Propaganda and National Power:

The Organization of Public Opinion for National Politics

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Dedication

To the master of political propaganda,

Dr. Joseph Goebbels

under whose brilliant leadership the neglected weapon of German politics became a creative art

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Chapter 1

National Power and Public Opinion

This book is intended for the intellectual leadership of the nation. They must be familiar with tools, the use of whose power over the spirit is once again secured. Spirit should not be talked about, rather it should be made effective, just as light illuminates an object without one being able to see the light beam in clear air.

A near-sighted national materialism likes to speak with a certain bitterness about “the people of poets and philosophers,” and thinks deeds are more important than words. But it forgets that the deed is born of the thought, and the thought of the word. Our energy, our military activity, and our spirit of sacrifice first declined when our most valuable possessions, our poets and philosophers, were mortally wounded. All the roots of our strength are in them, as is the almost daemonic willingness to sacrifice oneself to enthusiastic attack and organized discipline, traits that the German people display better than anyone else.

Liberalism and its offspring Marxism are intellectually and organically finished.

The nation again passionately recognizes German politics, German soldiers, and the German spirit. The mutual bond and dependence between these feelings and forces is apparent to everyone.

Our questions are these: In which ways will public opinion properly express the instinctive spirit and will of the nation? How will radio, the press, news services, and propaganda and cultural institutions give expression to the powerful life currents of the nation? How can they be intellectually controlled without falling into the traps and pitfalls of liberalism?

Will public opinion take on intellectual or primitive form? Will it stress individual freedom, Bolshevist bureaucracy, or be restricted only according to certain forms and aims? May we choose between the liberal principle of individualism and the Bolshevist principle of collectivism, or must we find a new way? These are vital questions for the German people and the German mind. They cannot be answered with theories from a desk. Their answers must rather grow out of the nation. That will be possible only when we have resolved to abolish the structures of liberal public opinion, and laid new foundations for future growth. This book contains a thorough study and investigation, not from a party standpoint, but rather with attention to the whole area.

Historical and contemporary examples show that the means of public opinion can endanger or destroy national unity if they are improperly used or controlled by the enemy.

But possession and use of the means are not sufficient. The greatest care must be taken to prevent propaganda from being used for its own sake. Propaganda is the will to power; it is always subsidiary to an idea. If the idea is missing, the whole artificial structure collapses. Idea, propaganda, and power are inseparably connected. A pure, crystal clear will and the highest idealism, intellectual superiority, vision, and sufficient knowledge of the means of public opinion and the possibilities and limits of governmental structures must all come together in order to successfully free the national will for our great task.

Chapter II

Propaganda and Power (Organized Strength)

Each organization of individuals

requires a certain amount of

common ideas and similar interests.

— Hitler —

The Creative Word

The word is apparently the original element of human thought, and therefore of human genius. Today as well, it exercises its inescapable power on everyone whose intelligence has not been overcome by cynicism.

Applicability to truth and falsehood is characteristic of the word; man alone decides which use he will make of it.

The average man, and more certainly the masses, succumbs almost infallibly to the power of the word, unconcerned with its inherent truth. The inherent truth in words is not enough to combat spoken lies, but rather only a new word which can be set against the old. In order for this new word to be believed, the people and masses must hear and understand it. It must come to them and speak their language; its power must be greater than that of the old.

If the arts and the sciences are somehow separated by their mysterious languages that define the borders of each and their jurisdictions, the art of life, politics, works more than ever with the means of creative language in order to win the masses and hold them firmly within the boundaries of a definite conception and worldview. Creative language will occasionally make wide departures from the natural and aesthetic. That has no harmful effect on the masses, whom we must today consider a political reality, even if it does violence at times to the German language. One generally has to be careful when applying the so-called aesthetic yardstick to politics, as it gives no hint of possible outcomes.

As long as Western civilization relied on secret cabinet politics, the polished language of diplomacy served as a sharp and pointed Toledo sword to politics. To cynics, it was the art of saying the opposite of what one thought. In the mouth of an expert, it was a way of protecting oneself from the aims and influences of by the enemy. When the French Revolution opened the age of mass struggle, the gentlemanly games and limited risks of cabinet politics were replaced by all-out struggling movements of masses and nations. The fine old language of diplomacy yielded to the new, blunt, and violent language of political mass propaganda. Political language became a public affair.

Freedom, equality, brotherhood, capitalism, socialism, communism, profit, surplus value, output, international economy, Soviet Germany, nationalism, blood, land, race, self sufficiency, Third Reich — each of these is its own slogan, encompassing the inferences and doctrines of worldview.

They assault the enemy, hammer at him, raise doubt, fear, resistance, and agreement.

Adherents see in them a positive promise of a brighter future, and find in them a spiritual, faith-restoring rescue from blind, purely psychological daily struggles.

Today, the political “layman” faces a puzzling mass of words, a flood of unfamiliar concepts, a mysterious, ordered, deafeningly strong and one-sided view of life that works through the word to recruit and organize.

The major ideological parties make use of the technical aspects of language in their organizational structures. What is a ‘Truf,” a “Staf,” the “Osaf,” an “Uschla?” They are no longer mere abbreviation in a telegraph code (Truppführer, Standartenführer, Oberster S.A. Führer, Untersuchungs- und Schlictungsausschuss), but rather these are new words that have become colloquialisms, a jargon, in the National Socialist Party. Although these words may not be found in the creative works of Luther, Goethe, or Nietzsche, many will remain in our vocabulary. Today, at any event, they exercise their effect in spite of theoretical philology.

Every German is familiar with Hitler’s S.A. In the popular mind, it simply means the brown shirts, “the Hitlers.” The Führer himself answers the question, “What does S.A. mean?” with three definitions: Saalschutzabteilung [meeting hall guards]; Sportabteilung [sports group]; and Sturmabteilung [storm troopers]. This explanation conceals a sense of uncertainty. The S.A. is a myth that cannot be captured in a few words; it can only be felt and experienced. The experience of a generation is summarized in this concept. The brief hard rhythm of this word has become something holy to millions.

The number of such words is legion. Each is propaganda by its very existence, each a form of intellectual bondage. Their very names require agreement or opposition, excite storms of the will, determine our actions.

Philologists and artists will accuse such newly created words of not being an organic part of the language, but rather artificial constructions. That is true of many such expressions. No one, however, will be able to root many of them out from the soul of people. They have become a familiar element of popular speech. The word S.A. is an example. One should on theoretical grounds question the right to existence of any expression which has not achieved popularity, acceptance, and organic union with the language. The right is a question of life. Life has previously created and justified such words in the sciences, arts, and economic and technical occupations. It now does so in politics as well.

There are also constructions that are intentionally designed to be effective and to produce suggestion through their unfamiliarity and which therefore remain strange to popular instinct. An example of such a construction is the communist word “agitprop.” There are “agitprop men,” “agitprop troops,” and “agitprop leaders,” the apostles of Bolshevist revolution under the red star. The word comes from agitation and propaganda.

The letters G.P.U. are just as strange. They are the initials of Gossundarstwennoje Polititschkoje Uprawlenje, the Soviet secret police. We call them the Cheka. They have systematically eliminated all other viewpoints in the country by systematic terror. These letters have become a symbol to the entire world of bloody terror and sinister underground power.

Creative language in political propaganda uses phrases and slogans to establish control. This is not new. The campaign slogans of a movement are and always have been the best propaganda. Anyone who had played a political role in the world was either a master of the word and of creative language, or else fought side by side with men accomplished in these arts.

Christianity conquered the world with its slogan “love thy neighbor as thyself.” The German people did not lose a war against the entire world because of the weakness of their weapons and soldiers, but rather because of the bureaucratic sterility of their leading officials. They were beaten not on the field of battle, but on the field of words. Their soul was crushed. They were never given a slogan to carry into the great struggle, while the enemy carried “against the Huns,” “for democracy,” and “for the League of Nations” onto the field. In politics, the fruitful and creative will always triumph over the unfruitful, the bureaucrats, the mere diplomats. Fichte’s observation that neither the power of the army nor the quality of the weapons decides a battle, but rather the power that leads the spirit to victory is also applicable to the political, military, and economic struggles of our day.

Psychological Foundations

Since the war, German historians have studied the problem of propaganda with commendable thoroughness. They have given lengthy and elaborate definitions, as Friedrich Tönnies has done, and engaged in fruitful work in concrete areas, as for example Friedrich Schönemann’s study of the art of mass propaganda in the United States of America.

We could also have studied the problems of propaganda and mass organization in an earlier period, and one closer to home, namely the origins of the German worker’s movement in the middle of the last century and its gradual drift towards Marxism. And the struggles of the Social Democrats, who emerged as victors from a struggle with the all-powerful Bismarck and who triumphed over Karl Peters, the German African hero, must certainly open our eyes to the nature, dangers, possibilities, and necessities of propaganda. The intelligentsia, meanwhile, lived in its own world of illusion as life passed them by. They do much the same today, although the tremendous power of the masses is displayed before their very eyes.

Such raw expressions of power are always springing up and falling apart when they do not succeed in seizing power. But their desperate power is often based on inescapable necessity.

The Social Democrats were a group of men who achieved political power through the abundant resources of the German working class. Communism fought to be their successors. Revolution will always strike at the heart of a state when bureaucrats, ignorant desk politicians, or generals believe that they can set naked force against effective propaganda. This is not sufficient, especially when the nation’s intellectuals are neutral or, as was the case in Russia in 1905, are sympathetic toward the revolution. If propaganda tactics are properly used, they will have a subtler, deeper, and therefore stronger effect on the human will than will blatant oppression. Propaganda is the art of exercising power without possessing the means of power; it is the secret through which the powerless can overcome the powerful when they rest too securely in their strength.

Marx and Engels began alone, as exiles without money in a foreign country. Lenin was alone in Switzerland, condemned to death. Mussolini was expelled from his social democracy as an agitator. Hitler was an unknown corporal with seven followers in 1918. In twelve years, he created the greatest mass movement in history, with which he conquered Bismarck’s state.

They were all poor, without property, alone. They had nothing but their heartfelt ideals. But these ideals, so fatal to some, but capable of so much more in others, would have been buried along with their poverty and extinguished with their lives had they not had the gift of inflaming, inciting, winning, and persuading others. They were not only idealists, but propagandists as well. As a result, they became great. They preached community, lived it, stirred the courageous, forced the common man to common labor. Their propaganda was the art of building community, their power was both actual and spiritual force.

There is something of the propagandist in everyone. We all have the feeling that we understand it. In reality, everyone uses propaganda; it is a manifestation of human community life. It is just as in politics. The barroom philosopher always knows what has to be done. The only thing missing with him, unfortunately, is the spiritual bond. Fundamentally, one may be so bold as to say that propaganda and politics are as accessible to the common man as to the intellectual. And the best propagandists are women.

They understand how to get “his” attention when they want to build a strong home, even when “he” isn’t so willing. A woman is the best propagandists of love and marriage.

Leading politicians often display unstable characteristics. The phrase “whims of the prima donna” applies not only to capricious women, but to many politicians as well. Examples are Julius Caesar whom the Romans called “regina” in mocking verse, and Napoleon, whose womanly breast drove doctors to distraction. His whims were the despair of those around him.

Effective propaganda is rarely a question of womanly inclinations or capriciousness as such. Often, an intuitive decision emerges with a surprising primitiveness of thought, as is clearly shown in the recently emerging harshness of manliness. Such thought is always instinctive, earthy, single-minded, intent on actions, never on so-called objective standards of observation. The objective observer, of course, is an intellectual who recognizes the apparent weakness of the opponent, and exploits it thoroughly. He sees the strength of the self-imposed limitations of a man of action as a weakness. This overlooks that fact that in politics, just as in the individual, there are two minds, one of action, and one of contemplation. Only one is publicly observable. No one is familiar with the other. The clarity, simplicity, and limited horizons of the working class, actually great naiveté and innocence in the Nietzschean sense, are disparagingly misinterpreted as peasant stupidity or cleverness, which city-dwellers take to be one and the same.

The ignorance of intellectuals in politics has shown itself throughout history. When Napoleon entered an academic competition in Lyon with an essay on human ideals, it did not win the prize that the poor lieutenant had longed for. Instead, it was scornfully judged to be “not worth looking at.” The same thing happens with many intellectually superior soldiers and politicians.

Only Caesar who, by calculation, was a democrat and remained so throughout his life has been admitted to the democratic pantheon of great heroes, and his clever work of propaganda on the Gallic Wars has become “world literature.”

Recently, he has had a successor. Bernard Shaw, the Irishman, praised Revolt in the Desert by the English Colonel Lawrence first, because he had to praise something English to maintain his popularity, and second, because Lawrence is, as a matter of fact, a good chap (and third, perhaps, because Colonel Lawrence made his English colleagues on the General Staff look stupid??). Literary circles compared the book to Caesar’s Gallic Wars, and called it one of the greatest works of literature (perhaps they were impressed by the English Colonel’s mocking judgments on the military?!).

In the popular criticism of today, no leading politicians fails to appear, in enemy propaganda, to be a perfect idiot, a coward, or a mere terrorist whose intelligence is so low that he must be secretly controlled from elsewhere. Lenin was portrayed as a sick criminal in middle class pamphlets, Hitler as a hangman and maniac in proletarian pamphlets, Mussolini as a bloody tyrant in class struggle pamphlets. Material intended for the masses is not so-called objective writing, but rather such hate-filled pamphlets and caricatures.

Caricature, misrepresentation, and one-sidedness appear to belong in propaganda.

To laugh at the enemy is as important as to fear his strength. The science of suggestion has, which is often dubious, found an accurate precept when it maintains that suggestion works most effectively in a state of excitement. Ridicule and fear are both sentiments and emotions that encourage effective suggestion. Ridicule gives the feeling of superiority, for when one laughs he is confident of victory. Fear, on the other hand, compels one to get to work at once because he believes he has perceived danger. Ridicule and fear, then, are two components of propaganda that are indispensable to its success.

Confidence in one’s cause and an absolute faith are further obvious requirements. Only a fool can hope to gain success for an idea in which he himself does not believe. “There is,” writes Goebbels, “only truth. Either we lie, in which case the enemy is right, or we tell the truth and everyone else lies. We believe that the truth is on our side with all the steadfastness of our blood.”

When an intellectual criticizes someone’s propaganda, his first point is not its simple, often vulgar language. He excuses that with a reference to the “people.” He also excuses the ridiculing or fear-provoking calumnies of the enemy, although he begins to speak of one-sided fanaticism, and inwardly holds the thesis that ‘to know all is to forgive all.” His greatest complaint concerns the perpetual repetition of certain goals, slogans, and catchwords.

He thinks assumed limitations are actual limitations, and says pityingly, “Well, he is after all only a propagandist…”

He then makes a few good “suggestions”: (1) one cannot take an absolute position, but rather one must say something good about the other side; (2) atrocity propaganda is not artistic. It offends the cultured; (3) one cannot always say the same thing, for that is boring.

If this brilliant intellectual became the head of a propaganda ministry, Betmann-Hollweg’s fiasco in propaganda leadership during the war would be surpassed. He would resemble those fine patriots who tried to encourage the “people” in 1917 with speeches about the fatherland, but who achieved the opposite.

If one reverses the principles of the intelligent, well-meaning intellectual, he will have the secret of effective propaganda.

Believe completely in your cause, do not shrink from powerful emotions, unceasingly hammer the same thoughts into the minds of the masses.

The necessity of conviction and of the methods of emotional arousal have been psychologically explained. One-sidedness is indispensable because the confusion around us is so great that every impression will quickly be shoved aside by a new one. Nothing is forgetful as the masses. Something can have appeared in a thousand newspapers and have been talked about by the millions, but a few months later it will be completely forgotten. Scarcely one per cent of those selected from the masses will recall the name of important personages of the dates and events.

Among the members of a large party one can observe that even the majority of those engaged in propaganda forget the most vital slogans in six months or a year unless the highest officials of the party repeat them over and over again. If those involved have such poor memories, others will not believe anything unless it is repeated to them. Life is a strong opponent. Only that which is itself lively, headed towards victory, and constantly present can overcome a hostile world. Criminal psychology has learned from practical experience that the testimony of a single witness is highly untrustworthy. There is no trial in which the witnesses say the same thing, even though they may all be disinterested and possess characters of the highest integrity. Often the assertions of witnesses who have experienced the same event are entirely contrary to each other. It is not surprising, then, that propaganda, which is only a substitute, must repeat the same thing over and over again to have any effect, since actual experiences are so poorly and imperfectly remembered. Its secret is simplicity and perseverance.

Power (Organized Strength)

Power built only on propaganda is fleeting, and can disintegrate from one day to the next unless the power of organization is added to propaganda. The use of such strength or power is reflected at all levels of human life, from the strong bond of the family which brings two people together as a simple matter of personal choice to the powerful bonds of peoples and nations.

“There has never been,” Mussolini said, “a government founded solely on the consent of the governed, who approved its every use of force. Consent is as transient as sand castles on a beach. It cannot always be present, it can never be complete.”

Not since the Inquisition has the West seen as large a scale of violent mental control as is seen today in Soviet Russia, where millions are sacrificed to a bloody idol. Even the blood bath of the French Revolution pales in comparison. The Cheka works carefully with the news and propaganda organizations of the Bolshevist party. If the party’s press and propaganda announcements were suppressed or sabotaged through indifference or terror, then power would be set against power, criminal penalties against sabotage, whips and hunger against indifference and apathy, and every spark of resistance would be crushed.

Since the individual remains defenseless even when he is an agent of power, a sense of strong community develops as quickly from an offensive as from a defensive spirit. The activists find each other in either case. The momentary flow of enthusiasm is spiritually maintained through popular gatherings and systematic schooling and discipline. Such organized power can then with greater power attack the unorganized and ultimately, like a polyp, devour all the positions of power in a governmental structure.

One entirely deceives himself if he thinks the principles underlying these methods are limited to Russia or to a certain time. Unrestrained instincts certainly make brutal intervention necessary, though civilized nations need not experience the same blood bath as did Russia under the rule of the Soviets, except under conditions of extreme danger.

Propaganda and power, however, are never entirely opposed to one another. The use of force can be a part of propaganda. Between them lie different degrees of effective influence over people and masses. The range extends from the sudden exciting of attention or the friendly persuasion of the individual to incessant mass propaganda, from the loose organizing of proselytes to the creation of state or semi-state institutions, from individual to mass terror, from authorized use of the might of the strong, of position, class, or government, to the military enforcement of obedience and discipline by means of martial law.

The principle of the unified formation of the will through a graduated use of propaganda and power is perfectly developed in the “advanced” nations of the world. We of the German Republic (with laws that forbade free speech!) can look to the United States of America. In this celebrated free democracy, one can clearly see the development of national ideals through the use of every kind of information and propaganda, including terror and the use of governmental power. This has resulted from an influx of immigrants which drove the Anglo-Saxon leadership to a tempo of extreme nationalism and self-defense. The “melting pot” is the slogan of Americanization. The struggle goes against the hyphenated (for example, the German-Americans), against every assertion of nationality, and against all those having dangerous intentions towards the existing governmental structure, such as the “radicals” who organized the labor unions in the United States. Schönemann quotes the following words of George Creel, the American propaganda chief during the war, which illustrate the general and particular goals of American propaganda:

What we had to have was no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America’s cause that should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination…. We began with the initial conviction that the war was not the war of administration, but the war of one hundred million people, and we believed that public support was a matter of public understanding.

The basic idea of propaganda was extended to complete autocracy by draconian war laws. The United States threatened, according to Schönemann, (law of 15 June 1917) fines “up to ten thousand dollars or imprisonment for twenty years:”

for whomever shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies;

for whomever shall willfully cause or seek to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, or

for whomever shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service.

Further additions were made to this dangerous and enticingly vague law. But that was not enough. The broader law of 16 March 1918 extended to all possible expressions against the war. Under Section 2, it prohibited all disloyal statements or actions regarding government bonds, and in Section 3 decreed further crimes such as “the uttering, printing, writing, or publishing of disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to bring the government, constitution, flag, or uniforms of the army and navy of the United States of American into contempt scorn, contumely, or disrepute.” And finally, “words or acts which support or encourage the cause of any country with which the United States is at war, or which oppose the cause of the United States.”

And if that were not enough, the Postmaster General could handle whatever the president, legislators, and courts could not. He could exclude from the mails that which he wished, and could even deny postal service to the sender for “evidence satisfactory to him.” Every suspected citizen was thus completely defenseless. And the non-English press was further muzzled, as it was required to submit an English translation of every political article to the local postmaster. And when one considers the lynching and terrorism, and the threats from the State Councils of Defense, nothing remained of freedom and thought, speech, or the press.

One might object that these laws were enacted solely because the United States was at war, under a state of emergency, and that these restrictions on public opinion disappeared when the war ended. This objection is easily refuted. Has not Germany been under an unbroken state of emergency since 1914? What danger threatened the powerful United States in 1914-1919, lying as it does on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean? The U.S.A. is safe in the center of a vast industrially rich continent; more than six thousand nautical miles separate it from any powerful enemy.

Germany fought a desperate war against the entire world. It fought not for the gain or loss of gold, goods, colonies, business, or markets. These were secondary. Its struggle was rather for existence, being or not being, for its spiritual and actual unity as a nation, for its daily bread. Instead of accommodating their spiritual attitude to this task, our political and intellectual leadership was entirely unfamiliar with the role of propaganda in other countries, all too silent in their disastrous and academic attempts to win influence with the peoples of foreign countries. They never understood how to powerfully suppress subversive foreign activity.

From the beginning, active and determined enemy propaganda was not limited to producing an absolute confidence in victory in their own nations which would be nourished by elements of hope, by the feeling of superiority, and of fear. They also looked for and found a way to reach Germany in order to produce the opposite beliefs of despondency, hopelessness, and inferiority, as well as disastrous belief that voluntary defeat and surrender would be favorably received, since the allies were not fighting against the innocent German people, but rather against Prussian militarism, the Kaiser, and the Junkers.

Enemy and German Propaganda during the World War

Captured English pilots who had dropped inflammatory leaflets over the Western front since December 1915 were convicted by our military courts, their offense punished as a violation of the laws of war. We forbade our own pilots to drop leaflets on enemy troops. Late in the war, we made a disastrous attempt at the counter-propaganda, using apparently moral unmanned hot air balloons. They kept our propaganda of “extravagance,” as one of us said, far from the enemy. That it also kept us far from success was not noticed. Our internal propaganda could not be “political,” our foreign propaganda could not “irritate England.” From the beginning, our enthusiasm and activism were officially corrupted to devotion, endurance, and passivity. The world and concept of propaganda left a stale aftertaste. They labeled enemy activity as evil and immoral which one was afraid of. One saw the enemy lies but was still taken in by them.

While the army at the front remained strong and in control of its actions, German intellectuals lost control of the masses. Their propaganda stood speechless before the raging flood from without and the bubbling turmoil within. Here their naiveté was exposed, for they believed the German people and the peoples of the world were too “sensible” to believe such “nonsense,” such lies and fabrications.

In his memoirs, published in 1920, Colonel Nicolai, the head of the German intelligence service, recalled with a quiet, rather painful pleasure the approach of the German bureaucracy to enemy propaganda. The Foreign Service office in the Foreign Ministry decided to seek expert advice as to the abnormal mental condition of the enemy, which was proven by his hate-filled propaganda! When German legislators and governmental officials saw examples of enemy propaganda, they suggested to the high command that they doubted the genuineness of the material, instead of opposing it everywhere with vehement action. They depended on so-called human reason, without considering that is it dependent on impressions from the surrounding world. We receive these impressions for the most part today indirectly, through news reports with pictures, sounds, and words. Every man therefore depends on the news, and even with the strongest opposition of the rational facilities one must finally believe what one hears over and over again and nowhere finds refuted with inner conviction and the force of truth.

The slogans about Huns and Boches and the bloody hand print (“The Hun’s market [sic]) which glared from a hundred thousand wall posters in large enemy cities for four years, the horror-provoking Belgian atrocity stories, the filthy lies about the use of corpses to make grease (based on an intentional mistranslation of the word Kadaververwertung [cadaver utilization], and the portrayal of German soldiers as grotesque, arrogant, cowardly drunkards and sauerkraut pigs must certainly have aroused the feelings of the enemy’s masses to an extreme and bitter desire for combat and victory.

H. G. Scheffeur said in regards to the German answer to such hate-propaganda:

Germany lost itself in otherworldliness, in varied and confusing world views; it worshipped the intellect for its own sake. Knowledge was often an end, not a means. It was used to shed light on the world and the universe, but not to master life. An army of worldviews sprang up, but not control over the world. They enriched the intellect, but as Schopenhauer proved, in a way that nourished itself like a vampire on the will and character.

Germany’s enemies deafened the world’s reason, as well as their own civilization, by childishly attempting to brand the greatest modern culture as “barbaric.” They expanded on hate inherited from their ancestors, or made even more revolting inventions, as was revealed in a survey of French scientists which asked “Whether Germans were human…”

The indignation which such claims of barbarism kindled in the breast of the German people proved that they could still see the true worth of the enemy. They expected truthfulness and justice from him. But the indignation was express together with a peculiar and unfortunate defect in human judgment which endangers the broadest and deepest thrusts of the German spirit. Germans tried to show that they were not barbarians through historical and scientific means. It would have been better and easier if they had proven their enemies were barbarians….

Such unified propaganda worked for the most part on the other side, although it was supported by some pitiable paid stooges and insane idealists among the German people. Here, the Germans suddenly became poets and philosophers who had been driven to war not for the defense of food, home, and freedom, but for the conquest of the world under the ruling class. The enemy masses were not insane, raving, chauvinistic, and inflamed Frenchman, Belgians, and Serbs, they were instead, peaceful farmers, workers, and citizens; their leaders were not relentless statesmen intent on victory, coldly calculating for the advantage of their own peoples, but rather humanitarians extending the olive branch, who were fighting only to give German freedom, human dignity, and — the League of Nations. The best of these apostles of happiness who appeared to the German people and its intellectuals was the noble Wilson, whose Fourteen Points were to bring “world peace.” “It was really tough luck for the Germans to believe Wilson,” an American Senator later said.

The English intellectuals worked hard under the leadership of Herbert George Wells, the popular novelist, trade unionist, and socialist, following the firm directives from the Propaganda Ministry headed by Lord Northcliffe. Müller-Freienfels wrote that Wells, in his reminiscences, said: “Those in England had carefully considered how best to reach the German mentality, and had agreed that we had to catch the Germans through their tendency towards speculative ideas; therefore, it was decided that the League of Nations was by far the best way. It was played up like a roman candle.” The enemy press completely cooperated with such propaganda. Significantly, the press chief (Lord Northcliffe) was a member of the Allied government, and conversely, the members of government considered it self-evident that the press should be a participant in decision making and in the center of discussion and debate. The foreign press portrayed us as having started the war, as war criminals, as protracting the war through our desire for world conquest, and as the final losers. This was done to strengthen their own militant posture and their alliance, and to prepare for a devastating peace. They worked towards a systematic weakening of our fighting force, and mobilized enemies of the German state as well as international fanatics in neutral nations and even in Germany itself to assist their cause. They were exceptionally clever in that they directed their propaganda against the Kaiser and General Ludendorff as the organizers of the war, but made little mention in pictures or publication of Field Marshal Hindenburg, who had the highest trust of the people. They hoped not only to gradually drive a wedge between these men but also to convince the masses that their supposed explanations of the depravity of our leaders were serious and accurate.

They acted like Bismarck in 1871. As is well known, he took the greatest care not to do anything that could harm the newly founded republican government as long as he knew it was agreeable to his political goals. He must have thought that, with the republican government in power, he could at least include it as a known factor in his calculations rather than as a chaotic force intent on gaining power by surprising and incalculable means.

While enemy leaders and intellectuals directed their entire wills and thoughts to our destruction, German officials in Berlin offices led the struggle as if they had the most secure positions in the world.

The Society of German Scholars and Artists used its own limited means to clear things up somewhat in 1915. In 1916, it approached the Reich Chancellor in conjunction with the Interior Ministry, the Admiralty, and the General Staff and demanded material and financial support. Reich Chancellor Betmann-Hollweg made a few trivial remarks, refusing every expense on the brilliant grounds that current funds “had not been appropriated” for purposes of internal political propaganda.

