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NOOMACHIA

WARS OF THE MIND

POLITICA AETERNA

POLITICAL PLATONISM AND BLACK ENLIGHTENMENT

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The main idea of the course on political philosophy is to show the synchronic structures of political Logos in their connection with philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology, and then to outline the diachronic unfolding of these structures in political history. It was precisely the synchronism of the structural description that became the decisive argument in choosing the title — Politica Aeterna or Eternal Politics. The author approaches the consideration of the political first as a timeless structure and only then as processes of historical transformation.

The two poles of the temporary deployment of Politica Aeterna are traditional society and modern society. Thus, Politica Aeterna, static in some of its structures, becomes clear in other structures only in the course of historical processes that actualise what previously remained potential. At the same time, the foundations of politics that dominated traditional society become potential, virtual, and gradually as marginal and "heretical" as the previously materialistic versions — democracy, individualism, economics, etc. This tension in the polar interpretation of the political throughout history is organised in such a way that at first one pole, well aware of itself, describes the opposite pole approximately or even incorrectly, and then the same happens with the opposite pole. The political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle conveys the truth about the vertical Logos of Tradition, but political materialism presents it in a distorted and very approximate way. Modern political philosophy moves towards the realisation of its nihilistic essence gradually, reaching it only when Modernity finally triumphs and the transition to Postmodernity and speculative realism begins. Here, the truth of political nothingness is revealed, but at the same time, the understanding of the Logos of Tradition is completely lost. Thus, in both cases, we are dealing with a partial truth about the structure of the political Logos, which is an inevitable and, probably, constitutive aberration of time for the very nature of history. It is time — political time — that prevents us from correctly assessing the metaphysical foundations of the Political in all its entirety, since we are forced to take a position in time, that is, in a specific phase of political history, which predetermines our view and, at the same time, the object on which it falls and which it seeks to distinguish.

Preface. Politica Aeterna — topology, theory, method

The Political Dimension of Eternity

The book Politica Aeterna is based on edited lectures from a course on political philosophy taught at the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University in 2014. However, some of the topics covered there are developed in much greater detail, and some sections have been rewritten. Thus, the book combines the simplicity of the lecture language with more rigorous philosophical generalisations. At the same time, the main idea of the course has been preserved unchanged. It was to show the *synchronic* structures of the political Logos in their connection with philosophy, metaphysics and ontology, and only then to outline the *diachronic* unfolding of these structures in political history. It was precisely the synchronism of the structural description that became the decisive argument in choosing the title — Politica Aeterna or Eternal Politics, but it can also be understood as the political dimension of eternity or the politics of eternity. Politica Aeterna approaches the Political first as a timeless structure, and only then as processes of historical transformation. The eternal explains time, which adds nothing to the structure of the philosophical City (polis), but may well detract from its completeness. However, this completeness, glimpses of which we encounter in the philosophical systems of the greatest geniuses — Plato, Aristotle and... Democritus, being generally represented in the classical teachings of Antiquity, many of which have direct analogues beyond the Mediterranean civilisation — in India, Iran, China, etc., nevertheless has, in turn, some less contrastingly described and interpreted aspects. This applies above all to the materialistic interpretation of politics, which was generally deeply alien to the very spirit of Greco-Latin culture and, moreover, to traditional civilisation as a whole. Yes, the ancient materialists Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius and the schools and movements close to them had already outlined the main vectors of their interpretation.

the political Logos, but for them to become fully clear, it was probably necessary to have the political philosophy of Modernity, where political materialism and nihilism itself could reveal themselves much more fully than in traditional society, where they were marginal and "heretical" (from a philosophical point of view) phenomena. Thus, Politica Aeterna, static in some of its structures, becomes clear in other structures only in the course of historical processes that actualise what previously remained in potential. At the same time, the foundations of politics that dominated traditional society become potential, virtual, and gradually as marginal and "heretical" as the previously materialistic versions — democracy, individualism, economics, etc.

Politica Aeterna is therefore supplemented by an analysis of political Modernity, which, without adding anything to the eternal structure, nevertheless clarifies some of the borderline territories of political Logos, revealing its darkest, shadiest aspects, associated with the structures of nothingness, matter and the figures of the Great Mother. At the same time, turning to the political Logos of traditional society as the main content of Politica Aeterna, we recall that its relationship with the "past" has a symbolic and conventional meaning that should not obscure the eternal relevance of patriarchal — Platonic and Aristotelian — models of vertical and hierarchical organisation of society. Therefore, what was obvious and clear — real — in traditional society in the Modern Age has become potential, blurred and considered "something that has been overcome," "removed," and therefore irrelevant and, ultimately, "incomprehensible." Conversely, the marginal and peripheral conception of the political in traditional society, which was in turn "incomprehensible,"
"eccentric" and "extravagant" became self-evident in the era of European Modernism. This tension in the polar interpretation of the Political throughout history is organised in such a way that at first one pole, well aware of itself, describes the opposite pole approximately or even incorrectly, and then the same happens with the opposite pole. The political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle conveys the truth about the vertical Logos of Tradition, but political materialism presents it in a distorted and very approximate way. Modern political philosophy moves towards the realisation of its nihilistic essence gradually, reaching it only when Modernity finally triumphs and the transition to Postmodernity and speculative re-

realism. Here, the truth of the political is revealed, but at the same time, the understanding of the Logos of Tradition is completely lost. Thus, in both cases, we are dealing with a partial truth of the structure of the political Logos, which is an inevitable and, probably, constitutive aberration of time for the very nature of history. It is time — political time — that prevents us from correctly assessing the metaphysical foundations of the Political in all its entirety, since we are forced to take a position in time, that is, in a specific phase of political history, which predetermines our view and, at the same time, the object on which it falls and which it seeks to distinguish. In Modernity, and especially in Postmodernity, we are close to political nothingness, to the lower limit of the Political, to the very substance of politics, and therefore we are able to discern its details at the quantum level. But the price for such detail is the loss of the idea of the whole, the complete, the perfect. The discovery of the truth about nothingness comes at the cost of the loss of being.

In traditional society, and especially in its most complete and perfect forms, existence reigns supreme, but at the expense of ignoring non-existence, pushing nothingness beyond the limits of attention, and at the expense of a lack of detail. And although in traditional forms of politics — empire, theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, etc. — the deficit is negligible (the only thing missing here is knowledge of what nothingness is), and in political modernity, on the contrary, knowledge of nothingness is achieved through complete oblivion of being, Nevertheless, for the completeness of the political Logos, it is important to combine the diachronic picture into a synchronic model, where not only completeness and perfection (lost in Modernity and even more so in Postmodernity) are taken into account, but also matter, distortions, decay, poverty, insignificance, and nothingness itself. This is precisely what constitutes the content of Politica Aeterna, complementing the traditional view of the Political with nihilism and the motifs of the "Black Enlightenment," but at the same time reminding the nihilistic period of political history in which we live that what once was is not simply a thing of the past, but is eternal, and therefore may be in the future, beyond Modernity and attempts to overcome it, plunging ever deeper into its own essence (i.e., into Postmodernity). The political vertical of Platonism and Aristotle's normal state (i.e., monarchy) are always and always possible. But there is also always and forever the possibility of political Modernity and Postmodernity, realised today, but fully understood and lived out by Democritus.

Taken together, this constitutes the general topology of Politica Aeterna, as a system of political philosophy that does not

knows political decrees as something irreversible and fatal, and opens up the realm of political thought to absolute verticality. The ancient Greeks or Hindus could have chosen materialism, scepticism, nihilism, and democracy. And sometimes they actually did. But then such choices were reversed, and the decision shifted to the realm of monarchy, aristocracy, or theocracy. The fact that vertical politics prevailed and constitutes the basic definition of traditional society: in it, verticality and sacredness prevail, and the always possible outbreaks of materialism are exceptions. In the modern era, on the contrary, materialism, egalitarianism, democracy, and atomism (individualism) are the most common, and attempts to return to sacred politics are exceptions. Politica Aeterna draws a fundamental conclusion from this observation: political time, with its own logic, is not an irreversible fate. It may seem so, but this is an illusion. Any political system, whether traditional or modern, is based on a Decision. Turning to "political eternity," we can choose any of its areas. Some of them seem more distant and difficult to access, while others, on the contrary, seem close and almost obvious. This is precisely what political history determines. But Politica Aeterna asserts a perpendicular to this history. It must be taken into account and reckoned with, but *the choice always exists*. This is precisely the revolutionary content of Politica Aeterna: it makes the Decision free, restoring the dignity of human (and non-human) thought. When choosing in the context of Politica Aeterna, we are dealing with the present, that is, with what is and what is here and now. Another question is the degree of intensity of this presence. It varies. But this is not fatal: for however shaky the truth may seem, in the end it will prove to be harder than any metal.

Philosophy and politics: the nature of an inseparable connection

From the description of the essence of Politica Aeterna, one can move in different directions. First, one can delve deeper into the thesis of the profound identity of philosophy and politics, or the philosophical and the political. This is almost obvious in theory, but we often forget about it when we immerse ourselves in political analysis, especially in applied political science. Meanwhile, no other field lies so close to philosophy and depends on it as much as politics depends on philosophy. It is philosophy that establishes the Political and all its proportions and structures, which

in turn affect science, society, education, the economy, and everyday life. This totality of the political is recognised by everyone from Plato to Deleuze, but politicians themselves and those who try to think about politics more systematically (political scientists) often overlook this, reducing politics to a set of technologies or solutions to practical issues related to power, its acquisition, retention, and application, and all the purely instrumental practices associated with it. For individuals or entire groups within society, the question of power is indeed central and paramount. But the context in which this power is acquired and exercised is much more important than is usually recognised. Everything fundamental in society depends on the political Logos, and individual rulers, parties, groups, dynasties, etc. can influence it only to a very limited extent. A tyrant, dictator or, conversely, a benevolent humanist in power can do practically nothing to change its structures. At the root of the most serious political transformations are prophets and philosophers, often having no direct connection to a particular authority, but deeply understanding the very nature of the political Logos. It is the Logos that rules, and those who realise this are closer to the element of power than those who occupy central positions in it. Power is a philosophical category and is associated with the depths of the metaphysical Decision. Those who do not know this element of Decision do not rule, but only play a role, representing the true power, which in this case lies elsewhere.

In traditional societies, this circumstance was openly acknowledged: the ruler was a priest, a philosopher, and the central figure of the social and cosmic cult. Power is sacred, and therefore those who wield it must be as close as possible to the sacred realm. In the modern era, democratisation processes were directed towards the desacralisation of power. However, this did not completely abolish the sacred (as that would have abolished power altogether), but rather concealed it. In this sense, the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt spoke of two types of power: Potestas Directa (direct power) and Potestas Indirecta (indirect power). True power is sacred, metaphysical and based on decisions made in the context of the general synchronous structure of Politica Aeterna. In traditional society, Potestas Directa (direct power) was openly sacred and therefore unique. Sometimes only two of its sides were represented by the pair of the king and the priest (as King Arthur and Merlin the wizard in medieval legends) or the Emperor and the Patriarch (as in the Byzantine symphony of powers). Both the king and the priest were Potestas Directa

(direct power). In the modern era, Potestas Directa (direct power) is stripped of its sacred content, hence the principle of separation of powers, transparency, etc. But such power, deprived of its connection with the political Logos, would be unstable and would quickly collapse. This is how "Shadow power" — Potestas Indirecta. This power also maintains links with the sacred, but only covertly, not directly, through parallel hierarchies and closed structures — lodges, clubs, etc. In this case, Potestas Directa (direct power) can indeed remain profane and ignorant in the sphere of political philosophy, since Potestas Indirecta (indirect power) takes care of the political Logos. In this case, the philosophical incompetence of the ruler does not pose a problem: he thinks he rules, when in fact others rule for him. And if Potestas Indirecta (indirect power) pursues everyday technical goals, this means only one thing: it is not real Potestas Indirecta (indirect power), but its simulacrum. Political ontology itself is such that it is inextricably linked to philosophy and depends directly on it.

But in any case, Politica Aeterna draws attention to the fundamental and decisive significance of philosophy in relation to politics, which is sometimes overlooked.

Politica Aeterna and the Fourth Political Theory

Politica Aeterna is fundamental in another context as well: in the search for an alternative to the political philosophy of Modernity and Postmodernity. We refer to the move beyond the political paradigm of the Modern era as the "Fourth Way" or "Fourth Political Theory." This direction aims to overcome the three dominant political philosophies of modernity — liberalism, communism and nationalism — and to construct an alternative political theory beyond the political paradigm that prevails today on a global scale. Interest in this is gradually growing, and accordingly, more and more detailed arguments are needed both in the critique of political modernity, and especially its currently dominant version — liberalism — and in the justification of an alternative political Logos — its content, its structures, its proportions and forms.

The fourth political theory includes, first and foremost, everything that was rejected by modernity: political Platonism

[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

and Aristotelianism. Platonism is included through its most radical and revolutionary version in the form of 20th-century traditionalism, which declared ontological and epistemological war on Modernity. In this capacity, the Fourth Political Theory can be seen as a logical continuation of traditionalism. But the appeal to Politica Aeterna significantly broadens the understanding of political Platonism, placing it in a broader context and clarifying its relationship with other political paradigms — above all with political Aristotelianism.

However, since the Fourth Political Theory addresses not only elites but also peoples as human beings as such, its focus is on the human being, taken, however, in isolation from secondary historical and social superstructures. Therefore, Da-sein, the central concept of Martin Heidegger's philosophy, is proposed as the subject of the Fourth Political Theory. This opens the way to phenomenology as a whole, making the Fourth Political Theory not just a call for sacred restoration, but also a path to the construction of a special existential ontology. This is part of the avant-garde nature of the Fourth Political Theory, which cannot be reduced exclusively to traditionalism. In the context of Politica Aeterna, the zone of phenomenology corresponds precisely to Aristotle's teaching, the appeal to which became the most important moment in the development of phenomenology — in Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger himself. Moreover, Heidegger's reading of Aristotle made it possible to establish a metaphysical kinship between Aristotle's philosophy and phenomenology in contrast to Platonism.

The combination of the political interpretation of Plato and Aristotle, or in modern terms, traditionalism and phenomenology (existentialism), forms the metaphysical basis of the Fourth Political Theory. Its alignment with the context of Politica Aeterna further clarifies its structure and essence.

At the same time, Politica Aeterna allows us to correctly interpret speculative realism and object-oriented ontology as expressions of the terminal stage of all political modernity and the final chord of postmodernity. Speculative realists close the page on rhetorical humanism, under which Modernity concealed its essential nihilism, detectable only by its critics (such as Nietzsche and Heidegger), and acknowledge this as its essence. This is the source of Nick Land's thesis of "Black Procession," accelerationism, and "transcendental nihilism" (R. Brasier). This truth about political materialism, which finds its justification and topological predestination only in Politica Aeterna, is also the most important argument of the Fourth Political Theory.

, is also the most important argument of the Fourth Political Theory. Political Platonism and political Aristotelianism did not know the truth of matter, denying the very possibility of the existence of Logos in it. Modernity created a political reality that was impossible and unacceptable within the structure of the ontological hypotheses of sacred vertical politics. In doing so, it insisted on its own Logos, fully manifested precisely in speculative realism, which pushed the boldest intuitions of postmodernism to their limits. The fourth political theory, thus, in opposition to liberalism, communism and nationalism, metaphysically rejects the entire political Modernity. But the essence of this political Modernity — political materialism and nihilism — in the field of philosophy is precisely the "Black Enlightenment." The Black Enlightenment no longer hides the essence of modernity and openly declares war on man and even on life in favour of the Radical Object. This is precisely what the Fourth Political Theory opposes, not simply rejecting the Logos of matter, but now — and precisely thanks to modernity — knowing its truth. The Fourth Political Theory does not simply reject nihilism, unwilling to know anything about it (like Plato and Aristotle), but overcomes it by first knowing it. And this overcoming, based on prior knowledge, is another distinctive feature of the Fourth Political Theory. It does not simply combine traditionalism with phenomenology (Dasein), but also accepts the challenge of the "Black Enlightenment," offering an answer to the challenge of the Radical Object of speculative realists. This answer is the Radical Subject[1] but this topic goes beyond the scope of Politica Aeterna, although it remains deeply connected to it.

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[1]   *зусин А. G.* The Radical Subject and Its Double. Moscow: Eurasian Movement. 2009.

PART 1. POLITICAL PLATONISM

Chapter 1. The Essence of Politics. Plato and His Cave

Subject of Study

First of all, let us consider the nature of the discipline known as *political philosophy*. If we turn to the history of philosophy and the history of political systems, we find the following pattern: from the very beginning, philosophy and politics have developed not simply in parallel, but inextricably linked. Among the first Seven Sages, who are considered the founders of the pre-Socratic philosophical tradition, are many who are known for writing political laws and regulations (in particular, Solon). In essence, they were political figures representing their cities and political entities. Therefore, from the very beginning of the history of philosophy, we see *an inseparable link between philosophy and politics.*

Thus, politics as a separate phenomenon, detached from philosophy, represents a completely different approach. The philosophy of politics is a much deeper discipline. It considers both philosophers who were involved in politics and wrote about politics, and politicians who justified their laws and the structure of their political system with philosophical principles. In fact, at the dawn of philosophy and politics, these things were not separated at all.

Thus, the subject of political philosophy is the *original* sphere that united philosophy and politics into a certain there is a common and unified direction.

I mean that there are no such separate phenomena as "philosophy" and "politics" that we artificially combine and use philosophy to study politics. We are not just talking about the political philosophy of a particular direction, period, culture or civilisation. When we talk about *the philosophy of politics,* we are talking, on the one hand, about *the essence* of politics, about what makes politics *politics,* and on the other hand, about the political essence of philosophy, which makes philosophy *philosophy*. But note that there is a difference: philosophy dominates here because *politics without philosophy is impossible.*

Politics is a form of applied philosophy, the application of philosophy to a specific sphere of human life. And philosophy without politics is possible. That is, there is philosophy that does not deal with politics. But there is no politics that is not based on philosophy.

The union of philosophy and politics

The philosophy of politics studies not only the philosophical foundations of politics, but also the political aspects of philosophy itself, because politics is not a private and accidental application of philosophy, but the *most fundamental*, albeit still applied, element of philosophy. As soon as philosophy appears, it necessarily turns first to politics; and all politics flows from philosophy. There is no equilibrium between them, but a deep organic connection. Where this original union *of the philosophical and the political* takes place*,* there arises the birth of all possible political systems and, at the same time, the crystallisation of philosophical knowledge.

In theory, there is a philosophy that is free from politics and deals with non-political issues. But in reality, even such a free, non-political philosophy is in one way or another connected with politics (since philosophy and politics have common roots). If philosophy considers aesthetic, historical, and cultural issues and yet says nothing about politics, this does not mean that such philosophy is a completely separate — non-political — phenomenon.

All *philosophy has a political dimension*: in some cases explicit (Solon, the pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle), in others implicit (when philosophy says nothing about politics, but the very fact of the existence of a philosophical paradigm implicitly contains the possibility of a political dimension). Therefore, there is a very deep connection between philosophy and politics — a connection at the level of their origins. And studying philosophy in isolation from politics significantly impoverishes or weakens the very meaning of philosophy.

On the other hand, the study of politics without philosophy is generally unreliable. A person who does not know philosophy cannot engage in politics. Any philosophical system has a political dimension. But not every philosophical system explicitly develops this model.

Homologies: the history of kingdoms and the history of ideas are not different from each other.

Strictly speaking, the history of philosophy and the history of politics follow *the same pattern*. There is absolute *homology* between them. When philosophy moves in one direction, politics moves with philosophy in the same direction and cannot move in another. If something changes in philosophy, something will inevitably change in politics. But if something changes in politics, it means that something (either before or simultaneously) has changed in philosophy, which predetermined this change.

In fact, there is no autonomy of politics from philosophy. From the point of view of political philosophy, political history is a cross-section of the history of philosophy, depending on this history in an absolute way. No politician is free from philosophy, and no philosopher can be considered in isolation from his implicit political dimension. In other words, the historical picture, history itself as such: the rise of kingdoms, the fall of kingdoms, the construction of a particular civilisation, the demise of civilisation, the conflict between civilisations, states or peoples, dynastic changes, political revolutions, changes in the balance between the urban and rural populations, etc. — all this has a philosophical dimension (not always obvious, not always clearly understood). But the task of those who study the philosophy of politics is to construct the completeness of this total homology. What does *homology* mean (from the ancient Greek ομοιος — similar, alike; λόγος — word, law)? It means equivalent in meaning; the meanings are common. The meaning of history — political-philosophical or philosophical-political — is the same. History has two sides: on the one hand, it is the history of kingdoms, states, peoples; on the other hand, it is the history of ideas. *The history of kingdoms and the history of ideas are not different. They are interconnected*. It is the same story.

Therefore, if we observe changes in the sphere of philosophy, for example, the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism, this is necessarily accompanied by similar political changes. In the transition from subjective idealism to objective idealism, we move from one political model to another. The transition from idealism to materialism entails other changes. Changes in the configuration of religions radically alter the content of political processes in societies where this philosophy is widespread. This homology between the philosophical and the political can be approached from all sides, but it is explained by the unity of a common semantic core.

In the image and likeness

This homology can be likened to the common ancestral root between the figures of the Father and the Son. The philosophical realm—the realm of ideas—is the domain of the Father. It is always above. This gives rise to a certain autonomy of philosophy in relation to politics—that is, the fact that philosophy can contain politics both explicitly and implicitly. Politics, on the other hand, is always and in all cases a projection of the philosophical.

However, the relationship between the Father and the Son, or between the Idea and the Kingdom, cannot be represented in strictly linear terms. The Father, who creates the Son, reproduces in him that which is *common* to both and which is commonly called *the genus*. There is no more nature in the Father than in the Son, despite a certain hierarchy and logical and chronological sequence. In some cases, the Son may embody nature more fully than the Father, and in this case he is more Father than the Father himself.

This can be illustrated in a diagram.

Scheme of the relationship between the Philosophical and the Political

Thus, the homology between the philosophical and the political must be conceived on the basis of generic unity, rather than as a mechanical application of philosophy to politics. After all, the genus is equally primary in relation to the Father and in relation to the Son, but not chronologically, rather ontologically, metaphysically.

Politics and the Political (Das Politische)

In order to study the philosophy of politics, we start with a certain axiom — the absolute homology between the Political and the Philosophical. Here, of course, one can find a certain difference between politics and the Political. One of the greatest political philosophers, Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), distinguishes between politics and *the Political (*das Politische)[1] The latter should be understood not as an adjective but as a noun. By "politics," Schmitt means the application of the Political to a specific social and historical situation. In other words, *politics is the concretisation of the Political.*

What, in turn, is the Political? Das Politische is the point where the Son/politics connects with the Father/philosophy. This is the realm of the genus. The political is the sphere of political philosophy, the point of homology where we are no longer talking about politics, but not yet about philosophy. Thus, the sphere of the political is the sphere of the existence of preconceptions. And by studying preconceptions, we study the homology mentioned earlier.

The point is that there is a field where the set of philosophy intersects with the set of politics, and between them there is something common that belongs to both the first and second circles — a certain segment that is the Political, the main subject of political philosophy.

The philosopher-king. Plato as a synonym for all philosophy

It is believed that Plato (c. 427–347 BC) was the creator of the first complete philosophical system in history. He most fully formulated the philosophical agenda that determined the entire ancient history of philosophy, the entire Middle Ages, and, to a large extent, the philosophy of the Renaissance, anticipating the philosophy of the modern era. Today, in the 21st century, there is no thinker who...

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[1] *Schmitt, K.* The Concept of the Political. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Publishing House "Nauka" RAS, 2016.

more famous and relevant, but at the same time less comprehended and less understood than Plato.

Plato is philosophy itself. All the most brilliant thinkers of the 14th–20th centuries turned to Plato. We still haven't outgrown his agenda. Every word Plato wrote is still hotly debated today. Some geniuses rise up to tear down ^Platonism, while others restore it. All Christian dogma is based on Plato, and there is not a single thesis in Christian theology that does not have a Platonic dimension. Islamic theology is also built exclusively on Platonism. That is why Plato is considered a philosopher-king whose kingdom — within the realm of philosophy — no one has yet been able to attack effectively. Thousands of times it has been declared that Plato's empire has fallen, but such statements have been reduced to "marginal hallucinations." It still stands.

Plato is the king of philosophy. We either dispute this (and then raise a slave revolt) or accept it unconditionally. The idea that the history of philosophy has added anything to Plato is completely unfounded. Even those who are considered the embodiment of, for example, modern philosophy—Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Karl Popper (1902–1994), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970)—turned to Platonism. Sometimes even such positivist philosophers as Whitehead (1861–1947) were inspired by Plato.

Plato is everything. When a person reads Plato, they come into contact not with a single philosopher, not with a single author, not with a single school — they come into contact with philosophy as such, because all philosophy is nothing more than a movement between Plato's theses, their development, their comparison or contrast, their rejection and new acceptance. Plato created *all of philosophy at once*. One could say that the study of philosophy is the study of Plato's philosophy. Everything else, in essence, as Whitehead himself said, is "mere notes in the margins of Plato."

Accordingly, we must pay attention to the fact that philosophy is only Plato, and if we do not understand Plato, we do not understand the "programming language" of philosophy. The study of philosophy begins with the study of Plato's works, continues through the study of Plato's works, and ends with the study of Plato's works. There is not a single philosopher who does not know Plato.

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[1]Among these geniuses were Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), whose philosophy, in his own words, was "inverted Platonism," and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976).

Thus, if we want to become acquainted with the matrix on which the Political, das Politische, is built, i.e., the sphere of the homology we are talking about, if we want to understand where politics comes from, what its structure is, and how it manifests itself through the Political, we need to study Plato. Consequently, Plato is the basic author for the course "Philosophy of Politics" ([1].

Politics and the doctrine of ideas

Let us turn our attention to where Plato formulates his doctrine of ideas in the clearest form. Key to understanding Plato in this sense is the dialogue The Republic [2](Politeia, Greek: Πολιτεία, *Latin: Respublica*). Plato's state is not simply a "state" in our understanding of "State" or "power." One could say that Politeia is the Political itself. Politeia is translated as both "state" and "republic," but the Greek word has a deeper meaning. It means *any political entity.* In essence, Politeia is what Carl Schmitt calls das Politische. It is the Political, which is most often embodied in the state; the state itself finds its meaning through the Political. *Politeia is primary in relation to the state.*

The question arises: is it a coincidence that Plato formulates his philosophy in its most systematic form in a work called "Politeia," The Political? The answer is no. Therefore, it is Plato's dialogue "The Republic," the main work of the main philosopher, that serves as our starting point for understanding the philosophy of politics.

Every philosopher has an inner coherence and an inner obligation to the truth. A philosopher is not free from the truth. What he writes, how he calls, how he formulates a phrase, is a fundamental statement in the face of the most monstrous authority, no less terrifying and irreversible than death.

As Heidegger notes, *philosophers think in the face of death*. Those who do not think in the face of death do not think at all. Every word of a philosopher is his *last* word.

Check out the dialogue "Phaedo" [3], which describes Socrates' last days and last words. The words Socrates spoke before drinking the cup of hemlock are

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[1] *Plato.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1990–1994.
[2] *Plato.* The Republic / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow: Myśl, 1994.
[3] *Plato.* Phaedo / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1993.

philosophy. What does Socrates say in this dialogue? He says: what have I been doing all my life, my friends? I have spent my whole life philosophising on the brink of death. Will I attain a new state after I drink the poison? I have spent my whole life in it — facing death. This cup of hemlock has accompanied me from the moment I felt my calling to philosophy.

Alcibiades in "The Symposium" [1] tells how Socrates bravely retreated during the war. He took part in military operations in which the Athenian army was defeated and all its participants fled. Those who fled cowardly were the first to be pursued by the enemies. Alcibiades says how well Socrates retreated. He retreated thoughtfully, calmly, and the enemies, seeing his unhurried gait, did not dare to throw a spear at him or strike him with a sword. According to Alcibiades, Socrates retreated *with dignity*. Alcibiades says:

> It was especially worth seeing Socrates, my friends, when our army, turning to flight, was retreating from Delia. I was then in the cavalry, and he was in the heavy infantry. He was leaving with Lachetus when our men had already scattered. And so I met them both and, as soon as I saw them, I urged them not to lose heart and told them that I would not abandon them. It was then that Socrates showed himself to me in an even better light than at Potidaea, for I myself was in less danger because I was on horseback. First of all, he had more self-control than Lachetus. Besides, it seemed to me that there, as here, he walked, in your words, Aristophanes, "looking properly to the left and to the right," that is, calmly looking at his friends and enemies, so that even from a distance it was clear to everyone that this man, if provoked, would be able to defend himself, and therefore both of them completed their retreat safely. For those who behave in this way are usually left alone in war; it is those who flee without looking [back] who are pursued.

The title "The State" in Plato cannot be accidental. His teaching about ideas, therefore, has a direct bearing on politics. "The Republic" is a basic document of political philosophy or the philosophy of politics. There we are dealing with the transition between philosophy (for Plato, this is the doctrine of ideas) and politics as the organisation of the polis in its pure form. Between philosophy and politics lies "The Republic".

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[1]   *Plato*. The Symposium / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.
[2] *Plato*. The Symposium. pp. 131–132.

It should be noted that in Plato's Republic, the philosopher reigns supreme. The ruling philosopher is a figure of the Political.

Plato did not succeed in establishing the political system described in The Republic during his lifetime, and it is quite possible that it cannot be established at all, but he managed to justify the Political, the "state of philosophers," the ideal state or Kallipolis (Καλλίπολις — from the Greek Kallos, "beautiful" and polis, "city"). If we understand what Plato was leading to (and he was leading to the philosophy of politics, not to politics), if we realise that all his statements are not concepts, but pre-concepts (in other words, the things from which specific political concepts are derived), then we will understand that the ideal state (Kallipolis) and the Political, which Plato described in his "Republic," are the meaning of practically all subsequent history — both the history of thought and the history of actions.

In reality, in his ideal state, he did not simply give some kind of covenant, plan or project that could either be implemented or not — he raised and showed the foundation on which all politics in its concrete manifestations rests.

Plato wanted to bring a whole range of specific forms of politics into a single matrix, and he succeeded in doing so. That is why Plato's "State" is the most realistic thing in the entire history of politics.

We live in Plato's state, we have always lived in Plato's state, and we are moving towards the construction of Plato's state — from Plato's state to Plato's state, but only by sorting through the technical possibilities and historical-political concepts of this "State," which all converge on the preconceptions of Kallipolis[1].

Three functions

Plato says that the structure of the Political is divided into three castes: philosophers (guardians), warriors (assistants) and everyone else (mainly peasants, as well as craftsmen and artists) engaged in the production of material goods. If we look at the history of Indo-European civilisation, as reconstructed by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986), we see that it was precisely these three functions that determined the structure of Indo-European societies for thousands of years: from the ancient Scythians and nomads who lived in Eurasia since time immemorial to Rome, Greece,

[1] In modern sociology, this corresponds to the concept of the "ideal type" (German:

Idealtypus) put forward by Max Weber (1864–1920).

Iran, India, and throughout the Mediterranean. Everywhere we encounter these three types: divine kings (or priests), warriors, and peasants[1].

Plato described to us the fundamental matrix of what was and is. The entire Middle Ages and the entire Roman Empire were built strictly according to this principle: at the top were the sacred monarchs (philosopher kings, or a division between king and philosopher, emperor and high priest); then the noblesse/noble warriors (the Russian aristocracy was also part of this second class), who, according to Plato, were the guardians' assistants; at the bottom was the main population — peasants (and artisans). We see exactly these models in Greece, Rome, Iran, India, etc.

There is an opinion that Plato's state was never realised, and that the philosopher himself was a "failure" who invented an unworkable system, and that all his attempts to involve the tyrant Dionysius in this system were fruitless, after which Plato was sold into slavery, later ransomed, and later no longer engaged in politics. This is a banal — and completely false — story about Plato's failures to build an ideal state.

The true story of the fate of Platonopolis is as follows: Plato built that great state which was, is, and will be, because he established an ontological and metaphysical system of preconceptions for political organisation. The three-function model discovered in the 20th century by Georges Dumézil (1898–1986) in the course of sociological research on the structure of Indo-European societies is nothing more than another retelling of Plato's "The Republic." The entire Middle Ages, with its three estates, is *the realisation of* Plato's ideal state (Kallipolis).

We see these estates in most societies. That is why Plato is one of the most successful political philosophers in the world, since the model he established truly dominates in various historical types (with some variations). It should be understood that *Plato was engaged in political philosophy*, not politics:
- his project was created at the level of a preconception,
- the construction of certain matrices within which different names and relationships can be fixed and arranged in different ways.
- he simply outlined the most general structure of what is Political, and all political forms are concretisations, transitions from preconception to concept.

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[1]   *Dumezile G.* The Supreme Gods of the Indo-Europeans. Moscow: Nauka, 1986; *Dumezile G.* The Tripartite Ideology of the Indo-Europeans. Paris: Latomus, 1958.

Chapter 1. The Nature of Politics. Plato and His Cave

23

There is nothing accidental, nothing banal, and nothing secondary in Plato.

The Cave. Anodos and Katodos

Let us turn to Plato's fundamental image in his dialogue The Republic. It is the image of a cave. The story told by Plato is as follows: deep inside a cave, there are people (believed to be slaves or captives) sitting and looking at a wall on which shadows are moving; the attention of the entire group is completely fixed on the shadows, and the people believe that this is life.

What does the philosopher do at this moment? He realises that something is wrong here and begins to look for another explanation for what is happening. The philosopher turns his head in the other direction, he *turns back.* In doing so, he separates himself from the other people who continue to contemplate the shadows (looking straight ahead). He takes a risky action, going against the flow.

And what does *the philosopher* see *when he turns around*? He sees that on a platform, some people (a procession) are carrying statues. Of course, this is the Dionysian procession. The priests of Dionysus are walking there. Everyone is looking only at their shadows.

Then the philosopher makes a second gesture — he rises from his seat and heads towards the procession. This is followed by a third gesture — the philosopher does not remain with the Bacchantes and the Phaenicians, but searches for the source of light that casts its rays upon them, so that they, in turn, cast away the shadows. Thus, the philosopher reaches the entrance to the cave and beholds the real world for the first time. Socrates says that the philosopher must do this at night because his eyes must first get used to the dim light of the stars, for if he immediately rushes outside, the sight of the sun will blind him. At first, the philosopher must look at the multitude of stars, at the world of ideas, and only then at the sun, which is the source of these ideas. Plato calls the ascent to the exit of the cave "anodos" (Greek: ανοδος — the way up).

Thus, the philosopher makes three gestures: he turns his head, joins the Bacchantes [1] and goes to the entrance of the cave to see the real world, where he first contemplates a multitude of ideas

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[1]In "Phaedo," Socrates calls true philosophers Bacchantes, counting himself among them: "Yes, for, as those who are knowledgeable in the mysteries say, 'there are many thyrso-bearers, but few Bacchants,' and 'Bacchants' here, in my opinion, are no one else but true philosophers. I have tried to become one of them — all my life, with all my strength, without missing anything. Whether I tried correctly and achieved anything, I will know for sure, if it pleases God, when I come to Hades." *Plato.* Phaedo. P. 29.

(in the form of stars), and then the main idea — the idea of Good (represented, according to some interpretations, by black [1]— the sun).

A philosopher is someone who has performed these three gestures and, in the end, has left the cave and sees the prototypes of those things whose shadows satisfy ordinary people. In other words, a philosopher twice overcomes man:

1) he moves from shadows to reality,

2) he passes from reality to archetypes.

Thus he accomplishes a fundamental ascent, anodós.

But then comes *katodos* (ancient Greek κάθοδος — the way down*)*. Realising how everything is arranged in the world of ideas, the philosopher *descends*. In this descent, he returns to those who contemplate the shadows and becomes their king. The philosopher becomes a philosopher through anodos/ascension, and a politician through katodos/descent.

Philosophy is ascension, politics is descent. This brings us to the main connection between philosophy and politics, to the structure of the homology we mentioned earlier. This is how pre-concepts are formed. The philosopher comes with knowledge that is inaccessible to everyone else and begins to open the eyes of the prisoners. He says that freedom is better than slavery, that reason is better than stupidity, that will and control are better than blind obedience, that truth is much more interesting and sweeter than delusion, that light is much more meaningful and exciting than this play of shadows in eternal twilight, that breathing the real air of existence is incomparably more pleasant than suffocating in the nightmarish stench of the cave floor.

Then (often) he is killed. He is killed because everything he says is completely at odds with the usual ideas, and the philosopher simply prevents people from watching the spectacle cast by the shadows of the Corybants on the wall. But in some cases (as an exception), he is not killed, and then he convinces the prisoners that even if not all of them are ready for the three philosophical gestures, at least they are capable of facing the truth — of looking back, of looking in another direction. Others can rise up to the Bacchantes and take part in the festival of Dionysus. If anyone wants to follow further, the philosopher takes him by the hand and leads him to the exit of the cave.

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[1]Neoplatonists emphasised the apophatic nature of the Good, identifying it with the super-being One from Plato's dialogue Parmenides. *Plato*. Parmenides/Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2. On the black sun, see *Marlan S.* The Black Sun: The Alchemy and Art of Darkness. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005.

Those who determine the philosophical paradigms of governance rule

Before us lies *the entire political programme*: rise up, descend so as not to leave people behind, and lift up all the rest — those who can still be awakened. Politics must be placed *under* the Political, i.e., under the philosophy of politics. Then the philosopher is the King, and only the philosopher has the right to power. All others are usurpers. Only those who can perform two actions — anodos and katodos — can be adequate philosophers and adequate rulers.

Of course, the question arises: why descend? Socrates replies that it is a sacrifice. A true philosopher must ascend, but if he does not descend, he will show his dependence on the filth he left behind. He will be too squeamish a philosopher. It is truly necessary to descend into the cave, reach its bottom, and clean up all the rubbish that is there, to awaken people from their sleep.

Therefore*, true politics is the politics of philosophical awakening*. Only a political system that guides all its citizens towards awakening and spiritual self-awareness is adequate. If politics does not pursue this goal, it is false politics, the politics of evil, the politics of usurpation.

All power has a philosophical dimension, and it is always philosophers who rule. Those who rule are those who determine the philosophical paradigms of governance, those who engage in political philosophy, not politics. And political philosophy, as we have said, involves two actions: the ascent to philosophical contemplation (anodos) and the sacrificial descent in order to awaken the people (katodos).

Therefore, in this parable, in Plato's cave, where the doctrine of ideas is first introduced, the most complete representation of political philosophy appears for the first time. The metaphor of the cave is the essence of political philosophy. For Plato, philosophy becomes complete when those who have attained the highest descend to the lowest, when those who have seen the truth bring it to those who are deluded and sitting below (but this is only possible by political means). A philosopher truly becomes a philosopher when he becomes a king.

Layers of polity

In The Republic, Plato describes the ideal city. Its fundamental feature is a vertical organisation

, a hierarchy corresponding to the vertical structure of Platonic ontology, that is, of all existence as a whole.

The philosopher-king stands at the top of the social hierarchy of the polity. He is completely immaterial, ascetic, devoted only to the contemplation of the Good, and performs all other functions only under the influence of the idea he contemplates. The Neoplatonist Plotinus (204/205–270) described this as the philosopher being "overflowing" with the rays of the One (Ev), which requires the further outpouring of these contemplated rays onto the rest of society. The philosopher thus performs a salvific function, and power acts as a soteriological instrument that dispenses genadic (from the Greek ὕνας, "genada," "participation in the One") belonging to the transcendent principle.

The main function of the philosopher is *knowledge*, therefore, in the human soul, royal power and aristocracy correspond to the ability to engage in higher forms of thinking — theory (θεωρία — contemplation).

At the opposite end, at the bottom of society, are peasants, cattle breeders, artisans, traders, merchants, artists, painters, metics, and slaves. They are divided vertically (slaves are at the bottom) and horizontally (Plato recognises the division of labour and sees in it the inability of people engaged in specific professions to rule the whole society). This is the main composition of the polity, engaged as necessary in interaction with the realm of materiality and corporeality. The attraction to the material is predetermined by the quality of the soul of the common people: they are dominated by lust, a craving for material pleasure, food, physical comfort, and lower down — by lust, debauchery, baseness, meanness, etc. Here, money becomes the key instrument as the antithesis of philosophical thought. Everything noble, sublime, refined, insightful, and upward-looking gravitates toward philosophy. Everything defective, ignorant, base, coarse, banal, and scattered in a multitude of carnal sensations strives for money. The soul of the lower classes is structured in such a way that it is dominated by a focus on production (poiesis).

Above the main mass of material citizens, focused on production, are the "guardians" (φύλα3) and their assistants. In some cases, the "guardians" are identified with the philosophers themselves, and the assistants of the guardians with warriors. The type of warrior is driven by "fury," θυμός. Warriors are called upon to defend the citizens of the City from external threats. In the structure of Plato's polity, guardians and warriors play a key role. They are seen as bearers of a special nature, in which gold and silver predominate,

while the lower classes are associated with copper and iron. It is the guards who represent the elite of the City and are the primary focus of Plato's attention. This is the "political class," and the quality of its condition and education directly determines the entire polity as a whole.

Possessing "fury" clearly distinguishes warriors from other types. Plato interprets fury as something that *restrains natural animal needs*: first and foremost, the need for production. A fierce person seeks honour and glory, i.e., builds their existential strategy on overcoming and excelling. Here, according to Neoplatonic theories, politics and "political virtues" begin.

Political virtue differs from other virtues (e.g., ethical virtues) in that it strictly regards the body as an instrument of the soul. The soul is fierce, and it is the soul that is most of all the soul, not the body, i.e., a self-propelling and matter-free autonomous entity, the source of movement and the centre of life. It is fierce where it is full, where it is "overflowing" with life, bursting at the seams. Fury freely manifests itself in war, in the defence of the homeland and the people from external threats. And there, warriors realise the fullness of their nature.

The metaphor of the dog

In one place, Plato addresses a very important issue: if ferocity is the main virtue of warriors (assistants to the guards), will they not spread it to each other, leading to chaos and discord within the polity itself?

Here, Plato's attention falls on the dog (incidentally, many have wondered why Socrates repeatedly swears by dogs in his dialogues). It is precisely the dog that Plato calls a philosophical animal, a beast possessing the primary skills of philosophy. What are these skills?

Plato explains it in the second book of The Republic:

— (...) You know about purebred dogs, that their nature is to be as gentle as possible with those they are accustomed to and know, but with strangers, just the opposite.

— I know, of course.

— So, it is possible, and seeking such qualities in guards is not contrary to nature.

— Apparently not.

— Don't you think that a future guard needs something else: not only must he be fierce, but he must also, by nature, strive for wisdom.

— How so? I don't understand.

— And you will also notice this trait in dogs, which is very surprising in an animal.

— What exactly?

— When a dog sees a stranger, it becomes angry, even though the stranger has done nothing to it, but when it sees a familiar person, it fawns on them, even though they have never done anything good for it. Hasn't that struck you?

— I hadn't really noticed it before, but it's clear that the dog behaves in this way.

— This trait of its nature seems remarkable and even truly philosophical.

— How so?

— Well, a dog determines whether a person it sees is friendly or hostile based on whether it knows them or not. Isn't this a desire to learn, when the determination of whether someone is close or, conversely, a stranger is made on the basis of understanding or, conversely, misunderstanding?

— This cannot be denied.

— And the desire to know and the desire for wisdom are one and the same[1].

The ability to control anger as the main trait of a guard dog is rooted only in wisdom, i.e. in theory, in philosophy. Therefore, a dog capable of abstract concepts such as "friend," "one's own" (even if it has done nothing good for it) and "enemy" ("stranger," even if it has done nothing wrong to it) represents an initial form of abstract philosophising, the identification of the eidos of "one's own" and "the other" as predetermining rigid behavioural patterns (playful games/threatening barking). Thus, the dog becomes a symbol not only of loyalty to its master (like a guard loyal to the polis), but also a symbol of wisdom, since it is capable of activating the higher aspects of its soul — precisely those where wisdom is rooted and where the ability to contemplate ideas is located. From this, we can draw an important conclusion: the symbolism of the dog may be related to the caste of warrior-philosophers or warrior-priests, which refers us to the Ghibelline Emperor, symbolised by a greyhound (veltro), to the Catholic order of the Dominicans (dogs of the Lord).

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[1] *Plato.* The Republic. pp. 138–139.

them), as well as to the use of dog heads in the symbolism of the Russian oprichnina under Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584) — a figure in Russian history who was closer than any other to the figure of the philosopher-tsar.

Guards and philosophy

The ability of guardsmen to control their anger gives them access to philosophy. The nobility of their souls is such that the best among them can become philosophers, and in their case, a philosophical education should complement their gymnastic and musical training. Physical strength and sensitivity must be crowned with theoretical knowledge. Therefore, the guards become the environment that binds the entire polity together: from this environment, the most worthy and wise become philosophers and, perhaps, kings, while others maintain the philosophical level from generation to generation through education, upbringing, and a kind of caste hygiene (encouraging selection — heroes and wise men should have as many children as possible, while the weak and inferior should have as few as possible). Another part of the guardians, whose abilities for philosophy are limited, remain in the rank of "assistants." Assistants interact with the general population, monitor order and compliance with norms and laws, and participate in military operations. All guardians are prohibited from owning private property, money, or starting families. Equality and simplicity of morals, contempt for materialism and physicality flourish among them. Their entire human nature is artificially constructed: the body is formed through physical exercise; the soul and sense of beauty are formed through the mastery of the arts and music (in "The Laws" ([1])Plato insists that the inhabitants constantly perform sacred dances in honour of the rulers and gods, sing and dance, and that this should be made a duty for citizens); wisdom i s achieved through contemplation and dialectics, the highest of the sciences. It is very important to emphasise here the direct identification of power with asceticism and material minimalism, and of submission with material well-being, wealth, and the possession of financial resources. Noble modesty rules over voluptuous wealth.

Stratification of polytheia

In The Republic, two forms of vertical division of society can be found: dyadic and triadic. In one case, there is a pro-

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[1]   *Plato.* Laws / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1994.

hundred men and guards. And from the most gifted of the guard dogs, philosophers-rulers are educated. In the other case, there are commoners, guards (as assistants) and philosophers-aristocrats. Both of these models can be accepted simultaneously, since the triadic structure corresponds exactly to the tripartite structure of the main properties of the soul: desire, anger and reason (which gives us commoners, guards and philosophers), while the dyadic structure draws a line between the noble elite (guards, including philosophers) and the masses (everyone else). At the same time, all castes are conceived as a single organism in which the soul and mind are related to the higher, and the body and organs to the lower.

The education of the guardians is the main task of the polity. To achieve this goal, Plato proposes censoring mythology and poetry, retaining only those stories that describe gods and heroes in a respectable manner.

Chthonogenesis

Plato expresses an important idea regarding the chthongensis of the citizens of the ideal state. Plato mentions the origin of humans from the earth in the dialogue "Politicus":

> *Stranger*. It is clear, Socrates, that in the nature of that time there was no birth of living beings from living beings; the lot of the generation of that time was to be reborn from the earth, as in the past, people were earth-born [1].

Plato suggests instilling in the citizens of the polity the belief that they were created by the earth, not by other people (thus proposing a return to the original time, the "golden age"). To this end, on the one hand, families are abolished so that children do not know their parents and attribute their birth to the state and its land, and on the other hand, a chthonic genealogy is taught from childhood. Plato writes:

> — I will try to convince first the rulers and soldiers, and then the rest of the citizens, that everything in which we have raised and nurtured them appeared to them in a dream as something they had experienced, when in fact they were underground, being moulded and nurtured in its depths — both themselves and their weapons and various

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[1] *Plato.* Politician / Plato. Collected works: In 4 volumes. Vol. 4. P. 20.

equipment prepared for them. When they were completely ready, the earth, being their mother, brought them forth. Therefore, they must still care for the country in which they live as for their mother and nurse, and defend it if anyone attacks it, and treat other citizens as brothers, also begotten by the earth([1].

And he continues:

Although all members of the state are brothers (so we will say, continuing this myth), the god who created you mixed gold into those of you who are capable of ruling, and therefore they are the most valuable, and silver into their assistants, and iron and copper into farmers and various craftsmen. You are all related, for the most part you give birth to your own kind, although it does happen that silver offspring are born from gold, and gold from silver; the same is true in other cases. God demands first and foremost of rulers that they be valiant guardians and protect nothing so zealously as their offspring, observing what admixture there is in the souls of their children, and if a child is born with an admixture of copper or iron, they should not show any pity towards him, but should treat him according to his natural abilities, i.e. include him among the craftsmen or farmers; if anyone is born with an admixture of gold or silver, he should be valued and honourably transferred to the guards or assistants. For there is a prophecy that the state will be destroyed when it is guarded by iron or copper guards ([2].

Plato clarifies here that if the actual characteristics of a member of a particular caste of the polity do not correspond to the norms, the caste can be changed — if a peasant's child shows an aptitude for war and philosophy, it means that there is gold and silver in his soul; and if an aristocrat is cowardly, mean, lazy, greedy, deceitful, or loves money, then copper or iron prevails in him, and he must be expelled from his caste.

In this way, patriotism is also cultivated: all citizens grew out of the Hellenic soil (as if Plato were continuing the mystical idea of the primacy of the soil of Xenophanes of Callippus), and therefore its defence is their direct natural duty.

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[1]   *Plato.* The Republic. P. 184.
[2]   Ibid. pp. 184–185.

It is important to emphasise here that the structure of the citizens of the City, who arise directly from the Earth under the influence of the heavenly Logos without the mediation of humans, corresponds to the phase when the cosmos is governed directly by God. Birth from humans and, accordingly, the institution of the family belong to that historical stage when the cosmos becomes autonomous and begins to (falsely) think of itself as self-created, autogenous. Within the cosmos, individual parts also begin to consider themselves autonomous and autogenous. Therefore, the artificial myth of the origin of humans from the earth, which Plato proposes to introduce as an element of the education of the guardians, is actually closer to the truth than the birth of humans from humans. It is the Logos, acting on matter, that makes humans human.

Chapter 2. Ontology of the ideal state (Kallipolis)

Political: implicit and explicit

Let us consider the classical view of political philosophy as presented by Plato. Three of his dialogues are specifically devoted to the problems of political philosophy: The Republic, The Statesman [1] , The Laws [2] (and its supplement, The After-Laws [3]). However, we will not focus on them. Although it is in these dialogues that Plato's conception of political philosophy is most fully developed, this conception is inextricably linked to Plato's philosophy *as such*. Therefore, based on the homology between the Political and the Philosophical, we can consider and seek the political dimension not only in those dialogues devoted to the philosophy of politics, but also in dialogues devoted simply to philosophy. This is a very important element. Plato's philosophy is something whole: in part he speaks about politics, and in part he does not. But even where he does not speak about politics, one can find political change. In any, even the most abstract and abstract philosophical statement of Plato*, we can find a kind of equivalent of the political — in that *intermediate set* where homology is constructed between philosophy and politics, i.e., in the sphere of the Political.

This does not mean that all philosophy boils down to politics; it only means that all philosophy has the potential for political interpretation. Philosophy, as we have said, is more than politics. Philosophy contains all politics within itself. Therefore, from the completeness of philosophy, we can extract the completeness of politics. The dialogues of Plato listed at the beginning of this lecture serve as an example of this. They make explicit the basic philosophical principles of politics.

[1]   *Plato.* The Statesman.
[2]   *Plato.* Laws.
[3]   *Plato.* After the Laws /Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4.

Every philosophical idea of Plato has a political dimension

In his dialogues devoted directly to politics, Plato says: we take philosophy, apply it to politics, and obtain the realm of politics. In other cases, he himself does not carry out this operation of translating the philosophical into the political.

But does this mean that Plato's other dialogues should be considered exclusively in the realm of philosophy? Certainly, they can be considered in the realm of philosophy in isolation from politics (this is a perfectly legitimate operation), but in fact, this is neither exclusive nor necessary; in other words, every philosophical idea of Plato has a political dimension.

In one case, this measurement is explicit, i.e., frank, open, and clear, while in another, it is implicit (this means that Plato himself did not apply a particular philosophical idea in the sphere of politics, but it does not mean that those who follow him cannot do so). Does this mean that the very application of a philosophical idea in a given sphere is called into question? No, it does not. If Plato himself did not draw political conclusions from his philosophical ideas, this does not mean that this should not be done or that it is impossible to do so. Consequently, in order to understand the completeness of Plato's Politics, we can draw on both dialogues explicitly devoted to political philosophy and those in which nothing is said on the subject.

Accordingly, Plato's *entire philosophy* can be viewed as either explicitly or implicitly containing political philosophy.

The ontology of Timaeus and the three states: ideal, phenomenal, material

In this regard, attention should be paid to the following dialogue, which is strictly necessary for understanding the completeness of Plato's thought as a whole. This is the dialogue "Timaeus" [1]. There, Plato talks about the structure of the cosmos, ontology and metaphysics, and says nothing about politics. Nevertheless, based on what has been said earlier, we ourselves can perform the operation that Plato did not perform. That is, we can apply his philosophical, cosmological, ontological, and metaphysical views to the political sphere. He himself does something similar in the dialogue "The Republic."

