The divergence on Vedanta between Evola and Guénon is alike to the one between Evola and Schuon about the castes: it depends on the personal nature in action. The roads going to the same "place" are different just because they pass through the physical individual nature in this word, while that goal is beyond it. So, Rowan, I think we have less truths than choices, also illusory, provisional choices, if you prefer, but always according to our true nature or personality. This is a choice that Evola called "classical".
Our nature is irrevocable; it is already a destiny, and even if that dominion over the object known be always in doubt, cannot be given up.
Evola said: "Personality is not a datum but a task" (J. Evola, Maschera e volto dello spiritualismo contemporaneo, Mediterranee, Roma 1971, pag.213). How much freedom I have in this task? I think little, because necessity and will are the two faces of the same meddle, but, in my opinion, this is not a contradiction of the young Evola, it is simply a discrepancy in every consciousness aiming at the awakening.
F.
In <evola_as_he_is@yahoogroups.com> <rowan_berkeley@...> wrote
Reading the 'Controversy' again, I am struck by what I can only regard as
Evola's youthful Hegelianism (though whether he ever outgrew this youthful
trait is debatable).
As Bruno tells us:
"The true aim of magic in its original higher, we could even say, Vedic,
form, is not, as Guénon conceived it, "to produce more or less extraordinary
phenomena, especially (but not exclusively) in the sensitive order" ('Formes
traditionnelles et cycles cosmiques', Gallimard, 1961), but to bring about,
through precise techniques and rituals meant to have a compelling effect on
supranatural forces, an inner transformation of the individual leading to
his "dominion over the object known", as Evola puts it here."
and indeed Evola reiterates:
"If Guénon understands 'intellectual realisation' (along with metaphysical
realisation) as something "essentially active", reflecting, in a certain
sense, the mode of the will, we certainly withdraw our reservations on this
subject (advising him however to prefer the expression "pure actuality") ;
but we will have to make our reservations again, when he speaks to us about
a will which does not find its area of operation in itself, but rather in a
certain 'knowledge' - and here 'knowledge' would mean also 'identification
with the object known'. Beyond this, we assert a higher value : dominion
over the object known."
Now let it be said that 'identification with the object known' implies unity
with it, while 'dominion over the object known' implies separation from it.
Thus for the latter dualism triumphs over monism to all eternity. Is this
what we desire?
In addition this illustrates the hidden thread which connects Evola's
doctrine of 'the Light' to that doctrine of 'the Darkness' revealingly
espoused by most of his contemporary followers, as opposed to those of
Guénon. Look again at this :
"The Earth is the main field of contention between the Solar Logos and the
Luciferian Principle. The Initiate strives towards a harmonious arrival at
the Theonium of Saturn, and not toward the Sun, because the Sun would
destroy and consume him. The Saturnine sphere offers enlightenment, control,
and independence."
and <evola_as_he_is@...> replied:
Evola's youthful Hegelianism (though whether he ever outgrew this youthful
trait is debatable).
As Bruno tells us:
"The true aim of magic in its original higher, we could even say, Vedic,
form, is not, as Guénon conceived it, "to produce more or less extraordinary
phenomena, especially (but not exclusively) in the sensitive order" ('Formes
traditionnelles et cycles cosmiques', Gallimard, 1961), but to bring about,
through precise techniques and rituals meant to have a compelling effect on
supranatural forces, an inner transformation of the individual leading to
his "dominion over the object known", as Evola puts it here."
and indeed Evola reiterates:
"If Guénon understands 'intellectual realisation' (along with metaphysical
realisation) as something "essentially active", reflecting, in a certain
sense, the mode of the will, we certainly withdraw our reservations on this
subject (advising him however to prefer the expression "pure actuality") ;
but we will have to make our reservations again, when he speaks to us about
a will which does not find its area of operation in itself, but rather in a
certain 'knowledge' - and here 'knowledge' would mean also 'identification
with the object known'. Beyond this, we assert a higher value : dominion
over the object known."
Now let it be said that 'identification with the object known' implies unity
with it, while 'dominion over the object known' implies separation from it.
Thus for the latter dualism triumphs over monism to all eternity. Is this
what we desire?
