RUSSIA AND OURSELVES

RUSSIA AND OURSELVES

RUSSIA AND OURSELVES

BY

VIDKUN QUISLING

HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LIMITED LONDON

First Printed . . . 1931

Made and Printed in Great Britain for Hodder and Stoughton Limited,
by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London

FOREWORD

THE pages of this book reflect the conditions which prevailed in Russia in the middle of 1931. These conditions are constantly changing. The facts have, however, been presented in a form which, the author hopes, will furnish not only a picture of the times, but other material of more permanent value to those who would understand the great Russian problem by which the world is confronted to-day.

VIDKUN QUISLING.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

AN unspeakably dangerous enemy is threatening our civilization, and primarily the British Empire. This enemy is Bolshevism, the master of Russia and the champion of the World Revolution.

The Bolshevist movement demands the closest attention; it may very well prove a decisive factor in the fate of the world. For Russia is a very great country, with unique potentialities of becoming a world power: an enormous area, almost three times that of the United States of America, with inexhaustible reserves of man power, immense natural wealth, and a central geo-political position between the East and the West. The insane revolutionary programme which the Russian Bolshevists have adopted, and of which they are the most fanatical, most purposeful, and most ruthless champions, affects vital controversial issues in

every country in the present world-wide crisis of civilization. Already the different views taken of the results which have been achieved in Russia are becoming momentous questions in the political life of the Western nations, and are to a large extent determining the political attitude of many of our fellow countrymen.

Above all others the Russian question is an issue between Bolshevism and the Teutonic nations, especially Great Britain, the natural upholder of all that is in opposition to and threatened by Bolshevism.

In these circumstances it is very important that an impartial and fairly detailed account of this great and novel factor in world affairs should be at the disposal of all thinking people in the English-speaking world.

My aim in writing this book is, however, not primarily to add another picture of life in Russia to the many books already in the market. I propose to elucidate the principles and methods of the Bolshevist policy—its aims, and its results; to expose Bolshevism as the deadly foe alike of our material interests and of our ideals; and

to set forth the principles and objects of the counter-policy we must adopt, in the interests of the world, to ensure the vigorous survival of the Northern nations, keeping them intact and true to their traditions and lofty aspirations.

We must look at things with Bolshevist eyes if we are to understand the work of Bolshevism in the world. May not, then, the antagonistic stand-point of this book towards Bolshevism prejudice its statement of the Russian problem?

There is doubtless some truth in this objection. It is as a vindicator of our own cause—not as neutral spectator in the crowd—that I make my contribution. For we must see Bolshevism as what it unquestionably is, an intransigent enemy, bent on the destruction of our civilization, and of nearly all that to our mind makes life worth living. There is no choice left in the matter. If this lack of toleration is called partiality and prejudice, I am willing to accept the reproach. But one may disavow and yet understand. At any rate I have lived under Bolshevism almost without a break since the beginning of the Revolution, and I shall

certainly not present the facts in a manner calculated to mislead the reader.

In order to comprehend the remarkable things which are going on in Russia, it is fundamentally important to realize that Russian Bolshevism is a product of two highly different influences.

First, there is international Communism, which has suddenly taken possession of Russia, and utilizes this great country both as a "laboratory" for its social experiments and as a base for further extension all over the world.

Second, we have tendencies of a characteristically Russian kind: the reaction against the old régime, and the inheritance of the past.

Everywhere these two influences are traceable—the international and the national side by side. Often they are interwoven to such an extent that they cannot be disentangled. How much of the Bolshevist policy in the Middle East is World Revolution, and how much a continuance of Tsarist Russia's march towards India? Or again, in Russian relations with the Baltic States and Poland, how much is due to zeal for the

World Revolution, and how much to the same considerations which moved Peter the Great and his successors?

It would be too much to say that the Bolshevists continue the foreign policy of the Tsars by revolutionary means. The World Revolution is undoubtedly the main consideration in the minds of the Bolshevists. But however international a movement may be, it cannot escape from the conditions peculiar to the country in which it is carried on. It is like the water of a river which derives its colour from the bed in which it flows. The development of Bolshevism and the activities of the Soviet Union and of the Communist International both in home and foreign politics are determined in the main by Russian conditions, which affect the interpretation of Communism in theory as well as in practice, and make Bolshevism a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, in spite of its international aims.

To trace the interaction of the different interests in the Bolshevist movement would be a complicated task, and I do not propose to embark upon a study of that problem in this book. I will merely emphasize this feature of Bolshevism in passing, and proceed to

survey various aspects of life in Russia, in order that the reader may grasp the real conditions in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and understand the theoretical and practical application of the main principles of Socialism and Communism.

CHAPTER II

HEALTH AND RACE

THE physical development and racial improvement of the people form the necessary basis of lasting progress.

A recognition of this truth is no prerogative of Socialism and Communism—still less of Bolshevism. To race, of course, Bolshevists attach no importance at all. Nevertheless the axiom is of such pre-eminent importance that it may properly be taken as the starting-point of our observations regarding Russian conditions.

I

Public Health occupies a foremost place in the programme of the Bolshevists, and there is no denying that, according to their lights, they have adopted various practical measures for the improvement of sanitary

conditions. In order to emphasize the urgency of these problems and to render their solution easier, they have established special Government commissariats (departments) of health in all the republics which are included in the Soviet Union.

The Bolshevists are, moreover, the first to make a real attempt to promote sport in Russia. Formerly the youth of Russia hardly knew the meaning of athletics and sport. To-day there is a vigorous sporting movement which includes a large proportion of the young people in the towns, and is beginning to spread to the villages as well.

But one looks in vain for anything peculiarly Bolshevist that we can admire in this campaign to improve the health of the people. Here, as in almost every other department of Russian life, one cannot help wondering whether the new and positive work done by the Revolution could not have been done, and better done, under any other form of administration.

I have not seen much of the Russian sports movement—which, of course, has its political side—but I have seen enough to convince myself that it cannot be compared with sport in Scandinavia or Great Britain,

either in itself or in its national importance. There is certainly no need of a revolution so far as our sport is concerned.

With the Russian health service, on the other hand, I have had a great deal to do in the course of my work in various parts of Russia, and I certainly do not think that the rest of the world has anything to learn from it. On the contrary, the Bolshevists might learn a good deal from the methods employed in our own countries.

In Russia the chemists, hospitals, sanatoria, and even the labours of the medical profession, have all been nationalized. This arrangement may please the political theorists, who hug their fixed ideas with religious fanaticism; and it was easy to carry out. But it is far from satisfactory to those who need medicine and medical attendance. Not only so, but the members of the dispensing and medical professions cannot keep up to date. Their medicines and instruments are either of the poorest quality or altogether inadequate. The treatment, whether private or at the hospitals and sanatoria, is usually poor and much hampered by red tape, while the patient who does not happen to belong to one of the

classes of society approved by the Soviet State stands little chance of receiving any attention at all.

In general, the Communist system has the same defects here as it has in other directions —defects which will be more fully described in later chapters.

Further, the influence of the Revolution upon public health and athletics cannot be estimated correctly without making large deductions for *negative* effects upon the health of the population, as an indirect result of Bolshevist activities in other fields. Insufficient food, bad housing, insecure and harassing conditions of life in which the primitive struggle for existence overshadows everything else, have undermined and are still undermining the health of the people. Tuberculosis, alcoholism and venereal diseases are terribly prevalent. And it is a question whether the nerves of most Russians, especially in the towns, and not excluding the Bolshevists themselves, have not deteriorated. One after another the Bolshevist leaders break down in body and mind, and the party has great difficulty in replacing them.

The haggard and weary expression which is so often to be seen on Russian faces bears eloquent witness to this deplorable state of affairs.

Notwithstanding all this, however, the great epidemics which accompanied the Revolution and civil war, and the high infant mortality which was such a disgrace to Russia, have been materially reduced. In spite of contraceptives and legalized *abortus provocatus*[1] the population is increasing again at the rate of more than three million people a year (i.e. more than the total population of Norway), and the inhabitants of the Soviet Union number already 160 millions. In fifteen years' time the population will be over 200 millions. Such figures are food for thought for Russia's neighbours. One can understand the feelings of the Englishman who wanted to solve the Russian problem by flooding the country!

Although the population is expanding in this uncanny fashion, no civilized individual will be so cynical as to ignore all that the Revolution has cost in blood and tears. In particular those who contemplate the possi-

[1] Abortion

bility of similar events in their own country will do well to pause and study the terrible facts.

To avoid misunderstandings I must here make a short digression to explain the relation between Socialism and Communism and Bolshevism.

Communism—which in Russia is usually termed Bolshevism—and Socialism are, as is well known, substantially in agreement respecting the ideal organization of society. But Communism goes further than Socialism, inasmuch as it aims at the complete collective organization of life and, ultimately, the abolition of the State itself. Socialism, therefore, is a transition stage on the road to Communism. This is why the Russian Bolshevists call their States "Socialist Republics."

The real difference between Communism and Socialism lies, of course, in the method by which they propose to establish a socialistic organization of society. Socialism prefers the way of peaceful political and social reforms. Communism—as expounded by Marx and Lenin—is pledged to violence, revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. This difference of opinion with

regard to methods and tactics amounts to a deep cleavage between Communists and Socialists (Social Democrats). Communists regard Social Democrats as virtual allies of the bourgeois, if not as the main impediment to the social revolution. The Social Democrats, with their superficial specifics for social ills, are considered by the Communists to act as a safety-valve which prevents capitalist society from exploding.

As regards the Bolshevists, their name derives from the schism in the Russian labour party which occurred at the congress in London in 1903, when the party divided (without an actual break) into two sections: revolutionary Communists and reformist Socialists. The former, led by Lenin, were in the majority—*bolshinstvo* in Russian—and thus came to be styled Bolshevists. The others, i.e. the Social Democrats, were called Mensheviks or minority men. In the Norwegian Labour party the development has, curiously enough, been more or less parallel, as the revolutionary Communist section has obtained an overwhelming majority.

Reliable statistics are not available of

what the Revolution has cost Russia in human lives. Nevertheless we can make a fairly correct estimate.

In the territories now included in the Soviet Union there was a population of approximately 140 millions at the beginning of 1914. To-day, as we have seen, this figure has been increased by about twenty millions. Had the increase been normal, however, between fifty and sixty millions should have been added. Russia's losses in the great war amounted to two million men. If we allow for emigration as well, we arrive at the result that the Revolution has cost the country about thirty million human lives. The greatest losses were, of course, incurred in the first few years of the Revolution. Even as late as 1924 the Soviet Union had a smaller population than there was in the same area in 1914—a whole decade earlier.

These are virtual losses, so to speak. The actual-death roll is not so large. But if we estimate the number of the dead at, say, twenty millions, we shall not be far out in our calculation of what the Revolution has meant so far, in direct and indirect loss of life by civil war, epidemics, famine, torture

and executions. By a more detailed study of the statistical material we arrive at approximately the same result, and similar figures have appeared in Soviet publications.

Twenty millions! That is twice the aggregate losses of all countries in the great war, and ten times the number lost by Russia in the war. Not to speak of all the lives which have been ruined in every other way.

In face of these stern and terrible facts the Bolshevist peace propaganda should really include anti-revolutionary propaganda as well. But to the Bolshevist, revolution—World Revolution—is the bloody but necessary operation which will eradicate war for ever.

So the Juggernaut of revolution rolls on.

The programme of the Norwegian revolutionary labour movement states that the movement is building upon experience gained in social conflicts in every country.

Now the revolutionary episode in Finland, which lasted for five or six months, resulted in the loss of more than twenty thousand lives; and according to the Russian standard a good hearty revolution in Norway would cost from 300,000 to 400,000 lives, and in England from six to eight millions.

Those who have drawn up this programme in Western lands, and propose to consummate the labour movement in a Bolshevist revolution cannot, in view of these facts, be unaware of the responsibility they are incurring.

As regards the majority of the rank and file who passively assent to this revolutionary policy, one can only suppose that they are ignorant of the real nature of a revolution, and that they have not clearly and fully grasped the ruthless, terrible logic of the developments for which they are involuntarily working.

II

Considering next the question of racial improvement in Russia we find that the Bolshevist activities in this domain are profoundly unsatisfactory.

From the stand-point of race the Russian Revolution, even more than the great French Revolution, has meant that oppressed races have risen in revolt and destroyed a degenerate and impotent upper class (mainly of Nordic origin).

Not that the Bolshevist Revolution stopped

short at the annihilation of the upper ten thousand. It aimed its death-dealing blows at the entire upper half of the Russian community. The Revolution has been particularly disastrous for the intellectual and middle-class people of Russia, who formed the backbone of the nation there as elsewhere. To some extent Bolshevist policy even deliberately tried to bring about the physical destruction of the classes where the most intelligent human material was to be found. A large proportion of the "fittest" people in Russia have been killed or otherwise lost —where they have not become social outcasts or been driven into exile. One does not see many intelligent faces in the drab crowd which fills the streets, theatres and trains of modern Russia. *Fabrikware der Natur*. Without being an ethnologist anybody can see how different the racial type is now, for example in Moscow, from what it was before the Revolution. The predominance of Asiatic and Oriental blood is particularly noticeable.

Such facts signify nothing to the Bolshevists. According to them, environment is the sole factor in the development of the individual. By nature all men are equally

endowed. In the improved conditions which will eventually be afforded by the Socialist State a new and higher type of humanity will emerge, irrespective of heredity or race.

Admittedly this theory agrees neither with science nor history, nor with the experience of everyday life. According to these the extermination of highly developed hereditary material involves an irretrievable loss and, as a policy, amounts to national suicide.

In point of fact, this loss is one of the most striking features of the Revolution, which is bound to have a decisive influence upon the ultimate fate of Russia.

Even in the old days, Russia had not too many well-equipped brains. And one may well ask whether the Revolution has not bled the country to such an extent that recovery will be impossible without help from outside. The Bolshevists already find it necessary to make use of foreign technical assistance on a large scale.

Possibly the destruction is in some degree counterbalanced by another distinctly grim feature of the Revolution. The bitter struggle for existence during these revolutionary years has ruthlessly wiped out a large number of

feeble and inferior individuals. Similarly a great many criminals have been killed off, instead of being interned for a shorter or longer period.

But this negative form of racial hygiene does not count for much in comparison with what has been lost through the decimation of the efficient members of society.

Apart from the uncertain influence of emigration, therefore, there appears to be only one thing which can save Russia from ultimately sharing the fate of India and China, i.e. from becoming a semi-colony. This is the possibility that the great masses in Russia may still possess not only a few gifted minds but genuine reserves of valuable human material, and that the Revolution may succeed in bringing these reserves to light.

Most of those who know Russia well have little faith in this prospect. Nevertheless, one often sees really fine types in the Russian villages—men who remind one of the best type of peasant in the Norwegian highlands, and sometimes have quite a Viking air about them. What I myself have seen of the Russian peasants has given me a great liking

for them and belief in them. Their influence, and the contribution they may make as a vital source of racial renewal, will decide the future of the Russian people.

It is all the more sad, therefore, to see how the Bolshevists are doing their level best now to stamp out the best peasant stock, evicting them from their homes and driving them off like herds of cattle to the wilderness of North Russia and Siberia, where they die by the thousand.

Such are the melancholy results of the Bolshevist efforts to improve the human race. Inter alia, they have undoubtedly an important bearing upon foreign activities in Russia in days to come.

There is, moreover, another side to the problem of revolution and race, which will be discussed in a later chapter.

CHAPTER III

POLICY

MY object in this chapter is to investigate the political principles and methods according to which the government of Russia is carried on. The foreign policy will be dealt with in a separate chapter, so that we can here concentrate upon three chief points of interest: (1) The problem of the Community and the Individual, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Class War; (2) the Soviet and Party system; (3) the Racial Policy.

I. THE SUPREMACY OF THE COMMUNITY OVER THE INDIVIDUAL. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT, AND THE CLASS WAR

The Socialist maxim relating to the supremacy of the community over the individual certainly appeals to many serious and practical minds, as was the case with the

Roman principle: the life of the individual for the State. The idea is congenial to that sense of discipline and duty which is inherent in every great commonwealth. And it holds good, so long as it derives from an acknowledgment of the fundamental truth that, although the highest expression of life is personality, the development of the individual is bound up with the development of the community. When, however, this doctrine of the supremacy of the community over the individual is based upon Marxist or Communist ideas regarding class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat, it becomes an evil obsession. The whole spirit of it is changed. A doctrine human and rational in itself is carried to mad extremes, reduced to an absurdity, and fanatically dehumanized.

In Russia the body politic has taken over not only the political activities of the community, but all its economic, social, and cultural life as well. The State is everything, the individual nothing. The idea, for instance, that private persons may bring an action against the State and obtain their rights is unheard of in Russia—a notion so

incomprehensible that the Soviet citizen can hardly imagine it, still less believe that such a thing is still done in any country.

No man's life, freedom, or property is safe in Russia, if the interests of the State are involved—as is always claimed. And this is quite apart from the personal abuses of power, which abound. Gone are the civil liberties which humanity secured by the struggles and revolutions of centuries : freedom of thought, speech and writing, together with all safeguards against the abuse of the power of the State. Russia is, in fact, a vast prison ; the citizens do not even enjoy the elementary right to leave or enter their own country. Justice in Russia is not what we call justice. It is only what is supposed to benefit the World Revolution and its champions, the Soviet Union and the Bolshevists.

If you have the privilege of being a subject of the first and only Socialist State in the world, the political police may at any moment come and arrest you, search your drawers, confiscate whatever you still possess, subject you to torture and keep you confined for a shorter or longer period in a cruelly overcrowded, indescribable prison, with your

fate hanging in the balance. They may summarily dispatch you to the Arctic Sea, Siberia, or into the next world. You need not be guilty of any offence against ordinary human laws. Political considerations—judged by the standard of Bolshevism, and often quite trivial—are enough. Or again there may be a faint suspicion ; a false accusation ; some indiscreet utterance regarding the Bolshevists ; unacceptable political or religious views or social origin. Even distant relationship to an antagonist of the régime may be fatal, or—quite a common pretext—the refusal to place yourself entirely at the disposal of the secret police. The Bolshevists have also adopted the reprehensible, though efficient, method of hostages and reprisals. An attempt on the life of a Bolshevist leader is followed by a wholesale massacre of innocent people, as was the case after the murder of Volkov, the Soviet minister at Warsaw, and especially after the attacks on Lenin and Ouritsky, the chief of the Cheka (secret police) in Petrograd.

The Socialist State, however, has other ways and means of keeping people in their places besides imprisoning or shooting them. If, for instance, a doctor does not consent to

exchange his work in the capital for an appointment in a remote corner of the country, he will be expelled from his trade union. Other recalcitrants or unacceptable persons may be dismissed, and deprived of their votes and civil rights. Measures of this nature involve much more fatal consequences in a Socialist republic than they do in a capitalist community, for they mean unemployment, and the loss of rations and lodgings at ordinary prices.

The day has long passed by when only the bourgeois had their human and civil rights outraged. Workmen and peasants, even the poorest labouring class—the true proletarians—are now prisoners in the strait waistcoat of the State and sufferers under the Terror. The Bolshevists themselves are bound with the cords they use to tie others.

And one may look in vain for any kindliness or chivalry in this procedure ; but there is no lack of mean and shabby methods, foul play, and often sadic and inhuman cruelty.

One could easily fill a book with fearful examples, and with this book in hand preach a crusade against the whole revolting system. Even so I do not take into account the monstrosities which occurred at the beginning

of the Revolution and during the civil war : I merely speak of the present more or less normal situation now that things have settled down.

In Russia, then, human beings are not an end in themselves. They are either " socially pernicious elements " that must be exterminated, or Communist social material, to be exploited as long as possible and then, when they are no longer of use to their rulers, incontinently thrown away, replaced, or destroyed. These are the naked facts. Neither labour protection laws nor social insurance make any difference to what is actually being done.

The adroit phrases and big talk of the Bolshevist propagandists make things no better. On the contrary, their misrepresentations of the facts are the implicit condemnation of their own political methods. With an audacity which ignores facts, Russia is represented as the home of real freedom, while the other countries of the world are described as groaning in the bondage of the capitalist system, under a ruthless political terror.

To take a typical case. In 1930 the Bolshevist propaganda in Russia stated with the boldest effrontery that 328,639 persons

had been killed in capitalist countries during the last five years for political reasons, that 500,000 had been imprisoned and that 24,000 of these had gone on hunger strike—figures which might well have represented Soviet conditions.

Such mendacious statements, which are largely believed by the ignorant Russian people, are a convenient excuse for the cruel oppressions which the autocratic Communist State heaps upon the individual.

And yet the Communist State—which is elevated so far above the individual and is the vehicle of a system embracing, in a sense, the whole of human life—is acknowledged only by a minority of the people, and hated by the great majority.

By a curious irony of fate the Revolution, which was so intoxicated with the idea of *svoboda* (liberty), has developed into an unprecedented tyranny.

It is one of the many anomalies of Communism that the communistic system, whose declared aim and end is the abolition of the State, has thus brought about the establishment of the most absolute form of government which has ever existed.

The Marxist Sophists try to explain away this anomaly by pointing out that what we are witnessing is the highest development of the power of the State preparatory to the extinction of the State.

If, however, we keep to hard facts instead of dreams of the future, this extinction of the rights of the individual spells the doom of the political system of Bolshevism. On the one hand, the individual is prevented from putting his abilities to the best use for the benefit of the community. On the other, the free and full development of the individual is rendered impossible.

Men and women in Russia have to grovel and humble themselves, though some, especially Communist youths, brag and bluster beyond measure. "*Ya malenki chelovek*" ("I am a little man") is a very common Russian expression in explanations to the magistrates, and a very significant one. Again it is difficult to imagine anything more revolting and derogatory to human dignity than what frequently occurs when accusations of real or fictitious political offences are brought against men of science, engineers, and other experts in Russia: the colleagues of these men have no choice but to pass

dictated resolutions reprobating the actions of their executed comrades, with whom they sympathize in their hearts, expressing their appreciation of the Soviet régime, which they loathe, and even thanking the vigilant and gallant secret police! *Primum vivere.*

The people are forced into conformity with a political, economic, social, and cultural system which is artificial and out of keeping with human nature, and which does not admit of free, organic growth. Individuality is destroyed, not only in the classes of society which are directly hit by the Revolution, but quite as much among the workmen and peasants, despite the Bolshevist claim that they have liberated these classes.

Compare Russia with ourselves! Remember how our rights are secured by our free institutions, how in countries like ours every man is deemed worthy of respect; and let us be thankful that we belong to a community which, though still far from the goal of our endeavours, is much nearer than Russia to that true relation between the individual and society which is an essential condition of further progress.

Moreover, the political theory which has

been put into practice in Russia invites criticism in other respects. The social community, in whose name the Bolshevists take such liberties, is not the community as a whole. It is only part of the community, namely the organized revolutionary proletariat, represented by its self-appointed agents, the Bolshevists, who have seized all the power in the State. By means of this absolute power, *the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, the Bolshevists intend to "liquidate" the other classes of society, and restore the unity and coherence of the community in accordance with the principles elaborated by Karl Marx in his learned seclusion.

It requires little imagination to foresee the consequences of this terrible theory, once it has been adopted as an article of belief by a fanatical sect whose power to practise their creed is only restricted by the resistance they provoke.

For thirteen years now this *class war* has been going on under the auspices of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. the Bolshevist oligarchy. It is no longer carried on as open civil war; it is waged in the political, economic, social, and cultural fields, according to the approved tactics of Macchiavelli

and with ample supplies of Marxist ammunition. Even now, apparently, the decisive stage has not been passed.

The facts contained in this book will reveal, in broad outline, the position as it is to-day. I will only add here that this war between Communism and the anti-Communist elements is more remorseless, harsh and cruel than any war between nations. It is carried even into the school and the family; it poisons men's minds, depraves their ideas and morals, destroys a vast amount of property, sacrifices human lives by the thousand every month, and seems utterly indiscriminate and futile.

Socialism of this sort is not a movement aiming at brotherhood and the common weal; it is frankly anti-social. For this reason many adherents of Socialism and Communism, who were formerly attracted by the gospel of association and solidarity, are turning away from these social specifics in disgust and embitterment.

II. THE SOVIET AND PARTY SYSTEM

The word "Soviet" has become the sign manual of the Bolshevist system; thus we

have the Soviet Government, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy, Soviet dumping, and so on. This term, however, is open to a certain amount of misunderstanding which ought to be cleared up.

The Russian word "Soviet" means just the same as the English word "council" (and "counsel"). It is not a new term as applied to political institutions—the council of the Tsar, for instance, was also called a "Soviet".

Moreover, the Soviet has been looked upon as a sort of "States General" of the working classes. This idea finds expression, for instance, in the programme of the Norwegian Labour party. Such a conception of the Soviet is, however, applicable at most to the early days of the Revolution, when workers' and soldiers' councils were formed as special revolutionary organs.

Nowadays, this institution can hardly be regarded as anything original or peculiar to Bolshevist Russia. The Soviet system is merely one form, and a rather undeveloped and primitive form at that, of representative popular government as it has long existed, at a higher level, in other countries. A Rural Soviet in Russia does not differ, in

principle, from a Rural District Council, or a Town Soviet from a Town Council, in Norway or England.

The chief difference is the secret connection between the Soviet organization and the organs of the party (of which more will be said later). Further, popular representation in Norwegian or English municipal government is more or less a reality, whereas the Soviet elections are a farce.

In the first place, a considerable proportion of the adult population of Russia has been disfranchized. The actual number varies with the way the political wind is blowing; it may be as high as from 10 to 20 per cent in some districts. The figure is fixed in a pretty arbitrary fashion. In some cases people have been deprived of the suffrage on the ground that their grandfather or uncle was formerly a merchant. In one district a peasant lost his vote because he owned a mower and was therefore a capitalist; in another district a man got his vote back because he bought a mower and thus helped on the work of industrialization in the Soviet Union!

Besides this, the elections are not secret. They practically take the form of mass meetings to register demonstrative approval

of lists which are drawn up in advance by the Communist party.

Nevertheless, the party finds it impossible to muster a greater number of Bolshevists than 10 to 15 per cent in the rural councils. In towns the proportion is 50 per cent or more. But in the superior Soviet organizations, whose members are chosen from the Soviets by indirect elections, the percentage of Communists rises steeply the nearer one gets to the top. The members of the Central Executive Committee, which is supposed to be a sort of parliament, are nearly all Communists, and only Communists are found in the Council of People's Commissars, which is the official government, nominally elected by the Central Executive Committee.

Constitutional provisions, moreover, secure to the towns, whose industrial population includes the bulk of the Communists, a much larger measure of representation in the Soviet pyramid than the peasants enjoy.[1]

[1] In the ambiguous regulations the towns have one representative for each 25,000 *electors*, the villagers one representative for 125,000 *inhabitants*. This means that the village representation is one-half or one-third of that of the town.

It is not, however, the Soviet system in itself which is characteristic, but, as I have said, the mode of its employment. The Soviet has been adopted by the Bolshevists as the official instrument of government, and in consequence it has special administrative functions.

But it has not any inherent connection with Bolshevism. The Soviet system may very well continue in Russia, with a certain amount of adaptation, even after the Bolshevists have disappeared from the scene.

The really distinguishing mark of the form of government which has been set up in Russia—in fact, the real government of the country—is the Bolshevist organization itself, the Communist party of the Union.

Russia has thus a dual organization of the State: the visible system of Soviets, and the invisible, but in reality all-powerful party.

"The Communist Party (the Bolshevists)", as it styles itself, is the only legal and at present the only possible party in Russia. All the other parties have been suppressed and only exist abroad, possibly with subterranean connections at home. Any attempt to form another party in Russia spells certain death. The Bolshevists have decided to make

an end once for all of rival parties. They are *the* party.

Accordingly the Communist party is not a political party in the ordinary sense of the word. It may be regarded as the cohesive and directive system in the body politic; the head and brain of the proletariat, as the Bolshevists say.

This party is strongly organized at the centre, with local branches, corresponding roughly to the administrative divisions of the country. Its ramifications extend so completely all over Russia that one cannot point to any department of life that has not been subordinated to its control.

In the Soviets, trade unions, co-operative societies, and all social and voluntary associations of any importance, there is always a Bolshevist "fraction" or committee which assumes the direction of their activities and "calls the tune" at secret party meetings.

