Американская и, шире, атлантистская (талассократическая) линия в геополитике развивалась практически без всяких разрывов с традицией. По мере осуществления проектов американцев по становлению "мировой державой" послевоенные геополитики-атлантисты лишь уточняли и детализировали частные аспекты теории, развивая прикладные сферы. Основополагающая модель "морской силы" и ее геополитических перспектив, превратилась из научных разработок отдельных военно-географических школ в официальную международную политику США.

Вместе с тем, становление США сверхдержавой и выход на последний этап, предшествующий окончательной планетарной гегемонии талассократии, заставил американских геополитиков рассматривать совершенно новую геополитическую модель, в которой участвовало не две основных силы, но только одна. Причем существовало принципиально два варианта развития событий либо окончательный выигрыш Западом геополитической дуэли с Востоком, либо конвергенция двух идеологических лагерей в нечто единое и установление Мирового Правительства (этот проект получил название "мондиализма" от французского слова "monde", "мир"). В обоих случаях требовалось новое геополитическое осмысление этого возможного исхода истории цивилизаций. Такая ситуация вызвало к жизни особое направление в геополитике "геополитику мондиализма". Иначе эта теория известна как доктрина "нового мирового порядка". Она разрабатывалась американскими геополитиками начиная с 70-х годов, а впервые громко о ней было заявлено президентом США Джорджем Бушем в момент войны в Персидском заливе в 1991.

Европейская геополитика как нечто самостоятельное после окончания Второй мировой войны практически не существовала. Лишь в течение довольно короткого периода 1959-1968 годов, когда президентом Франции был "континенталист" Шарль Де Голль, ситуация несколько изменилась. Начиная с 1963 года Де Голль предпринял некоторые явно антиатлантистские меры, в результате которых Франция вышла из Северо-Атлантического союза и сделала попытки выработать собственную геополитическую стратегию. Но так как в одиночку это государство не могло противостоять талассократическому миру, на повестке дня встал вопрос о внутриевропейском франко-германском

сотрудничестве и об укреплении связей с СССР. Отсюда родился знаменитый голлистский тезис "Европа от Атлантики до Урала". Эта Европа мыслилась как суверенное стратегически континентальное образование совсем в духе умеренного "европейского континентализма".

Вместе с тем к началу 70-х годов, когда геополитические исследования в США становятся крайне популярными, европейские ученые также начинают включаться в этот процесс, но при этом их связь с довоенной геополитической школой в большинстве случаев уже прервана и они вынуждены подстраиваться под нормы англосаксонского подхода. Так, европейские ученые выступают как технические эксперты международных организаций НАТО, ООН и т.д., занимаясь прикладными геополитическими исследованиями и не выходя за пределы узких конкретных вопросов. Постепенно эти исследования превратились в нечто самостоятельное в "региональную геополитику", довольно развитую во Франции ("школа Ива Лакоста", издателя журнала "Геродот"). Эта "региональная геополитика" абстрагируется от глобальных схем Макиндера, Мэхэна или Хаусхофера, мало внимания уделяет основополагающему дуализму, и лишь применяет геополитические методики для описания межэтнических и межгосударственных конфликтов, демографических процессов и даже "геополитики политических выборов".

Единственная непрерывная традиция геополитики, сохранившаяся в Европе с довоенных времен, была достоянием довольно маргинальных групп, в той или иной степени связанных с послевоенными националистическими партиями и движениями. В этих узких и политически периферийных кругах развивались геополитические идеи, прямо восходящие к "континентализму", школе Хаусхофера и т.д. Это движение совокупно получило название европейских "новых правых". До определенного момента общественное мнение их просто игнорировало, считая "пережитками фашизма". И лишь в последнее десятилетие, особенно благодаря просветительской и журналистской деятельности французского философа Алена де Бенуа, к этому направлению стали прислушиваться и в серьезных научных кругах. Несмотря на значительную дистанцию, отделяющую интеллектуальные круги европейских "новых правых" от властных инстанций и на их "диссидентство", с чисто теоретической точки зрения, их труды представляют собой огромный вклад в развитие геополитики. Будучи свободной от рамок политического конформизма, их мысль развивалась относительно независимо и беспристрастно. Причем на рубеже 90-х годов сложилась такая ситуация, что официальные европейские геополитики (чаще всего выходцы из левых или крайне левых партий) были вынуждены обратиться к "новым правым", их трудам, переводам и исследованиям для восстановления полноты геополитической картины.

Наконец, русская геополитика. Официально признанная "фашистской" и "буржуазной псевдонаукой" геополитика как таковая в СССР не существовала. Ее функции выполняло несколько дисциплин: стратегия, военная география, теория международного права и международных отношений, география, этнография и т.д. И вместе с тем, общее геополитическое поведение СССР на планетарной арене выдает наличие довольно рациональной, с геополитической точки зрения, модели поведения. Стремление СССР укрепить свои позиции на юге Евразии, в "береговой зоне", проникновение в Африку, дестабилизирующие действия в Южной Америке (призванные внести раскол в пространство, контролируемое Северо-Американскими Штатами по доктрине Монро) и даже вторжение советских войск в Афганистан (для того, чтобы рассеять американскую "анаконду", стремившуюся приблизить стратегические границы "талассократии" вплотную к южным границам "географической оси истории") и т.д. Такая последовательная и геополитически обоснованная политика СССР указывает на существование какого-то "центра решений", где должны были сводиться воедино

результаты многих традиционных наук и на основании этого "сведения", "синтеза" приниматься важнейшие стратегические шаги. Однако социальная локализация этого "криптогеополитического" центра представляется проблематичной. Есть версия, что речь шла о каком-то секретном отделе советского ГРУ.

Собственно же геополитика развивалась исключительно маргинальными "диссидентскими" кружками. Самым ярким представителем этого направления был историк Лев Гумилев, хотя он никогда не использовал в своих работах ни термина "геополитика", ни термина "евразийство", и более того, стремился всячески избежать прямого обращения к социально-политическим реальностям. Благодаря такому "осторожному" подходу ему удалось опубликовать даже при советском режиме несколько книг, посвященных этнографической истории.

После распада Варшавского договора и СССР геополитика стала в российском обществе снова актуальной. Отмена идеологической цензуры сделала возможной, наконец, называть вещи своими именами. Не удивительно, что первыми в возрождении геополитики приняли участие национально-патриотические круги (газета "День", журнал "Элементы"). Методология оказалась настолько впечатляющей, что инициативу перехватили и некоторые "демократические" движения. В скором времени после перестройки геополитика стала одной из популярнейших тем всего русского общества.

С этим связан возросший интерес к евразийцам и их наследию в современной России.

Глава 2. Современный атлантизм

2.1 Последователи Спикмена Д.У. Мэйниг, У.Кирк, С.Б.Коен, К.Грэй, Г.Киссинджер

Развитие американской, чисто атлантистской линии в геополитике после 1945 года в основном представляло собой развитие тезисов Николааса Спикмена. Как сам он начал разработку своих теорий с коррекцией Макиндера, так и его последователи, в основном, корректировали его собственные взгляды.

В 1956 году ученик Спикмена Д.Мэйниг опубликовал текст "Heartland и Rimland в евразийской истории". Мэйниг специально подчеркивает, что "геополитические критерии должны особо учитывать функциональную ориентацию населения и государства, а не только чисто географическое отношение территории к Суше и Морю"⁵³. В этом явно заметно влияние Видаля де ля Блаша.

Мэйниг говорит о том, что все пространство евразийского rimland делится на три типа по своей функционально-культурной предрасположенности.

"Китай, Монголия, Северный Вьетнам, Бангладеш, Афганистан, Восточная Европа (включая Пруссию), Прибалтика и Карелия пространства, органически тяготеющие к heartland.

Южная Корея, Бирма, Индия, Ирак, Сирия, Югославия геополитически нейтральны.

Западная Европа, Греция, Турция, Иран, Пакистан, Таиланд склонны к талассократическому блоку.⁵⁴"

В 1965 году другой последователь Спикмена У.Кирк выпустил книгу⁵⁵, воспроизводящую название знаменитой статьи Макиндера "Географическая ось истории". Кирк развил тезис Спикмена относительно центрального значения rimland для геополитического баланса сил. Опираясь на культурно-функциональный анализ Мэйнига и его дифференциацию "береговых зон" относительно "теллуократической" или "талассократической" предрасположенности, Кирк выстроил историческую модель, в которой главную роль играют прибрежные цивилизации, от которых культурные импульсы поступают с большей или меньшей степенью интенсивности внутрь континента. При этом "высшие" культурные формы и историческая инициатива признается за теми секторами "внутреннего полумесяца", которые Мэйниг определил как "талассократически ориентированные".

Американец Сол Коен в книге "География и Политика в разделенном мире"⁵⁶ предложил ввести в геополитический метод дополнительную классификацию, основанную на делении основных геополитических реальностей на "ядра" (nucleus) и "дисконтинуальные пояса". С его точки зрения, каждый конкретный регион планеты может быть разложен на 4 геополитических составляющие:

- 1) «внешняя морская (водная) среда, зависящая от торгового флота и портов;

⁵³ D.W.Meinig "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History" in "West Politics Quarterly", IX, 1956 pp. 553-569

⁵⁴ Ibidem

⁵⁵ W.Kirk "Geographical Pivot of History", Leicester Universal Press, 1965

⁵⁶ S.B. Cohen "Geography and Politics in a divided world", New York, 1963

- 2) континентальное ядро (nucleus), тождественное "Hinterland" (геополитическому термину, означающему "удаленные от побережья внутренние регионы");
- 3) дисконтинуальный пояс (береговые сектора, ориентированные либо внутрь континента, либо от него);
- 4) регионы, геополитически независимые от этого ансамбля.»⁵⁷

Концепция "дисконтинуальных поясов" была подхвачена такими ведущими американскими стратегами, как Генри Киссинджер, который считал, что политическая стратегия США относительно "дисконтинуальных" береговых зон состоит в том, чтобы соединить фрагменты в одно целое и обеспечить тем самым атлантизму полный контроль над Советской Евразией. Эта доктрина получила название "Linkage" от английского "link", "связь", "звено". Чтобы стратегия "анаконды" была до конца успешной, необходимо было обратить особое внимание на те "береговые сектора" Евразии, которые либо сохраняли нейтралитет, либо тяготели ко внутренним пространствам континента. На практике эта политика осуществлялась через вьетнамскую войну, активизацию американо-китайских отношений, поддержку США проамериканского режима в Иране, поддержку националистов-диссидентов Украины и Прибалтики и т.д.

Как и в предшествующие эпохи послевоенная американская атлантистская геополитическая школа постоянно поддерживала обратную связь с властью.

Развитие геополитических взглядов применительно к "ядерной эпохе" мы встречаем у другого представителя той же американской школы Колина Грэя. В своей книге "Геополитика ядерной эры"⁵⁸ он дает очерк военной стратегии США и НАТО, в котором ставит планетарное месторасположение ядерных объектов в зависимость от географических и геополитических особенностей регионов.

2.2 Атлантисты выиграли холодную войну

Геополитическое развитие атлантизма к началу 90-х годов достигает своей кульминации. Стратегия "анаконды" демонстрирует абсолютную эффективность. В этот период можно наблюдать почти "пророческую" правоту первых англосаксонских геополитиков Макиндера и Мэхэна, скорректированных Спикменом.

Распад Варшавского договора и СССР знаменует торжество ориентации атлантистской стратегии, проводившейся в жизнь в течение всего XX века. Запад побеждает в холодной войне с Востоком. Морская Сила (Sea Power) празднует свою победу над heartland'ом.

Геополитически это событие объясняется так:

Противостояние советского блока с НАТО было первой в истории чистой и беспримесной формой оппозиции Суши и Моря, Бегемота и Левиафана. При этом геополитический баланс сил отражал не просто идеологические, но и геополитические константы.

СССР как heartland, как Евразия, воплощал в себе идеократию советского типа. С географической точки зрения, это было довольно интегрированное "Большое

⁵⁷ Ibidem

⁵⁸ Colin S. Gray "The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era", N.Y., 1977

Пространство" с колоссальными природными ресурсами и развитым стратегическим вооружением. Главным преимуществом СССР были "культурно-функциональные" наклонности населения, живущего на его просторах или примыкающего к советской территории, и наличие трудно достигаемых внутриконтинентальных просторов, позволяющих создать надежные оборонные и технологические плацдармы. Кроме того, с двух сторон с Севера и Востока СССР имел морские границы, защищать которые намного легче, чем сухопутные.

За счет централизованной экономики СССР добился товарно-продовольственной автаркии и военного статуса сверхдержавы. По мере возможностей он стремился распространить свое влияние и на другие континенты.

Но у Восточного блока было несколько принципиальных геополитических недостатков. Самый главный заключался в огромной протяженности сухопутных границ. Если с Юга границы совпадали с грядой евразийских гор, от Маньчжурии до Тянь-Шаня, Памира и Кавказа, то на Западе граница проходила посередине равнинной Европы, которая была стратегическим плацдармом атлантизма, в то время как центральная его база находилась на западном берегу "Срединного Океана" (Midland Ocean). Но даже в южном направлении горы служили не только защитой, но и препятствием, закрывая путь для возможной экспансии и выход к южным морям.

При этом Восточный блок был вынужден сосредоточить в одном и том же геополитическом центре военно-стратегические, экономические, интеллектуальные, производственные силы и природные ресурсы.

С таким положением резко контрастировало геополитическое положение Запада с центром США. (Это особенно важно, так как положение Западной Европы было в таком раскладе сил весьма незавидным; ей досталась роль сухопутной базы США, прилегающей к границам противоположного лагеря, своего рода "санитарного кордона"). Америка была полностью защищена "морскими границами". Более того, стратегически интегрировав свой континент, она получила контроль над огромной частью евразийского побережья, rimland. От Западной Европы через Грецию и Турцию (стран - членов НАТО) контроль атлантистов простирался на Дальний Восток (Таиланд, Южная Корея, стратегически колонизированная Япония), и эта зона плавно переходила в Индийский и Тихий океаны важнейшие военные базы на острове Сан Диего, на Филиппинах, и далее, на Гуаме, Карибах и Гаити. Следовательно, все потенциальные конфликты были вынесены за территорию основного стратегического пространства.

При этом атлантисты создали сложную дифференцированную систему геополитического распределения силовых "ядер". Непосредственно США обеспечивали военно-стратегическую мощь. Интеллектуальные, финансовые и производственные структуры, а также центры разработки высоких технологий сосредоточивались в Западной Европе, свободной от тяжести обеспечения собственной военной безопасности (кроме содержания полиции и чисто декоративных ВС).

Природные ресурсы поступали из экономически малоразвитых регионов Третьего мира, откуда в значительной мере приходила и дешевая рабочая сила.

Сохранение статус кво, сложившегося сразу после Второй мировой войны, было наступательной позицией, так как, по предсказаниям атлантистских геополитиков, такая ситуация неминуемо должна была привести к истощению континентального блока,

обреченного на полную автаркию и вынужденного в одиночку развивать все стратегические направления одновременно.

У heartland'a в такой ситуации было только два выхода. Первый осуществить военную экспансию на Запад с целью завоевания Европы до Атлантики. После этого усилия СССР мог бы обеспечить себе спокойные морские границы и промышленно-интеллектуальный и технологический потенциал. Параллельно следовало было предпринять аналогичное усилие и в южном направлении, чтобы выйти, наконец, к теплым морям и порвать "кольцо анаконды" Sea Power. Это жесткий путь, который мог бы привести в случае успеха к стабильному континентальному миру и в ближайшей перспективе к краху Америки, лишенной rimland.

Другой путь заключался, напротив, в уходе СССР и его ВС из Восточной Европы в обмен на уход из Западной Европы сил НАТО и создание единого строго нейтрального Европейского Блока (возможно, с ограниченным "диссуазивным" ядерным потенциалом). Этот вариант всерьез обсуждался в эпоху Де Голля.

То же самое возможно было осуществить и с Азией. Пойти на отказ от прямого политического контроля над некоторыми Среднеазиатскими республиками в обмен на создание с Афганистаном, Ираном и Индией (возможно Китаем) мощного стратегического антиамериканского блока, ориентированного внутриконтинентально.

Можно было бы, наконец, скомбинировать эти два варианта и пойти мирным путем на Западе и силовым на Востоке (или наоборот). Важно лишь было начать оба этих геополитических действия синхронно. Только в таком случае можно было бы надеяться на изменения планетарного баланса сил из явного позиционного проигрыша Суши к ее выигрышу. Необходимо было любой ценой прорвать "сдерживание" этим термином называли в период холодной войны геополитическую тактику "анаконды".

Но поскольку СССР так и не решился на этот радикальный геополитический шаг, атлантистским державам осталось только пожинать результаты своей строго рассчитанной и геополитически выверенной долговременной позиционной стратегии.

От всестороннего перенапряжения автаркичная советская держава не выдержала и пала. А военное вторжение в Афганистан без параллельного стратегического шага в Западной Европе (мирного или немирного) вместо того, чтобы спасти дело, окончательно усугубило ситуацию.

2.3 Аэрократия и эфирократия

Традиционная атлантистская геополитика, полагая в центре своей концепции Sea Power, является "геополитикой моря". Глобальная стратегия, основанная на этой геополитике, привела Запад к установлению планетарного могущества. Но развитие техники привело к освоению воздушного пространства, что сделало актуальной разработку "геополитики воздуха".

В отличие от "геополитики моря", законченной и вполне разработанной, полноценной "геополитики воздуха" не существует. Фактор воздухоплавания добавляется к общей геополитической картине. Но некоторые соотношения при актуализации воздушной среды и связанных с ней новых типов вооружений стратегической авиации, межконтинентальных ракет и ядерного оружия значительно изменились.

Освоение воздушного пространства в некоторой степени уравнило между собой Сушу и Море, так как для самолетов и ракет разница между этими пространствами не так значительна. (Особенно важным шагом было создание авианосцев, так как это окончательно оторвало воздушные базы от Суши, сделав их независимыми от качества земной поверхности.)

Вместе с тем развитие авиации изменило пропорции планетарного масштаба, сделав Землю значительно "меньше", а расстояния "короче". Вместе с тем ракетостроение и развитие стратегической авиации во многом релятивизировали традиционные геополитические факторы морские и сухопутные границы, внутриконтинентальные базы и т.д.

Перенос вооружений на земную орбиту и стратегическое освоение космического пространства были последним этапом "сжатия" планеты и окончательной релятивизации пространственных различий.

Актуальная геополитика помимо Суши и Моря вынуждена учитывать еще две стихии воздух и эфир (космическое пространство). Этим стихиям на военном уровне соответствуют ядерное оружие (воздух) и программа "звездных войн" (космос). По аналогии с теллурократией (власть Суши) и талассократией (власть Моря) эти две новейшие модификации геополитических систем могут быть названы аэрократией (власть Воздуха) и эфирократией (власть Эфира).

Карл Шмитт дал эскизный набросок этих двух новых сфер. При этом самым важным и принципиальным его замечанием является то, что и "аэрократия" и "эфирократия" представляют собой дальнейшее развитие именно "номоса" Моря, продвинутое фазы именно "талассократии", так как весь технический процесс освоения новых сфер ведется в сторону "разжижения" среды, что, по Шмитту, сопровождается соответствующими культурными и цивилизационными процессами прогрессивным отходом от "номоса" Суши не только в стратегическом, но и в этическом, духовном, социально-политическом смысле.

Иными словами, освоение воздушной и космической сред есть продолжение сугубо талассократических тенденций, а следовательно, может рассматриваться как высшая стадия сугубо атлантической стратегии.

В данном ракурсе ядерное противостояние блоков в холодной войне представляется как конкуренция в условиях навязанных "морской Силой" heartland'у, вынужденному принимать условия стратегической позиционной дуэли, диктуемые противоположной стороной. Такой процесс активного "разжижения стихий", сопряженный с логикой развития западного мира в технологическом и стратегическом смысле, параллелен наступательной позиции атлантистов в их политике отрыва береговых зон от континентального центра в обоих случаях налицо наступательная инициатива одного геополитического лагеря и оборонительная реакция другого.

На интеллектуальном уровне это выражается в том, что атлантисты на теоретическом уровне разрабатывают "активную геополитику", занимаясь этой наукой открыто и планомерно.

Геополитика в случае Запада выступает как дисциплина, диктующая общие контуры международной стратегии. В случае же Восточного блока она, не будучи долгое время

официально признанной, существовала и все еще продолжает существовать в качестве "реакции" на шаги потенциального противника. Это была и есть "пассивная геополитика", отвечающая на стратегический вызов атлантизма больше по инерции.

Если в случае ядерного оружия и авиации (в сфере аэрократии) СССР смог ценой напряжения всех внутренних ресурсов добиться относительного паритета, то на следующем этапе, в области эфирократии произошел структурный надлом, и конкуренция в области технологий, связанных со "звездными войнами", привела к окончательному геополитическому проигрышу и к поражению в холодной войне.

Для понимания сущности геополитических процессов в ядерном мире и в условиях освоения орбитальных пространств замечание Карла Шмитта о том, что аэрократия и эфирократия являются не самостоятельными цивилизационными системами, но лишь развитием "номоса" Моря, является фундаментальным.

2.4 Две версии новейшего атлантизма

Победа атлантистов над СССР (heartland'ом) означала вступление в радикально новую эпоху, которая требовала оригинальных геополитических моделей. Геополитический статус всех традиционных территорий, регионов, государств и союзов резко менялся. Осмысление планетарной реальности после окончания холодной войны привело атлантистских геополитиков к двум принципиальным схемам.

Одна из них может быть названа "пессимистической" (для атлантизма). Она наследует традиционную для атлантизма линию конфронтации с heartland'ом, которая считается не законченной и не снятой с повестки дня вместе с падением СССР, и предрекает образование новых евразийских блоков, основанных на цивилизационных традициях и устойчивых этнических архетипах. Этот вариант можно назвать "неоатлантизмом", его сущность сводится, в конечном итоге, к продолжению рассмотрения геополитической картины мира в ракурсе основополагающего дуализма, что лишь нюансируется выделением дополнительных геополитических зон (кроме Евразии), которые также могут в дальнейшем стать очагами противостояния с Западом. Наиболее ярким представителем такого неоатлантистского подхода является Самуил Хантингтон.

Вторая схема, основанная на той же изначальной геополитической картине, напротив, оптимистична (для атлантизма) в том смысле, что рассматривает ситуацию, сложившуюся в результате победы Запада в холодной войне, как окончательную и бесповоротную. На этом строится теория "мондиализма", концепции Конца Истории и One World (Единого Мира), которая утверждает, что все формы геополитической дифференциации культурные, национальные, религиозные, идеологические, государственные и т.д. вот-вот будут окончательно преодолены, и наступит эра единой общечеловеческой цивилизации, основанной на принципах либеральной демократии. История закончится вместе с геополитическим противостоянием, дававшим изначально главный импульс истории. Этот геополитический проект ассоциируется с именем американского геополитика Фрэнсиса Фукуямы, написавшего программную статью с выразительным названием "Конец Истории". Об этой мондиалистской теории речь пойдет в следующей главе.

Разберем основные положения концепции Хантингтона, которая является ультрасовременным развитием традиционной для Запада атлантистской геополитики. Важно, что Хантингтон строит свою программную статью "Столкновение цивилизаций" (Clash of civilisation) как ответ на тезис Фукуямы о "Конце Истории". Показательно, что на

политическом уровне эта полемика соответствует двум ведущим политическим партиям США: Фукуяма выражает глобальную стратегическую позицию демократов, тогда как Хантингтон является рупором республиканцев. Это достаточно точно выражает сущность двух новейших геополитических проектов неоатлан тизм следует консервативной линии, а "мондиализм" предпочитает совершенно новый подход, в котором все геополитические реальности подлежат полному пересмот ру.

2.5 Столкновение цивилизаций: неоатлан тизм Хантингтона

Смысл теории Самуила П. Хантингтона, директора Института Стратегических Исследований им. Джона Олина при Гарвардском университете, сформулированный им в статье "Столкновение цивилизаций"⁵⁹ (которая появилась как резюме большого геополитического проекта "Изменения в глобальной безопасности и американские национальные интересы"), сводится к следующему:

Видимая геополитическая победа атлан тизма на всей планете с падением СССР исчез последний оплот континентальных сил на самом деле затрагивает лишь поверхностный срез действительности. Стратегический успех НАТО, сопровождающийся идеологическим оформлением, отказ от главной конкурентной коммунистической идеологии, не затрагивает глубинных цивилизационных пластов. Хантингтон вопреки Фукуяме утверждает, что стратегическая победа не есть цивилизационная победа; западная идеология либерал-демократия, рынок и т.д. стали безальтернативными лишь временно, так как уже скоро у незападных народов начнут проступать цивилизационные и геополитические особенности, аналог "географического индивидуума", о котором говорил Савицкий.

Отказ от идеологии коммунизма и сдвиги в структуре традиционных государств распад одних образований, появление других и т.д. не приведут к автоматическому равенству всего человечества на универсальную систему атлан тистских ценностей, но, напротив, сделают вновь актуальными более глубокие культурные пласты, освобожденные от поверхностных идеологических клише.

Хантингтон цитирует Джорджа Вейгеля: "десекуля ризация является одним из доминирующих социальных факторов в конце XX века". А следовательно, вместо того, чтобы отбросить религиозную идентификацию в Едином Мире, о чем говорит Фукуяма, народы, напротив, будут ощущать религиозную принадлежность еще более живо.

Хантингтон утверждает, что наряду с западной (= атлан тистской) цивилизацией, включающей в себя Северную Америку и Западную Европу, можно предвидеть геополитическую фиксацию еще семи потенциальных цивилизаций:

- 1) славяно-православная,
- 2) конфуцианская (китайская),
- 3) японская,
- 4) исламская,
- 5) индуистская,

⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington "Clash of civilisations" in "Foreign Affairs", summer 1993, стр. 22-49

б) латиноамериканская

и возможно, 7) африканская⁶⁰.

Конечно, эти потенциальные цивилизации отнюдь не равнозначны. Но все они едины в том, что вектор их развития и становления будет ориентирован в направлении, отличном от траектории атлантизма и цивилизации Запада. Так Запад снова окажется в ситуации противостояния. Хантингтон считает, что это практически неизбежно и что уже сейчас, несмотря на эйфорию мондиалистских кругов надо принять за основу реалистическую формулу: "The West and The Rest" ("Запад и Все Остальные")⁶¹.

Геополитические выводы из такого подхода очевидны: Хантингтон считает, что атлантисты должны всемерно укреплять стратегические позиции своей собственной цивилизации, готовиться к противостоянию, консолидировать стратегические усилия, сдерживать антиатлантические тенденции в других геополитических образованиях, не допускать их соединения в опасный для Запада континентальный альянс.

Он дает такие рекомендации:
"Западу следует

обеспечивать более тесное сотрудничество и единение в рамках собственной цивилизации, особенно между ее европейской и североамериканской частями;

интегрировать в Западную цивилизацию те общества в Восточной Европе и Латинской Америке, чьи культуры близки к западной;

обеспечить более тесные взаимоотношения с Японией и Россией;

предотвратить перерастание локальных конфликтов между цивилизациями в глобальные войны;

ограничить военную экспансию конфуцианских и исламских государств;

приостановить свертывание западной военной мощи и обеспечить военное превосходство на Дальнем Востоке и в Юго- Западной Азии;

использовать трудности и конфликты во взаимоотношениях исламских и конфуцианских стран;

поддерживать группы, ориентирующиеся на западные ценности и интересы в других цивилизациях;

усилить международные институты, отражающие западные интересы и ценности и узаконивающие их, и обеспечить вовлечение незападных государств в эти институты."⁶²

Это является краткой и емкой формулировкой доктрины неоатлантизма.

⁶⁰ Ibidem стр. 25

⁶¹ Ibidem стр. 39

⁶² Ibidem стр. 49

С точки зрения чистой геополитики, это означает точное следование принципам Мэхэна и Спикмена, причем акцент, который Хантингтон ставит на культуре и цивилизационных различиях как важнейших геополитических факторах указывает на его причастность к классической школе геополитики, восходящей к "органицистской" философии, для которой изначально было свойственно рассматривать социальные структуры и государства не как механические или чисто идеологические образования, но как "формы жизни".

В качестве наиболее вероятных противников Запада Хантингтон указывает Китай и исламские государства (Иран, Ирак, Ливия и т.д.). В этом сказывается прямое влияние доктрин Мэйнига и Кирка, считавших, что ориентация стран "береговых зон", rimland а "конфуцианская" и исламская цивилизации геополитически принадлежат преимущественно именно к rimland важнее, чем позиция heartland'a. Поэтому в отличие от других представителей неонатлантисма в частности, Пола Вольфовица Хантингтон видит главную угрозу отнюдь не в геополитическом возрождении России-Евразии, heartland'a или какого-то нового евразийского континентального образования.

В докладе же американца Пола Вольфовица (советника по делам безопасности) правительству США в марте 1992 года говорится о "необходимости не допустить возникновения на европейском и азиатском континентах стратегической силы, способной противостоять США"⁶³, и далее поясняется, что самой вероятной силой, которая имеется здесь в виду, является Россия, и что против нее следует создать "санитарный кордон" на основе стран Прибалтики. В данном случае американский стратег Вольфовиц оказывается ближе к Макинделу, чем к Спикмену, что отличает его взгляды от теории Хантингтона.

Во всех случаях, независимо от определения конкретного потенциального противника, позиция всех неонатлантистов остается сущностно единой: победа в холодной войне не отменяет угрозы Западу, исходящей из иных геополитических образований (настоящих или будущих). Следовательно, говорить о "Едином Мире" преждевременно, и планетарный дуализм талассократии (укрепленной аэрокрацией и эфирократией) и теллуократии остается главной геополитической схемой и для XXI века.

Новой же и более общей формулой такого дуализма становится тезис Хантингтона The West and The Rest.

⁶³ Цит. по "Monde Diplomatique" 1992, ежегодный сборник

Глава 3. Мондиализм

3.1 Предыстория мондиализма

Концепция "мондиализма" возникла задолго до окончательной победы Запада в холодной войне.

Смысл мондиализма сводится к постулированию неизбежности полной планетарной интеграции, перехода от множественности государств, народов, наций и культур к униформному миру One World.

Истоки этой идеи можно разглядеть в некоторых утопических и хилиастических движениях, восходящих к Средневековью и, далее, к глубокой древности. В ее основе лежит представление, что в какой-то кульминационный момент истории произойдет собирание всех народов земли в едином Царстве, которое не будет более знать противоречий, трагедий, конфликтов и проблем, свойственных обычной земной истории. Помимо чисто мистической версии мондиалистской утопии существовали и ее рационалистические версии, одной из которых можно считать учение о "Третьей Эре" позитивиста Огюста Конта или гуманистическую эсхатологию Лессинга.

Мондиалистские идеи были свойственны чаще всего умеренным европейским и особенно английским социалистам (некоторые из них были объединены в "Фабианское общество"). О едином Мировом Государстве говорили и коммунисты. С другой стороны, аналогичные мондиалистские организации создавались начиная с конца XIX века и крупными фигурами в мировом бизнесе например, сэром Сэилом Роудсом, организовавшим группу "Круглый Стол", члены которой должны были "способствовать установлению системы беспрепятственной торговли во всем мире и созданию единого Мирового Правительства." Часто социалистические мотивы переплетались с либерал-капиталистическими, и коммунисты соседствовали в этих организациях с представителями крупнейшего финансового капитала. Всех объединяла вера в утопическую идею объединения планеты.

Показательно, что такие известные организации как Лига Наций, позже ООН и ЮНЕСКО были продолжены именно таких мондиалистских кругов, имевших большое влияние на мировую политику.

В течение XX века эти мондиалистские организации, избегавшие излишней рекламы, и часто даже носившие "секретный" характер, переменяли много названий. Существовало "Универсальное движение за мировую конфедерацию" Гарри Дэвиса, "Федеральный Союз" и даже "Крестовый поход за Мировое Правительство" (организованный английским парламентарием Генри Асборном в 1946 году).

По мере сосредоточения всей концептуальной и стратегической власти над Западом в США, именно это государство стало главным штабом мондиализма, представители которого образовали параллельную власти структуру, состоящую из советников, аналитиков, центров стратегических исследований.

Так сложилось три основные мондиалистские организации, о самом существовании которых общественность Запада узнала лишь относительно недавно. В отличие от официальных структур эти группы пользовались значительно большей свободой

проектирования и исследований, так как они были освобождены от фиксированных и формальных процедур, регламентирующих деятельность комиссий ООН и т.д.

Первая "Совет по международным отношениям" (Council on Foreign Relations, сокращенно C.F.R.). Ее создателем был крупнейший американский банкир Морган. Эта неофициальная организация была занята выработкой американской стратегии в планетарном масштабе, причем конечной целью считалось полная унификация планеты и создание Мирового Правительства. Эта организация возникла еще в 1921 году как филиация "Фонда Карнеги за вселенский мир", и все состоявшие в ней высокопоставленные политики приобщались мондиалистским взглядам на будущее планеты. Так как большинство членов C.F.R. были одновременно и высокопоставленными дигнитариями шотландского масонства, то можно предположить, что их геополитические проекты имели и какое-то гуманистически-мистическое измерение.

В 1954 году была создана вторая мондиалистская структура Бильдербергский клуб или Бильдербергская группа. Она объединяла уже не только американских аналитиков, политиков, финансистов и интеллектуалов, но и их европейских коллег. С американской стороны она была представлена исключительно членами C.F.R. и рассматривалась как ее международное продолжение.

В 1973 активистами Бильдербергской группы была создана третья важнейшая мондиалистская структура "Трехсторонняя комиссия" или "Трилатераль" (Trilateral). Она возглавлялась американцами, входящими в состав C.F.R. и Бильдербергской группы, и имела помимо США, где расположена ее штабквартира (адрес 345 East 46th street, New York), еще две штаб-квартиры в Европе и Японии.

"Трехсторонней" комиссия названа по фундаментальным геополитическим основаниям. Она призвана объединять под эгидой атлантизма и США три "больших пространства", лидирующих в техническом развитии и рыночной экономике :

- 1) Американское пространство, включающее в себя Северную и Южную Америки;
- 2) Европейское пространство;
- 3) Тихоокеанское пространство, контролируемое Японией.

Во главе важнейших мондиалистских групп Бильдерберга и Трилатералья стоит высокопоставленный член C.F.R. крупнейший банкир Дэвид Рокфеллер, владелец "Чэйз Манхэттен банк".

Кроме него в самом центре всех мондиалистских проектов стоят неизменные аналитики, геополитики и стратеги атлантизма Збигнев Бжезинский и Генри Киссинджер. Туда же входит и знаменитый Джордж Болл.

Основная линия всех мондиалистских проектов заключалась в переходе к единой мировой системе, под стратегической доминацией Запада и "прогрессивных", "гуманистических", "демократических" ценностей. Для этого вырабатывались параллельные структуры, состоящие из политиков, журналистов, интеллектуалов, финансистов, аналитиков и т.д., которые должны были подготовить почву перед тем, как этот мондиалистский проект Мирового Правительства смог бы быть широко обнародован, так как без подготовки он натолкнулся бы на мощное психологическое сопротивление народов и государств, нежелающих растворять свою самобытность в планетарном melting pot.

Мондиалистский проект, разрабатываемый и проводимый этими организациями, не был однороден. Существовало две его основные версии, которые, различаясь по методам, должны были теоретически привести к одной и той же цели.

3.2 Теория конвергенции

Первая наиболее пацифистская и "примиренческая" версия мондиализма известна как "теория конвергенции". Разработанная в 70-е годы в недрах С.Ф.Р. группой "левых" аналитиков под руководством Збигнева Бжезинского, эта теория предполагала возможность преодоления идеологического и геополитического дуализма холодной войны через создание нового культурно-идеологического типа цивилизации, который был бы промежуточным между социализмом и капитализмом, между чистым атлантизмом и чистым континентализмом.

Марксизм Советов рассматривался как преграда, которую можно преодолеть, перейдя к его умеренной, социал-демократической, ревизионистской версии через отказ от тезисов "диктатуры пролетариата", "классовой борьбы", "национализации средств производства" и "отмены частной собственности". В свою очередь, капиталистический Запад должен был бы ограничить свободу рынка, ввести частичное государственное регулирование экономики и т.д. Общность же культурной ориентации могла бы быть найдена в традициях Просвещения и гуманизма, к которым возводимы и западные демократические режимы, и социальная этика коммунизма (в его смягченных социал-демократических версиях).

Мировое Правительство, которое могло бы появиться на основе "теории конвергенции", мыслилось как допущение Москвы до атлантического управления планетой совместно с Вашингтоном. В этом случае начиналась эпоха всеобщего мира, холодная война заканчивалась бы, народы смогли бы сбросить тяжесть геополитического напряжения.

Важно провести здесь параллель с переходом технологических систем от "талассократии" к "эфирократии": мондиалистские политики начинали смотреть на планету не глазами обитателей западного континента, окруженного морем (как традиционные атлантисты), но глазами "астронавтов на космической орбите". В таком случае их взгляду представал действительно One World, Единый Мир.

Мондиалистские центры имели своих корреспондентов и в Москве. Ключевой фигурой здесь был академик Гвишиани, директор Института Системных Исследований, который являлся чем-то вроде филиала "Трилатерала" в СССР. Но особенно успешной была их деятельность среди крайне левых партий в Западной Европе, которые в большинстве своем встали на путь "еврокоммунизма" а это и считалось основной концептуальной базой для глобальной конвергенции.

3.3 Планетарная победа Запада

Теории конвергенции были той идеологической основой, на которую ссылались Михаил Горбачев и его советники, осуществившие перестройку. При этом за несколько лет до начала советской перестройки аналогичный проект начал реализовываться в Китае, с которым представители "Трехсторонней комиссии" установили тесные отношения с конца 70-х. Но геополитические судьбы китайской и советской "перестроек" были различны. Китай настаивал на "справедливом" распределении ролей и на соответствующих сдвигах в

идеологии Запада в сторону социализма. СССР пошел по пути уступок значительно дальше.

Следуя за логикой американских мондиалистов, Горбачев начал структурное преобразование советского пространства в сторону "демократизации" и "либерализации". В первую очередь, это коснулось стран Варшавского договора, а затем и республик СССР. Началось сокращение стратегических вооружений и идеологическое сближение с Западом. Но в данном случае следует обратить внимание на тот факт, что годы правления Горбачева приходятся на период президентства в США крайних республиканцев Рейгана и Буша. Причем Рейган был единственным за последние годы президентом, последовательно отказывавшимся участвовать во всех мондиалистских организациях. По убеждениям он был жесткий, последовательный и бескомпромиссный атлантист, либерал-рыночник, не склонный ни к каким компромиссам с "левыми" идеологиями даже самого умеренного демократического или социал-демократического толка. Следовательно, шаги Москвы, направленные на конвергенцию и создание Мирового Правительства со значительным весом в нем представителей Восточного блока, на противоположном полюсе имели самые неблагоприятные идеологические препятствия. Атлантист Рейган (позже Буш) просто использовали мондиалистские реформы Горбачева в сугубо утилитарных целях. Добровольные уступки heartland'a не сопровождались соответствующими уступками со стороны Sea Power, и Запад не пошел ни на геополитические, ни на идеологические компромиссы с самоликвидирующейся Евразией. НАТО не распустился, а его силы не покинули ни Европу, ни Азию. Либерально-демократическая идеология еще более укрепила свои позиции.

В данном случае мондиализм выступил не как самостоятельная геополитическая доктрина, реализовавшаяся на практике, но как прагматически использованный инструмент в "холодной войне", от логики которой, основанной на тезисах Макиндера и Мэхэна, США так и не отказались.

3.4 "Конец Истории" Фрэнсиса Фукуямы

После распада СССР и победы Запада, атлантизма мондиалистские проекты должны были либо отмереть, либо изменить свою логику.

Новой версией мондиализма в постсоветскую эпоху стала доктрина Фрэнсиса Фукуямы, опубликовавшего в начале 90-х программную статью "Конец Истории". Ее можно рассматривать как идейную базу неомондиализма.

Фукуяма предлагает следующую версию исторического процесса. Человечество от темной эпохи "закона силы", "мракобесия" и "нерационального менеджирования социальной реальности" двигалось к наиболее разумному и логичному строю, воплотившемуся в капитализме, современной западной цивилизации, рыночной экономике и либерально-демократической идеологии. История и ее развитие длились только за счет нерациональных факторов, которые мало помалу уступали место законам разума, общего денежного эквивалента всех ценностей и т.д. Падение СССР знаменует собой падение последнего бастиона "иррационализма". С этим связано окончание Истории и начало особого планетарного существования, которое будет проходить под знаком Рынка и Демократии, которые объединят мир в слаженную рационально функционирующую машину.

Такой Новый Порядок, хотя и основанный на универсализации чисто атлантической системы, выходит за рамки атлантизма, и все регионы мира начинают переорганизовываться по новой модели, вокруг его наиболее экономически развитых центров.

3.5 "Геоэкономика" Жака Аттали

Аналог теории Фукуямы есть и среди европейских авторов. Так, Жак Аттали, бывший долгое время личным советником президента Франции Франсуа Миттерана, а также некоторое время директором Европейского Банка Реконструкции и Развития, разработал сходную теорию в своей книге "Линии Горизонта".

Аттали считает, что в настоящий момент наступает третья эра "эра денег", которые являются универсальным эквивалентом ценности, так как, приравнивая все вещи к материальному цифровому выражению, с ними предельно просто управляться наиболее рациональным образом. Такой подход сам Аттали связывает с наступлением мессианской эры, понятой в иудейско-кабалистическом контексте (подробнее этот аспект он развивает в другой книге, специально посвященной мессианству "Он придет"). Это отличает его от Фукуямы, который остается в рамках строгого прагматизма и утилитаризма.

Жак Аттали предлагает свою версию будущего, которое "уже наступило". Доминанция на всей планете единой либерально-демократической идеологии и рыночной системы вместе с развитием информационных технологий приводит к тому, что мир становится единым и однородным, геополитические реальности, доминировавшие на протяжении всей истории, в "третьей эре" отступают на задний план. Геополитический дуализм отменяется.

Но единый мир получает все же новую геополитическую структурализацию, основанную на сей раз на принципах "геоэкономики". Впервые концепции "геоэкономики" предложил развивать историк Фритц Рериг, а популяризировал ее Фернан Бродель.

"Геоэкономика" это особая версия мондиалистской геополитики, которая рассматривает приоритетно не географические, культурные, идеологические, этнические, религиозные и т.д. факторы, составляющие суть собственно геополитического подхода, но чисто экономическую реальность в ее отношении к пространству. Для "геоэкономики" совершенно не важно, какой народ проживает там-то и там-то, какова его история, культурные традиции и т.д. Все сводится к тому, где располагаются центры мировых бирж, полезные ископаемые, информационные центры, крупные производства. "Геоэкономика" подходит к политической реальности так, как если бы Мировое Правительство и единое планетарное государство уже существовали.

Геоэкономический подход Аттали приводит к выделению трех важнейших регионов, которые в Едином Мире станут центрами новых экономических пространств.

- 1) Американское пространство, объединившее окончательно обе Америки в единую финансово-промышленную зону.
- 2) Европейское пространство, возникшее после экономического объединения Европы.

3) Тихоокеанский регион, зона "нового процветания", имеющая несколько конкурирующих центров Токио, Тайвань, Сингапур и т.д.⁶⁴

Между этими тремя мондиалистскими пространствами, по мнению Аттали, не будет существовать никаких особых различий или противоречий, так как и экономический и идеологический тип будет во всех случаях строго тождественным. Единственной разницей будет чисто географическое месторасположение наиболее развитых центров, которые будут концентрически структурировать вокруг себя менее развитые регионы, расположенные в пространственной близости. Такая концентрическая переструктуризация сможет осуществиться только в "конце Истории" или, в иных терминах, при отмене традиционных реальностей, диктуемых геополитикой.

Цивилизационно-геополитический дуализм отменяет ся. Отсутствие противоположного атлантизму полюса ведет к кардинальному переосмыслению пространства. Наступает эра геοэкономики.

В модели Аттали нашли свое законченное выражение те идеи, которые лежали в основании "Трехсторонней комиссии", которая и является концептуально-политическим инструментом, разрабатывающим и осуществляющим подобные проекты.

Показательно, что руководители "Трилатерала" (Дэвид Рокфеллер, Жорж Бертун тогда глава Европейского отделения и Генри Киссинджер) в январе 1989 году побывали в Москве, где их принимали президент СССР Горбачев, Александр Яковлев, также присутствовали на встрече другие высокопоставленные советские руководители Медведев, Фалин, Ахромеев, Добрынин, Черняев, Арбатов и Примаков. А сам Жак Аттали поддерживал личные контакты с российским президентом Борисом Ельциным.

Несомненно одно: переход к геοэкономической логике и неомондиализму стало возможным только после геополитической самоликвидации евразийского СССР.

Неомондиализм не является прямым продолжением мондиализма исторического, который изначально предполагал присутствие в конечной модели левых социалистических элементов. Это промежуточный вариант между собственно мондиализмом и атлантизмом.

3.6 Посткатастрофический мондиализм профессора Санторо

Существуют более детальные версии неомондиализма. Одной из наиболее ярких является футурологическая геополитическая концепция, разработанная миланским Институтом Международных Политических Исследований (ISPI) под руководством профессора Карло Санторо.

Согласно модели Санторо, в настоящий момент человечество пребывает в переходной стадии от биполярного мира к мондиалистской версии многополярности (понятой геοэкономически, как у Аттали). Международные институты (ООН и т.д.), которые для оптимистического мондиализма Фукуямы представляются достаточно развитыми, чтобы стать ядром "Мирового Правительства", Санторо представляются, напротив, недейственными и отражающими устаревшую логику двухполярной геополитики. Более того, весь мир несет на себе устойчивый отпечаток "холодной войны", геополитическая

⁶⁴ Jack Attali "Lignes d'horizon", Paris. 1990

логика которой остается доминирующей. Санторо предвидит, что такая ситуация не может не закончиться периодом цивилизационных катастроф.

Далее он излагает предполагаемый сценарий этих катастроф:

- 1) Дальнейшее ослабление роли международных институтов
- 2) Нарастание националистических тенденций среди стран, входивших в Варшавский договор и в Третьем мире. Это приводит к хаотическим процессам.
- 3) Дезинтеграция традиционных блоков (это не затрагивает Европы) и прогрессирующий распад существующих государств.
- 4) Начало эпохи войн малой и средней интенсивности, в результате которых складываются новые геополитические образования.
- 5) Угроза планетарного хаоса заставляет различные блоки признать необходимость создания новых международных институтов, обладающих огромными полномочиями, что фактически означает установление Мирового Правительства.
- 6) Окончательное создание планетарного государства под эгидой новых международных инстанций (Мировое Правительство)⁶⁵.

Эта модель является промежуточной между мондиалистским оптимизмом Фрэнсиса Фукуямы и атлантистским пессимизмом Самуила Хантингтона.

⁶⁵ См. Prof. Carlo Santoro "Progetto di ricerca multifunzionale 1994 - 1995 -- I nuovi poli geopolitici", Milano

Глава 4. Прикладная геополитика

4.1 "Внутренняя геополитика" школа Ива Лакоста

Геополитический ренессанс в Европе связан с деятельностью географа Ива Лакоста, который в 1976 году основал журнал "Геродот", где впервые в послевоенной Европе стали регулярно публиковаться геополитические тексты. Особо следует подчеркнуть, что во главе стоял человек близкий к левым политическим кругам, тогда как до этого момента геополитикой в Европе занимались лишь довольно маргинальные правые, националистические круги.

В 1983 году журнал "Геродот" вводит в название подзаголовок "журнал географии и геополитики", и с этого момента начинается вторая жизнь геополитики, отныне признанной официально в качестве особой политологической дисциплины, помогающей в комплексном анализе ситуации.

Ив Лакост стремится адаптировать геополитические принципы к современной ситуации. Сам Лакост не разделяет ни "органицистского подхода", свойственного континенталистской школе, ни чисто прагматического и механицистского геополитического утилитаризма идеологов Sea Power. С его точки зрения, геополитические соображения служат лишь для "оправдания сопернических устремлений властных инстанций относительно определенных территорий и населяющих их людей"⁶⁶. Это может касаться как международных отношений, так и узко региональных проблем.

У Лакоста геополитика становится лишь инструментом анализа конкретной ситуации, а все глобальные теории, лежащие в основе этой дисциплины, низводятся до относительных, исторически обусловленных понятий.

Таким образом, Лакост предлагает совершенно новое определение геополитики, фактически новую дисциплину. Это более не континентальное мышление, основанное на фундаментальном планетарном цивилизационно-географическом дуализме и сопряженное с глобальными идеологическими системами, но использование некоторых методологических моделей, существовавших у традиционных геополитиков в общем контексте, но взятых в данном случае как нечто самостоятельное. Это "деглобализация" геополитики, сведение ее к узкому аналитическому методу.

Такая геополитика получила название "внутренней геополитики" (la geopolitique interne), так как она сплошь и рядом занимается локальными проблемами.

4.2 Электоральная "геополитика"

Разновидностью такой внутренней геополитики является специальная методика, разработанная для изучения связи политических симпатий населения и территории, на которой данное население проживает. Провозвестником такого подхода был француз Андре Зигфрид (1875-1959), политический деятель и географ. Ему принадлежат первые попытки исследовать "внутреннюю геополитику" применительно к политическим симпатиям тех или иных регионов. К нему восходят первые формулировки

⁶⁶ Yves Lacoste "Dictionnaire Geopolitique", Paris, 1986

закономерностей, которые легли в основу "электоральной геополитики" новой школы Ива Лакоста.

Зигфрид писал:

"Каждая партия или, точнее, каждая политическая тенденция имеет свою привилегированную территорию; легко заметить, что подобно тому, как существуют геологические или экономические регионы, существуют также политические регионы. Политический климат можно изучать так же, как и климат природный. Я заметил, что несмотря на обманчивую видимость, общественное мнение в зависимости от регионов сохраняет определенное постоянство. Под постоянно меняющейся картиной политических выборов можно проследить более глубокие и постоянные тенденции, отражающие региональный темперамент."⁶⁷

В школе Лакоста эта теория получила систематическое развитие и стала привычным социологическим инструментом, который широко используется в политической практике.

4.3 Медиакратия как "геополитический" фактор

Ив Лакост поставил своей задачей привести в геополитику новейшие критерии, свойственные информации обществу. Наибольшим значением среди информационных систем, прямо влияющих на геополитические процессы, обладают средства массовой информации, особенно телевидение. В современном обществе доминирует не концептуально-рациональный подход, но яркость "образа" ("имиджа"). Политические, идеологические и геополитические воззрения формируются у значительной части общества исключительно на основании телекоммуникаций. Медиатический "образ" является атомарным синтезом, в котором сосредоточены сразу несколько подходов этнический, культурный, идеологический, политический. Синтетическое качество "имиджа" сближает его с теми категориями, которыми традиционно оперирует геополитика.

Информационный репортаж из какой-нибудь горячей точки, о которой ничего не известно, например, жителю Капитолии, должен за кратчайшее время представить географический, исторический, религиозный, экономический, культурный, этнический профиль региона, а также расставить акценты в соответствии с узко заданной политической целью. Таким образом, профессия журналиста (особенно тележурналиста) сближается с профессией геополитика. Масс-медиа в современном обществе играют уже не чисто вспомогательную роль, как раньше, но становятся мощнейшим самостоятельным геополитическим фактором, способным оказывать сильное влияние на исторические судьбы народов.

4.4 История геополитики

Существует еще одно направление в рамках общего процесса "возрождения" европейской геополитики история геополитики. Оно не является в полном смысле слова геополитическим, так как ставит своей задачей историческую реконструкцию этой дисциплины, работу с источниками, хронологию, систематизацию, библиографические данные и т.д. В некотором смысле, это "музейный подход", не претендующий ни на какие выводы и обобщения применительно к актуальной ситуации. Такая историческая линия

⁶⁷ Andre Siegfried "Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République", Paris, 1913

представлена, в первую очередь, трудами Пьер-Мари Голлуа и таких авторов, как Эрве Куто-Бегари, Жерар Шальян, Ганс-Адольф Якобсен и т.д..

В рамках этой инициативы публикуются и переиздаются тексты исторических геополитиков Макиндера, Мэхэна, Челлена, Хаусхофера и т.д.

Такого рода исторические исследования часто публикуются во французском журнале "Геродот" и новом итальянском геополитическом журнале "Limes", издаваемом Лучо Карачоло и Мишелем Коренманном при участии того же Лакоста.

4.5 "Прикладная геополитика" не геополитика

Прикладная или "внутренняя геополитика", развиваемая Ивом Лакостом, а также другими крупными специалистами, Мишелем Коренманном, Поль-Мари де ля Горс и т.д., характерна для современной европейской политологии и сознательно избегает концептуальных обобщений и футурологических разработок. В этом принципиальное отличие всего этого направления, особенно развитого во Франции и Италии, от собственно атлантистских и мондиалистских школ, находящихся в США и Англии.

Прикладная геополитика сохраняет с исторической, довоенной геополитикой гораздо меньше связей, нежели атлантизм и мондиализм, не говоря уже о "континентальной" традиции. Это чисто аналитическая, политологическая, социологическая методика и не более того. Поэтому между ней и планетарными глобальными проектами собственно геополитиков следует делать различие. В сущности, речь идет о двух дисциплинах, которые сближает только терминология и некоторые методы. Игнорируя геополитический дуализм, считая его либо преодоленным, либо несущественным, либо просто выходящим за кадры основного предмета изучения, "прикладная геополитика" перестает быть геополитикой в собственном смысле этого слова и становится лишь разновидностью статистико-социологической методики.

Реальные же геополитические решения и проекты, связанные с судьбой Европы и народов, населяющих ее, разрабатываются в иных инстанциях, связанных со стратегическими центрами атлантизма и мондиализма. Так, проект европейской интеграции был выработан исключительно усилиями интеллектуалов, сотрудничавших в "Трехсторонней комиссии", т.е. в мондиалистской сверхнациональной организации, не имеющей ни строгого юридического статуса, ни политической легитимности. Француз Жак Аттали развивал свои геополитические теории, основываясь на данных именно этой организации, членом которой он являлся, а не на основании "прикладной" геополитики современной европейской школы.

Глава 5. Геополитика европейских "новых правых"

5.1 Европа ста флагов. Ален де Бенуа

Одной из немногих европейских геополитических школ, сохранивших непрерывную связь с идеями довоенных немецких геополитиков-континенталистов, являются "новые правые". Это направление возникло во Франции в конце 60-х годов и связано с фигурой лидера этого движения философа и публициста Алена де Бенуа.

"Новые правые" резко отличаются от традиционных французских правых монархистов, католиков, германофобов, шовинистов, антикоммунистов, консерваторов и т.д. практически по всем пунктам. "Новые правые" сторонники "органической демократии", язычники, германофилы, социалисты, модернисты и т.д. Вначале "левый лагерь", традиционно крайне влиятельный во Франции, посчитал это "тактическим маневром" обычных правых, но со временем серьезность эволюции была доказана и признана всеми.

Одним из фундаментальных принципов идеологии "новых правых", аналоги которых в скором времени появились и в других европейских странах, был принцип "континентальной геополитики". В отличие от "старых правых" и классических националистов, де Бенуа считал, что принцип централистского Государства-Нации (Etat-Nation) исторически исчерпан и что будущее принадлежит только "Большим Пространствам". Причем основой таких "Больших Пространств" должны стать не столько объединение разных Государств в прагматический политический блок, но вхождение этнических групп разных масштабов в единую "Федеральную Империю" на равных основаниях. Такая "Федеральная Империя" должна быть стратегически единой, а этнически дифференцированной. При этом стратегическое единство должно подкрепляться единством изначальной культуры.

"Большое Пространство", которое больше всего интересовало де Бенуа, это Европа. "Новые правые" считали, что народы Европы имеют общее индоевропейское происхождение, единый исток. Это принцип "общего прошлого". Но обстоятельства современной эпохи, в которой активны тенденции стратегической и экономической интеграции, необходимой для обладания подлинным геополитическим суверенитетом, диктуют необходимость объединения и в чисто прагматическом смысле. Таким образом, народы Европы обречены на "общее будущее". Из этого де Бенуа делает вывод, что основным геополитическим принципом должен стать тезис "Единая Европа ста флагов"⁶⁸. В такой перспективе, как и во всех концепциях "новых правых", ясно прослеживается стремление сочетать "консервативные" и "модернистские" элементы, т.е. "правое" и "левое". В последние годы "новые правые" отказались от такого определения, считая, что они "правые" в такой же степени, в какой и "левые".

Геополитические тезисы де Бенуа основываются на утверждении "континентальной судьбы Европы". В этом он полностью следует концепциям школы Хаусхофера. Из этого вытекает характерное для "новых правых" противопоставление "Европы" и "Запада". "Европа" для них это континентальное геополитическое образование, основанное на этническом ансамбле индоевропейского происхождения и имеющее общие культурные корни. Это понятие традиционное. "Запад", напротив, геополитическое и историческое понятие, связанное с современным миром, отрицающее этнические и духовные традиции,

⁶⁸ Alain de Benoist "Les idess a l'endroit", Paris, 1979

выдвигающие чисто материальные и количественные критерии существования; это утилитарная и рационалистическая, механицистская буржуазная цивилизация. Самым законченным воплощением Запада и его цивилизации являются США.

Из этого складывается конкретный проект "новых правых". Европа должна интегрироваться в "Федеральную Империю", противопоставленную Западу и США, причем особенно следует поощрять регионалистские тенденции, так как регионы и этнические меньшинства сохранили больше традиционных черт, чем мегаполисы и культурные центры, пораженные "духом Запада". Франция при этом должна ориентироваться на Германию и Среднюю Европу. Отсюда интерес "новых правых" к Де Голлю и Фридриху Науманну. На уровне практической политики начиная с 70-х годов "новые правые" выступают за строгий стратегический нейтралитет Европы, за выход из НАТО, за развитие самодостаточного европейского ядерного потенциала.

Относительно СССР (позже России) позиция "новых правых" эволюционировала. Начав с классического тезиса "Ни Запад, ни Восток, но Европа", они постепенно эволюционировали к тезису "Прежде всего Европа, но лучше даже с Востоком, чем с Западом". На практическом уровне изначальный интерес к Китаю и проекты организации стратегического альянса Европы с Китаем для противодействия как "американскому, так и советскому империализмам" сменились умеренной "советофилией" и идеей союза Европы с Россией.

Геополитика "новых правых" ориентирована радикально антиатлантистски и антимиондиалистски. Они видят судьбу Европы как антитезу атлантистских и миондиалистских проектов. Они противники "талассократии" и концепции One World.

Надо заметить, что в условиях тотальной стратегической и политической доминации атлантизма в Европе в период холодной войны геополитическая позиция де Бюна (теоретически и логически безупречная) настолько контрастировала с "нормами политического мышления", что никакого широкого распространения получить просто не могла. Это было своего рода "диссидентство" и, как всякое "диссидентство" и "нонконформизм", имело маргинальный характер. До сих пор интеллектуальный уровень "новых правых", высокое качество их публикаций и изданий, даже многочисленность их последователей в академической европейской среде резко контрастируют с ничтожным вниманием, которое им уделяют властные инстанции и аналитические структуры, обслуживающие власть геополитическими проектами.

5.2 Европа от Владивостока до Дублина. Жан Тириар

Несколько отличную версию континенталистской геополитики развил другой европейский "диссидент" бельгиец Жан Тириар (1922-1992). С начала 60-х годов он был вождем общеевропейского радикального движения "Юная Европа".

Тириар считал геополитику главной политологической дисциплиной, без которой невозможно строить рациональную и дальновидную политическую и государственную стратегию. Последователь Хаусхофера и Никиша, он считал себя "европейским национал-большевиком" и строителем "Европейской Империи". Именно его идеи предвосхитили более развитые и изощренные проекты "новых правых".

Жан Тириар строил свою политическую теорию на принципе "автаркии больших пространств". Развита в середине XIX века немецким экономистом Фридрихом Листом,

эта теория утверждала, что полноценное стратегическое и экономическое развитие государства возможно только в том случае, если оно обладает достаточным геополитическим масштабом и большими территориальными возможностями. Тириар применил этот принцип к актуальной ситуации и пришел к выводу, что мировое значение государств Европы будет окончательно утрачено, если они не объединятся в единую Империю, противостоящую США. При этом Тириар считал, что такая "Империя" должна быть не "федеральной" и "регионально ориентированной", но предельно унифицированной, централистской, соответствующей якобинской модели. Это должно стать мощным единым континентальным Государством-Нацией. В этом состоит основное различие между воззрениями де Бенуа и Тириара.

В конце 70-х годов взгляды Тириара претерпели некоторое изменение. Анализ геополитической ситуации привел его к выводу, что масштаб Европы уже не достаточен для того, чтобы освободиться от американской талассократии. Следовательно, главным условием "европейского освобождения" является объединение Европы с СССР. От геополитической схемы, включающей три основные зоны, Запад, Европа, Россия (СССР), он перешел к схеме только с двумя составляющими Запад и евразийский континент. При этом Тириар пришел к радикальному выводу о том, что для Европы лучше выбрать советский социализм, чем англосаксонский капитализм.

Так появился проект "Евро-советской Империи от Владивостока до Дублина"⁶⁹. В нем почти пророчески описаны причины, которые должны привести СССР к краху, если он не предпримет в самое ближайшее время активных геополитических шагов в Европе и на Юге. Тириар считал, что идеи Хаусхофера относительно "континентального блока Берлин-Москва-Токио" актуальны в высшей степени и до сих пор. Важно, что эти тезисы Тириар изложил за 15 лет до распада СССР, абсолютно точно предсказав его логику и причины. Тириар предпринимал попытки довести свои взгляды до советских руководителей. Но это ему сделать не удалось, хотя в 60-е годы у него были личные встречи с Насером, Чжоу Эньлаем и высшими югославскими руководителями. Показательно, что Москва отвергла его проект организации в Европе подпольных "отрядов европейского освобождения" для террористической борьбы с "агентами атлантизма".

Взгляды Жана Тириара лежат в основе ныне активизирующегося неконформистского движения европейских национал-большевиков ("Фронт Европейского Освобождения"). Они вплотную подходят к проектам современного русского неоевразийства.

5.3 Мыслить континентами. Йордис фон Лохаузен

Очень близок к Тириару австрийский генерал Йордис фон Лохаузен. В отличие от Тириара или де Бенуа он не участвует в прямой политической деятельности и не строит конкретных социальных проектов. Он придерживается строго научного подхода и ограничивается чисто геополитическим анализом. Его изначальная позиция та же, что и у национал-большевиков и "новых правых", он континенталист и последователь Хаусхофера.

Лохаузен считает, что политическая власть только тогда имеет шансы стать долговечной и устойчивой, когда властители мыслят не сиюминутными и локальными категориями, но

⁶⁹ Jean Thiriart "L'Empire Eurosovietique de Vladivostok jusque Dublin", Brussell, 1988

"тысячелетиями и континентами". Его главная книга так и называется "Мужество властвовать. Мыслить континентами"⁷⁰.

Лохаузен считает, что глобальные территориальные, цивилизационные, культурные и социальные процессы становятся понятными только в том случае, если они видятся в "дальнозоркой" перспективе, которую он противопоставляет исторической "близорукости". Власть в человеческом обществе, от которой зависит выбор исторического пути и важнейшие решения, должна руководствоваться очень общими схемами, позволяющим найти место тому или иному государству или народу в огромной исторической перспективе. Поэтому основной дисциплиной, необходимой для определения стратегии власти, является геополитика в ее традиционном смысле оперирование глобальными категориями, отвлекаясь от аналитических частных (а не "внутренняя" прикладная геополитика школы Лакоста). Современные идеологии, новейшие технологические и цивилизационные сдвиги, безусловно, меняют рельеф мира, но не могут отменить некоторых базовых закономерностей, связанных с природными и культурными циклами, исчисляемыми тысячелетиями.

Таковыми глобальными категориями являются пространство, язык, этнос, ресурсы и т.д.

Лохаузен предлагает такую формулу власти:

"Могущество = Сила x Местоположение"

Он уточняет:

"Так как Могущество есть Сила, помноженная на местоположение, только благоприятное географическое положение дает возможность для полного развития внутренних сил."⁷¹

Таким образом, власть (политическая, интеллектуальная и т.д.) напрямую связывается с пространством.

Лохаузен отделяет судьбу Европы от судьбы Запада, считая Европу континентальным образованием, временно подпавшим под контроль талассократии. Но для политического освобождения Европе необходим пространственный (позиционный) минимум. Такой минимум обретается только через объединение Германии, интеграционные процессы в Средней Европе, воссоздание территориального единства Пруссии (разорванной между Польшей, СССР и ГДР) и дальнейшего складывания европейских держав в новый самостоятельный блок, независимый от атлантизма. Важно отметить роль Пруссии. Лохаузен (вслед за Никишем и Шпенглером) считает, что Пруссия является наиболее континентальной, "евразийской" частью Германии, и что, если бы столицей Германии был не Берлин, а Кенигсберг, европейская история пошла бы в ином, более правильном русле, ориентируясь на союз с Россией против англосаксонских талассократий.

Лохаузен считает, что будущее Европы в стратегической перспективе немыслимо без России, и наоборот, России (СССР) Европа необходима, так как без нее геополитически она незакончена и уязвима для Америки, чье местоположение намного лучше, а следовательно, чья мощь рано или поздно намного опередит СССР. Лохаузен подчеркивал, что СССР мог иметь на Западе четыре Европы: "Европу враждебную, Европу подчиненную, Европу опустошенную и Европу союзную". Первые три варианта неизбежны при сохранении того курса европейской политики, которую СССР вел на протяжении "холодной войны". Только стремление любой ценой сделать Европу "союзной и дружественной" может исправить фатальную геополитическую ситуацию СССР и стать началом нового этапа геополитической истории - этапа евразийского.

⁷⁰ Jordis von Lohausen "Mut zur Macht. Denken in Kontinenten", Berg, 1978

⁷¹ Ibidem

Позиция Лохаузена сознательно ограничивается чисто геополитическими констатациями. Идеологические вопросы он опускает. Например, геополитика Руси боярской, России царской или Советского Союза представляется для него единый непрерывный процесс, не зависящий от смены правящего строя или идеологии. Россия геополитически это heartland, а следовательно, какой бы в ней ни был режим, ее судьба предопределена ее землями.

Лохаузен, как и Тириар, заранее предсказал геополитический крах СССР, который неизбежен в том случае, если он следовал бы своему обычному курсу. Если у атлантистских геополитиков такой исход рассматривался как победа, Лохаузен видел в этом, скорее, поражение континентальных сил. Но с тем нюансом, что новые возможности, которые откроются после падения советской системы, могут создать благоприятные предпосылки для создания в будущем нового евразийского блока, Континентальной Империи, так как определенные ограничения, диктуемые марксистской идеологией, были бы в этом случае сняты.

5.4 Евразийская Империя Конца. Жан Парвулеско

Романтическую версию геополитики излагает известный французский писатель Жан Парвулеско. Впервые геополитические темы в литературе возникают уже у Джорджа Оруэлла, который в антиутопии "1984" описал футурологически деление планеты на три огромных континентальных блока "Остазия, Евразия, Океания". Сходные темы встречаются у Артура Кестлера, Олдоса Хаксли, Раймона Абеллио и т.д.

Жан Парвулеско делает геополитические темы центральными во всех своих произведениях, открывая этим новый жанр "геополитическую беллетристику".

Концепция Парвулеско вкратце такова⁷²: история человечества есть история Могущества, власти. За доступ к центральным позициям в цивилизации, т.е. к самому Могуществу, стремятся различные полусекретные организации, циклы существования которых намного превышают длительность обычных политических идеологий, правящих династий, религиозных институтов, государств и народов. Эти организации, выступающие в истории под разными именами, Парвулеско определяет как "орден атлантистов" и "орден евразийцев". Между ними идет многовековая борьба, в которой участвуют Папы, патриархи, короли, дипломаты, крупные финансисты, революционеры, мистики, генералы, ученые, художники и т.д. Все социально-культурные проявления, таким образом, сводимы к изначальным, хотя и чрезвычайно сложным, геополитическим архетипам.

Это доведенная до логического предела геополитическая линия, предпосылки которой ясно прослеживаются уже у вполне рациональных и чуждых "мистицизму" основателей геополитики как таковой.

Центральную роль в сюжетах Парвулеско играет генерал Де Голль и основанная им геополитическая структура, после конца его президентства оставшаяся в тени. Парвулеско называет это "геополитическим голлизмом". Такой "геополитический голлизм" это французский аналог континентализма школы Хаусхофера.

⁷² Jean Parvulesco "Galaxie GRU", Paris, 1991

Основной задачей сторонников этой линии является организация европейского континентального блока "Париж Берлин Москва". В этом аспекте теории Парвулеско смыкаются с тезисами "новых правых" и "национал-большевиков".

Парвулеско считает, что нынешний исторический этап является кульминацией многовекового геополитического противостояния, когда драматическая история континентально-цивилизационной дуэли подходит к развязке. Он предвидит скорое возникновение гигантской континентальной конструкции "Евразийской Империи Конца", а затем финальное столкновение с "Империей Атлантики". Этот эсхатологический поединок, описываемый им в апокалиптических тонах, он называет "Endkampf" ("Финальная Битва"). Любопытно, что в текстах Парвулеско вымышленные персонажи соседствуют с реальными историческими личностями, со многими из которых автор поддерживал (а с некоторыми поддерживает до сих пор) дружеские отношения. Среди них политики из близкого окружения Де Голля, английские и американские дипломаты, поэт Эзра Паунд, философ Юлиус Эвола, политик и писатель Раймон Абеллио, скульптор Арно Брекер, члены оккультных организаций и т.д.

Несмотря на беллетристическую форму тексты Парвулеско имеют огромную собственно геополитическую ценность, так как ряд его статей, опубликованных в конце 70-х, до странности точно описывает ситуацию, сложившуюся в мире лишь к середине 90-х.

5.5 Индийский океан как путь к мировому господству. Робер Стойкерс

Полной противоположностью "геополитическому визионеру" Парвулеско является бельгийский геополитик и публицист Робер Стойкерс, издатель двух престижных журналов "Ориентасьон" и "Вулуар". Стойкерс подходит к геополитике с сугубо научных, рационалистических позиций, стремясь освободить эту дисциплину от всех "случайных" напластований. Но следуя логике "новых правых" в академическом направлении, он приходит к выводам, поразительно близким "пророчествам" Парвулеско.

Стойкерс также считает, что социально-политические и особенно дипломатические проекты различных государств и блоков, в какую бы идеологическую форму они ни были облачены, представляют собой косвенное и подчас завуалированное выражение глобальных геополитических проектов. В этом он видит влияние фактора "Земли" на человеческую историю. Человек существо земное (создан из земли). Следовательно, земля, пространство определяют человека в наиболее значительных его проявлениях. Это предпосылка для "геоистории".

Континенталистская ориентация является приоритетной для Стойкера; он считает атлантизм враждебным Европе, а судьбу европейского благосостояния связывает с Германией и Средней Европой⁷³. Стойкерс сторонник активного сотрудничества Европы со странами Третьего мира и особенно с арабским миром.

Вместе с тем он подчеркивает огромную значимость Индийского океана для будущей геополитической структуры планеты. Он определяет Индийский океан как "Срединный Океан", расположенный между Атлантическим и Тихим. Индийский океан расположен строго посередине между восточным побережьем Африки и тихоокеанской зоной, в которой расположены Новая Зеландия, Австралия, Новая Гвинея, Малайзия, Индонезия, Филиппины и Индокитай. Морской контроль над Индийским океаном является ключевой

⁷³ Robert Steukers "La Russie, L'Europe et L'Occident" dans "Orientation" № 4 nov.-dec. 1983

позицией для геополитического влияния сразу на три важнейших "больших пространства" Африку, южно-евразийский rimland и тихоокеанский регион. Отсюда вытекает стратегический приоритет некоторых небольших островов в Индийском океане особенно Диего Гарсия, равноудаленного от всех береговых зон.

Индийский океан является той территорией, на которой должна сосредоточиться вся европейская стратегия, так как через эту зону Европа сможет влиять и на США, и на Евразию, и на Японию, утверждает Стойкерс. С его точки зрения, решающее геополитическое противостояние, которое должно предопределить картину будущего XXI века, будет разворачиваться именно на этом пространстве.

Стойкерс активно занимается историей геополитики, и ему принадлежат статьи об основателях этой науки в новом издании "Брюссельской энциклопедии".

5.6 Россия + Ислам = спасение Европы. Карло Террачано

Активный геополитический центр континенталистской ориентации существует и в Италии. В Италии после Второй мировой войны больше чем в других европейских странах получили распространение идеи Карла Шмитта, и благодаря этому геополитический образ мышления стал там весьма распространенным. Кроме того, именно в Италии более всего было развито движение "Юная Европа" Жана Тириара, и соответственно, идеи континентального национал-большевизма.

Среди многочисленных политологических и социологических "новых правых" журналов и центров, занимающихся геополитикой, особый интерес представляет миланский "Орион", где в течение последних 10 лет регулярно публикуются геополитические анализы доктора Карло Террачано. Террачано выражает наиболее крайнюю позицию европейского континентализма, вплотную примыкающую к евразийству.

Террачано полностью принимает картину Макиндера и Мэхэна и соглашается с выделенным ими строгим цивилизационным и географическим дуализмом. При этом он однозначно встает на сторону heartland'a, считая, что судьба Европы целиком и полностью зависит от судьбы России и Евразии, от Востока. Континентальный Восток это позитив, атлантический Запад негатив. Столь радикальный подход со стороны европейца является исключением даже среди геополитиков континентальной ориентации, так как Террачано даже не акцентирует особо специальный статус Европы, считая, что это является второстепенным моментом перед лицом планетарного противостояния талассократии и теллурократии.

Он полностью разделяет идею единого Евразийского Государства, "Евро-советской Империи от Владивостока до Дублина", что сближает его с Тириаром, но при этом он не разделяет свойственного Тириару "якобинства" и "универсализма", настаивая на этнокультурной дифференциации и регионализме, что сближает его, в свою очередь, с Аленом де Бенуа.

Подчеркивание центральности русского фактора соседствует у Террачано с другим любопытным моментом: он считает, что важнейшая роль в борьбе с атлантизмом принадлежит исламскому миру, особенно явно антиамериканским режимам: иранскому, ливийскому, иракскому и т.д. Это приводит его к выводу, что исламский мир является в высшей степени выразителем континентальных геополитических интересов. При этом он рассматривает в качестве позитивной именно "фундаменталистскую" версию Ислама.

Окончательная формула, которая резюмирует геополитические взгляды доктора Террачано, такова:

Россия (heartland) + Ислам против США (атлантизм, мондиализм)⁷⁴

Европу Террачано видит как плацдарм русско-исламского антимондиалистского блока. С его точки зрения, только такая радикальная постановка вопроса может объективно привести к подлинному европейскому возрождению.

Сходных с Террачано взглядов придерживаются и другие сотрудники "Ориона" и интеллектуального центра, работающего на его базе (проф. Клаудио Мутти, Маурицио Мурелли, социолог Алессандра Колла, Марко Баттарра и т.д.) К этому национал-большевистскому направлению тяготеют и некоторые левые, социал-демократические, коммунистические и анархистские круги Италии газета "Уманита", журнал "Нуови Ангулациони" и т.д.

⁷⁴ Carlo Terracciano "Nel Fiume della Storia" in "Orion", Milano, №№ 22 -- 30, 1986 -- 1987

Глава 6. Неоевразийство

6.1 Евразийская пассионарность Лев Гумилев

Самым ярким учеником евразийца Савицкого был знаменитый русский ученый историк Лев Николаевич Гумилев. Собственно геополитические темы он в своих трудах не затрагивал, но его теория этногенеза и этнических циклов явно продолжает линию "органицистского" подхода и отчасти "географического детерминизма", которые составляют сущность геополитики уже у Ратцеля, Челлена, Хаусхофера и т.д.

Особенно важны исследования Гумилева в отношении древних периодов этнической карты Евразии, степи, кочевых народов и их цивилизаций. Из его трудов складывается совершенно новое видение политической истории, в которой евразийский Восток выступает не просто как варварские земли на периферии цивилизации (приравненной к западной цивилизации), но как самостоятельный и динамичный центр этногенеза, культуры, политической истории, государственного и технического развития. Запад и его история релятивизируются, евразийская культура и созвездие евразийских этносов обнаруживаются как многомерный и совершенно не изученный мир со своими шкалой ценностей, религиозными проблемами, историческими закономерностями и т.д.

Гумилев развивает и доводит до логического предела общеевразийскую идею о том, что этнически великороссы, русские представляют собой не просто ветвь восточных славян, но особый этнос, сложившийся на основе тюркско-славянского слияния. Отсюда косвенно вытекает обоснованность русского контроля над теми евразийскими землями, которые населены тюркскими этносами. Великорусская цивилизация сложилась на основе тюркско-славянского этногенеза, который реализовался на географическом плане как исторический альянс Леса и Степи. Именно геополитическое сочетание Леса и Степи составляет историческую сущность России, предопределяя характер ее культуры, цивилизации, идеологии, политической судьбы.

Гумилев, вслед за Шпенглером и Тойнби, выделяет циклы цивилизаций и культур, а также соответствующих этносов. С его точки зрения, этно-культурные образования нации, государства, религиозные общины во всем подобны живым организмам. Они проходят периоды рождения, юности, зрелости и старения, а потом исчезают или превращаются в т.н. "реликты". В этом снова явно заметно влияние "органицистской философии", общей для всех континенталистских геополитических школ.

В высшей степени интересны теории Гумилева относительно причин этногенеза, т.е. рождения народа или государства. Для описания этого процесса он вводит термин "пассионарности" или "пассионарного толчка"⁷⁵. Это необъяснимый синхронный всплеск биологической и духовной энергии, который внезапно приводит в движение вялотекущее историческое существование "старых" народов и культур, захватывая различные сложившиеся этнические и религиозные группы в динамическом порыве пространственной, духовной и технической экспансии, что приводит к завоеваниям и сплавлению разнородных остаточных этносов в новые активные и жизнеспособные формы. Высокая и полноценная пассионарность и динамический процесс этногенеза ведут в нормальном случае к возникновению особого суперэтноса, который соответствует не

⁷⁵ Л.Гумилев "Этногенез и биосфера земли", Ленинград, 1990

столько национально-государственной форме политической организации, сколько империи.

Пассионарность постепенно убывает. На смену "пассеизму" (для Гумилева это позитивная категория, которую он приравнивает к "героизму", к этическому стремлению к бескорыстному созиданию во имя верности национальной традиции) приходит "актуализм", т.е. озабоченность лишь настоящим моментом в отрыве от традиции и без оглядки на судьбу будущих поколений. В этой фазе происходит "пассионарный надлом" и этногенез входит в отрицательную стадию консервация и начала распада. Далее следует "футуристическая" фаза, в которой доминирует тип бессильных "мечтателей", "фантазеров", "религиозных эскапистов", которые утрачивают веру в окружающее бытие и стремятся уйти в "потустороннее". Гумилев считает это признаком окончательного упадка. Этнос деградирует, суперэтноты распадаются на составляющие, империи рушатся.

Такая ситуация продолжается вплоть до нового "пассионарного толчка", когда появляется новый свежий этнос и провоцирует новый этногенез, в котором переплавляются остатки старых конструкций. Причем некоторые этносы сохраняются в "реликтовом" состоянии (Гумилев называет их "химерами"), а другие исчезают в динамике нового этногенетического процесса.

Особенно важно утверждение Гумилева относительно того, что великороссы являются относительно "свежим" и "молодым" этносом, сплотившим вокруг себя "суперэтнос" России-Евразии или евразийской Империи.

Из евразийства Гумилева напрашиваются следующие геополитические выводы (которые он сам не делал по понятным политическим соображениям, предпочитая оставаться строго в рамках исторической науки).

- 1) Евразия представляет собой полноценное "месторазвитие", плодородную богатейшую почву этногенеза и культурогенеза. Следовательно, надо научиться рассматривать мировую историю не в однополярной оптике "Запад и все остальные" (как это свойственно атлантистской историографии), а в многополярной, причем северная и восточная Евразия представляют собой особый интерес, так как являются альтернативным Западу источником важнейших планетарных цивилизационных процессов. В своих трудах Гумилев дает развернутую картину тезиса Макиндера о "географической оси истории" и наделяет эту ось конкретным историческим и этническим содержанием.
- 2) Геополитический синтез Леса и Степи, лежащий в основе великоросской государственности, является ключевой реальностью для культурно-стратегического контроля над Азией и Восточной Европой. Причем такой контроль способствовал бы гармоничному балансу Востока и Запада, тогда как культурная ограниченность западных цивилизаций (Лес) при ее стремлении к доминации, сопровождающейся полнейшим непониманием культуры Востока (Степи), ведет лишь к конфликтам и потрясениям.
- 3) Западная цивилизация находится в последней нисходящей стадии этногенеза, являясь конгломератом "химерических" этносов. Следовательно, центр тяжести обязательно переместится к более молодым народам.
- 4) Возможно также, что в скором будущем произойдет какой-то непредсказуемый и непредвиденный "пассионарный толчок", который резко изменит политическую и

культурную карту планеты, так как доминация "реликтовых" этносов долго длиться не может.

6.2 Новые русские евразийцы

Сам Гумилев не формулировал геополитических выводов на основании своей картины мира. Это сделали его последователи в период ослабления (а потом и отмены) марксистской идеологической цензуры. Такое направление в целом получило название "неоевразийства", которое имеет, в свою очередь, несколько разновидностей. Не все они наследуют идеи Гумилева, но в целом его влияние на эту геополитическую идеологию колоссально.

Неоевразийство имеет несколько разновидностей.

Первое (и самое основное и развитое) представляет собой законченную и многомерную идеологию, которую сформулировали некоторые политические круги национальной оппозиции, противостоящие либеральным реформам в период 1990-1994 годов. Речь идет о группе интеллектуалов, объединившихся вокруг газеты "День" (позже "Завтра") и журнала "Элементы"⁷⁶.

Это неоевразийство основывается на идеях П.Савицкого, Г.Вернадского, кн. Н.Трубецкого, а также идеолога русского национал-большевизма Николая Устрялова. Анализ исторических евразийцев признается в высшей степени актуальным и вполне применимым к настоящей ситуации. Тезис национальной идеократии имперского континентального масштаба противопоставляется одновременно и либеральному западничеству, и узкоэтническому национализму. Россия видится как ось геополитического "большого пространства", ее этническая миссия однозначно отождествляется с имперостроительством.

На социально-политическом уровне это направление однозначно тяготеет к евразийскому социализму, считая либеральную экономику характерным признаком атлантического лагеря. Советский период российской истории рассматривается в сменовеховской перспективе как модернистическая форма традиционного русского национального стремления к планетарной экспансии и "евразийскому антиатлантическому универсализму". Отсюда "прокоммунистические" тенденции этой версии неоевразийства.

Наследие Льва Гумилева принимается, но при этом теория пассионарности сопрягается с учением о "циркуляции элит" итальянского социолога Вильфреда Парето, а религиозные взгляды Гумилева корректируются на основании школы европейских традиционалистов (Генон, Эвола и т.д.).

Идеи традиционалистов "кризис современного мира", "деградация Запада", "десакрализация цивилизации" и т.д. входят важным компонентом в неоевразийство, дополняя и развивая те моменты, которые были представлены у русских авторов лишь интуитивно и фрагментарно.

Кроме того, досконально исследуются европейские континенталистские проекты (Хаусхофер, Шмитт, Никиш, "новые правые" и т.д.), за счет чего горизонты евразийской доктрины распространяются и на Европу, понятую как потенциально континентальная

⁷⁶ Françoise Thome "Eurasisme et Neo-Eurasisme" dans "Commentaire", etc 1994, № 66.

сила. Это мотив совершенно чуждый историческим евразийцам-эмигрантам, которые писали основные произведения в ситуации, когда США еще не имели самостоятельного геополитического значения, и тезис о различии Европы и Запада еще не получил должного развития. Неоевразийство, внимая европейским континенталистам, признает стратегическую важность Европы для геополитической законченности и полноценности евразийского "Большого пространства", особенно учитывая то, что именно фактор неустойчивого разделения геополитической карты Европы привел к поражению СССР в "холодной войне".

Другой особенностью неоевразийства является выбор исламских стран (особенно континентального Ирана) в качестве важнейшего стратегического союзника. Идея континентального русско-исламского альянса лежит в основе антиатлантической стратегии на юго-западном побережье евразийского материка. На доктринальном уровне этот альянс обосновывается традиционным характером русской и исламской цивилизаций, что объединяет их в противостоянии антитрадиционному, светско-прагматическому Западу.

В этом направлении неоевразийства картина всех геополитических проектов применительно к актуальной ситуации достраивается до своей полноты, так как и идеологически, и стратегически, и политически, и позиционно, неоевразийский проект представляет собой наиболее полную, непротиворечивую, законченную и исторически обоснованную противоположность всем разновидностям западных геополитических проектов (как атлантистских, так и мондиалистских).

Мондиализм и атлантизм выражают две разновидности геополитической идеологии крайнего Запада. Европеизм и умеренный континентализм европейских геополитиков представляет собой промежуточную реальность. И наконец, неоевразийство "Дня" и особенно "Элементов" выражает радикально антизападную точку зрения, смыкающуюся со всеми остальными альтернативными геополитическими проектами от европейского национал-большевизма до исламского фундаментализма (или исламского "социализма") вплоть до национально-освободительных движений во всех уголках Третьего мира.

Другие разновидности неоевразийства менее последовательны и представляют собой адаптацию всего комплекса вышеназванных идей к меняющейся политической действительности: либо речь идет только о прагматическом экономическом "евразийстве", призванном воссоздать экономическое взаимодействие бывших республик СССР (проект президента Казахстана Н.Назарбаева), либо об обосновании экспансионистских тезисов ("великодержавный" проект В.Жириновского), либо о чисто риторическом взывании к "евразийской общности" для сохранения единства русских и национальных меньшинств (в большинстве своем этнических тюрок и мусульман) в составе РФ (проект некоторых деятелей правительства Б.Ельцина), либо о чисто историческом интересе к наследию кружка Савицкого, Трубецкого, Сувчинского, Карсавина и т.д. в эмиграции. Но все эти версии с необходимостью искусственны, фрагментарны, непоследовательны и не могут претендовать на самостоятельную и серьезную геополитическую идеологию и методологию. Поэтому подробнее останавливаться на них не имеет особого смысла.

Заметим только, что любые апелляции в евразийству и Евразии, какой бы ограниченный смысл ни вкладывали бы в эти понятия те, кто их используют, прямо или косвенно отсылают именно к тому неоевразийскому проекту, который выработан в кругах оппозиции и оформлен в работах авторов "Дня" и "Элементов", так как только в этом контексте употребление слова "евразийство" оправдано и преемственностью русской

геополитической школы, и соотносительностью с общим веером геополитических проектов планетарного масштаба, существующих вне России.

6.3 К новой биполярности

Неоевразийство, помимо своего интеллектуального наследия и общих принципов континентальной геополитики, стоит перед лицом новейших проблем, поставленных в форме последних геополитических проектов Запада. Более того, это геополитическое направление приобретает значение именно в той мере, в какой оно способно не просто объяснить геополитическую логику происходящих исторических событий, но выработать связный футурологический проект, способный противостоять проектам Запада.

Победа Запада в "холодной войне" концептуально означает окончание биполярного и начало однополярного мира. При этом если чистые атлантисты (Хантингтон) предполагают, что эта однополярность будет относительной выигравший Запад (The West) будет вынужден постоянно улаживать нарастающие междивизиональные конфликты со "всеми остальными миром" (The Rest) то мондиалисты (Фукуяма, Агтали) видят беспроблемную доминацию Запада над всей планетой как нечто уже случившееся. Даже самый конфликтный вариант профессора Санторо предполагает, в конце концов, установление Мирового Правительства.

Это проекты геополитических победителей, обладающих сегодня неоспоримыми преимуществами и стратегической инициативой, с которыми необходимо считаться в высшей степени. Все они сходятся в одном: на планете рано или поздно должен восторжествовать универсализм западного типа, т.е. атлантистская, талассократическая система ценностей должна стать доминирующей повсеместно. Двухполюсный мир времен холодной войны считается полностью преодоленным. Евразии и евразийству в такой картине просто нет места. Все это логично и вытекает напрямую из работ первых англосаксонских геополитиков, стремившихся всемерно ослабить силы Суши, подорвав их могущество и сдерживая их развитие разнообразными стратегическими методами особенно стратегией "анаконды", т.е. жестким контролем над все большими и большими секторами rimland.

Неоевразийство не может, оставаясь самим собой, признать правомочности такого положения дел и обречено на то, чтобы искать возможности обратить все эти процессы вспять. И начинает оно с самого центрального вопроса с вопроса об однополярности. Однополярность (доминанция атлантизма в любых формах как в чистом виде, так и через мондиализм) обрекает Евразию как heartland на историческое небытие. Неоевразийство настаивает на том, что этой однополярности следует противостоять.

Осуществить это можно только через новую биполярность .

Это требует пояснения. Есть точка зрения, что после окончания противостояния США СССР мир сам по себе перейдет к многополярному устройству возвысится Китай, демографические процессы выведут исламские страны в разряд геополитически центральных, тихоокеанский регион заявит о своей конкурентоспособности с Европой и Америкой и т.д. Все это возможно, но здесь не учитывается, что такая новая многополярность будет проходить под знаком "атлантистской системы ценностей", т.е. будет представлять собой лишь территориальные разновидности талассократической системы, и никак не подлинную геополитическую альтернативу. Вызов Запада, рынка и либерал-демократии универсален. После победы heartland'a все попытки народов и

государств следовать каким-то иным путем, кроме западного, лишились основной опоры. И просоветские режимы, и все "неприсоединившиеся" страны, настаивавшие на "третьем пути", существовали лишь за счет биполярности, за счет зазора, существовавшего между Западом и Востоком в их позиционной геополитической борьбе. Современный победивший Запад отныне будет диктовать идеологические и экономические условия всем, кто станет претендовать на роль развитого региона. Поэтому любая многополярность при сохранении статус кво будет фиктивной и мондиалистской.

Это неплохо осознают западные стратеги, прекрасно понимающие, что главной геополитической задачей Запада на данном этапе является недопущение самой возможности формирования масштабного геополитического блока континентального объема, который мог бы быть по тем или иным параметрам сопоставим с силами атлантизма. Это является главным принципом военно-политической доктрины США, что сформулировано в докладе Пола Вольфовица. Иными словами, Запад более всего не хочет возврата к биполярности. Это было бы для него смертельно опасно.

Неоевразийство, исходя из интересов "географической оси истории", утверждает прямо противоположное Западу. Единственным выходом из сложившейся ситуации может стать лишь новый биполяризм, так как только в этом направлении Евразия смогла бы обрести перспективу подлинной геополитической суверенности. Только новая биполярность сможет впоследствии открыть путь такой многополярности, которая выходила бы за рамки талассократической либерал-демократической системы, т.е. истинной многополярности мира, где каждый народ и каждый геополитический блок смог бы выбирать собственную систему ценностей, имеет шанс осуществиться только после освобождения от глобальной атлантистской доминации через новое планетарное противостояние.

При этом важно, что евразийский континентальный блок не может стать простым воссозданием Варшавского пакта. Распад прежней геополитической континентальной конструкции необратим и коренится в самой его структуре. Новый континентальный альянс должен либо включить в себя всю Европу до Атлантики и несколько важнейших секторов южного побережья Евразии Индию, Иран, Индокитай и т.д., либо обеспечить дружественный нейтралитет этих же пространств, т.е. вывести их из-под контроля атлантизма. Возврат к старому биполяризму невозможен по многим причинам в том числе и по идеологическим. Новый евразийский биполяризм должен исходить из совершенно иных идеологических предпосылок и основываться на совершенно иных методиках.

Эта теория "нового биполяризма" достаточно развита в неоевразийских проектах, являясь теоретическим обоснованием для всех неконформистских геополитических теорий Европы и Третьего мира. Как heartland объективно является единственной точкой, способной быть плацдармом планетарной альтернативы талассократии, так неоевразийство представляет собой единственную теоретическую платформу, на основе которой может быть разработан целый веер планетарных стратегий, отрицающих мировую доминацию атлантизма и его цивилизационной системы ценностей: рынка, либеральной демократии, светской культуры, философии индивидуализма и т.д.

ЧАСТЬ III РОССИЯ И ПРОСТРАНСТВО

Глава 1. Heartland

Россия, со стратегической точки зрения, представляет собой гигантскую континентальную массу, которая отождествляется с самой Евразией. Россия после освоения Сибири и ее интеграции однозначно совпала с геополитическим понятием Heartland, т.е. "Центральной Земли" континента. Макиндер определял русское Большое Пространство как "Географическую Ось Истории". Географически, ландшафтно, лингвистически, климатически, культурно и религиозно Россия является синтетическим единением евразийского Запада и евразийского Востока, причем ее геополитическая функция не сводится к суммированию или опосредованию западных и восточных тенденций. Россия есть нечто Третье, самостоятельное и особое ни Восток, ни Запад. Культурно осмыслившие "срединное" положение России русские евразийцы говорили об особой культуре "Срединной Империи", где географические и геополитические противоположности снимаются в духовном, вертикальном синтезе. С чисто стратегической точки зрения, Россия тождественна самой Евразии хотя бы потому, что именно ее земли, ее население и ее индустриально-технологическое развитие обладают достаточным объемом, чтобы быть базой континентальной независимости, автаркии и служить основой для полной континентальной интеграции, что по геополитическим законам должно произойти с каждым "островом", в том числе и с самим "Мировым Островом" (World Island), т.е. с Евразией.

По отношению к России-Heartland все остальные евразийские государства и земли являются прибрежными, Rimland. Россия это "Ось Истории", поскольку "цивилизация" вращается вокруг нее, создавая свои наиболее броские, выразительные и законченные формы не в своем животворном континентальном истоке, но в "береговой зоне", в критической полосе, где пространство Суши граничит с пространством Воды, моря или океана. Со стратегической точки зрения, Россия является самостоятельной территориальной структурой, чья безопасность и суверенность тождественны безопасности и суверенности всего континента. Этого нельзя сказать ни об одной другой крупной евразийской державе ни о Китае, ни о Германии, ни о Франции, ни об Индии. Если по отношению к своим береговым соседям или к государствам иных "Островов" или континентов Китай, Германия, Франция, Индия и т.д. могут выступать как континентальные силы, то по отношению к России они всегда останутся "береговыми полосами", Rimland, со всеми соответствующими стратегическими, культурными и политическими последствиями. Только Россия может выступать от имени Heartland с полным геополитическим основанием. Только ее стратегические интересы не просто близки к интересам континента, но строго тождественны им (по меньшей мере, на актуальном этапе развития техносферы дело обстоит именно так).

Глава 2. Проблема Rimland

Отношение России к соседним континентальным цивилизациям романо-германской на Западе и трем традиционным цивилизациям на Востоке (исламской, индуистской и китайской) имеет, по меньшей мере, две плоскости, которые ни в коем случае нельзя смешивать между собой, так как это неизбежно приведет к множеству недоразумений. Во-первых, культурно-исторически сущность России, ее духовное самоопределение, ее

"идентичность", безусловно определяются формулой "ни Восток, ни Запад" или "ни Европа, ни Азия, но Евразия" (по выражению русских евразийцев). Россия духовно есть нечто Третье, нечто самостоятельное и особое, что не имеет выражения ни в терминах Востока, ни в терминах Запада. На этом уровне высшим интересом России является сохранение любой ценой ее уникальности, отстаивание ее самобытности перед вызовом культуры Запада и традиции Востока. Это не означает полного изоляционизма, но все же ограничивает спектр возможных заимствований. Исторический реализм требует от нас мужественного признания того, что утверждение "своего", "нашего" всегда идет параллельно отрицанию "чужого", "ненашего". И утверждение и отрицание являются фундаментальными элементами национальной, культурной, исторической и политической самостоятельности народа и государства. Поэтому отрицание и Запада и Востока в культурном плане является историческим императивом для независимости России. В этом вопросе, естественно, могут быть самые различные нюансы и дискуссии признавая самобытность, некоторые считают, что лучше открыться больше для Востока, чем для Запада ("азиатское направление"), другие наоборот ("западники"), третьи предпочитают полный отказ от всякого диалога ("изоляционисты"), четвертые предполагают равномерную открытость в обе стороны (некоторые направления "неоевразийства").

На стратегическом и чисто геополитическом уровнях ситуация совершенно другая. Так как Россия-Евразия на настоящем историческом этапе в качестве своего планетарного оппонента имеет не столько "береговые цивилизации", Rimland, сколько противолежащий "Остров", атлантическую Америку, то важнейшим стратегическим императивом является превращение "береговых территорий" в своих союзников, стратегическое проникновение в "прибрежные" зоны, заключение общеевразийского пакта или, по меньшей мере, обеспечение полного и строгого нейтралитета как можно большего числа Rimland в позиционном противостоянии заатлантическому Западу. Здесь стратегической формулой России однозначно должна быть формула "и Восток и Запад", так как только континентальная интеграция Евразии с центром в России может гарантировать всем ее народам и государствам действительный суверенитет, максимум политической и экономической автаркии. На стратегическом уровне сегодня актуально единственное противопоставление: либо мондиализм (общепланетарная доминация американизма и атлантизма), либо континентализм (деление планеты на два или более Больших Пространства, пользующихся политическим, военным, стратегическим и геополитическим суверенитетом). Rimlands необходимы России, чтобы стать действительно суверенной континентальной геополитической силой. В настоящий момент, при актуальном развитии военных, стратегических и экономических технологий, никакого иного, неконтинентального, суверенитета просто не может быть: всякие "этнократические", чисто "изоляционистские" проекты решения государственной проблемы России в стратегической сфере дают результат строго соответствующий мондиалистским планам по тотальному контролю над планетой и по полной стратегической, политической и экономической оккупации Евразии и России.

Очевидно, что перенесение культурно-исторической проблематики России на стратегический или геополитический уровень (т.е. надделение формулы "ни Восток, ни Запад" сугубо геополитическим смыслом) есть не что иное, как политическая диверсия, направленная на стратегическую дезориентацию внешнеполитического курса России. Что бы ни лежало в основе "узко-этнических", "расово-националистических", "шовинистических" моделей русской государственности невежество, наивность или сознательная работа против своего народа и его независимости, результатом является полное тождество с мондиалистскими целями. Не превратив Россию в "этническую резервацию", США не смогут получить полного контроля над миром.

Проблема Rimland ставится именно таким образом только сегодня, когда за спиной у нас остается вся стратегическая история биполярного мира и планетарной холодной войны СССР и США. Во времена пика политической активности русских евразийцев стратегическая ситуация была совершенно иной, и в будущее могли заглянуть совсем немногие. Поэтому некоторые геополитические проекты евразийцев следует рассматривать с осторожностью. В частности, проблема Rimland трактовалась ими скорее в культурном, нежели в стратегическом аспекте. Все это необходимо учитывать для того, чтобы Россия могла выработать серьезную и обоснованную геополитическую программу, реалистичную и перспективную, во главу угла которой следует поставить главный геополитический императив независимость, суверенность, самостоятельность, автаркию и свободу Великой России.

Глава 3. Собрание Империи

Одним из главных постулатов геополитики является утверждение о том, что геополитическое положение государства является намного более важным, нежели особенности политического устройства этого государства. Политика, культура, идеология, характер правящей элиты и даже религия рассматриваются в геополитической оптике как важные, но второстепенные факторы по сравнению с фундаментальным геополитическим принципом отношением государства к пространству. Часто (особенно у нас в России) такая специфика геополитики как науки считается чуть ли не "цинизмом" или даже "антинациональным" подходом. Это, конечно же, совершенно неверно. Просто геополитика отнюдь не претендует на то, чтобы быть единственной и высшей инстанцией в определении государственных и политических интересов нации. Геополитика это одна из нескольких базовых дисциплин, позволяющих адекватно сформулировать международную и военную доктрину государства наряду с другими, не менее важными дисциплинами. Как физика, для того чтобы быть точной наукой, должна абстрагироваться от химии и ее законов (это отнюдь не означает, что физика отрицает химию), так и геополитика для того, чтобы быть строгой дисциплиной, должна оставлять в стороне иные, негеополитические, подходы, которые могут и должны приниматься во внимание при окончательных заключениях в отношении судьбы государства и народа наряду с геополитикой.

Одним из насущнейших геополитических требований России является "собрание Империи". Как бы мы ни относились к "социализму", СССР, Восточному блоку, странам Варшавского договора и т.д., как бы ни оценивали политическую и культурную реальность одной из двух сверхдержав, с геополитической точки зрения, существование восточного блока было однозначно позитивным фактором для возможного евразийского объединения, для континентальной интеграции и суверенитета нашего Большого Пространства. Именно геополитическая логика заставила бельгийского теоретика Жана Тириара говорить о необходимости создания "Евро-советской империи от Владивостока до Дублина". Только Восточный блок мог стать основой объединения Евразии в Империю, хотя разделение Европы и непоследовательность советской политики в Азии были серьезными препятствиями для осуществления этой цели. По мнению многих современных геополитиков, распад СССР был в значительной мере обусловлен именно его стратегической уязвимостью на западных и восточных рубежах США контролировали Rimland Запада и Востока настолько умело и последовательно, что, в конечном итоге, они и не допустили континентальной интеграции и способствовали распаду самого Восточного блока. Конец двуполярного мира это стратегический удар по Евразии, удар по континентализму и возможному суверенитету всех евразийских государств.

Императив геополитического и стратегического суверенитета России заключается в том, чтобы не только восстановить утраченные регионы "ближнего зарубежья", не только возобновить союзнические отношения со странами Восточной Европы, но и в том, чтобы включить в новый евразийский стратегический блок государства континентального Запада (в первую очередь, франко-германский блок, который тяготеет к освобождению от атлантистской опеки проамериканского НАТО) и континентального Востока (Иран, Индию и Японию).

Геополитическое "собрание Империи" является для России не только одним из возможных путей развития, одним из возможных отношений государства к пространству, но залогом и необходимым условием существования независимого государства, и более того независимого государства на независимом континенте.

Если Россия немедленно не начнет воссоздавать Большое Пространство, т.е. возвращать в сферу своего стратегического, политического и экономического влияния временно утраченные евразийские просторы, она ввергнет в катастрофу и саму себя, и все народы, проживающие на "Мировом Острове".

Ход возможных событий легко предвидеть. Если Россия выберет какой-то иной путь, нежели "путь собрания Империи", континентальную миссию Heartland начнут брать на себя новые державы или блоки государств. В таком случае, просторы России будут основной стратегической целью для тех сил, которые объявят себя новой "цитаделью Евразии". Это совершенно неизбежно, так как контроль над континентом немыслим без контроля над пространством "географической оси Истории". Либо Китай предпримет отчаянный бросок на Север в Казахстан и Восточную Сибирь, либо Средиземная Европа двинется на западно-русские земли Украину, Белоруссию, западную Великороссию, либо исламский блок постарается интегрировать Среднюю Азию, Поволжье и Приуралье, а также некоторые территории Южной России. Этой новой континентальной интеграции избежать невозможно, так как сама геополитическая карта планеты противится ее однополярной, атлантистской ориентации. В геополитике вполне правомочен сакральный закон "свято место пусто не бывает". Причем, к экспансии на русские земли другие евразийские блоки подтолкнет отнюдь не "территориальный эгоизм" или "русофобия", но неумолимая логика пространства и геополитическая пассивность России. В сфере континентальной стратегии глупо ожидать того, что другие народы остановятся перед территориальной экспансией на русские земли только из уважения к "самобытности русской культуры". В этой сфере действуют лишь силовые территориальные импульсы и позиционные преимущества. Даже сам факт колебания в вопросе незамедлительного "собрания Империи" является уже достаточным вызовом, достаточным основанием для того, чтобы альтернативные геополитические Большие Пространства двинулись в русские пределы. Это, естественно, вызовет реакцию русских и повлечет за собой жуткий и бесперспективный внутриевразийский конфликт; бесперспективный потому, что он не будет иметь даже теоретически позитивного решения, так как для создания нерусской Евразии необходимо полностью уничтожить русский народ, а это сделать не только непросто, но фактически невозможно, как показывает история. С другой стороны, такой конфликт проложит линию фронта между соседними государствами континентальной и антиатлантистской ориентации, а это лишь усилит позицию третьей силы, т.е. США и их коллег по мондиалистским проектам. Отсутствие действия это тоже своего рода действие, и за промедлением в "собрании Империи" (не говоря уже о возможном отказе от геополитической экспансии России) неминуемо последует большая евразийская кровь. События на Балканах дают страшный пример того, что может произойти в России в несравнимо более грандиозном масштабе.

Воссоединение евразийских территорий под покровительством России как "оси Истории" сегодня сопряжено с определенными трудностями, но они ничтожны перед лицом тех катастроф, которые с неизбежностью грядут в том случае, если это "собрание Империи" не начнется немедленно.

Глава 4. Теплые и холодные моря

Процесс "собрания Империи" должен изначально ориентироваться на дальнюю цель, которой является выход России к теплым морям. Именно благодаря сдерживанию русской экспансии на южном, юго-западном и северо-западном направлениях, атлантистской Англии удавалось поддерживать свой контроль над всеми "береговыми пространствами", окружающими Евразию. Россия геополитически являлась "законченной" державой на Востоке и Севере, где ее политические границы совпадали с естественными географическими границами евразийского материка. Но парадокс заключался в том, что эти побережья прилегают к холодным морям, что является непреодолимым барьером для развития мореходства в той степени, в какой это позволило бы всерьез конкурировать на морях с флотами Западного Острова (Англии, а позднее Америки). С другой стороны, восточные и северные земли России никогда не были достаточно освоены в силу природных и культурных особенностей, а все проекты по интеграции русской Азии от предложенных доктором Бадмаевым последнему Императору до брежневского БАМа по какой-то странной закономерности рушились под воздействием спонтанных или управляемых исторических катаклизмов.

Как бы то ни было, выход к холодным морям Севера и Востока должен быть дополнен выходом к теплым морям Юга и Запада, и только в этом случае Россия станет геополитически "законченной". За это, собственно, и велись многочисленные русско-турецкие войны, плоды которых, однако, пожинали не турки и не русские, а англичане, обескровливающие две последние традиционные империи из трех (третья Австро-Венгрия). Последним рывком к жизненно необходимому России Югу была неудачная экспансия СССР в Афганистан. Геополитическая логика однозначно показывает, что России обязательно придется туда вернуться снова, хотя гораздо лучше было бы прийти верным союзником, защитником и другом, нежели жестоким карателем. Только тогда, когда южными и западными границами России станет береговая линия, можно будет говорить об окончательном завершении ее континентального строительства. При этом не обязательно речь должна идти о завоеваниях, экспансии или аннексиях. Прочный антиатлантический паритетный стратегический союз с континентальными европейскими и азиатскими державами был бы достаточен для достижения этой цели. Выход к теплым морям может быть получен не только путем кровопролитной войны, но и путем разумного мира, выгодного для геополитических интересов всех континентальных держав, так как проект евразийской стратегической интеграции даст возможность всем этим державам стать реально суверенными и независимыми перед лицом альтернативного им атлантического Острова, объединенного, в свою очередь, стратегической доктриной Монро. Проливы и теплые моря были недоступны для России тогда, когда столь очевидного атлантического фактора, как США, угрожающего интересам всей Европы и всей Азии, еще не существовало, и различные державы материка оспаривали друг у друга первенство в противостоянии Англии и лидерство в деле территориального стратегического объединения. Реализация доктрины Монро в Америке высветила всю геополитическую значимость России, и поэтому союз с Россией стал самоочевидным императивом для всех реалистичных геополитиков материка в каких бы политических формах он ни воплощался в зависимости от обстоятельств. Угроза мондиализма и атлантистского глобализма

теоретически открывает России выход к теплым морям через сам собой напрашивающийся союз Heartland и Rimland против заокеанских оккупантов.

ЧАСТЬ IV ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ БУДУЩЕЕ РОССИИ

Глава 1. Необходимость радикальной альтернативы

В нашем обществе сегодня представлены два принципиальных проекта относительно русского будущего. Они в той или иной степени затрагивают все аспекты национальной жизни: экономику, геополитику, межнациональные отношения, этнические интересы, промышленную структуру, хозяйственный уклад, военное строительство и т.д.

Первый проект принадлежит радикальным либералам, "реформаторам", которые берут в качестве примера западное общество, современный "торговый строй", и полностью подписываются под проектами о "конце истории", развитыми в знаменитой одноименной статье Фрэнсиса Фукуямы. Этот проект отрицает такие ценности, как народ, нация, история, геополитические интересы, социальная справедливость, религиозный фактор и т.д. В нем все строится на принципе максимальной экономической эффективности, на примате индивидуализма, потребления и "свободного рынка". Либералы хотят построить на месте России новое, никогда еще не существовавшее исторически общество, в котором установятся те правила и культурные координаты, по которым живет современный Запад и, в особенности, США. Этот лагерь может легко сформулировать ответ на любые вопросы относительно того или иного аспекта российской действительности исходя из уже существующих на Западе моделей, пользуясь западной либеральной терминологией и юридическими нормами, а также опираясь на разработанные теоретические структуры либерально-капитализма в целом. Эта позиция еще некоторое время назад почти доминировала идеологически в нашем обществе, да и сегодня именно она является наиболее известной, так как совпадает в целом с общим курсом и принципиальной логикой либеральных реформ.

Второй проект русского будущего принадлежит т.н. "национально-патриотической оппозиции", которая представляет собой разнообразную и многоликую политическую реальность, объединенную неприятием либеральных реформ и отказом от либеральной логики, проповедуемой реформаторами. Эта оппозиция является не просто национальной и не просто патриотической: она является "розово-белой", т.е. в ней доминируют представители коммунистов-государственников (во многом отошедших от жесткой марксистско-ленинской догматики) и сторонники православно-монархического, царистского типа государственности. Взгляды обоих компонентов "объединенной оппозиции" довольно значительно различаются, но сходство есть не только в определении "общего врага", но и в некоторых ментальных, идеологических клише, разделяемых и теми и другими. Более того, патриотическая "оппозиция" в подавляющем своем большинстве состоит из деятелей доперестроечной системы, которые привносят элементы сугубо советской ментальности даже в "белые", "царистские проекты", к которым чаще всего они не имели никакого исторического, семейного или политического отношения до начала перестройки, прекрасно чувствуя себя в брежневской реальности. Как бы то ни было, оппозиционный проект можно назвать "советско-царистским", так как он основан на некоторых идеологических, геополитических, политико-социальных и административных архетипах, которые объективно сближают между собой советский и досоветский период (по меньшей мере, в рамках XX века). Идеология патриотов намного более противоречива и путана, чем логичные и законченные конструкции либералов, и поэтому она часто проявляется не в форме законченной концепции или доктрины, а фрагментарно, эмоционально, непоследовательно и отрывочно. И все же этот гротескный конгломерат из перемешанных советско-царистских ментальных обломков обладает

некоторой целостностью, которую, однако, иногда не просто рационально структурировать.

Оба этих проекта и либеральный и советско-царистский являются сущностно тупиковыми для русского народа и русской истории. Либеральный проект вообще предполагает постепенное стирание национальных особенностей русских в космополитической эре "конца истории" и "планетарного рынка", а советско-царистский силится возродить нацию и государство именно в тех исторических формах и структурах, которые, собственно, и привели постепенно русских к краху.

По ту сторону и либерализма "реформаторов" и советско-царизма "объединенной оппозиции" назревает насущная потребность в "третьем пути", в особом идеологическом проекте, который был бы не компромиссом, не "центризмом" между теми и другими, но совершенно радикальным новаторским футуристическим планом, порывающим с безысходной дуалистической логикой "либо либералы, либо оппозиция" где, как в лабиринте без выхода, мечется нынешнее общественное сознание русских.

Следует разрубить gordiev узел и утвердить истинную альтернативу, противостоящую и тем и другим. На карту поставлена великая нация, ее интересы, ее судьба.

Глава 2. Что такое "русские национальные интересы"?

2.1 У русских сегодня нет Государства

В настоящей политической ситуации невозможно, строго говоря, рассуждать о "стратегических перспективах России". Тем более невозможно предлагать какие-либо проекты относительно внешней и внутренней политики России, поскольку главный вопрос что такое Россия сегодня? остается не только не решенным, но и не поставленным всерьез.

Стремительные перемены всего политического, геополитического, идеологического и социального уклада, происшедшие в бывшем СССР, полностью опрокинули все существовавшие правовые и политические критерии и нормы. Распад единой социалистической системы и позже советского государства создал на бывших советских территориях поле совершенной неопределенности, в котором нет более ни ясных ориентиров, ни строгих юридических рамок, ни конкретных социальных перспектив. Те геополитические структуры, которые образовались "автоматически", по инерции после распада СССР, случайны, преходящи и предельно неустойчивы. Это касается не только отделившихся от Москвы республик, но, в первую очередь, самой России.

Для того, чтобы строить планы относительно "интересов государства", необходимо иметь ясное представление, о каком именно государстве идет речь. Иными словами, это имеет смысл при наличии четко выявленного политического субъекта. В настоящей ситуации такого субъекта в случае русских нет.

Существование России, понятой как Российская Федерация (РФ), явно не удовлетворяет никаким серьезным критериям при определении статуса "государства". Разброд в оценках статуса РФ в международной политике ярко свидетельствует именно о таком положении дел. Что такое РФ? Наследница и правопреемница СССР? Региональная держава? Мононациональное государство? Межэтническая федерация? Жандарм Евразии? Пешка в американских проектах? Территории, предназначенные к дальнейшему дроблению? В зависимости от конкретных условий РФ выступает в одной из этих ролей, несмотря на абсолютную противоречивость таких определений. В какой-то момент это государство с претензией на особую роль в мировой политике, в другой это второстепенная региональная держава, в третий поле для сепаратистских экспериментов. Если одно и то же территориально-политическое образование выступает одновременно во всех этих ролях, очевидно, что речь идет о какой-то условной категории, о некоей переменной величине, а не о том завершенном и стабильном политическом феномене, который можно назвать государством в полном смысле этого слова.

РФ не является Россией, полноценным Русским Государством. Это переходное образование в широком и динамическом глобальном геополитическом процессе и не более того. Конечно, РФ может стать в перспективе Русским Государством, но совершенно не очевидно, что это произойдет, и также не очевидно, следует ли к этому стремиться.

Как бы то ни было, о "стратегических интересах" такого нестабильного и временного явления, как РФ, невозможно говорить в долгой перспективе, и тем более нелепо пытаться сформулировать "стратегическую доктрину РФ", основываясь на сегодняшнем положении дел. "Стратегические интересы РФ" могут проясниться только после того как появится,

сложится и определится политический, социальный, экономический и идеологический субъект этих интересов. Пока же этого не произошло, любые проекты в данном направлении окажутся сиюминутной фикцией.

РФ не имеет государственной истории, ее границы случайны, ее культурные ориентиры смутны, ее политический режим шаток и расплывчат, ее этническая карта разнородна, а экономическая структура фрагментарна и отчасти разложена. Данный конгломерат лишь результат развала более глобального геополитического образования, фрагмент, вырванный из целой картины. Даже для того, чтобы на этом острове Империи создать нечто стабильное, понадобится настоящая революция, аналогичная революции младотурков, создавших из фрагмента Османской Империи современную светскую Турцию (хотя здесь снова всплывает вопрос а стоит ли к этому стремиться?).

Если РФ не является Русским Государством, то не является таковым и СНГ. Несмотря на то, что практически все территории стран СНГ (за редким исключением) входили в состав Российской Империи, а следовательно, некогда были частью Русского Государства, на сегодняшний момент страны СНГ имеют достаточную степень автономии и де-юре числятся независимыми политическими образованиями. В отношении этих стран можно утверждать (и с еще большим основанием) то же, что и в отношении РФ эти образования не обладают никакими серьезными признаками подлинной государственности, лишены атрибутов фактической суверенности и представляют собой скорее "территориальный процесс", нежели стабильные и определенные геополитические единицы. Даже если отвлечься от возрастающего национализма стран СНГ, который часто ориентирован антирусски, из противоположных, нестабильных и противоречивых самих по себе фрагментов не возможно сложить гармоничной картины. Бельгийский геополитик Жан Тириар привел по этому поводу одно точное сравнение. "СССР был подобен плитке шоколада, с обозначенными границами долек-республик. После того, как дольки отломлены, их уже недостаточно сложить вместе, чтобы восстановить всю плитку. Отныне этого можно добиться только путем переплавки всей плитки и новой штамповки".

"Стратегические интересы РФ" та же пустая фигура речи, что и "стратегические интересы стран СНГ". К "стратегическим интересам русских" это имеет весьма косвенное отношение.

2.2 Концепция "постимперской легитимности"

Несмотря на несуществование Русского Государства в полном смысле, определенные правовые принципы действуют на всем постсоветском пространстве, на чем и основывается как западная реакция на те или иные действия РФ, так и сиюминутная логика шагов российского руководства. Именно эти принципы, на первый взгляд, удерживают РФ и, шире, СНГ от тотального хаоса. Речь идет о доктрине "постимперской легитимности". Для того, чтобы понять сущность сегодняшних геополитических процессов в Евразии, необходимо кратко изложить основные тезисы данной концепции.

"Постимперская легитимность" является совокупностью правовых норм, тесно связанных с непосредственно предшествующей фазой политического развития региона, т.е. с "имперской легитимностью" ("legacy of empire"). Империя (по меньшей мере, "светская" либеральная или социалистическая) чаще всего руководствуется при территориальном устройстве своих колоний сугубо административными и экономическими признаками, не учитывая ни этнические, ни религиозные, ни национальные факторы. Административные границы в рамках Империи довольно произвольны, так как они заведомо представляют

собой условные барьеры, созданные лишь для удобства централизованного контроля метрополии. Империя в период своего существования заставляет остальные державы признать свою внутреннюю административную систему как легитимную. Но при распаде Империи всегда возникают "зоны правовой неопределенности", так как прекращает существовать та структура, которая юридически регулировала статус своих составных частей.

В процессе "постколониальных" преобразований была сформулирована международно-правовая концепция, которая легла в основание классификации правомочно сти и неправомочности постимперских территориально -политических образований. Это концепция "постимперской легитимности". Смысл ее сводится к тому, что несмотря на отсутствие Империи как целого ее чисто административные составляющие получают полноценный правовой статус независимо от того, удовлетворяет ли данное образование критерию полноценного государства или нет. В основе такого подхода лежит светская либеральная идея относительно произвольности любого государственного образования как исторической случайно сти. По этой логике этнический, религиозный, культурный и социальный компоненты являются малозначимыми и несущественными, так как население понимается здесь как простая совокупность экономико-статистических единиц. В этом сказывается инерция "имперского", "колониального" подхода, привыкшего считать "колонии" и "провинции" чем-то второстепенным и несущественным, "дополнительным" в рамках общего контекста.

Как правило, "постимперские образования" никогда (или почти никогда) не становятся полноценными государствами и продолжают существовать в качестве экономико-политических придатков бывшей (или новой) метрополии. Почти всегда правящая элита в них является прямой наследницей (часто ставленницей) колониальной администрации, экономика целиком зависит от внешних факторов, а политико-социальный уклад подстраивается под модель бывшего центра. Сохранение такой "постимперской легитимности" часто приводит к тому, что один и тот же автохтонный этнос населяет территории разных постимперских государств, а в рамках одного государства проживает несколько этнических и религиозных групп. Фактически относительный баланс интересов поддерживается в таких случаях только апелляцией ко внешнему фактору чаще всего к явной или скрытой мощи бывшей метрополии (или того развитого государства, которое может прийти ей на смену). Весьма показательно, что на последних этапах "освобождения" Африки Панафриканский конгресс постановил применять во всех вновь образованных государствах как раз принцип "постимперской легитимности", хотя многие большие африканские народы в частности, банту, зулусы и т.д. оказались проживающими сразу в двух или трех государствах. Это было сделано под предлогом избежания этнических, межплеменных и религиозных войн. На самом деле, речь шла о стремлении руководители постимперской администрации сохранить свои искусственные элиты у власти, не допустив создания в процессе национального подъема новых представителей органичной национальной иерархии. Учитывая стратегическую и социально-экономическую отсталость Африки и отсутствие свежих и жизненных государственных традиций, этот подход сработал довольно успешно.

Принцип "постимперской легитимности" сегодня прикладывается и к странам, возникшим на развалинах СССР. В бывших "союзных республиках" почти повсеместно у власти находятся наследники "колониальной администрации", отсеки разломленной на части единой управленческой структуры, сформировавшейся целиком в имперском советском контексте. Эта элита отчуждена от национально-культурных традиций своих народов и ориентирована по инерции на сохранение экономико-политической зависимости от метрополии. Единственным исключением является Армения, где логика "постимперской

легитимности" была нарушена (в случае Нагорного Карабаха), и где, соответственно, сугубо национальные политические силы имеют больший вес, чем во всех остальных странах СНГ. Кроме того, Армения единственная моноэтническая республика из стран СНГ.

На первый взгляд, может сложиться впечатление, что принцип "постимперской легитимности" играет на руку РФ и Москве, так как создает предпосылки для сохранения влияния РФ в "ближнем зарубежье" и упрощает политико-экономические отношения с географическими соседями. Но на самом деле все обстоит несколько сложнее. Как и в случае "деколонизации" стран Третьего мира, распад Империи ослабляет геополитическое могущество метрополии, и часть колоний и доминионов переходят под неявный контроль другой, более сильной державы, которая использует систему "постимперской легитимности" в своих собственных целях. Яркий пример тому США, фактически захватившие под свое влияние большинство бывших английских, испанских, португальских, французских и голландских колоний в ходе процесса "деколонизации". Таким образом, на смену постсоветской "колониальной администрации" в странах СНГ может прийти (и приходит) иная "колониальная администрация", использующая в своих целях уже существующие искусственные структуры.

С другой стороны, "постимперская легитимность" и саму РФ ставит в один ряд с другими странами СНГ, коль скоро в данном случае полностью игнорируются национально-культурные, религиозные и этнические интересы русского народа, попадающего под абстрактные нормы "постимперского", чисто административного права и разбросанного по чуждым псевдогосударственным и квазинациональным образованиям. Останки имперской администрации в рамках РФ (партийно-бюрократический аппарат) оказываются столь же чуждыми национальному контексту русских, что и в других республиках, так как сама система Империи была построена на иных, чисто административных и экономических, а не национальных и культурных принципах. Русские, "освободившись" от республик, не получают свободу и самостоятельность, но теряют значительную часть своей национальной общности, сохраняют зависимое положение от остатков прежней номенклатуры и вдобавок подвергаются новой опасности попасть под влияние внешних политических сил более могущественных держав. Эта последняя опасность была не столь близкой в период существования Империи, но в качестве простой "региональной державы" РФ подвергается ей в полной мере.

Все эти соображения заставляют поставить под сомнение полезность в нынешних условиях принципа "постимперской легитимности", так как это в значительной степени противоречит русским национальным интересам.

Но какими же критериями следует руководствоваться в определении того, что является "русскими национальными интересами"? Кого взять в качестве главного субъекта, в отношении которого можно было бы определить, что выгодно, а что невыгодно? В каких категориях следует осмыслять сегодня Россию?

2.3 Русский народ – центр геополитической концепции

Развал Советской Империи, хрупкость и государственная несостоятельность новых политических образований на ее территории (включая РФ) заставляют искать более конкретную категорию для понимания "русских национальных интересов". Единственной органичной, естественной, исторически укорененной реальностью в этом вопросе может быть только русский народ.

Русский народ это историческая общность, имеющая все признаки полноценного и стабильного политического субъекта. Русский народ объединен этнически, культурно, психологически и религиозно. Но не только это является главным основанием для постановки его в центр геополитической концепции как субъекта политической и социальной стратегии. Русский народ, в отличие от многих других народов, сложился как носитель особой цивилизации, имеющей все отличительные черты самобытного и полноценного планетарно-исторического явления. Русский народ та цивилизационная константа, которая служила осью в создании не одного, а многих государств: от мозаики восточнославянских княжеств до Московской Руси, Петровской Империи и Советского блока. Причем эта константа и определяла преемственность и связь между образованиями, столь различными политически, социально, территориально и структурно. Русский народ не просто давал этническую базу для всех этих государственных формаций, он выражал в них особую цивилизационную идею, не похожую ни на какую другую. Не государство сформировало русскую нацию. Напротив, русская нация, русский народ экспериментировал в истории с различными типами государственных систем, по-разному выражая (в зависимости от обстоятельств) специфику своей уникальной миссии.

Русский народ безусловно принадлежит к числу мессианских народов. И как у всякого мессианского народа, у него есть универсальное, всечеловеческое значение, которое конкурирует не просто с иными национальными идеями, но с типами других форм цивилизационного универсализма. К.Леонтьев и русские евразийцы довольно полно развили эту идею.

Независимо от смут, переходных периодов и политических катаклизмов русский народ всегда сохранял свою мессианскую идентичность, а следовательно, всегда оставался политическим субъектом истории. После очередного государственного потрясения одна и та же древняя и могущественная русская сила создавала новые политические конструкции, облекая свой духовный порыв в новые геополитические формы. Причем, как только государственные конструкции развивались до критической черты, за которой брезжила окончательная утрата связи политической формы с национальным содержанием, наступали кризисы и катастрофы, вслед за чем начиналось новое геополитическое и социальное строительство, облечение цивилизационной миссии русского народа в новые образы и политические конструкции.

И на нынешнем переходном периоде именно русский народ должен быть взят в качестве главного политического субъекта, от которого и следует откладывать шкалу геополитических и стратегических, а также социально-экономических интересов России. Русский народ и есть сегодня Россия, но не как ясно очерченное государство, а как геополитическая потенция, реальная и конкретная с одной стороны, но еще не определившая свою новую государственную структуру ни ее идеологию, ни ее территориальные пределы, ни ее социально-политическое устройство.

Тем не менее "потенциальная Россия" сегодня имеет гораздо больше фиксированных характеристик, нежели эфемерные РФ или СНГ. Эти характеристики связаны напрямую с той цивилизационной миссией, в осуществлении которой состоит смысл бытия русского народа.

Во-первых, русский народ (= Россия), без сомнения, ответственен за контроль над северно-восточными регионами Евразии. Этот русский "Drang nach Osten und Norden" составляет естественный геополитический процесс русской истории в последние века, который не прекращался ни при каких политических катаклизмах. Макиндер называл

Россию "геополитической осью истории", и это совершенно справедливо, так как русский народ действительно традиционно тяготеет к цивилизационно му освоению всех тех внутриконтинентальных евразийских пространств, которые расположены в самом центре материковой массы. Отсюда можно заключить, что стратегические интересы русских неотделимы от просторов Северо-Восточной Евразии. В этом заключается фундаментальный принцип при определении реальных перспектив геополитики России (русского народа).

Во-вторых, русский народ (= Россия) наделен особым типом религиозности и культуры, которые резко отличаются от католико-протестантского Запада и от той постхристианской цивилизации, которая там развилась. В качестве культурной и геополитической антитезы России следует брать именно "Запад" как целое, а не просто одну из составляющих его стран. Современная западная цивилизация является универсалистски ориентированной: во всех ее отсеках существует особое культурное единство, основанное на специфическом решении главных философских и мировоззренческих проблем. Русский универсализм, фундамент русской цивилизации, радикально отличается от Запада во всех основных моментах. В некотором смысле, это две конкурирующие, взаимоисключающие друг друга модели, противоположные полюса. Следовательно, стратегические интересы русского народа должны быть ориентированы антизападно (что проистекает из императива сохранения русской цивилизационной идентичности), а в перспективе возможна и цивилизационная экспансия.

В-третьих, русский народ (= Россия) никогда не ставил своей целью создание моноэтнического, расово однородного государства. Миссия русских имела универсальный характер, и именно поэтому русский народ планомерно шел в истории к созданию Империи, границы которой постоянно расширялись, охватывая все больший и больший конгломерат народов, культур, религий, территорий, регионов. Считать планомерный и ярко выраженный "экспансионизм" русских исторической случайностью абсурдно. Этот "экспансионизм" составляет неотъемлемую часть исторического бытия русского народа и тесно сопряжен с качеством его цивилизационной миссии. Эта миссия несет в себе некий "общий знаменатель", который позволяет русским интегрировать в свою Империю самые различные культурные реальности. Однако "общий знаменатель" имеет свои особенности и применим только к тем народам, которые имеют определенную историческую специфику и культурное содержание, тогда как остальные народы (в частности, некоторые нации Запада) остаются глубоко чуждыми русскому универсализму (что исторически проявляется в неустойчивости и даже противоречивости русского политического влияния в Европе).

В-четвертых, русский народ (= Россия) исходит в своем бытии из еще более глобальной, "сотериологической" перспективы, которая в пределе имеет общепланетарное значение. Речь идет не о безграничном расширении "жизненного пространства" русских, но об утверждении особого "русского" типа мировоззрения, который акцентирован эсхатологически и претендует на последнее слово в земной истории. Это высшая сверхзадача нации как "богоносного народа".

Следовательно, теоретически нет на планете такого народа, такой культуры или такой территории, чья судьба и чей путь были бы безразличны русскому сознанию. Это проявляется в непоколебимой вере русских в финальное торжество Правды, Духа и Справедливости, причем не только в рамках русского государства, но и повсюду. Лишить русских этой эсхатологической веры равнозначно их духовному оскотлению. Русским есть дело до всего и до всех, и поэтому в последнем счете интересы русского народа не ограничиваются ни русским этносом, ни Русской Империей, ни даже всей Евразией. Этот

"трансцендентный" аспект русской нации необходимо учитывать при разработке будущей геополитической стратегии.

Очевидно, что в нынешних условиях и при общепринятых западных, светских, количественно-либеральных нормах юридического подхода не существует никакой объективной возможности не только правовым образом закрепить статус "русского народа" как самостоятельного политического субъекта, но даже ввести в юридический и дипломатический обиход такой термин, как "народ". Современное международное право (копирующее в основных чертах римское право) признает в качестве полноценных политических субъектов только государство и индивидуума .

И поэтому есть кодекс "прав государств" и "прав человека", тогда как само понятие "прав народа" отсутствует. Это неудивительно, так как светский и количественный подход не может принимать в расчет такие культурные духовные категории, как этнос, народ и т.д. Сходное количественное отношение характеризовало и советский строй, и "демократический" мир. А так как русский народ в актуальный период пребывает на территории, где действуют либо "постимперские", либо либерально-демократические принципы легитимности, ни о каком автоматическом признании политического статуса "народа" не может быть и речи. Следовательно, логика выяснения и защиты "русских национальных интересов" требует серьезных изменений в существующей юридической практике, и более того, радикального пересмотра этой практики в национальном ключе.

Такая трансформация была бы невозможна, если бы речь шла о каком-то одном народе, слабо развитом и технологически не оснащенном. В случае русских это, к счастью, не так. Сегодня у нас еще сохраняется возможность довольно независимых от остального мира политических преобразований, так как наличие у России стратегических видов вооружений позволяет в определенной степени противостоять давлению Запада. И здесь все зависит лишь от политической воли и решимости тех лиц, которые возьмут на себя ответственность за судьбы России и русского народа.

Как бы то ни было, первым шагом к выявлению "национальных интересов русского народа" является признание этого народа самостоятельным политическим субъектом , имеющим право самому решать, что ему выгодно, а что нет, и предпринимать в соответствии с этим геополитические, социально-экономические и стратегические шаги.

Глава 3. Россия немыслима без Империи

3.1 Отсутствие у русских "государства-нации"

Россия никогда не была аналогом тех "государств -наций", которые характерны для Европы нового времени и модель которых была спроецирована на Азию и Третий мир в целом в колониальную и постколониальную эпоху.

"Государство-нация" основывается на административном единстве и бюрократическом централизме, которые и формируют политическую общность, созданную государством и теснейшим образом связанную с государством. Вне всяких сомнений, впервые модель "государства-нации" сложилась в абсолютистской Франции, а потом была закреплена в якобинской революционной модели. "Государство-нация" изначально имело подчеркнутую светскую природу и представляло собой в первую очередь политическое единство. В такой концепции термин "нация" понимался как "совокупность граждан", а не как "народ" или "народы" в органическом, "холистском" смысле. Такой тип государства основан на этническом, конфессиональном и сословном нивелировании населения, на утверждении во всем обществе сходных юридических и процессуальных нормативов, не принимающих в расчет ни региональные, ни религиозные, ни расовые особенности. Номинально "государство-нация" может быть и монархическим, и демократическим, и социалистическим. Существенным элементом является в нем не специфика политического устройства, а понимание государства как административно-централизованной инстанции, поставленной надо всеми социально-этническими и культурно-религиозными различиями. Следует подчеркнуть, что "нация" в данном случае имеет чисто и исключительно политический смысл, резко отличающийся от того, который вкладывают в это понятие националисты.

"Государство-нация" исторически возникло в Европе в период окончательного распада имперского единства в результате уничтожения последних останков имперской системы, сохранившихся в форме феодальных региональных структур. "Государство-нация" по сути своей сопряжено с доминацией профанических, буржуазных ценностей, сводящих качественные социальные различия к упрощенной количественной административной структуре. "Государство-нация", как правило, управляется не "божественной идеей" (как теократия или Священная Империя), не "героической аристократической личностью" (как феодальная система), но "диктатурой закона" ("номократией"), что дает огромную власть правоведам и юридической бюрократии. Фактически, "государство-нация" является наиболее удобной для управления и наиболее количественно упорядоченной политической реальностью, так как все неколичественные, "нерациональные" факторы в ней сведены к минимуму.

В русской истории "государства-нации" так и не возникло. Когда в Европе начиная с XVIII века стала укореняться именно эта модель, Россия отчаянно сопротивлялась ей любыми путями. Царистский режим стремился сохранить максимально нетронутым именно имперскую структуру, хотя некоторые уступки европейскому образцу делались постоянно. Несмотря на проевропейские петровские реформы Российская Империя сохраняла и теократические элементы и аристократический принцип, а перевод иереев и представителей знати в разряд государственных бюрократов никогда не осуществлялся на практике до конца (в отличие от стран Западной Европы). Национальная стихия противилась такому перерождению Империи в "государство-нацию", что порождало регулярно волны спонтанной или сознательной реакции как со стороны народа, так и со

стороны элиты. Даже при одном и том же государе в России часто менялись реформистские и реакционные настроения, и от либеральных реформ часто обращались к мистическим реставрационистским проектам (ярче всего это проявилось в царствовании Александра I, основателя Священного Союза).

Лишь в начале XX века Россия вплотную подошла к реализации "государства-нации" по европейскому образцу. Однако и на этот раз процесс был сорван революционным всплеском, вобравшим в себя (пусть неосознан но) глубинный национальный протест против такого типа государственного устройства, в котором не было бы места проявлению духовной народной миссии. За модернистической риторикой большевизма русские смутно распознали свои собственные эсхатологические идеалы торжество Идеи, Справедливости, Правды. Советское государство воспринималось народом как строительство "Новой Империи", "царства Света", "обители духа", а не как создание наиболее рационального устройства администрирования и управления количественными единицами. Трагизм и фанатизм большевистских катаклизмов был вызван именно "идеальностью" задачи, а отнюдь не неспособностью к более "гуманной" и менее затратной организации людских ресурсов.

СССР не стал "государством-нацией", он был продолжателем сугубо имперских национальных традиций, облеченных в экстравагантные внешние формы и противопоставленных позднейшей царистской модели, скатывающейся к обычному буржуазному обществу, к "диктатуре закона". Советская Империя, как и любая политическая конструкция, знала три этапа "революционный этап" построения уникальной системы (Ленин юность), стабильный этап укрепления и расширения державы (Сталин зрелость) и этап развала и одряхления (Брежнев старость). Причем именно позднебрежневский период породил политико-административную структуру, ближе всего напоминающую бюрократический централизм типичного "государства-нации". В перестройку жизненный цикл всей этой советской формации закончился. Вместе с этим закончился и очередной этап национальной истории русского народа.

Важно отметить, что в русской истории существует такая закономерность: когда дело доходит до превращения России в "государство-нацию", следуют катастрофы, и на новом витке нация находит очередной (подчас довольно экстравагантный) способ ускользнуть от казалось бы неминуемой трансформации. Русские стремятся любой ценой избежать такого поворота событий, поскольку их политическая воля несовместима с узкими нормативами рационального и усредненного количественного существования в рамках бюрократически эффективного механизма. Русские готовы идти на немыслимые жертвы и лишения, лишь бы реализовывалась и развивалась национальная идея, великая русская мечта.

А границы этой мечты нация видит, по меньшей мере, в Империи.

3.2 Русские народ Империи

Не моноэтническое государство, не государство-нация, Россия почти изначально была потенциально имперским государством. Начиная с объединения славянских и угрофинских племен под Рюриком и до гигантских масштабов СССР и территорий под его влиянием русский народ неуклонно шел по пути политической и пространственной интеграции, имперостроительства и цивилизационной экспансии. При этом следует подчеркнуть, что русская экспансия имела именно цивилизационный смысл, и отнюдь не была утилитарной погоней за колониями или банальной борьбой за "жизненное пространство".

ство". Не нехватка этого "жизненного пространства" и не экономическая необходимость подвигала русский народ все более расширять свои границы на Восток, на Юг, на Север, на Запад. Недостаток земли никогда не служил истинной причиной русского имперостроительства. Русские расширялись как носители особой миссии, геополитическая проекция которой состояла в глубинном осознании необходимости объединения гигантских территорий евразийского материка.

Политическая целостность евразийского пространства имеет для русской истории совершенно самостоятельное значение. Можно сказать, что русские чувствуют ответственность за это пространство, за его состояние, за его связь, за его цельность и независимость. Макиндер справедливо считал Россию главной сухопутной державой современности, которая наследует геополитическую миссию Рима, Империи Александра Великого, Чингисхана и т.д. Это "географическая ось истории", которая просто не может не осуществлять своего геополитического предназначения независимо от внешних и преходящих факторов.

Русский народ настолько связан с геополитической реальностью, что само пространство, его переживание, его осознание, его духовное восприятие сформировало психологию народа, став одним из главнейших определений его идентичности, его сути.

Реальное земное пространство не является чисто количественной категорией. Климат, ландшафт, геология местности, водные пути и горные хребты активно участвуют в формировании этнического и, шире, цивилизационного типа. С точки зрения геополитики, цивилизация и ее специфика вообще строго детерминированы географией и с необходимостью подчиняются особым качественным законам. Русские сухопутный, континентальный, северно-евразийский народ, при этом культурная специфика нации такова, что ее "душа" максимально предрасположена к "открытости", к осуществлению "интегрирующей" функции, к тонкому и глубинному процессу выработки особой материковой, евразийской общности.

Культурный фактор является естественным дополнением чисто геополитической предопределенности России. Геополитическая миссия осознается на культурном уровне, и наоборот, культура осмысляет, оформляет и активизирует геополитический импульс. Пространство и культура две важнейших составляющих русского народа как народоимперостроителя по преимуществу. Не кровь, не раса, не административный контроль и даже не религия сделали из части восточных славян особую, ни с чем не сравнимую общность русский народ. Его сделали именно бескрайние евразийские просторы и предельная культурная, душевная открытость. Под знаком "пространства и культуры" были переосмыслены и этнические, и политические, и этические, и религиозные аспекты. Русские сложились, развились и вызрели как нация именно в Империи, в героике ее построения, в подвигах ее защиты, в походах за ее расширение. Отказ от имперостроительной функции означает конец существования русского народа как исторической реальности, как цивилизационного явления. Такой отказ есть национальное самоубийство.

В отличие от Рима (первого Рима), Москва, Россия имеют в своем имперском импульсе глубинный телеологический, эсхатологический смысл. Гегель развил интересную концепцию, что Абсолютная Идея в эсхатологической ситуации должна проявиться в окончательном, "осознанном" виде в форме прусского государства. Однако в планетарном масштабе Пруссия, и даже Германия, взятые отдельно, геополитически недостаточны для того, чтобы к этой концепции можно было бы относиться всерьез. Россия же, Третий Рим, и религиозно, и культурно, и пространственно, и стратегически прекрасно соответствует

подобному телеологическому взгляду на сущность истории и явно стремится исполнить именно эту миссию. Абсолютная Идея Гегеля в случае России есть духовный корень русского имперостроительства, тяготеющего к цивилизационному освоению континента Евразии. Нелепо прикладывать столь серьезные гегелевские критерии к "государству-нации", которое заведомо предполагает рядом с собой другие "государства-нации" со своими собственными целями, мифами и интересами. Сообщать такой относительной структуре качество абсолютной значимости довольно абсурдно. Но в случае гигантской Империи, основанной на специфических, во многом парадоксальных, а в чем-то и не совсем проясненных принципах совершенно другое дело, и не случайно древние Империи назывались "Священными Империями": качество "святости" сообщалось им исполнением особой духовной миссии, предначертательно прообразующей "Империю Конца", континентальное Царство Абсолютной Идеи.

Русский народ шаг за шагом двигался именно к этой цели. На каждом этапе расширения своего государства русские переходили на очередную ступень мессианского универсализма сначала сплотив восточных славян, потом включив в себя тюркский поток степей и Сибири, затем двинувшись на Юг, в пустыни и горы, и образовав, наконец, гигантский политический блок, контролирующий в советский период, буквально, полмира. Если осознать, что русский народ в своей сущности и есть этот имперостроительный процесс, волевой геополитический вектор создания "государства Абсолютной Идеи", то станет совершенно очевидным, что существование русского народа напрямую зависит от продолжения этого процесса, от его развития, от его интенсификации. Урезав или подавив этот вектор, мы поразим русских в самое сердце, лишим их национальной идентичности, превратим их в исторический рудимент, сорвем глобальный телеологический, эсхатологический планетарный процесс.

3.3 Ловушка "региональной державы"

Русский народ со своей цивилизационной и геополитической миссией традиционно являлся (и является) серьезной преградой для повсеместного распространения на планете сугубо либеральной модели западного образца. И царистский, и советский режимы, повинувшись неумолимой национальной логике, препятствовали культурно-политической экспансии Запада на Восток и особенно вглубь евразийского континента. Причем серьезность геополитического противостояния всегда отражалась в том, что Россия федерировала в себе и вокруг себя разные страны и народы в мощный стратегический имперский блок. Именно в качестве континентальной Империи Россия участвовала в мировой политике и отстаивала свои национальные и цивилизационные интересы.

В настоящее время, после распада СССР, Запад стремится навязать России другую геополитическую функцию, превратить Россию в такую политическую структуру, которая была бы неспособна напрямую участвовать в мировой политике и иметь широкую цивилизационную миссию. В докладе Пола Вольфовица американскому конгрессу в 1992 году однозначно утверждается, что "главной стратегической задачей США является недопущение создания на территории бывшего Советского Союза крупного и самостоятельного стратегического образования, способного проводить независимую от США политику". Именно исходя из такой насущной потребности Запада России была предложена роль "региональной державы".

"Региональная держава" это современная геополитическая категория, которая характеризует крупное и довольно развитое государство, чьи политические интересы, однако, ограничены лишь областями, непосредственно прилегающими к ее территории

или входящими в ее состав. Региональными державами считаются, к примеру, Индия, Иран, Турция, Пакистан, Китай и т.д. Специфика региональной державы состоит в том, что она имеет больший политический вес, чем обычное рядовое государство, но меньший вес, чем сверхдержава или Империя. Иными словами, региональная держава не имеет прямого влияния на планетарную цивилизацию и глобальные геополитические процессы, подчиняясь в основных стратегических линиях балансу сил более мощных Империй. В то же время региональная держава имеет определенную свободу по отношению к своим непосредственным (более слабым) соседям и может оказывать на них политическое и экономическое давление (естественно, лишь в тех случаях, когда это не противоречит интересам сверхдержав).

