

JULIUS EVOLA

POLITICAL
ESSAYS

IDEA IMPÉRIALE ET NOUVEL ORDRE EUROPÉEN ET
ÉCONOMIE ET CRITIQUE SOCIALE
GERMANISM AND NAZISM



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JULIUS EVOLA

TESTS
POLICIES

THE IMPERIAL IDEA AND THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CRITICISM
GERMANISM AND NAZISM

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PRESENTATION

This book brings together twenty-eight articles by Julius Evola published between 1930 and 1958. The division of the collection into three sections - "The Imperial Idea and the New European Order", "Economy and Social Criticism", and "Germanism and Nazism" - is the work of the Italian editor, Renato Del Ponte, one of the best specialists in Evola's work. It should be noted, often, Evola starts a work he is reviewing and goes on to analyse and develop it in ways that go far beyond the subject of the book he is reviewing, the book itself serving only as a pretext. Some of the articles thus become veritable little essays, hence the title adopted for this French edition of the collection, *Essais politiques*, which is certainly more explicit than a literal translation of the title chosen by Italian publisher (*Saggi di dottrina politica*, "Essais de doctrine politique").

To be correctly understood, each of the texts
The works collected here must be seen in the context of the period in which they were written: this is why, following the Italian edition, year of publication of is clearly indicated above the title. Taken as a whole, this collection cannot be dissociated from other works or articles by Evola, particularly the books *Les Hommes au m'lieu des ruines* (2- ed. fr.: Paris-Puiseaux, 1984; 1* ed. original: Rome, 1953), *Le fascisme vu de droite* (Paris, 1981; 1* ed. original: Rome, 1964).

and, to a lesser extent, *writings on the Fra22C- Masonry* (Puisseaux, 1987; collection of eight articles published between 1937 and 1942) and his *Presentation* in Hans F. K. Günther's essay, *Religiosité indo-européenne* (Pardès, Puisseaux, 1987, pp. 17-26; 1-- original ed. 1934). This latter text, in which Evola is at times highly critical of Günther's theses, is of particular importance in that it represents-

sente l'état définitif de la pensée de notre auteur - Evola, who died on 11 June 1974, wrote it in 1970 - sur le problème indo-européen tel 'il a pu être abordé par ce chercheur proche du national-socialisme'.

To ignore these historical and bibliographical facts would be to leave the way open to serious misunderstandings and ambiguities, which it is important to dispel without delay. A single example will suffice to justify our assertion. At the beginning of the article *La romariité, le germanisme et le cas Manacorda* (1941), Evola makes a favourable allusion, without naming him, to "one of the best-known German racists", and, in a note, Renato Del Ponte specifies that "this is very probably Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss (1892-1974), one of the main representatives of the "German racist" movement".

He was a member of the "Nordic thought" movement in Germany in 1920s and 1940s, and a close friend of Evola. Since Evola, in accordance with the vocabulary of the epoch, uses the term 'Nordic thought', it is not surprising that he is also a close friend of Evola.

For a historical retrospective on Evola's - metapolitical - commitment to Fascism and National Socialism, from 1928 to 1945, and for an outline of a critical analysis of these two regimes from a counter-revolutionary or, better still, "integral traditionalist" point of view, cf. Philippe Baillet, *Les rapports de Julius Evola à vec le fascisme et le national-socialisme*, in *Politica Hermerica, L'Âge d'Homme*, 1 ("Métaphysique et politique - René Guénon, Julius Evola"), 1987, p 49-71 . In this study, the author has taken care to use only verified and verifiable sources, which are therefore unassailable.

that, in Fascist Italy, the term "racism" (*razzismo*) to designate theories of race and the word "The uninformed reader might think that Evola did not disdain the friendship of the most fanatical and primitive Nazi ideologues. However, this is not at all the case with Claus².

With regard to Claus, who never wanted to join the Nazi party, the following details are essential. "In 1936, when he was in charge of a course on the psychology of peoples at the University of Berlin, Claus, in his *Journal*, clearly criticised the National Socialist theory of race. A few months later, he resigned from the editorship of the journal *Rasse*, which he criticised for its new orientation. In 1940, the Nazi party, having discovered that his main collaborator, who lived with him and from whom he refused to separate, was a Jew called Margarete Landé, multiplied the warnings and criticisms against him (. . .) On 28 March 1941, during a working session organised by Rosenberg's services (Dr Walter Gross, director of the *Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP*, declared (...) "What is important for us now is to cast Claus and his work into the shadows even more than before, to put an end to the controversy and quite simply to kill it with silence [*totschweigen*]. It will be decided in high circles to what extent he can be allowed to continue his scientific work". On 8 February 1942, events to celebrate Claus's fiftieth birthday were banned (. . .) A few months later, Claus was banned from teaching at the University of Berlin. In 1943, he was officially dismissed from his post and automatically transferred to the Waffen-SS as a disciplinary measure. His collaborator, Margarete Landé, was discovered in property he owned in Brandenburg. She was arrested and incarcerated in Potsdam prison, from where Claus succeeded in making her ((Robert) de Herte, *Profid bio-bibliographique [sans titre] de L.F. Claus, in Études et Recherches*, nouvelle série, 2, 4- trimestre 1983, p. 25). It should also be noted that the 'racist' Claus lived for several years among the Bedouins of Jordan and wrote numerous works on the Arab world and Islam.

The first part of this collection, the most specifically doctrinal, is concerned with major metapolitical orientations. In other words, an area where, according to some, still many on the "right", Evola would demonstrate an unbearable "unrealism", particularly in his criticism of modern notions of "nation" and "people. This reproach was recently levelled at him by an anti-fascist intellectual, a good connoisseur of counter-revolutionary thought and a specialist in modern theorists of race.

"He is the author of numerous works on the European "new right", often characterised by an astonishing mixture of almost "inquisitorial" meticulousness in study of sources and a desire to "dialogue" with his adversary. Pierre-André Taguieff writes

Among the works of this author, let us mention in particular: *La etreté- gie culturelle de Ja 'Nouvelle Droite'- en France (1968-1983)*, in *Mous avez dit fascismes?* (collective work), Paris, 1984, Arthaud/Montalba, p. 13-152; Alain de Benoist's philosophy, 'in *Les Temps Modernes*, 451, February 1984, p. 1439-1478. As far as 'dialogue' is concerned, it is probable that P. A. Taguieff, having taken a great deal of interest in a current of thought which is in the minority but which is anxious for respectability and wishes to see itself in some way 'recognised' by the official and dominant culture, whether academic or not, has some difficulty in grasping the 'core' from which the radicality of the - integral culture - of traditional inspiration derives, it has been redefined by its most - radiant exegeses, precisely. - Integral culture (...) must be understood as the projection in perspective of an a-rational core in an intellectual and historical-concrete 'zone' (...) Integral culture (...) is totally subordinate to the choice consisting in attaching oneself to a non-rational core (...) The choice is *not* 'justifiable' by rational mediation - rationality itself being no more than the fraction a totality oriented according to the 'rational'.

that [Evola's] "political proposals may seem to imbued with nostalgic utopianism, and fall -

This metapolitics of principles - he adds - too often resembles a grand statement of principle, and is reduced to the definition of the ideal regime, doomed to be missed by all its empirical and political incarnations. Such a metapolitics of principles - he adds - all too often resembles a great petition of principle, and is reduced to the definition of the ideal regime, doomed to be missed by all its empirico-historical incarnations, betrayed because translated".

We shall try to show here that this remark would benefit from being considerably more nuanced, and that Evola's supposed unrealism is *sometimes* a superior realism or "realism of the idea". While Evola refuses to make do with words, since words are not things, he proves here, on several occasions, that he knew how to play with words. In the first part of this collection, for example, there are certain semantic variations that owe nothing to chance: in one instance, Evola clearly reaffirms the opposition between the "imperative idea" and the "realism of the idea".

des directions *non -roïonnelles*" (Francesco Ingravalle, *APfunti suite cul- ture* integrade, in *Risguardo II, Ax*, Padua, 1981, *ti. fr.* Culture *inté- grafe* et intuition *du monde*, in Fotafité, 14, Spring 1982, pp. 23-24). Adherence to the Idea, to the traditional vision of the world, insofar it derives from a meta- rational 'choice' (obviously 'irrational' from the point of view of the heirs of the Enlightenment), from a certain 'race of the mind', to use Evola's phrase, cannot be the subject of 'discussion: 'We say then that integral culture must be (. . .) religious, not secular (. . .) axiomatic, not secular (. . .).... axiomatic, not critical (...) We maintain that integral culture (...) must derive from principles, not theses; from vocations, not opinions (...) That it must be founded (...) on the recognition of authority, not on the search for discussion" (Franco Giorgio Freda, *Elcmenti dette culture* integra/e, in *R isguardo I, lx*, Padua 1980; tr. fr. *Êtémens de la culture iii tégrale*, in J . G. Malliarakis [ed.], *L'édi- tcur emprisonné. Soutienô Giorgio Fzeda*, La Librairie Française, Paris, 1985, pp. 143-144).

Pierre-André Taguieff, Jtîlius Êvoïa *penseur* de la décaderice. A -- *métaphysique de l'histoire* - in *In pempective traditionnelle et l'hyper- critique de Is modernité*, in *Politica Hermetica* , 1, 1987, p. 12.

At other times, skilfully adapting to the official Fascist discourse without conceding anything essential, he uses the term 'imperialism', giving it a positive connotation. But it is above all the last article in this first part *On the spiritual conditions and structural aspects European unity* (1951) - text contemporary of the fundamental *Orientalisms (Orientamenti*, Rome, 1950) - which seems to us to best illustrate Evola's superior realism.

Considering a problem that was the subject of much debate in Italian 'radical right' circles at the time - which since 194 had always been the most 'Euro-peanist' of its counterparts on the Old Continent - and which continues to haunt political and cultural currents hostile to both liberal capitalism and Marxist communism, Evola shows, through reasoning of admirable intellectual rigour, that this unity, which *on the face of it* should be favoured by so many factors, will be very difficult to achieve, if it is ever achieved at all, precisely for "structural" reasons. Since this is an essential problem, it is important to follow Evola's argument from the outset, which will make it possible to clearly identify its specificity in relation to other currents that are sometimes tempted to make abusive claims.

⁵ Evola was to take up this article, in a reworked and, in our opinion, less rigorous form, to make it the sixteenth and last chapter of *Formes et conditions préalables de l'unité européenne*: cf. "Formes et conditions préalables de l'unité européenne", p. 235-250 of the 2nd French edition.

A new **translation** of *Orientalisms*, **presented** and annotated by Ph. by Baillet, is due to be published by Pardès.

of his work. Ex-ola's reasoning is based on eight points

1) To take up again the idea empire in the perspective of European unity can have, today, only the value of a theoretical position, for Empire, Evola reminds us, referring here to Spengel's distinction between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation*, is consistent with a period of "culture", not of "civilisation". Now, it is in a period of this second type that Europe finds itself, not since yesterday, but since the advent of "modern times". It follows that any Bonapartism, Caesarism or European "imperialism" can only be a counterfeit, a parody of the Empire.

2) If it is to be established and last, genuine European unity implies existence of a principle of authority, on a supranational scale, which must necessarily transcend the political domain in the strict sense. Where is such a principle to be found at present?

3) European unity be identified purely and simply, from an "imperialperspective, with the dissolution of historical nations into a single nation, a kind of European magma, heterogeneous and invertebrate, but demands the organic integration of each nation as part a whole endowed a superior legitimacy. Referring to the imperial idea and, at the same time, wanting to move from "small nationalisms" to a "great European nationalism" is in fact contradictory (Evola thus criticises in advance the theses that would be supported at the beginning of the following decade, and to which we will refer later).

4) An "imperial" Europe truly worthy of the name cannot be based on the criteria - reputedly "the existential and political distinction between friend and foe and the pure biological imperative.

survival (Evola's condemnation of the purely Machiavellian conception of politics, the one, of racism as a *self-affirmation* of the value of the race to which one belongs, on the). To confine oneself to these criteria, says Evola, is to remain on the level of "collectivising processes". It means admitting from the outset that Europe will become "an ersatz of its adversaries in terms of confrontations determined by a brutal desire for existence and power, while waiting for the general factors of disintegration, specific to technical and mechanical civilisation, to make their impact felt".

5) "The soul a supranational European bloc should be religious": but since **Evola** did not believe in the possibility of a new Catholic Europe, and even less in a "generic Christianity" as a potential unifying factor, the question of the religious legitimacy of a united Europe, after a multi-century process of desacralisation, remains entirely open.

6) Is there really such a thing as a "differentiated European culture" today, that we can effectively oppose the "Is it the American and Soviet 'models'?" No, answers Evola, who adds that "if we can rightly consider certain aspects of North American civilisation and Russian-Bolshevik civilisation to be barbaric and anti-European, we must not lose sight of everything that is, in both nothing more than a 'model'". development pushed to the extreme of trends and of evils that first appeared in Europe. This is precisely the reason why Europe is so permeable to the influences of other parts of the world" (Evola thus rejects all the explanations of European decadence in the form of "*aphi-bis*": the primary fact is not the "enue-

but by the "enemy within, the "enemy within us". This enemy has a name: it's called "modernity". To systematically accuse, for example, the "Californian by-products", instead of asking why they spread so easily among peoples of Western Europe, is to confuse watchword and analysis).

7) The logical consequence of the previous point is that "European tradition" understood as culture currently has no content other than the subjective and more or less divergent interpretations of intellectuals and fashionable literati". This is not the way to unify a continent.

8) Are there still people capable of taking on this twofold imperative: to 'progressively and effectively overcome' everything that relates to an era of "civilisation"; forging "a kind of 'metaphysics' capable of justify a principle (...) of pure authority".

When you remember that the text you have just quoted *pelé les articulations* was written in 1951, and when we see, as we must, that it has not aged a bit, we come to doubt Evola's 'realism'. Of course, if 'realism', political or otherwise, consists in lulling the reader into illusions, in waving around catchwords that are all the more droning because they cover nothing solid, then there is no doubt that Evola is supremely unrealistic. Conversely, if 'realism' consists in seeing evil right to its roots, which is the condition for any real cure, in analysing in depth the characteristics of the 'historical landscape' which any action must take into account if it is to be effective, then Evola can be said to be an authentic realist. But politicians and 'realists' of all stripes cannot like Evola, because they do not like him.

metaphysics. It is true they are not the only ones in this situation, since Saint Thomas taught us this apparent paradox: that which is most universal is loved and known only by a very small , while the great number take only the accidental and the indivi- dual. This is a great pity, not only for the metaphor, but also for the

It's not a question of the science of physics, but of 'realists, who would save themselves a of time and energy by practising the science of principles to some extent. Because they have reduced reality to what they perceive of it, that is, to its crudest and least intelligible forms when considered in themselves, detached from the higher causes from which they derive, 'realists' are incapable truly embracing the order of contingency, And those who willingly present themselves as 'disenchantedMachiavellians, highly sensitive to con- flictuality and the balance of power between individuals and peoples, are not always the last to nurture the most **foolish** illusions.

Among these is the idea that the unity of Europe, having failed to develop on spiritual or authentically political foundations, will be achieved by the sheer force of things, "things" here referring to the all-powerful commercial imperatives. As early as 1924, considering the wider problem of a possible understanding East and West, René Guénon wrote the following, which applies a *fortiori* to the question of the unity of Europe "It is not the ease brought by mechanical inventions to external relations between peoples that will ever give them the means to understand each other better (...) as for agreements based on purely com- mercial interests, one should know only too well what value they have...".

it is appropriate to attribute to them. Matter is, of its own nature, a principle of division and separation.

what proceeds from it cannot serve to found a real and lasting union, and moreover it is the incestuous change that is the law here".

Let us return to the 1951 article and the question a New European and Imperial Order, around which the texts in the first part of this collection revolve. By underlining what separates the imperial idea from a more or less Jacobin conception Europe, from Europe as a "great nation" in the age of continental blocs, on the one hand , on the other, by denying the existence, today, of a "New European Order".

"On the other hand, Evola was unknowingly pointing to two of the fault lines that were to allow to "traditionalist" inté-

René Guénon, *Orient et Occidezit* (1924), Véga, Paris, 1976, p. 124. At exactly the same time, Abel Bonnard, on his return from a trip to China in 1920-1921, was developing considerations very similar to those of Guénon on the difference between traditional unity and modern uniformity, favoured by communications technology . What is lost is all that man had acquired, conquered over himself, all that was hierarchy, morals, discipline, and what remains instead is the monotony of appetites. In fact, certain distinctive characteristics do not fade away, nature has imprinted them too deeply on the races. It is not the differences that disappear, but the variety, is to say the peaceful, aesthetic and happy expression of these differences; they remain only in they have rough and ungrateful (. . .) Faster communications have shortened all distances, but we have never seen so well that certain factors, whatever their destructive power, are incapable of creating anything in the order that exceeds them. These intertwining interests, from which we lazily expected so many results for morals, have only succeeded in making neighbours enemies. The world is unifying, not uniting" (En *C'hine*, Fayard, Paris, 1924, p. 342). This convergence of views between Guénon and Bonnard is not fortuitous, for Bonnard knew and greatly appreciated the work of Guénon: cf. Guénon's letter to his friend De Giorgio, in which Guénon quotes an extract from a highly complimentary review of *L'homme et son devenir* selon le *Vedânta* given by Bonnard to the *journal des Débats*. This extract appears in: Guido De Giorgio, *L'Instant et l'Eterziité et aures textes sur la Tradition*, Arché, Milan, 1987, p. 257.

gral', much later, to define its special character, which was clearly irreducible to both the variants of 'Europeanist neo-fascism and the 'new right'.

of more recent appearance.

The Jacobin conception of Europe was reaffirmed by the Belgian Jean Thiriart in a book published in 1964 (despite the presence of the word "empire" in the title). Written with force and talent, and very quickly translated into the main European languages, Thiriart's work exerted a fairly profound influence on the European Union.

"In Italy, Thiriart's theses appealed to circles that had been strongly influenced by Evola's work. In Italy, Thiriart's theses struck a chord with circles that had been strongly influenced by Evola's work: they appealed to them in particular because of their lucidity in geopolitical matters, but left them perplexed because of their essentially modern premises. The alliance did not last: from 1969 onwards, the most radical Italian traditionalists - who were sometimes unfaithful to Evola in terms of their political orientations and their regrettable propensity to let themselves be -

Cf. Jean Thiriart, *Un empire de 400 millions d'hommes: J'Europe*, Brussels, 1964. The Jacobin, unitarian conception of the nation is particularly evident in a brochure by Thiriart with the significant title *Le Grande NaLion. L'Europe de Brest à Bucarest*, Brussels, 1963. But it was undoubtedly his review *La Nation Européenne* (30 issues published between October 1965 and February 1969) that left the most lasting impression on Thiriart: his theses in favour of a third-worldist Europeanism and his virulent anti-Americanism (the United States were identified with "Carthage", the future united and free Europe with "Rome") heralded several years in advance the anti-Westernist turn of the French "New Right", although there was no direct connection between Thiriart and the latter. Evola refers briefly to Thiriart's book in *Les hommes au milieu des ruines*, cit. , p. 236, 238. The most comprehensive study of the subject to date is by Yannick Sauvage, *Jean Thiriart et l'Europe nationale-communautaire européenne*, Mémoire pour le D.E.A. I.E.P. de l'Université de Paris, 1978.

ser lulled by the siren song of the "Nazi myth,
 both criticized and "ennobled", but orthodox as regards
 the doctrine - are self-critical and denounce via-
 the idea of 'Europeanism', seen as an assembly of-
 blage de formules rhétoriques destinées à cacher cette cruelle
 réalité : l'Europe qu'il s'agirait d'unir et de
 to defend, at all costs, *for herself*, was home to
 of all modern infections infections(9)

In the second part of this collection, Evola deals with much
 more contingent questions. There is, however, a valuable article,
Corporations and Laws of Honour (1986), on a subject which has
 not hitherto been the subject of serious study in French the
 National Socialist conception of the corporation and the
 enterprise in their relation to labour legislation. of the
 corporation and enterprise in their relationship to labour
 legislation.

' We fought for European hegemony (...) without realising that this Europe
 had become a slave to the USA and the USSR, because the nations and peoples of
 Europe had absorbed - as a result of military defeat, but not as a consequence of
 that defeat - the ideological exports of the USA and the USSR (...)(...) The time
 has come to stop toying with the puppet "Europe" and to gargle in its name (...) []
 is a whore, whose womb conceived and engendered the bourgeois revolution and
 the pro-letarian revolt (...) And we, now, have to stop toying with the puppet
 "Europe" and to gargle in its name (...) [Europe] is a whore, whose womb
 conceived and engendered the bourgeois revolution and the pro-letarian revolt
 (...)... And we, now, would like to redeem her, by whispering magic words to her:
 by telling her, for example, that she must give herself to the
 'Europeans exclusively... from Liest to Bucharest?! We raised the flag of Europe
 without understanding that it could not represent any valid and homogeneous
 meaning for us without seeing how
 many folds and knots its torn fabric was composed of and how much excrement it
 concealed" (Franco Giorgio Freda, *La dis! In te- graziorie deJ sistema*, Ar. Padua,
 1969; tr. fr. *Le désiritegra tion du*
y time, id. - To'aii'i ., Pari , 1980, p. i 7-18).

vail. We will also see, from the articles that Evola devoted to him, that the essential point of anti-bourgeoisism could sometimes give rise to debates of a certain theoretical quality among fascist intellectuals. For the rest, Evola repeats his condemnation of any kind of "national socialism" and pseudo-revolutionary fads about "social justice", stressing that the important thing is first to detoxify one's mind of all forms of economism, whether overt or covert. His conclusions are sometimes very similar to those of Céline, though expressed in a much more drastic way.

"The greedy guts of proletarians versus the contracted guts of the bourgeoisie. This is the whole mystique of democracy (...). Class consciousness is nonsense, a demagogic convention. All every worker wants is to get out of his working class, to become a bourgeois, as individually as possible, as quickly as possible".

The presentation of the third part of the book, Germanism and Nazism", would theoretically require "that we trace the ritual magic circle and that the exorcisms nonce exorcisms customary : that is to say that repeats with a few variations, if necessary - the pre introducto and obvious sentence of condemnation ry

"Louis- Ferdinand Céline, *L'école des cmdc wes*, Denoël. Paris, 1938, p. 128-129.

"8 8 m Card'flî, Ö pl'iTerai "o incantato. Messianismo liideriano, mito-

We will not do so here, and we will explain why, (at the risk of passing for an accomplice, for a sympathiser of the enemy of man², since it turns out, decidedly, that 'the modern world does not regard (...) Hitler as an enemy of any kind', but 'has elevated him to the rank of a metaphysical enemy'".

We agree with the author we have just quoted that "in history (...) rehabilitations - like exaltations, condemnations and justifications - are a false problem". The man who wrote these lines is not a "swastika nostalgist", but a Catholic, one Italy's leading medievalists, a man classified as "right-wing", admittedly, but who frequently contributes to left-wing journals: Professor Franco Cardini of the University of Florence.

But the key issue lies elsewhere. For a long time now, in all Western countries, and more particularly in France where it often takes on truly pathological forms, we have been observing a singular phenomenon: the people who are constantly telling us in every possible tone, from the learned to the propagandist, that The "sleep of reason has engendered monsters" (Nazism and - incidentally from the point of view of those we are talking about - Stalinism), are also those, most of the time, who proceed to an obsessive demonisation of national-socialism. As si

poietica nazionalsocinlisto e angoscia r.ontemporanea, in *Intr.rven to*, 29, janv.-fév. 1978; tr. fr. *Le jon eur de FJû te erichan téé. Messian isme hit- Jérien, m yth opoieticfue n ationale - sociullsr. et angoisce con tr.m f:iorain e , iri Entahte*, 1 2, été 1981 , p. 36.

² *Ibid.*

"Ibid. , p. 37.

"Ibid. , p. 35.

the latter was intrinsically irreducible to any "comprehensive interpretation, in the etymological sense of the term, i.e. capable of integrating and accounting for the extreme complexity and many contradictory aspects of this phenomenon. Apart from the "armed arm of capital" once proposed by orthodox Marxism, but now out of fashion, we would have no choice but to _____ if _____ wanted to stigmatise the

"explanations _____ explain nothing, but which all revolve - whether in register of occul- tism or that of a more or less Jungian psychoanalysis - around the idea of the Austrian 'sorcerer' who 'bewitched' an entire people of ancient culture in order to establish the 'empire of evil'. _____ empire of evil". But the strangest is that, as soon as passions flare up again, this last 'explanation' is sometimes taken up again by by _____ certain heirs

"rationalist _____ of the Enlightenment.

Pure and simple ignorance plays a not inconsiderable role in all this, especially in France. We had to wait fifty-six years for a complete French translation of Rosenberg's *Mythos* (*Le mythe du X- siècle. Bilan des combats culturels et spirituels de notre temps*, Avalon, Paris, 1986), and it is not, as would have been relatively logical, a critical edition drawn up by an 'official' and competent historian; there is not a single study of any scale in French on *the AlinenerLie*, the cultural institute of the SS, or on Nazi theorists such as Ernst Krieck and Alfred _____ Bäumler; the name of Hans

F. K. Günther, who appeared here and a few years ago in connection with polemics on the interpretation of the Indo-European problem, almost fell into oblivion, while authors such as Herman Wirth, L. F. Clauss, Bernhard Kummer, etc., are almost completely forgotten.

Even 'classics' of official historiography have only recently become available in French, as in Martin Bros.'s *de Der Staat Mitlers* (Munich, 1969).

zat (*L. 'État hitlérien*, Fayard, Paris, 1986) and *Ile deutsche Dikta tue* (Cologne, 1969) by Karl Dietrich Bracher (*La dicte ture allemande*, Privat, Toulouse, 1986), the record having been set by Franz Neumann's book, *Behemot. Structure and Practice of National-SociaJism* (Toronto, 1942), which only waited forty-five years (!) being translated: *Behemot. Structure and Practice of National-Socialism* (Payot, Paris, 1987).

And ignorance, as we all know, breeds fear, and fear feeds fantasies. There is much to be said, in truth, about the troubled and profoundly unhealthy relationship that a certain rhetorical anti-Nazism maintains with object it claims to abhor. The same phenomenon can be seen, symmetrically, with a certain neo-Nazism (we're talking about people born after 1945, and often very young people), in what ignorant journalists take to be rhetorical anti-Nazism, is often seen to be the same thing.

"Nostalgia" is in reality nothing more than the "return of the repressed" of the modern democratic conscience, the fascination for that which is adorned with the charms of the forbidden and the transgressive. In both cases, we can see that there is often, and significantly, almost total ignorance of what we are claiming to be talking about, in order to indulge in ritual execration or, conversely, in apologetic venting. The dimension potentially

The "religious" but parodic nature of National Socialism is certainly not unrelated to these phenomena of fascination-repulsion. This is why a *genuine* "demonological" critique of National Socialism would be of the utmost interest. However, any "demonology" above-

We can see from this that modern ideologies are not the best equipped to carry out such a critique. In reality, such criticism can only come from those, basing themselves on traditional thought and adhering to an anti-materialist anthropology ('nature', even understood in the broadest sense, does not exhaust essence of man), can also hold the doctrinal keys - the only ones likely to open up the third dimension, the 'subtle dimension, history.

We spoke earlier of indirect role played by ignorance in demonising the Nazi phenomenon. Before to the content proper of Evola's texts in the third part of this collection, it is necessary to mention the complementary opposite ignorance, deliberate bad faith aimed at a very precise objective: ideological disqualification, cultural delegitimation. A truly emblematic example of this procedure - both in terms of the person using it and the work it is intended to target - was recently offered to us. A few months ago, Umberto Eco, now a world-famous writer who needs no introduction, published an article in the weekly *L'Espresso* with the provocative and vulgar title *Ammazza l'ebreo!* ("Kill the Jew" or "Death to the Jew"). After quoting some fifty from lines taken from from Evola's introduction to the 1937 Italian edition of *The Protocols of the Elder Sages of Zion*, Eco wrote "We know how well have counted the 'Protocols' to gassing six million Jews. The person who wrote these lines is a sad and foolish character called Julius Evola, who in recent years has been repropounded by the New Right as an important thinker, while some fools on the New Left have admitted that in the past, Evola's work has been the basis for the gassing of six million Jews.

Evola's rational pages, the had a few qualities (most of the "theology", the "theology", other pages being the mage the "theology". Otelma [?] occultism would be ashamed)

Eco's encyclopaedic erudition, his familiarity with the classics of counter-revolution and even with the main exponents of traditional thought, including the work of Evola, that he has no excuse here other than to see himself as one of the last defenders of the 'no *mon's land*' where for the past forty years the following have been sterilely intertwining the barrage of the fascism/antifascism polemic" ⁱ. But must respond, again and again,

"Umberto Eco, *Amrnazza l'ebreo!* in *k 'Espresso*, 12 April 1987; quoted in: Anonymous [Marco Tarchi], *Spezzaze l'omertà*, in *Diorarno let- terario*, 103, April 1987, p. 2. On subject of "occultism in operation", we can contrast Eco with the radically different judgement of another well-known writer, Marguerite Yourcenar, who, reporting on first French edition of Evola's *Yoga tantrique*, wrote: "J'acquis là l'éd. It is one of Evola's great merits to combine a prodigious wealth of scholarly detail with the gift of isolating from their local conditions ideas or disciplines that apply to us all, and even abolishing the notion exoticism. Before describing Evola as an "eru- dit of genius" (expression he doubt did not appreciate, but that's another matter), Yourcenar had only this reservation: "Evola, like Malaparte, seems to have belonged to that type Germanic Italians in whom there still survive who knows what obsessions of the Ghibelline" (*Des recettes pour un art du mieux-vivre*, 'in *Le Monde*, 21 July 1972). This judgement carries all the more weight in that M. Yourcenar, who was no doubt aware of Evola's *political* ideas, had no sympathy for fascism: "Fascism seemed grotesque to me; I had seen the march on Rome: gentlemen from good families', sweating under their black shirts, and people being beaten up they disagreed" (*Les yeux ouverts*, entretiens avec M. Gaiey, *Le Centurion*, Paris, 1981, pp. 86-87).

"Gérard Boulanger, *Compte rendu du 2° colloque national de "Poli- tico Hermetica"*, in *Totalité*, 21, Spring 1987, p. 53. A case in point

without tiring, in a firm and serene manner, in the open air of slander, without wishing to conceal the darker sides. In the text that aroused the ire of the carefully calcu-
lée by Umberto Eco, for example, in the middle a sequence on Judaism in culture:

"Jewish, Tzara, creator of Dadaism, extreme limit of disintegration of avant-garde art ^{**17*} remarks who may seem unsympathetic, a useless concession to the propaganda discourse, especially when we know that Evola had known Tzara well in his youth. But there are also the following considerations which, while certainly not indicative of any kind of philoJudaism, show how much separated Evola from the 'conspiracy' vision of the opponents of the 'Jewish world conspiracy', especially if we place these lines in the heated context of the time: 'Let us say immediately

typical of the delirium aroused by the controversies surrounding Nazism: - Whenever ideological commandos venture to challenge the gas chambers, as if to test the waters an Élysée candidate, blundering or betrayed by his subconscious, sees it as nothing more than a "detail", (Bertrand Poirot-Delpech, *Quand l'intelligence conduisait ou sacrifiçe*, in *Le Monde*, 11 December 1987). Here we have some of the ingredients of 'conspiratorial' fantasy: attribution to Enemy of a highly concerted strategy (the 'commandos', the 'candidate' and the 'hussardinet' - heirs to the 'hussars, no doubt?) obey a "clandestine orchestra conductor"); and the disconcerting revelation, so enormous that it is supposed to prevent any reply: today, in France, it is the ideological heirs of the Collaboration who "massively dispose of the means expression", even "they are only a few - .. Paraphrasing the title Poirot-Delpech's article, we would be tempted to say, were it not for the respect due to them, that the sacrifice of the martyrs of the Resistance has unfortunately not led the histrionics of pari- 8ianism I intelligence.

Julius Evola, *Introduzione ni Protocolli*, in Claudio Mutti (ed.), *Ebraicità ed Ebraismo. I Protocolli der Se vi di Sion*, Ar, Padua, 1976,

that, personally, we cannot follow, here, a certain fanatical anti-Semitism which, by seeing the Jew par-tout as *deus en machine*, ends up being itself-même victime d'une sorte de piège". Criticising those who, like Nilus, are convinced of the existence of a Jewish conspiracy organised a very long time ago, Evola wrote: "On the contrary, we must bring back the positive destructive action [equivalent here to : "We must think that the Jews found a terrain already undermined by processes of decomposition and involution, the origins of which go back to very remote times and are linked to a very complex chain of causes: they used this terrain, grafted onto it so to speak, their action, accelerating the pace of these processes". For Evola, the cure could not come from measures of repression and persecution against individuals, and the following quotation will give the reader an idea of the level he was at, even when dealing a document as surrounded by controversy as the *Protocols*: "We know what was great about our old imperial, aristocratic and spiritual Europe, and we know that this greatness has been destroyed. We have descended

Ibid. , p. 55.

Ibid. , p. 55-56. In the same perspective "(...) far from attributing to the Jewish people the conscious direction a world plan, as a fanciful anti-Semitic Wop myth would have it, we tend to see, in a certain Jewish instinct for humiliation, degradation and dissolution, the force which, at certain historical moments, has been used for the realisation of a much vaster plot, the ultimate threads of which predate the apparent events, as well as at the level where simply ethnic energies come into play" (Julius Evola, *ère aspetti del problema ebraico*, Rome, 1936; quote from the 2nd ed. Ar, Padua, 1978, p. 48).

The political myths of the masses are too little, their breath is short, their validity often tainted by the very evils they seek to remedy. What is *needed* is a complete return to the *spiritual idea of the Empire, or, on the contrary*, a precise, hard, absolute desire for truly 'traditional' reconstruction in all fields, and consequently, first and foremost, in that of spirit, which is the basis of the Empire.

everything else depends".

After these preliminary but essential considerations, the presentation of Evola's articles on Germanism and Nazism calls for only brief comments. In the article that opens this section, *de*

In his *article entitled "m/the" du non veau nationalisme allemand* (1930), Evola reviews Rosenberg's *M yHius*: he does so the same year that the work is published, proof of his seriousness and his refusal to be satisfied with second-hand readings. In this article, Evola already made a number of reservations about Rosenberg's book, but nonetheless stated in a note: "As a general rule, the similarity of several of the Hitlerian theorist's theses with those we have set out, the basis of an integral fas- cism, in our *Imperialismo pagano*, is moreover singular". Evola was clearly seduced by Rosenberg's anti-Christianism, which only partially overlapped with his own, but which was in any case considered "courageous". Five years later, the tone was completely different: in 1 *Paradoxes de*

⁰ *Ibid.* , p. 62. With regard to Evola's 'racism' in its various fields of application and forms of **expression, we refer** to the study by Giovanni Monastra, *Antbrypologie azistocztatique et racisme . l'itinéraire de julius Evolo cn terre maudite*, to be published in issue no. 2 of the journal *Politica Hermetica* .

notre temps : pagnriisrrie *raciste* -- 'd/umiriisrrie *libéral*, Evola engages in a brief but radical demolition of Rosenberg's theses, accused of taking up against Christianity the flattest and most over-articulate 'arguments' of the Enlightenment (the article is unsigned, but is precisely this anonymity that allows Evola - speaking of an author official of a nation "friend" - to really express the substance of her thoughts).

In the meantime, Evola had delved more deeply into work of Guénon, whose influence on his thought greatly overshadowed that of Nietzsche. Generally speaking, it can be seen that the articles of the 1930s are fairly critical, even very critical, of several aspects of Nazism, and not just its paganising tendencies. This is not the case, on the other hand, of the three articles published during the war, and there are, it seems to us, two reasons for this 1) the outbreak of the conflict and the Italo-German alliance led Evola to harden his commitment: 2) towards the end of the thirties, Evola undoubtedly made contact with German intellectuals who were better oriented than Rosenberg and discovered the existence, in Germany, of tendencies developing theses relatively close to his own. His positive comments on Christoph Steding's book, *Des fi eicñ und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur*, seem to bear witness to this (Evola saw Steding as "one of the best representatives of the new National Socialist political culture": however, according to some reports, which unfortunately we have not yet been able to verify, Steding's work was violently criticised in the official press of the Nazi party).

The articles published here confirm this conclusion.

sion drawn by Pierre-André Taguieff, who is hardly suspected of sympathy for racist theories, but who is far more honest than Umberto Eco. "For Evola, the doctrine of race has only an instrumental meaning, in that it must *lead to* (something other than itself), and can in no way have the value of a foundation (...). Biological racism is therefore, in the traditional perspective represented by Evola, nothing more than the latest version of modern naturalism and immanentism, a mostly unconscious offshoot of the nationalist particularism inherited from the unpredictable encounter between Jacobin mysticism and the scientific dogma of the 19th Im. As such, it embodies the push-pull synthesis par excellence: that of integral naturalism, which tends towards materialist monism, and of classificatory and metrological rationalism. Zoological racism is a particularly crude aspect of the reign of quantity".

Finally, it should be pointed out that some of the expressions used here ("German race", "Germanic race) are completely inappropriate,

"Pierre-André Taguieff, *Julius Evola penseur de la deczence*, art. cité, p. 30. On the subject of National Socialist paganism, this author writes that "this curious mixture of integral naturalism, anti-Christian (or anti-Biblical) fanaticism, militant scientism and nationalist particularism was first embodied in the conception of the world' of Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), the founder the 'monist religion' in Germany" (*ibid.* p. 4ö, note 55), one of the great names of Darwinism and the father of the "fundamental biogenetic law", according to which ontogeny recapitulates phylogenesis. This is an important point, because it is Darwinism itself, within Nazi biological racism, that makes the latter reprehensible in Evola's eyes. Evola's radical hostility to Darwinism is a constant: already present in his early theoretical texts, it is reaffirmed in the first two chapters of his *Metaphysics of Sex* (1st- original ed. 1958).

in Evola's writing must obviously be compared with the "journalistic" style he sometimes used in his articles.

So, taken as a whole, while it helps to put Evola's itinerary into perspective, this collection is above all an irreplaceable source of information on the ideas discussed under Fascism and National Socialism. In the case of the latter, given the paucity of bibliographical sources and ideological references, (in France, at least) on Evola's articles, often written on the basis of documentation, are all the more valuable. Assuming that an "ideology" existed - which, given the current state of research, we can legitimately doubt - Evola's articles are all the more valuable. and articulated "Nazi ideology", the reader, thanks to Evola, will thus be able to appreciate, judge and, if necessary, condemn, but he will do so with (partial) knowledge of the facts. Those who have taken the initiative publishing these *Political Essays* by Evola have set themselves the primary objective of making an indirect contribution to the reconstruction of the history of ideas in the twentieth century; they are not motivated by the desire to see something analogous to National Socialism return to European scene, if only they do not appreciate caricatures of the ideas they are fighting for. Born after 1945, their first concern is to *understand*: and understanding does not necessarily mean defending the indefensible.

The truth, beyond the hypocritical indignation, as insincere as it is automatic, a veritable reflex con-

ditioned works that cost nothing but can "bring in a lot", is that Evola "bothers" a lot of people. On the left, he is disturbing because of his anti-Semitism

This is particularly true of Marxism, which is undeniable but nevertheless moderate - at least in its expression (except on very rare occasions) - if we compare it with that of a certain non-Marxist socialism, from Toussenel to Proudhon, not to mention the Marx of *The Jewish Question*. He was also disturbing the right: his condemnation, even contempt, of most forms of nationalism and his

His "realism of ideas" clashed head-on with "integral nationalism" and the Maurrassian-inspired "politics first". Still on the right, and in France in particular, his 'active impersonality' and his disdain for the 'vanity fair' so dear to small cultural cenacles hardly appealed to 'literary' circles that were inclined to denounce the mores of left-wing intelli'yentsia, but which themselves never missed an opportunity practise reticent and obligatory praise.

Evola is disturbing and frightening. He is not actually frightening because, according to pitiful rumours that have been vindicated, he was the Duce's "éminence grise, the "Italian Rosenberg", Himmler's "friend". He is frightening because of his *coherence*: "I Evola was coherent, excessively coherent you might say, he repeated the same things for fifty years", admitted one left-wing academic. But our world, which 't like greatness, can't like coherence, which is made up of courage, rigour, of frankness, of fidelity to itself, of

"Franco Ferraresi,
1987, p. 123.

General *discussion*,

in *Politica* Hermetica , 1,

hard" too. For those who don't commit, it will be much forgiven: this is why what is permitted to Cioran^o, for example, whose "bitter syllogisms" are so appealing to certain left-wing aesthetes, is refused to Evola. But between Giulio Cogni, an ultra-Antisemitic fascist who called in the fortnightly *La Difesa della fiazza* to the persecution of Italian Jews, before converting to the apology of universal crossbreeding²¹, and Evola, who was always able to retain his the dignity of a warrior, without denying his commitment at a later date.

⁽³⁾ In *La tentation d'exister* (Gallimard, Paris, 1956; and *Idées/NRF*, 1974: ed. used here), Cioran devoted an entire chapter to the Jewish people ("Un peuple de solitaires", pp. 69-103). It reads: "Excessive in everything, emancipated from the tyranny of the landscape, from nonsense of rootedness, unattached, acosmic, they are (...) foreigners in themselves and cannot unequivocally speak for the natives" (p. 70-71). The most intolerant and persecuted of peoples unites universalism with the strictest particularism" (p. 73). "There is nothing rmfureĽ or vegetal about them, no "sap, no possibility of withering. In their permanencesomething abstract, but not bloodless, a hint of the demonic, unreal and active at the same time, a disquieting halo and kind of reverse nimbus that individualises them forever" (p. 82). "When they were living on usury, weren't they secretly studying the Kabbalah? Money and mystery (...). To rage against them, to fight them? Only the fool dares to do so: only he dares to confront the *invisible* weapons with which they are equipped" (p. 86). "Their irony (...) smacks of bitterness; it is a long-standing bitterness; festered, its features kill. It is not laughter, which is relaxation, but sneering, which is tension and the revenge of the humiliated. And let's face it, Jews are unbeatable at sneering" p. 90). "Too ardent to be epicureans, they stuff their pleasures (...), busybodies in every sense of the word, from the most vulgar to the most noble" (p. 99). These expressions are inserted into a text whose tone, from beginning to end, remains very measured. But all the same: from "acosmicity" to "affairment", most of the major themes of the anti-Semitic argument recur in Cioran's writing. Yet we have never seen him accused of anti-Semitism.

²¹On Cogni, cf. Julius Evola, *L'Arc et Is Massue*, Paris-Puiseaux, 1984, chap. XVII I ("On the metaphysics of sex and the 'One' "), p. 257-268.

to prefer the latter to the former.

Preziosi was also, in his own way, a cohesive man. This is why we thought would be useful to include in this collection, after Evola's articles, Renato Del Ponte's biographical note him, which is of obvious historical interest. In works on Fascism, Preziosi is always mentioned only superficially, and the only image we retain of him is that of a sickly anti-Semite, which this cultivated and intelligent man was. But the

is undoubtedly more complex than it appears^{2S}

Over and above the choices he made yesterday and the Although Evola was fully involved in a conflict which was also a European civil war, he knew how to keep the "honour of arms". Leaving aside the case of tué- non, which it would be wrong to place in the camp of the Total Counter-Revolution, it is probably not too much to say that Evola was "the last of the great".

"Referring explicitly to Preziosi, the great historian of Fascism Renzo De Felice makes this interesting remark. "I have always had (.) a certain taste, a certain psychological and human interest for a specific type of character with a dark (fusca) and Luciferian coherence, but, in his own way, disinterested. And I would say that between my Jacobins, my Illuminati, and a certain type of Fascism (.), there is in common an *elusive quid*, historiographically false, but psychologically true" (interview su *L'Ascismo*, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 1985, pp. 4-5; 1st ed.: 197f). On Preziosi, see also: Henri Rollin, *L'Apocalypse de notre temps. Les dessous de la propagande allemande d'après des documents inédits*, Gallimard, Paris, 1939, p. 491-493, 498; Norman Cohn, *HytOim d'un mythe. Le - Gonspiraâan "juive et les Protocoles des Pages de SiOn*, Gallimard, Paris, 1967, p. 243-245.

reactionary of modern times and the first prophet of tomorrow's new right --²¹.

François MAISTRE

Translators' note :

The notes by Italian publisher, Renato Del Ponte, and our own notes have been distinguished by [Note by R.D.P.] and [N.D.T.]. The titles of foreign works (particularly German) directly translated into Italian by Evola in the body of his articles have, of course, been translated into French here, the title in the original language being given in the notes. Works whose place of publication is not indicated were published in Paris.

" Renato Del Ponte, *A vviamento allo lettura di Julius ñvÖiA*, in *Bollettino interro del CL S.E.* , 6, May 1971, . 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The sources of the texts included in this collection are given below. Most of these texts come from the archives of the *Centro Studi Evoliani* in Genoa, which holds them either in their original state or in the form of photocopies; the other texts have been found thanks to the painstaking research of Professor Giovanni Conti of Modena, who has long been very active in the field of Evolian bibliographical studies.

The monthly review *La Rita Italiana* (1913-1945), edited by Giovanni Pre- ziosi, is the most important in terms of the number and importance of its articles, from which eleven articles have been extracted:

Due facce del nazionalismo, XVIII, 216 (March 1931),
p. 232-243.

Universalità imperiale e particolarismo nazionalistico,
XVIII, 217 (April 1931), pp. 330-339.

Osservazioni critiche sul "razzismo" nazional-socialista,
XXI, 248 (November 1933), pp. 544-549.

Corporazioni e reggi d'onore, XXIV, 281 (aofit 1936),
p. 137-145.

Processo ama borghese, **XXVIII**, 324 (March
1940),
p. 259-268.

Mito e realtà nella lotta antiborghese, XXVIII, 333 (December
1940), pp. 621-627 (article written under the pseudonym
Arthos).

Romanesimo, germanesimo e il caso Manacorda, XXIX,
339 (June 1941), pp. 649-657 (article signed under the
pseudonym Arthos).

Vedute sull'ordine futuro delle nazioni, XXIX, 342 (sep-
tember 1941), pp. 270-281.

"Neutralizzazione o dignificazione della burocrazia, **XXIX**,
343 (October 1941), pp. 360-366 (article written under the
pseudonym Arthos).

fi'uzione del'idea imperiale e distruzione della "cultura Neutral", XXXI, 358 (January 1943), pp. 10-20.

A proposito della carta stampata inutile, XXXI, 361 (April 1943), pp. 376-381.

Second, with eight articles, was the monthly *Lo Stato* (1931-1943), edited by Carlo Costamagna, from which we have extracted the following texts:

ii nazisino suite vie di Mosca?, VI, 3 (March 1935), p. 186-195.

A proposito del convegno corporativo italo-francese, VI, 6 (June 1935), p. 437-438.

Paradossi dei tempi: paganesimo razzista= illuminismo libeznle, VI, 7 (July 1935), p. 530-532 (unsigned article).
L'inglùterra e la degradazione dell'idea di impero, XI, 7 (July 1940), p. 322-332.

Elementi dell'ideo europea, XI, 9 (September 1940), p. 476-486.

Per mi vero "diritto europeo", XII, 1 (January 1941), pp. 21-29.

Sulle differenze fra In concezione lascista e nazista dello Stato, XII, 4 (April 1941), p. 143-153.

Per un allineaieato politico-culturale dell'italia e della Geraiania, XIII, 5 (May 1942), p. 141-153.

In third place we have the daily *Ji Aegime Fas-cista* (1926-1945), edited by Roberto Farinacci, from which three articles have been taken (the last being from the special page *Diorame Filosolico quinäiciaale* edited Evola himself), namely:

Suite premesse spirituali dell'Impero, 6 August 1937, p. 3.

Eticità dell'autarchia, 7 June 1938, p. 3.

Limiti della "giustizia sociale", 21 March 1940, p. 3.

In fourth place came the monthly *Vite Now* (1925-1933), dirigé par Leandro Arpinati, avtc deux articles extraits, à savoir

Ii "mito" del auovo nazionalismo tedesco, VI, 11 (November 1930), pp. 930-934.

JJ probleme "ewopeo" al Convcgno "Volts", VIII, 216 (March 1931), pp. 1071-1075.

Finally, with one article each, the periodicals :

Rassegna Italiana (1918-1943), directed by Tommaso Sillani,
with

"Neue Sachlichkeit. Una confessione delle nuove generazioni tedesche", XVI, 179 (April 1933), p. 315-324.

Bibliografia fascista (1926-1943), edited by Alessandro Pavolini, with

La lotta nazionalsocialista per la "visione del mondo", IX, 5 (May 1934), pp. 360-366.

Nuropa Nazione (1951) with

Sui presupposti spirituali e strutturali dell'unità europea, I, 1 (January 1951), pp. 48-54.

Pagine libere (new series: 1956-?) with

Quo vadis Germania, III, 8-10 (August-October 1958), p. 21-23.

Renato DEL PONTE

PART ONE

THE IMPERIAL IDEA
AND THE NEW
EUROPEAN ORDER

I

1931

THE TWO FACES NATIONALISM

It is a fact that the Great War, far from having exhausted the process of the emergence of nationalisms, both European and non-European, on the contrary brought it to a climax. A reflection aimed at clarifying the meaning of such a state of affairs is therefore fully justified at the time.

What meaning can nationalism have in the context of a philosophy of culture? To the problem posed in these terms, we believe we can offer the following solution: *the nationalist option admits of two ideally distinct and antithetical possibilities, although in practice they are often confused. While the first is a degeneration and regression, the other leads to higher values - it is the prelude to a resurrection.*

Let's look at how to make such an idea understandable, an idea which, even as it is stated, is rich in consequences. A phenomenon such as nativism cannot be understood without placing it in the context of a global vision of history that rests on solid foundations in terms of value criteria. For a vision of this , the obvious fact is the progressive decline of political power from one level to another,

in ancient civilisations, attested to the qualitative differentiation of human possibilities - a process that goes back to the beginning of so-called 'historical times and has developed right up to the present day, as Western 'political history in particular attests

We know that the analogy between the political organism and the human organism belongs to a very ancient tradition. At the lower level, these are the undifferentiated energies of pure vitality; but above them already dominate the functions of exchange and the general organic economy - which, in turn, find in the *will* that which moves and directs the whole body space. And at the top, finally, sits a power intellectuality and freedom, as the centre and inner fire of the organism.

Traditions existed for which the "great body" constituted by the *ñats* - considered by them almost as spiritualised bodies, and not as creations of necessity and temporal contingency - required a division and hierarchisation of classes and castes strictly along the same lines. To , organic economy, will and spirit corresponded the four distinct classes of serfs (or workers), merchants, warriors and, finally, representatives of an authority that was both royal and priestly. Each of the castes was arranged hierarchically: the masses, under the control and government of those who mai-

¹ The idea of the regression of castes was first set out in our work *Imperialismo pagano* (Roma-Todi, 1928) (anastatic reprint: Edizioni di Ar, Padua, 1978 - Editor's note). **Vezzani**, but these have not yet been set out in writing. It was **finally clarified** systematically by René **Guénon** in *Autorité spirituelle et temporelle* (Paris, 1929).

These, in turn, were under the authority of the warrior aristocrats who, through their accomplished and conquering type, attested in some way to the presence of that which, in man, goes beyond man.

The ancient East (India) and the Far East were familiar with a similar type of social organisation, which ancient Greece and Rome were partly inspired by; it is to be found in the political doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, and the Catholic-feudal Middle Ages were its ultimate revival in terms of social organisation.

It is important to note that such an organisation corresponded to a type of *qualitative* hierarchy and attested to the emergence of higher forms of interest and individuality. In the ancient East, the members of the two upper castes were described as "regenerated", and were therefore expressions of a spiritual elite - the Warrior and the Aristocrat also having, according to this conception, a more "sacred" than "political" significance. Any hierarchy based on the economy, work, industry and collective administration remained confined to the two lower castes, equivalent to , in human organism, is limited to the physical-vital domain.

This is why the hierarchy of the four castes represented-

The second caste, the managers of work and wealth, already represented the outline of a type, a "person", in relation to the anonymity of the mass devoted solely to "living". Compared to the anonymity of the mass who simply "lived, the managers of work and wealth of the second caste already represented the outline of a type, a "person". But in the heroism of the Warrior and the ethos of the Aristocrat, the third caste we sense, even more clearly, the mode of a "more than living", of a being who, of himself, gives himself a law eclipsing the natural, instinctive, collective and utilitarian element. If, finally, the Ascetic, the King and the *Pontifex* were to merge, according to the primordial conception of the

This is an indication a universal and almost supernatural fulfilment of personality, the completed expression of what, in common man, on the other hand, lacks the strength to free himself from the contingent in order to be exclusively himself. Insofar as such dominators, as completed individuals, served as the pivot of the entire social organism, that organism was comparable to a body underpinned by the spirit; temporal power and spiritual authority coincided, and the hierarchy *was legitimate* in the absolute sense of term. Once this outline had been drawn — whose ideal model, a creator of values, is independent of extent and form — which any society may have realised it in the past —, the observation of the process of the progressive 'fall' of political power, in times that are properly historical, must be followed. toric, appears in a raw light.

The era of the "sacred —kings", whose natures were simultaneously imperial and priestly —, was already on the threshold "mythical times. The pinnacle disappeared, and power passed to the level immediately below — to the Warrior caste; all that remained were secular monarchs: warlords or lords of temporal justice.

Second collapse: the great European monarchies disappeared, the aristocracies died out with the revolutions (in —England and France) and the Constitutions, becoming mere superfluous survivals in the face of the "will of the nation". The formation, within parliamentary, republican and bourgeois democracies, of the "will of the nation" was the first step in the process. economic oligarchies, then expresses the fatal transfer of political power from the second to the modern equivalent of the third caste — the merchant caste.

Finally, the crisis of bourgeois society, the pro-letarian revolt, the despotism of the masses constituting themselves into purely collective, economic and international entities, herald the final collapse which will enable the bourgeois political system to survive.

see will pass into the hands of the last caste — that — of the nameless and faceless beings, leading to the reduction of

any standard of *living* in terms of material and quantitative.

Or again: exactly like the person who can no longer bear the tension of the spirit, nor that of the will, of the force that moves the body, and lets himself sink - only to rise again magnetically, like a body without a soul under the impulse of *another* force, this time emerging from the folds of pure vitality.

The time has come to recognise the illusion of all the myths associated with 'progress', to open our eyes wide to reality. The time has come to recognise the terrible destiny of spiritual devastation that has weighed down the West, and which is now bearing its ultimate fruit.

To return to the specific problem we have posed, we need to highlight the fact that at the heart of the process involution described above is the transfer from the individual to the collective, which follows closely from the decline, to which we have alluded, of the poles of interest from which the higher castes derived the legitimacy of their hierarchical authority, to the level of those proper, on the other hand, to the lower castes.

In reality, it is only by engaging in free activity that man can truly flourish. And so, through the two symbols pure Action (heroism) and pure Knowledge (contemplation, asceticism) based on an aristocratic regime, the two upper castes opened up ways for man to participate in this "supramundane" order - the only one in which he can belong and experience the full, universal meaning of personality. By destroying all interest in this order, by concentrating on practical and utilitarian objectives, on economic achievements or on any of the preoccupations of the two lower castes, man disintegrates, becomes off-centre, opens himself up again to forces that tear him away from himself and resti- bute him.

But the effort to rise above them is the hallmark of any truly superior culture.---

Thus, in the most recent social forms, the collective acquires ever importance, to the point of, almost, the *totemism* of primitive communities. Today, the nation, the race, society and humanity assume a mystical personality and demand unconditional adherence and subordination from the individuals who form part of them, while at the same time, in the name of "freedom, hatred is aroused for the superior and dominating individualities, the Seules, towards whom the principle of subordination and obedience of particular individuals was sacred and justified. And this tyranny of the collective is not confined to asserting itself over what, in individual life, belongs to the political and social sphere: it arrogates to itself a moral and 'spiritual' right and, by claiming that culture and spirit cease to be a matter for the individual, it also asserts itself over the collective. by claiming that culture and the spirit cease to be disinterested forms of activity and become organs dependent on the collective temporal entity, it exalts the very morality which affirms that the spirit is not only the product of the individual, but also of the collective.

only has meaning and value as an instrument in the service of the body. That man, before conceiving of himself as a personality, as an "I", must conceive of himself as a social group, as a faction or as a nation - this is one of the commandments of the latest subversive ideologies, through which the relationship according to which the primitive considered himself in relation to the *totem* of his own tribe or clan reappears in a very precise way.

In the revival of the Russian race, in way of feeling itself invested, with Bolshevism, with a universal prophetic mission, we find a confirmation of this regression to primitive social stages, present in so many forms of modern life. The opinion of those who see in the new Russia the final revolt of a barbaric Asiatic race, which rejects the European civilisation undertaken by the Tsars over the last two centuries, and tends to make common cause with the "new Russians", is therefore very accurate.

Bolshevism is the incarnation, in a modern form, of the old spirit of the Slavic race. Bolshevism is the incarnation, in a modern form, of the old spirit of the Slavic race: a race without tradition which, in its social mysticism, in its amalgam of sensuality and spirituality, in its predominance of *pathos* over *etfios* and of instinct over rationality, takes us back to forms sub-personal indifferenciation and pro-a communising mischievousness peculiar to primitives.

The explosion of the world war gave this element free rein and turned it into a terrible ferment of decomposition that is undermining what was still healthy in Europe. In announcing the advent of the "proletarian era", the "Soviet civilisation" declared its dedication to the elimination of the "leprosy" of personality and freedom, the "poisons of bourgeois society" and the principles of all evil; the abolition, not only of private property, but also of all independent thought and all "supernatural motivation and, therefore, alien to class interests" (Lenin); advent of the "all-powerful mass-man" who alone must live and give shape to all individual ways of life and thought. The modern aspect of Bolshevism lies solely in its "method": mechanisation and rationalisation are the means to realise, within a purely economic universal social regime, the mass-man who already mystically lived in the Slavic soul. This is how "Soviet civilisation" came to meet - and it was aware of this - another nation which similarly arrogated to itself a unified regenerative mission and the presumption of representing the ultimate end of civilisation: America.

In the United States, the process does not simply mon- It follows the inflexible determinism which dictates that the moment man closes himself off from all forms of pure spirituality and gives himself over to the pursuit of temporal things, he *ipso facto* ceases to belong to himself and becomes an integral part of an irrational collective entity, which he can no longer dominate.

ner. America, in the course of the sanctification of the temporal and the secularization of the sacred, of which the Protestant heresy was the initiator, has come to this very end. Wearing the ideals of material conquest to a climax of the world Europe had set itself, it ended up, without even realising it by giving a practical and physical character to any understanding of power, justice, activity and personality, to the point of constituting an even more terrible form of barbarism. There, the Ascetic is regarded as a sloth, an anachronistic parasite and "useless to society"; the Warrior, as a dangerous exalted, which humanitaræpacifist prophylaxis should eliminate and no doubt replace with the model of the *boxer**. The perfect type, the spiritual champion, is on the contrary "the man who works, who pro- ducts", and any form of activity, even spiritual, is appreciated only as "work", "productive work", This "social service" could not be a better description of the extent to which, at the top of such a society, we find exactly the representative type of the last of the ancient castes: that of slaves devoted to toil.

Here too, having renounced his spiritual personality, man ceases to have any value whatsoever, outside the conditions imposed by the collective organisation, caught up in the fever to produce, to 'achieve', to agitate. Con- ditions which, moreover, usurp a moral and even religious value and tend to standardise souls too, according to a collective egalitarian *Norma mentis*, to the point of suffocating even the ability to realise the degree of degeneration that all this represents.

These are the forms in which the cycle closes and the collapse is completed. Russia and America are the two SymptmeS, Ils deux vis geS d'un meme phenOmène².

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- In French only.

² By the end of the 1920s, Evola had clearly defined the two terms of global subversion: cf. his essay *Anicricanismo e Bols- cevismo*, in *Nuova Antologia*, CCLXV, 1371, May-June 1929, pp. 110-128.

From being a human organism, as it was when the brilliance and authority of the higher castes governed it, the social body retrogrades to the stage of a subhuman acephalous organism. It is the advent of the "faceless beast".

We now have all the information we need to tackle the problem seriously: *what is the meaning of nationalism in the modern world?*

A certain type of nationalism offers us, on the basis of what we have said so far, a preconceived physiognomy. This is the degree immediately before the forms of economic-proletarian collectivism. tarian.

In this nationalism, the important thing is not that a distinct national consciousness emerges as opposed to others, but that the "nation" becomes a person, an entity in itself; and the inability to go beyond this right of land and blood - which concerns only the natural and infra-intellectual aspect of man - and the impossibility for the individual to acquire a value except in the terms specific to a given community and tradition, end up being elevated to the rank of ethical values. The fact of being 'national', in this context, confers on a veritable mystical aura guarantees its inviolability and imposes respect for it. This sub-intellectual ethnic element not only fails to recognise the authority of higher principles, it also demeans such in its own service. The "nation" demands the first tribute: it is only later, and in a subordinate way, that a place is given to reality, truth and the spirit. But certain forms of nationalism go even further: any disinterested, objective criterion is accused of abstraction; it is claimed that, even when it comes to reality, truth and culture, it is not possible to be "national".

[tr. tr. . *Américanisme et bolchevisme*, in J. Mabire, J. Warenne, P. Pascal et al., *Julius Evola, Le visionnaire loudroyé*, Copernicus, Paris, 1977, p. 71-101 - Editor's note]. - (Note by R.D.P.).

national tradition and the interests of the country.
that's when we start talking about *our*
scientific, philosophical and even religious³.

poli-
tra-

And anything that isn't 'ours' and doesn't 'value (the nation)' immediately met with defensible prejudice or, at the very least, suspicious disinterest.

And just as we do not tolerate activities of a higher order manifesting themselves freely and leading to a higher reality than that conditioned by race, so too a nationalism conceived in this way respects elite persona only insofar as it is a "national".

"representative" of the nation. Born in the midst of the revolutions which overthrew what remained of the aristocratic-feudal regime, this nationalism expresses nothing more than a pure and simple "herd mentality": it is a variety of democratic intolerance for any leader who is not a simple organ of the "popular will", dependent in everything and for everything on the sanction of the latter. In the former, the individual is redissolved in the original ethnic-national entities; in the latter, the differentiation inherent in the latter is itself overcome, giving rise to an even greater collectivisation and disintegration within "national" element.

"mass". To move from one level to the other, the mystique of race simply has to give way to a purely economic-mechanical structure: by its very nature, such a structure eliminates all vestiges of qualitative differentiation, rationalisation and mechanisation.

³ When, as here, we speak of tradition in the negative sense, we mean to refer to the conception of tradition which does not involve any truly intellectual, i.e. supra-ethnic, element, (and) which represents, as Chesterton said, an extension in time of what is, in relation to space, the right granted to majorities: the right of the dead over the living, based the (fact that they are the dead) of the same race.

sation of social life, leaving the way virtually clear for the advent of the homelandless mass-man. Now, if we consider that the domain proper to contempo-

The most important is precisely that of the economic-mechanical power against which every criterion of value and every magnitude is practically measured.

a question of time for such ^{4g}transitions

But we can also ask whether nationalism is not capable of taking on another meaning. We think we can answer this question in the affirmative. As we have seen, nationalism appears to be a transitional form that belongs to the political domain that has fallen into the hands of the third caste, while waiting to pass to those of the last caste. By its very nature, however, it is capable of having a dual meaning: if this transitional form can be found in the direction of the fall, it can also be found in the direction a recovery, an eventual reintegration. Let us suppose that we have hit bottom: in the hypothetical case where we still find the strength to rise to the surface, we will once again encounter nationalism.

