"Marcuse always paid special attention to the important role of
technology in organizing contemporary societies and with the
emergence of new technologies in our time the Marcusean emphasis on
the relationship between technology, the economy, culture, and
everyday life is especially important". Yet, he paid less attention
to the relationship between so-called 'new media' and world-wide
organised crime, that is to say, that he didn't get to the heart of
the question : beyond being instruments of manipulation and of
slavery, new technologies and new media have more concrete
applications. Twenty years of ever-faster financial transactions,
spurred by the rise of electronic communications, have turned money
gained from criminal activities into a source of political and
financial superpower, the "Superpower of Crime".
Even though Marcuse once worked for the State Department, whose
strategy is based on misdirection, it would be going too far to
accuse him of having deliberately tried to misdirect people : after
all, Marcuse was above all a thinker ; but, as any thinker, he could
be instrumentalised.
As shown by Klebnikov in 'Godfather of the Kremlin - the Decline of
Russia in the Age Gangster Capitalism', the root of the war in
Chechnya, far from being ideological, religious, or political, is
economic ; the war in Chechnya, whether 'new romantics', whether
leftists or rightists, like it or not, is part of the "Great Mob
War" ; that war is not being waged in the name of Allah or in the
name of God, but for the control of the Central Asia heroin market,
for the control of the Central Asia oil and gas. Since Western public
opinion needs to dream awake and the communication groups which are
in charge of modelling it are here to satisfy fully their needs,
media have manufactured a 'war of religion' for Western public
opinion, while thinkers, backed up by those media, have been talking
of "clashes of civilisation", and so on.
Here is another example of misdirection :
Since the 9/11 -, the illicit substances or products searched for
in priority by American customs are explosives and war weapons likely
to be used in an attack, and no longer drugs, nor counterfeiting. The
30th of July 2002, at the twentieth anniversary of the "Organized
Crime and Drug Enforcement Task", the admiral Thomas Collins stated
that his "anti-drug missions have been cut by 90 per cent after the
9/11". The FBI now focuses on the analysis of terrorist threat to the
detriment of the repression of narcotraffic. To Robert Mueller,
(former) boss of the FBI, "Drug enforcement is no longer a top
priority". Still in the aftermath of the 9/11, the FBI transferred
more than 600 of its agents from the fields of drug, kidnapping and
organised crime, to the so-called "War on Terror". The 'organised
crime' section of the NYPD was also invited to take more interest in
terrorism (source : X. Raufer; 'Le grand réveil des mafias', JC
Lattès, 2003 - X. Raufer is a junior lecturer at the institute of
criminology of Paris).
That author tells us that "organised crime is now the main global
threat. Those who should warn us against it - media - and those who
should protect us against it - governments - too often turn away from
it". Far from this peculiar jejunity without which it is impossible
to get a teaching job in a French university in particular and in a
Western university in general, Pascal Bernardin, the author of 'La
face cachée du mondialisme vert' ('The Hidden Face of Green
Globalisation'), a book which unmasks in part the Marxist logic at
work behind Capitalist globalisation, spelled it out in an article
published in a French 'far-right' newspaper a few years ago ; here
are a few excerpts of that article, whose impact a peculiarly jejune
scholar, who, as a professor of political science, is expected to
claim that Bernardin doesn't provide a shred of evidence, and who, as
a matter of fact, claims it, in one of those desperate scholarly
attempt to obliterate realities and, at the same, to reassure
oneself, has been put in charge of cushioning : "For Bernardin,
government attempts to root out corruption are in fact a subtle
manoeuvre aimed preparing the way for globalization and the new world
order. He begins by noting that one can only understand the true
purpose of anti-corruption policies by a "deep understanding of the
intentions of our adversaries." The struggle against corruption,
Bernardin notes, comes from the "highest level of international
institutions," and was initiated at the Rio conference where
the "mondialistes of all kinds were moved to tears watching Arabs and
Jews follow each other to the same podium."