Статус "региональной державы", предложенный (навязываемый) сегодня России Западом, для русской нации равнозначен самоубийству. Речь идет о том, чтобы искусственно и под сильным внешним воздействием обратить вектор русской национальной истории вспять, в обратную сторону, оборвать связный процесс геополитического становления русских как Империи. Россия как региональная держава будет являть собой отказ от того глубинного импульса нации, который лежит в основе ее высшей и глубиннейшей идентичности. Потеря имперского масштаба для русских означает конец и провал их участия в цивилизации, поражение их духовной и культурной системы ценностей, падение их универсалистских и мессианских чаяний, обесценивание и развенчание всей национальной идеологии, оживлявшей многие поколения русского народа и дававшей силы и энергию для подвигов, созидания, борьбы, преодоления невзгод.

Если учитывать специфику национальной имперской самоидентификации русских, становится совершенно очевидно, что принятие статуса "региональной державы" Россией не может стать последней линией обороны. Удар, наносимый тем самым по национальному самосознанию русских, будет в таком случае настолько сильным, что дело не ограничится рамками РФ или аналогичным территориальным пространством. Потеряв свою миссию, русские не смогут найти сил, чтобы достойно утвердить свою новую, "умаленную" идентичность в "региональном государстве", так как утверждение этой идентичности невозможно в состоянии того аффекта, который логически возникает при утрате нацией имперского масштаба. Следовательно, процессы дезинтеграции, скорее всего, продолжатся и в "региональной державе", и нарастающей волне регионального и религиозного сепаратизма обездоленные русские уже ничего не смогут противопоставить.

Даже для того, чтобы зафиксировать "региональный статус" постимперской России, необходимо будет пробудить мощную волну национализма, причем национализм совершенно нового, искусственного, основанного на энергиях и идеях, ничего общего не имеющих с традиционной и единственно подлинной и оправданной русской имперской тенденцией. Можно сравнить это с малым, "светским" национализмом младотурков, которые на развалинах Османской Империи создали через "национальную революцию" современную Турцию, "региональную державу". Но национализм младотурков, не имел ничего общего с геополитическим и религиозным национализмом Османской Империи, и фактически, нынешняя Турция и духовно, и этнически, и культурно является совершенно другой реальностью, нежели турецкая Империя начала века.

То же самое, если не хуже, грозит и России, причем скорее всего попытки укрепиться как "региональная держава", отказавшаяся от цивилизационной миссии и универсалистских ценностей, вызовут к жизни политиков "младоросского" типа (по аналогии с младотурками), которые, весьма вероятно, будут исповедовать особую сектантскую идеологию, ничего общего не имеющую с магистральной линией русской национальной идеи. Такой русский "неимперский" национализм, светский и искусственный, будет

геополитически играть лишь на руку Западу, так как он закрепит за Россией "региональный" статус, приведет к иллюзорной и кратковременной внутренней стабилизации и одновременно заложит базу для будущих внутрироссийских этнических и религиозных конфликтов. Но если у Турции есть две или три крупные этнические общности, способные активно противиться младотурецкому централизму, то в РФ проживают сотни народов, прекрасно уживавшихся в имперской модели, но никак не вписывающихся в рамки "малого русского национализма". Вывод очевиден: Россия постепенно втянется в бесконечную цепь внутренних конфликтов и войн, и, в конце концов, распадется.

Это будет закономерным результатом утраты русскими своей имперской миссии, так как этот процесс не может ограничиться относительным урезыванием территорий и с необходимостью должен дойти до своего логического предела до полного уничтожения русской нации как исторического, геополитического и цивилизационного субъекта.

3.4 Критика советской государственности

Последней по счету формой имперской организации русского народа был СССР и зависевший от него геополитический ареал (страны Варшавского договора). В советский период сфера влияния русских расширилась географически до немыслимых ранее пределов. Освоение земель и военные походы включили в геополитическую зону русских огромные территории.

В пространственном смысле такая экспансия, казалось бы, должна представлять собой высшую форму русской государственности. И невозможно отрицать того факта, что осевой конструкцией советской Империи был именно русский народ, воплотивший свой специфический универсализм (по крайней мере, частично) в советскую идеологическую и социально-политическую модель.

Сегодня, на первый взгляд, представляется, что перспектива подлинного русского национального развития в нынешних условиях должна была бы совпадать с реставрацией СССР и воссозданием советской модели и советской государственности. Это отчасти верно и логично, и в данном случае некоммунистическое движение, ратующее за воссоздание СССР, более близко к пониманию геополитических интересов русского народа, отчетливее и яснее представляет сущность его стратегических и цивилизационных стремлений, чем некоторые неонационалистические круги, склоняющиеся к "младоросской" (по аналогии с "младотурецкой") модели "малого", "урезанного", "этнического" национализма. Безусловно, геополитический реставрационизм некоммунистов оправдан, и их национализм более органичен и "национален", нежели романтические и безответственные по форме (и подрывные по результатам) узконационалистические проекты славянофильского, православно-монархического или расистского крыла патриотов. Если бы выбор лежал между воссозданием СССР и построением моноэтнического или даже монокультурного великоросского государства, то в интересах русского народа логичнее и правильнее было бы выбрать проект СССР.

Однако причины распада СССР и крах советской Империи нуждаются в объективном анализе, который ни в коем случае не может быть сведен к выявлению внешнего (враждебного) и внутреннего (подрывного) влияния, т.е. к "теории заговора". Внешнее давление либерально-демократического Запада на СССР было действительно огромно, а деятельность "подрывных элементов" внутри страны крайне эффективна и слажена. Но оба эти фактора стали решающими только в такой ситуации, когда существование

советской Империи вошло в стадию внутреннего кризиса, имеющего глубокие и естественные причины, коренящиеся в самой специфике советского строя и советской системы. Без понимания этих внутренних причин распада и их анализа любые попытки реставрации СССР (и тем более создания Новой Империи) окажутся тщетными и бесперспективными. Более того, любая чисто инерциальная консервативность в этом вопросе может лишь еще ухудшить положение дел.

Выявим несколько факторов, приведших Советский Союз к геополитическому и социально-экономическому краху.

Во-первых, на идеологическом уровне за все время существования социалистического режима сугубо национальные, традиционные, духовные элементы так и не были введены в общий комплекс коммунистической идеологии. Будучи во многом национал-коммунистической де факто, она никогда не трансформировалась в таковую де юре, что препятствовало органичному развитию русско-советского общества, порождало двойной стандарт и идеологические противоречия, подтачивало ясность и осознанность в осуществлении геополитических и социально-политических проектов. Атеизм, материализм, прогрессизм, "просвещенческая этика" и т.д. были глубоко чужды русскому большевизму и русскому народу в целом. На практике эти заимствованные из марксизма положения (кстати, и в самом марксизме являющиеся довольно произвольными элементами некоей данью старомодному позитивистскому гуманизму в стиле Фейербаха) были осознаны русскими коммунистами в ключе народно-мистических, подчас неортодоксальных эсхатологических чаяний, а не как рационалистические плоды западно-европейской культуры. Однако идеология национал-большевизма, которая могла бы найти более адекватные, более русские термины для нового социально-политического строя, так и не была сформулирована. Следовательно, рано или поздно ограниченность и неадекватность такой идеологически противоречивой конструкции должна была сказаться негативным образом. Особенно это дало о себе знать в позднесоветский период, когда бессмысленный догматизм и коммунистическая демагогия окончательно задавили всякую идеологическую жизнь в обществе. Такое "застывание" правящей идеологии и упорный отказ от введения в нее органичных, национальных и естественных для русского народа компонентов, вылились в крах всей советской системы. Ответственность за это лежит не только на "агентах влияния" и "антисоветчиках", но, в первую очередь, на центральных советских идеологах как "прогрессивного", так и "консервативного" крыла. Советскую Империю и идеологически и фактически разрушили коммунисты. Воссоздать ее в той же форме и с той же идеологией сейчас не только невозможно, но и бессмысленно, так как даже гипотетически при этом будут воспроизведены те же предпосылки, которые уже один раз привели к разрушению государства.

Во-вторых, на геополитическом и стратегическом уровне СССР был неконкурентоспособен в долгой перспективе для сопротивления атлантическому западному блоку. С точки зрения стратегии, сухопутные границы являются намного более уязвимыми, чем морские, причем на всех уровнях (количество пограничных войск, стоимость военной техники, использование и размещение стратегических вооружений и т.д.) После Второй мировой войны СССР оказался в неравном положении по сравнению с капиталистическим блоком Запада, сгруппировавшимся вокруг США. У США была гигантская островная база (американский континент), полностью подконтрольная и окруженная со всех сторон океанами и морями, защищать которые не составляло большого труда. Плюс к этому США контролировали почти все береговые зоны на Юге и Западе Евразии, создавая гигантскую угрозу для СССР и оставаясь при этом практически вне досягаемости для потенциальных дестабилизирующих акций Советского Союза. Разделение Европы на Восточную (советскую) и Западную (американскую) только

осложнило геополитическое положение СССР на Западе, увеличив объем сухопутных границ и поставив вплотную к стратегическому потенциальному противнику, причем в ситуации пассивной враждебности самих европейских народов, оказавшихся в положении заложников в геополитической дуэли, смысл которой им был неочевиден. То же самое имело место и на южном направлении в Азии и на Дальнем Востоке, где СССР имел непосредственных соседей или контролируемую территорию на Западе (Пакистан, Афганистан, дохоемистский Иран) или довольно враждебные державы несоветско-социалистической ориентации (Китай). В этой ситуации СССР мог приобрести относительную устойчивость только в двух случаях: либо стремительно продвинувшись к океанам на Западе (к Атлантике) и на Юге (к Индийскому океану), либо создав в Европе и Азии нейтральные политические блоки, не находящиеся под контролем ни у одной из сверхдержав. Эту концепцию (нейтральной Германии) пытался предложить еще Сталин, а после его смерти Берия. СССР (вместе с Варшавским договором), с геополитической точки зрения, был слишком большим и слишком маленьким одновременно. Сохранение статус кво было на руку только США и атлантизму, так как при этом военные, промышленные и стратегические потенциалы СССР все больше изматывались, а мощь США, защищенного острова, все возрастала. Рано или поздно Восточный блок неизбежно должен был рухнуть. Следовательно, воссоздание СССР и Варшавского блока не только почти невозможно, но и не нужно, потому что это даже в случае (практически невероятного) успеха приведет лишь к возрождению заведомо обреченной геополитической модели.

В-третьих, административное устройство СССР основывалось на светском, чисто функциональном и количественном понимании внутригосударственного деления. Хозяйственный и бюрократический централизм не принимал в расчет ни региональных, ни тем более этнических и религиозных особенностей внутренних территорий. Принцип нивелирования и сугубо экономической структурализации общества привел к созданию таких жестких систем, которые подавляли, а в лучшем случае "консервировали" формы естественной национальной жизни различных народов, в том числе (и в большей степени) самого русского народа. Территориальный принцип действовал даже тогда, когда номинально речь шла о национальных республиках, автономиях или округах. При этом процесс регионально-этнической нивелировки становился все более отчетливым по мере "старения" всей советской политической системы, которая к своему последнему этапу все больше склонялась к типу советского "государства-нации", а не Империи. Национализм, который во многом способствовал созданию СССР на первых этапах, в конце стал чисто отрицательным фактором, так как чрезмерная централизация и унификация стали порождать естественные протест и недовольство. Атрофия имперского начала, окостенение бюрократического централизма, стремление к максимальной рационализации и чисто экономической продуктивности постепенно создали из СССР политического монстра, потерявшего жизнь и воспринимающегося как навязанный насильно тоталитаризм центра. Некоторые коммунистические тезисы буквально понятого "интернационализма" во многом ответственны за это. Следовательно, и этот аспект советской модели, оперирующий не с конкретными этносом, культурой, религией, а с абстрактными "населением" и "территорией" возрождать не следует ни в коем случае. Напротив, следует как можно скорее избавиться от последствий такого количественного подхода, чьи отголоски так трагично сказываются сегодня в вопросе Чечни, Крыма, Казахстана, Карабахского конфликта, Абхазии, Приднестровья и т.д.

В-четвертых, экономическая система в СССР основывалась на таком "длинном" социалистическом цикле, что постепенно отдача общества конкретному человеку перестала ощущаться вовсе. Предельная социализация и детальный контроль государства надо всеми экономическими процессами, вплоть до самых мельчайших, а также

делегирующие функции перераспределения лишь централизованной, чисто верхушечной, инстанции порождали в обществе климат социального отчуждения, апатии, незаинтересованности. Социализм и все его преимущества становились неочевидными, незаметными, отходили на задний план перед гигантской конструкцией бюрократически-государственной машины. Человек и конкретный коллектив терялись перед абстракцией "общества", и цикл социалистического распределения утрачивал связь с реальностью, превращался в необъяснимую, отчужденную и внешне произвольную логику бездушной машины. Не сам социализм ответственен за такое положение дел, но та его версия, которая исторически сложилась в СССР, особенно на поздних его этапах, хотя истоки такого вырождения следует искать уже в самой доктрине, в самой теории. Тоталитарный госсocialизм лишил экономику гибкости, людей энтузиазма и ощущения соучастия в созидательном процессе, способствовав развитию паразитического отношения к обществу, которое абсолютизировалось сегодня в мафиозно-либералистском настроении. За этот постсоветский эксцесс также ответственны коммунисты, которые оказались неспособны реформировать социализм применительно к национальной стихии и поддерживать в нем достойную жизнь.

Эти четыре основных аспекта бывшей советской модели являются главными факторами краха советской государственности, и именно они ответственны за распад советской Империи. Совершенно естественно, что при гипотетическом воссоздании СССР в этом отношении следует сделать радикальные выводы и в корне уничтожить те причины, которые уже один раз исторически обрекли великий народ на государственную катастрофу.

Однако, если восстановление СССР будет проходить под знаменами идеологии, отказавшейся от материализма, атеизма, тоталитаризма, государственного социализма, советского геополитического пространства, административного устройства, интернационализма, централизма и т.д., то правомочно ли вообще говорить об "СССР" или "советском государстве", о "коммунизме", "реставрации" и т.д.? Не будет ли правильнее назвать это созданием "Новой Империи"?

3.5 Критика царской государственности

Сегодня все чаще можно услышать призывы к возврату к царской, монархической модели. Это довольно закономерно, так как дискредитация советизма заставляет русских обратиться к тем формам государственности, которые существовали до коммунистического периода русской истории. Эта модель имеет некоторые позитивные и некоторые негативные стороны. Независимо от невероятной трудности реставрации докоммунистической государственной системы, этот проект обсуждается все более и более серьезно.

Учитывая историческую логику геополитического развития русской нации, имеет смысл говорить о поздних периодах правления Романовых, когда Россия вышла на рубежи своего максимального территориального имперского объема.

Наиболее позитивным в данном проекте является идеологическая основа царской России, где (пусть номинально) декларировалась верность национальному духу (Народность), религиозной истине (Православие) и традиционному сакральному политическому устройству (Самодержавие). Однако, по справедливому замечанию русских евразийцев, уваровская формула (Православие, Самодержавие, Народность) была в последние периоды царской России скорее идеалистическим лозунгом, нежели реальным

содержанием политической жизни и социального устройства. Русское Православие, потрясенное светскими реформами Петра, в этот период довольно далеко отстояло от идеала "Святой Руси", будучи фактически подчиненным государственному контролю и во многом утратив свой сакральный авторитет и гармоничность православной симфонии. Потеряв духовную независимость, Русская Церковь была вынуждена идти на компромисс со светской властью, воплощенной в подчиненном царю Синоде, и тем самым была ограничена в свободе подлинного исповедания неземных Истин.

Самодержавие, со своей стороны, все более утрачивало сакральное значение, вовлекаясь в решение чисто политических задач, подчас забывая о своей высшей миссии и религиозном предназначении. Хотя десакрализация царской власти никогда, вплоть до отречения последнего Императора, не доходила в России до уровня той пустой пародии, в которую превратились европейские монархии, в первую очередь, французская и английская, все же влияние Европы в этой области было очень велико.

И наконец, "Народность" знаменитого лозунга была скорее чисто декларативной, а сам народ пребывал в глубоком отчуждении от политической жизни, что проявилось, к примеру, в повальном безразличии к Февральской и позднее Октябрьской революциям, радикально разрушившим монархическую модель.

Прямая апелляция в наших условиях к реставрации этой триады, скорее всего, приведет к восстановлению того худосочного и в большей степени демагогического компромисса, который на практике скрывался за этими тремя принципами в позднеромановскую эпоху (в которую они и были, кстати, сформулированы). Более того, учитывая отсутствие однозначных претендентов на российский престол, нестабильное и неопределенное состояние нынешней Православной Церкви, а также абстрактное значение термина "народность" (под которым часто понимают лишь поверхностный, фольклорный стиль или вовсе подделку под народ фантазирующих интеллигентов), нетрудно предвидеть, что возврат к уваровской идеологии станет еще большей пародией, чем предреволюционный царский режим.

Царистская модель имеет кроме того серьезнейший геополитический изъян, точно так же приведший Российскую Империю к краху, как и СССР на семьдесят лет позднее.

Возврат к царистской и, следовательно, в целом "славянофильской" геополитике, таит в себе страшную угрозу. Дело в том, что в последние полвека царствования Романовых внешнюю политику правящего дома определяли не евразийские традиции Александра Первого и перспективы континентального Священного Союза (основанного на альянсе России и держав Средней Европы), но проанглийские и профранцузские проекты, ради которых Россия втягивалась в самоубийственные конфликты на стороне своих естественных геополитических противников и против своих естественных геополитических союзников. Поддержка сербских требований, безответственный миф о "Босфоре и Дарданеллах", вовлеченность в европейские антигерманские интриги французских масонов все это заставляло Россию выполнять политическую роль, не только ей не свойственную, но прямо для нее губительную. Пытаясь на славянофильской основе обосноваться в Восточной Европе и постоянно втягиваясь в конфликт со среднеевропейскими державами (природными союзниками России), царский режим планомерно подтачивал основы русского государства, прямолинейно вел Россию к геополитическому самоубийству. К этому же относятся и турецкие войны, и война с Японией. Парадоксально, но кажется, что Россия стремилась наилучшим образом услужить атлантистским интересам прогрессистской Франции и колониально-капиталистической Англии вместо того, чтобы выполнять свою естественную

евразийскую миссию и искать союза со всеми сходными (и политически и духовно) консервативными и имперскими режимами. Славянофильская геополитическая утопия стоила России Царя, Церкви и Империи, и только приход евразийски ориентированных большевиков спас тогда страну и народ от тотальной деградации, от превращения в "региональную державу".

Попытка следовать такой позднеимперской, "славянофильской" линии в наших условиях не может не привести к схожему результату. И даже сама апелляция к дореволюционной России несет в себе потенциально самоубийственные политические мотивы, намного более опасные для русского народа, нежели проекты советской реставрации.

Есть еще один фактор, который является крайне опасным в случае монархических тенденций. Речь идет о той капиталистической форме экономики, которая была присуща России на рубеже XIX-XX веков. Хотя это было вариацией национального капитализма, ограниченного государственными, социальными и культурными рамками, а не "диким" свободным рынком, эффект экономического отчуждения, свойственный любому капитализму, был крайне силен. Русский буржуа прочно занял место государственной и военной аристократии, духовного сословия, потеснив чиновничество и служащих. Этот тип русского буржуа (довольно отличный от представителей традиционного, докапиталистического, феодального купечества) фактически противостоял культурным, социальным и этическим нормам, которые являлись сущностью системы русских национальных ценностей. Воспринявший уроки английского экономического либерализма, почувствовавший вкус финансовых и биржевых спекуляций, ловко использующий экономическую неэффективность все еще скованной кодексом чести русской аристократии, русский буржуа вышел на передний план русской политической жизни, прекрасно вписавшись в общую картину лубочной монархической псевдопатриархальности, утратившей все свое жизненное, сакральное содержание. Именно русские капиталисты (причем очень часто националистической, "черносотенной" ориентации) стали первыми проводниками английского и французского влияния в России, естественными агентами той атлантистской торговой модели, которая развилась и оформилась в англосаксонском и французском обществах.

Позднеимперский государственный строй это сочетание десакрализованно-монархического фасада, самоубийственной славянофильской геополитики и атлантистски ориентированного рыночного капитализма. Во всех случаях национальная риторика была лишь ширмой и фигурой речи, за которой стояли политико-социальные тенденции, не просто далекие от истинных интересов русского народа, но прямо противоположные этим интересам.

Еще один элемент этой модели является довольно сомнительным это принцип губернского административного деления Российской Империи. Хотя на практике это не мешало свободному развитию народов, входивших в состав Российской Империи, и в нормальном случае русские только помогали этносам образовать и развить свою специфическую культуру, юридическое непризнание культурно-этнических и религиозных автономий, некоторый жесткий государственный нивелирующий централизм были не лучшими методами вовлечения наций в единое и свободное континентальное имперостроительство. Элементы "государства-нации" проявились в последние периоды Романовых точно так же, как и в последние десятилетия СССР, и эффект этого был весьма схожим отчуждение этносов от Москвы (Санкт-Петербурга) и русских, сепаратистские настроения, всплеск "малого национализма" и т.д. И как ответная

реакция следовало вырождение великой русской мессианской воли в банальный национал-шовинизм.

В монархической России позитивной была именно культурно-религиозная сторона, номинальная верность сакральным традициям, память об идеале Святой Руси, Священном Царстве, о Москве Третьем Риме. Православная Церковь как оплот догматической Истины, симфония Самодержавия, осознание исторической миссии богоносного русского народа суть духовные символы истинной Русской Империи, которые имеют архетипическую, непреходящую ценность, которую, однако, следует очистить от формализма, демагогии и фарисейского налета. Но противоестественная геополитика, податливость к капитализации, недооценка этнического и религиозного фактора у малых внутриимперских народов, антигерманская, антияпонская и антиосманская ориентация Империи поздних Романовых все это должно быть осознано как тупиковый политический путь, не имеющий ничего общего с подлинными интересами русского народа, что и было доказано историческим крахом этой модели.

3.6 К новой Евразийской Империи

На основании предшествующих соображений можно сделать определенные выводы касательно перспективы грядущей Империи как единственной формы достойного и естественного существования русского народа и единственной возможности довести до конца его историческую и цивилизационную миссию.

1. Грядущая Империя не должна быть "региональной державой" или "государством-нацией". Это очевидно. Но следует особенно подчеркнуть, что такая Империя никогда не сможет стать продолжением, развитием региональной державы или государства-нации, так как подобный промежуточный этап нанесет непоправимый ущерб глубинной национальной имперской тенденции, вовлечет русский народ в лабиринт неразрешимых геополитических и социальных противоречий, а это, в свою очередь, сделает невозможным планомерное и последовательное, логичное имперостроительство.

2. Новая Империя должна строиться сразу именно как Империя, и в основание ее проекта должны уже сейчас быть заложены полноценные и развитые сугубо имперские принципы. Нельзя отнестись к процессу к далекой перспективе, надеясь на благоприятные условия в будущем. Для создания великой Русской Империи таких условий не будет никогда, если уже сейчас народ и политические силы, стремящиеся выступать от его имени, не утвердят сознательно и ясно своей фундаментальной государственной и геополитической ориентации. Империя не просто очень большое государство. Это нечто совсем иное. Это стратегический и геополитический блок, превосходящий параметры обычного государства, это Сверхгосударство. Практически никогда обычное государство не развивалось в Империю. Империи строились сразу как выражение особой цивилизационной воли, как сверхцель, как гигантский мироустроительный импульс. Поэтому уже сегодня следует определенно сказать: не Русское Государство, но Русская Империя. Не путь социально-политической эволюции, но путь геополитической Революции.

3. Геополитические и идеологические контуры Новой Империи русских должны определяться на основе преодоления тех моментов, которые привели к краху исторически предшествующих имперских форм. Следовательно, Новая Империя должна: быть не материалистической, не атеистической, не экономикоцентристской;

- a) иметь либо морские границы, либо дружественные блоки, на прилегающих континентальных территориях;
 - b) обладать гибкой и дифференцированной этнорелигиозной структурой внутреннего политико-административного устройства, т.е. учитывать локальные, этнические, религиозные, культурные, этические и т.д. особенности регионов, придав этим элементам юридический статус;
 - c) сделать участие государства в управлении экономикой гибким и затрагивающим только стратегические сферы, резко сократить социальный цикл, добиться органического соучастия народа в вопросах распределения;
- (Эти первые четыре пункта вытекают из анализа причин краха Советской Империи.)
- d) наполнить религиозно-монархическую формулу истинно сакральным содержанием, утраченным под влиянием светского Запада на романовскую династию, осуществить православную "консервативную революцию", чтобы вернуться к истокам подлинного христианского мировоззрения;
 - e) превратить термин "народность" из уваровской формулы в центральный аспект социально-политического устройства, сделать Народ главной, основополагающей политической и правовой категорией, противопоставить органическую концепцию Народа количественным нормам либеральной и социалистической юриспруденции, разработать теорию "прав народа";
 - f) вместо славянофильской геополитики обратиться к евразийским проектам, отвергающим антигерманскую политику России на Западе и антияпонскую на Востоке, покончить с атлантистской линией, замаскированной под "русский национализм";
 - g) воспрепятствовать процессам приватизации и капитализации, а также биржевой игре и финансовым спекуляциям в Империи, ориентироваться на корпоративный, коллективный и государственный контроль народа над экономической реальностью, отбросить сомнительную химеру "национального капитализма";
 - h) вместо губернского принципа перейти к созданию этнорелигиозных областей с максимальной степенью культурной, языковой, экономической и юридической автономии, строго ограничив их в одном в политическом, стратегическом, геополитическом и идеологическом суверенитете.

(Эти пять пунктов вытекают из критики царистской модели.)

Строители Новой Империи должны активно противостоять "младоросским" тенденциям в русском национализме, стремящимся к закреплению за Россией статуса "государства-нации", а также со всеми ностальгическими политическими силами, содержащими в своих геополитических проектах апелляцию к тем элементам, которые уже приводили Империю к катастрофе.

Существование русского народа как органической исторической общности немыслимо без имперостроительного, континентального созидания. Русские останутся народом только в рамках Новой Империи.

Эта Империя, по геополитической логике, на этот раз должна стратегически и пространственно превосходить предшествующий вариант (СССР). Следовательно, Новая Империя должна быть евразийской, великоконтинентальной, а в перспективе Мировой.

Битва за мировое господство русских не закончилась.

Глава 4. Передел мира

4.1 Суша и море. Общий враг

Новая Империя, которую предстоит создавать русскому народу, имеет свою внутреннюю геополитическую логику, вписанную в естественную структуру географического пространства планеты.

Основной геополитический закон, сформулированный яснее всего Макиндером, гласит, что в истории постоянным и основным геополитическим процессом является борьба сухопутных, континентальных держав (с естественной формой идеократического политического устройства) против островных, морских государств (торгового, рыночного, экономического строя). Это извечное противостояние Рима Карфагену, Спарты Афинам, Англии Германии и т.д. С начала XX века это противостояние двух геополитических констант стало приобретать глобальный характер. Морским, торговым полюсом, втягивающим в свою орбиту все остальные страны, стали США, а сухопутным полюсом Россия. После Второй мировой войны две сверхдержавы окончательно распределили цивилизационные роли. США стратегически поглотили Запад и прибрежные территории Евразии, а СССР объединил вокруг себя гигантскую континентальную массу евразийских пространств. С точки зрения геополитики как науки, в холодной войне нашло свое выражение древнее архетипическое противостояние Моря и Суши, плутократии и идеократии, цивилизации торговцев и цивилизации героев (дуализм "героев и торгашей", по выражению Вернера Зомбарта, автора одноименной книги).

Распад Восточного блока, а затем и СССР нарушил относительный геополитический баланс в пользу атлантизма, т.е. Западного блока и рыночной цивилизации в целом. Однако геополитические тенденции представляют собой объективный фактор, и упразднить их волюнтаристическим, "субъективным" способом не представляется возможным. Тенденции Суши, континентальные импульсы не могут быть отменены в одностороннем порядке, и следовательно, создание новой сухопутной, восточной, континентальной Империи является потенциальной геополитической неизбежностью.

Атлантический, морской, торговый полюс цивилизации сегодня, безусловно, предельно силен и могуществен, но объективные факторы делают континентальную реакцию Востока практически неотвратимой. Сухопутная Империя потенциально существует всегда и ищет лишь удобных обстоятельств, чтобы реализоваться в политической реальности.

На ясном осознании этой геополитической неизбежности должна строиться Новая Империя. В этой Империи естественной ключевой функцией будут обладать именно русские, так как они контролируют те земли, которые являются осевыми в евразийской континентальной массе. Новая Империя не может быть никакой иной, кроме как Русской, поскольку и территориально, и культурно, и цивилизационно, и социально-экономически, и стратегически русские естественно и органично соответствуют этой планетарной миссии и идут к ее осуществлению на всем протяжении своей национальной и государственной истории. Русские земли Макиндер называл "географической осью истории", т.е. тем пространством, вокруг которого создавалась береговая цивилизация Евразии (отождествляющаяся часто с "цивилизацией" вообще) под влиянием диалектического противостояния морских (внешних) и сухопутных (внутренних) культурно-политических импульсов. Какой-то другой народ или какая-то другая страна

сможет выступать в роли полюса евразийской континентальной Империи, только захватив контроль над совокупностью русских земель, а для этого необходимо выполнить практически невероятное условие уничтожить русский народ, стереть с лица земли русскую нацию. Так как это представляется маловероятным, русским надо признать, осознать и взять на себя в очередной раз сложную роль центра Евразийской Империи.

В основу геополитической конструкции этой Империи должен быть положен фундаментальный принцип принцип "общего врага". Отрицание атлантизма, отвержение стратегического контроля США и отказ от верховенства экономических, рыночно-либеральных ценностей вот та общая цивилизационная база, тот общий импульс, что откроют путь прочному политическому и стратегическому союзу, создадут осевой костяк грядущей Империи. Подавляющее большинство евразийских государств и народов имеют континентальную, "сухопутную" специфику национальной истории, государственных традиций, экономической этики. Подавляющее большинство этих государств и народов воспринимает американское политическое и стратегическое влияние как непосильное бремя, отчуждающее нации от их исторической судьбы. Несмотря на все внутренние цивилизационные, религиозные и социально-экономические различия евразийских держав между собой у них есть прочный и непоколебимый "общий знаменатель" неприязнь к тотальности атлантистского контроля, желание освободиться от заокеанской опеки того Торгового Строя, который усиленно насаждается США, оплотом "морской" цивилизации.

Различия в региональных интересах евразийских государств, в религиозной, этнической, расовой и культурной ориентации все это немаловажные факторы, с которыми нельзя не считаться. Однако о них можно говорить всерьез и полновесно только тогда, когда исчезнет удушающее экономическое и стратегическое влияние "общего врага", навязывающего ту модель, которая чужда практически всем и христианам, и социалистам, и мусульманам, и национал-капиталистам, и буддистам, и коммунистам, и индуистам. Пока же доминирование США сохраняется, все внутриевразийские конфликты и противоречия носят искусственный характер, так как подобное выяснение отношений имеет смысл лишь при отсутствии более глобального фактора, который, на практике, организует и контролирует эти конфликты с целью поддержать в Евразии разобщенность и дробление. В этом смысле все "региональные державы" в Евразии логически служат интересам атлантистов, так как, будучи не в состоянии оказать им масштабное сопротивление (а это возможно только в имперском стратегическом контексте), они целиком зависят от единственной Сверхдержавы и направляют свою энергию на соседей только с санкции заокеанских властителей.

"Общий враг", атлантизм, должен стать связующим компонентом новой геополитической конструкции. Эффективность этого фактора не подлежит сомнению, а все доводы против этого соображения либо наивно не учитывают объективной серьезности и тотальности атлантистской доминации, либо сознательно отвлекают геополитическое внимание от единственной ответственной и реалистической перспективы в пользу второстепенных региональных проблем, вообще не имеющих никакого решения без учета глобальной расстановки сил.

Евразии предопределено географическое и стратегическое объединение. Это строго научный геополитический факт. В центре такого объединения неминуемо должна стоять Россия. Движущей силой объединения неизбежно должен быть русский народ. С этой миссией полностью гармонирует и цивилизационная миссия русских, и их универсалистский идеал, и логика исторического становления нации и государства. Новая Евразийская Империя вписана в географическую и политическую предопределенность

мировой истории и мировой геополитики. Спорить с этим обстоятельством бессмысленно. Интересы русского народа неотделимы от построения такой континентальной конструкции.

Евразийская геополитика Новой Империи не просто географическая абстракция или выражение гипотетической воли к безграничной экспансии. Ее принципы и основные направления учитывают и геополитические константы, и актуальную политическую ситуацию, и реально существующие международные тенденции, и стратегический баланс сил, и экономико-ресурсные закономерности. Поэтому евразийский имперский проект несет в себе одновременно несколько измерений культурное, стратегическое, историческое, экономическое, политическое и т.д. Важно с самого начала подчеркнуть, что в том или ином "осевом" геополитическом альянсе при создании Империи речь идет о совершенно разной степени интеграции в зависимости от уровня. В одном случае может быть культурное или этническое сближение, в другом религиозное, в третьем экономическое. Эти вопросы имеют в каждом конкретном случае особое решение. Единственной универсальной интегрирующей реальностью в будущей Евразийской Империи станет категорический императив стратегического объединения, т.е. такого геополитического альянса, который позволит по всем стратегическим направлениям эффективно противостоять атлантическим влияниям, американскому геополитическому давлению и политико-экономическому диктату.

Стратегическое объединение континента, о котором идет речь, должно обеспечить контроль над морскими границами Евразии по всем сторонам света, континентальную экономическую, промышленную и ресурсную автаркию, централизованное управление евразийскими вооруженными силами. Все остальные аспекты внутриевразийской интеграции будут решаться на основании гибких, дифференцированных принципов в зависимости от каждого конкретного случая. Это фундаментальное соображение необходимо постоянно иметь в виду, чтобы избежать необоснованных сомнений и возражений, могущих возникнуть в том случае, если вместо стратегического объединения кто-то ошибочно полагает, что дело касается политического, этнического, культурного, религиозного или экономического объединения. Кстати, такую подмену с необходимостью будут вполне сознательно осуществлять представители "малого национализма" всех народов, упрекая евразийцев и континентальных имперостроителей в том, что они хотят растворить свои этносы, религии, культуры и т.д. в новой "интернационалистской утопии". Евразийский проект никоим образом не ведет к нивелировке наций, напротив, он исходит из необходимости сохранения и развития идентичности народов и культур, только при этом в нем речь идет не о безответственных романтических грезах "малых националистов" (которые на практике приводят лишь к шовинизму и самоубийственным этническим конфликтам), но о серьезном и объективном понимании актуальной ситуации, где достичь этой цели можно лишь при условии радикального подрыва мирового влияния атлантического Запада с его рыночной, либеральной идеологией, претендующей на мировое господство.

Теперь остается лишь выяснить специфику этого континентального проекта, учитывая те негативные факторы, которые сорвали в предшествующие периоды осуществление этого грандиозного цивилизационного плана.

4.2 Западная ось: Москва Берлин. Европейская Империя и Евразия

На Западе Новая Империя имеет прочный геополитический плацдарм, которым является Средняя Европа.

Средняя Европа представляет собой естественное геополитическое образование, объединенное стратегически, культурно и отчасти политически. Этнически в это пространство входят народы бывшей Австро-Венгерской Империи, а также Германия, Пруссия и часть польских и западно-украинских территорий. Консолидирующей силой Средней Европы традиционно является Германия, объединяющая под своим контролем этот геополитический конгломерат.

Средняя Европа по естественно-географическим и историческим соображениям имеет ярко выраженный "сухопутный", континентальный характер, противостоящий "морским", "атлантическим" пространствам Западной Европы. В принципе, политическое влияние Средней Европы может распространяться и южнее в Италию и Испанию, чему было много исторических прецедентов. Геополитической столицей Средней Европы логичнее всего считать Берлин как символ Германии, являющейся, в свою очередь, символом и центром всего этого образования. Только Германия и немецкий народ обладают всеми необходимыми качествами для эффективной интеграции этого геополитического региона исторической волей, прекрасно развитой экономикой, привилегированным географическим положением, этнической однородностью, сознанием своей цивилизационной миссии. Сухопутная и идеократическая Германия традиционно противостояла торгово-морской Англии, и специфика этого геополитического и культурного противостояния заметно затронула европейскую историю, особенно после того, как немцам удалось наконец создать свое собственное государство.

Англия геополитически является наименее европейским государством, чьи стратегические интересы традиционно противоположны среднеевропейским державам и, шире, континентальным тенденциям в Европе. Однако параллельно усилению роли США и захвату ими практически полного контроля над английскими колониями стратегическая роль Англии значительно уменьшилась, и сегодня в Европе эта страна выступает, скорее как экстерриториальная плавающая база США, чем как самостоятельная сила. Как бы то ни было, в пределах Европы Англия является наиболее враждебным континентальным интересам страной, антиподом Средней Европы, а следовательно, Новая Евразийская Империя имеет в ее лице политического, идеологического и экономического противника. Вряд ли будет возможно волевым образом переломить цивилизационный путь этой специфической страны, создавшей в свое время гигантскую торгово-колонизационную империю чисто "морского" типа и столь способствовавшей появлению всей современной западной цивилизации, основанной на торговле, количестве, капитализме, спекуляции и биржевой игре. Это совершенно нереально, и поэтому в евразийском проекте Англия станет с неизбежностью "козлом отпущения", так как европейские процессы континентальной интеграции будут с необходимостью проходить не просто без учета английских интересов, но даже в прямой противоположности к этим интересам. В данном контексте немалую роль должна сыграть европейская и, шире, евразийская поддержка ирландского, шотландского и уэльского национализма, вплоть до поощрения сепаратистских тенденций и политической дестабилизации Великобритании.

Другим противоречивым геополитическим образованием является Франция. Во многом французская история носила атлантический характер, противостоящий континентальным и среднеевропейским тенденциям. Франция была основным историческим противником Австро-Венгерской Империи, всячески поддерживала раздробленное состояние немецких княжеств, тяготея к "прогрессизму" и "централизму" антитрадиционного и противоестественного типа. Вообще, с точки зрения подрыва европейской континентальной традиции, Франция всегда была в авангарде, и во многих случаях французская политика отождествлялась с самым агрессивным атлантизмом. По крайней

мере, так дело обстояло до тех пор, пока США не взяли на себя планетарной функции главного полюса атлантизма.

Во Франции существует и альтернативная геополитическая тенденция, восходящая к континентальной линии Наполеона (которого еще Гете воспринимал как вождя сухопутной интеграции Европы) и ярко воплотившаяся в европейской политике де Голля, искавшего альянса с Германией и создания независимой от США европейской конфедерации. Отчасти эта же линия вдохновляла и франко-германские проекты Миттерана. Как бы то ни было, гипотетически можно представить себе такой поворот событий, что Франция признает верховенство фактора Средней Европы и добровольно пойдет на соучастие в геополитическом европейском блоке с антиамериканской и континентальной ориентацией. Территория Франции является необходимым компонентом евразийского блока на Западе, так как от этого напрямую зависит контроль над атлантическим побережьем, и соответственно, безопасность Новой Империи на западных рубежах. Франко-германский союз в любом случае является главным звеном евразийской геополитики на континентальном Западе при том условии, что приоритетными здесь будут интересы Средней Европы, именно ее автаркия и геополитическая независимость. Такой проект известен под названием "Европейской Империи". Интеграция Европы под эгидой Германии как основа такой Европейской Империи идеально вписывается в евразийский проект и является наиболее желательным процессом в деле более глобальной континентальной интеграции.

Все тенденции к европейскому объединению вокруг Германии (Средней Европы) будут иметь положительный смысл только при соблюдении одного фундаментального условия создания прочной геополитической и стратегической оси Москва Берлин. Сама по себе Средняя Европа не обладает достаточным политическим и военным потенциалом для того, чтобы получить действительную независимость от атлантистского контроля США. Более того, в нынешних условиях трудно ожидать от Европы подлинного геополитического и национального пробуждения без революционного воздействия русского фактора. Европейская Империя без Москвы и, шире, Евразии не только не способна полноценно организовать свое стратегическое пространство при дефиците военной мощи, политической инициативы и природных ресурсов, но и в цивилизационном смысле не имеет ясных идеалов и ориентиров, так как влияние Торгового Строя и рыночных либеральных ценностей глубоко парализовало основы национального мировоззрения европейских народов, подорвало их исторические органические системы ценностей. Европейская Империя станет полноценной геополитической и цивилизационной реальностью только под воздействием новой идеологической, политической и духовной энергии из глубин континента, т.е. из России. Кроме того, только Россия и русские смогут обеспечить Европе стратегическую и политическую независимость и ресурсную автаркию. Поэтому Европейская Империя должна формироваться именно вокруг Берлина, находящегося на прямой и жизненной оси с Москвой.

Евразийский импульс должен исходить исключительно из Москвы, передавая цивилизационную миссию (при соответствующей адаптации к европейской специфике) русским Берлину, а тот, в свою очередь, приступит к европейской интеграции по принципам и проектам, вдохновленным глубинным геополитическим континентальным импульсом. Залог адекватности Европейской Империи заключается в однозначном преобладании русофильских тенденций в самой Германии, как это понимали лучшие немецкие умы от Мюллера ван ден Брука до Эрнста Никиша, Карла Хаусхофера и Йордиса фон Лохаузена. И как продолжение такого геополитического русофильства остальная Европа (и в первую очередь, Франция) должна следовать германофильской

ориента ции. Только при таких условиях западный вектор Евразийской Империи будет адекватным и прочным, стратегически обеспеченным и идеологически последовательным. Но следует признать, что никакое иное объединение Европы просто невозможно без глубинных противоречий и внутренних расколов. К примеру, нынешнее объединение Европы под американским, натовским контролем очень скоро даст почувствовать всю свою геополитическую и экономическую противоречивость, а следовательно, оно неминуемо будет или сорвано, или приостановлено, или спонтанно приобретет неожиданное, антиамериканское (и потенциально евразийское) измерение, которое предвидел Жан Тириар.

Важно сразу подчеркнуть, что объединение Европы вокруг Германии должно учитывать крупные политические просчеты предыдущих попыток, и в первую очередь, провал эпопеи Гитлера и Третьего Рейха. Геополитическое объединение Европы вокруг Средней Европы (Германии) ни в коем случае не должно подразумевать этнической доминанции немцев или создания централизованной структуры якобинского толка в виде гигантского Немецкого Государства. По словам Тириара, "главная ошибка Гитлера в том, что он хотел сделать Европу немецкой, в то время, как он должен был стремиться сделать ее европейской". Этот тезис остается совершенно актуальным и на сегодняшнем этапе, и вообще может относиться ко всем неоимперским процессам, в том числе и в России. Европейская Империя, организованная вокруг Германии, должна быть именно европейской, свободной от этнической и лингвистической доминанции какого-то одного народа. Чтобы быть геополитическим сердцем Европы, Германия должна приобрести сверхнациональный, цивилизационный, собственно имперский характер, отказавшись от противоречивых и невыполнимых попыток создания расово однородного "государствования". Европейские народы должны быть равными партнерами в строительстве западного плацдарма Евразии и адаптировать общий имперский импульс к своей собственной национальной и культурной специфике. Европейская Империя должна не подавлять европейские нации, не подчинять их немцам или русским, но, напротив, освобождать их из-под гнета количественной, потребительской, рыночной цивилизации, пробуждать их глубинные национальные энергии, возвращать их в лоно истории как самостоятельных, живых и полноценных политических субъектов, чья свобода будет гарантирована стратегической мощью всей Евразии.

Создание оси Берлин-Москва как западной несущей конструкции Евразийской Империи предполагает несколько серьезных шагов в отношении стран Восточной Европы, лежащих между Россией и Германией. Традиционная атлантистская политика в этом регионе основывалась на макиндеровском тезисе о необходимости создания здесь "санитарного кордона", который служил бы конфликтной буферной зоной, предотвращающей возможность русско-германского союза, жизненно опасного для всего атлантистского блока. С этой целью Англия и Франция стремились всячески дестабилизировать восточно-европейские народы, внушить им мысль о необходимости "независимости" и освобождения от германского и русского влияний. Кроме того дипломатический потенциал атлантистов любыми способами стремился укрепить русофобские настроения в Германии и германофобские в России, чтобы втянуть обе эти державы в локальный конфликт по разделу сфер влияния на промежуточных пространствах в Польше, Румынии, Сербии, Венгрии, Чехословакии, Прибалтике, на Западной Украине и т.д. Ту же линию преследуют и нынешние стратеги НАТО, выдвигая идею создания "черноморско-балтийской федерации" государств, которая была бы непосредственно связана с атлантизмом и потенциально враждебна как России, так и Германии.

Создание оси Берлин-Москва предполагает первым делом срыв организации в Восточной Европе "санитарного кордона" и активную борьбу с носителями русофобии в Германии и

германофобии в России. Вместо того, чтобы руководствоваться региональными интересами в зоне обоюдных влияний и поддерживать в одностороннем порядке политически и этнически близкие народы этого региона, Россия и Германия должны все спорные вопросы решать совместно и заранее, выработав общий план перераспределения географии влияния в этом регионе, а затем жестко пресекать все локальные инициативы восточноевропейских наций по пересмотру русско-германских планов. При этом главное, к чему надо стремиться, это категорическое устранение всякого подобия "санитарного кордона", заведомое развеяние иллюзий промежуточных государств относительно их потенциальной независимости от геополитически могущественных соседей. Необходимо создать непосредственную и ясную границу между дружественными Россией и Средней Европой (Германией), и даже в перспективе создания единого стратегического блока по оси Берлин-Москва эта граница должна сохранять свое геополитическое значение как лимит культурной, этнической и религиозной однородности, чтобы заведомо исключить этническую или конфессиональную экспансию на пограничных пространствах. Русско-украинские, русско-прибалтийские, русско-румынские, русско-польские и т.д. отношения должны изначально рассматриваться не как двухсторонние, но как трехсторонние с участием Германии. То же самое касается и отношений между Германией и восточноевропейскими странами (народами); они также должны носить тройственный характер с обязательным участием русской стороны (и с исключением во всех случаях постороннего, атлантистского, американского вмешательства). Например, немецко-украинские отношения должны с необходимостью быть немецко-русско-украинскими; немецко-прибалтийские немецко-русско-прибалтийскими; немецко-польские немецко-русско-польскими и т.д.

Ось Москва-Берлин поможет решить целый комплекс важнейших проблем, с которыми сталкиваются сегодня и Россия и Германия. Россия в таком альянсе получает прямой доступ к высоким технологиям, к мощным инвестициям в промышленность, приобретает гарантированное соучастие Европы в экономическом подъеме русских земель. При этом экономической зависимости от Германии ни в коем случае не наступит, так как Германия будет соучаствовать в России не как благотворительная сторона, а как равноправный партнер, получающий взамен от Москвы стратегическое прикрытие, гарантирующее Германии политическое освобождение от доминации США и ресурсную независимость от энергетических резервов Третьего мира, контролируемых атлантизмом (на этом и основан энергетический шантаж Европы со стороны США). Германия сегодня экономический гигант и политический карлик. Россия с точностью до наоборот политический гигант и экономический калека. Ось Москва-Берлин излечит недуг обоих партнеров и заложит основание грядущему процветанию Великой России и Великой Германии. А в дальнейшей перспективе это приведет к образованию прочной стратегической и экономической конструкции для создания всей Евразийской Империи Европейской Империи на Западе и Русской Империи на Востоке Евразии. При этом благосостояние отдельных частей этой континентальной конструкции послужит процветанию целого.

Как предварительные шаги в деле образования оси Москва-Берлин имеет смысл тщательно очистить культурно-историческую перспективу взаимных отношений от темных сторон прошлой истории русско-германских войн, которые были следствием успешной подрывной деятельности атлантистского лобби в Германии и России, а не выражением политической воли наших континентальных народов. В этой перспективе целесообразно вернуть Калининградскую область (Восточную Пруссию) Германии, чтобы отказаться от последнего территориального символа страшной братоубийственной войны. Для того, чтобы это действие не стало бы восприниматься русскими как очередной шаг в геополитической капитуляции, Европе имеет смысл предложить России другие территориальные аннексии или иные формы расширения стратегической зоны влияния,

особенно из числа тех государств, которые упрямо стремятся войти в "черноморско-балтийскую федерацию". Вопросы реституции Восточной Пруссии должны быть неразрывно связаны с территориальным и стратегическим расширением России, и Германия, помимо сохранения в калининградской области российских военных баз, должна со своей стороны способствовать дипломатически и политически усилению стратегических позиций России на Северо-западе и Западе. Страны Прибалтики, Польша, Молдавия и Украина как потенциальный "санитарный кордон" должны подвергнуться геополитической трансформации не после реституции Пруссии, а одновременно с ней, как элементы одного и того же процесса окончательного фиксирования границ между дружественными Россией и Средней Европой.

Слова Бисмарка "на Востоке у Германии врага нет" должны вновь стать доминантой немецкой политической доктрины, и обратная максима должна быть принята и русскими правителями "на Западных рубежах, в Средней Европе у России есть только друзья". Однако для того, чтобы это стало реальностью, а не только благопожеланиями, необходимо добиться того, чтобы именно геополитика и ее законы стали главной базой для принятия всех существенных внешнеполитических решений и в Германии и в России, так как только с этой точки зрения необходимость и неизбежность теснейшего русско-немецкого союза могут быть осознаны, поняты и признаны тотально и до конца. В противном случае апелляция к историческим конфликтам, недоразумениям и спорам сорвет всякую попытку создания прочной и надежной базы жизненно важной оси Москва-Берлин.

4.3 Ось Москва Токио. Паназиатский проект. К евразийской Трехсторонней комиссии

Новая Империя должна иметь четкую стратегию относительно своей восточной составляющей. Поэтому восточные пределы Евразии для этой Империи обладают такой же стратегической значимостью, как и проблемы Запада.

Исходя из основополагающего принципа "общего врага", Россия должна стремиться к стратегическому альянсу именно с теми государствами, которые более других тяготятся политическим и экономическим давлением атлантистской сверхдержавы, имеют историческую традицию геополитических проектов, противоположных атлантизму, и обладают достаточной технологической и экономической мощью для того, чтобы стать ключевой геополитической реальностью нового блока.

В этой перспективе совершенно безусловной представляется необходимость максимального сближения с Индией, являющейся нашим естественным геополитическим союзником в Азии и по расовым, и по политическим, и по стратегическим параметрам. После деколонизации Индия стремилась избежать любыми средствами вхождения в капиталистический блок и фактически возглавляла движение "неприсоединившихся стран", искавших в узком "ничейном" геополитическом пространстве возможностей придерживаться политики "Третьего Пути" с нескрываемой симпатией к СССР. Сегодня же, когда в России отменена жесткая коммунистическая догматика, препятствий для теснейшего сближения с Индией вообще не существует.

Индия сама по себе континент. Сфера ее геополитического влияния ограничивается, однако, Индостаном и небольшой зоной в Индийском океане, расположенной южнее полуострова. Индия с необходимостью станет стратегическим союзником Новой Империи, ее юго-восточным форпостом, хотя при этом надо учитывать, что индийская

цивилизация не склонна к геополитической динамике и территориальной экспансии, а кроме того, индуистская традиция не имеет в себе универсального религиозного измерения, и поэтому важную роль эта страна может играть лишь в ограниченной части Азии. Одновременно, довольно слабое экономическое и технологическое развитие этой страны не позволяет опереться на нее в полной мере, а следовательно, никаких проблем Новой Империи альянс с ней на данном этапе не решит. Индия сможет служить стратегическим форпостом Евразии, и на этом ее миссия фактически исчерпывается (если не брать во внимание ее духовную культуру, знакомство с которой может способствовать выяснению важнейших метафизических ориентиров Империи).

Индия важный союзник Евразии, но не главный. На роль подлинного восточного полюса Евразии претендуют в сегодняшнем мире две геополитические реальности это Китай и Япония. Но между этими странами существует глубинный геополитический антагонизм, имеющий долгую историю и соответствующий типологии двух цивилизаций. Следовательно, Россия должна выбрать что-то одно. Проблема не может ставиться таким образом: и Китай и Япония одновременно. Здесь необходим выбор.

На первый взгляд, Китай представляет собой сухопутную континентальную массу, его цивилизация носит традиционный авторитарный (неторговый) характер, и само сохранение коммунистической идеологии при проведении либеральных реформ в современном Китае, казалось, должно было бы окончательно способствовать выбору именно Китая, в противовес капиталистической, островной Японии. Однако, история показывает, что именно Китай, а не Япония, геополитически являлся важнейшей базой англосаксонских сил на евразийском континенте, тогда как Япония, напротив, поддерживала союз с центрально-европейскими странами противоположной ориентации.

Для того, чтобы понять этот парадокс, следует внимательно посмотреть на карту и отметить на ней географию двух последних мировых войн. В северном полушарии можно условно выделить четыре геополитические зоны, соответствующие главным участникам мировых конфликтов (странам или блокам государств). Крайний Запад, атлантизм, объединяет США, Англию, Францию и несколько других европейских стран. Эта зона обладает совершенно определенной геополитической ориентацией, однозначно тождественной "морской", "карфагенской" линии мировой истории. Это пространство максимальной цивилизационной активности и источник всех антитрадиционных, "прогрессивных" преобразований.

Вторая зона Средняя Европа, Германия, Австро-Венгрия. Это пространство, непосредственно прилегающее к атлантистскому блоку с Востока, с геополитической точки зрения, обладает всеми признаками антиатлантистской, континентальной, сухопутной ориентации и географически тяготеет к Востоку.

Третья зона это собственно сама Россия, лежащая в центре тяжести континента и ответственная за судьбу Евразии. Сухопутная и нелиберальная, "консервативная" сущность России очевидна.

И наконец, четвертой зоной является тихоокеанский ареал, где центральной ролью наделена именно Япония, развивающаяся быстро и динамично и обладающая при этом жесткой системой традиционалистских ценностей и ясным пониманием своей геополитической роли. При этом Япония ориентирована сущностно антизападно и антилиберально, так как ее ценностная система представляет собой нечто прямо противоположное идеалам "прогрессивного" атлантистского человечества.

Западный мир (атлантизм) в лице своих самых глубоких идеологов (Макиндер, Мэхэн и т.д.) прекрасно понимал, что самой большой угрозой для планетарного атлантизма являлась бы консолидация всех трех зон Евразии от средневропейской до тихоокеанской с участием и центральной ролью России против англо-саксонского и французского "прогрессизма". Поэтому основной задачей атлантистских стратегов было противопоставить три евразийские зоны своим непосредственным соседям и потенциальным союзникам. И русско-германские и русско-японские конфликты активно провоцировались именно атлантистами, действовавшими как внутри евразийских правительств, так и извне, используя дипломатические и силовые рычаги. Противники атлантизма начиная с Хаусхофера окончательно пришли к выводу, что эффективное противостояние атлантизму возможно только при отвержении навязываемой трем евразийским зонам логики, т.е. при категорическом отказе русских от германо- и японофобии, а японцев и немцев от русофобии, к каким бы историческим прецедентам сторонники этих "фобий" ни прибегали.

При этом именно Япония как символ всего тихоокеанского пространства обладает в этих антиатлантистских проектах первостепенной значимостью, так как стратегическая позиция Японии, динамика ее развития, специфика ее ценностной системы делают ее идеальным партнером в планетарной борьбе против цивилизации Запада. Китай же, со своей стороны, не играл в этой геополитической картине особой роли, будучи лишен вначале политической независимости (английская колонизация), а потом геополитической динамики. Лишь в период активного маоизма проявилась в самом Китае сугубо почвенная, евразийская тенденция, когда возобладали проекты "крестьянского социализма", всекитайского национализма и ярко выраженной советофилии. Но такое состояние продлилось очень недолго, и Китай под предлогом несогласия с развитием советской модели снова вернулся к исполнению сомнительной геополитической функции дестабилизации дальневосточных интересов Евразии и нагнетанию конфликтов с Россией. Нет никаких сомнений, что начатая с 80-х годов китайская перестройка была окончательным поворотом от маоистского периода к проатлантистской модели, что должно было бы окончательно закрепить разрыв Китая с СССР и его ориентацию на Запад. При этом "атлантизация" современного Китая прошла гораздо более успешно, нежели в России, так как экономический либерализм без политической демократизации позволил бесконфликтно поставить Китай в зависимость от западных финансовых групп, сохраняя тоталитарную систему и видимость политической самостоятельности. Либерализм был насажден в Китае тоталитарными методами, и именно поэтому реформа удалась в полной мере. К политической власти партийной олигархии добавилась экономическая власть той же олигархии, успешно приватизировавшей народную промышленность и национальные богатства и сплавившейся с интернациональной космополитической элитой Торгового Строя. Экономические успехи Китая представляют собой довольно двусмысленную реальность, так как они достигнуты ценой глубинного компромисса с Западом и не сочетаются ни с какой ясной геополитической концепцией, которая могла бы служить залогом политической самостоятельности и независимости. Скорее всего, новый либеральный Китай, имеющий рядом с собой двух серьезных конкурентов экономически мощную Японию и стратегически мощную Россию снова, как уже много раз в истории, вернется к чисто атлантистской функции на Дальнем Востоке, соединив для этого политическую диктатуру и потенцию капиталистического развития. Более того, с чисто прагматической точки зрения, стратегический альянс России с Китаем для создания единого блока немедленно оттолкнет от русских Японию и, соответственно, снова сделает враждебным тот ключевой тихоокеанский регион, от участия которого в общем евразийском проекте зависит конечный геополитический успех противостояния Суши и Моря.

В Новой Империи восточной осью должна быть ось Москва Токио. Это категорический императив восточной, азиатской составляющей евразийства. Именно вокруг этой оси должны складываться основные принципы азиатской политики Евразии. Япония, являясь самым северным пунктом среди островов Тихого океана, находится в исключительно выгодной географической точке для осуществления стратегической, политической и экономической экспансии на Юг. Федерация тихоокеанского пространства вокруг Японии было основной идеей т.н. "паназиатского проекта", начавшего реализовываться в 30-е 40-е годы и прерванного лишь из-за поражения стран Оси в войне. К этому паназиатскому проекту необходимо вернуться сегодня, чтобы подорвать экспансию американского влияния в этом регионе и лишить атлантистов в целом их важнейших стратегических и экономических баз. Согласно некоторым футурологическим прогнозам, в будущем тихоокеанский ареал станет одним из важнейших центров цивилизации в целом, и поэтому борьба за влияние в этом регионе является более чем актуальной это борьба за будущее.

Паназиатский проект является центром восточной ориентации Новой Империи. Альянс с Японией жизненно необходим. Ось Москва Токио вопреки оси Москва Пекин является приоритетной и перспективной, открывающей для континентального имперостроительства такие горизонты, которые, наконец, сделают Евразию геополитически завершенной, а атлантистскую империю Запада это предельно ослабит, а возможно, и разрушит окончательно.

Антиамериканизм японцев, прекрасно помнящих ядерный геноцид и ясно осознающих позор политической оккупации, длящейся уже несколько десятилетий, не вызывает сомнений. Принцип "общего врага" здесь налицо. В книге американца Серджа Фридманна "Грядущая война с Японией" (книга так и называется "Coming war with Japan") представляется неизбежной. Экономическая война Японии с США уже идет. У России, строящей Евразийскую Империю, не может быть лучшего союзника.

Ось Москва Токио решает также ряд важнейших проблем в обеих странах. Во-первых, Россия получает в союзники экономического гиганта, оснащенного высокоразвитой технологией и огромным финансовым потенциалом. Однако у Японии отсутствуют политическая независимость, военно-стратегическая система, прямой доступ к ресурсам. Все, чего не хватает Японии, в изобилии есть у России, а все, чего не хватает русским, в избытке есть у японцев. Объединив усилия в деле построения континентальной Империи, японцы и русские смогли бы в кратчайшие сроки создать небывало могущественный геополитический центр, охватывающий Сибирь, Монголию, саму Японию и в перспективе весь тихоокеанский регион. В обмен на стратегическую защиту и прямой доступ к евразийским ресурсам Япония могла бы быстро и эффективно помочь русским в технологическом развитии и освоении Сибири, заложив остов самостоятельного регионального организма. Японская технологическая и финансовая помощь решила бы множество проблем в России.

Кроме того, Россия с Японией вместе могли бы переструктурировать и дальневосточную часть континентальной Евразии. Показательна в этом отношении постоянная возрастающая интенсивность монгольско-японских контактов, основанных на единстве происхождения, расовой близости и духовно-религиозном родстве. Монголия (возможно, даже Внутренняя Монголия и Тибет, находящиеся в настоящее время под китайской оккупацией), Калмыкия, Тува, Бурятия образуют евразийский буддистский анклав, который мог бы послужить прочным соединяющим элементом между Россией и Японией, дать промежуточные звенья оси Москва Токио. С одной стороны, эти регионы тесно и неразрывно связаны с Россией, а с другой культурно и расово близки Японии.

Буддистский блок мог бы играть важнейшую роль в создании прочной геополитической конструкции на Дальнем Востоке, которая была бы континентальным звеном тихоокеанского паназиатского союза. В случае обострения отношений с Китаем, которое неизбежно произойдет при начале реализации оси Москва Токио, буддистский фактор будет использоваться как знамя национально-освободительной борьбы народов Тибета и Внутренней Монголии за расширение собственно евразийских, континентальных пространств в ущерб проатлантистскому Китаю.

Вообще говоря, Китай имеет все шансы стать геополитическим "козлом отпущения" при реализации паназиатского проекта. Это может быть осуществлено как при провоцировании внутрикитайского сепаратизма (тибетцы, монголы, мусульманское население Синьцзяна), так и при игре на региональных противоречиях, а также при активной политической поддержке антиатлантистских, сугубо континентальных сил потенциального буддийского (и даосского) лобби внутри самого Китая, что в перспективе может привести к утверждению такого политического режима в самом Китае, который будет лоялен Евразийской Империи. Кроме того, следует предложить Китаю особый вектор региональной геополитики, направленный строго на Юг к Тайваню и Гонконгу. Экспансия в южном направлении компенсирует отчасти утрату политического влияния Китая на Севере и на Востоке.

Китай в восточных регионах Новой Империи следует уподоблять на Западе не Англии, но Франции, так как в отношении его Евразийская Империя будет руководствоваться двумя критериями в случае активного противодействия евразийскими проектам с Китаем придется обращаться как с геополитическим противником со всеми вытекающими отсюда последствиями, но если удастся создать внутри страны мощное прояпонское и прорусское одновременно политическое лобби, то в перспективе и сам Китай станет полноценным и равноправным участником континентального проекта.

Ось Москва Токио вместе с западной осью Москва Берлин создаст такое геополитическое пространство, которое прямо противоположно главной модели атлантистских идеологов, чьей высшей инстанцией стал сегодня "Трилатераль", "Трехсторонняя комиссия". "Трехсторонняя комиссия", созданная американскими кругами высшего политического истеблишмента, предполагает в качестве новой конфигурации планеты стратегическое объединение трех геополитических зон, точно соответствующих трем геополитическим элементам из четырех, о которых мы говорили выше. Три стороны этой комиссии, которая стремится выполнять функции "Мирового Правительства", соответствуют:

- 1) американской зоне (США, крайний Запад, чистый атлантизм),
- 2) европейской зоне (континентальной Европе, Средней Европе, но под эгидой Франции и Англии, а не Германии)
- 3) тихоокеанской зоне (объединенной вокруг Японии).

"Трилатераль", таким образом, стремится сконструировать такую геополитическую модель, в которой собственно Евразия (=Россия) будет окружена с двух сторон надежными геополитическими партнерами США, т.е. три зоны из четырех, объемлющих северные регионы планеты, попадают под прямой контроль США. При этом между потенциальным евразийским противником атлантистов (Евразией) и самим центром атлантизма (США) находятся два служебных геополитических пространства (Европа и Япония). Важно заметить, также, что перестройка в Китае в начале 80-х годов была начата именно с подачи представителей "Трехсторонней комиссии", которые стремились окончательно вернуть Китай в русло атлантистской политики.

Евразийский проект предлагает нечто прямо противоположное планам "Трилатерала". Новая Империя есть анти-Трилатераль, его обратная, перевернутая модель. Это объединение трех геополитических зон с центром в России, ориентированных против Америки. По той же самой логике, согласно которой США стремятся геополитически удержать Европу и Японию под своим контролем, понимая все стратегические выгоды для американского могущества в такой расстановке сил, Россия при строительстве Новой Империи должна всячески стремиться к созданию прочного стратегического союза с Европой и Японией, чтобы достичь собственной геополитической стабильности, мощи и гарантировать политическую свободу всем евразийским народам. В принципе, речь может идти о создании своей евразийской "Трехсторонней комиссии" с русским, европейским и японским отделениями, в которой будут участвовать, однако, не политики атлантического и проамериканского толка, а интеллектуальные и политические лидеры национальной ориентации, понимающие геополитическую логику актуального положения дел в мире. При этом, естественно, в отличие от "Трилатерала" атлантического, евразийская "Трехсторонняя комиссия" должна иметь в качестве главного представителя Европы не француза, а немца.

Учитывая стратегическую необходимость японского фактора в евразийском проекте, становится совершенно ясно, что вопрос о реституции Курил не является препятствием для русско-японского альянса. В случае Курильских островов, как и в случае Калининградской области, мы имеем дело с территориальными символами Второй мировой войны, альянсы и весь ход которой был полным триумфом атлантистов, расправившихся со всеми своими противниками одновременно путем крайнего истощения СССР (при навязывании ему такой геополитической позиции, которая не могла в перспективе не привести к перестроечному развалу) и прямой оккупации Европы и Японии. Курилы напоминание о нелепой и противоестественной братоубийственной бойне русских и японцев, скорейшее забвение которой является необходимым условием нашего обоюдного процветания. Курилы надо вернуть Японии, но это должно осуществляться в рамках общего процесса новой организации евразийского Дальнего Востока. Кроме того, реституция Курил не может быть осуществлена при сохранении существующего расклада политических сил в России и Японии. Это дело лишь евразийских, имперостроительно ориентированных политиков, которые смогут полноценно отвечать за истинные национальные интересы своих народов. Но понимание геополитической необходимости реституции Курил у евразийской элиты должно присутствовать уже сейчас.

4.4 Ось Москва Тегеран. Среднеазиатская Империя. Панарабский проект

Политика Евразийской Империи в южном направлении также должна ориентироваться на твердый континентальный альянс с той силой, которая удовлетворяет и стратегически, и идеологически, и культурно общей евразийской тенденции антиамериканизма. Принцип "общего врага" и здесь должен быть решающим фактором.

На Юге Евразии существует несколько геополитических образований, которые могли бы теоретически выступать в роли южного полюса Новой Империи. Так как Индию и Китай следует отнести к зоне Востока и связать с перспективой паназиатской интеграции, то остается только исламский мир, простирающийся от Филиппин и Пакистана до стран "Магриба", т.е. Западной Африки. В целом вся исламская зона является естественно дружественной геополитической реальностью по отношению к Евразийской Империи, так как исламская традиция, более политизированная и модернизированная, чем

большинство других евразийских конфессий, прекрасно отдает себе отчет в духовной несовместимости американизма и религии. Сами атлантисты рассматривают исламский мир в целом как своего потенциального противника, а следовательно, Евразийская Империя имеет в его лице верных потенциальных союзников, стремящихся к единой цели подрыв и в перспективе полное прекращение американской, западной доминации на планете. Было бы идеально иметь интегрированный исламский мир как южную составляющую всей Евразийской Империи, простирающуюся от Средней Азии до Западной Африки, религиозно единую и политически стабильную, основывающую свою политику на принципе верности традиции и духу. Поэтому в дальней перспективе Исламская Империя на Юге ("новый халифат") может стать важнейшим элементом Новой Евразии наряду с Европейской Империей на Западе, Тихоокеанской на Востоке и Русской в Центре.

Однако в настоящий момент исламский мир крайне разобщен и внутри него существуют разнообразные идеологические и политические тенденции, а также противоположные друг другу геополитические проекты. Самыми глобальными являются следующие течения:

- 1) иранский фундаментализм (континентального типа, антиамериканский, антиатлантистский и геополитически активный),
- 2) турецкий светский режим (атлантистского типа, акцентирующий пантюркистскую линию),
- 3) панарабизм, проповедуемый Сирией, Ираком, Ливией, Суданом, отчасти Египтом и Саудовской Аравией (довольно разноплановые и противоречивые проекты в каждом конкретном случае),
- 4) саудовский ваххабитский тип фундаментализма (геополитически солидарный с атлантизмом),
- 5) разнообразные версии "исламского социализма" (Ливия, Ирак, Сирия, модели близкие к панарабизму "левого" толка).

Сразу ясно, что чисто атлантистские полюса в исламском мире, будь они "светскими" (как в случае Турции) или исламскими (в случае Саудовской Аравии), не могут выполнять функции южного полюса Евразии в глобальном проекте континентальной Империи. Остается "иранский фундаментализм" и "панарабизм" (левого толка).

С точки зрения геополитических констант, приоритетом в этом вопросе обладает, безусловно, Иран, так как он удовлетворяет всем евразийским параметрам это крупная континентальная держава, тесно связанная со Средней Азией, радикально антиамериканская, традиционалистская и акцентирующая одновременно "социальный" политический вектор (защита "мустазафов", "обездоленных"). Кроме того, Иран занимает такую позицию на карте материка, что создание оси Москва Тегеран решает огромное число проблем для Новой Империи. Включив Иран в качестве южного полюса Империи, Россия мгновенно достигла бы той стратегической цели, к которой она шла (неверными путями) несколько столетий выход к теплым морям. Этот стратегический аспект отсутствие у России такого выхода был главной козырной картой атлантистской геополитики еще со времен колониальной Англии, которая полностью контролировала Азию и Восток, пользуясь именно отсутствием у России прямого доступа к южным берегам континента. Все русские попытки выйти в Средиземное море через Босфор и Дарданеллы были стремлением к соучастию в политической организации прибрежных

районов Евразии, где безраздельно властвовали англичане, легко пресекавшие любые попытки русской экспансии через контроль над этой береговой зоной. Однако, даже если бы России удалось это осуществить, атлантистский контроль над Гибралтаром всегда оставался бы препятствием для действительно крупномасштабных морских операций и не дал бы России подорвать английское могущество. Только Иран, континентально примыкающий к России и выходящий непосредственно в Индийский океан, и тогда и теперь мог и может быть радикальным решением этой важнейшей геополитической проблемы. Получив стратегический доступ в первую очередь, военно-морские базы на иранские берега, Евразия будет в полной безопасности от стратегии "кольца анаконды", т.е. от реализации традиционного атлантистского плана по "удушению" континентальных просторов материка через захват прибрежных территорий по всей протяженности Евразии, и особенно на Юге и Западе.

Создание оси Москва Тегеран разом рассекает "анаконду" в самом уязвимом месте и открывает России безграничные перспективы к приобретению все новых и новых плацдармов внутри и вовне Евразии. Это самый существенный момент.

С другой стороны, существует проблема бывшей советской Средней Азии, где сегодня конкурируют три геополитические тенденции "пантюркизм" (Турция, атлантизм), "ваххабизм" (Саудовская Аравия, атлантизм) и "фундаментализм" (Иран, антиатлантизм). По вполне понятным причинам "панарабизма" среди тюркоязычных в большинстве своем народов Средней Азии быть не может. Наличие же параллельно с этим мощной прорусской ориентации также следует принимать в расчет, но трудно себе представить, каким образом эти исламские регионы с пробуждающимся национальным самосознанием смогут снова примкнуть к России бескровно и безболезненно. Совершенно очевидно, что среди "непромосковских" тенденций Новая Империя может опираться только на проиранскую ориентацию, которая выведет этот регион из-под прямого или косвенного контроля атлантистов. Одновременно с этим прочная ось Москва Тегеран снимет все противоречия между русофильством и исламизмом (иранского типа), сделает из них одну и ту же геополитическую тенденцию, ориентированную и на Москву и на Тегеран одновременно. Параллельно с этим такая ось автоматически означала бы прекращение гражданского конфликта в Таджикистане и Афганистане, которые подпитываются только за счет геополитической неопределенности этих образований, раздираемых противоречиями между исламско-иранским фундаменталистским вектором и тяготением к России. Естественно, на фоне такого противоречия обостряются и мелко-этнические трения, а также облегчается деятельность атлантистских "агентов влияния", которые прямо или косвенно (через Турцию и Саудовскую Аравию) стремятся дестабилизировать внутриазиатские пространства в их ключевых центрах.

Иран геополитически и есть Средняя Азия, точно так же, как Германия есть Средняя Европа. Москва как центр Евразии, ее полюс, должна в рамках Новой Империи делегировать Тегерану миссию наведения "иранского мира" (*Rex Persica*) на этом пространстве, организацию прочного среднеазиатского геополитического блока, способного противостоять атлантистскому влиянию во всем регионе. Это означает, что будет резко прерваны пантюркистская экспансия, а также финансово-политическое вторжение саудитов. Традиционно враждебный и Турции и Саудовской Аравии Иран выполнит эту функцию гораздо лучше, чем русские, которые решат свои геополитические проблемы в этом сложном центре только с помощью стратегической поддержки иранской стороны. Но здесь, как и в случае с Германией, речь не должна идти о создании Иранской Империи или об иранизации Средней Азии. Следует говорить о создании "Среднеазиатской Империи", которая на федеральных началах смогла бы интегрировать различные народы, культуры и этносы в единый южный геополитический блок, создав, тем самым,

стратегически однородное, но этнически и культурно многообразное исламское образование, неразрывно связанное с интересами всей Евразийской Империи.

В вопросе оси Москва Тегеран важное место занимает армянский вопрос, так как он традиционно служит центром дестабилизации в Закавказье. Надо заметить, что армяне арийский народ, ясно осознающий свою иафетическую природу и родство с индоевропейскими народами, особенно азиатскими т.е. с иранцами и курдами. С другой стороны, армяне народ христианский, их монофизитская традиция вписывается именно в общий настрой Восточной Церкви (хотя она и признана Православием еретическим течением), и геополитическая связь с Россией осознается ими очень живо. Армяне занимают земли крайней стратегической значимости, так как через Армению и Арцах лежит путь из Турции в Азербайджан и далее в Среднюю Азию. В оси Москва Тегеран Ереван автоматически становится важнейшим стратегическим звеном, дополнительно скрепляющим Россию с Ираном, и отрезающим Турцию от внутриконтинентальных пространств. При возможной переориентации Баку с Анкары на Тегеран в общем проекте Москва Тегеран быстро разрешится и карабахский вопрос, так как все четыре стороны будут жизненно заинтересованы в немедленном установлении стабильности в столь важном стратегическом регионе. (В противном случае, т.е. при сохранении протурецкой ориентации Азербайджана, эта "страна" подлежит расчленению между Ираном, Россией и Арменией.) Почти то же самое относится и к другим регионам Кавказа Чечне, Абхазии, Дагестану и т.д., которые будут оставаться зонами конфликтов и нестабильности только при столкновении в них геополитических интересов атлантистской Турции с евразийской Россией. Подключение сюда иранской геополитической линии мгновенно лишит содержания видимость столкновения между "исламом и православием" на Кавказе, которую пытаются придать конфликтам в этой области турецкие и российские "агенты влияния" атлантизма, и восстановит мир и гармонию.

В данном проекте переустройства Средней Азии следует заметить, что русские этнические интересы смогут быть защищены наилучшим образом, так как Среднеазиатская Империя будет строиться не на основании искусственных политических конструкций, фиктивной "постимперской легитимности", но на основании национальной однородности, что предполагает мирный переход под прямую юрисдикцию Москвы всех территорий Средней Азии (особенно Казахстана), компактно заселенных русскими. А те территории, этнический состав которых спорен, получают особые права на основании русско-иранских проектов в пределах той или иной Империи. Следовательно, путем евразийского геополитического проекта русские смогут добиться того, что представляется целью "малого (этнического) национализма", но что сам этот национализм выполнить никогда не сможет.

Важно учитывать также необходимость навязывания Турции роли "козла отпущения" в этом проекте, так как интересы этого государства на Кавказе и в Средней Азии вообще приниматься в расчет не будут. Более того, вероятно, следует акцентировать поддержку курдского сепаратизма в самой Турции, а также автономистские требования турецких армян, в целях вырвать этнически близкие Ирану народы из-под светско-атлантистского контроля. В качестве компенсации Турции следует предложить или развитие на южном направлении в арабский мир через Багдад, Дамаск и Эр-Рияд, либо провоцировать проиранских фундаменталистов в самой Турции на кардинальное измерение геополитического курса и на вхождение в дальней перспективе в Среднеазиатский блок под антиатлантистским и евразийским знаком.

Ось Москва Тегеран является основой евразийского геополитического проекта. Иранский ислам наилучшая версия ислама для вхождения в континентальный блок, и именно эта версия должна быть приоритетно поддержана Москвой.

Второй линией евразийского альянса с Югом является панарабский проект, который охватывает часть передней Азии и Северную Африку. Этот блок также жизненно важен для континентальной геополитики, поскольку эта зона является стратегически важной в вопросе контроля над юго-западным побережьем Европы. Именно поэтому английское, а позже американское присутствие в этом регионе является историко-стратегической константой. Контролируя Ближний Восток и Северную Африку, атлантисты традиционно держали (и держат) континентальную Европу под политическим и экономическим давлением.

Однако интеграцию панарабского проекта с общей Евразийской Империей следует доверить сугубо европейским силам, вернувшись к проектам Евроафрики, представляющей собой, с чисто геополитической точки зрения, не два континента, а один. Европейская Империя, жизненно заинтересованная в максимально глубоком проникновении на юг африканского континента, должна в перспективе полностью контролировать, опираясь на панарабский блок, Африку вплоть до Сахары, а в будущем постараться стратегически внедриться на весь африканский материк. В перспективе Евроафрики Средиземное море не является подлинным "морем", но лишь внутренним "озером", не представляющим собой ни преграды, ни защиты от атлантистского влияния. За пределом арабской Африки следует разработать подробный политический проект, который помог бы переструктурировать черный континент по национально-этническому и культурному признаку, вместо того противоречивого постколониального конгломерата, который представляют собой современные африканские государства. Нюансированный панарабский (неарабский) национальный проект смог бы стать геополитическим дополнением к плану панарабской интеграции.

Учитывая, что модель чисто иранского фундамента лизма вряд ли сможет стать универсально приемлемой в арабском мире (во многом, за счет специфики шиитской, арийской версии иранского ислама), панарабский проект должен стремиться к созданию самостоятельного антиатлантистского блока, где приоритетными полюсами стали бы Ирак, Ливия и освобожденная Палестина (при определенных условиях также Сирия), т.е. те арабские страны, которые яснее других осознают американскую опасность и радикальнее других отвергают рыночно-капиталистическую модель, навязываемую Западом. При этом в панарабском проекте "козлом отпущения" станет, в первую очередь, Саудовская Аравия, слишком укорененная в атлантистской геополитике, чтобы добровольно войти в панарабский блок, дружественный Евразии. В отношении Египта, Алжира и Марокко дело обстоит несколько иначе, так как правящие проатлантистские силы в этих государствах не выражают национальных тенденций, не контролируют до конца ситуацию и держатся лишь на американских штыках и американских деньгах. При начале панарабской освободительной войны на достаточно интенсивном уровне все эти режимы падут в один час.

Но необходимо четко понять, что наиболее гармоничная конструкция панарабского пространства дело не столько России, сколько Европы, Средней Европы, Германии, а еще точнее, Европейской Империи. Россия (точнее, СССР) вмешивалась в арабские проблемы лишь тогда, когда она сама в одиночку представляла собой евразийское государство перед лицом американизма. При наличии мощной европейской базы евразийской ориентации, т.е. после создания оси Москва Берлин, эту функцию следует делегировать Берлину и Европе в целом. Непосредственной заботой России в исламском мире должен быть

именно Иран, от союза с которым зависят жизненные стратегические и даже узко этнические интересы русских.

Иран, контролирующей Среднюю Азию (включая Пакистан, Афганистан и останки Турции или "Турцию после проиранской революции") вместе с Россией, является центром приоритетных интересов Москвы. При этом следует употребить традиционное влияние России среди "левых" режимов панарабской ориентации (в первую очередь, Ирак и Ливия) для сближения арабских стран с Ираном и скорейшего забвения искусственного и инспирированного атлантистами ирано-иракского конфликта.

4.5 Империя многих Империй

Новая Империя, построение которой отвечало бы глобальной, планетарной цивилизационной миссии русского народа, есть сверхпроект, имеющий множество подуровней. Эта Новая Империя, Евразийская Империя, будет иметь сложную дифференцированную структуру, внутри которой будут существовать различные степени взаимозависимости и интегрированности отдельных частей. Совершенно очевидно, что Новая Империя не будет ни Русской Империей, ни Советской Империей..

Основным интегрирующим моментом этой Новой Империи будет борьба с атлантизмом и жесткий отпор той либерально-рыночной, "морской, "карфагенской" цивилизации, которую воплощают сегодня в себе США и планетарные политические, экономические и военные структуры, которые служат атлантизму. Для успеха этой борьбы необходимо создание гигантского геополитического континентального блока, единого стратегически. Именно единство стратегических континентальных границ будет главным интегрирующим фактором Новой Империи. Эта Империя будет единым и неделимым организмом в военно-стратегическом смысле, и это будет накладывать политические ограничения на все внутренние подимперские формирования. Все блоки, которые будут входить в состав Новой Империи, будут политически ограничены в одном категорическом запрещении служить атлантистским геополитическим интересам, выходить из стратегического альянса, вредить континентальной безопасности. На этом и только на этом уровне Новая Империя будет целостным геополитическим образованием.

На следующем, более низком, уровне Новая Империя будет представлять собой "конфедерацию Больших Пространств" или вторичных Империй. Из них сразу следует выделить четыре основных Европейская Империя на Западе (вокруг Германии и Средней Европы), Тихоокеанская Империя на Востоке (вокруг Японии), Среднеазиатская Империя на Юге (вокруг Ирана) и Русская Империя в Центре (вокруг России). Совершенно логично, что центральная позиция является в таком проекте главной, поскольку именно от нее зависит территориальная связанность и однородность всех остальных составляющих гигантского континентального блока. Кроме того, отдельные самостоятельные Большие Пространства будут существовать и помимо указанных блоков Индия, панарабский мир, панафриканский союз, а также, возможно, особый регион Китая, чей статус пока трудно определить даже приблизительно. Каждая из вторичных Империй будет основываться на особом расовом, культурном, религиозном, политическом или геополитическом интегрирующем факторе, который в каждом случае может быть разным. Степень интеграции самих Империй будет также переменной величиной, зависящей от конкретной идеологической базы, на которой та или иная Империя будет создаваться.

Внутри этих вторичных Империй также будет действовать конфедеративный принцип, но уже применительно к более мелким этническим, национальным и региональным

единицам к тому, что, с большим или меньшим приближением, можно назвать "страной" или "государством". Естественно, суверенитет этих "стран" будет иметь существенные ограничения в первую очередь, стратегические (вытекающие из принципов всей континентальной Новой Империи), а во вторую, связанные со спецификой тех Больших Пространств, в состав которых они войдут. И в этом вопросе будет применен принцип предельно гибкой дифференциации, учитывающий исторические, духовные, географические, расовые особенности каждого региона.

Великороссы, к примеру, могут рассматриваться как отдельный народ или даже "страна" в рамках Русской Империи, наряду с украинцами, белорусами, возможно, сербами и т.д., но в то же время все они будут тесно связаны с юрисдикцией славянско-православного типа, воплощенной в специфической государственной системе. Одновременно Русская Империя будет зависеть от Евразийской Империи, Новой Империи, стратегические интересы которой будут поставлены выше национально - расовых и конфессиональных интересов восточных православных славян.

То же самое можно сказать, к примеру, и о французах, которые останутся народом или "страной" в рамках Европейской Империи наряду с немцами и итальянцами, связанными с ними общей европейской имперской традицией, христианской религией и принадлежностью к индоевропейской расе. Но сама Европейская Империя, в свою очередь, будет подчиняться стратегическим императивам всей великоконтинентальной Новой Империи.

Так же дело будет обстоять и в Средней Азии, и на тихоокеанском пространстве, и в арабском мире, и в черной Африке, и в Индии и т.д.

При этом на глобальном уровне строительство планетарной Новой Империи главным "козлом отпущения" будет иметь именно США, подрыв мощи которых (вплоть до полного разрушения этой геополитической конструкции) будет реализовываться планомерно и бескомпромиссно всеми участниками Новой Империи. Евразийский проект предполагает в этом отношении евразийскую экспансию в Южную и Центральную Америку в целях ее вывода из -под контроля Севера (здесь может быть использован испанский фактор как традиционная альтернатива англосаксонскому), а также провоцирование всех видов нестабильности и сепаратизма в границах США (возможно опереться на политические силы афро-американских расистов). Древняя римская формула "Карфаген должен быть разрушен" станет абсолютным лозунгом Евразийской Империи, так как он вберет в себя сущность всей геополитической планетарной стратегии пробуждающегося к своей миссии континента.

Конкретика в выяснении статуса того или иного народа, той или иной "страны", той или иной "Империи Больших Пространств" в рамках общего континентального блока станет актуальной только после геополитического объединения, после создания необходимых осей, и лишь тогда евразийские народы и государства смогут решать свои внутренние проблемы совершенно свободно, без давления со стороны атлантистских сил, которые принципиально заинтересованы только в одном не допустить в Евразии мира, гармонии, процветания, независимости, достоинства и расцвета Традиции.

Глава 5. Судьба России в имперской Евразии

5.1 Геополитическая магия в национальных целях

Русские национальные интересы могут быть рассмотрены на нескольких уровнях на глобальном, общепланетарном, геополитическом, цивилизационном (об этом речь шла в предыдущих разделах) и на узконациональном, конкретном, социально-политическом и культурном (об этом речь пойдет в данной части). Как соотносятся между собой макропроекты континентального имперостроительства и этническая линия русского народа? Об этом кое-что было уже сказано. Здесь же следует рассмотреть эту проблему более подробно.

"Имперостроительская ориентация", "континентализм", "евразийство" все эти термины и соответствующие проекты часто отпугивают тех русских, которые слабо знакомы с символизмом русской истории, не вникают в смысл исторических тенденций нации, привыкли оперировать банальными бытовыми клише при осмыслении того, что такое народ и каковы его интересы. Это порождает множество недоразумений среди самих националистов, провоцирует пустые дискуссии и бессодержательные полемики. На самом деле, специфика русского национализма состоит как раз в его глобальности: он связан не столько с кровью, сколько с пространством, с почвой, землей. Вне Империи русские потеряют свою идентичность и исчезнут как нация.

Однако реализация евразийского плана ни в коем случае не должна привести к этническому размыванию русских как "осевого" этноса Империи. Великороссы нуждаются в поддержании и своей этнической идентичности, без чего центр континента потеряет свою цивилизационную и культурную определенность. Иными словами, в рамках самой наднациональной геополитической Империи должны существовать особые нормы (в том числе и юридические), которые обеспечивали бы русским сохранение этнической идентичности. Специфика Новой Империи должна состоять в том, что при центральной роли русских в деле геополитической интеграции это не должно сопровождаться "русификацией" нерусских территорий, поскольку такая "русификация", с одной стороны, извратит смысл Империи, сведя ее до уровня гигантского "государствования", а с другой стороны, растворит русскую общность в иной национальной среде.

В отношении русского народа в рамках континентального блока следует подчеркнуть, что его роль будет не "изоляционистской" (вопреки проектам "малого национализма") и не этноэкспансионистской (вопреки "этническим империалистам" и, отчасти, славянофилам). Из двух этих проектов надо взять отдельные стороны, отбросив другие. На уровне стратегическом речь действительно пойдет об "экспансионизме", но не этнического, а геополитического характера, что заведомо исключает любые формы русского или славянского расизма. На чисто этническом уровне, напротив, должен реализоваться в той или иной степени "изоляционистский" вариант, при отбрасывании изоляционизма политического и государственного. Русские будут существовать как единая национальная общность в пространстве сверхнационального имперского комплекса. Этническая реальность будет консолидироваться в пределах народа, а сверхэтническая миссия будет выражаться в пределах Империи. Только при таком сочетании можно достичь одновременно и сохранения здорового национального ядра и максимального расширения геополитического влияния. Иными словами, национальный фактор будет определяться исходя из совершенно нового сочетания этнического и политического, которого не было ни в одном из предшествующих этапов национально-

государственной истории русских. Этническая однородность существовала на Руси лишь на ранних этапах государственности в пределах довольно ограниченных территорий. Царистская модель была основана на принципе определенной "русификации", а Советы, расширяя геополитические пределы России, напротив, пренебрегали этническим качеством русского народа. В Новой Империи эти факторы должны выступить в новой пропорции, соответствующей современным геополитическим и этнографическим условиям, а также необходимой для установления стабильного этнополитического равновесия в русском народе.

Русские в Новой Империи выступают одновременно в двух ролях:

- 1) как один из больших народов, являющихся политическими субъектами Федеративной Империи Наций,
- 2) как инициатор континентальной интеграции в эту Федеративную Империю Наций.

Следовательно, русские оказываются в привилегированном положении, так как, с этнической стороны, будучи одним из нескольких более или менее равных этнических компонентов Империи, они геополитически становятся в центре всего политического процесса. Такая двойная функция позволяет в ходе осуществления одного и того же имперостроительного действия одновременно но увеличить свое внеэтническое влияние и консолидировать внутриэтнические силы. Имперостроительство является единственным способом сохранить, усилить и объединить русский этнос, не прибегая при этом к межнациональным конфликтам, войнам, пересмотру политических границ. Все политические границы Евразии в процессе построения Новой Империи будут постепенно отменены как политические рубежи, и вместо них возникнут естественные, органические этнические границы, не имеющие того строго разделительного значения, как это имеет место в случае границ государственных. Эти этнические границы не будут иметь ничего общего с тем, что понимается под словом "граница" в современной ситуации, так как они будут проходить по этнокультурно му, конфессиональному признаку, не предполагающему политической доминации над меньшинствами уже по той причине, что эти этнообразования не будут иметь полноценного политического суверенитета, будучи ограниченными стратегическими интересами всей Империи, которая, в свою очередь, жизненно заинтересована в поддержании в своих пределах мира и гармонии. Иными словами, русские в рамках такой Империи не обретут своего национального государства как политического выражения этнической общности, но обретут национальное единство и гигантское континентальное государство, в управлении которым они получат центральную роль.

Уже само выдвижение такого проекта сразу снимает угрозу тех потенциальных конфликтов, которые зреют в силу разделенности русских в настоящее время по различным новорожденным "государствам" в рамках СНГ. Имперостроительный вектор мгновенно переводит проблему соотношения русских и казахов в Казахстане, или русских и украинцев на Украине, или русских и татар в Татарстане в совершенно иную, нежели этническая, плоскость. Это соотношение перестает быть политико-государственной проблемой, которая может разрешиться только при нанесении определенного политико-территориального ущерба той или иной стороне (к примеру, этническое деление Казахстана, сепаратизм в рамках РФ, военное подавление Чечни, конфессиональное и национальное дробление Украины, проблема Крыма и т.д.), и становится вопросом сосуществования различных этносов в рамках единого политического пространства. А в таком случае этническая консолидация, скажем, русских в Казахстане с русскими в пределах РФ не будет рассматриваться как подрыв политического суверенитета

"казахского национального государства" в пользу "русского национального государства", а станет органичным культурно-этническим процессом, не ущемляющим, но и не возвышающим ни одну из сторон по той причине, что никакого "казахского национального государства" или "русского национального государства" просто не будет существовать. Советская модель в чем-то была схожа с этим проектом, но с одной важной оговоркой понятие "этноса" рассматривалось в ней как некий рудимент, как исторический атавизм, лишенный к тому же статуса внутривнутриполитического субъекта. В рамках Новой Империи, напротив, этнос, не имея прямого государственного выражения, будет признан главной политической ценностью и верховным юридическим субъектом во всех внутримперских вопросах.

Резюмируя это вопрос, можно сказать, что операции с глобальными геополитическими проектами, на первый взгляд, не имеющими никакого отношения к достижению узкоэтнических целей русских, на самом деле, приведут к наилучшему удовлетворению и этих конкретных национальных целей. Отказываясь от недостаточного и слишком малого ("русское государство в рамках РФ"), не пытаясь путем завоеваний и аннексий увеличить это малое в кровопролитной, братоубийственной войне, предлагая народам Евразии строительство континентально го блока на равных условиях, русские смогут приобрести то большое и достойное их, что в противном случае останется навсегда недостижимой мечтой.

Отказавшись от этнического государства, мы обретем единство народа и Великую Империю. В нынешних условиях только таким образом и никак иначе можно не только спасти русский народ от политической немощи и этнического вырождения, пробудить его во всем его грандиозном объеме для планетарных свершений и воздать ему наконец то, что он на самом деле заслуживает.

5.2 Русский национализм. Этническая демография и Империя

Русский народ, в узко этническом смысле, находится в тяжелом демографическом положении. В далекой перспективе это грозит страшными последствиями как для самой нации, так и для будущей Империи, поскольку замещение русских как основного носителя континентального объединений какой-то иной нацией неминуемо приведет к отклонению континентального блока от своей естественной цивилизационной миссии, породит хаос и конфликты в Евразии, лишит геополитическую структуру важнейшего культурно-политического компонента.

Такое слабое демографическое положение русских особенно тревожно в сравнении с демографическим ростом евразийского Юга, который, напротив, бурно развивается в количественном смысле. Если эти тенденции будут сохраняться в существующей пропорции, неизбежно произойдет вытеснение русских с центральных позиций в Империи, размывание однородности нации и либо поглощение этноса в море южных народов, либо его превращение в реликтовый остаток, достойный существо вания лишь в резервации. К этому следует добавить отсутствие компактного заселения русскими значительных евразийских пространств, контролируемых ими лишь политически и административно. Этот последний фактор может послужить причиной нарушения этнического баланса в Евразийской Империи и подтолкнуть бурно развивающиеся в демографическом смысле народы Юга к национальной экспансии на русские территории (особенно это касается Сибири и Дальнего Востока).

Эту проблему следует решать немедленно, но при этом надо особенно подчеркнуть, что ее решение должно не предшествовать созданию Империи и не следовать за этим созданием. Реализация геополитических планов с самого начала обязана синхронно сопровождаться действиями, направленными на демографический рост русских и на их этническую перегруппировку с целью компактно освоить полноту "жизненного пространства" нации. Достичь этой цели можно исключительно политическими методами, которые должны и привести непосредственно к искомому результату и предопределить экономические меры в этой области.

Политическое решение может быть только одно — выдвижение на первый план концепций русского национализма. Этот национализм, однако, должен использовать не государственную, а культурно-этническую терминологию с особым ударением на такие категории как "народность" и "русское православие". Причем этот русский национализм должен иметь совершенно современное звучание и избегать любых попыток прямой реставрации тех форм, которые исторически себя исчерпали. Именно национализм народнического, этнического, этико-религиозного типа, а не "государственность" и не "монархизм" должны быть приоритетными в данной ситуации. Следует внушить всем русским основную идею, что личная самоидентификация каждого отдельного человека есть второстепенная, производная величина от самоидентификации национальной. Русские должны осознать, что, в первую очередь, они являются православными, во вторую русскими и лишь в третью — людьми. Отсюда и иерархия приоритетов как в личной, так и в общественной жизни. Выше всего православное самосознание нации как Церкви, затем ясное понимание неделимости, целостности, тотальности и единства русского этнического организма, состоящего не только из живущих, но и из предков и грядущих поколений, и лишь потом, в последнюю очередь, переживание конкретной личности как самостоятельной атомарной единицы.

На практике осуществление такого национализма в политике должно означать тотальное воцерковление русских и превращение всех культурных институтов в продолжение Единой Церкви, не в организационно-административном, но в духовном, интеллектуально-этическом плане. Такое воцерковление должно лишить культуру и науку их профанической оторванности от бытийных основ, вовлечь их в процесс духовного домостроительства, превратить прагматическое и децентрализованное техническое развитие в реализацию центрального промыслительного завета Церкви, в подчиненный инструментальный сверхматериальный план. Лишь таким радикальным образом русские могут быть реально возвращены в лоно Церкви, которая лежит в основе их исторического национального бытия и которая в основных чертах сформировала то, что в самом высоком смысле называется Русским. Именно тотальная реставрация православного мировоззрения со всеми вытекающими из него последствиями способна вернуть народ к его духовному истоку. Всякое относительное возрождение Церкви как узкоконфессиональной, религиозной структуры, всякая ограничивающаяся культами и внешней обрядностью реставрация будут недействительны. Воцерковлению в рамках русского национализма подлежат не индивидуумы, но вся русская культура, наука, мысль вместе взятые. Только таким образом коллективному самосознанию нации будет придана духовная вертикаль, которая, в свою очередь, превратит проблему демографического роста в некое духовное задание на основе православной этики, запрещающей, например, контрацепцию и аборт.

Следующий уровень — это собственно этническое самосознание, представление о народе как о едином теле и единой душе. Причем бытие этого единого организма должно пониматься как нечто сверхвременное, не ограниченное ни пространственными, ни временными категориями. Русский национализм должен апеллировать не только к настоящему нации, но и к ее прошлому и ее будущему, взятым одновременно, как

совокупность единого духовного существа. Это "существо" великий русский народ в его сверхисторической тотальности должно осознаваться каждым русским и узнаваться в самом себе. Факт принадлежности к русской нации должен переживаться как избранничество, как невероятная бытийная роскошь, как высшее антропологическое достоинство. Пропаганда этой национальной исключительности (без малейшего налета ксенофобии или шовинизма) должна стать осью политического воспитания народа. В первую очередь, демографический всплеск будет обеспечен идеологически, культурно, этически. Народу следует внушить мысль, что рождая русского ребенка, каждая семья участвует в национальной мистерии, пополняя духовное и душевное богатство всего народа. Дети должны пониматься как общенациональное достояние, как физическое выражение внутренней энергии великого народа. Русский ребенок должен пониматься вначале именно как русский, а потом уже как ребенок.

Учитывая тяжелое демографическое состояние сегодняшнего дня, начать национальную пропаганду надо как можно быстрее и использовать при этом любые политические и идеологические методы. При этом необходимо до предела нагнести националистические тенденции, спровоцировав драматическое и быстрое пробуждение великого и мощного этноса.

Надо заметить, что никакие экономические меры сами по себе никогда не дадут положительного демографического результата без соответствующего религиозно-этического и идеологического обеспечения. Демографический спад можно остановить до нуля, а затем спровоцировать обратный процесс только с помощью соответствующей идеологии, которая сосредоточила бы основное внимание на изменении сознания народа, на преобразении его мышления, на внедрении в повседневную сферу сотен и тысяч символов, явно или неявно ориентирующих людей на национальные интересы. В рамках русского этноса русский национализм должен быть единственной и тотальной идеологией, могущей иметь свои различные версии и уровни, но всегда остающейся постоянной во всем, что касается постановки категории "нации" над категорией "индивидуальности". В конечном счете, должен быть выдвинут радикальный лозунг: "нация все, индивидуум ничто".

Эта политическая ориентация на национализм должна быть подкреплена и мерами чисто экономического характера, так как для осуществления национальной цели необходимы также чисто материальные инструменты. Будет оказана поддержка матерям, многодетным семьям, обеспечены социальные условия содержания работающим мужчиной большой семьи. Но этот экономический компонент будет иметь эффект только при условии доминанции национальной идеологии, которая должна не просто экономически поддержать демографический рост русских, но в целом сориентировать экономику в сугубо национальном ключе, поставить материальные интересы этноса выше индивидуальных интересов личности. Иными словами, экономическая поддержка рождаемости является частным случаем общей тенденции в экономике, которая вся в целом должна выводиться как раз из национальных интересов, а не из индивидуалистических эгоистических мотиваций или утопических абстракций.

Обращение к националистической идеологии, на первый взгляд, казалось, должно было бы спровоцировать этнические конфликты, ухудшить межнациональные отношения русских с соседними этносами, породить множество неразрешимых противоречий. Так бы, действительно, и произошло, если бы русский национализм распространял свои претензии на государственность в классическом смысле этого понятия. В русском националистическом православном государстве вряд ли захотели бы жить представители других этносов и конфессий. Но жить рядом с русским православным народом,

исповедующим национальную идеологию, в рамках единой континентальной Империи, объединенной геополитически и стратегически, но гибкой и дифференцированной во внутреннем устройстве, напротив, не представляет никаких затруднений для кого бы то ни было, так как всегда будет наличествовать высшая инстанция, перед лицом которой этно-религиозные общины имеют равный статус и которая руководствуется беспристрастными принципами имперской гармонии и справедливости. Проект Новой Империи на этническом уровне заключается именно в том, что не только у русского народа должна восторжествовать и утвердиться ярко выраженная национально-религиозная идеология, но это относится и ко всем остальным народам, которые войдут в состав Империи. Таким образом, возникнет конгломерат "позитивных национализмов" с общим знаменателем вертикалью имперской ориентации.

Важно, что только таким образом самый радикальный русский национализм сможет реализоваться в полной мере, так как основные преграды для его развития в таком случае будут устранены ни один из соседних народов не почувствует себя униженным или подавленным русской нацией, так как культурно-этнические и конфессиональные границы между народами Империи не будут иметь никакого политического значения. Русские будут жить в своей национальной реальности, татары в своей, чеченцы в своей, армяне в своей и т.д. даже в том случае, если речь будет идти об этнических анклавов или национальных меньшинствах среди иного народа. Национализм, свободный от проблемы государственности и границ, только укрепит взаимопонимание наций, предоставив им как свободу контактов друг с другом, так и свободу этнической изоляции.

Для выживания русского народа в нынешних трудных условиях, для демографического взлета русской нации, для улучшения ее тяжелейшего положения в этническом, биологическом и духовном смыслах необходимо обращение к самым радикальным формам русского национализма, без чего все технические или экономические меры останутся бессильными. Но этот национализм будет возможен лишь в органичном единстве с принципом геополитической континентальной Империи.

5.3 Русский вопрос после грядущей Победы

Видимо, с теоретической точки зрения, следует рассмотреть то положение русских, в котором они окажутся после возможной победы Евразийской Империи над атлантизмом. Конечно, это настолько далекая перспектива, что всерьез разбирать те проблемы, которые возникнут в таком случае, сейчас почти бессмысленно. Однако надо учитывать, что коллапс атлантизма может произойти почти мгновенно на любом этапе евразийского имперостроительства, поскольку геополитическая устойчивость Запада основана исключительно на правильном и умелом оперировании с геополитическими категориями, а отнюдь не на реальной индустриальной, экономической или военной мощи. Атлантистская конструкция на деле является крайне хрупкой, и стоит только выбить из нее одну из стратегических осей, к примеру Среднюю Европу, Тихоокеанский ареал или евразийский континентальный Юг, как рухнет все гигантское здание атлантизма, столь могущественного и устойчивого на первый взгляд. В тот момент, когда геополитическая стратегия "Трехсторонней комиссии" будет хотя бы в некоторой степени блокирована альтернативным евразийским проектом, можно ожидать серьезного сбоя в функционировании всего атлантистского комплекса, причем далее события могут разворачиваться стремительно и обвално, как это было в случае с распадом Советской Империи и ее сателлитов. Поэтому, хотя победа над атлантизмом и является крайне далекой перспективой, следует сформулировать несколько тезисов, относительно положения русских в гипотетическом постатлантистском мире.

В первую очередь, следует подчеркнуть, что геополитическое поражение США поставит перед самой Евразийской Империей множество проблем. В этот момент исчезнет тот главный фактор, который лежит в основе проекта геополитического объединения наций и народов в Новую Империю исчезнет принцип "общего врага". Эта консолидирующая энергия потеряет свое значение, и даже сам смысл дальнейшего существования Евразийской Империи будет поставлен под сомнение. В такой ситуации может начаться переход от нового двуполярного устройства мира Евразия против Атлантики к многополярной модели. При этом необходимо акцентировать тот факт, что многополярная модель станет возможной только после победы над атлантизмом, и никак не ранее. Пока атлантизм как сила, претендующая на универсальность, существует, ни о каком многополярном устройстве не может идти и речи. Лишь в рамках Новой Империи, в рамках глобального евразийского проекта и в ходе стратегического противостояния атлантизму могут сложиться объективные предпосылки для возникновения более или менее сбалансированной многополярности и никак не до этого. Зародыши многополярности сформируются лишь при реализации той дифференцированной имперской модели, которая утвердит статус политического субъекта за некоторыми органическими, культурно-духовными категориями народ, этнос, религия, нация вопреки ныне существующей доминирующей системе, где речь идет только о правовом статусе государств и отдельных личностей ("права человека"). "Столкновение цивилизаций" (по выражению Хантингтона) в многополярном мире будет реальностью только в том случае, если эти цивилизации смогут утвердиться и отвоевать себе право на существование в контексте антиатлантистского стратегического альянса. В настоящее же время есть только одна "цивилизация" атлантистская, западная, либерально-рыночная, противостоящая всем остальным историческим органическим культурным моделям.

Крах атлантизма поставит народы Новой Империи, ее отдельные сектора перед серьезной проблемой: сохранять ли дальше геополитическое единство или закрепить крупные цивилизационные блоки внутри Империи как самостоятельную геополитическую реальность? Но в любом случае национальные различия народов и конфессий выдвинутся при этом на первый план.

В таком случае, наилучшим вариантом было бы сохранение имперской структуры как наиболее гармоничной системы разрешения всех внутренних противоречий. По аналогии с некогда существовавшей доктриной *Jus Publicum Europaeum*, т.е. "Гражданского Европейского Закона", общего для всех народов Европы, Евразийская Империя в постатлантистскую эпоху могла бы основываться на сходной, но расширенной доктрине *Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum*. Утратив свое военно-стратегическое значение, имперский континентальный комплекс мог бы выступать в качестве высшей юридической инстанции, что сняло бы напряжение между евразийскими нациями, связь которых после победы над "общим врагом" неминуемо ослабнет. Такой выход был бы идеальным.

Но можно предполагать и распад континентального единства и образование на евразийских пространствах нескольких цивилизационных блоков русско-славянского (шире православного), европейского, дальневосточного, среднеазиатского, исламского и т.д. Соотношение каждого из них с остальными, и даже их границы и структуры, сейчас, естественно, невозможно предвидеть. Однако в такой гипотетической перспективе в проект устройства русской нации уже сегодня должна быть заложена модель, учитывающая в отдаленном будущем (и только после конца атлантизма) самостоятельное участие русских в мировой истории, вернувшейся к своему органическому и естественному ходу после длительного периода атлантистской аномалии. В таком случае русской нации надо быть готовой и к созданию своей собственной государственности или

к формированию более широкого естественного этно-государственного образования, скрепленного единством традиции, культуры, религии, судьбы. Вопрос о русском государстве может встать в полной мере, но это относится исключительно к постевразийскому периоду, который сам по себе проблематичен и гипотетичен.

Но уже в настоящий момент русские должны бросить все силы на национальную консолидацию, духовное, культурное и религиозное возрождение народа, на его окончательное становление и полноценное пробуждение с тем, чтобы в будущем (если потребуется) он смог отстоять свою национальную Истину не только от врагов, но и от союзников по имперостроительству, обладающих своим собственным исторически предопределенным национальным мировоззрением. Русские не просто должны сохранить свою идентичность в имперском контексте, они должны ее утвердить, раскалить и предельно углубить. И в дальней перспективе после краха атлантизма русским надо быть готовыми к отстаиванию своей собственной цивилизационной миссии, к защите своего универсального промыслительного национального пути.

Как бы то ни было, русские в любом случае окажутся на стратегически центральном месте в евразийском имперском пространстве, и следовательно, в вопросе цивилизационных приоритетов Империи в постатлантистский период (если Империя все же сохранится) они окажутся в привилегированном положении. Следовательно, в какой-то степени вся эта Империя будет связана с Русской Идеей, которая, действительно, эсхатологична и универсальна по определению, слита с гигантскими пространствами и космическим чувством. Если же континентальный блок станет распадаться на составляющие, русские, восстановившие свои силы благодаря националистическому периоду и энергичному процессу имперостроительства, окажутся снова в геополитически выгодном положении, занимая центральную позицию среди освобожденных народов и государств континента, что сделает возможное Русское Государство, Русскую Империю, устойчивой и стабильной геополитической реальностью, основанной на прочной национальной почве.

Обе эти возможности следует учитывать уже сегодня.

Глава 6. Военные аспекты Империи

6.1 Приоритет ядерного и межконтинентального потенциала

В военно-стратегическом смысле Новая Империя может быть реально создана лишь при условии сохранения ядерной мощи бывшего СССР, а также всех видов стратегических и космических вооружений в руках евразийского блока. Это главное условие не только для дееспособности грядущего континентального образования, но и для самого его создания, так как интеграция государств и "больших пространств" вокруг России, утверждение главных осей Евразии реализуются лишь при наличии у Москвы стратегического потенциала, который будет основным гарантом серьезности всего проекта. Именно сохранение стратегического баланса между атлантизмом (НАТО) и Россией (военно-стратегической наследницей СССР и полюсом нового евразийского блока) делает политические планы Новой Империи серьезными и практически достижимыми.

В настоящий момент стратегический потенциал бывшего СССР еще сохраняет свою пропорциональную сопоставимость с НАТО в сфере ядерного вооружения, атомных подводных лодок, некоторых военно-космических программ, в вопросе стратегической авиации. Как только этот баланс однозначно сместится в пользу атлантистов, евразийская Империя станет невозможной, Россия окончательно превратится в простую "региональную державу", а следовательно, резко сократит свою территорию и масштабы влияния. После этого никакие геополитические оси и политические проекты не смогут ничего изменить. Лишь на данном этапе, пока расклад сил "холодной войны" в стратегической сфере еще не изменился необратимо, геополитика и политика России действительно имеют решающее значение и континентальный вес. Фактически, возможность свободного и независимого геополитического проектирования напрямую зависит от сохранения стратегической сопоставимости русского и атлантистского потенциалов. Как только эта пропорция резко нарушится, Россия превратится из субъекта геополитики в ее объект. В этом случае русским останется лишь лавировать в навязанной извне ситуации, выбирая роли и приоритеты в сущностно "не своей" игре.

Такое положение дел делает евразийский проект напрямую связанным с качеством и потенциалом русской (бывшей советской) армии. И автоматически из этого можно сделать вывод: армия в таких условиях ни в коем случае не должна зависеть от сиюминутной политической ситуации в Москве. Напротив, само качество армии (естественно, в первую очередь, в вопросе стратегических вооружений) является основой всей русской политики, ее осью, а следовательно, структура армии должна предопределять общие контуры этой политики, утверждать сугубо политические ориентиры. Пока стратегический баланс в какой-то мере сохраняется, армия будет оставаться важнейшим фактором русской политики, так как сам политический статус страны, ее вес, ее возможности и ее будущее в такой ситуации напрямую зависят именно от ВС.

В данный момент в русской армии под давлением атлантизма происходит очень опасный процесс переориентации всей военной доктрины с континентально-советской структуры на регионально-локальную. Это означает, что в качестве "потенциального противника" России начинают рассматриваться более не США и страны НАТО, но пограничные с Россией страны, а также внутренние регионы РФ, могущие обратиться к сепаратизму. Такой поворот новой военной доктрины фактически полностью противоположен единственно разумной, с геополитической точки зрения, позиции ВС, так как "потенци

альными противниками" в данном случае становятся именно те страны, которые логически должны были бы стать естественными "союзниками" русских. Иными словами, "потенциальные союзники" рассматриваются в роли "потенциальных противников", а главный геополитический "потенциальный противник" России атлантический блок вообще сбрасывается со счетов.

Военный вопрос находится в прямой зависимости от геополитического выбора. Если Россия мыслит свое будущее как Империя, как интегратор и полюс нового континентального блока, ее ВС должны с необходимостью приоритетно ориентироваться на ядерное и стратегическое вооружение в ущерб более локальным формам вооружения. Основные военные действия в имперском плане будут развиваться в перспективе "войны континентов", и следовательно, особую роль приобретают межконтинентальные ракеты (в первую очередь, с ядерными боеголовками), стратегическая авиация, авианосцы и атомные подводные лодки, а также все формы космических военных программ, разрабатывавшихся как альтернатива СОИ. Приоритет именно таких видов вооружений как нельзя лучше способствовал бы континентальной интеграции и делал бы альянс с Россией привлекательным и фундаментальным для остальных евразийских блоков и стран. Именно такие виды вооружения напрямую связаны с возможностью России разыгрывать геополитическую карту на уровне континента, а следовательно, на более конкретном плане решать попутно и экономические проблемы на основе сотрудничества с развитыми регионами Средней Европы и Японией. Не следует забывать, что именно ядерный фактор, преподанный США как "гарант защиты Запада и демократии от советского тоталитаризма", был основным движущим мотором американской экономики в послевоенный период, когда экономически сильные, но военно-политически слабые страны Запада (и Япония) были вынуждены субсидировать американскую экономику и промышленность в обмен за стратегическую опеку *Pax Americana*. В некотором смысле, Россия уже в настоящий момент может предложить нечто аналогичное как Европе, так и Японии, с тем дополнением, что в интересах России способствовать политическому созреванию этих двух "потенциальных Империй", а не ослаблять и жестко контролировать их, как это имеет место в случае американской, атлантической доминации. Даже на чисто прагматическом уровне, преодоление экономического кризиса в России возможно только при активном геополитическом использовании стратегического фактора и соответствующих видов вооружений. Чтобы получить "больше хороших товаров", проще не перепрофилировать ВПК на изготовление кастрюль, а продолжать и интенсифицировать изготовление авианосцев и атомных подводных лодок. При соответствующем политическом обеспечении несколько подводных лодок могут принести России целые страны с развитой промышленностью, причем сугубо мирным путем, тогда как перестроив военные заводы на выпуск стиральных машин, Россия нанесет себе непоправимый экономический ущерб.

Перепрофилирование армии в целом на "региональный" манер означает развитие всех нестратегических, обычных видов вооружения. Если провести такую военную реформу разумно и последовательно (во что в наших условиях верится с трудом), то русские получат эффективную мобильную армию, готовую к боевым действиям в континентальных условиях и способную решать успешно и беспроblemно военные конфликты масштаба Афганистана, Таджикистана или Чечни. Неэффективность советских войск в локальных конфликтах, которую можно было наблюдать в афганской войне и в перестроенных конфликтах, была результатом стратегического приоритета в строительстве ВС СССР, который ориентировался на глобальный ядерный конфликт, а не на локальные войны малой и средней интенсивности. Это закономерно. Перестройка в армии с приоритетом "региональной ориентации", т.е. выбор в качестве основной цели именно успешные военные действия в рамках "войн малой и средней интенсивности",

неминуемо приведет к разрушению стратегических вооружений, так как ни одна армия сегодня, даже в самой богатой и развитой экономической стране к примеру, США не способна эффективно проводить свое строительство сразу в двух направлениях стратегическом и региональном. (Недееспособность американцев в локальных конфликтах была уже не раз продемонстрирована начиная с Вьетнама и кончая Югославией и Сомали.) Поэтому, на первый взгляд, "позитивное" преобразование армии, якобы отвечающее духу времени, в далекой перспективе означает конец стратегической безопасности русских, потерю каких-либо серьезных гарантий территориальной целостности РФ и полную невозможность каким-то образом улучшить свое геополитическое состояние в будущем.

Русские национальные интересы заключаются сегодня в том, чтобы любой ценой сохранить свой стратегический потенциал на межконтинентальном уровне, т.е. остаться "сверхдержавой", хотя и в урезанном, редуцированном варианте. Для обеспечения этого условия можно пожертвовать всем идти на любые политические, геополитические, экономические и территориальные компромиссы. При сохранении стратегического потенциала любая сегодняшняя уступка будет пересмотрена в пользу русских завтра. Пока все остается по-прежнему, все политические шаги российского руководства в пользу Запада остаются теоретически обратимыми.

Судьба русских и их грандиозного будущего заключается сегодня не в том, сколько русских оказались вне РФ, и не в том, какое у нас политическое или экономическое положение в данный момент, а в том, будет ли у нас достаточный уровень вооружений для того, чтобы военным образом отстоять свою независимость от единственного и естественного "потенциального врага" России от США и североатлантического блока. Все остальные вопросы вытекают отсюда. На этом же основывается и однозначное определение того, возможна ли еще реализация глобального евразийского имперского проекта или уже нет.

6.2 Какие ВС нужны великой России?

Иерархия развития военного комплекса в перспективе создания Евразийской Империи ясно вытекает из основных геополитических положений:

- 1) Приоритетом пользуются космические виды вооружений, которые имеют такой потенциальный масштаб территориального воздействия, что традиционные формы обеспечения военной безопасности государства или блока государств перед ними отступают, полностью теряя эффективность и значение. Разработки русского варианта СОИ имеют здесь центральное значение. Также крайне важны разработки "атмосферического" оружия и эксперименты с неортодоксальными типами вооружений, связанными с воздействием на психический компонент человека. Эта затратная и наукоемкая сфера вооружений, практически неприменимых при этом в локальных конфликтах, на самом деле, является самой главной осью подлинной безопасности государства и нации. Без этих исследований и соответствующих результатов, народ оказывается практически незащищенным перед лицом "потенциального противника", и все вопросы "независимости", "суверенитета" и "геополитических проектов" отпадают сами собой.
- 2) Далее следует ядерное оружие на воздушноносителях ракетный потенциал и стратегическая авиация. Эта межконтинентальная сфера вооружений, нацеленная на потенциальный конфликт с атлантическим полюсом, создает постоянную угрозу тем регионам, которые надежно защищены морскими границами от всех остальных

форм военного вторжения. Неслучайно, именно развитие советского ракетостроения вызвало такую панику в свое время в США, и именно успехи в этой области позволили СССР и Варшавскому договору просуществовать так долго после Второй мировой войны, несмотря на предельно невыгодную геополитическую ситуацию с сухопутными границами. Только межконтинентальные виды вооружений делали СССР в некотором приближении "континентом", что давало определенные основания для стратегического паритета с настоящим континентом США.

- 3) Следующим уровнем важности надо считать ВМФ. Этот вид вооружений так же, как и межконтинентальные ракеты и стратегическая авиация, призван выполнять глобальные военные задачи при столкновении с "потенциальным противником" №1 США. При этом в перспективе создания континентального блока ВМФ России должен стать отправной точкой для создания гигантской системы стратегических портов как на Юге, так и на Западе (чего Россия и СССР были традиционно лишены). Авианосцы и атомные подводные лодки играют в этом первостепенное значение. ВМФ должен структурно ориентироваться на ведение боевых действий в морских условиях и в прибрежных зонах, т.е. в пространстве максимально удаленном от сухопутной базы. Это должно стать приоритетной формой боевых действий в потенциальном военном конфликте, так как основной императив успешной стратегии заключается, как известно, в ведении боевых действий либо на территории потенциального противника, либо на нейтральной территории. При этом заранее надо предусмотреть геополитическую и стратегическую специфику адаптации существующей модели ВМФ к условиям южных морей и океанов, а также к западной Атлантике. Черноморский флот и флот Балтийский рано или поздно утратят свое значение для России как Империи, поскольку они являются важными стратегическими пунктами только для "региональной державы", становление которой уже само по себе равносильно для России стратегическому самоубийству.

Поэтому контроль над Индийским океаном и Атлантикой гораздо важнее для континентального блока, чем второстепенные порты, легко замыкающиеся проливами или узким перешейком между Балтикой и Северным морем. ВМФ в целом должен ориентироваться, скорее, на дальневосточные и североморские образцы, аналоги которых Россия должна быть готова воспроизвести, когда придет время, в Индии, Иране и Западной Европе, так как именно эти территории являются подлинными геополитическими границами имперской (а не региональной!) России.

- 4) Сухопутные войска имеют в имперской перспективе наименьшее значение и призваны играть скорее роль "внутренних войск", чем действительно важной стратегической величины. В реальном межконтинентальном конфликте сухопутные войска должны исполнять лишь вспомогательную функцию этим и определяется их место в иерархии военного строительства. Единственным исключением являются в данном вопросе воздушно-десантные войска и спецназ, которые в силу своей мобильности и несвязанности с сухопутными континентальными базами могут принимать активное участие в серьезных межконтинентальных операциях. Соответственно, ВДВ надо наделять приоритетом перед иными сухопутными секторами армии.

Такая структура ВС России и будущей Новой Империи в общих чертах воспроизводит сугубо советскую модель армии в послевоенный период. Последняя явилась результатом естественного геополитического процесса, который яснее всего осознавался именно

армейским руководством, дававшим адекватный ответ на самую геополитическую логику истории, в то время как политические и идеологические клише не позволяли партийным руководителям СССР поступать в согласии с единственной, само собой напрашивавшейся, логикой государственного и стратегического развития Советского Государства. Перспектива геополитического и стратегического экспансионизма вписана в самую основополагающую структуру географического положения России, и именно армия понимала это полнее и отчетливее других. Поэтому ВС СССР в общем смысле двигались в совершенно правильном направлении и в определении "потенциального противника", и в выборе приоритетов развития тех или иных видов вооружений, и в техническом оснащении армии новейшими технологиями. При этом, однако, чрезмерное идеологическое давление и общее обветшание позднесоветского общества сказались и на ВС, которые, казалось, мгновенно забыли о своей собственной логике и своих собственных интересах (совпадающих с национальными интересами всех русских в вопросе свободы и безопасности нации), и частные погрешности отвлекли внимание от основных стратегических вопросов.

Актуальная перестройка армии, исходящая из концепции "Россия региональная держава", фактически переворачивает ту иерархию, которая должна существовать в Новой Империи и которая существовала в общих чертах в ВС СССР.

В "региональной" армии РФ приоритет отдается сухопутным войскам, хотя ВДВ также несколько выделены из остальных родов войск.

Далее следует ВМФ, причем конверсия и сокращение осуществляются, в первую очередь, за счет авианосцев и атомных подводных лодок, а вокруг Черноморского флота, практически лишенного стратегической значимости, поднимается скандал между Москвой и Киевом, вообще не имеющий никакого исхода, так как изначальные термины и цели в корне неверны.

Еще меньше внимания уделяется авиации и ракетостроению, а стратегическая авиация и межконтинентальные ракеты вообще уничтожаются. Параллельно реализуется отказ от ядерного оружия.

Программы развертывания космических видов вооружения, совершенно излишних в региональных конфликтах, замораживаются и свертываются, поскольку в узко "региональной" перспективе они представляют собой только гигантскую и бессмысленную статью расходов госбюджета, не имеющую никакого оправдания.

Сравнив две модели приоритетов армейского строительства, мы видим, что они представляют собой две противоположности.

Одна армия (первый континентальный вариант) предназначена для защиты континентального блока, Евразии, России в ее истинном геополитическом объеме от "потенциального противника", которым были и остаются США и атлантистский блок. Такая армия ориентирована на обеспечение подлинных интересов русских и является гарантом национальной независимости и свободы. Кроме того, такая армия позволяет эффективно реализовать глобальный евразийский проект, который только и способен сделать геополитическое положение России в мире стабильным и безопасным, а также решить важнейшие экономические проблемы.

Вторая армия ("регионального" типа) нужна России, понятой только как РФ и заинтересованной лишь в решении локальных и внутренних политических проблем. Такая

армия не может быть подлинным гарантом национальной безопасности. Ее изначальная установка на потенциальный конфликт с соседними странами и народами заставляет русских постоянно находится в ожидании удара со стороны "враждебного соседа" ("бывшего братского народа"). Ее структура лишает русских возможности вступления в адекватные геополитические отношения со Средней Европой и Японией, так как ее будет явно недостаточно, чтобы в перспективе защитить эти геополитические образования от потенциальной агрессии США. Более того, такая структура заставляет русских относить всех трех участников будущих геополитических осей Евразии Берлин, Тегеран, Токио к "потенциальным противникам", и соответственно, провоцирует такое же отношение этих стран к России. И совершенно неважно, что армейская структурная перестройка будет сопровождаться пацифистскими уверениями. В геополитике а она стоит выше чисто политических соображений при принятии самых ответственных решений характер вооружений той или иной страны говорит гораздо выразительнее, чем официальные и неофициальные заявления дипломатов и политических лидеров.

Глава 7. Технологии и ресурсы

7.1 Технологический дефицит

Одна из причин поражения СССР в холодной войне заключается в его серьезном технологическом отставании по сравнению со странами противоположного геополитического лагеря. Дело в том, что технологический скачок атлантистов был обеспечен эффективным распределением ролей среди стран участниц НАТО. С одной стороны, США концентрировали в себе сугубо военный, стратегический полюс, предоставляя другим капиталистическим странам развивать торговый, финансовый и технологический аспект, не заботясь о непосредственных инвестициях "новых высоких технологий" в военно-промышленный комплекс. США часто лишь использовали готовые высокие технологии применительно к своему ВПК, а создавались и разрабатывались они в Европе, Японии и других странах. Страны, находившиеся под "опекой" США, платили патрону "технологическую дань" за геополитическую протекцию. СССР, со своей стороны, радикально централизовал все технологические разработки почти исключительно в рамках своего ВПК, что делало исследования и новейшие проекты более сложным делом, они как бы изначально готовились в централизованном административном организме и ориентировались на планово поставленные цели, а это резко сужало сферу технологического новаторства. Иными словами, на одну и ту же централизованную структуру ложилось сразу две задачи: огромное напряжение по созданию планетарного военного стратегического комплекса и технологическое обеспечение этого комплекса вместе с развитием наукоемких производств в параллельных сферах. Вся область высоких технологий, информационных программ, вычислительной техники и т.д. была строго связана с ВПК, и это лишало ее необходимых подчас гибкости и независимости. Можно предположить, что при отсутствии у США таких геополитических "вассалов", как Франция, Англия, Германия, Япония, Тайвань, Южная Корея, и т.д., их технологический уровень был бы значительно ниже актуального.

Технологическое отставание СССР было неизбежным. И сегодня русские в полной мере переживают последствия неудачи СССР в этой области, так как с каждым днем усугубляется зависимость русской промышленности и экономики от западных патентов, ноу-хау и т.д. А между тем, определенный уровень технологической развитости совершенно необходим для любого государства, стремящегося иметь вес в международной политике и обладать эффективной, конкурентоспособной внутренней экономической структурой. Если же говорить об имперской перспективе русской нации, то высокий технологический уровень тем более необходим для обеспечения всех стратегических и геополитических факторов, на которых покоится всякая геополитическая и экономическая экспансия. Итак, ставится вопрос: двигаясь в каком направлении, русские смогли бы наверстать упущенное и преодолеть технологическое отставание, унаследованное от СССР, при том, что в настоящее время оно не уменьшается, а наоборот возрастает (утечка мозгов, сокращение государственного финансирования научной деятельности, конверсия, упадок и перестройка в ВПК и т.д.)?

Есть три гипотетические возможности. Первая заключается в том, что Россия отказывается от всех своих геополитических претензий на самостоятельность, полностью капитулирует перед атлантизмом, и в качестве "награды" за послушание дозированно получает из рук американцев доступ к некоторым "высоким технологиям", несколько устаревшим и не представляющим собой стратегических секретов. Этот путь фактически был опробован на примере некоторых стран Третьего мира, которые таким образом

действительно смогли совершить экономический, финансовый и промышленный скачок (т.н. "азиатский" или "тихоокеанский тигр"). В случае России США будут гораздо более осмотрительны, чем в отношении стран Европы или Третьего мира, так как геополитический и исторический масштаб России настолько велик, что экономическое процветание и технологический рывок может в какой-то момент снова сделать ее мощным "потенциальным врагом" США. Естественно ожидать, что доступ русских к "высоким технологиям", даже на условиях полной капитуляции и тотального демонтажа стратегических аспектов ВПК, будет всячески тормозиться и саботироваться. Этот путь представляется тупиковым.

Второй путь, свойственный сторонникам "малого национализма", заключается в том, чтобы предельным усилием внутренних ресурсов совершить технологический скачок без помощи посторонних сил. Это предполагает предельную, почти тоталитарную, мобилизацию всего народа и резкое ухудшение отношений с Западом. Если при этом все ограничится объемом РФ и Россией, понятой как "региональная держава", то подобные попытки обречены на провал, поскольку возникнут те же самые проблемы, что и в случае СССР русские должны будут одновременно и защищать себя от сверхдержавы в качестве "потенциального противника" и сами развивать такие тонкие сферы, как исследования в области высоких технологий. Поскольку с этим не справился стабильный и строго организованный СССР, то кризисная, дестабилизированная РФ с этим не справится и подавно. К тому же в данном случае придется вводить элементы "тоталитаризма", что с неизбежностью вызовет глубокий внутренний протест. Значит, и этот путь следует отбросить.

Последний вариант заключается в том, что высокие технологии заимствуются у развитых европейских и азиатских стран (но не у США) в обмен на стратегический альянс и доступ к русским ресурсам. Здесь есть все шансы на успех, причем такой путь сохранит у русских определенную независимость от США и в то же время позволит избежать перенапряжения нации, диктатуры и жестких мер. Хотя подобный процесс незамедлительно вызовет ярость со стороны США, угрозы России и, самое главное, своим "неверным вассалам", некоторые страны могут пойти на это в случае, если стратегическая мощь России еще будет сопоставима с американской, а русская идеология не будет откровенно империалистической (или коммунистической). Кроме того, высокие технологии в данном случае будут обменены на важнейший для Германии, Японии и других развитых стран компонент ресурсы, доступ к которым во всем мире жестко контролируют США. Русские ресурсы, Средняя Азия, Сибирь и т. д. являются жизненно важными именно для этих стран, поскольку США в целом в этом вопросе довольно независимы. Полезные ископаемые, сырье, источники энергии плюс мощная стратегическая военная протекция эта совокупность вполне может склонить некоторые развитые страны пойти на теснейшее сотрудничество в сфере высоких технологий и предоставить в распоряжение русских самые высшие достижения в этой области (вместе с инсталляцией и организацией производства). В перспективе же постепенно наладилось бы и национальное направление в этих вопросах, но в любом случае начальный толчок здесь необходим.

Этот третий путь целиком и полностью вписывается в общий евразийский проект, являясь его конкретизацией на более практическом уровне. Фактически, он означает, что создание геополитической оси Берлин Москва Токио есть не просто политико-географический план, но и наилучшее решение проблемы технологического отставания русских.

7.2 Русские ресурсы

Россия является естественным поставщиком ресурсов в другие страны. Такое положение дел имеет довольно долгую историю и стало, во многом, определяющим фактором в геополитическом статусе России. Рассмотрим подробнее геополитическое значение экспорта ресурсов и роль ресурсного обеспечения в целом.

В глобальном распределении ресурсов на планете существует некоторое неравенство две зоны из четырех развитых секторов Севера имеют доступ к ресурсам и способны обеспечить в случае необходимости ресурсную автаркию (США и Россия), а две испытывают острый ресурсный дефицит (Европа и Япония). Таким образом, в значительной степени контроль над двумя небогатыми ресурсами зонами определяется взаимоотношениями с двумя остальными. При этом есть и еще одна особенность США стремится контролировать ресурсы колониальных или полуколониальных территорий и с их помощью влиять на развитые страны. Собственные ресурсы США стараются сберечь для самих себя и расходуют их крайне бережно, хотя в случае необходимости для США не составит большой проблемы создать для самих себя ресурсную автаркию и без колониальной стратегии в этой области. Россия же традиционно манипулирует экспортом собственных ресурсов. Это различие в позиции двух держав имеет, и с той и с другой стороны, как плюсы, так и минусы. США постоянно имеет неприкосновенным стратегический запас, но одновременно колониальные ресурсные базы всегда теоретически имеют шанс выйти из-под контроля. Россия, со своей стороны, может быть уверена в ресурсном обеспечении, поскольку ресурсы находятся на ее территории, но вместе с тем, экспортируя их, она тратит всегда собственные стратегические запасы.

Такое объективное положение дел в перспективе создания континентального блока может быть использовано на благо русских следующим образом. На начальном этапе Россия может предложить потенциальным партнерам на Востоке и Западе свои ресурсы в качестве компенсации за обострение отношений с США, которое неминуемо произойдет уже на первых этапах реализации евразийского проекта. Это будет возможным еще и потому, что с Европой и Японией может быть установлена на прямая сухопутная связь, не зависящая от того морского и берегового контроля, который является главным козырем в геополитической стратегии атлантизма. Естественно, такой экспорт не будет односторонней помощью, так как этот процесс должен быть вписан в общий геополитический план, предполагающий активное финансовое и технологическое участие Европы и Японии в стратегическом развитии самой России, а кроме того, существенное расширение ее политических и оборонных рубежей на Востоке и Западе.

В перспективе же следует ориентироваться на вытеснение США из Африки, с Ближнего Востока и тихоокеанского региона с соответствующим перераспределением богатых ресурсами территорий в пользу евразийских партнеров и самой России. Этот план является прямой противоположностью "плана анаконды" со стороны атлантистов, который предусматривает жесткий контроль США именно над южно-евразийскими, африканскими и тихоокеанскими пространствами в целях недопущения организации автаркичных экономических зон для своих геополитических конкурентов. Когда удастся загнать "анаконду" атлантизма обратно на американский континент, весь "бедный Юг" Евразии станет естественным дополнением более развитого евразийского Севера. Арабская нефть, африканские полезные ископаемые и ресурсы тихоокеанских пространств смогут поступать непосредственно в страны евразийского блока, минуя США. В таком случае, Россия сможет не только начать копить ресурсы для себя самой, но и получит новые ареалы в южном направлении. Евразийская Европа двинется на Юг, чтобы стать Евроафрикой, а Япония установит в Тихом океане тот "новый порядок",

который она планировала осуществить в 30-е годы. Сама же Россия, используя тот технологический опыт, который она либо уже имеет, либо приобретет за период снабжения ресурсами своих технологически развитых партнеров по блоку (на первом этапе континентального строительства), сможет принять активное участие в разработке новых месторождений в Средней и Восточной Азии и постепенно заморозит те месторождения, которые жизненно необходимы для обеспечения ее собственного стратегического будущего.

В вопросе ресурсов план создания "анти-Трилатера ля" (блок Берлин Москва Токио) и в близкой и в далекой перспективах представляется в высшей степени реалистичным, так как переходный период для Западной и Восточной оси (для Берлина и Токио), которые испытают на себе жесточайшее давление США, будет смягчен ресурсными возможностями России, способной на переходном периоде своим экспортом полезных ископаемых создать все условия, необходимые для полноценного политического и стратегического возрождения Европы и Японии. А после этого и сами эти "большие пространства" смогут усилить свою экономическую и политическую экспансию по направлению Север Юг. Особенно важно, что Россия за этот переходный период сможет, в свою очередь, получить эффективное технологическое оснащение для разработок месторождений и апробировать, двигаясь по наилегчайшему пути, развитую методологию и технические модели, поставленные с европейского Запада и японского Дальнего Востока. А этот фактор в перспективе значительно усилит стратегическую автаркию русских независимо от того, как повернутся события в дальнейшем.

Естественно, что в настоящий момент проблема русских ресурсов решается как угодно, только не так, как это было бы выгодно России. Русские сегодня продают ресурсы по демпинговым ценам, за фиктивные деньги и иностранные товары, причем либо непосредственно США, либо при их посредничестве (американские монопольные компании или ТНК, неявно контролируемые атлантистами) странам Западной Европы. В качестве альтернативы "националисты" выдвигают вообще неосуществимое требование совсем прекратить экспорт ресурсов и полностью оставить для России и их разработку и их потребление. Последний проект потребует такого напряжения всех национальных сил, что может реализоваться только в условиях политической диктатуры, что почти невероятно в настоящей ситуации. Здесь дело обстоит так же, как и в случае высоких технологий. Только "третий путь" ни ресурсный экспорт в пользу США, ни полный отказ от какого бы то ни было экспорта может быть реальным выходом в нынешней ситуации.

И снова все упирается в политическую необходимость скорейшего создания континентального евразийского блока.

Глава 8. Экономические аспекты "Новой Империи"

8.1 Экономика "третьего пути"

Промышленная перестройка в России назрела. В том, что говорят "реформаторы" о неизбежности экономических преобразований в России, есть значительная доля истины. Советская система, хотя и была до определенной степени эффективной и конкурентоспособной, постепенно стала настолько негибкой и застывшей, что просто не могла не рухнуть, и, к великому сожалению, под ее обломками были похоронены многие эффективные и позитивные аспекты социализма как такового.

Логика экономических преобразований в России, начатая в перестройку, основывалась на дуалистическом подходе к экономике. С одной стороны, имелась существующая модель жесткого централистского государственного социализма, "тотальный дирижизм", когда государство вмешивалось в малейшие нюансы производства и распределения, подавляя любые частные инициативы и исключая все рыночные элементы. Такая структурная жесткость не только делала всю экономическую систему громоздкой и неповоротливой (отсюда постепенный проигрыш в конкуренции с капитализмом), но и извращала основной принцип социализма, предполагающий эффективное соучастие общества в экономическом процессе. В экономико-философских рукописях Маркса есть предупреждение о подобном вырождении социалистической системы, которое может быть охарактеризовано как "отчуждение при социализме".

Критика такой централизованной экономики, однако, очень быстро перешла в противоположную крайность, т.е. к абсолютной апологетике либерально-капиталистической системы с ее "законами рынка", "невидимой рукой", "свободой торговли" и т.д. От сверхцентрализации либеральные реформаторы (пусть только в теории) решили перейти к сверхлиберализму. Если советский социализм на поздних своих этапах ослаблял государственную автаркию в ее конкуренции с противостоящим геополитическим блоком, то рыночные реформы повлекли за собой настоящее разрушение этой автаркии, что не может быть квалифицировано иначе как "предательство национальных интересов". Реформы были необходимы, но дуалистическая логика либо советский социализм, либо капиталистический либерализм с самого начала поставила вопрос в совершенно неверной плоскости, поскольку спор приобрел чисто теоретический характер, и соображения геополитической автаркии России были отодвинуты при этом на задний план. Предложенные либеральные преобразования в стиле программ "Чикаго бойз" и теорий фон Хайека нанесли экономике сокрушительный удар. Однако и реставрационистские экономические программы, на которых настаивала в той или иной мере "консервативная" оппозиция, были немногим лучше. В обоих случаях речь шла о полемике между двумя утопическими абстрактными моделями, в которых вопрос "национальных интересов русских" стоял где-то на втором или даже третьем плане.

Это было вполне логично, так как советские экономисты в силу специфики своего образования привыкли иметь дело только с двумя экономическими моделями догматическим советским социализмом (который они до поры до времени защищали) и либеральным капитализмом (который они до поры до времени критиковали). Обе эти модели в той форме, в которой они изучались и разрабатывались, никогда не соотносились с таким критерием как "геополитические интересы страны", так как эта тема (хотя и в другой форме) была приоритетом армейских и идеологических структур (особенно ГРУ и КГБ). Перенесся основной акцент на экономику, лидеры перестройки

вынесли вопрос о "национальной и государственной безопасности и мощи" за скобки. И как только это произошло, страна попала в ловушку неправильно сформулированной проблемы, любое решение которой в заданных терминах было заведомо тупиковым.

Строго говоря, народ должен был выбирать не между либерал-капитализмом и советским социализмом, а между либерал-капитализмом, советским социализмом и особой экономической доктриной, сочетающей элементы рынка и элементы планирования, подчиняясь главному императиву национального процветания и государственной безопасности ("третий путь"). Этот "третий путь" в экономике отнюдь не компромисс, не синкретическое сочетание разнородных элементов двух других экономических моделей, а законченная и самостоятельная доктрина, имеющая долгую историю и множество примеров реализации на практике. Однако об этом "третьем пути" практически не упоминалось в рамках общественных споров вообще. Результат упорного отказа от серьезного рассмотрения такого варианта налицо: разрушенная и ослабленная страна, разваленная экономика, возрастающая паразитическая зависимость России от ВМФ и Международного Банка, распад хозяйственных и промышленных связей и т.д. На данный момент нет ни социализма, ни рынка, и вряд ли что-то можно поправить, оставаясь в рамках той логики, которая стала доминирующей при решении важнейших экономических вопросов.

"Третий путь" в экономике не тождественен ни шведской, ни швейцарской модели вопреки тому, что думают некоторые политики, начинающие отдавать себе отчет в тупиковости сложившейся ситуации. Ни Швеция, ни Швейцария не являются полноценными геополитическими образованиями и не обладают серьезным стратегическим суверенитетом, а следовательно, гигантская часть государственного, промышленного и военного сектора, необходимого для обеспечения реальной автаркии, в этих государствах вообще отсутствует. Некоторый компромисс между социально ориентированной структурой общества и рыночной экономикой в этих странах действительно достигнут, но здесь речь идет о сугубо искусственной модели, которая смогла сложиться именно за счет полной деполитизации этих стран и сознательного отказа от активной роли в геополитическом раскладе сил в Европе. Россия никогда не сможет стать по своим масштабам "второй Швецией" или "второй Швейцарией", так как само ее геополитическое положение обязывает к активной роли; нейтралитет в данном случае просто невозможен. Следовательно, обращаться к таким примерам бессмысленно.

Второй иллюзией, характерной для тех, кто интуитивно ищет моделей "третьего пути" для России, является Китай и его реформы. Однако и в этом случае имеет место "обман зрения", объяснимый отсутствием объективной информации о сущности и ходе китайских реформ. Китайские экономические преобразования лишь внешне похожи на модель "третьего пути". На самом деле, речь идет о трансформации общества, в целом похожего на советское, в чисто либеральный строй, но без демократических преобразований в политике, т.е. при сохранении тоталитарного контроля правящей элиты над политической ситуацией. Речь идет о том, что политический тоталитаризм коммунистической номенклатуры плавно переходит в экономический, монополярный тоталитаризм той же самой номенклатуры, которая при этом стремится с самого начала отсечь всякую возможность экономической конкуренции снизу. Одна модель "общества отчуждения" плавно переходит в другую модель "общества отчуждения", а политическая эксплуатация незаметно превращается в экономическую эксплуатацию одной и той же социальной группы.

Показательно, что такой тип реформ был разработан именно "Трехсторонней комиссией", чьи представители уже с начала 80-х годов договорились с китайской номенклатурой о

включении Китая в перспективе в мондиалистскую зону влияния с предоставлением ему статуса "региональной державы". Во многом этот ход атлантистов был обусловлен стратегией "холодной войны" против СССР, но одновременно и стремлением поддержать традиционного конкурента Японии на Дальнем Востоке и ограничить экономическую экспансию последней.

Подлинный "третий путь" в экономике нашел свое классическое воплощение в работах Фридриха Листа, сформулировавшего принципы "экономической автаркии больших пространств". Эта теория исходит из факта неравномерности экономического развития капиталистических обществ и из логического следствия экономической колонизации более "богатыми" странами более бедных; причем для "богатых" в таких условиях "свободная торговля" выгодна, а для "бедных" наоборот. Отсюда Лист сделал вывод, что на определенных этапах экономического развития общества нужно прибегать к протекционизму, дирижизму и таможенным ограничениям, т.е. к ограничению принципа "свободы торговли" на межнациональном уровне, для того, чтобы достичь уровня национальной и государственной независимости и стратегического могущества. Иными словами, для Листа было очевидно, что экономика должна быть подчинена национальным интересам, и что всякая апелляция к "автономной логике рынка" является лишь прикрытием для экономической (а впоследствии и политической) экспансии богатых государств в ущерб более бедным, и последующее порабощение последних. Такой подход сразу ставит четкие границы, в каких должен действовать "рыночный" принцип, а в каких "социалистический". Интересно, что и Ратенау, автор германского "экономического чуда", и Витте, и Ленин, и даже Кейнс, формулировали свои экономические принципы исходя как раз из доктрины Фридриха Листа, хотя при этом использовался язык более близкий либо к чисто капиталистической, либо коммунистической лексике.