— but a very different nationalism! As in the case of so-called 'sectorial quantities in physics, such a phenomenon can only be defined on the basis of a directional factor.

For the first nationalism, the meaning of this direction is that of collectivisation, achieved at the level of the "nation". For the latter, on the other hand, *the* meaning ranged from collectivisation to the reconstruction of a new *aristocratic* hierarchy.

Nothing could better express the premises of this

⁴ These Evolian assertions, which have a prophetic flavour given the time (1931) when they were formulated, find occasional confirmation today. Evola also saw a dangerous tendency towards *völkisch* nationalist regression in certain currents of National Socialism. Cf. in/ra his article *Considérations sur l'ordre futur des nations*, 1941 [Note by R.D.P.].

second nationalism than the words of Paul de Lagarde, a well-known theorist of German nationalism. The fact of being 'human' is a minus compared to the fact of being "national", and the fact of being national, at least by rap- In other words, in relation to the quality of "humanity", the "national" element of differentiation adds "x", and the element specific to the individual's personality adds "x". In other words, in relation to the quality "humanity", the "national" element of differentiation brings an added value of "x", and the element specific to the individual's personality brings an additional added value of "y" to this "x". The idea is of a hierarchy, moving from the abstract to the concrete - the abstract being the collective, the general, while the concrete is, on the contrary, the differentiated, the individual. In relation to the amorphous mass of 'humanity', the resurgence of differentiated national consciousness can therefore be a first step forward. But the national consciousness, the common ethnic trunk, must in turn appear as a formless matter in relation to the individualities which are fulfilled, become themselves, develop according to forms of existence superior to those solely conditioned by blood or the demands of the collectivity, making this matter pass from the state of *nãos* to the state of *cosmos*, from power to act. It is at this point that relations are reversed: the nation is no longer the end of individual; on the contrary, it is the individual, as an aristocratic and spiritual personality, who constitutes the end of the nation.

of the nation - insofar as the latter remains in some way its mother, in the same material conditions, practically, as the earth in relation to the tree, which detaches itself from it in its upper part to rise towards the free sky.

Now that the dividing line has been clearly drawn, all we have to do is return to the qualitative significance of the old caste hierarchy, to fix it once and for all. A nationalism that would be the prelude to a resurrection is inconceivable (it would not only be an attempt to "restore" the caste hierarchy, it would also be an attempt to "restore" the caste hierarchy).

P. de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften*, B.I., S. 164.

The only way we can go beyond the mechanico-collectivist stage (but we go beyond it) is if we do not establish the fundamental need to restore an order of irreducible values to everything that is practical, 'social' and e_cono- logical, and if we do not establish the fundamental need to restore an order of irreducible values to everything that is practical, 'social' and e_cono- logical.

mics, and to attribute to these values a direct pre-eminence and authority over everything else. Without such a requirement, there can be no hierarchy and without hierarchy, the

It is impossible to return to a higher, spiritualised type state. In reality, hierarchy does not just mean classification: it means the subordination of that which is inferior in nature to that which is superior.

The "inferior" being everything that can be measured in practical, utilitarian, worldly terms; the "superior" being everything that expresses a pure and disinterested form of activity. Any other criterion would be both illusory and corrupting. "Illusory" is the right word for any hierarchy envisioned within the framework of pure economics, based as it is on differences in income, political or professional rank, class in the Marxist sense, and so on. It is only with the emergence of forms of interest higher than the economic level taken as a whole that the principle a genuine hierarchy can emerge: we must start from the idea that we do not live to develop the economy, but that the economy is only a means to an end, the end being inner elevation, the fulfilment of the person in the integral and "supramundanesense. A hierarchy is indeed 'corrupting' when it expresses the enslavement of what is not 'practical' to is; when the mind becomes the instrument of the body; and, above all, when 'pragmatics' rages in every field, including science, along with the shoddy Machiavellianism and generalised arrivism of which today offers so examples. is as anti-hierarchical or even as anarchical as these counterfeits of hierarchy.

From the point of view of restorative nationalism, the objec- firstly, to give form and order to everything in society that corresponds to the needs of the individual.

to the physical-vital or animal part a human organism and belonged to the domain of the two subaltern classes: work, the economy, political organisation in the narrow sense of the term, leading to an "economic peace" which, through its effects, will allow energies of a higher order to free themselves and act on a higher plane. We can then begin tackle the "reconstruction" of the second caste, that of the warrior aristocracy to which the first of the aristocrats belongs: the Monarch. It is through the aristocracy that the ideal of superior personality formation can be realised. But we must not think here of those representatives of certain corrupt and degenerate families against whom easy demagogic criticism is levelled: we must have in mind the original type of Lord, that being in whom self-control, perspicacity, disinterestedness, culture, honour, and, above all, leadership have become a second nature whose solidity rests on the reliable basis of *blood*. Aristocracy is the necessary extension of positive nationalism, for while the latter delimits the boundaries of a given bloodline and ethnic trunk, aristocracy operates within this framework, making finer selection and differentiation, accelerating the process that leads from the general and the collective to the individual, the direction of all true progress.

Once an aristocratic tradition has been rebuilt, the first breath
spirit will have been communicated to the

Once the "body" of the State has been created, nationalism, having achieved its specific objective, can give way to higher forms State, comparable to those which the second caste governed in the past. What will characterise them will be an absolute personalisation of all relations, signalling the passage from the mechanical to the organic, from constraint to freedom.

In the old days, for example, there were no soldiers "but *warriors*"; we didn't fight for the sake of war. the "nation" or for the "law, but for their King they did not "obey" not to the "law social": were "faithful" to his lord. He who submitted *knew*

to whom he submitted, and he did so with pride. Responsibility was assumed directly by the chiefs, by the Monarchs: they did not offload it onto faceless entities and ideological *taboos*.

Authority was based on the greatness of personality and the ability to devote oneself to something that could not be bought, sold or measured in terms "utility": something that no longer belonged to simple life, but to a "more than life". In turn, this will serve as the basis for an even higher type state, but one too remote to even hint at. Just as men can remain free and distinct as a body while being united by the same idea, so when the elites of the different human races have been able to rise to the level of true spiritual superiority, the way will be virtually open a new *universal* culture.

Here, universalism does not mean "internationalism" or, or, worse still, "levelling humanitarianism". both of which are products of a materialistic mentality. In reality, the purely political differentiation of states is of the same order as that of bodies: it is not a question physical unity, but cultural unity, of adherence to supra-individual realities. The Catholic Middle Ages, as well as the Roman Empire and India, are examples of universality conceived in this way: they show us the possibility a cultural and spiritual unity that is pro- founded, within the plurality, and often even the struggle, of ethnically distinct states or races. If we were to evoke a future *European* consciousness, it would be uni- that it would be appropriate to do so.

But this has already gone beyond the objective we set ourselves of clarifying the two possible meanings of nationalism. We believe that these meanings are now unambiguous for everyone. As for the extent to which today's nationalisms, which are struggling in the different States, obey one or other significa- This is an empirical problem, totally unrelated to the present considerations.

ii

1931

**UNIVERSITY IMPERIAL
AND NATIONALIST
PARTICULARISM**

Judging by the reactions they have elicited from more than one reader, some of the assertions made in our previous article, *The Two Faces of Nationalism*, seem worthy of a little more elaboration, but without leaving the field that interests us alone, that of principles. We will tell things as they are, and no one would make a worse mistake than to believe that some of our considerations might be dictated by special circumstances specific to this or that country.

We need to move on from analysing the meaning of the phenomenon of 'nationalism' to the meaning of the concept of 'imperialism', to determine the relationship between the two. In the light of the preceding analysis, the problem posed presents a major difficulty. In fact, since 'nation' was a new word to designate a phenomenon that was itself relatively new, it was not difficult to make oneself understood: it was simply a question of interpreting such a phenomenon in the light of a more complete historical vision that was more in tune with reality. On the other hand, the notion of "empire" ren-

the way to something that belongs to an ideal world well different from that to which modern people are accustomed: so it is explainable that in this area are day misunderstandings or more or less serious confusion- of most of those who currently refer to themselves as "the people". to this concept.

We have demonstrated that there are two kinds of of nationalism: the first is a phenomenon of degener- The first is a negative phenomenon, in that it expresses a regression of the individual into the collective (the "nation"), of intellectuality into vitalism (*pathos* and "soul" of the race). The second is a positive phenomenon, because it expresses a reaction against even more radical forms of collectivisation, such as, for example, the proletarian internationals or the standardisation of the sation of the practical à based economic-social (America).

The first (demagogic nationalism) aims to destroy the individual's own specific qualities in favour of so-called "national" qualities. In the second (aristocratic nationalism), the aim is to wrest individuals from the subaltern state to which they have fallen and where each one finds himself the equal of the other: it is therefore a question of differentiating them until the fact of feeling that they belong to a particular race or nation expresses a value and dignity superior to the fact of feeling that they are equal (egalitarian fraternity, communist-style "humanity").

By developing the process by which nationalism takes on the meaning a positive phenomenon, we are brought back to the values of difference and hierarchy: by becoming themselves again, individuals pass from the plane of materiality, where there can be no real difference, to that of intellectuality, in which they participate in something that is non-individual not in the sense of infra-individual (collectivism) but on the contrary *supra-individual*: they participate a *universality*. It is then that, from nation- alism, we move on ininégalitéisme, to the anonymity of great realities are more than human. All true imperialism

is universal, and is presented as a type of *positive* overtaking of the nationalist stage.

Let us try to clarify this fundamental point the opposition between collectivism and universalism, which might appear to a reader unfamiliar with these issues as a logician's subtlety. Collectivism is the mixing diverse elements to the point making a potpourri in which they lose all character and autonomy, under the guise of either an amorphous mass or the uniformity of a 'type. Universalism is about tracing the multiplicity of different elements back to a principle that is both superior to and prior to their differentiation, which arises solely from their sensible reality. Here, difference is abolished; here, difference *integrated*. Universality is a purely spiritual reality: we reach it by rising, through kind of "asceticism", from sensitivity and passion to the realm of the particular. *the domain of the particular* pure intellectuality and, more generally, to disinterested forms activity. it no more denies individual realities than a physical law denies the specific character of very different phenomena, which may find in it their common principle. We have stated these ideas in abstract form, so that they retain their most general meaning. But we can now turn to the important practical consequences of the distinction between collectivism and universalism. There are certain narrow forms of nationalism which, example, tendentiously confuse the former with the latter. They extend a legitimate reaction against attempts to timationalise and erase ethnic differences (a legitimate reaction, since we are opposing trends towards collectivist levelling), to things which have, on the other hand, a universal significance, appealing to the freedom of individuals vis-à-vis collectivist and infra-intellectual aspect of nationalism itself. In this respect, J. Benda, in his book *La trahison des clercs (The betrayal of the clergy)*, made a

a number of very accurate observations. Et nous-même, dans notre précédent article, avons cloué au pilori l'étrange prétention de certains nationalistes extrémistes, qui en arrivent à vouloir une science « nationale », une philosophie "national" art and even a religion. "national".

But to want this means having no idea of the *universal* potential of these spiritual phenomena: it means limiting them, transposing them from their own plane to a lower one, .e. an ethnic plane rather than a spiritual or intellectual one. We could put the problem bluntly in these terms: a "national science", insofar as it is "national", is not a "science" and, as a science, it is not merely "national". And if, on the other hand, we were only to refer to the fact that a given science has been cultivated, in a particular way, by people belonging to a given nation, and not to the objective results of their work (which have a 'scientific' value independent of individuals), it is quite clear we would then be confining ourselves to the anecdotal and biographical aspect, which is entirely empirical and which no-one has the right impose on higher-order considerations. The fact that a scientist is not from 'our' land certainly does not make the results he has arrived at any more false or any less acceptable if they are correct; conversely, the fact he is from 'our' land does not make them any more true or any more acceptable if they are false! While it is difficult to refute the evidence of such statements when they apply to science, many people believe they can do so when it comes to other fields such as philosophy, art or the supra-sensible. In doing so, they demonstrate only one thing: that for everything that is no longer in the realm of matter (science), their attitude is that of the irréalisme, and that they are still incapable of rising to the point of view proper to objectivity, to supra-individuality.

Having said that, it is clear that imperialism deserves its name when it dominates by virtue of universal values to which it is committed.

the one nation or a particular race has risen through-
towards its capacity to surpass itself. This is exactly the opposite
of the "morality" inherent in the so-called "sacred egoism" of
nations. Without a "Die and become", no nation can aspire to an
effective and legitimate imperial mission. You can't remain locked
into your national characteristics and then want, on that basis, to
dominate the world or simply another land. If the imperial attempts
of modern times have aborted or led to the ruin of the nations that
embarked on them (the most recent example being the Central
Empires), then the

The cause is the contradiction of wanting to be,
at the same time, "nation" and "empire"— as well as the basic
absence of any real universality.

The attempts in question also imply a materialist and barbaric
degradation of the very concept of empire. It cannot be any other
way: true domination can only occur if we rise to something
superior to what we wish to dominate; we do so by remaining at
the same level. As a hand, a hand cannot claim to be able to
dominate the other organs of the body; on the other hand, it
succeeds in doing so by ceasing to be a hand, by becoming a soul,
is to say by appealing to the unitary and immaterial function which
has the vocation of uniting and directing the diversity of particular
physical functions. The hypothetical attempt by a hand to take
control of the body, by usurping the function assigned to soul, may
help us to understand the state of mind of certain 'imperial'
ideologies of the nationalist, materialist or militarist type. Here, the
means is not superiority, but the simple violence of a more
powerful force of the same nature as one it intends to subject to its
rule.

What is strange is the fact in a civilised nation, it is
reprehensible for anyone to take another person's property by
force, simply because they need it—and that such behaviour is
considered to be a criminal offence.

nations seems the most natural and legitimate in the world, and serves as the basis for that barbarous conception of imperialism referred to above.) A poor nation, it is felt, has every right to lay its hands on the property of a richer nation, in order to give "space" to its expansion. The military or diplomatic solution to achieve this would have the "sacred" character that "imperialists" of this type pride themselves on. And that's not all: in some cases, a situation is created in which the nation is deliberately driven to the need for expansion, i.e. to imperialism. Such, for example, is the "demographic" type of method: once overpopulation has been achieved, the condition of a nation is created.

"The need for an outlet for the 'spaceless' is obvious.

our view, as long as we stay on this level, it is difficult to distinguish these characteristics from those of the "barbarian invasions".

The materialism of this 'imperialist' conception is also glaringly apparent in its inability to recognise the power of numbers and quantity over quality. If a nation does not possess the solid foundation of a qualitatively superior culture, all the expansions made necessary by its excess numbers whether through emigration or military expansion - will lead to the same result: the production of raw material on which will predominate a type of culture that is foreign to it. The victors in material terms will be the vanquished in ideal terms. The case Rome in relation to Greece is not entirely comparable, but it does give us a glimpse of validity of such a thesis. Today, we could mention America, a singular melting pot where waves emigrants of the most diverse ethnic origins have, two generations later, been virtually reduced, on the whole, a single type while India, for example, has managed to maintain its ideal unity intact, despite the domination of the world.

The result is that, for centuries, it has been dominated by races that are more powerful but qualitatively inferior to it.

Alongside this false imperialism is another, equally false, economic imperialism. Today, it goes without saying that virtually all activity is conditioned and measured in economic (we have seen in this the sign of the advent of the penultimate caste, that of the merchants); that fertile ground is offered to those who cherish the illusion that dominating and monopolising the economic resources of a group of races has imperial significance. But for anyone who does not believe in the moral abasement so characteristic of the modern *standard*, such an illusion undoubtedly presents all the aspects of extravagance, not to say ridiculousness.

The lords of old left administrative matters (the economy) to their freedmen and stewards. Their main concern was to cultivate the higher, 'aristocratic' forms of interest, existence, action and dignity that constituted the very essence of the law and office inherent in their caste. If someone was suited to administration and had a taste for it, they could carry it out without exception: the fact that it was this one rather than that one who was in charge of the economy could only be of mediocre interest to them, the essential thing being that the just subordination and the commitment of loyalty of the non-caste administrator in relation to the aristocrat or the Prince remained. But things are very different today. The plutocrats have taken the place of the aristocrats; the administrator, like the trafficker with his gold, takes himself for 'chiefs' and no longer recognises anyone to whom he is answerable until, one fine day, the contingency inherent in any material force, left to its own devices and deprived of principles, overthrows them and puts others (if not the outright anonymity of the masses) in their place.

This is the context in which we need to assess the risk that

This danger exists and is very real for anyone who accepts the reduction of all criteria and concepts of wealth to the level of pure economics. This danger exists, and is very real for anyone who suffers and accepts the reduction of any criterion or conception of power to the level of pure economics. But anyone - individual or race - who, conversely, rises a little above such a plan and anchors himself firmly where things are not, will be in danger.

"If the world is no longer 'bought' or 'sold', we fail to wonder what such 'imperialists' think is the basis of their domination.

Consideration of these negative aspects leads us to the real conditions for empire. A race is ripe for empire when it proves capable of going beyond itself, when it takes the same step as the hero - who would not be what he is if, in his impetus, he did not triumph over the instinct that would reduce him to a petty animal love for his own life. This is why nationalism (in the static, exclusivist sense) and imperialism are two mutually exclusive terms. It does not oppose one particularism to another (one nation to another, the right of this one to the right of that one, etc.): it opposes the universal to the particular.

Anything that is subjective, sentimental, idealistic or even utilitarian belongs in the realm of the particular. What is universal is that which is free of such elements and can be expressed in terms of pure objectivity. We are talking about the development of an individual, a culture or a race, understanding the point of view of reality and wanting it to be true against all odds is a decisive step - before which it could be said that the mind has not yet true virility. If it is feelings, pride, values, greed, hatred - in short, everything that is 'human' in the narrow sense of the term, both individually and collectively - that are the cause of the problem, then it is not the cause of the problem.

- that guide a race, that race will necessarily be at the mercy of the contingency inherent in things do not have their own destiny.

in themselves their principle. But if this race, at least) within an elite group of chiefs, manages to get rid of all two elements of birth and action — fundamental aspects of existence: the — con- it will then prove itself qualified to

a mission, which is arguably already superior to the empirical and political world. *Urtiversahé as con- birth and univezsalité as action: these are the two pillars of every imperial era.*

Knowledge is universal when it succeeds in giving us the meaning of things before whose grandeur and eternity all human *pathos* and caprice vanish; when it introduces us to the primordial, the cosmic: to that which, in the realm of the spirit, has the same features of purity and power as the oceans, deserts and glaciers. Every true universal tradition has always carried with it this breath of the open sea, arousing selfless forms of activity, awakening a sensitivity to values that can no longer be measured by any utilitarian or passionate criteria, both individually and collectively; opening up, alongside 'life', to a 'more than life'. This is the type of invisible empire that history shows us Brahmanical India, the Catholic Middle Ages and Hellenism itself: a unitary culture that prevails from within, within a diversity of peoples or possibly independent cities, over any 'politically' and economically conditioned reality.

This is how we can conceive of an empire, visible as well as invisible, having a material as well as a spiritual unity. Such an empire is built when, alongside universality as knowledge, we also have "universality as action". By way of historical references, we could ancient China, Rome and, again, in part, the Middle Ages, through both the Crusades movement and Islamism.

Action "universalist", is action pure —

heroism. Thus, in the two requirements of the imperial concept we find very exactly the qualities that defined the two ancient upper castes: the sapiential caste (which does not necessarily mean "It was also the case for the 'priestly' caste and the warrior caste. Without further ado

The concept of "heroism" used here is not that of the moderns. Traditionally, heroism is asceticism in the most rigorous sense of the term: the hero is a nature as purified of all 'human' elements as the ascetic; he shares the same character of purity as the great forces of things, and he has no use for passion, sentimentalism or the various motivations, ideal or material, collective or individual, that drive men. The specific functions of each of the ancient castes expressed the very nature and mode being of the person who belonged to it: thus, for the warrior, war was his ultimate end, the kingship of his own spiritual realisation. Fighting was therefore

"War was a good in itself, and heroism a "pure", and therefore universal, form of activity. The rhetoric of the "struggle for rights", "territorial claims", sentimental or humanitarian pretexts and other nonsense are typically modern, and absolutely alien to the traditional conception of heroism. In the Bhagavad-Cîtâ, in the *Koran*, in the Latin conception of the *mous triumphalis*, in the Hellenic assimilation of the hero to the initiate, in the symbol of the Nordic IVafñafa open only to heroes, in certain aspects of the 'holy war' expressed by the Catholic faith itself, we find, variously formulated, the idea of a transcendent heroism that is both supranational and supra-human. Here, heroism is a technique of virile asceticism, of the destruction of lower nature, a path to immortality, a relationship with ~~that~~ which is eternal. Transfigured by such a general atmosphere, action acquires a universal nature: *it becomes a force from above, capable of embodying in an earthly body the universality of a spiritual tradition: it is*

the very condition of empire in the highest sense of the term'.

Are such exhumations as futile as they are anachronistic? That cannot be ruled out either. But under these conditions, the conclusion that must be drawn is that the times are such that they are also transforming into rhetoric the education, before which many hesitate, of ideals and symbols that have, today, lost their original significance.

This in no way prevents us from drawing a line of demarcation between concepts on the doctrinal level, and taking care not to sink into contradictions. When points of reference are "national pride", "irredentist claims", "the necessities of expansion", etc. - let's repeat it - you are in the wrong business. - When the reference points are "national pride", "irredentist claims", "the need for expansion", etc. - let us repeat - we are dealing with the legitimate principles of a great fashionable nation, but in no way with those of an empire. Can anyone imagine that a Roman ever fought for something similar, and that he ever needed to warm his head with some passionate rhetoric, to achieve the miracle of this world conquest, through which the universality of the luminous Greco-Latin civilisation spread to the most distant shores?

It is necessary to go back to this state of pure forces, forces that move with the same fatality and purity, with the same inhumanity as the great forces of things. The great conquerors have always con-

We have gone into great depth on the traditional conception of heroism in articles such as *Simboli eroici della etnice tzadi- zione romana* (*Vita Nova*, 1929, no. 8) and *Lø Grande e Ja Pic- coia Guerra Santa* (*La Torre*, 1930, no. 10). As far as the latter text is concerned, in order to show clearly just how far the bad faith and imposture of certain irresponsible polemicists can go, we would point out that our defence of the traditional idea (according to which a warrior caste fights wars it finds in them the joy fulfilling its mission) is not the only one we are defending.

his duty, not for a piece of land) was presented as an explicit statement, on our part, that... Dalmatia rightfully belongs to Yugoslavia (!!!).

sidered, in a way, as 'sons of destiny', bearers a force that *had to* be fulfilled and to which everything, starting with themselves, their happiness and their tranquillity, had to be bent and sacrificed. In its fullest sense, empire is something superior and transcendent: *sacrum imperium*. How, then, can we associate the myth of empire - as we wrote a few years ago ² - with this or that 'idealism' or traditionalism (in the narrow sense of the term), this or that sentimentalism or 'utilitarianism'? How can it be linked to the demands of a faction or a nation - not to say a region, a market town or a village? Such absurdities are all too common among modern people.

Anyone who ever mentions imperial symbols again, regardless of the land in which they were born, must be able to see all this. know what is.

He needs to know what a "nation" is and what an "empire" is, and what the limits of each are. He needs to open his mind to what, in man, neither begins nor ends with man: he needs to understand universality as the culmination of individuality brought to its climax - in terms of both knowledge and action. But the most important thing, above all, is that, aware of the artificial decline in standards in all areas that is rife today, he should know that there is a whole world to which he must say 'no' if the aurora- I lights a possible European imperial era are to shine - beyond the world of 'serfs' and 'merchants'.

² Cf. *Imperialismo e säle renlistico*, in the daily *Tevere* of 20 January 1929.

1932

**THE "EUROPEAN" THE "EUROPEAN"
PROBLEM
AT THE "VOLTA" CONFERENCE**

For those who attended the "Volta" Congress, held recently in Rome at Italian Academy, it is useful to take a look *back at the* orientations and demands expressed there. Nor is it without interest to indicate the results objectively, if indeed there are results at all.

For a whole week, the participants were treated to an average of seven or eight hours a day of conferences and speeches of all kinds, which followed one another without interruption, to which must be added the disruption caused by translations and commentaries - often unrelated to the subjects being dealt with. In addition, although care had been taken in initial programme to divide the 'work' according to the particular aspects - political, ideological, economic - of the European problem, there was continual interference due to the diversity of both the levels at which the analyses were carried out and the points of view. Finally - and let us be frank - what was missing above all from this meeting was the living, creative dimension. In fact, we found something

similar to the atmosphere in Geneva*, i.e. a very "diplomatic" atmosphere: correct, but basically devoid of warmth. If a review such as *Il Secolo Fascista* (No. 18) deplored the precautions taken by the organisers of the Congress "to exclude the revolutionary elements of Fascism and independent culture", on the pretext that these could have "jeopardised the seriousness of the meeting, but in reality with the aim of not calling into question the prejudices and the monopoly of official culture, the organisers of the Congress" - we, for our part, can only endorse this fair criticism.

In any case, we shall endeavour here to indicate some of the dominant themes that emerged most frequently in the course of the many and varied papers presented at the "Volta Congress.

Firstly, there is a consensus on the need to tackle the *spiritual problem* of the European crisis before we can hope to resolve the political and economic ones. Such a problem essentially leads us to examine whether there is a unitary "European" idea, what its content is, and what strength it still represents in a world faced with changing living conditions and a changing society.

Almost all the delegates agreed that *there is* a unitary European idea. Listen to Roger Nathan: "Even if the European idea did not stand up to critical analysis, it represents a considerable force. Whatever the scope of its content, it is a myth that statesmen would be perfectly justified in developing and putting at the forefront of their concerns". The problem of European collaboration, the only way to resolve the crisis, would, in his view, only present difficulties of a technical nature.

* At the time, Geneva was home to the League of Nations.

of "implementation". Count de Reynold', while acknowledging the absurdity of the "pan-European" idea, pointed out that it expresses an as yet need, the undeniable reality of which is more widespread and popular than one might think in many countries. H.E. Coppola' underlined the sense of the fundamental cultural unity of Europe, observing that, even when it is not manifested directly, it nevertheless appears in all its vigour as soon as one leaves this continent or experiences certain essentially "anti-European" mentalities, such as American, Russian and Asian. For his part, the Prince of Rohan' did not express any different ideas, although he did allude to the fact, in his opinion, the unitary European element should not simply be spatially circumscribed, but above all conceived as a quality diffused throughout, even if it is in Europe that it is found in the most concentrated way in terms of its intensity.

In the same vein, Albert Berzeviczy said that it was not a question of waiting for the creation of a new world, insofar as the old world still existed as a solid starting point: old Europe would remain standing, despite the wounds of war and the bad doctors of peace. Finally, Erwin von Beckerath pointed out that, in the face of the last remaining ideals of level-playing

Count Gonzague de Reynold later contributed to the *Diorama filosolico*, a special page of Roberto Farinacci's daily *Il Regime Fasciste*, which Evola edited from 1934 to 1943 [Note by R.D.P.].

² Francesco Coppola, a nationalist and member of the Italian Academy, also collaborated in Evola's *Diorama* (cf. No. 1 of 2 February 1934 *Nazione Italiana e Universalità Italiana*) [Note by R.D.P.].

³ Prince Karl Anton Rohan, a leading figure in Austrian monarchist and (traditionalist) circles, exerted a profound influence in European (conservative) circles with his famous *Europäische Revue*.

A great friend Evola, he collaborated to many of its editorial initiatives.

the, from the (*Diorama*) (to) the magazine *Monarchia*, founded in 1956 under the name of

under the auspices of the *Unione Nazionale Italiana* [Note by R.D.P.].

The European idea takes on a special significance insofar as it is linked to the feeling of superiority of its culture and its great national traditions - and therefore to an idea which, from the point of view of world politics, is eminently aristocratic. According to Roger Nathan, this sense of common superiority can be a privileged link in reconciling our divided peoples. William Martin was the only person to defend a similar thesis, namely that the world is one, and that only international institutions can convey it. Within the framework of such universal institutions, certain problems might also require solutions specific to a particular continent; however, for him, this would result not in the creation of European institutions, but in a special adaptation such institutions. It should be noted, however, that W. Martin was more concerned here with practical matters than with ideas, and that the necessary internationalisation many aspects of contemporary external life was a reality recognised by many other congress participants.

Where opinions begin to diverge is on *the content of* such a unitary European idea. Here we need to distinguish between the political and the purely cultural points of view. From the political point of view, this idea seems to be characterised both by an irreducible plurality, by the personification of nations and by a "The *not of the distinct*" asserted. What unites us is also divides us", says Nathan, "namely that it is because it has an *üstoize*, a history for each particular nation, that Europe possesses its spiritual personality. For his part, the Count of Reyriold believes that,

While we can believe in an organised, "archaic Europe, we cannot believe in a unified Europe, which is impossible and even undesirable. The essential element of Europe is its nations, which independence, sovereignty and borders. Christopher Dawson points out that the characteristic feature of Europe is the absence racial uniformity; that its development is linked to an existential tension, arising from a multiplicity of different races, brought together by the dynamic attraction of a common goal in terms of civilisation; that Europe owes its culture to an uninterrupted process of international and interracial collaboration. As for Rosenberg and Weber, they quite rightly speak European unity as an "explosive unity", into which a multiplicity of elements ready to burst and fly off in all directions enter. And the same Dawson touches on an essential point when he says that the absence racial uniformity, which is a strength of European civilisation as long as Europe is united, becomes a weakness at the precise moment when this dynamic unity breaks down and the various racial elements tend to gravitate towards external centres of attraction rather than their common European centre.

Ideas about what might be called the European tradition from a strictly cultural point of view are more vague. In this respect, we cannot conceal our the impression that the opinions expressed had a strong certain dilettantism, essentially due to the fact, in general, the delegates belonged to the world of politics, economics or sociology, and therefore had no knowledge of the subject. not of skills technical skills order historic and speculative. So every time we've stepped forward a little in the field of the philosophy of cul-

At the end of the day, all we heard were hackneyed formulas, commonplaces that have had their day, were criticised and gave rise to problems of which the participants seemed to know nothing. Sir Charles Petrie, example, argued that the axis of European civilisation and tradition was the idea of Rome - and immediately afterwards identified this with Latinity and, finally, with the Christian religion - which, in his opinion, should serve as the basis for the politics of any society that claims to be civilised. As if all that could be considered one and the same thing! Other speakers defined the fundamental character of Europe by the "secular-rationalist" element, without realising the serious mutilations that would have to be inflicted on so many elements of our traditional greatness for such an idea to become reality. For Pascale Jannacone, Europeans, we are the bearers of two fundamental ideas: freedom and the *law*, or legal order - and it is to the periods of happy fusion of the two that we owe the highest forms, both ideal and ethic, of our civilisation. More interesting is Alfred Weber's thesis, although it is influenced by a somewhat 'domesticated Nietzscheanism. For him, the origins of European civilisation lie in a

"In other words, a society of nomadic warriors, in love with mobility, wide open spaces, expansion, struggle and domination. It is to the original core of races endowed such a spirit - and victorious over races devoted to agriculture, tied to the land and peace-loving, patriarchal - that Europe owes its initial strength, which is to be found even in modern forms of technical conquest of the world, colonisation and capitalist adventurism.

• The British author of *Monarchy*, Sir Charles Petrie later became an active collaborator of Evola's, before and after the Second World War, from Diorama to *Monarchie* [Note by R. D.P.].

On this basis, Weber goes on to consider the causes of the contemporary crisis. Today, we have reached a stage where the possibilities of external irradiation have been exhausted for Europe: it is like a bundle of explosive forces that can no longer space, to the point where, if the spirit of struggle and the intimate desire for conquest and external expansion persist, this can only lead to the destruction of Europe.

on a self-destructive process, a definitive breakdown equilibrium and collapse of European unity. In the diversity of its disciplines, sport appears to be a phenomenon that compensates for the original instincts of the Herrenmensch, i.e. the conqueror, the European, but that is not enough.

anachronistic and, in its military aspect, dangerous, pitting one nation against As a chivalric disposition, working for the community, guiding the masses and understanding the interests that drive them, as a synthesis of collectivism and personalism that rebuilds nations from within subsequently leads to relations of chivalry and solidarity between nations. Christopher Dawson no other idea when he speaks of the need reverse the European centrifugal movement and regain awareness of the common spiritual ideals, intellectual traditions and political principles on which our civilisation is based. Once again, however, as regards the nature and concrete form of the point of reference for such a European "introversion", we have I waited in vain for him to give me some details.

H.E. Coppola, whose speech was one of the best in his field, spoke of Europe's "poor understanding" of its responsibilities in the crisis threatening it. In reality, it is Europe itself which, through its ideologies, has given rise to and shaped precisely those elements which today represent its greatest threat.

great peril. Its democratic ideology and techno-capitalist ideals have favoured the birth of America (this point was later clarified during Leonardo Vitetti's intervention); its humanitarian ideology and the right of peoples to self-determination (forged during the Great War) are being used as ferment for the revolt of non-European peoples, who were once subjects of Europe and who did not dispute Europe's right to dominate them. Faced with this situation, Coppola showed the need to return to our roots, the need to emancipate ourselves ideologies that did not correspond to the reality of Europe and served only to undermine the foundations of its power. Other congressmen such as Alfred Rosenberg, Mihail Manoilescu' and Willy Hell- pach expressed similar views to some extent.

For the Hitlerite Rosenberg, the scourge of Europe was the universalist myth, the democratic-rationalist ideology, with its conception of a "truth" and "principles" valid for all. A renaissance requires us to move such a myth and ideology and return to a differentiated organic conception, in other words for each people to return to an original tradition and a truth of its own, linked to blood, which for it has an ultimate and irreducible value as the internal creative principle of any political or cultural form. Manoilescu also referred to ideologies, which are like 'organic' parts, bio- logical appendages linked to the specific nature and the will to affirm the identity of a nation. mation a people and "imported" ideologies, i.e. extrinsic, 'non-conforming'. Europe had the illusion of finding in materialism, liberalism and the optimistic and progressive myth, an ideology that was "con-

Mihail Manoilescu, a legionnaire in the Romanian Iron Guard who had been de-) ceased by Comeliu Zelea Codreanu, became Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1940 (Note from R.D.P.).

But this illusion has vanished. Fascism, Bolshevism, neo-spiritualism and cultural pessimism are the new forces that have erupted, sweeping away the illusory unity and posing the problem a European reconstruction that is both realistic and organic. Willy Hellpach also spoke of the crisis of humanist education and its own universalism crisis that needs to be overcome —

By means of a new European realism based, on the one hand, on the technological domination of nature and, on the other, on the development, in a national direction, of civilisation, but he hardly bothered to show how the contradictions between such premises could be overcome. The conceptions set forth by the Prince of Rohan ultimately bring us back to the same point. He sees three main forces in the current situation of culture: firstly, the traditional religious idea, which, with the advent of free thought and criticism, nonetheless demonstrating a very uncertain effectiveness; secondly, secularised reason as a science and as a philosophy, which, however, has so far proved incapable of providing Europe with an integral unitary conception, but also of overcoming the pluralism and individualism recurrent in the various philosophical systems and of supplementing the experimental positivist approach with principles of a higher order; finally, Bolshevism, as the type of a new mentality, activist, realist and unitary but revealing itself as such only at the cost of destroying all traditional values. For Rohan, it was a question of going beyond Bolshevism by creating a type that was also revolutionary, organic and realistic, but spiritually integrated, capable being simultaneously "traditional" in its inner orientation and behaviour. This is also the idea developed by the Count of Rey-~~n~~old, who posits as "European" the ideal of *personalism* as a way overcoming both anarchic individualism and the standardised mass.

cism, not academic and formal, but in the sense evoked by Goethe when he wrote: "I call classical what is healthy, and romantic is sick. He denounces "idealism", understood as that which, by creating a confusion between the real and the spiritual, makes impossible *that adaequatio rer et intellectus* in which "truth" consists.

ü wants to be, enrn, conservative: not of errors but of certitudes, not of what is dead but of is alive, conceiving tradition in such a way that it implies a dynamism, a forward march, that it is a "style", an "orientation" - "a conception of becoming sub-ordinate to a conception being".

The same Reynold says that while the eighteenth century was a time of

Where there was a "conspiracy of philosophers" to destroy the old world, today there is a "conspiracy of intellectuals", a "constructive Encyclopaedia", which will give birth to a new world. This, in essence, is the point on which the majority of opinions converge, and which practically constitutes the conclusion and the wish of the Congress.

"Yolta.

For the majority of participants, once the differentiation and individuality of nations had been accepted as a fundamentally "European" element, European unity at the external, political level could only be conceived in terms of a common front fighting common perils - whether internal (Marxism, plutocracy) or external - or in terms of common undertakings in the event of new phases of expansion. On the domestic front, however, it is believed that a more positive and concrete unity is possible in the spiritual and cultural spheres. According to R. According to R. Nathan - and his idea seems right to us - the fundamental point here is to recognise that a spiritual and ethical community exists above State, and that the State only has value as an intermediary, enabling the individual to participate in this community. For Frantisek Weyr, culture possesses spontaneously a unifying tendency: as soon as, in the units of States interest formed purely

ideals, a principle of solidarity will establish itself. The major obstacle would be politics, in the narrow sense, and everything connected with it, to which higher forms of activity are subservient. A spiritual nationalism - von Beckerath adds - cannot come into conflict with the European idea: today, the need for solidarity cannot arise from rationalist constructs, but will only become a reality thanks to a traditional spiritual inner attitude, which Europe already bears within itself. Gabriele Gabrielli, after quoting Mazzini's words: "It is necessary to elevate the nation to the concept of humanity, but without nations humanity cannot exist", Gabriele Gabrielli referred in particular to the objective of creating an intellectual aristocracy in every country (at an equal distance from the monastic style of the "ivory tower" and the ideological style of party service) , to proceed, therefore, to a spiritual integration of the various nations, in a way that is as contemporary as possible and on which a concrete European solidarity can be founded. He rightly warned against a possible danger: "Above all, we must prevent culture from becoming a formidable weapon in service of racial imperialism". In the lecture he handed in (having been unable to attend the Congress), Stefan Zweig spoke of a "moral detoxification of Europe", consisting of eliminating the instinct for struggle and hatred aroused and deliberately encouraged during the Great War, stressing that this instinct, which today no longer finds outlet, could produce tensions, antagonisms and upheavals in all 1e5 areas. But when he goes on to propose a new type of education which, instead of considering the separatist military aspect in the history of peoples, should

In an attempt to accustom the new generations to consider the spiritual and cultural aspect that unites them, he ended up with a rather suspicious pacifism that smacks of bourgeois literati. By asserting that the reconstitution of European consciousness is first and foremost a problem of thought being a problem of

politics and that, as a result, intellectuals in the political sphere should no longer be regarded as 'individuals without a mandate', as if this were the 'preserve' people incapable, in fact, of any vision of the higher order - Alfred Rébelliau, for his part, said something very sensible.

However vague the doctrinal conceptions of the content of the European idea and its metapolitical values, which are likely to play a real role as symbols in its defence - from this last point of view, relating to European collaboration and unity on an intellectual level - the congressmen gathered at the aristocratically elegant Roman "Farnesina" undoubtedly gave us the impression of having a conciliatory spirit and "good intentions".

The future will tell us to what extent these good intentions are truly sincere and have the necessary strength to be translated into reality - or what extent, conversely, they belong to those of which Catholic teaching speaks when it says that "the road hell is paved with good intentions".

IV

1937

ON THE SPIRITUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE EMPIRE

The problem of empire, in its highest sense is that of a supranational organisation in which unity does not mean the destruction and levelling of the ethnic and cultural multiplicity it encompasses.

Thus posed, the problem of empire admits of two major types of solution: if the first is *legal*, the second is *spiritual*.

For the first, the unity of the empire that of a simple politico-administrative organisation, a general law of order, in the most empirical sense of the term. In this hypothesis, the specific qualities, cultures and traditions of the various peoples united within the empire are not harmed, simply because the remains indifferent and alien to them. Here, the only thing that matters to the empire is simple political and administrative organisation combined with pure legal sovereignty. The empire behaves towards peoples in exactly the same way as the agnostic state behaved towards individuals, allowing them to do they wished, provided certain general laws were respected. In modern times, a typical example of an empire conceived in this way is the British Empire.
Cer-

Some historians (Bryce, for example) have tried to establish an analogy, based on similar criteria, between the British Empire and that of ancient Rome. Even in our own country, historians have not failed to fall into the same error, persisting in considering the Roman Empire solely in terms of its legal and political aspects, and neglecting - or taking for granted - its social and cultural aspects.

accessory - any higher-order premise, whether it be spiritual or religious.

It is nonetheless true that, with Rome, a *second type* of imperial organisation is already taking shape, corresponding, in other words, to the second solution. And this means that unity must be determined by something spiritually more eminent than the particularism of everything that, among peoples, is conditioned by the ethnic and naturalistic element.

In ancient Rome, this kind of reality existed two reasons.

Firstly, by virtue of the presence of a type and a single ideal corresponding to the *civis romanus*, which was by no means, as some imagine, a pure legal formula, but an ethical reality, a human model with supranational value.

Secondly, Rome established the *imperial cult* as a transcendent point of . As we know, the Roman *Pantheon* housed the symbols of all the faiths and ethnic-spiritual traditions of the races subject to Rome, which Rome respected and sometimes protected. But this hospitality and this protection were presupposed and conditioned by a "fidelity" (the *Rdes*) of a higher order. Above the religious symbols assembled in the *Pantheon*, the symbol of the Empereur, conceived as numen, as a divine being, took pride of place: he embodied the very transcendent and spiritual unity of the empire, for the empire of Roman tradition was conceived less as merely human work than as that of the forces above. Fidelity to this symbol was a prerequisite. Once the oath loyalty had been taken in the form a sacred rite, any particular faith or tradition was no longer valid.

insofar as it did harm or offend Roman ethics and general law was accepted and respected. —

It is in these terms that ancient Rome presents itself to us as an example of imperial organisation of eternal and universal value.

In , it is enough to replace the forms, conditioned by time, of a solution like this with other forms to sweep away any appearance of anachronism - and to realise that anyone wishing to tackle the problem of a spiritual empire today would be unable to envisage any other perspective.

What would be much more "anachronistic" nowadays would be to envisage a supranational organisation based on the affirmation of a particular religious idea, even a Christian one. No one can realistically consider the idea of returning to a Spanish-style empire, ultra-Catholic and inquisitorial like that of Charles V, be current today. But even if we exclude this extreme, albeit coherent, form, other, vaguer and more 'intellectual' formulas for supranational unity based unilaterally on religion show, analysis, the same flaw. In the context of a vast entity such as the empire, we cannot ignore the fact that many religious traditions exist, most of them of comparable dignity and spiritual elevation. If the empire were to resort to violence to achieve its unity basing it on the affirmation and recognition of one religion to the detriment of the others, it is quite clear that we would be faced with a manifestation of sectarianism rather than spiritual universalism.

The imperial example that is emerging with fascism seems to- In fact, the Fascist empire declared Catholicism to be the national religion of the Italian people. In fact, in the Fascist empire, Catholicism represented the national religion of the Italian people, while at the same time the empire declared itself to be protector of Islam, and recognised and respected the Coptic religion as well.

What does this mean, if not that fascism asserts the need a point of reference that already goes beyond that of a particular religious faith? We say "beyond" and not "apart from", because it should be borne in mind that fascism also possesses an ethic, a spirituality, a human type, an aspiration to translate into terms of dominating will the sense of a permanent and universal reality. In this context, therefore, it cannot simply be a matter of indifferent, agnostic respect, along the lines of the first of the two solutions we mentioned at the outset, but rather the principle a higher, "Romanachievement".

Having recognised this, the general problem of the spiritual premises of the empire consists in defining the principle according to which we can simultaneously recognise and transcend any particular religious faith of the nations that constitute it. This is the fundamental point. Empire in the May sense, in fact, can only exist if it is animated by a spiritual fervour, a faith, something that draws on the same spiritual sources from which religion derives its *raison d'être*. If this is lacking, all we will ever have is a creation forged by violence "imperialism", a simple, soulless, mechanistic superstructure. That's why we need to capture if you like the very forces at work within religious-faiths, without in the least harming them, but rather integrating and sublimating them. And there is a way of achieving this: *it is revealed to us by the idea that every spiritual tradition and every religion represents nothing more than the particular expression of a unique content, prior and superior to each of its various expressions*. Knowing how to trace this unique and, so to speak, supertraditional content would also mean having a solid basis for founding a unity that does not destroy, but rather, is the basis of the unity of all religions. integrates any particular faith, thus defining a "fidelity". lity", precisely by reference to this higher-order content. *Transcend*, according to the Latin etymology,

means "to go beyond on the way up": whole essence of the problem is contained in this word.

For the moment, let's limit ourselves to these general outlines: they will serve as a starting point in a later article for considerations that will shed more light on the concept developed in these columns.

1940

ENGLAND AND THE DECLINE OF THE IDEA OF EMPIRE

It is absolutely vital today that the events of the current material and military conflict do not divert attention from certain questions of principle, which are, in fact, the only ones capable of giving this very conflict its true and profound meaning, while indicating the points of reference around which a new order and a new type of civilisation can be crystallized. There are two fundamental problems. Both are linked to an interpretation of the present conflict as a phenomenon of potential reconstruction and restoration, intended less to 'revolutionise' in the worst sense of the term than to renew, by seeking to re-establish a system which is once again faithful to the fundamental principles of all normal and traditional civilisation. The first of these problems concerns the question of colonies and the right to colonies. The second is the idea of Empire. In cases, it a question of reconsideration, the most obvious example of which is the question of the Empire.

¹ Cf. J. Evola, *Il conLitto attuale e il crepuscolo dei miti*, in *Lo Stato*, XI, 5, May 1940, p. 222-225 [Note by R.D. P.].

is given by England, taking into account the significance of the
its domination and hegemony. in the
as part a general history of civilisation.

On more than one occasion, both in our various books and in the
articles published in this magazine, we have alluded to
impossibility of understanding the true meaning of the main events
of the historical cycle to which the contemporary world also
belongs, and of overcoming one-sided, superficial and
subjective interpretations, if we do not refer to traditional idea, for
which

the history of the last few centuries has, in its broad outlines,
the significance of an *involution*. This involution essentially
concerns the type of values which give a civilisation or a group of
cultures its general tone, and which therefore also influence the
political and social order, and finally the national and inter-national
legal forms - corresponding to this order. And we have clarified a
concept such as this by recalling that, in the integral hierarchical
model as it was realised more than once in pre-modern history,
particularly among peoples Aryan origin, the schema was as
follows: at the top, a purely spiritual authority; immediately below,
a warrior nobility; then the bourgeois and mercantile class and,
finally, the mass of workers. While in Antiquity there were distinct
castes or classes that corresponded to such differentiations, here we
need to consider, above all, the general, "typological" aspect,
relating to four kinds of concerns, ideals and concepts of life
we might even say four

The "races of the mind" — are hierarchically ordered.

The direction of Western history is therefore, on the whole, that
of involution, since it is quite clear that civilisations whose
dominant tone was set purely spiritual authority belong to the
distant past; with the revolutions, the later type of civilisation has
also disappeared (or been profoundly altered): one in which the
values proper to a warrior and heroic aristocracy and, on the
political level, the monarchical and dynastic principle were the
mainstays.

tic model. Finally, Marxism, collectivism and Bolshevism were also about to overthrow the type of civilisation born of the decline of the monarchical, warlike and feudal model, i.e. the bourgeois civilisations, in order to give power to the world of the socialist and materialised masses, and to place in the foreground the values and "ideals" that were pro- posed to them. If we do not take this schema as a point of reference, which is not, we repeat, a personal construction but corresponds to an objective reality, we will be left with a superficial vision of things and will not be able to orient ourselves properly. That's why we thought it appropriate to remind you once again. —

On the basis of such a conception, how should the current conflict be interpreted, and what roles do its pro- tagonists play in it? Today we talk about the fight against plutocratic democracy in terms that are practically slogans. As a starting point, that's an excellent thing. But we need to be more precise about what we're talking about.

"This is the historical and spiritual 'locus' of plutocratic democracy. It appears to us, very clearly, as the outgrowth of that phase of Western decadence when power, authority and the right to wealth passed into the hands a class corresponding to the old caste of merchants or the mercantile bourgeoisie which, normally, should have remained subject to the representatives of a warrior aristocracy whose justification lay, for its part, in its reference to transcendental, purely spiritual values.

Unfortunately, the sensitivity of our contemporaries has been anaesthetised by the triumph of materialism, so that at most it considers that a world controlled by the bourgeois plutocracy is a world of injustice, having been led to it solely by instinct and by the effects of catastrophic material consequences. But to speak of injustice is as vague as it is indeterminate. What we should be talking about is *degradation* and *usurpation* all the rest being mere consequences.

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-It is a degradation and usurpation of a higher conception of law and a higher legitimisation of power and empire. The fact that power is defined by wealth, by gold, and that the "powerful" nations thus conceived, without any other title to , control the world and make it rain and shine - this is much less an "injustice" than absurd, abnormal, irrational. It is a situation analogous to that of a body⁵ in which the functions of animal vegetative life, by hypertrophying, tend to take over the direction of the whole, subjugating every other force, every other faculty: it is a purely pathological and teratological phenomenon.

The importance of looking at the enemy to be fought from this particular angle lies in the fact it also clarifies the values that should be emphasised more and more, so as to avoid certain 180° turns that we can already see emerging in some of the 'myths' disseminated to the masses. We will not repeat what we have already had occasion to say in these columns on this subject. We shall simply mention this fundamental point, namely that if the current conflict is to have a higher, constructive, "revi-sionist" significance in the history of civilisation, it must be resolved, it will be less by resolving the problem of domination as a *fact* than that of domination as a *right*.

Two interpretations that are both abusive and dangerous must be ruled out here. The first could be qualified as the term "successionalist": it is the term used by those who believe that the purpose of war is simply to relieve the guard, a "Get out of here so I can on with it!" tion of the wealth currently held by the by democracy in oligarchy. The second is to eliminate in depth is, of course, the Marxist and proletarian interpretation, in the broadest sense of the term: it would reduce the spi- ritual level of the motives and objectives of the present conflict to that of the "political" level. the myth of the communist world revolution,

decided to eliminate the bourgeois and capitalist states, in order to "socialise" and proletarianise their wealth within the framework of a society essentially dominated by the values of the fourth and last of the castes, evoked in the diagram above relating to the stages of the general process involution. It is true that those who support such an interpretation point out that the struggle for international "social justice" is not now being waged by an undifferentiated proletariat, but by national states. But the very fact of putting this forward

should highlight the not exclusively material and social motives which animate this struggle and distinguish it from the similarly anti-bourgeois, anti-plutocratic and anti-democratic struggle which the Third could wage, including against states which are also our adversaries. To dispel any pretext for such a materialist interpretation, it is necessary to emphasise the relativity of the concept of the

"Let's take a banal but suggestive example. Let's take all the peoples of the East and suppose that, thanks to timely propaganda, they are persuaded to adopt a policy of excessive demography and that, at the same time, they are convinced that the precarious standard of living of the majority is unjust and lamentable: we will thus have created an enormous mass that is pre-tended to be 'spaceless', which, according to the materialist criterion, would have the 'right' to assert itself over other peoples and other territories. It is not numbers alone that give a person the right to 'wide open spaces' and hegemony: such a concept can only be true at the level of the civilisation of the last of the four human types mentioned above. If we look back to Aryan origins, and particularly to Rome, it is precisely a right of a totally different nature that was always recognised: namely, the right of a minority, of a restricted group of conquerors, over the masses and space - a right based, in the examples given above, precisely on the virtues peculiar to the elites, irreducible to mere material factors and linked to the "human spirit".

contrary to heroic, aristocratic values and pure spiritual authority.

This posited, we are brought back to the crucial point .

Today, it is essentially a question of challenging the right of a usurping elite and replace them with a new elite.

(Consequently,) it is) also a question of substituting for a counter-manner of empire, proper to the first, a conception of it referring) first of all to its original and superior meaning. This is why we have spoken of "restorative war", instead of sacrificing ourselves to the abusive use of the term today, at every opportunity and mechanically, of the word "revolution".

Revolution, no doubt, but in a relative sense: as a revolt against an illusory order which, moreover, has historically been born out of the revolutions (in the subversive sense) that have prevailed until now. But this is only the contingent and instrumental aspect of the upheavals underway. If these upheavals are really to lead to something positive, their essential characteristic, over and above the clearing away of rubble, must be a return to the "normal" origins.

The time has come to say a few words about England, as a significant example of the hierarchical perversion we have been talking about. It is indeed a significant example because, unlike France and the United States, England has preserved and maintained an image of the old traditional forms: it has a monarchy, a nobility, in part even of feudal origin, and a fairly acute sense of caste. But all this is no more than a kind of automatic survival, having lost its original function, which no constitutes the centre which has instead sunk to the level of the spirit and interests of the merchant caste.

England is the first nation in Europe to have desecrated the imperial title: offered by the Jew Disraeli to the British monarchs, this title ceased to have the meaning of a superior civilising orientation and a supranational spiritual mission, to become comparable to the

honorific titles that the newly rich adorn themselves with, because it is defined solely on the basis of colonial possessions. even if, in this case at least, it's not a question of originally, the title "Emperor of India" was referred to a conquest which, more than any other, in a certain sense resembled a "barbarian invasion". It is clear that at the time the Indies were occupied by the English, they possessed an eminently spiritual civilisation, born of the common Indo-European trunk, i.e. Aryan, opposite the materialism of the British of the "Company of India" with their vulgar appetite for wealth.

It is true that we can speak of a heroic cycle in the English colonial conquest: the remnants of a warrior civilisation, i.e. of the second easte and the second type, but without the slightest referēce to truly spiritual values, initially created English greatness. But very soon the merchant prevailed over them, and the spirit of the merchant, in a natural coalition with certain elements of the English culture, became the driving force. They took over the administration and exploitation of this greatness— while what remained of the warrior elements became a simple militia serving their interests.

This deterioration, this inversion, has gradually become stabilised, and is clearly visible, through certain very specific symptoms, in the field of ethics. Since the "Empire" came into being, where can we now find in England anything that really conforms to the old gens/eman ethic, which was the same with the style and sense honour and loyalty proper to the Aryan warrior elites? Where is the fair *play*, the ancient precept according to which it is not the outcome of the fight that matters, but the style, the way of behaving in it? Imperial England has made the most cynical Machiavellianism its technique.

Hypocrisy the least *gentile* and most Judaic disposition imaginable marks its corner in political *praxis*. England preaches "freedom of the seas" when this identified English hegemony over the world.

the waves, in order to protect the "free trade" monopolised by the Judeo-British merchants. It is the paladin of "international law" and the "freedom of the people".

ples", for the exclusive defence of its interest. Incapable to assert its will to dominate in a virile, "Aryan" way, it did not hesitate to use the rhetoric of humanitarianism and sentimentalism to mobilise energies in its service and to encourage par-

The only purpose of this conflict - like that of 1914-1918 - was to consolidate and extend its imperialism. None of this has any of the characteristics a superior, warlike race worthy the Empire. Instead, it is the merchant caste and the Jewish race that betray themselves here. The virtues still present in certain English elements no more than survivals; they can only be admired by those who stop at outward appearance and do realise that, behind a certain "style", there is, in most cases, nothing but emptiness. The most ridiculous and contemptible type of operetta king is the Duke Windsor - whose case sheds a revealing light on what lies behind the façade of England's highest social class.

If England can therefore be considered as the owner of an "empire", it must be said that the throne has been vacant for a long time and is waiting for someone to take over.

And what is essential, beyond any conflict and any problem of space and "social justice", is to know precisely who, ideally, will ultimately take over this succession.

Faced with the current situation, we might be led to think that History, by creating irrational and unbearable material situations that finally call for a , is tending to lead people towards a new order that they are not directly in a position to perceive. We are thus witnessing a "heterogenesis of ends", i.e. the emergence, by force of circumstance, of motivations which

completely transcend original intentions and immediate motives. The most flagrant example of this is the overcoming, today in action, of positivist and rationalist international law, and even of the "atomistic", neutral and agnostic concept of national sovereignties the exact reflection, international level, of what was, within a State, the liberal-individualist conception of particular individuals. State borders are wavering. are now aggregations eth-

and policies that are no longer likely be challenged.

nies based solely on the idea of the state, the national state and even race. From the very reign of matter, economics and geopolitical factors, new forces are emerging which can only be adequately and creatively applied within the framework of vast zones and spheres of influence, which are also new. This is why the force of events is tending to force a return to the true idea of empire in the traditional sense.

It is not yet possible to foresee the material and legal form that such an idea might take, if it really took hold. Be that as it may, its first postulate is that the problem of colonies and raw materials should be resolved as best and as quickly as possible, that space should be given to those who need it and that similar revisions should be carried out, so as to eliminate any imperialist counterfeit of the imperial idea, to prevent its return in any form whatsoever and to prevent material motives from once again succeeding in usurping the dignity of ideals and playing a predominant and destructive role in the formation and destiny of the community of European peoples. In a word, the problem of international "social justice" and the rational administration of overseas wealth must be put in its place once and for all, in order to block the pretensions those who, under this pretext, are basically aiming at an action of a socialising and anti-traditional type, radically ignoring the fact that the mission of our Restorative Revolutions is really of a spiritual nature.

As far as the hierarchical formation of new imperial conglomerates and the graduation of proofs within the framework of a new, genuinely organic and differentiated European law are concerned, the second condition is as required by the idea of empire to put into practice values that are not mass (fourth stage) or mercantile (third stage), but heroic and then authentic. It is only on this basis a truly supranational guiding authority can be defined. In this respect, however, we need to go beyond general formulations and come up with precise ideas, to be defended with absolute intransigence.

The words "superior civilising mission", "work of civilisation" and other similar phrases are often used when similar problems arise, but for those who know how to look at things in depth, they are that contribute nothing. It is on the very concept of civilisation that we should begin to agree, for while this concept may express a higher consumption of soap, aeroplanes and radio, the number of kilometres of roads and bridges, social hygiene organisations and so on, in itself it is far superior to all that. Moreover, it has little to do with the "arts and sciences", in the knowledge that the former are reduced to the frivolous exercises of intellectuals deprived of authority and all too often of character, and that the latter are mere appendages of materialistic and mechanical civilisation.

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If the guiding idea of the new imperial law is to be defined in heroic and therefore spiritual terms, the first step must be to bring about the formation of new warrior and aristocratic elites, endowed with the corresponding authority, at the top of the states destined to take over from the plutocracies in terms of hegemony and spheres of influence. As we have already alluded to here, it is to be hoped that in this respect the very experience of the new confüt and of its possible developments will give shape to a

mateNa prima, capable of integrating the potential contained-
ment already already fitats anti-democratic and
anti-Bolsheviks.

The second stage, the spiritual stage, which will consecrate and
thus legitimise in a supreme sense the imperial and supranational
role of warfare, is a much bigger problem . Those who fight

— rightly— the postulates and principles of law

As soon as they seriously consider the legal form that could
replace it and be suitable for an imperial-type structure, the
'positive' internationalists must necessarily find a solution to this
problem. It must be realised that this now moxibund ooit
intemaüonal was basically the only one that could, by virtue of its
formal and agnostic character, be suitable for a materialistic and
secular society. But apart from this 'modern' Ooit, all other
conceptions of law have always had sacral and suprapoütic
premises: either openly, or by derivation, tacitly. This was case of
ancient Aryan law in the civilisations of the East, of early Roman
law, and then again of medieval law. The most that can be done is
to create a set of practical administrative rules that refer to a plan
that is more 'imperialist' than imperial. This is how the legal
problem, if it is not allowed to become bogged down in academic
and technical considerations, once again comes down to the
problem of a supratemporal and suprapolitical authority: for only
the forms justified by this authority will be able to avoid presenting
the character of a constraint, of a coercion, of a norm extrinsic to
par- ticular political and temporal organisms and to specific forms
of territorial sovereignty included in the imperial space.

If you don't want to be seen as a bad prophet, you should
must, for the time being, leave this question hanging, while we
wait to see which peoples will be brought together in the new
imperial conglomerates. While clearly stating-

The question may even arise as to whether it is really necessary to speak of a common European law or whether, on the contrary a certain articulation should be envisaged within such a law. When we talk about the old common European law, we must never forget that, as a historical reality, it belongs to a time when, firstly, religion (not in the formal sense but in the real sense) played a role in the public and private life Europe, which is no longer case today; secondly, and more importantly, we must not forget that, at that time, the schism of the Reformation had not yet occurred. To reunite Europe under the banner of Catholicism, for example, would be a sheer gamble, we consider that at a much more propitious historical moment - that of the Holy Alliance - it was possible to reunite Europe under the banner of Catholicism.

-Such an ambition turned out to be unrealistic. This is why, let us repeat, in the face of such a problem we must first see what direction the new potentially imperial aggregations will take - all the more so since, as we have seen, they seem to be formed more by force of circumstance than by the mature reflection of men. Only then will we be in position to study what authority from on high will be able to animate the inter-European legal forms which are approached to them, so that these forms may result from adherence, not coercion, and so that we can move from the stage of imperial *aggregations* to that of authentic imperial *bodies*.

VI

1940

APPROACHES OF EUROPEAN IDEA

If we were to consider the main results, which are predictable, of implicitly revolutionary action of the present world conflict - and which result less from a mature reflection on the part of men than from the very force choices and events - we would be led, broadly speaking, to conclude the following:

1) The concepts of sovereignty and "international law" that were characteristic of the period that immediately preceded us in the process of being liquidated. The rigid division of the surface of the globe by means of impermeable territorial borders - theoretically corresponding to those of a political sovereignty which would be its own *raison d'être* - is being replaced by the idea of a division into spaces grouping together various ethnic groups and various particular political units according more real and organic affinities.

2) Correlatively, the previously accepted idea (of essentially formalist and 'positivistins- piration) of "International law" bites the dust. Instead of abstract principles that claim to have the same validity for any State - and are therefore considered

This is the first time in history that the world has been "atomically" transformed, in defiance of the diversity of , the power and unequal dignity of peoples.

the idea a new law is emerging: articulated and supranational, this adjective to be understood not in a *généraliste* (i.e. universalist) sense, but in relation to the principles and ideas that will form the respective basis of each of the new areas, encompassing several nations.

3) As far as the designation of such supranational spaces is concerned, we feel that the now commonly used term 'living space' is inappropriate, insofar as it places too much emphasis on the purely material aspect of the problem. - of "living space", insofar as it too much emphasis on purely material aspect of the problem. As we wrote in our previous article, the current conflict will only take on a higher significance if it does not simply lead to a "changing of the guard" in terms European imperialism and material hegemony, distorting the right to "living space" that certain peoples, such as our own, are entitled to.

our own to the so-called "plutocratic" nations. Today's war can take on a higher and truly revolutionary meaning, on the sole condition that we understand precisely the need go beyond "imperialism", a purely material and political fact, in the sense of the "war on terror". a purely material and political fact, in the most inferior sense of the term and to return the idea of empire, which has always corresponded to a spiritual fact and to a right to domination of a higher essence.

4) As things stand, what we can already foresee is simply the imminent formation *imperial alliances*, to use Carlo Costamagna's felicitous expression.

However, the fundamental problem of the new order that was to emerge after the Axis victory was to move from imperial *aggregations* to imperial *bodies*.

A renowned writer and jurist, Carlo Costamagna was the editor of the monthly magazine *Lo Stato*, from which this article, the previous one and the next are taken. After the war, in the 1950s, Costamagna was to be found alongside Evola in the counter-offensive launched by the first journals of the National Right (Note by R.D.P.).

