Freedom: a concept of slaves

She was.

It has become a value.

Value has become a concept.

The concept has become a political slogan.

The political slogan has become an ideal.

The ideal has become individual, collective and universal.

The universal ideal has become a law.

The collectivist ideal has become a social currency.

The individual ideal has become a belief.

As a law, as a social currency and as a belief, it developed into a revolutionary weapon.

Benedetto Croce called it a "religion".

Julius Evola called it “fetishism”.

It's just a word, repeated neurotically by the masses and chanted on all media 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Its pathological character cannot be doubted.

What J. Evola points out in the introduction to The Myth of Blood about race in antiquity can also be applied to freedom at that time: “[…] in aristocratic traditions [racism does not was not theorized but lived]. Therefore, the term "race" can very rarely be found in the ancient world: ancient men did not need to speak of race in the modern sense of the term since they had race, so to speak. »

This absolutely fundamental fact was well discerned by KA Raaflaub in his study of the rare occurrence of the term “freedom” in the literature of Archaic Greece: “He who is free […] or, more precisely, the noble elite […] ] – usually did not view their freedom as a fact worth noting. Freedom was thus unimportant or taken for granted. (1) In this context, it is normal that “members of Homeric society seem to have thought and spoken of freedom only when they perceived a threat to their own freedom, which they had hitherto taken for granted. (2) The two explanations offered to account for this fact demonstrate a deep understanding of traditional cultures of Aryan origin: "First, in general, the difference in status between the free and the unfree may have mattered less in Homeric society than it did later because of other social distinctions and criteria that were more important and helped to minimize this difference. Second, in particular, the scant attention given to freedom reflects and builds on specific elite traits. Their social organization and relations, their norms and values, ways of thinking and relations to the community apparently offered no means by which freedom could be highly valued. (3) Nor did 'freedom' play any role in the life and political institutions of the early Hellenes. “Freedom of expression was not a formal right; it was simply taken for granted by those who benefited from it. Free status was not recognized as a criterion for determining “rights” such as participation in assemblies or debates; and the freedom of individuals or of the community was not a matter of public debate. » (4)

The community was homogeneous and organic, and its homogeneity and its organicity were due, as J. Evola shrewdly explained, to the continuous and closed hereditary transmission of a force which, like a magnet, established contacts, created a psychic atmosphere. , stabilized the social structure and determined a system of co-ordination and gravitation between the individual elements and the center for the continuous development in individuals taken in isolation from prenatal determinations on the plane of human existence. It was a racial community, the only community worth its salt, and that explains why, although full awareness of individual freedom and its value may have existed from the earliest times,polite to strongly value “freedom” and to conceptualize it. Even better, it was one of the "deeply rooted conditions of the aristocratic way of life which prevented freedom, in any context, from coming to general notice and entering the political arena as a cry." programmatic rallying in its own right. (5) There was a higher concern which was the autonomia of the oikos and the polis (6).

The fact that the nobles took freedom for granted may account for the fact that no positive definition of freedom ( eleutheria ) is found in early Greek literature, and that "from its first appearance […] eleutheroes […] form a pair of opposites with doulos . In Homer donlion émar and eleuthéron émarilluminate the same event from two sides. Both expressions are used only when attention is focused on the fact and the moment of the loss of freedom […] The absence of freedom is determined on the one hand by subjection to force and to an alien will […] in other words, by restricted freedom of action […] and on the other hand by loss of protection, home and country”, so that it seems reasonable to assume that the Homeric idea of ​​"being free" must at least include control of one's own person and actions and the security of living in an intact and stable community (7). The adjective eleutherosis “primarily used in a single fixed formula referring to the time of loss of liberty; that is, it does not refer directly to a person but to a change in that person's condition. Eleutheros never designates in Homer the status of individuals or a group in the free or dominant part of society unlike those who are not free or dependent. The idea of ​​community is evoked only by a sentence containing eleutheros (8). »

We must therefore understand exactly what made “freedom” become a highly valued value in the political and social spheres. Various coherent hypotheses can be put forward: "The way of waging war may have changed so that armed conflicts no longer resulted in the destruction of cities but in their subjugation and the enslavement not only of women and children but also men. Consequently, male slaves would have become less exceptional and more and more frequently slavery would have changed in character, prompting a change of consciousness among free men as well. Moreover, free farmers would have come to depend on the nobility not only for the arbitration of disputes but also economically, which would have led to exploitation and new forms of dependency. Consequently, the loss of freedom would no longer have been attributed solely to intangible facts […] war, piracy or a divinely decided destiny […] but also to individuals who were members of the same community who were known and could thus be criticized or attacked. All of this could have happened not just in isolated cases but more and more frequently and in recognizable patterns. The aristocratic value system could once again have been challenged and the power of the elite challenged; in the self-perception of the aristocracy new alternatives to status based on dominance would have appeared […] Eventually, the relationship in the community between the private and public spheres would have changed; the second would have intensified and would have been structured by regulated institutions, procedures and laws; new forms of power would have arisen, new identities would have become possible or required, and the principles that previously determined the individual's ability to participate in government would have lost their validity (9). The Solonian Athens illustrates to some extent the possibility of such developments which, however, could hardly have happened without a drop in the level of the aforementioned force as a result of the interbreeding of certain Hellenes castigated in the new identities would have become possible or would have been demanded, and the principles which previously determined the capacity of the individual to participate in government would have lost their validity (9). The Solonian Athens illustrates to some extent the possibility of such developments which, however, could hardly have happened without a drop in the level of the aforementioned force as a result of the interbreeding of certain Hellenes castigated in the new identities would have become possible or would have been demanded, and the principles which previously determined the capacity of the individual to participate in government would have lost their validity (9). The Solonian Athens illustrates to some extent the possibility of such developments which, however, could hardly have happened without a drop in the level of the aforementioned force as a result of the interbreeding of certain Hellenes castigated in theMenexene (10).

The economic and social crisis of the end of the seventh century created the conditions for the emergence of a typology of slave and free man and for the emergence of a concept of political freedom. The small farmer used to face economic difficulties that meant he had to borrow from wealthy landowners. “Since the farmer's land was inalienable, he could not pawn it for the loan; something else had to be found. In this case it was his own person and his family who guaranteed the loan. When he was unable to repay the loan the creditor seized the pledge and the farmer and his family were reduced to a state of servitude” (11). The increased availability of imported slaves, combined with other factors, such as the heavy impact on cereals of cheaper cereals grown by slaves in the colonies and exported to Attica – the same causes always producing the same effects in the economic realm – only made matters worse for him. A stage was reached when a large and growing number of small farmers lost their economic freedom and, consequently, were on the verge of losing their civic freedom. Solon outlawed debt bondage, enacted an amnesty law, banned loans secured by the person of the debtor, and restored economic and civic freedom to enslaved or enslaved farmers. The damage was however done: were on the verge of losing their civic freedom. Solon outlawed debt bondage, enacted an amnesty law, banned loans secured by the person of the debtor, and restored economic and civic freedom to enslaved or enslaved farmers. The damage was however done: were on the verge of losing their civic freedom. Solon outlawed debt bondage, enacted an amnesty law, banned loans secured by the person of the debtor, and restored economic and civic freedom to enslaved or enslaved farmers. The damage was however done:eleuthéria , along with doulé , were de facto imbued with political office. “The consequences for a whole community of loss of freedom in various forms were experienced in a context other than war and not primarily in relation to women and children; freedom (in the form of the freeman status of the citizen) was recognized as a fundamental prerequisite for the well-being of the polis ; citizens forged bonds of solidarity that went far beyond the immediate victims of social abuse and took responsibility for individual freedom so that the whole community could survive and prosper. For the first time the meaning of freedom was understood in its political implications and awareness of its value became widespread. » (12)

The freedom of the individual, as we have seen, was linked to eleutheria and, more importantly in the eyes of the politês , to autonomia (to have one's own laws, to have the power to live and to be governed by its own laws) of the polis . The loss of autonomia , or the threat of losing it, could only impinge on how eleutheria was perceived in the community and make it more important. The Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes in the early fifth century, as recounted by Herodotus, were certainly crucial to the development of the idea of ​​eleutheria along a political line. in the stories, “freedom becomes more than a political fact; it is a value that characterizes the Greeks and distinguishes them from their adversaries. (13) However, it was perceived and lived strictly as a community fact and rightly so, because, in times of war, in any political entity, the question of freedom within it tends to be relegated to a lower priority. to that of its freedom: “Herodotus […] deliberately depicted the Greek war as a war of liberation. He repeatedly uses the terms "freedom" and "servitude", while the traditional notions of glory and arete, much more applicable to individuals, appear less and less. (14) An indication of the growing perception of freedom as a value and its conceptualization is provided by his statement that the Greeks were able to achieve victory over the superior power of the barbarians because "they love freedom ".

In Thucydides, if eleutheria is still used "as an indication of a person's personal status, such as the status of a free person, as opposed to that of a slave or a helot", and as "a description of personal freedom of action in daily life", its main meaning, in this context, is unsurprisingly that of "the freedom of a community from foreign authority, and of Greece's freedom from oppression by the Persians. » (15)

It was not long before the desire for freedom which had led the Greek city-states to form an alliance against foreign domination at the end of the Persian Wars turned against them, developed in internal affairs and exerted an effective influence. on the relationship between the individual and the city-state. Liberty was invested with such importance, such value, in internal affairs, that it became, with equality, the second pillar of democracy. E leutheria developed into a concept as the opposition between freeman and slave came to be used metaphorically in political discourse: " Eleutheriawas regularly invoked as a fundamental democratic ideal in debates between democracy and tyranny. The opposite of this form of eleutheria was to be enslaved in a metaphorical sense, that is, to be subject to a despotic ruler. The concepts of freedom and slavery are transposed from the microcosm of the domicile ( oikia ) to the macrocosm of the city-state ( polis ) and used in a metaphorical sense. » (16)

By the end of the fifth century, eleutheria had thus become a concept in three different contexts. In a social sense, eleuthero meant to be free as opposed to being a slave. In a political sense, eleutheroes took on the meaning of "being self-sufficient as opposed to being dominated by others", as exemplified by the call for the freedom struggle of all city-states against the barbarians in the Persian Wars. and, later, by the appeal of Demosthenes to defend it from Macedonian domination. “As a constitutional concept, however, eleutheria was associated with both political participation in the public realm and personal liberty in the private realm. (17) If the eleutheriawas obviously highly praised as a social and political concept by oligarchies and democracies, the aspect of eleutheria that was rejected by oligarchs and monarchs was the constitutional aspect, one that relates not to foreign policy of the polis but to its internal politics. Furthermore, the fact that monarchies and oligarchies emphasized the freedom of the polis while the ultima ratio of democracies seems to have been freedom in the polis , is immensely suggestive.

The second major problem with Athenian democracy from an aristocratic point of view is not really that it was a political system based on majority rule since the democratic body of citizens consisted only of the adult males of Athenian origin (18), i.e. from a very small minority of the population, a criterion which, if applied to the modern democracies of our continent, would result in the ineligibility of masses of politicos currently in office and in exclusion from political institutions, from the whole political sphere, from the most sincere apologists of this political system and of the so-called "freedom of expression". The problem lies in the idealization of the concept of freedom: "as a democratic ideal the eleutheria(in the sense of personal freedom) applied not only to citizens but also to metics and sometimes even to slaves. Thus a slave, who in the social sphere was deprived of eleutheria , could very well, in a polisdemocratic, to be entitled to a share, for example, of freedom of expression, even if only in private and obviously not in political assemblies” (19) – this point cannot be overemphasized. It is only a step further to affirm that "freedom began its career as a social value in the slave's desperate desire to deny what, for him or her, and for those who 'were not slaves, was a particularly inhuman condition", that, to be more precise, "freedom began its long journey in Western consciousness as a woman's value" (20), provided one did not lose of the fact that this degenerative process began at a period of Greek culture later than the one we are dealing with here, when the relatively small number of slaves and their effective integration into theoikos prevented them from developing a socially oriented "group consciousness", and the patriarchy was still intact.

Generally speaking, the rise of democracy has fostered an increased interest in the “individual” in more ways than one, with each concept coming to be interpreted in a subjective and relativistic way (21). With Protagoras' statement that “man is the measure of all things,” the figure of the naturally free and selfish individual came onto the historical scene. This spirit of individualism pitted the sophists against the objectivism of traditional conceptions of physis and nomos . Traditionally, nomos is the divine economy of Zeus according to which human justice must be modeled (22); from Hesiod to pseudo-Demosthenes an unbroken series of authors affirm that the nomosis the will of Zeus, in accordance, as Revolt Against the Modern World rightly points out , with the transcendental realism on which the notion of law ( rta ) is based. In early Greek culture, “ nomoi and physis were one and the same. Legal authority did not ultimately rest with a pyramidal hierarchy of officials in a city-state or a similar hierarchy of gods and goddesses from the afterlife. The nomos – physis binarywas not necessary as an explanatory or supporting tool. The laws seemed to control everything. They weren't written in scripts like Solon's Code. The unwritten laws didn't even identify with a custom author or source. Not being written and authorless, the laws could not be traced back to a higher authority. Indeed, legal authority did not rest on an origin or an archesanctioning which could be traced back to conventions. Nor were they reflective when applied. And yet, unwritten laws were believed to bind both gods and tribesmen. The constraints seemed natural, universal, eternal and uncontrollable. No mortal could ignore or override the universal spirits beyond. (23) Traditional man "ignored or considered absurd the idea that one could speak of laws and the obedience due to them if the laws in question had simply a human origin, whether individual or collective. Any law, in order to be considered objective, had to have a "divine" character. Once the "divine" character of a law had been sanctioned and its origin attributed to a non-human tradition, then its authority became absolute; this law then became something ineffable, inflexible, immutable and was beyond all criticism. » (24)

Later, the term nomos took on a political meaning in the context of the polis . It was conceived as an embodiment of the polis and an absolute prerequisite for its existence (“where the laws have no authority there is no constitution.” ( Pol . IV.4 1292a32-33) ) It meant "everything assigned", "custom", "usage", "law", "order made by authority", "rule" as an authoritative and prescriptive guideline for moral and legal conduct , "convention" and, as the transcendent ground of the nomos grew darker and the nomoscame to be understood in a legal and rationalistic sense, this “convention”, now seen as based only on human criteria, was destined to be questioned, contested and fought against. “The people of society agreed to be governed by certain rules. The only sanction of such rules is that they had to be approved by the citizens and could be changed at will. This conception of the law became possible from the second half of the fifth century BC. AD due to pre-Socratic philosophers or physiologoi .

The physiologoi had secularized the universe and everything in it. They had removed from the cosmic scene the Homeric gods and their allied divine forces. The world as a whole was physis and there was in physisno place for the gods. Second, the universe did not owe its existence to divine intervention. The first attempts of some of the pre-Socratics like Thales or Anaximenes to find a universal substance from which everything in the universe would come evolved into the explanation, as Heraclitus tried for example to do, of the invariable principles which governed the functioning of the universe. Common to these speculative thinkers was the assumption that everything that took place in the universe was an interaction between its parts that had the same physisor nature. Anaxagoras attempted to propose the mind or an intelligent principle as the basis of the functioning of the universe, but he reduced such a principle to a mechanical operation immanent in the world. The order of the universe was imposed by physis itself and did not come from a source outside of it.

Attempts by some early pre-Socratics like Heraclitus and Anaximander to find common principles that would apply both to the physical world and to the moral and political world of man were abandoned by later atomist philosophers. Democritus and Leucippus, who removed from physis any relation to human values. Values ​​could only be human and approved by a convention of men. Democritus affirmed the separation of nomos and physis : “Sweet and bitter, hot and cold, are so by convention [ nomos ]; color is by convention: truth lies in atoms and emptiness. » » (25) The distinction between nomos andphysiswill govern the development of Greek political thought and, consequently, of Greek thought about freedom from the second half of the fifth century. Whether it was first established by Hippocrates of Kos (“Peri aeron, hydaton, kai topon” [“airs, waters and places”] (26)) or by Archelaus, the physicist and Ionian teacher of Socrates, this It is no coincidence that this distinction incubates the "mixing of cultures" that took place during the Peloponnesian Wars, of which these physicists were contemporaries and which saw a profound change in economic circumstances. “The increasing complexity of life in the Greek city-states created a demand for technical knowledge due to the growth of business, manufacturing and trade. Political leaders needed to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to deal effectively with the economic, social and political problems resulting from the increase in all its forms of commercial activity. (27) A group of itinerant professional teachers were able to meet such needs, as long as their fees could be paid: the sophists.

Despite their lack of interest in scientific ideas and pursuits, they came to rely heavily on pre-Socratic philosophy for both form and content. “They consciously attempted to apply the methods of abstract thought which had been developed by the speculative philosophers in order to explain the physical universe to the practical questions of public and private life. And that quickly led to a series of crucial questions about the origins and legitimacy of law and morality. (28) Not all sophists supported physis versus nomos as the primary source of human law, customs, and mores. All the sophists who upheld the primacy of physisdid not go as far as Antiphon in asserting that there is no natural basis for distinguishing high and low birth or different races, "since by nature we are all made to be alike in all respects, whether that either the barbarians or the Greeks. (29) “This does not mean, however, that the majority of sophistic ideas about politics, religion, or morality were traditional or conservative. Nor does it mean that their doctrines were not fundamentally shaped in response to the doctrines of Socratic natural philosophy. Nomos sophistsdiffered from traditionalists largely in that they could not accept the notion that conventions were divinely inspired and sanctioned. They developed a new notion of the importance of convention in human affairs.

The framework for new sophist discussions about the meaning of human conventions grew out of questions raised by pre-Socratic philosophers about the possibility of knowing or learning the nature of the universe. Science is a search for universally valid knowledge and the notion of validity implies certain criteria, either to verify the conformity of our knowledge in relation to the reality that it claims to illuminate, or to judge the “truth” of our knowledge. The question of validity never arose […] at least in a conscious and explicit way […] in relation to the traditional religious and mythopoetic understanding of the world. The relevance of a traditional myth was established by its very survival, and mutually contradictory mythopoietic accounts of any given social phenomenon or practice seemed to be tolerated without generating overt embarrassment. The idea of ​​establishing certain criteria for judging the validity of knowledge was, however, a critical problem for the pre-Socratics. And from the outset it led in two closely related but distinct directions. " (30)

According to Democritus, who was the first to explore the second, our knowledge of the world comes from sensory experience. “That the experiences of all men should largely be the same (ie, universal) follows from the fact that we are similarly constituted and are all affected by the same events. These events give rise to sensations when the atoms of external objects interact with the atoms that make up human beings, and we simply agree to call certain kinds of sensations by certain names. But it is possible for a variety of reasons […] for different individuals to experience the same real events somewhat differently. So, although sensory evidence underlies our knowledge of reality, there is no strict correlation between real events and our perceptions of them. A context-determined variability is superimposed on the basic regularity of experience. (31) It was Democritus' emphasis on the possibility of subjective sensory states that the sophists retained in developing their basic moral and political arguments. Archelaus, a pupil of the naturalist philosopher Anaxagoras before becoming the teacher of Socrates, and a man credited with marking a turning point in Greek philosophy from the subject of nature to the subject of man, stepped into the breach, arguing that " If hot and cold, sweet and bitter, have no real existence, but are due only to our momentary disposition, must we not assume that the just and the unjust, the good and evil, have an equally subjective and unreal existence? […] Some primitive arts, such as medicine and agriculture, only assist the forces of nature and can have great power. But political art and legislation are far removed from nature. They are artificial, like the gods, they differ from place to place according to local customs. Because gods and laws exist by convention and artifice, justice has nothing to do with nature but owes its existence entirely to design. And if justice is just an artificial human creation then it is subject to change whenever humans choose to recreate it. » (32) only assist the forces of nature and can have significant power. But political art and legislation are far removed from nature. They are artificial, like the gods, they differ from place to place according to local customs. Because gods and laws exist by convention and artifice, justice has nothing to do with nature but owes its existence entirely to design. And if justice is just an artificial human creation then it is subject to change whenever humans choose to recreate it. » (32) only assist the forces of nature and can have significant power. But political art and legislation are far removed from nature. They are artificial, like the gods, they differ from place to place according to local customs. Because gods and laws exist by convention and artifice, justice has nothing to do with nature but owes its existence entirely to design. And if justice is just an artificial human creation then it is subject to change whenever humans choose to recreate it. » (32) Because gods and laws exist by convention and artifice, justice has nothing to do with nature but owes its existence entirely to design. And if justice is just an artificial human creation then it is subject to change whenever humans choose to recreate it. » (32) Because gods and laws exist by convention and artifice, justice has nothing to do with nature but owes its existence entirely to design. And if justice is just an artificial human creation then it is subject to change whenever humans choose to recreate it. » (32)

Thus, “in place of the old conceptions, the sophists introduced an opposition between physis and nomos which was their own. On the one hand, laws were dismissed as artificial human creations that had no objective basis in justice. On the other hand, nature was reduced to the free play of human passions and instincts. In its most radical form, the sophists asserted that nomos was an artificial and unjustifiable check on the natural operations of physis . The real task of the legal philosopher was to liberate physisof these contingent constraints. (33) 'Nature' was praised as 'free being', as opposed to the 'constraints of law'. This view was expressed in its most radical form by Callicles, the individual credited with coining the term "natural law."