Much the same holds good of every institution, workshop, and place of recreation—even of every house. There is invariably a committee or an agent in close touch with the party.

Inside or alongside of this network are the ramifications of another system, partly con-

cealed even from the members of the party, and feared by all: the O.G.P.U. or State political police. This is the pretorian guard and inquisition of the Russian Revolution, a vast and amazing piece of organization. The efficiency of Russia's inquisition, at any rate, leaves nothing to be desired.

The Communist party, then, rules Russia as the Fascist party rules Italy; it cannot be compared to a government party in any other country. The form of administration in Russia being a dictatorship, the actual government are the exponents of the dictatorship, i.e. the leaders of the Communist party.

Nominally the dictatorship is in the hands of the Party Congress, as the highest central authority of the party. In reality, however, the dictatorship is exercised by the dominant group in the congress, known as the Central Committee, and within that again by a few men who form its Executive Committee, the so-called Political Bureau in which Stalin, the actual ruler of Russia, is paramount.

Stalin rules Russia by means of the Political Bureau and Central Committee of the party, in the same way that Robespierre ruled France by means of the Committee of Public

Safety set up by the National Convention. The People's Commissariats (ministries), the Soviet Central Executive Committee (parliament), the Red Army, the O.G.P.U. (State political police), the Trade Unions, and the Communist International, all obey the orders of the Political Bureau, the majority of whose members, but not Stalin, have annexed the chief posts in the administration.

It cannot, however, be said that the Political Bureau entirely controls the above-mentioned Central Committee of the party. This committee, which must not be confused with the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Congress (parliament), consists, like the Great Sanhedrin at Jerusalem and the College of Cardinals in Rome, of about seventy members. It is the true Bolshevist oligarchy, which usually assembles every second month, is really self-elected, and at a pinch can turn out any member of the Political Bureau. This committee, therefore, is the ultimate seat of power in Russia.

In the case of the O.G.P.U., as of other pretorian guards and janissaries, it is sometimes difficult to tell who is sovereign—the body-guard or the object of the body-guard's care.

Such, then, is the actual system of government in Russia, the carefully thought out political system which makes it possible for a handful of determined fanatics not only to subject to their will the largest country in the world, but to organize a Communist conspiracy which embraces the entire globe. When the Russian Labour party under their leadership seized the reins of power thirteen years ago, its strength was only equivalent to, say, a party of two thousand members in Norway. Even now it does not include more than 10 per cent of the workers in Russia or 1 per cent of the population.

The entire world knows by now that this terrible sect is no longer a homogeneous whole, and that the Bolshevists themselves are divided by bitter dissensions in their ranks.

These antagonisms are partly due to differences of opinion regarding the economic policy and the nationality question, which will be discussed in the chapters devoted to those problems. In part, too, they are due to the fact that increasing numbers of quondam revolutionaries are losing their interest in Bolshevism. Many of those who were once

lean, hungry revolutionaries are now fat and comfortable; having feathered their nests they no longer want revolution but would prefer to enjoy their gains in peace. They are ready to stop the class war and let things develop naturally. On the other hand the forces of revolution constantly enrol new and fanatical recruits from among the young revolutionaries who have received a Communist education. The tendency among these is to carry the revolution further and further; they are the staunchest supporters of the implacable fanatics who still lead the party.

Up to the present, Stalin has succeeded in maintaining unity by that iron discipline and rigorous centralization which is a basic principle of the organization of the Bolshevist party. But open dissensions have naturally weakened the power and prestige of the party among the people at large.

These divisions are significant in another respect. The Bolshevist party is, as we have seen, the only legal and at present the only possible party in Russia. Accordingly the opposition, especially on the right wing of the party, is, in a way, a reflection of political currents in the nation which can find no other

expression. Here we have the germ of new political developments.

III. RACIAL POLICY

Russia, as everyone knows, is not a homogeneous nation. To begin with it is divided, like Caesar's Gaul, into three parts, i.e. the three main branches of the Russian people: Great Russians in the centre, North and East (80 millions); Ukrainians or Little Russians in the South, to the North of the Black Sea (30 millions); and White Russians in the West (5 millions). These Russian nations differ from one another in language and culture much as the three Scandinavian nations differ in these respects.

In addition to the Russians there are a great many altogether foreign nationalities. Besides Jews and Germans, there are mainly Finnish and Tartar peoples in the Volga region, Turkish peoples in Central Asia, and Caucasians. Of such nationalities 9 number over a million; and 27 exceed a hundred thousand. In all there are 180 nationalities in Russia, with 150 different languages and dialects.

Under the old régime all the other peoples in Russia were subordinate, nationally speak-

ing, to the Great Russians, who were the dominant and imperialist element both on account of their numerical superiority and for other reasons—much as the Prussians used to be in Germany. Russia was only outwardly a homogeneous State. In reality she was a patchwork empire built up by conquest and colonization.

A certain amount of credit is due to the Bolshevists for the manner in which they have dealt with the national problem in this immense empire.

One of the chief objects of the French Revolution was to wipe out the last traces of racial animosities in France and convert the French people into a centralized and homogeneous nation. Accordingly it abolished the old provincial divisions of the country, which were a survival of earlier tribal divisions, and partitioned it geographically into a large number of departments. In Russia the opposite process has taken place. Formerly she was divided into governments as France is divided into departments. But the result of the Russian Revolution has been a re-partitioning of the country on *national* lines. The Bolshevists have granted the dif-

ferent nationalities cultural autonomy, and in other respects more or less complete home rule, either as republics on an equal footing with Great Russia, or as autonomous republics and territories.

The details may be studied in handbooks and almanacs or on a map of the Union of Soviet Republics. I will merely mention that I myself have had the opportunity to watch, for a lengthy period, the actual working of the Bolshevist national policy in the Ukraine and in the Caucasus, where the conditions are particularly complicated. I have also been able to study the national problem in the Balkans, where the conditions much resemble those in the Caucasus; and I must confess that the comparison is not altogether in favour of Europe.

Nevertheless, there are a couple of very serious defects in the Bolshevist solution of the question of nationality.

In the first place the cultural liberty of the different peoples is restricted by the dictatorship of the proletariat in the same way as the ordinary liberty of the subject. Second, even the smaller nationalities are completely dominated by the centralized party machinery.

It may also be mentioned that this racial policy plays a definite part in the agitation for the further dissemination of Bolshevism throughout the world. Independent national States have been set up on every frontier of the Soviet Union where corresponding nationalities are found in neighbouring States across the frontier. Thus we have Carelia facing Finland, White Russia and the Ukraine facing Poland, Moldavia facing Rumania, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan facing Persia, Tajikstan facing Afghanistan, and so on.

All real national freedom is thus curtailed to fit the frame of the party policy. But it cannot be denied that the Bolshevists have laid the foundations of independent national life for these peoples, who have been permitted to set up their own government and to use their own language in their schools, press, literature, theatre, and administration. The credit for this is largely due to Stalin, who was at one time the head of the now abolished Commissariat of Nationalities, and who knew, as a Caucasian, where the shoe pinched.

The Bolshevists are often afraid, not without good reason, that they have gone too far

in their national policy. There can be little room for doubt that it will mean one more nail in their coffin. Yet they could hardly have left it to their enemies to exploit the growing sense of nationality in the peoples outside the leading nation of Great Russians.

As things have developed, however, this nationalist sentiment has steadily increased in intensity. Stalin's task in the party is the difficult one of steering a middle course between the Great Russian opposition and the local Bolshevist nationalists. The Great Russian opposition appeals to the pretended principle of internationalism, and urges that the policy which encourages nationalities should be abandoned. The local nationalists try to be independent of Moscow and desire to follow a *national* Communist policy. They are even inclined to relax the class war in their own country.

This local nationalism, therefore, presents a serious problem for the Bolshevists, especially as so many of the peoples who aspire to independence are on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Exaggerated nationalism in new or revived countries is a familiar phenomenon. The same dangerous tendency is apparent in

the Soviet Union, where the very nationalism of the new national republics is taking the wind out of the sails of Bolshevism. Lenin, it is true, said that no man is a good Communist who is not prepared to sacrifice his country for the cause of World Revolution. But it is a fact that Bolshevism in the Union of Soviet Republics has comparatively few reliable adherents except in Great Russia or the big industrial centres elsewhere with a large percentage of Great Russians. Most of the Caucasian Communists, for instance, although so many of them are members of the central administration in Moscow, are really Caucasians first and only Communists in the second place. Bolshevism has its base among the Finno-Slav population of Great Russia, as it derives its origin from them. If Bolshevism lost its strongholds there, it could not hold out for long in the other Soviet republics.

Europe herself will be profoundly affected by the way in which these problems of nationality are settled in Russia. Shall we witness the disintegration of Russia into a number of independent States, a development for which such powerful forces are working? Will the solution take the form of a United States of

Russia? Or will there be some sort of union of the peoples of Europe and Russia?

The *Jewish* question in Russia stands by itself, and a great deal has been said and written about the part played by Jews in the Russian Revolution. Unquestionably the Jews took a leading part in bringing about the first Revolution in 1917 and overthrowing the old régime. This applies not only to the Jewish intelligentsia in Russia but to international Judaism as well. The main reason for this was, of course, that the Jews in Russia, numbering six millions, were subject to various restrictions as to residence, the posts they could hold, etc., besides suffering a certain amount of persecution. This forced many of the Jewish intelligentsia to join the revolutionary parties. Moreover, it inflamed the Jews in all parts of the world against the Tsarist régime. One effect of this was that relations between the United States and Russia before the Revolution were largely determined by the Jewish question in the latter country.

There is no doubt that the Jews also played a very important part in the Bolshevist Revolution. Not only are the theories of

Marxism and Bolshevism mainly a product of the Jewish mind, but the Jews have done far more than any other race, in proportion to numbers, to apply these ideas. So many Jews have taken an active part in the leadership of the Revolution, and not least in the revolutionary tribunals, that ordinary people in Russia look upon Jews and Bolshevists as practically synonymous. True, a number of Jews have been dismissed from the supreme command in recent years as a result of the controversies in the party. But there are still plenty left. In particular they occupy many posts in the spheres of finance and the arts. In Moscow and Leningrad, where Jews were seldom permitted to live under the Tsarist government, official statistics show that 10 to 11 per cent of all the appointments in public institutions are filled by Jews. These figures, issued with the intention of allaying anti-Semitic fears, certainly do not err on the side of exaggeration; even so, they reveal that the number of Jews in the administration is disproportionately large. Russian popular humour asserts that 50 per cent of the Jews in Russia live in Moscow, and that the remaining 50 per cent are on their way thither.

On the other hand the Jews, as a whole, have suffered more in consequence of the Revolution than any other race in Russia. This stands to reason, as the bulk of the Jewish inhabitants are craftsmen and small traders, whose occupations have been ruined by the Revolution. Nor can it be said that the Jewish capitalist class has fared any better than other capitalists in Russia.

In addition to this, the Jewish population —especially in the Ukraine and White Russia —was violently persecuted and decimated by the massacres known as *pogroms* during the Revolution and the civil wars. It is true that they suffered chiefly at the hands of anti-Communist elements ; nevertheless, their fate must be placed to the account of the Revolution. In the Ukraine alone, several hundred thousand Jews were killed and hundreds of thousands of Jewish homes were pillaged during the Revolution, not to speak of the women who were violated and the 300,000 children left to wander about homeless.

These facts, however, make little or no impression upon the masses in the Ukraine and Great Russia. Their immemorial race-hatred of the Jews has been intensified by the Revolution, and the circumstance that

the Bolshevist authorities discourage anti-Semitism both in theory and practice does not mend matters in the least. The least criticism of the Jews is liable to be punished with rigour. But underneath the ashes the fire of fierce hostility to the hated race is smouldering; and not infrequently it flares up even among the workers, notwithstanding the severity of the present régime. "Kill the Jews; save Russia!" is a slogan that comes readily to a Russian when a little too much *vodka* has loosened his tongue.

Intermarriage between Jews and "gentiles" has become far more common in Russia. But it does not seem at all likely that this will bury the eternal Jew and make an end of the Jewish question. At any rate not for many a long day. Formerly half the Jewish population in Russia lived in parts of the empire which have seceded, especially Poland. Even now, however, something like three million Jews remain, chiefly in White Russia and Western Ukraine, where many of the large towns have a 25 to 50 per cent Jewish population. Possibly the real number of Jews in Russia is far greater than the official total, for many of them avoid stating their proper nationality.

Thus the Jewish question is still one of the most difficult problems of Russian domestic policy.

The very fact that the Bolshevists are so deeply involved in it—as was the old régime, though in another way—may prove as fatal to their government as it did to the government of the Tsar.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

EVERY aspect of human life falls within the ambit of Communism, but economics is, of course, the chosen field in which Communism and Socialism have introduced their characteristic system. Here the Marxist theories must be put to the crucial test, especially as the Marxists themselves declare that every phenomenon can be traced to economic causes.

The characteristics of the Marxist economic system are well known. These are (1) the confiscation of all the means of production by the community ; (2) socialized production and distribution ; (3) the abolition of private initiative and competition.

We have already seen in the last chapter that every activity of the community in Russia is completely dominated by the supreme political power. The distinguishing mark, therefore, of the Marxist system is the

fact that the political power, i.e. the State, carries on the economic life of the community —in other words there is State Socialism, or rather *State Capitalism.* This brutal truth contains practically all that need be said about the theoretical side of the Bolshevist economic system.

Let us, however, look a little more closely at this system in practice, bearing in mind the fact that the system has now been tested for thirteen years, in nine of which peace conditions have reigned.

The peasant question is a separate subject of such importance that I will consider it later in a chapter by itself. The other aspects of economic life in Russia will be dealt with here. But first a few words about the economic status of the private individual.

I. ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL

It will be seen from what follows that there is not much scope in Russia for private initiative in business, though there is a little. The economic status of the individual in the Socialist State is based (apart from the peasants), upon the scanty wage of the workman

or clerk. During the present years of transition this pittance is often eked out by the sale of personal goods and chattels.

The private rights of ownership and inheritance have been retained, but within very narrow limits. The right of property is practically confined to money, furniture and personal effects. The maximum amount which can be inherited is 10,000 roubles (£1,000)—probably intended to represent the standard of worldly wealth beyond which a good citizen of the Soviet State should not go.

Few indeed reach that level, though clandestinely wealthy people still exist here and there. The majority would barely satisfy Schiller's condition that a man must have something he can call his own, or he will become a murderer and incendiary. Thirty or forty per cent of the population may be regarded as owning nothing; in other words they are true proletarians.

That there is no security for personal property, even within the maximum allowed by law, has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Not only is this the case, but the law is liable to the most arbitrary and dictatorial alteration at any time. People who, for example, invest in houses, relying on the

law of the land, may suddenly find their property confiscated without any compensation at all.

With these preliminary observations, we may pass on to consider industrial life in its socialized aspect.

II. INDUSTRY

Practically all the Russian industries have now been nationalized (of course without compensation to the owners, who may be thankful if they escaped with their lives), and are carried on as limited liability companies owned by the State and organized in trusts and syndicates, under the ultimate control of a government department.

Private capitalistic industries still account for 5 per cent of the production (chiefly small industries and concessions); but they are gradually being wound up, either because the Bolshevists think them superfluous, or because their capital is exhausted.

The Russian State industries are not at all efficiently run. The employees are slack; the commodities produced are dear and bad. A frankly protectionist system of trading

bolsters up industries which would soon collapse if they had to meet the unrestricted competition of foreign countries. Vast subsidies are paid out of public funds to these same industries, which impose a further tax upon the bulk of the population by selling their manufactures at inflated prices.

The quality of the goods manufactured is usually such that it only excites the contempt of the people. A Russian or "Soviet" article has become synonymous with a bad one, just as a "foreign" article means a good one.

On the outbreak of the Revolution the Russian industries were instantaneously crippled, to linger on for a long time, living from hand to mouth. Even by 1920 their total production was no more than 20 per cent of the pre-war output. By 1924 they had raised it to about half the amount. This comparatively rapid improvement was due to the light industries and the output of coal and oil; for these branches of industry could be more or less restored without much difficulty. The heavy industries, on the other hand, and especially the metal industries, still found it impossible in 1924 to produce more than 20 to 25 per cent of their output in pre-war days.

By now the output in nearly all branches of industry seems, generally speaking, to have equalled or passed the pre-war level, and we are told that it is increasing steadily at the rate of 30 per cent per annum or more. The striking thing is, however, that the goods get scarcer and the queues longer. The best gauge of the expansion of Russian industry as a whole is the country's foreign trade, which has not yet reached 80 per cent of what it was before the war, though in the meantime the population has increased by nearly 20 per cent.

In judging, however, of the present state of Russia's industries, we must take into account the industrial policy which has been adopted by the dominent section of the Bolshevist party under the leadership of Stalin. This policy aims at a rapid industrialization of Russia, based on the development of her heavy industries and an increased output of raw materials.

It is upon these efforts that the chief stress is laid at present in the famous five years' plan—not upon the production of necessaries for the population of the country. When we find, therefore, that the output of cotton cloth is still rather smaller than it was before the

war, that the goods do not wear so well, and that there are no imports, while on the other hand the population has increased, we cannot wonder that there is a shortage. Nevertheless, the painful lack of these and other necessary commodities may easily induce us to take too gloomy a view of the state of affairs. The fact remains that numerous plants and factories are being built, often with the help of foreign engineers, and sometimes on a very large scale with splendid equipment—even if they invariably cost far more than they should.

The two great problems, however, which are causing the Bolshevists uneasiness are: lack of capital and a shortage of efficient employees.

Of course it would be a decided relief to them if they could secure big foreign loans or credits for the purchase of machinery and raw materials and for other purposes. But they have had to reconcile themselves to the unpalatable fact that the world will only contribute a limited amount towards its own destruction. The Bolshevists have therefore to squeeze the necessary capital out of the Russian people or to obtain it by exporting—

which means selling what they can for what they can get.

Still more difficult is the position in regard to capable employees, as I have already stated. Russia does not possess the large numbers of efficient, loyal and specially trained men who are needed, especially for such gigantic undertakings as those which are contemplated in the five years' plan. Nor is there any prospect of getting them in adequate numbers either abroad or at home. This is evident when we consider that Russia has only 100,000 technical experts with a higher education (including agriculture), whereas the five years' plan necessitates 350,000. The figures for technical workers of a lower grade are 200,000 and 850,000 respectively.

Moreover the majority of the experts of the old régime who are working for the Bolshevists are distinctly unfriendly to them. They work because they are afraid and in order to earn a living for themselves and their families. The conditions and the pay that are offered them are seldom of such a nature that they can take much pleasure or interest in their employment. And if anything this state of things has been getting worse year by year.

The new experts and the workmen who are thrust into administrative and technical positions are usually insufficiently educated or otherwise unsuitable. Often, too, they quite naturally acquire the same " upper class tendencies " as their predecessors, with equally little chance of satisfying these deplorable instincts.

Even the Bolshevists have begun to realize at last that this problem of filling up the cadres is a matter of life and death for them. It is not a good sign, however, that they still boast of their intention to solve it along Bolshevist lines.

III. TRADE

Most of the trading is now in the hands of the public authorities. All the foreign trade of the country is, of course, strictly a State monopoly.

According to the official statistics of internal trade, 99 per cent of the wholesale and 90 per cent of the retail business is now carried on by the State or by co-operative societies. It is mainly in the hands of the co-operatives, but as things are in Russia these societies are virtually State institutions.

Such private trading as is left consists chiefly of the peasants' market sales or the sale of provisions and clothing in places where the authorities have not yet succeeded in taking over the trade.

After being practically killed during the first years of the Revolution, private trading sprang up with a mushroom growth as soon as the restrictions were more or less removed by the new economic policy (NEP) in 1921–22. The methods which were subsequently used to suppress private trading should be studied by those handicraftsmen and small traders in other countries who so naïvely and unsuspectingly follow at the heels of revolutionary Marxist labour leaders.

The results of the State monopolization of internal trade are unsatisfactory. The system of supply and distribution does not work. Thus it not infrequently happens that, notwithstanding the shortage, enormous quantities of provisions go bad and become unusable through careless handling in transport or warehousing.

The working expenses in connection with distribution are far greater than they are where private trading is the rule. Obviously it does not matter to the servants of the State

whether they sell or not, and the customers are often painfully aware that they exist for the trade officials instead of the reverse. The public must just accept what they can get and be satisfied, whether the quality be good or bad. There is little or no choice.

Ration cards have now been introduced by the co-operative societies for all necessaries, and the rations both of food and clothing are siege rations. This rationing is doubtless due to the shortage. But it may also be a necessary feature of the Marxist system. For how else can the extent of a demand be ascertained?

Besides all this, the private trading which is still allowed, and which is by no means inconsiderable in certain places and at certain times (there are several industrial districts where even the workers have to make a quarter, or more, of their purchases from private traders), is hampered by such heavy taxation and other restrictions that the prices are bound to soar, quite apart from the shortage of commodities. This makes a vast difference to the cost of living. Those who suffer most are of course the unfortunate individuals who, being disfranchised, and

therefore deprived of their ration cards, have to buy everything from private traders.

Anyone who wants to see Marxist trading in all its stark realism should, however, study life as it appears in the food and ready-made clothing shops in the great towns. One hardly knows whom to pity most: the people who stand in queues for hours to get the miserable portion allotted to them, or the assistants who have to keep on all day and every day as if the Christmas shopping was at its height.

A Bolshevist explained this phenomenon to a foreign tourist as "selling off at reduced prices". We know better. Confusion, war rations, inflated prices and a shortage of the indispensable necessaries of life are the outstanding characteristics of the Communist system of distribution.

IV. FINANCE

In the sphere of finance the results are even less satisfactory.

Nearly all the branches of Russian industry live on the State to a greater or less degree, and the ordinary revenue of the State is

insufficient to cover the deficit on its nationalized trade. Even the State monopoly of the sale of spirits does not suffice, although it brings in about a hundred million pounds a year. Hence the Socialist State resorts to what it should logically regard as a disreputable capitalist expedient: inflation of the currency, coupled with forced loans to act as a check on the volume of the note-issue.

The rouble touched bottom, as we know, more than once in the early years of the Revolution. At the present time it is again well on the way to a similar catastrophe. The parity of the rouble is still maintained by dint of a compulsory rate of exchange, and the Bolshevists are straining every nerve to preserve, if not lower, the official price-level, upon which every thing depends. But they seem to be losing their grip. The prices of the private traders have long been steadily rising, and the value of the rouble between man and man is only a fraction of its gold value. On an average the price-level is at least twice as high as that in Europe, and in private trading many necessaries are priced far higher.

A fresh inflation of the rouble is thus in full swing, and it will be more catastrophic than its predecessors. The first inflations occurred during the civil war or were intimately connected with it. But the new inflation will be the result of many years of peaceful Marxist reconstruction. Such a result cannot easily be explained away. One can imagine various excuses which may be made if the scandal reaches a point where it can no longer be concealed. But of one thing we may be sure—the daring of the Bolshevist explanation will, as usual, exceed anything we anticipate.

Private banks no longer exist in Russia. Under the new economic policy a number of private mutual credit associations were established. These, however, have since been wound up—in the Russian way. On the other hand the Bolshevists make a great point of public savings banks as a way of squeezing capital out of the people without issuing too many notes. Little success, however, has attended this effort. The total amount of the deposits, notwithstanding a high rate of interest, is positively ridiculous for a country like Russia. People have no money;

still less have they any confidence in their rulers.

The bank crashes in other countries since the war have been bad enough and have naturally furnished welcome material for communist propaganda. But what are we to say of the way in which people have been treated in Russia? Not capitalists only, but numbers of humble folk, of the aged, and of poor creatures who had toiled and moiled all their lives, lost their savings, their pensions, their bonds and all they had to live on, when the Bolshevists seized the banks and allowed the rouble to go to the dogs.

And since then how many millions in rouble notes have been left on the hands of the Russian peasants—notes which the Bolshevists paid them for their produce and then made valueless?

Of late the Bolshevists have extorted money annually from the population—especially from workmen and clerks—by means of huge loans which are described as voluntary but are really compulsory. As the value of money is constantly falling, this, too, hits the common people.

The Bolshevist government need foreign

currency for their purchases abroad, for other activities there, and as a reserve.

This foreign money they obtain chiefly by exporting, and being able to regulate imports at will, they manage to maintain a kind of trade balance.

On the other hand the falling rouble, coupled with the fact that they can operate with all their resources as a single economic unit, makes it easy for them to carry on dumping in other countries. The chief sufferers by this policy are presumably the Russian workers, whose wages are paid in paper roubles, and in another way the Russian people as a whole, who have to look on while the commodities they so sorely need are sent out of the country.

V. MEANS OF TRANSPORT. THE POSTAL, TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH SERVICES

These services are not particularly interesting in the present connection, as their organization is, generally speaking, the same as that in many other countries. They are carried on by the State (in Russia this is true of the shipping as well as of the railways).

One point, however, deserves mention. These services exhibit the most striking examples both of the havoc wrought by the Revolution and of the extreme difficulty of reconstruction in a Marxist community. The railways, for instance, are still incapable of dealing with the traffic. As for the river transport, which plays such an important part in the trade of Russia, and which is a nationalized service, it has not yet risen to one-half of what it was before the war.

CHAPTER V

THE PEASANT QUESTION

THE peasant question takes precedence of all others in Russia. Eighty per cent of the population are peasants, and the Bolshevist Revolution was eighty per cent an agrarian revolution. Problems connected with the land are at the root of the whole political situation. The touchstone of Russian statecraft is, therefore, its success in dealing with these problems.

In order to understand the peasant question we must make a brief historical survey.

I. A LITTLE HISTORY

As long as the Vikings ruled in Russia the Russian peasants remained free. The Vikings had, of course, their thralls, as they had at home in Scandinavia, most of these being prisoners of war. But the Russian inhabitants were free and could migrate and

roam about to their hearts' content. At that time they were still semi-nomadic.

Feodor, the last Viking to occupy the throne of Russia—and a pretty feeble specimen of a Viking, too—was responsible for introducing villenage into Russia in the year 1597. The object of this measure was to put a stop to the migrations of the peasants, which at that particular time interfered very seriously with the financial and military interests of the State and the ruling class.

Little by little this villenage developed into serfdom, which spread over more or less the whole of Russia. The peasants were appurtenances of the land: so and so many "souls" was as a convenient term used to denote the size of an estate.

It is a well-known fact that serfdom was only abolished in Russia in the nineteenth century, at about the same date as negro slavery in America. The reform, associated with the famous manifesto issued by Alexander II in 1861, was more properly the result of a number of different measures distributed over practically the whole century.

This liberation of the peasants did not finally do away with the peasant problem,

any more than the abolition of slavery in America solved the negro problem. The peasants had to pay for the land they received, and the amount of land allotted to them was insufficient. They were supposed to get the land which was traditionally theirs by right of user, but in reality they were cheated. This created bad blood; and they were obliged to lease more land from the great landowners or to work for them as in the past—on very unsatisfactory terms in either case.

As in Denmark a century and a half ago, the Russian peasants, with a few exceptions, lived in villages. Each village owned the land collectively; the different plots were passed on in turn to the different households, while the pastures and woods were common. This system was termed the *mir* system. Naturally no one thought it worth while to take much trouble with his allotments, as there was every prospect that they would pass into other hands at the next redistribution of the land. Not only so, but the allotments shrank every time they were distributed, on account of the growing population. Thus the households became more and more impoverished, and the land-hunger

keener. Nor was the land allotted to each household as a single plot in one place; it might consist of thirty or forty separate strips dotted about all over the land owned by the village.

Owing to these unfortunate agricultural conditions and many other unfavourable circumstances the Russian peasantry were very poor even at the beginning of the present century. The farming was decidedly primitive—wooden ploughs were still the rule—crops were scanty, and the standard of civilization among the peasants was terribly low. Close by lived the great estate-owners whose lands were the more tempting, as they could be incorporated in the land belonging to the village without any quarrelling over the spoil.

Thus it happened that the peasants were well prepared for a revolution, in virtue both of their semi-Socialistic village organization and of the unsatisfactory conditions of life which they could see no prospect of improving without taking the law into their own hands.

The Tsarist government endeavoured to remedy this state of things—especially after

the alarming revolution in 1905—by colonization in Siberia and elsewhere; by developing agriculture; by making it easier for the peasants to buy land from the big estates; and above all by trying to destroy the system of common ownership, making the peasants independent owners of their holdings, which were allotted to them as complete farms.