5) This problem, as Costamagna himself has pointed out, will have to take account of three types of concern: that of *economic complementarity* @w which will settle the question of "vital spaces" in the literal, i.e. material, sense of the term); that of the *racia4 background*; and, finally, that of *the aLLinity of civiñsation* or, we would prefer to say, *the uuity of civilisation*.

6) That this last element is decisive is clear from the following facts of the fact we cannot speak of a true organism where there is no living unity. However, it would be pointless to look for it at level of a material economic and administrative structure; at the level of national and ethnic affinities, it would be just as problematic, given the strength, in this area, of traditional inclinations, ambitions and pride, which inevitably particularist in nature. It is therefore on the spiritual level, and in form a 'civic unity', that we must look for the reagent capable of ensuring that, within the new *imperial* hopefuls, imperial aggregations become effective *organisms* and, as such, provide a sufficient guarantee of the stability of the new order. Now, in our article quoted above, as in many others other occasions, we have stressed that, when we speak of 'civilisation' in the context of the objectives of new order, we must begin by reviewing *from London to London* the concept of civilisation which came to prevail in the modern era, and in an virulent manner from the French Revolution onwards and from Ency- clopedism. This civilisation, which boils down to 'scien- ces' and 'aGs' as conceived by the moderns, which is therefore inseparable from mechanicism and rationalism, and which seriously believes that the alibi of its 'superiority' is the 'superiority' of the human race. technical achievements (not to mention the con- socialquests), is something that has no face, something essentially international and neutral, which cannot therefore provide, in any way whatsoever, the premises for a clearly differentiated hierarchical order.

On the contrary, it is heroic, aristocratic, traditional and even sacred values that should be given prominence: it is these that should be used as a lever to build new imperial spaces. But the current situation is particularly unfavourable, primarily with the advent and universal dissemination of the other, mechanical and internationalist civilisation, such values have been diluted and dispersed. Gathering into new centres of crystallisation, destined in their turn to be both the soul and the cement of new civilisations, is a particularly difficult task.

supranational companies, is an objective on the difficulties of which we should be under no illusions. This is it would be particularly risky to say at present time,

In Europe, any idea that is already sufficiently complete, alive and vigorous to serve, without having to look any further, as a foundation for the task mentioned above. What is indispensable, on the other hand, is to give way to an action either of reciprocal integration, or of awakening, or of reinforcement. We are moving towards the idea of a European civilisation or, if you like, towards the "idea of Europe", but the data on Europe is not the same. still spiritually vague.

Just as revolutionary action in Europe has its origins in the Axis powers, so it is clear that the original and essential core of European construction must be based on the potential and spiritual heritage of the two Axis powers. The primary objective - the premise of all further development and aggregation - will therefore be to specify the areas in which the Italian or, better still, the Roman - element will be present.

and the Germanic element could integrate and reinforce each other within framework of an idea Europe. Here, we seem to witnessing return of a historical cycle. In other words, something similar to what happened when the last authentic type of European imperial civilisation was created - that of the Middle Ages, born essentially from the symbiosis of the Roman and Germanic elements - seems to be taking shape or imposing itself.

But what functions and meanings will these elements have in the future civilisation of "imperial spaces"?

The form in which they last appeared is more or less well known to everyone: the Germanic, or Nordic-Germanic, element was essentially embodied in a new form, in the form of the "Germanic".

tially in the feudal socié'té and the ethics that cor-

The Roman element was closely linked to Christianity in the sense, above all, it provided transcendent and supra-temporal for a type political organisation that went beyond national framework.

Once this point has been made, we must begin by examining the specific political ideas currently proposed for Italy and Germany, in order to establish what differentiates them and what makes them likely to serve as a coherent premise for the new type of civilisation. In this respect, if we look at the facts as objectively and impartially as possible, it is clear that the fascist idea is more "topical" and "feasible" than the National Socialist idea. We shall confine ourselves to two points.

First of all, it is clear that the very force of the events-

These developments, and the imperial objectives that loom large in the years ahead, have led to a radical departure from the central formula of the National Socialist programme, expressed in the well-known slogan: *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer*. This formula has now had its day: the unity of all those who belong to the same people, or *Volk* (people-race), in a single Reich under its single *Führer*, could be a useful ideological instrument when shreds of the German people remained outside the political borders of the Reich. For the tasks of tomorrow, it will be something quite different - not to say outright

of the opposite— that it is a question of: it is a question of seeing how little-

wind, conversely, to delimit the authority and influence of a Reich over various peoples destined to be encompassed within the same imperial space.

Such a problem also logically leads us beyond a second leitmotif of national-socialist political doctrine, in which some authors have tried to see an irreducible point of divergence from the fascist idea. We are referring to the highly suspect concept *the Volksgemeinschaft*, or "national-racial community", and to idea that in the *Volk*, in the "people

According to this ideology, the State is a secondary element, while the *Volk* is the primary element. According to this ideology, the State is a secondary element, while the *Volk* is the primary element, the latter being the container and the former the content: it is the *Volk* that founds the State. For fascism, however, the opposite is true: it is the State that founds the people, the national-racial community, the nation. The nation, as Mussolini said, exists only in and through State.

Now, it is quite clear that if we want to identify a concept of government and political authority that is valid as an axis of reference in a space that is no longer national but supranational and imperial, it is not the National Socialist concept but the Fascist concept that offers the most coherent premise. A self-rule that legitimises itself exclusively means of a given *Volk* can never have any value beyond the limits of that *Volk*, except by coercion. The situation is quite different when, with fascism, a certain distance is established between the nation and the power which, as a state, organises it— including, to a certain extent, from above. Such a power possesses an intrinsic force and, *ideally*, it is superior to the nation: it can therefore be sounded out for a process that will elevate it, sublimate it, unify it to the point of naturally giving it a value beyond even the limits of the people within which it was originally asserted and concretised.

That being said, it is quite clear that certain anti-Roman animosities professed by certain extremist national socialist circles, who had made Romanity their own, were not in fact Roman.

a completely tendentious and erroneous idea - appar-
are now in the past. It's also in the past tense
belongs to the trial that the same circles had
the best aspects of the German tradition.

request itself to Charlemagne and the Hohenstaufens,
not to mention the Habsburgs - against whom, even today in
Germany, there are still harsh and one-sided slogans, for contingent
reasons of which everyone is aware. On the other hand, a
'Romanisation' of National Socialism seems to us to be an inalienable
condition if Germany is to be able to assume, within its vital
space, an effectively imperial function and prevent any
form of deviation
imperialist²

The anti-Roman prejudices to which we have alluded were partly the result of erroneous assimilations. Thus, for example, true Roman law was confused with a law that would have been better described as Napoleonic, and which was influenced by a natural law which, in organic whole formed by the Roman "imperial space", was only the mark of exhaustion and decadence. An analogous confusion, albeit less far-reaching, is due to assimilation of Romanity and the Catholic Church - with all the implications that this implies, particularly in Protestant circles. We ourselves have recognised that, in conjunction with Catholicism, Romanity played a role in the formation of medieval imperial civilisation. But it is important to consider *what kind of* Catholicism we are talking about. Genuine Roman law was not 'universalist' in the modern, rationalist, encyclopaedic sense of the term; it embodied the shape of a well-defined imperial space, based on a type of human ideal and civilisation that was also perfectly defined. Similarly, Catholicism

² On this subject, Evola's *La romanité, le gerinanisme et la "Lumièze du Nord"*, in *L'A+c et /a Massue*, Guy Trédaniel-Pardès, Paris-Puiseaux, 1984, p. 163-180 [N.D.T.] is a useful reference.

The medieval "Christendom" to which missionarism contributed through its political and military activity was essentially identified with the community of European Aryan nations, conceived as an organic, fighting unit that worshipped the ethics of honour and loyalty far more than the virtues of renunciation and universal humanitarian embraces.

If we stop at this stage, "virile" in its way, of Catholicism, it is therefore perfectly possible to see in such a tradition something which does not necessarily contradict the Roman ideal, nor the Germanic ideal. A point of reference similar to that offered by Catholicism for the construction of medieval civilisation will be necessary and indispensable for the new order itself. If imperialism means the part that imposes itself on the other parts, exploits them and administers them, the empire must, conversely, assume the function of guide and superior justice of a *unum quod non est pars* - but which cannot be such without reference to supratemporal, i.e. transcendent, values.

At the same time, this briefly indicates the general aspect under which a Catholic component could, together with others, be brought together with a view to the formation of spiritual centres specific to the new imperial spaces, in solidarity with the Roman component itself.

As for the Germanic component, of which the feudal society was the manifestation, it can be developed in two ways: either technically, in the sense of a decentralisation and a relative distribution, or graduation, of partial politico-territorial sovereignties; or spiritually and ethically, by the creation of relationships between the Germanic and Germanic components of the feudal society, in the sense of a decentralisation and a relative distribution, or graduation, of partial politico-territorial sovereignties; or spiritually and ethically, by the creation of relationships between the Germanic and Germanic components of the feudal society.

clear and personalised: dependence for those who are for those at the bottom, and responsibility for those at the top. In reality, it is impossible to imagine the structure of the new imperial formations in any coherent form other than as a "feudal" system, i.e. based on a "central eminent right and parastatal sovereignties".

tielles" — *imperium eminens et jus singulare*. It should be noted in passing that the formula "pro- tectorates", which was adopted in the past, basically reflected the same idea: the feudal bond was established by the subordination and *fides* of one of the parties, which was matched by the "protection" of the other. It is clear that such a principle could only be fruitful and have a positive value in a phase of normalisation, during which the peaceful, clear and dignified feeling of the *Bationaities* would replace the exasperation of the *feudal* system.

In a phase of this kind, whether in relation to a given people, individual or class, we may once again feel the conviction that, even between *peoples*, *there is a kind of dependence* which cannot be ignored. In a phase of this kind, whether in relation to a given people, individual or class, we can once again experience the conviction that, even between peoples, there exists a kind of dependence which is in no way humiliating or degrading, but which is, on the contrary, a source of pride, because it establishes links of participation in a civilising mission and commits the one who asks to the one who obeys.

Since we are discussing the notion of "superior" and "inferior" in the context of relations between European peoples, it should be stressed that these terms should never be taken in an absolute sense. In *this* area, it is always possible to emphasise the racial element in order "to" as much as possible the substance gathered together in an imperial space, so that differentiation is less about varying degrees of intensity than about actual differences in quality.

To deal with this problem in depth, it must be recognised that it is inseparable from that of *interracial selection*. We shall confine ourselves here to touching on the question, having already examined it extensively elsewhere. Quiconque parle aujourd'hui de race en se référant de façon plus ou moins explicite au type ethnique commun prédominant dans une nation donnée (et tel est le cas lorsque, dans les journaux, on parle de « race italienne », de « race allemande », de

(e.g. "Slavic race", etc.), cannot invoke basic ethnic in their pure state, but rather more or less homogeneous ethnic compounds with sufficient stability to be considered as a whole.

health. Such compounds contain, to a greater or lesser extent various breeds; and it is very difficult to cite a European people where there is not, in a to some extent, at least one other of the main breeds europeennes by doctrinaire racism. Also

the problem 'homogeneity' is relative, and to pose it rigidly would be to pose it badly. The important thing is not to look at the gross percentage by which a given race is represented in a given nation, but to see *which* race, in that nation, has, or should have, the leading role, and who should set the "tone" for the whole. In this way, we enter a field of potentialities, dynamic relationships and spirital influences. There is no doubt that the fundamental condition for imperial spaces to truly possess an organic structure is their particular relief and function.

specific direction which, within the nations included in such spaces, will be given to racial and spirital elements similar to those of which the properly imperial nations present the greatest concentration. Insofar as the two poles of the Axis must also be those of the two largest imperial areas, this substance - intended, as it were, to serve as a cement, way of affinities - will refer, the one hand, to the Aryan-Roman element and, on the other, to the *Nordic-Aryan* element, elements which must in turn be understood as ramifications a single trunk.

We have also clarified the meaning and content of these two terms. For the time being, we shall confine ourselves to pointing out that any use of expressions that were once in vogue, such as "Latin peoples", "Latin fraternity", etc., should be avoided in future. These are suspect expressions which, if they have any meaning at all, are reduced to a veneer covering an ethnic substance that is quite heterogeneous but, above all, infected and denatured by processes of spirital and political degeneration. The force of origins, the formative force of a civilisation worthy the name, is not 'Latin' but quite simply 'Latin'.

It is simply Aryan-Roman, just as it is simply Nordic-Aryan among the peoples of the North, at least as regards those aspects of civilisation which alone can interest us and which alone we can recognise as the foundations on which to build a European reconstruction and a new order.

Having said that, we would have to examine the Latin possibilities that exist among the European peoples for moving towards one or other of the two poles to which we have alluded. But how can we fail to see that we are currently in the middle of a trajectory, that we are facing a "trial by fire" (both in terms of vocations and the stability of the various national groupings), a trial that has only just begun? It would seem that destiny intended that the European renewal should not be the result of internal action, but of fractures provoked by the force of arms and things, through upheavals, and that only the future will allow us to know whether deeper forces have replaced those that appear on the surface and what the nature of these forces is, case by case.

A positive outcome will emerge if, somehow, these forces manage to retain something of the formative energies that once gave birth to the medieval community of 'Aryan' and 'Christian' nations. This applies to all modern Western nations, whether or not they are directly involved in warfare. The nations of Europe, where the Slavic component is predominant, and which are under the sign of the Orthodox religion, are no exception. not, either. The Romanian legionarism of a Codreanu, one of the ideologies most worthy interest, was not the only one. In this ideology, the reference to the ecumenical understanding of the Orthodox Church gives rise to an organic ideal of national life as a unity of race and faith, of the living and the dead, and of the law of God.

an ideal which, in certain respects and from the same direction, goes beyond what the Axis ideologies have not yet achieved, due to circumstances of a contingent nature (ideologies considered, of course, in their spiritual, and not political, aspect').

Thus, with the exception of Romania, now neck and neck with us, the Slavic and Orthodox nations themselves could be organically incorporated into the Axis imperial areas, provided, of course, that they returned to their traditions. returning to their roots in this way, they could easily recognise the illusory nature of the "Slavic" disguise of certain Bolshevik endeavours, and discover (in a very different direction) the true centre of gravity of their highest aspirations, as well as the space in which their possibilities could blossom, in a given and harmonious way, from the perspective and with the guarantee of a superior civilisation capable of understanding and respecting them.

Readers wishing to know more about the analysis made by Evola of C. Z. Codreanu's movement will be able to refer to three of its articles included in the little *Codreanu* book *and the Guardia di Ferro*, from C. Sburlati, Volpe, Rome, 1977, pp. 71-87, (as well as Evola's interview with Codreanu conducted on 22 March 1938 and reproduced in *Bollettino del Centro Studi Evoliani*, VII, 17 (April 1976), pp. 1-4 (Note by R.D.P.J. - Tr. fr. in *Totalité*, 18-19, Summer 1984, p. 198-203 - N.D.T.].

VII

1941

**FOR A GENUINE
"EUROPEAN LAW"**

At present time, it is of the utmost importance to bring to a conclusion the warlike enterprise in which we are engaged, and to clarify the ideas that will form the basis of the new order that will be established after the victory of Axis powers. But, at a time like this, it is also extremely important to examine, with the utmost attention, everything that is already being done in the legal field to revise the concepts hitherto accepted by the peoples of Europe, and to clarify the prospects open to us.

In this respect, we thought it worthwhile to report and comment briefly on the ideas expressed by a jurist well known to the readers of our journal, Carl Schmitt, in a recent essay published in the periodical *Deuts- che Rechts wissenschaft*, and devoted to the processes which led to the disappearance of the European legal order and the constitution of what has been called the international *harv*. It is well known that, according to Schmitt - and this is a view that we unreservedly share - the norms that once governed relations between nations in practice were organic and differentiated in character, until a relatively recent period that has already been forgotten by the modern world with unprecedented speed.

nant. There was no kind of abstract, imperial, universalist law. In fact, in earlier times, the history of law was identified with the history of empires, offering us the idea of 'great spaces' as spheres of influence that were neither simply national nor organised on the basis of common interests - an idea that only today, by the very force of things, is once again haunting people's minds.

However, even at the end of the truly imperial period in the history of our continent, Schmitt noted the presence of a law that was not at all "international", but belonged to the "law of the European nations".

As he rightly points out, until relatively recently, speaking law meant the same thing as speaking of 'European law' *src et simpliciter*, and this expression profoundly supported the unity of the civilisation of the European peoples. This situation lasted until the end of the 21st . From 1890 onwards, a new era began, bringing with it profound transformations and consequences whose deleterious nature was to become increasingly , right up to the crisis that gave rise to the present conflict.

Schmitt fixes the beginning this new era in 1890, the date on which Bismarck gave up his duties as Chancellor, because it seems that Bismarck was the one , at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and then at the Congo Conference in 1885, appeared to be "the last statesman firmly attached to a law of nations that was still specifically European and applied by the great European powers". On this point, we do not entirely agree with Schmidt , who also points out that it was precisely at the Congress of Berlin (albeit with certain reservations) that Turkey was annexed to the European legal community.

the prestige of a major European power at the time, Imperial Russia. Nor should it be forgotten that this admission was agreed with the English Jew Disraeli, which can only give rise to a feeling of unease insofar as the two politicians got on so well in Berlin, as evidenced by Bismarck's historic phrase about Disraeli: "*Der alte Jude, dies ist des Mann*", i.e. "This old Jew is the right man for the job". We mention all this to highlight the fact that, contrary to what many people believe, not everything in Bismarck's policies in Germany and Europe was "in order": anyone who takes the trouble to leaf through a very interesting and "hook" on the backstage of European history, which we have recently translated, could easily be convinced of this. More than Bismarck, it seems to us that it is Metternich who is far more deserving of the appellation of "last European", in other words the last politician who felt the need for a concrete solidity of the European nations, not driven solely by reasons of political realism and material interests, but referring, on the contrary, to ideas and a desire to maintain Europe's traditional heritage at its best.

But let us close this parenthesis. Be that as it may, we can agree with Schmitt when he points out that it was during the last decade of the twentieth century that the concept of law underwent transformations that were both fundamental and decisive. It would perhaps be appropriate to examine the internal reasons for such a change: as we have the impression, in a nutshell, that it wouldn't have been possible if, in Europe, the law had not already been "materialised" and secularised — if, in other words, in

Cf. E. Malynski and L. de Poncins, *La Cluerra occulta*, Hoepli, Milan, 1939 (English translation, by Evola himself, of *La guerre occulte*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1936 - N.D.T.).

When it came to regulating relations between the peoples of Europe, considerations of a more than purely political, military and economic nature still carried a great deal of weight. Indeed, we should not be under too many illusions about the famous 'European civilisation' which, at a time when the law was not yet universal and generalised, 'legitimised', so to speak, that same law vis-à-vis the States and peoples of other continents. In reality, this was simply a myth in which the ideology of the Enlightenment and of the

"This civilisation, which was extolled as a privilege of the white races, was contrasted with the peoples of other continents, and not only with the 'savages' and truly 'inferior' races. This civilisation, which was extolled as a privilege of the white races and contrasted with the peoples of other continents, and not only with the "savages" and truly "inferior" races, was defined much more by technical and social conquests, by scientism and rationalism than on the basis of Europe's traditional waiment values. Already, at the Congress of Vienna, the religious basis of a European understanding based on a common civilisation had ~~to~~ to be highly uncertain. In Berlin, in 1878, it was left aside altogether and, from then on, the focus was simply on "politics". If, as Schmitt points out, we still had European law, this was due to the automatic survival of a certain state of affairs: there were indeed concrete relations, to a large extent dynastic and traditional, between the great European powers, but the original suprapolitical premises had disappeared. As long as this survival retained a breath of life, there was still a right to

But once a certain limit had been crossed, it was inevitable that the ~~it~~ would take place, because, the one hand, all contact with any higher point of view had now been broken and, on the other, "new ideas" were spreading throughout the European states, along with the rationalist, democratic and anti-traditional conception of civilisation that flowed from them.

And that's how we very quickly arrived at the elaboration of the

It is a new and paradoxical type of law - one that only yesterday tended to be the law par excellence, the true basis for the moral organisation of peoples. As Schmitt puts it, it is a question of "extending the law of the European peoples, the *public law Europe* - to a general, cosmopolitan and international law, encompassing all peoples, all races and all continents. What some European nations had developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, on the basis of the close kinship of the representatives of the same European family, in the form of a certain concrete order, became at a moment's notice a world law, which should have applied indiscriminately to five continents.

sixty heterogeneous states. It is a strange process. Strange, too, is the speed with which this generalisation was achieved around 1890, through a series of accomplished facts. But even stranger is the irresponsible attitude that the science of the law of nations adopted in the face of such a process, to the point of ending up in abstract universalism - as if it had not been a question of an essential and fundamental mutation, but simply a process quantitative extension".

We will not follow Schmitt here in his enumeration of the most characteristic stages of this process. With him, we will simply recall the essential role played by Anglo-Saxon ideology, both English and American. It is precisely from these jurists that the expression "internatiortaï harv" comes to describe the new law.

In older works, the term "international law" was used. It should be noted here that this term is still used in many branches of our teaching today, whereas the corresponding German expression is *Völkerrecht*, literally translated as "law of peoples" and "law of nations", a term which does not necessarily evoke in mind the premises of "international law".

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- In French **only**.

globalist" and "levelling" concepts that are characteristic of the 'international law'. This law, Schmitt observes, does not refer no longer belong to any "system" of states its premise was

rather a disorganised collection of heterogeneous political units, deprived of spatial and ethnic relations, and credited with an identical type of sovereignty: in fact, a veritable atomisation that should have been kept in place by a mechanism of abstract 'norms', rules based on more or less recognised jurisprudence.

In parallel with this transformation, a dual dualism is emerging. First, according to Schmitt, there is the dualism between the law in force in a given State and the law applicable to relations between States: this is a new symptom of the inorganicity of the new era. In this respect, Schmitt's analysis deserves a separate technical commentary. Schmitt considers one of the main causes of the dualism in question to be what is known as *Staatsbezogenheit*, by which he means approximately state centralism implemented by means of a rigorous 'positivisation' of the law. And the more 'positive' the law in a state becomes, and the more it is defined by a rigid corpus of laws that apply rigorously and precisely on the basis of pure state authority, the further the sphere of domestic law moves away from the general principles of 'international' law.

At the same time, however, a second dualism comes into play here: that between the properly political element and the legal element. Such a dualism, or at least such a dichotomy as Schmitt notes in itself, does not date yesterday; but in the period we are dealing with, it has become the essential foundation of the new law of nations. "The ideal structure of the latter was no longer determined by the idea of certain fundamental rights of peoples and states, nor by the more or less tautological principle of *pacta sunt servanda*, but precisely by exclusion of all that is political, economic and social.

by a science which, like law, is specifically political".

Thus, a whole host of treaty-makers set out to guarantee the 'purity', or 'newness', of the law of nations in terms of normative formalism. So far, however, these efforts have met with an unfortunate fate. No one - Schmitt rightly notes - has succeeded in rigorously defining these two new and quite distinct entities: the 'political' and the 'legal'. Those who have tried to get to the bottom of things have inevitably ended up with a vague decisionism. This is how we will be told that to decide - whatever the political element and the moment at which it asserted - there nothing other than *the will* of each State concerned. And if we move on to the problem of war, we arrive at the same result: when armed military action (reprisals, blockades, etc.) ceases to be a state of peace and gives rise to war, this is decided only by the will, by the *animus belligerandi* of each State concerned. Similarly, we have seen authors adopt the same irrationalist criterion with regard to the recognition of the label of "subject of international law": what determines such a quality - they say - is ultimately the "will" of that same international law.

In so doing, we witness a curious reversal of the situation: in order to ensure the 'purity' of an abstract and formalist law, we are forced to make a profession of faith that is... irrationalist! Perhaps Schmitt could have given greater prominence to this point by linking it to what he himself, in other works, had occasion to say about what was really behind the 'new' façade of *the international* Iniv. We now know very well, that, far from being "neutral", "international law" is "*neutral*". nal" had become the docile instrument of a policy controlled by the democracies and, above all, England and France. This is why Schmitt is not quite right when, stepping outside the purely scientific field, he argues that the 'state' was a 'state of affairs', he said that institutionalized law lacked the right tone of voice.

This foundation, beyond legal fictions, existed in reality: it was precisely an attribute, "imperialist" in its own way, of the Atlantic powers — in other words, the figureheads of European democracy. Moreover, it is clear that this same state of affairs determined the 1914-1918 war and the system of peace treaties that followed. And the so-called "positive" law posited as a norm not only contained a political element, but this element ended up becoming a con- This was to be consolidated through the international law that emerged from Geneva, by exalting the "conquests" of the French Revolution and wiping the remnants of the "obscurantist" and "reactionary" world of the Central Empires off the map.

While remaining on strictly legal ground, Schmitt nonetheless develops, in his interesting essay, various considerations demonstrating that the most recent attempts to codify normativism international law have themselves highlighted the need for a multitude of concrete legislations and positive circumstances, which had to be presupposed at every step and which eluded generalizations of a universalist type. In one way or another, one gets the distinct impression that the era of the international law is now over, and that the premises for a new stage in the development of the law of nations need to be firmly established. All the more so since, with the definitive collapse of our adversaries, there will come the liquidation, also definitive, of legal forms whose internal contradictions and disastrous nature are now obvious to all.

Referring to the split between the political and legal elements, Schmitt observes that when a state is powerfully organised, it can even tolerate this split and turn it to its own advantage, since its authority and the power vested in the executive are sufficient to prevent any dangerous reversal; moreover, in 'positivism', the state is able to tolerate and turn the split to its own advantage, since its authority and the power vested in the executive are sufficient to prevent any dangerous reversal.

of the law specific to a given State, 'depoliticisation' cannot go beyond a certain threshold. But the same is not true at the international level, and the split referred to above has very different consequences. We cannot allow the 'internationalist' premise to persist, that a law that would govern the relations of all the peoples of the world, and at the same time want a concrete organisation of States, however approximate it may be. Certain conditions seem to us to be indispensable: either an articulation, or the establishment of a political authority that is the guarantor of the law at the international level, in the same way as within a given State

Nlais, by the same token, easily returns to the theory of 'great spaces' and 'imperial conglomerates', developed insistently in these columns and which, from now on, can be considered as decisive in the context of a new European order, whether in its legal aspect or in those of a cultural and economic nature². And, in a new system articulated in this way, it would be possible to give concrete expression to another requirement for coherence in order to overcome the other dualism pointed out by Schmitt, namely the dualism between the form of a State's internal law and the form of law which should, conversely, define and regulate relations between the various States. Recent years have clearly demonstrated the absurdities to which such a dualism must give rise - absurdities which the formalist and positivist fiction of international law (in fact, today, of the law stemming from Geneva) has not succeeded in masking. These were norms whose democratic-egalitarian premises were obvious to all, and which claimed to apply equally to States that had

² Cf. C. Costamagna, *Gli aggregati imperiali*, in *Lo Stato*, X, 10 (October 1939); C. Costamagna, *"patto d'acciaio" e il nuovo diritto internazionale*, in *Lo Stato*, XI, 5 (May 1940); C. Schmitt, *il concetto imperiale di spazio*, in *Lo Stato*, XI, 7 (July 1940) - (Note by R.D.P.).

adopted the premises in question for the use of the law in force in their country, than for the fascist type which denied them purely and simply and had been constituted on basis of completely different ideas.

In the new Europe, it will be necessary to ensure that such inconsistency gradually disappears and even that, in this field, we arrive at truly organic forms, at principles which, valid on a given level, continue to be valid on other levels, whatever form is chosen. As far as the rights of the peoples brought together in the 'space' of the Axis forces are concerned, it is clear that this principle can only be that of *hierarchy*. Just as within a State or a particular political unit there will be a hierarchical gradation of functions (and not a mass of "individuals" governed by arbitrary norms), so we will find, at the very basis of the law specific to the system belonging to our "space", the idea of diversity, of relative independence, of gradation and hierarchisation.

VIII

1941

CONSIDERATIONS ON FUTURE ORDER OF NATIONS

Hans K. E. L. Keller is known in various European circles for having created, a few years ago, a kind of association entitled *The International of Nationalists*, which was by a number of personalities from various countries and developed its activity in several directions: congresses in capitals such as Berlin, London and Oslo, publication books and pamphlets, conferences, debates, etc. Keller himself has written a number of works of a mainly legal nature. Keller himself has written a number of works, mainly of a legal nature. The latest, just published, entitled *Das Reich der Völker (The Reich of Nations)*, Standard Verlag, Berlin, 1941. It is this book that we wish to discuss, because it raises issues of vital importance for the future of Europe. We will therefore summarise Keller's fundamental ideas and then indicate the express reservations which, from our point of view, it seems necessary to make.

Keller's basic idea is the opposition between *Völkerrecht* and *Jter?if der Völker* - expressions which, from a literal point of view, are synonymous, but which are expressed by the Keller uses them: the first, "international law" of a positive and normative type, referring essentially to the "law of the nations".

The first would be the specific form of the legal order that has prevailed to date. The first would be the proper form of the legal order that has prevailed until now; the second, on the other hand, would be the main idea of a future order which, according to Keller, must be conceived as a "Jtegniim of nations". To be exact, the expression is "*Reich* of Nations". Rejecting the translation "*Empire of the peoples*"* by which a French author wanted to render this idea, Keller himself proposed as a translation in Romance languages "ordre des nations", *ordo nationum* (p. 105).

We believe, however, that the expression *Regnum*, as used in Christian literature itself, is more appropriate: we will see why later.

The opposition mentioned earlier is based on another opposition: that between the State and the 'nation-people' (*Volk*). Adopting certain tendentious interpretations typical of a somewhat superficial new German law, Keller exacerbates this latter opposition. In itself, the State has nothing to do with the *Volk*, with the people. In relation to the latter, the State would represent not the essential but the accessory, and whenever it prevail, it would be to give rise to something deleterious and contrary to the norm. The foundation of the State would be a normative-authoritarian system based on the pure and simple.

power" - a system that usurps the name of law and pretends to provide the premises a real "power".

"order". Keller gives such a system the name of statism, a word coined from the word *Fiat* --, and he conceives the possibility of its extending beyond a given society and encompassing various peoples, if not by violence, at least without any real recognition on their part, thus giving rise to the phenomenon of "imperialism". And, in both cases - whether in the simple *establishment of a state* or in the

• In French only.

-In French in the text [N.D.T.].

tism than in "imperialism" he sees the very antithesis of the idea of "the people", the anti-people and, above all, the anti-Reich. Through *Reich*, Keller conceives, somewhat abusively, an order and a right that do not derive from an authority placed above them but come from the nation itself, a nation understood as a "natural" reality, with very precise features and its own immanent law. The objective of the new age would be to "de-statise" nations; and the constitution of the *Volk*, the people-nation, as the sole positive source of law, would be the foundation of a new order, both national and international.

From the national point of view, the overcoming statism, if it did indeed mean the elimination of the State, would imply the reversal of a hierarchical relationship: it is not the nation that should belong to the State, but the State to the nation (p. 104), as a mere organ or instrument of the latter, as the form in which the nation organises its power, with view to a single end: to protect the nation and its people.

It is the "people", its right and its absolute sovereignty (p. 132). For the sole sovereign must remain the *Volk*, the people-nation (p. 65). Hence the idea a "total people".

{*total*es *Volk*), as opposed to that of "total State", as well as the wish to see the process of forming such "national-people totalities" (*Volksganzheiten*) strengthened throughout the world the years.

Only "total peoples" will be the subjects of the new international legal system prophesied by Keller. In Keller's view, the more natural national feeling develops, the more all aspirations to power and imperialism disappear, giving way to a feeling of respect for other nations, and thus to the possibility of natural relations coordination and direction of a higher order (pp. 48-49). Respect for all peoples, whatever their nationality

and the clear and active determination of every nation be respected, will therefore be the cornerstone of the new law within the "*Regnum* of nations". This law will not be above the peoples, but at their service (p. 48). —

possibly coming to the aid of special law
of each of them: either to prune any overgrowth

In the law of nations, the "aggressor" would be defined on the basis of an attack not on territory, but on the essence of a nation (p. 239-240). In the law of nations, the "aggressor" would be defined on the basis of an attack not on territory, but on essence of a nation (p. 239-240).

Thus, at the institutional level, Keller seems to favour a "fiagnuni of nations" with two parliaments: a parliament specific to the nations themselves, and a parliament of the States, i.e., according to the concept mentioned above, of their executives. *This* parliament of states would deal only with the technical and practical aspects of the problems examined and resolved by the parliament of nations. Since the real subjects of the new law and the fundamental pillars of the new order would be the peoples who had truly achieved "totality, Keller envisaged the possibility that the executive bodies of these peoples would look after other peoples as well.

"They would therefore come under the same State as the former, not in order to lose their national character, but, on the contrary, in order to be protected and helped to realise their full potential as nations.

Although every true people has an equal right to be respected, not all peoples have the same right to assume a leadership function superior to the merely national one (p. 190), admitted by Keller as the concrete basis of the fiagnuni in question within the framework of the new order. The new order would not, however, be based on *the Impe-* rium, but would have to emerge from the 'gravitational' relationships between certain peoples and other peoples - relationships that depended on a set of factors that were difficult to define in terms of abstract law, such , for example, — those of a racial and geopolitical nature (p. 21). Keller writes (p. 190): "The leadership of peoples belongs to a world

ideal organic-ethical and non mathematical-quantitative as is, on the contrary, the case with the equality of States among themselves. The models are to be found in nature, for example, in the order governing the sun and the planets, which is not based on a desire for domination but on mutual attraction, determined by relationships of mass and equilibrium". Here we come back to the idea, underlined emphatically, that the Reich should be conceived of as a exclusively "natural" order (p. 66), whose relationships are determined by the essence and "the eternal laws of the life of peoples" (p. 65-70). Although "dynamic", a "Natural law" is the basis for the "fiegBum of nations" (p. 243). And if, from a legal point of view, doubts remain as to the influence that a given people must obey in order to organise itself within the general system, Keller believes that the solution must be indicated exclusively to that people "by an inner voice which will har- cue them until they obey it" (p. 21, 22).

However, we need to find the basis for this

A "community determined by nature" *naturgege- bene Gemeinschaft*. Where there is a common race, we can refer to the feeling of a common origin. Or one can refer to a "community of destiny" and, better still, to the common will to shape future (p. 43, 91-93). In the case of the German Reich, Keller considers the following ~~at~~ peoples with a spiritual life similarly oriented in a "Germanic" direction; peoples with a common historical and geopolitical destiny (Poles and Czechs); peoples encompassed in a single Germanic-European economy of large spaces, or, if one prefers, vital spaces (peoples Eastern Europe) (p. 67).

In Keller's conception, however, any precise definition disappears. For him, the *Regnum* would be open to all peoples (p. 65), the "community of destiny" would now encompass all nations (p. 43), and the logic of this ideology would therefore lead to a single *Völker-Reich*, a *Jtegnuni* embracing all the nations of the world.

the nations of the world and attentive to the interests of each of them (p. 22-23). From this point of view, any concrete and "criteria" for determining affinity and the right to supranational leadership naturally fall by the wayside. Keller bases this right on a difference in "rank". Analysing the various ideas on which such a difference could be based, and noting the inconsistency or inadequacy many of them, Keller is forced to define this "rank" on the basis of pacifist criteria: on the sense of responsibility that each people, in relation to its own mission, feels towards peace and its maintenance, respecting and safeguarding the right of every other people (p. 151, 197-206). Any attempt to 'denationalise' would indicate a negative attitude on the part of a people aspiring to this eminent leadership (p. 206). This function is not an end in itself, but must be placed at the service each nation. Unlike the Roman idea (?), it is not simply a matter of showing consideration for the subjugated peoples (*iparcere sub jectis*), but of placing power at their disposal (p. 217). Given that the *ordo nationum* or *Regnum* of peoples conceived by Keller basically does not involve any form of "positivisation" and stabilisation of a right resulting from the natural equilibrium between peoples ; given, moreover, that these relationships of equilibrium are contingent in nature, since there are many peoples "in the making", Keller is forced to admit the possibility and necessity of war, on the one hand, and to recognise, the other, that those who today transgress the law may appear tomorrow as those who formulate and defend the law. This being admitted, the only criterion for judging whether a war between nations

is right will be provided by its ability to move towards the *fiagnuni* ou *Jteicli* des nations (p. 235), where the *jus belli* would cease to fall under the sovereignty of States. "Homo my who make history in the name their States - it is the right of peoples nations, which they have in view" (p. 86). same as for From

Frank, for Keller too, "peoples are divine creations and, as such, are above the human creations that are states" (p. 31). However, the limiting concept is a universalist one, as an order encompassing all the peoples of the world.

Keller considers that the *Reich* or *ordo nationum*, understood in this way, is a specifically Germanic idea. From the earliest times, Germans would have seen the State as the adversary of the nation-people (p. 15, 138). Moreover, the author makes no secret of his aversion to the Roman conception of the Empire, which, in his view, was reduced to imperialism, to a pure fact of "power". Only racially non-unitary peoples would have this "heteronomous" imperial order, and that would have been the case with the heterogeneous peoples of the Mediterranean (p. 56). The medieval order, influenced above all by the Roman-Christian idea, would have been equally "imperialist" (p. 54), and only the spread of this idea among the Germanic peoples would explain the emergence, among them, of "imperialist" tendencies (p. 57). Keller goes so far as to criticise the Prussian conception of the State, which, in his view, has little to do with the hypothetical German heritage linked to the myth of the *Volk*, and is much more influenced by the albeit secularised— idea of "order" and "sovereignty".

(p. 136-137). goes on to quote Montesquieu's nonsensical formula: "The Romans dispossessed other peoples of their nationality and even led them to ruin", while asserting that

"the German national idea is absolutely reconcilable with the idea of a universal order" (p. 61). Finally, here is Keller's assessment of

the Fascist idea: "Fascism, which, according to a widespread opinion in Italy, has already gone beyond narrow nationalism, is the representative a conception hostile to German National

Socialism: that of egalitarian universalism or, in other words, imperialism" (p. 157). In the Jtegnum of Nations again according to Keller would be alien to any transcendent idea, any justification based on a supranatural order or religious confession.

This order — let's repeat it — must be a purely "natural". The author also denies that the source of the earthly rights of peoples must be related to a non-earthly order— to the point of believing that the "Kingdom of God" is a purely imaginary projection into the hereafter of the idea of a temporal fiegntim (p. 52-53). Just as the in use in Rome, any theory of the fieicîi, or *Regnum*, a confessional basis, would be deprived of two fundamental requisites: that of universality and that of organicity; in fact, this religious confession could, on the one hand, divide and oppose one part of the same people to another; on the other hand, it would unify in a formless way races and peoples of the same confession, since all would be equal before God and since the common denominator of this faith would have primacy over the specific national quality (p. 53).

These are the main ideas set out by Keller as priorities for the future order he called . Among them, a certain number of legitimate demands are mixed with intellectual distortions and suggestions which have their origin in the confuse ideology of certain German extremist circles. We would like to express our reservations as follows.

In prinñs et antc omnia, we cannot subscribe to the mythology of the *Volk* of the "people-nation" so dear to Keller, who made it the cornerstone of his entire legal edifice. Mussolini once spoke ironically of the

A "mysterious entity called the people". In the same way as *Volk*, 'people' is a simple myth, always and inevitably demagogic: especially when it is accompanied by polemical statements aimed at

to devalue and belittle the significance of everything that is the State, a political force that forms from above. Keller remains locked in the most ingenuous optimistic jusnaturalism: he really believes that peoples exist as very specific entities, endowed with their own consciousness and will, determined by superior "eternal laws".

They are also the guardians of specific values. We cannot speak of things such things to to particularly today, when the natural feeling of nationality (quite different from any other feeling) is not so strong. nationalism" and devoid of "political connotations) is has become extremely vulnerable in the face of the massification of peoples and the advent a civilisation based on values that no longer have anything tra- ditional about them. Hegel said and Keller reminds us of this (p_191).

"The people are that part of the state that doesn't know what it wants. That's true. Our conviction is that the people, the nation, exist only as the State, within the State and, to a certain extent, thanks to the State.

But our state is not *the* state of Keller's artificial antithesis: it is not a legal superstructure, a pure fact of 'power', an unfounded external authority. It is ethical and spiritual. It has the value an *entelechy*, .e. a force that gives form to the nation and the 'people', who would otherwise remain a scattered and shapeless reality, vegetating on a naturalistic plane of existence, devoid of any metaphysical, ethical or even truly heroic tension.

Our point of view is at equal distance from both the jusnaturalistic and collectivising idea of 'the people' and the abstract, legal and rationalist idea of the State. We are realists. If we don't believe in "the people", we do believe in the elites who form, show the way and, eventually, dominate the people. Keller only sees the State as a *caput mortuuni*, i.e. what it has become in certain cases, when political structures founded by leaders and elites living traditions became "depersonalised", "objectified", and created an *alibi* to justify themselves, namely self-perpetuating public powers and forms of "self-government". or "neutrallegal standards, in order to gain the recognition that the direct affirmation and charisma of real leaders and principles can bring.

were no longer sufficient . For in place
same objective, i.e. to maintain without
the myth of the 'State', which appears to be opposed to the myth of
'State'.

neutral, but which in reality served the same purpose.

lity: the myth of the "people". Keller admits that the idea of the *Volk* was "discovered" in 1933 (p. 31). Even if, in our opinion, the date is not so recent, since it has undeniable precedents, particularly in French democratic nationalism and Jacobinism (in fact, it was precisely in France, as a reaction against an excess of statism resulting from the centralizing, absolutist and anti-aristocratic actions of the Kings of France since Philip IV the Fair', that the mystique of the nation*, of the people as the source of everything, was born).

right, incapable of supporting any authority from above) —
Even if, as we said, the *Volk* was not really discovered in 1933, the fact remains that the 'mythology' that refers to it is new, that it was ignored by previous civilisations and that it came into being for very specific political and propaganda reasons: The "people" and the "*Volk*", far being notions with any real content today, are two powerful ideas, two myths which have been seized upon by a power in order to consolidate a given political system, brought about by circumstances, in order to capture and organise forces which are themselves disoriented and ready to obey the most diverse suggestions— of the real "people", and, consequently, to consolidate a certain type of political authority. In , where socialist tendencies are less strong, we have not had to resort to this myth: the spiritual idea of the State united with direct authority stemming a *Ducc* and the "people" of the State are not the same thing.

On the subversive role played by Philip the Fair in 17th-century France, cf. J. Evola, *Il caso di Filippo il Bello*, in *Arthos*, V, 11 (January-April 1976) p. 1-9, with a note by Giovanni Conti (p. 9-11) [Note by R.D.P.] - [Tr. fr. Le cas de Philippe le Bel, in *Totalité*, 3, winter 1977, p. 33-41 - N.D.T.].

- Bn French in the text (N.D.T.).

of a Monarch have been enough to lead us to the same end. result.

Keller says that the whole difference between "state" law and law based on the idea of the *Volk* lies in the judgement one makes about human nature: in the first case, as in any conception of the *Reich* or the *Jniperium* of Roman-Christian origin, pessimism prevails: one does not trust human nature, in the second case, one trusts it (p. 80). But what is this 'human nature'? We are not pessimists, but realists. We believe in human nature, but not in just anyone, and even less in the human nature of the collective as a whole, because we know its psychology too well. By On the other hand, we believe in the human nature of the minorities who create states, who give a soul to peoples, who guide communities to heights that, by their own efforts, they would never have reached.

Not statism, therefore, nor ingenuously optimistic jusnaturalism, but the aristocratic-hierarchical idea, without those disguises that only demagogues and the spineless are fond of. For us, that means Roman and Aryan realism. To the Romance peoples writes Keller (p. 103), "the only thing that matters is the state, even if they make incidental appeals to nationalist motives".

As far as we're concerned, we'd say that these "motiva- Our point of reference is the Mussolini idea that the people is something elusive and blind it constitutes, with the birth of the State, a unitary reality and will, intimately imbued with meanings of a higher order. But this does not make us 'statists, because we do not make an idol of the State like Keller and certain German jurists. the make the *Volk*. Because for us, let's repeat it, there are a someone behind the State: it y a of Chefs, of Monarchs — and, if you like, an "eminent race" at

which only "nation", "people", "race", "tradition" cease to be abstractions. In any large "Influences are always present,

eth-

nies and diverse traditions. It is up to the elites to choose and highlight a given element among them, and to subordinate all the others to it— thus bringing back to a very precise order what would otherwise have remained hybrid and frozen under the species of a confused potentiality.

Keller believes in laws that are immanent in peoples, provided by "nature", respected and followed in themselves, deriving no power from above or that can be personified, and, in any case, having nothing to do with an "afterlife" (p. 46 and 52-53). This is a

"It is a 'belief' like any other. In fact, it would be very difficult to cite a single piece of legislation from ancient peoples, including the Aryans, in which the authority of the law did not refer an origin from above, "divine", and which was not considered to have been introduced by legislators who were also "divine". But we already know Keller's point of view: instead of recognising, in the order inherent in an earthly and temporal *Imperiuni*, the reflection a transcendent order and, moreover, the secularisation of a law and authority originally purely spiritual, Keller tends to see in any idea of a solely spiritual fiegnum a kind of chimerical projection of the utopian image of an earthly kingdom (p. 53). He is more or less on the same level evhemerism.

Moreover, it is extremely difficult for Keller to define the concept of *Volk*. In some cases, it seems that he adopts the National Socialist conception, which corresponds to the *Volksgemeinschaft* form, as his criterion and unit of measurement. Thus, on page 48, he states that the "community of nations", the supranational order to which he aspires, cannot be achieved until all peoples have organised themselves in accordance with the Nazi totalitarian and social concept, expressed precisely in the formula mentioned above (cf. p. 69). Elsewhere, however, he concedes that "it is of no importance to consider the

the way in which particular peoples conceive of themselves: the essential thing is that each should leave the other free to form this or that conception of its own existence and to live in accordance with it" (p. 115). This is the conclusion of his analysis of the various theories relating to the "people" (pp. 113-115), a conclusion which obviously leads to total indifferentism and a derisory norm of reciprocal tolerance at international level. Keller's recognition of the inadequacy of race in defining the people, his introduction of the concept,

Finally, he speaks of "peoples in the making" without being able to say how *the terminus ad quem* will be defined, *i.e.* the definitive form of this making. All this confirms the mythical and vague nature of his conception of the *Volk*. The only coherent solution would be to assert dogmatically that nations as such do not really exist until they are "nations".

"In the National Socialist formula of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, this is a 'total nation'. However, to make such a political form a condition for full membership of the *national* order is clearly to empty the principle of respect due to all peoples of its substance, to the point of deeming them not yet 'of age' and placing them under virtual tutelage (p. 121, 123), possibly under that of a foreign state, such time as they have managed to give themselves this form.

But that is not all. As we have seen, Keller denounced the inorganicity and levelling that would be inherent in any Roman or religious conception of the *Regnum* or, if you like, the *Reich* of nations. However, such a grievance is precisely turned against his own conception, whose logic, in fact, places no obstacle in the path leading ultimately to the utopian vision of an order which would embrace *all* the nations of the world. And if nothing stands in the way of this, it is precisely because such an order is even more abstract.

and empty of all content than that of the defunct "League of Nations" itself. In such a framework, it would simply be a matter of looking after the rights of each people, protecting them, maintaining peace and equilibrium - in short, it would be a kind of purely administrative function, presupposing no specific world view, no higher point of reference. But all this, in turn, stems from the particularist, relativistic and collectivist conception of the *Volk*. If we do not recognise the authority of higher-order values, it is quite clear that between the various "national" units there can only ever be extrinsic relationships, "gradations" and "balances" which, the final analysis, imply nothing essential. In any case, for us, such an *ordo nationum* as a universal order is absurd and inaccessible: our conception is that concrete, differentiated supranational units, centred on a specific worldview and values that "set the tone", and from which the internal cohesion of a given "imperial space" derives. The superior civilisation of a race destined to dominate must serve as a point of reference for a set of minor politico-ethnic units, enabling them to go beyond their merely national values and, by integrating them, to find within themselves the principle that will make them understand each other and feel united: truly united, and not by adopting the stylemade up of tolerant indifference, of the members of some club.

This is why these supranational units, which will put an end to era of particularistic, schismatic and anti-European nationalism, will not only be differentiated: they may also be of a military nature. We have seen that Keller accepts war, but without recognising any specific value in it: in the same way he accepts, at the very least,

the state as a transitional phase, as an instrument and teacher capable helping "the people" to finally realise themselves in a "total" form (p. 71). But the general tone of his discourse remains pacifist (p. 83). Whenever Keller uses the word "power", *Macht*, for him it only oppression, vexation, violence and the denaturing of peoples. He has forgotten the

Moltke's famous phrase: "Universal peace is not a dream and it's not even a nice dream". Now, insofar as, for Keller, each people's inclinations should be respected, one might think that there are warrior peoples by race and vocation - no one is unaware of what some people have said, starting with Klemm and D'Eichtal, about the typology distinguishing between "passive races" and "active races", "ser-vile races" and "dominating races", etc. It is true that Keller refers to the results of research carried out on wild tribes, in particular those which demonstrate natural inclinations to respect one another. It is true that Keller refers to the results of research carried out on wild tribes, in particular those which demonstrate natural inclinations towards mutual respect and peace (p. 45 et seq.), in order to challenge the idea that the natural state would be war against all. But this thesis would require much more documentation to be relevant; against it, the whole of the great Aryan story is already at odds: a story not of perpetual war or war for its own sake, of course, but a story which features virile and domineering human types, capable of **realising**, through struggle, superior values often superior to anything that can be derived from a climate of peace and naturalistic harmony. One of the rights that Keller recognises for peoples (p. 171-184) is the right to "specific development", but we should ask ourselves why this development should be confined to the "bourgeois" sphere of life.

"This is the case when the natural inclination of a given people is, of the warrior and heroic type! For our part, we believe heroic and warlike elements are of particular importance in the development of a nation.

importance, as the foundations an "imperial space", i.e. a concrete and well-articulated order within a given group of nations ².

Since we must now come to a conclusion, the only thing we can say is that

what is acceptable in Keller's ideas is the polemic against an abstract normativism in international law - which is, moreover, in the process of being definitively eliminated - and against the 'neutral', de-personalised forms, devoid of any qualitative basis or real force, the idea of the State has taken on and there in the modern world. The positive points of reference invoked by Keller against this state of affairs are, however, highly problematic and unacceptable from the point of view of a tradition which, without difficulty, we declare Roman

- without immediately adding that, in its Romanity, it is one with the traditions of the great civilisations of the past, of which those of the old Aryan world are the most important. In fact, as we have said, this mythologising of the *Volk*, of the 'people-nation' as the source all authority, is no more than a modern invention, born recently in Germany, and which now appears to have been practically superseded, even in Germany, by the very force of the events taking place in Europe. The efforts made by Keller (p. 63) and other authors to link it to an ancient 'German' tradition are just . We have seen that, to this end, Keller found himself obliged to condemn the very tradition of the Prussian state as non-German and 'Romanising', and to extend a similar condemnation to the imperial Middle Ages. It is not impossible that he may have drawn on some of the ideas of the early Germans. But this is of little interest to us, because they cannot be authoritative: the Germans "primitive" are, in fact, only a few par-

² Cf. J. Evola, *Das Zeitalter des soñdafiscJien Ethos*, in *Dic Aktiozi*, March 1941.

We must judge them and understand their traditions on the basis of what the great Aryan civilisations of antiquity, including Rome, offer us in a much more complete, precise and documented form.

It is true that these ancient traditions contain many 'myths', but their content is on a completely different level and has a completely different reality from that of the modern *Volk* - which, as we have already alluded to, was essentially bequeathed to dynastic and traditional Europe by French Jacobinism, and has strongly collectivist and anti-hierarchical overtones. From our traditional point of view, "nationalities" can certainly exist, but on a "naturalistic" level, so to speak, i.e. not yet political or properly spiritual: as specific and spontaneous forms of sensitivity, as particular mores where, however, the predominant element is ultimately more the race than the "nation". On the contrary, the centre, the indispensable condition of the nation as a political and spiritual reality, is the State. The State is not a pure fact of "power", or a kind of abstract legal superstructure, but an ethical and spiritual reality as well as a formative and selective force. In turn, this force is linked either to an elite, to a race of leaders and the prestige that is theirs, or to values that are to some extent transcendent (which do not necessarily have to be those of the Christian religion alone: ancient Iran, ancient Rome, etc., show this) and which legitimise them, for there is no true authority except authority from above. The suggestive power of such principles, once they have unified a 'people' and given it a soul, can be projected beyond its borders by various means, including war, lead to higher units, i.e. supranational units.

These are the "imperial spaces". The the "rank" that ensures a given nation's role as a "leader". the supranational guiding principle cannot be measured in

It is the adherence to the transcendent values mentioned above, and the related ability to animate, to exalt, to give impetus and self-sacrifice, as if it were a police force ensuring collective security and peace. On the contrary, it is adherence to the transcendent values mentioned above, and the associated ability animate, exalt, inspire and give oneself, to communicate the strength needed to confront a tragic situation or an adverse destiny that bears the stamp of authentic superiority. The internal logic of this system is not to extend it to all the nations of the world, but to limit it to specific areas as blocs of nations united by the bond of an "Order" and capable, if necessary, of a heroic unanimity comparable to that of a "crusade". Leaving aside both universalist and nationalist myths, the organisation a European bloc, Aryan and The "Roman" is the only concrete objective of our future, and the only object worthy of serious consideration in terms of new law and a new order of peoples.

IX

1943

FUNCTION OF THE IMPERIAL IDEA AND ELIMINATION NEUTRAL CULTURE

In Italy, as in Germany, it is not easy to find, at the present time, idealistic and cultural positions of the same resolute and organisational character as that offered by revolutionary thought, pro- pretically political. And it is no less difficult to find authors capable a global vision that is supra-ordinate to anything that comes under particularism or immediate political interest. This is we must mention a work from Germany which, in our opinion, is one of the most important to have appeared since National Socialism came to power. The author is Christoph Steding, and the title of the book is *The Empire and the Diseases of European Culture* ¹. In truth, it is an unfinished work: the author died in 1938 before he could give it a definitive form, which explains the many repetitions and the relative vagueness of its plan. Nevertheless,

¹ C. Steding, *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europai!schen Kultur*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 2nd edition, Hamburg, 1938, another edition of which has just been published.

In its present form, this book undoubtedly bears the stamp of precise, bold and uncompromising thought, expressing the most interesting tendencies of National Socialism—, precisely those on the basis of which the vocations of our two nations can be reconciled. There is an additional reason why we thought it would be useful to make Steding's ideas known: a certain number of deviations peculiar to certain extremist circles are definitively overcome, while we find clarified points of reference that are likely, in principle, to be valid for both the Germanic and Roman traditions.

All of Steding's thought revolves around the concept of Empire or *Reich*. For him, the Empire has always been the pivot and soul of everything European. In our history, the Empire has never meant a mere political institution, to be placed on the same level as any other form of state, but the principle a higher order, the very foundation, source and sustenance of our continent's civilisation (p. 6, 28). It was both a political and a cultural centre. But it has to be said that, over the centuries, this centre has a kind of paralysis, to the point all that remains in its place is a vacant political space. Indeed, the last hundred and fifty years of European history have been characterised by the disappearance of the great States created and guided by races belonging to the Nordic Aryan trunk. The initial phases of this involution date back to the Thirty Years' War, followed by the French Revolution and all its consequences. However, for Steding, all this is not about cause and effect. The fundamental element remains the Empire: it was precisely because the Empire degenerated that a series of negative phenomena occurred, and not vice versa. The victories of the French and Swedes in the seventeenth century, the liquidation of monarchical France, the secession of Sweden, the decadence of Austria, the dismantling of Peter the Great's Russia and so on.

up to 1918, are phenomena that come under the heading of of the order of consequences and result from the neutralisation of the centre of gravity of the older Europe, i.e. of imperial idea (p. 7, 3).

There is no other explanation for the fact that the word "The term 'Europe' has become increasingly synonymous with 'Western Europe', in other words with *the* demo-liberal world that came into being with the French Revolution and the definitive affirmation of the very forces that had provoked the crisis of the imperial idea. So much so that people came to believe that things would be all the better for Europe if they were all the worse for what still remained of the imperial legacy (p. 5), to the point where people attributed the character of the 'Western Europe' to the fact that it was the 'imperial world'.

of a kind of holy war in the name of "civilisation" to everything that, in reality, had the meaning of a diabolical subversion of the traditional European idea (p. 9). At the same time, Europe's centre of gravity was to shift, to the benefit of the territories.

overseas, which, as colonial possessions, came to constitute the main force of the Western democratic powers (p. 7). But that's not all: a similar shift has taken place in favour of subaltern racial cuts corresponding to human types that are in themselves deprived of history, neutral and apolitical, that had hitherto only had any meaning when guided and organised under the aegis of ethnic groups of a superior type. This is the real explanation not only for democracy, Bolshevism and Communism, but also for similar phenomena of decadence that have befallen the Germanic peoples themselves. In fact, it is not only a question of the reappearance of exogenous racial substrates, but also of the predominance, within the last generations, of hereditary dispositions which had previously been forced to adopt a latent form under the influence of force which, in these same peoples, concealed other racial and ethnic components of a higher level (p. 9). For Steding, 1789 already represented the crisis humanity

"Apollonian" and Aryan, insofar as the irruption of the

of the demonic substance of the Parisian plebs went hand in hand with the reappearance of the obscure substratum of pre-historical races deprived of history (p. 8, 497). It is by this yardstick that the secret of Judaism's success must be measured: by nature, the Jews are a 'neutral' people, without roots, anhistorical, unassimilable and cosmopolitan vis-à-vis any Aryan or European politico-national organisation. They therefore found the way clear until, with the crisis of the idea of Empire, the following came to predominate in Europe a human substance and a 'race' that are similarly new, shapeless and anti-imperial (p. 13, 118, 650).

In particular, Steding analyses the forms that the process of 'neutralisation' has taken in the countries bordering Germany, which have recently also turned towards the principle of neutrality, internationalism or separatism, as in Switzerland, Holland, the Scandinavian countries and, Steding adds, in part of the Rhineland, as well as in some aspects of Austria itself. In these territories on the periphery of the former German imperial space, political neutralisation had as its counterpart the development an equally neutral 'culture' which, in various forms, is the typical expression of an allergy and hostility to the imperial idea and, consequently, of the very disease from which modern Europe suffers. Yet these countries were to exert a particular attraction on thinkers and intellectuals who, while belonging to other countries, had adopted the ideal of "neutral" culture. In Wilhelm's Germany itself, such a spiritual climate had managed to gain increasing ground, giving rise to a "Helvetisation" or "Helvetism". intellectual and moral "hollandisation", which had the following effects During this period, there were pacifist, anti-Prussian, anti-literary and anti-political tendencies. Until recently, culture par excellence was precisely that of intellectuality. "neutral".

Steding clearly accuses all those who were its representatives, in a list that goes from Burckhardt to Jung,

Bachofen and Huizinga to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Söderblom, Ibsen and Strindberg; Keyserling, Steiner, Van der Velde and Klages to Barth, Freud, Thomas Mann, Stefan George, and so on. Such an association of names will surprise more than one reader. It cannot be denied that Steding's criticism is

It may sometimes be one-sided, but the underlying reason for it is nonetheless justified and bears the stamp of a profound cohesion. To understand the meaning of this, we need to distinguish between two types of culture. On the one hand, there is an organic, unitary culture, intimately linked to a formative political force and ultimately, to the very idea of the State and Empire. On the other hand, there is a culture that embraces the principle of dualism, isolation, escape, separation and the absolutization of the particular. According to Steding, this second culture has no reality of its own: it is merely the twilight or "autumnal" stage of the first, which eventually forgets both it is and where it came from (p. 633 ff.); and it is only for this reason that it conceives artificial antitheses between spirit and power, between intellectuality and the State, between civic forces and heroic and political forces, as if, historically too, antecedent of a Sophocles, example, had not been Thermopylae (p. 721).

The unity of a people, or a group of peoples, determined by an empire, is also reflected in a unity, an integration of the individual. Wherever the dualistic principle— is asserted, whether in human beings or in their works and creations, there is a symptom of illness, dissociation, "neutralisation" resulting from the obscuring and withering away the imperial idea (p. 140, 165 ff).

Thus Steding, after indicting has been called Barth's 'dialectical theology' and the similar conceptions of Kierkegaard - which always have in view a human nature torn apart, a soul with problems that goes from crisis to crisis - does not spare Nietzsche himself, he calls 'the great split man', putting 'the great dialectic' to the test.

his thinking is contradictory, impulsive, incoherent and anti-architectonic. In this thinker, who 'Switzerland his birthplace' and to whom the climate of Bismarckian Germany had become unbearable, Steding detects affinities, including racial affinities with Baltic and Slavic element that had always undermined the Empire and that betrays itself in the torn and contradictory characters of Dostoyevsky (p. 91, 158).

The fracturing of the unity of the Empire by the 'neutral' states also had the counterpart of a crisis of all objective, normative authority and source of commitment, a crisis highlighted by a whole series of cultural phenomena. Generally speaking, the first symptom is particularism. Particular aspects of a whole are experienced separately and become absolutes. Hence, for example, the tendency towards intimism and subjectivism: this is the culture that wants nothing to do with grand politics, and 'escapes' into the world of the interior, conceived as a world in itself, where only what is psychologically and aesthetically 'interesting' is of value, to which may be added nostalgia and exhumations of the past (p. 201). It is on the same basis that a certain historiography was born, of which one of the typical representatives cited by Steding is the Swiss Burckhardt, who came to hypothesize a "history of culture" cut off from the great political history. Steding is less convincing when he also attacked the Swiss Bachofen² who embodied

² When it came to the traditional revision of ancient history, particularly Roman history, J. Evola was always interested in the research of Johann Jakob Bachofen, a twentieth-century Swiss writer and author of numerous philological and archaeological studies. It was precisely Evola who made this author known in Italy beyond (specialist) circles by translating an anthology of Bachofen's texts *Le Madri e la virilità olimpica* (Bocca, Milan, 1949), accompanied by commentaries and a long introduction (Note by R.D.P.). - This introduction has been translated into French: cf. J. Evola, *Les Mères et la virilité olyrienne*, in *Rebis*, 8, Summer 1985, p. 1-8 - [Editor's note].

a romantic tendency to value the irrational and vital substratum of civilisations and matriarchal origins, the world symbols, myths and primordial cults. More generally, he pillories irrationalism. The aversion to the *ratio* in the name of all that is life, biology and instinct, itself reflects a phobia for the imperial organic idea, which sublimates and dominates life (p. 295). This is why Burckhardt called the state "barbaric".

Roman (p. 332), a Mommsen understood its meaning, just as he had understood that of warrior state bis- (p. 295).

In 'neutral' culture, the process of dissociation takes various forms. Either what is dissociated and considered in itself turns out to be the "soul", the psyche and then we have all the varieties of psychologism; or it is the lower part of the soul itself, i.e. the unconscious and subconscious and then we have psychoanalysis, the philosophy of the unconscious, the new mysticism of "life", whether that cultivated by Klages or by the Swiss C.G. Jung. Sometimes it's the economy and then we have historical materialism and the "sociological" interpretation of history; sometimes it's sexuality - and then we have, apart from the various varieties of psychoanalysis, a whole series of erotic books or popular pseudo-scientific works centred on the normal or abnormal forms eros like Van der Velde or Hirschfeld. Finally, there may be the purely aesthetic element— and then we have phenomena like Stefan George and the various 'humanist' trends. And so on. The cradle of this culture was above all the "neutral" countries. And Steding, in a very close analysis, highlights the premises, insofar as it is always a culture that has asserted itself in parallel with the decline of the organic imperial idea.