Under the influence of the sophists, or at least certain sophists, not only did physis become the measure of all that was ethical and nomos was reduced to a body of merely arbitrary conventions, but the very terms of physis and nomos also came to be used in an entirely different sense from that traditionally attributed to them. What was conceived as one and immutable, in that it was attributed to the gods, was physis and no longer nomos , henceforth thought to be valid only among certain groups and people on the basis of the emphasis on the mutability of customs.

This opposition did not remain "wisely" in the realm of philosophical speculation and science, but was quickly used to justify attacks on tradition in the ethical and political realms. The relativity promoted by the sophists on the ontological level was logically reflected in their ethical and political conceptions.

Ethically, the presumption of the primacy of nature led to "reinforcing in nature the power of self-assertion and the dominance of the passions", to declaring that one should give free rein to natural instincts. "Any citizen can justify conduct on the basis of what he deems to be his own physis , that is, his own interest, or legitimize his struggle for another nomos which, while equally relative, is more advantageous to him. (34) The revolutionary import of this sophistic analysis of the law did not escape the attention of the commentators of Antiphon nor of Plato (35).

Politically, it served to discredit the sovereignty of the politês and, more generally, to question the laws of the state; freedom no longer came to be regarded as a political status enjoyed exclusively by freeborn citizens possessing the right and duty to participate in the life of the state and thus eligible for public office, but as a natural quality possessed by all human beings without distinction of race, sex and social and economic condition. The sophist Alcidamas declared that “God made all men free; nature has made no one a slave. (Aristotle, Rhet. 1373b 18) “And it was no mere school declamation; it was part of a vibrant appeal to all Hellenes in favor of the Messenian helots then fighting for their freedom against the Spartan power. (36) Because of the subjectivist implications of sophist moral relativism which held that all legal distinctions between individuals were purely arbitrary, that nomos, the law itself, was purely artificial, the idea that all human beings were entitled to rights quickly germinated and, one thing leading to another, to the same rights (37). "Lycophron called for the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy, Alcidamas undertook to abolish slavery, Phales demanded equality as to property and education for all citizens, and Hippodamos was the first to outline the contours of an ideal political regime. The sophists even used the opposition between physis and thesis to formulate a demand for political equality between men and women. » (38)

The ethical and political implications of sophistic philosophy were the logical result of its theoretical principle that "the individual Ego can arbitrarily determine what is true, just and good" and that since "all thought rests solely on the apprehensions of the senses and on the subjective impression […] we therefore have no other norm of action than utility for the individual. (39) This was not all: if the sophism was a protest against the present state of things, against the nomos , there existed a law to which the sophist had to submit unconditionally: that "which any human being can discover by a persevering examination of himself. » (40)

“For Aristotle and his contemporaries, perception was essentially a cognitive process apprehending the forms of sensitive objects without matter. Such apprehension of external objects was considered direct, consciousness as consciousness of the objectively real character of things. The conception of a perceiving mind as such was foreign to their modes of thought […] During the earlier period, therefore, the mind was studied in its manifestations in nature and society; in late ancient speculation, investigation was based primarily on introspection and analysis of the mental operations of the individual thinker. (41) Subsequently, “the sophist discovered that the world was himself and therefore all research had a personal purpose. Doubting any positive knowledge of the natural world, he turned to life in society, which was more understandable. For the first time there appeared an attempt to study the mind, which was developed by Socrates. Thus the sophists, from an individualist point of view, and Socrates and his followers, from a universalist point of view, studied the human mind in its social aspect. » (42)

It remained for the cynics to push further the sophistic view of “nature” and “freedom” along this subjectivist orientation.

For the cynics, "nature" clearly meant the functions, processes and sensations which constitute the life of man. He must come to terms with them.

The indications of the senses and of instinct were the sure expression of nature, convincing and irrefutable; in accordance with them, virtue and the will would be exercised naturally and would come to the full and entire realization of themselves. The only sufficient path to happiness lies in obedience to the primary mandates of nature, as expressed by the impulses of appetite, function, and natural propensity, and satisfied by the inner self-gratification of willingness. Focused on these, the sage would refuse to involve himself in disturbing sensitivities or in any unwarranted distraction of thought or affect or outward deference or obligation. Praise, reproaches and the whole range of social sanctions would be foreign to the very nature of man and should not undermine the unconditional self-assertion and self-control essential to moral independence. Even less importance can be given to external appendages such as wealth, rank, costume, reputation or environment. These things are not to be decried as in themselves harmful or undesirable or to be regarded as temptations which the sage must avoid by virtue of his profession; they belong strictly to the same category as their opposites, poverty or misery or abjection. Inner satisfaction is to ignore and not to mortify desire. » (43) essential to moral independence. Even less importance can be given to external appendages such as wealth, rank, costume, reputation or environment. These things are not to be decried as in themselves harmful or undesirable or to be regarded as temptations which the sage must avoid by virtue of his profession; they belong strictly to the same category as their opposites, poverty or misery or abjection. Inner satisfaction is to ignore and not to mortify desire. » (43) essential to moral independence. Even less importance can be given to external appendages such as wealth, rank, costume, reputation or environment. These things are not to be decried as in themselves harmful or undesirable or to be regarded as temptations which the sage must avoid by virtue of his profession; they belong strictly to the same category as their opposites, poverty or misery or abjection. Inner satisfaction is to ignore and not to mortify desire. » (43) These things are not to be decried as in themselves harmful or undesirable or to be regarded as temptations which the sage must avoid by virtue of his profession; they belong strictly to the same category as their opposites, poverty or misery or abjection. Inner satisfaction is to ignore and not to mortify desire. » (43) These things are not to be decried as in themselves harmful or undesirable or to be regarded as temptations which the sage must avoid by virtue of his profession; they belong strictly to the same category as their opposites, poverty or misery or abjection. Inner satisfaction is to ignore and not to mortify desire. » (43)

This general picture of the cynical conception of "nature" already suggests how ill-advised it is to draw parallels between the cynical approach to freedom and that of J. Evola, except that the accent is put on autarkeïa at home. In fact, autarkeïacynical and that of J. Evola are diametrically opposed. Indeed, for the supporters of Diogenes, achieving sufficiency only requires a return to the natural state. “The cynics held that animals are superior to men in certain respects since they were independent of footwear, clothing, habitats and the particular preparation of their food and that they were worthy of imitation in these respects in the as far as men were able. (44) They took the dog as their model, not "the guard dog, the domestic dog, or the hunting dog, but the homeless, ownerless stray dog." (45) The wandering dog without an owner was free and was therefore considered worthy of emulation in their quest for freedom and happiness. Whether the Cynics sought happiness through freedom or freedom through happiness is not completely clear from primary sources and is still the subject of debate among commentators. In the first case, cynical freedom would not be purely negative: "freedom from" things, "from desires, fear, anger, reproaches, unhappiness and other emotions, from religious control or morals, of the authority of a city or state or of officials, of consideration for public opinion and to care for property, confinement to any locality and the care and support women and children” (46), marriage (Pseud. Diog.,Epist . 47, 1-6, in M. Billerbeck, Epiktet. Von Kynismus , Brill, Leiden, 1978, p. 131) and even of procreation (47), would have an object: happiness.

Cynicism is a form of eudaemonism and, as such, an immanent ethics. But one must respond with disbelief to “those who point out 'the way to happiness' in order to make man follow a certain course of action”: “But what does happiness matter to us? » » (48). On the other hand, "the philosophical concern with freedom as the good of the soul of the individual rather than of the body", "of the freedom of the individual and his spirit apart from government and society", (49) which contributed enormously to the rise of individualism and humanism, is radically opposed to real freedom, which resides only in "the superiority [of man] over his own individuality" (50 ), while unconditional authority was given by the cynics to the criterion of individual experience and will.

Moreover, the cynical conception and practice of askesis , the cornerstone of this movement, in that it is supposed to lead to sufficiency and freedom, bears only the most superficial and peripheral resemblance to the “Doctrine of Awakening”. The cynic is an ascetic "by compromise rather than by principle, a precaution and in a certain sense a confession of weakness rather than a council of perfection [...]" In order to recover "his true nature" the cynic is supposed to endure the ponoi (suffering), athloi (hardship) and many talaiporia (misery). “These words are especially associated with athletics, the Olympic Games and their mythical founder, Heracles. The twelve labors of Heracles wereathloi ; according to cynical and stoic allegory, he endured them for the good of mankind. He slew the Nemean lion with his bare hands, slaughtered the Stymphalian birds, and generally cleared the earth of monsters and criminals, so great was his philanthropy. It was all hard work, athlos . The related adjective athlos means "miserable" and "suffering", and an athlete ( athlétès ) is literally someone who suffers, either because he is training for competition or because he is taking part in competition. in the hot sand of the Games. Another word the cynics play on is ponos., meaning both “labor” and “suffering” (see D. Chr. 8.16; Epict. Ench. 29.6-7). The cynics played even more on this conception since they submitted themselves to ascetic "labors" in order to train themselves in a wise and natural life. These ponoiinvolve physical suffering: rolling in hot sand, kissing snow-covered statues, walking barefoot in snow, and enduring summer heat, winter cold, uncomfortable beds, and little food. Their works also include exercises of deception and psychological suffering. (51) Even if cynical asceticism can be described as "a joyous and hedonistic asceticism, which does not deny the world", since the cynics "paradoxically welcomed suffering as a necessary condition of elementary pleasure" and "that the askesismade them real hedonists, to such an extent that they could even take pleasure in the sufferings they chose for themselves: "the contempt of pleasure is the greatest pleasure" (DL 6.71)" (52), this n t is certainly no coincidence that such a great connoisseur of Christian asceticism as Origen singles out “Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates as champions of pagan asceticism and links them to the Hebrew prophets; even more radically, he implicitly compares them to Christ” ( C. Cels . 2.41, 7.7; cf. 6.28). » (53)

The widespread view that cynicism was a way of life rather than a doctrine calls for some nuance. Among the later cynics kaprepia(endurance) came to mean the ability to endure the hardships inherent in the cynical way of life. In relation to poverty, another of the cardinal virtues of Cynic ethics, “the avoidance of money seems to have been a theory and a tradition among later Cynics rather than an actual practice. Cynical expressions regarding pleasure are inconsistent: Crates of Thebes, a pupil of Diogenes, “held that the pursuit of pleasure was a form of slavery and should be avoided. The cynics held this idea in theory but did not always put it into practice. But the idea that pleasures had a place in the cynical way of life spread and this probably facilitated the acquisition of new converts. " Ultimately, parrhèsia was a political prerogative at the time: it granted all citizens the right to express their opinions in public assemblies. When cynics, many of whom were wanderers or exiles, claimed parrhesia , they brazenly appropriated and transformed the notion. They transformed parrhesia , previously the state-sanctioned privilege of the few, into the prerogative, even the duty, of all human beings, and they expanded the concept to mean not only the right to express oneself in public on matters concerning the polisbut also the right to express what one thinks in all circumstances, on private as well as public matters, whether one has been formally invited to do so or not. » (54)

The main importance of this school lies in the fact that it was the first to completely abandon the ideal of the city-state […] The theoretical basis of Cynic philosophy is the presumption that the sage, of whom Socrates is supposed to be the type, is completely self-sufficient. Only that which is fully in his power, that is, the world of his own thought and character, can be necessary for a happy life. Everything short of moral character is indifferent, and in this wide circle of indifference the cynic includes not only the conveniences and even the proprieties of life, but also property and marriage, family and citizenship, education and good reputation, and all the practices and conventions and pieties of civilization. For the wise is governed by the law of virtue and not by the law of any city. He will not even desire the independence of his native city. It follows that for the cynic the only true social relationship is that which exists between sages, and since wisdom is by nature universal, the relationship has nothing to do with the local boundaries of earthly cities. All the sages of the whole world form a single community, the city of the world, which is the only true state. For the sage no local custom is foreign or strange because he is a citizen of the world. It stands out as intrinsically superior to any conventional and customary stratification of society […] All of the usual distinctions of Greek social life could thus be subjected to destructive criticism. Rich and poor, Greek and barbarian, citizen and foreigner, free man and slave, that of high birth and that of low birth are suddenly reduced to a common level. »

“In the Cynic school we thus see the first appearance of cosmopolitanism, and it is not without reason that the men of antiquity perceived a link between this philosophy and the rise of the Macedonian empire. Nevertheless, there was little positively significant about the Cynics' cosmopolitanism. » (55) « The politeiacynical, the cynical "state" is nothing but a moral "state": that is, the "state" of being a cynic. (56) Cosmopolitanism was engendered by the intellectualization and psychologization of personal freedom: “By withdrawing into himself, the philosopher rejects the constraints of institutions previously thought to shape the character of the citizen. Rather than protecting freedom as an essential value for political participation, the cynics sought to defend freedom from the political sphere, which they saw as an external constraint imposed on naturally free human beings […] Freedom that they seek to protect is universal; it is considered the greatest of goods to be protected against the particular demands of political institutions.

The cosmopolitanism of the Cynics was “a leveling attack on the city-state and all its typical social institutions. It was aimed not so much at the establishment of a new social principle as at the destruction of all civic ties and the abolition of all social restrictions. It aimed to return to nature in a sense that makes nature the negation of civilization. The cynical, dirty, mocking, contemptuous, shameless, rude philosopher is the prime example of the philosophical proletarian. » (58)

Cynics did much to pave the way for Christianity "by destroying respect for existing religions, ignoring distinctions of race and nationality, and instituting an order of wandering preachers claiming exceptional freedom of expression." Tertullian says that early Christian preachers adopted the cynic's cloak ( De Pallio 6) and Augustine mentions the staff or cane as the only distinguishing feature of cynics ( De Civitate Dei 14, 20). Julien mentions the similarity of the methods of cynics and Christians in their public speeches and their collections of contributions (7, 224). Lucian describes the cooperation between Cynics and Christians ( Peregrinus). The early Christians worked side by side with the Cynics for three hundred years and were to some extent influenced by them. We are not aware of any early Christian art, music, literature or science. The first priestly Christian orders accepted celibacy and poverty as virtues. The Dominicans explained their denomination by saying that they were Domini canes (dogs of God). » (59)

"Diogenes became a Stoic hero, playing the role in their literature of a wise model" (60), even if, to use a most fortunate expression, it was Diogenes without the barrel. For Juvénal, the only distinction between Cynics and Stoics lies in the coat they wear. The Stoic doctrines contained little that had not been taught by his predecessors: the self-sufficiency of virtue, the identification of virtue with knowledge, the unconditional supremacy of the moral will in the determination of life, the independence and responsibility of the individual as a unit of morality, the distinction between good, bad and indifferent things, the ideal portrait of the wise, the total withdrawal from the external world into the enclosure of the mind and the strength of a moral will,

The personal touch which they added to the preceding “Greek” philosophical schools was, however, decisive in their success.

“Aristotle perceived the world as a system of specific forms; these complete organisms could be explained by studying the parts in relation to the whole, as means to an end. Thus his study of the soul was a biological treatise in which development, the transition from potentiality to actuality, was the keynote. The underlying motive was the desire to expose the universal form in the empirical data of nature and life since the universal potentially exists in the concrete.

Aristotle's problem was determined by his epistemological position (based on the Socratic concept and the Platonic mediation between ideas and particulars) that universals are the only objects of scientific knowledge and that concrete particulars, reality in the sense strict, are presented in sensory perception. No regulative principle was therefore required or provided; and its search became the dominant problem of post-Aristotelian philosophy.

Rejecting the Aristotelian conception of transcendence, the Stoics developed the other side of latent dualism, the vision of the world as organism, by adopting the Heraclitean notion of primordial, eternal, divine fire, endowed with thought and will. All existing things partake of this divine substance which appears as a hold or bond of union in inorganic matter, as a vital principle in plants, as an irrational soul in animals and as a rational soul in man. With significant contrasts in ethics Aristotle's ideal was carried to its logical conclusion; but a new spirit was introduced with the doctrine of universal law and still more with the ever greater emphasis on the will, on self-determination, which implied a practical rather than a theoretical standard of living. The concrete was the object of study, but not so much the individual in general as the person in particular. The introduction of assent or recognition into the cognitive process by Zeno was the gateway to the subjective point of view. As the volitional attitude became fundamental in psychology and in epistemology, the need for a norm imposed itself. It is possible to trace back to ancient Stoicism the growing emphasis on assent as fundamental to knowledge and growing skill in psychological analysis, while the criterion of truth remained distinctly objective. The problems thus raised were therefore bequeathed to average stoicism; the emphasis was then placed on attention and the necessity of reason in all forms of knowledge was recognized. In late Stoicism judgment, interpretation, "advice" became all that mattered. The relationship between the universal and the particular, the abstract and the concrete, remained a thorny problem while the tendency was always towards the subjective interpretation of the universal. Thus, when the individual as such asserted itself, the will began to be treated as a specific function, just as Aristotle, contrary to Plato, had distinguished activity from the other functions of the soul; the more analytical point of view tended towards a transformation of the philosophical attitude. » (62) remained a thorny problem while the tendency was still towards the subjective interpretation of the universal. Thus, when the individual as such asserted itself, the will began to be treated as a specific function, just as Aristotle, contrary to Plato, had distinguished activity from the other functions of the soul; the more analytical point of view tended towards a transformation of the philosophical attitude. » (62) remained a thorny problem while the tendency was still towards the subjective interpretation of the universal. Thus, when the individual as such asserted itself, the will began to be treated as a specific function, just as Aristotle, contrary to Plato, had distinguished activity from the other functions of the soul; the more analytical point of view tended towards a transformation of the philosophical attitude. » (62)

