


HAYATI BICE

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BOOKS



Dr. Hayati Bice

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DEDICATION

*This book is
dedicated to the souls of the martyrs of the "Three
Crescents" who fell to the black earth in the prime of their
lives while supporting the political struggle of the MHP.
in the prime of their lives.*

May Allah's mercy be upon them...

Dr. Hayati Bice

Foreword

T I am pleased to present the new edition of my book containing my writings on Turkish politics and the MHP, entitled "**Leader – Organisation – Doctrine / MHP Organisational Culture**". This edition was deemed appropriate to change the order of the articles. The title of the detailed analysis, which was the most popular article in the first edition and is frequently cited in academic studies, examining how the organisational culture of the nationalist movement was formed and what its main elements are, has been moved to the cover in this edition.

The triad of "**Leader - Organisation - Doctrine**," chosen as the main title of the book, is often presented with an ironic tone in publications related to the MHP because it is considered "**indisputable**" among the nationalist/idealist crowd. However, this triad has a very important place in nationalist/idealist organisational culture. This triad, which is the fundamental argument used by ideological opponents to label the MHP as an "autocratic party," is the source of the nationalist movement's resistance to time, having overcome unimaginable obstacles and existed for over half a century. Perhaps because this has been recognised, it has been and continues to be ruthlessly criticised as a pathological reflex.

The first section of the book highlights the articles that attracted the most public attention in the first edition. Among the articles that contribute to the historical significance of the work, the attempt by FETÖ to infiltrate the MHP prior to the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 was recorded in this book for the first time in the Turkish press, from the primary source. I would like to note here that this historical anecdote was written after consulting with **Prof. Dr. Şakir Akça**, who was a witness to the infiltration attempt himself, due to its historical significance. This information, which is often shared in the print and online media without reference to my book, has not been denied by the 'perpetrators beyond the horizon' to this day.

*The second chapter of the book, entitled "**Doctrinal Turkish Nationalism**," contains assessments that shed light on the ideological foundations of the nationalist movement. These writings provide a better understanding of both the deep roots of the organisational model in society and its competition with other political currents.*

*The final chapter of the book focuses on the late **Devlet Bahçeli**, the founding leader of the MHP, who left his mark on the final period of idealist politics, and **Gün Sazak**, the 'symbolic figure' representing thousands of idealist martyrs, who are unforgettable for idealist youth. **Devlet Bahçeli**, who left his mark on the final period of idealist politics; **Gün Sazak**, the 'symbolic name' representing thousands of idealist martyrs; **Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu**, an unforgettable leader for idealist youth; and **Ali Güngör**, an exemplary figure in idealist politics.*

As with my first KDY-branded book, I would like to thank the staff at Folx Agency, who made it possible for this book to reach you, and Yunus Emre Aytaç, who designed the cover, for providing a high-quality print from cover to interior design.

***May God protect and exalt the Turks,
wherever they may live on this earth!***

Dr. Hayati Bice

Ankara, 4 April 2020

FIRST SECTION

*LANDMARKS OF
NATIONALIST POLITICS*

1.1. MHP Organisational Culture

A healthy assessment of the MHP; an analysis based on the MHP's history spanning over 50 years, as an organisation, for the purpose of constructive criticism.

M This assessment has been made for this purpose. First, the fundamental characteristics of the MHP organisational culture are examined, followed by a discussion of the elements of this culture that need to be rehabilitated or restored. Only by proceeding in this manner can a **positive** contribution be made to the MHP tradition, which is the aim of this article.

Political Parties and Producing Organisational Culture

It is appropriate to evaluate political party structures as organisations independent of their political objectives. Where an organisation is concerned, an organisational culture that gives life to that organisation will also develop over time. In light of this assessment, when we look at organisations that have been structured as "political parties" in Turkey's recent history, interesting results emerge. From this perspective, it is possible to speak of an organisational culture that has developed over the 42 years since the MHP emerged on the political scene in 1969.

The elements that shape organisational culture come together to form a picture of interaction. When examining any structure that can be defined as an organisation or institution, it is possible to find at least some of the following elements in this structure.

Even if this culture is broadly targeted at the outset, its true nature only emerges over time in an interactive manner; as the sum of dialectical relationships. Political organisations with an organisational culture formed by natural flow should identify the elements that constitute their own culture in detail, instil this in their members, and disseminate it throughout society, starting with their members and sympathisers.

Some organisations, taking examples of historical success as models, have attempted to create a more robust organisational structure *by synthetically producing* the essential elements of organisational culture. Today, regardless of their objectives, groups that come together under an organisational structure must use the same method to deepen the organisation's impact on society in order to ensure that their organisation achieves its goals.

Although it is possible to examine all political organisations in Turkey based on their organisational cultures and compare them with each other, such a voluminous study is not the aim here. The MHP organisational culture, which has accumulated significant experience in terms of "organisation" and "unique organisational culture" in recent Turkish political history, will be evaluated as a "case study" based on the elements that constitute it. Specifically, the MHP's political Turkish nationalism organisation will be examined in terms of organisational culture, and the elements that constitute an organisation's culture will be analysed and interpreted using the MHP as an example, based on effective examples developed throughout history.

The main factors constituting the organisational culture of the MHP are *-History, Heroes, Physical Environment and Symbols, Unique Beliefs, Values and Assumptions, Unique Language and Terminology, Internal Behaviour and Attitudes, Ceremonies and Rituals, Formation of Organisational Culture and Leadership* have been examined under separate headings.

a. Organisational History in the MHP Example

Since an organisation's culture is a product of its history, formed over the course of time, it cannot be fully understood without considering that organisation's history. As organisational culture is not a static structure but rather a variable one, knowing the organisation's history is essential to anticipate where its culture may be headed in the future.

It would be practical to begin the organisational history of the MHP from the date when its "legendary leader" Alparslan Türkeş was elected as party chairman. Although various political organisations had been engaged in "political nationalism" activities prior to Alparslan Türkeş's election as party chairman, it is possible to link the emergence of Turkish nationalism as a school of thought on the political stage to this date. The elections in which the MHP has participated since 1969, its political performance and the cadres it has formed constitute the main vein of political Turkish nationalism. It would be useful to examine the approximately 42-year history of the MHP in three periods, linked to some important historical events:

1. The 1969-1980 period: This period spans from Alparslan Türkeş's election as party leader to the military coup of 12 September 1980. The changes observed in the MHP's organisation and policies during this period can be disregarded as they were related to pragmatic considerations. This period should be examined particularly closely, as it was a time when the foundations of the MHP's organisational culture were laid and, to some extent, shaped. It is significant because it was a period when the MHP was represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and participated in government work for the first time as a coalition partner.

2. 1980-1997 period: During this period, the MHP temporarily suspended its "political" activities due to legal issues. However, informal activities continued. This period includes important milestones such as Alparslan Türkeş regaining his political rights after his imprisonment, the MHP regaining representation in the Grand National Assembly, and finally his death on 4 April 1997. It would be realistic to assess this period as an "interlude" or the "rehabilitation phase" of the Turkish nationalist political movement.

3. 1997–present : The Devlet Bahçeli era: Alparslan

This period began with the election of Dr Devlet Bahçeli as Chairman of the MHP on 6 July 1997, following the death of Türkeş. This was a period of significant experience, marked by the MHP achieving its "greatest electoral success in its history" and gaining representation in the Grand National Assembly, as well as gaining "executive experience in government" as an important component of the coalition government. The most ideologically striking aspect of this period has been the ideas and strategies of MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, which have exerted considerable influence on the party's course. This period has been marked by Bahçeli's introduction of theoretical topics to the MHP base that were largely unfamiliar to them, such as *"globalisation and localism"*; *"the differences between ethnogenetic nationalism and sociocultural nationalism"*; and *"alliance with global resistance centres against new colonialism led by the USA"*.

The 14 years that have passed since he was elected as the leader of the MHP are long enough to evaluate the pros and cons of the Bahçeli era in the history of the MHP. *It is unrealistic to say that the deepening of these theoretical issues reflected in the leader's statements has been understood and embraced even by the titled figures sitting at the MHP Headquarters, let alone shared in the MHP's provincial organisations.*

Alongside the positive theoretical contributions Bahçeli has made to the MHP's structure, a negative situation that must be taken into account and that is important for the healthy communication of a political party with society is the failure to develop an effective public relations strategy during the Bahçeli era and the failure to establish and operate the press and publication channels necessary for an ideological party like the MHP to reflect its theses to society.-information channels necessary for reflecting the MHP's theses to society.

The most concrete example of this is that, although almost every political movement in Turkey has a TV channel organised to communicate its theses to the entire public and to propagate them, it has not been possible to professionally organise TV broadcasting that would ensure that the MHP's theses are reflected to the public. The same criticism applies today to the field of internet journalism and internet media, which has become an important channel of mass communication. ⁽¹¹⁾

b. Organisational Heroes in the MHP Example:

As a "social unit," organisations progress by creating their own "special history" while also bringing forth their **own "unique heroes."**

The experiences of the MHP's 40-year history, its bitter-sweet events, and especially the "violence" suffered by the "nationalist movement" before 12 September have left painful pages and indelible marks on the history of the MHP from the perspective of its heroes. If one were to compile a list of heroes within the MHP's organisational culture, it would be necessary to remember not only the thousands of well-known names that would be included on such a list, but also the tens of thousands of "**unsung** heroes" whose names are unknown. Nevertheless, to give an idea, some names that must be mentioned *include* **Alparslan Türkeş**, *Dündar Taşer*, and *Gün Sazak*, who were "state men"; *H. Nihal Atsız*, *S. Ahmed Arvasi*, and *Galip Erdem*, who were "ideological pioneers"; and *Mustafa Pehlivanoglu*, *Dursun Önkuzu*, and *Yusuf İmamoğlu*, who were among the first.

; "ideological pioneers" such as H. Nihal Atsız, S. Ahmed Arvasi, and Galip Erdem; and "idealist martyrs" numbering in the thousands, including Dursun Önkuzu, Yusuf İmamoğlu, Mustafa Pehlivanoglu, and Fikri Arıkan, who were executed.

Heroes constitute an indisputable motivational force in influencing individuals within the organisation. For every MHP member, **Leader Türkeş** is an example as a political leader; Gün Sazak as a statesman; and Erol Güngör as a scholar.

The organisation's heroes, who stood out for their contributions to ideas and theory, were influential in determining the organisation's cultural values and in developing and preserving the sense of loyalty to the organisation. In this regard, it is a well-known fact that H. Nihal Atsız, author of the novel "Bozkurtlar" (Grey Wolves), made valuable contributions to deepening Turkish nationalist consciousness, while S. Ahmed Arvasi, author of the book "**Türk-İslâm** Ülkü" (Turkish-Islamic Ideal), made valuable contributions to the development of the moral norms of the MHP organisational culture. How can we forget the "idealist" Galip Erdem, who rendered great services in raising the moral motivation of the idealist youth and overcoming the psychology of collapse with the least possible damage through his unforgettable writings, such as "*How Can Beşiktaş Be Saved?*", written in the days following the coup d'état of 12 September 1980, and the "letters" he collected?

c. The Physical Environment and Symbols of the Organisation in the Case of the MHP

One of the elements that make up the cultural environment of the organisation is physical and material objects. These may include the organisation's 'Headquarters' building, provincial and district headquarters buildings, the architecture of the buildings, the organisation's promotional items (logo, sign, etc.), as well as organisational documents; reports,

fixed assets, and all kinds of tools and equipment used in decoration. Functional elements such as how office spaces are used within the organisation, the preferred furniture, and the dress code for organisation personnel also form part of the physical framework. Computers and communication tools, which are elements of information technology that have come to play an important role in office functions in recent years, have also become important elements that make up the physical framework.

The quality of the information technologies used in the organisation and the software used within this framework, as well as the websites created on behalf of the organisation, are an indication of the technological environment within the organisation. As a political organisation, the official website of the MHP and the websites that are ideologically parallel to it have also gained importance in recent years as an important channel for relations with society.

c.a. MHP Headquarters and its Contribution to the Organisation's Identity

Nowadays, even the physical appearance of a company's head office has gained importance. The architecture of an institution's building is more important than one might think. The architectural style and interior design of the organisation's building influence the behaviour of both the organisation's employees and those who come to the organisation's headquarters for whatever reason. The architectural features of the organisation's building can be used as a symbol representing the organisation's strategic style.

From this perspective the MHP has a General Headquarters building that is unrivalled by any other party. The choices made by the architect of the MHP General Headquarters Building Ahmet Vefik Alp, and those who planned the interior decoration have given the MHP General Headquarters Building characteristics that must be evaluated in terms of organisational culture. MHP members who are familiar with the premises previously used as the "Headquarters" building in the history of the organisation

should experience a sense of self-confidence the moment they step through the doors of the MHP Headquarters Building.

The modern structure of the building is striking, with details inspired by Turkish-Islamic architecture skilfully integrated into it. The exact replicas of the **Orhun** Monuments, which were unveiled at a ceremony held in front of the MHP Headquarters on 12 September 2006, greet visitors to the MHP Headquarters with a sense of history dating back 1,300 years, unlike any other party could achieve. It is certain that any ordinary MHP member who happens to visit the MHP Headquarters, if they have even a little knowledge of the Orhun Monuments, will be filled with a sense of pride as magnificent as the responsibility and sense of duty that Turkish history has placed on their shoulders. The importance of this belief and sense of belonging, rooted in the depths of history, for an organisation is so obvious that it requires no explanation. ⁽¹³⁾

The mosque, placed within the building as an important element representing Islamic elements, which are important in the ideological structure of the MHP, stands out as a neat space. Although the establishment of a library at the MHP Headquarters was also considered, it is unclear to what extent this library is used.

There are also quite a few who say that the MHP building alone has no meaning and that it would be of no use if it were empty. Opposition voices, which grew stronger after the weakness that emerged in the MHP General Headquarters management, will not go beyond being a tool for a destructive campaign if they fail to fulfil their duty to make the mosque in the MHP functional. ⁽¹⁴⁾

c.b. Material Objects in MHP Buildings

The form and characteristics of organisational buildings and changes in these characteristics

typically reveal details of the organisation's culture. The development of standardised shop decoration and signage styles by major brands across their nationwide chains is a typical example of this. Party organisations must also display a similar physical structure in their representative offices throughout Turkey. Everything from the signage at party representative offices to the frames hung on the walls in the representative's office should be evaluated in this context.

c.c. MHP Party Emblem

Organisational symbols are objects that carry special and distinct meanings for the organisation; they can be forms, words, or actions. In the case of a commercial institution, the "logo" and the special colours associated with the institution are among the most prominent symbols. For a party, the choice of a special emblem and a special colour on all printed materials adds distinctive features in terms of organisational culture. From this perspective, one of the important material objects that constitute organisational culture in political parties is the "party emblem".

During the historic congress process in 1969, **the "Three Crescents"** emblem chosen for the MHP fulfils a very important mission on its own, both as one of the root symbols of Ottoman history and as a summary of the MHP's 40-year legacy. *The MHP's "party emblem" immediately stands out due to its historical connotations, simplicity, and memorability.* ^{([151](#))}

c.d. MHP Official (Corporate) Website

One of the MHP's faces to the public – and perhaps the most important one in recent years – is its corporate website, which is published at mhp.org.tr.

is published at mhp.org.tr. As criticising the aesthetics and content of the MHP website is not one of the main objectives of this article, I would like to simply direct interested readers to the address provided.^[6]

d. Organisational Beliefs, Values, and Assumptions in the MHP Example:

Organisational beliefs relate to the conscious support of beliefs that are dominant within the organisation as a determinant of organisational culture. Organisational values are determined by the moral codes of the organisation. Organisational attitudes emerge when those who embrace the organisational culture exhibit similar behaviours in similar situations. It is a reality that even when beliefs and values are concerned within an organisation, they must be based on a religious and philosophical foundation.

For Turkish society, this foundation is directly shaped within the framework of Islam's transcendent values. Alongside this, common human values that are the shared heritage of all humanity, such as love, virtue and freedom of thought, cannot be ignored.

The organisation's fundamental premise is a theoretical philosophical framework that is not explicitly divine or transcendent in nature, such as faith and values, but which determines the organisation's politics and is applied within the organisation. The organisation's fundamental premises may concern human-nature relations, the nature of eternal truth, and the meaning of human beings and human life, which require a philosophical background in order to be discussed. For this reason, the support that the MHP will draw from Turkish history must be based on the Turkish Sufi tradition, which determines the way Islam is lived in Turkish society.

In his speech at the 17th Erciyes Congress, held at the foot of Mount Erciyes in Kayseri on Sunday, 6 August 2006, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli reminded the MHP organisation of the virtues unique to the MHP that they must keep alive in their hearts and minds: love of the nation, patriotism, *Turkish consciousness*, love of service, a culture of compromise, loyalty to the state and respect for its continuity, respect for history, loyalty to ancestors, gratitude to martyrs, respect for veterans, and sincerity towards *religion*.

Bahçeli, who does not want Turkish nationalism to be confused with Western nationalisms, points to the inclusive nature of Turkish nationalism, which embraces the Turkish people and every member of the Turkish nation, emphasising its fundamental principles as love for humanity, sharing and distribution, justice and fairness. According to Bahçeli, at the core of Turkish nationalism lie *"the advice of Bilge Khan, the wisdom of Dede Korkut, the love of Yunus Emre, the virtue of Hacı Bektaş, the vision of Fatih, the courage of Mehmetçik, the leadership of Atatürk, and the call of Türkes Bey."* Bahçeli's deliberate selection and listing of these historical figures is extremely significant when considering their reflections in Turkish society. ⁽⁷⁾

For these fine theoretical statements to resonate within the party base, to be understood and embraced by the MHP organisation, and to gradually gain widespread acceptance in society, it is essential that the MHP conduct an activity in the form of "internal party education". The **"Educators Team"** structure, which the MHP schematically completed before the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 but which was not fully implemented in a functional sense, should be revisited in terms of developing internal communication and a common language within the MHP. ⁽⁸⁾

e. Organisational Language and Terminology in the MHP Example

Stories spread within the organisation emerge from the oral transmission of events taken from the organisation's history, with the aim of establishing organisational values and shared beliefs. These stories often undergo changes as they are passed from one language to another. If, as they pass from mouth to mouth, the stories change to the point where they are completely divorced from reality, they become "extraordinary legends".

The language specific to the organisation takes shape as stories, myths and legends originating from the organisation's history, and spreads within the organisation through gestures, jokes and metaphors. The social framework of the organisation formed around this language is thus jointly determined by the language used, behavioural styles, symbols, rules and processes.

For the MHP, the concepts of "Commander-in-Chief"; "Leader"; "Organisation"; "**Cause**"; "Home"; and "Ideological Comrade" have now acquired symbolic meaning and importance as elements of a common language.

The common language and concept categories used within the organisation constitute an important feature of the organisational culture. If a common understanding has been established within the entire organisation regarding the concepts used, then a "common organisational language" emerges as an element of the organisational culture.