Scientism and the positivist myth belong to the same universe. Materialism, the obsession with sticking to the truth.

the "pure facts", once again mark a split, a difference between the

a one-sided, flat exaltation of what is only a part of the whole that is reality (p. 303). In this respect, Steding completely reverses the thesis "objectivity", so dear to "neutral" science. For him, a science is only objective when it is political, because it is only then that there is a coincidence between the spirit and the law according to which a civilisation develops and existence of a race is concretely affirmed. Conversely, it is only insofar as a science claims to be apolitical that it renounces all objectivity, because it ends up adopting as its cri-

objectivity what is merely a particular point of view.

This is what the science of 'neutral' cultures is all about (p. 299).

This is precisely what the science of 'neutralcultures consists of.

Steding unhesitatingly asserts that "every objective scientific truth was once an order". In field of the positive sciences themselves, all certainty is also linked to the force of decision that creates empires: all certainty is initially born in a "Prussian" manner, and only later, by "devirilising", does it assume an "apolitical" character (pp. 572-573). The very distinction between the positive sciences and the others which would not be "positive" because their object is of a spiritual nature marks a pathological dualism: "The exactitude of the natural sciences arose from tacit agreement to ignore anything that might disturb exactitude itself, namely first and foremost the qualitative element, which is essential in the world" (p. 615). The fact that a "circumcised nature", i.e. one reduced to a purely quantitative element, could be considered truly real is yet another sign of a humanity that is not "in order", of a humanity that is torn apart internally and as a nature.

list (p. 616).

Other symptoms of regression and split: the , characteristic of a certain spiritualism, towards forms of the Oriental or Far Eastern spirit; the cult of 'relics of the past', including the aesthetic veneration for the 'old'.

"heroes" and "geniuses"; a certain prehis- toric research that takes refuge in the nebulous world of origins.

nes; and even certain spiritualisations of the idea of Empire, where the concept of a more or less universalist spiritual *Regnum* is so emphasised that the idea becomes something totally unreal and inconsistent. On another level, Steding sees a typical phenomenon of splitting and emancipation of the particular in the feminist and women's liberation movement, which developed from the Netherlands and the Scandinavian states, i.e. the particularly 'neutralised' areas of the former European imperial space (pp. 274-5).

Of crucial importance is what Steding writes about dissociation and regression, which are reflected in one-sided and polemical importance given to the naturalistic subset of life whether it is conceived as —

"For Steding, as for ourselves, all this corresponds simply to the element of 'matter'. For Steding, as indeed for ourselves, all this corresponds simply to the element of 'matter', against which the 'State' and the 'Empire' represent the element of 'form' - the latter being in relation to the former like the male principle in relation to the female principle, like the idea (in the Platonic sense) in relation to nature. On this criterion, democracy is perpetuated in a certain nationalism, but also in a certain racism, since it always a question 'matter' tending to emancipate itself from 'form', which becomes absolutised and seeks to undermine the higher political authority to which mass, people and nation must submit. For Steding, the state and the empire are therefore superior to nations, peoples and ethnic groups. It is "men", he writes, who declare themselves for the state, while "matriarchal" natures declare themselves for the people and deify them. But where such a cult is born, the pathological dissociation prevalent in twilight, anti-imperial Europe is affirmed once again (pp. 217, 218, 223, 229, 230).

With the Empire, all dualism between State and people-race was overcome: a firm political will held "the
A people only really exists when there is a will and a purpose. A people can only really exist when it has the will and the means to do so.

In itself, it is no more than a *materia prime* (pp. 292-3, 223, 228), assuming a personhood only when the virile component, represented by the State and the Empire, is neutralised. The importance of the views developed by Steding lies in the fact, thanks to them, certain socialising aspects of Nazi ideology are overcome, and a fundamental convergence between it and the Fascist conception emerges. Of course, as relief Frank in his introduction (p. XXV), Steding does not conceive of the political idea, in relation to which people, nation and race are merely *valeria prima*, in an abstractable way and almost as if it fell from the sky or were its agent: Steding also conceives of it in relation to a "race". Here, however, "race" is understood in a higher sense: it is what we have called the "race of the spirit" or the "solar element of a race". This is confirmed at the end of the book (pp. 516, 587), when Steding elaborates on the concept of the "master race". This is not a naturalistic concept. Steding asserts that even if we were to refer to the North Germanic Aryan races, to which some attribute superior characteristics, we must be convinced that they too need a kind of transfiguration that tears them away from the naturalistic state, conditioned solely by blood, and raises them to the level of the spirit — the only one that, for the State, for the Empire and at every turning point in history, has a decisive character. A race be struck by "Apollo's thunderbolt" and, beyond the weight of its passions and instincts, it must possess the "fire" capable illuminating other peoples and uniting them within a great imperial formation (p. 587). This same symbolic "thunderbolt of Apollo" is necessary for the emergence and imposition of evidence and truths, so that the very system of sciences and particular disciplines, in parallel with the affirmation of the will of Empire, takes on the superior form of a living organism, unitary and decisive (p. 603), not "neutral" but decisive and "neutral" (p. 604), and so that the system of sciences and particular disciplines, in parallel with the affirmation of the will of Empire, takes on the superior form of a living organism, unitary and decisive (p. 603), not "neutral" but decisive and "neutral".

normative (p. 602). It is only then that materialism will be overcome, that 'matter' will be freed from its particularisms and will take on a 'form': in close relation to the spiritually centralising action inscribed in the imperial idea (p. 303).

On the contrary, the 'culture' born of the exhaustion and neutralisation of old Europe is characterised by a recurrent attitude of contestation against the political element, by a lack of understanding of any spirituality that is also power, by hysterical opposition to any attempt to include intellectuality and science once again within political unity. In the eyes of such a 'culture', everything that is organisation, discipline, positive order, will, appears as 'barbarism', as

"These are the reactions of a spiritually feminine substance. These are reactions of a spiritually feminine substance, whereas, let us repeat, it is the virile element that expresses itself in the political concept of State and Empire. The belles-lettres, the arts and sciences, civilisation conceived as aesthetic and humanistic refinement, represent in the context of such an anti-political polemic only symptoms of illness and hysteria. What would be "spirit" and "defence of the spirit" is in reality nothing more than an opposition between negation and affirmation, between banter, play, adventure, rambling and gossip and then seriousness, strength, architectural style (p. 340, 341, 386). —

However, Steding does not fail to point out what has often provided weapons for the polemic of neutral culture. More than once, we have seen the political element become rigid, simply surviving the great actions that came from the most intimate substance a people, that called it to life, forged it, and from which a mentality, a culture and a science were born at the same time (p. 446, 453). But this is playing with words. Referring to the very field of "militarism", so abhorred by the "neutres" intellectuals, Steding notes that the organisation of a victorious war implies an outpouring intellectual energy.

whose "cultural representatives" are —

generally mere literati, people who indulge in speculation and rhyme often don't have a clue (p. 334). For Steding, an empire manifests itself not only through its own architecture, science and literature, but also, and just as perfectly, through the creation of submarines, tanks and bombers. The aim of all this is to create the ironclad that an empire needs to defend itself, because the danger of dissolution fostered by "culture" and the irruption races with no history is always present—

lement presents the threat of those who, precisely in the name of a so-called "civilisation", would like to violate this higher principle (p. 498, 503). One civilisation is opposed by another: the negative, feminine civilisation associated with the period when the imperial idea was lacking is opposed by a positive civilisation, based on the transfiguration of all the dark, threatening forces of the earthly element and their domination within the rigid framework of discipline. This second culture can be seen in the very style of Prussianism. And from this point of view, it is precisely the other *culture* that appears as "bar- bare" (p. 519). A supra-temporal, "eternal" order can only become a reality an empire from which it follows that outside the Empire there is no true civilisation (p. 636, 519, 520).

Steding believed that we were moving towards a new imperial era that would mark the end of the sickness of European culture. The new Empire, by devoting itself to the restoration of a general European truth and order, will act in a virtually 'catalytic' way. Its very presence will have a destructive effect on any form of "neutralisation", and will determine a process of rebirth and refocusing which, in a certain sense, in its objectivity and impersonality, will be uni- versal. For individuals too, the Empire will represent the best therapy against all forms of "liberation", uncertainty, internal contradiction and escapism, as it will

will take them beyond themselves, to a place where their will is directed towards a higher purpose. And Steding reports the words that Frederick the is said to have uttered, like a recruitment notice: "My boys, would you have liked to live forever?" (p. 658, 282).

These are the fundamental ideas set out by Steding, which, as we have said, express the most positive tendencies of the new Germany. The reservations that can be made are as follows.

We have translated *Merci* as "Empire" or "Empire".

"Steding himself recognised the close relationship between the political idea of the state as a virile formative force and the Roman tradition. He himself recognised the close relationship between the political idea of the state as a virile formative force and the Roman tradition. For him, the Roman state was more

"This is , for the Germans of the Middle Ages, it had the value of an ideal (p. 294, XV). This overcomes the slyly anti-Roman tendencies of certain extreme German circles, against which Steding also took a stand with his ideas on the relationship between state, people and race. To a large extent, Steding took up the great imperial tradition, in which the Germanic and Roman elements coincide. This being the case, it would have appropriate to state what role, apart from the North Germanic idea, the Roman idea must play in the desired revival of such a tradition and, consequently, to allude to the fact that, here, the North Germanic type must have as its corollary the Aryan-Roman type, with a view to reciprocal integration. While acknowledging the 'Roman' element in the Prussian political idea itself, Steding nevertheless neglects this point and develops his considerations in a rather one-sided way, because he seems to have his eye above all on the German Reich as created by Bismarck, a *Reich* which, after a period of latency and rigidity, would have reasserted itself as an ideal in National Socialism.

But even if we were to limit the horizon in this way, the question of

To what extent these more recent forms of the Meicii correspond purely and simply to the traditional conception could be asked of Steding. Bismarck's own action, if considered from this point of view, is not without certain grey areas³. Steding virtually ignores the fact that the construction of the Bismarckian state was linked to a serious blow to the prestige Austria, which was in fact the legitimate heir to the Holy Roman Empire. Steding's irony towards Austria often of dubious taste, resembling the rather trivial commonplaces that are widespread in modern Germany. He rightly observes that Austria was going through a phase of degeneration, so that Germany was entitled to inherit it. But is Steding really sure that what Germany had already taken over in Bismarck's time was exactly the principle that Austria had embodied until then? All that Steding writes about federalism (p. 196 ff.), for example, is hardly convincing. In its current phase of development, the Reich is affected by a centralism that is hardly reconcilable with the traditional hierarchical idea—to the extent that its overcoming will undoubtedly constitute the necessary condition of a new European imperial idea. By referring too insistently to the purely Prussian ideal of state, Steding often gives the impression of conceiving the idea of empire in a somewhat secular and securitarian way. which would then reflect one of the typical splits in the sickness of European culture. On page 337, for example, he contrasts the link of the medieval Empire, which was religious, to a link that should be "essentially political". Elsewhere (pp. 241, 350), he criticises the Hohenstaufens for having cultivated "unrealistic" and "utopian" concepts. It is true that he also recalls the role played by the notion of Providence

³ Cf. the book by E. Malynski and L. de Poncins, *La guerre occulte*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1936.

and divine decision in the thinking of the modern Reich leaders (p. 514). But these only hints. Steding does not tell us what supernatural foundation and what precise world view were to guide the *Reich* so that its formative, organising and animating force would assert itself in all areas of civilisation.

Some of Steding's criticisms, we have seen, are flawed by their one-sided side: in order to denounce error, he sometimes comes to overlook what certain authors or certain trends might offer his own ideas. When, for example, he speaks of the "luminous divinities of world of politics" as opposed to the obscure region myths, symbols and primordial traditions, he runs the risk of ending up, unwillingly, in rationalism (pp. 339, 76, 226), he perfectly conceives the possibility an exploration of the spiritual world which would have the same characteristics accuracy and clarity as the natural sciences (p. 617). Many of Steding's accusations against Bachofen are downright unfair: on the contrary, Bachofen contains many elements support precisely 'Apollonian' and virile ideal a 'Roman' state as opposed to the equivocal world of the naturalist and matriarchal substratum. In the final analysis, Steding often influenced by Bachofen's salutary ideas.

Similarly, it is not clear that the attention that many It should not be forgotten that many Eastern traditions retain traces of a common Aryan heritage with a purity not always found elsewhere. We must not forget that many Eastern traditions preserve traces of a common Aryan heritage, with purity not always found elsewhere. Even the new directions taken by the science prehistory have a precise spiritual value, which Steding did not see: on this point, he seems to be displaying a certain 'political narrowness (in the modern, pejorative sense of the word).

Steding's attitude to Nietzsche is similar. unilateral. It is highly questionable whether the doctrine nietzschean du sur homme expresses really,

as Steding believes, a revolt against the concept of the State. Rather, the opposite would appear to be true, namely that the State and Empire are hardly conceivable without some reference to the doctrine of the superman, which exalts an elite, a dominating race with a specific spiritual authority. In fact, only an elite conceived in this way can provide the basis for primacy that Steding claims for the State in the face of what is merely "the few". He comes close to this idea when he refers to those who are "struck by ApolJon's thunderbolt", but he does not develop it further.

Generally speaking, while Steding's work appears to be well-founded in its critical part, it reveals a certain weakness as regards the transcendent points of necessity to be able to really justify a *Reich* or Empire, he conceives it. Faced with the insubstantial and neutral world of the dominant culture, against a whole range of phenomena of dissociation and regression that so aspects of the modern Western mentality express, Steding once again appeals to an ideal of civilisation which, in its harshness, its assertiveness, its warrior virility, its desire for form, discipline, organicity and absolute unity, can be said to be Prussian as well as Roman. But this ideal needs to be illuminated, as it were, and linked back to a very specific spirituality and an authentic tradition, in order to avoid the danger that the purely political aspect end up prevailing, even if it were with a vague mystique. Be that as it may, Steding's work constitutes a noteworthy step forward - especially in Germany - on the subject of

the plan to clarify ideas, to align

positions, a conscious revival of this imperial idea which, Steding has shown, is identified with the reality of the best Europe.

1951

ON SPIRITUAL CONDITIONS
AND STRUCTURAL
OF EUROPEAN 'UNITY

At the moment, by the very force of events, the need for unity is coming to the fore in our conti- nent. But, until now, it has been mainly negative factors that have fuelled it: we want to unite in order to defend ourselves, and what comes into play is not a positive or pre-existing motivation, but rather the realisation that we have virtually no other choice when faced with the threatening presence of blocs and interests from outside Europe. This situation means that we do not have a very clear vision of the internal configuration of genuine European unity. For the time being, it seems that the project of a coalition or federation is not being taken much further, and as such will always have an extrinsic character, not *organic* but associative and, therefore, contingent. We could, however, conceive of a truly organic unity, but only on the basis of the formative force, at once

• This text has already appeared, under the title *Sur les fondements spirituels et stnicturuux de l'iniité européenne* (trans. by Paul Durand), in the review *Offense de l'Occident*, no. 167, July-August 1979, pp. 17-28 [N.D.T.].

and from above, specific to common idea, culture and tradition. However, anyone wishing to approach the European problem in these terms cannot fail to see how unfavourable the current situation is, and how many problematic factors prevent us from being easily lulled into optimism.

Some have given their full attention to these aspects of the European problem. There is a significant work on this subject: Ulick Varange's *Imperium* (Westropa Press, London, 1948, two volumes), which can be used to complete the analysis of the difficulties mentioned above.

Varange's argument for European unity was not therefore purely political; he based his argument on a general philosophy of history and civilisation inspired by Oswald Spengler. The Spenglerian concept is well known: there is no linear development of civilisation in the singular: history is broken down into distinct but parallel cycles of civilisation, each of which constitutes an organism, experiencing, like all organisms, phases of youth, maturity, old age and decline. In each cycle, Spengler distinguishes between a period of 'culture' (*Kultur*) and a period of 'civilisation' (*Civilisation*). The

Ulick Varange is the pseudonym of the American Francis Parker Yockey (1917-1960), a typical example of a 'victim' of the modern repressive system of Western democracies. In 1946, Yockey, who had ostensibly commented on the legality of prosecutions against "war criminals" (he was himself an employee of the Nuremberg Tribunal), was forced to resign. He lived in Brittas Bay, Ireland, in 1947-48, where he devoted himself to writing his voluminous *Imperium*, first printed in London in only one thousand copies, then in the United States (Noontide Press, with a preface by William Carto), to which he had returned and where his political persecution began in 1952. Initially arrested for a trivial matter of passporting, Yockey appeared before the Caresh magistrate on a charge of "expressing an opinion". It was during his trial that he was found dead, for reasons that were not clear to him.

"(Note from R.D.P.).

The first is that of the origins; under the sign of quality, it is characterised by form, differentiation, national articulations and living traditions. The second, on the other hand, is the autumnal, twilight phase, in which the destructive forces of materialism and rationalism come into play, leading to mechanicism, shapeless grandeur and the reign of quantity. According to Spengler, these phenomena are inevitable in any cycle of civilisation. They are biologically conditioned.

Let us leave Spengler there. Varange follows him, and also agrees with him in considering the European world as one of those cultural organisms endowed with a life of its own, developing a specific idea, having a particular destiny. He also follows him in noting that cyclical phase in which Europe and the West now find themselves is that of "civilisation". But Spengler who, at least, had coined the famous phrase "the decline of the Occident" in response to this situation, Varange seeks to transform the evil into a remedy, to make the best of a bad situation by starting with new forces that would obey an imperative of rebirth and values irreducible to materialism and rationalism. Beyond the ruins of yesterday's world, cyclical development would carry Europe into a new era, the era of 'absolute politics', of supranationality and authority, in other words, the era of the 'Imperium'. Conform to this biological imperative in the age of civilisation, or perish: that would be the alternative for Europe itself.

If we follow this line of thought, what would ideally belong to the past, to yesterday's world, would not only be the scientific and materialist conception of the universe, but also liberalism and democracy, communism and the UN, pluralist states and nationalist particularism. The historical imperative would be to build Europe as national, cultural, racial and state unit, under the auspices of a principle restored authority and of

new and precise biological distinctions between friend and foe, our own world and a foreign, 'barbarian world'. We need to say a few words about what Varange calls the "pathology of cultures". The realisation of the internal and natural law of a culture as an organism can be hindered by processes of distortion (*culture-distortion*), when foreign elements within it channel its energy towards actions and ends that have no connection with its real and vital requirements and which, on the contrary, make it a "culture of *distortion*".

the interplay of external forces. This has a direct application in the field of war, where the real alternative, according to Varange, is not between war and peace, but between wars that are useful and necessary to a culture and those that alter and disintegrate it. This is the case not when we enter into conflict with a real enemy that bio-logically threatens the material and spiritual organism of the culture to which we belong - a hypothesis in which only 'total war' is conceivable - but when a war of this type breaks out a culture *itself*, was precisely the case for the West in the last two conflagrations. During these conflicts, heads of state preferred the ruin of Europe and the fatal subjugation of their homelands to the foreign and 'barbaric' peoples of East and West, rather than cooperate in a new Europe that aimed to move beyond the world of the twenty-first century and reorganise itself under new symbols of authority and sociality. The disastrous consequence of such a choice is now clearly visible: it was not the victory of a few European nations over others, but the victory of anti-Europe, Asia and America over Europe in general.

This accusation was directed primarily at England, but Varange also extended it to the United States of America, arguing that their entire intervention policy had developed as a result of a "cultural distortion", by focusing on objectives that had no organic link with vital national needs.

At this point, the pace is accelerating, and it is a question of whether or not the West recognises the biological imperative corresponding to the current phase of its cycle: to overcome the divisions between states and create the unity of the European nation-state, standing together against the anti-Europe.

The objective will be internal and spiritual. Europe must rid itself of traitors, parasites and agents of "distortion. European culture must detoxify itself of the residues of the materialist, economicist, egalitarian and rationalist conceptions of the twenty-first. Secondly, rediscovered unity of Europe as a civilisation or culture must be expressed in a corresponding political unity; this must be pursued at all costs, possibly at the cost of civil wars and struggles against the powers that want to keep Europe under their yoke. Federations, customs unions and other economic measures cannot be solutions; unity must be born of an internal imperative - an imperative that should be achieved even if it appears economically disadvantageous, since economic criteria can no longer be considered the ultimate value in a new era. In the third stage, the problem of the space needed to overpopulate the European nation could arise: for Varange, the best solution would be an advance to the East where, under the mask of communism, the power of races secularly and biologically hostile to Western civilisation is gathering and organising itself.

For our purposes, this overview of Varange's work will suffice. Now let's see what we can make of it. The fundamental symbol mentioned by Varange is the

and a new principle of authority. We think, however, that he does not see very clearly all that such a symbol implies, it is assumed as it should be. Varange does not realise the distance separating this symbol from everything that belongs to the endemic 'civilisation' phase a culture, that of Europe.

In our opinion, we should not hesitate to follow Varange when he denounces the inadequacy of any solution of the following nature federalist and economic solution to the European problem. As we have already said, true unity can only be *organic*, and we are familiar with the model: it is the model which was once concretised in the form of the medieval ecumenical, for example. There is both unity and multiplicity, and this model is expressed in the form of a system of . hierarchical participation What we need to overcome and leave behind once and for all is nationalism, as a schismatic absolutisa- tion of the particular, and move on (or return) from there to the natural concept of nationality. Within each national space, a process integration would then have to take place politically which would coordinate the forces within a hierarchical structure, and establish an order based on a central principle of authority and sovereignty. An identical process should later take place within the supranational space that is Europe in general: nations as organic partial units gravitating around a *unum quod non est pars* (poet to borrow an expression from Dante), i.e. around a principle of authority hierarchically superior to each them. To be such, this principle must necessarily transcend the political sphere in the strict sense, and be founded and legitimised on the basis of an idea, a tradition, a spiritual power. It is then that the imperium would be born, the virile and organic European unity, truly emancipated from all levelling ideologies, liberal, democratic, chauvinist and collectivist, and capable, at the same time, of clearly taking its place in the world.

distances from both 'East' and 'West' - in other words, from the two blocks which, like the jaws of a single pair of pliers, are closing in on us.

This is why the postulate of a development in this direction is not the dissolution of nations into a single nation, into a kind of homogenous European social substance, but on the contrary the organic integration of each nation. Authentic unity, which is organic and not confused, is not achieved at the bottom but at the top. Once nationalist *hubris*, which always corresponds to a demagogic, collectivist and schismatic phase, has destroyed, and once the individual nations have been hierarchically constituted, a virtual unification will take shape is capable of extending beyond the nations - which will, however, be left with their own individuality and configuration.

would be in its place. The unfortunate thing is that the natural framework for such a realisation is that of a world going through a phase of 'culture', not of

In other words, they are "civilising", to use Spanglerian terminology. Authors like Yarangé mix up things that belong on different planes and get things wrong - as happened to Mussolini himself in his day. Probably unaware of Spengler's fundamental work, Mussolini read *Jahre der fintscheidiing*² and was struck by the prognosis of a new Caesarism or Bonaparism, which is why he wanted it translated into Italian. But Mussolini did not-

² A new Italian edition, with a preface by Julius Evola, **appeared** under the title **Ami decisivi**, ed. Il Borghese, **Milan**, 1973. Evola was the Italian translator of Sprngler's main work, *Le d erin de l'Occident*; cf. *Il tramof2io dell'OcÖdente*, Lon- ganesi, Milan, 1957; 1970; 1978 (Note by R.D.P.). - *Jafire der Entschcheidung* has been translated into French: cf. *Années decisivts*, Mercure de France, 1934; II-edition: 1943; III-edition: Copernicus, 1980 (with a preface). face Alain de Benoist) - N.D.T.].

Spengler's view of the place of such forms in the cyclical development of civilisations was not taken into account: it is when the world of tradition collapses, when there is no longer a *Kultur* but only a *Zivilisation*, when qualitative values have disappeared and the shapeless 'mass' prevails, it is then, specifically, in the autumnal and twilight phase a cycle, that nations give way to the great supranational aggregations, which manifest themselves under the banner of pseudo-Caesarism, of centralised personal power, in itself devoid of form or higher *idea*. This is not Empire, but at most 'imperialism', and for Spengler, a last gasp before the end — the end a civilisation, which may be followed by another civilisation, with no link of continuity with the previous one.

Now, when Varange speaks of the new era of the 'absolute polity' and of blocs which, having absorbed the nations of a single civilisation into a single organism, should adopt as their ultimate criterion the absolute, existential distinction between friend and enemy (a thesis borrowed from Carl Schmitt, who had defined the essence of purely political modern units in these terms) and the pure biological imperative, he remains precisely on the level of the 'absolute polity'.

"civilisation" and "totalitarian" collectivising processes, which must be *seen* as sub-national rather than supranational, and whose closest and most coherent realisation is to be found today in Stalinism. Now, it is clear that if European unity were to take this form, the Occident — the tooth, thanks to her, could perhaps resist and get back on its feet.

It would have had to defend itself materially and biologically against non-European imperialist powers, but it would nonetheless have abdicated internally, Europe would have finished.

and European tradition; it would become an ersatz of its opponents in terms of determined confrontation by a brutal desire for existence and power, by

Waiting for the general factors of disintegration that are part and parcel of technological and mechanical civilisation to make felt. This is, more or less, the prognosis that Burnham does too, when he considers the possible outcomes of the course for he calls the *managerial revolution* in course'.

Are other perspectives still possible? It is difficult to say. As far as nations are concerned, each cannot - maintain its individuality and dignity as a whole.

It is only when the nation directly recognises a truly superior authority, one that is not purely political and not liable to be monopolised by any one nation within the framework a "hegemonism", that it will be able to take on the role of an organic "partial whole", or subordinate itself to a superior order, in the two possibilities already indicated: either in the extrinsic and non-binding case material utility and external necessity; or when the nation directly recognises a truly superior authority, one that is not purely political and not liable to be monopolised by any one nation within the framework of a "hegemonism". Where can such a point of reference be found? We like to talk about European tradition, European civilisation, Europe as an autonomous organism, but unfortunately, if we look at things today and measure them against the yardstick of absolute values, we see that there is little more to all this than slogans and that we are content with mere phrases.

At the highest level, it is clear that soul of a supranational European bloc should be religious: religious not in the abstract, but in reference to a precise and positive spiritual authority. However, even if we disregard the already very advanced and widespread processes of secularisation and secularisation that have taken place in Europe, nothing of the sort exists on our continent today. Catholicism is the religion of only a few European nations - and we have seen, moreover, at a time incomparably more favourable than the present one, in the post-Napoleonic era, that the Holy Alliance - through the

° James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York, 1941 [tr. in French: *L'dre des organisateurs*, Calmann-Lévy, 1947].

towards which the idea of solidarity was expressed such as from and virile of European nations - was name, and that it lacked true religious legitimacy, an exalted and universal idea. If it were merely a generic Christianity, it would be too little, too disembodied and formless, not exclusively European, not likely to become the monopoly of European civilisation. Moreover, one can only have doubts about the possibility of reconciling pure Christianity with a "metaphysics of Empire": the medieval conflict between the two powers, provided we understand the real terms, teaches us this.

Let's leave this area now and move on to that of culture. Is it possible today to speak of a differentiated European culture - or rather, of a spirit that remains *unique*, in its varied and harmonious expressions, as the culture of each of the European nations? Once again, it would be imprudent to answer in the affirmative, and for a reason that Christoph Steding made clear in a remarkable book that dealt precisely with the 'Empire' and the 'disease of European culture'. The reason lies in what the author calls the *neutralisation* of European culture: a culture that no longer conforms to a common political idea; a 'private' culture, in transit, cosmopolitan, disaggregated, anti-architectonic, subjectivist, neutral and truly anonymous in its scientific and positivist aspects. To blame all this on a 'pathology of culture', an external and ephemeral 'distortion', brought about by foreign elements, as Varange would have it - and not just for Europe, but for America - is a rather simplistic way of thinking. Generally speaking, where can we find these days,

• Christoph Steding, *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur*, Hamburg, 1938. - [For a review of this book, see **Evola's** previous article **in this** collection - Note by **R.D.P.**].

In a phase of 'civilisation', a cultural base sufficiently differentiated to be able to seriously oppose the 'foreigner', the 'barbarian', to ourselves, and how did we find it in the case of previous imperial spaces? We would have to go a long way to achieve this, to undertake a process of detoxification and reintegration.

While there are certain aspects of North American civilisation and Russo-Bolshevik civilisation which are European, we must not lose sight of the fact that both are nothing more than the extreme development of tendencies and evils which first appeared in Europe. This is precisely the reason why Europe is so permeable to the influences of the other.

At the point we have reached, we are falling into equivocation even when it comes to 'tradition'. For a long time now, the West has not known what 'tradition' is in the highest sense, anti-traditional mentality and Western mentality having been identified since the time of the Renaissance. 'Tradition' in the fullest sense is a category that belongs to the epochs that Vico would have called the 'heroic ages': when a single formative force, with metaphysical origins, manifested itself in morals as well as in worship, law, myth, artistic creations, in short in every particular area of existence. Where can we find today a survival of tradition in this sense? Particularly as a European tradition, a great, unanimous tradition, not a village or folk tradition? It is rather in the sense of levelling 'totalitarianism' that tendencies towards political and cultural unity have emerged. In concrete terms, 'European tradition' understood as culture currently has no content other than subjective and more or less divergent interpretations.

° Cf. René Guénon, *Le crise du raonde modcrne*, Bossard, 1927 - (This work was translated into Italian by Evola - Note by R.D.P.).

of fashionable intellectuals and literati: all of it, the "Volta Congresses" yesterday, and numerous initiatives same type, today, have provided sufficient of testimonies not very edifying.

These and similar considerations lead to one fundamental conclusion: a supranational unity with positive, organic features is not conceivable in a period of "civilisation". What is conceivable in such a period is, at best, the fusion of nations into a more or less shapeless power bloc, where the political principle becomes the ultimate authority, subjugating all moral and spiritual factors: either as the "telluric" world of "world revolution" (Key-Serling), or as the world of "absolute politics" (Varange), or again in the form of new totalitarian complexes in the hands of *managers* (Bumham), depending on what has already been sensed here or there. Unity according to 'tradition' is something very different.

Should we then draw up a negative balance sheet and be tempted by a more modest, federalist, "social" or societal idea? Not necessarily, because once we have established the antithesis, all we have to do is orient ourselves accordingly. If it is absurd to pursue the highest ideal within the framework a "civilisation", because it would be deviated from and counterfeited there, we must see in the overcoming of what is precisely a "civilisation" the condition for any truly constructive initiative.

"Civilisation" is more or less the same as "the modern world", and, without any illusions, we have to recognise that the West, and indeed Europe, is eminently responsible for this "modern world", with its materialism, economism, rationalism and other factors of involution and disruption. First and foremost, therefore, there needs to be a renewal with a spiritual impact, awakening new forms of sensitivity and interest, and consequently a new inner style, a new fundamental and homogeneous orientation of the spirit. To this

It is important to realise that this is not a question of would like Varange, to overcome the concep- We must also be very wary of Spengler's biologising interpretation of civilisation, especially if we are to believe, with the author we have just mentioned, in the various aspects of existence. We must also be very wary of Spengler's biologising interpretation of civilisation, especially if we believe, as aforementioned author does, in an almost fatal upturn heralded by various symptoms. should we rely too heavily on the ideas of the revolutionary and renewal movements of the past: in these movements, in fact, several tendencies, sometimes even opposed to each other, coexisted and could only have been defined positively if circumstances had made their complete development possible, which was, on the contrary, shattered by the military defeat.

On the political level, it is the crisis of the principle of self-rule which seems to us to constitute the most serious difficulty - let us say, or $\bar{\rho}$ authority in the true sense, authority capable of bringing about obedience, but also sincere adherence and direct recognition: because only such self- rity can lead, within a nation, to the overcoming of individualism and "socialism" and, in the European area, to the reduction de the Îlybris nationalist, of the

"It is the spontaneous union of free men, proud to serve a leader truly worthy of the name. If there is anything specific to the Aryan-Western tradition, it is the spontaneous union of free men, proud to serve a leader truly worthy of the name. With a view to true European unity, it would be impossible to conceive of anything other than a large-scale repetition of this situation, "heroic" in its own way, not that a "parliament".

or of an ersatz joint-stock company.

The error of those who accept a kind of political agnosticism for the European idea is therefore clear, since this idea would then be reduced to a kind of formless common denominator.

The form of the whole cannot fail to be reflected in the form of its parts. With a background not of 'civilisation' but of *tradition*, this form can only be organic and hierarchical. The closer we get to supranational unity, the more we work towards it in particular, i.e. national, areas.

The fact that many external factors now make us feel that, for Europe, forming a bloc is a matter of life and death this necessity must, in turn, lead us to recognise the twofold internal problem that needs to be resolved in order to provide a solid basis for a possible European front: on the one hand, the problem of the progressive and effective overcoming of all that relates to an epoch of "civilisation"; the other, the problem of a kind of "metaphysics" capable of justifying a principle - either national, or supranational and European - that would be the basis of a European front of pure authority.

This twofold problem brings us back to a twofold imperative. It remains to be seen how many people today are still standing amid so many ruins to understand and accept this imperative.

PART TWO

ECONOMY
AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

I

1935

ABOUT THE CORPORATE CONGRESS

Attending the recent Italian-French Congress of Corporate Studies in Rome, we couldn't help thinking about the appropriateness of the comments made on more than one occasion in these columns about the ambiguous nature of the use of the word "revolution". A word which, when applied to fascism, takes on a meaning that is diametrically opposed to the subversive, left-wing meaning that previously prevailed.

- to the point that it is impossible to refer, even in part, to such a meaning without leading to a radical misunderstanding of nature and of the true and highest ends of our movement.

The use of this word in the context of the Corporative Congress gave rise to some highly unusual positions on the part of the French, almost all of whom represented the socialist movement, and who began to look for the "revolution" in the Italian corporative system. Insofar, naturally, they did not find much in it that corresponded to the "revolution".

* We have faithfully translated Evola's thought, who uses the adjective corporaúvo, "corporate". But the author, of course, goes on to speak of "fascist corporatism [*corporativismo*]".

to idea they had of it by reference to the meaning they gave to the word in the context of pure unionism, they more or less concluded that we were quite "backward" and much more "revolutionary" in word than in deed. And the best thing was that some of our comrades - whose previous experience of trade unionism had been definitively integrated into the set of ideas inherent in fascist corporatism - almost seemed, through a kind of momentary reappearance of that past which had been theirs, to listen with embarrassment to this reproach formulated by the French, since they felt the need to remind them that the Fascist Revolution is at present far from "finished, that it knows well how still separates it from the realisation of its own objectives : as if the latter were precisely those of left-wing trade unionism, to which the observations and judgements of the French congressmen more or less referred.

The equivocation also persists among certain so-called Italian "theorists" of corporatism, who want to be considered "integral corporatists", discoverers of the internal logic of fascist corporatism - even though, with all their smoky dialectic of "idealist" obedience, they are nothing more than stragglers in the convoy of true fascist corporatism, which is advancing at a steady and "revolutionary pace, in a direction quite different from the one they would like to see and which, consequently, they advocate.

That's why it's a good thing that clear, precise reference points have been set once and for all. There is a revolution whose point of departure was the Jacobean revolt, whose extension was **Marxism** and whose conclusion was sovietism. This direction is it is, it has very specific features and an unequivocal meaning. As an ideology, it is defined and not open to new developments, but at most to adaptations and compromises imposed by circumstances.

- something which, by a backlash, **is in the process of being**

in Russia itself. Ideally, such a

The "revolution" is bloodless. It is a twilight phenomenon at the end of a cycle that no longer speaks to us at . Those who, on the other hand, are "revolutionaries" in the sense given to the word revolution in fascism, have left this experience behind: for them, it represents the past, not a "preliminary" phase which should more or less continue, but a deviation which has been overcome. The fundamental principle of fascism *is of a different nature*, it not have as its point of departure at all the

"Hence a spirit that imparts a different meaning, even to institutions which, from an external point of view, i.e. abstract and mechanical, might have some affinity with the systems proposed by socialism on basis of a diametrically opposed conception of existence and life in society.

This is why, when more or less declared trade unionists and socialists reproach us for being "behind the times", every conscious fascist should reply that those who are "behind the times" today *are precisely they*; that the point they would like to see us reach is precisely *the point we left behind a long time ago*; that the "revolutionary" they would like to see in us is, on the contrary, the counter-revolutionary, and nothing else; that their invitation to move forward is ultimately an invitation to keep pace with... the crayfish.... the crayfish— to repeat and experiment with mistakes or, at least, positions that are incompatible with our Roman and Italian way of feeling positions that we have instinctively rejected and condemned.

" at our crisis national.

—
These are the terms in which the problem must be posed, without compromise: by setting ourselves the primary objective of laying down *principles* perfectly clearly, in order to prevent any *maacœuwe* on part of those who camouflage their intentions.

confusions, their errors and their unavowed inclinations behind the ostentatious declaration that corporatism is a purely technical field, themselves wishing to deal only with technical problems of an institutional and economic nature, keeping clear of all "abstractideological questions...

II

1936

CORPORATIONS AND LAWS OF HONOUR

The attempt to develop new forms of institution in an intermediary field, situated at equal distance from the public and the private, politics and sociology, law and ethics, is an aspect that is unique to the implementation of the National Socialist idea in Germany.

The definition of this intermediate zone is essentially based on a conception that is *both organic* and anti-individualistic. The corresponding reality should be the *corporation*, and its founding principle honour. In Italy, all this is not totally ignored, since such conceptions have already inspired several important laws in the new Germany, such as the law on the reintegration of the peasantry and the law on the organisation of companies and work. However, it cannot be said that the Italians have an in-depth knowledge of the premises and the general inspiration of which this legislation is only a consequence. This is why it will be interesting to say a few words a book which has just been published, the purpose of which is to provide a first systematic exposition of conceptions in this field, and to propose the subsequent legislative developments which these necessarily imply. This

book is entitled '*Dispositions d'honneur pour les corporations professionnelles* (*Bezufsständische E renordnungen*, Berlin-Leipzig, 1936); its author is Friedrich Everling, a former member of the Reichstag and a confirmed ideologue of the National German movement'.

We have translated *Stand* as "corporation, in the absence of a more appropriate Italian equivalent. A word of caution is therefore in order: this word must not give the impression that this Germanic ideology is anything like our corporate organisation. Insofar as some have thought it necessary to oppose the principle of the *Stand* to that of our corporation, a clarification is essential, especially as it will lead us directly to the idea at the heart of the system, which is precisely what we wanted to focus on.

Everling refers to the sociological distinction, now very fashionable in Germany, made by Ferdinand Tönnies*: the distinction between 'community' and 'society'.

- *Gemeinschaft* - and "society" - *Gesellschaft* - with "society" referring to any rational, mechanical unit, and "community" to any unit conceived as an organism and endowed with a real life of its own. While each of these two terms presupposes a group of associated individuals, "in society, these individuals remain divided even when they are united, whereas in the community they remain united in spite of any possible separation". In "society", the notion of personality applies only to the individual, the rest having the meaning of a more or less constructed order; in "community, a supra-individual form of personality is asserted.

Friedrich Everling was one of the collaborators of the *Dioram*" fiJosofico directed by Evola [Note by R.D.P.].

• Cf. Ferdinand Tönnies, *Comaiuaauté et société*, tr. in French, P.U.F., 1944; second edition: Retz, 1977 (original edition: 1887). On Tönnies, see in particular Alain de Benoist, "*Coaunuaauté*" et "*société*", in *EU-meats*, 23, Sept.-Nov. 1977, pp. 3-9.

sonnality, conceived not as an abstraction, but as a reality, prior in fact and in law to the personality of the individual.

Now, it is precisely in the form of "communities" that corporations, as *Stände*, are conceived by the new German ideology; consequently, as "supra-individual persons" determined by selection (when they are qualified by birth - *Geburtsstände*) or by the division of labour, endowed with an organic life of their own, and also with an "honour" - this last principle being precisely the subject of our reflections. To be precise, here is the definition given by

Everling: "Corporations are a form of 'communité' in which the active members a nation are linked according to common objective of their very activity". Consequently, the *Stand* is neither the "class" of yesterday's liberal or Marxist conceptions, nor even our corporation, in which the theorists in question would tend to see a form of "society" rather than "community", since it is not so much an immedial and traditional form existence as a superior principle, ordering and harmonising production and work on a trade union-type basis. This is confirmed the new German labour legislation, which rejects the union element, thus eliminating the socialist paren- thesis, and seeks to restore to company its lost unity, in the form of solidarity between the bosses - who correspond to the old "Masters" - and their followers, who would be the workers. But, from this point of view too, we can see the ambiguity, or at least the problematic aspect, of the corporation as a *Stand* in practical terms, i.e. in the context of modern living conditions, production and the economy: in order to be cohesive, the corporation would have to identify itself with a kind of caste and be nourished essentially by principles of an ethical nature, of course, but also such that only a tradi- tion of the workers would be possible.

In this respect, it is clear that those who defend such concepts expect a great deal from the contribution that the practical application of racism will make to the new organisation of the German nation. On this point, it is clear that those who defend such concepts expect a great deal from the contribution that the practical application of racism will make to the new organisation of the German nation, i.e. from the results of legislation hygiene and the purity of the race. As a matter of fact, "Blood and honour" is one of the most frequently used watchwords in this area. However, it can be observed that we are implicitly led to believe that "communities" that do not yet exist, or that have disappeared, can be born or reborn on the basis of measures that, at least in un premier temps, ne pourront être que

The term "social" is used in the sense of Tönnies. In reality, all measures relating social organisation, including laws for the protection of blood and provisions based on honour, cannot fail to appear, initially at least, as measures and laws formulated on the basis of ideas and principles which one would look for in vain in factual situations and in traditions that are more or less alive. It is therefore hoped, as in the case of an artificial incubation, that a new form of existence will emerge from it. As far as the success of the experiment is concerned, it is difficult to form an opinion one way or the other because, on a general level, it will be necessary to see to what extent we will succeed in setting very precise limits to modes of life and production, to a contemporary mentality which hold sway, including in Germany, and which are diametrically opposed to any attitude of the traditional type.

An initial divergence from the traditional spirit can be seen in the fact that the new concept does not envisage a hierarchy of "corporations", but simply a hierarchy *within* "guilds". Commenting on the new German legislation, Frauendorser wrote: "The guilds find themselves-

They therefore constitute a horizontal subdivision of the nation, while internally each is organised in a vertical sense". This is "equality before work conceived as a service", a principle is also in force in France.

Italy, where, similarly, we have failed to achieve a genuine-hierarchy of the various guilds, to which corresponded very precise relationships of rank and subordination, depending on the quality of the particular forms of activity.

As set out by Everling, the German concept of corporate subdivision is essentially threefold: political organisation, culture and economy. The first corresponds to the organs of the State, i.e. the army and the "corporation" of civil servants. The cultural domain extends from the forms of national religious activity to the liberal professions. Finally, the economic sphere primarily comprised the agricultural guild, followed by the sectors grouped together in the Reich Chamber of Economics (industry, crafts, trade, banking, insurance and energy). The aim is to combine all these subdivisions into organic forms, entities corresponding to very specific modes of activity and life, with one common denominator: the ethical principle of *corporate* *fionoeur*, which must be expressed in as many specific forms under the protection of as many corporate provisions, codes and tribunals.

Everling focuses on corporations professional groups, which he defines as "partial units whose members are linked by a common way of life expressed in a common honour of the corporation" (p. 22). In this context, Everling's use of traditional sentimental concepts is clearly visible. For example, he warns from the outset that the profession must correspond to effective training of the personality: it must prepare and complete this training, rather than being a simple utilitarian skill, cut off from the way of life.

to be proper to the person exercising it. "In this way, the danger of becoming collectivist. The

The organic concept is not in itself an enemy of personality: quite the contrary. It calls for the total fulfilment of the personality, but as a function of the whole". Achieving this requires the individual to come into contact with tradition, conceived as a form activity but also of life, specific to a given professional corporation, in which the individual must be able to recognise his own vocation and his own way of being, and which he must therefore make his own.

Once you have joined a corporation, there is a differentiation and a plurality of degrees, which must not be confused with each other. not to ~~be~~ to purely materialistic elements, but to envision the value of personality as being as essential as all the others. Everling quite rightly observes that rank is nowadays positively determined by the amount of pay whether honorarium or salary— and many people joke about what they see as a "hollow title". Although — Everling does not specify the exact criterion, his idea of a "corporate" dignity and ranks which have a value in themselves, founded on the virtues service, honour and loyalty, alien to any self-interested or material motivation— seems to us to be an idea worthy attention. Achieving, in all areas, the construction of an authority and power that are, so to speak, ascetic, and not susceptible being defined by what is completed, sold or won, seems to us to be the inalienable task of all reconstruction.

In relation to the notion, mentioned above, of lifestyles and actions in which people recognise themselves and of which they are proud, professional "guilds" obviously make "honour" a fundamental principle. Everling gives the following definition: "Honour the value of a person in a given environment, a value that is measured in terms of what that person represents

for this environment, that is to say, of his qualification and the fulfilment of his duty". Such a definition gives rise to a number of considerations aimed at elevating honour to the status, not a mere sentiment, but of a normative principle giving rise to *sui generis* legislation. This where organic aspirations find their way into law. The two basic principles on which the social order rests - morality and law - need to be better articulated. Basically, the subject of these principles is the private individual as an isolated facet of abstract general norms: rights, duties and responsibilities are things that an individual must have at his disposal, including in a more differentiated and concrete framework, directly linked to the professional manifestations of his personality, which must always underpinned by an ethical principle and by a sense of responsibility.

"value'. This gives rise to the idea of a series of interlocking legal authorities, ranging from the universal to the particular, and correlating with the differentiation of the very notion of honour. At the top is human honour in general, with its own specific requirements; then comes the honour of being a civilised man; then racial, national, family and professional honour, the honour of the sex to which one belongs and, finally, the honour of rank, which must be interpreted as inherent in the particular position occupied by the individual within the professional corporation of which he is a member. The principle of "*Noblesse oblige*"* should apply to each of these degrees, and determine qualifications and disqualifications accordingly. That these different areas of honour do not always form concentric circles and that, as a result, the various standards of honour can only be partially superimposed and harmoniously intertwined, Everling sincerely acknowledges: ü provides for ten-

• In French in IC tChte [N.D.T.)-

sions and conflicts, but believes that they will be all the less serious and insurmountable the more the institutions conform to a truly organic principle.

In this respect, there is one principle that differentiates the new

The spirit of the corporation must be such that everyone feels proud of the one of which they are a member and considers it, in a way, to be the most important of all. The spirit of the corporation must be such that everyone feels proud of the one of which he is a member and considers it, a way, the most important of all; the presence and effectiveness of a higher principle of loyalty, however, prevents the development of particularisms or "centrifugal" tendencies. Everling also alludes to the constitutional guarantees needed to satisfy this aspiration. We know, moreover, that in the new German labour legislation, companies, constituted as so many feudal units, have councils which must include a manager directly appointed by the State, a manager who exercises to a certain extent a liaison and control function based on a political principle of national interest, which corresponds to the function also existing in Italian corporations.

Everling repeatedly insists on the professional guild as a way of life: membership must correspond to a kind of *indelebilis character*, so that rank and the principle of honour must be retained by individuals, even when they cease exercise an effective activity in the way that rank and a certain lifestyle, a certain behaviour, remain attached to the true officer even when he no longer renders service. The code of honour of each guild will therefore set out its requirements and decree its sanctions with regard to active members, but also inactive members, those who no longer practise their profession.

For this code, the principle *nulli in ciuim sine lege* cannot be applied; this code demands the principle *iustitiam cri-men sine poena*. It cannot, in fact, be a question of a law

The criterion is not a positive one, based on certain facts and certain failings, but a criterion which is essentially concerned with "behaviour" more or less in keeping with honour of the corporation, a behaviour which must be examined in the individual's professional activity, but also in corporation as a whole.

of his life. Almost always, we are talking here a *delictum innominatum*, which can only be established by a *tradition*, not a definition. It is therefore less a code than a particular sensibility, which reflects the ethical level of a corporation at a given time. Honour therefore differs not only from one guild to another, but also from one era to another, and it is tradition that must safeguard it. "The older and more closed a professional guild— writes Everling , the less it needs casuistical prescriptions to meet the demands of its own honour. And the closer a guild is to political power, the more developed its self-nomination, the more typical its way of life , the more stringent the demands of its honour".

As far as the legal aspect is concerned, each corporation will have to have its own court of honour, looking after the education its members and the protection its purity.

Its measures will therefore be both corrective and purifying, and will be limited to the perpetual expulsion of the guilty member of the corporation. Because of the concentric nature of the various legal frameworks and areas of honour referred to above, in the event that the act or fault also falls under the rigours of a broader law, for example criminal law, the judgement of the court of honour will take precedence over any other judgement, and the guilty party will only be the subject of a further judgement as a degraded member, disqualified and excluded from the corporation.

In Germany today, there a growing trend to introduce e@ics into criminal law, by reducing the various offences to variants a single offence, generically described as "*inRdelity*".

Veruntreuung or

breach of honour. This is another effect of the conception 'organic-idealistic. Legislation for the reintegration of the peasantry, which once again required the peasant to enter into kind of feudal commitment and to be qualified for his position, on pain of penalties could go as far as expropriation; labour legislation, which made fidelity the fundamental principle governing the dependence of workers on company managers; racial legislation, which punished marriage or divorce as an offence of treason against the order of the race. even simple sexual union with Jews or people of other faiths.

are all manifestations of the same trend in Germany. Everling's work is certainly influenced by common aspirations, which in many areas have already been fulfilled, for example in the guild of army civil servants through solid institutions.

It is not difficult to admit that trends this kind have real value, if we compare them with all that is anonymous, mechanical, anodyne, legal and rationalist in the political and social life of the most recent West. But the ultimate, *spiritual* meaning of reforms of this kind - their absolute meaning not their relative, political and social meaning - is still rather problematic in the current state of affairs in Germany.

In Everling's case, the uncertainty is easy to dispel, since he a pure traditionalist who makes no secret of his indebtedness to the aristocratic ideals of the old imperial Germany of the Roman-German Middle Ages. The same cannot be said of other representatives of the German revolution, who all too often, in their drive towards the future, end up forgetting the creative word that can come from the past and insist on rather suspect "" aspirations.

Indeed, when an entire system seeks to justify itself and base itself on the essentially spiritual act of fidelity, of which a sense of honour is the consequence, then the

the spiritual value of the whole ends up being measured in terms of what, in this ideal, serves as the supreme and exclusive point of reference at the centre of the hierarchy and of the overall system of dependency relationships.

In the Middle Ages, this hierarchy of dependencies had a clear meaning: as a general rule, we moved from the loyalty of the peasant and the craftsman to the loyalty of the nobility, the feudal lord, the prince of a nation, up to an immaterial loyalty granted to the supra-political and universal authority of the Empire. Today, the hierarchical chain is already half broken, and what remains of it is dissolving into uncertainty. But, by the same token, it is the inviolable and absolute nature of the bond of fidelity that is seriously undermined, the foundation of this inviolability being of a purely spiritual order, given, alone, by the supreme principles. However noble and legitimate they may be at their level, the political and social myths of a people cannot possess this value of supreme spiritual principles, and therefore cannot provide any solid guarantee that the organic conception will not degenerate, at some point, into a more or less collectivist conception, ending up inverting in its opposite pole its original requirement, spiritalism and personalism. In fact, the principle of free personality and that of its virile subordination in the name of 'fidelity' can only coexist and complement each other in turn by reference spirit and tradition, understood in a higher, aristocratic and transcendent sense.

This is why these new concepts are, for the time being, interesting from a theoretical point of view, including their ethical and legal aspects. From a practical and, at the same time, spiritual point of view, all judgements are pre-mature. It may be a good old wine put into new wineskins traditional rebirth, or a dubious new wine that attempts to ennobel and sell themselves by appearing in old-timer the wineskins of a noble tradition. Before deciding what to , we need to wait for the transformation to pass from the

current phase —of new patterns, new arrangements and new directives emanating from on high to something living. It will then be easy to understand the spiritual significance of this life, and therefore also of has evoked it and made it propitious beyond a world in crisis.

III

1938

THE ETHICAL VALUE AUTARKY

In our time, it is often the case that the force of circumstance and "positive causes", the latter of which are taken into account to such an extent in many circles, end up causing situations which, on the surface, only make sense in themselves, but which, to a more acute eye, are also likely to embody a higher value and thus rise above the order of pure contingency.

We have used the word "likely" quite deliberately, to indicate the "possibility" rather than the "necessity" of this higher meaning. There are many cases where destiny offers us something without our realising it and without our knowing how to take advantage of it. And in other cases just as numerous, whether in individual or collective life, the force of things acts like the breeder who, while having a genuine affection for a new horse, was forced to whip it regularly because it did not understand him, diligently completing all the parts of the exercise, but always stopping before the last obstacle, which it could easily have overcome, with a little effort, if it had understood. At a time when

is hypnotically fixed on the material plane, that of your Painful cases of this kind are very common in "positive reality": we get "blows" from all sides, without managing to *understand* and follow the right direction. The 'lessons of experience' serve to laboriously accumulate facts, to link them together in various ways according to our practical goals; they don't serve to make us grasp a text message, don't serve to *wake us up* and lead us, awake, towards the right reaction.

The famous phrase: "*the economy is notrc destiny*", is but the sad sign an era, unfortunately not yet entirely extinct. An obvious fallacy in any normal period of history and civilisation, this principle *became* true once man had destroyed, one after the other, all the traditional values and higher points of reference that had previously his decisions and actions. The omnipotence of the economy is merely a sign of abdication, just as, in hypnotic phenomena, the omnipotence of psycho-physical automatisms presupposes the sup- portance of the conscious faculties and, in general, of the personality.

Naturally, this principle, as a formula, has been overcome today, at least among right-wing currents. In Mussolini's words, "Fascism still believes in acts in which economic motive, near or remote, intervenes", and refuses to admit that economic developments alone, to the exclusion of all other factors, are sufficient to explain all history. Another well-known formula says that recognition of the power of the economy must go hand in hand with this: man is not the object, but the *subject* of the economy. All this is obvious, intuitive, natural. It's the opposite view, which has all the hallmarks of genuine ideological ano- maly.

In theory. In practice, things are unfortunate.

But, as Goethe warned us, "the spirits you evoke will not be so easily removed". So while, on the one hand, we can only condemn the principles of idealist renewal, on the other, we are often forced to take into account very specific practicalities and this is an equally sacred commitment for anyone who does not want to cut their nation off from reality and lead it, in the short term, to ruin. The most tragic aspect of this kind of dualism is that it can degenerate into a veritable anomy: we are sometimes obliged to temporarily silence the idea or to make it wait, in the name of economic, financial or commercial forces demanded by the most fundamental interests of the nation. Idea and reality do not always run parallel in contemporary politics; this is of no consequence when the idea is a mere simulacrum, a mere myth, subordinate to Mammon; it is a serious matter, on the other hand, when it is truly an idea.

Anyone looking back over the last few years will be convinced that autarky, rather than a principle, is the necessary consequence of a certain general political and economic situation. For many people it still represents a real scandal, which is why it's important to take a closer look at it.

rationality is seen,

by these people, in the "division of labour", in an exchange with a sufficient margin of freedom, on the basis of a "fair deal".

customs equalisation. It's absurd," we say.

on, to constitute from the outset a system whereby certain peoples are obliged to imagine all sorts of resources and tighten their belts in order to live "in autarky", while others are struck down by their very wealth. It follows that autarky seen as a "creation of necessity", determined by the violent and intentional intervention of politics in the economy.

The ease with which (such) a point of view, to the indubitable materialistic overtones, can be overturned is, in

surprising truth. You might well ask whether the

system opposed to autarky, the one deemed free, would be "It would be nothing other than a system in which the raw fact of a certain economic power is used as the basis for a decision. The superior power of a few peoples - a power based, above all, on the possession of raw materials - would enclose other in the unbreakable net of passive dependence, precisely through the "fatality" and "rationality" of the "normal" economic process. From a higher point of view, this would exactly the most repugnant of illogicalities; a subjugation more brutal than that of any personalised tyranny.

The peoples who today refuse allow themselves to be caught up in the cogs and wheels of such a system, and who have adopted self-sufficiency as their principle, are peoples who have already awakened to something spiritual, peoples who are sensitive to values that cannot be purely reduced to those of the stomach and what depends on it: and this is already the beginning of a liberation. If it is necessity that has led them to this situation (and we must also include in necessity everything that has to do solely with political realism), we must recognise that necessity, in this case, has fulfilled precisely that providential function we spoke of at the beginning, and that it is enough take one more step in order to rise, through a just reaction, to an effectively spiritual consciousness.

Autarky' etymologically means 'having one's own principle within oneself'. The Ancients said only those who have their own principle within are free. The whole question revolves around the meaning of this freedom. The current interpretations are well known: they are based on the financial sphere, on the one hand, and the military sphere, on the other. Economic autarky guarantees us a margin of freedom with regard to monetary policy, allowing us to set and defend our currency. Without economic independence, the conduct of a modern war is seriously compromised; it becomes something akin to a game of chance that succeeds on the spot (à brief).

The technical and military equipment required for modern warfare is not self-sufficient, even if we disregard the possibility of a blockade.

These are two excellent reasons. But the third, and in our view the most important, is overlooked. Autarky has the value of a principle, in the highest sense of the term, because it is the *conditio sine qua non* a freedom of alliances and enmities on a basis that is not materialistic (realistic), but ethical. It is obvious that the more a nation succeeds in living in economic autarky, the more it will be able to follow an idea, or even an ideal, in all its foreign policy; in other words, the greater its ability to designate friend or foe regardless of the most trivial occasion or the most brutal necessity. Autarchic nations would therefore be the only ones able to form fronts justified by true principles, by ideal and spiritual affinities, rather than by a simple and changing convergence of interests. Of course, one thing does not exclude the other, and the ideal condition would undoubtedly be achieved if the two plans were to coincide. In all cases of imperfect coincidence, unlike the sly epoch of materialism and economism, from which we are in the process of extricating ourselves, and which was characterised by a cynical, cold and immediate subordination of the idea to interest, the new epoch, if it is not to betray itself, and if it is to truly deserve to be called new, will be characterised by the opposite principle, that , by an active decision by nations, a decision coming from above, on the basis of the possibilities of independence and mobility that derive from the maximum degree of autarky sensibly achievable in each them.

The day we achieve this, *positive* side of autarky will become fully apparent. And if at first this principle was practically imposed us from outside and demanded effort and discipline from us, the new

anti: ude :is-us p'rr tileti ra to judge the thing from a point of x ne emu
di t'l'errit: la ce rrcit ioin e.xercée par l'" histoire soi a c un pi ise c'
mime le .seul moyen qui était à disposi-

: *ri tx*ur cv-ii terer to a higher in.stinct, still incons- ent fr s'*i. a
preiiiiier sense of the right direction.

IV

1940

THE LIMITS SOCIAL JUSTICE

"As Lenin saw it, the human race was divided into two species by a horizontal plane: the exploiters or the full and the exploited or the deprived. The only reason for this separation lay in the womb, and there was no room for the spirit, no divine or satanic inspiration (...) Lenin's specifically materialistic and Darwinist error was to have ignored the fact that while the human body is the brother of the beasts, the soul, about which he wanted to know nothing, is the sister of angels, good or bad. Because of this, in contrast to what happens in the animal world and in accordance with what Scripture implies, the spiritual element has primacy, and what really divides Adam's posterity since Cain and Abel is not the struggle for life or the class struggle, but the war between the good angels and the bad angels, which has been going on since the beginning and will continue unabated until the consummation of the centuries.

These sentences by Count Emmanuel Malynski, if we put

Emmanuel Malynski-Léon de Poncins, *La guerre œœufie*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1936; quotation from the non-commercial edition: Paris, 1940, pp. 239-240 [N.D.T.J.]

apart from their mystical side, deserve to be meditated upon, not only to penetrate the essence of Judeo-Communist materialism, but also to "rectify" tendencies which, opportunely masked, often appear in theories and movements of an entirely different type.

There is too much talk, for example, of "social justice", and few people have the courage to highlight the disparate and often contraband content of this term in different cases. That 'justice', along with 'freedom, is one of the most abused terms in democratic jargon, for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of subversion and the establishment of new and worse forms of tyranny (as the 'dictatorship' of the proletariat teaches us), is something known, and something that should give us pause for thought. Let there be no illusions: for a long time now, 'justice' is spoken of, it is not *aequitas* but *aequalitas* that is meant: not true justice, expressed by the classical Roman principle *suum cuique*, to each his due - naturally, according to differences in nature, dignity and function, but the opposite, the prevaricatory claim that everything should be made equally available to all.

But, as we have already said, egalitarianism is only a transitional phase and an instrument of subversion: it serves to level the playing field. Once the foundations of a previous hierarchical order have been destroyed in the name of "justice", once the barriers have been eliminated, another order is formed, which is the counterfeit and inversion of the first, like a pyramid whose point is at the bottom. In addition to what has already been said about the "dictatorship of the proletariat", expressing a power which has in no way been "socialised" but which has become the monopoly of the lowest strata, the case of Judaism is eloquent. The Jew, too, demanded and obtained emancipation in the name of 'justice' and 'equality'. Once free, far from

to assimilate and to work "as equals" alongside the non-Jew, he passed on his back and occupied, in many-

countries, albeit in sometimes invisible form, the pos-
important controls. social, political and cultural

In any case, it is easy to see that, even in the most favourable cases, the formula of "social justice" undeniable links with the Marxist materialist premises denounced by Malynski in the extract quoted above. Of course, it is fair fair in the human sense and in the most elementary way that per-

No one suffers from hunger, while others are fed and satiated by the product of their labour. But it is difficult for those who aim to achieve such

These demands do not have another ideology of their own, one that is in- vated and all the more important for them: the desire of the masses to conquer envied positions, to seize the same goods, despised in the person of another class, but coveted, considered to be just as essen- tial and decisive.

There has been much talk, precisely in connection with the formula of "social justice", of "deproletarianising the worker and the peasant". But this is almost always the wrong approach. The real "deproletarianisation" would consist in leading the worker and the peasant back to themselves, detoxifying them from the envy, the thirst, the ambitions and the artificial and unnatural needs aroused in them classist ideology. This would be tantamount to helping them find their way back to the dignity of their functions within the whole a well-differentiated hierarchical organism. On the contrary, in many , social justice con- sists of welcoming people sometimes out of fear, sometimes out of recklessness, sometimes out of compromise anti-national and "modernaspirations, inoculated into the masses by socialism and similar subversive ideologies: the —

"Deproletarianisation" then means helping the working masses to "gentrify", to attain as far as possible a "bourgeois" standard of living, with its conveniences, its dis- tractions, its mediocrity - not to say outright spiritual flatness. The bourgeoisie is on trial,

but it is so that the proletariat can itself become bourgeoisie, so that it adopts, inevitably, the very defects and vices of the bourgeoisie'.

The spiritual factor does enter into all this in the least.

Wages, empty or full stomachs, rights or wrongs in terms of matter and economics, these are the only factors in the question.

And today it is very difficult to understand what was taken for granted in earlier times: that wealth and power have nothing to do with values and superiority; and since the former do not create the latter, they do not destroy them.

Nor do they feel or compromise them. It is a fact, moreover, that the 'deproletarianised', gentrified and urban element of Central Europe, despite its outward veneer

The "civil" man, with his pervasive impertinence, awareness of his "rights" and his "social function", represents a human type that is clearly inferior, from point of view of inner character and values, the Tyrolean craftsman, the Calabrian countryman, the Sardinian or Hungarian shepherd, whatever their poverty and often sad conditions of life and culture, whatever their weak desire to "rise. They are still human beings and are rarely wrong in their judgement of who is different them and truly superior to them. The others are human sawdust, a shapeless element, both impertinent and cumbersome.