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[1]   *Plato.* Timaeus / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 3.

Timaeus is a long, detailed dialogue, most likely representing a Platonic exposition of Pythagorean cosmology. The following is important for us: what is set out in Timaeus is fully consistent with the entire structure of Plato's thought and, in particular, with the picture we discussed when talking about the cave metaphor — first of all, where it is about shadows, then about objects, and then about the search for the source of light. This ascent (ανοδος) of the philosopher to the source of light and his descent/return (κάθοδος) on the one hand, describes a kind of vertical path of philosophy, and on the other, the vertical structure of politics, because at the centre of the Political, according to Plato, stands *the philosopher-king* who has returned from his metaphysical journey to the origins. If he has not made this journey, his power *is metaphysically illegitimate.*

Legitimacy, validity, normality, and idealism in the structure of power are like a philosopher returning from a transcendental journey. That is what a king is. He returns with memories of contemplating the highest principle. Thus, the vertical ascent and descent that underlie the basic scenario of normative political philosophy are clarified in the topic of the dialogue
"Timaeus."

The metaphor of the Father: The world of paradigms

What does the dialogue "Timaeus" say in its most fundamental dimension? It says that there are three principles, three main types of all that exists. All that exists can be divided into three ontological categories.

The first category, which Plato summarises as the Father, represents *the world of paradigms* (Greek: παράδειγμα — model*).* This corresponds exactly to *the idea* (Greek: ίδέα — prototype, type*).* An idea is almost the same thing as a paradigm. The first world of paradigms is the world of the spirit, the world of the Mind, Νους. It is the world in which the original seeds of things, ideas or eidos, reside.

Accordingly, this world is truly real. It exists in the full sense of the word. It is not a representation or projection of human consciousness. On the contrary, human consciousness is a projection of these ideas.

It is important to note that, according to Plato, the contemplative (νοητȭς) comes first, followed by the contemplative (νοερȭς). In the beginning, there is an ideal world, which is a zone of models according to which everything else is arranged. This world is active and is the centre of existence.

From Plato's point of view, an idea is not something that is in our heads, not something we invent; an idea is something that really exists. An idea is the contemplative (νοητōς). It is also παράδειγμα. ίδέα is the visible, παράδειγμα is the model.

These two concepts are very important because their meaning and identification show us how Plato's philosophy (Platonism) and practically all idealistic philosophy is constructed. When we talk about ίδέα, about παράδειγμα, we describe philosophy as such, in its original, unchanging, eternal structure, characteristic of philosophy today.

Contemporary philosophy represents a vicious attack on Plato, that is, an attack of time on eternity, of stupidity on intelligence, of delusion on truth. However, in reality, all that exists is Plato and his enemies (and, of course, the notes in the margins of his works).

Everything is Plato. That is why it is so important to understand *what* Plato is. And if we are talking about political philosophy, we must constantly refer to Plato. Plato was, is, and will be. This is the only thing that people who study political philosophy begin with and, more often than not, end with. Everything else is, at best, good commentary. Reading the dialogues: "The Republic," "The Laws,"
"The Statesman," but also "Timaeus" will give us some idea, albeit a very distant one, of Plato. Without this, it is impossible to study political philosophy. If Plato is not open to us and these works are not read, our knowledge of political philosophy will be notoriously incomplete.

The ideal state is a state that eternally exists

Thus, ídéa is παράδειγμα, the visible is the exemplary. This means that the idea/paradigm/world of the Father is what is. *How* does an idea exist? It exists *eternally*. Therefore, the idea was, is, and will be. The idea is primary in relation to time. The idea contains within itself all its possible embodiments. The world of ideas constitutes the world of paradigms (models). This is the world of the Father.

Please note: when we say "the ideal state," we are not talking about the state we should strive for, nor are we talking about the state we have imagined. *We are talking about the state that exists.* And to the extent that the existing state resembles the ideal state, *to that extent* it is the ideal state.

An ideal state is a state that exists eternally and serves as a model for all historically existing states. All historically existing states are nothing more than temporary and random reflections of this ideal state. Accordingly, we speak of the ideal state not as something that could be, should be, or was conceived by someone, but as a state that truly exists.

The following can be said about the state in which we live: to the extent that it resembles the ideal state, it also exists. Similarly, to the extent that it does not resemble an ideal state, it is non-ontological, non-existent, fictitious, transient, unstable, false and non-existent. That is, it does not really exist, but rather a distorted parody of it, a pseudo-state.

The true and the visible

Greek philosophy, starting with Parmenides (c. 540 – c. 470 BC), distinguishes between the true (, Greek for "unhidden," "true") and *the visible* (δό3α, Greek for "opinion," "imaginary"). The world we see is the imaginary world. The real world is hidden *behind* the imaginary world, just as truth (αλήθεια) is hidden behind opinion (δό3α). What we see is imaginary, containing truth within itself, simultaneously hiding and revealing it. But not everything we see, perceive and know is true; much of it is only imaginary, apparent. Thus, the imaginary deceives us, appearing to be, but not being.

The ideal state is a state that fully corresponds to the idea of the state; a state that exists eternally in the structure of the paradigm. That is, we can say that it is a paradigmatic state, or a state of ideas/a state of paradigms. Accordingly, the idea of the ideal state as a Fatherland, founded on the logic described by Plato, exists eternally; it is true, it is. Everything else combines "is" and "is not." Everything that is different from the ideal state is *an imaginary state*.

The metaphor of the Son: icons, symbols

In order to understand the ontology of everything else besides the world of the Father and move on to the second principle of the Timaeus, we turn to *the metaphor of the Son*. This is the second world.

Good

Father

paradigms

ideas   is

eternity

demiurge (creator)

Son

phenomen   and is, and is not

a icons

cosmos   symbols

time

existence

Nurse   **Mother**   Recipient   is as if not

matter choir

space   elements (elements)   place

The structure of "Timea"

Who is the Son? The Son is both the Father, since he was created by the
Father, and Other than the Father. And since the Son is in the Father, and not
the Father in the Son, he is in some ways similar to the Father, and in some
ways different from him. The Son is in some way inferior to the Father. He
cannot be better than the Father, otherwise, from the point of view of

the idea, he would be the Father himself[1]. The Father-Son relationship in the patriarchal Greek model is a symbolic relationship, a relationship of wholeness and part (inheriting something from the whole). So, the metaphor of the Son is the first thing.

The second is the icon (from the Greek εἴκον, from the ancient Greek εἴκο̄ν, "image," "depiction"). The world of the Son consists of icons or images. Images are not models; images are copies. The second world is the iconic or symbolic world, the world of symbols (σύμβολον).

What do symbols symbolise? They symbolise ideas. Ideas are what exist, but symbols... do they exist or not? *Symbols partly exist and partly do not*.

Ideas are identical to themselves. They are themselves, they are what they are. Symbols *point* to these ideas. That is, symbols partly *exist* to the extent that they point to an idea, but partly they do not exist — just as they do not exist in isolation from the ontological act of pointing. If the formula A=A (an idea is an idea) is true for an idea, then a symbol has a much more complex relationship to being; it exists because it is not itself (A≠A); a symbol does not symbolise itself, but someone else, and without the other, it loses its meaning in being. disappears. It exists as long as it points to something other than itself.

But a symbol in itself is not what it points to. It is not an idea or a model. A symbol is not a paradigm, but an icon, a copy. Accordingly, like A=A, it does not exist.

The existence of a symbol is not the same as the existence of an idea. The existence of a symbol is both real and unreal. It is *a combination of existence and non-existence in one*. As an indicator of an idea (which definitely exists), a symbol exists. As a thing in itself, it does not exist. What is a mirror? In reality, a mirror is meaningless *in itself*. It acquires content when it reflects something. But what does a mirror reflect when it reflects nothing? Nothing. That is, there is no existence in this mirror. If we imagine a symbol as a mirror reflecting some kind of existence, we will say that we really see some kind of existence in it, and therefore this mirror exists.

In the work of Stéphane Mallarmé (1842–1898), the image of a mirror lying on the floor of a dark room at night recurs, and the poet asks, in what sense does this mirror exist? This mirror reflects nothing. The meaning of a mirror is to reflect. But if a mirror reflects nothing, does it exist?

From the idea of a mirror left in an empty room at night, the idea of pure possibility arises, which Plato describes in Timaeus as the third genus or order of being.

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[1] This is possible, however, if we consider the primordial nature of the concept of gender in relation to both the Father and the Son.

The phenomenon as an icon

But before we move on to explaining the ontology of matter, I would like to draw attention to another second-order name, the world of copies or the iconic world. Plato calls it *phenomenon (from the Greek* φαινόμενον — "appearing," "phenomenon"*)*.

It is important to note that a symbol, an icon, a copy is *a manifestation* of an idea. Through the Son, the Father is manifested; through the copy, the paradigm is manifested; through the phenomenon, the idea is manifested. The meaning of a phenomenon lies in its dual existence. On the one hand, it is φαινόμενον, a phenomenon — it is (since something is manifested in the phenomenon), and on the other hand, it does not exist in itself. This is a very important philosophical point. Hence the term "phenomenal" or the branch of philosophy called "phenomenology." A phenomenon is that which is revealed, but revealed not as identical to itself. A phenomenon always has its essence, that is, something that is through this phenomenon.

The world of phenomena, the world that is given to us in direct perception, is the world of the manifestation of ideas — to us. That is, they exist through the world of ideas, and therefore this world is not identical to itself. The world we perceive is an imaginary world, a world of opinions. Nothing here points to itself, nothing here is self-referential. Every object and every phenomenon of nature, from the point of view of Platonism, is a symbol, i.e. a pointer to something else. It is not the truth itself, but its manifestation.

Time, according to Plato, is a copy of eternity.

But there is something in this phenomenon that resembles an idea (which is why the world is fundamentally beautiful), and there is also something that does not resemble an idea (which is why the world is essentially transient and mortal). The law of the second world, *the world of the Son, is* γένεσις (origin) *and* φθόρος (destruction); moreover, it is time.

If eternal ideas exist in the world of models/paradigms, then time exists in the world of copies. What is time, according to Plato? It is *a copy of eternity*. What is simultaneous in eternity is sequential in time.

In eternity, we are unborn, small, adult, old and dead *at the same time* [1]. The idea of us is eternal and unchanging.

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[1] In this sense·Empedocles (c. 490 – c. 430 BC), who taught about the four elements (roots) of reality, claimed that he was *simultaneously* a child, a bush, a fish, and a bird. By this he wanted to show that his inner self, his subject or his daimon, was essentially unchanged, no matter what elements it took on. It is interesting

, but in the world it is given to us sequentially: we appear from nowhere, come into the world of phenomena and disappear into nowhere.

But according to Plato, this "nowhere" — the world of death and the world that precedes birth — is what *we ourselves* are. Our death is fundamentally ontological. This is our *idea*. We emerge from the idea of ourselves and return to the idea of ourselves. Moreover, this idea of ourselves is, to a greater extent, itself not when we are, but when we are not.

Plato describes this through the concept of the eternity *of the soul* (ψυχή). The soul is the idea of us. We ourselves are phenomena, which is why we live in time. In time, the idea of us turns into a phenomenon, the ideal "us" turns into the phenomenal, we are ourselves through ourselves. *We are copies of ourselves.* Note that here the concept of the dialectic of the world of the Father and the world of the Son, the world of originals and the world of copies, is introduced.

The ideal and phenomenal state

We can apply the second principle to the state: there is an ideal state and a phenomenal state (the state as a phenomenon, the symbolic state, the iconic state, the state of copies).

What is the phenomenal state a copy of? The ideal. If the ideal state exists, what is the ontological status of the phenomenal state?

On the one hand, the phenomenal state exists (since it reflects and represents the ideal state), and on the other hand, it does not exist (since it has a diminished ontology, which is ultimately non-existent). We can say that the ideal state (Kallipolis) is *a state of the soul,* where its citizens are eternal ideas, and the phenomenal state is a genetic state (it arises and then inevitably perishes). Its citizens are people.

The ontological status of the ideal state and the phenomenal state through "Timaeus" helps us understand the metaphor of the cave. The philosopher's upward movement (ανοδος) and downward movement (κάθοδος), his exit from politics through the Political into the Philosophical, and further, the establishment of ideal politics through the Political in his return, are in fact precisely this *dialectic*

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that the human image in Empedocles (the child) corresponds to the element of fire or the sun. *Wright M. R.* Empedocles. The extant fragments. NY; L: Yale University Press, 1981. A similar idea of the eternally unchanging Soul was held by the Neoplatonist Plotinus (204/205–270).

the transition from Father to Son. When the Political emerges, the philosopher (the Son, the phenomenal man) returns to his own soul (the Son returns to the Father) and descends again to himself, but now *as someone else*. It is one thing for the Son *to be* simply *born,* and quite another *for* the Son *to know* the Father. At first, the Son realises that he *is only* the Son, that this phenomenal world, the world of opinion (δόξα), is only a copy, just like himself. Realising what he is a copy of, i.e. comprehending the Father through contemplation of himself, he becomes *a different* Son*;* a Son who emphasises *his similarity* to the Father, not *his difference, his unity* with the Father, not *his opposition.* The Son understands that he is not himself, but a symbol. He is no longer a victim of the delusion that the world we are given is everything. The Son understands that this world is not true. What is true in this imaginary world? That it *symbolises* the true world. Therefore, by the method of cataphysics (from the Greek καταφατικός, 'affirming'), by the method of similarity, we can arrive at *what* is in the phenomenon. What is in the phenomenon is not the phenomenon itself. Pay attention to how the phenomenal state relates to the ideal state: the phenomenal state is a state-phenomenon, a copy, and to the extent that this copy reflects the ideal state (Kallipolis), this state exists. Similarly, to the extent that it does not reflect it, this state does not exist.

The philosophy of politics asserts that *politics cannot be studied using political methods*. The content of politics is not politics itself. The content of politics is philosophy. Politics is the realm of phenomena, while philosophy is the realm of ideas. Every element of politics is nothing more than *a political phenomenon,* a phenomenon. *What* this phenomenon is is a question that needs to be studied.

And one last remark: we need to pay attention to what a "norm" (Latin: norma) is. A norm means almost the same thing as the word "idea" or "ideal." "To be normal" and "to be ideal"
are approximately the same thing. A norm is never a given; a norm is an ontological content or paradigm/model against which we measure the phenomenal. Therefore, Plato's ideal state is *a normal state*. Moreover, any phenomenal state is normal only to the extent that it is ideal or similar to the ideal. What, then, is the state we are dealing with in history? It is by definition an abnormal state, differing only in the scale and variety of its abnormality.

Woman and the bastard Logos

The third genus in Timaeus is "chora" (χōρα). This term originally means "space" or "place." Plato calls χōρα
"Mother," "Recipient," or "Nurser" and identifies space and the feminine principle with each other, simultaneously describing it as a sphere where the primary elements (στοιχεῖο) are located.

This third feminine principle, from Plato's point of view, cannot be understood by the mind, because in the pure feminine principle everything is meaningless. Woman is understood through a special Logos — a bastard ("illegitimate") Logos. Everything in a woman that is purely feminine is understood not by the mind, but by the pseudo-mind.

On the contrary, the Father and the Son are understood by the normal Logos. Therefore, Plato does not pay much attention to the bastard Logos. In Greek, "illegitimate," "illegitimate" is λόγος νόθος.

Plato writes about it as follows

There is another genus, namely space (χōρα): it is eternal, impervious to destruction, provides a home for everything that is born, but is itself perceived outside of sensation, by means of a kind of unlawful reasoning (λόγος νόθος — literally "bastard logos"), and it is almost impossible to believe in it. We see it as if in dreams and assert that all existence must necessarily be somewhere, in some place, and occupy some space, and that anything that is not on earth or in heaven does not exist. In our sleepy oblivion, we transfer these and related concepts to the nature of true being, which is unrelated to sleep, and when we wake up, we find ourselves unable to distinguish between them and speak the truth, namely that, since an image does not bear the cause of its own birth within itself, but invariably represents the phantom of something else, it must be born within something else, as if attached to its essence, or not be anything at all ([1].

It should be noted that at this point in Timaeus, Plato's previously crystal-clear speech loses its transparency, and he begins to speak using vague images, losing the metaphysical certainty that is unshakeable when he describes the first and second kinds of being. This can be likened to...

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[1] *Plato.* Timaeus. P. 455.

to the fact that the gaze of the heavenly god reaches the surface of the Earth, the lower boundary of the world of copies, and here, encountering its limits, sees something that cannot be clearly distinguished. On the border of day, the realm of night dreams flickers. Therefore, Plato limits himself to a few indications and postulates "chorus," χο̄́ρα (space) as a flat boundary beyond which there is nothing, which cannot be understood, since there is nothing to understand in it.

The Logos born of the law is the Logos of the Father and the Son. Between them unfolds the entire philosophy of politics in the ideal state (Callipolis). Woman (χο̄́ρα) is only a nurse; she feeds the Son without giving him anything of substance. Woman (χο̄́ρα) merely gives him *a* certain *phenomenal existence.* In essence, woman (χο̄́ρα) brings only *illusion* into the world. She is the mother of pure "doxa," that is, the direct opposite of truth.

When does the phenomenal approach the ideal? When the second (Son) approaches the first (Father), breaking away from the third (Mother, Nurse). What does a woman give to the soul, according to Plato? The body. But the body is a kind of meaningless burden that transforms the eternal into the temporal, the transparent into the semi-transparent, and so on.

The chariot of the soul

Plato asserts the same fundamental triad in the very structure of the human being. In Phaedrus[1] he compares the human soul to a chariot drawn by two horses. This chariot participates in the races of the gods across the heavens. And only when the chariot strays from its path and breaks away from the group of deities does it enter the body, from where it strives to free itself and return to its divine companions and leaders.

In the structure of the soul (chariot — Greek ὄχημα) there is
 1) a charioteer (Greek: κούβεφθείς, i.e. λόγος, νους — "mind"),
 2) a white horse with a black eye (anger, Greek θύμος)
 3) and a black horse with a white eye (lust, Greek ꟼπιθυμία). The chariot
 of the soul, driven by the charioteer, has three principles: nothingness
nothing and two horses.

The charioteer himself is a philosopher, the noblest part of the soul. He who cultivates the mind develops the highest principle within himself. He does not simply live by the power of the soul, but subjugates life to thought, contemplation...

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[1]   *Plato.* Phaedo / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.

contemplation, that is, he strives to give life meaning and purpose. The charioteer represents the most divine side of the soul

The white horse with a black eye is rage (θύμος), the desire to kill, to commit violence, but also to be courageous, to defend one's homeland. Rage is a masculine trait, the soul's desire for expansion. It is the turbulent principle of the soul, associated with pride, vanity, the will to power, the desire to dominate others, to conquer. But at the same time, this desire draws the soul away from the physical world — into more subtle worlds.

The black horse with a white eye is lust (Ʉπιθυμία), which binds a person to material things, thereby constituting them, because it is precisely the orientation of expansion towards matter that gives rise to the materiality and corporeality of things. According to Plato, this horse must first be subjugated, the other tamed, and the charioteer nurtured, as this is our "higher self."

Thus, Plato distinguishes three fundamental levels in the structure of man.

The dialectic of Parmenides

To understand Plato's thought as a whole, it is also important to consider the dialogue
"Parmenides" [1] . It establishes a hierarchy of dialectical statements reflecting the relationship between the One and the Many. Later, non-Platonists — primarily Plotinus [2] , Iamblichus [3] (245/280–325/330), and especially Proclus[4] (412–485) and Damascius [5] (458/462 – after 538) built on the analysis of this dialogue a detailed and extensive system combining theology, cosmology, ethics and physics [6]. Proclus and Damascius identify nine hypotheses in the dialogue Parmenides. The first five hypotheses are based on the recognition that the One (Ev) exists. For the Platonists, this recognition is fundamental: if the One (Ev) exists, then everything else exists, that is, the Many. However, immediately in the first hypothesis, the very existence of the One (Ev) is significantly clarified: the One (Ev) does not simply exist like everything else, it exists in a radically different way. In a sense, if we take "is" to mean how everything is,

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[1]   *Plato.* Parmenides.

[2]*Plotinus.* Enneads: In 7 vols. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyško Publishing House; University Book, 2010.

[3]   *Iamblichus of Chalcis.* Commentaries on Plato's Dialogues. St. Petersburg: Aleteya. 2000; Ibid. On the Egyptian Mysteries. Moscow: Aleteya, 2004.

[4]   *Proclus Diadochus.* Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. St. Petersburg: Publishing House Mir, 2006.

[5]   *Damascius.* Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. St. Petersburg: Mir. 2008.

[6]   *Dugin, A. G.* In Search of the Dark Logos. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

What is, is the One (Εν), which is qualitatively superior to everything else. This is stated in the first hypothesis: the One (Εν) radically transcends being. And only when recognised as such does being itself begin to exist. Being has a pre-existent (super-existent) cause. In the theological system of Christianity, this was called
the "apophatic interpretation of God." We find similar ideas in Islamic Sufism, Jewish Kabbalah, Hinduism, and Buddhism.

So, the first five hypotheses are as follows:

1) ὄν (the one);

2) ὄν πολλά (the one and the many);

3) ὄν και πολλά (the one and the many);

4) πολλά και ὄν (many and one);

5) πολλά (many).

All five of Parmenides' first hypotheses originate from the One (Εν), therefore all the worlds they describe exist. The second, third, fourth and even fifth hypotheses become valid only because the first was already established.

The remaining four hypotheses, from the sixth to the ninth, discussed in the same dialogue, originate from the non-One. These are purely speculative logical constructions, which for the Platonists have no ontological basis.

The sixth hypothesis asserts *that there is no unity, but there is much*, and therefore, *under certain circumstances*, *much can be combined into a "unity.*" This "one" will be composite, collective, artificial, i.e., it will not possess the primacy of the genuine one (the denial of which gives rise to the second series of hypotheses). Some Neoplatonists say that such an assumption is simply a game of the mind. Others (such as Damascius) say that unity can be conceived in this way from the point of view of the body. In other words, such a unity is the possibility of combining a multitude of atomic (individual) parts into a secondary whole.

The seventh hypothesis states: *There is no unity, but there is multiplicity, which is left to itself*, that is*, it cannot* be combined into a "unity." The eighth hypothesis: *There is no unity, but there is multiplicity for multiplicity*. That is, individual atoms exist through interaction between co-

.

Finally, the ninth hypothesis: *There is no unity, but there is also no multiplicity for the many*.

This dialectic of the One/Many gives rise to another type of hierarchy, quite homologous to the general structure of Platonic ontology, and clarifies some of its most important points.

Unity

Father

1- The hypothesis — The One — God — super-is

Good

2- Hypothesis — The One Many — Um

Son

3- a hypothesis — Unity and Many — is

4- a hypothesis — Many and One — world

Mother

5 -th hypothesis — Many — matter — is how not to eat

– –

the boundary between existence and non-existence

Not the One

submaterial (subcorporeal) worlds

6 -a hypothesis — *from many, "one"*
(according to Damascius)

7- the hypothesis — *from many, not "one"* — falsehood is not

from many, many

8- The hypothesis
(according to Damascius)

9- the hypothesis — *from many, not many*

Metaphysical and ontological hierarchy of the One/Many in Plato's Parmenides

Three types of political ontology in "Timaeus"

Thus, we have arrived at three types of political ontology. Accordingly, there exists:
- the ideal, paradigmatic, Father; it is.
- the phenomenal, iconic, filial; it is and is not; it is as a symbol. Thus, there are two states: the ideal and the phenomenal.
- Χὄρα is the place where the state resides; where the physicality of the state, the primary matter of the state, exists. Χὄρα, to the extent that she is only a woman, only herself, does not exist; however, to the extent that she exists, she participates in the Son; the Mother exists through the Son.

According to Plato, a woman represents nothing except nursing and bearing *another* than herself. And the material structure of statehood acquires being (including political being) only when it begins to act as the primary matter *for the* state *phenomenon*.

Thus, we can imagine three ontologies of political philosophy:
- The State of the Father: eternal, ideal, paradigmatic state, which eternally exists;
- The State of the Son: a phenomenal state — a projection of the first true state into the sphere of phenomena, which is partly there and partly not there; it combines being and non-being, arises and disappears, and can be likened to us ourselves, living beings.
- The material aspect of the state. In its pure form, it does not exist. It is a kind of burden on the state. A non-existent, false state.

We obtain a triangular figure in which three sectors can be identified (see next page).

The economy appears here as non-politics, or the politics "animalistic humanity" (according to Plato); this is the lower aspect.

Many positions and many schools will fit into this triangle, into this Platonic picture of political philosophy. Whatever philosophy of politics, whatever state and whatever political system we take, we must find a place for it in this Platonic picture. Beyond the limits of this scheme, there can be no politics or thought about politics.

The

state of the
Father

of the
paradigm
models

ideas

eternity

the ideal   state

state of the Son

phenomenal state

phenome
na
symbols
images

icons

material aspects of
the state

Choir

existence

place

economy

Three ontological layers of politics

Plato's ideal state: the philosopher-king

Now we can correlate these three parts of the general ontology of Timaeus, the three types of state (ideal, phenomenal and material) and the three classical castes of Plato's ideal state.

What does the ideal state correspond to? A philosopher-king. Plato also adds: aristocracy. At the head of Plato's ideal state (Callipolis) are representatives of the first caste (philosophers, kings, aristocrats, guards). This is monarchical rule, philosophical rule, and aristocratic rule. For Plato, only philosophers are *the best (*ἄριστος). In any state, those who know what the ideal state is should rule. And even if this state is phenomenal, the best should rule.

Who is a monarch? A monarch is someone who has, to a greater extent, found his way to his soul. For him, the entire state is himself, not a collection of others. A monarch experiences everything personally, and accordingly, the political in him reaches its peak of intensity at the moment of power. He represents the point of the most concentrated expression of the paternal principle.

And the fourth concept (along with the three already mentioned: philosopher, king, aristocrat) is guardian (φύλα3). A guardian does not simply guard, he *stays awake when everyone else is asleep.*

Remember how the philosopher began to behave in the cave metaphor? Everyone was satisfied with the state of illusion, but he wanted the truth. Everyone was asleep, but he woke up. Everyone was looking in one direction, but he looked in the other. Night falls, and everyone falls asleep. Everyone except the guardian. He alone walks through the city with his club while everyone else sleeps. Surrounded by owls and gods, who are also awake, the guardian patrols the Greek polis. He separates his destiny from that of others. He lives at night. He guards not only these sleeping people, but to a greater extent he guards the gods (sometimes even from these people themselves). The guard guards the sacred, existence, the ideal state. He is on guard for the Other. For that which truly is.

The phenomenal state — the state of the warrior

The second level is the phenomenal state. In Plato's hierarchy, it corresponds to *the guardians' assistants*. They are also warriors whose virtue is masculinity.

What is most important in the world of phenomena? Plato says that another virtue dominates here — not the contemplation of ideas

directly, not the protection of being, not a view of the paradigm, but *courage*. If a philosopher enters the world of death, reaching its depths, then a warrior or a philosopher's assistant constantly interacts with this death from outside. A warrior causes death to others, i.e., he necessarily kills, and he is ready to sacrifice himself for his state and for the Political itself.

Accordingly, this is the second caste of warriors, which represents the assistants and defenders of philosophers who strive for glory and courage; in addition, they are disciples of philosophers. They have a completely different structure — they are *people of the phenomenal world;* they are born, kill and die, they are not in eternity, but in time. If the first caste is philosophical, the ontological caste of philosopher-kings, then the second caste is phenomenal.

The phenomenal is not the concern of the philosopher. Unlike him, members of the second caste are concerned with phenomena. In this sphere, *rage* (θύμος) reigns supreme. According to Plato, this is a positive passion. Of course, rage prevents philosophising, but it is nevertheless very useful in other cases, as it is the maximum expression of life force.

Thus, we come to an understanding of the phenomenal state, or the state of warriors (the Kshatriya state), in which valour (αρετή) and rage (θύμος) dominate.

Pacifist warriors are a pathology

The dialogue "Politician" talks about how to tame warriors who live by rage. Since a warrior is incapable of pure contemplation, when left to his own devices, he may discover *a tendency towards* ὕβρις (Greek "arrogance," "pride"), and boundless belligerence (under its influence, a person not only kills an enemy but, for example, mocks his corpse). Enough examples can be found in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Under the influence of ὕβρις, the warrior's fury goes beyond its legitimate limits.

Fury is necessary, Plato believes, but a balance must be found. It is *philosophers who pacify warriors*. In order to pacify them, warriors must be eager for battle. Pacifist warriors are undoubtedly pathological. Warriors must be fierce, they must love to kill, like hunting dogs, they must smell blood and be excited by it; however, moderation is necessary here. Thus, the problem of the phenomenal state is rage and *the measure of rage*. In other words, the phenomenal state is created by warriors; they constitute the warrior caste.

Providing for thinkers and warriors

The third principle is associated with χο̄ρα, the Provider. Just as the nurturer feeds the child, so the peasantry and craftsmen feed the warriors and philosophers. The task of the peasant is to ensure that the warrior is well fed when he rides out to cut off someone's head. Accordingly, the resource-based economic state is subordinate to the warriors.

Mothers and wet nurses (χο̄ρα) correspond to the third caste — the caste of producers and peasants. They are located in the sphere of space, in χο̄ρα; they work in the countryside: they plant and harvest crops. Their role is to provide a visible material foundation for the state, to be the place where the state manifests itself.

In the dialogue "The Laws," Plato talks a lot about what ordinary citizens of the state should do. They should dance in circles (introduced by the state as a duty). Plato dwells in detail on how these circles should be arranged, proposing to divide them into three circles according to age categories. Circular movements reproduce the rotation of the heavenly bodies and planets. Therefore, through the cyclical nature of labour and festive dances, the main population of the ideal state also participates in eternity — in the world of ideas.

Philosophers think, warriors fight, and the rest work and dance in circles. This is the ideal model of political philosophy.

Stages of state degradation according to Plato: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny

In the dialogue "The Republic," Plato talks about perverted types of states. So, there is an ideal state (Kallipolis), which we have described, and there are perversions or deviations from this paradigmatic model. Plato names four types of state that should not exist but, unfortunately, do: *timocracy, oligarchy, democracy* and *tyranny*.

1. Timocracy (τιμοκρατία) *or timarchy* (τιμαρχία). Plato associates it with the Spartan model, in which the military principle (rather than the philosophical one) prevails. That is, there is a certain weakening of the philosophical principle and a strengthening of the military one. The centre of gravity shifts from the guards to the assistants of the guards. Under timocracy, there are still philosophers, but they are not as powerful as they should be. Fury, as a trait of warriors and a virtue of the second level, begins to dominate wisdom, a virtue of the first level. This is not yet a complete seizure of power by philosophers, but only a

philosopher-king

first caste

aristocracy

wisdom   guards

second caste

guard assistants

warriors

fury

peasants

dances

artisan body

third caste

economy

The three castes of Callipolis

Initial state, first signs. Here, wise men are listened to less, and valour is elevated to an absolute, rather than relative, value. Spartan gerousia, military style, and militarism become dominant values.

Plato does not think badly of timocracy, saying that it is not the worst form of government. Nevertheless, timocracy is a perversion. It is very important to note that as soon as a warrior is distracted from philosophy, that is, ceases to be a spiritual warrior, an assistant to the guardians of being, he becomes attracted to material things. He begins to use his will not only to fight, but also to grab as many trophies as possible. As the realm of phenomena becomes more self-centred, it becomes more material and less and less *what* it is. When the warrior class becomes interested in material aspects, it approaches its degeneration.

2. Oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία)[1] . This type of government arises when several degenerate, influential military rulers or corresponding groups who have lost their status, together with wealthy townspeople, form a society of a few rich people, oligarchs. This is a group of major material and political figures who, by fair means or foul, by force or cunning, have gained power and rule the city (state). Plato considered this to be a very bad order. It is a transition to an even lower stage — between the phenomenal state and pure economics. Oligarchy is a decisive step away from the order of the Son to the order of the Mother.

3. Democracy (δημοκρεια)[2] . Plato believed that this political system represented a complete perversion and decline, and essentially meant the transition of the phenomenal state into *a* material *sub-state*. Here, oligarchic power is distributed among a large number of citizens, each of whom thinks selfishly only of their own material well-being.

For Plato, Socrates' death was the death of a philosopher-king at the hands of a maddened democratic mob. This is the essence of Plato's revolution in relation to the society in which he lived. He said that we are in the third, practically the worst form of perversion, and in order to return to a normal state, we must turn away from the democratic mob and take a step towards the ideal model. Thus, Plato, being a representative of the aristocracy, believed that the state should be ruled by the wise, and not by the masses.

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[1] Greek: ὀλιγαρχία (oligarchia) — "rule by the few", from ancient Greek: ὀλίγος (oligos) — "few" and other Greek words derived from ȧrché (arche) — "power".

[2] Ancient Greek δημοκρⴰτία — "power of the people," from δῆμος — "people" and κράτος — "power."

The leader of an aristocratic Athenian family (one might say an oligarchic family) challenges it and says that this form of government must be corrected and that it is necessary to return from the material sub-state χο̄r to the ideal model.

4. Tyranny (τυραννία)[1]. According to Plato, this is the worst and final form of statehood. It is an inverted parody of the rule of the philosopher-king. The philosopher-king is the best of men who rules, while the tyrant is the worst. Any democracy ends in dictatorship, i.e., tyranny, the seizure of power. It is clear that sooner or later, a dull democratic society will choose (or have imposed upon it) the worst of its representatives. Or, out of fear of disorder and chaos, it will surrender power to a usurper.

Anti-king

This is how Plato describes the four stages of the degradation of the ideal state (Kallipolis). At first, we have a departure from the norm, then an increasing deviation, and finally a complete parody, because the tyrant parodies the philosopher-king. The tyrant is the anti-king, the anti-philosopher. He is the most foolish and vile of men, claiming to rule over others. He is the most cowardly, claiming to lead the army. He is a thief and a corruptor, saying that he can improve life. Tyranny embodies *anti-politics*. Starting with democracy, we enter the realm of the sub-state.

The whole picture we have described will only be clear if we understand what an ideal state (Kallipolis) is. An ideal state always exists; it remains unchanged, which cannot be said about its projections, phenomena. The ideal state (Callipolis) may be slightly distorted in a timocracy, more distorted in an oligarchy, even more distorted in a democracy, and as a parody, as its own opposite, in a tyranny. Accordingly, a tyrant parodies a monarch, a dictator parodies a philosopher, and so on. According to Plato, tyranny brings together all the worst that can be found in other types of statehood. From the point of view of ontology, *a tyrant is someone who is even lower than matter.* Therefore, the existence of tyranny is minimal. There is nothing more ephemeral than tyranny. What claims to be eternal in tyranny usually turns out to be temporary, transitory, and illusory.

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[1] Greek: τυραννίς — arbitrariness.

However, the cycle of degradation does not affect the nature and existence of the ideal state. All distortions are distortions of the original, which remains unchanged in itself. Therefore, according to Plato, after tyranny, the time of the philosopher-king returns. Callipolis, in its ideal immutability, establishes the boundaries of its phenomenological manifestation. When the copy state reaches the limit of dissimilarity with the model state, that is, when tyranny is established, everything returns to Callipolis, restoring the normative proportions. Therefore, the Greeks considered one of the wonders of the "old tyrant"; tyrants usually did not live to old age.

Chapter 3. The State of the Son. Aristotle

Politics according to Aristotle

Plato's philosophy provides the most complete picture of the essence of metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, political, and anthropological issues. As we have already said, Plato represents the completeness of all possible variants and includes all possible types of worldviews. When we spoke about "Timaeus," we pointed out that there are three kinds of beings —

1) paradigmatic,
2) phenomenological, and
3) material

These correspond to three principles:

1) the Father,
2) Son, and
3) Mother (Nursing Mother, Recipient).

Theoretically, we can identify three philosophies in this cosmology of Timaeus:

1) a philosophy that emphasises *paradigms*,
2) a philosophy that *emphasises phenomena*,
3) a philosophy that *emphasises matter*.

These three levels of the cosmos, being, ontology, and metaphysics, correspond to three philosophical traditions. We encounter them both in Ancient Greece and in the modern world. In fact, Plato and everything that is called Platonic philosophy is inextricably linked to the first philosophy — to the supremacy of the world of paradigms. In the first philosophy (in Platonism in the broadest sense), ideas are endowed with being, which are considered to be the only fully and purely *existing things,* while phenomena in this case become *half-existing, half-non-existent,* with virtually no attention paid to the material side of being (hence the idea of matter as privation, deficiency).

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Three Logos. Moscow: Academic Project, 2014. This line of thought is consistently traced throughout all volumes of the Noomakhia project.

Matter is *the physicality* of a phenomenon. Everything we see in the material world *exists* because it has a certain eidos (εἶδος), a type, i.e. the existence of a material object does not in any way flow from matter itself, which is merely a "receptor" of eidos, which has an immaterial (supermaterial, supra-material) nature.

Here a very clear picture emerges: the world of paradigms *is absolute*, the world of matter/corporeality in its pure form *is not absolute in* itself, but the phenomenal world mixed between them *both is and is not*.

Platonic philosophy and, accordingly, Platonic political philosophy are constructed in exactly this way. In this case, there are

1) an ideal state (which is),

2) the phenomenal state (which partly is and partly is not) and

3) the lowest material "state," concerned with purely material issues — caring for the population, striving for comfort, i.e., the economy[1] (such a state *is not*, or at least is not a state, not a polity (πολιτεία), but something else — for example, a "civil society" or a "market").

From Plato's point of view, a political system that pays attention to the third caste of producers and traders (oligarchy and democracy) is *anti-political*, destroying political idealism.

Three philosophies of politics

Theoretically, it is possible to consider other types of philosophy. Plato describes all of them at once, but we can also outline a consideration of phenomenological philosophy (in the 20th century, this philosophy was partially constructed by Husserl (1859–1938) and, to a large extent, Heidegger) and materialist philosophy (materialism appeared as early as Ancient Greece — Democritus

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[1] The term "economy" here refers to its modern meaning, whereas in Ancient Greece it was called "chrematistics" χρηματιστική, "enrichment," from χρήματα, "money." It is important to note that etymologically, the word χρᾶίματα, "money," comes from the verb χρᾶίω, "to need something," "to experience need." This corresponds precisely to the Platonic understanding of matter as lack, deficiency, need. "Economy" (from oikos, "house," 'household' and νόμο, 'law', 'organisation of territory') was a more complex concept of the ordering of life and living space, i.e. 'house building' or 'housekeeping', which was by no means reduced to increasing comfort, let alone the pursuit of money and profit.

Crete, Epicurus). Thus, within the Platonic complex (Timaeus), three philosophies of politics can be distinguished:

- Platonic;
- phenomenological;
- materialistic (reduces politics to economics). Examples of contemporary materialism, which has developed in

The political components are well known: liberalism, Marxism and (to some extent) nationalism. The materialists of the ancient world were unable to build a definitive political system. Plato built one (and we can see how complete and comprehensive his political philosophy is). It should be noted that the materialist Democritus was the first to engage in speculation (pure chrematistics) in his city of Abdera, buying up grain reserves and then reselling them when their price rose. Nevertheless, the Greeks never created a materialistic philosophy of politics that would be directly and comprehensively linked to the third genus of being — to Mother and "chora."

The polity of the Father and the polity of the Son

Now we move on to the philosophy that was developed in Greece and which differed significantly from Plato's philosophy. This is the political philosophy of Aristotle (384–322 BC).

Let us begin with the fact that Aristotle was a student of Plato and listened to the entire course of Platonic teaching. Therefore, whether he wanted to or not, he was fundamentally "programmed" by the basic maxims of Platonism.

If you like, Aristotle's consciousness was shaped by Platonism. This thinker is within the Platonic tradition. When people say "Plato and Aristotle," they essentially mean

"Aristotle is the 'Son' of Plato." What Aristotle has that is most essential and reasonable, he took from his "Father."

But Aristotle decided to construct *the philosophy of the Son*, that is, a kind of prototype of what in the 19th and 20th centuries would be called "phenomenology." Earlier, we spoke of three worlds or kinds: the world of ideas, the world of phenomena/appearances, and the world of matter. Plato's philosophy is based on the first kind, while *Aristotle's philosophy is based on the second kind.* This is *phenomenological philosophy of politics*[1].

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[1] This can be compared to the sociological theory of the "normal type" (German: Normaltypus) put forward by Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936). In this interpretation, Max Weber's "ideal type" corresponds to Tönnies' "normal type."

Aristotle constructs the philosophy of the Son partly similar to the philosophy of the Father, and partly not. As we have said, the Son has something from the Father and something not from the Father. Or, from Plato's point of view, he has something from being and something from non-being. Aristotle is the same: he has something from Plato and something not from Plato. What he has from Plato determines his similarity to Platonism. But Aristotle also has something else — criticism of Plato.

Aristotle, being a Platonist, sets himself the task of criticising Plato. This is the criticism of the Father by the Son. To the extent that the Son follows the Father, he is *the same* as the Father. To the extent that he opposes the Father, he falls, from the point of view of Platonism, into "sin."

Two male philosophies

Aristotle's philosophy is partly the same as that of the Father, and partly directed against him. To the extent that it is directed against the Father, it does not exist. To the extent that it continues the Father, it exists. Therefore, Aristotle himself is the spiritual "Son" of Plato, and together Platonism and Aristotelianism cover all the possibilities of male philosophy (the philosophy of the first two genera). That is, a man thinks either as the Father (and then he is a Platonist) or as the Son (and then he is an Aristotelian). Where materialism prevails, the third genus (in particular, economics), the masculine principle disappears, is eliminated, and what can be called the philosophy of the Mother or the philosophy of the "chora" begins. There, statehood (as polity, πολιτεία) ends, the idea of the classical Greek Indo-European order disappears, and the domination of two castes (the caste of philosophers and the caste of warriors), which correspond to two philosophies, the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son, is eliminated.

There are two male philosophies: Platonism as a fully male philosophy (Plato did not allow women to listen to his lectures, but some still managed to sneak in by dressing in men's clothes; among them were several female disciples who were so devoted that after his death they created the Oracle of Plato, propagated his teachings and designated their philosophical priestly dignity) and Aristotelianism as a revision of Platonism from the point of view of the Son. Plato

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is analogous to the relationship between Plato's ideal state and Aristotle's actual (normal, phenomenal) state.

    [1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Three Logos.

and Aristotle remain within the same philosophical space: one looks at ideas and positions himself as the Father (the philosophy of Zeus, Apollo), the other looks away from ideas and positions himself as the Son (the philosophy of Dionysus)[1].

Logos apophantikos and the declarative state

So, if Plato develops the theme of the *ideal* state (Callipolis), i.e.*,* one that *exists* from the point of view of the world of ideas, and considers that the *phenomenological* state, i.e., the state that *is,* is nothing more than a relative manifestation of the eternal in the temporal, the absolute in the transitory, then Aristotle justifies another state — the phenomenal (phenomenological) state itself. This is a state that exists here and now and must be understood as a given, as a phenomenon. In the spirit of Aristotle's teaching, it can be called *an apophantic state (* from the Greek ἀπόφανσις, "statement," "affirmation"), parallel to the way Aristotle uses the concept of *apophantic or apophantic statement (λόγος αποφαντικός).*

"affirmation"), parallel to Aristotle's use of the concept of disclosure or declarative utterance (λόγος αποφαντικός). The declarative (apophantic) state is what the state is in isolation from what it should be and what it is in the transcendent world of ideas. Here we see a transition from the political philosophy of the Father (paradigm) to the political philosophy of the Son (phenomena).

Now, if we recall "Timaios," it immediately becomes clear that as soon as we place ourselves in the position of the Son, we say
"The Son is everything. And what is Fatherly in him is the Son, and what is not Fatherly in him is also the Son."

But if Plato says that the part of the Son that is not Father is accidental and illusory, then the Son, who constructs an autonomous philosophy, asserts something else and says:
"The Son is what *is*, and the Father and the Nourisher are not, but are only the boundaries of the Son."

In other words, the Son places himself at the centre and builds politics, the state, philosophy, cosmology, and theology from this *central position*. Therefore, if Plato's philosophy is divine, then Aristotle's philosophy is divinely godless. To the extent that the Son resembles the Father, it is divine. To the extent that there is criticism of the world of ideas, it is godless philosophy.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Three Logos

But this is only from Plato's point of view. From Aristotle's point of view, this is certainly not the case. On the contrary, Aristotle says that his philosophy is true and correct in both directions. There is neither the material nor the paradigmatic here, but there is the phenomenal. That is, that which is, λόγος αποφαντικός.

It is fundamentally important that for Aristotle, *it is* the phenomenon itself *that exists* (just as for Plato, *it is* the idea *that exists* first and foremost), which is why he attacks Plato's doctrine of ideas. At the same time, Aristotle does not assert things (in their physicality) instead of ideas; he asserts something else — instead of ideas, for him there is eidos (εἶδος), form. For Plato, eidos (εἶδος) and idea (ἰδέα) are almost the same thing. Aristotle asserts that ideas do not exist separately from phenomena, but that phenomena have an eidetic character, since every phenomenon has within itself μορφή (form), which is eidos (εἶδος), and ὕλη (matter, wood). If Plato spoke of χο̄ρδα (space), Aristotle spoke of ὕλη. Incidentally, the word "matter" (māteria) is not derived from the word "mother," as many believe, but from a word that referred to shipbuilding timber, from which masts, in particular, were made. We are dealing with a practical calque of the Greek word ὕλη, meaning "tree," "wood" ([1].

Aristotle's philosophy denies not only Plato's upper world of ideas, but also the world of Matter

So, according to Aristotle, there are no ideas, but there are eidos (εἶδος). Phenomena are always constructed in this way: they have a primary element (eidos, εἶδος) and a secondary element (matter, ὕλη); there is content (content, form) and subject (substance), i.e., that *in which* this content manifests itself (the material). Unlike Plato, Aristotle believed that matter does not exist on its own. In Plato, matter, χο̄ρα, is called the third genus of being. It is a genus of being that is non-existent, but this genus exists in itself, in its non-being. Aristotle says: matter does not exist, just as ideas do not exist, but there is *a* material and ideal eidetic *horizon of phenomena.*

Aristotle's philosophy denies not only Plato's upper world of ideas, but also the world of Matter. It asserts that there is only and exclusively *the world of the Son*. Who is the Father? This is the Son's hypothesis about his origin. Who is the Mother? This is the material cause.

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[1] Some Latin authors translated Aristotle's term ὕλη not as materia, meaning 'mast wood' or 'ship timber', but as selva, simply 'forest' or
"wood."

on the Son, who thinks about his origin. In other words, for Aristotle, everything boils down to the Son, to the intermediate level, to the world of phenomena, where there are two horizons — the ideal and the material. But what is *a horizon (*Greek ὁρί3ων — literally, a limit, a restriction from the root ὁρί3ω, "to divide")? It is the most extreme side of the same thing. And for Aristotle, this implies that beyond the horizon of the Son, on the other side of it, *there is nothing.* The philosophy of the Son is absolutised, which clarifies the fundamental difference between Plato's use of the concept of "idea" (ἰδέα) and Aristotle's use of "eidos" (εἰδος). Aristotle thinks of eidos (εἰδος) as the upper horizon and ὕλη (matter) as the lower horizon. These are the boundaries of the Son *from within* himself. Nothing exists beyond these boundaries. Therefore, Aristotle has no concept of the "transcendent" or "beyond the limits." In this respect, Aristotle's philosophy is certainly not Platonism and is based on complete immanence.

Two philosophies

Thus, two philosophies emerge: Plato's transcendental philosophy and Aristotle's immanentist philosophy. If Plato's theology, later developed by the Neoplatonists — in particular, Proclus[1] (412–485), is associated with a *transcendent* God, a god beyond the limits of the world, Aristotle's god is completely different — he is an *immanent* God ("unmoved mover" — Greek ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ). Plato's God is God the Father, while Aristotle's God is God the Son. In essence, these are two views of the divine.

According to Aristotle, the entire universe revolves around an "immovable mover," and all things strive toward it, but the matter mixed with these things prevents them from merging with God. They remain at a certain distance. The rotation of the heavenly spheres, the daily rhythms, the cycle of the year and the elements show us how this happens. Everything revolves around the point of the "immobile mover," around the pure Son, and only an Aristotelian philosopher can come so close to God that he essentially becomes that god. Aristotle considered himself a god, and his disciple Alexander the Great (356–323 BC) also considered himself a god. They (one from the point of view of philosophy, the other from the point of view of politics) were closest to the "immobile mover." In this sense, Aristotle is divine, but divine *in an immanent sense.*

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[1] *Proclus.* Platonic Theology. St. Petersburg: RHGI, Summer Garden, 2001.

Aristotle as an apologist for slavery

Aristotle constructed a complete, comprehensive, developed, phenomenological, immanentist ontology, philosophy, cosmology, physics, and political science. These things are necessary to know in order to understand the meaning of Aristotle's treatise Politics [1].

Like Plato, Aristotle discusses politics by applying his philosophy to the political sphere. And, like Plato, Aristotle asserts that engaging in politics and engaging in philosophy are two types of activities that are noble and superior. Anyone who does not engage in philosophy and politics, from Aristotle's point of view, is a slave. However, Aristotle treats this slave very well, since a slave must work, master technical professions, and be able to get along well with others. Accordingly, people who are engaged in technical matters (production, management, etc.) are, for Aristotle, inferior people. He even said that people who produce something with their own hands should not be given freedom. People who are connected with material things, with physicality, should be slaves; otherwise, they will try to bring their completely unnecessary economic considerations into politics, which is the business of warriors, and into philosophy, which is the business of wise men. Aristotle was an apologist for slavery.

On the one hand, Aristotle rebelled against Plato, stating that one should not submit to a higher transcendent principle. At the same time, however, he retained many of Plato's ideas, believing that it was necessary to introduce a strict hierarchy within the phenomenal (note: *declarative*) state. At the head of the expressive state (the Son), we again encounter three Platonic types: philosophers, assistants, and producers. Aristotle taught that philosophers (but not Platonists, rather Aristotelians, priests of the "unmoved mover," priests of the immanent deity), alongside them should be warriors (well-armed, strong, courageous, and willing to sacrifice their lives), and below them should be everyone else.

Aristotle set himself a practical task, asking the question: how can philosophers rule over warriors? This was solved with the help of an ethical system that prioritised nobility and refinement. People who think are, of course, more noble and refined than those who fight. In turn, those who fight are more noble and refined than those who

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[1]   *Aristotle.* Politics / Aristotle. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1983.

They labour, dealing with physicality, matter and its inherent heaviness and coarseness.

Despite all his differences from Plato, Aristotle retains his three-part structure of vertical social organisation. Thus, in Nicomachean Ethics [1]he speaks of three types of life and the hierarchy that exists between them. These types are as follows:

1) βίος θεωρētικός (*contemplative* life, whose goal is to understand the essence of the human being as such in itself and the truth);

2) βίος πολιτκός (*political* life, whose goal is the acquisition of glory, "time[2] " — τιμή);

3) βίος ἀπολαυστικός (a life of pleasure, i.e. hedonism). These three forms of life correspond to three abilities of the eternal soul:

human soul:

1) mind (νους),

2) striving, desire, attraction (ὄρε3ις[3]) and

3) feeling (αἰσθησῖς).

Here we see the same triadic scheme that Plato elaborates in the Phaedrus. Accordingly, the types of life are forms of priority development of one or another part of the soul. And again, like Plato, Aristotle reduces this triad to three human types.

1) the perfect man

2) hero

3) the common man.

According to Aristotle, the person who has the most developed mind and who strives for a contemplative life is the perfect man (τέλειον). Through the study of philosophy, such a person achieves complete self-control and complete *self-sufficiency* (αυτάρκη). Thus, it is thought that makes a person truly free and independent of any external conditions and circumstances. Self-sufficiency stems from the fact that only through

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[1] *Aristotle.* Nicomachean Ethics/ Aristotle. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Myśl, 1983.

[2] The predominance of this type of life in Plato lies at the heart of "Timocracy."

[3]The term ὄρε3ις goes back to the verb ὀρέγω, "to stretch out," which means horizontal expansion. Its etymology is related to the Indo-European root *h3reǵ-, from which fundamentally important Indo-European terms related specifically to the second caste (the warrior caste) in Sanskrit (the element of fire associated with the middle — warrior — part of the soul — "rajas", from which "raja" — king, ruler), the Iranian tradition — "kharj", also king, ruler, and Latin — rex, king, and rego, "I rule". From the same root (rehtaz) in Germanic languages, concepts meaning "law," "straight direction," and "order" are formed.

Contemplation is understood as the highest goal of existence. And it is precisely in the course of a contemplative life that goodness becomes the inner content of the thinker (hence self-sufficiency).

According to Aristotle, heroes also strive to make virtue internal and inseparable (δυσαφαίρετον) through glory, but they still depend on certain external conditions — not on nature, but on society.

The third category of people live by their feelings and strive for physical and emotional pleasures. They constitute the common people.

The common people are mainly engaged in "household management" (economics, οἴκειον) and are completely dependent on the external world, on society and nature.