In his speech at the 7th Ordinary Grand Congress of the MHP on 12 October 2003, MHP leader Dr Devlet Bahçeli spoke in the distinctive language of the MHP organisation: *"For the whole world, for all humanity, a new spirit, a new alternative, a new stance against this global encirclement and exploitation has now become inevitable. This spirit, which will initiate this movement, is blossoming in the spiritual climate of Turkish-Islamic sources, rising on the experiences of the Ottoman Empire, the Cihan State,*

and the experiences of our War of Independence. It is our national duty as the Nationalist Movement to express the experience and accumulated knowledge of the Turkish-Islamic civilisation in light of humanity's needs and problems, in a way that resonates with the understanding of the age. We know that opening new horizons for humanity will only be possible with the construction of a Turkey that is powerful, influential, and a leader in the world.

***f- Organisational Behaviour and Attitudes,
Ceremonies and Rituals in the Example of
the MHP***

Organisational behaviour can be understood by drawing on data from psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics, and certain elements within the organisation can be positively influenced and changed.

Looking at Turkish history, these elements of organisational culture have been defined using terms inherited from the Ottoman state tradition as "Adâb", "Usûl" and "Erkân". Indeed, throughout Turkish history, we can still easily observe traces of a behavioural tradition developed for every social event, from birth to death, even in everyday life today. It is possible to observe certain behavioural patterns that are characteristic of the MHP organisation, albeit not particularly sophisticated in terms of quality, at its "special ceremonies and meetings".

Almost every organisation has certain behavioural styles and rules. Rules are vital for the organisation to sustain daily life. Organisational rules and behavioural styles are an important element that sustains the organisational structure and holds the organisational culture together as a whole.

Ceremonies are a means of celebrating organisational culture and aim to reinforce cultural values within the organisation. For example, award ceremonies, appointment or retirement ceremonies are occasions where organisational culture is revealed.

Ceremonies. Rituals, on the other hand, are more theatrical cultural expressions than ceremonies and are generally intended for the benefit of spectators. The purpose of rituals is to establish organisational culture among participants.

The relationship between the organisation and people is examined as "*organisational behaviour patterns*". Both the organisation's institutional behaviour and attitudes and the behaviour of people within the organisation fall within the scope of organisational behaviour. The components that constitute intra-organisational behaviour include actors such as the organisational leader, senior managers, organisational staff, organisational members, and individuals who feel a sense of belonging to the organisation; committees within the organisation; commissions, other sub-units of the organisation and the relationships between them; civil society organisations such as trade unions and professional associations; and other private and legal organisations with which the organisation has relations.

We should also mention the Erciyes Victory Congresses as a ceremony that influenced the MHP's structure, which developed differently from other political parties. Held at the beginning of August every year until 2008, this congress played an important role in creating a positive effect on the moral motivation of the MHP masses, despite all its shortcomings and mistakes.

g- Total Quality in the MHP Example:

When an organisation is involved in any kind of industrial, intellectual or political production, concepts such as "total quality", "excellence" and "zero defects" take on a meaning specific to that organisation.

The 'Total Quality' of an organisation refers to the average level of its members' education, culture, and development indices.

Total Quality Management, which should aim to improve the quality of its members, will directly affect the effectiveness and ultimately the success of a political organisation within society. The most important factor in improving total quality is to create well-equipped, knowledgeable human resources or to improve the quality of members.

As preferred by classical and authoritarian organisation leaders, *instead of members who are obedient and flawlessly execute orders*, as expected from an unqualified human resource pool, *it is beneficial for a political party, as with any organisation, to have a confident, continuously developing, initiative-taking, knowledge-producing human resource that is educated, thoughtful, capable of analysis and synthesis, innovative, creative, participatory, and inclined towards team spirit. confident, continuously improving, able to take initiative, and knowledge-producing human resources.* Possessing human resources with these qualities or aiming to train members of the desired quality should be the goal of any organisation, including a political party.

Comprehensive field studies are needed to assess the MHP organisation's situation in terms of total quality. However, it is known that the average quality prevailing in MHP organisations is not of a standard that would satisfy the party's general top management. While this is directly related to the fact that the average length of education among the electorate nationwide is 3.5 years, as determined by the OECD's development criteria, I would like to emphasise that the situation in question here concerns not MHP voters but people who have served in MHP organisations. ⁽⁹⁾

The MHP's founding doctrine, the 9 Lights theory, which can be summarised as the principles of *Liberalism, Individualism, and Progressivism*, reflects the idea of development as the basis of overall quality. It is thought that this principle was upheld during the party's founding years – at least on paper.

During the final period of the MHP's last 14 years under Bahçeli's leadership, an important step was taken towards improving the overall quality of MHP members with the establishment of *the School of Politics and Leadership*, which began operating on 10 October 2009, albeit considerably late. It was expected that Bahçeli, a politician with an academic background, would have initiated such capacity-building efforts much earlier, perhaps immediately upon taking office. ⁽¹⁰⁾

h. The Formation of Organisational Culture and Leadership in the MHP Example:

The relationship between organisational culture and leadership is closer than the relationship with other management functions. According to modern leadership theories, leadership is a function of the leader, the followers and the circumstances. Accordingly, the leader must decide whether to maintain or change the organisational culture, taking into account the circumstances and the likely reactions of the followers.

The fundamental elements that distinguish the MHP from other parties, along with the more abstract characteristics of the MHP organisation, must be considered in **the MHP tradition of leadership**. In Turkish politics – and indeed in Turkish history in general – the importance of the leader is indisputable. Numerous studies examining voter behaviour reveal that the leader factor is more influential than all other factors in determining which party voters will vote for. Therefore, the success of an electoral campaign, which is the means by which a political organisation achieves its goal of political power, is directly proportional to the qualities of its leader and leadership.

The founding leader of the MHP, Başbuğ Alparslan Türkeş, and Devlet Bahçeli, who took the chair of the General Presidency after the death of the undisputed leader, are examples of the MHP line as leaders.

Bahçeli, who assumed the position of General Chairman after the passing of the undisputed leader, are examples of the MHP line as a leader. Bahçeli experienced all the difficulties of assuming the leadership position after a charismatic and undisputed figure like Başbuğ Türkeş.

If we consider 1969 as the starting point of the MHP's political line, following the 28-year leadership of Başbuğ Türkeş (1969-1997) and Bahçeli's 14-year tenure as General Chairman, they have provided the nationalist community with the experience necessary to make a sound assessment of their leadership qualities.

It is impossible to summarise Alparslan Türkeş's political life here, as it would require a book-length assessment. I must content myself with pointing to his exceptional place in Turkish history, marked by his service in forming a generation that proudly carried the consciousness of belonging, a generation known as "**Idealist** Youth," to which the author of these lines also honourably belongs. ⁽¹¹⁾

An assessment of Devlet Bahçeli's contributions to the organisational culture of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who was elected as the party's leader on 6 July 1997 and continues to hold the same position, can be made by looking at a 14-year period. The style and political priorities brought to the MHP leadership by Devlet Bahçeli, who is still the leader of "political Turkish nationalism" in the political arena with the title of "**MHP General** Chairman," and the state of success in the political arena should be examined and evaluated as another subject of study. To this end, it is essential to examine Bahçeli's political speeches, as well as the events that took place during the 1999-2002 government coalition, when the MHP shared political power most strongly, and the results of the elections held during this period. It is clear that this warrants a thesis-level study from a political science perspective. ⁽¹²⁾

At the midpoint of his term, Devlet Bahçeli's speech at the Erciyes Congress on 6 August 2006 detailed the messages he wished to convey to the MHP organisation during his tenure and the cornerstones of the structure he aimed to establish, while also pointing out elements that should not feature in the roadmap he had drawn up for the MHP organisation. *It is evident that a significant portion of the issues Bahçeli, who sought to provide a vision for the MHP organisation, advised avoiding were aimed at eliminating the negative effects that current debates within the MHP organisation would cause.*

When each of the headlines contained in just a few lines of this important, critical speech is analysed individually, it is clear that *Bahçeli himself is uncomfortable with certain elements within the organisation he leads.*

Bahçeli stated in this important speech: *"In the challenging period ahead; merely offering feeble ideological support, observing developments from the sidelines, contenting oneself with memories of the past, accepting what is said without question, contributing nothing but excitement, seeking adventure far removed from reason and common sense, preoccupying oneself with the present without concern for the future, constructive criticism without offering any contribution, standing still without considering the times and life, and personal ambitions that disregard national interests will never, ever be valid."*

It is understood that the leader of the MHP organisation, Devlet Bahçeli, has not developed an appropriate stance towards diagnosing these illnesses, which he himself has identified, and that no effective measures have been taken to purge the organisation of these diseased structures that have permeated its body.

Everyone should have clearly seen how these pathological findings, which reveal the nature of the disease that has taken root within the MHP, manifested themselves in the attacks carried out against the MHP prior to the 2011 elections, including the use of sexually explicit video recordings.

Within this main framework, the MHP's internal communication, specifically the smooth functioning of the channels of thought and ideas between the leader and the organisation, should be discussed as an important issue. The greatest responsibility in this regard falls on the MHP's General Presidency, given the nature of the office.

Regardless of the size of its parliamentary group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) – even if it is not represented in the TBMM – the MHP tradition in Turkish politics is a unique structure that no power with an agenda concerning Turkey can afford to ignore. In the eternal journey of the Turkish nation, it is the duty of everyone who considers themselves Turkish to protect the MHP as a political apparatus and to contribute to strengthening the political structure by constructively pointing out its organisational weaknesses. This historic duty falls upon everyone who identifies as MHP, from the most senior official appointed at the top of the MHP organisation – at its headquarters – to the voter at the lowest level.

History will inevitably demand accountability; for what has been done, and perhaps even more so for what has not been done...

(*) It should not be thought that I have borrowed the concept of "organisational culture," a term from contemporary management science, from leftist literature. It is indisputable that the MHP's classic understanding of "Leader-Organisation-Doctrine" is directly related to the topics discussed in this study. This study was prepared prior to the 8th MHP Ordinary Grand Congress in 2006 and was revised with a few minor changes before being published in this book.

[1] Everyone familiar with the history of the past decade will recall the process by which the Gülen movement transformed from STV into the media giant ZAMAN newspaper. The examples of Doğu Perinçek's Ulusal Kanal and BTP leader Haydar Baş's Mesaj-Meltem TV should also be remembered. Alongside the unsuccessful ATA-TV experiment, the effectiveness of Bengütürk-TV, which broadcasts via satellite, does not possess any qualities that would satisfy any nationalist.

[2] The important speech made by MHP General Chairman Devlet Bahçeli during the move to the new headquarters reflects this pride. During my visit about three months after the move to the new headquarters, in response to my "best wishes," Bahçeli conveyed with great satisfaction the good wishes for the MHP expressed by the ambassadors of the Turkic Republics, who had recently visited the MHP headquarters en masse

with great satisfaction, then said: "This General Headquarters building should be considered one of the most important services I have rendered to the MHP." Later, the AKP and CHP also moved into their magnificent headquarters buildings. For Bahçeli's speech at the opening of the MHP General Headquarters on 29 May 2004, see:

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/gbk.php?content=160&cat=15>

[3] On 12 September 2006, during a ceremony held in front of the MHP Headquarters, the Orhun Monuments were unveiled. In his speech on the day of the unveiling, MHP leader Dr Devlet Bahçeli stated the following: "... These three sacred monuments before us, despite the passage of nearly 13 centuries, retain their meaning and are the first documents to mark the Turkish presence on the stage of history with their own name and alphabet... These three monuments, faithfully reproduced in their original size and appearance, with no counterparts in the world, will continue to speak for eternity in the Orhun Valley and on the shores of Ötüken, our ancestral lands, 5,600 kilometres away from Ankara Of these historical monuments, the Kültigin inscription dates back to 1274, Bilge Khan.

The monument was erected in 1271, and the Bilge Tonyukuk Monument was entrusted to the great Turkish nation in 1286 to remain for eternity. Bilge Khan's call, "Oğuz beys, Oğuz people, listen," which opened a very honourable page in Turkish history, has been passed down from father to son, from grandfather to grandson, spanning centuries. As in every period throughout history when we faced hardship and experienced social, political, and economic crises, the national secret that will restore our nation to its honourable position among the nations of the world today lies hidden in these immortal messages that stand tall before us, reaching from the Orhun to the present day Bilge

When explaining the purpose of the inscription he had carved on the north face of the monument, Kağan said: "Turkish lords, Turkish people, hear this! Here I have carved that I will gather the Turkish people and establish a state. Here I have carved that he who errs will die. Whatever words I have spoken, I have carved them into eternal stone. Look upon it and know." These words are a warning about the Turkish nation's unique experience of life or death At the Kültigin Monument, "God willing, my state exists

and my destiny exists, I revived and nourished a nation that was dying. I clothed the naked nation, I enriched the poor nation. I made the small nation great." These words are proof of this. These words, carrying such high responsibility, are also a historical lesson for the unprincipled and hypocritical leaders who are unaware of the power and identity of the great nation they govern, who fill their lives with petty and daily squabbles, and who chase after their personal fortunes.

[4] During my visits to the MHP Headquarters, the emptiness of the mosque, where I always made sure to pray at least one prayer, always touched my heart. One would expect the mosque in a place where approximately 200 people gather daily for work and visits to be more functional.

[5] It is important to note that some "new MHP members" have voiced suggestions that the MHP's three-crescent emblem is now "archaic" and "needs to be changed," which is sure to irritate many senior nationalists like myself.

[6] MHP official website: <http://www.mhp.org.tr>

[7] It is possible to find many of Devlet Bahçeli's speeches touching on theoretically very important points along these lines in the archives. As an example, I will limit myself to quoting a few paragraphs from his interview published in the Middle East Newspaper on 17-18-19 April 2006:

"At the root of the problems Turkey faces today lies an allergy and hostility towards the resistance displayed with a new spirit and vigour during our War of Independence against the crusader mentality that sought to uproot the Turks from Anatolia, and towards the national state that emerged from this resistance and the Turkish Nation's determination to defend its national existence."

The policies initiated by the United States first in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later declared under the name of the Greater Middle East Project to encompass all of Asia and Africa, are guided by the understanding and expectation that this goal will be achieved by influencing the already troubled political and economic structures of these regions.

It is possible to say that the root cause of the problem, which is increasingly reflecting a state of chaos, lies in the rapid changes experienced by the world system since the early 1990s. The situation that emerged after the collapse of the bipolar world system prompted the US to take action with the aim of establishing a unipolar international system, while at the same time bringing to the fore the search for a multipolar world system by the new actors in the international system, namely the structures that emerged in various regions of the world, primarily the EU.

as new actors in the international system, seeking a multipolar world system. This systemic change, which we believe lies at the root of the chaos and uncertainty emerging at the global level, has led other centres to respond with similar policies to the United States' attempts to establish a unipolar world system through expansionist policies.

...Let me state clearly that the actors in the globalisation process are powerful states, multinational corporations, international capital and finance, and supranational organisations. Those who lose their nation-state cannot escape falling under the control of others.

[8] It is a bitter truth that the MHP cadres have begun to lose their shared feelings and ideas. I would like to remind you that I conveyed my recommendation to print 100,000 copies of the first edition of Leader Türkeş's 9 Lights book (approximately 100 pages in length) and distribute them to the entire MHP organisation and Ülkü Ocakları (Ideological Youth Clubs) in order to establish a common ground in the organisation's ideological framework; and t h e n used as the main text in internal party training. The disgraceful situation that emerged among MHP headquarters managers prior to the 2011 elections painfully revealed how much even the most extreme Ülkücü needed the principle of "Morality" in the Nine Lights, as did many people at the MHP headquarters.

[9] A survey conducted among MHP provincial and district organisation managers indicates that the average length of time these managers remain in education is around seven years. The details of this study should be brought to the attention of the MHP senior management. The lack of education exhibited by people involved in politics in the field, in terms of subjective development criteria, should not be considered unique to the MHP. This situation applies to all political parties in our country. In this situation, it is a tragedy for our country that the complaints of academics, bureaucrats and other "white-collar" professionals about politics at the provincial and district level being in the hands of people from professions such as market traders, wholesalers, kiosk owners, gallery owners, estate agents and shopkeepers are met with disdain. In order to improve this situation, the practically meaningless ban on public officials engaging in politics needs to be reviewed within a 'legal framework'. It may be fruitful for the MHP to address this issue together with other parties in the Grand National Assembly.

[10] The MHP website has announced that registration is ongoing for the 5th term of the School of Politics and Leadership, which is still active.

<http://www.mhp.org.tr/haber.php?id=2683&foto=galeri>

[11] Although many works have been written about Alparslan Türkeş's life and political struggle, I would recommend Arslan Tekin's book entitled "*Son Başbuğ*" (*The Last Leader*), especially to young readers.

[12] Since Bahçeli was elected leader of the MHP, the full texts of all his important speeches can be accessed on the MHP website. It should be noted with appreciation that Dr Devlet Bahçeli, who has an academic background, has had his congress speeches and Grand National Assembly speeches compiled into booklets and published, thereby enabling future researchers to rely on sound data. An academic MP who worked closely with Bahçeli between 1999 and 2002 and was tasked with editing his speeches once stated, while showing draft speech texts, that Bahçeli personally highlighted the underlined lines and was very meticulous about the spelling in the speech text – with a slight complaint.

1.2. What If Devlet Bahçeli Had Not Been at the Helm of the MHP While FETÖ Was in Power?

-FETÖ's Attempt to Infiltrate the MHP-

It was the height of the disappointment felt by the MHP base following the November 2015 elections. The heavy agenda, bombs exploding in major cities, the news of martyrs... **1** was increasing even more. It was during those days that, unaware of the second bypass operation scheduled for 15 days later, I visited MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli at his office on 30 December 2015. I visited him to express my gratitude for my name being proposed as the MHP candidate to the Grand National Assembly in the RTÜK membership election held four months earlier and to convey the inappropriate behaviour I had encountered during the election. Prof. Dr. Bilgehan Atsız Gökdağ, one of our ÜLKÜ~YAZ managers, accompanied me. After Gökdağ presented his newly published book, "The World of the Turks," to Bahçeli, we also discussed the events that took place during the RTÜK election process.

As we were about to conclude our visit and take our leave, Bahçeli refreshed our tea and brought up a new topic: the Gülen movement's attempt to infiltrate the MHP. To be honest, I did not expect this because there was no sign of today's social attitude, and since the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 was not yet on the horizon, Bahçeli's "anti-movement" words were considered exaggerated even in our own circles. Moreover, the coalition to remove MHP leader Bahçeli from the MHP presidency had not yet been formed. The campaign that Emre Uslu, one of FETÖ's fugitive intellectuals, would ignite on social media a month later, at the beginning of February, was also nowhere in sight.