The last-named measure was extremely successful; it rendered increasing numbers of peasants prosperous, and would probably, in time, have saved Russia from the Revolution. But the moving spirit in this work, the prime minister Stolypin, was assassinated, and then came the great war.

II. THE BOLSHEVISTS SEIZE THE POWER

In 1917 the whole framework of society in Russia was completely disorganized by the war and the first Revolution. Even under Kerenski the peasants began to help themselves to what they wanted; and the Bolshevists made the still unsatisfied land-hunger of the peasant masses one of the planks of their platform. The other parties tried to restrain the peasants, wishing to postpone the land question for parliamentary considera-

tion. But the Bolshevists encouraged the plundering of the large estates and gave it the sanction of the law. This irresistible popular rising, and the general war-weariness —which the Bolshevists also knew how to exploit—served to help them into the saddle. "Land and peace!"

In this way the Bolshevists took advantage of the extremity of their country in war-time to launch the Social Revolution.

Opinions may differ regarding this political coup. But it is worth while to remember that even Napoleon, the enemy of Russia, shrank from the thought of using this weapon. During his Russian campaign in 1812 he might have proclaimed the freedom of the peasants and thus raised the greater part of the Russian people against the rest, with a good prospect of winning the war. In many villages the peasants actually begged him to do so. Napoleon, however, knew the meaning of a social revolution by experience. Foreseeing the horrors which would follow if these ignorant and brutal masses were unleashed, the "war god" refused to employ such a weapon against his foes.

The day after their accession to power the

Bolshevists issued a decree concerning the nationalization of the land. All rights of property in land were formally vested in the State. But the peasants took over the cultivation rights and the actual ownership of most of the land—even if, in a sense, they now became the serfs of the State.

They retained the same *mir* system as before; but now they had more land at their disposal. About a hundred million acres of land, which had belonged to 150,000 landowners, to the Church, and to the imperial family, passed into the hands of the peasants. Many day-labourers who had previously owned nothing now received a holding. The number of households increased from sixteen millions to about twenty-five millions.

III. WAR COMMUNISM

A period then followed in which the Bolshevists had neither money nor manufactured goods with which to pay the peasant for his produce. They had ruined the finance and industry of the country by their Revolution. But food must be got for the Red Army and the workers in the towns. This meant seizing supplies from the peasants by force.

Armed requisition columns invaded the villages, and the peasants on their side did what they could to defend themselves. Free-trading was prohibited. The peasants had to hand over all surplus products to the State without compensation.

In this struggle the Bolshevists sought the aid of the proletariat in the villages, whom they organized in committees and incited against the more well-to-do peasants. It was now the turn of the latter to be plundered and held to ransom, as the landowners had been before. Something like a hundred million acres were transferred from the prosperous peasants to those who were not so well off.

In addition to all this the villages were forced to supply the Red Army with men and horses, and before long the dissatisfaction of the peasantry found vent in frequent risings. Only the follies of the contra-revolutionaries and the peasants' fear of losing their land prevented the country population from joining in a united rising against the Bolshevist tyranny, which would have decided the civil war in favour of the Whites.

When the civil war came to an end, however, and the crops simultaneously failed in

great parts of Russia, the Bolshevist peasant policy resulted in a fearful economic crisis and the well-known great famine. The peasants sowed no more than they needed for their own use, and their live stock dwindled to an extent which spelled disaster. The agricultural industry as a whole failed to produce half the pre-war crops. To save the Revolution Lenin was forced, in 1921, to introduce the so-called "New Economic Policy"—in other words, to revert to more capitalistic methods.

IV. "THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY"

The peasants could now buy and sell as they pleased. In place of requisitioning, a definite land tax was imposed—at first in kind, later in money. The pressure on the well-to-do peasants relaxed. It was permissible once more to hire land and labour.

Russia is so rich and primitive, and the individualistic system is so infinitely superior, that no more than this was needed to start a rapid recovery of agriculture throughout the country as soon as the famine years—1921–23—were at an end.

The peasants thought they had won. If

one mentioned the Bolshevists to a Russian peasant at that time he would smile with amused tolerance. As for the Revolution, why: "It came driving into the village, just had a look round, turned the horse, and drove back to town." But they soon learned their mistake.

In point of fact the Bolshevist land policy had two aims:

(1) A negative aim. This was to prevent the rise of a free and prosperous peasant class, whose naturally capitalistic and conservative leanings would imperil the organization of the Socialist State.

(2) A positive aim. This was to foster closer relations between the proletariat in town and country, and to organize agriculture on a Communist basis in order that the towns might be regularly supplied with provisions and the industries with raw materials.

The party and Soviet officials in the country concentrated almost exclusively on these objects and thought little of improving the conditions of the country population. The new economic policy was, in the words of Lenin, merely one step back in order to take two steps forward.

Keeping these aims steadily in view, the Bolshevists went on applying the Roman precept: Divide and rule. They had divided the peasants into three classes: (1) well-to-do peasants, styled *kulaks*, which means "clenched fists"; (2) small farmers, called in Russian "middle" peasants; and (3) those who own nothing. And Lenin laid down the following tactical rule: "Let your base be those who own nothing; enter into an alliance with the small farmers; never forget for a moment that you are at war with the *kulaks*." The chief means of converting the country population to Communism was to be the co-operative societies.

It would be a mistake to suppose that these much abused *kulaks* are wealthy farmers. The ownership of three cows is enough to make a man a *kulak*. More exactly a *kulak* is a peasant who owns live stock and farm implements to the value of between 800 and 1,000 roubles or more and who can afford occasionally or regularly to hire labourers or land from other peasants who are not cultivating their own holdings. Formally, as I have said, all land is owned by the State. A small amount is kept for State purposes, but most of it is given to

the peasants. The land council of the villages allots a holding to each family according to its size—the average allotment being two acres a head—and this may neither be bought nor sold. Of the 25 million farms in Russia 10 per cent are considered to belong to *kulaks*, between 50 and 60 per cent to small farmers, and between 30 and 40 per cent to unpropertied peasants or paupers.

The Bolshevist classification of the peasants cannot, however, be accepted without qualification.

It would be more correct to say that the natural line of development in the Russian village community since the villagers started afresh (on more or less the same level) leads to a division of the peasants into two, not three, classes. On the one hand there are the hard-working, efficient, and successful peasants who gradually rise, earning profits and adding to their property. On the other there are the lazy, inefficient and unsuccessful ones, who cannot farm their land and are obliged to sell their labour to those who are better off. The Bolshevists lay themselves out to help these weak-kneed individuals against the stronger workers—to aid Lazarus

against the rich peasant. Such an aim would be praiseworthy enough if it were pursued in a reasonable way—if it did not so often mean helping the unworthy against the worthy, and starting a class war which is quite unnecessary, inasmuch as all the peasants have common interests.

Lenin, who had made a close study of these questions, was fully aware that this class war would unavoidably lead to the defeat of the village proletariat if they had to fight their own battle in the villages, and even if the Bolshevists assisted them to the best of their ability. Accordingly he maintained that the best policy was to seek an alliance with the great bulk of the peasants who were not, as yet, so sharply differentiated. Experience has shown that Lenin's reasoning was tactically correct. The vacillating attitude of these intermediate masses has been the deciding factor in the crises of recent years, as it was in the civil war.

After the NEP had been in operation for a couple of years, however, the Bolshevists began to feel anxious about the rate at which matters were developing in the villages. The village community was being differentiated anew. The *kulaks*, who were definitely hos-

tile to Bolshevism, were rapidly growing in numbers and influence. This made it necessary for the Bolshevists to pay increasing attention to the village population, whose problems had hitherto been practically ignored.

V. A REACTION

A Left opposition now arose in the party, led by Trotsky, who wished to suppress the peasants again, swiftly and decisively. People in other countries, and even in Russia, are often under the impression that Trotsky advocated a more moderate policy than the leading Bolshevist group. This mistake is probably due to the mere fact that he was in opposition.

Trotsky, however, had to disappear. There was no room for him and Stalin together. Stalin may, indeed, have been right to some extent; for the Bolshevists were not strong enough in 1925, 1926 and 1927 to launch their main attack on the peasants.

Nevertheless, the pressure upon the well-to-do peasants increased as time went on, and eventually Stalin felt that he must carry out Trotsky's programme. This he did

with greater thoroughness than even Trotsky had contemplated, with the result that a strong Right opposition arose in the party, advocating greater facilities for independent farming.

The Bolshevists were compelled to treat the country population in this high-handed fashion because they had to procure supplies for the towns without abandoning the Bolshevist system. The financial resources of the State were not equal to paying the full price of the corn, quite apart from the fact that this generosity would enrich the peasantry to a dangerous degree. On their side the peasants had now recovered, and were by no means willing to sell their grain at the price offered by the government, especially in view of the continually increasing taxes and the exorbitant price of industrial products. Accordingly the peasants boycotted their Bolshevist rulers.

After a difficult corn campaign in 1928–29 the situation in the autumn of 1929 was so critical that the authorities had to return to the old method of requisitioning supplies, which they had adopted in the days of war Communism. By resorting to forcible

measures of every kind they succeeded in extorting the necessary ten million tons of corn from the peasants at a price of 6 roubles per 100 kilos, though the price in the open market was from ten to fifteen times as much. The peasants were ordered to deliver so much corn, whether they had it or not. If they were short of a certain amount they either had to buy it at a premium, which in itself was of course illegal, or else they were imprisoned, banished, shot or compelled to pay various fines. At the same time the well-to-do peasants were bled white by taxation, whereas the poorest peasants were not only exempted from paying taxes but granted increased facilities in the form of credit, seed corn and agricultural machinery.

VI. THE COMMUNIST AGRARIAN POLICY

The Bolshevists would hardly have dared to bleed the peasants a second time had they not been forced to do so, and had they not been convinced that the moment had come to replace individual farming by the system contemplated in the Marxist programme. This new system involved the following measures :

(1) An immense expansion of the *State farms*; (2) the organization of many small, independent farms as large collective concerns, which could use modern machinery and methods of cultivation; and (3) the extinction of the *kulaks*, or well-to-do peasants, by excluding them from these collective farms, confiscating their property, and banishing them and their families.

In order to understand the dilemma by which the Bolshevists were confronted here we must realize that the enormous increase in the number of farms as a result of the Revolution, and their reduction to a smaller size, has had the effect of immensely decreasing the quantity of agricultural produce available for the towns, even if the aggregate crops are approximately equal to what they were before the war. The total corn harvest in 1929 was estimated at 78 million tons as against 82 million tons before the war; but out of these totals 68 and 61 million tons respectively were consumed by the country population. This leaves only 10 million tons for the towns and for export, as against 21 millions in pre-war days. In view of the fact that the town population has increased

more than 20 per cent it is no wonder that there is a shortage of bread, and that the corn exports, which in pre-war times amounted to as much as 14 million tons, have largely dwindled away.

Having made up their minds that the forces of individualism and capitalism must on no account be let loose in the country, the Bolshevists could have taken no other course than the one they adopted. They hope that it will result in larger crops, which will furnish the necessary corn and other supplies. The productivity of the land in Russia is very low indeed compared with European and American agriculture. Even the stony soil of Norway yields twice or three times as much per acre as the rich soil of Russia. In comparison the Norwegian farmers have four or five times as much productive live stock; and their cows give twice as much milk as the Russian cows. A Russian farm of average size, with a family of five or six persons and ten or twelve acres of land, would seldom have a budget amounting to much more than a couple of hundred roubles a year.*

Will this Bolshevist peasant policy succeed?

* Before . £1.0.0 = 10 roubles.

Its first consequence, at any rate, was a fearful disorganization of Russian agriculture. The exaggerated enthusiasm with which the Bolshevists tried to carry through their land policy very nearly brought about the complete collapse of their administration. The ferment in the country affected the Red Army, which is largely composed of peasant soldiers and therefore reflects public opinion among the villagers. Soon the Central Committee had to put on the brake and proceed more cautiously.

But what is done cannot be undone. The class war is raging more furiously than ever in the villages. A great deal of valuable property has been destroyed; among other things the peasants slaughtered their live stock when they were forced to enter the collective farms. As a result the amount of meat available for the towns has been reduced to less than a third of what it was before the war. Not only so, but the independent farmers, who still hold much more than half the land, have been frightened and do not care to grow more than what they themselves need.

It must not be supposed, however, that the modification of the Bolshevist policy in

regard to the peasants signifies any new departure. It is merely a tactical manœuvre because they realize that they have advanced too far. Their final objective is still the same. No longer are the peasants directly compelled to join the collective farms. The socialization of their poultry, pigs and agricultural implements has stopped. Greater care is exercised in labelling people *kulaks*. But the persecution of the *kulaks* continues: their property is confiscated and both they and their families are driven away from their homes. This policy affects 10 per cent of the peasants—and those the best and most successful cultivators. Together with their families they number several million people.

As for the *State farms*, they are in many ways impressive enough. There are 200,000-acre and even 400,000-acre estates. In two years' time from now they should embrace an aggregate area greater than the area of Canada. At present there are about five thousand farms with a total of six million acres. The Bolshevists have done their best to organize many of these on modern lines as regular corn factories. In view, however,

of the fact that the State farms last year received government grants amounting to 865 million roubles, and that they were expected to deliver 108 million poods (1 pood = 16·4 kilogrammes) of corn at 1 rouble the pood, the undertaking may be regarded with a certain amount of scepticism.

The *collective farms* are said to represent from 30 to 40 per cent of the agriculture of the country, and the ultimate goal is a hundred per cent minus the State farms.

I suppose an English farmer would hardly regard this system of collective farming without an amused shrug of his shoulders—at the same time thanking his stars that he lives on the opposite side of the sea. To the Russian, however, it appears less strange than it does to him. It should be remembered that the agricultural system which has existed in the past and still exists in Russia is in fact collective tenure of the land, though not of the stock or farm implements. Even under the old régime many agricultural experts held that collective farming with modern methods of cultivation would be the best continuation of the traditional system. And it cannot be denied that the natural

conditions in Russia are particularly favourable for industrialized agriculture.

On the other hand great numbers of competent leaders are needed for a system of that kind; and for the peasants themselves it means a new form of slavery. With the sort of government there is in Russia, it is obvious that free collective farming, of the nature that some naïve sect might organize on a basis of brotherly love, is quite out of the question. Here an absolute political and economic administration holds the peasants in a grip of iron, issues detailed instructions for the conduct of their lives, work, and finance, and takes the necessary steps to enforce obedience.

Meanwhile the State has to pay out more and more. Last year the collective farms received from the public purse about 800 million roubles, in addition to 400 million roubles' worth of property taken from the *kulaks*. Hitherto the Bolshevist State has to a large extent lived on the peasants, but what will happen when the peasants too become parasites on the State? And it is by no means certain that the collective farmers are much more willing to sell their corn at a loss than the individual peasants

were. Up to the present, experience seems, if anything, to indicate the contrary.

Collective farming, as a system, has proved unsatisfactory in every country where it has been tried. In Russia also it may very well be a transitional stage leading on to more up-to-date methods of agricultural co-operation by peasants who actually own their farms. Prior to the war Russia had proceeded a considerable distance along the same line of development which carried the agriculture of Denmark from villenage and the collective system to the leading position it now holds. In stopping this natural process and ruining the enterprising independent farmers the Bolshevists are pursuing a policy which can hardly be called other than reactionary. Here, if anywhere, the well-known English definition of Socialism as an attempt to legislate unsuccessful men into success, and successful men out of it, is thoroughly applicable. This policy is described as reactionary even by the Right opposition in Russia, who have quite openly declared that the Bolshevist party fleeces the peasants and treats them more harshly than the worst landowners and officials ever did.

Perhaps the most damning judgment on the Bolshevist policy, however, was pronounced by a Siberian peasant who told me that : " Our labour has become our enemy."

I have dealt at some length with the evolution of the peasant question during the Revolution, partly because it is vital for the understanding of the Revolution itself, and partly because it has an important bearing upon conditions in other countries. No doubt it will be urged that the conditions in Russia are utterly different from those in other countries. As a matter of fact, however, a revolutionary government in any country would probably have to adopt the same peasant policy as the Russian rulers, not only because it is the official Marxist policy, but because revolutionary developments occur with a certain inexorable logic of their own.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

THE chief social aim of Socialism is, as everybody knows, to provide the same conditions for all. The demand for *social justice* is the kernel of Socialism and its most telling appeal to the masses. In this chapter, therefore, we will see how matters stand in Russia with regard to social equality and justice.

The first point which is bound to strike us is that the Bolshevists have not tried to bring about equality by levelling up: they have made no attempt to lift those who are at a disadvantage up to those who are better off. On the contrary their method has been to turn the whole structure of society upside down in the most brutal manner, first allowing the proletariat to "steal the stolen"—to plunder the people who owned anything, and to divide the spoil among themselves.

The most noticeable feature of this social process was that the proletariat, with their leaders and adherents, took possession of all the houses and flats. They turned out the previous owners—if they did not kill them—or at the best allowed them the use of one cramped room or a cellar. Portioning out all the furniture, they settled down in their new quarters, usually with a family occupying each room. When the soldiers parted the garments of Jesus among them, they were thoughtful enough to cast lots for His coat, so as not to spoil it. The vandals in Russia had not so much common sense: they cut up costly carpets in order that everyone might have a piece.

The things that happened in the country when the estates were pillaged were even more outrageous and picaresque.

This is, of course, a short cut to equality, but it leads to equality in misery. A foreign Communist delegate in Russia described the result with unconscious felicity when, in a congratulatory address to the Bolshevist government, he said that no other government could have turned the masses into such *true* proletarians.

Nor is this all. By inverting, as it were,

the strata of society, so that those who were at the top are now underneath, and *vice versa*, Russia has gone to the opposite extreme—and with a vengeance.

Large numbers of the population have practically been deprived of all rights: they are disfranchised; they are not allowed to have ration cards; cannot live where they like; cannot enter any of the public services; and cannot get their children educated. The Bolshevists have even returned to the barbarous principle of holding a person responsible for the sins of others and making him suffer for his social origin. They shoot innocent individuals whom they have seized as hostages or as a reprisal, and penalize people whose fathers or grandfathers once held offices which would not be tolerated now in the Communist system. Justice! How much injustice is perpetrated in thy name!

Instead of equality, what has actually been set up is a regular system of caste:

1. At the top is the Bolshevist aristocracy, which is a privileged class enjoying all the material and other advantages of those in an official position.

2. Next come the industrial workers. These

are flattered as being the chief supporters of the system. But in reality their lot is by no means commensurate with the privileges which they enjoy in theory.

3. The third category consists of other workers, soldiers in the Red Army, and day-labourers on the land.

4. The fourth category includes small peasants and handicraftsmen who have no hired help, and next to them non-party officials and brain workers who have resigned themselves to the Bolshevist régime.

All the rest are pariahs subject to the law of organized arbitrary action. It is also worth noting that as time goes on the soldiers are rising and the workers going down in the official estimation—for obvious reasons.

Even in the privileged classes, moreover, the ideal of equality is very inadequately realized.

The Communist theory demands, of course, absolute equality, even in wages. Outside Russia the Marxist labour parties are against fixing the wages of the workers (though not of the party leaders) in accordance with their efficiency, and they are also against individual agreements. In Russia, on the contrary, collective agreements may be the rule, but there

are also piece-work rates, premiums, and a scale of wages which is infinitely more graduated than that in England or Norway. The average monthly wage is from 50 to 60 roubles. Skilled laboureres can earn up to three times that amount. Unskilled labourers and the bulk of the agricultural labourers have to be satisfied with a rouble a day or less. *)

On the other hand there is naturally a tendency to assimilate the wages of industrial workers and of brain workers proper. Compared with the conditions elsewhere, this is effected by drastically cutting down the wages of the brain worker.

According to the tariff of 1926 an elementary school teacher, for instance, receives 32–44 roubles a month; a secondary school teacher 44–65; a country doctor 65–85; a dentist or chemist 36–53; a judge 50–70, and a chief constable in the country 33–48 roubles. (Theoretically the gold value of the rouble is about two shillings; but its purchasing power is now considerably less than *one* shilling.)

The five years' plan reckons with 98 roubles a month as the average rate of wages to be reached in 1932, in comparison with the miserable 25 roubles which the Russian

*) 1 rouble equals 2/—

worker on an average received before the war—i.e. an apparent quadruplication of the amount. But can anybody who knows the facts doubt that the 100 paper roubles a month in 1932 (which remain to be realized) mean much less than 25 gold roubles in 1913 ?

Members of the party (Communists) receive a maximum wage of between 200 and 300 roubles a month. This applies even to the highest officials of the State. But as most of them are also provided with all kinds of amenities and emoluments (free housing, light, heating, food, a motor-car, doctoring, etc.), they do not feel the burden of financial cares. They cannot, however, be said to live on a lavish scale. The only people who spend money in Russia are—at present—the numerous class of embezzlers and swindlers who continue to flourish in spite of the numbers who are shot or banished.

II. HOUSING AND CONDITIONS OF LIFE

The rates of wages quoted above give some idea of the low standard of life in Russia. And we must remember that in practice these wages are considerably reduced by subscriptions to unions and by all kinds of deductions

to pay contributions or partake in loans. It is complained that these often swallow up from 20 to 30 per cent of the wages.

In the country the budget of a peasant family does not, on an average, amount to more than a couple of hundred roubles a year. What this means, may be judged from the fact that a pair of boots costs from 40 to 50 roubles.

A true conception, however, of the standard of life in Russia can only be obtained by studying the housing conditions. The state of things in the country is not of much importance in this connection, as the bulk of the peasants live as they did before; they have retained possession of their houses, which as a rule are humble cottages.

Turning to the towns, we are confronted by the deplorable phenomenon that what we should regard as a decent home hardly exists any longer in Russia. Even in Moscow there are very few families who inhabit a two-room or three-room flat. The majority have to put up with one room, and many with only part of a room. The floor-space per head in many places is no more than what one may expect to have some day in the churchyard. Think what life means in such circumstances

—when, for instance, a five-room flat has to house six or seven families who use the same kitchen, jostling one another to get at their Primus cooking-stoves: with the same 'conveniences', and the same electricity meter! What endless occasions for quarrelling, intrigues and disorder. Nor can anyone keep his rooms tidy and nice, for fear of the tax inspectors and the reproach of being a bourgeois. The more untidy and poverty-stricken a man's home looks, the more safe he can feel in a political sense.

Hardly anyone ever repairs the houses, and there is practically no upkeep of the flats. Nearly all the houses are owned by the public authorities, or occasionally by co-operative societies, and the rent is graded according to the social position and wages of the tenant. The upkeep is usually left to the occupants, who have neither money for such a purpose nor the inclination to spend it if they had, as they can be evicted at a moment's notice.

The Bolshevist house committees often act in a very arbitrary and autocratic fashion; and it goes without saying that any amount of intriguing, envy, strife and corruption enters into the matter. We, who live in

happier circumstances, can hardly conceive how unbearable people can make the lives of their neighbours in such a desperate situation.

A certain amount of building is in progress —chiefly workmen's dwellings. But it does not keep pace with the increase in population or the decay of the existing houses. The authorities have also tried to encourage private building enterprise; but people will not trust them any longer. Meanwhile, the shortage of houses has become worse and worse with every year of the revolutionary régime.

In such conditions and with insufficient nourishment it is only natural that *vodka* figures largely in the expenditure of most Russians, as suicide does in the statistics of mortality. *Wer hat Sorgen hat auch Liqueur.*

During the last five years the money spent by the workers on alcohol has increased tenfold. And it is calculated that in the country, apart from the spirits sold by the State, more than 600 million litres of brandy are distilled annually from over a million tons of corn in Great Russia alone.

The State monopoly of spirits used to be

one of the chief points in the revolutionary agitation against the old régime. It is a bitter pill for many of the old Bolshevists that they themselves have been obliged to raise money by re-introducing the very system which they attacked so fiercely in the past, and which the Tsarist government ultimately abolished. But a hundred million pounds—the revenue from the sale of spirits—is a lot of money.

Has the position of the workers been improved by the Revolution?

Most of the workers who survived the war would say no. The younger workers, on the other hand, who have never experienced anything but war and revolution, and have been spoon-fed on Bolshevist propaganda for a whole generation, would mostly say yes. In addition to this they all feel a kind of satisfaction at being a privileged class, even though they are under the lash.

Pleased with their present lot few of them can be, but it is possible that the majority still cling to their faith in the promise that Socialism will usher in better times.

The truth is that the lot of the Russian worker does not bear comparison with that

of the British or Scandinavian working man. In the first years of the Revolution the Russian workers suffered indescribable hardships. Under the new economic policy there was some improvement. Now the times are harder again. The workers in our countries have better houses, better food, better clothes, better wages—infinitely better. A striking illustration would be to compare what a Russian workman can get, in his country, in the way of various products and comforts for a week's wages, with what a workman could buy in our countries with *his* wages. To put it in figures, I should say that our working people are from five to ten times better off. To portray the conditions in Russia as desirable is, therefore, either ignorance or a deliberate fraud.

Labour is also in a weaker position in relation to capital now that the latter is united with the executive, although the executive power is wielded in the name of the working class. Bolshevist capital has to compete with capital elsewhere in the world. In order to increase production it is forced to adopt in an extreme form the very methods which are used by Capitalism and which are so violently assailed by the Communists.

Unemployment is quite as formidable a problem in Russia as it is in capitalistic countries. Not to speak of the difference between what is done for the unemployed in Russia and in our countries. But Russia has invented a neat and novel method of reducing the official figures of unemployment: the thing is done by deleting names from the list of unemployed, or by refusing to add them for some reason—usually a political one. In this way unemployment, which a few years ago amounted to millions, does not officially exist any more in Russia. True, the five years' plan is absorbing an increased number of workers, especially skilled labour (Russia is short of skilled labour as mentioned above). But this measure does not even keep pace with the enormous growth of the population. The fact remains that the great bulk of the people is only employed to a very small part of its capacity, and that politically disliked classes or individuals are completely, or partially, barred from employment.

With regard to the seven hours' day, so far as it is adhered to, and the six hours' day promised in the Communist programme, it should be noted that, even in the programme, this number of hours is exclusive of two

extra hours without wages which are devoted to instruction in the political grammar of Bolshevism and to military training.

But this does not end the matter. The Russian workers have to put up with grave departures from the official programme and standards. Often the working day may be one of ten or twelve hours—" on account of the havoc of war and the pressure of imperialism ", as the saying is.

Next to the capitalist class proper, the labouring class is the order of society in Russia which has suffered most by the Revolution—in blood, in prosperity, in every respect.

III. " THE NEW LIFE "

The introduction of the *continuous five days' working week* has, in a sense, completely altered the life of the townsfolk. This new kind of week has altogether done away with Saturday and Sunday; thus the weekly holiday is not the same for everybody, but is distributed all over the week on a group system. Apart from the probability that the system will be found unworkable in industry, this means that a family can seldom enjoy a holiday together.

But the Bolshevists are trying to remodel the social life of their fellow men even more radically than this.

All human societies have been and are based on the grouping of individuals in families. An organization which is rooted in life itself, satisfies our human nature and serves to develop the social sentiments and customs which are necessary for a civilized community. In their endeavour to reconstitute the social life of their fellows the Bolshevists are attacking the family, an institution upon which all great civilizations rest.

How do they envisage the new life?

The family as an economic and social unit is to be split up into its several parts, without any common home. Man and wife are to live in separate lodgings, and they are no longer to be bound by any mutual ties, whether legal or financial. The children are to live and be educated away from their parents, in children's homes run by the State. Should the parents wish to visit their children —the mother might want to do so!—permission can be given, but not too often. (When, for instance, the plans for some new

children's homes included visitors' rooms for mothers, a leading party organ described this idea as " a preposterous lucubration of petty bourgeois mentality ".) Mothers should preferably be encouraged to devote themselves to the care of children in its social aspect, where they will find a much wider and more satisfactory outlet for any maternal feelings they may still retain.

Besides being relieved of the burden of looking after her own children, the woman is to be emancipated from the kitchen in order that, on an equality with the man, she may devote her energies to productive work and social activities. The ideal which floats dimly before the eyes of these social reformers is therefore, the tenement house with a common kitchen, and vast public eating-houses on factory lines.