In a normal society, a philosopher-king, a perfect contemplator, rules. He is the bearer and guardian of the Logos, *and therefore* of the polis. According to Aristotle, man is by nature defined as a "thinking animal" [1](3ωον λόγον ὕχον) and at the same time as a "political animal" [2] ῾3ōον πολιτικόν). Thought and politics constitute the essential aspects of human existence, separating it from other forms of life. Therefore, the most intelligent (philosopher, contemplator) is at the same time the most political, and the contemplative life is not opposed to politics, but is its source and its centre. States are a form of thought. And therefore, the central place in a good state must be given to wise men.

The state is defended and protected by warriors who love glory. If the philosopher is focused on truth (αλήθεια), then the warrior is focused on appearance, that is, on approaching truth, which the Greeks defined as δό3α. The meaning of the term δό3α is multifaceted and goes back to the verb δοκέω, "to indicate," "to seem," "to suppose," "to imagine." In some cases, δό3α is translated into Slavic as "glory," hence όρθοδο3ία,
"Orthodoxy," which means "right opinion." Thus, warriors, driven by a desire for glory, seek the truth on the one hand, and on the other hand, embody what they have been able to comprehend in life, thereby bringing order to it and introducing an orthodox vector. This vector is the existential axis (ὄρε3ις) of heroism.

All other citizens of Aristotle's phenomenal state live a quiet and measured life devoted to pleasure and bodily comforts. They belong to the lower spectrum of existence and have only an indirect relationship to truth and even orthodoxy —

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[1]   λόγον δ□ μόνον ανθρωπος ὕχει των 3□ων. *Aristotle.* Nicomachean Ethics; *Ibid.* Politics. P. 379.

[2] ὸ ανθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν 3¼ον. *Aristotle.* Politics. P. 378.

through the ordering of the world of things and feelings. They also participate in politics, but in its most pragmatic and practical matters related to the organisation of the physical world.

Since ordinary citizens develop the lower, sensual side of the soul, they should play a subordinate role in politics.

First a warrior, then a philosopher

With regard to the structure of the soul, Aristotle generally accepts Plato's division into three parts — rational, passionate, and lustful — and, accordingly, the metaphor of the chariot of the soul, consisting of a charioteer (reason), a white horse (passion), and a black horse (lust). Depending on which principle prevails in a person, we get a philosopher-sage, a warrior or a lustful labourer. How can we establish a hierarchy between them? Aristotle believed that the intelligent and strong would inevitably establish dominance over the "materially oriented part of the population." Aristotle asks himself: how are the specific societies of most Greek polis organised — in Lacedaemon (Sparta), Attica, Epirus, Magna Graecia, Ionia, as well as in other countries — for example, in Phoenicia or Thrace? They are organised exactly like this. And it has never been otherwise. The stupid, weak, and materially preoccupied are always under the boot of the clever and bold.

The question is how to make a strong warrior with a sword obey a philosopher without a sword, who thinks about the high, the right, and the true, but whose fury is tamed? That is, how to make a strong horse submit to a groom?

According to Aristotle, the problem of the philosophical and military principles can only be solved if we consider the following situation: when there is *something that is different* and at the same time *the same* (i.e., it simply violates the first law of its own logic). In order for us to be able to subordinate warriors to philosophers, it is necessary that they be *the same people*. The same, but different. To do this, we need to divide the life of a noble person into two parts — young and older, up to 50 and after 50. Up to 50, he is a warrior, after 50 — a philosopher. That is, in the first part of his life, a person fights for the state, and in the second, he lives as a philosopher. Thus, a person (warrior) is not subordinate to another, but to himself (philosopher), but to his older self. According to Aristotle, a noble person is a warrior-philosopher (who is first a warrior and then a philosopher).

Both types — philosopher and warrior — are considered aristocracy by Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle said that in some societies, people are born aristocrats, in others they become aristocrats, and in others they are both born and become aristocrats. The philosopher believed that if a person is born noble, he will remain noble, but if he is born a slave, he will remain a slave.

some societies, while in others they become aristocrats, and in others they are both born and become aristocrats. The philosopher believed that if a person came from a noble family and if his ancestors had fought for Greece, then he was most likely a good person and would have good offspring. According to Aristotle, people born with inferior qualities should be killed, since only those who improve society, not those who worsen it, should live.

Aristotle himself was not a citizen of Athens, that is, a metic (Greek: μέτοικος), and he even had restrictions on owning his own school, the Lyceum (Greek: Λύκειον). He was born in Stagira. He did not protest against this. The man who raised the great emperor nevertheless had certain restrictions on his citizenship by virtue of the law. Therefore, aristocracy does not always coincide with the highest administrative positions in the polis. As with Plato, Aristotle is primarily concerned with aristocracy of the soul.

The paradigm of three types of government

What types of government does Aristotle identify in his Politics? He differs somewhat from Plato in his list of types, but he does agree with him in part. Aristotle says that there are three fundamental types of government, which can be viewed positively or negatively, or as genuine or false. There is the rule of one — the rule of a king. There is the rule of a few — the rule of a certain elite. There is the rule of the majority, i.e. of many. Aristotle sees these three forms in all political systems. In Sparta, he identified all three types and therefore (like Plato) sympathised with this part of Greece and its political system, while being sceptical of Athenian democracy.

The three models outlined above form a kind of matrix, a topology of political systems that has remained unchanged to this day. Accordingly, just as Plato set the global framework for political philosophy, Aristotle's political theory also creates fundamental types of politics. Unlike Plato, these types are not based on the eternal-temporal, ideal-perverted model. Aristotle looks at the situation phenomenologically. In fact, there is either the rule of one, the rule of several, or the rule of many — and in various combinations. One can draw a triangle of Aristotelian politics, with the rule of one at the top, the rule of several in the middle, and the rule of many at the bottom.

rule by one autocracy

rule by
several

rule by many

General scheme of Aristotle's types of government

This triangle can be used to analyse any political system, both ancient and modern. It is a general law of political science or political philosophy.

A good state

Aristotle goes on to say that there is good government by one, good government by several, and good government by many, and there is bad, perverted government by one, government by several, and government by many. In other words, a duplicate of this scheme is created. Not one triangle, but two triangles.

The correct triangle would be:

Monarchy

rule by one autocracy

Aristocracy

rule by
several

Polity

rule by many

Positive types of political systems according to Aristotle

Aristotle considers these three systems of government to be correct:
  1) monarchy (μοναρχία),
  2) aristocracy (ἀριστοκρᾱτια) and
  3) polity [1] (πολιτεία).

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[1]Aristotle uses the term "πολιτεία" in a slightly different sense than Plato. For Plato, it means any politically organised community, regardless of its form of government, while for Aristotle, it refers to a specific type of government in which power is distributed among all free citizens of a city or settlement. Therefore, we use two English transcriptions for the same Greek word πολιτεία:
"politeia" in the case of Plato and his interpretation, and "politia" in the case of Aristotle to denote the positive version of what is generally understood by "democracy" or "organic democracy."

Various combinations and combinations are possible between them, which are also theoretically positive.

Monarchy: the monarch is a noble philosopher, a wise man, a person who is truly guided by the common good. The monarch is the embodiment of political good. His power must be as reasonable, selfless and exalted as possible. This is exactly how Aristotle tried to raise his son Philip of Macedon (382–336 BC), Alexander, who indeed became the greatest of the Greek rulers.

Aristocracy: the embodiment of political dignity, i.e., certain virtues associated with courage, bravery, heroism, and self-sacrifice. Aristocrats are, first and foremost, noble warriors. At the top of their value system are bravery, honour, dignity, and fearlessness in the face of death.

Polity: a community of mentally sound, responsible, benevolent people of good will. The majority are qualified to make laws and govern themselves. Aristotle usually refers to a village where everyone knows each other. Polity is the least good form of government; it is much worse than the rule of warriors, aristocrats, and, even more so, monarchy. But it is not bad either.

At the same time, Aristotle introduces a spatial principle for classifying types of political systems. Monarchy is most suited to large territorial states. Aristocracy is suited to medium-sized states, while polity is most effective on a small scale — in villages, settlements, and small towns, where people know each other and can assess the qualities of those elected more or less responsibly.

If we mix all these levels — monarchy, aristocracy, and polity — we get a positive image of a state that is not ideal, but *good*. Aristotle does not say that such a state exists. He says that it can be and should be. This is the "immovable mover" to which we aspire. It is *the natural place* of politics, towards which all processes are directed. In any state, there must be an intelligent king who cares about the common good, there must be the best warrior-aristocrats who have proven with their lives, courage and skill that they have a right to power, and there must be a responsible, kind, pious people who obey all the rules.

According to Plato, there is no doubt that the ideal state exists. According to Aristotle, such doubts exist because a good state may or may not come into being.

Look at how this political doctrine transformed the consciousness of Alexander the Great. The Macedonians came from the north,

Athens was captured, and Aristotle told his student Alexander that it was necessary to create a unified whole, with a single "immovable mover" at its centre. They should strive to create a state headed by a king who cares for the common good, surrounded by an aristocracy and a responsible population. Alexander thinks — Alexander acts. He listened to his teacher, and a few years later, the vast Greek world, which had never been united by anyone in all of history, plus territories many times larger than it, stretching as far as Northern India, the entire Middle East, and all of Iran, found itself under the rule of a single monarch. That is what a good philosopher is, and that is what a good student is. Alexander realised that he was that "good king," dealt with his rivals, selected the best, formed a guard based on them, and conquered the whole world. Aristotle's ontology of politics takes on the character of action, of an active phenomenon. For something to appear, it must be revealed. The state comes into being when we create it. This is Aristotle's philosophical praxis.
stotel.

Note how political philosophy is transformed in the transition from Plato to Aristotle, from a philosophy where contemplation completely dominates action — Aristotle introduces "*contemplative action*." When we take this teaching seriously, we get an empire in which there really is the best king, the best aristocrats and responsible citizens. It is this combination of monarchy, aristocracy and polity that became the possible, achievable ideal of classical Mediterranean civilisation.

It was this idea that later formed the basis of the Roman Empire. It was built according to the "pattern" of Alexander the Great. It is a completely Aristotelian empire, dominated by three principles: Caesar (the sacred emperor), the senate (the aristocracy) and the Roman people (the polity). Aristotle's eidetic goal, the natural place of Aristotelian politics, is possible, achievable, desirable, and the best are moving towards it.

A bad state

Just as there can be a good state, there can also be a bad one. But even a bad state, in all its forms, can be reduced to the original typology of the Political. This gives us a version of the same triangle, but with all forms of government being non-negative.

Tyranny

rule by one autocracy

Oligarchy

rule by
several

Democracy

rule by many

Negative types of political systems according to Aristotle

According to Aristotle, as well as Plato, the worst form of government is tyranny, the rule of an idiot; Carl Schmitt calls this "sovereign dictatorship" [1](when the dictator acts only in his own name as an individual). The rule of one in a positive case is the best, and the same rule of one in a negative triangle is the worst. Accordingly, if a sole ruler is guided not by the common good but by his own individual interests, he is a representative of the worst political system.

[1] *Schmitt, C.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006.

A little better than tyranny, but still a bad form of government, is oligarchy, the rule of a few. Oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy. A few of the best rule in an aristocratic system, and a few of the worst rule in an oligarchic system.

The next level, the worst form of government, is democracy. Democracy is a parody of polity. While in polity, responsible citizens make responsible decisions, in democracy, irresponsible citizens make irresponsible decisions, moving in sporadic bursts of sleepy consciousness. In other words, democracy is a parodic organisation of the majority, where the mob (ὄχλος) acts under the guise of the majority. At the same time, Aristotle excluded not only slaves but also many labourers from even such a democracy.

The philosopher considered democracy to be the terrible rule of the intellectually inferior masses. At the same time, he says that if tyranny is radically different from monarchy (like top and bottom) and oligarchy is also very different from aristocracy, then polity is less different from democracy. Nevertheless, worse than democracy is oligarchy, and worse than oligarchy is tyranny. On a par with the kingdom of Alexander the Great, one can imagine an anti-Empire ruled by a tyrant, supported by oligarchs and under the cover of an unthinking majority.

Aristotle's analysis, with all his models, is absolutely applicable to any political system of any time.

Chapter 4. Sacred politics and religion

Religion and three types of societies

All types of society can be reduced to three general groups [1]:

 1) traditional society (also known as pre-modern society);

 2) modern society (modern society);

 3) postmodern society (postmodern society). Religion is a distinctive (and main) feature of traditional society.

Therefore, in order to study all aspects of any traditional society, and above all its political structure, it is necessary to thoroughly study the religious premises on which it is based.

Any religion and, more broadly, any traditional teaching [2]places at the head of its value system an otherworldly, spiritual principle, that is, something sacred, divine, sometimes formulated into a strict theological system, sometimes represented in the form of myths, rites and rituals, sometimes existing as completely archaic beliefs (which is characteristic of the simplest types of societies).

This is the most general concept of religion, encompassing all types of traditional societies, including archaic ones. Religion can be institutionalised in the form of a church, a body of dogmas, texts, or laws. It can also have more vague contours, taking the form of mythology, rituals, or a system of beliefs in spirits, gods, heroes, the souls of the dead, etc.

It is characteristic that modern society is built on the denial of the dominant position of religion. Therefore, modernisation includes secularism, i.e. the relegation of religion to the periphery of the socio-political system; the strict separation of religion from power, politics, education, etc. Modern society is also defined by its attitude towards religion, but in this case, the attitude is negative; if religion is allowed, it is only in the form of

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy. Moscow: Eurasian Movement. 2009.

[2]There are many different definitions of religion. The difference between religion and sacred tradition will be discussed later.

marginal authority, and the choice of religion becomes a matter for each individual to decide by law. This is the fundamental difference between traditional society (pre-modern) and modern society (modern). The former is necessarily religious, and religion plays a dominant role (including politically). The latter rejects religion in this role and either relegates it to the periphery or abolishes it altogether.

Postmodern society has a more complex relationship with religion. It does not so much deny it outright as parody it, mock it and give it grotesque features. Postmodernism seeks to carry the line of modernism to its conclusion, but believes that the means of modernism itself cannot achieve this. Therefore, atheism and secularism, which predominate in modernism, are seen by postmodernists as insufficient, and they resort to irony, parody and simulacra to destroy religion.

The sacred: dark and light sides

Traditional society includes all types of societies in which God, the divine, and the spiritual are at the forefront. This type of society can be called *a sacred society*.

The sacred [1] is a very complex category. Usually, the sacred is separated from the concept of "holy," although it is formally very difficult to find an exact equivalent for the concept of "sacred" in Russian. It is both holy and sacred at the same time. At the same time, it includes something "cursed" and "demonic." In any case, the sacred inspires awe and reverence and establishes a distance between people and powers that far exceed human capabilities and understanding.

The concept of "sacred" is an essential sociological category and represents a kind of higher principle that cannot be rationally understood and precedes all types of

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[1] From Latin sacer — "sacred." The sacred is ambivalent and includes not only the "holy" and "pure," but also the "demonic." Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) also points this out: "Commenting on Virgil's words 'auri sacrafames' ('rumour sacred to the ear'), Servius rightly remarks that 'sacer' can mean both 'cursed' and 'holy'. Eustathius points to the same duality of meaning in the Greek αγιος, which can mean both "purity" and "impurity." And we find the same ambivalence of the sacred among the ancient Semites and Egyptians." *Eliade, M.* Essays in Comparative Religion. M.: Ladomir, 1999. P. 30. See also *Durkheim, E.* The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. M.: Publishing House DELO, 2018 and *Eliade, M.* The Sacred and the Profane. M.: Moscow State University Press, 1994.

[2] *Otto, R.* The Idea of the Holy: An Essay on the Meaning of the Rational in a World Filled with Myths, Theologies, and Religious Theories. New York: The Free Press, 1959.

myths, theologies, and religious theories. This concept is experienced in concrete experience—in the experience that C. G. Jung (1875–1961) called *the numinous experience*[1].

We are talking about a collision between a person and something fundamentally higher than themselves. So high that this collision gives rise to a double feeling: a feeling of delight and a feeling of horror. It is very important that the sacred is not just an experience of goodness; it is an experience that has not yet been divided into awe and horror, into a sense of one's own absolute insignificance and the greatness of what is revealed.

There is a dark side to the sacred, and there is a light side . The dark side is what terrifies a person and therefore removes their personality (in this respect, the sacred often takes the form of death). In other words, the individual ceases to exist when experiencing the sacred.

The other, light side of the sacred is that which fills a person with delight, endless joy, and bliss; here again, the individual is stripped away, but in a positive sense, and the place of the vanished person is taken by the all-consuming joy of contemplating the light.

The sacred is distinguished by the fact that the terrifying and the awe-inspiring remain *inseparable*. This is the common root of the two most powerful forms of experience. Thus, a society that places this instance at the forefront is a sacred society. It may be called "God," "spirit," "Heaven," "supernatural," but in each case we are dealing with something sacred. In some societies, leaders became sacred figures (sacralisation of power), inspiring both fear and love in the people.

The sacred ruler is the central figure of a religious society.

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[1] The concepts of "numinous," "numinous," and "numinosum" (from the Latin numen, meaning "divinity" or "will of the gods") were introduced by the German theologian Rudolf Otto (1869–1937) in his work The Sacred (Das Heilige). According to Otto, the numinous includes four main components: 1) a sense of creaturehood (Kreaturgefuhl), 2) a terrifying mystery (Mysterium tremendum), 3) awe (Fancinans), and 4) a sense of the numinous value of the sacred (Sanctum als numinoser Wert). According to Otto, the basis of all religions is one and the same and is rooted in the experience of the numinous. See *Otto, R.* The Sacred: An Essay on the Irrational in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Following him, C. G. Jung believed that "the idea of God originated from the experience of the numinous. It was a physical experience, moments of being overwhelmed, intoxicated by it. Rudolf Otto, in his psychology of religion, defined this moment as numinosity, tracing the word back to the Latin numen, meaning hint or sign." *Jarrett James L. (ed.).* Jung's seminar on Nietzsche's Zarathustra (1934–1939). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. P. 1038.

The main element of the political philosophy of a religious society (if we understand religion in a broad sense) is the sacred, and we are dealing either with a *sacred* society (in which case it is religious) or with *a profane society*, i.e. one that does not place the sacred at the forefront, but something else. Traditional society is sacred. Modern society is profane, i.e. non-sacred. Continuing to apply this criterion, we can say that postmodern society is anti-sacred, parodically sacred, or sacred in reverse. The term sacred has been widely used in sociology and politics since Durkheim. Sacred sociology was founded in the late 1930s by Roger Caillois (1913–1978) and Georges Bataille (1897–1962)[1].

Religion according to Guénon

There is a narrower understanding of the term "religion," particularly that used by Protestant theologians [2] and by the French traditionalist René Guénon (1886–1951). Guénon views religion not as the entirety of sacred society, nor as all types of sacred phenomena, but only as a part thereof. According to his terminology, only those sacred institutions that consider the sacred principle to be strictly transcendent can be called "religion" in the full sense of the word. René Guénon insists that the term "religion" should only be used within the group of monotheistic religious traditions formed by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Guénon also points out the difference between purely metaphysical thinking, corresponding to the sacred in the most general sense, and theological, i.e., religious thinking.

According to Guénon, religion differs from other sacred systems in that its highest sacred principle is called a transcendent God. This God is *the Creator* (hence the concept of "creationism"); he creates the world out of nothing, not out of himself (in creationism, there is an ontological gap between God and the world He created). God is always and absolutely, while the world is created out of nothing (the idea of creation ex *nihilo)*. It is precisely the concept of creation, creation out of nothing, that defines what is called religion in the narrow sense. From this view arises strict monotheism, that is, the dogmatic assertion that God is not only one, but also unique, and that between Him and the rest of the world (including humans) lies an insurmountable ontological abyss([4])

[1] *Denis O*. College of Sociology. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2004.

[2] *Bartsch H.-W*. (ed.) Kerygma und Mythos. Vol. 1–5. Hamburg: Resih, 1948–1955.

[3] *Guénon, R*. Essays on Tradition and Metaphysics. St. Petersburg: Azbuka-Klassika, 2010.

[4] *Dugin, A. G*. Post-Philosophy.

Creation and Manifestation.

Every term in philosophy, politics, and science in general must be explained in a certain way through a negative pair. When we talk about the sacred, we emphasise: the sacred, *not* the profane. When we talk about the ideal, we contrast it with the "normal" and the "material." When talking about sole rule, we contrast it with the rule of several or the rule of many (i.e., not one). The most important aspect of philosophy is the precise selection of a specific and positive meaning that takes the place of the initial thesis, term, or statement in the process of negation ([1].

general view of Greimas' semantic square

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
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
semantics of monarchy

Examples of Greimas' semantic square as applied to basic terms in political philosophy

[1] This is systematically studied by hermeneutics and, in particular, by A. Greimas (1917–1992), who developed a special semantic square. See: *Greimas, A.-J.* Structural Semantics. Moscow: Academic Project, 2008.

What semantic pair, what antonymic doublet is there for the concept of 'creation'? Is it the term 'manifestation',
"Manifestation." Herein lies the difference between the *broad* understanding of religion (which includes both theories based on manifestation and theories based on creation) and the *narrow* understanding (which includes only those theories of the origin of the world that are based on the principle of creation).

Semantics of the definition of religion and monotheism

Creation means God's creation from nothing (ex nihilo), not from Himself (ex Deo). And therefore, another pair of terms to the pair "creation — manifestation" is *"creatio ex nihilo — creatio Ex Deo"* ("creation from nothing — creation from God"). Creatio Ex Deo= manifestation. If God creates from Himself, then He manifests Himself in the world. There is no rigid, insurmountable ontological barrier between Him and the world, no strict transcendence.

God the Creator as a Person

God the Creator is a personal God. He is, if you will, an individual who is in a "contractual" relationship with other individuals. This gives rise to the idea of the Covenant as an agreement, a contract, a legal transaction between one individual (transcendent, omnipotent, absolute, eternal, immortal and creative) and other individuals who are his antithesis; that is, people who are mortal, limited, temporary, and ambiguous.

This idea of the individualisation of the sacred is the second feature that defines a narrow understanding of religion. God in religion, in the narrow sense, is always a personal, creative, transcendent God.

Religious and secular societies

Thus, we have divided the concept of religion into a broad understanding and a narrow understanding. It is precisely the second, narrow understanding of religion that is characterised by such a phenomenon as theology.

The term "theology" itself was introduced by monotheism to describe the construction of the philosophy of religion within this basic model: when God is the Creator and when God is a personality. The narrow understanding of religious societies includes three monotheistic religions:

1) Judaism,
2) Christianity, and
3) Islam.

If we take a broader concept of religion, then, of course, all other types of societies are included, except for the profane society — that is, modern Western society or societies modelled on it.

Secular societies began to emerge in Europe in the modern era, starting in the 16th century. All other societies — non-European societies, as well as

European societies before the 16th century — were and remain, in *a broad* sense of the word.

Some societies existing today are also religious. Such are some Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iran, etc. Hindu civilisation is, of course, sacred and religious in the broad sense (but not in the narrow sense!); apart from a few branches of Vishnuism, the main body of Hindu religious beliefs corresponds to manifestationism [1] In Hinduism, God is impersonal; He creates the world from Himself (creatio ex Deo).

The Chinese civilisation (perhaps until the Soviet period) is a sacred civilisation, and the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Japan and, to some extent, Indochina were under its decisive influence. Throughout its history, Chinese civilisation has been religious in a broad sense, but not monotheistic or creationist, because the Chinese tradition is even further removed than all other traditions from the idea of an individual deity. While in Hinduism, in some forms of Krishnaism and Vishnuism, there are instances of an individual God perceived as a personality, nothing of the sort can be found in the Chinese tradition. This tradition does not even have a remote concept of a creative transcendent personality. It has the Tao, the will of Heaven, the sacred Emperor. It is a sacred civilisation in the full sense of the word, but in the narrow sense of "religion" it is very poorly grafted onto it.

If we look at the world as a whole, we see that most political systems and most societies — both in ancient times and today — live in sacred societies. This may surprise many, because we are accustomed to thinking that we live in a new era (Russians live in it only halfway), but this is only a small spot of profanity compared to the vast sea of sacredness. However, modern society is extremely intrusive and intolerant, claiming universality and universality, although in reality, even today, despite Westernisation, modernisation and globalisation, it is only a pretentious, aggressive, colonial, imperialist island of profanity in a sea of sacredness. This sea has not dried up.

Romanian intellectual Calin Georgescu, who was the UN Special Representative for the Pacific, said that until the 1950s, the Marshall Islands were an absolute

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Great India. The Civilisation of the Absolute. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. The Yellow Dragon. Civilisations of the Far East. China. Korea. Japan. Indochina. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

a paradise where everything was sacred. Then the Americans came, and in just a few decades, the paradise islands turned into a real hell. The Americans set up a naval base there, spread tents with Coca-Cola and Pepsi, and gradually the people began to degenerate.

The natural relations between the tribes began to turn into competition, and life expectancy decreased significantly. Nature was destroyed by underwater nuclear explosions, everything was contaminated with radiation, and a huge, feral, impoverished population, grouped in new pseudo-Western cities, was forced to feed on scraps.

Thus, the stain of profanity reached the sacred Marshall Islands. The history of Western European civilisation can be viewed in much the same light, which first dismantled sacredness on its own territory and then spread throughout the world like a poisonous stain, reaching territories further and further away from Europe.

Therefore, when we want to gain a clearer understanding of what a sacred society is and what a profane society is, and, accordingly, what sacred (religious) politics and profane politics are, we must take into account that, although today our education is based on *the absolutisation of the profane,* the majority of humanity *still* lives in a sacred world. When we talk about sacred political philosophy, we are not talking exclusively about something that once was — today it is almost the entire Islamic world (!), and if we look at other regions, then, apart from Europe and North America, sacred principles clearly prevail there. It is believed that modern humanity has been living in a modern society for several centuries. This is true only for Western Europe and North America. Outside these regions, elements of traditional society remain extremely stable and sometimes even openly dominant.

This is a paradoxical moment: modern humanity is more sacred than profane, although the official (quite totalitarian) ideology of self-understanding of all our cultures and civilisations is precisely profanity.

This topic immediately brings to mind the idea that somewhere there is a pole of "pure profanity"; this is modern Europe and the United States. For 500 years, the West has been living under profane philosophy and profane politics. Over the course of these 500 years, religion has gradually been replaced by

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Theory of a Multipolar World. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

further and further away — from the centre of society to the periphery, transforming from a public (and political) institution into a private one.

The experience of the death of the individual

The collective dimension of religion is decisive for a sacred society, which places emphasis not on the individual but on that which *transcends* the individual. When we experience the sacred, we experience the death of the individual. When we experience the sacred, we experience something greater than ourselves. So much greater, brighter, more global that we dissolve before it and rejoice in this dissolution. Or we are terrified. Or we experience both at the same time.

Therefore, we can say that at the heart of *the sacred philosophy* of politics lies the experience of death, the experience of the "terrible" beginning, which is at the same time the beginning of "good." And if we try to separate the good beginning from the terrible, for example, the delight from the horror, we will simply destroy the sacred, since its property is to have both sides *at the same time*.

The sacred cannot be *only* holy. The sacred is necessarily also monstrous, that is, it frightens, destroys, suppresses, and causes trembling. And if the sacred does not make us tremble, then it is not sacred, but merely a substitute, a simulacrum. The genuine sacred is distinguished by the fact that it precedes the division into the good and the terrifying.

Secularism

Profane civilisation banishes the concept of the sacred and constructs a completely different profane politics. In this case, religion moves from being a central institution of society to a peripheral one, from a universally binding model to a matter of private choice.

Accordingly, religion ceases to be religion, and even if it survives, it survives in these profane societies in a new guise. Is there religion in the modern West? Of course there is. But it is a profane society because religion is neither at the centre of social life, nor does it have a public dimension, nor is it a political institution. It exists, but from a socio-political point of view, it does not exist. It does not exist as the axis and core of the political. And before the beginning of the modern era, it was precisely that — a kind of "measure of things."

This is the idea behind secularism and secularisation: the separation of church and state, the separation of religion and society. In a sacred (religious) society, this is impossible. Politics is subject to religious principles and has its roots in religion. In a profane society, politics is seen as something independent, also stemming from philosophy, but from profane philosophy. Thus, we can say that there is a religious philosophy of politics, characteristic of sacred societies, and a profane philosophy of politics, characteristic of profane societies, i.e. those that have proclaimed the principle of secularism and made religion not political or social, but personal and private.

When religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it ceases to be a religion

When religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it ceases to be religion

The fact is that if religion becomes a private matter for individuals, it *ceases to be religion.* When the Church or another institution moves from the sacred world to the profane world, *the nature of religion changes*. Religion presupposes a comprehensive understanding of the world. The religious world cannot be the product of the "self-development of matter" or the "evolution of monkeys." The world with which the religious worldview deals is either an expression of the deity or a product of God's creation. In both cases, this world unconditionally possesses the principle of holism, of wholeness. The whole precedes the parts; it is not composed of parts, nor is it the result of their "evolution." God, thought, spirit, and subject are primordial.

Holism is opposed to the concept of individualism [1]. Thus, we have two approaches to understanding (any) thing. Aristotle gave us a holistic understanding of things: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. An individualistic understanding implies that the whole is an arbitrary combination of parts (i.e., the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, and if we regroup these parts, we create a different whole). From the point of view of holism, the whole possesses a quality that surpasses the qualities of all its constituent parts, determines them and precedes them. From the point of view of individualism, the whole is completely equal to its parts. The founder of sociology, Émile Durkheim understood society in an Aristotelian way, believing that

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[1]*Dumont, L*. Homo Hierarchicus: An Attempt at a Description of the Caste System. St. Petersburg: Eurasia, 2001; Ibid. Essay on Individualism. Dubna: Phoenix, 1997.

[2]   *Durkheim, E.* Sociology: Its Subject, Method, and Purpose. Moscow: Canon, 1995.

that society is primary in relation to the individual. This is a holistic approach.

As for the *religious* philosophy of politics, in a broad sense we can consider it as a combination of political Platonism and political Aristotelianism. All types of religious philosophy fit completely into Platonism and Aristotelianism. In fact, Islamic political philosophy, Christian political philosophy, Jewish political philosophy, and the political philosophy of India and China can all be explained in one way or another using Plato's understanding of the world and the state (polis), and — provided that something does not fit into the framework of this political Platonism — the principle of political Aristotelianism can be applied.

Both Plato's political philosophy and Aristotle's political philosophy are *religious*. These types of political philosophy are sacred and correspond to traditional society (one with a highly differentiated structure).

One more general remark should be made. Many archaic societies are generally not as symmetrical and vertical as the pictures painted by Plato and Aristotle. We have already mentioned that both Plato and Aristotle distinguish three castes, three classes:

- priests/philosophers
- warriors
- producers

This scheme corresponds to developed traditional societies, where we see a high degree of social differentiation. In hunter-gatherer societies or in the simplest agrarian collectives, we do not find such a strict triadic model.

PART 2.
MONOTHEISTIC RELIGIONS AND TYPES
OF POLITICAL THEOLOGIES

Chapter 1. The Political Philosophy of Judaism

Judaism and politics. Israel as an idea

The political philosophy of Judaism is based on the religious principle of a covenant between a single personal God (the Creator) and the "chosen people" (the Jews). This is called the Old Covenant[1]. The Jews made a pact with God the Creator to serve Him and no other gods.

From the whole collection of sacred symbols, the Jews chose one figure. Here, religion coincides with the people, and belonging to the people is determined by the fact of religion. Anyone who believes in the one God of the Old Testament, anyone who inherits the covenant with him, is a Jew.

Since the Jewish people lived for a long time in opposition to other peoples, they developed a distrustful attitude towards peoples who also claimed to believe in gods and in the sacredness of their political system, but did so differently from the Jews. Thus, a gradual convergence between the ethnic and the religious took place.

It is interesting that, from the point of view of Jewish political philosophy, the optimal political system is a state of paradise (before the Fall). In this "political" system, there are no rulers, no labour, only Adam, faithful to God. This paradise on earth is the starting point of history and a spiritual model. Paradise in Judaism fulfils the same role as the ideal state (Kallipolis) in Plato's philosophy.

It is important to note that the word "paradise" (Hebrew:פרדס , pardes) comes from the ancient Iranian root parādaiĵah-, from which the Avestan pairi-daêza- was derived, meaning "park surrounded by walls" [2]. At the same time, the most ancient meaning of this term was associated precisely with walls (Old Persian daêza), but it was precisely the presence of walls that was the main feature in ancient times.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al. Moscow: Academic Project, 2017.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

sign of the city, πόλις[1] . Paradise (paradise) is a paradigm of the structure of life in the Jewish tradition.

The entire history is conceived as the expulsion of the forefathers from paradise, that is, the departure from the ideal city, wanderings and trials, and the restoration of paradise in the last days. Thus, in a political and philosophical sense, history itself is interpreted by Jews as a path from paradise (which lay at the beginning of history) to the final messianic times, when the Messiah will come that is back to paradise.

At the heart of Judaism is a covenant with the Creator

Accordingly, the various historical stages between the Fall/expulsion of the first parents from paradise and the restoration of the original fullness of the paradise world constitute the cycle of sacred history.

The Jewish people and the Jewish religion are directly linked to this sacred history. A Jew is someone who lives in this history and is part of it. A Jew is a subject of history. All other peoples are demons, manifestations of the powers of "the other side" (Hebrew: "סטרא אחרא " —
"sitra achra"). This gives rise to the idea that since the Jewish people are the subject of history, then in fact, from beginning to end, all of history is conceived and measured in terms of the stages of the Jewish people's existence. This gives rise to radical religious ethnocentrism.

Thus, at the heart of Jewish political philosophy lies the covenant between the Jews and the Creator of the world, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In essence, the entire history of Judaism is a problem of loyalty and betrayal towards one's God.

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[1]The fact that such a fundamental term in Judaism as "paradise" is an Iranian borrowing is highly significant. After their return from Babylonian captivity, the Jews incorporated many elements of Iranian religion into their religious, political and cultural traditions. See *Dugin*, *A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Moon Monotheism and the Gestalt of Baal.

[2] Mashiach, or Messiah, comes from the Hebrew word "מָשִׁיחַ," meaning "anointed one." See: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Moon Monotheism and the Gestalt of Baal.

[3]This religious-political philosophy of history is associated with the coming of the King-Savior at the end of time, and the term "anointed" refers specifically to the King.
"anointed to the kingdom" also almost certainly has Iranian origins, since the Iranian tradition was originally built on a close connection between the structure of history, the fate of the kingdom, and the expectation of the coming King-Restorer (Saoshyant in the Mazdean tradition). At the same time, all these themes are absent in early Judaism and appear only in the later, post-Babylonian edition. See *Dugin*, *A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.

At different stages, the political organisation of the Jews relates differently to this vertical structure. Having received the Old Testament, the Jews begin to carry it. The most important idea became the organisation of society around the vertical axis of the Covenant: around religious leaders, judges, prophets, around the sacred Ark of the Covenant, where the tablets of the Covenant that Moses received on Mount Sinai are kept. Accordingly, Jewish society, politics and history are built around this *sacred* model, which is why Jews often refer to themselves as a "priestly nation."

Judaism and Platonism

If we now return to Plato's model of the cave and ask who is the legitimate ruler in the Jewish understanding, we will answer that it is the same Platonic philosopher who rises from the cave (anodos) and descends again (katodos). The entire Jewish people as a whole think of themselves as priests among other nations. Other nations are either warriors or craftsmen, while the priestly nation is the nation of the book, the nation of thought, the nation that makes service to the supreme deity its fundamental task (hence the large number of synagogues and people studying the Torah).

This approach shapes the perception of the place of Jews among other peoples. This is the royal-philosophical place that was occupied by the Jews during the period when the Promised Land was destined for the future kingdom, followed by the Egyptian captivity, and then, with Moses, the Jews were able to return to the Promised Land to once again become rulers, restoring their royal dignity.

The Promised Land was given by God to the 12 tribes of Israel, and they returned to their land to become kings of the Canaanite peoples living around them. A Canaanite centre emerged, where the Jews controlled what was then a vast territory of Israel. At first, the organisation of the Jewish people, linked to the division of the territory into 12 tribes, was uncertain: after the messianic leaders Moses, who led the Jews out of Egypt, and Joshua, who reconquered the territory of Israel after the end of the wanderings in the Arabian desert, a period of judges began. All Jewish leaders were priests and sages who determined how to fairly organise the political and social model of ancient Israel based on the Covenant.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

However, during the conquest of Canaan, it was military leaders such as Joshua, who achieved a religious goal by military means, who distinguished themselves. The Israelites often fought with neighbouring peoples, but in their eyes, this war was *sacred*. Establishing Jewish rule over the "promised land" was a religious mission, a kind of restoration of the conditions of a lost paradise. From this, it is easy to understand the place of the territory of Palestine in the political philosophy of Judaism (both in ancient times and today).

Property, livestock, slaves, and everything else that the Jews seized from the defeated peoples as a result of war was called by a special term, "cherem" (Hebrew:חרם). This is a very interesting term, which is worth considering in the sociology of religion by Émile Durkheim.

Why is the spoil captured by the Jews from other nations called "cherem"? On the one hand, "cherem" can be offered as a sacrifice to God, and on the other hand, it is something that the Jews themselves, being pure, cannot eat or take for themselves. Herem must either be sacrificed to God or destroyed, because other peoples are "tainted by demons" and polytheism, and what is taken from them is "herem." The term "herem" corresponds exactly to the concept of "sacred." It is both too high (i.e., belonging to God) and too terrifying, capable of causing irreparable harm to people. Here we see the duality of the very principle of the sacred, the meaning of which is that the sacred transcends the human level — both upward, toward God, and downward, toward the "demonic."

We see that in the Jewish religion and the sacred history of the Bible, there is a clear and coherent political philosophy that fits perfectly into the concept of political Platonism, but instead of a philosopher-king, there is a chosen people, the "king of all nations." God says to the Jews: "You shall rule over all nations" [1].And not because they are kings, and not even because they want to be. They will rule over other nations because they have ascended (ανοδος) to God, and God sends them to rule, sends them as a sacrifice (κάθοδος) so that they may save their people and, through them, the whole world. From the point of view of Platonic topics, one can understand both the religious structure of Judaism and its political philosophy. The anodos of the Jews is the Revelation received by Noah, Avraham, Jacob, Moses, and other leaders of the Jews, which became the axis of the Covenant or the Law.

[1] "And thou shalt rule over many nations, and they shall not rule over thee." Deuteronomy 28:12.

It is telling that the Bible refers to the Torah (Hebrew:תּוֹרָה), which literally means "law," as the socio-political and legal code governing the life of society. Once again, we clearly see the profound unity and common roots of religion, philosophy, and politics.

The philosopher Samuel and King Saul

During the reign of Saul, the idea of a Jewish kingdom emerged. It is very interesting how the Bible describes its formation: the Jewish people felt that they could not cope with an organisation based on the authority of the institution of judges that had developed after Joshua, and asked the prophet Samuel to appoint a king over them.

The prophet Samuel is very upset by this request, because God is the king of Israel, and if the people ask for a king to rule over them, as other nations have, it means that they want less and worse for themselves. The prophet Samuel tests the Jewish people, pointing out that if he appoints a king over them, they will have to obey God *indirectly* rather than directly. Samuel promises to anoint Saul as king, while warning the Jews that they will lose the best king (God) — by losing a *sacred* king, they will get a king who is only *partly* sacred.

By decision of the Jewish people, the prophet Samuel nevertheless anoints Saul as king. Thus, a new political system is established — a kingdom that receives blessing and ritual anointing from a priestly authority (the prophet). The king of Israel becomes the "firstborn of Israel." Here we see again the figure of the philosopher-king, but now it is divided: there is
"philosopher" Samuel and "king" Saul. And Saul, king of Israel, is not just a warrior, not just the best and strongest. He becomes a sacred figure who belongs to the first caste, not the second. Below him is the Israeli nobility, and below the nobility (as in any system) are the labourers.

The Babylonian Captivity

During the era of the Kingdoms, the structure of the chosen people's relationship with God changes, but the general model of politics remains the same:

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[1] "And the Lord said to Samuel, 'Listen to the voice of the people in all that they say to you, for it is not you they have rejected, but Me, that I should not reign over them.'" 1 Book of Kings. Chapter 8: 7.

We are dealing with classical political philosophy of a sacred nature, but instead of the general figure of the philosopher-king (as in Plato), here patriarchs (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob), messianic leaders (such as Moses and Joshua), then judges, and then kings (Saul, David, Solomon, etc.).

The Age of Kingdoms is also based on sacred philosophy: the king is a sacred figure. However, the warning of the prophet Samuel gradually begins to come true, and kings in the specific circumstances of their reign begin to deviate from high ideals.

This deviation began with Saul, and even the prophet David had serious transgressions (taking Bathsheba as his wife and effectively murdering her husband, Uriah the Hittite). Under King Solomon, through his numerous wives taken from other nations, foreign motives, cults, and practices penetrated the religion itself.

The kingdom begins to decline in a certain way until its complete destruction, collapse, division into Israel (north) and Judah (south), under the rule of separate dynasties, and finally the invasion of the Babylonians, the capture of Jerusalem, the destruction of the Temple, and the Babylonian captivity. In the future, the Kingdom of Israel no longer reaches its own highest horizon. It is punished by God for deviating from his ideal model, for the Jews' departure from their destiny. Real politics deviated critically from normative political philosophy, from Heavenly Israel, from the idea of Israel, from Israel as an idea, from the eternal paradigm of "pardes."

Israel and Aristotle

The meaning of Israel, when it acts in history, can be reduced to Aristotelian politics. Recall what Aristotle's "unmoved mover" or his immanent God is.

The function of the "immovable engine" in Jewish political philosophy during the era of the Kingdoms is performed by the axis of the world — Jerusalem or the Temple built by the third king, Solomon[1]. Everything related to Jewish history thereafter is a desire to preserve and protect the Temple, and after its destruction, to restore it

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[1] But Jerusalem is already the fourth historical manifestation of the "immovable engine." The original, first and eternal is "paradise," the "garden enclosed by camps," the Callipolis of Judaism. Then its role is transferred to the Promised Land, located in the centre of Canaan. And finally, under David, the ancient city of Jebus (named after the Jebusites), also known as Jerusalem, becomes the final historical-mystical form.

The Temple (which was built during the construction of the Second Temple by Zerubbabel) and finally, in our time (considered in Judaism to be the Messianic, "Last" era), to build the Third Temple[1].

If the Platonic model represents an ideal and eternal Israel that is always close to God, then the Aristotelian model represents a phenomenal Israel. Such a phenomenal Israel may in some situations stray from God, but it can (and must) return to Him through its own *efforts*. This is the Aristotelian effort. It is not simply the contemplation of a pure image of political philosophy, but a volitional, active, practical striving connected with the political metaphysics of the Temple. Hence the idea of returning to Jerusalem and rebuilding the Temple. Thus, within the spectrum of political Aristotelianism, Jewish political philosophy is linked to the restoration of the Temple, the defence of Jerusalem and the re-establishment of the state of Israel.

In a political sense, the dispersion that began with the reign of Titus Flavius Vespasian (9–79), from 70 CE, was God's final punishment of the Jews for their unfaithfulness to Him and their departure from His divine commandments. And the Jews were sent into galut (Hebrew:גָּלוּת — "exile") in order to purify themselves. During this period, their politics are directed towards the past and the future; they have no political philosophy in the present. For 2,000 years, the Jews have lived under the influence of other (gentile) political systems, which are a punishment for them. Therefore, the political philosophies, states and societies in which Jews have been present for 2,000 years are, in essence, anti-Jewish and were given to the Jews so that they would feel how bad it is to abandon God. This is a kind of historical propaedeutics.

The peak of suffering was the mass extermination of Jews — the Holocaust (Greek: ὀλοκαύστος — "burnt offering," "sacrifice by fire") or Shoah (Hebrew:שׁוֹאָה "disaster," "catastrophe"). This purifying suffering prepares the next — and final — stage in Jewish history: the return to the Promised Land, the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the construction of the Third Temple on the Temple Mount, and finally, the coming of the King of the Jews, the Messiah. This will be the restoration of the "immovable mover" as the axis of the world and the foundation of the "good kingdom," which in turn will restore the direct connection with the transcendent and will be a return to paradise (the ideal state).

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

Israel as Political Praxis. Zionism. King Messiah

How does Jewish political philosophy dictate that Israel should act in the era of galuta? The main thing is to strive to return to the Promised Land, that is, to restore the past (but in essence, the eternal) in the future. Hence the messianic-political idea of returning to Palestine by any means necessary, rebuilding the state of Israel, recreating it in the same place where it once stood. This is a genuine desire to return to what Aristotle calls the "natural place." And the "natural place" of the Jews, from a religious point of view, is the Temple of Jerusalem. This aspiration formed the basis of the politics of the galuta during that period.

However, how and when the Jews should return to Palestine from the Diaspora was a matter of fierce debate within the Jewish diaspora. At the same time, the Talmud strictly forbade this return from taking place *before the time was right* — that is, before the coming of the Messiah.

The first wave of Zionism, i.e. the return to Zion, where Jerusalem is located, to its "natural place," occurred in Jewish history with the appearance in the 17th century of the "pseudo-Messiah" Sabbatai Zevi[1] (1626–1676). Sabbatai Zevi announced to his followers that the end of time had come, that he himself was the Messiah, and that they should follow him to the Promised Land. This marked the beginning of the first active emigration of Jews to Palestine. From the point of view of Jewish historical philosophy, the end of the world will come with the arrival of the Messiah. Note: for Jews the Messiah is a *king* a good and righteous king who will restore the completeness of Jewish political philosophy in both its Platonic and Aristotelian forms.

In a platonic sense, this eschatological Israel becomes the ideal Israel, and from the point of view of volitional intention, it is embodied in the Messiah King (it is very important that for Jews, the Messiah is not God, but a king, a messenger of God, and this is their fundamental difference from Christians). This king, by his will — in the Aristotelian sense — returns his people to the Promised Land; and here the action of the phenomenal world, subject to time, resonates with the structures of the unchanging eternal world; the immanent pole, which is Jerusalem, is closed

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal

[2]   On the Iranian roots of this idea, see: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomachia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation; *Ibid.* Noomachia. Semites. The Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Baal.

Temple, and the transcendent principle. This is the end of history, and this is the political project of modern Jewry.

The dispute over time and methods

The process of the Jews implementing their historical political programme, which spans thousands of years, is not taking place in a vacuum. It is unfolding against the backdrop of the collapse of traditional Western civilisations, de-Christianisation and the establishment of the secular political paradigm of the modern era, where religious factors are not taken into account at all. Modernisation also affects Zionism, which in the 19th century takes on the form of nationalism copied from the European bourgeois type (but within the Zionist movement, of course, it is enlivened by religious political philosophy).

Israel, as it exists today and was created in 1947, is a sign of the beginning of the messianic era. Jews are already living in the messianic era. Jews are returning to Israel, the Promised Land, from their galuta only in the messianic era (and not on the eve of it).

Thus, this horizontal phenomenal philosophy of politics is closing in on the vertical philosophy of politics. And this is happening now. This explains the intensity of the confrontation with Muslims in Jerusalem. Muslims are contesting the territory where the Temple stood, and the Temple, as we have already said, is the "immovable engine" of Jewish politics, its historical, political and religious goal.

Most Jews, both those who have returned to Israel and those who remain outside it, accept the general model of Zionism in one form or another, whether in its religious, secular, or mixed form. Only a small number of religious Jews, particularly those from the Neturei Karta movement, reject Zionism as contrary to the traditions of the Talmud and the entire logic of the Jewish religion. For them, the creation of Israel before the coming of the Messiah, based on force, nationalism and political intrigue, is a parody and sacrilege, something similar to the actions of the pseudo-Messiah Sabbatai Zevi. Although the "Neturei Karta" proceed from a strictly identical political philosophy to that of the Zionists, they radically disagree with them on the methods and timing of the return to Palestine. Returning from the Diaspora before the arrival of the Messiah is equivalent in their eyes to "political and religious Satanism," since in this case people attribute to themselves the attributes of God and God's messenger.

The political philosophy of Judaism, embedded in sacred history, in the Old Testament religion, in Judaism as a whole

the Jewish people as the subject of history

Pardes the Promised Egyptian
Paradise Land captivity

Adam Noah Abraham
patriarchs

Moses
Joshua

judges

Saul
David
Solomon

Kingdom

Division into Israel and Judah

Destruction of the First Temple

Prophets

Nebuchadnezzar

Babylonian captivity

Babylonian Empire

Construction of the Second Temple

Zorobabel

Ezra

Persian Empire

destruction of the Second Temple

Vespasian

Greek Empire

Galut Dispersion

Roman Empire

Sabbatai Zevi

Zionism

Shoah
creation of the State of Israel

Modern

The Kingdom of Israel The arrival Messiah

Third Temple

The structure of the historical process in the context of Judaism

religious and legal concepts is not merely a shadow of some distant past. The texts of the Torah are still read today, prayers are continuously offered, commentaries and the Talmud are diligently studied — and this is one continuous process of Jewish political philosophy, which at the present stage, the final one for the Jews, puts the final seal on the Covenant made by the Jews with their God in ancient times.

The philosophy of politics as applied to religion is extremely relevant. And this is not a thing of the past — it is happening today and allows us to adequately interpret news stories concerning, for example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or American-Israeli relations. Thus, the political philosophy of religion is an active factor in contemporary politics, explaining the past and determining the future.

Chapter 2. The Political Philosophy of Christianity

Christianity and Rome. The restraining force (katechon)

Christian political philosophy is made up of several factors. First, there's the special theological model of Christianity. Christianity is a specific religion that partly comes from Judaism and therefore accepts its basic ideas about monotheism and creationism. At the same time, the idea of the incarnation of God, unimaginable for Judaism and contrary to all logic of Jewish religious theology, is at the centre of the Christian religion. Christianity is thus both a continuation of Judaism and, at the same time, its theological overcoming or refutation. In this sense, Christianity finds itself in a complex position in relation to Judaism. The fact that Christian theology is completely unique in the context of other versions of monotheism (Judaism and Islam) also affects *Christian political philosophy*.

In addition to a special theology based on the New Testament and the basic Christian idea of the incarnation of God in man, there is another very important circumstance — the continuity of Christianity in the Roman Empire[1].

The philosophy of the Roman Empire tends to combine all three types of positive models of Aristotelianism. The Roman Empire is more similar to Aristotle's philosophy of politics than to Plato's; and to a large extent, the Roman Empire saw itself as a repetition (in Latium, in Italy) of the state-building feat of Alexander the Great, who was a student of Aristotle. This empire strives to embody the three best aspects of Aristotle's understanding of politics and proposes to establish *a positive monarchy (*hence: the emperor as a sacred figure, in fact a living deity). The empire

[1] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Latin Logos. Sun and Cross. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

The ruler was also called "pontifex" (Latin for "bridge builder") — a bridge between the world of humans and the world of gods, between Earth and Heaven, between life and death. Therefore, the sacred king, the emperor, is at the centre of this sacred monarchy of the Roman Empire.

Монархия   **Римский Император**
правление одного   Понтифекс
    единовластие
                         живое божество

Аристократия   **Сенат**

  правление   Римские патриции
  нескольких

              римский народ
Полития   populus Romanus
 правление
  многих

*The Political Structure of the Roman Empire and
Aristotle's "Good State"*

The next level of power is *the aristocracy*: the Roman Senate, the Roman patricians, the high-ranking noble citizens of Rome, who represent the second layer of Aristotle's model.

And finally, *the* Roman *polity*, that is, the people of Rome, who also act as a political institution in significant cases.

The Roman people support or overthrow the emperor; they side with the aristocratic patrician families or, conversely, enter into conflict with them, and in the Roman Empire they sometimes even organise systems of self-government based on a *qualified* majority (as opposed to democracy).

Thus, in the Roman Empire, we see a combination of all three types of Aristotle's political model:

1) the sacred Emperor (Pontifex), who corresponds to the monarch;

2) aristocracy in the form of the Senate;

3) Roman citizens, Populus Romanus Quiritium — members and foundation of Roman politics.

Note how Aristotle distributed these forms of government among themselves:

1) A large territory tends towards monarchy,

2) the middle part to aristocracy,

3) and the small one to polity.

Accordingly, since the Roman Empire was huge, it was headed by monarchs or emperors. At a more limited level of the Roman Empire, power belonged to the aristocracy, and finally, in small settlements, towns or villages, polity prevailed.

When Christianity became established in the Roman Empire, a very important theoretical identification of the figure of the emperor with the image from the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Thessalonians occurred. This passage defines the essence of Christian political philosophy.

In the prophecy of the Apostle Paul, it is said that the son of perdition, that is, the Antichrist, will not come into the world "until he who restrains now is taken out of the midst" [2]. This mysterious phrase has been interpreted in different ways. The classical Orthodox (and to a large extent

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[1] The Apostle Paul, who lived in the era of the first apostles, initially acted as a persecutor of Christ, but was later converted and became the most prominent preacher of Christianity.

[2] "Let no one deceive you in any way, *for that day will not come* until the apostasy comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of destruction, who opposes and exalts himself above every so-called god and every object of worship, so that he sits in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God. Do you not remember that when I was still with you, I told you this? And now you know what he is doing, that the time for him to be revealed has *not yet* come. For the mystery is already at work; *only* he who now restrains it will do so until he is taken out of the way." Second Epistle of Saint Paul to the Thessalonians. Chapter 2:3–7.