For Zénon de Cition, the founder of Stoicism, ethics was the pinnacle of philosophy; the study of human nature in its individual and social aspects was thus fundamental. In addition, his physical is eminently psychological. It operates on the assumptions that “(1) the whole universe is governed by the providence of God. This providence is the activity of his Reason, his Logos, which expresses itself in the world as the Law of Nature. (2) Man is the only creature in the world who has been endowed with reason by God, and this is a bond between God and man […] The “highest reason” is simply the Logos at work in nature; but there is the necessary implication that the Logos is a moral force, at least in its subjective aspect, in the minds of men. (63) While for Cleanthes, Zeno's successor as a scholar of the Stoic school of Athens, nature was used as an objective factor character and that emphasis was placed on the unification of macrocosm and microcosm and the accord of nature and of universal law, the main focus of Chrysippus, his pupil, was in human nature, harmony and rational control of thought and action and, in general, "virtue". “In middle Stoicism the introspective attitude came to be distinctly recognized and employed. The difficulties which arise from the objective criterion and the increasing emphasis on assent led these philosophers to find a solution in a subjective point of view […] Panetius argued that knowledge and morality must be based on the logos common to all. all men and that differences of opinion are due to the specific character of individual reason […] This insistence on the universality implied by rational thought as opposed to the individualistic point of view of the skeptics combined with the just recognition of differences Individuals signaled the adoption of a subjective point of view. This attitude is also manifest in the Platonic conception of the soul supported by Posidonius [of Apamea, in Syria]. Because the difference in point of view is significant: no explanation is required, says the Stoic, introspection is the only verification necessary. The transition from social psychology to introspective psychology had been definitely accomplished. (64) "While in middle Stoicism the introspective analysis was mainly concerned with the problem of knowledge, in Roman Stoicism as inaugurated by Cicero and continued by Seneca it was in ethics that the subjective attitude developed […] In regard to the transition from the teleological to the legal point of view of morality and from an external standard to an internal standard in which stoicism played the main role, Cicero is of great importance in the history of ethics. His belief in the importance of the state and the duty of citizenship is clearly on display; but in his strictly ethical works the individualistic point of view is predominant. » (65)

Seneca made further progress towards a subjective point of view by defining “reason primarily in individual terms, as human nature and not as part of a rational cosmos; this is what is called identity today: “animum intuere, qualis quantusque sit” (76.32). The self in its rational examination of itself (“se ​​sibi adplicere”), in the use of its own rational resources to manage its relation to the world in the fulfillment of its own nature, achieves its own gaudium. (66) He gave ethics an introspective aspect by associating moral progress with self-knowledge, confession of faults and examination of conscience. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius put even more emphasis on self-awareness, the first from an individual point of view, the second from a universalist point of view. “Epictetus' emphasis on reflective consciousness culminates in the self-awareness implied by his doctrine of the daemon, the divine element in man, reason as the better self, consciousness. For Posidonius the daemon had been the objective, unchangeable, divine nature of man; for these late Stoics the daemon was subject to change for better or for worse as an explanation of the reality of sin. In Epictetus the feeling of the high destiny and the value of man is intense, the close bond with God is vital. The inner consciousness of the divine is the dearest and most certain fact of experience. Godlikeness is moral rather than intellectual; with regard to the will the resemblance is perfect. (67) According to this moral point of view, the center of the moral life is identified not so much with apprehension and knowledge as with feeling and will. The good of man is the will, and progress consists in the exercise and improvement of the will. The inner self is the object of all analysis in the with regard to the will the resemblance is perfect. (67) According to this moral point of view, the center of the moral life is identified not so much with apprehension and knowledge as with feeling and will. The good of man is the will, and progress consists in the exercise and improvement of the will. The inner self is the object of all analysis in the with regard to the will the resemblance is perfect. (67) According to this moral point of view, the center of the moral life is identified not so much with apprehension and knowledge as with feeling and will. The good of man is the will, and progress consists in the exercise and improvement of the will. The inner self is the object of all analysis in theMeditations . “In this me the immanence of the God who resides there appears in broad daylight. (68) “The brotherhood of man with all mankind is not by blood or physical descent but by community of spirit; and the spirit of every man is God, an inflow of deity. In social relations all considerations must be directed towards the inner self of man. Civil obligation was thus replaced by cosmic obligation; citizenship became world citizenship in the City of God. This conception came to include the whole range of social duties and activities and because of the position of the emperor was invested with a new conviction and reality. In the hands of the great jurists the lex naturae was being formulated asnatural law, which Stoic influences helped secure as the moral foundation of the imperial law code. Cosmopolitanism thus became the self-awareness of Rome's mission. The overly exclusive emphasis on reason and the intolerance that result from purely individualistic morality were ameliorated by the recognition of the social bond. Although Stoicism from the beginning insisted on the interiority of morality and therefore on disposition and motivation, initially simple consistency with oneself satisfied the requirement of conformity to nature. Such self-centered selfishness has proven to be a failure in the relationship of the individual to society. Hence gradually, as the focus on motivation and self-awareness grew, the social perspective widened so that the individual risked being absorbed by the cosmic world. It was in the tension of this conflict that the subjective point of view developed. For this conception of a cosmic order, of a cosmic norm, of a cosmic interrelation and of a cosmic duty was based on self-consciousness. It was “in the small realm of the self” that Marcus Aurelius found the foundation of all reality” (69), the foundation of right conduct.

“From its beginnings and throughout its history, Stoicism insisted on this interaction of the human and the divine, of the individual and the whole. All speculation must start from human things and progress continually towards the divine and universal principle of existence. That the theoretical cannot be separated from the practical was a Stoic maxim. Zeno's material monism included everything […] that was inorganic, organic, thought, feeling, will, man and God […] in the category of matter; hence metaphysical materialism. An equally universal rule was established for conduct. When philosophy sought a right canon of life, a formula to serve as a standard, "nature" which had been researched for centuries, found universal favor. » (70)

Much like Diogenes, the Stoics viewed philosophy as a way of life, as a practice ( askésis ) and adopted from the cynics various techniques such as apatheia and parrhesiabut rejected the animalistic aspects of these outrageous behaviors and provocative dialogues which were considered by cynics as necessary steps to lead a life “according to nature”; the nature the Stoics had in mind and wished to return to was different, however: “They turned to the ideal and refused to copy the habits of the lower animals or of primitive man. They thus arrived at the conception of a pure and noble individual, participating in the divine, and of a universal brotherhood of humanity and preached the need for the individual to consider himself a citizen of the world and fulfill his social duties. (71) "'The return to nature', far from implying a return to animality and the reduction of human needs to the level of those of beasts, proved to involve a fundamental differentiation of reasoning man from the unreason of the brute or the inertia of matter, in order to place man on a single spiritual plane and ultimately to raise him from isolation individual to conscious brotherhood with the species and to harmony of will with God [...] "Thus, for man, 'living according to nature' means 'the concordance of human actions with the law of nature, the conformity of the human will with the Divine Will, living according to the principle which is active in nature and which the human soul shares. The Stoics thus annulled the difference between nature and reason: to act according to reason and to act according to nature are identical, law and nature are united because law is the product of reason; Therefore, we are allowed to think in terms of natural law. The ethical end of the Stoic sage, hissummum bonum , is necessarily submission to the divinely established order of the universe. But we must now specify that man conforms his conduct to his own essential nature, reason. The two statements are in fact identical since the universe is governed by the law of nature. It is therefore evident that the universal law of nature is both the guiding principle of the cosmos and the goal and standard of man. With the Stoics it follows that there is no difference between the ethical fulfillment of the individual, the ethical fulfillment of the whole community of humanity […] and the rational law of nature. » (72)

Certainly, acting according to reason and acting according to nature are identical insofar as the correct use of reason makes it possible to grasp nature as a universal order. If a person does not use reason to guide his actions and follow nature, such a person is no better than an animal.

"One of the first effects of restoring reason to its 'natural' place was the reintroduction of the whole order of 'indifferent things' into the realm of morality. So long as virtue was only a just condition and an exercise of the will, acting on the promptings of instinct and the senses, no alternative was possible except acceptance or rejection; no intermediate way, no negotiation or suspension of decision could be allowed without admitting the fallibility of and renouncing the independent autocracy of the moral organ. But with the appearance of reason on the scene, with its power of discrimination, evaluation and, above all, of “suspension”, the position changed. Technically, indeed, the supremacy and independence of the will remained intact and its contempt for indifferent things was as unconditional and uncompromising as its rejection of undesirable things, but reason, despite everything, made concessions which the virtuous will could not admit; it established from its own point of view classifications and degrees of merit, it attached conditional values ​​and preferential claims to recognition, according to whether things tend to advance or retard life according to nature, and thus reduced the number of things strictly indifferent to a remnant which stood outside any determining relationship with the will and to which reason itself could not attribute such a secondary value, positive or negative. » (73) it established from its own point of view classifications and degrees of merit, it attached conditional values ​​and preferential claims to recognition, according to whether things tend to advance or retard life according to nature, and thus reduced the number of things strictly indifferent to a remnant which stood outside any determining relationship with the will and to which reason itself could not attribute such a secondary value, positive or negative. » (73) it established from its own point of view classifications and degrees of merit, it attached conditional values ​​and preferential claims to recognition, according to whether things tend to advance or retard life according to nature, and thus reduced the number of things strictly indifferent to a remnant which stood outside any determining relationship with the will and to which reason itself could not attribute such a secondary value, positive or negative. » (73) and thus reduced the number of strictly indifferent things to a remnant which stood outside of all determining relation to the will and to which reason itself could not attribute any such secondary value, positive or negative. » (73) and thus reduced the number of strictly indifferent things to a remnant which stood outside of all determining relation to the will and to which reason itself could not attribute any such secondary value, positive or negative. » (73)

"Through these stages Stoicism entirely altered the physiognomy of the 'wise'. Reason, once its place in nature vindicated and restored, tended to become the dominant partner in every exercise of the will. It alone could furnish criteria of self-conformity, interpret and direct the impulses of the senses; she alone could rightly oppose the reduction of needs and the abandonment of independence. She was thus on all sides necessary for right action, and held, in a way, the preponderant voice in the adjustments of nature to life. Control came to be seen as more important than initial impetus, and so the very essence of personality and "nature" was found to lie in the dominance of reason. It gradually usurped more than a simple directing power and claimed to settle the preliminary question of utility. She could deny assent to any line of motion and condemn any impulse or emotion to inertia. At this point the reversal of the initial position was complete. For "nature" in which reason had no place in the first place was now entirely at its mercy and could be cast aside as unauthorized and in conflict with the mandates of primary authority. Nature had become contrary to nature and therefore had to cease to be. The suppression of emotions ( At this point the reversal of the initial position was complete. For "nature" in which reason had no place in the first place was now entirely at its mercy and could be cast aside as unauthorized and in conflict with the mandates of primary authority. Nature had become contrary to nature and therefore had to cease to be. The suppression of emotions ( At this point the reversal of the initial position was complete. For "nature" in which reason had no place in the first place was now entirely at its mercy and could be cast aside as unauthorized and in conflict with the mandates of primary authority. Nature had become contrary to nature and therefore had to cease to be. The suppression of emotions (apathéia ) […] a self-determination distinct from the imperturbability ensured by the rejection of needs […] takes a cardinal place in the Stoic scheme of life. And so […] the idea of ​​personality […], of the ultimate unity of individual will and consciousness, of an Ego distinct from the physical organism and the environment […] ends up making its path in Greek thought […]” (74) and, even more importantly, reveals a deeper dualism new to “Greek” philosophy and, more generally, an antithesis previously unknown to Aryan peoples.

Indeed, “until then the accent had been placed on the physical and sensitive side of nature; the taking into account of reason and, consequently, the link that was established between reason and social relations changed the conception of the wise and of indifferent things. In the progressive clarification of the implications of pantheistic immanence and social brotherhood, the return to nature involved separation from brutes and inert matter and the passage from individual isolation to conscious brotherhood with human kind. and harmony of will with God. As long as feeling and instinct were the only judges, there could only be absolute rejection or absolute acceptance. When reason was placed above feeling and instinct, the result was a hierarchy of indifferent things according to their capacity to favor or hinder the life in conformity with reason. The result was the erasure, or at least an attempt to erasure, of emotions and the idea that nature, from which reason had been excluded, was subordinated precisely to reason. From the view that reason was sovereign gradually emerged the conception of personality as the ultimate unity of individual will and consciousness, distinct from the physical organism and environment; finally, late Stoicism establishes the final antithesis, not between thought and sensation, but between spirit and flesh. » from which reason had been excluded, was subordinated precisely to reason. From the view that reason was sovereign gradually emerged the conception of personality as the ultimate unity of individual will and consciousness, distinct from the physical organism and environment; finally, late Stoicism establishes the final antithesis, not between thought and sensation, but between spirit and flesh. » from which reason had been excluded, was subordinated precisely to reason. From the view that reason was sovereign gradually emerged the conception of personality as the ultimate unity of individual will and consciousness, distinct from the physical organism and environment; finally, late Stoicism establishes the final antithesis, not between thought and sensation, but between spirit and flesh. » not between thought and feeling, but between spirit and flesh. » not between thought and feeling, but between spirit and flesh. »

For the Stoic, the task was to bring man's thoughts and action into harmony with the laws of the universe, man's reason with “universal reason”. This could only be accomplished by the "wise" through the practice of virtue. It was made easier by the teaching of Zénon de Cition who, in his Republic, a work written while he was with the Cynics and which was designed to subvert that of Plato, redefined political concepts such as freedom and citizenship in terms of virtue (75) and, to begin with, altered the traditional meaning of virtue which, for Plato, was a hereditary capacity shared only by nobles (76). For Zeno, on the contrary, virtue is "a rational life, an agreement with the general course of the world", which can potentially be attained by everyone, regardless of race and sex: "only the wise or the virtuous are true citizens or friends or brothers or free men. (77) For Epictetus, freedom is a moral quality, a state of mind, that only the wise possess; the term is related to peace of mind.apathéia ), or […] perhaps – of “inner neutrality”. (78)

For some reason that will become crystal clear in the next part of this study, Stoic thought about freedom can best be grasped in relation to his ethical view of slavery. It can be summarized in four points:

“1. Slavery under the law, institutional slavery, is external, beyond our control and therefore need not be cared about; 2. Slavery as a condition of the soul is both within our control and could not be more important; 3. Only the wise or the good man is free and independent; the inferior/foolish or bad man is dependent and servile; 4. The wise are very few while almost all of humanity is inferior. Most men are (morally) slaves. » (79)

Legal slavery was marginal in Stoic philosophical discourse. “There is no sign that the Stoics debated the origins and justification of legal slavery in terms of the argument that surfaces in Aristotle 's Politics . They do not seem to have argued, as Aristotle's opponents did, that slavery was a man-made institution, and an unjust institution based on force. The reason is that from the point of view of their philosophy the whole debate was irrelevant. Legal slavery was evidently a product of nomos, law or convention. But he was also, from the standpoint of the individual, outward and indifferent, not something that should attract our attention, excite our emotions, or exercise our intellect upon. (80) The essence of slavery for the Stoic was the loss of the power of autonomous action. “For the Stoic, legal slavery, the kind of slavery that struck Diogenes, is of no importance. It is not in our control, it is external, like health and disease, wealth and poverty, low or high status. As such, it should be judged neither good nor bad, but rather indifferent. True slavery, like true freedom, is a condition of the soul, not of the body. Therefore a free soul or spirit can exist in an unfree body. The soul, especially the faculty of reasoning, is under our control, by the dispensation of the gods. Whether or not we are free and independent and exercise free choice (prohairesis ) depends on our attitude to external elements. We can either not be constrained and dominated by them and be free, or allow them to constrain us or dominate us and be enslaved. » (81)

From this, it is to be expected that most Stoics would reject Aristotle's theory of natural slavery. The doctrine of the very few of the wise who are free and the mass of the inferiors who are slaves is not presented as a doctrine of people who are thus divided by virtue of a natural disposition, and the assertions of certain Stoic texts to about the potential of all human beings to become virtuous, while they should not be exaggerated, nor should they be underestimated (82). In fact, the Stoics even taught, well ahead of their time, the possibility of moral progress – a view which seems to contradict their assertion that there are no degrees of virtue and vice, no intermediate positions. . For Seneca, slaves are virtuous, or at least potentially are; far from being inferior to their masters, they can be their moral equals.

Stoicism's contribution to the theory of slavery “was to shift the focus from legal slavery to moral slavery. In doing so, they no longer wondered, as Aristotle was compelled to do, how the most blatant form of lawful exploitation of some people by others could be justified, but how human beings could free their souls from oppression of passions and emotions and aligning their moral attitudes and behavior with a law superior to the law of men, the law of nature […] Their starting point was the acceptance of the rationality of all human beings. In late Stoicism this led to the thesis that all men are related by nature. They distanced themselves from Aristotle simply by establishing this point of reference. (83) They developed the cosmopolitanism of the Cynics into a doctrine of the common kinship of all men as rational beings. “Slaves and freemen are declared to be brothers, descendants of the same stock, of the deity or “of the world”. (84) Epictetus "infers the existence of the world community, the cosmic city, from the fact that God and men are related, that men are sons of God." (85) The common theme of many texts by Hierocles and others is universality: “All men are related, we are all from the same source; all men possess rationality; we have an affinity towards and a responsibility to care for “the whole human race”. (86) For Marc Aurèle, this "natural affinity of rational beings" entails "an ethic of social responsibility", which in turn implies that each of these "rational beings" conforms to "the intelligence of the universe", which "has done the lower things for the good of the superiors and […] adapted the superiors to each other. » (Meditations , 5.30). In other words, the hierarchy according to Stoic thought is airy (87).

Certainly, “nothing indicates that they were ready to go further (sic). “Stoicism (the Stoicism of the paradox 'Every good man is free and every bad man is a slave', the Stoicism of Epictetus) was not optimistic about the chances of attaining moral freedom and independence. All can be born with the impulse towards virtue and the lower ones can become wise. But the wise are very few. (88) But nothing prevented those who were sensitive to his teaching from believing, in accordance with the human tendency, all too human, in the vanity of which, given the eminently psychological method of investigation of Stoicism, the Stoics could have been aware that they were among the "few". Certainly, “Stoicism was deterministic. Fate or Providence has foreseen in advance the main details of an individual's life. He assigned him a role to play, and it is his moral responsibility to willingly apply himself to that role […] The message for slaves, explicit among the late Stoics, was to stay in their place and serve well their masters. Therein lies moral goodness and hence happiness…Both slavery itself and the doctrine of the external elements, which helped to sustain it, remained intact. (89) History has shown that the Stoic audience was not as fatalistic as the Stoics. was to stay in their place and serve their masters well. Therein lies moral goodness and hence happiness…Both slavery itself and the doctrine of the external elements, which helped to sustain it, remained intact. (89) History has shown that the Stoic audience was not as fatalistic as the Stoics. was to stay in their place and serve their masters well. Therein lies moral goodness and hence happiness…Both slavery itself and the doctrine of the external elements, which helped to sustain it, remained intact. (89) History has shown that the Stoic audience was not as fatalistic as the Stoics.