A weary indolence filled the Berlin offices when important war matters were handled. Enthusiasm was much greater on jurisdictional disputes, and while the army bled to death in an enormous ring, those in Berlin joined with growing enthusiasm in the hunt for soft jobs and war profits.

A few well meaning patriotic societies, a few voices in the wilderness, believed they could restore lost spiritual vitality through thundering speeches or emotional appeals. They spoke and wrote, but knew noting of the hard realities of the front and of common life, with husbandless wives and starving families. They aimed for the mind but achieved the opposite, and gave the enemy free agitation material. The Assistant General Command said in its monthly report that it was to be feared that the public appearance of the “German National Union” on 4 August 1916 served the enemy more than the fatherland.

Wounded volunteers, seriously wounded and disabled workers, farmers, soldiers, and officers of unshakable spirit were not trained and set before the public. One had no confidence in the magnitude of Germany’s sacrifice, and no courage to affirm it.

It was the army General Headquarters under the leadership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, after a look at the enemy, that finally decided to combat the nation’s lethargic will, not the responsible political leadership. But German specialization and bureaucracy exercised their disastrous force. The General Staff had little direct influence on the machinery and instruments of public opinion. In a resigned Imperial Germany, they apparently could not reach the revolutionary decision to brutally set aside an ossified government that did not willingly use its power.

Colonel Nicolai, the experienced head of Section IIIb of the General Staff, was given control of propaganda.

After October 1915, the War Press Office was independent, operating directly under the General Staff. It consisted of:

a) The Domestic Office for the German Press, under the leadership of Major Deutelmoser;

b) The Censor’s Office, under Major von Oldberg;

c) The Foreign Office for the Foreign Press, under Lieutenant Colonel von Herwarth.

General control was in the hands of Deutelmoser. Thus army officers took over the political leadership of public opinion, a task for which the government was unsuited. Colonel Nicolai himself said that some journalists of suitable ability, had they possessed political character, could not have brought the impartiality that the officers in War Press Office demanded. The tragedy of the Germany army, politics, and propaganda is contained in that sentence.

German public opinion could not be led colorlessly, but rather it required indivisible political will and character. It is indicative of the disintegration of our internal position that a conflict could result about whether the War Press Office was seeking “political influence!” It is really so naive that one must wonder what those engaged in the argument thought of as the tasks of the War Press Office.

In the course of his reflections, Colonel Nicolai himself comes to the conclusion that the solution to the military necessities was inseparable from political deliberations. Politics, military leadership, and public opinion must be unified to secure success. Those who direct a war must at the same time direct politics and public opinion.

At the end of 1915, the War Press Office together with the National Union of the German Press and the Union of German Newspaper Publishers drew up a common set of guidelines, but it refused to give the press a representative in the War Press Office or to permit private organizations to play a part in developing the guidelines. Later, the War Press Office began distributing prepared articles, written for the most part by officers in competition with professional journalists. This must naturally have led to an intensification of existing antagonisms and further crippled work with the press.

The political leadership intentionally ignored the German press, and worked exclusively through the Foreign Ministry.

The Wolff Telegraph Company was the center of its news agency. The Censorship law of 1916 offset its total neglect of the German press by censoring statements of the Reich and other leading officials taken from the foreign press.

The General Staff had to make the rather obvious demand that the political leadership at least inform the German press at the same time as the foreign press. When around 1916 the political leadership finally gave in to pressure from the General Staff and decided to establish an office for press and propaganda, Major Deutelmoser was relieved of his previous duties in the War Press Office and put in charge of the new department.

While the influence of the War Press Office declined (despite the addition of a fourth department which was added under the Hindenburg Plan to strengthen the will to war) nothing new, of equal or superior value developed to take its place. Everything was blocked by bureaucracy. People began to ‘organize’ instead of making propaganda.

While England had three propaganda ministers working along side each other — Lord Northcliffe who led English propaganda with restless energy, Robert Donald who was propaganda minister for neutral nations, and Rudyard Kipling, who handled internal propaganda — foolishness and a general weakness of the will dominated Germany. It lacked the character necessary to handle the strong tensions controlled by the powerful apparatus of economic, military, and political war leadership. It also lacked a circle of men who could work together confidently on specialized tasks and who were together possessed by an unyielding will for victory. Will extended only as far as jurisdiction, and judged itself only that far.

Our first governmental attempt at propaganda had no success within the country, and it damaged and exposed “German propaganda” in the eyes of the entire world. One must finally conclude that the propaganda was faulty in organization, in psychology, and in timing:

In organization, because it did not understand how to mobilize public opinion;

In psychology, because it lacked the unified leadership on which enthusiastic activity and belief depends;

In timing, because propagandists generally did not learn abut an attack until after it had already begun.

Propaganda is not instituted at the height of political or military actions. It is, rather, to be used as an extensive and wide-ranging preparation for them.

The Necessity of Action

The German-American Hansen wrote in 1920: “The German people and its former ruling class have learned nothing from the most terrible experience that has befallen any people.”

If one looks at the history of German nationalism, that was true for over a decade. This marvelous nation, the most intelligent, disciplined, and courageous in the world, has seen an almost unbroken selection of its worst qualities in its leadership. They understood neither the spirit of the world or of their own people. They spoke when they should have kept silent and were silent when there was a chance to speak. They had neither organized belief nor the courage to use power.

The former ruling class, which had given up without a fight in 1918 and groveled under the red boot, began to complain when fiery nationalism sprang from the depths and carried the masses along like an avalanche. Intellect without strength feels inferior, and that is dangerous. That man of the people [Hitler] was too powerful for their tastes. They laid traps and began talking of “brains.” Things, however, did not depend on “knowledge,” with which they had failed so miserably, but on ability. The nation needed his strength, not their “brains.”

Bismarck noted that he could not repress disturbing thought when considered the extent to which our ruling circle had lost political ability. He said that the first Chancellor who reached his position because of seniority would be Germany’s misfortune He was right. Mr. Betmann-Hollweg was the top student from a model school in Schulporta. He reached the office Reich Chancellor in all the right ways, provided one ignores such things as fighting ability, propaganda, and strength. He ably led us to national despair.

This system of national weakness bred good soldiers without political instincts, and politicians without backbones. It fell apart attempting the impossible. Today, the “brain” with his academic record or the nonpolitical soldier who seeks political office proclaims his political judgment to the nation and to history.

Germany has always had the best soldiers in the world. It was an enemy general, not a German one, who said that the German soldier had always been worth three of the enemy. But a soldier without political instincts is a mercenary. The soldier must carry a sense of the political system in his blood. And although it is his duty to defend it to the limits of his ability, it is the duty of the politician to avoid the necessity of doing so. Hitler has properly said: “The duty of a statesman is not to heroically lead a nation to defeat, but to preserve its existence.” This requires politicians with a military, or morBettmane generally speaking, fighting spirit [Blut] who do not confuse politics with their official careers. The one as well as the other, soldier and politician, must be willing to go to the limits. There is no use of power which, in the face of necessity, should not be used to defend the whole.

For the first time since that lone wolf Bismarck, the German race has a man of political genius, who is above all a dogmatist of great ability. Hitler will live in German history.

Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, who was popularly called the Soldier-King, created the loyal Prussian civil service which became a model to the world. Likewise, Hitler took the active, restless, and strong-willed elements of our people, organized them into the National Socialist movement, stamped it with his personality, and added an unprecedented aggressiveness and a flexible political will. The creation of the Nazi Party will hold a place in history.

No one knows what the end of the German drama will be, but this much is certain. This noble nation, possessing the best cultured people in the world, cannot continue in the center of a ring of greedy and uncivilized nations if it is not in future decades to be torn apart by actual or spiritual (as was the case during the last war) civil strife. Some say that enemy propaganda won the World War. More accurately, divisions in the German national will lost it. Whoever struggles with himself, whose soul is torn by conflicting emotions, cannot capably direct his attentions outwards because all his energies are required for the internal struggle. It is no different for a great nation than for the individual. National power depends on a unity of the national will. There is no way for Germany’s fate to improve that does not begin with national union.

Fichte said in one of his speeches:

No nation that has sunk into a state of despondency can rescue itself by the usual and previously successful methods. If their application was useless when the nation was in possession of all its strength, of what use will they be when the greater part is missing....

Every German who still believes that he is a part of a nation, who thinks highly and honorably of it, who hopes and strives for it, who builds and supports it, should eliminate all uncertainty from his faith….

The goals of spiritual reconstruction cannot be stated more beautifully or more nobly, nor the use of all means better justified. Uncertainty of belief means diversity and doubt; it means the paralysis of hope, will, and action. It should be replaced by a certainty of the unity of political beliefs in order to give the nation certainty and unity of aspiration and action.

Control of Public Opinion

Nationalization is not only preaching; it is action and organization as well. It must breed the type that compels others to accommodate it, or be strong enough to lead them. Then all desires and aspirations will no longer works against each other. Rather, their strengths which previously neutralized each other will be united in a powerful central movement. Individually each was too weak, but together they are as a firmly bound bundle of sticks. Such a consolidated nation is unshakable, unbreakable, and indivisible.

The achievement of such a goal requires a change from Bismarck court politics; mass movements provide the means in our century. Its method requires that all existing forces in the area of public opinion, provided they voluntarily submit, join to forcibly destroy and extinguish enemy dogmas and enemy opposition. Its goal is the elimination of all serious opposition in the masses; this, in order to produce a combat ready national mass will that can preserve the nation’s existence through powerful national politics. A nation which has bled to death, which has been enslaved and dismissed by half the world, and which has been shredded by civil strife cannot win back its right to life unless its leadership is resolved to ignore so-called liberal advances in public life, and to obey only the cold laws of history.

Liberalism is dead. If the nation is to live, liberal phrases must also die. Attempts to establish liberalism’s principle of universal freedom have endangered everyone’s life. Its dogmas about “public opinion” produced division and weakness in the national will. Even the greatest proponent of liberalism, John Stuart Mill, demanded of the government “the greatest possible centralization of information, and its dissemination from a central point.” Capitalistic liberalism itself scrapped the holiest principles of its prophets and apostles and used so-called “public” opinion solely for its own profit. But now the end has come.

The slogan of the freedom of public opinion must be buried without tears.

Public opinion does not spring up by itself, nor does it correspond to true public feeling. Otherwise public opinion would reflect decisions on important political affairs before anyone else, and would thus predict such things as election results. The liberals, however, saw only the interest that stood behind them, and thought along the same lines whenever something new came up from the masses.

In contrast, vague moods of the masses which strive for recognition but fail to achieve it, there is a public opinion for whomever can afford it. The buyer remains in the shadows. The liberal states are dominated by capitalistic interest groups. Knowingly or unknowingly, the intellectual leadership of the press, literature, etc., works for them.

The capitalistic interest groups will be thrown out so that they cannot endanger the whole in pursuit of their own interests. They will be replaced by men, who, with a national instinct and primitive politics, will again achieve victory. In place of the formation of opinion by private interests, the future will inevitably bring a great and unified will-storm of national political interests, not only for conditions of crisis, but for a lengthy historical period.

Public opinion can therefore be brought to a unity which it could never have in liberal states.

Public opinion is the unified and leading expression of the public will.

Within the masses are moods which are not public and which cannot simply be equated with public opinion. In the end, there is a gap between intellect and drives. One should not consider this to be dangerous in the way that blocking an outlet can be. The liberal mentality and propaganda have taught us to conceive of propaganda in this way in the interests of those behind them, the ruling interest groups. This illusion has been destroyed forever. The vague moods of the populace which are not expressed through intellectual, economic, or political emotions are not relevant or threatening to large-scale politics. Every strong instinct finds an intellectual expression; else its apparent strength rests on deception. If the intellectual elite becomes active in the service of the whole, politics probably has to pay a limited amount of attention to the existence of these inevitable, constantly changing dreamy moods, but it may choose its means, methods, and goals without respect to them.

It is clear that the use of the revised Bismarck method requires, under today’s circumstances, a strong element of compulsion and power which are indeed necessarily a part of these methods. One must add something important, however. Bismarck’s political system, based on Prussian militarism and official absolutism, believed it could check and restrain the dangerously rising power of the masses by prohibitions and compulsion. This is a serious error which was somehow incessantly repeated by all national German governments until our recent republican days.

Only the democratic states recognized the obvious, that the masses cannot be controlled simply by prohibition. The masses begin economically where financial independence stops. Personal responsibility and restraint end there as well. What we today call the masses develops not from just any group of people but from one characterized so strongly by instability, pliability, and explosiveness that the individual is no longer tangible. The principles and methods of violent suppression break down, as a result, when applied to this phenomenon. The entirely negative use of power will never achieve its goals, for it will be successfully opposed by the power structures of the masses — associations, organizations, and labor unions. The masses are more numerous than the police. Bismarck’s defeat by the Social Democrats is but one of many examples.

Propaganda and the use of differing degrees of power must therefore cooperate in exceptionally clever ways. They must use the organizations of the masses if they are to achieve definite success. A practical rule for the state is thus: One does not scatter those who are organized, rather one organizes them oneself.

All systems that have gained control of government through modern mass movements have done this. Although it may outwardly appear complicated, it has been brought about by the varied conditions of life, corresponding to a system of public organizations, cooperatives, and associations. While governmental propaganda strongly and consistently pursues its clear and vital goals and while the exercise of governmental power makes any active or passive attempt at obstruction impossible, the entire public organizational apparatus will be used to make possible an organized variety of vigorous individual interests alongside the unity of the mass propaganda line. But this variety no longer permits the individual, only sums of individuals. Thus from the human soup of liberalism a state will emerge an organism dominated by a single compelling idea. The cells will no longer be independent and opposed to one another, but will rather be linked together by a high, meaningful, living reality.

Since our Gothic Reich collapsed and German unity was lost in battles over intellectual and political beliefs, innumerable legends and fables have lived in our people and in the artistic creations of our greatest poets and philosophers that expressed the longing for the coming Reich and an idea of its basic structure. The Prussians of the Mediterranean, the Fascist Italians, have lived the great ideals of the German spirit for a decade — Kant’s obligation, the Prussian knowledge of government, Nietzsche’s joyful struggle, Fichte’s national development. Luckily, they have found the way to national will building faster than the shredded German people, and have perfected the methods of propaganda and the use of differing degrees of power in the development of a modern state. Fascism has a special ministry for national education. The party possesses a school of political propaganda and the practical will to power. The motto of the Fascists, “live dangerously,” is taken from Nietzsche. The corporative philosophy which the labor force organized for the state is not individualistic-Italian, but socialist-Gothic.

No one has the right to use the cheap slogan of an imitation of Fascism in Germany because the deeply German spirituality, originating from ideals, concepts and forms, is with us again today, placed at the service of our modern leadership. Mussolini is historically unique, an accident, perhaps. He is a powerful personality with deep spiritual roots going back to Nietzsche. His system is, therefore, German in its essential characteristics, developed from the creative spirit of German soil, and is returning to that soil today. Here, supported by technical, highly developed, struggle-loving, and disciplined people, it will reach a new and earthshaking level.

Chapter II

Propaganda and Power (Organized Strength)

Each organization of individuals

requires a certain amount of

common ideas and similar interests.

— Hitler —

The Creative Word

The word is apparently the original element of human thought, and therefore of human genius. Today as well, it exercises its inescapable power on everyone whose intelligence has not been overcome by cynicism.

Applicability to truth and falsehood is characteristic of the word; man alone decides which use he will make of it.

The average man, and more certainly the masses, succumbs almost infallibly to the power of the word, unconcerned with its inherent truth. The inherent truth in words is not enough to combat spoken lies, but rather only a new word which can be set against the old. In order for this new word to be believed, the people and masses must hear and understand it. It must come to them and speak their language; its power must be greater than that of the old.

If the arts and the sciences are somehow separated by their mysterious languages that define the borders of each and their jurisdictions, the art of life, politics, works more than ever with the means of creative language in order to win the masses and hold them firmly within the boundaries of a definite conception and worldview. Creative language will occasionally make wide departures from the natural and aesthetic. That has no harmful effect on the masses, whom we must today consider a political reality, even if it does violence at times to the German language. One generally has to be careful when applying the so-called aesthetic yardstick to politics, as it gives no hint of possible outcomes.

As long as Western civilization relied on secret cabinet politics, the polished language of diplomacy served as a sharp and pointed Toledo sword to politics. To cynics, it was the art of saying the opposite of what one thought. In the mouth of an expert, it was a way of protecting oneself from the aims and influences of by the enemy. When the French Revolution opened the age of mass struggle, the gentlemanly games and limited risks of cabinet politics were replaced by all-out struggling movements of masses and nations. The fine old language of diplomacy yielded to the new, blunt, and violent language of political mass propaganda. Political language became a public affair.

Freedom, equality, brotherhood, capitalism, socialism, communism, profit, surplus value, output, international economy, Soviet Germany, nationalism, blood, land, race, self sufficiency, Third Reich — each of these is its own slogan, encompassing the inferences and doctrines of worldview.

They assault the enemy, hammer at him, raise doubt, fear, resistance, and agreement.

Adherents see in them a positive promise of a brighter future, and find in them a spiritual, faith-restoring rescue from blind, purely psychological daily struggles.

Today, the political “layman” faces a puzzling mass of words, a flood of unfamiliar concepts, a mysterious, ordered, deafeningly strong and one-sided view of life that works through the word to recruit and organize.

The major ideological parties make use of the technical aspects of language in their organizational structures. What is a ‘Truf,” a “Staf,” the “Osaf,” an “Uschla?” They are no longer mere abbreviation in a telegraph code (Truppführer, Standartenführer, Oberster S.A. Führer, Untersuchungs- und Schlictungsausschuss), but rather these are new words that have become colloquialisms, a jargon, in the National Socialist Party. Although these words may not be found in the creative works of Luther, Goethe, or Nietzsche, many will remain in our vocabulary. Today, at any event, they exercise their effect in spite of theoretical philology.

Every German is familiar with Hitler’s S.A. In the popular mind, it simply means the brown shirts, “the Hitlers.” The Führer himself answers the question, “What does S.A. mean?” with three definitions: Saalschutzabteilung [meeting hall guards]; Sportabteilung [sports group]; and Sturmabteilung [storm troopers]. This explanation conceals a sense of uncertainty. The S.A. is a myth that cannot be captured in a few words; it can only be felt and experienced. The experience of a generation is summarized in this concept. The brief hard rhythm of this word has become something holy to millions.

The number of such words is legion. Each is propaganda by its very existence, each a form of intellectual bondage. Their very names require agreement or opposition, excite storms of the will, determine our actions.

Philologists and artists will accuse such newly created words of not being an organic part of the language, but rather artificial constructions. That is true of many such expressions. No one, however, will be able to root many of them out from the soul of people. They have become a familiar element of popular speech. The word S.A. is an example. One should on theoretical grounds question the right to existence of any expression which has not achieved popularity, acceptance, and organic union with the language. The right is a question of life. Life has previously created and justified such words in the sciences, arts, and economic and technical occupations. It now does so in politics as well.

There are also constructions that are intentionally designed to be effective and to produce suggestion through their unfamiliarity and which therefore remain strange to popular instinct. An example of such a construction is the communist word “agitprop.” There are “agitprop men,” “agitprop troops,” and “agitprop leaders,” the apostles of Bolshevist revolution under the red star. The word comes from agitation and propaganda.

The letters G.P.U. are just as strange. They are the initials of Gossundarstwennoje Polititschkoje Uprawlenje, the Soviet secret police. We call them the Cheka. They have systematically eliminated all other viewpoints in the country by systematic terror. These letters have become a symbol to the entire world of bloody terror and sinister underground power.

Creative language in political propaganda uses phrases and slogans to establish control. This is not new. The campaign slogans of a movement are and always have been the best propaganda. Anyone who had played a political role in the world was either a master of the word and of creative language, or else fought side by side with men accomplished in these arts.

Christianity conquered the world with its slogan “love thy neighbor as thyself.” The German people did not lose a war against the entire world because of the weakness of their weapons and soldiers, but rather because of the bureaucratic sterility of their leading officials. They were beaten not on the field of battle, but on the field of words. Their soul was crushed. They were never given a slogan to carry into the great struggle, while the enemy carried “against the Huns,” “for democracy,” and “for the League of Nations” onto the field. In politics, the fruitful and creative will always triumph over the unfruitful, the bureaucrats, the mere diplomats. Fichte’s observation that neither the power of the army nor the quality of the weapons decides a battle, but rather the power that leads the spirit to victory is also applicable to the political, military, and economic struggles of our day.

Psychological Foundations

Since the war, German historians have studied the problem of propaganda with commendable thoroughness. They have given lengthy and elaborate definitions, as Friedrich Tönnies has done, and engaged in fruitful work in concrete areas, as for example Friedrich Schönemann’s study of the art of mass propaganda in the United States of America.

We could also have studied the problems of propaganda and mass organization in an earlier period, and one closer to home, namely the origins of the German worker’s movement in the middle of the last century and its gradual drift towards Marxism. And the struggles of the Social Democrats, who emerged as victors from a struggle with the all-powerful Bismarck and who triumphed over Karl Peters, the German African hero, must certainly open our eyes to the nature, dangers, possibilities, and necessities of propaganda. The intelligentsia, meanwhile, lived in its own world of illusion as life passed them by. They do much the same today, although the tremendous power of the masses is displayed before their very eyes.

Such raw expressions of power are always springing up and falling apart when they do not succeed in seizing power. But their desperate power is often based on inescapable necessity.

The Social Democrats were a group of men who achieved political power through the abundant resources of the German working class. Communism fought to be their successors. Revolution will always strike at the heart of a state when bureaucrats, ignorant desk politicians, or generals believe that they can set naked force against effective propaganda. This is not sufficient, especially when the nation’s intellectuals are neutral or, as was the case in Russia in 1905, are sympathetic toward the revolution. If propaganda tactics are properly used, they will have a subtler, deeper, and therefore stronger effect on the human will than will blatant oppression. Propaganda is the art of exercising power without possessing the means of power; it is the secret through which the powerless can overcome the powerful when they rest too securely in their strength.

Marx and Engels began alone, as exiles without money in a foreign country. Lenin was alone in Switzerland, condemned to death. Mussolini was expelled from his social democracy as an agitator. Hitler was an unknown corporal with seven followers in 1918. In twelve years, he created the greatest mass movement in history, with which he conquered Bismarck’s state.

They were all poor, without property, alone. They had nothing but their heartfelt ideals. But these ideals, so fatal to some, but capable of so much more in others, would have been buried along with their poverty and extinguished with their lives had they not had the gift of inflaming, inciting, winning, and persuading others. They were not only idealists, but propagandists as well. As a result, they became great. They preached community, lived it, stirred the courageous, forced the common man to common labor. Their propaganda was the art of building community, their power was both actual and spiritual force.

There is something of the propagandist in everyone. We all have the feeling that we understand it. In reality, everyone uses propaganda; it is a manifestation of human community life. It is just as in politics. The barroom philosopher always knows what has to be done. The only thing missing with him, unfortunately, is the spiritual bond. Fundamentally, one may be so bold as to say that propaganda and politics are as accessible to the common man as to the intellectual. And the best propagandists are women.

They understand how to get “his” attention when they want to build a strong home, even when “he” isn’t so willing. A woman is the best propagandists of love and marriage.

Leading politicians often display unstable characteristics. The phrase “whims of the prima donna” applies not only to capricious women, but to many politicians as well. Examples are Julius Caesar whom the Romans called “regina” in mocking verse, and Napoleon, whose womanly breast drove doctors to distraction. His whims were the despair of those around him.

Effective propaganda is rarely a question of womanly inclinations or capriciousness as such. Often, an intuitive decision emerges with a surprising primitiveness of thought, as is clearly shown in the recently emerging harshness of manliness. Such thought is always instinctive, earthy, single-minded, intent on actions, never on so-called objective standards of observation. The objective observer, of course, is an intellectual who recognizes the apparent weakness of the opponent, and exploits it thoroughly. He sees the strength of the self-imposed limitations of a man of action as a weakness. This overlooks that fact that in politics, just as in the individual, there are two minds, one of action, and one of contemplation. Only one is publicly observable. No one is familiar with the other. The clarity, simplicity, and limited horizons of the working class, actually great naiveté and innocence in the Nietzschean sense, are disparagingly misinterpreted as peasant stupidity or cleverness, which city-dwellers take to be one and the same.

The ignorance of intellectuals in politics has shown itself throughout history. When Napoleon entered an academic competition in Lyon with an essay on human ideals, it did not win the prize that the poor lieutenant had longed for. Instead, it was scornfully judged to be “not worth looking at.” The same thing happens with many intellectually superior soldiers and politicians.

Only Caesar who, by calculation, was a democrat and remained so throughout his life has been admitted to the democratic pantheon of great heroes, and his clever work of propaganda on the Gallic Wars has become “world literature.”

Recently, he has had a successor. Bernard Shaw, the Irishman, praised Revolt in the Desert by the English Colonel Lawrence first, because he had to praise something English to maintain his popularity, and second, because Lawrence is, as a matter of fact, a good chap (and third, perhaps, because Colonel Lawrence made his English colleagues on the General Staff look stupid??). Literary circles compared the book to Caesar’s Gallic Wars, and called it one of the greatest works of literature (perhaps they were impressed by the English Colonel’s mocking judgments on the military?!).

In the popular criticism of today, no leading politicians fails to appear, in enemy propaganda, to be a perfect idiot, a coward, or a mere terrorist whose intelligence is so low that he must be secretly controlled from elsewhere. Lenin was portrayed as a sick criminal in middle class pamphlets, Hitler as a hangman and maniac in proletarian pamphlets, Mussolini as a bloody tyrant in class struggle pamphlets. Material intended for the masses is not so-called objective writing, but rather such hate-filled pamphlets and caricatures.

Caricature, misrepresentation, and one-sidedness appear to belong in propaganda.

To laugh at the enemy is as important as to fear his strength. The science of suggestion has, which is often dubious, found an accurate precept when it maintains that suggestion works most effectively in a state of excitement. Ridicule and fear are both sentiments and emotions that encourage effective suggestion. Ridicule gives the feeling of superiority, for when one laughs he is confident of victory. Fear, on the other hand, compels one to get to work at once because he believes he has perceived danger. Ridicule and fear, then, are two components of propaganda that are indispensable to its success.

Confidence in one’s cause and an absolute faith are further obvious requirements. Only a fool can hope to gain success for an idea in which he himself does not believe. “There is,” writes Goebbels, “only truth. Either we lie, in which case the enemy is right, or we tell the truth and everyone else lies. We believe that the truth is on our side with all the steadfastness of our blood.”

When an intellectual criticizes someone’s propaganda, his first point is not its simple, often vulgar language. He excuses that with a reference to the “people.” He also excuses the ridiculing or fear-provoking calumnies of the enemy, although he begins to speak of one-sided fanaticism, and inwardly holds the thesis that ‘to know all is to forgive all.” His greatest complaint concerns the perpetual repetition of certain goals, slogans, and catchwords.

He thinks assumed limitations are actual limitations, and says pityingly, “Well, he is after all only a propagandist…”

He then makes a few good “suggestions”: (1) one cannot take an absolute position, but rather one must say something good about the other side; (2) atrocity propaganda is not artistic. It offends the cultured; (3) one cannot always say the same thing, for that is boring.

If this brilliant intellectual became the head of a propaganda ministry, Betmann-Hollweg’s fiasco in propaganda leadership during the war would be surpassed. He would resemble those fine patriots who tried to encourage the “people” in 1917 with speeches about the fatherland, but who achieved the opposite.

If one reverses the principles of the intelligent, well-meaning intellectual, he will have the secret of effective propaganda.

Believe completely in your cause, do not shrink from powerful emotions, unceasingly hammer the same thoughts into the minds of the masses.

The necessity of conviction and of the methods of emotional arousal have been psychologically explained. One-sidedness is indispensable because the confusion around us is so great that every impression will quickly be shoved aside by a new one. Nothing is forgetful as the masses. Something can have appeared in a thousand newspapers and have been talked about by the millions, but a few months later it will be completely forgotten. Scarcely one per cent of those selected from the masses will recall the name of important personages of the dates and events.