Экономическая иерархия, выстраиваемая Листом, может быть сведена к простой формуле: те аспекты хозяйственной жизни, которые по масштабам сопоставимы с интересами частного лица, индивидуума, должны управляться рыночными принципами и основываться на "частной собственности". Речь идет о жилье, небольшом производстве, малых земельных владениях и т.д. По мере возрастания значения того или иного вида хозяйственной деятельности, форма производства должна приобретать черты коллективного владения, поскольку в данном случае "частная собственность" и индивидуальный фактор могут войти в противоречие с коллективными интересами; здесь должен действовать "кооперативный" или "корпоративный" критерий. И наконец, экономические сферы, напрямую связанные с государством и его стратегическим статусом, должны контролироваться, субсидироваться и управляться государственными инстанциями, так как речь идет об интересах более высокого уровня, нежели "частная собственность" или "коллективная выгода". Таким образом, в подобном экономическом укладе не элиты, не рынок и не коллектив определяют хозяйственный, промышленный и финансовый облик общества он формируется на основе конкретных интересов конкретного государства в конкретных исторических условиях, и соответственно, в данной модели не может принципиально существовать никакой догматики по мере изменения геополитического статуса государства и в силу исторических и национальных условий пропорции между объемом этих трех ступеней хозяйственной иерархии могут значительно меняться. К примеру, в мирное время и в эпоху процветания частный сектор вместе с коллективным могут возрастать, а государственный сокращаться. И наоборот, в сложные периоды национальной истории, когда под удар поставлена независимость всего народа полномочия государственного сектора увеличиваются за счет некоторых коллективных хозяйственных образований, а те, в свою очередь, теснят частное предпринимательство.

Очень интересно, что именно модель Фридриха Листа использовалась исторически развитыми капиталистическими странами в кризисные моменты. Так, даже США, радикальные защитники принципа "свободы торговли", периодически прибегали к протекционистским мерам и государственным субсидиям в промышленный сектор, когда наступали периоды "экономической депрессии". Именно таким периодом был этап реализации New Deal, когда американцы почти буквально воспроизвели принципы Листа, хотя и подав их в смягченном варианте Кейнса, автора теории "экономической инсуляции", что, в целом, есть не что иное, как новое название для теории "экономической автаркии больших пространств". Кстати, сам Лист долгое время жил в США и наблюдал процесс капиталистического строительства на ранних фазах. На основании этих наблюдений он и сформулировал основные принципы своей теории применительно к Германии. Но, конечно, наиболее грандиозные результаты дала реализация доктрины Листа в национал-социалистической Германии, когда его идеи были претворены в жизнь тотально и без всяких либеральных или марксистских поправок.

Доктрина экономики "третьего пути" имеет еще один важный аспект соотношение финансового и производственного факторов. Очевидно, что ранний капитализм и социализм советского типа ставили основной акцент на развитии производства, отводя финансовой системе второстепенную, подчиненную роль. Развитый капитализм, напротив, тяготеет к доминации финансового капитала над производством, которое, в свою очередь, становится второстепенным моментом. Доминанция принципа "труда" рано или поздно приводит к политическому насилию, доминанция "капитала" к насилию экономическому. В первом случае труд автономизируется и отрывается от конкретных ценностей, во втором автономизируются деньги, также теряя связь с ценностью и превращаясь в кредитно-процентную фикцию. "Третий путь" настаивает на жестком связывании труда и ценности (к примеру, золотых запасов и, шире, ресурсов), отводя сфере потребления и циркуляции товаров подчиненную, второстепенную, чисто инструментальную роль. Такое сочетание труда и ценности диктуется в данном случае теми же соображениями обеспечения "национального могущества" и государственного суверенитета, что и вся структура этой экономической доктрины. Можно упрощенно выразить эту идею формулой "ни роскошь, ни нищета", "довольствование разумным минимумом". Это означает более гибкий и свободный подход к труду, нежели при советском социализме, но большую ограниченность возможностей личного обогащения, чем при капитализме. Такая модель позволяет нации не зависеть в стратегических областях от других государств и экономических систем, но в то же время лишает трудовой процесс принудительного характера и связывает его с материальным эквивалентом.

Именно такой вариант экономики "третьего пути" является единственной альтернативой в нынешней России, противостоящей одновременно и безудержному либерализму и реставрационистским проектам некоммунистов, не желающих серьезно корректировать устаревшие и оказавшиеся неэффективными догмы. Если бы не мгновенно возникающие ассоциации с гитлеровским режимом, можно было бы назвать данный проект "социализмом национального типа". Уже сам факт выдвижения теории Листа (развитой, впрочем, такими знаменитыми экономистами, как Сисмонди, Шумпетер, Дюмон и т.д.) в контексте нынешней экономической ситуации в России был бы большим достижением, так как здесь можно найти ответы на наиболее насущные вопросы и разом покончить с тупиковым дуализмом "реформаторов и антиреформаторов". Более того, позитивные стороны и либеральных преобразований и сохранившихся еще от социализма структур могли бы быть прекрасно задействованы в этот экономический проект. Но все это даст положительный эффект только в контексте осознанного и теоретически проработанного доктринального корпуса, а не в качестве прагматических ходов, совершаемых от случая к

случаю. Экономика "третьего пути" должна иметь свое однозначное политическое выражение, сопоставимое с "партией либералов" или "партией коммунистов". Всякий инерциальный центризм, прагматизм и компромисс будут заведомо обречены на поражение. Фридрих Лист и его идеи должны стать такими же символами, как Адам Смит и Карл Маркс. "Третий путь" нуждается в таких носителях этой идеологической догмы, которые были бы сопоставимы по подготовленности, убежденности и информированности с либералами и коммунистами. Принципы экономики "третьего пути" столь же строги и однозначны, как и принципы двух других идеологий. Из них естественным и органичным образом можно вывести все необходимые вторичные следствия и приложения.

Экономическая тенденция "третьего пути", принцип "автаркии больших пространств" предполагает максимальный объем того национально-государственного образования, где применяется эта модель. Лист настаивал на невозможности осуществить эти теории в государствах с недостаточным демографическим, ресурсным, индустриальным и демографическим объемом, так как автаркия в таком случае будет простой фикцией. На этом основании он в свое время выдвинул императив "Zollverein", "таможенной интеграции", которая была призвана объединить Германию, Пруссию и Австрию в единый промышленно-финансовый блок, так как только в таком пространстве можно было говорить об эффективной конкуренции с развитыми колониальными державами того времени Англией и Францией.

На современном этапе эталоном суверенного государства являются США и то политико-экономическое пространство, которое входит в состав доктрины Монро, т.е. континентальная совокупность Северной и Южной Америки, контролируемых США. Очевидно, что полноценно конкурировать с таким трансатлантическим "большим пространством" сегодня может только его континентальный аналог в Евразии. Следовательно, экономика "третьего пути" уже в своей теории предполагает геополитическую интеграцию, в которой субъектом выступает не "государство-нация", а современный аналог Империи. В противном случае произойдет либо перенапряжение сил нации (причина развала СССР), либо попадание в зависимость от более могущественного и независимого соседа (Европа, Япония и т.д.). Такое соображение показывает, что при всей логичности и самодостаточности этой теории, успех ее реализации напрямую зависит от более общего геополитического проекта, т.е. от начала созидания Новой Империи. Только в таком масштабе и таком объеме "третий путь" в экономике даст максимальные результаты. Кроме того выдвижение такой экономической модели станет наилучшим теоретическим знаменателем для всех потенциальных участников континентального блока, так как даже либеральные авторы (к примеру, Мишель Альбер в книге "Капитализм против капитализма") подчеркивают фундаментальное отличие "рейнско-ниппонской" модели (имеющей многие черты экономики "третьего пути") от англосаксонской. Если на этот путь станет и Россия, евразийская цепь замкнет ся самым естественным образом. В таком случае можно будет выдвинуть новую версию Zollverein, соответствующую нынешним геополитическим условиям проект "евразийской таможенной интеграции", который только и может сегодня составить серьезную конкуренцию атлантическому блоку и привести народы Евразии к процветанию.

8.2 Экономический регионализм

В основе советской экономики был заложен принцип централизма. Высшая инстанция принятия всех важных, менее важных и совсем неважных решений находилась в Москве, откуда поступали регламентации и директивы. Такой централизм делал экономику

неповоротливой, не способствовал развитию региональной инициативы, сдерживал естественный рост экономического потенциала областей. Кроме того, советская экономика повсюду репродуцировала стандартный образец устройства производственно-финансовых отношений, не учитывая ни региональные, ни этнические, ни культурные особенности разных областей или округов. Такая жесткая система была одной из причин отставания и экономического краха советизма.

Либералы, пришедшие на смену коммунистам, несмотря на свои теоретические проекты, по сути сохранили старое положение дел, только отныне централизм был не плановым, а рыночным. Но, как и прежде, основные экономические решения осуществляются централизованно, и главные экономические пути проходят через Москву, где либеральное правительство жестко контролирует общий ход реформ в регионах. Одна форма абстрактного репродуцирования повсюду заданной схемы сменилась иной формой, но принцип централизма в экономической структуре остался прежним. Кстати, во многом провал рыночных преобразований объясняется именно таким инерциальным централизмом, когда московские правительственные чиновники стремятся жестко контролировать экономическое развитие регионов.

Трезвый анализ такого положения дел и сопоставление российской ситуации с наиболее развитыми экономическими системами (в первую очередь, рейнско-ниппонского типа) приводят к выводу о необходимости радикально отойти от такого экономического подхода и обратиться к хозяйственной модели, строящейся на сугубо региональной, областной, локальной основе. Хозяйственная взаимосвязь всех регионов СССР между собой была искусственно созданной конструкцией. Эта взаимосвязь, основывавшаяся более на плано-волюнтаристских методах, нежели на принципах максимальной эффективности, часто сдерживала автономное развитие региональной экономики. Свою роль в этом играл и план, возведенный в абсолют. С обрывом такой общей сети и приходом к власти либералов многие сектора промышленности были вообще предоставлены сами себе и обречены на деградацию и вымирание, и весь акцент был сделан на приоритетном развитии ресурсодобывающих отраслей, продукты которых можно было незамедлительно продать за рубеж. И западные товары, полученные монопольными псевдорыночными структурами либералов Москвы, снова централизованно распределялись по регионам. Таким образом, региональная экономика пострадала еще больше, а ее зависимость от центра с уходом коммунистов парадоксальным образом только возросла.

Реализация планов "экономики третьего пути" должна основываться на совершенно иных методах. Централизм здесь должен быть в первую очередь стратегическим и политическим, но ни в коем случае не экономическим, так как максимального экономического эффекта Империя сможет достичь только тогда, когда все ее составляющие будут иметь экономическую автономию и развиваться в наиболее свободном и естественном ключе. Как в контексте всего континентального проекта в целом, каждая его часть должна стремиться к тому, чтобы быть максимально самостоятельной и самодостаточной на своем уровне, так и в рамках России следует создать предельно гибкую региональную экономику, построенную не на учете интересов центра или плановых требований, но на максимально органичном развитии тех экономических потенциалов, которые более всего соответствуют данному региону. Безусловно, стратегические аспекты экономики ресурсы, стратегическое сырье, ВПК должны иметь централизованное руководство, но в других отраслях промышленности, а также в вопросах финансирования, областям должна быть дана максимальная степень свободы.

Исходя из культурных, этнических, религиозных, географических, климатических и т.д. условий конкретного региона следует предельно дифференцировать не только экономическую или промышленную ориентацию, но и сам экономический уклад. Вплоть до того, что на территории Империи могут возникнуть области с разным экономическим порядком от максимально-рыночного до почти коммунистического. Те народы, которые отвергают банковскую систему (мусульмане), должны сконструировать свои финансовые модели, исключая процентное финансирование промышленности, тогда как в других регионах, напротив, банки могут развиваться и процветать. Самое главное в этом проекте достичь такого уровня, когда каждый регион или область станут самодостаточными в удовлетворении самых насущных потребностей жителей в первую очередь, речь идет о жилье, пропитании, одежде и здоровье. При этом следует вначале добиться именно региональной автономии в обеспечении самым необходимым, и лишь потом строить проекты по повышению жизненного уровня, по совершенствованию технологий, техническому и промышленному развитию. Каждый регион должен обладать упругой и гибкой системой самообеспечения, чтобы в любой момент и при любых обстоятельствах и возможных кризисах иметь гарантии достойного минимума для всего населения, независимо от межрегиональных отношений или экономической ситуации в центре.

Стратегический глобальный аспект экономики должен рассматриваться в полном отрыве от региональных структур, работающих на самообеспечение населения. Состояние этого населения ни в коем случае не должно зависеть от приоритетного развития в данном регионе той или иной стратегической отрасли. Иными словами, должен соблюдаться принцип "необходимый жизненный минимум есть всегда и независимо ни от чего", а концентрация усилий региона на той или иной стратегической глобальной отрасли может проходить только при контроле за сохранением самостоятельных хозяйственных структур, никак не соприкасающихся с этой отраслью. В таком случае перепрофилирование того или иного вида производства, отказ от устаревших или неэффективных производств, территориальное перемещение предприятий или переориентация на выгодный во всех отношениях импорт никак не будут влиять на общий жизненный уровень региона, который будет изначально и принципиально гарантирован.

В компетенции центра останется только стратегическое производство и планирование, которые будут реализовываться не как ось экономики, но как наложение некоей глобальной суперструктуры на уже существующую автономную хозяйственную региональную сеть, при этом обе сферы не должны никак влиять друг на друга. Получение жилья, социальная защита или обеспечение продуктами питания ни в коем случае не могут зависеть от экономической эффективности промышленного или стратегического предприятия, расположенного в данной области (как это имеет место сейчас). Следует добиться такой хозяйственной самостоятельности отдельных регионов, вплоть до самых мелких, что все наиболее насущные экономические проблемы должны решаться в отрыве от участия населения в стратегическом производстве. Этот принцип должен стать доминантой в вопросах стратегического планирования, которое с неизбежностью будет существовать на государственном уровне, даже в условиях самой широкой экономической свободы.

Регионализм надо спроецировать и на финансовую систему, взяв, к примеру, опыт региональных и земельных банков в Германии, где малые финансовые структуры, часто ограниченные одной или несколькими деревнями, демонстрируют чудо эффективности в развитии хозяйства, так как в таком объеме крайне облегчен контроль за займами (что делает излишней службу фиска), и объем ссуд, процентов и сроки возврата определяются исходя из конкретных органичных общинных условий и представляют собой не количественный, абстрактно-математический, но жизненный, этический элемент хозяйст

ования. В целом же региональная финансовая система может иметь самую оригинальную форму, адаптируясь к логике этнокультурного и географического пейзажа. Самое главное при этом избежать централизации капитала, предельно рассредоточить его по автономным региональным финансовым структурам, заставить его служить хозяйству, а не наоборот, ставить хозяйство в зависимость от него.

Можно даже ввести две параллельные и непересекающиеся финансовые системы, две "валюты": одну предназначенную для обустройства стратегической общеимперской сферы, другую для региональных нужд. В первом случае будет иметь место строгое государственное планирование, основанное на специфических принципах финансирования и производства, в другом региональный рынок и региональный финансовый фонд. Капитал государственный и капитал областной. Частная собственность должна быть атомарной составляющей именно областного, регионального капитала, в то время как государственный капитал в принципе не должен иметь с частной собственностью никакой общей меры. Только в таком случае будет проведена строгая грань между государственным, общественным и личным, а следовательно, устойчивость, гибкость внутренней структуры и автаркия Империи будут максимальны.

В целом же экономика должна руководствоваться основополагающим принципом предельный стратегический централизм плюс предельный региональный плюрализм и "либерализм".

Глава 9. Заключение

Предпринятая попытка набросать в самых общих чертах континентальный проект, выделить самые глобальные и осевые моменты евразийской геополитики для России и русского народа, безусловно, нуждается в самом обстоятельном развитии, что потребует колоссальной работы по уточнению, аргументации, иллюстрации различных моментов и аспектов данной темы. Для нас, однако, было предельно важно представить самый приблизительный вариант той единственной модели геополитического будущего русского народа, которая по ту сторону заведомо тупиковых путей смогла бы вывести его на планетарный и цивилизационный уровень, соответствующий его миссии, его национальным, духовным и религиозным претензиям. Многие в этом проекте может показаться новым, необычным, непривычным, даже шокирующим. Но необходимость затронуть все важнейшие аспекты будущего нации заставили нас пренебречь разъяснениями, опровержениями возможной критики, уйти от долгих цитат, перечисления имен и колонок с цифрами. По мере необходимости все это будет сделано. Пока же важнее всего указать общие контуры "третьего пути", того единственного пути, который может вывести наш великий народ и наше великое государство из бездны хаоса и падения к сияющим высотам Русских Небес.

ЧАСТЬ V ВНУТРЕННЯЯ ГЕОПОЛИТИКА РОССИИ

Глава 1. Предмет и метод

1.1 Внутренняя геополитика России зависит от ее планетарной функции

Геополитический анализ внутрироссийских геополитических проблем не может быть осуществлен без учета более общей, глобальной картины места России в геополитическом ансамбле. Лишь постоянно имея в виду планетарную роль и значение России, можно эффективно и непротиворечиво разбирать и описывать ее внутреннюю геополитическую структуру. В отличие от европейской школы «внутренней геополитики» (Ив Лакост и т.д.), тяготеющей к изоляции локальных и региональных проблем от учета диспозиции сил в планетарном масштабе, в случае России нельзя абстрагироваться от ее мирового значения, а следовательно, все частные, внутренние ее проблемы адекватно формулируются (не говоря уже об их решении) только в рамках более общего, интегрального геополитического поля.

Россия не просто одна из стран материка. Она категория, принадлежащая к базовым принципам всей геополитики. Россия heartland, «географическая ось истории», Суша. Россия есть Евразия. Такое ее значение не зависит от блоков, идеологии, политической ориентации, специфики режима: континентальность ее историческая, географическая и геополитическая судьба. В случае России вопрос не может ставиться о выборе между «атлантизмом» и «евразийством». Она есть евразийская сила и не может не быть таковой. Отказ от исполнения Россией своей роли в ансамбле планеты возможен только в случае ее полного географического уничтожения, так как в случае отказа русского государства исполнять эту миссию при сохранении евразийской континентальной массы все равно рано или поздно с необходимостью возникнет новое политическое образование в тех же границах, которое возьмет на себя функции «географической оси истории». Пока же Россия существует, она остается осью евразийского вектора в планетарном масштабе.

Этот характер и предопределяет угол рассмотрения ее внутренних геополитических проблем. Эти проблемы стоят только в следующем ключе: каким образом и на каких естественных (или искусственных) предпосылках сохранить максимальный геополитический объем России, по возможности увеличить его, распределив все внутренние геополитические факторы так, чтобы наилучшим образом обеспечить возможность планетарной геополитической экспансии?

Такая постановка проблемы уже сама по себе ставит условия анализа необходимо акцентировать и приоритетно исследовать:

- 1) возможности центростремительных тенденций регионов;
- 2) возможности расширения пространственного влияния центра на периферию и за ее пределы.

Это предполагает четкое выделение двух базовых критериев понятий геополитического центра и геополитической периферии. Соотношения между ними и составляют сущность исследования внутренней геополитики России.

1.2 Внутренняя геополитика и военная доктрина

Военно-промышленный комплекс играет огромную роль в геополитической организации российских пространств, так как во многих (особенно малозаселенных) территориях именно к военным городкам и базам привязаны гражданские поселения. С этим же связано и размещение важнейших центров промышленности, также сопряженных с нуждами т.н. «оборонной промышленности». От модели военной доктрины зависит вся геополитическая конфигурация России.

Эта военная доктрина, в свою очередь, имеет два компонента. Политическая ориентация руководства (которая может меняться в зависимости от внутри- и внешнеполитических факторов) и геополитические константы, устанавливающие те рамки, в которых возможны вариации политического курса. Этот второй компонент (геополитическое положение России) однозначно утверждает континентальное значение ВС России, ориентацию на то, что главным «потенциальным противником» России является именно атлантистский блок. А это автоматически влечет за собой континентальную ориентацию всей военной доктрины, безусловный приоритет стратегических видов вооружений, ориентированность на глобальный конфликт планетарного масштаба. При этом совершенно не важно, каким будет политическое оформление режима. Совершенно не обязательно геополитическая конфронтация будет дублироваться идеологической конфронтацией. Это зависит от конкретной ситуации и может влиять на вербальное оформление политического курса, смягчающего или, напротив, акцентирующего геополитическое противостояние, сохраняющееся при любых обстоятельствах. Не претендуя на конечную формулу военной доктрины, геополитика задает ее рамки, нарушение которых немедленно влечет за собой тотальный социально-политический кризис и территориальный распад государства.

Даже в случае полного идеологического взаимопонимания с атлантизмом, военная доктрина России все равно должна определять в качестве потенциального противника номер 1 именно США и западный лагерь, и только исходя из этого принципа строить всю структуру ВС. А это, в свою очередь, будет влиять на общую структуру внутренней геополитики России в более широком смысле.

Военная доктрина России должна быть абсолютно евразийской. Только в таком случае и под таким углом зрения можно ответственно анализировать внутреннюю геополитику России и намечать приоритетные вектора развития. Без этого любой анализ предскажет лишь катастрофическую деградацию российских регионов, территориальный распад, цепную реакцию разрушения и геополитического самоликвидаторства. Теоретически такого поворота событий нельзя исключить, и современная «военная доктрина» РФ, не упоминающая среди «потенциальных противников» США и блок НАТО, но включающих их в число потенциальных геополитических союзников России по евразийскому блоку, дает для этого множество оснований. Однако исходя из более общей исторической и географической перспективы, следует рассматривать это состояние как «временную аномалию», которая будет скоро устранена при любом политическом режиме как эксцесс сложного переходного периода. Возможно описать сценарий «геополитики катастроф», который выделил бы фазы распада «географической оси истории». Но такая позиция должна более интересоваться атлантистский лагерь, и поэтому вполне естественно, если подобные модели изучаются геополитиками талассократических держав. Русская геополитика, которая не может не быть евразийской, должна, соответственно, ориентироваться на позитивные перспективы, анализируя актуальную и будущую ситуацию, исходя из нормальных исторических и геополитических законов развития континентального и цивилизационного дуализма. А в этом случае следует сделать допуск

(даже если в данный момент это еще не так), что «военная доктрина» России соответствует общей континентальной логике и базируется на строгих геополитических константах.

Это обстоятельство следует иметь в виду в ходе дальнейшего изложения.

1.3 Центр и периферия

Исторический центр heartland'a не является постоянной географической величиной. Нынешняя столица России Москва наследует одновременно линию славянских столиц (Киева, Владимира) и линию степных ставок Чингиза. Будучи геополитическим синтезом Леса и Степи, Россия имеет сразу две историко-геополитические традиции, совокупность которых и лежит в основе своеобразия русского пути.

Петербургский период также был сопряжен с территориальной экспансией, хотя балтийское расположение Санкт-Петербурга воплощает в себе европейскую ориентацию государства, «геополитическое западничество». В петербургский период территориальная экспансия русских была менее органична и более искусственна, чем раньше. Характер синтеза был не столь очевиден, хотя многие евразийские народы Азии и Сибири приняли власть «белого царя» исходя из древнейших континентальных традиций.

Москва географически более всего отвечает евразийской миссии России. Она равноудалена от всех основных географических зон, составляющих своеобразие русского ландшафта. Расстояния до полярного севера, восточно-европейского запада, степного и субтропического юга и таежного востока приблизительно одинаковы. Поэтому «нормальной» (с геополитической точки зрения) евразийской столицей, континентальным центром следует считать именно ее. В этом отношении нынешнее положение дел совпадает, в целом, с геополитическими константами. Москва естественная столица heartland'a.

Беглый картографический анализ России вместе с тем сразу же обнаруживает в таком положении некоторую асимметрию. Дело в том, что за Уралом (который не является, впрочем, никакой естественной внутривосточной границей за счет малой высоты гор и однородности климата с обеих сторон хребта) довольно однородная таежная зона распространяется на тысячи километров вглубь Сибири, превращая, таким образом, Москву в центр лишь «европейской России». Такой чисто количественный взгляд уравнивается, однако, другими геополитическими соображениями.

Во-первых, Сибирь не представляет собой того климатического и рельефного структурного многообразия, какое характеризует доуральскую Россию. С этой точки зрения, все это гигантское пространство есть лишь диспропорциональное растяжение восточного ландшафта, масштаб которого намного превосходит зональную картину собственно России. Таким образом, в ландшафтном смысле гигантский пространственный объем сводится к ограниченному климатическому качеству.

Во-вторых, точно такая же диспропорция наличествует и на демографическом уровне. За Уральским хребтом живет такое же количество населения, которое характерно для каждой из ярко выделенных природой ландшафтных зон европейской России.

В-третьих, освоение этого региона с точки зрения коммуникаций, городов, связи и т.д. также несопоставимо с его пространственным объемом.

Поэтому в актуальной ситуации геополитическая роль Сибири не может рассматриваться пропорционально ее пространству. Это особое, «резервное пространство», которое представляет собой последнюю «неосвоенную» как следует часть евразийского материка.

Таким образом, с учетом особого качества Сибири, Москва действительно отождествляется с геополитическим центром «географической оси истории». Заметим: именно неосвоенность Сибири (особенно Восточной Сибири) заставили Макинтера в его поздних работах включать «Lenaland», т.е. пространство, лежащее восточнее от реки Лена, в особое геополитическое образование, не принадлежащее, строго говоря, heartland'у.

Но уже Шпенглер отметил тот момент, что Сибирь представляет собой географическое пространство, роль которого может проявиться постепенно и оказаться решающей в историческом процессе. Он предвидел, что именно из Сибири сможет развиваться особая уникальная культура, которая положит конец «упадку Запада» и его «фаустианской» цивилизации. Эту же идею поддержки вали и русские «азийцы», крайнее ответвление евразийцев, считающих, что Восток (Азия) важнее не только Запада, но и самой Евразии (так, в частности, полагал В.Иванов и некоторые «тихоокеанисты», Pazifiker, хаусхоферовской школы Курт фон Бекман и т.д.). Таким образом, в далекой перспективе, которая предполагает изменение демографического и информационного состояния развития Сибири и ее уравнивание с остальными русскими (или европейскими) регионами, можно предположить, что географическое положение Москвы утратит свою центральность, и геополитический центр Евразии сместится к востоку.

Но в данный момент это следует учитывать, лишь как футурологическую перспективу. (Подробнее об этом в главе о русском Востоке).

От центра (Москвы) можно провести лучи к различным областям периферийных российских земель. Эти лучи не являются отрезками, так как их длина не фиксирована. Центробежные и центростремительные силы воздействуют на регионы с переменной величиной, зависящей от многих исторических факторов. Кроме того, физические расстояния от геополитического центра (Москвы) не всегда соответствуют «геополитическим расстояниям». Эти расстояния зависят не только от количественной, но и от качественной стороны связей, от самостоятельности региональных образований, их формы, их культурно-этнической специфики.

Можно свести все эти лучи, сходящиеся к центру, к четырем основным категориям или «внутренним осям»:

- 1) Москва -Восток
- 2) Москва -Запад
- 3) Москва -Север
- 4) Москва -Юг

С другой стороны, соответствующие периферийные пространства представляют собой «зоны» или «полосы», каждая из которых обладает специфическими характеристиками и особой структурой. Эти полосы можно назвать, соответственно, «русский Восток», «русский Запад», «русский Север» и «русский Юг». Определение «русский» имеет в

данном случае не этнический, но геополитический смысл, подчеркивающий связь региона с центральной «континентальной осью» Москвой.

Главным содержанием темы «внутренней геополитики» России будет выяснение геополитической структуры этих четырех «периферийных зон» и качества и характера «лучей», связывающих их с центром. Структура зон будет подробнее разобрана в следующих главах. Характер лучей, в самых общих чертах, можно рассмотреть сейчас.

1.4 Внутренние оси («геополитические лучи»)

Четыре геополитические луча связывают Москву с периферией «русского пространства». Эти лучи имеют разное качество.

Их можно разделить на две пары лучи Москва Запад и Москва Юг, с одной стороны, и лучи Москва Восток и Москва Север, с другой.

Первые два луча, с геополитической точки зрения, «незакончены», «открыты». Они упираются в сложную геополитическую систему значительного территориального объема, которая отделяет континентальную массу России от идеальной границы береговой линии. Южная и Западная границы России, с геополитической точки зрения, представляют собой широкие пояса, отделяющие центральную часть от береговой линии. В этом отношении эти два луча представляют собой наиболее уязвимые для России направления, и вся геополитическая динамика по этим осям является крайне напряженной, сложной, имеющей множество уровней и измерений.

Оси Москва Запад и Москва Юг сочетают в себе как внутренне-, так и внешнеполитические аспекты, так как здесь регионы собственно России-Евразии плавно переходят в зоны, находящиеся под контролем других государств, и некоторые из этих государств принадлежат к противоположному планетарному блоку, к лагерю талассократии.

Вторые два луча: оси Москва Север и Москва Восток резко отличаются от первой пары. Здесь граница России совпадает с береговой линией, «государств-прокладок» не существует, и поэтому политическая динамика в этих направлениях исчерпывается внутривнутриполитическими темами. На Севере и на Востоке Россия имеет законченные геополитические границы. И главной задачей в данном случае является сохранить статус кво.

Более того, Север и Восток именно за счет океанических границ являются резервными и прекрасно защищенными тылами «географической оси истории», где в критические моменты всегда можно создать дополнительные пространственные платформы для геополитического и стратегического переструктурирования.

Разница между осями «Запад» и «Юг» и осями «Север» и «Восток» не является следствием исторической случайности. Сам географический ландшафт, а позже этническая и культурная карта соответствующих регионов представляют собой матрицу, которая по мере течения политической истории заполнялась конкретным государственным содержанием. На западных и южных окраинах России и на смежных территориях соседних стран сложились развитые соцветия культур, государств и этносов, со своими политическими и духовными традициями, государственностью и т.д. Это зона, одной своей стороной входящая в rimland. Здесь активно развиты объективные и

искусственные предпосылки для «сепаратизма», а тот, в свою очередь, в планетарном масштабе отождествляется с талассократической стратегией.

Север и Восток России, напротив, крайне ландшафтно однородны, и неплотно населены народами, не имеющими развитых политических и государственных традиций или давно утративших историческую инициативу имперостроительства (к примеру, алтайские тюрки, буряты и т.д.). Здесь у Москвы доступ к морям свободный, но и качество морей соответствующее. Они мало судоходны, холодны, значительную часть года покрыты льдами, оторваны от центральной части за счет плохих коммуникаций, их порты малоразвиты. Определенные стратегические преимущества компенсируются соответствующими недостатками.

Две пары лучей дают полную геополитическую симметрию. Протяженность северных и восточных берегов России сопряжена с демографической разряженностью, коммуникационной неразвитостью. Западные и южные границы сухопутны, густо заселены, ландшафтно разнообразны и представляют собой объемные полосы значительной площади.

Геополитические отношения центра с периферией в России, таким образом, разделяются на два вида чисто внутренние оси с океаническими линейными границами (Север, Восток) и полувнутренние оси с сухопутными границами «полосного» («зонального») качества (Запад, Юг). Динамика «Юг и Запад» подразумевает вступление в сферу международных отношений, дипломатию и т.д. Динамика «Север и Восток» ограничивается внутривнутриполитическими проблемами. Однако чисто геополитический подход делает эту картину, в некоторой степени, относительной. Там, где в данный момент находится «независимое» государство, геополитик видит «будущую провинцию», и наоборот, береговая часть территории одного государства в какой-то момент может стать береговым плацдармом альтернативной геополитической силы (т.е. новым «суверенным» государством).

Лучи, идущие из центра к периферии, «импульсы континентальной экспансии», сталкиваются постоянно с противоположным силовым давлением. Атлантический блок стремится ограничить центробежную энергию Москвы, используя «сепаратистские» тенденции окраинных народов или соседних государств, базируясь при этом на тех береговых зонах, которые уже находятся под уверенным контролем талассократии. На Юге и на Западе это противодействие вполне различимо в конкретной политической реальности. На Севере и Востоке противодействие менее очевидно и наглядно. Но, тем не менее, оно существует в виде стратегического военного присутствия атлантистов в океанической береговой зоне (особенно ядерные подводные лодки), и в определенные критические периоды может выражаться в прямом политическом вмешательстве во внутривнутрироссийские дела и поддержку (или провокации) сепаратистских настроений этнических и культурных меньшинств.

Глава 2. Путь на север

2.1 Модель анализа

Геополитический луч Москва Север в большом приближении распадается на целый спектр лучей, расходящихся от единого центра по всей протяженности побережья Северного Ледовитого Океана. Мы получаем, таким образом, усложненную модель, в которой возникают три проблемы:

- 1) соотношение секторов Севера между собой;
- 2) соотношение их с Центром (Москвой);
- 3) соотношение с другими областями русского пространства (Югом, Востоком, Западом)

Геополитический анализ дробится сразу на несколько секторов и проблем. При этом основная задача состоит в том, чтобы, по возможности учитывая региональную специфику и детали, не потерять из виду общего комплекса «внутренней геополитики России» и еще более широкого планетарного контекста.

Геополитический императив Центра в отношении Севера заключается в максимально возможном укреплении стратегического контроля над этими областями. Учитывая малозаселенность территорий, расположенных за северным полярным кругом, и отсутствие развитых политических и государственных традиций этносов, там проживающих, культурно-политические аспекты здесь отступают на второй план. Наиболее важной стороной становятся военный контроль за побережьем (военные, военно-воздушные и военно-морские базы), информационное сообщение, энергоснабжение и обеспечение продовольственного и жилищного достатка.

2.2 Геополитический характер русской Арктики

Климатический характер северных территорий предполагает точечное, а не «полосное», его заселение. Отсюда возрастает роль центров, приобретающих важнейшее значение и становящихся, до некоторой степени, эквивалентом того, что в иных районах определяется как «территория». Это тождество «центра» и «территории» на Севере максимально, так как промежуточные просторы не просто малопригодны для жилья, но смертельно опасны тундра, холод, отсутствие селений, путей и т.д.

Таким образом, геополитически Север это система точек, расположенных в арктической зоне, созвездие дискретных поселений, разбросанных по довольно однородному (климатически и рельефно) пространству. Подавляющее большинство северных земель представляет собой тундру, т.е. северную пустыню с редкой растительностью (лишайники). Это зона вечной мерзлоты.

Характер северного пространства в чем-то близок «водной стихии». В нем границы между территориями не имеют практически никакого серьезного значения, так как контроль над той или иной землей не дает никаких особых преимуществ. Учитывая малозаселенность, автоматически снимается и вопрос о «конкуренции за кочевья» у оленеводческих народов.

Население Севера представляет собой разнообразие древнейших евразийских этносов, обитавших на этих территориях в течение тысячелетий без особой культурной, миграционной или этнической динамики. Любопытно, что именно на севере западной границы России проходит деление и по этническому признаку: север Европы Скандинавию, Германию, Данию вплоть до Англии, Ирландии и Исландии населяют «развитые» народы индоевропейского происхождения (молодые этносы); а начиная с Финляндии и Карелии и вплоть до Чукотки русский Север заселен этносами, намного более древними и архаическими, чем население европейского Севера (угры, архаичные тюрки и палеоазиаты чукчи, эскимосы и т.д.). Причем, по мере движения на восток вдоль побережья Северного Ледовитого океана архаичность этносов возрастает. Более молодые индоевропейцы (или тюрки), динамично передвигаясь по наиболее обитаемым частям Евразии, волнами «сдвигали» автохтонов к северу.

С запада на восток: после карелов и финнов (все же довольно активно участвовавших в современной истории, хотя и на вторых ролях) более архаичные ненцы и коми, потом ханты и манси, долганы, эвенки, а далее чукчи и эскимосы. Огромный сектор Восточной Сибири занимает Якутия (Саха), но собственно якуты (одно из ответвления тюрков) живут гораздо южнее северного полярного круга, а сам север области почти необитаем.

От угров до эскимосов пространство русского Севера демонстрирует нам исторические временные срезы цивилизации.

Понятие «русский Север» представляет собой трапецию, повторяющую очертания Евразии в целом. К западу она сужается, к востоку расширяется. На русско-финской границе эта территория захватывает приблизительно 10 градусов по меридиану, а Чукотка с Камчаткой покрывают уже 20 градусов. Но это пространственное расширение мало влияет на геополитический характер территории; и по демографическим признакам, и по степени освоения, и по качеству коммуникаций и частоте поселений эта географически расширяющаяся к востоку трапеция дает зеркальную картину, так как «узкий» западный фланг северного сектора освоен и заселен больше, чем противоположный восточный фланг.

Если Сибирь является геополитическим «резервом» России, то Север, и особенно сибирский Север, является «резервом» самой Сибири, будучи самым удаленным от цивилизации регионом Евразии. Это ледяная неизведанная земля, формально описанная в картах, но не представляющая никакого исторического знака, не имеющая никакого глобального культурного измерения (по меньшей мере, в обозримых исторических пределах доступного изучению прошлого). Такое положение странно контрастирует с той ролью, которую «север» играет в мифологиях многих народов. Там он наделяется качеством «великой прародины», «обетованной земли», «древнего рая». В данный исторический момент это скорее нечто противоположное холодное, неприветливое, враждебное людям, отчужденное пространство с редкими вкраплениями искусственных очагов цивилизации.

2.3 Север + Север

Административно большинство северных земель являются автономными округами РФ, кроме Карелии, Коми и Якутии, которые имеют более самостоятельный политический статус (республики). Политически области расположены так (с запада на восток): Карелия, северней Мурманская область, Архангельская область, республика Коми и

ненецкий автономный округ, Ямало-Ненецкий автономный округ, таймырский (Долгано-Ненецкий автономный округ), северные сектора Якутии, Чукотский автономный округ, Магаданский край, Корякский автономный округ и Камчатка.

Сходство геополитического качества всех этих территорий является достаточным основанием для того, чтобы они могли образовать некоторый территориально-стратегический блок на основе определенных интеграционных структур. Все эти области сталкиваются с типологически близкими проблемами; их развитие проходит по одинаковым траекториям. Это естественное сходство, столь выпукло проявляющееся даже при самом беглом геополитическом анализе, показывает необходимость определенной консолидации. Эта консолидация, своего рода пакт «Арктических земель», может иметь несколько уровней от духовно-культурного до практического и экономического.

Можно изначально наметить общие направления такого блока.

Его культурной базой может стать сугубо евразийская теория переосмысления традиционной цивилизации как позитивной модели социального устройства, сохранившего память о космических пропорциях. Это означает, что архаизм народов Севера (неразвитость, отставание, примитивность и т.д.), является не минусом, но духовным плюсом. Древние этносы не только не подлежат «перевоспитанию» и включению в «современную цивилизацию», а, напротив, нуждаются в том, чтобы условия их существования максимально соответствовали их традиции. Причем забота об этих традициях частично должна быть переложена на государство, стремящееся обеспечить себе стратегический контроль над этими землями.

Параллельно этому следовало бы взять на вооружение «мифологический» аспект Севера как древнейшей родины человечества, и проект «духовного возрождения Севера» приобрел бы в таком случае достойный исторический масштаб. При этом акцент следовало бы сделать на сезонной специфике арктического года полярном дне и полярной ночи, которые считались индусами и древними персами «сутками богов». Существование в арктических условиях (общее для всего евразийского Севера) возвращает человеческое существо в условия особого космического ритма. Отсюда духовно-терапевтическое значение арктических зон.

На материальном уровне и особенно применительно к условиям существования мигрантов с Юга, т.е. в большинстве своем русских, следует сплотить усилия всех северных центров в разработке оптимальных моделей городов и селений с учетом климатической специфики. В данном аспекте требуется применение новейших технологий нетрадиционных источников энергии (солнечная энергия, ветровые электростанции и т.д.), строительных ноу-хау для вечной мерзлоты, системы коммуникаций и транспорта, развитие межрегионального авиатранспорта и т.д. Изначальным должен быть проект общего арктического развития, выработки единой и наиболее эффективной формулы, которая позволила бы в кратчайшие сроки модернизировать поселения, сделать их существование более динамичным и взаимосвязанным.

Учитывая важность этой проблемы, логично было бы предоставить ее решение самим арктическим областям, обеспечив государственную поддержку всему проекту в целом из центра. Выработка «арктической формулы» дело самих северян.

Так как Север это геополитический «резерв резервов» России, то следует готовить его регионы к возможной активной миграции населения с Юга. Это касается другой стороны проблемы нового заселения Севера. Рано или поздно, учитывая демографические

процессы, это станет необходимым, и лучше уже сейчас начать создавать для этого структурные предпосылки.

Особо следует выделить военный аспект. Север является гигантской стратегической военной зоной России, важнейшим поясом ее безопасности. Здесь сосредоточены многие ракетные базы и базы стратегической авиации; Мурманск и Архангельск являются крупнейшими в России военно-морскими базами. Такое положение не следствие произвола идеологического противостояния двух лагерей в эпоху холодной войны. Стратегическое значение Севера в военном смысле сохраняется для России в любом случае, так как речь идет о соблюдении интересов Евразии, heartland'a. Смысл военного присутствия на Севере России вытекает из континентального характера структуры российских ВС и из естественного осознания себя континентальным лагерем, противостоящим «силам моря». Основное значение этих военных объектов защита береговой зоны от возможных морских и воздушных вторжений и обеспечение в случае необходимости нанесения ядерного удара по американскому континенту через Северный полюс. Это кратчайшее расстояние от России до территории США. По этой же причине данная территория является приоритетной зоной развития противоракетной обороны.

В настоящее время Север дает огромный процент в общем промышленном продукте России. При этом не учитывается его центральное значение в военно-промышленном комплексе. Многие полезные ископаемые в частности, соль, никель и т.д. добываются преимущественно в приарктических областях. Но между такой промышленной развитостью Севера и отставанием в других областях развития существует огромный зазор. Геополитическая логика требует активного выравнивания ситуации. Причем удобнее всего сделать это именно в рамках «Арктического пакта». В таком случае следовало бы обозначить столицу (или несколько столиц) Севера, в которой сосредоточился бы интеллектуально-технологический потенциал, куда свелись бы основные экономические, финансовые и инженерные рычаги. Это дало бы Северу значительную независимость от центра, свободу от контроля в деталях, резервы для гибкого регионального развития и быстрой промышленно-экономической реакции.

На всех этих уровнях ясно выступает необходимость интеграции Севера. Это важно в духовном, этническом, культурном, военно-стратегическом, промышленном, социальном, финансовом плане. Результатом такой многоуровневой интеграции (пока существующей лишь потенциально) стало бы создание совершенно новой геополитической реальности, в которой значительное повышение автономности и региональной самостоятельности не ослабляло бы стратегической связи с центром. Освоение Севера стало бы путем в будущее, плацдармом совершенно нового (основанного на геополитике) понимания пространства в долгосрочной перспективе.

Северная Земля из бесплодной пустыни снова превратилась бы в полярный рай, укрепив планетарный вес континента и создав модель общества «евразийского будущего», основанного на сочетании традиции и развития, верности корням и технологической модернизации.

2.4 Север + Центр

Первый подход к геополитическому анализу Севера (Север + Север) основан на выделении «полярной трапеции» в единый связный регион, который можно рассматривать как самостоятельную пространственную фигуру. Такое видение Севера позволяет выработать наиболее гибкую модель его развития, так как самой устойчивой

геополитической конструкцией является та, которая состоит из самодостаточных автаркийно-автономных (в ограниченном смысле) элементов. Но даже подобная относительная автаркия требует определенного территориального масштаба. «Трапеция» русского Севера отвечает всем необходимым условиям для того, чтобы сложиться в самостоятельное внутрироссийское «большое пространство». Более того, такая интеграционная автономия может в значительной мере компенсировать неизбежный для государства стратегический централизм.

Второй геополитический подход заключается в анализе системного функционирования по оси Центр Север. Эта ось была и во многом до настоящего времени остается единственной и главной в административной организации северных территорий. Отдельные регионы и центры Севера были напрямую подчинены Москве, которая контролировала все основные вектора развития этих территорий. Такой однозначный централизм не позволял максимально эффективно развивать внутренние геополитические потенциалы Севера, заведомо делал специализацию регионов однобокой и ориентированной на масштаб всей страны. Это позволяло поддерживать режим строгого централизма, но значительно тормозило вскрытие внутренних возможностей.

Геополитическая логика подсказывает, что вопрос соотношения Центра и Периферии (а в нашем конкретном случае, Москвы Севера) должен заведомо делиться на две составляющие:

- 1) строгий централизм в сфере макрополитики и стратегической подчиненности;
- 2) максимальное раскрепощение внутренних возможностей за счет предельной культурной и экономической автономии.

В иных терминах: стратегический централизм + культурно-экономический регионализм.

Для выработки наиболее эффективной модели такого геополитического распределения ролей снова встает вопрос о «столице Севера», которая могла бы выполнять роль промежуточной инстанции между Центром и всеми областями. К этой точке сходились бы все военные связи от баз, военных частей, портов и т.д. Кроме того, здесь могло бы находиться «правительство Севера», гибкая инстанция политической координации всех частей «полярной трапеции», подчиняющаяся непосредственно Москве, но выступающая перед ней от лица всего Севера. Это мог бы быть «парламент народов Севера» и соответствующие исполнительные структуры. При этом важнее всего было бы достичь гармоничного сочетания военного руководства с региональными представителями, так как централистский характер стратегического контроля сопрягался бы в таком случае с выражением региональной воли северных земель. Тандем военного представителя Москвы с гражданским представителем «народов Севера» в такой геополитической столице мог бы стать идеальным прообразом наиболее эффективной и оперативной, гибкой, но крепко связанной с центром организации всего евразийского пространства. При этом межэтнические и культурные трения между народами Севера в таком интеграционном процессе будут минимальными по историческим и географическим причинам дробности и мозаичности расселения и малочисленности этносов.

Именно на Севере следует опробовать эту модель реорганизации пространства, основанную на чисто геополитических предпосылках. В данном случае все условия для такого проекта налицо: принадлежность всех регионов Севера к России, территориальная и демографическая разряженность, назревшая потребность в реструктуризации промышленно-экономических систем, часть из которых выпала из общей системы национального «распределения труда», демографический кризис, критическое положение

с народами Севера, распад энергоснабжающих систем и коммуникаций, необходимая реформа ВС и т.д.

Отношение Москва Север напрямую зависит от общей интеграции северных регионов в единый блок и еще по одной причине. Россия имеет широтную географическую структуру, она вытянута вдоль параллели. Основные тенденции ее развития имели именно широтную динамику. На интеграции пространств вдоль широт строилось русское Государство. По этой причине основные коммуникации и системы связей внутри России складывались в согласии с этой моделью. Особенно наглядно широтный процесс выразился в освоении Сибири и «рывке к Океану». Поэтому устойчивость внутренней структуры России напрямую зависит от полноты и динамики широтной интеграции. Если брать Россию в целом, то для ее континентальной стратегической полноценности необходимо развитие по оси Север-Юг. Это касается в первую очередь экспансии за ее пределы, так как любая геополитическая организация пространства по вертикали дает максимальную степень стратегической автаркии. Но в пределах самой России такая полная автаркия совершенно нецелесообразна. Здесь, напротив, следует настаивать на предельном стратегическом централизме, на взаимосвязи региональных пространств с Центром. Поэтому можно сформулировать геополитический закон: внутри России приоритетной является интеграционная ось Запад-Восток, вовне России ось Север-Юг. (Более нюансированно этот закон формулируется так: жестко этнически и политически контролируемые Россией и русскими пространства требуют широтной интеграции, тогда как внутрироссийские земли, компактно заселенные иными этносами с фиксируемыми исторически традициями политического сепаратизма, напротив, нуждаются в интеграции по меридианальному признаку.) Динамика вдоль меридиана делает политическое образование независимым от соседей слева и справа. Это нужно для страны в целом, но излишне для отдельных секторов этой страны. Динамика вдоль параллели, напротив, жестко связывает Центр с периферией; это полезно для внутривнутриполитической организации государства, но приводит к конфликтам и дисбалансу на межгосударственном уровне.

На основании этой закономерности следует настаивать именно на широтной интеграции Северных регионов, учитывая их принадлежность к единой климатической и рельефной зоне, а не чисто географическую (и даже в некоторых случаях этническую) близость их к иным (южным, восточным или западным) областям. Широтное объединение Севера будет способствовать его культурно-экономическому развитию, но препятствовать созданию предпосылок для потенциального политического и стратегического суверенитета. Только такая структура решит проблемы Центр-Периферия в максимально позитивном, с геополитической точки зрения, ключе.

2.5 Финский вопрос

Единственной международной проблемой, связанной с русским Севером, является проблема Карелии (и Финляндии). Карельский этнос близок к финскому и связан с ним культурно-историческим единством. Если исходить из логики широтной интеграции, карельский вопрос представляется, на первый взгляд, аномалией. Здесь возможны два подхода.

Первый заключается в том, чтобы абсолютизировать геополитически карело-финскую границу и предложить Карельской республике интегрироваться по оси Север-Юг с исконно русскими регионами вокруг Онежского озера, Ладоги. Такой вектор развития противоестественен и к нему следует прибегать только в самом худшем случае, так как искусственный разрыв этнического единства по административной линии чисто

политической границы никогда не дает геополитической устойчивости региону. Дело усугубляется еще и тем, что карело-финская граница представляет собой легкопроходимый лесной и болотистый рельеф и имеет огромную протяженность; надежно защищать такую границу крайне сложно, громоздко и дорого.

Второй подход предполагает создание карело-финской геополитической зоны, культурно и отчасти экономически единой, но представляющей собой стратегическую опору евразийского Центра. В европейских языках наличествует термин «финляндизация», появившийся в ходе холодной войны. Под ним понимают номинально нейтральное государство с капиталистической экономикой, но стратегически склоняющееся к СССР, т.е. к heartland'у. Финляндия как государство есть в высшей степени неустойчивое и далекое от автаркии образование, естественным и историческим образом входящее в геополитическое пространство России. Это проявлялось на самых разных этапах истории. Центр мог бы пойти на широкую автономию карело-финского объединения с единственным условием стратегический контроль над Ботническим заливом и размещение евразийских пограничных войск на финско-шведской и финско-норвежской границе. Протяженность границы сократилась бы вдвое при том, что финско-шведская и финско-норвежская границы рельефно гораздо менее однородны и легкопроходимы, чем карело-финская. Кроме того, Россия получила бы возможность контроля над Балтикой с Севера.

Второй подход является во всех отношениях предпочтительным, и именно такая тактика должна использоваться континентальным Центром во всех этнически и культурно смешанных зонах на границах государства. Расколотое этническое единство автоматически означает нестабильность пограничной зоны, неустойчивость границ. Атлантистский противник рано или поздно попытается взять на вооружение это обстоятельство, чтобы провести этническую интеграцию в своих целях т.е. усилить контроль над gimland'ом и ослабить heartland. Поэтому континентальные силы должны активно и наступательно пользоваться аналогичной тактикой и не страшиться уступать культурный и даже экономический суверенитет пограничным народам в обмен на стратегическое присутствие и политическую лояльность.

Когда устойчивых границ нельзя добиться путем прямой военной или политической экспансии, следует применять такой промежуточный гибкий вариант, которым в антиевразийском смысле постоянно и с успехом пользуется талассократия.

2.6 Север и Не-Север

Специфика географии арктического побережья русской Евразии сводит проблему соотношения регионов Севера с другими регионами к более упрощенной формуле Север Юг, так как широтные проблемы (а именно, с Западом) возникают только в случае Карелии. Единственным исключением является проблема Якутии, которая стоит здесь особняком, так как Якутия имеет, хотя и крайне искусственную, но все же исторически фиксируемую традицию политического сепаратизма. Этот аспект отражается и в позднейшей классификации Макинде ром Евразии, где он выделил «Lenaland», «землю реки Лена», а Якутия (Саха) составляет ось этого региона, простирающегося от моря Лаптевых до Амурской области и Алтая на юге. Но случай Якутии надо рассматривать особо.

Начнем с западной части «северной трапеции». Здесь выделяются Кольский полуостров, Мурманск и Карельская республика. Вместе с Финляндией все это составляет единый

географический и геополитический сектор, который эффективнее всего было бы интегрировать в самостоятельную и законченную систему, в которой стратегическим приоритетом и качеством военного центра решений обладала бы Мурманская область и сам Мурманск, а карело-финское пространство было бы наделено широким культурно-экономическим суверенитетом. В этом случае Мурманскую область можно было бы увеличить за счет северных областей Финляндии финской Лапландии. Баланс между Мурманском (стратегии чешской проекцией Москвы) и карело-финским пространством был бы конкретным выражением евразийского обустройства континента примером «новой финляндизации» в условиях, складывающихся после окончания «холодной войны».

Дальнейшее движение на юг этого блока мы рассмотрим в главе, посвященной русскому Западу. Надо заметить, что в любом случае основополагающей стратегической осью в данном случае будет ось Мурманск-Москва.

Далее: Архангельский край. Здесь следует сделать исключение из общего правила и обозначить важность интеграции не только по широте Север-Север, но и по меридиану. Дело в том, что Архангельский край расположен строго над центрально-европейской частью России, а следовательно, сама идея возможного суверенитета этого вертикального сектора от Белого моря до Черного в отношении России в целом исключается, так как этот регион и есть собственно Россия. Поэтому Архангельск и архангельский край находятся в той стратегической позиции, которая более всего отвечает принципу стратегической интеграции Севера в интересах Центра. Ось Москва-Архангельск единственная из всего спектра внутренних «геополитических лучей» представляет собой не просто военно-стратегическую конструкцию. Здесь необходимо добиться максимальной и разноплановой интеграции с Югом, вплоть до Москвы, постараться создать плавный переход от (относительно) густонаселенных районов Вологодской области к точечным поселениям Поморья. Миграция русского населения на Север, его активное освоение, развитие и преобразование должно начинаться именно с Архангельска. Этот крупнейший порт находится в наиболее выигрышной позиции в сравнении со всеми остальными населенными пунктами Севера, поэтому логичнее всего именно Архангельск выбрать в качестве «столицы Арктического пакта». Развитие оси Москва-Архангельск должно быть всесторонним и приоритетным. От качества и динамики этой единственной (из всего Севера) меридианальной интеграции будет зависеть состоятельность и эффективность всего «Арктического пакта».

Восточнее в зону Севера входят два административных образования: Ненецкий автономный округ и Республика Коми. Интеграция этих пространств между собой не имеет никаких противопоказаний, особенно при учете незначительной заселенности Ненецкого автономного округа. Близость к Архангельску позволяет активнейшим образом и приоритетно развивать этот регион в рамках общего проекта. Особым значением обладает освоение островов Новая Земля и Земля Франца Иосифа. Эти арктические земли обладают колоссальным стратегическим значением в контексте межконтинентального противостояния. Это наиболее близкие к полюсу, а соответственно, и к США, русские территории, которые используются как военно-стратегические базы. Как и в случае с Карелией и Мурманском, самые северные пространства контролируются преимущественно военными, тогда как южнее более развита гражданская администрация. Весь регион в целом имеет центром Воркуту, к которой сходятся основные коммуникации и пути сообщения.

Воркута крупный промышленный и стратегический центр, который расположен недалеко и от Ямало-Ненецкого округа, где нет аналогичного по масштабу центра. Следовательно, Воркута могла бы контролировать и гигантскую территорию побережья Карского моря

вплоть до устья Енисея и бассейна устья Оби. В этой области Ямало-Ненецкий округ географически близок к Ханты-мансийскому округу, и оба они входят в единый геополитический сектор.

Особо следует подчеркнуть, что южная граница «Северной трапеции» в случае Республики Коми имеет очень важное геополитическое значение. В данном случае интеграционные процессы этого северо-уральского региона с остальным Уралом (и северным Поволжьем) не только малоцелесообразны, но откровенно вредны, так как юго-западнее (за Коми-пермяцким округом) расположен Татарстан, где сепаратистские тенденции имеют долгую историю. Будучи помещенным в середину русских земель, Татарстан не представляет особой опасности, но во всех аналогичных случаях «сепаратистская логика» заставляет искать выхода к морям или иностранным территориям, и любые интеграционные процессы по вертикали в данном случае рано или поздно могут оказаться крайне опасными. Здесь следует пойти обратным путем (нежели в случае Архангельской области) и попытаться максимально оторвать весь северо-уральский регион и соседние с ним сектора на востоке и западе от Поволжья и Урала. В данном случае «северная трапеция» должна быть строго отделена от всего континентального пространства, расположенного южнее.

Еще восточнее лежат земли Енисейского бассейна, которые административно приходятся на Таймырский и Эвенкийский автономные округа и на северную часть Красноярского края бывший Туруханский край. В этой области выделяется Норильск, который может быть определен в качестве центра для всего этого гигантского региона. В данном случае меридианальная динамика по оси Север-Юг не исключается, так как Южная Сибирь от Омска до Байкала густо заселена русскими, и интеграция в этом направлении особой опасности представлять не может. Весь этот блок лежит на промежуточной территории, где заканчивается зона более или менее равномерного заселения территории и начинается собственно «Lenaland» Макиндера, «ничейная земля». Это зона и все более восточные территории представляют собой гигантскую континентальную пустыню, безжизненную тундру на севере и непроходимую тайгу на юге. Это «потенциальное пространство». С юга оно частично освоено и русскими и древними тюрко-монгольскими народами с относительно развитой политической культурой. Но на самом Севере оно представляет собой «no man land». Такое положение нельзя изменить быстро и одним рывком, а, следовательно, гигантский регион с центром в Норильске еще определенное время будет представлять собой «внутреннюю границу» континентальной России на северо-востоке, стратегический форпост Центра на Севере. Это логически подводит к необходимости особо развивать именно Норильск, который обладает чрезвычайно важным геополитическим значением. На него ложится функция контроля над Таймыром (и островом Северная Земля) на севере и бассейном Енисея на юге, а кроме того, от этой точки должна начинаться зона менее широкого, т.е. более точечного, узконаправленного контроля Центра над «дальним Севером-востоком» Евразии, над Lenaland.

Lenaland Макиндера включает в себя Якутию, Чукотку, Камчатку, Магаданский край, Хабаровский край, Амурскую область и Приморский край, остров Сахалин и Курилы. Все пространство делится на две геополитические области фрагмент «северной трапеции», с одной стороны, и Южная Якутия, Приамурье, Приморский край и южная половина Хабаровского края, с другой. Оба пространства качественно совершенно разные. Южная часть, особенно побережье Охотского и Японского морей, относительно плотно заселена, имеет древние политические традиции, является местом проживания довольно активных евразийских этносов. С точки зрения технического развития и, одновременно, в климатическом смысле, этот южный сектор представляет собой продолжение Южной Сибири.

Полной противоположностью является северная часть Lenaland. Это самая неразвитая и «дикая» часть Евразии, гигантский материковый пласт, с зачаточной инфраструктурой и практически без населения. Единственным крупным центром всего региона является Магадан, но он представляет собой порт, очень слабо связанный с необъятными континентальными просторами Колымы, Северной Якутии. Анадырь на Чукотке так же не является центром в полном смысле слова и так же не связан с континентом. Данный сектор отдельный материк, блестяще защищенный морскими границами, обладающий многочисленными полезными ископаемыми, но при этом совершенно не развитый и не освоенный, находящийся в потенциальном состоянии. Эта часть Сибири вынесена за рамки истории, и именно к ней в большей степени относится футурологическое пророчество Шпенглера относительно «грядущей сибирской цивилизации». Этот уникальный сектор Старого Света, еще не сказавший своего слова в истории цивилизаций и никак не проявивший своей геополитической функции.

Такая неразвитость этого региона объясняется на основании т.н. «потамической теории цивилизации», согласно которой культурное развитие региона происходит гораздо быстрее в тех случаях, когда русла основных рек в нем расположены не параллельно друг другу, но пересекаются. Сибирь (особенно Восточная) классическое подтверждение этого принципа, так как в ней все крупные реки текут в одном направлении, не пересекаясь. Однако запаздывание в развитии не есть чисто негативная характеристика. Историческое отставание помогает накопить (на основании рационального осмысления истории других территорий и наций) важнейший исторический опыт. Это при определенных обстоятельствах может стать залогом небывалого взлета.

Северная половина Lenaland, с точки зрения чисто географической, предполагает рассмотрение в качестве единого геополитического комплекса. И здесь встает очень важный вопрос. Вокруг какого центра сможет сложиться это грядущее геополитическое образование? Какой ориентации оно будет придерживаться? Сам факт сомнения Макиндера относительно того, причислять или нет Lenaland к «географической оси истории», указывает на возможность альтернативных решений ситуации. Этого достаточно для того, чтобы континентальная стратегия уделила данному сектору особое внимание.

Ясно, что задачей максимум является включение этой области в «Арктический пакт» под контролем Центра (Москвы) и корреляция с другими, вторичными центрами Северного пояса. Но здесь возникают два препятствия:

- 1) отсутствие в центре этого региона какого-то крупного стратегического пункта, вокруг которого можно было бы выстраивать интеграционные системы;
- 2) осевое положение Якутии (Республика Саха) в этом регионе, что особенно осложняется наличием у якутов пусть номинального, но исторически фиксируемого «сепаратизма».

В данном случае соотношение северной половины «арктической трапеции» с Югом впервые приобретают действительно драматический характер, так как Якутия обладает таким стратегическим местонахождением, которое дает все предпосылки для превращения в самостоятельный регион, независимый от Москвы. Это обеспечивается и протяженной береговой линией, и меридианальной структурой территорий республики, и ее технической оторванностью от остальных сибирских регионов. При определенном стечении обстоятельств именно Якутия может стать основной базой атлантистской

стратегии, отправляясь от которой талассократия переструктурирует тихоокеанский берег Евразии и попытается превратить его в классический rimland, подконтрольный «морскому могуществу». Повышенное внимание атлантистов к тихоокеанскому ареалу и в высшей степени показательное выделение Макиндером Lenaland в особую категорию, а затем включение этой территории в зону rimland'a в картах атлантистов Спикмена и Кирка все это свидетельствует о том, что при первом удобном случае весь этот слабо связанный с центром регион антиконтинентальные силы попытаются вывести из-под евразийского контроля.

В этой связи следует предпринять следующие меры:

- 1) Резко ограничить юридически политический суверенитет Якутии.
- 2) Разделить Якутию на два или несколько регионов, причем важнее всего административно отделить регион побережья моря Лаптевых и Восточно-Сибирского моря от континентального бассейна реки Лена. Важно также максимально увеличить зону, отделяющую границы Якутии от тихоокеанского побережья и усилить стратегический контроль над этими береговыми зонами.
- 3) Установить над всей этой территорией специальный жесткий контроль представителя Москвы.
- 4) Организовать промышленно-финансовую интеграцию Якутии в неякутские регионы, сделать область максимально зависимой от Центра или от его проекций на Севере и на Юге Сибири.

Названные шаги предполагают такую реорганизацию этой территории, которая создала бы здесь совершенно новую геополитическую конструкцию: новый центр и новые радиальные связи. Иными словами, не дожидаясь реорганизации Lenaland по атлантистскому сценарию, пока эта область остается в составе России, следует немедленно перейти к строительству континентальной Lenaland по евразийскому образцу.

Проблема соотношения Север и Юг имеет для данного сектора особое решение: здесь не просто следует ограничить контакты по этой оси, но заново реорганизовать все северное пространство, оторвав его полярные и береговые зоны от континентальных пространств Якутии. Это не только превентивный геополитический ход, это геополитическая атака, позиционная война за Lenaland, за будущую Сибирь, за ее континентальную, евразийскую судьбу. Пока этот вопрос может иметь внутрисполитическое значение. Нельзя допускать, чтобы он приобрел международное значение и стал внешнеполитическим.

2.7 Резюме

Северный пояс евразийского материка, входящий в Россию, представляет собой важнейшую геополитическую реальность, значение которой будет неуклонно возрастать по мере развития общепланетарной динамики. При этом особенно важен этот регион для утверждения Россией своего глобального геополитического статуса «географической оси истории».

Только при определении атлантизма, талассократии как своего основного геополитического противника вся система Севера приобретает реальное стратегическое наполнение. При отказе от признания геополитического дуализма на уровне военной доктрины или международной политики вся эта тема мгновенно теряет смысл. При этом

неизбежна не только быстрая деградация русского Севера, но и в дальнейшей перспективе его дробление и даже отторжение отдельных регионов от России.

Общий ритм геополитических процессов в настоящее время таков, что вопрос геополитической реорганизации Севера в соответствии с вышеперечисленными геополитическими константами является в высшей степени актуальным, насущным делом. Даже для того, чтобы сохранить статус кво, необходимо немедленно начать геополитическую реорганизацию всех этих пространств.

Судьба России напрямую связана с геополитической судьбой Севера. Этот закон является базой ее грядущей геополитики.

Север это будущее, это судьба.

Глава 3. Вызов Востока

3.1 «Внутренний Восток» (объем понятия)

Разбирая геополитические проблемы русского Востока применим тот же метод, что и в случае Севера, разделив вопрос на три составляющих:

- 1) Центр - Восток
- 2) Связи секторов Востока между собой
- 3) Связи этих секторов с другими регионами и геополитическими зонами России.

Но прежде следует определить, что понимать под «Русским Востоком». Надо сразу подчеркнуть разницу между Востоком как чисто географическим понятием и Востоком культурным, цивилизационным, историческим. Так, в культурный Восток принято включать все территории Северной Африки, Ближнего Востока, Передней Азии, Средней Азии вплоть до Пакистана и дальше к Филиппинам (исламский мир) и Индию, тогда как к Китаю и Индокитаю, а также к странам тихоокеанского региона принято применять понятие «Дальний Восток». С позиции России, географически все это представляет собой Юг, простирающийся от далекого магрибского Запада до тихоокеанского Дальнего Востока.

С другой стороны, в рамках самой России «Востоком» являются совершенно иные географические и геополитические реальности это территория, простирающаяся от Поволжья (Татария) через Урал, Сибирь, вплоть до Тихого океана. Эта геополитическая категория может быть названа «русским Востоком» или «внутренним Востоком». Изучая внутреннюю геополитику России, следует взять в качестве «Востока» именно это второе понятие, «внутренний Восток», географические территории, лежащие к Востоку от Центра (Москвы).

В таком случае, Кавказ и Средняя Азия попадут в категорию «Юга» и будут рассмотрены в соответствующей главе.

Учитывая, что мы рассматриваем внутреннюю геополитику России как «открытую систему», не совпадающую с административными границами РФ, исходя из метода «геополитических лучей», выделение геополитических зон зачастую приходится на территории соседних государств, в том случае, если налицо геополитическое, этническое и географически-ландшафтное единство. По этой причине во «внутренний Восток» России следует включать как Южный Урал, так и Северный Казахстан от Актюбинска до Семипалатинска приблизительно по 50-й широте. Кроме того, Монголия, Синьцзян и Манчжурия геополитически входят в сектор Юга по отношению к России. Следовательно, вся Южная Сибирь, Алтай, Тува, Бурятия, Приамурье и Приморье (плюс южная половина Хабаровского края) входят в полосу «внутреннего Востока» вместе с центрально-сибирскими регионами, расположенными южнее «северной трапеции».

Так, «внутренним Востоком» следует считать прямоугольник, простирающийся от Казани и Урала до Тихого океана.

3.2 Пояс «русской Сибири» (структура)

Климатически русский Восток резко отличается от Севера. Это зона с умеренным континентальным климатом. В Поволжье и на Урале, а также в Сибири и Приморье преимущественно расположена лесная зона. От Северного Казахстана до Байкала идет сужающийся клин степей. Алтай и Приамурье массивы невысоких гор. Большинство территорий довольно плотно заселено и представляет собой благоприятные для проживания и хозяйствования рельефы.

Этнический состав внутреннего Востока России таков: подавляющее большинство представляют собой русские, рассеянно проживающие в национальных республиках и компактно в большинстве Сибирских земель. Можно выделить несколько этнических зон, совпадающих в общих чертах с соответствующими автономиями и республиками.

В Поволжье расположен Татарстан, довольно монолитное этно-национальное образование, сохраняющее традиции политической самостоятельности и определенно го соперничества с Россией. Это наиболее уязвимый (с точки зрения сохранения целостности России) регион, так как национальное самосознание татар очень развито. Самым важным фактором, делающим проблему «татарского сепаратизма» все же второстепенной, является географическое месторасположение Татарстана в середине континентального пространства без морских границ или соседства с нерусским государством. Пока такая геополитическая ситуация сохраняется, это не представляет особой опасности для России. Но в любом случае историческая традиция татар требует повышенного внимания к этому региону и проведения такой политики Центра в отношении Казани, благодаря которой геополитическая система Татарстана была бы связана с чисто русскими регионами (возможно, не прилегающими территориально). При этом, напротив, интеграционным процессам с Башкирией, Удмуртией, Мордовией и Мари-эл следует препятствовать. Кроме того, имеет смысл акцентировать территориальное деление Татарстана по культурно-этническим признакам, так как татары этнос составной и по расовым и по культурно-религиозным факторам. Имеет смысл также поощрять русскую миграцию в эту республику.

Татары тюрки и мусульмане, а это делает их геополитической частью тюрко-исламского мира. В этом отношении Центр сталкивается с проблемой, которая представляет собой доминанту всей геополитики Юга (о чем пойдет речь в соответствующей главе). Совершенный отрыв Татарии от этой реальности невозможен ни путем ассимиляции, ни путем активной географической изоляции. Поэтому «татарский вопрос» входит как отдельная статья в более широкую проблему Россия и ислам. Общим знаменателем при решении всех аналогичных ситуаций является поиск геополитического баланса интересов «географической оси истории» и исламского мира. В этом отношении антиатлантизм является во всех без исключения случаях общим знаменателем, позволяющим основать долговременный планетарный альянс. В случае Татарстана следует особенно акцентировать естественный континентальный характер татарской нации, чья историческая судьба неразрывно связана с Евразией, а при отождествлении геополитики Евразии с геополитикой России в настоящих условиях, сознательный и добровольный союз является более глубоким императивом, нежели этно-конфессиональные различия.

Шире, евразийская держава Россия основана на сочетании славянского и тюркского элементов, которые и дали собственно великоросский этнос, ставший осью «континентального государства», отождествившегося с heartland'ом. Поэтому и в дальнейшем эти два этноса славяне и тюрки (+ угры и монголы) остаются столпами евразийской геополитики. Их будущее в развитии политической и этнической интеграции,

а поэтому акцентировка этнокультурных различий, и особенно стремление придать этим различиям политическую форму, противоречат логике исторической судьбы и русских и татар. Эта тема должна стать осью отношений Москвы и Казани, и не исключено, что для этого потребуются создание особого «геополитического лобби», выражающего интересы Евразии еще и политически (или метаполитически).

Почти те же самые соображения применимы и к Башкирии, расположенной южнее Татарстана. В ней также проживает тюркский этнос, исповедующий ислам. Единственное отличие в том, что у башкир нет столь проявленной сепаратистской традиции и столь развитого национального самосознания, как у татар, которые были наиболее активным и «передовым» этносом во всем Поволжье. По этой причине татаро-башкирские связи никак не могут способствовать геополитической стабильности в этом секторе «внутреннего Востока» России, и Центр должен сделать все возможное, чтобы интегрировать Башкирию в южно-уральские регионы, заселенные русскими, и оторвать ее от ориентации на Казань. При этом имеет смысл акцентировать своеобразие сугубо башкирской культуры, ее уникальности, ее отличия от других тюркско-исламских форм. Укрепление геополитических связей Татарии с Башкирией предельно опасно для России, так как южная административная граница Башкирии пролегает недалеко от Северного Казахстана, который (при самом неудачном развитии геополитической ситуации) теоретически может стать плацдармом тюркско-исламского сепаратизма. В этом случае heartland'у грозит самое страшное быть разорванным тюркским (протурецким, т.е. проатлантическим) клином прямо посередине материкового пространства. В этом смысле, ориентация Татарии на юг, попытки интеграции с Башкирией, и даже сближение Башкирии с Оренбургской областью, являются крайне негативными тенденциями, которым континентальная политика Центра должна помешать любой ценой. Башкирии следует укреплять широтные связи с Куйбышевым и Челябинском, а меридианальные контакты с Казанью и Оренбургом следует, напротив, ослаблять.

Далее, от Южного Урала (Челябинска) до Красноярска тянется полоса земель, активно заселенных и освоенных русскими. С запада на восток явно вырисовывается геополитическая ось, которая исторически соответствовала пути покорения русскими Сибири: Челябинск Омск Новосибирск Томск Кемерово Красноярск Иркутск. Весь этот пояс представляет собой развитую промышленную зону, а такой город, как Новосибирск, является еще и крупнейшим интеллектуальным центром. При этом в этническом смысле это почти чисто русская зона. Сходная ситуация повторяется и с восточной стороны Байкала, где вдоль Байкало-Амурской магистрали от Читы до Хабаровска и далее, южнее к Владивостоку, расположено как бы продолжение той же полосы, начинающейся на Южном Урале. Единственным отклонением является Бурятия, территориально окаймляющая Байкал с севера и разрывающая непрерывность в остальном однородного пояса «русской Сибири».

Строго южнее этого сугубо русского пояса пролегает параллельная зона со значительной примесью тюркского (восточнее монгольского) населения. Она начинается в Северном Казахстане, от Актюбинска доходит по территории Казахстана до Семипалатинска и Усть-Каменогорска и продолжается на российской территории на Алтае (колыбели тюркского этноса), в Хакасии, Туве и Бурятии. При этом от Алтая до Забайкалья (Чита) этот тюркско-монгольский пояс ландшафтно и в значительной степени этнически плавно переходит в Монголию, никакой очевидной географической границы с которой на самом деле не существует. С геополитической точки зрения, весь этот нижний пояс входит составной частью в стратегическое пространство «русской Сибири», и поэтому его следует рассматривать как продолжение «русского Востока» на юг. Единственным исключением является фрагмент китайской территории (Китайская Манчжурия),

расположенный от восточной границы с Монголией до реки Уссури. Исходя из логики, он должен был бы стратегически контролироваться Россией, так как в противном случае он неизбежно станет поводом для позиционных коллизий между «геополитической осью истории» и территориями, геополитически входящими в rimland, а Китай несомненно относится к категории rimland (в этом ни у кого из геополитиков никогда не было и тени сомнений).

В отношении названной полосы «русской Сибири» справедлив один и тот же геополитический принцип: весь этот территориальный сектор необходимо активно интегрировать в единое геополитическое поле, причем приоритетным направлением здесь будет широтная интеграция по длинной оси Челябинск Хабаровск (меридианальная короткая ось Хабаровск Владивосток является продолжением этой линии в особом геополитическом секторе). Все это пространство гигантской протяженности составляет главное стратегическое преимущество России как подлинно евразийской державы. Благодаря этому южно-сибирскому коридору Россия получает возможность накрепко связать регионы Центра с тихоокеанским побережьем, обеспечив тем самым потенциальную магистраль полноценного освоения Сибири и окончательного выхода Москвы в Тихий океан. Это полоса является рычагом управления всей Евразии, включая Европу, так как организация высокотехнологической континентальной связи от Дальнего Востока до Дальнего Запада позволяет таким образом переструктурировать планетарную реальность, что талассократический контроль над океанами извне потеряет свое ключевое значение. Ресурсы Сибири свяжутся в перспективе с высокими технологиями континентальной Европы и развитой Японии, и когда это сможет осуществиться, планетарной доминации талассократии наступит конец.

Широтная интеграция Сибири (ось Челябинск Хабаровск) является наиважнейшим стратегическим преимуществом, которое есть только у России. С освоения этой области может начаться вся геополитическая история будущего, и в этом случае пророчества Шпенглера оправдаются.

В более узком, «внутреннем», смысле развитие интеграции «русской Сибири» дает возможность расширению геополитического контроля и по меридиану. Южный «тюрско-монгольский» пояс будет связываться с более северными сугубо русскими территориями, при том, что максимально широкая этнокультурная автономия будет сопровождаться экономической интеграцией и стратегической доминацией русской оси Челябинск-Владивосток. Причем в этот процесс должны включаться такие разнородные в административном смысле образования, как Казахстан, автономные округа и республики на территории РФ, Монголия и, возможно, некоторые районы китайской Манчжурии.

Вместе с этим аналогичный меридианальный вектор предполагается и в северном направлении, где ситуация отличается лишь тем, что автохтонное нерусское население гораздо более разряжено, политически менее развито и не имеет свежего исторического опыта политического суверенитета. В Ханты-Мансийском и Эвенкском округах, а также в Хабаровском крае предел северного расширения пояса «русской Сибири» устанавливается параллельным процессом внутренней интеграции «северной трапеции». Эта интеграция в отличие от сложной геополитической функции «русской Сибири» (ось Челябинск Хабаровск), которая имеет три вектора развития (широтный, северный и южный) и сталкивается в ряде случаев со сложившимися и довольно самостоятельными политическими формами (государствами), имеет простой чисто широтный характер. Поэтому оба геополитических процесса будут развиваться в разном ритме, а следовательно, конкретная результирующая граница между развитием «русской Сибири»

на север и общей интеграцией «северной трапеции» будет зависеть от непредсказуемых факторов.

Все эти геополитические вектора развития не являются по сути чем-то новым и неожиданным, так как они оказываются лишь продолжением масштабных исторических процессов движения России на восток и становления евразийской державы. Русский путь к Тихому Океану не случаен, и территории русского освоения Сибири также следуют ясной географической логике. Этот путь соответствует рельефной границе Леса и Степи, на геополитическом синтезе которых основано само Русское Государство. По «опушке» северных таежных лесов, граничащих со степью (или лесостепью), двигались русские освоители Сибири, оседая на наиболее пригодных для жилья и сельского хозяйства землях. От Челябинска до Байкала этот ландшафтный сектор представляет собой сужающийся клин. А от Байкала до тихоокеанского побережья это сплошная зона северных лесов, постепенно и незаметно переходящих в леса тропические. При этом увеличивается процент нагорий и горных массивов.

Эта зона от Байкала до устья Амура снова возвращает к проблеме «Lenaland», которая уже вставала тогда, когда мы разбирали якутский сектор «северной трапеции».

3.3 Позиционная битва за Lenaland

Как и в случае Якутии (при анализе геополитики русского Севера), при подходе к Восточной Сибири, простирающейся восточнее Енисея, мы сталкиваемся с целым рядом геополитических проблем. Забегая вперед, заметим, что в третий раз столкнемся со сложностями и тогда, когда дойдем до разбора самого восточного сектора «евразийского Юга».

Уже с чисто географической точки зрения, за Байкалом начинается серьезное изменение рельефа по сравнению со всеми более западными секторами Евразии. Там, между континентальными лесами на севере и тропическими (горными) лесами на юге, обязательно пролегалли зоны степей, что создавало естественную симметрию, с выделением центральной области, первого (степного) периферийного круга и пограничных рельефов тропических лесов и гор. Эта картина сохраняется от Молдавии до Алтая, севернее степная прослойка просто пропадает. В случае Восточной Сибири, мы имеем дело с совершенно новым геополитическим и ландшафтным регионом, требующим иных позиционных решений. Параллельно неожиданному ландшафтному «вызову» (плавный переход континентальных лесов в тропические на фоне гор, сопков и холмов) обнаруживается и крайне неудачная этнополитическая картина наличие в регионе нескольких внутренних и внешних национальных образований, чья геополитическая лояльность России не так очевидна. На фоне крайне слабого заселения всей области Lenaland русскими геополитическая картина становится крайне тревожной.

Во-первых, территория Бурятии. Она нарушает непрерывность собственно русского сибирского пояса, выдаваясь далеко на север от озера Байкал. Буряты ламаисты, и в критические моменты русской истории они пытались основать на своей территории независимое теократическое государство, ориентированное на Монголию и Тибет. Само по себе это еще не дает оснований для беспокойства, но здесь возникает и новая проблема территориальная близость южных границ Якутии к северным границам Бурятии. Якуты принадлежат к тюркской группе, значительно христианизированы, но часто сохраняют и древние шаманские традиции. При этом некоторые группы исповедуют и ламаизм. При наличии выхода Якутии к морю и границы Бурятии с Монголией все это представляет

собой опасность появления потенциального геополитического блока, который имел бы больше предпосылок для относительной геополитической самостоятельности, чем Татарстан или некоторые северокавказские народы, сепаратизм которых очевиден. Если добавить к этому близость тихоокеанского берега, крайне слабо заселенного русскими, то опасность удваивается за счет возможного контроля талассократии над береговыми зонами (или секторами зон, потенциальными коридорами из Lenaland'a к Тихому океану). И наконец, дело еще больше усугубляется тем, что юг Якутии от северо-восточной границы Китая отделяет довольно тонкая полоска Амурской области, что дает основания для открытия прямого геополитического коридора от южных китайских берегов Индийского океана до моря Лаптевых на Севере.

Все эти потенциальные геополитические конфигурации крайне настораживают. Нет сомнений, что подобная картина не может не представляться крайне заманчивой атлантистским стратегам, так как богатейшая землями, ресурсами и уникальная в смысле стратегических возможностей Lenaland оказывается в весьма уязвимом, с геополитической точки зрения, положении, и любое ослабление российского контроля над этим регионом может незамедлительно вызвать необратимое отторжение гигантского куска евразийского материка от самой географической оси истории. Для предотвращения этих событий недостаточно просто усилить военный контингент, расположенный на Дальнем Востоке или в Приамурье. Необходимо предпринять масштабные геополитические шаги, так как речь идет ни больше ни меньше как о потенциальной позиционной войне. На что следовало бы обратить особое внимание:

- 1) Важно усилить стратегическое присутствие представителей Центра на юге Якутии. Это достигается через направленную миграцию и планомерную «колонизацию» земель народами из более западных регионов.
- 2) Следует осуществить то же самое с землями, лежащими к северу от озера Байкал. В таком случае опасные границы будут раздвинуты.
- 3) Одновременно необходимо усиленно осваивать север Иркутской области и всю Амурскую область, осуществляя план целенаправленной «колонизации» этих территорий.

Эти три меры надо подкрепить усилением военного присутствия в означенной зоне и активизацией стратегического, экономического и технологического расширения к западу и к востоку. Все это призвано сгладить опасное сужение «русского пояса».

- 4) Следует активизировать позиционное давление на северо-восточный Китай, предпринять превентивное давление на эту область, которое изначально предупредило бы любое геополитическое поползновение Китая к северному расширению.
- 5) Необходимо максимально укрепить демографически и стратегически сектор, расположенный между городами Благовещенск Комсомольск-на-Амуре Хабаровск, чтобы создать здесь массивный щит от потенциальной талассократической (с моря) или китайской (с суши) геополитической агрессии.
- 6) Все эти меры важно подкрепить максимальной активизацией русско-монгольских отношений, так как бесплодная и мало привлекательная в иных отношениях Монголия для геополитики этого региона представляет ключевую и важнейшую территорию. Массивное военное присутствие России вдоль всей монгольско-китай

ской границы, и особенно на ее восточной части, минимализировало бы геополитический риск отторжения Lenaland.

Напомним, что геополитика Севера предполагала сконцентрировать особые усилия в этом же секторе только с севера, с побережья Ледовитого океана. Соединение обоих геополитических стратегий и их параллельное осуществление позволит России заложить позиционную основу на далекое будущее, когда важность этих земель будет настолько очевидной, что от контроля над ними будет зависеть планетарное значение Евразии в целом.

Геополитическая битва за Lenaland должна начинаться уже сейчас, хотя широкое внимание к этому региону будет привлечено позже. Но если не заложить правильной геополитической и стратегической модели изначально, разрешить конфликт после того, как он начнется, будет гораздо сложнее, а может быть, это окажется невыполнимым.

В геополитике основные сражения выигрываются задолго до того, как они переходят в открытую форму политического или международного конфликта.

3.4 Столица Сибири

Проект интеграции Сибири ставит вопрос о географическом центре этого процесса, т.е. о той точке, которая смогла бы стать полномочным представителем Москвы за Уралом и выполнять функцию притяжения для всех остальных регионов. На эту роль более всего подходит Новосибирск, который не просто является крупнейшим городом всей Сибири, но и важнейшим интеллектуальным центром общероссийского масштаба.

От Новосибирска западная ось идет к Екатеринбургу, столице Урала, а Восточная к Иркутску, далее Хабаровску и Владивостоку. На Новосибирск, таким образом, падает важнейшая функция связи всего «русского пояса Сибири», в котором он является главным звеном. Ось Москва Новосибирск становится важнейшей силовой линией «внутренней геополитики» России, тем главным «лучом», по которому осуществляется взаимобратный процесс обмена центростремительными энергетическими потоками из Центра и центробежными от периферии.

Уральский регион с центром в Екатеринбурге имеет смысл замкнуть на Москву непосредственно, а не делать из него промежуточную инстанцию в сообщении между центральной частью России и Сибирью. Геополитическая позиция Новосибирска настолько важна, что этот город и прилегающие к нему регионы должны обладать особым статусом и особыми полномочиями, так как именно отсюда должны расходиться вторичные геополитические лучи по всей Сибири к северу, югу, востоку и западу.

Исключение из такой вторичной централизации имеет смысл сделать только для Приморского края и южных секторов Хабаровского края. Это совершенно особая зона, жестко связанная с проблематикой Lenaland и позиционной борьбой за контроль над ней. В этом отношении особый статус должен быть предоставлен Хабаровску и Владивостоку, и их следует напрямую связать с Москвой (как и Екатеринбург).

Для взаимодействия с «северной трапецией» удобно организовать дополнительные стратегические оси Новосибирск Норильск и Хабаровск Магадан. Таким образом Восток будет стратегически сопряжен с Севером.

Восток, как и Север, представляет собой плацдарм геополитики будущего. Здесь лежит судьба Евразии. При этом благоприятный климат «русской Сибири» делает ее более предрасположенной к тому, чтобы именно отсюда начинать грандиозный проект создания новой континентальной модели. Здесь должны быть построены новые города и проложены новые магистрали, освоены новые земли и месторождения и созданы новые военные базы. При этом важно изначально закладывать в проект гармоничное сочетание двух начал рельеф, ландшафт, этнокультурный фактор, наконец, экологию, с одной стороны, и технические и стратегические критерии, с другой. Архаичные традиции следует соединить с новейшими технологичными разработками. Надо учитывать места древнейших стоянок человека в этих землях и соотносить с ними выбор для развития производств и военных баз.

Такая логика приводит к открытой перспективе появления в Сибири нового центра, пока не проявленного и не задуманного. И по мере развития всего русского Востока, по мере актуализации Тихого океана как «океана будущего» не исключено, что встанет вопрос и о переносе столицы всей Евразии именно в эти земли в небывалую и еще не существующую блистательную столицу Нового Тысячелетия.

Придет время, когда Москва утратит свое «срединное» значение, станет недостаточной в геополитическом смысле, слишком «западной». И тогда вопрос о Новой Столице в Сибири получит не просто общегосударственное, но общеконтинентальное, общемировое значение.

Однако нельзя ни на мгновение упускать из виду, что такая перспектива возможна только при выигрыше позиционной борьбы за Lenaland, без чего геополитическое возрождение Евразии немыслимо.

Глава 4. Новый геополитический порядок Юга

4.1 «Новый геополитический порядок» Юга

Геополитика южных регионов (как и западных) связана с планетарной миссией России-Евразии в еще большей степени, нежели проблемы Севера и Востока. Если даже при рассмотрении Севера и Востока, принадлежащих геополитически к внутрироссийским территориям, внешнеполитический фактор возникал постоянно, то в случае разбора проблематики Юга (равно как и Запада) говорить только о «внутренней геополитике» России просто не имеет смысла, так как все внутрироссийские реальности настолько связаны здесь с внешнеполитическими, что их разделение просто невозможно без того, чтобы полностью не нарушить строгость общей геополитической картины.

В отношении Юга у «географической оси истории» есть только один императив геополитическая экспансия вплоть до берегов Индийского океана. Это означает центральность и единственность меридианального развития, однозначную доминацию оси Север Юг. С геополитической точки зрения, все пространство, отделяющее российскую территорию от южной береговой линии Евразии, является полосой, чью площадь необходимо свести к нулю. Сам факт существования rimland'a, который является не линией, но полосой, есть выражение талассократического воздействия, противоположного базовому импульсу континентальной интеграции. Если rimland Евразии на севере и востоке России сведен к нулевому объему, и континент здесь является геополитически законченным (единственно, что остается это сохранять позиционный статус кво, заранее предупреждая возможность превращения линии в полосу под воздействием талассократического импульса), то rimland на юге (и западе) представляет собой открытую проблему. На востоке и севере у России rimland актуальная линия, но потенциальная полоса, а на юге и западе наоборот актуальная полоса, но потенциальная линия. В первом случае основным императивом является оборона и защита, сохранение, консервация положения вещей и предупредительные геополитические ходы. Во втором случае речь идет, напротив, об активно наступательной геополитике, об экспансии, суммарно «оффенсивной» стратегии.

На Юге всей Евразии Россия должна установить «новый геополитический порядок», исходя из принципа общеконтинентальной интеграции. Поэтому все сложившиеся политические образования Юга исламские страны, Индия, Китай, Индокитай следует заведомо рассматривать как театр континентальных позиционных маневров, чья окончательная задача заключается в том, чтобы стратегически жестко соединить все эти промежуточные регионы с евразийским Центром с Москвой.

Отсюда вытекает концепция «открытых лучей», идущих от Центра к периферии, которые не останавливаются на собственно российских границах, но должны быть проведены вплоть до южного океанского берега. Те отрезки «лучей», которые приходится на российские территории, являются актуальными, на те страны, которые стратегически солидарны с Россией полуактуальными, а на те государства, которые следуют собственному геополитическому пути или (в худшем случае) входят в зону прямого атлантистского контроля потенциальными. Общая логика евразийской геополитики в этом направлении сводится к тому, чтобы вся протяженность лучей стала актуальной или полуактуальной.

На этом основании все побережье евразийского континента от Анатолии до Кореи следует рассматривать как потенциальный «русский Юг».

4.2 Зоны и горы-границы

Императив геополитической экспансии в южном направлении предопределяет и структуру композиции тех областей, которые входят в административные границы России или в состав союзных с Россией государств (СНГ). Поэтому анализ периферии актуальных и полуактуальных геополитических лучей не должен ни на мгновение отвлекаться от изначальной тенденции, диктуемой законами геополитики.

«Русским Югом», в более ограниченном смысле, являются следующие зоны:

- 1) Север Балканского полуострова от Сербии до Болгарии;
- 2) Молдавия и Южная и Восточная Украина;
- 3) Ростовская область и Краснодарский край (порт Новороссийск);
- 4) Кавказ;
- 5) Восточное и северное побережье Каспия (территория Казахстана и Туркмении);
- 6) Средняя Азия, включающая Казахстан, Узбекистан, Киргизию и Таджикистан;
- 7) Монголия.

Над этими зонами континентальный стратегический контроль установлен. Но все они должны рассматриваться как базы дальнейшей геополитической экспансии на юг, а не как «вечные» границы России. С геополитической точки зрения, наличие береговых полос, не подконтрольных heartland'у, является постоянной угрозой сокращения даже тех территорий, которые в данный момент соединены с Центром Евразии довольно крепко. Распад СССР и появление самостоятельных политических образований на базе бывших союзных республик дает впечатляющий пример того, как отказ от экспансии вовне, к южным берегам континента (вывод советских войск из Афганистана) неминуемо влечет за собой откат надежных границ Москвы далеко на север, вглубь континента. Но ослабление континентального присутствия никогда не порождает вакуум или усиления суверенитета «освободившихся» территорий, так как их провинциальный статус заведомо исключает их геополитическую автаркию. На место теллуократического влияния Москвы автоматически приходит талассократическое влияние атлантизма (в той или иной форме).

Следовательно, структура всего внутреннего пояса «русского Юга» должна изначально рассматриваться как потенциальный наступательный плацдарм.

Однако дело осложняется тем, что практически все пограничные территории приходится на горные (часто высокогорные) районы.

На севере Балканского полуострова это Балканские горы, восточнее Кавказ, далее хребет Копетдаг и Гиндукуш, потом Памир, Тянь-Шань, Алтай. Горный рельеф южной границы России-Евразии, который во многом предопределил всю историю Востока, в настоящий момент является одним из важнейших геополитических козырей атлантизма. Древние индоевропейцы делили весь евразийский Восток на две составляющие северный Туран

(все, что выше евразийской гряды гор) и южный Иран (лежащий ниже этой гряды). Фактически, это деление строго соответствует современным геополитическим терминам heartland (Туран) и rimland (Иран). Спустя несколько тысячелетий южный фронт России ставит ту же геополитическую проблему, которая была характерна для диалектики отношений "степные кочевники против оседлых земледельцев Персии".

Но в данном случае ситуация кардинально изменилась в том смысле, что к степному Турану добавился оседлый славянский северный Лес, сбалансировав и зафиксировав динамику туранских кочевников. Оседлые индоевропейцы (славяне) замкнули степь с севера культурными формами, во многом повторявшими архетипы иранского юга. Россия как Евразия, как синтез Леса и Степи качественно превосходит Туран, а следовательно, проблема Ирана (шире нерусской Средней Азии) приобретает иной цивилизационный и геополитический смысл. Особенно это проявляется с момента Исламской революции в Иране, которая радикально порвала с атлантистской талассократической политикой шахского режима.

Все эти геополитические аспекты предполагают необходимость в радикально новом подходе к проблеме «евразийских гор», которые должны утратить функцию стратегической границы, стать не преградой на пути континентальной интеграции, но мостом к ней.

Потребность в изменении функции гор на юге России (и ее стратегического ареала) является столпом будущей евразийской геополитики. Без такой предварительной операции Евразия никогда не добьется действительного мирового господства, более того, никогда даже не приблизится к подлинному равноправному диалогу с талассократией.

4.3 Балканы

Поскольку большинство южных земель России и ее стратегического ареала приходится на земли, расово, культурно и религиозно отличные от цивилизации русских (кроме Балкан и Украины), то геополитически оси должны быть строго меридианальны. Отсюда вывод: следует способствовать всем вертикальным (долготным) интеграционным процессам и препятствовать всем горизонтальным (широтным), т.е. в сфере, этнически и политически отличной от собственно русских пространств, следует применять принцип прямо противоположный принципу, доминирующему в условиях этно-культурной однородности.

Наметим основные формы геополитической структуры «русского Юга» (в широком смысле), поочередно рассматривая все локальные геополитические системы с запада на восток.

Балканский полуостров. Здесь существует четыре особые зоны:

- а) боснийско-хорватская (самая западная и атлантически ориентированная, чистый rimland);
- б) сербская (расположенная восточнее и явно евразийски ориентированная);
- в) болгарская (еще более восточная, имеющая элементы «левантийской версии rimland'a») наиболее ясно эта модель представлена Турцией и континентально-го евразийского синтеза);

г) греческая (православная, но входящая в атлантистский блок).

«Новый геополитический порядок» (континентальный и евразийский) в этой области (как и повсюду) основан на поощрении всех интеграционных процессов по оси Север Юг. Это означает, что следует максимально содействовать укреплению связей Белград Афины и София Афины. Так как весь регион Балкан представляет собой мозаичную и крайне сложную конфигурацию, проект общеславянской южной федерации, состоящей из Сербии, Болгарии, Македонии, Черногории и Сербской Боснии, который был бы теоретически идеальным решением, вряд ли осуществим в ближайшее время. Более того, он предполагает опасный процесс широтной интеграции, которая в таких сложных этнически регионах является всегда проблематичной. Вспомним, к примеру, ожесточенные балканские войны начала века между православными государствами Сербией, Болгарией и Грецией и постоянно встающую проблему Македонии, являющейся «яблоком раздора» внутри потенциально континентальных и евразийских православных держав. Поэтому пример средневековой Сербской «империи» Неманичей может быть взят в качестве позитивной геополитической парадигмы. Более того, все значительные успехи Греции в глобальных геополитических проектах (в частности, завоевания Александра Великого) питались энергиями, идущими с севера Балкан македонская династия, а ранее дорийский тип индоевропейской Спарты. В рамках малой модели всего Балканского полуострова сербы (и, отчасти, болгары) являют собой евразийский импульс, выступают как носители идеи heartland'a. Расположенная южнее Греция геополитически растянута между этим северным континентальным импульсом и устойчивой исторической идентификацией с rimland'ом. Поэтому все объединительные интеграционные проекты Греции с севером Балкан могут способствовать усилению в Греции внутриконтинентальных импульсов, что могло бы основываться на конфессиональной близости с Православной Россией.

Если в далекой перспективе можно представить себе общую Балканскую Федерацию, евразийски ориентированную, то геополитическую программу минимум можно сформулировать как создание неправильного ромба София Москва Белград Афины (и снова София), в котором из Центра исходят два луча русско-сербский и русско-болгарский, а сходятся они в Афинах. При этом вопрос Македонии мог бы быть решен за счет предоставления ей особого статуса, чтобы снять камень преткновения между всеми тремя православными балканскими и потенциально евразийскими (в разной степени) государствами. Отсюда логически вытекает насущный интерес Москвы в проблеме Македонии.

Если посмотреть на всю картину с противоположной точки зрения, с позиции атлантистов, сразу же станет очевидным, что для талассократии важно придать всем геополитическим процессам прямо противоположный характер.

Во-первых, для «морской силы» важно поддержать проатлантистские силы на севере Балкан (хорваты и мусульмане), а кроме того, оторвать Сербию и Болгарию от геополитического союза с Грецией. Для этого удобнее всего использовать Македонию, которая сможет разрушить все континентальные проекты в этом регионе. А если подключить Турцию к болгарской проблеме, т.е. способствовать улучшению турецко-болгарских отношений в ущерб болгарско-русским, то вся евразийская континентальная политика здесь потерпит поражение. Это надо учитывать геополитикам Евразии.

4.4 Проблема суверенной Украины

Далее встает украинский вопрос. Суверенитет Украины представляет собой настолько негативное для русской геополитики явление, что, в принципе, легко может спровоцировать вооруженный конфликт. Без черноморского побережья от Измаила до Керчи Россия получает настолько протяженную прибрежную полосу, реально контролируемую неизвестно кем, что само ее существование в качестве нормального и самостоятельного государства ставится под сомнение. Черное море не заменяет собой выхода к «теплым морям» и его геополитическое значение резко падает за счет устойчивого атлантического контроля над Босфором и Дарданеллами, но оно, по меньшей мере, дает возможность обезопасить центральные регионы от потенциальной экспансии турецкого влияния, являясь предельно удобной, надежной и недорогостоящей границей. Поэтому появление на этих землях нового геополитического субъекта (который, к тому же стремится войти в атлантический союз) является абсолютной аномалией, к которой могли привести только совершенно безответственные, с геополитической точки зрения, шаги.

Украина как самостоятельное государство с какими-то территориальными амбициями представляет собой огромную опасность для всей Евразии, и без решения украинской проблемы вообще говорить о континентальной геополитике бессмысленно. Это не значит, что культурно-языковая или экономическая автономия Украины должна быть ограничена, и что она должна стать чисто административным сектором русского централизованного государства (как, до некоторой степени, обстояли дела в царской империи или при СССР). Но стратегически Украина должна быть строго проекцией Москвы на юге и западе (хотя подробнее о возможных моделях реструктуризации пойдет речь в главе о Западе).

Абсолютным императивом русской геополитики на черноморском побережье является тотальный и ничем не ограниченный контроль Москвы на всем его протяжении от украинских до абхазских территорий. Можно сколько угодно дробить всю эту зону по этнокультурному признаку, предоставляя этническую и конфессиональную автономию крымским малороссам, татарам, казакам, абхазцам, грузинам и т.д., но все это только при абсолютном контроле Москвы над военной и политической ситуацией. Эти сектора должны быть радикально оторваны от талассократического влияния как идущего с запада, так и из Турции (или даже Греции). Северный берег Черного моря должен быть исключительно евразийским и централизованно подчиняться Москве.

4.5 Между Черным морем и Каспием

Собственно Кавказ состоит из двух геополитических уровней: Северный Кавказ и территория трех кавказских республик Грузии, Армении, Азербайджана. Вплотную к этому сектору примыкает вся область русских земель от Таганрога до Астрахани, т.е. все русские земли, расположенные между Черным морем и Каспием, куда входит также клином пространство Калмыкии.

Весь этот регион представляет собой крайне важный стратегический узел, так как народы, его населяющие, обладают огромной социальной динамикой, древнейшими геополитическими традициями, а сам он напрямую граничит с атлантической Турцией, стратегически контролирующей, со своей стороны, приграничную зону, которая, с точки зрения рельефа, принадлежит единому пространству горного массива Кавказа.

Это одна из самых уязвимых точек русского геополитического пространства, и не случайно именно эти территории традиционно были ареной жестоких военных действий

между Россией-heartland'ом и странами gimland'a Турцией и Ираном. Контроль над Кавказом открывает, в первом приближении, выход к «теплым морям», и каждое (даже самое незначительно) передвижение границы к югу (или к северу) означает существенный выигрыш (или проигрыш) всей континентальной силы, теллуократии.

Три горизонтальных пласта всего этого региона русские земли, Северный Кавказ в составе России и собственно Кавказ имеют также свое потенциальное продолжение еще южнее. Этот дополнительный, чисто потенциальный пояс, находящийся за пределом не только России, но и СНГ, состоит из Южного Азербайджана (расположенного на территории Ирана) и северных районов Турции, которые в значительной степени заселены курдами и армянами. Весь этот регион представляет такую же этнокультурную проблему для Турции и Ирана, как кавказские этносы, входящие (или входившие) в состав России. Следовательно, для расширения континентального влияния вглубь кавказского ареала есть все объективные предпосылки.

Итак, между Черным морем и Каспием выделяется четыре уровня или пласта, предполагающие дифференцированный подход со стороны Центра.

Первый пласт, собственно русский, следует максимально связывать по широтной ориентации, создав жесткую конструкцию Ростов-на-Дону Волгоград Астрахань. Это важнейшее звено русского пространства в целом, так как к северу оно упирается в Центральную часть России, а еще северней в Архангельск, важнейший северный порт и потенциальную столицу «северной трапеции». В силу относительно близких расстояний от центрально-европейской части и за счет демографически плотной заселенности и технической развитости треугольник Ростов-на-Дону Волгоград Астрахань представляет собой важнейший форпост России на Юге. Это своего рода замещение самого евразийского Центра, вторичный центр, связанный непрерывной территорией с глубинными пространствами. Именно поэтому данный регион должен стать геополитическим ядром всей кавказской стратегии Евразии, а для этого следует укреплять его технологически, стратегически и интеллектуально. Желательно создать здесь особую сплоченную русскую зону, интегрированную административно и политически.

При этом некоторые проблемы возникают с северными районами Калмыкии, которые, однако, довольно слабо заселены. Имеет смысл включить эти северные степные регионы в общий интеграционный пояс, геополитически «растянув» их напрямую между Ростовом-на-Дону и Астраханью, чтобы замкнуть снизу треугольник с вершиной в Волгограде. Тем самым будут воспроизведены географически и геополитически границы древней Хазарии, контролировавшей весь этот регион в начале первого тысячелетия. Можно условно назвать это геополитическое образование «хазарским треугольником».

При переходе от чисто русской зоны «хазарского треугольника», которая должна следовать широтной (горизонтальной) логике, хотя и тесно связанной с севером и с самим Центром (Москвой), вектор интеграции радикально меняет свой характер. Весь Северный Кавказ и все, что лежит южнее его, должно подчиняться исключительно меридианальной ориентации. Стратегические центры «хазарского треугольника» должны развивать самостоятельные геополитические цепи, развертывающиеся строго на юг. От Ростова через Краснодар к Майкопу, Сухуми и Батуми. От Ставрополя к Кисловодску, Нальчику, Орджоникидзе, Цхинвал и Тбилиси. От Астрахани в Махачкалу.

Всякое широтное размежевание этнических регионов Закавказья следует поддерживать, а долготную интеграцию напротив, укреплять. Так, важно любыми средствами оторвать активную сепаратистскую Чечню от Дагестана (и Ингушетии), закрыв выход к Каспию.

Если оставить Чечне только лежащую на юге Грузию, то она будет геополитически контролироваться со всех сторон, и управлять ею можно будет и со стороны православной Грузии. К Грузии следует привязать также, отчасти, Дагестан и Ингушетию, что может привести к созданию автономной северо-кавказской зоны, развитой экономически, но стратегически полностью подконтрольной России и евразийски ориентированной. Общий передел Северного Кавказа мог бы решить и осетинскую проблему, так как новые этнические образования (например, объединенная Осетия) теряли бы смысл национально-госу дарственных образований, приобретая чисто этнический и культурный, лингвистический и религиозный смысл. Следуя той же меридианальной логике важно связать Абхазию напрямую с Россией.

Все эти шаги направлены к одной геополитической цели укреплению евразийского теллурократического комплекса и подготовка его планетарного триумфа в дуэли с атлантизмом. Поэтому можно назвать весь этот план «новым геополитическим порядком на Кавказе». Он предполагает отказ от традиционного подхода к существующим политическим образованиям как к «государствам-нациям», т.е. строго фиксированным административным образованиям с постоянными границами и законченной властной структурой. «Новый геополитический порядок на Кавказе» предполагает полный передел ныне существующих политических реальностей и переход от модели взаимоотношений государство-госу дарство или нация-нация к чисто геополитической системе Центр периферия, причем структура периферии должна определяться не политической, но этнокультурной дифференциацией.

Это возможно осуществить через план создания «Кавказской Федерации», которая включала бы в себя как три кавказских республики СНГ, так и внутрироссийские автономные образования. Центр при этом уступал бы всему этому району культурно-экономическую автаркию, но обеспечивал бы жесточайший стратегический централизм. Это привело бы к предельно гибкой системе, которая основывалась бы не на насилии, оккупации или униформизации кавказского многообразия, но на осознании единства и общности континентальной судьбы.

Особую геополитическую роль играет Армения, которая является традиционным и надежным союзником России на Кавказе. Армения служит важнейшей стратегической базой для предотвращения турецкой экспансии на север и восток в регионы среднеазиатского тюркского мира. И напротив, в наступательном геополитическом аспекте она важна как этнокультурная общность, непрерывно продолжающаяся и к югу, на территорию Турции, где находится значительная часть древней Армении и ее главная святыня гора Арарат. Расовое и лингвистическое родство связывает армян и с курдами, другим важнейшим этническим фактором, который можно использовать для провокации геополитических потрясений внутри Турции. При этом крайне важно создать сухопутный коридор, пересекающий весь Кавказ и надежно связывающий Армению с «хазарским треугольником».

Армения важна и еще в одном смысле. Основываясь на исторической и этнической близости с Ираном, именно Армения могла бы служить одним из важнейших звеньев для распространения евразийского импульса от Центра к иранскому rimland'у. Это означает создание оси Москва Ереван Тегеран.

К Ирану (и ни в коем случае не к Турции) следовало бы привязать и Азербайджан, акцентируя шиизм, этническую близость с иранским Южным Азербайджаном и исторические связи. Таким образом, важнейший стратегический луч Москва Тегеран через Ереван дублировался бы лучом Москва Баку Тегеран, образуя ромб, во многом

симметричный балканскому ромбу. Вообще, между Балканами и Кавказом существует множество геополитических параллелей. И самое главное: именно здесь яснее всего проявляется действие важнейшего геополитического закона широтные процессы провоцируют страшные конфликты, долготные связи приводят к стабильности и устойчивости. Особенно выразительно это в Югославской войне и в армяно-азербайджанском конфликте по поводу Нагорного Карабаха. Сама же карабахская проблема в чем-то аналогична проблеме Македонии. И поэтому для стабилизации всего региона Москве следует налаживать с Карабахом самые прямые связи, чтобы сделать эту территорию точкой равновесия всей кавказской геополитической системы. Для этого карабахские переговоры оптимально должны иметь четыре стороны: Азербайджан, Армения, Россия и Иран с исключением всех атлантистских участников, чье политическое присутствие в регионе нецелесообразно по геополитическим соображениям.

4.6 Новый геополитический порядок в Средней Азии

Средней Азией принято считать огромный фрагмент евразийской суши, тянущийся от североказахских степей до побережья Аравийского моря. От бывших советских среднеазиатских республик эта зона через хребет Копетдаг и Памир простирается на юг к равнинному Ирану и на юго-восток в Афганистан. Средняя Азия является тем геополитическим пространством, которое скорее, чем все остальные, может вывести heartland к заветной цели к Индийскому океану. Если бы Москве удалось выиграть позиционную войну с талассократией на этом направлении, автоматически решалось бы множество параллельных вопросов интеграция в континентальный блок Индии, стратегическая поддержка Ирака против Турции, прямой коридор на Ближний Восток и т.д. Все это делает данную область центральной в вопросе геополитической реструктуризации евразийского Юга.

Заметим, что Средняя Азия делится грядой гор не только политически и геополитически, но и расово. Бывшая советская зона Средней Азии (за исключением Таджикистана) населена тюрками-суннитами, наследниками ми Турана, многие из которых продолжают преимущественно заниматься кочевничеством и животноводством. «Несоветская» Средняя Азия Иран, Афганистан (и даже этно-культурно родственные Пакистан) населена оседлыми индоевропейцами. Таким образом, геополитическое единство имеет четко выраженную расовую границу.

Вся эта зона делится на три части:

1) Центральный Казахстан (южнее 50-й параллели, так как севернее ее расположены земли, включаемые в «русский Восток»);

2) Пустынные Туркмения и Узбекистан и горная Киргизия

(это чисто туранские земли);

3) Иран Афганистан Пакистан Индия (это Иран в расширенном смысле «Ариана», «земля ариев»).

Новый евразийский порядок в Средней Азии основан на том, чтобы связать все эти земли с севера на юг жесткой геополитической и стратегической осью. При этом, как и всегда в подобных случаях, важно структурировать пространство исключительно в меридианальном направлении, способствуя долготному сближению отдельных областей.

Начиная с севера, речь идет о связи всего Казахстана с русскими Южным Уралом и Западной Сибирью. Эта связь должна служить несущей конструкцией всего среднеазиатского ареала. В последовательной и продуманной интеграции Казахстана в общий континентальный блок с Россией лежит основа всей континентальной политики. При этом самым важным моментом изначально является задача жестко прервать всякое влияние Турции на этот регион, воспрепятствовать любым проектам «туранской» интеграции, исходящим из атлантистской Турции и предлагающим чисто широтное геополитическое развитие бывшей «советской» Средней Азии, противопоставленной индоевропейскому Северу (Россия) и индоевропейскому же Югу (Иран, Афганистан, Пакистан, Индия). Туранская интеграция является прямой антитезой геополитического евразийства и заключается в расщеплении теллуократических сил на три составляющих западную (европейская Россия), восточную (русские Южная Сибирь и Дальний Восток) и южную (Иран, Афганистан, Пакистан). Подобный «туранизм» призван расколоть расовый и геополитический альянс Леса и Степи, давший начало как Русскому Государству, так и великорусскому этносу, а в отношении Ирана и Афганистана он разрывает на части религиозное единство исламского мира. Исходя из этого heartland должен объявить Турции и носителям «пантуранизма» жесткую позиционную геополитическую войну, в которой главным союзником России будет исламский арийский Иран. Средняя Азия должна быть «растянута» по вертикали между двумя глобальными индоевропейскими реальностями между русскими и персами. При этом следует всячески стремиться к тому, чтобы выделить во всем тюркском пространстве локальные автономистские культурные тенденции, поддержать регионалистские силы в автономных областях, усугубить трения между кланами, племенами, «улусами» и т.д. Повсюду в этой области следует стараться замкнуть территории, округа, промышленные комплексы, экономические циклы, стратегические объекты на территории, расположенные вне тюркского ареала, либо в строго меридианальном направлении. Так, к примеру, Каракалпакия на западе Узбекистана территориально должна интегрироваться не в восточном направлении (Бухара, Самарканд, Ташкент), а в северном (Казахстан) и южном (Туркмения). На том же принципе следует реструктурировать пограничные области между Узбекистаном и Таджикистаном Самарканд, Ферганская долина и исторически и этнически связаны с таджикскими территориями не меньше, чем с узбекскими. То же самое справедливо и для южной Киргизии.

Геополитическим шарниром всей среднеазиатской геополитической стратегии теллуократии должен стать Таджикистан. Эта область совмещает в себе важнейшие аспекты всего русского «Drang nach Süden», «рывка на Юг». Таджики мусульмане индоевропейского происхождения, этнически близкие к иранцам и афганцам. Т.е. они представляют в этом регионе фрагмент «иранского» мира. Вместе с тем Таджикистан входил в состав России и СССР, т.е. был интегрирован в собственно континентальную, евразийскую геополитическую систему. Поэтому судьба этой маленькой высокогорной страны, древней Согдианы, символизирует собой успех (или провал) установления нового евразийского порядка в Средней Азии.

Фактическая граница между Таджикистаном и Афганистаном не должна восприниматься как строгая линия. Это не историческая данность, но геополитическое задание, так как в интересах heartland'a было бы вообще отменить здесь какие бы то ни было строгие ограничения, перенести стратегический рубеж далеко на юг, а всю промежуточную область перестроив на основании этнокультурных, племенных и региональных границ. Афганистан не имеет традиции законченной централизованной государственности. Он населен множеством кочевых и оседлых племен (пуштуны, таджики, узбеки и т.д.), связанных больше религией (ислам), чем государственностью и политикой. Поэтому геополитическое возвращение России в Афганистан неизбежно и предопределено самой

географией. Единственно, что необходимо опираться при этом не столько на военную мощь, сколько на продуманную геополитическую стратегию, на подготовку сознательного и добровольного с обеих сторон стратегического альянса, вызванного необходимостью общего противостояния талассократии, «силам Запада», «атлантизму», которая автоматически сближает русских и мусульман. Таджикистан в этом процессе играет роль основной базы, причем его территория становится геополитической лабораторией, в которой сходятся два разнонаправленных импульса исламский импульс индоевропейского евразийского Юга и русский геополитический импульс, идущий из heartland'a, с севера. Здесь, в Таджикистане, в Душанбе или в другом городе, должна выработываться совместная русско-исламская стратегия по реорганизации более северного «Турана». Эта земля призвана выработать эпохальное решение о создании Новой Евразии, в которой окончательно и бесповоротно был бы закреплен тезис о свершившемся синтезе между Степью и северным Лесом, с одной стороны, и между той же Степью (Тураном) и Ираном, с другой.

Таким образом, из евразийского Центра логично провести еще один луч: Москва Душанбе Кабул Тегеран, вдоль которого должна складываться небывалая геополитическая реальность.

Часть Таджикистана Горный Бадахшан расположен совсем недалеко от Пакистана и Индии, которые сходятся почти к одной точке вместе с Китаем (Синьцзян). Несмотря на то, что эти зоны почти не проходимы, так как расположены очень высоко в горах Памира, сама Горно-Бадахшанская область имеет глубокий геополитический смысл. Она населена исмаилитами, исламской еретической сектой, которая является выражением самого крайнего шиизма, т.е. наиболее индоевропейской (с духовной точки зрения) версии ислама. Бадахшанские исмаилиты расселены рядом с регионами Пакистана, а это государство (хотя и официально суннитское) в этническом отношении представляет собой индусов, обращенных в ислам. А это указывает на то, что им, безусловно, ближе индоевропейские тенденции в рамках этой религии, если не откровенно «шиитские», то «криптошиитские». Не так далеко расположен индийский Кашмир, населенный также индусскими мусульманами и шиваистами. Мусульмане уйгуры населяют и Синьцзянскую область в Китае. Поэтому религиозная специфика Бадахшана и его стратегическое положение дает возможность heartland'у активно участвовать в решении важнейших геополитических проблем, которые сходятся как раз в этой области пакистано-индийские войны, потенциальный уйгурский исламский сепаратизм в Китае, национально-освободительная борьба в Тибете, сикхское движение в несколько более южном Пенджабе и т.д. Все нити этого критического узла Азии сходятся в Таджикистане, а точнее, в Бадахшане. Отсюда само собой напрашивается дополнительная и самостоятельная ось Москва Хоруг (столица Бадахшана). Более того, так как связь Бадахшан с остальным Таджикистаном не очень крепка (этно-религиозные и клановые противоречия), Москва должна выделить данный регион в отдельную геополитическую реальность подобно Македонии или Карабаху, так как стратегическое значение Хоруга центрально для гигантского региона, превосходящего масштабы не только Таджикистана, но и всей Средней Азии.

Всю эту сложную область следует переструктурировать при самом активном влиянии «географической оси истории» России на основе теллуократической модели, т.е. вопреки тем планам, которые имеют на этот счет талассократические атлантические элементы. Известно, что именно Англия поддерживала сепаратистское движение индийских мусульман, приведшее к отделению Пакистана. Индо-пакистанские конфликты также выгодны атлантистам, так как это позволяет им укреплять свое политическое и экономическое влияние в обоих регионах, пользуясь геополитическими противоречиями и

ставя весь регион в зависимость от военно-стратегического присутствия американцев и англичан. В настоящий момент и Пакистан, и Индия, и Китай устойчиво входят в контролируемый талассократами rimland. Геополитическая роль Таджикистана и Бадахшана заключается в том, чтобы радикально изменить такое положение вещей и организовать на всем этом пространстве евразийскую систему континентальной интеграции. При этом в сфере идеологической крайне важно учитывать малейшие этно-религиозные и культурно-лингвистические нюансы, а в сфере военно-стратегической необходимо стремиться к жесткому и безальтернативному централизму.

В политическом смысле антиамериканизм фундамен талистского Ирана и строгий «нейтралитет» Индии дают для успеха евразийской стратегии серьезные основания. Остальное зависит от геополитической воли Москвы и, шире, России-Евразии.

4.7 The Fall of China

Китай является наиболее опасным геополитическим соседом России на Юге. В чем-то его роль аналогична Турции. Но если Турция является членом НАТО откровенно, и ее стратегический атлантизм очевиден, то с Китаем все обстоит сложнее.

Геополитика Китая изначально была двойственной. С одной стороны, он принадлежал к rimland, «береговой зоне» Тихого океана (с восточной стороны), а с другой никогда не становился талассократией и напротив, всегда ориентировался на континентальные архетипы. Поэтому существует устойчивая политическая традиция называть Китай «Срединной Империей», а этот термин характеризует как раз континентальные теллуократические образования. При этом от Индийского океана Китай отделен Индокитайским полуостровом, на котором расположено соцветие государств с откровенной талассократической ориентацией.

В ходе освоения (колонизации) Западом Востока Китай постепенно превратился в полуконию с марионеточным проанглийским правительством последнего поколения императоров династии Цин. С начала XIX века вплоть до 1949 (победа КПК над Гоминданом) геополитика Китая следовала чисто атлантистским тенденциям (при этом Китай выступал не как самостоятельная талассократия, а как евразийская береговая база Запада). Победа Компартии изменила положение дел, и Китай на короткое время (1949-1958) переориентировался на евразийскую прорусскую политику. Однако в силу исторических традиций евразийская линия была вскоре оставлена, и Китай предпочел «автаркию». Оставалось дожидаться того момента, когда евразийская ориентация ослабнет настолько, что потенциальный атлантизм и геополитическая идентичность Китая как rimland'a станет очевидной. Это произошло в середине 70-х, когда Китай начал активные переговоры с представителями мондиалистской «Трехсторонней комиссии». Это означало новое вхождение Китая в структуру атлантистской геополитики.

Не отрицая возможности Китая при определенных обстоятельствах снова вступить на путь Евразийского Альянса, на это особо рассчитывать не следует. Чисто прагматически Китаю намного выгоднее контакты с Западом, нежели с Россией, которая не сможет способствовать технологическому развитию этой страны, и такой «дружбой» только свяжет свободу геополитических манипуляций Китая на Дальнем Востоке, в Монголии и Южной Сибири. Кроме того, демографический рост Китая ставит перед этой страной проблему «свободных территорий», и земли Казахстана и Сибири (почти не заселенные) представляются в этой перспективе в высшей степени привлекательными.

Китай опасен для России по двум причинам как геополитическая база атлантизма и сам по себе, как страна повышенной демографической плотности в поисках «ничейных пространств». И в том и в другом случае heartland имеет в данном случае позиционную угрозу, местонахождение которой в высшей степени опасно. Китай занимает земли, расположенные южнее Lenaland.

Кроме того, Китай обладает замкнутой расово-культурной спецификой, и в исторически обозримые периоды он никогда не участвовал в евразийском континентальном строительстве.

Все эти соображения независимо от политической конкретики делают Китай потенциальным геополитическим противником России на Юге и на Востоке. Это следует признать как геополитическую аксиому. Поэтому геополитическая задача России в отношении самого восточного сектора своего «внутреннего» южного пояса заключается в том, чтобы максимально расширить зону своего влияния к югу, создав как можно более широкую «пограничную зону». В перспективе Евразия должна распространить свое влияние вплоть до Индокитая, но достичь этого путем обоюдного союза практически невероятно. И в этом принципиальное отличие Китая от исламской Азии (за исключением Турции) и Индии. Если евразийский альянс с другими южными секторами Евразии должен основываться на учете взаимных интересов, т.е. быть следствием сознательного и добровольного союза, основанного на осознании общности геополитической миссии, то в случае Китая речь идет о силовом позиционном геополитическом давлении, о провокации территориальной дезинтеграции, дроблении, политико-административном переделе государства. Тот же самый подход касается и Турции. Китай и Турция потенциальные геополитические противники. Ирак, Иран, Афганистан, Пакистан, Индия, Корея, Вьетнам и Япония потенциальные геополитические союзники. Это предполагает использование двух различных геополитических стратегий. В случае противников следует стремиться причинить вред, в случае союзников надо выявить общность геополитических целей.

Теперь легко вывести приоритеты «внутренней геополитики» России на пространстве от Бадахшана до Владивостока.

Основной моделью здесь является отрыв североки тайских территорий от более южных земель. Геополитический анализ сразу же дает для этого серьезные основания. Северо-запад Китая приходится на Синьцзян, древнейшую страну, имеющую долгую историю политической автономии. Здесь исторически существовали многочисленные ленные государства, сменявшие друг друга. Более того, в данный момент эти земли населены уйгурами тюркским этносом, исповедующим ислам. Китайцы поддерживают контроль в этих областях за счет прямого силового давления, прямой колонизации, угнетая местное население и подавляя все его попытки отстоять религиозную и этническую автономию. Идеи присоединения Синьцзяна к России существовали уже у русских императоров в рамках проекта освоения Сибири. К этой линии следует вернуться. Южнее Синьцзяна простирается Кунь-Лунь и Тибет, где мы снова сталкиваемся с аналогичной ситуацией. Тибет — отдельная страна с особым населением, специфической религией, древнейшими политическими и этническими традициями. Власть Пекина здесь также искусственна и основана на прямом насилии, как и в Синьцзяне. Россия геополитически заинтересована в активной поддержке сепаратизма в этих сферах и начале антикитайской национально-освободительной борьбы во всей этой области. В перспективе все эти территории гармонично вписались бы в евразийскую континентальную федерацию, поскольку их с атлантизмом не связывает ни география, ни история. Синьцзян и Тибет должны войти в пояс теллурократии. Это будет самым позитивным геополитическим

решением и создаст для России надежную защиту даже в том случае, если Китай не откажется от антиевразийских геополитических проектов. Без Синьцзяна и Тибета потенциальный геополитический прорыв Китая в Казахстан и Западную Сибирь становится невозможным. При этом не только полное освобождение этих территорий от китайского контроля, но даже первые этапы дестабилизации обстановки в этих регионах уже будут стратегическим выигрышем России.

Восточнее идет сектор Монголии стратегического союзника России. Здесь важно действовать превентивно и не допускать самой возможности усиления прокитайского фактора в монгольской политике. Монгольские степи и пустыни прекрасно защищают Южную Сибирь от Китая. При этом следует активизировать связи Монголии с Синьцзяном и Тибетом, чтобы создать предпосылки для новой конфигурации всего региона с ориентацией на постепенное вытеснение Китая и его геополитического влияния. Для этой цели можно выдвинуть проект Монголо-Тибетской федерации, куда могли бы войти также Бурятия, Тува, Хакасия и Алтайская Республика. Единство ламаистской традиции этих народов для Москвы является важным инструментом для антикитайской геополитической стратегии.

Последней зоной южного пояса является Манчжурия территория, расположенная на северо-востоке Китая. И здесь мы сталкиваемся со слабым (для Китая) геополитическим звеном. На этой территории также существовали древние государства, имеющие традицию политической независимости. Уже в XX веке Япония снова воссоздала Маньчжурское государство со столицей в Харбине, которое было континентальным плацдармом для вторжения Японии в Китай. Для России существование в Манчжурии особого политического государства, не подконтрольного Китаю, в высшей степени желательно. Так как сама Япония входит в число потенциальных геополитических союзников Евразии, то в этом вопросе можно было бы соединить усилия.

Тибет Синьцзян Монголия Манчжурия составляют вместе пояс безопасности России. Основная задача в этом регионе сделать эти земли подконтрольными *heartland*'у, используя при этом потенциальных геополитических союзников России Индию и Японию, а также страдающее от Пекинского диктата местное население. Для самого Китая этот пояс является стратегическим плацдармом для потенциального «рывка на Север», в Казахстан и Сибирь. Это земли, вплотную примыкающие с юга к *Lenaland*, вокруг которой с неизбежностью будет разворачиваться позиционное геополитическое противостояние ведущих мировых сил. Россия должна оторвать этот плацдарм от Китая, отбросить Китай к югу и предложить ему в качестве геополитической компенсации развитие по оси Север-Юг в южном направлении Индокитай (кроме Вьетнама), Филиппины, Индонезия, Австралия.

4.8 От Балкан до Манчжурии

Евразия должна «давить» на Юг на всем пространстве от Балканского полуострова до Северо-восточного Китая. Весь этот пояс является стратегически важной зоной безопасности России. Народы, населяющие разные сектора этого пространства различны этнически, религиозно, культурно. Но у всех без исключения существуют элементы, которые сближают их с геополитической формулой *heartland*'а. Для одних это Православие, для других историческая принадлежность к единому государству, для третьих этническая и расовая близость, для четвертых общность противника, для пятых прагматический расчет. Такое разнообразие Юга диктует необходимость крайне гибкой геополитики и чрезвычайно развитой аргументации, обосновывающей необходимость

связей, альянсов и т.д. Ни один из критериев не является здесь приоритетным нельзя опереться только на один из факторов этнос, религия, раса, история, выгода и т.д. В каждом конкретном случае следует поступать по-разному. Самым высшим критерием при этом остается геополитика и ее закономерности, которые должны подчинять себе все остальные соображения, а не становиться лишь инструментом внешней (или внутренней) политики, основывающейся на каких-то отдельных и самостоятельных принципах. Только в этом случае Евразия сможет достичь стабильности, а Россия надежно обеспечить свою континентальную безопасность и осуществление своей теллуократической миссии.

Глава 5. Угроза Запада

5.1 Два Запада

Проблема организации пространства на Западе Евразии является той темой, которая составляет основу всей геополитики как науки. Западная Европа это rimland Евразии, причем rimland наиболее законченный, однозначный и исторически идентифицируемый. В отношении самой России как heartland'a Запад в целом представляет собой главного планетарного противника тот сектор «береговой цивилизации», который полностью принял на себя функцию законченной талассократии и отождествил свою историческую судьбу с морем. В авангард де этого процесса была Англия, но все остальные европейские страны, принявшие эстафету индустриализации, технического развития и ценностные нормативы «торгового строя», также раньше или позже вошли в этот талассократический ансамбль.

В ходе исторического становления окончательной географической картины Запада первенство от острова Англия перешло к континенту Америка, особенно к США. Таким образом, максимальным воплощением талассократии в ее стратегическом, идеологическом, экономическом и культурном аспектах стали США и контролируемый ими блок НАТО.

Такая окончательная геополитическая фиксация планетарных сил помещает полюс атлантизма и талассократии за Атлантику, на американский континент. Сама же Европа (даже Западная, в том числе сама Англия) из центра талассократии становится «буферной зоной», «береговым поясом», «стратегическим придатком» США. Такой перенос талассократической оси за океан несколько меняет геополитическую конфигурацию. Если столетие назад Европа (Англия и Франция) была основным противником России, то после Второй мировой войны этот регион утратил самостоятельное стратегическое значение, превратившись в стратегическую колонию США. Такая трансформация строго соответствует тому «взгляду с моря», который характеризует типично колониальное отношение к материкам любой талассократии. Если раньше «береговая» природа Европы была потенциальной характеристикой, активируемой особым геополитическим образованием «островом Англия», то сейчас это точно соответствует актуальной картине распределения сил. США, геополитическая реальность, вышедшая из Европы как ее почти искусственная проекция, стали совершенно самостоятельным полюсом, Западом в абсолютном смысле этого слова, превратив Европу из метрополии в колонию. Все это находится в полном соответствии с классической логикой талассократической геополитики.

Таким образом, в настоящее время геополитическая проблема планетарного Запада в самом широком смысле распадается для России на две составляющие Запад как Америка и Запад как Европа. С геополитической точки зрения, эти две реальности имеют различный смысл. Запад как Америка является тотальным геополитическим противником России, полюсом прямо противоположной Евразии тенденции, штабом и центром атлантизма. Позиционная геополитическая война с Америкой составляла и составляет сущность всей евразийской геополитики, начиная с середины XX века, когда роль США стала очевидной. В этом отношении позиция heartland'a ясна необходимо противодействовать атлантистской геополитике США на всех уровнях и во всех регионах земли, стараясь максимально ослабить, деморализовать, обмануть и, в конечном счете, победить противника. Особенно важно при этом внести геополитический беспорядок во

внутриамериканскую действительность, поощряя всяческий сепаратизм, разнообразные этнические, социальные и расовые конфликты, активно поддерживая все диссидентские движения экстремистские, расистские, сектантские группировки, дестабилизирующие внутривнутриполитические процессы в США. При этом одновременно имеет смысл поддерживать изоляционистские тенденции в американской политике, тезисы тех (часто право-республиканских) кругов, которые считают, что США должны ограничиться своими внутренними проблемами. Такое положение дел России выгодно в высшей степени, даже если "изоляционизм" будет осуществляться в рамках изначальной редакции доктрины Монро т.е. если США ограничат свое влияние двумя Америками. Это отнюдь не означает, что Евразия должна при этом отказываться от дестабилизации латиноамериканского мира, стремясь вывести отдельные регионы из-под контроля США. Все уровни геополитического давления на США должны быть задействованы одновременно, подобно тому, как антиевразийская политика атлантизма одновременно "спонсирует" процессы развала стратегического блока (Варшавский договор), государственного единства (СССР) и дальнейшего этно-территориального дробления, под видом регионализации России осуществляя ее прогрессирующий распад вплоть до полного уничтожения. Heartland вынужден платить Sea Power той же монетой. Эта симметрия логична и обоснована. Все это является центральной задачей "внешней геополитики" России относительно США, поэтому более детальный анализ выходит за рамки данной работы.

Вторая реальность, также обозначаемая термином «Запад», имеет иное значение. Это Европа, геополитический смысл которой за последние десятилетия резко изменился. Будучи традиционно метрополией для других частей планеты, Европа впервые оказалась в ситуации колонии стратегической, культурной, экономической, политической и т.д. Американский колониализм отличается от более явных и жестких форм прошлого, но его смысл остается тем же. Европа на данный момент не имеет собственной геополитики и собственной географической воли, ее функции ограничиваются тем, что она служит подсобной базой США в Евразии и местом наиболее вероятного конфликта с Евразией. Такое положение автоматически приводит к тому, что антиамериканская линия становится общей геополитической альтернативой европейских государств, объединяя их единым проектом, которого никогда не существовало ранее. Объединение Европы в Маастрихте есть первый сигнал появления Европы как целого и самостоятельного организма, претендующего на то, чтобы вернуть себе историческое значение и геополитический суверенитет. Европа не хочет быть ни русской, ни американской. После конца «холодной войны» эта воля проявилась во всем объеме.

Теперь встает вопрос: каково, в общих чертах, отношение Евразии к своему западному полуострову?

С чисто геополитической точки зрения, Евразия однозначно заинтересована в том, чтобы вывести Европу из-под контроля атлантизма, США. Это является приоритетной задачей. На Западе Россия должна иметь морские границы, это стратегический императив геополитического развития Евразии. Именно отсутствие таких границ, наличие вместо них сухопутной линии, пересекающей Европу посередине, искусственно и насильственно, привело, в конечном итоге, к геополитическому проигрышу СССР. Следовательно, задача не повторять ошибок и исправить положение. Евразия только тогда будет свободна от Sea Power, когда ее стратегическими границами на Севере, Востоке, Юге и Западе станут океаны так же, как и в случае Америки. Лишь тогда дуэль цивилизаций будет протекать на равных условиях.

Поэтому у России есть два выхода либо военная оккупация Европы, либо такая реорганизация европейского пространства, которая сделает этот геополитический сектор надежным стратегическим союзником Москвы, сохранив его суверенитет, автономию и автаркию. Первый вариант настолько нереален, что обсуждать его всерьез не следует. Второй вариант сложен, но осуществим, так как полвека, проведенные Европой в положении американской колонии, оставили серьезный след в европейском сознании.

Дружественная Европа как стратегический союзник России может возникнуть только в том случае, если она будет единой. В противном случае атлантический противник найдет множество способов внести дробление и раскол в европейский блок, провоцируя конфликт, аналогичный двум мировым войнам. Поэтому Москва должна максимально способствовать европейскому объединению, особенно поддерживая центрально-европейские государства, в первую очередь, Германию. Альянс Германии с Францией, ось Париж Берлин (проект Де Голля), является тем позвоночником, вокруг которого логичнее всего строить тело Новой Европы. В Германии и Франции есть устойчивая антиатлантическая политическая традиция (как у правых, так и у левых политических течений). Будучи до поры до времени потенциальной и скрытой, она в определенный момент заявит о себе во весь голос. Москве же следует ориентироваться на эту линию уже сейчас, не дожидаясь окончательного развития событий.

Задача Москвы вырвать Европу из-под контроля США (НАТО), способствовать ее объединению, укреплять интеграционные связи с Центральной Европой под знаком основной внешнеполитической оси Москва Берлин. Евразии нужна союзная дружественная Европа. С военной точки зрения, она еще долго не будет представлять сама по себе (без США) серьезной угрозы, а экономическая кооперация с нейтральной Европой сможет решить большинство технологических проблем России и Азии в обмен на ресурсы и стратегическое военное партнерство.

Исходя из этой внешнегеополитической задачи, следует анализировать и внутривнутриполитическую ситуацию России в ее западных регионах.

5.2 Разрушить «санитарный кордон»

Основной формулой анализа геополитики «русского Запада» является принцип: «Европе европейское, России русское». Здесь, в целом, следует поступать так же, как и в случае с исламским миром: новые границы неизбежны, некоторые регионы следует поделить заново, но во всех случаях главной остается задача создания на Западе дружественно-нейтральных образований, с максимальной этнокультурной, экономической и социальной свободой, но со стратегической зависимостью от Москвы. Задача максимум «финляндизация» всей Европы, но начинать надо с реорганизации пространств, вплотную прилегающих непосредственно к России.

Здесь сразу возникает сложная проблема: «санитарный кордон». Атлантические геополитики прекрасно осознают стратегическую опасность союза России с Европой (особенно Германией) и традиционно стремятся всячески помешать этому. Самым эффективным методом талассократии является «санитарный кордон», т.е. полоса из нескольких пограничных государств, враждебных как восточному, так и западному соседу, и напрямую связанных с атлантическим полюсом. В роли такого «санитарного кордона» традиционно выступает Польша и восточно-европейские страны, расположенные южнее Чехословакия, Румыния и т.д. Идея такого «кордона» была выработана геополитиком Макиндером и весьма успешно воплощалась в жизнь в начале

века и перед Второй мировой войной. Причем в обоих случаях цель была достигнута в конце концов, между двумя континенталистскими державами Россией и Германией завязывался конфликт, в результате которого стратегические победы доставались атлантистам. Своим местом во главе Запада Америка обязана именно двум мировым войнам, которые обескровили Европу и особенно обессилили ли Германию и Россию (главных соперников атлантизма).

Очевидно, что такой «санитарный кордон» возникнет и сейчас, созданный из малых, озлобленных, исторически безответственных народов и государств, с маниакальными претензиями и сервильной зависимостью от талассократического Запада.

Речь идет о появлении геополитической полосы между Балтикой и Черным морем, состоящей из государств, не могущих войти полноценным компонентом в Европу, но усиленно отталкивающихся от Москвы и Евразии. Претенденты на членов нового «санитарного кордона» таковы: прибалтийские народы (литовцы, латыши, эстонцы), Польша (включая западную Пруссию), Белоруссия (эту идею лоббирует католическое антиевразийское меньшинство), Украина (особенно Западная униатско-католическая), Венгрия, Румыния (также под влиянием униатов), Чехия и Словакия. При этом видно, что почти везде речь идет о католическом секторе Восточной Европы, который принадлежал традиционно к зоне влияния Запада. При этом мы имеем дело с теми же странами, которые уже не один раз в геополитической истории выступали как рычаги разрушения континентальных образований Российской империи, Австро-Венгерской империи, недавно СССР.

Задача Евразии в том, чтобы этого кордона не существовало. Это в интересах и Европы и России. Сами эти образования, если рассматривать их в качестве государственных, несостоятельны, этнически и конфессионально противоречивы, стратегически и экономически недоразвиты, лишены ресурсов. Иными словами, эти фиктивные государства имеют смысл только как стратегические зоны, искусственно поддерживаемые атлантизмом. Повсюду есть факторы, которые привязывают их к Евразии (либо православие, либо осознание славянского родства, либо наличие русского населения, либо историческая близость, либо несколько компонентов сразу и т.д.), но есть и противоположные факторы, сближающие их с Западом (католичество, униатство, этническая инаковость, политические традиции суверенитета и т.д.). Пока эти образования представляют собой нечто цельное, они не могут предпочесть ни одну из двух ориентаций, и именно поэтому становятся в полном смысле слова «санитарным кордоном». Интеграции с Востоком препятствуют одни элементы, интеграции с Западом другие. Отсюда постоянная внутренняя и внешняя нестабильность, провоцируемые этими странами, что играет на руку талассократии и является постоянным препятствием на пути евразийской геополитики и континентального блока.

Единственным путем устранения «санитарного кордона» является полный передел государственных новообразований на основании чисто геополитических факторов. Это не обязательно должно автоматически означать аннексию территорий к иным государствам. Речь может идти о создании на месте государств федераций или нескольких государств, чья геополитическая ориентация будет, однако, однозначной. Небольшим образованиям, единым и этнически, и культурно и конфессионально, будет легче интегрироваться в крупные геополитические блоки, а при наличии крепких союзнических отношений между Россией и Европой новые границы не будут означать подлинного порога, разрыва. Более того, только отсутствие «санитарного кордона» и может сделать эти общеевразийские отношения нормальными, превратить пространство от «Дублина до Владивостока» в зону евразийской кооперации, сотрудничества и стратегического партнерства.

5.3 Балтийская Федерация

Рассмотрим более подробно весь западный пояс, прилегающий к России. Все пространство делится на несколько секторов. Севернее всего лежит скандинавский пояс, идущий от Норвегии до Финляндии. В отношении Финляндии общий геополитический проект мы рассмотрим в главе, посвященной Северу. Здесь речь идет о создании карело-финского этно-территориального образования с максимальной культурной автономией, но стратегической интеграцией в евразийский блок. Норвегия и Швеция, а также Прибалтийские республики принадлежат иному геополитическому контексту, более широкому, нежели карело-финская проблематика.

Здесь мы сталкиваемся с более общей темой геополитики Балтики и Скандинавии. Самое удобное было бы в данном случае последовать за шведским геополитиком Рудольфом Челленом (изобретшим термин «геополитика») и рассмотреть весь балтийский регион как северное продолжение Средней Европы, структурированной вокруг Германии. Челлен считал, что скандинавская геополитика не может иметь никакого иного развития, кроме стратегического объединения с Германией, основанной на этнической, культурной и географической общности. Но связующим элементом всей конструкции должна быть Пруссия немецкое государство с доминанцией протестантской конфессии, общей для скандинавов. Протестантско-скандинавский блок должен быть северным продолжением Пруссии, Берлина. Поэтому все это пространство, начав осознавать себя единым целым, не может обойтись без геополитического восстановления прусского единства. В настоящий момент Пруссии не существует, ее земли распределены между Германией, Польшей и Россией. Следовательно, самая главная предпосылка для создания «нейтральной» политически и дружественной Москве Балтийской Федерации отсутствует. Отсюда практическая невозможность организовать данный регион в соответствии с евразийскими принципами.

На чисто теоретическом уровне проблема решается в два этапа:

- 1) Воссоздается новое этно-конфессиональное пространство в пределах исторической Пруссии. Инициаторами выступают Москва и Берлин. Из этого вытекает лояльность названной осевой фигуры в отношении России, которая даст этому образованию жизнь, уступив часть прусских земель, приобретенных в ходе Второй мировой войны (Калининградскую область).
- 2) Вокруг Пруссии начинается процесс стратегического объединения балтийских государств в единый блок. В блок входят Норвегия, Швеция, Германия, Эстония, Финляндия-Карелия, Дания, возможно, Голландия. Особый статус делегируется Польше, Литве и Латвии. Обязательным условием является выход всех стран из НАТО и создание в Балтике демилитаризованной зоны. В перспективе стратегический контроль переходит к Москве и ВС «нейтральной» Европы, т.е. к евразийскому оборонному комплексу.

Единственным слабым элементом в этой системе оказываются Польша и Литва, где преобладающей конфессией является католичество. Эти земли были главным рычагом талассократической геополитики, направленной против Евразии и возможности создания континентального блока. Более того, в истории существует прецедент значительной политической самостоятельности Польско-Литовского княжества, а некоторые историки (в частности, Шпенглер) даже говорили о существовании особой «балтийской цивилизации», географически совпадающей, в общих чертах, с историческими границами

Польши и Литвы. Лишь определенные исторические условия не позволили этой цивилизации развиваться окончательно и сделали ее «абортивной» (термин Шпенглера). Надо признать, данная проблема вообще не имеет позитивного решения, так как формулируется она следующим образом: либо польско-литовское пространство будет существовать как самостоятельная геополитическая реальность (и тогда она станет непреодолимым препятствием на пути проевразийского Балтийского единства с осью в Пруссии), либо его фрагменты будут интегрированы в другие геополитические блоки, а само оно будет расчленено и задавлено в зародыше. Любая интеграция на католической основе в этом регионе будет создавать напряжение и в отношении Востока (Москва), и в отношении Севера (протестантский мир Скандинавии), и в отношении Запада (Германия). Следовательно, в Польше и Литве главным геополитическим партнером Евразии должны стать силы, настаивающие на не католической ориентации политики этих стран сторонники светской «социал-демократии», «неоязычники», «этноцентристы», протестантские, православные религиозные круги, этнические меньшинства. Кроме того, этническая напряженность в польско-литовских отношениях является чрезвычайно ценным элементом, который следует использовать и, по возможности, усугублять.

Если воссоздание Пруссии решило бы, по большей части, проблемы с Польшей, которой в такой ситуации оставался бы только путь на юг (так как Балтийский регион был бы под германо-русским контролем), то с Литвой ситуация еще более сложная, так как она является самым северным фрагментом католического мира, имеет длинную береговую линию на Балтике и отделяет русское пространство от северной оконечности Средней Европы, не принадлежа ни к тому, ни к другому миру. Очевидно, что атлантистские геополитики не преминут воспользоваться этим обстоятельством и попытаются именно Литву сделать причиной раздора и основным препятствием для реорганизации Европы. Ограничить негативные следствия геополитического расположения Литвы для евразийского проекта можно только частично, укрепляя стратегическое единство всего этого ареала и стремясь замкнуть его с северо-запада через шведско-датское звено.