The Stoic ethic had an enormous influence on the Roman ethos and on Roman society: “Stoicism […] did not believe in social progress. Nevertheless, by placing his practical ideal not in the isolation of the individual human being but in his union with the great whole of nature and humanity - an abstract universal instead of an abstract particular - he promoted progress. very social he seemed to deny. This was the creed appropriate to the best citizens of a universal empire; it provides intellectual justification for breaking down barriers of race and caste. Before Christianity he proclaimed that all men were brothers and that all could be by adoption the children of God. In its contempt for "outer things" as indifferent things, much like Christianity, he escaped the need to deal directly with the many social problems; but he introduced a cosmopolitan and humanizing spirit into the minds of the citizens who were engaged in the work of administering and interpreting the law of the Roman world. (90) Last but not least, since freedom is internalized, as it is in Stoicism, outward bondage became unimportant. “It's all about self-awareness, self-assessment. Whether you are a slave or a consul, as a Stoic you play a social role while remaining internally free. » (91) (90) Last but not least, since freedom is internalized, as it is in Stoicism, outward bondage became unimportant. “It's all about self-awareness, self-assessment. Whether you are a slave or a consul, as a Stoic you play a social role while remaining internally free. » (91) (90) Last but not least, since freedom is internalized, as it is in Stoicism, outward bondage became unimportant. “It's all about self-awareness, self-assessment. Whether you are a slave or a consul, as a Stoic you play a social role while remaining internally free. » (91)

This “humanizing spirit” can best be seen at work in the pre-modern Stoic view of the concept of rights, which is closely related to that of “natural law”: “For Aristotle […] all Rights exercised in a community are conferred on specific individuals by virtue of the fact, and only by virtue of the fact, that they exercise specific political or legal functions. One might be tempted to call such natural rights in the broad sense since they were based on natural justice and for Aristotle the polisis itself rooted in nature. None of these political or legal rights, however, is inalienable or attaches naturally to individuals solely because of their humanity. If, for example, an individual of preeminent virtue appeared in the city, all political rights and privileges would be removed since Aristotle thought it would be best for the virtuous person to rule. On the other hand, the Stoics were the first thinkers of antiquity to develop a conception of rights which are natural in the stronger sense of being naturally attached to individuals by the simple fact that they are human beings and, as such , members of a natural human community. » (92)

Again, “the primary stage of Greek eleutheria is public, not private; its setting is the public square ( agora ) and not the inner citadel of the human psyche. Eleutheria was a combination of participation and duty, obligation and potential for creative civic action. Ancient cultures lacked our contemporary understanding of the notion of individual freedom. Much later, the Stoic Greek philosopher Epictetus (c. 55 – c. 135 AD), himself an emancipated slave who experienced many misfortunes in his life including physical disability and exile, developed the doctrine of inner freedom as the only refuge of the individual, a " polisinterior" and an "acropolis of the soul". (93) “The principle of inner freedom, sufficient unto itself for happiness, led Stoicism to the separation of man from the citizen and to his emancipation from the state. The foreigner, the barbarian, the slave can be a man: the citizen cannot. By defining man without any reference to citizenship, by going so far in the same direction as to affirm, on the basis of a moralistic understanding of the principle of universal order, the unity of the human race, the Stoicism undermined and shook the whole traditional system of the Greco-Roman world. Moreover, the Stoic abstract definition of freedom emphasizes only the subjective free will of the one who acts, whereas libertasRoman law was in the first place the objective right to act. The Romans conceived of libertas not in terms of autonomy of the will but in terms of social relations, as a duty as well as a right: a right to claim what is due to oneself and a duty to respect what is is due to others, the latter being exactly what acceptance of the law amounts to, for respecting the law ultimately means respecting rights other than one's own.

The development of the Christian doctrine of freedom in the Gospels is essentially the work of Paul. We will see that the Epistles of Paul and some of the Synoptic Gospels are informed by beliefs related to the crystallization of the subjectivist and anti-traditional concept of " eleutheria " in the aforementioned ancient "Greek" sects and schools of philosophy critical of the ethos of civil society (94).

While disregarding the possibility of a direct intellectual affiliation between Paul and the sophism, some of his commentators could not help but be intrigued by the wealth of rhetorical sophistication he exhibits in his criticism of the sophistic Corinthian movement in 1 Corinthians1.4-9, some of them going so far as to acknowledge that "in enumerating his accomplishments and accomplishments, Paul must at first have resembled any sophist who proves his life to be a testimony" (95) , especially when he exhorts the Corinthians to “imitate” and “boast” of him, just as the sophists did with their leaders. Either way, whether Paul reversed the model of sophistic boasting (3:18-23) or simply applied it knowingly, as an “initiate”; whether or not he was thus familiar with the elements of sophistry, and if so, whether or not he was fully aware of his debt to sophistry, the fact is that he was in agreement with the anti-traditional use of the antithesis between the nomosand the physis which was previously popularized by certain sophists. Indeed, Paul made use of the former as the antithesis of the latter in order to contrast particular human law with the "law of nature" - which was used by the Romans and Galatians as a synonym. of "inner law". Furthermore, Paul replaced nomos with suneidesis (a so-called “universal aspect of human consciousness”) and physis with pistis . The nomosis considered, along with “the dominion of sin” and “death”, as an obstacle to freedom, which only faith in Jesus can bring. Consequently, the disdain for and indifference to commonly accepted values ​​and virtues that were professed in (popular) cynicism were promoted ( Gal . 4.8-10, Col.. 2.8-10) even more aggressively. "Paul's 'heathen' Galatian converts were encouraged to abandon all their most obvious social landmarks - festivals, dietary rules and other rules of purity, any code governing social rank, race and gender, rules that structured civil life. These were to be seen not as enabling but as enslaving; renounce it for Christ and you will enjoy real freedom. (96) Because of this and other aspects of his teaching, "it is difficult to imagine how Paul could have been perceived as anything other than a cynical renegade Jew." Cynics were the only surrounding individuals to come to these very negative conclusions, to act upon them themselves, and to urge others to emulate them. (97) Furthermore,Phil 3.5) it is almost certain that Paul was aware of Stoicism and its discussion of "the law" (as was the author of 4 Maccabees and Josephus and Philo; and if Luke is right to place Paul's origin in Tarsus, which had a strong Stoic tradition). Paul would then have been aware that cynicism was the original nurse and continuing sparring partner of stoicism. (98) The theme of renouncing material possessions, the first step towards cynical "freedom", which was taken by Crates when, after having donated all his possessions to his native city, he cried out in the middle of the ' ecclesia "Crates, son of Crates, free Crates", will not fall on deaf ears in the first Christian communities: "The wandering cynical philosophers will find counterparts among the first wandering Christian charismatic figures. They, too, will renounce home, family, and possessions […] The words of Epictetus […] speak volumes: “I am lying on the bare earth; I have no wife, no child, no small house – only earth and sky and a big clock. Yet what am I missing? Am I not carefree, fearless? Am I not free? ( Dissertation III 22.46-8). »

“A similar radical ethos is found in the gospels. According to Mark (10:1 7ff) Christian discipleship requires the renunciation of possessions and according to Matthew (6:25) “Ultimately what is needed is inner freedom from possessions and freedom towards providence”. » (99)

Traditionally, eleutheria was the privilege of free men, citizens, citizens of a particular polis linked to an ethnicity and locality who, as such, participated fully in its political life and who, however, did not were free only by law ( nomos ). None of the many occurrences of eleutheria in Paul's epistles bears the remotest relation to its original political significance. Eleutheria \_is not conceived as freedom for something, as a starting point reserved for a minority on the basis of its birth, but as “freedom in relation to things”, as a point of arrival – for all (100). “For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism involved the assertion of moral obligations to human beings everywhere because they all share a common rationality regardless of their political, religious differences and other particular affiliations. Stoic cosmopolitans believed that all humans live together “as if they were in a state. (101) They conceived of this community in moral terms. They used global citizenship as a metaphor for common membership in a single moral community. In Christian discourse,

The criterion of politéia (citizenship) was consequently altered. The criterion for participation in the ecclesia – the principal assembly of the Athenian democracy – applied by Paul is the pistis (faith) in connection with the pneuma (spirit) (102). "While Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle conceptualized freedom as the freedom to perform one's public duties, a freedom that could only be exercised within a polis, henceforth freedom had acquired a personalized and autonomous significance. Freedom no longer depends on the existence of a specific political organization, rather it is potentially accessible to all; an inner state that can be experienced independent of social and political orders. (103) For Aristotle, "the eleutheriais, politically, the very end of a city, ethically, the end of an individual” (104), it being understood that the end of the latter cannot be accomplished independently of that of the former. These complementary goals are stoically decoupled in Paul's epistles. The new doctrine of “freedom” is defined by moral choice whereby “regardless of social class, an individual who was inwardly well disposed could achieve freedom of choice, but a freedom interpreted ethically and ontologically. (105) In Paul and in Stoicism, as well as in the whole of the philosophical current from which Stoicism came, freedom passes from the political plane to the moral plane, from the objective to the subjective, from the common to the personal. While the whole of political discourse "withdrew into ethics, the city became internalized”, freedom “then located itself in the provinces of morality and the beyond. (106) The "inner freedom" of the Stoics was no longer "attainable only by the wise", the "kingdom of God" was now within reach of everyone and, in fact, it was said to be in each individual, especially since the apocalyptic and imminent "kingdom of God" was slow to materialize. Whatever term Paul uses to qualify the conception of citizenship, it belongs to the lexical field of abstraction. B. Blumenfeld decided to call it "mystical". Why not ? (107) the "kingdom of God" was now within everyone's reach and, in fact, was said to be within every individual, especially as the apocalyptic and impending "kingdom of God" was slow to unfold. materialize. Whatever term Paul uses to qualify the conception of citizenship, it belongs to the lexical field of abstraction. B. Blumenfeld decided to call it "mystical". Why not ? (107) the "kingdom of God" was now within everyone's reach and, in fact, was said to be within every individual, especially as the apocalyptic and impending "kingdom of God" was slow to unfold. materialize. Whatever term Paul uses to qualify the conception of citizenship, it belongs to the lexical field of abstraction. B. Blumenfeld decided to call it "mystical". Why not ? (107) Why not ? (107) Why not ? (107)

Those who caution against too close an analogy between Paul's understanding of freedom and the concept of freedom in the "Greek" schools of philosophy argue that their resemblance would be superficial on the grounds that "while for Paul freedom was based on the grace of God and was charismatic in nature, it was based on the philosophy and result of education for the Stoics. While Paul defines it as being "in Christ", the Stoics insisted that it was synonymous with educated moral autonomy. While Paul speaks of freedom from sins, the Stoics advocated freedom from destiny […] At the very heart of the matter Paul and Stoicism are at odds. Both speak of surrender and obedience but for one it is to Christ while for the others it is to the inner law of his being. One is theo- and christo-centric; the other is anthropocentric. (108) “The Stoic is free because he is master of himself through rational thought; for Paul the will of man is corrupted and he is in himself totally incapable of freedom. The Stoic finds the certainty of existence in self-restriction and this is his freedom; for Paul the responsibility towards oneself leads man to despair and he can only achieve freedom if he frees himself from himself. The Stoic can separate himself from time and deny the future, thus achieving freedom by abstraction; for Paul temporality is inherent in the nature of man, so that, even if he is conditioned by his past, he must continually make new decisions for the future, which he cannot because he is his past and can only have freedom by gift of grace” (109), etc. What is superficial is rather those kinds of distinctions which, no matter how relevant some of them may be from a philosophical or theological perspective, are essentially splitting hairs from a deeper perspective, from which this What distinguishes and even separates the Stoic concept of freedom from Paul's discourse on freedom seems infinitely less important than what binds them together, their many dissimilarities infinitely less central than their similarities. Their similarity in nature is often inadvertently alluded to in arguments about their contrasts, as in the following statement: "The Stoics maintained that the individual only achieves freedom by his own efforts to live according to nature and virtue, whereas for Paul the individual achieves freedom only by the help of God, manifested by the Christ. (110) "Individual" is the key word, the lowest common denominator of freedom in Paul and of freedom in Stoic philosophy.

The growing interest in the individual, influenced by democratic developments in Athens, or rather, as has been previously pointed out, by developments in the democratic ideal (111), hypnotized some individuals into a belief in human equality. and consequently led to the erasure of social, political and economic status in the name of moral concerns. Masters were admonished to remember that “the man whom you call your slave is of the same stock, is under the same heavens and on equal footing with you breathes, lives and dies. ( Epistulae, 47:30) For Paul, following in the footsteps of the Stoics and Philo (112), it goes without saying that morality takes precedence over slavery under the law, not to mention “spiritual slavery”; soul bondage is more damaging than body bondage. Like Seneca and other Stoics, he is interested in the quality of the relationship between master and slave. “A vision of the unity of humanity plays a supporting role in his argument, as in that of Seneca. (113) It is claimed that "the comparison falls apart when one takes a closer look at the goals and concerns of the two men." Seneca is addressed only to masters. He offers them as an incentive to treat their slaves (who as rational beings are their brethren) with mercy the prospect of real benefits - ranging from devoted and sacrificial service to their slaves to freedom from fear of being murdered by them. Paul, addressing equally slaves and masters, equal in the eyes of God, speaks of rewards and alludes to punishments in the hereafter. His message to slaves is that by serving their masters well they are serving Christ. Instructions to slaves and masters should be seen as part of an appeal to all men, regardless of their social, legal or ethnic condition. (114) Comparison collapses only to become effective again and even to be reinforced by a common belief in the equality of all men, a persistent, recurrent, insidious, tenacious belief which, beyond doctrinal and tactical differences, is unmistakably the distinctive mark of one and the same current of thought in the samsaric sense, whether externalized in a philosophical form or in a religious form. In fact, the Epistles go further than the late Stoics on the problem of the relationship between masters and slaves, or, to tell the truth, between slaves and masters: not only, contrary to the Stoics, does Paul address slaves, s addressed directly to them, something which was most unusual in the moral instruction of antiquity, but, as has been pointed out, the apostle addresses the inferiors, the slaves, first in this pair of relation . Furthermore, "if society viewed slaves as property, Paul addresses them as persons. If the law required obedience, Paul made slavery an act of devotion where service to Christ is the greatest good. »

“Similarly Paul encourages masters to establish their relationship with their slaves in such a way as to tangibly demonstrate their equality in Christ. They must apply the golden rule to their treatment of slaves: "Masters, grant your servants what is just and equitable, knowing that you too have a master in heaven." ( Col. 4:1). Since the Lord is the master of all masters and slaves, slaveholders must remain aware that "everyone, whether slave or free, shall receive from the Lord according to what good he has done." ( Eph. 6.8). (115) One must either have no idea of ​​the nature of slavery in Paul's day, an institution so widely accepted that it never occurred to anyone to attack it, at least frontally, or, what is more likely in this case, to consider it as immaterial, to affirm that “the social attitudes which he betrays when he addresses slaves and their masters are conventional and conservative. The first, crucial instruction as set forth in 1 Corinthiansis that slaves must precisely remain in their place without resentment, knowing that it makes no difference to Christ whether one is a slave or a free man. Indeed, no sooner has Paul ordered slaves to be content to remain in the position in which they were when they became Christians (1 Corinthians 7:20) than he encourages them to do the opposite: “As- you were called being a slave, do not worry about it; but if you can become free, rather take advantage of it. (1 Corinthians 7:21) (116).

There is something profoundly and shrewdly subversive about the treatment of the relationship between slaves and masters in the epistles. When Paul “emphasizes that purity of heart which is expected of the slave, but that masters should exercise justice and also equality ( isotes ) toward slaves |…] it means more than just” fairly” and “fairly”. It is a recognition that subtly subverts social stratification itself (3:22-4:1) using the language of "brotherhood" and "friendship" ( koinonia ) […] terms that recall the Philippians […] to describe a relationship that was anything but koinoniain the ancient world […] Paul relativizes the whole social system by placing it within the critical framework of the “good news” of God. » (117)

This implies that “Paul … applies the principle of transcendence to the social dispositions and attitudes themselves. Submission is conditioned by the measure of what “befits the Lord” (3:18) […] Further, slaves are to serve as those who “fear the Lord” (3:22) and as if they “serve the Lord rather than humans” (3:23), because in fact they “serve the Lord Christ” (3:24). » (118)

It also implies "that there will be a tension between any form of stratification and the ideal community of 'neither slave nor free, neither Jew nor Greek' (3:11) and 'neither male nor female' ( Gal . 3 :28). (119) The fact that this relation of slave and master is defined as a relation which takes place under God, who is master of slaves and masters and before whom slaves and masters are thus fundamentally equal, could not have profound long-term social implications. 1 Tim. 6:1-2 clearly shows that the slaves whom Paul said were equal to their masters before God took his message at face value. More generally, there is no indication that the gospels were understood only symbolically by a large part of the mass of "worthless and contemptible people, fools, slaves, poor women and children" who, as implicitly 1 Corinthians 1:26-29, was the target audience of the early evangelists (indeed, Paul's audience, too, who are said to have been far more literate, far more familiar with the Jewish scriptures than the early Christian communities , can just as well be considered by Celsian standards to have been made up of "worthless and contemptible people, fools, slaves [...]")

There is no inherent contradiction between 1 Tim . 6:1-2 or even Gal . 3:11 and various other passages in the epistles which command, or rather advise, slaves to obey their “masters”. The latter are addressed to the small world of the nascent and heterogeneous Christian community, the former to a most desired Christian world, in which the tension is ideally resolved and “there is neither slave nor free man”.

Paul's imagery and discourse on the relationship between masters and slaves is consistent with that of Jesus. “Jesus, despite the (underdeveloped (sic)) message of liberation found in the Gospel of Luke, never acts to abolish slavery. Rather, he legitimized it. Despite violent slave uprisings, such as the one Spartacus led (c. 70 BC), resulting in the crucifixion of 6,600 of his followers along the Appian Way, no one in the first century wrote abolitionist tracts or even questioned the legitimacy of slavery. The fact that slavery is a constant motif in the preaching of Jesus ( Matt . 13:24-30; 18:23-35; 22:1-14; 24:45-51; 25:14-30; Mark 12 :1-12; Luke14:15-24; 15:11-32; 20:9-19) is in itself something unique. Placed in the context of the general message of the gospels, in which the Messiah is portrayed as both slave ( doulos ) and Lord ( kyrios ) and in which this suzerainty is achieved by becoming a slave ( Phil . 2:5-11) , a subversive point of view began to emerge.

“When Jesus uses slavery as a metaphor for understanding our relationship to God, he places one relationship above all others: God places an exclusive and absolute demand on the life of every believer. As Jesus taught, “no slave can serve two masters” ( Luke, 16:13). Rather than legitimizing the practice of slavery, the analogous use of slavery to understand our relationship to God […] when properly understood (sic) […] radically transforms any other relationship. (120) Likewise, Paul does not explicitly condemn slavery or call for the abolition of slavery, yet his use of slavery as a metaphor for mankind's relationship to God is established from that of Jesus in order to eliminate the difference between the slave and the free man.

The Pauline use of the metaphorical language of slavery, the apostle's identification of himself as "a slave of Christ," and in general the Pauline "theology of slavery" are best understood in the context of the Old Testament. “Slavery was an accepted, structural element in the society of ancient Israel, but slavery was the fate of others, not Jews. Jews could only be enslaved temporarily, unless they chose to remain with their masters ( Exodus 11:1-7; Deut. 15:11-18). Therefore, slavery (of the Jews) to men was defined as evil slavery. The alternative to slavery to men was slavery to God, which could be called good slavery. Moses, Abraham and the rest of the patriarchs were slaves of God. The same is true for all of God's chosen people. They were freed from slavery in Egypt to be slaves of their God (see Lev. 15:24 and 55) and were firmly instructed not to become slaves of men. (121) Israel identified themselves with the slaves of God. It has been rightly noted that “slavery to God became part of the Jewish self-understanding…an emblem that helped to demonstrate a distinctive perception of and relationship to God. (122) And helped them to identify with the rest of the world.