Among the members of a large party one can observe that even the majority of those engaged in propaganda forget the most vital slogans in six months or a year unless the highest officials of the party repeat them over and over again. If those involved have such poor memories, others will not believe anything unless it is repeated to them. Life is a strong opponent. Only that which is itself lively, headed towards victory, and constantly present can overcome a hostile world. Criminal psychology has learned from practical experience that the testimony of a single witness is highly untrustworthy. There is no trial in which the witnesses say the same thing, even though they may all be disinterested and possess characters of the highest integrity. Often the assertions of witnesses who have experienced the same event are entirely contrary to each other. It is not surprising, then, that propaganda, which is only a substitute, must repeat the same thing over and over again to have any effect, since actual experiences are so poorly and imperfectly remembered. Its secret is simplicity and perseverance.

Power (Organized Strength)

Power built only on propaganda is fleeting, and can disintegrate from one day to the next unless the power of organization is added to propaganda. The use of such strength or power is reflected at all levels of human life, from the strong bond of the family which brings two people together as a simple matter of personal choice to the powerful bonds of peoples and nations.

“There has never been,” Mussolini said, “a government founded solely on the consent of the governed, who approved its every use of force. Consent is as transient as sand castles on a beach. It cannot always be present, it can never be complete.”

Not since the Inquisition has the West seen as large a scale of violent mental control as is seen today in Soviet Russia, where millions are sacrificed to a bloody idol. Even the blood bath of the French Revolution pales in comparison. The Cheka works carefully with the news and propaganda organizations of the Bolshevist party. If the party’s press and propaganda announcements were suppressed or sabotaged through indifference or terror, then power would be set against power, criminal penalties against sabotage, whips and hunger against indifference and apathy, and every spark of resistance would be crushed.

Since the individual remains defenseless even when he is an agent of power, a sense of strong community develops as quickly from an offensive as from a defensive spirit. The activists find each other in either case. The momentary flow of enthusiasm is spiritually maintained through popular gatherings and systematic schooling and discipline. Such organized power can then with greater power attack the unorganized and ultimately, like a polyp, devour all the positions of power in a governmental structure.

One entirely deceives himself if he thinks the principles underlying these methods are limited to Russia or to a certain time. Unrestrained instincts certainly make brutal intervention necessary, though civilized nations need not experience the same blood bath as did Russia under the rule of the Soviets, except under conditions of extreme danger.

Propaganda and power, however, are never entirely opposed to one another. The use of force can be a part of propaganda. Between them lie different degrees of effective influence over people and masses. The range extends from the sudden exciting of attention or the friendly persuasion of the individual to incessant mass propaganda, from the loose organizing of proselytes to the creation of state or semi-state institutions, from individual to mass terror, from authorized use of the might of the strong, of position, class, or government, to the military enforcement of obedience and discipline by means of martial law.

The principle of the unified formation of the will through a graduated use of propaganda and power is perfectly developed in the “advanced” nations of the world. We of the German Republic (with laws that forbade free speech!) can look to the United States of America. In this celebrated free democracy, one can clearly see the development of national ideals through the use of every kind of information and propaganda, including terror and the use of governmental power. This has resulted from an influx of immigrants which drove the Anglo-Saxon leadership to a tempo of extreme nationalism and self-defense. The “melting pot” is the slogan of Americanization. The struggle goes against the hyphenated (for example, the German-Americans), against every assertion of nationality, and against all those having dangerous intentions towards the existing governmental structure, such as the “radicals” who organized the labor unions in the United States. Schönemann quotes the following words of George Creel, the American propaganda chief during the war, which illustrate the general and particular goals of American propaganda:

What we had to have was no mere surface unity, but a passionate belief in the justice of America’s cause that should weld the people of the United States into one white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, devotion, courage, and deathless determination…. We began with the initial conviction that the war was not the war of administration, but the war of one hundred million people, and we believed that public support was a matter of public understanding.

The basic idea of propaganda was extended to complete autocracy by draconian war laws. The United States threatened, according to Schönemann, (law of 15 June 1917) fines “up to ten thousand dollars or imprisonment for twenty years:”

for whomever shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies;

for whomever shall willfully cause or seek to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, or

for whomever shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service.

Further additions were made to this dangerous and enticingly vague law. But that was not enough. The broader law of 16 March 1918 extended to all possible expressions against the war. Under Section 2, it prohibited all disloyal statements or actions regarding government bonds, and in Section 3 decreed further crimes such as “the uttering, printing, writing, or publishing of disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to bring the government, constitution, flag, or uniforms of the army and navy of the United States of American into contempt scorn, contumely, or disrepute.” And finally, “words or acts which support or encourage the cause of any country with which the United States is at war, or which oppose the cause of the United States.”

And if that were not enough, the Postmaster General could handle whatever the president, legislators, and courts could not. He could exclude from the mails that which he wished, and could even deny postal service to the sender for “evidence satisfactory to him.” Every suspected citizen was thus completely defenseless. And the non-English press was further muzzled, as it was required to submit an English translation of every political article to the local postmaster. And when one considers the lynching and terrorism, and the threats from the State Councils of Defense, nothing remained of freedom and thought, speech, or the press.

One might object that these laws were enacted solely because the United States was at war, under a state of emergency, and that these restrictions on public opinion disappeared when the war ended. This objection is easily refuted. Has not Germany been under an unbroken state of emergency since 1914? What danger threatened the powerful United States in 1914-1919, lying as it does on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean? The U.S.A. is safe in the center of a vast industrially rich continent; more than six thousand nautical miles separate it from any powerful enemy.

Germany fought a desperate war against the entire world. It fought not for the gain or loss of gold, goods, colonies, business, or markets. These were secondary. Its struggle was rather for existence, being or not being, for its spiritual and actual unity as a nation, for its daily bread. Instead of accommodating their spiritual attitude to this task, our political and intellectual leadership was entirely unfamiliar with the role of propaganda in other countries, all too silent in their disastrous and academic attempts to win influence with the peoples of foreign countries. They never understood how to powerfully suppress subversive foreign activity.

From the beginning, active and determined enemy propaganda was not limited to producing an absolute confidence in victory in their own nations which would be nourished by elements of hope, by the feeling of superiority, and of fear. They also looked for and found a way to reach Germany in order to produce the opposite beliefs of despondency, hopelessness, and inferiority, as well as disastrous belief that voluntary defeat and surrender would be favorably received, since the allies were not fighting against the innocent German people, but rather against Prussian militarism, the Kaiser, and the Junkers.

Enemy and German Propaganda during the World War

Captured English pilots who had dropped inflammatory leaflets over the Western front since December 1915 were convicted by our military courts, their offense punished as a violation of the laws of war. We forbade our own pilots to drop leaflets on enemy troops. Late in the war, we made a disastrous attempt at the counter-propaganda, using apparently moral unmanned hot air balloons. They kept our propaganda of “extravagance,” as one of us said, far from the enemy. That it also kept us far from success was not noticed. Our internal propaganda could not be “political,” our foreign propaganda could not “irritate England.” From the beginning, our enthusiasm and activism were officially corrupted to devotion, endurance, and passivity. The world and concept of propaganda left a stale aftertaste. They labeled enemy activity as evil and immoral which one was afraid of. One saw the enemy lies but was still taken in by them.

While the army at the front remained strong and in control of its actions, German intellectuals lost control of the masses. Their propaganda stood speechless before the raging flood from without and the bubbling turmoil within. Here their naiveté was exposed, for they believed the German people and the peoples of the world were too “sensible” to believe such “nonsense,” such lies and fabrications.

In his memoirs, published in 1920, Colonel Nicolai, the head of the German intelligence service, recalled with a quiet, rather painful pleasure the approach of the German bureaucracy to enemy propaganda. The Foreign Service office in the Foreign Ministry decided to seek expert advice as to the abnormal mental condition of the enemy, which was proven by his hate-filled propaganda! When German legislators and governmental officials saw examples of enemy propaganda, they suggested to the high command that they doubted the genuineness of the material, instead of opposing it everywhere with vehement action. They depended on so-called human reason, without considering that is it dependent on impressions from the surrounding world. We receive these impressions for the most part today indirectly, through news reports with pictures, sounds, and words. Every man therefore depends on the news, and even with the strongest opposition of the rational facilities one must finally believe what one hears over and over again and nowhere finds refuted with inner conviction and the force of truth.

The slogans about Huns and Boches and the bloody hand print (“The Hun’s market [sic]) which glared from a hundred thousand wall posters in large enemy cities for four years, the horror-provoking Belgian atrocity stories, the filthy lies about the use of corpses to make grease (based on an intentional mistranslation of the word Kadaververwertung [cadaver utilization], and the portrayal of German soldiers as grotesque, arrogant, cowardly drunkards and sauerkraut pigs must certainly have aroused the feelings of the enemy’s masses to an extreme and bitter desire for combat and victory.

H. G. Scheffeur said in regards to the German answer to such hate-propaganda:

Germany lost itself in otherworldliness, in varied and confusing world views; it worshipped the intellect for its own sake. Knowledge was often an end, not a means. It was used to shed light on the world and the universe, but not to master life. An army of worldviews sprang up, but not control over the world. They enriched the intellect, but as Schopenhauer proved, in a way that nourished itself like a vampire on the will and character.

Germany’s enemies deafened the world’s reason, as well as their own civilization, by childishly attempting to brand the greatest modern culture as “barbaric.” They expanded on hate inherited from their ancestors, or made even more revolting inventions, as was revealed in a survey of French scientists which asked “Whether Germans were human…”

The indignation which such claims of barbarism kindled in the breast of the German people proved that they could still see the true worth of the enemy. They expected truthfulness and justice from him. But the indignation was express together with a peculiar and unfortunate defect in human judgment which endangers the broadest and deepest thrusts of the German spirit. Germans tried to show that they were not barbarians through historical and scientific means. It would have been better and easier if they had proven their enemies were barbarians….

Such unified propaganda worked for the most part on the other side, although it was supported by some pitiable paid stooges and insane idealists among the German people. Here, the Germans suddenly became poets and philosophers who had been driven to war not for the defense of food, home, and freedom, but for the conquest of the world under the ruling class. The enemy masses were not insane, raving, chauvinistic, and inflamed Frenchman, Belgians, and Serbs, they were instead, peaceful farmers, workers, and citizens; their leaders were not relentless statesmen intent on victory, coldly calculating for the advantage of their own peoples, but rather humanitarians extending the olive branch, who were fighting only to give German freedom, human dignity, and — the League of Nations. The best of these apostles of happiness who appeared to the German people and its intellectuals was the noble Wilson, whose Fourteen Points were to bring “world peace.” “It was really tough luck for the Germans to believe Wilson,” an American Senator later said.

The English intellectuals worked hard under the leadership of Herbert George Wells, the popular novelist, trade unionist, and socialist, following the firm directives from the Propaganda Ministry headed by Lord Northcliffe. Müller-Freienfels wrote that Wells, in his reminiscences, said: “Those in England had carefully considered how best to reach the German mentality, and had agreed that we had to catch the Germans through their tendency towards speculative ideas; therefore, it was decided that the League of Nations was by far the best way. It was played up like a roman candle.” The enemy press completely cooperated with such propaganda. Significantly, the press chief (Lord Northcliffe) was a member of the Allied government, and conversely, the members of government considered it self-evident that the press should be a participant in decision making and in the center of discussion and debate. The foreign press portrayed us as having started the war, as war criminals, as protracting the war through our desire for world conquest, and as the final losers. This was done to strengthen their own militant posture and their alliance, and to prepare for a devastating peace. They worked towards a systematic weakening of our fighting force, and mobilized enemies of the German state as well as international fanatics in neutral nations and even in Germany itself to assist their cause. They were exceptionally clever in that they directed their propaganda against the Kaiser and General Ludendorff as the organizers of the war, but made little mention in pictures or publication of Field Marshal Hindenburg, who had the highest trust of the people. They hoped not only to gradually drive a wedge between these men but also to convince the masses that their supposed explanations of the depravity of our leaders were serious and accurate.

They acted like Bismarck in 1871. As is well known, he took the greatest care not to do anything that could harm the newly founded republican government as long as he knew it was agreeable to his political goals. He must have thought that, with the republican government in power, he could at least include it as a known factor in his calculations rather than as a chaotic force intent on gaining power by surprising and incalculable means.

While enemy leaders and intellectuals directed their entire wills and thoughts to our destruction, German officials in Berlin offices led the struggle as if they had the most secure positions in the world.

The Society of German Scholars and Artists used its own limited means to clear things up somewhat in 1915. In 1916, it approached the Reich Chancellor in conjunction with the Interior Ministry, the Admiralty, and the General Staff and demanded material and financial support. Reich Chancellor Betmann-Hollweg made a few trivial remarks, refusing every expense on the brilliant grounds that current funds “had not been appropriated” for purposes of internal political propaganda.

A weary indolence filled the Berlin offices when important war matters were handled. Enthusiasm was much greater on jurisdictional disputes, and while the army bled to death in an enormous ring, those in Berlin joined with growing enthusiasm in the hunt for soft jobs and war profits.

A few well meaning patriotic societies, a few voices in the wilderness, believed they could restore lost spiritual vitality through thundering speeches or emotional appeals. They spoke and wrote, but knew noting of the hard realities of the front and of common life, with husbandless wives and starving families. They aimed for the mind but achieved the opposite, and gave the enemy free agitation material. The Assistant General Command said in its monthly report that it was to be feared that the public appearance of the “German National Union” on 4 August 1916 served the enemy more than the fatherland.

Wounded volunteers, seriously wounded and disabled workers, farmers, soldiers, and officers of unshakable spirit were not trained and set before the public. One had no confidence in the magnitude of Germany’s sacrifice, and no courage to affirm it.

It was the army General Headquarters under the leadership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, after a look at the enemy, that finally decided to combat the nation’s lethargic will, not the responsible political leadership. But German specialization and bureaucracy exercised their disastrous force. The General Staff had little direct influence on the machinery and instruments of public opinion. In a resigned Imperial Germany, they apparently could not reach the revolutionary decision to brutally set aside an ossified government that did not willingly use its power.

Colonel Nicolai, the experienced head of Section IIIb of the General Staff, was given control of propaganda.

After October 1915, the War Press Office was independent, operating directly under the General Staff. It consisted of:

a) The Domestic Office for the German Press, under the leadership of Major Deutelmoser;

b) The Censor’s Office, under Major von Oldberg;

c) The Foreign Office for the Foreign Press, under Lieutenant Colonel von Herwarth.

General control was in the hands of Deutelmoser. Thus army officers took over the political leadership of public opinion, a task for which the government was unsuited. Colonel Nicolai himself said that some journalists of suitable ability, had they possessed political character, could not have brought the impartiality that the officers in War Press Office demanded. The tragedy of the Germany army, politics, and propaganda is contained in that sentence.

German public opinion could not be led colorlessly, but rather it required indivisible political will and character. It is indicative of the disintegration of our internal position that a conflict could result about whether the War Press Office was seeking “political influence!” It is really so naive that one must wonder what those engaged in the argument thought of as the tasks of the War Press Office.

In the course of his reflections, Colonel Nicolai himself comes to the conclusion that the solution to the military necessities was inseparable from political deliberations. Politics, military leadership, and public opinion must be unified to secure success. Those who direct a war must at the same time direct politics and public opinion.

At the end of 1915, the War Press Office together with the National Union of the German Press and the Union of German Newspaper Publishers drew up a common set of guidelines, but it refused to give the press a representative in the War Press Office or to permit private organizations to play a part in developing the guidelines. Later, the War Press Office began distributing prepared articles, written for the most part by officers in competition with professional journalists. This must naturally have led to an intensification of existing antagonisms and further crippled work with the press.

The political leadership intentionally ignored the German press, and worked exclusively through the Foreign Ministry.

The Wolff Telegraph Company was the center of its news agency. The Censorship law of 1916 offset its total neglect of the German press by censoring statements of the Reich and other leading officials taken from the foreign press.

The General Staff had to make the rather obvious demand that the political leadership at least inform the German press at the same time as the foreign press. When around 1916 the political leadership finally gave in to pressure from the General Staff and decided to establish an office for press and propaganda, Major Deutelmoser was relieved of his previous duties in the War Press Office and put in charge of the new department.

While the influence of the War Press Office declined (despite the addition of a fourth department which was added under the Hindenburg Plan to strengthen the will to war) nothing new, of equal or superior value developed to take its place. Everything was blocked by bureaucracy. People began to ‘organize’ instead of making propaganda.

While England had three propaganda ministers working along side each other — Lord Northcliffe who led English propaganda with restless energy, Robert Donald who was propaganda minister for neutral nations, and Rudyard Kipling, who handled internal propaganda — foolishness and a general weakness of the will dominated Germany. It lacked the character necessary to handle the strong tensions controlled by the powerful apparatus of economic, military, and political war leadership. It also lacked a circle of men who could work together confidently on specialized tasks and who were together possessed by an unyielding will for victory. Will extended only as far as jurisdiction, and judged itself only that far.

Our first governmental attempt at propaganda had no success within the country, and it damaged and exposed “German propaganda” in the eyes of the entire world. One must finally conclude that the propaganda was faulty in organization, in psychology, and in timing:

In organization, because it did not understand how to mobilize public opinion;

In psychology, because it lacked the unified leadership on which enthusiastic activity and belief depends;

In timing, because propagandists generally did not learn abut an attack until after it had already begun.

Propaganda is not instituted at the height of political or military actions. It is, rather, to be used as an extensive and wide-ranging preparation for them.

The Necessity of Action

The German-American Hansen wrote in 1920: “The German people and its former ruling class have learned nothing from the most terrible experience that has befallen any people.”

If one looks at the history of German nationalism, that was true for over a decade. This marvelous nation, the most intelligent, disciplined, and courageous in the world, has seen an almost unbroken selection of its worst qualities in its leadership. They understood neither the spirit of the world or of their own people. They spoke when they should have kept silent and were silent when there was a chance to speak. They had neither organized belief nor the courage to use power.

The former ruling class, which had given up without a fight in 1918 and groveled under the red boot, began to complain when fiery nationalism sprang from the depths and carried the masses along like an avalanche. Intellect without strength feels inferior, and that is dangerous. That man of the people [Hitler] was too powerful for their tastes. They laid traps and began talking of “brains.” Things, however, did not depend on “knowledge,” with which they had failed so miserably, but on ability. The nation needed his strength, not their “brains.”

Bismarck noted that he could not repress disturbing thought when considered the extent to which our ruling circle had lost political ability. He said that the first Chancellor who reached his position because of seniority would be Germany’s misfortune He was right. Mr. Betmann-Hollweg was the top student from a model school in Schulporta. He reached the office Reich Chancellor in all the right ways, provided one ignores such things as fighting ability, propaganda, and strength. He ably led us to national despair.

This system of national weakness bred good soldiers without political instincts, and politicians without backbones. It fell apart attempting the impossible. Today, the “brain” with his academic record or the nonpolitical soldier who seeks political office proclaims his political judgment to the nation and to history.

Germany has always had the best soldiers in the world. It was an enemy general, not a German one, who said that the German soldier had always been worth three of the enemy. But a soldier without political instincts is a mercenary. The soldier must carry a sense of the political system in his blood. And although it is his duty to defend it to the limits of his ability, it is the duty of the politician to avoid the necessity of doing so. Hitler has properly said: “The duty of a statesman is not to heroically lead a nation to defeat, but to preserve its existence.” This requires politicians with a military, or morBettmane generally speaking, fighting spirit [Blut] who do not confuse politics with their official careers. The one as well as the other, soldier and politician, must be willing to go to the limits. There is no use of power which, in the face of necessity, should not be used to defend the whole.

For the first time since that lone wolf Bismarck, the German race has a man of political genius, who is above all a dogmatist of great ability. Hitler will live in German history.

Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia, who was popularly called the Soldier-King, created the loyal Prussian civil service which became a model to the world. Likewise, Hitler took the active, restless, and strong-willed elements of our people, organized them into the National Socialist movement, stamped it with his personality, and added an unprecedented aggressiveness and a flexible political will. The creation of the Nazi Party will hold a place in history.

No one knows what the end of the German drama will be, but this much is certain. This noble nation, possessing the best cultured people in the world, cannot continue in the center of a ring of greedy and uncivilized nations if it is not in future decades to be torn apart by actual or spiritual (as was the case during the last war) civil strife. Some say that enemy propaganda won the World War. More accurately, divisions in the German national will lost it. Whoever struggles with himself, whose soul is torn by conflicting emotions, cannot capably direct his attentions outwards because all his energies are required for the internal struggle. It is no different for a great nation than for the individual. National power depends on a unity of the national will. There is no way for Germany’s fate to improve that does not begin with national union.

Fichte said in one of his speeches:

No nation that has sunk into a state of despondency can rescue itself by the usual and previously successful methods. If their application was useless when the nation was in possession of all its strength, of what use will they be when the greater part is missing....

Every German who still believes that he is a part of a nation, who thinks highly and honorably of it, who hopes and strives for it, who builds and supports it, should eliminate all uncertainty from his faith….

The goals of spiritual reconstruction cannot be stated more beautifully or more nobly, nor the use of all means better justified. Uncertainty of belief means diversity and doubt; it means the paralysis of hope, will, and action. It should be replaced by a certainty of the unity of political beliefs in order to give the nation certainty and unity of aspiration and action.

Control of Public Opinion

Nationalization is not only preaching; it is action and organization as well. It must breed the type that compels others to accommodate it, or be strong enough to lead them. Then all desires and aspirations will no longer works against each other. Rather, their strengths which previously neutralized each other will be united in a powerful central movement. Individually each was too weak, but together they are as a firmly bound bundle of sticks. Such a consolidated nation is unshakable, unbreakable, and indivisible.

The achievement of such a goal requires a change from Bismarck court politics; mass movements provide the means in our century. Its method requires that all existing forces in the area of public opinion, provided they voluntarily submit, join to forcibly destroy and extinguish enemy dogmas and enemy opposition. Its goal is the elimination of all serious opposition in the masses; this, in order to produce a combat ready national mass will that can preserve the nation’s existence through powerful national politics. A nation which has bled to death, which has been enslaved and dismissed by half the world, and which has been shredded by civil strife cannot win back its right to life unless its leadership is resolved to ignore so-called liberal advances in public life, and to obey only the cold laws of history.

Liberalism is dead. If the nation is to live, liberal phrases must also die. Attempts to establish liberalism’s principle of universal freedom have endangered everyone’s life. Its dogmas about “public opinion” produced division and weakness in the national will. Even the greatest proponent of liberalism, John Stuart Mill, demanded of the government “the greatest possible centralization of information, and its dissemination from a central point.” Capitalistic liberalism itself scrapped the holiest principles of its prophets and apostles and used so-called “public” opinion solely for its own profit. But now the end has come.

The slogan of the freedom of public opinion must be buried without tears.

Public opinion does not spring up by itself, nor does it correspond to true public feeling. Otherwise public opinion would reflect decisions on important political affairs before anyone else, and would thus predict such things as election results. The liberals, however, saw only the interest that stood behind them, and thought along the same lines whenever something new came up from the masses.

In contrast, vague moods of the masses which strive for recognition but fail to achieve it, there is a public opinion for whomever can afford it. The buyer remains in the shadows. The liberal states are dominated by capitalistic interest groups. Knowingly or unknowingly, the intellectual leadership of the press, literature, etc., works for them.

The capitalistic interest groups will be thrown out so that they cannot endanger the whole in pursuit of their own interests. They will be replaced by men, who, with a national instinct and primitive politics, will again achieve victory. In place of the formation of opinion by private interests, the future will inevitably bring a great and unified will-storm of national political interests, not only for conditions of crisis, but for a lengthy historical period.

Public opinion can therefore be brought to a unity which it could never have in liberal states.

Public opinion is the unified and leading expression of the public will.

Within the masses are moods which are not public and which cannot simply be equated with public opinion. In the end, there is a gap between intellect and drives. One should not consider this to be dangerous in the way that blocking an outlet can be. The liberal mentality and propaganda have taught us to conceive of propaganda in this way in the interests of those behind them, the ruling interest groups. This illusion has been destroyed forever. The vague moods of the populace which are not expressed through intellectual, economic, or political emotions are not relevant or threatening to large-scale politics. Every strong instinct finds an intellectual expression; else its apparent strength rests on deception. If the intellectual elite becomes active in the service of the whole, politics probably has to pay a limited amount of attention to the existence of these inevitable, constantly changing dreamy moods, but it may choose its means, methods, and goals without respect to them.

It is clear that the use of the revised Bismarck method requires, under today’s circumstances, a strong element of compulsion and power which are indeed necessarily a part of these methods. One must add something important, however. Bismarck’s political system, based on Prussian militarism and official absolutism, believed it could check and restrain the dangerously rising power of the masses by prohibitions and compulsion. This is a serious error which was somehow incessantly repeated by all national German governments until our recent republican days.

Only the democratic states recognized the obvious, that the masses cannot be controlled simply by prohibition. The masses begin economically where financial independence stops. Personal responsibility and restraint end there as well. What we today call the masses develops not from just any group of people but from one characterized so strongly by instability, pliability, and explosiveness that the individual is no longer tangible. The principles and methods of violent suppression break down, as a result, when applied to this phenomenon. The entirely negative use of power will never achieve its goals, for it will be successfully opposed by the power structures of the masses — associations, organizations, and labor unions. The masses are more numerous than the police. Bismarck’s defeat by the Social Democrats is but one of many examples.

Propaganda and the use of differing degrees of power must therefore cooperate in exceptionally clever ways. They must use the organizations of the masses if they are to achieve definite success. A practical rule for the state is thus: One does not scatter those who are organized, rather one organizes them oneself.

All systems that have gained control of government through modern mass movements have done this. Although it may outwardly appear complicated, it has been brought about by the varied conditions of life, corresponding to a system of public organizations, cooperatives, and associations. While governmental propaganda strongly and consistently pursues its clear and vital goals and while the exercise of governmental power makes any active or passive attempt at obstruction impossible, the entire public organizational apparatus will be used to make possible an organized variety of vigorous individual interests alongside the unity of the mass propaganda line. But this variety no longer permits the individual, only sums of individuals. Thus from the human soup of liberalism a state will emerge an organism dominated by a single compelling idea. The cells will no longer be independent and opposed to one another, but will rather be linked together by a high, meaningful, living reality.

Since our Gothic Reich collapsed and German unity was lost in battles over intellectual and political beliefs, innumerable legends and fables have lived in our people and in the artistic creations of our greatest poets and philosophers that expressed the longing for the coming Reich and an idea of its basic structure. The Prussians of the Mediterranean, the Fascist Italians, have lived the great ideals of the German spirit for a decade — Kant’s obligation, the Prussian knowledge of government, Nietzsche’s joyful struggle, Fichte’s national development. Luckily, they have found the way to national will building faster than the shredded German people, and have perfected the methods of propaganda and the use of differing degrees of power in the development of a modern state. Fascism has a special ministry for national education. The party possesses a school of political propaganda and the practical will to power. The motto of the Fascists, “live dangerously,” is taken from Nietzsche. The corporative philosophy which the labor force organized for the state is not individualistic-Italian, but socialist-Gothic.

No one has the right to use the cheap slogan of an imitation of Fascism in Germany because the deeply German spirituality, originating from ideals, concepts and forms, is with us again today, placed at the service of our modern leadership. Mussolini is historically unique, an accident, perhaps. He is a powerful personality with deep spiritual roots going back to Nietzsche. His system is, therefore, German in its essential characteristics, developed from the creative spirit of German soil, and is returning to that soil today. Here, supported by technical, highly developed, struggle-loving, and disciplined people, it will reach a new and earthshaking level.

Chapter 3

Mass Meetings and Powerful Propaganda

In the long run, the man from the people requires

only the development of strength and discipline.

— Goebbels —

After fourteen years of internal political struggle and decline, the German nation again faces all its vital question with awakened understanding. When Hitler during 1923-1924, in the solemn quiet of his cell, unbroken and as certain as ever of victory, wrote down his knowledge of struggle for the nation, he proved that he was more than the best propagandist of our people. It was there that he developed the psychological and practical principles of propaganda and organization that he had learned earlier as a worker among Marxist agitators and as a front line soldier under the flood of enemy propaganda leaflets. These principles have led him as a statesman to victory. As the great teacher of the German nation, he surrounded himself with a band of versatile, active, and fanatic propagandists. He had the good luck to discover among them the brightest of all, Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the master of applied propaganda.

With statesmanly coldness and vision, Hitler developed the necessities, means, and methods of political propaganda, and used them when political circumstances required. Stronger, however, than his propaganda, stronger than his speech and words, was the force of his personality. The great strength and confidence which flowed from him overcame individuals and masses, enchained them, made them followers, and mobilized them.