The medieval interpretation (both Catholic and Orthodox) identified the image of the "restrainer" with the Emperor[1].

In the Apostle Paul's prophecy about the "last days," it is said that the "son of perdition," that is, the Antichrist, will not come into the world "until he who restrains him is taken out of the way," which in Greek is "katechon" (ὸ katechōv — "he who restrains"). The word "katechon," usually translated into Russian as "holding back," literally means "the one who has under himself" (Greek: kat — "under" and ὕcho — "to have"), that is, "the one who rules," "the one who possesses."

In the Greek text of the Gospel, the passage from the Epistle of St. Paul — "and now you know *that* it is not permitted for him to be revealed at his time" — includes an important concept that is omitted in the Synodal translation: "And now the holding back, that it may be revealed at his own time" [2]— "that which restrains," in the neuter gender — in Greek τὸ κατέχω. This "restraining" is that which restrains "the restrained." It is precisely this "holding" that St. John Chrysostom (c. 347–407), the undisputed bearer of Christian orthodoxy, identifies as "the Roman state." Let us quote this passage in its entirety because of its fundamental importance for the very foundations of Christian political philosophy:

> It is fair for anyone to ask, first, what is *this restraining force* (τό κατέχον), and then to want to know why Paul speaks so unclearly about it. What is this *"restraining force"* that *appears to him*, that is, "the hindrance"? Some say that it is the grace of the Holy Spirit, while others say that it is the Roman state; I agree more with the latter. Why? Because if the apostle had wanted to speak about the Spirit, he would not have expressed himself unclearly, but would have said clearly that what was now preventing him from appearing was the grace of the Holy Spirit, i.e., extraordinary gifts. Besides, it would have been appropriate for him to come already, if he was to come when the (extraordinary) gifts were depleted, because they had long since been depleted. But since (the apostle) says this about the Roman state, it is understandable why he only hints at it and speaks covertly for the time being. He did not want to incur excessive enmity and useless danger. Indeed, if he had said that the Roman state would soon be destroyed, then immediately he would have been

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Byzantine Logos. Hellenism and Empire. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

[2] In the original Greek: kàì vu˜v tò kàtechov oidate eis tò apokaluthèvtai autòv thv tò dautou kaipò.

as a rebel, would wipe them off the face of the earth, and (along with them) all believers, both living and striving for this.

That is why he did not use such an expression; nor did he say that it would soon follow, although (implicitly) he always says so. (...) He says the same thing here: *"hold fast (*ὸ katechō) *now until the middle of time*." That is, when the Roman state ceases to exist, then he (the Antichrist) will come. And rightly so, because as long as people fear this state, no one will quickly submit (to the Antichrist); but after it is destroyed, lawlessness will reign, and he will seek to seize all power, both human and divine. Just as the kingdoms were destroyed before, namely: the Median by the Babylonians, the Babylonian by the Persians, the Persian by the Macedonians, and the Macedonian by the Romans, so this last one will be destroyed by the Antichrist, and he himself will be defeated by Christ and will no longer reign. All this is conveyed to us with great clarity by Daniel. *"And then,"* he says, "*the lawless one will appear*." What then? Immediately after this comes consolation: (the apostle) adds: "*whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the spirit of His mouth, and bring into nothing the appearance of His coming: whose coming is to the working of Satan*." Just as fire, when it approaches, even before its arrival, paralyses and destroys small animals that are even far away, so Christ, with a single command and His coming, will kill the Antichrist. It is enough for Him to appear, and all will perish. As soon as He appears (the Lord), He will put an end to deception ([3])...

Christianity emerged on the eve of the anticipated arrival of the Antichrist, and this determined Christian philosophy and history. The Christian religion asserts that Christ will come at the "end of time" to save the world, followed by an era of "apostasy" (apostasy — Greek ἀποστασία) and, finally, the Antichrist will appear. Unlike Judaism, Christ is not the King of Israel, but the King of all existence, and "his kingdom is not of this world." Consequently, the understanding of political history is also different from Judaism: it is not limited to the Jewish people (as the subject of history), but extends to all of humanity. However, it is the Church of Christ that becomes the true subject. It was founded by Christ and the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy Spirit, after the Resurrection and Ascension of Christ.

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[3]   *St. John Chrysostom*. Works of Our Holy Father John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople. Vol. 11. Book 1. St. Petersburg: Publication of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, 1905. pp. 597–598.

And since Christ is God for Christians, the Old Testament history ends and a new history begins — the New Testament. This is the history of the Church. In this history, in turn, semantic poles arise — the exemplary time becomes not so much

"Paradise" refers to the time Jesus Christ spent on earth among people, and the opposite pole is the coming of the Antichrist. Therefore, Christianity thinks politically differently, introducing a "transcendent" dimension—the Kingdom of Heaven, which is expressed in the Church.

Christian teaching is eschatology, the doctrine of the "end of the world" (from the Greek ꙓσχατον — "end," "limit"). Christ comes in the last days before the coming of the Antichrist, and the Christian worldview can be called the worldview of people awaiting the end of the world. This end of the world has the following scenario: first comes the Antichrist (Αντίχριστος), which can mean both the one who *is against* Christ and the one who comes *before* Him. Then the Second Coming of Christ takes place and the Antichrist is defeated by the heavenly army.

The First Coming is Christ suffering and crucified. The Second Coming is "Christ in power" ([1].The second time, Christ comes not as a man, but as God, and puts an end to the reign of the Antichrist. The reign of the Antichrist thus takes place between the First Coming and the Second.

The philosophy of Christian history asserts: Christ came, saved the world, was crucified, and on his blood and flesh the Church was formed as a new subject of history (this New Testament Church moves through history, carrying out its mission of universal salvation), in the further future — the coming of the Antichrist, apostasy, and, finally, the Second Coming, which will end the era of apostasy. It is in this eschatological context that Christian political philosophy is situated. Accordingly, when we say that

"until the one who restrains him is taken out of the way," the son of perdition (the Antichrist) will not appear, the holy apostle Paul indicates that after the worldwide spread of Christianity and its victory, there will be a certain historical period during which the coming of the Antichrist will *not yet* take place. That is, there is the following Christian structure of historical logic.

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[1]   The central icon in the traditional Russian iconostasis is also called this. "Christ in Power" is an image that expresses the appearance of Christ the Saviour at the end of time in glory and power. Christ will descend to earth in the name of fulfilling God's Providence, uniting heaven and earth under Christ's head.

God the Father

God the Trinity

Father   Son   Holy Spirit

Kingdom of Heaven

Jewish people

Christian Church

Second Coming of Christ

Adam

John

The coming of Christ

For some time,

The Coming

Para dise

The Baptist

until the Antichrist comes

Antichrist apostasy

Kingdom

Christian Empire

Old Testament
era of the law

New Covenant
era of grace

The structure of the Christian understanding of history

After the era of Christ, there will be a unique period when the Antichrist will not yet exist — in the Apocalypse, this is described as a time when the dragon, the ancient serpent, will be bound for a thousand years.

> And I saw an angel coming down from heaven, having the key to the bottomless pit and a great chain in his hand.
> He seized the dragon, that ancient serpent, who is the devil and Satan, and bound him for a thousand years.
> and cast him into the abyss, and shut him up, and set a seal upon him, so that he should deceive the nations no more, until the thousand years were finished; after that he must be released for a little while.

And further

> When the thousand years are over, Satan will be released from his prison and will go out to deceive the nations in the four corners of the earth, Gog and Magog, and gather them together for battle. Their number is like the sand of the sea.

The serpent (Satan) is released from his prison at the very moment when "the restrainer is taken out of the midst." Such is the Christian view of history.

Christianity already contains a political component even when it does not yet speak of it does not speak of it

The first community was built in the time of Christ on the basis of communal living; it was not yet a political system, but an organisation of society completely immersed in the fact of the divine incarnation and in the understanding of the "Good News."

But already in the first generation, particularly in the writings of St. Paul the Apostle, there is a certain view of how Christianity will exist until the next period, when it is destined to spread throughout the earth. *The prophecy about the catechon is the key to the entire formula of Christian history and political philosophy.* The restrainer mentioned in the epistle of St. Paul was interpreted by Orthodox teachers, including St. John Chrysostom, as the Roman Emperor.

[1] Revelation of St. John the Theologian. Ch. 20: 1–3.

[2] Revelation of Saint John the Theologian. Chapter 20: 7.

Thus, long before Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, there was already a prophetic understanding of the coming ecclesiasticalisation of the Empire and the religious mission of its ruler, the Emperor. Already in the first apostolic period, which was an era of persecution and oppression (including from the Empire), early Christians believed that after some time Christianity (as a community with no political dimension) would change its catacomb nature and become a creed with *a political dimension.*

Thus, we see that Christianity already contained a political component from the very beginning, even when it did not explicitly state this and appeared to be completely separate from politics. In the concept of "holding back," we are dealing with an image that is rare in the early Christian context and has a political dimension; it is from this point that the entire political philosophy of Christianity is born.

The Roman Empire (Aristotle's political model) is further seen as a providential vessel (the kingdom prepared by God's Providence) for receiving Christianity. Thus, the early Christians, in a remarkable way, believed that the Roman Empire was created for them and that the fact that Christ was born in this very empire was endowed with enormous prophetic significance. Thus, according to the early Christians, this empire was to fulfil a very important religious function connected with the coming of the Antichrist. As long as the Empire exists, as long as there is an Emperor (the one who holds it together), the Antichrist cannot come. Note the fundamental religious significance that the Roman state acquires in Christian political philosophy.

The doctrine of the four kingdoms and the "political Antichrist"

In Christianity, there was a doctrine of the Four Kingdoms. The first kingdom was considered to be Babylon, the second — Persia, the third — Greece (the kingdom of Alexander the Great), and the fourth — the Roman Empire. Each of these kingdoms corresponded to a specific metal: gold to Babylon, silver to Persia, copper or bronze to the Empire of Alexander the Great, and iron to the Roman Empire. This symbolism was based on the story of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, in which he saw a colossus made of four metals standing on clay feet, and on the interpretation of this dream by the prophet Daniel.

It is very important that the Empire in this understanding is not just an ordinary state. It is conceived as *a world kingdom*, a kind of absolute state, a meta-state, a superstate, which included many states and smaller polities (πολιτεία). The emperor was not just a king, but a "king of kings" — a sacred, divine figure.

It is precisely because of its sacred nature that the Empire is able to unite such diverse individual states, peoples, principalities, and other political forms. From a Christian point of view, the only legitimate entity is the Christian Roman Empire. It is the political homeland of Christians. This Empire is the direct heir to the previous three kingdoms, and after it, there can be no legitimate organisation of the political space on a global scale. When Rome falls, the Antichrist will come. This will happen when the Roman Emperor, the "katechon," the "restrainer," is "taken out of the midst." The fall of the Empire will mean the onset of the "last days" and the coming of the Antichrist.

Here, a very interesting point arises—the possibility of giving the Antichrist a political or historical-political dimension. In a sense, one can speak of the "political philosophy of the Antichrist." That which destroys the normative (good) kingdom, that which replaces the only correct and acceptable political form of the Christian state*, is *the political Antichrist.* The political Antichrist is, in general terms, everything that is *opposed to the Empire.* The doctrine of the political philosophy of the Antichrist is the doctrine of any political organisation that denies the fundamental soteriological (from the Greek σωτήρ, "savior") eschatological function of the Christian Roman Empire. Thus, a conscious enemy of the Empire, an opponent of the "katechon," appears in the context of Christian political philosophy as the bearer of the political philosophy of the Antichrist.

The political system of the devil

The end of the Roman Empire, the fall of Rome, and the removal of "the thing that now restrains" bring Christians into a world *of illegitimate political systems*. Any non-imperial, non-Christian political system is illegitimate for Christians, and one that is not simply excluded from the Empire but comes after its end or instead of it, contributing to its destruction, is *an active*

the political form of the Antichrist. It follows that Christians must oppose the Antichrist not only on a religious level, but also on a political level. A political system built around a secular non-Christian (anti-Christian) ruler and *any* non-catechumenal (and especially anti-catechumenal) political ideology is *a political system of the devil* or a political system of the Antichrist.

After the pagan Roman Emperor Constantine (288–337) issued the Edict of Milan prohibiting the persecution of Christians, and after some time moved his capital to the newly rebuilt Byzantium and proclaimed Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire, the prophecy of St. Paul the Apostle from the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians came true, and the katechon (the restrainer) becomes a concrete political and historical reality.

Thus, the Christian Roman Empire was established in practice, whose purpose was to keep the devil, the ancient serpent, in chains for a thousand years and prevent the coming of the Antichrist. Constantinople was given the name New Rome, but now the Orthodox Empire is conceived as a continuation of the same fourth universal kingdom.

Byzantium. Symphony of Powers

At first, the Roman Empire united the East and the West, but gradually they began to separate because the western Roman provinces slipped out of the control of New Rome.

Thus, a difference arises in the political destinies of the two halves of the Christian world. The classic moment we talked about — the doctrine of the Orthodox Empire, of the katechon, of Rome, of the Emperor preventing the coming of the Antichrist — is fully affirmed in the eastern part of the Roman Empire (much later it will be called "Byzantine").

Here, too, a political doctrine of normative "symphony of powers" developed, in which the Orthodox Emperor, a sacred figure endowed with the function of preventing the coming of the Antichrist, stands at the head of the sacred state, and with him is the patriarch (or several patriarchs), the head of the Church. The Emperor bases his rule on a union with the head of the Church. Religious and imperial power, represented by the patriarch and the emperor, act in complete harmony, because the Church is not simply an addition to the Empire, but the force that changes

the very essence of the Empire. Thus, we once again encounter the Platonic figure of the philosopher-king, the sacred ruler, only in this case his figure is divided into two "inseparable and unmerged" (like the two natures in Christ) poles, which constitute the content of the "symphony of powers."

In turn, the Empire is not merely an instrument of the Church, it is something transformed by the rays of Christ's faith; a space where "sacred" ("sacral") politics is established. From a Christian point of view, imperial politics is sacred; in its context, every person who carries out the political instructions of their leader fulfils, in a sense, not just a civic duty, but a *religious* one.

When the Church becomes inseparable from the state, the state itself becomes part of the Church. Therefore, political decisions and political institutions are not simply rational mechanisms — they become moral soteriological instruments. A person who rules well and a person who rules badly are not simply passing a technical exam in their competence, and even less are they realising their personal will to power — they are either sinning or practising virtue. At the same time, the scale of the Emperor's sins and virtues far exceeds that of ordinary citizens — the Emperor is given much, but much is also demanded of him. Therefore, the very rule of the Empire acquires a comic and, moreover, a spiritual dimension. The Christian Emperor acts in the earthly world on behalf of Christ's "heavenly kingdom" and carries out the will of Heaven on earth.

In the eastern part of the Roman Empire, the idea of sacred politics (hieropolity) remained in its original form. In the west, starting from the first centuries of the Byzantine Empire, a gradual departure from this norm began. This happened against the backdrop of the increasing political autonomy of the western lands, their distancing from the capital of the Empire, and the gradual conquest of these territories by pagan peoples. The Western Roman Empire began to tremble and decay under the blows of the barbarians.

The barbarians establish a completely different political system there. Its main difference is that the barbarians do not build an empire, but ordinary states, completely detached from soteriology, eschatology, the catechon mission, and the doctrine of the universal kingdom. In each part of the fragmented Western Roman Empire, their own kings appear, whose polities (πολιτεία) are organised in accordance with the traditions of warlike tribes and tribal unions, primarily Germanic ones. Here, there is no figure of the emperor himself.

These peoples still nominally recognise the Byzantine Emperor as their supreme ruler, but they have already built a completely different political system. It is qualitatively different from the catechon Byzantine system. In the new political system, the unity of the Western Roman Empire is no longer ensured by the emperor (as in the Eastern Roman Empire), but by the Pope of Rome.

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The model of "unholy politics"

A completely new model of "unholy politics" is emerging, the preconditions for which can be seen in the theory of the "two cities" [1]of St. Augustine (354–430). Instead of Aristotle's idea of a phenomenal Empire, St. Augustine offers a theory more reminiscent of Plato. He formulates a doctrine of "two cities," the Heavenly City and the Earthly City, between which there is a war. The Earthly City lies in evil, while the Heavenly City is the city of saints, waging war against the city of the damned.

Here we can see the origins of a completely different political philosophy, distinct from the Byzantine sacred (symphonic and catechon) politics. Here, a holy ideal city and an unholy dark earthly city are affirmed, between which there is not harmony, symphony, that is, "consonance" (as in Byzantium), but opposition. It is precisely this teaching of Blessed Augustine that forms the basis of the political system known to us as Catholic political philosophy.

Initially, the Christian political philosophy we discussed earlier prevailed in the western part of the Roman Empire. but gradually, as the fates of the western and eastern parts of the Roman Empire diverged, it survived only in Byzantium, where it existed until its end, while in the western part a new political philosophy emerged, based *on the opposition between* the Church and the state. In Byzantine political philosophy, their *synthesis* was established, while in Catholic political philosophy, on the contrary, their *separation* was established.

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[1]   *Blessed Augustine.* The City of God. Moscow; Minsk: AST; Harvest, 2000.

In such a situation, the Pope, who was the only authority ensuring the ideological and cultural unity of the Western Roman Empire, began to be identified with the representative on earth of the "city of saints," the Heavenly City, while secular kings, princes and other rulers, as well as the polities (πολιτεία) they created on the ruins of the Western Roman Empire, found themselves in the position of the "city of the damned." Thus arose the idea of a spiritual war between Catholicism (the Roman See) and the political systems of the barbarian rulers.

Thus, in the dualism of the "two cities," something emerges that goes beyond the classical Roman tradition—a political phenomenon that is in itself devoid of sacredness, that is, "unholy." And in order to give this phenomenon legitimacy, it must be subordinated to the will of the Pope and the Catholic Church as an institution that ensures the connection with the "Heavenly City." In the Eastern Empire, "sacredness" is inherent in imperial politics as such. In the Western part, this sacredness disappears, and only a non-political institution — the Catholic Church — can restore it, at least in part.

The Papacy. The usurpation of the empire by Charlemagne

Thus, two political philosophies gradually emerged in the once united Christian world (the Christian oikoumene):

1) the main "catechon" philosophy, which continued to exist in Byzantium, in the eastern part of the Roman Empire;
2) a new dualistic philosophy of "two cities," systematically taking root in the gradually disintegrating Western Roman Empire.

If we look at these models from the point of view of the philosophical and political paradigms we discussed earlier, we can say the following: initially, the Aristotelian idea of the Roman Empire prevailed in Christianity, while in the Western Roman Empire, a dualistic form of political Platonism gradually took hold, in which models were contrasted with their copies (the earthly city — the heavenly city).

In history, this phenomenon has been called "Caesaropapism" [1] and "Papocaesarism" [2]. Caesaropapism is an Eastern, Byzantine model in which the emperor is not merely a political secular ruler, but also a spiritual authority who prevents the coming of the Antichrist. Pa-

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[1] Caesaropapism also comes from the Latin caesar, meaning "Caesar," and papa, meaning "pope."

[2] Formed from the same words, only in reverse order.

Caesarism is a Catholic model in which, on the contrary, any political figure is seen as strictly secular, non-sacred and even deliberately "sinful" ruler, above whom stands the sinless and sacred Pope of Rome.

Thus, Aristotelianism and Platonism within Christian political philosophy take on somewhat antagonistic expressions. This continues from the 4th to the beginning of the 9th century.

However, since until the 9th century there was only one emperor in the Christian oikoumene (nominally recognised even by the West), it can be said that during this period the entire Roman Empire still nominally existed as a single political and religious entity with a common political philosophy. At a certain point in Byzantium, Irene (c. 752–803) became Empress, and in parallel with this, important changes took place in the West: the powerful king from the Carolingian dynasty, Charlemagne (748–814) united numerous Germanic tribes under his rule and became the almost sole ruler of the previously fragmented lands of the Western Roman Empire.

So, in the East, dynastic power ended up in the hands of a woman (which was unusual for the patriarchal Roman society), while the western, previously fragmented half of the Roman Empire was united under the leadership of a strong and masculine king of the Franks. In this situation, Charlemagne decided to become emperor. According to some sources, he initially wanted to achieve this through a dynastic marriage with the Byzantine Empress Irene. The plan was as follows: if he married Irene, he would become the sole emperor of both the East and the West, and the Roman Empire would be restored in its ecumenical unity. Charlemagne sent matchmakers to Irene, but the empress refused. After her fatal decision, Charlemagne declared that he denied her imperial title and was ready to proclaim himself Emperor. The Pope anointed Charlemagne as king according to the ancient rite of the "Emperors," just as the Patriarchs of Constantinople anointed the Byzantine Emperors. The coronation of Charlemagne took place.

Thus, in the space of the nominally unified Christian Empire, two catechons, two emperors, emerge simultaneously: Charlemagne in the Western Roman Empire and Empress Irene in the Eastern Roman Empire.

Constantinople does not recognise Charlemagne's coronation.

It is important that, in parallel with his claims to imperial status, Charlemagne moves towards recognition of the Filioque (a dogmatic addition

to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed, concerning the Third Person of the Trinity — the Holy Spirit — as
"proceeding from the Father and the Son" [1]. By introducing the Filioque and crowning Charlemagne as Emperor, Western Christianity separated itself from Constantinople. Thus, a second
"katechon" appeared in the Christian oikoumene.

Byzantium rejected both, declaring the Filioque a heresy and refusing to recognise the imperial status of the Carolingian kings. From the point of view of Byzantine political philosophy, this was usurpation. Here, the contradictions between the Christian East and the Christian West, which had been building up for some time, reached their peak, gradually leading to the final schism in 1054.

It should be noted that in the case of Charlemagne, the Christian West acted on the basis of the original and common Christian conception of *political philosophy*. The Carolingian ruler understood perfectly well that the only legitimate political form for Christians (and the Franks were among the first to adopt Orthodox Christianity)was the Holy Roman Empire. One could only be the political ruler of all Christians as an emperor, no matter how vast the power of a particular ruler might be. The Franks were able to retain their imperial status later on, which Constantinople — and Orthodox Christianity as a whole — never recognised. Later, Charlemagne's state was named the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

Two political philosophies: Orthodox and Catholic

In 1054, the final schism of the Churches took place, followed by excommunication: Catholics called Orthodox Christians "Eastern schismatics" (heretics), while Orthodox Christians declared Catholics to be representatives of the "Latin heresy" or
"papist heresy."

From this moment on, two political forms emerged — two political philosophies that prevailed in two parts of what was once a united Christian world. On the one hand, there was Orthodoxy

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[1]In the Orthodox version, the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father. The addition of the phrase "and from the Son" (Latin: Filioque) to the Creed gave Orthodox theologians the impression that the West had adopted a model of subordination, i.e., hierarchical subordination of the Persons of the Holy Trinity, which was rejected as heresy.

[2]Many other Germanic tribes — primarily the Goths — were inclined towards Arianism, a heresy that had already been rejected at the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea.

the glorious philosophy of politics, and Catholicism. These two models continued to dominate for many centuries and have retained some of their influence in Western and Eastern Christianity to this day. It can be said that political Platonism in its dualistic, rigidly antagonistic version, contrasting the Heavenly City (the Church) with the Earthly City (the state and its ruler), came to dominate in Western Europe. This was finally consolidated with the victory of the Guelphs (the papal version) over the Ghibellines, supporters of imperial power (the heirs of Charlemagne and, above all, the Hohenstaufen dynasty) in the Western manner. Thus, the West became the territory of papal supremacy. In the East, the Caesaropapist, catechistic imperial principle, which was original to Christianity, remained unchanged and continued to prevail until the end of the Byzantine Empire. From there, it spread to other Orthodox peoples — the Bulgarians, Serbs and, finally, the Russians, who at various stages proclaimed themselves the successors of the Byzantine Empire (hence the ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome).

Thus, within the framework of a single Christian religion, two political philosophies were formed: Orthodox and Catholic. The first predetermined the normative structure of the Eastern Church's politics, the second that of the Western Church's politics.

The wandering Rome reaches Moscow

In 1452, the history of Byzantium came to an end. Byzantium fell under the blows of the Ottoman Turks, after which the Ottoman Empire arose in place of the Eastern Roman Empire, where Islam and its corresponding political philosophy became the dominant religion. At various stages of history, a number of Orthodox peoples had already expressed their intention to become the successors of Byzantium. This was the case during the heyday of the First and Second Bulgarian Empires ([1]) In the 14th century, the Serbian rulers grew in power, building a strong state that successfully rivaled the weakening Byzantium. Thus, the Serbs also dreamed of becoming the Third Rome. These claims of the Slavic Orthodox rulers, who at certain moments achieved power and prosperity, were based on the concept of the "wandering Rome."

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Eastern Europe. Slavic Logos: Balkan Nav and Sarmatian Style. Moscow: Academic Project, 2018.

The idea was as follows: in the historical and geographical context of the same Fourth World Kingdom (the Iron Roman Empire), the centre of the Empire (i.e. Rome) could shift. It is important to note that the First Rome is not the Catholic Rome of the Popes, but Rome as the capital of the pre-Christian Roman Empire, the seat of the Emperor. With the adoption of Christianity, this Rome moved to the Second Rome, or New Rome, which became Byzantium. Therefore, as Byzantium weakened, the status of "Rome" could shift again — to those Orthodox peoples who proved themselves worthy of it.

This idea of a "wandering Rome" became particularly relevant when Byzantium finally fell to the Ottoman Turks. Accordingly, it seemed natural to imagine that this time Rome "migrated" to those Orthodox peoples and states that remained independent.

Among all the Orthodox kingdoms at that time, only one managed to preserve its imperial scale, independence and Orthodox faith — the Russian state, Muscovy [1]. It was then that the Russians declared themselves the Third Rome, while the Bulgarians, Serbs and even Romanians, who had previously claimed this status, found themselves under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Moscow, as the Third Rome, took on the mission of the catechon. The doctrine of a normative political system was transferred to Muscovy. Perhaps this is why Aristotle, the most brilliant thinker of the "real Empire," is depicted in some ancient frescoes in Russian churches. Sacred politics moved to the Third Rome, and Russian rulers, beginning with Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584), became not just grand princes, but Vasilevs (Greek: Βασίλειος), emperors. The realisation of the new significance of Muscovy began under Ivan III (1440–1505), when the doctrine of "Moscow is the Third Rome" was finally formulated and during the reign of Ivan IV, the historical ritual of anointing the Russian tsar according to Byzantine canons took place. Since then, Russian tsars became the catechon, the Russian kingdom became "Rome," and the Russian people became part of sacred politics, where — at least according to religious-political philosophy — every action of every person took on a soteriological character. This found expression in the theory "draught state."

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Russian History. The People and the State in Search of a Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2019.

[2] Its authorship belongs to the monk Philotheus (c. 1465–1542) of the Pskov-Pechersk Monastery.

Reflections of the Catechon

The end of the Muscovite period is associated with processes of desacralisation that led to a schism in the church. The official Church and state followed the countries of the West, which had already entered the New Age, into the paradigm of Modernity. The most consistent proponents of the ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome were the Old Believers ([1])who, however, were defeated and found themselves in the position of a persecuted minority. The Old Believers adhered to the norms of Ancient Rus, which predetermined their complete rejection of religious reforms, which were followed by political innovations.

This was most evident during the reign of Peter the Great (1672–1725), who began to restructure the political and ecclesiastical system along the lines of Western European monarchies, primarily Protestant ones.

Despite the departure from the fundamentals of Orthodox political philosophy embodied in the principle of the symphony of powers (Peter abolished the patriarchate altogether, transferring power over the Church to a secular official, the Oberprokuror of the Synod), distant echoes of strictly Christian politics persisted in later eras. This was particularly noticeable in the 19th century, when Russian tsars and the intellectual elite (especially the Slavophiles) once again focused on the mission of defending Christian truth and rethought the role played in Russian history by the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome. An attempt to give politics a sacred — Christian — dimension was proclaimed by Alexander I (1777–182) in the "Holy Alliance," which was intended to unite Christian peoples in the face of advancing secularism, atheism, and political modernity in general.

Until the Soviet period of Russian history, there was a shadow of sacred politics, the idea of the Empire as a mission, the religious function of the Russian state, and the Russian tsar as the one who holds things together, the one who stops the "son of perdition" from coming.

It can be noted that for an Orthodox Christian, the only legitimate form of political existence is the sacred Christian Empire. Catholics have a slightly different view: for them, in accordance with the political philosophy of Catholicism, the most important thing is submission to the Pope.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Russian History. The People and the State in Search of a Subject.

From the point of view of a fully-fledged Christian politics (both Orthodox and Catholic), the idea of the separation of Church and state is inherently anti-Christian and even anti-Christ. Political Modernity, which attempts to build its political philosophy on the denial of the sacred character of the Empire and of politics as a whole, cannot be anything other than an "anomaly," an unnatural, perverted form of government, a "bad state" in the eyes of a Christian. According to Aristotle, the worst versions of this are democracy and tyranny.

Protestantism and democracy

In Western Christianity, the Reformation began in the 16th century, leading to another form of Christian political philosophy — the phenomenon of Protestantism[1]. Protestantism, which is opposed to Catholicism, is nevertheless an entirely Western phenomenon and inherits all the characteristics that historically divided Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Protestantism stands even further from Orthodoxy than Catholicism, although in the early stages of the Reformation some Protestant leaders sought an alliance with Orthodox rulers, but these attempts did not develop further.

What does Protestant political philosophy oppose to Catholicism? For Catholics, as we have already noted, the highest authority is the Pope as the spiritual head of the Western Christian world. Protestants, on the other hand, reject this authority, abolish the doctrine of the two kingdoms, attack St. Augustine and political Platonism, and, for the first time in history, introduce a completely new model of political system based on *the individual* which had previously been absent in the Christian world.

Protestantism within the Western Christian Church justifies the doctrine of democracy — that is, the worst and lowest type of government (according to Aristotle). In church democracy, Protestants reject the clergy, celibacy, the power of priests, and the transmission of apostolic blessing, that is, all those sacred components that have survived in the West to this day in Catholicism.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Germanic Logos. The Apophatic Man. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015; *Ibid.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[2]*Dumont, L*. Essay on Individualism. See also: *Sombart, W*. Collected Works: In 3 vols. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2005.

Believers themselves are capable of creating any denomination based on the contractual acceptance of certain interpretations, which completely abolishes the very idea of the Church as created from above — from God to people, from Heaven to Earth.

From the vertical model emerges a kind of horizontal religiosity, where there is a transcendent God and an individual who builds his own individual model of relations with this God, ignoring all mediating instances. In essence, such a view of religion brings to the fore human reason, the human individual who exists on his own — outside the Church (unlike Catholics) and outside the Empire, outside sacred politics (unlike Orthodox Christians) — and takes it upon himself to judge what is right and wrong, that is, to "establish" the Church and, accordingly, create a political regime that meets its needs and interests. This is an act of radical desacralisation of the entire Christian teaching as a whole, including its political dimension.

## Protestantism — a revolution against vertical thinking

Protestantism represents an unprecedented step in Christian history, sharply different from Platonism, Aristotelianism, Catholicism, and Orthodoxy. In fact, it is a break with the entire tradition of Christian politics, which, as we have seen, continued the Greco-Roman model. Here there is neither directly sacred politics (Caesaropapism) nor religious Platonic politics (Papocaesarism).

Protestantism represents a religious revolution directed against the authority of the Church. In fact, it rejects the thesis of the Church as a community of the elect, whose pastors have direct apostolic succession.

Aimed primarily against the Pope and Catholicism, Protestantism carries with it a fundamentally new political philosophy. This political philosophy is linked to the self-organisation of individual groups.

Protestantism began its struggle simultaneously with the Empire (Western) and with the Catholic Church. In essence, it is a rejection of both political Platonism and political Aristotelianism. It is a rebellion of matter, of the plebs, a rebellion of the masses against the educated majority, against the clergy, against the priesthood, and also against the nobility and aristocracy.

The Coming of Christ

2nd Epistle to the Thessalonians

Apostolic
era

Constantine the Great

Christianisation
Empires

Catechon

Charlemagne

Usurpation of the
Catechon

Schism of the
Churches

Catholicism

Orthodoxy

Moscow, the
Third Rome

Fall of Constantinople

schism

October Revolution

Protestantism Bourgeoisie Democracy

Reformation

End of the
Habsburg dynasty

Antichrist

VII BC VI BC   IV BC   0   IV   IX 105   1453 XVI   1917

Babylon   Persia   Greece   Modern

Rom
e

World Kingdom Sacred
Politics

Christian history and contexts of Christian political philosophy

This is the bourgeois revolution, or Protestant ethics[1]. In fact, this is how *a* completely new *bourgeois political philosophy* emerges, which is a direct product of the Protestant religious Reformation. Capitalism and the bourgeois system grew out of Protestant Europe as a direct consequence. Protestantism as a religious phenomenon carries within it the political idea of anti-sacral, anti-imperial and anti-ecclesiastical democracy, where all decisions are made on the basis of the individual reflection of a single member of society.

Thus, a new subject emerges — not the chosen people (as in Judaism), not the Church, and not the Christian Empire (as in Catholicism and Orthodoxy), but the individual, who henceforth becomes the source and measure of legitimacy in religious and political matters.

Three political philosophies of Christianity and the assumption of a fourth model

So, we have briefly examined three types of political philosophy in Christianity:

1) the political philosophy of Orthodoxy (Caesaropapism, symphony of powers, the katechon, the sacred Empire);
2) the political philosophy of Catholicism (papal supremacy, two cities, the primacy of the Holy See over "sinful" politics);
3) the political philosophy of Protestantism (which rejects superhuman authority and makes the individual, capable of independently determining his relationship with God and other people, the main criterion).

It is worth noting here that, in theory, Christian thought allows for a fourth type of political philosophy, which is in direct opposition to Christianity in general. It can be conditionally called the "political philosophy of the Antichrist." Such a philosophy can be found in a state or other form of political organisation where the truth of Christianity is denied and the separation of Church and politics is normatively justified. In the eyes of a Christian, such a political system represents an anomalous eschatological phenomenon, suggesting that the coming of the "son of perdition," which was prevented by the traditional political model, has been accomplished.

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[1]   See: *Weber, M.* The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Moscow: Ist-Viu, 2002.

Chapter 3. Political Philosophy of Islam

Radical Creationism

The Islamic religion is based on the principle of radical creationism, embodied in the idea that there is no intermediary between God and the world (man). This is the essence of Islam. In Islam, the formula "do not associate partners with God" [1] is of central importance. Attributing partners to God, i.e., denying pure monotheism, is called *shirk* (Arabicشرك , "paganism," "polytheism") in Islam, which is considered the most serious crime, not only religious but also *political (* within the Islamic system).

The meaning of strict creationism in Islam *lies in the absence of an intermediate authority* and, accordingly, in the emergence of a relationship of absolute domination between God and humans: God appears as the unconditional, sole Lord of the world and of humans, a Lord who has nothing in common with his slaves. The term *"Islam" (*Arabic:الإسلام) means "submission" (to God), complete humility before the Lord (Arabic: بر´) and recognition of one's own insignificance before Him[2] Thus, God and the world (man) are radically different metaphysical entities. God is Everything, and man is nothing. God acts as an absolute scythe of death in relation to the world — God kills the world because the world is insignificant in relation to God [3] Between these two poles — insignificant man and absolute God — there is no mediator. This is the fundamental meaning of the Islamic religion: it is impossible to place anyone or anything *between* absolutely insignificant man and absolutely complete God. human being and the absolutely complete God.

Here we see a special version of the transcendental relationship between God and man, or more broadly, between the Creator and creation[4]. This relationship is extremely tense and represents an opposition: God is opposed to

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[1] Quran. Sura 17, verse 22.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[3] *Dzhemal G.* The Revolution of the Prophets. Moscow: Ultra.Culture, 2003.

[4] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

It is presented to humanity and the world as a radical alternative, and all creatures are forced to make a fundamental choice between submission to the Other or solidarity with what is given—with the fact of existence. Thus, the Platonic dualism of the "ideal state" takes on a conflictual character here, and the two poles — the paradigmatic and phenomenological ontology of Timaeus — find themselves in profound opposition. This is the basis for Islam's criticism of what is called "jahiliyya" *(Arabic جاهلية)* or "polytheism."

Shirk

Polytheism implies "assigning partners to God," affirming certain *intermediate* instances between God and the world (man), and therefore, for Islam, polytheism represents a metaphysically completely false model of philosophy and ontology.

The main thrust of Islamic philosophy is directed against polytheism. Those who recognise the oneness of God are righteous, true, and submissive to the transcendent God (Muslims). Those who oppose the oneness of God, this absolute Person who removes any possibility of autonomous ontology, are bearers of evil, rebelling against God.

What kind of evil, and to what extent is this evil? Islam clearly states: to the extent of the absolute necessity of the physical destruction of polytheists.

The Quran contains a direct call to this effect:

Kill (the infidels) wherever you find them, drive them out of the places where they drove you out, for their disbelief (fitna) is worse than death at your hands[1].

Elsewhere, this call is literally repeated:

They want you to become unbelievers like them, so that you may be equal. Therefore, do not take them as helpers or friends until they emigrate in the way of Allah. But if they turn away, seize them and kill them wherever you find them.

A person who does not recognise the oneness of God must be put to death. This is the norm in Islamic tradition. At least, this is how it should be in a normative (Islamic) society.

[1]   Quran. Sura 2, verse 191.
[2]   Quran. Sura 4, verse 89.

Political and Religious Anthropology of Islam. People of the Book and Their Status

Islamic theology is based on the idea of genocide on religious grounds: all people who do not recognise the oneness of God (Allah) must be destroyed. The only exception is for those referred to as "people of the Book" (Arabic: اهل الكتاب — "ahl al-Kitab") — Jews and Christians. From the Muslim point of view, Jews and Christians worship the same God as Muslims. This is the one God, a transcendent, creationist God. Jews and Christians are not considered polytheists, and therefore guilty of shirk, i.e. "associating partners with God"; accordingly, the People of the Book have the right to live.

Nevertheless, the Quran contains significant criticism of Jews and Christians, based on the most important principle of the Islamic religion — "*not associating* partners with God." Those who are pure pagans *openly* "associate partners with God." In turn, the "people of the Book" (the Abrahamic traditions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) recognise the uniqueness of the transcendent God.

The Prophet Muhammad (571–632) is considered by Muslims to be the last prophet and the "seal of the prophets" [1] (النَّبِيِّينَ خَاتَمَ), completing the cycle of prophets. Why, from a Muslim point of view, is the last revelation of the monotheistic cycle necessary? Muhammad restores the completeness of the original Revelation, so it can be said that Islam in its archetype (as pure paradigmatic monotheism) has always existed: in the original form of the ancient Revelation, then in the form of Judaism, then in the form of Christianity, and then the Revelation was restored to its fullness through the prophet Muhammad[2].

Jihad: either Islam or paganism

Continuing this line of radical purification of the transcendent God from all intermediaries, insisting that the transcendent God and the immanent world (and man) have nothing in common and nothing in between, the norm of religious genocide of polytheists (which is the leitmotif of Islamic history) is essentially justified. the norm of religious genocide of polytheists (which is the leitmotif of Islamic history). We are talking about a holy war, "jihad" (from the Arabic الجهاد — "effort") against pagans, i.e., those who "associate partners with God." The entire history of Islam has been and continues to be marked by this.

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[1] Quran. Sura 33, verse 40.
[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

Thus, religious philosophy in Islam is directly expressed in politics, since jihad appears as an expression of a profound metaphysical truth. "Why is it necessary to fight the pagans?" "Because they deny the philosophical religious truth *of the oneness* of God."

From the Muslim perspective, they are theologically mistaken, which means that they must either submit to Muslims and acknowledge their righteousness or be destroyed. This radical approach to religious philosophy has predetermined the political practice of Islam throughout its history.

The uniqueness of God (Allah) is directly linked to the theme of power. Recognising a single God means recognising his authoritative status. To be a "Muslim" (literally, "one who has submitted to Allah") means not only to recognise God as the Creator of the world, but also as the supreme ruler. Thus, the Islamic religion, at its very core, already includes a *political* dimension, since power is primarily a political concept.

Where there is polytheism or any other form of society that refuses to recognise God (Allah) as the bearer of absolute power, a socio-political and cultural environment develops that is radically incompatible with Islam. It is either Islam or paganism (shirk, jahiliyya). If Islam comes into contact with paganism, then someone must die (from the Muslim point of view, but not from the point of view of the pagan, who does not take away the Muslim's right to believe in one God, while reserving the right to believe otherwise).

However, in such a situation, how do Muslims view a figure such as Christ, i.e., the God-man (mediator between the purely transcendent God and the world)? What is their attitude towards the community of Israel, the Jewish people, who also consider themselves mediators? These two points — the Incarnation in Christian theology and the special sacred function of the chosen people in Judaism — are what the Qur'an holds against Christians and Jews, fundamentally distinguishing them from Muslims. They do not recognise any gods other than the one God, and therefore they are recognised as human beings, but from the Muslim point of view, it is precisely these theological postulates that violate the purity of radical transcendentalism, and thus they find themselves *between* heretics/polytheists and pure Islam. Jesus Christ is regarded by Muslims as one of a chain of prophets who preceded Muhammad, and Jews are considered one of the peoples who received revelation on an equal footing with others, but who are not "chosen" and do not differ fundamentally from all others.

Attitude towards Jews and Christians

Islam rejects the dogma of the Holy Trinity and the incarnation of God in Christ, whom Muslims see as merely a man, a prophet, and the belief of Jews that they are the chosen people (there is no such concept as "people" in Islam). Jews and Christians are, from the point of view of Islam, "non-Muslims" and, accordingly, "non-citizens," so in the political system they, as "people of the Book," are subject to additional taxes ("jizya" —جِزْي), significant restrictions on holding certain positions in the state, and various prohibitions on the practice of religion (for example, in some Islamic countries it is forbidden to have crosses on Christian churches, and in almost all Islamic countries the use of bells is prohibited). In the political system

In Islam, "people of the Book" have the الذِّمَّة ('Ahl) meaning

literally "under protection" or "under guardianship." Similar formulas are used in political philosophy to refer to a category of people whose rights are limited but not completely denied.

Note the significance of theology here: the gradation of three types of people in Islam (Muslims, "non-Muslims," pagans) associated with the structure of the religious worldview takes on a purely political expression and predetermines social and political status.

The pure transcendence of God constitutes the Muslim, which in Islamic politics guarantees full political status and citizenship. Recognition of the transcendence of God with some elements of mediation in the person of the Incarnation of Christ (for Christians) or the divine election of the Jewish people (for Jews) — place

"Zimmis" were relegated to a lower status (people under the "protection" of others, i.e., full citizens). Polytheists fell outside the political system altogether, finding themselves in the position of outcasts — they were offered the choice of converting to Islam or being destroyed. In practice, Muslims did not always treat polytheists so harshly, sometimes being forced to compromise and granting them the "right to live" in marginalised areas of society. This was the case with Hindus and Buddhists in India, Zoroastrians in Persia, some archaic tribes in Africa that came under Muslim rule, etc. From the point of view of a complete political philosophy of Islam, however, such "softness" is already a deviation from the strict norm of exclusive monotheism. Thus, the legal and judicial system of Islam reflects

There are three metaphysical attitudes between the world and God.

The global Islamic political empire

Islamic theology predetermines not only the internal politics of Islamic society, but also its foreign policy. This was the driving force behind Islamic expansion when a small religious community of nomadic Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula spread its influence worldwide, creating a huge centralised state — the Caliphate — built on the principles of Islamic religious philosophy.

Why should Muslims rule the world? Because the world is *already* ruled by the one transcendent God (Allah). Muslims' belief in this purely transcendent God, and moreover, their recognition of Him as the only true and legitimate Lord and ruler, gives them the right to global planetary rule; moreover, it makes this a duty.

Christians and Jews are under the protection of Muslim rule until they themselves become Muslims.

Who is financing the construction of this global Islamic political empire? At the expense of pagans (as well as materialists, atheists, and agnostics), who must either be destroyed or converted to Islam. That is why Islamic religious philosophy inherently carries political universalism and justification for political expansion.

Of course, when they find themselves in the context of other, non-Islamic societies built on principles different from Islamic philosophy, Muslims adapt to the existing conditions. But from the point of view of the completeness of the Islamic worldview, this state of affairs is "temporary," a kind of political (and even partly religious) compromise with easily discernible limits.

Islam and Christianity in architecture

Let us consider other aspects of Islamic tradition. For example, architecture. In his book Understanding Islam, Frithjof Schuon ⟨1907–1998), a Swiss traditionalist philosopher who converted to Islam in its mystical form (Sufism), describes the specific features of Islamic architecture. The idea that one should not "give God partners" is embodied in the absence of roofs on Islamic buildings. The idea of flatness, horizontality, which has no common

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[1]   *Schuon F.* Understanding Islam. Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 1998.

Measures with verticality are expressed in the very structure of the Islamic city. If we look at a traditional Islamic city, we see flat roofs, low buildings, periodically interrupted by tall, slender minarets (towers dedicated exclusively to God). This model of the Islamic polis reflects the essence of both the Islamic religion and Islamic political philosophy.

With God, everything is vertical, with man, everything is horizontal. There is no unity between the temple and the home. In the Christian tradition, on the contrary, the structure of the temple and the structure of the home are always connected with roofs (there is a gradual and slow ascent from the horizontal to the vertical). The triangular roof of an ordinary dwelling (both rural and urban) symbolises the ascent of many things to the One. The phenomenon of the roof itself (primarily its shape, ridge, carved patterns, etc.) represents the deepest metaphysical element of the Christian world. In essence, every house is a small temple, a small church. A church is a large house, and a house is a small church. And both are directed towards the sky.

A completely different picture emerges when we consider the flat roofs of ordinary people's dwellings and the minarets reaching towards the sky. Two different metaphysics, two different architectures, two different societies.

The absence of priests in Islam

In Islamic teaching, all people are fundamentally equal. This equality leads to a sharp rejection by Islamic tradition of the very status of priests/clergy [2]. In Islam, there are no priests, no ordination, and the mullah, whom we sometimes mistakenly perceive as a priest, is nothing more than a learned Muslim who has received special education. This is a striking difference from the Christian priesthood, where the priest is a minister of God Almighty and receives special

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[1] A contemporary American philosopher (of Iranian origin) and proponent of "speculative realism" Reza Negarestani gives a similar theological and political interpretation of the hostility of modern radical Salafi Muslims, who preach a return to original Islam and reject all vertical structures and objects in general. In the spirit of Negarestani's own philosophy, he interprets this as a desire for underground realms, inside the earth, towards the centre of maximum poverty and insignificance, as the main property of creation in Islam — the most radical of all versions of monotheism. *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials. Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008.

[2] *Jemal G.* The Revolution of the Prophets.

The laying on of hands by the Holy Spirit, which comes from the apostles, and is actually considered a person endowed with a special status.

For a Muslim, there is no difference between a simple believer, a political leader of Islam, and a mullah. They are all ordinary people. And if someone says that he has more reason to believe that he is closer to God than others, he will find himself in the position of one who

"gives God a partner" (i.e., himself), and thus becomes a bearer of shirk and thereby condemns himself to death. There is fundamental equality among Muslims; Islam rejects any kind of caste-based anthropological differentiation. It is important to note that for Muslims, even Muhammad, whom they revere, and other prophets are simply human beings. Muhammad is not God, not an angel, but only a human being, albeit one chosen from among other people to receive revelation about the absolute transcendence of God.

Therefore, the landscape of Islam consists only of flat roofs, only ashes, only decay, only death. The Islamic world is a world of fundamental death. Everything that happens in Islamic society is movement *within the territory of death,* because only God is alive and only God is a person (while all others are not persons, they are not alive, they do not exist, and the most they are capable of is being submissive). Who is a Muslim? He is submissive, bowed down, prostrate. He does not see himself as God or the son of God. He is only a created human being, but unlike other creatures, he has knowledge of the existence of the absolute God, the creator of Heaven and Earth, and humbly accepts His absolute power.

This model represents a departure from the traditional state structure based on a pyramid, as described by Plato and Aristotle. The radicalisation of relations between the Creator and creation gives rise to a different model of politics — the *Islamic* state as a state based on anthropological equality (contrary to Plato's ideal state with the domination of a philosopher-king or Aristotle's phenomenal Empire, where various forms of power or a combination of several types are allowed).

Islam and politics: dispute is war

In Islam, the absence of a distinction between religion and politics can be seen most clearly. Islam does not conceive of itself as a *purely* religious or *purely* political phenomenon. Islam does not accept

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[1] *Jemal G.* Daoud vs Jalut (David vs Goliath). Moscow: Social and Political Thought, 2011.

knows no difference between religion and politics. If power belongs to God, then accordingly, those who *properly* worship that God should rule. The struggle for faith in a theological dispute and the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims in a military sense are strictly *the same thing*.

There is no separate theological dispute and separate war. Dispute is war, war is dispute. *Muslims see the affirmation of their metaphysics in concrete political actions*. Theology and politics are one and the same. In the Quran, we can find ideas about the structure of heaven and hell, the creation of the world and man, sacred history, religious norms, as well as advice on how to organise human society in an orderly manner, how to build relationships within the community (Arabic: Umma, أمة), how to treat livestock, what hygiene rules to follow, etc.

This is where the Quran is totally different from the Bible. The Bible doesn't say anything about how to organise politics and society (Christians got their social and political model from the Roman Empire). The Quran presents a completely different situation — it is filled with political, social, economic, moral, and even everyday guidelines that determine the political system, government, norms of social organisation, and forms of warfare. Here we see the complete unity of religion and politics.

Therefore, for a true Muslim, it is absolutely unacceptable to consider Islam as *merely* a religion. This is the meaning of the concept of "sharia" (Arabic: شريعة f), which originally means "mode of action," but in Islam it acquired the meaning of the legal basis of society. "Sharia" is the legitimate model of politics, which organically combines theological norms, structures of universally binding religious practice, the foundations of the political system, principles of economics, morality, culture, and everyday behaviour that are considered necessary for compliance. In Sharia, religion and the socio-political system are regulated with equal rigour and clarity. For Muslims, Sharia is the only acceptable and justified form of social organisation, which, in addition to religious worship, necessarily includes everything else.

Caliphate

In its pure form, *Islam does not recognise any society other than an Islamic one*, and the entire history reflected in the Quran, and even more so,

The entire history of Islamic conquests is connected with this. In the beginning, there was a struggle between Muhammad's community and his followers against the Arab pagans. Later·this grew into the imposition of Islam on the surrounding peoples. The impulse to strictly combine religion with politics, the unconditional assertion of the necessity for Muslims to rule over all non-Muslims, and the call for the destruction of polytheists all had a tremendous explosive effect in the era of Muhammad, in the late 7th and early 8th centuries. And already during the eighth century, in just a few decades, a gigantic Islamic empire was created. In this empire, everyone either converted to Islam, found themselves in the position of "dhimmi" ("People of the Book"), or were destroyed. We see the construction of the first Arab Caliphate as a complete and brutal affirmation of the foundations of Islamic theology, reflected in the Quran and stemming from the main tenet of the Islamic religion (the absolute transcendence and uniqueness of the Creator).

The first Arab Caliphate, founded during Muhammad's lifetime, was a model of the practical application of Islamic teachings and their embodiment in life. For centuries thereafter, this was considered the norm for Muslims. History, of course, placed Muslims in new historical circumstances. They were not always able to behave as strictly and consistently (aggressively) everywhere. They did not always succeed in following the original line flawlessly in everything. But where such an opportunity arose, it was precisely this approach that prevailed: the combination of religion and politics, the direct implementation of the metaphysics of creationism, embodied in the political power of Muslims, without any intermediate instances.

Thus, Islamic history in its internal — paradigmatic — dimension represents an *eternal* struggle against "jahiliyya" ("polytheism," "shirk"), the *eternal* conquest of Medina and Mecca by Muhammad's followers, which symbolically means the struggle against pagans, against all non-Muslims, and the establishment of Islamic rule over all historically accessible territory. This is a model, a kind of "ideal type" of society (according to M. Weber), which, under favourable historical circumstances, also becomes "normal" (according to F. Tönnies). The conception of the Islamic religion, embodied in the Islamic political system and historically fixed in the Arab Caliphate, is for Muslims a kind of *absolute horizon of the Political*.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

The House of Islam and the House of War

Contemporary Islamic theorists (mainly theorists of pure Islam[1]) have proposed *the theory* of *the "three houses*." Where the rules we have discussed are observed, that is, where Sharia law is established, there is *the "house of Islam*" (Arabic: "dar al-Islam,"

دار الإسلام). The territory where there is no "dar al-Islam" is called "dar al-kufr [2]" (دار كفر), *"house of *falsehood*"* or "house of *Satan*" (دار شيطان —) because any non-Islamic society is a "Satanic society." A Muslim who lives in the "house of Islam" must be peaceful, law-abiding and humble. He is on his own territory, and any deviation from Sharia law is both a moral sin and a social crime, which must inevitably result in appropriate punishment.