Bahçeli spoke slowly and deliberately, as he did when discussing important matters: "You know our teacher Şakir Akça ^[1]. Every June, he goes to his summer house in his hometown for holidays. Before leaving, he has made it a habit to stop by and have a meeting with me. In June 2009, he came for such a meeting. However, he had a guest with him. He said this person was Prof. Dr. Şerif Ali Tekalan ⁽²⁾, a former member of the Council of Higher Education and rector of Fatih University. He was ostensibly paying a courtesy visit and had brought an invitation to his daughter's upcoming wedding. After the welcome formalities and my best wishes for the couple, Tekalan spoke up and suddenly brought up the subject of the friendship between Fetullah Gülen and our leader Alparslan Türkeş.

I sensed that Şakir Hoca was uncomfortable with this situation, and I listened without interrupting him. He said that they were sympathetic to the MHP, but that their "Hocaefendi" was uncomfortable with my attitude and distance towards them. He then extended the topic to how all politicians showed interest in the "Turkish Language Olympics" while I kept my distance, and finally revealed his true intentions: "If you appoint Ekrem Dumanlı ⁽³⁾, the editor-in-chief of Zaman Newspaper, who is no stranger to you, ^{and} Mustafa Yeşil ⁽⁴⁾, president of the Journalists and Writers Foundation, as deputy chairmen of the ^{MHP}, we as a community will support you with all our might."

After he said this, I asked him, "Have you finished?" and I said the following, one word at a time: "This is an institution governed by the Political Parties Law. The rules dictate who can become a member of the Central Executive Committee, how and when, and who will form the Presidential Council. That is the first point. Secondly, how dare you make such a proposal? I appreciate some of your work, such as the Turkish Language Olympics. But if you do not give up your desire to interfere so much in national institutions and

political parties, your 'community' will eventually clash with the nationalist movement. Be aware of this."

Frustrated at not getting the answer he wanted, Tekalan asked if he could go to the United States soon to meet with the person there and whether he could relay this meeting. I replied, "You can recount it exactly as it happened." "Professor Şakir apologised for being caught in the middle and left. A few months had passed since our meeting when, as you know, rumours spread again in 2006 through the community's publications and whispering newspapers. What were these allegations? "The MHP Chairman does not know how to perform ablutions, does not pray, and no one has ever seen him prostrate his forehead in prayer." You are already familiar with these allegations.

Bahçeli was referring to reports that had previously appeared in a newspaper used by a former journalist to manipulate nationalists, claiming that "Bahçeli fired the party's imam." (*My article titled "The Friday Prayer Fitna," which addresses this issue in detail, is also included in this book.*)

As we concluded our meeting and parted ways, Gökdağ was understandably surprised: "Does Bahçeli always explain everything so openly?" Because what he saw did not match the image of Bahçeli projected to the enlightened segment of the nationalist base.

I had anticipated that this meeting would be of historical significance, but it would gain even greater importance following the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.

Two weeks after our meeting, Bahçeli underwent open-heart surgery. Our next meeting took place two months after the surgery, when he was permitted to visit the MHP headquarters. It was a courtesy visit, with the wish that he "get well soon".

As he recovered quickly, Bahçeli was dealing with the distress caused by those who, despite owing their political existence largely to him, were attempting to oust him by convening an extraordinary congress, setting aside the difficulties of a serious post-operative period. During this period, on 30 April 2016, I visited him and presented him with a copy of *Divan-ı Hikmet*, published by Ahmet Yesevi University. Out of courtesy, I said, "On behalf of ÜLKÜ~YAZ, I can make a statement of support regarding the struggle for the presidency." With all sincerity, he said, "Look at the wonderful things you are doing; don't get involved in these matters. I am aware of where everyone stands."

Less than three months later, the bloody coup attempt launched around midnight on 15 July 2016 threw the country into chaos. Bahçeli, one of the first male voices to speak out against the coup, announced that, as a statesman, he stood with the Turkish Government against the coup plotters. This was the stance I expected from Bahçeli.

Before recording our historically significant conversation, I met with our esteemed elder Şakir Akça, who had witnessed FETÖ's intention to infiltrate the top ranks of the MHP, and obtained his confirmation on the matter. Akça said, "When they suggested that I intercede on their behalf because they were having difficulty reaching Bahçeli to introduce themselves, I was naturally unaware of their intention to infiltrate the MHP. During the meeting, after the usual pleasantries and the presentation of the wedding invitation, I conveyed my complaints to them about the difficult situation they had put me in with the offer they brought down from above."

While the dust from the coup attempt had not yet settled, on 29 August 2016, he held a press conference where he stated that

all TV stations and news agencies reported it as a "Breaking News" development under the headline "FETÖ Wants to Take Over the MHP"; but what they reported was no surprise to me. The topic was reflected on the Milliyet newspaper's website that day, sourced from IHA, among the "Breaking News" items, as follows.

***Statement from Bahçeli Regarding the Meeting
with Şerif Ali Tekalan***

IHA / 29 August 2016

MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli stated that during his meeting with Prof. Dr. Şerif Ali Tekalan, Rector of Fatih University and member of the Turkish Language Olympics Organising Committee, he said, "If you destroy all the values of our society, one day you will inevitably face the nationalist movement."

MHP Chairman Bahçeli made statements on current issues at his party's headquarters. Answering questions from the press, Bahçeli said the following regarding whether he would attend the opening of the Judicial Year:

"I would like to state that I will attend the opening meeting of the judiciary on 1 September. In the past, we have sometimes received invitations and sometimes not. However, there is no point in first interpreting positively and then abandoning an assessment that could enable many institutions in Turkey to act together and in unison. If the leader of the main opposition, along with the Bar Association, is going to Beştepe to discuss Turkey's agenda after 15 July with the President, it is difficult to understand what kind of objection they have to going to a hall inside Beştepe."

In response to a question from a journalist about Meral Akşener, who has been referred to disciplinary action, Bahçeli gave the following answer:

“There should be no issue more important than 15 July. Constantly mentioning one name is unbecoming behaviour. That is not the only issue on the MHP’s agenda. The MHP’s agenda is the state and the nation.”

“One day, you are destined to face the nationalist movement.”

Bahçeli also commented on his meeting with Prof. Dr. Şerif Ali Tekalan, Rector of Fatih University and member of the Turkish Language Olympics Organising Committee. Bahçeli stated that during the meeting, he told Tekalan that if they destroyed all the values of society, one day they would inevitably face the nationalist movement, adding, "You have repeated an incident that has been interpreted in different ways in the press for a long time. Let me make this very clear. In June 2009, Şakir Akça, the Rector of Gazi University, of which I am a proud member, wanted to visit at the end of the year, as they do every year, and after the visit, they planned to go to his residence in Elmalı, Antalya. Upon such an invitation, we gave them an appointment. Mr. Rector Şakir Akça arrived accompanied by another person. They introduced him as a member of the Faculty of Medicine. They said they had an invitation and wanted to present it on this occasion. I congratulated them because it was their daughter's wedding invitation. I offered my best wishes and then learned that the esteemed faculty member was Şerif Ali Tekalan. At that time, some

They have expressed their desire to share their thoughts with us on these matters. Sir, we love and respect you, but you do not participate in many of our activities. He began by saying that in the past, the founding chairman of your party, Mr Alparslan Türkeş, had occasionally met with Fetullah Gülen, but that you had not done so. I listened to them until the end and then said the following: 'Some of your activities have been positively received by the nation. However, some of your activities have wiped out even those that were positively received. We are witnessing your publications that destroy all of Turkey's cultural, national, and spiritual values. If this continues, and you destroy all the values of our society, one day you are bound to face the idealist movement.' They responded to my statement by saying, 'I will be visiting soon. May I share this conversation?' and we said, 'You may share it wherever you wish.' About 1.5-2 months later, discord spread within the MHP. Some individuals were used as tools in this regard. Rumours spread in Anatolia that the MHP Chairman was irreligious, did not know how to pray, that the chairman was this or that, and that the outcome must change. The talk of change and transformation today has been going on since October 2009. Thank God, we did not perceive the transformation in this sense, nor did we fall into this game of change."

"We will sever ties with anyone we know or recognise who has ties to the MHP."

Bahçeli, who said that the organisation known as FETÖ had expanded into seven areas, stated, "These include the Turkish Armed Forces and the security forces. It is also said to be present in the political arena. The question everyone is asking is this: 'Are those who are present in every area that makes up society...

Are they also present in politics? If so, those fighting FETÖ today need to review the political arena. If such a review reveals that anyone we know or recognise has ties to the MHP, we will sever those ties. There can be no question of us joining forces with the MHP.

In response to a journalist's question, "If there is a purge within the ruling party as part of an operation against the political wing of the FETÖ organisation, what kind of support will the MHP provide in light of the resulting situation?", Bahçeli said the following:

"You want us to predict the future. We are not knowledgeable enough to predict the future in this direction. We have stated how many judges and prosecutors have been dismissed, how many people have been expelled or arrested from the Turkish Armed Forces. The political data is not yet known. If the political authority, while continuing its fight against the FETÖ organisation or similar terrorist organisations, shares with the public what is happening in the political arena and to what extent, then data will be obtained that can answer your question."

Bahçeli made the following statements regarding the National Consensus Government:

The government enjoys broad support in parliament with 316 MPs. On that basis, what national consensus will you establish? With whom will you establish it? Can there be national consensus with the extensions of the PKK? Can there be national consensus with the remnants of FETÖ? We need to see and understand these things. We are prepared to make every sacrifice. ^{Sacrifice} means that we are ready to do whatever is required of us. The Republic of Turkey is not ownerless. The division and fragmentation of Turkey will not be permitted. If anyone attempts this, we will confront them and, as a nationalist movement, we will fight with all our might, with our blood and our lives" ^([5])

All the details in the news were the same as in our interview with Bahçeli eight months ago. Two names were missing: *Ekrem Dumanlı* and *Mustafa Yeşil*. Now both are fugitives wanted on a red notice for "terrorist organisation leadership".

Any words about why Bahçeli's leadership of the MHP is important are superfluous at this point. This is precisely why it is essential that the MHP leader be someone who cannot be bought or blackmailed. If someone who could be bought or blackmailed were sitting in Bahçeli's chair, what would happen in our beloved country?

Everyone should think about the answer to this question, but those who define themselves as "idealists" should think twice!

[1] Prof. Dr. Mehmet Şakir Akça: Retired faculty member of the Ankara Faculty of Dentistry. He was born on 29 October 1933 in the Elmalı district of Antalya. He began his university life in 1953 when he was accepted into Istanbul University Faculty of Dentistry. He became the founding rector of Gazi University in 1982 and held this position until 1987. He is one of the most beloved elders of nationalist circles in Ankara.

[2] Prof. Dr. Şerif Ali Tekalan: He is one of the top-level managers of FETÖ. It has been recorded that he managed FETÖ's relations with Ankara's upper bureaucracy and political cadres. He fled abroad due to investigations launched against him after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt.

[3] Ekrem Dumanlı: The last editor-in-chief of the Zaman newspaper, who fled abroad before the arrest warrant was issued against him in connection with FETÖ. He used his detention during high school with a nationalist group as proof of his nationalist background.

[4] Mustafa Yeşil: He fled abroad before the arrest warrant was issued under the FETÖ investigation and is the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Journalists and Writers Foundation, the organisation's legally established media arm.

[5] <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bahceli-den-serif-ali-tekalan-gorusmesine-ankara-yerelha-ber-1532142/>

1.3. “ Will Become Head of State”

MI believe I met the leader of the MHP in 1979, when I was still a medical student. He was the General President of ÜNAY, the association of idealistic medical professionals. The Medical Students' Union shared the same flat in Ankara. In fact, the ÜMİD-Bir General Headquarters was also operating in the same flat. We, as idealistic young people from Ankara University Faculty of Medicine, were using a small room in the same flat. Later, when I started writing for the Töre magazine on 12 September 1980, we would occasionally meet and chat at the magazine's management centre, known as MAYAŞ, which I would visit from time to time.

After the passing of Leader Alparslan Türkeş, we closely followed the developments in Yalova, as in the rest of Turkey, prior to the Extraordinary MHP Congress convened on 18 May 1997, which was postponed to 6 July 1997 due to the events that unfolded. The declaration of support we signed as "Yalova Ülkücüler" during the General President candidacy process was featured in the Middle East newspaper at the time.

As members of the nationalist community who are respected figures in the Yalova public sphere, we published a declaration on 24 June 1997, shortly before the congress date.

Written by me and sent to the Middle East newspaper for publication, this statement, which I will reproduce here without changing a single word, contained certain points that, despite the passage of 15 years, are still valid today. ^[1]

Not content with merely declaring our support for Dr Devlet Bahçeli for the MHP leadership, a few friends who had prepared the declaration and I travelled from Yalova to Ankara before the congress and conveyed our support to Bahçeli in person during a meeting at his office in Kızılay.

On 6 July 1997, Dr Devlet Bahçeli was elected as the leader of the MHP for the first time at the congress.

In the first elections held, the MHP achieved its highest ever vote share in its history and succeeded in sending a number of MPs to the Grand National Assembly that it had never seen before. In subsequent congresses, Bahçeli always won the MHP leadership, sometimes competing against several candidates. Following an unfortunate coalition partnership, the 2002 elections saw the party fall below the electoral threshold, and during the subsequent difficult period, I conveyed my views on matters I deemed necessary for the success of the nationalist movement to Dr Devlet Bahçeli in numerous meetings, describing them as "a duty imposed on us by our nationalist ideology".

When the MHP Government was formed, I was working in Yalova, so I could only observe those days from afar as a 'provincial doctor'. During my consultancy as State Secretary for the Turkic World, which began on 1 June 2002, I did not have the opportunity to work more closely before the early elections were held and the MHP was left outside the Grand National Assembly.

In 2004, the MHP moved to its new headquarters and developed its institutional structure. Starting in 2006, I visited Mr Bahçeli regularly. During our private conversations, he would bring up topics he wished to be recorded and entrusted them to my memory to be written down when the time came. I later published some of these topics

later. The topics "The Friday Prayer Fitna" and "The Inside Story of the Death Penalty," which I have included in this book, are among them.

When I shared with him the idea of establishing the Ülkücü Writers Association, which we decided to found on 12 September 2012, he expressed his belief that we would preserve the brand value of Ülkücülük and promised to register as the first "Honorary Member". Indeed, after the Ülkü~Yaz was officially established, during a visit I made with my friends, he filled out the membership application form by hand and became the first Honorary Member of the Ülkücü Writers Association.

Who is Devlet Bahçeli?

He was born in Osmaniye in 1948. He belongs to a large Turkmen family known locally as the Fettahoğulları. Bahçeli completed his primary education in Osmaniye and his secondary education in Istanbul, and received his university education at the Ankara Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences. Dr Bahçeli held positions at every level of the Ülkücü Movement from its inception. While a student at the Ankara Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences in 1967, Dr Bahçeli served as a founder of the Ülkü Ocağı. He held the position of Secretary General of the Turkish National Student Federation from 1970 to 1971.

Since 1972, he has served as an assistant in the Economics Department at the Ankara Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences and its affiliated colleges. Bahçeli obtained his Doctorate in Economics from the Institute of Social Sciences at Gazi University and continued his teaching career at the same university's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences in the Department of Economic Policy until 1987.

Bahçeli was one of the founders of the Nationalist Financialists and Economists Association (ÜMİD-BİR) in the 1970s and the founding President of the University Academy and Higher Education Institutions Assistants Association (ÜNAY).

Bahçeli, who played an important role in the training of nationalist academic staff during his tenure at Gazi University, resigned from his teaching position at the university on 17 April 1987 upon being called to duty by Leader Alparslan Türkeş. On 19 April 1987, he was elected to the party leadership at the MÇP Grand Congress and appointed as Secretary General.

Dr Devlet Bahçeli, who held positions in the management teams of the MÇP and MHP, including membership of the Central Management Board, Secretary General, Deputy Chairman, membership of the Central Decision Board, and Chief Advisor to the Chairman, was elected Chairman of the MHP at the 5th MHP Extraordinary Congress on 6 July 1997.

He was re-elected as General Chairman at the MHP Ordinary Congresses held on 5 November 2000, 12 October 2003, 19 November 2006, 2009, and 4 November 2012.

“If anyone claims to have laid a single brick, let them come forward for accountability!..”

The points emphasised by Devlet Bahçeli in his speech at the opening of the MHP Headquarters, which he brought to the nationalist movement, provide important insights into Bahçeli's character. Before the 3 November 2002 elections, the amount allocated to the MHP from the large sum given to parties from the treasury was blocked by the MHP leader Bahçeli, approximately one-third of it

was blocked by MHP leader Bahçeli to complete the construction of the General Headquarters.

An MHP state minister was also heard fuming about the 1,500 TL spent on renting and outfitting a minibus for election campaigning, saying, "The General Chairman has blocked the party's billions for a building, and we're struggling here to run our campaign." (This MHP State Minister later parted ways with Bahçeli and has been distanced from the MHP administration since 2002.)

On 29 May 2004, the opening day of the MHP's magnificent headquarters, Dr Devlet Bahçeli, using his own petty calculations as background music, shouted to those asking, "Do you know how the giant construction in Balgat is progressing?": "I would like to emphasise one point in particular: The entire construction costs of this magnificent building were covered by state aid received by our Party from the treasury. No institution or individual made any financial contribution in this regard, nor was any such contribution requested in any way.

I am stating this clearly here and now: If a single penny of anyone's money has been spent on this building in any way, let them come forward and say so today. We will pay them back immediately."

The Ülkücüler built their headquarters solely with treasury assistance. I wish to express this with great peace of mind

Seeing is not the same as hearing!

I would like to conclude my writing with a final impression from the 2003 MHP Congress: The MHP's performance in the government under Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit

was frequently discussed within our family, just as it was in the homes of many of our Ülkücü comrades.

That is why I took my wife with me to the 12 October 2003 congress. We sat directly opposite the protocol stand, intending to listen to the speeches of the three candidates for General Chairman.

As the other two presidential candidates, who were sitting on the platform directly opposite us as rivals to Bahçeli, moved to their places in the protocol stand, they joked among themselves and burst into artificial laughter, virtually ignoring Bahçeli. The disrespect shown to the MHP President, especially by one of them, was beyond any definition of decency.

My wife, who was watching this scene unfold like a film from the front row, asked us to leave the hall once Devlet Bahçeli had finished his opening speech. When I asked, "Why? You were going to listen to the other candidates too!", she replied, "There's no need to listen to the other candidates! After seeing this scene, even if I had all the votes of the more than a thousand delegates in the middle of the hall, I couldn't give a single one to anyone other than Devlet Bahçeli. That's why it's unnecessary to listen to their speeches."

Bahçeli's Prayer

At the end of his speech at the 10th MHP Congress on Sunday, 4 November 2012, Devlet Bahçeli uttered a prayer, and the tens of thousands of idealists filling the hall responded with a loud "Âmiin," their hands raised to the sky and their hearts open to our Merciful Lord: *"O Allah, do not leave our homeland, shaped by Islam and Turkishness, helpless!"*

This scene, which sent a spiritual shiver through the congress hall, must have affected them deeply, as the *Aydınlık* newspaper chose the headline "Bahçeli Left Matters to Prayer" for its congress report.