Although the naive observer might think that the anti-corruption
policy adopted by 178 governments was a response to pressure from
ordinary people, in fact, only "the initiated can understand its real
purpose". According to Bernardin, the "totalitarian mondialiste
power," following the lessons of Gramsci is trying to create a
consensus" which rejects corruption as profoundly unjust. But this
movement against corruption has revolutionary aims. In fact, the real
goal of the "international mondialiste institutions is to get the
elites to march together in order to destroy any opposition
powers.... it is necessary to make the elites submit to the law [of
the world power] in order to establish a false state of law in each
nation and in the entire world." In other words, the real aim of the
anti-corruption movement is to implement a single rule of law over
the entire world, which can then be manipulated by the globalizers
because "corruption prevents the globalizers from totally controlling
society." Thus anti-corruption laws will be applied to the elites so
that the "world system responds precisely to the directives coming
from the top of the pyramid." But, for fear of alienating the public
or being forced to use counter-productive measures of force, the law
is applied less strictly to ordinary citizens, although the ultimate
aim is to inculcate a belief in world law in the public. Once this is
done, the globalizers can then achieve their project of world
domination.
(...) "the struggle against corruption is a globalizing maneuver to
affirm the power of international institutions. Society will thus
lose the last recourse against a totalitarian power - the corruption
of venal bureaucrats. Far from raising the morality of political
life, the struggle against corruption will allow the totalitarian
globalizing power to re-enforce its hold over society." However, this
won't be accomplished without a struggle between the revolutionary
globalizers and the globalizing forces of big capital. The first
consist of devoted revolutionaries who, having failed to achieve
their goals through world communism, have transferred their field of
action to the international arena; the second group consists of the
globalizers from big capital. The adoption of anti-corruption
resolutions therefore marks a victory of the revolutionary
globalizers over those from big capital. From this point on, politics
will no longer be determined by wealth, rather "law has become the
touchstone, a law, of course, dictated by very progressive
international organizations." In the end, the "elites and the people
are victims of manipulations coming from the top of the pyramid....
And the demand for justice [his italics] is used, but not fulfilled,
by the globalizers." In sum, anti-corruption legislation and the rule
of law is just a smokescreen for the machinations of revolutionary,
that is ex-communist, globalizers intent on imposing a uniform system
of law on the world all the better to dominate it." (
http://www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/theories-right/theory3.html )
It seems to us that Bernardin's considerations offer an answer to the
question which any sensitive person is bound to ask oneself in this
respect : why on earth would 178 more or less corrupt governments
feel the need to meet publicly to (state, just as publicly, they)
fight public corruption, were it not to define a common global
gangster strategy? What we are actually witnessing is not so much a
globalisation of economy as an integration of the underworld economy
into a centralised world-wide economy.
Public corruption is likely to be as old as government : it is
mentioned in the Hammurabi's code of laws ; Plato talked about it in
his 'Laws' ; forty temptations which civil servants might yield to
are listed in the Arthashastra, a Hindu philosophical treatise of the
third century BC ; in his book on 'Le pain et le cirque', P. Veyne
cannot but acknowledge that the state of public corruption in
Athenian democracy was unprecedented in Greece ; in China and in the
Middle-East, it's, so to speak, an old-age institution. During the
reign of Franz-Joseph, in the 1880's, his ministers once handed down
their resignation to him at the beginning of a Cabinet meeting in
which he was to announce the appointment, for the first time in the
history of the Empire, of ministers of bourgeois extraction in the
government, who, unlike the nobles which were part of it, were to
receive emoluments ; surprised, the Austro-Hungarian emperor asks
them the reason of their act : "Your Highness, they answer - the fact
that the Emperor did not seem to have a clue about that reason says a
lot about his character, and the fact that he even thought of
appointing bourgeois ministers in the government reveals an inner
weakness which was to be fatal to the regime later -, either one
serves one's country, or one uses his country for one's own profit".
In a few lapidary words, the whole difference between the
aristocratic regime and the democratic regime was summarised. We may
as well say : the whole difference between two opposite types of
men : the man who serves his country, and the man who uses his
country for his own profit.