Meanwhile, a Muslim living in the "house of falsehood" must turn that house into *a "house of war*" ("dar al-harb" — دار الحرب). Thus, if a Muslim lives in an Islamic society, he is a respectable and law-abiding citizen. However, if this same Muslim is transferred to a non-Islamic society, he becomes a centre of terrorist activity and turns the "house of Satan" into a "house of war" — in order to sooner or later destroy the polytheists ("jahiliya") or subjugate the "people of the Book" (because Christians and Jews — in normal circumstances — should also be subordinate to Muslims, i.e. have the status of "dhimmis" under "protection").

Of course, most Muslims today do not believe this and do not adhere to it, but throughout world history there have been Islamic tendencies that have repeatedly returned to original Islam and sought to build the same caliphate, to reproduce the same logic. Today, this is a minority of Muslims, but nevertheless, this principle is at the heart of the Islamic religion itself, at the heart of the religious philosophy and theology of Islam, and at the heart of the political system of Islam. Therefore, there is always the possibility that a certain group of Muslims will decide to return to the original model and transform

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[1]According to Iraqi scholar Majid Khadduri (1909–2007), this theory basically took shape around 732 after the Umayyad Caliphate got beat at the Battle of Poitiers, which stopped the spread of Islam in Europe. See: *Khadduri M.* War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.

[2] The term "kufr" (كفر) means "unbelief," "concealment (of the truth)," etc. Hence "kafir" means "unbeliever" or "non-believer."

the "house of falsehood" (dar al-kufr) becomes the "house of war" (dar al-harb). This gives rise to a corresponding system of actions directed against societies that do not conform to Islamic norms.

In the full sense of the word, such a coherent ideology did not dominate for long. Muslims lived according to this law for several decades — during the era of the first Arab Caliphate[1]. At that time, there were no hereditary rulers of the ummah — the most courageous and gifted were chosen from among Muhammad's companions; there were no nation states or priesthood. It was a society of radical, militant and religious egalitarianism, *jamaat* (Arabic جماعة — a society, collective, community), male brotherhoods, which were essentially engaged in warfare against atheists, polytheists, and Christians (at that time, Jews did not constitute an independent political force). Although this idea was given theoretical form at the next stage — during the Umayyad Caliphate [2] —when some deviations from the original model of Muhammad's military-religious community had already occurred.

In general, the theory of the "three houses" has become widespread among theorists and practitioners of Salafism and Wahhabism, radical fundamentalists and other structures. It forms the basis of the political projects of extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda (القاعد), Hizb ut-Tahrir (حزب التحرير), Islamic State (also known as Daesh — داعش [3] etc.

Shiism and its philosophy

During the reign of the third caliph, Uthman ibn Affan (574–656), *the Fitna* (Arabic:فتنة f meaning "turmoil") began, a civil war within Islam. At this point, Islam split into two deeply different tendencies: Sunni and Shia. During this civil war, an alternative pole emerged in the form of the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, Ali (599–661), who was married to his daughter Fatima (605–633). A separate party, *the Shia (*Arabic: شِيعَةٍ — literally "party," "group of followers"). Since politics in Islam is inextricably linked to religion, the struggle for power in the Arab Caliphate was inextricably and organically intertwined with theological issues and the problem of interpreting the Quran and Islamic tradition as a whole.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[2]   *Khadduri M.* War and Peace in the Law of Islam.

[3]These organisations are officially banned in the Russian Federation and most countries as terrorist organisations.

This is how *Shiism* emerged as a distinct branch of Islam. Shiism asserts that all fundamental Islamic tenets accepted by the Muslim ummah (community) at that time are completely valid. Except for one, but fundamental, concerning the legitimate political authority in Islamic society and, at the same time (inseparable from this), the question of the highest authority in interpreting Muhammad's legacy. The Shiites, supporters of Ali, proclaimed that, apart from the figure of the prophet, *nabi (*Arabic:نبي), Muhammad, there is another fundamental figure — the interpreter, *the wali (*Arabic:ولي — "interpreter," "support," "saint"), who possesses the highest divine knowledge of the Quran and the basic religious tenets. This interpreter is Ali, the prophet's cousin. Accordingly, the fundamental principle of equality on which Islamic philosophy is based is violated or, more precisely, significantly modified.

This gives rise to a completely different model of theology, a different religious philosophy, where another instance appears between God and the world. Islam eliminates all instances between God and the world, while Shiism, recognising the adequacy of this elimination in relation to polytheists, and partly to Christians and Jews, re-establishes a certain instance that turns out to be more important than the ordinary person. This is further developed in the theory of "imamate" (Arabic:إمامة), which is an institution of rulers-interpreters and their loyal followers (Shiites), founded by the "first imam" Ali, and then his descendants, the "holy imams" [1].

Thus, Shiism establishes anthropological, ontological, soteriological, gnoseological, and political *inequality*. All people are equal, Shiites assert, except for the "holy imams." All people are the same, except for the house of the Prophet Muhammad through his cousin and his daughter Fatima. The holy imams are intermediaries between God and people, and only they know how to interpret the Quran and Islam correctly. That is, only they possess the keys to true interpretation, and only their interpretation is reliable. In a religious sense, a new authority emerges. When asked how to understand the suras of the Quran and the hadiths, Shiites respond: as the holy imams tell us. Accordingly, it is they who should hold power in a fully-fledged Islamic society. This community was founded by the prophet, the nabi, who is considered the last in Islam. Therefore, he may have successors among the prophets, whose chain ends with Muhammad. They are replaced by a chain of interpreters, the vali, that is, the imamate.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al.

Ali's opponents, the followers of Uthman, rejected the claims of the Shiites in both theology and politics. And military force was on their side. This led to a division between *the Shiites,* supporters of Ali and the imamate, and *the Sunnis,* who relied on the interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah (سُنَّة — sacred Islamic tradition). The Umayyad Caliphate was Sunni, and Ali's supporters found themselves in the role of a persecuted minority ([1].

The Mahdi and the culture of expectation

Shiism is a deeply elitist ideology that permeates Islam and changes many of its aspects. "Elitist" in this case means that all people are equal, but there are those who are higher than all these equals — the "holy imams." This gives rise to the idea of the political power of the imams — only the Alids (Arabic:العلويين) can rule, and if there are none, representatives of the holy imams must rule, who act as intermediaries not only with God, but with the imams. It is believed that the Last Imam (the Seventh for the Ismailis and the Twelfth for the Twelver Shiites) did not die but went into hiding and will return at the end of time.

This gives rise to a political "culture of waiting." The Shiites await the arrival of the Imam, and until he comes, they remain in the minority and are persecuted. They base their political system on the return of the holy Imam Mahdi. A new fundamental hierarchy emerges, rejected by Sunni Islam, giving rise to the dynastic succession of the Alids and the idea that religious interpretation should be based on the authority of the holy Imams.

Between the status quo, in which Sunnis enjoy political and theological superiority, and the ideal Shiite state, there is opposition. It will be resolved through the arrival of the last Imam and his representatives. However, the expectation of the Mahdi should not be passive: his arrival must be hastened by the struggle for Shiite truth, which is both religious and political. This principle was the basis for the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171), which temporarily united the countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East under Shiite rule, the Karmathian state, and later Safavid Iran, created in 1501 by the Shiites, and the modern Islamic Republic of Iran.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.
[2]   *Korben, A.* History of Islamic Philosophy. Moscow: Sadra, 2018.
[3]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.

Shiism and Iranian influences

So, two parties emerged in the Islamic world: *Sunni* and *Shia*. One (Sunnis) stands for the original version of Islam, although since the Umayyad era it has undergone certain changes that became even more apparent in the Abbasid Caliphate (with its capital in Baghdad), while the other stands for the Shiite version [(1)]. Thus, a certain pole *of alternative metaphysics* emerged in Islam*, which was immediately projected into *alternative politics*. Moreover, since we have seen that theology and politics are not separate in Islam, a slight change in theological orientation (as in Shiism) also changes the political structure.

These principles are valid for understanding the history of Islamic states in the period of traditional societies (pre-modern), but they also have a significant influence on the current political situation in Islamic societies. Thus, modern Iran is a Shiite state in the full sense of the word, and the current leadership of Syria is also Shiite (Alawites are one of the branches of Shiism).

There are two other fundamental elements that changed Islamic metaphysics and politics. The second element, alongside Shiism, was a movement known as *spiritual Islam* or *intellectual Islam*. This movement began to develop during the Abbasid Caliphate and was dominated almost exclusively by Iranians [(2)].

Arab Muslims, who were the first to adopt this ideology (extremely Sunni), took over the Persian Empire of the Sassanids, killed a bunch of Zoroastrians, and made everyone else convert to Islam. Thus, huge masses of a completely different Iranian culture, which had nothing in common with the Arabs and represented a different metaphysics based on the principle of the opposition of Light and Darkness[3], found themselves under Islamic influence (having accepted Islam, they immediately began to reinterpret it based on their own deep philosophical models). An Iranian stratum immediately formed around the first Shiites, supporters of Ali. The Iranians enthusiastically supported the Shiite version because they saw in it much more similarity to their own pre-Islamic tradition. Gradually, Shiism became, to a large extent, an almost purely Iranian phenomenon.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.
[2]   *Korben, A*. History of Islamic Philosophy.
[3]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. World War and the Culture of Waiting.

Sufism — the secret "religion of love"

In Sunni Islam, another movement developed in parallel — *Sufism*, which radically reinterpreted the Islamic tradition in the spirit of Platonism and dualistic Iranian light gnosis[1]. This was a completely different Islamic philosophy. In essence, Islamic philosophy itself was created [by] the Iranians For example, the two greatest representatives of Islamic philosophy, Al-Farabi ʿ 870–950) and Avicenna (980–1037), were Iranians.

Iranian philosophy and Sufism represented a metaphysics based on *the metaphysics of mediation*. We have already established that Islam categorically *rejects* mediation. Sufism and spiritual Islam, on the other hand, *affirm* mediation. For example, it is claimed that before Muhammad there was the eternal Light of Muhammad (Arabic: نور محمدی), which existed between God and people and manifested itself in the historical Muhammad. Accordingly, this Light connected God and the world, and those who are part of this Light are special beings, "friends of God." Once again, an anthropological differentiation arises, dividing people into two types on grounds very close to Platonism. The "friends of God" are those who contemplate His Light, rising above the prejudices of the blind majority, who are satisfied with merely contemplating the play of shadows on the wall of Plato's cave.

Sufism is less politically pronounced than Shiism. Sufis do not have a single doctrine about who should hold power. They have not created their own political doctrine, but they do believe that Sufi sages, or sheikhs, should guide political power. This applies equally to Sunnis and Shiites. The consideration of the inner dimension of existence, which Sufis insist on, is extremely useful for ensuring that power is just, harmonious, and spiritual. Also, Sufis do not have a big problem with the existence of Muslims outside Islamic society. Following their own — inner — tol-

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[1] *Korben, A.* The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism. Moscow: Foundation for the Study of Islamic Culture; Magic Mountain; Design. Information Cartography, 2009

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The Light War and the Culture of Expectation.

[3] Al-Farabi is the author of a series of treatises on the "ideal state," which generally follow Plato's main line of thought. In Islamic philosophy, he was the one who most fully described the model of "Kallipolis." *Al-Farabi. On* the Perfect State. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. At the same time, he proposed building Islamic societies on this basis in specific political and historical circumstances, that is, harmoniously combining Plato's "ideal type" with Aristotle's "normal type." *Al-Farabi.* The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001.

the Islamic religion, they can adapt to any society, finding reflections of the one Truth everywhere. Thus, the greatest philosopher of Sufism. Ibn Arabi (1165–1240), wrote about a special "religion of love," understanding it as the teaching of the Sufis:

> My heart has become capable of taking any form: it is a pasture for gazelles, a monastery for Christian monks, a temple for idols, the Kaaba for pilgrims walking around it, the tablets of the Torah, and the scroll of the Quran. I follow the religion of love, and whatever path the camels of love choose, that is my religion, my faith.

Mazhabs and states

Already in the Umayyad Caliphate and the Abbasid Caliphate that followed, the idea of dynastic succession of caliphs gradually took root, which was a departure from the original egalitarianism of the umma. Various ideas and attitudes of the peoples who found themselves under Arab rule also began to gradually penetrate Islamic culture, gradually strengthening their influence on the Arab elite. Thus, in the Abbasid Caliphate, the active formation of legal schools, or madhhabs (Arabic: مذهب), began.

The most widespread was the Hanafi madhhab (Arabic: حنفية — Hanafi), which included local ethnic beliefs as one of the sources of law, something that was completely unthinkable in early Islam. Other madhhabs — primarily the Hanbali (Arabic: الحنبلي) — reflected attitudes more appropriate to Arab nomadic societies. The Shiites created their own madhhab, the Ja'fari (Arabic: جعفرى), which included the political and religious ideas of the imamate ([3]).

At the same time, the unified Islamic space became pluralised: various separate states began to emerge, where Islam and Sharia law formally dominated, but local customs — including those relating to the political and social structure — continued to retain their significance to a large extent. The initial extreme metaphysical radicalism of the early Caliphate increasingly gave way to various local lo-

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

[2] *Ibn al-Arabi*. Turjumān al-Ashwāq. Beirut: Dār ?ādir, 1966. English translation in *Nicholson R.* The Tarjumán al-Ashwáq: A Collection of Mystical Odes by Muhyiddīn Ibn al-'Arabī. London: Royal Asiatic Society, Oriental. 1911.

[3] *Dugin A. G.* Noomakhia. Semites. The monotheism of the moon and the gestalt of Wa'al.

cal tendencies. In the Abbasid Caliphate, which replaced the Umayyad Caliphate[1], these tendencies became somewhat entrenched. Although the state was conceived as a religious umma, it largely acquired an independent character.

The political landscape

The political history of Muslim societies is closely linked to theology. Theology and politics are inseparable components of a unified Islamic worldview. This fully confirms the basic thesis that politics is only one dimension of philosophy, if we understand philosophy broadly, including religion and its inherent metaphysical picture of the world, i.e., theology. The political philosophy of Islam is shaped by how the Islamic religious worldview emphasises, understands or interprets the relationship between the world (human beings) to God, how radically or non-radically it pursues the idea of the absence of a mediator, or, conversely, how it expresses and describes an intermediate instance between God and the world. The entire political history of Islamic societies is inextricably linked to theological attitudes within Islam. The same principle applies here as the features of Islamic architecture noted by Shuon: the pattern of the political history of Islamic peoples and states is built depending on the structures of the metaphysical interpretation of the most profound and fundamental theological and metaphysical questions. The nature of the relationship with God, the interpretation of sacred texts, and one or another version of the sacred determine how events, wars, conflicts, dynastic collisions, popular uprisings, and social protests unfold. It should be noted that when dealing with Islamic society, we find ourselves in the paradigm of Tradition (Premodern), and therefore the transcendent dimension underlying Islamic religion and dogma must be taken into account as a crucial and effective factor.

In order to understand what is happening in the Islamic world and how we should build relations with Muslims today, it is necessary to operate on the basis of theological principles.

Salafism and Wahhabism

Today, there are several versions of political Islam.

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[1]Remnants of the Umayyad state survived, however, in North-West Africa and on the Iberian Peninsula, where they persisted for several more centuries.

- radical Islam, Salafism (and its extreme form, modern Wahhabism),
- political Shiism,
- and a wide range of versions of traditional Islam. Salafi Islam (from the Arabicسلفية, meaning "the followers of the first generation") calls for

It seeks to return to the ideals and norms of the first Arab Caliphate, the era of Muhammad himself and his companions. Here, the political programme consists of a literal repetition of early Islamic history, including an uncompromising attitude towards "infidels," a tightening of the application of Sharia law, a rejection of flexible forms of legal interpretation, and an irreconcilable struggle against internal Islam (Sufism) and Shiism. Salafis differ from representatives of traditional Islam precisely in that they view virtually all periods of Islamic history with suspicion, with the exception of the earliest era. They see a departure from the "ideal" ("norm") already under the Abbasids, not to mention later periods.

In the 18th century, an even more radical version of Salafism emerged in Saudi Arabia, rejecting all madhhabs (although most Salafis still recognise the legitimacy of established Islamic legal forms, except for Shiite ones) — Wahhabism. Its founder was the preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), who called on his followers to reject any interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, taking everything strictly literally and returning to the 6th–7th centuries, right down to clothing, everyday life and the smallest details Among the Wahhabis, Salafi tendencies towards the "purification of Islam" reached their logical conclusion, and the entire history of traditional Islam was subjected to radical criticism, being recognised as a deviation and hidden "idolatry" (i.e. shirk). The alliance of Wahhabi reformers with the political leaders of the Saud dynasty, the traditional rulers of the Arabian city of Ed-Diriyah, laid the foundation for the future state of Saudi Arabia, which emerged with British support on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

Saudi Arabia and a number of Arab states close to it remain to this day a stronghold of radical Salafism and its corresponding political philosophy. Ideologically close to this movement is the Muslim Brotherhood, which emerged in Egypt. In its extreme forms, this version of Islam is used to justify terrorism and various forms of political and religious extremism, which stems from the literal application of

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Wa'al.

the principle of the "three houses." The Islamic State is one of the most striking examples of such a political-religious model.

Contemporary Shiism

Modern Shiism prevails in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where, after the overthrow of the Shah's regime, a special form of Shiite rule was established, called the "state of the enlightened" [1] (Arabic:ولاية والفقيه — "wilayat al-faqih"). It assumes that while the Last Imam is still in hiding, Shiite scholars, who form a hierarchy based on the depth of their religious experience and breadth of Islamic knowledge, should rule on his behalf. The highest rulers are the Ayatollahs (آية الله , the highest rank among interpreters of religion and law), among whom the Alids, descendants of various branches of the family of Ali, are particularly distinguished. Together, the Alids constitute the "ahl al-Bayt" (أهل البيت), meaning "people of the House," referring to the descendants of Muhammad and Ali.

The "wilayat al-faqih" system is oriented towards the coming of the "end times," when the Last Imam must return to the world and engage in the final battle with the armies of Darkness (which the Shiites consider to be primarily modern Western civilisation — materialistic, atheistic, colonial and hegemonic). This should be accompanied by the spread of Shiism and a series of political victories.

The model of "wilayat al-faqih" and the theories of the Islamic (Shiite) revolution were developed in the 20th century by Shiite intellectuals, primarily Imam Khomeini (1900–1989), who became the leader of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. However, similar ideas were supported by the Shiites of Iraq (who make up about 70 per cent of the Iraqi population) and the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah. There are also Shiite populations in other countries, such as Syria, Yemen (where Shiite Houthis are currently fighting other political groups), Bahrain, Turkey (Alevis), and some countries in the Middle East, the Maghreb, and Central Asia. Shiism is also somewhat widespread in Africa and the United States (mainly among African Americans). There are Shiites in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The Shiites, who have always been persecuted, have a principle called *takiyya* (Arabic:التقية — "prudence," "caution," "discretion").

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. The World War and the Culture of Expectation.
[2] The Shiite revolution in Iran took place in January 1978 - February 1979 (1357 according to the Iranian calendar).

"caution"), i.e. the principle of concealing one's own affiliation in difficult circumstances. Thus, Shiites do not always say that they are Shiites. And in cases where they encounter aggressive opponents of Shiism, they may refer to themselves as "Sunnis". Shiism is a tradition that is, in a sense, parallel to Islam. Shiism has almost always lost historical battles, and all the first imams were killed.Therefore, it is very difficult to determine the exact number of Shiites in the world.

Shiism is a tradition of suffering and pain, a tradition of waiting. But this waiting must be *active* and energetic. At present, Shiite authorities clearly distinguish between the signs of the "last days" and the approaching arrival of the Mahdi, the Last Imam. This has a significant impact on the contemporary political map of the Middle East and, to some extent, Central Asia. The confrontation between modern Iran and Israel is interpreted by both sides in religious and eschatological terms. For Shiites, the state of Israel, which arose on territories previously inhabited by Muslims and is preparing to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the second holiest site in Islam after the Kaaba, in order to begin construction of the Third Temple on that site, embodies the power of pure evil — the principle of Dajjal (Arabic:الدجال), the "Deceiver" — the analogue of the Antichrist in Christian political philosophy, is an eschatological enemy. The support of Israel by the West, and especially the United States, further convinces Shiites of the correctness of this analysis (the West is═ Dadjal, or "Great Shaitan," in the words of Khomeini). In response, Israelis identify Iran as the force that is preventing the coming of the Messiah and seeking to prevent the fulfilment of the prophecies about the restoration of the Third Temple.

Traditional Islam

It remains to briefly consider traditional Islam. As a rule, this refers to the Abbasid-Ottoman versions of Islam adapted to local conditions. That is, "traditional Islam" refers to Sunni Islam, but not fundamentalist, Salafi, or Wahhabi Islam. At the theological level, this form of Islam tends to soften the relationship between the world and God. Theological and

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[1] It is reported that Abu Hasan Rida said: "All eleven imams after the Prophet (s) were killed. Some died by the sword, like the Commander of the Faithful and Husayn (a), and others were poisoned." *Al-Ka'im Mahdi Muntazir*. Jesus in the Qur'an and Hadith. St. Petersburg: Petersburg Oriental Studies, 2012. P. 63.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Iranian Logos. World War and the Culture of Expectation.

The metaphysical meaning of traditional Islam lies in softening the opposition between the immanent existence given to us and the transcendent Beginning (Allah). As soon as this opposition is softened, we are dealing with traditional Islam.

And where this traditional Islam reaches its highest intellectual level of understanding, we encounter Sufi *tariqas* (Arabic: — road, path), orders, and representatives *of tasawwuf* (Arabic طريقه).

Sufism, continuing the line of Ibn Arabi, reinterprets the exclusive oneness of God into an inclusive unity, which allows Muslims to find a place outside the Sharia context, and in Islamic societies to be sufficiently open to various religious forms — primarily monotheistic, but not exclusively so (as Asian Sufism demonstrates in relation to the polytheistic traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism). Politically, this is reflected in the fact that traditional Islam even formally rejects Salafism, recognises the legitimacy of various periods of Islamic and world history, and seeks to find the key to their dialectical interpretation. Therefore, for traditional Islam, the interpretation of the Quran is always relevant and should not be closed at any stage or rejected altogether (as in Wahhabism).

At the same time, supporters of traditional Islam, which includes the vast majority of Muslims in all countries, do not have a single political ideology. Such Islam naturally gravitates towards maintaining Sharia norms, insisting on the fulfilment of religious obligations and the norms of Islamic law. Where possible, priority is given to the creation of an Islamic social order based on the principles of the Quran and Sunnah. However, the most stringent precepts of Islam are interpreted allegorically. Thus, among the two versions of "jihad" ([1]) "holy war," priority is given to the "great jihad," which believers must wage against their own vices and weaknesses, while the "lesser jihad," i.e., the actual "war against infidels," is interpreted as opposition to the enemies of the fatherland, that is, in the spirit of generalised patriotism. Therefore, traditional Islam and its most intellectual core (Sufism) contrast with the more clearly expressed models of the Salafis and Shiites (both in theology and politics), but at the same time it does not represent something whole and allows for many versions.

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[1] This interpretation goes back to the Arab jurist and theologian of the Abbasid period, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (1002–1071), whose authority is generally rejected by Salafis.

The Sufi Empire of the late

The political ideas set forth by Ibn Arabi in his major work The Meccan Prophecies [1] bear a striking resemblance to Shiite eschatology. Ibn Arabi describes the regime that the Mahdi and his loyal viziers will establish at the end of time as a model state. The Mahdi here represents an eschatological version of the "perfect man" (al-insān al-kāmil الكامل الإنسان—), who is generally described by Ibn Arabi as a mediator between God and the world and a divine vice-regent. At the beginning of time, the "perfect man" is represented by Adam, and at the end by the Mahdi. The Mahdi, like the Jewish Messiah, is presented as the "ideal ruler." During the reign of the Mahdi, the restrictive aspects of external Islam and a number of legal interpretations will be abolished, as the Mahdi will know spiritual truth directly. The Mahdi's viziers are described as spiritual beings capable of penetrating divine mysteries and, together with the Mahdi, bringing the external material world into conformity with the Divine plan and light archetypes. Ibn Arabi clarifies that none of the Mahdi's assistants will be ethnic Arabs, although they will all speak only Arabic. Some passages by Ibn Arabi suggest that the Mahdi's "vizirs," endowed with superhuman qualities, will not be mere servants, but his mentors, direct conduits of divine will, a kind of incarnate angels, while he himself will be only a sword, that is, an instrument of will. This again takes us back to the rule of the philosopher-guardians of Plato's Kallipolis. Mahdi (al-Mahdi —ٱلْمَهْدِي) literally means "guided" (meaning "guided by God"), but his viziers are called "the guided" (al-hudat —الهُداة). According to Ibn Arabi, there should be nine such "guided" ones.

It is important that the Sufi vision of the End Times Empire includes a forceful component. The Mahdi himself is repeatedly referred to as a "sword," and various fragments of the "Mecca Prophecies" emphasise that he will defeat his enemies by force.

At the same time, one of the most important features of the Mahdi's rule should be the fair distribution of wealth and honours. If injustice reigns in the present world, the Mahdi's empire will overturn the existing proportions and restore the divine order that has been lost over time. This is the social character of political Sufism, which is, however, exclusively

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[1]   *Morris J W., Chittick W. (ed.)* Ibn 'Arabi:‾ The Meccan Revelations. NY: Pir Press, 2002.

In view of the prospect of the "end of the world," Sufis suggest focusing on the inner spiritual path and calmly accepting the injustices and lawlessness that prevail in the world. In this, the Sufi attitude towards society differs significantly from Salafi projects, which insist that compliance with Sharia law is already a sufficient condition for justice and that this must be enforced immediately, without waiting for some special era.

Sufi sheikhs, including the highest among them, who have the status of "pole" (al-qutb القطب), generally avoid direct involvement in politics, limiting themselves to providing spiritual guidance to those leaders who turn to them for help. However, in the end times, Sufi teachings (and therefore the inner core of traditional Islam) take on pronounced political features, and the scenario of the Mahdi's struggle with his opponents, and even his title "Great Imam" (al-Iman al-Akbar الأكْبَر الأمَام) completely coincides with Shiite eschatology. The only difference is that the Sufi scenario of the restoration of the "ideal state" under the leadership of the "perfect man" is not directly linked to the descendants of Ali, and accordingly, the Sufi Mahdi is seen as having no (at least explicit) connection with the "hidden Imam."

Islam of the Medina Constitution

However, there is another version of traditional Islam that differs from Sufism. In this interpretation, the emphasis is not so much on metaphysics as on determining what constitutes the normative structure of society. In this case, the focus is on the position of the Islamic ummah that prevailed during the lifetime of Muhammad himself. At that time, his followers formed a traditional tribal community of Arab nomads, where the laws of military democracy prevailed, but in the case of Muslims, the head of this community was the prophet. Probably, the Jews in the era of Abraham, but also Moses and up to the era of the Judges, were a similar society, which was replaced by the establishment of the kingdom under Samuel and Saul. In the corpus of Islamic hadiths, evidence of how this early community was organised is contained in the so-called Medina Constitution.

Supporters of this interpretation of traditional Islam reject Salafism, which considers the structure of Islamic society that developed after Muhammad under the first caliphs (i.e., the "salafa," or "followers") to be an unconditional dogma. "followers"), when the foundations of the state, as understood by Sunnis, were laid. In the Umayyad,

Abbasid and, ultimately, Ottoman caliphates, many extraneous elements were added to this. The Shiites and Sufis further enriched Islamic culture with various mystical motifs, moving even further away from Muhammad's Arab nomadic community than the first caliphs and Salafis. If traditional Islam is understood in this way, it can serve as a religious justification for the tribal system in combination with Islamic tradition and as a paradigm for the preservation or even artificial revival of tribal communities. For some Islamic peoples who have preserved their tribal institutions (such as the Chechens and their teips), this interpretation of traditional Islam may be relevant. This explains why one of the leading theorists of such traditional Islam is the Chechen public figure Khoja Ahmed Nukhaev[1]

The same is true for some ethnic groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Malaysia, and probably for the Bedouins who have preserved their nomadic way of life, some Berber tribes and peoples of Africa who have converted to Islam.

Islam in Russia

In modern history, and in particular in Russian society, as in Europe, America and the rest of the world, these theological and, accordingly, political models are still in force and determine a great deal.

Sunni Islam traditionally dominates among Russian Muslims (only Azerbaijanis are Shiites).

In Sunni Russian Islam, in turn, there are two poles, two political philosophies:

1) traditional Islam, oriented mainly towards Sufi tariqas, and
2) radical Islam, Salafi and Wahhabi, imported relatively recently and mainly from Saudi Arabia).

Radical Islam, as we have seen, is guided by a metaphysical vision of a harsh confrontation between man and God. In essence, it is a terrorist ideology that turns any Muslim (if he lives in a non-Islamic society) into a bearer of "dar al-harb," the "house of war." If he is in an Islamic but non-Salafi society (for example, in a Shiite

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[1]   *Nukhaev, H.-A. T.* Vedeno or Washington? Moscow: Arktogey-Centre, 2001.

or in a traditional Islamic environment), he must once again rise up against "incorrect" (i.e., non-Wahhabi) Islam. Supporters of this radical version unite in jamaats, militarised political-religious structures that often resort to terrorist activities. Representatives of traditional Islam, and above all authoritative Sufi sheikhs, often become the targets of assassinations and terrorist acts. For Salafis, it is important first and foremost to get rid of ideological opponents within the Islamic umma itself.

Representatives of traditional Islam in Russia (including Sufi circles) are not unconditional supporters of the Russian political system. Historically, some Sufi tariqas became the core of resistance among the mountain Islamic peoples of the Russian Empire, as was the case, in particular, in the Shamil uprising (1797–1871). Although these versions of Caucasian Sufism already had some features of Salafi ideology, directed primarily against local Caucasian ethnic customs that were calmly accepted by traditional Islam. Also, traditional Islam, for all its inclusiveness, cannot accept the legitimacy of atheistic, materialistic, and hedonistic attitudes, as well as social models that go directly against the norms of Islamic tradition. This applies to certain aspects of political modernity and, even more so, to postmodernity. Supporters of traditional Islam are generally bearers of traditional values such as religion, ethics, justice, morality, family, etc. It was precisely by turning to traditional Islam for support in the fight against radical (Salafi) Islam that Russia owed its success in the Second Chechen War, when the main ally of Moscow in Chechnya became the sheikh of the Sufi tariqa (virda) Akhmad Kadyrov (1951–2004).

There is irreconcilable enmity between the two designated poles of Islam — traditional and Salafi. Although Muslims belong to both poles, their metaphysics, political views, social attitudes, ideas about a normative society, and attitudes towards other nations and religions are diametrically opposed.

# PART 3. THE POLITICAL PARADIGM OF MODERNITY. THE WAR OF CONCEPTS

Chapter 1. The Political Philosophy of Atomism

Generalised paradigm of politics in the pre-modern era

We now move from the political philosophy of traditional society (pre-modern) to the political philosophy of modern societies. In order to understand the political and philosophical essence of this transition, we must again refer to the map of types of the political, based on Plato's dialogue "Timaeus." The meaning of modernity and the entire spectrum of political teachings inherent in it will remain completely incomprehensible if we do not constantly keep in mind the context in which it originated and what the fundamental system of axioms, principles, and basic postulates it negated. Modernity is the negation of Tradition. But as it spread and deepened, what it originally and programmatically denied disappeared behind the horizon or was distorted beyond recognition in the biased and obsessive interpretations of Modernity itself. Therefore, in order to understand how the Political came to be understood and constructed in the New Age, and on what foundation its hermeneutics was based, one must always refer to the very scheme that Modernity itself sought to demolish, refute and abolish.

So, politics in traditional society can generally be reduced to a common pattern described by Plato and Aristotle, which has remained fundamentally unchanged throughout this period (right up to modern times).

All types of political philosophy in traditional society are based on the first two principles. In turn, they can be divided into Platonic political philosophy, where the focus is on the figure of the Father and the model of imitation of the earthly world by the heavenly world, and Aristotelian political philosophy (the political philosophy of the Son), which focuses on the world of phenomena, divided into the upper horizon (eidos, εἶδος) and the lower horizon (matter, ὕλη).

Good

Father

paradigms models

ideas   is

eternity

the ideal state

Empire of the Spirit

Demiurge (creator)

Eidos

Horizon

Son

phenomena

icons

cosmos   symbols

time

to eat or not to eat

normal state

World kingdom

horizon

matter

existence

body   Nurse

Receptacle

matter

space   chora

place

flesh

elements (elements)

materialism

Mother

not there, but reveals

itself or is

kingdom of quantity

nihilism

infra-corporeal zone

center of
hell

Artificial
Intelligence

Antichrist

The tradition
political philosophy of the pre-modern era

Modern
political philosophy of the Modern era

Postmodern

The structure of "Timaeus" and types of political philosophy

Political philosophy in the pre-modern era is characterised by the reduction of all positive ("good") political systems to two fundamental paradigms: the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son. Applying this to the political philosophy of monotheistic religions, we determine in each specific case where the Father paradigm is stronger and where the Son paradigm is stronger, how they combine and how their balance changes in the course of historical transformations, reforms and conflicts[1].

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[1] Only in Protestantism did we encounter for the first time elements of a different political system that goes beyond these two fundamental paradigms of political philosophy.

Let us also recall the division into three socio-political strata (types of milia castes) that we find in the most general models of traditional societies (also in Plato and Aristotle).

Plato   **Aristotle**

philosopher-king   rule of one autocracy   monarch
guardians   *contemplative life*

rule by several
volitional life   aristocracy warriors
assistants to the guardian   *heroism desire for glory*

warriors

craftsmen   rule by many   polity (democracy)
peasants   *sensual life*
physical pleasure   fear
economy

The hierarchy of political strata in Plato and Aristotle

These two types dominate political philosophy in the Tradition. In other words, it is either a monarchical or an aristocratic society. A special case is "theocracy," θεοκρατία, in which the emphasis is on the rule of priests, which does not change the general scheme (domination of contemplative life) but gives the highest caste a special characteristic ([1].

Some elements of democracy are also found in the Salafi interpretation of Islam.
[1] The two founding theorists of traditionalism, René Guénon and Julius Evola (1898–1974), disagreed on the primacy of priests or sacred kings in traditional society. Guénon insisted on the primacy of priests (Indian

The centrality of hierarchy in Tradition

In traditional society, *a vertical hierarchy* is necessary: radically vertical when it comes to the Father, or relatively vertical when it comes to the Son.

The Greek word ἱερπαρχία is formed from two roots, ἱερ, "sacred," and ἀρχή, "rule," i.e., "sacred rule." One may ask: why "sacred authority," why does the term ἱερός appear in this system of power? The point is that the political system reflects the system of theology (if we are talking about monotheistic religions) or ontology (in the case of pre-monotheistic religions). In other words, the political structure of traditional society is sacred; it is based on the principle of sacredness. This is the most important distinguishing feature of traditional society.

Vertical organisation is inextricably linked to sacredness, since it places at the root of the hierarchy not simply quantitative criteria such as power, wealth, or the ability to subjugate others by any means. Such a vertical structure would not be 'sacred', that is, it would not be a 'hierarchy'. Power has an otherworldly source. It originates in heaven, in the realm of the eternal and divine. And it is precisely this relationship with the Divine (however it may be interpreted) that determines the legitimacy of power.

The third type in "Timaeus"

In Plato's Timaeus and Republic, as well as in Aristotle, there is another, third principle. In Timaeus, it is called "chora" (χῶρα), "Mother," "Nurse," "Recipient." In Parmenides, this corresponds to the ontological concept of "many" (πολλά). In Plato's ideal state (Callipolis), this third principle corresponds to peasants or artisans.

In Aristotle's description of the physics of the world, we encounter the principle
"matter (ὕλη — "wood"). In politics, it corresponds to democracy, as the power of representatives of the lowest — third — class. Accordingly, the political philosophy of traditional society is built on the following model: the political philosophies of Father and Son can argue with each other, the Brahmin castes can argue with each other

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the Brahmin caste). See: *Guénon, R.* Spiritual Dominion and Worldly Power. Moscow: Belovodye, 2012. Evola (in the spirit of the Ghibelline ideology) defended the principle of the superiority of sacred kings. *Evola, Y.* Revolt Against the Modern World. Moscow: Prometheus, 2016; *Ibid.* The Mysteries of the Grail. Moscow-Voronezh: TERRA FOLIATA, 2013.

Priests and warriors, just as the aristocracy and the monarchy can argue among themselves — and this is within the bounds of what is permissible.

The third principle in traditional society almost never acquires full power. This principle is material, maternal, peasant-craft. But purely theoretically, just as there is a political philosophy of the Father and the Son, there is also *a* potential *political philosophy of the Mother,* which is unrealizable within the framework of traditional society. This form of government exists only as a hypothesis; from Plato's point of view, it is the ultimate degradation of the ideal state (democracy and tyranny), and from Aristotle's point of view, it is the worst system of government. We are talking about the power of the third principle.

In philosophy, this hypothesis corresponds to the zone of the Mother, matter or space. The sacred politics of traditional society is built on higher levels, but the overall picture of ontological levels and types of political systems reserves a special place for such political philosophy. This place lies beyond the paradigm of Tradition (Premodern) and for many millennia remains a purely potential possibility, coming to life only when normative forms of politics fall into decline and reach a critical point of degeneration.

From Democritus to democracy

However, even in ancient times, we encounter some thinkers who attempted to explain the world not in the traditional Greek manner, where everything originates from the Father or is contained in the living synthesis of the Son, but from the bottom up, starting from matter, bodies, and the direct fact of existence. Plato, in [his] dialogue [Sophist] speaks of a "giantomachy in relation to essence," that is, a dispute between those who recognise the world of ideas and consider it to be original and autonomous (like Plato himself), and those who, on the contrary, accept only bodily things as existing. Plato likens this to a battle between gods and giants — the position of the gods corresponds to the bearers of the classical tradition, while the Titans are the first representatives of ancient materialism. The main character of the dialogue "The Stranger" says the following about them to his listener Theaetetus:

> — Some pull everything down from the sky and from the invisible realm onto the earth, as if embracing oak trees and rocks with their arms. Clinging to everything

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[1]   *Plato.* Sophist / Plato. Collected Works: In 4 vols. Vol. 2.

they claim that only what can be touched and felt exists, and they consider bodies and existence to be one and the same thing, while they pour contempt on all those who say that something immaterial exists, not wanting to hear anything more[1].

To which Theaetetus reasonably
remarks:

— You have named terrible people [2].

Here Plato refers to the teachings of the atomists, primarily Democritus (c. 460 – c. 370 BC). Democritus was one of the first to attempt to construct a philosophical model based on the principle of
"bottom-up" principle. Early thinkers such as Leucippus, who is considered to be ᴰᵉᵐᵒᶜʳⁱᵗᵘˢ'teacher, can also be included here. Later, similar ideas were developed by Epicurus (342/341–271/270 BC) and his follower, the Roman philosopher Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–55 BC).

Leucippus and Democritus put forward the thesis of "isonomy" (ίσονομία), anticipating later ideas of the Modern Age about the isotropy of space and the existence of everything (the principle of contingency[4]). This thesis, often attributed to Leucippus, reads as follows: "no more than otherwise" (Greek: μηδ Ễν μᾶλλον τοιουτον ή τοιουτον είναι)[5] It stems from the idea of the infinity of the phenomenal world (which is strictly opposed to both Plato and Aristotle, since the world in their systems is limited and finite, although for different reasons — in Plato, due to its secondary nature compared to the paradigm, and in Aristotle, because of its harmonious structure around a fixed centre[6]). Thus, everything becomes

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[1]   *Plato*. Sophist. P. 314.

[2]   Ibid.

[3]   Many authors in Ancient Greece (e.g., Epicurus) questioned the existence of Leucippus, believing that Democritus himself was the creator of atomism.

[4]   Copernicus' astronomy, Galileo's and Newton's physics were based on this principle, and in postmodernism, contingency was elevated to the highest principle in object-oriented ontology. See: *Meillassoux, Quentin*. After Finitude: Essays on the Necessity of Contingency. Ekaterinburg; Moscow: Kabinetny Ucheny, 2016.

[5]   *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. L.: Nauka, 1970. P. 207.

[6]   The Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BC) conveyed Democritus' teaching about isotropic space as follows: "Democritus believes that the bodies he calls atoms, i.e. indivisible, due to their hardness, float in an infinite void, in which there is no highest, lowest, middle, furthest or outermost point, and that they float in such a way that when they collide, they stick together, resulting in all the things that exist and that we see; this movement of atoms must be thought of as having no beginning (

relative, and any order turns out to be just a special case of chaos, and moreover, something random and fleeting. This totally destroys the semantic verticality of the world, which turns out to be a purely material phenomenon, since "infinity" in Greek thought was synonymous with matter.

The principle of "isonomy" established a kind of equality not only between one and another, but also between the existing and the non-existing, equating being with non-being, that is, "something is no more than what it is not" (Greek οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν ἤ τὸ μή ὄν εἴναι).

Democritus, following Leucippus, put forward the idea that *atoms* exist. An atom (ὅ ατομος) literally means "something indivisible," "something that cannot be cut." Atomists used another term for indivisible particles — ἀδιαίρετα (2) .The corresponding term "amera" (Greek ἀμερή), literally "that which has no parts," was proposed in the 4th century BC by the sophist and dialectician Diodorus Cronus of Megara. Democritus considered "atoms" to be "dense" ("full,"
"perfect" — Greek πλήρης, ναστός). Thus, Democritus completely overturns the Platonic conception of being, placing existence not above, in the realm of ideas and the divine One, but below. However, only Democritus' commentators identified atoms with existence. He himself apparently did not use such a category as being to describe them. Atoms were contrasted with *emptiness* (3)(το κένόν), infinity (ἀπειρία) or "nothingness" (οὐδέν), but precisely as a mirror opposition. Their non-emptiness, non-infinity and non-nothingness do not yet mean that they *exist,* that they represent being. This is only a concept, and it is no coincidence that Democritus avoids ontological definitions in his philosophy. The difference between emptiness and atoms is speculative, purely conceptual, like emptiness and atoms themselves. The "existence" of atoms is only evidenced by human thought, but according to Democritus, this thought is secondary, being a derivative of the momentary random play of atoms. Thinking is an accident of cosmic chaos. Therefore, its conclusions are, on the whole, random. There is no reliability that Plato attributes to the conclusions of thinking.

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but already happening for an infinite amount of time." *Lurie. S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 251.

[1]The Stoic Posidonius (139/135–51/50 BC) reports that the first to formulate the theory of atoms were the Phoenicians, in particular a certain Mohos of Sidon, who lived before the Trojan War. Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was also convinced of this, identifying Mohos with Moses. See: *Dugin, A. G*. Noomachia. Semites. Monotheism of the Moon and the Gestalt of Va'al.

[2]   This term is attributed to Democritus' disciple Mitrodorus of Chios.

[3] A synonym for "emptiness" is also the important philosophical term "absence" (Greek στέρψη, Latin privatio).

and Aristotle, Democritus is nowhere near. These conclusions are truer than the hallucinations of sensory forms, but still only relatively so. Therefore, the existence of atoms is also relative. They are not so much the ontological foundations of everything as the concept of such foundations. Consequently, it can be said that atoms are not emptiness, but it can hardly be said with certainty that they exist.

Democritus was seriously concerned with epistemology and ontology, that is, reflection on the basis on which he himself asserted the existence of atoms and emptiness and how these assertions relate to sensory experience. It is likely that his emphasis on this distinction led to Democritus sometimes being regarded as a follower of the Eleatics, who, following Parmenides, based their philosophy on the distinction between opinion (δό3α) and truth (ἀλήθεια), where sensory experience affected only opinion, while truth was hidden deep within and accessible only to the intellect. This epistemological position was most fully developed by Plato. But the entire system of Democritus' worldview is opposed to the unity of Plato and Parmenides, proceeding, on the contrary, from multiplicity and emptiness. At the same time, however, Democritus bases his metaphysical judgements on sensory experience, considering it secondary, distorted and unreliable. The Great Void and atoms are postulated by thought, but by a thought that is fundamentally different from the classical Greek interpretation. This is not Logos, not Nous (Νους), not Sophia, which are divine, universal and belong to the transcendent philosophy of the Father. This thought, νοερός, is a product of the mental activity of an individual being. In modern philosophy, this is usually called a "concept" (Latin conceptum, from the verb capere, which literally means "to grasp").

"to grasp"). The instance that grasps the concept is not divine reason, but human reason [1]. But this "quick-witted reason" is different from the information conveyed by the senses. In essence, Democritus was the first in his era to assert a completely original conception of thinking, a special epistemology that surprisingly anticipates the Modern Age, where basic judgements are made on the basis of the same instance — human (primarily individual) reason — bon sense of the French rationalist Descartes (1596–1650) or the common sense of the Scottish realists — T. Reid (1710–1796), A. Ferguson (1723–1816), etc. But it was in the Modern Age that this understanding of thought as a product of rational thinking was most fully proposed by

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[1] Democritus said about this: "We know nothing of what is clear in reality, but the opinion of each of us represents the form (*of things*) in a modified form." *Lurie S.Y.* Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 219.

John Locke (1632–1704), who will be discussed further, was a follower of Democritus. Therefore, Democritus' epistemology, as well as his void-atomist ontology, were completely unprecedented in classical Greece. He considered truth to be the result of the activity of the individual mind, i.e. a concept, while existence (or non-existence, nothingness, emptiness, etc.) appeared as the fruit of rational conclusion. At the same time, he considered truth itself to be inaccessible, hence his famous expression "truth is in the abyss" (Greek: ἐν βυθωι γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια[1]).

According to Democritus, atoms are like tiny particles of dust that can be seen in the sun's rays but remain invisible when scattered in the air. However, this does not mean that humans are capable of seeing atoms, but is merely a metaphorical indication that something invisible under certain circumstances can become visible under others. The Christian author Bishop Jerome of Stridon (342–419 or 420) in his commentary on the Book of Isaiah (40:12) specifically focused on the following passage:

> Who has measured the waters in the hollow of
> his hand, and marked off the heavens with a
> span,
> and counted the dust of the earth?

In the expressions "earthly dust" and "ashes," he saw a reference to another Hebrew word, daq (דק), which he in turn compared to Democritus' "atoms." From this observation, a number of important parallels can be drawn between grains of sand, the smallest particles of matter, and atomist theory. A similar view was shared by the Islamic Ash'ari school, which also identified the smallest particle of matter, the "atom" (Arabic:ذرة — dhara[2]), with the fundamental basis of existence. For the Ash'arites, every "atom" of matter, as well as every point in space and every moment in time, was created by God. In the materialistic picture of Democritus, Leucippus, and other atomists, these particles of dust were not created by anyone, arose by themselves, and are not subject to any law except chance. Therefore, worlds are created and destroyed by the arbitrary play of atoms that stick together and separate ([3]

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[1]   *Lurie, S.Y.* Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 38.

[2] ذرة — dhara literally means "grain," which refers to a completely different symbolic chain associated with agrarian societies and their beliefs.

[3]This topic has been developed by contemporary philosophers — speculative realists, supporters of objectively oriented ontology, who, at a new stage, seek to justify the existence of matter and sub-material dimensions.

The cosmos is composed of atoms, material particles. It arises from the fact that atoms collide chaotically with each other, clump together and disintegrate, forming *a vortex* (δῖνος).

Democritus clearly did not want to explain which came first, atoms or emptiness, but his description of the emergence of a vortex as a stream of atoms cannot avoid this problem. The birth of a vortex is described as follows:

> A whirlwind of all shapes separated from the universe [1].

These words are attributed to Democritus by the Neoplatonist Simplikios (c. 490–560). Epicurus puts it this way:

> The world is a part of space that has separated from infinity [2].

In the first case, the verb ἀποκρίνω is used in the sense of "to separate," while in the second, Epicurus uses the verb ἀποτέμνω, which has the same root as the word "atom," indicating "cutting" or "dividing." A whirlwind, consisting of indivisible particles, is initially separated from emptiness (infinity), which becomes the beginning of the movement of atoms in emptiness. But here it should be noted that in order to separate from emptiness, it is necessary first to be merged with it, unified, inseparable. And although Democritus and Epicurus strive to give both atoms and emptiness, in the very sense in which they are described, the property of eternity, and thus eternal separateness from each other, the very description of the appearance of a whirlwind of atoms indicates some state preceding this separateness, since the appearance of a whirlwind

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The themes of "sand" and "particle memory" are also of great importance to contemporary philosopher Reza Negarestani, who links sand and dust, as the root of matter, to the distinctive style of Middle Eastern cultures and even directly to Islamic civilisation. See: *Negarestani R.* Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials. Melbourne: Re.Press, 2008. The "memory of atoms" was also a central theme for Russian cosmists N.F. Fedorov and K.E. Tsiolkovsky. According to Fedorov, matter contains the atoms of deceased ancestors, which must be resurrected by scientific methods. *Fedorov N. F.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Progress-Tradition; Evidentis, 1995–2004. Tsiolkovsky believed that every atom of matter was once part of a living organism (according to Tsiolkovsky, life cannot be a random phenomenon of a single planet and is a universal phenomenon, hence his conviction in the existence of life in other worlds, galaxies and planets). Therefore, the atom contains an euphoric quantum of being (the memory that a particle of matter was a component of a living organism inspires it with happiness. *Tsiolkovsky, K. E.* Cosmic Philosophy. Moscow: IDLi; Sfera, 2004. See also: *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Images of Russian Thought. The Sun King, the Reflection of Sophia, and Underground Russia. Moscow: Academic Project, 2019.

[1]   *Lurie, S. Ya.* Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 274.
[2]   *Ibid.* P. 275.

is described as an event whose meaning consists in separation. And it is obvious that the primordial state preceding the appearance of a vortex consisting of atoms must be the non-existence of atoms as such and their fusion with emptiness. This allows us to assume a shadow side of atomistic ontology (more precisely, nihilistic ontology), which Democritus himself probably calls "the abyss in which truth resides."

If we put aside this highly problematic cosmogony (ontogony), the cosmological description of the already existing cosmos, in which vortices swirl, looks as follows. There are voids between atoms, and motion (including the cycle of births and deaths) is explained by the random coupling (Ϥπάλλα3ις) and uncoupling of atoms. According to Democritus, the world itself is essentially the Great Void (το κένόν[1]), infinity (ἀπειρία)[2] or "nothingness" (οὐδέν[3]). Atoms move chaotically in this void, creating worlds that arise and are destroyed.

> Atoms rush about in the void in a haphazard manner; colliding with each other spontaneously as a result of their disorderly movement and intertwining due to their diversity of forms, they do not cling to each other and thus create the world and everything in it, or rather, infinite worlds [4].

These worlds consist of forms (εἴδωλα[5]). Democritus denies the existence of ideas (unlike Plato) and that each thing has its own purpose (unlike Aristotle). Therefore, the only way to explain things is to identify the cause. Existence, having no purpose and no higher eternal meaning, becomes, on the one hand, accidental and, on the other hand, mechanically predetermined by a law of cause and effect, that is, material necessity.

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[1] Lat. inanitas.

[2] Lat. infinitas.

[3] Lat. nihil.

[4] *Lurie. S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 276.

[5] The choice of the term εἴδωλον to denote form as opposed to Plato's ἰδέα, εἴδος or Aristotle's μορφή is significant. The Greeks used this word to denote something that appears to be — a ghost, a phantom. The concept of "idol" derives from this. This is not a vision of the essence of a thing, but, on the contrary, its false appearance. In the eidolon, the "idol," the ghost, nothing essential is hidden; it is a shadow, deprived of the body that casts it. Such is the atomistic universe — it is a ghost. In postmodernism, this theme was developed in the direction of "ontology," the "science of ghosts.*" Derrida, J.* Specters of Marx. M.: Logos altera, Ecce homo, 2006; *Buse P., Scott, A. (eds)*. Ghosts: Deconstruction, Psychoanalysis, History. London: Macmillan, 1999.

The lying logos

We have seen that Plato, in Timaeus, claimed that matter is grasped by a special "bastard logos." This "bastard logos" is the form of conceptual thinking with which Democritus grasps the existence of emptiness (το κένόν) or "nothingness" (ούδέν). The Neoplatonist Plotinus, reflecting on the nature of the "bastard logos" (λόγος νόθος), comes to the conclusion that Plato's third type of being, the incomprehensible "chora" (χ͞ρα), "is comprehended by thought that does not proceed from the mind, but is empty" ([1].

The mysterious, empty, bastard, illegitimate Logos is not emptiness itself, since it is still a definite property, but *an emptied thought*. This is the conceptual thinking of the individual, which later became the normative form of consciousness in the Modern era.

According to Plotinus, matter is "fantasy," that is, a purely pseudo-logical category. Plotinus writes:

> (…) some find matter empty (identifying it with emptiness). I say that it is a phantom (fantasy) of mass (weight), φάντασμα ὄγκου, since the soul, which has come (extremely) close to matter, cannot distinguish anything (clearly) (distinguish, ὀρίσαι, define, place within limits, within boundaries), begins to tremble (rage, agitate) in uncertainty, and has no power to grasp something with its gaze (give form, outline, recognise eidos, eidetic features, define) or come to (reveal) a sign (meaning), because that would be the same as distinguishing (and that is precisely what it cannot do)([2].