He had seen it. (Who knows, perhaps they would have said, "Bahçeli's fate is in Allah's hands," but they did not dare.) Yet, anyone with a primary school level of Islamic knowledge knows that prayer is very important for a believer, that a Muslim's business is always with prayer, and that in any case, it is up to Allah. In Turkish culture, every stage of life is intertwined with prayer, from the beginning of life with the Dede Korkut prayer, "I gave you your name; may Allah give you life," to the end of life with the words, "May Allah have mercy," as the body is laid to rest in the ground.

The number of people who know Arif Nihat Asya's poem "Prayer," which inspired this prayer that touched the hearts of tens of thousands in the congress hall and hundreds of thousands of idealists watching the congress on television, is probably very small. For this reason, and with the hope that it may be a source of mercy for Arif Nihat Asya himself, I would like to share the prayer that Bahçeli recited, introducing it with the words, "I would like to conclude my speech with a new prayer inspired by our late poet Arif Nihat Asya."

"We are faint voices; O Allah, do not leave our minarets without the call to prayer, our sky without the flag."

O God, do not abandon our homeland, shaped by Islam and Turkishness.

We know how to stand up to our enemies, O Allah, do not leave us lifeless. Do not leave us loveless, thirsty, breathless, and without a homeland, O Allah.

Do not leave us rootless, homeless, without a future, and alone, O Allah.

Keep the wolf's head high, the idealist's forehead clear, and bless the future of the Three Crescents, O Allah.

Forgive our sins, O Allah, and grant us the blessing of being among those who love and are loved⁻⁽³¹⁾

Islamist writers who claim that during Bahçeli's period, the MHP abandoned the Islamic/religious rhetoric established during the period of Başbuğ Türkeş, such as "*Turkishness is our body, Islam is our soul*," and veered towards a "soulless secularism," will they regret what they wrote in memory of this prayer? (I highly doubt it...)

Writers like Tarhan Erdem, who have become detached from the spiritual climate of our nation and who, in evaluating the MHP Congress, denounce Bahçeli's rhetoric as "mixing politics with religion," would surely be surprised if Bahçeli had also recited the lines from the poem by Arif Nihat Asya, a Mevlevi dervish: "Give us strength... the field of jihad, O Allah, without a champion!" had also been recited; who knows what they would have written, including labelling Bahçeli a "jihadist"?

Or, the disease of viewing the MHP as the 'headquarters of fascism', which rears its head every now and then in Cumhuriyet newspaper, whose editorial board highlights only one of the 75 (seventy-five) names (written as one) from the 75 (written as seventy-five) names of the Central Executive Board, could have set aside the metaphor behind the words "Either scatter the flock left without a shepherd, or do not leave it without a shepherd, O Allah!" and run the headline "Vulgar Fascism Has Resurfaced in the MHP".

The Overall Quality of the Nationalist Crowd

Ultrationalists of my generation (pre-1980 university students), who have followed the incessant, even stubbornly persistent debates within the ultranationalist community, cannot help but feel saddened by the crudeness and lack of sophistication on display. The fact that this lack of decency is not an isolated incident for those who know the nationalist community from within is, unfortunately, a reason for even deeper sorrow. It is the shared belief of our generation, now "elders" in terms of biological age, that overcoming this obstacle, which erodes our nation's nationalist sensibilities, is only possible through widespread spiritual education and by raising the average quality of the nationalist crowd, and that this obstacle will be overcome.

beyond that—this obstacle, which erodes our country's nationalist sensibility, can be overcome. This is the shared conviction of our generation, each of whom, given their biological age, is now an "elder statesman." As a necessity of this belief, I submitted the issues I believed needed to be updated and implemented from our declaration titled 'Invitation to the Idealist Attitude', with the original attached, as an information note to MHP General Chairman Devlet Bahçeli on 17 July 2009. The matters I requested be updated and implemented to raise the average quality of the nationalist crowd—and ultimately the overall quality of the nationalist cadre—were as follows:

* The establishment of a scientific-academic working group to develop the party's ideological structure and clarify it along the lines of the "Turkish-Islamic Ideal" (See Declaration: Article 5)

* Ensuring the political unity of the idealist community (See Declaration: Article 6)

The 20-year period since we recorded our idealist stance in 1997 cannot be considered a short period of time. During this period, certain events, including the pornographic tape scandals before the last elections, left dark marks on the history of the nationalist movement, and it is clear that no assessment has been made of the political situation that emerged after the martyrdom of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu. I believe that some of these views, which contributed to the MHP's march towards eternity as the political action of Turkish Nationalism, which recently celebrated its 48th anniversary, should be updated and put into practice.

[1] Declaration dated 24 June 1997 entitled "Invitation to the Idealist Stance":

1. The current candidates for the MHP General Presidency – Dr Devlet Bahçeli (Alliance candidate) and Tuğrul Türkeş – should proceed to the 6 July 1997 congress.

2. Personally, we unconditionally support Dr. Devlet Bahçeli, the candidate of the "ideological tradition".
 3. Following the election of the party leader, the regular congress should be brought forward from October 1997 and held as soon as possible (e.g. August 1997) to give Dr Devlet Bahçeli the opportunity to form the Central Executive Board (MKYK) with whom he will work.
 4. The new Central Executive Board should not include former MPs who served as MHP MPs in the Grand National Assembly between 1991 and 1995 and whose activities were unimpressive (except for Muharrem Şemsek), nor should it include individuals transferred from parties such as ANAP and DYP who will not actively contribute to or benefit the party. If these individuals become candidates through their own efforts and receive delegate support, it is their right to join the MKYK, just like any other MHP member. What we object to here is the danger of these worn-out names being placed in the MKYK today and in the MP candidate lists tomorrow through backroom deals and intrigues.
 5. An academic working group should be appointed without delay to develop the party's ideological structure and clarify its Turkish-Islamic vision.
 6. In particular, a direct appeal should be made to the "true idealists" within the BBP and other political organisations, honouring them before the idealist public and inviting them to join the MHP "as foot soldiers." It should be declared that if they do not accept this invitation, all relations with them will be frozen. The number of individuals we deem suitable for a personal invitation and worthy of the term "true idealist" is not very large. (For example, in our opinion, Hasan Çağlayan, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, Yaşar Yıldırım, Orhan Kavuncu, Abdurrahim Karakoç, Mehmet Ekici, Mahir Damatlar) The attitude of these individuals, who can be counted on the fingers of two hands, will be decisive in determining our future stance towards the aforementioned individuals. The very reason for the existence of a BBP that does not respond positively to this call will cease to exist. It is imperative that this be clearly explained to the idealist public; that is, it is obligatory for every idealist.
 7. We wish to make it known that we do not welcome the presentation of those who promote themselves as the "Integration Group," which gives the impression that they are determining the editorial line of the Middle East newspaper or that the Middle East newspaper is behind this proposal.
 8. The events that took place at the 18 May 1997 congress have been evaluated as necessary by the entire nationalist public, from Ardahan to Yalova. The soundness of this evaluation will be clearly seen in the results of the 6 July 1997 congress.
 9. The claims made at the 18 May 1997 congress that the idealists had reduced the MHP's vote share from 20% to 3% should not be taken seriously. It is understood that these ugly acts will come back as a spiritual arrow to the "owners of these ugly attitudes" and their "instigators," in accordance with the saying, "Bad words bind the speaker." Those who still fail to grasp this truth will surely understand it on the day of the convention on 6 July 1997. The crudeness and tyranny displayed at the aforementioned congress marked the beginning of the MHP Movement's journey towards achieving a purity and nobility commensurate with its historical mission. We regard this situation as a blessing from Allah for our cause.
 10. We do not wish to see the name of Ali Güngör, whom we know from the Töre and Hamle magazines, MAYAŞ, and MÇP during the difficult days of the 1980s, mentioned alongside certain other names.
 11. We declare this statement and our desire for it to be published in the Middle East newspaper to reach the public as a "duty imposed on us by our idealism" and as a democratic stance of enlightened responsibility, and we invite all enlightened idealists to clearly state their positions in the same manner.
 12. May Allah be with our future "General Chairman" Dr Devlet Bahçeli, who kindles the "idealistic fire" in our hearts, on his sacred journey... 24.6.1997
- The Holy Qur'an, Surah 25, Furqan, Verse 77: (O Muhammad!) Say: "If you did not pray, why would my Lord value you? You have denied the truth. Therefore, the punishment will not leave you."
- [2] For Bahçeli's speech at the opening of the MHP Headquarters on 29 May 2004, see: http://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/genel_baskan/konusma/158/index.html
- [3] Arif Nihat Asya (7 February 1904, Çatalca, İstanbul – 5 January 1975, Ankara) is our Turkish nationalist poet who became famous as the "flag poet" for his famous poem "Bayrak" (Flag), which he wrote for Adana's liberation day.
- Arif Nihat Asya's dervish-like style can be seen in the following lines, which are like his last will and testament:

If I am Arif Nihat; if I have devoted myself to a noble cause; if I have been able to walk my path throughout my life with faith, determination, and by facing all difficulties head-on, trampling the thorns that stood in my way; if I have been able to convince both friend and foe that I am a poet who uses Turkish most beautifully; if I have been added to the 'golden chain' awaiting a new link after Yahya Kemal; moreover, if I can leave behind poets who love Turkishness and are already approaching the summit, such as Niyazi Yıldırım Gençosmanoğlu and Yavuz Bülent Bakiler; if the beliefs I have devoted my life to are in safe hands and are growing and developing with each passing day; if the blessed youth I cherish like the apple of my eye is growing like an avalanche; if my poems never cease to be on the lips of those who believe in the blessed cause and never will; if my "Flag" has found the wind it awaited; Well, death is welcome, it is a blessing:

"Death is a peaceful spring country for a dervish."

I, who could have drowned in the blessings of this world if I had wanted to, pushed them aside with the back of my hand; I said, "Filling one's belly and ruminating is what animals want; being human begins after this stage," and I fell in love with this homeland, this nation, Turkish nationalism, and the Turkish flag:

"Animals die, but lovers do not."

Just let my eyes not remain behind, mine. Let no unholy hand touch the bosom of my homeland; may Allah not show me my homeland, which I see in every colour, as red. Otherwise, death is not the "end" for me; it is rebirth. "The soil from which martyrs will spring forth if squeezed" has never frightened us. Like Koca Yunus, like Mevlana, I too have known the "truth of God" in the earth; I have known my origin:

"I saw my moon on the ground; what do I desire in the sky? My

face must be on the ground; mercy rains down upon me from the earth."

We settled; we departed, leaving a pleasant echo in the dome. "I was a grain; I reached the threshing floor, I became the threshing floor; I was a flood, I reached the sea, I became the sea."

How blessed am I and those who can be like me..."

Arif Nihat Asya's "Prayer" Poem

We are faint voices... minarets, O Allah, do not leave us without the call to prayer! Either call those who make home here, or do not leave us without a hive, O Allah!
The minarets are without lights... the sky too, O Allah, do not leave it without stars!
The land moulded by Islam, O Allah, do not leave it without Muslims! Give us strength... the field of jihad, O Allah, do not leave it without champions!
The crowds awaiting heroes, O Allah, do not leave them without heroes! Let us know how to stand against the enemy, O Allah, do not leave us lifeless! On the paths of tomorrow, the years too, O Allah, do not leave them without Ramadan! Either scatter the flock left without a shepherd, or O Allah, do not leave them without a shepherd! O Allah, do not leave us without love, without water, without air; and without a homeland! Do not leave the land shaped by Islam without Muslims, O Allah!
Arif Nihat Asya's prayer poem, taken from Bahçeli's speech, is included in his book *Dualar ve Âminler* (Ötüken Neşriyat).

1.4. “Those Attacking the MHP from the Left and Right ”

I have a report titled ***“Those Attacking the MHP from Left and Right”*** (A Current Analysis, Situation Assessment, and Recommendations). To MHP General Chairman Devlet Bahçeli

EThis report, presented with its appendices, suggests how the MHP should relate to Islamic communities and indicates that the Gülen Community has been subtly developing an anti-MHP discourse through publications such as Aksiyon magazine and ZAMAN newspaper. In this respect, this report, which foreshadowed the tension between the Gülen Movement and the MHP on the eve of the 2011 elections five years in advance, is of great importance in terms of examining the relations between nationalist politics and Islamic circles.

The introduction of the report observes that "as the election period approached, calculations regarding the MHP began to surface" and points out that these types of attacks, which are not unfamiliar to the MHP community, "were organised in a manner aimed at undermining and eroding the ideological foundations of the movement itself, unlike previous attacks." It is also noted that those carrying out this organisation are striving "to sabotage the efforts of Turkish intellectuals to come together, regardless of right-left divisions, to break this colonial stranglehold, against foreign-backed power centres seeking to tighten the imperialist stranglehold into which our country has been plunged."

Today, tracing the roots of the efforts to distance nationalists from religiosity and religious people from nationalism in our country to the writings of such discredited pens reveals the treacherous scheme facing the nationalist movement.

Faith-Based Games Played on the Nationalist Masses

The following section of the report draws attention to the first signs of the anti-MHP stance adopted by the Gülen Movement with the following lines:

“It is understood that a community group centred on the ZAMAN newspaper, which until now has been known to show little activity in the field of daily politics beyond “political support given in exchange for deals made during election time”, has become one of the main elements driving the movement against the MHP, and that the group is working to prevent, or at least weaken, any potential cooperation between nationalist forces and the magazine and television channel. magazine and television channel, are working to prevent and at least weaken any potential cooperation between national forces.”

Following this striking observation, the reasons for the Gülen Community's shift towards an anti-MHP stance since 2006 were highlighted:

"In parallel with its activities, which form an interesting chain of relations linked to US policies, news and commentary about its planned activation throughout Turkey in the coming period have also been reflected in the public sphere."

Glorifying Türkiye – Attacking Bahçeli

Alongside the ZAMAN newspaper, STV, which acted almost like the AKP's mouthpiece during the last election period, along with mass media outlets such as Samanyolu Haber TV, became part of a campaign to undermine the MHP. The media's stance of targeting the current MHP leadership under Bahçeli by comparing it to Alparslan Türkeş's MHP is being questioned.

This group [Gülen Movement Media], which lacks a clear consensus within itself, reveals the provocative nature of its work by claiming that there is a rift between the current MHP leadership and its founder, Alparslan Türkeş. An interview published in Aksiyon, the group's magazine, explicitly states that 'if Başbuğ were alive, he would never have allowed the Kızılçelebi Coalition', with the aim of confusing the youth base of the nationalist movement."

Two questions and answers from an interview with author Lütfü Yıldız, who compiled a collection on "idealist martyrs"—one of the most sensitive issues for the idealist crowd—published in Aksiyon magazine, have been evaluated from this perspective⁽¹¹⁾

Furthermore, some claims made by Hasan Cemal in his latest book (*I Loved the Republic*), in which he recounts his memories of the Cumhuriyet newspaper, which was popular at the time, are highlighted and brought to the fore, and on this occasion, an attack on the MHP with a disparaging attitude towards its conservative base is revealed in the following lines:

"This 'community media group' has become influential in terms of circulation, and many nationalist tradesmen in Anatolia have subscribed to it as part of a campaign. According to a study, it is the most widely read newspaper among members of the MHP's provincial and district organisations.- In a *three-day news commentary* broadcast, Hasan Cemal's latest book recounting his memories of Cumhuriyet Newspaper was used as a pretext to deliberately highlight news items about MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli that were aimed at the party's base. In this news commentary, the lines written under the subheading **"İlhan Selçuk is secretly meeting with Bahçeli"**

what significance could they possibly hold for the readers of ZAMAN newspaper, other than confusing MHP sympathisers among the readership?

?"^[2] However, in this rather voluminous book, the name Devlet Bahçeli appeared only a few times among the dozens of names mentioned. So why do you think a few of Hasan Cemal's lines about Bahçeli were highlighted and presented to Zaman readers?

***The 'Traditional' Enmity of
Ethnicist-Islamic Radicals towards
the MHP***

It is very difficult to understand the Gülen Community's policy shift, which has aligned itself with the "Moderate Islam" and "Interfaith Dialogue" projects implemented by the US in the Islamic world and does not deny this. An interesting point is the consensus on the line of 'enmity towards the MHP' among some Islamic groups that have always kept their distance from each other – and even do not hesitate to accuse each other of shirk and takfir – ranging from radical takfiris to the moderate ones. There must be a very important reason for this... But what?!

The rhetoric of a "former mujahid" elected to the Grand National Assembly through cooperation with separatist circles in the last election, which extended to the President of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, suggests that this attitude has developed against a backdrop of ethnic resentment. The rhetoric against Turkish nationalism in the name of religion, which was previously pursued with a sense of shame, is now voiced with a hatred driven by ethnic animosity in the climate of ethnic separatism into which our country has rolled. While how this can be reconciled with Islam, which prohibits tribalism, requires theoretical discussion, it is understood that many of the "old mujahideen" have forgotten

are now forgotten.

The aforementioned report reveals the stance of radical Islamists towards the MHP, as outlined in an article by Mustafa İslamoğlu—who has established a television channel broadcasting across Turkey via satellite—based on an MHP congress document:

"Elements with a radical Islamic discourse, which has long been directed against nationalism, have taken their aggression to extremes, such as whether the MHP can be considered Islamic or Marxist, and have not hesitated to write about this openly. A very typical example of this is the rantings in an article by Mustafa İslamoğlu, considered one of the most consistent writers of this group, about the party document entitled **"The Great Meeting"** declared to the public at the MHP's last congress.

In this article, Mustafa İslamoğlu claims that the MHP considers Karl Marx to be a great intellectual and philosopher in the aforementioned document. In the same article, he ruthlessly asserts that the MHP, and even beyond that, the **Turkism** movement, is structured as part of a mission to **"Christianise the country"**^[3]

In my next article, I would like to discuss the reasons why the "community" intensified its anti-MHP rhetoric during the last election period and how the erosion of the MHP's standing among conservative voters can be prevented, based on the "Recommendations" included in the aforementioned report.

How Should the MHP Approach Islamic Communities?