Dr. Goebbels went his own personal and creative way. He became the apostle of modern political propaganda. He proved that propaganda is a creative art. Propaganda became his life, his task, and his mission. With the fervor of a believer and martyr, he carried the banner of the propaganda idea, an idea that always advanced, that knew no limits, that won millions only to make those millions apostles of an idea who were then sent out into the entire world. He united the religious intolerance of a prophet with a superior intellect and the retiring nature of an artist. In every action and expression, he remained subject to the idea and obligation of his mission. They inspired him so perfectly that a critical journalist could rightly say that it made no difference what he said; the masses only wanted to hear him again and again, to be carried along and uplifted by his fervor and passion.

Mass meetings can do without the speaker being visible. The mass meetings of the National Socialists in which radio broadcasts to loudspeakers at overflow meetings were used have proven this. In its place, however, contact between the speaker and the masses must continually be established. Only when that is the case can the speaker sense in the faces of those to whom he speaks the initial apathy which is often characteristic of the masses, empathize with them, enable them to rise and become excited and enthused. This is where our governments since 1918 and our press have so seriously erred. They believed that they could preserve their system from stormy national attacks coming from the masses by cold radio speeches and long-winded newspaper articles.

Other nations have better appraised the psychology of the masses. Until the appearance of Hitler, the United States was undoubtedly the country with the best developed use of oratory. In spite of the varied influences from churches, schools, universities, etc., the American public had developed countless types of professional speakers or political orators, and all major political actions were successful because of their leadership. It is difficult for us to remember our propaganda of the days prior to and during the World War. In America, the flood of propaganda materials, brochures, air dropped leaflets, placards, and newspapers, such as which would be used here, was far surpassed by extensive public speaking. These speeches were quickly adopted to a given situation, depending upon American conditions and abilities.

Mass meetings of with fundamental political confrontations, which Hitler used in Germany, were not used in the America, give the complete unity of political propaganda in all branches of public life. It needed only to find a method of personal contact between the speaker and the masses. This was accomplished by a volunteer band of 75,000 four minute speakers. They volunteered throughout the entire country to speak in all public places — in theaters, movie houses, schools, universities, clubs, associations. They flooded America, day after day and night after night with their short, fanatical speeches. It was the Four Minute Men who finally got the ball rolling in 1916-1917 and brought American public opinion to the boiling point by persuading it that war with Germany was a necessary and honorable duty of America, fervently desired by the entire populace. The Four Minute Men, according to Schönemann, gave about 755,000 speeches in 5,000 communities. In comparison, the National Socialists alone held about 30,000 rallies of approximately two hours duration during the spring of 1932 to prepare for the Reich presidential election.

All the means of public opinion were denied to Hitler. His newspapers were banned, he was denied use of the radio, his brochures and leaflets were confiscated. He had no choice but to reach the masses directly through constantly growing mass rallies. More than actual excitement and direct contact had to be created, for there was no opportunity to use other means of public opinion to prepare for the meeting. Often, the mass meetings had to be built up from scratch, and that occurred in such an unprecedented and ingenious form that from the beginning the German mass meeting had a cultic character. The National Socialist movement made an early decision between evening talks at which discussion could take place and mass meetings at which discussion and hostile interruption were absolutely prohibited. The style of these mass meetings was grand and elevating. The National Socialists, for the first time in the history of any country, demanded an offering from the people, that is, a proper admission fee. Before Hitler’s wise management created this type of mass meeting, it was the practice (as it still is among other parties) to allocate and contribute sums of money for the preparation and execution of large rallies. The National Socialist movement, however, carried things to their conclusion. They not only used the proceeds from their mass rallies to meet all expenses, but also to finance their constantly expanding struggles. That, together with the large contribution of party supporters, explains the enormous financial means produced by the National Socialists for political purposes, the extent and source of which the opposition press so eagerly, extensively, and falsely fantasized about.

All propaganda is preparation for political action. Life is constantly moving, so a properly expanding propaganda that properly understands its task can never stand still, but must always hurry along. It always has to guide preparations for the necessities of the future so as to be able to use all of its means in the psychologically best way. But although it is occupied with advance preparations for artistic activities, it also faces daily demands to make decisions about things that have to be done tomorrow. This is not planning for far distant activities, but rather by the art of exciting action, the direct contact of wills that leads to actions or to spontaneous agreement.

It is an essential characteristic of propaganda that the preparatory work in the masses can from time to time be started by a single individual. The individual can influence schools, newspapers, and the radio; he can use them spiritually, guide them, and prepare.

If one wishes to get an action-ready crowd from a single prepared individual, one must overcome the barriers that lie before the individual. That is, one must establish contact with the masses in order to spark action. In the end, only the mass mind makes possible the unified actions of many people. When the mass mind awakes, the barriers and walls that separate individuals from one another must entirely fall, the mass must visibly and perceptibly appear. From this moment on, it is capable of acting. No newspaper, no microphone, no film is able to counterfeit these living facts or to cause them by deception. All of these helpful means of propaganda and mass influence are subordinated to the living facts on a fixed level — on the abstract, as with a newspaper, on the acoustical as in radio, on the optical as with a film. Take, for example, the sound film, in which the pretense of reality has achieved the highest degree of perfection. Still, the viewer sees the film as a film and maintains an inner reserve. No one flees the theater in panic when shooting occurs on the screen or when an actor shouts “fire, fire!” The same events in the midst of a mass meeting, whether caused by oneself or by political opponents, unleash panic, flight, and excitement. There is further an essential difference between that which we experience in plays, films, and radio and the actual event. The essential difference is this: all pretense remains pretense and unable to satisfy the intense urge which the masses have for personal experience.

This urge is perfectly expressed in the modern mass meeting. Here the mass feels like a living unity and force. No overview, no excellent radio coverage, no first-rate press or film reports can convey a true-to-life impression of such a meeting or serve the listener or hearer as a substitute. To the contrary, each such report serves only as propaganda for the actual experience itself. It is therefore clear that the mass meeting is generally the strongest form of propaganda that we possess. If we want to trace this phenomenon back to its human origins, we might perhaps say that in the unity of the crowd each individual receives an uplifted and elevated self-confidence as well as a feeling of power. We find all the strong elements of a people in a mass meeting, while the main weaknesses are kept out.

Aside from the number of participants and the conditions of the meeting, the most important aspects of a mass meeting (or of any other important form of mass expression) are those that signify strength — arms, uniforms, weapons of every form. The military parade, for example, owes its existence, its popularity among the crowds, and its necessity to soldiers in whom it creates self-confidence. The clearer the strength is to the masses, the more impressive and forceful is the effect on each individual. When uniformed troops in strict discipline appear before a gathering of the civil populace, the rallies have a powerful character and a boundless jubilation is released. At the splendid parade of 100,000 on Cologne on February 19, 1933, the population joyously greeted countless S.A. units. Their jubilation grew to hurricane force, throwing everything else into the shadows, when armed police marched by in uniform. Whoever has seen something like this will realize the extent of the unconditional admiration which the masses give to strength. He will understand what is meant by the idea that powerful propaganda is the strongest way to have an influence.

A movement or government which has to defend itself against everyone can never rely on the faulty principle of compromise that originated in the days of routine parliamentary politics. Rather, it must always be uncompromising in its propaganda. It is simply not true that he who opposes the government, the social order, or the prevailing worldview or religion may not provoke moderate elements or the government’s resources of power by tough attitudes or open demonstration. All the power one has, indeed even more than one actually has, should be displayed and demonstrated. A hundred speeches, five hundred newspaper articles, radio talks, films, and plays are unable to produce the same effect as a procession of gigantic masses of people taking place with discipline and active participation, or a demonstration in which the means of power and weapons of the state are expressed through its military, police, and political forces. All revolutionary governments since the last war — the Italian Fascists as well as the Russian Bolshevists — have, as their most valuable propaganda, brought the masses supporting them into the streets and shown them one or another of the military means they controlled.

Timid souls certainly will not be suited for such actions, as anxiety is generally the worst counselor in propaganda and politics. They will perhaps grant that such demonstrations are useful and appropriate for internal politics, but that they seriously, very seriously, impede policy. However, one may say that the tone makes the music. Extreme chauvinism or an irresponsible grandiloquence will certainly have that result. But insecurity in domestic politics exposes one to foreign difficulties. Properly weighed and balanced, powerful propaganda will have the proper effect abroad. The principle of appearing weak so as not to provoke one’s opponents is a monstrous creation of irrational anxiety. Powerful propaganda, if it understood that it must be given the proper support, is the best guarantee of peace and security.

Chapter 4

Radio

Radio is the most powerful instrument

that technology has ever put in the hands of the government.

— Mussolini —

Individualism, Collectivism, or Something Else?

The nationalization of the broad masses is propaganda’s mission. It requires the cultivated, single-minded, systematic, and unified use of all means of public opinion. The following pages are devoted to the methods of accomplishing this. It will be necessary to discuss propaganda’s basic aims as well as its methods. By itself propaganda technique is useless. It can be a cold routine good for inventing detergent advertisements or writing outwardly clever books and theories. In real life, however, such propaganda techniques are merely amusing. Any worker can easily toss them aside because they are entirely ineffective. We must clearly understand this fact:

A propaganda technique is only a means to an end. In this it resembles diplomacy.

A clear goal is a requirement. Without a clear, close to life goal that deals with every necessity there are no results, least of all in propaganda and public opinion, where the laws of life are stronger than in the abstract sciences.

The goal is not to be confused with the content or missions of propaganda. The content can change to meet the day’s tactical situations. The mission is the nationalization of the masses. The goal, however, cannot be designated with a general slogan or an arbitrary form. It should be concrete. It should not be a rather fixed and fanciful point in a program, but rather it should create a reality.

False, random, or fanciful goals contain an error that, despite the use of clever techniques, leads to exhaustion, discouragement, and hostility rather than agreement. All reactionary governments err here. They are always deceived as to the effectiveness of their well intentioned national programs, and have in propaganda taken only the first step in creative language.

Such well-meaning methods of nationalization led to the shipwreck of Imperial Germany and made our propaganda have effects opposite from those intended. Propaganda is more than using words. As we have already noted, the union of propaganda and power is organized power. We must be clear that it is more than method. Propaganda is a function of life, and life cannot be deceived. The more lively and successful propaganda is, the more certain one may be that it is realistic and healthy. The unified use of all public means, radio, the press, news agencies, cultural institutions, etc., is necessary if the nation is to survive. However, aimlessness or false goals will help the opposing nation-destroying forces to victory.

In which way shall our propaganda win the masses for the nation? Do we want to promise and grant everyone “golden freedom” (after the manner of liberalism) and appeal to enlightened self-interest to strengthen the nation, expecting and anticipating the voluntary use of property and lives for it? Or shall we elevate the masses as the highest gods after the fashion of the Russian apostles of Marxism? They entirely subordinate the individual or single personality, and despise, persecute, and root out every living element of personality to encourage the growth of collectivism that knows no personality. Do we have to be children of liberal individualism or prophets of Bolshevist collectivism, or is there perhaps another way> The old Prussian state had a hundred thousand trained, zealous, and loyal officials. Was it individualistic? Or a formless collective?

Was the German army a spineless herd of slaves as the enemy maintained, driven into the enemy only by drunken officers and generals, unscrupulous individuals and powerful men? Or was it perhaps a Bolshevist commune in which everything belonged to everyone and in which each might command the other in a total triumph of the masses? If one considers the sharpness of the contrast he will realize that the Prussian official and the German soldier and officer were not individualistic, nor were they supporters or members of a collective. Rather they possessed their own hierarchical structure. They built a state for themselves that was an organized community of a certain type.

We see collectivism as an enormous arrogance on the part of the masses that pulls down everything higher than the level of the lowest and most common; and we see individualism as the reckless display of personality to the cost and hurt of the general populace.

Our type is incompatible with both.

Ours is the Führer model of a disciplined personality, consciously and racially based. (The administrative type is the Prussian official; the artistic case is the pre-Raphael painters; and the religious example is the Catholic priest.)

The type is not a mass of people having an effect through terror, as is a collective, rather it is a higher community. The community is indeed a part of the masses and remains bound to them. At the same time, however, our type sharply and clearly becomes the model and ideal of the masses by virtue of its superior and practical virtues and its self-confidence. The German soldier has been a model for the entire nation, as has the loyal Prussian official. His position seemed important to everyone despite its meager remuneration and rigorous training period. No one impeached his honor.

The experiences of a World War and a revolution did not disprove the value of our army as an arsenal of weapons and soldiers, rather they repudiated Prussian militarism, the guiding idea which the German soldiers and officers had created. Those events demonstrated more clearly against the dutiful Prussian officials who served the state but nothing else. Because Prussian militarism and Prussian officialdom were open to attack from both inside and outside, and because both forms of life lacked political leadership, both were destroyed.

Life, which allows no systematic repetition, will not allow us to re-establish the old forms. Neither the apolitical solider nor the apolitical official is the type which can preserve and protect our fatherland from the internal and external storms of the twentieth century.

Our life is politics.

Our task today is to create a new political type who, as soldier or politician, will be equal to the tasks of the present and the future, possessing unfailing political instinct.

If this political type is to preserve the existence of our people and our culture in the future, it is obvious that all other goals of public life must be subordinated to this one goal. Thus, the principle of creating this type becomes the guiding idea not only for the training of politicians, but also for the entire nation. We know that times of entirely individualistic expression in the arts, religion, philosophy, and science leave no traces. The creation of a type is the great accomplishment in every area.

Originality of the Radio?

Every means that is available today to influence public opinion has already served varied goals. The French Revolution preached and created absolute individualism through the press and leaflets as well as through schools and educational institutions. Bolshevist Russia set about the opposite with the means of public opinion, and consequently bred collectivism. No one seriously disputes the fact that words, leaflets, newspapers and brochures, books, pictures, and music are able to serve any aim.

The radio today has no tradition or history, no comfortable model of past experience. Only there do theoretician and expert contend to the possibilities and limits of its use, maintaining that the technical characteristics of radio places certain narrow limits on it, limits which are not present with other means of public opinion. Strangely enough, they come to quite opposing conclusions, depending on which side they write for.

We have a four hundred year press tradition, but no one thinks it necessary to bring newspaper readers together in groups or associations. The readers would have little interest in that. But there are probably a large number of reading circles, discussion and promotional evenings, etc.. The clever Ullstein, Mouse, and Schorl publishing companies, for example, organized regular discussion and promotional evenings in large German cities, to which readers who subscribed were admitted.

They resembled the cultural and technical evenings organized by the radio corporations. The level and intentions of these evenings becomes sufficiently clear through the Oilstone slogan “Bridget buy Oilstone patterns,” or through the advertising slogan “Become a radio listener.” Such advertising events have nothing at all to do with the development of groups that result from the needs of the broad masses.

Such a need does apparently exist among radio listeners. When the radio was first officially licensed in the fall of 1923, the listeners were all amateurs. They joined together in organizations, clubs, and groups. In the first years one could explain that as a result of the need for exchange of technical information. The time of the amateur, however, is long past. Today we have 100,000 amateur or short wave operators, but about 22 million radio listeners. In spite of that, the formation of radio associations and clubs, a development of the earliest period, has not ceased but is rather stronger than ever before. The largest and most important organizations have been founded within the past five years.

Their appearance has complicated the entire radio scene. While some saw an unfortunate indication that free individualistic development was being hampered, others found confirmation of their theory that the radio must inevitably lead to collectivism.

Today radio is a child of ten. It is understandable that the judgments of outsiders as well as of experts should be uncertain, indeed contradictory, regarding such a recent phenomenon. Everything in radio, except the technical aspects, has been learned the hard way by men who originally came from the theater, the stage, the concert hall and lecture room, from literature, the press, and administration. The present nature of radio developed under their leadership, as did its accompanying organization. Valiant attempts have led to at least some partial successes, but often to failures as well. In general the leadership of this new and still unfamiliar weapons has been fumbling, and here and there all too slick. New attempts have to be made. The problem must perhaps be tackled in an entirely different way. The struggles of a generation, through argument and counterargument, will establish the style and form of classical radio.

If someone with a year or two of experience in radio wants to call himself an “expert,” one should not refuse him because there are no educated people in the field at a level consistent with the idea of Germanic thoroughness. Otherwise, could anyone be called an “expert” in radio?

We do not want to operate with concepts which are generally accepted and used to judge dramatic directing or a theater play, concepts which are not applicable to the radio. Leasing’s Liken and his theory of the unity of place, time, and action do not always apply to the radio. One must start from scratch, without previous assumptions, and be guided only by the force of new realities. They must be understood. One must see the whole, not merely a special area, and be on guard against rash theories. Theories are weak as everyone knows. They risk being half-baked, especially when made hastily.

In the works published in cooperation with the Reich Radio Company, general theoretical principles are explained. Because of the fact that we have only sound broadcasting today, some think that radio is unrealistic. Such observations equate the real with the visual, a rather strange piece of dialectics. Certainly an electric bullet that flies through our head or a cannon shot hate strikes our ears is as real as a picture that we can perceive only with our eyes. The idea that radio eliminates realism leads to the dangerous fallacy that radio has to operate on a somewhat abstract plane.

Some also believe that crude sensationalism must be avoided. If we would accept that as a guiding principle in radio programming, we would rob the radio of its most important and vigorous element. One has only to think of the deep effect of an infectious mass meeting with all its noise, tumult, and excitement, and of what the foregoing principle would set in their place! The identification of the real with the visual is merely theoretical; the denial of real effect from nonvisual events is untenable.

The real effect of a word or sound carried by radio is much deeper than that, say of a newspaper or other piece of writing that must be interpreted before it is understood. Radio broadcasting works directly, without that bridge of thought, and has, therefore, greater effectiveness than the printed page. This is common knowledge. Everyone knows that our most important sense, after vision, is hearing. (“I’m all ears.”)

One should not engage in theoretical battles as to the real effectiveness of radio if he does not wish to close his eyes to its plain effect for the sake of aesthetic principles. One must still, however, consider the question as to whether the use of this means of public opinion is in some sense limited.

Some believe, for example, that a strong individualistic effect must be attributed to the radio. They think that the word of the speaker arouses ideas and therefore mental currents in the hearer. These supposedly depend on the intellectual ideas of the hearer. The general effect of radio is a result of that. The radio probably has a superficial effect on the masses and it may well satisfy a mass need, but it still stands apart from the masses. This school concludes that radio’s effect is individualistic in the deepest sense; that is, radio leads to individual rather than community experience.

This erroneous contrast between a superficial mass effect and a deep individual effect leads one to suspect that, if one observes the real effect of radio, he will reach a quite different conclusion.

If one thinks that radio must lead to individual experience because its effect depends on the individual ideas of the hearer, he has made his first mistake. The radio transmits sound and word. Both are decided upon by a creative artist, not the hearer. The musical form is no doubt one that allows the listener great freedom of experience, especially when no other distractions divert his attention from the loudspeaker or headphone. After loosening the intellectual and rational bonds and restraints, music leads the listener to a realm of free fantasy and rhythmic elation. The individual feelings of the hearer are however directed and limited by the art form itself. One does not experience Negro jazz in the same way as a Beethoven symphony. The subconscious potentialities of race and blood are deeply influenced by music. A musical work includes or hastens the awakening, development, or deterioration of these potentialities, but it can never lead to unrestrained individual feelings, even when transmitted by the radio.

The spoken word allows the listener much less freedom of thought. The word itself probably changes its meaning and conceptual force continually. Like a dew drop, it takes on all colors, even improbable ones. Taken out of context by an enemy, it may have an opposite meaning. One thinks of the gulf separating the meanings which, for example, the word “property” has depending on whether it is spoken by a businessman or a worker, or of words like “rent,” “capital,” and “religion.” From these examples, one can understand how the moral and intellectual power of words varies and changes with each new form, with each new context. The last named factors also, show, however, that narrow limits exist for this variety and change. The proper construction of a sentence or speech requires presuppositions that must necessarily lead to fixed conclusions (logic).

We have therefore proven that both musical and spoken programs on the radio neither can nor must lead to arbitrary and entirely individualistic ideas in the listener. The opposite is true. The radio itself does not determine the effect, but rather what is transmitted.

Thus the claim that radio has an inevitable collectivistic effect is also rejected. It always depends on the artistic and creative way in which the form is used. Those who want individualism can encourage it through the radio. Those who want collectivism. or who think some other task necessary, also have the freedom of the form and means.

The Political Type as a Goal

The question is no longer one of where the essential nature of the radio must lead, but rather it can be replaced by asking to what ends it should lead.

The opposing individualistic and collectivistic types are, as it were, vertexes of an equilateral triangle. Each is incompatible and irreconcilable with the other. Only the most innocent liberal could believe that this could be smoothed over by compromise. That is impossible. One can only make a definite choice.

No one can defend general individualization or collectivization. Both leave men and masses rootless and without dignity, and rob them of the strength as well as the capacity for action. Neither the rootless intellect nor the apathetic masses can ensure the continued existence of the nation and the life of the community; that requires the construction of an army of model leaders and subordinates, that is, a political type that will penetrate and lead the entire nation.

“Public life,” according to Wolf Zeller, “was formerly founded on personal leadership and local groups. This has been atomized and destroyed by modern developments. It can be restored again to all regions and peoples by the radio. The creative personalities must of course be typical, must be identical with the hearer, with the times and with that on which the community agrees. They must not teach or persuade, but must rather act as a belief or a worldview acts. They must embody and personify this impressively in their bearing, and that requires a worldview.”

The radio, which is supported by all and which is politically and culturally connected with everything, should serve the tasks of the entire nation. It is not an instrument to arouse collective mass psychosis, nor is it to be used for intellectual acrobatics. It should not be a substitute for other means of information to be used by specialists, sectarians, and outcasts. The esoteric thrives in the quiet seclusion of a like-minded circle, and is thus unsuited to the radio.

The radio can work like a newspaper, but with more immediacy, versatility, depth, and impressiveness as a result of the aesthetic element inherent in it. Newspapers and radio speak the language of the people. Our times have already seized and transformed the type of the German people through powerful storms of life as well as movements. The confusing picture of four thousand German newspapers is, for example, only a Fata Morgana of the old individualistic freedom and splendor. In reality, the power of a few large concerns with clearly fixed aims is behind this appearance — the middle class nationalist or middle class democratic newspaper readers, the National Socialist and Marxist leaders, etc. The German man however has yet to emerge from the gap that separates these types.

For the first time in history, radio gives us the chance to reach millions of people with daily and hourly influences. The old and young, workers, farmers, soldiers, and officers, men and women, sit before the apparatus, listening. Gathered quietly during a leisure hour are those from the clean farmhouses of Schleswig-Hollstein, in mountain villages of Bavaria and the Austrian Alps, in fishing huts along the coast from Friesland to Memmel, in German villages along the Volga and in Swabian households in Chicago. The loudspeaker resounds over sports fields, squares, streets, and public places in large cities, and in factories and barracks.

An entire people listens.

What statesman would want a liberal individualism that endangers the unity of national thought and desire, things more precious than gold? Freedom of choice ends here not for reasons inherent in radio, but for reasons of responsibility to the nation and community. Their life is more important than the freedom of the individual.

Radio shall serve this life. Its mission is the formation of national will. Its means are entirely determined from now on. Its mission can only be by the conscious construction of a political type which will personify and safeguard the unity and strength of the nation.

These certainly are tasks which have not until now troubled public opinion and radio criticism. Aesthetics stood in the foreground. Problems of style, program format, and effect were talked of and discussed. No one, however, knew how to set a goal. They paid no attention to the instinct of the masses. On the radio, they were without the intellectual basis necessary to understand mass movements, unification, and the creation of a type. Types do not spring up from a desk, but rather they grow out of the masses. The masses built up listener organizations, powerful factors that soon united men of certain views, of a certain political type. The strongest binding force was that feeling of identity that they wanted to express over the radio or with which they wanted to defend themselves against foreign influences on the radio.

The intellectual opponents of radio organizations have not generally understood the real significance of these proceedings. They mostly raised questions of taste, or intellectual arguments. Some see the same unfruitfulness in listener organizations as, for example, in parliament. The most trivial matters are discussed, the most important shouted to death. It moreover appears that the intellectual circle stays away from such gatherings and that only the shouters and know-it-alls supporting the shallowest programs ask to speak. Thus, the listener organizations can only disturb the task of program directing. The radio magazines (it is said) must carefully weigh the listener interests with radio’s tasks and capacities. This is the proper manner in which listener organizations, in cooperation with radio magazines, should operate.

Truth and falsehood are mixed in these views. One can certainly have views on questions of programming and taste. The agreement of listeners on such things is naturally impossible; people will always disagree on matters of taste.

The question, however, is not one of taste, but rather something more important, namely the unity of spirit and nation. The task of listener organizations is not to be a parliament of programming or taste. No one today behaves that way. The belief that radio magazines are a substitute for listener organizations rests as much on a typical journalistic overestimation of the newspaper as on an ignorance of modern organizational methods.

It would be quite ridiculous to vote at a general meeting whether there should be more or less music in radio programs, more or less seriousness, more or less cheerfulness, more or less dance music, jazz, Wagnerian operas, military marches, or popular music. The members would be unable to agree on any of these motions and would probably agree in the end to disband their organization out of frustration with their own chatter. At first no one made such an attempt, thus proving that with large organizations, the only ones having a right to exist, practice is always sounder than theory.

Instead of such parliamentarianism, programming boards or several gifted individuals enjoying the confidence of the listeners work at the top of the larger organizations. In so far as they have political instinct, they have long since outgrown mere questions of taste. If today the so-called intellectual circle is a long way from the top, especially on the national level, it is certainly not the fault of the listener organizations. The native intellectual class of our fatherland has already failed in the propaganda, execution, and conclusion of the World War. They forgot not only the old saying of Luther, that one should walk firmly and keep talking, but also the wisdom of the Olympian Goethe whom they themselves admired. They enclosed themselves in their own little glass world which then, like the Homunculus’s vial of light, was shattered in the storms our nation underwent.

All of these honest, sincere, and entirely isolated intellectuals had in the end was the paper millions of inflation. Hopefully, the German mind has learned for all time that intellect is unthinkable without strength. It may be that the masses need the intellect as leader and illuminator, but it is equally certain that the spirit of the masses cannot be lacking as the echo and initial source of its strength. It is incorrect to understand Nietzsche’s “will to power” in this way?

The intellectual class has to lead the nation (and itself) to a desire for duty in order to guarantee that nothing worse usurps leadership. Certainly, he who wants to be a leader in Germanic northern Europe must not want to enthrone himself as a satrap over the people.

Oriental aloofness is in general unsuited to our race. It is especially bad when found in intellectuals. If the intellectuals are too refined to lead the masses, the masses will not be stupid enough to follow those aloof minds. The result is starvation of the intellectual, and sometimes the destruction of the masses to the profit of foreign exploiters.

One is entirely wrong if he thinks that the masses can be led by purely intellectual means, through radio speeches delivered from a desk, or through newspaper articles and the like. An instrument like the radio which has a huge circle of listeners and whose performers have no direct contact with their audience during their performance, absolutely requires the establishment of communication between those who want to have an effect and those who are to be affected. If radio magazines are suggested as a means of doing this, the answer is that they establish no more direct contact than does the radio. Both are in the same position with respect to the masses. They have only an indirect effect. One should not overestimate the effect of the press in these matters. It in general decreases as the influence of living organizations increases. Proof of this is in the victory of Mussolini and the Fascist organization and party over the unorganized Italian liberalism which controlled the entire and extensive press, or in the victory of Lenin over Kerensky, who controlled the entire Russian press with Entente money. And in Germany, the National Socialist movement under Hitler’s leadership won its battle against the entire press.

The newspaper concerns were unable to stem or break the powerfully rising movement. The opposition of four thousand German newspapers, having the entire nation as their readership, was indeed a powerful stimulus for the Hitler movement to establish its own press and to take up the battle against general ostricization by means of the press. In the fourteen years of growth, the hundred National Socialist newspapers and magazines that emerged certainly contributed to the success of the movement, but not decisively so.

The success came as a result of living propaganda and organization. The printed page is unable to excite or control mass impulses. If one calls the press a great power, as does the liberal slogan has it, one must realize that its star is fading. More correctly, perhaps, one should realize that it does not generally depend on its own power but it is rather a means and tool of a power, namely financial and industrial liberalism, that has secretly controlled public opinion for one hundred and fifty years in this comfortable way.