This phrase develops the idea that heaviness is more a state of the soul than a property of matter, that heaviness is born of the frenzy, the obsession of the soul, which falls and desperately tries to stop its fall — but not through flight, but through dark and ignoble operations that ultimately lead to the constitution of materiality — as a mark of the deepest degeneration of the mind.

Matter itself does not exist, but there is a "logos" that perceives it. This is the "lying logos."

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[1]   àllà λογισμ¼ ούκ Ҷк νου, àλλà κενως. *Plotinus*. Second Ennead // Plotinus. Enneads: In 7 vols. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House; University Book, 2010. P. 203.

[2]   *Ibid.*

According to Plotinus, the atom is the limit of the descent of the Mind, which cuts and divides any object of thought into two halves.

The Mind seeks duality, for it divides until it reaches the simple, which can no longer be divided. As long as it can, it will continue to descend into its abyss. The abyss of each is matter; therefore, it is completely dark, for light is the Logos[1]

Accordingly, the cessation of division, i.e., the attainment of the atom, is the moment of complete extinction of the Mind. But if the Mind is extinct, then it does not exist. It can exist after its end only as a phantasm, as an extremely weakened parody of itself, incapable of performing what is the main characteristic of the Mind — *to distinguish*. An undifferentiating mind is a paradox, but it is precisely this epistemological instance that operates with the concept of the atom.

Plotinus' remark is extremely important for Politica Aeterna, as it allows us to better understand the metaphysical foundations of Modernism. Modernity is based on pseudo-logic; it is a generalisation of the "lying logos." And the first to formulate the "lying logos" as the main and only one was Democritus, the most modern of the modern thinkers.

The mortality of the gods, the pull of hell, and democracy

Democritus taught that nothing is eternal, and even the gods are only more durable (more stable) than humans, but sooner or later they perish. It is significant that various sources indicate that Democritus wrote a work entitled "On the Kingdom of Hades," which claimed that the dead can feel something. On this basis, he proposed preserving corpses (in honey) so that they could be resurrected under certain circumstances. All this testifies to Democritus' heightened interest in precisely that underground realm which, in traditional ontologies of classical Greece, was placed at the lowest level of existence.

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[1]   *Plotinus*. Second Ennead. P. 189.

[2]This theme anticipates not only Modernism, but also, in part, the Postmodern paradigm, where, in the context of post-humanist theory and technological development, the question of achieving physical immortality becomes one of the main ones. This aspect of Democritus' teaching can be correlated with the philosophy of the "Russian Cosmists." See *Fedorov*, *N. F.* Collected Works: In 4 vols. Moscow: Progress-Tradition; Evidentis, 1995–2004.

[3] *Dugin, A. G*. Noomachia. Hellenic Logos. Valley of Truth. Moscow: Academic Project, 2016.

Democritus did not construct an original political philosophy and mainly taught about the structure of the world, but as we have repeatedly noted, any philosophy necessarily has a political dimension. Therefore, if we apply Democritus' principle to society, we obtain the seeds *of a theory of democratic society*. The philosophy of atomism, when projected into the sphere of politics, gives us the basic idea of *democracy*. As confirmation of this, we find a brief fragment from Democritus himself:

> Poverty in a democratic state is preferable to what is called a happy life in a monarchy[1].

When we project the concept of an atom onto a political system, we arrive at the concept of a "social atom." In Greek, atom, ατομος ("indivisible," "that which cannot be cut"). In Latin, there is a direct translation of the term — individuum, "indivisible." From this, it is easy to logically deduce that the aggregate of individuals (political atoms) creates and establishes a political state. Thus, in the most general terms, the philosophy of democracy is born, filling the hypothetical — third — place assigned to it in the complete three-part model of the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the nature of the Political.

The formula "one from many"

Democritus was an atomist philosopher, and his philosophy, which describes a world built from material atoms (he even considered gods to be material), is a doctrine of democracy. This doctrine can be described by the following formula: from many, "one" can arise. This is the sixth hypothesis from Plato's dialogue "Parmenides." It is significant that the Latin version of this expression, "e pluribus unum" (Latin for "out of many, one"), is the motto on the coat of arms of the United States.

This is the philosophy of the third principle, which is essentially absent in the ancient traditional world, in the world of sacred politics. Plato called for the burning of Democritus' books because, from the point of view of the Greeks, who were oriented towards the Father and the Son, the maternal "philosophy from below" that the masses would determine what is true could inspire only

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[1]   *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 361.

For those thinkers who stood on the side of the gods in the "gigantomachy of essences," the phenomenon of democracy or the philosophy of Democritus (atomism) was the ultimate form of degradation.

As long as we are dealing with a religious society, we always remain within the paradigm of the political philosophy of the Father or the Son, and any attempt to construct a political system based on a multitude (individuals, political atoms) is impossible in a traditional society. Although democracy was a phenomenon partially known in Ancient Greece, it was hardly possible to elevate it to an independent political doctrine, to political philosophy. Rather, democracy was conceived as a product of the corruption of more perfect forms of political organisation. But the example of Democritus (as well as Epicurus and Lucretius) shows that the possibility of constructing a philosophical teaching based on the third — material, matriarchal — principle was nevertheless partially realised. It did not develop significantly, since in the culture of Greece, Rome, and then in the European Middle Ages (as well as in the Islamic world and other civilisations) until the Modern era, the traditional model of sacred hierarchy prevailed.

The situation began to change only with the advent of the Modern era. And only then, in the Modern era, did this political philosophy, the philosophy of the third level, gradually come to the fore until it became dominant.

Epicurus: ancient liberalism of the "Garden"

Another Greek materialist philosopher, Epicurus, lived after Democritus, from whom he completely borrowed the idea of atoms and emptiness. While accepting Democritus' cosmology and his atomistic metaphysics, he nevertheless placed much greater trust in sensory perception, which he considered to be the main criterion of truth. Considering the data of the senses to be the basis of real existence, Epicurus developed a sensualist ontology, which, however, rested on a more fundamental basis — the conceptual philosophy of Democritus, to which Epicurus turns whenever it is necessary to make a more profound conclusion than sensory experience allows. Thus, Epicurus explains the existence (and at the same time the mortality) of the soul and even of the gods by the bonding of atoms. Epicurus' gods live in the voids between worlds (Greek: μετακοσμία), which are again a scaling of Democritus' interatomic void.

If Epicurus does not introduce anything fundamentally significant into the ontology of the third kind — Matter, "chora," "multiplicity" —[1] , and his sensualism is in a sense a step backward compared to Democritus' conceptual materialism, he justifies several social and ethical theories which — like everything materialistic and individualistic — will be adopted in the Modern era. Thus, Epicurus considers the human desire for pleasure (Greek ἡδονή — hence "hedonism") to be the basis of ethics. Here we can easily recognise the third principle of the soul in the metaphor of the chariot in Plato's Phaedo. In Plato, the lowest — the third (a direct analogy with the third gender — Mother-Receiver) — force of the soul is called "desire" or "lust," "wanting" (Greek ἐπιθυμία), and Epicurus reduces the structure of man to this very quality. Man is governed solely by desires, which constitute the highest goal of his existence. In turn, all desires can be classified, but what desire as such gravitates towards is precisely *pleasure*. Such directness in glorifying the lowest — the least noble — property of the soul was rare in Hellenic culture, but in turn anticipated the ethics of the Modern Age — above all the "utilitarianism" of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832).

Even more insightful — in the same vein as Modern's anticipation — was Epicurus' theory of the origin of society. From his point of view, society and the state arise from the bottom up, as the result of *a "social contract*." Unlike Plato and Aristotle, for whom the whole preceded the parts, Epicurus derives the whole from the parts. He considers the subject of the "social contract" to be the maximisation of pleasure and the minimisation of violence, which is the antithesis of pleasure. People unite in society not because it has some special ontology, mission or goal, but only to protect themselves from causing each other unpleasantness. In general, Epicurus considered a more or less secluded life devoted to the pursuit of pleasures, which included sensory experiences of various kinds — from eating and drinking to conversations with friends — to be optimal. This right to pleasure was something natural for Epicurus, from which he derived the theory of "natural law" (φύσεως δίκαιόν) as the original and normative existence of the individual.

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[1] The exception is the assumption of deviation (παρἔγκλισις) of an atom from a straight line of motion, which was later noted by Karl Marx. The theme of deviation became particularly relevant in postmodern philosophy.

Therefore, the wise man Epicurus advised to "live hidden" (λάθε βιō̄σας), at a sufficient distance from society, without getting too involved in its element. He called the school where he lived and taught others his philosophy "The Garden."

Epicurus' attitude towards death is revealing. He considered fear of death unnecessary, as he did not believe that the soul could survive the body and, therefore, that there was no continuity or common measure between life and death (just as between an atom and emptiness). When a person lives, he only comes to life, that is, he exists. And this existence of sensory being is, in a sense, total. It is not limited by anything, since the onset of death does not affect the same being that enjoys life. Death is not experienced, not realised, and does not pose a threat to life, since it does not exist during life, and after death it also does not exist, since there is no subject that could testify to its demise and compare posthumous existence with life. In this, Epicurus disagrees with Democritus, who taught that a corpse has residual sensuality and that the soul disintegrates more slowly than the body. Democritus based his ontology of Hades on this. For Epicurus, who based everything on sensory experience, such a difference between the speed of disintegration into atoms of the body and the soul is meaningless, since it cannot be reliably determined from experience. Once again, this view of death and the absence of the soul corresponds precisely to the most existential culture of the Modern era.

In fact, Epicurus' ideology represents almost complete *liberalism*, anticipating European philosophical thought by a millennium and a half.

Epicurus' teachings were first adopted during the Renaissance, when Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655) took a keen interest in his atomism and sensualism.

Ockham's nominalism

The first approximation to the atomism of the Modern Age, in which some features of Democritus' teachings can already be recognised, can be considered the position of the nominalists in the medieval dispute about *universals*. This dispute was in fact a new edition of the "gigantomachy regarding essence," resumed more than a millennium after the era of Plato. The most consistent Platonism, that is, the philosophy of the Father, was the position of "idealism."

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[1]   *Gassendi, P.* Works: In 2 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1966–1968.

The most prominent representative of this school was the Irish mystic John Scotus Eriugena (c. 810–877). Idealists completely shared the position of Plato and the Platonists that ideas precede things and exist independently of things and before them. The idealists interpreted universals, i.e. generalising concepts, precisely as Platonic ideas and insisted on their autonomy and complete ontological superiority. This position was defined as (universalia ante rem). However, this position was rejected by Catholic dogma, although this did not prevent Platonism from surviving in the Catholic Church, albeit mainly in Catholic mysticism.

The idealists-Platonists were opposed by realists who, relying on Aristotle, insisted that "eidos" (but not the idea!) exists and has being only when it exists *through* a thing, within a thing, through a thing (universalia in re). This interpretation was called "realism" (from the Latin res, "thing," since only existing things were endowed with unconditional being). Here, universals were equated precisely with eidos or form, that is, the philosophy of the Son and Aristotelian immanentism (but without materialism) prevailed. This position was held by the majority of scholastics, and it was accepted by Catholicism as an unconditional dogma.

But already in the 11th century, representatives of a third position appeared, who in fact laid the foundation for future materialism and individualism. They argued that a general concept is only a linguistic convention and is not endowed with any existence, representing an "empty sound" (flatus voci). Their position was defined by the formula universalia post rem. The term "nominalism" comes from the Latin nomen, "name," "designation," "designation." This meant that nominalists believed that only concrete things exist, and that their reduction to a generalised form, to a universal, is nothing more than a name attributed from outside for the convenience of classification. The first representative of nominalism was the French scholastic, the founder of nominalism, John Roscelin of Compiègne (c. 1050 - c. 1122). Roscelin's ideas and nominalism in general were condemned because they contradicted realism, which was accepted as a philosophical dogma.

In fact, nominalists propose a model of the universe that corresponds to the third type of Plato's Timaeus — that is, Matter, "chore." Here, a thing is conceived as a primary given, the fundamental

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[1] *Erigène Jean Scot.* De la division de la nature. Periphyseon. P.: Presses Universitaires de France; Épiméthée, 1995–2009.

which are materiality and individuality. Only the unique, separate and concrete exist in the full sense of the word, according to nominalists. An attempt to give the same name to different — albeit similar — individual things does not change the existence of each of them or all of them together. They continue to exist both together and separately precisely as individual objects, and the commonality of names is attributed to them by human consciousness, which simplifies its perception of the world through artificial operations that do not affect the individuality — in essence, the atomicity — of each concrete thing. This means that for nominalists there is neither idea nor eidos, that is, neither a model (paradigm) nor a bipolar and indivisible structure in which essence and matter necessarily exist and are both endowed with full and independent existence. By opposing realists, nominalists undermined the very foundation of the worldview on which the medieval model of the world was built, where Aristotle's ontology dominated.

In the spirit of nominalism, a model was constructed by one of the most prominent representatives of late scholasticism, Duns Scotus[1] (1265–1308), who insisted that the most general element of existing things is matter, which constitutes being (an extremely anti-Platonic and anti-Aristotelian idea). At the same time, matter itself in its universality can only be known by God, and everything else that exists is an individual unit. For Duns Scotus, a thing is not a combination of form and matter, as in Aristotle and the realists, but an individuality that is the highest and ultimate reality, ultima realitas entis. Duns Scotus' followers introduced a special term to denote this highest individual reality — haecceitas, "thisness." According to Duns Scotus, the sign of being does not coincide with what a thing is (quidditas, "whatness"), but with the fact of the existence of the named "this" thing. From this follows the recognition of being behind matter (but this truth is open only to God) and behind individuals, and this represents the ultimate truth and the limit of human knowledge. Thus, we see here both materialism (equating being with matter, not with eidos or idea) and individualism, i.e., the refusal to recognise independent existence behind universals.

The nominalist philosophical paradigm was finally formulated by another English thinker, the Franciscan William

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[1] *Blessed John Duns Scotus.* Selected Works: Franciscan Publishing House, Moscow, 2001.

Occam [1](1285–1349). Occam accepts most of Duns Scotus' ideas, but goes even further. According to Occam, God does not create matter (as in Duns Scotus) by his will, which then becomes individual objects through a volitional impulse, but individual things, individuals, directly. According to Occam, individuals exist entirely *outside* the mind, both divine and human. But in God they have their origin as God's will, and in humans, who are in turn pure individuals, the will is limited by certain boundaries. Therefore, in any case, cognition is only cognition by individuals and of individuals. *God knows things through the process of their individual creation.* Man knows things through individual experience of contact with individual things.

The experience of individual things, which alone possess existence, corresponds in consciousness to two types of intentions that form two classes of natural signs. The first intention is *a natural sign* of the mind, a concept (conceptum) corresponding to an individual thing, a kind of "natural sign." The second intention is even more conventional and, in turn, serves to designate "natural signs." These two intentions characterise the logical activity of the knowing mind. Finally, there are also *conventional signs (*flatus voci), which, by agreement, serve to exchange information about natural signs between people. Languages belong to this category. At the same time, according to Ockham, there are no "universals" at all, and everything that serves to designate individual things is nothing more than signs of one kind or another. Thus, Ockham's nominalism prepares the philosophical platform for the science and logic of the modern era. Only individual material physical things are endowed with existence, while their conceptual analogues (first intention and second intention) are placed in the realm of human consciousness and regarded as conventions. Occam's political ideas are highly symptomatic ([2].

He was one of the first European authors to advocate the separation of church and state, formulating his ideal in terms of "enlightened absolutism." Based on his conception of the individual ontology of man and things, he provided a metaphysical justification for absolute private property as a direct legal relationship between two individual entities —

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[1] A compendium of Ockham's teachings: a translation of the Tractatus de principiis theologiae. St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure University, 1998.

[2] *Guilelmi de Ockham.* Opera Politica. 4 vols. Manchester; Oxford: Manchester University Press; Oxford University Press, 1940–1997.

man and thing, which later became the basis of the economic philosophy of liberalism.

Overall, Occam is rightly considered a precursor of *the* later *bourgeois liberal-democratic ideology* based on philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics, which is extremely close to Occam's views. Both the main currents of empirical science and representatives of contemporary analytical philosophy usually trace their origins back to him.

Nominalism prepared the ideological ground for Protestant philosophy and for some trends of the Renaissance. In it, we see two fundamental aspects of the political Logos of the New Age: materialism and individualism, which would later develop fully in a different context — completely outside the paradigm of Tradition. In principle, nominalism contains all the basic prerequisites for a political philosophy that is built strictly from the bottom up, contrary to the vertical models that dominated the Church and the state in the Catholic Middle [Ages.]

The Modern Era. The Modern Paradigm

Here we come to what is the paradigm of the Modern Age.

The Modern Age is an era that began in the 16th century in Western Europe and lasted until the end of the 20th century, representing a completely unique historical period. During the same period, traditional societies based on the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son still existed in non-Western Europe. Therefore, the Modern Era is a phenomenon that can be localised not only historically but also geographically.

It can be said that the Modern Era is a specific type of philosophy, politics, culture, science, and thinking characteristic of Western European countries from the 16th to the 20th centuries. Initially, under its influence

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[1]It should be noted that in Orthodox culture there has never been anything even remotely resembling nominalism, and the basic topology of thought remains within the context of the philosophy of the Father and the philosophy of the Son, never coming even close to equating being with matter or individuality. In Orthodoxy, Aristotle's philosophy has retained its significance to this day, the most important points of which in the context of Orthodox theology are set out by John of Damascus (c. 675 – c. 753). See The Works of St. John of Damascus, Source of Knowledge. Moscow: Indrik, 2002.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

These were partly Italy [1], where certain scientific materialistic teachings developed, as well as England [2]and France [3], which became the two main centres for the spread of Modernism both in Europe and beyond. Modernism then began to expand in "circles," spiraling—mainly through colonial conquests—across the entire world. In fact, the age of Columbus coincides with the beginning of the modern era. In some societies, the modern worldview penetrated as deeply as in Europe itself, where it reached the mineral roots of human culture, making modernity a natural, self-evident mental environment.

While in Europe this movement was directed inward (it could be called "*intensive* Modernism"), in colonial societies or societies that were partially Westernised and Europeanised from outside, these systems of thought were superficially superimposed on deeper archaic and traditional models, and in this case, the extensive spread of the Modern paradigm affected mainly only the superficial aspects of society. This superimposition of two paradigms — the Modern paradigm on the not yet completely obsolete paradigm of Tradition — gave rise to a special sociological phenomenon — *the archaeo-modern (*[4] In any case, since the 16th century, this paradigm of the New Age has gradually expanded, and today it is dominant in one form or another on a global scale.

What is the meaning of the New Age from a philosophical point of view? Starting with Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) and Pierre Gassendi, the first theorists who laid the foundations [for]the scientific picture of the Modern Age·this philosophy directly refers to Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. This marks a departure from the vertical worldview of Plato and Aristotle and establishes a new view of the world — from the bottom up, from the perspective of matter, corporeality, and direct earthly existence. This is accompanied by radical attacks on Aristotle, who was considered in the Middle Ages to be the standard and infallible thinker in all matters of science and cosmology. The legacy of the atomists, which existed on the periphery of culture, is extracted

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Latin Logos. Sun and Cross.

[2]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[3]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. French Logos. Orpheus and Melusina. Moscow: Academic Project, 2015.

[4]   *Dugin, A. G*. Archeomodern. Moscow: Eurasian Movement, 2011.

[5]   *Dugin, A. G*. Evolution of the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science. Moscow: Arktogeya-Centre,
2002

from nothingness and gradually becomes a new scientific and philosophical dogma.

The direct predecessors of the atomists were the medieval nominalists, who had the greatest influence in England. Later, it was England that became the cultural environment where, earlier than other European countries and in a sense more fully and vividly, the main provisions of this new paradigm were developed.

From the perspective of Plato's three levels of existence in the Modern Age, we are dealing with the philosophy of Mother, Metria, and χōρα. The entire scientific picture of the world in the Modern Age — in Galileo, Copernicus, and especially in Descartes and Newton (1642–1727) — is based on the idea of Democritus' atomism. Thus, the philosophy of the New Age is new because it rejects both the principle of the Father and the principle of the Son, and at the same time, the Christian Middle Ages is overthrown. But at the same time, it rediscovers the basic tenets of a philosophical movement that was considered marginal and extravagant in classical Greece.

The new era saw itself as a paradigm alternative to the Middle Ages and set itself the task of overthrowing the verticality that constituted the essence of previous worldviews, which had prevailed in Europe in both the Christian and pre-Christian eras. From then on, scientists who considered only knowledge obtained through rational judgement or physical experience to be valid still acknowledged God, but only as a philosophical convention, an abstract cause necessary to explain the existence of material being. This trend was called "deism," that is, belief in God apart from religion, worship, full-fledged theology, and a complete dogmatic worldview. Such a belief was conceived not as a revelation received from Heaven, but as a rational conclusion reached by a group of separate, atomic individuals on the basis of consistent reasoning.

Protestantism is based on the "religious atom."

The Protestant Reformation was the most important moment in the transition from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity in Europe.

We have briefly described the model on which the Orthodox and Catholic interpretations of politics are based, mentioning Protestantism as well. Here we should dwell on this in a little more detail, since it is precisely Protestantism that is associated with the phase transition of European civilisation to the Modern Age.

In the 16th century, a new religious movement called *Protestantism* emerged in Europe. It rejected Orthodoxy and Catholicism, asserting a new religious model based on
the "religious atom," not on God, but on man, capable of independently forming his own judgement about God.

The Protestant Reformation, while remaining formally within the Christian context, marked a transition from the political theology of the Father and the Son to *a political theology of the Earth*, at the centre of which was no longer God, but man, ᵗʰᵉ individual personality. Protestants unite in congregations, communities where they discuss God based on their own conscience and make decisions about Him. In doing so, they consider themselves entitled to abolish certain aspects of tradition or add something new. Religious dogma loses its meaning. The doctrine of the Church, based on the supernatural presence of Christ and the Holy Spirit, is replaced by a social constructivist interpretation. Thus, at the level of religion, the vertical hierarchy is completely lost, and consequently the entire picture of the sacred world collapses. Protestants rethink Christianity from an individual perspective. This was the main reform of Martin Luther (1483–1546) and his followers, which dealt a powerful blow to the medieval worldview and theocracy.

A new theology, a new philosophy of nature, and, most importantly for us, *a new philosophy of politics* are emerging in the Protestant environment. Almost all the classics of modern political philosophy came, in one way or another, from Protestant circles, since we are dealing with a general phenomenon — *a paradigm shift,* a transition from Aristotelianism and Platonism to a completely new picture of the world. This time, it is horizontal and even chthonic, and at its centre stands not God, as before, but man. Ideas about the world, God, and the relationship between the Creator and creation are constructed not from the top down, but from the bottom up. The political system is now also organised from the bottom up; it is now conceived as a product
"collective agreement" or "social contract." In principle, Democritus understood the essence of politics in a similar way, arguing that laws and states were invented by people and therefore there is nothing sacred about them; they can be restructured or abolished at any time.

Although Protestantism is still a religion, it fundamentally paves the way for the emergence of pure atheism. Here one can

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Germanic Logos. The Apophatic Man.

recall the words of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900): "God is dead. We killed him — you and I!"[1] With regard to political philosophy, this tragic statement means that the essence of the New Age is the dismantling of the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of God and the transfer of everything to earth, to materiality, to the economy, to the individual, to material and technical progress, to capitalism. Thus, the political philosophy of the New Age is nothing more than a political cross-section of a new philosophical paradigm.

The revolt of the third estate

In Plato, the philosopher rises from the cave and descends back into it; he separates himself from ordinary people, who see only shadows; then he comprehends the truth and returns with new knowledge. In Aristotle, we saw the "unmoved mover," which is the immanent God around whom all beings revolve, striving to come closer to him. In Platonism, the subject is a transcendent God, and all of Platonism's politics is built around God as an actor. In Aristotelianism, God is no longer thought of as transcendent, but as inherent in the world; this is the idea of an "unmoved mover" who stands at the centre of things, not above them.

At the third level, in the philosophy of the Modern Age, *a new subject* emerges (the bourgeoisie, the third estate), which democratically organises its political system, acts as a socio-political atom and emphasises material things. This transformation is an act of rebellion by the third estate of European society against the two higher castes (priests and warriors). Such an act of rebellion constitutes the profound meaning of modern philosophy.

The political philosophy of the Modern Age presents society and politics as *the creation of human hands*. The state appears as a property of human individuals, and the idea of a social contract (a state based on a social contract) emerges.

Note the metaphysical and philosophical roots of this completely new idea. *The state becomes a product of a social contract only if the subject of politics is the human being, and the object of politics is the human being.*

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[1] *Nietzsche, F.* The Gay Science (la gaya scienza) / Nietzsche, F. Complete Works: In 13 Volumes. Vol. 3: Dawn. Messinian Idyls. The Gay Science. Moscow: Cultural Revolution, 2014. P. 440.

The individual (i.e., the atom) *is the basis of politics*. Self-sufficient atoms unite into a group and launch the state, creating it.

Plato's conception of the state is completely different: the state is not created by anyone, its structure is not created by people, the state as Kallipolis always exists, and in the world of phenomena it is an expression of being, of sacred being, built on the principle of a sacred hierarchy.

Aristotle said that "man is a political animal." What does "political animal" mean? It means that everything non-political in man is animal, and if we remove politics from man, we are left with a beast. Elsewhere, Aristotle says that man is "an animal with the power of thought." Here, man is defined through the state and through thought, rather than thought and the state being defined through man. In the classical version of a vertical society, only a being ("animal") that has awakened to philosophy and politics is truly human. If a person is not involved in politics, according to Aristotle and Plato, if he does not think or philosophise, then he does not exist. Thus, man is a derivative of Logos, of the idea.

The philosophy of the New Age completely overturns this definition. For it, man himself produces both thought and the state. The idea of eternal, shining heavenly truth is transformed into the result of the reasoning of an individual, whose norm becomes the bourgeois, the philistine. Accordingly, the state loses its sacred dimension, turning into a kind of artel, trust or commercial enterprise. The third estate brings with it its own philosophy — the philosophy of the body, feelings, matter, comfort, carnal pleasures, well-being and security. Politics is now built according to the philosophy not of priests, thinkers and heroes, but of merchants.

Man as a producing and trading being

The political philosophy of the Modern Age considers thought and political philosophy to be an artificial construct of the individual. For Platonists and Aristotelians, for people of traditional society, politics is given just as the world is given. For representatives of modern philosophy (as for Democritus), politics is a man-made phenomenon. Politics is as random as the collision of atoms. The state arose artificially,

[1] *Sombart, W*. Merchants and Heroes. Jews and the Economy/Sombart, W. Collected

Works: In 3 vols. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2005.

based on contracts and agreements between people, and therefore politics may not exist.

What, then, is man in this philosophy of the New Age? Man here is a producing (homo faber) and trading (homo mercatus) being.

In the classical model, politics is an integral part of the very nature of the philosopher and warrior, but for representatives of the third estate, politics is fundamentally optional. Hence the idea that the philosophy of politics in the modern era regards the political dimension as artificial and contractual, i.e., not inherent in the nature of the world or even in human nature. Politics is understood here as an artificial construct built by humans, but it does not reflect human essence. Politics becomes optional.

What, then, reflects human nature? Food, trade, comfort, security, pleasure, material activity, bodily reproduction. This is the fate of merchants and craftsmen. Politics and the state, unlike economic activity, are completely optional parts of existence in modern philosophy. This gives rise to the idea of civil society as a society of autonomous individuals who, in essence, do not need politics and are content with non-political forms of life.

Thus, economics or political economy gradually comes to the fore. For economic people (homo economicus), who are gradually replacing political people (homo politicus), economics truly becomes destiny.

Godlessness and democracy

Gradually, in modern times, political (i.e., vertically organised, hierarchical) society was replaced by civil society. "Citizens" refers to ordinary city dwellers, townspeople, which means that they do not belong to the higher classes. The term "bourgeois" (French bourgeois), derived from the German Burg, meaning "city," has the same meaning. Civil society is the same as bourgeois society, i.e., a model where the representative of the third estate is the norm.

Civil society is, at its core, a radical, revolutionary, democratic and, in the extreme, "godless" concept. It reflects the act of "killing God" in the sphere of political philosophy. It is a rejection of the recognition of the sacred dimension of politics,

of hierarchy, of the state as an ontological reality. It is the reduction of the political to the economic, commercial, and mercantile.

According to Plato, this is the ultimate degradation of Kallipolis to the level of oligarchy and democracy (ultimately to tyranny). According to Aristotle,
"democracy" is the worst form of government of the many.

However, from the perspective of the modern paradigm, civil society is conceived as the "natural state of man." This gives rise to the idea *that the state is not necessary*. According to classical modern theories, the state can — and sooner or later *must* — be abolished. This is described with some differences in various political ideologies of the modern era. For example, liberals believe that a global market should replace the state. Communists believe that when the communist state has fulfilled its historical function, it will be abolished, and everyone will live in a "single human community."Why do liberalism and communism, as two typical philosophies of modernity, reject the state? Because, from the point of view of the primordial concept of civil society as consisting of atoms, the state is conceived as an artificial construct created by people. Consequently, politics, although possible, does not constitute an essential dimension of human existence. As modernisation and "progress" advance, the state and politics must be completely replaced by the economy (hence the thesis: "the economy as destiny"). If people created the state themselves and it has nothing sacred in itself, then they can also abolish it. Sooner or later, under certain circumstances, they will do so.

Accordingly, politics is something temporary, conditional, intermediate, artificial and completely man-made, non-ontological, non-sacred, non-religious, unnatural and inorganic. Thus, in the transition to the modern paradigm, politics fundamentally changes its status, its very existence. Now it is no longer a universal trait inherent in every human being, but something optional. From now on, it is not man for politics (as a "political animal"), but politics for man.

Moving on to the political philosophy of the Modern Age, we are dealing with a radically new philosophical picture of the world, with different

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[1]Vladimir Mayakovsky (1893–1930) wrote in his poem "To Comrade Nette, the Steamboat, and Man": We live bound by an iron oath. For it, we will be crucified and shot: this is so that in a world without Russia and Latvia, we may live as one human community.

philosophical foundations of thought, science, culture, and social organisation.

This is how the unity between the divine paradigm (the Idea), man, and the world is lost. Now everything is divided into the subjective and the objective (as in Descartes): in such a situation, the state is conceived as something subjective, constructed by people, while nature, and especially matter, is conceived as something objective that must be known and subjugated.

Secularisation: a secular society that kills God

In traditional society, it was impossible to conceive of political philosophy based on material premises. Such a society had to deny God and the sacred in politics, overthrow the hierarchical vertical, and this was at odds with the entire structure of the Traditional (Pre-Modern) worldview.

The term that denies the dominance of religion and the sacred in politics is "secularisation."A secular society is one that has undergone desacralisation. The very concept of secularity is a fundamental concept of modern philosophy, implying that society is not created by God, on the basis of Revelation or Covenant, or by some higher powers, but exclusively by people — separate, corporeal, atomic individuals.

Secular society is a society that kills God, a society that is godless and anti-Christian. A person who calls himself a supporter of the secular model is a supporter of the Antichrist. This is the meaning of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy. Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) (1934–1982) said that the true enemy of Christ is not the one who is a great denier, but the one who is a small affirmer, who has Christ only on his lips and not in his heart He was referring precisely to Nietzsche. Nietzsche, who wrote about the death of God, does not kill God; he merely states that the modern secular paradigm and philosophy of Modernism, secularism, is the Antichrist. Nietzsche does not call for the Antichrist; he sees the Antichrist in the modern Western secular modernist scientific picture of the world. Nietzsche says that it was not he personally who killed God, but Western European civilisation, which condemned

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[1]We have seen that one of the first advocates of secularisation was the great nominalist William of Ockham.

[2]*Seraphim (Rose).* Nihilism: The Source of the Revolution of the Modern Age. Forestville, California: Fr. Seraphim Rose Foundation, 1994.

carried out the rebellion of the Earth against God the Father and God the Son. Nietzsche exposes the negation, the nihilism that lies at the heart of the third version of political philosophy. Nietzsche is a great negator, but, from Seraphim Rose's point of view, those who expose the monstrous essence of the modern world are not as dangerous as those *who do not notice it and* remain indifferent to everything that is happening. The truth about evil is not evil in itself.

Svinopolis of the New Age

All paradigms of modern political philosophy are built within the framework of the fundamental model of political philosophy of the Mother (Titanism, materialism[1]). As Modernity strengthened, the initiative in the battle between gods and giants shifted to the giants.

The modern era radically changed human thinking. In both Antiquity and the Middle Ages, Europe lived by inertia within the framework of the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son (this was the traditional sacred society). The new era decisively rejects these models: there is no Father and no Son, there is only the atomic individual left to himself, bound to his biological existence. Everything else is his constructs, his projections, his creation. This is homo faber, the "man who creates," who has replaced Deus Faber, God the Creator.

If Aristotle had seen the political history of Europe from the 16th to the 20th century, he would probably have said: "Look, these are not people! Their politics are secondary, their thinking is vague. Divine thought and contemplative life are no longer their highest values. It is not wisdom but animal instinct that prevails in their souls." Socrates spoke of something similar in "The Republic," painting a picture of a "city of pigs," a "pigopolis," where people are interested only in food, individual comfort, travelling on holiday, etc. The following picture emerges in the dialogue:

> — If, Socrates, Glaucon replied, the state you are proposing consisted of pigs, what else would you feed them but this?
> — But what else is required, Glaucon?
> — What is customary: to lie on couches, dine at tables, eat the food and delicacies that people currently enjoy — that, in my opinion, is what is needed in order not to suffer deprivation.

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Three Logos
[2] *Plato.* The Republic. P. 134.

"Lying on couches, dining at tables, eating delicacies and luxuries," "not suffering deprivation" — this is the ethical ideal of pig-like humanity.

The philosophy of the New Age in all its dimensions falls under Socrates' idea of the "city of pigs" or Nietzsche's idea of the "last men" ("Happiness has been found by us," say the last men, and they wink [1]).

Since the 16th century, Western European society and all societies under its influence have been living according to this paradigm for several centuries, so it seems self-evident to us. In essence, our entire education system, our entire society, our entire culture, and our entire politics are built on the foundation that the figure of the citizen and human rights are the main principles, that the individual is the measure of all things, that democracy is the natural, acceptable, and legitimate form of political organisation, that the state is a construct created by individuals and is unquestionably secular, and that the welfare and prosperity of citizens, freedom of trade and freedom of movement are the basic principles of the political system. For us, modern political philosophy is a fundamental code that we are fundamentally incapable of questioning. But this means that other types of political philosophy remain completely inaccessible to us, and we have a very distorted view of them.

Taking "pig-polis" for granted, we can hardly imagine what politics was like in other eras, what it is like for other cultures that have preserved their connection with religion and tradition, and what it could theoretically become again if we choose a different paradigm — that of the Father or the Son.

Regicide — a fundamental gesture of Modernity

In order to gain an understanding of what political philosophy is in its fullest form, of what Politica Aeterna is, one must realise how fundamental the shift was in the transition from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity. The contemporary worldview — both in relation to nature and society — is entirely based on the Democritean materialist principle. In modern political philosophy, there can be no Platonic philosopher, no king, no aristocrat, no hero. Moreover, within this model, *those who look up*

[1] *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra/Nietzsche, F. Collected Works: In 2 vols. Moscow: Myśl, 1996. Vol. 2. P. 12.

Those who seek to go beyond the cave and its spectacle must be sacrificed — torn apart, killed by the rebellious, aggressive masses who *gaze at the shadows* and voraciously destroy anyone who tries to show them something different.

Regicide can be called the fundamental principle of modern political philosophy. The guardians of Plato's state, priests, aristocracy, are also subject to demonisation — the bourgeois uprising presupposes the elimination of the two highest classes — priests and warriors. The new era is the absolutisation of the bourgeois caste, the third estate. The act of regicide was the culmination of the three most symbolically significant revolutions in modern European history —

   1) the English Revolution, when Charles I (1600–1649) was executed, which was the culmination of radical Protestantism;

   2) the Great French Revolution, during which the Jacobins beheaded Louis XVI (1754–1793), establishing a bourgeois republic;

   3) the October Revolution, when the Bolsheviks shot the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II (1868–1918), who held the status of "katechon," and began building the first socialist state in history, based on radical materialism and atheism.

These executions symbolised the destruction of the vertical structure, because at each stage of the revolution, the revolutionaries dealt a crushing blow to the very vertical organisation of society, to the sacred axis and hierarchy, to the foundations of the political philosophy of Tradition. At the same time, the structure of society became — at least nominally — increasingly horizontal, egalitarian, reduced to its lowest common denominator.

The present moment of Modernity

Today, we find ourselves at the end of a full cycle of affirmation of modern political philosophy — at the very bottom of this conceptual field, where individualisation and the movement towards materiality are reaching the stage of transition into the sphere of virtual dispersion and the final elimination of the political principle. In the early 1990s, American political analyst Francis Fukuyama wrote an important text on the "end of history" ([1]) He meant *the end of political history,* the complete removal of the Political and the transition exclusively to the

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[1]   *Fukuyama, F.* The End of History and the Last Man. Moscow: AST Publishing House, 2004.

In his view of the world, global politics was now to be replaced by global economics. And since history is always and above all *political history*, the transition from politics to pure economics would also mean the end of history itself.

Although Fukuyama's prediction proved somewhat hasty, his analysis is generally correct. Political modernity initially consisted of replacing hierarchical (sacred) politics with democratic and secular politics, and as democratisation progressed, politics itself was to be gradually abolished. In effect, Fukuyama declared that "pigopolis" had been built on a planetary scale, and in a sense, given the successes of civil society, liberalism, and the market economy by the end of the 20th century, he was not far from the truth. In any case, there is no doubt that we are currently at the very end of the Modern era. This Modern era began in the 16th century and came to an end at the beginning of the 20th century. We are therefore in a unique situation where we can look back on the entire cycle of the Modern political paradigm. We know how and when it began, we can trace its development and we can roughly imagine how it will end, since the end is obviously near and absolutely inevitable.

Compared to the difference between the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son, between two male political philosophies and ontologies, the transition to the maternal model of the third principle was radically new. The new era was truly *new*. The shifts here were much more fundamental than in the transition from Platonism to Aristotelianism, especially since in the context of traditional society (the pre-modern paradigm), the political philosophy of the Father and the political philosophy of the Son coexisted quite harmoniously and often formed a single structure.

Here, however, with the transition to the political philosophy of the Mother,   , a global revolution actually took place, a radical change in all proportions. In all the main philosophical axes, the vectors changed by 180 degrees: in the structure of the world, in the structure of God, in human existence, in the existence of the Political, in ideas about time and space, etc. This was a genuine revolution of the New Age, which can only be understood when fully correlated with other political philosophies characteristic of traditional society.

If we do not understand how revolutionary, avant-garde, and innovative the philosophical assertions of the New Age were,

we will not be able to understand the world we live in and the processes that take place in it. For if we consider *only* the philosophy of the modern era as fundamental, unique and optimal, we will not be able to comprehend what happened in ancient European history, what is happening now in non-Western European societies, or what is increasingly looming over contemporary culture in the form of the Postmodern paradigm, which has already significantly replaced Modernity in many areas.

For a complete understanding of political philosophy, despite the fact that we live in a world of modern political philosophy, we must bear in mind the complete reference structure — the political philosophy of Platonism and the political philosophy of Aristotelianism, even if they do not exist in their pure form in our society. This structure is necessary in order to more accurately understand the very nature of Modernity (which is now in its own transition phase to Postmodernity), to correctly interpret traditional societies remaining in the non-Western world, and to interpret complex variants of the archaeo-modern, i.e., political systems in which modernisation has not penetrated deeply, giving rise to bizarre hybrid forms. This phenomenon is characteristic of some post-colonial countries (Asia, Africa, Latin America), as well as Russia and China, which were forced to carry out defensive modernisation under external pressure from Western civilisation.

Chapter 2. Protestantism and its secularisation: a phase transition in the structure of political theology

Third Christianity

The politics of the New Age are closely linked to the Protestant religion. Protestantism emerged in the 16th century during the reforms of Martin Luther and other reformers such as Jean Calvin (1509–1564) and Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560). The leaders of Protestantism proposed a completely new model of Christianity. This model broke sharply with the paradigm of the Christian worldview that had prevailed in Orthodoxy and Catholicism during the Middle Ages. The Protestant interpretation of Christianity differed both from the Aristotelianism of the scholastics (with elements of Platonism, which was particularly evident in the doctrine of the "two cities") and from the ontology of the Empire that prevailed in the Orthodox world (Byzantinism)[1] Protestants based their beliefs on a completely new approach to the interpretation of God, the world, the Church, and man. At the heart of their theories was the Christian as an individual who determines his relationship with God based on his own reason.

Thus, a new form of Christianity emerges—the third—beyond the boundaries of Platonic and Aristotelian Christianity: a democratic, "Democritean," atomistic Christianity. This is still a religion, that is, a doctrine that recognises the existence of God and a number of Christian dogmas, including the authority of the Old and New Testaments, Revelation, the Trinity, and the divinity and humanity of Christ. But something is already emerging that fundamentally breaks with the pre-modern era, with the era of traditional society in Europe itself.

Protestantism, as a religion, theology and ethics, prepares the paradigm of modern philosophy in politics, culture,

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G*. Noomakhia. Byzantine Logos. Hellenism and Empire.
[2] The immediate predecessors of this "third" Christianity were the nominalists (materialists and individualists), who remained formally within Catholicism but were secretly preparing a completely different worldview.

in economics and other key areas of public life. It was precisely the Protestant worldview, Protestant religion, and Protestant ideology that laid the foundations for the paradigm of the New Age. This is precisely a transitional moment, because religion *still* exists, but the Church (as in Catholicism) no *longer* exists, nor does the Empire (as in Orthodoxy or under the Habsburgs).

The abolition of Holy Tradition

Luther proclaimed that it was necessary to return to the times of early Christianity and "purify" religion of historical accretions. Catholicism (as well as Orthodox Christianity) accepted as sources of indisputable truth and supreme authority the Holy Scriptures (the Bible) and Holy Tradition, i.e., tradition, including interpretations, institutions, customs, foundations, institutions, etc. Luther, Calvin, and other leaders of Protestantism completely rejected Sacred Tradition, i.e., tradition. At the same time, they recognised the authority of Holy Scripture, which, however, they interpreted arbitrarily, relying on rational analysis and personal spiritual experience.

The Catholic Church is built from the top down. There is Christ, there is His incarnation. There is a direct transmission of grace from the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Holy Trinity, descending upon the apostles through an unbroken chain of priesthood. The Holy Spirit *descended from above* upon the apostles at Pentecost. The apostles, thanks to the power of the Holy Spirit, form the Church. The first of the apostles, Simon Peter, becomes the foundation (Greek: Πέτρος — rock) of the Church, the first bishop of Rome, from whom the line of Roman Popes descends. Everything is formed from above, from Christ to his apostles, who, like God, consecrate people, and the Holy Spirit descends upon them at Pentecost. Strictly speaking, the Church is formed according to a vertical principle, by descent. At the same time, it is eternal and participates in history.

This dimension of eternity and this vertical symmetry are also fully inherent in Orthodoxy.

In Protestantism, however, everything changes. Here there is an authoritative book, the text — the Bible. People read it. They comprehend, interpret and comment on the texts, relying on their own reasoning. Some may interpret a passage from the Holy Scriptures in one way, others in another way, and still others in a third way. Here, everyone has the right and freedom to interpret, there is no binding tradition, no higher unquestionable authority. Anyone can, relying entirely on their own reason and their own reflections, interpret any passage of the Holy Scriptures. And when these interpretations satisfy others, they unite in a community, a congregation, a sect.

reflections, interpret any passage of the Holy Scriptures. And when these comments satisfy others, they unite into a community, a congregation, a kind of sect. At the same time, the term "sect" in Protestantism has a neutral-positive character. Formally registered Protestant sects are called "churches" or denominations.

This is not the case in Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. Interpretation forms the basis of the Holy Tradition of the Church. The interpretation of the Gospel and the Old Testament is transmitted in the Church as an authoritative opinion, confirmed by the Councils and the decisions of the Pope. Orthodox Christians recognise the supreme authority of the Seven Ecumenical Councils and the vast body of patristic literature. Catholics recognise later Councils, but consider the opinion of the Pope to be the ultimate authority in matters of religion. The Pope has the final say in determining what constitutes heresy and how a particular passage of Scripture should be interpreted. In Orthodoxy, this function is performed not by the Patriarch, but by the entire Orthodox tradition as a whole (the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils and the patristic traditions). The two branches of Christianity — Catholicism and Orthodoxy — recognise both Scripture and Tradition. Tradition is passed down in the Church. In this case, personal interpretation of religion and the fundamental issues associated with it must be consistent with this Tradition. Catholics add to this the binding nature of decisions officially announced by the Pope (in the form of a bull).

Protestants object: no, we will interpret religion ourselves. We will interpret it as we see fit. Accordingly, a completely new conception of authority, of the source of authority, arises. The Church or its equivalent is created here *not from the top down, but from the bottom up*. Based on their own interpretations, people make judgements about God, the world, and themselves.

In other words, a completely different concept of authority emerges. The Church still exists, as does the Christian community and the Holy Scriptures, which are endowed with supreme authority. But all interpretation, all constitution of the Church, the community, and society as a whole is built "from the bottom up."

The rejection of Sacred Tradition became the core of the Protestant Reformation, which demanded that only the text of the Bible be followed, calling into question all other aspects of the living Christian tradition, from interpretation to rituals.

of the Bible, questioning all other aspects of living Christian tradition — from interpretation to rituals. Thus, some versions of Protestantism rejected the Eucharist (Communion), liturgy, and icon worship, reducing worship to the communal singing of individual psalms and rather arbitrary sermons. Some

Some sects, such as Calvinism, abolished the institution of the priesthood. Most Protestant sects reject icons. Some Protestant movements, such as the Hussites inBohemia, reject the cross as a symbol of Christ's suffering. In other words, even the cross ceases to be a symbol of Christianity. In churches, chalices are depicted as a symbol of this movement.

Many have questioned the fundamental foundations of the Christian faith, to the point that the most extreme Protestants — "Unitarianists" or "Socinians"— have rejected the dogma of the Trinity.

Against celibacy

Protestant ideology, based on the individual, his reason and his personal will, destroys the very foundation of the idea of the divine origin of the Church, as understood by both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. By "Church," Catholicism understood the clergy, that is, the body of priests ordained into the priesthood. At the same time, for Catholics, all priests had to remain unmarried (mandatory celibacy) ([3] According to Roman Catholic teaching, the Catholic clergy — that is, ordained priests who strictly observe celibacy — constitute the citizens of the "City of God," that is, the Church. Ordinary Christians have the right to marry through a special sacrament.

Luther and other reformers struck a blow against priestly celibacy, declaring that the rules of clerical celibacy were a later "innovation" and decreed that from now on priests could be married. Luther himself was originally a monk, and having decided that monks could now marry, he set an example. Thus, monasticism was completely abolished and monasteries were dissolved.

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[1] Hussites — the name of a Czech reformist religious movement, named after Jan Hus. They were called "Chasniki" because they demanded that the chalice be made available to lay people during communion, since in Catholicism only clergy receive communion under both species (the body and blood of Jesus Christ), while lay people are given only prosphora (a wafer). See *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. Eastern Europe. Slavic Logos: Balkan Nav and Sarmatian Style. Moscow: Academic Project, 2018.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject.

[3] The Orthodox tradition allows marriage for the white clergy, but the highest episcopal rank requires celibacy, as in Catholicism.

[4] From the perspective of Orthodoxy, the Church includes not only priests and bishops (the clergy), but also all baptised Orthodox Christians, which significantly broadens the concept of the Church and changes its content to some extent.

The authority of the Pope, on which the entire Western European political philosophy had previously been based, was completely rejected. The entire Catholic clergy — cardinals, bishops and priests — suffered the same fate. Some Protestant movements (Lutheranism itself) retained their hierarchy and a number of liturgical practices, while others (Calvinists) rejected both completely.

Against the Empire

Alongside the rejection of the previous doctrine of the Church, the Reformation also rejected the very idea of the Empire. At first, the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire wavered between supporting Rome or the Reformation, partly continuing the imperial traditions of the Ghibellines. Under Charles V of Habsburg (1500–1558), the Protestant north and the Catholic south attempted to divide their powers within a common political system (the Peace of Augsburg). However, some of the Habsburgs, primarily Philip II (1527–1598), a radical supporter of Catholicism, chose Rome, and in the end, the Austrian Habsburgs also leaned towards that choice. This led to the separation of the Protestant countries — Holland, Sweden, Norway and Prussia. Together with England and France (which remained Catholic but was strongly opposed to the Habsburgs), this gave rise to an anti-imperial coalition of European powers.

In place of the Empire—with its echoes of the doctrine of the Cato—comes a completely different political normative idea: the nation-state, created by people (again from the bottom up) for security, protection, and the optimal realisation of private material interests. Such a nation-state has no higher purpose or mission. It rejects both the Byzantine concept of the katechon and the Catholic interpretation of the doctrine of the "two cities." The Empire had a sacred meaning, and papal power brought a transcendent (also sacred) dimension to European politics in the Middle Ages. People obeyed God, the Earth obeyed Heaven, and individual political entities obeyed the highest unity. That is why the Empire was consistently called "Holy." The Protestant state is fundamentally not sacred. It has no mission or higher purpose. It performs technical functions and can always, in theory, be restructured, changed or even abolished. Protestant communities were built on this principle, from which anyone could leave at any time, attracted by a different interpretation.

and converting to a different sect. Bourgeois companies, firms, trusts and trading partnerships were also formed.

Thus, in this Protestant worldview, we arrive at the concept of *the social contract,* which is fundamental to the entire philosophy and politics of the modern era. The Church is no longer a product of the condescension of the Holy Spirit from above. It is a product *of a social contract.* And the state is no longer an empire endowed with a sacred mission, but an artificial creation of individuals for the purpose of solving certain private secular tasks.

Thus, the political philosophy of Protestantism rejected the very structure of the vertical organisation of the world, society, and religion, which was common not only to Western and Eastern Christianity, not only to Byzantinism and the doctrine of the "two cities," but also to the entire European history known to us — from Antiquity to the Renaissance. This is the special significance of Protestantism: it paved the way for a completely new model of looking at the world from the bottom up.

Wealth as a virtue

The phenomenon of Protestantism as the basis of the paradigm of the Modern Age was thoroughly analysed by German sociologist Max Weber, one of the founders of sociology as such, in his work "The Protestant Ethic" [1]. This work by Max is one of the most famous classical works on sociology. In it, Weber shows how the Protestant worldview, Protestant theology, Protestant ideology, and the ethics built on them form the foundations of bourgeois society and the value system of capitalism, which arose precisely from this Protestant approach.

M. Weber demonstrates that Protestantism justified the supreme value of rational practical activity and elevated the merchant, the entrepreneur — that is, the townspeople, the citizens, the bourgeoisie — to the highest ideal. Weber shows that the Catholic worldview as a whole is oriented toward the spiritual world, and wealth is never considered the highest virtue — hence the cult of poverty in some monastic orders, especially among the Franciscans. Protestantism, on the other hand, focused its attention on earthly life, considering material wealth a sign of "electivity." Calvin, in his theory of Predestination, even stated that man is incapable of changing either

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[1]   *Weber, M.* The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

neither their earthly nor their posthumous fate, and wealth and success should be interpreted as the most visible form of virtue; wealth is good and a sign of being chosen, while poverty is a vice and a curse.

In Protestantism, the concept of posthumous reward disappears. It is believed that a person receives reward not in the future, but in this life. This gives rise to the thesis that God distributes good and evil, rewards the righteous and punishes sinners *in this life*. Not later, not after death, but here and now. Thus, the afterlife, which plays a huge role in Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity, effectively loses its meaning, and the themes of Judgment, punishment, and retribution are transferred to earthly life.

This approach turns everything upside down. In Orthodox Christianity·in full accordance with Christ's Sermon on the Mount· it is precisely the poor in spirit, those who mourn, those who suffer, and those who hunger who are considered blessed. That is, the Beatitudes describe people who are deprived, people who suffer, who mourn, who have nothing. And the second part of these symmetrical formulas promises future justice, achieved in the kingdom of heaven — for they shall be comforted, for they shall be filled, for they shall be called sons of God... All the unhappy, the unsuccessful, the destitute, the poor, the suffering, the deprived are the "salt of the earth." This is the ethical norm in Orthodox Christianity. For Orthodox Christians, being poor means, most likely, being good and honest. Being rich means, probably, not being so good. And it is more difficult for the rich to enter the Kingdom of Heaven than for the poor ([2) The poor are promised an easy path to the Kingdom of Heaven, while the rich have a difficult one. This does not mean that it is closed to them, nor does it mean that every poor person is good. But in general, the poor are better than the rich. Because it is easier for the poor and suffering — they are deprived of much or even everything in this world, in the material, physical universe. And this is not just a test, but a driving force to seek truth and justice beyond its limits — to strive for the kingdom of heaven and Christ. The rich, on the other hand

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[1]Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled. Blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown mercy. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God. Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God. Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are you when people insult you, persecute you and falsely say all kinds of evil against you because of Me. Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven, for so they persecuted the prophets who were before you. Gospel of Matthew 5:3–11.