In addition this illustrates the hidden thread which connects Evola's
doctrine of 'the Light' to that doctrine of 'the Darkness' revealingly
espoused by most of his contemporary followers, as opposed to those of
Guénon. Look again at this :
"The Earth is the main field of contention between the Solar Logos and the
Luciferian Principle. The Initiate strives towards a harmonious arrival at
the Theonium of Saturn, and not toward the Sun, because the Sun would
destroy and consume him. The Saturnine sphere offers enlightenment, control,
and independence."
and <evola_as_he_is@...> replied:
Hello,
So long as Evola's early works and his self-biography, 'Il Camino del
cinabro' have not been translated into English, misunderstandings
will persist in the Anglo-Saxon world with respect to Evola's
positions on idealism in general and Hegelianism in particular. The
third chapter of 'Il Camino del cinabro' - the longest one in the
book - goes back over the "speculative period, magical idealism and
the theory of the absolute individual", only to sum up, as far as
Hegelianism is concerned, the stand he took on it 40 years or so
before, that is, starting from Hegel's ideas, only to criticise them
and to go beyond them.
'Men among the Ruins' can however give you a foretaste of this
overcoming. In this work, just as in 'Spiritual and structural
presuppositions of European union', Evola, not only condemns
irrevocably Hegel's historicism as well as his concept of
the "Absolute state", but also refutes transcendental idealism. The
Real is not necessarily the rational, no more than the rational is
the real. This critique can already be found in Evola's early works.
Going back over them and more particularly over an introduction to
the work of Lao-Tzu published in the early 1920's, he wrote,
precisely in 'Il Cammino del cinabro': "Through Lao-Tzu, even though
it was not clearly formulated, the fundamental orientation by which
the system which I built later on differentiated itself from idealist
philosophy appeared. As a matter of fact, Lao-Tzu's 'non-acting'
clearly contrasted with the immanentist identification between the
subject and the action, the action and the fact, identification which
I was to fight fiercely, in itself and in its historicist
applications. The principle, basically aristocratic, of detachment
and impassivity was, here, in the foreground. In imitation of the
divine model, the Perfect, the Taoist "real man" or "transcendent
man", by not identifying himself with exteriority, by not
intervening directly, by not externalising his Self by self-
assertion, by practicing instead the active renunciation to 'being'
and 'acting' in a direct and conditioned sense, achieves the
essential element, enters the Path, (...) and is able to exert a
subtle, invisible, magical action - wei-wu-wei, the 'acting-without-
acting', the sovereign and irresistible spontaneity - (...)".
It seems to me that these considerations can be used as a starting
point to resolve the problem and the contradiction you see in the
enlightening idea and principle of a 'dominion over the object known'.
Thompkins&Cariou
So long as Evola's early works and his self-biography, 'Il Camino del
cinabro' have not been translated into English, misunderstandings
will persist in the Anglo-Saxon world with respect to Evola's
positions on idealism in general and Hegelianism in particular. The
third chapter of 'Il Camino del cinabro' - the longest one in the
book - goes back over the "speculative period, magical idealism and
the theory of the absolute individual", only to sum up, as far as
Hegelianism is concerned, the stand he took on it 40 years or so
before, that is, starting from Hegel's ideas, only to criticise them
and to go beyond them.
'Men among the Ruins' can however give you a foretaste of this
overcoming. In this work, just as in 'Spiritual and structural
presuppositions of European union', Evola, not only condemns
irrevocably Hegel's historicism as well as his concept of
the "Absolute state", but also refutes transcendental idealism. The
Real is not necessarily the rational, no more than the rational is
the real. This critique can already be found in Evola's early works.
Going back over them and more particularly over an introduction to
the work of Lao-Tzu published in the early 1920's, he wrote,
precisely in 'Il Cammino del cinabro': "Through Lao-Tzu, even though
it was not clearly formulated, the fundamental orientation by which
the system which I built later on differentiated itself from idealist
philosophy appeared. As a matter of fact, Lao-Tzu's 'non-acting'
clearly contrasted with the immanentist identification between the
subject and the action, the action and the fact, identification which
I was to fight fiercely, in itself and in its historicist
applications. The principle, basically aristocratic, of detachment
and impassivity was, here, in the foreground. In imitation of the
divine model, the Perfect, the Taoist "real man" or "transcendent
man", by not identifying himself with exteriority, by not
intervening directly, by not externalising his Self by self-
assertion, by practicing instead the active renunciation to 'being'
and 'acting' in a direct and conditioned sense, achieves the
essential element, enters the Path, (...) and is able to exert a
subtle, invisible, magical action - wei-wu-wei, the 'acting-without-
acting', the sovereign and irresistible spontaneity - (...)".
It seems to me that these considerations can be used as a starting
point to resolve the problem and the contradiction you see in the
enlightening idea and principle of a 'dominion over the object known'.
Thompkins&Cariou