The Russian politico-social theorists are still very far, however, from the realization of these crazy notions.

The first attempts to organize society in the early days of the Revolution petered out of themselves. The projected children's homes came to nothing for lack of the necessary funds and because sounder human instincts prevailed.

It is only in recent times that the Bolshevists have begun to take up these plans in earnest. In connection with several of the large factory plants they have established children's communes and what are called "Socialist towns", where an attempt is being made to put these ideas into practice.

The numerous cranks in the party have become so keen of late on this far-reaching social revolution that the Central Committee has found it necessary to restrain their zeal. We get some idea of the way the wind is blowing when a circular issued by the Central Committee finds it necessary to warn the hot-heads not only against a too rapid and complete socialization of the lives of the workers, as regards catering, housing, the education of the children apart from their parents, etc., but also against administrative regulations prohibiting individuals from cooking their own meals!

A few "kitchen factories" are now in operation, and are considered satisfactory enough to be shown to foreigners. As a rule, however, the public eating-houses in Russia are indescribable. In these squalid places, where the tables, crowded closely together, are covered with filthy cloths usually made

of paper, people sit cheek by jowl, mostly wearing their caps and outdoor things, while they hurriedly bolt their food. Behind their chairs stand other customers waiting impatiently for their turn; and on the wall are staring red posters which remind them that "The old world has been destroyed; we are building a new one", or that "Without public catering there is no new life".

The children's homes, too, are generally very poor, with a few exceptions. In this connection one is forcibly reminded of the tens, and indeed hundreds, of thousands of orphan and untended children whom one has seen roaming like wild animals along the Russian railways and in the streets and open spaces of the towns.

For the harm which has already been done to home life the direct action Bolshevists cannot altogether claim the credit; it is the result of indirect causes, especially the shortage of houses. The primary condition for a sound home life is, of course, decent housing which admits of a certain amount of comfort and well-being.

Another contributory cause is the great relaxation of the marriage tie, upon which the solidarity of the family so largely depends.

Further, the Bolshevists have introduced the class war into family life, by setting up the young against the old and destroying the authority of parents. Children are openly encouraged to seek the assistance of the public authorities against their parents if the latter disapprove of the new radical opinions. In many instances children have reported their parents as being contra-revolutionary, and have been commended for so doing. There have even been cases where sons have directly voted for the execution of their fathers, with the result that the latter have been shot.

In general it should be observed that the Russian young people and children of to-day are most emphatically a product of war conditions and the Revolution.

More than sixteen years have elapsed since the great war broke out. Most of the people in Russia who are under twenty-five or thirty have seen little else but war and revolution. The principles of Bolshevism have taken as firm a hold upon their impressionable minds as the catechism once did upon ours. Russia's great mission, and the fiction that the state of things in Russia is splendid, after all, compared with the awful conditions in the capitalist countries, have been dinned into

their heads in season and out of season. All this the younger generation of Russians believe, because they have no opportunity to compare their lot with that of others, and because their unrestrained life of excitement and licence has a certain attraction. There are exceptions—few in the towns, but many in the villages.

The Communist young people's association and the Communist scout movement have a membership to-day of three and four millions respectively. It must be admitted that there is a certain amount of idealism in this movement. Their activities, however, and more especially the behaviour of the young people's associations, are such that *komsomolets* (boy in a young people's association) and *komsomolka* (girl in a young people's association) are terms of abuse in the mouth of the average citizen.

Theoretically the Bolshevist Revolution has made *women* absolutely equal with men in every respect. When she marries, a woman can keep both her surname and her nationality. She is supposed to be the equal comrade of the man. But women in Russia do not take much part in public life. Not

more than from 10 to 20 per cent of the party are women.

There is no doubt that this emancipation of women has really given freedom to the women of the Mohammedans and Orientals in Russia, who number twenty millions. Among the Russian peasants, too, the Revolution has certainly given the women more freedom and independence.

But it is no less certain that this complete equality of the sexes is worse for the women when, as in Russia, the reform is not accompanied by any real moral respect for womanhood.

"Wo Sittlichkeit regiert, regieren sie,
Wo Frechheit herrscht, da sind sie nichts."

Generally speaking, it is the women who have lost most by the Revolution, who suffer most by it, are least satisfied with it, and who form the strongest body of opinion against it.

IV. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS

One might expect the people in a Socialist community to become less egotistical, more helpful, and more socially-minded. Far from it. In Russia a man may be dying in the

street, but no one will budge to lend him a helping hand. People think more of themselves and less of others than they did. You are pushed about and sworn at in life as you are in the trams. And in practice the Communist rule has become: "What is yours is mine, but what is mine is not yours."

There is far more real Socialism elsewhere than there is in the country which is so proud of its Socialist title. The system, not the people, is at fault in Russia. And the tree may be known by its fruits. If Western peoples, now well-disposed and helpful, and ready to lend a hand wherever it is needed, were in the same case as the Russians, they would become just as unsympathetic about the misfortunes and sufferings of others, just as envious, and just as irritable. Everyone would find that his own concerns were a sufficient pre-occupation.

Communism, which purports to be a gospel of social redemption, does not bring about a richer growth of noble social sentiments. It kills them.

There are two great commandments in the law which governs human action. The first is self-assertion: the development of our

innate powers and capacities. The second is mutual responsibility—the love of one's neighbour. The first is more in accordance with human nature. The second is more difficult, and it is apt to lead to discrepancies between precept and practice. Nationalism and Fascism use the candid language of egotism. Socialism and Communism inscribe the Christian virtues on their banner but worship utilitarianism in their hearts, and are consequently prone to hypocrisy.

In a Bolshevist society this lack of candour is further accentuated by the conditions of restraint and the fear which oppresses the majority of the people. In Russia the walls have ears. Nothing is safe—neither the post, nor the telegraphic service, nor the telephone. One half of the population is engaged in spying upon, shadowing and informing against the other. As for the O.G.P.U., it has become such a name of terror that people do not even dare to mention it; they refer to it as "the initials", or use some other pseudonym. People must lie and deceive in Russia if they are to live at all under such a reign of terror. And there is the melancholy inheritance from the past as well.

Modern Russia, then, is a society permeated

with espionage, lies and hypocrisy from top to bottom. The hypocrisy of the rulers may be seen in concentrated form in their propaganda and policy—for example in their peace policy and (most cynical of all) in the resolutions with which Russian-learned societies, institutes of engineering, and archbishops are ready to impress the world on suitable occasions.

This public and private insincerity is almost more revolting than the occasional open and impudent avowals of Macchiavellianism. Combined with the system of espionage and informing it contributes more than anything else to give life in Bolshevist Russia its sinister and oppressive character.

That the Bolshevist failure to deal satisfactorily with the social problem is largely due to a violent reaction against the century-old injustice of the Tsarist régime is understandable enough. Some credit is also due to the Bolshevists for their well-meaning if unsuccessful efforts to improve the lot of the lower strata of the Russian population, not least by a comprehensive system of social insurance. It may be that their true historical mission has been—apart from the

destruction of what was useless in the old régime—to awaken the self-consciousness of the lower classes, and to consolidate their position with a bloody hand.

For the rest, the awful Russian example shows that social justice, which is desirable on practical as well as on moral grounds, is *not* attainable by way of a Communist social revolution. It shows, in point of fact, that the disastrous consequences of Bolshevism bear hardest, in the long run, upon the least fortunate members of society, whose lot is merely changed from bad to worse.

Socialist and Communist agitators and organs in other lands, whose praiseworthy object it is to chastise social abuses and injustice, would find that the material in Russia provided them with an *embarras de richesses*. On the other hand they would search in vain for any results to justify the unspeakable crimes against humanity and morality which accompany the attempt to carry out the Communist programme.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURE AND RELIGION

RUSSIA has always been and still remains a secluded, self-contained country. She was drawn into the current of world-civilization at a late date. Christianity was introduced about the year 1000, when it also made its entry into the Scandinavian countries. Russia was then virtually a Scandinavian State with a Nordic upper class and a Finno-Slav lower class. The Russians proper were Scandinavians.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, however, Asiatics overran Russia and ruled the country for three hundred years. This was a calamity for Russia, for it retarded progress by at least as many centuries—especially by the decimation of the leading Nordic classes or the adulteration of the Nordic stock by intermarriage. Besides this, the Russians had derived Christianity and

the Mediterranean type of civilization from Constantinople, which isolated them from Latin-Germanic culture, whose nearest representative, the Latin-Slav State of Poland, actually became Russia's hereditary foe. Eventually the main source of Russian civilization was cut off by the Turkish conquest of Constantinople and the Eastern-Roman Empire in 1453.

In this way the development of Russia came to a standstill. Even as late as two centuries ago the Muscovites in Europe were looked upon as unmitigated barbarians.

In the reign of Peter the Great (about 1700) the Russians began in earnest to adopt the civilization of the West, especially on its material side. Under Peter they acquired it chiefly in its Nordic form (from Holland, England and Scandinavia); later on they turned alternately to Germany and France. At the same period a native culture began to grow up, particularly around the national Church, which came to be the real basis of Russian society. Finally, in the course of last century, a really independent national Russian culture developed. But the vast masses of the people were still plunged in the deepest ignorance while the aristocracy

made a great show of dazzling, but often superficial, European culture.

At the Revolution this borrowed culture of the upper classes was destroyed, giving place to a set of Marxist ideas which were likewise imported. The most significant cultural and religious phenomenon in Russia to-day is the attempt that is being made by Marxism, as a philosophic system, to capture the masses and combine with the national Russian and other national forms of culture to form a new proletarian or Socialist culture. In this the national element—the spirit of Russia—will only be the warp; the woof, on the other hand, which fills in the pattern in colour, will express the Marxist view of life.

Bolshevism, therefore, is not merely a politico-economic-social system; it is also an attempt to create a new form of culture. Bolshevist rule may be unscrupulous, but it has its philosophic side.

Now the philosophy of Bolshevism is atheism and materialism.

One can be a Socialist without being either an atheist or a materialist. But a Communist

must be both—in theory and in practice. A religious or non-materialistic view of life is incompatible with membership of the party.

The materialistic view of nature and of spiritual experience is expanded so as to include human societies, in a special theory of historical materialism which lays stress upon the decisive influence of economic factors, upon the class war, and upon the idea that Capitalism dies in bringing forth Socialism. The whole system is thus a kind of unitary explanation of existence, claiming to be based upon science and experience.

I need not enter into a discussion of this philosophy here—it is a ramshackle building with neither roof nor floor, founded upon a misunderstanding of the relation between mind and reality.

II. BOLSHEVISM AS A WORLD RELIGION

But Bolshevism is more than a world-philosophy. It demands possession of the whole man, and invades every department of human activity. Accordingly it also possesses the character of a world-religion, if we abstract all spiritual ideas and confine ourselves to its emotional content.

Nothing demonstrates this in a more striking fashion than a Bolshevist procession. Isn't it just like looking at a Russian church procession in the old days—except that the crosses and ikons are replaced by waving red flags and propaganda banners? Instead of the hymns there is military music, and the "International". Instead of the priests marching before the flock there is a handful of Bolshevist coryphæi. And instead of well-dressed people one sees a lot of shabby, worn and weary-looking creatures. Russia has fallen out of the frying-pan into the fire.

It may seem sacrilegious to name Christianity and Bolshevism in the same breath; they are such utter contrasts. And yet there are many points of contact, as is so often the case with extreme opposites.

Both are international, and in both the Jews have played an important part in working out the theory and then putting it into practice. Both start from a strong affirmation of the brotherhood and solidarity of mankind. (The first Christian congregations had, as we know, all things in common.) Both address themselves to the oppressed, and proclaim liberty and equality for all peoples and nations.

But Christianity is passive and idealistic, whereas Communism is active and materialistic. Communism promises the oppressed that they shall enter paradise not after death, but here and now in this life. They are to win this reward not by self-renunciation, but by class and civil war. The ultimate appeal, in fact, is not to altruism but to the deepest and worst instincts of human nature: the lust of murder and spoliation. This mixture of humanitarian ideas with robbery and massacre gives to Communism both its attraction and its astonishing offensive power. At the same time, however, it makes Communism not a religion of love but a religion of hate.

With Islam there are, perhaps, even more numerous points of contact. This applies especially to Islam under Mohammed and his immediate successors, in the days when the new faith was propagated by fire and the sword.

The Communist movement centres round the person of Lenin, and its creed might very well be summed up in the formula: There is no God but the World Revolution, and Lenin is its Prophet.

On propaganda posters for use in the

East one may see Lenin portrayed in company with the other founders of great religions. Communism has become Leninism. The twenty-five volumes of his works are quoted like the Koran and the Bible, and it is customary in Bolshevist party discussions for the disputants to floor each other with quotations from Lenin. Were it not for the prevailing materialism and the transparent conditions, the worship of Lenin would doubtless assume mystical forms. The tendency is certainly there.

III. BOLSHEVIST MORALITY

The moral law which governs our actions—however expressed—necessarily presupposes the existence of a higher being than the individual, and amounts in reality to this—that we act in accordance with the will and purpose of that higher being.

To the Bolshevists the higher being is the World Revolution and the establishment of the Socialist order of society, at present represented by the Soviet Union. The World Revolution is not only the medium of redemption, it is also the foundation of morality. Whatever militates against the World Revo-

lution is evil. Whatever promotes the World Revolution is good. This principle is followed even in the penal law. To speak ill of the Bolshevist administration is a more serious crime in Russia than murder.

For nationalism the higher being means the interests of the fatherland. My country, right or wrong.

For the genuinely religious outlook, on the contrary, it is an absolute, supreme being—a divinity, whether conceived as a personal God outside the world-order, or as the immanent, collective spirit of the universe.

By denying the existence of this absolute being, and by basing their morality upon a bloody revolt of the spiritually most backward class of society and upon the party-dictatorship, the Bolshevists have in fact renounced the heritage of our common humanity. Everything is in a state of flux, and it is impossible for other people to find any common ground with them.

The Mohammedans divide the world into two portions: the abode of war and the abode of peace. The abode of war is where infidels live; the abode of peace houses the faithful. In the abode of war anything is lawful which is done with the intention of

overthrowing the infidel dispensation. Similarly anything done by the Bolshevists is permissible if it helps to destroy the Capitalist system and serves the ends of the World Revolution, alias the Soviet Union, alias the party, alias, in the last resort, the Bolshevists themselves.

The attempt to base a standard of values upon such a foundation has invariably led to disaster in the past. And in Russia we see once again that it has resulted in utter confusion and corruption, both of ideas and morals.

IV. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION

Obviously a militant quasi-religion, such as Bolshevism is, cannot tolerate the existence of any rival sect. This is the main reason why the Bolshevists have carried on religious persecution ever since they came into power—persecution which has become so rigorous of late that it has attracted the attention of the whole world.

In the very first days of the Revolution they abolished all State grants for religious purposes, confiscated some seven million acres of land from the churches and monasteries,

disfranchised the clergy and forbade them to teach, and closed about a thousand monasteries and convents which had contained 80,000 monks and nuns.

Later on, during the famine, the Bolshevists availed themselves of the opportunity to relieve the churches of a large part of the valuables which "superstition had collected", and since then the struggle between the religious bodies and the Bolshevists has become more and more acute.

The Bolshevists plan of campaign is to proclaim religious liberty far and wide, and simultaneously to suppress religion by persecuting, imprisoning, banishing and shooting its adherents. Churches, synagogues, mosques and meeting-houses are demolished or converted into clubs, eating-houses or cinemas. Anti-religious teaching and propaganda is ordered and subsidized. Saturday and Sunday have been abolished, and so on. The Bolshevists have also more subtle weapons in their armoury. Thus they can say to a young woman who works to support her mother and herself: "We have noticed that your mother goes to church. Either she must stop doing so or we must dismiss you."

Liberty of thought and religion as we under-

stand it in Europe or America is simply inconceivable in Bolshevist Russia, where a dictatorship, not only in political and economic matters but in the social and spiritual sphere as well, oppresses every point of existence with the most cruel and petty tyranny. Liberty of thought exists in Russia only for those who think or pretend that they think the same as Marx and Lenin. One of the most characteristic traits of the Bolshevist mentality is a mania for persecution. And the aim of Bolshevist religious policy, clearly enunciated in the official programme, is the complete annihilation of all that is commonly termed religion.

If the religious bodies have nevertheless enjoyed comparative immunity up to two or three years ago (the church bells were silenced far sooner in the French than in the Russian Revolution), the explanation is that the Bolshevists were afraid to challenge and strengthen religious sentiment by too rigorous measures. In connection with the intensified class war, however, they ventured upon a great offensive—which again abated somewhat in face of the reaction it provoked in other countries. Thus they advance, at intervals, towards the goal. The ABC of

Leninism states that the proper education of children and young people will result, after one or two generations, in the complete eradication of religion from Soviet Russia.

Here, however, as in so many other directions, there is a complete lack of sympathy between the great bulk of the people and their rulers.

The old religious bodies, and not least the Greek Catholic Church, had certainly their weak points. But in contrast with the new rule these weaknesses are no longer remembered. The fascination of the old days has increased threefold. Even the late Tsar is included: he is invested with a martyr's halo and is well on the way to being canonized by popular opinion. The strongest supporter of these "reactionary" feelings is the Church —and that is why the Bolshevists fear it.

Moreover the Bolshevist attack on religion is really founded on a far-reaching error. The belief that "religion is dope for the people" —an invention of the upper classes, enabling them more easily and completely to exploit the proletariat—is the cornerstone of the whole Bolshevist position in regard to religion. This Marxist axiom has been engraved

in stone at the entrance to the Kremlin in Moscow, as the official Bolshevist exposition of their highly unimaginative conception of religion. It is characteristic, too, that their propaganda against religion is solely occupied with more or less unimportant details—just the things which, on a superficial view, are apt to repel us. As for the essence of all religion, to which a more profound study invariably brings us back, namely man's dependence upon the universe—they have no eye for it and reject it out of hand with the rest.

Great numbers of Russians, however, understand this truth instinctively, even if they cannot grasp the concept in a clear form. They understand that man is not alone in the world, that the World Revolution cannot be the true God, and that it is an impossible foundation for morals. They see, in fact, that morality and everything else will degenerate if people are brought up, like the present generation in Russia, to believe that they have no sheet-anchor in life.

It should also be remembered that religious persecution in Russia is not solely concerned with religion. In reality it is aimed at all freedom of thought and development.

V. SCIENCE AND THE ARTS

In his book on Russia in 1923 Fridtjof Nansen wrote:

"The Government's intolerance astounds and embitters foreigners, for whom liberty of thought and word represent an inalienable right. It is to be hoped that the Russian authorities will gradually understand this; they should find it the easier, it seems to me, in that they no longer need fear any attacks from without; and at home the political passions have cooled down."

The Bolshevists have completely belied Nansen's hopes. It was inevitable that they should: otherwise they would not be Bolshevists.

Just as in the Middle Ages science and art were the handmaidens of the Catholic Church, so now, in Russia, they have to subserve Bolshevist policy. The Bolshevists insist that every branch of science and scholarship shall set out from dialectical materialism and promote the cause of World Revolution and the class war. With the intimate connection that exists between all questions of principle, a philosophy of life must be consequent throughout if it wishes to leave no vulnerable places in its armour. This is why the Communist professors are so industriously revising all

the sciences in accordance with the spirit of Marxism. Biology, for instance, must now teach that acquired characteristics can be inherited. The reason is that this theory—the tenability of which has yet to be proved—minimizes the effects of the destruction of valuable hereditary material which has taken place during the Revolution and is still proceeding, and that it justifies the hope that the new form of society will produce a new and higher type of humanity. At the same time the Marxist men of science are favoured in every possible way as compared with their colleagues who do not accept the theories of Communism, and who are gradually being weeded out.

Of true science there is only one criterion: it must be sincere. This is its most essential characteristic. If science does not keep to the truth it belies its own nature. And without freedom to prosecute its researches it can never thrive. These considerations carry no weight, however, in a country where a professor can be dismissed for writing a scientific work which omits to mention Lenin!

Another point. The Catholic Church, whose authority was supreme in the Middle Ages both in theory and in practice, recog-

nized at all events the priority of the intellect. The Bolshevists, on the contrary, put manual labour first—at least in theory. In practice this means that the most wretched conditions are accorded to the learned professions—despite the Bolshevist talk of the value of scientific knowledge, and the occasional grants they make for certain purposes.

When new religious and moral ideas arise they quickly find expression in new artistic forms. The Bolshevists, like the mediæval Church, are anxious that *art*, as well as science and letters, should be the handmaiden of their faith.

Every form of art is made to subserve the ends of policy and propaganda. Of course a sharp watch is kept at the same time to see that nothing appears in the realm of art which might smack of contra-revolution or disapproval of the Bolshevist administration. The censorship is so rigorous in this respect that it even proposes to prohibit the broadcasting of Russian folk-songs which might make people sigh for the good old days. The most usual pieces at the theatres are those which portray the class war and the victory of the proletariat. And Russian propaganda

films are familiar in other countries, though not in their crudest form.

But besides this false political art, which is an artificial product of Marxist studies, and besides remains of the old Russian artistic achievements in music, the drama, the ballet, etc., there is a new and genuine art, welling up spontaneously from the hidden springs of existence, which reflects the life of the individual and of society with transparent sincerity. We find it in literature, in the drama, in painting, in architecture and in nearly every other form of art.

What does this 'proletarian' art tell us? It tells us of the agonized soul of the Russian people, and of the national aspirations of the many races who inhabit Russia. For the rest there are three features which are particularly noticeable.

First, this art is intensely primitive. The effect produced, when one sees these new artistic productions—for instance, the painted china—side by side with the refined art of pre-war Russia, is that of a sudden relapse into the Stone Age.

Second, this art is vague, nebulous, indefinite and bewildered. Those who are inclined to doubt that the Russian Revolution is a

neurosis and a witches' dance which has lost all sense of direction, should take the trouble to read the new Russian poets and study the new Russian painting. This would tell them far more than Russian statistics do. Art is such a true mirror of the life of society that one might say that the Revolution even cast its shadow before in the new art. No one can read Russian futurist poetry or look at Russian futurist pictures from the days before the Revolution without a strong feeling that something very terrible was about to occur.

A third characteristic of the new art in Russia is that it is ugly and in bad taste—an aberration in keeping with the evil times. It neither aspires to beauty nor seeks the true path of development. But it portrays life as it is, a thing discordant, foul and repulsive!

VI. BOLSHEVISM AND POPULAR EDUCATION

Since the Bolshevists regard scientific knowledge and art in the way I have described, it will astonish no one that their chief educational aim is not the enlightenment of the people, but the exploitation of the schools for

propagandist purposes and as a means of reorganizing society on a Communist basis.

In the first place the principle of class distinctions is consistently applied in popular education. The proletariat are given the precedence, while a large proportion of the children of the bourgeois class can get no education, particularly no higher education. In addition to this, the whole system of popular education is deliberately designed to bring up and confirm the pupils in the doctrines of Communism. The teaching given drives many parents to despair, and many teachers too. But the latter, especially in the elementary schools, are obliged to profess at least a nominal belief in Marxism.

Only half the population of Russia above eight years of age can read and write. And it will be many a long day before Russia can carry out the projected four years' compulsory education in elementary schools. Even now the proportion of school children and students to population is only about one third of what it is in a normal civilized country.

The secondary schools and courses of study are still less satisfactory, and generally maintain a very low standard as compared with

the Russian secondary schools of former days. The students who enter the universities and colleges know less than children of fifteen in our schools in Western countries.

In order to augment the numbers of educated people, of whom there are so few, the Russian universities and colleges have to make their courses as short as possible. As their human material is poor in quality, the results are not encouraging. Half the students are now workmen; and it is becoming increasingly the rule to accept working class students only, in order to swell the ranks of the politically reliable officials in posts which presuppose an academical education. The demand for educated people also makes it necessary to build a great many new colleges. It is estimated that the number of teachers must be raised from ten thousand to thirty thousand in the next two years if these colleges are to be staffed. The effect of all this upon the standard of education can easily be imagined.

It will be seen, then, that the whole educational system in Russia is becoming proletarian in more senses than one. On the positive side it is characterized by the same tendency

which prevailed in the French Revolution, inasmuch as the chief stress is laid upon instruction in technical science.

For the rest there is little to be said about the educational work that is being carried on under the auspices of Bolshevism. The efforts to raise the popular standard of intelligence cannot compare in value with what is being done in most other countries. To complete the picture, however, it should be added that the programme for popular enlightenment drawn up by the Bolshevist Party includes as one of its objects: "The development of propaganda for Communist ideas on the most far-reaching lines, and the utilization to this end of the organization and funds of the State."

This form of instruction is carried on by two departments, one for "propaganda" and the other for "agitation", which are under the direct supervision of the Central Committee. It may safely be asserted that this work, and the organization of espionage, are the only social activities in which Communism has shown marked efficiency.

VII. THE RACIAL BASIS OF BOLSHEVISM

The world is governed by thoughts, though not always by those who think them. Thoughts which arise in the minds of the elect take shape in discoveries, inventions and ideas, to become, in due course, the property of the masses and revolutionize men's lives.

Ideas are also the mainspring of the Russian Revolution, as I have tried to show. Lenin himself was more a thinker than a politician. And in reality the Revolution was due to two words: *Land* and *Peace*.

But men's ideas, religion, language, learning, art and institutions are all forms under which the spirit of race expresses itself. Race —the inherited physical and mental constitution of a people—is also to a certain extent the vehicle of a particular philosophy of life. A typical illustration of this may be seen in the spread of Protestantism, which practically coincides with the distribution of the Nordic race.

There is little doubt that Socialism—apart from its adherents among the Jewish intelligentsia—is mainly prevalent in the short-skulled Alpine race, which includes the bulk of the lower classes in Central Europe and the

majority of the original Slav inhabitants of Eastern Europe. In the case of Bolshevism, we find that this revolutionary development of Socialism exists as a mass-movement precisely in those parts of Russia where there is most Asiatic blood in the Slav population. Bolshevism might be described as an Asiatic-Slav movement led by Jewish minds.

This is all the more striking in view of the circumstance that a similar Asiatic racial foundation underlay the Bolshevist revolutions in Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland. In Czecho-Slovakia, too, where the Communists are so strong, there is considerable Asiatic racial element.

In these countries Bolshevism partially runs in the blood, and will be difficult to eradicate until the popular mind has learnt wisdom from bitter experience. In Western lands, on the contrary, Bolshevism is a matter of confused thinking ; the evil is not so deep-seated, and should be easier to cure by a simple clarification of ideas. Neither Socialism nor Communism suits the Nordic temperament, with its strong individualistic bias.

From very early times Russia has been an arena where the Nordic and the Asiatic

mentalities have carried on a struggle for the mastery.

This struggle has now spread westwards to our own peoples and infected our own minds. We may even say that the sharpest antagonisms in the world to-day, especially, perhaps, in my own country of Norway and in Germany, amount in the last resort to a duel between the Nordic-European principle and the Asiatic-Oriental principle, i.e. Bolshevism.

In this world-struggle the forces of Marxism are advancing on a wide front based on a complete system worked out to the last detail, which embraces every department of human life and provides a universal philosophy that can, with skill, be made acceptable to the masses. It might, indeed, be still more correctly styled a universal religion, in which a belief in terrestrial utopias takes the place of a belief in Heaven. In this religion one-third of my own countrymen profess to believe.

The only way to wean people from this brachycephalic religion and prevent the ultimate triumph of Marxism is by organizing a comprehensive and thoroughgoing educative campaign.

People must be made to realize that their salvation depends upon their Nordic

origin and character, and upon a truly religious and responsible philosophy of life. Like every other society which is struggling to surmount a great crisis they must draw upon their own natural principles, and thence derive a fresh access of power.

CHAPTER VIII

RUSSIA AS AN EXAMPLE

IN the preceding chapters I have tried to paint a picture of the internal conditions in Communist Russia. It is not intended to be a photograph. I have been obliged to pass over many things, or to deal with them quite briefly. Nor has it been possible to enter much into detail. As a whole, however, this sketch should give a correct impression of the actual conditions existing in Russia to-day.

Many have fallen in love with Bolshevist Russia without having seen the object of their affection.