[2]It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. From Matthew 19:24.

bound to earthly existence. For it is said: where your treasure is, there will your heart be also[1]. And, moreover, you cannot serve both God and mammon[2]. The rich have riches in their hearts, which are of little use to them in the next world, and it is difficult for them to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Of course, it is possible if they distribute their wealth to the poor, if they serve their country and the Church. But this is more difficult to do. It is a pity to part with what one has acquired.

In Catholicism, it is not quite the same as in Orthodoxy, but it is close. For example, St. Francis of Assisi (1181 or 1182–1226) composed hymns to poverty, saying that there is nothing more beautiful than the poor brotherhood, and that the second thing he loves after Christ is poverty. He gives everything away. He completely sacrifices himself, absolutely everything. He walks barefoot in winter, wearing only a single robe. His monasteries flourish, and he lives only with beggars and the poor, content with very little. Of course, this is far from the whole of Catholicism, but to a large extent, Franciscan ethics are considered the undisputed pinnacle of piety in Western Christianity. Because everything important and valuable is not here. "My kingdom is not of this world" ([3] This is how the Orthodox and Catholic religions understand the world and ethics.

But Protestantism understands the world completely differently. On the contrary, from a Protestant point of view, rich means good, which means chosen. The Last Judgment takes place here, and retribution is also meted out here. Therefore, those who are poor *are* also *bad*. And, accordingly, the idea of enrichment takes on a religious meaning. If a person works well, earns a lot, and has accumulated a lot of wealth, then he is almost a saint.

This idea that the rich are holy and the poor are damned is an important feature of Protestant ethics, a specific worldview. Note how ethical guidelines change. Formally, we are dealing with Christianity, but all proportions are reversed, and the entire structure of the worldview is almost directly opposite.

Protestantism creates a completely new scale of values within Christianity. First, the Church is built from the bottom up, not from the top down. And, accordingly, it can be dissolved and re-created. Strictly speaking, there is nothing sacred in the Church. The Church becomes the work of lay people, and people gather around the Holy Scriptures in order to interpret them together, sometimes speaking in tongues (Pentecostals, modern charismatics), that is

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[1] Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 6:21.
[2] Gospel of Luke. Chapter 16: 13.
[3] Gospel of John. Chapter 18: 36.

They shout incomprehensible words, sometimes shake and make incomprehensible gestures, believing that they are vessels for God's will (like the Shaker sect).

Protestantism as the foundation of Modernism

It was from the Reformation movement that the political philosophy of Modernism was born. The modern world is based on Protestant principles:

- religion here is a collective matter, which is determined by consensus as to whether God exists or not, or how He should be interpreted;
- instead of a sacred Church founded by Christ and the Holy Spirit, there is a profane "church," that is, a sect;
- Instead of a God-given and mission-driven Empire, a secular nation-state established on the basis of a social contract;
- instead of focusing on the kingdom of heaven and Christ, complete involvement in the affairs of the material world;
- instead of posthumous reward and the Last Judgement, fatal predestination to poverty or wealth as an expression of earthly justice, measured by material well-being;
- instead of a sacred hierarchy, equality of opportunity;
- instead of priests, monks and warriors — the bourgeoisie;
- instead of verticality, horizontality;
- instead of universality — individualism and the glorification of absolute private property;
- instead of the heavenly — the earthly;
- instead of goodness and compassion — the ethics of profit and material prosperity.

This is precisely what Max Weber emphasises: Protestantism, by shifting attention from the spiritual to the physical and from the heavenly to the earthly, gave supreme importance to wealth.

Protestantism breaks with traditional society and lays the foundations for modernity. But it is still a transition. In Protestantism, there is still an appeal to God; the Church still exists; the authority of Holy Scripture is still recognised; the existence of the state is still justified. From now on, the basis of these elements of religion and politics is the individual, but some objects of interpretation remain from the previous paradigm of the world of Tradition. The axis of interpretation radically changes its direction — instead of a view from above, the view is now directed from below, but some distant connection with the vertical axis still remains.

from the bottom up, but some distant connection with the vertical axis still remains.

If we secularise this Protestant theology, if we remove any mention of God and the Church, if we reject the authority of the Bible altogether, and if we completely relativise the state (which was necessary for Protestants at least as a defence against Catholics), then we arrive at the paradigm of the modern world, Modernity, in its fullest sense. Here, instead of "churches" (i.e., sects), individuals unite in political parties, and parties make up the parliament. Instead of freedom to interpret the Holy Scriptures, it is now possible to interpret anything, and the authority of materialistic science completely supplants the authority of religion. Now the individual is free not only to interpret sacred texts, but also to create his own, which in the context of a purely profane culture are essentially equal in status to private opinion. The state breaks away this time even from the task of defending Protestantism and becomes entirely and completely created by the arbitrarily established Republic, which has strictly selfish interests. Wealth is seen not as a sign of a person's election in a predetermined destiny, but simply as the highest value in isolation from any meaning whatsoever. Capital is now the measure of all things. Hence capitalism, liberalism, the secular world, civil society and, ultimately, globalism.

Weber — as well L. Dumont (1911–1998), W. Sombart (1863–1941) and others — show that the Protestant Reformation led precisely to this result, but it was achieved only through the overcoming of Protestantism itself. The Reformation paved the way for Modernity. But it was not yet fully Modern, retaining within itself — albeit inverted and distorted — certain echoes of traditional society.

The secularisation of Calvinism gave rise to liberalism.

Protestant theology and Protestant ethics predetermine the foundations of political philosophy in the modern era. It should be noted that several quite different trends can be identified within Protestantism. Each of these trends can be viewed as a matrix on the basis of which one of the three main political ideologies of the Modern era developed in the course of further secularisation.

The most orthodox line emerging from the secularisation of Protestantism was capitalism. It is most fully reflected in the ideology of liberalism.

liberal ideology. It is liberalism that puts the individual, who has become the measure of all things in Protestant anthropology, at the forefront and considers material wealth to be the highest form of personal evaluation. Money in capitalism is an absolute value.

Among Protestant theologians, the Swiss reformer John Calvin is closest to this model. It was he who formulated the basic principles of an individualistic interpretation of religion, politics, society and culture. He was also more consistent than others in insisting on wealth as a sign of being chosen.

Calvinists were the most radical opponents of Catholicism, rejecting hierarchy and the sacraments. In politics, they adhered to extremely democratic views. During the English Revolution of 1640–1660, Calvinists and various movements inspired by them formed the most extreme wing of the Protestant party, insisting on the abolition of the monarchy (or the creation of a special Fifth Monarchy[1]) and the complete restructuring of society on bourgeois-democratic principles.

It is important to note that the founding fathers who arrived by ship in New York when it was still a Dutch colony were Calvinists. The main core of immigrants from England and Europe to North America as a whole were representatives of the most extreme Protestant groups of the Calvinist persuasion. They laid the foundations of North American civilisation.

Calvin was the originator of the Protestant doctrine of predestination, which rejects the Christian thesis of free will (liberum arbitrium). This doctrine radically changed the very concept of the nature of time and the logic of history. Calvin believed that the eternity of God necessarily contains all time. For God, time is synchronous, whereas for humanity it is experienced as a sequence. But in this case, the diachronic unfolding of events cannot change the content of history, because if it were otherwise, God would not be perfect. Consequently, Calvin concludes, free will does not exist; it is merely an optical illusion of a mortal being whose horizon is fatally limited by time. Taking into account predestination, all history was predetermined and had a complete structure.

As this view became more secular and the "God hypothesis" was put aside, Calvinism—in its final modernist, materialistic version—laid the groundwork for the ideology of progress, which is an interpretation of history in which all stages are

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Noomakhia. England or Britain? The Maritime Mission and the Positive Subject.

are predetermined. Progress from Calvinism spread to all political ideologies of the Modern era — liberalism, communism and nationalism — becoming one of their most important features in the context of the entire Modern era. But overall, Calvinism had the greatest influence on liberalism. It is quite possible to argue that *liberalism is a product of the secularisation of Calvinism.*

The secularisation of Lutheranism gave rise to bourgeois nationalism

The ideas of Martin Luther, considered the main figure of the Reformation, generally placed the individual at the forefront and had much in common with liberalism. Although Luther relied politically on the support of German princes who sought to use the Reformation to strengthen their political positions in opposition to the Papacy and, to some extent, the Empire, he, like Calvin, was an exponent of the interests of the third estate, ironically referred to in Plato's "The Republic" as "pig-herding." .

However, Lutheranism was not as strict regarding church traditions. It retained the idea of the priesthood (only now priests were allowed to marry) and some church sacraments, such as baptism, communion, and marriage. Lutherans categorically rejected the status of the Pope, sometimes going so far as to identify him with the Antichrist. But while strongly opposing the Vatican, they recognised the legitimacy of national churches subordinate to secular — most often monarchical or princely — authority. Thus, in England, after the restoration of the monarchy, it was the Lutheran model that prevailed in the form of the Anglican Church, whose head is considered to be the English king.

A similar system developed in Scandinavia and Northern Germany, where Lutheranism became the philosophical foundation of nation states in which the vertical structure of monarchical power was combined with the ever-growing political influence of the bourgeoisie. A striking example of such a state was Protestant Prussia, which in the 19th century became the main initiator of the creation of Germany under the Protestant Hohenzollern dynasty. A comprehensive description of the Lutheran Prussian type of political system — a kind of "Prussian socialism or national socialism" — is convincingly presented in the classic work by Oswald Spengler (1880–1936) Prussianism and Socialism ([1].

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[1]   *Spengler, O.* Prussianism and Socialism. Moscow: Praksis, 2002.

Lutheranism can be seen as the model that gave rise to modern political nationalism (and, to some extent, National Socialism) during the process of secularisation and modernisation.

The secularisation of Anabaptism gave rise to communism.

Protestantism also had an extreme version, most vividly represented by the Anabaptist movement, one of whose leaders was Thomas Müntzer (c. 1490–1525). The Anabaptists were mainly peasants who shared apocalyptic views. The Anabaptists shared common features with Christian Gnostics, who believed that the world was ruled by an "evil god" whose servants were the representatives of the official Church and the nobility. The supporters of Anabaptism perceived the Reformation as the onset of the end times, when the false church and the associated rule of the nobility would fall and an era of universal equality would dawn. Münzer identified the Catholic Church with the whore of Babylon, categorically rejected Luther, and compared the German princes who followed Luther to the "kings of the Apocalypse." The Anabaptists called on all true awakened Christians to rise up in a rebellion of the poor, backed by Christ, against the rich, who were enemies of the faith. Münzer saw his own mission as the work of John the Baptist, who had come call humanity to spiritual baptism.

Münzer inspired the Thuringian peasants to revolt, but they were defeated in May 1525 at the Battle of Frankenhausen. He himself was captured and executed in Mühlhausen.

Here we see how the rejection of Catholicism during the Reformation gave rise to an ideology that was in many ways opposed to Calvinism, with its "deification" of wealth, and to Lutheranism, with its deep alliance with the princes and the nation state. Marx (1818–1883) himself was clearly aware of the connection between his ideas and those of the Anabaptists, whom he considered the harbingers of communism.

Communism can well be considered the result of the secularisation of Anabaptism.

Three ideologies

Thus, Calvin, Luther, and Münzer can be considered the three figures of the Reformation who anticipated the three main dominant political ideologies of the Modern era: liberalism, nationalism, and communism. The roots of the corresponding versions of Political So-

remain in Protestantism. Consequently, we are entitled to consider Protestantism as the historical paradigm of political philosophy in the modern era. In Protestantism itself, these three versions are not yet completely secular. We are still dealing with Christianity. Even the Gnostic-peasant rebellion of Müntzer, which is very similar to later communism, still unfolds in anticipation of the Second Coming of Christ. Calvin argues that wealth and prosperity are important because they are an expression of being chosen, of holiness, that is, a consequence of predestination. Luther insists that it is necessary to affirm and support the nation state primarily to protect Protestant interests from the Catholic Austrian Empire and the Roman See. These versions of the Reformation still retain a reference to the religious dimension. These are religious movements, and the politics based on them in the 16th–19th centuries still retain something of Christianity and, accordingly, of traditional society (the pre-modern paradigm). But having been subjected to secularisation, completely detached from theology, with the factor of God and Holy Scripture being bracketed out (in what Nietzsche called "the death of God"), they give us three political theories that dominate the modern era (liberalism, communism and nationalism). Geographically, the German North of Europe becomes predominantly Protestant, while the Latin South remains Catholic. At the same time, there is a solid segment of Catholicism among the Germans — Austria, Bavaria, and more broadly, Southern Germany. In addition, the Celtic Irish remained faithful to Catholicism, which sharply distinguished them from the Celtic Scots, who became the most radical

the bearers of Calvinism in the British Isles.

Chapter 3. Founding Fathers of Modern Political Philosophy: T. Hobbes, N. Machiavelli, J. Bodin

Niccolò Machiavelli: the autonomy of politics

Protestantism is a historical but still religious expression of a philosophy that contains the seeds of a specific secular politics that became the norm in the New Age. Now we can examine how this philosophy of modern politics acquired its explicit features, formulated programmes, and created basic founding texts.

The foundations of the already explicit political philosophy of the Modern Age were laid primarily by three authors who are classics of modern political thought. These are the Italian Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), the Frenchman Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and the Englishman Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679).

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) is one of three political thinkers who substantiated the concept of secular politics. There is still heated debate about the interpretation of his ideas. Some consider Machiavelli an extreme "reactionary" and "monarchist," a precursor of fascism, while others, on the contrary, consider him a "progressive republican."

Machiavelli's main idea is that politics is an autonomous world governed by laws specific to this sphere. This was a complete innovation for the 15th century. For people of the modern era, it is quite natural to recognise that different laws apply in politics, morality and religion. But for medieval Christian Europeans, the idea that there is one truth in politics and another in morality, religion and ethics was completely unacceptable and blasphemous. All spheres of knowledge were built on a single set of universal Christian principles. The only area of medieval thought that partly anticipated this division into several truths was the philosophy of the Islamic thinker Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198), whose followers

— especially among Europeans — proposed dividing *theological truth*, based on the authority of Scripture, into the sphere of religion, and *scientific truth* about the natural world, based on the conclusions of reason.

However, Machiavelli goes much further and proposes to consider the political sphere as autonomous. He asserts that politics is an absolutely self-sufficient thing. In his opinion, politics has no goal or higher meaning. Power is the beginning and end in itself. Therefore, the criteria that should be applied to politics should not be taken from the realm of religion, morality, history, and so on. Politics is a completely self-sufficient world with its own laws, rules, criteria, and evaluations. Machiavelli proceeds from the premise that *the state has no other goal than the exercise of power*.

The Prince: the tyrant as a force from below

The personification of the state is *the Sovereign,* the Prince [1], il Principe.

A prince is not a person, nor is he a specific ruler. He is a special authority, a figure who embodies the sum total of politics, taken in isolation from all other levels of existence. This is how the idea of *an autonomous, self-referential sphere of politics* is formed. Politics is elevated to an independent discipline, an independent sphere. The figure of the prince, who embodies the essence of politics, becomes the symbol of this politics.

Politics, in this case, is taken in isolation from any higher meaning. Machiavelli completely and radically rejects the political philosophy of the "two cities," offering something completely new in its place. He completely disregards the "heavenly city" and focuses his attention entirely on the problems of earthly power, its preservation, strengthening and most effective use. Machiavelli now deals only with the "earthly city," which becomes the sole and self-sufficient object of political philosophy.

The sovereign in Machiavelli's view is *an absolute individual* who rises to the heights of earthly power not in the name of some goal (like Plato's philosopher-king) and not to fulfil some mission. He is pushed to the top by the abundance and even excess of earthly forces. It is *power* that becomes the ontological foundation in Machiavelli's view.

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[1]   *Machiavelli, N.* The Prince. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya Literatura, 1982.

of power; power in its most direct and earthly sense. Everyone *wants* to rule, but only the strongest *can*. Therefore, it does not matter how a person becomes a ruler: if he has become one, then this in itself means that he has proved himself strong enough for it. If power is obtained by chance and by someone who is not very strong, then he will quickly lose it, as a powerful rival will surely rise up from the depths of life to replace him.

Machiavelli builds his theory on this: the sovereign has no other goal than to maintain the power he has, strengthen it, and, if possible, increase its scope and extent. In this theory, we see the absolutisation of the "earthly city" and, at the same time, the standardisation of the figure *of the tyrant*. According to Plato, a ruler who cares only about the realisation of his will and uses power solely to achieve his selfish goals is a classic tyrant. Tyrannical traits were certainly inherent in many Italian rulers as early as the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance, examples of this type of government became even more frequent.

Two moralities according to Machiavelli

Developing his analysis of the Prince, Machiavelli comes to an important conclusion: there is not one morality, but two.
- *The morality of the Prince*, which consists in the most effective retention of power, and
- *the morality of the general population*, ordinary citizens, who must strictly follow prescribed ethical obligations and bear full responsibility for violating the rules.

Machiavelli's idea that the sovereign requires a special morality, different from that of the masses, is completely new. This morality must put power itself at the forefront. For the sovereign, there is one good and one virtue: power, and the stronger and longer it lasts, the better. Everything else flows from it. What good, argues Machiavelli, is it if the sovereign is good, merciful, gentle and compassionate, if he is unable to hold on to power, which means he cannot resist external or internal enemies, protect his citizens from turmoil, establish an effective social and administrative system, and defend the state from its enemies? Conversely, what significance can the personal sins — and even crimes — of a ruler have

if he copes with the main thing: ensuring the prosperity and stability of society, which is impossible without strong power. Even the most bloodthirsty tyrant, committing individual atrocities, cannot cause great harm to society as a whole, at least not remotely comparable to uprisings or enemy invasions.

However, if public morality is violated by the masses, society will fall into turmoil, become ungovernable, the power of the ruler will be shaken, and the state will slide into anarchy and collapse. The morality of ordinary people should be religious, ethical, and consistent with the views of the social majority. In this respect, Christian morality is quite suitable. People who follow moral and religious principles set themselves the goal of having a good reputation, saving their souls, maintaining social order, and not breaking the rules — these ideas about morality, from Machiavelli's point of view, are absolutely remarkable, beautiful, and require observance. By everyone except the Prince. The Prince, on the other hand, must be guided first and foremost by *the pure imperative of power,* which for him is the highest and most binding morality, while the prescriptions for the masses may be shared to one degree or another, but only as something additional and voluntary, and even then only if it does not interfere with the exercise of power.

Machiavelli does not speak out directly against religion, the Church, or traditions. He only talks about the art of ruling and builds his philosophy in a way that is as consistent as possible under the given conditions.

The prince is a representative of the ruling authority. However, this is not necessarily an individual personality. The prince may be collective or individual. He may be legal and legitimate, or illegal and legitimate. This is irrelevant. Only one thing is important: those who stand at the head of society must be guided by a fundamentally *different* approach to evaluating their actions and the actions of others than ordinary citizens.

The idea that the people, the majority, and the prince have two different moralities is an innovation of Niccolò Machiavelli. The morality of the prince is that he is not responsible for himself personally and does not pursue his own interests, but for the realisation of large-scale tasks that involve a large number of people.

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[1] *Schmitt, C.* Legality and Legitimacy/Schmitt, C. The State: Law and Politics. Moscow: Publishing House "Territory of the Future", 2013.

For example, one of the prince's tasks is to preserve the territorial integrity of the principality, the state in which he is the ruler. To achieve this, the ruler can do anything: he can lie, threaten, break agreements, dress his troops in enemy uniforms, stage provocations, send poisoners, invade foreign territory, take relatives and close friends of his enemies hostage — in short, violate all norms of morality and ethics. According to Machiavelli, all this is morally justified for the Prince, although it should be categorically prohibited for everyone else. Because if the majority starts acting in the same way, the state will soon collapse.

The opposite is also true: if a prince is a good, pious, devout man who loves his neighbours, observes all moral precepts and meets the highest standards of morality and godliness, but at the same time is unable to effectively resist the armies of a neighbour who is seizing his territory, plundering his lands, rapes and takes the local inhabitants captive, then even though he is a *good* man, he is *a very bad prince.* He may be a saint as a man, but a complete nonentity as a prince. But if, by sacrificing all Christian commandments, through deception, cunning, meanness, force, etc., the prince is able to play out a political situation in which his lands increase several times over, strengthening the power of his principality, then he is a wonderful prince.

The same applies to domestic policy. Here, the main goal is peace, prosperity, security, and food security for citizens, as well as maintaining order. If, to achieve this, the prince eliminates his rivals, incites enmity among his entourage, promotes to power those who are far from the most worthy and deserving, weaves intrigues, uses deception, bribery and repression, as well as any other methods, to achieve his goal, then he is still a good prince. What is the point, argues Machiavelli, if a good and pious ruler avoids such measures and chaos, disorder, turmoil, famine and anarchy reign in the state? He may save his soul, but he will ruin the state entrusted to him.

Thus, two logics are postulated. What is good for the prince and what is bad for the common man. The goal is to provide a territory that is reliably protected, well-fed, satisfied citizens, security, peace, and order. What you personally do in the process, citizen prince, is of no interest to anyone. What you do there, how you justify it, what is in your heart — that is your business, your personal business.

Machiavelli's paradox: the goal of power is power

Machiavelli builds his political philosophy on this basis. There is no justification for this state of affairs, no criticism, no satire, as Machiavelli's commentators sometimes believe. It is simply a cold statement of facts that the political philosopher sees around him and which he undertakes to describe systematically as they are. If society is openly told about this, it will rebel, and chaos and unrest will ensue. But for the political science of the modern era, of which Niccolò Machiavelli can rightly be considered the founder, this is a fundamental truth. Therefore, Machiavelli himself does not address the masses. He writes for the Prince, for the political elite. Among Machiavelli's advice to the Prince is to hide what he does, use secret intrigues, set everyone against each other, and not allow anyone who could pose a problem or competition to the Prince to rise to the elite. Do not inform your opponents of the real state of affairs. Use various political tactics.

Let the people think what they want; all that is required of them is to obey the established rules and submit. This is how a special realm of politics emerges, where completely separate criteria apply.

From Machiavelli's point of view, the Prince has one main task: *to retain his power*. Outwardly, this seems like a completely selfish and immoral task. For a person, it is, but for the Prince, it becomes moral — because in order to retain it, he must meet all the requirements of power.

First, the Prince *must have power*. That is, he must obtain it, no matter how. This is the first condition. If someone manages to obtain power, this is in itself, according to Machiavelli, a fundamental position. Only those who have power are Princes, not those who are born with it or want to obtain it.

Secondly, he must have a state. There must be a people who do not reject him, who obey him and thereby acknowledge him. It is completely irrelevant how they feel about the prince — whether they love or hate him, accept or simply tolerate him, respect or simply fear him. It does not matter at all. If the Prince is in power, that is the only decisive factor. And that means that the citizens are under him. He ceases to be a ruler only if he is overthrown — by competitors, opponents or subjects. But a new Prince takes his place, and the cycle begins anew.

Despite the apparent simplicity of this analysis, it contains some very serious points. After all, in order to gain and maintain power, the Prince must preserve the territorial integrity and, preferably, even expand the territory of his polity. He needs a calm, normal, submissive people who obey discipline, follow rules and regulations, and refrain from rebellions, uprisings and conspiracies.

This leads to Machiavelli's paradox: a successful prince, without setting any positive goals, with no desire to please his people, leave a mark on history, serve the Church, or contribute to the common good, but instead thinking only of himself, his power, following pure selfishness and driven by a lust for powerand the will to power, is capable of frequently carrying out brilliant historical deeds, building states and societies where the people prosper, temples are full, culture flourishes, territories grow, bread ripens, thought and science develop, and people are free and happy. But above all this stands the sinister, selfish, jealous Prince, an aggressive and predatory "political animal" [1]who does not allow any figure or personality capable of competing with him to come close to his territory.

Such princely egoism, since it operates on a completely different scale than that of a private individual, an ordinary citizen, is — but only and exclusively in the case of the Prince — more important than any altruism.

It is important to note that we live in Machiavelli's world because the current conception of power and the political elite fits perfectly into this model of the Prince (at least in those areas of political philosophy where realism prevails).

Although Machiavelli's views influenced the conception of the nature of politics in the Modern Age as a whole, the most consistent supporters of his approach were representatives of the neo-Machiavellian school, which emerged in Italy at the end of the 19th century. This school includes political philosophers such as the Italians Vilfredo Pareto ʿ1848– 1923) and Gaetano Mosca ʿ1858–1941) and the German sociologist Robert Michels ʿ 1876–1936). Both were greatly influenced by the ideas of French-

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[1]   In a sense different from Aristotle.

[2]   *Pareto, V.* Compendium of General Sociology. Moscow: Publishing House of the Higher School of Economics, 2008.

[3]   *Mosca G.* History of Political Doctrines. Bari: Laterza, 1937.

[4]   *Michels R.* Sociology as a Social Science. Berlin: Mauritius, 1926.

economist Léon Walras (1834–1910), who constructed a model of economic equilibrium. The theory of elites developed by these authors effectively extends the concept of the Prince to the structure of society as a whole. From this perspective, all politics boils down to the seizure and preservation of power.

In other words, the elite is a collective definition of the Prince, and all political life is a struggle to take his place.

All representatives of the school of neo-Machiavellianism denied the independent significance of political ideologies, as well as religious views in their influence on politics, justifying the realm of politics as an independent and autonomous sphere governed only by its own laws and rules. This technological and pragmatic approach to politics stemmed from Walras' principle of equilibrium and the rejection of the idea of progress, as well as any other linear and unidirectional change in society.

Various strands of realism in the field of international relations are also based on this principle.

The prince as a tyrant and as the Antichrist

According to Machiavelli, it is pointless to ask why there is a prince or why there is a political state. It is also impossible to determine whether it is "holy" or "cursed," "good" or "evil," whether it leads to the salvation or destruction of the soul — all these questions are irrelevant, completely unimportant for the organisation of politics and for the study of its nature and laws.

If in the Middle Ages the prevailing belief was that politics was a cross-section of philosophy, then with Machiavelli the opposite occurs. *Philosophy becomes an application of politics*. Politics acquires the character of absolute autonomy, which is connected with the very paradigm of the transition from top-down logic to bottom-up logic.

If we turn to the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, it becomes clear that Machiavelli describes the worst form of government — *pure tyranny*. But unlike the classical vertical model of the ideal state or normal state, where the tyrant is a purely negative figure who turns the entire hierarchy upside down and asserts

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[1] *Walras L.* Éléments d'économie politique pure; ou, Théorie de la richesse sociale. Lausanne: L. Corbaz, 1874.

[2] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology). Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

The worst replaces the best; in the theoretical field of the New Age, such a titanic image becomes the new norm.

The ontology of the state itself is also changing. The state of the Prince belongs to the dimension of the Mother; it is deeply material, as it is governed by materiality and accepts material criteria as fundamental. The Prince establishes a tyrannical ontology of the Political, introducing a new "political theology" (according to C. Schmitt), from which transcendence, mission, ideal, and normativity are completely expelled. The Prince's state, his "principality," is completely detached from the higher dimension. It represents nothing but itself. In this sense, it is the antithesis of the Holy Empire, since there is nothing sacred in it. Machiavelli gives the first completely profane description of the Political.

It is important that he chooses the term "prince" to describe the main character. Not king, not ruler, and certainly not emperor or tsar, but precisely prince, il Principe. In Latin, as in the Russian translation, the devil in the Gospel is called "the prince of this world" — Pinceps hujus mundi. And in this formula, it is especially emphasised that we are talking about "this" world, as opposed to "that" world, that is, the kingdom of heaven, the Empire of Christ. Machiavelli's state belongs entirely to "this world"; it has no higher meaning, no connection with heaven. And that is why Machiavelli's image of the "Prince" with all his paradoxes has so much in common with the typical characteristics attributed to the devil in religious tradition. Satan, who tempted Christ in the desert, also offered him power over the world. Christ rejected this as a temptation of the "prince of this world." Machiavelli accepts this as a fact, presenting this devilish version of The Prince as the norm. And it becomes the norm in the Modern Age.

Thus, there is a complete reversal of the political ontology of Plato and Aristotle, and the worst form of rule — tyranny — not only gains the right to exist, but becomes the basic methodology for analysing politics. In the Christian context, this could not fail to evoke direct associations with the devil — the "prince of this world."

Hobbes and the idea of absolute original sin

The fundamental author who had a decisive influence on modern political philosophy was the Englishman Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was personally acquainted with such figures fundamental to

philosophy and science in the Modern era, such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642).

Hobbes is the author of the famous book on the nature of the state, Leviathan [1]. Hobbes' radically materialistic and completely immanent (secular) view of politics was several centuries ahead of political science and became the subject of study and practical application by subsequent generations of Englishmen and Frenchmen, as well as Europeans as a whole. Leviathan is the most fundamental work setting out the basic principles of modern political philosophy. It provides an understanding of human nature, the essence of the state, the significance of ethics, the significance of coercion and violence, and the various states of civilisation as understood in the modern era. It is a fundamental political philosophy that provides answers to all fundamental questions.

Hobbes argues that humanity initially exists in a state of nature. At the same time, Hobbes asserts that human nature is evil and that *humans are evil*. Hobbes introduces the axiom "man is wolf to man" (homo homini lupus est). In the state of nature, Hobbes argues, man strives for only one thing: domination over others, the seizure of prey, and the satisfaction of his basest desires and instincts. That is, in his view, man is an aggressive predator, a wolf who seeks only his own benefit. If left to his own devices, man will immediately begin to commit violence, subjugate those around him, seize things and territories, disregard everyone else, and use whatever comes to hand solely for his own interests. He acts in this way out of absolute selfishness, because his nature is evil.

This is the idea of original sin, absolutised in a political and anthropological sense. Yes, Christianity asserts that man is a product of original sin, but for Calvinist Protestantism, the only way to be saved is to accumulate wealth and become rich. Christianity and Catholicism have completely different ideas about this: although man bears the burden of the fall of his forefathers, who were expelled from paradise, Christ came into the world and saved humanity, and now it is possible to become a fundamentally new person, a Christian person, build their society and, ultimately, a political system based on different Christian values. That is why Catholics insist

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[1]   *Hobbes, T.* Leviathan. Moscow: Yurist, 2001.

based on the principle of free will. According to Thomas Aquinas, man is endowed with sufficient grace to resist sin if he has the will to do so (the theory of gratia sufficiens). For Protestants — for Luther and especially for Calvin — this is impossible, since after the Fall, man became too weak, and this cannot be remedied. In Hobbes, this thesis breaks away from Christian theology and is asserted as a completely secular view of human nature. Man is an evil, selfish creature, a kind of social beast, pursuing exclusively private interests and disregarding others. Thus, from Protestant pessimism about human nature, we arrive at modern atheistic and materialistic pessimism, detached from its theological foundations (Hobbes no longer believes in paradise and the Fall).

So, according to Hobbes, man is a predator. But he is not just a predator, he is also an *intelligent* predator. He is a wolf with brains, which he needs to acquire more, defeat more effectively, capture and destroy his neighbour or force him to serve himself. Gradually, this selfish wolf begins to understand that if he acts solely in his own interests, without regard for the interests of others, then in some situation he himself may find himself in the position of a victim, weaker and prey to another, stronger and more powerful predator.

According to Hobbes, while still in its "natural state," an intelligent wolf at some point begins to understand the relativity of the very principle of predation. It then begins to think about creating conditions in which it can dominate others, but others cannot dominate it. Since this cannot be achieved directly, the intelligent predator concludes that certain compromises must be made.

And then the cunning wolf proposes to conclude *a social contract* with other wolves (people), establishing a set of rules both to legalise and to somewhat restrict their evil nature. A social contract is an agreement. Its essence boils down to the acceptance of certain rules that regulate the war of all against all, establishing laws, boundaries and norms. But in the natural state, no one will simply follow these laws, since no one will force the strongest to respect them, as they will not want to limit their appetites of their own free will (according to Hobbes, free will does not exist, only evil will exists).

The solution to this dilemma is to leave the "natural state" and enter into an agreement to create a state. Cunning wolves come

to the conclusion that it is necessary to delegate some of their powers so that this authority — the State — can control compliance with certain rules in the satisfaction of individual desires.

But for this authority — the State — to be effective, it must be feared, inspiring terror even in the strongest and most powerful of human wolves. Hence the idea of Leviathan, mentioned in the Bible. Leviathan is a sea monster. It is mentioned in the Book of Job [1] when Job protests that he was righteous, loved God, was closest to God, and suddenly experienced such misfortune, blows of fate, losing everything, his wealth and loved ones, and finding himself poor and insignificant, he turns to God with reproaches. God answers his reproaches: "Have you seen Leviathan, Job? He is so terrible that the mountains tremble before him. The seas boil. Have you seen the behemoth, Job? When he walks, the earth shakes. So be afraid and do not rebel against God, for God is almighty and can both give and punish according to his own will. God is stronger than all, even Leviathan and Behemoth, the two primordial monsters, stronger than which there are none.

The reference to Leviathan turns out to be the most convincing argument. Job humbles himself: well, of course, if You have frightened me so much, then You are right. This may not be very Christian ethics, but it is quite in keeping with Protestant pessimism. The more powerful frightened the weaker, and the weaker submitted and fell silent. They showed Leviathan to Job, and Job admitted that he was wrong. So, according to Hobbes, it is enough to present Leviathan to intelligent wolves, and they will retreat in terror.

But if in the Bible there is a man (Job) on one side, God on the other, and between them — as an argument — Leviathan, then Hobbes' materialism does not recognise a separate eternal God. Leviathan is "god," only man-made, created by human hands as a result of a social contract.

According to Hobbes, the meaning and nature of the state is *creation*. *"God*." But an evil, punishing, artificial, and man-made god. This "evil god" is the state, which cunning and selfish wolves nevertheless establish over themselves as an authority to which they can no longer disobey because it is stronger than each of them. And Leviathan now represents an instrument of "legitimate violence" (according to M. Weber[2]). Levi-

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[1]   , Book of Job, Chapters 40:20–41:26.

[2]   *Weber, M.* Politics as a Vocation and Profession / Weber, M. Selected Works. Moscow: Progress, 1990.

A fan is a state. Its main task is to scare and punish those who do not follow the rules established by consensus. If they were *only* wolves (i.e., in their natural state), they would not have created a state. But they are *intelligent* wolves, they have the ability to think, and they understand that they can destroy each other. To prevent this from happening, they create a new monster. This monster, Leviathan, is the state of the modern era.

The main idea of Leviathan is that the state is created *from below*, by evil, disgusting, vicious, selfish people. And it is created solely to keep selfish villains in relative check. The state is an evil, monstrous, punishing "god" established by villains to give some order to villainy, which is why the state does not prevent violence, robbery, seizure, subjugation, and deception; it organises all of this by establishing rules that everyone must obey.

Such is the world of Thomas Hobbes, his political philosophy. Evil, in order not to destroy themselves with their own evil, out of cunning and individual selfishness, create a man-made abominable "god" called Leviathan, who will frighten and oppress them.

Here, the fundamental idea is the notion of the negativity of human nature.

Spencer: atomism and the struggle for survival in a liberal society

Hobbes did not yet have a theory of evolution of species, as Darwin (1809–1882) later did, but it can already be anticipated in general terms by replacing wolves with monkeys. According to Hobbes, humans are intelligent wolves who built Leviathan but retained their wolf-like nature. According to Darwin, humans are monkeys who, in the struggle for survival, developed the ability to think and built society. Both theories were combined in social Darwinism by the greatest theorist of liberal political philosophy, Herbert Spencer (1820–1903).

Spencer draws on Hobbes and, like him, applies the principles of atomistic physics to society. His goal is to construct a system that would unite the physical structure of matter and the development of biological species and the history of humanity under common laws and methods of investigation. Physicists

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[1]   *Danilevsky, N.* Darwinism. A Critical Study: In 2 vols. St. Petersburg: M. E. Komarov Publishing House, 1885–1889.

[2]   *Spencer, G.* Scientific, Political, and Philosophical Experiments in 3 Volumes. Minsk: Sovremenny Literator, 1998.

Spencer's theory is based on the idea that matter, which in its zero state consists of heterogeneous atoms, particles, possesses an internal inherent force (life, striving) that causes these homogeneous particles to stick together, producing heterogeneous agglomerates in a state of motion. Movement — its accumulation in integrated structures and its dispersion — is a property inherent in matter itself. Agglomerates of particles, driven by the motion of matter, begin to adapt to external conditions, and the results of this adaptation constitute a hereditary code that is transmitted from thing to thing, from being to being. Thus, an ordered universe is born, which is both a consequence of evolution and its process. The goal of evolution is to achieve maximum adaptation to the surrounding conditions, but these conditions themselves are in turn a process of evolution. This gives rise to the principle of struggle and "survival of the fittest," which is at the heart of Spencer's philosophy. The universe and its order embody the limit of adaptation of the fittest and are the peak of evolution. The first most successful and "most adapted" agglomerate of particles is *an individual thing,* which turns out to be so stable that it transmits its properties to other things. In the natural world, the pinnacle of individuation is living beings capable of self-reproduction as species series, perfecting their qualities and passing them on to their offspring, thereby strengthening their individual essence. *The universe is nothing more than individuation.* That is why humans are thought of as individuals capable of adapting to their environment better than other species. and thereby build society.

At the same time, according to Spencer, the individual, in complete harmony with Hobbes, is selfish and aggressive in his natural state, pursuing exclusively his own benefit, sometimes in a deadly struggle with other individuals. Intraspecific and interspecific struggle, according to Spencer, made man human, forcing him to master new and new techniques of adaptation, attack and defence, which are passed on by inheritance, thereby perfecting the human series of individuals. In the course of the struggle between humans, the "fittest" rise to the top of society. Spencer considers *social inequality to be a positive factor,* as it reflects "natural selection" and, therefore, the progress of humanity. A strong person is more human than a weak person, Spencer believes, and on this basis he opposes equality — people should be given the freedom to maximally realise their selfish nature in order to gradually produce more and more perfect series of people, but this realisation will be more rational and "evolutionary" if it is based on the principle of natural selection.

to realise their selfish nature in order to gradually produce increasingly perfect series of people, but this realisation will be more reasonable and "evolutionary" if the rights and freedoms of others are respected, not as givens, but as possibilities. Everyone has the right to participate in the struggle, but the winner gets everything, and the loser is left alone with his loss; so that next time he will fight better, think faster, act more perfectly and more effectively, thereby contributing to the process of evolution.

Chaos and struggle of all against all, war of all against all, are characteristics of natural coexistence, stemming from the evil nature of man. According to Spencer, this is an order based on pure force. But it is precisely because of the struggle for survival and natural selection that people understand that the development of rationality is the most important advantage for survival and success. And on the basis of this rationality, they establish politics, agreeing to some restriction of their freedom, but only in order to realise their will in the best possible way.

Spencer views history as consisting of three evolutionary phases:
- an initial chaotic phase,
- then a phase of creation based on the power and violence of states and political structures that rigidly enforce hierarchies and hinder the free process of natural selection,
- and finally, a phase of industrial competition, when the struggle for survival unfolds through market competition, which is the highest form of intra-species struggle, as it completely unleashes the full potential of selfishness inherent in the human individual and reflects the maximum dynamism of self-propelling matter.

Spencer's political philosophy is *an elitist version of liberalism*, in which *equality of opportunity (participation in competition) leads to inequality of results*, while competition itself takes place in the area where the highest technical and scientific achievements of the human species are concentrated, as an arsenal of methods for waging economic wars. Spencer was opposed to widespread public education, believing that the ignorance of the weak and lower classes was an incentive for the strong and superior to multiply and develop knowledge. Spencer denied women equal rights, believing that they were the least perfect product of evolution, accumulating and genetically passing on

that set of adaptive functions that only reinforced their weakness and uncompetitiveness.

Thus, as modern political philosophy developed, Hobbes' basic thesis about Leviathan and its genesis continued in a new form, when the aggressive consciousness of wolf-like people in the conditions of the State was honed to such an extent that it went beyond its boundaries and chose a new strategy corresponding to the more developed form of modernity. But it was Hobbes who laid the foundation for this approach.

The primacy of the social contract and panegoism

Hobbes' ideas about the nature of the state, developed by his followers, form the basis of modern political philosophy. The overwhelming majority of modern theories about the origin of the state, its functions, its nature and its history are based in one way or another on Hobbes's theses. This applies not only to those who follow him or seek to develop his intuitions, but also to those who fundamentally disagree with him.

Hobbes is a philosopher of the modern era, just as Plato and Aristotle were philosophers of the Tradition. And Hobbes understood with extreme clarity the very spirit of the new paradigm, built from the bottom up, from matter to consciousness, from animal to human, from body to mind, from the chaotic struggle of all against all to the rules artificially established in the course of the social contract.

For Hobbes, the state is negative because it is nothing more than a restrictive institution of violence. But it is not evil in relation to people (who are neutral or good in themselves), but it is evil precisely because the people who created it are evil. Sociologist Max Weber defines the state as an "apparatus of legitimate violence."This is a very Hobbesian idea, because the sole task of Leviathan is to repress, suppress, and punish. But this violence is legitimate; it is used to repress those who challenge the state system (Leviathan), to execute criminals, and to destroy those who do not abide by the rules of the social contract.

The vast majority of modern societies are built on Hobbes' paradigm. This is the prevailing model of the modern state.

[1] *Weber, M.* Politics as a Vocation

[2] *Foucault, M.* Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. M.: Ad Marginem, 1999.

Protestant influences (Calvinism) are clearly evident at the origins of this model, but Leviathan's model itself is completely autonomous. This is purely "political theology" (K. Schmitt), in which the state is "God," and the presence or absence of any other level of divinity adds nothing to this complete picture and takes nothing away from it. Hobbes combines atomism and materialism with social and political philosophy and obtains a completely finished and consistent picture. In Plato's Parmenides system of hypotheses, it corresponds to the sixth hypothesis: atoms artificially create a "unity," which Hobbes calls "Leviathan." It is in this type of society that humanity lives in the modern era.

In Hobbes, we already see the fundamental unit of political philosophy that remains relevant to this day. If we remove original sin or distract ourselves from the idea of social Darwinism, we see only one thing: what is the norm of our modern political philosophy: man is a purely selfish actor, *a rational egoist.* As an egoist, he is a predator; as a rational being, he subordinates his immediate predatory egoistic instincts to certain rational strategies in order to achieve the optimal result.

There is a humorous definition: "An egoist is someone who loves himself very much and hates me completely." Every egoist considers others to be "too selfish." Thus, relationships between people become like mirrors reflecting each other; this is how *panegoism* develops — everyone acts in their own interests without thinking about others And only when it comes to safety and when the situation becomes critical do selfish individuals create a common defence system for their own safety. In such a picture, selfishness lies at the root of predatory behaviour and at the root of its restraint. Egoism makes animals think, but only to better satisfy their appetites and increase their chances of survival in the struggle between species and individuals. This view of humans as purely selfish actors is at the heart of our understanding of the world today, but its roots go back to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.

[1] The famous "fable of the bees" by Bernard Mandeville, a classic of liberal thought, is based on this principle (1670–1733), which describes how a society consisting of complete egoists comes to universal prosperity, without remotely setting itself such a goal, and, on the

contrary, an altruistic society of kind and compassionate people leads to degeneration, decline and degradation, since everyone in it thinks only of others and not of their own well-being, which ends in universal poverty. *Mandeville B.* The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits. Clarendon Press, 1714.

Later, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) offered a slightly different interpretation ᵒᶠthe social contract. Rousseau also asserts that society is based on a "social contract," but he gives it a significantly different interpretation based on the recognition of the "noble savage," that is, on the idea that human nature in its original state is not evil, as Hobbes believed, but rather good. But it is important to note that Hobbes spoke about this much earlier and provided a philosophical analysis of the mechanism of this social contract. What do selfish actors agree on? They agree on how to establish some kind of order above themselves that will reflect this relationship between their own animal nature and their desire to somehow limit the animal nature of others. This is in order to justify their own selfishness and at the same time protect themselves from the selfishness of others. In Rousseau, this simple but convincing logic of Hobbes is disrupted, and although he also considers the state to be evil, he interprets it as something external to man himself. Hobbes, on the other hand, is extremely consistent and seeks to explain everything by purely immanent factors, without introducing anything extraneous into his system. The limitation of egoism is a consequence of egoism, and the violence of the state is a reflection of the violence inherent in the wolf-man.

Politics is a product of the social contract, and the entire political ontology is built on it. This thesis describes the essence of modern political philosophy. In this, we can easily recognise a complete reversal of Platonism. The state has no existence of its own in the realm of ideas. It has no model. It is built from below by separate atomic material subjects driven by private interests and selfish appetites. Everything else follows from this — the meaning and purpose of politics, its structure, its improvement, the creation and reform of political institutions, the place and powers of authority, as well as its nature, the distribution of powers, the relationship between rulers and the general mass of citizens, etc.

The point of a bottom-up policy is to balance selfish impulses in a smart way. This balancing act requires a certain level of intelligence. There's also a certain balance in a wolf pack, but it's not smart. The strongest wolf is the leader. As soon as the leader weakens, he is killed. In humans, rational mechanisms are also involved in the distribution of roles and powers. The strong unite in society

[1] *Rousseau, J.-J.* The Social Contract. Treatises. Moscow: KANON-press; Kuchkovo, 1998.

and strive to conclude social contracts that would guarantee their dominant position and further strengthen their position. However, the lower classes may respond to forms of political revolution, uprisings, and popular unrest that they consider too unfair. The weaker ones may unite and pose a greater threat. Therefore, it is necessary to negotiate with the lower classes and take their opinions into account. This gives rise to a secondary form of social contract — already within the framework of the Leviathan that has been created: the upper classes negotiate with the lower classes — this is already a different form of social contract. It would be easier to simply suppress the lower classes (as, according to contemporary political philosophers, was the case in Antiquity and the Middle Ages), but even the weak possess intelligence and are capable of realising their selfish interests, which suffer from the domination of the stronger. Thus, they can strike back. The development of this idea leads to socialism and communism. But Hobbes serves as the starting point in any case.

The balance of revising various social contracts constitutes the political history of the modern era. But in any case, in the Modern era, no one seriously questions that the political body of Leviathan itself, its evolution and modernisation, is based on the actions of selfish actors who recombine with each other, creating — always from the bottom up — various political models. At the same time, the bottom-up principle becomes increasingly emphasised, erasing even the distant remnants of verticality inherent in the political systems of early modernity.

Leviathan is a "god-machine," a "god-mechanism," a man-made "god." It is *a* true *idol*. Friedrich Nietzsche expresses this very accurately:

> The state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. It lies coldly, and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people." (...)
> The state lies in all languages about good and evil: and what it says, it lies — and what it has, it has stolen.
> Everything in it is fake: it bites with stolen teeth, toothless. Even its womb is fake.
> The mixing of languages in good and evil: I give you this sign as a sign of the state. Truly, this sign means the will to die! Truly, it winks at the preachers of death!
> Too many people are being born: the state was invented for the surplus!

Look how it draws them to itself, this multitude!
How it suffocates them, chews them up and chews them over!
"There is nothing on earth greater than me: I am the ordering
finger of God," roars the monster [1].

Therefore, Hobbes emphasises that there is nothing sacred or holy in the state. Monstrous — yes, frightening — yes, awe-inspiring — yes. But it is just an ordinary man dressed in a police uniform. It is the shell that frightens. When the wearer of the uniform comes home, changes into his home clothes, sits down next to his wife and children, he is harmless and dangerous. There is nothing frightening about him, nothing of the monster. But dressed in his armour, the guardian of order gives the impression of a storm.

This observation is wittily described in the fairy tale "The Wonderful Wizard of Oz" [2]. The ruler of the Emerald City, "The Great and Terrible," turns out to be a harmless and pathetic fool who inspires fear only by virtue of a "social contract," embodied by the mandatory requirement to wear green glasses so that all objects in the Emerald City appear emerald. This is exactly what Nietzsche means when he says about the state:
"everything in it is fake."

The meaning of the state is only to frighten. But unlike the sacred, it inspires fear, not horror. It does not abolish our self, replacing it with something new, a new spiritual personality, but simply suppresses it, forces it to bend, curl up, and tremble lowly.

Jean Bodin and the concept of "sovereignty"

Jean Bodin was another creator of the political philosophy of the Modern Age. He played a significant role in political thought during the turbulent 16th century, which was a turning point for France and Europe as a whole, when there was fierce opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism. Jean Bodin drew a fundamental political conclusion from the religious conflict between the Huguenots (Protestants) and Catholics, which, on the one hand, took Calvinist theories of opposition to Rome and its supranational authority to their logical conclusion, and on the other, partly in the spirit of the Catholic party (but entirely in the spirit of Lutheranism), advocated the absolutisation of royal power. In this way, he arrived at *the form*

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[1]   *Nietzsche, F.* Thus Spoke Zarathustra. P. 35.
[2]*Baum, F. L.* The Wonderful Wizard of Oz/Baum, F. L. The Magic Land. St. Petersburg: Andreev and Sons, 1991.

models of the nation state, combining monarchism and the interests of the bourgeoisie, without any specific religious component. Thus, Jean Bodin, somewhat anticipating Hobbes, became the main theorist *of political modernity,* asserting as the norm *a* completely *secular state,* detached from any religious (sacred) content.

Jean Bodin's main idea is *the concept of sovereignty*. From his point of view, the state is based on the fact that there is no higher legal or religious authority *above it*. The state has no transcendent goals; its tasks are purely technical. It must protect citizens from external enemies and organise economic and social life based on maximum efficiency and rationality. Bodin's state is a purely mechanical construct whose function is limited to optimal material organisation.

According to Boden, the sovereignty of the state is justified precisely by the fact that it has no tasks that go beyond the scope of technical concerns and challenges. If the state does not serve any idea or mission, then there is no authority capable of evaluating its activities based on higher criteria. The state can judge only itself; this is the essence of its sovereignty, the absence of any higher levels.

Like Hobbes in the biblical triad of Job, Leviathan and God, God is removed and his place is taken by a man-made monster, Leviathan. In Bodin's view, the sovereign, the bearer of sovereignty, is the highest authority. And although Boden does not deny God, in the spirit of deism, he denies Him the ability to effectively intervene in the course of human history. History is made only by the sovereign. He may or may not take God into account. But this has no bearing on the structure of the Political itself.

The elimination of the power of the Pope

This idea that the head of state and the state itself are fundamentally absolute structures is radically new to medieval thinking. God becomes politically powerless, unable and unwilling to intervene in the course of human political history. In effect, he is placed outside the brackets. It is obvious that this is just as radical as

[1] *Bodin, J.* Six Books on the State /Anthology of World Political Thought: In 5 vols. Vol. 2.
Moscow: Mysl, 1999.

radically contradicts the Catholic idea of the "two cities" and the ontology of the Empire, as well as the ideas of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

Today, the concept of sovereignty is the foundation of international law and a basic constitutional norm. We use it easily. But why was it important to introduce this concept in the 16th century, when Jean Bodin lived and wrote his works? Because at that time, there was still a belief that there was an authority above states that limited their power — primarily the Roman Catholic Church. The Pope appointed cardinals and bishops, who were, in essence, conduits of the supranational system. The cardinal was the most important figure in a European nation-state; he was subordinate not to the king, but to the Pope. This gave rise to dual power. The universal supranational power of Catholicism, the Pope, and the national power of the king. The essence of Bodin's idea is that there cannot be two powers in a nation state, and all power should be transferred to a secular ruler, i.e., a prince or king. The king is sovereign because sovereignty is the fundamental assertion that there is no other higher legal authority above the king.

Therefore, according to Bodin, European society should be viewed as a collection of sovereign states, sovereign units, rather than a single legal field of the Catholic Church, united consecrated by the Pope.

For the era in which Bodin lived, this was a completely new conception of the very nature of politics. Before him, the idea of the state had a sacred foundation: the state serves the Church. Hence such concepts as "Christian monarchy," coalitions of "Christian countries," etc. The Christian principle, embodied in the Catholic Church, was the authority that spiritually endowed the national European states with *a* certain spiritual, supernatural, and super-rational *mission*. The guardians of this mission were the representatives of the Pope, who were the bearers of supranational control. According to Carl Schmitt, this type corresponded to the concept of "commissarial dictatorship" ([1] i.e., a form of government in which the entire ruling institution acted in the name of a higher goal. The Pope himself did not rule on his own behalf, but as "Commissioner of Christ." And his legates, cardinals, and all other clergy, obeying the Pope, also participated in this mission through him. The system of power was open. Boden, however, postulates a completely different model—from now on, the king's power is a "sovereign dictatorship."

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[1] *Schmitt, K.* Dictatorship: From the Origins of the Modern Idea of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle.

where the head of the institution of power is the individual as such. And it is precisely this individual — as a person, not as the bearer of a mission — who is served by his subordinates and the entire people. The words attributed to Louis XIV (1643–1715) can serve as a formula for "sovereign dictatorship":

"I am the state!"