This shade of meaning of the title "slave" would have gone unnoticed by the non-Jews who made up the bulk of Paul's audience and readership, who would have understood Paul's use of the term in the same way that they perceived themselves as true slaves and, in any case, probably would not have been as able as modern scholars to distinguish between cases where douloswas used in its Greek meanings and between cases where it had non-Greek meanings. In general, however, the lexical form of the New Testament is Greek and its substance is Jewish (123). The view, shared by some anti-Semitic circles and by some scholars, that Christianity is essentially a universalization from the depths of Judaism, is made even more believable by Paul's ambiguous and ambitious use of the term Christos, which can be translated as "Christ" or "Messiah" and recalls the Old Testament use of "Servant", and by the continuity of thought which a careful reading of the Greek original betrays between the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Elder Testament: "Paul quite rightly does not regard Christian society, the Church, as a new society: rather it is the direct, true and legitimate continuation and development of the old divine society, the people of the covenant of Israel. (124) Generally speaking it has been conclusively proven that Semitic sources played a constitutive role in the composition of more than one Gospel (125), something which, in the light of the presence of Stoic elements ( or cynics) specific, whether or not they are linked to the concept of freedom, in Mark, Matthew and Luke, would not have surprised the Hellenistic Jewish philosopher Aristobulus, who perceived that "the correspondence of the points of view of the Stoic philosophers and the Jewish scriptures are the result […] not of the fact that the Jewish thinkers read the and were influenced by the Stoics but that the Stoics read and were persuaded by Moses. He states that “it seems to me that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato followed [Moses] with great care in every respect. They copy it when they say they hear the voice of God, when they contemplate the arrangement of the universe, so carefully made and so constantly maintained by God. » » (126) who perceived that “the correspondence of the views of the Stoic philosophers and the Jewish scriptures are the result […] not of the fact that the Jewish thinkers read and were influenced by the Stoics but that the Stoics read and were persuaded by Moses. He states that “it seems to me that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato followed [Moses] with great care in every respect. They copy it when they say they hear the voice of God, when they contemplate the arrangement of the universe, so carefully made and so constantly maintained by God. » » (126) who perceived that “the correspondence of the views of the Stoic philosophers and the Jewish scriptures are the result […] not of the fact that the Jewish thinkers read and were influenced by the Stoics but that the Stoics read and were persuaded by Moses. He states that “it seems to me that Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato followed [Moses] with great care in every respect. They copy it when they say they hear the voice of God, when they contemplate the arrangement of the universe, so carefully made and so constantly maintained by God. » » (126) when they contemplate the arrangement of the universe, so carefully made and so constantly maintained by God. » » (126) when they contemplate the arrangement of the universe, so carefully made and so constantly maintained by God. » » (126)

One can fully understand Paul's inferences about freedom only in a larger context than that of Jewish history and beliefs. The notion that Jehovah had become a special protector of Israel and that the Hebrews as a whole had become the slaves of God reflected the language of the royal court in which the king's subjects were often called slaves, not only in ancient Israel , but also throughout the ancient Near East. Most of the patriarchs, kings and prophets of Israel are referred to as slaves of Jehovah while the officials of the eastern kings were already called their servants or slaves (127). There is also evidence that the absolute monarchs of Persia viewed their subjects as slaves (128). Three points should be emphasized in this regard: First, Semitic and Eastern peoples “did not consider this notion of slavery as repulsive but as a common way of identifying with the god(s) they worshipped. (129) It is interesting to note that the words for "slave", "servant" and "worshipper" derive from the same root in the Semitic languages. Secondly, at least in ancient Mesopotamia, "[...] apart from the particular attention given to theawelumin the code of Hammurabi […] usually translated as “lord” […] there does not seem to be any particular designation for a “free” man. There is no notion of a “free” person in a political sense (130). Third, Patterson finds the idea expressed in prehistoric Mesopotamia and even in Africa that all who serve the ruler are "slaves of the king" and tries to justify it by arguing that "since only the god-king is free, the only freedom that was worth was that which was obtained by proxy by becoming a slave to him. In fact, "a king's subjects took an oath before the gods to watch over him and protect him, so that their servitude to him was ultimately servitude to the gods", yet, at least in the Near -East,

To conclude this overview of the genesis and development of the concept of "freedom" in the ancient Greco-Roman world as a preliminary to the study of the influence of the Christian concept of freedom on the Genossenschaftearly Germanic, suffice it to say that the full conceptualization of freedom occurred first as a political and social category, under the influence of non-aristocratic elements ("The concept of freedom was not invented and made useful either by Greece nor Rome. In Rome, on the contrary, its political dynamism and attractiveness as a watchword in social conflicts was apparently engendered by the need to protect non-elite citizens from the elite. which, despite all its power and all its social superiority, depended on the citizens for the defense of the community. In Greece, the protection of the external independence of the polisonly became problematic when in some of the ruling communities equal political participation had already become a crucial concern of the broad non-elite classes” (132)), only to be used and understood later in a non-elite sense. political and even apolitical; then as an individual attribute, again and even more obviously under the influence of foreign conceptions, which will be duly brought out in the next part of this study. These developments were accompanied by and were shaped by a growing abstraction linked to the growing weight "of a human type who, in order to defend values ​​which he cannot realize and which thus seem to him more and more abstract and utopians, ends up feeling dissatisfied with and frustrated with any existing positive order and any form of authority. » (133)

It is most significant that the term first appeared as an adjective (free), then as a nominal (the free) and only much later as a noun (freedom).

In the Athenian era, it was impossible for the cosmopolitan class of metics, which enjoyed supremacy in industry – with the exception of mining – as well as in commerce, which “imported goods, and with them ideas, from all over the world, who was able to deploy the effort of his intelligence in all directions and to guide his instinct for success in all fields, never knows any other means of action than money [… ]” (134) The liberal and intellectual professions also attracted the metics. “Most of the philosophers who taught in Athens before Socrates and after Plato came from abroad. They exercised a powerful influence on the moral and social evolution of the Athenian people. They brought with them all the ideas that developed in the Hellenic world, but in particular those which best suited men who did not respect local traditions and were eager for practical novelties. As teachers, lecturers living in their profession and desiring to make a very comfortable living from it, they frankly presented themselves as importers of intellectual goods and merchants of them. Thus the wogs, while invading the economic domain in Athens, were at the same time penetrating their ideas into public and private life. They systematically occupied all the avenues of thought that radiated from the center of sophistry. Their successful initiative spawned the great systems of the fourth century. The Academy was an exception; it was for true Athenians that Plato expounded the principles of aristocratic idealism imbued with religion. (135) They then set their sights on the remaining domains which they had not yet monopolized: practical intelligence than in industry, commerce and banking. They founded the principal schools of rhetoric, they created philosophical systems with realistic tendencies, they were the best lawyers, they made modern music fashionable and they attained great popularity as authors of comedies. They invaded, transformed and appropriated every sphere in which, while making money and fame, they were able to express their feelings and spread their ideas. » (136)

The Academy did not long remain an exception. From Carneades, born in Cyrene, a Greek city in North Africa, the Academy “will be led by non-Athenian scholars […] The other schools were absolutely not local in their direction: no Athenian will ever lead the Peripatos. » (137)

Athens, Smyrna and Ephesus were the main sophistic centers but the overwhelming majority of those traditionally included among the early sophists came to Athens from Asia Minor: Byblos, Gadara, Tyre, Emesa, Tarsus, Tyana, Side, Perge, Aphrodisias , Thyatira, Cnidos, Nicodemia, Amastris, Perynthus, Aenos, Laryssa. Protagoras was a native of Abdera, a colony founded by Ionians in Thrace, where he "associated with the Persian Magi" (Philostrate, Lives of the Sophists, 1.10); Gorgias, from Sicily; Anaxagoras, from Asia Minor. Members of the second sophistry were Syrians; later Lucian of Samosata considered himself a Syrian. The sophists often emphasized their uprooting. Aristippus boasted about it: “I am a stranger everywhere. Some of the leading sophists visited Athens as ambassadors; others were exiles. After settling there, they moved from one city to another, teaching rhetoric for money […] It was not customary for teachers to charge for their services in those days – to the children of wealthy families. They never formed a school in the institutional sense.

While the briefest reference is made to the Asiatic origin of most sophists in most scholarly works on the subject, great care is taken not to consider their antithesis between nomos and physis.in morals and politics, their desire for equality in liberty, their ethical relativism, their systematic skepticism based on their sensualistic subjectivism, their rationalistic theories of religion, all of their rhetoric and philosophy, in the light of their eastern origin. It goes without saying, in the academic “Western tradition”, that the sophistic movement is one of the sources of the “Western tradition” and that it can only be studied in the context of Hellenic culture. However, if we look at the bottom of things, things seem quite different: “The sophists and the Hellenic religion clearly belong to two different worlds separated by a wide chasm of profound changes which occurred during the fourth century BC. J.-C. To the casual observer it seems inconceivable that the two could have anything in common, especially if the point of comparison is religion and gods. Any Western religion, Hellenic or otherwise, by definition involves a conviction that gods exist and a firm belief in them. In contrast, the sophists are known for their explicit agnosticism or atheism, Protagoras and Prodicus in particular. » (138) Protagoras and Prodicus in particular. » (138) Protagoras and Prodicus in particular. » (138)

There are similarities between the sophistic perspective and that of contemporary non-Greek philosophical systems; striking are those which exist between the first and the Carvaka school in India. “There is reason to believe that the carvakas shared certain qualities of mind with the early Greek philosophers. They were both critics of official theology, willing to treat dogma lightly, and exhibited an uncommon openness to speculation regarding epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. Both were remarkably free from the shackles of the past; both held that it was a right of the philosopher to regard the universe as a matter of private interest […]” (139) The epistemological perspective of carvaka was empirical, its materialistic metaphysics and hedonistic ethic and, as such, "carvaka is considered to stand unreservedly at the highest level of naturalism. (140) Naturalistic elements can be found in the highest degree in schools of philosophy which, like Jainism and Samkhya, precede the development of "Greek philosophy"; thus, it is manifestly not true that naturalism is “as contrary to Eastern modes of thought as it is frequent in more or less explicit forms in Western conceptions. » (141) precede the development of “Greek philosophy”; thus, it is manifestly not true that naturalism is “as contrary to Eastern modes of thought as it is frequent in more or less explicit forms in Western conceptions. » (141) precede the development of “Greek philosophy”; thus, it is manifestly not true that naturalism is “as contrary to Eastern modes of thought as it is frequent in more or less explicit forms in Western conceptions. » (141)

The Greeks received this thought through various channels, through various intermediaries. Apuleius repeats a tradition that Pythagoras traveled to India where he was educated by Brahmins. Diogenes Laertius says of Democritus: “Some say he associated himself with the gymnosophists of India. (DL 9, 35); Aelian says: “Democritus went to the Chaldeans in Babylon and to the Magi and Sophists of India. ( Var . Hist . 4, 20); Hyppolite: “Democritus […] devised his system by discussing with the gymnosophists of India, with the priests of Egypt and with the astrologers and magi of Babylon. ( Rebuttals1.13) It is said that Pyrrho, the founder of the skeptical school of philosophy, traveled to India with Alexander's army and obtained from the Indians the ideas of scepticism, suspension of judgment and indifference (DL 9, 61- 68). It is said that Onesicritus, a historical Greek author who accompanied Alexander on his campaigns in Asia and wrote a biography about him, was "sent to converse with those Indian sophists" (Strabo 15, 1, 63), whose contempt for customs, l immodesty, freedom of expression, conception of life according to nature and of apathy as a state of indifference to the passions which is obtained by training and hardship, are outrageously reflected in cynicism . The cynics were associated with the gymnosophists (“naked teachers”) by Plutarch,

The cynics did not form a school in the institutional sense any more than did the sophists and, unlike them, did not ask for money to teach. “[…] The cynical teacher […] in a symbolic garb consisting of a cape, a satchel and a stick, spoke on street corners and in squares open to the ordinary man of the street [ …] These cynical sermons were informal speeches that used the Socratic method of questioning and dialogue; only, as the preacher answered his own questions, setting up a fictitious interlocutor whom he could oppose and whom he could convince, the form of such a colloquium was called diatribe. It was a kind of dialogue-monologue that was very effective in informally presenting ethical teaching. (142) Gold, it has been established that the methods of argumentation of the diatribes elaborated by the cynics, more precisely by Bion of Borysthenes, who addressed the crowd, resemble “the methods of argumentation in dialogic form of certain exegetical midrashim. (143) Later the Stoics will also use the diatribe with great success.

The Cynics, as we might also expect, were mostly non-Athenians, and many of them were probably not Greeks by birth. Menippus, a former slave, was born in Gadara in Coele-Syria, just like, two centuries later, the poet Meleager who, with a truly cynical spirit, remarked in an epigram: "If I am a Syrian, what is -what matters ? Stranger, we dwell in a marvel, the world: a chaos gave birth to all mortals […]” (144) Antisthenes, who is believed to have been the founder of the Cynic movement, also shares dubious ancestry with many cynics, for he “was not an Athenian citizen but the son of a citizen and a Thracian; he is thus described as having held his “readings” in the gymnasium reserved fornothoi or illegitimate, known as the Cynosarges or "agile dog". This last name is certainly partly responsible for the synthesis of Antisthenes in the group of cynics. His birth, which deprived him of the rights of Athenian citizenship, also endowed him with the potential for cynical cosmopolitanism and a predilection for neglecting matters of rank and status. (145) Indeed. Liberty and Slavery is one of the works attributed to him. Most of its followers seem to have essentially experienced the latter.

Diogenes of Sinope […] the son of a dishonest banker who had been banished from his hometown after being accused of counterfeiting – had not set foot in Greece, where they had been exiled, that the Oracle of Delphi , where he had traveled, urged him to "falsify the currency" (146). He was reportedly captured by pirates and sold into slavery in Crete later in his life. His pupil, Monime de Syracuse, would have been the slave – it's a small world – of a banker; Bion of Borysthenes was the son of an emancipated merchant of salting equipment and a courtier. “Such circumstances might have caused these cynics to look beyond past circumstances and outward appearances. " In effect.

The fact is that “the cynics have not grasped Indian philosophies in their entirety. If there were similarities there were also differences. Indian philosophers spent their time in instruction, discussion, meditation and self-improvement; they had no time to earn a living and their requests for food were understood and met. They accepted nothing but food and refused money. Cynics usually asked for money and this demand was irrational. The Indian philosophers were kind and helpful; the cynics were offensive and unsociable. Cynics were orators and Indian philosophers were not. Indian philosophers did not seek happiness or the enjoyment of life; they were looking to improve, to progress spiritually and to be more useful to others. » (147)

Still in matters of practice, the link is even more pronounced between the cynics and the members of the Shaivite sect known as the pasupatha, - the first to have venerated Shiva, so that, even if the first reference to this cult is found in the later portions of the Mahabharata(150 BC – 150 AD), one might think that it has more ancient origins; in any case, his practice is lost in the darkness of pre-Aryan India. “The pasupatas, like the cynics, regularly exposed themselves to contempt and actively sought dishonor even at the cost of blows. Their methods of inducing censorship were diverse: wearing dirty clothes, using violent and indecent language, imitating animals, performing acts in public which were ridiculous and gave the impression of madness or which were interpreted by society as obscene […] The cynics, in undergoing the test of dishonor, hoped to assimilate themselves to the object of their cult, the hero Hercules, who was believed to hold a club, just as the founder of the pasupata cult called Lakulisa, the “Lord of the Club”. Pseudo-Diogenes exhorts to be strong through poverty and dishonor. What he means by dishonor (adoxia ) is precisely what the pasupatas mean by avamana . And everywhere we find the cynics urging their followers to anti-social actions in order to gain strength, just as the pasupatas sought self-aggrandizement (vrddhi) by similar acts. (148) What is also most interesting is that the pasupatas, like the cynics, "used to imitate dogs in sound and deed." » (149)

Now, in matters of doctrine, there is a flagrant lack of transcendence, of an equivalent of moksa , the ultimate goal of the pasupatas, in cynical asceticism. If, in the case of sophism and cynicism, the similarities with the Indian schools of philosophy are too numerous and striking to entertain any doubt that the same ideas arose in Greece and India independently, we may agreement with R. Guénon that the “Greeks” did not always expose Indian thought as they received it, not to mention that any concept cannot fail to undergo distortions when it passes from one culture to another. In any case, the cynical practice can be seen as a radicalization of a type of asceticism that was foreign to Aryan traditions (150).

The early Stoics seem to have advocated the absence of shame ( adoxia) as doctrinally as the cynics did: “There is no need to build temples, gymnasiums, tribunals; money is useless; only the virtuous are citizens, friends, brothers and free […] all the others are at war with each other, enemies, alienated and slaves; Zeno supports the doctrine of the so-called community of women; men and women must wear the same attire; no part of the body should be completely covered; nothing is shameful about incest and other conventionally abhorred sexual actions; if an amputated limb can serve as food, it must be eaten; the traditional educational program is useless; no special effort should be made for the funeral of one's parents”, etc. (151) According to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno traveledXenophon's Memorabilia in an Athens bookshop, asked the bookseller where he could find a man like Socrates and was directed to a pupil of Diogenes of Sinope, Crates, who was passing by at the time. He eventually made himself independent and established his own business under the Stoa Poikilé .

The Academy, as stated above, from Carneades, will be led by non-Athenian scholars, the other schools were absolutely not local in their direction, "the Stoa, from Zeno of Cition, will be under the control of non-Athenian philosophers during the first two centuries of its existence. The students of the schools were no less of heterogeneous origin […] We learn that the first followers of Zeno in the Stoa came from all over the Mediterranean: Perseus, son of Demetrios, came to Athens from the same city of Cition as Zeno ; Ariston, the son of Miltiades came from Chios; Herillus of Carthage; Dionysius of Heraclea; Spheros of the Bosphorus; Cleanthes, who resumed school on the death of Zeno, from Assos; Philonides of Thebes; Callipus of Corinth; Posidonius of Alexandria; Athenodorus of Soli and Zeno of Sidon.

Zeno himself came from Cition, the first Phoenician colony in Cyprus, whose population was largely of Phoenician blood. Some have been "led to suspect that the ideas behind the cosmopolitanism of Stoicism were themselves of Eastern origin" and "have long postulated a connection between the cosmopolitan composition of the philosophical schools of Athens in the late Classical period and at the beginning of the Hellenistic period and their political and ethical teachings. “Unsurprisingly, no serious scholarly study has ever attempted to describe Zeno's 'Semitism' in detail, aside from a previous generation's vague references to 'Adamic' theories about the unity of mankind. Luckily, college studies don't lack a sense of humor:polis[…] were, in many respects, those of a foreigner. This is not to suggest that the fact that Zeno was a stranger determined his thinking; this is only to point out that "the foreign oriental character" seems to have been connected with Stoic ideas in the minds of Zeno's contemporaries" and "given the state of the evidence it is of course impossible to discover what were "Semitic" influences (whatever that may mean in this context) on Zeno's thought if there were any. (153) Leaving aside that his father's name, Mnesias (a Hellenized form of Menahem) (154) was "often used by the Phoenicians" (155), that "his contemporaries often referred to him as 'the Phoenician"" (156), that his adversaries even made fun of him for this fact and that it is said that Polemo, the ruler of the Platonic Academy from 314 to 269 BC. J.-C., weary of his smugness, addressed him as follows: "You interfere, Zeno, through the garden gate - I am fully aware of this - you monopolize my doctrines and give them a Phoenician twist” (DL, VII, 25), “there seems to be no reason” (157) to suppose that he was of Phoenician origin.

“It remains […] a strange coincidence that the founder of Stoicism would have come from a race whose language was almost identical to Hebrew, and from a Greco-Oriental city so close to Tarsus. The link between Stoicism and this region has always been close. Chrysippus, the "second founder" of Stoicism, as he was called, came from Cilicia, and his successor, another Zeno, from Tarsus. When Paul lived in young Tarsus, it was still one of the main centers of Stoic philosophy. (158) It was also a coincidence, which will remain strange and purely accidental for those who do not grasp the hermetic link between the spread of trade and the spread of ideas, that Tarsus was also the "home port" of the Cilician pirates. who, according to Plutarch's account,Vita Pompei , XXIV, 234-236).

Russell alludes to a study that “suspects” alien influences in Stoicism, an academic study that actually goes further than suspecting alien influences in Stoicism. They can be found in his ethics, in his physics and in his cosmology (159).

The study of ethics was elevated to a new level of importance by the early Stoics because of their attention to the pre-Aristotelian individualism of the cynics and also the character of the time, shaped, at least in part, by the conceptions of previous influential philosophical schools. The domain “of public life and action had disappeared and thus individuality supplanted the idea of ​​citizenship. Finding the way to happiness for the individual soul then became not one problem among others but the great problem of philosophy, to which all others had to be secondary and subordinate. In addition to a "monastic exclusivity of attention to the subjective and practical well-being of the individual soul",

“Its essence consists in the introduction of the Semitic temperament and the Semitic spirit into Greek philosophy.