5.4 Католики-славяне входят в Среднюю Европу

Спускаясь южнее, мы попадаем в славяно-католический или униатский регион, который простирается от Польши через Западную Белоруссию и Западную Украину, Волынь, Галицию, Словакию и Чехию до Хорватии и Словении на западе Балканского полуострова. К этому пространству геополитически примыкают Венгрия, Австрия и Бавария, населенные, соответственно, католиками венграми и немцами. Униатская церковь существует также и в православной Румынии. Это преимущественно славянское пространство несмотря на свое этническое и расовое родство с Россией никогда не отождествляло себя с восточно-славянской государственностью, а в еще меньшей степени с евразийской империей Москвы. Этническое родство в данном случае не является достаточным основанием для геополитической интеграции. Двусмысленность этого фактора исторически порождала конфликты и войны России и Германии (шире Европы), препятствовала органичной и непротиворечивой организации геополитического ансамбля Центральной Европы.

Культурно славянские католические народы сложились в Австро-Венгерской империи, и этнические трения с ней, приведшие к распаду, возникли только тогда, когда сама Вена потеряла представление о своей наднациональной имперской геополитической миссии и стала все больше и больше отождествляться с этническим "германизмом". Единственным исключением является лишь Богемия, Моравия и Босния, где славянство изначально осознавало свое духовное отличие от германо-католического начала, что выразилось в

гуситских войнах, реформационных брожениях и всплесках сектантства (в случае боснийских сербов-богомиллов). С геополитической точки зрения все эти народы принадлежат Средней Европе и должны структурироваться вокруг средневропейского Центра, которым естественным образом является Германия. Прямое воздействие на эти области Москвы никогда не сможет стать приоритетным, так как этническая близость лишь подчеркивает культурно-исторические и духовно-конфессиональные различия.

Исходя из этих соображений России необходимо отказаться от прямого контроля над странами Восточной Европы, предоставив их германскому контролю. При этом Москва должна не просто пассивно ждать, пока это произойдет само собой, но активно способствовать органичным процессам в этой сфере, чтобы стать вместе с Берлином инициатором и реализатором всего процесса, приобретая тем самым геополитическую долю в решении всех деликатных проблем. При этом придется отказаться от доминанции над некоторыми регионами Западной Украины Галицией и Закарпатьем, компактно заселенных униатами и католиками. Это же касается некоторых регионов Белоруссии. Отказываясь от прямой политической доминанции над некоторыми территориями, взамен Москва должна получать право стратегического присутствия на самых западных границах всего Средневропейского региона. В этом и заключается смысл всей реорганизации Восточной Европы. Москва должна пойти на предоставление всему католико-славянскому пространству возможности интеграции в Среднюю Европу под началом Берлина, т.е. замкнуть эту зону по принципу Север Юг. Единственно важно изъять из этого ансамбля Литву (по причинам, о которых мы уже говорили, чтобы вся средневропейская конструкция патронировалась строго двумя сторонами (Россией и Германией), при совершенном исключении Запада талассо-кратии, так как в противном случае весь этот пояс приобретет противоположное значение, превратившись в "санитарный кордон" (хотя он создается как раз для того, чтобы не допустить возникновения такого "кордона").

5.5 Объединение Белоруссии и Великороссии

На карте, учитывающей конфессиональную структуру Восточной Европы, отчетливо видно, как по мере движения к югу православное население сдвигается все западнее, тесня католическое. Некоторые сербские земли доходят до Адриатического побережья, а кроме того, определенный процент православных есть и среди албанцев (основателем независимой Албании был православный священник Фан Ноли).

Эти территории, куда входят Белоруссия, центральная часть Украины, Молдавия, Румыния, Сербия и Болгария, имеют двойственную геополитическую природу географически они принадлежат к южному сектору Средней Европы, а культурно и конфессионально к России-Евразии. Духовная идентичность этих народов складывалась из противостояния исламу на юге и католицизму на западе, их национальная идея неразделимо связана с православием. В такой ситуации Москва не может ни полностью делегировать геополитический контроль над регионом Германии, ни заявить о своем прямом политическом влиянии на эти страны. Тем более, что в русско-молдавских и русско-румынских отношениях (не говоря уже об Украине) не все гладко. Наиболее тесные исторические контакты у России с Сербией, но на них невозможно построить тактику интеграции всего региона, так как у Сербии со своими православными соседями также традиционно довольно натянутые отношения. Кроме того, общую картину геополитической стратегии России на Балканах мы осветили в главе, касающейся Юга. Здесь же следует более конкретно рассмотреть территории, которые занимают Белоруссия, Украина и Румыния (с Молдавией).

В отношении Белоруссии геополитическая картина довольно ясная. За исключением небольшой части полонизированных белорусов (католиков и униатов, а также поляков), подавляющее большинство населения однозначно принадлежит русскому пространству и должно быть рассмотрено как субъект центрального евразийского этноса, т.е. как «русские» в культурном, религиозном, этническом и геополитическом смысле. Языковая специфика, некоторые этнические и культурные особенности не меняют общей картины. Поэтому с Белоруссией Москва должна интегрироваться самым тесным образом, не забывая при этом о том, что поощрение культурной и языковой самобытности белорусов является важным позитивным моментом во всей системе евразийской интеграции. В отношении этносов, принадлежащих к единому государству, этот принцип следует соблюдать столь же строго, как и в отношении пограничных народов или соседей. Единственный болезненный шаг в Белоруссии, который необходимо предпринять для предупреждения центробежных и подрывных тенденций, это выделение в особую административную категорию некоторых областей, компактно заселенных католиками и униатами вплоть до предоставления им значительной автономии, достаточной для того, чтобы войти в Среднеевропейское пространство. Стремление любой ценой удержать Белоруссию всю целиком под прямым и жестким контролем Москвы приведет к тому, что и в ней самой и со стороны западных соседей Россия будет иметь тлеющие угли потенциального геополитического конфликта, который в данном случае (в отличие, например, от Литвы) может быть решен в интересах всех заинтересованных сторон.

Белоруссию следует рассматривать как часть России, и поэтому интеграцию с ней надо проводить по оси Запад-Восток, являющейся приоритетной во всех случаях внутренней организации этнически однородного пространства. Настоящая западная граница России должна пролегать намного западнее, поэтому в полноценной геополитической картине белорусские земли скорее относятся к центральной области, чем к западной окраине.

5.6 Геополитическая декомпозиция Украины

Вопрос Украины более сложен, хотя модель геополитического состава этого государства очень сходна. Здесь, правда, важную роль играет геополитический масштаб Украины, которой представляет собой гигантское территориальное образование, превышающее по объему многие крупные европейские державы. Несравнимо более активен на Украине и сепаратизм, и тенденции политического суверенитета. Украина как государство не имеет никакого геополитического смысла. У нее нет ни особенной культурной вестиментальности, ни географической уникальности, ни этнической исключительности. Исторический смысл Украины отражен в самом ее названии «Украина», т.е. «окраина», «пограничные территории». В эпоху Киевской Руси территории нынешней Украины были центром государственности восточных славян, для которых в то время Владимир (позже Москва) был восточной окраиной («украиной»), а Новгород северной. Но по мере превращения Руси из славянского государства в евразийскую империю геополитические функции крупнейших центров радикально меняли свое значение. Столицей империи стала Москва, а Киев превратился во второстепенный центр, в котором сходились евразийское и средневропейское влияния. Ни о каком синтезе культур не могло быть и речи. Скорее всего, более архаические, сугубо русские православные пласты подвергались динамическому более «модернистическому» воздействию Западной Европы особенно через Польшу на западе и Австро-Венгрию на юго-западе. Безусловно, украинская культура и язык своеобразны и уникальны, но какого бы то ни было универсального значения они лишены. Казаческие поселения, которые образовали, в значительной мере, украинский этнос, отличались независимостью, особым этическим, хозяйственным и социальным укладом. Но всех этих

элементов недостаточно для геополитической самостоятельности, а потамическая карта Украины, где главные реки (Днестр, Днепр и т.д.) текут параллельно друг другу, объясняет замедленное развитие украинской государственности.

По этой причине самостоятельное существование Украины (особенно в современных границах) может иметь смысл только в качестве «санитарного кордона», так как противоположные по геополитической ориентации элементы не позволят этой стране целиком присоединиться ни к восточному, ни к западному блоку, т.е. ни к России-Евразии, ни к Центральной Европе. Все это обрекает Украину на марионеточное существование и геополитическую службу талассократической стратегии в Европе. В этом смысле роль Украины схожа с ролью Прибалтийских республик. На этом основании одно время всерьез обсуждался проект создания «черноморско-балтийской федерации», т.е. типичного «санитарного кордона» подрывного геополитического образования, служащего для провокации нестабильности в Восточной Европе и предуготовления предпосылок для целой серии вооруженных конфликтов. Существование Украины в нынешних границах и с нынешним статусом «суверенного государства» тождественно нанесению чудовищного удара по геополитической безопасности России, равнозначное вторжению на ее территорию.

Дальнейшее существование унитарной Украины недопустимо. Эта территория должна быть поделена на несколько поясов, соответствующих гамме геополитических и этнокультурных реальностей.

- 1) Восточная Украина (все, что лежит восточнее Днепра от Чернигова до Азовского моря) представляет собой компактно заселенную территорию с преобладанием великоросского этноса и православным малороссийским населением. Вся эта территория безусловно близка к России, связана с ней культурно, исторически, этнически, религиозно. Это прекрасно освоенная, технически развитая область вполне может составлять самостоятельный геополитический регион, с широкой автономией, но в безусловном и крепчайшем союзе с Москвой. Здесь предпочтительней меридианальная интеграция, связь Харьковской области с более северными (Белгородская, Курская и Брянская области) собственно русскими территориями и распространение конструкции к югу.
- 2) Крым это особое геополитическое образование, традиционно отличающееся этнической мозаичностью. Малороссы, великороссы и крымские татары расселены в Крыму в очень сложной конфигурации и представляют собой три достаточно враждебных друг другу геополитическим импульсом. Великороссы ориентированы подчеркнута промосковски (более агрессивно, чем на остальной Украине, даже Восточной). Малороссы, напротив, крайне националистичны. Крымские татары вообще ориентированы больше на Турцию и довольно враждебны России. Об учете геополитической ориентации крымских татар вообще не может идти речи, так как Турция во всех отношениях является прямым геополитическим противником России. Но с наличием в Крыму татар не считаться также нельзя. Прямое присоединение Крыма к России вызовет крайне негативную реакцию малороссийского населения и создаст проблемы интеграции этого полуострова в российскую систему через украинские территории, что вообще мало реально. Оставлять Крым «суверенной Украине» также невозможно, поскольку это создает прямую угрозу геополитической безопасности России и порождает этническую напряженность в самом Крыму. При учете всех этих соображений напрашивается вывод о необходимости придания Крыму особого статуса и обеспечения максимальной автономии при прямом стратегическом контроле Москвы, но с

учетом социально-экономических интересов Украины и этнокультурных требований крымских татар.

- 3) Центральная часть Украины от Чернигова до Одессы, куда попадает и Киев, представляет собой другую законченную область, где этнически доминирует малороссийский этнос и язык, но преобладающей конфессией является православие. Эта православная Малороссия представляет собой самостоятельную геополитическую реальность, культурно родственную Восточной Украине и безусловно входящую в евразийскую геополитическую систему.
- 4) Западная Украина неоднородна. На Севере это Волынь, отдельный регион, южнее Львовская область (Галиция), еще южнее Закарпатье (западный выступ), и наконец, восточная часть Бессарабии. Все эти регионы представляют собой довольно самостоятельные области. На Волыни преобладают униаты и католики, эта область культурно принадлежит католическому геополитическому сектору Средней Европы. Почти такая же картина в Галиции и Закарпатье, хотя эти более южные земли представляют собой отдельную геополитическую реальность. Волынь исторически связана с Польшей, а Галиция и Закарпатье с Австро-венгерской империей. Бессарабские земли Украины населены смешанным населением, где малороссы и великороссы перемежаются румынами и молдаванами. Этот регион практически целиком православный и представляет собой православный пояс, наискось уходящий от Великороссии на Балканы к Сербии. Весь сектор от Бессарабии до Одессы следует отнести к центрально-украинскому геополитическому пространству, поэтому его логичнее включать в меридианальный левобережный пояс Днепра, западная граница которого простирается от Ровно до Ивано-Франковска по оси Север-Юг и далее по Днестру до Одессы на юге.

Таким образом, Западная Украина, в узком смысле этого понятия, состоит из трех областей Волыни и Галиции и Закарпатья. Будучи территориально близкими, они отличаются по рельефу (Закарпатье горный массив, как и Словакия), этническому составу и политическим традициям. Этим областям, которые сегодня активно влияют на общую политическую атмосферу Украины, активно проводя антимосковскую, прозападную геополитическую линию, следует предоставить значительную степень автономии (вплоть до политической), чтобы оторвать эти «подрывные» территории от православного и в целом прорусского общеукраинского пространства как центрального, так и восточного. Стратегическая граница России на этих параллелях не может зависеть от места прохождения украинско-польской, украинско-венгерской или украинско-словацкой границы. Эта стратегическая граница должна пролегать много западнее, по меньшей мере, на западной оконечности Средней Европы, а в лучшем случае по Атлантике. Именно исходя из такой перспективы предпринимается вся геополитическая переструктуризация этого региона, так как, выступая в роли инициатора геополитических преобразований в Восточной Европе и в качестве главного партнера Германии, Россия должна настаивать, в первую очередь, на условии выведения всей этой области из-под атлантистского контроля и создания на этом месте комплекса евразийской континентальной обороны, состоящей из военно-стратегической кооперации России с Европой в целом.

Волынь, Галиция и Закарпатье могут составить общую «западно-украинскую федерацию», степень интегрированности внутри которой может устанавливаться произвольно в зависимости от конкретных обстоятельств. Здесь важнее всего провести культурно-конфессиональную границу между Центральной Украиной (собственно

Киевской землей) и Западной Украиной, чтобы избежать дисгармоничного центрально-европейского католического или униатского влияния на православные территории.

Украинский фактор является наиболее уязвимым местом в западном поясе России. Если в других местах опасность разрушения геополитической состоятельности heartland'a является потенциальной, и позиционная борьба за евразийскую геополитическую систему ставит перед собой лишь превентивные цели, то факт существования «суверенной Украины» является на геополитическом уровне объявлением России геополитической войны (а это дело не столько самой Украины, сколько атлантизма и Sea Power). Речь идет не о том, что Украина сама сознательно выбирает роль атлантистского «санитарного кордона», хотя в некоторых случаях это не может не быть осознанным шагом, но о том, что она на практике начинает выполнять данную роль, коль скоро она не включается активно в интеграционные процессы с Москвой или (по меньшей мере) не распадается на отдельные геополитические составляющие.

Украинская проблема главная и самая серьезная проблема, которая стоит перед Москвой. Если проблемы Севера и «полярной трапеции» связаны с далеким будущим России и Евразии, если освоение Сибири и битва за Lenaland имеет значение для близкого будущего, если, наконец, позиционная стратегия переустройства азиатского Юга имеет для России актуальное, но превентивное значение геополитика Запада и центр этой геополитики «украинский вопрос» требует от Москвы немедленных ответных мер, поскольку речь идет о нанесении России уже в настоящем стратегического удара, не реагировать на который «географическая ось истории» просто не имеет права.

Учитывая то, что простая интеграция Москвы с Киевом невозможна и не даст устойчивой геополитической системы, даже если это произойдет вопреки всяким объективным препятствиям, Москва должна активно включаться в переустройство украинского пространства по единственно логичной и естественной геополитической модели.

5.7 Румыния и Молдавия интеграция под каким знаком?

Румыния и Молдавия представляют собой две части единого геополитического региона, населенного единым православным этносом потомками даков, говорящими на языке латинской группы и в значительной степени вобравшими культурные, языковые и расовые элементы славянского окружения. С геополитической точки зрения интеграция Румынии и Молдавии неизбежна, но при этом Москва должна стремиться провести это объединение в своих целях, чтобы включить это пространство в зону своего прямого стратегического контроля. Культура Румынии представляет собой в целом типичную православную модель, прямо связывающую эти земли с Евразией. Единственным препятствием для совершенной интеграции этих земель в Россию является языковый фактор и геополитическая близость к католическим регионам. Кроме того, на западе Румынии в Банате значителен процент венгров-католиков и румын-униатов.

Через Румынию, Молдавию и Центральную Украину проходит непрерывная полоса, населенная православными народами, связывающая земли России с Сербией, форпостом Евразии на Балканах. В интересах Евразии превратить всю эту область в единый стратегический и культурный регион фактически в одну страну. Это требует от Москвы, чтобы именно она выступила инициатором молдавско-румынской интеграции, знак которой должен быть изначально определен как православный и евразийский. При этом важно, чтобы румынский православный анклав с востока и с запада замыкали собственно славянские православные народы украинцы и сербы, обеспечивая таким образом

непрерывность территориальной интеграции, основанной не столько на этническом, сколько на конфессиональном признаке и культурном родстве. Вместе с тем такой "православный блок" от Днестра до Черногории, в центре которого должна находиться объединенная Румыния, должен складываться в сотрудничестве с Берлином, которому предоставляется более западная часть Средней Европы от Пруссии через Чехию и Словакию к Венгрии, и Австрии, а далее к Хорватии, т.е. к Адриатике. Если добавить к этому восточный выступ Польши и Восточной Пруссии, который достается Германии северней, то естественное продолжение России на запад в балканском регионе будет логичным и приемлемым, не нарушающим геополитического баланса Средней Европы, которая геополитически принадлежит сфере влияния Германии.

5.8 Условие: почва, а не кровь

Все эти действия вытекают из общей картины европейской геополитики, в которой четко выделяются регионы Средней Европы (под эгидой Германии) и Западной Европы в узком смысле. С Западной Европой у России нет точек прямого соприкосновения, поэтому проведение евразийской стратегии в этом регионе (ключевым элементом которого является Франция) зависит от построения общеевропейской конструкции вдоль оси Берлин Париж. Но евразийский фактор в Западной Европе не может быть прямо линией Москвы. Москва выступает здесь только через Берлин, а евразийские континенталистские и антиатлантистские тенденции здесь описываются одним термином «германофилия». Для французов нельзя требовать более отчетливого «евразийства», нежели «германофилия», так как проблематику heartland'a Западная Европа постигает через германский континентализм. Россия же является в данном случае «геополитической абстракцией».

Однако это отнюдь не означает, что Россия должна быть безучастна к западноевропейским проблемам. В ее интересах вывести всю Европу из-под атлантистского влияния, а значит, Москва должна активно содействовать равнению Западной Европы на Среднюю Европу, т.е. на Германию.

При этом самой Германии следует изначально выдвинуть основополагающее требование: все интеграционные процессы в Средней Европе, где геополитическая доминация Берлина откровенна, а также все преобразования в Западной Европе, ставящие своей целью ориентировать европейские державы на Германию, должны исключать принцип этнического господства немцев в культурной, политической, конфессиональной или идеологической области. Европа должна быть европейской, а Средняя Европа средневропейской, т.е. вся языковая, этническая и духовная самобытность народов Европы должна расцвести и поощряться Берлином, чей приоритет должен быть исключительно геополитическим и социальным, и ни в коем случае не расовым. За многие средневропейские этносы Москва отвечает и в силу расового с ними родства (славянство). Более того, именно этноцентризм и национальное, расовое высокомерие немцев не раз приводило к кровавым конфликтам в Европе. В течение всей геополитической реорганизации Европы Россия должна выступать гарантом того, что Берлин строго разделит геополитику и расу, «почву и кровь», чтобы заведомо исключить трагедии, подобные гитлеровской авантюре. Любые признаки немецкого национализма в вопросах геополитического переустройства Европы должны нещадно подавляться самим Берлином; все процессы должны проходить на основании строжайшего соблюдения «прав народов», полной автономии культур, вероисповеданий и языков.

Такие же требования Москва должна предъявлять и к себе самой, и к своим союзникам. Этническое начало должно поощряться и активно поддерживаться геополитическим центром только в позитивном аспекте, как утвердительная реальность, как национальная самоидентификация. Конечно, нельзя ожидать полного исчезновения межэтнических трений и проявления негативных сторон национального самоутверждения, но как раз в этом моменте должен активно вступать в действие принцип геополитического централизма как высший надэтнический арбитр, решающий внутренние проблемы, исходя из жизненных политических и стратегических интересов евразийского целого.

Этот принцип является универсальным для всех регионов, в которых должен установиться Новый Евразийский Порядок как внутренних для России, так и внешних. Но в случае Запада, Европы, это особенно важно, так как этнические проблемы в этих пространствах лежат в основе всех самых ужасных конфликтов, потрясших XX век.

ЧАСТЬ VI ЕВРАЗИЙСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ

Глава 1. Геополитика Православия

1.1 Восток и Запад христианской экумены

Самым существенным моментом при определении геополитической специфики Православия является то, что речь идет о Церкви Восточной. В границах христианского мира, до открытия Америки, географически совпадавшего с северо-западом евразийского континента, Ближним Востоком и Северной Африкой, ясно прослеживается демаркационная линия между православным пространством и пространством католическим. Это деление, безусловно, не является исторической случайностью. Православный мир духовно и качественно родственен Востоку, тогда как католицизм сугубо западное явление. А коль скоро это так, то и сами теологические формулировки, лежавшие в основе окончательного разделения церквей в 1054 году, должны нести в себе элементы геополитического характера.

Спор о "филиокве", т.е. об исхождении Святого Духа только от Отца или от Отца и Сына⁷⁷, в богословских терминах предвосхищает дальнейшее развитие двух типов христианских и постхристианских цивилизаций рационалистическо-индивидуалистической западной и мистико-коллективистской восточной. Принятие Западом поправки к Никейскому Символу Веры относительно "филиокве" окончательно закрепило ориентацию на рационалистическую теологию т.н. "субординатизма", т.е. на введение в Божественную реальность иерархически соподчиненных отношений, принижающих таинственную и сверхразумную природу Троицы.

Параллельно с вопросом о "филиокве" важным пунктом разногласий стала идея верховенства Римского престола и наивысшего богословского авторитета Папы. Это также было одним из следствий католического "субординатизма", настаивающего на строгой прямолинейной иерархии даже в тех вопросах, которые находятся под знаком провиденциального действия Святого Духа по спасению мира. Такая позиция совершенно противоречит идее языковой автономии поместных Церквей и вообще традиционной для Православия предельной свободе в области духовной реализации.

И наконец, последним важнейшим аспектом разделения церквей на Восточную и Западную было отвержение Римом святоотеческого учения об Империи, которая является не просто светским административным аппаратом, грубо подчиненным церковным властям, как хотели представить это Папы, но таинственным сотериологическим организмом, активно участвующим в эсхатологической драме как "препятствие приходу антихриста", "катехон", "державший", о чем говорится во Втором послании апостола Павла к Фессалоникийцам.

Сверхразумность Божественного действия (примат апофатической мистической теологии), духовная и языковая свобода поместных церквей (восходящая к глоссолалиям апостолов в день Пятидесятницы) и учение о сакральной роли Империи и императоров (теория православной симфонии) вот основные моменты, определяющие специфику

⁷⁷ Напомним, что православные считают, что Святой Дух исходит только от Отца (хотя и изводится Сыном), а католики утверждают, что и от Сына, *filioque* по-латыни означает "и от Сына".

Православия в отличие от католицизма, фактически отрицающего эти аспекты христианства.

Все эти различия заметны задолго до окончательного разрыва, но определенный баланс до 1054 года сохранять удавалось. С этого же момента геополитический дуализм христианской эйкумены определился полностью, и оба мира православный и католический пошли своими собственными путями.

Вплоть до 1453 (дата взятия Константинополя турками) Православная Церковь геополитически отождествлялась с судьбой Византийской империи. Мир католицизма охватывал Западную Европу. До этого времени Рим и Константинополь представляли собой два христианских "больших пространства" (если выражаться в геополитической терминологии) со своими геополитическими, политическими, экономическими и культурными интересами, а также с четко фиксируемой и недвусмысленной богословской спецификой, отражающей и предопределяющей различие церквей со всей интеллектуальной догматической однозначностью и логической взаимосвязью. Запад основывался на рационалистическом богословии Фомы Аквинского, Восток продолжал линию мистического богословия, апофатики и монашеского умного делания, ярчайшим образом воплотившихся в текстах великого афонского исихаста святого Григория Паламы.

Палама против Фомы Аквинского вот богословская формула, отражающая суть геополитического дуализма христианского Востока и христианского Запада. Мистическое созерцание фаворского света, симфония властей и литургическая глоссолалия поместных церквей (Православие) против рационалистической теологии, папского диктата в мирских делах европейских королей и доминации латыни как единственного священного литургического языка (католицизм). Налицо геополитическое противостояние двух миров, имеющих разнонаправленную культурную ориентацию, психологическую доминанту и различное, специфическое политическое устройство.

Такова самая общая схема основ православной геополитики. Очевидно, что в подобной ситуации главной задачей Византии и Православной Церкви было сохранить свою структуру, защитить пределы своего политического и духовного влияния, отстоять свою самостоятельность. Причем Православие в такой ситуации имело двух основных геополитических противников:

- 1) нехристианский мир, чье давление проявлялось как в набегах варваров на окраины империи, так и в массивном давлении исламизированных турков;
- 2) христианский мир Запада, рассматривавшийся не просто как земли "латинской ереси", но и как мир апостасии, отступничества, как страна людей, познавших истину и спасение, но отказавшихся от них, предавших их.

В такой изначальной и полной картине геополитического места Православия очень легко разглядеть все те геополитические проблемы, которые будут волновать Восточную Церковь и православные государства на протяжении долгих веков уже после распада Византии. Византийские императоры в определенный момент столкнулись с двойной угрозой "турецкий тюрбан или латинская митра". Учитывая особенность теологического отношения к Западу и Риму, легко понять тех православных, кто делал выбор в пользу "турецкого тюрбана" в тех случаях, когда третьего было не дано. Кстати, многие православные восприняли падение Константинополя как Божью кару за геополитический шаг Византии, попытавшейся сблизиться с Римом за счет принятия "филиокве" в т.н.

"Флорентийской унии" (хотя по возвращении послов в Константинополь это признание было денонсировано).

1.2 Поствизантийское Православие

После падения Константинополя вся геополитическая картина резко изменилась. Несмотря на то, что константинопольский Патриарх оставался главой Православной Церкви, стройность всей структуры нарушилась. Напомним, что одним из краеугольных камней Православия было учение о сотериологической функции Империи, а так как Православной Империи (и, соответственно, православного Императора, Василевса) больше не существовало, то Церковь вынуждена была вступить в новый, особый и достаточно парадоксальный, период своего существования. С этого момента весь православный мир делится на две части, имеющие глубокие различия не только с геополитической, но и с богословской точки зрения.

Первый сектор поствизантийского православного мира представляют собой те Церкви, которые оказались в зоне политического контроля неправославных государств, особенно в османской империи. Эти Церкви административно входили вплоть до распада этой империи в т.н. православный "миллет", который включал православных греков, сербов, румын, албанцев, болгар и арабов. Верховной фигурой среди этих православных считался Патриарх Константинопольский, хотя наряду с ним существовали Патриарх Александрийский (архипастырь православных греков и арабов, проживающих в Египте) и Патриарх Антиохийский (глава православных арабов на территории современных Сирии, Ирака, Ливана). Особым статусом обладал небольшой Иерусалимский Патриархат, а также автокефальные Церкви Кипра и горы Синай. Константинопольский Патриархат считался духовно главенствующим во всем православном мире, хотя здесь не существует такой прямой иерархии, как в католичестве, и автокефальные церкви имели значительную долю самостоятельности⁷⁸. Константинопольский Патриархат расположен в квартале Фанар, и от этого слова происходит собирательное название греческого клира, подчиненного этому Патриархату "фанариоты". Заметим, что начиная с 1453 года этот сектор православного мира пребывает в двусмысленном положении и на геополитическом и на богословском уровнях, так как отсутствие православной государственности прямо влияет на эсхатологическое видение православными политической истории и означает пребывание Церкви в мире как в "море апостасии", где мистическому приходу "сына погибели" уже ничто не мешает. Неизбежный отказ от православной симфонии властей превращает греческую Православную Церковь (и другие, связанные с ней политической судьбой, церкви) в нечто иное, нежели то, чем она являлась изначально. Это значит, что ее богословские и геополитические ориентации меняются. Меняется и ее сакральная природа.

Ясное понимание взаимосвязи между богословием и политикой в полноценной православной доктрине заставило Россию встать на тот путь, которому она следует с XV века, и который теснейшим образом связан с теорией "Москвы Третьего Рима". Россия и Русская Православная Церковь это второй сектор поствизантийского восточного христианства, имеющий совершенно иную геополитическую и даже духовную природу.

Установление на Руси Патриаршества и провозглашение Москвы "Третьим Римом" имеет прямое отношение к мистической судьбе Православия как такового. Русь после падения

⁷⁸ Отдельно следует рассмотреть грузинскую Православную Церковь, сохранившую свою относительную независимость от турков.

Константинополя остается единственным геополитическим "большим пространством", где существовала и православная политика и православная Церковь. Русь становится преемницей Византии и по богословским мотивам и на геополитическом уровне. Только здесь сохранились все три основных параметра, которые делали Православие тем, чем оно являлось, в отличие и от латинского Запада и от политического господства нехристианских режимов. Следовательно, вместе с мистическим статусом "преграды для прихода сына погибели" Москва наследовала и всю полноту геополитической проблематики Константинополя. Так же, как и Византия, Русь столкнулась с двумя враждебными геополитическими реалиями с той же "латинской митрой" и тем же "турецким тюрбаном". Но в данном случае вся полнота исторической ответственности падала на русских царей, русскую церковь и русский народ. Тот факт, что эта ответственность была передана Москве после падения Константинополя, наделял всю ситуацию особым эсхатологическим драматизмом, отразившимся не только на психологии русских в последние пять веков, но и на специфике геополитической ориентации русского государства и русской Церкви. Параллельно этому сформировалась концепция русского народа как "народа-бо гонольца".

Но одновременно появилась и новая проблема: отношения с православным миром за пределом Руси и статус Константинопольского Патриарха применительно к Патриарху Московскому. Дело в том, что нерусские православные оказались перед дилеммой: либо признать Русь "ковчегом спасения", новой "Святой землей", "катехо ном" и, соответственно, подчиниться духовному авторитету Москвы, либо, напротив, отрицать возможность существования "православного царства" как такового и отнести к Москве как к нелегитимной узурпации византийской эсхатологической функции. Соответственно этому выбору должна была строить свои отношения с остальными церквями и Москва. Можно сказать, что, фактически, с этого момента православный мир разделился на две части, различающиеся и геополитически и теологически. Известно, что в Константинопольской сфере влияния победила антимосковская линия, а значит, клир фанариотов адаптировал православную доктрину к тем условиям, когда о политической проекции не могло быть и речи. Иными словами, греческое Православие изменило свою природу, превратившись из интегрально го духовно-политического учения, в исключительно религиозную доктрину индивидуального спасения. И отныне соперничество Константинополя с Москвой являлось, по сути, противостоянием двух версий Православия полноценного, в случае Москвы, и редуцированного, в случае Константинополя.

Более того, изменения качества греческого Православия сблизило его, в некотором смысле, с линией Рима, так как один из трех основных пунктов догматических противоречий (вопрос о "катехоне") отпал сам собой. Духовное сближение фанариотов с Ватиканом сопровождалось их политическим сближением с турецкой администрацией, в которой многие православные греки традиционно занимали высокие посты. Такое раздвоенное существование, сопряженное с соперничеством с Русской Церковью за влияние над православным миром, фактически, лишило греческое Православие самостоятельной геополитической миссии, сделало его лишь одним из второстепенных геополитических факторов в более общем неправославном контексте политических интриг Османских властей и папских легатов.

Как бы то ни было, с XV века термин "геополитика Православия" стал почти тождественным термину "геополитика России".

Вместе с тем, неверно было бы рассматривать весь нерусский православный мир как подконтрольный политике фанариотов. В различных его частях существовали и

противоположные настроения, признававшие за Православной Русью богословское и эсхатологическое первенство. Особенно это касалось сербов, албанцев, румын и болгар, у которых русофильские и фанариотские геополитические тенденции традиционно конкурировали. Со всей силой это проявилось в XIX веке, когда православные народы, входившие в состав Османской империи, предприняли отчаянные попытки восстановить свою национальную и политическую независимость.

1.3 Петербургский период

Но между падением Константинополя и началом борьбы за независимость православных балканских народов произошло событие, которое имеет огромное значение для Православия в самом широком смысле. Речь идет о русском расколе и следующих непосредственно за ним реформах Петра Первого. В этот момент на Руси произошло качественное изменение статуса Православия, и отныне догматические основы Восточной Церкви, сохранявшиеся около 200 лет незыблемыми, пошатнулись. Дело в том, что перенос столицы из Москвы в Санкт-Петербург и упразднение Патриаршества вместе с учреждением Синода означали то, что Россия перестала быть догматически легитимной Православной Империей в богословском и эсхатологическом смысле. Фактически, был осуществлен переход от собственно православной геополитической модели к некоему подобию протестантского государства. Отныне Русское Православие также превратилось в некую двусмысленную реальность, лишь частично совпадающую на геополитическом уровне с Российским Государством. Но хотя догматическая подоплека была откровенно поколеблена, общая логика российской геополитики продолжала изначальную линию, хотя и на ином уровне, так как светские и чисто политические интересы стали однозначно главенствовать над религиозно-эсхатологической проблематикой. Параллельно, и на самом Западе традиционная католическая модель тоже уступила место укреплению чисто национально-политических образований, государств-наций, так что и там теологическая проблематика стерлась и отошла на второй план перед лицом более практических, меркантильных и узко политических интересов. Однако, геополитический расклад, предопределенный догматически в схизме церквей, остался суммарно прежним, если не считать появления протестантских стран.

Протестантизм геополитически делится строго на два сектора прусское лютеранство и англо-швейцаро-голландский кальвинизм. При внешней схожести и синхронности обоих всплесков протеста против Рима лютеранство и кальвинизм имеют почти полярно противоположное значение. Лютеранский лагерь, сконцентрировавшийся в прусском государстве, был основан и догматически и мистически на критике Ватикана с точки зрения радикализации предпосылок "Нового Завета", и в общих чертах это воспроизводило традиционные для Православия претензии к католицизму. Лютеранская Пруссия и географически располагалась между православной Россией и католической Западной Европой. Кальвинизм же, ставший государственной религией Англии (а позже в огромной мере повлиявший на политическое устройство США), основывался, напротив, на подчеркнуто ветхозаветном подходе и критике Рима с этих позиций. Не случайно, что и географически кальвинизм и вытекающие из него секты тяготели к крайнему Западу и в Европе, и по ту сторону Атлантики.

Послепетровская Россия Романовых была ближе к прусской модели, т.е. отходя от собственно православной догматики, она отталкивалась на полпути к католицизму, который, к тому же, постепенно сдавал позиции государствам-нациям. При этом основное геополитическое напряжение концентрировалось между Россией, с одной стороны, и Австрийской Империей и Британской Империей, с другой. На религиозном уровне это

было противостоянием Православия католицизму (Австрия) и кальвинизму (Англия). Абсолютистская, а потом и революционная Франция играла во всем этом особую роль, стремясь распространить республиканские идеи и Просвещение. При этом важно отметить, что, если у России были с Австрией некоторые общие геополитические интересы (в частности, противостояние Турции), то стратегия Англии была практически во всем противоположна стратегии России вплоть до поддержки англичанами османской империи.

Как бы то ни было, даже послепетровская Россия наследовала основные черты византийской геополитики, хотя догматическая полнота концепции "Третьего Рима" была нарушена. Отныне можно было говорить только об инерциальном продолжении того, что некогда было полноценным и теологически обоснованным путем "народа-богоносца" в истории. Параллельно этой трансформации материальные и узко политические интересы начинали играть во внешней политике все большую роль, и сами религиозные факторы зачастую использовались как предлог для того или иного политического хода, ориентированного исключительно на благо государства в его светском аспекте.

1.4 Национальное освобождение православных народов

В XIX веке многие православные народы греки, сербы, болгары, албанцы, румыны и т.д. начали активно освобождаться от политического контроля турков. Религиозный фактор играл в этом значительную роль, превращаясь в один из основных мотивов национально-освободительной борьбы.

Появление новых православных государств и разрушение империи османов было следствием нескольких геополитических и идеологических факторов:

- 1) Деградация политической власти турков позволила развиваться национальному чувству греков и других балканских народов, чему, в свою очередь, способствовало распространение идей Просвещения; в этом важную роль играла Франция, колыбель "модернистических веяний".
- 2) Россия как геополитический противник Турции активно использовала ситуацию, чтобы подточить своего врага изнутри; русские агенты в Греции и на Балканах сосредоточили свои усилия на поддержке требований православных, что сопровождалось и внешним геополитическим давлением России.
- 3) Начался своеобразный религиозный ренессанс православных народов, и идея борьбы за политическую и национальную независимость сопровождалась мессианскими предчувствиями эсхатологического характера.

В этот период сформировались политико-идеологические концепции Великой Греции (или Великой Идеи, *Megale idea*), Великой Болгарии, Великой Сербии ("начертанье"), Великой Румынии и т.д.

1.5 Megale Idea

Сторонники Великой Греции стремились к полному отвоевыванию греческих территорий у турков и воссозданию "Новой Византии", восстановлению царской власти и возврату Константинопольского Патриарха к его главенствующей роли во всем православном

мире. Вследствие ожесточенной борьбы и национального восстания греки смогли отвоевать себе в 1830 небольшое независимое государство вокруг Пелопонеса и Мореи, которое после Балканских войн в 1913 года фактически удвоило свою территорию. При этом осуществление "Великой идеи" столкнулось с геополитическими интересами других православных народов, так как греки требовали присоединения Македонии, Фракии и иных территорий, на которые претендовали также болгары и сербы. Кульминацией этого плана было освобождение Константинополя (Стамбула) от турков. Но весь проект окончился катастрофой после поражения Греции в войне с Турцией Атаатюрка, который разбил греков и заставил греческое население Анатолии массовым образом переселиться на греческие земли.

Очень важно отметить, что национально-освободительная борьба греков никак не приветствовалась и не вдохновлялась фанариотским духовенством и Константинопольским Патриархатом, которые были политически солидарны скорее с османской империей, чем с российской геополитикой или балканскими народами, стремящимися к свободе. Более того, распад турецкой империи был катастрофой для духовного верховенства фанариотов в православном мире за пределами России. Поэтому греческий национализм и "Великая Идея", хотя и имевшие отчетливо православный характер, изначально продвигались некоторыми особыми тайными организациями масонского типа, в которых важнейшую роль играли русские агенты влияния и вместе с тем сторонники французского Просвещения. Иными словами, православная идея в Греции в критический период ее освобождения от турецкого господства была достоянием некоей параллельной религиозной структуры, связанной с греческой диаспорой в России и в других Средиземноморских регионах. Любопытно также, что греческая аристократия, генетически и политически связанная с фанариотами, уже после завоевания независимости, ориентировалась больше на Австрию и Германию, тогда как греческая буржуазия, в среде которой и созрела "Великая Идея", была яростной сторонницей союза с Россией. В этом снова отчетливо различима некоторая солидарность официального греческого поствизантийского Православия с линией Ватикана.

1.6 "Начертанье"

Идея Великой Сербии, основанная на историческом прецеденте огромного балканского государства, созданного в XIV веке сербской династией Неманичей, снова возродилась в ходе сербской освободительной борьбы. Вначале восставшие сербы освободили от османского господства небольшую территорию, Шумадию, а после этого начали борьбу за создание на Балканах независимого славянского государства, с доминацией сербов и православной династии. Начиная с 1815 года сербы добились некоторой независимости, которая, однако, несла с собой две различные геополитические ориентации, воплотившиеся в двух сербских династиях Обреновичей и Карагеоргиевичей. Обреновичи, хотя и были православными, ориентировались на близкую Австрию, и не последнюю роль в этом вопросе сыграла активность некоторых политико-интеллектуальных кругов из Воеводины, территории, ближе всего лежащей к Австрии. Карагеоргиевичи, напротив, тяготели исключительно к России. В 1903 году без участия русских спецслужб династия Обреновичей была свергнута, и Сербия обратилась к прорусской линии. К 1920 году при Карагеоргиевичах была создана Югославия, огромное балканское государство, объединившее под сербским началом многие балканские народы, в том числе католических хорватов и словенцев, православных македонцев, мусульман Боснии и албанцев. Кроме того на севере Югославии под сербский контроль попали католики-венгры. Однако эта геополитическая конструкция оказалась неустойчивой, так как неправославные народы Югославии (не без

помощи австрийских и турецких агентов влияния) стали противиться этнической доминации сербов и религиозному примату Православия. Особенного накала это противостояние достигло во время Второй мировой войны, когда прогерманские Хорватия и Босния фактически осуществляли геноцид православных сербов.

1.7 Великая Румыния

Проект Великой Румынии появился также в православной среде, причем речь шла не только о полном освобождении от турецкого контроля (хотя и Молдавия и Валахия никогда не входили официально в состав османской империи), но и о противодействии политике фанариотов, стремившихся подчинить своему влиянию румынский клир. В этом течении антитурецкие и антифанариотские настроения поддерживала Россия, что облегчалось принадлежностью к русским территориям Бессарабии, населенной румынами. Вместе с тем в Румынии начиная с XVIII века активизировались униатские тенденции. Униатство это идея подчинения Православной Церкви Ватикану при сохранении православной обрядности, но, на самом деле, в таком подходе выигрывает геополитически исключительно Ватикан, а Православие однозначно проигрывает. Не случайно поэтому, что униатство рассматривалось православными как тактический ход католицизма, стремящегося расширить свое миссионерское, политическое и духовное влияние на Восток за счет православных народов. И в самой Румынии униатство, распространенное особенно в Трансильвании, изначально сопровождалось культурными тенденциями латинизации, прославления романской сущности Румынии, латинских корней языка и т.д. Униатство в Румынии опиралось на католическую Австрию, а Православие поддерживалось, естественно, Россией. Показательно, что греческие православные, фанариоты, проводили в Румынии, фактически, протурецкую политику, противоречащую как австро-католическим, так и русско-православным геополитическим интересам. Идея Великой Румынии имела однозначно православный подтекст, и под этим знаменем румыны боролись за национальную независимость. При этом важно, что румынский национализм имеет откровенно антигреческий характер, а в конфессиональной сфере униатство, сопряженное с ориентацией на латинскую культуру, тяготеет к Риму и Западной Европе, тогда как румынское Православие следует промосковской линии. Интересно, что после советизации Румынии в 1948 году формально атеистический коммунистический режим занял однозначно позицию румынского Православия, подчинив ему униатские конфессии и подвергнув католические меньшинства определенным репрессиям.

1.8 Великая Болгария

Начало движения православного и одновременно национального возрождения болгар можно датировать 1870 годом, когда под давлением и при поддержке России был создан болгарский экзархат, ставивший своей целью объединить православных, живущих на Балканах, в геополитический блок, политически враждебный османской империи и духовно противостоящий Константинопольскому Патриархату и доминации фанариотов.

Параллельно обретению геополитической самостоятельности Болгария разработала националистический проект "Болгарии трех морей", что предполагало присоединение Македонии, Фракии и Константинополя. Традиционно будучи русофильским, болгарское Православие в некоторые моменты истории отклонялось от этой линии ради достижения узко национальных целей, и так же, как униаты Румынии, династия Обреновичей в

Сербии, греческая аристократия и некоторые другие восточно-европейские силы, вставало на сторону Средней Европы, выступая союзником Австро-Венгрии против России.

Интересно, что по мере возникновения новых православных государств на Балканах их геополитическая ориентация постоянно колебалась между Россией и Австрией, т.е. между Русским Православием и Римским католичеством. Причем формальным поводом такого устойчивого дуализма были некоторые спорные, территории и в первую очередь Македония. Из-за Македонии постоянно возникали трения между Грецией, Болгарией и Сербией, и поддержка Россией той или иной стороны в этом конфликте автоматически бросала противоположную сторону в объятия Австрии.

1.9 Православная Албания

По расселению албанцев проходила традиционная граница между византийским и католическим миром. В этом народе существует 4 конфессии албанцы-сунниты (отуреченные албанцы), албанцы-бекташи (члены суфийской организации, имеющей, как в некоторых исключительных случаях, родовой, а не только инициатический характер), албанцы-католики и албанцы-православные. Несмотря на то, что православные албанцы составляют меньшинство, именно эта группа стояла в центре национально-освободительной борьбы, и независимое государство Албания возникло благодаря православному епископу Фан Ноли, который и стал первым албанским правителем в 1918 году. Фан Ноли был однозначным сторонником России, и Русское Православие активно поддерживало его во всех начинаниях. Православные албанцы объединили под своим контролем всю нацию независимо от конфессии, но их главными противниками и соперниками были даже не столько католики, сколько греческий православный клир, традиционно укорененный в Албании! И снова на примере Албании мы сталкиваемся с геополитическим дуализмом в поствизантийском православном мире, где противостоят геополитические интересы Греческой и Русской Церквей.

Фан Ноли сохранил свою прорусскую ориентацию и после Октябрьской революции, за что и был свергнут Ахмедом Зогом, будущим королем Албании. Во время оккупации Албании фашистской Италией албанских православных преследовали прокатолические власти, но после "советизации" снова Православная Церковь получила государственную поддержку теперь уже от коммунистических властей. Лишь в 1967 в ходе "культурной революции" и маоистского уклона советская Албания объявила себя "первым исключительно атеистическим государством в мире" и начала прямые преследования верующих любых конфессий.

1.10 Геополитические лобби в православных странах

Общий обзор геополитических тенденций балканских православных стран выявляет важнейшую закономерность: в каждом таком государстве существуют, как минимум, два геополитических лобби, характер которых сопряжен с некоторыми религиозными особенностями.

Во-первых, повсюду наличествует пророссийское лобби, ориентирующееся на геополитику Русской Православной Церкви, которая, в свою очередь, наследует (хотя и с оговорками) линию "Москва Третий Рим". Это лобби ориентировано против Рима и любого сближения с ним (а значит, против Австрии, Венгрии и католической Германии, т.е. против католического сектора Средней Европы), но одновременно, стоит на

антитурецких и анти-"фанариотских" позициях, противопоставляя себя в той или иной степени Константинопольскому Патриархату. В некоторых случаях (как, например, в самой Греции) это лобби включает в себя не только православные круги, но и некоторые секретные общества масонского типа.

Во-вторых, в этих же странах существует и противоположное лобби, которое, будучи или не будучи православным, сочувственно относится к сближению с Римом, к ориентации на Среднюю Европу, Австрию, в пределе на униатство или даже католичество.

В-третьих, везде остаются следы турецкого влияния, которое поддерживалось в этом регионе Англией, а это означает, что англосаксонская геополитика в данном случае имеет южную ориентацию и опирается на фанариотские тенденции и в современном Православии в балканских странах, традиционно связанные с османской администрацией.

Распад Югославии дает нам пример геополитического расклада на Балканах. Русофильская линия воплощена в позиции Белграда и боснийских сербов. Хорватия и Словения ориентируются на Среднюю Европу, а англосаксы (США и Англия) активно поддерживают боснийских мусульман, наследников турков. При этом снова встает вопрос Македонии, о которой опять возникают споры между Сербией, Грецией и Болгарией. С новой силой дает о себе знать и албанская проблема в частности, в Косове. Приднестровская трагедия и антиросийские настроения в нынешней Румынии и Молдавии снова заставляют обратить особое внимание на униатское и прокатолическое лобби, которое только и может быть носителем антимосковских настроений и латинских тенденций в этих областях.

1.11 Русская Православная Церковь и Советы

Соотношение между Православием и советским режимом вопрос крайне трудный. С одной стороны, существует точка зрения, что советский период, несмотря ни на что, унаследовал от дореволюционной России геополитическую линию, строго совпадающую в самых важных аспектах с геополитикой Русской Церкви. Можно условно определить это как "сергианство" по имени Патриарха Московского Сергия, сформулировавшего знаменитый тезис, ставший отправным пунктом внутрицерковных споров, не утихших и в наши дни: "Ваши успехи наши успехи" (в обращении к атеистическому антихристианскому режиму И.Сталина). Эта "сергианская" формула далеко не так парадоксальна и чудовищна, как хотят ее представить православные консерваторы. Дело в том, что большевистская Революция повлекла за собой такие перемены в церковной жизни России, которые поражают своим символизмом. Синхронно было восстановлено Патриаршество, столица перенесена в Москву (символическое возвращение к идее "Москва Третий Рим"), чудесное обретение иконы "Державная" в Коломенском, московской резиденции русских царей, знаменовало возврат к мистической, сотериологической и эсхатологической функции царской власти, восстанавливаемой в ее сверхъестественном измерении после двухсотлетнего Санкт-Петербургского периода. Вместе с этим большевики наследовали всю русскую геополитику, укрепили государство и расширили его границы. Параллельно шло и духовное обновление Церкви, через гонения и страдания восстановившей забытую огненность религиозного чувства, практику исповедничества, подвиг мученичества за Христа.

Вторая точка зрения рассматривает Советскую Россию как полную антитезу России Православной, а "сергианство" считает конформизмом с антихристом и отступничеством. Такой подход исключает возможность рассмотрения советского периода как продолжения

геополитики Православия. Носителем такой идеологии в ее самой отчетливой форме является Русская Православная Церковь за Рубежом и сектантская Истинная Православная Церковь, чьи позиции вытекают из эсхатологического отождествления большевизма с приходом антихриста. Любопытно, что такой подход отказывает Православию в политическом измерении и типологически совпадает с позицией "фанариотов", отрицающих необходимость соотнесенности Православной Церкви с политикой, что является основой полноценной православной доктрины. Одновременно, такой подход сочетается с симпатиями к "белому" движению, которое геополитически основывалось на поддержке Антанты, западноевропейских и, особенно, англосаксонских стран. И не случайно центр Русской Православной Церкви за Рубежом находится в США. Геополитически такой "православный" антисоветизм и "антисергианство" совпадают с традиционной для Запада атлантистской линией, направленной против России (советской, царской, патриархальной, модернистской, демократической и т.д.) независимо от ее идеологической системы.

1.12 Резюме

После падения Византийской Империи геополитика Православия лишена однозначной богословской и эсхатологической функции, которую она имела в эпоху "тысячелетнего царства" с V по XV века. Двести лет "Москвы Третьего Рима" примыкают к этому "святому" периоду, который для православного сознания тождественен периоду полноценной Традиции. После раскола и петровских реформ начинается более двусмысленный период, на всем протяжении которого Россия все же следует, в самых общих чертах, прежней геополитической линии, утрачивая при этом доктринальную строгость. Весь поствизантийский период характеризуется дуализмом в рамках самого Православия, где Русское Православие, напрямую связанное с геополитикой Русского Государства, противостоит греческо-фанариотской линии Константинопольского Патриархата, который воплощает в себе тип Православия, строго отделенного от политической реализации и выполняющего инструментальные функции в общей структуре османской системы.

Сама же Россия перенимает византийскую традицию конфронтации с "латинской митрой и турецким тюрбаном" и вынуждена в одиночку защищать интересы Православия на геополитическом и государственном уровнях. Эта линия заставляет участвовать Россию в балканской политике, где она сталкивается с целым рядом геополитически враждебных тенденций, включая постоянное "фанариотское" антироссийское влияние.

И наконец, в советский период геополитика, как это ни парадоксально, продолжает общую планетарную стратегию Русской Государственности, расширяя сферы влияния России за счет традиционно враждебных Православия стран и народов. Конечно, здесь не может идти речи о догматической преемственности Советов по отношению к Русской Православной Церкви, но при этом не следует забывать, что догматическая очевидность безнадежно утрачена уже при Петре, а поколеблена в период раскола. И если встать на точку зрения "сергианства", можно рассмотреть геополитические успехи советской сверхдержавы, покорившей полмира, традиционно враждебного русским православным христианам и нашему государству, как успехи Русской Церкви и Православной геополитики. Этот последний тезис является, вне всяких сомнений, весьма спорным, но таким же спорным является, строго говоря, отождествление романовской послепетровской России с истинно православным государством. Хотя и в первом и во втором случае налицо явная геополитическая преемственность.

В наше время, когда нет ни царской, ни советской России, а есть издыхающая и искалеченная, разворованная и проданная Западу, нашему извечному врагу, страна, мы в состоянии осмыслить всю геополитическую историю Православия беспристрастно и объективно и выявить ее константы, которые следовало бы начертать на скрижалях новой государственности власти, желающей называться "русской".

Глава 2. Государство и территория

2.1 Три важнейшие геополитические категории

Большинство споров в отношении новой геополитической картины мира сосредоточено вокруг трех фундаментальных категорий:

- 1) "государство-нация" ("Etat-Nation"), т.е. традиционное исторически сложившееся централистское государство (такое, как Франция, Италия, Германия, Испания и т.д.);
- 2) регион, т.е. такое административное, этническое или культурное пространство, которое является частью одного или нескольких государств-наций (Etat-Nation), но при этом обладает значительной степенью культурно-экономической автономии (например, Бретань во Франции, Фландрия в Бельгии, Каталония, Галисия и страна басков в Испании и т.д.);
- 3) Большое Пространство, "содружество" или "сообщество", которое объединяет несколько государств-наций ("Etat-Nation") в единый экономический или политический блок.

Многие "европеисты", как левые, так и правые, считают, что категория "государства-нации" (Etat-Nation), т.е. традиционного централистского государства вообще изжила себя, и что следует сделать акцент именно на двух других модальностях на регионализме и даже автономизме, с одной стороны, и на континентальном объединении регионов в единый блок, с другой стороны. Показательно, что здесь сходятся точки зрения полярных политических спектров: "новые левые" считают Etat-Nation слишком "правым", слишком "тоталитарным" и "репрессивным", слишком "консервативным" образованием, от которого следует отказаться во имя прогресса, а "новые правые", напротив, это же государство-нацию (Etat-Nation) относят к слишком "модернистическому", слишком антитрадиционному этапу европейской истории, когда истинно традиционная европейская Империя была разрушена нигилистическим и светским французским абсолютизмом. Кроме того "новые правые" видят в регионализме возврат к этническим традициям и к принципу этнокультурной дифференциации, что является осью всей "новой правой" мысли.

С другой стороны, существует довольно широкая категория политиков, которая, напротив, отстаивает ценности "государства-нации" (Etat-Nation). И снова приверженность к государственному централизму может объединять и "правых" и "левых". Но, как правило, на этой позиции стоят не "новые", а "старые" правые и левые. Характерно, что во Франции противниками европейского объединения были три политические силы: Национальный Фронт Ле Пена (крайне правые), коммунисты Марше (крайне левые) и социалисты-центристы с национальными симпатиями Жан-Пьера Шевенмана. Из этого следует, что в рамках одного и того же геополитического проекта могут сочетаться самые далекие друг от друга идеологические и политические симпатии.

И, тем не менее, у каждой политической силы есть свое собственное понимание трех фундаментальных версий геополитического устройства современного общества. Любопытно было бы построить схему того, как оценивают в перспективе своих собственных идеологий все три проекта разные силы. Для наглядности мы будем говорить

о крайних позициях, которые, естественно, обрастают нюансами и оттенками по мере приближения к политическому центру.

2.2 Регионализм правых и левых

Общий комплекс левых идеологий ориентируется на ослабление влияния государства, административных и политических структур на общественную жизнь. Это предполагает принцип децентрализации, постепенной эволюции от одного центра власти к нескольким и, в перспективе, к большому их числу. В свое время эту теорию разработал известный анархист Прудон. Левые стремятся к ослаблению и постепенной отмене тоталитарных и авторитарных форм управления, а значит, их геополитическая ориентация направлена против сохранения традиционного государства, с его границами, чиновничьим аппаратом, репрессивными органами и т.д. Все это вытекает из главной идеологической ориентации левых на "гуманизм", на ценность атомарного индивидуума, а не на какие-то сверхиндивидуальные структуры, ограничивающие его свободы. На этой идейной основе и развился современный европейский регионализм как довольно устойчивая тенденция к социально-экономической децентрализации, к отказу от традиционного для Запада последних столетий принципа Государства-Нации.

Эта либеральная тенденция левых в пределе отрицает и само понятие "государства", и само понятие "нация" как исторический пережиток. Этим принципам противопоставляется "гуманистическая" идея "прав человека", которая давно уже перестала быть абстрактным филантропическим лозунгом и превратилась в довольно агрессивный идеологический комплекс, открыто направленный против традиционных форм коллективного существования людей как членов нации, народа, государства, расы и т.д. Отсюда логичный для левых акцент на регионализме, так как административная самостоятельность территориальных частей государства, с их точки зрения, приближает ценностный эталон к индивидууму, снимает с широких общественных категорий ореол безусловного авторитета и функции контроля.

Очевидно, что данная тенденция левых противоречит национально-государственным идеологам, т.е. "этатистам" и "националистам", для которых именно историческое и политическое единство народа, воплощенное в Etat-Nation, представляется высшей ценностью. Противостояние государственников-националистов либералам-регионалистам представляет собой константу бурных полемик относительно основных геополитических проектов практически во всех странах, где политические процессы развиваются активно и динамично.

Но существует и "правый регионализм", тесно связанный с проблемой традиции и этноса. Такой регионализм исходит из положения о том, что современное централистское государство является лишь инструментом культурного и идеологического нивелирования его членов, что оно давно утратило сакральные функции и превратилось в репрессивный аппарат, ориентированный против остатков подлинных культурных, этических и этнических традиций. "Правые регионалисты" видят в децентрализации возможность возродить отчасти обрядовую, культовую форму жизни народов, традиционные ремесла, восстановить такие формы правления, которые были свойственны традиционной цивилизации до наступления сугубо современного мира. Фактически, такой "правый регионализм" точно соответствует понятию "почвенничество". В принципе, правые подспудно имеют в виду и некоторый "природный" дифференциализм, свойственный жителям провинций, которые гораздо более остро и неприязненно реагируют на инородцев, чем жители крупных городов.

Таким образом, складывается вторая линия политического противостояния: "правые регионалисты", часто апеллирующие и к этнически-расовой чистоте, и "левые этатисты", считающие, что лучший способ внедрения "прогрессивных", "либеральных" ценностей в общество это государственный централизм, предохраняющий общество от возможной реставрации "преодоленных прогрессом" пережитков.

2.3 Новое Большое Пространство: мондиализм или Империя?

В отношении сверхгосударственной интеграции также существует довольно противоречивая политическая раскладка. С одной стороны, имеется "мондиалистский проект", предполагающий полную отмену традиционных государств и создание планетарного цивилизационного поля, управляемого из единого центра, который условно можно назвать "мировым правительством". В принципе, такой проект является логическим завершением либеральных тенденций, стремящихся разрушить все традиционные общественные структуры и искусственно создать единое "общечеловеческое" пространство, состоящее не из народов, а из "индивидуумов", не из государств, а из технократических ассоциаций и промышленных чернорабочих. Именно в таком свете виделись мондиалистам начала века "Соединенные Штаты Европы", о которых мечтали как капиталисты-либералы (Моне, Куденоф-Калегри и т.д.), так и коммунисты (Троцкий и т.д.). Позже эти же идеи вдохновили и конструкторов Маатстрихта, и идеологов "нового мирового порядка".

Но параллельно такой мондиалистской перспективе существует и альтернативный вариант, отстаиваемый неконформистскими политическими силами. Речь идет о теоретиках Новой Империи, считающих современные государства-нации результатом трагического распада традиционных империй, которые только и могут в полной мере соответствовать истинно сакральной организации общества, основанной на качественной дифференциации, на духовной иерархии, на корпоративной и религиозной базе. Такое понимание "Нового Большого Пространства" вытекает не из чисто количественного подхода к интеграции (как у мондиалистов), но из некоего духовного и сверхнационального принципа, который был бы трансцендентен по отношению к существующим историческим формациям и мог бы объединить их в высшем сакральном синтезе. В зависимости от обстоятельств "имперский проект" берет за основу либо религиозный фактор (католические сторонники восстановления Австро-Венгерской Империи), либо расовый (идеологи Европейской Империи, объединенной единством происхождения индоевропейских народов, в частности, французские "новые правые"), либо геополитический (теории бельгийца Жана Тириара), либо культурный (проекты русских евразийцев).

Следовательно, и здесь существуют два противоположных политических полюса, которые видят схожие геополитические реальности, но в обратной перспективе.

	ЛЕВЫЕ (демократы)	ПРАВЫЕ (консерваторы)
малое пространство	<i>регионализм, сепаратизм</i>	<i>этнизм, традиционализм, почвенничество</i>
среднее пространство	<i>просвященное государство</i>	<i>государство-нация, "этатизм", национализм</i>
большое пространство	<i>мондиализм</i>	<i>Империя</i>

Итак, мы выделили в каждом из геополитических проектов по два радикально различных, противоположных подхода, что в совокупности предопределяет все основные возможности идеологической борьбы вокруг принципиальных вопросов. Благодаря такой схеме можно классифицировать различные политические альянсы между довольно далекими друг от друга силами.

2.4 Геополитика России

Общая проблематика геополитического устройства современного мира имеет прямое отношение к России, где мы встречаемся с теми же основными геополитическими проектами. Три категории регионализм, государство -нация и Большое Пространство имеют прямые аналоги в нашей геополитической действительности.

Регионализм соответствует сепаратистским тенденциям в пределах РФ как в случае национальных республик и округов, так и в случае претензий на полную автономию сугубо территориальных образований (проекты Сибирской, Уральской и др. республик).

Централистско-государственная модель отстаивается сторонниками геополитического проекта "Россия в рамках РФ".

Те, кто ратуют за восстановление СССР, воссоздание Российской Империи в рамках СССР или создание Евразийской Империи, относятся к категории идеологов Нового Большого Пространства.

Как и в общей схеме, сторонники того или иного проекта совершенно не обязательно придерживаются одинаковых политических убеждений. Более того, каждый проект может иметь два полярных знака, которые, условно, определяются как "правый" и "левый".

Попробуем обозначить позиции "правых" и "левых" в российской политической жизни в их отношении к трем геополитическим вариантам.

Сепаратистские тенденции на крайне "левом" фланге используются теми силами, которые стояли и за развалом СССР. Считая советское государство оплотом "реакционности" и "тоталитаризма", российские либералы уже давно выдвигали идеи "Руси в границах XIV века" и т.д., что предполагало дробление русских территорий на отдельные фрагменты как по этническому, так и по чисто географическому принципу. Для таких "левых" единство русской нации и могущество русского государства не только не представляют никакой исторической ценности, но, напротив, рассматриваются как помеха на пути к общечеловеческому "прогрессу". Данный регионалистский проект отстаивается некоторыми крайними либералами, откровенно желающими распада РФ.

Такой ультралиберальный вариант созвучен некоторым идеям определенной части противоположного, крайне националистического лагеря, которая считает, что русским необходимо создать компактное моноэтническое государство, основанное на принципах расовой чистоты и этнического изоляционизма. Такова идея создания "Русской Республики". Среди нерусских этносов, населяющих территорию РФ, существуют аналогичные по сути проекты создания независимых мононациональных государств.

"Левый" вариант национально-государственной программы в рамках РФ воплощало в себе постгорбачевское российское руководство, убежденное, что для проведения реформ выгоднее всего использовать именно централистские методы, подчинив все российские

регионы жесткой линии Москвы. Государственный централизм, по мысли этих сил, является наилучшим и скорейшим способом трансформировать социально-политическую реальность России таким образом, чтобы привести ее к "общечеловеческим", "прогрессивным", а, по сути, "западным" и "атлантистским" стандартам. В регионализме "левые" централисты закономерно видят опасность для осуществления своих целей, так как децентрализация и автономизация регионов могут способствовать созданию таких режимов, которые отвергли бы логику либеральных реформ и предложили бы иные, альтернативные (условно "правые") социально-политические проекты. Имперская экспансия также неприемлема для этих сил, так как восстановление СССР может повлечь за собой соответствующие идеологические последствия.

Существует и активно набирает силу движение "правых" государственников. Это патриоты, смилившиеся с распадом СССР и считающие, что создание из РФ мощного централизованного российского государства послужит делу сплочения нации, организации мощного самостоятельного автаркийного пространства. "Правые" государственники отвергают и сепаратизм и империализм, считая, что дробление РФ означает потерю русскими принадлежащих им территорий, а имперская экспансия принесет много инациональных элементов и грозит национальной доминации русских.

Среди теоретиков воссоздания Империи также есть два полюса. "Левые" российские мондиалисты в основном ориентирующиеся на Горбачева и его лобби, считают необходимым скорейшее создание "единого демократического пространства" как на территории СНГ, так и шире, в рамках евразийского пространства.

"Правое" понимание Нового Большого Пространства воплотилось в политических программах оппозиции, непримиримой по отношению к режиму. Большинство представителей этой оппозиции как национал-коммунисты, так и традиционал-империалисты считают, что Россия в рамках РФ является не только территориально, но недостаточным геополитическим образованием, но принципиально ложным решением в вопросе защиты стратегических интересов России как великой державы. "Правое" евразийство исходит из сугубо имперского понимания исторической миссии России, которая либо должна быть самостоятельным автаркийным "континентом", либо отклониться от своего исторического и геополитического предназначения.

Итак, мы можем свести все варианты геополитических проектов относительно будущего российской государственности в одну схему, учитывающую идеологическую ориентацию тех или иных сил.

	Российские консерваторы, патриоты	Российские либералы, реформаторы
Российский регионализм	<i>"Русская Республика"</i>	<i>"этнические республики", сепаратизм в рамках РФ</i>
Российский централизм	<i>патриоты в рамках РФ</i>	<i>"либеральные реформы при авторитарном центре"</i>
Евразийское Большое Пространство	<i>"Евразийская Империя", "восстановление СССР"</i>	<i>"левый мондиализм", "единое демократическое пространство"</i>

Глава 3. Геополитические проблемы ближнего зарубежья

3.1 Законы Большого Пространства

Фундаментальным законом геополитики является принцип Большого Пространства, выделенный Макиндером и Хаусхофером и развитый Карлом Шмиттом. Согласно этому принципу, национальный суверенитет государства зависит не только от его военной силы, технологического развития и экономической базы, сколько от величины и географического месторасположения его земель и территорий. Классики геополитики исписали сотни томов, доказывая то, что проблема суверенитета прямым образом зависит от геополитической самостоятельности, самодостаточности, автаркичности региона. Те народы и государства, которые действительно стремятся к суверенитету, должны в первую очередь решить проблему территориальной самодостаточности. В нашу эпоху такой самодостаточностью могут обладать только очень крупные государства, расположенные в регионах, стратегически защищенных от возможного нападения (военного, политического или экономического) других государственных образований.

В период противостояния капитализма и социализма необходимость блоков, Больших Пространств была очевидна. Никто не сомневался, что страна могла быть "неприсоединившейся" только ценой своего устранения из сферы планетарной геополитики за счет маргинализации и смещения на периферию. Кроме того, все "неприсоединившиеся" все равно делали выбор в пользу того или иного лагеря, хотя менее радикальный, нежели прямые сторонники социализма или капитализма. Разрушение одной сверхдержавы, безусловно, серьезно изменяет геополитическое пространство земли. Но при этом принцип Больших Пространств отнюдь не теряет своей силы. Напротив, сегодня все более распространенным становится геополитический проект "мондиализма", смысл которого сводится к превращению всей поверхности земли в Единое Большое Пространство, управляемое из американского центра.

3.2 Pax Americana и геополитика мондиализма

Проект проамериканского, "атлантистского" Большого Пространства, создание планетарного Pax Americana или установление "нового мирового порядка" с единым "мировым правительством" это, по сути, геополитические синонимы. Именно такой план разрабатывается и реализуется сегодня в международной политике Запада, и в первую очередь, США. Очевидно, что мондиалистская концепция Большого Пространства полностью исключает любые формы подлинного государственного и политического суверенитета каких бы то ни было народов и государств. Более того, двуполярный мир давал несравнимо больше степеней свободы (суверенитета) государствам, включенным в сферу влияния одного из двух Больших Пространств, чем это планируется в мондиалистском проекте, хотя бы уже потому, что планетарное противостояние заставляло не только подавлять государства-сателлиты, но и подкупать их. Единое планетарное Большое Пространство мондиалистских футурологов будет означать полное исчезновение даже слабой тени какого бы то ни было суверенитета, так как силовое (военное или экономическое) подавление раздробленных и атомизированных "малых пространств" станет единственным способом контроля (потребность в подкупе и обмане отпадет сама собой за отсутствием возможного геополитического конкурента).

Актуальная ситуация ставит перед каждым государством и каждым народом (и особенно перед государствами и народами, входившими ранее в геополитический блок, противоположный атлантистскому Западу) насущную альтернативу либо интеграция в единое Большое Пространство под руководством атлантистов, либо организация нового Большого Пространства, способного противостоять последней сверхдержаве. Вопрос о подлинном геополитическом суверенитете имеет к этой альтернативе прямое отношение, но при этом никакого полного суверенитета для отдельного народа или государства не может быть ни в одном из двух случаев. При принятии мондиалистской модели всякий суверенитет вообще заведомо исключается, так как "мировое правительство" становится безальтернативным и единственным центром власти, и суверенным является в таком случае только планетарная псевдоимперия "нового мирового порядка". Все ее части становятся при этом колониями. При организации нового Большого Пространства мы имеем дело с относительным суверенитетом в рамках большого геополитического образования, так как это возможное Большое Пространство будет относительно свободно при определении идеологической и мировоззренческой доминанты. Значит, народы и государства, которые войдут в этот блок, смогут рассчитывать, по меньшей мере, на этнокультурный суверенитет и на прямое участие в созидании и разработке новой макроидеологии, тогда как мондиалистский вариант "нового мирового порядка" уже является идеологически законченным и выработанным и предлагается всем народам земли как колониальный аналог либерально-рыночной американской модели.

3.3 Парадокс России

Особенность актуальной геополитической ситуации в том, что инициатива разрушения евразийского Большого Пространства, существовавшего до последнего времени в форме социалистического лагеря, исходила из самого центра этого лагеря, из столицы Евразии Москвы. Именно СССР в лице Горбачева стал инициатором включения евразийского блока в мондиалистский проект. Идеи "перестройки", "нового мышления" и т.д. на геополитическом уровне означали полное принятие модели единого Большого Пространства и сознательный переход от двуполярного мира к однополярному. Вначале был разрушен социалистический лагерь, урезан Восточный блок. Потом геополитическое самоликвидаторство было продолжено и от России отбросили те регионы, которые принято называть сегодня "странами ближнего зарубежья".

Как бы то ни было, Россия как сердце Евразийского Острова, как Heartland, в актуальной геополитической ситуации лучше всех остальных регионов могла бы противостоять атлантистской геополитике и быть центром альтернативного Большого Пространства. Но факт ее геополитического самоликвидаторства вынудил ее на время (надеемся, на короткое) уйти с центральных ролей в геополитическом противостоянии. Поэтому следует разобрать иные возможности создания альтернативного Большого Пространства, чтобы государства и народы, отказывающиеся от мондиалистского проекта, смогли предпринимать некоторые самостоятельные шаги, не ожидая геополитического пробуждения России. (Кстати, эти шаги могли бы только ускорить такое пробуждение).

3.4 Россия остается "Осью Истории"

Геополитический выбор антимондиалистской альтернативы вне временно парализованной России должен все равно учитывать ключевую стратегическую и географическую функцию именно русских земель и русского народа, а значит, противостояние современным мондиалистам, контролирующим до некоторой степени российское

политическое пространство, не должно переходить в общую русофобию. Более того, коренные геополитические интересы русских и культурно, и религиозно, и экономически, и стратегически совпадают с перспективой альтернативного антимондиалистского и антиатлантистского Большого Пространства. По этой причине национальные тенденции политической оппозиции внутри России с необходимостью будут солидарны со всеми антимондиалистскими проектами геополитической интеграции вне России.

3.5 Mitteleuropa и Европейская Империя

Одной из возможных альтернатив нового Большого Пространства является Европа, которую определенные политические и идеологические круги противопоставляют Западу англосаксонскому миру, и в первую очередь, США. Такая антизападная Европа не является чистой утопией, так как подобный проект неоднократно реализовывался в истории, хотя всякий раз с определенными погрешностями или искажениями. Так, в XX веке страны Оси представляли собой остов именно такой Европы, хотя англофилия и франкофобия определенных кругов в германском руководстве (наряду с другими обстоятельствами) и помешали полному осуществлению этого проекта. После Второй мировой войны подобная попытка предпринималась Де Голлем, и этой политике Франция обязана тем, что она не является сегодня официально членом НАТО. Как бы то ни было, идея антизападной, традиционной, имперской Европы становится все более и более актуальной сегодня, когда присутствие американских войск на европейском континенте не оправдывается более наличием "советской угрозы" и приобретает характер открытой американской оккупации. Европа по уровню своего технического и экономического развития является серьезным противником Америки, и при усилении давления снизу естественных геополитических интересов европейцев мондиалистская и проамериканская верхушка европейских государств может отступить, и Европа начнет самостоятельную геополитическую жизнь. Тенденции к политической эмансипации и к поиску идеологической альтернативы нарастают в Европе с каждым днем, параллельно с этим возрастают шансы создания независимого европейского Большого Пространства.

3.6 Германия сердце Европы

Европейское Большое Пространство должно складываться вокруг самой континентальной из европейских держав вокруг Германии, а еще точнее, вокруг Mitteleuropa, т.е. Средней Европы. Геополитические интересы Германии традиционно были противоположны атлантистским тенденциям Запада. Это касалось как собственно континентальных, так и колониальных аспектов геополитики. Германия всегда была противником англосаксонских колониальных завоеваний и стремилась к созданию сугубо сухопутной, континентальной, автаркийной цивилизации, основанной на традиционных, иерархических и почвенных ценностях. Mitteleuropa в лице Австро-Венгерской империи Габсбургов была последним европейским следом Великой Римской Империи, к которой и восходит корнями европейская цивилизация в ее государственно-социальном аспекте. Собственно говоря, Римская Империя и была Большим Пространством, объединявшим Западную и Среднюю Европу в единый геополитический организм. И сегодня идея Европейской Империи прямым образом связана с Германией и странами, входящими в зону германского влияния.

Из этих тезисов можно сразу сделать один важный геополитический вывод. Для всех западных стран "ближнего зарубежья" (как прибалтийских республик, так Украины и Молдавии) антимондиалистский геополитический союз возможен только при вхождении в

блок Средней Европы (если, конечно, ситуация в самой России не изменится) при ориентации на Германию. В таком случае, западные регионы СССР будут иметь шанс стать восточными пограничными районами европейского Большого Пространства и смогут обладать некоторым подобием суверенитета (хотя намного меньшим, нежели в составе России или в возможном новом Евразийском Блоке с центром в антимондиалистской России).

Европейская Империя сможет гарантировать этим регионам определенную культурную, лингвистическую и экономическую автономию и сберечь их от нивелирующей мондиалистской Системы, уничтожающей в либерально-рыночной, плутократической структуре даже намеки на различие, автаркию и сохранение национальной идентичности. Однако ни о какой политической и государственной независимости здесь не будет и речи. Более того, Европейская Империя с германским центром всегда будет находиться под угрозой вспышки немецкого национализма, хотя это и чревато ее распадом, как был чреват поражением "пангерманизм" Гитлера.

3.7 "Примкнуть к Европе"

Более всего эта перспектива близка Западной Украине и Эстонии, так как только эти области, действительно, принадлежат исторически и религиозно к западной культуре и считают свои геополитические интересы тождественными интересам Средней Европы. Что же касается других "стран ближнего зарубежья", то Белоруссия и восточные и центральные районы Украины политически и культурно принадлежат к зоне России-Евразии, и если в чем-то и существует культурное различие, то оно может быть сведено к частным деталям, отнюдь не предполагающим смену геополитического блока с Восточного на Центральный (Средняя Европа) и могущим быть урегулированными в рамках этнокультурной (но не государственной!) автономии. Литва, со своей стороны, всегда играла особую роль в геополитике Восточной Европы, выполняя двойную функцию по отношению к России она выступала как носительница западной культуры, по отношению к Средней Европе она, напротив, вместе с Польшей проявляла себя как восточная сила, отстаивающая балто-западно-славянскую независимость от германского давления. С геополитической точки зрения, в последние столетия Литва становилась то немецкой, то русской, и единственно какой она уже давно не является (да и не может являться), так это литовской, так как у нее нет достаточных геополитических предпосылок для того, чтобы соответствовать условиям суверенитета, выдвигаемым современностью.

Отчасти то же самое можно сказать и о Латвии, хотя она в отличие от Литвы вообще никогда не играла никакой самостоятельной роли в геополитической истории, являясь периферией посторонних воздействий в Балтике.

Что касается Молдавии, то это территориальное образование также никогда не имело своей государственности, и какая бы то ни было самостоятельная политическая и государственная традиция у румын, как и у молдаван, полностью отсутствует. Однако исторически Румыния (включая некоторые земли Молдавии) входила в геополитический блок как России-Евразии, так и Средней Европы (в лице Австро-Венгрии), поэтому определенный прецедент альянса со Средней Европой у Румынии был. Хотя Православие подавляющего большинства молдаван и румын больше сближает их все-таки с Востоком и Россией.

3.8 Границы "свободы" и утраченные преимущества

Перспектива вхождения западных стран "ближнего зарубежья" в Европейскую Империю и их примыкание к Средней Европе является возможным и исторически обоснованным, хотя почти во всех случаях (исключая Эстонию как колониальные земли Тевтонского Ордена, населенные потомками безмолвных и покорных автохтонных угро-финских работников, и Западную Украину) Восточный блок России-Евразии, с чисто геополитической точки зрения, предпочтительней во много раз, так как культурно эти регионы больше связаны с Востоком, нежели со Средней Европой. Таким образом, союз западных "стран ближнего зарубежья" со Средней Европой может служить промежуточным вариантом антимондиалистской геополитической ориентации в том случае, если Россия будет продолжать отказываться от своей интеграционной миссии.

Надо заметить, что никакого политического суверенитета в случае вхождения в состав гипотетической "Европейской Империи", конечно, эти страны не получают, так как Большое Пространство, предоставляя геополитическую, экономическую и военную протекцию, требует от своих подданных, в свою очередь, отказа от политико-национальной самостоятельности, от права проводить собственную идеологическую или дипломатическую политику, идущую вразрез с интересами Империи. Как бы это ни затрагивало представителей "малого национализма", в нашей ситуации суверенными могут быть только сверхгосударства, континентальные Империи, взятые как единое целое.

3.9 "Санитарный кордон"

Геополитическая проблема западных "стран ближнего зарубежья" имеет и еще один аспект это атлантический фактор, действующий непосредственно и навязывающий этим странам политические ходы, выгодные мондиализму и американизму. В этом вопросе существует несколько уровней. Начнем по порядку.

США имеет перспективу реального мирового господства только в том случае, если никакого иного Большого Пространства на планете больше не будет. Отсюда следует вывод, что американская геополитика своей главной целью имеет разрушение потенциального геополитического сильного блока и создание препятствий для его образования. В истории мы имеем прецедент такой политики в лице Англии, всегда стремившейся к созданию на континенте "санитарного кордона" или "санитарных кордонов". "Санитарный кордон" представляет собой территорию государств и народов, которая располагается между двумя крупными геополитическими образованиями, чей союз или обоюдное вхождение в Большое Пространство могло бы составить опасную конкуренцию заинтересованной державе (ранее Англии, сегодня США). Страны "санитарного кордона" как правило являются одновременно причиной конфликтов двух континентальных держав, причем их геополитическая самостоятельность де факто невозможна, и поэтому они вынуждены искать экономической, политической и военной поддержки на стороне. Сущность политики третьей крупной геополитической силы в данной ситуации состоит в том, чтобы сделать из "санитарного кордона" зону напряженности между двумя близкими Большими Пространствами, провоцируя эскалацию конфликта через дипломатическое влияние на правительства "промежуточных" стран. Самым радикальным вариантом "санитарного кордона" является положение, при котором "промежуточная" страна стремится к полной независимости от обоих континентальных соседей, что на практике означает превращение в колонию третьей "далекой" державы.

Самым знаменитым примером "санитарного кордона" были в начале века страны, расположенные между Россией и Германией и контролировавшиеся Англией. Они разбивали Большое Пространство Средней Европы и Большое Пространство России-Евразии, служа прямыми агентами и сатрапами стран европейского Запада. Тот же ход повторялся неоднократно и в других более локальных ситуациях. В наше время США в силу прямой геополитической необходимости вынуждены сделать "санитарный кордон" основным инструментом своей внешней политики. В докладе американского советника по делам безопасности Пола Вольфовица правительству США (март 1992) прямо говорилось о "необходимости не допустить возникновения на европейском и азиатском континентах стратегической силы, способной противостоять США", и в этом смысле указывалось, что страны "санитарного кордона" (в частности, страны Прибалтики) являются "важнейшими стратегическими территориями, покушение на которые со стороны русских должно повлечь за собой вооруженный отпор со стороны стран НАТО". Это идеальный пример геополитической логики третьей державы в зоне обоюдных интересов Германии и России.

3.10 Превращение из провинции в колонию

Политику "санитарного кордона" можно выразить в формуле "независимость от ближнего и зависимость от дальнего". При этом надо ясно понимать, что ни о какой подлинной независимости или суверенности здесь не может быть и речи, хотя близорукий "мелкий национализм" и может на уровне обывателя временно отождествить такую "колониальную зависимость от третьей державы" с успехом "национально-освободительной борьбы". Следует напомнить также, что в случае малых государств в нашем прекрасно управляемом мире не может быть не только победы, но и полноценной, единодушной борьбы.

Страны "ближнего зарубежья", вышедшие из под контроля Москвы по воле различных геополитических обстоятельств, среди которых их внутренняя борьба за независимость играла ничтожно малую роль (если вообще таковая наличествовала), имеют все шансы стать "санитарным кордоном" мондиалистской политики США на континенте, а значит, потерять доверие своих соседей и навлечь на себя проклятие "двойного предательства". Более того, в этом случае они превратятся из провинций в колонии. Что произойдет в этом случае с их национальной культурой вообще страшно себе представить, так как мондиализм предложит вместо нее универсальный колониальный суррогат, культурную "кока-кола низацию". В качестве же правителей "санитарный кордон" будет иметь марионеточных надзирателей. Политической самостоятельности эти страны будут полностью лишены, а безопасность их населения постоянно будет под угрозой континентальных соседей, которые не преминут отомстить.

Таким образом, для стран "ближнего зарубежья" перспектива превращения в "санитарный кордон" означает потерю всякой геополитической независимости, так как за возможность "санитарной моськи" подразнить "континентального слона" сама "моська" заплатит полным политическим, культурным и экономическим рабством у заокеанских шефов "нового мирового порядка" (и плюс к тому, вполне закономерной реакцией "слона" в самом близком будущем).

Перспектива "санитарного кордона" в отношении западных стран "ближнего зарубежья" очевидна. Ее формула "ни Германия, ни Россия" (т.е. "ни Средняя Европа, ни Евразия"). Поскольку Германия как самостоятельная геополитическая сила сегодня является чистой потенцией, то справедливо предположить, что за понятием "независимости" ("суверенитета") западных стран "ближнего зарубежья" следует видеть как раз переход на

службу мондиализму и американизму. По меньшей мере, такова актуальная геополитическая картина. Иными словами, западные страны "ближнего зарубежья", действительно стремящиеся к "независимости" (а не "обреченные на независимость" предательской политикой Москвы), скорее всего, сознательно выбирают роль "санитарного кордона" на службе США. Особенно это характерно для тех "стран", у которых традиционно с Германией были довольно неприязненные отношения.

Страны "санитарного кордона" из "ближнего зарубежья" входят в альянс с Западом (с Западной Европой), минуя Среднюю Европу, и это является ярчайшим признаком их атлантистской, мондиалистской ориентации.

В принципе, то же самое верно и для восточных стран "ближнего зарубежья". Однако чтобы адекватно понять их геополитические перспективы, надо более подробно остановиться на геополитических силах Востока.

3.11 Азия перед выбором

На Востоке существуют следующие потенциальные геополитические силы, которые могут претендовать на то, чтобы стать Большими Пространствами: Китай, Иран, Турция и Арабский мир. Проанализируем кратко специфику каждого из этих Больших Пространств применительно к восточным странам "ближнего зарубежья".

Надо сказать, что геополитика Китая представляет собой особую тему, которую невозможно осветить в нескольких строках. Так как "ближнее зарубежье" Востока является регионом распространения ислама, то перспектива образования с Китаем единого Большого Пространства отходит на второй план перед возможностями исламских геополитических коалиций. По меньшей мере, так обстоит дело в настоящий момент, что не исключает, впрочем, резкой активизации китайского фактора как фактора интегрирующего в ближайшем будущем.

В рамках собственно исламского мира для восточных стран "ближнего зарубежья" актуальны три геополитических фактора, имеющие глобальные перспективы, причем каждый из этих факторов имеет свои ярко выраженные идеологические особенности. Это континентально-исламский, революционный Иран; светская, атлантистская, профанически-националистическая Турция; и арабский "саудовский" теократический вариант ислама. Конечно, в арабском мире есть и другие геополитические возможности (Ирак, Сирия, Ливия), но ни одна из них в настоящий момент не может претендовать на роль интегрирующего Большого Пространства по отношению к странам Средней Азии. Вообще говоря, ориентацию на Саудовскую Аравию можно условно и геополитически приравнять к ориентации на "арабский (несоциалистический) ислам".

Восточные страны "ближнего зарубежья" имеют перспективу трех возможных геополитических интеграций в рамках азиатского блока.

3.12 Континентальные перспективы "Исламской Революции"

Иран является сегодня уникальной страной, которая выполняет в Азии роль Средней Европы на Западе. Характерно, что сами иранцы резко отличают себя как от Запада, так и от Востока, понимая под "Западом" "профаническую мондиалистскую цивилизацию Европы", а под "Востоком" "Индию, Китай и ... Россию".

Иранский ислам является динамической и мощной силой, которая имеет яркую антимиондиалистскую направленность и претензии на глобальную Мировую Исламскую Революцию. В геополитическом смысле Иран является сугубо континентальной державой, имеющей и стратегически, и экономически, и идеологически все шансы стать ядром крупного евразийского блока.

Ориентация среднеазиатских республик на Иран (и в первую очередь, Азербайджана с его нефтью и гигантского ядерного Казахстана) вполне могла бы создать предпосылки для подлинного континентального суверенитета. Проиранская коалиция была бы среднеазиатским аналогом Средней Европы (сравните: Средняя Азия Средняя Европа), так как и исторические прецеденты, и идеологические принципы, и культурно-религиозная однородность этих континентальных регионов служат достаточным основанием для прочности и эффективности такого союза.

Важно заметить, что проиранское Большое Пространство потенциально включает в себя Афганистан и Пакистан, а это, в свою очередь, открывает полосу территориальной непрерывности с Таджикистаном и Узбекистаном. С Туркменией же Иран имеет непосредственные границы.

3.13 Ловушка "пантюркизма"

Совершенно иной характер имеет ориентация на Турцию, часто сопровождающаяся "пантюркизмом" (так как среднеазиатские народы "ближнего зарубежья" являются по преимуществу "тюркскими").

Турция как государство возникло на месте Османской Империи не как ее продолжение, но как пародия на нее. Вместо полицентрической имперской многонациональной исламской структуры Кемаль Ататюрк создал восточный вариант французского Etat-Nation, Государства-Нации, со светским, атеистическим, профаническим и националистическим строем. Турция была первым государством Востока, которое резко порвало со своей духовной, религиозной и геополитической традицией. Фактически, Турция, будучи сегодня членом НАТО, является восточным форпостом атлантизма и мондиализма, "санитарным кордоном" между азиатским Востоком и арабским миром. Геополитическая модель, которую предлагает Турция, это интеграция в западный мир и атеистическую, мондиалистскую цивилизацию. Но так как сама Турция, стремящаяся войти в "Европу", пока остается лишь "политико-идеологической" колонией США, а не действительным членом европейского Большого Пространства (что могло бы теоретически предполагать участие Турции в блоке Средней Европы), то ориентация на Турцию означает для стран "ближнего зарубежья" интеграцию в мондиалистский проект на правах "санитарного кордона", в качестве "колониальной прокладки" между восточной континентальной массой Евразии (с Ираном, Китаем и Индией) и взрывоопасным арабским миром, постоянно стремящимся сбросить мондиалистское марионеточное руководство.

Путь Турции это путь служения атлантистской сверхдержаве и принятия мондиалистской модели планетарного Большого Пространства, подконтрольного "мировому правительству". Могут возразить, что карта "пантюркизма", разыгрываемая Турцией, имеет внешне традиционалистский характер. Это отчасти верно, и проекты "Великой Турции от Якутии до Сараево" действительно активно разрабатываются турецкой пропагандой. Надо при этом заметить, что серьезность этим проектам могла бы придать только радикальная смена политического, идеологического и экономического курса

сегодняшней Турции, а это предполагает ни больше ни меньше как Революцию и поворот геополитических интересов на 180 градусов. Не исключая такую возможность, надо отметить все же малую вероятность такого течения событий в ближайшем будущем. Но в то же время подобная перспектива, пропагандируемая в настоящем, может привести к весьма конкретному геополитическому результату к повороту восточных стран "ближнего зарубежья" от Ирана, к выбору светской, атеистической модели общества, к постепенной интеграции в проатлантический "санитарный кордон". "Пантюркизм" столь же двусмыслен, как и "панславизм" или "пангерманизм", т.е. как все идеологии, ставящие национальный признак выше геополитических, пространственных и религиозных интересов народов и государств.

3.14 Нефтедоллары и мондиализм

Саудовская Аравия, оплот сугубо арабского ислама и исламской теократии, на идеологическом уровне представляет собой особую "ваххабитскую" модель авторитарного, моралистического и "пуристского" мусульманства, типологически очень близкого протестантским формам христианства. Восточная азиатская созерцательность, аскетизм и религиозная пассионарность заменены здесь ритуализмом и доминацией почти секулярной этики. По замечанию исламского фундаменталиста Гейдара Джемаля, "Саудовская Аравия в ее актуальном состоянии представляет собой прямую противоположность миру "континентального ислама". Геополитически интересы ваххабитской Саудовской Аравии вполне совпадают с определенной версией мондиалистского проекта, так как экономическое и военное благополучие этой страны основано на поддержке США, которые защищают династические интересы саудовских королей в военной и экономической сферах. Пример военной поддержки война против Ирака. Экономическая "поддержка" состоит в следующем. Вся экономика Саудовской Аравии заключается в нефти. Вся арабская нефть традиционно поступает на мировой рынок через англо-американские руки. Разработка евразийских месторождений и их освоение теоретически могли бы составить конкуренцию саудовцам, обогатить евразийские государства и сделать Европу и Японию независимыми от США. Таким образом, США, управляющие экономикой Европы через контроль над арабской нефтью, и Саудовские короли, основывающие свою экономику на американских нефтедолларах, имеют одни и те же интересы.

Саудовская ваххабитская теократия много раз выступала как препятствие для создания собственно арабского Большого Пространства, так как это противоречило и интересам династии, и интересам атлантистов. Еще больше оснований у саудовцев опасаться евразийского континентального исламского Большого Пространства. Революционный Иран вообще считается идеологическим врагом номер 1 саудитов. Таким образом, геополитические интересы Саудовской Аравии в восточных странах "ближнего зарубежья" прямо противоположны возникновению азиатского исламского Большого Пространства. А значит, путь к арабско-исламской интеграции под "ваххабитским" знаменем для азиатских республик на деле окажется также включением в мондиалистский проект, но только не в светско-националистическом варианте "пантюркизма", а в морально-теократической версии. В некотором смысле, этот путь также есть не что иное, как включение в "санитарный кордон". Только в данном случае "соблазном" является не национализм, но религиозный фактор (и деньги).

Подытоживая все эти соображения, можно сказать, что восточные страны "ближнего зарубежья" имеют только один позитивный путь создания нового Большого Пространства это путь "Исламской Революции" с ориентацией на Тегеран. При этом могут быть решены

национальные конфликты и осуществлена реставрация религиозной традиции и религиозного строя. На геополитическом же уровне это будет означать создание мощного континентального блока, вполне способного противостоять мондиалистским проектам в этих регионах. Более того, даже первые шаги, сделанные в этом направлении, вызовут цепную реакцию в арабском мире, что грозит мондиалистам утратой контроля во всей исламской умме. Кроме того, такой геополитический союз с неизбежностью пробудит антимондиалистские силы Средней Европы (естественного и главного союзника Ирана на Западе) и России-Евразии.

3.15 Минимум два полюса или ... смерть

В современной геополитической ситуации вопрос стоит чрезвычайно остро: либо планетарный "новый мировой порядок" под руководством США, где все государства и народы будут безличными и послушными "винтиками" мондиалистской технократической, атеистической -торгашеской "дисней-лэндовской" космополитической модели либо немедленное создание геополитической оппозиции атлантизму и мондиализму и организация потенциально антимондиалистских, традиционных и почвенных народов и государств в альтернативный блок (или в несколько блоков). Сегодня ситуация является настолько критической, что почти неважно, каким образом и под каким знаком может возникнуть альтернативное Большое Пространство. Если оно возникнет, и если оно действительно будет противостоять мондиализму, то уже одного этого будет достаточно для того, чтобы расширить, диверсифицировать и умножить геополитические альтернативы, чтобы увеличить внутренние степени свободы в рамках антимондиалистской оппозиции. Следует всегда помнить, что для США "главная задача не допустить возникновения геополитической альтернативы" (какой бы то ни было альтернативы). Поэтому совершенно справедливо всем антимондиалистским силам выдвинуть прямо противоположный тезис: "главная задача создание геополитической альтернативы" (какой бы то ни было).

Ситуация сегодня настолько серьезна, что выбирать между "хорошим" и "лучшим" в ней не приходится. Если Россия сможет восстановить геополитическую самостоятельность и избавиться от атлантистского руководства прекрасно. У стран "ближнего зарубежья" появится в этом случае замечательная возможность снова войти в русскую Евразию, на этот раз лишенную идеологического негатива двусмысленного марксизма. Кроме того, добровольное и сознательное возвращение нынешнего "ближнего зарубежья" будет гарантом грядущей культурной, религиозной, языковой, экономической и даже, быть может, политической (но не государственной) автономии. Это было бы самым простым и самым лучшим вариантом. Причем обнажение истинных колониальных целей мондиалистов в этот катастрофический переходный период станет, безусловно, предпосылкой еще большего увеличения числа союзников и сателлитов России-Евразии (как на Востоке, так и на Западе).

Если этого не произойдет, то детонатором антимондиалистского геополитического проекта может стать иное Большое Пространство либо Средняя Европа под флагом Германии, либо объединенная Средняя Азия под знаком "Исламской Революции". В принципе, остается перспектива антимондиалистского восстания в арабском мире и в Латинской Америке, хотя в военном отношении эти потенциальные Большие Пространства недостаточно оснащены для того, чтобы составить конкуренцию Сверхдержаве.

Для стран "ближнего зарубежья" проблема Большого Пространства является центральной и жизненно важной. От выбора геополитической ориентации там зависит сегодня все будущее нации, религия, культура, свобода, благосостояние, безопасность. Вопрос стоит как нельзя остро. Сегодня все ответственные люди должны понимать, что принятие мондиалистской модели означает ни больше ни меньше, как полное и окончательное уничтожение самобытности, идентичности, исторического лица их государств и наций, конец их национальной истории.

Глава 4. Перспективы гражданской войны

4.1 Национальные интересы и мондиалистское лобби

Проблема возможной гражданской войны в России становится все более и более актуальной, и сегодня необходимо изучить этот страшный вопрос с аналитической точки зрения по ту сторону как алармистских эмоций, так и пацифистских увещеваний. Хуже всего (если гражданский конфликт в России все же разразится) оказаться совершенно неподготовленными к нему, растерявшись в сложном и противоречивом раскладе сил, способным ввести в заблуждение даже самых проникательных и идеологически последовательных патриотов.

В этом вопросе, как и во всех других важнейших аспектах политического бытия нации и государства, надо начать с напоминания принципиальных моментов, определяющих общие контуры современного состояния геополитической ситуации. Главным императивом существования государства и нации является принцип суверенности, независимости и политической свободы. И именно требования национальной суверенности являются синонимом национальных интересов. Россия и русский народ имеют в контексте политической истории мира свое уникальное место, свою миссию, свою роль, и свободное и полное исполнение национально-государственного предназначения является главным смыслом самого существования народа как органической общности.

Но мы живем в особую эпоху, когда внутринациональная политика государства неразрывно связана с внешнеполитическим контекстом, и быть может, еще никогда в истории внешнее давление на национально-государственные образования не было столь сильным и настойчивым. Более того, чуть ли не самой главной доктриной в современном политическом истеблишменте Запада стала теория мондиализма, т.е. такой организации жизни людей во всем мире, при которой не должно существовать национально-государственных образований, никакой суверенности, национальных интересов. Во главе мондиалистского мирового сообщества призвана стоять космополитическая верхушка, управляющая не обществами, а математической суммой атомарных индивидуумов. Следовательно, мондиалистский вектор изначально ориентирован против любых национально-государственных формаций, и его главной задачей является отмена старого традиционного мира, поделенного на народы и страны, и устройство "нового мирового порядка", отрицающего все формы исторических и органических общественно-социальных образований.

Мондиалистский фактор направлен, естественно, не только против России (другие нации и государства также являются для него преградами), но именно Россия как мощнейшее геополитическое образование до последнего времени являлась основным бастионом, мешающим постепенному распространению мондиалистского контроля с Запада на весь мир. Конечно, советская система в определенных своих аспектах тоже обладала мондиалистскими чертами, и один из проектов западных мондиалистов заключался именно в постепенном, "эволюционном" включении СССР в общепланетарную систему "нового мирового порядка". Эта известная теория конвергенции, скорее всего, и была главным ориентиром тех сил, которые начали перестройку. Но мягкий вариант "мондиализации" России по тем или иным причинам не "сработал", и тогда мондиалистская политика в отношении к России приняла форму агрессивного давления и откровенно подрывной деятельности. Жесткий и сверхбыстрый распад СССР лишил сторонников "конверген-

ции" рычагов управления, и мондиалистская политика перешла к откровенно агрессивным, русофобским формам.

Мондиалистский вектор является крайне важным моментом для понимания актуального положения России. Если раньше внешнее воздействие на нашу страну оказывалось со стороны иных национально-государственных образований, стремящихся ослабить мощь русского государства или склонить его на свою сторону в тех или иных международных конфликтах; если раньше потенциальными противниками России (явными и тайными) были геополитические силы, в целом сопоставимые по своей структуре с ней самой, то в настоящий момент главным внешним фактором стала особая форма давления, не имеющая никаких четких национально-государственных или геополитических очертаний и представляющая собой наднациональный, глобальный утопический социально-политический проект, за которым стоят невидимые манипуляторы, обладающие гигантским экономико-политическим могуществом. Конечно, традиционные внешнеполитические факторы тоже продолжают действовать (мондиалистский проект пока еще не получил полной реализации), но их значимость и весомость бледнеют в сравнении с тотальностью мондиалистского давления, отходят на второй план. К примеру, отношения России с Германией, Японией или Китаем являются сегодня делом не двух сторон, но, по меньшей мере, трех России, другого государства и мирового мондиалистского лобби, выступающих как прямо, так и через своих "агентов влияния" в политических образованиях, выясняющих между собой двусторонние проблемы. При этом именно "третья сила", мондиализм, чаще всего и оказывается определяющей, так как ее средства воздействия и структуры влияния несравнимо более отлажены и эффективны, нежели соответствующие механизмы "архаических" национально-государственных образований.

Таким образом, в России, как во внутренней так и во внешней политике, можно выделить два основополагающих элемента, стоящих за принятием тех или иных решений, за организацией тех или иных процессов, за определением тех или иных ориентаций русской политической и социально-экономической жизни: это мондиалистские "агенты влияния" и группы, руководствующиеся национально-государственными интересами. Исходя из всего вышесказанного, очевидно, что оба полюса являются противоположными друг другу в самом главном: одни стремятся минимализировать суверенность и самостоятельность, автаркийность России (вплоть до ее полной отмены в мондиалистском космополитическом контексте "нового мирового порядка"), другие, напротив, ориентированы на утверждение, усиление и расширение национально-государственной суверенности, на максимальное выведение нации из планетарной мондиалистской структуры, враждебной, по определению, существованию любого полноценного автаркийного общества. Конечно, в реальной политике эти два полюса почти никогда не встречаются в чистом виде, большинство властных структур представляют собой смешанные системы, где соприкасаются обе тенденции, но, тем не менее, именно два этих полюса определяют основные силовые тенденции, которые находятся в постоянном и жестком противодействии, завуалированном компромиссе, наивностью, недалекостью или коррумпированностью "непосвященных" статистов от политики.

Итак, мы выделили два полюса в актуальной политической картине России. Им соответствуют две различные точки зрения на возможность гражданской войны в России. И именно эти две силы, в конечном итоге, и будут являться основными субъектами потенциального конфликта, основными противниками, основными сторонами, хотя их противостояние и может быть скрыто под более частным и запутанным распределением ролей. Пример первой гражданской войны в России показывает, что в этом случае национальные и антинациональные силы выступали не под собственными знаменами, но

под сложной и противоречивой системой социальных, политических и идеологических ориентаций, скрывающих истинные геополитические мотивы и тенденции. Чтобы не повторять ошибок прошлого, надо объективно проанализировать страшную перспективу новой гражданской войны, по ту сторону политических или идеологических симпатий.

4.2 Варианты расстановки сил

Выделим основные сюжеты гражданской войны в России, определим действующие силы и непосредственные мотивации, наметим предположительные ее варианты.

- 1) Первый (и самый маловероятный) вариант гражданской войны мог бы развиваться по линии противостояния: *национально-государственные силы* против *мондиалистского лобби*.

Действительно, такое разделение ролей было бы весьма логичным, если учесть полную несовместимость главных ориентаций тех и других. Мондиалисты стремятся всячески ослабить суверенность России, подорвать ее экономико-политическую самостоятельность, сделать ее зависимой от космополитического мондиалистского истеблишмента, лишить ее возможности свободно выполнять национальную миссию. Националисты и государственники, напротив, хотят укрепить автаркию, добиться максимальной политической самостоятельности и экономико-социальной самодостаточности. Естественно, что мирно сочетать эти две тенденции невозможно, так как они противоречат друг другу во всем в общем и частном.

Однако, такой вариант гражданской войны ("космополиты против националистов") вообще не может стать общенародным и глобальным, так как мондиалистская идеология принципиально не способна привить массам фанатизм и поднять на защиту своих идеалов хоть сколько-нибудь значительную часть населения. В мирных условиях, конечно, инерциальность, безразличие и общая пассивность могут быть вспомогательными факторами для мондиалистов, но в случае кровавого конфликта, стрельбы и убийств необходима апелляция к более глубинным слоям человеческой психики, необходимы фанатизм и жертвенность. Националисты, напротив, легко могут рассчитывать на поддержку подавляющего большинства народа в случае открытого и широкого вооруженного противостояния с мондиалистами, если, конечно, конфликт приобретет общенациональный характер, а не будет локализован в особых жестко контролируемых мондиалистами центрах.

Иными словами, гражданская война по сценарию "мондиалисты националисты" в любом случае не станет настоящей и тотальной гражданской войной, так как у мондиалистов в чистом виде нет и не будет прочной идеологически спаянной и политически активной основы, способной организовать массы для противостояния националистам. Если бы такой конфликт разгорелся, то его исход был бы скорым и однозначным: национально-государственные силы быстро расправились бы с антинациональным лобби, обозначенным в качестве такового и ставшим лицом к лицу с поднявшимся за патриотическую идею народом. В принципе, такая гражданская война была бы почти бескровной и очень краткой, и после уничтожения мондиалистов внутренний источник конфликтности был бы ликвидирован, а политическая и социальная жизнь государства развивалась бы строго в границах национальных интересов, как это и имеет место в традиционных государствах и нациях.

Но мондиалистское лобби вряд ли не понимает своего истинного положения и самоубийственности такого сценария, а значит, оно будет стараться избежать подобного поворота событий любой ценой. Именно поэтому данный вариант и является почти невероятным.

- 2) Второй вариант гражданской войны определяется формулой: *РФ против одной (или нескольких) из республик ближнего зарубежья*. Такая ситуация легко может сложиться из-за крайней нестабильности новых государственных образований на территории бывшего СССР. Эти государства, подавляющее большинство которых не имеет никакой более или менее устойчивой государственной и национальной традиции, созданные в рамках совершенно произвольных границ, не совпадающих ни с этническими, ни с социально-экономическими, ни с религиозными территориями органических обществ, неминуемо будут ввержены в глубокий внутренний и внешний кризис. Они принципиально не смогут обрести никакой подлинной суверенности, так как их стратегические возможности не позволяют отстоять свою независимость, не прибегая при этом к внешней помощи. Коллапс политической, социальной и экономической систем в них неизбежен, и естественно, это не может не сказаться на их отношении как к русскому (или прорусски ориентированному) населению, так и к самой России.

В данном случае, скорее всего, именно с их стороны будет брошен России вызов, на что РФ будет вынуждена ответить с той или иной степенью агрессивности. Этот процесс скорее всего будет носить цепной характер, так как взрыв межэтнических или территориальных противоречий, затрагивающий Россию и русских, неминуемо отзовется в других бывших советских республиках.

Очевидно, что национальные интересы русских и ориентация мондиалистского лобби внутри России (и внутри новых республик) в таком случае не столкнутся между собой непосредственно и открыто. Основным противником в такой войне будут для русских непосредственные соседи. При этом совершенно не обязательно, что мондиалистское лобби будет играть в данном случае на поражение РФ. Такой конфликт, называемый американскими стратегами "войнами малой интенсивности" (или даже "средней(!) интенсивности"), вполне может удовлетворять интересам мондиалистского лобби, если он дестабилизирует стратегическую и геополитическую ситуацию в России и, шире, Евразии, став локальным, затяжным и двусмысленным. Русские национальные интересы в таком случае тоже не обязательно будут выполняться, даже если гражданская война будет проходить под патриотическими и националистическими лозунгами. Как в случае Афганистана, вооруженный конфликт России с соседними регионами приведет лишь к ослаблению русского влияния в этих государствах и подорвет притягательность интеграционного импульса соседей к объединению с Россией в единый геополитический евразийский блок. При этом схожесть культурно-социального типа между населением РФ и бывших советских республик сделает данный конфликт братоубийственным и воистину гражданским. В случае славянских республик (в первую очередь, Украины) это будет еще и внутринациональной трагедией.

Таким образом, данный вариант гражданской войны является противоречивым и двусмысленным. Русские национальные интересы, императив суверенности, совершенно необязательно будут укреплены в таком развитии событий, а мондиалистское, русофобское лобби, со своей стороны, может от этого даже выиграть, создав вокруг РФ пояс "войн малой интенсивности", дискредитирующий русских на международном уровне и подрывающий и так шаткую социально-экономическую стабильность государства. Конечно, это не означает, что Россия не должна выступать защитником

русских и прорусски ориентированных народов в ближнем зарубежье. Но выполняя все это, она должна особенно печется о расширении своего геополитического и стратегического влияния. Даже если русским удастся отвоевать у соседей часть исконно русских земель, ценой за это может стать появление новых враждебных государств, которые будут отброшены в лагерь главных противников России, т.е. мондиалистов, и в таком случае новая имперская интеграция, необходимая России, будет отодвинута на неопределенный срок.

- 3) Третий вариант подобен первому по своей структуре, только здесь гражданская война может начаться *в рамках самой РФ между представителями русского и нерусского этносов*⁷⁹. Сценарий может быть схожим с предыдущим: русское население подвергается агрессии со стороны инородцев в каком-либо национальном округе или внутренней республике; этническая солидарность подталкивает других русских принять участие в конфликте; иные национальные нерусские регионы втягиваются в вооруженное противостояние на этнической почве; гражданская война принимает характер "войны малой интенсивности". В данном случае это еще опаснее для России, так как результатом может явиться нарушение территориальной целостности РФ или, по меньшей мере, провоцирование этнической враждебности к русским инородцев там, где их удастся "подавить". При этом неизбежно в конфликт против русских будут втянуты иные государственные и национальные образования, что может сделать его затяжным и долговременным. Такой конфликт переведет положение русских с национально-государственного на узко этнический, что еще больше сузит геополитическое качество России, которая с распадом Варшавского договора, а затем СССР, и так уже утратила свое имперское качество.

Данный вариант гражданской войны вообще противоречит национальным интересам русских, так как в нем, фактически, будет узаконен дальнейший распад русского пространства на этнические составляющие, что в перспективе сведет геополитическое качество некогда имперского народа до чисто этнического, почти "племенного" уровня. Для жесткого русофобского мондиализма, ориентированного на подрыв русской национально-государственной автаркии, такой вариант был бы довольно привлекательным, так как он предполагает привитие русским не государственной, а узко этнической самоидентификации, что неизбежно сузит стратегический объем России. С другой стороны, и в этом случае есть определенный риск для мондиалистов, так как взрыв этнического самосознания может ударить и по "агентуре влияния". Русским же патриотам такой конфликт невыгоден ни с какой стороны.

- 4) Четвертый вариант также является внутророссийским, но основан не на этнической розни, а *на региональных, административно-территориальных противоречиях*. Централистская политика Москвы в вопросах политико-экономических и социальных не может не вызывать мощного противостояния регионов, которые в общем процессе дезинтеграции стремятся получить максимум автономности. Здесь, как и в случае этнических трений, распад советской империи лишает централистскую и интеграционную идею ее легитимности, очевидности и привлекательности. Кроме того актуальная политика центра, переняв командный тоталитарный стиль прежней системы, фактически отказалась от второй половины отношений центр-регионы, заключавшейся в помощи и социально-административной поддержке.

⁷⁹ Отметим, что этот текст был написан в декабре 1993 года, т.е. за год до начала Чеченской войны.

Центр так же хочет забирать и контролировать, как и раньше, но теперь он фактически ничего не дает взамен. Экономически регионы от этого только теряют, так как поле их возможностей сужается и зависит от центра. Но к этому прибавляется и политическая особенность регионов, где антинациональный характер мондиалистских реформ ощущается намного более болезненно, чем в космополитических мегаполисах столиц.

Первые шаги в сторону сепаратизма регионами уже были сделаны, хотя эти попытки и были пресечены центром. Однако весьма вероятно, что в какой-то момент русские на юге России, в Сибири или где-то еще захотят создать "независимое государство", свободное от политической и экономической диктатуры Москвы. Это может быть основано на чисто экономической целесообразности: продажа региональных ресурсов или товаров местного производства в обход Москвы в некоторых случаях способна резко улучшить локальную ситуацию. С другой стороны, "региональная революция" может выдвинуть и политические задачи: к примеру, отказ от крайней либеральной политики центра, сохранение социальных гарантий, усиление национального аспекта в идеологии. Все это делает возможность гражданского конфликта на этом уровне вполне реальной. В какой-то момент регионы могут всерьез настоять на своем, что, естественно, вызовет противодействие центра, нежелающего терять контроль над территориями.

Такая версия гражданской войны не менее двусмысленна и противоречива, как две предыдущие. Действительно, с одной стороны, требования регионов, желающих обособиться от Москвы, центра реформ, имеют некоторые черты патриотизма и национализма, отвечают интересам народа; мондиалистские силы центра, выступив против регионов, будут при этом отстаивать не национальные, а антинациональные интересы, так как контроль либералов над всей полнотой российских территорий выгоден, в первую очередь, именно конструкторам "нового мирового порядка". Но, с другой стороны, региональный сепаратизм приведет к распаду русских государственных территорий, ослабит общенациональную мощь, уготовит линии разлома внутри единого русского народа. Мондиалисты могут сознательно пойти на провокацию такого конфликта в том случае, если их контроль над Россией ослабнет, и в таком случае, территориальный распад страны будет последним шагом в деле ослабления национально-государственной автаркии.

Национальные силы должны поступать в этом вопросе, исходя из прямо противоположной логики. Пока власть центра сильна, следует солидаризоваться с региональными требованиями, поддерживая их стремление к автономии от центра. Но при этом с самого начала следует подчеркивать необходимость стратегической и политической интеграции всех регионов на основе перспектив воссоздания империи. По мере ослабления мондиалистского лобби в центре патриотам следует плавно менять свою ориентацию, настаивать на недопустимости гражданского конфликта и призывать регионы к объединению.

Как бы то ни было, гражданская война на региональной основе никак не может соответствовать национальным интересам, равно как и два предыдущих сценария.

Следует оговорить особо следующий момент. Сам собой напрашивается и пятый вариант гражданской войны, в котором силы распределились бы не по идеологическому, национальному и территориальному, а по социально-экономическому признаку: к примеру, "новые богатые" против "новых бедных". В принципе такой вариант не исключается, и в будущем для него могут сложиться все предпосылки. Но при нынешнем состоянии общества чисто экономический фактор очевидно не является доминирующим. Несмотря на страшные экономические катаклизмы, на повальное обнищание трудовых

слоев и гротескное обогащение "новых русских", русское общество пока не формулирует своих требований в экономических терминах. Геополитические, национальные, идеологические аспекты несравнимо более действенны и актуальны. Именно они способны вывести массы на площади и заставить их взяться за оружие. Экономический кризис служит прекрасным фоном для гражданского конфликта, он может послужить в определенных случаях толчком для катаклизмов, но основными силовыми линиями будут иные неэкономические тезисы. Апелляции к нации, этносу, патриотизму, свободе сегодня способны релятивизировать чисто материальную сторону жизни, сделать ее второстепенной. Но даже в том случае, где материальная сторона окажется главенствующей, она, в силу дискредитации марксистских и социалистических доктрин, не сможет выразить свои требования в форме последовательной и зажигательной политической идеологии. Скорее всего, экономический фактор в возможных конфликтах будет сопутствующей, а не определяющей категорией.

4.3 Итоги анализа

Гражданская война в России, к сожалению, возможна. Фундаментальные противоречия между национально-государственными интересами и планами мондиализма вряд ли можно будет разрешить мирно и полюбовно. Для того, чтобы всерьез можно было бы говорить о "консенсусе" или "перемирии" между этими силами, необходимо либо окончательно уничтожить носителей национально-государственных тенденций (а это возможно лишь вместе с уничтожением самого русского государства и русской нации), либо покончить с представителями мондиалистского лобби.

Именно поэтому, развязывание гражданской войны в России или создание на ее территории пояса "войн малой интенсивности" может в любой момент стать главным проектом мондиалистского лобби. При этом нет сомнений, что представители этого лобби постараются сделать все возможное, чтобы самим остаться в тени, выступая под каким-то иным знаменем (как сепаратистским, так и централистским).

Три варианта гражданской войны РФ против ближнего зарубежья, русское население РФ против инородцев, регионы против центра принципиально неприемлемы для всех тех, кто действительно озабочен национально-государственными интересами России и русского народа. Все эти три варианта чреваты дальнейшим расколом геополитического и стратегического пространства России, даже в том случае, если определенные территории перейдут под российский контроль. Следовательно, гражданскую войну по этим трем сценариям патриоты должны предотвратить любым способом. Не говоря уже о том, что с моральной точки зрения, она им и не выгодна. А коль скоро это так, то логично предположить, что к провокации такого рода конфликтов (если они начнут разгораться) приложат руку именно мондиалисты.

Для мондиалистского лобби нечто подобное гражданской войне в России может быть выгодно и еще по нескольким причинам. Начало военного конфликта с непосредственным участием русских позволило бы либералам из центра:

- 1) ввести политическую диктатуру под предлогом "спасения отечества" и насильственно избавиться от политических противников;
- 2) списать на войну экономический коллапс и заставить экономику функционировать под прямым контролем центра;

- 3) отвлечь общественное внимание от деятельности "реформаторов" , которая становится сегодня опасно очевидной;
- 4) заведомо пресечь возможный в будущем союз русских с соседними национально-государственными евразийскими и европейскими образованиями под знаком континентальной солидарности против атлантистской доминации Запада и мондиалистских проектов.

Все это заставляет полагать, что носители жесткого варианта мондиализма в России рано или поздно прибегнут к "гражданской войне", особенно если позиция либерального режима будет становиться все более и более шаткой. При этом важно отметить, что в таком случае с необходимостью произойдет "структурная перестройка" внутри самого мондиалистского лобби, и часть его выступит под патриотическими, и быть может, даже националистическими и шовинистическими лозунгами.

Трудно сказать, когда именно могут произойти первые взрывы. Это зависит от многих спонтанных и искусственных факторов. Но даже если некоторое время ничего подобного не произойдет, потенциальная угроза такого поворота событий будет более чем актуальной, коль скоро мондиалистское лобби не только существует в России, но и контролирует важнейшие рычаги государственно-политической власти.

Лишь первый вариант "гражданской войны" мондиалисты против националистов мог бы быть кратким, почти бескровным и выгодным для патриотов, для России. Более того, прямое столкновение нации с ее внутренними врагами неминуемо дало бы победу именно национальным силам. Фактически это была бы не "гражданская война" в полном смысле этого слова, но короткая вспышка активного противостояния, в результате которой возможность полноценной гражданской войны если не уничтожилась совсем, то отложились бы на неопределенно далекий срок. Но для этого необходимо спровоцировать мондиалистское лобби выступить под своими собственными знаменами, и от имени ясно обозначенных и точно названных русских национально-государственных интересов должны были бы сплотиться и патриотические силы. Это сделать безусловно не просто(почти невозможно). С одной стороны, сами мондиалисты не настолько наивны, чтобы во всеуслышание говорить о ненависти к той стране, в которой они действуют, и о своем стремлении ее разрушить, а с другой стороны, представители национально-государственных сил часто не способны вразумительно и последовательно, но в то же время кратко и убедительно, сформулировать основы своей идеологической позиции. Этому мешает приверженность отжившим советско-коммунистическим клише, повышенная эмоциональность, слабая способность к аналитическому мышлению, игнорирование основополагающих принципов геополитики и т.д.

Подлинный гражданский мир не может быть основан на компромиссе, если две стороны этого компромисса являются во всем прямыми противоположностями. Пока доминирующей является мондиалистская система ценностей, то все ее фланги правые, левые, центристы при всем различии не ставят под сомнение общей ориентации. Да, при такой ситуации "мир" возможен, но ценой гибели государства и радикального исключения национальных сил из диалога. Если же доминирующей станет национально-государственная система ценностей, то можно будет говорить о поиске компромисса между национал-капиталистами, национал-социалистами, национал-коммунистами, национал-монархистами или национал-теократами, но и в этом случае, антинациональные, мондиалистские, русофобские силы будут исключены из диалога, поставлены идеологически вне закона.

Наше общество чревато страшным гражданским конфликтом. Если у нас еще осталась способность влиять на ход событий, выбирать, то мы должны выбрать меньшее из зол.

Глава 5. Геополитика югославского конфликта

5.1 Символизм Югославии

Общеизвестно, что Югославия является той территорией в Европе, с которой начинаются самые серьезные и масштабные европейские конфликты. По меньшей мере, именно так обстояло дело в XX веке. Балканы это узел, в котором сходятся интересы всех главных европейских геополитических блоков, и именно поэтому судьба балканских народов символизирует собой судьбу всех европейских народов. Югославия это Европа в миниатюре. Среди населяющих ее народов можно найти точные аналоги крупнейших континентальных сил.

Сербы представляют на Балканах Православную Россию (= Евразию). Хорваты и словенцы Среднюю Европу (т.е. Германию, Австрию, Италию и т.д.). Мусульманские албанцы и боснийцы остатки Османской Империи, а значит, Турцию и даже исламский мир в целом. И наконец, македонцы смешанный сербо-болгарский этнос, который являет собой символ Великой Православной Югославии (основанной на объединении Сербии и Болгарии), так и не сумевшей исторически сложиться, несмотря на существовавшие в начале века сербо-болгарские проекты.

5.2 Три европейские силы

В самых общих чертах можно сказать, что геополитическая карта Европы разделяется на три основополагающих ареала.

Первый ареал это Запад. Собственно континентальный Запад, представлен, в первую очередь, Францией и Португалией. В более широком смысле, к нему относятся Англия и заатлантические внеевропейские США. Хотя между континентальным Западом (Францией), островным Западом (Англией) и заокеанским Западом (Америкой) могут существовать внутренние противоречия, по отношению к остальным европейским геополитическим образованиям Запад выступает чаще всего как единая геополитическая сила.

Вторым ареалом является Средняя Европа (Mitteleuropa). К нему относятся государства бывшей Священной Римской Империи Германских Наций, бывшие земли Австро-Венгрии, Германия, Италия и т.д. Для Средней Европы характерно геополитическое противостояние как с европейским Западом, так и с Востоком.

И наконец, *третьим* ареалом является Россия, которая выступает в Европе не только от своего имени, но и от имени всех евразийских народов Востока.

Вообще говоря, можно было бы выделить и четвертый исламский геополитический ареал от магрибских стран Северной Африки до Пакистана и Филиппин, но этот геополитический блок является внеевропейским, а кроме того в XX столетии его геополитическое влияние на Европу было не слишком значительным, хотя возможно, что в будущем исламский мир снова (как это было в Средневековье) станет важной составляющей европейской геополитики.

Три геополитических европейских образования создают на континенте постоянные зоны напряженности, которые проходят на условных и постоянно меняющихся границах между европейским Западом и Средней Европой (Mitteleuropa), с одной стороны, и между Средней Европой и Россией-Евразией с другой.

Схематично можно выделить некоторое число геополитических союзов или, напротив, противостояний, которые составляют константы европейской международной политики.

Европейский Запад может противостоять Средней Европе как своему наиболее близкому соседу с Востока. Наиболее ясно эта геополитическая тенденция воплощена в противостоянии абсолютистской Франции (Etat-Nation) и имперской Австро-Венгрии. Позже это противоречие выразилось в многочисленных франко-германских конфликтах. С другой стороны, существует теоретическая возможность и франко-германского геополитического союза, идеи которого вдохновляли как Виши, так и де Голля. Показательно, что Запад может подчас в борьбе против Средней Европы вступать в союз с европейским Востоком (Россией-Евразией). В других же случаях именно Россия становится главным геополитическим противником как европейского Запада, так и Срединной Европы.

Срединная Европа (Германия) также в отношении своего восточного геополитического соседа может находиться как в состоянии противостояния (что всегда прямо или косвенно выгодно европейскому Западу), так и в состоянии союза (что всегда создает опасность для Запада).

И наконец, геополитические предпочтения России в европейской политике могут быть ориентированы как в антигерманском ключе (Франция, Англия и даже США логически становятся в таком случае союзниками), так и в антизападном (тогда неизбежен русско-немецкий союз).

Таковы, в самом грубом приближении, основные геополитические факторы европейской политики. Их совершенно необходимо учитывать при анализе балканской проблемы, так как все эти три тенденции сталкиваются между собой в югославском конфликте, создавая потенциальную угрозу новой большой европейской войны.

5.3 Правда хорватов

Хорваты (равно как и словенцы) традиционно входили в состав Австро-Венгрии, являлись этносом, полностью интегрированным в католический сектор германской Средней Европы. Их естественная геополитическая судьба связана именно с этим европейским блоком. Поэтому тяготение хорватов к Германии и Австрии отнюдь не случайный оппортунистический произвол, но следование логике исторического бытия этого народа. Крушение Австро-Венгрии и создание Югославии было результатом долгой борьбы европейского Запада против Средней Европы, и именно этим объясняется прагматическая поддержка сербов французами. (Вариант: Запад вместе с Востоком против Средней Европы). Те хорваты, которые приветствовали создание Югославии шли, в некотором смысле, против своей геополитической и религиозной традиции, и не случайно большинство из них через масонские институты ориентировались именно на "Великий Восток Франции" и его геополитические проекты, направленные на триумф в Европе сил Запада. При создании Югославии, как и во всей расстановке сил в период Первой мировой войны, прослеживается доминация именно западной тенденции, успешно использующей силы Востока (как Сербию, так и большую Россию) против Срединной Европы.

Хорваты при создании Югославии и стали первыми жертвами такой политики, и не удивительно, что немцев они позже встречали как освободителей (как, впрочем, и украинские католики и униаты, всегда тяготевшие к зоне средневропейского влияния). Но поддержка силами Запада Францией сербов (кстати, эта поддержка так же осуществлялась, в первую очередь, через масонские каналы) была весьма двусмысленной, так как и сами сербы, в свою очередь, становились заложниками такого геополитического образования на Балканах, целостность которого могла быть сохранена только путем силового контроля.

При актуальном кризисе восточного блока (т.е. всей зоны влияния России-Евразии) в период перестройки, интеграционные силы в Югославии несколько ослабли, и хорваты (вместе со словенцами) не замедлили заявить о своей геополитической чужеродности по отношению к сербской Югославии, понимаемой двояко и как искусственное создание Запада, и как форпост Востока в Средней Европе.

Таким образом, хорваты на геополитическом уровне отстаивают тот принцип, чтобы Средняя Европа оставалась самой собой, т.е. независимым, самостоятельным и территориально объединенным европейским регионом. Хотя надо заметить, что идея превращения Хорватии в самостоятельное этнически однородное карликовое балканское Государство-Нацию (Etat-Nation) французского образца уже заведомо закладывает мину под геополитическое единство средневропейского пространства, способного гармонично существовать лишь как гибкая, но целостная структура, а не как дробный конгломерат эгоистических микрогосударств. Иными словами, геополитическая тенденция хорватов будет полноценной лишь в случае ее сверхнациональной ориентированности, а это предполагает и мирное решение проблемы сербского меньшинства в Хорватии. Хорватский национализм, выходя из геополитической плоскости в плоскость сугубо этническую, теряет свою оправданность и меняет свой знак на противоположный.

5.4 Правда сербов

Геополитическая перспектива сербов имеет однозначный прорусский, евразийский характер. Через религиозный и этнический фактор Сербия прямо примыкает к России, являясь ее геополитическим продолжением на юге Европы. Судьба сербов и судьба русских на геополитическом уровне это одна и та же судьба. Поэтому для того, чтобы сербам вернуться к истокам своей европейской миссии, им необходимо обратиться к Востоку, к Евразии, понять смысл и цели русской геополитики. При этом не наивный и искусственный панславизм, несостоятельность которого прекрасно показал русский философ Константин Леонтьев, а именно проект Великой Евразии с осью России своего рода экуменически-континентальный православный неовизантизм должен быть путеводной звездой истинно сербской геополитики. Лишь в этом случае сербская тенденция вернется к своим собственным корням и перестанет играть роль марионетки в руках атлантистов, используемой лишь для борьбы против Средней Европы и германского мира.

В геополитической истории Европы можно проследить одну постоянную тенденцию, выяснение которой поможет понять то, что для Сербии является позитивным решением. Эта тенденция такова: союз Востока и срединной Европы против Запада всегда выгоден и той и другой стороне. Равно как выгоден континентальному Западу (Франции), союз со срединной Европой (Германией) против Запада островного и заокеанского (англосаксонский мир). Иными словами, приоритет, отдавая мый геополитическому

Востоку (даже Востоку относительно ведь Средняя Европа, к примеру, является Востоком по отношению к Франции) практически всегда выгоден не только самому Востоку, но и западному участнику этого союза. И наоборот, геополитический союз с приоритетом западной тенденции (Франция с Англией и США против Германии, Франция с Германией против России и т.д.) завязывает узлы все новых и новых европейских конфликтов и войн.

Учитывая эти соображения, мы можем сказать, что геополитическая ориентация сербов должна обратиться в качестве ориентира к болгарской геополитике, которая практически всегда сочетала в себе русофильство с германофильством, создавая в Южной Европе пространство политической стабильности и гармонии, что постепенно могло открыть Средней Европе выход к мусульманскому югу, а значит, и положить конец доминации в этом регионе атлантистского Запада. Более того, Сербия должна осознать всю двусмысленность той поддержки, которую некогда оказывал ей Запад и цена которой хорошо видна в антисербских санкциях западных стран. Только геополитическое единение с другими православными восточноевропейскими народами (и, в первую очередь, с Болгарией) в единый прорусский и одновременно дружественный Средней Европе блок создаст на Балканах зону стабильности и выведет из употребления позорный термин "балканизация".

Так же, как и в случае хорватов, идея чисто сербского Государства-Нации также не решит никаких проблем в том случае, если это сербское государство воспримет ствует у созданной масонами Югославии ее германофилию и ориентацию на Запад.

5.5 Правда югославских мусульман

Югославские мусульмане Боснии и албанцы представляют собой исламский, "османский" геополитический фактор в Европе. Важно заметить, что Турция, влияние которой больше всего ощущается среди югославских мусульман, безусловно, является в Европе выразителем крайне-западных, атлантистских тенденций. Если Запад, старавшийся использовать европейский Восток (Россию) против Средней Европы, все же не смог окончательно подавить самостоятельное геополитическое самопроявление этого континентального региона и часто сталкивался, напротив, с экспансией России-Евразии (либо через русско-германский союз, либо непосредственно через создание Варшавского блока), то светская псевдоисламская Турция стала надежным инструментом в руках атлантистских политиков. И шире, атлантистское влияние на геополитику исламских стран чрезвычайно велико. Поэтому антисербские выступления югославских мусульман намечают собой несравнимо более глобальный континентальный конфликт Северной Евразии (России и ее геополитического ареала) с Югом. При этом важно отметить, что такой конфликт противоречит интересам самого Юга, поскольку он становится в данном случае таким же инструментом в руках атлантистского Запада, каким был Евразийский Восток (в лице сербов) против Средней Европы (в лице Австро-Венгрии и ее представителей хорватов).

Единственным логичным выходом для югославских мусульман Боснии и албанцев было бы обращение к Ирану и преемственность его политики, так как только эта страна в настоящее время проводит геополитику, ориентированную на независимость, самостоятельность и континентальную гармонию, действуя в соответствии со своей собственной логикой независимо от интересов атлантистов в этом регионе. Обратясь к Ирану, югославские мусульмане смогут обрести должную геополитическую перспективу, так как радикально антизападный, континентальный и традиционалистский Иран

является потенциальным союзником всех европейских блоков восточной ориентации от России-Евразии до Средней Европы. Более того, ориентация на Иран европейских восточных Больших Пространств могла бы резко изменить положение дел во всем исламском мире и резко ослабить там американское влияние, что было бы не только на руку европейцам, но и освободило бы исламские народы от экономического и военного диктата англосаксонских атлантистов.

Только при такой ориентации югославских мусульман их геополитическое присутствие в Европе могло бы стать гармоничным, логичным и бесконфликтным. Можно сказать, что данная проблема разделяется на три этапа. Первый этап: переориентация мусульман от Турции на Иран. Второй этап: укрепление геополитического союза Средней Европы с Ираном и исламским миром в целом. И третий этап: геополитический евразийский альянс Востока и Средней Европы. При этом данные этапы могут проходить параллельно, каждый на своем уровне. Здесь особенно важно понять, что проблема маленького балканского народа геополитически не может быть решена без самых серьезных и глобальных геополитических трансформаций. Никогда не следует забывать, что именно с небольших по размеру, но гигантских по символической значимости локальных конфликтов начинаются все мировые войны.

5.6 Правда македонцев

Македонская проблема современной Югославии коренится именно в искусственности реально существовавшей "Югославии", которая являлась "государством южных славян" только по названию. Македонцы, представляющие собой этнос, промежуточный между сербами и болгарами и исповедующий Православие, должны были бы входить как естественный компонент в настоящую Югославию, состоящую из Сербии и Болгарии. Но существование двух славянских государств якобинского типа на Балканах вместо одного федерального, "имперского", славянского государства евразийской ориентации привело к тому, что маленький македонский народ очутился на границе между двумя политическими регионами с довольно различной политической спецификой.

В настоящий же момент дело еще усугубляется и тем, что в нынешней Болгарии растет якобинский национализм, уже не раз сталкивавшийся православные балканские державы между собой и препятствовавший обращению к единственно верной неовизантийской геополитике. Изначально в этом процессе было активно замешано и атлантическое лобби (как католическое, так и английское), которое дает о себе знать и в современной Болгарии, хотя и в иных формах.

В сущности, западная тактика остается здесь той же самой, что и в начале века. Тогда, разрушив Австро-Венгрию, Запад не допустил создания крупной славянской общности, разыграв карту "балканских национализмов" греческого, болгарского, сербского, румынского и т.д. Сегодня те же геополитические силы Запада снова наносят двойной удар по Средней Европе и по югославянскому единству, провоцируя хорватский сепаратизм на Западе и македонский на Востоке.

В случае Македонии, как и во всех других балканских конфликтах, выход может быть найден только через глобальный интеграционный процесс организации европейских Больших Пространств, а не путем прямолинейного сепаратизма и создания карликовых псевдогосударств. Присоединение Македонии к Болгарии также никоим образом не решит проблему, но лишь подготовит новый, на сей раз действительно межгосударственный, межславянский конфликт.

5.7 Приоритеты югославской войны

Будучи глубоко символическим и крайне значимым, югославский конфликт требует от каждой страны, от каждой европейской политической и геополитической силы определиться и обозначить свои приоритеты в данном вопросе. Здесь речь идет не только о сентиментальной, конфессиональной, исторической, этнической или политической наклонности тех или иных людей, народов и государств. Речь идет о будущем Европы, о будущем Евразии.

Сторонники приоритета Средней Европы и германо-фили изначально заняли прохорватскую позицию. Этот выбор основывался на геополитическом анализе причин создания Югославии, на отвержении масонской политики Франции в Средней Европе, на понимании необходимости мости естественного воссоздания единого средневропейского пространства после завершения "ялтинской эры", в течение которой Европа была искусственно разделена на два, а не на три геополитических лагеря. Именно этим объясняется присутствие среди хорватов многих европейских национал-революционеров.

Но логика предпочтения Средней Европы не учитывала одного очень важного соображения. Дело в том, что помимо инструментальной роли геополитического Востока при исполнении планов Запада против Средней Европы существует и всегда существовала коренная, глубинная и почвенная собственно евразийская геополитика этого Большого Пространства, геополитика Православной России, ориентирующейся на свои собственные континентальные интересы, а в далекой перспективе на новый Священный Союз. Когда в процессе жестокого внутреннего конфликта между сербами и хорватами сербское самосознание пробудилось вполне, когда кровь сербского народа снова вызвала из бессознательных глубин древнейшие геополитические, национальные и духовные архетипы, когда актуальной стала идея Великой Сербии, Духовной Сербии, инструментальная миссия Югославии закончилась, и на ее место вступила Великая Евразийская Идея, Идея Востока.

Пока сербы сражались со Средней Европой (в лице хорватов) атлантисты от Парижа до Нью-Йорка повсюду аплодировали Федеративной Югославии или, по меньшей мере, упрекали хорватов в "национализме" и "профашизме". Как только сербы перешли определенную черту, и их борьба приобрела характер борьбы с самой идеей Запада, с атлантизмом, тут же Сербия была объявлена главным препятствием для построения "Нового Мирового Порядка", и против нее последовали жесткие политические и экономические санкции.

Чтобы сделать окончательный выбор, необходимо снова обратиться к уже сформулированному нами выше геополитическому закону, согласно которому континентальная гармония реальна только при приоритете Востока, при выборе Евразии в качестве позитивной ориентации, так как даже позитивная сама по себе идея Средней Европы при ее противопоставлении России-Евразии становится негативной и разрушительной, как это ясно обнаружилось в глубокой и трагической ошибке Гитлера, начавшего антивосточную, антирусскую экспансию, что, в конце концов, обернулось выгодой только для западного, атлантического блока, разрушило Германию и породило зародыши кризиса в России. Поэтому и в югославском конфликте геополитический приоритет должен быть отдан сербскому фактору, но, естественно, в той мере, в какой сербы следуют евразийской, прорусской геополитической тенденции, тяготеющей к созданию мощного и гибкого южнославянского блока, сознающего важность Средней

Европы и способствующего установлению германо-русского альянса против Запада. Сербская германофобия в сочетании с масонским франкофильством, какими бы благовидными предложениями они ни прикрывались, никогда не смогут дать основания для положительного решения югославской проблемы.

Иными словами, наибольшее предпочтение должно быть отдано сербам-традиционалистам, укорененным в православной вере, сознающим свое славянское духовное наследие и ориентированным на создание новой гармоничной прорусской геополитической структуры с однозначно антизападной и антиатлантической ориентацией.

С другой стороны, следует внимательно отнестись к требованиям хорватов и к их тяготению в регион Средней Европы. При наличии у них антиатлантических тенденций хорваты могут в перспективе стать позитивной внутриевропейской силой.

Боснийский фактор при переориентации югославских мусульман с Турции на Иран также необходимо принять в расчет, чтобы, "превратив яд в лекарство", на этой базе положить начало совершенно новой европейской политике в исламском мире, прямо противоположной экономическому и военному империализму США в исламских странах.

И наконец, македонцы вместо того, чтобы быть яблоком раздора южных православных славян, должны стать зародышем сербско-болгарского объединения, первым шагом к созданию истинной Великой Югославии.

К таким выводам приводит беспристрастный геополитический анализ югославской проблемы. Конечно, в ужасе братоубийственной войны трудно сохранить здравый смысл, потоки крови будят в сердцах лишь ярость и желание мести. Но иногда, быть может, лишь холодный, разумный анализ, учитывающий исторические корни и геополитические закономерности, может предложить правильный выход из тупика братоубийственной войны, тогда как эмоциональная солидарность с теми или с другими лишь усугубит безысходность кровавого кошмара. Кроме того, такой анализ ясно показывает, что истинный враг, провоцирующий весь внутриславянский геноцид, остается в тени, за кадром, предпочитая издали наблюдать, как один славянский народ уничтожает другой, сея раздор, на долгие годы закрывая возможность союза и братского мира, руша Большие Пространства самого могущественного, но раздробленного ныне континента.

Истинным инициатором югославской бойни являются атлантистские силы Запада, руководствующиеся принципом "в стане врага надо натравливать одних на других и ни в коем случае не допускать единства, союза и братского единения". Это необходимо понять всем участникам сложной югославской войны за Европу, чтобы она не стала окончательно войной против Европы.

5.8 Сербия – это Россия

Важность югославских событий еще и в том, что на примере небольшой балканской страны как бы проигрывается сценарий гигантской континентальной войны, которая может вспыхнуть в России. Все геополитические силы, участвующие в балканском конфликте, имеют свои аналоги и в России, только в несравненно большем пространственном объеме. Хорваты и словенцы, стремящиеся войти в Среднюю Европу, имеют своими геополитическими синонимами украинцев, хотя сродненность этих последних с Великой Россией датируется не несколькими десятилетиями, а несколькими

столетиями, и конфессиональных трений, кроме униатов и украинских католиков, здесь не существует. Как бы то ни было, судя по определенным тенденциям, некоторые силы Киева начинают "тяготиться русским Востоком" и стремятся сблизиться с европейским пространством, экономически контролируемым Германией. Русские и другие нации, проживающие на Украине, могут стать заложниками "срединно-европейской" политики этих республик, и в этом случае их судьба будет подобна судьбе сербов в Хорватии.

Такое сопоставление, кроме всего прочего, показывает, что в геополитических и дипломатических отношениях с Украиной и Белоруссией Россия должна руководствоваться своим фундаментальным пониманием проблемы Средней Европы, т.е. в первую очередь, Германии. Чтобы быть реалистами в этом вопросе, следует исходить при его решении не из патетических лозунгов о "единстве кровных братьев славян" (каким бывает это "единство" можно убедиться на примере сербо-хорватской резни), а из глубокого анализа логики русско-немецких отношений, так как и Украина, и даже Польша это не самостоятельные геополитические образования, но лишь пограничные регионы двух Больших Пространств Евразии-России и Средней Европы. Нельзя забывать и о том, что конфликт в этой пограничной зоне чрезвычайно выгоден и другой геополитической силе Западу. Ведь не случайно англосаксонская дипломатия всегда рассматривала все территории от Румынии до Прибалтики, как "санитарный пояс", предохраняющий Запад (и особенно англосаксонский мир) от крайне нежелательного для него русско-германского союза.

Сербо-мусульманский конфликт является аналогом возможного русско-исламского противостояния в Средней Азии и на Кавказе, и важно заметить, что и в этом случае мусульманские республики, входившие в состав СССР, являются зоной конкурентного геополитического влияния Турции и Ирана. Как и в случае с югославскими мусульманами, это сравнение показывает, что республики, ориентированные на Иран, имеют больше шансов прийти к геополитической гармонии с основным русским блоком евразийского континента. И напротив, геополитический фактор Турции, в настоящее время выполняющей роль проводника атлантистской политики в этом регионе, с необходимостью сопряжен с драматическими и конфликтными ситуациями.

На примере Югославии видно, что грозит России в случае аналогичного хода событий, а тот факт, что эти события действительно разворачиваются в одном и том же русле, сегодня ни у кого более не вызывает сомнения. Вся разница лишь в скорости, которая тем больше, чем меньше пространство и малочисленнее народы. Чтобы не допустить в России гигантской "Югославии", чудовищной по масштабам и последствиям кровавой бойни, надо заранее дать ответ на фундаментальные геополитические вопросы, определить русскую континентальную стратегию, которая должна руководствоваться знанием русской политической традиции и пониманием основных геополитических задач России-Евразии, "географической Оси Истории". При этом инерция, пассивное следование за фатальным ходом событий будут не только разрушительными для всей системы континентальной безопасности, но и чреватые гибелью всего человечества.

Глава 6. От сакральной географии к геополитике

6.1 Геополитика - "промежуточная" наука

Геополитические концепции давно стали важнейшими факторами современной политики. Они строятся на общих принципах, позволяющих легко проанализировать ситуацию любой отдельной страны и любого отдельного региона.

Геополитика в том виде, в котором она существует сегодня наука безусловно светская, "профаническая", секуляризованная. Но, быть может, именно она среди всех остальных современных наук сохранила в себе наибольшую связь с Традицией и с традиционными науками. Рене Генон говорил, что современная химия является результатом десакрализации традиционной науки алхимии, а современная физика магии. Точно так же можно сказать, что современная геополитика есть продукт секуляризации, десакрализации другой традиционной науки сакральной географии. Но поскольку геополитика занимает особое место среди современных наук, и ее часто причисляют к "псевдонаукам", то ее профанизация не является столь же совершенной и необратимой, как в случае химии или физики. Связи с сакральной географией видны здесь довольно отчетливо. Поэтому можно сказать, что геополитика занимает промежуточное положение между традиционной наукой (сакральной географией) и наукой профанической.

6.2 Суша и море

Два изначальных понятия в геополитике суша и море. Именно эти две стихии Земля и Вода - лежат в основе качественного представления человека о земном пространстве. В переживании суши и моря, земли и воды человек входит в контакт с фундаментальными аспектами своего существования. Суша это стабильность, плотность, фиксированность, пространство как таковое. Вода это подвижность, мягкость, динамика, время.

Эти две стихии суть наиболее очевидные проявления вещественной природы мира. Они вне человека: все плотное и жидкое. Они и внутри его: тело и кровь. (То же и на клеточном уровне.)

Универсальность переживания земли и воды порождает традиционную концепцию Тверди Небесной, т.к. наличие Верхних Вод (источника дождя) на небе предполагает и наличие симметричного и обязательного элемента земли, суши, небесной твердыни. Как бы то ни было, Земля, Море, Океан суть главные категории земного существования, и человечество не может не видеть в них неких основных атрибутов мироздания. Как два основных термина геополитики они сохраняют свое значение и для цивилизаций традиционного типа, и для сугубо современных государств, народов и идеологических блоков. На уровне глобальных геополитических феноменов Суша и Море породили термины: талассократия и теллуократия, т.е. "могущество посредством моря" и "могущество посредством суши".