The bitter truth is that the Russian Revolution has little to teach us, except as a terrible example. Unquestionably, too, the Bolshevists are Russia's Jacobins, for good or evil. The great tragedy of the Revolution is that the Russian people, after thirteen years of incredible suffering, are on balance far worse off than they were before. A student of the

Russian Revolution in its present form will find many features which remind him not only of the French Revolution but of the state of things in Russia under the old régime. Most of the defects which invited the violent criticism of revolutionary agitators and shocked the rest of the world, are still the curse of Russia, usually in an aggravated form: absolutism, lack of liberty, militarism, disregard of the individual and his rights, the secret police, famine, social inequalities, unsolved peasant problems, the State monopoly of the sale of spirits, etc. etc.

Lenin and his followers have been good house-breakers but bad builders. New catastrophic changes are the prospect in Russia to-day, as they were a generation ago.

As we look back at this gloomy picture two questions arise which need an answer, but should be kept apart:

(1) Can Communism really last in Russia?

(2) How far does the Russian experiment help to solve the burning world-question: Capitalism or Socialism?

I. SOCIALISM IN ISOLATION

The question as to whether it is possible to establish Socialism in Russia alone has led,

as everyone knows, to a great deal of controversy in the Bolshevist party. The Left opposition inspired by Trotsky hold that it cannot be done, because Russia is too backward, both industrially and in general civilization. Further, they look upon the socialization of millions of peasant farms as a problem which defies solution. Unless, therefore, Communist revolutions can soon be stimulated in other great countries, they believe that Communism in Russia will have to give up and relinquish the field to some other form of government.

The dominant centre of the party led by Stalin, and also in a way the Right opposition, argue on the other hand that Socialism can and must be carried through in Russia, even if the World Revolution be delayed. This attitude must, of course, be maintained simply in order to prevent the toiling masses of Russia from losing heart and patience. Besides which there may be a certain amount of justification for such a view.

Russia is a self-contained world, a vast and immensely rich country which is well adapted in every way to be self-supporting. At the same time she is an undeveloped country, whose industrial life is based on a primitive

form of agriculture, and whose inhabitants are very patient, frugal and unused to free institutions. In these circumstances it is possible to indulge in economic experiments which would quickly come to grief elsewhere. It was a stroke of good fortune for Communism that the Revolution broke out, not in one of the most *highly* developed of the great capitalistic communities—as Marxist theory anticipated—but in one of the *least* developed.

The Bolshevists are still firmly in the saddle. They still command all the salient points in the life of the nation. The socialized sector of economic life is growing larger ; the private capitalistic sector is being reduced to ever-smaller dimensions. In the towns all obstacles to the organization of the Socialist community have been removed. In the country, on the other hand, the difficulties are considerably greater. But supposing the Bolshevists succeed in breaking the opposition of the peasants as well—which is now dangerously possible—there seems little reason why Russia should not struggle on with her Socialist system, notwithstanding all its drawbacks, if we take nothing but the internal conditions into account. That an institution is bad and unpopular does not necessarily

mean that it cannot continue, as is best proved by the example of pre-war Russia.

It is possible, of course, that the difficulties which beset the Bolshevists at all points in their home policy may prove too great in the aggregate; or the internal dissensions in the Communist party may lead to modifications of the system which will give the Revolution a new direction. Even that, however, would not mean the disappearance of Bolshevism. For a new generation saturated with Communist ideas is growing up and adding new fuel to the Revolution, although many of the older Communists are heartily sick of it.

Had it not been for the Manchurian war there would have been no revolution in Russia in 1905. Had there been no world war there would have been neither the March Revolution nor the November Revolution in 1917. Nowadays, of course, the internal situation is far less stable than it was under the last of the Tsars. In particular, the unfortunate peasant policy adopted by the Bolshevists is bound to have a profound effect upon every other department of the national life. Nevertheless it is difficult to see how a complete change could come about in Russia unless the Bolshevists became involved in serious conflicts

abroad. They are always ready to modify their principles a little when needful (as in the case of NEP), and they are never niggardly of promises at a pinch. But how will the world react in the long run to a Russia of this kind? And how will a Russia of this kind react to the rest of the world? These are the great questions which, together with the peasant policy, the policy of nationalities, and the suicidal racial policy, will sooner or later bring about the ruin of the Bolshevists.

Marxism was mistaken in its forecast of where the social revolution would break out. It will be mistaken also about the World Revolution. There will be no Marxist World Revolution. But revolutionary outbreaks may be expected in various parts of the world, especially as long as the Bolshevists are in power in Russia. *To underrate the power and capabilities of the Bolshevists in Russia is, therefore, to underrate the danger of revolution in the world.*

On the other side, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the question of the continuance of Bolshevism in Russia is really independent of the question as to whether Communism and Socialism are of value in themselves. A man who takes over a large and

highly productive farm may cultivate it very badly and yet make a living—perhaps even get a good harvest now and then. Similarly the Bolshevists may hang on in Russia, and may even be able to secure some—at any rate quantitatively—impressive results, quite apart from the influence of Communism or Socialism. One might go further and assert that such results will appear sporadically, not *owing to* Bolshevism, but *in spite of* Communism and Socialism.

II. CAPITALISM OR SOCIALISM?

It is perhaps too early, therefore, to express any definite opinion regarding the probable fate of Communism in Russia. Moreover we shall have to come back to this subject after considering Russia's foreign policy. But when we turn to the second question, regarding the inherent value of Communism and Socialism as a system, it cannot be denied that the evidence is amply complete and decisive enough to justify definite conclusions.

Even if we had seen no more of the Revolution than its effects in the purely *physical* domain (public health and race), this would be

enough to stamp Bolshevism as one of the most sinister influences in the history of mankind. The humanitarian will be appalled at the fearful loss of life all round as a result of the Revolution. The more academically minded observer will probably think chiefly of the havoc the Revolution has wrought among the intelligentsia and the most valuable human material in Russia.

From both points of view Bolshevism is a crime—an infinitely greater crime than any which can be laid at the door of capitalists or imperialists. From the latter standpoint especially (the racial loss) it is a sin against the Holy Ghost of history, not to be forgiven here or hereafter.

These are the things that a clique of revolutionaries invite us to repeat. It is much to expect of our countrymen, especially of the workers and those who sympathize with the aspirations of Labour.

In order to reassure us, we are told that such things as have happened in Russia could never happen in such civilized countries as our own. What a superficial argument, if it is used in earnest ! What ignorance it reveals of the real state of things and of human

nature! Those of us who have seen a social revolution, not only in Russia but in other countries, cannot be so easily reassured. The refusal to look facts in the face is only too reminiscent of the attitude of those who in pre-war days asseverated that a European war was an impossibility.

Now the fact is that the social revolution which, for instance, the present leaders of the Norwegian Labour party are "actively fighting for"—I quote their printed phrase—would be relatively as cruel and destructive of human life in Norway, or in other countries, as it has been in Russia. During the short time that the revolution in Finland lasted, the Reds murdered close upon 2,000 bourgeois; from 3,000 to 4,000 lost their lives on both sides in the fighting; from 5,000 to 6,000 Reds were shot; and 10,000 died of hunger, although the famine had not yet begun in earnest. In Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany and every other country where a Communist revolution has been attempted, similar massacres have invariably occurred.

Northerners should be under no delusions regarding the superior strength of their own civilization. A strong undercurrent of Viking blood still runs in the veins of most of us.

Although Northerners have never been prone to wanton cruelty, they have not flinched from putting out their enemies' eyes or carving the blood-eagle on their backs. In the rougher days of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers it was still in many parts of Scandinavia the custom for women to take a shroud with them when they attended a country feast. And what about the great war?

Most people are not so civilized after all. They are not really held in check by moral convictions (as they may suppose), but by fear of the arm of the law and above all by the established traditions and customs of society. When these authorities are weakened or overthrown, as invariably happens in a social revolution, the low human instincts awake to life, and men use their intelligence only to be more bestial than the beasts themselves. At such times the wolves emerge from the forest. Old and new criminals take advantage of the absence of restraints. Subterranean forces of this kind play a great part in every social upheaval; the most ghastly examples could be quoted from Russia.

It is also absolutely certain that Communist revolutions in our countries would result in a terrible famine. The agricultural output

would automatically decline, and supplies would no longer find their way to the towns. Moreover, we should not be able to import sufficient supplies from abroad, even if we were not blockaded, which might easily happen. All hopes of assistance from Russia would be illusory and would depend upon what suited Moscow best.

I myself have seen how the Ukraine, after the Revolution had won the day there, had to send its corn to Great Russia in the middle of its own appalling famine. When, for instance, I reached the Black Sea province of Nikolayev in 1922, the local authorities estimated that 700,000 people were starving in that province alone; but grain transports were still being sent to the north.

Far be it from me to suggest that there is necessarily better stuff in our upper classes than in the lower strata of society. Our countries differ from Russia in that the common people in town and country form, generally speaking, our racial centre of gravity. But, for all that, the destruction of educated intelligence and stored-up personal culture and experience which accompanies social revolutions is a very serious matter.

These indisputable facts regarding the effects of revolution should prove sufficient to banish all thoughts of a Communist revolution from normal minds, whether in Norway, in Great Britain, or elsewhere.

As things are, a Communist revolution would never be ultimately successful in the Western world. But it might do irreparable damage. Surely the peoples of Europe have had enough of this revolutionary talk—they should refuse to listen to any further discussion of the matter. To advocate a Bolshevist revolution in our countries is not politics but a crime. The public should insist on restoring the authority of the State; they should insist that their rulers bear not the sword in vain, but safeguard labour, property, and the peaceful organic development of the nation.

In 1917 Kerenski had a prolonged opportunity to render the Bolshevists harmless, which could have been done with comparative ease. But he waited until it became dangerous. And when it became dangerous he postponed it until it was no longer possible. The politicians and electors who adopt a tolerant attitude towards revolutionaries will find to their cost that liberalism of that kind

is totally out of place in the perilous times which lie ahead of us.

Maybe the world is so constituted that great results cannot be achieved without great sacrifices. But Russia shows us what is gained by the blood-offerings of Communism. And the information contained in the preceding chapters should have made it clear that however different the conditions in Russia and Europe may be, the results would be the same. The danger may be compared to a disease. For although the symptoms vary in different cases, the disease remains the same in its general character.

In Russia we had, first, a period of the most appalling destruction which reduced the country's industries to less than one-fifth of what they had been, agriculture to less than one-half, and money to nothing, wiped out twenty million people, and ruined the lives of a still greater number.

This was followed by doctrinaire and febrile efforts to build up a new Socialistic community. These efforts have not yet reached the stage of development which had been attained before the work of destruction began; and still the destruction goes on.

Before the war the economic development of the Russian Empire was proceeding at a great rate. Agriculture, as we have seen, was being modernized. Russian industry was growing at the rate of 4 per cent per annum. Had it not been for the Revolution, the staple industries of the country would have doubled their output by now, and the conditions would have been ripe for a more than American expansion.

A calculation based on the Bolshevist official Statistics (which are certainly too optimistic) shows that the Revolution has so far entailed a *loss on production* of approximately £10,000,000,000 in the case of the manufacturing industries, and rather over £10,000,000,000 in the case of agriculture—a total loss on Russia's staple industries of more than £20,000,000,000. Every year the loss increases by milliards of pounds. To this must be added the direct destruction of values amounting to vast sums. One need only recall the account which the Bolshevists themselves presented to the Allies in respect of the alleged damage done by them in the civil war. A social revolution is certainly bad business, except perhaps for those who engineer revolution and who often live *on* Socialism rather than *for* it.

When we consider, moreover, that the Russian Revolution rapidly reduced the output of the manufacturing industries to less than 20 per cent (the metal industry dropped to 5 per cent) and that ten years elapsed before these industries began even to approach their former level, it is evident that a social revolution would be still more disastrous in a modern industrial community. A revolutionary earthquake of the kind which did not lay the Russian peasant cottages in ruins, would completely shatter a Western community and turn it into a desert. A social revolution is like measles: it is more dangerous to adults than to children.

Nor is it Communism alone that has revealed its impracticability in a thousand ways. The whole economic system of Socialism has been shown up in the Russian experiment.

Socialism may live on in Russia, and it would be strange indeed if its promoters could not make *something* out of it in such a wealthy country, however grossly they mismanaged things. But three-quarters of the population of Russia, who have made personal trial of Socialism, are thoroughly convinced that the industries of Russia would

rapidly recover, and that every class would benefit, if only the economic principles of Socialism could be abandoned. The whole nation yearns for this.

That the improvement would, in fact, be very rapid if the country returned to a more individualistic system, came out very clearly in the days of the "new economic policy", when the Bolshevists had to allow Russian industries more liberty for a time in order to save Communism and themselves. Foreigners who have managed to get a peep behind the scenes know that this is true. The argument that Bolshevist Russia can build big factories and other plants proves nothing; for this, as I have said, has nothing to do with Socialism. If Socialism is responsible for anything here, it is for the slipshod and wasteful way in which the work is generally done.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the Communist experiment in Russia is, therefore, *that Socialism as an economic system has been utterly compromised, both in its revolutionary and in its reformist aspects.* To-day, if ever, there is some truth in the old saying that Russia stands outside the rest of humanity, and that her mission in

the world is to act as a warning to the other peoples of the earth.

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate all the arguments for and against Socialism which are to be found in the literature of the subject. But I will mention five salient points which strike one in Russia, which hold good equally for other countries, and apply to Socialism as well as to Communism.

(1) The *lack of economic liberty* under Socialism, with all the disastrous and intolerable effects of so much compulsion, both for the individual and the community.

(2) Things cannot be done properly without *unity of command.* The best way to carry on any undertaking is to appoint one responsible head, with the necessary authority, means, and time, and a free hand to show what he can do. Theoretically this system could perfectly well be adopted in a Socialist society. But experience proves that the difficulties are very great in a self-styled Labour State, especially when individualistic methods are despised as bourgeois and contemptible. Lenin realized the advantages of the one-man principle of leadership long ago, and fought for its adoption in Russian

industry. But the Communist schools in his country teach the pupils to solve their problems collectively. And Stalin still rages against the factories for being parliaments instead of engines of production.

As regards *responsibility*, we see how the industrial leaders in Russia waver between two extremes: irresponsibility and the fear of responsibility. This failing has inflicted immense losses upon the country's industries.

(3) Another, and apparently an unavoidable consequence of the Socialist system is the incredible prevalence of fruitless and offensive *bureaucratic* methods, and a perfect orgy of statistics, projects, inspection, reports and correspondence all over Russia. All this red tape means a fearful waste of time and energy, which the Bolshevists strive in vain to remedy.

(4) *The disastrous consequences of introducing politics into trade and industry.*

Anyone who has studied military history knows how military operations suffer when politicians interfere with the military command. In the economic sphere such interference appears to be still more fatal. Not only are irrelevant considerations often allowed to decide the issue, with results that

are unfortunate, but there is another great disadvantage of which one sees abundant examples in Russia. The individualistic system with its seemingly chaotic economic organization is to a certain extent self-regulating. As soon as a demand arises, someone is ready to supply what is needed. In the Socialist system, on the other hand, everything is centralized in the politico-economic command. This is supposed to play the rôle of economic providence, and as such it should be omniscient and omnipresent, which unfortunately it is not. As a result the machinery is always breaking down, now in one place, now in another. It is much as if all the bodily functions were conscious and demanded the attention of the mind all the time.

(5) The Socialist system is also confronted by insuperable obstacles, in the purely *human* sphere. With very few exceptions people are constituted in such a way that they are most careful, industrious and zealous where their own interests are concerned, and when they can look forward to the undisturbed enjoyment of the fruits of their labour. Of this truth one sees both the obverse and the reverse in Russia.

Socialism has not had an edifying influence there. On the contrary, as I have said, people think more than ever of their own interests and what they can get for themselves. And it seems less immoral to take something from the State than from one's neighbour. Particularly as the ideal of Communism is that every man should give what he can and take what he needs.

Thus, if psychological factors are mainly responsible for attracting the masses to Socialism, they are also the reef upon which Socialism founders.

The fact that Socialism is a *faith* makes every theoretical discussion of it futile and fruitless. When, however, Socialism is adapted to the conditions of real life, it at once becomes evident that its neglect of psychological factors reduces the efficiency of industry and increases the cost price in a way which is highly injurious to the whole community, including the workers. The Socialistic system not only involves the loss of economic freedom—the worst slavery of all—but results in a reduction of all material advantages such as houses, goods, etc., thus sensibly lowering the standard of life in every class of society.

The chief accusation brought against the capitalist system is that the profits are not employed as they should be to improve the lot of the working class. But this desired improvement is precisely what one does not get by applying the principles of Socialism and Communism—on the contrary. This is what the Russian example shows in unmistakable fashion. The conditions under which the workers live in Russia are worse than they are in any country in Europe. And they are worse now than they were three years ago.

Far be it from me to defend the present capitalist system through thick and thin. The existing system certainly needs reforming. Our people and society as a whole will not regain the sense of unity until the relations between labour and capital are changed, possibly by the industrial workers becoming part-owners of the capital. Moreover, there must be a more deliberate regulation and encouragement of development in all the staple industries, in order to ensure sound and steady economic progress with the fewest possible reactions. Economic reforms should aim at the full exploitation

of our natural resources, and at making the best use of our valuable human material. There should be closer co-operation between the different departments of the same industry: labour, technical workers, administration, and capital. We also need some national organ, representative of the different industrial and trade organizations, through which these organizations could directly voice their views, and in which they would form a unit expressing the organic development not only of rival sections but of society as a whole.

But all these reforms, and more, can be carried out on the basis of the existing system and without restricting the freedom of industrial life and private initiative. What is wanted, indeed, is to reduce governmental economic interference to a minimum. The intervention by the State in economic production should take place only when private initiative is lacking, or is insufficient, or when the political interests of the State are involved. The State should play the part of a wise gardener. But the introduction of Socialism—even by Act of Parliament or by the popular method of continually increasing taxation—would result in a fearful set-back to social development.

This is Russia's clear and urgent message to all lands and all times. And to the working class she adds the special warning that the labour movement and Marxism should be kept strictly apart.

Many people feel it as a personal defeat if they have to admit this failure of Socialism. But it is something, after all, to have trodden the way which leads to the truth.

The workers, in particular, should realize that the costly experiments in Russia have not been useless, inasmuch as they have definitely shown that both Communism and Socialism are injurious in every department of life. They should take notice of the fact that the Socialist State has shown itself in its true colours as a *police* State, and Socialist industry as the worst form of capitalism, namely State capitalism carried on by a political party clique.

The point at issue, therefore, when all's said and done, is not Capitalism or Socialism; for both are capitalism, and the latter is more ruthless and less social than the former. The real question is: *Individualism or Socialism?* Should the economic system be based upon the productive activities of individuals in free competition and co-operation, or

solely upon collective activities, in which the individual is nothing but a cog on one of the wheels of the State machine? The latter system ignores the fundamental truth that human progress, however much it is bound up with the society, depends upon individuals and attains its end in them. Nothing has done more harm in Russia than this fatal defect in the Marxist system. Nothing is less in keeping with the Nordic temperament than such an error. The workers, therefore, must shake off this children's disease and infatuation of Marxism, throw overboard all these alien, inferior and compromised ideas, together with the Communist and Socialist leaders whose policy would wreck their country, and adopt a sound *national labour policy* which will promote their own and the whole nation's interests.

CHAPTER IX

FOREIGN POLICY

"Moscow is the third Rome."

(*Old Russian proverb.*)

"The Soviet Union is a decisive step towards the unification of all countries in a world-wide Socialist Soviet Republic."

(*From the Constitution of the Soviet Union.*)

I. THE FOUNDATION

A NATION is a living organism with its own inner life, which can never be altogether determined by any compulsory political system, however thoroughgoing that system may be.

This holds good also of its relations with the outside world.

At the present time Russian foreign policy —as already mentioned in the Introductory— is the result of two different currents. Russia is the basis of that international revolutionary Communism which has become the

dominating factor in the country; the aim of its foreign policy is universal revolution, and the organization of a world-wide union of Socialist Soviet republics. But, whilst the Soviet Union would thus form the nucleus of a new League of Nations, it would also represent, to a certain extent, the continuation of the old Russian Empire upon whose soil it has taken root.

We can truly say that the Bolshevists have in a few years—from 1917 to 1921—repeated the century-long conquests of the empire of the Tsars. Starting from Moscow, where all lines of communication meet, they have gradually extended their sway in all directions.

Throughout Asia, they have practically reached as far as the frontiers of old Russia. On the European side, there is, as we know, the great difference that those alien nations on the Western boundary of Russia which had previously been held in subjection have gained their freedom and formed independent States: Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland. In addition to this, the Rumanians have annexed Bessarabia. In Europe, Russia has been relegated to the epoch of Peter the Great.

The Soviet Union is thus still confined

within the frontiers of old Russia, and the foreign policy of the Bolshevists must therefore move along many of the same lines as that of their predecessors. In spite of the Revolution, many factors have remained unaltered.

The most important of these factors is the position of Russia as a world-power between Europe and Asia.

Russia constitutes one-half of Europe: it is Eastern Europe, as against Western Europe. But it is also Northern and Central Asia. Over two-thirds of its territory lie in Asia, and even in European Russia the Asiatic element is very marked. If, for example, we study an ethnographical chart of A.D. 1,000 we find that almost the entire Northern half of Russia is Finnish-Asiatic, and the Southern half is Turkish-Asiatic. The languages of these races have now become practically merged in Russian, but their influence still affects Russia itself, as is particularly noticeable since the Revolution, when the alien European nationalities in the West have been separated, and the most European classes of society decimated. We must not forget that Russia was under Asiatic

rule for no less than 250 years—from 1224 to 1478; and this has left deep traces. Russia, then, is fully half Asiatic. It is Russia in antithesis to Europe proper.

This intermediate position between Europe and Asia has created a great dilemma for every Russian statesman, whether he is a Bolshevist or not. It is typified by the old Russian arms which still surmount the spires of the Kremlin at Moscow. The imperial eagle of Byzantium gazes eastwards with one head, westwards with the other. Will Russia turn to Europe or to Asia? Or will it, perhaps, continue to be Russia—Eurasia—acting as a link between East and West?

During the decades that preceded the great war, this state of affairs had brought about two distinct orientations in Russian foreign policy: the old national and traditional leaning towards the West and South-west—towards Constantinople; and a more modern and imperialistic trend southwards and eastwards, towards Asia. The latter attitude was responsible for the Russo-Japanese war; the former resulted in the great war.

The Bolshevists have inherited this equivocal position from their predecessors. But,

as we shall see later, they have also based their political strategy upon this situation of Russia between the West and the East.

Another point must be taken into consideration. Russia is one of the great continental world powers, not to be compared with the other European nationalities such as France and Germany, but having a different status. Russia is by no means a unified State, it is a mottled empire of conquered peoples and colonies, with Russians as the predominating element. It is a continent—a self-contained sphere of civilization, like Continental Europe, the United States of America, the Near East, India and China. From an economic point of view, it is also a world in itself, an "œcumene", possessing every qualification for a self-contained, self-supporting existence.

We can therefore say that, so far as the Russian Revolution is concerned, it has long ago attained the same limits as the French Revolution attained under Napoleon, when he spread revolution throughout the Continent as far as the Niemen. Whilst the wars of the French Revolution were waged beyond French frontiers (France being only a part

of Continental Europe), those of the Russians have been confined within their own borders, where they have been fought out as civil wars, assisted by foreign intervention. The Bolshevists only crossed their natural boundaries when they marched on Warsaw, as Napoleon had done in his march on Moscow.

From another point of view, the following consideration is of interest. The world is tending towards unity. Within this organization of humanity, a process of crystallization is taking place, not only into great, but into world powers: "Empires," of which Russia is one. And the remarkable fact is that Russia occupies just such a central position as regards the world powers over the whole globe, as Germany occupies amongst the great national powers of Europe. In the larger scale of the world, Russia appears as a new and larger Germany, whilst Continental Europe is suggestive of a larger France, if not a larger Switzerland or Italy.

Again, the policy of a country is in a remarkable way determined by the position of its territory with regard to the different oceans of the globe. The policy of Rome and Italy, for instance, was and is a Mediterranean

policy. The policy of Sweden is chiefly a Baltic policy. The imperial policy of the British Empire, scattered all over the world, is intimately bound up with all the seas and their adjacent territories; the strange thing being that whilst the mother country is situated in the Northern seas, the main part of the Empire is grouped around the Indian Ocean, whose borders the British have rendered secure in the same way that Rome safeguarded her conquests in the Mediterranean world.

If the position of Russia is examined from this point of view on a map of the world, certain fundamental features of the policy of this power will be seen clearly. The waters of European Russia flow chiefly into the Baltic and the Black Sea. More remote parts of Russia are drained by rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific. Finally a great part of the country in Europe as well as in Asia has no outlet to the oceans, but discharges its streams into the interior of the Eurasian continent. The last-mentioned circumstance is of no small importance. It is exactly in these regions, ranging from Caucasia to Tibet, that Russia and Russian policy are brought into direct con-

tact with the vital interests of the British Empire of the Indian Ocean.

In this way Russia has a Baltic policy aspiring to the North Atlantic Ocean; a Black Sea policy aspiring to the Mediterranean; an Arctic policy and a Pacific policy; and last but not least an inland policy aspiring to the Indian Ocean.

In addition to her above-mentioned geopolitical position, Russia's place in the scheme of things, and her foreign policy, are finally determined by two important historico-geographical facts.

(1) Russia is a Northern country, the Eastern portion of what may be termed the great Nordic fatherland. It formed part of the primeval home of the Nordic race, and for centuries served as a stage for the energies and activities of the Nordic tribes. Long before the settlement of the Slav peoples in Russia, Nordic nations had founded mighty kingdoms there, such as, for instance, that of the Goths in South Russia during the first centuries of the Christian era. As I have repeatedly pointed out in these chapters, the Russians properly so-called were Scandinavians, and the Russian Empire was

originally a Scandinavian State, the ruling class being Nordic, and the lower classes of Finnish-Slav-Asiatic stock.

It is not easy for a nation to dissociate itself completely from its past, and from the natural position of its country. History tends to flow back into its ancient channels. We may be convinced that the Northern element, which was of vital importance in the foundation of Russia, will in future play a weighty part in the development of events —though we must hope that it will not manifest itself as it did 200 years ago, in a great Northern war. Unfortunately there are already signs of such a possibility.

(2) All roads lead to Rome. And Russia, in particular, is a successor of the Eastern-Roman Empire at Constantinople. When in 1472 Ivan III, Grand Duke of Moscow, and the real founder of the Russian Empire, married Sophia Palaeologos, the heiress of the last Byzantine Emperors, it was symbolic of the fact that the Eastern-Roman Empire was continuing its existence in higher latitudes under the name of Russia. This fact has permeated the whole of Russian history. In conjunction with the pan-Slavic theory and consequently with practical questions as

well, it has been the cause of endless wars right up to the present time, partly with the Ottoman Sultans, who were the next heirs in Constantinople, and partly with the Latinized West, more particularly Poland.

The great war overthrew the throne of the Russian Cæsars (Tsars), as well as of the other successors to the Roman Empire at Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople. But on the political chessboard of the nations, Russia still retains her character as a State embodying the Roman-Byzantine imperial idea and, especially, as the Northern portion of the Eastern Hemisphere.

Moreover, we recognize in the European ambitions of Bolshevism, distinct traces of the flimsy pan-Slavic beliefs in the regeneration of old Europe by means of Russia.

Such, then, are the natural dynamic lines behind Russia's foreign policy. From its central position among the Powers, it is drawn, as it always has been, now West, now East, now North, now South.

As was the case under the dispensation of the Tsars, the Bolshevists prosecute their activities in every direction. Sometimes their power is concentrated on one special

line; if they fail there, they start on a new track.

But two radical alterations have resulted from the Revolution. In the first place, the foreign ambitions of Russia are now world-wide. They no longer stop short, as in former times, with a demand for free access to every ocean, nor do the great European States any longer lie beyond her ambitions. The aim of Russia is precisely to destroy these powers in their capacity of capitalistic and imperialistic States. And the second point is this: there is to be nothing more in the way of a Great Russian national policy of conquest, but there is to be a "liberation" of all the oppressed classes and nations throughout the world, in a union of Socialist republics, where no nation will exercise really sovereign power.

Russia is enrolled in the service of World Revolution. Her soldiers no longer swear allegiance to Cæsar, but bind themselves at Lenin's tomb to fight for this World Revolution.