It is well known that MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli has been portrayed as a person who is distant from religion, particularly among community members. Bahçeli, who has been slandered as **someone who "does not prostrate himself in prayer,"** as the saying goes in Anatolia, and whose name has been tarnished among the religious voters of Central Anatolia, has been weakened by this slander, even though the Friday prayer he performed with MHP executives at the Fetih Mosque in the ruins of Ani in Kars at the end of 2010 has weakened this slander.-s at the Fetih Mosque in the ruins of Ani in Kars in late 2010 weakened this slander, but it cannot be ignored that these smear campaigns were effective even among the MHP's voter base. It is known that Devlet Bahçeli was disturbed by these despicable campaigns, which reached his ears. He reflected this discomfort to the public with his words to a group of journalists who met with him after the 2011 elections: ***"They say there is no Alparslan Türkeş at the head of the party, there is an Abu Jahl."*** ⁽¹⁴⁾

However, five years earlier, attention was drawn to the smear campaigns aimed at undermining the MHP on religious grounds, and on 11 March 2006, a report entitled *"Those Attacking the MHP from the Left and Right - A Current Analysis, Assessment of the Situation and Recommendations"* was presented to Devlet Bahçeli with its appendices. After summarising the "arguments aimed at sabotaging the ideological roots of Turkish nationalism, beyond even the legal personality of the MHP," the report presented, under the heading *"Recommendations,"* a list of measures that the MHP should take against these disruptive efforts, particularly regarding its *"Approach to Islamic Communities":*

How Should the MHP Approach Religious Communities?

** We must be vigilant regarding "community activities" carried out within the MHP base that seek to sabotage the unity of feelings and hearts between the grassroots and the party leadership. These structures, known to be "nourished in every sense" by the nationalist base, must be exposed and prevented from operating within the MHP base.*

** Today, according to official reports, there are 5,000 (five thousand) according to official reports, each of whom is a "local religious leader" in their own right. It is known that a significant portion of these community leaders have traditionally had no issue with the MHP line. These community leaders should be utilised to strengthen national unity and solidarity by adopting an approach similar to that of the early years of the Republic.*

** The MHP, particularly under the leadership of its academic staff, should utilise all avenues of formal and informal education to equip university youth with knowledge about Islam, Turkish homelands, and the imperialist restructuring process the world is undergoing. Nationalist youth should be educated on religious matters.*

** The importance of the unity of the nationalist cadres, divided along religious sensitivities during the separation of the BBP, under the umbrella of the MHP should be turned into a campaign through Anatolian tours and open calls that will overcome the press's "silence censorship" on this issue.*

** The MHP's respectful secular stance towards clear beliefs inherited from its leader Alparslan Türkeş in terms of Islamic sensitivity should be displayed without any complexes and without paying attention to "black propaganda methods". If necessary, the warm attitude of respected figures in the theological community towards the MHP tradition should also be brought into play in this area.*

What needs to be done is what Türkeş did!

The MHP has ample guidance within its tradition on how to restore its relationship with its devout voter base. There is ample evidence that the MHP's founding leader, Başbuğ Alparslan Türkeş, established relationships with leading figures in the spiritual world, even if only politically, based on respect and affection, and maintained them with sensitivity. In the days leading up to Türkeş's death, it is said by leading members of the community that he visited M. Zahid Kotku several times on his sickbed to seek his forgiveness.

Hacı Mustafa Bağışlayıcı, one of the leading figures of the İskenderpaşa Dergâhı, one of the main branches of the Naqshbandi tradition in our country, and the representative in the Samsun region, was an indispensable guest in the protocol tribune of the MHP congresses during the Türkeş era, 'dressed from head to toe in white'. The author of these lines is one of tens of thousands of living witnesses to this scene. This friend of Allah, whom I visited at his bookshop, which he established as a gathering place in Samsun, and with whom I shared a cup of tea, lived as an example of someone who felt no discomfort with his MHP identity, and passed away in that manner. The MHP should take inspiration from figures like Kastamonulu Mehmed Feyzi (Pamukçu) Efendi, one of the leaders of the Nur community, who always maintained a close relationship with Alparslan Türkeş, and update this approach by fostering similar connections with opinion leaders.

Starting with Mustafa Erdem, a professor of theology who was elected as an Ankara MP for the MHP in the last elections and appointed as Deputy Chairman of the new MHP Executive Board, ***the MHP leadership sought to weave a web between the MHP and Islamic communities and, increasingly, individual voters with strong Islamic sensibilities.*** MHP leaders are expected to show the necessary sensitivity to break down the psychological barriers that have been erected between the MHP and Islamic communities and increasingly individual voters with strong Islamic sensibilities – barriers that have been significantly heightened by the tape scandals preceding the last elections. This approach is important and sensitive not only in terms of votes but also in terms of the irreplaceable contribution that Islamic brotherhood can make to the national unity and solidarity of our country.

Efforts should be made to re-establish a relationship that begins with courtesy visits to specific social groups, whose sole purpose is to come together to share an Islamic sensibility, and which are local religious leaders and free from any questionable connections, and which gradually strengthens mutual trust. Otherwise, there is a risk of fundamentally losing the chance to convey political messages to the blocs of voters within the community groups and ultimately to win their votes.

[1] The provocative questions and the sincere idealist's answers published in Action magazine were as follows:

- You have dedicated one of the volumes to Alparslan Türkeş. You give examples from Türkeş's little-known religious life?

- The leader would definitely pray when the call to prayer was sounded. Even if he was on the road. Before and after prayer, he would not engage in dialogue with anyone for three or five minutes, remaining alone with himself. He wanted silence around him during prayer. Sufism is legitimate in Islam. He viewed all Sufi orders practised by their followers with tolerance. For example, there was the group of Kastamonu Mehmet Feyzi Efendi. He had a good dialogue with them. Even now, the Kastamonu Alperenler Group organises events for him every year. He would visit all the communities and groups throughout Anatolia that provided good services to Islam.

- Recently, the Kızılçelebi Coalition formed by Ülkü Ocakları with the left has been the subject of much debate. How would Başbuğ have reacted to these initiatives if he were alive today?

I do not find the Kızılçelebi Commission sincere.

I do not consider the Kızılçelebi alliance to be correct. There can be no alliance with materialist, extreme left-wing groups.

materialist and Maoist groups who claim that oppression exists everywhere. They claim that oppression exists everywhere, yet they turn a blind eye to what is happening in East Turkistan. The Leader always advised unity and solidarity for the sake of our homeland. However, I do not believe that the leftist groups with whom this alliance is being formed are sincere.

<http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-9680-34-basbugun-goremedigi-arastirma.html>

[2] Under the subheading "Selçuk is secretly meeting with Bahçeli" in the Zaman newspaper, the following was written:

İlhan Selçuk established a true 'one-man rule' in Cumhuriyet after the coup he staged following Nadir Nadi's death. He imposed his own ideological line on Cumhuriyet. Initially more of a blend of Kemalism and Marxism, İlhan Selçuk's line later began to shift clearly towards nationalism. Selçuk described this line as 'New Turan' with quotations from Ziya Gökalp's poems. To this end, he entered into secret negotiations, including MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, seeking to form a 'Kızılçelebi Coalition' and pursue Panturkizm (...) İlhan Selçuk took on the role of ideologue for the 'Kızılçelebi Coalition'. He was able to hold secret meetings with Bahçeli.

<http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=234987&title=ilhan-selcuk-ilerici-subay-darbele-rine-bel-bagliyordu&haberSayfa=1>

[3] Regardless of his place in personal daily life, Mustafa İslamoğlu, who is known for his sensitivity regarding Islamic beliefs and who knows the idealist community quite well, a sensitivity that does not escape even the eyes of 'outsiders' such as Ertuğrul Özkök, (who used the pseudonym Sami Hocaoglu) wrote the following instructive lines in a column titled "Watermelon" in the Yeni Şafak newspaper, intended to influence the nationalist base:

The Turkish nationalist and Marxist factions did not stop at merely winking at each other at this point. In a manner that we would not interpret as auspicious even if we saw it in a dream, the current leader of the Turkish nationalist party glorified Marx, the ideological father of communism, in a book titled "The Great Gathering" prepared for his party's congress, praising and extolling him as "a great social and historical philosopher."

The same book also contained equally shocking statements about Christianity. One wing of the Turkish nationalist community labelled these statements as "Christian propaganda" and likened them to the argument of Islam's opponents that "Islam has held us back".

<http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/ekim/13/shocaoglu.html>

[4] Bahçeli spoke to VATAN: "Can I be called Abu Jahl?"

In response to Deniz Güçer's question from the Vatan newspaper, "Has there ever been an election campaign where religious sentiments have been so prominently featured?", Bahçeli's answer clearly reveals his discomfort with the issue:

"Not just in the squares. The words spoken against the MHP and its Chairman Devlet Bahçeli in home conversations and mosque courtyards are shameful expressions. Can the Chairman of the MHP be called Abu Jahl, sir? They say, 'There is no Alparslan Türkeş at the head of the party, there is an Abu Jahl. How is this political struggle? How can this be? Every religious person in Turkey has remained indifferent on this issue. (...) They say you are harsh towards some people, but if you knew their propaganda in Anatolia, what we do and say is minimal. You stand up and say this to elderly, devout people in the courtyard of a mosque. What kind of faith is this? No one questions these things.'

<http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Haber/386250/1/Gundem>

1.5. Devlet Bahçeli and the “Friday Prayer” Fitna

The headline of the *Taraf* newspaper, which is alleged to be funded by the movement, featured the story “*Operation Against the MHP*,” and the subheading revealed one stage of the plan as follows

: “The narrative that Bahçeli is distant from religion and nationalism will be spread.”

While visiting a shop to fix a problem with my mobile phone, a young friend of mine who is knowledgeable about Sufism said, “Sir, it is said that Bahçeli is indifferent to religious matters. He even fired the party imam who told him he should pray on Fridays. Is this true? What do you think?” This headline, published less than a week after his question, compelled me to write down some testimonies I had wanted to write for a long time but had always postponed.

It was the year 2006; the MHP was out of the Grand National Assembly, and with no prospect of coming to power on the horizon, the magnificent building to which the MHP headquarters had moved in 2004 often appeared quiet and deserted. MHP leader Dr Devlet Bahçeli had withdrawn to his office to consult on the strategy the party would follow in the upcoming elections and the future of the political organisation of Turkish nationalism. We had visited him with a doctor friend of mine and made several presentations on how social issues such as “Organisational Culture”, “Learning Organisation” and “Idealist Total Quality” could be applied in the “MHP example”.

At that very time, in his book published in the ZAMAN newspaper, Hasan Cemal recounted his “Memories of the Republic” and, in summary, stated that

"İlhan Selçuk is in constant contact with Bahçeli," the MHP leader was being portrayed in the nationalist base as someone who "consulted with leftists" and was "a personality distant from religion." Meanwhile, the community's weekly news magazine, AKSİYON, clearly stated how much of a "religious leader" Alparslan Türkeş, the founding leader of the MHP, was, and how the MHP after Türkeş had gradually become alienated from the Turkish-Islamic Ideal. The vulgarised rhetoric spreading among the community base and within the MHP masses was the slanderous claim that "no one has ever seen Bahçeli put his forehead to the ground in prayer."

As it happens, a request from Prof. Dr. Beyza Bilgin, Dean of Ankara Faculty of Theology, was conveyed to me to be delivered to Mr Bahçeli by another professor working at the Faculty of Theology. Ms Bilgin wanted to "invite Mr Bahçeli for a cup of coffee at his office one day when he came to the Faculty of Theology Mosque for Friday prayers." I knew that Mr Bahçeli was praying at the mosque in Gazi Mahallesi at that time. It seems that sometimes he also preferred to attend Friday prayers at the Faculty of Theology mosque, which was close to his home in Tandoğan where he was residing at the time. His preference for praying Friday prayers at these small mosques stemmed from his sensitivity to avoid publicity while fulfilling his religious obligations.

During one of our meetings, while conveying the request of the Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Prof. Dr. Beyza Bilgin, to Mr Bahçeli, I said that the "grey propaganda" created by rumours that he was "distant from religion" was being spread among nationalist youth, and that the religious segment of the MHP base was being influenced by this rhetoric in an attempt to alienate them from the MHP and its leader. In response to Bahçeli's remark, "What can we do, everyone says everything," I replied with an example from recent political history: "You know Mesut Yılmaz's distance from religious practices. But Mustafa Taşar and Halil Şıvgın practically forced him at gunpoint to Koca-

They took him to Kocatepe Mosque for Friday prayers. You too should pray at least one Friday prayer a month at Kocatepe Mosque.

Mr Bahçeli responded to my suggestion by spreading his arms wide and asking, "Doctor, are we going to advertise our Friday prayers now?" I did not just convey the matter to Mr Bahçeli; I also requested theologian Prof. Dr Abdurrahman Küçük, who was a member of the MHP Central Executive Board at the time, to persuade Mr Bahçeli to occasionally perform Friday prayers at Kocatepe Mosque during a face-to-face meeting.

About a year after this meeting, an article by Sabahattin Önkibar, who was writing for the *Yeniçağ* newspaper at the time, caused an uproar among the MHP base: "Bahçeli expelled the imam who asked him why he didn't attend Friday prayers" (1 January 2008, *Yeniçağ*).

According to the report, which was full of false and misleading information, during the Friday prayer held in the magnificent mosque in the MHP's new building, attended by hundreds of people, Bahçeli was sitting in his office on the second floor and did not go down to the mosque below for prayers. According to Önkibar's slander, Imam Mehmet Demirdelen, who said that this was not well received among nationalists, was abruptly removed from Bahçeli's office, beaten up, and banned from entering the building and the organisation.

However, those who knew even a little about the working routine of the General Chairman at the MHP Headquarters knew that Mr Bahçeli would quietly go from his home to the small neighbourhood mosque to perform Friday prayers, and would come to the party headquarters after performing Friday prayers outside. The reason he did not want to pray at the MHP headquarters was the possibility that people would flock to the headquarters on Fridays to see him, thereby mixing hypocrisy into their worship.

Furthermore, those in the know are aware that the crush of people queuing up to kiss his hand after Friday prayers was also a situation that Mr Bahçeli would never have liked.

[At this point, I should also mention that after a physical attack on Mr Bahçeli (in 1986), a relative of mine who was assigned to his home as part of his security detail relayed to me his personal observations, which testified to Mr Bahçeli's sensitivity regarding prayer, let alone his refusal to attend Friday prayers.]

Despite the facts being as they are, the impact of Sabahattin Önkibar's false report has endured to this day, seven years later, spreading from mouth to mouth until it reached the question my young friend, who runs a mobile phone shop and is a sincere Sufi with no ulterior motives, asked me last week.

My request and the task I assigned to Abdurrahman Küçük were not enough to get Devlet Bahçeli to appear in a Friday prayer at Kocatepe Mosque, but the images of the Friday prayer performed with a group of MHP members at the Fetih Mosque in the ruins of Ani in Kars to launch the 2011 election campaign somewhat mitigated the slander that "no one saw Bahçeli's forehead touch the ground in prostration."

When I shared my concerns about the Friday headline in *Taraf* newspaper with a member of the MHP Presidential Council and suggested that something be done to counter the "Friday prayer controversy" spread by Sabahattin Önkibar, which the AKP was likely to use in the upcoming election campaign, he complained, "Mr. Chairman doesn't like these things. Last year, when we wanted to include an image of Friday prayers at the Ani Ruins on a page of the MHP calendar we were printing, he even opposed that."

Nevertheless, I insisted that something must be done, because it was already clear that "Bahçeli's relationship with Islam would be part of the upcoming election campaign." When the manager, one of the few names I care about at the MHP Headquarters, said, "If the entire MHP community cannot prevent a Sabahattin Önkibar fitna, what can we do?", I thought that writing this article was now a religious obligation for me.

It is with this thought in mind that I have shared these insights, which I have kept to myself for nearly 10 years, with the public.

Even though I know that Mr. Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP, would not approve of this...

What can we do? The words of our Rabbi, who said, "Fitna is worse than killing a man," are paramount.

[1] In this article, I have only mentioned the names of a few of the individuals discussed. I intend to publish the names of the others who do not object to their names being published at a later date.

[2] This article was first published on 1 September 2011.

1.6. “The MHP did not hang Apo” – ?!..

-At the Execution Summit on 12 January 2000

Do Turkish Nationalists Know About the Death Threats?-

TAfter the theoretically focused articles, I would like to address some issues related to the MHP and the death penalty debate, which remains on the agenda despite the 16 years that have passed.

I would like to return to the agenda. A news item that appeared out of the blue on the front page of the Yeni Şafak newspaper on 22 February 2012 was noteworthy: "ANASOL-M also met with İmralı." According to the report, it had emerged that state officials had held meetings with the terrorist leader during the ANASOL-M Government, of which the MHP was a partner, and it was alleged that state officials had shared the terrorist leader's handwritten notes with MHP ministers after the meeting.

This news gave me pause for thought. Just a few months earlier, on 6 July 2011, we were faced with a new disinformation campaign by those who were alarmed by the disclosure of 'handwritten messages' transferred from İmralı to Kandil. In this context, I recalled the discussions surrounding the summit where it was decided to postpone the execution of the terrorist leader's death sentence.

The postponement of the execution of the terrorist leader, who was enjoying himself on İmralı, by the coalition government, of which the MHP is a partner, is one of the classic debates that remains on our political agenda and is heated up from time to time. The news summarised above, featured on the front page of today's (22 February 2012) Yeni Şafak newspaper, is further proof that the issue will be brought up whenever the MHP is put in a difficult position, as has always been the case.

The Infamous Death Penalty Summit

On 12 January 2000, at the Prime Minister's Office on the second floor, DSP Chairman Bülent Ecevit (Prime Minister), MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli (Deputy Prime Minister), ANAP Chairman Mesut Yılmaz (Deputy Prime Minister), State Minister Cumhur Ersümer (ANAP), Hüsametdin Özkan (Deputy Prime Minister-DSP), Foreign Minister İsmail Cem (DSP), Minister of Justice Hikmet Sami Türk (DSP), Minister of Industry and Trade Ahmet Kenan Tanrıkulu (MHP) and Minister of State Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik (ANAP) attended a summit on the subject of "The death penalty case of the terrorist leader." Despite the passage of 12 years, this summit is still being debated. Prior to the summit, the parties forming the 57th coalition government at the time were deeply divided. ^{According} to the DSP and ANAP, the 'file should have been kept at the Prime Minister's Office'. The MHP, however, was pushing for the file to be sent to Parliament as soon as possible. The European Court of Human Rights' (ECHR) decision not to proceed with the execution process made the status of the file controversial.

Some continue their habit of attacking the MHP and its leader Devlet Bahçeli over the decisions taken and the protocol signed at this summit. The interesting aspect is that those who wish to attack the MHP and Bahçeli over this summit represent a broad spectrum, ranging from politicians from the AKP to the BDP to a group of individuals with personal ambitions regarding the political future of the nationalist movement.

In addition to the deaths of Bülent Ecevit and İsmail Cem, two important figures who participated in the summit in question, the fact that all the political actors at that summit today – except for Devlet Bahçeli and MHP İzmir Deputy Kenan Tanrıkulu – have fallen from the political stage is driving the issue further into

into obscurity. While a photocopy of the minutes signed by the three leaders at the summit has been circulating in election campaigns, it is noteworthy that there is still less known than known about what transpired during the hours-long summit.

The limited statements made to the press by Deputy Prime Minister Hüsametdin Özkan and former MIT Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun, who participated in the summit, reflect the event from their own perspectives and therefore only reveal certain aspects of the truth.