It would therefore be advisable not to play with ambiguous formulas and to call everything by its proper name. Even in the polemic against bourgeoisie, the essential point has almost always **been overlooked**, namely the reference to the values and motivations that transcend the bourgeoisie.

On this subject, it would be useful to consult the works of Werner Sombart, especially *Le Juifs et la vie économique*, Payot, Paris, 1923; *Le bourgeois*, Payot, 1928 (since then, revised and updated edition in the "Petite Bibliothèque Payot"); *Le socialisme allemand*, Payot, Paris, 1938.

Fascism has explicitly declared itself to be in favour of. Reaching out to the people, to social justice, to the anti-bourgeoisie, etc., must not serve to circulate elites in the most banal parochial sense, that of one class passing over the back of another, replacing it, while losing its original and natural qualities in order to acquire all the characteristics and vices of other class.

And we need to be even more careful when we talk about "social justice" at international level, so that the same equivocation does not recur and so that, once again, materialistic motivation does not come to constitute *the only* justification. The right of peoples who "have no space" is a human right. But let us not confuse things, let us not confuse one right with another, and let us not reduce the dialectic of nations to an exchange, *mutatis mutandis*, of roles. Neither the fact of having more, nor a *fortiori* the fact of not having more or having less, is a legitimate title to power and supremacy, either the order of a particular race or in the order of a group of races.

The only legitimate title to power and supremacy is superiority.

V

1940

TRIAL OF THE BOURGEOISIE

There has been so much controversy over the last few years about the bourgeoisie that the idea a survey on this subject, in order to arrive at something solid and conclusive, must surely be considered opportune. This is the aim of a recently published work entitled *Pzocesso ella Bozghesia'*, which brings together a series of essays by various authors, mainly under the direction of Edgardo Sulis. We shall see what these essays are about, and to what extent their conclusions are acceptable. But we must point out that, even in the case of these authors, who do not belong to the *cliques* - the "official third pages" - an "individualistic" way of proceeding, unfortunately typical of our culture, is confirmed: we mean that each person takes a position according to his or her own convictions and views, instead of there being a collective work, taking up the results obtained by those who have already done some research, either to criticise these results and show that they are "wrong" or "wrong".

Edizioni di Roma. 1939-XVIII.

- In French in the text.
- In Italian dailies, the third page is always devoted to 'cultural' issues.

or to develop them and go further in their development.
constructive way. This has manifested itself and manifests
itself

Again, for example, for the problem of race or for the Jewish question; and this applies, once again, to the polemic about the bourgeoisie. By way of a simple example, we would point out that for a long time now, both in these columns and in the *Fascist Regime*³, we have had the opportunity to provide elements of a traditional order which can facilitate a sure orientation for the problem of the bourgeoisie and its overcoming. But it is as if this had not been written, in

On this point, too, everyone goes their own way, without taking into account what has already been specified or, at least, prepared.

To return to the book, let's say that it begins with a The "identification of the accused", who would be the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is defined as "enemy no. 1 of the fascist revolution", which leaves room for the legitimate question of whether Bolshevism and communism, which until recently held this honorary title, have lost it, and since when. It is true that several contributors to the book establish a certain link between the bourgeoisie and Marxism. The distinction, however, remains and must remain: communism is the final and conclusive phase of the evil of which bourgeois culture was a preliminary stage or a less acute form. In nations where Bolshevism is no longer an internal danger, the title of Enemy No. 1 can certainly pass to the bourgeoisie: but, especially in such uncertain times from the international point of view as the present, care must be taken not to confuse the two, to the point of

^o That is, in the monthly *La Vita italiana* [Note by R.D.P.].

³ See, for example, Evola's article *Il nostro -onte antiborghese*, published on 3 April 1934; reprinted in the anthology *Diorama Fùosoñco. Pro- blemi delto spirito nell'etica fasciste*, vol. I, 1934-35, Europa, Rome, 1974, p- 39-42 [Note by R.D.P.].

believe, for example, that in certain cases the fight against Bolshevik nations can be neglected because it is more important to bring down bourgeois-democratic nations.

In the identification of the accused, the bourgeoisie is said to be It's the "daughter of Luther and the French Revolution". This is true, but incomplete. We would gladly add the Communes to our list of paternity, for therein lies the most obvious beginning of the evil whose ultimate consequences we are now suffering. We are therefore surprised that none of the authors of the volume has alluded to this point. Is this to be attributed to the lingering prejudice of this purely Masonic "national history", which sees the rise and revolt of the Communes as a national episode, and not as a pure phenomenon of anti-traditional subversion, having nothing to do with a homeland? By neglecting this point, the authors of the book let slip the best points of reference for the problem: for as soon as we define the bourgeoisie as

"If we not refer to the aristocratic-feudal, anti-humanist, ascetic and warlike type of civilisation, of which the Communes were precisely the clearest antithesis, it will be in vain to arrive at precise ideas.

Let's turn now to the first essay, by Sulis: here, the most accurate idea is that the bourgeoisie is born when feudal aristocracy declines, and that what already meant decadence for the aristocrat becomes ideal for the bourgeois. On this last point, the author is thinking above all of economic values, property and wealth, which are going to supplant the true and legitimate forms of power and be accompanied a harmless, impersonal system, capable of guaranteeing pre-eminence and influence without the need to assume any risk or responsibility. On the one hand, the economy, which has become the fundamental force of existence; on the other, the 'convenient life', guaranteed by the 'easy life'. and laws that are always sufficient to ensure that the-
the bourgeoisie to act and develop in a flexible way.

lop off its parasitic, or at least sedentary, activity without being exposed to danger.

This presentation by Sulis is fair; fair is also the observation that Marxism, at bottom, only the bourgeoisie in order to take its place, the type of aspirations and the ideal of the worker now being bourgeois - to the point where Sulis comes to say that there is, today, only the bourgeoisie, in the double form of the owner bourgeoisie and the proletarian bourgeoisie. But the author starts to make mistakes as soon as he talks about the notions of "class" and "people" and when he studies the antidotes. "Fascism will bury the notion of class by driving the bourgeoisie back into the people, unlike democracy, which drove the people into the bourgeoisie (...)(...) You cannot fight the bourgeois if you have not first changed the bourgeois system, if you have not first opposed the with an aristocracy that conquers the means of the bourgeoisie, to give them back the public character from which they were stripped, if you have not first sent the bourgeois class back to the people where it was born and to which it must return". Once the bourgeois class has been dissolved back into the people, according to Sulis, a new aristocracy will emerge from the people, aware of its political responsibility and exercising a public function.

It's all very unclear. As with Mussolini, for us too, the "people" is a "mysterious entity" in which we have no faith whatsoever, it's just a word in the jargon of demagogic agitators; in reality, either the people is a passive substance which belongs to those who know how to take it, or it is the final phase of a process of social disintegration and levelling. To speak of "classes" in relation to "the people", whether to deny or to affirm them, is to succumb, even without knowing it, to the Marxist mentality. Classes are nothing more than the degenerate derivative of those very different things, in the traditional world, were castes or similar articulations, determined not artificially, but by the very nature of the people.

lement, but by the difference in nature, dignity and function of beings. To think of abolishing classes and simply allowing the pairing of "people and rulers" to remain is to go no further than the collectivist level of the tyrannies of the people and the tribunes of the people of Antiquity. Aristocracy only makes sense in an *articulated* social system, in which it occupies its rightful place, in the totality of the social order.

other degrees. It is not a question of dissolving the bourgeoisie into the mass, but of forcing it to take up its rightful place in normal social organisation, by preventing any inclination to prevaricate and any hypertrophic and parasitic development. In ancient Aryan societies, the bourgeoisie carried out its normal activities as a social stratum superior to that of the ordinary workers, but it was in turn subject to the warrior aristocracy and, beyond that, to the representatives of pure spiritual authority. Sulis writes: "Which aristocracy will be expressed by the people? It's easy to predict. It is the aristocracy of intelligence that will be expressed, that is to say, the aristocracy of absolute superiority over all other men". Words can be misleading, but we fear that Sulis, who considers intellectualism to be a bourgeois attribute, is falling prey a bourgeois ideal. What is the 'aristocracy of intelligence' if not the most typical of all anti-aristocratic ideals? Historically, it has been precisely the bourgeoisie's substitute for the ascetic and warrior ideals that defined the castes to which it should normally be subordinated and subjugated. Sulis, moreover, speaks "new and whole men" who guide the people against the bourgeois class. Frankly, none of this can lead beyond a mixture of humanism (remember the infamous humanist type of the *condottieri*) and Bolshevism.

In the second essay of the volume, Berto Ricci ⁴, while

From Berto Ricci, one of the best representatives of the 'young' generation.

reaffirming his "anti-classist" tendencies, took it upon himself to refute this idea of the "people", the importance of which we saw in the first article. "When pointing out the shortcomings and faults of the bourgeoisie, we must not fall into the deification of the people" Ricci rightly writes, showing how many different meanings there are to this abused word. Ricci sees the bourgeoisie as a category of the mind, a mentality, rather than as a way of thinking. a class: "Not heritage, but conduct, no longer occupation, but , the use of oneself and one's own resources". " L.-. bourgeois is in us, in each one of us, with his renunciations and ambitions, his way of quibbling and doubting, individual, family and class peculiarity, his thirst for wealth, his fear especially of poverty; his fear of courage ; its piquet habits; its lukewarm shower of arrangements; its foreignness to physical life and to what civilised man needs of nature if civilisation is not to turn into the most petty barbarism". We can agree with all that, even if we remain here in a rather generic framework. The discourse becomes more concrete when the author addresses the question of the measures to be taken. Ricci declares that it is essential for the anti-bourgeois struggle to dethrone wealth, to ensure that the social hierarchy no longer consists of economic privilege: "Above all, to give people the feeling that wealth is not everything, or even much. But for that to happen, private wealth must be worth very little; it must be of little use; little must be achieved with it, both in terms of material goods and in terms of authority over people".

Ricci makes another correct observation when he states that it is not capitalism as a whole that is bour-

generation of "imperial" fascism, a contributor to *PopoJo d'Imh'a*, a member of the School of Fascist Mysticism (he took part in the 1940 symposium organised by the latter), who died in htros during the Second World War, the publisher Volpe published *Prose e ritmi* (Note by R.D.P.).

capitalism, in its classical period, had its own spirit of adventure and conquest. This is what Sombart', in a well-known work, has clearly shown.

in relief. But, once again, it is impossible to com-

The true meaning of this aspect of capitalism can only be grasped if we refer to the law of caste regression, to which we have so often drawn attention. These avenging features of the capitalist bourgeoisie derive, through degradation and reduction to the level of the economy, from the values and spirit proper to the caste and culture of the warrior aristocracy, and this happens when effective power passes from the latter to the caste immediately below it, to the bourgeoisie.

Ricci's idea, which we have just been talking about, is expressed in the following essay by Icilio Petrone:

"To call an American billionaire who risks a large part of his income on the stock market or in a risky business venture bourgeois is absurd. Whatever the morals of this man and his adventure, he has nothing to do with bourgeois morals". What we said above makes it possible to pinpoint the truth of this statement: the bourgeois element remains, because it is the plane of the economy, of economic action, which defines it; but, in the case in question, values are at work which have descended, by involution, from the higher, heroic and spiritual plane, to the bourgeois level and mode of being, i.e. essentially linked to the economy. Given that Petrone's essay begins with the formula "the bourgeoisie is an effect, not a cause", we are left a little disappointed not to find an adequate investigation into the real cause of the bourgeoisie - that is to say, the teratological growth of the bourgeoisie and the power it has usurped. As a particular observation, it is true that "in order to purify the air of the bourgeois mind, it is necessary to

° Cf. Le b-urgeoü, Payot, 1928 and note 2 of the previous article on *The limits of "social justice"* [Note from R.D.P.].

would sweep away I don't know how many modern world's bureaucratic superstructures". But we are not

agree with the solution proposed under this form :

"The more freedom the fascist revolution grants to genius and intelligence, the more we shall proceed, without even needing to shout it out, to the liquidation of the bourgeoisie". We repeat that "genius" and "intelligence" themselves idols and superstitions of the bourgeois epoch, the watchwords of a civilisation of parvenus.

The bourgeoisie can only be overcome by going back the world which, in the traditional hierarchical order, stands above the bourgeois: and this superior world is made up of warriors and ascetics, not of 'geniuses' and intellectuals, both of whom are mere 'humanist' appendages of a bourgeois-type civilisation.

Roberto Pavese's essay is constructive on two points in particular: firstly, when he defines the bourgeoisie, which is the subject of the current controversy, as essentially a middle class, which brings together elements from the lower classes as well as the wrecked or shipwrecked members of the upper classes, united by a preference for material goods and by a typical agnostic and rationalist mentality. "The bourgeoisie is a spiritual half-breed, the result of a cross between an aristocracy that has lost its sense of spiritual values and a plebeian class that has not yet acquired this sense". The second point - a fundamental one - that Pavese is the only one of the contributors to the book to have made clear, is that the bourgeoisie and its advent remain

* In French only.

⁶ The philosopher Roberto Pavese was a great friend of Evola's and a contributor to both *La Torre* and *Diorama ñlosolico*. In the complete reprint of the collection of the first journal (*Il Palco*, Milan, 1977), see his article *Per una soluzione integrale deJ probleme della morte delle razze*, pp. 193-197; in the partial edition of *Diorama* (1974), see his article *Problemi dei nostri tempi*, pp. 324-328 (Note by R.D.P.).

very closely linked to the modern vision of the world, determined essentially by the myth of scientism. This is really the fundamental point. It was the vision of the world and of civilisation that increasingly prevailed in the West from the Renaissance onwards, a desacralised, secular, material, positivist vision, that provoked the crisis of the previous heroic, spiritual and aristocratic civilisation.

the bourgeoisie's every move.

social and intellectual. But it is a pity that, in his essay, Pavese did not develop this point as he should have done; some of his expressions could even be misleading. This is the case, in our opinion, when Pavese, in the chapter on antidotes, speaks simply of

He is also referring to the "religiosity" and the need to "believe" apart from the fact that "the touchstone of our race must no longer gold, but iron, and even the steel of our daggers and our hearts". It is true that Pavese also evokes a

"We are well aware, in his works, he tried to make a positive contribution to this new conception. However, we do not believe that the essential point can be achieved by synthesising a philosophical system, even a finalist one, which is fully and consciously dependent on the spiritual element, and 'religion' it is conceived in the West today. We believe, with Guénon, that it would be better to make a *tabula rasa* and ask ourselves the serious problem of knowing to what extent an effective return to the traditional spirit and to the traditional vision of the world⁷ is still possible today. Alberto Luchini's essay is aware of the conditions

⁷ For the specific meaning of the word 'traditional' used here, we refer the reader to Guénon's *La crise du monde moderne*, Bossard, Paris, 1927, or to our *Rivolta contro il mondo moderno*, Hoepli, Milan, 1934.

Alberto Luchini, head of the Office of Race at the Ministry for Popular Culture, who is well versed in traditional sciences, had planned to

necessary for an anti-bourgeois reaction. 11 rightly calls Mussolini's words the "scalpel formula": "The creed of the bourgeois egoism, the creed of the fascist is heroism"—adding: "Bourgeois and anti-bourgeois are therefore only spiritual categories, and everything else is just a way of gargling.

Without forgetting the words of Our Lord

Jesus Christ on the great difficulties for the rich to enter the Kingdom of Heaven". And also: "Either we act in the name of an empirical, precarious ego that could not be further from the truth. Or you act in obedience to God's law. *Tertium non datur*".

This clarification, which reminds us of the need for a transcendent point of reference, is very timely. There are many ways of being a hero, and you can be a hero in the name of so many things. Visit

The "martyr" of subversive revolutions, the gangster who stands up to an entire group of police officers, the soldier who fights for the cause of democracy, the crusader, the fanatic of a savage tribe, etc., are all heroes. It is therefore a question of seeing what the heroic capacity is to sacrifice one's life immediately. It is only when a transcendent, well-defined point of reference is added to this that heroism, which was profane, so to speak, becomes sacred and we really come into contact with the values that defined the castes and the higher civilisations, as opposed to bourgeois values.

In 1942, he and Evola founded the journal *Sangue e spirito*, which never saw the light of day due to the hostility of certain Catholic circles, allied representatives of the "materialist" racism then expressed in the journal *La Difesa della Raza* (cf. J. Evola, In *Chemin du Cinabre*, Archè-Arkto, Milan-Carmagnole, 1983, pp. 153-154). Luchini, too, collaborated in the last period of his career.

of this initiative, to *Dior ne ñlosorco*; see, for example, his articles *Razzismo y: iudaico, tedesæ, italiano* (15 February 1939), *Nascifa c durata deJia "razzn fasciste"* (15 July 1941), *Razza interne e dirersitd raz- mali estemc* (22 March 1942) and *Contro l'attesismo" antirazzista* (16 iuin 1943) (Note by R.D.P.).

This awareness of the highest aspects of the anti-bourgeois problem is also expressed by Luchini in what he says about Bolshevism. He clearly sees that bourgeois decadence is a transitional phase which, in the continuity of the process of fall and with the essential help of scientism, rationalism and atheism, leads fatally to the last stage, Bolshevism, the concrete and historical equivalent, for Luchini, of the reign of the Antichrist. This is the limit of the involutive process, "the scientific organisation of the revolt of the lower against the higher": we arrive at a degradation that, more human, is diabolical. But we don't agree with Luchini's use of the word 'people', or even the expression 'people's state' (to designate the fascist, anti-bourgeois state). It is true he hastens to specify

"But isn't this a misuse of language? But isn't this a misuse of language? Etymologically, *populus* referred to the mass of participants in the political comices of Antiquity, or to all the soldiers in certain meetings, as opposed to their way of presenting themselves in distinct formations in other circumstances. It is therefore the 'collective' aspect of a given group, as opposed to the same group when we consider essentially the differences and therefore also the hierarchies. We need to be aware of the trap secretly set by certain words and refuse to make concessions to incompatible ideologies by retaining, albeit with changes in meaning, the terminology or, better still, the jargon.

Omero Valle's essay is interesting for its useful details and for the emphasis it places on traditional views. "In the Middle Ages it was said: you're powerful ? so you're rich. The age of the bourgeoisie reverses the positions: you're rich? so you're powerful. This apparent wordplay contains a profound diversity of concepts.

Whereas the qualification of powerful concentrates spiritual, personal and inalienable values,

itself
as

strength, audacity, valour, that of the rich identifies the elements constituting personality and superiority with something extrinsic to man's nature". And

again: "The bourgeoisie is closed to faith, because the act of faith is a way of projecting oneself outside oneself, a sacrifice and a self-sacrifice, if necessary, for ideal ends without first establishing the amount of one's personal income, without the great problem, the eternal obsession of the bourgeoisie: is it really worth doing this? Faced with the classic dilemma of "your purse or your life", the bourgeois, paradoxically, would be the person who answered: "awaylife, but leave me my purse". His insurmountable limit is "don't lose your feathers". The bourgeois is the anti-feudal, just as the feudal is the anti-bourgeois par excellence. "In the Middle Ages, the political leader was not at all willing to be the merchants' delegate-counsellor".

Valle's observations on bourgeois idealist hypocrisy and the bourgeois work ethic are also relevant. On the former, he writes: "Marxism and historical materialism fell into the grave and naive error of declaring openly that they did not believe in historical values, including the value of the nation; the bourgeoisie immediately took advantage of this by crying foul and hiding its contraband under the label of ideals. This tactic, incidentally, has always **paid off** handsomely for the bourgeoisie. This is a very important point. The most dangerous bourgeoisie is precisely the hypocritically idealistic bourgeoisie, ready to seize on any ideal and to exalt any

The bourgeoisie will never accept any "noble principle", including those the fatherland, of self-rule and of order, as long it can continue to play its game, or at least as long it keeps its head above water. It has to be said again: it is this bourgeoisie which is the most dangerous for us, much more than the bourgeoisie which presents itself unmasked, with its materialism and agnosticism. This bourgeoisie is the cancer that still afflicts our nation, and whose extirpation is a matter of urgency.

so difficult, because of the mimetic capacity of this class.

Valle goes on to denounce as bourgeois the much-vaunted "work ethic", whose plebeian and Protestant origins are hard to dispute. "The bourgeoisie has always sung the praises of work with a loud voice. It couldn't be any other way; as soon as you see the world as a buy-sell relationship, those who have nothing to sell will give of themselves in the form of their , on pain of starvation. It is curious that the slogan "he who does not work does eat" is today the exclusive possession of Bolshevism. It would have a thousand titles to be that of the bourgeoisie... It has always stamped its contempt for work on the aristocrat and the free poor". But Valle opportunely points out as we have done on another occasion that the 'work' of this bourgeois myth and mercantile ethic is to be despised only because it represents the degradation and materialisation of higher forms of activity: , in the traditional world, all work could take on the character of 'action' in the sense of something unselfish, personalised, creative, today or, better still, in bourgeois-proletarian civilisation, all action is degraded into 'work', that is, as Valle writes, "a degrading effort, locked in the tragic circle of working to eat and eating to work, (which) becomes a pitiful slavery and remains on the level of the biblical curse from which man will try in vain to free himself. And it is precisely in this form and figure that the bourgeoisie, in its heart of hearts, conceives of work... Buying and selling are the norm and the measure. The bourgeois hatred, the false disdain and the repressed envy of the bourgeois for the qualities of the aristocracy of the blood, combined with the hypocritical apology for work, are the fruit of the fundamental impossibility of buying an attribute that is inalienable by definition". Valle thus comes close a traditional point of view and courageously denounces myths

which, even today, unfortunately find a certain number of credit.

As far as solutions are concerned, we agree with him that they must not be "Plato-nian". In fact, proclaiming the renunciation wealth, asceticism and the anti-market is precisely what the bourgeois would want in order to continue to assert himself and to live quietly in opposition to all this, relegating the anti-bourgeois to the clouds of mysticism, idealism and poverty. "Money does not elevate human materiality, which grows vice versa with renunciation, so let me carry all this cross and blessed are you, you poor, for the Kingdom of Heaven awaits you. And in the meantime he (the bourgeois) is thinking: die, I'll fatten up, I'll look after myself, I'll buy and sell as I please and when I please, because only the naive will believe your words. Behind my brand-name car, however I acquired it, is a whole consideration". Starting from the idea that wealth is not a value, but an instrument, Valle argues that human freedom must acquire the instruments for its own realisation and affirmation, and therefore also the power of gold. It is therefore a question of reconstituting forms of power and authority which, while not based on wealth or justified by it, nevertheless exercise an unchallenged domination over all the processes that have come so close to making the economy a fatal and primary reality human existence.

The last essay, by Federico Forni, takes us back to the theoretical domain, since it deals with "bourgeois science". First of all, it confirms, in passing, what we said about the subordinate character of everything "intellectual" in a traditional anti-bourgeois order. Forni recalls, for example, after

• 11 took part in the National Colloquium on Fascist Mysticism (Milan, 19-20 February 1940) [Note by R.D.P.].

Sorel, that the function of philosophers in the salons of the Ancien Régime was similar to that of jesters in the Middle Ages, and that the relationship between Frederick II and Voltaire, when studied according to original documents, shows that the King of Prussia made no great difference between an illustrious man this type and a domestic. It was precisely the bourgeoisie that created the myth of the aristocracy of thought, on an essentially rationalist and scientific basis, and the intellectual circles of the eighteenth , inspired above all by Freemasonry, prepared the ground for the revolutions that were to give power definitively to the bourgeoisie. Forni points out, however, that the bourgeoisie, which emerged to give concrete form to ideological abstractions in rigid schemes, was unable to withstand the crisis of values, and that this was its tragedy. After the apogee, constituted by the cult of the goddess Reason, by the religion of science, by the great era of positivism and the negation of the supernatural, begins a period of crisis and reaction, which ends with a loss of presence for most of the previous rationalist and scientist idols. But when Forni considers only the positive aspect of this new stage, we cannot follow him. In fact, most of the reactions in question, far from surpassing reason by referring to something truly superior to it, end up— by their irrationalist, voluntarist, naturalistic inclinations, by their worship of "life, of becoming, instinct and feeling on a plane even lower than that of reason: so , in the majority of cases, they give rise to new processes involution and dissolution, quite parallel to those which tend to "surpass" the bourgeoisie only to arrive at collectivism and the "bourgeoisie". only to arrive at collectivism and Bolshevism.

So it's not enough to say that the bacchanalia of the have come to an end. It remains to be seen who will succeed her. In contemporary movements of anti-rationalist reaction, it is very difficult to find a firm point of support in the distinction between the infrational and the rational.

supra-rational without this distinction, it is impossible to par-
nothing positive to come of it, nor to prevent falls to a
level— despite all appearances to be even lower. But we've
already had the opportunity to talk about all this on several
occasions.

The conclusion of the book, which serves as the "verdict" of the
trial against the bourgeoisie, is only two and a half pages long: it is
rather inadequate and simplistic. We
takes up the idea that the bourgeoisie must be sent back to the
people: an erroneous idea, because on the contrary, it is a question
of ensuring that the bourgeoisie becomes once again it should "be
in a traditional hierarchical system: linked, supportive and
subordinate to other very distinct human nuclei, devoted to other
activities, sometimes superior, sometimes inferior to those which
define the bourgeoisie. The next demand is for the abolition of the
Constitutions, the trench and wall of the bourgeois class and its
anonymous power. This too is equivocal: the destruction of the
Constitutions and, more generally, of all positive law, is also what
subversion, anarchy and Bolshevism demand, as part of the same
anti-bourgeois demand. For our part, we would propose a return to
jus singulare. It is true that it is said that the abolition of the
Constitutions should allow a true aristocracy to have a free hand,
since it should also subjugate the government of men to the
administration of things and subject economic processes to
political will. Since it is once again Sulis who is speaking, we must
once again point out the vagueness of his conception of aristocracy,
understood, now, as "revolutionary intelligence". Let us repeat that
it was essentially the encyclopaedism of the seventeenth century
that had this character. On the contrary, we should refer to the
principles and the way in which traditional teaching defines all
normal social organisation: by clearly seeing the values on the
basis of which the social body, which has today become a
shapeless and inarticulate mass, can once again acquire the features
a superior organism, to the par-

It is under these conditions that we will be able to get a true and definitive picture of the problem to which this book is devoted. Only under these conditions will it be possible to get a fair and definitive picture of the problem to which the work we have just referred is devoted.

VI

1940

MYTH AND REALITY IN THE ANTI-BOURGEOIS STRUGGLE

When we fuel political and cultural polemics by following this or that slogan, we are all too often concerned only with their journalistic and intellectual aspect. Little attention is paid to examining the effects they have, not on those who are used to cultural *routines** and who, for various reasons, often personal taste or expediency, may judge one position to be more or less interesting than another, but on those who neither write nor intellectualise, and who look at reality with simplicity.

The same applies to the famous anti-Bourgeois campaign. Apart from the political intellectuals themselves, Italian and Fascist circles were and still are interested in it, sensing the importance of problems of this kind for the new culture in the making: but when the time comes to compare the "myth" with reality, these circles often end up being perplexed.

On this subject, confirmation comes a series

• In French only.

observations, accompanied by a request for clarification, sent to us by a squadriste. These are considerations that deserve to be examined outside the of the

It is in this purely personal and private context that we realise the existence certain states of , which are certainly not felt by our correspondent alone. By way of premise, he wishes to emphasise that his per- plexity does not concern the presentation of the problem anti

bourgeois from a traditional and aristocratic point of view, our correspondent declares himself to be in agreement with an orientation of this kind and, more particularly, with our articles on this problem which have appeared in these columns or in *Aegime Fascista*. For him, was more a question of understanding, in the end, "what the precise objective of the campaign in the political conception and intentions of the regime".

It is claimed that this campaign is directed against the conception of life peculiar to the bourgeoisie. But, as our correspondent observes, the question is only apparently settled, because this conception of life is certainly not the exclusive possession of the bourgeoisie. Although it undoubtedly emerged with the bourgeoisie, this conception is now widespread among the great majority of the masses throughout the modern world, at least in the West. "Henceforth, therefore, the crusade should not be confined to the bourgeois front, but extended to nine-tenths of the nation, that is, to the masses. The campaign, on the contrary, seems to start from the supposedly untenable premise of a real opposition between the bourgeoisie and the masses. Indeed, who has ever criticised peasants or industrial workers for aspiring above all, like the bourgeoisie, to material well-being? Is there an essential difference between some, who dream of material pos-

In other words, in the monthly *Le Vite Italiann*. The article republished here, as was the next, was from Artlios signed by Evola under the pseudonym [Note by R.D.P.].

sion large package of shares, more fertile fields and higher salaries". and others, who want more, less tax

It is not easy to dispute the accuracy of these re-markings, as well as the logical consequence drawn from them by our correspondent: "Since, undeniably, bourgeois mentality is equivalent to the predominance of materialistic attitudes in life, the minimum of coherence would be, rather than launching an anti-bourgeois campaign, to talk about the gradual gentrification of the nation, a phenomenon of fatal importance which, although obvious, has never been the subject - it seems to me - serious examination".

This is very true. It must be admitted, even in our own country, we are still too much influenced by the demopro-letarian myth, which gratuitously attributes to the lowest strata of a nation qualities of which there is no trace in the higher strata: this is a remnant of Rousseau's naturalist optimism. But the course of recent history and the study of the true meaning of world Marxism show us that the truth' is quite different. In most uprisings by "the people", in the sense of the lowest classes as a whole, far from there being a realization of the values of a healthier, more natural, fairer life, there is a phenomenon of resentment and envy: they don't want something different; on the contrary, they want to enjoy a similar standard of living and similar privileges. From the sixteenth century onwards, we are not witnessing a genuine revolt of the masses against the bourgeoisie, but rather the conquest of the bourgeoisie's positions by the masses, in other words, their embourgeoisement. Even when they are not Red in the strict sense of the word, Marxism and related movements, far from relying on the healthy and specific values that the people, unlike the higher classes who are sometimes corrupted, can sometimes preserve, have been concerned awakening tendencies, needs, aspirations, ambitions, etc. in the people.

The result has to generate all kinds of unrest and disorder and, in the best of cases — when the movement has not encountered rigid obstacles - to enrich the ranks of the through cooperation, to the point of improbability.

Using positive and convincing examples, our correspondent expresses the same idea: "Under the effect of the incessant rise in the standard of living of the masses, the possession and enjoyment of material goods have become the coveted objective of the lives of almost all the people, who in the past were satisfied with being able to provide for the pure necessities of life. The desire and need to satisfy new needs, unknown in the past, means that more and more importance is being attached to material well-being, because everyone can see that today only money can provide all these pleasures, which very few people are prepared to give up. So this mentality, which was once a characteristic of the bourgeoisie, has taken hold of those who were not bourgeois, either by origin, vocation or economic circumstances. And at the very moment when war is declared on the bourgeoisie, we see it absorbing the masses. For all those sons of peasants and workers who, over the last twenty years, have gradually achieved a higher standard of living, are now being absorbed by the bourgeoisie.

traders, contractors, employees, or practising

What are they, then, if not ~~new~~-bourgeois? And they are, of course, with all mental characteristics of the bourgeoisie: attachment to one has and to well-being, great ambition, and the ability to make a living.

to conquer ever higher positions.

and, finally, to accumulate titles and honours — just like the old bourgeoisie. Unless this war is only aimed at the former bourgeois-

sie? That wouldn't be right. Between this and the new, what difference could there possibly be? I can think of one

the one that separates the rich of yesteryear from the new rich".

We share this opinion. The growing well-being of the masses, produced everywhere by the myth, constantly invoked, of "social justice", has ineluctably led them to the bourgeois standard of living, habits and mentality - even in Soviet communism. As soon as they came to, did we not see people of very low extraction display not only the worst features of the corrupt bourgeoisie that they had so reviled, but, from orgies to debauchery, lead the same type of life as that of a certain degenerate aristocracy? If we wanted to take things seriously, what we needed to do was to destroy, by every means possible, the suggestion of 'progress', especially and most particularly in its material and social aspects. We would therefore have to react on two fundamental points: , on the issue of overproduction, obviously driven by the capitalist spirit; secondly, on the issue of unnatural aspirations.

Overproduction wants the "progress" of "the people", i.e. it wants the needs which lead to the purchase of products to become natural and unverifiable in ever-wider layers within a nation; cooperating - in this field as in so many others - with capitalism, Marxism and the various other "social" movements do everything in their power to make this **happen**: they inject the fad of "social justice" and "enlighten" the previously healthy class of workers. The anti-bourgeois campaign will remain mere chatter as long as we do not decide to act in the most energetic way possible on these two points: the one hand, by returning to the most rigid and controlled forms of an *utarcique consumer* economy, and on the other, by detoxifying the masses, by repressing the unnatural aspirations, needs and ambitions of the working class.

But it would be very difficult to define the "proletariat" and related strata. But it would be very difficult to achieve the second objective without the help of two

secondly, to awaken *other* interests in the masses, over and above material interests; because you don't overcome an aspiration by stifling it, but by confronting it with a different and stronger aspiration.

The first of these tasks refers us to other observations made by our correspondent. Having noted that the anti-bourgeois campaign so far appears to be very one-sided, in that it is justified only by hostility to materialism, he wonders whether it is not, rather, a "manifestation of tendencies". And here we come across inconsistencies that our correspondent, in all his fascist frankness, does not hesitate to denounce.

"What exactly is a plutocracy? If by plutocracy we mean a ruling class made up of rich people - as in the United States, France or England - it will not be necessary to demonstrate that we speak of the existence such a class in Fascist Italy. In fascist Italy, the direction of political life is now in hands other than those of the plutocrats - and if, in some sectors, residual or new plutocratic formations exist, more or less masked, there is reason - let us say it - not to polemicise, but to act, to act from above, to purify our hierarchies.

The political domination of the rich was not the issue here, so it would only be a question of the existence of the rich in our country. "With the anti-bourgeois campaign, war would therefore be declared on the rich and on wealth itself. But by whom? Perhaps by the regime? I don't think so - writes our comrade. On the contrary, there are quite a indications the contrary. Wealthy people, their tastes, demands and habits are taken very much into account. The sumptuous luxury of our transatlantic super-ships, the pride of the nation, to whom could-

Was it intended for a plutocratic public? Or should we admit that our shipping companies were only thinking of pleasing foreign millionaires, English or American? And aren't the new luxury hotels - not to mention the existing ones, about which the word tolerance springs to mind - built in recent years, for example in Valle d'Aosta, reserved for rich? And all the luxury industries, the National Fashion Office exhibitions, the elegant restaurants, Florentine May, the San Remo festivals, the gala shows at the Royal Theatre in Rome or at La Scala - who, if not the rich, is allowed to enjoy all this? Wouldn't a single gesture be enough to put an end to it, if it were frowned upon by the regime? Clear words are needed here, if only to avoid pernicious confusion in the minds of Italians: Are *Fiat* and *Lancia* acting badly when they make luxury cars, or are the rich acting badly when they buy and use them? Now even an old figure from the satirical newspapers of the past has resurfaced (e.g. in *La Stampa della Sera*): the commander - (of course: bald, fat, asthmatic) as a typical representative of the bourgeoisie. But what might have been acceptable in the middle of a democracy rings hollow today. For these blessed titles are conferred by His Majesty the King on the proposal of the regime. It is inconceivable that in the fascist era unworthy and ridiculous people should be honoured with knighthoods. So, either we abolish the titles, or we leave the commanders unchallenged. And there's another thing: every year hundreds of thousands of Italians and fascists buy lottery tickets in Tripoli and Merano.

• *Commendatore* in the text, a pejorative term in modern Italian 1 when applied to a person with one or more titles that do not correspond to any real merit [N.D.T.J.]

The government is doing everything it can to encourage them to do so. On the walls, we exhortations in big letters: "Do you want to become a millionaire? And after the draw, the newspapers and announce the happy news to the nation: the new millionaires! So it's about time we got our act together: we either want these millionaires or we don't †".

And here the conclusion of our correspondent: "Who are these bourgeois who deserve such excessive fury? The bigwigs of high finance, the managing directors of credit and major industries, the snobs of both sexes of the elegant world, isn't it? But the innumerable modestly-paid employees of banks and industry, who, while inwardly congratulating themselves on the anti-bourgeois mockery, dream only of the soft fau- teuils of the boards of directors and the fat dividends of their bosses, the clerks, the saleswomen and the midwives, who, while inwardly congratulating themselves on the anti-bourgeois mockery, dream only of the soft fau- teuils of the boards of directors and the fat dividends of their bosses, the clerks, are they less bourgeois than their bosses, are they closer to the fascist ideal? No, a discrimination between those who strive to maintain and increase the possession of their material goods and all the others who fight and toil to achieve maximum well-being, does not stand up to common sense. This discrimination between those who have and those who have not is not serious, it is an outdated demagogic argument".

"Only one thing emerges clearly from so confusion" - adds our correspondent. He notes the existence and exclusivity *of* a certain style of life among the riches, an imitation of the style of the nobility of the past, "not the warrior nobility of medieval origin, but the nobility of the XVIIIth century; an exclusivity which - of course, always in relation to and dependent on materialism - has always been a source of inspiration for them.

contemporary can resemble, even remotely, even as a caricature of the exclusivity and aristocratic refinement of the past. Could this be the real target? Jacobin, plebeian instincts, then, rising to the surface! Please tell me if I'm wrong.

We replied to our correspondent that he had not but that, perhaps, he went a little too far. The fact is that in the anti-bourgeois struggle as a whole - and we are not referring here only to Italy - there are sometimes unacknowledged tendencies at work, which are in no sense

"in line" and that we didn't miss a beat.

clearly denounced. The whole question does not depend on the anti-bourgeois struggle in itself, *but on what we are fighting the bourgeoisie for* and what we want to achieve by fighting the bourgeoisie. That's we have to understand. But then we realise that the problem goes back to the world of values, of traditional meanings, and therefore to the highest question, on which our correspondent said he had found sufficiently clear points of reference in articles published here.

So in practical terms, what needs to be done, what are the keys to coherence? We come back to the two points already mentioned. In a colony in China, an American industrialist, regretting that he had only a few workers at his disposal, thought he had found the remedy by doubling the hourly wage. But the remedy turned out to be the opposite: instead of working eight hours a day, the workers now only worked four hours a day for the industrialist. It seemed absurd to them to work more than was necessary to cover their real needs. This anecdote captures the spirit of this part of the anti-bourgeois struggle.

and at the same time anti-Marxist —which should be carried out in the lowest strata of the population, to bring them back to normality. But in addition, we said, we must eliminate or at least limit the grounds for scandal.

By eliminating the concentration of wealth, the sense of class, exclusivism of lifestyle? Not at all. *E.n*

eliminating usuzpations. Let's not kid ourselves. Fascist Italy, there's the "commander" of the ancient satirical newspapers, even when the title is new; some the one who accumulates charges, which in sec- indirect influences and powers are not very different from those of the those of the plutocrats in a "democratic" regime and parliamentary; there is the opportunist bureaucrat, cum- lard and upstart, as cumbersome as he was intriguing. To purify Italy of all these residues, we don't need repetitive phrases and speeches about the "fascist style" and the "fascist mystique", we need a precise and daily denunciation of those who do not live up to moral standards, wherever they may, without regard or compro- mis. Only then would the "bourgeois", whether fascist or not, be in a position to denounce them. would be to sleep soundly.

Secondly, the problem is not the elimination of wealth, but the scandal it represents when it is in vile and unworthy hands, i.e. when the privilege of the "rich class" does not stem from any superiority, but from "envergures" which are, spiritually speaking, those of plebeians or, precisely, bourgeois. In this case, it's clear that we can really talk about 'social injustices', and anyone who sees such caricatures of elitism can legitimately ask themselves why they can't be part of it too. There may be a purely ascetic aristocracy but it is at the very top of an ideal hierarchy. In addition, there can be an aristocracy that legitimately possesses wealth, and even, if you like, in certain more or less exclusivist forms, just as its style of life and is excluded in a certain way. There's nothing wrong with that, since it's precisely the overcoming of plutocracy and the 'bourgeoisie'. The supreme criterion here is, to repeat, *superiority*. When they are associated with genuine superiority, wealth, opulence and a sense of class are no longer a scandal, and the "people" - neither proletarianised nor gentrified - remain in their place, happy.

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It is a different matter when, on the one hand, it is no longer superiority that legitimises wealth, but wealth that creates privileges and counterfeits of superiority. It is a different matter when, the one hand, it is no longer superiority that legitimises wealth, but wealth that creates privileges and counterfeits of superiority; on the other hand, when we begin to inject 'the people' with the materialistic and upwardly mobile virus, to the point of distorting it and transforming it into a force of subversion. This is how we should understand the real tasks of the anti-bourgeois struggle, so that we can then act correctly, without talking too much, without softening or compromising. Otherwise, everything will be reduced to words, to brilliant polemics, to animosity, whose ultimate motives could even be suspicious and demagogic, to the point of provoking, in the most serious people, states of mind like those we have tried to point out in this report. our correspondent's considerations.

VII

1941

"NEUTRALISATION" OR IMPROVEMENT ADMINISTRATION?

From the comrade who sent us the observations on which we based our article *Myth and Reality of the Is Anti-Bourgeois Struggle* (see *Vita Italiana*, December 1940, p. 621), we received a very interesting piece of writing, which could also serve a basis for useful considerations on a fundamental problem of the Revolution, that of the ruling class and administration.

Readers may remember an article on a similar subject which appeared in this magazine, dealing with the problem of administration and its 'neutralization'. The central idea was as follows: very often in authoritarian regimes, fascist regimes included, the bureaucracy ceases to be an impersonal system of administration, it becomes "politicised", not in the proper sense of the word

- to introduce the political idea into the state to which one belongs in order to serve it more correctly - but to satisfy personal interests, to place political authority in the hands of state, to

¹ Cf. Arthos (J. Evola), *Settori da battere: la burocrazia "non neutro"*, in *La Vita Italiana*, XXIX, 335 (february 1941), . 134-139 (Note by R.D.P.).

to serve these interests and therefore to form ministerial and paraministerial coteries, centred on a group of small, well-connected and "influential" ras*,

coteries that distort, disrupt and hinder the reports between the nation and the real political class. So we were talking about "neutralising" this bureaucracy that manages and profits: about returning to the impersonal and apolitical character of those who must content themselves administering and executing.

However, the point of view defended in his writing by our This is the opposite of "neutralisation". However, the basic requirement was the same. When we spoke of neutralisation, we had in mind a de facto may, which we intended to remedy quickly, if only to prevent a certain bureaucracy from doing any harm. Our correspondent, on the other hand, has in mind a condition of normality in the highest sense and proposes a model of "improved bureaucracy" which, admittedly, would be political, but in the right sense of the term, so that, apart from the various imperfections of the system still in force, the deviation mentioned above would be overcome.

Our correspondent happily describes the situation of the ruling class in democratic regimes: "These democratic states always presented the same aspect: administrations deprived authority and prestige, with bloated, poorly paid staff, haphazard procedures and, at the top, 'authorities' vested with the power of government, i.e. politicians, almost always incompetent (journalists, lawyers, businessmen), who casually took over and exchanged portfolios for War or Public Works, Treasury or Education, whenever there was a ministerial reshuffle, and without the famous 'man in the street' ever being appointed.

• Term of Ethiopian origin meaning more or less "tribal chief". Under Fascism, it became a synonym for "little (hierarchy) ("), with a strong pejorative connotation (N.D.T.J.).

of the street would have wondered these Ministers had not been solemnly rejected in a competition for student posts in their own Ministry". "Léon Blum himself did not hesitate to admit with candour that accepting the condition of competence for government office would be a mortal blow to the democratic system. , if any democratic regime were to renounce the power to distribute ministerial portfolios among its followers alone, it would thereby be abandoning its *raison d'être*".

This explains why democratic states have always had a "sacred terror" of a strong and responsible administration. Ministers themselves, aware of their incompetence, see themselves as influential intruders in the compact world of bureaucrats, and have a clear aversion to them. But this muted and latent hostility between democratic governments and the administration inevitably and always leads to obvious and serious damage to the solidity of the regimes themselves. This explains why parliaments, the press and public opinion, of all political hues, have vied with each other to speak ill of the administration, and why the most benevolent of its critics regard it as a necessary evil".

The democratic system is now total crisis. However asks our correspondent, can we really say that the state of affairs described — above is truly and completely over," that the question of the administration and the "ruling class has been settled? This last problem our correspondent rightly points out did not exist in this form in the old authoritarian regimes (Germany, Russia, Austria), where the strength of traditional principles offered more tenacious resistance to the slow contamination effected by the subversive spirit. It did not exist, because "the sovereign's power manifested itself not only in the way of formally, but effectively, government administration". The closest connection

central authority to the administration and the army. In addition, the administration and the army had their own style and mentality, with the fundamental presupposition of deep loyalty, a style and mentality which were passed on seamlessly to the new elements who gradually entered the corps of civil servants and officers. "State careers were open to all. Only the most eminent posts at the Imperial Court were practically reserved for the high aristocracy. However, an appropriate selection process, which resulted in a rigidly exclusivist criterion in the categories enjoying the greatest prestige (the General Staff, the cavalry and naval arms, diplomacy and the Interior Administration), tended to ensure maximum homogeneity in public functions in order to effectively promote the maintenance of tradition". Thus, around the stable central core constituted by the monarchy, a substance was organised that shared the same stability, guaranteeing the very solidity of the State.

Another feature of the system in question— remarks our correspondent , was *competence*—

"In accordance with a traditional principle, the highest government posts were almost always entrusted to *career civil servants*. That a "deputy", i.e. an incompetent politician, could become, for example, a Minister, was inconceivable for the mentality of the time. Indeed,— and everyone reasoned as follows: who, more than a civil servant, could have inspired confidence, thanks to competence and experience acquired many years, thanks also to a devoted attachment to the State, who would have been a more suitable and worthy guardian of the governmental tradition?

In this , service to state had its own dignity and prestige. The fact that, in these regimes, "the service of the Sovereign, of the State, was more envied than any other career or profession, remains incomprehensible even to the new Italy" observes our comrade. He recounts the following episode: one of his colleagues at

the administration once asked an Austrian government official, a very well-to-do man who had resigned after the end of the monarchy: "How could you be a civil servant, you who, as a multimillionaire, certainly had no need a salary? No less astonished, the civil servant replied: "I was a civil servant because I could think of no greater honour than to serve Her Majesty. "I understand the astonishment of both comments our comrade. In our country, public careers do not enjoy any prestige in the nation, and this remains an undeniable reality, although the official language tries to maintain the fiction to the contrary. The service of the state is seen at best as a modest job for those who need it and can't get a better one. Who, more than the bureaucrats themselves, would be surprised to see the son of Pirelli or Agnelli, Albani-Chigi or Doria-Pamphili, take part in a competition to become a sub-prefect? , while membership of the Fascist Party is now seen as an honour, no one would dream of saying the same about service to the State".

Given this lack of sensitivity, it is natural to neglect the basic conditions necessary to protect the dignity and enhance the prestige and authority of those who, more than civil servants, should see themselves as a kind of guard or Order of the regime. Even among the highest administrative figures, for example, there is too often a lack of notoriety, "without which the people cannot easily conceive of the authority of outstanding men". Another fundamental *requirement* is also often lacking: distance: "Apart from the lack of notoriety, there are the people born in the same place as him, his school mates, his friends, his friends' parents, etc.". Among the latter, Machin will recall the modest origins of Excellence X, Truc was a very good client of sub-secretary Y, a former solicitor, and Bidule boasts having played

at cards, once, with another Minister. Nothing wrong with that, but what do these reminiscences mean? That another condition of prestige, no less essential than notoriety, is missing: *distance*.

Another negative factor : sudden appointments and
This is again a legacy of the democratic style and the predominance of the political factor in the abstract. Once again, this is a legacy of the democratic style and the predominance of the political factor, understood in an abstract sense: on the basis of this factor, this or that person suddenly finds himself at the top of a hierarchy, whereas it would have been logical for him to have reached the top after having gone through it , albeit quickly, and to have reached it to stay there. "The man in the street does not understand that the apprenticeship should be at the *highest*, and not the *lowest*, level of government, nor that the apprentice should be accorded respect and authority. Nor does the precariousness of ministerial posts serve to increase their prestige. No one thinks that someone should hold such a post for the rest of his or her life, but the fact that this post, instead of being the natural culmination of an entire life, is practically an , even a very glamorous one, after which the hierarch, in the middle of his or her life's journey, has to move down to positions of lesser responsibility or go back to being what's-his-name's or what's-his-name's sidekick, seems incompatible with the hierarchical principle itself. Since comparisons between the hierarchies of the regime and those of the army are frequent and natural, we are entitled to ask ourselves whether it is conceivable that a commander be degraded to lead a brigade or regiment".

With regard to the administration in general, our correspondent notes that many civil servants are not always provided with the material means necessary for their dignity. "Misery is deplored by the vast majority of employees and civil servants (belonging to the low and middle echelons), who, for this reason, are not always provided with the material means necessary for their dignity.

who could not even aspire to higher office and who, moreover, felt no discomfort because of the impossibility of maintaining a higher standard of living". Our correspondent is right to point out that it is not a question of facilities for the bourgeois and material life of individuals, or even of the personal prestige of civil servants, but always of the necessary prestige of the government they represent. "For what prestige will *it have* when administration is, in the eyes of all, synonymous with misery? What respect can the masses have for government when countless ministerial officials have their frugal meals in

When the net monthly salary a secretary of the Prefecture is completely absorbed by purchase a decent suit and a pair shoes, and when many civil servants with large families are obliged to see their relatives do the most humble jobs? Abroad, however, we are right to pursue a policy prestige. Sumptuous residences for our embassies and legations, automobiles, elegant civil servants

But is the prestige of the government any less necessary in Italy? Or is it only natural for the three dozen Ministers and Under-Secretaries, whom ninety-nine per cent of the nation never sees in person? This strange contrast between our prestige abroad and the misery at home reminds me of those people who, being seen on the outside in elegant clothes, do not hesitate, at home, to cover themselves with old rags". Finally, there is the internal style that persists in much of the state bureaucracy, the result that our Administration too often appears as "a gigantic accounting department, imbued with a police mentality", as a counterpart, the "constant, unconscious, preoccupation with not incurring one of the innumerable responsibilities referred to in Article...". Consequently on the one hand, a lack initiative and courage on the other.

rage, personal gifts, on other: it's a style that's well which should be in force among members of a virile and united organisation, the embodiment authority of the State.

Our correspondent also tackles a number of problems This allows him to clearly show that, in the hypertrophy and typical bureaucratic centralism, there are also remnants of the democratic heritage and as many completely artificial obstacles, only pro- voiced by the lack courage in favour a reform and a complete revision of the remaining structures a return to the spiritual and political significance of the administration and government in general. —

Certain historical and traditional factors have endured, despite the contamination caused by the democratic spirit— as our comrade states, and, alongside the army and the nobility, these include the administration. We must build on these elements and try to give them back all the meaning they had previously. Our correspondent therefore fights against the idea that the administration is a necessary evil and that the aim of any reform is to neutralise or reduce it so that it does as little harm as possible. "I believe that Fascist, and therefore revolutionary, reform should, as a first step, affirm the absurdity of this axiom. That it is of genuinely democratic origin is clearly proved by the irrefutable fact that, in anti-democratic regimes, this prevention was not only inconceivable, but that the administration enjoyed the greatest prestige in public opinion. It follows that not all administration is necessarily evil, but *only that* which, created under the influence of (French) democratic tendencies, has fully preserved all the disastrous imprints of these tendencies, if only because all reforms were limited to superficial touch-ups. Admittedly, the spirit of our administration is bourgeois, and therefore democratic, and therefore anti-aristocratic and anti-traditional, but it is precisely in this diagnostic

The *administration must be transformed into an aristocratic caste of the fascist spirit*. A gigantic, revolutionary task, not of a chiseller, but of a pick. To achieve this, no existing institution, no element in force should be considered as intangible".

addition to a series of technical reforms, a rigorous human selection process would be required:

"training within the administration, perhaps with some special functions to be created alongside' general functions

in each ministry, a fascist elite, in the sense a selected corps or general staff". The elite will have to be made up men for whom fascism is a flag, an instruction, who are not content with having party card, men capable of drive and practicality, who know life better than ministerial circulars and who are deeply aware that the high prestige offices and functions depends on the prestige of the regime. On the human level, this new civil servant should serve as an example to others of a high style, an example of distinction, of upright and courageous conduct, of loyalty. "The problem of administration is inseparable from that of self-reliance," and therefore concerns the very essence of the new State. For such a State, it is not enough to look to isolated figures of great stature, eminent and providential leaders. It is also necessary to banish the residues of the very concept of the State that has been destroyed by democratisation. "Doesn't the very history of the democratic state show it to be constantly defensive in the face of parliament, the press and public opinion? And what could be more unpopular than this state, namely the taxman, the implacable enemy of the taxpayer, and then the legions of carabinieri, finance guards and police officers? But today this anarchist mentality has not disappeared. Despite all the rhetorical euphemisms, for many people the State is still the minotaur that threatens the very existence of our society.

the selfish interests of the masses, but which does not always succeed-days to defeat them".

This is why the reform of administration why the administration must be strong and homogenous why it should be included in the management class.

geante. Therefore, no opposition to it, opposition which diminishes the prestige of both, and not even a neutralisation of the administration (which would not go beyond the antithesis), but the profound fusion between this traditional institution and the forces of the Revolution. Then, finally and only, can a feeling of true respect for the self-rule of the State be born in the nation. Consequently, the administration and the officer corps must be given the character of castes *sui generis*. This is not easy; the impopularity is almost too obvious, for the democratic spirit, far from being dead, lives on with a strength that seems almost indestructible. By coming together and making the most of those elements still capable of understanding the meaning of the historical tradition, the elites would give birth to a new tradition of the fascist spirit and would then have to maintain and strengthen it through exclusive tendencies, of course in the sense of a continuous and severe selection, and would finally have to transmit the tradition to the new generations".

These are our correspondent's conclusions. For our part, we frankly endorse them, because they present us with an ideal which, realised in the cycle of dynastic, traditional and pre-democratic civilisations, also has the sense of the *terminus ad quem* of a desirable future development. "Neutralisation", referred to in the article mentioned above, refers to a state of affairs in which the principle of authority, i.e. the political element, in the hands an administration which retains the appearance it had in a democracy and something of the Masonic spirit with which many of its parts were so imbued, has been transformed into a factor anarchy and involution, instead of representing the basis a possible "improvement" of the administration.

This negative possibility having already been (realised) (in) (too)

^{many}CRIS, the traditional ideal of administration, identical to a kind of loyalist Order fused with the political class management within a system of skills and competencies. of truly hierarchical articulations, this ideal in itself, is undoubtedly acceptable and complies with the normality; but its realisation is nonetheless conditional-born of un grave problème : celui de la substance human', which comes to ask in which to the extent that the ethics of the Revolution give rise to a man effectively new, incapable of compromise and tran- with everything around him that betrays another type of inner race.

² Evola was thus "putting his finger on the wound", touching the fundamental issue: that of the human substance of our nation. If Fascism failed then, if we have fallen today to such a level that it is difficult to imagine that we could sink any lower, this must unfortunately be attributed to the human substance of the overwhelming majority of Italians. This once again brings us back to the essential problem: that of building a qualified elite, above and beyond the 'people. As long as this problem is not tackled, any discourse will have no effect.

To talk about "revolutionary", "reactionary" or "counter-revolutionary" will be pure drivel. But this problem is, today, a matter of fact, and still a long way from a possible solution, any sign of awakening to us hope [Note by R. D.P.].



YIII

1943

**ABOUT UNNECESSARY PRINTED
PAPER**

There is a famous expression: "to make virtue a necessity", which can also be given a meaning, or one that is significantly different from the usual one. We can draw from what certain exceptional circumstances impose on us an incentive to achieve something intrinsically worthwhile that we would otherwise have neglected. The force of things, in this case, instead of being con-tractive, is a help and a support. Even if abruptly and indirectly, it helps us to get back on our feet, or to wake up, or to be tougher and more resolute in our dealings with ourselves.

We could apply these considerations to many of the restrictions imposed by the current state of war, restrictions which would immediately take on a different meaning and would see their negative aspect greatly reduced if we adopted this active attitude. We will confine ourselves here to one particular case: that of the printing paper crisis.

Here, the crisis is not yet as deep as it is in Germany. But Germany has set us an example in this respect, an example which, in itself, seems to us to contain many good things. It is a principle that was adopted at the beginning of the war.

Special authorisation is required before a book can be published. This authorisation differs from any preventive censorship measure in that it is *positive*. To obtain it, it is *enough for the book to contain nothing contrary to current ethics and political ideas; it must also mean something, it must* a real contribution to the country's culture. The situa-

As the domestic front became more difficult, and the shortage of paper more acute, the criterion also became more rigorous, in the sense , for both books and magazines in *primatur* (consisting of authorisation to obtain a certain quantity of printing paper from the Reich) was linked to the quality of *kriegswichtig*, i.e. "importance for the war", naturally in both a direct and indirect sense: For example, a novel, a history or a biography is important for the war if its contents are likely to strengthen courage, to nourish the feelings necessary for the solitude of the home front.

Let us now disregard this second phase of the restriction, linked to exceptional moments; and let us also note that apart from what galvanises and refers to the effort for victory, can also be *kriegswichtig* what distracts, relaxes, just as breaks for recreation are indispensable to the warrior as to the ascetic, particularly to enable them to resume the effort later, with fresher strength. We will only examine the first criterion. We consider it appropriate and likely to be adopted, but without taking into account the circumstances which may have favoured its application, .e. the need not to waste the quantities of paper available and, on the contrary, to make the best possible use of them.

This criterion is in fact entirely consistent with the realist, organic, active and totalitarian conception of culture that is characteristic of the new, antidemocratic and antiliberal state. Not simply tolerating what is not dom- mageable, but admitting, wanting and favouring only what is positively useful, what has a real signi

fication is a criterion that could be linked to a famous maxim of Dorian wisdom: "nothing super-fluent", and which today would only be the corollary of the anti-agnosticism professed by the new State.

Even today in Italy, despite a certain amount of - There are also a number of cuts that have already been made, and an entire editorial and journalistic output that is more or less parastatal in nature, which makes you wonder what it's really about. Even in the political arena.

Let's take this one as an example. We still see a whole series of magazines which, although they advertise their "fascist" character, nobody actually reads them, and which which moreover are totally meaningless meaningless, since at best they are content to repeat commonplaces and to echo, in a stereotyped way, sayings, phrases or events about which anyone who reads the main organs of the fascist press is perfectly well informed. You often don't realise these magazines exist which is what happened to us - only by finding them by chance in the anteroom a Ministry, in a Confederation, a hotel or a bank, even though they have been appearing for years. In reality, *these* are streets that lead an almost clandestine existence and live only they have managed to obtain direct or indirect subsidies, for example by obtaining a certain number of subscriptions this or that organisation and the offices and companies that depend on it. More generally, Giovanni Preziosi wrote (April 1942) in the "Facts and comments" section of this magazine. "I would like to display in a room a copy of all I repeat, all the publica-

' That is to say, the monthly *Le Vita Italiana*, whose 'Facts and commentaries' were a permanent feature, generally due to Preziosi himself, the journal's editor. See, at the end of this collection, our bio-bibliographical note on Giovanni Preziosi, which deals in particular with Evola's long collaboration (1931-1943) with his journal (Note by R.D.P.).

Italian periodicals, from dailies to the latest printed bulletin from the Vattelapesca bakery, from the most worthy illustrated magazine with a hundred publications of film sycophancy.

I would also like to invite those who are responsible for regulating this issue in order save paper to do so.

material. It would be a spectacular demonstration of the waste at a time when the paper we use for our products is being is lacking. But I can't find a salon in Italy that's ready to host such an exhibition.

Since then, it's true, there have been "drastic cuts". But there's still a lot to be done, and there are other sectors too. There is a whole literary production that is almost intimist, which is still present in our country today, and which, once again, we ask ourselves what purpose it serves, other than to feed the very stupid vanity of a few fats who want to pass themselves off as 'authors', writers or poets, or satisfy the frivolity a superficial public of dilettantes : not to mention books that have virtually no public appeal, since they are self-published for a small group of acquaintances, or to add a title for some university lecture, or, finally, to let off steam. In the latter case, it's not uncommon for even the standard censor to have to intervene, but after the fact, when the paper has already been wasted or, at the very least, soiled, and when it can only be recovered after it has been thrown in the bin. A recent example is a book printed by a professor on top-quality paper and withdrawn from circulation because of its theses violently defending the Jewish cause.

- in the year XXI of the Fascist Revolution and at a time when we are at war against a front in which international Judaism is one of the main forces! ²

To return to the other cases, let's say that they remind us of the famous phrase from the Gospel: "Be cold

² The recent measure (21 March), which provides that publications dealing

or be fervent — for I vomit the lukewarm". We want
t's fair to say that a certain kind of parasitic and vain literature is
even more anachronistic and unbearable than a certain
dangerous" literature, likely to attract the wrath of the usual
censors. , when faced with this second type of literature, any
intelligent reader is forced to take a stand, to think, to react: when
it comes to issues of a certain scale, these books, for this very
reason, do not reach the part of the public which, for lack of
criteria, could certainly be seduced by them. But
'intimateliterature, especially when it is
has certain 'shiny' qualities and a veneer intel-

lectuality, seems to us to be even more harmful, because of its
greater potential for dissemination and it encourages distraction
and dilettantism. If we are mistaken, the following quip is by Say:

"Boileau divided men into those who think and those who
entertain. How can the third and far more numerous category
of those who do not think

nor entertain could she have escaped him?

This joke could not be more appropriate to our situation. We
would like to know, for example, what reading the many books and
novels , which we still have an abundance, and which are even
very recent, can do for anyone who is not spiritually asleep,
whether they be Italian texts or foreign novels usually centred on
the obligatory theme of love with its inevitable variations and
complications: books and novels that so often exhaust themselves
in hollow psychology, in an account of personal vicissitudes
deprived of grandeur, deprived of strength, deprived of universal
significance, and in which it is sad to note a

The fact that so many historical, religious and racial issues of political
interest, and not just publications directly concerned with war and
international relations, require a *nüiJ obstat*, already a step forward in
terms of prophylaxis. It will prevent the recurrence of cases such as the
one reported here.

The stylistic quality is sometimes not inconsiderable, because it would have been much preferable - as the vulgar saying goes - to be content with telling all this to one's concierge. And since the 'bourgeois' public in the worst sense of the term, and especially the female bourgeois public, are so prone to bad taste, wouldn't the force of choice be salutary, since it could, through a rational system paper attribution, prevent them from being flattered?

The reduction in the thickness of newspapers, through the consequent limitation of "third pages", has already contributed, to a certain extent, to this clean-up, which we consider salutary, in another sector, which again concerns the press. You can judge our opinion as you wish, but we think that, as a general rule, these "third pages" in Italy are a kind of scourge: they have essentially been platforms for subjectivist and intellectualising exercises in aesthetics and "variety", as well as well-defended strongholds for *cliques** critics and academics who praise each other and rub salt in the wounds of those in the opposite group. In other words, a style worthy of true intellectual liberalism, fortified by two prejudices: firstly, the rule, established as a rule of conduct by many newspaper editors, that only 'light' things should be published, that 'everyone' can read, and therefore likely to confirm an inevitably low general level, a level that should, on the contrary, be sought to raise by all means, without worrying about the risks involved in terms of distribution and, possibly, by systematically fasting.

The second prejudice is that of a 'free hand' when it comes to anything other than politics in the strict sense of the term, or to certain issues.