What happens when the effect of these tools ceases is shown in the political developments in Italy, Russia, and Germany, as well as in the erroneous conceptions the general press has had in the face of these proceedings. The press breaks down when it has to fight the power of a living organization. It is therefore only a weapon of limited tactical value in the struggle with such an organization.

It is no different with radio magazines and organizations of listeners. It should be added to this account of the development of radio organizations that they have most often established their own radio magazines to support their work. That smart newspaper publishers have attempted to go the opposite direction by establishing dummy organizations as fronts for their magazines is but further proof of the primary importance of organizations, not the opposite. These publishers have attempted to make the most of the organizational need of radio listeners for their businesses. We will later consider the psychological foundations for the establishment of radio organizations, and will end this section with the comment that radio needs magazines as well as listener organizations.

The radio magazines are necessary for news and technical information (programming).

The organizations establish contact between the radio and the masses.

Without organization, there is only irregular contact, as for example the thousands of enthusiastic or indignant letters from listeners that can never be taken as a guide to the actual state of public opinion. Once organized contact eliminates the danger of individual selfishness or collective stupidity, radio can being creating a type.

The Radio Corporation

Today Germany has about a thousand local and amateur radio organizations. About 75% are united in about three dozen large organizations, some of which cover the entire nation. Altogether about one million German radio listeners are organized; that is, about 22% of all known radio owners. A comparison with political parties, which have barely 10% of the voters as members, shows how high this figure is. Regardless of what is said in theoretical discussions, this figure persuasively shows that there is a living need for organization among listeners. We need only consider the development or foundation of some important listener organizations.

The Workers Radio Association of Germany [Arbeiter-Radiobund Deutschlands, the Arabu], founded in spring 1924, sees its task to be in the technical area as well as in assisting its poorer members and in expressing its Marxist tendencies in the cultural and political aspects of radio.

Segall says this about its goals: “Two requirements are the total conversion of the radio to a government monopoly and the remodeling of cultural advisory boards which should affirm the ideas of leading politicians.”

The association was composed of 246 local groups in 1929, of which 227 engaged in radio assistance and 174 in technical aid. The first magazine, Workers’ Radio [Arbeiterfunk], appeared sometime after its foundation in August 1924. Today it appears as People’s Radio [Volksfunk].

The association is a member of the Workers Radio Internationale [Arbeiter-Radio-Internationale].

As the politics of the KPD [Communist Party of Germany] and the SPD [Socialist Party of Germany] diverged more and more, a communist opposition group developed in June of 1929 within the association. It succeeded, and established a new organization, the entirely communist Free Radio Association of Germany [Freien Radiobund Deutschlands]. This association published the Workers Station [Arbeitersender] as soon as it had sufficient members and a secure financial base.

The German Radio Technical Federation [Deutsche Funktechnische Verband e.V.], which is closely related to the Workers Radio Association, was founded in 1925 as the successor to the German radio cartel. It includes over 500 societies scattered about the Reich. Furthermore, the Radio Amateur Association [Bastlerbund Sendung} was founded on 20 February 1927 by about 3,000 people in Berlin’s Great Theater. It has about 100 local groups in Germany.

On the national level, the Federation of German Radio Participants [Reichsverband Deutscher Rundfunkteilnehmer] was founded on 12 August 1930 with the leadership and participation of the National Socialists, the German Nationalists, and the military federations like the Stahlhelm and others. After several months, it established its own magazine for the entire country, the weekly German Broadcaster [Der Deutsche Sender].

Its program demanded “the financial independence of radio from the Postal Ministry, the exemption and reduction of radio fees for the unemployed and underpaid, the elimination of shallow intellectual programming from the radio, and the exclusive employment of German artists and intellectuals.” It also demanded “laws regarding the total structure and improvement of radio.”

The Federation of German Radio Participants may further be the first radio federation that openly came out against nonpolitical radio, and clearly said: “We demand the immediate and unlimited politicization of the radio in the service of the German freedom movement.”

About a year after its establishment, the National Socialists undertook a drive within the federation and established about 3,000 radio listening rooms around the entire nation which were united under the leadership of radio wardens in the National Socialist Federation [Verbandsgruppe Nationalsozialisten].

The listening rooms developed lively political and propaganda activity in most areas. They were especially interested in technical service [Technische Dienst], technical aid [Funkhilfe], interference locating [Störsuche], and short wave communication, either independently or in cooperation with other local organizations.

This organization succeeded in gaining dominant influence in the Federation between June and December of 1931, and on 19 December 1931, it overthrew the German Nationalist board during a stormy membership meeting at the Hotel Prinz Albrecht in Berlin. Again, the superiority or organization to the press was clearly demonstrated. The official radio magazine of the Federation was completely under German Nationalist control. Not once was it allowed to mention the existence of the National Socialist Federation, founded six months previously, to its readers. But by October the National Socialists had become so strong that they published a monthly propaganda magazine for their members (Let the Radio be German [Deutsch der Rundfunk]).

When on 19 March 1932 a second membership meeting of the Federation finally expelled the boar members of the German Nationalists and the Stahlhelm, they established two competing organizations, the Association of Nationalist Radio Listeners [Bund Nationaler Rundfunkhörer] and the Union of Stahlhelm Radio Listeners [Vereinung der Stahlhelmfunkhörer], along with the magazines National Radio [Nationalfunk] and The Stahlhelm Broadcaster [Der Stahlhelmsender]. The total effect was minimal. The German Nationalists had little organizational strength, and unlike the Federation of German Radio Participants that published a weekly and a monthly, the two magazines appeared to be similar and competing.

One might also consider the insistent evangelical or Catholic radio listening groups as well as the politically or culturally neutral federations and federations of German expatriates. These are widespread.

The Evangelical Union for Radio [Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Rundfunk] under Hinderer’s leadership works in this manner: “In the same way as the radio transmitter reached the entire country by establishing provincial transmitters, the greater part of the evangelical press federations were established in individual provinces. During the first year of their existence, the novel problem of radio came to the foreground. The organizational consolidation of these offices was intentionally delayed until the foundation for a truly fruitful work could be laid. This consolidation occurred in 1927. The Evangelical Union for Radio is controlled by the Evangelical Press Federation of Germany. At present the tightly unified society is composed of 23 state and provincial offices. It gathers biannually for meetings, publishes monthly magazines, and engages in correspondence.”

The Evangelical Union for Radio (whose magazine is The Radio Listener [Der Rundfunkhörer] became a member of the International Evangelical Union for Radio [Internationalen Evangelischen Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Rundfunk] in 1928. That organization is located in Berlin.

The Radio Union of German Catholics [Rundfunkgemeinarbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Katholiken] is a part of the Central Office for German Catholic Federations [Zentralbildungsausschuss der katholischen Verbände Deutschlands] under Marschall’s leadership. It sees its tasks as the transmission “by radio of our movement and work, and the provision of qualified persons from our circle for the various programs. We are ready to cooperate…”

The society also became associated with the Bureau catholique internationale de la radiophone at the 1928 Catholic exposition in Pressa.

Furthermore, nearly all the German states have local federations.

There are also a goodly number of federations which can only be spoken of as fraudulent.

A Cologne federation came in conflict with the National Socialist radio wardens at the beginning of 1932, was broken up, and declared bankruptcy.

The Marxist federations and the National Socialist Federation of German Radio Participants have absorbed or driven into dissolution countless small clubs and groups. Today, the apolitical, purely economic or technical federations are especially beginning to seek union. The German Radio Technical Federation [Deutsche Funktechnische Verband] and the Amateur Radio Federation [Bastlerbund der Sendung] merged with the Workers Radio Association (Social Democratic), the Federation of German Engineers [Verband Deutscher Radioingenieure] with the Federation of German Radio Participants.

All this clearly shows that listener organizations must take political instincts and vital questions as a basis, just as the mass struggle movements must. What appears to happen is that the number of listener federations gradually decreases, leaving room for large and essentially political groups. This is the same phenomenon we have witnessed in the history of German political parties. In 1919, forty-eight parties appeared on the ballot. By the Reichstag election in 1933, forty-four had either disappeared or sunk into insignificance. As is well known, only the National Socialists, Social Democrats, Centrists, and German Nationalists had factions, that is, more than fifteen seats.

If one wants to understand the psychological reasons behind the spontaneous growth of listener organizations to at least some extent, he must consider the practical experiences and lessons of a few of the successful and active people in this area. As long as the technical element in radio was primary and the programming secondary, the technicians and amateurs organized to exchange their experiences. There were about 9,900 radio listeners in 1924. The German radio industry has often gratefully acknowledged that many fruitful suggestions and many successful developments came from the amateur radio movement. As the initial difficulties were overcome and the transmissions gradually attained a certain artistic quality, the true radio listener appeared. By 1925, there were 789,000 of them. The fee was reduced from sixty marks per year to two marks per month, and radio became the property of the entire nation during a decade of stormy growth. The radio listeners now began to organize as the technicians had previously done. In place, however, of a society consisting of a limited elite of a few hundred men who understood radio techniques, they began to build rapidly a genuine mass organization from the listenership.

The technical and legal ignorance of the listeners regarding the unfamiliar apparatus was naturally one of the reasons that made unification seem advisable. The listener associations developed as interest groups. Nearly all the prospectuses and by-laws of the associations made references to technical and legal aid for the membership — assistance in locating interference, technical assistance, and radio protection. Technical assistance is especially likely to remain important and valuable to the listener for a long time to come because of the imperfections in the new discovery and the ever present disturbances that are difficult to eliminate under today’s radio conditions. As long as the state fails to establish radio protection laws to protect the whole and to protect this important means of communication, the radio federations will have the task of attempting to resolve these problems by their own means and influences in public and private.

Another very important problem is at the center of the discussions and demands of the federations. It often results in the most remarkable distortions. Pompous words are spoken about German, cosmopolitan, Nationalist, Marxist, Socialist, Democratic, and Aryan “culture,” which the radio supposedly has to care for, of the influence of the listenership on programming, of the subordination of the radio to the wishes of the hearer, etc. The central problem seems to be this: the listener instinctively understands that he has no control over the transmissions that come to him through the aether. He does not know their source, their bias, their truth or falsity. He seeks to exert a control that the radio itself cannot give him, that he cannot get in answer to his letter to the radio company, that no newspaper and no magazine can convincingly provide.

As long as he is politically, culturally, or artistically informed through a newspaper or through the printed page and picture, he can check the truth in other newspapers. Each man has a higher drive the yearning for absolute truth. If he learns that his newspaper lies to him, that newspaper loses him and he moves to another paper. It is different with the radio. He has no choice with the German radio, no really satisfying control. That which his radio, newspaper, or magazine tells him either before or after the program lacks the topicality, timeliness, and urgency of the radio program. It comes either too early — for what the listener actually experiences — or too late.

Suddenly, then, what counts the most is not what one has carried home in black and white, but rather the spoken words that come with all their suggestive urgency from the radio speaker. The hearer seeks therefore to control and protect himself from this one-sided influence not by printed brochures and radio newspapers, but rather by something living. He does not want to believe the printed words of a newspaper critic, but rather, in this generation of mass movements, he wants to join a mass of those who sound the same, feel the same, and think the same. They desire for unity, for identity with a large community, triumphs over individualism. Thus the listener organizations develop. The listener feels that he as a member of a great unity which is not tossed this way and that by assorted and numerous opinions, but is rather firmly and steadfastly centered. That center is the community of certain views, interests, and feelings. In it, he feels sheltered from lies and deceptions, defended from all attacks on his mental stability. He feels as if he is attacking opposing views and doctrines.

For these reasons, the large ideologically-based organizations are today in the midst of most difficult political-ideological struggles as to their essential shape and form. At the same time, the old technically based organizations with decreasing memberships seek merger, or fall apart.

When genuine and active mass movements spring up from all sides, the foremost task of national politics is to incorporate them wisely into the unified life of the nation.

At a time in which the slogan of anti-parliamentarianism has become the rage and in which the glorious past is though to tower over all present organizational forms of the state and human society, the existence of federations, interest groups, and ideological associations and parties is, in an obvious misunderstanding, labeled as “parliamentarian” by those who are always limping behind events and developments. He who possesses no feeling for living growth sees in the current state of each only the contradictions and contrasts that everything living has.

A writer investigating such current developments can easily become an unfruitful critic. He who is able to describe and portray historical events brilliantly is at times helpless before current developments. Or, he may be so filled with hate and hostility because of his own unfruitful dogmas that he is unable to perceive the living force and the triumphant desire for freedom and form of new ideas, much less to properly evaluate them.

What, they ask, is the meaning of organization, federation, association? Why they become superfluous in the course of the development of political power. Party? The party is absorbed by the state! They are all parliamentary fossils. Whoever has power handles all these questions “from the top down.”

What nonsense! As if there has ever been word of a command transmitted into action that did not have an organization supporting its realization! Organizations become superfluous in the course of the development political power — that means no more nor less than anarchy and chaos, it means powerlessness! Organization is hierarchy, that is, order and subordination, the perfection of strength.

Today twenty million, and perhaps in the future forty million, radio listeners of differing political views have united their most vigorous elements in mass movements, in listener federations. The duty of a strong government cannot be to smash the controlling organs that spring from a living need of the masses. As is well known, one cannot in life simply abolish opposition, not to mention a totality. We cannot do it in ourselves, even less if we want to try the experiment with the masses. Psychology tells us that emotional forces cannot simply be eliminated, but rather they can only be suppressed.

This knowledge is also based on the methods of struggle used by all successful ideological movements. In Facism as well as in Bolshevism and National Socialism, intelligent leadership has realized from the beginning that it would not be sufficient to be critical of the existing order. One must also give the masses something to believe in.

Radio, the most advanced technical form of influence and education, must make use of these laws and experiences.

The listener organizations have developed out of necessity. Depending on their political outlook and their internal situation, they may be in strong opposition to or in general agreement with the governmental radio leadership. Likewise, the listener federation can be an organization of agreement as well as criticism. Should the state allow the free play of forces in the liberal sense to run wild and watch while its strongest weapon in the struggle for control of the populace becomes, in the long run, a football in demagogic hands? Or should one act in accordance with the comfortable and short-sighted views of the former Interior Minister von Gayl and build and lead the radio “without regard to the wishes of the organizations!?” Should the government apply the principle of lazisse faire, lassier aller as it does with the press and allow the strongest instrument of public opinion to fall into enemy hands, only to add grist to their mill by subsequent prohibitions? People did not worry about the mass parties on the left until they took over the state. In recognition of the technical and psychological marvel of the radio, a much bolder design must replace halfway and unfruitful methods — the radio corporation.

The concept originates with the Fascist corporate state, and suggests the professional organization planned by Hitler or the guilds of our Gothic past.

It much resembles Mussolini’s comprehensive newspaper policies, which firmly incorporated all of Italian journalism into the Fascist national state despite all the individual escapades, or the Theater Corporation established by the Fascists. The radio corporation, however, is broader in its aims and scope. It includes within its boundaries not only intellectual leaders and the economically concerned, but the listeners as well. The radio as an instrument and as an intellectual tool has become progressively more important in comparison with the transitory technical developments during the years 1928-1933. In those years, as it is well known, people attempted to meet the growing difficulties in all states through the construction of large transmitters. The large transmitter enabled centralized leadership and control, and was therefore considered superior to newspapers, which are not centrally led. We cannot forsee future developments with certainty. Present experience shows, however, that radio centralization by no means precludes strong opposition movements among the listeners as well as among the artistic elements. The new task begins here.

The radio corporation should bring together the creative artists and the participating listeners. Between them stand industry, commerce, management, and technology.

The radio listener

As of 1 January 1933, 4,300,000 German radio owners were registered with the Postal Ministry. The total number of listeners is estimated at about 20,000,000. Compared with 1 January 1932, there was a 9.2% increase during the calendar year 1923. The population of Germany as of 1 January 1933 was 64,776,000. Thus there were about 66.5 registered radio receivers per 1000 of population. 512,141, about 12% of the total owners, had their radio fees waived.

Country

Registered Set Owners

Date

Estimated number of listeners

Belgium

325,709

Late November 1932

1.7 million

Canada

592.896

Late October 1932

3.0 million

Denmark

496,160

Late November 1932

2.5 million

Great Britain

5,123,183

Late November 1932

26 million

Norway

120,446

Late November 1932

0.6 million

Austria

488,415

Late November 1932

2.5 million

Sweden

593.668

Late September 1932

3.0 million

Switzerland

218,866

Late November 1932

1.1 million

Czechoslovakia

444,008

Late October 1932

2.3 million

Hungary

320,095

Late November 1932

1.5 million

Italy

176,000

Late November 1932

0.9 million

Source: World Radio Association

Industry and Commerce

The German radio industry is organized into the Radio Industry Federation [Verband der Funkindustrie e.V.] in which the Telefunken and Aaron firms have the strongest influence, and also in the Central Federation of the German Electrical Industry [Zentralverband der deutschen elektrotechnischen Industrie e.V.], which is to some extent controlled by the Siemens and Lorenz firms. At the beginning of 1933, approximately 50 firms participated in radio production.

Besides the organizations of these large firms, there are also about 340 state and district groups comprising the Federation of German Radio Merchants [Reichsvervand Deutscher Funkhandler e.V.], which has over 1200 individual members. There is also the Union of the German Radio Trade [Interessengmeinschaft des Deutschen Funkhandels] and the Economic Federation of the German Radio Trade [Wirtschaftsverband des Deutschen Funkhandels].

Still, the number of organized firms is small, and this harms the merchants and the industry. Berlin alone has 1500 dealers, the entire country 12,000 to 15,000 (70,000 according to another estimate!) dealers, yet only about 12% are organized.

The importance of the radio corporation to the radio industry and commerce cannot be stated too strongly.

The firm structure of the corporation guarantees complete purchasing discipline by the public, and therefore the elimination of foreign sets to the benefit of German sales. Dumping and price cutting will become impossible because of the professional organization and the selling and manufacturing licenses legally administered by it.

The living and direct contact that each member has with the radio corporation will lead him to think of himself not only as a listener, but in a certain sense as a co-creator. It will multiply and broaden the circle of listeners to an extent that we cannot today imagine. Thus, a continuing improvement in business conditions is guaranteed for industry and the dealer, which, by the way, have always aimed in differing ways for the closest possible relations with the listener.

It further means that a unity of artistic, cultural, and political expression is achieved by means of corporate commitment.

Reckless attacks by demoralizing writers or demagogic leaders of the masses are most easily neutralized by strong mass organizations and newspaper organizations. How easily the use or misuse of radio can set the masses in motion is shown by the radio protest meetings called by the National Socialists, Social Democrats, and Communists. At them, for example, the KPD, which next to the National Socialists and the National Democrats possesses the surest instinct for mass leadership, used their best speakers, such as Representative Torgler and others.

A leadership that is confident of its aims will not take too seriously the opposition movements among the listenership. As a result of the expansion of radio, small events can instantly become movements of millions of people. It is a sign of superiority when one allows the strong must to ferment without wanting to make an impression everywhere with the rod of threats, prohibitions, repressions, etc.

Active attempts to break the state monopoly are, however, very dangerous. The Social Democrats, who controlled nearly every German radio station after 1925, attempted to exploit their international connections after they lost power in summer 1932.

The Social Democratic radio organization openly encouraged a radio strike and sabotage, and organized direct attacks from across the border. The most important strongholds of these attacks were in Holland, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and German Austria, countries in which the Social Democrats have partial control of the government, or as in Holland, in which they even control their own station. (The listeners organizations in Holland rent the stations.) This station immediately began broadcasting extensive Marxist propaganda in German. The Social Democratic organizations on this side of the border openly discussed this action in meetings, circular letter, sand the press, and encouraged their members to listen exclusively to these foreign stations. Here are a few lines from the Social Democratic Münchner Post of 11 November 1932:

“The Voice of Freedom from Hilversum

Lobe’s forbidden Commemorative Address of 9 November

For the first time, the German social democracy has made it impossible to use the radio within Germany as a witness to an historical event, a commemorative address on the German Revolution of 1918. Yesterday, the Nazi Radio Commisionar Scholz forbade Reichstag Representative Paul Lobe to give his 9 November speech on the German radio. Minister von Gayl upheld this band despite the protest of the Socialist Culture Federation. The right of the radio is thus denied to the working class while the reactionary Junker government daily misuses it for its own purposes.

But the gentlemen’s club government deceives itself if it believes itself able to forbid free discussion of the event which occurred on 9 November. Freedom always finds a free state. That was true during the time of the socialist laws, during which the printed words of fearless and brilliant men were smuggled across the border into Germany. It was also true this past 9 November — the spoken word found a home across the border and was carried by the aether to establish historical truth. After the ban in Germany, Comrade Lobe was invited by Dutch workers to have his address broadcast from Hilversum. Holland is liberal enough to put the radio at the service of free speech, and to stay a long way from the muzzling that occurs in Papen’s Germany. It was therefore possible for Comrade Lobe to pay open tribute to historical truth within the framework of a great cultural program. And what he said last night was heard throughout Germany. The ruling Metternichs in Berlin were outwitted…….”

The extent to which international propaganda intended for German workers exists is shown in Volume 2, Number 9 of the National Socialist monthly Deutsch der Runkfunk! It lists the following programs during the few days from 7 August to 20 August:

[There follows two pages of programming from foreign socialist stations that I have omitted.]

The above listing includes neither the French or the Polish governmental broadcasts that have regularly carried anti-German programs in German during the past four years. From the west one hears of the industrial nation that has the least unemployment and the lowest rate of taxation, from the east of extensive untilled farmlands and low prices.

The Communist Party of Germany has worked in a similar way for a long time with Moscow propaganda stations, which as is well known are the most powerful in Europe. It is listened to and used politically by many groups of German workers at the community evenings held by the communist Free Radio Association (see the pamphlet by engineer Paul Jansen, technical head of the Free Radio Association of Germany, entitled “How Can I Receive Moscow?”). The unlimited lying propaganda from the Soviet Union and the fact that it appeals without exception to the lowest classes of the populace, who have no non-communist educational or instructional material, shows how necessary defense is.

The Fourth World Congress of the Red Trade Union Internationale, held in Moscow from 13 March to 3 April 1928, called the radio a ‘powerful means of unification, agitation, propaganda, and cultural and educational work.” It talked of the significance of listener organizations, whose development among the workers must play an important role with respect to international association as well as in the elections, etc. The congress also stated that the growing radio amateur movements are of tremendous importance for direct relations between the working classes of different countries. The revolutionary trade unions and minorities have made the expansion of a network of short wave transmitters and receivers their duty. Thus, radio amateurs in the USSR would be in a position, with the help of their homemade transmitters and receivers, to be in contact with listeners in Germany and other countries.

The International Radio Commission of the Trade Union Internationale convened an international radio conference in Moscow in November 1929. The Conference published the Bulletin of the Agitprop Department of the RGJ, Number 12, December 1929, according to which it is absolutely essential to create strong contact between radio listeners and to organize them for the struggle against reformist and middle class radio all along the line.

The daily program is as follows:

Moscow: German programs

Trade Union Station: 1305 meters

Comintern Station: 1481 meters

Short Wave Station: 50 meters

1932

7.8 21:00: War and the Mensheviks.

8.8 21:00: How wars develop.

11.8 21:00: Newsreel and letterbox

12.8 21:00: How a Komosol film is made in Magnitogarsk.

13.8 21:00: Cultural growth under the second five-year plan.

14.8 21:00: The world’s Jews.

15.8 21:00: Soviet Theater.

16.8 21:00: Weekly newsreel and letterbox

17.8 21:00: A day in the children’s town in the culture park.

18.8 21:00 :Agricultural workers in the Soviet Union

(Source: Deutsch der Rundfunk: Volume 2, Number 9)

Defense against such baleful influences is possible only with the active cooperation of the listenership. It is more difficult to stop objectionable broadcasts from across the border than shipments of enemy leaflets.

One needs to realize just once the suggestive mass effects which wild agitation can arouse in any crowd in receptive times. Then he will understand the terrible danger which the German millions, surrounded by a ring of enemies, face when the entire strength and forcefulness of criminal lying propaganda suddenly floods across the border.

The propaganda printed by the Entente made an important contribution to the downfall of our homeland in 1918. Its consistent repetition and apodictic certainty even affected the younger members of the army at the front. The power of such propaganda would be far greater today, for they could hurl the spoken German word, and could simply outshout the facilities of the vacillating Reich Postal Ministry with strong transmitters in foreign countries. At the end of 1932 we had postponed completion of our central German 150 KW transmitter, while Moscow broadcasts with not 250 KW, but 500 KW, and Warsaw has broadcast for a long time with 200 KW.

The individual has no defense against the news as long as he is alone. If the news is uncontrolled and unchallenged, and reaches not tens of thousands but millions, mass panic can result on an historically unprecedented scale. What can newspapers, extras, pamphlets, appearing hours or perhaps days later, say? By that time, new lies have long been spread. Against this, there is but one weapon: the most vigorous construction of the German radio network as well as the education of the German masses towards national discipline by the creation of the powerful organizational structure of the radio corporation.

The radio corporation must embrace the totality of radio. It will then be the strongest element of national will building and security. Its contact with the entire populace and with the creative artistic circle, its determination, discipline, and importance for the defense of radio, and its connection with industry and commerce, make it an indispensable instrument for any national power politics that works with all modern means.

The listener organizations and artist federations are a supplement to firm leadership of the radio, under the authority of leading statesmen. In contrast to the barrenness of bureaucracy, they are the living source that will bring to radio the fresh strength of a vigorous population of spirited and stormy youth, thus placing an eternal source of fresh strength at the disposal of the leadership of the Reich.

The radio corporation therefore becomes a platform for the rising younger generation, especially for artists.

This structure is required by a kind of internal law of growth. Federations of radio performers, critics, technicians, merchants and listeners now exist in varying forms alongside each other. If this strength is to be disciplined, it must be firmly concentrated in the corporative structure. This guarantees a unified leadership full freedom of action in questions of jurisdiction and interest.

The Governmental Reich Radio Company

We need an outstanding authority in order to form a robust national character from German individualism, which is currently scattered in a thousand directions.

Wulf Bley’s plan to put the radio in the hands of the leader of the Reich, in the hands of one in whom confidence is already place, is therefore brilliant. That has happened under the leadership of Dr. Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry. Bley outlined the essential principles for the administrative framework of the German radio in his pamphlet Deutsche Nationalerziehung und Rundfunkneubau. The radio is independently organized, and is under the authority of the Reich Chancellor or leading statesmen. The existing situation is described in the following way by the monthly Wille und Weg, Number 3, 1933.

The form of the old radio organization did not result from extensive thought. It owes its existence to the technical accident that included it along with the telegraph under the Postal Ministry. In consequence, the radio’s organization and transmitting facilities are in the hands of the Postal Ministry. It further owes its existence to the jurisdictional accident that awarded authority over the radio to the Postal Ministry in violation of that ministry’s logical borders. The Postal Ministry has thus had the authority to stage a comedy with the radio, and to make a joke of it.

One may say that this is excessive and demagogic.

Well, if money from one of the firms controlled by Mr. Hugenberg was invested in the Scherl Company and secured control of the Scherl Company, and if the money of that company controlled the Berliner Lokalanzieger, one would with justification speak of a Hugenberg Trust, and maintain that Mr. Hugenberg controlled the Berliner Lokalanzieger.

The same interlocking capitalistic system is characteristic of the Postal Ministry. It controls the majority of the stock in the Reich Radio Company in Berlin. In return, the R.R.G. controls the companies. The result is not decisions based on purely ethical or political grounds or on the needs of the state, but rather decisions based entirely on capitalistic tendencies created by the capitalistic control of the Postal Ministry over the radio.

This dictatorship must fall if the radio is to be led along sound lines. The 100 million in annual radio fees is the fund which can be used to carry out a national-political task of enormous proportions.

It is disgraceful that great guiding principles, that is, political viewpoints, have never been in the foreground during years of proposals for radio reform. Politics is life. Prattle about “nonpolitical radio is therefore either proof of unfamiliarity with life or of dishonest demagogy. Neither had better be allowed in the realm of public opinion.

The radio must be political. Moreover, it can follow only the politics that is that of the leading statesmen. It belongs in authorized hands, and must therefore be forever removed from the departmental quarrels of the Postal Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and a dozen special ministers. The settlement of these disputes occurs not in an exchange of views over a conference table, but in the battle of opinions within the framework of the radio corporation. They find their political, intellectual, and economic resolution in the radio leadership. That means that corporations and federations as well as the governmental Reich Radio Company itself must be subordinated to the responsible orders of the Reich Chancellor.