II. WORLD REVOLUTION

Thus Russian foreign policy at the present time is dominated by the fanatical desire

of the Bolshevists to bring the whole world within the scope of their sanguinary experiments. The plans for this Communist World Revolution are based on the idea that the Bolshevists will be aided by risings among the organized revolutionary workers and peasants of other countries. They will take advantage of disputes between the rest of the Powers; they will incite the peoples of the East to rebel against imperialism and, through the diplomacy and the means of coercion exercised by the Soviet Union, they will gradually bring about a successful revolution throughout Europe. With the help of Asia, the revolution will, either continuously or by fits and starts, cover the same road from East to West as that taken, in the contrary direction, by the great French Revolution, i.e. the 2,700 kilometres from Moscow to Paris.

Then, if not sooner, London, which is the head of imperialism and capitalism, will be forced to bow the knee before them.

The Communist world-combination is thus working along five lines of action:

1. Class-warfare in capitalist countries.

2. The intensification of the world-wide economic crisis.

3. Exploitation of antagonisms between the

capitalistic powers, of mutual disputes between the victors in the great war, and of disputes between the victors and the vanquished.

4. Inciting the coloured races—yellow, brown, black, and especially the oriental nations—to rise against the white races.

These four lines might be summed up under the single aim : " to do as much harm as possible in the world." Finally comes a fifth, of equal importance :

5. To strengthen and develop the Soviet Union, partly as an international power and partly as an example for propagandist purposes.

Where such a Revolution as the Russian is concerned, domestic policy is actually a link in foreign policy.

It has been asked : Who is really the head of this world-embracing scheme of destruction ? Is Russia merely being sacrificed to the Communist International (the Komintern) ? Or is the Komintern simply the instrument of the Soviet Government ?

The facts set forth in a previous chapter on political rule in Russia leave no doubt as to the actual state of affairs. The government in Russia, in fact, and also, indeed, in form (since, in a country governed by a

dictatorship, those who wield the dictatorship constitute the formal government), is the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party, with its Executive Committee, the Political Bureau, which together decide the policy both of the Soviet Union and of the Komintern.

The Bolshevists like to speak of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (consisting of representatives of the Communist parties in other countries) as the general staff of the World Revolution. And this is accurate, for it is a staff. But the general in command is the Russian Political Bureau. If additional proof were needed, we can see how any disputes in the Russian Communist party are immediately transmitted to the sections of the Komintern throughout the world, where they are conveniently settled in due time on the same lines as in Russia, and in accordance with instructions received from that country.

In spite of all this, we cannot quite say that the international revolutionary activities of the Bolshevists are equivalent to a Russian struggle for world dominion; although, when we examine Bolshevist foreign policy, it is difficult to determine where Russian inter-

ests end, and international ones begin, or vice versa. The Russian people, taken as a whole, believe that they and their country have been sold and betrayed for the sake of the World Revolution. But by degrees, as the Bolshevists are brought up against the realities of the outside world, the actual Russo-socialist interests, if not the Russo-national ones, are coming more and more into the foreground. The Bolshevists are attempting to unite the international and the Russian Socialist points of view, by declaring that the cause of World Revolution will best be furthered by furthering the cause of the Soviet Union.

Another step in the same direction is that the theory of the possibility of Socialism being effectual in Russia alone has overruled the hypothesis of the need for a World Revolution. And it is, perhaps, symptomatic that the latter doctrine is mainly advocated by the Jews, with Trotsky at their head.

III. PROPAGANDA. REPARATIONS. DUMPING

Propaganda, reparations and dumping are the three great and universal questions at issue between Russia and the world.

Propaganda represents, in brief, the revolutionary activities of Bolshevism in foreign countries. To abandon propaganda would mean, for Bolshevism, to cease to breathe. This does not apply only to the indirect form of propaganda which lies in the mere existence of Bolshevism. It involves direct propaganda too. For, since Bolshevism is a destructive rather than a constructive movement, it is dangerous for it to remain inactive. Both at home and abroad, it must constantly aim at advancing, or else, like fire, it will consume itself and disappear.

The Bolshevists maintain that propaganda in foreign countries functions automatically. This is, to some extent, true, since Bolshevism is largely the result of such circumstances as economic crises, unemployment, and so on.

Besides this, Bolshevism is not, properly speaking, a cause of the world-crisis through which we are passing, but one of its results. Here, however, we must notice that there is a powerful interaction of forces. The Bolshevists in Russia are undoubtedly attempting to accentuate the crisis, and they are doing it to a dangerous degree. If, therefore, the world is to be healed of its wounds, it is necessary to be on our guard against

the deliberate transmission of infection from the Russian disease, the bacilli of which drift about and infect the whole world.

When the Bolshevist propagandists are caught *flagrante delicto*, the official Bolshevist government throws the blame upon the Communist International, which is represented as a rather troublesome organization over whose activities the Soviet Government is unfortunately unable to exercise any definite control. This may be largely true, just as such a figure-head government as that of the Soviet is frequently impotent to intervene in anything undertaken by the Political State Police (O.G.P.U.). It must be understood that the authorities to be reckoned with are neither the Soviet Government nor the Komintern, but those central managers of the party who govern Russia *de facto* and *de jure*, and without whose consent neither the Soviet Government nor the Komintern could exist for a single day, or undertake any important action. If the world does not wish to continue being made a laughing-stock, it must, therefore, insist upon the recognition by the Soviet Government of its own and the Komintern's dependence upon the central organs of the party. Or else the foreign governments

who desire to recognize Bolshevist administration must accredit their representatives to the real Russian government, i.e. either to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee or to the O.G.P.U., as the case may be. This is the formal view of the matter. The real point is, of course, that propaganda is bound to continue by one means or another as long as the Bolshevists exist ; it is a matter of life and death to them. It is, in sum, an absolute delusion to believe in any far-reaching or permanent reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.— As well reconcile fire and water !

The second and never-buried bone of contention between Russia and the rest of the world is the question of paying Russia's earlier national debt to foreign nations, and the reparations due to foreigners who have suffered losses in Russia as a result of the nationalization of industries and property.

The view taken by the Bolshevists is that they are willing to pay a minimum of the pre-war debt, for the purpose of raising fresh loans, the idea being that they will pool the instalments paid on the old reduced debt with the instalments of the new one. In

other words, foreign nations are not only to cancel the larger portion of their claims, providing the Bolshevists with funds to pay off the rest, but they are also expected to provide fresh funds to further the World Revolution; so that, if all goes well, the Bolshevists will in due time get all their debts written off.

The Bolshevists maintain that the war loans were granted to the Russians in return for allowing themselves to be slaughtered for the cause of the Allies. There is therefore no need to repay them.

Still less are the Bolshevists inclined to grant compensation to private creditors. The ABC of Leninism—the doctrine which is taught to the Russian masses—sets forth boldly and unblushingly the following considerations with regard to industry: "Before the war, about 1,500 millions of gold roubles (150 million pounds sterling) in foreign capital were invested in Russian industries. By nationalizing industry, we have wiped out all foreign claims to this capital. No doubt the capitalist powers will continue from time to time to bring forward claims made by the former foreign owners of coal-mines in Donetz, or factories in the Urals, but we have no

intention of recognizing such claims. In the meantime, it is to our advantage that foreigners should continue to invest their money in the development of our industries, especially in districts where we are at present having difficulties."

As regards the British Empire, France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, the question of compensation now involves (including interest) enormous sums of money. Looked at from the point of view of political economy, not only a few capitalists, but the whole nation, including the workers, have been defrauded of that money. Many of the common people are amongst those most directly affected. The injury is too great and the affront too blatant to make it possible to forgive and forget this affair. In particular the nationalization, without compensation, of imported and unpaid for goods is the most open violation of international agreements.

It is well known that irresponsible persons dislike paying their debts. And the Bolshevists find a ready audience when they stir up the Russian populace with talk of foreign claims, and show them the symbolical Russian workman who, at the coming of the Revolu-

tion, lets fall from his burdened shoulders a sack laden with millions of foreign debt. There is a chance, however, that the Russian people would pay gladly enough, if by so doing they could get rid of the Bolshevists.

But even with the Bolshevists in power, there is a far better basis of negotiation for settling the question of reparations than the question of propaganda. If Russia is faced with collective and determined international action, she will be forced to recognize her liabilities. Even if, as a bankrupt country, she may succeed in compounding with her creditors on reasonable terms.

As the Bolshevists have outwitted their adversaries with regard to reparations and propaganda, so also they are leading the world by the nose in the matter of their *foreign trade monopoly* and the practice of *dumping*. Here they kill two birds with one stone: they secure foreign currency and disorganize foreign trade. By keeping the popular standard of life very low and paying their workers with inflated roubles, the Bolshevists are able—despite the low efficiency of the Russian workman—to produce at actual cost price, which may prove very pro-

fitable if foreign currency is converted into roubles not at the official compulsory rate of exchange, but at the net value of the paper roubles. But contrary to the view generally held this fact is not the main point about dumping. The crucial point is that the Soviet Union forms one economic system and is the strongest and most dangerous trust in the world. Even if the economic activities of the Bolshevists in foreign countries as well as in Russia are largely bluff, they are at least real enough to enable the Bolshevists to turn the scale in many economic fields. (The percentage of Russian exports out of the total exports of the world was 3·5 per cent in 1913: and 1·9 per cent in 1930. The total export value of Russia in 1913 was 1,500 million roubles, but in 1930 only 1,000 millions.)

The monopoly of foreign trade enables the Bolshevists to act collectively against foreign men of business. They can frustrate competition between their own organizations, and play off foreign competitors against one another, thus obtaining favourable terms both for purchase and sale. In this way, monopoly provides an important weapon against foreign influence in Russia, as well

as an effective means of promoting Bolshevist encroachment in foreign countries. It is therefore quite reasonable that the Bolshevists should be set on maintaining this system; and the capitalistic world has not yet realized that the proper means of neutralizing it is to beat the Bolshevists with their own weapons, i.e. by establishing international regulation of the trade with Russia.

We may mention here that the Bolshevists, for political reasons, are endeavouring to force the development of Russian economic life in the direction of increased industrialization—changing it from an agricultural country into an industrial one. Before the war the agricultural output of Russia was one and a half times greater than the industrial. Today, the proportion is inverted, the industrial output being two-thirds of the total production of Russia.

If this development continues,—and every nerve will be strained to maintain it—Russia's position in the trade of the world cannot fail to become still more abnormal. The antagonism between Russia and the capitalistic countries will thus be greatly intensified. In particular, the East will be swamped

with her industrial products. Nevertheless, it is quite certain that the Bolshevists are also making preparations to enable them to carry out on a large scale the dumping of their industrial products in the markets of the West.

They are thus taking steps to develop antagonisms in a way which reminds one to some extent of Germany's attitude before the great war.

A fourth point which forms a stumbling-block between Bolshevist Russia and the rest of the world is the Bolshevist *Reign of Terror*, and its suppression of liberty and religion.

The Bolshevists resent any discussion of this as interference in Russia's domestic concerns, or as propaganda against the Soviet Union. But that is idle talk; for in any case the Bolshevists are a party of professedly international character. The Soviet Government is a would-be world government. Russia's concerns are therefore not independent of the rest of the world. But, apart from that, the civilized portion of mankind will not for ever endure without protest the practices now rife in Russia, just as in a

civilized community there are limits to a father's right to treat his family with openly inhuman tyranny; more especially if this is done with the intention of preparing the rest of the community for a similar fate.

IV. RUSSIA'S GRIP UPON THE WHOLE OF ASIA

The Bolshevist struggle for World Revolution is a war on two fronts. As we have seen, this revolution is to be the fruit of two movements: the proletarian struggle in Europe and the national revolt of the dissatisfied peoples of the East.

To obtain a clearer view of Russia's present foreign policy, let us consider Bolshevist policy both in the East, and on the Russian front towards Europe.

The Russian frontiers on the Asiatic side are three times the length of her European boundaries. But the relative importance of these boundaries is, if anything, in inverse proportion. We have a good illustration of this in the lines of communication, especially the railways, which cross the frontiers. Russia is connected with the West both by the sea and by a dozen important lines of railway. Eastwards, on the contrary, there is only

the Trans-Siberian railway and a couple of less important lines to the Near East. Beyond these, the means of communication are limited to the old caravan routes. Russia's foreign trade with the East is also a mere fraction of her trade with the West.

Meanwhile we have the significant difference that whereas in the West Russia occupies a very humble position in the ranks of civilization, in the East she can pose as an exponent of civilization, *primus inter pares*. Indeed it has been Russia's mission in the history of the world to act as a bulwark against Asia; the might of the Asiatic hordes was destroyed in Russia. But this struggle exhausted Russian resources both at home and abroad, and left her far behind in the march of civilization, with the result that we see to-day. But for Genghis Khan there would have been no Lenin.

And now that the Bolshevists are turning their attention to the East, their aim is, for the most part, only a continuation of the imperial policy. One new factor has, however, crept in, viz. that the East is in almost as great a ferment as Europe, and that Russia is taking a hand in this agitation, not only as a conqueror, but in two other distinct

rôles. First, as an ally of the Eastern nationalists in their revolt against European imperialism. And second, as a champion of the Eastern proletariat against their own national rulers.

To begin with, the Bolshevists chiefly appeared in the first of these rôles. Moscow helped Kemal Pasha to beat the Greeks—in other words, the British. It helped Persia and Afghanistan to throw off British tutelage, and it operated in China in conjunction with the Chinese insurgents.

It was not until 1920, when Bolshevism was thoroughly established both in Europe and in Asia, that the second aspect of its activities in the East was fully revealed.

In the autumn of 1920, the Communist International summoned an Oriental Congress at Baku, where nearly two thousand delegates assembled, representing the whole of the East. No secret was made of the fact that Russia's Eastern policy contemplated not merely the liberation of the East from the great imperial powers, but also its "Bolshevization".

"We are arming ourselves against the English bourgeoisie," said the Chairman

Zinoviev, president of the Communist International. "We will seize English imperialism by the throat and fling it to the ground. Our fiercest battle must be waged against English imperialism. But, at the same time, we must arouse the working classes of the East to oppose the upper classes whoever they may be. The revolution now starting in the East is not requesting English imperialism to retire from the table in order that the wealthy natives may be more comfortably accommodated!"

The congress was accompanied by a general forward movement throughout Asia. Georgia and Armenia were overrun by the Red Army, and reconstituted as Soviet republics. The Bolshevists penetrated into Persia, but were obliged to withdraw. In Central Asia, on the contrary, the Emirs of Bokhara and Khiva were driven out, and the two countries organized as Soviet republics. Then followed revolutionary events in China and disturbances in India. We may mention, as a significant illustration, that the Bolshevists denounce even Gandhi's activities as bourgeois policy.

Such events as these have given the Eastern nationalists food for thought. There is not

much to be gained in liberating their countries from European imperialism if they themselves are to fall into the hands of Russia, and, in addition, to be robbed or murdered by their own countrymen. By degrees a certain amount of reaction against Communism is thus spreading over the entire East.

But this does not mean that the Bolshevists have retired from the scene of action. The twofold war which is being waged by the nationalists of the East, has complicated their position. On the one hand, there is the struggle with Europe; on the other the threatened social revolution, and the risks and advantages of throwing in their lot with Moscow.

The Bolshevists still have their opportunity among the masses of the East, even now that they have unmasked themselves, and are brutally staking everything on the dictatorship of the proletariat and class-warfare. This applies especially to India and China, with their vast peasant proletariat, and to Japan with its growing industrial population.

The Bolshevists have some grounds for pointing out that conditions in India and

China resemble the state of things in Russia before the Revolution. The bulk of the people are poor peasants who carry on their shoulders a large proportion of the burdens of the community. And as, in Russia, the social revolution succeeded because the revolutionary Labour party were able to get the poor peasantry to co-operate with them, so the Bolshevist policy in India and China aims at establishing councils of workmen, peasants and soldiers as revolutionary organs, in which the intellectuals and the workers will act as leaders of the peasant movement.

In China, a Soviet government already exists side by side with the national governments, possessing a Red Army and all other accessories, not excepting revolutionary tribunals. With regard to the Western Chinese dependencies, Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan, in particular, Russian influence is gaining an ever-increasing power. These countries can only be civilized and opened up commercially through co-operation with their Russian neighbours. They have been badly administered from Peking, so that it has not been difficult for the Bolshevists to gain their support, when they preach deliverance from China, in the same way as, in China,

they promise deliverance from England, America and Japan.

The outer part of Mongolia was converted some time ago into two so-called national republics, which are, in fact, united to the Soviet Union and controlled from Moscow. Russia is also once more firmly installed along the Eastern Chinese railway through Northern Manchuria.

Besides this, the Bolshevists have connected Turkestan and Siberia by means of a railway running parallel with the Chinese frontier. They have also moved the capital of Russian Central Asia farther East, in order that it may serve as a kind of centre for Chinese Turkestan. All along the frontiers of Asia, Soviet republics have been established, corresponding to the various countries on the other side of the frontier: Persia, Afghanistan, Eastern Turkestan, and Mongolia; while in the Near East the Bolshevists are maintaining friendly relations with the most nationalistic and anti-European powers, such as Turkey and Afghanistan, relations which entail concessions, but presumably are worth it, since in this way the encirclement of Russia is pierced in the South. The Bolshevists are also endeavour-

ing to attract the Oriental countries by favourable commercial agreements, and have made special efforts to turn the famous Fair at Nijni-Novgorod into a trading-centre for the East.

In these and a hundred other ways, Bolshevism is infiltrating into Asiatic countries, and is preparing for their transformation into Soviet republics, as soon as they have become sufficiently adapted, and the time is otherwise ripe.

A great advantage for Russia in her schemes for the East, which deal for the most part with Mohammedan countries, lies in the fact that she has so many Moslem subjects, their number being about 20 millions. The Bolshevists are, therefore, considerably more tolerant towards Islam than towards other forms of belief. There are even those who —though with much exaggeration—persist in interpreting Russia's machinations in Asia as an alliance between Bolshevism and Islam. There can be only a small grain of truth in this theory, because, in fact, Bolshevism is opposed to all religion, while Islam, for its part, is striving to detach the Mohammedan subjects from Russia, partly on religious—

pan-Islamic—grounds, partly from ethnical (pan-Turkish, pan-Turanian) considerations.

Nevertheless, it is true that in the East as in no other place, Bolshevist aggressiveness is a strange medley of plans for world revolution, and the old, half mystical Russian dreams of world domination. As this activity is, in a way, a continuation of Russia's earlier efforts, the Bolshevists have found ready to hand a mass of material, besides many available people who are familiar with all the problems connected with this policy. And new agents, native as well as Russian, are being trained.

There is in Moscow a large institute for the study of Oriental languages, culture, and politics, as well as two separate universities for Oriental students. And in Turkestan, for example, there is, or at any rate was, a Staff College through which something like sixty military political agents for the East passed every year. In the same way, a number of Asiatics are trained in the Soviet Union as military officers.

What then is the real aim of the Bolshevist policy in the East?

I have already indicated it, but I will

define it more exactly. It is, in the first place, to make the situation as involved as possible for the colonizing powers, to tie their forces and destroy their markets, and to incite the Eastern nations, both yellow and brown, to revolt against Europe. Their second objective is the extension of the Soviet Union.

The Eastern policy of the Bolshevists, therefore, takes the form of a powerful diversion or demonstration in connection with the main revolutionary operations in Europe. And the ultimate aim of these Bolshevist conspiracies is to dominate England.

V. RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN THE EAST

For a Russian policy which admits its limitations, it would seem as though friendly relations with England and the British Empire were worth aiming at. The two countries need one another and could be mutually complementary. But the fact is that since Russian and British interests touched in the East, a more or less powerful antagonism has been developing during the last century between the greatest sea-power and the greatest land-power. Only a few months

before the great war, Witte, the Russian Premier, and one of her most prominent statesmen, wrote as follows: "England is our principal enemy, as she always has been the enemy of every one of the great powers that is independent."

This antagonism has been greatly intensified by the Bolshevist Revolution. The Bolshevists fully realize that England is the true obstacle to universal revolution. She is the arch-enemy of the Russian Revolution, as she was of the French. Wherever Russia turns throughout the world, in Europe or in Asia, she comes up against England. To injure England is the chief aim of Bolshevist policy, as it was of the French Revolution and Napoleon, as well as of Germany.

The methods of injuring England are also, broadly speaking, the same: she must either be crippled directly, in the British Isles, or indirectly on the European Continent and in the overseas possessions, especially India.

Russia cannot, like Napoleon or Imperial Germany, attempt to invade Ireland or the South of England, or make use of airships and submarines. But she can use equally effective means: those of propaganda and dumping, and the revolutionary movement

among the workers. And, with regard to Great Britain's Eastern Empire, conditions are far more favourable now for her present enemies than in former times for Napoleon and Germany, who were separated from the East by an ocean dominated by the British fleet.

The Bolshevists in Russia see their opportunity and are doing their best to make the most of it.

Russia is trying to oppose to the British mastery of the seas a Eurasiatic overland policy, an enlarged edition of Napoleon's continental system. Russian policy in the East can be summed up in one word: to wage war on the British Empire as a rival in Asia and a dominating power in Europe. The disastrous results of one or the other aspect of such an antagonism may be delayed, but not averted by any agreements that are possible between Russia and England under existing conditions.

For this reason the ultimate goal of Bolshevist activity in the Near and the Far East, is India, the keystone of the British Empire, upon which every eighth person in Great Britain depends for his livelihood.

If Russia succeeds, at the same time, in

injuring the other Powers, that will be one more point to the advantage of the Bolshevist plans.

Thus, in addition to a revolution in China, concentric action against India, with risings in that country, is in contemplation.

There is no ground to anticipate immediate military operations in this connection, as far as Russia is concerned. Here, as elsewhere, the first line of attack takes the form of secret revolutionary activities. The East is being overrun by Bolshevist emissaries, in spite of all stipulations for the restriction of political propaganda. The sapping ants are hard at work in every country, from Africa and the Yemen to Java and Korea. Bolshevist influence is scheming for admission to British India along the ancient trade-routes in Central Asia, and along the coast-lines from the ports of the Indian Ocean and of the Pacific, everywhere using methods and language which are curiously familiar. The Russian Revolution is held up as an example for India and the ignorant people openly called upon to rise and overthrow the British rule and the capitalist system.

And not without some result. Moscow records with pride that whereas during 1927

there were 129 strikes in India, involving 131,000 operatives and resulting in two million lost working-days, in 1928 the number of strikes amounted to 203, with half a million strikers and 31⅓ million lost working days. In 1929 and 1930 the situation became still more acute, and developed, under the skilful manipulation of propagandists, into several serious conflicts, accompanied by bloodshed.

Besides all this, Englishmen must face the fact that a military invasion of India may come sooner or later. Of course such an undertaking would be hazardous, whether it were attempted in conjunction with an insurrection in India, or not.

But, on the other hand, one cannot help seeing that if it once comes to a decisive struggle, Russia has everything to gain by attempting an invasion of India. If it were successful, it would completely annihilate British supremacy, and it is not easy to estimate beforehand what the result of such a catastrophe might be. If the attempt were unsuccessful, the British military forces would, at all events, be immobilized in India.

However, affairs in the East have not yet

reached such a crisis. "The Great Day" for which the Bolshevists are preparing, delays its coming. Meanwhile it is important that we should watch these events in the East, which conceal their profound significance behind apparent chaos; for their reaction may injure us more severely than many other of those political events which fill our newspapers and monopolize our interest at the present time. China, indeed, has already become the theatre of war for the powers which are fighting for world hegemony. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 was the beginning of the cycle of wars of revolution through which the world was destined to pass. Perhaps the next great war will break out in the East, or as a result of Eastern problems. We have already had an attempt at another Manchurian war.

VI. RUSSIA'S EUROPEAN FRONT

As things are now, Russia faces Europe on two fronts: an exterior and an interior one. The exterior front is her new Western frontier from Petsamo to the Black Sea; the interior front is the fighting-line of the revolutionary workers' party in European countries.

We will deal here with the exterior front only, and investigate Russia's relations with her neighbours in the West.

Bessarabia is pre-eminently the bone of contention between Russia and Rumania. Their points of view in the matter appear to be irreconcilable, at all events they have hitherto proved to be so during the abortive negotiations between the two powers.

Bessarabia was occupied by the Rumanians at the beginning of 1918, and, with the consent of the allied Great Powers, it was afterwards incorporated with Rumania. This arrangement is based partly on force, partly on ethnical considerations, and partly on the fact that in the time of the Turks, Bessarabia formed part of the principality of Moldavia, whose successor Rumania claims to be. On the other hand, Bessarabia never actually belonged to Rumania itself, but was taken by the Russians from the Turks in 1812, before any Rumanian State had come into existence. Moreover, rather less than half of the inhabitants of Bessarabia are Rumanians; about a quarter are Russians. If Russianized Jews are included, the number of Russians about equals that of Rumanians,

i.e. something like a million in all. The rest are mainly Germans or Bulgarians. The Rumanian Government has flatly refused every proposal for a plebiscite, and is carrying on a policy of suppression of all Russian influences. The Bolshevists, on their side, are obviously willing to countenance Bessarabia's independence, and they have founded a small autonomous Moldavian republic by way of decoy, on the Soviet bank of the Dniester (the river which forms the boundary). But they obstinately refuse to acknowledge the present arrangement. Between Russia and Rumania there is no bond: they are not at war, but neither is there peace.

It should be remembered that this dissatisfaction concerning Bessarabia is shared by nearly all Russians. Their national feelings are revolted by the alleged ingratitude of the Rumanians. Did not Russia wage five bloody wars with the Turks to gain liberty for Rumania?

Here we have a repetition of the old pan-Slavic agitations. Meanwhile, it is easy to understand the supreme importance of Bessarabia to Russia, and in particular, to the Bolshevists. In the first place, it is a fertile country of the same size as Denmark, and

with a population equal to that of Norway. Second, it is the key to one of the approaches to Constantinople; it would admit Russia to the Danube, and bring her into closer connection with the Balkan States, while Rumania would become definitely weaker, and the lines of defence of the Ukraine would be advanced by some 100–200 kilometres from the Dniester to the Pruth. As things are now, Odessa, which is the largest Russian town and port on the Black Sea, is only 25 kilometres from the Rumanian frontier.

The recovery of Bessarabia is thus an important aim of Russian foreign policy. But a further ambition in this direction, and one which is being followed up in various ways, is, of course, the revolutionizing of the whole of the Balkans.

As Rumania is a member of the Little Entente, and is allied both with France and Poland, the Bessarabian question is a European question, and, strangely enough, this controversy between Europe and Russia reminds one in many respects of the Alsace-Lorraine controversy between France and Germany.

Among the many unforeseen results of the

great war, was the restoration of a totally independent *Poland*. It was an unforeseen result, because it implied the defeat of both Germany and Russia.

The most characteristic thing about Polish territory, from the point of view of foreign politics, is that, with the exception of the Carpathians, the country has no natural frontiers. Poland lies, so to speak, between hammer and anvil, and she has therefore been obliged to choose between making herself as powerful as possible, or relapsing into insignificance. As a result, Poland has acquired the frontier towards Russia which was agreed upon at the peace of Riga, in 1920, and was afterwards completed by the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland, in the same way that Bessarabia was included in Rumania.

Roughly speaking, this boundary is identical with the Polish frontier of 1772, and runs about 100 kilometres east of the fixed Eastern front during the great war. But this penetrates so far into Russia, that Poland absorbs two large slices of dense Russian population: White Russians in the North and Ukrainians in the South. Of Poland's thirty million inhabitants, at least seven million are

Russians (besides three million Jews and from one to two million Germans). In the territory lying between the Eastern frontier and the closely packed Polish population, the Russians form nearly two-thirds of the inhabitants. The Soviet republics of White Russia and the Ukraine thus each possess a *terra irridenta* in Poland, containing respectively two and five millions of their fellow-countrymen and named by the Bolshevists West White Russia and West Ukraine. As the Poles within these debated territories belong mostly to the upper classes, and the White Russians and Ukrainians to the lower, the social conflict intensifies national antagonisms.

On the other side, Poland's historical Eastern frontier lies still farther eastwards than the modern one, namely as far as the Dnieper.