Всякое государство, всякая империя основывает свою силу на предпочтительном развитии одной из этих категорий. Империи бывают либо "талассократическими", либо "теллуократическими". Первое предполагает наличие метрополии и колоний, второе столицу и провинции на "общей суше". В случае "талассократии" ее территории не объединены в одном пространстве суши, что создает фактор прерывистости. Море это и

сильное и слабое место "талассократического могущества". "Теллуократия", напротив, обладает качеством территории альной непрерывности.

Но географическая и космологическая логика сразу же усложняют вроде бы простую схему этого разделения: пара "земля море" при наложении друг на друга ее элементов дает идеи "морской земли" и "земной воды". Морская земля это остров, т.е. основа морской империи, полюс талассократии. Земная вода или вода суши это реки, которые предопределяют развитие империи сухопутной. Именно на реке располагаются города, а значит, и столица, полюс теллуократии. Эта симметрия является и символической и хозяйственно-эко номической и географической одновременно. Важно заметить, что статус Острова и Континента определяется не столько на основании их физической величины, сколько на основании специфики типичного сознания населения. Так, геополитика США носит островной характер, несмотря на размеры Северной Америки, а островная Япония геополитически представляет собой пример континентального менталитета и т.д.

Важна и еще одна деталь: исторически талассократия связана с Западом и Атлантическим океаном, а теллуократия с Востоком и евразийским континентом. (Приведенный выше пример Японии объясняется, таким образом, более сильным "притяжением", влиянием Евразии.)

Талассократия и атлантизм стали синонимами задолго до колониальной экспансии Великобритании или португало-испанских завоеваний. Еще до начала волны морских миграций народы Запада и их культуры начали движение на Восток из центров, расположенных в Атлантике. Средиземноморье также осваивалось от Гибралтара к Ближнему Востоку, а не наоборот. И напротив, раскопки в Восточной Сибири и Монголии показывают, что именно здесь существовали древнейшие очаги цивилизации, а значит, именно центральные земли континента были колыбелью евразийского человечества.

6.3 Символизм ландшафта

Помимо двух глобальных категорий Суша и Море геополитика оперирует и с более частными определениями. Среди талассократических реальностей разделяются морские и океанические образования. Так, цивилизация морей, например, Черного или Средиземного, весьма отличается по своему качеству от цивилизации океанов, т.е. островных держав и народов, населяющих берега открытых океанов. Более частным делением являются также речные и озерные цивилизации, связанные с континентами.

Теллуократия также имеет свои специфические формы. Так, можно различить цивилизацию Степи и цивилизацию Леса, цивилизацию Гор и цивилизацию Долин, цивилизацию Пустыни и цивилизацию Льда. Разновидности ландшафта в сакральной географии понимаются как символические комплексы, связанные со спецификой государственной, религиозной и этической идеологии тех или иных народов. И даже в том случае, когда мы имеем дело с универсалистской эйкуменистической религией, все равно ее конкретное воплощение в том или ином народе, расе, государстве будет подвержено адаптации в соответствии с локальным сакрально-географическим контекстом.

Пустыни и степи являются геополитическим микрокосмом кочевников. Именно в пустынях и степях теллуократические тенденции достигают своего пика, поскольку фактор "воды" здесь сведен к минимуму. Именно империи Пустыни и Степи логически должны быть геополитическим плацдармом теллуократии.

Образцом империи Степи можно считать империю Чингисхана, а характерным примером империи Пустыни арабский халифат, возникший под непосредственным воздействием кочевников.

Горы и цивилизации гор чаще всего представляют собой архаические, фрагментарные образования. Горные страны не только не являются источниками экспансии, но наоборот, к ним стягиваются жертвы геополитической экспансии других теллуократических сил. Ни одна империя не имеет своим центром горные районы. Отсюда столь часто повторяющийся мотив сакральной географии: "горы населены демонами". С другой стороны, идея сохранения в горах остатков древних рас и цивилизаций отражена в том, что именно в горах расположены сакральные центры традиции. Можно даже сказать, что в теллуократии горы соотносятся с некоей духовной властью.

Логическим сочетанием обеих концепций гор как образа жреческого и равнины как образа царственного стала символика холма, т.е. небольшой или средней возвышенности. Холм символ царской власти, возвышающейся над светским уровнем степи, но не выходящей за пределы державных интересов (как это имеет место в случае гор). Холм место пребывания короля, герцога, императора, но не жреца. Все столицы крупных теллуократических империй расположены на холме или на холмах (часто на семи по числу планет; на пяти по числу стихий, включая эфир и т.д.).

Лес в сакральной географии, в определенном смысле, близок к горам. Сама символика дерева родственна символике горы (и то, и другое обозначает ось мира). Поэтому лес в теллуократии также выполняет периферийную функцию это также "место жрецов" (друиды, волхвы, отшельники), но одновременно и "место демонов", т.е. архаических остатков исчезнувшего прошлого. Лесная зона также не может быть центром сухопутной империи.

Тундра представляет собой северный аналог степи и пустыни, однако холодный климат делает ее гораздо менее значимой с геополитической точки зрения. Эта "периферийность" достигает своего апогея во льдах, которые, подобно горам, являются зонами глубокой архаики. Показательно, что шаманская традиция у эскимосов предполагает одинокое удаление во льды, где будущему шаману открывается потусторонний мир. Таким образом, льды зона жреческая, преддверие иного мира.

Учитывая эти первоначальные и самые общие характеристики геополитической карты, можно определить различные регионы планеты в соответствии с их сакральным качеством. Этот метод применим и к локальным особенностям ландшафта на уровне отдельной страны или даже отдельной местности. Можно также проследить сходство идеологий и традиций у самых, казалось бы, различных народов в том случае, если одинаков коренной ландшафт их обитания.

6.4 Восток и Запад в сакральной географии

Стороны Света в контексте сакральной географии имеют особую качественную характеристику. В различных традициях и в различные периоды этих традиций картина сакральной географии может меняться в соответствии с циклическими фазами развития данной традиции. При этом часто варьируется и символическая функция Сторон Света. Не вдаваясь в подробности, можно сформулировать наиболее универсальный закон сакральной географии применительно к Востоку и Западу.

Восток в сакральной географии на основании "космического символизма" традиционно считается "землей Духа", землей рая, землей полноты, изобилия, "родиной" Сакрального в наиболее полном и совершенном виде. В частности, эта идея имеет свое отражение в тексте Библии, где речь идет о восточном расположении "Эдема". Точно такое понимание свойственно и другим авраамическим традициям (исламу и иудаизму), а также многим неавраамическим традициям китайской, индуистской и иранской. "Восток это обитель богов", гласит сакральная формула древних египтян, и само слово "восток" (по-египетски "нетер") означало одновременно и "бога". С точки зрения природного символизма, Восток место, где восходит, "вос-текает" солнце, Свет Мира, материальный символ Божества и Духа.

Запад имеет прямо противоположный символический смысл. Это "страна смерти", "мир мертвых", "зеленая страна" (как называли ее древние египтяне). Запад "царство изгнания", "колодец отчуждения", по выражению исламских мистиков. Запад это "анти-Восток", страна "заката", упадка, деградации, перехода из проявленного в непроявленное, из жизни в смерть, от полноты к нищете и т.д. Запад место, где заходит солнце, где оно "западает".

В соответствии с данной логикой естественного космического символизма древние традиции организовывали свое "священное пространство", основывали свои культовые центры, погребения, храмы и постройки, осмысливали природные и "цивилизационные" особенности географических, культурных и государственных территорий планеты. Таким образом, сама структура миграций, войн, походов, демографических волн, имперостроительства и т.д. определялась изначальной, парадигматической логикой сакральной географии. По оси Восток-Запад выстраивались народы и цивилизации, обладавшие иерархическими характеристиками чем ближе к Востоку, тем ближе к Сакральному, к Традиции, к духовному изобилию. Чем ближе к Западу, тем больше упадок, деградация и омертвление Духа.

Конечно, эта логика не была абсолютной, но в то же время, не была она и второстепенной и относительной как ошибочно считают сегодня многие "профанские" исследователи древних религий и традиций. На самом деле, сакральная логика и следование космическому символизму были намного более осознанными, осмысленными и действенными у древних народов, нежели это принято считать сегодня. И даже в нашем антисакральном мире, на уровне "бессознательного" почти всегда архетипы сакральной географии сохраняются в целостности и пробуждаются в самые важные и критические моменты социальных катаклизмов.

Итак, сакральная география утверждает однозначно закон "качественного пространства", в котором Восток представляет собой символический "онтологический плюс", а Запад "онтологический минус".

Согласно китайской традиции, Восток это ян, мужской, световой, солнечный принцип, а Запад это инь, женский, темный, лунный принцип.

6.5 Восток и Запад в современной геополитике

Теперь посмотрим, как эта сакрально-географическая логика отражается в геополитике, которая, будучи наукой сугубо современной, фиксирует лишь фактическое положение дел, оставляя за кадром сами сакральные принципы.

Геополитика в ее изначальной формулировке у Ратцеля, Челлена и Макиндера (а позже у Хаусхофера и русских евразийцев) отталкивалась как раз от особенно стей различных типов цивилизаций и государств в зависимости от их географического расположения. Геополитики зафиксировали факт фундаментальной разницы между "островными" и "континентальными" державами, между "западной", "прогрессивной" цивилизацией и "восточной", "деспотической" и "архаической" культурной формой. Поскольку вопрос о Духе в его метафизическом и сакральном понимании в современной науке вообще никогда не ставится, то геополитики оставляют его в стороне, предпочитая оценивать ситуацию в других, более современных терминах, нежели понятия "сакраль ного" и "профанического", "традиционного" и "антитра диционного" и т.д.

Геополитики фиксируют принципиальное различие государственного, культурного и индустриального развития регионов Востока и регионов Запада в последние века. Картина получается следующая. Запад является центром "материального" и "технологического" развития. На культурно-идеологическом уровне в нем преобладают "либерально-демократические" тенденции, индивидуали стическое и гуманистическое мировоззрение. На экономическом уровне приоритет отдается торговле и технической модернизации. Именно на Западе впервые появились теории "прогресса", "эволюции", "поступательного развития истории", совершенно чуждые традиционному миру Востока (и тем периодам истории Запада, когда и на нем существовала полноценная сакральная традиция, как, в частности, это имело место в Средневековье). Принуждение на социальном уровне на Западе приобретало чисто экономический характер, а Закон Идеи и Силы сменялся Законом Денег. Постепенно специфика "идеологии Запада" отлилась в универсальную формулу "идеологии прав человека", которая стала доминирующим принципом самого западного региона планеты Северной Америки, и в первую очередь, США. На индустри альном уровне этой идеологии соответствовала идея "развитых стран", а на экономическом уровне концепция "свободного рынка", "экономического либерализма". Вся совокупность этих характеристик с добавлением чисто военного, стратегического объединения разных секторов цивилизации Запада определяется сегодня понятием "атлантизм". В прошлом веке геополитики говорили об "англосаксонском типе цивилизации" или о "капиталисти ческой, буржуазной демократии". В этом "атлантистском" типе нашла свое наиболее чистое воплощение формула "геополитического Запада".

Геополитический Восток представляет собой прямую противоположность геополитическому Западу. Вместо модернизации экономики на нем преобладают традицион ные, архаические формы производства корпоративного, цехового типа ("развивающиеся страны"). Вместо экономического принуждения государство пользуется чаще всего "нравственным" или просто физическим принуждени ем (Закон Идеи и Закон Силы). Вместо "демократии" и "прав человека" Восток тяготеет к тоталитаризму, социализму и авторитаризму, т.е. к различным типам социальных режимов, единых лишь в том, что в центре их систем стоит не "индивидуум", "человек" со своими "правами" и своими сугубо "индивидуальными ценностями", но нечто внеиндивидуальное, вневещное будь-то "общество", "нация", "народ", "идея", "мировоз зрение", "религия", "культ вождя" и т.д. Западной либеральной демократии Восток противопоставлял самые различные типы нелиберальных, неиндивидуалистиче ских обществ от авторитарных монархий до теократии или социализма. Причем, с чисто типологической, геополитической точки зрения, политическая специфика того или иного режима была вторичной по сравнению с качественным делением на "западный" (= "индивидуа листически-торговый") строй и на строй "восточный" (= "внеиндивидуалистически-силовой"). Типичными формами такой антизападной

цивилизации являлись СССР, коммунистический Китай, Япония до 1945-го года или Иран Хомейни.

Любопытно заметить, что Рудольф Челлен, автор, впервые употребивший сам термин "геополитика", так иллюстрировал различие между Западом и Востоком. "Типичная приговорка американца, писал Челлен, это "go ahead", что дословно означает "вперед". В этом отражается внутренний и естественный геополитический оптимизм и "прогрессизм" американской цивилизации, являющейся предельной формой западной модели. Русские же обычно повторяют слово "ничего" (по-русски в тексте Челлена А.Д.). В этом проявляются "пессимизм", "созерцательность", "фатализм" и "приверженность традиции", свойственные Востоку".

Если вернуться теперь к парадигме сакральной географии, то мы увидим прямое противоречие между приоритетами современной геополитики (такие понятия, как "прогресс", "либерализм", "права человека", "торговый строй" и т.д., стали сегодня для большинства положительными терминами) и приоритетами сакральной географии, оценивающей типы цивилизации с совершенно противоположной точки зрения (такие понятия, как "дух", "созерцание", "покорность сверхчеловеческой силе или сверхчеловеческой идее", "идеократия" и т.д. в сакральной цивилизации были сугубо позитивными и до сих пор остаются таковыми для народов Востока на уровне их "коллективного бессознательного"). Таким образом, современная геополитика (за исключением русских евразийцев, германских последователей Хаусхофера, исламских фундаменталистов и т.д.) оценивает картину мира прямо противоположным образом, нежели традиционная сакральная география. Но при этом обе науки сходятся в описании фундаментальных закономерностей географической картины цивилизации.

6.6 Сакральный Север и сакральный Юг

Помимо сакрально-географического детерминизма по оси Восток-Запад крайне важной является проблема другой, вертикальной, оси ориентаций оси Север-Юг. Здесь, как и во всех остальных случаях, принципы сакральной географии, символизм сторон света и соответствующих им континентов имеют прямой аналог в геополитической картине мира, которая или складывается естественно в ходе исторического процесса, или осознанно и искусственно конструируется в результате целенаправленных действий лидеров тех или иных геополитических образований. С точки зрения "интегрального традиционализма", разница между "искусственным" и "естественным" вообще весьма относительна, так как Традиция никогда не знала ничего похожего на картезианский или кантианский дуализм, строго разводящий между собой "субъективное" и "объективное" ("феноменальное" и "ноуменальное"). Поэтому сакральный детерминизм Севера или Юга не есть только физический, природный, ландшафтно-климатический фактор (т.е. нечто "объективное") или только "идея", "концепция", порожденная умами тех или иных индивидуумов (т.е. нечто "субъективное"), но нечто третье, превосходящее и объективный и субъективный полюс. Можно сказать, что сакральный Север, архетип Севера, в истории раздваивается на северный природный ландшафт, с одной стороны, и на идею Севера, "нордизм", с другой стороны.

Наиболее древний и изначальный пласт Традиции однозначно утверждает примат Севера над Югом. Символизм Севера имеет отношение к Истоку, к изначальному нордическому раю, откуда берет начало вся человеческая цивилизация. Древнеиранские и зороастрийские тексты говорят о северной стране "Арьяне Ваэджа" и ее столице "Вара", откуда древние арии были изгнаны оледенением, которое наслал на них Ахриман, дух Зла

и противник светлого Ормузда. Древние Веды тоже говорят о Северной стране как о прародине индусов, о Света-двипа, Белой Земле, лежащей на крайнем севере.

Древние греки говорили о Гиперборее, северном острове со столицей Туле. Эта земля считалась родиной светоносного бога Аполлона. И во многих других традициях можно обнаружить следы древнейшего, часто забытого и ставшего фрагментарным, нордического символизма. Основной идеей, традиционно связанной с Севером, является идея Центра, Неподвижного Полюса, точки Вечности, вокруг которой вращается не только пространство, но и время, цикл. Север это земля, где солнце не заходит даже ночью, пространство вечного света. Всякая сакральная традиция почитает Центр, Середину, точку, где сходятся противоположности, символическое место, которое не подлежит законам космической энтропии. Этот Центр, символом которого является Свастика (подчеркивающая неподвижность и постоянство Центра и подвижность и изменчивость периферии), в каждой традиции именовался по-разному, но всегда он прямо или косвенно связывался с символизмом Севера. Поэтому можно сказать, что все сакральные традиции суть проекции Единой Северной Примордиальной Традиции, адаптированные к тем или иным историческим условиям. Север сторона Света, избранная изначальным Логосом для того, чтобы проявить себя в Истории, и всякое последующее его проявление лишь восстанавливало изначальный полярно-райский символизм.

Сакральная география соотносит Север с духом, светом, чистотой, полнотой, единством, вечностью.

Юг символизирует нечто прямо противоположное материальность, тьму, смешение, лишенность, множественность, погруженность в поток времени и становления. Даже с природной точки зрения, в полярных областях существует один длинный полугодовой День и одна длинная полугодовая Ночь. Это День и Ночь богов и героев, ангелов. Даже деградировавшие традиции помнили об этой сакральной, духовной, сверхъестественной стороне Севера, считая северные регионы обителью "духов" и "потусторонних сил". На Юге День и Ночь богов раскалываются на множество человеческих суток, изначальный символизм Гипербореи утрачивается, и воспоминание о нем становится фактором "культуры", "предания". Юг вообще часто соотносится с культурой, т.е. с той сферой человеческой деятельности, где Невидимое и Чисто Духовное приобретает свои материальные, огрубленные, зримые очертания. Юг это царство материи, жизни, биологии и инстинктов. Юг разлагает северную чистоту Традиции, но сохраняет в материализованном виде ее следы.

Пара Север-Юг в сакральной географии не сводится к абстрактному противопоставлению Добра и Зла. Это, скорее, противостояние Духовной Идеи и ее огрубленного, материального воплощения. В нормальном случае при признанном Югом примате Севера между этими сторонами света существуют гармоничные отношения Север "одухотворяет" Юг, нордические посланцы дают южанам Традицию, закладывают фундаменты сакральных цивилизаций. Если Юг отказывается от признания примата Севера, начинается сакральное противостояние, "война континентов", причем, с точки зрения традиции, именно Юг ответственен за этот конфликт своим преступлением священных норм. В "Рамаяне", к примеру, южный остров Ланка считается обителью демонов, похитивших жену Рамы, Ситу и объявивших войну континентальному Северу со столицей Айодхья.

При этом важно отметить, что ось Север-Юг в сакральной географии является более важной, нежели ось Восток-Запад. Но будучи более важной, она соотносится с наиболее древними этапами циклической истории. Великая война Севера и Юга, Гипербореи и

Гондваны (древнего палеоконтинента Юга) относятся к "допотопным" временам. В последних фазах цикла она становится более скрытой, завуалированной. Исчезают и сами древние палеоконтиненты Севера и Юга. Эстафета противостояния переходит к Востоку и Западу.

Смена вертикальной оси Север-Юг на горизонтальную Восток-Запад, характерная для последних этапов цикла, тем не менее, сохраняет логическую и символическую связь между двумя этими сакрально-географическими парами. Пара Север-Юг (т.е. Дух-Материя, Вечность-Время) проецируется на пару Восток-Запад (т.е. Традиция и Профанизм, Исток и Закат). Восток есть горизонтальная проекция Севера вниз. Запад горизонтальная проекция Юга вверх. Из такого переноса сакральных смыслов можно легко получить структуру континентального видения, свойственного Традиции.

6.7 Люди Севера

Сакральный Север определяет особый человеческий тип, который может иметь свое биологическое, расовое воплощение, но может и не иметь его. Сущность "нордизма" заключается в способности человека возводить каждый предмет физического, материального мира к его архетипу, к его Идее. Это качество не есть простое развитие рационального начала. Напротив, картезианский и кантианский "чистый рассудок" как раз и не способен естественным образом преодолеть тонкую грань между "феноменом" и "ноуменом", но именно эта способность лежит в основе "нордического" мышления. Человек Севера это не просто белый, "ариец" или индоевропеец по крови, языку и культуре. Человек Севера это специфический тип существа, наделенного прямой интуицией Священного. Для него космос это ткань из символов, каждый из которых указывает на скрытый от глаз Духовный Первопринцип. Человек Севера это "солнечный человек", *Sonnenmensch*, не поглощающий энергию, как черное вещество, а выделяющий ее, изливающий из своей души потоки созидания, света, силы и мудрости.

Чисто нордическая цивилизация исчезла вместе с древней Гипербореей, но именно ее посланцы заложили основы всех существующих традиций. Именно эта нордическая "раса" Учителей стояла у истоков религий и культур народов всех континентов и цветов кожи. Следы гиперборейского культа можно найти и у индейцев Северной Америки, и у древних славян, и у основателей китайской цивилизации, и у тихоокеанских аборигенов, и у белокурых германцев, и у черных шаманов западной Африки, и у краснокожих ацтеков, и у скуластых монголов. Нет такого народа на планете, который не имел бы мифа о "солнечном человеке", *Sonnenmensch*. Истинный духовный, сверхрациональный Ум, божественный Логос, способность видеть сквозь мир его тайную Душу это определяющие качества Севера. Там, где есть Священная Чистота и Мудрость, там незримо присутствует Север, независимо от того, в какой временной или пространственной точке мы находимся.

6.8 Люди Юга

Человек Юга, гондванический тип это прямая противоположность "нордическому" типу. Человек Юга живет в окружении следствий, вторичных проявлений; он пребывает в космосе, который он почитает, но не понимает. Он поклоняется внешнему, но не внутреннему. Он бережно сохраняет следы духовности, ее воплощения в материальной среде, но не способен перейти от символа зирующего к символизируемому. Человек Юга живет страстями и порывами, он ставит душевное выше духовного (которого просто не знает) и почитает Жизнь как высшую инстанцию. Для человека Юга характерен культ

Великой Матери, материи, порождающей многообразие форм. Цивилизация Юга цивилизация Луны, получающей свой свет от Солнца (Севера), сохраняющей и передающей его некоторое время, но периодически теряющей с ним контакт (новолуние). Человек Юга Mondmensch.

Когда люди Юга пребывают в гармонии с людьми Севера, т.е. признают их авторитет и их типологическое (а не расовое) превосходство, царит цивилизационная гармония. Когда они претендуют на главенство своего архетипического отношения к реальности, возникает искаженный культурный тип, который можно определить совокупно как идолопоклонничество, фетишизм или язычество (в негативном, уничижительном смысле этого термина).

Как и в случае с палеоконтинентами, чистые северные и южные типы существовали только в глубокой древности. Люди Севера и люди Юга противостояли друг другу в изначальные эпохи. Позже целые народы Севера проникали в южные земли, основывая подчас ярко выраженные "нордические" цивилизации древний Иран, Индия. С другой стороны, южане иногда заходили далеко на Север, неся свой культурный тип финны, эскимосы, чукчи и т.д. Постепенно изначальная ясность сакрально-географической панорамы замутнялась. Но несмотря ни на что типологический дуализм "людей Севера" и "людей Юга" сохранялся во все времена и во все эпохи, но не столько как внешний конфликт двух разных цивилизаций, а как внутренний конфликт в рамках одной и той же цивилизации. Тип Севера и тип Юга, начиная с некоторого момента сакральной истории, противостоят друг другу повсюду, независимо от конкретного места планеты.

6.9 Север и Юг на Востоке и на Западе

Тип людей Севера мог проецироваться и на Юг, и на Восток, и на Запад. На Юге Свет Севера порождал великие метафизические цивилизации, подобные индийской, иранской или китайской, которые в ситуации "консервативного" Юга надолго сохраняли вверенное им Откровение. Однако простота и ясность северного символизма превращалась здесь в сложные и разнообразные хитросплетения сакральных доктрин, ритуалов и обрядов. Однако, чем дальше к Югу, тем слабее следы Севера. И у жителей тихоокеанских островов и южной Африки "нордические" мотивы в мифологии и ритуалах сохраняются в предельно фрагментарной, рудиментарной и даже искаженной форме.

На Востоке Север проявляется как классическое традиционное общество, основанное на однозначном превосходстве сверхиндивидуального над индивидуальным, где "человеческое" и "рациональное" стирается перед лицом сверхчеловеческого и сверхрационального Принципа. Если Юг дает цивилизации характер "устойчивости", то Восток определяет ее сакральность и подлинность, главным гарантом которых является Свет Севера.

На Западе Север проявлялся в героических обществах, где свойственная Западу как таковому тенденция к дробности, индивидуализации и рационализации преодолевала саму себя, и индивидуум, становясь Героем, выходил за узкие рамки "человеческой-слишком-человеческой" личности. Север на Западе персонифицирован символической фигурой Геракла, который, с одной стороны, освобождает Прометея (чисто западная, богоборческая, "гуманистическая" тенденция), а с другой помогает Зевсу и богам победить восставших на них гигантов (т.е. служит на благо сакральным нормам и духовному Порядку).

Юг, напротив, проецируется на все три ориентации прямо противоположным образом. На Севере он дает эффект "архаизма" и культурной стагнации. Даже сами северные, "нордические" традиции под воздействием южных, "палеоазиатских", "финских" или "эскимосских" элементов приобретают характер "идолопоклонничества" и "фетишизма". (Это, в частности, характерно, для германо-скандинавской цивилизации "эпохи скальдов".)

На Востоке силы Юга проявляются в деспотических обществах, где нормальное и справедливое восточное безразличие к индивидуальному переходит в отрицание великого Сверхчеловеческого Субъекта. Все формы тоталитаризма Востока и типологически и расово связаны с Югом.

И наконец, на Западе Юг проявляется в предельно грубых, материалистических формах индивидуализма, когда атомарные индивидуумы доходят до предела антигероического вырождения, поклоняясь лишь "золотому тельцу" комфорта и эгоистического гедонизма. Очевидно, что именно такое сочетание двух сакрально-геополитических тенденций дает самый отрицательный тип цивилизации, так как в нем друг на друга накладываются две ориентации, уже сами по себе негативные Юг по вертикали и Запад по горизонтали.

6.10 От континентов к метаконтинентам

Если в перспективе сакральной географии символический Север однозначно соответствует позитивным аспектам, а Юг негативным, то в сугубо современной геополитической картине мира все обстоит намного сложнее, и в некотором образе, даже наоборот. Современная геополитика под термином "Север" и "Юг" понимает совершенно иные категории, нежели сакральная география.

Во-первых, палеоконтинент Севера, Гиперборея, уже много тысячелетий не существует на физическом уровне, оставаясь спиритуальной реальностью, на которую направлен духовный взгляд посвященных, взыскующих изначальной Традиции.

Во-вторых, древняя нордическая раса, раса "белых учителей", пришедших с полюса в примордиальную эпоху, отнюдь не совпадает с тем, что принято называть сегодня "белой расой", основываясь лишь на физических характеристиках, на цвете кожи и т.д. Север Традиции и его изначальное население, "нордические автохтоны" давно уже не представляют собой конкретную историко-географическую реальность. Судя по всему, даже последние остатки этой примордиальной культуры исчезли из физической реальности уже несколько тысячелетий тому назад.

Таким образом, Север в Традиции это метаисторическая и метагеографическая реальность. То же самое можно сказать и о "гиперборейской расе" она является "расой" не в биологическом, но в чисто спиритуальном, метафизическом смысле. (Тема "метафизических рас" была подробно развита в трудах Юлиуса Эволы).

Континент Юга и в целом Юг Традиции тоже давно уже не существует в чистом виде, равно как и его древнейшее население. В определенном смысле, "Югом" с некоторого момента стала практически вся планета, по мере того, как сужалось влияние на мир изначального полярного инициатического центра и его посланцев. Современные расы Юга представляют собой продукт многочисленных смешений с расами Севера, и цвет кожи давно уже перестал являться главным отличительным признаком принадлежности к той или иной "метафизической расе".

Иными словами, современная геополитическая картина мира имеет очень мало общего с принципиальным видением мира в его сверх-историческом, надвременном срезе. Континенты и их население в нашу эпоху предельно удалились от тех архетипов, которые им соответствовали в примордиальные времена. Поэтому между реальными континентами и реальными расами (как реальностями современной геополитики), с одной стороны, и метаконтинентами и метарасами (как реальностями традиционной сакральной географии), с другой стороны, сегодня существует не просто различие, но почти обратное соответствие.

6.11 Иллюзия "богатого Севера"

Современная геополитика использует понятие "север" чаще всего с определением "богатый" "богатый Север", а также "развитый Север". Под этим понимается вся совокупность западной цивилизации, уделяющей основное внимание развитию материальной и экономической стороны жизни. "Богатый Север" богат не потому, что он более умен, более интеллектуален или духовен, нежели "Юг", но потому, что он строит свою общественную систему на принципе максимизации материальной выгоды, которую можно извлечь из общественного и природного потенциала, из эксплуатации человеческих и естественных ресурсов. "Богатый Север" расовым образом связан с теми народами, которые имеют белый цвет кожи, и эта особенность лежит в основе разнообразных версий явного или скрытого "западного расизма" (в особенности англосаксонского). Успехи "богатого Севера" в материальной сфере были возведены в политический и даже "расовый" принцип именно в тех странах, которые стояли в авангарде индустриального, технического и экономического развития т.е. Англии, Голландии, а позже Германии и США. В данном случае, материальное и количественное благосостояние было приравнено к качественному критерию, и на этой базе развились самые нелепые предрассудки о "варварстве", "примитивности", "недоразвитости" и "недочеловечности" южных (т.е. не принадлежащих к "богатому Северу") народов. Такой "экономический расизм" особенно наглядно проявился в англосаксонских колониальных завоеваниях, а позднее его приукрашенные версии вошли в наиболее грубые и противоречивые аспекты национал-социалистической идеологии. Причем часто нацистские идеологи просто смешивали смутные догадки о чисто "спиритуальном нордизме" и "духовной арийской расе" с вульгарным, меркантильным, биологическо-торговым расизмом английского образца. (Кстати, именно эта подмена категорий сакральной географии категориями материально-технического развития и была самой негативной стороной национал-социализма, приведшей его, в конце концов, к политическому, теоретическому и даже военному краху). Но и после поражения Третьего Рейха этот тип расизма "богатого Севера" отнюдь не исчез из политической жизни. Однако его носителями стали в первую очередь США и их атлантистские сотрудники в Западной Европе. Конечно, в новейших мондиалистских доктринах "богатого Севера" вопрос биологической и расовой чистоты не акцентируется, но, тем не менее, на практике в отношении к неразвитым и развивающимся странам Третьего мира "богатый Север" и сегодня проявляет чисто "расистское" высокомерие, характерное как для колониалистов-англичан, так и для немецких национал-социалистических ортодоксов линии Розенберга.

На самом деле, "богатый Север" геополитически означает те страны, в которых победили силы, прямо противоположные Традиции, силы количества, материализма, атеизма, духовной деградации и душевного вырождения. "Богатый Север" означает нечто радикально отличное от "духовного нордизма", от "гиперборейского духа". Сущность Севера в сакральной географии это примат духа над материей, окончательная и тотальная

победа Света, Справедливости и Чистоты над тьмой животной жизни, произволом индивидуальных пристрастий и грязью низкого эгоизма. "Богатый Север" мондиалистской геополитики, напротив, означает сугубо материальное благополучие, гедонизм, общество потребления, беспроблемный и искусственный псевдорай тех, кого Ницше назвал "последними людьми". Материальный прогресс технической цивилизации сопровождался чудовищным духовным регрессом истинно сакральной культуры, и поэтому, с точки зрения Традиции, "богатство" современного "развитого" Севера не может служить критерием подлинного превосходства над материальной "бедностью" и технической отсталостью современного "примитивного Юга".

Более того, "бедность" Юга на материальном уровне очень часто обратным образом связана с сохранением в южных регионах подлинно сакральных форм цивилизации, а значит, за этой "бедностью" подчас скрывается духовное богатство. По меньшей мере, две сакральные цивилизации продолжают существовать в пространствах Юга и до сегодняшнего дня, несмотря на все попытки "богатого (и агрессивного) Севера" навязать всем свои собственные мерки и пути развития. Это индуистская Индия и исламский мир. В отношении дальневосточной традиции существуют различные точки зрения, так как некоторые усматривают даже под покровом "марксистской" и "маоистской" риторики некоторые традиционные принципы, которые всегда были определяющими для китайской сакральной цивилизации. Как бы то ни было, даже те южные регионы, которые населены народами, сохраняющими приверженность очень древним и полузабытым сакральным традициям, все равно в сравнении с атеизированным и предельно материалистическим "богатым Севером" представляются "духовными", "полноценными" и "нормальными", тогда как сам "богатый Север", со спиритуальной точки зрения, совершенно "анормален" и "патологичен".

6.12 Парадокс "Третьего мира"

"Бедный Юг" в мондиалистских проектах является фактически синонимом "Третьего мира". "Третьим" этот мир был назван в период холодной войны, и само это понятие предполагало, что первые два "мира" развитый капиталистический и менее развитый советский являются более важными и значимыми для глобальной геополитики, нежели все остальные регионы. В принципе, выражение "Третий мир" носит уничижительный смысл, так как по самой логике утилитарного подхода "богатого Севера" подобное определение фактически приравнивает страны "Третьего мира" к "ничейным" базам природных и человеческих ресурсов, которые следует лишь подчинять, эксплуатировать и использовать в своих целях. При этом "богатый Север" умело играл на традиционных политико-идеологических и религиозных особенностях "бедного Юга", стараясь поставить на службу своим сугубо материалистическим и экономическим интересам те силы и структуры, которые по духовному потенциалу намного превышали спиритуальный уровень самого "Севера". Это ему почти всегда удавалось, так как сам циклический момент развития нашей цивилизации благоприятствует извращенным, аномальным и противоестественным тенденциям (согласно Традиции, мы находимся сейчас в самом последнем периоде "темного века", кали-юги). Индуизм, конфуцианство, ислам, автохтонные традиции "небелых" народов становились для материальных завоевателей "богатого Севера" лишь препятствиями для осуществления их целей, но одновременно часто они использовали отдельные аспекты Традиции для достижения меркантильных целей играя на противоречиях, религиозных особенностях или национальных проблемах. Такое утилитарное использование аспектов Традиции в сугубо антитрадиционных целях было еще большим злом, нежели прямое отрицание всей Традиции целиком, так как высшее извращение состоит в том, чтобы заставить великое служить ничтожному.

На самом деле "бедный Юг" является "бедным" на материальном уровне именно в силу своей сущностно духовной ориентации, отводящей материальным аспектам существования всегда второстепенное и маловажное место. Геополитический Юг в нашу эпоху сохранил в общих чертах сугубо традиционалистское отношение к объектам внешнего мира отношение спокойное, отстраненное и, в конце концов, безразличное в прямой противоположности к материальной одержимости "богатого Севера", вопреки его материалистической и гедонистической паранойе. Люди "бедного Юга" в нормальном случае, пребывая в Традиции, и до сих пор живут полнее, глубже и даже роскошнее, так как активное соучастие в сакральной Традиции наделяет все аспекты их личной жизни тем смыслом, той интенсивностью, той насыщенностью, которых давно лишены представители "богатого Севера", истерзанные неврозами, материальным страхом, внутренней опустошенностью, полной бессцельностью существования, представляющего собой лишь вялый калейдоскоп ярких, но бессодержательных картинок.

Можно было бы сказать, что соотношение между Севером и Югом в изначальные времена полярно противоположно соотношению между ними в нашу эпоху, так как именно Юг сегодня сохраняет еще связи с Традицией, тогда как Север их окончательно утратил. Но все же это утверждение не совсем покрывает полноту реальной картины, так как истинная Традиция не может допустить по отношению к себе такого унижительного обращения, какое практикует агрессивно-атеистический "богатый Север" с "Третьим миром". Дело в том, что Традиция сохраняется на Юге лишь инерциально, фрагментарно, частично. Она занимает пассивную позицию и сопротивляется, только защищаясь. Поэтому духовный Север не переходит в конце времен на Юг в полной мере, на Юге лишь скапливаются и сохраняются духовные импульсы, пришедшие некогда с сакрального Севера. С Юга принципиально не может исходить активной традиционной инициативы. И наоборот, мондиалистский "богатый Север" сумел так укрепить свое тлетворное влияние на планете благодаря самой специфике северных регионов, предрасположенных к активности. Север был и остается местом силы по преимуществу, поэтому истинной эффективностью обладают геополитические инициативы, идущие с Севера.

"Бедный Юг" сегодня имеет все духовные преимущества перед "богатым Севером", но он при этом не может служить серьезной альтернативой профанической агрессии "богатого Севера", не может предложить радикального геополитического проекта, способного нарушить патологическую картину современного планетарного пространства.

6.13 Роль "Второго мира"

В двухполюсной геополитической картине "богатый Север" "бедный Юг" всегда существовал дополнительный компонент, имевший самостоятельное и очень важное значение. Это "второй мир". Под "вторым миром" принято понимать социалистический лагерь, интегрированный в советскую систему. Этот "второй мир" не был ни по-настоящему "богатым Севером", так как определенные духовные мотивы подспудно влияли на номинально материалистическую идеологию советского социализма, ни по-настоящему "Третьим миром", так как в целом ориентация на материальное развитие, "прогресс" и прочие чисто профанические принципы лежали в основе советской системы. Геополитически евразийский СССР также располагался как на территориях "бедной Азии", так и на землях довольно "цивилизованной" Европы. В период социализма планетарный пояс "богатого Севера" был разомкнут на востоке Евразии, усложняя ясность геополитических соотношений по оси Север-Юг.

Конец "Второго мира" как особой цивилизации предполагает для евразийских пространств бывшего СССР две альтернативы либо интегрироваться в "богатый Север" (представленный Западом и США), либо скатиться к "бедному Югу", т.е. превратиться в "Третий мир". Возможен и компромиссный вариант отхода части регионов к "Северу", а части к "Югу". Как всегда в последние столетия, инициатива по переделу геополитических пространств в этом процессе принадлежит "богатому Северу", который, цинично используя парадоксы самой концепции "Второго мира", проводит новые геополитические границы и перераспределяет зоны влияний. Национальные, экономические и религиозные факторы служат мондиалистам лишь инструментами в их циничной и глубоко материалистически мотивированной деятельности. Не удивительно, что помимо лживой "гуманистической" риторики все чаще используются и почти откровенно "расистские" доводы, призванные внушить русским комплекс "белого" высокомерия в отношении азиатских и кавказских южан. Коррелирован с этим и обратный процесс окончательное отбрасывание южных территорий бывшего "Второго мира" к "бедному Югу" сопровождается игрой на фундаменталистских тенденциях, на тяге людей к Традиции, к возрождению религии.

"Второй мир", распадаясь, разламывается по линии "традиционализм" (южного, инерциального, консервативного типа) "антитрадиционализм" (активно северного, модернистского и материалистического типа). Такой дуализм, который лишь намечается сегодня, но в ближайшее время станет доминирующим явлением евразийской геополитики, предопределен экспансией мондиалистского понимания мира в терминах "богатый Север" "бедный Юг". Попытка спасти бывшее советское Большое Пространство, попытка просто сохранить "Второй мир" как нечто самостоятельное и балансирующее на грани между Севером и Югом (в сугубо современном понимании), не может увенчаться успехом, пока под сомнение не будет поставлена сама основополагающая концепция современной геополитики, понятая и осознанная в ее реальном виде, по ту сторону всех обманчивых заявлений гуманитарного и экономического характера.

"Второй мир" исчезает. В современной геополитической картине ему больше нет места. Одновременно возрастает давление "богатого Севера" на "бедный Юг", оставшийся один на один с агрессивной материальностью технократической цивилизации при отсутствии промежуточной инстанции, существовавшей до сих пор "Второго мира". Какая-то иная судьба, нежели тотальный раскол по правилам, диктуемым "богатым Севером", для "Второго мира" возможна только через радикальный отказ от планетарной логики дихотомной оси Север-Юг, взятой в мондиалистском ключе.

6.14 Проект "Воскрешение Севера"

"Богатый мондиалистский Север" глобализирует свою доминацию над планетой через раскол и уничтожение "Второго мира". Это в современной геополитике и называется "новым мировым порядком". Активные силы антитрадиции закрепляют свою победу над пассивным сопротивлением южных регионов, ценой экономической отсталости сохраняющих и защищающих Традицию в ее остаточных формах. Внутренние геополитические энергии "Второго мира" стоят перед выбором либо встроиться в систему "цивилизованного северного пояса" и окончательно оборвать связи с сакральной историей (проект левого мондиализма), либо превратиться в оккупированную территорию с дозволением частичной реставрации некоторых аспектов традиции (проект правого мондиализма). Именно в этом направлении разворачиваются события сегодня и будут разворачиваться в ближайшем будущем.

В качестве альтернативного проекта можно теоретически сформулировать иной путь геополитических трансформаций, основанный на отвержении мондиалистской логики Север-Юг и на возвращении к духу подлинной сакральной географии насколько это возможно в конце темного века. Это проект "Великого Возвращения" или, в иной терминологии, "Великой Войны Континентов".

В самых общих чертах суть этого проекта такова.

- 1) *"Богатому Северу" противопоставляется не "бедный Юг", но "бедный Север".* "Бедный Север" это идеальный, сакральный идеал возврата к нордическим истокам цивилизации. "Бедным" такой Север является потому, что он основан на тотальном аскетизме, на радикальной преданности высшим ценностям Традиции, на полной жертвенности материального ради духовного. "Бедный Север" географически существует только на территориях России, которая, являясь, в сущности, "Вторым миром", социально-политически до последнего момента противилась окончательному принятию мондиалистской цивилизации в ее наиболее "прогрессивных" формах. Евразийские северные земли России это единственные планетарные территории, не освоенные до конца "богатым Севером", населенные традиционными народами и составлявшие terra incognita современного мира. Путь "Бедного Севера" для России означает отказ как от встраивания в мондиалистский пояс, так и от архаизации собственных традиций и от сведения их на фольклорный уровень этно-религиозной резервации. "Бедный Север" должен быть духовен, интеллектуален, активен и агрессивен. В других регионах "богатого Севера" тоже возможна потенциальная оппозиция "бедного Севера", что может проявиться в радикальном саботаже со стороны интеллектуальной западной элиты основополагающего курса "торгашеской цивилизации", восстание против мира финансов за древние и вечные ценности Духа, справедливости, самопожертвования. "Бедный Север" начинает геополитическое и идеологическое сражение с "богатым Севером", отказываясь от его проектов, взрывая изнутри и извне его планы, подрывая его безупречную эффективность, срывая его социально-политические махинации.
- 2) *"Бедный Юг", не способный самостоятельно противостоять "богатому Северу", вступает в радикальный альянс с "бедным (евразийским) Севером" и начинает освободительную борьбу против "северной" диктатуры.* Особенно важно нанести удар по представителям идеологии "богатого Юга", т.е. по тем силам, которые, работая на "богатый Север", ратуют за "развитие", "прогресс" и "модернизацию" традиционных стран, что на практике будет означать лишь все больший отход от остатков сакральной Традиции.
- 3) *"Бедный Север" евразийского Востока вместе с "бедным Югом", простирающимся по окружности всей планеты, концентрируют свои силы в борьбе против "богатого Севера" атлантического Запада.* При этом идеологически навсегда кладется конец вульгарным версиям англосаксонского расизма, воспеванию "технической цивилизации белых народов" и сопровождающей мондиалистской пропаганде. (Ален де Бенуа выразил эту мысль в названии своей знаменитой книги "Третий мир и Европа: мы едины в борьбе" "L'Europe, Tiersmonde meme combat"; речь в ней идет, естественно, о "духовной Европе", о "Европе народов и традиций", а не о "маатстрихтской Европе торгашей".) Интеллектуальность, активность и духовность подлинного сакрального Севера возвращает традиции Юга к нордическому Истоку и поднимает "южан" на планетарное восстание против единственного геополитического врага. Пассивное

сопротивление "южан" приобретает тем самым точку опоры в планетарном мессианизме "северян", радикально отвергающих порочную и антисакральную ветвь тех белых народов, которые стали на путь технического прогресса и материального развития. Вспыхивает планетарная надрасовая и наднациональная Геополитическая Революция, основанная на фундаментальной солидарности "Третьего мира" с той частью "Второго мира", который отвергает проект "богатого Севера".

ЧАСТЬ VII ТЕКСТЫ КЛАССИКОВ ГЕОПОЛИТИКИ

Хэлфорд Джордж Макиндер

*ГЕОГРАФИЧЕСКАЯ ОСЬ ИСТОРИИ*⁸⁰

Когда в отдаленном будущем какой-нибудь историк захочет исследовать времена, которые мы сейчас переживаем, и представить их в резюмированной формуле, как это делаем мы сегодня в отношении династий древнего Египта, то очень может быть, что последние четыреста лет он назовет "эпохой Колумба" и скажет, что завершилась она вскоре после 1900 года. Сегодня стало прямо-таки общим местом говорить о географических исследованиях как о чем-то практически завершенном. Считается также, что географию следует свести исключительно к тщательному обзору и философскому синтезу. За четыреста лет объекты на географической карте мира получили достаточно верные и точные очертания и даже в районах обоих полюсов экспедиции Нансена и Скотта значительно сократили возможности новых и невероятных открытий. При этом начало двадцатого столетия квалифицируется как конец великой исторической эпохи, причем это касается не только ее достижений, как бы велики они ни были. Миссионер, завоеватель, фермер, шахтер и, наконец, инженер шли буквально по следам путешественников вот почему можно с уверенностью сказать, что мир в своих самых отдаленных пределах был открыт уже до того, как мы стали говорить о его фактическом политическом освоении. В Европе, Северной и Южной Америке, Африке и Австралии едва ли найдется такое место, где можно было бы вбить в землю колышки, предъявив на этот участок право собственности. Такое возможно разве что в ходе войны между цивилизованными и получивилизованными державами. Даже в Азии мы становимся, вероятно, зрителями последних актов пьесы, начатой конниками Ермака, казаками и мореходами Васко де Гамы. Для сравнения мы можем противопоставить эпоху Колумба предшествующим векам, приведя в качестве ее характерной черты экспансию Европы, не встречавшей практически никакого сопротивления, тогда как средневековое христианство было загнано в рамки небольшого региона и находилось под угрозой внешнего нападения варваров. Начиная с сегодняшнего дня и впредь, в пост-колумбову эпоху, мы будем вынуждены иметь дело с закрытой политической системой, и вполне возможно, что система эта будет иметь мировые масштабы. Каждый взрыв общественных сил вместо того, чтобы рассеяться в окружающем неизведанном пространстве и хаосе варварства, отзовется громким эхом с противоположной стороны земного шара, так что в итоге все слабые элементы в политическом и экономическом организме Земли будут разрушены. Существует большая разница между тем, когда снаряд попадает в яму и когда он падает в закрытое пространство между жестких конструкций огромного здания или судна. Возможно, хотя бы частичное понимание этого факта отвлечет, наконец, внимание государственных деятелей от территориальной экспансии и заставит их сосредоточиться на борьбе за согласованное созидание.

Вот почему мне кажется, что в настоящее десятилетие мы впервые находимся в том положении, когда можно попытаться установить, с известной долей определенности, связь между наиболее широкими географическими и историческими обобщениями. Впервые мы можем нащупать некоторые реальные пропорции в соотношении событий, происходящих на мировой арене, и выяснить формулу, которая так или иначе выразит определенные аспекты географической обусловленности мировой истории. Если нам

⁸⁰ Halford Mackinder "Geographical Pivot of History" in "Geographical Journal", 1904.

посчастливилось, то эта формула обретет и практическую ценность с ее помощью можно будет вычислить перспективу развития некоторых конкурирующих сил нынешней международной политической жизни. Известная фраза о том, что империя распространяется на запад, является лишь эмпирической попыткой подобного рода. Так что сегодня я хотел бы описать те характерные физические черты мира, которые, по моему, очень тесно связаны с человеческой деятельностью, а также представить некоторые основные фазы истории, органически связанные с ними, причем даже тогда, когда они были еще неизвестны географии. Я вовсе не ставлю себе целью обсуждать влияние того или иного фактора или заниматься региональной географией, но скорее хочу показать историю человечества как часть жизни мирового организма. Я признаю, что могу достичь здесь лишь одного аспекта истины, и я отнюдь не испытываю желания предаваться чрезмерно материализму. Инициативу проявляет человек, не природа, но именно природа в большей мере осуществляет контроль. Мой интерес лежит скорее в области изучения всеобщего природного фактора, нежели в сфере изучения причин всеобщей истории. Совершенно ясно, что здесь можно надеяться только на первое приближение к истине, а потому я со смирением восприму все замечания моих критиков.

Покойный профессор Фримен говорил, что единственная история, которую следует принимать в расчет, есть история средиземноморской и европейской рас. В каком-то отношении это, конечно же, верно, ибо именно среди этих рас зародились идеи, приведшие к тому, что потомки греков и римлян стали господствовать во всем мире. Однако в другом и не менее важном отношении подобное ограничение значительно стесняет мысль. Идеи, формирующие нацию как противоположность простой толпе человеческих существ, обычно принимаются под давлением общего несчастья, либо же при общей необходимости сопротивляться внешней силе. Идея Англии была вколочена в государства Гептархии датскими и норманнскими завоевателями, идея Франции была навязана гуннами спорившим между собой франкам, готам и римлянам в битве при Шалоне и позднее, во время Столетней войны с Англией; идея христианства родилась из гонений в Римской империи и была доведена до логического завершения в эпоху крестовых походов. Идея Соединенных Штатов была воспринята при участии местного патриотизма колонистов только во время длительной войны за независимость; идея Германской империи была принята, да и то неохотно, в Южной Германии после ее борьбы с Францией в союзе с Северной Германией. То, что я могу описать как литературную концепцию истории, возможно невольно опускает из вида изначальные движения, чье давление играло роль побуждающего импульса в атмосфере, в которой выращивались великие идеи. Какая-то вызывающая отвращение персона выполняет некую важную общественную функцию в объединении своих врагов, так что именно благодаря давлению внешних варваров Европа сумела создать свою цивилизацию. Вот почему я прошу вас взглянуть на Европу и европейскую историю как на явления, подчиненные Азии и ее истории, ибо европейская цивилизация является в весьма большой степени результатом вековой борьбы против азиатских вторжений.

Наиболее важный контраст, заметный на политической карте современной Европы это контраст, представляемый, с одной стороны, огромными пространствами России, занимающей половину этого континента, и группой более мелких территорий, занимаемых западно-европейскими странами с другой. С физической точки зрения здесь, конечно, тоже существует подобный контраст между нераспаханными низинами востока и богатствами гор и долин, островов и полуостровов, составляющих в совокупности остальную часть этого района земного шара. При первом взгляде вам может показаться, что в этих знакомых фактах перед нами предстает столь очевидная связь между природной средой и политической организацией, что едва ли стоит об этом говорить, особенно если мы упомянем, что на Русской равнине холодной зиме противостоит жаркое лето, и

условия человеческого существования приносят таким образом в жизнь дополнительное единообразие. И тем не менее, несколько исторических карт, содержащихся, например, в Оксфордском атласе, покажут нам, что грубое совпадение европейской части России с восточно-европейской равниной не случайно, и это произошло не за последние сто лет, но и в более ранние времена здесь существовала совершенно иная тенденция в политическом объединении. Две группы государств обычно делили эту страну на северную и южную политическую системы. Дело в том, что топографические карты не выражают того особого физического своеобразия, которое до самых последних пор контролировало передвижение и расселение человека на территории России. Когда снежное покрывало постепенно отступает на север от этих широких равнин, его сменяют дожди, которые особенно сильны в мае и июне на побережье Черного моря, однако в районе Балтики и Белого моря они льют чаще в июле и августе. На юге царит долгое засушливое лето. Следствием подобного климатического режима является то, что северные и северо-западные районы покрыты лесами, чьи чащи изредка перемежаются озерами и болотами, в то время как юг и юго-восток представляют из себя бескрайние травянистые степи, где деревья можно увидеть лишь по берегам рек. Линия, разделяющая эти два региона, идет по диагонали на северо-восток, начинаясь у северной оконечности Карпат и заканчиваясь скорее у южных районов Урала, нежели в его северной части. За пределами России граница этих огромных лесов бежит на запад, проходя почти посередине европейского перешейка, чья ширина (то есть расстояние между Балтийским и Черным морями) равняется 800 милям. За ним, на остальной европейской территории, леса занимают долины Германии на севере, в то время как на юге степи формируют великий Трансильванский бастион у Карпат и простираются до Дуная, там, где теперь колышутся румынские нивы, и вплоть до Железных ворот. Отдельный степной район, известный среди местных жителей под названием "пушта" и ныне активно обрабатываемый, занял Венгерскую равнину; его окаймляет цепь лесистых Карпатских и Альпийских гор. На западе же России, за исключением крайнего Севера, расчистка леса, осушение болот и подъем неосвоенных земель сравнительно недавно определили характер ландшафта, сглаживая в большой степени то различие, которое раньше было так заметно.

Россия и Польша возникли на лесных полянах. Вместе с тем, сюда через степи из отдаленных и неизвестных уголков Азии направлялась в створ, образуемый Уральскими горами и Каспийским морем, начиная с V и по XVI столетие непрерывная череда кочевников-туранцев: гунны, авары, болгары, мадьяры, хазары, печенеги, куманы, монголы, калмыки. Во время правления Аттилы гунны утвердились в середине пушты, на самых отдаленных "дунайских" островках степи, и оттуда наносили удары на север, запад и юг по оседлому населению Европы. Большая часть современной истории может быть написана как комментарий на изменения, прямо или косвенно явившиеся последствием тех рейдов. Вполне возможно, что именно тогда англосаксы заставили пересечь море и основать на Британских островах Англию. Впервые франки, готы и жители римских провинций оказались вынуждены встать плечом к плечу на поле битвы у Шалона, имея перед собой общую цель борьбы с азиатами; таким образом они непроизвольно составили современную Францию. В результате разрушения Аквилеи и Падуи была основана Венеция; и даже папство обязано своим огромным престижем успешному посредничеству папы Льва на встрече с Аттилой в Милане. Таков был результат, произведенный толпой безжалостных и не имевших никаких представлений о культуре всадников, затопивших неуправляемые равнины это был удар, свободно нанесенный азиатским молотом по незанятому пространству. За гуннами последовали авары. Именно в борьбе с ними была основана Австрия, а в результате походов Карла Великого была укреплена Вена. Затем пришли мадьяры и благодаря своим непрекращающимся набегам из степных лагерей, расположенных на территории Венгрии, еще больше увеличили значение австрийского аванпоста, переводя тем самым фокус с Германии на восток, к границе этого королевства.

Болгары стали правящей кастой на землях к югу от Дуная, оставив свое имя на карте мира, хотя их язык растворился в языке их славянских подданных. Вероятно, самым долговременным и эффективным в русских степях было расселение хазар, бывших современниками великого движения сарацин: арабские географы знали Каспий или Хазарское море. Но, в конце концов, из Монголии прибыли новые орды и на протяжении двухсот лет русские земли, расположенные в лесах к северу от указанных территорий, платили дань монгольским ханам или "Степи", и таким образом развитие России было задержано и искажено именно в то время, когда остальная Европа быстро шагала вперед.

Следует также заметить, что реки, бегущие из этих лесов к Черному и Каспийскому морям, проходят поперек всего степного пути кочевников, и что время от времени вдоль течения этих рек происходили случайные движения навстречу перемещениям этих всадников. Так, миссионеры греческой церкви поднялись по Днепру до Киева подобно тому, как незадолго до этого северяне варяги спустились по той же самой реке на пути в Константинополь. Однако еще раньше германское племя готов появилось на короткое время на берегах Днестра, пройдя через Европу от берегов Балтики в том же юго-восточном направлении. Но все это проходящие эпизоды, которые, однако, не сводят на нет более широкие обобщения. На протяжении десяти веков несколько волн кочевников-всадников выходило из Азии через широкий проход между Уралом и Каспийским морем, пересекая открытые пространства Юга России и, обретая постоянное местожительство в Венгрии, попадали в самое сердце Европы, внося таким образом в историю соседних с ними народов момент неперемогимого противостояния: так было в отношении русских, германцев, французов, итальянцев и византийских греков. То, что они стимулировали здоровую и мощную реакцию вместо разрушительной оппозиции при широко распространенном деспотизме, стало возможным благодаря тому, что мобильность их державы была обусловлена самой степью и неизбежно исчезала при появлении вокруг гор и лесов.

Подобная мобильность державы была свойственна и морякам-викингам. Спустившись из Скандинавии на южное и северное побережье Европы, они просочились вглубь ее территории, пользуясь для этого речными путями. Однако масштаб их действий был ограничен, поскольку, по справедливости говоря, их власть распространялась лишь на территории, непосредственно примыкавшие к воде. Таким образом, оседлое население Европы оказалось зажатым в тисках между азиатами-кочевниками с востока и давившими с трех сторон морскими разбойниками. Благодаря своей природе ни одна из этих сторон не могла превозмочь другую, так что обе они оказывали стимулирующее воздействие. Следует заметить, что формирующее влияние скандинавов стояло на втором месте после аналогичного влияния кочевников, ибо именно благодаря им Англия и Франция начали долгий путь к собственному объединению, в то время как единая Италия пала под их ударами. Когда-то давно Рим мог мобилизовывать свое население, используя для этого дороги, однако теперь римские дороги пришли в упадок и их не меняли до восемнадцатого столетия.

Похоже, что даже нашествие гуннов было отнюдь не первым в этой "азиатской" серии. Скифы из рассказов Гомера и Геродота, питавшиеся молоком кобылиц, скорее всего, вели такой же образ жизни и относились, вероятно, к той же самой расе, что и позднейшие обитатели степи. Кельтские элементы в названиях рек Дон, Донец, Днепр, Днестр и Дунай могли, вероятно, служить определением понятий у людей с похожими привычками, хотя и не из одной и той же расы, однако непохоже, чтобы кельты пришли из северных лесов, подобно готам и варягам последующих времен. Тем не менее, огромный клин населения, который антропологи называют брахикефалами, оттесненный на запад из брахокефальной Азии через Центральную Европу вплоть до Франции, вероятно, внедрился между

северной, западной и южной группами долихокефалического населения и, вполне возможно, он происходит из Азии.

Между тем, влияние Азии на Европу незаметно до того момента, когда мы начинаем говорить о монгольском вторжении пятнадцатого века, правда до того, как мы проанализируем факты, касающиеся всего этого, желательно изменить нашу "европейскую" точку зрения так, чтобы мы смогли представить Старый Свет во всей его целостности. Поскольку количество осадков зависит от моря, середина величайших земных массивов в климатическом отношении достаточно суха. Вот почему не стоит удивляться, что две трети мирового населения сосредоточены в относительно небольших районах, расположенных по краям великих континентов в Европе около Атлантического океана, у Индийского и Тихого океанов в Индии и Китае. Через всю Северную Африку вплоть до Аравии тянется широкая полоса почти незаселенных в силу практического отсутствия дождей земель. Центральная и Южная Африка большую часть своей истории были так же отделены от Европы и Азии, как и Америка с Австралией. В действительности южной границей Европы была и является скорее Сахара, нежели Средиземное море, поскольку именно эта пустыня отделяет белых людей от черных. Огромные земли Евро-Азии, заключенные таким образом между океаном и пустыней, насчитывают 21 000 000 квадратных миль, то есть половину всех земель на земном шаре, если мы исключим из подсчетов пустыни Сахары и Аравии. Существует много отдаленных пустынных районов, разбросанных по всей территории Азии, от Сирии и Персии на северо-восток по направлению к Манчжурии, однако среди них нет таких пустынь, которые можно было бы сравнить с Сахарой. С другой стороны, Евро-Азия характеризуется весьма примечательным распределением стоков рек. На большей части севера и центра эти реки были практически бесполезны для целей человеческого общения с внешним миром. Волга, Окс, Яксарт текут в соленые озера; Обь, Енисей и Лена в холодный северный океан. В мире существует шесть великих рек. В этих же районах есть много, хотя и меньших, но также значительных рек, таких как Тарим и Хельмунд, которые опять-таки не впадают в Океан. Таким образом, центр Евро-Азии, испещренный пятнышками пустыни, является в целом степной местностью, представляющей обширные, хотя и зачастую скудные, пастбища, где не так уж и мало питаемых реками оазисов, однако необходимо еще раз подчеркнуть, что вся ее территория все-таки не пронизана водными путями, идущими из океана. Другими словами, в этом большом ареале мы имеем все условия для поддержки редкого, но в совокупности весьма значительного населения кочевников, передвигающихся на лошадях и верблюдах. На севере их царство ограничено широкой полосой субарктических лесов и болот, где климат слишком суров, за исключением западных и восточных оконечностей, для развития сельскохозяйственных поселений. На востоке леса идут на юг до тихоокеанского побережья вдоль Амура в Манчжурию. То же и на Западе; в доисторической Европе леса занимали основную территорию. Ограниченные, таким образом, на северо-востоке, севере и северо-западе, степи идут, не прерываясь, на протяжении 4 000 миль от венгерской пушты до Малой Гоби в Манчжурии, и, за исключением самой западной оконечности, их не пересекают реки, текущие в доступный им океан, так что мы можем не принимать во внимание недавние усилия по развитию торговли в устье Оби и Енисея. В Европе, Западной Сибири и Западном Туркестане степь лежит близко к уровню моря, местами даже ниже его. Далее на восток, в Монголии, они тянутся в виде плато; но переход с одного уровня на другой, над голыми, ровными и низкими районами засушливых центральных земель не представляет значительных трудностей.

Орды, которые, в конечном счете, обрушились на Европу в середине четырнадцатого века, собирали свои силы в 3 000 миль отсюда, в степях Верхней Монголии. Опустошения, совершаемые в течение нескольких лет в Польше, Силезии, Моравии, Венгрии, Хорватии

и Сербии, были, тем не менее, лишь самыми отдаленными и одновременно скоротечными результатами великого движения кочевников востока, ассоциируемого с именем Чингизхана. В то время как Золотая Орда заняла Кипчакскую степь от Аральского моря через проход между Уральским хребтом и Каспием до подножия Карпат, другая орда, спустившаяся на юго-запад между Каспийским морем и Гиндукушем в Персию, Месопотамию и даже Сирию, основала державу Ильхана. Позднее третья Орда ударила на Северный Китай, овладев Китаем. Индия и Манги или Южный Китай были на время прикрыты великолепным барьером Тибетских гор, с чьей эффективностью ничто в мире, пожалуй, сравниться не может, если, конечно, не принимать во внимание Сахару и полярные льды. Но в более позднее время, в дни Марко Поло в случае с Манги, в дни Тамерлана в случае с Индией это препятствие было обойдено. Случилось так, что в этом известном и хорошо описанном случае все населенные края Старого Света раньше или позже ощутили на себе экспансивную мощь мобильной державы, зародившейся на степных просторах. Россия, Персия, Индия или Китай либо платили дань, либо принимали монгольские династии. Даже зарождавшееся в Малой Азии государство турок терпело это иго на протяжении более полувека.

Подобно Европе, записи о более ранних вторжениях сохранялись и на других пограничных землях Евро-Азии. Неоднократно подчинялся завоевателям с севера Китай, а Индия завоевателям с северо-запада. По меньшей мере, одно вторжение на территорию Персии сыграло особую роль в истории всей западной цивилизации. За триста или четыреста лет до прихода монголов, турки-сельджуки, появившиеся из района Малой Азии, растеклись здесь по огромным пространствам, которые условно можно назвать регионом, расположенным между пятью морями Каспийским, Черным, Средиземным, Красным и Персидским заливом. Они утвердились в Кермане, Хадамане, Малой Азии, низвергли господство сарацин в Багдаде и Дамаске. Возникла необходимость покарать их за их обращение с паломниками, шедшими в Иерусалим, вот почему христианский мир и предпринял целую серию военных походов, известных под общим названием крестовых. И хотя европейцам не удалось достигнуть поставленных задач, эти события так взволновали и объединили Европу, что мы вполне можем считать их началом современной истории это был еще один пример продвижения Европы, стимулированного необходимостью ответной реакции на давление, оказываемое на нее из самого центра Азии.

Понятие Евро-Азии, которое мы таким образом получаем, подразумевает под собой протяженные земли, опоясанные льдом на севере, пронизанные повсюду реками и насчитывающие по площади 21 000 000 квадратных миль, т.е. более чем в три раза превышающие Северную Америку, чьи центральные и северные районы насчитывают 9 000 000 кв. миль, и более чем в два раза территорию Европы. Однако у нее нет удовлетворительных водных путей, ведущих в океан, хотя с другой стороны, за исключением субарктических лесов, она в целом пригодна для передвижения всякого рода кочевников. На запад, на юг и на восток от этой зоны находятся пограничные регионы, составляющие широкий полумесяц и доступные для мореплавания. В соответствии с физическим устройством число этих районов равняется четырем, причем отнюдь не маловажно то, что в принципе они совпадают, соответственно, со сферами распространения четырех великих религий буддизма, брахманизма, ислама и христианства. Первые две лежат в зоне муссонов, причем одна из них обращена к Тихому океану, другая к Индийскому. Четвертая, Европа, орошается дождями, идущими с Запада, из Атлантики. Эти три региона, насчитывающие в совокупности менее семи миллионов кв. миль, населяет более миллиарда человек, иначе говоря, две трети населения земного шара. Третья сфера, совпадающая с зоной пяти морей или, как ее чаще называют, район Ближнего Востока, в еще большей степени страдает от недостатка влажности благодаря

своей приближенности к Африке и, за исключением оазисов, заселена, соответственно, негусто. В некоторой степени она совмещает черты как пограничной зоны, так и центрального района Евро-Азии. Эта зона лишена лесов, поверхность ее испещрена пустынями, так что она вполне подходит для жизнедеятельности кочевников. Черты пограничного района прослеживаются в ней постольку, поскольку морские заливы и впадающие в океан реки делают ее доступной для морских держав, позволяя, впрочем, и им самим осуществлять свое господство на море. Вот почему здесь периодически возникали империи, относившиеся к "пограничному" разряду, основу которых составляло сельскохозяйственное население великих оазисов Египта и Вавилона. Кроме того, они были связаны водными путями с цивилизованным миром Средиземноморья и Индии. Но, как и следует ожидать, эти империи попадали в зону действия череды невиданных до того миграций, одни из которых осуществлялись скифами, турками и монголами, шедшими из Центральной Азии, другие же были результатом усилий народов Средиземноморья, желавших захватить наземные пути, ведущие от западного к восточному океану. Это место самое слабое звено для этих ранних цивилизаций, поскольку Суэцкий перешеек, разделивший морские державы на западные и восточные, и засушливые пустыни Персии, простирающиеся из Центральной Азии вплоть до Персидского залива, предоставляли постоянную возможность кочевым объединениям добираться до берега океана, отделявшего, с одной стороны, Индию и Китай, а с другой стороны, их самих от Средиземноморского мира. Всякий раз, когда оазисы Египта, Сирии и Вавилона приходили в упадок, жители степей получали возможность использовать плоские равнины Ирана в качестве форпостов, откуда они могли наносить удары через Пенджаб прямо в Индию, через Сирию в Египет, а через разгромленный мост Босфора и Дарданеллы на Венгрию. На магистральном пути во внутреннюю Европу стояла Вена, противостоявшая набегам кочевников, как тех, что приходили прямой дорогой из русских степей, так и проникавших извилистыми путями, пролежавшими к югу от Черного и Каспийского морей.

Итак, мы проиллюстрировали очевидную разницу между сарацинским и турецким контролем на Ближнем Востоке. Сарацины были ветвью семитской расы, людьми, населявшими долины Нила и Евфрата и небольшие оазисы на юге Азии. Воспользовавшись двумя возможностями, предоставленными им этой землей лошадьми и верблюдами, с одной стороны, и кораблями с другой они создали великую империю. В различные исторические периоды их флот контролировал Средиземное море вплоть до Испании, а также Индийский океан до Малайских островов. С этой центральной, стратегической точки зрения, позиции, находившейся между западным и восточным океанами, они пытались завоевать все пограничные районы Старого Света, повторяя в чем-то Александра Македонского и упреждая Наполеона. Они смогли даже угрожать степи. Но сарацинскую цивилизацию разрушили турки, полностью отделенные от Аравии, Европы, Индии и Китая язычниками-туранцами, обитавшие в самом сердце Азии.

Передвижение по поверхности океана явилось естественным соперником передвижения на верблюдах и лошадях, наблюдаемого внутри континента. Именно на освоении океанических рек была основана потамическая стадия цивилизации: китайская на Янцзы, индийская на Ганге, вавилонская на Евфрате, египетская на Ниле. На базе освоения Средиземного моря основывалось то, что называют "морской" стадией цивилизации, цивилизации греков и римлян. Сарацины и викинги могли управлять побережьем океанов именно благодаря своей возможности плавать.

Важнейший результат обнаружения пути в Индию вокруг мыса Доброй Надежды состоял в том, что он должен был связать западное и восточное каботажное судоходство Евро-Азии, даже хотя бы таким окольным путем, и таким образом в некоторой степени

нейтрализовать стратегическое преимущество центрального положения, занимаемого степняками, надавив на них с тыла. Революция, начатая великими мореходами поколения Колумба, наделила христианский мир необычайно широкой мобильностью, не достигшей, однако, заветного уровня. Единый и протяженный океан, окружающий разделенные и островные земли, является, безусловно, тем географическим условием, которое обеспечило высшую степень концентрации командования на море и во всей теории современной военно-морской стратегии и политики, о чем подробно писали капитан Мэхэн и м-р Спенсер Уилкинсон. Политический результат всего этого заключался в изменении отношений между Европой и Азией. Не надо забывать того, что в средние века Европа была зажата между непроходимыми песками на юге, неизведанным океаном на западе, льдами или бескрайними лесами на севере и северо-востоке, и на востоке и юго-востоке ей угрожала необычайная подвижность кочевников. И вот теперь она поднялась над миром, дотянувшись до тридцати восьми морей и других территорий и распространив свое влияние вокруг евроазиатских континентальных держав, которые до сих пор угрожали самому ее существованию. На свободных землях, открытых среди водных пространств, создавались новые Европы, и тем, чем были ранее для европейцев Британия и Скандинавия, теперь становятся Америка и Австралия и в некоторой степени даже транссахарская Африка, примыкающая теперь к Евро-Азии. Британия, Канада, Соединенные Штаты, Южная Африка, Австралия и Япония являют собой своеобразное кольцо, состоящее из островных баз, предназначенных для торговли и морских сил, недостижимых для сухопутных держав Евро-Азии.

Тем не менее, последние продолжают существовать, и известные события еще раз подчеркнули их значимость. Пока "морские" народы Западной Европы покрывали поверхность океана своими судами, отправлялись в отдаленные земли и тем или иным образом облагали данью жителей океанического побережья Азии, Россия организовала казаков и, выйдя из своих северных лесов, взяла под контроль степь, выставив собственных кочевников против кочевников-татар. Эпоха Тюдоров, увидевшая экспансию Западной Европы на морских просторах, лицемерила и то, как Русское государство продвигалось от Москвы в сторону Сибири. Бросок всадников через всю Азию на восток был событием, в той же самой мере чреватый политическими последствиями, как и преодоление мыса Доброй Надежды, хотя оба эти события долгое время не соотносились друг с другом.

Возможно, самое впечатляющее совпадение в истории заключалось в том, что как морская, так и сухопутная экспансия Европы продолжала, в известном смысле, древнее противостояние греков и римлян. Несколько неудач в этой области имели куда как более далеко идущие последствия, нежели неудачная попытка Рима латинизировать греков. Тевтоны были цивилизованы и приняли христианство от римлян, славяне же от греков. Именно романо-тевтонцы впоследствии плыли по морям; и именно греко-славяне скакали по степям, покоряя туранские народы. Так что современная сухопутная держава отличается от морской даже в источнике своих идеалов, а не в материальных условиях и мобильности⁸¹.

Вслед за казаками на сцене появилась Россия, спокойно расставшаяся со своим одиночеством, в котором она пребывала в лесах Севера. Другим же изменением необычайной внутренней важности, произошедшим в Европе в прошлом столетии, была миграция русских крестьян на юг, так что, если раньше сельскохозяйственные поселения

⁸¹ Это заявление подверглось критике в ходе дискуссии, последовавшей за прочтением доклада. Пересматривая этот параграф, я все-таки думаю, что в основе своей оно справедливо. Даже византийский грек был бы другим, подчини Рим себе всю древнюю Грецию. Без сомнения, идеалы, о которых идет речь, были скорее византийские, нежели эллинские, но римскими они не были, это уж точно. (прим.автора)

заканчивались на границе с лесами, то теперь центр населения всей Европейской России лежит к югу от этой границы, посреди пшеничных полей, сменивших расположенные там и западнее степи. Именно так возник необычайно важный город Одесса, развивавшийся с чисто американской скоростью.

Еще поколение назад казалось, что пароход и Суэцкий канал увеличили мобильность морских держав в сравнении с сухопутными. Железные дороги играли, главным образом, роль придатка океанской торговли. Но теперь трансконтинентальные железные дороги изменяют состояние сухопутных держав, и нигде они не работают с большей эффективностью, как в закрытых центральных районах Евро-Азии, на широких просторах которой нельзя встретить ни одного подходящего бревна или камня для их постройки. Железные дороги совершают в степи невиданные чудеса, потому что они непосредственно заменили лошадь и верблюда, так что необходимая стадия развития дорожная здесь была пропущена.

В ситуации с торговлей не следует забывать, что океанический способ, хотя и относительно дешевый, обычно прогоняет товар через четыре этапа: фабрика-изготовитель, верфь отправителя, верфь получателя и склад розничной продажи, в то время как континентальная железная дорога ведет прямо от фабрики-производителя на склад импортера. Таким образом, промежуточная океанская торговля ведет, при прочих равных условиях, к формированию зоны проникновения вокруг континентов, чья внутренняя граница грубо обозначена линией, вдоль которой цена четырех операций, океанской перевозки и железнодорожной перевозки с соседнего побережья равна цене двух операций и перевозке по континентальной железной дороге.

Русские железные дороги бегут на протяжении 6 000 миль от Вербаллена на западе до Владивостока на востоке. Русская армия в Манчжурии являет собой замечательное свидетельство мобильной сухопутной мощи подобно тому, как Британия являет в Южной Африке пример морской державы. Конечно, Транссибирская магистраль по-прежнему остается единственной и далеко не безопасной линией связи, однако не закончится еще это столетие, как вся Азия покроется сетью железных дорог. Пространства на территории Российской империи и Монголии столь велики, а их потенциал в плане населения, зерна, хлопка, топлива и металлов столь высок, что здесь несомненно разовьется свой, пусть несколько отдаленный, огромный экономический мир, недостижимый для океанской торговли.

Пробегаая столь быстрым взглядом по основным тенденциям истории, не видим ли мы со всей очевидностью постоянства в плане географическом? Разве не является осевым регионом в мировой политике этот обширный район Евро-Азии, недоступный судам, но доступный в древности кочевникам, который ныне должен быть покрыт сетью железных дорог? Здесь были и продолжают существовать условия, многообещающие (хотя и ограниченные определенным фактором) для развития военных и промышленных держав. Россия заменяет Монгольскую империю. Ее давление на Финляндию, Скандинавию, Польшу, Турцию, Персию, Индию и Китай заменило собой исходившие из одного центра набеги степняков. В этом мире она занимает центральное стратегическое положение, которое в Европе принадлежит Германии. Она может наносить и одновременно получать удары со всех направлений, за исключением севера. Окончательное развитие ее мобильности, связанное с железными дорогами, является лишь вопросом времени. Да и никакая социальная революция не изменит ее отношения к великим географическим границам ее существования. Трезво понимая пределы своего могущества, правители России расстались с Аляской, ибо для русской политики является, фактически, правилом

не владеть никакими заморскими территориями, точно так же как для Британии править на океанских просторах.

За пределами этого осевого района существует большой внутренний полумесяц, составляемый Германией, Австрией, Турцией, Индией и Китаем, и внешний Британия, Южная Африка, Австралия, Соединенные Штаты, Канада и Япония. В настоящем состоянии баланса осевое государство, Россия, не равносильная периферийным государствам, и здесь в качестве противовеса она может выступить Франция. Только что восточной державой стали Соединенные Штаты. На баланс сил в Европе они влияют не непосредственно, а через Россию, и нет никаких сомнений в том, что они построят Панамский канал для того, чтобы сделать ресурсы Миссисипи и Атлантики доступными для перекачки в Тихий океан. С этой точки зрения линию реального разделения между востоком и западом следует искать именно в Атлантике⁸².

Нарушение баланса сил в пользу осевого государства, выражающееся в его экспансии на пограничные территории Евро-Азии, позволяет использовать необозримые континентальные ресурсы для постройки флота. Благодаря этому скоро перед нашим взором явится мировая империя. Это может случиться, если Германия захочет присоединиться к России в качестве союзника. Вот почему угроза подобного союза должна толкнуть Францию в объятия морских держав, и тогда Франция, Италия, Египет, Индия и Корея составит такое сильное объединение, в котором флот будет поддерживать армию, что в конечном итоге заставят союзников оси развертывать свои сухопутные силы, удерживая их от концентрации всей мощи на морях. Если привести более скромное сравнение, то это напоминает то, что совершал Веллингтон во время боевых действий с базы Торрес Вердас. И не сможет ли Индия, в конце концов, сыграть такую же роль в системе Британской империи? И не эта ли идея лежит в основании концепции мистера Амери, говорившего, что фронт боевых действий для Британии простирается от мыса Доброй Надежды через Индию вплоть до Японии?

На эту систему может оказать решающее влияние развитие огромных возможностей Южной Америки. С одной стороны, они смогут усилить позиции Соединенных Штатов, а с другой, если, конечно, Германия сможет бросить действенный вызов доктрине Монро, они в силах отъединить Берлин от того, что я описал как политику оси. Региональные комбинации держав здесь значения не имеют. Я утверждаю, что, с географической точки зрения они, совершают что-то вроде кругового вращения вокруг осевого государства, которое всегда так или иначе является великим, но имеющим ограниченную мобильность по сравнению с окружающими пограничными и островными державами.

Я говорил обо всем этом как географ. Настоящий же баланс политического могущества в каждый конкретный момент является, безусловно, с одной стороны, результатом географических условий (а также экономических и стратегических), и, с другой стороны, относительной численности, мужества, оснащенности и организации соревнующихся народов. Если аккуратно подсчитать количество всего этого, то мы сможем заранее предсказать результат соперничества, не прибегая к силе оружия. Географические показатели в подсчетах более употребительны и более постоянны, нежели человеческие. Вот почему мы надеемся найти формулу, приложимую в равной степени и к прошлой истории, и к сегодняшней политике. Социальные движения во все времена носили

⁸² Этот тезис Макиндера был полностью опровергнут ближайшими десятилетиями. Уже в Первой мировой войне, то есть спустя лишь десять лет, Соединенные Штаты проявили себя как сугубо западная, атлантическая держава, противоположная восточному, евроазиатскому, континентальному и тихоокеанскому вектору геополитики. Линия разделения Востока и Запада проходит строго по Тихому океану, а никак не по Атлантике (А.Д.).

примерно одни и те же физические черты, ибо я сомневаюсь в том, что постепенно возрастающая сухость климата, если это еще будет доказано, меняла в историческое время окружающую среду в Азии и Африке. Движение империи на запад кажется мне скорее кратковременным вращением пограничных держав вокруг юго-западного и западного углов осевого района. Проблемы, связанные с Ближним, Средним и Дальним Востоком, зависят от нестабильного равновесия между внутренними и внешними державами в тех частях пограничного полушария, где местные государства почти не принимаются в расчет.

В заключение необходимо отметить, что замена контроля России каким-то новым видом внутриконтинентального контроля не приведет к сокращению значимости этой осевой позиции. Если бы, например, китайцы с помощью Японии разгромили Российскую империю и завоевали ее территорию, они бы создали желтую опасность для мировой свободы тем, что добавили океанические просторы к ресурсам великого континента, завоевав таким образом преимущество, до сих пор не полученное русским хозяином этого осевого региона.

Петр Савицкий

ГЕОГРАФИЧЕСКИЕ И ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ ЕВРАЗИЙСТВА⁸³

Россия имеет гораздо больше оснований, чем Китай называться "Срединным государством" ("Чжун-го", по-китайски). И чем дальше будет идти время тем более будут выпячиваться эти основания. Европа для России есть не более чем полуостров Старого материка, лежащий к западу от ее границ. Сама Россия на этом материке занимает основное его пространство, его торс. При этом общая площадь европейских государств, вместе взятых, близка к 5 миллионам квадратных км. Площадь России, в переделах хотя бы современного СССР, существенно превосходит 20 млн. кв. км. (в особенности, если причислить к ней пространство Монгольской и Тувинской народных республик бывших "Внешней Монголии" и "Ряньхойского края", фактически находящихся в настоящий момент на положении частей Советского Союза).

За редким исключением русские люди конца XIX начала XX вв. забывали о зауральских пространствах (один из тех, кто помнил о них, был гениальный русский химик Д.И.Менделеев). Ныне наступили иные времена. Весь "Уральско-Кузнецкий комбинат", с его доменами, угольными шахтами, новыми городами на сотню другую тысяч населения каждый строится за Уралом. Там же воздвигают "Турксиб". Нигде экспансия русской культуры не идет так широко и так стихийно, как в другой части Зауралья в т.н. "среднеазиатских республиках" (Туркмения, Таджикистан, Узбекистан, Киргизия). Оживает весь торс русских земель "от стрелок Негорелого до станции Сучан". Евразийцы имеют свою долю заслуги в этом повороте событий. Но с тем вместе совершенно явственно вскрывается природа русского мира, как центрального мира Старого материка. Были моменты, когда казалось, что между западной его периферией Европой, к которой причислялось и Русское Доуралье ("Европейская Россия" старых географов) и Азией (Китаем, Индией, Ираном) лежит пустота. Евразийская установка русской современности заполняет эту пустоту биением живой жизни. Уже с конца XIX в. прямой путь из Европы в Китай и Японию лежит через Россию (Великая Сибирская железная дорога). География указывает с полной несомненностью, что не иначе должны пролегать дороги из Европы (во всяком случае, северной) в Персию, Индию и Индокитай. Эти возможности к настоящему времени еще не реализованы. Трансперсидская железная дорога, прорезывающая Персию в направлении с Северо-запада на Юго-восток и связанная с железнодорожной сетью как Британской Индии, так и Европы (через Закавказье, Крым и Украину), была близка к осуществлению накануне мировой войны. В настоящее время, в силу политических обстоятельств, она отошла в область беспочвенных проектов. Нет связи между железными дорогами русского Туркестана ("среднеазиатских республик") и Индии. Нет ориентации русской железнодорожной сети на транзитное европейско-индийское движение. Но рано или поздно такое движение станет фактом будь то в форме ж.-д. путей, автолюбительских линий или воздушных сообщений. Для этих последних кратчайшие расстояния, даваемые Россией, имеют особенно большое значение. Чем больший вес будут приобретать воздушные сообщения со свойственным этому роду сношений стремлением летать по прямой тем ясней будет становиться роль России-Евразии, как "срединного мира". Установление трансполярных линий может еще больше усилить эту роль. На дальнем севере Россия на огромном пространстве является соседом Америки. С открытием путей через полюс или вернее над полюсом она станет соединительным звеном между Азией и Северной Америкой .

⁸³ ГАРФ фонд П.Н.Савицкого № 5783 (ред.).

В последующих статьях говорится о стремлении евразийцев дать духовный синтез восточных и западных начал. Здесь важно указать на те соответствия, которые являет этому стремлению область геополитики. Россия Евразия есть центр Старого света. Устраните этот центр и все остальные его части, вся эта система материковых окраин (Европа, Передняя Азия, Иран, Индия, Индокитай, Китай, Япония) превращается как бы в "рассыпанную храмину". Этот мир, лежащий к востоку от границ Европы и к северу от "классической" Азии, есть то звено, которое спаивает в единство их все. Это очевидно в современности, это станет еще явственней в будущем. Связывающая и объединяющая роль "срединного мира" сказывалась и в истории. В течение ряда тысячелетий политическое преобладание в евразийском мире принадлежало кочевникам. Заняв все пространство от пределов Европы до пределов Китая, соприкасаясь одновременно с Передней Азией, Ираном и Индией кочевники служили посредниками между разрозненными, в своем исходном состоянии, мирами оседлых культур. И, скажем, взаимодействия между Ираном и Китаем никогда в истории не были столь тесными, как в эпоху монгольского владычества (XII-XIV вв.). А за тринадцать-четырнадцать веков перед тем исключительно и только в кочевом евразийском мире пересекались лучи эллинской и китайской культур, как то показали новейшие раскопки в Монголии. Силой неустрашимых фактов русский мир призван к объединяющей роли в пределах Старого Света. Только в той мере, в какой Россия - Евразия выполняет это свое призвание, может превращаться и превращается в органическое целое вся совокупность разнообразных культур Старого материка, снимается противоположение между Востоком и Западом. Это обстоятельство еще недостаточно осознано в наше время, но выраженные в нем соотношения лежат в природе вещей. Задачи объединения суть в первую очередь задачи культурного творчества. В лице русской культуры в центре Старого Света выросла к объединительной и примирительной роли новая и самостоятельная историческая сила. Разрешить свою задачу она может лишь во взаимодействии с культурами всех окружающих народов. В этом плане культуры Востока столь же важны для нее, как и культуры Запада. В подобной обращенности одновременно и равномерно к Востоку и Западу особенность русской культуры и геополитики. Для России это два равноправных ее фронта западный и юго-восточный. Поле зрения, охватывающее в одинаковой и полной степени весь Старый Свет может и должно быть русским, по преимуществу, полем зрения.

Возвращаемся, однако, к явлениям чисто географического порядка. По сравнению с русским "торсом", Европа и Азия одинаково представляют собою окраину Старого Света. Причем Европой, с русско-евразийской точки зрения, является, по сказанному, все, что лежит к западу от русской границы, а Азией все то, что лежит к югу и юго-востоку от нее. Сама же Россия есть ни Азия, ни Европа таков основной геополитический тезис евразийцев. И потому нет "Европейской" и "Азиатской" России, а есть части ее, лежащие к западу и к востоку от Урала, как есть части ее, лежащие к западу и к востоку от Енисея и т.д. Евразийцы продолжают: Россия не есть ни Азия, ни Европа, но представляет собой особый географический мир. Чем же этот мир отличается от Европы и Азии? Западные, южные и юго-восточные окраины старого материка отличаются как значительной изрезанностью своих побережий, так и разнообразием форм рельефа. Этого отнюдь нельзя сказать об основном его "торсе", составляющем, по сказанному, Россию-Евразию.

Он состоит в первую очередь из трех равнин (беломорско-кавказской, западносибирской и туркестанской), а затем из областей, лежащих к востоку от них (в том числе из невысоких горных стран к востоку от р. Енисей). Зональное сложение западных и южных окраин материка отмечено "мозаически-дробными" и весьма не простыми очертаниями. Лесные, в естественном состоянии, местности сменяются здесь в причудливой последовательности, с одной стороны, степными и пустынными областями, с другой

тундровыми районами (на высоких горах). Этой "мозаике" противостоит на срединных равнинах Старого Света сравнительно простое, "флагоподобное" расположение зон. Этим последним обозначением мы указываем на то обстоятельство, что при нанесении на карту оно напоминает очертания подразделенного на горизонтальные полосы флага. В направлении с юга на север здесь сменяют друг друга пустыня, степь, лес и тундра. Каждая из этих зон образует сплошную широтную полосу. Общее широтное членение русского мира подчеркивается еще и преимущественно широтным простираем горных хребтов, окаймляющих названные равнины с юга: Крымский хребет, Кавказский, Копетдаг, Парапамиз, Гиндукуш, основные хребты Тянь-Шаня, хребты на северной окраине Тибета, Ин-Шань, в области Великой китайской стены. Последние из названных нами хребтов, располагаясь в той же линии, что и предыдущие, окаймляют с юга возвышенную равнину, занятую пустыней Гоби. Она связывается с туркестанской равниной через посредство Джунгарских ворот.

В зональном строении материка Старого Света можно заметить черты своеобразной восточно-западной симметрии, сказывающейся в том, что обстояние явлений на восточной его окраине аналогично такому же обстоянию на западной окраине и отличается от характера явлений в срединной части материка. И восточная и западная окраины материка (и Дальний Восток, и Европа) в широтах между 35 и 60 град. северной широты в естественном состоянии являются областями лесными. Здесь бореальные леса непосредственно соприкасаются и постепенно переходят в леса южных флор. Ничего подобного мы не наблюдаем в срединном мире. В нем леса южных флор имеются только в областях его горного окаймления (Крым, Кавказ, Туркестан). И они нигде не соприкасаются с лесами северных флор или бореальными, будучи отделены от них сплошной степно-пустынной полосой. Срединный мир Старого Света можно определить, таким образом, как область степной и пустынной полосы, простирающейся непрерывно линией от Карпат до Хингана, взятой вместе с горным ее обрамлением (на юге) и районами, лежащими к северу от нее (лесная и тундровые зоны). Этот мир евразийцы и называют Евразией в точном смысле этого слова (*Eurasia sensu stricto*). Ее нужно отличать от старой "Евразии" А. фон Гумбольдта, охватывающей весь Старый материк (*Eurasia sensu latiore*).

Западная граница Евразии проходит по черноморско-балтийской перемычке, т.е. в области, где материк суживается (между Балтийским и Черным морями). По этой перемычке, в общем направлении с северо-запада на юго-восток, проходит ряд показательных ботанико-географических границ, например, восточная граница тиса, бука и плюща. Каждая из них, начинаясь на берегах Балтийского моря, выходит затем к берегам моря Черного. К западу от названных границ, т.е. там, где произрастают еще упомянутые породы, простирается лесная зона на всем протяжении с севера на юг имеет непрерывный характер. К востоку от них начинается членение на лесную зону на севере и степную на юге. Этот рубеж и можно считать западной границей Евразии, т.е. ее граница с Азией на Дальнем Востоке переходит в долготях выклинивания сплошной степной полосы при ее приближении к Тихому Океану, т.е. в долготях Хингана.

Евразийский мир есть мир "периодической и в то же время симметрической системы зон". Границы основных евразийских зон со значительной точностью приурочены к пролеганию определенных климатических рубежей. Так, например, южная граница тундры отвечает линии, соединяющей пункты со средней годовой относительной влажностью в 1 час дня около 79,5%. (Относительная влажность в час дня имеет особенно большое значение для жизни растительности и почв). Южная граница лесной зоны пролегает по линии, соединяющей пункты с такой же относительной влажностью в 67,5%. Южной границе степи (на ее соприкосновении с пустыней) отвечает одинаковая

относительная влажность в 1 час дня в 55,5%. В пустыне она повсюду ниже этой величины. Здесь обращает на себя внимание равенство интервалов, охватывающих лесную и степную зоны. Такие совпадения и такое же ритмическое распределение интервалов можно установить и по другим признакам (см. нашу книгу "Географические особенности России", часть 1-я, Прага 1927). Это и дает основание говорить о "периодической системе зон России-Евразии". Она является также системой симметрической, но уже не в смысле восточно-западных симметрий, о которых мы говорили в предыдущем, но в смысле симметрий юго-северных. Безлесию севера (тундра) здесь отвечает безлесие юга (степь). Содержание кальция и процент гумуса в почвах от срединных частей черноземной зоны симметрически уменьшаются к северу и к югу. Симметрическое распределение явлений замечается и по признаку окраски почв. Наибольшей интенсивности она достигает в тех же срединных частях горизонтальной зоны. И к северу, и к югу она ослабевает (переходя через коричневые оттенки к белесым). По пескам и каменистым субстратам от границы между лесной и степной зоной симметрически расходятся: степные острова к северу и "островные" леса к югу. Эти явления русская наука определяет как "экстразональные". Степные участки в лесной зоне можно характеризовать, как явление "югоносное", островные леса в степи суть явления "североносные". Югоносным формациям лесной зоны отвечают североносные формации степи.

Нигде в другом месте Старого света постепенность переходов в пределах зональной системы, ее "периодичность" и в то же время "симметричность" не выражены столь ярко, как на равнинах России-Евразии.

Русский мир обладает предельно прозрачной географической структурой. В этой структуре Урал вовсе не играет той определяющей и разделяющей роли, которую ему приписывала (и продолжает приписывать) географическая "вампика". Урал, "благодаря своим орографическим и геологическим особенностям, не только не разъединяет, а наоборот теснейшим образом связывает "Доуральскую и Зауральскую Россию", лишняя раз доказывая, что географически обе они в совокупности составляют один нераздельный континент Евразии". Тундра, как горизонтальная зона, залегает и к западу, и к востоку от Урала. Лес простирается и по одну и по другую его сторону. Не иначе обстоит дело относительно степи и пустыни (эта последняя окаймляет и с востока и с запада южное продолжение Урала Мугоджары). На рубеже Урала мы не наблюдаем существенного изменения географической обстановки. Гораздо существенней географический предел "междуморий", т.е. пространств между Черным и Балтийским морями, с одной стороны, Балтийским морем и побережьем северной Норвегии с другой.

Своеобразная, предельно четкая и в то же время простая географическая структура России-Евразии связывается с рядом важнейших геополитических обстоятельств.

Природа евразийского мира минимально благоприятна для разного рода "сепаратизмов" будь то политических, культурных или экономических. "Мозаически-дробное" строение Европы и Азии содействует возникновению вению небольших замкнутых, обособленных мирков. Здесь есть материальные предпосылки для существования малых государств, особых для каждого города или провинции культурных укладов, экономических областей, обладающих большим хозяйственным разнообразием на узком пространстве. Совсем иное дело в Евразии. Широко выкроенная сфера "флагоподобного" расположения зон не содействует ничему подобному. Бесконечные равнины приучают к широте горизонта, к размаху геополитических комбинаций. В пределах степей, передвигаясь по земле, в пределах лесов по воде многочисленных здесь рек и озер, человек находился тут в постоянной миграции, непрерывно меняя свое место обитания. Этнические и культурные

элементы пребывали в интенсивном взаимодействии, скрещивании и перемешивании. В Европе и Азии временами бывало возможно жить только интересами своей колокольни. В Евразии, если это и удастся, то в историческом смысле на чрезвычайно короткий срок. На севере Евразии имеются сотни тысяч кв. км. лесов, среди которых нет ни одного гектара пашни. Как прожить обитателям этих пространств без соприкосновения с более южными областями? На юге на не меньших просторах расстилаются степи, пригодные для скотоводства, а отчасти и для земледелия, при том, однако, что на пространстве многих тысяч кв. км. здесь нет ни одного дерева. Как прожить населению этих областей без хозяйственного взаимодействия с севером? Природа Евразии в гораздо большей степени подсказывает людям необходимость политического, культурного и экономического объединения, чем мы наблюдаем то в Европе и Азии. Недаром именно в рамках евразийских степей и пустынь существовал такой "унифицированный" во многих отношениях уклад, как быт кочевников на всем пространстве его бытования: от Венгрии до Манчжурии и на всем протяжении истории от скифов до современных монголов. Недаром в просторах Евразии рождались такие великие политические объединительные попытки, как скифская, гуннская, монгольская (XIII-XIV вв.) и др. Эти попытки охватывали не только степь и пустыню, но и лежащую к северу от них лесную зону и более южную область "горного окаймления" Евразии. Недаром над Евразией веет дух своеобразного "братства народов", имеющий свои корни в вековых соприкосновениях и культурных слияниях народов различнейших рас от германской (крымские готы) и славянской до тунгусско-манчжурской, через звенья финских, турецких, монгольских народов. Это "братство народов" выражается в том, что здесь нет противоположения "высших" и "низших" рас, что взаимные притяжения здесь сильнее, чем отталкивания, что здесь легко просыпается "воля к общему делу". История Евразии, от первых своих глав до последних, есть сплошное тому доказательство. Эти традиции и восприняла Россия, в своем основном историческом деле. В XIX и начале XX вв. они бывали по временам замутнены нарочитым "западничеством", которое требовало от русских, чтобы они ощущали себя "европейцами" (каковыми на самом деле они не были) и трактовали другие евразийские народы, как "азиатов" и "низшую расу". Такая трактовка не приводила Россию ни к чему, кроме бедствий (например, русская дальневосточная авантюра начала XX в.). Нужно надеяться, что к настоящему времени эта концепция преодолена до конца в русском сознании и что последние русские "европеизма", еще укрывающиеся в эмиграции, лишены всякого исторического значения. Только преодолением нарочитого "западничества" открывается путь к настоящему братству евразийских народов: славянских, финских, турецких, монгольских и прочих.

Евразия и раньше играла объединительную роль в Старом свете. Современная Россия, воспринимая эту традицию, должна решительно и бесповоротно отказаться от прежних методов объединения, принадлежащих изжитой и преодоленной эпохе методов насилия и войны. В современный период дело идет о путях культурного творчества, о вдохновении, озарении, сотрудничестве. Обо всем этом и говорят евразийцы. Несмотря на все современные средства связи, народы Европы и Азии все еще, в значительной мере, сидят каждый в своей клетушке, живут интересами колокольни. Евразийское "месторазвитие", по основным свойствам своим, приучает к общему делу. Назначение евразийских народов своим примером увлечь на эти пути также другие народы мира. И тогда могут оказаться полезными для вселенского дела и те связи этнографического родства, которыми ряд евразийских народов сопряжен с некоторыми внеевразийскими нациями: индоевропейские связи русских, переднеазиатские и иранские отношения евразийских турок, те точки соприкосновения, которые имеются между евразийскими монголами и народами Восточной Азии. Все они могут пойти на пользу в деле строения новой, органической культуры, хотя и Старого, но все еще (верим) молодого, но чреватого большим будущим Света.

Жан Тириар

СВЕРХЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКИЙ КОММУНИЗМ

(Письмо к немецкому читателю)⁸⁴

Современная история будет далее оперировать понятием не территориального, а континентального государства. Уже в 1962-1963 гг. в своей книге "Европа империя с населением 400 миллионов человек" я довольно подробно описал пути создания Европы "от Дублина до Бухареста". Являясь свидетелем так называемого "крестового похода" 1941-1945 гг., я уже в 1963 г. подчеркивал, что такая Европа должна будет любой ценой избегать конфликта с Востоком, более того, даже не питать антагонизма к нему.

Ускорение хода истории заставляет меня уже сегодня сказать, что теперь речь должна идти уже не о мирном сосуществовании между Западной Европой и СССР, а о создании единой Европы от Владивостока до Дублина. Нужно понять, что Россия относится к числу европейских стран, и что она является единственной европейской державой, независимой от мировой американской империи.

Наше историческое мышление должно отвлечься от типа идеологии нынешнего СССР. Марксистский коммунизм это не нечто ужасное, а нечто глупое. Эта идеология должна исчезнуть под давлением фактов. Она исчезнет, потому что в один прекрасный день, который, видимо, уже не за горами, советское руководство убедится в том, что эндемическая слабость экономики СССР обусловлена именно марксистскими догмами. Если советское руководство хочет удержаться у власти а это зависит от того, выживет ли Советский Союз, то ему придется сделать поворот в сторону "исторического образа мышления" и избавиться от ослабляющего его догматизма.

Рубеж, проходящий по линии Любек-София, продолжает оставаться исторической нелепостью. Он неотвратимо напоминает о разделе Германии середины XVII в. между протестантскими и католическими государствами, который, начиная со времен Ришелье и Мазарини, позволил Франции на 250 лет отсрочить создание Второго Райха.

Как некогда Вестфальский договор дал возможность Франции вмешиваться в дела Германии, так Ялтинский договор позволил США вмешиваться в дела Европы. Некоторые немцы готовы сегодня беспрекословно подчиняться американцам. Это достойно лишь презрения. Вот уже 30 лет, как Бонн опорожняет ночной горшок Госдепартамента. Помимо этого, в нынешней Германии отмечаются две другие тенденции: тяга к нейтрализму, с одной стороны, и к национализму с другой.

Рассмотрим сначала вопрос о немецком национализме. Германия не была разбита в 1945 г. В драматической ситуации ее мужество приобрело шекспировский характер. Ее военное умение неоспоримо. В июне 1940 г. французский правящий класс без оглядки бежал из Парижа. В апреле 1945 г. немецкое руководство гибло в боях на улицах Берлина. В 1945 г. Германия была не разбита, а раздавлена. Окончательно. Лишь в течение 12 лет Германия существовала как единое сформированное государство, тогда как Англия, Франция, Испания были таковыми веками. Но если Германия и была раздавлена в 1945 г., то она сама к этому стремилась. Гитлер хотел создать германскую Европу. Идея "европейской" Европы была выше его понимания. Человек исключительный во многих

⁸⁴ Декабрь 1982 г. Текст этого письма передан А.Дугину непосредственно его автором в 1992 г. (ред.)

отношениях, он проявил полнейшую близорукость по этому вопросу. Будучи провинциалом, выходцем из Центральной Европы, он оказался неспособным оценить огромную важность Средиземного моря для геостратегии. Кроме того, он не мог подняться до мысли, что другие народы тоже могут обладать выдающимися качествами. Его презрение к русскому человеку, к славянину, явилось причиной недооценки им отваги русского солдата. Геббельсовская пропаганда изображала русских как сомнительную помесь татар, монгол и калмыков. Фотослужбы Отдела пропаганды и кинооператоры "РК" фронта старались перещеголять друг друга в этой области.

Сегодня я выписываю журнал "Revue militaire sovietique" (Советское военное обозрение). В противоположность публикациям геббельсовской пропаганды советские солдаты изображаются здесь "с симпатичными лицами, совсем как у наших ребят": высокие, со светлыми, коротко подстриженными волосами и "веселым взглядом". Доктор Геббельс не говорил нам, что они являются потомками варягов. Тех варягов, которые беспрепятственно могли вступать в войска "СС". Они полностью соответствовали расовым признакам, по которым отбирались кандидаты в эти отборные части Третьего Райха.

Лубочные картинки тоже меняются со сменой политического строя и исторической эпохи. Сегодня сводный тель-авивско-вашингтонский отдел пропаганды изображает советскую армию как армию, которая в Афганистане только и делает, что насилует, жжет и убивает исключительно детей, женщин и стариков.

В молодости я остро пережил неудачную попытку франко-германского сближения в 1940-1942 гг. Принимая адмирала Дарлана в Бертехсгадене 14 мая 1941 г., Гитлер еще находился под впечатлением побега Гесса в Англию (11 мая 1941 г.). Гитлер не был великодушен, он не был способен на то, чтобы франко-германский конфликт кончился без побежденного и Франция не была уничтожена. Та самая Франция, которая еще владела африканскими, особенно средиземноморскими колониями и абсолютно целым флотом. В союзе с Францией Гитлер мог бы, пройдя через Сирию, захватить Ирак, нанеся тем самым поражение Англии в Средиземном море. Английский флот был бы тогда вынужден уйти из Средиземного моря. "Все было возможно" уже на следующий день после Мерс-эль-Кебирской бойни 3 июля 1940 г., когда английский флот расправился с безоружными моряками адмирала Жансуля. В последовавшую за этим событием неделю Гитлер легко мог бы вовлечь Францию в свою войну против Англии. Но для этого нужно было обладать великодушием и мыслить по-европейски. Гитлер не был великим европейцем. Он был лишь великим немцем.

Я пережил и выстрадал все это. Я принимал активное участие в событиях, но не на стороне Германии, а на стороне национал-социализма. Многие из нас были тогда разочарованы, а некоторые чувствовали себя еще и одуроченными. И все же мы до конца бились на стороне Райха. Многие мои товарищи заплатили за это своей жизнью: одни погибли на Восточном фронте, другие были расстреляны сразу же по окончании войны в мае 1945 г. Благодаря влиятельным адвокатам мне удалось легко отделаться тремя годами обычной тюрьмы, что было чуть ли не подарком. Из всей этой истории я сделал вывод, что национализм подчиняющий, эксплуатирующий и унижающий побежденного, приносит неисчислимый вред. Гитлер был неспособен подняться до объединяющего национализма.

Немецкий и французский национализмы принесли не мало бед и вреда. Поэтому сегодня нужно беспощадно подавлять во имя европейских интересов малейшее проявление немецкого национализма.

Германии нечего жаловаться на то, что ей нанесли поражение в 1945 г.

Она сама шла к этому, унижая поляков и русских и презирая французов.

Гитлеровская Германия ошиблась, выбрав в союзники Италию Муссолини. Этот союз стоил ей целого ряда глупостей и ошибок. Муссолини препятствовал малейшему сближению Франции с Германией. Именно поэтому Германия и, в частности, ряд видных нацистов-англофилов ошиблись и в выборе врага. Рудольф Гесс неудачно, слишком буквально, применил концепции генерала Хаусхофера, адъютантом которого он был во время Первой мировой войны 1914-1918 гг. В 1940 г. беспощадным врагом Германии была не континентальная Франция, а морская держава Англия. Именно Англия в течение вот уже пяти веков является исконным и главным врагом Европы.

В 1945 г. Третий Райх потерпел полный крах. Но не только Германия проиграла эту войну. Мы все ее проиграли. Сначала голландцы были изгнаны из своих колоний. Затем Франция и Англия и, наконец, Бельгия. После постыдной потери Алжира в 1962 г. Франция окончательно перестала существовать как независимая держава. Мы все вместе проиграли эту войну. Уже с конца 1941 г. англичане начали вытеснять французов из стран Ближнего Востока (Сирия). В отместку французы помогли сионистам изгнать англичан из Палестины. Еще до 1945 г. англичане и французы постарались лишить Италию ее африканских колоний. Наконец, в 1960 г. по приказу Вашингтона бельгийцы оставили Конго, самую богатую страну во всей Африке. Наши националистические распри привели к гибели всю Европу или, по крайней мере, многонациональную Европу. Теперь пришло время создавать мононациональную, единую континентальную Европу, великую Европу "от Владивостока до Дублина".

Соединяя ясные геополитические концепции Хаусхофера с мощью Советской армии, нужно попытаться, идя с востока на запад, осуществить то, что Гитлер не сумел проделать, идя с запада на восток. Нужно избавить коммунизм от его неэффективности, обусловленной марксистскими и ленинскими догмами. Коммунизм советского типа следует очистить от марксизма, усовершенствовать, подвергнуть мутации.

Необходимо осуществить синтез немарксистского коммунизма с нерасистским национал-социализмом. Я против неэффективного коммунизма, но за эффективный. Именно в этом состоит суть национал-коммунизма. Этот синтез должен отражать гениальное понимание сути империи Александром Великим и Цезарем: империя это интегрирующий, гибкий национализм. Победенный становится партнером, помощником и, наконец, соотечественником. Я говорю об "имперском коммунизме", некоем Новом Риме или "Великой Пруссии", об империи, которая явится выражением идеи государства с более совершенной функциональной структурой, об империи, право присоединиться к которой будет даваться не каждому государству.

При этом не исключается опасность возникновения классического русского национализма, являвшегося способом подавления и эксплуатации других народов. Если СССР попытается навязать нам Европу русского типа, то эта попытка провалится еще быстрее, чем попытка гитлеровской Германии. Напротив, если СССР постарается применить принципы "советского" национализма имперского типа, национализма интегрирующего, у него будет гораздо больше шансов на успех. Понятия "Великая Русь" и "Советская империя" отражают две противоположные концепции, а именно, концепции подавляющего и интегрирующего национализма. Подавляющий национализм порождает, усиливает и обостряет национализм соседних государств. Он сам плодит своих

противников, своих антагонистов. В случае неудачи проводимого им геноцида такой национализм обречен на провал в силу заложенного в нем внутреннего противоречия.

Для подавляющего большинства людей смена концепции "территориального" (подавляющего) национализма на концепцию "континентального" имперского национализма является трудной, если не невозможной умственной операцией.

Подавляющий национализм напоминает эволюционный выбор, сделанный членистоногими. Он работает по жестко заданной программе. Он сам положил себе предел. В отличие от него интегрирующий национализм, отражающий "имперскую концепцию", напоминает позвоночных. Теоретически его территориальное расширение может быть беспредельным. Будь то на верхнем уровне концепции или на нижнем уровне идеологии, выбору членистоногих, как противоположности выбора позвоночных, можно найти аналогию в целом ряде областей: от религии до образования наций, включая разработку политических теорий. Так, иудейская религия, основанная на расовом подходе, разделяет участь членистоногих. С демографической точки зрения, она получила лишь весьма ограниченное распространение. Напротив, христианская и исламская религии, не ограниченные ни языковыми, ни расовыми критериями, получили широчайшее распространение.

Ограниченная расово-языковыми рамками экспансия гитлеровской Германии тоже пошла путем членистоногих. Она закончилась роковым несварением желудка неспособностью переварить 200 миллионов славян. Вчерашних "Дерулед" и нынешних "Дебре", а также вздыхающих по каске с шишаком или по свастике, следует также зачислить в класс членистоногих. Все они стиснуты панцирем своих жестких идеологий. Что касается европейского национализма, то он служит аналогией эволюции позвоночных. Он является своего рода открытой системой. Он характеризуется гибкостью, интеграционной способностью. Для его понимания требуется уровень мышления, абсолютно недоступный большинству "обыкновенных националистов".

Здесь мы подходим к вопросу об извечной попытке нейтрализации, "финляндизации" Германии.

Жизнь безжалостна к слабым. То же самое можно сказать и об истории. Сегодняшняя Европа, раздираемая на части узколобыми националистами (французскими, немецкими, английскими и т.д.), является потенциальным "полем битвы". В этом она сходна с Германией середины XVII в. Как когда-то говорили о "Германиях-марионетках", дергаемых за веревочку Ришелье и Мазарини, так сегодня можно говорить о "Европах, которыми манипулирует Вашингтон".

Всех тех, кто рабски смиряется с американским господством в Европе (особенно в Западной Германии, где оно носит совершенно неприкрытый характер) и готовы пойти на "финляндизацию" Западной Германии, можно назвать мазохистами от истории. В 1840 г., когда лучшие представители Германии боролись за объединение Второго Рейха, такие мазохисты превозносили добродетели Вестфальского мира (двухсотлетний план заключения договора). Так, некий Кристоф Гак прославлял историческое ничтожество Германии. Этот тип людишек, согласных купить мир ценой исторической кастрации, совсем не нов.

Сегодня нужно искать сближения с Советским Союзом. Нужно вести переговоры сначала о сближении, затем об объединении и, наконец, о слиянии с ним. Речь идет о совершенно откровенных переговорах. Нам не нужен мир между кошкой и мышкой.

Западная Германия должна получить право на равенство и достоинство в рамках Западной Европы. Для этого нужно отбросить еврейско-американские тезисы "виновного народа" и первородного греха немцев. Это библейский бред. Образ бесчеловечной Германии тщательно культивируется с помощью всех средств массовой информации во Франции, Англии, Бельгии, Голландии, Италии. Эта пропаганда имеет своей целью разделить Западную Европу, воспрепятствовать ее объединению, беря старые раны.

Вооруженные силы Западной Германии, Бундесвер, сведены сегодня до положения колониальной пехоты (вроде сенегальцев в войне 1914-1918 гг.) США.

Нынешняя Германия должна набраться мужества, чтобы изгнать из себя злых духов и сказать себе, что национал-социализм окончательно принадлежит прошлому. В любом случае Гитлер совершил не больше преступлений, чем те, кто обагрили свои руки кровью, разбомбив Гамбург или бесцельно разрушив Дрезден в 1945 г., не говоря уже о 1500 женщин, детей и стариков, невинно убитых недавно в Ливане. Каждый должен отвечать за свои проступки, но, в конце концов, наступает время, когда эти проступки должны стать предметом изучения не политиков, а историков. Это время пришло для Германии. Почти все уцелевшие участники войны 1939-1945 гг. уже умерли. Новое поколение немцев не должно взваливать на себя наследие Гитлера. С одной стороны, Германия не должна полностью снимать с себя ответственность за военные преступления, с другой сегодня она вправе требовать соблюдения принципа срока давности и по отношению к себе. Германия не должна больше мириться со своей ролью падчерицы Общего рынка или НАТО. Падчерицы, приемные родители которой "ужасны".

Западная Европа должна стремиться к вооруженному нейтралитету и избегать безоружного нейтралитета. Только мазохисты, наивные люди и скопцы могут ратовать за такой нейтралитет. Европа должна выставить вон 400 000 размещенных в ней американских солдат. Риск войны кроется в американском военном присутствии в Европе. Пентагон, подчиненный Госдепартаменту, который покровительствует государству Израиль, может сыграть в "атомный покер" в Европе в ответ на действия СССР в Средиземноморье или какой-нибудь другой части мира.

Если ядерное оружие будет находиться в руках европейцев (включая, конечно, западных немцев), то Советский Союз подвергается несравненно большему риску ядерного конфликта, чем если оно будет в руках у американцев, размещенных в Европе. Европа это извечное поле битвы, испытательный полигон. Здесь есть над чем задуматься. Мы познали ужасы войны как в России в 1941-1943 гг., так и у себя в 1943-1945 гг. Здесь знают, что такое война, и решаются на нее лишь в крайнем случае. В Вашингтоне, столице страны, у берегов которой вот уже почти два века не появлялась вражеская канонерка, не знают, что такое война.

Европа должна положить в основу своей политики заключение союза с Востоком, союза, обусловленного геополитическими соображениями. Европа, простирающаяся с запада на восток, не может остановиться на линии Любек-София. Одновременно, и великие Советы, идущие с востока на запад, не могут остановиться на этом искусственно установленном рубеже. Наше отдаленное будущее можно прочесть на географической карте. Граница, проходящая вдоль линии Любек-София, является линией обороны, чрезвычайно уязвимой в случае ведения маневренной войны. Наличие такой границы весьма опасно, с геостратегической точки зрения. Защищать ее очень трудно. Именно этим объясняется важность, которую СССР придает классическим вооружениям. "Фланг" Любек-София является единственным слабым местом советской обороны на дальних подступах. Со всех

других сторон СССР хорошо защищен благодаря своему климату (на севере) и огромным расстояниям (на юге). Выражаясь в терминах классической военной науки, американскую армию, базирующуюся в Западной Германии, можно было бы сравнить с одной советской армией, стоящей в Канаде между Монреалем и Виннипегом. В этом чисто гипотетическом случае основная часть американских сухопутных сил была бы расположена между Миннеаполисом и Бостоном.

"Естественными" берегами СССР (в противоположность границам) являются Канарские острова, Азорские острова, Ирландия, Исландия. То же относится и к Западной Европе.

"Культурная" или "экономически развитая" нация немыслима без опоры на "политически сильную" нацию. С 1648 по 1870 г. Германия являлась примером "культурной" нации, славилась своим фарфором и музыкантами. При этом она служила полем битвы для кого угодно. Без армии нет нации, а сегодня нет армии без ядерного оружия. Потеряв свои колонии, такие страны, как Англия и Франция, являются ныне лишь ПАРОДИЯМИ на великие державы. Отныне нации с численностью населения меньше 200-300 миллионов жителей не имеют никакого международного веса. История предлагает нам на выбор два варианта:

- 1) Советский Союз завоевывает Западную Европу или ему приходится это сделать в порядке превентивной войны;
- 2) войны удастся избежать, и Западная Европа, избавленная от политических наймитов Вашингтона, идет на политический союз с Востоком.

Сотрудничество, партнерство, союз и, наконец, объединение. Германия, которая сегодня стоит одной ногой на Западе, а другой на Востоке, лучше всех может справиться с ролью посредника.

В Германии существует националистическое движение левацкого толка, возникшее в Западном Берлине в перерыве между хэппенингом и вечеринкой с приемом наркотиков. Отец Брандт уже обесчестил свою страну и свою расу. Ныне мы можем любоваться романтическими фантазмами его отпрыска Петера. Преобразование Бундесвера в "Национальную народную армию" по типу югославской это сушая потеха. Даже в случае воссоединения (я допускаю такую гипотезу) Германия стала бы лишь карликовой державой, такой, как Франция Миттерана или Англия Тэтчер, кичащиеся своей "независимостью" от США, СССР и Китая. Жалкие молодые люди, тянущиеся к Петеру Брандту, хотят вернуть времена романтической Германии до 1848 г., Германии до Фихте. В 1982 г. речь идет уже не только о Германии - "поле битвы", а всей Европе - "поле битвы".

Религиозная война между "марксистским коммунизмом" и "демократизмом" ослепляет большинство этих людей, и эта слепота мешает им осознать геополитическую реальность. Чтобы Европа не стала "полем битвы", нужно перевести направление возможного советского наступления на Гибралтар, Дублин и Касабланку. С Советским Союзом нужно искать согласия и уже сейчас закладывать основы эффективного сотрудничества. Местом затяжной войны должна стать Африка между 20 градусами северной широты и 20 градусами южной широты. Даже если эти зоны будут частично опустошены, это не слишком сильно отразится на будущем человечества.

Чтобы избежать разрушения Европы, мы должны сознательно идти на тесное сотрудничество с СССР, сотрудничество, а не надувательство, предложенное Гитлером французам в 1940-1942 гг. Западная Европа и СССР должны создать некое "сообщество судеб", диктуемое географией, брак по расчету, принудительный брак.

СССР и Западная Европа должны как можно скорее разработать вместе некий противовес доктрины Монро. Нашей доктриной Монро должен стать девиз "...ни одного солдата, ни одного американского солдата на Средиземном море". Европейские проблемы должны решаться самими европейцами. Русские такие же европейцы, как и немцы, французы, англичане и другие европейские народы.

Мы должны заставить американцев уйти из Европы не только по геополитическим причинам. Их присутствие в Европе можно сравнить с завоеванием Карфагена нами Сицилии под боком у Римской республики. Оставаясь в Европе и увеличивая опасность возникновения войны, американцы не смогут справиться с кризисом своего общества, который лишь начинается. Мы рискуем заразиться от них. Этот кризис общества обусловлен распадом трех сфер:

- 1) технико-экономического строя,
- 2) политики, строящейся на убеждении, демагогии, словом, "демократизме",
- 3) помешавшейся культуре.

Технико-экономический строй является отражением материалистического мира, мира науки, рационализма, предвидения. Вторая сфера, сфера политики, не поддается никакому логическому анализу, никакому рационалистическому подходу. Здесь преобладает аргументация убеждения (в первой сфере преобладает логико-экспериментальная аргументация). Что касается культуры, то ее сегодня следует скорее относить к области психиатрии. По крайней мере, в США. Только тоталитарная система может привести в равновесие эти три сферы.

В политику уже давно пора ввести понятие рационализма. В моей следующей работе "Евро-советская империя" я посвящу целую главу вопросу, должна ли политика, метаполитика, строиться на силе или наслаждении (удовольствии).

Северная Америка сделала свой окончательный выбор в пользу гедонизма, и вся ее политика направлена на "средства наслаждения". Такой выбор завел бы человечество в тупик. Остается заставить коммунистов поумнеть и объяснить им, в чем состояла бы метаполитика, направленная на "средства действия" или, иначе говоря, на средства силы.

Уже Гоббс показал, что свобода покоится на силе. В нашу эпоху научно-технической революции к этому можно добавить, что сила служит знанию (космические исследования, фундаментальные исследования в области физики), а знание придает силы.

Если мы хотим создать *homo novus*, то нам придется сделать выбор между силой и удовольствием. Мечтой Маркса было дать каждому по потребности. Сегодня эту мечту можно легко осуществить. Достижение изобилия проблема планирования и воли. На ее решение потребовалось бы не более четверти века. Это изобилие привело бы либо к появлению общества гедонистского типа, обреченного на упадок (США), либо к превращению обычного человека в *homo novus*.

Хаксли и Оруэлл отметили лишь возможную отрицательную сторону "Прекрасного нового мира". Положительная же его сторона осталась неизвестной им.

Вспомните также пророчество Кестлера: "Тезис победители, антитезис побежденные, синтез победители и побежденные становятся сплоченными гражданами гигантской новой евразийской родины".

Я бы изменил его: "Тезис расистский национал -социализм, антитезис марксистский коммунизм, синтез великоевропейский национал-большевизм, иначе говоря, элитный имперский коммунизм, отвергший Маркса как идеолога и Гитлера как ограниченного близорукого националиста..."

Национал-социализм был великолепной школой эффективности, той самой эффективности, которой так не хватает марксистскому коммунизму.

Обыкновенному коммунизму нужно сделать ребенка, чтобы у него родился необыкновенный отпрыск, своего рода "одаренное чудовище", "сверхчеловеческий коммунизм".

Уже в 1941 г. Кестлер знал, кто должен стать его отцом.

Карл Шмитт

***ПЛАНЕТАРНАЯ НАПРЯЖЕННОСТЬ МЕЖДУ ВОСТОКОМ И ЗАПАДОМ И ПРОТИВОСТОЯНИЕ ЗЕМЛИ И МОРЯ*⁸⁵**

Противостояние Востока и Запада, совершенно очевидное сегодня, включает в себя противоречия различного рода: экономические интересы, качественное различие правящих элит и несовместимость основополагающих интеллектуальных установок. Все эти противоречия возрастают, взаимно усиливая друг друга. Однако связь экономических, социологических и духовных напряжений проявлялась во всех великих войнах человеческой истории. Особенность современного антагонизма состоит в том, что эта напряженность стала глобальной и охватывает собой всю планету. Поэтому сегодня совершенно необходимо адекватно разобрать ту историческую и геополитическую подоплеку, на которой основано это напряженное противостояние.

Мы ведем речь о противоположности Востока и Запада. При этом очевидно, что речь не может идти лишь о географических различиях. В ходе нашего исследования мы обстоятельно разберем, о каком виде противоположности здесь идет речь, и покажем, что существует два различных типа напряженного противостояния: историко-диалектическое и статично-полярное.

Противоположность Востока и Запада не есть полярная противоположность. Земля имеет Северный и Южный полюса, но не имеет ни Восточного, ни Западного. В условиях нашей планеты географическая противоположность Запада и Востока не является чем-то фиксированным и статичным; это только динамическое отношение, связанное с суточным "убыванием света". В географическом смысле, Америка является Западом по отношению к Европе; по отношению к Америке Западом являются Китай и Россия; а по отношению к Китаю и России Запад это Европа. В чисто географическом смысле, четкие полюса отсутствуют, а следовательно, исходя только из географии совершенно невозможно понять реально существующую планетарную враждебную напряженность между Востоком и Западом и мыслить ее основополагающую структуру.

1.

Можно пойти по пути исследования исторической, культурной и моральной специфики нынешнего Востока и нынешнего Запада и таким образом вычленив целый ряд антитез, которые, без сомнения, имеют очень важное значение. Здесь я бы хотел употребить один термин, введенный в оборот географом Джоном Готтманом в его блестящей работе "La politique des Etats et leur geographie"⁸⁶: понятие региональной иконографии (иконаграфии пространства) *iconographie regionale*. Различные картины мира и представления, возникшие как результат различных религий, традиций, разного исторического прошлого, разных социальных моделей образуют автономные пространства. В этом смысле к иконографии определенного пространства принадлежат не только картины и произведения пластического искусства, но также и все видимые формы общественной и частной жизни. На существенное значение искусства в данной связи указал недавно Луис Диез дель Корраль, в своей книге "Похищение Европы", которую можно назвать энциклопедией европейской иконографии. Различие между пониманием формы в тех или

⁸⁵ Carl Schmitt "Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West", 1959 in "Schmittiana-- III" von prof. Piet Tommissen, Brussel, 1991 (ред.).

⁸⁶ "Политика Государств и их география" (фр.)(ред.).

иных культурных регионах, и особенно в сфере структуры власти и государственного устройства, исследовал Карлос Ольеро. В понятие "иконография пространства" мы можем включить помимо различных форм общественной жизни также и все прочие типические формы проявления человеческого бытия, системы характерных импликаций, аллюзий, символический язык чувств и мыслей в том виде, в котором они характерны для определенных территорий с особой неповторимой культурой.

Сюда же относятся образы прошлого, мифы, саги и легенды, точно так же, как и все символы и табу, топографически локализованные в одном определенном пространстве и только в силу этого обретающие историческую действительность. Готтман говорит в этой связи о "циркуляции иконографий", т.е. о динамическом влиянии территориальных культур друг на друга в течение времени. Таким образом, на место знаменитой теории "циркуляции элит" Парето приходит не менее важная теория циркуляции иконографий.

Употребление слова (и понятия) "иконография" кажется мне в данном случае вполне уместным и плодотворным, прежде всего потому, что этот термин точнее всего вскрывает сущность противостояния Востока и Запада. Отношение к образу, иконе обнаруживает сущностные качества Востока и Запада в их наиболее глубинном измерении:

Восток традиционно выступает как противник зрительных изображений, картин и икон, Запад же, напротив, как оплот почитания иконописи и, шире, живописи.

Когда речь идет об иконоборчестве или запрете на изображение Бога, образованный европеец вспоминает события из истории Византии, о борьбе вокруг иконоборческой ереси времен короля Льва (717-741) и о признании иконописи Карлом Великим. На память приходит также запрет изображать Бога в Ветхом Завете и в исламе. Некоторые зашли так далеко, что обнаруживают здесь изначальное противоречие между словесным и зрительным выражением, которое они, в свою очередь, возводят к еще более общему противоречию между слухом и зрением, акустикой и визуальностью, причем слово и слух однозначно отождествляются с Востоком, а изображение и зрение с Западом.

Употребление термина "иконография", в вышеназванном всеобъемлющем смысле, должно уберечь нас от подобных упрощений. В действительности, не существует такого географического места, где отсутствовало бы визуальное измерение реальности, и образ, изображение, икона и иконография присутствуют повсюду. Поэтому только и возможна противоположная тенденция, отрицающая ценность визуального изображения, т.е. иконоборчество в самом широком смысле. Причем проблема иконоборчества не ограничивается отнюдь Византией или исламом. Запад также знает многочисленные и весьма агрессивные формы иконоборческого духа. Виклифиты и гуситы, сектанты баптисты и пуритане, религиозные модернисты и грубые рационалисты все эти иконоборческие течения возникли и развились именно на Западе. Планетарного масштаба этот конфликт, этот основной спор всемирной истории достиг в эпоху великих географических открытий и колонизации Нового Света, и внешне он проявился в борьбе двух конфессиональных форм римского католицизма и северного протестантизма, линии иезуитов и кальвинистов. Попробуем рассмотреть иконографический аспект этого конфликта, что подведет нас к более глубокому пониманию его смысла.

Смысл Реконквисты заключался в отвоевании пространства на Иберийском полуострове для свободного почитания Образа Пречистой Божьей Матери. Однажды я написал, что испанские моряки и конквистадоры Нового Света видели символ своих исторических свершений в водружении повсюду образа Непорочной Девы Богородицы. Некоторые читатели поняли меня превратно. Один католический автор даже писал по этому поводу:

"Шмитт рассуждает о всяких христианских аксессуарах Конкисты, которые могут лишь ввести читателей в заблуждение ". Для меня икона Девы Марии это не "всякие христианские аксессуары". Более того, почитание иконы Пречистой имеет для меня огромное значение, что становится более понятным, если принять во внимание приведенные несколько выше рассуждения о связи зрительного образа, иконы с сущностью западной традиции. Я берусь утверждать, что все религиозные войны Европы XVI-XVII веков, включая Тридцатилетнюю войну на немецких землях, в действительности, были войнами за и против средневекового католического почитания иконы Девы Марии. Следует ли считать в этом контексте иконоборчество английских пуритан сугубо вос точным явлением, а иконопочитание баварских, испанских и польских католиков признаком их западной духовной природы? В византийских спорах вокруг иконоборческой ереси на богословском уровне затрагивалась христианская догма Троичности. Духовная проблема заключалась в сложности иконографического совмещения в Божестве Единства и Троичности. Но все же, было бы неверно строго отождествить догмат Троичности исключительно с Западом, а абстрактный монотеизм с Востоком. Конечно, в определенные моменты истории такое совпадение было почти полным. Монахи-франки дополнили христианский Символ Веры Запада формулой, согласно которой Святой Дух исходит не только от Отца, но и от Сына, и возмущение греческих патриархов Filioque привело к великому расколу между Западной и Восточной Церквями⁸⁷. Исходя из этого, можно было бы считать, что Filioque было выступлением Запада против Востока, но это опровергается, с одной стороны, особым учением о Троичности и Богородице сирийских Отцов Церкви, а с другой стороны, взглядами западных ариан, вообще отрицавших Божественную природу Христа. Таким образом, впечатляющее иконографическое различие между Востоком и Западом в вопросе Троичности становится не таким безусловным и абсолютным.

Традиционная иконография не статична, в нее вторгаются все новые факторы. К примеру, индустриальное вторжение техники. Современный психоанализ также вполне можно рассмотреть как проявление иконоборческой тенденции. Испанский психоаналитик Хуан Хосе Лопес Ибор предпринял очень интересное исследование этой сферы, исходя из нашего иконографического подхода к проблеме. Кроме того, практически вся современная живопись и абстрактная, и сохранившая остатки предметности несет в себе разрушение традиционного понимания образа, визуального изображения, иконы. Все три явления связаны между собой техника, психоанализ и современная живопись. Если предпринять исследование такой взаимосвязи, сопоставив ее с актуальным противостоянием Востока и Запада, можно прийти к поразительным, сенсационным выводам. Единственной преградой на этом пути является невозможность строго отождествить Восток с иконоборчеством, а Запад с иконопочитанием. Чтобы до конца осознать структуру мирового дуализма Запад-Восток нам все же следует исходить из иных критериев.

2.

⁸⁷ Католик Шмитт считает, что Filioque только подчеркивает Троичность Божества и усиливает иконографическую ориентацию христианского догмата, тогда как отказ от этого нововведения в Православной Церкви представляется ему выражением иконоборческого, ветхозаветного духа. Это совершенно неверный тезис, опровергаемый даже таким историческим наблюдением, как повсеместное распространение и почитание икон у православных народов, и особенно на Руси, где икона до сих пор играет столь колоссальную роль в религиозной практике, какую она не играла даже в периоды расцвета католицизма в Европе. Более того, введение Filioque было как раз выражением того абстрактного монотеизма и рационалистической теологии, которые ничего общего не имеют с утверждением полноты Троичности и примата Образа. Более подробно по этому поводу см. А.Дугин "Метафизика Благой Вести". (А.Д.)

История планетарной конфронтации Востока и Запада во всей своей полноте сводима к основополагающему дуализму элементов: Земли и Воды, Суши и Моря.

То, что мы сегодня называем Востоком, представляет собой единую массу твердой суши: Россия, Китай, Индия громадный кусок Суши, "Срединная Земля"⁸⁸, как назвал ее великий английский географ сэр Хэлфорд Макиндер. То, что мы именуем сегодня Западом, является одним из мировых Океанов, полушарием, в котором расположены Атлантический и Тихий океаны. Противостояние морского и континентального миров вот та глобальная истина, которая лежит в основе объяснения цивилизационного дуализма, постоянно порождающего планетарное напряжение и стимулирующего весь процесс истории.

В кульминационные моменты мировой истории столкновения воюющих держав выливаются в войны между стихией Моря и стихией Суши. Это заметили уже летописцы войны Спарты и Афин, Рима и Карфагена. Однако до определенного времени все ограничивалось областью Средиземного моря. Люди еще не знали громадных пространств, великих океанов, планетарных конфликтов. Сразу заметим, что надо делать концептуальное различие между стихией Моря и стихией Океана. Конечно, частичные параллели существуют, и многие ссылаются в этом смысле на известный пассаж из первой филиппики Демосфена (38.41). Я сам не вполне разделяю язвительности Платона, который сказал о греках, что "те сидят на берегу Средиземного моря, подобно лягушкам".

Тем не менее, между морской цивилизацией, являющейся внутриматериковой, и океанической цивилизации ей существует значительная разница. Та напряженность между Востоком и Западом, та планетарная постановка проблемы конфликта, которые характерны для нашего периода истории, не имеют аналогов в прошлом. Окончательного всемирно-исторического объема противостояние Суши и Моря (как Океана) достигает только тогда, когда человечество осваивает всю планету целиком.

Планетарный характер битвы между Сушей и Морем впервые обнаружился во времена войн Англии против революционной Франции и Наполеона. Правда, тогда деление на Сушу и Море, Восток и Запад не было еще столь четким, как сегодня. Наполеон был, в конце концов, разгромлен не Англией, но континентальными Россией, Австрией и Пруссией. "Номос" Земли⁸⁹ еще заключался тогда в равновесии между силами Суши и Моря; одно Море не могло добиться своими силами решительной победы. В 1812 году, когда столкновение достигло своего апогея, Соединенные Штаты объявили войну не Наполеону, а Англии. Тогда произошло сближение между Америкой и Россией, причем оба этих молодых государства стремились дистанцироваться как от Наполеона, так и от Англии. Противоречие между Землей и Морем, между Востоком и Западом еще не

⁸⁸ Вначале Макиндер использовал термин "Pivot area", "осевая область", позже "Heartland", "Земля Сердцевины". (А.Д.)

⁸⁹ «Номос» фундаментальная категория Карла Шмитта, ось его теории истории, права, геополитики. "Der Nomos der Erde" называется его главный труд. Номос в греческом *verbum occasionalis* от глагола *nemein*, означающем "брать, владеть, делить, распределять, устраивать и т.д.". Этимологически ему соответствует немецкое *nehmen* и *Nahme*, т.е. "брать", "взятое". Родственно слову *Nahme*, т.е. "имя". В русском языке ближе всего эту идею отражает слово "иметь" и старославянское "имать" ("брать"), от которого "имя", "имущество", "имение", откуда "поднимать", "перенимать", "отнимать", и даже "понимать" (сравни фр. *saisir* хватать, схватывать, брать, понимать). В чем-то близко значению слов "делить", "надел", "доля" (в смысле "имущество" и "судьба"). Идея "номоса" идея упорядоченной структуры, свойственной специфически человеческой исторической организации общества, семьи, территории, права и т.д. Можно соотнести понятие "номоса" у Шмитта с понятием "структуры" у французских структуралистов, причем нельзя исключить в этом случае и прямого плагиата (естественно, со стороны французов). Известен тот факт, что Шмитт в значительной степени повлиял на крупнейшего европейского гегельянца Александра Кожева, бывшего, в свою очередь, учителем Маркузе. (А.Д.)

выкристалли звалось тогда в чистое противостояние стихий, что произошло лишь в момент заключения Североатлантического союза в 1949 году.

Но уже во времена Наполеона довольно ясно проявилась закономерность политического конфликта, предопределенного различием цивилизационных стихий, т.е. такого конфликта, где надо было выбирать между Сушей и Морем. В июле 1812 года, когда Наполеон подступал к Москве, Гете сочинял панегирик якобы королеве Марии Луизе, но, на самом деле, ее супругу французскому императору:

"Там, где тысячи людей пребывают в замешательстве, там все решает один человек (Наполеон)."

Немецкий поэт продолжает, имея в виду глобальный аспект противостояния Суши и Моря:

"Там, где собираются сумерки столетий,

Он (Наполеон) рассеивает их светом духовного взора.

Все ничтожное исчезло,

Лишь Суша и Море имеют здесь значение".

("Worueber trueb Jahrhunderte gesonnen

Er uebersieht's im hellsten Geisteslicht.

Das Kleinliche ist alles weggeronnen,

Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht.")

Гете был на стороне Наполеона. Для него это была сторона Суши, Земли. Но Наполеон отождествлялся также с Западом. Запад был тогда еще Сушей и никак не Морем. Немецкий поэт искренне надеялся, что Запад так и останется воплощением сухопутной, континентальной силы, а Наполеон, как новый Александр, будет отвоевывать у сил Моря прибрежные территории, и тогда "Суша вступит в свои права."

Так Гете, типичный представитель Запада, летом 1812 года сделал выбор в пользу Суши, Земли против Моря. Конечно, в соответствии со своим мировоззрением, он понимал противостояние Земли и Моря как статичную, полярную напряженность, а не как диалектический неповторимый исторический момент. В данном случае, крайне важно то различие между статичной полярностью и исторической диалектикой, о котором мы говорили в самом начале статьи.

3.

Гете мыслил в терминах статичной полярности. Но полярная напряженность значительно отличается от напряженности историко-диалектической. Статика полярного напряжения предполагает синхронизм, постоянств во, при котором взаимодействие противоположных полюсов составляет фиксированную структуру, остающуюся сущностно одинаковой при всех внешних изменениях, проистекающих из конкретных исторических ситуаций. Это своего рода вечное возвращение.

Конкретно-исторический подход исследует, напротив, цепь логической и исторической взаимосвязи между конкретикой определенного вопроса и данного на него ответа. Вопрос и ответ дают диалектику исторически конкретного и определяют структуру исторических ситуаций и эпох. Подобная диалектика не обязательно должна отождествляться с гегелевской логикой понятий или с фатально заданной закономерностью природного течения событий.

Нас здесь интересует, однако, исследование структуры конкретно существующего в нашем мире планетарного дуализма (а не общая теория исторического процесса). Историческое мышление есть мышление однократными, одноразовыми историческими ситуациями и, следовательно, одноразовыми истинами. Все исторические параллели служат лишь наилучшему распознаванию этой единственности, в противном случае они становятся лишь мертвыми функциональными элементами абстрактной системы, которой в реальной жизни просто не существует. Абсурдно и нереалистично делать предположения такого рода: что случилось бы, если бы события приняли иной оборот, нежели они приняли в реальной истории. К примеру, а что, если бы сарацины победили в битве при Пуатье? Что, если бы Наполеон не проиграл сражения при Ватерлоо? Что, если бы зима 41/42 была не такой холодной? Такие нелепые предположения, которые можно встретить даже у знаменитых историков, абсурдны уже потому, что в них совершенно упускается из виду единственность и неповторимость любого исторического события. Структура полярной напряженности всегда актуальна, вечна, как вечное возвращение.

Историческая же истина, напротив, истинна лишь один раз. Она и не может быть истинной больше, чем один раз, так как именно в однократности заключается ее историчность. Одноразовость исторической истины является одним из секретов онтологии, как выразился Вальтер Варнах. Диалектическая структура вопроса и ответа, о которой мы здесь ведем речь, пытаюсь объяснить суть истории, никоим образом не ослабляет и не упраздняет качества однократности исторического события. Напротив, она только усиливает ее, поскольку речь идет о неповторимом конкретном ответе на столь же неповторимый конкретный вопрос.

Если бы противостояние между Сушей и Морем, выраженное в современном планетарном дуализме, было исключительно статично полярным, т.е. включенным в цепь природного равновесия и вечного возвращения, то оно было бы лишь фрагментом чисто природного процесса. Стихии в природе разделяются и воссоединяются, смешиваются и расслаиваются. Они сменяют друг друга и переходят друг в друга в беспрестанном круговороте метаморфоз, который открывает все новые и новые образы и формы сущности всегда тождественного полярного напряжения. Если бы дело сводилось только к такому природному статическому дуализму, актуальное противостояние Востока и Запада было бы лишь особой формой выражения вечной циркуляции элит, проблемой иконографий. Вечное возвращение и вечное превращение не знает специфической правды, неповторимой ситуации, исторического момента. Статично-полярное противостояние исключает историческую неповторимость. Но в конкретной истории все иначе. В определенные эпохи появляются дееспособные и могущественные народы и группы, которые захватывают и делят землю в процессе дружественных договоров или войн, хозяйничают на своей территории, пасут скот и т.д. Из этого образуется Номос Земли. Он ограничен своим уникальным здесь и теперь, а напряженность между элементами, о которых мы рассуждаем, между Сушей и Морем, лишь порождает природный, объективный контекст, в котором данный Номос складывается.

Если взять Землю и Море (и населяющих их существ) как исключительно природные элементы, то очевидно, что сами по себе они не могут породить враждебного

противостояния, которое имело бы сугубо исторический событийный смысл. Обитатели Моря и обитатели Суши не могут быть по своей природе абсолютными врагами. Случается, что наземные животные пожирают морских, но нелепо в данном случае говорить о какой-то вражде. Сами рыбы сплошь и рядом пожирают друг друга, особенно крупные мелких. Да и обитатели Суши относятся друг к другу не намного лучше. Поэтому нельзя утверждать, что существует природная враждебность Суши и Моря. Скорее, в чисто природном состоянии эти две стихии существуют совершенно безотносительно и безразлично друг к другу, причем в такой степени, что говорить о таком специфическом и интенсивном соотношении как вражда здесь совершенно нелепо. Каждое живое существо пребывает в своей стихии, в своей среде. Медведь не враждует по своей природе с китом, а кит не объявляет войну медведю. Даже морские и сухопутные хищники твердо знают свои границы и пределы своего обитания. Медведь не посягает на владения льва или тигра; даже самые смелые звери знают свое место и стремятся избежать неприятных столкновений. Те, кто приводят в качестве примера природной вражды отношения кошек с собаками, лишь лишней раз доказывают, что такая природная вражда резко отличается от человеческой. Когда собака лает на кошку, а кошка шипит на собаку, их конфликт имеет совершенно иной смысл, нежели вражда людей. Самое главное отличие состоит в том, что люди по контрасту с животными способны отрицать наличие самого человеческого качества у своих противников, а животные нет. Бытие собаки духовно и морально не ставит под вопрос бытия кошки и наоборот.

Однако показательно, что именно басни из жизни животных особенно выпукло иллюстрируют специфически человеческие политические ситуации и отношения. Вообще говоря, с философской точки зрения, проблема басен о животных интересна сама по себе. Перенос на животный мир сугубо человеческие политические ситуации, мы демифологизируем, проясняем их, лишаем идеологических и риторических покрывал. Именно в силу того, что отношения среди животных имеют совершенно иной смысл, нежели отношения среди людей, такой аллегорический прием когда люди выступают как звери, а звери как люди позволяет обнаружить доселе сокрытое через сознательный отход от прямолинейного и одномерного анализа. Перевоплощение в зверя отчуждает человека от человеческого, но через такое отчуждение человеческое становится только более отчетливым и выпуклым. На этом основан политический смысл басен о животных (на чем мы не будем более здесь останавливаться).

При переносе дуальности Суша-Море на человечество, казалось бы, речь должна идти о морских конфликтах между людьми Моря и сухопутных конфликтах между людьми Суши. На самом деле, дело обстоит совершенно иначе, начиная с того момента, когда историческое планетарное напряжение достигает определенного критического уровня. В отличие от животных люди и только люди способны вести войну между народами Суши и народами Моря. Когда вражда достигает своей высшей точки, военные действия захватывают все возможные области, и война с обеих сторон разворачивается как на Суше, так и на Море. Каждая из сторон вынуждена преследовать противника вглубь враждебной стихии. Когда осваивается и третья, воздушная стихия, конфликт переносится и на нее, а война становится воздушной войной. Но изначальные субъекты конфликта не утрачивают своего качества, поэтому мне представляется вполне разумным говорить именно о противостоянии элемента Земли и элемента Моря. Когда планетарно-историческое противостояние приближается к своему пику, обе стороны до предела напрягают все свои материальные, душевные и духовные силы. Тогда битва распространяется на все прилегающее к противоположащим сторонам пространства. И стихийное природное различие Суши и Моря в этом случае превращается в настоящую войну между этими элементами.

Вражда между людьми обладает особым напряжением, которое многократно превосходит напряжение, характерное для враждебности в царстве природы. В человеке все аспекты природы трансцендируются, обретают трансцендентное (или трансцендентальное, как угодно) измерение. Это дополнительное измерение можно назвать также "духовным" и вспомнить Рембо, который сказал: "Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille des hommes"⁹⁰. Как бы то ни было, вражда между людьми может достичь невероятной степени. Эта высшая степень вражды отчетливо проявляется в гражданских войнах, когда противник настолько криминализируется, морально, юридически и идеологически, что фактически ставится вне всех человеческих законов. В этом дает о себе знать какой-то свойственный лишь человеку, сугубо сверхприродный элемент, трансцендентный по отношению к его природному измерению; этот элемент порождает невероятное напряжение и превращает природную полярность в конкретную историческую диалектику.