The meeting of Eastern and Western ideas had been prepared by the conquests of Alexander and the production of Stoicism was one of its first fruits. We moderns have all been imbued with the Semitic spirit in its highest manifestations through the pages of Holy Scripture. Other manifestations of this spirit, such as the Mohammedan religion, for example, demonstrate it by an intense fervor […] tending to enthusiasm and even fanaticism for abstract ideas of religion and morality. The Semitic spirit found in Athens a new and favorable ground for its development at the end of the fourth century BC. If philosophy in general then tended for other reasons to exalt ethics in relation to metaphysics, this tendency was perfectly suited to Semitic moral fervor. Ethics was taken over by the Phoenician Zeno and came out of his hands with a new aspect. A phase of thought then appeared for the first time on Hellenic soil in which the moral conscience of the individual, the moral ego, became the center and the starting point. Such a view, together with various concomitant ideas, such as duty, responsibility, introspection, the feeling of inadequacy and the moral cultivation of self, is familiar to us in the psalms of David and later in the writings of Paul, but they are absent from the conversations of Socrates, the dialogues of Plato and the ethics of Aristotle. He was indeed foreign to the Hellenic […] spirit, with its tendency to objective thought and appreciation of nature. We must meditate on the following affirmation: "Our own view in modern times has been so tinged with Hebraism that the highest degree of moral consciousness seems quite natural to us, and so it can be said that Stoicism, which introduced this state of mind into the ancient Hellenic world, constituted a stage of transition between Greek philosophy and the modern ethical point of view. It so happens that in many modern books of morals, and even in many practical sermons, we find many things which have a close affinity with the modes of thought of the ancient Stoics, while such productions seldom have any affinity with the ways of thinking of Plato and Aristotle. » (161) and thus we can say that Stoicism, which introduced this state of mind into the ancient Hellenic world, constituted a stage of transition between Greek philosophy and the modern ethical point of view. It so happens that in many modern books of morals, and even in many practical sermons, we find many things which have a close affinity with the modes of thought of the ancient Stoics, while such productions seldom have any affinity with the ways of thinking of Plato and Aristotle. » (161) and thus we can say that Stoicism, which introduced this state of mind into the ancient Hellenic world, constituted a stage of transition between Greek philosophy and the modern ethical point of view. It so happens that in many modern books of morals, and even in many practical sermons, we find many things which have a close affinity with the modes of thought of the ancient Stoics, while such productions seldom have any affinity with the ways of thinking of Plato and Aristotle. » (161) we find many things which have a close affinity with the ways of thought of the ancient Stoics, while such productions seldom have any affinity with the ways of thought of Plato and Aristotle. » (161) we find many things which have a close affinity with the ways of thought of the ancient Stoics, while such productions seldom have any affinity with the ways of thought of Plato and Aristotle. » (161)

In this context it is clear that Stoic apatheia as "'disconnection' from the realm of social mores" can legitimately be associated with the detachment that diaspora Jews maintain from the societies in which they live (162). As has already been pointed out, the points of contact between Stoicism and the "Doctrine of Awakening" in matters of askesis are not as firm as J. Evola supposes. Even though the Stoic apathéia (“without pathê ”: without emotions, without passions) and the Buddhist “( citta ) viveka ” generically mean detachment of the mind from the passions; even if pathê(passions) was considered by some Stoics as well as by Cicero, who proposed to translate pathê by "pathology" instead of "emotions", by "disturbance" instead of "suffering", according to the etymology of pathê (from the verb paschein (aorist pathein : to suffer or to endure)), the Stoic understanding of pathos remains much closer to the popular meaning of dukkha (suffering) than to its metaphysical meaning of "agitation" and "concussion". For the Stoics, the “wise” is the one who is able to distinguish what is under his control from what is not; for some the pathêshould be avoided; for others they must be eliminated, whereas the "Doctrine of Awakening" insists that nothing can be said to be "ours" and takes a realistic approach to the problem by teaching that asava(mania), not being avoidable or destructible, can only be overcome. “The Stoics asserted that the purpose of human beings is to live in accordance with or according to nature. They also claimed that purpose can be described by other expressions that are probably equally valid: in particular, "life according to reason", "life according to virtue" and "happiness" or "the attainment of happiness ". All these expressions denote the same thing and cumulatively can give the impression that the central principles of Stoic ethics are a series of vicious circles: One must live according to nature because it accords with reason; one must live according to reason because it accords with nature, etc. (163) Even if the author of these lines endeavors to prove in the rest of his study that the impression is false,upadhi-viveka ) is completely absent from Stoic ethics, which is concerned only with life and, in life, with the moral conduct of man, with the ordering of his life according to the so-called "law of nature", "reason", a "reason" common to all, which in turn is supposed to be the manifestation of a "universal reason" called "logos".

The samsaric nature of the Stoic teachings is even reflected in the metaphor Zeno uses to describe happiness as a result of living according to "virtue" and in accord with "nature": "a good flow of life."

Semitic influences are also striking in Stoic physics and cosmology. They are essentially of Chaldean origin (164).

“Everywhere it [Stoicism] devoted itself to the task of justifying popular cults, sacred stories and ritual observances. In Greece, he was able to adapt without too much difficulty to cults that were more formalist than doctrinal, more civic than moral, in which no authority required assent to definite dogmas. A system of accommodating allegories could easily yield a physical, ethical, or psychological interpretation of gods or myths that would reconcile them with the cosmology or ethics of Stoicism. In the East, where more theological religions have always involved a more precise conception of the world, the task seemed less easy. However, certain deep affinities reconcile Stoicism and Chaldean doctrines. Whether or not they contributed to the development of Zeno's ideas, they offered a singular analogy to his pantheism which represented ethereal fire as the primordial principle and considered the stars as the purest manifestation of its power. Stoicism conceived of the world as one great organism whose "sympathetic" forces necessarily acted and reacted in relation to each other, and therefore had to attribute a predominant influence to the celestial bodies, the largest and most powerful of all in nature, and its […] Destiny, linked to the infinite succession of causes, also readily agreed with the determinism of the Chaldeans, founded as it was on the regularity of sidereal movements. This philosophy thus made remarkable conquests not only in Syria but also as far as Mesopotamia. (165) This interactive movement of ideas was to "definitely introduce astrology as well as star worship into Stoic philosophy" (166) by the opinions of Zeno. “For us the person who almost single-handedly represents this fusion of West and East is Posidonius of Apamea [in Syria] […] but the preparations for this fusion were unquestionably carried out by his predecessors. It is remarkable that the great astronomer Hipparchus [of Nicaea, Bythinia] whose scientific theories […] were directly influenced by Chaldean teaching, was also a staunch supporter of one of the main doctrines of star religion […]” (167) The scientific discoveries of Chaldean astrology “achieved such prestige by virtue of their beliefs that they spread from the Far East to the Far West, and even now their grip has not been completely reversed. They penetrated by mysterious means as far as India, China, Indo-China, where divination by means of the stars is still practiced at the present time, and perhaps even reached the primitive centers of American civilization. . In the opposite direction, they spread to Syria, Egypt and throughout the Roman world, where their influence continued until the fall of paganism and lasted from the Middle Ages to the dawn of modern times. (168) "We should be struck by the power of this sidereal theology, founded on the ancient beliefs of the Chaldean astrologers, transformed in the Hellenistic period under the double influence of astronomical discoveries and Stoic thought, and promoted, after being became a pantheistic sun cult, the official religion of the Roman Empire. » (169)

In this respect also “it can be said that Stoicism was a Semitic philosophy. » (170)

“In the first century BC. AD and the first century AD. AD many prominent astrologers (e.g. Manilius, Cheremon) were also Stoics and a number of influential Stoics (especially Posidonius) defended astrological divination on a philosophical basis. Inasmuch as this philosophical endorsement seems to have facilitated the positive reception of astrology among the Roman elites, it also became a site of controversy against the Stoics themselves. (171) There was a Greek reaction and, later, an even greater Roman reaction against these foreign influences, which were perceived as such: "In Hellenistic historiography, knowledge about the stars […] both “scientific” and divinatory […] illustrated the “foreign wisdom” which the Greeks borrowed from ancient “barbarian” nations. Following the initial appropriation and subsequent criminalization of astral divination under Augustus (63 BC–AD 14), its traditional association with non-Greek nations began to take on more negative connotations. When the first Roman and Romanized authors of the empire tried to dissociate the "scientific" study of the stars from astral divination (in particular horoscopic astrology), it was often by appealing to the suspicious foreign origins of the latter, which was increasingly equated with the category of "magic" (see, for example, Pliny, Following the initial appropriation and subsequent criminalization of astral divination under Augustus (63 BC–AD 14), its traditional association with non-Greek nations began to take on more negative connotations. 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When the first Roman and Romanized authors of the empire tried to dissociate the "scientific" study of the stars from astral divination (in particular horoscopic astrology), it was often by appealing to the suspicious foreign origins of the latter, which was increasingly equated with the category of "magic" (see, for example, Pliny, its traditional association with non-Greek nations began to take on more negative connotations. When the first Roman and Romanized authors of the empire tried to dissociate the "scientific" study of the stars from astral divination (in particular horoscopic astrology), it was often by appealing to the suspicious foreign origins of the latter, which was increasingly equated with the category of "magic" (see, for example, Pliny,Hist . nat ., 30.1V). » (172) From 33 BC. AD to 93 AD. J.-C. the astrologers were regularly banished from Rome or executed because of proven or presumed frauds or manipulations, personal and political. Astrology "…as a destabilizing political force and a powerful instrument to deceive the masses…is 'a concept' to which Josephus mentions in The Jewish War , when he recounts the fascination with celestial omens and their interpretations erroneous, which contributed to the outbreak of the Jewish revolt against Rome ( The Jewish War,6.288V). (173) “What is significant is the fact that early Jewish attitudes toward astronomy/astrology were not completely negative. On the contrary, some of Josephus' predecessors seem to have adopted the view of astronomy/astrology as an emblem of great antiquity and as an integral part of the scientific progress of mankind […] so that the Chaldean origins of Abraham and its associations with astronomy/astrology could serve the positive purpose of affirming the place of the Jewish people in world history. (174) “On this basis, the equation established by Pliny, sensitive as he was to the Jewish problem, between the threat of magic and the threat of foreign invasion and cultural contamination, takes on its full meaning. ; for similar reasons, Pliny or Celsus recognized an Eastern cult like Christianity as a threat to public order and most likely saw that Stoicism and Eastern cults were not so much rivals as objective allies since "the latter numbered their supporters by the hundreds among whom the preaching philosopher could occasionally find a supporter. The importance of the philosophers in the spread of non-Roman beliefs lay chiefly in the fact that they touched all classes of society and, as different as they may appear from the cults associated with the various foreign deities, they truly represented the same emotional need as the latter. (175) Astrology, however, was never formally banned in Rome where it had the full support of the plebs,magi mais mathematicii ) at their court.

More generally, philosophy in the Greco-Roman world tended to play a subversive role in all areas as soon as its tenor became individualistic, provoking a real displacement of objective investigation towards the subjective terrain of practical and in particular political concerns and, as we have seen, its tenor became more and more individualistic, ethical and political as the number of philosophers from Asia and North Africa increased. Already "the pre-Socratics were generally politically active and influential, combining an abstruse and ethereal contemplation of the cosmos with an aggressive political engagement" (176), so much so that by the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth century they were the target of disgruntled citizens. " First of all, the scientific studies of cosmologists deal with distant phenomena and offer theories that are not verifiable. Second, these studies are irrelevant to the needs of society and useless for the education of the individual. Third, the techniques of debate and argument can be used interchangeably to support true or false positions and are therefore potentially harmful. Fourth, the theories of philosophers are impious and subversive of traditional values. (177) Fully aware of the danger, an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, introduced a law "forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and the these studies are irrelevant to the needs of society and useless for the education of the individual. Third, the techniques of debate and argument can be used interchangeably to support true or false positions and are therefore potentially harmful. Fourth, the theories of philosophers are impious and subversive of traditional values. (177) Fully aware of the danger, an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, introduced a law "forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and the these studies are irrelevant to the needs of society and useless for the education of the individual. Third, the techniques of debate and argument can be used interchangeably to support true or false positions and are therefore potentially harmful. Fourth, the theories of philosophers are impious and subversive of traditional values. (177) Fully aware of the danger, an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, introduced a law "forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and the Fourth, the theories of philosophers are impious and subversive of traditional values. (177) Fully aware of the danger, an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, introduced a law "forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and the Fourth, the theories of philosophers are impious and subversive of traditional values. (177) Fully aware of the danger, an Athenian, Sophocles of Sunium, introduced a law "forbidding the establishment of a philosophical school without the express permission of the Athenian assembly and theball ; the establishment of a school of philosophy without permission being punishable by death. (178) Unfortunately for Athens, the law was soon declared illegal as it was seen as a violation of the right of free religious association (179) and Athens was again in the Greco-Roman world the only safe "home base" philosophers and rhetoricians, the only place where "free thinkers" pouring in from all over the Near East and North Africa as exiles or ambassadors, could settle and practice without fear of banishment , despite Plato's and Aristotle's opposition to their teachings and despite the fact that a number of Athenian citizens perceived this philosophy to be unpatriotic and therefore dangerous. That Cato the Elder,politeia of philosophia and the foreign origin of most philosophers, the fact is that he clearly saw the danger posed by philosophers and had Carneades and his team, who had been sent from Athens to Rome as ambassadors, in Greece, and had them subsequently banished from Rome, where philosophy was ridiculed in the comedies of the time. Until Rome conquered Greece, many young Romans had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with "Greek" philosophy and men such as Cato were no longer there to deal with it (180).

Taking note of the fact that it is said, including Herodotus, that Thales was of Phoenician origin and fled Phoenicia for Miletus, WKC Guthrie writes that "it would be interesting to find a trace of Semitic blood at the very beginning of philosophy Greek. The controversy over the origin of Greek philosophy is not new since Diogenes Laertius reports with disapproval that “philosophy appeared among the barbarians. »

BK, translated from English by JB

(1) Raaflaub, KA, The discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 30.

(2) Ibid .

(3) Ibid ., p. 31.

(4) Ibid ., p. 35.

(5) Ibid . An exhaustive comparative study of these two terms in Homeric literature suggests that “ autonomia emphasizes self-determination and eleutheria is the absence of foreign domination; eleutheria is passive, autonomia is active; eleutheria is a doubly negative concept (“not not free”), autonomiaa positive; eleutheria implies "freedom from something", autonomia "independence for something". ( ibid ., p. 154).

(6) Ibid ., p. 44-45. Various studies have highlighted the possible link between eleutheroes and liut (from the Indo-European root \*leudh-o), the old Germanic term for "people", which allows us to deduce that this Greek adjective originally meant belonging legitimate to a social and family community linked to the ethnic group as a place for the development of individual activity. See Berthouzoz OP, R., Theologian in social dialogue , Fribourg: Academic Press, 2006, p. 49.

(7) Raaflaub, KA, op . cit ., p. 24.

(8) Ibid ., p. 28.

(9) Ibid ., p. 44-45.

(10) “[W]e are of purely Greek origin and unmixed with the barbarians. With us, no Pelops, Cadmus, Egyptus and Danaus, nor so many others, true barbarians by origin, Greeks only by law. Pure Greek blood flows through our veins without any mixture of barbarian blood; hence, in the very bowels of the republic, the incorruptible hatred of all that is foreign. ( Menexenus , 245d).

(11) Stanley, PV, The Economic Reforms of Solon , St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 1999, p. 176.

(12) Raaflaub, KA, op . cit ., p. 57.

(13) Davis, RW, The Origins of Modern Freedom in the West , Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 46. ​​In the Histories , the notion of nomos is “always something essentially and intrinsically Greek. The famous dialogue between Xerxes, the barbarian king, and Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, is a perfect demonstration of this: The Spartans, says Demaratus, are both free and subject to a "master", the law. The laughter with which Xerxes greets this statement indicates his total incomprehension. (Brunschwig, J., Le Savoir Grec: A Guide to Classical Knowledge , Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 645).

(14) Polenz, M., Freedom in Greek Life and Thought: The History of an Ideal, Dordrecht : D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1996, p. 13.

(15) Dmitriev, S., The Greek Slogan of Freedom and Early Roman Politics in Greece, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 18.

(16) <https://griceclub.blogspot.fr/2011/04/why-eleutherism-rather-than-liberalism.html>.

(17) Photopoulos, T., Towards an Inclusive Democracy: The Crisis of the Growth Economy and Need for a New Liberatory Project, Londres : Cassell, 1997, p. 179.

(18) Lape, S., Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 25 ; <https://historiantigua.cl/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Race-and-Citizen-Identity-in-the-Classical-Athenian-Democracy.pdf> , p. 6: “The criterion of birth for citizenship evolved in three stages […] from 'free birth of an Athenian father' to 'free and legitimate birth of an Athenian father' to 'free and legitimate birth of an Athenian father'. Athenian and an Athenian mother". If, as indicated on p. 25, "prior to the passage of the Periclean citizenship law there is no evidence that citizens of known foreign origins were considered a threat to the polis or democracy", there are good reasons to to think that this was only because there were then few citizens with foreign origins, since immigration from the Near East was still limited.

(19) Hansen, M. H. , In The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology , University of Oklahoma Press Edition, 1999, translated by JA Crook, p. 76.

(20) Patterson, O., Freedom in the Making of Western Culture , 1991, p. 42, 51.

(21) One aspect of the growing interest in the individual is clearly illustrated by the philosophical meaning given by the Socratics to the Delphic precept “Know thyself”. While the ancients thought that in practice "self-knowledge can be obtained by some kind of consultation of the 'personal daemon'" (Betz, HD, Hellenismus und Urchristentum, Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990, p. 160), implying “that the Delphic maxim commands them to summon their personal daemon and gain control of it by magical means; the Socratics sought it by the result of philosophical introspection, by an attentive examination of their "conscience." “They identified the self with the psyche [daemon] […] [which] for the Socratic milieu came to mean the rational faculty. They assumed that the main task of life was to take care of this psyche; the term arete (virtue or excellence) was redefined to mean the excellence of the psyche [for Homer, aretemeans “martial excellence”]; to take care of it meant to develop the particular excellence of reason and to ensure that reason dominates all other faculties. They believed that moral and political life would only be placed on a good foundation if all citizens recognized the supremacy of reason. (Dawson, D., Cities of the Gods: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought , New-York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 55).

(22) Ibid ., p. 9. The deepest meaning of nomos , coming from nemein, “to divide”, “to graze”, for the early Hellenes, is perhaps revealed in the following insightful remarks: it was “the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible […] ] The initial measure and division of pastures, i.e. the appropriation of land as well as the concrete order it contains and which flows from it […] Nomos is the measure by which the land is divided and located in a particular order; it is also the form of political, social and religious order determined by this procedure. Here, measure, order and form constitute a spatially concrete unity. The nomosby which a tribe, a suite or a people establishes itself, that is to say, by which it is historically situated and transforms a part of the surface of the earth into a force field of a particular order, becomes visible in the appropriation of land and in the founding of a city or a colony. (Schmitt, C., The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus . Translation and introduction by GL Ulmen, Telos Press Publishing, 2006, p. 70).

(23) Conklin, WE, The Invisible Origins of Legal Positivism: A Re-Reading of a Tradition , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, p. 26.

(24) Evola, J., Revolt against the Modern World , Rochester, Vt: Inner Traditions International, 1995, p. 20-21.

(25) Hall, R. Plato , London: Routledge, 2004, p. 13-14.

(26) See F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis: Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im Griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts , Darmstadt: Wiss. Buchges., 1980, p. 125.

(27) Hall, R., op . cit ., p. 14.

(28) Olson, R., Science Deified and Science Defied: The Historical Significance of Science in Western Culture , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983, p. 88.

(29) The arguments, if not in favor of racial equality, at least in favor of social equality, were drawn for the most part from scientific themes. For example, in PhoiníssaiAccording to Euripides, “equality among men is bound up with the exact quantitative considerations which apply to calendrical astronomy, and human ethical considerations are considered analogous in the course of inanimate phenomena. ( ibid. , p. 90).