Although there is not a large percentage of Poles in the Soviet districts adjacent to the frontier, the Poles take up the position that the White Russian and Ukrainian *terra irridenta* lies in the Soviet Union, and not in Poland. The Poles wish to detach the Ukraine and White Russia from Greater Russia, in order to unite them and Lithuania with Poland, thus constituting a powerful confederation of seventy million people who,

under Polish hegemony, would be able to hold their own against Germany and Russia.

These facts should be sufficient to show the latent risk of disputes between Poland and Russia, quite apart from the World Revolution. Here too, even more than in the Bessarabian question, the Bolshevists can reckon upon the national sympathies of the Russian people. The Poles and the Russians have been born and sworn enemies for the last 900 years —ever since the Poles made a descent upon Kiev in 1016, when it was still under Scandinavian rule—and the bitter enmity has been further intensified by the fact that the Poles are Roman Catholics. In the famous monastery at Kiev one can see how the traces of the Polish bombardment in 1920 have been kept in everlasting remembrance by means of red lines encircling the repaired shell-holes in the masonry; and in Warsaw in 1923, the Poles razed the Greek Catholic Cathedral to the ground.

With one to two million Germans, and seven or eight million Russians within her borders, Poland possesses not only a material weakness, but also a moral vulnerability, which is augmented in one direction by the preposterousness of the Dantzig corridor, in

another by the national autonomy now possessed by the White Russian and Ukrainian peoples on the other side of the frontier, in the Soviet Union.

This danger is increased by the tempting prospect which the Bolshevization of Poland would offer as a move in the great game of the World Revolution. The Soviet Union would be able to get into direct touch with Germany; it would be able, via Cracow, to operate against Czecho-Slovakia, where there are already so many Communists, and against Vienna, the centre of the "two and a half International". In fact, it would reach as far as the countries of the Danube and the Balkans. If the Bolshevists took Poland, they would also be only seven days' march from Berlin, twelve from Vienna, and ten from Budapest. The Baltic States would be the next to fall, almost automatically, into the hands of Bolshevism. Moreover, it is clear that, considering how deeply France is involved in Polish affairs, the downfall of Poland would be a severe blow to her. The Bolshevization of Poland might affect France as acutely as an Indian revolution would affect Britain. It might be the signal for a rising in Paris, where the elections have

shown that the Communists are a factor which must be taken into account.

The sapping and Bolshevization of Poland occupy almost as important a place, therefore, in modern Russian foreign policy, as the work of destroying the British Empire. And it is worthy of notice that Russia is only now developing as a really national State, and that in both the above-mentioned paramount aims, the Revolution falls into line, as it were, with the national Russian policy of conquest.

Let us pass on to the *Baltic States*. As is well known, Esthonia and the Northern half of Latvia were wrested from the Swedes by Peter the Great, whilst Lithuania and the Southern part of Latvia, which was united to Poland, came under Russian rule at the partition of Poland towards the end of the eighteenth century. It is also a matter of common knowledge that Peter the Great seized the Baltic provinces in order to provide Russia with an entrance into Europe, and free passage to the sea. These ambitions, which must have cost Russia about 700,000 men in those days, are just as vigorous to-day.

We must remember that in pre-war times, more than 30 per cent. of Russia's foreign trade was carried across the Baltic; that the Russian frontier on the Baltic side has been reduced to a small proportion of what it was before the war, and could easily be blockaded; that Leningrad is ice-bound for five or six months of the year; that the most northerly ice-free port is in Latvia; and that the greater part of Russia's Baltic hinterland lies south of Leningrad, with its natural outlet to the Baltic Sea via Latvia and Esthonia. Taking all these points into consideration, one can understand that Russia is deeply interested in the re-annexation of these small States.

Besides this, there are important considerations as to methods of defence, both economic and strategical. Esthonia and Latvia must be regarded as buffer States between England and Russia; for England's actual frontiers are conterminous with the sea. We all know the fate of such buffer States! They are apt to be influenced alternately by the two great countries between which they lie. Russia fears that England may transform the Baltic countries—Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithunia—into a new Egypt, from which

she would be able to dominate the extensive Russian and partly Polish territory that stretches away behind them, and thus be able to attack Russia's most vulnerable spot, should war break out. The distance from the Esthonian frontier to Leningrad is 150 kilometres, and that from the frontier of Latvia to Moscow is 600 kilometres; with proportionate distances to the railway between these two capitals—a railway which one may describe as the backbone of Russia. Above all if we include Finland, whose frontier lies 30 kilometres from Leningrad, there are no points from which a blow could be so speedily and so effectively aimed at Russia.

Whilst Esthonia and Latvia are united in an alliance, Lithuania stands aloof, since she has no frontier in common with Russia. She is separated from her by Latvia and by the broad arm which Poland stretches out to the Dvina. Lithuania is also strongly opposed to Poland on the question of Vilna. During the Russian war with Poland in 1920, Lithuania preserved a neutral attitude, with leanings towards the Soviet. The Russian policy is to develop Lithuania's possibilities as a menace on the flank of Poland, and as a

bridge leading to Germany; and in general to maintain the discords amongst the border States, which arise out of the grievances of Lithuania.

Unsolved problems, therefore, are to be found along the whole length of the new frontier-line across the continent between Europe and Russia, from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea. Russia is forced by the whole trend of her history, and by powerful political, strategical, and economic considerations, to desire a revision of her frontiers with Poland and Rumania, and to expand in the direction of the Baltic Sea.

It is of equally vital importance for Europe that this frontier should be stabilized, as, in spite of everything, it is a serviceable means of preserving the balance between the two worlds.

How far this will be possible in the long run, depends to a very great extent on the relations between Poland and Germany; and these, again, are governed by the relations between France and Germany. In other words the issue depends upon the consolidation of Europe.

Another important step in the stabilization

of the Eastern front must be the settlement of the Vilna question; and in general, the satisfactory solution of all the Polish national problems.

A third condition is the accomplishment of a general understanding between the three Baltic States, and also that public opinion in Europe should change its ingrained conviction that these States are doomed to return to Russia sooner or later. The fact is that these countries, with a population of five millions, occupy precisely the same situation and significance in relation to Continental Europe, Russia and Scandinavia, that Holland and Belgium do in relation to France, Germany and England. Esthonia and Latvia correspond to Holland; Lithuania to Belgium. Apart from the cynical possibility that Poland and Russia might agree to divide the Baltic territories among themselves, e.g. along the river Dwina (which would practically restore the state of things which existed in the eighteenth century), every attempt on the part of Russia to establish the *status quo ante bellum* in the Baltic States would inevitably result in a Polish-Russian dispute, and this again would draw in Poland's allies—Rumania and France and

probably Finland as well. Moreover, it would probably lead to a serious conflict with England. To challenge the independence of the Baltic States would therefore reopen a whole series of questions; and in any case these States themselves are determined to fight to the death for their independence.

It should also be observed that these small States—unlike Poland and Rumania—are only opposed to Russia in defence of their own existence, and because their position in relation to her is an inconvenient and possibly a dangerous one.

Taken by itself, this attitude, in spite of the above-mentioned circumstances, should not prove any more impossible either economically or strategically, than the position of Holland in regard to Germany. Even before the great war, some of the Russian statesmen, e.g. the Premier Witte, believed that it would perhaps be advantageous to Russia and that she would gain in homogeneity and stability, if she relinquished the alien peoples in the West, including the Baltic provinces.

I have dealt at some length with this subject of the Baltic States, because the Russian pressure upon them—from within as well as from without—is very great. These States

were the earliest of Russia's conquests, which the Bolshevists have not yet succeeded in retaking. If Europe allowed the Baltic States to go, we should probably experience a repetition of the conquests of Russia under the Tsars; and the chronological order would probably be: Poland followed by the Balkans or the countries in the North.

The Scandinavian States, in particular, would soon realize that they were being brought into closer contact with revolution. Indeed it is a question whether the North might not be particularly hard hit by the Bolshevization of the Baltic States. Finland would be hampered and seriously weakened by an Esthonian Soviet republic in the South. And the fact that England professedly fought both the Napoleonic wars and the great war in defence of the independence of Belgium and Holland, suggests the significance for Scandinavia of the developments foreshadowed here, even if we do not press the analogy too far.

Finland was captured from Sweden in 1808–9, when Russia reaped the benefits of her alliance with Napoleon. The seizure of Finland had long been contemplated—as early as 1743 Russia had annexed the country

of Viborg—and the intention was to bring about the entire destruction of Sweden's sovereignty on the eastern shore of the Baltic; to ensure the safety of St. Petersburg, the Russian capital; to augment Russian influence in the Baltic—indeed, throughout the North; and at the same time, to render possible a further advance towards the Atlantic.

Speaking generally, these conditions are as valid now as they were then. Although Moscow has become the capital of Russia, the importance of Leningrad to the country must not be underestimated. Leningrad is still a window towards Europe, and a great centre of industry and of communication. It is the Hamburg of Russia.

It is, naturally, uncomfortable for Russia to have an awkward neighbour whose frontier is barely 30 kilometres from such an important point. Yet neither this, nor the above-mentioned considerations, are really vital questions for Russia. It would seem easier for Finland and Russia to live peaceably side by side, than for Russia and Poland to be on good terms. Yet two factors have to be taken into consideration, which alter the whole aspect of affairs.

The first of these is the growing antagonism

in Finland herself between Fascist and Democratic tendencies, and the strenuous revolutionary activities carried on by the Finnish Communists, especially on the other side of the frontier. Despite the apparent triumph of the Lappo movement, Bolshevism has penetrated deep into Finland, where it seems to have become engrained in the nature of a large proportion of the people. And Finland has a dangerous neighbour in Russia, especially as a large number of the Finnish Reds have migrated there, and with unquenchable hatred are carrying on the work of Bolshevizing their own country. They have also started a special Finnish Soviet republic in Eastern Carelia, between the Finnish-Russian frontier and the White Sea.

The second factor which endangers relations between Finland and Russia is supplied by the Finnish activists, who are anxious to make Finland into the chief of the Northern powers. They wish to work in close harmony with the Baltic States, and even to unite with their kinsmen, the Esthonians. They are seeking to weaken Russia by splitting her up and taking Eastern Carelia for themselves, thus extending Finland's Eastern boundary to its natural limits, from the Gulf of Finland

across the lakes of Ladoga and Onega, direct to the White Sea. A considerable number of the Finnish activists maintain also that Leningrad, with the adjacent Ingria, really belongs to Finland, or should, at all events, be a free State. Some of these men are even more ambitious, and would extend the influence of Finland as far as Archangel and Vologda, and so on to the kindred Syrians, Permiaks, and Volga Finns, right across the whole of Northern Russia, which in point of fact was Finnish before it became a State. These pan-Finnish aspirations are rather hypothetical and fantastic, and are not shared by a large proportion of the Finnish people, who hold that the future, no less than the past, of their country is bound up with Scandinavia. But all this is sufficient to put Russia, in her turn, upon her guard—especially as the Bolshevists are apprehensive that Finland may become a dangerous instrument of foreign intervention.

It is thus evident that the antagonisms arising on the Finnish-Russian frontier resemble those on the Polish-Russian one. They may be less significant from a European standpoint, but they are of the greatest significance for Scandinavia, and more particu-

larly for Norway, owing to the exposed position of Northern Norway, which province is, in fact, nearer to Leningrad than to Oslo. The social fabric of Finland is undoubtedly strong, and fundamentally sound, but it is also subject to a very severe strain both from within and from without.

Finland may at any moment become involved in serious disputes, the result of which might be, if things took an unfavourable turn, that Norway and Sweden would be brought face to face with revolution much sooner than anyone expects. It would be a dangerous illusion to believe that Norway is practically secure on the East, because she no longer has Russia as her immediate neighbour, and because Finland lies between them.

We must remember that Russia is a Northern country, and that Scandinavia is her natural continuation. Did many people in Norway realize clearly how near destruction the country was in 1918?

It is also a fact that since Britain and Russia are the protagonists, Norway and the rest of Scandinavia lie right in the path of events, all the more so as Scandinavia is practically forced into it by the developments within its own frontiers. This hardly seems

to be realized as yet by the general public in Scandinavia, any more than they recognize that they have got beyond parochial politics; that they have abandoned their splendid isolation by reason of their adhesion to the League of Nations; and that they have been drawn perforce into world-politics.

VII. THE BOLSHEVIST WAR AND PEACE POLICY

Our study of Russian foreign relations cannot but leave us with a strong impression that there is no lack of occasions which might precipitate a conflict with Russia. Both in Asia, and on Russia's European frontier, the situation is such that the world may at any moment find itself suddenly involved in a serious war with an adversary who would be almost as deadly as Imperial Germany; and this would happen in the very midst of a grave world crisis.

Some such warlike method of settlement is inevitable, if the Bolshevists maintain their position in Russia long enough to enable them to stabilize the Socialist system, and concentrate sufficient forces. But it may also be taken for granted that in the event of an impending internal catastrophe in Russia, the

Bolshevists will adopt the time-honoured plan of attempting to disguise or ward off such a catastrophe by provoking a war. This would not be difficult. Russia is constantly at loggerheads with Poland, for instance, and this might at any time develop into open warfare.

"If we are obliged to quit," said Trotsky, "we shall slam the door after us in a way that will echo throughout the whole world!" Trotsky, however, did not get the chance of making much noise before he left! And the same thing might happen to the entire Bolshevist movement, if the crisis came suddenly and paralysed it—and especially if internal dissensions in the party were the cause. But we must not forget that Bolshevism is also an international movement, and though it may fail in Russia it need not fail everywhere. There is no doubt that it has prepared for such contingencies in various ways, including the investment of funds. Accordingly the danger that Bolshevism may yet involve the world in war is a very real one.

In connection with this crucial question of war and peace, the Bolshevists adopt tactics which, though ingenious, are familiar and

transparent: they accuse others of wishing to bring about war, representing and praising themselves as the real and anxious friends of peace, while, at the same time, they are making every possible preparation for war and revolution throughout the whole world. They are wolves in sheep's clothing! More precisely defined their policy is:

1. To accuse the capitalist and imperialist powers, with Britain and France at their head, of attempting by conspiracies within Russia, by war and blockade, to interrupt the work of Socialistic reconstruction in the Soviet Union, because the Socialist developments in the Soviet republics are as menacing to capitalism as—according to Bolshevist assertions—they are splendidly and steadily progressive.

Although this theory of aggression is apparently paradoxical, there is something in it. If the Bolshevists are left in peace in such a country as Russia, they can hardly, as I have said, avoid achieving certain quantitative results. Even if such results, *per se*, have no connection with Socialism and Communism, the distinction will scarcely be perceived by revolutionary-minded workers in other countries. Many people who know Russia well, hold that the country still uses

more than it produces—when the accounts are properly balanced. Be that as it may, the Bolshevists are constantly adding to the sinews of war, and thus becoming increasingly dangerous. The declared aim of the five years' plan—to overtake and pass the capitalist countries—is a futile one if it is interpreted in the sense of real social and economic development. But this plan, even if it is not completely realized (as it certainly will not be in the allotted time, ending 1932), will make the industrial output of the Soviet Union, in several fields, quantitatively equal to the output of the great countries of Europe, if not to that of the United States of America, the admitted ultimate rival.

All this goes to prove that other countries are running a great risk, when they go so far as to base perhaps their very existence on the ill-founded hypothesis that Bolshevism in Russia will automatically come to an end.

On the other hand, the world will hesitate before giving the Bolshevists such an opportunity as a war would afford them for explaining away the fiasco of the Marxist system, and for starting a general rebellion all over the world.

There can hardly be a statesman in Europe

to-day, who would venture to contemplate a preventive war. The Bolshevists, however, persist in reiterating that the imperialists may be expected to declare war upon them at any moment. And from time to time they launch vigorous campaigns of propaganda both in Russia and abroad, the gist of which is: "Hands off the Soviet Union!"

2. The second item in the Bolshevist peace and war policy is their zeal for radical disarmament, and their alacrity in endorsing the Kellogg Pact and any other guarantee or pact. But a policy which counts as a gain every breach between other powers; which would be nearer its goal if Europe were to become involved in a fresh world war; which is working with all its might for a war ten times worse than any conflict between States, and is itself preparing for war, and counting upon war as a weapon—surely such a policy is incompatible with all this enthusiastic concern for peace! One cannot reconcile world peace and world revolution.

3. The third objective of the Bolshevik peace and war policy is to arm to the teeth, and carry into effect the militarization of the entire population. To give one example: during the period from 1928 to 1931, the Soviet

association for aerial navigation and chemical warfare increased its membership from not quite three millions to six millions, of whom 400,000 are women in military training. Every dispute that arises in foreign politics, as well as the world-wide disgust aroused by the religious persecutions in Russia, is utilized to extract from the populace an extra "voluntary" contribution to pay for more war material. "A reply to the Pope of Rome" means raising money to buy aeroplanes and tanks for the Red Army. "A reply to Chamberlain" means the same thing. And the five years' plan itself is also, in a way, a war programme.

The Bolshevists' preparations for war are revealed, however, most clearly in their warlike budgets. The military vote in 1926 was 600 million roubles, and rose in 1931 above 1,500 millions, whereas the total military expenditure of the Tsar Government in the last year before the great war, amounted to round about 700 millions. The military vote has more than doubled in the last five years, and in the same period the Bolshevists have taken in hand a complete militarization of the population. The regular army (562,000 men plus the O.G.P.U. guard, with

a strength of 100,000) is only the kernel, around which is organized a great territorial army and a nation in arms. And even that is not all. The Red Soviet Army has auxiliaries beyond the frontier. An international Red Army is established all over the world with divisions already organized in several countries.

The Bolshevists are working methodically and straining every nerve to prepare for war and to secure a definite military superiority, sufficient for every politico-strategical contingency.

In spite of all this, Russian policy, at the moment, is in favour of peace. In preference to any offensive aim, Moscow's official policy is still chiefly occupied with the economic development of Russia. The idea is to gain time, because they believe that the trend of events is working in their favour, and because —from a military point of view—war offers little prospect of success at the present time.

In the event of war, the Bolshevists' chief advantage would lie in the definiteness of their aim, in the social and national inequalities in other countries, and in their own entire and unconditional power within

Russia itself. The Russian people are easily led by an active minority, and all this—added to the fact that Russia occupies strategically interior lines—ensures a unity in leadership and in offensive power which the divided countries of the world would find it difficult to achieve, however imminent the danger from Russia might be.

But, as regards most of the other considerations which arise when there is a prospect of war, the present conditions do not seem favourable to the Bolshevists. Russia is still, as she has always been, a giant with feet of clay.

The Red Army, in particular, is still inferior as regards leadership, mobilization, training, technical armament, and possibly even as regards numbers on the first summons to arms, to the joint military forces which the nearest border States alone—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania—can put into the field to meet a Red attack. And Russia must be prepared to find that they will act together in the common cause. Moreover she will be still further outmatched supposing any of the Great Powers or the League of Nations should intervene, as would probably happen if Moscow attempted to break

any link in the safety-chain of nations by which revolutionary Russia is encircled.

Russia herself has no trustworthy ally; the friendly neutrality of isolated nations is the most that she can count upon. Besides this, she is inferior in war-material and war-manufactures; although she has one advantage in that even in peace-time her factories are State-controlled, and thus could easily be converted into war-industries.

Taking automobiles as an example, the total number possessed by Russia only amounts to about half the total in Norway.

The Bolshevists have also to fear the economic effects of a blockade, although, on the other hand, they could take advantage of it to conceal the imperfections of their own system, and to inflame national sentiment, as they did in the first years of the Revolution.

Moreover, the Bolshevists cannot overlook the possibility that interior enemies would ally themselves with foreign foes to destroy them. The powerful ferment existing in the country, especially in the villages, would be immensely increased in war-time, and not the less so because the Bolshevists would find it necessary to make forced requisitions all along the line. They have no money to finance a

war; even their present budget and financial system is a mere soap-bubble. Great numbers of the Russian people are quite frankly counting upon war and foreign intervention, in the hope that they will put an end to the Bolshevist administration.

Napoleon's Russian campaign is often quoted as a warning against an invasion of Russia. People forget that the catastrophe of 1812 was brought about by the coincidence of a number of peculiar circumstances, and that conditions are quite different to-day, especially as regards means of communication. After all, it only took Napoleon two months to lead his European army from Russia's present frontier to Moscow; and the Bolshevist régime would never survive such a death-blow, as that which was warded off by the Tsarist régime. The fact that both in the Crimean and the Manchurian wars, Russia was brought to her knees by entirely peripheral and comparatively speaking minor wars, might also afford the Bolshevists food for thought.

In addition to this, the revolutionary prospects throughout the world have shrunk appreciably. In contrast to the revolutionary optimism which prevailed a few years ago,

the Bolshevists have now come to the conclusion that they must focus their aims upon a remoter objective.

The Bolshevists therefore still desire peace; but they are preparing for war, because they intend to bring it about in the long run, if not now. They cannot abandon and have not abandoned the thought of a World Revolution.

As it does not suit them at present to have recourse to an armed settlement, they are attempting to obtain definite guarantees that the foreign powers will not initiate hostilities against them. From this point of view, these guarantees, and pacts, and peace *démarches* remind one of the way in which Imperial Russia took the lead in convoking the Hague Peace Conference, because she had not the means to re-equip her army. But it was not very long before she was setting the world in a blaze, first in the East and then in Europe.

The Bolshevists can carry on their peace and treaty policy all the more safely, because their offensive plans do not as yet contemplate a brutal war of aggression. They will, by preference, make use of the method which they have already practised in Caucasia and Central Asia, and have attempted in

Esthonia: infiltration and sedition, effected by the proclamation of a Soviet republic and adherence to the Soviet Union. In this way they invalidate any grounds for intervention. The whole thing is carried out as a matter of domestic policy, in which foreign countries and the League of Nations have no right to intervene.

It was Machiavelli's advice that when men wished to dominate or destroy everybody, they should take the part of the weak against the strong.

We can see how the Bolshevists, in accordance with this advice, have more or less successfully attempted a rapprochement to such of the world powers as are more or less "in opposition" in the present world constellation. Thus, in addition to China, they have made advances to Germany, Lithuania, Italy, Mexico, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Japan.

But those who would sup with the Bolshevists must use a long spoon. As we saw in our review of conditions in the East, Russia's "partners" soon come to the conclusion that it is dangerous to have much to do with Moscow. Intrusive and often blundering

propaganda has been destructive of most of the diplomatic combinations, and the Soviet Union is becoming more and more isolated. Foreign commercial connections, too, have not proved so favourable as the Bolshevists had hoped. Particularly as regards America, with which it is so important for them to maintain stable relations, among other things in order to counteract any threat of blockade from Europe or the League of Nations.

As regards *Germany*, her co-operation with the Bolshevists has already got her into trouble once. If, in 1918, she had suppressed Bolshevism in Russia, (which would, at that time, have been a task well within her power), and concluded an alliance with that Empire, under entirely new conditions, she might conceivably have won the war, or, at all events, have obtained more favourable terms of peace. Instead of that, Bolshevism was allowed to live on in Great Russia. The German forces were consequently undermined by revolutionary propaganda and by troops from the Eastern front, who were tainted with Bolshevism. After the war, again, nothing has damaged Germany more than the Rapallo treaty with Russia. This agreement deprived Germany of any support from Britain, and

delayed, amongst other matters, the termination of the Occupation, and the adjustment of war indemnities. Fortunately both for herself and for the world, Germany is becoming more and more alive to the fact that it is questionable policy to ally herself to some one who is attempting her life, and that redemption will not be won by war and revolution (which must always be the ultimate result of co-operation with Bolshevism) but by co-operation in Europe and a Northward orientation both in internal and external policy.

There are thus many indications that the Bolshevists have passed the highest point of international recognition, and that, as Lenin himself predicted, they are descending after an interval of tranquillity, into a period fraught with increasing dangers from without.

CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS

DOMESTIC and foreign politics always exert a great influence upon one another. This is especially the case with a revolution like the Russian. It is impossible to take a complete view of the whole situation, until, as we have done now, we examine internal as well as external conditions.

Russia stands revealed as the fortress and workshop of World Revolution, with her frontiers touching Asia as well as Europe, her agents and skirmishers spread over the whole globe from Australia, South Africa and the Argentine, to Norway and Iceland—from Mexico and Seattle to Japan. This is a rôle for which Russia would seem to be peculiarly fitted, with all her natural resources, and occupying a central, but at the same time rather sequestered and inaccessible position between the East and the West;—Russia,

which contains over one-sixth of the land, and one-twelfth of the population on this globe.

We ask ourselves: "What is the meaning of this great upheaval?" Behind all this bloodshed and destruction, such an important event as the Russian Revolution must have a deeper purpose and design, both for Russia and for the rest of the world, than a Utopian world revolution and the fulfilment of Karl Marx's fantastic ideas. Let us, in conclusion, consider this aspect of the matter.

I. THE REVOLUTION AND CIVILIZATION

One cannot rightly understand the Russian Revolution by considering events in Russia as isolated facts. We are living in a world-embracing period of transition. The changes affecting the life-conditions of the human race take place so rapidly and are so profound that the development has assumed a violent character all over the world.

One main reason for this world crisis in the history of civilization must be seen in the fact that, whereas a number of new ideas, inventions and discoveries have completely changed the conditions of human life, the forms

of human society have not yet managed to adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Thus crises and antagonisms arise, both in individual countries and between different nations, giving rise to wars and revolutions.

The most important of these antagonistic factors are :

(*a*) The fact that although the world tends to become a unit, the frontiers of the countries are not only maintained, but even more sharply accentuated.

(*b*) The disputes between labour and capital.

(*c*) The anomalies of supply and demand, productive capacity and consumption.

(*d*) The differences between the belligerents who participated in the great war.

(*e*) The reaction of the colonial nations against European and American imperialism.

Of these facts the fundamental phenomenon of our times is undoubtedly the first, i.e. that the whole of the terrestrial globe has been discovered and conquered by mankind, and that the world is becoming a unit, as happened in the case of the Mediterranean world two thousand years ago.

A glance at history will place this event in its right context :

The power of the Roman Empire was confined to the conquest of the Mediterranean countries and to the amalgamation of Eastern religion, Greek thought and Roman statecraft into that Græco-Roman civilization disseminated throughout the whole of the ancient civilized world, which it brought into being. Practically the whole of this work of civilization was due to the influence of Nordic races: Aryans, Greeks, Italians, who emigrated to Southern lands from the snowy solitudes where existence had been so hard, and established themselves as a dominant class ruling the indigenous races. These latter included the so-called Mediterranean race which acted as the second great racial factor in the development of civilization.

But when the Roman Empire had exhausted its power of expansion, it withdrew behind its fortified frontiers, and fell into decadence in proportion as the Northern strain deteriorated. It had to break up, if its permanent cultural values were to influence the world more widely. So another Northern people, the Germanic invaders, dismembered the Roman Empire; and from the old Mediterranean civilization, and the more vigorous new Nordic influences, there arose another

civilization, the European—a process which occupied the whole of the Middle Ages.

A new era began with the further development of European civilization into the North Atlantic civilization. This was carried to other parts of the world by the European national States and America, which were all, in fact, constituted on Nordic lines, and which took the lead in turn.

At the present time, this expansion is almost complete, and we are entering upon a fresh phase of evolution. The separate parts have accomplished their destinies, as such, and are beginning to unite. Modern discovery has reduced the whole globe to smaller proportions than that of the Græco-Roman Mediterranean world of ancient times. The world is beginning to draw together in an attempt to achieve unity, the human race is trying to organize itself. And in the transition, world-powers, hitherto unsurpassed in magnitude, have arisen.

Now, as in ancient days, the work of civilization, speaking ethnically, is in the hands of the two European races, properly so called: the Nordic race and the Mediterranean race, with a certain admixture of other races. And just as in ancient days we

find, cutting across the racial distinctions, a national and popular division of labour between the Greeks and the Romans (both of whom were at that time substantially Nordic nations), so civilization to-day is coming under the control of the Latin and Teutonic racial-groups, to the latter of which the Slav nations are most nearly allied.