Слово "диалектика" выражает здесь то особое качество (свойственное лишь человечеству), которое кардинально отлично от всех природных форм полярности. Слово "диалектика" указывает на структуру "вопрос-ответ", которая только и может адекватно описать историческую ситуацию или историческое событие. Историческая ситуация может быть понята только как брошенный человеку вызов и его ответ на этот вызов. Каждое историческое действие есть ответ человека на вопрос, поставленный историей. Каждое человеческое слово это ответ. Каждый ответ обретает смысл через вопрос, на который он призван отвечать; для того, кто не знает вопроса, слово остается бессмысленным. А смысл вопроса, в свою очередь, лежит в той конкретной ситуации, в которой он был поставлен.

Все это напоминает "логику вопрос-ответ" (Question-Answer Logic) Р.Дж. Коллингвуда, и в самом деле, мы именно ее имеем в виду. Коллингвуд с помощью мышления в терминах "вопрос-ответ" стремился определить специфический смысл истории. Он сделал это с блистательной точностью, так как для него данное определение означало венец философского пути по преодолению собственного внеисторического естественнонаучного позитивизма. Замысел Коллингвуда был великолепен, но английский ученый был слишком глубоко затронут английским определением науки, свойственным XIX веку, чтобы суметь преодолеть психолого-индивидуалистическое толкование проблемы "вопрос-ответ". Только этот фактор и может объяснить его болезненные, закомплексованные припадки германофобии, которые изрядно подпортили его последнее произведение "The New Leviathan"⁹¹. Но великая заслуга его "логики вопроса-ответа"

⁹⁰ «Духовная битва так же жестока, как человеческая война» (фр.).

⁹¹ Сам Шмитт, в свою очередь, мог бы быть обвинен в русофобии, основанной на столь же несостоятельных (по большому счету) предрассудках, проистекающих, однако, из другого источника: из его конфессиональной приверженности католицизму и геополитической абсолютизации Средней Европы. Армин Мелер в своей блистательной книге "Консервативная Революция в Германии 1918-1932" убедительно показал как геополитическое членение Европы на три зоны: Западная Европа (Англия, Франция), Средняя Европа (Германия, Австрия), Восточная Европа (Россия) проецируется на культурные оценки своих соседей-обитателями этих трех зон. Для англичан и французов немцы варвары, только что вышедшие из лесов, "гунны", дикие потомки Аттилы. Для самих немцев такими варварами представляются русские. Но для русских немцы, кажущиеся варварами французам и англичанам, видятся как бездушные автоматы, носители сугубо западной цивилизации и культуры (т.е. как классические, утрированные европейцы). Сами же немцы в отсутствии жизненности и исторического воодушевления упрекают французов и англичан. Кстати, эта геополитическая типология европейских этносов предопределила концепцию "юных народов" (почерпнутую немецкими консервативными революционерами у Достоевского), признающую таковыми русских и немцев. Иными словами, упреки в варварстве могли быть истолкованы и в позитивном ключе, как это имело место в русофильском (преимущественно, прусском, протестантском или языческом) лагере Консервативной Революции в Германии, к которому принадлежали Артур Мюллер ван ден Брук, Освальд Шпенглер и, особенно, Эрнст Никиш и национал-большевики. Но несмотря на свою русофобию, Шмитт

остаётся безусловной. Однако необходимо особо подчеркнуть, что вопрос здесь ставится не отдельным человеком или группой людей, и уж совсем не произвольно взятым историком, исследующим прошлое, но самой Историей, состоящей в своем качественном аспекте из вопросов и ответов. Вопрос это само по себе историческое событие, из которого произрастает через конкретный человеческий ответ следующее событие. Ровно в той степени, в какой люди принимают вызов и вопрос истории и в какой они стараются ответить на них своим отношением и своими поступками, в той степени они демонстрируют свою способность на рискованное участие в истории и, следовательно, подвергаются ее суду. Одним словом: они переходят из природного состояния в историческое.

Арнольд Тойнби развил "логику вопроса-ответа" (question-answer logic) до культурно-исторической концепции "структуры вызов-ответ"⁹² (challenge-response-structure). Концепцию "вопроса" Тойнби развил до понятия "вызова", а концепцию "ответа" до "ответа". Это было важнейшим этапом в прояснении сущностной характеристики исторического, так как здесь явно различимо не просто статично полярное, природное напряжение, разбиравшееся неисторическими индивидуально - психологическими естественнонаучными школами мысли, но напряжение, понятое диалектически. Тойнби вычленил на основании своего метода более двадцати культур или высших цивилизаций, каждая из которых основана на конкретном историческом ответе, отзыве людей на поставленный историей вопрос, брошенный ею вызов. К примеру, в случае Египта вызов заключался в природной специфике долины Нила, в привязанности к реке и в постоянной угрозе вражеских нашествий. Освоение и организация пространства долины Нила, защита от внешних, варварских влияний и основанная на этом египетская цивилизация с ее культами богов, династиями, пирамидами и священным искусством все это было конкретным ответом на брошенный вызов.

Методология познания приобрела от такого подхода чрезвычайно много, так как отныне стало возможным изучать диалектическую структуру всякой исторической ситуации. Но и сам Тойнби не смог избежать характерного заблуждения, значительно повредившего его концепции. Когда он начинает описывать механизм взаимодействия между собой выделенных им двадцати цивилизаций или культур, в его анализе пропадает самая существенная сторона исторического, структура самой истории уникальная одноразовость каждой конкретной ситуации и ее разрешения. Не существует никаких всеобщих законов мировой истории. Эта абстрактная попытка подчинить живую историю сухим

заслуживает почитания и изучения со стороны русских, подобно тому, как сам он, будучи ярким немецким националистом, легко прощает ради интеллектуальных заслуг германского брата англичанина Коллингвуда. (А.Д.)

⁹² В русском языке не существует двух слов, которые соответствовали бы английским терминам "answer" и "response". Мы в данном месте переводим их как "ответ" и "отзыв". Оба термина означают "ответ". Кстати, нет такого различия и в немецком, так что Шмитт в тексте использует английский термин "response", всякий раз, когда ссылается на Тойнби и немецкое слово "Antwort", когда имплицитно имеет в виду Коллингвуда. В самом английском языке наличие двух терминов объясняется не четким семантическим разделением, но романским дублированием (response) германского слова (answer). Мы предпочли в русском переводе в дальнейшем оба слова переводить как "ответ", чтобы не перегружать текст терминологически (тем более, что мы показали искусственность такого различия). Response как ответ-отзыв, по мысли Шмитта, описывает человеческую реакцию на вызов истории в ключе, более отвлеченном от естественнонаучных представлений, от которых концепции Коллингвуда так никогда до конца и не освободились. Впрочем, по мере изложения сам Шмитт начинает употреблять оба термина как синонимы, выбирая тот или иной, скорее, по соображениям чисто стилистического характера. То же самое можно сказать и о паре терминов "вопрос" и "вызов", question и challenge. В данном случае, Шмитт почти однозначно предпочитает слово "вызов", который он то переводит на немецкий Ruf, Anruf, то оставляет в изначальной английской форме challenge. В русской философской литературе принято этот термин всегда переводить как "вызов". (А.Д.)

закономерно стям или статистической вероятности внутри узко функциональной системы в корне неверна.

В реальности мы имеем дело лишь с одноразовыми конкретными ситуациями. И конкретная ситуация собственно нашей эпохи определяется тем, что в ней противостояние Востока и Запада приобрело характер планетарного дуализма, планетарной вражды. Когда мы пытаемся выяснить природу диалектического напряжения, порождаемого этим дуализмом, мы не стремимся вывести всеобщий закон или статистическую вероятность, не говоря уже о построении какой-то системы. Когда мы употребляем слово "диалектика", "диалектическое", мы подвергаемся риску быть неверно понятыми и причисленными к узко гегелевской школе. Это не совсем так. Историческая диалектика Гегеля, на самом деле, дает возможность осмыслить одноразовость и уникальность исторического события, что видно хотя бы из фразы Гегеля о том, что вочеловечивание Сына Божьего есть центральное событие всей человеческой истории. Из этого явствует, что история для Гегеля была не просто цепью объективных закономерностей, но обладала и субъективным измерением активного соучастия. Но во всеобщей гегелевской систематизации часто теряется историческая уникальность, и конкретное историческое событие растворяется в одномерном мыслительном процессе. Этого замечания достаточно для того, чтобы прояснить наше понимание термина "диалектика" и предупредить автоматическое зачисления в гегельянцы, что весьма свойственно для "технического", автоматического образа мысли наших современников.

Помимо неверного понимания сущности исторической диалектики, характерной для гегельянства в целом, следует также опасаться типичной для XIX столетия мании к формулировке закономерностей и открытию законов. Этой болезни подверглись практически все западные социологи и историки кроме Алексиса де Токвиля. Потребность выводить из каждой конкретной исторической ситуации всеобщий закон развития покрыла научные открытия даже самых прозорливых мыслителей прошлого столетия почти непроницаемой пеленой туманных обобщений.

Возведение конкретно-исторического факта к какому-то общечеловеческому закону было той платой, которой XIX век компенсировал свой научно-естественный позитивизм. Ученые просто не могли представить себе какую-то истину вне всеобщей, точно высчитываемой и измеряемой функциональной закономерности. Так Огюст Конт историк современности, наделенный гениальной интуицией, правильно определил сущность своей эпохи, представив ее результатом развития, состоящего из трех этапов: от богословия через метафизику к позитивизму. Это было совершенно верное замечание, точно определяющее одноразовый, осуществленный в трех моментах шаг, который совершила западная мысль с XIII по XIX век. Но позитивист Огюст Конт смог сам поверить в истинность сформулированного им принципа только после того, как заявил, что закон трех стадий распространяется на все человечество и на всю его историю. Карл Маркс, в свою очередь, поставил очень точный диагноз тому положению дел, которое было характерно для второго этапа индустриальной революции в середине XIX века в Средней и Восточной Европе; но беда в том, что он возвел свои соображения в универсальную всемирно историческую доктрину и провозгласил упрощенный тезис о "классовой борьбе", тогда как, на самом деле, речь шла всего лишь о конкретном моменте техно-индустриальной революции, связанном с изобретением железных дорог, телеграфа и паровой машины. Уже в XX веке Освальд Шпенглер значительно ограничил значение своего открытия относительно глубинных исторических параллелей между настоящей эпохой и эпохой римской гражданской войны и периодом цезарей тем, что составил на этом основании всеобщую теорию культурных кругов, а следовательно, убил сугубо исторический нерв всей своей работы.

4.

Индустриализация и техническое развитие являются сегодня судьбой нашей земли. Итак, постараемся определить одноразовый исторический вопрос, великий вызов и конкретный ответ, порожденные индустриально-технической революцией прошлого столетия. Отбросим при этом все поверхностные заключения, вовлекающие нас в рискованные системы причинно-следственной обусловленности. Мы вычленили из общего понятия напряженности сугубо диалектическую напряженность, отличную от полярно-статической. Но эта концепция диалектической напряженности не должна пониматься как банальный продукт гегельянства, естественнонаучных воззрений или нормативистских конструкций. Формула Тойнби относительно "вызова-отзыва" также должна использоваться лишь в качестве инструмента, так как нам надо, в первую очередь, верно понять сугубо одноразовую актуальную истину сегодняшнего планетарного дуализма Востока и Запада.

Здесь нам поможет текст Арнольда Тойнби 1953 года с выразительным названием: "The World and the West" ("Мир и Запад")⁹³. Это произведение спровоцировало ожесточенную критику и полемику, которую мы предпочитаем обойти молчанием, так как нас интересует здесь лишь противостояние Земли и Суши. Тойнби говорит о нашей эпохе, выделяя в ней как отдельную категорию Запад, противопоставленный всему остальному миру.

Запад представляется ему агрессором, который в течение четырех с половиной столетий осуществлял экспансию своей индустриально-технической мощи на Восток в четырех основных направлениях: Россия, исламский мир, Индия и Восточная Азия. Для Тойнби представляется очень важным, что эта агрессия осуществлялась через освободившуюся от норм христианской традиции технику (entfesselte Technik). Тот факт, что сегодняшний Восток сам начал широко использовать технику, означает для Тойнби начало его активной самозащиты перед лицом Запада. Правда, в XVII веке иезуиты сделали попытку проповедовать христианскую религию индусам и китайцам не как религию Запада, но как религию универсальную, относящуюся равным образом ко всем людям. Тойнби считает, что эта попытка, к несчастью, провалилась из-за догматических разногласий между различными католическими миссиями и централизованной проповеднической сетью иезуитов. Смысл Октябрьской коммунистической революции, согласно Тойнби, состоит в том, что Восток стал вооружаться освобожденной от христианской религии европейской техникой. Эту технику Тойнби называет "куском европейской культуры, отколовшимся от нее к концу XVI века". Заметим эту важнейшую, абсолютно точную формулировку.

Выясним теперь в свете "логики вопрос-ответ", что было тем вызовом и тем отзывом, которые исторически проявились в нашу эпоху через индустриально-технический рывок.

Из чего происходит индустриальная революция? Ответом на какой вопрос она является? Каковы ее истоки и ее родина, ее начало и ее мотивация? Она происходит с острова Англия и датируется XVIII веком. Повторим все известные даты 1735 (первая коксовая печь), 1740 (первая литая сталь), 1768 (первая паровая машина), 1769 (первая современная фабрика в Ноттингэме), 1770 (первый прядильный станок), 1786 (первый механический ткацкий станок), 1825 (первый паровоз). Великая промышленная революция происходит с

⁹³ Эта формула "The World and the West" (и имплицитно содержащаяся в ней геополитическая концепция) явно перекликается с работой Самуила Хантингтона "Clash of civilisations", одна из глав которой называется аналогично "The West and the Rest". Американский консерватор Хантингтон явно находится под влиянием Тойнби и, видимо, считает себя его продолжателем. (А.Д.)

острова Англия, ставшего начиная с XIX столетия главной промышленной страной мира. Этот исторический феномен, который мы постоянно должны иметь в виду, заметил уже первый немецкий социолог Лоренц фон Штайн в 1842 году.

Он писал по этому поводу:

"Удивительным образом и совершенно неожиданно, в то же самое время, когда во Франции распространяются идеи свободы и равенства, в Англии появляются первые машины. Вместе с ними открывается совершенно новая эпоха для всего мира в вопросах благосостояния, производства, потребления и торговли. Машины стали подлинно революционной силой в материальном мире, и из этого подчиненного ими материального мира они начали распространять свое могущество во всю глубину, во все сферы мира духовного."

"Удивительным образом и совершенно неожиданно" причем именно "в Англии"! В этих словах слышится жадное к познанию удивление молодого немца, который начинает осознавать историческую ситуацию своего народа и в Париже Луи Филиппа понимает, что политическая революция, расползающаяся начиная с 1789 года по всему европейскому континенту, есть лишь бледный идеологический эпифеномен по сравнению с индустриальной революцией, распространяющейся из Англии и представляющей собой подлинно революционную силу. Так родилась только что приведенная нами замечательная фраза из главы под значительным названием "Пролетариат". В этом же тексте впервые в европейскую дискуссию вводится научное осмысление проблемы фундаментального различия между рабочей силой и собственностью.

Итак, индустриальная революция происходит из Англии XVIII столетия. Какова была историческая ситуация на этом острове в то время? Англия была островом, отделившимся начиная с XVI века от европейского континента и сделавшим первые шаги к чисто морскому существованию. Это, с исторической точки зрения, является для нас самым существенным. Все остальное лишь надстройка, суперструктура. Какое бы внешнее событие мы ни выбрали в качестве окончательного шага к чисто морскому существованию, захват Ямайки Кромвелем в 1655 году, окончательное изгнание Стюартов в 1688 году или европейский мир в Утрехте в 1713 году, главным является следующее: один европейский народ начиная с определенного момента перестал считать остров, на котором он жил, частью несколько удаленной европейской Суши и осознал его как базу для чисто морского существования и для морского господства над мировым океаном. Начиная с XVI века Англия вступила в эпоху великих географических открытий и принялась отвоевывать колонии у Португалии, Испании, Франции и Голландии. Она победила всех своих европейских соперников не в силу морального или силового превосходства, но лишь исключительно из-за того, что сделала решительный и бесповоротный шаг от твердой Суши к открытому Морю, и в такой ситуации отвоевывание сухопутных колоний обеспечивалось контролем над морскими пространствами.

Это был одноразовый, неповторимый, исторический ответ на столь же одноразовый, неповторимый исторический вызов, на великий вызов века европейских географических открытий. Впервые в известной нам истории человечества возник вызов, относящийся не только к конкретным рекам, берегам или внутриматериковым морям; впервые он имел планетарный, глобальный характер. Большинство европейских народов осознали этот вызов в континентальных, сухопутных терминах. Испанцы создали свою гигантскую заокеанскую империю; при этом она оставалась сущностно сухопутной и строилась на обширных материковых массах. Русские оторвались от Москвы и завоевали гигантскую

страну Сибирь. Португальцам, несмотря на их удивительные достижения в мореплавании, также не удалось перейти к чисто морскому существованию. Даже героический эпос эпохи португальских открытий, "Лузиады" Коменса, говорят об Индийском океане по сути почти так же, как Эней Вергилия говорит о Средиземном море. Голландцы первыми пустились в глобальные морские авантюры и долго оставались в авангарде. Но база была слишком слабой, укоренность в политике сухопутных держав слишком глубокой, и после заключения мира в Утрехте в 1713 году Голландия окончательно была привязана к Суше. Французы вступили в двухсотлетнюю войну с Англией и, в конце концов, проиграли ее. Англию континент особенно не беспокоил (the least hampered by the continent), и она окончательно и успешно перешла к чисто морскому существованию. Это создало непосредственные предпосылки для индустриальной революции.

Бывший некогда европейским остров отбросил традиционную, сухопутную картину мира и начал последовательно рассматривать мир с позиции Моря. Суша как естественное жизненное пространство человека превратилось в нечто иное, в берег, простирающийся вглубь континентальных просторов, в *backland*. Еще в XV веке во времена Орлеанской девы английские рыцари, подобно рыцарям других стран, в честном бою добывали себе трофеи. Вплоть до XVI столетия англичане были овцеводами, продававшими шерсть во Фландрию, где из нее делали ткани. И этот народ превратился в нацию "пенителей морей" и основал не только морскую, но океаническую, мировую империю. Остров перестал быть отдельно расположенным фрагментом Суши и превратился в Корабль, лежащий на якоре вблизи континента. На место старого, сухопутного Номоса Земли вступил новый Номос, включающий в свою структуру освоенные пространства открытого Моря, но при этом отрывающий открытое море от континентальной массы и противопоставляющий пространство Моря пространству Суши, чтобы создать равновесие с помощью контроля над Сушей со стороны Моря.

То, что отпало от европейской культуры в XVI веке, было, вопреки Тойнби, не "техническим осколком", но чем-то совсем иным. Европейский остров откололся от европейского континента, и новый, призванный островом мир Моря поднялся против традиционного мира континентальной Суши. Этот мир Моря породил противовес миру Суши, и мир (*Frieden, peace*) на земле стал подобен весам в его руках. Это было выражением конкретного ответа на вызов открывшегося Мирового Океана. И на этом острове Англия, принявшая вызов и сделавшая решительный шаг к морскому существованию, внезапно появились первые машины.

5.

Корабль основа морского существования людей, подобно тому, как Дом это основа их сухопутного существования. Корабль и Дом не являются антитезами в смысле статического полярного напряжения; они представляют собой различные ответы на различные вызовы истории. И Корабль и Дом создаются с помощью технических средств, но их основное различие состоит в том, что Корабль это абсолютно искусственное, техническое средство передвижения, основанное на тотальном господстве человека над природой. Море представляет собой разновидность природной среды, резко отличную от Суши. Море более отчужденно и враждебно. Согласно библейскому повествованию, человек получил свою среду обитания именно через отделение Земли от Моря. Море оставалось сопряженным с опасностью и злом. Здесь мы отсылаем читателей к комментариям на первую главу "Книги Бытия" в третьем томе "Церковной Догматики" Карла Барта. Подчеркнем лишь, что для преодоления древнего религиозного ужаса перед Морем человечество должно было предпринять значительное усилие. Техническое усилие, предпринятое для такого преодоления, сущностно разнится со всяким иным

техническим усилием. Человек, отваживающийся пуститься в морское путешествие, слово "пират" изначально означало того, кто способен на такой риск, должен иметь, по словам поэта, "тройную броню на груди" (aes triplex circa pectus). Преодоление человеком инерциального сопротивления природы, составляющее сущность культурной или цивилизаторской деятельности, резко отличается в случае кораблестроения и освоения Моря и в случае разведения скота и строительства жилищ на Суше.

Центр и зерно сухопутного существования, со всеми его конкретными нормативами жилище, собствен ность, брак, наследство и т.д. все это Дом. Все эти конкретные нормативы произрастают из специфики сухопутного существования и особенно из земледелия. Фундаментальный правовой институт, собственность *Dominium* получил свое название от Дома, *Domus*. Это очевидно и известно всем юристам. Но многие юристы, однако, не знают, что немецкое слово *Bauer* (*paganus*, крестьянин) происходит не непосредственно из слова "Ackerbau" (пахота), но от слова "Bau", "Gebäude", "aedificium", т.е. "здание", "постройка", "дом". Оно означало изначально человека, владевшего домом. Итак, в центре сухопутного существования стоит Дом. В центре морского существования плывет Корабль. Дом это покой, Корабль движение. Поэтому Корабль обладает иной средой и иным горизонтом. Люди, живущие на Корабле, находятся в совершенно иных отношениях как друг с другом, так и с окружающей средой. Их отношение к природе и животным совершенно отлично от людей Суши. Сухопутный человек приручает зверей слонов, верблюдов, лошадей, собак, кошек, ослов, коз и "все, что ему принадлежит" и делает из них домаш них животных. Рыб невозможно приручить, их можно только поймать и съесть. Они не могут стать домашни ми животными, так как сама идея Дома чужда морю.

Для того чтобы осознать бездонное различие между сухопутным и морским существованием, мы привели культурно-исторический пример. Сейчас мы стараемся найти ответ на вопрос, почему индустриальная революция со свойственным ей раскрепощением технического порыва (*entfesselte Technik*) зародилась в условиях морского существования. Сухопутное существование, центром которого является Дом, совершенно иначе относится к технике, нежели морское существование, центром которого является Корабль. Абсолютизация технического прогресса, отождествление любого прогресса исключительно с техническим прогрессом, короче, то, что понимается под выражением "раскрепощенный технический порыв", "раскрепощенная техника" все это могло зародиться, произрасти и развиваться только на основании морского существования, в климате морского существования. Тем, что остров Англия принял вызов открывающегося мирового океана и довел до логическо го завершения переход к чисто морскому существова нию, он дал исторический ответ на вопрос, поставлен ный эпохой великих географических открытий. Одновременно это было и предпосылкой индустриальной революции и началом эпохи, чью проблематику пережива ем сегодня мы все.

Конкретно мы говорим о промышленной революции, которая является сегодня нашей общей судьбой. Эта революция не могла осуществиться нигде и никогда, кроме как в Англии XVIII века. Промышленная революция как раз и означает раскрепощение технического прогресса, а это раскрепощение становится понятным только исходя из специфики морского существования, при котором оно, до некоторой степени, разумно и необходимо. Технические открытия делались во все времена и во всех странах. Техническая одаренность англичан не превышает одаренности других народов. Речь идет лишь о том, каким образом использовать техническое открытие и в каких пределах; иными словами, в какую систему нормативов это открытие поместить. В условиях морского существования технические открытия совершают ся более легко и свободно, так

как они не обязательно должны встраиваться в фиксированную структуру нормативов, свойственных сухопутному существованию. Китайцы изобрели порох; они были несколько не глупей европейцев, которые также изобрели его. Но в условиях чисто сухопутного, закрытого существования тогдашнего Китая, это повлекло его использование исключительно для игр и фейерверков. В Европе же то же самое привело к открытиям Альфреда Нобеля и его последователей. Англичане, совершившие в XVIII веке все свои знаменитые открытия, повлекшие за собой промышленную революцию, коксовые печи, сталелитейное производство, паровую машину, ткацкий станок и т.д., не были гениальнее других народов из других стран и других эпох, живших по сухопутным законам и сделавших аналогичные открытия независимо от англичан. Технические открытия не являются откровениями таинственного высшего духа. Они во многом диктуются временем. Но забываются или развиваются они это зависит от того человеческого контекста, в котором они были сделаны. Я выражусь определеннее: технические открытия, лежащие в основе промышленной революции, только там на самом деле приведут к индустриальной революции, где сделан решительный шаг к морскому существованию.

Переход к чисто морскому существованию уже несет в самом себе и в своих прямых следствиях раскрепощение техники как самостоятельной и самодовлеющей силы. Всякое развитие техники в предшествующих периодах сухопутного существования никогда не приводило к появлению такого принципа как Абсолютная Техника. При этом надо подчеркнуть, что береговые и связанные с внутренними морями формы культур еще не означают перехода к чисто морскому существованию. Только при освоении Океана Корабль становится настоящей антитезой Дома. Безусловная вера в прогресс (понятый как технический прогресс) является верным признаком того, что совершен переход к морскому существованию. В исторически, социально и морально бесконечном пространстве морского существования само собой возникает цепная реакция безбрежной череды открытий. Речь идет не о различии между кочевыми и оседлыми народами, а о противоречии между Сушей и Морем двумя противоположными стихиями человеческого существования. Поэтому неверно говорить о "морских кочевниках" в одном ряду с кочевниками на лошадях, верблюдах и т.д. Неправомочно переносить сухопутные условия на стихию Моря. Жизненное пространство человечества в его сверхприродном, историческом смысле радикально различается по всем параметрам внешним и внутренним в зависимости от того, идет ли речь о сухопутном или морском существовании. С какой бы позиции мы ни смотрели на это различие, с Моря на Сушу или с Суши на Море, оно проявляется в совершенно иначе структурированном силовом цивилизационном и культурном поле; при этом надо заметить, что культура сама по себе в большей степени относится к Суше, а цивилизация к Морю⁹⁴, морское мировоззрение ориентировано техноморфно, тогда как сухопутное социоморфно.

Два важнейших феномена XIX столетия могут быть освещены в новом свете при помощи теории специфики морского существования. Речь идет о классической политэкономии конца XVIII начала XIX века и о марксизме. По мере развития промышленной революции обнаруживающаяся безбрежность провоцировала все новые и новые шаги по пути раскрепощенного технического прогресса. Так называемая классическая политэкономия была концептуальной суперструктурой, разработанной на основании первой стадии промышленной революции. Марксизм, в свою очередь, основал свое учение уже на этой суперструктуре классической политэкономии. Он развил ее и разработал концептуальную суперструктуру для второй стадии промышленной революции. В этом качестве марксизм был взят на вооружение элитой русских профессиональных революционеров, которым

⁹⁴ Явная аллюзия на Освальда Шпенглера, противопоставлявшего цивилизацию и культуру. (А.Д.)

удалось совершить в 1917 году революцию в Российской Империи и перенести двойную суперструктуру на условия своей аграрной страны. Во всем этом речь шла отнюдь не о практическом осуществлении чистого учения и о логичной реализации объективных законов исторического развития. Речь шла о том, что промышленно отсталая аграрная страна испытывала необходимость вооружиться современной промышленной техникой, так как в противном случае ей была обеспечена роль добычи для других более развитых промышленно крупных держав. Таким образом, марксизм из идеологической надстройки второй стадии промышленной революции превратился в практический инструмент для преодоления индустриально-технической незащищенности огромной страны, а также для смещения старой элиты, явно не справлявшейся с исполнением исторической задачи.

Но последовательное доведение до логического конца принципов классической политэкономии было лишь одним аспектом марксистского учения. Корни марксизма оставались гегельянскими. В одном месте гегелевских "Основ философии права" в параграфе 243 содержится смысл всей проблемы. Это знаменитое место. Этот параграф описывает диалектику буржуазного общества, беспрепятственно развивающегося по своим собственным законам, и подчеркивает, что "это общество неизбежно несет в себе прогрессирующий рост народонаселения и промышленности". Гегель утверждает, что такое общество "при всем его богатстве никогда не будет достаточным богатым, т.е. исходя только из своих внутренних возможностей никогда не сможет воспрепятствовать росту нищеты и увеличению числа неимущего населения". Гегель при этом откровенно ссылается в качестве примера на тогдашнюю Англию. В параграфе 246 он продолжает:

"Согласно этой диалектике, конкретное буржуазное общество вынуждено выходить за свои границы, чтобы искать среди других народов, отстающих либо по уровню развития промышленных средств, либо по техническим навыкам, потребителей своей продукции, а следовательно, средства для своего собственного существования."⁹⁵

Таковы знаменитые параграфы 243-246 из гегелевских "Основ философии права", которые получили свое окончательное развитие в марксизме. Но, насколько мне известно, никто не обратил внимания на глубиннейший смысл параграфа 247, непосредственно следующего за только что процитированным. В нем утверждается фундаментальная противоположность между Сушей и Морем, и развертывание этого параграфа могло бы быть не менее значительным и важным, чем развертывание параграфов 243-246 в марксизме. Здесь утверждается связь промышленного развития с морским существованием. Этот 247-ой параграф содержит следующее решающее предложение:

"Подобно тому, как для супружества первым условием является твердая земля, Суша, так как для промышленности максимально оживляющей ее стихией является Море."

Здесь я прерываю свое изложение, и предоставляю внимательным читателям возможность увидеть в нем начало развертывания 247-го параграфа из "Основ философии права" Гегеля, подобное тому, как развертывание параграфов 243-246 создало марксизм.

⁹⁵ Из этого положения легко выводятся основные моменты ленинской теории "империализма как высшей стадии развития капитализма" и основополагающие принципы концепции "автаркии больших пространств" (и шире, "экономического национализма") Фридриха Листа. Любопытно, что немецкие консервативные революционеры извлекли из развития тезисов Листа практически те же выводы, что и Ленин из Гегеля и Маркса. В обоих случаях речь шла о планетарной антиимпериалистической борьбе за "права народов" против англосаксонского талассократического колониализма. Кстати, главным теоретиком "прав народов" был именно Карл Шмитт. Геополитическое применение и развитие этого принципа характерно для Хаусхофера. (А.Д.)

Наш разбор порождает новый вопрос и вместе с ним новую опасность. Само собой напрашивается желание поставить следующую проблему: каков актуальный вызов истории? И тут же возникает опасный соблазн ответить на этот вопрос старым способом, адекватным и правильным в предшествующую эпоху. Людям свойственно цепляться за то, что доказало когда-то ранее свою истинность и эффективность. Они категорически отказываются понимать, что со стороны человечества новый ответ на новый вопрос может быть только предположением, и чаще всего, как это было в случае путешествия Колумба, слепым предположением. У человека есть непреодолимая потребность относиться к последнему хронологически историческому опыту как к чему-то вечному. Когда мы, немцы, в 1914 году вторглись во Францию, нам казалось, что события будут отныне развиваться как в 1870-71 годах вплоть до нашей решительной победы. Когда в 1870-71 гг. осажденные французы совершили вылазку из Парижа, они были уверены, что все снова пойдет по сценарию победоносной революции 1792 г. Когда государственный секретарь США Стимсон в 1932 году провозгласил свою знаменитую доктрину, доктрину Стимсона, он считал, что в целом сложившаяся ситуация напоминает в увеличенном масштабе 1861 год и начало войны за независимость.

Чувство истории должно уберечь нас от подобных ошибок. Парадоксальным образом именно в тех странах, которые дальше других продвинулись по пути раскрепощенной техники, распространено мнение, что отныне с помощью технических средств начинается прорыв в новые бесконечные пространства космоса. По сравнению с этим прорывом в космос пятисотлетний прорыв эпохи великих географических и технических открытий покажется несущественным отрезком времени. Люди планируют атаку на стратосферу и полеты на Луну. Сама наша планета, Земля постепенно превращается в космический корабль, плывущий в космическом пространстве.

Такое мнение представляется мне повторением старого ответа, развитием того ответа, который был дан некогда на вызов открывшегося мирового Океана. Люди рассматривают вызов сегодняшнего дня как масштабное повторение открытия Америки. Психологически, так сказать, это понятно. Тогда открывались новые континенты и океаны земли. Сегодня я не вижу никакого открывающегося космоса, не слышу никакого космического вызова. Не будем говорить о летающих тарелках. Раскрепощенная техника может сколь угодно долго и яростно вгрызаться в космос, из этого не получится нового исторического вызова и тем более ответа на такой вызов. Конечно, раскрепощенная техника порождает чудовищный силовой импульс и стремление преодолеть его. Но этот импульс не то же самое, что вызов. Верно, что современная техника все время порождает искусственные потребности, но это значит лишь, что она способна в лучшем случае давать в высшей степени искусственный ответ на столь же искусственно поставленный ей самой вопрос.

Именно это ультрасовременное развитие старого ответа является, с точки зрения истории, неисторичным и анахроничным. Впрочем, вполне естественная ситуация, когда победивший в прошлую эпоху совершенно пропускает мимо внимания новый вызов истории. Да и как может победитель понять, что его победа является одноразовой истиной? Кто научит его этому? Я пришел к выводу: уже хорошо, если мы отказываемся давать старый ответ на новый вопрос. Уже много, если мы осмысливаем новый мир не по той схеме "нового мира", которая существовала вчера. Лично я вижу новый вызов не по ту сторону стратосферы. Я замечаю, что раскрепощенная техника скорее ограничивает людей, чем открывает им новые пространства. Современная техника нужна и полезна. Но сегодня она очень далека от того, чтобы служить ответом на какой бы то ни было вызов. Она лишь удовлетворяет новые, отчасти порожденные ей же самой, потребности. В остальном она сама ставится сегодня под вопрос, а значит, именно поэтому не может быть ответом. Все говорят о том, что современная техника сделала нашу землю до смешного

маленькой. Новые пространства, откуда появится новый вызов, должны поэтому находиться на нашей земле, а не вне ее в открытом космосе. Тот, кому первому удастся закрепить раскрепощенную технику, скорее даст ответ на ныне существующий вызов, чем тот, кто с ее помощью попытается высадиться на Луне или на Марсе. Укрощение раскрепощенной техники это подвиг для нового Геракла. Из этой области слышится мне новый вызов, вызов Настоящего.

(перевод с немецкого А.Д.)

ЗЕМЛЯ и МОРЕ

созерцание всемирной истории

1

Человек — существо наземное, сухопутное.

Он стоит на земле, идет по земле, он передвигается по ее твердой неколебимой поверхности. Это его самостояние и его почва; благодаря ей он обретает и имеет свою точку зрения; это определяет его впечатления и самый способ восприятия мира. Не только свой кругозор, но даже форму своей походки и движений, свой образ и облик он обретает и сохраняет как существо на земле родившееся и живущее. Поэтому небесное тело, на котором он обитает, он именует “Земля”, хотя известно, что почти три четверти поверхности Земли составляет вода и только одну четверть собственно земля; при этом даже наибольшие участки суши являются всего лишь островами в океане воды. С тех пор, как мы знаем, что Земля имеет форму шара, мы говорим как о само собой разумеющемся о “Земном шаре”. Если бы тебе пришлось представить себе “морской шар” или “водный шар”, ты бы нашла это странным и необычным.

Все наше посястороннее существование, радость и страдание, счастье и беда - есть для нас земная жизнь и, соответственно, рай на земле и земная юдоль скорби. Таким образом, вполне объяснимо то, что во множестве мифов и сказаний, в которых народы сохранили свой самый древний опыт и глубочайшие воспоминания, Земля выступает как великая мать людей. Ее называют самым старшим среди всех божеств. Священные книги повествуют нам о том, что человек взят от земли и должен вновь соделаться прахом земным. Земля - это его материнское лоно, он сам, таким образом, сын земли. В своих ближних он видит земных собратьев, граждан Земли. Среди традиционных четырех стихий - Земли, Воды, Огня и Воздуха - стихия Земли более всего определяет человека и ему предопределена. Мысль о том, что из четырех стихий какая-то кроме земли может решающим образом формировать человеческое бытие, на первый взгляд выглядит лишь как фантастическая возможность. Человек - это не рыба и не птица, тем более не какое-то существо из огня, даже если предположить, что таковые могут существовать.

Следует ли из сказанного, что сущность человеческого бытия и самого существа человека чисто земная, и все остальные стихии являются лишь дополнительными элементами второго порядка? Дело обстоит не так просто. Ответ на вопрос о том, может ли что-то кроме земли составлять отличительный признак человеческого присутствия в мире, лежит ближе, чем мы думаем. Стоит тебе только выйти на берег моря и посмотреть в даль - и грандиозная морская гладь по всему горизонту захватит твой взор. Примечательно, что когда человек стоит на берегу, он естественным образом устремляет свой взор со стороны суши на море, а не наоборот, со стороны моря на сушу. В глубоких, часто бессознательных воспоминаниях людей вода и море являются тайной первопричиной всего сущего. В мифах и сказаниях большинства народов содержатся воспоминания не только о землях рожденных, но и о вышедших из моря богах и людях. Всюду повествуется о сынах и дочерях морей и вод. Афродита, богиня женской красоты, возникла из пены морских волн. Море породило и другие создания, и мы познакомимся впоследствии с “детьми моря” и дикими “пленителями моря”, мало похожими на чарующую картину из пены рожденной женской красоты. Ты видишь здесь совершенно другой мир, непохожий на мир земной тверди и суши. Теперь ты можешь понять, почему поэты, натурфилософы и естествоиспытатели ищут начало всякой жизни в воде, а Гете провозглашает в торжественных стихах:

- Все возникло из воды,
- Все сохраняется водою,
- Океан, даруй нам
вечное твое покровительство!

Основателем учения о происхождении всего живого из водной стихии чаще всего называют греческого натурфилософа Фалеса из Милета (ок. 500 года до Р.Х.). Но это воззрение одновременно моложе и старше Фалеса. Оно вечно. В последнем 19 веке о происхождении людей и всего живого из моря учил крупный немецкий ученый Лоренц Окен. И в генеалогических схемах, сконструированных естествоиспытателями-дарвинистами, рыбы и наземные животные идут рядом и один за другим в различной последовательности. Обитатели моря фигурируют здесь как предки людей. Древнейшая и древняя история человечества, по всей видимости, подтверждают эту гипотезу о происхождении жизни. Авторитетные исследователи открыли, что наряду с “автохтонными”, то есть родившимися на суше, существуют также “автоталассические”, то есть исключительно морем определяемые народы, никогда не бывшие путешественниками по земле и не хотевшие ничего знать о твердой суше, которая являлась границей их чисто морского существования. На островах Тихого океана, у полинезийских мореплавателей, канаков и самоа еще можно обнаружить последние остатки такого рода людей-рыб. Все их бытие, мир представлений, язык складывались под определяющим воздействием моря. Все наши представления о пространстве и времени, сложившиеся в условиях твердой поверхности суши, казались им настолько же чуждыми и непонятными, насколько для нас, жителей суши, мир тех чисто морских людей означает едва постижимый иной мир.

В любом случае возникает вопрос: что есть наша стихия? Мы — дети земли или моря? На этот вопрос невозможно ответить однозначно. Доисторические мифы, естественнонаучные гипотезы Нового времени и результаты исторического исследования эпохи первых письменных памятников оставляют обе возможности для ответа открытыми.

2

Слово “стихия” в любом случае требует небольшого дополнительного пояснения. Со времени вышеупомянутого философа Фалеса, начиная с эпохи ионийской философии, то есть примерно с 500 года до нашей эры у европейских народов принято говорить о четырех стихиях или элементах. С тех пор это представление о четверице элементов — Земле, Воде, Воздухе и Огне — осталось живо и неискоренимо и до сего дня, несмотря на всю научную критику. Современное естествознание упразднило эти четыре изначальные стихии; оно различает сегодня более девяноста совсем иначе структурированных “элементов” и понимает под этим словом каждый исходный материал, неразложимый и нерастворимый посредством методов сегодняшней химии. Таким образом, элементы, исследуемые сегодня естествознанием экспериментально и теоретически, имеют с теми четырьмя изначальными первоэлементами лишь общее название. Ни один физик или химик не решится сегодня утверждать, что какой-либо из четырех первоэлементов является единственной первопричиной, исходным материалом вселенной, как то говорил о воде Фалес Милетский, об огне — Гераклит Эфесский, о воздухе — Анаксимен Милетский, а Эмпедокл из Акраганта учил о соединении стихий, которые называл “корнями всех вещей”. Один лишь вопрос о том, что, собственно, означают здесь слова первопричина, исходный материал, корни вещей — завел бы нас в обсуждение необозримого количества физических, естественнонаучных, метафизических и гносеологических проблем. Для нужд нашего исторического созерцания мы можем все же

ограничиться представлением об этой четверице элементов, или стихий. Ибо для нас эти стихии суть простые и наглядные имена. Это обобщающие значения, указывающие на различного рода фундаментальные возможности человеческого бытия в мире. Поэтому мы вправе еще и сегодня использовать их, в особенности когда ведем речь о господстве посредством моря и о господстве посредством суши, о морских и континентальных державах, имея в виду стихии воды и земли.

Таким образом, “элементы” Земля и Море, о которых идет речь ниже, не могут мыслиться лишь как естественнонаучные величины. В этом случае они бы немедленно распались на химические составляющие, то есть обратились бы в историческое ничто. Предопределяемые этими стихиями варианты исторического свершения, в особенности морские или земные формы существования также не развертываются с механической заданностью. Если бы человек был живым организмом, без остатка сводимым к воздействию окружающего мира, он представлял бы собою или животное, или рыбу, или птицу или фантастические смещения этих элементарных форм, сообразно воздействию природных стихий. Чистые типовые образцы, соответствующие четырем элементам, в особенности чисто морские или чисто земные люди имели бы между собой весьма мало общего, они противостояли бы друг другу совершенно изолированно, причем эта изоляция была бы тем безнадежней, чем меньше примесей содержал бы данный тип. Смещения давали бы удачные или неудачные типы и порождали бы приязнь или вражду, как химическое сродство или контраст. Бытие и судьба человека определялись бы чисто природным порядком, как это бывает в случае животного или растения. Можно было бы лишь констатировать, что одни пожирают других, в то время как остальные мирно сосуществуют в биологическом симбиозе. Не существовало бы никакой человеческой истории как человеческого поступка и человеческого решения.

Мы знаем, однако, что существо человека несводимо к чисто природному порядку. Он обладает даром овладеть собственным бытием и сознанием в процессе исторического свершения. Он знает не только рождение, но и возможность духовного возрождения. В беде и опасности, когда животное и растение беспомощно гибнут, он способен возродиться к новой жизни путем интеллектуального усилия, волевого решения, уверенного анализа ситуации и умозаключения. Он располагает свободным пространством для своей власти и своего исторического могущества. Ему дано выбирать, и в определенные моменты истории он способен выбрать ту стихию, к которой он прилепляется посредством собственного поступка и собственного усилия, как к новой форме своей исторической экзистенции, и в которой он обустраивается. В этом смысле он хорошо усвоил, как говорит поэт, “свободу выбирать путь, которого возжелал”.

3

Всемирная история - это история борьбы континентальных держав против морских держав и морских держав против континентальных держав. Адмирал Кастекс, французский специалист по военной науке, предпослал своей книге о стратегии обобщающий заголовок: Море против Земли, *la Mer contie la Terre*. Тем самым он пребывает в русле давней традиции.

Изначальный антагонизм земли и моря был замечен с давних пор, и еще в конце 19 века имевшуюся тогда напряженность в отношениях между Россией и Англией любили изображать в виде битвы медведя с китом. Кит обозначает здесь огромную мифическую рыбу, Левиафана, о котором мы еще кое-что услышим, медведь же означает одного из многих представителей наземных животных. Согласно средневековым толкованиям так называемых каббалистов, всемирная история суть не что иное, как борьба между могущественным китом, Левиафаном, и столь же сильным наземным животным Бегемотом, которого представляли себе в виде быка или слона. Оба имени — Левиафан и Бегемот - заимствованы из книги Иова (главы 40 и 41). Итак, каббалисты утверждают, что

Бегемот старается разорвать Левиафана своими рогами и зубами, Левиафан же стремится зажать своими плавниками пасть и нос Бегемота, чтобы тот не смог есть и дышать. Это предельно наглядное, какое только и позволяет дать миф, изображение блокады континентальной державы морской державой, которая закрывает все морские подходы к суше, чтобы вызвать голод. Так обе воюющие державы убивают друг друга. Однако евреи, — говорят каббалисты дальше, — празднуют затем тысячелетний “пир Левиафана”, о котором рассказывает в знаменитом стихотворении Генрих Гейне. Для того, чтобы дать историческое толкование этого пира Левиафана, чаще всего цитируют каббалиста Исаака Абраванеля. Он жил в 1437 — 1508 гг. во времена великих открытий, был казначеем сначала у короля Португалии, потом у короля Кастилии и умер уважаемым человеком в Венеции в 1508 году. Таким образом он познал белый свет и все богатства мира и знал, что говорил.

Бросим же беглый взгляд на некоторые события всемирной истории под углом зрения этой борьбы между землей и морем.

Мир греческой античности возник из путешествий и войн народов-мореплавателей, “недаром вскормил их бог моря”. Господствовавшая на острове Крит морская держава изгнала персов из восточной части Средиземноморья и создала культуру, все необъяснимое очарование которой было явлено нам при раскопках Кносса. Тысячелетие спустя в морском сражении при Саламине (480 г. до Р.Х.) свободный город Афины оборонялся от своего врага — “всем повелевающих персов” — за деревянными стенами, то есть на кораблях, и спасся благодаря этой морской битве. Его собственное господство было побеждено в Пелопонесской войне континентальной Спартой; последняя, однако, именно в силу своего континентального характера оказалась не в состоянии объединить города Эллады и возглавить греческую империю. Рим, напротив, бывший с самого начала итальянской крестьянской республикой и чисто континентальным государством, превратился в настоящую империю в процессе борьбы с морским и торговым господством Карфагена. История Рима, как вся в совокупности, так особенно и в этот период долгой борьбы между Римом и Карфагеном, часто сравнивалась с другими историческими ситуациями и катаклизмами. Такие сравнения и параллели могут быть весьма поучительными, однако они часто приводят к странным противоречиям. Например, параллели всемирной английской империи находят то в Риме, то в Карфагене. Сравнения такого рода в большинстве случаев являются палкой о двух концах, которую можно взять и повернуть любой стороной. Из рук угасавшей Римской империи морское господство вырвали вандалы, сарацины, викинги и норманны. После множества неудачных попыток арабы покорили Карфаген (698 г.) и основали новую столицу Тунис. Тем самым началось их многовековое господство над западным Средиземноморьем. Восточноримская Византийская империя, управляющая из Константинополя, была береговой империей. В ее распоряжении был сильный флот и таинственное боевое средство — так называемый греческий огонь. Впрочем, все это служило исключительно оборонительным целям. Во всяком случае, в своем качестве морской державы она могла предпринимать нечто такое, чего не могла себе позволить империя Карла Великого — держава чисто континентальная; Византия была настоящим “удерживающим”, “катехоном”, несмотря на свою слабость, она “удерживала” ислам много веков, предотвращая тем самым возможность завоевания Италии арабами. В противном случае с Италией случилось бы тоже самое, что произошло тогда с Северной Африкой, — антично-христианская культура оказалась бы уничтоженной, и Италия была бы поглощена миром ислама. В христианско-европейском ареале впоследствии возникла новая морская держава, возвысившаяся благодаря крестовым походам: Венеция.

Тем самым в мировую историю вторгается новое мифическое имя. Почти половину тысячелетия республика Венеция считалась символом морского господства и богатства, выросшего на морской торговле. Она достигла блестящих результатов на поприще большой политики, ее называли “самым диковинным созданием в истории экономики

всех времен”. Все, что побуждало фанатичных англоманов восхищаться Англией в 18-20 веках, прежде уже было причиной восхищения Венецией: огромные богатства; преимущество в дипломатическом искусстве, с помощью которого морская держава умеет вызывать осложнения во взаимоотношениях континентальных держав и вести свои войны чужими руками; аристократический основной закон, дававший видимость решения проблемы внутривластного порядка; толерантность в отношении религиозных и философских взглядов; прибежище свободолюбивых идей и политической эмиграции. Сюда же относится очаровательное великолепие роскошных празднеств и красоты изящных искусств. Один из этих праздников особенно занимал человеческое воображение и способствовал прославлению Венеции в мире - это было овеянное легендами “Обручение с морем”, так называемая *sposalizio del mare*.

Ежегодно в день Вознесения Господня дож республики Венеция отправлялся в открытое море на роскошном государственном корабле, и бросал в волны кольцо в знак соединения с морем. Сами венецианцы, их соседи, а также народы, обитавшие вдалеке от Венеции, видели в этом убедительный символ посредством коего рожденная морем держава и рожденное морем богатство приобретали мифическое освящение. У нас, однако, еще будет возможность убедиться в том, как в действительности обстояло дело с этим прекрасным символом, когда мы вновь увидим его в его изначальном свете.

Эта сказочная царица моря сияла все ярче с 1000 по 1500 годы. В 1000 году тогдашний император Византии Никифор Фока мог еще с некоторым на то основанием утверждать о себе: “До сих пор вы были в брачном союзе с морем, отныне оно принадлежит мне.” Между этими двумя датами лежит эпоха венецианского морского господства над Адриатикой, Эгейским морем и восточной частью Средиземного моря. В эту эпоху возникла легенда, привлекавшая в Венецию еще в 19-20 веках бесконечное множество путешественников и знаменитых романтиков всех европейских наций, поэтов и людей искусства — таких, как Байрон, Мюссе, Рихард Вагнер, Баррэ. Никто не сможет избежать очарования этой легенды, и меньше всего хотелось бы умерить сияние ее славы. Но если спросить, имеем ли мы здесь дело со случаем чисто морского существования и подлинного выбора в пользу морской стихии, то мы сразу же увидим, сколь стесненной оказывается морская держава, ограниченная Адриатикой и бассейном Средиземноморья, когда однажды открываются необозримые пространства мировых океанов.

4

Немецкий философ географии Эрнст Каш, ум которого был целиком во власти обширного мира идей Гегеля, классифицировал империи в зависимости от фактора воды в своей “Сравнительной географии” (1845). Он различает три стадии развития, три акта великой драмы. Мировая история начинается для него с “потанического” времени, то есть с культуры речных пойм ближнего и среднего Востока в двуречьи Евфрата и Тигра и на реке Нил, в ассирийском, вавилонском и египетском царствах Востока. Далее следует так называемый талассический период культуры внутриматериковых морей и бассейна Средиземного моря, которому принадлежат греческая и римская античность и средиземноморское Средневековье. С открытием Америки и началом кругосветных плаваний наступает последняя и высшая стадия, эпоха океанической культуры, носителями которой являются германские народы. Для прояснения существа дела мы, однако будем пользоваться трехчастной схемой, различающей реку, внутриматериковое море и океан. Тогда мы яснее увидим, почему морское господство Венеции оставалось целиком на второй, талассической ступени.

Как раз праздник, подобный вышеупомянутому “Обручению с морем”, позволяет сознать это различие. Такие символические действия соединения с морем встречаются и у других зависимых от моря народов. Например, индейские племена Центральной Америки, занимавшиеся рыбным промыслом и мореплаванием, приносили божествам моря жертвы

в виде колец и других драгоценностей, в виде животных и даже людей. Я, однако, не думаю, что подобные же обряды практиковали и настоящие “пленители моря”. Из этого не следует, что они были менее предрасположены к набожности или в меньшей степени чувствовали потребность в заклинании божественных сил. Но о церемонии обручения или бракосочетания с морем они не думали именно потому, что они были настоящими детьми моря. Они чувствовали себя идентичными стихии моря. Те же символические обручения или бракосочетания показывают, напротив, что приносящий жертву и божество, которому приносится жертва, суть различные, даже противоположные существа. С помощью такой жертвы должно умиловать враждебную стихию. В случае Венеции церемония отчетливо позволяет понять, что смысл символического акта не является порождением изначального морского существования; в гораздо большей степени здесь присутствует особый стиль праздничных символов, созданный высокоразвитой береговой культурой и культурой лагун. Обычное мореплавание и культура, основывающаяся на использовании выгодного приморского месторасположения представляют собой все же нечто иное, нежели чем перемещение всего исторического бытия с земли в море, выбор моря как стихии существования. Господство Венеции в прибрежной зоне начинается в 100 году морским походом в Долмацию. Господство Венеции над хинтерландом, например над Хорватией и Венгрией всегда оставалось проблематичным, каким только и может быть господство флота над сушей. И в области техники кораблестроения республика Венеции не покидала Средиземного моря и Средневековья вплоть до своего упадка в 1797 году. Как и народы Средиземноморья, Венеция знала только гребное судно, галеру. Судходство на больших памятниках пришло в Средиземное море из Атлантического океана. Венецианский флот был и остался флотом больших галер, движимых гребной силой. Парус использовался лишь в качестве дополнительного элемента при благоприятном попутном ветре, как это было уже в античную эпоху. Особенным навигационным достижением было усовершенствование компаса до его современной формы. Благодаря компасу “корабль приобрел нечто разумное, в силу чего человек вступает в общение и породняется с транспортным средством” (Капп). Только теперь самые отдаленные участки земли на всех океанах могут вступить в контакт, так что открывается круг земной. Но современный компас, появление которого в Средиземноморье относили раньше чаще всего к 1302 году и к итальянскому морскому городу Амальфи, в любом случае изобретен не в Венеции. Использование этого нового средства для океанических плаваний было венецианцам не свойственно.

Как я уже говорил и еще раз повторяю, мы не хотим преуменьшить сияние и славу Венеции. Но мы должны понять смысл происходящего, когда народ в совокупности всего своего исторического бытия делает выбор в пользу моря как чужой себе стихии. Способ ведения морских сражений того времени нагляднее всего демонстрирует то, о чем здесь идет речь, и в сколь малой степени можно говорить об элементарном переносе всей человеческой экзистенции с земли на море в тогдашнем Средиземноморье. В античном морском сражении гребные суда атакуют друг друга и пытаются протаранить и взять на бордаж один другого. Морской бой поэтому всегда представляет собою ближний бой. “Корабли хватают друг друга словно пары борющихся мужчин”. В битве при Милах римляне сперва брали вражеские суда на бордаж, перебрасывая настилы из досок и устанавливали таким образом мост, по которому могли вступить на вражеский корабль. Морской бой превращался тем самым в сухопутное сражение на кораблях. На корабельных досках рубились мечами словно на сцене. Так разыгрывались знаменитые морские сражения древности. Похожим образом, хотя и с помощью более примитивных ручных орудий, вели свои морские сражения малайские и индейские племена.

Последнее крупное морское сражение такого рода оказалось вместе с тем последним славным подвигом венецианской истории — то был морской бой при Лепанто (1571). Здесь испано-венецианский флот встретился с турецким и одержал самую убедительную победу на море из всех, когда-либо одержанных христианами над мусульманами. Битва

произошла в том же самом месте, у Акциума, где незадолго до начала нашей эры (30 г. до Р.Х.) вступили в бой флотилии Востока и Запада, Антония и Октавиана. Морская битва при Лепанто велась в основном теми же корабельно-техническими средствами, что и сражение у Акциума полтора тысячелетия назад. В ближнем бою на корабельных досках сражались отборные пешие части испанцев, знаменитые терции, с янычарами, элитарными войсками Османской империи.

Изменение способа ведения войны на море произошло лишь немногими годами позже битвы при Лепанто, — именно при разгроме испанской армады в проливе Ла-Манш. Маленькие парусники англичан обнаружили свое преимущество перед большими кораблями испанского флота. Однако ведущими в области техники кораблестроения были тогда не англичане, а голландцы. За время с 1450 по 1600 годы голландцы изобрели новых типов кораблей больше, чем все остальные народы. Просто открытия новых частей света и океанов было недостаточно для того, чтобы заложить основы господства на мировых океанах и обеспечить выбор моря в качестве стихии существования.

5

Не благородные дожи на помпезных судах, но дикие искатели приключений и “пенители моря”, отважные, бороздящие океаны охотники на китов и смелые водители парусников суть первые герои новой морской экзистенции. В двух важнейших областях — китобойном промысле и кораблестроении — голландцы были сперва далеко впереди всех.

Здесь я обязан сперва воздать хвалу киту и охотнику на кита. Невозможно говорить о великой истории моря и о выборе человека в пользу морской стихии, не упоминая сказочного Левиафана и его столь же чудесного преследования. Конечно же, это огромная тема. Моя слабая похвала не достигает ни кита, ни охотника. Как я могу брать на себя смелость подобающим образом рассказать о двух морских чудесах — о могущественнейшем из всех живущих зверей и об отважнейшем из всех охотников человечества?

Я осмеливаюсь на это только потому, что могу опираться на авторитет двух великих глашатаев и провозвестников обеих этих морских чудес, — значительного французского историка Жюль Мишле и великого американского писателя Германа Мелвилла. В 1861 году француз опубликовал книгу о море — гимн красоте моря и миру его неоткрытых чудес, богатствам морского дна всех континентов, которыми еще не завладел и которые еще не использовал “свирепый король этого мира”, человек. Мелвилл же является для мировых океанов тем, чем для восточного Средиземноморья является Гомер. В захватывающей повести “Моби Дик” (1851) он описал историю великого кита, Моби Дика, и охотящегося за ним капитана Ахаба, сложив тем самым величайший эпос океанской стихии. Я, конечно, осознаю, что, когда я при случае употребляю здесь вместо слова “кит” словосочетание “рыба-кит” и вместо “охотник на кита” говорю иногда “охотник на китовых рыб”, это сочтут дилетантским и неточным словоупотреблением. Меня начнут поучать о зоологической природе кита, который, как это известно любому школьнику, представляет собой млекопитающее, но не рыбу. Уже в напечатанной в 1776 году “Системе природы” старого Линнея можно было прочитать о том, что рыба-кит — теплокровное, дышит легкими, а не жабрами, как обычная рыба; что самка кита рождает уже сильно развитого живого детеныша и почти целый год любовно заботится о нем и вскармливает его своим молоком. Я никоим образом не хочу спорить с учеными-специалистами в обширной науке о китах, с цетологами, но хочу только кратко, без всяких дискуссий, объяснить, почему я полностью не отвергаю старое имя “рыба-кит”. Само собой разумеется, кит не есть рыба, такая, как щука или сельдь. Тем не менее, называя это странное чудовище рыбой, я обнажаю всю нелепость того, что такой теплокровный гигант предан стихии моря, хотя он и не предрасположен к этому своим

физиологическим строением. Только вообрази на минуту противоположный случай: громадное, дышащее жабрами существо бегает по суше! Самое крупное, самое сильное и самое мощное морское животное бороздит мировые океаны от северного до южного полюсов, дышит легкими и, будучи млекопитающим рождает живых детенышей в этот мир моря! Оно не является также амфибией, но является настоящим млекопитающим, и все-таки одновременно рыбой по своей стихии обитания. В рассматриваемый нами период, а именно с 16 по 19 века, охотники на эту огромную рыбу были подлинными Охотниками с большой буквы, а не просто какими-то банальными “китобоями” или “китоловами”. Это небезразлично для нашей темы.

Французский восхвалитель кита Мишле в своей книге о море описывает любовную и семейную жизнь китов с особой проникновенностью. Самец кит — проворный любовник самки-кита, нежнейший супруг, заботливейший отец. Он являет собой гуманнейшего из всех живых существ, он гуманнее человека, который истребляет китов с варварской жестокостью. Но насколько же невинны были методы ловли рыбы в те времена, в 1861 году, когда об этом писал Мишле! Впрочем, уже тогда пароходы и пушки нарушили равноправие кита и человека и низвели бедного кита до удобного объекта отстрела. И что бы сказал гуманный друг людей и любитель животных Мишле, увидев сегодняшнее промышленное изготовление китового жира и реализацию китовых туш! Ибо то, что сегодня, после Мировой войны 1914 — 1918 гг., образовалось и все больше усовершенствуется под названием “пелагической”, глубинной ловли, более невозможно именовать не только охотой, но даже и ловлей. Сегодня к Южному полюсу Земли в Полярное море отправляются огромные корабли водоизмещением до 30000 тонн, оснащенные электрическими приборами, пушками, минами, самолетами и радиоаппаратурой, подобные плавающим кастрюлям для пищи. Туда скрылся кит, и там мертвое животное перерабатывается промышленным способом прямо на судне. Так бедный Левиафан исчез бы вскоре с нашей планеты. В 1937-1938 гг. в Лондоне наконец-то было достигнуто международное соглашение, которое определяет известные правила китобойного промысла, устанавливает районы ловли, предусматривает прочие условия с тем, чтобы защитить хотя бы оставшихся в живых китов от дальнейшего внепланового истребления.

Охотники на кита, о которых здесь идет речь, были, напротив, истинными охотниками, а не банальными ловцами, и уж точно не забивали китов механическим способом. Они гнались за своей добычей из вод Северного моря или от атлантического побережья на парусниках и гребных судах через огромные пространства мировых океанов, а оружием, с помощью которого они вступали в битву с могучим и хитрым морским гигантом, являлся гарпун, бросаемый человеческой рукой. Это была опасная для жизни битва двух живых существ, причем оба они, не будучи рыбами в зоологическом смысле, передвигались в стихии моря. Все подручные средства, которые использовал в этой борьбе человек, тогда еще приводились в действие мускульной силой самого человека: парус, весло и гарпун, смертельное метательное копьё. Кит был достаточно сильным для того, чтобы одним ударом своего хвоста разнести в щепки корабль и лодку. Человеческой хитрости он мог противопоставить тысячу собственных уловов. Герман Мелвилл, который сам много лет служил матросом на китобойном судне, описывает в своем “Моби Дике”, как между охотником и его жертвой возникают, можно сказать личная связь и интимные отношения дружбы-вражды. Здесь человек все более погружается в стихийную бездну морского существования, благодаря борьбе с другими обитателями моря. Эти охотники на кита плавали под парусами с севера на юг земного шара и от Атлантического до Тихого океана. Все время следуя таинственным путям кита, они открывали острова и континенты, не деля из этого большого шума. У Мелвилла один из этих мореплавателей, познакомившись с книгой первооткрывателя Австралии капитана Кука, произносит такие слова: этот Кук пишет книги о вещах, которые охотник на китов не стал бы даже заносить в свой судовой журнал. Мишле спрашивает : Кто показал людям океан ? Кто открыл

океанические зоны и проливы? Одним словом: Кто открыл земной шар? Кит и охотник на кита! И все это независимо от Колумба и от знаменитых золотоискателей, которые с большой шумихой ищут то, что уже найдено благородными рыбаками Севера, из Бретани и из страны Басков. Мишле говорит это и продолжает: эти охотники на кита являют собою величайшее проявление человеческого духа. Без кита рыболовы всегда оставались бы только на побережье. Рыба-кит заманила их в океаны и даровала независимость от берега. Благодаря киту были открыты морские течения и найден проход к Северу. Кит предводительствовал нами.

Тогда, в 16 столетии, на нашей планете два различных вида охотников одновременно находились во власти пробуждения стихий. На земле то были русские охотники на пушного зверя, которые, следуя за пушным зверем, покорили Сибирь и вышли по суше к восточноазиатскому побережью; на море северо- и западноевропейские охотники на кита, которые охотились на всех мировых океанах и, как справедливо указывает Мишле, сделали видимым глобус. Они — первенцы новой, стихийной экзистенции, первые настоящие “дети моря”.

6

На эту смену эпох приходится важнейшее событие в области техники. И здесь голландцы оказываются впереди всех. В 1600 году они были бесспорными мастерами кораблестроения. Они изобрели новые приемы парусной техники и новые типы парусных кораблей, которые упразднили весла и открыли возможности для навигации и судоходства, отвечающие размерам вновь открытых мировых океанов.

Около 1595 года в Северной Голландии появляется новый тип корабля из западнофризского города Хоорн. Это была лодка с прямыми парусами, шедшая под парусом не только при попутном ветре, как старый парусник, но также и сбоку от ветра, умевшая использовать ветер совсем иначе, чем прежние суда. Корабельные снасти и искусство парусного мореплавания усовершенствуются отныне в небывалой степени. “Судоходство Средневековья заканчивается катастрофическим образом”, - говорит по поводу этого события Бернхард Хагеборн, историк развития корабельных типов. Здесь находится подлинный поворотный момент в истории взаимоотношений Земли и Моря. Этим было достигнуто все, чего позволял достичь материал, из которого были сделаны тогда судно и такелаж. Новый поворот в технике кораблестроения наступил только в 19 веке. “Подобным откровению, - говорит Хагеборн, - должен был казаться морякам момент, когда однажды они оставили большой парус и увидели, сколь богатые возможности открывает перед ними маленький парус”. Благодаря этому техническому достижению голландцы стали “извозчиками” всех европейских стран. Они унаследовали также торговлю немецкой Ганзы. Даже мировая держава Испания была вынуждена фрахтовать голландские суда для обеспечения своих трансатлантических перевозок.

В 16 веке кроме того появляется новый военный корабль, и этим открывается новая эра морской военной стратегии. Оснащенный орудиями, парусник с бортов обстреливает залпами противника. Тем самым морское сражение становится артиллерийским боем с дальнего расстояния, требующим большого искусства управления парусником. Только теперь можно по-настоящему говорить о морском сражении, ибо, сражение экипажей гребных галер, как мы видели, представляет собой только сухопутный бой на корабле. С этим связана совершенно новая тактика морского боя и ведения войны на море, новое искусство “эволюций”, необходимых до, во время и после морского сражения. Первая научная в современном смысле книга об этом новом искусстве вышла в Лионе в 1697 году под названием “L`art des armecs navales ou trait des evolutions navales”; ее автором был священник ордена иезуитов француз Поль Ост. В ней дан критический обзор морских сражений и морских маневров голландцев, англичан и французов во время войны Людовика 14 с голландцами. Впоследствии появились и другие французские

исследования этого вопроса. Только в 18 веке в 1782 году в ряд знаменитых теоретиков морской тактики входит англичанин в лице Клерка д'Эльдина.

Все западно- и центральноевропейские народы внесли свой вклад в общее достижение, заключавшееся в открытии новой земли и имевшее следствием всемирную европейскую гегемонию. Итальянцы усовершенствовали компас и создали навигационные карты; открытие Америки состоялось прежде всего благодаря силе познания и уму Тосканелли и Колумба. Португальцы и испанцы снарядили первые великие исследовательские экспедиции и совершили кругосветные плавания под парусами. В становление новой картины мира внесли свой вклад великие немецкие астрономы и замечательные географы; название “Америка” придумал в 1507 году немецкий космограф Вальтцемюллер, а предприятие иностранцев в Венесуэле явилось большим колониальным стартом, который, однако, не мог справиться с испанским сопротивлением. Голландцы были ведущими в китобойном промысле и в области техники кораблестроения. Франция располагала особенно широкими возможностями как благодаря своему географическому положению на трех побережьях — Средиземного моря, Атлантического океана и Ла-Манша — так и в силу своего экономического потенциала и из-за склонности к мореплаванию населения ее атлантического берега. Французский викинг Жан Флери в 1522 году нанес первый ощутимый удар по испанской мировой гегемонии и захватил два груженных драгоценностями корабля, которые Кортес направил из Америки в Испанию; французский первооткрыватель Жан Картье уже в 1540 году открыл Канаду, “новую Францию” и завладел ею для своего короля. Особо важную часть при пробуждении морских энергий той эпохи составляли гугенотские корсары, выходцы из Ла-Рошеля. Франция на много десятилетий превзошла Англию в области военного строительства парусных кораблей еще в 17 столетии, при гениальном морском министре Кольбере.

Достижения англичан в судоходстве, само собой разумеется, также весьма значительны. Но плавать южнее экватора английские моряки начинают только после 1570 года. Лишь в последней трети 16 века начинается великое пробуждение английских корсаров к плаванию за океан и в Америку.

7

Всевозможные “пленители моря”, пираты, корсары, занимавшиеся морской торговлей авантюристы составляют, наряду с охотниками на кита и водителями парусников, ударную колонну того стихийного поворота к морю, который осуществляется на протяжении 16-17 веков. Здесь перед нами следующий отважный род “детей моря”. Среди них есть известные имена, герои морских рассказов и сказаний о разбойниках, такие, как Франц Дрейк, Хеквинс, сэр Уолтер Рэлли или сэр Генри Морган, прославленные во множестве книг; судьба каждого из них в самом деле была достаточно богата приключениями. Они захватывали испанские флотилии с серебром, и одна эта тема сама по себе уже довольно интригующая. Существует обширная литература о пиратах вообще и о многих великих именах в частности, а на английском языке составлен даже словарь о них под забавным названием “The Pirate`s Who`s Who”, энциклопедия пиратов.

Целые категории этих отважных морских разбойников в самом деле снискали себе славу в истории, ибо нанесли первые удары по испанской гегемонии во всем мире и по испанской монополии в торговле. Так, гугенотские пираты во французской морской крепости Ла-Рошель заодно с голландскими морскими гезами сражались против Испании во времена королевы Елизаветы. Затем это были так называемые елизаветинские корсары, внесшие весомый вклад в разгром испанской армады (1588г.). За корсарами королевы Елизаветы последовали корсары короля Якова I, среди них был сэр Генри Мейнверинг, сперва один из самых отъявленных морских разбойников, затем помилованный королем в 1616 году и, наконец, победитель пиратов, награжденный должностями и почестями. Далее идут флибустьеры и дикие пираты, отправлявшиеся в свои далекие плавания с

Ямайки и из вод Карибского моря, французы, голландцы и англичане, среди них сэра Генри Морган, разграбивший в 1671 году Панаму, возведенный в рыцарское достоинство королем Карлом II и ставший королевским губернатором Ямайки. Их последним подвигом стало покорение испанской морской крепости Картахена в Колумбии, которую они совместно с французским королевским флотом взяли приступом в 1697 году и ужасающим образом разграбили после ухода французов.

В подобного рода “пленителях моря” проявляется морская стихия. Их героическая эпоха длилась приблизительно 150 лет, примерно с 1550 до 1713 года, то есть со времени начала борьбы протестантских государств против всемирного господства католической Испании и до момента заключения Утрехтского мира. Морские разбойники существовали во все времена и на всех морях и океанах, начиная с упоминавшихся выше пиратов, изгнанных критским государством из восточного Средиземноморья много тысячелетий тому назад и вплоть до китайских джунгов, которые еще в 1920-1930 годах захватывали и грабили торговые суда в восточноазиатских водах. Но корсары 16 и 17 веков занимают в истории пиратства все же особое место. Их время кончилось только с заключением Утрехтского мира (1713), поскольку тогда произошла консолидация системы европейских государств. Военные флотилии морских держав могли теперь осуществлять эффективный контроль, а новая, на море воздвигнутая всемирная гегемония Англии впервые стала очевидной. Тем не менее еще и до 19 века существовали корсары, воевавшие частным образом, с разрешения своих правительств. Но прогрессировала организация мира, техника кораблестроения и навигация усовершенствовались, становились все более наукоемкими, а пиратство есть все же, как сказал один английский знаток военно-морского дела, “донаучная стадия ведения морских войн”. Переставший надеяться на собственный кулак и собственные расчеты пират превратился отныне в жалкого преступника. Разумеется всегда имелись некоторые исключения. К таковым принадлежит французский капитан Миссон, попытавшийся в 1720 году создать на Мадагаскаре диковинное царство гуманности. Однако в целом после Утрехтского мира пират был вытеснен на обочину мировой истории. В 18 веке он всего лишь беспутный субъект, грубый криминальный тип, могущий еще служить персонажем увлекательных рассказов, наподобие “Таинственного острова” Стивенсона, но не играющий более никакой роли в истории.

Напротив, корсары 16-17 веков играют весьма значительную роль в истории. Во всемирном противоборстве Англии и Испании они являются активными воинами. У своих врагов испанцев они считались настоящими преступниками; их вешали, когда ловили. Так же и собственное правительство хладнокровно жертвовало ими, когда они становились неудобными или когда это диктовалось соображениями внешнеполитического порядка. Часто лишь случай решал, закончит ли такой корсар жизнь королевским вельможей, высокопоставленным сановником или приговоренным к повешению пиратом. К тому же, различные наименования, как-то пират, корсар, Privateer, Merchant-Adventurer на практике трудно различимы и употребляются одно вместо другого. В собственном смысле слова, с юридической точки зрения, между пиратом и корсаром существует большая разница. Ибо, в отличие от пирата, корсар обладает документом, подтверждающим его права, полномочиями своего правительства, официальным каперным письмом своего короля. Он вправе ходить под флагом своей страны. Пират же, напротив, плавает без всяких законных оснований. Ему подходит лишь черное пиратское знамя. Но сколь бы четким и ясным ни казалось это различие в теории, на практике оно легко стирается. Корсары часто превышали свои права и плавали с фальшивыми каперскими свидетельствами, а иногда и с письменно заверенными доверенностями от несуществующих правительств.

Существеннее всех этих юридических вопросов нечто иное. Все эти Rochellois, морские гезы и флибустьеры, имели политического врага, а именно, Испанию, великую католическую державу. До тех пор, пока они остаются сами собой, они основательно грабят большей частью только корабли католиков и с чистой совестью рассматривают это как богоугодное, благословенное Господом дело. Таким образом, они входят в огромный

всемирно-исторический фронт, во фронт борьбы тогдашнего всемирного протестантизма против тогдашнего всемирного католицизма. То, что они убивают, грабят и разбойничают, не нуждается поэтому в оправдании. В общем контексте этой поворотной эпохи они в любом случае занимают определенную позицию и, тем самым, обретают свое историческое значение и свое место в истории.

8

Английские короли — как королева Елизавета, так и Стюарты Яков и Карл — и английские государственные люди этого времени не имели какого иного исторического сознания своей эпохи, по сравнению с большинством современников. Они проводили свою политику, пользовались предоставлявшимися преимуществами, получали прибыли и стремились удержать любую позицию. Они использовали право, если таковое было на их стороне, и возмущенно протестовали против несправедливости и беззакония, если право было на стороне их противников. Все это совершенно естественно. Их представления о Боге и мире, о справедливости и законности, их осознание пришедшего в движение исторического развития были — за такими гениальными исключениями, как Томас Мор, кардинал Вулси или Фрэнсис Бэкон — ничуть не более авангардными по сравнению с воззрениями большинства дипломатов и государственных мужей любой другой европейской страны, вовлеченной в мировую политику.

Королева Елизавета вполне заслуженно считается великой основательницей английского морского господства. Она вступила в борьбу с мировой гегемонией католической Испании. Во время ее правления была одержана победа над испанской армадой в проливе Ла-Манш (1588); она воодушевляла и чествовала таких героев моря, как Френсис Дрейк и Уолтер Рэлли; из ее рук в 1600 году получила торговые привилегии английская Ост-Индская торговая кампания, покорившая впоследствии под английское владычество всю Индию. За 45 лет ее правления (1558-1603) Англия стала богатой страной, какой прежде не являлась. Раньше англичане занимались овцеводством и продавали во Фландрию шерсть; теперь же со всех морей к английским островам устремились сказочные трофеи английских пиратов и корсаров. Королева радовалась этим сокровищам — они пополняли ее богатства. В этом отношении все время своего девичества она занималась тем же самым, чем занимались многочисленные английские дворяне и буржуа ее эпохи. Все они участвовали в большом деле добычи. Сотни тысяч англичан и англичанок стали тогда “корсар-капиталистами”, *corsairs capitalists*. Это также относится к тому стихийному повороту от земли к морю, о котором мы здесь ведем речь.

Прекрасный пример подобного расцвета раннего капитализма, выросшего на пиратской добыче, предоставляет нам семейство Киллигрю из Корнуэлла. Его воззрения и образ жизни дают нам картину господствовавших в то время сословий и настоящей “элиты” гораздо более жизненную и точную, чем множество служебных актов и официальных документов, обусловленных эпохой. Эти Киллигрю типичны для своего времени совсем в ином смысле, чем большинство дипломатов, юристов и увенчанных славой поэтов, причем в любом случае необходимо отметить, что и среди представителей этого рода имеются видные интеллектуалы, а фамилия Киллигрю еще и сегодня более десяти раз представлена в библиографическом национальном лексиконе Англии. Проведем же некоторое время в этом обществе избранных.

Семья Киллигрю жила в Арвенаке в Корнуолле (Юго-Восток Англии). Главой семьи во времена королевы Елизаветы был сер Джон Киллигрю, вице-адмирал Корнуолла и наследный королевский управляющий замка Пенденнис. Он работал в тесном взаимодействии с Уильямом Сесилом, лордом Берли, первым министром королевы. Уже отец и дядя вице-адмирала и управляющего были пиратами, и даже против его матери, как то достоверно сообщают нам английские летописцы, было возбуждено уголовное дело по обвинению в пиратстве. Одна часть семьи работала на берегах Англии, другая в

Ирландии. Многочисленные двоюродные братья и прочая родня на берегах Девона и Дорсета. К этому стоит добавить приятелей и собутыльников всякого рода. Они организовывали нападения и разбойничьи набеги, подстерегали в засаде приближавшиеся к их берегу корабли, следили за разделом добычи, и торговали долями в прибыли, постами и должностями. Большой дом, в котором проживала семья Киллигрю в Арвенаке, стоял в непосредственной близости от моря в безлюдной части порта Фальмут и имел тайный проход к морю. Единственным расположенным поблизости зданием был вышеупомянутый замок Пенденнис, резиденция королевского управляющего. Замок был оснащен сотней пушек и служил пиратам убежищем в случае крайней необходимости. К тому времени, как благородная леди Киллигрю стала трудолюбивой и умелой помощницей своему супругу, она уже помогала своему отцу, блестящему “gentleman pirate”. Она предоставляла в своем доме приют пиратам и была гостеприимной хозяйкой. Во всех местных портах были устроены укрытия и места для ночлега.

Королевские власти редко беспокоили семью Киллигрю или, тем более, препятствовали ей в ее занятиях. Лишь однажды, в 1582 году, дело дошло до подобного вмешательства, о котором я хотел бы вкратце рассказать. Ганзейское судно водоизмещением 144 тонны, принадлежащее двум испанцам, отнесло штормом в порт Фальмут. Поскольку Англия в тот момент не воевала с Испанией, испанцы безбоязненно встали на якорь, и как раз напротив дома в Арвенаке. Лэди Киллигрю заметила корабль из своего окна, и ее наметанный глаз тотчас же различил, что судно гружено драгоценным голландским сукном. В ночь на 7 января 1582 года вооруженные люди Киллигрю во главе с благородной леди атаковали несчастный корабль, перебили команду, побросали трупы в море вернулись в Арвенак с ценным голландским сукном и прочей добычей. Сам корабль непонятно как оказался в Ирландии. Обоих испанцев, владельцев судна, к их счастью не было на боту во время боя, поскольку они переночевали в маленькой гостинице на берегу. Они подали иск в местный английский суд в Корнуэлле. После некоторых изысканий суд пришел к выводу, что корабль вероятно украден неизвестными преступниками, прочие же обстоятельства дела не могут быть расследованы. Но поскольку испанцы обладали связями среди политиков, им удалось передать дело в более высокую инстанцию в Лондон, так что было назначено повторное предварительное следствие. Леди Киллигрю вместе со своими помощниками была привлечена к суду в другой местности. Ее признали виновной и приговорили к смертной казни. Двое из ее пособников были казнены, сама леди в последний момент была помилована.

Такова правдивая история леди Киллигрю. Еще и на четырнадцатый год правления королевы Елизаветы большая часть тоннажа английского флота была задействована в разбойничьих плаваниях или в незаконных торговых сделках, а совокупное водоизмещение судов, находившихся в легальных торговых предприятиях, составляло едва ли более 50000 тонн. Семейство Киллигрю — это прекрасный пример отечественного фронта великой эпохи морских разбойников, в которую сбылось старое английское пророчество 13 века: “Детеныши льва превратятся в морских рыб”. Итак, детеныши льва в конце средневековья разводили в основном овец, из шерсти которых во Фландрии получали сукно. Только в 16 и 17 веках этот народ овцеводов действительно превратился в народ “пленителей моря” и корсаров, в “детей моря”.

9

Англичане сравнительно поздно добиваются успехов в океанических плаваниях. Португальцы стали заниматься мореплаванием на сто лет раньше, однако плавали они в основном вдоль побережья. С 1492 года испанцы начинают великую Конкисту, покорение Америки. За ними быстро последовали французские мореплаватели, гугеноты и англичане. Но лишь в 1553 году с основанием Muscovy Company Англия начинает проводить трансатлантическую политику, с помощью которой ей удалось несколько

потеснить прочие великие колониальные державы. Как уже было сказано выше, только после 1570 года англичане стали плавать южнее экватора. Практически первым свидетельством того, что Англия начинает обретать новый английский всемирный кругозор, является книга Хэклеята “Принципы навигации”; она вышла в 1589 году. В китовой ловле и кораблестроении учителями англичан, равно как и других народов, также были голландцы.

Тем не менее, именно англичане были теми, кто в конце концов всех опередил, одолел всех соперников и достиг мирового господства над океанами. Англия стала наследницей. Она стала наследницей великих охотников и водителей парусников, исследователей и первооткрывателей всех остальных народов Европы. Британское владычество над землей посредством моря вобрало в себя все отважные подвиги и достижения в мореплавании, содеянные немецкими, голландскими, норвежскими и датскими моряками. Правда, великие колониальные империи других европейских народов продолжали существовать и в дальнейшем. Португалия и Испания сохранили огромные владения за океаном, но утратили морское господство и контроль за морскими коммуникациями. С высадкой и укреплением войск Кромвеля на Ямайке в 1655 году была решена общеполитическая всемирно-океаническая ориентация Англии и заокеанская победа над Испанией. Голландия, достигшая около 1600 года расцвета своего морского могущества, уже сто лет спустя, в 1700 году, стала в большей степени сухопутной, континентальной страной. Ей пришлось возводить сильные полевые укрепления и обороняться от Людовика XIV на суше; ее наместник Вильгельм III Оранский в 1689 году становится одновременно королем Англии; он переселился на острова и проводил теперь уже не собственно голландскую, но английскую политику. Франция не выдержала того великого исхода к морю, который был связан с гугенотским протестантизмом. Она все же принадлежала римской духовной традиции, и когда с переходом Генриха IV в католичество и благодаря Варфоломеевской ночи 1572 года дело решилось в пользу католицизма, то тем самым в конечном итоге был совершен окончательный выбор не в пользу моря, а в пользу суши, земли. Правда, Франция обладала очень крупным флотом и могла, как мы видели, справиться с Англией еще при Людовике XV. Но после того, как французский король отстранил от дел в 1672 году своего выдающегося министра торговли и военно-морских сил Кольбера отменить выбор в пользу суши уже было невозможно. Продолжительные колониальные войны 18 века только подтвердили это. Между тем, Германия потеряла всю свою мощь и силу в религиозных войнах и из-за политических неудач тогдашней империи. Так Англия стала наследницей, универсальной наследницей великого пробуждения европейских народов. Как это могло стать возможным? Это невозможно объяснить при помощи общеизвестных аналогий с предшествующими историческими примерами морского господства, ничего не дают и параллели с Афинами или Карфагеном, Римом, Византией или Венецией. Здесь перед нами случай единственный по самому своему существу. Его своеобразие, его несравненность состоит в том, что Англия осуществила превращение стихий в совсем иной момент истории, совсем иным образом, нежели прежние морские державы. Она действительно отделилась от земли и основала свое существование в стихии моря. Благодаря этому она выиграла не только многие морские сражения и войны, но одержала верх в чем-то совсем ином и бесконечно большем, — в революции, а именно, в уникальной революции, в планетарной революции пространства.

10

Что это такое революция пространства?

Человек обладает определенным представлением своего “пространства”; это представление изменяется под влиянием крупных исторических преобразований. Различным жизненным формам соответствуют столь же разнообразные пространства.

Уже внутри одной и той же эпохи повседневная картина окружающего мира отдельных людей разнится в зависимости от их профессии. Житель крупного города мыслит себе мир совершенно иначе, чем крестьянин; охотник на кита располагает совсем иным жизненным пространством, чем оперный певец, а летчику мир и жизнь предстают опять же не только в ином свете, но и в иных мерах, глубинах и горизонтах. Различия в представлениях о пространстве станут еще глубже и значительнее, если сравнить целые народы и разные эпохи истории человечества. Научные истории о пространстве могут значить здесь практически очень много и очень мало. На протяжении столетий ученых, уже тогда считавших Землю шаром, держали за душевнобольных и вредителей. В Новое время разные науки с растущей специализацией также выработали свои особые понятия пространства. Геометрия, физика, психология и биология следуют здесь особенными, далеко друг от друга разошедшимися путями. Если ты спросишь ученых, они ответят тебе, что математическое пространство представляет собой нечто совсем иное, чем пространство электромагнитного поля, последнее, в свою очередь, совершенно отлично от пространства в психологическом или биологическом смысле. Это дает полдюжины понятий пространства. Здесь отсутствует любая цельность и подстерегает опасность расчленения и забалтывания важной проблемы в изолированном сосуществовании различных понятий. Философия и гносеология 19 столетия также не дают никакого всеохватывающего и простого ответа и практически оставляют нас в тупике.

Но государства и силы истории не дожидаются данных науки точно так же, как Христофор Колумб не дожидался Коперника. Каждый раз, когда в виду новой атаки исторических сил, через высвобождение новых энергий в поле зрения всего человечества попадают новые земли и океаны, изменяются также пространства исторической экзистенции. Тогда возникают новые масштабы и измерения политико-исторического действия, новые науки, новые устройства, новая жизнь новых или возродившихся народов. Это распространение может быть настолько интенсивным и поразительным, что меняются не только меры, масштабы и пропорции, не только внешний оком человека, но и сама структура понятий пространства. Тогда уже можно говорить о революции пространства. Впрочем, уже с каждым историческим изменением в большинстве случаев связано видоизменение картины пространства. Это является истинной сущностью той всеобъемлющей политической, научной и культурной трансформации, которая тогда разворачивается.

Это общее положение мы сможем быстро прояснить для себя на трех исторических примерах: последствия завоевания Карла Великого, Римская империя в первом веке нашей эры и влияние крестовых походов на развитие Европы.

11

Во времена завоевательных походов Александра Великого грекам предстал новый огромный пространственный горизонт. Культура и искусство эллинизма являются его следствием. Великий философ Аристотель, современник этого изменения пространства, видел, что обитаемый людьми мир все более смыкается со стороны Востока и со стороны Запада. Аристарх Самосский, живший некоторое время спустя (310 — 230), уже предполагал, что солнце является неподвижной звездой и стоит в центре земной орбиты. Основанный Александром город Александрия на Ниле стал центром потрясающих открытий в технической, математической и физической областях. Здесь учил Евклид, основатель евклидовой геометрии; Хирон осуществил здесь удивительные технические изобретения. Здесь учился Архимед из Сиракуз, изобретатель больших боевых механизмов и первооткрыватель естественнонаучных законов, а заведующий Александрийской библиотеки Эратосфен (275 — 195) уже в то время правильно рассчитал местоположение экватора и научно доказал, что Земля имеет форму шара. Так было предвосхищено учение Коперника. И все же эллинистический мир был недостаточно

обширным для планетарной пространственной революции. Его знание осталось уделом ученых, ибо он еще не вообрал в свою экзистенциальную действительность мировой океан. Когда триста лет спустя Цезарь, выйдя из Рима покорил Галлию и Англию, взору предстал Северо-Запад и открылся выход к Атлантическому океану. Это было первым шагом к сегодняшнему понятию европейского пространства. В первом веке римской эпохи цезарей, особенно, конечно, во времена Нерона, сознание глубочайшей перемены стало столь мощным и ощутимым, что, по крайней мере, в господствовавшем умонастроении можно было уже говорить о почти революционных изменениях картины пространства. Этот исторический момент приходится на первое столетие нашей эры и потому заслуживает особого внимания. Видимый горизонт раздвинулся к Востоку и к Западу, к Северу и к Югу. Завоевательные и гражданские войны заняли собой пространство от Испании до Персии, от Англии до Египта. Далеко удаленные друг от друга области и народы вошли меж собой в соприкосновение и обрели единство общей политической судьбы. Солдаты из всех частей империи — из Германии и из Сирии, из Африки или из Иллирии — могли сделать своего генерала Римским императором. Был прорублен Коринфский перешеек, корабли обошли с юга Аравийский полуостров, Нерон послал научную экспедицию к истокам Нила. Письменными свидетельствами этого расширения пространства являются карта мира Агриппы и география Страбона. То, что Земля имеет форму шара, осознавалось уже не только отдельными астрономами или математиками. Знаменитый философ Сенека, учитель, воспитатель и: в конце концов, жертва Нерона, запечатлел тогда в чудных словах и стихотворных строках почти планетарное сознание той эпохи. Он указал со всей ясностью, что достаточно в течение не очень большого количества суток идти под парусом от крайнего берега Испании при собственном, попутном, то есть восточном ветре, чтобы на пути к Западу достичь расположенной на Востоке Индии. В другом месте, в трагедии “Медея” он изрекает в стихотворной форме поразительное пророчество:

Жаркий Инд и хладный Аракс соприкасаются
Персы пьют из Эльбы и Рейна.
Фетида явит взору новые миры (novos orbis),
А Туле не будет более крайним пределом Земли.

Я процитировал эти строки, поскольку они выражают то всеобъемлющее ощущение пространства, которое присутствовало в первом веке нашей эры. Ибо начало нашей эры было действительно рубежом эпох, с которым было связано не только сознание полноты времен, но и сознание заполненного земного пространства и планетарного горизонта. Но вместе с тем слова Сенеки перебрасывают таинственный мост в Новое время и в эпоху открытий; ибо они сохранились и дошли до нас сквозь столетиями длившиеся сумерки пространства и сквозь обмеление европейского Средневековья. Они передали думающим людям чувство большего пространства и вселенского простора, и даже способствовали открытию Америки. Как и множество его современников, Христофор Колумб знал слова Сенеки, они побудили его отправиться в отважное плавание к Новому Свету. Он намеревался, плывя под парусами к Западу, достичь Востока, и действительно достиг его. Выражение “Новый свет”, новый мир, *novus orbis*, которое использует Сенека, было тотчас же применено по отношению к только что открытой Америке.

Гибель Римской империи, распространение ислама, вторжения арабов и турок вызвали столетние пространственные сумерки и обмеление Европы. Изолированность от моря, отсутствие флота, полная континентальная замкнутость характерны для раннего Средневековья и его системы феодализма. За время с 500 по 1100 годы Европа стала феодально-аграрным континентальным массивом; европейский правящий слой, феодалы, доверили всю свою духовную культуру, в том числе чтение и письмо, Церкви и духовенству. Знаменитые властители и герои этой эпохи не умели ни читать, ни писать;

для этого у них был монах или капеллан. В морской империи правители, вероятно, не смогли бы столь долго оставаться неграмотными, как это было в таком чисто материальном массиве суши. Однако в результате крестовых походов французские, английские и немецкие рыцари познакомились со странами ближнего Востока. На Севере новые горизонты открылись благодаря расширению Немецкой Ганзы и распространению Немецкого рыцарского ордена, здесь возникла система транспортных и торговых коммуникаций, получившая название “всемирного хозяйства Средневековья”.

Это пространственное расширение также являлось культурной трансформацией глубочайшего рода. Повсюду в Европе возникают новые формы политической жизни. Во Франции, Англии и на Сицилии создаются централизованные органы управления, в чем-то уже предвосхищающие современное государство. В верхней и центральной Италии происходит становление новой городской культуры. Развиваются университеты, в которых преподают теологию и до сих пор неизвестную юриспруденцию, а возрождение римского права создает новый образованный слой юристов, и подрывает монополию клира на образование, типичную для феодального Средневековья. В новом, готическом искусстве, в архитектуре, пластическом искусстве, в живописи мощный ритм движения сменяет статическое пространство предшествующего романского искусства и помещает на его место динамическое поле сил, пространство движения и жеста. Готический свод — это такое устройство, в котором части и элементы взаимно уравниваются их тяжестью и держат друг друга. В противоположность недвижимым, тяжелым массам зданий романского стиля здесь присутствует совершенно новое пространственное чувство. Но и в сравнении с пространством античного храма и пространством последующей архитектуры Ренессанса в готическом искусстве обнаруживается только ему присущие сила и движение, преобразующие пространство.

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Можно найти и другие исторические примеры, но все они меркнут перед лицом глубочайшего и самого богатого последствиями изменения планетарной картины мира во всей известной нам мировой истории. Это изменение происходит в 16 и 17 веках, в эпоху открытия Америки и первого кругосветного плавания. Теперь возникает в прямом смысле слова новый мир, Новый Свет, и в корне меняется всеобщее мировосприятие сначала западно- и центральноевропейских народов человечества. Это первая настоящая пространственная революция во всеобъемлющем смысле слова, охватившая всю землю, весь мир и все человечество.

Она несравнима ни с какой другой. Она была не просто всего лишь особенно обширным в количественном отношении распространением географического горизонта, которое само собой наступило вследствие открытия новых частей света и новых океанов. Гораздо большие изменения в совокупном восприятии человечества претерпела общая картина нашей планеты и тем самым общее астрономическое представление о всем мироздании. Впервые в своей истории человек мог держать настоящий, целый земной шар, словно мяч. Мысль о том, что Земля должна иметь форму шара, казалась человеку Средних веков и даже Мартину Лютеру забавной и несерьезной фантазией. Теперь шаровидный образ Земли стал осязаемым фактом, неопровержимым опытом и бесспорной научной истиной. Теперь столь неподвижная прежде Земля вращалась также вокруг Солнца. Но даже это еще не составляло грядущего подлинного, фундаментального преобразования пространства. Решающим был прорыв в космос и представление о бесконечном пустом пространстве.

Коперник первым доказал научно, что Земля вертится вокруг Солнца. Его труд о вращениях небесных орбит “*De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*” вышел в 1543 году. Хотя он и изменил тем самым всю картину нашей солнечной системы, но он все же еще твердо держался того мнения, что мироздание в целом, космос представляет собой ограниченное

пространство. Таким образом, еще не изменился мир в глобальном космическом смысле и с ним вместе не переменялась сама идея пространства. Несколько десятилетий спустя границы пали. В философском смысле Джордано Бруно предположил, что наша солнечная система (в которой планета Земля вращается вокруг Солнца) представляет собой лишь одну из множества солнечных систем бесконечного звездного неба. В результате научных экспериментов Галилея подобные философские умозрения приобрели статус математически доказуемой истины. Кеплер рассчитывал пути движения планет, хотя его самого и охватывал ужас при мысли о бесконечности такого рода пространств, где планетные системы движутся без какого-либо центра. С появлением учения Ньютона новое представление о пространстве прочно утвердилось во всей свободомыслящей Европе. В то время, как силы притяжения и отталкивания взаимно уравновешивают друг друга, скопление материи, небесные тела по законам гравитации движутся в бесконечном, пустом пространстве.

Таким образом, люди могут представить себе пустое пространство, что было ранее невозможно, пусть некоторые философы и рассуждали о “пустоте”. Раньше люди боялись пустоты; они страдали так называемой *horror vacui* (боязнь пространства). Отныне люди позабыли свой страх и не находят более ничего особенного в том, что они сами и их вселенная существует в пустоте. Такое научно доказанное представление вселенной в бесконечном, пустом пространстве даже приводило писателей Просвещения 18 века, и прежде всего Вольтера, в состояние особой гордости. Но попробуй реально представить себе хоть раз действительно пустое пространство! Не только безвоздушное, но и лишенное всякой тонкой и одушевленной материи абсолютно пустое пространство! Попытайся хоть однажды действительно различить в твоём представлении пространство и материю, отделить их друг от друга и помыслить одно без другого! С тем же успехом ты можешь попытаться помыслить себе абсолютное Ничто. Деятели Просвещения очень забавлялись по поводу этой *horror vacui*. Но вероятно, это был всего лишь вполне объяснимый страх перед ничто и перед пустотой смерти, ужас перед лицом нигилистического образа мыслей и перед нигилизмом вообще.

Такого рода изменение, каковое присутствует в мысли о бесконечном, пустом пространстве, невозможно объяснить лишь следствием обыкновенного географического расширения ойкумены. Оно носит столь фундаментальный и революционный характер, что позволяет сказать также нечто прямо противоположное, а именно: что открытие новых континентов и совершение первых плаваний вокруг земли явились всего лишь внешними обнаружениями и следствиями более глубоких изменений. Только поэтому высадка на неизвестном острове и могла вызвать к жизни целую эпоху открытий. На берег американского континента нередко высаживались пришельца с Запада и с Востока. Как известно, викинги из Гренландии достигли берегов Америки уже около 1000 года, а индейцы, которых обнаружил Колумб, так же откуда-то переселились в Америку. Но “открыта” Америка была только в 1392 году Колумбом. “Доколумбовые” открытия не только не содействовали планетарной пространственной революции, но и не имели к ней ровным счетом никакого отношения. В ином случае ацтеки не оставались бы в Мексике, а инки — в Перу; однажды они явились бы в Европу с картой земного шара в руках, и не мы бы их открыли, но, напротив, они открыли бы нас. Для того, чтобы революция пространства состоялась, требуется нечто большее, чем простая высадка в неизвестной дотле местности. Для ее свершения необходимо изменение представлений о пространстве, которое охватывало бы все уровни и области человеческого бытия. Что это значит, позволяет понять рассмотрение необычного рубежа эпох, имевшего место в 16-17 веках.

В эти столетия эпохальных перемен европейское человечество обретает новое понимание пространства во всех видах своего творческого духа. Живопись Ренессанса упраздняет пространство средневековой готической живописи; художники помещают теперь нарисованных ими людей и предметы внутрь такого пространства, которое дает в

перспективе пустую бездонность. Люди и вещи покоятся отныне и движутся отныне внутри пространства. В сравнении с пространством готической картины это в самом деле означает другой мир. То, что художники теперь иначе видят, что изменяется их зрение, для нас исполнено глубочайшего смысла. Ибо великие художники не просто изображают для кого-то нечто прекрасное. Искусство есть историческая ступень в осознании пространства, и настоящий художник — это человек, который лучше и правильнее других людей видит людей и предметы, правильнее, прежде всего, в смысле исторической правды своей собственной эпохи. Но не только в живописи возникает новое пространство. Архитектура Ренессанса творит свои всецело отличные от готического пространства здания с классически геометрической планировкой; ее пластика свободно размещает в пространстве изваяния человеческих фигур, в то время как скульптуры Средневековья расположены у колонн и в углах зданий. Архитектура Барокко находится снова в динамике движения, устремления и потому сохраняет некоторую связь с готикой, но все же она остается накрепко закованной в новое, современное пространство, возникшем в результате пространственной революции и испытавшим решающее воздействие самого барочного стиля. Музыка извлекает свои мелодии и гармонии из старых тональностей и помещает их в звуковое пространство нашей так называемой тональной системы. Театр и опера предоставляют своим персонажам передвигаться в пустой глубине сценического пространства, которое отделяется занавесом от пространства зрительного зала. Таким образом, все без исключения духовные течения двух этих столетий - Ренессанс, Гуманизм, Реформация, Контрреформация и Барокко — по-своему участвовали в тотальности этой пространственной революции.

Не будет большим преувеличением сказать, что новым пониманием пространства охвачены все области человеческой жизни, все формы бытия, все виды творческих способностей человека, искусство, наука, техника. Огромные перемены в географическом облике Земли составляют всего лишь внешний аспект глубокого преобразования, означенного таким многообещающим и чреватых многими последствиями словосочетанием, как “пространственная революция”. Отныне неотвратимо наступает то, что называли рациональным превосходством европейца, духом европеизма и “рационализма Оккама”. Он проявляется у народов Западной и Центральной Европы, разрушает средневековые формы человеческого общежития, образует новые государства, флоты и армии, изобретает новые машины и механизмы, поработывает неевропейские народы и ставит их перед дилеммой: или принять европейскую цивилизацию или опуститься до уровня простого народа колонии.

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Всякое привычное упорядочивание представляет собой упорядочение пространства. О составлении, конституировании страны или части света говорят как о его основном, первичном упорядочивании, его номосе⁹⁶.

Итак, действительное, истинное первичное упорядочивание основано в своей важнейшей сущности на определенных пространственных границах и ограничениях, на определенных мерах и определенном разделе земли. В начале каждой великой эпохи происходит поэтому великий захват земель. В особенности любое значительное изменение и

⁹⁶ Греческое имя существительное Nomos происходит от греческого глагола Nemein ; как и этот глагол, оно имеет три значения. Во-первых, Nemein значит “брать”. Поэтому Nomos означает, во-первых, “взятие”, “захват”. Точно так же, как греческому Legein-Logos соответствует немецкое Sprechen-Sprache, так и греческому Nemein-Nomos соответствует немецкое брать-взятие, захват. Захват является вначале захватом земель, позднее также захватом моря, покорением моря, о чем много сказано в нашей созерцании мировой истории, а в области индустрии это значит захват индустрии, то есть захват индустриальных средств производства.

смещение в облике Земли связано с переменами в мировой политике и с новым переделом мира, новым захватом земель.

Столь поразительная, беспрецедентная пространственная революция, какая имело место в 16-17 веках, должна была привести к столь же неслыханному, не имеющему аналогий захвату земель. Европейские народы, которым открылись тогда новые, казавшиеся бесконечными пространства и которые устремились в даль этих просторов, обходились с открытыми ими неевропейскими и нехристианскими народами как с бесхозным добром, которое становилось собственностью первого попавшегося европейского захватчика. Все завоеватели, будь-то католики или протестанты, ссылались при этом на свою миссию распространения христианства среди нехристианских народов. Впрочем, такую миссию можно было бы попытаться осуществить и без завоеваний и грабежа. Никакого другого обоснования и оправдания не находилось. Некоторые монахи, как например испанский теолог Франческо де Витория в своей лекции об индейцах (*De Indis* 1532), доказывали, что право народов на их территорию не зависит от их вероисповедания и с удивительной откровенностью защищали права индейцев. Это ничего не меняет в общей исторической картине европейских колониальных захватов. Позднее, в 18 и 19 веках задача христианской миссии превратилась в задачу распространения европейской цивилизации среди нецивилизованных народов. Из таких оправданий возникло христианско-европейское международное право, то есть противопоставленное всему остальному миру сообщество христианских народов Европы. Они образовали “сообщество наций”, межгосударственный порядок. Международное право было основано на различии христианских и нехристианских народов или, столетием позже, цивилизованных (в христианско-европейском смысле) и нецивилизованных народов. Нецивилизованный в этом смысле народ не мог стать членом этого международно-правового сообщества; он не был субъектом, а только объектом этого международного права, то есть он принадлежал одному из цивилизованных народов на правах колонии или колониального протектората.

Разумеется, тебе не следует представлять “сообщество христианско-европейских народов” как некое стадо мирных овец. Между собой они вели кровавые войны. Но все же это не упраздняет исторического факта существования христианско-европейского цивилизационного единства и порядка. Мировая история представляет собой историю колониальных захватов, а при каждом захвате земель захватчики не только договаривались, но и спорили, часто даже посредством кровавых гражданских войн. Это справедливо и в отношении большинства колониальных захватов. Причем войны ведутся с тем большей интенсивностью, чем большую ценность представляет собой объект завоевания. Здесь речь шла о захвате нового мира, Нового Света. Испанцы и французы на протяжении 16 века годами вырезали коренное население самым жестоким образом, например во Флориде, причем не щадили ни женщин, ни детей. Испанцы и англичане вели между собой столетнюю изнурительную войну, в которой насилия и зверства, на которые люди способны по отношению друг к другу, достигли, казалось, высшей возможной степени. Причем они также не испытывали никаких угрызений совести от того, что использовали неевропейцев, индейцев или мусульман в качестве явных или тайных помощников или даже союзников. Вспышки ненависти необычны; друг друга называли убийцами, ворами, насильниками и пиратами. Отсутствует только одно единственное обвинение, которое обычно охотно выдвигали против индейцев; европейцы-христиане не обвиняли друг друга в людоедстве. В остальном же для обозначения злейшей, смертельной вражды привлекается все богатство языка. И все же это утрачивает всякое значение ввиду всепокоряющей действительности совместной европейской колонизации нового мира, Нового Света. Смысл и сущность христианско-европейского международного права, его исходное упорядочивание состояло именно в разделе и распределении ранее неизвестной земли. Между собой европейские народы были, не рассуждая, едины в том, что они рассматривали неевропейскую территорию земли как колониальную территорию, то есть как объект своего захвата и использования. Этот

аспект исторического развития столь важен, что эпоху открытий можно с тем же успехом, и, вероятно, еще точнее обозначить как эпоху колониальных захватов, покорения новых земель. Война, — говорит Гераклит, — соединяет, а правда — это ссора.

Во-вторых, *Neimen* означает: деление и распределение захваченного (того, что взято). Таким образом, второе значение *Nomos*: основной раздел и распределение земли, территории и покоящийся на этом порядок прав собственности.

Третье значение таково: эксплуатация, то есть использование, обработка и реализация полученной при разделе территории, производство и потребление. Захват — Распределение — Использование являются в этой последовательности тремя основными понятиями каждого конкретного упорядочения. Подробнее о значении *Nomos* см. в книге *Der Nomos der Erde*. Köln. 1950 (L. Auflage. Berlin. 1974)

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Португальцы, испанцы, французы, голландцы и англичане боролись между собой за раздел новой земли. Борьба велась не только силой оружия; она протекала также в форме дипломатического и юридического спора за получение более выгодного права собственности. В этом вопросе, в противоположность коренным жителям, можно было, конечно, проявить исключительную щедрость и великодушие. Высаживались на берег, воздвигали крест или вырезали на дереве герб короля, устанавливали привезенный с собою столб с изображением герба или помещали гербовую грамоту в дыру между древесных корней. Испанцы любили со всей торжественностью возвещать толпе сбежавшихся туземцев, что эта страна принадлежит отныне короне Кастилии. Такого рода символические вступления во владение должны были обеспечить приобретение законных прав собственности на огромные острова и целые континенты. Ни одно правительство, будь-то португальское, не соблюдало права туземцев и коренного населения на их собственной территории. Другой вопрос - это спор европейских народов-колонизаторов между собою. Здесь каждый ссылался на любой правовой документ, который был у него в этот момент в руках и, если это оказывалось выгодно, то и на договоры с туземцами и их вождями.

До тех пор, пока Португалия и Испания, две католические державы, определяли положение дел в мире, Папа Римский мог выступать в качестве творца правовых актов, инициатора новых колониальных захватов и арбитра в споре колониальных держав. Уже в 1493 году, то есть по прошествии почти года после открытия Америки, испанцам удалось добиться издания тогдашним Папой Александром VI эдикта, в котором Папа, силою своего апостольского авторитета, даровал королю Кастилии и Леона и его наследникам только что открытые вест-индийские страны в качестве мирских ленных владений Церкви. В этом эдикте была определенная линия, проходившая через Атлантический океан в ста милях к Западу от Азорских островов и островов Зеленого Мыса. Испания получала от Папы все земли, открытые западнее этой линии, в ленное владение. В следующем году Испания и Португалия условились в договоре у Тордесильяс о том, что все земли восточнее линии должны принадлежать Португалии. Так немедленно с огромным размахом начинается раздел Нового Света, хотя Колумб открыл к тому времени всего лишь несколько островов и прибрежных областей. В то время еще никто не мог представить себе реальную картину всей Земли, однако передел Земли начал осуществляться в полной мере и по всем правилам. Папская разделительная линия 1493 года оказалась в начале борьбы за новое исходное упорядочение, за новый *номос* Земли.

Более ста лет испанцы и португальцы ссылались на папские разрешения, (в своем стремлении) отклонить все притязания следовавших за ним французов, голландцев и англичан. Бразилия, открытая Кабралем в 1500 году, стала, естественным образом, собственностью Португалии, ибо эта выступающая часть западного побережья Америки

попала в восточное, португальское полушарие вследствие позднейшего переноса разделительной линии к Западу. Однако другие державы-колонизаторы не чувствовали себя связанными условиями соглашения между Португалией и Испанией, а авторитета Римского Папы не хватало для того, чтобы внушить им уважение к колониальной монополии обеих католических держав. Благодаря Реформации народы, принявшие протестантизм, открыто порвали с любой зависимостью от римского престола. Так борьба за колонизацию новой земли превратилась в борьбу между Реформацией и Контрреформацией, между всемирным католицизмом испанцев и всемирным протестантизмом гугенотов, голландцев и англичан.

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В противоположность коренным жителям недавно открытых стран, христианские колонизаторы не составляли друг с другом единого фронта, ибо в данном случае отсутствовал общий боеспособный противник. Тем более ожесточенной, но и более значимой в историческом смысле, более ярко выраженной и оформленной была развивавшаяся теперь религиозная война между христианскими народами-колонизаторами, всемирная битва между католицизмом и протестантизмом. Таким образом обрисованная и с этими участниками она предстает как религиозная война, и таковой она в действительности тоже являлась. Но этим еще не все сказано. В своем истинном свете она целиком предстает нам лишь тогда, когда мы и в данном случае обратим внимание на противоположность стихий и на начинающееся в то время отделение мира открытого моря от мира земной тверди.

Некоторые участники этой великой религиозной борьбы служили для великих писателей прототипами сценических персонажей. Излюбленной темой драматургов стало противоборство испанского короля Филиппа Второго и английской королевы Елизаветы. Оба этих персонажа порознь встречаются в различных трагедиях Шиллера; их прямая конфронтация неоднократно описывается в рамках одной и той же пьесы. Это служит прекрасным материалом для эффектных театральных сцен. Но подобным образом невозможно уловить глубинные противоречия, изначальные ситуации дружбы-вражды, последние элементарные силы и противоборства стихий. В Германии того времени нет для этого сценичных героев. Лишь один единственный немец этой столь бедной деяниями эпохи в жизни Германии (1550-1618) стал героем значительной трагедии: король Рудольф Второй. Ты, вероятно, немного слышала о нем и действительно, нельзя сказать, что он продолжает жить в исторической памяти немецкого народа. Тем не менее, его имя принадлежит данному контексту и крупный немецкий драматург Франц Грильпарцер с полным на то основанием помещает его в центр действия своей трагедии "Братоубийство в Габсбурге". Но вся проблематика и все величие как самой трагедии Грильпарцера, так и его героев состоит именно в том, что Рудольф Второй не был активным героем, но своего рода задержателем, замедлителем. В нем было нечто от "катехона", понятия, уже упоминавшегося нами однажды в ином контексте. Но что вообще может предпринять Рудольф в том положении, в котором оказалась тогда Германия? Одно то, что он осознал отсутствие внешнеполитической угрозы в отношении Германии, было уже очень много, и целым достижением явилось только то, что он в самом деле задержал начало Тридцатилетней войны на десятилетия.

Своеобразие положения Германии тех времен состояло именно в том, что она не определилась в выборе союзников и никак не могла принять какую-то сторону в этой религиозной войне. Она заключала в самой себе противостояние католицизма и протестантизма, однако это внутринемецкое противоречие было чем-то иным, нежели всемирное, решающее для колонизации Нового Света противостояние католичества и протестантизма. Германия была все же родиной Лютера и страной возникновения Реформации. Но борьба колониальных держав давно преодолела изначальную

противоположность католичества и протестантизма и, миновав внутринемецкую проблематику, достигла гораздо более точного и глубокого противопоставления учения иезуитов и кальвинизма. Теперь это было различие друга и врага, служащее мерилем для всей мировой политики.

Лютеранские немецкие князья и сословия, прежде всего протестантский правитель империи курфюрст Саксонский, пытались сохранять верность и католическому королю. Когда под натиском кальвинистов возник военный союз евангелических немецких сословий, так называемый Унион, а католические сословия образовали встречный фронт, так называемую Лигу, курфюрст Саксонский, лютеранин по вероисповеданию, не знал, к какой стороне ему примкнуть. Еще в 1612 году велись переговоры о его вступлении в католическую Лигу. Ненависть лютеран к кальвинистам была не меньшей, чем их ненависть к папистам, и не меньшей, чем ненависть католиков к кальвинистам. Это объясняется не только тем, что лютеране на практике в общем и целом больше следовали принципу подчинения власти, чем гораздо более активные кальвинисты. Подлинная причина состоит в том, что Германия была в то время отстранена от участия в европейской колонизации Нового Света и насильственно втянута внешними силами в мировое столкновение западно-европейских колониальных держав. В то же время на Юго-Востоке ей угрожали наступавшие турки. Иезуиты и кальвинисты Испании, Голландии и Англии поставили Германию перед альтернативами, совершенно чуждыми собственно немецкому развитию. Неиезуиты-католики и некальвинисты-лютеране, каковыми являлись немецкие князья и сословия, пытались избежать участия во внутренне им чуждом споре. Но это требовало решительности и огромных собственных сил. За неимением таковых они оказались в ситуации, которая точнее всего обозначалась как “пассивный нейтралитет”. Следствием этого было то, что Германия оказалась полем сражения внутренне чуждых ей трансатлантических сил за колонии без реального участия в этой войне. Кальвинизм был новой воинственной религией; пробуждение стихии моря захватило его как соразмерная ему вера. Он стал верой французских гугенотов, голландских борцов за свободу и английских пуритан. Он был также вероисповеданием великого курфюрста Бранденбургского, одного из немногих немецких властителей, знавших толк в морских сражениях и колониях. Внутриматериковые кальвинистические общины в Швейцарии, в Венгрии и в других странах не играли роли в мировой политике, если они не были связаны с указанными морскими энергиями.

Все некальвинисты приходили в ужас от кальвинистического вероучения, и прежде всего, от суровой веры в избранность людей от вечности, в “предопределение ко спасению”. Но выражаясь светским языком, вера в предопределение есть всего лишь предельно усилившееся сознание принадлежности к иному миру, чем этот — приговоренный к гибели и развращенный. Говоря на языке современной социологии, это высшая степень самосознания элиты, уверенной в своем положении, уверенной в том, что ее час пробил. Говоря проще, человечнее, это уверенность в том, что ты спасен, а спасение есть все же определяющий любую идею смысл всей мировой истории. Преисполненные этой уверенности, распевали свою прелестную песнь нидерландские гезы:

“Земля станет морем, земля станет морем, но будет свободной”.

Когда в 16 столетии произошло пробуждение стихийных энергий моря, то их действие было столь сильным, что они быстро стали определять политическую историю мира. В этот момент они должны были заговорить духовным языком своего времени. Они не могли больше оставаться просто охотниками на китов, рыбаками и “пленителями моря”. Они должны были найти себе духовного союзника, союзника самого радикального и отважного, того, кто по-настоящему покончил бы с образами прежней эпохи. Им не могло быть немецкое лютеранство того времени. Последнее развивалось с тенденцией к территориальности и всеобщему обмелению. В любом случае, упадок Ганзы и конец немецкого господства на Балтике столь же четко совпадает в Германии с эпохой Лютера, как рост мирового могущества Голландии и великое решение Кромвеля — с эпохой

кальвинизма. И еще нечто приходит на ум. Большинство прежних исторических изысканий все еще находится под влиянием методов изучения суши. Они имеют в виду всегда только твердую землю и развитие государств, в Германии даже только территориально-государственное развитие, при этом часто еще ограничиваются в своем предмете исследования малыми государствами и малыми пространствами. Но стоит нам обратить взор к морю, и мы тотчас же увидим встречу, совпадение по времени, или, если мне позволено будет так выразиться, всемирно-историческое братство, связующее политический кальвинизм с пробуждающимися морскими энергиями Европы. Религиозные войны и теологические лозунги этой эпохи также содержат в своем существе столкновение стихийных сил, повлиявших на перенос всемирно-исторической экзистенции с земли на море.

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В то время как на береговой стороне исторического свершения с большим размахом шел процесс захвата новых земель, на море завершилась другая, не менее важная часть нового предела нашей планеты. Это происходило посредством английского покорения моря. На море то было результатом общеевропейского пробуждения этих столетий. Им определена основная линия первого планетарного упорядочения пространства, сущность которого состоит в отделении земли от моря. Земная твердь принадлежит теперь дюжине суверенных государств, море принадлежит всем или, наконец, в действительности лишь одному государству : Англии. Устройство земной тверди, суши состоит в том, что она поделена на территории государств; открытое море, напротив, свободно, это значит свободно от государственных образований и не подчинено никакому территориальному верховенству. Таковы решающие факты устройства пространства, на основании которых развивалось христианское европейское международное право трех последних столетий. Это был основной закон, номос земли этой эпохи.

Только в свете этого изначального факта британского покорения моря и отделения моря от земли многие знаменитые и часто цитируемые слова и выражения обретают свой подлинный смысл. Таково, например, высказывание сэра Уолтера Рэлли: “Тот, кто господствует на море, господствует в мировой торговле, а тому, кто господствует в мировой торговле, принадлежат все богатства мира и фактически сам мир.” Или: “Всякая торговля суть мировая торговля; всякая мировая торговля суть морская торговля.” Сюда же относятся слова о свободе, сказанные в период расцвета английского морского и мирового могущества: “Всякая мировая торговля есть свободная торговля.” Нельзя сказать, чтобы все это было так уж неверно, однако все это относится к известной эпохе и к определенному международному положению и становится несправедливым тогда, когда из этого пытаются сделать абсолютные и вечные истины. Но прежде всего распря земли и моря раскрывается в сопоставлении морских и сухопутных войн. Конечно, война на суше и война на море всегда отличалась друг от друга в стратегическом и тактическом отношении. Однако их противоположность становится отныне выражением различных миров и противоположных правовых норм.

Начиная с 16 века государства европейского материка выработали определенные способы ведения сухопутной войны, в основе которых лежит представление о войне как о взаимоотношении государств. По обеим сторонам линии фронта находится государственно структурированная, военная власть, и армии борются между собой в открытом полевым сражении. В качестве врагов противостоят друг другу лишь участвующие в битве войска, при том, что мирное гражданское население не участвует в боевых действиях. Оно не враг и его не считают врагом до тех пор, пока оно не участвует в войне. Война на море, напротив, предполагает уничтожение торговли и экономики противника. Врагом в такой войне является не только воюющий противник, но и любой подданный враждебного государства и, наконец, даже нейтральная страна, ведущая

торговлю с неприятелем и имеющая с ним экономические отношения. Наземная война имеет тенденцию к решающему открытому полевому сражению. Конечно, и во время войны на море дело может дойти до морского сражения, но ее типичными средствами и методами является обстрел и блокада берегов неприятеля и захват вражеских и нейтральных торговых судов согласно призовому праву. По самому своему существу эти типичные для морской войны средства направлены как против военных лиц, так и против мирного населения. В особенности продовольственная блокада, которая обрекает на голод все население блокированной области одинаково, не различая военных и гражданских, мужчин и женщин, стариков и детей.

Это в действительности не только две стороны международно-правового порядка, но два совершенно разных мира. Но со времени британского покорения моря англичане и народы, бывшие во власти английских идей, привыкли к такому положению дел. Представление о том, что континентальная держава сможет осуществлять мировое господство на всем земном шаре, было для их мировосприятия неслыханным и невыносимым. Другое дело — мировое господство, основанное на отделившейся от суши мировой экзистенции и охватывающее собою мировые океаны. Маленький остров на северо-западной стороне Европы стал центром всемирной империи благодаря тому, что оторвался от земли и сделал решающий выбор в пользу моря. В чисто морском существовании он обрел средство мирового господства, простирающегося во все концы Земли. После того, как отделение земли от моря и раздор обеих стихий стали однажды основным законом планеты, на этом фундаменте был возведен огромный каркас ученых мнений, аргументов и научных систем, посредством которых люди обосновывали мудрость и разумность этого положения дел, упуская из виду первичный факт британского покорения моря и временную обусловленность этого факта. Подобные системы были разработаны великими учеными, специалистами в области политической экономии, юристами и философами, и большинству наших прадедов все это казалось совершенно очевидным. Они были больше не в состоянии представить себе какую-то иную экономическую науку и иное международное право. Здесь ты имеешь возможность убедиться в том, что огромный Левиафан обладает властью также и над умами и душами людей. И это самое удивительное в его могуществе.

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Англия - это остров. Но лишь став носителем и средоточием стихийного исхода из мира земной тверди в мир открытого моря и лишь в качестве наследника всех высвободившихся в то время морских энергий она превратилась в тот остров, который имеется в виду, когда снова и снова подчеркивается, что Англия является островом. И только став островом в новом, неведомом дотолем смысле слова, Англия осуществила захват мировых океанов и выиграла на том первом этапе планетарной революции пространства.

Само собой разумеется, Англия — это остров. Но одним установлением этого географического факта сказано еще очень мало. Есть много островов, политические судьбы которых совершенно различны. Сицилия также остров, как и Ирландия, Куба, Мадагаскар, Япония. Сколь много противоречивых тенденций всемирной истории соединяются уже в этих немногих именах, каждое из которых именуется остров! В определенном смысле все континенты, в том числе самые крупные, являются всего лишь островами, а вся обитаемая земля омывается океаном, о чем знали уже древние греки. Англия сама всегда была островом в неизменном географическом смысле при всех превратностях исторических судеб, с тех пор, как она много тысячелетий тому назад - вероятно 18000 лет до нашей эры - отделилась от материка. Она была островом, когда ее заселили кельты и когда она была завоевана для Рима Юлием Цезарем, при норманнском

завоевании (1066) и во времена Орлеанской девы (1431), когда англичане удерживали за собой большую часть Франции.

Жители этого острова обладали чувством островной защищенности. Из эпохи Средневековья до нас дошли чудные выражения и стихотворные строки, в которой Англию сравнивают с укрепленным замком, омываемым морем, словно оборонительным рвом. В стихах Шекспира это островное самоощущение нашло свое самое прекрасное и знаменитое выражение :

“Этот второй Эдем, этот коронованный остров, почти что рай,
Этот бастион, возведенный самой природой,
Эта жемчужина в оправе морского серебра,
Которая служит стеною и рвом, оберегая дом.”

Понятно, что англичане часто цитируют подобные строки, и что особенно выражение “эта жемчужина в оправе морского серебра” могло стать крылатым..

Но такого рода выражения английского островного сознания относятся к старому острову. Остров все еще рассматривается в качестве участка суши, отделившегося от земной тверди и омываемого морем. Островное сознание все еще остается чисто земным, сухопутным и территориальным.. Представляется даже, что островное чувство проявляется как особо ярко выраженное территориальное чувство земли. Было бы заблуждением считать любого островного жителя, любого англичанина еще и сегодня прирожденным “пленителем моря”. Мы уже видели, какое изменение состояло в том, что народ овцеводов превратился в 16 веке в народ детей моря. Это было фундаментальным преобразованием политико-исторической сущности самого острова. Оно состояло в том, что земля стала рассматриваться теперь лишь с точки зрения моря, остров же из отделившегося участка суши стал частью моря, кораблем или, еще точнее, рыбой.

Наблюдателю, находящемуся на континенте, трудно представить себе последовательно морской взгляд на вещи, чисто морское восприятие земли. Наш повседневный язык при образовании своих значений имеет своим исходным пунктом естественным образом землю. Это мы видели уже в самом начале нашего созерцания. Образ нашей планеты — это образ земли; мы забываем, что он может быть и образом моря. В связи с морем мы говорим о мореходных путях, хотя здесь не существует никаких путей или дорог, как на земле, но лишь линии коммуникации. Корабль в открытом море мы представляем себе в виде куска суши, который плывет по морю, в виде “плавающего участка государственной территории”, как это называется на языке международного права. Военное судно представляется нам плавающей крепостью, а остров, такой как Англия — замком, окруженным морем словно рвом. Морские люди считают все это совершенно ложными толкованиями, плодом фантазии сухопутных крыс. Корабль столь же мало похож на кусок суши, сколь рыба - на плавающую собаку. На взгляд, определяемый исключительно морем, земная твердь, суша есть всего лишь берег, прибрежная полоса плюс “хинтерланд” (незахваченная территория). Даже вся земля, рассматриваемая лишь с точки зрения открытого моря, исходя из чисто морского существования предстает простым скопищем предметов, выброшенных морем к берегу, извержением моря. Типичным примером такого образа мыслей, поразительного для нас, но типичного для людей моря, является высказывание Эдмунда Бергса: “Испания есть ничто иное, как выброшенный на берег Европы кит”. Все существенные отношения с остальным миром, и в особенности с государствами европейского материка должны были измениться от того, что Англия перешла к чисто морскому существованию. Все меры и пропорции английской политики стали отныне несравнимы и несовместимы с таковыми же прочих европейских стран. Англия стала владычицей морей и воздвигла простирающуюся во все концы света британскую всемирную империю, основанную на английском морском господстве над всей землей. Английский мир мыслит морскими базами и линиями коммуникаций. То, что

было для других народов почвой и родиной, казалось этому миру простым хинтерландом, незахваченной территорией. Слово континентальный приобрело дополнительное значение отсталости, а население континента стало “backward people”, отсталым народом. Но и сам остров, метрополия такой всемирной империи, основанной на чисто морском существовании, лишается тем самым корней, отрывается от почвы. Он оказывается способным плыть в другую часть земли, словно корабль или рыба, ибо он все же только транспортабельный центр всемирной империи, разбросанной по всем континентам. Дизраэли, ведущий английский политик времен царствования королевы Виктории, сказал применительно к Индии, что Британская империя это государство скорее азиатское, чем европейское. Он был так же тем, кто в 1847 году в своем романе “Танкред” выдвинул предложение о том, что английская королева должна поселиться в Индии. “Королева должна снарядить большой флот, отправиться в путь со своей свитой и всем правящим сословием и перенести свою имперскую резиденцию из Лондона в Дели. Там она найдет огромную готовую империю, первоклассную армию и большие постоянные доходы.” Дизраэли был Абраванелем (ср. выше) 19 века. Кое-что из сказанного им об иудаизме и христианстве и о расе как о ключе ко всей мировой истории было усердно распропагандировано неевреями и нехристианами. Так что он знал, о чем говорил, когда выдвигал подобные предложения. Он чувствовал, что остров более не является частью Европы. Судьба острова не была отныне с необходимостью связана с европейской судьбой. Он мог отправиться в путь и изменить место своего пребывания в качестве метрополии всемирной морской империи. Корабль мог сняться с якоря и бросить якорь в другой части света. Огромная рыба, Левиафан, могла прийти в движение и пуститься исследовать другие океаны.

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После битвы при Ватерлоо, когда Наполеон был побежден в результате 20-летней войны, настала эпоха бесспорного морского владычества Англии. Эта эпоха продолжалась весь 19 век. Своей кульминации она достигла в середине века, после Крымской войны, окончившейся Парижской конфедерацией 1856 года. Эпоха свободной торговли была также временем свободного расцвета английского индустриального и экономического превосходства. Свободные морские просторы и свободная мировая торговля, свободный рынок соединились в представлении о свободе, олицетворением и стражем которой могла быть только Англия. В эту эпоху своего апогея достигает также восхищение и подражание английскому примеру во всем мире.

Внутреннее измерение коснулось элементарной сущности громадного Левиафана. Впрочем, тогда еще это осталось незамеченным. Совсем напротив вследствие наступившего потрясающего подъема мировой экономики, позитивистская, ослепленная быстро растущим богатством эпоха верила, что это богатство будет все время и далее возрастать и окончится тысячелетним раем на земле. Однако перемена, коснувшаяся существа Левиафана, была как раз следствием промышленной революции. Последняя началась в Англии в 18 веке с изобретением машин. Первая коксовая доменная печь (1735 г.), первая литая сталь (1740 г.), паровая машина (1768 г.), прядильная машина (1770 г.), механический ткацкий станок (1786 г.), все это сначала в Англии — таковы некоторые примеры, проясняющие, насколько велико было промышленное превосходство Англии над всеми другими народами. Изобретения парохода и железной дороги последовали в 19 веке. Англия и здесь была впереди всех. Огромная морская держава стала одновременно огромной машинной державой. Ее господство над миром казалось теперь окончательным.

Выше мы уже видели, насколько значительным был прогресс в развитии морского дела за короткий период начиная с битвы на галерах при Лепанто (1571) и до уничтожения испанской армады в Ла-Манше (1588). Столь же значительный шаг вперед был сделан в период между Крымской войной, когда Англия, Франция и Сардиния сражались против

России в 1854-1856 гг. и гражданской войной в Америке в 1861-1863 гг., в которой северные индустриальные штаты покорили аграрный Юг страны. В Крымскую войну воевали еще с помощью парусников, война за отделение Юга велась уже при помощи бронированных пароходов. Тем самым открылась эпоха современных промышленных и экономических войн. Англия и здесь была впереди и почти до конца 19 века удерживала за собой огромное превосходство. Но прогресс в эту эпоху означал вместе с тем новую стадию в элементарных взаимоотношениях земли и моря.

Ибо Левиафан превратился теперь из огромной рыбы в машину. На деле то было сущностное превращение, неслыханное в своем роде. Машина изменила отношение человека к морю. Отважный тип личностей, определявший до сих пор размеры морской державы, утратил свой старый смысл. Смелые подвиги моряков парусных кораблей, высокое искусство навигации, суровое воспитание и отбор определенной породы людей — все это утратило всякое значение ввиду надежности современного технизированного морского сообщения. Море все еще сохраняло свою силу. Но ослабевало и постепенно окончилось действие того мощного импульса, который превратил народ овцеводов в пиратов. Между стихией моря и человеческой экзистенцией встал аппарат машины. Морское господство, основанное на индустрии машин, очевидно представляет собою нечто иное, чем морская держава, ежедневно возрастающая в ожесточенной и непосредственной борьбе со стихией. Парусник, требующий только мускульной силы человека и корабль, движимый паровыми колесами, представляют собой уже два различных способа связи со стихией моря. Промышленная революция превратила детей моря в изготовителей и слуг машины. Перемену почувствовали все. Одни сетовали по поводу конца старой эпохи героев и находили прибежище в романтике пиратских историй. Другие возликовали по поводу технического прогресса и кинулись сочинять утопии сконструированного людьми рая. Со всей очевидностью мы устанавливаем здесь факт сущностного повреждения чисто морской экзистенции, тайны британского мирового господства. Но люди 19 века не видели этого. Ибо будучи рыбой или машиной, Левиафан в любом случае становился все сильнее и могущественнее, и его царству, казалось, не будет конца.

19

В конце 19 - начале 20 века американский адмирал Мэхан предпринял замечательную попытку продлить и в эру машины прежнюю ситуацию британского господства над морем. Мэхан является значительным историком, автором “Влияния морской державы в истории”. Так он озаглавил свой главный труд, вышедший также на немецком языке и получивший признание в кругах немецкого военно-морского флота, в особенности, у его основателя гроссадмирала фон Тирпица.

В одной своей работе, датированной июлем 1904 года, Мэхан ведет речь о возможностях воссоединения Англии с Соединенными Штатами Америки. Глубочайшую основу для подобного воссоединения он усматривает не в общей расе, языке или культуре. Он никоим образом не недооценивает эти соображения, столь часто приводившиеся другими писателями. Но для него они — всего лишь желанные дополнительные обстоятельства. Решающей для него является необходимость сохранения англо-саксонского господства на мировых океанах, а это может произойти лишь на островной основе, путем соединения англо-американских государств. Сама Англия стала слишком мала в результате современного развития, так что не является более островом в прежнем смысле. Напротив, Соединенные Штаты Америки представляют собой истинный остров в современном смысле. Из-за их протяженности — говорит Мэхан — это до сих пор не осознано. Но это отвечает сегодняшним масштабам и соотношениям величин. Островной характер Соединенных Штатов должен способствовать тому, чтобы морское господство могло быть сохранено и продолжено на более широкой основе. Америка — это тот самый

большой остров, на базе которого британское покорение моря должно быть увековечено и в еще больших масштабах продолжено в качестве англо-американского господства над миром.

В то время, как такой политик, как Дизраэли хотел перенести всемирную британскую империю в Азию, американский адмирал вынашивал мысль об отправке в Америку. Это было свойственно типу мышления, естественного для англо-саксонского моряка 19 века. Адмирал чувствовал эпохальные перемены, видел громадные изменения мер и размеров, которые неизбежно наступали с развитием индустрии. Но он не видел того, что промышленная революция как раз важнейший момент — элементарную связь человека с морем. Таким образом выходит, что он продолжает мыслить в старом русле. Его более крупный остров должен был сохранить, законсервировать, унаследованную, устаревшую традицию в полностью новой ситуации. Старый, слишком маленький остров и весь комплекс воздвигнутого на его основе морского и мирового господства должен быть взят на буксир новым островом, словно спасательным судном.

Сколь бы значительной ни была личность Мэхана и сколь бы впечатляющей ни была его конструкция большего острова, но она не постигает подлинного смысла нового упорядочения пространства. Она не является порождением духа старых мореплавателей. Она исходит из консервативной потребности в геополитической безопасности, в ней не осталось более ничего от тех энергий пробуждения стихий, которые сделали возможным всемирно-исторический союз между отважным мореплаванием и кальвинистской верой в предопределение в 16 и 17 веках.

20

Промышленное развитие и новая техника не могли оставаться на уровне 19 века. Прогресс не закончился с изобретением парохода и железной дороги. Мир изменился быстрее, чем того ожидали пророки машинной веры, и вступил в эпоху электротехники и электродинамики. Электротехника, авиация и радио вызвали такой переворот во всех представлениях о пространстве, что явно началась новая стадия первой планетарной пространственной революции, если даже не вторая, новая революция пространства.

За короткий период времени с 1890 по 1914 год Германия, государство европейского материка, догнала и даже перегнала Англию в важнейших областях деятельности, в машиностроении, кораблестроении и локомотивостроении, — после того, как Крупп уже в 1868 году продемонстрировал свое преимущество перед англичанами на поприще производства вооружений. Уже Мировая война 1914 года проходила под знаком нового. Конечно, народы и их правительства вступили в нее, не обладая сознанием революционной для пространства эпохи, так, как будто бы речь шла об одной из прошлых войн 19 века, в которых они участвовали. В высоко индустриализованной Германии господствовали еще английские идеалы законодательства, и английские идеи считались непререкаемыми, в то время как огромная аграрная страна, какой была царская Россия, вступила в 1914 году в первую мировую и сырьевую войну, не располагая на своей обширной территории собственным современным моторостроительным заводом. В действительности продвижение от парового судна до современного военного корабля было не меньшим, чем шаг от гребных галер до парусника. Отношение человека к стихии моря вновь глубочайшим образом изменилось.

Когда появился самолет, было покорено новое, третье измерение, добавившееся к земле и к морю. Теперь человек поднялся над поверхностями земли и моря и приобрел совершенно новое средство передвижения и столь же новое оружие. Меры и соразмерности вновь изменились, а возможности человеческого господства над природой и над другими людьми расширились до необозримых пределов. Понятно, почему именно военно-воздушные силы получили наименование “пространственного оружия”. Ибо

производимые ими революционные изменения пространства суть особенно сильные, непосредственные и наглядные.

Но если кроме того представить себе, что воздушное пространство над землей и морем не только бороздят самолеты, радиоволны станций всех стран со скоростью секунды беспрепятственно пронизывают атмосферное пространство вокруг земного шара, то есть все основания поверить в то, что теперь не просто достигнуто новое, третье измерение, но прибавился даже третий элемент, воздух в качестве новой стихии человеческой экзистенции. Тогда к обеим мифическим животным — Левиафану и Бегемоту — стоило бы добавить и третье: большую Птицу. Но мы не должны столь опрометчиво делать столь многообещающие утверждения. Ибо если поразмыслить о том, с помощью каких технико-механических средств и энергий осуществляется господство человека в воздушном пространстве и представить себе двигатели внутреннего сгорания, которыми приводятся в действие самолеты, то скорее Огонь покажется всякому дополнительным, собственно новым элементом человеческой активности в мире.

Здесь не место разрешать вопрос о двух новых стихиях, прибавившихся к земле и к морю. Здесь еще слишком сильно переплетены серьезные соображения и спекулятивные рассуждения, гипотезы и домыслы, для них все еще существует необозримое поле возможностей. Ведь и согласно одному учению времен античности, вся история человечества есть только путь через четверицу стихий. Если же мы постараемся трезво следовать нашей теме, то сможем со всей очевидностью и достоверностью констатировать две вещи. Первая затрагивает то изменение идеи пространства, которое наступило в новый период пространственной революции. Это преобразование происходит с глубиной ничуть не меньшей, чем уже знакомое нам изменение 16-17 веков. Тогда люди поместили мир и вселенную в пустое пространство. Сегодня мы уже не представляем себе пространство как просто лишенную всякого мыслимого содержания бездонную протяженность. Пространство стало для нас силовым полем человеческой энергии, действия и результата. Только сегодня для нас становится возможной мысль, невероятная в любую другую эпоху; ее высказал немецкий философ современности: "Не мир находится внутри пространства, но пространство находится внутри мира".

Наше второе установление касается изначального соотношения земли и моря. Сегодня море более не является стихией, как это было в эпоху охотников на кита и корсаров. Сегодняшняя техника транспортных средств и средства массовой информации сделали из него пространство в современном смысле слова. Сегодня любой владелец судна может в любой день и час знать, в какой точке океана находится его судно. Тем самым в противоположность эпохе парусников, мир моря коренным образом изменился для человека. Но если это так, то тогда приходит и то разделение моря и земли, на котором основывалась прежняя связь морского мирового господства. Исчезает сама основа британского покорения моря и вместе с нею прежний номос земли.

Вместо него безудержно и непреодолимо образуется новый номос нашей планеты. Его вызывают новые отнесенности человека к старым и новым стихиям, и изменившиеся меры и отношения человеческой экзистенции форсируют его становление. Многие увидят в этом лишь смерть и разрушение. Некоторые решат, что присутствуют при конце света. В действительности мы переживаем лишь конец прежних отношений земли и моря. Однако человеческий страх перед новым часто столь же велик, как боязнь пустоты, даже если новое преодолевает пустоту. Многие видят лишь бессмысленный хаос там, где в действительности новый смысл прокладывает путь соразмерному себе порядку. Старый номос, конечно, уходит, и вместе с ним вся система унаследованных размеров, норм и отношений. Но грядущее все же не является только отсутствием меры или враждебным номосу ничто. И в жестоких схватках старых и новых сил возникают должные меры и составляются осмысленные пропорции.

И здесь присутствуют и властвуют боги,
Мера их велика.

Лейпциг, 1942 год.
Перевод с немецкого Ю.Коринец

ТЕОРИЯ ПАРТИЗАНА

Промежуточное замечание по поводу понятия Политического

Посвящается Эрнсту Форстхоффу к 60-летнему юбилею 13 сентября 1962 года

Предисловие

Данное сочинение о Теории партизана возникло из двух лекций, которые я прочитал весной 1962 года - 15 марта в Памплоне, по приглашению Estudio General de Navarra, и 17 марта в университете Сарагосы, в рамках мероприятий Catedra Palafox, по приглашению ее директора, профессора Луиса Гарсия Ариас. Лекция напечатана в публикациях Catedra в конце 1962 года.

Подзаголовок Промежуточное замечание по поводу понятия Политического можно объяснить исходя из конкретного мгновения публикации. Издательство в настоящее время готовится вновь опубликовать мой текст 1932 года. В последние десятилетия появились многочисленные следствия на данную тему. Данное сочинение не является таким следствием; это самостоятельный, пусть и эскизный труд, тема которого неизбежно выливается в проблему различения друга и врага. Таким образом, я хотел лишь представить эту разработку моих лекций весны 1962 года в непритязательной форме промежуточного замечания и тем самым сделать их доступными для всех тех, кто до сих пор внимательно следил за сложной дискуссией о понятии политического.

Февраль 1963 года

Карл Шмитт

Введение. Взгляд на исходное положение 1808/13

Исходным положением для наших размышлений о проблеме партизана является герилья, которую испанский народ вел в 1808 – 1813 годах против войска чужого завоевателя. В этой войне народ – добуржуазный, доиндустриальный, доконвенциональный народ – впервые столкнулся с современной, вышедшей из опыта Французской революции, хорошо организованной, регулярной армией. Благодаря этому открылись новые пространства войны, образовались новые понятия ведения войны, и возникло новое учение о войне и политике.

Партизан сражается нерегулярным образом. Но различие между регулярной и нерегулярной борьбой зависит от точности регулярного и обретает свою конкретную противоположность и тем самым также свое понятие только в современных организационных формах, которые возникают из войн Французской революции. Во все времена человечество вело войны и битвы; во все времена имелись правила ведения войны и правила ведения боя, и вследствие этого также нарушение правил и небрежение правилами. В особенности во все времена разложения, к примеру, во время Тридцатилетней войны на немецкой земле (1618-48), далее во всех гражданских войнах и во всех колониальных войнах мировой истории снова и снова обнаруживаются явления, которые можно назвать партизанскими. Только при этом следует иметь ввиду, что, для теории партизана в целом, сила и значение его нерегулярности определяется силой и значением партизаном под вопрос поставленного регулярного. Именно это Регулярное государства как и Регулярное армии обретает как во французском государстве, так и во французской армии благодаря Наполеону новую, точную определенность. Бесчисленные войны белых завоевателей против американских индейцев с 17 по 19 века, впрочем, как и

методы Riflemen (стрелков) во время американской войны за независимость против регулярной английской армии (1774-83) и гражданская война в Вандее между шуанами и якобинцами (1793-96) относятся все без исключения еще к до-наполеоновской стадии. Новое военное искусство регулярных армий Наполеона возникло из нового, революционного способа ведения боевых действий. Одному прусскому офицеру того времени вся кампания Наполеона 1806 года против Пруссии представлялось лишь как «Одно большое политиканство¹».

Партизан испанской герильи 1808 года был первым, кто отважился нерегулярно бороться против первых современных регулярных армий. Наполеон осенью 1808 года разгромил регулярную испанскую армию; собственно испанская герилья началась только после этого поражения регулярной армии. Еще нет полной, документированной истории испанской партизанской войны.² Она, как говорит Fernando Solano Costa (в своем цитированном в примечании сочинении *Los Guerrilleros*) необходима, но и очень трудна, поскольку общая испанская герилья складывалась из приблизительно 200 региональных маленьких войн в Астурии, Арагонии, Каталании, Наварре, Кастилии и т.д., под руководством многочисленных борцов, чьи имена окутаны множеством мифов и легенд, среди них Juan Martin Diez, который как *Emprecinado* стал ужасом для французов и сделал дорогу из Мадрида в Сарагосу ненадежной.³ Эта партизанская война велась обеими сторонами с самой ужасной жестокостью, и не вызывает удивления то, что много текстов друзей французов напечатаны как труды сторонников герильи. Однако как бы ни соотносились миф и легенда, с одной стороны, и документированная история, с другой, - линии нашего исходного положения в любом случае ясны. Согласно Клаузевицу часто половина общей французской военной силы находилась в Испании и половина ее, а именно 250-260 000 человек, были втянуты в герилью; их число оценивается Gomez de Artechе в 50 000, другие предлагают гораздо меньшие цифры.

Ситуация испанского партизана 1808 года характеризуется прежде всего тем, что он отваживался на борьбу на своей небольшой родной почве, в то время как его король и семья короля еще точно не знали, кто же был настоящим врагом. В этом отношении легитимная власть вела себя тогда в Испании не иначе чем в Германии. Кроме того, высшее духовенство и буржуазия повсюду были *afrancesados* (друзья французов), то есть ситуация в Испании характеризуется тем, что образованные слои аристократии, симпатизировали чужому завоевателю. И в этом отношении выявляются параллели с Германией, где великий немецкий поэт Гете создавал гимны во славу Наполеона, и где немецкое образование никогда окончательно не уяснило для себя, на чьей же оно стороне. В Испании *Guerrillero* осмеливался на безнадежную борьбу, бедняга, первый типичный случай нерегулярного пушечного мяса конфликтов, имеющих политическое значение для всего мира. Все это в качестве увертюры принадлежит теории партизана.

В то время искра попала из Испании на север. Она не раздула там такой же пожар, который обеспечил испанской герилье ее всемирно-историческое значение. Но она оказала там такое воздействие, чье развитие сегодня, во второй половине 20 века, изменяет облик Земли и человечества. Она вызвала к жизни теорию войны и вражды, которая последовательно достигает апогея в теории партизана.