These could lead to 'trouble' depending on the arrangements in place at the time. The requirement

-
- In French only.

We mean the ^{the} ^{to} to organise literary and intellectual cultural expression around a clearly defined world view, so that a single theme is reflected, so that the meaning of the fascist spirit is conveyed even when the word "fascist" is used.

"The word 'fascism' is not used at all, even when the usual, conventional references are missing. But there's a lot to be said for that. The worst thing is that there are people in our country who murmur and talk about the restrictions of 'freedom of thought' in the literary and intellectual sphere. These people should go to Germany. They would then realise that the "intellectual" still enjoys a privileged liberal status in Germany. In any case, we were talking about 'third pages'. Whether the reduction of space has always produced an 'essentialization' and a turn in an 'organic direction, we cannot say. But, undoubtedly, it would be, here again, an opportunity to make a virtue of necessity, and to follow criteria which would certainly be beneficial, even under normal conditions, for a reduction in everything that is vain and affected by dilettantism³. Freedom" understood as the ability to say the silliest and most hollow things, to deal incoherently with this or that subject, without principles, as in the salon conversations of "gentlemen, is precisely what we are unable to conceive. It is precisely because there are too many tendencies individualism in the Italian "intellectual" that we need to act with surgical resolve in this area.

' It is sad to note, as we live in epic (and tragic times and) on the battlefields really awakens, in so many men, the best race latent in different parts of our people, that the writers in view of the "third page" seldom think of tackling subjects of this kind and of deriving symbols from authentic figures of heroes, in a severe, clear, rhetorical (way,) preferring (to continue,) on the contrary, their literary exercises and their small "Vdflétés articles -

Although it (is) (no longer) about printed paper, we would also like to allude to the theatre. When leaving a theatre who hasn't often wondered what the author was looking for when he wrote his and had it performed, given that there was no inner echo, no incentive to think and reflect? Some will reply that it is at least a way of spending the afternoon or evening. As for the authors, they will reply, in most, that they are making "art" and that those who make art want nothing, have no goal in mind, art being an end in itself. We don't agree with either of these points of .

First of all, if it's just a question of a pass-time, then, frankly, it's better to go and see a film, an 'operetta' or, in normal times, go to a nightclub, because in these cases there are no fictions or misunderstandings, but direct compliance with the intended objective, without intellectual and artistic alibis. As for the authors' point of view, which refers to that of 'anti-mist' literature, it would be good for them to realise the situation as it . On the subject of *purity*, i.e. *the direct* non-intentionality of a certain *great* art, we naturally have nothing to object to; unwittingly, this art reflects the great ideas of an era, and even those from which a given political conception takes its form. But it is also certain that with today's "pure art", as expressed in novels, short stories or, indeed, , in at least eighty per cent of cases it is merely a matter of passing the time, and therefore of monopolising time that could often be better spent. In reality, these "authors" and "creators" today have a similar significance to that of the jesters in the old feudal courts. We say analogous because of two important differences. The first difference is that this vain production is not, as in the past, aimed at the legitimate pastime of aristocrats, warriors and knights, but at a "neutral" bourgeois middle class.

Instead of entertaining, as a good short stories or comedies of past centuries could still do, this literature acts like a kind of soft drug, designed to distract, to carry the mind and imagination here and there, but always within very narrow and conventional frameworks.

The only real thing in all this, then, is a genuine *voire aux variétés*: vanity on the part of the 'authors and vanity on the part of a flatly bourgeois public, internally shapeless and lazy, which worships a pseudo-culture and readily panders 'intellectuality.

The 'virtue' favoured by 'necessity', which we referred to at the beginning, should consist precisely, today, in a style *which would progressively make life impossible for the Bourgeois intellectual*, cutting off all resource, accustoming him, as a condition existence, to something stronger, harder; with the overcoming, on the one hand, of individualism and, on the other, of a mawkish conformism, an evil, for various reasons including the influence a certain Passover Catholicism—, is particularly prevalent in our country.

For books and the press in general, the instrument for action of this kind, under a system of saving printing paper, should be the one indicated at the beginning of this article: a system of allocations according to a criterion that is not *negative*, but positive; not leaving the hands of the printing press to the printing press.

free à which, in the Strict sense, *is not* harmful, but demanding something real, something positive, really corresponding to our central ideas and, today, to the orientation of our fight.

We readily admit that such a system is not without its dangers. If those who were appointed to carry out such supervision did not possess the required qualifications, if they displayed a narrow-minded adjutant mentality, if they did not refer impersonally to

to truly superior and living ideas, abuses and deviations would become possible. Here, as elsewhere, we come back to the problem of men and the choice of men. But, for the time being, starting to feel this necessity would be an important first step.



PART THREE

GERMANISM AND NAZISM

I

1930

THE MYTH OF THE NEW GERMAN NATIONALISM

Although the German nationalist movement led by Adolf Hitler is fairly well known in Italy, especially since his victory in the recent elections, the same cannot be said of the ideal presuppositions on which his political action is intended to be based and developed. Moreover, these presuppositions have only recently been the subject of a systematic exposé. This is contained in a large volume published this year, authored by Alfred Rosenberg, the *Hauptsektionsleiter* of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, Hitler's main newspaper. The title of the work is: *Le mythe du Der Mythos des xx. Jahrhunderts*, Hoheneichen Verlag, München, 1930 *. We feel it is of some interest present the broad outlines.

The 'myth' that Rosenberg, in a somewhat Sorellian sense, proposes to the xx- century as the principle of its regeneration is the myth of blood and, more particularly, the myth of *Nordic blood*. This myth seeks a 'truth' that is no longer abstract, impersonal, uni-

* Unabridged French translation: *Le mythe du xx- siècle. Bilan des combats culturels et spirituels de voire temps*, Avalon, 1986 (N.D.T.).

versalistic, but intensely lived, indissolubly linked to the very roots of individual and collective life. We need to find this truth in the blood (race) that we have so clearly defined.

It is there it should be awakened and actualised, to the point of becoming the central force capable of determining every idea and every action. Each blood or race has its own "myth", its mystical soul, and this, for Rosenberg, is the ultimate, insurmountable fact. "The history of the races is simultaneously a mystical history, a revelation, which grasps its own meaning in the great myths.

it produces".

This premise, or demand, led Rosenberg to link up directly with a spiritual current that is very strong in contemporary Germany, and which presents itself as the "return to origins" current. It is believed that primordial times contain, in a pure and transparent state original visions and meanings that the contingency of time and the mixing of races have altered and . A renewed understanding of origins is therefore expected to help us find a more precise orientation in midst of spiritual chaos. Rosenberg refers above all to Herman Wirth and J. J. Bachofen: on the basis of the research and insights of these two authors, he formulates the myth of the

This is the "primordial Nordic blood", which he then places at the centre of his entire concept and at the foundation of the revival of the Germanic race.

In an important and much-discussed book, which we have reviewed, Wirth argued that

Cf. *Aspetti del movimento culturale della Germania contemporanea*, in *Nuovo Antologiu*, 1, 1^o January 1930 [reprinted in: J. Evola, *i saggi della Nuova Antologia*, Ae, Padua, 1970 and 1982; tr. fr. *Aspects du mouvement culturel de l'Allemagne contemporaine*, in *Fotolite*, 23, autumn 1985, p. 8-27 - N.D.T.]; review *Ur*, 1928, 11-12: *La tradizione riordinata all'antico*, and 1929, 3-4: *La nascita dell'Occidente* {tr. fr. *Itellesciis modernes sur la tradition nordico-atlantique*, in J. Evola, *Ur et Xrur (1927-1928-1929)*, 4 vols, Archè, Milan, 1986,

In order to explain a large number of symbolic convergences and correspondences, anthropological and philological data, etc., it is necessary to admit the existence of a primordial Nordic race which, around the Stone Age, moved southwards from the Arctic regions, giving rise to the highest forms of civilisation. tion of the cosmic-solar type*. Rosenberg accepts this idea and inserts it into a strongly dialectical conception. For him, nothing is more absurd than the idea of a calm and progressive development of humanity, conceived as a homogeneous whole. secret of history is

p. 97-113, *L'Auroze de l'Occident*, in Idem, *Ur et mur. Krur 1929*, 3 vols, Archè, Milan, 1985, p. 55-97 - Editor's note]. As a general rule, the concordance of several of the Hitlerian theoretician's theses with those we have set out, on the basis of integral fascism, in our *Imperialismo pagano*, is moreover singular.

(The work by Herman Wirth referred to is *Der Auf-gang der Menschheit*, Eugen Diederichs Verlag, Jena, 1928, a quarto volume of 634 pages with a detachable appendix and illustrations. The writings that appeared in *Ur* in 1928 and 1929 or, rather, in the latter year, in *mur*, were reprinted, with modifications, as chapters in *Rivolta contro il mondo moderno* (1- ed.: Hoepli, Milan, 1934). On this subject, see our article *I vols e l'esperienza del "Gruppo di Ur"*, in *Arthos*, II-III, 4-5, Sept. 1973-April 1974, p. 184-185 - Note by R.D.P.].

* This sentence is incomprehensible because of a typographical "bumblebee". graphic, in the original version of the text: FJ "mito" del nuovo nazionalismo tedesco, in *Vite Nova*, VI, 11, Nov. 1930, pp. 930-934, a version reproduced unchanged in the Italian edition of this collection, pp. 183-189, although the error is pointed out by Renato Del Ponte, p. 185, note 2. We have reconstructed the sentence from the Italian text of the second, more detailed and critical version of the same article, published under the title *la "mistica del sangue" nel nuovo nazionalismo tedesco*, in *Bilychnis*, XX, 1, Jan.-Feb.fév. 1931, p. 1-12 (article reprinted in: J. Evola, *i saggi di Bilychais*, éd. partielle des articles de l'auteur parus dans cette revue, Ar, Padoue, 1970; éd. intégrale: Ar, Padoue, 1987). The religious studies journal *Bilychnis* (meaning the "lamp with two wicks"), published by the Anabap school of theology-tiste de Rome, was founded in 1912 and ceased publication in summer of 1931. Evola was a fairly regular contributor of essays, articles and book reviews from 1925 to 1931 (Editor's note).

it — is, on the contrary, the struggle between irreducible truths, qualities and values, insofar they are the expressions and "myths" of different races, of fundamentally opposed bloodlines.

The Nordic race would have been the race that carried the spirit

It encountered other races, obscure, southern, Mongoloid, which it clashed with; hence the origin of all decadence, right up to that which characterises contemporary Europe. These ideas, as everyone can see, are not exactly new (Gobineau, Chamberlain, Lagarde); but to be precise

"In his study of the 'mystery' of 'Nordic blood', Rosenberg also draws on Bachofen's research into the conflict between two types of morality, cult and, in general, spirituality in very ancient cultures: one, North-Western in character, centred on a vicarious experience of spirituality, with a vision of life as heroic, solar and free, with a rigorous ethical order based on paternal rights (*Vaterrecht*), the other, 'gynaecocratic' (*Mutter- zecht*), of an oriental-meridional character, centred on the mystical meaning of Mother Earth, in relation to whom all beings are equal and brothers, hence a vision and also a social constitution of a universalist and communist type. To complete the opposition, Rosenberg posits the antithesis of *Honour and Love*. Freedom, law, honour, the will to dominate, loyalty — it is in these elements that the nature of Nordic blood would manifest itself. On a higher level, the Nordic sense of life would revolve the idea of the *will* reduced to its "anti-que purity", understood as a free, suprasensible principle, clearly opposed to everything that is tendency (*Trieb*) and passion, capable - according to Master Eckhart's formula of acting for love of action itself.

Although Rosenberg sometimes falls into this trap, it must be stressed that the "Nordic myth" of the new German nationalism cannot be identified, purely and simply, with ideologies on the superiority of the race.

and then of the German people, which have long since run their course. The frameworks to which we must refer are, we repeat, those of 'pre-Antiquity', the field in which Wirth is conducting his research into North Atlantic cultures. Historically, Nordic blood is certainly to be found in the pure Germanic lineages, but it also serves as the foundation of the warrior cultures which, in India, succeeded the first Vedic period, which was magical in nature; it appears in the sapiential conceptions of Iran; in Greece - manifested in the solar symbol of the Hyperborean Apollo in the cycle of heroic myths - it fights against Eastern conceptions and mores; finally - again according to Rosenberg, who closely follows Bachofen's interpretations here - this blood gave rise to the miracles of ancient Rome. Leaving aside the later period of democratisation, then Asiaatisation, Rome would even express the triumph of the 'Nordicvision and will in the anti-world. With such an extension, which allows it to incorporate the highest values of the classical universe, the adjective "Nordic" has, in this history or - if we prefer - in this mythology of races, a scope and a degree of seriousness greater than that of simple Pangermanism: it is a universal myth and an ideal typicality, rather than something that can be geographically conditioned.

With the fall of Rome, the mixing of races and values - and, consequently, decadence - only increased. According to Rosenberg, Christianity, with its "fraternalist", humanitarianist, loving and forgiving values, had inflicted a mortal blow on the North-Western tradition. And the Catholic Church would have done even worse. The German nationalists' *j'accuse** against Christianity is based on the following points:

1. - the Semitic-Syriac residue that ü still contains, and

• In French **only**.

his religion of love and humanity, opposed to the religious Nordic region of honour and warrior pride;

2. - its *stale* universalism, deleterious to the conscience of the blood, and necessarily leading to an abstractism, whose response is that of the purely intellectualist philosophy of Rome;

3. - its doctrine of grace, its precepts of mechanical obedience to Jesuitical morality, its dogmatism and priestly authoritarianism, all of are contrary to the Nordic sense of responsibility, honour and freedom;

4. - all its sacramental aspect, even more contrary to Nordic spirit, this *ex operato* action of the rite and the sacrament, which makes Rosenberg not hesitate to associate Catholicism with the demonic-magical vision a primitive *medicine* man.

The antithesis between "Nordic" culture and Roman-Catholic culture is thus affirmed, and in the clearest possible form. One of the formulas of the new Germanic nationalism is precisely: *Clegen Rom* (Rome as Catholicism, not ancient Rome, which represents for him, on the contrary, one of the highest incarnations of the 'Nordicspirit) *und gegen Judentum*.

It is worth pointing out, however, that such an opposition is not established, as with so many other thinkers, to the greater glory of Protestantism. On the contrary, Protestantism is criticised for having preached a return to the texts of the Semitic tradition, while Catholicism is at least credited with having preserved and adapted some of the cosmic symbols of the primordial Nordic tradition.

So: against Catholic Rome - an "intellectualist-magical-dogmatic *compositum*" - and against Judaism. Rosenberg writes: "Even today, three great forces are vying for the conquest of the world. The first corresponds to the Nordic ideal and Nordic blood, with its principles of freedom, of honour and of heroism; the second, with its

the second includes the ar lantes of the religion of 1 arriour, from those that end blaf ard acquiescence to a priestly caste to those that express themselves in the various democratisms and humanitarisms, and to end in the dostoeievsk ten man", in that profound racial and value decompo- sition that made bolshe- vism possible. Finally, the third force that of economic-materialist individua- lism, the homeland-less, anon ymous finance that is trying to take over the world through

This third force would correspond to Semifism. We are all familiar with the ferocious and violent anti-Semitic campaign undertaken by Hitler's nationalism, but we are less familiar with its ideal justification, through which it rekindles an old racial hatred: the fight against the Jew - the *Se ujnde* - is the fight against gold, against the economic determinism of international finance, which is strangling the old values.

"It is believed that international finance is in the hands of the Jews, and what is written in the famous *Protocols of the Elders of* about the Jewish plan to conquer the world through gold is given an importance other than that a .

Reawakening the original force of the old Nordic tradition - *die Urkralt altnordischer UeberlieLerung* - and turning it into a 'myth' intensely lived by German blood, that was the aim of the new movement of which Hitler was the political leader and Rosenberg the ideologue. Its symbol is a pre-Christian symbol: the black cross with square brackets.

the *Hakenkreuz* - the Nordic sign of the fire that burns by its own virtue and of the nai ssing sun - and this sign appeared on the thousands of flags fluttering in the wind at the grandiose rallies of the last German elections. Rosenberg goes on to write: 'Against the old, feminised world, German thought today demands glory, honour, race, people and state - culture, autarky, recon- birth of the mystery of blood, defence of types". Neither indi-

vidualism and universalism - both products of decadence - but a return to a sense of organicity that resolves the opposition between blood and culture, between individual and state, that liberates with a view to returning to our buried roots, where we are ourselves and where, at the same time, we realise the profound type of our race. This is the basis of the new idea of the mystical and, at the same time, strongly carnal "nation". "The myth of blood - the myth of Nordic blood - is the myth of the 21st century, the myth of rebirth after the universalist, democratic decadence of the 20th century.

and intellectual life of the 21st century".

"The idea honour - and national honour - is for us the beginning and the end of all our thought and action". "For us, honour and freedom are not empirical qualities, but essences beyond space and time". We proclaim a return to Master Eckhart, seen as one of the most typical expressions of the Nordic and aristocratic sense of spirituality: Eckhart who put forward the right of the "noble soul", the duty of man to "be one with himself, free and master of his works, a closed, divine, detached, supra-sensible entity, linked from all eternity to the supernatural causes of things and such that if it were not, "God himself would not be". The idea a future

The "German Church", founded on a spirituality of this type, can also be found in the ancient myths of Nordic paganism, which must be elevated to the status of symbols and substitutes for the Semitic myths of the Old Testament.

While these ideal positions of the new German nationalism have, on the whole, a definite physiognomy, the paths leading to their concrete realisation do not appear so clear-cut: there are even more than one erroneous choice in this respect. Given the extension of the term 'Nordic', it would have been preferable above all for Rosenberg,

in dealing with modern times, was not limited to the German people, but also studied the possibilities of the 'Nordic' element present elsewhere: for this gives rise to the idea of a 'Nordic' people.

Firstly, it would have been preferable for him to have formulated the relationship between "Nordic" values (always as "ideal typicalities") and modern Germany more precisely and more clearly. Secondly, it would have been desirable if he had formulated the relationship between 'Nordic' values (always as 'ideal characteristics') and modern civilisation more precisely and more clearly. Opposition to the ahrimanic tyranny gold: all very well; but isn't gold an inseparable part of a whole, constituted by modern materialistic and mechanical civilisation? And what is Rosenberg's attitude to this civilisation? He even makes dangerous concessions. On the basis of the active will and the agonistic overcoming of the world (instead of escape from the world and love), he comes to justify the madness of modern activism and mechanism, i.e. that which expresses, in the illusion of an entirely external and inorganic power over things and systems of things, man's renunciation of all real power and all real direct domination. Rosenberg goes so far as to write that "those who have not understood the value of machines and technology in transcending the world have not understood one aspect of the Nordic spirit, and will therefore not be able to understand the other, mystical and metaphysical aspect either". To which we would like to reply that it is precisely those who allow themselves to be taken in by such an illusion who stand little chance of grasping the best of the 'Nordic myth'. The domination of the world through the machine is a factor of decadence, in the same way as the 'Semitic' domination of peoples through gold: both are the creatures of a quantitative, universalist, inorganic, anti-aristocratic civilisation. "antinordique".

This misstep was not without consequences, not least in political terms. Rosenberg opposed the "Pan-Europe" of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, a "Judeo-French creature", with the idea of a North German coalition based on other, anti-democratic principles. But little by little meshes of the net widen, eventually forming a single

a sort of bag containing all sorts of things. England, for example, and North America, albeit by way of sympathetic understanding, are included. In our opinion, this means subordinating the point of view of blood and spiritual tradition to a much more empirical point of view: it means opening the doors to mechanical and industrial civilisation, of which the "semiotic" gold factor is indissociable; it means introducing - or, to put it better, maintaining - the worst ferment of decomposition in the blood that we want to regenerate through the mystical *UrkraLt altnordischer Ueberliezung*. We can see that this incoherence is linked to the error of assuming as

"From a higher point of view - which we would have liked to see Rosenberg hold to more firmly - does not deserve this honour at all. What can be derived from the aristocratic, qualitative ideal of spirituality and that living penetration of the interiority of nature which Rosenberg so often links, with Goethe, to Nordic spirit, is something quite different: something which, *in primis et ante omnia*, implies a radial revolt against the modern world, especially the Anglo-Saxon world, taken as a whole, and not in one or other of the most visible forms of its decadence.

We believe, therefore, that the examination of certain *ahoutissements** of a political nature should not be neglected in the study of the new movement à la *Hakenkreuz*: for they might even oblige us to ask ourselves to what extent, in this movement, ideas have been called upon to justify a practical reality, and to what extent, on the contrary, there is a tendency to form and subor- give practical reality to an idea.

• In French only.

If
1933
*! *Nzvz sxcni icwzzir*":
A CONFESSION
OF THE YOUNG GERMAN
GENERATION

In the preface to his infamous "war novel", E. M. Remarque wrote: "This book is neither an accusation nor the assertion of a thesis. It is simply about a generation shattered by war, even when it was spared by grenades".

The Prince of Rohan also wrote: "Our generation had no youth. It entered the world tragedy as an adolescent and emerged as an adult, serious and solitary, bearing only the traces of the harsh discipline of obedience and command.

Nietzsche, prophetic on *this* point too, had already foretold the "collapse of civilisation", the "But he also wrote: "When the tree dies, only the flowers that are already dry fall; that which does not kill us makes us stronger". And just the *Book of Kings* speaks a light, pure sulphur, "which alone bears the Lord", after the earth has shaken and the fire has burnt, so Nietzsche drew up the myth a new race that rises again.

after the collapse and returns to the great breath of free altitudes and realities that are no longer human.

Now, we can say that something similar is taking shape in the atmosphere of the countries where these writers were born. The fact is that war has produced, among the peoples of the North, more than anywhere else, a destruction that is not only material, but also and above all spiritual. A generation has been broken spirit. It has found itself separated as if by an abyss from previous generations: it no longer understands them, it is something else. It lives another life and doesn't even know which bridges have collapsed behind it. It's not a question of new artistic or intellectual forms, but rather of a profound change in attitude that has occurred in practice without any human involvement, as a state of affairs created by the very force of things. Man's relationship with reality is no longer the same; even the meaning of human existence has changed. In Germany, a new world was born, cold, without half-tones, devoid of sentimentality, free, anti-romantic: the world of *rieue Sachlichkeit*, of the "new essentiality".

Neue Sachlichkeit is the watchword of a new Nordic youth.

To feel the extent to which this transformation all the interests, all the values, all the meanings of existence, by following a central theme, we need to be able to say that we are in the midst of a transformation.

We prefer to render *Sachlichkeit* as 'essentiality' rather than 'objectivity'. *Sachlichkeit* comes from *Sache*, "thing", not only in the material sense, but in the more general sense of concrete, objective element ("to stick to the thing"). *Sachlich* means that which is adherent to a thing, to its essence, to the exclusion of the arbitrary, the sub-jjective, accidental.

tral, you need to read a recently published book, which is a significant and courageous profession of faith from the new German generation, and more precisely from the mouth of a twenty-seven year old man. The author is Franz Matzke. The book is entitled *Nous les jeunes, nous sommes comme ça!*² It's not about a doctrine, but about a reality, a reality that may be worrying for , unsuspected by many, and a sign, in any case, of the times to come.

"I write about the meaning of life for the younger generation, for those of us who are not broken, for those who are of one piece, for the Lords of tomorrow. There is a new race, with a new attitude mind and body, born today fighting, dominating tomorrow, in decline the day after tomorrow.

"Support has been removed, ties have been dissolved, forces have been deprived of their objects: we have been left in a vacuum, in total relativity", writes Matzke,

"But we were not defeated. We have created a support system and a way of life. We were not overthrown by chaos; on the contrary, we gained a clearer vision and the security of our state. And *we liberated the world of reality from the world of the human*".

What characterised the previous generation, according to Matzke, was the cult of the "soul. In the name of this cult, things were clothed in sentiment, romantic nuances, passionate warmth, tragic or intimate forms, "intentions" of all kinds. The verism of the last century was itself no more than a literary mask. At the centre of everything was the human person with his problems, his complications, his judgments: and everything acquired importance only insofar as it referred to that centre. We wanted the world to speak to us of man, to assume our form. We

²F. Matzke, *Jugend bekennt: so sind wir* ', Reclam Verlag, Leipzig, 1930.

In this way, we enlivened coldness with the warmth of our hearts, we spiritualised the world in order to reduce the distance between it and us and to resolve the harshness of its conditions: *Gelühl und Gemüt*. We never let things reach us directly; they always had to reach us through "soul".

All this would no longer exist in the new Nordic generation. They tend to restore to the world the characteristics of eternity and indifference to the human being had been lost in previous eras. encounter things in all their coldness and hardness, silencing the soul and having eyes only for what is real: *neue Sachlichkeit*.

"We are *sachlich*," writes Matzke, "everything that is merely human disgusts us and because we talk about it as little as possible; because we see reality, which for us is higher than the thoughts of men - the reality of things is great, infinite, and everything human is small, conditioned, imbued with feeling. We are *Sachlich* because the objectivity, the unpretentiousness and the lack of language of things are closer to us than the loquacity of thoughts and passions; because only what is expressed in terms of reality interests us and because everything that is an immediate expression from heart to heart is repugnant to us; because in every field we despise the vanity of the author and because the objective, in its universality, is for us superior to any private psychology".

So, first and , liquidate all compromises between things and people: purify things of the human, make the world calm, stable, clear, cold: magnificent as on the first day; give it back its primordial, silent, unsettling grandeur. No twilight, no thin veil illusions and thoughts: "better ugly and clear than beautiful and veiled".

"Just as under the midday sun every patch of shade disappears, so under our gaze," writes Matzke, "the

things are freed from the anaemic life of our neighbour, which had nested everywhere to weaken, falsify and corrupt them: they become free and limpid again. It is not that we have become insensitive, and only others will think that a soul that is silent is no longer a soul: we too have sensitivity, but it no longer lights up in the presence of the feelings of others, it only lights up in the presence of real things and in the presence of , in man, is real and elemental.

This is the core of *neue Sachlichkeit*. Linked to this change attitude is shift in ~~in~~ aspects of nature. The new generation is no longer interested in the picturesque, "artistic", the unusual, the characteristic. We no longer look for the "beautiful", which feeds our dreams and us nostalgic. For Matzke, the adjective "beautiful" is a word reserved for human works, which cannot applied to nature.

landscapes are more 'beautiful' than others, just more distant, more immense, calmer, harder, colder than others.

"Nature is for us the great kingdom of the cho- ses, of those things that want nothing from us, that do not impose themselves or demand any attitude from our soul: that stand mute before us, like a world eternally alien to us. This is precisely what we need today, this grandeur and remoteness, this entity that rests within us, far above the petty joys and sufferings of mankind. An impenetrable realm of objects, in which we ourselves feel ourselves to be objects full freedom from all that is purely subjective, from all vanity and all personalist nullity that is what nature is for us. We are denied any inclination to worship, and so our worship is not a worship of nature. No God speaks to us from the landscape. No God and no man. And such is the grandeur of the landscape and our happiness".

So nature no speaks to the new youth in the form of picturesque waterfalls among the trees, sunsets and moonlight; it speaks to them through its deserts, its rocks, its steppes, its glaciers, its black Norwegian *ffjords*, its implacable tropical suns - in the form of what is primordial, calm, inaccessible, silent. Matzke notes the very form of the feeling for nature is now different: this feeling is epic, no longer lyrical, tranquil and continuous, no longer exceptional. The previous generation leafed through or contemplated albums of mountain photos; the new generation climbed rocks and icy walls; nature drove the former towards feelings, it drives the latter towards actions; the former felt nature through the "soul, the latter experienced it through the body. What's more, for the previous bourgeois-romantic generation, nature was like a mistress of Sundays or summer rest periods: a poetic interruption to city life. For the new generation, nature is something fundamental, something that exists, something serious, something hard: it's the vast world where the stone and steel panoplies of the great metropolises, the interminable straight streets, the great building sites bristling with cranes are put on the same level as the immense and solitary forests, whose austere impression never to leave the soul.

Neue *Sachlichkeit* thus forges an inner style, a posture of the mind.

"Just as we boycott feeling," writes Matzke, "so we ignore the tendency as well as the pleasure of expressing ourselves and 'communicating'. We feel a natural reluctance to express our inner selves. We no longer like to talk, and when we write, we evoke things rather than feelings. We stick to actions and primordial states, without hypocrisy or effusion, in the objectivity of our attitude, in the calm of our soul, in our love of distance".

This is precisely another characteristic of the spirit of the new Nordic ge⁶: it is recollected and serious, even in the midst of the madness and din of the modern world, even in the midst of the inextricable network and dismantling of the great cosmopolitan organisations.

"We feel we are in a harsh world, without support or guidance.

We rest in a seriousness that is calm, natural and simple, and not the consequence of internal or external preoccupations. Silence and action are the hallmarks of our style. We love imperceptibility, the disappearance of man from work or the thing. We understand the greatness of the anonymity of the Middle Ages, so stripped of all personal vanity, where no one bothered to pass to others the pain or joy of their heart, but quietly created their work. For us, "tragedy" is simply a private matter, and concerns only those who consider themselves to be something important. We have a greater inclination for observations and actions than for feelings and effusions. For us young people today, there is no God to whom we can tell what we are suffering: the greater the pain, the tighter our lips. We see the opposite as smallness, not greatness. Works do not speak to us of their author: they stand before, closed and independent, like 'things' in the higher sense. So, instead of the "human" warmth and closeness of yesteryear, there is a coldness and distance in relation to things as well as people; "especially in relation-
port to people".

"Objectivity forbids proximity and demands distance: to see, you have to stand apart". "On the other hand", Matzke confirms, "we feel like a solitary race, even when we form a mass, but not in the sense of yesterday's solitude. Yesterday's loneliness was painful, desperate and romantic, whereas today's loneliness is a bit more...

tude is a perfectly natural state for us. We are free of all vanity for our "I", we think of ourselves as "I".

We are not selfish, we accept hierarchies like the generations that came before us, we act, and yet we feel that we are alone. We feel that deep down we are not connected by any bridges, that all ties have been severed, that we are strangers like travellers in this world, even when the route is the same for everyone, even to the things we love: our land, our friends, our wives. What's more, it's not a forced solitude, full of regrets for things lost or ideals disappointed. We cannot regret such ideals because we never had them. We remain calm in our state, in our distance. It seems to us as obvious and natural as a law of things. We feel totally alienated from individualism as a theory or relation of the "I" - so dear to those who came before us: it no longer speaks to us in any way. The "I" is not for us a mysterious, mystical, transcendental depth: it is something like a hard stone, on which we are firmly leaning".

"It is precisely because external life has been **freed** from the manifestations of the soul and the assertions of the 'I', precisely because we have moved and enclosed the core of life within" - continues our author - "that externally we are perhaps much less individualistic, much more inclined to associate and submit than previous generations".

And Matzke uses an effective image to clarify this idea: "Just as the shepherd comes down from his mountain when the country is in danger, joins up with the others, fights with them, talks and sings, then returns to his mountain when the enemy is defeated - to be alone again with the green meadows and dark forests, the avalanches that tumble down and the azure sky - so our existence: made up of solitude and, at the same time, ready to be used as a source of inspiration.

to action. Organising ourselves for an idea, getting excited about it, is now incomprehensible to us: on the other hand, we are ready to organise ourselves for joint action, to achieve the same goal".

11 It is easy to foresee the consequences of such an attitude in the particular spheres of existence. All heat contracts silently at the centre; outside, everything becomes clearer, harder, simpler, clothed in ice or pale metal. The heavens gradually move away from the earth.

Love, for example, is de-dramatised: "Because we are not incessantly subject to the senses, but practically free in relation to them, it follows that everything sexual no longer has the significance and importance for us of the past. The erotic obsessions of Freud or Weininger, the expediencies of excitement and morbid transgression of a certain pre-war and post-war literature, the romanticism of the single, fatal passion, the tragedy of unrewarded or betrayed love, we feel are things of a generation that we no longer understand. Here too, an inner transformation has taken place, as if it were . We have acquired a new spontaneity, a new clarity, a new 'objectivity'. Instead of the "couple", for us the man next to the woman is natural: *der Herr neben der Dunne*. Our friends, less adorned and embellished than those of yesteryear, have nonetheless remained feminine, even if they ignore the many sentimentalities and bourgeois and moral limitations that were once obligatory for a well-bred young girl. Moonlight romances no longer mean anything to us; in terms of form, we have become cold at heart: without phrases, without gestures, without sentimentality.

lity, with no personal history. Not that love - 1'attraction between men and women - is dead; he has changed form: it is no longer the agitated, red flame of the past, but a clear, unflickering, unmistakable light.

On the outside, love has all but disappeared

For the young people of yesterday, the meaning of love was also supraterrrestrial, miraculous. For the young people of yesterday, the meaning of love was moreover supraterrrestrial, miraculous; it now appears to us as an everyday thing, incapable of constituting the centre and the seriousness an existence, and the woman no longer stands before us as an idol, but as a being who is our equal".

's more, we know" - adds Matzke

"that

not even women can offer us a passage to the future.

beyond our fundamental solitude: for us, it is nothing more than a companion in life, perhaps more intimate and more secure, which we do not know if it will not leave us one day, but to which we nevertheless remain faithful; a companion to whom we are internally attached by unfathomable foreign forces, about whom we know many things as it does about us - but who, however, essence, is once again foreign to us. We cannot say whether we are happier or less happy in this way. Joy, incidentally, is something that is entirely our own. We have lost some things and gained others. In any case, we don't feel sick or tired*, and it's not our will that comes into play here, but the very force of things.

We shall shortly see what the implications of *neue Sachlichkeit* are for culture in the true sense. But first it should be noted we would be mistaken, in our **opinion**, to believe that we are dealing with simple materialism or something analogous to the two-dimensional, anti-metaphysical mentality of the other side of the Atlantic. Externally speaking, there may be

• In French (N.D.T-I)

points in common, but the meaning is fundamentally different. Unlike the American soul, the Nordic soul has a whole tradition of interiority that cannot be liquified by the stroke of a pen. It seems to us that the *neue Sachlichkeit* is not the elimination of the metaphysical, but more its coincidence with reality in a conformity

from the container to the content. It's like a new classicism, a new Doric paganism returning in a Nordic form, perhaps harsher, less harmonious, less luminous, more serious and active, but not without an interiority of its own, metallic and hidden. And it has nothing to do with flat, prosaic simplification.

Anglo-Saxon. The closed, unequivocal, exact form,

For the new Nordic generation, the idea of a physical object was not a materialistic one, but rather a symbol of a certain spirituality. The indefinite nature of feelings and effusions is rejected not so much for reasons of aridity, or because of the practical efficacy of an ideal similar to the classical ideal of *life*, but because of a desire for form, a passion for what is strong, clear and simple. Matzke loves the world of technology, but as the expression a

Matzke's "will to the adequate": *Wille zuni Aadequate*, while remaining as indifferent to machines in themselves as he is to a knife or a fork. Matzke appreciates the criteria of minimum dispersion of force and the most direct path, but, once again, not out of love of convenience, but out of a passion for clarity and objectivity, out of a hatred of everything that is superfluous, that returns to nothingness, that is pushed without object³. Finally, if we seek and love in nature the pure *Sach-*

³ Matzke emphasises the difference in this new attitude towards the world of the machine, both in relation to those who saw it an apology and imagined that it would open the way to 'progress' (the mentality of the *Excelsior* ballets), and in relation to those who, more recently, have seen the machine as a kind of apocalyptic monster, the author of the decadence of civilisation (*Metropolis* myths). With regard to

lichkeit, if I am disgusted by the previous cult of interiority and psychology, it is not to give rise to a verist or positivist cult of matter, but because sensitivity to something that is no longer merely human is stronger than anything else.

It is also in this light that we need to understand the great renunciation towards which the new game is heading.

Nordic ness: the renunciation of belief.

"Do we affirm the existence of God? Do we deny it? Neither. These problems have lost all meaning for us: we no longer understand them, they are far removed from us. We are neither devotees nor romantic deniers of God, still less 'free thinkers'. We are not enemies of the Churches. All religions seem worthy to us, but all have become equally alien to us, as have the great metaphysical systems. We regard them only as works of art, or as phases of historical reality. For us, everything lies within itself, all things are equally near and far from us - so blissfully foreign and mute - and we go among them, acting and contemplating. Our eyes turn in all directions and towards all objects: our hearts may be full of joy or sadness, elevation or misery, but we are always alone. We no longer feel looked upon by a Father, but on the bare earth. Nothing in us speaks of God, neither joy nor suffering. We have lost God and faith in God, *lost* in the literal sense. It will be said that we are impoverished in spirit: but can we call someone impoverished because of absence of something for which he no longer has any need? We have no God, but

The new generation is also cold and indifferent to the machine. They use it as a natural thing, and are no more enthusiastic about the most miraculous technical inventions than they are about the fork or knife we use every day.

we are not *air*
haben keinen
entgöttert - "

neither atheistic nor devoid a divine character,
GOtt, eben wir sincl weder gottlos noch

This same typical phenomenon of disappearance of everything support, which also produces a real collapse, is repeated in other fields. Indifferent to all faiths, this new Nordic generation, by experimenting with it, has taken on a new dimension. as a state of , has little or no sensitivity

interest in philosophical constructs. It no longer overestimates thought: it deprives the 'thinker' of the primacy and cult he enjoyed in previous decades. It prefers to know that it does not know rather than to believe or speculate. The search for a 'meaning' or an 'essence' behind the world, it doesn't know what it doesn't know.

it means. Any "cosmic synthesis" seems futile to him.
and .

"Today we have a security in life that requires no metaphysical or religious justification. Deprived of any transcendent background, we are not overwhelmed by it, nor do we suffer from it: we act, think and fight as if we were in a world of our own.

4 It may be interesting to note that Matzke's love of *neue Slach- lichkeit* led him to appreciate Catholicism rather than Protestantism in terms of style. In Catholicism, he argues, the private excitements of the soul are in direct dialogue with the soul.

"To be Catholic means to be a member a grandiose world army whose supreme leaders are far away from us. In Protestantism, everything is warm and *herzlich*; in Catholicism, everything is cold and rigorous; we are in the realm of order, command and service, with its stable form and severe construction. Here, the soul does not express itself in immaterial, sentimental forms, but speaks through things, signs and symbols, and is therefore *sachlich*. Catholicism is distance; Protestantism is closeness and intimacy. - Of course, the question here is *not* to what extent Catholicism can be reconciled with this interpretation, where it is clear that the pagan-Roman element of Catholicism is valued more highly than the original, 'fra- ternitarian' and devotional element of the Christian ferment.

those who, on the contrary, had one and who, in order to live, needed to give 'meaning' to their lives. For our part, we do not expect compensation any kind our actions. The death of the gods has not turned us into Epicureans or materialists, sceptics in the passive sense, or even ascetics or apa-thic contemplatives. We like to act, and we feel that there is plenty to do around us. We live in a kind of everyday heroism, devoid of fanfare and romantic or titanic colourations. We like to subordinate ourselves to a task, to a goal, even to the point of contempt for ourselves, but we don't need supporters for that: it's the ethic of the aviator flying over the oceans, of sportsman, of the scientist: "It is the ethic, too, and above all, of the good soldier, who does not ask for the 'ultimate meaning', the 'justification', or even a reward before doing he must do, but who acts and con- serves a rigorous and silent behaviour, both towards himself and towards others".

Matzke continues: "The word 'progress' in its literal sense has become unintelligible to us. "Not only do we not believe, but we don't know what it is either. means. It's true that we're seeing "progress" in a number of areas.

practical areas as, for example, in the organisation of telephones or hospitals. We work for progress in this direction at least as energetic as the but we don't imagine that we'll be able to do it. not that humanity is taking steps forward in this way. It' not a question of pessimism' about the future of the of "civilisation", values company. or ultimate goals

as if we believed in certain mes, of which it has been discovered that they (cannot)(orien-) reality or even, simply, that they are inadequate ; c'est le sens même de ces valeurs qui (nous) (man-) that, and this is why there is no need to speak of "pessimism' about us. Thus, our action is free: it all around her is the pure atmosphere, cold and hard.

The very concept of the essence of 'culture' has been

culture" is for us the form of an inner attitude, whose greatness is measured by its unitary and conclusive character: and what does this have to do with paintings, poems or special research? We can see that today a new sense of life and action is asserting itself in the younger generation, but not thanks to a new 'culture' or a new philosophy. It is asserting itself fatally not as a 'value' but as a state of affairs, and perhaps it will not even have a reflected or artistic expression, because the new generation is no longer interested in 'expression': it is no longer an 'artistic' and 'expressionist' generation.

This brings us back to the fundamental theme of "returning to the wide world". Matzke tells us of his disgust with books and the arts, and explains the meaning of his new passion for sport, thus touching on something that is far from having marked only the youth to which he belongs. However, it would certainly be a mistake to establish a simple identity between the new Nordic attitude and that which may characterise American-style sport.

"One difference compared with the generation that preceded us", says Matzke, for example, "is that the ~~for~~ transpositions of life have ceased to interest us more strongly than life itself. What is revealed through our own sensations, in the sun and the air, interests us more than what is offered to us through the sensations of others. Yesterday, we read travelogues; today, we are travellers, and our journeys are more 'epic' than 'lyrical': speed destroys the epic, the local, the picturesque and the particular of the lands we cross, no longer connects us to them emotionally, we owe to vast, unitary, simplified, universal sensations, to the impression that we are travellers in the world, an impression associated with that of a state of power and security in relation to things. We love sport not as a fad or a novelty, but as a way of life.

new religion, but because it frees the things of the soul, because it leads us from the realm of sensations to that of actions, in the cold and limpid air: it speaks the language of things and of the body, and not that of the soul.

All we want is air—even if it's freezing cold and sharp — and the harsh aspects of the world, without mitigation. We want to be awake, not dreamers with fine words. Or rather, strictly speaking, we don't even 'want' to be: we couldn't be otherwise.

"We have become too serious, and art is no longer enough to satisfy this seriousness. We have become too serious, and art is no longer enough to satisfy this seriousness. We dispute everything that has been said about art revealing the essence of the world: for these fine words have never been backed up by proof. Art is a way of hovering above things, not a way of getting to their core. "Life is serious, art is vain": we understand these words of Schiller once again.

It follows, instead of the interpenetration of art and life, we demand the clearest separation between one and the other: we seek a sensation of things without passing through the intermediary of the artistic soul of man understood as our neighbour: things insofar as they are great, distant, independent of time and man. We want them to speak to us, not to us to speak to them in our outbursts. In the best of cases, art—after Schlegel—is given a value irony, of pure form: it is a thing in itself, on the side.

That's why "we prefer above all to walk in the open air, and only afterwards, if we still have the time and the desire, to go to a library or a museum. Should we call this progress or regression? We don't know, and it really doesn't matter to us. We only know that this is a different condition from the last, but we don't feel any poorer or more unhappy. Our sense of

Today, the world we live in is formed in factories and homes, not in museums: it is brighter, clearer and more unified. We are at ease in the towns, on the rivers or on the peaks, not among the books or in the theatres. Around, above us, is the real world, inexorable, vast, soulless, and poems and paintings are only a small part of it. The world is vast, but the poems are short and the paintings narrow. We cannot place the work of man above that of God, and that is why we have to be careful.

We feel "without culture" *kulturlos*, which is why the French can also say of us Germans: they are barbarians".

Man's relationship with himself, with his "soul", is also undergoing a transformation in the direction of the *neue Sachlichkeit*. The passion for introspection, for the analysis of thoughts and feelings taken to those morbid limits of which, after the Russians, a Joyce or a Proust are such typical exponents in the modern world - these are all things that the new generation wants nothing to do with. It no longer looks at the soul from the inside, so to speak, but from the outside, dispassionately, in the same way that we can observe things in the outside world when a clear light brings out their contours, sharp and raw. There is no longer emotional, literary or mystical intermediary to stand between consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Hence a sincere attitude, the destruction of all individualistic narcissism, of all complication, of all mask.

"In the final analysis", writes Matzke, "even the life of the soul is worth to us, a gift, a gift, a gift.

It is a world born into existence, with its attributes of foreignness, remoteness and inevitability. Rather than looking at the world from the point of view of the soul, we look at the soul from the point of view of the world. Everything then seems clearer, more natural, more obvious, while everything that is purely subjective seems increasingly insignificant, increasingly laughable, even when we are silently experiencing the same passions, the same emotions, the same emotions.

same desires, the same sufferings and the same struggles as those that gave rise, in others, to the great cries of tragic humanity. In what manifests itself in the creative interiority of men, we are interested only in what they know how to express not through feelings, but through things, with clarity, coldness and objectivity:

Sach-

lichkeit , - that which has a large, stable, definite form, and which they express in broad strokes, that which has a firm structure; that which betrays the constructing will of its creator and not his private feelings; that which springs from the great calm and immobility of the world, not from the small souffrances of the Ego: everything that is monolithic, elementary, harsh, monumental".

These last words hint at a classical will. And we believe that precisely in this lies the secret of what is positive about the *new* German *Sachlichkeit*, even in relation to other tendencies, which certainly coexist with the one whose spirit we have come to through Matzke's book.

Beyond the 'twilight of the gods', beyond the flames of war and the misery of the post-war period, it is the spirit of a new activist 'paganism' that is making a comeback in the form of extreme, hard-line modernity. This spirit no longer inhabits the temples of the Mediterranean, the sun-drenched Ionian islands or the bright lights of **Latium**, but a

° We have refrained from indicating which broader currents, outside even the new German generation which **expresses** its profession of faith in Matzke's book, are the bearers of the same ideas. On this subject, see our essay *Suieramento del Romanticismo, which appeared* in issues 1 and 2, 1931, of *Vite Nova* [This essay was republished in 1976 and 1979 by the "J. Evola Foundation" in Rome - Note by R. D. P.] .

It's a strange architecture that has replaced the romantic, misty forests of Nibelungia, destroying Gothic fervour in favour of implacable rectilinearity, with blindingly clean, rational buildings made of glass and metal rather than stone, as bare and severe as asceticism. This world no longer reflects youth and joy, but the seriousness of life, which has matured under the steel helmet as it once did under the monastic gown. It is no longer epic in the sense of Pindar, with games, competitions and aerial dances, but epic in the theatre of the vast world of things, above the oceans, in the silence of frozen peaks or desert horizons, on lucid machines that devour the wind or in Nordic interiors purified of all decoration, stripped and surgical to the point of archaic desolation. And this world is forever closed to all remnants of sweet melancholy and nostalgic escapism.

"That which does not kill us makes us stronger; that which is not consumed regains its purity".

An era is coming to an end: the Romantic era. The fire burnt away all the bark, laid bare all the essence. Along with Germany, another land has reached the end of this process: Russia. There too, there is neue *Sachlichkeit*. There too, they want to do away with the soul and the ego, described as "prejudices of the bourgeois era". There, too, everything subjective, arbitrary, personal, ideological and sentimental is regarded as an irrational and evil excrescence, which can only be brought to an end by expedient processes.

In the United States too, the trend is towards an impersonal world, of things more than people, primordial, naked, devoid of the heavens. There too, the trend is towards an impersonal world, of things more than people, primordial, naked, devoid of skies.

But in Russia, after the destruction of the superstructures, which has been

as the meaning of its neue *Sachlichkeit*, it is the old barbarian soul of the Slavic race, finally liberated from the civilisation drive undertaken for two centuries by the Tsars: it is the race of the faceless, the "beast without a face".

name", the acephalous and multiform "collective man of the economic mechanism, in the name of which those who believe in "Soviet civilisation" have and destroyed forever everything that made them distinct and independent beings⁶. sOuS all sacri-

In Germany, on the contrary, it is the clear consciousness of the Ego proper to an ancient warrior *pagonitas* - the very same of which the Hitler sections now bearing the black swastika, a sign of fire burning by its own virtue and of the reborn sun, evoke the symbol, which the Christianity of the feudal Middle Ages was never able to fully bend and which is finally reappearing, albeit through intellectual constructs, in the series of great idealist phi-lo5ophies - it is this very consciousness that is reborn, simplified, metallised, displayed as something simple and inalienable even where the demon of cosmopolitan civi- lisation reigns, as the soul and nucleus of *the new Nordic Sachlichkeit*.

What will be the destiny of this new generation? What will be era it heralds and to which it strives to lead the way? What significance does it have for Europe and its tradition, which is threatened by Russia to the east and America the west? Only the future - but perhaps a very near future - can provide the answers to these questions. Matzke writes: "We know that we are just a wave in a current that has no beginning and no end, and whose very essence is its rapid flow. But this wave - *our* wave - is the one that now dominates. We are moving towards a peak, which for the moment has only valleys around it.

⁶ For this interpretation of Soviet Russia, see our essay *Americanismo e bolscevismo*, in *Nuova Antologia*, 1929, 10 (1* May). [Tr. fr. *Américanisme et bolchevisme*, 'in *Julius fivoJa, le visionnaire toudroyè*, Copernic, 1977, p. 71-102 - N.D.T.].

TH
1933
REMARKS CRITICISM
OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST
RACISM

The speech recently given by Adolf Hitler on the occasion of the cultural tour of the National Socialist Party in Nuremberg, and reproduced by the German press under the title : *Profession de loi héroïque*, deserves, in our opinion, some attention, because of the elements it offers for the understanding of this famous doctrine of race, which plays, as we know, such an important part in the ideology of the revolution bearing the swastika. In fact, these are official statements by the leader of this movement, intended to express in the most self-critical and clear-cut way possible what National Socialism borrows from this doctrine. We will mention here the main concepts specified by Chancellor Hitler, and add a few brief comments.

The first point which, as a general premise, is highlighted is a curious mixture of *naturalism* and *providentism*. It is indeed strange that a heroic vision should be based on a genuine theological fatalism, which is directly influenced by the pro-testing doctrine of absolute predestination. Providence", as Hitler puts it, "willed that men should not

are not equal, determined ' ' a plurality of races, and for each of them has fixed particular qualities and characteristics, which cannot be altered without degeneration and decadence". This predestination is twofold: it is both *biological* and *psychical*. To the intimate biological and morphological laws that each particular race obeys, there corresponds

worldview, which may be present or latent, but which fundamentally does not change over the centuries. This gives rise to cultural and spiritual pluralism, which in turn openly opposes the universalist, Catholic-inspired views defended by the party of the Centre. There are as many truths, as many conceptions

of the world as there are races. Hitler clearly contested that it was possible to speak absolutely about the correctness, or otherwise, of a certain world view. In fact one can only talk about it in relation to a given race, to the goals and will to exist and to power of that race, and this truth - says Hitler - which "is the most natural for a race, because it is innate to it and because it is adapted to the expression of its life, can mean in certain cases, for another people differently formed, not only a serious danger, but outright extinction". Universalism and internationalism are synonymous with uncertainty, decadence of instinct, loss of contact with the deepest forces of the people to which we belong. If we have the right to call Catholic the vision for which all ethnic differences are part of a naturalistic and temporal plane, beyond which there exists a unique truth, a supra-political Christian society, according to which there is neither the Aryan nor the Semitic, neither the European nor Asian, and so on - then there is no doubt that the doctrine expounded by Hitler cannot be described as "orthodox", provided, of course, that it is thought through to the end and developed without intellectual compromise.

A few critical remarks are in order here, however. First and foremost, we would be tempted to ask whether every truth

being linked to one race and true for it alone, the very truth according to which this pluralism is believed must be deemed true for one race only, being dictated by the particular characteristics of that race, or else it is true universally and in a supraracist mode for all races. All relativism, in general, is condemned to this wasp and this contradiction: for in very act by which it proclaims itself to be true, it assumes precisely, *mutatis mutandis*, the characteristics of an absolutism or a universalism. But let us leave aside this objection, which is of a speculative nature. There is undoubtedly a positive aspect to Hitler's vision: it is a reaction against the rationalist, illuminist and democratic myths of European decadence. The doctrine of race is a value, insofar as it signifies the primacy of quality over quantity, of the differentiated over the formless, of the organic over the mechanical; insofar, above all, as it proposes the ideal a profound and living unity between spirit and life, between thought and race, between culture and instinct. However, such an ideal still remains in relation to the indeterminate content of— ; secondly, it is something which, in order to become a value, needs to be liberated from both the fatalistic background and naturalistic element.

On the first point, to set oneself the task of a creative synthesis between the innate idea of a race and the material conditions that impose themselves upon it, up to a "crystalline conformity to the goal" - *kristallklar erfüllten Zweck- mässigkeit* - is not yet to resolve the fundamental problem, which is: what content, case by case, is to be realised in this synthesis? How can we recognise what is the task of one race, and therefore "true, and not of another?

race? Hitler seems to be showing a propensity for a pragmatic solution, i.e. one that is pragmatic and empirical, when he says, with regard to the correctness of a given vision, and therefore with regard to its right to apply to a given race, that it is difficult to give an opinion, except in terms of the consequences and effects that will flow from it among the men who have adopted it. But we fall

The famous predestination by "providence" becomes a myth which, at best, serves as an "idée-force", a suggestive reinforcement of a certain vocation or conviction; is said, objectively, about a criterion which can justify *a priori* and link a certain mission or truth precisely to a certain race. It is a little odd that Hitler should conceive of heroism as a "just as there is birth in the species of cat or elephant, species each of which has its own characteristics.

The heroic man would think and act heroically by nature and by virtue his racial characteristic, and even by predestination, not through free inner action. And since it is also said that any action that does not conform to the innate ethnic-spiritual characteristic is only an occasion for decadence, then any effort, for example, by a race predestined not to be heroic, to adopt a heroic truth and rise heroically, would be an occasion for decadence. This example may serve to illustrate strange mixture we observe, on this point, in Hitler's theses.

But there is something else. What distinguishes man The "Nordic-Aryan" characterisation of human characteristics of other races is seen as a fundamental point. However, this point *is* not resolved by Hitler , at least not in the context of the speech to which we are referring here , since Hitler simply attributes as a characteristic of "North Aryan man" the fact that, in both ancient and modern times, he has always achieved "a decisive synthesis between the tasks set, the goal and the material given", by means a free and creative mind. In fact, this distinction is similar to that between who knows how to organically realise his own nature, in a specific lifestyle, and anyone who doesn't know how to come. But aren't there lifestyles and lifestyles? par-Realising our own way being 'classically' is an ideal which can be embodied on the basis of such characteristics as

Hellenic, Hebrew, Japanese or Germanic. The concept therefore remains undefined, and the specific features of the famous **élément** "Nordic-Aryan" remain vague. Something more positive comes from Hitler's reference to an opposition due to innate inclination of certain races to transcend the naturalistic element, the subs-

The idea is to use the primitive trait of existence to transfigure the main features of their own lives. But this is no more than an allusion. All that related, in the ancient traditions, to the "supernatural" character of the *ârya* as

" *dvija* , as opposed to the *asûrya*, the "dark" man dominated by the demonic element of his nature, is barely touched upon.

Another question arises from the point of view of criticism. Given that Hitler does not intend to educate seers capable of directly knowing the plans pre-established by divine providence with regard to the various destinies and tasks of the races; given, as we have seen, that he does not provide a criterion for determining *a priori* the spiritual element which a given race will have to realise in a demiurgic way - the danger remains of ending up in simple naturalism, and therefore in materialism. What we mean is that it will always be possible to suspect that what is involved here is not a creative and heroic adherence of the race to the idea, but a simple subordination of the idea to what is presented as racial data. In other words, the mere constitution a given race, what it happens to be on the naturalistic level or also (in an empirical sense) on the historical level, and what it adopts by virtue of a crude will to exist and power, could become the only criteria on the basis of which to decide, pragmatically, on the truth, validity and innate conformity, for the said race, of elements which in fact belong to a higher, meta-biological, spiritual or cultural plane.

We wish to stress the importance of this consideration, which clearly shows the stumbling block on which racism can end up breaking down. Especially today,

forces of an internal and collective nature erupting on all sides, it is essential to consider the dilemma *of whether it is the spirit that shapes a race* (or, more specifically, a nation), *or whether it is a race (a nation) that shapes the spirit*. More briefly still: *is there determination from above, or determination from below?* Those who believe that this is nothing more than sophistry and captious reasoning are unaware of one of the main problems on the contemporary political horizon.

As we have shown on another occasion here, there are two distinct types of racism and nationalism: one is *spiritual*, the other is *materialistic* and corrupting*. The fact that they are both opposed to democratic and internationalist levelling, and to liberal desegregation, should not in the least lead us to confuse them. In one, we have the emergence of the pre-personal, and therefore undifferentiated, subset a given race, which, as the "soul of the race", is given a mystical halo, arrogates to itself a sovereign right and does not recognise any value in the spirit, intellectuality and culture, which are thus transformed into instruments at the service of a temporal and political enterprise. In this case, race and nation really do provoke a destructive pluralism, giving rise to a multiplicity of antagonistic notions which, by their very nature, cannot admit of any superior, unitary point of reference. When racism takes on such a meaning, conditioned by the ethnic and collectivising element, it can be said, as we have done, that it inevitably opposes any universalist vision, such as, for example, that of Catholicism.

But it is a different matter when nation and race are truly, and not rhetorically, prefigured as spiritual and transcendent concepts: when it is no longer blood, or the collective soul, or tradition in the vulgar and empirical sense, or the brutal will to exist and to be, but the will to live.

* In the text: ptrveritōre [N.D.T.].

of power of a group, which stands at the centre - but rather, precisely, an *idea*, playing the role of a determining force that is exerted from above. This is not the place to go into this at all, and we have already discussed it at greater length in some of our books.

Aryan, has always had this character. In this case, the —
The correctness of racism is limited to recognising that the formative action of forces superior to nature on nature itself, that is to say on the naturalistic and biologically conditioned element, is so profound that it is reflected in a certain heredity and in a certain "form" or "style" of life, common to an entire group. But then it also remains clear that this heredity, this form or this style do not explain themselves, do have their principle in themselves, are not a pure "gift", the characteristics of an animal species can be: on the contrary, they are appearances, and like signs and consecrations of a conquest and of a higher strength.

Hitler writes: "The Greeks and Romans immediately felt very close to the Germans, because their roots went back to a single fundamental race, and this explains why the immortal creations of the peoples of Antiquity exerted an attraction on their racially related descendants". Now, it seems to us that this example, in particular, must lead to something more than simple racism. In fact, Romans and Germans joined forces - and gave birth to the greatest type of culture that Europe has ever known at a time, the Imperial Middle Ages, dominated not by racial particularism, *but by a universal idea*. The Middle Ages offer us precisely one of the clearest examples of supra-political and supranational unity, acting in a formative way from above; of a single principle which, far from being shattered by ethnic egoism and nationalistic prevarications, applied to the different races in multiple forms.

But they were always capable, by virtue of a profound spiritual affinity, founding a *corpus*, a grandiose and admirable *ordinatio md unum*, in which the particular did not end up being emptied of its substance, but spiritually integrated. Although we have studied not only Hitler's writings, but also those of the main National Socialist ideologists, we have not been able to see clearly, in the final analysis, which of the two directions we have indicated is the one towards which the profound soul of the revolutionary current bearing the swastika is directed. *Overcoming international destruction, reintegrating itself into values such as quality, race and difference, not in the way that leads to a plurality closed units and ideas placed at the service of matter and empirical politics, but on the contrary by making possible the formation a reality This seems to the fundamental problem facing the future of Europe.*

The future will tell us what direction German reconstruction will eventually take. For the moment, one thing is certain: insofar as it has indissolubly associated the idea of nation and race with a superior universal idea - that of Rome - Fascism has already clearly established the symbol which alone is likely to have a positive value for the problem we have just been talking about.

IV

1934

THE FIGHT NATIONAL SOCIALIST "WORLD VIEW"

It would seem that the last watchword of National Socialism is *Weitanschauung*, i.e. "world vision". In his recent speech to student delegations from all over the Reich, Hitler said: "Those who have seen National Socialism only as a political party struggling to exert a certain influence on the life of the state have learned nothing from the past and have not understood the tasks of the future. The Chancellor concluded by saying that the task of the generation was not only to maintain everything physical, but also to create "works of truly immortal culture". In this ideology, "culture" is a concept very close to that of "world view" - *Weitanschauung*. For his part, Alfred Rosenberg, who can be considered the leading theoretician of the Nazi movement, argued in the newspaper he edited, the Yöikischler *Beobachter*, which is, incidentally, the official party organ, something even more significant about the rapport between the idea of the State and the 'vision of the world'. He has criticized the notion of a total or "total state" in a substantive text.

totalitarianism, thus disputing that, for National Socialism, the State is an autonomous reality, a creature endowed with life to which everything else owes to be subordinate, as, for example, in the conception of a Treitschke. On the contrary, the State would be *the means*: the means by which, even if authoritatively, the national socialist "world view" should eventually permeate the German people completely. Similar theses were supported by other representatives of the movement, such as Minister Goering.

Since this is the case, we naturally arrive at a visitwonder at what is precisely— and officially - this *Weltanschauung* of which Nazism speaks of. This is not an easy problem to solve. It is true that there is an ideological system and a philosophy history with fairly well-defined features, precisely the one Rosenberg set out in his major work *The Myth of the Twenty-First Century*. However, the first edition of this book contains a disclaimer in which the author states that ideas he supports in the book are not official party ideas, but personal ones. After the revolution, however, the book was reprinted in a popular edition, distributed thousands of copies and officially recommended to schools, Rosenberg himself being appointed head of all German educational and cultural organisations. It was this last fact that led the Catholic Church to Index all of Rosenberg's work. Rosenberg responded in kind with a speech to the Reichstag entitled: *The coming of the Worldview [Der Kampf um die Weltanschauung]*, which we shall now briefly revisit. Let us say straight away that not will satisfied with the results of this examination. The fact is that Rosenberg, because the official nature his speech, only partially reaffirmed he had defended in his book, not without some very significant waverings and under the influence of the purely political aspect (which, for us, is not the most important part of his speech).

of its activity. On the other hand, if we were to look elsewhere for better points of reference for this famous *Weltanschauung*, we find none, we wanted 'official. Expressions of abrupt and harsh racism are official - but to call them a "world view" would be abusive. The orientations of the authors of the "anti-secular front", such as,

by example, those who depend on *Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt*, are of a higher standard - but they are not 'official. As for the representatives of conservatism associated with Nazism, such as Everling, they seem to have been sidelined in Germany, even though their ideological positions are interesting and lofty ². The best thing to , then, is to read what Rosenberg said in his recent speech, in which he also used some of Hitler's own ideas.

Rosenberg began by arguing that the World War had created a divide between two eras, which in reality were no longer connected by anything profound. There are both positive and negative aspects to this assertion.

The positive aspect is the attack on liberalism and Marxism, in terms of the worldview. Rosenberg's observation that the liberal thesis, which originally referred to an ideal personality fulfilment, had in the end been decisively inverted into a cosmopolitan rationalism detached from life, blood and any national reality, with the concomitant omnipotence of "enjuvenated" industry and the "Marxist" Marxism, was fair, if not original.

On one of the best representatives of this group, Wilhelm Stapel, see our article *Une teoïogïa del nazionolismo*, in *La Vita Italiana*, 1933, number 12.

² For a summary of these positions, see our study: *Il nuovo mito germanico del Terzo Regno*, in *Politica*, June-August 1932.

of finance. But the advent of such abstractism systematically aroused against it the international pro-letarian masses, with the Marxist vision of the world and the Marxist call to class struggle. Rosenberg saw the absurdity of this: believing that a new order could be built by fomenting the revolt of one part against the whole. Hitler added that this

There is also a biological counterpart: under the symbols of the socialist international, there was an appeal to something eietically biological common to all strata of Europe, the revival of a kind of obscure sub-national and pre-national substratum, in the name of which a united front was proclaimed against other, biologically more differentiated elements, from which the multiplicity of European traditions emerged. For having lost their original force, for having contented themselves with mere politico-state ideas deprived of the living foundation that only race can give them, these other elements were on the verge of being overthrown. All this is contained in Hitler's speech to the youth. On this basis, Hitler asserts and Rosenberg repeats that Germany had *already* begun to decompose before the *war*. In our opinion, this was a rather peculiar assertion. Hitler reproached pre-war German political thought for having neglected the national-racist presuppositions required of all social life and for having thus virtually paved the way for decadence.