The king's musketeers against the cardinal's guards

Let us recall the famous novels of Alexandre Dumas (1802–1870), featuring the king's musketeers and the cardinal's guards. Their confrontation reflected the fundamental dilemma of 17th-century France: the Catholic authority of the Pope or the national sovereignty of the monarch. The cardinal's guards were a French segment of a special supranational army — bearers of a pan-European (and, given the European colonies, global) network of "commissarial dictatorship." They were not guided by the personal interests of the powerful Richelieu (1585–1642), but ensured *the unity of the European world in the name of a supranational mission*. In this case, sovereignty — and openly so — was held only by the Pope and his system of cardinals, who oversaw the nation states as representatives of the "heavenly city" in the "earthly city." As we have seen, in the model of the blessed Augustine, this "city of heaven," from a Catholic point of view, was the city of the righteous (hence celibacy and priests), while the "city of earth" was the city of sinners. The musketeers, who were on the side of Dumas himself and, more broadly, the republican-nationalist-oriented French of the 19th century, who had by that time already lived for several centuries in a world where the ideas of Jean Bodin had completely prevailed.

It is precisely against the "dictatorship of the commissars" of the Pope and his legates that Bodin's main idea is directed. According to Boden, the state has no mission whatsoever and *therefore* no authority should be above the king. Consequently, cardinals should be stripped of all real power and be purely ecclesiastical officials. In essence, this is a change in the conception of the political system of all European politics and all European philosophy. Here, the "heavenly city" disappears from view altogether. Politics becomes the exclusive domain of the "earthly city." But since there is nothing to compare it to, it cannot be called a "city of sinners." Thus, the vertical dimension is completely removed from politics.

Towards the Westphalian world order

Boden's monarchism is completely desacralised. In his understanding, the king is a strictly immanent and technical figure, but being placed at the head of the state, he becomes its concentrated expression. The sovereign king represents the highest authority of the Political.

In practice, this meant that each state had complete and absolute freedom to build its relations with other states solely and exclusively on the basis of its national interests. Previously, the European order was qualitatively different: for example, Rome and the Catholic Church, which had significant legal powers, actively intervened in disputes and conflicts between England and France. Of course, secular rulers did not always follow the instructions of the popes and tried to influence them themselves (due to political intrigues and unrest in the Catholic Church in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, there were several popes), but from the point of view of the European legal system, it was precisely this supranational system that was legitimate. It was based on the (probably apocryphal) "Donation of Constantine," a legendary document or order according to which Constantine the Great (272–337) transferred full power over the Western Roman Empire to Pope Sylvester (?–335). In such a situation, neither France, nor England, nor any other European power was sovereign in the full sense of the word. It was precisely against this that Jean Bodin's ideas were directed. From now on, the rulers of nation states became the highest actors. And there was no higher authority above them. Relations between them were determined solely on the basis of bilateral treaties, alliances and coalitions, negotiations or war. This was most clearly evident in Protestant England, but France, although it never broke decisively with Catholicism, became the second pole of the new political system. Therefore, although political sovereignty is a product of Protestant thought, it found its application in the Catholic world, where the avant-garde of the transition to modernity was France.

The system based on the principle of sovereignty was finally adopted by the European powers in the 17th century following the bloody Thirty Years' War. In it, a coalition of Protestant countries in northern Europe clashed with southern European powers that sided with the Counter-Reformation and remained loyal to Rome and the Habsburgs. The Catholic south...

made a last-ditch attempt to preserve — even restore — the medieval order, which assumed the supremacy of the popes and the status of the Empire. But even during this war, it became clear that a number of Catholic countries (primarily France) were guided not by a common Catholic agenda, but by their own national interests (opposition to Austria, etc.). Since neither side managed to gain a decisive advantage during the Thirty Years' War, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 essentially cemented the victory of the principle of national sovereignty, rejecting any legal basis for religious authorities, whether Catholic or Protestant. In essence, this was an ideological victory for Protestantism, which initially (in Luther and England) advocated the complete autocracy of national kings and princes. From that moment on, the nation state and its sovereign became the highest political authority, and religious issues were relegated to the periphery of politics. This situation was enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia, which remains the main norm of international law to this day. Thus, the ideas of Jean Bodin prevailed.

Inside Leviathan

We can draw an analogy between the main concepts of the three fundamental founding fathers of modern politics:

The Prince (Machiavelli) — Leviathan (Hobbes) — the sovereign (Bodini)

These are very similar and interrelated concepts. Together and separately, they constitute a new (compared to Antiquity and the Middle Ages) structure of the Political. From now on, politics is situated exclusively in the conditions of the "world of this life"; the ontological vertical collapses, and the state is conceived as an exclusively immanent phenomenon. Politics becomes material, materialistic, technical, and exclusively earthly, sharply detached from any heavenly spiritual dimension. In such politics, there is no place for a philosopher-king or even a warrior-aristocrat. Everything in it is subordinated to utilitarian practical tasks. To recognise the legitimacy of Machiavelli's Prince, Hobbes' Leviathan or Bodin's sovereignty is tantamount to agreeing with the pig-polity and the legitimacy of its philosophical foundations.

Today we live in Hobbes' world (Leviathan, social contract, rational egoism), under the rule of the Prince (the source of names

but sovereign, not commissarial, dictatorship), and from the point of view of the structure of international law — in Jean Bodin's system (the Peace of Westphalia). Any supranational organisations — such as the UN, etc. — have only symbolic significance and possess a recommendatory status[1]. Any state may accept or reject the principles of "international law," since the main provision of this law is precisely sovereignty, which means, among other things, the completely justified possibility of disregarding any international norms. If the principle of sovereignty is recognised as the highest foundation, any supranational union is nothing more than a club. Ostracism or condemnation may be psychologically and morally unpleasant and even painful, but there is no authority that can legitimately force a sovereign state to pursue or refrain from pursuing a particular policy. Only force decides everything, and the decisive argument for exerting pressure on a sovereign state is the ability of another state or coalition of states to compel it to act in one way or another by force.

The politics of the third principle

We live in a world of "Leviathan"; we are dealing with actors of rational egoism, that is, with rational wolves; this justifies the very existence of the state, and the legitimacy of violence on the part of the state is justified precisely by this pessimistic anthropology. Sovereignty is the reality that continues to be of absolute importance to us today. Bodin wrote in the 16th century, but even today this is a fundamental factor in the very structure of the political system, regardless of the specific state in which we live. We are still in Jean Bodin's world. This world remains Westphalian, which means that we base our international practice and international law on the principle of sovereignty.

It is with these three European thinkers—Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Bodin—that a paradigm shift in political philosophy takes place. We are leaving behind the state of the Father and the state of the Son, political Platonism and political Aristotelianism, and moving towards the domination of the third principle of Timaeus, the realm of the third social type (the common people, the majority, the demos) and the third principle of the soul (carnal bodily desires).

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* International Relations (Paradigms, Theories, Sociology). Moscow: Academic Project, 2014.

All these lines are synchronised — the rise of the bourgeoisie, capitalism, secularisation, the abolition of the transcendent dimension, the transition from the vertical to the horizontal, the replacement of religion by science, the shift of the main criterion from unity to multiplicity, etc.

This is how not only the subject but also the object changes. Instead of Plato's and Aristotle's universe, Democritus' universe becomes the norm. Atoms of matter have their counterparts in society in the form of individuals, citizens of a democratic system. The masculine contemplative and heroic principle gives way to Mother, Nurturer, and Recipient.

Chapter 4. Individualism as the basis of political philosophy in the modern era

The basis of Protestantism is the social contract

The dominant basis of modern politics is the idea of the individual as the basic instance of the political. That is, the political is conceived as a product of the creation of the individual. As we have seen, the origins of this approach lie in the special theology of Protestantism, which placed the individual rational being at the centre of the interpretation of Holy Scripture.

Protestants view the Church as a human creation resulting from a social contract. The social contract forms the Church for Protestantism. At the heart of this Church is not the clergy (as in Catholicism), nor apostolic grace, nor a group of people united by the sacrament of baptism (as in Orthodox Christianity), but a contract between individuals. Protestants believe that Christians agree among themselves, and the Church is created from this agreement.

This gives Protestantism a deeply *democratic* character as a religion. In some cases, this leads to the rejection of the priesthood altogether — when there is no pastor at all, or he is elected by all members of the community and does not receive any additional ordination. In many forms of Protestantism (especially in Calvinism, its variants and parallel movements), this leads to the rejection of the Eucharist. In addition, in Protestant sects, we see an almost complete rejection of icons — statues and images of saints and even of Christ himself are considered "idolatry."

In fact, the concept of the Church is radically changing. The Protestant Church is a product of a collective agreement, a social contract.

All we need to do is secularise this Protestant ecclesiology, and we get the basic model of the political philosophy of the New

time. In Protestantism, the principle of the individual is still applied to the interpretation of Scripture, which is still considered sacred and unquestionable authority. The next step towards Modernism is the rejection of this, and from now on individuals are free to interpret not only the Bible, but everything in general. The motive of the sufficiency of the rational principle for judging how a particular passage of Scripture should be understood is extended to the limit: from now on, man can make any judgement based on his own reason.

This is how the normative representation of the subject of the New Age as an individual is formed. This conception is characteristic of all three classical ideologies of modernity — liberalism, communism, and fascism These three political theories describe practically the entire spectrum of basic, mainstream versions of political philosophy in the modern era. These ideologies take different positions in relation to the individual — but nevertheless, in all three, the idea of the basic source of politics is taken not from outside the human being (in God, in the sacred, in nature, etc.), but precisely from within the human being. The individual human being becomes the main subject of politics. This is the specificity of the modern era.

At the root of all three theories lies the secular model of Protestant ideology. To put it somewhat simplistically, one could say that if we take Protestant ideology and remove God, Christ, and the Holy Scriptures, we are left with the political philosophy of the modern era and the idea of the social contract that underlies this politics.

The paradoxes of the atom — the nihilistic underpinnings of modern ontology

There is a direct and immediate connection between atomism in physics and individualism in political philosophy. This reveals the unity of philosophy and politics, which constitutes the nature of both.

In fact, the concept of the individual is not as simple and self-evident as it may seem. The philosophy of the New Age introduces a new element into the structure of the world that was absent in the Middle Ages, in Antiquity, in religious society, in the world of Tradition, and in cultures where the sacred prevailed.

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[1]   *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

The theories of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius were excluded from the prevailing systems of cosmology and ontology (predominantly Platonic or Aristotelian), which directly rejected atomism. However, modern physics, beginning with Galileo and Gassendi, brought this marginal theory of atomism back into the spotlight. The idea that there is something indivisible at the lowest level of the world (the atom in nature and the individual in society) was an avant-garde, paradigmatic idea of the modern era, since the concept of matter in the scholastic, Platonic, and Aristotelian sense is fundamentally anti-atomistic. Why? Because matter is seen as a principle of insufficiency (i.e., privation, absence). The movement towards matter is a process of cooling of the Spirit, the fading of the idea of light. But darkness is only the absence of light. Evil is the diminution of good·as Plotinus wrote, which was taken up by Christian Platonism. And in this sense, matter as such does not exist.

Matter is merely a horizon, a limit towards which the falling Spirit strives. There is no darkness as such, only *fading light*. Therefore, from a philosophical point of view, in the era of Antiquity, the Middle Ages and classical philosophy, matter is *a process of materialisation*. Matter is only a limit, only a horizon that is unattainable in itself. The spirit fades, and the process of its fading is movement towards matter. Matter itself was thought of as something that does not exist, as something apophatic, having no existence in itself.

Accordingly, matter is not something given, but *a process*. There is no indivisible atom, there is *a process of division*. Only the conditional, purely conceptual horizon of this division can be called "matter." There is a process of dispersion of the original unity into a multitude, and *the limit of division*, which is unattainable in the full sense, is called "matter."

In this case, atomism cannot exist, because any material atom — as something that is not subject to "tomé" (Greek τομή) — "division" — is the limit of division, and this limit is ontologically unattainable. An atom can exist as the last link in an infinite chain of division, having no existence of its own.

This is how classical philosophy thinks, and on this it builds its theories about political structure, about the sacred Empire, about the mission of the state. Everything proceeds from the One and moves towards multiplicity in the course of ever greater movement, fragmentation,

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[1] Literally: "Evil is not some deficiency of good, but rather a complete deficiency." *Plotinus. First Ennead.* P. 275.

fragmentation, but never fully reaches this multiplicity, since it represents "nothingness."

It is interesting that Democritus himself builds his atomistic terminology on a pair of concepts — δέν and οὐδέν, which are usually interpreted as "atom" and "emptiness." But only οὐδέν is a full Greek word, meaning "nothing," "absence"[1]. The second term, δέν, has no meaning in the language and was artificially created by Democritus to denote the opposite of "nothing," that is, "not nothing." According to Democritus, δέν means "something," "particle," "atom." But the very creation of this artificial concept is highly significant: Democritus begins with "nothing" (οὐδέν) and moves from there to designate its conceptual opposite. However, Democritus does not use an existing Greek word, but deliberately creates a neologism — δέν. This is necessary to emphasise the purely speculative (conceptual) nature of the "atom," which is postulated by the mind but is not an object of sensory perception like ordinary physical objects. And the fact that this concept is postulated in opposition to another — the original — concept οοὐδέν, indicates the ontological primacy of negation. We have said that Democritus himself, unlike his interpreters, does not define the atom as "existing." Not to be "non-existent"

"emptiness" and "nothingness" do not necessarily mean "being." The speculative nature of the atom does not give Democritus sufficient grounds to speak about existence with the same certainty as Plato and Aristotle (for whom the mind itself is God and obviously represents the maximum of being). Therefore, in opposition to "nothing" (οὐδέν), the term δέν appears as an indication of a special mode of being, derived only from rational reasoning and not confirmed by sensory experience. It is important that, from a linguistic point of view, unlike the Russian "ni-chto" or the English "no-thing", the second part of the Greek term οὐδέν, i.e. δέν itself, does not carry the meaning of "thing" (English "thing"). Rather, it corresponds to the Greek particle δέ, which is translated into Russian as "well," "how," "how so," etc., while οὐδέν in this case is something like "here it is," "how so," etc.

"here it is", "how is it", etc., and οὐδέν in this case is something like "No." By discarding "no," we do not obtain something affirmative; rather, we obtain something meaningless in itself and taken separately from other words — "ze." It is telling that in modern Greek, δέν means precisely "no," "not," as a shortened form of οὐδέν, where the negation οὐ has undergone apheresis. Thus, the truncated word has retained the meaning of the more complete earlier version. From here

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[1]   *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 250, 253.

we can draw the most important conclusion: the atom as δέν is not, in the full sense of the word, an ontological instance, that is, something that exists, relating to being. Δέν is not "something" obtained by reading "nothing" or "no" out of "nothing." Δέν is "not nothing," about whose existence we cannot say anything definite. The negation of negation in ontology and philosophy (unlike in arithmetic) does not necessarily lead to affirmation. And if, according to Democritus, things that are perceived by the senses are phantoms (εἰδωλον), then atoms are the sources of phantoms, their genetic matrices.

Democritus understood emptiness and atoms collectively, which in classical ancient cosmology were seen as matter,
"many" (πολλά), since the absence of an eidetic principle (form) did not allow one to speak of any justified existence and could only be a purely conceptual abstraction, arbitrarily posited within "nothingness." Therefore, δέν as the antithesis of οὐδέν is not yet "something," although it is postulated "as not nothing." The ontology of the atom is problematic and contrary to the obvious — both to the obviousness of the classical light mind and to the elements of sensory perception. The atom is something that is as non-ostensible and non-evident as an idea or spirit, but it is not located above, in the realm of the mind, but below, in the inaccessible depths of nothingness.

The same applies to individuals in society. Such a figure does not exist, since every person is partly individual and partly collective, and the proportions between these statuses are extremely complex and multidimensional. To obtain an individual, it is necessary to destroy society. Similarly, in order to obtain an atom, one must first destroy the body by dispersing it below the body's boundaries. Nothing is found only at the boundary with nothingness.

Hence *the nihilism of atomism as a whole*. Not only classical vertical ontologies see matter as nothing, but Democritus, who was groping, nevertheless, in the densest medium of non-being (materiality) for something that differs from it, agrees with this in a certain sense.

It is telling that as atomistic physics developed, it became apparent that an indivisible limit could not be reached, and what was previously considered an "atom," "indivisible," turned out to be "divisible," consisting of even smaller particles that could be divided again. Thus, the atom remains unattainable, which, however, does not refute Democritus, but only emphasises the original conceptual nihilism of his theory. Similarly, the individual is unattainable in society, since even if we free man from all ties to collective identity, we will not reach

the minimum of humanity — beyond that begins the transition to the dividuum, the "parliament of organs," the "rhizome," genetic engineering, and cyborg projects, which form the basis of postmodern anthropology (post-humanism and transhumanism).

An idiot is a person without qualities.

If we consider the classical ancient or medieval interpretation of the nature of earthly man, he was necessarily thought of as part of something. He is part of Adam, part of the Church, part of the people, part of the political body. In a sense, man is part of his own soul (and not vice versa). The individual, on the other hand, is a conditional abstract result (non-existent and impossible in reality) of the dismemberment of some whole. Therefore, in the full sense of *the word, the individual* does not and cannot exist from the point of view of traditional political philosophy. There is *individuation,* a movement towards the individual, but the individual itself does not exist — because its content would be strictly zero. If we really find this individual, it will be insignificant, nihilistic. It will be as elusive an abstraction as Democritus' δέν. As we move from the whole to the particular, as the whole is dismembered, we lose content. Therefore, the individual as such is an empty abstraction.

In Ancient Greece, the term was used to denote a figure in which all qualitative forms of collective identity were abolished and which was reduced to the simple fact of the existence of a human being in complete isolation from content.

"Idiot," ἰδιῶτης. The modern Russian word "idiot" (both in the clinical and derogatory sense) is a calque of an ancient Greek political term that describes a private individual who does not belong to any social group. An idiot is a person who has no ancestors in this city, no place in the social system, no connection to a cult or profession. Such people are neither citizens nor slaves; they are nobodies. They are idiots. An idiot is a pure individual, devoid of any specific form of social identity, with the necessity associated with collective existence and its parameters.

In Greece, where everything was of high quality, an "idiot" was considered to be a person who, for example, came to a city where no one knew him and was unable to say anything meaningful or relevant about himself. The person exists, but there is no substance to him. There were no mythological ancestors, no connection to religion (at least, recognisable within the framework of

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* Post-Philosophy.

this society). At the same time, he may be rich, strong, handsome, attractive. But when people in the Greek polis tried to define him, they said, "He's just a 'private individual,' an idiot."

In clinical terms, an "idiot" is a person who is unable to form any coherent discourse, does not really know who they are, and is incapable of making the minimal distinctions and actions necessary to communicate with those around them. No matter how an idiot feels or what he thinks of himself, he is completely detached from society, desocialised and incapable of socialisation. Here, the political criterion of the Greek polis is transferred to a clinical case, which is a pathology and a clear anomaly for any culture. An idiot is a private individual without qualities. A unit with eyes, ears and eyebrows, but no content. What to do with an idiot, with a pure individual as such? In many societies, this was a serious problem. Where to put them? On the one hand, they are not human beings, since they do not possess any form of effective socialisation; on the other hand, they exist and resemble human beings. In some societies, idiots were banished or even killed. In others, such as Christian societies, they were allowed to live freely and were even supported. But even in this case, they were not endowed with any qualities other than the most general ones. Thus, the euphemism for "idiot" was the word "cretin," derived from the French le chr tien, meaning "Christian," which implied that a person lacked any qualities, connections, or characteristics, Therefore, out of mercy, in Christian society they were simply called "Christians" or "good Christians."

The idiot as the norm and individuals as objects

The new era, following the logic of atomism, including socio-political atomism, radically changes the attitude towards the individual. From now on, a person deprived of qualities acts as a social atom and, consequently, as a positive phenomenon (rather than the result of the sum of properties). Thus, something unprovable, non-existent (like an atom in physics) or frankly degenerative is taken as the starting point, the fundamental model for understanding the political process. The origins [of] individualism are therefore not as obvious as they might seem at first glance.

It seems that there is nothing more empirically obvious than the individual. Ostensibly pointing to someone next to us or

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[1]   *Dumont L.* Essay on Individualism.

When we think about ourselves, we automatically consider both aspects of an individual to be ours. In reality, this is not the case. In order to extract the individual from a specific person, including ourselves, it is necessary to subtract from them everything that constitutes their collective identity: language, way of thinking, gender, parents, origin, education, school, nationality, age, social roles and statuses, etc.

If we take the sociological completeness that forms the content of personality (persona [1]), and subtract all collective forms, we get an abstraction. It is this individual — the social δέν — that is considered the main actor in the political philosophy of the New Age. It is he who enters into a social contract with another individual for the subsequent formation of a political body. Similarly, according to Democritus, bodies are formed by invisible and imperceptible atoms. It is important that the state is created not by people, not by personalities, not by collective identities, but precisely by "individuals," that is, philosophical abstractions. These abstractions henceforth become political and legal norms existing in the ontology of law, but which cannot be discovered in reality, except in cases of clinical idiocy. Nevertheless, it is precisely this instance that is considered to conclude the social contract.

Let us recall Hobbes' Leviathan. What characteristics did he attribute to this normative idiot? He is not quite an idiot, that is, a person without qualities. But he is close to it. Hence the stable and extremely important metaphor of a beast. Moreover, a wild one — in Hobbes' case, a wolf. Plato, who also wanted to express a minimum of social and political qualities, used metaphors of pigs — hence the term "pig farmer." Democritus saw the origins of human society in the imitation of animals. People learned

> from spiders to weave and darn, from swallows to build houses, and from singing birds — swans and nightingales — to sing[2].

Thus, according to Hobbes, an idiot is a wolf. It is someone who, based on their purely selfish desires, wants to obtain the maximum possible amount of pleasure, possession, food, comfort,

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[1] The fact that personality, unlike individuality, is a social and even sociological concept is explained in detail by anthropologist Marcel Mauss (1872–1950). See*: Mauss, M.* Societies. Exchange. Personality. Works on Social Anthropology. Moscow: Knizhny Dom "Universitet," 2011.

[2] *Lurie, S. Ya*. Democritus. Texts. Translation. Research. P. 352.

security. Accordingly, this is someone who strives to build a situation from within themselves. At the centre of their system are their desires and appetites, and on the periphery is everything else. Of course, the beast is by no means an idiot, and is driven by a fairly rigid programme that predetermines its very nature. In this sense, it is collective: all wolves or all hares act almost identically in similar situations. This means that they have certain qualities and characteristics. But when applied to humans, the metaphor of the beast is an attempt to find some kind of atomic basis, that is, to strip humans of everything human. The individual is a beast in the sense that it arises as a result of subtracting human content from humans, as the fruit of abstraction, reduction, and liberation from the human eidos. The most material beginning in a human being is much more material than the body. The body has form, structure, qualities. The fact of separateness carries nothing but the act of cutting off, tearing away, dismembering. Therefore, "wolf," "pig," or "bee" in political narratives applied to humans serve to illustrate the special essences of "wolf-man," "pig-man," "bee-man," etc., designed to describe the chimerical and purely speculative nature of the individual. These are not animals as such, but a specific metaphor illustrating the concept of individuality.

It is very important to note that *the individual is not a subject*. More precisely, the very concept of subject (Greek υποκείμενον, Latin subjectum) carries a semantic ambiguity: it literally means "below," "under" (Greek υπο-, Latin sub-). In Greek, there was a similar term, hypostasis, ὑπόστασις (from υπο- "under" and στᾰσις, στᾰσεως — "standing," "being"). But what is "under" or "inside" a thing or being can be interpreted in two philosophical paradigms. On the one hand, it is a hidden essence (Greek οὐσία, Latin essentia), which in the Platonic and Aristotelian perspective means the spiritual, heavenly principle, eidos, paradigm. In this case, the "subject" is conceived as a rational soul, that is, the highest level of the soul, peculiar only to humans, while animals, plants and stones have their own souls — animal, vegetative and mineral (there were different opinions about the souls of stones in Antiquity). In this case, the prefix υπο- or sub-oz- means "hidden behind the mask of corporeality," "located on the other side of phenomenal reality." The concept of "subject" has come to mean precisely this — the centre of the thinking, volitional soul of a human being. In Christian theology, this meaning became firmly associated with the concept of "hypostasis," which coincided with the Latin persona, meaning personality.

But it was possible to move in a different direction, following the literal meaning of the prefix "upo-" or "sub-," extending the movement from spirit to matter, from Father to Mother-Nurturer, from paradigm to "chore," from the One to the many, and giving it the meaning of that which lies even lower than the boundary of corporeality. In Latin, this interpretation became associated with the concept of sub-stantia, literally "that which is under," which gives us a complete calque from the Greek ὑπόστασις, but with the opposite meaning this time. Substantia is the deepest layers of materiality, located below the body; in a sense, it is not simply matter, but sub-matter, the material roots of matter. Scholastics directly contrasted the pair of terms essential and substantia with each other, referring to two opposite poles of existence — spiritual, divine, heavenly, thinking, and material, created, insignificant, earthly, and non-thinking. Later, this pair came to be defined as subject and object (objectum), where ob-jectum (Greek ἀντικείμενον) meant that which lies opposite, in front of the subject. At the origins of these concepts, one can see an indication of something hidden, which later came to be interpreted as "hidden" as spirit, as the source of things, as the inner dimension of being, and "hidden" as matter, as that which lies beneath the body, as the most external dimension of being. Ultimately, this could mean both limits of ontology and the One (Ev) and πολλά of Plato's Parmenides. Among the pre-Socratics, this terminology was not clearly defined, and therefore Democritus' atom should be understood from the context as the source of substance, that is, the maximum possible objectivity, materiality.

Interestingly, Aristotle discusses the atom in the social dimension, i.e., the individual in similar terms, in Politics, saying that the political dimension, i.e., collective identity, is the natural state of people, from which there are two possible ways out. Aristotle writes:

> Man is by nature a political animal (3¼ον πολιτικόν), and anyone who lives outside the state by virtue of his nature (διὰ φύσιν) and not by chance is either an immoral creature (φαυλός) or a superhuman (κρέσσων); Homer reviles him, saying, "without family, without tribe, without laws, without a home" (άφρέτωρ άθέμιστος άβέστιος); such a man, by his very nature, craves only war; he can be compared to an isolated pawn on a chessboard (a3u3 ων Ϲσπερ Ϥν πεττοῖς)[1] .

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[1]   *Aristotle*. Politics. pp. 378–379.

Going beyond collective identity (political) gives us either a "superhuman," someone who is better, stronger, and more capable (kréissōv) than other people, or an underdeveloped degenerate — φαυλός. It is important that Aristotle compares him to an unpaired figure (Greek a3u3) in a game. What is meant by the individual in modern philosophy is precisely the sub-material section of the human being, the pole of attraction of the soul towards pure nothingness. The ego in man is the most (and not the least) material instance, which represents *an inverted vertical.* This is the "inner idiot," φαυλός, an unpaired meaningless object a3u3, or the political analogue of what Democritus calls "δέν," "not nothing." Indeed, the idiot/individual is not nothing, but at the same time it *is not something.* It is a vector pointing below the lower boundary of the body. And as Democritus said, atoms can only be seen with the mind, since they are pure concepts. But not Platonic ideas or Aristotelian essences, but ^{concepts,}something artificially assembled, as understood by modern philosophy. An individual is precisely an object, the most objective and distant part from its essence and spirit, from its eidos and its idea ([2].

Such empty, "idiotic" individuals, "denes," become *normative figures* in the philosophy of the New Age. They are selfish because at the centre of their individual structure is the point of attraction of their ego, with its desires, ambitions, will, etc. But all the properties of the ego are no longer individual; they are shared by many. The ego itself is individual, its most inner dimension.

The bearer of the ego, the individual, is fundamentally unattainable in reality; it is as abstract and conceptual as a speculative atom.

In physics, the atom serves only as a reference point in the process of increasingly subtle division of matter. This division itself constitutes the essence of "progress" as the main content of time in the conditions of the New Age. This progress is a movement into the depths of matter, a striving to find an even smaller particle behind each new achievement. Progress is an intense transition from the unified

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[1]   *Guattari, F., Deleuze, G.* What is Philosophy? Moscow: Institute of Experimental Sociology; St. Petersburg: Aleteya, 1998.

[2]In contemporary postmodern philosophy — primarily in speculative realism — this becomes the main goal: to reduce the human subject to an object. But such a reduction does not violate general individualism; on the contrary, it is the bringing of individualism to its ultimate logical limit. For the core of the individual is precisely the pure object or *the radical object.*

to many things. Therefore, knowledge about many things multiplies, and objects become increasingly fragmented. And although the next contender for the title of "atom" (i.e., something "indivisible") once again proves to be subject to division, progress does not stop and does not reconsider its starting point — belief in the atom.

In political philosophy, something similar happens with the individual. The postulation of the individual as an ego entity becomes the driving force of progress, which consists in liberating the individual from what is collective in him, from what can be separated from him. This determines the dynamics of political time in the modern era — social progress. This progress consists in *delving deeper into the social fabric* in order to find what is sought — the individual, who constantly eludes capture at every stage of liberation, repeatedly turning out to be a "dividee" or a bearer of collective identity. Protestantism liberates the individual from the Catholic Church with its dogmas and from the Empire with its mission. But he finds himself once again captive to the religious authority of one sect or another or under the rule of the Prince. Next comes the liberation of the individual from the state and politics. This is the ideal of civil society and the transition to purely economic interactions. The successes of liberalism, which are increasingly approaching the core of the individual, at some point emphasise that gender is also a collective identity, which gives rise to feminism and the call for gender optionality, just as religion, nationality, class, etc. were previously declared optional. The final step is the transition to post-humanism, since humans are also a collective identity. But it is obvious that the desired individual — pure "idiot" — will not be obtained in this case either, since the result of such liberation will be a machine and/or Artificial Intelligence, which in turn is something individual that can be analysed, dissected, and divided. Therefore, individualism in the New Age should be understood as a process, as a movement towards a limit that cannot be reached by analytical methods.

Goat-deer and pseudo-science

Given the special nature of atoms and the content of the basic concept of the individual, we can say that the main idea of the New Age is this: what does not exist, exists. Nihil (nothingness) exists. Non-being exists.

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[1]   *Genon R.* The Science of Numbers. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2013.

This is an anti-Parmenidean paradox, although in a certain sense it had already been conceptualised in Plato's dialogues. From Plato's point of view, a lie is a non-being that exists, because if a person expresses an opinion, then the expression itself and the opinion presented in it exist. But being false, that is, narrating something that does not exist, it is not the whole truth and not complete being. This is how the ontology of falsehood arises — a kind of "pseudology" (ψευδολογία)[1].

If we take as the basis of being that which, from the point of view of Plato and Aristotle, does not exist (such as the worlds described by the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th hypotheses of Parmenides), then we find ourselves in the context of a special ontology — *pseudo-logical ontology,* which is precisely in the same sense as a false opinion. Plotinus wrote clearly about the "being" of matter:

> Everything that it (matter) presents itself as is a lie; it itself is a lie [2].

Such a pseudo-logical field of existence is pure nihilism. This is the basis of modern philosophy — nihilism manifested in the ontology of falsehood. That which cannot be (an atom or an individual) is taken for what is.

Aristotle, in his treatise "On Interpretation," gives an example of a possible word that denotes a thing whose existence or non-existence is undefined and cannot be determined. He writes:

> Names and verbs are like thoughts without connection or separation, for example, "man" or "white"; when nothing is added, there is neither false nor true, although they denote something: for "goat-deer" denotes something, but it is not yet true or false when the verb "to be" or "not to be" is not added, either in general or with regard to time[3].

For Aristotle, a goat-deer (Greek τραγέλαφος) is a phenomenon that has no ontological status, that is, a pure concept. In the 19th century, the representative of phenomenological philosophy, Alex-

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[1] *Plato.* Sophist.

[2] Διὸ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᵬπαγγέλληται ψεύδεται. *Plotinus.* Third Ennead/ *Plotinus.* Enneads: In 7 vols. Vol. 3. St. Petersburg: Oleg Abyshko Publishing House; University Book, 2010. P. 301.

[3]*Aristotle.* On Interpretation/Aristotle. Collected Works in 4 Volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Myśl, 1978. P. 93.

S. Meinong [1](1853–1920) proposed a special term for such objects: "substantiation." It is impossible to assert that they exist, but it cannot be proven that they do not exist, since at least the formal aspect of the name complies with certain structural rules and laws. Therefore, "goat-deer" or "golden mountains," according to Meinong, substist, they neither are nor are not. Such objects can be called "virtual" or "pseudo-logical."

The ontological status of an individual belongs to this category — it is a pseudo-logical unit, analogous to "goat-deer." The same applies to atoms.

The entire philosophy of the Modern Age is based on implicit nihilism. From the point of view of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the philosophy of the Modern Age is a well-developed, fundamental, scientifically substantiated lie.

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[1] *Meinong, A.* On Possibility and Probability: Contributions to the Theory of Objects and the Theory of Knowledge. Leipzig: J. A. Barthe, 1915.

Chapter 5. Liberalism (the first political theory). John Locke and his legacy

The common metaphysical denominator of the three political ideologies of the Modern Age

In modern times, the history of European societies, as well as European colonies on other continents and in other parts of the world, unfolds exclusively in the context of Plato's third type of "Timaeus." The modern era was born out of a combination of the Renaissance and the Reformation·where the tendency towards the immanent and secular principles of the Renaissance was combined with Protestant individualism. Southern Europe, where the Renaissance began, did not accept the Reformation and individualism of northern Europe. The Council of Trent of the Catholic Church harshly rejected Calvinism and Lutheran theology, laying the foundation for the Counter-Reformation. In some areas of the Protestant world, Renaissance secularism was rejected (for example, by Calvin in Switzerland, where a peculiar Protestant theocracy was established). But the common denominator of Modern philosophy, in complete opposition to both Antiquity and the Middle Ages, was precisely the combination of materialism and secularism on the one hand, and individualism (social atomism) on the other. This is the formula of Modernity: materialism+ individualism.

These properties corresponded precisely to the third zone in the structure of Politica Aeterna, located at the base of the hierarchical triangle of the Political vertical. In ontology, it was about matter, multiplicity (πολλά), "chore" (χōρα), nothingness, the lower limit of ontology, the "realm of quantity" ([2]·and in Democritus' model, about the great void (ούδέν) and the atoms that separated from it (δέν). In the metaphysics of gender, it was about the figure of the Mother, the Nurturer, the Recipient, called upon to nurture and envelop the Son with an outer shell, wholly and completely

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[1] *Gilson É.* Héloïse et Abélard. P.: J. Vrin, 1938.

[2] *Guénon, R.* The Kingdom of Quantity and the Signs of the Times. Essays on Hinduism. Esotericism in Dante. Moscow: Belovodye, 2003.

the creation of Heaven-Father. In the structure of the soul, this corresponded to the black horse, personifying carnal desire, bodily pleasures, comfort, etc. (ἐπιθυμία).

In politics, this was reflected in the urban population, which consisted mainly of artisans and merchants, and in a broader sense, all social units that were free and engaged in the production of goods and material objects — with peasants constituting the overwhelming majority in traditional society. However, peasants were placed outside the city-state and, consequently, at some distance from politics. Thus, a situation arose in which, in the social structure of three estates or classes, the peasants were replaced by townspeople, whose status did not correspond to either the warrior caste (aristocracy, nobility), the priestly caste (clergy), or the dynastic rulers (royal family). Therefore, urban artisans and merchants became representatives not only of themselves, but also of the peasants, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population of any state until the very last eras. Peasants remained on the periphery of the Modern era, and townspeople — citizens, bourgeois — spoke on their behalf. Therefore, the third component of society, associated with the lower limit of ontology and anthropology, was represented at the origins of Modernity by the normative merchant, whose role grew as we moved from the paradigm of Tradition to the paradigm of Modernity. Thus, gradually, the bourgeoisie, the merchant became synonymous not just with the townspeople, but specifically with the merchant and entrepreneur, who was now the primary bearer of the physical, material, quantitative principle in society, that is, the collective image of the third estate, which originally included the peasantry, gradually completely pushed to the periphery of the Political.

The entire structure of the Political New Age belongs to this third segment on the Politica Aeterna map. Of course, Modernity did not triumph immediately, even in Europe itself, where its confrontation with traditional society, its philosophy, its interpretation of religion, its institutions and its foundations lasted for several centuries. Therefore, even in the Modern Age, we encounter certain remnants of the old — medieval — order or combined forms of it until the beginning of the 20th century. But from the point of view of political philosophy, everything that rightfully belongs to the modern era and represents contemporary political ideology must necessarily share the fundamental axioms of modernity, that is, the primacy and supremacy of the third sector of ontology, an-

tropology and politics. This means that only political ideology is truly modern in the full sense of the word, as it is based on materialism, a scientific worldview, and the recognition of the primacy of democracy and individual identity, with people uniting into various groups and collectives only artificially and secondarily. At the same time, it is precisely material aspirations (ἐπιθυμία) that are considered predominant and central in humans and society, while everything else is seen as a superstructure over the "black horse" from Plato's "Phaedrus." It is precisely this volitional (or lustful, since the word "lust," from the verb "to want," originally meant simply desire, will, aspiration) side of the human structure that is considered "real," primary, while everything else, including consciousness, is seen as important but secondary. Thus, man is equated with an animal, but one that has developed to such an extent that it has acquired rational qualities. Thus, Aristotle's definition of man as a "political animal" received a new — biological, materialistic — interpretation in the Modern era. For Aristotle, the political dimension is a constitutive quality of man, his eidos, manifested through his immediate physical presence. For the political anthropology of the modern era, beginning with Hobbes, politics was conceived as a new battlefield for survival, gradually formed and mastered by animals. For Aristotle, philosophy and politics are the natural state of man. For Hobbes, they are the result of going beyond the natural state, and for Locke, they are the product of the education (upbringing) of a neutral human inert mass ready to perceive any external impulse.

Within the entire segment of political philosophy of the New Era, as we have repeatedly stated, three distinct ideological forms can be identified: liberalism, communism, and nationalism (fascism). All of them fit completely within the framework of the Modern paradigm and therefore share its ideological tenets — primarily materialism and individualism — but while agreeing with this general tenet, they draw different conclusions, place different emphases and priorities, and offer their own interpretations and combinations of various political and philosophical terms and concepts. This unity of the common denominator and the differences in the theoretical and institutional constructs built upon it should always be kept in mind when considering contemporary political ideologies — liberalism, communism

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[1] *Dugin, A. G.* The Fourth Way. Introduction to the Fourth Political Theory.

and nationalism. Although they are very different and even antagonistic, grouping themselves into various combinations and alliances in the course of political history, and especially at the decisive stage of the 20th century, they share a common paradigmatic metaphysics and belong to the same segment of Politica Aeterna.

Three types of social contract and the universality of Hobbes

Starting with the Protestants, and especially with Calvin, we are dealing with individuals as the primary creators of the Church, society, and the state. Sometimes these three contracts are separated: agreement among people regarding the interpretation of religion creates a sect or denomination (this is a religious contract), agreement regarding the model of relations with each other at the horizontal level creates society (this is a social contract), and agreement regarding the system of subordination to authorities creates the state (this is the political contract). Secularisation leads to the first type of contract receding into the background, while the second and third come to the fore. At the same time, Hobbes does not distinguish between social and political contracts, since, in his view, individuals first and foremost agree with each other precisely on the creation of Leviathan, i.e. on power. Any other contract is secondary.

This is how *a* completely specific *political anthropology* emerges. The individual is endowed with derivative properties (such as egoism), regarded as the basis of the political body, and then the entire political philosophy is built around this figure. This figure forms the basis of the modern paradigm and is common to all types of political ideologies of the modern era. Liberals, socialists, and nationalists all build their doctrines on the centrality of individuals who enter into a contract with each other. In Hobbes, this contract generalises all possible types that will be derived from this principle in the future. First of all, individuals agree on power, that is, this contract is political, and at its centre stands the establishment of the state. Political nationalism follows precisely this line: the elevation of Leviathan to the highest value. And although, according to Hobbes, this is only a necessary measure for people who are wolves, nationalism gives Leviathan an axiological significance, making it a source of inspiration and positive affect. The individual wants to identify with Leviathan, to become one with it. The exaltation of this identification lies at the heart of modern nationalism and patriotism.

Liberalism and socialism pay more attention to the social contract, that is, the agreement between individuals regarding the creation of society. According to Hobbes, this stems from the will to have a state. But later, this aspect began to stand out as an independent dimension. The social contract does not form a vertical power structure, but rather a kind of trust, a company, or a cooperative. Here, too, certain mandatory rules apply, but they are much less strict and do not imply the establishment of a monopoly on violence in any one structure. Liberals and socialists partly contrast the social — horizontal — contract with the political (vertical) contract, believing — unlike nationalists — that the state is not a value but a necessity (or even an evil), and that the less state there is, the better. Therefore, in theory, according to liberal and socialist teachings, individuals can enter into a contract among themselves to dissolve the state and replace it with social, civil structures.

But there is also a difference between liberals and socialists — this time in their interpretation of the nature of the social contract itself. Both liberals and socialists reject social classes, traditional society, hierarchy, the sacredness of politics, the mission of the state, etc.; they are unanimous in their egalitarianism and desire for equality. But they understand equality differently. For liberals, the highest value is the individual, freed from all forms of collective identity — both classical (ancient, medieval, ecclesiastical, class, imperial, etc.) and new, artificial (national, state or even social). Therefore, liberals insist on equality of opportunity and starting conditions. This is the essence of the liberal contract: everyone agrees that no one in society should have special privileges, and that every individual is completely equal to every other. But only at the beginning. Then, individuals, endowed with equal opportunities, begin to realise them, bring them to life, and do so with varying degrees of success in the process of free competition. The optimal form of such competition is the market, since the economy is the most peaceful form of rivalry — unlike wars, robbery, and battles of all against all. Those individuals who have achieved success find themselves at the top of liberal society. Those who have lost are at the bottom. But this does not violate the principle of equality, liberals believe, and the principle of individual freedom is fully respected. In liberalism, individualism is most fully revealed, as it is freed from both Leviathan and the socialist interpretation of equality.

This socialist interpretation insists not only on equality of opportunity, but also on complete equality of individuals in practically all spheres. According to socialists, any competition carries an element of dishonesty, and starting conditions are never equal in reality. Moreover, the property inequality that develops in a liberal society is unjust and violates the freedom of some individuals (the unsuccessful, the weak, the losers) in favour of others (the successful, the strong, the winners). This gives rise to the idea of a different type of social contract, which can be called socialist. Individuals enter into it among themselves with regard to the recognition of the imperative of de facto equality, which can be achieved through the redistribution of wealth or specific tax policies.

But here the state comes into play again. Some authority must supervise that individuals comply with the contract, whatever it may be, liberal or socialist. Therefore, the state (Leviathan) once again becomes necessary as an instrument for coercing individuals to comply with what they themselves have decided. Such a state may be liberal or socialist, but it comes back into play.

Thus, Hobbes and his political philosophy retain their significance in later stages of the development of modern political philosophy, when his own views receive a more differentiated and isolated interpretation.

John Locke: anthropological optimism

Before Hobbes' fundamental ideas, in various interpretations, became the semantic axes of the three main political ideologies of the Modern era, Hobbes' anthropological pessimism, his view of the evil nature of man (man as a wolf), his egoism, and the immutability of this state of affairs. At the same time, as we have said, this pessimism is purely secular and breaks away from the Christian notion of original sin. Man as an individual is ultimately just a beast, which determines everything else — right down to the contract and Leviathan.

The response to Hobbes' challenge came in the 17th century from another fundamental philosopher of the Modern Age, the founder of political liberalism

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[1] *Schmitt, K.* Leviathan in the Doctrine of the State by Thomas Hobbes. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2006.

liberalism, John Locke[1]. Like Hobbes, Locke extended his fundamental influence over the entire political philosophy of the Modern era, right up to the 21st century. But while Hobbes encompasses the entire political Modernity — in all three dominant ideologies (liberalism, socialism, nationalism) — Locke extends his influence primarily to liberals, who necessarily follow the basic tenets of his thought. For socialists and nationalists, he is more of an ideological opponent, which at the same time includes recognition of the soundness and integrity of his teachings.

Liberalism could have been derived from Hobbes if we focus on the individual, who already forms the basis of politics in his work. But it is Locke who adds something to Hobbes's teaching that significantly changes the parameters of political ontology. Locke's paradigm responds to the challenge of Hobbes' paradigm at the deepest philosophical level. For Hobbes, the normative individual is evil — homo homini lupus est. This "idiot wolf" has no qualities other than greed, selfishness, and the desire to destroy others, subjugate them, eat them, and take everything they have. This view of man lies at the heart of Leviathan. Taking into account the analysis of the ontology of atomism and accepting the fundamental thesis that the individual is the most objective, material and even sub-material principle, Hobbes' idea seems quite well-founded metaphysically, although it rejects the very possibility of an alternative — primarily non-individualistic, holistic, eidetic, Christian — Platonic and Aristotelian — anthropology. Hobbes is right in saying that man as an individual is indeed a wolf. But he clearly exaggerates when he asserts that no other human beings exist.

But Locke criticises Hobbes and his view of man from a position that is by no means Platonic or Aristotelian. Locke is just as much an individualist, nominalist and modernist as Hobbes. He also does not allow for any human identity other than the individual. But he disagrees with Hobbes's assessment of the individual — not man as a whole, but the individual himself, the social idiot, the political atom. Thus, Locke accepts Hobbes's boundaries and does not seek to go beyond them, but while remaining within them, he radically changes their interpretation. For him, the individual is still the same profane, desacralised individual (as in Hobbes), but now he sees him not in a sinister light, but quite benevolently. This is not a change of anthropological register or subject of study, but a change of perspective.

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[1]   *Locke, J.* Works in Three Volumes. Moscow: Myśl, 1985–1988.

rhetoric of its description. What horrified Hobbes, Locke even likes to some extent. Locke domesticates the individual, transforming the wolf into a domestic dog through benevolent, pacifying discourse. And Locke says: indeed, we are dealing only with individuals, but is the individual really so bad? And from here begins the fundamental debate in political philosophy about the natural state.

state of nature.

This is the most important debate for determining all forms of political philosophy in the modern era. Hobbes tells us that the natural state is a war of all against all, and he justifies this with the evil nature of man. Human nature is evil. The "idiot wolf" is aggressive, selfish, and just waiting to attack others and crush the weak. But he is a clever "idiot wolf" and invents the state to somehow balance this aggression of all against all and turn chaotic slaughter into a war of the state against criminals and a war of states against each other. That is, wars are not between everyone against everyone, but between one Leviathan and another or between Leviathan and its internal enemies. This is a wonderful way to organise aggression: first, the state's apparatus suppresses those who violate its laws, and second, wars are waged, interspersed from time to time with alliances and truces. But all this makes sense when we are dealing with anthropological pessimism and agree that "man is evil." Hobbes formulated his ideas on the basis of the English Civil War, which he witnessed first-hand. When he declares that "man is a wolf to man," he knows what he is talking about, because around him there are monstrous clashes between different political parties, the beheading of the king, violence, torture, denunciations, looting, executions, massacres, all in the context of rabid religious extremism, when simply belonging to the Catholic or Protestant faith, or to one sect or another, was sufficient grounds for immediate murder. And being Irish meant being under attack. It was not easy for the Scots, who were torn between Catholicism and radical Puritanism. All this was "natural" to Hobbes. There is no Leviathan, or Leviathan is weak — and this is what you get as a result. Hobbes also formulates his theory by observing what is happening outside the window of his carriage. Someone is dragging someone else to the gallows, someone is burning, raping and robbing someone else. Informers are scribbling anonymous letters. Yesterday's favourite is dangling from a lamppost. It is not difficult to conclude on this basis that man himself is like that.

Then, looking out of the carriage window—but now in a fundamentally different era, during the Glorious Revolution—Locke peered out of the carriage window.

In his youth, already a staunch Puritan, he fought in Cromwell's army and later participated in the overthrow of James II Stuart (1633–1701). But later, a different landscape appeared before his eyes. Everything gradually fell into place. The sun shines on the green meadows of lovely, kind England and Scotland, which is even more dear to Locke. The bourgeoisie wake up in the morning and hurry to the market. Peasants harvest bread. With difficulty, a new social contract between the warring parties is concluded, albeit at the cost of compromises. And then a thought arises: perhaps the natural state of man is not so bad? Look at all the good people around you — they have gathered their goods and are going to the fair. Where do you see wolves here? Where do you see war of all against all? Man is a commercial being, peaceful and benevolent, concludes Locke.

And then, based on this observation, he formulates a completely alternative political ideology: the individual and the social contract exist, but man takes everything not from his nature, but from society. Man is, in fact, an individual, but not evil, just empty. This is analogous to Democritus's concept of inner emptiness, which he distinguished from outer emptiness (between atoms). Therefore, if an individual is raised in a wolf pack, he becomes a wolf, but if he grows up among friendly Scottish bourgeois and receives a decent education and upbringing, he will not fight, trying to resolve all issues peacefully, relying on his own mind.

From wolf to blank slate

Man is not bad, says Locke. It is not that he is good, but he is a blank slate (tabula rasa). Man is what society has made him. This is a very profound observation, anticipating modern sociology. You can write good things on a person, and you can write bad things.

Of course, Locke did not come to these conclusions simply by looking around and observing life in post-revolutionary England. He was first and foremost a philosopher, and in the field of philosophy he followed the classical English tradition of empiricism. Locke himself was a member of the British Royal Society, which included his friends Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727), and continued the English traditions of empiricism in the natural sciences and nominalism in philosophy — he revered Ockham above all others. The connection with nominalism is fundamental, since the materialism and individualism inherent in nominalism are precisely what defines

the foundations of Protestant theology, the scientific worldview, and the corresponding bourgeois liberal political philosophy. All these elements are fully inherent in Locke and constitute the semantic core of liberalism.

In the spirit of radical empiricism, Locke argued that human consciousness is a "blank slate" (tabula rasa), and its content is formed by the totality of influences from the external world (in particular, from society—hence the primary importance Locke attached to the process of education). At the same time, Locke rejected those aspects of French rationalism (Descartes, 1596–1650) that recognised the existence of innate "ideas." For Locke, "ideas" are neither independent entities (as in Platonism[1]), nor eidos, manifesting themselves in things (as in Aristotle and Thomism), nor even innate concepts (as in Descartes), but always relative and secondary *products of strictly individual thinking*[2]. An "idea" has no independent existence; it is a transient attribute of individual consciousness. Therefore, all "ideas" are ultimately transient, subject to change and dependent on upbringing and experience. By themselves, they mean nothing and can change depending on a particular social situation or experience. At the same time, Locke sees the genesis of "ideas" in concrete individual and material things, whose reflections or imprints they are in consciousness. It was precisely this understanding of ideas that became generally accepted in European philosophy of the Modern Age. In fact, we are not talking about the ideas of Plato and the Platonists, but about concepts artificially constructed by human reason, or about the "eidolons," "ghosts," and "mental idols" of Democritus.

But if an individual is a "blank slate," then a series of "ideas" can be written on it, that is, certain eidolons can be projected onto it, which he will then manipulate and use to construct his chains of statements, his structures — his
"ideas." The individual here turns out to be a kind of machine that must first be pre-programmed and only then allowed to move freely within the context of the established code.

Therefore, Locke concludes, the natural state of the individual mind does not necessarily have to be wolfish. It is nothing.

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[1] He argued with a group of Cambridge Platonists (R. Cadwall, G. More, J. Glenville, R. Carpenter, R. South, D. Sergent, J. Smith, E. Stillingsfleet, M. Hale).

[2] *Locke, J.* An Essay Concerning Human Understanding // Locke, J. Works in Three Volumes. Vol. 1. Moscow: Mysl, 1985.

And if society undertakes education, that is, enters into a social contract to make itself better, more humane, more reasonable, more friendly, more organised, etc., then the result will be individuals who produce good thoughts and perform moral actions. Thus, the transition from Hobbes to Locke changes the normative conception of the content of the individual: from a beast to a blank slate, from evil to neutrality, which can be programmed in any direction. The individual is no longer evil or bad; he is nothing.

The relativisation of Leviathan

Here we come to a crucial point: if people are not so bad in their natural state and if their sustenance is taken from society (and the social contract is conceived horizontally, as trust), then Leviathan is necessary only in certain historical conditions and primarily to combat an evil society, a state of wolves. It is not necessary to fight against the good. Accordingly, individuals enter into a contract for a political Leviathan when society is in a bad, difficult state, when it is necessary to prevent the worst, stop the slaughter and bring order to chaos. But if the state begins to educate the population, to civilise its citizens, then everything can change. Leviathan will lose its relevance. If people are well educated, Locke believes, then Leviathan can be abolished, allowing society to remain in a natural state, which can become good and continue to improve further and further.

Accordingly, based on the change in the attitude towards human nature and the assertion that this nature is neutral, a new political ideology emerges. It consists of the following: the main actor remains the individual, but the individual is subject to re-education. The individual is not bad, and if we educate him well, he will be law-abiding, moral and well-mannered, enlightened and rational. And the next generation will be even better, as positive attitudes will be strengthened, accumulated and developed. For Hobbes, human society is fundamentally static. For Locke, it changes, develops, and evolves. This brings us to the idea of social and historical progress.

From the point of view of liberalism, education and enlightenment are necessary for social progress to be irreversible. While Hobbes, in his combination of "rational egoism," emphasises "egoism," Locke emphasises "rational." This rationality consists in the ability to