The fact that Devlet Bahçeli and Kenan Tanrıku, the two representatives of the MHP at the historic summit on 12 January 2000 that resulted in the suspension of Abdullah Öcalan's death sentence, have not yet made a detailed public statement on this matter is a significant reason why this issue has become a source of attrition for the MHP.

Hüsametdin Özkan's Revelations

Deputy Prime Minister Hüsametdin Özkan, who attended the summit alongside Ecevit on behalf of the DSP, stated in an interview with Aksiyon magazine in 2006, "We convinced Devlet Bahçeli thanks to reports from the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT)." This statement reveals certain truths about the 'political-bureaucratic elite alliance' that left Turkish nationalists, represented by MHP leader Bahçeli, on their own.

After these observations, let us leave the course of events at the summit to the lines of Aksiyon reporter Zekâi Özçınar, who likely relied on Hüsametdin Özkan's account, clearly showing that everything was orchestrated to convince Devlet Bahçeli to postpone the execution:

"...Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit spoke first. He gave a long presentation. He explained why the execution file should be kept at the Prime Ministry, i.e., why the execution should be postponed. He listed his reasons based on the studies presented to him by 'sensitive state institutions' and began by referring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' request to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) requesting that the execution process not be carried out until the review of Öcalan's application was completed. The report contained the main idea that compliance with the ECHR decision was mandatory."

According to witnesses, Ecevit said: "Up to this point, we have always worked harmoniously, together, making decisions. Let us show harmony here too. It would be right for the file to remain at the Prime Minister's Office until the European Court of Human Rights makes a decision."

Foreign Minister İsmail Cem supported Ecevit's reservations, stating, "Turkey's compliance with the international treaties it has signed and its fulfilment of its commitments require this. We signed the treaty on the abolition of the death penalty."

-in fact-, revealed his contribution to the formation of that reservation.

Mehmet Ali İrtem-çelik, State Minister from the ANAP party with a background in foreign affairs, stated, "The government is the addressee of the decision to suspend the execution. Referring the file to the Grand National Assembly despite this is considered a failure to fulfil the state's commitment. The EU process will be disrupted. Let us wait for the ECHR decision. Let's put the file on hold conditionally. Let's evaluate it alongside other simultaneous measures such as the abolition of the death penalty."

İsmail Cem's view reflects classic foreign policy timidity: "There should be a state policy on this issue. How will the outside world view the death penalty? We cannot explain it. We must think carefully. Our EU membership will be jeopardised. We will enter a process of exclusion. We will be isolated. We will be left on the sidelines. It should be suspended until the outcome from the European Court of Human Rights. Every measure must be taken to prevent the execution."

Hikmet Sami Türk, Minister of Justice from the Democratic Left Party (DSP): "The matter should be viewed from a legal perspective; the file should be kept at the Prime Minister's Office in line with the ECHR's decision." With these words, he plays the role of an indecisive politician playing for time.

Hüsamettin Özkan: "If the file is sent to the Grand National Assembly, the following procedure will be followed. The file will first be reviewed by the Joint Committee on Justice and the Constitution. Then a vote will be held in the general assembly."

Mesut Yılmaz: "The government is doing well. There are two aspects to this issue. The legal aspect is our job. We have commitments under the European Convention on Human Rights. We must comply with the ECHR's interim measure decision. Let the file wait here. As for the political aspect, let's not be the ones to decide. Let it be like the MGK decision. Let's discuss this issue with another agenda. The MGK did not hold any discussions or evaluations regarding the execution. This is a shortcoming," he says, seeking to prevent the execution from being brought to the agenda.

Finally, Ecevit, drawing strength from the pile of excuses put forward by his ministers, announces his final decision: "Domestic and foreign issues have become intertwined. National law and international law have become intertwined. We cannot ignore international law. Let's leave it with the Prime Minister's Office. Also, as a human being, I am opposed to the death penalty on principle."

How Will Devlet Bahçeli's Resistance Be Overcome?

It is clear that all these efforts are aimed at removing Devlet Bahçeli's objection to the 'death penalty file being shelved'.

Bahçeli: "The ECtHR's interim decision must be considered in a multifaceted manner. From the perspective of domestic law, Article 87 of the Constitution is clear. The file cannot be kept at the Prime Ministry. The principle that judicial decisions cannot be delayed is evident. This delay could also constitute a violation of the Constitution. The issue does not leave the initiative to the Prime Minister's Office. The Prime Minister's Office is the referring authority. Then why were the other death penalty files referred? We are not keen on hanging people. But there is a judicial decision, and we must comply with this legal decision. We must initiate the legal process. The impression that 'this state cannot hang Apo' should not be created. Let's send it to Parliament. Let them apply the same procedure to this case as they do to other death penalty cases. There are 52 cases, it will be 53. Let's send it and respect the Parliament's decision, whatever it may be. Except for terrorist crimes, we will then look at abolishing the death penalty. Let us abolish the death penalty at the same time as sending the file. Let the death penalty label remain on this man."

The MİT 'Intelligence' That Frightened Ecevit

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, alarmed by Bahçeli's words, expressed the fear planted in his subconscious: "When we send it to Parliament, what if that file is pulled out and dealt with among the other files? What will happen then?"

Ecevit brought up the MİT report on 'what would happen if the death penalty were carried out', the source of his fear that changed the country's destiny.

He says: "Let's wait and see what the PKK's strategy is. We should focus on how Öcalan will be used politically. While the execution process is being prolonged, we should consider whether he can be used as a bargaining chip. According to intelligence from the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT), if the execution takes place, PKK actions will increase. We could be facing a process that will turn the country into a bloodbath."

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit then mentions a threat whispered in his ear: "There are reports of attacks on MHP ministers, MPs and their organisations. The MIT told me this."

It is clear that these words constitute a threat directed at all MHP members, particularly Bahçeli. Devlet Bahçeli, recalling the martyrdom of Gün Sazak, responds to this threat—which is not even veiled and concerns him personally—with the thought, "The MHP will not be the first to carry a minister's coffin. ⁽¹³⁾We have not forgotten our thousands of martyrs," and persists in his stance. He makes it clear that they will not heed the threats allegedly originating from the MİT with the following words: "We must initiate legal proceedings. Then, we must make a new move and take action. As for the issue of the MİT's use, we will look into that after sending the file to Parliament. Let us set the conditions. As Turkey, let us not be the ones to have conditions imposed on us. There is talk of reports and rumours. What report are you referring to? Is there a report? Those who provide these reports should stand behind them. If you have such rumours, you will take precautions as the MIT. If there are threats, the state is there to prevent them. Isn't it incompetence to do nothing in the face of rumours?"

At this point, Mesut Yılmaz, alarmed by the atmosphere at the summit, which seemed to be heading towards the execution of the death penalty, turned to his private...

By citing the information provided, it intervenes and raises another threat that sheds light on the international – or transatlantic – dimension of the issue: "If the execution is carried out, the country defined as a 'friend and ally(?)' has implied through its intelligence agencies that it may remain neutral in the 'uprisings' likely to begin in some parts of the country."

Translated from diplomatic language into everyday language, this means that 'a Kurdish uprising that will begin/be initiated in the country after the execution will be supported by external forces (to see the flag of this external force, look at recent events in the Islamic world). According to witness statements, when this possibility was raised at the summit, Ecevit panicked, his face turned black, and his hands and feet became entangled.

From this point on, the execution of the terrorist leader became deadlocked. Ecevit's panic must have been related to his experiences with the US during the Cyprus operation, when it imposed an embargo on our country and fuelled internal turmoil.

From another perspective, the state of health of Bülent Ecevit, who was Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey at the time, could be seen as fate's 'joke' on this country.

Bahçeli's Question that Silenced Ecevit: "Is There a Promise Made to a Country?"

At this point in the conversation, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, seeing Ecevit trembling under the effect of Yılmaz's blackmail, turns to him and asks, "As a state, do we have any commitments to another country regarding this person?" Overwhelmed by the gravity of the issues at hand, Ecevit, who is on the verge of losing consciousness, is unable to answer this question.

Bahçeli continues resolutely: "If the file is not sent to the Grand National Assembly, we, as the MHP, will withdraw from the government. We are not obsessed with power. We have made a promise, and we are determined. If they insist on delaying it, we will withdraw from the government. You can continue. You have formed a government among yourselves before. You are also in agreement on the death penalty. We will support you from the outside; we will not leave Turkey without a government. Go ahead, we are out."

After these words, Bahçeli abruptly grabbed the files in front of him and, amid the astonished looks of Ecevit and Yılmaz, left the meeting room and went to his office. The end of the coalition was imminent. Hüsametdin Özkan, who was said to work as the Prime Minister's close protection, escorted Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who was visibly shaken, out of the room, saying, "Let me take you to your office, sir."

Bahçeli retreats to his office and has a long private meeting with Mesut Yılmaz. According to those who were there that day, Mesut Yılmaz, who had a close relationship with MİT Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun, confirms with Atasagun, who is in the Prime Minister's office at the time, and explains to Bahçeli the seriousness of the intelligence reports and asks him to take into account the threats of civil war directed at the MHP, and the threat of civil war, and reiterated his request to postpone the referral of the execution file to the Grand National Assembly. He then told Bahçeli: "During the postponement process, if PKK actions continue, I will vote with you on sending the file to Parliament."

Bahçeli requests that the coalition partner DSP also join Yılmaz's verbal guarantee and that the commitment be put in writing. This time, discussions arise over the wording of the text. The text of the public statement, drafted by Bülent Ecevit, is presented to Bahçeli three times. Each time, Bahçeli crosses out certain sections

. With the addition of the phrase "If the PKK uses the decision to delay the case against Turkey, the execution process will begin immediately," the seven-and-a-half-hour marathon summit on the death penalty came to an end, and the coalition government was saved from collapse.

The source of the intelligence that determined the fate of the execution summit, MIT Undersecretary Şenkal Atasagun, gave an interview to the *Milliyet* newspaper after his retirement. Six years after the summit, this interview was published in *Aksiyon* magazine, in which Deputy Prime Minister Hüsamettin Özkan recounted these statements (without naming names), supporting the interview.

A Historical Decision Gathering Dust in the State Archives

The historic decision taken at the summit and announced to the public by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was as follows: *"The leaders of the DSP, MHP and ANAP, which form the coalition, met today at the Prime Minister's Office and discussed in detail the European Court of Human Rights' (ECHR) decision to impose a precautionary measure postponing the execution of the finalised death sentence against terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan. As is well known, it is out of the question for the ECHR, whose judicial authority Turkey has accepted, to change decisions handed down by Turkish courts. Once the process required by our Constitution and our international commitments has been completed, the file will be sent to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey without delay. The chairmen agreed that if this decision, taken with respect for the law, is deemed to be exploited by the terrorist organisation and its supporters against the nation, the state, and Turkey's high interests, the postponement process should be terminated and the execution process should commence immediately."*

Even today, during election campaigns, copies of this document are being circulated from hand to hand, and the signature of "Devlet Bahçeli" underneath it is being presented as "the seal of the terrorist leader's decree of salvation." Surely, no one has failed to see this document...

***What Happened at That Summit Must Be Written
Down, the Truth Must Come to Light***

Today, those who accuse MHP leader Bahçeli of betraying Turkish nationalism by joining the chorus of its detractors—how much are they aware of these facts? The truth must be investigated.

Bahçeli's only mistake in this matter, if any, may be that he hastily made the decision to "end the coalition government that day" at the summit and failed to explain the facts to the Turkish people as they were. Even today, 12 years later, it is not easy to calculate the cost to the country of the chaos that would have ensued if this announcement had been made and the government had fallen.

Writing about the MHP's perspective on this issue, which has been constantly raised against Turkish nationalists and the MHP, is a historical obligation for Kenan Tanrıkulu, the then Minister of Industry and Trade who attended the summit with Bahçeli's permission and is now the MHP's İzmir MP.

Remaining silent on the summit's perspective, which has already been articulated by Hüsamettin Özkan and Şenkal Atasagun, has now become utterly meaningless. This is also the expectation and right of the idealists who are subjected to the questions and harassment of opponents of Turkish nationalism on this issue almost every day.

As we go through processes where the state's inner sanctums are being entered and the Chief of General Staff is accused of "leading a terrorist organisation," I have a question for those who believe that what is written in this article will harm the "supreme interests of the state":

Are you certain that a state, whose 'supreme interests' must be protected with care in the near future, will remain intact?

[1] Zekai Özçınar, Behind the scenes of the Öcalan summit, Aksiyon Magazine, 8 May 2006.

[2] The statements of then Prime Minister Ecevit and his ministers cited in this article are taken from an unverified report published in the magazine. Those who wish to refute the statements quoted in this article should not resort to conspiracy theories without comparing them with the relevant article and the texts I have provided. For details, see: Özçınar, 8 May 2006.

[3] Gün Sazak, the Minister of Customs and Monopolies of the MHP, about whom I also wrote in this book, attained martyrdom at the hands of communist militants in an armed attack in front of his home on 27 May 1980. May Allah exalt his status.

*CHAPTER TWO DOCTRINAL
TURKISH NATIONALISM*

2.1. The Balance of Thought and Action in the Nationalist Movement

*-An Analysis of the Early Days of the Idealist
Movement's Development Process-*

When determining the title of my article, I drew inspiration from Orhan Türköz's essay "The Balance of Action and Thought in Turkish Nationalism," published exactly 43 years ago. Ideology-net.com archive, I came across this article and, drawing on it, I recommend that new nationalists, who criticise the MHP leadership, the sole representative of the nationalist movement in politics, without any knowledge of the forty-year accumulation of the nationalist movement, devote at least one hour a week to benefit from the immense wealth of information in the ülkünet.com archive.

If they do so, they will see what the movement's founding cadres, from Alparslan Türkeş to Dündar Taşer, and those who contributed to the nationalist movement, from Devlet Bahçeli to Erol Güngör, thought and discussed, and their respect for the Ülkücü movement's past will increase, while their hopes for its future will also rise.

With these thoughts in mind, I wish to both update a debate in the recent history of Turkish nationalism and, drawing on a historical text, take the relationship between thought and action—which, though not articulated within the idealist movement, has always been on the agenda—a step further.

Transforming the System of Ideas into Effective Action

In this article, Türköz aims to shed light on the debates arising from the development of Turkish nationalism into political action before its ideological foundation was fully formed ^[1]. He summarises his points as follows, citing specific examples:

"Ideological systems and doctrines first form in the human mind without any connection to each other. Under the impetus of circumstances and the passage of time, rapidly multiplying elements approach each other, come into contact, and connect. Initially, these connections do not encompass all elements, nor do they possess a certain strength and sharpness. Over time, with the addition of new elements to the field, the connections spread to all units, gain strength, take on a distinct shape, and elements that were previously unconnected attain the status of a system. It is only then that the transition is made from the realm of ideas to the realm of action.

The most important point to emphasise here is this: Considering that the formation of simple ideas, their convergence into themes, their amalgamation into a system, takes a long time; that systematisation occurs more quickly and clearly in some specific areas, while in others it proceeds slowly; should we wait for the system to be fully formed before ideas are put into action? Or should units that have gained clarity within the system be transferred to the action plan while the system is being completed on the conceptual level?"

Türköz believes that time and effectiveness factors must be evaluated together when seeking an answer to this question:

"The goal of action is to be effective. Effectiveness depends not only on power, but also on the distribution of power over time, that is, on strength. (...)

For an idea system to be put into action, it is as important for it to reach a certain level of development and gain a certain strength as it is for that same idea system, regardless of the strength it has acquired, to be concentrated within a specific time and space (a specific environment) and brought to fruition. The practical consequence of this is that the lack of accumulated potential and power can serve as an excuse not to take action, but to limit action. (...)

Türköz, who wants to explain that delaying action, waiting to act after perfectly formulating the theory, is often useless, that time can ruin all plans, makes some beautiful conclusions: "Instead of waiting for army plans to be prepared to fight an enemy army, grabbing your weapon and heading for the hills to join the first squad that forms is a behaviour that is not only consistent with theory but also practical, as it organises the first squad into a team, the team into a division, and so on. The clever gardener is not the one who rots half the crop to harvest the melons at the same time, but the one who harvests the most at the end of the year. The duty of every raindrop that falls is to set out to meet another drop and reach the river. Not to wait until a river forms around it..."

At the end of his article, in which he explains the relationship between thought and action in Turkish nationalism in very simple terms, Türköz summarises his own principles as follows:

1. In Turkish nationalism, every idea must be immediately put to the test of practice; ideas and actions must coexist in a suitable combination, in the same place and at the same time.
2. If action cannot be continuous and effective, intermittent but ineffective action is a waste; it is of no benefit to Turkish nationalism.
3. The primary and ideal way to gain effectiveness is to increase strength.

4. Until strength is increased, the field (in terms of time and space) should be limited, and forces should be concentrated in one area.

5. However, in cases where it is not appropriate to further reduce the field, it may become necessary to wait until strength reaches an effective level.

"Until the Wise Think, the Foolish Cross the Mountain"

Turkish nationalists, who are sensitive to the dangers facing our country, can benefit from this analysis when evaluating any issue involving ideas, discourse or action, even when assessing the situation regarding separatism. For example, those who say that the MHP aims to establish a new structure at its first congress but fail to present any project or design, are they aware of how important the current MHP leadership's 'resistance' to separatism is for the country? Is there any "headquarters opponent" who can foresee where separatist action could drag the country if the armed struggle currently being waged is not continued until terrorist organisations are eliminated at their source, by creating an "imaginary" strong party leadership, coming to an "imaginary" power, and establishing the most perfect "imaginary" alliances?

Or if another name were at the top of the MHP today – for example, one of the names allegedly warming up for the presidency – to what threshold would this resistance fall, to what surmountable point, and which financial files would be placed before whom, reducing the national resistance of Turkish nationalism's political cadre to what negligible level? Answering these questions sincerely is quite difficult for those who cannot answer the question "Where did you find it?", but for those who are merely observing from the sidelines, even without knowing the names behind it, it is very easy to see the scheme organised against Turkish nationalists before the last election, aimed at keeping the MHP out of the Grand National Assembly.

-even for those who merely observed from the sidelines, unaware of the names behind it.

On the slippery slope of politics, if the MHP, led by Devlet Bahçeli, were to lose its "firm stance," shows that if the MHP, which has demonstrated this firm stance, were to lose its influence in Turkish politics, the country would face a future of turmoil. Orhan Türköz's article alone is highly significant in demonstrating that such a political stance would betray 40 years of Turkish nationalism. Those who spend their time with academic chatter and pen-pushing, unaware that the country's foundations are being undermined, will find that their claims of striving to build the most dazzling project will hold no meaning or importance once it is too late.

The First Thing That Must Be Done in the Name of 'Positive Idealism'

To summarise what needs to be done in the name of 'Positive Idealism' in one sentence, instead of chasing imaginary projects on the political agenda, every idealist should make every effort to make the MHP, with its institutionalised structure, functional and contribute to raising the overall quality of the idealist movement.