(30) Ibid ., p. 91.

(31) Ibid ., p. 92.

(32) Ibid ., p. 93. As such, as Hegel clearly saw, the sophism had an enormous corrupting effect on Athenian democracy as well as being the precursor to modern freedom: “When reflection comes into play one begins to wonder whether the principles of law ( das Recht) cannot be upgraded. Instead of clinging to the actual state of things, one relies on inner conviction; and thus begins the independent subjective freedom in which the individual finds himself able to put everything to the test of his own conscience, even in defiance of the existing constitution […] This decline even Thucydides remarks when he speaks of the fact that everyone thinks things are going badly when they don't participate in management. (Hegel, GWF, The Philosophy of History , New York: Dover, 1956, translated by J. Sibree, p. 253).

(34) Roederer C., Moellendorff, D., Case Law , Lansdowne: Juta and Company Ltd, p. 31.

(35) Fouchard, A., Aristocracy and Democracy: Ideologies and Societies in Ancient Greece, Paris: The beautiful letters, 1998, p. 371. For a discussion of Plato's attempt to reconcile nomos and physis in a synthesis, see Hall, R., op . cit ., p. 13-31.

For Plato, the nomos is not a simple convention nor is it opposed to the physis ; on the contrary, the nomos conforms to it. The assumption that nomos and physis are antithetical results from a misunderstanding of the term physis : "He believes that physishas been misinterpreted by the proponents of these doctrines [the sophists]; they have indeed reversed the natural order of things. What these thinkers call 'natural' and 'primary' is actually secondary and derived, and what they call 'derived' and 'secondary' is preeminently natural. Presumably basing their thinking on Greek cosmological speculation, they misuse the term "nature" to signify the random processes by which primary substances (in their view fire, earth, air, and water) are created. The soul derived from these in a later stage, together with things related to the soul ( your psyches ). This, states Plato, is the source of the "foolish opinions of all who have undertaken to study nature." (Byron, S.,Plato's Resolution of the Nomos-Physis Antithesis , McGill University, 1984, p. 56-57). “The antithesis between nomos and physis is a faulty distinction engendered by the erroneous notion that physis is characterized by material substance and that the soul and things related to the soul are subsequently derived from these material substances. Plato, on the contrary, proves that the soul and things related to the soul are logically prior to material substance and, therefore, are truly natural.

“However, there is a problem with this presentation. Plato is sometimes described as a prototypical natural law theorist. And, as Morrow asserts, there is little doubt that Plato foreshadowed and influenced the Stoic conception of the "law of nature", doing so to speak the philosophical work necessary to bring together the concepts of nomos and physis . By praising the role intelligence plays in legislation and asserting that laws that fail to promote the good are not true laws, Plato was clearly formulating ideas developed by later natural law theorists. ( ibid . p. 59)

The essential complementarity of physis and nomos appears clearly, as well as the limits of Plato's attempts to bring them together, in this most insightful and powerful gloss on Heidegger's interpretation of the former: "Etymologically, the term physis is from the Indo-Germanic root bhu, bheu (the corresponding term in Greek is phuo ), which means self-emergence, "to emerge, to maintain, to rise from oneself and to remain upright". Therefore the fundamental meaning of Being denotes the self-sustaining and self-emerging implications of entities. The physisis Being itself, which by nature abides in itself and unfolds itself. It signifies growth or emergence. The physis is therefore explained as what emerges from itself or what results in unfolding itself. It is about what emerges and unfolds, what achieves itself, which at the same time returns to its source: withdrawal. The physis as a fundamental term signifies the emergence in what results, the return of the emergent in itself […] The physis signifies the emergent constant hold. Physis brings beings into the "world" to be as they are. (Manithottil, P., Difference at the Origin: Derrida's Critique of Heidegger's Philosophy of the Work of Art, New Delhi: Atlantic, p. 29-30). “The distortion of the concept of physis took place with the translation of physis into Latin by natura ( nasci ), which means “to be born”, “to come from”. The basic meaning of physis is already ignored by this translation. We do not understand the physis here in the original sense of the emergent constant hold, but rather as the nature of things, as the being prior to all beings. Thus, over time, the fundamental Greek experience of physis is transformed into a philosophy of nature, “a representation of all things that they are really material in nature. » » (ibid ., p. 30) “In Plato the essence of truth is the exactness of the representation and thus philosophy becomes the search for the truth of beings in terms of Ideas. His thinking brings about a change in the essence of truth; the physis is transformed as a conception of beings as beings, the real is interpreted and determined by Ideas. And this change in the essence of truth has dominated the whole of philosophy until today […] In Aristotelian metaphysics, the narrowing of the meaning of physis takes place in the direction of a physical interpretation or materialist of this term ( physis). He describes nature as "the foundation of beings as such", "what is, as such and as a whole". In summary, beings as such and as a whole […] is the physis , which means the emergent constant hold as that which is their essence and character; but the narrowing of the physis takes place to mean what is naturally or physically […] The conceptualization of the meaning of beings, the humanization of truth, leads to the distortion of the original meaning of the physis ” ( ibid ., p. 31-32) while “the etymological implications of the term physis and its corresponding Latin translation natura, nature, indicate how the original sense of Being as physis degraded into physics, into what a thing is […]” ( ibid ., p. 28.29) “With concern for what is human and the question of the meaning of beings began the degradation of the original meaning of Being as physis . The humanization of truth determines the truth of things rationally. ( ibid . p. 28).

(36) In Plato's Gorgias , virtue and happiness are equated by Callicles “with luxury, intemperance and freedom”. Aristotle and Plato argued that freedom, especially as an ideal, can easily be corrupted and degenerate into license ( Gorg . 492c5;Laws , III 701a7; Politics , VI, 2 1317b11-13, 4 1319b30-2), for, when defined in the Athenian democratic sense as "doing what one wills" ( Pol . V, 10, 1310a31-2), freedom prevents one from attaining personal moral perfection and becomes a threat to the constitutional order ( Pol . V, 12, 1316b21-7; VI, 4, 1318b38-1319a1); by analogy, for Tacitus, only imbeciles can identify licencia with libertas ; "the libertiesin Rome and for the Romans is not an internal faculty or a human right but the sum of the civic rights granted by the laws of Rome; it therefore rests on the positive laws which determine its scope. This fundamental idea implies that libertas contains the notion of restraint inherent in all law. In fact, it is the notion of restraint and moderation that distinguishes libertas from licentia , whose main characteristic is arbitrariness; and libertas not tempered by moderation degenerates into licentia . The real libertas, therefore, is in no way the absolute power to do what one wants; such power […] whether granted or assumed […] is licentia , not libertas . (Wirszubski, Ch., Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early Principate , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 7) mos maiorum and of the instituta patrum , because it is conceived as a right and a faculty not of an isolated individual but of the citizen of the organized community of the Roman State […] La libertasin Rome was not the watchword of the individual who tried to assert his own personality against the supreme authority of society. ( ibid ., p.8).

(37) Benn, A. W., History of Ancient Philosophy , Watts & Co., 1912, p. 44.

(38) It is hardly necessary to emphasize the “[striking] similarity in the way of thinking of the Greek sophists […] of the fifth century BC. and supporters of seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal ideas” (Ritchie, D., Natural Rights: A Criticism Of Some Political And Ethical Conceptions , vol. 11, London: Routledge, 2004, p 25.

What would later be called individualism, both as a belief, a belief in the primary importance of the individual and personal independence, and as a doctrine, a doctrine advocating the absence of government regulation in the pursuit of the economic goals of the individual and arguing that the interests of the individual must take precedence over the interests of the state and of the social group, was already the origin of the sophistic and cynical corruption of the concept of eleutheria .

(39) Keulartz, J., Struggle for Nature: A Critique of Radical Ecology , London: Routledge, 1998, p. 110.

(40) Davis, CHS, Greek and Roman Stoicism and some of Its Disciples, Boston: Herbert B. Turner & co., 1903, p. 29. The utilitarian aspect of knowledge in the sophism is reflected in the humanizing philosophy of Socrates who "just like the sophists […] entirely rejected the physical speculations in which his predecessors had indulged and made the subjective thoughts and opinions of men its starting point. He endeavored to extract from the common intelligence of humanity an objective rule of practical life. Socrates aimed to step out of the contemplation of nature and turn his attention to his own phenomena. ( ibid ., p. 34).

(41) Ibid ., p. 29.

(42) Sunne, DG, Some Phases in the Development of the Subjective Point of View during the Post-Aristotelian Period, The University of Chicago press, 1911, p. 9.

(43) Ibid., p. 10.

(44) Marcus Aurelius, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to himself: an English translation with introductory study on stoicism and the last of the Stoics, traduit par Gerald H. Rendall. Londres : Macmilan, 1898, xl-xlii.

(45) Sayre, F., Greek Cynics, Baltimore : J. H. Furst, 1948, p. 4.

(46) Ibid., p. 7.

(47) DL., VI., 29, in Clément, M., Le Cynisme à la renaissance d’Erasme à Montaigne, Genève : Droz, 2005, p. 141.

(48) Evola, J., Ride The Tiger, Rochester : Inner Traditions International, 2003, p. 49.

(49) Thornton, B. S., Greek Ways: How the Greeks Created Western Civilization, Encounter Books, 2000, p. 176.

(50) Evola, J., op. cit., p. 53.

(51) Desmond, W. D., Cynics, Berkeley : University of California Press, 2008, p. 153-54.

(52) Ibid., p. 101-2.

(53) Ibid., p. 219.

(54) Shea, L., The Cynic Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon, Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, p. 11.

(55) Marcus Tullius Cicero., On The Commonwealth, Columbus (Ohio) : The Ohio State University Press, traduit par G. H., Sabine, 1929, p. 17-18. Dans HermotimusLucian of Samosata describes a city where “all the citizens are foreigners, not one of them is native; they include many barbarians, slaves, cripples, dwarves […] Distinctions such as superior and inferior, noble and common, slave and free, simply do not exist here, not even in name. It is described as utopian…

(56) Goulet-Caze, MO, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy , Berkeley-LA-Londres, University of California Press, 1996, p. 111.

(57) Howard, D., The Primacy of the Political: A History of Political Thought from the Greeks , p. 82.

(58) Marcus Tullius Cicero., op . quote., p. 18. The promotion of cosmopolitanism, as one might expect, was not purely ideal, nor was it disinterested; the motivations behind it not as abstract as its wording. For example, the concept of hospitality or the rights of strangers (xenia ) put forward by Aristippus of Cyrene, one of Socrates' pupils – apparently the first to accept money for his teaching – and the founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, was designed to secure his personal freedom (Branham, RB, Goulet-Caze, MO, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 111).

(59) Sayre, F., Diogenes of Sinope: a Study of Greek Cynicism, Baltimore : J. H. Furst, 1938 p. 28.

(60) Garnsey, P., Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine, Cambridge : Cambrige University Press, 1996, p. 132.

(61) Voir Davis, C. H. S., op. cit. ; Marcus Aurelius, op. cit., p. xxxvi-xxxviii.

(62) Sunne, D. G., op. cit., p. 18-19.

(63) Dillon, J. M., The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 80-81.

(64) Sunne, D. G., op. cit., p. 30-31.

(65) Ibid., p. 33. “No one discoursed more eloquently than he on the intrinsic value of virtue. The real test is internal, the consequences are morally irrelevant; the will is the only good. Another proof of the subjective point of view is the prominence given to the softer and sympathetic side of the character; although his writings bear the imprint of more severe and manly traits, Cicero was an influential actor in the progress towards the softer virtues. Another conception that shines through in Cicero's ethics is that of humanism, a feeling of universal sympathy rooted in nature for man simply as a human being. The tendency to the subjective attitude in the transition from the conception of the supreme good to that of the supreme law is the most important.gentium juice . In discussing universal law he says that divine reason has the authority to command in matters of good and evil, imposing a penalty for disobedience. For Cicero, the law of nature is then, from the objective point of view, a supreme code; and from the subjective point of view, a natural principle commanding distinctly what to do and what not to do. Thus, as regards ethics, Cicero rallied in general to the point of view of average stoicism but made more progress towards a subjective point of view by granting a greater place both in religious beliefs and in ethical doctrines to the personal element. and internal control. ( Ibid ., p. 34)

(66) Strozierp, RM, Foucault,Subjectivity, and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and Self, Détroit (Mich.) : Wayne State University Press, 2002, p. 170-171.

(67) Sunne, D. G., op. cit., p. 40.

(68) Ibid., p. 43.

(69) Ibid., p. 46.

(70) Ibid., p. 47.

(71) Davidson, W. L., The Stoic Creed, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1907, p. 135. Stoicism and cynicism drew their cosmopolitan perspective from a study of "human nature" which led them to conceive of it as a set of faculties and ends peculiar to all human beings independently of temporal and geographical variations of customs, customs and laws. Stoic cosmopolitanism was based on altruism; cynical cosmopolitanism over selfishness. It was no less cosmopolitanism.

(72) Fernandez-Santamaría, JA, Natural Law, Constitutionalism, Reason of State, and War , New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005, p. 19.

(73) Davis, CHS, op . cit ., xiv.

(74) Ibid ., xivi-xiviii.

(75) Garnsey, P., op. cit., p. 133.

(76) Kamtekar, R., Distinction Without a Difference? Race and Genos in Plato, in Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays, Oxford : Backwell, 2002, p. 7, 9, <https://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/9780631222262/001.pdf>.

(77) In Bobzien, S., Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 339.

(78) Si le terme pathos, which Cicero had difficulty translating into Latin, actually means, as is sometimes suggested, "disturbance", possibly even "disease" figuratively, it may be related to the Buddhist notion of dukkha . In this case, apatheia could also be related to the fifth quality of the Aryan warrior, who is reminded that “desire causes evil and aversion causes evil; and there is a middle way by which one avoids desire and aversion: a way which gives sight and vision, which leads to calmness, which leads to clear vision” ( Majjhima-Nikaya, 3), since, as has been well noted, for certain late Stoics, "the sign of recognition of the madman is that he considers many things as good and bad, which are in truth neither one nor the other, for example, life, health, strength, beauty, good reputation, power, wealth and their opposites. Therefore the fool develops an inappropriate attachment to or revulsion towards those things which he regards as good and bad. This attachment or revulsion constitutes enslavement because it prevents the fool from doing what he reasonably would like to do in pursuit of his own good. It is these presumed goods and evils that become his masters, direct and determine his life, in that they then compulsively make him pursue them or flee them, regardless of what he should do to follow his true interest. (Frede, M.,A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought , Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, p. 67) Conversely, freedom would consist of having the ability to act for oneself, to act of one's own volition, to act on one's own account, to act independently ( ibid .) However, no Stoic never lives beyond this, which is considered a starting point in the totalitarian ascetic economy of the “Doctrine of Awakening” – for Seneca “the body is only the hoof and the prison of the spirit shaken and persecuted by chastisements, violence and disease.

(79) Garnsey, P. , op . cit ., p. 133.

(80) Ibid ., p. 137.

(81) Ibid., p. 132.

(82) Ibid ., p. 75.

(83) Ibid ., p. 150.

(84) Ibid ., p. 142.

(85) Ibid .

(86) Ibid ., p. 144.

(87) If the Stoic thinkers, like Aristotle, defined psychology as the ability to reason, in contrast to him “they rejected the idea that there are different “types” of human souls and with them the social and political hierarchical structures that Aristotle advocates in The Politics and elsewhere. (Richter, D., S., Cosmopolis: Imagining Community in Late Classical Athens and the Early Roman Empire, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, p. 67). They obviously only rejected them in principle.

(88) Garnsey, P., op . cit ., p. 150

(89) Ibid .

(90) Ritchie, D., op . cit ., p. 35.

(91) Downing, FG, Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian Origins II, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 17. The verb "to play" (in the sense of "to act") and the expression "social role" are particularly apt to express the subversive dimension of the Stoic "ethical" teaching: you do not have a social function in accordance with your own nature and your own qualifications, "you play a social role" and, since it is a "role", you can eventually change it, voluntarily or not.

(92) Ierodiakonou, K., Topics in Stoic Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 162.

(93) Boym, S., Another Freedom: The Alternative History of an Idea, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010, p. 13. Certainly, neither in the thought of Diogenes or in that of his “master” nor in Stoicism, whether Greek or Roman, “inner freedom” does not consist in a pure and simple renunciation of the things of the world; Antisthenes' ideal was simply to make himself as independent as possible of external things; in Roman Stoicism there was a strong emphasis on the notion of duty, an even greater emphasis than that of self-control, so that the idea of ​​inner tranquility and that of public duty seem rather balanced in the work of Seneca.

(94) It should be clear that much of the anti-traditional nature of the ideas and action of these philosophical schools and religious sects lies in their use of a weapon of occult warfare identified by J. Evola as " the deliberate misidentification of a principle with its representatives. Traditional institutions may have decayed in Greece and Rome, in part because of the corruption of their representatives, and yet, instead of demanding that individuals unworthy of the normative and operative principles they were supposed to embody and manifest be replaced by qualified individuals, these schools and sects claimed that the principles themselves were false and deleterious and that they should be replaced by their own principles. They were fiercely critical of thepolis as such and from its foundation, the nomos , as such. This extensive criticism etymologically means apoliteia .

(95) Winter, BW, Philo and Paul Among the Sophists , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 225, <https://lionelwindsor.net/bibleresources/bible/new/Wisdom_1Corinthians.rtf> .

(96) Downing, FG, Cynics, Paul, and the Pauline Churches: Cynics and Christian , London and New York: Routledge, 1988, p. 71.

(97) Ibid ., p. 72.

(98) Ibid ., p. 73.

(99) Goodman, E., The Origins of the Western Legal Tradition: From Thales to the Tudors, Sydney: The Federation Press, 1995, p. 62-63. On the other hand, (popular) cynicism offered the humble-turned-cynic “freedom from constraints, a change of environment, a great tolerance of behaviors and a life (of a certain kind) without work. (Dudley, DR, A history of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century , London: Methuen, 1937, p. 147). There's no reason Paul's audience didn't have him in mind.

It has been repeatedly pointed out, with some basis, that the cynicism was an attempt to "put responsibility on the rebellion": "The adversaries of convention had standardized the manner and substance of their assault in a conventional form that demanded of its exhibitors no originality of thought but rather, at best, impeccable asceticism and enough wit and rhetorical power to hold the public's attention. ( ibid ., p. 127) Like the sophists, "the cynics scoffed at the customs and conventions of others but were inflexible in observing their own." (Sayre, F., op . cit., p. 18) The Greek historian Appian was even more specific in his criticism of cynicism: "We now see many, obscure and miserable, who wear the garb of philosophy out of necessity and bitterly mock the rich and powerful, not because that they have a real contempt for wealth and power, but out of jealousy of those who possess them. ( Mith . 5.28).

The preaching of pious poverty as a lever for social mobility is also a common feature in the lives of many famous Egyptian ascetics and notorious bands of Egyptian and Syrian monks as well as in the careers of an array of beggars, fugitives, vagabonds, slaves, day laborers, peasants, mechanics, of the lowest kind, of thieves and bandits” who found that “by becoming monks they would become gentlemen and sorts of saints” ( [https://www.ftarchives](https://www.ftarchives/) .net/foote/crimes/c1.htm), starting with Georgius of Cappadocia, “born in Epiphany, Cilicia, [who] was a little parasite who obtained a lucrative contract to supply the army with bacon. Thug and informant, he became rich and fled from justice. He saved his money, converted to Arianism, assembled a library, and was promoted by a faction to the episcopal throne of Alexandria. (Emerson, RW, Essays and English Traits : Emerson, Cosimo, 2009, vol. 5, p. 407).

Basically, the more we become familiar with the cynical mentality, the more we realize that it has never been as jubilant as it is today in the barking of committed artists in the broad sense.

(100) Kleingeld, P., Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship , Cambridge (Eng.): Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 2.