The complete practicality of such an organizational form is sufficiently proven by a look at the present structure of radio. We need not go into detailed economic and legal arguments.

The Reich Postal Ministry Financing Law of 14 January 1928 gives the Postal Ministry financial independence (it is not accountable to the Reichstag). It thus violates the obvious provisions of Article 88 of the Constitution, under which the authority of the Postal Ministry extends to “conditions and fees for the use of the airwaves.”

The proclamation of 24 August 1925 concerning “entertainment programming” took control of what remained, which is the public at large thinks of as “radio.” The fee was fixed at two marks, and the conditions and regulations of postal control were laid out.

Besides public broadcasting, there is a press radio service controlled by the Wolff Telegraph Agency and the Telegraph Union.

There is also an economic radio service as well as grants of postal authority for the establishment of radio installations in the Reich Office, the State Police Office, and the public railroads.

Finally, there are border radio and high seas radio licenses, etc.

The concept of authority allows these peculiar relations to develop between the Postal Ministry and other governmental agencies. It grants the Postal Ministry uncommon power not only over against these agencies but especially over against the public, because no contractual or civil law relations develop from these one-sided grants, but rather only relations established under public law.

As a result, no one can force the Postal Ministry to transfer authority or to grant radio licenses. Likewise, the grant of authority can be revoked upon due notice if required by the needs of the general communication system or the public interest. That is crucial both for the activities of those engaged in transmission or reception and also for the right of the state itself to exercise its authority over the Postal Ministry by defining conditions such that they come under the concept of national interest rather than the communication system.

Because of its complete financial control, the Postal Ministry has avoided extensive influence on programming. It can therefore maintain with an appearance of justice that it has no more influence no the radio than it has on the selection and presentation of the materials transmitted by the Postal Ministry for the press news services.

The Postal Ministry, however, owns 51% of the stock in the Reich Radio Company, the holding company of the ten German broadcasting firms. The Reich Radio Company in turn fully controls these firms both financially and through the allotment of the yearly radio fees. The whole is thus a typically capitalistic interlocking structure, which cannot in the least obscure the actual and pervasive influence of the Postal Ministry.

The influence of the Postal Ministry on public broadcasting cannot be compared with the other branches of the radio and communication system, because other uses of the radio are self-supporting and independent, while the broadcasting companies are attached to the Postal Ministry in purely capitalistic ways.

The Radio Press Service, for example, works with the news agencies (WTB and TU) and their customers. The Postal Ministry finances neither party.

The Wireless Press Service transmits material intended for publication in the editorial sections of newspapers. Only newspapers and other news agencies along with the branch offices if they are members of the transmitting news agency, can receive the material. Private subscribers, banks, commercial firms, etc., are not allowed.

The licensed news agencies themselves negotiate the arrangements for the required license documents, and set the fee for the use of their receiving installations by German customers.

The Economic Radio System has an “Express Service,” which transmits from the postal installation as Konigswüsterhausen. It transmits exchange rates, world market prices, and stock and market reports to interested banks, industrialists, businesses, and marketing and purchasing companies.

The High Seas Radio Company transmits its news over the main radio station at Nordreich-an-Reeder to shipping firms and ship owners. It broadcasts weather reports, harbor conditions, and news of harbor strikes and accidents.

Foreign radio services such as Reuters, Havasian, Helvetian, and the special sports service of Rea and Sporn also do business in Germany.

Financial independence from the Postal Ministry is a characteristic of all these organizations. The conceptual and legal design of reconstruction (radio law), which is otherwise distinguished by a penetrating acuteness and persuasive power, is certainly wrong if it wants to put public broadcasting on the same level as these organizations. That analogy would put public broadcasting within the jurisdiction of the Postal Ministry. In reality, public broadcasting is a unique area which should be a public monopoly.

One can get an idea of the cultural and political effect that postal influence on the radio has had when considers that a country like Germany, which ahs the largest book production n the world, has fewer radio listeners after ten years of development, both in percentages and absolute terms, than has, for example, England.

In purely numerical terms, the picture is as follows according to the German Broadcaster [Deutsche Sender] of 18 December 1932:

A total of about 90 million marks in radio fees was taken in this past year. The Postal Ministry took 50.5 million as its share, while the rest, except for 6 million that went for the remission of fees to the blind, war cripples, and the unemployed, went to the broadcasting companies for the performance of their tasks. A considerable part of the remaining 40 million marks, however, came back to the Postal Ministry in the form of repayments, line rentals, etc. At most, 32 million remained at the effective disposal of the broadcasting companies. Postal money was spent as follows:

1. For the operation of broadcasting installations

5.5 million

10.9%

2. For construction of new broadcasting installations

10.0 million

19.9%

Depreciation of old broadcasting installations

3.5 million

6.9%

4. Maintenance of lines

1.0 million

1.9%

5. Collection of costs of fees

9.0 million

17.9%

6. Personnel costs to the Postal Ministry for transmitter servicing, the Postal Central office, and radio reports from the O.P.D.

4.0 million

7.9%

7. Radio’s share of the general business expenses of the Postal Ministry

2.5 million

4.9%

8. Sales tax

2.0 million

3.9%

9. Payments for coastal and overseas service

10.0 million

19.9%

10. Paid to the Reich

3.0 million

5.9%

One notices that the Postal Ministry takes the trouble to satisfactorily show the public the revenue it receives from the radio.

Thus far the German Broadcaster.

The use of radio fees for other purposes of the postal service must necessarily lead to the neglect of the basic needs of radio.

What is most peculiar and surprising here is the lack of an independent radio news agency.

The radio, which could be much faster and emphatic that the press, has at its disposal an annual budget of over 90 million marks for news, propaganda, and cultural purposes, of which less than 30 million marks goes for technical costs. Yet it has not decided to establish its own news agency that would be independent of the press and subject only to the influence of the state.

The “Dradag” (the Wireless News Service), which existed until 1932, was not a news agency, but rather a selection and censorship agency for the government. It was entirely dependent on the press. Rauscher, who headed Dradag for many years, explained things in the following manner:

Only with great expense could it (the radio) create its own network of correspondents. Even the large newspapers that have such a network at their disposal cannot do without the services of a news agency. The radio, like the newspapers, gets its news from sources that provide it by agreements. The Wireless Service is not the radio’s news agency, but rather its dispatch agencies and correspondents. The broadcasting companies get the weather services, as well as differing local and sports agencies. The Wireless Service is dependent on the same material as is at the disposal of a major newspaper. The services of the news agencies are tailored to the deadlines of their main customers, the press, which places radio (which has a different deadline) at somewhat of a disadvantage.

Today, the Wireless Press Service receives news from the Wolff Agency, the Telegraph Union, the Ullstein Agency, the European News Agency, the United Press, the Newspaper Publishers Agency (Parliamentary news), a social-political agency, and all the party and trade union agencies.

Since April 1933, the Dradag has been put on new foundations as a result of its organizational attachment to the Ministry for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda. The “Wireless Service” is now known as the Service Office. It is under the leadership of the former Telegraph Union editor Fritzsche, and belongs in theory in the Reich Press Chief’s department in the Propaganda Ministry. There is naturally a radio news office, its budget determined through the Reich Radio Company by the radio commissioner. An important thing to note in the official proclamation is: “Its task consists on the one hand of the acquisition and dissemination of the daily news, and on the other of the preparation and dissemination of reports and information of the government on the radio. The News Department should rapidly and accurately inform the listenership of the most important news events of the day in a concise and lively manner. It should above all inform them of domestic and foreign political and economic developments.”

The situation described above does not mean that the news agency is concerned exclusively with politics. The significance of political news on the radio is shown in the following tables.

Programming Hours of German Radio: 1923-1930

1923

86

1924

13,000

1925

45,000

1926

76,000

1927

90,000

1928

100,000

1929

130,000

1930

146,000

Programming Distribution

Music and Entertainment

39.0%

Records

19.0%

Literature

5.5%

Lectures

14.5%

Reports

13.1%

Morning Celebrations

1.6%

Children’s Hour

4.7%

Women’s Hour

1.6%

Farming

1.0%

TOTAL

100%

The programming distribution of the German radio is such that about 28% of all programming is given to talks and reports. This percentage is as least as high as the corresponding figures for similar material in the daily press. However, one must consider that without exception radio programs reach a much larger number of hearers than individual newspapers have readers, and that many hearers turn to the radio only for news reports.

The reconstruction of radio must, therefore, include the establishment of an independent news agency as the foundation of responsible leadership of public opinion. According to the reorganization scheme promulgated by the Reich Radio Company, a German radio company is composed of these, among other, departments: superintendent’s office, current events department, choir and concert department, literary department, opera department, orchestral department, drama department, lecture and news department, and a record department.

One can see the variety and the enormous cultural and artistic possibilities which will, in the final analysis, be illusions possessing but latent strength if responsible foundations are not laid for the radio’s news service

Under the Gayl-Scholz reorganization of the radio, the principle of decentralization was carried out, giving the states in practice a greater influence on the radio than they previously had. A second principle, which has already been sufficiently criticized, was the standard of “freedom from politics.”

The radio has once again been firmly centralized as a result of its inclusion in the Ministry for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, and also because of the political events in the German states in the spring of 1933. The Konigswürsterhausen station, now officially the Germany Station [Deutschlandsender], will function as a representative station with its own comprehensive programming. An “Hour of the Nation” has been broadcast by the Germany Station since 1 April 1933, and has been regularly repeated by all the state stations. Such programs can also be produced by local stations and relayed by the Germany Station. The Germany Station has the task of creating a comprehensive national program of construction and, in the words of Dr. Goebbels, of “leading the way for everyone else.”

Chapter 5

The Leadership of the Press

The activity of the so-called

liberal press was the work of

grave-diggers for the German

people and the German Reich

— Hitler

Objectivity

Germany has the world’s greatest annual production of books, magazines, and newspapers. That we have a greater volume does not mean that we have more writers or cleverer ones than other leading cultural nations. It does mean that one will find more intellectual trash in our publishing houses than elsewhere.

The German people has an elevated and noble desire to do things for their own sakes. This German idealism has enabled our people in the past to accomplish the greatest and most superhuman deeds, and will do so in the future as well. The marvelous German trait of seeing something and offering to it our humble selves becomes grotesque, however, when the thing is not worth the sacrifice. It is but a step from the elevated to the absurd. Self-sacrifice by workers, teachers, engineers, artists, soldiers, or politicians that serves life (and is therefore noble) can instantly become farcical if it is “objectively” subjected to examination with about the same scientific eagerness as is given to the urination of sheep dogs. (This actually happened at the scientific psychology congress in Hamburg in April 1931, and was reported in the Vossischen Zeitung).

“Impartiality” is a danger for people of weak character because it tempts them to hold it as more important than life. We have become well enough acquainted with it in both North and South Germany as well as in the former Habsburg monarchy as the most miserable and pedantic of bureaucratic manias. Revolutions and other events have shown us how little backbone its supporters have. A part of the German press has been slightly colored by it as well. Although they are in direct contact with the people, whose lives are in constant motion, contact with reality is not guaranteed. Paper can take a long time to die if it is not promptly devoured by the flames of revolutionary youth.

The ideal of the German press is “impartiality,” or “objectivity,” which sounds better. Those who want to be “impartial” or “objective” forget that one can be so only when he serves a great cause. The press is not a cause in itself, only an instrument.

Only a part of the press believes in the possibility of objectivity, and that not the brightest. The Mosse and Ullstein organizations are probably quite clear as to what a centralization of the news service and press means, and how it is possible to “spread infection” through the simple news. Only the naïve still believe it possible for news, and therefore its printing in the newspapers, to be objective.

The simplest laws of psychology as well as the experiences of criminology and jurisprudence compellingly prove that no report can be given that corresponds to the real course of events. The characters and souls of the participants act as a fine filter in every event. They permit only the assimilation and absorption of an entirely predetermined view of events. It is not even necessary to consider the degree of attentiveness, the inability to see the whole picture, or intentional efforts to present a false picture of events.

When a young scamp gets his ears boxed, the teacher is naturally at fault. If one asks the teacher, he will get a different story!

One may argue that today human weakness can be overcome by technology, and that for example a photograph can accurately represent a scene. That, however, is true only under very carefully controlled conditions in certain areas, as for example, scientific or criminal photography. In general, though, the camera lense is only as objective as the cameraman.

It all depends on one’s angle. It makes all the difference if a photographer uses his camera to photograph a wild and stormy revolutionary crowd or the energetic line of police facing them with nightsticks or carbines.

For example, one picture can be used by the middle class magazine Die Woche to make the flesh of its readers creep before revolution; the other persuasively shows the readers of the communist Arbeiter-Illustrierte the brutal and completely unfounded actions of the police “against the proletarian masses.” A clever reporter could snap both pictures and earn good money from both sides.

It is the same with every event. Each reporter, each group of reporters, will of necessity report something different. Thus, views, distortions, misrepresentations, lies, and falsehoods can play a part, but it does not have to be that way. When a journalist defends the honor of his profession, justice is on his side. The journalist is generally better than his reputation. In nationalist middle class circles, however, one always encounters an unjustified narrow-minded arrogance which is merited neither by position nor character.

If one wants to label working correspondents and the press as “objective,” he does so against better advice. If any large part of the press seriously worries about “objectivity” without serving a living political goal, it will decay into a comedy of objective objectivism that glorifies itself, and leads not to impartiality but to insipidness.

As a result, its readership will not be familiar with life.

Such a press produces types of intellectuals and average citizens who happily read about the nation without having the least notion of the way in which the nation shows its strength and what other forces it fights against. If one attempts to show these forces to an objectivist, he quickly makes the terrible discovery that the forces are not mysterious and incomprehensible entities dwelling in the clouds, but rather earthly men of flesh and blood who have organized a strong federation, who are building a party! Terrible, terrible. This objectivist is not, of course, in favor of those who want to make a reality of nationalization and who have joined together under banner. In the end, he thinks, the state is not the tribunal of life. Rather, it is a museum, a record keeping office, with everything neatly displayed in a showcase, having a number, a title, a governmentally approved name, with last of all the objectivist himself hanging on a nail in a glass case!

The kind of journalism these men have developed (they call it free, independent, neutral, nonpartisan, above party, and objective — ever and again objective) must be replaced or Germany will disappear. There is but one objective worthy of the full effort of the press — the nation. And the only justifiable objectivity is that which serves the cause of the nation.

Freedom of the Press

This is the place to speak of a second idol, “freedom of the press.” Thanks to its four hundred year tradition and its temporary control over the public opinion so idolized by liberalism, and thanks to the words of Napoleon III who called it the “eighth great power,” the press still feels today that it is valuable and powerful by itself. This claim stands in contrast to reality, which shows the press to be the tool of certain forces, and by the moral outlook that demands not “freedom of the press,” but that the press serve the nation. The slogan of the freedom of public opinion did untold damage during the war. Our leading politicians, themselves uncreative and unimaginative in the use of language, succumbed all too easily to the slogans of their political opponents. All areas of public life came under government control as a result of the pressures of the war, whether in the area of material usage, food supplies, war materials, etc. A nation of 70 million had to comply with the bureaucratic necessities of the hour. The thousands of German newspapers, however, remained under the influence of a slogan, each without firm leadership, each dedicated to the quarrels of parties and interest groups.

A certain part of the press slowly but steadily set about eroding freedom and the spirit of resoluteness and joyful struggle, and concealing the picture of an enemy intent on our annihilation.

It is not at all clear that the professional association of the German press has drawn any conclusions in the fifteen years since the war. The by-laws of the Federation of the German Press (Reichsverband der Deutschen Presse) still say that the purpose of the federation is to: “Defend against all attempts to hinder the press in its legal tasks, especially…to defend against all attacks on the freedom of the press and on the honor of the German press, in particular, of German journalists.”

That the representatives of the press wish to defend their honor is understandable to Germans. It must be just as certain, however, that when the legal tasks of the press are spoken of, that these tasks are to be equated with the interests of the nation. In spite of this, men cling to the impossible idol of an independent press. Absolute freedom of the press should supposedly serve“ colorless tasks under public law,” and public law in turn should protect the press. Struggling for freedom of the press, some demand the relaxation of the emergency press decrees of the government. The Federation of the German Press has about 3700 members that are, according to its figures, about 85% of all full-time journalists in Germany. They want to lead the struggle both through intellectual organizations as well as in cooperation with the publishers and the Reich Labor Union. They demand “the speediest possible abolition of the unbearable emergency decrees” and the “responsible participation of representatives of the R.D.P. in German press reforms as well as guarantees of just new press legislation in the interests of German journalists and publishers.” One would hope the Federation and the Union of German Newspaper Publishers would promptly, voluntarily, and clearly conclude that one can have influence only when one takes actual responsibility. They have expressed a strong defense of the honor of their profession. It would be good if in the by-laws of those federations that want to serve the public the talk were first of the nation and then of their professional interest, and if in fact they behaved that way. It is to be hoped that the leaders of German journalism will soon decide on the necessary changes in these organizations that will enable their feelings, their honor, and their sense of responsibility to be admired by everyone.

The German intellectuals active in public opinion should speak not of freedom, but rather of self-discipline and responsibility. The press should not be the ultimate value to which they pay homage, but rather they should serve the nation with their ability and strength.

What is the situation with respect to freedom of the press in other countries?

The alleged total freedom of the press in France is refuted by the dependence of the press on two agencies: Havas and Radio News. Even the largest papers in France are characteristically not very profitable. This has not led, as in Germany and England, to a concentration and merging of newspapers, but rather to a degree of venality and corruption unimaginable in Germany. It is well known that the pre-war anti-German incitement in the French newspapers came from the largest and most respected French newspapers without regard to their partisan political stands. Money went to the Petit Parisien, Le Jounal, Matin, Temps, etc. The Russian agent Rassalovich organized a fine system of corruption which lasted for a decade and gave French newspapers millions annually through open bribery of newspaper directors, editors, and journalists, as well as through bribery by advertising, highly profitable supplements, and the like. The campaign of bribery reached such enormous proportions that Poincare, the French Prime Minister, intervened in 1913. His intervention did not lead to a cessation of bribery, only to a diversion of the money to newspapers approved by the government.

Would a German journalist wish to establish the “freedom of the press” of democratic France here?

The control and leadership of the press in England is free of such happenings. A concentration of the press has since 1905 led to a remarkable series of mergers and to the formation of capitalistic trusts. In no other country has the concentration of the press taken the same remarkable form as in England. One need only think of the leading press trust built by Northcliffe and today led by Lord Rothermere, of the millions of copies of the great English newspapers, or of the newspaper trusts of Ellerman and Berry. A similar concentration has occurred in the American press, leading to mergers, the reduction of the number of newspapers and an increase in their circulations, though the English structure has not been as fully implemented in the U.S.A.

In as much as it is dominant has influence with the broad masses, and is connected with the government, the U.S. press is thoroughly modeled after the English. This was a natural consequence of language and blood relationships, which to some extent resulted in an intuitive inclination towards the English press structure. The American and British press systems are both dependent on the world-spanning English news agency (Reuters). That was shown in an especially unfortunate way during the World War. The systematic press campaign which was waged in North America after the war began was in essence a simple product of the English news and cable agencies. Furthermore, the English propaganda minister, Lord Northcliffe, had a very great influence on the American press, and invested in or controlled a considerable number of newspapers. During the war, a close relationship developed between Northcliffe’s London Times and the New York Times.

Germany could not get news to the U.S.A., so there was never a real battle for public opinion, only an entirely one-sided influence on the part of the ruthless English press.

The freedom of the press so beloved in Germany generally has not existed and does not now exist in the U.S.A. The dependence of the press on central news agencies (Associated Press and International News Service) and the officially encouraged nationalistic passion of the populace simply does not permit newspapers to have “free,” “neutral,” or “nonpartisan” attitudes. Leaving aside the differences in social and party politics, the public really only knows one party called “America” or “England.” All else is secondary. Right or wrong, my country!

The Anglo-Saxon world thus offers a picture of freedom of the press that exists not for the sake of the press, but for the sake of national tasks. It is generally not restricted by laws because the press possesses sufficient self-discipline. If, however, the ship of state steers through dangerous waters, or if the self-imposed discipline is somehow seriously endangered by freedom (as during the World War or other national emergencies, drastic measures are carried out to guard the health of the nation.

One has only to recall the American war laws and their enforcement. Clever restraint is exercised. No restrictions are placed on the free expression of personality as long as they do not seem necessary. If they are necessary, however, they are carried out with a drastic strength that immediately silences all rebellious elements with a single blow. This is the method used by Moltke against the humanists and humanitarians during the siege of Paris, and the one used by all great political craftsmen, whether during a struggle on a battlefield, in internal politics, or on the battleground of public opinion.

There is little to be said of Bolshevism in this study. Until just recently, it enjoyed 100% freedom of the press in Germany. In its homeland, it chased the middle class editors and journalists to the devil, sent them to Siberia, or put them up against a wall. They established a firm Asiatic system of complete subjection. Certainly those professional associations of the German press that are today so eager and enthusiastic about the establishment of Bolshevism in their own country would not take it at all well if Bolshevism had the opportunity to apply its methods to them. The Russian press today is a governmental and bureaucratic institution.

Fascist press organization is very interesting. Joachim Bottcher has kindly provided us with information about it.

Until the Fascist legislation, absolute freedom of the press prevailed. They began to change the organization of the press with the law of 8 July 1924. In the following years, press legislation was passed that attacked the plague of too many “nonpartisan” newspapers by encouraging consolidation and reuction in numbers.

The honor of journalists is well protected, and their number limited and controlled by the state. This is done in such a way that the governmentally approved professional associations themselves exercise the control, and have disciplinary and supervisory powers over their members. Corresponding to the corporative system, the professional journalistic associations are united by a syndicate. Local syndicates are at the bottom level, with regional syndicates above them. They are united in a national syndicate, which for its part belongs to the Confederation of Free Professions and Artists.

An intellectual leadership is thus established which is in direct contact with the government, maintains its own freedom and discipline, and leads the masses with the instruments of public opinion. The General Secretary of the Journalism Syndicate says the following about the effectiveness of the Fascist form: “The journalistic membership book has made the morally and spiritually uplifted Italian journalism into a secure and reliable tool of the state.” The professional, social, and economic interests of the professional journalists are, of course, protected along with the intellectual and political tasks of the corporation.

There is no censorship office for the press to accompany this power self-protected freedom and discipline, although there is a theater censor. The State’s Attorney in the Ministry of Justice can proceed against books and newspapers only for criminal offenses. The fact that one can sharply criticize the system and the Duce despite the Fascist state is shown by Croce’s clever book against Fascism which is still found today in the homes of faithful Italian liberals without in any way harming the public’s national drives.

The German and Foreign Press

The principles of objectivity and freedom of the press have led the German character, which is somewhat given to exaggeration, to a fragmentation that is unequaled elsewhere, and whose cause in no way lies in the famed German race. Otherwise, each village of more than five hundred inhabitants would have its own conception of the German “race.” We have the dangerous remnants of city, state, and church steeple politics. It looks as if we must also have a Bismarck to force the small under the leadership of the large.

According to the Institute for Newspaper Studies in Berlin (Dovifat), Germany has over 4,500 newspapers. North America, England, France, and Italy combined do not reach that total. The total daily circulation is 28 million in both Germany and England. In England, however, this total is shared by only 140 newspapers! The Institute also states that, if one disregards the reduction during the war, the number of German newspapers has been continually increasing for about 40 years. All the technical innovations and all the capitalistic influences have not brought about a reduction in the number of German newspapers or raised the circulation of the larger papers. Thus, there is a newspaper for every 21,000 inhabitants in Prussia, one for every 15,000 in Württemberg! England has only one newspaper for every 180,000 inhabitants! Countless German regions with less than 20,000 inhabitants have three or four newspapers.

The excessive fragmentation shown by these figures has its effect on the party position of papers. We have already shown that a newspaper is not an end in itself, and that a newspaper must serve a task and an idea. The task and idea can only be political. Hugenberg has discussed this notion in the following basically correct way. “In the long run, no great German paper can be the property of an industrial firm, of a group of industrial firms, or a federation of interests. Nor can a German paper in the long run be the representative of the property interests of such a firm or such a federation for the simple reason that the readers would go elsewhere. In the long run, a great newspaper can crystallize only around an idea…. This is proven today not only by socialism and the deliberate struggle against private property, but also in the uncertain direction and confusion of public opinion…. There is nothing for which I am more thankful to my friends in the Ruhr than this: they have previously followed this train of thought and have brought economic concentration into reality.”

The policy in German newspaper rooms is still quite different. Of the 3,000 newspapers that existed in 1895, 45% designated themselves as nonpartisan. The figure has since steadily increased. By the year 1930, it was over 55%. And newspapers that designated themselves as nationalist, patriotic, German, etc., were included with the party papers, not in the percentages of the nonpartisan. The result is a ratio of party papers to nonpartisan papers of 22% to 70%. A dismal state!

Less than 1% of the total of 4,500 German newspapers have circulations over 100,000, and about 70% have circulations of less than 5,000. The largest German newspaper is Ullstein’s Morgenpost with a circulation of about 500,000 followed, to a greater or lesser extent by papers such as the Nachtausgabe, the Lokalanzeiger, the Münchner Neusten Nachrichten, the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, the Völkischer Beobachter, the Hamburger Anzeiger, the Breslauer Neuesten Nachrichten, the Welt am Abend, and the B.Z. am Mittag, all having circulations between 150,000 and 200,000. Alongside them are a profusion of boulevard, yellow, local, provincial, and village papers, having circulations between 200 and 15,000 (in total, 99% of the German newspapers).

The defect in national and economic discipline shown by these figures becomes apparent when comparison is made to conditions in other countries. In Italy, according to Hans-Joachim Bottcher’s figures, there are at present no more than abut 80 daily newspapers. (The most important are La Tribuna, Il Giornale d’Italia, Il Lavoro Fascista, Il Corriere della Sera, Il Popolo d’Italia, La Stampa, Il Mattino.)

The most important newspapers in the Soviet Union are Isvestia with a circulation of 500,000 and Pravda with 600,000 as well as boulevard and party papers printed in Moscow and Leningrad which have circulations between 180,000 and 300,000.

The number of newspapers is also small in the United States of America; nevertheless consider that the Chicago Daily News has a circulation of 440,000, the Chicago Tribune 820,000 daily and 1,050,000 Sunday, the New York American 220,000 daily and 1,000,000 Sunday, the Daily News 1,300,000 daily and 1,600,000 Sunday, the New York Herald Tribune 300,000 daily and 400,000 Sunday, the New York Times 420,000 daily and 700,000 Sunday, and the New York World with 350,000 daily and 530,000 Sunday.

The unity of public opinion is shown even more strongly in the intellectually advanced French and English papers. France’s largest newspaper is the Petit Parisien which has a circulation which varies between 1,400,000 and 1,800,000. Matin has 700,000 as does the Petit Journal. Intransigeant has 400,000, the nationalist Coty paper L’ami du people has a circulation of 1,000,000 and sells for two pfenning. La Croix, the Catholic family paper, has 750,000, and a dozen provincial papers have circulations between 250,000 and 300,000.

In Great Britain, the Daily Express and its competitor the Daily Mail have circulations of almost 1,800,000. The circulations of the Daily Telegraph (1,500,000), the Daily Sketch and the Daily Herald (120,000 each), the Sunday Dispatch (1,300,000), the News Chronicle, and the Sunday Express (100,000 each), The Star, the London News, and the Manchester Guardian are likewise uncommonly high.

In Japan, the five leading daily newspapers in Osaka and Tokoyo have circulations ranging from 800,000 to over 1,000,000.

Despite the importance of leading individual newspapers in these countries, extensive concentrations of newspaper publishers, cartels, etc., have come about. Fortunately we can see that the confusing picture of 4,500 German newspapers having miniscule circulations has slowly but surely led to changes during the past two decades that were at first only under the surface, but which will eventually force unification. To a growing degree, press concentrations have developed in our country. The bravely upheld editorial policy of objective nonpartisan church steeple horizons is still a negative trait, but it no longer is the entire picture.

To ensure that these harsh but entirely justified criticisms of the daily press are not falsely understood or maliciously misinterpreted, it is necessary to praise another, as yet unmentioned, part of the German press. That is the German technical, academic, and professional journals.