An idealist with the goal of raising overall quality must first look within themselves and ask themselves in front of the mirror:

"What have you done today to elevate the quality of your idealism and become a more quality-driven idealist than you were yesterday?"

[1] State, 14 April 1969, Issue: 2, Page: 9. <http://ulkunet.com/SureliYayin.aspx>

[2] To read the full text of Orhan Türköz's valuable article, see: <http://ulkucuyazarlarbirligi.org/?p=1668>

2.2. Turkish Nationalism, Politics, and Intellectuals

MFrom the day he entered the political arena, Alparslan Türkeş, leader of the MHP, guided young people, and especially intellectuals, towards becoming advocates of a cause.

. In order for this effort to be accepted, it was first necessary to understand "our cause," and so we can find various definitions of our cause in Türkeş's works.

"The MHP has instilled the spirit of Turkish nationalism in our youth and intellectuals. Today, we are fighting to bring about a new resurgence. With God's help, we will succeed in this struggle. For our path is the path of virtue, our cause is a just cause. We are determined and resolved to overcome every obstacle that stands in our way for this cause. We will build a Great Turkey." (Türkeş, The Spirit of Heroism, pp. 72-73)

"We are the strongest in terms of ideas, ideals and causes. The most noble ideas are ours. The most legitimate, most just cause is our cause. We are the champions of the cause of a noble, honourable, yet oppressed nation; the cause of not trampling on its rights, of not placing chains of slavery around its neck, of preventing its descent into servitude. No other cause can be imagined with such lofty, such noble goals." (Türkeş, Gönül Seferberliğine, p.129)

We are embarking on a relentless race where everything is organised according to national style, and modern science is considered the method in our endeavour to build civilisation. Three points of harmony will be achieved within the framework of the Nationalist Movement Party. The order of the human inner world, the order on the street, and the order within the state will form a whole. The order within the individual, on the street, and

state will be swiftly removed from a state of conflict and mutual degradation. Thus, man will be happy. Thus, peace will be achieved. There is no task that man, integrated with the structure of the state and life on the street, cannot accomplish, no problem he cannot solve. (...)

The Turkish people will be educated according to these principles. An uneducated army cannot fight. An uneducated nation cannot achieve success on the path to development and civilisation." (Türkeş, Gönül Seferberliğine, p.305)

The Turkish nation, embracing Islam as its spirit and Turkishness as its body, will achieve great strides by making its own culture dominant in its life, rising above the contemporary level both materially and spiritually. Turkish intellectuals are tasked with freeing themselves from the influence of foreign cultures, acquiring the habit of thinking like a Turk, and leading their nation by finding solutions to its problems from this perspective. While rallying around the nationalist movement, Turkish intellectuals have also found a way to unite with our people. The victory of the Nationalist Movement means the victory of the Turkish nation." (Türkeş, Kahramanlık Ruhü, p.71)

Getting Involved in Politics

In the legendary magazine of our youth before 12 September, Tö-re, Prof. Dr. İskender Öksüz, whose monthly series entitled *"The System of Thought of Turkish Nationalism – Theory"* I eagerly awaited, recently published an article entitled *"Turkish Nationalism and Politics"*.^[1] Questioning the relationship between Turkish Nationalism and politics, Öksüz made some important observations, stating: ***"If Turkish Nationalists have an ideal, there is no way to realise it without 'getting involved in politics'. Politics must be the primary concern of Turkish Nationalists."***

After making this observation, Öksüz gratefully remembers Alparslan Türkeş, who transformed Turkish nationalism, which had been confined to weak association activities until then, into a political action and one of the main veins of Turkish politics: *"The party and politics were the option defended by Alparslan Türkeş. History bears witness to how correct this choice was. **The period when Turkish nationalism grew most rapidly, appealing to and embracing the broadest youth demographic, was the period when our nationalism entered politics. This is how the great power of 1980 was achieved.** Turkish Nationalism is grateful to Alparslan Türkeş for making this choice and for his leadership in bringing the movement to that peak during the period 1968-1980."* He adds: *"Politics has brought Turkish Nationalism to a level of power it had not achieved for decades. This is the reality. Logic must surrender to reality. The truth indicated by experience is this: The answer to the question, 'Should nationalists enter politics?' is a definitive 'Yes.'"*

İskender Öksüz's important words reminded me of a debate that took place when Alparslan Türkeş entered the political arena and, together with a few friends, took control of the party and changed its emblem to the *"three crescents"*. During this debate, Türkeş is said to have responded to certain Turkish nationalists who accused the party of shifting towards an "Islamist" line and argued that the party emblem should be a "gray wolf" rather than "three crescents" by saying: *"If we want to engage in politics in this country, we must win the votes of its people. To get votes from the people of this country, we must take into account the religious beliefs of the people of this country. A party that does not take the people's beliefs into account will not get more than 3-5% of the vote. However, if we want to bring our ideas to power and empower Turkish nationalism, it is essential that we get the support of the people. Those who are satisfied with 3-5% of the vote should go and join a charity instead of engaging in politics..."*^[2]

The Trap of "It's a Dirty Job; Stay Away"

For many years, both nationalist thinkers and conscious Muslims have been kept away from being subjects of politics. The power centres presenting this exclusion operation have developed such beautiful rhetoric that one might feel they deserve to be prayed for five times a day for keeping the nationalist-religious segments of society away from the filth of politics...

Öksüz describes how this operation, aimed at nationalists to keep them away from politics and thus maintain control over the mechanisms of government, has been applied in a different form to "Muslims": *"It is clear that a similar political antipathy has been further expanded and injected into so-called Muslim thought: 'If the government does not interfere with Muslims' worship, then Muslims will not concern themselves with the government.'*

The Danger of Turning Politics into a Matter of Faith

Certainly, there are also some dangers awaiting people involved in politics. We must acknowledge that making politics the sole meaning of one's life is a pathological state. Every town in Anatolia is full of 'coffeehouse philosophers' who attempt to impose order on the world without having any in-depth knowledge on almost any subject... Imagine where the issue could lead if these people were to turn politics into a matter of religion and faith...

Öksüz, who expresses his reservation on just one issue with the words, "But politics is not everything. *Nationalists should enter politics, but nationalism should not be reduced to politics,*" dislikes the MHP...

He also shows those who keep their distance from politics a way out: *"If the MHP is not good, we will fix it. If we cannot fix it, we will look for other solutions; but nationalism must be involved in politics, and it will be."*

Öksüz's warning can also be understood as: *"Muslims should enter politics, but Islam should not be reduced to politics."* Although there are not many people left within its sphere of influence, this country has seen those who promote the party leader as *"a jihad commander to whom allegiance is obligatory"* (even the Mahdi!). The author of these lines has personally witnessed charlatans in Arafat Square swearing pilgrims gathered around them to vote for a certain party, threatening them that if they renege on their oath, they will grab them by the collar on Judgement Day.

Who Has the Political Arena Been Left to?

The leader of the nationalist movement, at the very beginning of the road, warned the idealistic youth, who aimed to be role models for society, as follows: *"A grey wolf, an idealist, is a propagandist for Turkish Nationalism and the Nine Lights with every movement, behaviour, sitting, standing, and speaking."*

We must not make people hate us with our bad, wrong actions. If we do not act in a manner befitting an idealist, we will all harm our cause in our own right. (Türkeş, Towards New Horizons, p. 71)

Our cause cannot be advanced by frivolous, lax, undisciplined, and methodless individuals. We must set an example in everything.

Turkish tradition is respect and obedience to elders, love and kindness to juniors; discipline, respect for the rights of elders and juniors. (...) A promise made in Turkish tradition is important. (...) Once a Turk gives his word, he does not go back on it.

Another requirement of Turkish tradition is a strong sense of duty. It is to fulfil one's duty at any cost. Another requirement is to make every kind of sacrifice for the sake of society. It is to renounce personal interests and personal pleasures for the service of the nation. Individuals sacrifice themselves for the nation. This is how the greatness of the Turkish Nation has been formed. Turkey will live and rise in this manner. You will keep it alive, you will raise it up. Another important requirement of Turkish custom is to keep secrets. To keep secrets...

There is a disease in the Turkish nation that has been passed down from Byzantium. Slackness, carelessness, gossip, discord, corruption, lack of manners, mutual dislike, inability to keep secrets, speaking carelessly... You have this disease too. Treat this disease. You must cure it. If you cannot cure this disease, choose your own path. Do not remain in the Nationalist Movement for a single second longer. You will be my comrades-in-arms, and above all, you must become 'highly qualified Turks'. (Türkeş, Towards New Horizons, pp. 120-121)

Öksüz, who emphasises the importance of the political arena, which the so-called elites who keep their distance from politics avoid, saying, "There are lies and deceit in politics...", makes a clear observation: *"The source of lies and deceit is not politics, but those who fill the void left by us (honourable intellectuals) abandoning the political arena. If you withdraw by saying politics is dirty, politics will be left to the dirty ones."*

Indeed, this is a discourse that intellectuals, especially from academic circles, resort to when they fail to receive the attention they expect from political parties: *"Politics today is in the hands of market traders, car park attendants, scrap dealers, estate agents, etc. What business does an intellectual have in such a vulgar environment?"* ^[3]

However, in the relatively recent past, there has been no obstacle preventing academic staff from becoming members of political parties. Academics are free to engage in political activities in any party they choose, provided they do not mix it with their professional work. In fact, this political freedom should also be extended to public officials, who are currently prohibited from engaging in politics.

A study conducted by the MHP Headquarters within its own organisation suggests that the average length of stay in provincial and district cadres is around 7 years.

I can say without hesitation that this situation also applies to the provincial and district organisations of other political parties.

Is it the Politician or the Intellectual Who is Effective on Society?

It is theoretically easy to answer this question by saying, "Of course, intellectuals should be influential in shaping society." However, looking at our recent political history, which is sufficiently long, it must be said that politicians have been influential in shaping society's common political and social perceptions. My first impression on this matter was formed while watching the funeral ceremony of Başbuğ Alparslan Türkeş, who passed away^{on 4} April 1997.

As a natural consequence of this inquiry, I could not help but compare the influence of Alparslan Türkeş and Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, now historical figures, on the intellectual climate of our country's nationalists. When asked *what remains today in terms of service to Turkish nationalism* from these two influential figures in the history of Turkish nationalism, who parted ways in 1969 due to political differences,

we must acknowledge that Alparslan Türkeş was indisputably more influential in establishing nationalist discourse among the people and in making nationalism a mainstay in our country's intellectual and political world.

It must be the realisation of the effectiveness of politics as a channel for conveying messages to society that led certain important intellectuals, such as the renowned thinker Sezai Karakoç^[(5)], who had concerns about society, and "Sultanü's-Şuârâ" Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, to enter the political arena and even establish a political party. ^[6]

Utilising the Language of Politics to Implant Discourses into Society

Alparslan Türkeş, who was raised and lived as a soldier, explains the purpose for which he would use politics by drawing examples from military service: *"In war, the most vulnerable points of a person for arrows, swords, and bullets are the heart and the brain. The cultural war targets the same point. For this reason, the cultural cause in the life of a nation is not the cause of reading and memorising the alphabet. It is the cause of developing and nurturing the mind, heart and body."* (Türkeş, Dokuz Işık, p.83)

Political parties must necessarily voice certain theses in their activities. Since there was not much difference between the discourses of the 'establishment parties' before 12 September, it is expected that parties with an ideological foundation, such as the MHP and SP, use political language to convey their theses to society. For the MHP, *pan-Turkist* discourse, and for the SP, *pan-Islamist* discourse must be used as a vehicle for political organisation activities to convey these ideas to society. The fact that Alparslan Türkeş was known throughout the Turkish homeland as "Başbuğ Türkeş"

is directly related to these pan-Turkist discourses, which the MHP has not been able to articulate very loudly. Similarly, efforts to make Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the MSP/RP/SP line, a leader of the Islamic world also fall within this scope. [7]

Looking at the present day, we cannot say that there has been any significant effort in the MHP line in the post-Başbuğ Türkeş period in terms of Turkish unity (=Panturkism). In particular, the cancellation of the Turkish Congresses, which had become a tradition since 1993, during the period when the MHP was a coalition partner in government, has greatly damaged the MHP's 'Pan-Turkist' image. In an era of rapidly deepening and strengthening communication, it is also implausible to claim that Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP Chairman and successor to Başbuğ Türkeş, is accepted as a 'political leader' in Turkish homelands outside Turkey. The fact that only a few pages were devoted to 'Relations with the Turkish World' in the MHP's 2011 election manifesto, which was about the length of a medium-sized book, can also be seen as an indication that the MHP's rhetoric has shifted away from the Turkish World axis.

Political Struggle and Protecting Intellectual Integrity

İskender Öksüz emphasises that people with ideas must be prepared to fight for them if necessary: *"Entering politics means engaging in a struggle to convince minds and hearts of your worldview. It means engaging in the struggle to implement your own programme for the country. In other words, politics is about being the bearer of ideas. If you understand and practise politics in this way, you must inevitably continue the struggle. Especially in today's Turkey..."*

, even in a party that is easy to compromise with on the path to power, there will only be a "struggle for sharing," Öksüz pointed out that carrying the ideology of nationalism would be too heavy for a "mass party."

To attribute the sensitivity of my generation, who devoted their hearts and efforts to the nationalist movement—even risking their futures and lives—and who were subjected to a severe moral attack prior to the 2011 elections, to personal interests in their criticism directed at the party's top leadership regarding the protection of the MHP's ideological integrity would be cheap. Everyone has only one life to live, and the average lifespan in Turkey is more or less known. Living with the responsibility of passing on the sense of nationalism we have inherited from Turkish history to the society formed by future generations is also a way of life.

The Duties of Intellectuals and Artists

Aware that the task of leading the intellectual elite in instilling Turkish nationalism in the public fell to him, Türkeş emphasised this at every opportunity: "Our goal is to transform the Turkish Nation, through humane and scientific methods and by the shortest route, into a strong, prosperous, happy society that can stand on its own two feet, possessing its rights and honour, and to bring it to the forefront of modern nations. The means to achieve this goal are to awaken the Turkish nation, to give it new vitality and momentum, and to inspire it to work and take action by instilling in it a new philosophy of life based on national history and Turkish consciousness, guided by modern science and high moral standards. It is to realise the great leap forward by explaining to our citizens the dangers that surround us internally and externally and by making the cause of our country's liberation and rise a matter for the people. Another way to achieve this goal is to educate the intellectuals who will lead the nation.

to raise them, filling them with love for the people, away from selfishness, living alongside the people and working for the people, and thus uniting the people with the intellectuals." (Türkeş, Fundamental Views, p.29)

Türkeş emphasises that artists also bear a great responsibility in making the cause acceptable to the public: *"Another need we have is a cultural campaign. It is a matter of putting the fine arts at the service of the people. The wings of ideas are the fine arts. In order to convey our national ideals to our people and to make them accept our cause, it is essential to make use of the fine arts, to mobilise the fine arts and put them at the service of the people. Without national education and national cultural mobilisation, Turkey's development and the creation of the happy social order we envision in Turkey will not be possible."* (Türkeş, Gönül Seferberliğine, p.281)

How Far with the MHP?

For our generation, the MHP has never been just '*one of many parties*' in Turkey. Nor can it be allowed to be...

Therefore, anyone wishing to engage in politics within the MHP must personally examine their conscience to determine how prepared they are to shoulder this historical responsibility and whether they can fulfil the requirements of the position – or indeed whether they can fulfil them. This is what is expected today of MHP personnel at every level – or those who will occupy such positions in the future.

To address the possibility that my question, *"How far with the MHP?"*, might be misinterpreted in a negative context, I will provide my own answer:

*With the MHP, from Orhun to Tuna... With the
MHP, from Kashgar to Mostar... With the MHP,
from Turkistan to Turan...*

[1] The articles published in Töre magazine under the pseudonym 'Ayhan Tuğcuğil' by İskender Öksüz were later published as a book entitled *"The System of Turkish Nationalist Thought – Theory"* and were read for a long time as one of the source works in the intellectual planning of nationalist youth. *Turkish Nationalism and Politics*, İskender Öksüz; 28 June 2011,

http://www.haberiniz.com/yazilar/koseyazisi34880-Turk_Milliyetciligi_ve_siyaset.html

[2] The source of this account is İsmail Hakkı Yılanlıoğlu (1918-1992), one of the leading figures of the Islamic tendency known within the party as the "three crescent moonists".

When I sent him a message to confirm this story, which I could not find in any written source, Yavuz Bülent Bakiler replied that he had no knowledge of such a transmission. However, he also recalled that his father-in-law, İsmail Hakkı Yılanlıoğlu, was as much a nationalist as he was a conscious Muslim.

[3] If I briefly summarise some of the realities I witnessed during my brief experience in politics, I believe the issue will become clearer: The provincial chairman of the party for which I was a candidate for parliament in 2007 was a self-employed individual, and he played an active role in determining the top spots on the party's candidate list, exerting his influence in selecting candidates for winnable positions. The person whom the provincial chairman, a high school graduate, ensured was placed immediately after him on the list was a secondary school graduate "businessman" engaged in scrap metal trading. However, among the 32 people who applied for candidacy for the same party, there were high-quality names such as a retired major general, a few doctors like myself, several lawyers, university lecturers, engineers, and a large number of professional managers who were university graduates. Looking at this picture now, it would be unfair to say that party administrations have surrendered to "snack bar owners," "pawnbrokers," and "car park attendants." However, no one can deny that there is a problem.

[4] My estimate is that the most optimistic figure would be less than 10%. When it comes to books such as Hüseyin Nihal Atsız's "Issues in Turkish History" or Prof. Dr. Erol Güngör's "Turkish Culture and Nationalism," it is certain that this percentage would be even lower.

[5] Sezai Karakoç, a respected poet of Turkish literature and one of the leading thinkers of the last century, attempted to establish and organise a party called the Diriliş Party, but never had the opportunity to participate in an election.

[6] It is well known that the famous poet Necip Fazlî Kısakürek always tried to influence right-wing politics. Before the 1977 elections, the last general elections held before the 12 September coup, Necip Fazlî, who had supported Erbakan's line until then, declared his support for the MHP in a statement he published. I would like to highlight some key lines from Necip Fazlî's historic declaration:

I have read the "Declaration to the Turkish Nation" by Alparslan Türkeş, the General Chairman of the MHP...

From this day forward, the MHP holds a completely different meaning and identity in my eyes. I regard it as a community committed to upholding the true rights of Islam and Turkishness, and I greet it from the bottom of my heart. In his declaration, Türkeş sets forth four fundamental principles, like the four pillars of a building:

1 - He is not among those responsible for the 1960 coup d'état.

2 - He is a nationalist in the sense of being free from superficial and hollow nationalism and subject to spiritual content.