Сначала, в 1809 году, во время краткой войны, которую вела австрийская монархия против Наполеона, была сделана планомерная попытка подражать испанскому примеру. Австрийское правительство в Вене инсценировало с помощью знаменитых публицистов, среди которых были Фридрих Гентц и Фридрих Шлегель, национальную пропаганду против Наполеона. Были переведены на немецкий язык и распространялись испанские труды.⁴ Генрих фон Клейст поспешил сюда и продолжил после этой австрийской войны 1809 года антифранцузскую пропаганду в Берлине. В эти годы, вплоть до своей смерти в ноябре 1811 года, он стал собственно поэтом национального сопротивления чужому завоевателю. Его драма «Тевтобургская битва» (“*Die Hermannsschlacht*”) - это самое великое партизанское творение всех времен. Он также сочинил стихотворение Палафоксу

(An Palafox), поставив защитника Сарагосы в один ряд с Леонидом, Арминием и Вильгельмом Теллем.⁵ То, что реформаторы в прусском генеральном штабе, прежде всего Гнейзенау и Шарнхорст, были глубоко потрясены испанским примером и старались в своих реорганизациях иметь его в виду, известно и ниже будет еще разбираться. В мире идей этих прусских офицеров генерального штаба 1808-1813 годов заключены также ростки книги О войне, благодаря которой имя Клаузевиц получило почти мифическое звучание. Его формула о войне как продолжении политики содержит уже в сжатом виде теорию партизана, чья логика доведена до конца Лениным и Мао Цзэ-дуном, как будет нами показано ниже.

До настоящей герильи-народной войны, которая должна быть упомянута в связи с нашей проблемой партизана, дошло дело только в Тироле, где действовали Андреас Хофер, Шпекбахер и капуцинский священник Хаспингер. Тирольцы стали мощным факелом, как выразился Клаузевиц.⁶ Впрочем, эта эпоха 1809 года быстро окончилась. И в остальных областях Германии дело не дошло до партизанской войны против французов. Сильный национальный импульс, обнаруживающийся в отдельных мятежах и партизанских отрядах, очень быстро и без остатка вылился в пути регулярной войны. Битвы весны и лета 1813 года происходили на поле сражения, а исход реализовался в битве лицом к лицу в октябре 1813 года под Лейпцигом.

Венский конгресс 1814-1815 годов вновь восстановил, в рамках всеобщей реставрации, понятия европейского права войны.⁷ Это была одна из самых поразительных реставраций в мировой истории. Она имела огромный успех, так что это право войны оберегаемой континентальной войны на суше еще в первую мировую войну 1914-18 годов определяло европейскую практику ведения войны на суше. Еще сегодня это право именуется классическим правом войны, и оно заслуживает этого имени. Ибо оно знает ясные различия, прежде всего, различия войны и мира, участников войны от неучастников войны, врага и преступника. Война ведется между государствами как война регулярных, государственных армий, между суверенными носителями *jus belli*, которые и в войне рассматривают себя как враги и не подвергают друг друга дискриминации как преступников, так что заключение мира возможно и даже остается нормальным, само собой разумеющимся концом войны. Перед лицом такой классической правильности – пока она имеет настоящую действенную силу – партизан мог быть только периферийным явлением, каким он фактически и являлся еще во время всей первой мировой войны (1914-18).

Горизонт нашего рассмотрения

Когда я при случае говорю о современных теориях партизана, я должен подчеркнуть для выяснения темы то, что старых теорий партизана в противоположность современным теориям собственно вообще не существует. В классическом праве войны прежнего европейского международного права нет места партизану в современном смысле. Он или – как в войне по династическим причинам 18 века – вид легкого, особенно подвижного, но регулярного отряда, или он как особенно отвратительный преступник стоит просто вне права и *hors la loi*. До тех пор, пока в войне сохранялось еще нечто от представления о дуэли и от рыцарства, по другому и быть не могло.

С введением всеобщей воинской повинности конечно все войны становятся по идее народными войнами, и тогда скоро создаются ситуации, которые для классического права войны являются трудными и часто даже неразрешимыми, как например ситуация более или менее импровизированного *levee en masse*, или добровольческий корпус или «вольные стрелки». Об этом речь впереди. В любом случае, война остается принципиально оберегаемой (*gehegt*), и партизан – вне этого оберегания (*Negung*). Теперь даже его сущностью и его экзистенцией становится то, что он находится вне любого оберегания.

Современный партизан не ожидает от врага ни справедливости, ни пощады. Он отвернулся от традиционной вражды прирученной и оберегаемой войны и перешел в область иной, настоящей вражды, которая возрастает путем террора и анти-террора до истребления.

Два рода войны особенно важны в контексте явления партизана и в известном смысле даже родственны с этим явлением: гражданская война и колониальная война. В явлении партизана современности эта взаимосвязь прямо-таки специфична. Классическое европейское международное право вытесняло эти две опасных формы проявления войны и вражды на периферию. Война *jus publicum Europeum* была межгосударственной войной, которую вела одна регулярная государственная армия с другой. Открытая гражданская война считалась вооруженным восстанием, которое подавлялось с помощью осадного положения полицией и отрядами регулярной армии. Колониальная война не ускользнула от внимания военной науки европейских стран – таких, как Англия, Франция и Испания. Но все это не ставило под вопрос регулярную войну государства как классическую модель.⁸

Особо необходимо упомянуть здесь Россию. Русская армия в течение всего 19 века вела многие войны с азиатскими горцами и никогда не ограничивалась исключительно регулярной войной армий, как это делала прусско-немецкая армия. Кроме того, русская история знает автохтонную партизанскую борьбу против наполеоновской армии. Летом 1812 года русские партизаны под военным руководством мешали французской армии в ее продвижении к Москве; осенью и зимой того же года русские крестьяне убивали обратившихся в бегство, замерзших и голодных французов. Все это продолжалось немногим более полугода, но этого оказалось достаточно, чтобы стать историческим событием, имевшим огромное воздействие, правда, больше ввиду политического мифа и его различных толкований, чем из-за его парадигматического воздействия для научной теории войны. Мы должны упомянуть здесь, по меньшей мере, два разных, даже противоположных толкования этой русской партизанской войны 1812 года: одно анархистское, обоснованное Бакуниным и Кропоткиным и ставшее всемирно известным благодаря описаниям в романе Толстого «Война и мир», и большевистское использование в сталинской тактике и стратегии революционной войны.

Толстой не был анархистом типа Бакунина или Кропоткина, но тем большим было его воздействие. Его эпопея «Война и мир» содержит мифообразующей силы больше, чем любая политическая доктрина или любая документированная история. Толстой возвышает русского партизана 1812 года до носителя стихийных сил русской земли, которая сбрасывает с себя знаменитого императора Наполеона вместе с его блестящей армией как надоедливое вредное насекомое. Необразованный, неграмотный мужик у Толстого не только сильнее, но и интеллигентнее, чем все стратеги и тактики, прежде всего интеллигентнее самого великого полководца Наполеона, который становится марионеткой в руках исторического свершения. Сталин подхватил этот миф коренной национальной партизанской борьбы во время Второй мировой войны с Германией и весьма конкретно поставил его на службу своей коммунистической мировой политике. Это означает существенно новую стадию явления партизана, в начале которой стоит имя Мао Цзэ-дуна.

Уже тридцать лет на обширных территориях Земли происходят ожесточенные партизанские битвы. Они начались уже в 1927 году, перед второй мировой войной, в Китае и в других азиатских странах, которые позже защищались от японского вторжения 1932-1945 годов. Во время второй мировой войны ареной такого рода войн стали Россия, Польша, Балканы, Франция, Албания, Греция и другие территории. После Второй мировой войны партизанская борьба продолжилась в Индокитае, где она была особенно продуктивно организована против французской колониальной армии вьетнамским коммунистическим вождем Хо Ши Мином и победителем Dien Bien Phu, генералом Vo Nguyen Giap, далее в Малайе, на Филиппинах и в Алжире, на Кипре полковником Griwas,

и на Кубе Фиделем Кастро и Че Геварой. В настоящее время, в 1962 году, индокитайские страны Лаос и Вьетнам являются территориями партизанской войны, которая ежедневно развивает новые методы победы над врагом и обмана врага. Современная техника поставляет все более мощные вооружения и средства уничтожения, все более совершенные средства передвижения и методы передачи информации, как для партизан, так и для регулярного войска, которое с партизанами борется. В дьявольском круге террора и анти-террора подавление партизана часто является только отражением самой партизанской борьбы, и все снова и снова оказывается правильным старый тезис, который большей частью цитируется как приказ Наполеона генералу Лефевру от 12 сентября 1813 года: с партизаном должно бороться партизанскими методами; *il faut operer en partisan partout ou il y a des partisans*.

Ниже необходимо будет остановиться на некоторых особых вопросах международно-правового юридического нормирования. Основное и так ясно; применение к конкретным ситуациям бурного развития спорно. В последние годы появился впечатляющий документ воли к тотальному сопротивлению, не только воли, но и детального руководства для конкретного исполнения: швейцарское руководство по ведению небольших войн для каждого (*Kleinkriegsanleitung fur jedermann*), изданное швейцарским союзом унтер-офицеров под названием *Тотальное сопротивление* и составленное капитаном Н. von Dach (2 изд., Biel, 1958). На более чем 180 страницах этот труд дает руководство по активному и пассивному сопротивлению чужому вторжению, с точными указаниями по саботажу, жизни в подполье, о том, как прятать оружие, по организации путчей, уходу от слежки и т. д. Тщательно использованы опыты последних десятилетий. Это современное руководство по ведению войн для каждого содержит указание, что его «сопротивление в высшей степени» придерживается Гаагской конвенции о законах и обычаях войны на суше и четырех Гаагских соглашений 1949 года. Это ясно само собой. Также нетрудно вычислить, как будет реагировать нормальная регулярная армия на практическое использование той инструкции по ведению локальной войны (например, стр.43: бесшумное убийство часового топором), пока она не чувствует себя побежденной.

Слово и понятие партизан

Краткое перечисление некоторых известных имен и событий, которым мы начали первое описание горизонта нашего рассмотрения, позволяет выявить безмерное богатство материала и проблематики. Поэтому необходимо уточнить некоторые признаки и критерии, чтобы обсуждение не стало абстрактным и безграничным. Один такой признак мы назвали в начале нашего изложения, когда исходили из того, что партизан является нерегулярным бойцом. Регулярный характер явления выражается в униформе солдата, которая является чем-то большим, чем профессиональное одеяние, поскольку она демонстрирует господство публичности; наряду с униформой солдат открыто и демонстративно носит оружие. Враждебный солдат в униформе – это настоящая мишень современного партизана.

В качестве следующего признака напрашивается сегодня интенсивная политическая ангажированность, которая характеризует партизана в отличие от других борцов. На интенсивно политический характер партизана нужно указать уже потому, что его необходимо отличать от обычного разбойника и злостного преступника, чьими мотивами является личное обогащение. Этот понятийный критерий политического характера имеет (в точной инверсии) ту же структуру, что и у пирата перед лицом международно-правовых норм ведения войны на море. Понятие пират включает неполитический характер скверного образа жизни, включающего разбой и личную выгоду. Пират обладает, как говорят юристы, *animus furandi*. Партизан воюет на политическом фронте, и именно политический характер его образа жизни снова возрождает первоначальный

смысл слова партизан. Это слово происходит от слова партия и указывает на связь с каким-то образом борющейся, воюющей или политически действующей партией или группой. Такого рода связи с партией особенно сильно проявляются в революционные эпохи.

Революционная война предполагает принадлежность к революционной партии и тотальный охват. Иные группы и союзы, в особенности современное государство уже не могут столь тотально интегрировать своих членов и подданных как революционно борющаяся партия охватывает своих активных борцов. В обширной дискуссии о так называемом тотальном государстве еще не стало окончательно ясно, что сегодня не государство как таковое, но революционная партия как таковая представляет собой настоящую и по сути дела единственную тоталитарную организацию.⁹ С точки зрения чисто организационной, в смысле строгого функционирования приказа и подчинения необходимо даже сказать, что иная революционная организация в этом отношении превосходит иное регулярное войско и что в международном праве войны должна возникнуть известная путаница, когда организацию как таковую делают критерием регулярности, как это произошло в Женевских конвенциях от 12 августа 1949 года.

Партизан по-немецки именуется *Parteigänger* (партиец), тот, кто идет с партией, а что это значит конкретно, в разные времена различается, как в отношении партии или фронта, с которым кто-то идет, так и в отношении его сопровождения (*Mitgehens*), примыкания (*Mitlaufens*), боевого товарищества (*Mitkampfens*), и, возможно, товарищества по заключению (*Mitgefangenwerdens*). Существуют партии, ведущие войну, но есть и партии судебного процесса, партии парламентской демократии, партии мнений и партии акций и т.д. В романских языках слово можно употребить как существительное и как прилагательное: на французском языке говорят даже о партизане какого-то мнения; короче говоря, из общего, многозначного обозначения вдруг получается слово большой политической важности. Напрашивается лингвистическая параллель с таким общим словом, как *status*, которое вдруг может означать государство (*Staat*). В эпохи разложения, как в 17 веке во время Тридцатилетней войны, нерегулярный солдат сближается с разбойниками и бродягами; он воюет на свой страх и риск и становится персонажем плутовского романа, как испанский *Picaro Estebanillo Гонсалеса*, который участвовал в битве при Нёрдлингене (1635) и рассказывает об этом в стиле солдата Швейка. Об этом можно прочитать и у Гриммельсхаузена в *Симплициусе Симплициссимусе*, это можно увидеть на гравюрах и офортах Жака Калло. В 18 веке "*Parteigänger*" принадлежал к пандурам и гусарам и другим видам легких войск, которые как подвижные войска «по отдельности сражаются» и ведут так называемую малую войну, в противоположность медленной большой войне линейных войск. Здесь различие регулярного и нерегулярного мыслится чисто военно-технически и ни в коем случае не равнозначно оппозиции легальный-нелегальный в юридическом смысле международного права и государственного права. В случае современного партизана обе пары противоположностей (регулярно-нерегулярно, легально-нелегально) большей частью стираются и пересекаются.

Подвижность, быстрота и ошеломляющее чередование нападения и отступления, одним словом: повышенная мобильность еще и сегодня – отличительная черта партизана, и этот признак даже еще усиливается благодаря внедрению техники и моторизации. Однако обе противоположности ликвидируются революционной войной, и возникают многочисленные полу- и пара-регулярные группы и формирования. Борющийся с оружием в руках партизан всегда остаётся зависимым от сотрудничества с регулярной организацией. Очень настойчиво подчеркивает это боевой соратник Фиделя Кастро на Кубе, Эрнесто Че Гевара.¹⁰ Вследствие этого уже благодаря взаимодействию регулярного и нерегулярного получают некоторые промежуточные ступени. Это происходит и в тех случаях, когда никоим образом не революционное правительство призывает к защите национальной территории от чужого завоевателя. Народная война и

малая война здесь переплетаются. В регламенте для подобных войск уже с 16 века существует обозначение партизан.¹¹ Мы еще познакомимся с двумя важными примерами формального регламентирования народной войны и ландштурма, которые пытаются регламентировать герилью. С другой стороны и чужой завоеватель публикует инструкции о подавлении вражеских партизан. Все нормирования такого рода стоят перед сложной проблемой международно-правового, т.е. законного для обеих сторон регулирования нерегулярного, в отношении признания партизана участником войны и его рассмотрения в качестве военнопленного, и, с другой стороны, соблюдения прав военных оккупационных властей. Мы уже дали понять, что здесь возникают некоторые юридические разногласия. Мы ещё вернёмся к спору о «вольных стрелках» германо-французской войны 1870-1871 годов, после того, как окинем взором международно-правовое положение (ниже с.).

Тенденция изменения или же упразднения унаследованных понятий – классических понятий, как любят говорить сегодня – всеобща и перед лицом стремительного изменения мира тем более постижима.¹² Не осталось в стороне от этой тенденции и «классическое» (если его можно так назвать) понятие партизана. В очень важной для нашей темы книге «Партизан» Рольфа Шроерса, вышедшей в 1961 году, нелегальный боец движения Сопротивления и активист подполья становится собственно типом партизана.¹³ Это такое преобразование понятия, которое ориентировано главным образом на определённые внутри-немецкие ситуации гитлеровской эпохи и именно как таковое заслуживает внимания. Нерегулярность заменена нелегальностью, военная борьба – сопротивлением. Это означает, как мне кажется, далеко идущее перетолкование партизана национальных войн за независимость и недооценку того факта, что и революционизация войны поддерживает военную связь регулярной армии и нерегулярного бойца.

В некоторых случаях перетолкование доходит до всеобщего символа и упразднения понятия. Тогда любой индивидуалист или нонконформист может быть назван партизаном, независимо от того, думает ли он вообще о том, чтобы взять в руки оружие.¹⁴ Как метафора это вполне допустимо; я сам пользовался ею для характеристики духовно-исторических фигур и ситуаций.¹⁵ В переносном смысле «быть человеком – значит быть борцом», и последовательный индивидуалист борется самостоятельно и на свой страх и риск. Тогда он становится сам себе партией. Такого рода упразднения понятий являются заслуживающими внимания знаками времени, которые требуют отдельного исследования.¹⁶ Но для той теории партизана, каковая здесь имеется в виду, должны иметься некоторые критерии, чтобы тема не рассеялась в абстрактной универсальности. Таковыми критериями являются: нерегулярность, повышенная мобильность активного боя и повышенная, усиленная интенсивность политической ангажированности.

Я хотел бы придерживаться ещё одного, четвёртого признака настоящего партизана, признака, который Jover Zamora обозначил как теллурический характер. Это, несмотря на всю тактическую подвижность и маневренность, важно для принципиально оборонительной ситуации партизана, который изменяет свою сущность, если он отождествляет себя с абсолютной агрессивностью идеологии мировой революции или техницистской идеологии. Вполне совпадают с этим критерием две особенно интересных для нас трактовок темы, книга Рольфа Шроерса (прим.13) и диссертация Jurg.H.Schmid о международно-правовом положении партизана (с.). Его обоснование теллурического характера такого явления, как партизан кажется мне необходимым, чтобы в смысле положения в пространстве сделать очевидным оборону, т.е. ограничение вражды и предостеречь от абсолютного требования абстрактной справедливости.

В отношении партизан, которые в 1808/13 годах сражались в Испании, Тироле и в России, это и так ясно. Но и партизанские сражения Второй мировой войны и последующих годов в Индокитае и других странах, связанные с именами Мао Дзэ-дуна, Хо Ши Мина и Фиделя Кастро, дают понимание того факта, что связь с почвой, с автохтонным населением и с географическим своеобразием страны – горы, лес, джунгли или пустыня – остаётся вполне актуальной. Партизан остаётся отделённым не только от

пирата, но и от корсара в такой же мере, в какой остаются разделены земля и море как различные элементарные пространства человеческой работы и военного столкновения между народами. Земля и море имеют не только различные способы ведения войны и не только различного рода театры военных действий, но и развили разные понятия о войне, враге и трофеях.¹⁷ Партизан будет представлять специфически земной, сухопутный тип активного борца по крайней мере так долго, сколько будут возможны антиколониальные войны на нашей планете.¹⁸ Теллурический характер партизана ниже будет более отчётливо очерчен в сравнении с фигурами типично морскими в правовом отношении (с.) и в разборе пространственного аспекта (с.).

Но и автохтонный партизан аграрного происхождения вовлекается в силовое поле неотразимого, технически-индустриального прогресса. Его мобильность настолько повышается благодаря моторизации, что он оказывается подвержен опасности полностью лишиться какой-либо почвы. Во времена холодной войны он становится техником невидимой борьбы, саботажником и шпионом. Уже во время Второй мировой войны имелись отряды диверсантов с партизанской выучкой. Такой моторизованный партизан утрачивает свой теллурический характер и является только транспортабельным и заменяемым орудием мощного центра, творящего мировую политику, который вводит его в действие для явной или невидимой войны и, сообразно обстоятельствам, снова отключает. Эта возможность также принадлежит его сегодняшней экзистенции и не должна остаться без внимания в теории партизана.

Этими четырьмя критериями – нерегулярность, повышенная мобильность, интенсивность политической ангажированности, теллурический характер – и со ссылкой на возможные последствия продолжающегося технизирования, индустриализирования и утраты аграрного характера мы, с понятийной точки зрения, описали горизонт нашего рассмотрения. Он простирается от Guerrillero наполеоновской эпохи до хорошо вооружённого партизана современности, от Empecinado через Мао Дзэ-дуна и Хо Ши Мина к Фиделю Кастро. Это большая область, постоянно растущий материал по историографии и военной науке. Мы используем его, насколько он нам доступен, и попробуем получить некоторые научные выводы для теории партизана.

Взгляд на международно-правовое положение

Партизан воюет нерегулярным образом. Но некоторые категории нерегулярных бойцов уравниваются с регулярными вооружёнными силами и пользуются правами и преимуществами регулярных участников войны. Это означает: их боевые действия не являются противозаконными, и когда они попадают в плен к врагам, то имеют право требовать особого обращения как военнопленные и раненые. Правовой статус нашёл в Гаагском уставе сухопутной войны от 18 октября 1907 года обобщение, которое сегодня признано общепринятым. После Второй мировой войны эта материя получила развитие в четырёх Женевских конвенциях от 12 августа 1949 года, из коих вторая регламентирует участь раненых и больных в сухопутной войне и в морской войне, третья – обращение с военнопленными, а четвёртая – защиту гражданских лиц во время войны. Их ратифицировали многие страны западного мира и восточного блока; с их формулировками согласован и новый американский военный справочник по праву сухопутной войны от 18 июля 1956 года.

Гаагский устав сухопутной войны от 18 октября 1907 года при определённых условиях уравнивал милицию, добровольческие корпуса и боевых товарищей спонтанных народных возмущений с регулярными вооружёнными силами. Позже, при разборе прусских разногласий с партизанством, мы будем упоминать о некоторых трудностях и неясностях этого регулирования. Развитие, приведшее к Женевским конвенциям 1949 года, характеризуется тем, что оно признаёт всё дальше заходящие ослабления до сих пор чисто

государственного, европейского международного права. Всё новые категории участников боевых действий считаются теперь участниками войны. И гражданские лица занятой войсками врага области – то есть, собственного района боевых действий партизана, борющегося в тылу вражеских армий, – пользуются теперь большей правовой защитой, чем согласно уставу сухопутной войны 1907 года. Много боевых товарищей, которые до сих пор считались партизанами, теперь уравниваются с регулярными бойцами и имеют их права и преимущества. Они, собственно говоря, не могут больше именоваться партизанами. Однако понятия ещё неясны и колеблются.

Формулировки Женевских конвенций учитывают европейский опыт, но не учитывают партизанские войны Мао Дзэ-дуна и позднейшее развитие современной партизанской войны. В первые годы после даты 1945 ещё не стало ясно то, что осознал и сформулировал такой знаток дела, как Hermann Foertsch: что военные акции после 1945 года приняли партизанский характер, поскольку обладатели атомной бомбы избегали её применения из гуманитарных соображений, а не обладающие ей могли рассчитывать на эти опасения – неожиданное влияние как атомной бомбы, так и гуманитарных соображений. Важные для проблемы партизана понятия Женевских нормирований абстрагированы от определённых ситуаций. Они являются (как говорится в авторитетном и крайне важном, составленном под руководством Jean S. Pictet комментарии Internationalen Roten Kreuzes, Bd.111,1958,S.65) точной ссылкой *une reference precise* на движения сопротивления Второй мировой войны 1939/45.

Здесь не было намерения фундаментально изменить Гаагский устав сухопутной войны 1907 года. Здесь даже принципиально придерживаются четырёх классических условий для уравнивания с регулярными войсками (ответственные начальники, постоянный твёрдый видимый знак отличия, открытое ношение оружия, соблюдение правил и обычаев права войны). Конвенция о защите гражданского населения должна, правда, иметь силу не только для межгосударственных войн, но и для всех интернациональных вооружённых конфликтов, итак, и для гражданских войн, восстаний и т.д. Но тем самым нужно создать лишь правовое основание для гуманитарных интервенций Интернационального Комитета Красного Креста (и других непартийных организаций). *Inter arma caritas*. В ст.3 абзац 4 конвенции настоятельно подчёркивается, что правовое положение, *le statut juridique*, конфликтующих партий этим не затрагивается (Pictet, a.a.O., 111, 1955, S.39/40). В межгосударственной войне оккупационные власти занятой войсками области по прежнему сохраняют за собой право давать указание местной полиции этой области поддерживать порядок и подавлять нерегулярные боевые действия, таким образом, преследовать и партизан, «независимо от того, какие идеи их вдохновляют» (Pictet IV, 1956,S.330).

Таким образом, отличие партизана – в смысле нерегулярного, не приравненного к регулярным войскам борца – и сегодня принципиально сохраняется. Партизан в этом смысле не имеет прав и преимуществ участников войны; он преступник согласно общему праву и может быть обезврежен суммарными наказаниями и репрессивными мерами. Это было принципиально признано и на судебных процессах по делам военных преступников после Второй мировой войны, главным образом в приговорах Нюрнбергского процесса против немецких генералов (Jodl, Leeb, List), причём само собой разумеется, что все выходящие за пределы необходимого подавления партизан жестокости, террор, коллективные наказания или даже участие в геноциде, остаются военными преступлениями.

Женевские конвенции расширяют круг лиц, приравненных к регулярным борцам прежде всего тем, что они уравнивают членов «организованного движения сопротивления» и сотрудников милиции и членов добровольческих корпусов и таким образом присваивают им права и преимущества регулярных участников войны. При этом не единожды военная организация недвусмысленно делается условием (ст.13 конвенции о раненых, ст.4 конвенции о военнопленных). Конвенция о защите гражданского населения

приравнивает «интернациональные конфликты», которые решаются силой оружия к межгосударственным войнам классического европейского международного права, и затрагивает тем самым ядро типичного для прежнего права войны правового института, *occupatio bellica*. К таким расширениям и ослаблениям, которые здесь могут быть приведены лишь в качестве примеров, прибавляются важные превращения и изменения, которые сами собою следуют из развития современной военной техники и со ссылкой на партизанскую борьбу действуют ещё более интенсивно. Что означает, например, положение об «открытом ношении» оружия для борца сопротивления, которого наставляет выше цитированное «руководство по ведению партизанской войны» швейцарского союза унтер-офицеров (с.33): «Передвигайся только по ночам и скрывайся днём в лесах!» Или что означает требование повсюду видимого знака отличия в ночном сражении или в сражении с применением дальнобойных орудий современной военной техники? Встаёт много подобных вопросов, когда рассмотрение ведётся с точки зрения проблемы партизана и когда не упускаются из виду ниже (с.) выявленные аспекты изменения пространства и технически-индустриального развития.

Защита гражданского населения в занятой военными области многообразна. Оккупационные власти заинтересованы в том, чтобы в занятой их военными области царил покой и порядок. Придерживаются того, что население занятой области обязывается не то чтобы быть верным, но, пожалуй, обязано повиноваться допустимым по праву войны распоряжениям оккупационных властей. Даже служащие – и сама полиция – должны корректно продолжать работать и соответственно этому с ними должны обращаться оккупационные власти. Всё это – с большим трудом уравновешенный, трудный компромисс между интересами оккупационных властей и интересами их военного противника. Партизан опасным образом нарушает этот вид порядка в занятой области. Не только потому, что его настоящий район боевых действий есть область в тылу вражеского фронта, где он выводит из строя транспорт и снабжение, но и, кроме того, если население этой области более или менее поддерживает и прячет его. «Население твой самый большой друг» – значит в только что цитированном «Руководстве по ведению партизанской войны для каждого» (с.28). Тогда защита такого населения потенциально является и защитой партизана. Так становится ясно то, почему в истории развития права войны при обсуждениях Гаагского устава сухопутной войны и его дальнейшего развития всё время происходило типичное группирование, расстановка сил: большие военные державы, то есть потенциальные оккупационные власти, требовали строгого обеспечения порядка в занятой войсками области, в то время, как меньшие государства, опасавшиеся военной оккупации – Бельгия, Швейцария, Люксембург – пытались добиться возможно более полной защиты борцов сопротивления и гражданского населения. И в этом отношении развитие со времен Второй мировой войны привело к новым научным выводам, и ниже (с.) выявленный аспект разрушения социальных структур действительно предполагает вопрос о том, могут ли иметься и такие случаи, при которых население испытывает нужду в защите от партизана.

Благодаря Женевским конвенциям 1949 года внутри классического, точно урегулированного и регламентированного правового института *occupatio bellica* произошли изменения, последствия которых во многом остаются непредвиденными. Борцы сопротивления, которых раньше трактовали как партизан, уравниваются с регулярными бойцами, если только они организованы. В противоположность интересам оккупационных властей интересы населения занятой области так сильно подчёркиваются, что – по крайней мере, в теории – стало возможным рассматривать любое сопротивление оккупационным властям, в том числе, партизанское сопротивление, если только оно возникает из достойных уважения мотивов, как не иллегальное. С другой стороны, оккупационные власти должны по-прежнему иметь право на репрессивные меры. Партизан в этой ситуации не будет действовать по-настоящему легально, но и не будет

действовать по-настоящему нелегально, но будет действовать на свой страх и риск и в этом смысле будет действовать рискованно.

Когда употребляют слово риск и рискованно во всеобщем, не уточнённом смысле, тогда необходимо установить, что в занятой военными врага и насыщенной партизанами области рискованно живёт ни в коем случае не только партизан. Во всеобщем смысле ненадёжности и опасности всё население такой области подвергается большому риску. Служащих, которые соответственно Гаагскому уставу сухопутной войны желают корректно продолжать работать, наступает дополнительный риск в смысле действий и бездействий, и в особенности служащий полиции оказывается в точке пересечения опасных, друг другу противоречащих требований: вражеские оккупационные власти требуют от него повиновения при поддержании безопасности и порядка, которые нарушаются как раз партизаном; собственное национальное государство требует от него верности и после войны привлечёт его к ответственности; население, к которому он принадлежит, ожидает лояльности и солидарности, которая, имея в виду деятельность полицейского служащего, может привести к совершенно противоположным практическим выводам, если полицейский служащий не решится на то, чтобы самому стать партизаном; и, наконец, партизан и оккупант быстро зачислят его в дьявольский круг их репрессий и анти-репрессий. Говоря абстрактно, рискованные действия (или бездействие) не является специфическим признаком партизана.

Слово рискованно приобретает уточнённый смысл благодаря тому, что рискованно действующий [субъект] действует на свой страх и риск и осознанно смиряется со скверными последствиями своего действия или бездействия, так что он не может жаловаться на несправедливость, если его достигают скверные результаты. С другой стороны он имеет возможность – насколько речь не идёт о противозаконных действиях – компенсировать риск тем, что он заключает договор страхования. Юридической родиной понятия риск, его научно-правовым топосом остаётся страховое право. Человек живёт среди разнообразных опасностей, а дать опасности с юридическим сознанием название риск означает сделать её и затронутого ей застрахованным. В случае партизана это, вероятно, привело бы к провалу нерегулярности и нелегальности его действий, даже если бы были готовы к тому, чтобы в технико-страховочном смысле защитить его от слишком большого риска зачислением в наивысший класс опасности.

Размышление над понятием риска необходимо для таких ситуаций, как война и вражда. У нас это слово введено в международно-правовое учение о войне в книге Josef L. Kunz “Kriegsrecht und Neutralitätsrecht” (1935, S.146, 274). Но там это слово не относится к войне на суше и совсем не относится к партизану. Эти вещи вообще не упоминаются в книге. Если мы не будем вспоминать о страховом праве как о юридической родине понятия риск и забудем неточные и нечёткие употребления этого слова – напр., сравнение с убежавшим пленным, который «рискует» быть застреленным – то обнаружится, что специфически плодотворное в смысле права войны употребление понятия «рискованно» у J. Kunz имеет в виду только морское право войны и типичные для него фигуры и ситуации. Война на море в большой мере экономическая война; в противоположность войне на суше у неё своё собственное пространство и свои собственные понятия о враге и трофеях. Даже улучшение участи раненых в Женевском регулировании августа 1949 года привело к двум, отдельным для земли и моря, конвенциям.

Рискованно в таком специфическом смысле действуют два участника войны на море: нейтральный нарушитель блокады и нейтральный провозчик контрабанды. Со ссылкой на них слово рискованно является чётким и точным. Оба рода участников войны пускаются на «весьма выгодное, но рискованное коммерческое приключение» (J. Kunz a.a.O., S. 277): они рискуют судном и грузом в случае захвата. При этом они не имеют врага, даже если они сами рассматриваются как враг в смысле международно-правовых норм ведения войны на море. Их социальный идеал – это хороший гешефт. Их поле деятельности – это свободное море. Они не думают о том, чтобы защищать дом, очаг и родину от чужого

захватчика, что относится к прообразу автохтонного партизана. Они заключают также договоры страхования, чтобы компенсировать свой риск, причём тарифы опасности соответственно высоки и приспособляются к меняющимся факторам риска, напр., к затоплению подводной лодкой: очень рискованно, но надёжно и дорого застраховано.

Не должно изымать такое удачное слово как рискованно из понятийного поля морского права войны и растворять его в стирающем все чёткие очертания общем понятии. Для нас, настаивающих на теллурическом характере партизана, это особенно важно. Если раньше я однажды назвал мародёров и пенителей моря начала капитализма «партизанами моря» (*Der Nomos der Erde*, S.145), то сегодня я бы исправил это как терминологическую неточность. Партизан имеет врага и «рискует» совсем в ином смысле, чем нарушитель блокады и провозчик контрабанды. Он рискует не только своей жизнью, как любой регулярный участник войны. Он знает, и не останавливается перед тем, что враг ставит его вне права, вне закона и вне понятия чести.

Это, конечно, делает и революционный борец, который объявляет врага преступником и все понятия врага о праве, законе и чести объявляет идеологическим обманом. Вопреки всем, характерным для Второй мировой войны и послевоенного времени вплоть до сегодняшнего дня соединениям и смешениям обоих видов партизана – оборонительно-автохтонного защитника родины и агрессивного в мировом масштабе, революционного активиста – противоположность сохраняется. Она покоится, как мы увидим, на фундаментально различных понятиях о войне и вражде, которые реализуются в различных видах партизан. Там, где война ведётся с обеих сторон как недискриминационная война одного государства с другим, партизан является периферийной фигурой, которая не взрывает границы войны и не изменяет общую структуру политического процесса. Однако если война ведётся с криминализациями военного противника в целом, если война ведётся, например, как гражданская война классового врага с классовым врагом, если её главная цель – свержение правительства враждебного государства, тогда революционное действие взрыва криминализации врага сказывается таким образом, что партизан становится истинным героем войны. Он приводит в исполнение смертный приговор преступнику и со своей стороны рискует тем, что его будут рассматривать как преступника или вредителя. Это логика войны *justa causa* без признания *justus hostis*. Благодаря ней революционный партизан становится подлинной центральной фигурой войны.

Однако проблема партизана становится лучшим пробным камнем. Различные виды партизанской войны могут так смешиваться и сливаться в практике сегодняшнего ведения войны, они остаются настолько различными в своих фундаментальных предпосылках, что применительно к ним оправдывает себя критерий группирования на друзей и врагов. Ранее мы напомнили о типичном группировании, которое явствовало при подготовке Гаагского устава сухопутной войны: большие военные державы против маленьких нейтральных стран. При обсуждениях Женевских конвенций 1949 года с большим трудом была достигнута компромиссная формула, уравнивающая организованное движение сопротивления и добровольческий корпус. И здесь повторилось типичное группирование, когда речь шла о том, чтобы закрепить опыт Второй мировой войны в международно-правовых нормах. И в этот раз большие военные державы, потенциальные оккупанты, противостояли маленьким, опасаящимся оккупации государствам; однако в этот раз со столь же необычной, сколь и симптоматичной модификацией: самая большая сухопутная, континентальная держава мира, самый сильный потенциальный оккупант, Советский Союз, был теперь на стороне маленьких государств.

Богатая материалами и хорошо обоснованная документами работа Jurg H. Schmid “Die volkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege” (*Zurcher Studien zum Internationalen Recht* Nr.23, Polygraphischer Verlag AG. Zurich, 1956) хочет поставить «под вывеску права» «Ведение герильи гражданскими лицами» – при этом имеются в виду конкретно партизаны Сталина (S.97,157). В этом Schmid видит «квинтэссенцию проблемы

партизана» и правовое творческое достижение Женевских конвенций. Schmid хотел бы устранить «определённые раздумья права оккупации», ещё оставшиеся от прежнего понимания оккупационной власти, в особенности, как он говорит, «воспетую обязанность выполнять приказ». Для этой цели он использует учение о легальных, но рискованных военных действиях, которые он по-новому акцентирует как рискованные, но не-иллегальные военные действия. Так он уменьшает риск партизана, которому он за счёт оккупационных властей присуждает возможно больше прав и привилегий. Как он думает избежать логики террора и анти-террора, я не вижу; дело обстоит так, что он просто криминализирует военного врага партизана. Всё это в целом – в высшей степени интересное пересечение двух различных *statuts juridiques*, именно участника войны и гражданского лица, с двумя различными видами современной войны, именно открытой и холодной войны между населением и оккупационными властями, в которой партизан Schmid'a (следуя Мао) принимает участие *a deux mains*. Удивительно только, и здесь заключается истинная поломка оси понятия, что эта де-иллегализация сталинского партизана за счёт классического международного права одновременно связывается с возвратом к чистой войне государств Portalis-доктрины Руссо, о которой Schmid утверждает, что она только «в своей детской обувке» запрещала гражданскому лицу совершение военных действий (S.157). Так партизан становится застрахованным.

Четыре Женевских конвенции от 12 августа 1949 года являются плодом гуманного образа мыслей и гуманного развития, которое заслуживает восхищения. Присваивая и врагу не только человечность, но даже законность в смысле признания, они остаются на основе классического международного права и в русле его традиции, причём такое произведение гуманности не является невероятным. Их базисом остаётся государственное ведение войны и построенное на этом оберегание войны, с его ясными различиями войны и мира, военных и гражданских лиц, врага и преступника, войны государств и гражданской войны. Однако давая ослабеть этим существенным различиям или даже ставя их под вопрос, они открывают дверь для такого рода войны, которая осознанно разрушает те ясные отделения одного от другого. Тогда иное осторожно стилизованное компромиссное нормирование предстаёт лишь тонким мостиком над бездной, которая скрывает в себе чреватое большими последствиями преобразование понятий о войне, о враге и о партизане.

Развитие теории/ Прусские разногласия с партизанством

В Пруссии, ведущей военной державе Германии, восстание против Наполеона весной 1813 года было преисполнено сильного национального чувства. Великое мгновение быстро миновало; однако в истории партизанства оно столь существенно, что мы должны будем позже особенно обсудить его.

Сначала нам необходимо обратить внимание на бесспорный исторический факт: прусская и ведомая Пруссией немецкая армия с 1813 года вплоть до окончания Второй мировой войны представляет классический пример организации войска, которая радикально вытеснила идею партизанства. Тридцать лет немецкого колониального господства в Африке (1885-1915) были в военном смысле недостаточно важны, чтобы серьёзно познакомить с проблемой блестящих теоретиков прусского генерального штаба. Австрийско-венгерская армия знала партизанскую войну на Балканах и имела регламент для малой войны. Напротив, прусско-немецкая армия вторглась во время Второй мировой войны 22 июня 1941 года в Россию, не думая о партизанской войне. Свою кампанию против Сталина она начала с максимы: воинская часть подавляет врага; мародёры обезвреживаются полицией. Лишь в октябре 1941 года последовали первые специальные инструкции по подавлению партизан; в мае 1944 года, за год до окончания четырёхлетней

войны, вышел первый полный регламент верховного главнокомандования вооружённых сил.¹⁹

Прусско-немецкая армия стала в 19 веке самой знаменитой, образцовой военной организацией тогдашнего, европоцентристского мира. Но она была обязана этой славой исключительно военным победам над другими регулярными европейскими армиями, в особенности над армиями Франции и Швейцарии. С нерегулярной войной она встретила только во время немецко-французской войны 1870-1871 годов во Франции, в образе так называемых франтиреров, которых по-немецки именовали партизанами (Heckenschutzen) и безжалостно обращались с ними в соответствии с правом войны, как это, впрочем, делала и любая регулярная армия. Чем строже дисциплина в регулярной армии, чем корректнее она различает военных и гражданских лиц и рассматривает только одетого в униформу противника в качестве врага, тем более чувствительной и нервной она становится, если на другой стороне в борьбе принимает участие и не одетое в униформу гражданское население. Военные реагируют тогда жёсткими репрессиями, расстрелами, взятием заложников и разрушением населённых пунктов и считают это справедливой самообороной против коварства и вероломства. Чем с большим уважением относятся к регулярному, одетому в униформу противнику как к врагу и не путают его даже в самой кровавой борьбе с преступником, тем злее обходятся с нерегулярным борцом как с преступником. Всё это само собой следует из логики классического европейского права войны, которое различает военных и гражданских лиц, участников войны и мирное население, и которое мобилизует редкую моральную силу – не объявлять врага как такового преступником.

Немецкий солдат узнал о франтирере во Франции, осенью 1870 года и следующей зимой 1870/71, после важной победы, которую он одержал над регулярной армией императора Наполеона III в битве у Седана 2 сентября. Если бы всё шло по правилам классической, регулярной войны армий, то нужно было бы ожидать, что после такой победы война будет окончена и что будет заключён мир. Вместо этого побеждённое правительство императора было смещено. Новое республиканское правительство под руководством Леона Гамбетта провозгласило национальное восстание против чужого захватчика, “Krieg a outrance”. Оно весьма спешно набирало всё новые армии и бросало всё новые массы плохо обученных солдат на поля сражений. В ноябре 1870 года оно даже достигло военного успеха у Логе. Так как не рассчитывали на длительное ведение войны, положение немецких армий стало угрожающим, и было поставлено под угрозу внешнеполитическое положение Германии. Население Франции пришло в состояние патриотического волнения и в самых разных формах стало участвовать в борьбе против немцев. Немцы арестовывали уважаемых лиц и так называемую знать (Notable) в качестве заложников, расстреливали франтиреров, которые попадались им с оружием в руках, и оказывали на население давление путём всякого рода репрессий. Это была исходная ситуация для более чем полувекового спора юристов в области международного права и официальной пропаганды обеих сторон за и против франтирера. Разногласия снова вспыхнули в первую мировую войну как бельгийско-немецкий спор о франтирерах. Об этом вопросе написаны целые библиотеки, и ещё в последние 1958-1960 годы коллегия уважаемых немецких и бельгийских историков попыталась прояснить и разрешить по крайней мере один спорный пункт из этого комплекса [вопросов] - бельгийский спор о франтирерах 1914 года.²⁰

Всё это показательно для проблемы партизана, поскольку это показывает, что нормативное регулирование – если оно должно, следуя фактам, осмыслить положение вещей и если оно должно не только выдавать глоссандо суждений о цене и об общих ограничительных условиях – юридически невозможно. Традиционное европейское оберегание межгосударственной войны исходит с 18 века из определённых понятий, которые хотя и были приостановлены Французской революцией, но тем более действенно были подтверждены реставрацией Венского конгресса. Эти восходящие к эпохе монархии

представления об оберегаемой войне и о законном враге могут быть легализованы между государствами лишь в том случае, если ведущие войну государства обеих сторон придерживаются их как во внутренней, так и в межгосударственной политике одинаковым образом, то есть если их внутренние и межгосударственные понятия о регулярности и нерегулярности, легальности и нелегальности содержательно совпадают или же, по крайней мере, некоторым образом гомогенны по своей структуре. В противном случае межгосударственное нормирование, вместо содействия достижению мира, станет только поставлять предлоги и лозунги для взаимных обвинений. Эта простая истина со времени первой мировой войны стала постепенно понятна. Но фасад унаследованного понятийного инвентаря идеологически ещё очень силён. По практическим причинам государства заинтересованы в использовании так называемых классических понятий, даже если эти последние в иных случаях отбрасываются в сторону как старомодные и реакционные. Кроме того, юристы европейского международного права упорно вытесняли из своего сознания различимую с 1900 года картину новой действительности.²¹

Если всё это в общем смысле имеет силу для различия между европейской войной государств старого стиля и демократической народной войной, тогда тем более это относится к импровизированной национальной народной войне а *outrance*, как её провозгласил Гамбетта в сентябре 1870 года. Гаагский устав сухопутной войны 1907 года – не иначе чем все его предшественники в 19 веке – не пытался достичь компромисса, имея в виду франтирера. Он требует известных условий для того, чтобы признать импровизированного воина, одетого в импровизированную униформу, участником войны в международно-правовом смысле: ответственные начальники, постоянный, далеко видимый знак отличия и, прежде всего, открытое ношение оружия. Неясность понятий Гаагского регулирования и Женевских конвенций велика и запутывает проблему.²² Партизан всё же именно тот, кто избегает открыто носить оружие, кто борется из-за угла, кто использует как униформу врага, так и устойчивый или свободный знак отличия и любой род гражданской одежды как маскировку. Скрытность и темнота – его сильнейшие орудия, от которых он честно не может отказаться без того, чтобы не утратить пространство нерегулярности, это значит: без того, чтобы не перестать быть партизаном.

Военная концепция регулярной прусской армии ни в коем случае не была основана на недостатке образования или на незнании значения герильи. Это видно по интересной книге типичного прусского офицера генерального штаба, который знал войну с франтирерами 1870-71 годов и который обнародовал своё мнение в 1877 году под заголовком «Леон Гамбетта и его армии». Автор, барон Colmar von der Goltz умер во время первой мировой войны командиром турецкой армии как паша Goltz. Со всей объективностью и с большой точностью юный прусский офицер обнаруживает решающую ошибку республиканского ведения войны и констатирует: «Гамбетта хотел вести большую войну, и он её вёл, к своему несчастью; ибо для немецких армий во Франции того времени гораздо опаснее была бы малая война, герилья».²³

Прусско-немецкое руководство сухопутными войсками, пусть поздно, но, наконец, постигло партизанскую войну. Верховное главнокомандование немецких вооружённых сил 6 мая 1944 года опубликовало уже упоминавшиеся общие директивы по борьбе с партизанами. Так немецкая армия перед своим концом всё же успела правильно познать партизана. Между тем директивы мая 1944 года признаны отличным регулированием и врагом Германии. Английский бригадир Dixon, опубликовавший после Второй мировой войны вместе с Otto Heilbrunn содержательную книгу о партизане, *in extenso* перепечатывает немецкие директивы как показательный пример правильной борьбы с партизанами, а английский генерал сэр Reginald F. S. Denning замечает в своём предисловии к Dixon-Heilbrunn, что ценность немецких инструкций по борьбе с партизанами 1944 года не уменьшается от того, что здесь речь идёт о директивах немецкой армии для борьбы против русских партизан.²⁴

Два явления немецкого конца войны 1944-45 годов не нужно приписывать немецкому вермахту; их скорее можно объяснить противоречием с ним: немецкий Volkssturm и так называемый вервольф. Volkssturm был призван указом от 25 сентября 1944 года, как территориальное народное ополчение для обороны страны; принадлежащие к нему люди, начиная действовать, становились солдатами в смысле закона о воинской повинности и участниками войны в смысле Гаагского устава сухопутной войны. Об их организации, вооружении, применении, боевом духе и потерях информирует недавно вышедшая работа генерал-майора Ганса Кисселя, который был шефом главного штаба Deutscher Volkssturm с ноября 1944 года. Киссель сообщает, что Volkssturm на Западе был признан союзниками как воюющий отряд (воинская часть), в то время как русские рассматривали его как партизанскую организацию и пленных расстреливали. В отличие от этого территориального народного ополчения вервольф был задуман как партизанская организация юношества. О результате сообщает книга Dixon и Heilbrunn: «Некоторые немногие начинающие вервольфы были схвачены союзниками, и этим дело исчерпалось». Вервольф характеризовали как «попытку выпустить на свободу войну детей-партизан» (Kinderheckenschutzenkrieg).²⁴ В любом случае, нам нет нужды останавливаться здесь на этом подробно.

После первой мировой войны тогдашние победители ликвидировали немецкий генеральный штаб и запретили его восстановление в любой форме в статье 160 Версальского договора от 28 июня 1919 года. Историческая и международно-правовая логика заключена в том, что победители во Второй мировой войне, которые тем временем объявили вне закона Duellkrieg классического европейского международного права, прежде всего США и Советский Союз, после их общей победы над Германией также поставили прусское государство вне закона и уничтожили его. Закон № 46 Контрольного совета союзников от 25 февраля 1947 года постановлял:

Прусское государство, которое с давних пор было в Германии носителем милитаризма и реакции, de facto прекратило существовать. Руководимый идеей сохранения мира и безопасности народов и желая восстановления политической жизни в Германии на демократической основе, Контрольный совет предписывает следующее:

Статья 1. Прусское государство со своим правительством и всеми своими органами управления ликвидировано.

Партизан как прусский идеал 1813 года и поворот к теории

Не прусский солдат и не стремящийся к реформам кадровый офицер прусского генерального штаба, а прусский премьер-министр Бисмарк был тем, кто в 1866 году против Габсбургской монархии и бонапартистской Франции «хотел взяться за любое оружие, которое нам могло предложить выпущенное на свободу(entfesselte) национальное движение не только в Германии, но и в Венгрии и в Богемии», чтобы не понести поражение. Бисмарк был полон решимости привести в движение Ахеронт. Он охотно употреблял классическую цитату Acheronta movere, но он приписывал это конечно с большей охотой своим внутривнутриполитическим противникам. Как прусский король Вильгельм I, так и шеф прусского генерального штаба Мольтке были далеки от ахеронтских планов; нечто подобное должно было казаться им жутким и также непрусским. И для слабых попыток немецкого правительства и генерального штаба подготовить революцию во время первой мировой войны слово acherontisch было бы чересчур сильным. Конечно, и ленинская поездка из Швейцарии в Россию в 1917 году принадлежит этому контексту. Но всё, что могли тогда, при организации путешествия Ленина, задумывать и планировать немцы, благодаря историческим последствиям этой подготовки к революции так чудовищно превзошло и перевернуло планы, что наш тезис о

прусских разногласиях с партизанством тем самым скорее подтверждается, чем опровергается.²⁵

Тем не менее, прусское государство солдат (Soldatenstaat) однажды имело в своей истории ахеронтское мгновение. Это было зимой и весной 1812-13 годов, когда элита офицеров генерального штаба пыталась высвободить и прибрать к рукам силы национальной вражды к Наполеону. Немецкая война против Наполеона не была партизанской войной. Едва ли можно назвать её народной войной; последней её делает, как точно говорит Эрнст Форстхоф, только «легенда с политической подоплёкой».²⁶ Быстро удалось направить те стихийные силы в твёрдые рамки государственного порядка и регулярной борьбы против французских армий. Тем не менее, это краткое, революционное мгновение сохраняет непреходящее значение для теории партизана.

Здесь сразу вспомнят о знаменитом шедевре военной науки – книге О войне прусского генерала фон Клаузевица. Вспомнят вполне обоснованно. Но Клаузевиц был тогда юным другом своих учителей и наставников Шарнхорста и Гнейзенау, и его книга была опубликована только после его смерти, после 1832 года. Зато есть другой манифест вражды к Наполеону, восходящий непосредственно к весне 1813 года; он принадлежит к самым удивительным документам всей истории партизанства: прусский эдикт о ландштурме от 21 апреля 1813 года. Речь идёт о подписанном королём Пруссии эдикте, который был с соблюдением всех правил опубликован в прусском своде законов. Несомненно то, что образцом для этого эдикта послужили испанский *Reglamento de Partidas y Cuadrillas* от 28 декабря 1808 года и известный под названием *Corso Terrestre* декрет от 17 апреля 1809 года. Но эти документы не были подписаны монархом лично.²⁷ Поражаешься, когда видишь имя легитимного короля под подобного рода призывом к партизанской войне. Эти десять страниц Прусского свода законов 1813 года (с.79-89) определённо принадлежат к самым необычным страницам всех изданных законов мира.

Каждый гражданин государства, так значится в королевском прусском эдикте апреля 1813 года, обязан сопротивляться вторгшемуся врагу всеми видами оружия. Настоятельно рекомендуются (в # 43) топоры, вилы, косы и дробовые винтовки. Каждый пруссак обязан не повиноваться никакому распоряжению врага, но обязан вредить ему всеми доступными средствами. Также если враг желает восстановить общественный порядок, никто не должен повиноваться ему, поскольку тем самым врагу облегчается проведение военных операций. Недвусмысленно говорится, что менее вреден «разгул необузданного сброда», чем состояние, когда враг свободно может распоряжаться всеми своими войсками. Репрессии и террор для защиты партизана обещаются, этим грозят врагу. Короче говоря, здесь налицо род *Magna Carta* партизанства. В трёх местах – во введении и в ## 8 и 52 - недвусмысленно ссылаются на Испанию и герилью как на «образец и пример». Борьба оправдывается как борьба в пределах самообороны, которая «освящает все средства» (#7), также и высвобождение тотального беспорядка.

Я уже говорил, что дело не дошло до немецкой партизанской войны против Наполеона. Сам эдикт о ландштурме уже три месяца спустя, 17 июля 1813 года, был изменён и очищен от всякой партизанской опасности, от всякой ахеронтской динамики. Всё последующее развёртывалось в боях регулярных армий, если даже динамика национального импульса и проникла в регулярный отряд. Наполеон мог похвастаться тем, что за многие годы французской оккупации на немецкой земле ни одно немецкое гражданское лицо не сделало ни одного выстрела во французский мундир.

Итак, в чём же состоит особенное значение того недолго существовавшего прусского распоряжения 1813 года? В том, что оно является официальным документом легитимации партизана национальной обороны, а именно особой легитимации, вышедшей из духа и из философии, которые царили в тогдашней прусской столице Берлине. Испанская герилья против Наполеона, тирольское восстание 1809 года и русская партизанская война 1812 года были стихийными, автохтонными движениями набожного, католического или православного народа, чья религиозная традиция не была затронута философским духом

революционной Франции и была в этом отношении слабообразована. В особенности испанцев Наполеон называл в возмущённом письме к своему гамбургскому генерал-губернатору Davout (2 декабря 1811 года) убивающим из-за угла, суеверным народом, который обманывают 300 000 монахов, - этот народ нельзя сравнивать с прилежными, трудолюбивыми и разумными немцами. Напротив, Берлин 1808-1813 годов был создан и отчеканен духом, которому была абсолютно поверена философия французского Просвещения, так поверена, что он мог чувствовать себя взрослым на ней, если не превосходящим её.

Иоганн Готлиб Фихте, великий философ; такие высокообразованные и гениальные военные, как Шарнхорст, Гнейзенау и Клаузевиц; такой поэт, как прежде упомянутый, в ноябре 1811 года умерший Генрих фон Клейст, - они характеризуют огромный духовный потенциал готовой тогда в критическое мгновение к действию прусской интеллигенции. Национализм этой берлинской интеллигентской прослойки был уделом образованных людей, а не простого или вовсе неграмотного народа. В такой атмосфере, когда объединились возбуждённое национальное чувство с философским образованием, был философски открыт партизан и его теория стала исторически возможна. То, что к этому союзу относится и учение о войне, показывает письмо, написанное Клаузевицом как «анонимным военным» в 1809 году из Кёнигсберга Фихте как «создателю сочинения о Макиавелли». В этом письме прусский офицер со всем возможным почтением наставляет знаменитого философа в том, что учение о войне Макиавелли слишком зависимо от античности и что сегодня «бесконечно больше выигрывают оживлением индивидуальных сил, чем искусственной формой». Новые орудия и массы, говорит в этом письме Клаузевиц, вполне соответствуют этому принципу, и, в конце концов, решает мужество одиночки вступить в ближний бой, «особенно в самой прекрасной из всех войн, которую народ ведёт на своей собственной земле за свободу и независимость».

Молодой Клаузевиц знал партизана из прусских планов восстания 1808/13 годов. В 1810-1811 годах Клаузевиц читал в Берлинском военном училище лекции о малой войне и был не только одним из самых значительных военных знатоков малой войны в специальном смысле использования лёгких, мобильных отрядов. Герилья стала для него, как и для других реформаторов его круга «прежде всего в высшем смысле политическим делом прямо-таки революционного характера. Выступление в защиту вооружения народа, восстания, революционной войны, сопротивления и мятежа против существующего порядка, даже если оно олицетворяется чужим оккупационным режимом – это для Пруссии новое явление, нечто “опасное” – то, что как бы выпадает из сферы правового государства». Этими словами Werner Hahlweg схватывает важную для нас суть. Но тут же он добавляет: «Правда, революционной войны против Наполеона, как она представлялась прусским реформаторам, не велось. Дело дошло лишь до «полу-мятежной (halb-insurrektionellen) войны», как сказал Фридрих Энгельс. Тем не менее, знаменитый меморандум февраля 1812 года остаётся важным для «внутренних побуждений» (Rothfels) реформаторов; Клаузевиц сочинил его при помощи Гнейзенау и Воуен перед тем, как перейти к русским. Он является «документом трезвого политического и сделанного в соответствии со стандартами генерального штаба анализа», ссылается на опыты испанской народной войны и желает спокойно довести дело до того, чтобы «ответить на жестокость жестокостью, на насилие – насилием». Здесь уже ясно узнаётся прусский эдикт о ландштурме апреля 1813 года.²⁸

Клаузевица должно было тяжело разочаровать то, что всё, чего он ожидал от восстания, «не состоялось».²⁹ Народную войну и партизан – «партийцев» как говорит Клаузевиц – он осознал как существенную часть «сил, взрывающихся на войне» и вставил в систему своего учения о войне. Особенно в 6 книге своего учения о войне (объём средств обороны) и в знаменитой главе 6 в восьмой книги (война – инструмент политики) он также признал новую «потенцию». Кроме того, у него можно найти удивительные, глубокие отдельные замечания, как, например, место о гражданской войне в Вандее: что

иногда некоторое малое количество отдельных партизан могут даже «претендовать на название армия».30 И тем не менее в общем он остаётся реформаторски настроенным кадровым офицером регулярной армии своей эпохи, который не мог сам до последней последовательности дать расцвести тем росткам, которые здесь становятся видимы. Это, как мы увидим, произошло гораздо позже, и для этого потребовался активный профессиональный революционер. Клаузевиц сам мыслил ещё слишком в классических категориях, когда он в «странной тройственности войны» присваивал народу только «слепой инстинкт» ненависти и вражды, полководцу и его войску – «мужество и талант» как свободное действие души, а правительству – чисто рассудочное манипулирование войной как инструментом политики.

В том недолго существовавшем прусском эдикте о ландштурме апреля 1813 года концентрируется мгновение, в которое партизан впервые выступил в новой, решающей роли, как новая, прежде не признававшаяся фигура мирового духа. Не воля к восстанию храброго, воинственного народа, но образование и интеллигенция открыли партизану эту дверь и сообщили ему легитимность, основанную на философском базисе. Здесь он стал, если мне будет позволено так высказаться, философски аккредитован и получил доступ ко двору. Прежде этого не было. В 17 веке он опустился до уровня персонажа плутовского романа; в 18 веке, во время Марии Терезии и Фридриха Великого, он был пандуром и гусаром. Но теперь, в Берлине 1808-1813 годов, его открыли и оценили не только в военно-техническом, но и в философском смысле. По крайней мере на одно мгновение он обрёл историческое положение и духовное посвящение. Это было событием, которое он не смог опять забыть. Это является решающим для нашей темы. Мы говорим о теории партизана. Что ж, политическая, превышающая специально военные классификации, теория партизана стала, собственно говоря, возможна только благодаря этой аккредитации в Берлине. Искра, попавшая в 1808 году из Испании на север, нашла в Берлине теоретическую форму, которая дала возможность сохранить её горение и передать её дальше в другие руки.

Правда, вначале тогда и в Берлине традиционное благочестие народа также не было под угрозой, как и политическое единство короля и народа. Оно, казалось, даже скорее усилилось, чем подверглось опасности, благодаря подтверждению присягой и прославлению партизана. Ахеронт, которого высвободили, сразу возвратился в каналы государственного порядка. После войн за освобождение Германии 1813-1815гг. в Пруссии доминировала философия Гегеля. Она пыталась создать посредничество между революцией и традицией.31 Она могла считаться консервативной и была таковой в самом деле. Но она законсервировала и революционную искру и благодаря своей философии истории предоставила развивающейся дальше революции опасное идеологическое оружие, более опасное, чем философия Руссо в руках якобинцев. Это историко-философское оружие попало в руки Карла Маркса и Фридриха Энгельса. Однако оба немецких революционера были в большей степени мыслителями, чем активистами революционной войны. Только благодаря русскому профессиональному революционеру – Ленину – марксизм как доктрина стал всемирно-исторической властью (Macht), которую он сегодня собой представляет.

От Клаузевица к Ленину

Ганс Шомерус, которого мы уже цитировали как специалиста в области партизанства, дал одному разделу своих (ставших мне доступными в манускрипте) рассуждений название: От Емресинадо к Будённому. Это значит: от партизана испанской герильи против Наполеона к организатору советской кавалерии, вождю конницы большевистской войны 1920 года. В таком названии просвечивает интересная военно-научная линия развития. Однако для нас, имеющих ввиду теорию партизана, оно слишком сильно

обращает внимание на военно-технические вопросы тактики и стратегии гибкой (beweglichen) войны. Мы должны не упускать из виду развитие понятия политического, которое как раз здесь совершает радикальный поворот. Классическое, зафиксированное в 18/19 веках понятие политического было основано на государстве европейского международного права и сделало войну классического международного права оберегаемой в международно-правовом смысле, чистой войной государств. С 20 века эта война государств с её обереганиями устраняется и заменяется революционной войной партий. По этой причине мы озаглавили нижеследующее изложение От Клаузевица к Ленину. Правда здесь – по сравнению с военно-специально-научным сужением [темы] – заключена в известном смысле противоположная опасность, что мы увлечёмся историко-философскими дедукциями и запутаемся в ветвях генеалогического древа.

Партизан здесь – надёжная точка наводки оружия, поскольку он может уберечь от таких всеобщих философско-исторических генеалогий и способен привести назад в действительность революционного развития. Карл Маркс и Фридрих Энгельс уже осознали, что революционная война сегодня не является баррикадной войной старого стиля. Особенно это вновь и вновь подчёркивал Энгельс – автор многих военно-научных сочинений. Но он считал возможным, что буржуазная демократия с помощью всеобщего избирательного права предоставит пролетариату большинство в парламенте и таким образом легально переведёт буржуазный общественный строй в бесклассовое общество. Вследствие этого и совершенно непартизанский ревизионизм мог апеллировать к Марксу и Энгельсу.

Напротив, Ленин был тем, кто осознал неизбежность насилия и кровавых революционных гражданских войн и войн государств и потому одобрил и партизанскую войну как необходимую составную часть общего революционного процесса. Ленин был первым, кто вполне осознанно постиг партизана как важную фигуру национальной и интернациональной гражданской войны и пытался превратить его в действенный инструмент центрального коммунистического партийного руководства. Насколько я могу судить, впервые это произошло в статье Партизанская битва, вышедшей 30 сентября/13 октября 1906 года в русском журнале «Пролетарий».32 Это ясное продолжение познания о враге и вражде, которое начинается в 1902 году в сочинении «Что делать?» прежде всего с поворотом против объективизма Струве. С этого «последовательно начался профессиональный революционер».33

Ленинская статья о партизане касается тактики социалистической гражданской войны и обращена против распространённого в то время среди социал-демократов мнения, что пролетарская революция сама собой достигнет своей цели как массовое движение в парламентских странах, так что методы прямого применения силы якобы устарели. Для Ленина партизанская война относится к методу гражданской войны и касается, как и всё остальное, чисто тактического или стратегического вопроса конкретной ситуации. Партизанская война – это, как говорит Ленин, «неизбежная форма борьбы», которую используют без догматизма или заранее намеченных принципов так же, как должно пользоваться другими, легальными или нелегальными, мирными или насильственными, регулярными или нерегулярными средствами и методами, судя по ситуации. Цель – коммунистическая революция во всех странах мира; то, что служит этой цели, хорошо и справедливо. Вследствие этого очень просто решается проблема партизана: руководимые коммунистическим центром партизаны являются борцами за мир и доблестными героями; партизаны, которые уклоняются от этого руководства, являются анархическим сбродом и врагами человечества.

Ленин был большим знатоком и поклонником Клаузевица. Он интенсивно штудировал книгу О войне во время первой мировой войны в 1915 году и заносил в свою Тетрадку выписки из неё на немецком языке, заметки на полях на русском, с подчёркиваниями и восклицательными знаками. Таким образом он создал один из самых грандиозных документов мировой истории и истории духа. Из основательного рассмотрения этих

выписок, заметок на полях, подчёркиваний и восклицательных знаков можно развить новую теорию об абсолютной войне и абсолютной вражде, которая определяет эпоху революционной войны и методы современной холодной войны.³⁴ То, чему Ленин мог научиться у Клаузевица и что он основательно выучил, - это не только знаменитая формула о войне как о продолжении политики. Это дальнейшее познание, что различие друга и врага в эпоху революции является первичным и первенствующим и определяет как войну, так и политику. Для Ленина только революционная война является подлинной войной, поскольку она происходит из абсолютной вражды. Всё остальное – условная игра.

Различие между Krieg (война) и Spiel (игра) Ленин сам особенно подчёркивает в заметке на полях к одному месту 23 главы книги 11 (“Schlüssel des Landes”). В логике этого различия совершается решающий шаг, который ломает те оберегания, которые удалось сделать войне государств континентального европейского международного права в 18 веке, которые настолько успешно реставрировал Венский конгресс 1814/15 годов, что они сохранились до конца первой мировой войны и об устранении которых и Клаузевиц ещё по-настоящему не думал. По сравнению с войной абсолютной вражды протекающая согласно признанным правилам, оберегаемая война классического европейского международного права - уже не больше чем дуэль между имеющими право искать удовлетворения кавалерами. Такому воодушевлённому абсолютной враждой коммунисту как Ленин подобный род войны должен был представляться только игрой, в которой он, судя по положению дела, участвовал, чтобы ввести врага в заблуждение, но которую он по существу презирал и находил смешной.³⁵

Война абсолютной вражды не знает никакого оберегания. Последовательное осуществление абсолютной вражды придаёт войне её смысл и её справедливость. Итак, вопрос только в том: имеется ли абсолютный враг и кто это *in concreto*? Ленин ни минуты не сомневался в ответе, и его преимущество перед всеми остальными социалистами и марксистами состояло в том, что он всерьёз принимал абсолютную вражду. Его конкретный абсолютный враг был классовый враг, буржуа, западный капиталист и его общественный строй в каждой стране, где он господствовал. Знание врага было тайной чудовищной ударной силы Ленина. Его понимание партизана покоилось на том, что современный партизан стал подлинно нерегулярным явлением и, тем самым, сильнейшим отрицанием наличествующего капиталистического порядка и на том, что он был призван как подлинный исполнитель вражды.

Нерегулярность партизана сегодня относится не только к военной «линии», как тогда, в 18 веке, когда партизан был только «лёгким, подвижным отрядом», и она также больше не относится к гордо выставленной напоказ униформе регулярного отряда. Нерегулярность классовой борьбы ставит под вопрос не только линию, но и всё здание политического и социального порядка. В лице русского профессионального революционера Ленина эта новая действительность осмыслила себя до философского осознания. Союз философии с партизаном, который заключил Ленин, высвободил неожиданно новые, взрывные силы. Этот союз вызвал, по меньшей мере, подрыв всего европо-центристского мира, который надеялся спасти Наполеон и который надеялся реставрировать Венский конгресс.

Оберегание межгосударственной регулярной войны и укрощение внутргосударственной гражданской войны стали настолько само собою разумеющимися для европейского 18 века, что и умные люди старого режима (Ancien Regime) не могли представить себе разрушение этого рода регулярности, даже после опытов французской революции 1789 и 1793 годов. Для этого они находили только язык всеобщего ужаса и недостаточные, по сути дела детские сравнения. Великий, смелый мыслитель старого режима (Ancien Regime), Жозеф де Местр, прозорливо предвидел, о чём шла речь. В письме, написанном летом 1811 года,³⁶ он считал Россию созревшей для революции, но он надеялся, что это будет, как он говорит, естественная революция, но не просвещенчески-европейская, наподобие французской. Чего он более всего опасался, так это образованного Пугачёва. Так он выразился, чтобы образно показать, что он правильно

познал как собственно Опасное, именно союз философии со стихийными силами восстания. Кем был Пугачёв? Вождём крестьянского и казацкого восстания против Екатерины II, который был казнён в Москве в 1775 году и который выдавал себя за умершего мужа царицы. Образованный Пугачёв был бы тот русский, кто «начал бы революцию на европейский лад». Это дало бы целый ряд ужасных войн, и если бы дело зашло так далеко, «то у меня нет слов, чтобы сказать Вам, чего бы тогда следовало опасаться».

Видение умного аристократа удивительно, как в том, что оно видит, именно возможность и опасность соединения западного ума с русским бунтом, так и в том, чего оно не видит. Со своей временной датой и местом – Санкт-Петербург лета 1811 года – оно находится неподалёку от прусских военных реформаторов. Но оно ничего не замечает в отношении своей собственной близости к стремящимся к реформам кадровым офицерам прусского генерального штаба, чьи контакты с царским двором в Санкт-Петербурге были все же достаточно интенсивны. Оно ничего не подозревает о Шарнхорсте, Гнейзенау и Клаузевице. Если скомбинировать их имена с именем Пугачёва, то суть дела фатальным образом была бы упущена. Глубокомыслие значительного видения пропадает, и остаётся только острое словцо в стиле Вольтера или, если угодно, Rivalor. Если ещё подумать о союзе гегелевской философии истории с высвобожденными силами масс, как его осознанно осуществил марксистский профессиональный революционер Ленин, тогда формулировка гениального де Местра рассеивается до маленького разговорного эффекта передних Ancien Regime. Язык и мир понятий оберегаемой войны и дозированной вражды уже не могли соответствовать наступлению абсолютной вражды.

От Ленина к Мао Цзэ-дуну

Во время Второй мировой войны русские партизаны после оценки экспертов отвлекли на себя примерно двадцать немецких дивизий и тем самым внесли существенный вклад в исход войны. Официальная советская историография – как, например, книга Бориса Семёновича Тельпуховского о Великой Отечественной войне 1941/45 годов – описывает доблестного партизана, который разрушает тыл вражеских армий. На огромных пространствах России и при бесконечно длинных фронтах, растянувшихся на тысячи километров, каждая дивизия была для немецкого военного командования незаменима. Основная точка зрения Сталина относительно партизана сводилась к тому, что партизан всегда должен сражаться в тылу врага, согласно известной максиме: в тылу партизаны, на фронте братство.

Сталину удалось связать сильный потенциал национального и отечественного сопротивления – итак существенно оборонительную, теллурическую силу патриотической самозащиты от чужого завоевателя – с агрессивностью интернациональной коммунистической мировой революции. Соединение этих двух гетерогенных величин господствует в сегодняшней партизанской борьбе на всей планете. При этом коммунистический элемент до сих пор был большей частью в выигрыше уже благодаря своей целеустремлённости и своей опоре на Москву или Пекин. Сталин жестоко пожертвовал польскими партизанами, сражавшимися во время Второй мировой войны против немцев. Партизанские сражения в Югославии в 1941/45 годах были не только общей национальной защитой от чужого завоевателя, но являлись так же весьма brutальными внутренними сражениями между коммунистическими и монархическими партизанами. В этой братоубийственной борьбе коммунистический вождь партизан Тито победил и уничтожил с помощью Сталина и Англии своего внутри-югославского врага, поддерживаемого англичанами генерала Михайловича.

Величайший практик революционной войны современности стал одновременно её самым знаменитым теоретиком: Мао Дзэ-дун. Некоторые из его трудов являются «сегодня

обязательной литературой для чтения в западных военных училищах» (Hans Henle). Он уже с 1927 года собирал опыты коммунистического действия и потом использовал японское вторжение 1932 года для того, чтобы систематически развить все современные методы одновременно национальной и интернациональной гражданской войны. «Долгий марш», от южного Китая до монгольской границы, начавшийся в ноябре 1934 года, 12000 километров с огромными потерями, был рядом партизанских достижений и партизанских опытов, в результате которых коммунистическая партия Китая сплотилась в крестьянскую и солдатскую партию, с партизаном как центром. Многозначительное совпадение заключается в том, что Мао Дзэ-дун создал свои важнейшие труды в 1936-38 годы, итак в те же самые годы, когда Испания в национальной освободительной войне сопротивлялась интернациональному коммунистическому охвату. В этой испанской гражданской войне партизан не играл никакой значительной роли. Напротив, Мао Дзэ-дун обязан победой над своим национальным противником, Куо-мин-танг и генералом Чан Кай-ши, исключительно опытам китайской партизанской войны против японцев и Куо-мин-танг.

Важнейшие для нашей темы формулировки Мао Дзэ-дуна находятся в работе 1938 года «Стратегия партизанской войны против японского вторжения». Но необходимо привлечь и другие работы Мао, чтобы полно представить себе картину учения о войне этого нового Клаузевица.³⁷ Речь на деле идёт о последовательном и систематически-осознанном продолжении и развитии понятий прусского офицера генерального штаба. Только Клаузевиц, современник Наполеона I, ещё не мог предвидеть степень тотальности, которая сегодня само собой разумеется для китайца-коммуниста в отношении революционной войны. Характерный образ Мао Дзэ-дуна явствует из следующего сравнения: «В нашей войне вооружённое население и малую войну партизан, с одной стороны, и Красную армию, с другой стороны, можно сравнить с обеими руками одного человека; или, выражаясь более практично: мораль населения является моралью вооружённой нации. А этого враг боится».

«Вооружённая нация»: это, как известно, было также девизом кадровых офицеров прусского генерального штаба, которые организовывали войну против Наполеона. К ним принадлежал Клаузевиц. Мы видели, что тогда сильные национальные энергии определённого образованного слоя населения были подхвачены регулярной армией. И самые радикальные военные мыслители того времени различают между войной и миром и рассматривают войну как ясно отграниченное от мира чрезвычайное положение. И Клаузевиц не мог исходя из своего существования в качестве кадрового офицера регулярной армии так систематически до конца довести логику партизанства, как это удалось сделать Ленину и Мао исходя из своего существования в качестве профессиональных революционеров. Но у Мао в отношении партизанства добавляется ещё конкретный момент, благодаря чему он ближе подходит к внутренней сути дела, чем Ленин и благодаря чему он обретает возможность крайнего идейного совершенства. Одним словом: революция Мао в большей степени теллурически фундирована, чем революция Ленина. Большевицкий авангард, который под руководством Ленина захватил власть в России в октябре 1917 года, обнаруживает большие различия с китайскими коммунистами, которые после больше чем двадцатилетней войны в 1949 году получили в руки Китай. Эти различия проявляются как во внутренней групповой структуре, так и в отношении к стране и народу, которые они захватили. Идеологический спорный вопрос о том, учит ли Мао настоящему марксизму или ленинизму, становится перед лицом ужасающей действительности, определяемой теллурическим партизанством, почти так же второстепенен, как и вопрос о том, не выражали ли старые китайские философы уже нечто похожее на маоизм. Речь идёт о конкретной «красной элите», отчеканенной и созданной партизанской борьбой. Ruth Fischer прояснила существенное – она указывает на то, что русские большевики 1917 года были национальным меньшинством «ведомым группой теоретиков, большинство которой состояло из эмигрантов»; китайские коммунисты 1949 года под руководством Мао и его друзей в

течение двадцати лет боролись на собственной, национальной почве с национальным противником, Kuo-min-tang, на базисе ужасающей партизанской войны. Может быть, что по своему происхождению они были городским пролетариатом, как и русские большевики родом из Петербурга и Москвы; но когда они пришли к власти, они принесли с собой отчеканенные опыты тяжелейших поражений и организаторскую способность «высадить» свои принципы «в крестьянской среде и развить их там дальше на новый, непредвиденный лад».38 Здесь налицо глубочайший росток «идеологических» разногласий между советско-русским и китайским коммунизмом. Но здесь обнаруживается и внутреннее противоречие в ситуации самого Мао, совмещающее в себе лишённого пространства, глобально-универсального, абсолютного всемирного врага, марксистского классового врага, с территориально могущим быть ограниченным, настоящим врагом китайско-азиатской обороны от капиталистического колониализма. Это противоречие One World, политического единства земли и человечества, против большинства больших пространств, которые разумно уравновешены внутри самих себя и между собою. Плюралистическое представление о новом номосе Земли Мао высказал в стихотворении Kunlun, (немецкий перевод Rolf Schneider):

Если бы небо было местом обитания военных, тогда я обнажил бы мой меч
И разрубил бы тебя на три части:
Одну – как подарок Европе,
Одну – для Америки,
Но одну часть оставил бы для Китая,
И мир воцарился бы на Земле.

В конкретном положении Мао встречаются различные виды вражды, которые усиливаются до вражды абсолютной. Расовая вражда против белого, колониального эксплуататора; классовая вражда против капиталистической буржуазии; национальная вражда против японского интервента той же расы; растущая в долгих, ожесточённых гражданских войнах вражда против собственного, национального брата – всё это не парализовало и не ставило под сомнение друг друга, как можно было бы думать, но подтверждалось и интенсифицировалось в конкретном положении дел. Сталину во время Второй мировой войны удалось соединить теллурическое партизанство национальной родной земли с классовой враждой интернационального коммунизма. Мао опередил в этом Сталина. Мао и в своём теоретическом сознании продолжил формулу о войне как о продолжении политики, минуя Ленина.

Мыслительная операция, основная у Мао, является точно так же простой, как и боеспособной. Смысл войны – это вражда. Поскольку война есть продолжение политики, то и политика всегда обретает, по крайней мере, как возможность, элемент вражды; и поскольку мир содержит в себе возможность вражды – что к сожалению является опытно подтверждённым фактом – то и он содержит момент потенциальной вражды. Вопрос лишь в том, может ли вражда быть оберегаема и регламентируема, то есть является ли она относительной или абсолютной враждой. Это может решить на свой страх и риск только сама воюющая сторона. Для Мао, думающего по-партизански, сегодняшний мир является только формой проявления настоящей вражды. Она не прекращается и во время так называемой холодной войны. Последняя, следовательно, не является наполовину войной и наполовину миром, но является приспособленным к положению вещей участием настоящей вражды с другими открыто насильственными средствами. В этом могут обманываться только слабовольные люди и мечтатели.

Практически отсюда вытекает вопрос, в каком количественном отношении стоит бой регулярной армии в открытой войне к иным методам классовой борьбы, которые не являются открыто военными. На этот вопрос Мао отвечает ясными цифрами: революционная война на девять десятых не-открытая, не-регулярная война, и на одну

десятью открытая война военных. Немецкий генерал, Helmut Staedke, на этом основании вывел определение партизана: партизан – это боец указанных девяти десятых ведения войны, которое предоставляет лишь последнюю десятую часть регулярным вооружённым силам. 39 Мао Цзэ-дун ничуть не упускает из виду, что эта последняя десятая часть является решающей для конца войны. Однако европейцу, принадлежащему старой традиции нужно именно здесь уберечься от того, чтобы использовать общепринятые классические понятия о войне и мире, которые, если говорят о войне и мире, подчинены европейской оберегаемой войне 19 века и, следовательно, не абсолютной, но лишь относительной и поддающейся обереганию вражде.

Регулярная Красная Армия появляется только тогда, когда ситуация созрела для коммунистического режима. Только тогда страна открыто бывает занята военными. Это конечно не относится к заключению мира в смысле классического международного права. Практическое значение подобного рода доктрины с 1945 года очень убедительно демонстрируется всему миру благодаря разделу Германии. 8 мая 1945 года война военных против покорённой Германии прекратилась; Германия тогда безоговорочно капитулировала. До сих пор (1963 год) ещё не заключён мир между союзниками-победителями с Германией; но до сегодняшнего дня граница протекает между Востоком и Западом точно по тем линиям, по которым 18 лет назад американские и советские регулярные воинские части разграничили свои оккупационные зоны.

Как отношение (выраженное в цифрах 9:1) холодной войны и открытой войны военных, так и более глубокая, всемирно-политическая симптоматика раздела Германии с 1945 года являются для нас только примерами, чтобы разъяснить политическую теорию Мао. Её сердцевина заключена в партизанстве, чей основной признак сегодня – это настоящая вражда. Большевицкая теория Ленина познала и признала партизана. По сравнению с конкретной теллурической действительностью китайского партизана у Ленина в определении врага есть нечто абстрактно-интеллектуальное. Идеологический конфликт между Москвой и Пекином, который всё сильнее проявлялся с 1962 года, имеет свой глубочайший источник в этой конкретно-различной действительности истинного партизанства. Теория партизана оказывается и здесь ключом к познанию политической действительности.

От Мао Цзэ-дуна к Раулю Салану

Славу Мао Цзэ-дуна как самого современного учителя ведения войны французские кадровые офицеры принесли из Азии в Европу. В Индокитае колониальная война старого стиля соприкоснулась с революционной войной современности. Там они узнали на собственной шкуре ударную силу хорошо продуманных методов разрушающего ведения войны, психологического массового террора и их связь с партизанской войной. Исходя из своих опытов, они разработали доктрину психологической, разрушающей и повстанческой войны, о которой уже имеется обширная литература.⁴⁰

Хотели увидеть в этом типичный продукт образа мыслей кадровых офицеров, а именно полковников, Colonels. Об этом прикомандировании к Colonel здесь не нужно далее спорить, хотя, быть может, было бы интересно поставить вопрос, не соответствует ли такая фигура как Клаузевиц в целом скорее духовному типу полковника, а не генерала. Для нас речь идёт о теории партизана и её последовательном развитии, а последнее воплощается в сенсационном конкретном случае последних лет скорее в генерале, чем в полковнике, а именно в судьбе генерала Рауля Салана. Он (больше, чем другие генералы Jouhaud, Challe или Zeller) является важнейшей для нас фигурой этого контекста. В откомандированной позиции генерала раскрылся решающий для познания проблемы партизана экзистенциальный конфликт, который должен наступить, когда регулярно сражающийся солдат не только при случае, но длительное время в надолго рассчитанной

войне должен выдерживать бой с принципиально революционно и нерегулярно сражающимся врагом.

Салан уже будучи молодым офицером узнал колониальную войну в Индокитае. Во время мировой войны 1940/44 годов он был прикомандирован к генеральному штабу колоний и оставался в этом качестве в Африке. В 1948 году он как комендант французских воинских частей прибыл в Индокитай; в 1951 году он стал высшим комиссаром Французской Республики в Северном Вьетнаме; он руководил исследованием поражения Dien-Bien-Phu в 1954 году. В ноябре 1958 года он был назначен высшим комендантом французских вооружённых сил в Алжире. До сих пор политически его можно было причислить к левым, и ещё в январе 1957 года одна тёмная организация, которую по-немецки можно назвать, вероятно, «фемгерихт» (Fehme), совершила на него опасное покушение. Но уроки войны в Индокитае и опыты алжирской партизанской войны повлияли на то, что он познал неумолимую логику партизанской войны. Шеф тогдашнего парижского правительства, Pflimlin, дал ему все полномочия. Однако 15 мая 1958 года он в решающий момент способствовал приходу к власти генерала de Gaulle. Во время публичного мероприятия в Алжире он крикнул Vive de Gaulle! Но вскоре он горько разочаровался в своём ожидании, что de Gaulle будет безусловно защищать гарантированный в конституции, территориальный суверенитет Франции над Алжиром. В 1960 году началась открытая вражда с de Gaulle. В январе 1961 года некоторые из друзей Салана основали OAS (Organisation d'Armee Secrete), чьим декларированным шефом стал Салан, и он 23 апреля поспешил в Алжир принять участие в офицерском путче. Когда этот путч уже 25 апреля 1961 года окончился провалом, OAS пробовало предпринять планомерные террористические акции, как против алжирского врага, так и против гражданского населения в Алжире и населения в самой Франции; планомерные в смысле методов так называемого психологического ведения войны современного массового террора. Террористическое предприятие претерпело решающую потерю в апреле 1962 года, с арестом Салана французской полицией. Слушание дела Высшим военным судом в Париже началось 15 мая и закончилось 23 мая 1962 года. Обвинение касалось попытки насильственного свержения легального режима и террористических актов OAS, и охватывало только период времени с апреля 1961 года до апреля 1962 года. Его приговорили не к смертной казни, но к пожизненному заключению (detention criminelle a perpetuite), поскольку суд признал за обвиняемым смягчающие вину обстоятельства.

Я кратко напомнил немецкому читателю некоторые даты. Ещё не существует истории Салана и OAS, и нам не следует вмешиваться со своими оценками и суждениями в такой глубокий, внутренний конфликт французской нации. Мы можем здесь лишь установить некоторые линии из материала, насколько он опубликован⁴¹, чтобы прояснить наш важный вопрос. Здесь напрашиваются многие параллели, касающиеся партизанства. Мы ещё возвратимся к одной из них, из чисто эвристических причин и со всей необходимой осторожностью. Аналогия между впечатлёнными испанской герильей прусскими офицерами генерального штаба 1808/13 годов и французскими генштабистами 1950/60 годов, которые опытно познали современную партизанскую войну в Индокитае и в Алжире, является ошеломляющей. Большие различия также очевидны и не требуют длинного изложения. Существует сродство в главной ситуации и во многих отдельных судьбах. Но это не должно абстрактно утрировать в том смысле, что можно отождествить все теории и конструкции побеждённых военных в мировой истории. Это было бы чепухой. И в случае с прусским генералом Людендорфом ситуация во многих существенных пунктах иная, чем в случае с лево-республиканцем Саланом. Для нас важно только прояснение теории партизана.

Во время слушания дела Высшим военным судом Салан молчал. Вначале слушания он сделал длинное объяснение, первые слова которого звучали так: Je suis le chef de l'OAS. Ma responsabilité est donc entière. В объяснении он возражал против того, что свидетели, которых он представил – в том числе президент de Gaulle – не были допрошены, и что

материал процесса ограничили временем с апреля 1961 года (офицерский путч в Алжире) по апрель 1962 года (арест Салана), благодаря чему его собственные мотивы были затушёваны и важные исторические процессы были изолированы, были отгорожены и редуцированы к типам и фактам нормального уголовного кодекса. Акты насилия OAS он называл просто ответом на ненавистнейший из всех актов насилия, который заключён в том, что люди, которые не хотят потерять свою нацию, эту нацию оберегают. Объяснение закончилось словами: «Я должен дать отчёт только тем, кто страдают и умирают за то, что они верили в нарушенное слово и в преданный долг. Теперь я буду молчать».

Салан сохранял своё молчание действительно во время всего слушания, наперекор многим, резко настойчивым вопросам обвинителя, который считал это молчание просто тактикой. Председатель Высшего военного суда после краткого указания на «нелогичность» подобного молчания рассматривал поведение обвиняемого в конце концов если не с уважением, то терпимо и не как *contempt of court*. В конце слушания Салан ответил на вопрос председателя о том, не желает ли он добавить что-нибудь в свою защиту: «Я открою рот только для того, чтобы крикнуть *Vive la France!*, а представителю обвинения я отвечу просто: *que Dieu me garde!*»⁴²

Первая часть этого заключительного замечания Салана обращена к председателю Высшего военного суда и имеет в виду ситуацию приведения в исполнения приговора о смертной казни. В этой ситуации, в момент смертной казни, Салан бы крикнул: *Vive la France!* Вторая часть обращена к представителю общественного обвинения и звучит несколько таинственно, как слова оракула. Однако дело проясняет то, что обвинитель – таким образом, какой для прокурора всё же ещё антиклерикального государства не является заурядным – стал вдруг религиозным. Он не только объявил молчание Салана высокомерием и отсутствием покаяния, чтобы выступить перед судом против признания смягчающих вину обстоятельств; он вдруг стал говорить, как он категорически выразился, как «христианин христианину», *un chretien qui s'adresse a un chretien*, и упрекал подсудимого в том, что тот благодаря отсутствию покаяния по собственной вине лишился милости милосердного христианского Бога и навлек на себя вечное проклятие. На это Салан сказал: *que Dieu me garde!* Видны бездны, над которыми разыгрываются остроумие и риторика политического процесса. Однако для нас речь не идёт о проблеме политической юстиции.⁴³ Нас интересует только прояснение комплекса вопросов, которые благодаря таким девизам как тотальная война, психологическая война, подрывная война, повстанческая война, невидимая война пришли в замешательство и изменяют проблему современного партизанства.

Война в Индокитае 1946/56 годов была «образцом широко развёрнутой современной революционной войны» (Th. Arnold, a. a. O., S. 186). Салан узнал современную партизанскую войну в лесах, джунглях и на рисовых полях Индокитая. Он узнал на собственном опыте, что индокитайские возделыватели риса могли обратить в бегство батальон первоклассных французских солдат. Он видел бедствие беженцев и узнал организованную Хо Ши Мином подпольную организацию, которая перекрывала и переигрывала легальное французское правление. С пунктуальностью и точностью генштабиста он принялся за наблюдение и исследование нового, более или менее террористического ведения войны. При этом он сразу же столкнулся с тем, что он и его товарищи называли «психологическим» ведением войны, которое наряду с военно-техническим действием свойственно современной войне. Здесь Салан мог сразу перенять систему мыслей Мао; но известно, что он также углубился в литературу об испанской герилье против Наполеона. В Алжире он находился в центре ситуации, когда 400 000 хорошо вооружённых солдат боролись против 20 000 алжирских партизан, с тем результатом, что Франция отказалась от своего суверенитета над Алжиром. Потери в человеческих жизнях у всего алжирского населения были в десять – двадцать раз больше, чем у французов, но материальные затраты французов были в десять-двадцать раз выше, чем у алжирцев. Короче говоря, Салан действительно находился со всей своей

экзистенцией как француз и солдат перед лицом *etrange paradoxe*, в логике безумия (*Irrsinnslogik*), которая могла ожесточить и привести к попытке контрудара мужественного и интеллигентного человека.⁴⁴

Аспекты и понятия последней стадии

Мы пытаемся различить в подобной, типичной для современной партизанской войны ситуации четыре разных аспекта, чтобы приобрести некоторые ясные понятия: аспект пространства, потом разрушение социальных структур, далее переплетение во всемирно-политических контекстах, и, наконец, технически-индустриальный аспект. Эта последовательность относительна и её можно изменить. Само собой понятно, что в конкретной действительности представлены не четыре друг от друга независимых области, которые можно изолировать, но только их интенсивные взаимодействия, их взаимные функциональные зависимости выявляют общую картину, так что любой разбор одного аспекта одновременно всегда содержит ссылки и импликации трёх других аспектов и наконец все они выливаются в силовое поле технически-индустриального развития.

Аспект пространства

Совершенно независимо от доброй или злой воли людей, от мирных или воинственных надобностей и целей, каждое возрастание человеческой техники продуцирует новые пространства и необозримые изменения унаследованных структур пространства. Это действительно не только для внешних, бросающихся в глаза увеличений пространства космонавтики, но и для наших старых земных пространств обитания, работы, культа и пространства свободы действий. Тезис «жилище неприкосновенно» вызывает сегодня, в эпоху электрического освещения, газопроводов, телефона, радио и телевидения, совершенно иной тип оберегания чем во времена King John (короля Иоанна Безземельного) и Magna Charta (Великой хартии вольностей) 1215 года, когда хозяин замка мог поднять подъёмный мост. О техническое возрастание человеческой эффективности ломаются целые системы норм как, например, морское право войны 19 века. Из не имеющего владельца морского дна всплывает пространство, которое находится у побережья, так называемый континентальный шельф, как новое пространство действия человека. В не имеющих владельца глубинах Тихого океана возникают бункеры для радиоактивных отходов. Индустриально-технический прогресс вместе со структурами пространства изменяет и порядки пространства. Ибо право есть единство порядка и местоположения, а проблема партизана есть проблема отношения регулярной и нерегулярной борьбы.

Современный солдат может быть настроен относительно своей личности прогрессивно-оптимистически или –пессимистически. Для нашей проблемы это не так важно. В военно-техническом отношении любой генштабист мыслит непосредственно практически и осмысленно-рационально. По сравнению с этим, исходя из войны, аспект пространства близок ему и теоретически. Структурное различие так называемого театра военных действий в сухопутной войне и в войне на море – старая тема. Воздушное пространство добавилось как новое измерение со времён Первой мировой войны, благодаря чему вместе с тем изменились прежние места действия (*Schauplatze*) земли и моря в их структуре пространства.⁴⁵ В партизанской борьбе возникает сложно структурированное новое пространство действия, поскольку партизан борется не на открытом поле сражения и не в той же плоскости открытой войны фронтов. Он скорее заставляет вступить своего врага в другое пространство. Так он добавляет к поверхности регулярного, обычного театра

военных действий другое, более тёмное измерение, измерение глубины⁴⁶, в котором носимая на показ униформа становится смертельно опасной. Таким образом он поставляет в области земного неожиданную, но поэтому не менее эффективную аналогию с подводной лодкой, которая точно также добавляла неожиданное измерение глубины к поверхности моря, на которой разыгрывалась морская война старого стиля. Он из подполья мешает обычной, регулярной игре на открытой сцене. Он, исходя из своей нерегулярности, изменяет измерения не только тактических, но и стратегических операций регулярных армий. Относительно малые группы партизан могут, благодаря использованию почвенных условий, связывать большие массы регулярных войск. Ранее мы упоминали “Paradox” на примере Алжира. Это уже ясно познал и точно описал Клаузевиц в уже цитированном (выше прим. 30) высказывании, когда он говорит, что малое количество партизан, в чьей власти некоторое пространство, могут претендовать на «название армии».

Конкретной ясности понятия служит то, что мы придерживаемся теллурически-земного характера партизана и не называем (и даже не определяем) его в качестве корсара земли. Нерегулярность пирата никак не связана ни с какой регулярностью. Напротив, корсар добывает на море военные трофеи и снабжён «письмом» правительства государства; его тип нерегулярности как-то связан с регулярностью, и так он мог быть юридически признанной фигурой европейского международного права до Парижского мира 1856 года. В этом отношении обоих, корсара морской войны и партизана сухопутной войны, можно сравнивать. Сильная похожесть и даже тождественность проявляется прежде всего в том, что тезис «С партизанами борются только партизанским способом» и другой тезис а *corsaire corsaire et demi* в основе означают одно и то же. Однако сегодняшний партизан – это нечто иное, чем корсар сухопутной войны. Для этого элементарная противоположность земли и моря остаётся слишком большой. Может быть, что унаследованные различия войны, врага и трофеев, которые доньше основывали международно-правовую противоположность земли и моря, однажды просто расплавятся в тигеле индустриально-технического прогресса. Пока что партизан означает всё ещё часть настоящей почвы; он является одним из последних постов земли как ещё не полностью уничтоженной всемирно-исторической стихии.

Уже испанская герилья против Наполеона полностью раскрывается только в важном аспекте пространства этой противоположности земли и моря. Англия поддерживала испанских партизан. Морская держава пользовалась для своих больших военных предприятий нерегулярным борцом сухопутной войны, чтобы победить континентального врага. В конце концов Наполеона заставила сложить оружие не Англия, но сухопутные державы Испания, Россия, Пруссия и Австрия. Нерегулярный, типично теллурический вид партизанской борьбы поступил на службу типично морской мировой политики, которая со своей стороны безжалостно дисквалифицировала и криминализировала любую нерегулярность на море в области права морской войны. В противоположности земли и моря конкретизируются различные виды нерегулярности, и только если мы имеем в виду конкретную особенность, обозначенные словами земля и море аспекты пространства в специфических формах их образования как понятий, только тогда аналогии позволены и плодотворны. Это действительно в первую очередь для аналогии, которая важна для нас здесь для познания аспекта пространства. А именно: аналогичным образом, как морская держава Англия в своей войне против континентальной Франции пользовалась коренным испанским партизаном, который изменял место действия сухопутной войны благодаря нерегулярному пространству; позже, во время Первой мировой войны, сухопутная держава Германия пользовалась в своей войне с морской державой Англией подводной лодкой как таким оружием, которое добавляло к прежнему пространству ведения войны на море неожиданное другое пространство. Тогдашние хозяева поверхности моря сразу же попытались дискриминировать новый вид борьбы как нерегулярное, даже преступное и пиратское средство борьбы. Сегодня, в эпоху подводных лодок с атомными ракетами

каждый видит, что и то, и другое – возмущение Наполеона испанским Guerrillero и возмущение Англии по поводу немецкой подводной лодки – лежало в одной и той же плоскости, а именно в плоскости возмущения малоценного мнения перед лицом непросчитываемых изменений пространства.

Разрушение социальных структур

Чудовищный пример разрушения социальных структур пережили французы в 1946-1956 годах в Индокитае, когда их тамошнее колониальное господство окончилось крахом. Мы уже упоминали организацию партизанской борьбы Хо Ши Мином во Вьетнаме и Лаосе. Здесь коммунисты поставили себе на службу и неполитическое гражданское население. Они руководили даже домашними слугами французских офицеров и служащих и подсобными рабочими французской службы тыла. Они взыскивали с гражданского населения налоги и совершали всякого вида террористические акты, чтобы побудить французов к анти-террору против местного населения, благодаря чему его ненависть к французам ещё более возбуждалась. Короче говоря, современная форма революционной войны ведёт ко многим новым нетрадиционным средствам и методам, чьё описание по отдельности взорвало бы рамки нашего изображения. Общество существует как *res publica*, как общественность, и оно ставится под вопрос, если в нём образуется пространство не-общественности, которое действительно дезавуирует эту общественность. Быть может, этого указания будет достаточно, чтобы осознать, что партизан, которого оттеснило профессионально военное сознание 19 века, вдруг оказался в центре нового вида ведения войны, чей смысл и чья цель была в разрушении наличного социального порядка.

В изменившейся практике взятия заложников это становится осязаемо видимым. В немецко-французской войне 1870/71 годов немецкие войска, в целях своей защиты от франтирёрров, брали знать населённого пункта в качестве заложников: бургомистр, священник, врачи и нотариусы. Почтение к таким уважаемым людям и к знати могло быть использовано для того, чтобы оказывать давление на всё население, поскольку социальный авторитет подобных типично буржуазных слоёв общества был практически вне сомнения. Именно этот буржуазный класс становится в революционной гражданской войне коммунизма подлинным врагом. Тот, кто использует таких уважаемых людей в качестве заложников, работает, судя по ситуации, на коммунистическую сторону. Для коммуниста подобного рода взятия заложников могут быть настолько целесообразны, что он их, если нужно, провоцирует – или для уничтожения определённого буржуазного слоя общества, или для привлечения его на коммунистическую сторону. В уже названной книге о партизане эта новая действительность хорошо познана. В партизанской войне, говорится там, действительное взятие заложников возможно только по отношению к самим партизанам или к их ближайшим соратникам. Иначе будут создавать только новых партизан. Наоборот, для партизан каждый солдат регулярной армии, каждый носитель униформы является заложником. «Каждый человек в униформе, - говорит Рольф Шроерс, - должен чувствовать угрозу, и тем самым под угрозой должно быть всё, что униформа представляет как девиз».47

Нужно лишь до конца продумать эту логику террора и анти-террора и потом перенести её на любой вид гражданской войны, чтобы увидеть разрушение социальных структур, которое сегодня в действии. Достаточно небольшого числа террористов, чтобы оказывать давление на большие массы людей. К узкому пространству открытого террора прибавляются дальнейшие пространства ненадёжности, страха и всеобщего недоверия, «ландшафт измены», которое представила Margret Boveri в ряде из четырёх захватывающих книг.48 Все народы европейского континента – с парой маленьких

исключений – испытали это на собственной шкуре в течение двух мировых войн и двух послевоенных эпох как новую действительность.

Всемирно-политический контекст

Точно так же наш третий аспект, переплетение во всемирно-политических фронтах и контекстах, давно овладел всеобщим сознанием. Автохтонные защитники родной почвы, которые умирали *pro aris et focus*, национальные и патриотические герои, уходившие в лес, всё, что было реакцией стихийной, теллурической силы против чужого вторжения, между тем попало под интернациональное и наднациональное центральное управление, которое помогает и поддерживает, но только в интересах совершенно иного рода всемирно-агрессивных целей, и которое, сообразно с обстоятельствами, защищает или бросает на произвол судьбы. Тогда партизан утрачивает свой существенно оборонительный характер. Он становится манипулируемым орудием всемирно-революционной агрессивности. Он просто приносится в жертву и обманом лишается всего того, за что он поднимался на борьбу и в чём был укоренён теллурический характер, легитимность его партизанской нерегулярности.

Каким-то образом партизан как нерегулярный боец всегда зависим от помощи регулярного могущества. Этот аспект дела всегда наличествует и также осознаётся. Испанский Guerrillero обретал свою легитимность в своей обороне и в своём согласии с королевской властью и с нацией; он защищал родную почву от чужого завоевателя. Но Веллингтон также относится к испанской герилье, и борьба против Наполеона велась при помощи Англии. Полный ярости, Наполеон часто вспоминал о том, что Англия была настоящим подстрекателем и собственно тем, кто извлекал пользу из испанской партизанской войны. Сегодня связь осознаётся ещё более отчётливо, поскольку непрерывное усиление технических боевых средств делает партизана зависимым от постоянной помощи союзника, который обладает технически-индустриальными ресурсами, чтобы развивать и обеспечивать партизана новейшим оружием и новейшими машинами.

Если многие заинтересованные третьи лица конкурируют друг с другом, партизан обладает свободным пространством для собственной политики. Таково было положение Тито в последние годы мировой войны. В партизанских битвах, которые разыгрывались во Вьетнаме и Лаосе, ситуация осложняется тем, что внутри самого коммунизма стало актуальным противоречие русской и китайской политики. При поддержке Пекина можно было забросить больше партизан через Лаос в Северный Вьетнам; это было бы более сильной помощью вьетнамскому коммунизму, чем поддержка Москвы. Вождь освободительной войны против Франции, Хо Ши Мин, был сторонником Москвы. Более сильная помощь решит исход дела, будь-то выбор между Москвой и Пекином или другие альтернативы в создавшемся положении.

Для подобных интенсивно-политических связей выше цитированная книга о партизане Рольфа Шроерса находит меткую формулу; там говорится о заинтересованном третьем лице. Это удачное выражение. Ибо это заинтересованное третье лицо здесь не какая-то банальная фигура, как третий смеющийся из поговорки. Оно скорее существенно относится к ситуации партизана и поэтому и к теории партизана. Могущественный третий поставляет не только оружие и боеприпасы, деньги, материальную помощь и всякого рода медикаменты, он создаёт и род политического признания, в котором нуждается нерегулярно борющийся партизан, чтобы не опуститься, как разбойник и как пират, в Неполитическое, это значит здесь: в криминальное. С расчётом на далёкое будущее нерегулярное должно получить легитимность в регулярном; а для этого у нерегулярного есть только две возможности: признание наличествующего регулярного, или осуществление новой регулярности собственными силами. Это жестокая альтернатива.

В той мере, в какой партизан моторизируется, он теряет свою почву и растёт его зависимость от технически-индустриальных средств, в которых он нуждается для своей борьбы. Тем самым растёт также власть заинтересованного третьего, так что она в конце концов достигает планетарного масштаба. Все аспекты, в которых мы до сих пор рассматривали сегодняшнее партизанство, кажется тем самым растворяются во всё покоряющем техническом аспекте.

Технический аспект

И партизан не остаётся в стороне от развития, прогресса, от современной техники и свойственной ей науке. Старый партизан, в руки которому прусский эдикт о ландштурме 1813 года хотел вложить вилы для сена, сегодня кажется смешным. Современный партизан сражается при помощи автоматов, ручных гранат, пластиковых бомб, и, вероятно, скоро с помощью тактического атомного оружия. Он моторизован и связан с информационной сетью, оснащён тайными радиопередатчиками и радарными. Он снабжается самолётами оружием и продовольствием. Но его, как сегодня, в 1962 году, во Вьетнаме, подавляют вертолётами и блокируют. Как он сам, так и его враги не отстают от стремительного развития современной техники и свойственного ей вида науки.

Один английский специалист в области военно-морских сил назвал пиратство «донаучной стадией» войны на море. В этом же духе он должен был бы определить партизана как донаучную стадию ведения войны на суше, и объявить это единственно научной дефиницией. Но и это его определение сразу опять научно устаревает, ибо различие между войной на море и войной на суше само попадает в вихрь технического прогресса и сегодня представляется техникам уже как нечто донаучное, то есть исчерпанное. Мертвецы скачут быстро, а если они моторизованы, они движутся ещё быстрее. Партизан, чьего теллурического характера мы придерживаемся, в любом случае становится скандалом для каждого преследующего рациональные цели и ценностно-рационально мыслящего человека. Партизан провоцирует прямо-таки технократический аффект. Парадоксальность его существования раскрывает несоответствие: индустриально-техническое приращение вооружению современной регулярной армии вида совершенства и доиндустриальная аграрная примитивность успешно борющихся партизан. Это уже вызывало припадки бешенства у Наполеона в связи с испанским Guerillero и должно было ещё соответственно усилиться с поступательным развитием индустриальной техники.

Пока партизан был только «лёгким отрядом», тактически особенно мобильным гусаром или стрелком, его теория была делом военно-научной специальности. Только революционная война сделала его ключевой фигурой мировой истории. Но что получится из него в эпоху атомных средств уничтожения? В технически насквозь организованном мире исчезают старые, феодально-аграрные формы и представления о борьбе, о войне и о вражде. Это очевидно. Исчезают ли поэтому вообще и борьба, война и вражда и умалются ли они до социальных конфликтов? Когда без остатка осуществлена внутренняя, по оптимистическому мнению имманентная рациональность и регулярность технически насквозь организованного мира, тогда партизан, быть может, уже не является нарушителем спокойствия. Тогда он просто исчезает сам собою в бесперебойном выполнении технически-функциональных процессов, не иначе, чем исчезает собака с автострады. Для технически настроенной фантазии он тогда едва ли ещё является полицейски-транспортной проблемой, и впрочем не является ни философской, ни моральной или юридической проблемой.

Это был бы один, а именно технико-оптимистический аспект чисто технического рассмотрения. Он ожидает Нового Мира с Новым Человеком. С подобными ожиданиями, как известно, выступило уже раннее христианство, а два тысячелетия позже, в 19 веке,

социализм выступил как Новое христианство. У обоих явлений отсутствовало всё уничтожающее efficiency современных технических средств. Но из чистой техники проистекает, как всегда у таких чисто технических рефлексий, не теория партизана, а только оптимистический или пессимистический ряд плюровалентных полаганий ценности или отсутствия ценности. Ценность, как метко говорит Эрнст Форстхоф, имеет «свою собственную логику».49 Это именно логика отсутствия ценности и уничтожения носителя этого отсутствия ценности.

Что касается прогнозов широко распространённого техницистского оптимизма, то он не лезет в карман за словом, то есть за ему очевидным полаганием ценности и отсутствия ценности. Он верит в то, что неудержимое, индустриально-техническое развитие человечества само собою переведёт на полностью новый уровень все проблемы, все прежние вопросы и ответы, все прежние типы и ситуации. На этом уровне старые вопросы, типы и ситуации будут практически столь же неважны, как вопросы, типы и ситуации каменного века после перехода к более высокой культуре. Тогда партизаны вымрут, как вымерли охотники каменного века, если им не удастся выжить и ассимилироваться. В любом случае они стали безвредными и неважными.

Но как удастся человеческому типу, который прежде поставлял партизана, приспособиться к технико-индустриальному окружающему миру, воспользоваться новыми средствами и развить новый, приспособленный вид партизан, скажем индустриальных партизан? Есть ли гарантия того, что современные средства уничтожения всегда будут попадать в верные руки и что нерегулярная борьба будет невообразимой? В противоположность тому оптимизму прогресса у пессимизма прогресса и у его технических фантазий остаётся большее, чем сегодня обычно думают, поле возможностей. В тени сегодняшнего атомного равновесия мировых держав, под стеклянным колпаком, так сказать, их громадных средств уничтожения, могло бы выделиться свободное пространство ограниченной и оберегаемой войны, с обычным оружием и даже со средствами уничтожения, о дозировании которых мировые державы могли бы открыто или тайно договориться. Это бы могло дать в итоге войну, контролируемую одной из этих мировых держав и было бы чем-то подобным dogfight.50 Это было бы по-видимости невинной игрой точно контролируемой нерегулярности и «идеального беспорядка», идеального в той мере, в какой им могли бы манипулировать мировые державы.

Наряду с этим существует, однако, и радикально-пессимистическое tabula-rasa-решение технической фантазии. В обработанной современными средствами уничтожения области конечно всё будет убито, друг и враг, регулярный солдат и нерегулярное население. Тем не менее, технически можно помыслить, что некоторые люди переживут ночь бомб и ракет. Перед лицом этой возможности было бы практически и даже рационально целесообразно, вместе запланировать ситуацию после бомбёжек и уже сегодня подготовить людей, которые в бомбами разорённой зоне сразу же займут воронки от бомб и оккупируют разрушенную область. Тогда новый вид партизана мог бы добавить к мировой истории новую главу с новым видом взятия пространства.

Так наша проблема расширяется до планетарных размеров. Она даже вырастает до над-планетарного. Технический прогресс делает возможным полёт в пространства космоса, и тем самым попутно открываются неизмеримые, новые вызовы для политических завоеваний. Ибо новые пространства могут и должны быть взяты людьми. За взятиями суши и моря старого стиля, как их знает прежняя история человечества, последуют взятия пространства нового стиля. Однако за взятием следуют деление и использование. В этом отношении, несмотря на весь прочий прогресс, всё остаётся по-старому. Технический прогресс вызовет лишь новую интенсивность нового взятия, деления и использования и только ещё усилит старые вопросы.

При сегодняшнем противоречии Востока и Запада, и особенно в гигантском состязании за неизмеримо большие новые пространства, прежде всего речь идет о политической

власти на нашей планете, как бы мала она между тем не показалась. Только тот, кто владеет ставшей будто бы такой крошечной Землёй, будет брать и использовать новые пространства. Вследствие этого и эти неизмеримые области являются ничем иным как потенциальными пространствами борьбы, а именно борьбы за господство на этой Земле. Знаменитые астронавты или космонавты, которые до сих пор были назначаемы только пропагандистскими звёздными величинами масс-медиа, прессы, радио и телевидения, тогда будут иметь шанс превратиться в космопиратов и, быть может, даже и в космопартизан.

Легальность и легитимность

В развитии партизанства нам встретилась фигура генерала Салана как показательное, симптоматическое явление последней стадии. В этой фигуре встречаются и пересекаются опыты и воздействия войны регулярных армий, колониальной войны, гражданской войны и партизанской борьбы. Салан до конца продумал все эти опыты, следуя неизбежной логике старого тезиса, что партизана можно побороть только партизанским образом. Это он последовательно делал, не только с мужеством солдата, но и с точностью офицера генерального штаба и пунктуальностью технократа. Результатом было то, что он сам превратился в партизана и, в конце концов, провозгласил гражданскую войну своим собственным верховным главнокомандующим и своим правительством.

Что является внутренним средоточием такой судьбы? Главный защитник Салана, Maitre Tixier-Vignancourt, в своей большой заключительной речи перед судом от 23 мая 1962 года нашёл формулировку, в которой содержится ответ на наш вопрос. Он замечает о деятельности Салана как шефа OAS: я должен констатировать, что старый воинствующий коммунист, если бы он вместо главного военного шефа стоял во главе организации, предпринял бы иные действия, чем генерал Салан (S. 530 отчёта о процессе). Тем самым угадан решающий пункт: профессиональный революционер делал бы это иначе. Он занимал бы иную позицию, чем Салан не только применительно к заинтересованному третьему лицу.

Развитие теории партизана от Клаузевица через Ленина к Мао двигалось вперёд путём диалектики регулярного и нерегулярного, кадрового офицера и профессионального революционера. Посредством доктрины психологической войны, которую французские офицеры – участники войны в Индокитае - переняли от Мао, развитие не возвращалось в роде *ricorso* к началу и к истокам. Здесь нет никакого возврата к началу. Партизан может надеть униформу и превратиться в хорошего регулярного бойца, даже в особенно храброго регулярного бойца, быть может, подобно тому, как о браконьере говорят, что он представляет собой особенно умелого лесного сторожа. Но всё это помыслено абстрактно. Переработка учения Мао теми французскими кадровыми офицерами на деле содержит в себе нечто абстрактное и, как это однажды было сказано в ходе процесса над Саланом, имеет нечто от *esprit geometrique*.

Партизан способен легко превратиться в хорошего носителя униформы; напротив, для хорошего кадрового офицера униформа - это нечто большее, чем костюм. Регулярное может стать институциональной профессией, нерегулярное не может. Кадровый офицер способен превратиться в великого основателя ордена, как святой Игнатий Лойола. Превращение в до- или субтрадиционное означает нечто иное. В темноте можно исчезнуть, но превратить темноту в район боевых действий, исходя из которого прежняя арена империи разрушается и вынимается из сети большая сцена официальной публичности, - этого не организуешь с технократической интеллигенцией. Ахеронт невозможно просчитать заранее и он следует не каждому заклинанию, пусть оно исходит от такой умной головы и пусть она находится в такой отчаянной ситуации.

В нашу задачу не входит высчитывать, что вычисляли интеллигентные и опытные военные времён путча в Алжире апреля 1961 года и организаторы OAS со ссылкой на некоторые для них весьма естественные конкретные вопросы, особенно относительно действия террористических актов против цивилизованного европейского населения или относительно выше упоминавшегося заинтересованного третьего. Уже этот последний вопрос достаточно многозначителен как вопрос. Мы напомнили о том, что партизан нуждается в легитимации, если он хочет держаться в сфере политического и не хочет упасть в сферу криминального. Вопрос не исчерпывается некоторыми ставшими сегодня обычными дешёвыми и несерьёзными антитезами легальности и легитимности. Ибо легальность оказывается именно в этом случае самой сильной законностью – тем, чем она первоначально собственно была для республиканца, а именно рациональной, прогрессивной, единственно современной, одним словом: высшей формой самой легитимности.

Я не хотел бы повторять то, что я уже больше тридцати лет назад сказал на эту всё ещё актуальную тему. Ссылка на это принадлежит к познанию ситуации республиканского генерала Салана в 1958/61 годах. Французская республика это режим господства закона; это её фундамент, когда её невозможно разрушить противопоставлением права и закона и отличием права как более высокой инстанции. Как юстиция, так и армия стоят выше закона. Имеется республиканская легальность, и именно это является в республике единственной формой легитимности. Всё остальное является для настоящего республиканца враждебным республике софизмом. Представитель общественного обвинения на процессе Салана соответственно этому имел простую и ясную позицию; он всё снова и снова ссылался на «суверенитет закона», который остаётся превосходящим любую другую мыслимую инстанцию или норму. По сравнению с этим суверенитетом закона не существует суверенитета права. Он превращает нерегулярность партизана в смертельную нелегальность.

Салан вопреки этому не имел другого аргумента чем указание на то, что и он сам 15 мая 1958 года способствовал генералу de Gaulle в достижении власти [и в борьбе] против тогдашнего легального правительства, что он тогда был обязан перед своей совестью, своим Pairs, своим отечеством и перед Богом и теперь, в 1962 году, видит себя обманутым во всём том, что в мае 1958 года было провозглашено и обещано как святое (отчёт о процессе, S. 85). Он ссылался на нацию в противоположность государству, на более высокий вид легитимности в противоположность легальности. И генерал de Gaulle раньше часто говорил о традиционной и национальной легитимности и противопоставлял их республиканской легальности. Это изменилось с наступлением мая 1958 года. И тот факт, что его собственная легальность стала несомненной только со времени референдума сентября 1958 года, ничего не изменила в том, что он самое позднее с того сентября 1958 года имел на своей стороне республиканскую легальность и Салан видел себя вынужденным, занимать сомнительную для солдата позицию, ссылаться вопреки регулярности на нерегулярность и превращать регулярную армию в партизанскую организацию.

Однако нерегулярность сама по себе ничего не конституирует. Она становится просто нелегальностью. Впрочем сегодня бесспорен кризис закона и тем самым кризис легальности. Классическое понятие закона, одно сохранение которого способно держать республиканскую легальность, ставится под вопрос планом и мероприятием. В Германии ссылка на право в противоположность закону и у самих юристов стала само собой разумеющимся делом, которое едва ли ещё обращает на себя внимание. И не-юристы сегодня говорят всегда просто легитимно (а не легально), если они хотят сказать, что они правы. Однако случай Салана показывает, что в современном государстве даже сама подвергнутая сомнению легальность сильнее чем любой иной вид права. Это объясняется децизионистской силой государства и его превращением права в закон. Здесь нам нет нужды углубляться в этот вопрос.⁵¹ Быть может всё это совершенно изменится, когда

государство однажды «отомрёт». Пока что легальность является неотразимым функциональным модусом каждой современной, государственной армии. Легальное правительство решает, кто является врагом, против которого должна бороться армия. Тот, кто берётся определять то, кто враг, притязает на собственную, новую легальность, если он не желает присоединиться к определению врага прежним легальным правлением.

Настоящий враг

Объявление войны всегда есть объявление врага; это само собой разумеется; а при объявлении гражданской войны это тем более подразумевается. Когда Салан объявил гражданскую войну, он в действительности провозглашал двух врагов: в отношении алжирского фронта продолжение регулярной и нерегулярной войны; в отношении французского правительства начало нелегальной и нерегулярной гражданской войны. Ничто иное не проясняет безвыходность ситуации Салана так отчётливо, как рассмотрение этого двойного объявления врага. Каждая война на два фронта вызывает вопрос, кто же на деле является настоящим врагом. Не знак ли это внутреннего раздвоения – иметь больше одного единственного настоящего врага? Враг – это наш собственный вопрос как гештальт. Если собственный гештальт однозначно определён, откуда тогда берётся удвоение врага? Враг – это не нечто такое, что по какой-либо причине должно быть устранено и из-за своей малоценности уничтожено. Враг находится в моей собственной сфере. По этой причине я должен столкнуться с ним в борьбе для того, чтобы обрести собственную меру, собственные границы, собственный образ и облик.

Салан считал алжирского партизана абсолютным врагом. Внезапно в его тылу возник гораздо более скверный для него, более интенсивный враг – собственное правительство, собственный начальник, собственный брат. В своих вчерашних собратях он внезапно увидел нового врага. Это суть случая Салана. Вчерашний брат раскрылся как более опасный враг. В самом понятии врага должна заключаться путаница, которая тесно связана с учением о войне и прояснением которой мы займёмся теперь, в конце нашего изложения.

Историк найдёт для всех исторических ситуаций примеры и параллели в мировой истории. Мы уже обозначили параллели с процессами 1812/13 годов прусской истории. Мы также показали, как в идеях и планах прусской реформы армии 1808/13 годов партизан обрёл свою философскую легитимацию, а в прусском эдикте о ландштурме апреля 1813 года – свой исторический аккредитив. Так что теперь не должно показаться странным, как было бы на первый взгляд, если мы для лучшей разработки главного вопроса привлечём в качестве примера ситуацию прусского генерала Йорка зимы 1812-1813 годов. Вначале в глаза конечно бросаются громадные противоположности: Салан, француз левореспубликанского происхождения и современно-технократической чеканки, против генерала императорской прусской армии 1812 года, который определённо не мог прийти к мысли объявить своему императору и высшему военачальнику гражданскую войну. Перед лицом таких различий эпох и типов представляется второстепенным и даже случайным, что и Йорк воевал офицером в колониях Ост-Индии. Впрочем, именно бросающиеся в глаза противоположности тем более отчётливо проясняют то, что главный вопрос тот же самый. Ибо в обоих случаях речь шла о том, чтобы решить, кто был настоящий враг.

Децизионистская точность господствует в функционировании каждой современной организации, в особенности в функционировании каждой современной, регулярной государственной армии. При этом главный вопрос для ситуации сегодняшнего генерала весьма точно предстаёт как абсолютное Или-или. Резкая альтернатива легальности и легитимности – это лишь следствие французской революции и её столкновения с

реставрацией легитимной монархии 1815 года. В такой дореволюционной легитимной монархии, как тогдашняя королевская Пруссия многие феодальные элементы сохраняли связь начальства и подчинения. Верность ещё не стала чем-то «иррациональным» и ещё не растворилась в простом, исчислимом функционализме. Пруссия уже тогда была чётко выраженным государством; её армия не могла отречься от фридрицианского происхождения; прусские реформаторы армии хотели модернизировать, а не возвращаться к каким-либо формам феодализма. Тем не менее обстановка и среда легитимной прусской монархии того времени может показаться сегодняшнему наблюдателю и в конфликтном случае менее острой и резкой, менее децизионистско-государственной. Об этом сейчас не требуется спорить. Дело заключается только в том, что впечатления различных одеяний эпох не стирают главный вопрос, именно вопрос о настоящем враге.

Йорк в 1812 году командовал прусским вспомогательным корпусом, который как союзный Наполеону отряд принадлежал к армии французского генерала Макдональда. В декабре 1812 года Йорк перешёл на сторону врага, на сторону русских, и заключил с русским генералом фон Дибичем известную Таурогенскую конвенцию. Во время переговоров и при заключении конвенции с русской стороны в качестве посредника принимал участие подполковник фон Клаузевиц. Письмо, которое Йорк 3 января 1813 года направил своему королю и верховному главнокомандующему, стало знаменитым историческим документом. Это справедливо. Прусский генерал с большим почтением пишет, что он ожидает от короля суждения о том, может ли он, Йорк, сражаться «против настоящего врага», или же король осуждает поступок своего генерала. Он преданно ожидает ответа, готовый, в случае порицания, «ждать пули на поле битвы».

Слова о «настоящем враге» достойны Клаузевица и схватывают суть. То, что генерал готов «ждать пули на поле битвы», относится к солдату, который отвечает за свой поступок, не иначе чем генерал Салан был готов крикнуть *Vive la France!* в окопах Vincennes перед расстрелом. Однако то, что Йорк, при всём почтении к королю, оставляет за собой право решать, кто является «настоящим врагом», - придаёт его словам подлинный, трагический и бунтарский смысл. Йорк не был партизаном и, пожалуй, никогда бы им не стал. Но в горизонте смысла и понятия настоящего врага шаг в партизанство не был бы ни абсурдным, ни непоследовательным.

Конечно это только эвристическая фикция, допустимая на краткое мгновение, когда прусские офицеры возвысили партизана до идеи, то есть только на это поворотное время, которое привело к эдикту о ландштурме 13 апреля 1813 года. Уже спустя несколько месяцев мысль, что прусский генерал мог бы стать партизаном, стала бы даже как эвристическая фикция гротескна и абсурдна и оставалась бы такою навсегда, покуда существовала прусская армия. Как было возможно то, что партизан, который в 17 веке опустился до *Pisago* (плута) и в 18 веке принадлежал лёгкому, подвижному отряду, в канун 1813 года на краткое мгновение предстал героической фигурой, чтобы затем в наше время, более ста лет спустя, стать даже ключевой фигурой в международных событиях?

Ответ на этот вопрос явствует из того, что нерегулярность партизана остаётся зависимой от смысла и содержания конкретно регулярного. После разложения и распада в Германии 17 века, в 18 веке развилась регулярность войн по династическим причинам. Эта регулярность придала войне настолько сильные оберегания, что война могла рассматриваться как игра, в которой нерегулярно участвовал лёгкий, подвижный отряд и враг как просто конвенциональный враг стал партнёром в военной игре. Испанская герилья началась, когда Наполеон осенью 1808 года разгромил регулярную испанскую армию. Здесь имелось различие с Пруссией 1806-1807 годов, которая после поражения своей регулярной армии тотчас же заключила унизительный мир. Испанский партизан снова восстановил серьёзность войны, а именно в противоположность Наполеону, соответственно на стороне обороны старых европейских континентальных государств, чья

старая, ставшая конвенцией и игрой регулярность показала себя не на высоте новой, революционно заряженной, наполеоновской регулярности. Враг тем самым вновь стал настоящим врагом, война – снова настоящей войной. Партизан, защищающий национальную почву от чужого завоевателя, стал героем, который по-настоящему боролся против настоящего врага. Это был в самом деле важный процесс, который привёл Клаузевица к его теории и к учению о войне. Когда потом сто лет спустя теория войны такого профессионального революционера, как Ленин слепо разрушила все унаследованные оберегания войны, война стала абсолютной войной и партизан стал носителем абсолютной вражды против абсолютного врага.

От настоящего врага к врагу абсолютному

В теории войны всё время идёт речь о различении вражды, которая даёт войне её смысл и её характер. Каждая попытка оберегания или ограничения войны должна быть исполнена сознания, что – в отношении к понятию войны – вражда является первичным понятием, и что различению разных видов войны предшествует различение разных видов вражды. Иначе все старания оберегания или ограничения войны – это лишь игра, которая оказывается несостоятельной перед взрывами настоящей вражды. После наполеоновских войн нерегулярная война была вытеснена из всеобщего сознания европейских теологов, философов и юристов. Действительно имелись сторонники мира, которые усматривали в отмене и ликвидации конвенциональной войны Гаагского устава сухопутной войны конец войны вообще; и имелись юристы, которые каждое учение о справедливой войне считали чем-то *eo ipso* справедливым, поскольку уже святой Фома Аквинский учил о чём-то подобном. Никто не подозревал, что означало раскрепощение, высвобождение нерегулярной войны. Никто не думал, какие следствия будет иметь победа гражданских над солдатом, когда однажды гражданин наденет униформу, в то время как партизан её снимет, чтобы продолжать борьбу без униформы.

Только этот дефицит конкретного мышления завершил разрушительную работу профессиональных революционеров. Это было большим несчастьем, ибо с теми обереганиями войны европейскому человечеству удалось достичь чего-то редкого: отказа от криминализации противника в войне, итак релятивизации вражды, отрицания абсолютной вражды. Это в самом деле нечто редкое, даже невероятно гуманное – привести людей к тому, что они отказываются от дискриминации и диффамации своих врагов.

Именно это, как представляется, снова поставлено под вопрос партизаном. К его критериям принадлежит крайняя интенсивность политической ангажированности. Когда Че Гевара говорит: «Партизан – это иезуит войны», то он имеет в виду безусловность политического применения. Биография каждого знаменитого партизана, начиная с Ерресинадо, подтверждает это. Во вражде незаконно сделанное ищет своё право. В ней оно находит смысл дела и смысл права, когда рушится скорлупа защиты и повиновения, где оно до сих пор обитало, или разрывает ткань норм легальности, от которой оно до сих пор могло ожидать права и правовой защиты. Тогда прекращается конвенциональная, традиционная игра. Но это прекращение правовой защиты не обязательно является партизанством. Михаэль Колхас (Michael Kohlhaas), которого чувство права сделало разбойником и убийцей, не был партизаном, поскольку он не стал политически ангажированным и боролся исключительно за своё собственное нарушенное частное право, не против чужого завоевателя и не за революционное дело. В таких случаях нерегулярность является неполитической и становится чисто криминальной, так как теряет позитивную связь с где-нибудь имеющейся регулярностью. Этим партизан отличается от – благородного или неблагородного – предводителя разбойников.

При разборе всемирно-политического контекста (выше с.) мы подчёркивали, что заинтересованный третий берёт на себя существенную функцию, когда он вступает в отношение к регулярному, которое необходимо нерегулярности партизана для того, чтобы оставаться в области политического. Ядро, сущность Политического – это не просто вражда, но различие друга и врага, Политическое предполагает обоих, друга и врага. Заинтересованный в партизанах могущественный третий может эгоистически думать и действовать; со своим интересом политически он находится на стороне партизана. Это имеет следствием политическую дружбу и является видом политического признания, даже если дело не доходит до гласных и официальных признаний как воюющей партии или как правительства. Еmpesinado был признан своим народом, регулярной армией и великой английской державой как политическая величина. Он не был Михаэлем Колхасом и не был Шиндерханнесом (прозвище главаря разбойников, умершего в 1808 году), чьим заинтересованным третьим были покровители преступников. Напротив, политическая ситуация Салана была окрашена полным отчаяния трагизмом, ибо он внутривнутриполитически, на своей родине, стал нелегальным, а снаружи, в мировой политике, не только не нашёл никакого заинтересованного третьего, но, напротив, натолкнулся на твёрдый вражеский фронт антиколониализма.

Итак, враг партизана – настоящий враг, но не абсолютный враг. Это следует из политического характера партизана. Другая граница вражды явствует из теллурического характера партизана. Он защищает участок земли, с которым он автохтонно связан. Его основная позиция остаётся оборонительной, несмотря на усилившуюся подвижность его тактики. Он ведёт себя точно так же, как святая Иоанна Орлеанская перед церковным судом. Она не была партизанкой и регулярным образом боролась против англичан. Когда церковный судья задал ей вопрос – теологический вопрос-ловушку – не будет ли она утверждать, что Бог ненавидит англичан, она ответила: «О том, любит ли Бог англичан или же ненавидит их, я не знаю; я знаю только, что они должны быть изгнаны из Франции». Такой ответ дал бы каждый нормальный партизан – защитник национальной почвы. С таким оборонительным характером дано и принципиальное ограничение вражды. Настоящий враг не объявляется абсолютным врагом, и не провозглашается последним врагом человечества вообще.⁵²

Ленин перенёс понятийный центр тяжести с войны на политику, то есть на различие друга и врага. Это было рационально и после Клаузевица являлось последовательным продолжением мысли о войне как продолжении политики. Только Ленин как профессиональный революционер, охваченный идеей всемирной гражданской войны, пошёл дальше и сделал из настоящего врага абсолютного врага. Клаузевиц говорил об абсолютной войне, но всё ещё предполагал как условие регулярность наличной государственности. Он вообще ещё не мог представить себе государство как инструмент партии и партию, которая приказывает государству. С абсолютным полаганием партии и партизан стал абсолютным и возвысился до носителя абсолютной вражды. Сегодня нетрудно увидеть идейный искусный приём, вызвавший это изменение понятия врага. Напротив сегодня гораздо сложнее оспорить иной вид абсолютного полагания врага, поскольку этот вид полагания представляется имманентным наличной действительности атомной эпохи.

Ибо технически-индустриальное развитие усилило вооружения людей до чистых средств уничтожения. Тем самым создаётся вызывающая несоразмерность защиты и повиновения: одна половина человечества становится заложником для другой половины повелителей, вооружённых атомными средствами уничтожения. Такие абсолютные средства уничтожения требуют абсолютного врага, если они не должны быть абсолютно нечеловеческими. Ведь уничтожают не средства уничтожения сами по себе, но люди уничтожают этими средствами других людей. Английский философ Томас Гоббс схватил суть процесса уже в 17 веке (de homine IX, 3) и сформулировал её со всей точностью, хотя тогда (1659) вооружения были ещё сравнительно безобидными. Гоббс говорит: человек

так же гораздо более опасен для других людей, которые, как ему кажется, ему угрожают, чем любое животное, как вооружения человека опаснее, чем так называемые естественные орудия зверя, к примеру: зубы, лапы, рога или яд. А немецкий философ Гегель добавляет: оружие есть сущность самого борца.

Конкретно говоря, это значит: супраконвенциональное оружие предполагает супраконвенционального человека. Оно не только предполагает его как постулат далёкого будущего; оно скорее допускает его как уже наличную действительность. Итак, последняя опасность заключается не в наличии средств уничтожения и не в дорациональном зле человека. Она состоит в неизбежности морального принуждения, насилия. Люди, применяющие те средства против других людей, принуждены и морально уничтожать этих других людей, то есть своих жертв и свои объекты. Они должны объявить противную сторону в целом преступной и нечеловеческой, тотальной малоценностью. Иначе они сами являются преступниками и чудовищами, нелюдьми. Логика ценности и малоценности развёртывает всю свою уничтожающую последовательность и вынуждает всё новые, всё более глубокие дискриминации, криминализации и обесценения вплоть до уничтожения всякой не имеющей ценности жизни.

В мире, в котором партнёры таким образом взаимно врываються в бездну тотального обесценения, перед тем как они физически уничтожат друг друга, должны возникнуть новые виды абсолютной вражды. Вражда станет настолько страшной, что, вероятно, нельзя будет больше говорить о враге или вражде и обе эти вещи даже с соблюдением всех правил прежде будут запрещены и прокляты до того как сможет начаться дело уничтожения. Уничтожение будет тогда совершенно абстрактным и совершенно абсолютным. Оно более вообще не направлено против врага, но служит только так называемому объективному осуществлению высших ценностей, для которых, как известно никакая цена не является слишком высокой. Лишь отрицание настоящей вражды открывает свободный путь для дела уничтожения абсолютной вражды.

В 1914 году народы и правительства Европы без абсолютной вражды нетвёрдо стоя на ногах, с закружившейся головой вступили в Первую мировую войну. Настоящая вражда возникла только из самой войны, которая началась как традиционная война государств европейского международного права и окончилась всемирной гражданской войной революционной классовой вражды. Кто предотвратит то, что аналогичным, но ещё бесконечно усилившимся образом неожиданно возникнут новые виды вражды, чьё осуществление вызовет нежданные формы проявления нового партизанства?

Теоретик не может делать больше того, чтобы хранить понятия и называть вещи своими именами. Теория партизана выливается в понятие политического, в вопрос о настоящем враге и о новом номосе Земли.

Перевод с немецкого Ю.Ю. Коринца

КОНТИНЕНТАЛЬНЫЙ БЛОК: БЕРЛИН-МОСКВА-ТОКИО

Нет сомнения, что наиболее грандиозным и важным событием в современной мировой политике является перспектива образования могущественного континентального блока, который объединил бы Европу с Севером и Востоком Азии.

Но проекты такого масштаба не рождаются лишь в голове у того или иного государственного деятеля, будь он столь же велик, как обладавшая способностью перевоплощаться знаменитая греческая богиня войны. Осведомленные люди знают, что такие планы готовятся в течение долгого времени. И именно в силу этого обстоятельства я охотно принимаю предложение нашей географической школы, избравшей именно меня из представителей старшего поколения в науке для того, чтобы привести свидетельства формирования континентальной евроазиатской политики — ведь уже много лет, начиная с первых рискованных попыток установления дружеских, а впоследствии и союзных отношений, я предпринимаю систематические исследования этого вопроса, позволявшие мне постоянно следить (подчас непосредственно присутствуя при образовании этих политических объединений) за кузницей судьбы, а иногда и вносить в нее свой скромный вклад.

Прежде всего необходимо усвоить один из принципов геополитики, который был впервые сформулирован еще в далекие времена зарождения римского государства и с тех пор не утративший своей актуальности: «*Fas est ab hoste doceri*» («Учиться у противника — священный долг»).

Вскоре после рождения важных политических образований у потенциального противника появляется инстинкт близкой угрозы, то самое симптоматическое чувство, которое замечательный японский социолог Г.Е.Вишара приписывает всему своему народу и которое позволяет японцам издалека видеть приближение какой-либо опасности. Такая национальная характеристика, вне сомнения, весьма драгоценна. Как бы то ни было, первыми едва появившуюся на горизонте возможность создания евроазиатского континентального блока, чреватого угрозой мировому англосаксонскому господству, увидели как раз английские и американские руководители, в то время, как мы во Втором Райхе не составили себе никакого представления о том, что можно извлечь из соединения Центральной Европы и могущественного потенциала Восточной Азии через необъятную Евразию. Лорд Пальмерстон, один из наиболее жестких и удачливых империалистических политиков, первым сказал премьер-министру, отстранившему его от должности во время правительственного кризиса: «Наши отношения с Францией теперь могут стать несколько натянутыми, но мы должны их сохранить любой ценой, ибо на заднем плане нам угрожает Россия, которая может соединить Европу и Восточную Азию, и одни мы не сможем этому противостоять». Эта фраза была произнесена в 1851 году — в эпоху, когда во всем своем блеске находилась победоносная Англия, когда пережившие ряд тяжелых внутренних кризисов Соединенные Штаты впервые применили жесткую формулу, которую нам следует навсегда начертать на наших скрижалях — формулу «политики анаконды». Гигантская змея, которая душит свою жертву, сжимая вокруг нее свои кольца до тех пор, пока не будут раздроблены все кости и не прекратится дыхание — образ не из приятных. Попытавшись представить себе эту угрозу, нависающую над политическими пространствами Старого Света, можно понять, какими бы стали величина и могущество этих пространств в случае неудачи «политики анаконды». Кроме того, еще в период процветания победоносной мировой империи раздалось предостережение и другого империалиста — Гомера Ли, написавшего знаменитую книгу о закате англосаксов. В этой книге, принадлежащей эпохе очевидного апогея мировой Британской империи, можно

прочитать, что роковой день, закат богов может настать для мировой англоязычной империи в тот день, когда Германия, Россия и Япония станут союзниками Друг друга. Все время, пока процветает мировая британская империя, существует это мрачное опасение относительно единственного альянса, заставляющего предчувствовать, что рано или поздно силы окружения — этого столь блистательно и умело разработанного искусства, мастером применения которого в Средние века была Венеция — могут потерпеть крах. В наше время самые проницательные предостережения сделал сэр Х.Макиндер, написавший в 1904 году эссе о географической оси истории. Ось — это великая империя степей, центр Старого Света, кем бы она ни управлялась — персами, монголами, тюрками, белыми или красными царями. В 1919 году Макиндер делает новое предостережение и предлагает раз и навсегда разделить немцев и русских, переселив жителей Восточной Пруссии на левый берег Вислы. Далее, в последние дни перед началом блицкрига против Польши «Нью Стэйтсман» обвинил узкий круг геополитиков, в том числе и нас, в поиске наиболее эффективных способов борьбы с британской империей и британским империализмом их собственными средствами. Мы были бы счастливы, если бы смогли действительно использовать эти средства в целях нашей обороны, в особенности в те моменты, когда оказываемся лицом к лицу с агрессивными действиями. Наконец, можно вспомнить и мою беседу со старшим Чемберленом⁹⁷, который предвидел опасность того, что Англия в конце концов может бросить в объятия друг друга Германию, Россию и Японию в их безнадежной борьбе за обеспечение необходимых жизненных условий: вот почему он предлагал сотрудничество между Англией, Германией и Японией. Страх перед германо-русским сотрудничеством даже в 1919 году, когда мы были разоружены и производили совершенно безобидное впечатление, был настолько силен, что родилось предложение ценой грандиозного переселения жителей Восточной Пруссии на Запад ограничить пределы Германии западным берегом Вислы, — в сущности, лишь для того, чтобы Германия и Россия больше не имели общих границ. Рапалльский договор явился грандиозным разочарованием для Макиндера и его школы. Таким образом, страх перед возможными потенциальными последствиями континентальной политики Старого Света для мировой Британской Империи проходит через всю ее историю. Ощутимый с самого начала, этот страх становился все более и более ясным впоследствии, по мере того, как правители британской империи утрачивали свою былую способность к видению ситуации в целом и некогда присущее им искусство смотреть фактам в лицо. А как известно, «страх и ненависть — плохие советчики». Можно заметить подобное предчувствие и в Соединенных Штатах. Так, Брук Адамс, один из наиболее замечательных и прозорливых специалистов в области экономической политики, еще задолго до приобретения Киао-Чао указывал на то, до какой степени будет поставлена под угрозу возрастающая англицизация мира, если через проведение обширной железнодорожной трансконтинентальной линии с конечными пунктами в Порт-Артуре и Циндао будет достигнуто грандиозное германо-русско-восточно-азиатское объединение — единственное объединение, против которого окажутся бессильными какие бы то ни было попытки английской, американской или даже объединенной блокады. И так, не кто иной, как наш противник придает нам уверенность в том, что прочный континентальный блок одержит верх над «политикой анаконды» в экономическом, военном, морском и стратегическом плане — ту уверенность, которую мы с радостью отметили при второй попытке удушения Старого Света. Посмотрим на перспективу образования континентального блока глазами «победителей», которым уже при приобретении Киао-Чао приписывали столь обширные планы. К нашему стыду, следует признать, что уже на рубеже века в России и Японии было гораздо больше мыслящих голов, предвидевших и исследовавших возможность создания

⁹⁷ В 1899 Хаусхофер провел личную беседу с Джозефом Чемберленом — английским министром колоний и выразителем крайне правых, империалистских тенденций в английском обществе. Речь шла о возможностях образования межконтинентального геополитического союза Британская Империя-США-Япония-Германия.

континентального блока, нежели в Центральной Европе. Так, можно вспомнить, что во время подготовки англо-японского союза 1902 года, из которого Англия извлекла гораздо большую выгоду, чем Япония, у дальневосточной островной империи было ощущение, что ее вовлекают в кабальный договор. Это соглашение беспокоило Японию, так как ей надо было бы обеспечить равное участие в соглашении Германии, которая явилась бы вторым противовесом могуществу британского флота. Переговоры тянулись два года, на протяжении которых предпринимались неоднократные попытки полноправного включения Германии в игру. Японцам казалось, что в одиночку Япония не сможет остаться на одном уровне с британским морским могуществом того времени, а подписанный договор окажется кабальным.

«Если бы германский и японский флоты сотрудничали с русской сухопутной армией, океанское соглашение перестало бы быть кабальной по отношению к Англии сделкой, превратившись в равный договор,» — такой была позиция прозорливых японцев, с которыми я беседовал на эту тему, и на этой позиции они явно стояли и гораздо раньше. Грандиозный шанс для изучения дипломатической истории этого вопроса предоставили японский посол в Лондоне, Аяши, опубликовавший свои мемуары, и Джон Гамильтон, издавший свои воспоминания о русско-японской войне. И если первые тома еще были выпущены без вмешательства «организованного давления», то вторые тома обоих авторов не могли не подвергнуться цензуре, а оба дипломата — угрозе опалы. Можно сказать, что первые тома Аяши и Гамильтона предстали в глазах мирового общественного мнения ретивыми рысаками, в то время как второй том оказался похожим на послушного мерина. Во всяком случае, первые тома покончили со всеми тайнами политики, и поэтому осведомленный человек мог прочитать их между строк. Так, например, когда японский маркиз Ито, пытаясь поставить на ноги японо-русско-германский союз, отправился через Санкт-Петербург в Германию, с целью нейтрализации его континентальных планов была предпринята нечистоплотная акция по изменению шифра поступающих из Японии депеш. Японские визитеры собирались противопоставить ответные хитрости англо-японскому союзу во Фридрихсруэ, сельском поместье Бисмарка — государственного мужа, которому особенно поклонялся маркиз Ито. Уже в 1901 -1902 годах у них было ясное представление о возможности создания континентального союза, и эта возможность углубленно изучалась в Японии. Довольно откровенно говорили о ней и в 1909 и 1910 годах. В то время мы располагали прекрасным посредником для установления контакта с самыми высокими японскими сферами — с маркизом Ито, с его самым умным последователем графом Гото, с Кацурой, который был тогда председателем совета министров, с наиболее влиятельными личностями в кругу пожилых государственных деятелей. Дело в том, что огромную роль здесь играл личный врач японской императорской семьи, блистательный знаток Дальнего Востока вюртембержец Эльвин фон Баэльц. Но когда этот человек, располагавший уникальным доверием самых высоких японских сфер, захотел сделать доклад о психических и физических характеристиках японцев на конгрессе германских медиков, председатель конгресса заявил ему, что такая тема не представляет интереса. Нет сомнения, что Англия вела бы себя совершенно иначе с этим человеком, принадлежавшим к интимному кругу советников микадо. Но для нас такие заявления всегда отчетливо показывали, что германский императорский дом, к несчастью, испытывает непреодолимое отвращение к сотрудничеству с Дальним Востоком. Лозунгом все еще была формула Вильгельма II: «Европейцы, ставьте свое благо превыше всего!». Но молодая раса угрожала свободе и равенству прав европейцев в гораздо меньшей степени, чем казавшиеся нам более близкими представители белой расы.