Like the general press, they look back upon a four hundred year tradition, and have every reason to be proud of that tradition.

The German scientific press is unrivalled in the entire world, and will remain so. Technical genius has been joined with precise expression, exactness, scrupulousness, and a perfection of description which has become a model for the international scientific press, for the intellectual elite of foreign countries, and for science and education throughout the entire world.

The journals of the German mathematical associations, engineering and chemical societies, and of the natural science, geographic, and physical associations, as well as our anthropological, literary, and linguistic publications are read by scientists and experts in every country. Our geographical works and maps (Perthes, Gotha) are used by the geographers, army general staffs, navies, and mariners of the entire world.

The German artistic journals are on the same high level. Their tasteful and excellent selection, the excellence of their color plates, their photographic and colored reproductions are representative documents of a highly developed culture. Their layout, binding, general appearance, and artistic content are far superior to American magazines, French revues, or English artistic journals. In most cases, they are free of the tasteless kitsch of the day, and have nothing whatever to do with the false sentimentality both characterized by their obtrusive and unpleasant sugar-coated advertising centered layout.

It is deplorable that the frightful difficulties which the German nation is under today are wreaking havoc on even the oldest and most respected journals, forcing them to reduce their staffs as well as their size and appearance.

In contrast to the scientific press, the semi-technical magazines dealing with associations or areas of common or limited interest to the masses have become lucrative. This has been at the cost, one my note of the daily press (fashion, sports, film, and radio magazines).

The illustrated magazines and the radio magazines deserve special mention here. The circulation figures of daily newspapers do not equal the Berliner Illustrierte’s 1,800,000, the Funkwoche’s and Sendung’s 400,000 each, or the Illustrierter Beobachter’s 180,000.

One would probably be correct in assuming that the increase in such magazines, especially the illustrated ones, is not entirely due to technical advances in picture printing and reporting, etc.

The enormous development of illustrated magazines in the last few years leads one to suspect that they are in some way bound up with the development of radio. The radio has taken on a part of the significance of the daily press, although the newspapers have discovered how artificially to paralyze radio’s topicality.

Nevertheless, the rapidity of the electronic medium as well the urgency and familiarity of the spoken word have contributed to the formation of a broad popular audience (It is estimated that there are twenty million radio listeners in Germany and four and a half million receivers) that relies more on the radio than the daily newspapers. Since the pure word prevails on radio, it was natural that the public sought to balance the verbal with visuals. The publisher could meet his need if he were able to provide the large initial investment necessary to produce an illustrated magazine. He then created an instrument almost independent of economic or political fluctuations that returned a secure profit.

The development of radio has been central for another type of illustrated magazine, namely the approximately eighty German radio magazines that have a weekly circulation total of five million. The radio magazines have combined some degree of artistic or cultural criticism and advance notice of radio programs with technical advice and illustrations stemming less from the needs of the radio than from the magazine needs of the reader. They have quickly established a broad audience.

The effect of the radio on the press, to the disadvantage of the daily newspaper and the benefit of the illustrated magazine, is by no means at an end. It has, however, been artificially neutralized by the tactics of the large press organizations. Until the reorganization of the radio in summer 1932, its whole communication was centered in the so-called Dradag (Wireless Service Company). This company, however, was half controlled by the Federation of the German Press, and furthermore by the Mosse, Scherl, Wolff Telegraph Agency, and Telegraph Union firms. The representatives of the remaining shares were government officials who had neither substantial influence with the press nor a knowledge of the immense topical and political possibilities of the radio that they controlled. Thus, the influence of the press trust was absolute.

The result was that, while the news service of the Dradag was gathering the day’s news, the Berlin sensationalist papers could appear in the early afternoon with headlines shouting the day’s sensation. All the radio listener got for his money was a boring and yawn provoking academic lecture at 10 p.m. that gave the same news he had been fed by the press, and this in a German that should have been sufficient to send the announcer back to school.

Today, the news service is reorganized within the Reich Propaganda Ministry, and is in the hands of Fritzsche, the former Telegraph Union editor. Whether the influence of the press is definitely abolished and whether the radio, which works with the speed of light, will under their leadership make use of the full extent of its topicality remains to be seen. It would be good if the press had to put an end to its sensationalism and replace it with an increase in illustrateds and magazines. This would give radio its necessary supplement through pictures, and would be better than the not too impressive topicality of articles on radio.

Newspaper Concentration

We can recognize the following large groups in the German press today, disregarding the sensationalist newspaper and insignificant outsiders.

1. The middle class democratic papers, such as those published by the three large and competing Ullstein, Mosse, and Frankfurter Sozietatsdrukerei firms.

Ullstein owns several of the largest Berlin newspapers, as well as a string of well established journals, magazines, etc.

The Mosse firm likewise owns leading papers in Berlin.

2. The middle class national papers, such as those published by the Scherl concern and the remainder of the Hugenberg Company. The Huck concern, the Nahiel newspapers, Girardet, and Leonhardt also belong here because of their ideology. (Together, this group consists of about 1,000 newspapers).

3. The Catholic family papers, usually under ecclesiastical, Christian labor union, or federation leadership (about 600 papers).

4. The National Socialist propaganda organs of the Eher Publishing House, and the more or less “official party” Gau publishing houses. (Völkischer Beobachter, Angriff, etc., about 120 papers according to Dovifat.)

5. The Social Democratic propaganda organs and trade union papers (about 130 newspapers.)

The Social Democratic press is combined in the Concentration Holding Company, the company which controls the Party’s newspapers.

6. The Communist propaganda organs of the Kosmos Publishing House (Munzenberg Company), of the Peuwag Holding Company, which controls about 50 Communist Party newspapers.

These concerns and groups control practically all of the important German newspapers. Their papers have a clear bias, despite the much talked of “objectivity” and “freedom of the press.” The further they stray from the center of their position’s strength because of the capitalistic interlocking system, the weaker becomes their effect. The leaders of the Federation of the German Press, who speak in their proclamation of a complete and unrealistic freedom of the press, are probably well enough aware of these facts, even if the general public is not as well informed as the experts about the reality behind the mask of freedom of the press. The democratic press, looking back upon a history of opposition, best understands how to make the news, light reading, and general appearance of the newspaper so unified and convincing that one never notices the bias. The more they speak of freedom of the press and independence, the more the expert is convinced that nothing of them remains. As a result, this press has a large circle of supporters and readers of entirely different political views.

The middle class national paper is generally inferior to the clever layout of the democratic paper. One already knows these housewives’ complaints, but they are really not as interesting as Ullstein’s Morgenpost!

Its inferiority shows itself not merely with respect to the selection, taste, and style of arrangement and content. It also lacks a unified and persuasive internal attitude, apparently because the declining middle class national world no longer possesses a unified intellectual attitude, and consequently cannot persuasively present one.

The day’s events are generally treated with a certain reserve in the Catholic family paper, which does take clear stands based on its ancient tradition of belief. It is indeed no servant of a phantom, but of a firmly established community of families and churches within the Christian faith. The Catholic family paper therefore holds a basically conservative attitude. It has firmly supported the Central and Bavarian People’s parties for many years. Both are parties of organized Catholics.

The tottering middle class press, no longer persuaded or capable of persuasion, and the conservative tradition of the Catholic organs are now up against the revolutionary press.

The idea of central press organization may first have been carried out in the National Socialist movement soon after the acquisition of the Völkischer Beobachter under the leadership of Amann, the brilliant newspaper organizer. A system was build up into the “Central Publishing House of the Party,” which was based not on the capitalist principle of interlocking interests, but rather on absolute loyalty to National Socialism and party discipline. It is a system that built about fifty centrally controlled newspapers and magazines, beginning from nothing, and without outside capital. The Illustriertre Beobachter began here as well. It did not just contain picture news, but rather had a clear direction.

The National Socialist propaganda organ does not want to be a paper that reports the news, nor does it want to be objective, free, and independent, as is the ambition of the liberal press which puts itself at the center of the universe.

Dr. Goebbels most clearly expresses this attitude:

We wanted to continue propaganda methods by means of journalism, since the free spoken word was prohibited to us. It was not our intention to found an informative paper for our supporters. Our newspaper developed out of our attitudes, and should be written from and for those attitudes. Our aim was not to inform, but to incite, to stimulate, to impel. The organ we founded should act like a whip to wake sleepers from their slumber and incite them to restless action. The name (Der Angriff) as well as the motto of the newspaper was a program: “For the Oppressed! Against the Exploiters!” stood in large letters next to the title. It demanded to be read. The whole program and field of action was outlined by the title and masthead of this newspaper.

It may be pointed out to the German reader that such an approach which intentionally produces an attitude is indeed a recent development for the German press, but not for the world press. Whoever looks at the American press will be astonished by the bold make-up, the clever and surprisingly powerful headlines, and the general liveliness of layout. A perusal will also establish the surprising fact that the American press virtually never gives pure news. Whether it deals with a corporation scandal, which can be adorned and decorated in everyway by the fantasies of reporters, or whether it deals with political facts, it will regularly include extensive commentary. Or, the news itself may be presented in the form of an apodictic expression of opinion. It in no way resembles a boring lead article in a German newspaper, which developed from the same desire to comment on political events. One is so sure of his attitude and intellectual basis that from the beginning each event is observed, chosen, and interpreted from this viewpoint. National Socialism has adopted and implemented this style to some degree, and has doubtlessly paved the way for further future cooperation between government, the press, and the journalistic associations.

The firm discipline of National Socialism is not imitated by other parties. One does not find in them the same central unity. The Social Democratic propaganda organs, however, have followed a firm party line for many years. This was especially clear during the war, when no other camp had a party as firmly organized as the Social Democrats. Their press was firmly in the hands of the political leaders, was built up with the party’s money, and had the party members as its readership. Colonel Nicolai said of them that they were the section of the German press which most supported the assertion that public opinion was “evoked.” In 1928, the Social Democratic newspapers were merged into the Concentration Company at the suggestion of the Workers Bank (Goldschmidt). That was necessary to support several endangered Social Democratic newspapers.

The best Communist propaganda organs are under the leadership of Munzenberg (Kosmos Publishing House). Munzenberg, among others, has creater the Arbeiter Illustrierte, a pictoral magazine that from the first page to the last presents not objective pictoral news, but rather propaganda and photographs. The Arbeiter Illustrierte comments incessantly on the ideas of communist class struggle with pictures and photographs that may either be taken from life or persuasively staged.

These six large groups comprise even a large share of German newspapers, as an examination of the publishing house figures shows. The interlocking system also makes it possible to invest, influence, and control outside firms and newspapers without an outsider being able to perceive the influence. The large central companies have thus made use not only of the means of direct influence, but have also established a broader influence through their impact on the provincial press by means of news agencies, advertising agencies, and matrix agencies.

The power of news agencies will be considered later. A second and at least as important a means of control, given today’s economic conditions, is the advertising agency.

The large press today depends not on receipts from newspaper sales, but on advertising to cover production and distribution costs. The amount of advertising is the barometer of a healthy economy. It is also the area in which the press can be cut to the quick. As a result, the large newspaper groups have also been concentrations of advertising for many years.

These advertising agencies are: Rudolf Mosse, Invalidenbank, Ala, Hassenstein and Vogler, and the National Socialist advertising agency in the Eher Publishing House.

The purpose of these advertising agencies is to handle the traffic between newspaper and advertiser, to advise which organs should be chosen (through which an effective political and economic influence can be had), or to select them themselves. The advertising staff also decides the most effective methods of formulation and presentation, usually at no cost to the customer. They ae paid significant rebates by the newspapers, since they are, so to speak, big customers. Such rebates could never be given to individual advertisers. As a result, the advertising agencies have the press by the neck. This leads to the further strengthening of the influence of unified agencies within the frameworks of the remaining holding companies.

The smaller papers are especially in need of assistance if they are to remain in competition with large modern newspapers. Such assistance both enables them to remain viable and limits their independence. A newspaper with a higher circulation can maintain its own reporting and editorial staffs alongside its news agency. This permits it to edit the material provided by the news agency, which often disagrees with the paper’s own viewpoint, and to add light reading and supplementary material from a local or political point of view. But this is impossible for the smaller papers. They cannot afford it. To maintain their competitiveness with the large papers, they would have to decide whether to purchase prepared supplementary materials (which are costly in terms of paper and time), or to receive news and supplementary materials already set in type, were not materials available from these large concerns.

The oldest matrix services are about twenty-five years old today. Each large press concentration also has a matrix service. The matrix, imprinted on cardboard, is light, cheap, and easily transported even by airplane because of its minimal weight. The matrix spares the newspaper the preparation of news, supplements, etc. The small paper is thus spared the necessity of typesetter, make-up editor, editor, and reporter, and is still able to provide its readers with new and varied material from all areas of the arts and sciences as often as it pleases.

Further Development

The centralization of the news agency, which is essential to the leadership of the press, will be discussed in the next chapter. A survey of the present structure of the German press suggests the following means of unified leadership.

It is intellectually, artistically, and legally necessary that the professional press association assume direct influence, and above all that the associations of German journalists and publishers do so. One may adopt the Italian way or the initiative may come from the federations. This is not a time for theoretical discussions. In any case, German journalism has the task of seeing to it that its professional honor and ideology are inseparably bound to the national honor and ideology so that in the future interference with or sabotage of national power politics by the press will be entirely impossible. If our intellectual elite will work in service of our national tasks with passion and devotion, no censorship or legal restrictions on freedom of the press will be necessary. It is enough if the members of these professional associations have the legal authority to throw out parasites and put an end to their work. The reputation and honor of German journalists who work for the nation must be so high with the public that he who dares attack or maliciously scorn them must run against an impenetrable wall. It is possible and desirable for criticism to exist within the framework of the professional association itself, and for lively conflicts of interests to exist between the differing groups.

Above all, the German publishing trade has to remain free from control by foreign capital groups (Ignatz Petscheck in Leipzig), and must eliminate the parasites, price-cutters, and hyenas in its ranks who systematically subordinate the large publishing houses to the interests of foreign groups. If necessary, the state should use legal action.” The press should be free from governmental capital and control in every other respect. It should enjoy not “independence” and “freedom of the press,” but rather the freedom of business and publishing policy, and a secure relationship with the readership and public opinion. These professional associations, which already cooperate in many areas with the Reich Labor Union, would be given certain legal authority in a press corporation.

The question of a centralization of advertising, which is necessary to the existence of the newspaper, and of a centralization of the typography and picture services would be handled within the framework of the Corporation. The basic roots of the strengths of both large and small newspapers are here. It would not be advisable to have a direct influence of the corporation on the central advertising, matrix, and picture agencies with indirect participation by the state, nor to have a direct governmental influence. It must be a supervisor, not a dictator, and set limits and legal boundaries against influence from unwelcome directions, especially from foreign groups.

Bureaucracy will be inhibited by the influence of the corporation and the newspaper publishers, as well as by sufficient room for free competition for advertising. If presently existing or newly formed press concentrations attempt to control the state, the state should have the obligation of eliminating such ideologically intolerable and government threatening concentrations. This would best be done, aside from direct prohibition, by eliminating the advertising base that finances them or by completely abolishing their ties with the central news agency.

Direct censorship and prohibition should be unnecessary. The unified leadership of the press is guaranteed by its own professional organizations, so that friction between local authorities and local press organizations are as good as eliminated. The newspaper publisher, for his part, controls those areas of the newspaper business that are important to him, and is entirely protected against economic attacks and sensationalistic demagogic maneuvers by shady competitors. The practicing journalist himself, in close cooperation with the wishes of the government and his publisher’s attitudes, creates the manner in which he will do his daily work. He develops a line that is in its essentials accepted by everyone. He bears the guiding idea of the German press and is respected by the nation. He is protected by the government, and with his fellow workers and artists advances national security and defense.

Chapter 6

The National News Monopoly

There are few facts that can tell their own story,

without explanation to bring out their meaning.

— Mill —

The Telegraph Agencies

As the press became more active and its circulation grew at the beginning of the Napoleonic era, the first attempts to supply newspapers with news from a central source were made. Finally, Reuter opened a news agency in Frankfurt (M) in the first half of the past century. At the same time he made an offer to the Prussian government to establish a central news agency on an official or semi-official basis. The offer was rejected. Since he had no luck in Germany, he soon moved to England where in 1849 he founded the parent firm of Reuters, whose boundless distorted material about Germany during the war is still well remembered by us. After the war, the close pre-war associations again developed between the semi-official German Wolff Telegraph Agency, the Italian Stephani Agency, and Reuters. Materials were freely exchanged.

For many years, no other news agency could succeed in Germany because of the dominance of the Wolff Agency, which even before the war was superior to everyone else in its international connections. The Wolff Telegraph Agency knows just as well today as it ever did how to establish close relations with the Wilhelmstrasse [the Berlin street housing many government offices] wherever possible. Previously it did this under the imperial government, now under the republican. The semi-official status of the W.T.B. goes back to 1871 when it helped the government by transmitting official reports.

As early as 1913, Schwerin had made an attempt to compete with the Wolff Agency by combining many smaller agencies. He founded the Telegraph Union. It was not able to achieve extensive influence for many years because of the limited capital at its disposal. After the war, the W.T.B. was forced (by the cartel agreement that had existed since about 1870) to carry a thousand words of Havas news a day. A Reichstag committee which investigated this intensely anti-German propaganda in our own nation came to a very secret conclusion after an investigation that lasted for weeks.

In any event, the final push was given to the financing of the Telegraph Union, which under Hugenberg’s leadership was combined with Otto Wolff’s concern in 1921. By 1924, it had achieved such a strong position alongside the Wolff Agency that it also secured a radio license permitting it the right of transmitting its news by the radio to its newspapers.

Breaking up the Wolff news monopoly still did not eliminate the danger to the national news service resulting from the relations between the semi-official W.T.B. and foreign agencies.

The Wolff Telegraph Agency is still the largest German news agency, employing over 800 people. Its stock is owned by the Berlin banking houses of Bleichroder, Delbruck, and Schickler. The W.T.B. has had cartel agreements with Reuters, Havas, Agencia Stephani, and other large foreign agencies for over sixty years. It receives the greater part of its foreign news from them and is also dependent on the help of foreign news agencies in its capacity as official news agency to the government. The foreign agencies follow a quite deliberate nationalistic policy. It is common knowledge, for example, that Reuter systematically gave the public one-sided news about Germany before and during the war.

Besides its forty-five branch offices in German cities and its correspondents in all major European cities, Wolff also has a large number of investments and subsidiaries. The most important of these is the Wolff Trade Agency, which is today part of the Deutscher Kursfunk Company. It prepares foreign and domestic economic reports, as well as stock exchange reports, for those interested in the German economy, and transmits them by the Wireless Radio Service, the “Economic Radio” [Wirtschaftsfunk].

Hugenberg’s Telegraph Union employs about 700 reporters, etc. The fact that there are almost a hundred editors working for the Telegraph Union shows that the news is not simply collected, with the news agency making a simple choice, but rather that news is deliberately “edited.” Next to the W.T.B., the T.U. is the largest news agency in the German-speaking world. It also controls a press radio service and prepares political, general, and economic news. It controls about thirty branch offices in Germany, has foreign correspondents in important places, and has likewise built an extensive organization of subsidiaries, such as the Parliamentary Agency and the extensive agricultural service, etc. The “Express Service for Politics, Culture, and Economics” is affiliated with the T. U., which also publishes the official bulletins of the German National People’s Party. Furthermore, the Wipro, the Economic Office for the Provincial Press, which supplies provincial and county papers with material and matrix services, belongs within the framework of the Hugenberg press organization.

About 1,600 German newspapers receive news from the Telegraph Union, according to a statement from the Hugenberg circle (Ludwig Bernhard). It is notable that many also receive material from the W.T.B. The nonpartisan press carries a colorful mosaic of Wolff and Hugenberg news.

Dr. R. Dammert’s press firm provides material to over 700 German papers, and is apparently closely connected with liberal circles. It puts out People’s Party material, especially illustrated magazine supplements set in type, news and articles of a political, entertaining, economic, or special content, novels, etc. The firm also has a special service for about 400 foreign German-language newspapers.

Further news agencies which are worth mentioning are: the Democratic News Agency, which is closely related to the German State Party and which appears daily; the news agency belonging to the Union of German Newspaper Publishers, which has become a subsidiary of the Wolff Agency; the National, Liberal Agency of the German People’s Party; the Social Democratic News Agency which is under the control of the Social Democratic Party, and which will soon have its license granting it permission to use the internal German radio service revoked; and finally, the Ullstein Agency.

In the United States of America and Great Britain, newspapers have cooperated in financing and operating the news agencies. The Associated Press of America in New York, for example, is a cooperative news agency on the part of about 1,300 American newspapers. It provides about 145,000 words a day by wire, with an additional 367,000 printed words. The London Press Association is a cooperative association of English papers that controls its own telegraph system. It controls the majority of the directors of Reuter, Ltd., which controls the international news service in the interests of English power politics by means of its worldwide organization and its agreements with the most important agencies in Paris, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Tokyo, and New York.

The cooperative press organizations are nonprofit and give no dividends; rather, they provide news to their customers at no cost.

The outline of the news agencies in other countries also shows extensive fragmentation. No one has thus far succeeded in achieving an absolute monopoly over the press by means of purely capitalistic policies. The struggle between industrial, agricultural, and financial groups has always resulted in the establishment of different news agencies and competition between them.

German News Agencies during the World War

We learned during the war how private news agencies can work against the interests of the government. We have had to watch while the Foreign Ministry established an ineffective news agency using diplomats and military attaches. These military attaches and officials were forbidden to act as a secret news service. While the diplomats and military attaches of foreign nations working in Germany acted as a news service for their governments, even at times endangering their careers, our foreign representatives had to ensure a total lack of understanding and bureaucratic restrictions, even official prohibitions from superior agencies.

As a result, both the navy and the army established their own news services alongside that of the Foreign Ministry. A reliable news service that could have informed the government of internal developments and given continuous information on foreign affairs never developed. That which the War Press Office had established was slowly and systematically destroyed by the growing struggles between the Union of the Berlin Press, the Federation of the German Press, the publishing associations, and the party struggles that were behind those associations. The government’s legal authority to establish a monopoly at least in regards to war news was neither preserved nor maintained with sufficient forcefulness. The psychological treatment of the press by the General Staff left something to be desired, but the government entirely bungled things.

For technical reasons, the War Press Office had to give the Wolff News Agency priority in reporting. The official reports were, because of bureaucratic channels, carried exclusively by this agency. The reports themselves were of insufficient detail, appearing once daily, although later an evening supplement was added. The enemy reports, on the other hand, were voluminous, psychologically designed, and appeared two or three times daily. The enemy even used our army report as material.

The enemy was of the opinion that it was necessary to give a picture of the entire front and of the entire military situation. Since we had a front some 2,400 kilometers long to report on, whereas the English front was at times only 135 kilometers, the condensed German method naturally had to result in total coldness and sobriety, and a so-called “impartial” method of presentation. It was wholly without color or character, and was fundamentally unmilitaristic. While the enemy’s army reports went into the details of battles for individual farms, woods, and hills, and described the exploits of individual units, officers, and soldiers in great detail, German reports had no room for such things. As a result, the German reader really got only a picture of the general military situation, but he never felt like a bystander, he was never in the actual situation. The enemy report was thus superior to ours as propaganda in that it encouraged and whipped up the enemy’s desire to fight, while our report, with its stylized format (as for example the phrase that Remarque borrowed for the title of his well known book All Quiet on the Western Front) was simply boring. It killed any interest in the conduct of the war.

If the Germans had adopted enemy methods, rapid reporting, quick overviews of the general situation, and detailed descriptions would have been given. Certainly it was always possible on a front as lengthy and active as ours to provide the reader with many exciting and inspiring individual events. The purpose of the army report is not to provide material for beer hall strategists, but rather to harden the will of the homeland. That cannot be done with impartiality, only with passion. From the beginning, however, that was not the goal. In his very first speech, Moltke demanded not enthusiasm and passion from the public, but rather the spirit of devotion and unity. In the first stormy days of August 1914, the appeal was not addressed to strength, will, and activity, but to endurance, patience, and passivity!

The worst psychological mistake committed by our news service and war reports was that the German press was allowed to use and publish the enemy military reports. The reader, of course, could not differentiate and distinguish between the control on one side and the lack of instinct on the other. Instead, the lack of action and passion in our material, as well as its boring nature, by contrast suggested the fiery and enthusiastic interest and fervent passion of the enemy soldier.

The notion that publishing enemy army reports would lead to “complete frankness” had already been disproved in this discussion. If there is no objective news agency, there is no so-called complete “frankness.” No news agency can say everything. That which it does say, however, must be significant and important for the will and life of the nation.

It is common knowledge by now that both economic and military warfare was waged against us, and that it was economic in conjunction with propaganda (psychological) warfare that finally defeated us. It is surprising that we had no news agency concerned with economic matters during the war, aside from the news agency created by the Imperial General Staff and the one that existed in the Foreign Ministry. It is also surprising that we still do not have a governmental agency that would provide necessary services both for our foreign and overall trade relations as well as for political developments. A really effective economic news agency was established during the war by England, our most energetic opponent, and repaid England well both during and after the war. The news gathered by the English Economic News Agency was used first in English propaganda activities. The material was prepared in cooperation with the navy, the army, and the commerce news office, so that England could tighten its blockade around Germany and deny us all necessary economic supplies. The English Economic News Agency so totally destroyed our foreign trade that we had to build it up again from nothing in 1919-1920.

The Monopoly

Ludwig Bernhard defines the difference between the commercial and industrial capital that are behind the W.T.B. and T.U. respectively as the difference between fluid and fixed capital. The opposition of these two is unthinkable as a permanent condition in Germany, for the geopolitics of the German Lebensraum do not permit a fluctuation resulting from the varying strengths of these forces. In England, where the opposition is expressed between the Liberal and Conservative parties, centuries of geopolitical conditions permit interest groups to exist along side each other and struggle for power.

Our hemmed in fatherland, which Karl Peters compared to a noble tree successfully growing in a dark and rocky canyon, is incompatible with the English system because of our situation. We are not geopolitically able to wage world war against everyone. We can exist in the future only if the cramping and binding ring of these groups is replaced by the victory of a new idea and the establishment of the lasting predominance of a principle.

The English two-party system, which our two public news agencies present as perfect, is a straightjacket that will not simply work here.

Germany can be governed only by a national state idea and it must completely eliminate internal opposition. This requires a German news agency.

It must be characterized by flexibility, initiative, national activity, and a complete monopolistic centralization. The Wolff Agency is a model, but it also shows us that a German news agency may not, in an effort to maintain its competitiveness, endanger the nation by making agreements with international agencies. To ensure that the agency concerned with foreign politics does not suffer a lack of means, large scale governmental subsidies might be necessary. The whole system should not be dominated by bureaucracy, but it should also be organized and led independently of private economic principles. That it can remain flexible and effective despite its close connections with the government and bureaucracy is shown by the examples of all great official news agencies. Bureaucracy is only a threat when one fails to exercise leadership.

Although the news requirements of the press are of a different character than those of the radio, one must still consistently work out a plan for centralization of the news system.

This means the establishment of a common news monopoly for radio, the press, and picture news, and the creation of departments in which news will be prepared for the radio or tailored to suit the press. The news agency is therefore a distinctive organization standing behind these two methods of public opinion.

The capital for the news agency would accordingly come from the radio as well as the press. Today, the press almost entirely finances the news agencies. If one sets about a reorganization of the radio, it will be possible to free a substantial amount of capital (about thirty million marks) from the radio and Postal Ministry to be used for the news agency and other tasks of national propaganda and educational work. According to the present financial head of the radio, it would be possible to free 30% of the current radio budget by a determined reorganization. The capital with which our large central news agencies work today is difficult to establish because of careful secrecy and interlocking, and also because of their extensive marketing networks.

The secret news agency of the Imperial General Staff, however, had less than half a million marks annually at its disposal, a quite insufficient amount. Extensive and ample means are naturally necessary if an up-to-the minute radio and press are to furnish a hundred million people with new information every hour. The establishment of a governmental news agency is probably the most difficult problem in the entire reorganization of public opinion.

The national news agency would have the following tasks:

1. The acquisition of news, pictures, and films from here and abroad, organized into various internal and external departments, with the following subdivisions:

a. an economic news agency;

b. a political, cultural, and general news agency;

c. a secret economic, political, and military new agency that would be an entirely independent department.