When, owing to democratic institutions, the latter human type is in
office (in this respect, the expression 'to be in office' is quite
revealing ; the corresponding French one is even more
revealing : 'être aux affaires'), public corruption cannot but be
structural, not to say institutionalised. In the bourgeois democratic
regimes which Europe experienced from the middle of the nineteenth
century to the 1960's, except a few rare exceptions, that is, a few
politicians not devoid of a certain sense of the state in the most
neutral sense of the word 'state', the political schemers in office
used that state as a means to favour their own interests and those of
the lobbies which they represented and to which they owed their
mandate. An even lower type of political schemer burst onto the
political scene at the end of the 1970's, owing to the 1968 anarchist
movement : for that type of political schemer, politics has become a
career as any other career, systematically to the detriment of the
state ; in the nineteenth century mercantilist state, public
corruption could benefit both to the politicians and to the state in
financial terms, whereas, nowadays, what is earned by political
schemers is systematically lost for the state, according to the
principle of the communicating vessels. Among them, we find former
sales representatives, former journos, former sports(wo)men, actors
(until 1792, only three categories of people didn't have any citizen
rights in France : Jews, butchers, and actors, who, for the latter,
were considered as the dregs of society until the middle of the
eighteenth century, while actresses were still considered as
worthless girls until the spread of cinema, at least in Europe), not
to mention, in countries like Italy, France and Russia, gangsters and
mobsters, who, for some of them, have reached the highest position in
those pimp states, "through the more and more visible cracks of the
existing order". The frontiers between the Underworld and the
political scene are more and more vague.
There is another important difference between contemporary political
schemers and the bourgeois politician of the nineteenth century, with
respect to the relation to power. Caught in flagrante delicto, the
latter would resign ; that doesn't mean that he apologised in public
as any Japanese or Korean political schemer do in those
circumstances, nor that he committed suicide as some Japanese
political schemers convicted of corruption do ; yet, he left office,
never to come back on the political scene ; the bourgeois was not
always devoid of any sense of decency. His resignation was not based
on ethics, but on moral considerations, on shame : to a large extent,
it was the accusing look of others which made him resign. Let's bear
in mind that, at that time, European political scene was still
greatly influenced by Christian morals, and the bourgeoisie was
persuaded to be a model of morality and got into its head to make the
people moral. But, in the meantime, if not the people, at least some
elements of the populace have managed to come to office, and, caught
in flagrante delicto, not only the new political schemers no longer
resign, but they stay in office, cling to power, to the little power
they may have (that is : to the money their being in office enables
them to make), as small molluscs on a rock in the midst of the storm.
They all do, claiming their "absolute innocence" to the face of the
world, assuring the populace that they are as white as snow, when
they get into trouble - as is known, the Mafia worships the Virgin
Mary. Of course, a few of them still have to resign from time to time
in South American or in Southern-Asian banana republics, sacrificed
on the altar of democracy by a more powerful and influential gang of
crooks. In Western countries, one of the main reasons why political
schemers, with extremely rare cases which are all connected to
the "Great War Mob", no longer resign despite blatant Mafia-like
practices is that, whatever their political label, they all depend on
each other, they all have files about each other : if one falls, the
rest of them fall, the whole Mafia-like system implodes. As the
French say, "ils se tiennent tous par la barbichette".
The second main reason of this state of affairs is connected with
considerations made by René Guénon on the "Great Impostor" in the
penultimate chapter of 'Le règne de la quantité et les signes des
temps'. This figure, placed at the head of the community, is
described by him as being the most complete expression and
the 'embodiment' of what it will represent. The fact is that the
political schemer has become a model for the masses, which identify
with him and, more or less unconsciously, would like to imitate him,
according to a demonic nemesis. Contrary to what some people would
like us to believe, most voters tolerate more and more the various
scandals which have been erupting the world over. In traditional
cultures, the people spontaneously identified with heroes. In
contemporary societies, on the contrary, the populace identifies with
the anti-heroes which are offered to it as models by media,
especially since the populace can feel that, basically, there are no
qualitative differences between it and its anti-heroes, and,
therefore, it considers them as 'one of them'.
In the two articles by Evola about the 'Fifth Estate' we have
mentioned, Evola considered structural public corruption and the
related phenomenon of global gangsterism and organised crime as one
of the signs of the coming of that 'Fifth Estate'.