It is here that the positive aspect of this ideology begins to fade in favour of the negative. There is an astonishing lack of understanding of the strength of what Rosenberg calls the residual forms of the Middle Ages in pre-war Germany in the face of the strength of the Marxist and liberal element. Germany, when it was imperial and Prussian, in the proper sense of the term, showed itself to be well united, in a harmonious articulation of particular classes and kingdoms, without any need for "racism", or for this obsession with "socialisation".

which, for many ideo-

It was the principle of loyalty, fidelity, pride in service, military discipline. So, when Rosenberg tells us that "the German revolution began in August 1914", we could show him that, in the name of the Roman *suum ius cuique tribuere*, we are capable of overcoming any partisan spirit, and prove him right: but in what sense? In the sense we must recognise that the general atmosphere in Europe before the war was polluted by Masonic democracy, by liberalism, by economic materialism, hypocritical humanitarianism; that such an atmosphere also, unfortunately, influenced part of the ideology adopted by the Allies, which found its conclusion in the infamous Wilson points when the Central Empires went into battle as aristocratic and still partly feudal nations, heirs, essence, to what had still been preserved of the 'world view' proper to our common medieval civilisation, albeit in the infrequent forms of affirmation that were to lead to debacle. But this is not the sense in which Rosenberg says that the German revolution began in 1914—just as we might say that the Italian revolution began in 1915, as the first instinctive reaction against the European political world and as the eruption of the heroic spirit, which was to become self-aware and justify itself by adopting the Roman and imperial ideals of fascism. The meaning of Rosenberg's phrase is in fact equivocal: there is anti-liberalism and anti-Marxism here, but there also seems to be something of an aversion to the old German regime. The old German regime which some National Socialist speakers had already expressed on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Reich and of the Kaiser's last birthday, going so far as to say that not only the Hohenzollerns, but also the Habsburgs and even the Hohens- taufens basically had a negative effect on the German people. That Rosenberg suffered, in some way, from the fact that the Hohenzollerns, the Habsburgs and even the Hohens- taufens had a negative effect on the German people.

influence ideas of this kind, seems to have a
as demonstrated by this passage from his speech: "For us, the
representative of the German Reich ideal is not Char-
lemagne, but his implacable adversary, Widukind, leader
of the Saxons. The Holy Roman Empire of of the Alle-
nation

Rather, we see the precursors of the Third Reich in all the great
rebels hostile to this Empire, whether they acted within the
framework of the ideal a universal monarchy, such as the great
Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, or whether they rose up against
Caesar-papism, such as Henry the Lion , Frederick William of
Brandenburg, Luther,

Hutter*, Frederick the Great or Bismarck. Today, at

At this turning point in the millennia, we can say that if the Saxon
leader Widukind succumbed in the seventh century, he returns as a
victor, through Hitler, in the twentieth century".

We shall not attempt to point out how many disparate and
contradictory themes are pressed together in these few
characteristic lines. We would simply like to ask how it is possible
to declare oneself an enemy of Charlemagne and exalt Frederick II,
both representatives of the same idea, with the aggravating
circumstance that the Court of Sicily and Frederick's innovations in
feudal law heralded the "rationalism" of those who, not yet
"enjuvenated", should hardly be in the odour of sanctity among the
Nazis. On the other hand, what does it mean to say that Hitler is a
kind of victorious reincarnation of Widukind? Who is the
Charlemagne against whom this avatar would have taken his
revenge? For the freedom of the German people, fine - but for the
German nation? The reality is that we can only see the Nazi
revolution as positive insofar as it is a counter-revolution, an anti-
Weimar and anti-Versailles, well as a revolt against liberalism and

• Jacob Hutter: founder an Anabaptist dissent, he was burnt alive in 1536.

socialism. As for the historical appendices just mentioned, they make no sense, or only a negative sense. And who can fail to see how risky it is, on Rosenberg's part, to reduce the true German tradition to nothing better than a tradition of "rebels": precisely as a certain French ideology, à la Massis, desires.

In his *Mythe of the - Century*, Rosenberg supported courageous ideas, which we sincerely appreciate, and we know that he was interested in similar ideas which we ourselves defended in Italy. This is why we are displeased to see him indulge in such doctrinal vacillation, which is understandable but not justifiable. One can understand, for example, the *raison d'être* of a dialectical or tactical opposition of Nazism to certain elements of the old regime, but it is a long way from that to a trial against the *principle* of this regime, and one can only take this great step on the lowest level an empirical policy, not on the doctrinal level. The concern to preserve the integrity of a race and a people is legitimate, but when this concern becomes fanaticism, uniting in the same negation the anti-race (internationalism) and the *supra-race* (the old ideal of the Empire), it is transformed into a dangerous deviation. This is why the definition of this famous National Socialist "world view" remains ambiguous. The only clear-cut feature seems to be the following: *overcoming liberalism and socialism, on the one hand, and aristocratic and imperial traditionalism, on the other, in the name of a new unity between race and spirit to be achieved in the national socialist totality.*

Rosenberg refers to this "inner heroism", which consists of solving problems even when the most deeply rooted mental habits oppose it, and says that we must first recognise, on the basis of this courage, that

"He adds that "the National Socialist revolution, while complete as far as political power is concerned, is still in its infancy as far as the political system is concerned.

The first consequence this is that the soul and the race condition each other, that a soul is born with a given race and enters into decadence when that race enters into decadence. This should be the presupposition of a whole new interpretation of history, of which Rosenberg gives a brief example in his speech by referring to Greece, but which he set out at length in *The Myth of the Twenty-First Century*.

We are thus returned to the previous point, i.e. obliged to ask ourselves whether the theses put forward in this book should be considered orthodox or not, as far as the definition of the national socialist vision of life is concerned. The idea of the interdependence between the soul and the body of a given race, although accepted, remains formal, undifferentiated, valid as a mere schema. What is essential and decisive, however, is *the doctrine of race within the framework a philosophy of history*: only then can we overcome this indeterminacy and arrive at a positive content for the Nazi vision of the world, valid for the German race and not for other races. And the only attempt at such a definition which is not limited to mere anthropology, as is the case with Günther's work, but which also develops into a philosophy of culture, is precisely that of Rosenberg. Hitler

Cf. Hans F.K. Günther, *nassenkunde des deutschea Volkes*, Munich, 1926; *Rasseakunde Euiopas*, Munich, 1930; *Rassengeseltciite des helleaischea Volkes*, Munich, 1929; *Die nordiscbe Rasse bei des Indogerma ea Amiens*, Munich, 1934. - (The following works by Gün-ther have been translated into French: *Le mariage*, Payot, 1952; *Platon eugéniste et vitafiste*, Pardès, Puiseaux, 1987; *Religiosité irido- européenne*, Pardès, Puiseaux, 1987, with a rather critical presentation by Julius Evola - first published in the journal *ii Coaciliatoze* on 15 August 1970 - which reads: "Moreover, Günther makes a serious reduction in the heritage of Indo-European spirituality by denying or ignoring what we might call the 'dimension of transcendence' in the human order no less than in the divine order" (p. 22) - N.D.T.J.

he too, in other circumstances, for example in his speech *Profession de loi héroïque*, attempted to deepen the content of the notion "Nordic-Aryan man", mais in an unsatisfactory manner: for to speak 'heroism' In other words, to speak of "creative ability", of "decisive synthesis between the tasks set, the objective and the material given", of "crystalline conformity to the innate goal", and so on, is once again to speak of formal characteristics and instrumental capacities, and is not really to define a *content* that is specific to one race and not to other races. In short, we we know that the National Socialist vision is the one that underpins the mind-race equation, but Hitler tells us nothing about what in the terms of this equation are in relation to *the Weltanschauung* that the Nazi state should spread among the German people.

It is Rosenberg, on the other hand, who could tell us, since he has developed a philosophy of the history of the primordial Nordic race, from its arctic prehistory to its many ramifications in the Indo-European and Indo-Germanic cultures of historical times, and even up to the Middle Ages and the modern era. This is certainly not the place to examine in detail the solidity of Rosenberg's reconstruction. Suffice it to say that we ourselves have had occasion to deal with the same subject and, on the basis of the results of our research⁵, we can affirm that, while it is legitimate to give, through a comparative study of oral and written traditions, myths and memories of the most diverse peoples of Antiquity, a sufficiently positive content to the idea a primordial Nordic culture (to avoid certain equivocations, we have preferred to speak of a "primordial" Nordic culture), it is also legitimate to give, through a comparative study of oral and written traditions, myths and memories of the most diverse peoples of Antiquity, a sufficiently positive content to the idea of a primordial Nordic culture (to avoid certain equivocations, we have preferred to of a "primordial" Nordic culture).

⁵ Cf. our *Osservazioni critiche sul "razzismo" nazionalsocialista*, In *La Vite Italiana*, 1933, number 11. - [This is the article by Evola that precedes this one in the present collection - Note by R.D.P.].

our recent *Rivolta contro il mondo moderoo*, hlilan, 1934.

hyperborean" or "boreal" culture) characterised by an elevated and virile spirituality, it is nonetheless problematic to posit an interdependence between cultural and ethnic factors, something that Rosenberg, Günther (even more so than the former) and, to a lesser extent, Wirth⁶ do to varying degrees, right from the start of what are strictly speaking historical times. On the other hand, it is downright arbitrary to make the spirit of this prehistoric civilisation the monopoly of any of the races that have appeared, as a result of all sorts of flows, in the modern world. In other words, the 'Nordic' myth, in the form in which it may objectively have some consistency, essentially refers to a generic type of civilisation and spirituality, which can only be abused in the service of the exclusivisms of modern racism and nationalism. The "Nordic" element, in the sense indicated above, is present not only among the ancient Scandinavians, but also in archaic China, India, Persia, Egypt, Greece, Rome, ancient Mexico, and even in the Philistine current of Semitic cultures (as the anti-Semite Rosenberg admits), etc. What is "Germanic" is not only the "Germanic" element, but also the "Nordic" element. What is "Germanic" therefore only becomes a species of the "Nordic" genus, and the right of the latter to refer to itself in an integrating manner is no greater than the right that other races, starting with our own, can claim for themselves.

Racist ideologists are in fact playing a kind of dialectical yo-yo ad *usum delphini*. From bottom to top: other words, from Germanic to pure Nordic. Then from top to bottom: you've discovered horizons and values that are basically supra-ethnic, collected testimonies from several groups of peoples, for-

⁶ Herman Wirth, *Der AuLgang der Menschheit*, Jena, 1928. On this book, see our article *Aspetti del movimento culturale della Germania contemporanea*, in *Nuova Antologia* }^{cr} January 1930.

But the Nazis were faced with a dilemma: either they maintained their exclusivism, or the notion of 'worldview' remained vague and indefinite for them. But it doesn't add up, and the Nazis find themselves faced with a dilemma: either they maintain their exclusivism, and the notion of 'world view' remains vague and indeterminate, not to say reduced to mere biological and, at best, ethical-artistic notions; or they define this notion means of the element 'world view'.

"If the term 'Nordic' is used in a philosophy of history of the type of Rosenberg or Wirth, then they have no right to claim this monopoly, nor to prevent the first term from having a broader logical and historical meaning than the second in the mind-race equation.

Our own research has also highlighted a
another point: if they really understood how the element
The "solar" and "royal" types were always specific to the
"solar" and "royal" types.

If the Nazis are to have a "Nordic" (in the supra-ethnic sense, of course) civilisation, then the Nazis should also attach greater importance to various aspects of the old German aristocratic tradition than they seem prepared to do by means of certain "Nordic" (in the supra-ethnic sense, of course) constructs.

In spite of everything, we cannot deny the exclusively Jacobin flavour of these "social" and "dictatorial" policies.

Let us now turn to the final point of Rosenberg's speech, which is affected precisely by the Church's condemnation of his work.

We cannot dwell here on the fact that giving a definition
The "Nordic" aspect of Nazi *Weltanschauung* means arriving
to theses clearly opposed to Catholic views, and Christian views
in general. Rosenberg made no secret this opposition, and his *Myth of the 21st Century* even indulged in the harshest attacks on the Church. A

In this respect, it must be said that the Church itself could
also be right, as when she decided to stigmatize
the aspect of simple mysticism of the blood presented by

But the real opposition arises when this inferior aspect is eliminated, when what is 'Nordic' is given the meaning of a 'spiritual category', i.e. a universal type of behaviour. But the real opposition arises when this inferior aspect is eliminated, when what is "Nordic" is given the meaning of a "spiritual category", i.e. a universal type of attitude to the world, to life and to the sacred, an attitude which - when thought through in depth, and precisely because of its immanent foundations, heroic and 'solai- res' - sees in the Christian spirit something inferior, in the Nietzschean sense, a Semitic-Plebeian *pathos* and a servility towards the divine alien to the virile and aristocratic orientation characteristic of the highest forms of Indo-European culture, an orientation present in ancient Rome and, albeit in the form of a compromise, in medieval Gibelinism. From this point of view, there is not much to be done. Our own research, the results of which appear in the book we have already mentioned, confirms and reinforces this incompatibility. And it does not fail to embarrass Rosenberg from time to time.

Having become the official speaker of the Reichstag and head of the German educational organisations, Rosenberg sought a solution by means of false distinctions of competence. But he found himself faced with a dilemma similar to that mentioned above: if confrontation is to be avoided, if the anti-Christianity of the National Socialist *Weltanschauung* is not to be openly declared (and let us stress that Rosenberg associates the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in his denial), then this *Weltanschauung* returns to an indeterminate state, losing its true scope and integral content, Even if it does not descend to the level of vulgar racism, against which the Church has every right defend itself, and which makes German bishop's assertion that it was not worth escaping from Bolshevik barbarism in order to fall into Germanic barbarism lacking in a pungent flavour. Either one holds firmly to the wholly 'Nordic' 'world view, and

then you have to have the courage to clearly con-
between Christian denominations, an adventure in which the
does not know up to the extent to which a Party, matter how
take the risk. strong, can

In any case, when Rosenberg says: "The struggle in the name
of dogma is over and the great struggle for values has begun", he
is not really breaking the deadlock. After all, what are dogmas if not
values of a transcendent nature rewritten in an authoritarian form?
Other useless parries: "The National Socialist State cannot be
the instrument a particular religious denomination". And: "The party
is one thing, faith is another".

other. When a National Socialist puts on the brown shirt, he ceases
to be a Protestant, a Catholic, or a member of the German Church,
etc., he is merely a militant member of the German nation. As a
private individual, however, he has the right to take whatever
position he wishes on religious matters. What can all this really
mean? Hasn't it been said over and over again that the Nazi state is
not simply a political and agnostic reality, but means of affirming a
spiritual content, of revolutionising our "world view"? Didn't
Rosen- berg say that the mystique of Nordic blood should be given
the same religious value as the ancient sacraments? What limits
can really separate religious confes- sion and 'world vision'? It was
in a kind of new theory of 'double truth' that Rosenberg tried to
find a way out and reconcile the politician and the author of an
anti-Christian work. But the dilemma already mentioned continues
to dog him: either everything falls back into simple racism as
human zootechnics and into pure social-political discipline,
agnostic in the face of the most decisive problems for the spirit and
history— and talk of "world vision" and of "the world as a whole".

In this case, the term "revolution" is abusive. Either we are talking
sensibly about Nordic *Weltanschauung* in the sense, now defined,
of a spiritual category relating to the highest solar traditions of the
Indo-European cycle, and we must then

to call on that "inner courage" that Rosenberg spoke of, and to prepare for confrontations far more important and dangerous than those involving Marxism or international Judaism.

So, overall, .e. in the entire

We have tried in these notes to establish the main elements of this problematic, and we can think of no better title than that of Rosenberg's speech: *The fight for a world vision*. On condition that it is an inner, spiritual struggle, rather than an external or national one. Obstructions of a biological materialism which, despite everything, feels Darwinian banalities; nationalist pathos mixed with nostalgia for the free spiritual horizons of the origins; instinctive reactions against the regime which led to the adventure war and equivocal tendencies towards "socialisation"; anti-internationalist and anti-universalist condemnation, but with a tendency to confuse antination with supranation (empire); aspirations towards a more concrete, heroic, virile and original spirituality than Christian spirituality, and at the same time a disregard for Rome's ecumenical ideal and the threat a new

"Gallicanism" of the naturalist and pagan type: myth and biology, tradition and revolution - all these factors are still chaotically at play in the German soul engaged in the struggle for a "world vision". Their confused presentation suggests that this struggle is still in its infancy. It will take men of unsuspected inner courage and strength of will, men capable of detaching themselves from the contingent and the past, capable of drawing from adherence to true principles the energy for absolute action, both spiritual and practical, if this struggle is to be brought to a successful conclusion in a way that is salutary for the destiny of a race which, after the Roman race, has contributed to the greatness of the West.

1935

NAZISM ON THE MOSCOW ROUTE?

The events of 30 June in Germany had the following overall significance: a) elimination of "cumbersome" elements of various kinds; b) elimination of a tendency of the extreme left (assault sections),
"(c) the elimination of an extreme right which aimed to make tactical use of left-wing elements in order to block the path of National Socialism, and then to assert itself in its place (von Schleicher).

Nazism had still been oscillating since 30 June, but seemed to be slowly, albeit moderately, tilting to the right. The centre of the movement therefore seemed to be moving away from the field of influence of the assault sections and into that of the Reichswehr. But this development might not be entirely regular (see the rumours

¹ On the subject of these events, it seems appropriate to quote what Evola wrote in his *Notes sur le Troisième Reich*, which appear at the end of the book *Le fascisme vu de droite* (Totalité, 1981), p. 123-124: "One episode that should be recalled here and which shows the gentle face of Hitlerism in this first period is the events of 30 June 1934. On that day, and precisely during the night that came to be known as the 'night of the long knives', a certain number of people were killed.

on the appointment of Goering to replace Papen), and is possible that, at some point in the moment de von The reaction of "revolutionary" elements, some of whom had already accused Hitler of "treason". Knowing what these elements want, what their ideology is, and what ideals they would like to bring Germany back to, through National Socialism, can therefore be of great interest.

interest.
In order to do this, we will use a book which appeared on the eve of the Nazi revolution, a book which therefore benefited from full freedom of expression; this work clearly and courageously defines ideas which, of course, do not surface as they are today, but which nevertheless continue to be cherished by the tendencies of Nazism to which we have alluded. We are referring here to Carl Dyrssen's book, entitled *The Message from the East* and subtitled as follows: *Fascism, National Socialism and Prussianism**. Published by Korn, from

personalities were eliminated using expeditious methods, mainly by the SS. Among them were people who did not share the same political orientation; in addition to former Chancellor von Schleicher, there were men from the Right, such as von Böse, von den Decken, von Alvensleben and a secretary of von Papen, Edgard Jung. But the main significance of the operation was as follows - among the SA, the Brown Chekies, led by Ernst Röhm, had spread idea of a "second revolution" or a second moment in the revolution; they denounced the survival, within the Reich, of "reactionary" groups, which were those of the Right, Hitler's connivance with the "barons of the army and industry" (...) However, 30 June 1934 essentially saw the crushing of this radical current in the party and its alleged plot. Roehm, head of the SA and a former close friend of Hitler, and Gregor Strasser, organiser of the Berliner Brownshirts, lost their lives" (Note by **R.D.P.**).

* **Original** title: *Die Botschaft des Ostens. Fascismus, Nationalsozialismus und Prussentum*. The preface to the work is dated autumn 1932, but the book was not published until 1933. Born in 1888 and dying **after 1945**, Carl Dyrssen belonged to the "mystical Prussianism" movement within the National Revolutionaries.

In Breslau, it is presented on an attractive cover with a red background featuring a photo-graphic montage of the silhouettes of Mussolini, Hitler and Cardinal Gasparri, with a parade of assault sections in the background, carrying their unfurled banners and passing under the Brandenburg Gate.

The authors considerations are essentially concerned with simple economic policy, betraying a perspective that is narrow, to say the least. For Dyrssen, there are two opposing worlds, more or less separated by the Rhine, and referred to as "East" and "West". For him, the 'West' was the world of liberalism, democracy, internationalism and, above all, *capitalism*. North America, France and England, with their principles of free trade and financial imperialism, belong to it. Typical of this system, in the final analysis, would be the principle of individualism, on the inside, and the principle imperialism, on outside. Its liberalism would be nothing but hypocrisy at the service of hegemonic or destructive action against other peoples.

For Dyrssen, the "Orient" would be, first and foremost, Germany: an industrial and capitalist type of state would be opposed by an essentially agrarian state; individualism would be replaced by a social spirit; and the imperialist and internationalist economy would be replaced by a consumer economy, directly linked to blood and soil.

According to our author, the meaning of world war would have been that of an assault by the West on the East. It would mark the critical moment when the individualist and capitalist idea would have blown up the natural limits of its own world and become - if we may put it this way - explosive, in its attempt to break and bend to its system - indifferent to land and blood - the part of Europe that still resisted it or could resist it. It is clear to everyone that, even here, Dyrssen takes an arbitrary or, at least, very one-sided view of things. It was precisely German circles

and Nazis who blamed Wilhelmian Germany, which had allegedly under attack from the "West, for some of the things it had done. underhand deals with big business and industry the heavy Germanic influence, it is well known that the "national territorialities" and the principle of nationalities have held a dominant role in the ideology of the Allies right up until the peace treaties.

In any case, such confusion is still nothing to write home about. compared to those committed by Dyrssen when he comes to to examine the post-war situation and, above all, the meaning of fascism.

In the ideological, social and political chaos of the post war, two main antagonistic currents would have emerged: a *reformist-Roman* current and a *Germanic-revolutionary* current, corresponding respectively to *fascism* (as Dyrssen imagined it) and *national socialism* (as Dyrssen hoped and as it was in the minds of the activist elements on the left).

For Dyrssen, fascism was not truly revolutionary, because it did not lead to a type state that was really different from the "Western type, based on on the capitalist private economy. Relying on the prejudices of some outdated or myopic historical-materialist schema, our author believes that ancient Rome, then the law formulated by the Roman Church and its practice, never emerged from the 'Western' world. The Roman ideal of *pax* and *justitia* would have been no more than a system of social equilibrium and moderation based on essentially individualist and capitalist premises, and the social ideology of the Church would not have followed a fundamentally different course. For Dyrssen, however, Fascism did not deviate from this course; having "domesticated" its original revolutionary and "socialist" impulse, it was not a revolt against the old system, but merely a correction of it. Fascism admits property and private initiative, and only erases the harshness and imbalances inherent in the simple class struggle and liberal capitalism.

In this way, the basic elements of the old "Western" system, no less than recognised, are strengthened and saved from the salutary crisis that was about to overthrow them elsewhere. Revolt" was avoided. Moreover, Fascism would retain its imperialist tendency, "a vocation inseparable from the Roman tradition": it was not content to stand as a national political ideal; it presented itself, directly or indirectly, as an example beyond Italy's borders. But insofar as Rome served precisely as a salvation for dying Western capitalism, it had to be seen as the new danger for the German anti-capitalist and "socialist" tradition. For Dyrssen, National Socialism would be called upon to defend this tradition revolutionarily, to continue the old movement of emancipation from Rome - *los vos Rom!* which began with Luther in the religious sphere.

For our author, the Lutheran revolt is closely related in spirit to that of the German peasants, already considered by various German racists as the last flash of the Nordic will for independence: The peasants who rose up against the nobility and the clergy and demanded that the rest of the land should revert to them within a communist framework, stood alongside the Lutheran refusal of authoritarian individualism, imperialism, urbanisation and the glorification Roman of the "world". Basically, these are two aspects of an essentially "socialist" turn of mind that, for Dyrssen, still lies at the very basis of the Prussian tradition, which is agrarian and anti-capitalist, with property having only a social function and kings appearing there as the "gods".

"servants of the people". National Socialism should A revolution not only against the attempt, put into effect by the German revolution, to reduce Germany to a colony in the service of "Western" Europe, governed by "Rome". A revolution not seulement against the attempt, set in motion by the German revolution of 1918, to reduce Germany to a colony in service of "Western Europe, governed by a "socialist" government.

It was not against the principles of capitalism, democracy and internationalism, but against the conservative and "feudal" residues of the German economy and against fascist "authoritarian capitalism". Hitler was faced with a choice: fascism or national socialism, the "West" or the "East, the continuation of the capitalist system, the last product of the individualist conception of economy and State, or the radical rejection of this system and the formation of a completely new economic and political structure.

And Dyrssen goes on: either heroic vision, or economic view of life. The German vocation is the rejection of cosmopolitan civilisation, because this vocation thinks in terms of collectivity and not individuality, because it aspires not to wealth but to strength, because it places value in people and not in choices, cultivating combativeness, not in the service of imperialism, but in defence of the , despising the "cadaverous obedience" of Catholic-Jesuit morality and being revolutionarily inclined to fight to the bitter end for the glory of its race.

It seems to us that there are many gross errors and confusions here. Like so many other racist authors who, in truth, do no credit to the culture of their country, and who today, following in the footsteps of Chamberlain² other dilettantes, repeat phrases of this kind, they are not only racist but also racist.

² Houston Stewart Chamberlain, author of *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Munich, (1899) ([tr.] fr.: *La genèse du xix- siècle*, deux volumes, Payot, Genève, 1913 - N.D.T.], (Rosenberg) (a) wrote *OHStOH S. Chamberlain*, Munich, 1927) on this author; see also : J. Evola, *Il mito del sangue*, Hoepli MilHR, 1937, p. 57-79 (Note de R.D.P.).

Not only did Dyrssen fail to understand the meaning of Romanity and Fascism, but he also appeared to know nothing of the best traditions of the German people. First of all, when he stated quite seriously that the aim of the new fascist system was "power through wealth" and that the values of ancient Romanity were reduced to individualism, capitalism and urbanisation, while loyalty to the land, the asceticism of strength and heroism would be a more or less Prussian monopoly - he was really speaking irresponsibly, not to say ignorantly. For who does not know that the union of sword and chariot, the double face of Mars, god of war and agriculture, the sacred relationship of the patricians with the land of their birth, and so on, were typical characteristics of pure original Romanity, and not of the decadence introduced into Rome by foreign elements? If Dyrssen's outlook were not so narrow, if his sectarian exclusivism were not the result of sheer mental stupidity, we could - it is true - recognise that we are dealing here with an Indo-European heritage in general, and consequently neither with his people nor with ours in particular. But this would only be a way of showing, once again, the one-sided nature of the two oppositions, to make it clear to Dyrssen how much of he denies is in he affirms, and vice versa.

On the subject of fascism, Dyrssen's blindness is no less. All warrior education that fascism sought to give the young generation by choosing a highly significant motto: "Life is the militia and the militia is life"; the fascist fight urbanisation; his precise and concrete initiatives to return to the land and reclaim it; the new provisions in

• In the sense, obviously, of *vite homini super terram atiliâa* est. The Italian *milizia* has no exact equivalent in French when it designates the combat waged by a group armed men united by an idea, and not this group as such. Some authors use a neologism: "militaTtCt 0 (N.D.T.).

legal matters, designed to make Dyrssen— as pre
 —from the formula "property is a
 The same thing goes for "theft", another formula: "property
 is a duty", and so on. So what does he make of all this? An
 authoritarian system at the service of capitalism and a simple ideal
 of economic life? Not the least. The
 Fascism's authoritarian system overturns subordination
 of politics to the economy, thus reaffirming the
 subjection of this one to that one, without falling into error
 It is not a "socialitarian" or a liberal error, but rather it proposes
 higher ideal of the "nation" to a differentiated, free but dis-
 ciplined economic reality, and, ultimately, of the "nation",
 from empire as point of reference supra-
 economic, supra-individual, spiritual ; c' is the ideal that
 respect for property, not in homage à 'truth' occi-
 This is because property is one of the material conditions essential
 to a person's dignity and autonomy.

It is precisely here that we discover two other serious
 confusions committed by Dyrssen. The first is the confusion
 between *personality* and *individuality*. The second the confusion
 between *internationalism* and *universality*. Incidentally, these are
 errors which we have had occasion to point out , but which
 nonetheless persist tenaciously in the dominant Nazi ideology.

On the first point, therefore, we repeat that it is possible to fight
 liberalism and individualism without being in any way hostile to
 the higher ideal of *personality*, and that this is even a condition
 to be fulfilled in order to really understand this ideal. Socialism
 and individualism are, in fact, only two sohdary aspects of the
 same materialistic, anti-qualitative, levelling decadence that has
 taken place in recent times. The ideal of free, differentiated, virile
 personalities, as the building blocks of an organic, hierarchical
 political reality in which each individual has his own function and
 dignity, is superior to both socialism and liberalism. And this ideal
 is first and foremost Indo-European, then classical, classico-
 Roman and, finally,

Roman-Germanic (Middle Ages). So Dyrssen can have a field day with the 'West': liberal, democratic and individualistic. Neither Fascism nor Romanism have anything in common with such a West, which is in reality only a relatively recent apparition, born of the ferment that has decomposed our common culture, a ferment that it is a mistake to identify with the 'West'. And when Dyrssen opposes socialism as the "solidarity of the working class", which merely expresses a feeling of inferiority consisting in envying the property of those who own it, he is contrasting it with a socialism not of "having" but of "being", a socialism not of hatred but of "being".

dignity, founded on a "spirit of aristocratic comradeship".

he is deluding himself in having defined a "Prussian" tradition in this way, since it in fact a question of values that our tradition knew, that fascism has taken over to a certain extent and which, finally, in medieval times, were a common heritage for us. *Consequently, the fact is that Dyrssen calls "the West" what is merely a recent decadence of the true, traditional West; and when he tries to lure us into such a decadence, using every pretext in name of anti-Rome, the truth is that his points of , precisely, must be qualified as "Western", in the sense of this perversion and this recent decadence.*

Indeed, what is soul of Dyrssen's 'prus- sian' anti-Romanticism if we exclude 'anti-capitalism', which is a fixed idea for him? *It's Luther.* In other words, the man who first fomented the individualist and anti-hierarchical revolt, which was gradually to be translated into the political sphere and lead, after beginning with the revolt of the German Princes against the univer- sal and 'Roman' principle of the Empire and continuing with the revolt of democratically conceived nations, to the contemporary individualist disintegration. And instead of highlighting what is, in its most

noble German, of the vast horizons, for example, of ideal, Dyrssen, on the other hand, shows a lack of understanding of the of this tradition; and finally, in the name of Luther, of "Prussian socialism", of the anti capitalism and the 'message from the East', where *I in Lenin's arms*. No more, no less.

Dyrssen wonders whether is, after all, a real spiritual frontier between the Elbe and Urals, and, without hesitation, asserts that Bolshevik Russia is today the only great power to have openly turned against the 'West', against Rome and capitalism. He claims that for a German determined to rid himself of all foreign and "occi- dental" influences that alter his essence, the fear of Bolshevisation is a childish fear. Taken as a whole, the "social" revolution of Nazism can only lead as far as Bolshevism did in relation to capitalism and individualism. Nazism and Bolshevism would have in common the ideal of a socialised and armed agricultural state, where the old system of the Germanic Almende would correspond in new forms, in a collectivism of the native soil, to the ancient Slavic mīr. But that's not all: in final apotheosis of the "message from the East

As Dyrssen the hierophant wishes, Luther and Lenin embrace fraternally. Soviet atheism, our author quietly maintains, is nothing more than a poor scarecrow with which they want to lead us by the nose. In reality, it reflects the very spirit of the Reformation: it is a rebellion against an official religion that is external, Romanised, worldly, authoritarian and tied to earthly riches - but it is precisely from this that a new, authentic, inner, free and social religiosity can develop, one that responds precisely to the aspirations of Luther, the prophet of the German people liberated from the Roman yoke.

Thus, after the very timid flights represented by his conception of an "aristocratic socialism" (whose origins can, however, be seen in the oldest form of

of our Roman senate) and by his references to the asceticism of strength and the Prussian heroic style, Dyrssen falls heavily to the ground. By saying 'no' to the ideal of Roman *universality*, and in his childish fear of a so-called 'fascist imperialism' (as if Mussolini hadn't spoken of an empire 'which, in order to be realised, needs only

even need to conquer a square kilometre of land.

ritoire" and—as if, on the other hand, *Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt* were the song of German agrarian anti-imperialism), he fell into the arms of the Bolshevik *International*. Dyrssen, in fact, seems to be unaware that, within the framework of sovietism, the notions of fatherland and nation have no place, a *fortiori* the notion of tradition by virtue of which the land can be seen as something other than mere matter and a few words; that the communist abolition of private property is only an episode in a much vaster action whose ideal is the abolition of the very notion of personality, of any autonomous faculty and of any interest in any way detached from that of the all-powerful and materialised collective man, who appeared to "redeem" humanity in an anonymous proletarianised mass.

So we think that's enough. It would be all too easy to demolish such an ideology point by point. But if it has no logical value, it has a *symptomatic* value. History shows us that it is not the most well-founded ideas that have been the most active, but those that have best contained the suggestive power of an idea-force, serving, as it were, as a crystallisation centre for the confused tendencies of a given milieu. In addition to Dyrssen, we could quote other Nazi authors, whose statements exude a similar threat. For example, Darré, a Nazi minister, is the author of a book entitled *La paysannerie comme source de vie de la race nordique** (*Nordic race**), a *The peasantry as the source of life for the* book which has been a success and which is still in print.

• Original title: *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen*
bass, Munich, 1929 [N.D.TR-I]

a quasi-official character in Germany, where the same whims of an "agrarian socialism", the same anxiety about imperialism, which would never have been a Nordic principle, the same tendencies against the notion of private property and against capitalism, recurred; and Darré was also the one who did not hesitate, in a well-known speech, to profess the same ignorance of German aristocratic traditions as that found in Dyrssen, by coming to concerns with the notion of private property.

not only the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, but even the Hohenstaufens, as traitors to the Germanic race. Readers may also have seen in these colonials our analysis of the resurgence of anti-Roman and racist law, of "social law based on blood". Perhaps he already knows that in Germany we no longer call him Charlemagne, but Charles the Frank, and that he, who had taken up the principle of Roman universality, is seen as the cause of the worst evils that have befallen Germany? Readers will also be aware that Rosenberg declared that the antecedent of the National Socialist "Third Reich" was not the tradition of the ancient *Sacrum Imperium*, but that of all the rebels to the Roman and imperial principle, starting with Widukind, the Saxon leader, the proud enemy of Charlemagne, who was certainly defeated in the twenty-first century, but who is now destined to be victoriously reborn in person of Adolf Hitler.

We could go on and on with quotations of this kind. Anti-aristocracy, socialism, smoky "Nordic" tradition as a pretext for anti-tradition, crude anti-Roman passion leading to philobolshevik attitudes.

Taken as a whole, this informs us about the nature of one of the potentialities inherent in Nazism, a negative potentiality influence today seems to be gradually waning: but an influence which cannot yet be said to have been completely overcome, and one which is bound lead, at some point, to a specific position being taken in the practical, political sphere. What Germany will look like in the end will also be interesting.

In fact, because of the role that this country plays, directly or indirectly, as a central European region, in the overall evolution of civilisation on our continent, we must hope that such trends will be overcome as clearly and as quickly as . We have a very precise path, which has nothing to do with the Freemasonic, democratic and liberal West, nor with the Bolshevist and socialist "East". Thus, it is not for us, but for Germany itself, and for role it can still play in the future, that we must express the hope that its best forces will likewise be able to lead it beyond this paralysing opposition, and consequently onto the path of genuine reconstruction.



VI

1935

PARADOXES OF OUR TIME: RACIST PAGANISM = ILLUMINISM LIBERAL

Alfred Rosenberg responds. The author of the famous *Myth of the 21st Century*, which has had so many repercussions and provoked so much controversy both inside and outside Germany, has decided to launch a counter-attack with a pamphlet entitled *To the Obscurantists of Our Time**, which has just been published in Munich.

Rosenberg warns that he does not intend to speak as a Nazi politician on this subject. He thus allows us to deal with his response in a way that is completely independent of our political relations with Germany. But it is no less true that Rosenberg's fundamental book, *The Myth*, has become a kind of spiritual guide for many sectors of the new German youth, sheltered from the well-intentioned tolerance of the Nazis.

The article reproduced here, taken from the magazine *Lo Steto*, was not published under signature of Evola, nor under one of his pseudonyms; it is signed a asterisk But there are many reasons, both its content and its plausible attribution to Evola form that {Note de

R.D.P.J.

- Title original : An *die Dunkelmlinner unsrer Zeit* [N.D.T.].

It is therefore interesting to see what Rosenberg has to say to defend his positions against the attacks that have been made on them, especially from the Catholic side. It is therefore interesting to see what Rosenberg has to say in defence of his positions against the attacks that have been made on them, especially from the Catholic side. This new work, in fact, is essentially a response to a publication by the diocese of Münster, a publication by a group of ecclesiastical specialists, who, without entering the fray as such, without really opposing Rosenberg's central conceptions, nevertheless wished to denounce all the errors and all the historical and doctrinal distortions contained in his main work.

We had hoped that time would have served Rosenberg well, and that the various criticisms and repercussions would have encouraged him to examine his theses in greater depth, to free them from numerous limitations and unsympathetic militant attitudes. But this is not the case. The opposite happened. Rosenberg became preoccupied with all that was most negative and narrow-minded in his book. In so doing, he has revealed the danger that his book represents if German youth continues to allow itself to be influenced by it instead of finding its way back to equilibrium and normality.

We won't go into detail here, as Rosenberg's response boils down to a petty war fuelled by often unsympathetic reprisals, because he uses the slightest pretext to move from the academic to the political level, to discover in his Catholic opponents epigones of the former members of the Centre Party, the enemy of National Socialism, thus relying on the commonplaces of an extremist and racist nationalism.

*It's the tone that makes the song** - and that's what's so interesting about Rosenberg's furious brochure,

-
- In French only.

it is simply the level to which the famous Germanic neo-paganism descends in the hands of this author. We are in the presence, no more and no less, of the anticlerical argumentation of the blessed times of Podrecca's Donkey, Voltaire and company, of the claims of 'free thought' and, in short, of the secular and rationalist Enlightenment. The same commonplaces against the Inquisition (why doesn't Rosenberg tell us anything about the torture methods in use in German cities at the same time?), the same polemic against the "obscurantism" of Catholic doctrine, the same contestation of Constantine's donation and, consequently, of the Church's right to temporal power, the same conception of all that is rite and supernaturalism as an invention of the priests to make themselves obey, to dominate and enslave consciences, the same unfortunate exaltation of what is simple naturalistic, scientific research, and of "self-nominated" morality, both founded not on the spirit, but on the "eternal laws of nature". Finally, let us say nothing about the identification of Rome with Judaism, about the Old Testament as a collection of "stories for cattle merchants and entertainers", and about other platitudes.

The interesting thing is rather the curious shift of forces from one front to the other: a whole pseudo-ideology, which yesterday was in the closest service of liberalism, socialism and rationalist democracy, is today in the service of racist, anti-liberal and antidemocratic nationalism, and of the new religion of the Germanic race. Yet we cannot fail to recall most precise antecedent of a phenomenon of this kind: the religion of the French Revolution, where fierce anticlericalism directed collectivist demagogy towards marriage with the cult of the goddess Reason.

Of course, Rosenberg should not be taken too seriously, and we should not . But neither can we ignore the fact that there are tendencies in Germany that are working, on various sides, towards a veritable involu- ment.

tion, summed up in the formula a "divine materialism".
nised", and as such much more dangerous than the material
rialism pure and simple, flat, two-dimensional. Let the object
of this materialism either the "life the "race the
"nation, the concept of "heroic-tragic", etc., .
changes absolutely nothing and, when comes to paganism,
then appears (the most serious) equivocation, the equivocation that
the least enlightened Catholics and the most ignorant Catholics.

most prisoner of militant apologetics, to easily get the better
of disturbing opponents and of any attempt to lead them
beyond their own limitations. Whereas the pagan world, in its
highest forms in the East and West, characterised by immensity
only as it gave, as something of a "divine", a "divine", a "divine", a
"divine".
"a sacred content and a transatlantic meaning.

The tendentious interpretation of neopaganism consists of a simple
'naturalism', the old bali- vern of the 'forest' versus the 'temple', of
a simple divinisation of natural forces, in other words of the reality
that secular science will come to know in its true, positive and
non-allegorical terms.

But that is exactly where the neo-paganism of Rosenberg and
several of his colleagues ends: it will end up - miracle of miracles
- in views drawn, no more and no less, from Catholicism: not even
from high, ascetic, ritual Catholicism, but from militant, sectarian
Catholicism. It follows that this new '**mysticism**' which Rosenberg
would like to offer to the younger generation of Germans is not
only open to criticism in that it ignores the highest, universal and
Roman values present in the Catholic religion, but also in that it is
a falsification of 'paganism' itself. And we could even show what
sinister devastation the new and fervent apostles of the Nordic race
have inflicted on the ancient mythological and heroic Nordic
traditions, with their tendentious interpretations infected with the
most modern' **p**

of the *Eddas*, thus proving that they are the first not to do so. to understand nothing more.

In Germany's present situation, these ideological excrescences can fortunately now be regarded as residues; residues of the revolutionary Left faction. In terms of forces, this fraction was liquidated with the death of Röhm, with the repression of the "second wave" (whose objective was national communism), with the disarmament of assault sections and the predominance of the Reichswehr; in economic terms, the same phenomenon took place with the dismissal of Feder ² and his replacement by representatives a way of thinking which, admittedly, is national, but not "social. What persists, therefore, is the cultural residue, consisting of the extremist ideology relating to race and autarky of race in relation to any superior principle, spiritual or religious, Catholicism included, with the consequence of illuminist, anticlerical and revolutionary neopaganism in the negative sense. It is to be hoped that this element, too, will soon be eliminated and that, in the field of cultural policy too, a condition of greater equilibrium, the basis of all spiritual exchange and all beneficial European collaboration, prevail in Germany.

² Gottfried Feder, representative of the "socialist" wing of the Nazi party. Before Hitler came to power, the National Socialist programme contained many of Feder's anti-capitalist positions [Note by R.D.P.J.



VII

1941

ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FASCIST AND NAZI IDEAS OF THE STATE

It is generally known that there is one point on which the fascist conception diverges from the national-socialist conception: the idea of the State in its relationship to the idea of the nation. The aim of the present notes is to identify this divergence, to see to what extent it is real, and finally to envisage and specify the point of view which would make it possible to overcome a possible or actual difference. This is, of course, a simple contribution to a complex problem that merits more detailed analysis.

Fascism asserted the "moral personality" of the State and the priority of the State over the nation. In this respect, we might recall several well-known formulas of the Duce himself: "Fascism reaffirms the State as the true reality of the individual"; "For the Fascist, everything is in the State, and human or spiritual exists, or has any value, outside State"; "It is not the nation that generates the State, according to the outmoded naturalist concept that served as the basis for the official discourse of the national States of the nineteenth century. On the contrary, the nation is created by the State, which gives the people, conscious of the fact, the power to act.

of its own moral unity, a will and, consequently, an effective existence"; "The fascist state organizes the nation".

Mussolini spoke of the "people", so dear to democratic ideology, as a "mysterious entity", in the sense of a myth, something inconsistent; this is why he said that "democratic regimes can be defined as those in which, from time to time, the people are given the right to vote.

people the illusion of sovereignty, whereas true and effective sovereignty is the province of other forces, sometimes irresponsible, sometimes secret". Finally, Mussolini reaffirmed the spirituality of the State: "The State, as Fascism conceives and realises it, is a spiritual and moral fact, since it embodies the political, juridical and economic organisation of the nation and this organisation is, in its appearance and development, a manifestation of the spirit". "It is the State which, transcending the short term of individual lives, represents the immanent consciousness of the nation". "The fascist state, the highest and most powerful form of personality, is a force, but a spiritual force. It sums up all the forms of man's moral and intellectual life". In this sense, Mussolini spoke the State as a kind of "entelechy" of the nation: as a "soul of the soul", an "inner form and norm".

We have intentionally taken these expressions from Mussolini's *Doctrine of Fascism*. They therefore fundamental official views, not phrases taken from speeches made for this or that occasion.

Let's turn now to the national-socialist conception, and here too we can refer directly to Hitler's statements in *Mein Kampf*. However, an etymological clarification of the meaning of the German word *Volk*, which has several meanings, is in order: *Volk* can mean nation, people, community of blood and even race. "People-race" would perhaps be the most appropriate translation. Compared with the Fascist concept, the National Socialist conception is characterized by its

It is characterised by the prominence it gives, not to the State, but specifically to the *Volk*, the people and the race, to the point where the latter becomes the primary element, the State being relegated to second . Hitler wrote: "The state is not an end, but a means. It is the condition for the formation of a superior human civilisation, without being the principle that creates this civilisation. This principle or cause can only be the presence of a race capable of civilisation. Even if there were hundreds of perfect states on earth, if the Aryan, the creator of , were to disappear, there would not even be a single civilisation left on earth.

spiritual height of the superior nations of our time". "We must distinguish with the greatest care between the State, which is the container, and the race-people, which is the content Hitler continues.—The container only makes sense if it is capable of accommodating and protecting the content: otherwise, it has no value". The supreme aim of the State is therefore to "preserve the original ethnic elements which, as creators of civilisation, can lead to the beauty and dignity of a superior humanity". On the other hand, a state must be said to be evil and not fulfilling its mission when, "although highly cultured, it condemns those who represent that culture, in its racial con- text, to decadence".

Naturally, there is a certain displacement of the problem here: we are dealing less with the State itself than with the human material destined to play the most important role in it. But the denial of the personality of the state is no less clear, since it is conceived as a mere instrument of the *Volk*, the race-people. This negation is reflected in the denial of a real authority, elevated above the nation. *Dux* and *Führer* are usually regarded as analogous terms: etymologically, they are, since the Latin *ducere*, which gave rise to *Dux*, corresponds to German *L'ühren*, which gave rise to *Führer*. However, there is a difference.

First of all, we could point out that the Fascist *Dux* is the head of the Government, but not Head of , the latter

function of the Monarchy, which represents the stability and continuity of government, lineage and tradition. But even if we **ce point**, the *Führer* is different from the *Dux* in that he —

He is less the one who creates, than the one who interprets and stands at the head of a people", fulfilling this function practically by delegation and common agreement. *Dic Weihe des Führertums ist das Volk* - this is a formula that precisely characterises this situation: "guidance" derives its legitimacy and authority from the *Volk*. This explains why the word "socialism", which is still — rightly — a This is not the case in Germany, if only it appears in the name of the Party, which, let us not forget, describes itself precisely as National Socialist, in the sense of National Socialist.

It is worth following this difference between the two ideologies in terms of law. Paragraph 19 of the Nazi party programme reads: "We demand that Roman law, enslaved a materialistic world order, be replaced by German public law". To understand what "Roman law" we are talking about, let us quote Helmut Nicolai: "Early Rome knew a law that was still imbued with virility and ethical responsibility. But the mixture of blood and races in an ethnic chaos took over the first Roman period: then, dominating this now altered substance, with Levantines, Africans and half-breeds, the Roman Imperium was born as an enormous, soulless state machine. With no longer any connection to blood, "Roman law" took shape. It developed on positivo-rationalist and universalist foundations, with abstract formulations of laws that were as rigid in letter as they were arbitrary and boycottable in practice. "In the Roman legal conception continues Nicolai , the

right is what arbitrarily discriminatory power of State described; in the racist conception, the right is on the contrary, an eternal ethical greatness that stands at the above the powers of the State and cannot be changed by State. What is considered a right is what resides in the law — *positum*, hence 'positivism' — here, is The only thing considered to be legal is that which conforms to an eternal legal idea. There, what is legal is what can be justified the letter; here, form gives way to content. Here, the star which guides us, is conformity to the paragraphs, here, it is conscience". This is not, of course, the conscience in general, equal for all, of jusnaturalism, but a conscience differentiated and conditioned by race.

This brings us back to race as the source of legal norms and therefore also of what is "positive in the structure of the State. The result is a curious interplay between law and racism — a racism which is even conceived as the hygiene of race. Hence the slogan: *Verteidigung der Rasse durch das Recht* — defending race through law. As long ago as 1936, the German Minister of Justice, Hans Frank, had argued that the law was "everything that works to the advantage of the *Volk*", the race-people, the "anti-law" being "everything that is harmful to it". Flak Ruttke goes even further: "It is less a question of defending the race by means of the law, than of consolidating and strengthening the German blood by referring to the theory of the race and the transmission of heredity", active aspect of the measures to be taken thus being clearly highlighted in relation to the purely defensive aspect. It is a logical consequence of the depositivisation of the idea of law. Alfred Rosenberg has already recalled this old Indo-Aryan maxim: "Justice and injustice do not go around together saying: this is how we are. On the contrary, what the Aryan considers just is just", before adding: "A primordial wisdom, now forgotten, teaches us that law, like religion or art, is not an empty scheme, but that it is eternally linked to the human being.

to a given blood, with which it appears and declining".

From

From this point of view, Ruttke is right when he says that law must not defend race, but that the reintegration of law must come from the reintegration of race. Only those who are racially pure can have the right sense of law - law, of course, not in general, but law in accordance with the people to which one belongs.

In this form, there would seem to be an effective divergence between the respective views of Fascism and National Socialism on the State and the law. Is it a question of opposition or of differences which do not preclude the possibility of a reciprocal integration and deepening of the two points of view?

We have already alluded to a shift in perspective in these differences. It can be said that the Nazi perspective stems a revolution that is still in progress, whereas the Fascist perspective has more to do with a revolution that has already been consolidated and is therefore destined to give rise to lasting and stable forms.

First of all, the two points of view are opposed to the purely legal conception of sovereignty. As Costamagna has recently reminded here as Costamagna recently pointed out, this conception separated itself from political doctrine by attributing sovereignty not to a man or a group of men, but to that pre-tended autonomous entity that should have been recognised in the legal personality of the State. Basically, the legal doctrine asserted itself it claimed to lead to an impersonal solution to the problem of power and because

Director of the political monthly *Lo Stato*, from which this article was taken [Note by R.D.P.].

that it had the following advantage: the holder of power, whoever he might be, could not claim to exercise it on his own behalf, but in interests of society, the possession of power becoming illegitimate if the purpose was lost sight of. But despite this interpretation of a democratic flavour, added by Michoud, the problem remains of the *form* a given legal system, a problem which constitutes the eternal stumbling block of the formalist and positive conception of law. The problem relating to the *principium individuationis* of law, to the 'sufficient reason' by virtue of which law and, finally, the State in its actual structure have a certain form and not another, remains unresolved.

National Socialism attaches particular importance to the forces that determine this form, which cannot fall from the sky (at least when it is no longer a question of traditional civilisations in the higher sense), but is created by men and races of men. From this point of view, it is correct to say that the State and the law represent something secondary to the quality of the men who created them, and that this State and this law are only good insofar as they remain forms faithful to the original requirements and instruments capable of consolidating and confirming the very forms that gave rise to them. But this is also the point of view of fascism.

Fascism certainly doesn't take the view of the "souveraineté juridique" impersonnelle, ni celle du "droit romain" as interpreted, in the most abusive terms, by the State, whose sovereignty and primacy fascism proclaims, is not something abstract or automatic. The proof of this is the fact that apart from) the supreme point of reference, source of legitimacy, constituted by the Monarchy, which is not not something impersonal but an eminently personal and abstract, personalised reality. personalised, apart from behind the fascist state there is the movement — that, and the fas-

cists. And this state is the revolutionary fitat, that is to say
the one renewed by fascism.

If we (wanted to) find differences, we would have to
shift the focus to socialism another plan: national-
and fascism similarly recognising a
dynawis, a force profound which determines and animates the
State, and is the fundamental principle of its authority and
sovereignty, it would be a question of specifying the nature
attributed to this (d)yn(awis,) (a force) profound which determines
and animates the State, and is the fundamental principle of its
authority and sovereignty.

dynanñs, ratio existentiae, so to speak, of the State in
its concrete expression. The "myth" of national socialism, in this
respect, is, as we have seen, race or race-people. We must be clear
about this, and not simply pay service to it.

Let's go back to Mussolini's *Doctrine of Fascism*, and pre-
paragraph 9 of the first part. Having already described the people
as a "mysterious entity", Mussolini repeated that "Fascism is
against democracy, which levels the people in the direction of the
greatest number, *lowering them to the rank of the majority*". He
defined a qualitative conception, that of the "idea that is more
powerful because it is more moral, more coherent, truer, that
actualised in the people as the conscience and will of a few, and
even of One Alone, and which, as an ideal, tends to be actualised in
the conscience and will of all. Of all those who, ethically, derive
from nature and history the reason for forming a nation, oriented
along the same line of development and spiritual formation, as a
single consciousness and a single will". And Mussolini adds:

"Not a race, nor a geographically defined region, but a lineage
perpetuating itself in history, a multitude unified by an idea, which
is the will exist and to power, self-consciousness, personality" -
and he concludes: "But this superior per-sonality is nation insofar
it is state". Is this a confirmation, mainly because of the specific
allusion to race, of the divergence? We don't think so.
not. Fascism, too, made racism its own.

But for us it's not about racism, which is a zoological myth. And
race must not

It no longer means for us, if it misinterpreted, a new mode appearance democratic deviation or socialising ideologies.

The nation and the State cannot be a "race" in the naturalistic sense: something affirmed not only by Mussolini, but by the most intransigent German racists; for they recognise precisely, and without difficulty, that all the nations corresponding to contemporary States are not "races", but mixtures of several races. Mussolini's vision was precisely this: there is a generic quality, which can be called "nation" or "nation-race", a quality that is not purely anthropological, which is spread throughout all the components of a given political unit, but, so to speak, in varying quantities or doses ; to such an extent that one might think that, latent and hindered in some, it is more present, more conscious, more realised in others, until it becomes, in an elite and in a Leader, absolute, pure, manifesting itself as precise consciousness and as precise will to power and existence. In a stream which, as a lineage, has an ethnic and racial basis, and is defined by the same line of development and spiritual training, this elite then becomes the central and dominant vein, the element which transforms and awakens and which is, in relation to the other parts, like the soul as the force which animates and shapes the body, and gives it consciousness. The sovereignty of the State and its primacy over the "people" and the nation are symbols of this action the elite and a **Leader**.

In these terms, is there still a fundamental difference between the Fascist idea and the National Socialist idea? Nothing fundamental remains, unless we make race, on which National Socialism places so much emphasis, into a mythical entity similar to the democratic "people" about which Mussolini was ironic. Even when it comes to Germany, what does race actually mean? We mentioned earlier that German racists admit that their "people" are a myth.

The people, too, are a mixture of races. The answer is not race in general, but the Aryan race, and even the Nordic race. Hitler, in fact, speaks an Aryan race that created civilisation and, more specifically, believes that the Nordic race— is one of the six main races included in the Germanic mix - possesses this quality in an eminent way. But here too, we have to get to the bottom of . The Aryan quality required for full German citizenship, for being this *Volksgenosse* or 'fellow-breed' who enjoys all civic and political rights, unlike the person who simply belongs to the German State, the *Staatsangehörige*, this 'Aryan' quality can only be defined in purely negative terms: to obtain it, it is sufficient not to be a Jew, nor of a coloured race, nor to have, among one's ancestors up to the third generation, blood of these races. At best, a clause could be added stipulating the absence of hereditary diseases likely lead to sterilisation, or absence of the con-genital inclinations that define 'asocials in Germany. But all this, in terms of racial purity, is too little. Will it be enough for us to perceive as self-evident what true law is, beyond any 'positive' law, and us to be able to contribute to the highest spiritual elevation of the State?

And if we wanted to talk, no longer about what is What is "Aryan" in general, but what is "Nordic"? We would then have to ask ourselves the problem of selection, given that the German people is not composed solely of Nordic ~~is~~, conversely, we know that Nordic elements are present nations other than the German nation. However, no one in Germany has been so radical as to draw all the consequences from the thesis of the superiority of the Nordic race, for example by entrusting only Nordic elements to the German nation. the care of the law or the work of shaping the State National Socialist. And if the supreme hierarchies of this state are composed 'Aryan' elements, they are certainly not 'Aryan'.

not, to date, composed exclusively of purely Nordic elements.

But there is more. In a speech given in Nuremberg in 1933, Hitler himself clearly acknowledged that the Nordic physical type may not be accompanied by corresponding spiritual factors, so that, in this area, the ultimate criterion must be provided by the attitude of the soul and spirit, by the character, by the works. Discrimination is therefore accepted within Nordic element itself. Finally, it is worth recalling has been said by L. F. Clauss², a well-known German racist theorist and champion of the Nordic thesis: we must not conceive of a pure race in terms of the collectivity, .e. numerically and statistically, but in terms of the purity of types: although all individuals in a given ethnic group can be called Nordic in the generic sense, only a few really are, those in whom the race expresses itself in a pure and perfect manner.

These last formulations correspond almost word for word to those of Mussolini with regard to an idea that It is "actualised as the consciousness and will of a few", although "as an ideal (it) tends to be actualised in the consciousness and will of all". It will be said that National Socialism contains a specific 'f' to race. This is true. But did we not recall that Hitler himself came to recognise that the true and decisive race must be sought, in the final analysis, in the spiritual element? A closer look shows, then, that the 'race' of Nazi political ideology is no more than a mere 'myth', with no precise corresponding reality,

Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss (1892-1974): author of *Rasse und* (SeeJe (Munich, 1926; eighteen successive editions), in which he developed "psycho-anthropological" theories on race. Clauss was a friend of a close friend of Evola's, who also devoted a certain amount of space to him in *mito del sangue*, cit. p. 133-141. On Clauss, cf. the profile bio-bibliography outlined by Robert de Herte in *Etudes et Recherches*, nouvelle série, 2, 4th quarter 1983, p. 24-26 [N.D.T.].

more or less synonymous with a people liberated from Jewish and mixed-race element, separated from its pathologically condemned components, or that it is more or less identified with the elite of which fascism speaks, the ones that create states and give nations.

In spite of this, it is true that National Socialism emphasises the biological aspect, on the one hand, and, on the other, values such as loyalty, honour, direct and anti-bureaucratic dependence between men and men, between leaders and subordinates, limiting by precise political interventions everything that is formal legal legality. But this difference will tend to diminish, since Fascism too has now officially adopted the racist idea: if this idea is consistently followed, similar values will gradually assert themselves here too, which can only be beneficial for our Revolution, still hampered in so many areas by "positivist" and "unofficial" or intellectualist scoriae, and by a style which, apart from the race of the body, cannot always be described as "Aryan".

On the other hand, there is no doubt that Fascist ideology can provide National Socialism with more than one impulse to pass from the dynamic phase, which still characterizes its orientations, to a more "classical" phase, in which attention will focus above all on the objective conditions for the definition a stable order, and "positive" in its own way, independently of revolutionary conjunctures and turning points. Perhaps the very consequences of the war, once it has been won, will make it possible, by guaranteeing Germany its vital space, to set aside certain socialist *pretexts* which are still sometimes used, for tactical and political reasons, to justify the war.

of domestic propaganda, the ideology of the friendly nation, and to arrive at a clearer and more Roman conception, but at the same time one more in keeping with the best Germanic tradition of the function of command and *ducere*.

viii

1941

**ROMANITY, GERMANISM
AND THE MANACORDA CASE**

Recently, one of the best-known 'German racists' passing through Rome, asked us to accompany him to a conference being held at the Institut d'Etudes Romaines; he told us that the subject might be of interest to us - since it was *Romanity and Germanism*. and that the speaker had also been introduced in Germany as the person responsible for monitoring cultural exchanges between the two friendly nations on behalf of Italy. We were not a little surprised to learn that this person was Professor Guido Manacorda. We wondered whether this was not a case "conversion". In fact, we were very familiar with the "Manacorda's 'antecedents', his favourite theses, and it struck us as odd, to say the least, that he should be called upon at this time to talk about Germanism and Romanism. A 'conversion', then? We gladly accompanied our German friend to the conference. And we didn't regret it. For we are here in pre

¹ This is probably Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss (see note 2 of the previous article) [Note by R.D.P.].

This is a case reporting, not so much for its own sake as for what it reveals.

It is worth briefly recalling the 'antecedents' of Manacorda. He's a Germanist who, for a long time, has put his uncommon erudition, and therefore his ability to impress the uninitiated, at service of a precise thesis, that of *the fundamental opposition between the Germanic spirit and the Roman spirit*, Roman being used here as a synonym for Catholic-Christian in the narrowest sense. This is the fundamental theme of a whole series of Manacorda's writings. The most important is his book *La selva e il tempio*, published in 1933² and ~~it~~ at the end of 1935. The title alone sums up the author's thesis.

The forest would be the symbol of Germanism, the temple that of Romanism. Manacorda's book was aimed at all those who "believe in the constructive value of criticism", claiming to "contribute to the clarification of some of the vital problems of our time". It is a collection of essays on ancient Germanic myths and on various German writers, in which the author, through fundamentally one-sided interpretations, tends only to highlight everything in Germanic traditions that is inferior in character and feels truly irreducible to Romanity, interpreted, moreover, to establish this opposition, in a no less one-sided and tendentious manner.

To quote Manacorda verbatim: "The Forest. Nature placed above the mind; truth sought and affirmed in the strata below reason: unconscious and sub-conscious. Eternal becoming, eternal return, horizontality. Freedom understood as elementary disorder. Surface optimism, radical pessimism. Sometimes dissolution and annihilation of individuality, sometimes exasperated, atomistic, solipsistic individualism. Empirical activism;

² Cf. Guido Manacorda, *La selva e il tempio*. Studi sullo spirito del germanesimo, Bemporad, Florence, 1933 [Note by R.D.P.].

action for action's sake, neither causality nor finality. Colourful and tumultuous art, weak sense of line and construction, musicality. Pantheism, monism, immanence, secular religion, natural revelation; aversion to worship, liturgy and hierarchy".

This is the "Forest", the spirit of Germanism. Let us now turn to the "Temple": "The Temple. Spirit above Nature; truth sought and affirmed within human reason, under the direction, light and control of a divine Reason that is both wisdom and love. Degrees, verticality. Grace cooperating with free will. Eternal bliss overcoming tragedy. Recognition of indestructible individuality. Finality. Strong sense of line, construction and measure. Monotheism, Catholic Christianity, transcendence, supernatural revelation, etc."

This is the Temple, the symbol of Romanity.

"Eternal contrast adds Manacorda reappearing under various names and forms: paganism and Christianity, Apollo (or Dionysus) and Christ, romanticism and classism, racism and universality, idealism and realism, with inevitable interference, deviations and confusion, but also, it goes without saying, with reciprocal concessions on the surface. "Deep down", Manacorda repeats, there is a perennial opposition.

Manacorda made no secret of his preconceived notion that the As a result, it is easy to foresee what the "critical, constructive" approach will lead to in the treatment of the various themes. But it is with regard to the ancient Nordic traditions that the most serious ambiguities appear. Manacorda pretends ignore everything that a number of specialists had already established in terms of the concordance of the fundamental themes of these traditions with those of the 'Aryan' cycle of all the main Indo-European cultures and mythologies. In fact, it focuses methodically on the episodic element, not the essential, the contingent and external part, not the internal meanings. The extremely fragmentary and mixed nature of ancient-

traditions, they are known to us today.
naturally comes to his aid. The warning
Günther, according to whom anyone who really wants to com-
Nordic spirituality does not have to refer to the
Germanic traditions alone, precisely they are
are already mingled and corrupted, but must orientate itself by means
of the purer expressions of ideas of the same origin that the ancient
Aryan-Eastern, Greek and Roman traditions have preserved for us -
this warning does not exist for Manacorda. He takes exactly the
opposite path, highlighting in every way possible the most
negative and second-rate aspects of his work.
of the cycle of Nordic-Germanic mythology.