Важным звеном в этой грандиозной политике была Россия. Там основным защитником мысли о необходимости образования континентального блока был немец по происхождению Витте, создатель транссибирской железной магистрали и один из наиболее важных русских финансистов. Во время войны он разрабатывал заключение сепаратного мира с Германией и в 1915 году умер при странных обстоятельствах. В

России всегда существовало течение, осознававшее выгоды и возможности, которые заключало в себе германо-русско-японское сотрудничество; и когда после войны один из наших наиболее выдающихся государственных деятелей — обладавший железным характером Брокдорф-Рантцау — захотел с моей помощью восстановить нить контактов, два русских государственных деятеля контролировали этот процесс и стремились благоприятствовать его ходу. По правде говоря, следовало соглашаться на все, что угодно, для достижения цели объединить ради высшего политического интереса японцев и русских, чтобы они смогли обоснованно урегулировать границы, защитив тем самым свои тылы и получив возможность для развертывания политической активности в других направлениях. Каждый участник этой игры должен был выдерживать ночи напролет в прогулках, после которых газоны были полностью покрыты окурками и пролитым чаем, и в атмосфере предельно странных дискуссий, проводимых с древней утонченностью, придававшей пикантность каждой из этих бесед. Когда после двух или трех часов казалось, что вопрос в целом можно прояснить, диалектика заставляла вновь начинать с самого начала, и вновь три часа дискуссии и утомленные и раздраженные соперники. У нас во Втором Райхе было слишком лояльное отношение к британской колониальной политике, чтобы воспользоваться жесткими и трезвыми геополитическими возможностями континентального союза, способного долго приносить хорошие плоды. Второй Райх отказался от этой перспективы, хотя использование этих возможностей предполагало вероятность двойного давления на противника. И именно в этом отказе таилась большая опасность.

Сегодня мы знаем: можно построить довольно дерзкие стальные конструкции, но лишь в том случае, если имеется твердый и прочный фундамент, если из по-настоящему крепкой и упругой стали сделаны основные несущие опоры, если структура сооружения настолько прочна, что намертво спаяны и камень и стальное сочленение. Но особую прочность и устойчивость к мировым бурям такая стальная конструкция получает тогда, когда в само ее основание введены, как в наших новых мостах, прочные каменные укрепления пространственного блока, простирающегося от Балтийского и Черного морей до Тихого Океана.

Подчеркнем, что на возможность участия Германии в такой континентальной политике мы смотрим совершенно хладнокровно. Эта возможность не была реализована князем Ито и Бисмарком. Аналогичные попытки предпринимал, обращаясь к Тирпицу, адмирал Като, начальник штаба флота в Цусиме, в том же самом направлении были направлены и мои скромные усилия. Для всех нас, работавших над этим великим соглашением ради спасения всего Старого Света, предварительным условием было германо-японское объединение.

Японский государственный деятель Гото говорил мне: «Вспомните русскую тройную упряжку — «тройку». Там применяется особый способ запрягать: в центре идет самая норовистая и самая сильная лошадь; а справа и слева, поддерживая среднюю, бегут две более покладистых. Обладая такой упряжкой, можно сильно выиграть в скорости и мощи». Взглянув на карту Старого Света, мы констатируем, что такой тройной упряжке подобны три пограничных моря: во-первых, ставшее в последнее время довольно политически близким нам Балтийское море с прибалтийским пространством: во-вторых, намного менее освоенное своими прибрежными жителями, чем Балтика — нами. Японское море: и в-третьих, находящаяся под итальянским господством и недавно замкнутая с юга Адриатика с примыкающим к ней Восточным Средиземноморьем⁹⁸. Все эти пограничные моря расположены в районах наиболее важных выходов России к свободному океану, если не учитывать свободный Северный ледовитый океан, использование которого зависит от капризов его обогрева атлантическими водами Гольф-Стрима.

⁹⁸ Хаусхофер имеет в виду произошедшую в апреле 1939 года аннексию Италией Албании.

Японцы, подчиняясь своему прочному инстинкту и следуя тактике контроля моря, в основном замкнули зону, окружающую русский выход к свободному океану в районе Владивостока, поступив намного более логично, чем германцы поступили с колыбелью своей расы в балтийском пространстве.

Еще в 1935 году мы нанесли себе в Швеции бесконечный урон, убедив социал-демократическое правительство Стокгольма, а затем и Осло, отказаться от уверенности в защите со стороны Лиги Наций и предпринять самостоятельные меры по защите своего обширного пространства: мы заявили, что такие меры нашли бы у нас самое полное понимание. Но, как известно, обещанного три года ждут. Предложенные пакты о ненападении так и не были приняты, и пространство Балтийского моря стало, таким образом, выглядеть для нас гораздо менее отрадно, нежели пространство Японского моря — для японцев. В этом следует винить прежде всего отсутствие четкого инстинкта жестких геополитических реалий, характеризующее по преимуществу социал-демократическую идеологию северных правительств.

Правда, в Швеции только меньшинство понимало те опасности и те возможности которые сулило будущее. Поняв, что в компетентных правительственных кругах Швеции Норвегии она не найдет необходимого пони мания, Германия решила однозначно следовать основным линиям континентальной поли тики, не учитывая интересы тех, чье дружелюбие выражалось лишь в громких фразах. Мы ?? могли из-за нескольких геополитических аутсайдеров ставить под удар ту тройку, которая только и могла вырвать Старый Свет из объятий анаконды.

Впрочем не новость и попытки русско-японского объединения, являющегося еще одним необходимым условием для проведения полноценной континентальной политики. Откровенно говоря, эти попытки начались уже в 1901-1902 годах. Затем они вновь предпринимались после русско-японской войны, в 1909 и 1910 году, когда я был в Японии—в то время глашатаем такой политики стал Ито. Тогда Соединенные Штаты сделали оригинальное предложение устранить основные трудности между Китаем, Японией и Россией, выкупив все железные дороги в Манчжурии и передав их в руки американских капиталистов; так они против своей воли заставили сблизиться русских и японцев.

Затем, свои усилия к образованию континентального блока начала прилагать и Италия. Там этим занимался Рикарди, вдохновивший Муссолини на создание института Среднего и Дальнего Востока. Благодаря этому институту появилось желание осторожно впрячь в политико-культурную упряжь драгоценные культурные элементы японского и китайского происхождения. На это не жертвовались большие суммы, но зато были предоставлены помещения одного из величественных дворцов, наполненных блистательной культурой Ренессанса. Рим обладает яркой силой, которой можно было доверять. Институтом Среднего и Дальнего Востока управляют сенатор Джентиле, эрцгерцог Туччи, герцог Аварнский, сын бывшего посла при императорском дворе в Вене. Они прекрасно справились со своими обязанностями, так как, судя по всему, не оставались погруженными всецело в мир филологии, проводя с большой гибкостью и чуткостью (довольно отчетливо ощущая действие психологии народов) активную культурную политику, жизненно важную и близкую народу.

Что касается последних инициатив, то огромную роль в подготовке континентального союза следует отвести и хорошо известным графу Мушакои и барону Ошима. Как нам известно, что на протяжении всей войны в Китае Япония сражалась лишь левой рукой, поскольку правая рука с резервной военной силой была всегда наготове в Манчжурии. Там были сосредоточены такие силы, о которых мы даже не предполагали. Теперь вопрос о границе отчасти урегулирован, причем в крайне искусной форме. К примеру, был заключен договор в отношении Монголии, где в течение пяти месяцев русские и японцы вели серьезные бои, повлекшие за собой многочисленные смерти и ранения. Тогда одновременно от обеих враждующих сторон, из Москвы и из Токио, поступили

предложения положить конец этой борьбе. Вскоре это и было сделано, причем заключению мира сопутствовала величественная картина проведения в чисто японской манере на бывшей спорной территории общей похоронной церемонии для душ погибших воинов. Несмотря на религиозный характер этой церемонии, а также на то, что само участие в ней было довольно непростым по идеологическим соображениям делом, на церемонии присутствовал генерал Потапов. Такие церемонии, как эта, имеют важное психологическое значение. Во главе марширующих с развернутыми знаменами войск старый генерал приближается к алтарю мертвых. Каждый японец твердо верит в то, что души воинов действительно находятся перед этим алтарем, чтобы получить послание императора. Само безукоризненное поведение советского генерала и его офицеров на этой довольно длительной церемонии делает честь их замечательной способности к культурной адаптации. Поскольку поворачиваться спиной к духам нельзя, все участники церемонии медленно издали подходят к алтарю и отходят назад. Повернуться спиной к духам предков, которые рассматриваются как живые, будет кощунством. Эта пронизанная абсолютной религиозностью церемония является весьма интересной и весьма убедительной с точки зрения этнопсихологии; она оказывала глубокое впечатление даже на умудренных полученным по всему миру опытом людей, которым позволялось на ней присутствовать. После церемонии они могли сказать себе: здесь весь народ твердо верит в переселение душ. Он верит, что во время краткого земного существования можно путем похвальных действий на благо Родины завоевать себе возвышенное место в потустороннем существовании, в противном случае же за гробом ждет бесчестье. Ощущение, что весь народ, за исключением нескольких скептиков-вольнодумцев, горячо воодушевлен этой идеей, придает этому народу силу, сплоченность и готовность к исключительной жертвенности.

Наконец-то геополитика благодаря тем необычайно выгодным, с политико-пространственной точки зрения, возможностям, которые удалось благодаря ей реализовать (и еще предстоит реализовать), преодолела идеологические препоны в деле континентального объединения для осуществления мировой политики — и большой вклад в это внесла сама двойная игра британской политики, подтолкнувшая этот процесс. Очевидно все бессилие лорда Галифакса, пытающегося проводить политику европейского сотрудничества; гораздо более сильное течение, руководимое противниками Чемберлена. готовилось к войне и колебалось лишь для видимости, пока не закончился процесс перевооружения⁹⁹.

Возможность объективного и непредвзятого изучения геополитической силы евразийского пакта представилась 7 декабря, когда в Чите началась конференция по поводу заключения торгового договора между Японией и Россией. Итак, на востоке от нас простирается Союз Советских Социалистических Республик с политико-пространственной массой в 21 352 571 кв. км. (без учета последних аннексий), с 13 000 км. береговых линий и 182 миллионами жителей. Далее располагается Япония, площадь которой составляет около 2 миллионов кв. км. (без учета территорий, расположенных вне ее непосредственных границ, а также территорий ее мощных союзников) с весьма продолжительной береговой линией и со 140 млн. человек населения.

Разумеется, из этого числа лишь 73 млн. жителей империи являются в прямом смысле ее политической и военной опорой, но рабочая сила числом 140 млн. человек вполне

⁹⁹ Здесь речь идет о двух течениях среди представителей английской внешней политики а годы, предшествовавшие началу Второй мировой войны. Одно из них, (т.н. «клайвденское»), возглавляемое ставшим в мае 1937 г. премьер-министром консерватором Невилем Чемберленом и его заместителем Галифаксом, стремилось «умиротворить» Германию, рассматриваемую как бастион против большевизма, и предлагало заключение соглашения Англия-Германия-Франция-Италия, что, в частности, отразилось на подписании 30 сентября 1938 г. «мюнхенского пакта» о разделе Чехословакии. Другое направление, возглавляемое оппозиционными деятелями Консервативной партии Уинстоном Черчиллем и Антони Иденом (они вошли в правительство уже после начала войны) и одержавшее верх, настаивало на необходимости борьбы с Германией.

доступна. Перед лицом такого положения дел на Востоке, мы хотя и трудимся, интенсифицируя наши культурные и экономические связи на западном фланге блока, но все-таки, с политико-пространственной точки зрения, не действуем в том объеме, как другие партнеры. В нашем распоряжении находится миллион кв. км. (а также право еще на три миллиона кв.км. в колониях) и от 87 до 100 млн. человек. Промежуточное положение в силу наличия как океанических, так и континентальных условий существования занимает Италия, обладающая 250 тыс. километрами побережий (что влечет за собой их уязвимость и необходимость прилагать основные усилия к развитию флота и авиации) и от 57 до 60 млн. человеческого резерва. Если мы сравним эти цифры с теми, на которых основывались центральные державы во время мировой войны, то, исходя из геополитических данных, увидим заметную разницу между положением дел тогда и теперь. И если нам удастся консолидироваться и поддерживать эту отважную и грандиозную евроазиатскую континентальную политику вплоть до достижения ее последних великих последствий, проявятся ее огромные возможности, при которых, к примеру, автономия и независимость Индии будут являться просто одним из сопутствующих такой политике феноменов. Дело в том, что иногда я встречал у молодых и не очень молодых людей мнение, что Индия старается добиться лишь статуса доминиона, оставшись под защитой британских войск. Все усилия тех политических деятелей и простых индийцев, с которыми я лично встречался, доказывают обратное: их окончательной и самой твердой целью является независимость. Они всегда сохраняли веру в то, что мы всерьез воспринимаем все возрастающую помощь, которую оказываем им в их борьбе за независимость.

С первых минут после обнародования советско-германского пакта о ненападении мы наблюдаем чрезвычайный переворот в индийском общественном мнении. До этого англоиндийские газеты были наполнены фразеологией на тему укрепления демократии во всем мире; и именно ради этого должна была существовать Индия. Но стоило только возникнуть грандиозному призраку европейской континентальной политики, как это мнение, подобно резкому изменению погоды, полностью переменялось. Теперь индийцы полагают, что Советский Союз, безусловно, мог бы причинить англичанам значительные неприятности в Индии — для этого ему будет достаточно вмешаться и переправить свои армии через перевалы.

Грандиозное и столь ослепительное во всей полноте эффектов зрелище евроазиатской континентальной политики подготавливалось по отдельности многими людьми. Оно было не случайным броском в неизвестность, но сознательным исполнением великой необходимости.

(перевод А.Карагодин)

*первая часть статьи, написанной в 1940 г.

Фрагменты второй части той же статьи (в целом посвященной более узким практическим вопросам):

“Германию обвиняют в том, что мы проводим в жизнь план по натравливанию цветных народов на их "законных" господ в Индии и Индокитае, поощряя их стремление к самоопределению. Мы же не сомом деле, основываясь на работе англичанина Макиндера, пропагандируем во всем мире идею того, что только прочная связь государств по оси Германия-Россия-Япония позволит нам всем подняться и стать неуязвимыми перед методами анаконды англосаксонского мира. Когда через 4 месяца после начала войны знаменитый английский журналист выдвинул мне такую претензию, я ответил ему, что, если вас атакуют в согласии с тактикой анаконды, примененной в глобальном масштабе, причем атакуют державы, которые со времен американской войны за независимость постоянно твердят об этой практике анаконды, то вы имеете полное право всячески

противиться этой политике противника, стремящегося отхватить все новые и новые куски влияния. Только идея Евразии, воплощаясь политически в пространстве, даст нам возможность для долговременного расширения нашего жизненного пространства.”

“Евразию невозможно задушить, пока два самых крупных ее народа — немцы и русские — всячески стремятся избежать междоусобного конфликта, подобного Крымской войне или 1914 году: это аксиома европейской политики.”

“Последний час англосаксонской политики пробьет тогда, когда немцы, русские и японцы соединятся. Так говорил Гомер Ли.”

ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ДИНАМИКА МЕРИДИАНОВ И ПАРАЛЛЕЛЕЙ

Существует геополитический термин: Большие Пространства (Grossraum). Он возник еще в античном мире, предопределенный спецификой средиземноморья, южных пустынь и горных хребтов. Термин как бы повторял тенденции развития, ориентированные на географические сектора как вдоль параллелей, так и на ось Восток-Запад. Это касалось умеренных, тропических и субтропических поясов. Исключения составляли государства, расположенные вдоль русла больших рек, текущих по линии Север — Юг. Речные геополитические образования в силу особенного расположения своих жизненных артерий, испытывали на себе давление т.н. “вращательного момента”, порождаемого экспансией вдоль параллелей. Это и составляло собственно геополитическую историю “речных государств”, пока она не была окончательно подавлена динамикой широтной экспансии империй передней Азии и, восточнее, ахеменидским Ираном.

Начиная с некоторого момента истории, последовали сменяющие друг друга волны “широтной экспансии” — финикийцы, эллины, римляне, арабы, степные народы, франки, иберийцы и т.д. Это породило глобальную тенденцию геополитического развития, идущую от романского Средиземноморья до Средиземноморья карибского. Эта тенденция исчерпалась после достижения португальцами и испанцами границ первого Большого Пространства, стремившегося к меридианальному развитию. Этим пространством было Китайское Царство, часто менявшее свою внешнюю форму, но остававшееся при этом удивительно постоянным в культурно-расовом смысле. Итак, восточно-азиатскую — китайскую и японскую — геополитическую структуру, развивающуюся по линии Север — Юг, прорезала испанская колониальная Империя, первое геополитическое “широтное Царство”. Однако, испанцы сохраняли свою монополию недолго — около 70 лет. По их следам пошли конкуренты, унаследовавшие “широтную стратегию”, стремившиеся ограбить своих предшественников и унаследовать их завоевания. Британцы были сильнейшими среди них. Им удалось построить свою Первую и Вторую империи, которые в целом следовали “широтной” ориентации. Англия была предопределена к этому и своим присутствием в Средиземноморье, и необходимостью охранять индийские владения.

На северной половине континента к Востоку постоянно расширялась Империя сначала белых, а потом красных царей. Между северной широтной Империей и югом лежали буферные зоны. И только в 40-х годах XX столетия два геополитических макрообразования, ориентированные по линии меридиана — восточно-азиатский блок и панамериканский блок, — почти одновременно вторглись в геополитическое поле широтной динамики, образовав “рамку” вокруг традиционной раскладки планетарных сил.

Это последнее геополитическое событие обладает воистину гигантским значением, так как оно предопределяет полное изменение “силового поля” земной поверхности. Именно оно придает реальность Евро-Африканскому проекту, попыткам Советского Союза перейти от своей “широтной стратегии” к “стратегии теплых морей” и планам Индии по динамизации своей политики в отношении тихоокеанских островов. Заново образующееся геополитическое поле разительно отличается от картины, обрисованной в 1904 г. Хэлфордом Макиндером, который определил в качестве “географической оси истории” центр Старого Света, хотя в 1904 году концепции Макиндера были вполне адекватными реальному положению дел.

Следует уточнить, что Большое Пространство Восточной Азии тяготеет к самоограничению своими континентальными границами. Иначе обстоит дело с США, которые, завершив свои планы геополитического панамериканизма, считают свой контроль надо всем американским континентом лишь первым шагом к достижению мирового господства и уже активизируют усилия в тропической Африке, Иране, Индии и

Австралии. США снова ориентируют свою геополитическую экспансию по линии Запад-Восток, стремясь сделать “широтную динамику” основой своего грядущего мирового могущества. Это даст им возможность уже в ближайшем будущем угрожать своим потенциальным противникам возможностью Третьей мировой войны. Таким образом, именно геополитическая экспансия по меридиану, по своему завершению создает основу для самой серьезной угрозы для мира, так как она несет в себе возможность порабощения Соединенными Штатами всей планеты.

Для отстаивания своей геополитической независимости Восточная Азия уже сегодня вынуждена укреплять собственную культурную и политическую форму и создавать на периферии своего влияния буферные зоны безопасности. Через одно поколение и Европе потребуются такие же буферные зоны, подобно тем, что императоры Ито, Гото и др. стремились создать против экспансии русских царей. Особенно явно тенденции широтного и долготного развития в Африке проявляются в исламских геополитических образованиях и в процессе освобождения азиатских стран от английского владычества. Южная тенденция геополитической экспансии Восточной Азии по естественному пути морских и воздушных сообщений приходится как раз на ненаселенные районы Австралии, расположенные между двумя секторами сосредоточения англоязычного населения. В этом случае для колоний “внешнего полумесяца” Макиндера существует вполне реальная возможность “быть смытыми в море”. Европа, таким образом, мгновенно теряет свою прочную связь с Африкой, и ключевой пункт потенциального противостояния “властителям широт” перемещается на юго-восток.

Советам, этой стране, которая всегда была “географической осью истории”, и странам Оси, контролирующим “Внутренний Полумесяц”, останется только наблюдать за происходящим на юго-востоке. Каким бы важным для культурного бытия Европы не было обильно смешанное с солдатской кровью военно-стратегическое пространство Черного и Каспийского морей, для будущего нового передела геополитического пространства оно будет второстепенным. Ибо начинается процесс создания новых “меридианальных” Больших Пространств, которые и приобретут решающее стратегическое значение.

* * *

Геополитическое будущее планеты зависит от того, сумеет ли англо-американская тенденция экспансии вдоль параллелей прорвать сопротивление восточно-азиатской тенденции экспансии вдоль меридианов. Чем бы это противостояние не закончилось, США считают, что в любом случае они будут надежно защищены остатками бывшей английской колониальной империи, даже если от нее останутся только тропические африканские колонии. И уж во всяком случае США могут рассчитывать на контролируемую ими тропическую Америку. Но посчитают ли они островную Индию, являющуюся третьей по запасам полезных ископаемых территорией, а также Иран и Индию, достойными того, чтобы проливать за них кровь и тратить деньги на военную экспедицию? Сочтут ли они необходимым тратить силы для того, чтобы оторвать от азиатского Большого Пространства этот кусок? В настоящий момент это самый важный и болезненный вопрос для расточителей денег и чужой крови: ведь дело идет об очень большой добыче.

* * *

Между Нанцинским и Чжунцинским Китаем сегодня, как и прежде, возможны самые невероятные, самые безумные компромиссы. Дальнейшее динамическое развитие вдоль меридиана Восточной Азии становится все более и более возможным, скрытые энергии зреют с каждым днем. Эти энергии пришли в действие и стали очевидными в правой части Восточной Азии — в Японии, и особенно, в Китае. В левой, западной части этого

Большого Пространства они пока проявились недостаточно. Можно предположить в этом регионе новую войну длительностью от 10 до 50 лет. В Китае гражданская война идет уже 32 года. У Японии за плечами 12 лет сухопутных боев, и то, насколько воинственно она настроена по отношению к тихоокеанскому региону, Япония доказала в полной мере. Противостояние геополитической экспансии по меридиану и экспансии по параллели требует от обеих сторон запастись терпением, так как эта проблема будет решаться в течение достаточно большого отрезка времени и на огромных территориях. Примером этому могут служить геополитические процессы, протекающие в последние десятилетия по обе стороны Тихого океана.

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Генерал Генрих Йордис фон Лохаузен

ВЕНА И БЕЛГРАД КАК ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКИЕ АНТИПОДЫ

Юго-восточная Европа трёх видов

Если посмотреть на географическую карту Европы, то юго-восточная Европа вырисовывается как очевидное единство. На севере и на северо-востоке прикрытая Карпатами, на северо-западе — Альпами, на юге она окружена шестью чередующимися морями. Единственная протекающая диагонально большая река — это Дунай.

Вена и Константинополь точно так же расположенные по диагонали друг к другу, обозначают входные ворота. В центре расположен Белград, естественный центр тяжести (ключевой пункт) всего пространства юго-восточной Европы. Это пространство распадается на три чётко различающихся области, по одной западнее и восточнее Железных Ворот и одну средиземноморскую область:

Одну область образует паннонская впадина. В её середине расположена пересекаемая Дунаем венгерская низменность. Эта впадина — местность, удалённая от моря, сопровождаемая на юго-западе, по ту сторону гор, далматинским побережьем.

Карпаты отделяют эту впадину от второй области, от береговых ландшафтов нижнего Дуная, от Валахии, Молдавии (область в Румынии), северной Болгарии и от дельты Дуная. Подобно восточно-эльбскому ответвлению сарматской низменности, эти четыре местности не имеют общего названия.

Балканские горы южнее этих четырёх областей опять же отделяют их от третьей области, от омываемого морем юга. Несмотря на природно данное единство и эти южные четыре классические местности — Фракия, Македония, Эллада и Иллирия — не имеют общего названия. Точно так же такое общее название отсутствует у иллирийских гор, тянущихся на юге от Карпат до Альп. Гряды гор отделяют окружённый берегом юг от паннонской местности, удалённой от моря.

Ключевая во многих отношениях позиция Белграда

Внутри этих трёх областей и разделяющих их гор Белград расположен не только в их геометрическом центре. Он расположен также близко к их стыку, затем близко к прорыву Дуная, но одновременно и в паннонском ключевом пункте на месте слияния пяти рек Дуная, Савы, Дравы, Тисы и Муреша.

Ключевой пункт — не всегда является вместе с тем центральным пунктом; смотри Париж — геометрически точный центральный пункт расположен далеко от столицы Bourges — смотри также Москву, смотри Лиссабон или Лондон. Все они расположены в естественных ключевых пунктах их сфер влияния, но не в центральных пунктах территорий в геометрическом смысле. В юго-восточной Европе центральный пункт и естественный ключевой пункт случайно — именно в Белграде — совпадают. Здесь также разветвляются все идущие с севера пути, будь то пути к Софии и Константинополю или к Салоникам и Афинам, к Бухаресту и к устьям Дуная.

Пространство тринадцати народов

То, что Белград несмотря на это никогда не достиг равного политического значения, не говоря уже о культурном значении Вены или Константинополя, и даже Будапешта, имеет таким образом не географические причины — их это не может иметь — но этнографические причины. Юго-восточная Европа — это не пространство больших народов. А именно в отличие от всех остальных природно данных ландшафтов европейского полуострова, например, от Испании, Италии или от франкского большого пространства, в отличие также от Британии или от Скандинавии юго-восточная Европа заключает в себе не так как все они соответственно только один, но большой народ и наряду с ним в крайнем случае один или два меньших народа. Напротив, этот юго-восток Европы содержит в себе одновременно десять народов, а именно десять исключительно родом из этого пространства народов, плюс лишь частично выдающиеся по окраине ещё три народа — немцы, украинцы и турки.

Благодаря такому раздроблению здесь внутри не могла возникнуть великая держава. Для этого базис всех этих десяти народов был слишком узким. Никто здесь не был когда-либо в таком положении, чтобы овладеть этим обширным пространством. Ни одному из них не удалось достигнуть того значения больших западно-европейских народов, каким обладали немцы, французы, испанцы или итальянцы — ни политически, ни культурно — как в своё время было в случае греков и византийцев. Пожалуй, венгры из середины паннонской впадины могли подчинить себе на долгое время большую часть её окраинных областей, время от времени даже распространить своё влияние до далматинского побережья, но такое состояние никогда не оставалось долгим.

Пассаровицкий (Пожаревацкий) мир

Великая держава могла развиваться здесь только извне как пришедшие из Малой Азии турки или выросшая из Германии Австрия. Соответственно, с 16 века на юго-востоке Европы имелись две великие державы; расположенная обширно за Веной Германская империя и Османская империя, развернувшаяся у входа в большой бассейн Дуная и после выходов из него со своими армиями за Белградом. Венгрия была между ними в качестве буфера.

И хотя потом эмблема власти султана всё же два раза была донесена до врат Вены, то штандарты императора напротив — вопреки многим далеко идущим планам принца Евгения Савойского — никогда не достигали территории после Ниша (Nissa), это всего 200 километров по ту сторону Белграда. Всё-таки блестящие победы принца в 1718 году согласно Пассаровицкому миру принесли Австрии три трамплина в направлении Стамбула: на западе весь северный край Боснии, на востоке Малую Валахию, в середине наряду с Белградом ещё 160 километров сербской земли по направлению к Салоникам.

Пусть это было немного, но притязания Австрии тем самым всё же были явлены: в приобретённой боснийской области притязание на остаток этой земли; в Малой Валахии притязание на Большую Валахию, следовательно, на низовье и на устье Дуная; в Белграде и его хинтерланде притязание на остальную Сербию и на прорыв к Эгейскому морю; во всех трёх — претензия на освобождение христианских балканских народов от объятий турков.

Три двуглавых орла и полумесяц

При этом можно было ожидать долгого спора обоих двуглавых орлов, немецкого и русского, за наследство третьего, также двуглавого орла Византии. Однако ещё были в союзе с Россией и этот союз продолжался ещё в течение 130 лет. Итак, при известных

условиях, пока турок ещё был противником, предлагалось разделение: Чёрное море, то есть сначала Болгария, — русским, Эгейское море и, прежде всего Сербия — Австрии. Однако во всех вариантах будущего русские обладали преимуществом. Они, пожалуй, вовсе не нуждались в разделе, ибо с самого начала у них были два козыря: 1) родственный язык сербов и болгар; 2) идентичность веры и ритуала — все Балканы были ортодоксально православными.

Но турок был ещё врагом. Мелкая ревность церковью ещё не играла роли. Пусть великодушные турецкого правления в вопросах веры и призывало к осторожности, пусть из лучших побуждений евангельские христиане Венгрии предпочитали турецкое господство габсбургскому, но России представился удобный случай разыграть карту ортодоксии и после неё карту панславизма в следующем 19 веке. Пока же, в 18 веке, сербский патриарх Ипека и болгарский митрополит Охриды выразили кайзеровскому генералу своё желание стать наподобие немецких архиепископов мирскими господами их обширных епархий и в качестве таковых присоединиться к Священной Римской империи германской нации, пока что кайзеру открывалась перспектива принимать сербских и болгарских архиепископов в Вене как своих вассалов! Ветер дул тогда ещё после 1718 года в знамёна Австрии и это было южнее Дуная в то время, когда русские ещё должны были бороться за их собственный южный берег, северный берег Чёрного моря.

Однако потом — принц Евгений Савойский тем временем умер — всё пошло иначе. Уже 1738 год принёс с собой катастрофу, а 1739 год завершил её; катастрофа была вызвана ничем иным, как ужасной неспособностью и бездарностью. Её причины были — где же ещё? — в Вене и она перекинулась ещё и на фронт. Её никогда так и не удалось исправить и она предстаёт ретроспективно во всём своём значении сравнимой, пожалуй, только с Hradec Kralove (чешский город).

1739 и 1866

Здесь на карту было поставлено господство в Германии, господство на Балканах и вдоль Дуная. Различие: немецкая Австрия и после Hradec Kralove осталась немецкой, напротив, потерянное в 1739 году на юго-востоке больше никогда не стало опять австрийским. Далее: в 1866 году вся Германия, даже вся Европа знала, о чём шла речь, в 1739 году в Вене едва пожали плечами по поводу перенесённой утраты. Будет день, будет и пища, утро вечера мудренее. Но утро не пришло никогда. То, что пришло, была смерть кайзера, полный отказ от Прагматической санкции, собственная война за порядок наследования, силезские войны — Вена имела теперь иные заботы.

И ещё одно отличие: в 1866 году выиграла судьбою предрешённая для этого Пруссия, в 1739 году, напротив, исторически находящаяся, собственно говоря, уже в упадке Турция, но не благодаря каким либо образом примечательному командованию или вооружению, нет, никоим образом не блестящая победа с одной стороны, никак не героическое поражение с другой стороны; нет героя как Бенедек, и нет такого противника, как Мольтке. Ничего в этом событии не имело и слабого оттенка величия. Кроме того, решение 1866 года сто тридцать лет было неминуемо, но решением 1739 года был опрометчиво брошен вызов по отношению к русским.

Едва ли есть более выдающаяся противоположность к обсуждаемому первенству политики перед ведением войны. Ответственные за фронт очутились на Шпильберге и на укреплении Граца, а в Вене — остались в своих креслах. Через французское посредничество — читай вмешательство — все санкционированные графом Найпбергом великому визирю уступки были ещё раз торжественно подтверждены в снова турецком Белграде. Россия не потерпела никакого ущерба, Франция стала покровителем всех христиан, живущих в турецкой сфере власти.

Значение сербов

Однако потерянный Белград остался остриём, направленным как на север, так и на юг. Турки знали, почему именно здесь они соорудили свою ставку, также и венгры знали, почему они раньше воевали за этот город несколько раз, и принц Евгений Савойский точно знал, почему он должен овладеть этим городом — любой ценой. Впрочем, с расчётом на далёкое будущее речь шла не только о Белграде, не только о его конфронтации с Веной, о его неповторимом местоположении между Балканами и венгерской низменностью, с расчётом на далёкое будущее речь шла и о сербах как о народе. Тот, кто хочет покорить юго-восток Европы, должен их поддержать и не должен иметь их в качестве своих противников. Он должен вовлечь их в свою империю в качестве друзей.

Подобно немцам в общеевропейских рамках в своей области сербы также являются срединным народом. Они граничат с шестью из выше названных десяти народов, со всеми кроме словенцев и словаков и отделены от греков только спорной Македонией.

Венгрия — подрывная шашка в середине Дунайской впадины

Лишь ещё один народ в этом пространстве граничит с таким же количеством чужих народов: мадьяры; а вместе с сербами они граничат со всеми одиннадцатью прочими народами юго-восточной Европы. Мадьяры занимают середину низменности. Нигде кроме как на севере их закрытый район поселения не достигает отрогов окружающих паннонскую впадину гор. Их сила происходит из равнины, того западного ответвления северно-евразийской степи, откуда гунны и авары предпринимали свои разбойничьи набеги.

Прежде турок, но после болгар — турки покорили выдвинувшийся в юго-восточную Европу и здесь единственный в Дунайской впадине ставший оседлым тюркский народ. Завоеватели и покорители более слабых окраинных народов — таких, как румыны, жители Трансильвании, словаки и хорваты, они использовали своё срединное положение вплоть до 1918 года. Важность их срединного положения они дали почувствовать прежде в личной унии, когда Австрия после 1866 года, лишённая своей немецкой позиции, без Венгрии уже не была великой державой. В 1867 году с достижением ими соглашения они уничтожают необходимую перестройку Дунайской монархии. Благодаря их упорному отказу во всяком самоопределении находящимся в их подчинении славянам, румынам и немцам представляющие только 40% венгерского и только 16% австрийско-венгерского населения мадьяры становятся легальной подрывной шашкой в середине габсбургской многонациональной империи.

Будапешт был их геометрическим центром и данной ключевой позицией, Вена как таковая была хотя и расположена между Брюсселем и Белградом, соответственно также между Франкфуртом и Белградом, но уже не между Пассау и Белградом. Свободная от своего западного влияния, для востока она стала обременительной как запад и тем самым в противоположность Будапешту оказалась в невыгодном положении. С позиции тогда ещё более двух третей Дунайской впадины контролировавших мадьяр (сегодня это едва ли пятая часть) Австрия была более или менее окраинной областью, просто изъяном в великой венгерской структуре ландшафта. Её бреши зияли на западе и на юге, перед Веной и Белградом, перед началом и концом Дуная. Немцы и сербы стерегли вход. Если Сербия принадлежала туркам, они обладали свободой выхода на север. Если она была австрийской, австриякам открывался выход к югу.

Сербия сохраняла ключ как к тому, так и к этому направлению. Белград был важнее Будапешта, помощь сербов была необходимой для каждого устроителя Дунайского пространства, неотменимым противовесом против оппозиционной мадьярской срединной

земли. В дотурецкое время несмотря на повторявшиеся попытки венгры никогда не смогли обосноваться в Сербии — народ всадников против народа гор. Вторжение турок отбросило оба народа назад, сербов, однако, несравнимо жёстче и на более продолжительное время чем венгров. Сербская главенствующая роль была сыграна, чего нельзя сказать о мадьярах. Не в последнюю очередь отсюда, именно из их истории, объяснимо и актуальное поведение сербов.

Трагедия сербов

Проникание зафиксированных позже славян племён на весь балканский полуостров начинается вследствие раскрепощённого гуннами переселения народов уже при императоре Юстиниане. Его первые волны движутся от германцев, поперёк пересекающих юго-восток Европы на юг, главным образом это готы, но и аланы и гепиды. Позже они аварами, на севере до Богемии, и здесь до Иллирии частью распространились, частью ушли в другие края. Уже в 6 веке хорваты освобождают — под именем *Nervaren* возможно германского происхождения — таких уже достигших берега Далмации славян из рук аварской власти. Так же добровольно, как и славяне под защитой степного народа заступившие на место болгар в низовье Дуная и сербы с их переселением в горы Иллирии оказываются под верховенством восточно-римской императорской власти (на время и хорваты, но только те, кто обосновался на берегу).

Сербы только весьма редко объединялись племенным вождём, как это было на краткое время в 9 веке. Они создали своё первое настоящее государство в конце 11 века; оно охватывало части Боснии, после двух периодов — сначала двадцатилетнего, потом семидесятилетнего болгарского господства. Это произошло, несмотря на повторявшиеся нападения теперь мадьяр и несмотря на сильное византийское противодействие. Правитель Зеты получает корону из рук папского легата. Столица королевства — далеко от Венгрии, Болгарии или Византии — это сегодня албанский город Скутари.

Однако же стойкое единство приносит сербам только двенадцатый век при династии Неманья, только без Боснии, которая в 1204 году после недолгой свободы оказалась опять под властью Венгрии. И её первый король получает своё королевское достоинство от римской курии, от Византии и как контрмеру признание впрямь самостоятельной, сербской православной церкви. Тем самым принято церковное решение и с одной стороны Балканы от Чёрного до Ионического моря наконец становятся православными², но с другой стороны хорваты так же окончательно выпадают из этого балканского контекста. Как Венгрия и Польша, и их страна становится предпольем, зоной нападения Запада, гласисом Запада. Это отделение от сербов, говорящих на одинаковом с ними языке, позже углубляется мощным вторжением турок.

Но прежде 13 век и начинающийся 14 век становятся золотым веком сербской истории. При доме Неманья Сербия становится господствующим на Балканах государством. Византийский суверенитет поколеблен. Неманьиды сами стремятся получить трон императора. Последовательно покоряются Македония, позже Тессалия, также половина Албании, Болгария принуждена вступить в союз. Скопье становится королевским городом. Республика Рагуза подпадает под сербскую защиту.

Перенос политического центра тяжести в Серес, в наполовину греческий юг, сопровождается расцветом собственного, выросшего на византийских образцах церковного искусства и культуры двора. Право упорядочивается. Издаются законы, обеспечивающие каждому жителю империи независимо от происхождения или веры свободу, жизнь и имущество, и эти законы также действительно неподкупно исполняются. Стефан Душан, предпоследний из рода Неманьидов, уже именуется «императором расков и ромеев», он уже предлагает — ещё своевременно — императору Карлу IV и папе Иннокентию VI совместную войну с турками с собою во главе, то есть себя он

предлагает как верховного главнокомандующего. Блеск его двора становится ярче блеска двора василевса на Босфоре, но потом, спустя почти шестнадцать лет после его смерти, за крутым взлётом следует стремительное падение: грандиозная победа турок. Уже в 1371 году объединённые войска у Matiza — это место ещё сегодня называется «гибель сербов» — потерпели тяжёлый ущерб, потом 15 июня 1389 года в решающей битве на Amselfeld ещё раз, но в этот раз они потерпели сокрушительное поражение и пожертвовали всем сербским дворянством.

Турки сначала довольствовались достигнутым. Их войско настоятельно нуждается в том, чтобы дойти до персидской границы. Сербь без вождя, обязанные впредь повиноваться и платить дань, более не представляют никакой опасности. То, что Венгрия, ставшая отныне прифронтовым государством, поддерживает отпавших от турок сербов, албанцев и валахов, не может спасти их страны. Этого не может сделать ни венгерский национальный герой Janos Hunyadi, ни Skanderbeg, герой Албании. Когда в 1448 году дело доходит до битвы на Amselfeld, турки оказываются победителями. Судьба сербов решена. В 1453 году Сербия окончательно оккупирована. С этого момента её история закончена на 400 лет. Её развитие превано, её будущее — быть под турками.³

Богомилы

Десять лет спустя та же участь постигла Боснию. Несмотря на затеваемые папой крестовые походы, богомилы воевали против Венгрии, Хорватии, против сербов и против республики Венеция за свою свободную государственность. Это было при Stefan Trcko. Он именуется себя «королём сербов и Боснии», позже «королём Боснии и Далмации». Во время одновременного упадка византийской, болгарской и сербской власти эта держава последней в юго-восточной Европе достигает своего расцвета. Она распростёрлась вдоль берега до города Каттаро (ныне Котор), но пришла в упадок со смертью Stefan Trcko. Враги богомилов ещё раз завоёвывают страну, однако уже в 1463 году и их сметают турки.

Но преследуемые богомилы — всё равно состоявшие в духовном родстве с суфиями, как на Западе с альбигойцами и в Боснии с арианскими вестготами — переходят в ислам и избегают по отношению к себе большей вражды. Таким образом, здесь сохраняется постоянный правящий слой, когда, к примеру, в Румынии этот слой был замещён фанариотами, это значит византийцами, поставленными турками для задач управления.

Пробуждение и ложный путь

В Сербии же, напротив, кроме турок и местных православных священников имелись только крестьяне. Дворянство было уничтожено. Однако именно среди этих сербских крестьян, как ни у кого из прочих балканских народов, воспоминание об утраченной свободе осталось стойким и живым. В своих далеко разбросанных горных селениях они на протяжении 400 лет несвободы воспевали своё гордое прошлое в песнях и сагах и передавали его от отца к сыну и от сына к внуку. Наконец, в конце 19 века с постепенным обретением государственной независимости отныне собственная сербская армия и быстро образующаяся каста политиков зашли под влиянием чуждых пространству образцов уже в 1918 году в тупик называющего себя «Югославия» ошибочного развития, в непрочную в долгосрочной перспективе тюрьму народов, построить которую вновь в 1945 году стоило огромных человеческих жертв. Больших жертв стоила так же начавшаяся в 1991 году упрямая попытка спасти то, что нельзя было спасти.

Две столицы

Очень поздно, незадолго перед 1 Мировой войной, после сперва выбранного для пребывания независимого сербского правительства Ниса, в конце концов сербской столицей стал Белград, город, на протяжении долгого времени едва ли бывший в самом деле сербским. Этот город под именем Сингидунум некогда служил римлянам как опорный пункт. Это название осталось позже в Византии. В 583 году он был покорён аварами, позже он принадлежал то Византии, то Венгрии. В 1456 году Hunyadi освобождает войско крестоносцев запертых в городе турками. Для сербов Белград был тогда ещё городом на внешней границе их области проживания. Впрочем, и Австрия возникла не в Вене.

Оба города с нетерпением ожидали власть, благодаря которой они смогли бы стать трамплином. Столетиями Вена была одновременно немецким пограничным городом и городом кайзера. В этом причина её повышенной опасности и её претензии на обладание Венгрией. Наоборот, перенос столицы маленькой Сербии на Дунай был недвусмысленным вызовом Австрии.

Местопребывание столицы может быть выражением отступления, как в 1917 году замена Петербурга Москвой или как в 1922 году замена Стамбула Анкарой, однако в приграничных столицах часто бывает выражением ожидаемого распространения территории, как в случае Вены и позже Белграда, впрочем также в своё время Берлина. Его изначальное местоположение на крайнем западе Пруссии предупредило её позднейшее продвижение на Маас и Мозель уже в 17 веке.

Но если мы спросим, возвращаясь к Вене и Белграду, об их самом бросающемся в глаза геополитическом различии, то мы заметим, что Белград находится сразу дважды в центре тяжести большого пространства, а Вена — между двумя, собственно говоря, между почти тремя большими пространствами, именно между франкским или западно-европейским и юго-востоком Европы, в то же время — через Моравию — граничит ещё с северо-востоком Европы. Её отличительный признак — это соединяющее, ищущее связь, но не покой в собственном весе, в собственном центре тяжести большого ландшафта. Ибо её ближайшее окружение — Моравия и восточная Нижняя Австрия — это опять же лишь малый промежуточный ландшафт между теми тремя большими пространствами и, следовательно, отсутствие собственного веса.

В этом отношении Вена представляется в невыгодном положении не только в сравнении с центрами тех больших ландшафтов, как, например, в сравнении с Парижем или Берлином или же с Белградом, но и в сравнении с такими центрами как Прага или Мюнхен. Перед 1866 годом этого не осознавали. И если вокруг Вены и строилось немецкое большое пространство, то это было не соответствующее ландшафту членение, но этническая гарантия. Однако именно этот фактор отсутствует в случае Белграда, отсутствует у сербов. Для них одних паннонское пространство слишком велико, как и весь юго-восток Европы. Они составляют в этих пространствах меньшинство среди многих народов.

И тем не менее, их незаменимое, геополитическое положение при малой численности сделало их — их и страну, их и Белград — предпочтительным рычагом чуждых этому пространству держав, который Франция и Россия прежде всего, но, конечно, и Англия использовали всегда против Вены, против Германии. Сербы оказались удобны для разжигания 1 Мировой войны.

Разрушенный эллипс

С отступлением турок немцы и сербы являются природными партнёрами в паннонском пространстве, но Вена и Белград как и прежде являются центрами эллипса. Превратить этот эллипс в политическое единство — таково было геополитическое требование. Это

требование исходило от Австрии, принц Евгений Савойский, казалось, исполнил его. Но что же произошло, едва он умер?

Совершенно неподготовлено объявили войну, которая собственно говоря была войной русских. Принц Евгений Савойский настоятельно советовал своему кайзеру оставить Марии Терезии сильное, в любое время готовое к битве войско. Но Карл VI уверенно — но, как мы знаем напрасно — вложил все деньги в Прагматическую санкцию 1713 года. Войско, его оснащение и вооружение пришли в упадок.

40000 человек стояли в Венгрии, но три корпуса были посланы в трёх различных направлениях — в Боснию, Сербию, Валахию — против врага; с 20000 восставшими сербами и албанцами не объединились; последние были разбиты турками. Ошибочно посланные в бой отряды кайзера в конце концов должны были вернуться со всех трёх фронтов.

Следующий год приносит бесславное окончание. Новый, требующий явно слишком многого от своего поражения главнокомандующий из-за незначительного проигрыша сразу же отступает за Дунай, просто бросает на произвол судьбы храбро защищавшийся Белград и посылает графа Найпперга в лагерь великого визиря для того, чтобы заключить мир. Мир даруется ему за уступки всех достигнутых Австрией в Пассаровицком мире областей. Одним росчерком пера была подарена Сербия.

«Надежда сербов вести под австрийским скипетром достойную жизнь, больше не имела места». Так говорится в VI11 томе изданной Шпамерсом в 1894 году в Лейпциге мировой истории. Продолжение гласит: «Если бы австрийцы стали оспаривать принадлежность Сербии, то Австрия стала бы господствующей на севере Балкан державой и немецкой культуре открылось бы там необозримое поле возможностей. Отныне все эти грандиозные перспективы были утрачены». Пьемонт по эту сторону Дуная

Эти перспективы всё же были не совсем утрачены, поскольку пятьдесят лет спустя, в 1789 году — во время Французской революции — Белград в теперь успешной в военном отношении войне был опять взят под начальством Лаудона, но в 1790 году согласно мирному договору между Австрией и Турцией в Систово Леопольд II восстановил *status quo ante bellum*, в этот раз будто бы под английским и прусским нажимом. С этого времени больше никто не продолжил дело принца Евгения Савойского. Однажды утраченное осталось утраченным, осталось таковым и в 1878 году. Тогда, во время занятия Боснии и Герцеговины Австрией, Мольтке, победитель Hradec Kralove, но теперь союзник, заметил, что победа будет неполной без принятия и всех прочих сербских областей. Он отчётливо понял, что сербы были для Австрии важнее, чем какой-либо народ их монархии кроме немцев.

Удовлетворить это ясное требование и подготовить его исполнение — этот путь ещё оставался, но не обязательно он был военным. Завоевывают не только посредством меча. Возможность создали ещё 17 и 18 столетия. С того времени вследствие массового заселения беженцев в Банате и в Сирмии имелось значительное сербское меньшинство и по эту сторону Дуная.⁴ К сожалению, это меньшинство так и не испытало соразмерного своей важности обхождения. Впрочем, уже Иосиф I в 1706 году и Карл VI в 1713 году подтвердили их старые, восходящие к 1690 году особые права. Поскольку сербское самоуправление всё же всегда было у ревнивой Венгрии бельмом на глазу, Карл VI вскоре снова отменил его, так как он зависел от признания Прагматической санкции венгерским рейхстагом.

Прагматическая санкция оказалась гигантским ошибочным инвестированием. Однако сербы требовали своих гарантированных прав. Сербский национальный конгресс выразил протест и уже в 1735 году дело дошло до крестьянского восстания, которое было подавлено в 1736 году. Габсбурги снова сделали ошибочный ход. Речь шла о том, чтобы сделать из сербов по эту сторону Дуная сербский Пьемонт.

Пожалуй, подобного рода ходы мысли были сначала чужды 18 веку, но в 1790 году, когда Леопольд II основал «Иллирийскую канцелярию при дворе», уже не могли иметь места.

Достижение сербов на военной границе, безусловная надёжность этих «пограничников» и их потомков до 1914 года оправдали попытку сделать их передовым отрядом сербской свободы. Зачем, собственно говоря, отправились на фронт принц Евгений Савойский и Лаудон? Для чего же иного создали предпосылки их победы?

Однако вместо того, чтобы причинять неудобства туркам или венграм, в Вене стали рыть яму для России. Полумерами ничего не достичь, ни по отношению к Богу, ни на земле.

Перевод с немецкого Ю.Ю. Коринца

ВОЙНА В ПЕРСИДСКОМ ЗАЛИВЕ — ВОЙНА ПРОТИВ ЕВРОПЫ

Австрийский генерал Йордис фон Лохаузен — крупнейший современный геополитик, прямой продолжатель геополитической школы Карла Хаусхофера. Наиболее известны его работы “Мужество властвовать” и “Стратегия выживания”, где он излагает основы своего понимания истории Европы, ее интересов, ее будущего. Лохаузен является радикальным противником атлантистских геополитических концепций и открыто выступает с конца 60-ых годов за освобождение Европы от американской оккупации. Лохаузен является сторонником концепции “Европейской Империи”, впервые сформулированной бельгийцем Жаном Тириаром.

Достаточно взглянуть на карту мира, чтобы увидеть континенты нашей планеты как три пояса, охватывающие ее с севера на юг. Первый, от Аляски до Огненной земли, образует Новый Свет, Америку. Вторым, от Северного мыса до мыса Доброй Надежды представляет собой континентальную часть Старого Света, Евро-Африку. Третий пояс проходит от Камчатки до Тасмании через Китай, Юго-восточную Азию и Индонезию и образует собой восточную часть, Австрало-Азию.

В центре центра

Между Евро-Африкой и Австрало-Азией (ближе к последней) находится на севере русско-сибирский пласт, а на юге — Ближний Восток. Он образует центр Старого Света, центр, в сердце которого располагается регион Персидского залива. Этот регион — ахиллесова пята Старого Света, место где на плечо Зигфрида упал липовый лист. И вопрос не только в нефти. Нигде больше океаны так глубоко не вдаются в афро-евразийский континент: Индийский океан через Красное море и Персидский залив, Атлантический океан через Средиземное и Черное моря. Между двумя океанами, равно удаленный от Африки и Азии, в устье Тигра и Евфрата находится древний город Ур. Это и есть “центр центра”, о котором мы будем говорить, — во всех отношениях самое уязвимое место Старого Света. Все потрясения, происходящие на планете, отражаются здесь. С насильственного открытия японских портов во время войны 1854 года, политика Соединенных Штатов заключается в установлении плацдармов на берегах Старого Света, а также в создании потенциальных “островных трамплинов”. Таким образом, американцы еще в 1898 г. обосновались на Филиппинах и в 1945 г. в Японии. Лишь после этого они направились в Южную Корею и Вьетнам. Этому предшествовали, соответственно, высадка в Нормандии, размещение войск в Германии и фактическое подчинение Западной Европы. Характерно, что эти плацдармы располагаются на территориях с высоким уровнем развития и на границах Атлантического или Тихого океанов, т.е. океанов, омывающих двойной афро-евразийский континент, а не, скажем, на таком хрупком южном фасаде, как Индийский океан.

Район Персидского залива находится именно в этой уязвимой зоне, в точке пересечения крупных силовых линий, связывающих Дальний Восток с Африкой и Европу с Индией. Здесь, на подступах к заливу, исламский мир разделяется на арабскую и персидскую части. Всякий, кто обосновался в этом районе, может создать защиту или угрозу по всем направлениям на флангах или тылах не только Среднего Востока, но и Европы, Индии и Африки. Кроме этого, такое расположение предполагает попытку создания третьего фронта против русской военной державы, все еще непокоренной. Позиция в заливе укрепляет также тылы Турции — союзника против России — и создает давление на Египет, Сирию и Иран, а также на Европу, и все это, главным образом, благодаря нефти. Последнее, кстати, важно и для Японии.

Война против Европы?

Была ли война в заливе войной против Европы? Ответ на этот вопрос был дан замечательным образом в католическом журнале “Трента джорни” профессором политических наук Миланского университета. Он заявляет: “Соединенные Штаты поняли, что, если они не хотят пережить тот же закат, что и Советский Союз, они должны противостоять своим завтрашним противникам, то есть Японии и объединенной Европе, центром которой является экономическая мощь Германии. Никто не позволит развенчать себя за здорово живешь. Америка не может мириться с Европой, которая в настоящее время, несмотря на слабую мобилизацию, опережает ее экономически и технически. Осознав, что в один прекрасный день они уже не смогут влиять на Европу, Соединенные Штаты сделали ставку на Средний Восток и на контроль над саудовским нефтяным краном, от которого Германия и Япония будут зависеть еще десятилетия, если им не удастся использовать сибирские резервы. Только тогда Средний Восток и воздействие, которое можно на него оказывать, утратят свое значение” (его стратегическая позиция по-прежнему остается главной). Для американцев окончательный случай представился в 1991 году, благодаря политическому устранению Советского Союза. Эти обстоятельства были заложены решением Рейгана истощить Москву гонкой вооружения; спровоцированы, как написано в сценарии, Саддамом Хусейном; воплощены, по тому же сценарию, Джорджем Бушем. На самом же деле этот план восходит к Киссинджеру, и был разработан под его покровительством. В 1975 году план был опубликован в журнале “Комментари”, позднее он появился в “Харперс мэгазин” под заголовком “Завладеть нефтью”.

Настоящие побежденные — союзники

Только поверхностное изучение вооруженных конфликтов может составить мнение, что противник — это только тот, с кем ведут войну. Часто, страны, победоносно участвовавшие в конфликте, могут констатировать, что основы их независимости или процветания подорваны (нередко и то и другое одновременно). Способ превращения своих собственных союзников в вассалов с помощью войны, осуществляемой совместно, стар как мир. Американцы являются подражателями своих далеких учителей римлян. Такими они показали себя в двух мировых войнах, в которых участвовали с большой выгодой для себя. В обоих случаях предлогом было разрушение немецкого могущества, тогда как цель простиралась намного дальше. Союзники Америки всегда брали на себя расходы в этом альянсе. Список, подтверждающий это, длинный: от Польши до Тайваня и Южного Вьетнама, вместе с колониальными европейскими империями, существовавшими после 1918 года во главе с Великобританией. После общей победы Америка становилась наследницей их могущества, или их доходных мест.

Тот, кто имеет власть над арабо-персидской нефтью, имеет ее и над Западной Европой и Японией, которые стали рабами не только нефти, но и, следовательно, державы ее контролирующей.

В американской имперской политике было бы непростительной небрежностью по возвращении из Персидского залива не натянуть сильнее вожжи Европейскому Сообществу, все более строптивому, и индустриально опасной Японии. Как обычно, мало рискуя при вмешательстве в сферу исламского влияния, Вашингтон должен был посчитать забавным удивительное усердие своих союзников, особенно немцев, преданных и лучших учеников в “атлантическом” классе, которые любезно согласились финансировать войну, способствующую их ослаблению.

Большая иллюзия беспомощных

Война в заливе припала к стати Америке. Ведь нужно, чтобы миллиарды, вложенные в вооружение на протяжении десятилетий, наконец стали рентабельными, а ожидаемые заказы на обновление военной машины быстро стимулировали бы нуждающуюся в этом экономику. Но особенно, чтобы мелкие, безызвестные, не имеющие званий, разбитые враги Второй мировой войны или обескровленные союзники не были готовы обогнать Америку в сфере экономики. Но прежде чем развеять их иллюзии, можно позволить им “поиграть во дворе со старшими”, а война поможет поставить их на место. Война, направленная не прямо против них, а скорее, имеющая целью один из источников их процветания.

Контроль над месторождениями полезных ископаемых усиливает превосходство хорошо вооруженной экономической державы над другими, менее сильными. Можно также считать, что заведомым преимуществом и подстраховкой для США является нахождение на ее собственной территории важнейших ресурсов для ее выживания и военных возможностей. В случае необходимости, страны, богатые полезными ископаемыми, но строптивные будут вынуждены раскаиваться, или — под воздействием пропаганды, проводимой в мировом масштабе и поддерживаемой террористическими группами (подпольными или зарубежными), или под давлением экономического бойкота, как это было в течение многих лет с Южной Африкой. Борьба против апартеида — идеологическое прикрытие этой кампании — была как нельзя кстати. Целью в Южной Африке была руда, необходимая в военной промышленности, а точнее, прекращение ее естественной монополии. Экономика Западной Европы, которая стала развиваться после 1945 года, не может больше процветать без некоторых металлов, имеющих только в Южной Африке, а также без арабской нефти. Падение черной власти в Южной Африке беспрепятственно приведет вышеупомянутые месторождения в руки влиятельных американских групп.

Результат, достигнутый в Персидском заливе, а именно возрастающий разрыв связей между Европой и мысом Доброй Надежды — несомненный успех американской политики, и что бы ни говорили, поражение, нанесенное европейцам. Такова цена за отказ от могущества в угоду потреблению. Теперь, более чем когда-либо, необходимыми полезными ископаемыми можно обладать только воспользовавшись услугами посредника, американского, разумеется.

Упущенные возможности

Однако после двух мировых войн в большей степени географические факторы, нежели исторические, способствовали экономическому союзу под европейским началом (по принципу самоопределения народов, а не по американскому принципу “национального строительства”), Африки и Европы, ставших естественным дополнением друг друга. Установление на восточной части Старого Света “азиатской сферы совместного процветания”, предполагаемого японцами, также потерпело поражение больше из-за нетерпимости последних к соседним народам, чем по причине американской победы на Тихом океане. Из-за мелких дряг своих лидеров и арабские страны не могут расширить круг своих совместных

действий. Подтверждение этому — Средний Восток, где вслед за американским вторжением можно ожидать консолидацию границ или повторяющийся отказ на право самоопределения народов, угнетенных религией, в первом ряду которых фигурируют курды. В этом есть и вина европейцев, как французов, так и англичан, отказавшихся от своего господства над арабским пространством, хотя после первой мировой войны оно было признано за ними. Таким образом, именно они оставили после себя незаконченное

дело чреватое осложнениями как уже не раз бывало. Примеры тому — трудное рождение Югославии и уход англичан и французов из Африки после 1945 года. Так что во всем происшедшем европейцы должны винить только самих себя.

перевод Л.Гоголевой

Жан Парвулеско

ГЕОПОЛИТИКА ТРЕТЬЕГО ТЫСЯЧЕЛЕТИЯ

“Индия с давних пор претендует на тотальную политическую гегемонию в Южной Азии.”

Дэян Дземин

Вместе с пятью ядерными испытаниями, проведенными Пакистаном в Белуджинстане в ответ на пять таких испытаний, осуществленных Индией, Южная Азия внезапно ворвалась в “большую историю”: отныне планетарное политико-историческое существование наций будет определяться лишь их способностью к эффективному метастратегическому ядерному сдерживанию. Вплоть до последнего времени единственной азиатской ядерной державой был Китай. И именно в сопоставлении с Китаем, а не с Пакистаном, как это может показаться на первый взгляд, следует оценивать метастратегическое вступление Индии в сферу активной континентальной геополитики. В настоящее время континентальная ядерная конфронтация протекает именно между Индией и Китаем, а Пакистан, несмотря на все претензии и усилия, играет здесь вспомогательную роль, призванную усилить антииндийский лагерь Китая, к которому в дальнейшем могут примкнуть и другие страны.

Тотальная геополитика Великого евразийского Континента, революционная, авангардная геополитика, утверждающая финальную имперскую концепцию интеграции в рамках общего изначального метаисторического предназначения — Западной Европы, Восточной Европы, России, Великой Сибири, Индии и Японии — явно исключает Китай из активного определения велико-континентального евразийского объединения. В некотором смысле, прогрессирующая потенциальная унификация Великого Континента направлена именно против Китая, и Индия в этом отношении явно поддерживается метастратегическим континентальным потенциалом России и Франции. Процесс велико-континентальной интеграции — вещь диалектическая.

В то же время индийско-китайская ядерная конфронтация на Юго-востоке Азии требует от Японии немедленного решения, необратимого стратегического выбора, который — как только он будет осуществлен — заставит ее примкнуть к велико-континентальному лагерю, чьим региональным полюсом на Юго-востоке является Индия. Это решение должно быть принято несмотря на вполне понятную ядерную психопатологию японцев.

Все идет к тому, что евразийская история ближайшего будущего будет состоять в ядерном окружении Китая (включая его стратегических сателлитов) ансамблем велико-континентальных имперских держав, входящих в политическую линию оси Париж-Берлин-Москва-Нью-Дели-Токио.

Отношение к этому демаршу со стороны США заведомо вписано в модель основных геополитических соответствий, так как финальная и решающая схватка — начало которой уже можно считать положенным — между Великим Континентом и Соединенными Штатами, соответствует основной силовой линии фундаментального онтологического антагонизма между “континентальными” и “островными” могуществами, а также не вызывает никаких сомнений тот факт, что появление политически единой Европы (как бы ни препятствовали ему активно работающие против этого проекта теневые, закулисные силы) создаст в определенный момент непреодолимую преграду для окончательной реализации “большого плана” США по установлению планетарной гегемонии. Силовое появление Великой Европы в диалектической игре по утверждению имперского планетарного могущества снова вернет США к статусу

второстепенной державы, и тем самым окончательно разрушит пресловутый “американский миф”.

По этой причине США объединят усилия по нейтрализации Великой Европы со стремлениями Китая противостоять его континентальному окружению. Это явно приведет к большому союзу Пекин-Вашингтон, при котором Китай предложит США гигантский плацдарм на Востоке Евразии, а США обеспечат Китаю выход на рыночные просторы, контролируемые этой океанической силой.

В то же время агрессивная антиконтинентальная перманентная геополитика США обретает сегодня внутри велико-континентального пространства новый огромный резервуар подрывных и конспирологических могуществ, сосредоточенных в сфере проатлантических версий фундаменталистского ислама (особенно ваххабитского или талибского типа), которые на всей протяженности южного берега Евразии присоединятся к активности геополитической крепости Китая, негативное излучение которого внутренне дестабилизирует и блокирует дальневосточное звено велико-континентальной интеграции, которым должна стать Япония.

В недавно вышедшей книге высокопоставленного французского чиновника Александра Дельваля “Исламизм и США, альянс против Европы”, сказано все необходимое относительно проблемы наступательного метастратегического использования США определенного фундаменталистского (ваххабитского) ислама в их борьбе против велико-континентального европейского возрождения, которое в данный момент переживает стадию решительного утверждения и революционного имперского самоопределения.

В условиях таких планетарных конвергенций особая миссия Франции (или, точнее, велико-континентального каролингского полюса утвержденной генералом Де Голлем оси Франция-Германия) заключается в идеологической поляризации и в объединении на почве осознания общности судьбы всего ансамбля элементов евразийского Великого Континента перед лицом агрессивного вызова США и Китая, а также перед лицом подрывной миссии, которую США определяют атлантическим разновидностям ислама, ведущим борьбу с велико-континентальным проектом.

Планетарному полюсу евразийского Великого Континента, чьей конечной и тайной целью является выбор духовной перспективы, противостоит материалистический блок оси Вашингтон-Пекин, находящийся под явным или все еще скрытым началом мондиалистской группировки в США, которая под маской установления планетарной экономической гегемонии стремится положить конец онтологической цивилизации Бытия — нашей цивилизации, вплоть до изменения самого статуса человека, который в нашем мире основан на инерциальном продолжении традиционных европейских, индуистских и японских концепций, верных мистерии “света бытия”.

Из этого следует также, что в ответ на активное политико-экономическое проникновение США в Африку Европа должна немедленно предпринять наступательную контр-интервенцию в Латинскую Америку, которая в геополитическом смысле является для США тем же, чем Африка для Европы — континентом-дублем, связанным с основным материком цепочкой прямых геополитических ревербераций.

Европейские элементы глубокого политико-революционного внедрения в настоящее время заметны в Аргентине и Чили, отталкиваясь от которых должна быть развернута масштабная наступательная революционная интеграция всего Южно-Американского континента.

В определенном смысле, проблема ближайшей планетарной идентификации мировой истории сводится к готовности Франции исполнить свое тайное, глубинное, бездонное предназначение, которое требует от нее новой (финальной) инициативы по метаисторической велико-континентальной интеграции, и именно Франция должна добиться того, чтобы эта интеграция увенчалась своим последним имперским триумфом.

По этой причине совершенно необходимо, чтобы во Франции пробудилась новая, неожиданная воля, способная утвердить открыто глубинные основы провиденциального

предназначения Франции, революционным образом мобилизовать их, становясь полюсом тотальной наступательной стратегии — и это будет новым началом французской истории, истории Европы и евразийского Великого Континента в целом. Иными словами, тайная Франция, параллельная Франция должна — как по волшебству — обнаружить себя из-под того жалкого, ничтожного состояния, куда она ниспала сегодня, исторгнуть из себя спасительное дыхание нового восхождения к бытию, чтобы “все снова вступило в зону высшего внимания”. Именно это с незапамятных времен ждуг и готовят “наши” — приход Тайной Франции к финальной политико-исторической власти.

Китайский президент Дзян Дземин недавно заявил, что “Индия с давних пор претендует на тотальную политическую гегемонию в Южной Азии”. Китайский президент Дзян Дземин несколько не ошибся. Действительно, Индия с давних пор претендует на тотальную политическую гегемонию в Южной Азии, но только не от своего собственного имени, но в пользу имперского велико-континентального единства, пламя которого хранит Тайная Франция.

Известно, что Россия отказывается от настоящего политического диалога с Францией, взятой в отдельности. Точно так же она поступает и с Германией. Но вместе с тем Россия полностью предрасположена к тому, чтобы развивать и укреплять решающий политический диалог с франко-германской осью, взятой целиком. Таково же и отношение Индии к Западной Европе, так как на конфиденциальном уровне Индия давно готова безусловно поддержать Россию в ее велико-континентальном диалоге с Францией и Германией.

Перемещение критического центра тяжести современной велико-континентальной геополитики с Запада на Восток является знаком фундаментальной метастратегической эволюции актуальной ситуации, чье содержание может показаться на первый взгляд двусмысленным.

Всякое перемещение центра тяжести к Востоку подразумевает, провозглашает и основывает начало нового исторического цикла. Сегодняшнее членение России вследствие неудавшейся марксистской авантюры пройдет как только закончится нынешнее тысячелетие, и мы увидим великий знак рождения Новой России, которое скажется напрямую на успешном осуществлении политико-исторического велико-континентального проекта. Именно Россия станет тогда геополитическим спасительным “мостом из Европы в Индию”.

Велико-континентальная ангажированность каролингского франко-германского полюса в пользу Индии и Японии реализуется через Россию, через Новую Россию, чье тотальное евразийское развитие обнаружит во всем его фундаментальном значении heartland — “высшую и финальную сердцевинную землю” Великого Континента.

На двух противоположных концах евразийского Великого Континента Индия и Франция притягиваются двумя океанами — Тихим на Востоке и Атлантическим на Западе. Особым значением в случае Франции обладает притяжение к южной Атлантике — к Южной Америке и Антарктике. Поскольку именно в Антарктике, как кое-кто из наших уже знает, будет решаться высочайшая судьба евразийского Великого Континента. Это последний секрет трансцендентальной геополитики, секрет, который нам отныне надо постоянно учитывать.

Для Франции наступает момент отбросить банальность собственной ничтожной современной истории и открыться для своего последнего, тайного, высочайшего предназначения.

Мировая история приближается сейчас к решительному повороту, к точке завершения и нового начала, третье тысячелетие символизирует возврат к истокам. В первый раз за десять тысяч лет народы евразийского Великого Континента, от Европы до Индии, захватив бразды политико-исторического становления всего евразийского ансамбля в свои руки, окажутся в состоянии восстановить то праединство изначального бытия, высокого сознания и общей судьбы, которое предшествовало их историческому разделению.

Великий метаисторический цикл завершается, замыкаясь сам на себя, его конец сливается с его началом. Конец одного мира возвещает о начале мира иного.

По ту сторону внешних политических обстоятельств, которые на самом деле представляют собой обманчивые миражи полной и неизлечимой катастрофы, будущее воссоединение евразийского Великого Континента трансцендентально вписано в логику исторического становления, и никто и ничто не сможет этому воспрепятствовать. Получив контроль над полюсами, над Арктикой и Антарктикой, евразийский Великий Континент обретет решительное и тотальное планетарное владычество, перейдя в состояние *Imperium Ultimum*, абсолютную власть над финальной историей этого мира. Это будет онтологическая доминация над историей и над тем, что трансцендентно находится по ту сторону истории, являясь “последней целью”. И все это уже заложено в форме зародыша в новой конвергенции активной планетарной геополитики, развитие которой мы должны контролировать и направлять. Нет ничего, кроме воли. Нет ничего, кроме предназначения. Все становится день ото дня более рискованным. В июне 1998 года Билл Клинтон провел “девять дней в Китае”, заложив тем самым безотзывным и откровенным образом стратегическую базу финального американско-китайского наступления на велико-континентальный евразийский фронт, на его решающие геополитические позиции.

Сюда же относятся и объявленные совместные американско-китайские морские маневры — знак принятого решения о политико-стратегических позициях, прикрытием которым служит видимость экономических проектов, и в жертву которым легко приносятся элементы демократической доктрины, связанные с соблюдением (или несоблюдением) “прав человека”. Все это было окончательно утверждено в момент июньского визита Клинтона в Пекин.

Теперь ясно, что откровенный антиконтинентальный заговор Китая и США заставляет нас обнаружить глубинную решимость дать этому отпор в метастратегическом ключе велико-континентальной линии со стороны действующих лиц евразийского проекта — в первую очередь, со стороны Франции и Индии. Решимость Франции, представляющий крайний Запад Евразии, и Индии, представляющий ее крайний Восток, должна повлиять на Россию в вопросе радикального и необратимого выбора ею будущего пути.

Итак, геополитические силовые линии будущих планетарных вспышек третьего тысячелетия обозначены. Остальное зависит от нашей воли к выживанию, от полноты нашего осознания и освоения бездн нашей собственной судьбы.

Эмрик Шопрад

БОЛЬШАЯ ИГРА

Окончание идеологического противостояния в рамках биполярной системы привело многих аналитиков к заключению о том, что началась эра всеобщего мира под знаком “либерализма” и “демократии”. Но в таком подходе почему-то не учитывается такой факт: большинство этих конфликтов основано не на идеологических, но на национальных противоречиях, что в них решающим фактором является именно геополитика. Мир и после окончания “холодной войны” не только сотрясается от малых региональных конфликтов на почве утверждения различными народами своей национальной и культурной идентичности, но — и это самое важное — все такие конфликты прекрасно вписываются в противостояние мирового масштаба между великими державами. Эта борьба наглядно проявляется в отказе таких великих держав как Россия и Китай признавать диктат американского империализма.

В Восточной Европе и в Средней Азии Вашингтон и его союзники ведут игру против России, урезанное территориально. Повсюду и в Восточной Европе, куда продвигается НАТО, и в гигантской битве за сферы влияния, которая разворачивается в Средней Азии, на Кавказе, на Украине Вашингтон со своими сателлитами — Германией, Турцией, Пакистаном — стремится подорвать российское влияние. Войны в Грузии, в Азербайджане, в Таджикистане и в Афганистане являются элементами новой Большой Игры, которая разворачивается между Россией и американской империей. Узбекистан представляет собой разновидность терминала, — в самом сердце Средней Азии, — где заканчивается свободный для США путь от Индийского океана в глубь континента. При этом Туркменистан все больше отдаляется от Москвы в сторону Турции и США.

В Европе новая Югославия, состоящая из Сербии и Черногории все более сближается с Россией, с Грецией, с Румынией и Кипром, образуя эскиз православного блока, противопоставленного неформализованному альянсу США и Германии в этой зоне. Этот атлантистский альянс включает в себя и турецкое крыло, включая Боснию. Косовский конфликт, разворачивающийся в самом центре того, что составляет полюс идентичности для исторического самосознания сербов, и раздуваемый албанцами при явной опеке ЦРУ является другим проявлением Большой Игры.

На Ближнем и Среднем Востоке стратегия американского империализма и его верного союзника Израиля привела к возникновению союза, еще недавно казавшегося невозможным — к сближению Дамаска, Багдада и Тегерана, хотя между этими тремя географически близкими государствами существует множество серьезнейших региональных противоречий.

Оправляясь после первого потрясения распада коммунистических режимов на своей традиционной периферии, Россия понемногу поднимает голову. Постепенная нормализация русско-украинских отношений и инициативы Москвы в вопросе Ирака явно об этом свидетельствуют. Напомним, что Борис Ельцин упомянул о возможности начала третьей мировой войны именно в связи с Иракским конфликтом...

Другая великая держава все меньше и меньше готова признавать диктат американского империализма. Это Китай. Мы окончательно вышли из эпохи русско-китайского конфликта, который в период биполярности объяснялся стремлением к идеологическому

лидерству в социалистическом лагере. Ось Москва-Пекин противостоит отныне оси Вашингтон-Токио. Новый Китай стремится обрести в Азии те же самые позиции, которые он занимал до прихода европейцев в XIX веке. Морские претензии Китая уже однозначно проявлены в Китайском море и Индийском океане, что подводит вплотную к началу китайско-индийского конфликта. Новый фактор — чтобы усилить свои позиции против Японии, Пекин пытается сблизиться с Ханоем.

Большая Игра в мировом масштабе постепенно все более приводит к оппозиции между проамериканскому империализму “либеральных демократий” и “клубом проклятых”: Китая, Ирана, Северной Кореи (которая активно сотрудничает в сфере ракетостроения с Тегераном), Кубы и Ирака...

Мировые конфликты возникают только тогда, когда налицо конкуренция интересов в мировом масштабе. Комментарии средств массовой информации внушают нам ложную идею, будто региональные конфликты являются частными аномалиями, независимыми от глобального контекста и проистекают из провинциального невежества местного населения. На самом деле геополитику следует уподобить движению тектонических платформ. Гигантские платформы скользят и сталкиваются друг с другом. В некоторых точках удары настолько сильны, что они порождают землетрясения. Но сам факт землетрясения не самостоятелен — в нем находят свое выражение невидимые подземные масштабные процессы...

(перевод с французского А.Д.)

Александр Дугин

The Rest Against The West

1. Два типа мондиализма

В современном осмыслении стратегической позиции Запада со стороны безусловных приверженцев западной цивилизации существует две магистральных линии, которые по-разному видят положение вещей в современном мире и предлагают два противоположных проекта. Важно отметить, что обе линии едины в том, что во главу угла здесь ставятся интересы Запада, понятого как наивысшая и безусловная цивилизационная ценность. Можно назвать условно эти два интеллектуальных лагеря среди западников "левым мондиализмом" и "правым мондиализмом".

Термин "мондиализм" означает, в самом широком смысле, концепцию интеграции планеты под началом Запада, создание в далекой перспективе единого Мирового Государства с единым Мировым Правительством. Однако на достижение этой цели существует два противоположных взгляда: условно "левый" и "правый".

"Левый мондиализм" исходит из предпосылки, что условия планетарной интеграции в целом уже налицо, и что общим знаменателем для такой интеграции служат повсеместные тенденции к победе либерально-демократических тенденций в самых различных обществах, установление повсюду рыночных режимов и распространение идеологии "прав человека". "Левый мондиализм" имеет тенденцию пренебрегать "пережитками" традиционных обществ, такими как религия, этническая и расовая принадлежность, социальные иерархии, этические нормы и т. д., считая, что они сами по себе скоро сойдут на нет в однородном технотронно-информационном планетарном обществе без границ и наций.

Ярчайшим выразителем такого "левого мондиализма" (или иначе "оптимистического мондиализма") является американец Фрэнсис Фукуяма, озаглавивший свою программную работу "Конец истории". Он утверждает, что до появления однородного планетарного либерально-демократического общества, сверстанного по образцу западной цивилизации и управляемого западной "элитой", остались считанные годы. Развал советской системы Фукуяма однозначно отождествил с наступлением "Конца истории", понятым как тотальное утверждение либерально-капиталистического порядка с его логикой, его управляемостью, его системой. Фукуяма высказывал концентрированно позицию, в целом свойственную американским демократам. В Европе аналогичные проекты развивал советник бывшего президента Франции Франсуа Миттерана Жак Аттали (см. "Элементы" N2), при этом рассматривая "конец истории" в мистической, иудео-мессианской перспективе (которая формально отсутствует у Фукуямы). (А *propos*, недавно Аттали издал новое произведение "Он придет", в котором актуальные социально-политические катаклизмы трактуются в перспективе каббалистической эсхатологии; здесь смысл мондиалистского понимания "конца истории" проявляется еще более откровенно и отчетливо, чем раньше.)

Вторая линия мондиализма, т.н. "правый мондиализм", напротив, рассматривает актуальную ситуацию довольно пессимистично, считая, что Верховенство Запада и планетарная интеграция под его началом всех народов земли наталкивается на множество

серьезнейших преград, которые и не думают исчезать, как этого хотелось бы мондиалистам. "Правые мондиалисты" указывают на тот факт, что крах главного врага Запада — советского блока — привел не к подлинной либерализации и демократизации бывшего советского мира, но к появлению на его месте разнообразных религиозных и национальных образований, не имеющих никакого желания снова отказываться от своей политической и культурной самобытности. Таким образом, предпосылки для "конца истории" еще совершенно не созрели, и прежде, чем такой конец действительно наступит, миру предстоит пройти через сложный этап цивилизационных конфликтов на основе вновь образовавшихся пространственно-политических и культурных единиц. В такой перспективе, "правые мондиалисты" считают, что на данном этапе необходимо укреплять западный мир, превращать его в надежно защищенную крепость, которая должна пережить период "войны цивилизаций" (clash of civilisations) и лишь потом приступить к реальной интеграции планеты и созданию Мирового Правительства.

Самым известным представителем этой "правой" линии мондиализма является Самуэл Хантингтон, изложение программной статьи которого мы привели выше. Хантингтон является выразителем мнения консервативных кругов США, и особенно Республиканской партии. Его полемика с Фукуямой отражает гораздо более глобальные реальности, нежели расхождения во взглядах двух конкретных аналитиков. Это столкновение двух базовых тенденций мондиализма, а следовательно, оба автора выражают позиции, которые жизненно отражаются на судьбах всех народов земли, поскольку в любом случае степень влияния Запада на цивилизационные процессы современного мира огромна. А от того, чья линия будет принята Западом к руководству — Фукуямы или Хантингтона — будет во многом зависеть будущее человечества.

Условно на основании главнейших теоретических текстов Фукуямы и Хантингтона можно обозначить два мондиалистских проекта ("левый" и "правый") как "Конец истории" (The End of History) и "Война цивилизаций" (Clash of Civilisations).

2. Антимондиализм и два проекта

Мондиалисты рассматривают актуальное положение вещей, естественно, исходя из своих интересов и взвешивая плюсы и минусы со своих позиций. Для последовательных и сознательных противников Запада и его модели, для всех антимондиалистских сил, от чего бы они ни отталкивались — православие, ислам, конфуцианство, социализм, национализм, традиция и т.д. — вполне логично рассматривать нынешнюю картину мира в обратной перспективе, беря с минусом то, что мондиалисты берут с плюсом, и наоборот. Следовательно, все тенденции отмеченные мондиалистами как позитивные, должны рассматриваться как негативные, и наоборот.

В качестве абсолютно негативной ценности, совершенной антиутопии, следует взять Фукуяму и его "идеал", который представляет для антимондиалистов самое страшное, что только может случиться. Таким образом, тезис о либеральном Конце Истории должен быть рассмотрен как радикально враждебная концепция, как принцип "общего врага", перед лицом которого должны сплотиться все антимондиалистские силы и тенденции, независимо от своих внутренних различий. Фигура Фукуямы и его тезисы должны быть взяты в радикально манихейской перспективе как Абсолютное Зло, как учение "детей тьмы". Сами левые мондиалисты также довольно ясно отдают себе отчет в том, что наступление конца истории требует отмены, т.е. уничтожения того, что составляло сущность истории — религий, наций, рас, традиций, культур. Поэтому здесь речь идет о действительном дуализме, так как осуществление фукуямовского проекта и сохранение

традиционных ценностей несовместимы. В этом смысле Запад становится для антимондиалистов синонимом чистого Зла, что возвращает нас к буквальному смыслу ритуала православного крещения, когда крещаемый трижды "отрицается сатаны", повернувшись лицом на Запад, к символическому "месту ада", противоположному Востоку, символическому "месту рая".

Таким образом, левый мондиализм является абсолютно негативной концепцией; вся ее ценность лишь в том, что она настолько отрицательна, что представляет собой очень удобную модель для консолидации всех сил, органически несовместимых с теорией мирового либерально-демократического режима, тотального космополитизма, One World. По Фукуяме, как по лакмусовой бумажке, следует определять стратегических союзников и стратегических противников: если Фукуяма вызывает одобрение, мы имеем дело с абсолютными врагами традиционного общества, с "детьми тьмы". Здесь все очевидно. Но с "правым мондиализмом", с теорией "войны цивилизаций", с концепцией Хантингтона дело обстоит сложнее.

Хантингтон, на самом деле, не является противником Фукуямы, его идеологическим оппонентом. Он также, как и Фукуяма, согласен признать высшей ценностью западную цивилизацию и озабочен ее доминацией над миром. Но в отличие от оптимизма Фукуямы Хантингтон сосредоточивает свое внимание не на описании мондиалистской либеральной утопии, а на выделении тех факторов, которые препятствуют в настоящее время и будут препятствовать в будущем ее реализации. Иными словами, если Фукуяма склонен не обращать внимания на остаточные аспекты традиционного уклада в жизни народов и государств, считая, что они сами собой нивелируются в общепланетарной рыночной мондиалистской структуре, то Хантингтон, напротив, внимательно анализирует антимондиалистские, т.е. антизападные тенденции и предсказывает, что им еще суждено сыграть важную роль в битве с Западом.

В этом смысле Хантингтон реалистичнее и объективнее Фукуямы. Но это ничего не меняет в той системе приоритетов, которыми он сам и стоящие за ним круги руководствуются.

Для антимондиалистов анализ Хантингтона очень важен, поскольку он выделяет несколько конкретных факторов, которые препятствуют реализации "Конца истории". Следовательно, именно эти факторы должны особенно внимательно изучаться и использоваться теми силами, которые стремятся сорвать мондиалистские планы. Но при этом важно ясно осознать, что те "уступки" традиционному обществу, которые делает Хантингтон в своем пессимистическом (для мондиалистов) прогнозе, он сам рассматривает как временные препятствия, непреодолимые в настоящий момент, но обреченные на поражение перед лицом универсальной и интеграционной миссии Запада. Поэтому истинный антимондиализм должен выдвинуть свой собственный третий проект, который был бы полной противоположностью Фукуяме, но при этом радикализовал бы антимондиалистские элементы, которые допускаются в проекте "войны цивилизаций" Хантингтона. Это требует внесения некоторых изменений в тот анализ ситуации, который Хантингтон предлагает со своей стороны.

3. Третий проект

Во-первых, надо сразу заметить, что выделяемые Хантингтоном цивилизации не являются равнозначными системами, соотносящимися друг с другом схожим образом. Среди них есть несколько цивилизаций, которые явно обладают универсалистскими претензиями и

совершенно особо понимают историческую телеологию, т.е. смысл и цель истории человечества. Другие же цивилизации, несмотря на свою развитость, древность и духовную полноценность обладают все же локальным характером, эсхатологически не заострены и не претендуют на универсальную миссию в планетарном масштабе. Это соображение привносит первое важнейшее деление в перечисленные Хантингтоном цивилизационные круги.

Так, западная, исламская и славяно-православная цивилизации явно обладают своей собственной универсалистской идеей, полагая, что только им принадлежит последнее слово в истории человечества. Тогда как конфуцианская, японская, индуистская, латиноамериканская и потенциальная африканская цивилизации никакой глобальной теологической миссией сами себя не наделяют, либо, если некоторые попытки все же имеются, речь идет о довольно искусственных и маргинальных теориях. Таким образом, потенциальные войны между цивилизациями изначально приобретают совершенно различную семантическую нагрузку.

Конфликт между цивилизациями с претензиями на универсальность — это один случай, теоретически предполагающий глобальность в самой своей основе.

Конфликт между цивилизациями без мессианских тенденций имеет совершенно иное значение, ограниченное региональными аспектами.

И наконец, можно рассмотреть третий случай, когда речь идет о потенциальном столкновении мессианской и немессианской цивилизаций. Это явно имеет новое, третье значение.

Иными словами, можно сказать, что три мессиански ориентированные цивилизации скорее всего будут динамически провоцировать конфликты на планетарной шкале, т.е. действовать не просто как рядовые цивилизационные субъекты, но как носители интегральной планетарной идеологии. Следовательно, эти цивилизации — западную, исламскую и православную — следует с самого начала рассматривать как главных участников идеологической войны относительно смысла истории, в которую они постараются втянуть остальные локальные цивилизации.

Тут следует сделать еще одно различие. Среди трех мессианских цивилизаций, одна находится в исключительном, привилегированном положении. Это западная цивилизация. Именно ей принадлежит ведущее место в контроле над планетарной реальностью и именно ей подчиняются все существующие международные институты. Таким образом, если мессианство православного и исламского мира являются потенциальными тенденциями, то западный мир, фактически, стоит на пороге полной реализации своих универсалистских претензий, т.е. ему почти что удалось утвердить свое понимание истории и ее конца.

Такой "избранности" и "привилегированности" Запада соответствует и еще одно важнейшее обстоятельство. Если все остальные цивилизации, как мессианские, так и немессианские, в целом являются традиционными, продолжающими, хотя и в современной форме, линии развития, предшествующие Новому Времени, то Запад основывает свое могущество как раз на отрицании Традиции, на опровержении всех аспектов традиционного общества, которое оно признает "отсталым", "архаичным", "неразвитым", "консервативным" и т.д.

Отсюда следует последнее соображение: западная мессианская антитрадиционная универсалистская цивилизация одна противостоит как альтернативным мессианским цивилизациям исламу и православию, так и всем остальным немессианским традиционным цивилизациям. Следовательно, главной и основополагающей линией "войны цивилизаций" однозначно является линия "Запад против всех остальных", the West against the Rest. А с позиции противников мондиализма закономерно напрашивается обратная формулировка "the Rest against the West", "все остальные против Запада".

Если войне цивилизаций суждено произойти, то ее главным и центральным фронтом будет борьба против Запада и его цивилизации всех остальных стран. Причем в этой борьбе роль исламского и православного миров заведомо представляется центральной и активной. возможно даже агрессивной и наступательной, тогда как остальным цивилизациям отводится роль пассивная и оборонительная, на уровне национально-освободительной борьбы против западного влияния.

Все эти соображения показывают, что третий проект, антимондиалистский проект должен иметь следующую форму.

В планетарной борьбе цивилизаций правильной желательной конфигурацией было бы всеобщее объединение всех стран и народов в геополитическом крестовом походе против Запада. В основе этого похода должен стоять православно-исламский альянс, так как именно для исламской и славяно-православной цивилизаций западная версия мессианства представляет собой ярко выраженную манихейскую противоположность их собственным эсхатологическим и телеологическим устремлениям. Если мы внимательнее приглядимся к интеллектуальному климату исламского и православного миров, мы увидим, что такое мессианское сознание продолжает жить у представителей обеих цивилизаций несмотря на все исторические перипетии, выпавшие на их долю: антиамериканизм и антизападничество — общее место современного ислама и современного православия.

Славяно-православный мир вместе с исламским миром представляют собой авангард противостояния "всего остального" (the Rest) Западу. Именно от активности такого альянса зависит эффективность антизападной стратегии в планетарном масштабе. При этом важно подчеркнуть, что, конечно, православный и исламский эсхатологизм представляют собой различные и не сводимые к единой доктрине тенденции, но по сравнению с антитрадиционной линией Запада между исламом и православием больше сходства, чем различий. И уже на совершенно прагматическом уровне, очевидно, что всерьез эсхатологический спор между исламом и православием может состояться только при условии исключенного третьего, т.е. только после вынесения за скобки западной цивилизации (а до этого еще так далеко, что даже думать об этом утопично). С другой стороны, все актуальные трения между исламом и славяно-православной цивилизацией, вне всякого сомнения, выгодны исключительно Западу, так как в результате напряженности Запад отвлекает силы своих самых главных и опасных исторических и геополитических противников. Православно-исламский конфликт в высшей степени выгоден Западу, и уже по этой причине легко понять, что он в такой же мере невыгоден исламу и православию. Поэтому антимондиалистская стратегия должна брать в качестве отправной точки безусловный и как можно более прочный и долговременный православно-исламский союз.

Далее, антизападная линия должна активно проводиться православно-исламским авангардом в другие, менее динамичные цивилизации. В этом смысле, указанные Хантингтоном конфуцианско-исламские связи следует только приветствовать. Более того, всякое геополитическое и стратегическое сотрудничество России и исламских стран с

другими цивилизациями имеет колоссальное значение в общей антимондиалистской стратегии. При этом тактически следует разумно распределять роли и сосредоточивать усилия России там, где ислам наталкивается на определенные проблемы, и наоборот.

Так, к примеру, в Индии, Латинской Америке и неисламской Африке разумнее всего интенсифицировать антизападную линию через Россию, в то время, как Китай, Япония и исламская Африка предпочтительней пойдут на контакты с исламскими странами. Если при этом духовная элита православной и исламской цивилизаций будет осознавать в общих чертах императив цивилизационного стратегического сотрудничества перед лицом тотального врага, то в перспективе можно будет говорить о тонкой координации всех подобных усилий в планетарном масштабе. И основной целью такой координации будет перенесение цивилизационных трений в русло единого универсального противостояния по линии *the Rest against the West*. Общий враг минимализирует противоречия внутри разнообразных компонентов "остального мира".

И наконец, последним важнейшим моментом антизападной стратегии является уязвимость тезиса Хантингтона о единстве западной цивилизации, куда он включает Западную Европу и США. Если США действительно и абсолютно являются синонимом Запада, как в геополитическом, так и в историческом, культурном смысле — эта страна изначально основывалась на отрицании традиций, на искусственном воплощении в жизнь абстрактных гуманистически-утопических либеральных принципов, то остальные европейские страны помимо очевидного западного компонента имеют и еще одно потенциальное традиционное измерение. Особенно это относится к странам Средней Европы и Испании, но определенные аспекты сохранились даже в либеральной и антитрадиционной Франции. Некоторые европейские интеллектуалы антиамериканского и традиционалистского направления говорят о различии и даже о противоположности концептов "Запада" и "Европы". "Европа", по их мнению, это нечто традиционное, связанное с религиозностью, этикой, этническими и национальными нормативами, тогда как "Запад" есть чистое отрицание всей Традиции и искусственная цивилизация, родившаяся в период глубочайшего европейского кризиса, в период "Заката Европы" не как продолжение европейской истории, а как ее отрицание, ее вырождение. Следовательно, потенциально можно включить в антимондиалистский планетарный фронт антиамериканские и традиционалистские течения в самой Европе, что позволило бы расколоть еще больше неустойчивое единство Запада.

По крайней мере теоретически имеет смысл включить Европу, противопоставленную США, в общий фронт планетарного антимондиализма, а это на практике означает необходимость геополитического давления на Европу со стороны России и исламского мира и выработку разнообразных геополитических проектов с общей тенденцией причинить максимальный вред безраздельному господству США в мире. И в данном случае ключевой страной является, безусловно, Германия. Идеальным же случаем будет организация франко-германского сотрудничества и параллельное превращение Европы в независимый от США самостоятельный геополитический сектор как пространство самостоятельной и отличной от Запада цивилизации. Такая европейская (романо-германская) цивилизация в перспективе могла бы играть самостоятельную роль в эсхатологической развязке истории, но для этого вначале необходимо покончить с Фукуямой и той суммой цивилизационных тенденций, которые воплотились в его проекте "Конец истории".

4. Конкретные рекомендации (Анти-Хантингтон)

Исходя из главной цели — борьбы с Западом и мондиализмом — и основываясь на тезисах Хантингтона, нетрудно сформулировать ряд рекомендаций, которые будут прямой противоположностью тому, что сам Хантингтон советует властителям Запада. По пунктам:

— Необходимо всемерно расшатывать американо-европейские отношения, поощрять дисгармонию и конфликты в этой сфере; следует всемерно акцентировать то, что разделяет Старый Свет и Новый, и всемерно затушевывать то, что их объединяет. В этом смысле полезно обратиться к европейской геополитической традиции т.н. "континентализма" (Хаусхофер, Никиш, Шмитт, Курт фон Бекманн, Лео Фробениус и т.д.), где было подробно разработана антизападная линия. В более актуализированной форме сходные темы легко найти и современных европейских "новых правых" (и некоторых "новых левых");

— Важно максимально мешать процессу интеграции в западную цивилизацию тех стран Латинской Америки, Восточной Европы и Востока, которые к этому стремятся. С этой целью имеет смысл разработка геополитических проектов, в которых эти страны могли бы получить определенные выгоды от сотрудничества с представителями незападных цивилизаций;

— Сделать все возможное, чтобы предельно обострить и испортить отношения с США России и Японии, прибегая для этого к любым политическим и экономическим методам. Охлаждение американо-российских и американо-японских отношений заставит объективно даже самое проамериканское правительство в этих странах следовать национальным курсом;

— Постараться перевести локальные конфликты между цивилизациями в единую общепланетарную конфронтацию с Западом, в кокой бы суровой форме это ни выразилось.

— Всемерно поощрять военную мощь православных, исламских и конфуцианских государств а целях дестабилизировать западную экономику, вынужденную конкурировать сразу с несколькими потенциальными противниками. России имеет смысл продавать оружие, в том числе ядерное, исламским странам — особенно Ирану и Ираку, а также Ливии. Ядерному атеизму Запада должны противостоять ядерное православие и ядерный ислам;

— Всячески поощрять пацифистские движения в США, используя при этом важный фактор неорелигиозности и неомистицизма. Имеет смысл сохранять и наращивать стратегическое вооружение России на Дальнем Востоке и по возможности подключить к этому Японию (в обмен на высокие технологии и финансовую поддержку). Японию следует рассматривать как главного стратегического союзника России в тихоокеанской области против США в самом ближайшем будущем. Имеет смысл также поддержать политическую экспансию Китая в южном направлении;

— Устранять и сглаживать трудности в контактах православных, исламских, конфуцианских и других стран, принадлежащих к незападным цивилизациям, стараться идти на компромиссы, чтобы не допустить возгорания внутренних конфликтов внутри потенциального антимондиалистского блока;

— Выявлять и по возможности подавлять и подвергать гонениям группы, которые являются проводниками западного влияния, особенно в тех странах, чей геополитический

статус является неопределенным. Кроме того, следует по возможности притеснять и маргинализировать те социальные прослойки, которые объективно препятствуют созданию планетарного антизападного блока и провоцируют конфликты среди незападных цивилизаций. Особенно это относится к антирусским и антиправославным тенденциям в исламе и антиисламским тенденциям среди русских и православных.

— Саботировать, разлагать и дискредитировать деятельность международных институтов, проводящих в жизнь интересы западной цивилизации, провоцировать или инспирировать выход из них максимально большого количества стран, о в перспективе их роспуск или, по меньшей мере, их перерождение из универсальных в региональные и локальные.

К сожалению, в настоящее время реализуются практически исключительно тезисы Хантингтона, а противоположная, антимондиалистская стратегия до сего времени даже не была никем сформулирована, не говоря уже о ее реализации. Югославский конфликт (см. "Элементы" N2) является мондиалистской провокацией Запада по отработке столкновения между собой его цивилизационных противников. Сходный сценарий планируется осуществить и на территории бывшего СССР, где исламский фактор последовательно противопоставляется православно-славянскому, а западно-славянский (проевропейский) великоросскому. В интересах же и ислама, и православия, и этносов, тяготеющих к Европе, было бы, напротив, заключение стратегического альянса и теснейшее взаимодействие в общем евразийском континентальном блоке.

Центр Специальных Метастратегических Исследований

ВМЕСТО ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЯ (ЧАСТЬ VIII)

АПОКАЛИПСИС СТИХИЙ

(От геополитики к философии истории размышления о теории элементов Карла Шмитта)

1.1 Цивилизационных стихий только две

Связь цивилизационной структуры с доминацией той или иной стихии Суши и Моря является осью концепции Карла Шмитта и ее наиболее сильной и впечатляющей стороной. При этом важно подчеркнуть, что речь идет не просто об абстрактном приложении сакральной теории 4 элементов к культурно-историческому анализу, но о вычлениении фундаментального исторического (а не только природного) дуализма двух стихий Суши и Моря, Земли и Воды, причем этот дуализм становится действительно историческим фактором лишь тогда, когда он осознается и интеллектуально переживается человеческим обществом. Чтобы пояснить, что, собственно, мы имеем в виду, укажем на отсутствие упоминания об огненной стихии и ее философского, культурного и цивилизационного анализа у Шмитта (об этом речь пойдет ниже). А относительно воздушной стихии, связанной с эпохой воздухоплавания, Шмитт утверждает, что она не породила собственного "номоса", собственного цивилизационного типа, будучи техническим продолжением исторической траектории, утвержденной цивилизацией Моря. Аэрократия и еще более актуальная эфирократия, т.е. воздухоплавательные и космические стадии развития техники не спровоцировали таких глобальных перемен в ходе человеческой истории, какие принесли с собой открытие Мирового Океана и его вызов.

Гениальная интуиция Шмитта совершенно верно подсказывала ему, что космос не несет в себе ни настоящего вызова, ни исторического ответа, а космические исследования в условиях "эфирократии" лишь демонстрируют агонию закабаляющей, но не освобождающей технократической цивилизации. На первый взгляд, кажется, что такой подход к исторической диалектике стихий у Шмитта, если учесть его имплицитно антиталассократические симпатии, должен стать базой сугубо консервативной доктрины с подчеркнуто экологической подоплекой. Возникает соблазн именно так понять заключительные слова из его статьи о "Планетарном напряжении между Востоком и Западом":

"Новые пространства, откуда появится новый вызов, должны находиться на нашей земле, а не вне ее в открытом космосе".

Так чаще всего и поступают последователи Шмитта, учитывая при этом и его консервативные взгляды в политике. Но, на наш взгляд, это было бы слишком просто. Если новый вызов есть не что иное, как возврат к сухопутной ориентации после революционной эпохи доминации "раскрепощенной техники" и океанической цивилизации, даже из-за страха перед технологической или экологической катастрофой, тогда духовное напряжение исторической диалектики теряет свое драматическое измерение, становится почти природным циклизмом, отождествляется с тем статично-полярным напряжением, на преодолении которого, согласно самому Шмитту, основана вся сугубо человеческая духовная история. Цивилизационный дуализм Суша-Море должен разрешиться как-то иначе.

Шмитт склонен считать переход к аэрокрации и далее, к эфирократии, лишь естественным развитием стратегии Моря, а не знаками новых революционных эпох. Таким образом, можно сказать, что стихия Воды в своей универсалистской экспансии, осуществляющейся как раз за счет Суши и пространств, ей традиционно подчиненных, ставит на службу себе две другие стихии воздух и эфир (вакуум), которые, с физической точки зрения, суть не что иное, как все более разряженные состояния материи. Иными словами, водная стихия моря проявляет себя через подчиненные стихии воздуха и эфира, продолжая свою цивилизационную тенденцию к "разжижению"; при этом напомним, что именно эта тенденция и породила историческую диалектику "морского существования" и связанные с ним раскрепощение техники и этапы промышленной революции.

Как объяснить в таком случае успехи в воздухоплавательной и космической сферах такой сухопутной сверхдержавы, как СССР последнего по времени планетарного выражения геополитического Бегемота, сил континентальных масс и сухопутного Номоса? Точно так же, как гениально объяснил сам Шмитт историческую функцию марксизма в России: это было концептуальное вооружение доктриной второй промышленной революции альтернативной элиты, сумевшей волевым и сознательным образом превратить архаическую сухопутную страну в гигантский индустриально-технический бастион, способный 70 лет успешно противостоять многоплановому напору океанической цивилизации. Использование аэрокрации и эфирократии Восточным блоком было продолжением марксистской стратегии промышленной революции для сопротивления буржуазной цивилизации Запада.

Итак, один член исторического дуализма Море включил в себя в процессе своего планетарного утверждения другие стихии. Если во времена написания Шмиттом статьи "Планетарная напряженность" 1959 год этот процесс был в зародыше, то к 80-м годам он стал прозрачным и очевидным для всех. Море освоило Воздух и Космос.

Тут мы подходим к важнейшей точке новейшей истории, которая является пробным камнем для подавляющего большинства идеологий и социально-политических доктрин, считавшихся вполне приемлемыми вплоть до самого последнего времени.

Мы имеем в виду крах Восточного блока и перестройку.

1.2 Конкретность вселенского потопы

Это событие является ключевым для проверки адекватности взглядов Карла Шмитта. Рассуждая в его терминах, можно описать это событие следующим образом.

Конец Восточного блока, воплощавшего в наш век планетарную тенденцию Суши, противостоящей Морю, означает конец того исторического этапа, в котором было возможно эффективное использование концептуальной структуры, резюмирующей вторую стадию промышленной революции для глобальной конкуренции с цивилизацией Моря, с Западом и миром, отождествившим свою судьбу с неограниченным развитием раскрепощенной техники. Иными словами, это был конец адекватности марксизма. Силы Суши утратили оборонную концептуальность, бывшую действенной, пока условия того ответа, который дал Маркс на современный ему вызов европейской истории, не изменились окончательно и бесповоротно.

Одним из объяснений краха Советского блока является его отставание в сфере технологической конкуренции, причем главным моментом в этом отставании была невозможность адекватно ответить на американскую программу СОИ. Иными словами, Море выиграло технологическую дуэль у Суши в сфере эфирократии высоких технологий, связанных со стратегическими изобретениями в космической области.

Что это означает, с точки зрения диалектики истории?

Первое: Море, породившее импульс технического рывка и в дальнейшем техническую цивилизацию, победило все-таки Сушу, хотя та и заимствовала своевременно и эффективно новейшую (для своего времени) концептуально новую технологию у самого Моря. Этот процесс строго совпал по времени с окончанием второго этапа промышленной революции. На теоретическом уровне это стало проявляться с начала 70-х годов параллельно быстрому вырождению коммунизма и социализма в Европе. На практике точка была поставлена в перестройку. Третий этап промышленной революции нуждался, по меньшей мере, в новом Марксе и новом марксизме. Им мог бы стать европейский фашизм, но эта попытка оказалась abortивной как на теоретическом уровне, так и на физическом плане Германия потерпела поражение от более цивилизованно последовательной сухопутной державы (СССР), поддержанной в этом случае Морем (как бывало уже много раз в истории от Наполеона до Первой и Второй мировых войн). Нового Маркса не было, видимо, не могло и не должно было быть.

Второе: Крах Восточного блока означает реальную глобализацию Моря, которое от роли судьи и контролера переходит к роли автократора (самодержца). Это мондиализм, цивилизационная интеграция планеты под эгидой Запада. В религиозном языке для этого события есть только одно название Всемирный Потоп, конец номоса Земли и универсальная доминация номоса Моря. Вспомним также апокалиптического зверя, выходящего именно из Моря¹⁰⁰. Это влечет за собой окончательный переход от эры противостояния двух стихий к эре покорения одной стихией другой, враждебной ей. Можно сказать, что это начало "универсального мира". Левиафан побеждает Бегемота, Кит Медведя. Триумф Моби Дика над Русским Медведем.

Третье: Морю отныне подчинены остальные стихии покоренная Суша (побежденный враг, Hostis), Воздух и Эфир (естественные союзники, солидарные с водной диалектикой, Amicus) служат идеовариациями Моря, подручными стихиями планетарного Корабля, Мирового Острова (World Island, в терминах Спикмена, а не Макиндера). Это эра One World, постиндустриальное общество, эпоха глобальной информатизации и автоматизации. На языке самых авангардных интуиций Маркса это называется "реальной доминацией капитала"¹⁰¹. Время исчезновения идеологий, время постмодернизма и "конца истории".

Вызов открывшегося Океана, принятый англосаксами, давшими ответ, который воплотился в техно-индустриальном рывке, отлился в современную западную

¹⁰⁰ Любопытно исследовать геополитический смысл символизма "лжепророка" или "другого зверя". О нем в "Апокалипсисе" говорится следующее: "И увидел я другого зверя, выходящего из земли"(Ап. 13, 11). Т.е. этот "другой зверь" принадлежит Суше. Но там же подчеркивается, что "он действует перед ним со всею властью первого зверя" (Ап. 13, 12). Иными словами, речь идет о "духе Суши", перешедшем на сторону стихии Моря, на сторону Левиафана. Как сам "зверь, выходящий из моря", есть представитель сатаны-дракона, его субститут (т.е. атлантизм есть историческое выражение мирового зла), так "другой зверь" или "лжепророк" есть в свою очередь уже представитель "зверя из моря", т.е. его субститут. Атлантистское лобби в державах Суши выполняет именно эту функцию.

¹⁰¹ См. Жан-Марк Вивенза «От формальной доминации капитала к его реальной доминации», «Элементы» № 7.

цивилизацию, подчинил весь мир и обрел окончательную форму в глобальной автократии Америки, того самого континента, с обнаружения которого Колумбом и начался "современный мир". Этот вызов завершил свое историческое проявление в крахе Восточного блока, в перестройке и распаде СССР. Раскрепощенная техника (entfesselte Technik) преодолела все внешние преграды. Власть Моря отныне абсолютна. Она воплощена в гегемонии технократического Запада, стратегическом первенстве США, доминации текучего капитала, полной размытости традиционных ценностных структур. Собственность, наследство, брак, жилище все это утратило то значение, которое имело в эпоху сухопутного существования вания, в эпоху номоса Земли.

1.3 Упущенный из виду элемент

Хотя Шмитт говорит об одноразовости подлинно исторических событий, предпочитая избегать любые формы детерминизма и систематизации, все же, будучи христианином, он вряд ли мог отрицать наличие у истории Конца и, следовательно, некоторой телеологии. Его отказ от телеологии Гегеля или Маркса не означает отказа от телеологии вообще. Как абсолютно честный мыслитель (и в этом смысле он схож с Хайдеггером) он не хочет ограничивать ни у себя, ни у других свободную интуицию истины, считая, что в этом и состоит высшее человеческое достоинство и интеллектуальная свобода, проецирующиеся, в конце концов, в Политику (das Politische) и в Решение (die Entscheidung). Во всех рассуждениях Шмитта имплицитно присутствует нормальный для христианина эсхатологизм: он подчеркивает уникальность Нового Времени, заключающуюся в его глобализме, и в его отношении к "раскрепощенной технике" и морскому существованию легко угадываются апокалиптические нотки.

Очевидно, что Шмитт осознал параллелизм между библейским повествованием о творении Суши как результате отхода Вод и актуальной ситуацией, представляющей собой нечто обратное наступление морского существования на сухопутное, т.е. символическое захлестывание Земли Водой. При этом важно, что перманентная в истории талассократическая тенденция лишь в настоящее время вступает в свою океаническую фазу, обретает максимально возможный масштаб. Излучение океанической талассократии в стратосфере и космос лишь иллюстрирует собой предельность ее победы.

Но возникает закономерный ретроспективный вопрос: почему именно номос Земли, Суши стал матрицей человеческого существования в тысячелетия Традиции? И далее, почему столь устойчивая сухопутная структура традиционного номоса (не опрокинутая ни потамически ми (речными), ни ограниченно талассократическими, ни кочевническими отступлениями) пала в конце концов жертвой хаотической стихии Океана?

Книга Бытия, утверждая существование Вод прежде Суши, намекает на некоторую первичность Хаоса по сравнению с порядком, и индоевропейская мифология во множестве сюжетов подтверждает это. В некотором смысле можно предположить (как это имеет место в герметической традиции), что Земля это сгущенная Вода, а в терминах географии, что Суша это дно Океана, освобожденное от Воды. Но эта отвоеванная у хаоса территория, номос, Суша, Континент, Heartland Макиндера, Митгард древних германцев, крепость Порядка, исторический Полис есть не причина традиционного номоса, но результат какого-то трансцендентного воздействия, зафиксированный в природе след Сверхприродного, отпечаток того, что можно было бы назвать истоком Истории. Русское слово, обозначающее твердую землю, das feste Land, die Erde, позволит нам приблизиться к этой таинственной силе. Это слово Суша. В нем этимологически содержится указание на качество сухости, отсутствующее в других языках. А это качество, в свою очередь,

вызывает ассоциацию с теплом, жаром и Огнем, тем последним забытым элементом, пятой стихией, которая привычна для античных классификаций, но почему-то отсутствует в цивилизационном и историческом анализе Шмитта.

И тут же мы вспоминаем о Гераклите, который вопреки Фалесу Милетскому и другим философам-талассо кратам утвердил революционную теорию происхождения Вселенной из Огня. Огонь безусловно, элемент трансцендентный по отношению к стихиям земной среды. Если Земля, Вода и Воздух являются внутренними по отношению к нашей планете и ее обитателям, и даже космический вакуум, окружающий стратосферу может быть рассмотрен как внутренняя по отношению к среде квинтэссенция (эфир), то Огонь, Тепло, Свет приходят к нам извне, от сияющей жертвенной звезды, Великого Солнца. Обычные элементы это стихии людей. Огонь стихия Богов, субстанция духовных Небес. И полярность Огня по отношению ко всем остальным элементам не вписывается в ту статическую, сугубо природную, схему, которую справедливо вычленил Шмитт, говоря о природной напряженности между Сушей и Морем, и которую он совершенно правильно отделил от напряженности, свойственной диалектике человеческой истории. На самом деле, напряжение, провоцируемое Огнем, и есть сущность диалектики, и если относительно происхождения Природы можно согласиться с Фалесом, то относительно происхождения Истории прав только Гераклит. Дар титана Прометея людям, божественный Огонь, сведенный на землю, и есть главный таинственный субъект исторической диалектики, *agent invisible* алхимиков, философский ребенок того же Гераклита, разворачивающий сквозь века и циклы содержание своего солнечного духа, небесного гнозиса.

Трансцендентный Огонь разгоняет изначальные Воды, чтобы возникла Суша. Трансцендентный Огонь почитается как главный Принцип людьми Земли они ставят его в центре своего Дома (священный очаг), в центре своего Храма (священный алтарь), в центре своего тела (почитание сердца), в центре своего мира (солнце, дающее ориентации пространства и измерение времени). Сухопутный номос Земли следствие subtilного влияния Огня. Сухопутным порядком человечество ответило на вызов Трансцендентного, и тем самым вступило в Историю, поднялось над природой и стало самим собой. Дом это ответ на Солнце. Суша и ее цивилизация это продукт интеллектуально осмысленного Огня.

Пока связь между Огнем и Землей осознавалась, океанического вызова не существовало. Талассократия уравнивалась теллурократией, и римская Веста победоносно крушила рождающийся из пены Карфаген, всякий раз, когда тот посягал на универсализацию своего культурного и цивилизационного послания. Когда священный огонь угас в домах людей, в сердцах людей, в их храмах, раздался апокалиптический рев Ливиафана. И Суша, потерявшая свой смысл, свой центр, свою мощь, отныне была обречена на то, чтобы проиграть эсхатологическую дуэль Морю.

Перестройка и заклание Бегемота стали неизбежны уже в тот момент, когда Традиция стала консервативной, когда ответ, данный на вызов трансцендентного Огня, окончательно заслонил собой вопрос, когда номос Земли перестал сверять свои нормы с номосом Неба. В конечном счете, вся человеческая история не что иное, как интерлюдия между Первовспышкой волшебной звезды и вселенским потопом.

1.4 Икона и Суша

Очень интересны замечания Шмитта относительно иконографии и его обобщения о связи Образа с Западом. Это имеет прямое отношение к стихии Огня, так как зрительная способность элемент светового измерения реальности, которое, в свою очередь, является одним из аспектов Огня (наряду с жаром). Если принять генетическую связь Суши с Солнцем, вскрытую нами, то станет понятным и связь Иконы, сакрального зрительного изображения с номосом Земли. Естественно, пространственная неподвижность, фиксированность, упорядоченность среды сами собой тяготеют к выражению в образе символе, иероглифе, картине. Огонь как бы выхватывает у текучей реальности некий фрагмент, преобразуясь в Образ, в Икону, в нечто постоянное. В этом как бы повторяется таинство происхождения изначальной Суши из массы водного хаоса. Номос земли через Икону постоянно напоминает о своем истоке. В этом смысле поклонение иконам и вообще использование живописи, действительно, является ярким признаком традиционного, земного, континентального существования.

Это соображение помогает развить те замечания, которые Шмитт высказал относительно исторической миссии Испании. Католическая Испания, водрузившая на всех завоеванных землях лик Пречистой Девы, выполняла невероятно важную миссию нейтрализации Океана (и его вызова) посредством Огня. В чем-то эта планетарная операция была аналогична исторической функции марксизма в России: в обоих случаях вызов Моря был принят с тем, чтобы по возможности нейтрализовать его пагубные для номоса Земли последствия и постараться превратить яд в лекарство. Проигрыш Испанией морской битвы с английскими пиратами был чреват страшными планетарными последствиями: на заатлантическом острове англосаксы посеяли семена той апокалиптической цивилизации, которой было суждено воплотить Левиафана во всей его эсхатологической, финальной мощи. Из пены возник Континент-Корабль, превосходящий по всем параметрам свой европейский прототип. Этому чудовищу было на роду написано погасить священный огонь, разбить Образ, установить на планете свой "новый мировой порядок". Естественно, доминирующим мировоззрением новорожденного монстра были идеи крайних протестантских сект, баптистов, пуритан, мормонов и т.д., отличающихся предельной степенью иконоклазма, церковного модернизма и светоненавистничества. Обреченная латино-американская герилья, основанная на смеси марксизма (sic!) и католической теологии освобождения (sic!!) вот все, что осталось сегодня от амбициозного планетарного демарша испанцев-конквистадоров по срыву вселенского потопа.

Но тут возникает одна теоретическая трудность, не до конца разобранная Шмиттом. Дело в том, что он упоминает о привычке отождествлять зрительный Образ и иконопочитание с Западом, а его отрицание, иконоклазм с Востоком. Сам же Шмитт приводит несколько примеров, опровергающих однозначную правоту такого отождествления. Разберемся с этим несколько подробнее. Тем более, что это вплотную затрагивает важнейшую для нас проблему исторический смысл России и ее миссии.

1.5 Абсолютные Amicus et Hostis портреты во времени и пространстве

Здесь мы имеем дело с проблемой, метафизический смысл которой разбирался в другой нашей книге ("Мистерии Евразии", глава "Подсознание Евразии"). Речь идет о типичном для европейских мыслителей отождествлении своей Традиции с Западом. При этом часто речь идет не просто о Западе, но о Северо-западе. И более того, иногда сливаются даже три географических понятия Запад, Северо-запад и Север. Этому противопоставляется Юг, Юго-восток и Восток, чаще всего, также сливающиеся в одну цивилизационную картину, представленную семитическим культурным ландшафтом Ближнего Востока,

наиболее знакомого Европе исторически. При этом такой взгляд иногда выводится из римского, а иногда и из христианского наследия.

Но речь идет, на самом деле, об оптической иллюзии, которой европейцы обязаны географии. Только самые глубокие умы и в первую очередь, Рене Генон смогли отстраниться от этого смещения и посмотреть на вещи с иной, более адекватной позиции. Так, Рене Генон совершенно справедливо указывал, что, с точки зрения реальной (и сакральной) географии, континент-Евразия представляет собой огромную массу Суши, где Европа является лишь западным мысом, полуостровом, устремленным в Атлантику. Индоевропейские народы же живут на всем материке от Индостана через Иран и Россию до самой Европы. Арийская Индия хранит память о наиболее древних мифах и интеллектуальных воззрениях белой расы, а православное христианство распространяется далеко за Урал вплоть до Тихого океана, занимая пространства, по объему превосходящие Европу. Впрочем, историческая узость и привитые клише вообще не позволяют европейцам относиться к православной культуре России как к совершенно аутентичной христианской традиции, причем вверенной белому индоевропейскому народу. Очень показательным в нашем контексте, что именно в православной России применительно к священному образу сохранилось греческое название "икона", и более того, именно православная, русская икона сегодня в полной мере поддерживает подлинно христианскую традицию, практически затухшую на Западе.

Рене Генон, рецензируя книгу немецкого профессора Германа Вирта "Происхождение человечества"¹⁰², указал, что следует различать такие понятия, как североатлантический (северо-западный), гиперборейский (северный) и атлантический (западный) регионы.

На самом деле, почитание Огня и сухопутный номос Земли, старательно изучавшийся Шмиттом, это отличительное качество индоевропейских белых народов в целом, которые спустились в Евразию с Севера, расселившись по всему ее пространству с Запада на Восток и с Востока на Запад. Там, где есть индоевропейцы, там есть Икона, священная живопись, поклонение Огню и Свету, солярные мифы, традиционная иерархия и память о Гиперборее. Священными образами изобилует Индия. В Иране даже после исламизации а ислам строжайшим образом запрещает изображения людей и животных процветала миниатюра и самая настоящая живопись. В русской православной Церкви почитались не только иконы, но и иконописцы, а православный исихазм, доктрина Нетварного Света, была центральной жизненной линией Русской Церкви. Икона неотъемлемый атрибут индоевропейцев и должна быть отождествлена именно с Севером, с Гипербореей, древнейшей прародиной нормального и традиционного сухопутного номоса Земли.

Неприязнь к изображению, иконоклазм, свойственен также не столько Востоку, сколько Югу. Это вполне нормальная географическая симметрия, если принять во внимание гиперборейские истоки индоевропейцев. Если раса Севера поклоняется огню и изображению, то противостоящая ей раса Юга должна поклоняться антитезе Огня (например, Воде) и антитезе иконы (например, звуку). Любопытно, что сам Генон соотносит этот культурный дуализм с оседлостью и кочевничеством: оседлость сопрягается им с фигурой библейского Каина, зрительным образом и временем, тогда как кочевничество с Авелем, вербальностью и пространством¹⁰³. Это прекрасно вписывается в дуальность элементов, разбираемую Шмиттом. Морское существование (хотя и строго разделенное с кочевничеством) представляет собой такое экстремальное развитие номадизма, которое переходит в новое качество в тот момент, когда заканчивается путь от

¹⁰² См. ж-л "Милый Ангел" N 1, Москва, 1991.

¹⁰³ См. Рене Генон "Царство количества и знаки времени", Москва, 1994.

су хопутного кочевничества через плавание по материковым морям и вплоть до решительного выхода в открытый Океан.

Крайне любопытна и еще одна деталь: Генон утверждает, что семитская традиция является традицией отнюдь не восточной, но атлантической, западной и одновременно кочевнической. Отсюда, согласно ему, и позитивное отношение к скотоводу-Авелю в библейском повествовании. Более того, Генон указывает на тот факт, что для строительства храма Соломонова великий архитектор был приглашен из числа чужеземцев, и доказывает, что речь шла о представителе индоевропейской традиции, так как для нее было характерно культивирование сакральной архитектуры, т.е. строительства того Дома, который, по Шмитту, лежит в основе номоса Земли, а сами семиты-кочевники имели иную социально-сакральную структуру.

И наконец, относительно Востока Генон утверждал, что эта сторона света более всех остальных сопряжена с Традицией, с постоянством сакральных архетипов, с верностью истокам. В книге "Восток и Запад" он подробно развил аргументацию в подтверждение этого тезиса. Можно сказать, что Генон однозначно связывает Восток с Севером, считая его историческим приемником изначальной нордической Традиции. Кстати, относительно тождества концепции Света Севера и Света Востока блестящие пассажи можно найти у Анри Корбена, лучшего современного специалиста по иранской традиции и переводчика великого Сохрварди.

Итак, подведем итог нашим замечаниям. Север отождествляется с индоевропейской традицией, оседлостью, почитанием Огня и Образа. Кроме того, Север сакрально связан также с Востоком. Именно эти две ориентации следует взять в качестве изначальных в вопросе об истории развития номоса Земли и его центральных силовых линиях. Защита иконопочитания в истории, таким образом, является отнюдь не западной, но северной или восточной тенденцией. Эта линия характерна для всей Евразии от Индии до Ирландии. Она совпадает с исторической траекторией Света Севера, Nordlicht, и с народами и культурами, выступающими в качестве носителей этого Света. Это дорическая Спарта, имперский Рим, зороастрийский Иран, ведическая Индия, Византия, православная Русь, католические Ирландия и Испания. Это лагерь номоса Земли.

На противоположном полюсе истории, соответственно, находятся Юг вместе с Западом(!), кочевники-семиты, иконокласты, зародыши талассократии, торговой цивилизации и "технологического рывка". Генон назвал бы этот лагерь "предпосылками антитрадиционной цивилизации" и "строителями Великой Пародии". Следует также напомнить изложенную Геноном в "Царстве количества" идею относительно эсхатологического растворения Яйца Мира, "диссолюции", что точно и хронологически и типологически совпадает с триумфом Моря, разобранным Шмиттом. Генон так же, как и Шмитт, связывает это растворение с техническим прогрессом, либеральной идеологией и западной цивилизацией Нового Времени. Англосаксонский мир весь в целом вызывал у него чувство глубокой неприязни и настороженности.

И наконец, роль семитского фактора западного и кочевнического, по Генону; южного, если оценивать распространение семитов с позиций Евразии; сопряженного с торговлей и свободным обменом, свойственным всем талассократиям (Карфаген против Рима); стоявшего у истоков капитализма (критикуемого как Марксом, так и Зомбартом); иконоборческого и враждебного всему индоевропейскому в религиозных вопросах (иудаизм и ислам); солидарного с протестантским движением в его кальвинистской версии (распространение кальвинизма в Голландии, Англии, а позже в Америке океанских державах по преимуществу); наконец, особо активного в деле разрушения традиционного

для Европы номоса Земли (о чем неоднократно писал сам Шмитт) ставит последнюю точку в цепи соответствий.

Север + Восток, Икона, индоевропейцы, Огонь, Дом, оседлость, Традиция и Суша. Это силы номоса Земли. Сторонники культуры и порядка, ответившие на вызов трансцендентного Огня веером арийских традиций вплоть до христианства.

Юг + Запад, иконоклазм, семитские народы, Вода, Корабль, кочевничество, модернизм и Море. Это силы отрицания Земли, носители растворения, апокалиптические энергии рационального хаоса, номоса Моря. Они ответили на вызов Океана тем, что стали на его сторону против Земли и против древнейшего, почти забытого огненного прометеического вопроса, который предшествовал валу номосу Земли и всей человеческой Истории.

1.6 Номос Огня

Конец Восточного блока означает полную победу номоса Моря. Все попытки противостоять его логике и его структуре с помощью его же технических средств оказались несостоятельными. Баталия на кораблях была проиграна Испанией; экономико-индустриальное, стратегическое и доктринальное сопротивление номосу Моря национал-социалистической Германии (1933-1945), вдохновленной отчасти евразийским проектом Хаусхофера, было подавлено силой и хитростью Запада, использовавшего для этих целей СССР; технологическое соперничество, с учетом уроков марксизма, длившееся дольше всех, было проиграно в 60-е-80-е годами Варшавского договора параллельно окончанию второго этапа промышленной революции и переходу к постиндустриальному обществу. Цикл человеческой истории, пройдя насквозь статические полярности природы, завершился, о чем нас известил один американец с японской фамилией.

Мы можем констатировать абсолютный проигрыш Суши, Бегемота, Евразии, номоса Земли. Конечно, сам номос Земли был лишь следом решения человечеством поставленной перед ним открытой проблемы Бытия, но не его сущностью. Внешней формой Ответа, но не огненной стихией, породившей гиперборейский Ответ. Земля не может больше ответить на вызов номоса Моря, ставшего глобальным и единственным. Она затоплена Водами, ее Порядок растворен через щели в Мировом Яйце. Окончание промышленной революции развенчало иллюзии того, что с раскрепощенной техникой (*entfesselte Technik*) можно соревноваться на ее же уровне. Эфирократическая стадия абсолютной талассократии, взгляд, брошенный на Землю из космоса, делает все существа, кишачие на ней, принципиально одинаковыми их ценность строго прагматична и равна их полезности. Жизнь исчислена в финансовом эквиваленте реально доминирующего Капитала. Генная инженерия выводит цыплят и людей-клонов, так же, как вчера изобретали паровую машину или ткацкий станок. Техника вторглась в человечество, достигнув его центра. В 1959 году у Шмитта могла быть еще искра надежды, что нечто внезапно может измениться. К концу столетия таких надежд нет.

Триумф Воды апокалиптически вобрал в себя все стихии и все исторические формы, которые смог не просто уничтожить, но трансмутировать в своей цивилизационной геополитической пародийной алхимии. Золото (деньги), универсальный растворитель и техническая изобретательность сил Моря превратили человечество в контролируемую биомассу. Но осталось нечто, что не подвержено этому глобальному процессу.

Огонь.

Именно он очищенный от своих природных, культурных и социально-политических наслоений, приобретенных за время путешествия по истории находится сейчас в привилегированном положении по сравнению с тем компромиссным состоянием, в котором он находил ся, оставаясь лишь номосом Земли, порядком Суши. Только сейчас проясняется структура его изначального вызова, так как только сейчас проявляется во всем историческом объеме то, чему этот вызов был брошен. Под вопросом стоит ни больше ни меньше как Человек. В какой степени он оказался историчен? В какой природен? В какой мере поддался стихиям, составляющим его естественную ткань (вплоть до общевидовой рациональности)? В какой смог сохранить верность неочевидному трансцендентному измерению? Сколько в нем, в конце концов, оказалось Огня? Или весь он только Вода?

ГЛОССАРИЙ

(основные понятия и термины геополитики)

Анаконды стратегия геополитическая линия атлантизма, направленная на отторжение от Евразии максимально большого объема береговых территорий для сдерживания ее геополитической экспансии.

Атлантизм (родственно терминам *Вода, Море, талассократия, Sea Power*) сложное геополитическое понятие; соединяет в себе : исторически западный сектор человеческой цивилизации, стратегически союз западных стран, в которых главенствует либерал-демократическая идеология, военно-стратегически страны-участницы НАТО, социально ориентацию на «*торговый строй*» и «*рыночные ценности*» (модель США). Противоположно евразийству.

Аэрократия греч. «власть посредством воздуха». Силовой компонент стратегии, основанной на освоении воздушного пространства и его использовании в целях *геополитической экспансии*. Развитие авиации, в отличие от развития мореплавания, своего собственного номоса не породило, став лишь развитием талассократического принципа.

Бегемот др. евр. «зверь», «сухопутное чудовище» (в Библии). Термин Шмитта. То же, что *континент, континентализм, евразийство*.

Берлин естественная стратегическая столица Средней Европы.

Биполярный мир (биполяризм или двухполярность) естественная геополитическая конструкция, отражающая в планетарном масштабе основной геополитический дуализм *талассократия* против *теллурократии*.

Блок объединение нескольких государств, значительно изменяющее их стратегическое и геополитическое качество, выводящее их на более высокий уровень планетарной деятельности. По закону «*пространственной прогрессии*» образование блоков неизбежный процесс.

Богатый Север то же, что атлантизм, Запад и либерал-демократический мир.

Большое Пространство (Grossraum) термин Шмитта. Объединение нескольких держав в единое стратегическое образование. Возникновение Больших Пространств обусловлено теорией «*пространственной прогрессии*».

Внешний полумесяц (или *островной полумесяц*) термин Макиндера, обозначающий совокупность территорий, входящих в зону *талассократического* влияния. Части континентов и острова, тяготеющие к «*морскому существованию*». Так же зона, целиком подконтрольная стратегически *атлантизму*.

Внутренне море (mare internum лат.) термин, обозначающий водное пространство, заключенное внутри сухопутного теллуократического объема, а поэтому не являющееся стратегической или культурной границей.

Внутренний океан термин означающий то же, что и «*внутреннее море*», только в планетарном масштабе. Также *Срединный океан*.

Внутренний полумесяц (или **континентальный полумесяц** или *rimland*) термин Макиндера, обозначающий береговые территории Евразии, расположенные между «**внешним полумесяцем**» и «**осевым ареалом**».

Внутренняя ось качество геополитической связи центра с периферией внутри единого стратегического (или политического) пространства. См. также геополитический луч и геополитический отрезок.

Вода (или Море) специальный термин, обозначающий «талассократию». Особенно разработан у Шмитта (*das Meer*) и у Мэхэна (*Sea, Sea Power*).

Восток то же, что Второй мир.

Враг (*hostis* лат.) термин Шмитта. Чисто политическое понятие, обозначающее совокупность внешних государственных, социальных, этнических или религиозных образований, стоящих на позициях, противоположных позициям стратегической столицы. Не имеет моральной нагрузки и может динамически переноситься на различные образования. Подвижная категория. См. друг.

Второй мир название социалистического лагеря в период «холодной войны». После конца «холодной войны» означает Евразию.

Географическая ось истории (или **осевой ареал** или *heartland*) термин Макиндера, обозначающий внутриконтинентальные евразийские территории, вокруг которых происходит пространственная динамика исторического развития. Совпадает с территорией России.

Геополитика наука, основные положения которой изложены в данной книге.

Геополитический дуализм основной принцип геополитики, утверждающий в качестве двигателя исторического процесса противостояние талассократии и теллутократии.

Геополитический луч вектор силового (экономического, стратегического, культурного, хозяйственного, административного и т.д.) воздействия геополитического полюса на периферийные регионы. Реальная политическая картина мира в статическом состоянии оперирует с геополитическими отрезками. В геополитике принято говорить о лучах, как об открытом динамическом процессе постоянно делящегося импульса.

Геополитический отрезок совокупность отношений стратегической столицы (или геополитического полюса) с периферийными регионами, рассмотренная в конкретный исторический момент без учета общей динамики политических процессов. См. также геополитический луч.

Геостратегия военные аспекты геополитического анализа.

Геоэкономика ответвление атлантистской геополитики. Рассматривает пространство в утилитарно-экономическом смысле. Одна из приоритетных дисциплин «талассократического» анализа.

Государство-Нация светское государство с ярко выраженным централизмом. Политическое образование, в котором государственные формы приводят к рождению

этноса и его культуры. Отличается от этнического образования (община, народ) и от Империи.

Граница в геополитике существует два вида границ: граница-линия и граница-полоса. Граница-линия представляет собой морскую границу. Граница-полоса сухопутную. Задача геополитического блока, претендую щего на действия в планетарном масштабе, сделать границы-линии максимальными для себя и минимальными для соперника, и наоборот.

Демополитика термин Челлена. Влияние демографических параметров на структуру государства. Широкого распространения не получил.

Дисконтинуальный пояс термин Коэна. Разорванные береговые зоны с неопределенной, вариабель ной ориентацией , могущие повернуться как к теллурократическому континенту, так и к талассократическому морю.

Друг (amicus лат.) термин Шмитта. Чисто политическое понятие. обозначающее совокупность внешних государственных, социальных, этнических или религиозных образований, стоящих на позициях совпадающих с позициями стратегической столицы. Не имеет моральной нагрузки и может динамически переносить ся на различные образования. Подвижная категория. См. враг.

Евразийство сложное геополитическое понятие; соединяет в себе: исторически восточный сектор человеческой цивилизации, стратегически актуальный или потенциальный блок государств и наций, отказывающихся признавать императив либерально-демокра тической идеологии, стратегически актуальное или потенциальное объединение в военный альянс восточных, «**теллурократических**» стран, социально ориентация на «**идеократию**», социальное государство, некапиталистический экономический строй.

Евразия то же что **континент, heartland, Суша, Земля, теллуократия**. В более ограниченном смысле означает геополитическую Россию.

Единый Мир (One World - англ.) см. мондиализм.

Жизненное пространство термин Хаусхофера. Минимальный территориальный объем, позволяющий народу достичь реализации своих исторических и политических стремлений.

Запад синоним **талассократии, атлантизма**.

Земля (или **Суша**) в геополитике специальный термин, обозначающий «теллуократию». Особенно подробно теория «Земли», das Land, развита у Карла Шмитта.

Идеократия гр. «власть идей, идеалов». Термин русских евразийцев (Н. Трубецкой, П. Савицкий). Противопоставляется «власти материи», «рыночной системе», «**торговому строю**». При идеократии иерархия в обществе и стимуляция труда исходят из неэкономиче ских принципов.

Империя сверхгосударственное образование, объединяющее несколько народов и стран под эгидой универсальной идеи религиозного, этического или идеологического характера.

Интеграция в геополитике означает многообразные формы объединения нескольких пространственных секторов. Интеграция может осуществляться как на основе военной экспансии, так и мирным путем. Существуют несколько путей геополитической интеграции: экономической, культурной, языковой, стратегической, политической, религиозной и т.д. Все они могут привести к одинаковому конечному результату: увеличению стратегического и пространственного объема блока.

Колония территория, подконтрольная силе, отделенная водным пространством. Рассматривается как временная и внешняя база, отчужденная от общего геополитического пространства метрополии. Противоположна **провинции**.

Конец Истории термин Фукуямы. Мондиалистский тезис о тотальной победе талассократии и либерально-демократической модели на всей планете. См. **мондиализм**, **Единый Мир**.

Континент Евразия, Суша, теллуократический принцип.

Континентализм синоним **евразийства** в узко стратегическом аспекте. Понятие близко к понятию **Суша, Земля**. Континенталистская школа геополитики является единственной в России, преобладающей в Германии, наличествующей во Франции и невозможной для англосаксонских стран. Противоположность **атлантизму**.

Кратополитика термин Челлена. Рассмотрение государства с точки зрения его силового потенциала. Широкого распространения не получил.

Левиафан др.евр. «морское чудовище» (в Библии). Термин Шмитта. То же, что **атлантизм**, **Море** и т.д.

Либерализм мировоззрение, сочетающее в себе левые (минималистический гуманизм, индивидуализм, этнический и культурный эгалитаризм) компоненты в области политики и правые (рынок, приватизация, частная собственность, капитализм) в области экономики. Правящая идеология атлантистского лагеря. Политическим выражением либерализма является **либерал-демократия**.

Меридианальная экспансия (экспансия по оси Север-Юг) расширение сферы влияния (военного, стратегического, культурного или экономического) вдоль меридиана, также **долготная экспансия**); основное условие территориальной и стратегической стабильности государства.

Меридианальная интеграция (интеграция по оси Север-Юг) связывание отдельных пространственных секторов в единое целое по меридиану (также долготная **интеграция**). Позитивна в случае уверенного контроля над северными и центральными областями. Негативна в случае нахождения на севере или в центре геополитических образований, чья лояльность **стратегической столице** сомнительна или слаба.

Месторазвитие термин Савицкого. То же, что качественное пространство или просто **пространство** (в геополитическом смысле).

Минимальная геополитика прикладная дисциплина, заимствующая от подлинной геополитики некоторые термины и методику, но оставляющая в стороне базовый геополитический дуализм.

Мировой Остров термин Макиндера. Макиндер называл им **Евразию** и географическую ось истории. У Спикмена это понятие радикально поменяло свой смысл и стало обозначать совокупность **талассократических** зон (**зоны внешнего полумесяца**). В связи с таким различием термин лучше не употреблять широко во избежание двусмысленности.

Многополярный мир на современном этапе чисто теоретическая концепция, предполагающее сосуществование нескольких **Больших Пространств**. Возможен только после преодоления **однополярного мира**.

Мондиализм от фр. monde «мир» (в смысле «world», а не «peace»). Особая идеология, предполагающая слияние всех государств и народов в единое планетарное образование с установлением Мирового Правительства, уничтожением расовых, религиозных, этнических, национальных и культурных границ. Существует «правый» мондиализм и «левый». Правый представляет собой глобализацию **атлантизма**. Левый считает необходимым включить в Единое Государство и **евразийский** сектор (на том или ином основании).

Море то же, что и **талассократия, Вода**.

Москва естественная стратегическая столица **Евразии**. Основа осей всякой **континентальной интеграции**. См. **Евразия**

Неоатлантизм современная версия атлантизма, отвергающая мондиализм (даже правого толка) как преждевременный и невыполнимый в данных условиях проект. Считает, что вместо **Единого Мира** произойдет **столкновение цивилизаций**.

Новый порядок проект масштабной геополитической реорганизации.

Новый мировой порядок то же, что мондиализм и проекты по созданию Мирового Правительства.

Номос термин Карла Шмитта. Базовый принцип организации любого пространства (географического, социального, политического, экономического, культурного и т.д.). Синонимичен понятию «порядок», «закон», «уклад». Номос Суши = **теллурократия**. Номос Воды (или Моря) = **талассократия**.

Общество результат распада общинных образований. В отличие от общины принципиально делимо на атомарных членов (индивидуумов).

Община естественная форма существования людей, связанных органическими узами. Противостоит **обществу**, в котором вместо органических связей главенствуют нормы формализованного договора между индивидуумами. Общество регулируется Традицией.

Огонь элемент, символизирующий чистый дух. Трансцендентный принцип.

Однополярный мир геополитическая модель, сложившаяся после поражения СССР в «холодной войне». Единственным доминирующим полюсом является атлантизм и США.

Ось геополитический союз двух или нескольких **геополитических столиц**.

Партизан термин Шмитта, символическая фигура защитника «номоса» Суши в ситуации триумфа противоположной геополитической силы.

Пассионарность термин Гумилева. Внутренняя энергетика этноса, движущая сила культурного, политического и геополитического созидания.

Периферия пространства и земли, не имеющие самостоятельной геополитической ориентации, удаленные от **стратегической столицы**, от лица которой принимаются основные геополитические решения.

Политическая география термин Ратцеля, обозначавший то, что после Челлена стало называться собственно "геополитикой".

Поссибилизм от фр. possible, «возможный». Термин Видаля де ля Блаша. Призван нюансировать географический детерминизм, отчасти свойственный геополитике. Теория поссибилизма утверждает, что **пространство** не предопределяет историю, но лишь предрасполагает к тому или иному ее течению.

Прикладная геополитика термин Лакоста. Использование геополитического инструментария применительно к микропроблемам регионального уровня без учета основополагающих принципов. Также **минимальная геополитика**.

Провинция периферийные территории, входящие в состав основного геополитического образования и рассматриваемые как неотъемлемая часть органического целого. Противоположна **колонии**.

Пространство основное понятие геополитики. Является не количественной, но качественной категори ей. Структура пространства предопределяет структуру истории (в первую очередь, политической истории) таков основной тезис геополитики как науки.

Пространственной прогрессии закон сформулирован Жаном Тириаром. Звучит так «от государств -городов через государства-территории к государствам континентам». Географическая динамика политической истории неумолимо ведет к увеличению масштабов минимальных социальных образований. См. также **«жизненное пространство»**.

Пространственный смысл термин Ратцеля. Заложена в качественном пространстве система исторических предопределений. См. **пространство**.

Регионализм ориентация на автономность **периферийных пространств**. Имеет несколько форм экономическую, культурную, политическую и стратегическую.

Сакральная география совокупность представ лений о качественном пространстве у древних. Современная геополитика руководствуется типологически сходным понимаем **пространства**, только выражает это в рациональной естественнонаучной форме.

Санитарный кордон искусственные геополити ческие образования, служащие для дестабилизации двух крупных соседних государств, способных составить серьезный блок, который, в свою очередь, явится опасным для третьей стороны. Классический ход в стратегии атлантистов в их противостоянии континентальной интеграции Евразии.

Север в сакральной географии (и у Дойблера) символ духа и идеального порядка. В современной геополитике синонимичен понятию **богатый север**, что представляет собой нечто прямо противоположное т.е. атлантизм и либерализм.

Социополитика термин Челлена. Изучение социальных аспектов государства.

Срединный океан (Midland Ocean) термин Спикмена. Атлантический океан, если рассматривать Северную Америку и Европу как единое геополитическое пространство.

Средняя Европа пространство, промежуточное между Россией и атлантическим побережьем Европы. Традиционно рассматривается как зона преимущественно германского влияния.

Столкновение цивилизаций термин Хантингтона. Теория перманентности и неснимаемости геополитических конфликтов на цивилизационном уровне.

Стратегическая столица (**геополитический полюс** или **источник геополитического луча**) центр геополитической **интеграции** и активный деятель масштабного геополитического процесса. Связи между стратегически ми столицами образуют геополитические **оси**.

Суша см. **Земля**

Теллуократия греч. «власть посредством земли» или «сухопутное могущество». Характеристика держав с явной сухопутной геополитической ориентацией. См. Евразия, Heartland, идеократия.

Талассократия - греч. «власть посредством моря» или «морское могущество». Характеристика государств и наций с доминированием мореплавания.

Токио естественная стратегическая столица Тихоокеанского пространства.

Торговый строй тип общества, в котором иерархия и стимуляция труда исходят из экономических принципов. Рыночная, либерально-демократическая система. Противоположен **идеократии**.

Третий мир общее название слаборазвитых стран, принадлежащих преимущественно регионам геополитического Юга.

Туран северо-восточные области евразийского континента, степные просторы Евразии.

Широтная интеграция (интеграция по параллелям) наиболее уязвимый и сложный момент связывания подконтрольных центру геополитических пространств. Должна осуществляться максимально мирными и дипломатическими средствами. Основана на постепенном присоединении разнородных регионов к центральной части через пространственную иерархию наиболее лояльных центру секторов.

Широтная экспансия (экспансия по параллелям) агрессивная геополитическая тенденция, неизменно порождающая конфликтные ситуации, геополитическая стратегия наступательного характера. Почти всегда чревата военными конфликтами. осуществляется только после завершения меридианальной экспансии.

Экополитика термин Челлена. Рассмотрение государства как экономической силы. Широкого применения не получил.

Эфирократия греч. «власть посредством надатмосферных пластов». Доминанция космического оружия. Развитие талассократических и аэрократических тенденций.

Юг в сакральной географии регионы беспорядка, смешения и вырождения. В современной геополитике Третий мир, слаборазвитые страны, где не утвердились либерально-демократические принципы.

Heartland англ. «сердцевинная земля»; см. *географическая ось истории*. Термин Макиндера.

Hinterland нем. «задняя земля». Территории, простирающиеся вглубь континента от береговых линий. Термин, характерный для *талассократического* анализа пространства.

Jus Publicum Europeum лат. «Общий Европейский Закон». Исторический свод юридических уложений, регламентировавших межгосударственные отношения в Европе.

Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum лат. «Общий Евразийский Закон». Проект международного закона, который мог бы регулировать отношения между евразийскими странами и народами на основании признания приоритета континентальных *теллуократических* ценностей.

Lenaland англ. «земля, прилегающая к бассейну реки Лена». Термин Макиндера. Обозначает все северно-евразийские территории, лежащие к востоку от реки Енисей вплоть до побережья Тихого океана. В своих поздних работах Макиндер уделял этой области особое внимание, считая, что эти земли принадлежат не *теллуократическим*, но *талассократическим* зонам влияния.

Linkage термин Киссинджера. *Атлантическая* стратегия по соединению *дисконтинуального пояса* Евразии в сплошную территорию, подконтрольную Западу.

Mitteleuropa нем. то же, что *Срединная Европа*.

One World мондиалистская концепция Единого Мира. См. также Конец Истории.

Pax Americana лат. «Мир по-американски». То же, что *атлантизм*.

Pax Euroasiatica лат. «Мир по-евразийски». То же, что *евразийство*.

Pax Persica лат. «Мир по-персидски». Проект геополитической реорганизации пространства Средней Азии под эгидой Ирана в союзе с Россией.

Rimland англ. «береговые земли»; см. «*внутренний полумесяц*». Термин Макиндера.