2. News editing and distribution for the domestic organs, with departments for:

a. dissemination of news to the press;

b. dissemination of pictures to the press;

c. dissemination of films;

d. dissemination of news to the radio.

3. The dissemination of news to foreign customers (organized as 2.)

4. Security service and radio protection.

The tasks of the security service would be directed towards every form of enemy news service. It would correspond roughly to the secret field police that existed during the war under the internal military command. The security service’s work would be supported by a special security police that would cover the entire nation. It would be a national governmental body unrestricted by the authority of the states — by their police laws, for example. The security police would be a part of the radio protection department, consisting of a group of men trained in radio and in locating interference. Such an agency is just as important now as it was during the war. Then, it was necessary to defend against the attacks of enemy news agencies, today against demoralizing Bolshevist propaganda that undermines our entire public life, against the pacifistic incitement financed primarily from France, and against Moscow, which beams radio propaganda at us with the strongest transmitter in Europe.

The intellectual diversity and lack of discipline of our public life has led to a degree of demoralization that is frightening. The solution will not be found by doctoring with a single instrument of public opinion, nor is the answer press censorship, emergency decrees, or the imprisoning or fining of the opposition. Only a resolute, systematic, and complete centralization of the news agencies, carried out by all means of power, will guarantee the instruction and leadership of public opinion in ways recognized as necessary by the government.

Chapter 7

Cultural Institutions

The less a culture has its own

substance, rootedness, and reality,

the more pathetic a cultural

phrase sounds..... Culture is no

longer any more independent than

is the economy or government.

— Krieck —

Intellect and Faith

(The Dualism of Public Faith)

Political propaganda preaches faith; it exists for no other reason. Our people longs for the inner meaning of political life. It wants a political creed, and is prepared to adopt one eagerly. German intellectuals are a part of our people, the leaders of the German mind. But they are still discussing arguments and counter-arguments, pros and cons, without ever reaching a conclusion. The German intellectual may no longer stand aside. He must place himself in the service of nationalization and at the head of our people; he must first and foremost serve the faith. The nation can exist only when there is a unity of intellect and faith. If intellect battles faith, it will not defeat the faith but will itself be defeated.

The intellect, if it is to serve life, must be a critic of the faith and the strength behind its compelling formulation and effect. Education and training give faith its direction by creatively developing its form and content. Each generation has its own demands and seeks its own living forms; the intellect thus always has the task of justifying the faith and affirming life.

Just as it is impossible to destroy the deep longing for faith that men have, so an awakened drive for truth or the search of the intellect for truth cannot be stopped. As soon as faith has established a view like a rocher de bronze, the intellect begins undermining it by raising that which can lead to destruction, but also to new creative accomplishments. Even in the masses to whom we want to direct our propaganda, the intellectual side and the longing for faith are always present. The man from the masses is a fanatic seeker after truth. He struggles incessantly with traditional as well as with new revolutionary ideas.

Intellectuals are too scornful of the knowledge and desires of the masses, which have been aroused for the first time in decades. Take, for example, Oswald Spengler’s grotesque conception of the Marxist masses, which he thinks look vacantly from behind a book they have never read, and which their leaders have never in the least understood. The truth is something else! There are fanatical seekers after truth who do things for their own sake, who must ponder all reasons and conclusions both in heaven and on earth. And such men are not alone. An army of millions stand shoulder to shoulder with each other.

There are millions in Germany who will think this description optimistic, exaggerated, and idealistic. Well, it is not. Among the men and women of the masses, there are many who live on seven marks a week and who spend a further seven on books and knowledge. At 28, they may have a philosophic countenance and grayed hair that is a result not of hunger or privation, but of sorrow and deep pain for their people and the fate of the world [Hadamovsky himself was 28 at the time the book was written].

If one knows how to listen to the answers of the man behind the lathe or the anvil, of those of the nearest street sweeper, he will find a wonderful doubting, searching, knowledge-seeking spirit in the simple working man.

From whence does this eternal desire come? Where does this ever-renewed doubt that always troubles the soul about life arise? We do not know, but we must reckon with its existence. We may “explain” it by the principle of progress or think it necessary to the organization of life, but it is in any case inherent and it demands satisfaction. Both intellectual and spiritual hunger lead to revolt and resistance. The drive for knowledge can be satisfied to some extent by cold intellectual analysis, but better by a passionate synthesis of belief. The intellect destroys, faith builds up. The dualism of public opinion is outlined in these tendencies. It would like to seek after knowledge while at the same time holding to a dogmatic faith. The dualism is thereby intensified to an almost tragic extent. The satisfaction of the desire for knowledge is never entirely achieved by the doubts of the intellect, that is, by analysis. Faith is always being shaken; it needs constant strengthening and restoration. This is best done by intellectually supporting the faith (which is, for example, the purpose of this book). Alongside the tasks of creative propaganda, then, from a political viewpoint, is the systematic intellectual development of the arts and sciences, the schools and universities, acts not in opposition to, but as further important support for, national education.

Churches, Schools, and Universities

When we consider the question of a constructive, creative, and critical intellectualism and the problem of faith, it is necessary to consider that most powerful belief factor, the church. The church is the organized strength of religious faith, and as such does not reject or replace political faith, but rather deepens it. When schools churches, and national propaganda build a unity, the greatest possible strength of internal forces and will results. Since they are based in faith, knowledge, and intellect, they can only provide further support and foundation for faith, resulting in a total unity of all spiritual forces in the nation. They can thus reach the same unity of faith and intellect characteristic of Gothic culture, which will remain a social ideal in the future as well.

Scarcely fifteen years have passed since German heroism rested from its high and triumphant, if tragic, moment. Between lies a period of deepest humiliation. We know today that it has been necessary to sweep out every trace of naiveté from the offices, agencies, villages, cities, and high government positions, and to replace it with the manly spirit of clear knowledge and a determined affirmation of life. The nation has loudly and clearly affirmed its support of everything that is politically necessary and desirable, and has thus provided German proof of the effectiveness of our new and unified national will. Whoever thinks that all our problems are solved, however, should remember first the relations between worldviews and vote totals, and second the great use that can be made of the government’s apparatus for building the will. They show that the problem is not solved, but is rather only on the way to the solution. It is still engaged in the struggle against all other forces. Thus, we loudly and clearly demand the deepening, shaping, and expanding of national schooling for the will.

It cannot be limited to the means which one commonly thinks of as means of public opinion, but must rather be deeper, earlier, and more extensive.

It must be deeper in the direct spiritual, religious, and ecclesiastical senses. It should be begun earlier so as to reach even the youngest children.

It should be more extensive, beyond the school system, whether in adult education programs, national educational institutions, technical schools, or universities. He who affirms the nation can see it only as a totality. Political passion built on political faith can exist only when it is based on the spirit and intellect. That is why, during his first groping steps towards power, Hitler demanded the ministries of religious affairs (Kultusministerien) for his movement, to the amazement of the Marxists and the so-called economic politicians. And that is why he also stressed and encouraged a positive National Socialist attitude towards Christianity. The conquest of the liberals, who are dangerous to the nation as to the church, requires that both follow a similar course. When the Duce in Italy abolished unlicensed schools and dissolved the strongly liberal Free Masonic associations, he did it just as much for the benefit of the national idea as for the religious bodies, and his action proved to be as helpful to the Fascist state as it was to the Catholic Church.

He who speaks of the relations between church and state or of religion and the nation in Germany runs the risk of being used as a witness by both sides of our religiously divided people. This is not a discussion of religious problems or ecclesiastical politics, but rather of the unity of all devout German men and women regardless of whether they are Protestant or Catholic.

The forty million German Protestants outnumber the twenty million German Catholics, of whom four and a half million are members of center and Bavarian People’s parties. The numerical inferiority of the Catholics should not, and under a responsible government will not, lead to any type of discrimination. The large German religious groups must have equal rights, and must enjoy the same support from the state. Whether this will occur in the form of concordants or through national and regional churches is a question of historical development. It is, however, certain that neither of these large churches stands outside the national interests, and it is just as certain that the overwhelming majority of their members affirm national interests. This goes to show the vital interest the government has in its leading religious bodies.

The fact that one can maintain a unified national outlook despite church divisions is shown by the English church as well as by the countless American churches. In the last analysis, it is simply a question of national patriotism by the masses.

Formal separation of church and state has existed for three hundred years in the United States. Close union and cooperation between these institutions has resulted despite the prohibition of cooperation and mutual support. American political life has been spared confessional struggles in the government since the political parties and the large national unions and associations do not ask ecclesiastical questions. As a result, the churches fight only among themselves, not through governmental or party means. The American churches are generally nationalistic. The Roman Catholic Church in the United States has adapted to patriotic nationalism and has prospered. Its relations with Rome could never force it to adopt any kind of anti-national attitude.

In Germany, things are quite different. As the difficulties of the war increased, the Center Party and its press joined the camp of those working against the war, such as the Berliner Tageblatt and the Frankfurter Zeitung, which advocated pacifism. The Center Party organs that support the war leadership were in contact with the military press service. As soon as the Armistice was signed, however, the entire center press switched directions. Since then, the Center Party and its press have always been on the side of the nation’s enemies.

One may expect that the results of the nationalization of the German public will rule out the possibility of any sort of political misuse of ecclesiastical ideas and organization in the future. Differences in belief will no longer be able to endanger national unity, for our large national churches will limit themselves to their purely religious tasks, and work hand in hand with the national leadership. The religious dogmas will thus serve as the basis for cooperation between church and state. Hitler sees in them “quite often the only basis for an ethical worldview” in the broad masses of a nation who do not have a philosophy, but need dogmatic principles. Professor Stark understands Hitler’s principle in the following way: “There is no separation of church and state. The state provides the church with protection and means for activity in the religious area. The schools and teachers are controlled by the state in such a way that religious instruction and the education of priests are exclusively controlled by the church.”

A corresponding purge of the church’s political tendencies occurred in Italy when the Holy See prohibited “priests and church officials from joining or working for political parties.” That is the way cooperation between church and state was established by the Vatican agreements.

The schools and universities are, as the churches, guardians of a spirit which should fervently affirm the nation.

The nation’s claim to the personality, will, strength, idealism, and sacrifice of each individual should be able to find its ethical justification in an educational ideal. Previously, however, no one gave the ideal political expression and educational form. After the war, the destructive forces that had wanted to see Germany lose blamed the German school teacher for the defeat. This vile slander cannot harm those who as teachers and instructors gave the best years of their lives to the young. They had to preach and prop up a system that was not in contact with reality. What they gave, and what they themselves thought the noblest and best part of their tasks, was not what they had been given as material, but rather that which they themselves brought with them as personalities, as men of the German race. Their personal wealth, which they freely gave, raised the youth of Langemarck [a World War I battle fought by young German volunteers] and millions more who were true to their duty both at the front and at home. The German teacher, the German professor, or the German and scientist did not fail. German politics gave them nothing before Bismarck’s time, and nothing after. The nation was proclaimed, but it was created outwardly, not inwardly.

Lacking a new guiding ideal, the intellects of our schools and universities had to pay homage to liberal and individualistic principles.

The principles of nationalization that Johann Gottlieb Fichte preached 125 years ago were almost entirely ignored by German pedagogy. Education was not changed to meet modern conditions, as would for example have been necessary under Fichte’s idea of education for discipline in small groups, and national will was not carried out consistently either. As national unity was born from the turmoil of the preceeding century and the German nation again came to have a political history, German schools still held to humanistic ideals. They chased after the dream of the encyclopediasts, believed themselves capable of establishing a well-rounded educational system and of making a difficult compromise between humanistic education and the technical sciences. Although the theoretical achievements of science have a philosophic character, they extend only to the technological mastery of life. The new form of the educational ideal cannot come from there. If it does, one is misusing the sciences. The new form must rather come from the national idea and from passion, not from a view of life that we create as a theoretical structure for the technological mastery of the world.

The material which our educational institutions have to teach, aside from intellectual and technical training, will essentially be determined in the future by the general goals of national propaganda.

In these observations, the creation of a political type has been shown to be a governmental and racial necessity. It cannot therefore be doubted that the first and most important task must be the building of a type with all means of public opinion in the schools, technical schools, and universities. The life of the pupil must from the first be organically bound to the community. The view of life which national propaganda has to make typical and universal will begin here, in the earliest grades and for the youngest pupils, with current events, with political happenings. If one wants artificially to keep politics, which is the life of the nation, out of the schools, he will on the one hand think the schools to be in opposition to youth organizations, and on the other hand, he will artificially limit the most lively educational forces in the young and also give the schools an outdated character that must inevitably hobble along in the wake of life. The connection between schools and youth organizations as well as the enthusiastic support of activities carried out by the youth itself leads not only to a powerful stimulus for the youth movement, but also to the securest foundation for the education of a youth that knows life and is politically schooled.

Thus all the subjects taught in schools must be included in the framework of an educational-political — that is, national-political — total program. The public schools do not have the task of producing experts, but rather of training citizens. Politics must dominate the schools if students are to participate actively in great historical events and celebrations, if they are to receive an appreciation of the real accomplishments of German civilization, and if the purely individualistic scribblings that the liberals designate as world literature (but which have no significance for the nation and race) are to be eliminated. As Ernst Krieck persuasively shows, the methods of such educational form can never be guided by a general outline. They depend rather on the teacher’s personal mastery of the form. “The only thing that is essential is the same overall direction as to the national political aims within the framework of an authoritative values.” To ensure that mastery of the form will actually be achieved — at least, a good workmanly ability on the part of the average teacher — the teacher must have close relations with the state political propaganda apparatus and with active political forces. This would be best done through self-created organizations. Radio, press, film, and theatre, as well as mass meetings, military celebrations, and national celebrations, should be a constant element in the educational system. Our leaders must regularly cooperate with these means of public opinion, whether intellectually, creatively, critically, or organizationally.

Theatre and Film

We may, without limiting the concept of the artistic, call the theatre and film effective instruments of nationalization and ignore the colorless conception of a “moral institution” that is supposedly governed by principles of aesthetics and content. One can always argue about the concepts and principles of morality as long as morality conceals itself behind the façade of empty philosophy. The problem takes on a clearer dimension if we call everything that serves the nation good and everything that harms it bad. The liberal who is concerned with the theatre objects to every political “tendency,” and pleads for pure theatre. He generally knows nothing of the rather obvious facts of form and control behind the curtain and is so lost in his liberal doctrines that he believes it is possible to evaluate the value of a work of art apart from its context. That is impossible. Value can only be gauged in terms of the surrounding world. Since we have defined the nation as the highest value in the surrounding world, the requirements of the nation are the standards of judgment in theatre and film.

Every play stems from political (polis) and cultic requirements, whether it be a Greek tragedy or entertainment for the masses (comedy). The cultic need of the masses finds no stronger expression today than in the large cultic mass meetings of revolutionary nationalism that dominate the political picture of our day.

In recent times, and especially during the political struggles of the past decade, the theatre has developed in two diverging directions that may lead to a return to health if properly understood and intelligently used in productive tasks.

If one compares an effective artistic film with one of our great stage dramas, leaving aside the technical, cinematic, and photographic elements and considering only the internal structures and ideological aims, he will conclude that live drama is directed to the select taste and intellectual level of the individual, while film drama presupposes and gears itself to a certain mass type. A Macbeth, a Hamlet, or a Faust is conceivable only in drama. If it is filmed, fundamental changes have to be made in the material. We have seen this with Shakespeare and Goethe.

This by no means implies that the film is colorless, projecting only an imitation of life on the screen. The two dimensional character of film, which works only with light and shadow, does indeed necessitate a graphic form on the screen, and also a different treatment than is found on stage, on which movement and form are possible in three dimensions. The essential difference between stage and film is not, however, a matter of purely technical characteristics.

Above all, the film has become a means of mass entertainment, despite initial criticism from the intellectual and artistic elite. Intelligent photographers and directors gave it a character that had to lead to a mass medium. The film has therefore achieved definite contact with the masses, with one limitation: the problem of conscious mass enlightenment has yet to be solved.

It is interesting that, in the past two decades, a new type of play has developed that is similar to the film and different from an intellectually based theatre. The latter is concerned with the pathos of the individual and is intended for the tastes of a limited audience.

A completely primitive form of theatre, suited to mass tastes, developed alongside the classical drama. This first happened in camps behind the front and in the prisoner and internment camps of the World War. They resembled, at least in German areas, the old burlesques and popular amusements that had been forgotten by our mature intellectual culture in the decades before the war. This primitive theatre, originally acted by amateurs, but today in a growing number of theatres as well, may already have reached a really broad audience with a corresponding effect.

To think of this development as transient and to therefore ignore it would be a mistake. The agitprop troupes of the Communist Party annually give thousands of shows to hundreds of thousands of spectators. The primitive theatre is similarly well developed in the Social Democratic Party. And there have been theatre groups like the Shock Troopers and the Brown Shirts in the National Socialist Party, who for many years have combined education in the meaning of their movement with enjoyment and entertainment.

When Dr. von Leers saw a gripping S.A. play presented by such a group, he commented that here was a new and primitive birth of art. This is doubtlessly correct, no matter how much an intellectual pride and professional arrogance want to ignore it. The ideals of the moral education system, which our modern playwrights have so entirely forgotten, come to clear and powerful expression here. It depends not on the leader or the individual personality, as does the great theatre of the classical era, but rather on a type of noble fighter from the masses, corresponding to the spirit of our times. What the film has previous lacked is completely realized in these simple plays. The reason may be their total lack of equipment and their primitiveness that scorns technology and that arouses the lively interest and enthusiastic applause of the masses. Hopefully, the German film industry will soon learn that one should not permit the rigor mortis of intellectual theatre to influence film scripts, that one does not have to make sacrifices to the individualistic idol, and that one should not bow before the so-called mass tastes, but should instead properly meet a deep mass need for a model. Then our films will hold their proper place in the nation and will exercise a truly effective national educational influence.

How can the government lead theatre and film? The strengths of each must first be explained. The film undoubtedly has a greater social and artistic effect today than the theatre. The competition between the two is limited to some degree because of their essential natures, so that film, no matter how technically advanced, will never be able to replace the theatre. Even if one would like to think it possible to stop the newly developed popular theatre, the intellectually based theatre would still be significant. Clearly, the film is an instrument of mass influence. The theatre has, over against the film, a view of existence that will keep its exclusive and esoteric character; this same view will enable primitive theatre to develop further.

The elite theatre today is dependent on subsidies and government grants. That suggests that complete control and systematic leadership may be attained without the necessity of censorship. A direct and immediate control is necessary over the popular theatre, which finds its audience in public organizations, federations, etc.

Things are different with the film. Its virtual monopolistic concentration requires, in view of its broad effect, control by the propaganda leadership. Germany had 5,000 commercial theaters in 1932, a number apparently unchanged since 1928, with a total of about two millions seats. Three quarters of the theaters are already equipped with sound apparatus. There are 30 seats per 1,000 German citizens. According to the Jahrbuch der Filmindustrie, the total number of customers of German movie theaters in the year 1931-1932 was three hundred million. On the average, then, every German adult goes to a movie once every six weeks. 145 German and 87 foreign feature films were shown in 1931. In the same period, our exports were as follows: 400,000 meters of film to England, 950,000 meters to North America (USA), and 1,500,000 to France.

The average film length is 2,000 meters, which gives an idea of variety and potential importance of these exports. Both entertainment and feature films are thus among the most important means of foreign propaganda.

This powerful means of propaganda must be controlled in three ways:

a) By direct influence on the associations and federations of film writers, filmmakers, and the film industry, as well as on the film press.

b) By appropriations for the production and distribution of films.

c) By organization of movie theater owners, who have a certain natural conflict of interest with the filmmakers and distributors, as well as a parallel organization of the movie goers.

This is where the film censor enters in. He undoubtedly belongs in the Propaganda Ministry. Censorship regulations in Germany are well known, especially in regards to the protection of the youth and the prohibition of so-called sex education films. In this regard, it is interesting that the Soviet Union has generally banned the Russian youth from the most tawdry and arousing American films. Italy forbids the showing of foreign language films and those that come from Russia. That our film censor is not always alert to attempts at political influence is shown well enough by a look at such films as Battleship Potemkin and Zyankali.

It must also be noted that the German film cannot simply be controlled in the interests of nationalization by censorship and prohibitions. As everywhere else in the life of the nation, the control of existing organizations and the formation of new ones is necessary. Since Tobis has a sound film monopoly while the Hugenberg group and the Deutsche Bank have a controlling interest in UFA, our largest film making company, and since the Munich Emekla concern will soon come under government control or merge with the other groups, the problem of German film production is difficult to solve from below by mass organizations. The simplest way therefore appears to be direct control of the above groups. Even though the Hugenberg group controls only three million of the 45 million marks worth of UFA stock, it has secured an almost total control of the German film industry because of its thirty-fold voting rights. A systematic national program would be possible here.

Art and the Artist

The closing words of this study of public opinion are dedicated to the creative personality of the artist, the carrier of our holiest ideals. There are no absolute standards based on art itself. The attempts of aesthetic philosophers have always led to differing and inconsistent conclusions. We thus want to return to the only valid standard, the standard of living results and lively effects, and apply it to art. The highest form of life, and therefore the highest standard, is the nation. What is said and written about humanity and universal humanity is but a phantom that is unable to arouse any living strength. After a century and a half of artistic liberty and licentiousness, we today demand wisdom of artists, and a determination which serves the national will. L’art pour l’art has lost its validity since the principle of freedom of the individual led to the starvation of millions. Freedom must give way to necessity and responsibility.

Art has therefore lost not its freedom, but rather its licentiousness. Great art has always been intellectually restricted, whether as in ancient sculpture, in Medieval church art, or in Gothic cathedrals. Individualistic art has always been mere display, but the creation of art is always the greatest accomplishment. When one examines the musical, poetic, sculptural, and architectural works of great artists for their rigor and purity of content and form, he will inevitably find that those who indulge in mere intellectual display are forgotten and useless within fifty years. Only the rigorous voice of life and the facts harmoniously expressed in a work of art make it possible to leave something for posterity, something that is elevating for us today.

The deep community with the people and the elevated formal tradition of the old German, Dutch, and Italian schools give an example of artistic fruitfulness and deep effect. The firm and faithful affirmation that the artist gives his people is above all responsible for his creative energies, which flood to him from all sides and enable him to move and inspire an entire nation.

Who strives to be great must unite the life of the people with art. It is not that which is in the artist himself and in his work that has a general effect, for that is entirely individual and accidental; but rather it is only that which is common and similar, which is in the soul of everyone.

Such an accomplishment raises the artist above the philosopher. He has the unspeakable joy of pouring out the creative riches of his soul and of awakening and giving life to the national soul. The calculating politician can only guide and lead it.

The heat and purity of his ideals kindles the deepest and noblest emotions of the people, enabling them to achieve superhuman accomplishments and to lead a heroic life. May the German artist recognize this as his task and as his highest freedom, and may he be worthy of it!

No passion and no idea is able to reach its final and fullest expression without a great symbol. A work of art is ultimately the strongest expression of fulfillment.

Every work of art shapes the realm of the soul. The laws of form can at times be dissected in proportion, in the unity of time, place, and action. The essential nature of art cannot be understood in this way, however. It les in the blood and race and is grounded in discipline and training. It is not born of the understanding.

All life, all politics, all searching, and all faith manifest themselves in the artistic, in the perfected and noble form, and all require a creative genius. It would be useless to search for standards and ways to intellectually understand or produce the artistic. One can, of course, avoid as much as possible the deceitful individualistic theories of liberalism, which wanted to give art absolute freedom of form and intent. Art has gained nothing by that, and indeed that freedom led to the lack of discipline and instinct that ruined art. The greatness of each genuine artist shows itself in the control and mastery of his goals and emotions. This control and mastery must lie in the rhythm of the epoch and culture if they are to work naturally with the artist. No one, not even the artist, lives independently, apart from the surrounding world and nation. Each is intimately bound to his culture and nation, and in each that which is common to all flourishes. The general worldview, of which some are aware of only in a confused way, finds the source of its creative form in the soul of the artist. If the native soil of a nation is a desert waste, the soul of the artist will also be unfruitful. Each great work of art comes from its time and from its nation. It cannot be decreed. If the nation and race are healthy, and if the national passion which affirms the faith and worldview are genuine and alive, then a great national art will also develop. The unfruitful apparatus of boards and government regulations can add but little. Of course, the selection the press makes of poets, or that the galleries and museums make of the works of sculptors and painters can encourage one direction and discourage another, making governmental control and leadership necessary at times. The creative itself, however, cannot spring from them. It can be born only of national passion and deep faith.

Oswald Spengler once said “Every deed changes the soul of the doer.” Art is a deed in that noble and deep sense.

The Spanish people, with its four hundred year tradition, has found its strongest symbol in the masterful works of Goya. Often, a well-intentioned patriotic kitsch poisons and corrupts weak and unimaginative art. Here, however, an inspired master gave the honor and passion of his people a lasting expression. Every day, visitors to the Prado in the Spanish capital stand before two powerful paintings, “The Execution of the Freedom Fighters by the French Guard on 3 May 1808” and “The Insurrection in Madrid.” Generations of Spaniards have received new love and faith in their people and country here, and have carried it back to every village and city of the Spanish world.

Gerhard Menzel gave Prussia something similar in his painting of Friedrich the Great and his “The Departure of King Wilhelm for the Army, 1870.” But this was not really great.

More than any one else, our happy, creative, and self-educated people, rich in personality and soul, have created such symbols of the highest artistic or religious nature. Look along the narrow streets at the gables in our Gothic cities. The framework of cathedrals rise powerfully above a sea of modest red-bricked buildings, the steep towers reach to infinity. Towns like Lüneburg or Stralsund, Worms or Cologne, Augsburg or Passau even from a distance give the picture of a living, richly organized, confident, and proud unity.

From the peaks of mountains in the fortunate land of Tyrolia, the mountain climber can look across miles of green meadows and dark spruces to the homes of mountain farmers, three or four next to each other. The Gothic steeple of a whitewashed church or chapel rises from among the almost flat, slate-shingled roofs. As these few farmers settled high in the mountains and built their own world, these chapels and churches were built alongside home and farms, but they were more magnificent, more proud. This tiny community that lived and worked to wrest its meager livelihood from the mountains through harsh daily labor gave more than the Medieval tithe to create this symbol of their immortality, their belief in God, the future, and their own existence on earth. The craftsmen, painters, and carvers decorated the interior for quiet meditation. Under the colorful tinsel and among the candles, the incense, and images of peaceful simplicity, one finds the masterful work of an inspired artist. Here, far from the intellectual world, he gave his best for a modest community of a few mountain farmers.

In the dark spruce forests of the Kaiser Mountain, just across the Bavarian-Austrian border, the wanderer hears a soft mountain melody. As everywhere in the German Alps, the air is filled with the blowing of the wind, the moving trees, the murmuring brooks and the roaring waterfalls. These sounds are scattered and mixed into a thousand sounds by every cliff, then echoed back. Suddenly, about the noon or evening hour, powerfully rising sounds enter this world of mountains, reaching to the very farthest pasture and peak with their joy, bringing nature around us to silence. It is the strong and somber voice of the Heroes’ Organ in the Kurfstein Valley, built with sacrificial gifts from everywhere in Austria, that makes the mountains and the German forests into a church, reminding everyone whether far or near of the hour of the dead. It is the largest outdoor organ in the world, a reminder of German and Austrian dead, and it is worthy of their superhuman and unforgettable sacrifice. When Beethoven’s symphonies are played by an accomplished organist, filling valley and mountain both north and south of the German border, this symbol of reverence and community becomes greater and more effective than the gravestones of unknown soldiers in other countries. May this voice of infinity ring throughout the Alps and all of Germany so that the nation will be eternally reminded of their heroic hours. May the day dawn when at the border separating brothers in the Reich from those on the other side of the bloody line, the bond of confidence, hope, and community will be renewed by hundreds of thousands gathered together by the sounds of the Heroes’ Organ in the Kurfstein Valley. We need this powerful symbol to overcome the smallness of human life and our trivial daily troubles. A strong world is never only hopes, struggles, abstract doubts and uncertain faith. It also creates a way of expressing its soul in every living, religious, and cultural way. The strongest expression of the longing and desire of a people is always a great work of art. Each perfected form renews inner strength. There is thus an eternal relationship between strength and expression, which the artist services, and which in turn enables him to rise.

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