(101) Ibid .

(102) “ Pistis is primarily a term for the fundamental understanding and conviction that accompanies the initial call and conversion to the gospel of Christ. In this acceptance it is a phenomenon of occurrence which is related to the entry into the group. Pistisis of course something that continues to be present […] This is why Paul uses it in 5:6 in order to introduce the topic of “ethics” into the group, that is, once a person has entered it. However, pistis apparently has its first logical place, one could even say its missionary Sitz im Leben […] in connection with the conversion and the entry into the group. The pneuma , on the other hand, is an entity that is mainly linked to group membership. It highlights a certain stable state of the believer. (Engberg-Pedersen, T., Paul and the Stoics , Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000, p. 158).

(103) Goodman, E., op . cit ., p. 62-63.

(104) Blumenfeld, B., The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework , Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004, p. 23-24

(105) Rasimus, T., Engberg-Pedersen, T., Dunderberg, I., Stoicism in Early Christianity , Grand Rapids, Mich. : Baker Academic, 2010, p. 180.

(106) Blumenfeld, B., op . quote .

(107) More interesting for the purposes of this study is his assertion that “This conception of (mystical) citizenship conforms to the Pythagorean Hellenistic conception of kingly justice. It would require further elaboration.

(108) Longenecker, RN, Paul, Apostle of Liberty, Regent College Publishing, 2003, p. 159-160.

(109) Ellul, J., The Ethics of Freedom, Grand Rapids : Eerdmans, 1976, p. 96.

(110) Deming, W., Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 161.

(111) Basically, the seeds of this interest were sown much earlier by the mystery cults: "The cult of Demeter was connected with the mysteries of Eleusis, and the savage cult of Dionysus accepted among its initiates citizens and slaves, the rich and the poor. Here the old and the new mingle, the agricultural religion and the Homeric gods, the rational and the irrational. These cults, with their egalitarian approach and emphasis on the individual, contributed to the transcendental breakthrough as much as the rationalist and naturalist philosophers and political thinkers of the polis . (Eisenstadt, SN, The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations , New York: State of New York University Press, 1986, p. 54).

(112) The Stoic echo is perceptible in Philo. Since the general opinion is that the connection between Stoic thought and Christian thought on slavery is found in his writings through a misinterpretation of Aristotle's theory of slavery, it is interesting to summarize his opinions on the subject: "Philo's two kinds of bondage are a simplified version of the primitive Stoic typology [...] Philo follows the founders of Stoicism in emphasizing the bondage of the soul and characterizing it as submission passions or emotions (here it is desire, fear, pleasure and pain). His position regarding slavery under the law […] is consistent with Stoicism. His teaching on the sage is clearly Stoic.physis ”: each is compatible with a Stoic position on slavery. (Garnsey, P., op. cit., p. 173)

“Philo had before him two kinds of slavery: slavery applies in one sense to the body, in another sense to the soul. The enslavement of the body is a consequence of capture in war or sale or birth. The slave as to the body is not ipso facto a real slave: he is inferior to his master only by the force of things […] The real slave, that is to say the moral slave, is one who is dominated by feelings or passions. Moral slavery, in Philo as in orthodox Stoicism, is avoidable: it resides within our sphere of control, responsibility and accountability. ( ibid ., p. 171)

“Philo also believed that moral slavery was ordained by God, who created two natures, one servile, the other blessed. He went so far as to sanction the subjugation of the moral slave to institutional slavery because he needs to be controlled in his interest and in that of others. Philo makes the transition between moral slavery and physical slavery. Moral slaves, it seems, must be physical slaves. ( ibid ., p. 172)

On the Stoic influence on Christianity, see Arnold, EV, Roman Stoicism , Cambridge (Eng.): University Press, 1911.

(113) Garnsey, P., op . cit ., p. 173.

(114) Ibid .

(115) Dodd, BJ, The Problem With Paul , Downers Grove. III. : InterVarsity Press, 1996, p. 100-101.

(116) Garnsey, P., op . cit ., p. 176. Since the Old Testament, in which "the history of Israel was commonly (inwardly) interpreted and summarized using the motif of divine overthrow, involving the downfall of enemies and the vindication of God's suffering people" (<https://etheses.nottingham.ac.uk/1812/1/Paul_and_the_Rhetoric_of_Reversal.pdf> , p. 35), uses and abuses the literary form known as chiasmus, so it appears significantly in many parts of the Gospels - whose "writers used the theme of the reversal and perceived it to be fulfilled in the events associated with the coming, suffering, death, resurrection, ascension, and return of Jesus Christ,” whose gospel “is presented as a message of imminent (but inaugurated) overthrow. ( ibid.. p. 40) – playing a considerable role in Paul. The significant use is rooted in the fact that the chiasmus "infused the modes of thought and expression with the Semitic mind, and in this way made its way into the Old Testament and then into the New Testament." (Man, RE, The Value of Chiasm for New Testament Interpretation , "Biblioteca Sacra", 41, April-June 1964, p. 146) This rhetorical device is part of the Pauline strategy of "reversing the statutes", or rather of the inversion of values ​​that is at the heart of the "good news". 1 Corinthians7.22 (“A slave who was called of the Lord is a freedman of the Lord; likewise a free man who was called is a slave of Christ.”) is most illustrative of this rhetoric.

(117) Johnson, LT, The Writings of the New Testament: An Interpretation , London: SCM Press, 1999, p. 401.

(118) Ibid .

(119) Ibid .

(120) Rodriguez, RR, Racism and God-Talk , New York, New York University Press, 2008, p. 145-146. It is hardly surprising that Chrysostom thinks that Ephesians6:9 (“And you, masters, do likewise to them, and refrain from threats, knowing that their master and yours is in heaven, and that before him there is no honor of people.”) indicates that masters should serve slaves.

(121) Garnsey, P., op . cit ., p. 155.

(122) Byron, J., Slavery Metaphors in Early Judaism and Pauline Christianity , Tubingue: Mohr, 2003, p. 17.

(123) Bickerman, EJ, Studies in Jewish and Christian History , Leiden: EJ Brill, 1986, p. 148.

(124) Chadwick, WE, The Social Teaching of St Paul, Cambridge (Eng.): The University press, 1906, p. 80. Moreover, all of Paul's rhetoric of moral exhortation stems entirely from the parenetic tradition of his Pharisee milieu.

(125) See, for example, Edwards, JR, The Hebrew Gospel and the Development of the Synoptic Tradition , Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009.

(126) Kee, HK, The Beginnings of Christianity: An Introduction to the New Testament , Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005, p. 453, <https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/21575/thedrama.pdf.txt;jsessionid=27E40E8736826129738470D3D035E4CA?sequence=1>. “The third witness is Josephus (AD 37 – 93), a Jewish historian writing in Greek. In his works, Josephus sometimes mentions Stoicism and Epicureanism. Contra Apionem contains the following remark: "I do not know how to explain how these notions of God are the feelings of the wisest among the Greeks...and how they were taught to them according to the principles which he [Moses] gave them […] for Pythagoras, Anaxagoras and Plato and the stoic philosophers who succeeded them, and almost all the others, are of the same feelings, and had the same notions of the nature of God. (Rev 168).

(127) <https://www.biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/bets/vol09/9-1_yamauchi.pdf> .

(128) Davis, RW, op .cit., p. 43. Voir aussi Kent, C. F., The Makers and Teachers of Judaism From the Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Herod the Great, New York : Scribner’s, 1911, p. 101.

(129) Byron, J., op. cit., p. 4. This notion later made its way into Islam, in which "Adb Allah" means "slave of God": "According to Abu Hafs, to be a slave is an adornment of the slave of God, and whoever renounces it of this adornment (Qushayri, Risala 91, Bab al-cubudiyya; Sendschreiben 283/25.6). There is nothing more honorable than to be a slave of God and no name more perfect for the believer than slave. At the most honorable hour that was assigned to the prophet on earth, that of his ascension, God designated him by the name of: "Great is He who made His slave travel by night (surah 17/1; according to ibn `Ata Allah, pious men have become sultans by choosing to be slaves of God (Sharh al-hikam, 2/128)” (in Ritter, H.,The Ocean of the Soul: Man, the World, and God in the Stories of Farīd Al-Dīn ʻAṭṭār, traduit par John O’Kane avec l’assistance éditoriale de Bernd Radkte, Leiden : E. J. Brill, 2003, p. 291).

(130) Davis, R. W., op. cit., p. 43.

(131) Hooke, S. H., Myth, Ritual, and Kingship: Essays on the Theory and Practice of Kingship in the Ancient Near East and in Israel, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1958, p. 24.

(132) Raaflaub, K. A., op. cit., p. 269.

(133) Evola, J., op. cit., p. 241.

(134) Glotz, G., Ancient Greece at Work: An Economic History of Greece from the Homeric, Hildesheim : Georg Olms Publishing House, 1987, p. 187.

(135) Ibid ., pp. 187-8

(136) Ibid ., p. 190.

(137) Richter, D., S., op . cit ., p. 57.

(138) Henrichs, A., in « Harvard Studies in Classical Philology », vol. 88 , 1984 , p. 140, <https://www.spiritual-minds.com/religion/Gnosticts/The%20Sophists%20and%20Hellenistic%20Religion,%20Prodicus%20as%20the%20Spiritual%20Father%20of%20the%20ISIS%20Aretalogies.pdf> . John S. Nelson ( What Should Political Theory Be Now ?, Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1983, p. 219) speaks of the “sophistic counter-tradition” without fully realizing how appropriate this expression is; it is no exaggeration to say (Perkinson, HJ, How Things Got Better: Speech, Writing, Printing, and Cultural Change, Westport , CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1995, p. 47), despite the use anachronism of the expression "Western civilization", that "the intellectual and moral arguments of Plato and Aristotle against the sophists (and the destruction of the written works of the sophists by the disciples of Plato and Aristotle) ​​have designated the latter as enemies of western civilization.

(139 ) Ibid., p. 56. It is interesting to note that the carvakas seem to have been Brahmins, although apostates.

(140) Ibid ., p. 77.

(141) Guénon, R., Introduction to the Study of the Hindu Doctrines , Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, translated by M. Pallis, 2nd revised edition, 2001, p. 134.

(142) Haight, EH, Essays on Ancient Fiction , New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1936, p. 87.

(143) “A borrowing and transformation of the diatribe took place, so that “Jewish traditions and Midrashic methods of interpretation became familiar with Hellenistic rhetorical and literary methods. » » (Gadenz, PT,Called from the Jews and from the Gentiles: Pauline Ecclesiology in Romans 9-11 , Tubingue : Mohr Siebeck, 2009, p. 36).

(144) In Navia, LE, Classical Cynicism: A Critical Study , Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1996, p. 67.

(145) Fairey, E., Slavery in the Classical Utopia: A Comparative Study , ProQuest, 2006, p. 59, <https://www.emilyfairey.info/drupal/sites/default/files/SlaveryintheClassicalUtopia.pdf> .

(146) Foucault, on the basis of the similarity between the Greek terms designating currency ( noumisma ) and law ( nomos), interpreted this oracle as an order to break the rules; more generally, he saw "the cynics' extreme, even outrageous pursuit of real life as an inversion of, a kind of carnivalesque grimace directed against the Platonic tradition. (Bernauer, J., Rasmussen, D., The Final Foucault , MIT Press, 1988, p. 110).

(147) Sayre, F., op . quote . p. 46.

​​(148) Nakamura, H., A Comparative History Of Ideas , Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing, 1992, p. 182.

(149) Navia, LE, op . cit ., p. 20.

(150) See Shea, L., op . quote .

(151) Vogt, KM, Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 24.

(152) Richter, DS, op . cit ., pp. 57-58.

(153) Ibid ., p. 57-59.

(154) See Baslez, MF, Research on the conditions of penetration and diffusion of Eastern religions in Delos (2nd-1st century BC) , École Normale Supérieure de Jeunes Filles, 1977, p. 364; Clermont-Ganneau, C., Leroux, E., Collection of Oriental Archeology , vol. 1, Paris, 1888, p. 187.

(155) Wallace, R., The Three Worlds of Paul of Tarsus , London: Routledge, 1998, p. 57.

(156) Richter, D. S., op. cit. p. 58.

(157) Ibid., p. 57.

(158) Bevan, E., Stoics And Sceptics, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1913, p. 14.

(159) They first made themselves felt in the area of ​​language: “Greek […] was now written by many people of non-Hellenic or at least mixed origin. The vocabulary of educated men had again become enormously more technical. Someone said that Plato was able to create a system without using more than one technical term. If we turn to […] the Stoics, we find that a whole vocabulary of technical terms must be learned by heart before their writings become intelligible. It is no doubt true that in some respects an increase in technical terms marks an advance in thought […] but the usage among these writers goes far beyond what is necessary. Simple verbs are abandoned for compounds without any gain in expressiveness; abstract terms are everywhere, and so on. (Bury, JB,The Hellenistic Age ; Aspects of Hellenistic civilization treated by J. B. Bury [and others], Cambridge : University Press, 1923, pp. 34-35).

If we turn to the sophists, it should also be mentioned in this regard that "the questions of language, philology and grammar which interest them [the sophists] most highly had already been introduced by great Indians like Yaska and Panini. These two scholars had completed their important studies on the language before such considerations appeared in Greece. (Riepe, DM Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought , Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing, 1996, p. 55.)

(160) Grant, A., Sir, The Ethics of Aristotle , vol. 1, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885, p. 308.

(161) Ibid ., p. 309-310.

(162) See Zizek, S.,The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. Chap. 2; see also Charrier, JP, The construction of the backworlds: The Captive Philosophy 1 , Éditions L'Harmattan, 2011, chap. 4. On a related subject, it has been observed that the portrayal of the Babylonian rabbis has commonalities with those of the sophists and rhetoricians who were mainly drawn from the eastern part of the Roman Empire from the second to third centuries AD. Among the known sophists of the second century are Asiarchs and high priests ( <https://www.wosco.org/books/Philosophy/Greek_Sophists_in_the_Roman_Empire.pdf> ).

(163) Long, AA, Stoic Studies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 134.

(164) This is emphasized in the Astronomicals , a didactic poem on astrology composed by Marcus Manilius, a North African Stoic philosopher and astrologer of the 1stcentury AD. and, in particular, in its preface, a short history of the origins of astrology, the tone of which is distinctly evolutionary. "His narrative combines four (typically distinct) themes derived from earlier treatments of the origins of human civilization: (1) the revelation of the arts by the divine heroes of culture, (2) the role of Nature in facilitating human progress, (3) the development of the sciences by barbarous nations of great antiquity, and (4) the slow progress by which animalistic humanity molded itself into civilized beings by discovering knowledge under the pressure of Necessity (1.42) . (p. 31) The institutionalization of the monarchy and priesthood is claimed to have taken place "under the eastern sky, whose lands are cut off by the Euphrates or flooded by the Nile, where the stars return to view and rise above the cities of the dark nations. (1, 40-67), and is closely related to the development of systematic astrology.

(165) Cumont, F., Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans, New York : London : G. P. Putnam’s sons, 1912, pp. 68-69.

(166) Ibid., p. 82.

(167) Ibid., p. 70. As for Posidonius, he was "a Stoic disseminator of Chaldean theology at or near its peak of popularity among most civilized races." He had a great reputation and many supporters during the first half of the first century AD. Although most of his writings have been lost, it is reasonably clear that he blended Semitic tradition with Greek thought and was an intellectual mediator between East and West who greatly influenced the thought of the aristocracy. He eloquently combined the mysticism and scholarly knowledge of the time with what modern historians call the exact sciences in a system that included an enthusiastic worship of the powers of nature and of the God who pervades the universal organism. Cicero attended his lectures.Manilius Astronomics . His ideas are reflected in the works of Seneca. This permeation of stellar concepts in intellectual circles eventually spread to all classes as the seeds of Christianity were sown. (Willner, J., Westin, L., The Perfect Horoscope , New York: Paraview Press, 2001, pp. 33-34).

(168) Ibid ., p. 73-74.

(169) Ibid ., p. 99.

(170) Ibid. The "key operational term 'Semitic'" is considered to be "nebulous" by most modern students of Stoicism. Strangely, the term "Greek" is not. Furthermore, they “have little information about the cultural views of non-Hellenic peoples in the Near East during this period. Obviously, they are not able to deduce the race of the spirit of these people from their culture, their beliefs, their art, their economy, etc. As for the "precisely one can easily find antecedents for precisely those views which some scholars have mistakenly and improperly termed 'Semitic'" (Bryant, JM, Moral Codes and Social Structure in Ancient Greece, Suny Press, 1996), what if they are essentially Semitic themselves? What is truly pathetic is that such individuals cannot even write the word "Semitic" without putting it in quotation marks.

A circulus in probando is also used here: “But I think some recent writers have exaggerated the oriental element introduced into Greek philosophy by the early Stoics. There is almost nothing in the early Stoic doctrine which cannot be traced to an earlier Greek origin. All that can be said is that their contact with the Eastern world, especially the Semitic world, might have made the Stoics inclined to emphasize the Eastern element, just as they certainly emphasized on and developed certain doctrines which were probably of Chaldean-Semitic origin but which had already appeared in Greek philosophy as early as Plato […]” (Armstrong, AH, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, p. 119).

(171) <https://www.annettereed.com/reed_abraham.pdf> , p. 33.

(172) Ibid ., p. 4.

(173) Ibid ., p. 34.

(174) Ibid ., p. 9.

(175) Radin, M, The Jews among the Greeks and Romans , Philadelphia : Jewish Publication Society of America, 1915, p. 241.

(176) <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/84456/1/ezl_1.pdf> , p. 9.

(177) Gagarin, M., The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece and Rome , New York : Oxford University Press, 2010, vol. 1, p. 22.

(178) O'Sullivan, L., 1998;The Law of Sophocles and the Beginnings of Permanent Philosophical Schools in Athens , “Rheinisches Museum für Philologie”, 145, 2002, p. 251. Meanwhile, Jewish propaganda was rampant in Attica: pagan gods were often conceived by Jewish writers "as not being absolute nonentities but really existing and evil demons [...] A belief that the early Christian Church firmly maintained and preached. “Even books intended primarily for Jews contain polemics against polytheism and attacks on pagan customs that the avowed purpose of the book does not justify. (Radin, M, op ​​. cit., p. 159) Despite the widespread existence of this Jewish anti-Greek propaganda there does not seem to have been any attempt to control it.

(179) von Wilamovitz-Moellendorff, U., Antigonos von Karastos , Philologische Untersuchungen 4, Berlin, 1881, p. 271. In our countries, the right of free religious association voluntarily granted by the power of occupation is precisely one of the most effective legalistic screens behind which the leaders of the extra-European masses that this power imports hide their subversive political agenda.

(180) Fabre d'Olivet is right to state that Cato, “hearing Carneades speak against justice, deny the existence of virtues […] and question the fundamental truths of religion, despised a science which could produce such arguments. He demanded the return of Greek philosophy so that Roman youth would not be impregnated with its errors; But the damage was done. The destructive germs which Carneades had left secretly fermented in the heart of the State, developed from the first favorable conditions, increased and finally produced this formidable colossus which, after having seized the public mind, after having darkened the the most enlightened ideas of good and evil, annihilated religion and delivered the Republic to disorder, civil wars and destruction; and rising again with the Roman empire, withering the principles of life which he had received, necessitated the institution of a new worship, and thus exposed himself to the incursion of foreign errors and the influences of the barbarians. This colossus, victim of his own fury, after being torn and devoured, was buried under the deceits he had accumulated […]” As much as his diagnosis of the evils from which the Greco-Roman world suffered is exact, as much the remedy as he thinks he has found in Zeno, "raised" by "Providence" to oppose the ravages of Pyrrhonism, then in Descartes and Bacon, is worse than evil (The Golden Verses of Pyhagoras , New York and London : GP Putnam's Sons, 1917, p. 203-204).