There is no doubt that in this he is following the mediocre
tactics of a certain Catholic apologetics, a master in the art
systematically discrediting and belittling other traditions in
order to exalt his own. From then on, the eye that can only see
the "Temple" on the one hand will only be able to see the
"Church" on the other.

"Forest". Nordic traditions are therefore essentially considered
from the point of view of the more or less Judaizing schools,
which are in any case flatly positivist, and which reduce all
myths to "naturalism", stopping at the letter and the more or
less chaotic images presented by the external and "poetic" side
of the traditions. But when it comes to the things that
Manacorda holds dear to his heart, this whole aspect of a
tradition is neglected, regarded as a symbol, a contingent
expression, in favour only of the higher content, the "Temple".
If these colonists would lend themselves to this, we could
demonstrate that Manacorda systematically used this tactic, thus
offering a totally distorted, arbitrary and one-sided conception of
Aryan Germanism.

It should be pointed out, however, that Manacorda's
romanticism— - or at least that of the Manacorda of the ~~our~~ ^{our} ~~wage~~
in question - coincides to a greater or lesser extent with a Thomistic,
ratio- nalising and militant Catholicism.

tianism and all other traditions, seen in no uncertain terms as barbaric, pagan, naturalistic, ignorant of transcendence and so on. This is made abundantly clear on p. 28 of the book, where Manacorda concludes his highly romanticised *excursus* on the con- in the *Eddas*: "Poor myth, that of the Germans, if poverty, as I believe, consists in not knowing transcendence or joy. But had the opulent myth, the high speculation and the mystériosophie of the Greeks known them? Or the contemplative Tao? or the Beggar Buddha? All that is pagan is also, irreparably, joyless". It's worth pointing out that 's a "germa- nist", a man with a reputation as a scholar and even a thinker, who indulges in such assertions, which are barely justifiable in context of mediocre apologetics for the most uneducated people. But we can guess, from these assimilations, what Manacorda had in mind when he reduced Germanism to the 'Forest. The second edition of the work in question includes an appendix entitled "*The Light at the Edge*", which is obviously aimed racist Germany. We have seen that, for Manacorda, one aspect of the "eternal contrast" between Germanism and Romanism is reflected in the opposition between "racism and universality". In this appendix, the author doubles the dose, while using more or less the same method; he deliberately chooses the least mediate and most fanatical forms a certain racism, forcing their features even further by a tendentious interpretation, instead of considering, in racism and in the new "Nordicmyth, the superior aspects, capable being integrated with elements of our best tradition.

Manacorda begins by presenting a veritable caricature of the "Hyperborean" thesis: he completely overlooks the fact that the elements that most seriously support it are to be found in the most diverse and ancient traditions; he more or less makes the primordial Nordic race equivalent of what race is for an outdated pangermanist myth; he does not even note that the "hyperborean" thesis is a myth.

that, if we are to confine ourselves solely modern studies, to those of Wirth or Kadner, the cultures of the Orient Hyperborean cycle having extended into and in Occi- from the earliest prehistoric times, is so vast that it has been eliminates the opposition between racism and universality; finally, to par-

To achieve his aims, Manacorda puts forward a purely materialistic idea of race, as if it were the only one defended in Germany, and tends to contrast the "blonde" superior whole peoples.

Inferior "browns". Race, then, reduced to colour hair and eyes, as if racism did not admit, for example, that the brown Mediterranean or Atlantic coast type is, in certain respects, merely a "colour".

This is the "variation" (idiovariation) of the Nordic type. Admittedly, the author recalls the thesis of the Nordic-Aryan origin of the first Greek and Roman civilisations, and of the same character presented, to a certain extent, by the Empire : but always in a tendentious way, i.e. to give the impression that we want to discredit, with theses of this kind, everything that is ours and attribute any form of superiority to the Germans; whereas it is not at all a question of the Germans, or even of the Nordics in the current sense, but of peoples having detached themselves from the same trunk thousands of years before the appearance of the Germans and the Nordics on the scene of history.

In any case, this is what Manacorda means when he says fication of racism: "Under the species of blood, and under it alone, man can and must be considered, judged and brought up as an 'animal' in the richest and most exclusive sense of the term. To speak spiritual man means nothing". Referring openly to the theses of dilettantes such as Klages or, worse still, Bergmann', but taking care not analyse the particular meaning given by these

E. Bergmann, whose book on "German National Church (*Die deutsche Nationalkirche*, Breslau, 1932) was blacklisted. Cf. J. Evola, *il mito* deb sangue, cit, p. 197-198 [Note by R.D.P.J.]

Manacorda adds: "The soul - *Seele* - is now preparing to oust the usurping spirit - *Geist* - and definitively reclaim its rightful empire". Other characteristic expressions: "If, with the new training (for that's it essentially about), men of genius were to disappear, the harm, to tell the truth, would not be very great. Unless it is limited to mechanical rationality, is felt that intelligence is too closely associated with cunning and malice for it not to be preferable, on the whole, to leave it to the brown races. Besides, when a man holds a sword, when his will conforms to that of fate, what use is intelligence? This is followed by further ramblings on the presumed characteristics 'Germanicheroism, which is dark and blind, aimless and restless, bursting forth from the troubled regions of the subconscious. Here, finally, are the last sentences in this series of "Studies on Spirit of Germanism": "There is no reason to laugh. This is not a comedy or a farce, but a tragedy. And in the face of tragedy, it would be imprudent, to say the least, not to pause and reflect. But wisdom teaches us to provide, so that disaster *{sic j does* not unexpectedly engulf the whole theatre from the stage.

Manacorda's views being what they are, we could not but be surprised to learn that it is precisely this author who is now being 'used' to fuel Italo-German cultural exchanges and to educate an audience about Romanity and Germanism. It is well known that, in certain cases, the *raison d'Etat* is an *extrema ratio*: it was therefore conceivable that, in an economic climate

fortunately overcome, we could go so far as to take seriously these distinguished ramblings, in which the most antipathetic polemical animosity of a Catholicism associated with militant a bad faith really below scientific dignity. But today... of any

A conversion, then? In reality, we have all too often seen the case, in our country, of people who, one fine morning, wake up racist, anti-Semitic and friends of Germany. We have to realise that this is not a case of conversion in the true sense of the word, but only of a "change of heart".

strategic conversion. Basically, everything remains as before; only the façade has changed slightly. Manacorda's coherence is intact. But not ours, that of an Italy that really wants to get along with Germany.

It would have been dangerous today to take Catholic Romanism as the sole point of reference for denouncing the 'Forest, immanentism, naturalism and everything that Manacorda had attributed to Germanism. So what was to be done? Stop talking about Catholic Romanity and start talking about ancient Romanity. This "strategic conversion" is something of a paradox.

Manacorda had previously lumped everything that is not Christian into the 'Forest' of paganism and naturalism, including not only the great metaphysical systems of the Aryan East and the Far East, but also the classical world. In his lecture, on the other hand, he did his utmost to rediscover a religiosity and even a certain transcendental awareness in the civilisation and customs of ancient Rome. He asserted that, all too often, we only exalt the Rome of wars and conquests; that there is also, in reality, an inner Rome, imbued with the spirit of the Roman Empire.

• The author is referring to the tension between Italy and Germany that arose in the period before Austria became part of Germany. On this subject, see Anonymous (J. Evola), *Il razzismo e l'AnscMuss*, in *Lo !Stato*, V, 8-9 (August-September 1938), pp. 6£13-605 [Note by R.D.P.] .

sense of suprasensible forces, with its *pietas*, with its *vir-tus*, which is not only courage, but also fortitude and ethical sense: a Rome that contains something of the metaphysical, so much so that, in Antiquity, Romanity has had, for everything that has come close it and has taken part in its work, sense of a kind of consecration.

That's all very well, and we were delighted for Manacorda. But we quickly realised the aim the manoeuvre. The transcendence of ancient Rome was highlighted in order to have a reference that was strategically equivalent to the Catholic reference, which made it possible to take up and reaffirm the previous anti-German theme, and thus to confirm the opposition between Romanity and Germanism. Indeed, when it came to the latter, Manacorda reiterated his fixed ideas, albeit with a few softenings: Germanism means "forest", pantheism, primitivist and irrational relationship with nature and blood, exaltation of eternal becoming and eternal tension, Faustian spirit, obscure dynamism, love of action without purpose. Nor did he spare race: "What does this emphasis on race mean, Manacorda said, if not the primacy of 'nature'? What does this reluctance of the Ciermains, already attested to by Tacitus, to mix their blood mean, if not a kind of fear, the inability of those who have the impression of losing themselves by spreading, they have no universal vocation, because they feel that they would lose all support by detaching themselves from blood and soil? Manacorda did not let slip opportunity to ironise with bad taste: the presumed love of the Germans for

The best illustration of aimless action is the myth of the Walhalla warriors who still fight after being killed (in reality, this myth refers to the forces of transfigured heroes that fuel a kind of metaphysical struggle). The very ideal of "fidelity", in its German form, would be proof of mental narrowness, a naturalism *sui generis*. Manacorda reminded us that,

In one version of the Faust legend, Faust meets a hermit who makes him understand the horror of the pact he has signed with Mephistopheles; he manages to convince Faust, who wants to break the pact. But Faust suddenly remembers that he has given his word : he then realises that there is nothing more to be done, because one does not betray word one has given, even when it is a pact of honour.

the devil. Manacorda saw fit to make and part of the audience laughed out loud at this sad and insipid irony, no doubt for the edification of the foreigners and, above all, the Germans present, who in this case would have had good reason to 'wit' with the cunning and malice of the 'brownraces...

In conclusion, Manacorda returned to his old idea, summing it up in the words: "Our conceptions are anti-thetical", but opportunistically looking for extenuating circumstances, admitting that at different times each of the two peoples had found inspiration in the other. So he recalled the Roman reminiscences of the German emperors, the Gibe- lines sympathies of Dante, the influence Albert the Great on Saint Tho- mas, of whom he was one of the teachers, what Mozart and Haydn owe to Italian music, and finally the role played by Hegel and Kant in part of our philosophy. Too little, in fact, if we take into account the fundamental presupposition... These are merely interferences of a primarily 'cultural' nature, in the most superficial and pro- fane sense of the term. In the political field, the Catholic Manacorda has found nothing better to evoke than the military alliance between Prussia and Italy against the Habsburg Autarchy, an example that could not have been more shocking to any traditional mind: for we know that this was nothing more than a political conjuncture in the most materialistic sense, Prussia having been pushed into this conflict by schismatic tendencies of clearly Lutheran origin, and Italy by liberal ideas of inspiration, in particular, from the Catholic Church.

at least in part, Masonic, while Austria) (pre)
felt at the time to be imperial and Catholic power,
traditional.

It is for all these reasons that we feel it necessary to mention Manacorda's role as a spoilsport for German-Italian cultural relations: a case that is highly revealing of the carelessness with which the development of these relations is still being pursued. Of course, we agree with Manacorda when he tries to bring out the spiritual content of our traditions, but we cannot follow him in any way when, to this, he systematically discredits our traditions.

In other words, it is not a matter of simply looking at each other's traditions and highlighting only their contingent and problematic aspects. What's more, since it's Germany we're talking about, this is particularly inappropriate today, and not just from a political point of view.

To support his theses, Manacorda relies mainly on bookish material; Although he has often visited Germany, he attaches more importance to the expressions of a certain romantic and confused literature than to what he must certainly have encountered in the Nordic soul - in terms of a sense of order, quiet self-control, love of clarity, superiority without vanity - by visiting some old family of the friendly nation and reflecting on certain aspects of Prussian style. Where, then, is the "Forest"? Wouldn't we be tempted to see something similar in the instinctive, individualistic way being of a certain part of our people, which fascism is increasingly trying to "rectify"?

Just as Manacorda can only see the more or less rationalising and Thomistic element of "Latinity", so he can only see the "romantic" element of Ger-manism, thus missing what is essential and com- mon.

mun to both. It is precisely for this reason that his one-sided judgements are particularly regrettable. There are certainly aspects of the German soul that are not 'in order', and, indeed, in relation to that soul, precisely, in relation to its highest heritage; there is undoubtedly something confusingly romantic, naturalistic, pantheistic in certain German cultural forms, just as tragic and 'Nibelungian' elements, linked to the memory of certain events, play a significant role in ancient myths. But all this represents a weakening and a deviation from true Nordic-Aryan spirituality; those who, following Günther's exhortation referred to above, refer to the expressions of a spirituality of the same origin found in more remote cultures, including the early Greek and Roman cultures, also recognise the other, truer and more original aspect of the Nordic soul and Nordic traditions, an aspect which also belongs to the 'temple': aspirations to a supernatural clarity, elements of a 'solar' and Ural spirituality similar to that of the entire Indo-Germanic cycle. In the formation of the Germanic character, these factors were decisive in depth: hence, as a reflection, this style of order, discipline, clarity and taste for action in the existence of the friendly people, a style that only fascism, in our country, has tried to change.

in our people. On the other hand, the "professors", "geniuses", "intellectuals" have often abandoned this style, have chosen and believed to be Germanic something which, let us repeat, is only weakening and involution: it will suffice to point out the falsifying action exerted by Wagner, with his operas, on the best spirit of the German-speaking countries.

ancient Germanic traditions and the influence exerted by still in some circles, unfortunately, le wagné-

rism. In other cultural fields too, we can see confusion, due to a lack of principles, that could give corda an appearance of to the theses of Manatruith.

Since this is case, we could exert a genuinely rectifying influence on Germany, which is still subject to these influences: not to distort it, but to steer it in the right direction. Provided that Romanity is not reduced, as Manacorda does, to a kind of synonym for militant Catholicism and Thomism, but deepened in its Aryan roots; Provided that we highlight the luminous and Olympian expression of our ancient tradition within the framework of our common Aryan and even, we might say, Nordic-Aryan heritage - then we could have a positive effect on the German soul, helping it to truly find itself, thus creating the premises for a real and creative understanding between the two peoples.

Manacorda, on the other hand, went in the opposite direction: he set out to formulate artificial or, at least, one-sided oppositions, to emphasise not what essentially unites, but what separates on the basis of sub-ordinate factors. It is in this respect that it represents a typical case today, which refers back to what has already been pointed out in this same review in relation to a similar field, that of the racial campaign in Italy. What we mean to say is that in the delicate sector of Italo-German cultural exchanges, we must be careful not to arouse suspicions of cordial sabotage, either because of such *gar/es**, of or because the distracted use of this or that more or less recommended person, with an established reputation, those "professors" and "Germanists" with indisputable academic skills, but who are totally unfit, because of their sensitivity, their mentality and their whims, to serve the desired purpose. It would certainly be undesirable for the authorities of the friendly nation to become convinced that we have nothing else to offer, and to draw all the legitimate conclusions from this conviction.

* In French only.



IX

1942

FOR POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ALIGNMENT ITALY AND GERMANY

Those who really want to contribute to this Italo-German understanding that is so often talked about must realise that it is now time, beyond the usual unofficial and academic exchanges, to break the ice, to decide to tackle the political and spiritual situation of the two countries with courage and determination. We must start from the idea that each of the two nations can help the other to develop, without each of the two peoples having to give up something of its national pride and tradition. Moreover, seeing how our own ideas are presented from a foreign perspective, different from the one to which we are accustomed, will always be one of the most effective means of achieving an objective vision and of gathering the elements necessary for fruitful self-criticism. It is important, therefore, to overcome the exaggerated sensitivity which leads some people to reject and loathe everything that "comes from outside", and by virtue of which it is thought that only the people of a given country should talk about things specific to that country. But two nations whose superior racial elements have common origins and which are today

involved in such an intimate community of destiny, as that of) the Axis, must overcome this exclusivist prejudice, and (therefore) admit the possibility reciprocal influences intended to rectify or reinforce sometimes the one, tan- early the other aspect of the views and ideology of each peo- ple. D'autre part, la nouvelle conception germanique, like the fascist conception, go beyond the framework a rigid and schematic ideological presentation. The forces of renovation and restoration are still at work today. In Germany, too, the primacy of everything that is Beive- ginig, i.e. "movement", has been recognised over all the particular forms in which this "movement" might take shape according to certain circumstances. With an eye to the future, it is possible to work together, to exchange contributions and influences, in order to make ever more compact and homogeneous the bloc which, spiritually too, will have to serve as a crystallisation centre for the new Europe.

But with this article, we would like to move away from generalities to tackle a particular area of Italian-German relations. We wish to consider the situation of the two countries, especially from a political and cultural point of view, starting by noting a significant divergence of views.

No one would deny that culture in - from culture in the broadest sense to law and philosophy - is still a 'neutral' sector. This is mainly due to the fact that it has been seen fit to give a , use and to recognise people whose mentality has long been sclerotised by intellectual *routines** and preconceived ideas dating to pre-Fascism. But it's absurd to think that, even with the best will in the world (which in reality is absent in three quarters of cases), this mentality can change overnight,

• In French in the text [N.D.T 1-

and that formal adherence to fascism can really become constitutive of these people. The fault lies rather with those who choose, letting themselves be impressed by "name", "reputation", "competence", university *curricula vitae*, instead of aiming at the essential, without worrying about prejudices, and measuring everything by the yardstick, and that alone, a revolutionary, renovating and constructive mentality.

This Italian 'culture' therefore lives under the sign of the "We say 'conservatism' in the negative sense of the term: yesterday's mental habits, intellectual automatisms, conventional ideas that live on credit and guard against any revision, inert traditionalism. We say 'traditionalism', not tradition, and we say 'conservatism in the negative sense of the term', because what we are talking about here is the continuation something truly original and our own: we are talking about the survivals of a relatively recent and particularly mediocre period in our history, the very 'Italianness' of which is debatable.

In philosophy, for example, how can we attribute a specifically 'Italian' character to criticism or neo-Hegelian idealism? No one can take seriously the historicist *alibis* that the latter wanted to give itself, claiming descent from certain Renaissance thinkers and other thinkers of the Risorgimento. Irrespective of whether these thinkers are significant from the point of view of the values of our most original and elevated traditions, or whether they themselves have been influenced by foreign influences, no one can deny that the decisive factor in the current in question, which is still present today in various cultural sectors and in national educational institutes, has been the direct influence of a certain German philosophy. It is in this way that one or other of our thinkers has been able to "discover-

• En français dans le texte [N.D.T.].

vieve' in Hegel - a Hegel, moreover, impoverished and reduced to the absurd - the antecedent or precursor of an imaginary Italian idealist tradition.

In legal terms, the situation is more or less the same. Conservatism in the negative sense is even more tenacious and reluctant here. It still sticks to the 'classics' of law, which are, moreover, those, almost all of them foreign, of the 'positivist' period of the nineteenth century. The best part is that they think they are defending the Roman legal tradition. In reality, the Roman law in question should much more accurately be called Napoleonic law. It is not the law of the best Roman period, but the law of a certain Romanity that had already gone astray, and which was then adapted to the liberal and democratic presuppositions of yesterday's thinking. When there is no question French influence, then, once again, this or that school of German jurists comes into play; and to say 'German' here is a way of speaking that overlooks indisputable cases of Judaic influence. We are in the world of an entirely schematic and insignificant philosophy of law, characterised by a profound split with political reality and by the mechanics of categories set up as substances.

Now, even in the midst of a fascist regime, the attitude of the vast majority of the official representatives of our legal front is no different. This sector seems absolutely resistant to any revolutionary renewal. Despite all appearances, it has not decided take the Revolution seriously. There remains, whether openly or reluctantly, the belief that there is, on the one hand, the objective science of law, unchanging in its foundations (which reflect, however, the neutral and liberalising mentality of yesterday and have little to do with our traditions), and, on the other, an empirical matter, more or less a creature of necessity, determined by new situations, which will be taken into account here and there, but which must be considered, as a general rule, as transitory, as a 'political' and not a legal reality. Thus, instead of assuming this

In the absence of any new material, produced by Fascist action, and of discovering in it the seeds of a new legal idea or the incentive to a real return to truly original forms, one adds, at best, this or that part to the previous schemes, to allow them to survive, practically unchanged. Technical language, combined with the enchantment exerted by this or that reputation, ends up playing the role of a smokescreen spread to conceal a strategic manoeuvre: a manoeuvre which, until now, in Italy, has almost always turned out brilliantly to the advantage of a false legal traditionalism.

Roughly the same thing could be said about a certain nationalist front. The various ~~is~~ already mentioned often interfere with each other, because in many cases this "nationalism" borrows from the ideals of "historicism" and outdated concepts of the state, the people and the nation from jurists. It is true that this nationalism is Italian in its object, since it defends Italy, but it is not Italian in its idea. Basically, it represents a continuation of the previous dominant democratic conception, and since its tradition takes us back to the Risorgimento, this is precisely what convinces us of the relativity of its Italianness. In fact, we know that due to a fatal combination of circumstances, the unity of Italy could only be achieved under the influence essentially anti-traditional ideologies, derived from Masonry and French Jacobinism. And those who would like to see things *ab ovo* would come to the same conclusion, for in the history of Europe, the nationalism we are talking about, opposed to the earlier, healthy and natural idea of nationality and to the aristocratic conception of the State, was not inaugurated by Italians: it was by Phi- lippe le Bel, King of France, whose work was continued without interruption by his successors, with the subversive consequences we are all familiar with.

In general, the democratic aspect is combined with the legal-positivist aspect in such nationalism. These nationalists profess, openly or inwardly,

a *non-possunius* towards the idea of race, which represents in this a real touchstone: their nation is one

reality " ideal ", historical and legal, in which he there's room for everyone, Jews included. And when these nationalists are Catholics, the dose is naturally doubled: instead of a strong, articulate, organisational and nique, raciale et hiérarchique de l'État, tout se dissout dans des formules vagues et rhétoriques sur l'universalisme, la romanité, la latinité et ainsi de suite.

Here, then, is series of very specific aspects that testify to the fact that-

In Italy, there has been a period of stagnation, and a false traditionalism that is 'new' and anti-revolutionary in nature. In its pretexts, traditionalism exploits a certain number of equivocations, because its points of reference are simply those yesterday and they are much more influenced by the ideas of the past.

than our original traditions.

Let's move on to Germany. The situation is immediately different and even, to a certain extent, opposite. With the *Gründlichkeit* (radicalism or systematic spirit) that is one of their characteristics, the Germans wanted to carry out a political and cultural revolution at all , **sparing** no area. Having swept away the most recent past, they wanted at the same time to return to national traditions that were reputed to be original. This is why many of the points of reference still held by Italian 'conservative' circles have been liquidated in Germany. As far as philosophy is concerned, Hegelianism and Criticism are in sharp decline in Germany, and only a few specialists with no say in the matter are still involved. In the field of law, the

"The 'masters' of positive law and public law in 19th-century Germany no longer dictate the law. Well-prepared attacks

have been made against nationalism in the same way

"Wilhelm von Huinboldt, for example, was not spared, and the role of Jewish influence in his nationalism and his theory of the State has been demonstrated. On every subject of the idea of the State, we know that National Socialist Germany did not shy away from revising its traditions, in some cases in a downright iconoclastic manner. The idea of race and race-people (*Volk*) takes on revolutionary significance here, giving rise to a new vision of the world and of life. It even takes a clear stance against religious confessions, whenever they give rise to obstruction or sabotage, whenever they provide weapons or pretexts for those who wish to hinder this trend towards revolutionary renewal.

situation in Germany could not be more different from that in Italy, although it often presented the danger of going from one excess to another, to use a German expression, of "throwing out the *baby with the bathwater*". The greatest danger lies in the fact that the German revolutionary impulse often lacks positive points of reference, which alone could give it direction and justification. Once the debris and impediments had been swept under the carpet, there was a danger taking the road.

This is particularly true when it comes to returning to original traditions. This is a feature that distinguishes us from National Socialist Germany. Our "traditionalism", we have seen, is more or less a dubious realism of the past: with, in addition, vague references to humanism or to a romanticism whose original content no one cares to specify, or even to what may have been preserved of this content in our highest traditions. Germans, on the other hand, feel no compulsion to leap over centuries, or even millennia, to draw on the sources of their race and their history. They don't stop at the Second Reich, or even the First, and want to penetrate the mystery of the spirit and way being of the German people.

and Aryan-Germanic origins. In this way, whole host of ideas, which would be regarded as fantasies of no scientific value by the 'researchers' and 'critics' of our universities, play a very important role, both politically and ethically, in the new Germanic culture and inspire precise directives for the systematic shaping of the mentality of young people.

In this area, moreover, the friendly and allied nation does not always keep its accounts correctly. Misunderstandings that can be explained by the absence of precise documentary references and by the power various suggestions — are neither rare nor negligible: there are even some that could compromise a serious understanding between our two countries. In general, to a famous proverb, it can be said that what has been thrown out through the door is often returned through the window: in the sense that those who thought they had made a revolutionary clean sweep of the ideas and idols of modern times have often succumbed, in their interpretation of the origins, to suggestions and motives which have nothing to do with the origins, which on the contrary distort and alter them, and which essentially stem from the modern mentality.

There are many specific examples of this phenomenon. We will confine ourselves to a few examples. In the legal sphere, there was a desire to create a new German public law, antipositivist in orientation and inspired by the racial-political idea. The main features of this law would go back to Germanic and Aryan origins. In reality, a double equation was created. , there was a clear opposition to Roman law but precisely we were unable to

As for the positive counterpart, it is more difficult to see how this is the case than the false Roman law, which is formalist, liberalising and universalist, and whose true derivation we have already indicated. As for the positive counterpart, we are more

more or less fallen back into a variant of jusnaturalism or natural law, with theses that we can be described as pre legal: we assumed that, without any determination authority from above, the meaning of the word "positive

true right would manifest itself and assert itself in anyone who is 'in good standing' with the breed— hence a reduction in the pro- This is because, today, only measures of hygiene, bio- logical selection and, virtually, dressage could recreate a relatively homogeneous racial core within the melan- ges that are now all the historical nations.

With regard to the doctrine of the State, even more negative positions were put forward. We know that many National Socialist circles were characterised by a polemical underestimation of the idea of the State in favour of the quasi-collectivist idea of the people and *Volksgemeinschaft* (the community of blood as solidarity and collective unity): this was the opposite excess of that represented by the statism of the previous period. They retained the idea of the Reich, which, however one interprets it, does not sit well with these new socialist views, but at the same time they wanted to put on trial any elevated form of authority and any superior legitimisation of power and command, by asserting, for example, that the legitimisation of the Niihrertum of any governing function, of the *ducere*, resides solely in the people-race, in the *Volk*. This is an arbitrary interpretation of Aryan and Aryano-Germanic origins, because it is not at all true that such principles were in force there. Even if we confine ourselves to the Germans, we know that their constitution was not fundamentally different from the Roman constitution: in addition to the *Dux* or *Heretigo* as an exceptional and, as it were, additional ruler (similar to the Roman imperator in the military and primary sense of the term), elected by consent and acclamation, which could correspond to the notion of *Fiihrertum*, the Germans also had the authority of the rex, quite distinct from that of momentary rulers, due to the rex's symbolically "divine" ancestry. As for the Aryan world in general, we do not find any 'social' right, but always a right articulated in degrees and, indeed, in

families and communities, even he could not ethnic stratification, with signs of domination, and nators and subjugated natives.

Finally, as part of the fight for a vision of the world (*KampL die Weltanschauung*), the wrong choices of same kind. Certainly, here as elsewhere, we must pay tribute to the courage and resolve of National Socialism. Whenever they have thought it necessary, our German comrades have not hesitated to challenge either the Catholic Church or the Protestant denominations, without allowing themselves to be impressed in the slightest by the prestige their adversaries enjoy among souls. The most radical revolutionary circles have gone as far as to They also asserted the need to return to purely Nordic and Aryan pre-Christian traditions. But it is precisely here that the equivocation of the new paganism appeared. As we have shown on several occasions (cf, for example, our *Sintesi di dottrina della razza*, Milan, 1941, pp. 195-214)', this new paganism, for lack of principles, seems to have fallen into the trap that its opponents had carefully prepared for it: far from taking up the authentic ideas of the Aryan traditions, it has often defended numerous theses that come under the heading of "paganism" in the negative sense, that is to say, of that paganism that never existed, which was fabricated, for polemical purposes, by the first Christian apologetics in order to discredit everything that strayed from the new faith. Thus, in the new paganism, we can clearly see themes that stem solely from doctrinal deviations or entirely modern intellectual ramblings, on basis of "immanentism", the "religion of becoming", the "cult of life", a "religion of life", a "religion of the universe", and so on.

¹ Cf. the new edition (anastatic reproduction of the IM I edition): Ar, Padua, 1978 [Note by R.D.P.].

deistic and pantheistic natural revelation, of an exaltation of the purely organic, vital element - we could telluric" - and irrational against any ideal of clarity, 'classic' superiority and so on.

Naturally, we have simplified the picture. It cannot be denied, however, that in the order of dominant orientations, the difference between the Italian cultural situation and that of Germany is clear. On the one hand, a pseudo-traditionalist standstill; on the other, a revolutionary adventure. To what extent and in what form is reciprocal influence and rectification possible?

The answer does not seem difficult to find. As far as Italy is concerned, we need to decide, once and for all, to take things seriously in the field of culture and, above all, culture in immediate contact with politics. It would be necessary to adopt a revolutionary intransigence similar to that of the National Socialists, in order to sweep away the "conservative" and pseudo-traditionalist coup d'arrêt. We need to do away with the particularly stubborn residues of the bourgeois, liberal, nineteenth century.

"The new Germany has not hesitated to detach itself from its most recent past. The new Germany has not hesitated to detach itself from its most recent past, which nonetheless, with the Second Reich, contained so many valuable elements, so many traditional, non-traditionalist forms: But shouldn't such a choice be extremely easy for us, when we know what the so-called Italian culture and political idea were reduced to until the last world war, when we know the abyss that separates them from the ideals that fascism, as a rule, defends today? We really must decide to act in this way.

kind of inertia and, above all, to abandon all the superstitious respect for the facades behind them.

where there is nothing and for the remains of a beautiful presence which are not even of national origin. The contempt fasciste de la "vie commode" ne devrait pas faire craindre d'éventuels "ennui", même dans le domaine des problèmes spirituels et moraux les plus délicats, car être assis entre deux chaises ne sera jamais la meilleure position pour ceux qui entendent construire avec courage et détermination.

us, this revolutionary action would only have the meaning of an *opus remotiois*. Our great advantage is that, having leapfrogged over the mediocre epoch of the Italy of yesterday and the day before, which was content to imitate the foreigner, we are now in the presence of a set of truer, more dignified traditions: the Roman world, the Roman Empire, the Roman Empire.

the Germanic world of the Dantean Middle Ages, or the purely Roman world. And here, let's not be intimidated the little phrase "anachronism". This is the usual pretext used by those who deliberately want to do away with the principle that gave rise to the contingent form conditioned by time, a principle that may in fact possess intrinsic validity and always receive other expressions in accordance with different situations. But at the very moment when we were reconnecting with our most ancient heritage, the point of drawing from it a very precise system of references, we would in turn be in a position to exert an influence, in the sense of rectification and reinforcement, on the friendly and allied nation: we could provide it with ideas and principles capable of ensuring that its revolutionary impulse, instead of getting lost in adventures and succumbing to rather murky influences of a nature that is so often modern and irrational, would truly start afresh from its origins.

And this is because these origins, at heart, are — if we look at the great central currents of the two peoples in common. — Those who study the original forms without prejudice

of the Aryan spirit and law cannot be avoided.

ter this observation. But if such a conviction go is reflected in very specific statements made by Hitler and to

At the same time, the 'anti-Roman complex' reappearing here and there in political culture. Our task must be to help suppress this complex, firstly by taking a stand against any unilateral and admitted identification between Romanity and the Catholic Church (since it is precisely from this that many in Germany draw their pretexts); secondly, by presenting in a direct and vivid way the 'Aryan' and 'classico-Aryan' content of the Roman element: either the original Roman element, or the Roman element that adopted the particular, organic and imperial form of the Roman-Germanic Middle Ages.

There was no shortage of men in Germany who were prepared to move in this direction. Let us quote, for example, some significant phrases from one of the best representatives of the new National Socialist political culture, Christoph Steding: "Given that the Roman state was the most typically statist in the Western world and embodied in a certain way, with ideal purity, the idea of a Nordic state, we should not be surprised that it was regarded as a model even by men who relied only on themselves, such as the Germans of the Middle Ages (...). And one look at the faces of our predecessors, thanks to the portraits and statues of them that have come down to us, can convince us that their 'Roman distance' probably did them no harm, for they presented a much more virile, conscious and firm aspect than those of our contemporaries who would like to deny a large part of our German past" (*Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur*, Hamburg, 1938, p. XV)⁽²⁾. Here, then, is a clear reaction against an extreme-

² On this subject, see chapter IX of the first part of this collection: *The Function of Imperial Idea and the Elimination of 'Neutral Culture'* (Note by R.D.P.).

In the end, because of its mythology of the *Volk* and its anti-Roman prejudices, with everything Roman presumed to be 'foreign', it ended up forgetting the greatest and most important aspects of the Germanic tradition. However, our personal experience has taught us, on more than one occasion, that there are German circles of a certain weight which would not be hostile to similar rectifications of their own ideas - if only because these rectifications, from a certain angle, will become increasingly necessary, by the very force of things and by the nature of the tasks awaiting us on a European scale.

But in order to work together and, consequently, to truly bring the two peoples and the two traditions closer together, we must - let us repeat - work together. let us repeat to commitment seriously. Let us be frank: in Italy, things being as they are in the cultural sphere - quite distinct from the sphere of the political and heroic forces of fascism in action - we are preparing disillusionment for the best disposed of of our German comrades. They certainly don't need to come to Italy to rediscover, in reduced edition, the ramblings of their "idealism" and their "histori- cism" of the last century, nor to take lessons from "traditionalist" jurists of liberal tendency, with academic and bourgeois mentality, nor to hear that Rome means universalism and anti-race, nor to find themselves faced with a nationalism that tends towards democracy. In Germany, the slogan "*DeutschWand erwache!*" was coined; we, in turn, should coin the slogan "*Italy, svegliati!*" We could then make a truly positive contribution to the culture the friendly nation and, in the process, to the whole of Western civilisation in the future: but only if we come to terms with ourselves, only if we get rid of the dross, the residues, the habits and the traditions of the past. conformism.

1958

QUO VADIS CERATANCE?

When speaking of Germany, it is essentially to West Germany, to the Federal Republic of Germany, that we intend to refer here; to East Germany, controlled by Russia, we would have to speak of something quite different and we will only allude to it briefly. As for the former Germany, the spectacle it offered in the post-war period arouses sincere admiration most people.

Indeed, this nation has been able to recover completely from destruction. Even under occupation, it has outstripped the victors in industrial and economic terms, regaining its position as a major production power; unemployment and social conflict are virtually non-existent in federal Germany; its economy has developed at a steady and unified pace, spontaneously, without interference from the State or its cumbersome superstructures; its currency, the Deutschmark, remains absolutely stable and at a high level; the general standard of living of Germans today exceeds that - already high compared with many other nations - of pre-1939.

These are the characteristics that most strike those who look at Germany today from the point of view of economic and social achievements. But there are also

another, less well-known aspect. Behind the positive aspects, there is, spiritually and politically, a kind of *vacuum*. Shifts in values have taken place, with the result that the Germans of this new Germany have become unrecognisable in more ways than one, and present problematic traits precisely because these Germans seem to be singularly lacking in problems. This is the provisional assessment, let's hope that those who, like ourselves, have very well

known as the Germany yesterday, can't help but do. The Germans always do things consistently. So it is with the game democratic inspiration. They have created a model democracy in the style of a

The German government was "neutral" more administrative than political, let's say - balanced and energetic at the same time. Unlike Italy, Germany, from the pre-war point of view of a coherent democracy, communism. The German Constitutional Court ruled on the basis of obvious, namely that a party such as the Communist Party, which only follows the rules of democracy for purely tactical and camouflage purposes, its declared official objective being the suppression of all opposing political currents and the absolute dictatorship of the proletariat, cannot be tolerated by a democratic State which does not intend to dig its own grave. And although Adenauer's party was officially a Christian Democrat, it was not, like the Italian Christian Democracy, composed of invasive, incompetent and pusillanimous politicians. On several occasions, Adenauer showed himself capable of preserving the dignity and interests of his country with sufficient energy.

On the other hand, what's surprising about the Federal Republic is the absence of any idea, any "myth", any higher vision of the world, any continuity with the Germany of yesterday. The very mention of *Weltanschauung*, of "world view", is suspect for today's Germany, because we remember that this notion played a fundamental role in the past. It really does seem that

the vast majority of Germans regard the National Socialist experience as a parenthesis to be erased from their history. But it gets worse: as we were able to see for ourselves when meeting young Germans, these young people totally accept the Allied propaganda has said about the horrors and aberrations of Nazism. As if under effect a "complex of guilt", it is believed that the German defeat was all that could be expected. Whereas, after their defeat in the First World War, the Germans had sought all sorts of explanations, often even imaginary ones, for their defeat, ferociously rejecting their presumed responsibilities and sticking squarely to the idea of revenge, nothing of the sort can be seen present-day Germany. And although the Germans are usually singled out, the criminal and unscrupulous cruelty of the Allied air war (from the pointless destruction of Dresden to the tens of thousands of victims burnt alive in Hamburg by phosphorus bombs) does not seem to have given rise to any desire for hatred or revenge.

This is why no comparison can be made between Germany and Italy. While there is evidence in Italy, starting with the MSI, of a return to the past and a determination not to renounce it, perhaps as a result of the civil war, the same cannot be said of Germany. German and Austrian friends to whom we sent Italian magazines and newspapers with a national orientation were literally stunned, declaring that something similar would be completely impossible in their country: impossible — because of the general atmosphere, not because of penal measures, since we know that in Germany there are no laws to punish "apology" for the previous regime*. A German party-

• We know that German legislation has since evolved in a much more repressive direction.

icipating in the Predappio pilgrimage - totally ruled out the possibility of anything similar happening in his country,

so by chance the remains was
remains of Hitler had
now buried.

As far as the right-wing parties are concerned, there are no

until recently, in Germany, that the *Deutsche Reichs-Partei*, which later became, more simply, the DP, the "German Party", a party so small that it is in the process of forming an alliance with the German government,

liberals to have a minimum of parliamentary representation. But here, too, we find a characteristic symptom: although the term Reich appeared in the expression Third Reich - *Drittes Reich* - which is specific to Hitlerism, it nonetheless expressed a fundamental idea of the entire best German tradition, from the Swabian rulers onwards. However, for the German ruling class of today, this term is intolerable, heresy; and it was precisely because it had used this term in its original designation that the German right-wing party we were talking about was declared unconstitutional, as a result of which it had to change its name and re-form itself. Organisations that are independent of the parties and maintain the old spirit, such as those that were numerous and important in the first post-war period (just think of the *Stahlhelm*), are now almost non-existent. Refugees and ex-servicemen only have simple self-help associations. The few men who remained loyal have almost all emigrated, are scattered abroad, or remain silent: even when they are people who had nothing, or almost nothing, to fear from the new regime.

As a general rule, what is most worrying about the Federal Republic of Germany is the lack of national sensitivity, as evidenced by a number of recurring signs. One of the most typical examples of this is the success achieved in Germany by the-

• Small town in Romagna where the mortal remains of Benito Mussolini are buried.

The most odious traits attributed by the Allied propa- ganda to the entire previous German political class are repeated and accentuated here. The most odious traits attributed by the allied propa- ganda to the *entire* previous German political class are repeated and accentuated here. It is asserted in no uncertain terms that Germany's defeat was necessary and that to achieve it, to overthrow the regime, treachery was the only way to go. Saboteurs were suspected, who did not hesitate to murder their comrades, pilots and officers in combat, whose planes they had sabotaged. The "devil's general" in charge of the investigation discovers the culprits, but instead of denouncing them, he too prefers to meet the same death by boarding a sabotaged aircraft. Such a despicable work did not indignation in Germany; on the contrary, it was a success. Another example is the radio drama Agamemnon *doit mourir*, by a writer called Beyr who, unlike Zuckmeyer, is not an old anti-Nazi émigré but a representative of the younger generation. Through a grotesque manipulation of the old Greek legend, he expressed the idea that anyone who, in the name of the ideals of the fatherland, war and honour - ideals that are merely hypocrisy and a mere pretext - silences his most intimate family feelings should be despised. Agamemnon, who has followed this course of action by sacrificing Iphigenia, must die, and his wife, Clytemnestra, is perfectly right to trucidate him. In the conclusion, the author states that Agamemnon can be reborn at any time, and that every mother must therefore convince herself that he must be killed (the fact that, in the legend, the figure exalted as the ideal mother, Clytemnestra, betrays her husband, who has gone to war, with Aegisthe, and incites him to kill her, by immobilising him by surprise, according one version of the legend, he was bathing, to prevent him from defending himself, thus allowing her lover to strike him cowardly - all this, of course, is a mere insignificant detail in the eyes of the author).

Furthermore, the lowering of Germany's intellectual standards in general is confirmed by the fact, since the end of the war, not a single book of a certain quality has appeared. political, cultural or social importance. spiritual: one more difference between the atmosphere of the post-war Germany and the first post-war Germany. war, so rich in existential tensions and spiritual ferment, in and artistic movements. And so, Germany

As in Italy, the fiction of those who believed in the existence genius and creativity, stifled by the dictatorial regime, has vanished: after the elimination of this oppression, nothing worthy of interest has appeared. Successful authors are a few old names, people who have nothing new say. In the case of a few good writers, the change of direction is impressive. We

Gottfried Benn, another poet who was not unaware of the 'metaphysical' dimension behind the traditional idea of the Reich, is a case in point. Even more significant is the case Ernst Jünger, who had been the anti-Remarque of the first post-war period, the defender of the spiritual values that the experience of war can offer to a superior human type, in the very context of the most destructive and mechanised total war. Himself a volunteer combatant, Jünger had proposed the ethics of "heroic realism" in his famous book *Le Travailleur*, and had advocated an era of the absolute person, capable of unconditional and supra-individual commitment, in a new union of life with elemental forces, beyond the values bourgeois culture,

The poet Gottfried Benn gave a very favourable review (*Sein und Werden*, in *Die Literatur*, 3, 1935) of the German edition of *Révolte contre le monde moderne*, published in Stuttgart in 1935 [Note by R.D.P.].

² See Julius Evola, *L'Operaio nel pensiero di Ernst Jünger*,

of individualism and liberalism; but this same Jün-ger, in his last works, is no more than a literary scholar qui ends, because of the shock produced by the last «xpéi-en- these, in an aesthetic humanism. And after launching the motto "to go, not into the sectors where we defend ourselves, but into those where we attack", as in a "tiger's ride", a mastery of the forces erupting after liberating and purifying destructions, here he is writing, in addition to a rough essay peace, books like *de sentier forestier (Der Waldgang)*, which was translated into French under the title *Traité du rebelle**, and which essentially deals with the methods by which the individual can hide and defend himself under a totalitarian regime of the worst kind, as if else were conceivable.

Volpe, Rome, 1974; see also: Julius Evola, *L'Operaio e le scogliere di marmo*, in *Bibliografia fascista*, XVIII, 1943, 3, p. 143 sq II- ed.: Ar, Padua, 1977 [tr. fr. *Le "Tza vallleuz" et les fAaïses de marbre*, in *Totalité*, 21-22, autumn 1985, p. 137-158 - N.D.T.] - Note by R.D.P.]

* Evola is obviously talking about Jünger here without having been properly informed. In the original text of his article, he mentions that Jünger's essay is entitled *Der Waldweg*; the correct title, which we have restored, is in fact *Der Waldgang*. As for the French title of the work, it was chosen by the translator, Henri Plard, with the author's agreement, and for very legitimate reasons that Evola seems unaware of:

"For want of a accurate French equivalent, I have translated the German word *Waldgänger* as 'rebel', which is itself borrowed from an ancient Icelandic coutume. In the early Middle Ages, Norwegian outlaws had "recourse to the forests": they took refuge there and lived freely, but could be shot by anyone who came across them. The Norwegian emigrants who Iceland brought this custom with them (...) Jünger's *Waldgänger* is a 'figure', in the sense that our author gives to this word: timeless, so that he can and must be actualised at any moment in history; similar, if you like, to the figures on a chessboard, which find themselves in different positions at each new game, but which retain their identity from one game to the next" (*Note on the term "Rebel"*, in: Ernst Jünger, *Traité du Rebelle ou le recours aux forêts*, III- ed, Christian-Bourgois, 1981, p. 145-147).

As far as everyday life is concerned, everyone in Germany is caught up in practical activities: people "don't have time". There are publishers who reject manuscripts because they are "too voluminous", saying that "nobody can find the time to read them". The concrete Americanisation of life is, unfortunately, the counterpart of German prosperity. To return to the more specifically political sphere, it can be said there is something fatal and unavoidable in the German way of life. In the fact in Germany, the trial, in part-legitimate criticism of certain aspects of national socialism has ended up involving and attacking values which, in themselves, belong to the great European political tradition of the right. We have often had to set the record straight with young Germans, when they claim to see the 'rotteness' of yesterday's regime as the reason for their detachment from and rejection of the recent past. The most elementary observation is that one would have thought of bringing this 'rotteness' to the fore if, by chance, Germany had won the war. Breaking the backbone of Communist Russia, humiliating America by driving it out of European culture and politics — price would have been too high to achieve such goals. The very "horrors" (taken in their exact measure) which, in a climate of defeat, so upset utopian humanitarianism, would have become secondary, like those, for example, of the Wars of Religion, the Crusades, the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution, in the eyes of those who believed in the ideas corresponding to these phenomena and who placed these ideas above everything else. As for the rest, the younger generation in Germany (and with them a large proportion of foreigners) seem to be unaware of the complex nature of National Socialist Germany. Fascism was practically born out of nothing, due to the very small number antecedents which, in the Italy of the 21st and early 20th century, could lead to the ideal of the "state".

Mussolini of a new state strong, hierarchical and

"Nazism, on the other hand, drew its main vital forces from a pre-existing and still living tradition, Prussianism, from an aristocratic and military caste, and from many of the men and ideas of what was called the "conservative revolution". It is true that

Hitlerism, in its populist sense, partly counterfeited and distorted several parts of this heritage; it is also true that some of its leaders and some its institutions were nothing short of shadowless: but not everything came down to , because *within* Nazism there continued to be valid men and ideas (often keeping a precise distance), which one would have looked for in vain in any other country.

Given this state of affairs, it would have been necessary to discriminate, to objectively separate positive and authentic from the negative and deviant; but of the sort happened in Germany. We've everything together, we're indifferent or intolerant. We don't want any problems. But this whole series of things cannot fail to have repercussions on the question of what role Germany can play in the physical defence of Europe, in the NATO bloc and in all the other alliances.

"Atlantic" . Perhaps we are placing too much faith in the potential that Germany could represent in the event of war: the one hand, we are drawing hasty conclusions from its economic and industrial recovery; on the other, we still have before our eyes traditional image of military Germany, admired unconsciously even by those who hated it. Now, the backbone of this Germany was a tradition, and like a mystique, of authority, discipline, impersonal service, combat and honour. But if we stick to what we said above, it appears that all this is no longer very relevant.

While this heritage seems to be less important in West-Germany, it is better preserved in East Germany.

East (which also includes the cradle of Prussianism), car the Soviets did not fail to favour the dis-

positions to put them at the service of their ideology. We can therefore speak of a "*Helvetisation*" - of

. To be from a Russian observer , the following statement is nonetheless rather accurate: in relation to the war, the prevailing atmosphere in West Germany resembles that in France before the Second World War - because of the primacy of the bourgeois values and allure of a sated, comfortable existence. 11 One of the most unprecedented developments in German history was the appearance of cartoons that ridiculed German soldier and officer, once untouchable figures surrounded by absolute respect. Added to this are numerous articles in magazines that do not spare the honour of the German army in the last war, following an inspiration that even the allied countries have now set aside. There are, of course, cases in which the Federal Republic of Germany has defended, liberated and rehabilitated men from yesterday's army; but even today, there are still cases in which trials are being held against men who, in the eyes of the public, were not even considered to be part of the German army.

"This was done by following the subversive Nuremberg thesis of guilt of those who simply carried out the orders of their superiors, and by distinguishing between those who had served the 'regime' and those who served Germany. As if, yesterday, the regime and Germany had not been one and the same, in a unanimous exaltation of the Führer and the Third Reich, an exaltation that even bordered on the pathological. And when the tribunes did not follow or conform to these criteria (as, for example, in the case of the pension for Heydrich's widow), the mainstream press reacted very violently.

But when military force is not backed up by a solid tradition and an idea, this force, even if it is considered or organised, will remain hampered in its effectiveness.

• *Svizzerizznzione* in the text. This is a neologism coined by Evola [Editor's note].

This is particularly true a human type such as the German, who needs a certain inner form, who is unable, unlike the Latin or the Slav, to give the best of himself on the basis of a simple emotional impulse and the individual enthusiasm of the moment. Nevertheless, it is likely, for some time to come, the automatic persistence of the form imprinted by the Prussian tradition over the generations will guarantee a certain cohesion in the new German army, despite the official stifling of this tradition as a consciously recognised ethical and political ideal (it was precisely thanks to a similar persistence that, in the economic and social spheres, Germany in 1945 avoided chaos). But this in no way detracts from the fact that we do know, today, where Germany is heading, or what it will be able to bring to bear on the most essential problem, the only thing that is important and decisive for the future of our civilisation: the awakening or reawakening of a great new shaping idea, spiritually and politically, beyond the neutral and contingent plane of material achievements, as the soul and ultimate meaning of these achievements.



GIOVANNI PREZIOSI
(1881-1945)
ELEMENTS
BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

As we have seen, the magazine with the greatest presence in this collection, in terms of the number and importance of the articles, and the one to which Evola contributed most frequently during the period between 1930 (the year in which his journalistic activity is generally considered to have begun, although it actually dates back to 1928) and 25 July 1943, was the monthly political review *La Vite Italiana*. Evola began writing for it in issue 216 of March 1931 (with article that opens this collection) and continued to do so until issue 364 of July 1943 (with the article *Come la Germania lotta internamente contro Il plutocrazia*): during this period Evola wrote around hundred articles, for the periodicalmost of them in his own name, under the pseudonym 'Gherardo Maffei' from July 1934, and from June 1937 under the pseudonym 'Arthos', which enabled him to publish

Published in *Le Vite Italiana*, XXXI, 364 (July 1943), pp. 29-34.

° It should be noted in passing that Silius Evola's entire journalistic output certainly exceeds one thousand published articles. Approximately 75 9+ of them are in the possession of the *Cent o Studi broJiarii*, either in their original state or in various forms of reproduction. Of the 25 9" about 2/3 of which consist of articles from the period 1949-1964, generally published in right-wing periodicals with little con- and not widely distributed.

two articles per month for a specific period-

The Director of his life (1937-1943).

and owner of *La Vite Italic*, Giovanni

Preziosi, " was a free, courageous, loyal and true man-honest mentality", as Evola to write much more

late'. Perhaps will succeed, one at trace day, Italian

serious political and journalistic history

on the eve of intervention in the Great War, the definitive end of fascism.

Preziosi and the role he played,

figure and role still now little known , because

exorcised' by both hidden and open opponents, fascist and anti-fascist, past and present. There are in fact no serious, historically-consistent studies of Preziosi, apart from an essay by Renzo De Felice published over twenty years ago. We therefore believe that

useful by providing here some data on

the director of *La Vita Italiana*, pending a study

otherwise organic and in-depth.

Giovanni Preziosi fonda en 1913 *La Vite Itaiiana* *ai'estero* (which became *La Vita Italiana* from July 1915)

Julius Evola, *Le Chemin du Cinabre*, Archè-Arktos, Milan-Carmagnole, 1983, p. 98. Cf. also Julius Evola, *Diario 1943-44*, Centro Studi Evoliani, Genoa, 1975, p. 8-14 [tr. fr. *Journal 1943-1944*, in *Totalité*, 21-22, Autumn 1985, p. 54-59.]

⁴ See Renzo De Felice, *Giovanni Preziosi e le origini del fascismo (1917-1931)*, in *Rivista storica del socialismo*, V, 15-16 (January-August 1962), pp. 493-555. Cf. also the very rare book by L. Cabrini, *Il poteze segreto. Ricordi e confidence di Giovanni Preziosi*, Cremona, 1950. According to information in our possession, this book was seized shortly after publication (for reasons that remain mysterious) and the author (who had been Preziosi's secretary in 1944-45) interned in an asylum, where he *remains to this day* (revenge by "occult forces"?). See also, much more generally: Paolo Andriani, *Preziosi: una vita per l'idea*, in *Ordine Nuovo*, V, 3-4 (March-April 1959), pp. 133-139. Much of the bibliographical information on Preziosi is taken from : Olga Majolo Molinari, *La starnpa periodica romans dan 1900 ai 1926. Science Morali, Storiche, Filologiche*, vol. I and II, Istituto di Studi Romani, Rome, 1977, *passim*.

after having acquired a solid cultural preparation and theoretical training and and Italian communities in the problems emigration Mediterranean. abroad.

Born in 1881 in Torella di Lombardi (Avellino), with a degree in philosophy, he was a priest until December 1912*.

Christian Democrat under Romolo Murri, actively collaborating in the latter's fortnightly *Cu/aura sociale* (1898-1906), devoting himself in particular to the problems of the Mezzogiorno, giving lectures on social issues and, from 1906 onwards, writing a number of important studies on the issue emigration. Preziosi worked for the Oeuvre Bonomelli and effectively defended the interests of Italian emigrants, frequently travelling to the United States and Germany for this purpose. In the press, especially from 1906 to 1912, he contributed to the following periodicals and dailies, among the most important ones: *L'Italia all'estero* (1907-1913), of which he became co-editor in 1912, *Rivista Coloniale* (1906-1927), *Rivista internazionale di scienze sociali* (1893-1935), the fortnightly *Il Carroccio* (1909-1910), which had a nationalist slant, as well as *La Voce* (political edition, 1915), *Cornière d'Italia* (1906-1929), *Rassegna con-temporanea* (1908-1915), and so on.

Appointed head of the *Mezzogiorno* in Naples in 1923

and then, for a short , du donna, Preziosi had to leave the management of these two dailies because of his tireless denunciation of the business and clien- telism that increasingly corrupted fascism. Isolated to the point of running the risk being placed under house arrest, he returned to his magazine *La Vita Italiana*. Founded in January 1913, before and during the Great War this magazine had adopted a clear tendency towards Fascism.

• Preziosi had indeed priestly ordination: he therefore lived as a priest suspended a *divinis*.

Preziosi's philosophy was nationalist and interventionist, anti-democratic and anti-socialist, particularly under the influence of the eminent economist and sociologist Maffeo Pantaleoni, a friend of Vilfredo Pareto. After the *Mezzogiorno* experience, oblivious to Pantaleoni's warning ("Be careful: one day or other they'll break your bones"), Preziosi wrote a series of articles on the persistence of Masonic influence within the Fascist party (for which he was reprimanded by the national leadership on 8 September 1931). In the meantime, from number 220 of July 1931, his magazine had become the *publi-monthly issue of "Il Regime Fascista"*, the daily newspaper *La Vite Italiana* was edited in Cremona by Roberto Farinacci, and was to remain so for twelve years, until issue 363 of June 1943, after which, with issue 364 of July 1943 (the last in the first series), *La Vite Italiana* returned to independent management. The friendship and alliance with National Socialist Germany in the common war, enthusiastically endorsed by Preziosi - who had long been the driving force behind numerous campaigns against anonymous and international capitalism - gave him the opportunity to escape from the marginalisation to which he had been relegated by the Fascist hierarchy. The latter feared Preziosi because of the mysterious and well-documented 'secret' archives he possessed, which were said to contain "interesting information on the activities of the Fascists".

[The armistice signed by Badoglio with the Allies north of Syracuse (Sicily) on 3 September 1943 was not officially announced until the following 8 September - Editor's note]. The measure was reported in *La Vita Italiana*, XIX, 222 (September 1931), p. 352 (note by G. Preziosi: "With discipline").

° Cf. Roberto Farinacci, *Ntatrimonio d'arnore*, in *La Vita Italiana*, XIX, 220, p. 1-2. Farinacci concluded as follows: "If I could dictate a motto for the Review, I would choose this one: 'the pen and the whip'".

7 Cf. our note 2 in: Julius Evola, *Diary 1943-1944*, cit, p. 69-70. According to some unverifiable reports, Preziosi's famous archives ended up in the hands of the Italian Communist Party.

the circumstances and names of the activities carried out by Masonry under Fascism", especially with regard to the complicity of Ciano and, above all, Badoglio. Appointed Minister of State in 1942, Preziosi then became (from 15 March 1944), after having given his full support to the Italian "Social Republic", head of the Demography and Race Office at the R.S.I. Ministry of the Interior.

The new series of *La Voce Italiana* (to which Evola did not contribute) appeared in Milan, published by the (nationalised) Mondadori publishing house, from number 1 (365 of the old series) of September 1944 to number 5-6 (369-370) of January-February 1945, the last attested issue¹⁰, which, among other things, analysed the text of the declaration of the Yalta Conference, which was to give birth to the sinister capitalist-communist division of Europe and the world, a division whose tragic consequences we are still suffering today.

Although he would probably have been able to escape the bloody repression unleashed after the last days of the war (he was safe in a friendly house and was only physically known to a few people), he was not able to escape.

¹⁰ R. F. Esposito, *La massoneria e l'Italia dal 1800 ai giorni nostri*, Rome, 1969, pp. 377-378. See also: Giovanni Preziosi, *Memoriale di Mussolini*, Munich, 1944 (reproduced in: Renzo De Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo*, Turin, 1969, pp. 665-667).

¹¹ Together Evola, Pavolini, Vittorio Mussolini, Parinacci, Renato Ricci and a few lesser , Preziosi formed the new Fascist shadow government on 10 September 1943, even before Mussolini had been freed (on the 13th) by Skorzeny (cf. Julius Evola, *Diary 1943-44*, cit., p. 58).

¹² An issue released on 25 April (the March-April issue?) is reported by F. W. Deakin, *Stone della Repubblica di Salò*, tr. it., Turin, 1963, p. 335. Cabrini, *op. cit.* p. 349, who is said to have seen it, speaks of an attack against Farinacci himself (accused of Masonic activities) that was contained in it. In any case, it is understood that this issue never left the printing works in proof form.
corrected.

Preziosi freely chose to die the Roman way: he committed suicide in the company of his wife Valeria on the morning of 28 April 1945, "so as not to survive the defeat a regime and its leader, he had so faithfully served.

Among those who contributed to *La Vita Italiana* in the period between 1913 and 1926, we should mention some illustrious names: the nationalist theorist Enrico Corradini, the jurist Carlo Costamagna, the philosopher Benedetto Croce, the great Romanian poet Nicolas Iorga, the sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (who wrote in a letter to Pantaleoni: "It is not possible to trace the Italian political history of the pre-war and war years without the collection of *La Vita Italiana*"). In one of the last issues of his magazine, Preziosi wrote: "I don't know physical fear, I have the certainty that I will win, and in any case, even in death I will continue to speak"².

Renato DEL PONTE

Cf. our note 1 in: Julius Evola, *Journaf 1943-44*, cit, p. 69, where several contradictory versions (including Evola's own) are given of the precise date and time of Preziosi's death.

¹⁰ Among Preziosi's many works, apart from the Italian edition of the famous *Protocols of the Elder Sages of Zion* presented and commented by him (first ed.: "La Vita Italiana", Rome, 1921; eighth ed. Mondadori, Milan, 1945): *Gl'italiani negli Stati Uniti*, Milan, 1909; *Le disoccupazione*, Palermo, 1912; *La Germania allo conquista dell'Italia* (with an introduction by M. Pantaleoni), Rome, n.d.; *Uno Stato neifo Stato: la cooperativa Garibafdi della gente di mare*, Florence, 1932; *Giudaismo, bolscevismo, plutocrnzia, masoneria*, Milan, 1941 (third ed.: 1944).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Presentation, <i>by François Maistre</i>	7
Bibliographical note, <i>by Renoto Del Ponte</i>	37

PART ONE: THE IMPERIAL IDEAL AND THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER

I. The two faces of nationalism (1931).....	43
It. Imperial universality and nationalist particularism (1931)	59
III. The "European" problem at the Volta Congress (1932)	71
IV. On the spiritual premises of empire (1937)	83
V. England and the decline of the idea of empire (1940)	89
VI. Approaches to the European idea (1940) . . .	101
VII. For a genuine "European law" (1941) .	113
VIII. Considerations on the future order of nations (1941) .	123
IX. Function of imperial idea and elimination of the "Neutral culture" (1943)	141
X. On the spiritual and structural conditions of European unity (1951) ..	157

PART TWO: ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

I. About the Corporate Congress Italian-French (1935)	173
II. Corporations and laws of honour (1936).....	177
III. The ethical value autarky (1938).....	189
IV. The limits of "social justice" (1940).....	195
V. Trial of the bourgeoisie (1940).....	201
VI. Myth and reality in the anti-bourgeois struggle (1940)	219

VII. "Neutralisation" or improvement of the administration? (1941)	231
VIII. About useless printed paper (1943)	243

PART THREE: GERMANISM AND NAZISM

I. The "myth" of the new German nationalism (93)	255
■ <i>Neue Sachlichkeit</i> ". A confession by the young generation (1933)	265
III. Critical Remarks on National Socialist "Racism" (1933)	285
IV. The National Socialist fight for the "vision of the world" (1934)	293
V. Nazism on the road to Moscow (1935)	307
VI. Paradoxes of our time: paganism = liberal illuminism (1935).	321
VII. On the differences between the fascist and Nazi State (1941) ...	327
VIII. Romanity, Germanism and the Manacorda case ⁹⁴	339
IX. For a politico-cultural alignment of Italy and Germany (1942)	353
X. <i>Quo vadis Germania</i> (1958) ...	367

<i>Appendix: Giovanni Preziosi (1881-1945). Biographical and bibliographical information, by Renato Del Ponte</i> ...	379
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This book brings together twenty-eight articles by Julius Evola published between 1930 and 1958. The texts are divided into three thematic sections: "The Imperial Idea and the New European Order", "Economy and Social Criticism", and "Germanism and Nazism".

Devoted to a critique of modern nationalism, the From the redefinition of the idea of Empire, to the question of a genuine 'European law', to the analysis of the spiritual and structural conditions of European unity, the first articles in this collection are concerned with major metapolitical orientations. In the second part, the reader will find a very valuable article on the subject of 'European law'. In the second part, the reader will find a very valuable article on the National Socialist subject of cor- poration, and texts reflecting the debates of Fascist intellectuals on an important point: the "trial of the bourgeoisie". Finally, in the third part, Evola analyses, sometimes very critically, a number of aspects of National Socialism: its *vô'lk is'h* and particularist natio- nalism, its biological racism, its "revolutionary" and "anti-Roman" excesses, its paganism and links with the Reformation and the Enlightenment, its conception of the State, and so on.

While it provides a better understanding of Evola's itinerary and the nature of his metapolitical commitment between the wars, this collection is above all an irreplaceable source of information on the ideas discussed under Fascism and National Socialism. The incessant polemics surrounding the latter phenomenon testify above all to the appalling ignorance of official French historiography about the sources and ideological references of National Socialism: hence the extreme interest of Evola's articles, often written on the basis of documentation.

The texts are preceded by a lengthy introduction by Fran- çois M aistre and followed by a bio-bibliographical note by Rcnato Dcl Ponte on a little-known Fascist leader, G iovanni Preziosi.



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