If we could now, as in the time of the Romans, divide the world into two portions corresponding to ethnical and lingual realities, our classification would be as follows. On one side we should have the Latin world, consisting of the Latin countries of Europe and their possessions, with Latin America. The other division would comprise the rest of the world, in which the Teutonic—and therefore the definitely Nordic nations of the present day—are or will become the dominating factor. As the world also comes naturally under the further definition of the old world and the new, we get four main threads in the fabric of civilization, two running cross-wise and two lengthwise :

1. Nordic and Latin in America = Pan-America.

2. Nordic and Latin in Europe = Pan-Europe.

3. Latin throughout the world = The pan-Latin Movement.

4. Nordic throughout the world = The pan-Nordic Movement.

All these currents, added to the many national ones, find their proper co-ordination in the substantially Nordic European-American world-civilization, and in the great and uniform task of rallying and organizing the world, which was seriously taken in hand after the world war, and is mainly identified with the League of Nations.

Has not mankind—perhaps unconsciously—been working for this great objective, ever since the beginning? And is not mankind's ambition here on earth to realize through human unity the rule of the spirit?

What, then, is the position of the Russian Revolution in this universal historical process so typical of our own time?

To begin with, the Revolution is the result of the international reaction against capitalism and imperialism, which has found its theoretical expression in Marxism. But as a matter of fact a good deal of this coincides with, and should rightly be looked upon as, a race-revolt throughout civilization, as we

suggested earlier in speaking of the racial foundations of Bolshevism.

It was natural that this reaction should triumph in Russia: partly because the brachycephalic European-Asiatic races constitute the bulk of the population there; and partly because, in that country, the antagonisms were strongest and the power of resistance weakest.

Imperial Russia had defended herself not only against the national movement of the nineteenth century, but also against the democratic reforms of the great French Revolution—such as representation of the people, equality before the law, abolition of privilege, and the handing-over of the land to the peasantry. But when the democratic movement and the different nationalist movements were joined by the Socialist labour movement, Imperial Russia, enfeebled by war and undermined for many years past, was unable to resist this threefold assault any longer.

At one fell swoop Russia passed through not only national emancipation and democratic revolution—which Western Europe had experienced a hundred years earlier—but also through the new Marxist Social revolution.

It was a fearful upheaval, and one that shook the masses and the community to their foundations. But while democratic ideals and national emancipation formed a link in the chain of world-unity, the Revolution, through the victory of the Marxist ideas, overshadowed the first motive, and stood in opposition to that unity. We see how the Bolshevists themselves suggest that the consolidation and organization of the world should proceed, not from Geneva, but from Moscow.

Geneva and Moscow may therefore be said to represent the two poles of world-development. It is perhaps open to doubt whether the positive pole of world-development is to be found at Geneva. But, at all events, the negative one is fixed at Moscow, and is the incarnation, on a vast scale, of all those renegade forces which oppose any organization of *the world* according to principles of religion, morality, goodwill, justice or common sense. Nevertheless, it serves, however indirectly, to further such an organization, and even helps to correct many faults and failings. "Part of that eternal power, which ever wills the Evil, yet ever makes for Good."

It is significant, too, that the two basic

ideas in the Bolshevist conspiracy against the world, i.e. the insurrection in the East and the revolt of the proletariat—have their exact analogies in Roman history in the first century B.C.—that period in history which most resembles our own. The Bolshevist Revolution is an Asiatic-Eastern revolt against civilization as a whole, similar to that experienced by Rome during the redoubtable movement in Asia Minor and the East, which is associated with the name of Mithridates. Further, in the insurrection of the slaves at Rome, we have the counterpart of the second main line of Bolshevik activity: the proletarian revolt. In recognition of this fact, the Bolshevists themselves have named the communistic movement in Germany after Spartacus, the Thracian gladiator who, at the head of a large force of runaway slaves, poverty-stricken peasants, outlaws and bandits, brought Roman society to the verge of social revolution. One is likewise impressed by the fact that the tragedy we are witnessing in Russia has so many points of resemblance with the dreadful breaking-up of Russia's predecessor, the Eastern-Roman Empire, under the onslaught of Islam and the Turks. Food for reflection with regard

to the duration of the Bolshevist régime; to the significance of its menace to Europe; as well as to the ulterior fate of Russia, and the subsequent succession to her Imperial idea!

That Bolshevism is really a revolt against world-civilization is also demonstrated with special distinctness by its anti-Christian and anti-Christlike character, as well as by its significant combination of tyrannical compulsion with lack of form and self-discipline which is the very antithesis of civilization.

This is one significant aspect of the Russian Revolution in the development and organization of the world. Side by side with it we find Russia playing the part in history of a warning against the impracticability of Marxist theories, as has already been explained in detail.

A second point—and one closely connected with the first—is that, in spite of all the present Asiaticizing of Russia, the Russian Revolution has actually cleared the way for the Europeanization of the country, and also for the advance of Western civilization into the heart of Asia.

It has therefore, to some extent, prepared

the way for the completion of the victorious progress of our present civilization throughout the world.

In pre-war Russia, a number of deeply rooted conditions and circumstances hindered her people from fully appropriating European civilization.

The Revolution has, very largely, done away with these hindrances. The Bolshevists are working to some extent like a second Peter the Great to enable Russia to appropriate the civilization—the technical civilization—of the West. As outward signs of this development, we may specify the change to the new calendar and to metric weights and measures, and the first steps in Latinizing the Russian alphabets. At the same time, the Bolshevists have certainly erected fresh barriers and created fresh difficulties as regards Europeanization, for, though they are working for it, they wish it to assume Marxist forms.

The result is that, although with some degree of advance in modernization, Russia has become more Asiatic; one might say that she has become Asiatic in a modern sense. Yet even this may in time prove more of a help than a hindrance to the advance

of civilization, because the power of resistance has been worn down. Lenin's work of destruction has, in point of fact, prepared the way for the Europeanization of Russia.

The above-mentioned factors taken together are characteristic of the crisis, and at the same time of the great and unique opportunity which the Bolshevist Revolution in Russia signifies in the history of civilization. The fate of Western civilization is being decided in Russia. Europe is confronted by two possibilities as regards the Russian Revolution: (*a*) destruction; or (*b*) a new and decisive accession of territory, which will admit European civilization into the otherwise almost inaccessible Eurasiatic continent, and will effect a regeneration of that civilization which is in danger of becoming extinct in its original and now too straitened surroundings. Russia and Europe cannot be parted for ever. The only question is, whether Europe will unite the Russian nations with herself, which would presuppose the downfall of Bolshevism, or whether the frontiers of the Soviet Union will be shifted westwards.

For those who believe in the vitality and the historic mission of Western civilization

there is no doubt as to which of these two possibilities should be realized. As has previously been emphasized, the Russian Revolution has already approached its natural limits. Moreover, revolution in the West would encounter very different conditions in countries, where, roughly speaking, that admixture of democratic, national and social revolutionary movements is absent, which—like coal, saltpetre and sulphur in gunpowder—have combined to bring about the explosion in Russia. Such an admixture is to some extent found in Central Europe, which makes the situation there a critical one. Apart from this, the most crucial unsolved problem in European countries is that of the social workers, which, even taken by itself, is a comparatively dangerous one. But European countries have too many people of the propertied classes to permit of Bolshevism being more than a passing and ineffectual assault. Also, our countries have learned how to distribute the necessary social development over an interval sufficiently long to prevent the accumulation of such explosive power as results in bloody social revolution; and machinery is gradually supplanting slavery.

The position in the East is more dangerous

because those countries are as yet only at the beginning of all the changes through which Europe has been passing during recent centuries, and which the Bolshevists are subtly attempting to embody in their revolution. But the fact that the conditions are so far from ripe, acts there, too, as a check on the progress of revolution.

The chances, then, of a World Revolution should be small, granted that the peace of the world can be preserved. But this does not preclude revolutionary outbreaks in one country or another, especially if a *laissez-faire* policy is pursued, and only half-measures are taken. Besides, if peace were to be broken on the European continent, there is no saying what might follow. In any circumstances, Europe may expect more serious difficulties with Russia than she has hitherto experienced. But just as Rome overcame Mithridates, after a number of crises, Europe will overcome the Bolshevists—in her own way. Her less developed neighbours will succumb to her more enlightened civilization and higher political development, and become incorporated with her. We have every reason to count upon this.

Yet destruction is perhaps menacing us in

a more insidious fashion. As we know, the inferior races are obtaining more and more influence in Europe, from sheer force of numbers. It is in this change of ethnical types, taken in connection with Bolshevism, that the greatest danger lies for Western civilization.

II. THE NEW RUSSIA

The task of restoring Russia to general civilization is the greatest political and cultural problem in the world at the present time. But its solution depends first and foremost on the development of Russia herself.

Uncertain as this development appears now, one can glimpse certain fundamental features in the real, new Russia, which are bound to emerge sooner or later from the revolutionary chaos.

These fundamental features are really connected with the triumph of democratic ideas and national movements, notwithstanding the preliminary Marxist blunders. What they amount to, in reality, is revolution minus Marxism, the three first of these main features being: (1) the transference of the land to the peasants; (2) the Soviet system; (3) the policy in regard to nationalities.

(1) The fact that the peasants have obtained actual possession of the greater part of the land, paves the way for the politico-economical evolution of the new Russia. The 25 million Russian agricultural households, with their 130 million inhabitants, no longer fear a counter-revolution (the loss of their land), but are moving in the direction of individualism and free co-operation. They wish to restore the rights of private ownership, individual agriculture, free sale and purchase of land and products, and freedom in co-operation. The existence of this vast community of small-holders also tends to create an enormous home market in Russia, which should afford a secure basis for the development of great national industries. The Bolshevists have turned this natural economic development upside down, because, for political reasons, they have begun by developing industry, and have neglected agriculture. But the natural stream will find an outlet in the long run. Of this the Right opposition in the Communist party is already, as it were, the harbinger. And this fractional split in the party seems to be the most natural and probable way of inaugurating a change of system in Russia.

This change will also be followed by the restoration of religion and of intellectual liberty; and in all probability by the transference of industry from State Control into private hands—partly in the form of concessions, partly as property, partly also, perhaps, by making the employees participants in the industrial concerns where they work. The Russian State owns all these undertakings, and would therefore find it comparatively easy to carry through such an arrangement as would satisfy the desires of the workers far more fully than the Marxist illusion, under which a band of party politicians and adventurers is let loose upon the economic life of the nation, merely usurping the place of the private capitalists.

2. A second thing which has come to stay in Russia is the Soviet or council system, not as the instrument which has been misused by the Bolshevists, but as a form of municipal and national self-government. Very far from tending to abandon the Soviets, the new Russia is, on the contrary, struggling to concentrate round them, with the slogan: "Soviets without Communists!"

What the form of government otherwise will be in Russia lies on the knees of the

gods! But there is no doubt that if the country is to be rescued from chaos, it will be obliged to fall back for a long time upon some form of dictatorship, even after it has got rid of the Bolshevists. But, it does not seem at all likely, at least not at present, that the Russian people will be in favour of the restoration of the monarchy.

3. Then there is the question of nationalities. The fact that the formerly subject nations in Russia have obtained national self-government, cannot but have a lasting effect. It does not seem possible that any Russian government would venture to abandon the new racial policy. That would be a gross reaction, and would call forth such opposition that the question of nationalities would still exercise a decisive influence upon the course of events. A system of autonomous national culture and local self-government, combined with a common organization in matters of economics and defence, would guarantee the unity of Russia far more effectively than Russification, and the unsolved problems of nationality, which rent asunder the old Russian Empire.

But at the same time the question of these

nationalities involves considerable danger to Russia. In the North, she runs the risk of losing Eastern Carelia and Kola, with the Murman railway; in the West, White Russia and the Ukraine; in the South, Caucasia; in the East, Turkestan and Siberia. Strong forces both within and without Russia are working for such developments. But these plans for complete disintegration seem too far-reaching. To separate Eastern Carelia, Turkestan and Siberia from Russia might conceivably be effected, but in the long run such an arrangement would prove both untenable and dangerous.

As regards the detachment of White Russia and the Ukraine, which is the most important, and, apart from the Caucasian, the most urgent question at the present time, the case may be compared with Napoleon's policy in Germany. It might prove a useful means for attaining certain ends, but it might also lead to a reaction which would be destructive to those who had planned it. Charles XII and Germany had that experience in the Ukraine, though this does not necessarily prove much as regards the present and the future.

For the rest, it must be remembered that

the Ukraine is a country of the same size as Germany, with a population of over 30 millions, possessing great natural wealth, and every qualification for becoming an independent State. White Russia may be compared to Bulgaria.

As everybody knows the Caucasian question reeks of oil! But there is another side to it as well, viz. that the Eastern part of Caucasia, on both sides of the Caucasus, is inhabited by Turkish races, with kinsmen on the other bank of the Caspian Sea, over the whole of Turkestan, and as far up as the region of the Volga (Kazan). Caucasia, and particularly Trans-Caucasia, has therefore a strong attraction for the pan-Turkish party, of which fact there was ocular demonstration in the course of the great war and the Revolution. These pan-Turkish efforts are threatening the existence of the other Caucasian nations—the Armenians and the Georgians. In particular, the million Armenians who are left are the only ethnical barrier to a homogeneous Turkish population from Anatolia to the Caspian Sea and beyond, the pan-Turks having already annihilated a million Armenians in Anatolia, in connection with the war.

The relationship between Russia and Turkey has been regularized for the time being; but, if Trans-Caucasia broke away, the pan-Turks would inevitably resume operations in earnest. Out of a Trans-Caucasian population of six millions, about two millions are Turks. For that reason Trans-Caucasia cannot contemplate an independent existence without the most positive international guarantees, all the more so because the country is torn between national and religious antagonisms.

And the power which is best fitted to give such guarantees—because it is sufficiently in her own interest to respect them—is Russia.

The natural solution of all these important problems regarding nationalities—whether it comes to pass or not—may be inferred from the developments which have so far taken place. The Soviet Union consists of seven federated republics: Great Russia, White Russia, the Ukraine, Trans-Caucasia, and three Central-Asiatic republics. Each of these federated republics is a sovereign power, and, in accordance with the constitution of the Soviet Union, has the right to withdraw from the Union. Although this

sovereignty is merely nominal at the present time, it does contain the germs of reality. And this reality would find its natural expression in the adhesion of these sovereign republics to the League of Nations, while they maintain their own federation, or possibly join some larger combination. A reorganization of the Russian union (e.g. on the lines of the German Empire) would also be a natural development (the United States of Russia). Very likely the foreign Trans-Caucasian and Central-Asiatic republics would occupy a special position (as mandatory States).

4. As a fourth positive and permanent reality resulting from the Revolution we must realize that the Russian masses have been awakened to consciousness in individual as well as in national respects. The Revolution has acted as a plough, turning up the Russian fields, and laying open the hidden soil to the sun. The sleeping villages have been roused to life. . . .

5. Finally, a fifth fundamental point about this new Russia consists in the fact, to which we have already drawn attention, that the Revolution has cleared the ground for the Europeanization of Russia.

Such, then, are the five main features of the new Russia which is emerging from the Revolution. They are the permanent activities, aims and gains of the Revolution, and they lie deeper than the superficial tenets of Marxism, which has to a great extent been imposed upon them from without. Life itself—the legitimate aspirations of a democratic organism—cannot in the long run be suppressed by the compulsory Marxist system.

The Bolshevists identified these things with Marxist dogmas and the World Revolution; yet, in a way, they fought the battle of progress in resisting the forces of counter-revolution and intervention. So long as they did so, history went along with them, and in spite of everything, progressive men found it difficult not to sympathize with them up to a point. But when the foundations of permanent progress were laid with bloodshed and tyranny, and the Bolshevists still persisted with their horrors and their Marxism, their machinations became an unmitigated public nuisance. This active sect—which, according to Lenin's own estimate, was composed of one per cent of genuine revolutionaries (in other words, fanatics), and 99 per

cent of equally-mixed fanatics and adventurers, and which has by no means improved upon its constitution—no longer in any sense furthers sound development in Russia, but is actually blocking its way.

One other feature will characterize the Russia of the future.

As I have said already, the Bolshevist destruction of the intellectual and material values of Russia—and especially the former—will have the inevitable result of bringing the country more and more under foreign influence, even if the Bolshevists themselves jealously defend the economic and political independence of the Soviet Union. Another circumstance points in the same direction, viz. that foreign countries, as a result of the Revolution, will become seriously involved in Russian affairs. Russia is in peril of becoming a semi-colony, if not before, then after the fall of the Bolshevists. Her unaided powers of resistance will scarcely suffice, in the long run, to stave off this danger, and maintain her as a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable State, unless she is supported by the growing conviction of the world at large that a

wise policy must be founded not on might alone, but on goodwill, and respect for others.

The early history of Russia tells how the Northern Vikings—styled Russians—established themselves as armed traders among the Finno-Slav population in "Österveg" (Eastway). Gradually increasing in power, they founded a State, which was named "Russia" after them. In Russian history this development has been represented as the work of the Russian people themselves who, tired of the unsettled conditions in their country, called in the help of strangers, saying: "Our country is large and wealthy, but there is no order and no justice. Come and reign over us."

Order and justice! The Russian people are still longing for them at the present day. History seems to be repeating itself. The new Russia must be built up by the aid of foreign capital and industry, but the help must be given in such a form as not to wound Russian national sensibilities. Its motto must be the same: "Order and justice." And, in addition to that, and above all—"no half-measures!"

When and how will this new Russia be born?

The Revolution against the Tsarist government started in some of the food-queues in Petrograd. Dissatisfaction in the queues led to fighting; the troops were called out, but they refused to fire on the crowd. And so things developed until the Revolution became an accomplished fact. The possibility of similar events exists in Russia to-day. Whether it develops will depend upon circumstances.

There are also, no doubt, in Russia, tendencies towards Bonapartism, and towards revolution with the army to back it up. A series of such conspiracies have gradually been detected and baulked. And history shows us that many a change of system or of government in Russia has been brought about in the following way: a couple of regiments have marched to the palace and expressed their opinion, or a group of conspirators have forced an entrance into the imperial apartments, and have extorted what they wanted. Palace-revolutions have always been possible in Russia, and their modern equivalents may still occur.

But the most natural and probable course,

or, at all events, basis of a revolution in Russia, seems, as we have said, to be one that will be inaugurated by a sectional group within the Communist party. As early as six years ago, there were definite signs of that process of disintegration which always sets in after a revolution. The Revolution began, like Chronos, to devour its own children. But it is, at the same time, constantly giving birth to fresh Communist offspring. The Russian Revolution has not yet attained its Thermidor, the turning-point which the French Revolution had already reached at the time of Robespierre's fall in July 1794, after two years of Jacobin rule and five years of revolution. The course of the revolutionary fever is proportionately slower in Russia, since the Russian Revolution actually began twenty-five years ago (in 1905) and has experienced thirteen years of terror. But if the Right opposition came into power, then the Russian Revolution would also have reached its turning-point, and would begin to move slowly, and through many crises, along the up-grade towards normal conditions.

No one can say when this change may occur. One can only feel sure that with

each celebration of the Revolution, the Bolshevists are one year nearer the end. Three-quarters of the Russian nation are determined that Stalin's present policy must cease; and a good half of the Bolshevists wish that it would do so. But even if Stalin falls, the Bolshevist government would not necessarily come to an end. The revolutionary oligarchy have countless methods of maintaining a hold upon the unfortunate country; they are energetic and unscrupulous men, with a vigilant police force and a loyal soldiery at their command; and they have weighty interests to safeguard: their monomaniacal ideas, their power, and their lives.

For these reasons, Bolshevism in Russia has a good chance of continuing so long that its revolutionary policy—which is becoming more and more aggressive—will succeed in embroiling Russia with other nations. That is, at all events, the alternative upon which the Bolshevists themselves are reckoning, and which the world at large will be wise to take into consideration. And it is possibly the only thing which can properly clear up the mess in Russia.

III. RUSSIA AND OURSELVES

We have seen how the Bolshevists are working against the world. How is the world to defend itself against Bolshevism, and Bolshevist-ridden Russia, which, with her resources, her means, and her aims, is not only a danger, but the greatest of all dangers to the civilization of the world, and the welfare of mankind?

This is the great question, and it cannot be dealt with publicly in detail. However, in addition to what has already been said, I may call attention to one point which is of paramount importance.

Nationalism and concentration of the Executive Power are the first and instinctive reactions against Bolshevism. This natural self-vindication combined with an attempt to solve the social question, which calls for immediate attention, has given origin to the synthesis represented by Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism. But riper reflection on the matter will look for a still more profound solution of the problem with greater propriety to our countries. True, the British nation has a strong antidote to Bolshevism in the great concept of the British Empire.

When, however, the truth comes to be realized that Bolshevism is a conspiracy against Western civilization of the Nordic type, that Northern ideals of life run the greatest risk of destruction, and that the most pronounced antagonisms in the world of to-day have resolved themselves into a duel between Bolshevism and Nordic-European principles—when all this is admitted, we cannot but see that the most effective remedy for Bolshevism and Bolshevist-Russian plots and intrigues will be found in a closer cultural, economic and political co-operation between those peoples which are the main supporters of Western civilization, and which can be described as Nordic in the widest sense of the term. Where are these peoples? They are in the Scandinavian countries, in Holland and Flanders, the British Empire, Germany, the United States of America, to a considerable extent in France, and largely intermingled with the people of other countries where the Nordic race, however, does not prevail to the same extent. A *Northern Coalition* of these nations, beginning with Scandinavia and Great Britain—and with the inclusion of Finland and Holland—which might attract Germany next, and possibly the

British Dominions and America later on. would render innocuous any Bolshevist combination, and would within a measurable distance of time ensure European peace and civilization.

In accordance with the development of tariff policies and economic conditions, it is natural that Scandinavia—and more particularly Norway—should seek a closer relationship with Great Britain, to which the Scandinavian kingdoms are already so firmly united by ties of mutual sympathy and regard. England's and Scandinavia's somewhat analogous position as regards Europe and the Revolution, and their common dangers and interests, also provide a stable foundation for closer co-operation. Hence British statesmen (especially Canning), when Napoleon was at the height of his power and in alliance with Russia, saw the rescue of Europe in a firm Anglo-Scandinavian league, which would keep open the Baltic and set bounds to the designs of Russia. The scheme failed, for well-known reasons and with well-known deplorable results.

The present circumstances are probably more favourable, not only for the foundation of this Northern co-operation, but for its further

development as well. The Scandinavian States, with Finland and Holland, already group themselves quite naturally in a little Northern entente. In the Baltic we recognize a quasi-revival of the Swedish Empire in modern co-operation between Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States. As regards Germany the " Nordic idea " is steadily growing in popularity and influence, and is beginning to play a significant part in practical politics. The same thing applies to America, and in part also to the British Dominions.

Thus the germs of a wider Northern co-operation already exist, and they will flourish. As is always the case under similar conditions, the movement has begun in the domain of culture and economics, spreading later to that of politics. What, for instance, is the practical result of the Church's struggle for unity, if not a preparation for a Northern universal church? It is only natural that international co-operation, which is such a vital issue in our time, should first and foremost be sought with our kinsfolk.

In spite of all the antagonisms which must needs remain as a legacy from the bloodshed in the great war, this promotion of cultural, economic and political understanding between

the Nordic peoples and people with Nordic sympathies all over the world, is the most important duty of far-seeing men and women in every country. I am so deeply convinced of the importance of this point both as regards present conditions, and for the future development of the world, that I feel I cannot conclude these reflections on Russian conditions, and their bearing upon our own, better than by making an appeal for a revival of the Nordic spirit and for such Nordic co-operation.

The Nordic nations must strive towards a fuller knowledge of themselves, their own character, and their place and task in the world. We must realize that we do not stand alone, but that we are members of a common Northern stock, which represents the most valuable contribution to the human race, and has always been the chief exponent of world-civilization. Not only Greece and Rome, but Europe and America owe their greatness to the Nordic element, and the fate of the modern world is bound up with its preservation or decay, as was the case with the ancient civilizations. Efforts towards the national revival of our countries are futile unless the Nordic spirit is reanimated. The

progress of our nations is inextricably bound up with the preservation of their Nordic blood; and in order to ensure this survival of our typical stock we must observe a set of rather primitive laws, already discovered by science. Unless we guard our Nordic character, it will be lost to us. How is it that the young people in our schools are taught all kinds of indifferent and superfluous things, but are left in ignorance of these important and serious questions, their foundation and their consequences?

Further, if we realize the profound truths in bygone and present-day history, and see how nobly the people of the Nordic race have laboured for the development of the world from the dawn of history until now, when they are more vigorous than ever before; if, too, we are convinced that the Divine Will is revealing itself through a process of evolution in the history of the world—then, without ignoring the importance and the achievements of others, we may be permitted to believe in the further divine and historical mission in this world of the Northern peoples.

This is not megalomania. It is the logical interpretation of incontestable facts, and the proper method of finding our way through the

perils and perplexities of the present world situation, if we desire to ensure the vigorous survival of our nations, intact and true to their racial ambitions. Our civilization, created and borne forward by the Nordic race and by Nordic elements in other races, is now threatened by the devastating activities of inferior races. If this crisis is to be safely passed, it is an essential condition that the various Nordic peoples, and people with Nordic sympathies, should join hands and initiate honest and intelligent co-operation for world organization and peaceful progress. At the same time such a foreign policy will secure the position of our countries in the world and create, to our own advantage and that of others, a broader sphere of work for that surplus power which cannot expect to find employment in our own countries. This purposeful foreign policy will thus assist also in solving a great part of our internal difficulties.

The accentuation of the racial side, however, must not develop into over-estimation of one's own, and the disparagement of other racial virtues and what is common to humanity. While we lay stress upon the importance of

the Nordic nations, we must not underrate the significance of a general European and international co-operation, either in its wider significance or in relation more particularly to the Russian question. The consolidation of Europe, based upon an understanding between France and Germany, is certainly a necessary assumption, if Europe is to be able to hold her own against Russia. To separate the two main streams in which our civilization meets—the Latin-Romanic and the Germanic-Nordic—would be to play into the hands of the forces of destruction. For this reason, while we emphasize the common interests of the North, we must also work for an all-European and international co-operation, expressing itself through and within the scope of the League of Nations. Moreover, in order to countervail the Bolshevist peril it is necessary to centralize internationally the management of the Russian problem, presumably under the auspices of the League of Nations. But someone must lead, even in a joint undertaking; and such leadership is the business of the Northern peoples, especially as regards the Russian question. If Germany could be prevailed upon to withdraw from her compromising co-operation

with the Bolshevists, and join a Northern entente between Scandinavia and Great Britain, to which she would by rights belong, that great Nordic constellation would become so strong that it could if necessary win a bloodless victory over Bolshevism by the sheer weight of its influence. It could then unite with America and the rest of Europe in helping to reconstruct Russia.

This reconstruction would preferably be accomplished with the assistance of American and British capital, and Scandinavian and German labour; and it would inaugurate that peaceful penetration into the Eurasiatic continent which would discover a new America and give the whole of European civilization the opportunity to make a fresh start on a broader foundation. Russia would be enabled to perform her true mission: that of civilizing Asia. The circle of the world would be complete.

Marxism is a religion, though a bad one, based as it is upon hate, and upon the absurd view that the world is a steam-engine and human beings a casual product of matter only. Still, it *is* a kind of religion, a philosophy of life whose emotional content

is of a religious nature. This imported and pernicious teaching, which does not accord with the Nordic character and is in itself fundamentally false and evil, cannot effectively be dealt with by party politics and by programmes in the form of election bait. We must get down to bedrock in the matter.

Our policy, apart from being abreast of the times, must conform to the needs and aims of our Nordic stock. Our political creed and our political activities must be grounded upon and permeated by a sane nationalism, and by a profoundly moral outlook on the world. Like Bolshevism itself it must be a politico-religious movement, in a sense a Puritan movement. And the only useful basis for this will be found in a Nordic revival. In our countries where the Nordic stock predominates, the notion of "race" ought to supply as workable an ideology as that of "class." By combining the "Nordic idea" with a religious and moral perception of the world, and attention to the requirements of modern progress, a scientific political doctrine may be evolved (religious in aim, national, social, and Nordic, or, if you will, social-individualistic) which will possess the necessary strength and conviction

to overcome the ogre which oppresses our communities. A national renaissance in Nordic spirit; a peaceable and just solution of the social problem; and a world-embracing co-operation between the various Nordic peoples and people of Nordic sympathies to promote the world's organization and peaceful development—this is not merely an anti-Bolshevist, but primarily a positive policy founded upon realities, and with a strong and noble aim in view, something really worth living and dying for. Far more so than the Godless chimeras of Karl Marx and Lenin.

Printed in Great Britain by Butler & Tanner Ltd., Frome and London