3 - *The sole spiritual content he relies on is, in a word and in every respect, ISLAM.*

4 - *He aspires to a revision of history that will expose all the frauds of our last 150 years of imitation and crystallise the true reality.*

From now on, I entrust my scorched heart, which can no longer tolerate new betrayals, to the warm hands that embrace this declaration, with a sensitivity that will not tolerate even the slightest deviation from the path of justice. I await and demand the fruits of my 40 years of labour from the proactive spirit of this community!

I am wherever the community lies that has the capacity to be the moulding pot for a new Turkish generation: Muslim at heart, shining Turkish on the outside, master of its inner self, slave to its outer self.

May Allah's grace and the Prophet's spirituality be upon those on this path!

For the full text of Alparslan Türkeş's "Declaration to the Turkish Nation" and Necip Fazlî's explanation, see:

<http://www.beykoz-turkocagi.org.tr/?p=22725>

[7] The widespread recognition of Alparslan Türkeş, the founding Chairman of the MHP, as a legend throughout the Turkish homeland is largely attributable to his portrayal as "the greatest enemy" in the Soviet Union's controlled media during the Cold War years. At the first Turkish Congress held in Antalya in 1993, representatives from across the Turkish world set aside President Turgut Özal and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to show their affection and respect for "Leader Türkeş," a gesture that remains vivid in my memory to this day.

2.3. Nationalist Politics and Civil Society Organisations

MThe MHP Indictment, as a document, sheds light on many details of the history of the Ülkücü Movement. Those who prepared the MHP Indictment based their findings on the associations, which were the most important civil society organisations of the era, regarding the civil society organisation of the Ülkücü movement:

“Since 1973, the Ülkücüler have pursued a planned organisation, continuing their organisational work through various main and regional associations established outside the party structure. Those that can be identified include:

- Ülkü Ocakları Association (ÜOD)
- Nationalist Youth Association (ÜGD)
- Ülkü Yolu Association (ÜYD)
- Great Ülkü Association (BÜD)
- Ülkücü Public Servants Solidarity Association (ÜLKÜM-BİR)
- Ülkücü Police Union (POL-BİR)
- Ultranationalist Workers' Union Association (ÜİBD)
- Nationalist Workers' Unions (MİSK)
- Ülkücü Teachers' Union Association (ÜLKÜ-BİR)
- Nationalist Technical Personnel Association (ÜLKÜ-TEK)
- Nationalist Accountants and Economists Association (ÜMİD-BİR)
- University and Higher Education Assistants Association (ÜNAY)
- Medical Students' Union (TİB-BİR)

- Nationalist Tradesmen and Craftsmen Association (ÜLKÜ-ES)
- Nationalist Farmers Association (ÜLKÜ-KÖY)
- Nationalist Women's Association (ÜLKÜ-HAN)
- Nationalist Journalists' Association (ÜLKÜ-CEM)
- Ultrationalist Cinema and Arts Culture Association (ÜLKÜ-SAN)
- Ultrationalist Lawyers Association
- Ultrationalist Political Scientists Union (ÜS-BİR)
- Ultrationalist Painters and Sculptors Association
- Ak Ülkü Association
- Economists Solidarity and Research Union (İDA-BİR)
- Television and Radio Organisation Staff Union (TRT-BİR)
- Association of Art and Technical School Graduates
- Limited Liability Workers', Civil Servants', Tradesmen's, Freelancers', Farmers', Employers' Consumption and Mutual Aid Cooperative (İMESKİ)

Regional nationalist organisations include:

- Bursa Kemerçeşme Neighbourhood Association of Lovers of Traditional Music and Instruments
- Bursa Çınar Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Bursa Arabayatağı Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Bursa Davut Kadı Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Bursa Beyazıt Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Bursa Hisar Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Bursa Şükran Neighbourhood Saz and Music Lovers Association
- Elazığ İzzetpaşa Cultural Association
- Elazığ Sürsürü Cultural Association

- Elazığ Harput Cultural Association
- Elazığ Nailbey Cultural Association
- Elazığ Yenimahalle Cultural Association
- Elazığ Dalıca Cultural Association
- Elazığ Aksaray Cultural Association
- Elazığ University Neighbourhood Cultural Association
- Elazığ Yurtbaşı Cultural Association
- Erzurum Cultural Association
- Erzurum Higher Education Students Association
- Erzurum Cypriot Students Cultural and Solidarity Association
- Erzurum Ilıca Cultural Association

- Kayseri Kılıçarslan Cultural Association
- Kayseri Fevzi Çakmak Cultural Association
- Kayseri Yenimahalle Cultural Association
- Kayseri Freedom Cultural Association
- Kayseri Maraşlı Cultural Association
- Kayseri Garip Çorak Cultural Association
- Kayseri Yıldırım Beyazıt Cultural Association
- Kayseri 344 Houses Cultural Association
- Kayseri Gazi Osman Pasha Cultural Association
- Kayseri Gültepe Cultural Association
- Kayseri 200 Houses Cultural Association
- Kayseri Keykubat Cultural Association
- Kayseri Tacettin Mirza Çetin Cultural Association
- Kayseri Yanıkoğlu Bekir Çifter Cultural Association

- Kayseri Şirinevler Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Zihni Demir Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Plevne Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Yavuzlar Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Atpazarı Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Küçük Mustafa Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Esenyurt Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Çifteönü Ötüken Cultural Association
 - Kayseri Music Folklore Education and Research Association (KAM-FED)
 - Kayseri Scientific Research Institute Association (İAD)
 - Kayseri Idealist Higher Education Association
 - Malatya Çarmuzu Cultural Association
 - Malatya Yeşiltepe Cultural Association
 - Malatya Fırat Cultural Association
 - Trabzon Bahçecik Neighbourhood Development and Beautification Association
 - Trabzon Hızırbey Neighbourhood Development and Beautification Association
- can be listed.*

These organisations, in addition to their rapid formation, have undertaken and carried out educational and propaganda activities for the entire Ülkücü community and, when necessary, have strived to emerge as a force. Some of these organisations have recently dissolved themselves in anticipation of possible closure. However, new organisations have been established to carry out the duties of these organisations, or alternative organisations with completed legal structures have been put into operation.

Following the closure of the Ülkücü Civil Servants and Ülkücü Workers associations on 7 March 1979, two organisations were formed under the names "Ülkücü Public Servants Solidarity Association (ÜLKÜM-BİR)" and "Ülkücü Workers Union Association (ÜİBD)". In 1978, anticipating the possible closure of the Ülkü Ocakları Association (ÜOD), the Ülkücü Youth Association (ÜGD) was established as an alternative organisation, and ÜGD branches were opened to replace the dissolved ÜOD branches.

It is thought-provoking that the nationalist movement, which managed to achieve such a strong civil society organisation under the socio-economic conditions prior to 12 September 1980, has failed to reach the same level of civil society organisation today, despite the passage of nearly 40 years, the development of socio-economic conditions, and the facilitative contribution of the communication environment to organisation. Although some nationalists accept this situation as a natural consequence of public employees organising themselves within a trade union framework under the umbrella of the Confederation of Turkish Public Employees' Trade Unions (TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN), the difference between trade union activities and civil society activities requires us to re-examine the issue of nationalist civil society organisation. ⁽¹¹⁾ The contribution of TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN, which is organised into 12 branches and has significant economic and financial resources, to the improvement of the overall quality of the nationalist movement must be assessed dispassionately. As a member who has contributed by paying union dues for 15 years, I consider this assessment to be imperative, -setting aside who is in the management positions- I must say.

When we consulted on the Ülkücü Writers Association, which we established on 12 September 2012 to bring together idealist writers, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli emphasised the importance of this issue as the founding president of ÜNAY before 12 September 1980.

Despite discussions with the MHP Central Headquarters Management's "Relations with Affiliated Organisations and Civil Society Presidency," which was established following his instructions in this context, no concrete progress has been made.

Before 12 September, ÜLKÜ-BİR had 40,000 (forty thousand) active members within a teaching staff that was approximately one-fifth the size of today's. Given that the teaching staff today numbers close to one million, you can calculate for yourselves how many members ÜLKÜ-BİR should have.

What Does It Mean to Remain "Above Politics"?

Alparslan Türkeş, who aimed to keep Turkish nationalism visible in every layer of society through civil society organisations, has also occasionally warned "nationalist civil society organisations" that have distanced themselves from the MHP for various reasons:

One of the associations that has had the greatest impact on the life of the Turkish nation and has served it most is the Turkish Association. However, because the Turkish Association did not aim to bring Turkish nationalism to power, it eventually became a plaything of the government, faded away, was suppressed, and fell into disuse. No nationalist association should succumb to wishful thinking. It should not say, 'I am a nationalist, I will do this or that in my activities'. Unless it lends a hand to the action of making nationalism the ruling ideology and works in cooperation with that action, it is doomed to stagnate on its own one day. Therefore, the great goal is to elevate the Turkish Nation to the highest level in science, technology, and civilisation in the shortest time possible. To strengthen it, to bring it prosperity and happiness, to establish a Great Turkey; the means to achieve this great goal is power. It is the power of Turkish Nationalism. Unless Turkish Nationalism comes to power, the Turkish Nation will have no

The case is unsolvable, it has not been solved." (Türkeş, Gönül Seferberliğine, p.120)

If lessons were learned from these words of Leader Türkeş and the necessary actions were taken, would Turkish nationalism be in this state in the Turkish homeland today?

It is worth considering.

[1] According to 2016 figures, the number of public employees organised under the umbrella of TÜRKiYE KAMU-SEN is 420,220, according to official figures published in the Official Gazette dated 4 July 2016.

Some figures by union: Turkish Education-Sen:

210,951

Turkish Health Workers' Union: 96,408

Turkish Office Workers' Union: 44,244

Turkish Religious Foundation Union:

13,914 Turkish Local Services Union:

13,437 Turkish News Union: 7,714

Turkish Culture and Arts Union: 2,394

2.4. 's Financing of Nationalist Politics

A It is generally accepted that during the period of Alparslan Türkeş, nationalist politics did not prioritise the economy and did not address economic issues. However, Türkeş's statements on the importance of the country's economic development were among the most emphasised topics in all his speeches:

We are facing serious and dangerous issues not only in economic and social terms, but also in spiritual and human terms. We have reached this point without learning the necessary lessons from the great disasters we have faced to date. However, if we do not pull ourselves together and rise up with great energy and faith, our country may face such dire disasters that even our independence could be at risk.

This is the context in which the historical position, duties and struggle of the MHP are defined. The MHP pursues the cause of establishing an economically developed, socially just and peaceful, spiritually healthy, organised and strong national society. Our economic and social views and our spiritual beliefs are directed towards this goal. (...) Turkey must find an economic way out." (Türkeş, Bunalımdan Çıkış Yolu [The Way Out of the Crisis], pp. 105-106)

Our approach to development is based on the principle of "people first". Development requires first-class scholars. First-class personnel in fields such as sociology, economics, agriculture, industry, education and culture, as well as technical sciences. Without such a human foundation, development is not possible.

It is not possible to train this cadre of 'first-class scholars' simply by equipping them with knowledge. They must possess a great love of learning, a passion for service, a drive to produce, and a deep love for their nation and humanity. Without a love and enthusiasm directed towards their own society, no matter what their level of knowledge, these pioneering cadres cannot escape imitation and unproductivity. This is one of the important reasons why, despite two centuries of efforts in Turkey, the cause of development has not yet been successful. It is because we take this national and universal truth into account that our doctrine brings together "idealism" and "scientificism".

However, unless the whole of society is filled with the kind of faith, love, ideals, enthusiasm and energy that gave rise to great civilisations, it is not enough for only the scientific community to possess these qualities. Human love, the excitement of progress, faith, the love of science, the drive to produce, and the spiritual joy of hard work must spread throughout the entire society. Faithful, honest, energetic, hard-working generations who believe in the guidance of science are the true saviours of nations." (Türkeş, Bunalımdan Çıkış Yolu [The Way Out of Crisis], pp. 167-168)

Two articles signed by my esteemed colleagues Şükrü Alınçık and Kürşat Tecel, written after the 2011 general elections, were remarkably similar when considered in terms of their psychological context.

Alınçık, in his article titled "Ülkücü Proletarya" written immediately after the elections, based on his observations during the election period, expressed concerns such as: "Has a class difference emerged among Nationalists who have devoted themselves to the MHP?" He expressed concerns such as, "Is there a class distinction between the Anatolian children who grew up in the movement and the nationalist aristocrats and 'princes of privilege' who completed their careers outside the Ülkücü movement?" ⁽¹⁾

According to Tecel, under the heading "My Words to Capitalist Ülkücüler," starting from the centre and extending to the grassroots level, "the biggest problem and the source of all our other problems was created by the 'Capitalist Ülkücüler,' defined by a generally accepted term as 'those who live off Ülkücülük.'" ⁽²⁾

Kürşat Tecel concluded his article, which questioned "what our situation consists of," with a call to action: "I believe that the time has come for idealist Idealists to speak out against the 'Capitalist Idealists' who view our value creators and everyone who contributes to production as slaves. If anyone has something to say, let them speak."

These two articles by two 'idealist' writers from the same background, reflecting almost identical mental frameworks, gave me pause for thought. Both articles pointed to a growing divide among nationalists over economic wealth and expressed resentment towards nationalists who had 'somehow' attained economic power. Based on these two articles, I believe that understanding this discontent, which I know is widespread among nationalist intellectuals, would be beneficial for the future of the nationalist movement.

I can say that the reflection of the nationalist movement's general economy in the press/media is not very different. It is regrettable that the nationalist line, an action-oriented movement that seeks to shape public opinion in the country, is inadequate even when compared to small communities in the press/media field today.

I do not believe there is a single nationalist who is satisfied with the current situation in daily newspapers, magazines, and especially visual media (TV/internet). Is there anyone reading this article who is unaware of the pitiful state of newspapers claiming to publish from a nationalist perspective, a subject that pains every nationalist who looks at daily newspaper circulation reports?

Having close knowledge of the conditions under which almost all of the nationalist press/publication organs published in Ankara were published, I must say that I did not find it difficult to reach this conclusion. Moreover, this situation can be generalised not only to newspapers but also to long-established, regular publications with a nationalist line, such as the magazines *Töre*, *Türk Yurdu*, and *Türk Edebiyatı*, which are still in circulation.

***“Ten Thousand People, One Thousand Lira Each”
or “Donate Your Zakat to the Cause”***

In order to prevent this important issue, which has always hindered the efforts of the Nationalist Movement to convey its message to society, from becoming trapped in the framework of partisanship/opposition in the heated atmosphere of the MHP congress process, I would like to discuss a documented example from the history of the Nationalist Movement.

Every nationalist who lived through those days remembers the sacrifices made for the cause by nationalists, who disregarded their personal/family financial problems before 12 September, and the fact that the MHP, as an institution, was unable to generate financial resources. Looking at the documents contained in the MHP's 12 September indictment with this perspective, some of the information I encountered revealed how the problem was perceived at the very heart of the movement. I would first like to point out this financial problem, which has persisted from 12 September to the present day, and then say a few words about the future.

In the MHP indictment, under the heading "Illegal Financial Organisation," the formation of the financial resources of the nationalist movement was defined and presented as a crime, and documents seized during raids were listed in the indictment as evidence of the crime. Some of these were as follows:

* During a search of the MHP headquarters, a document found in Alparslan Türkeş's office, which upon handwriting comparison was determined to have been written by Acar Okan, stated that "a campaign to raise 1,000 lira from 10,000 people to provide financial resources to the MHP" had been organised in 1976.

* A document bearing the title "1,000 TL donation list" written in Taha Akyol's own handwriting and signed by 14 (fourteen) individuals indicates that he collected money for the 1,000 lira campaign from 10,000 people.

* In the income/expense statement of the Ülkücü Youth Association, Namık Kemal Zeybek is listed among those who contributed the 1,126,000 lira obtained under the name of donations, and it is stated that Zeybek also contributed to the 857,000 lira collected under the name of zakat-fitre, although the amount is not specified. (Appendix: 207)

I wonder if Taha Akyol and Namık Kemal Zeybek remember these records from the MHP indictment today; I do not know, but it is understood that Akyol and Zeybek, who were important figures in the ideological sphere of the nationalist movement at the time, were actively involved in overcoming the party's financial problems (I cannot bring myself to say that they "begged for help from the 'money men' for the MHP").⁽¹³⁾

After 12 September, the situation would remain unchanged until the 1999 elections, when the MHP secured significant representation in the Grand National Assembly and gained access to treasury assistance. Between 1980 and 1999, many scenes reflecting the "economic hardship of the nationalist movement" and causing deep pain remain vivid in the memories of many nationalists.

Today, I am pleased to note that the MHP, led by Devlet Bahçeli, has gone beyond the point of collecting alms and zakat by reaching out to "enlightened and leading figures" in order to consolidate its institutional identity and continue its political activities. However, I cannot say that the nationalist movement, with its national/universal claims concerning Turkish society – and indeed all Turkic peoples worldwide – has, in general terms, overcome its material financing problems. To say otherwise would be tantamount to burying one's head in the sand for anyone in today's Turkey who is more or less unaware of what is happening.

This "psychology of material insufficiency" had penetrated so deeply ^[4]that when the current headquarters was being built, many senior/devoted idealists expressed concern that the heating and lighting costs of such a large building, even the electricity and water bills, could not be paid. I will also write about the challenge posed by Devlet Bahçeli at the opening of the MHP Headquarters, which directly concerned certain individuals. If anyone is interested, I will also mention the harassing fire they launched from the trench of "Do you know how that huge building in Balgat is being built?" which spread from a well-known circle during the construction of the MHP's current magnificent headquarters building.

The Problem of 'Unreliability' Becoming Anonymous

I do not know whose idea it was to organise the "Ten Thousand People, One Thousand Lira Each" campaign to secure funds for the MHP's election campaign before the 1977 elections, but it has an aspect that sheds light on the present day. If the financial situation of individual idealists is not such that they can provide sound financing to sustain even a monthly cultural magazine, a weekly newspaper, or a decent internet portal, let alone large organisations such as a TV/media group, then there is no other way but to create a "common fund".

So, how will this "common fund" be established, and to whom will it be entrusted? This is where all lines become blocked, and the "trust issue," which has always been a potential problem, has evolved into a massive "trust crisis" after the "tape scandals" that hit the market before the last election and whose contents are known to the whole world. No idealist can ignore the fact that the scandal has reached the point where the name entrusted with the MHP's "official coffers" has been implicated, and that the affair has descended into disgusting levels beyond prostitution, centred on material gain.

To distance the subject from individuals playing politics and to encourage more dispassionate thinking, let us continue with an example from the cultural sphere. A magazine I know, which had been working hard to be republished in recent months, was ready for printing for almost three months but was delayed due to financial problems. When I asked a colleague if he could help find subscribers for this magazine in his own circle, in the important university city where he works, his response reflected a caution that warrants serious consideration: "I'll pay the subscription fee myself right away, but I won't act as an intermediary to collect money from anyone for an annual subscription; what if, after three or five issues, those who shut down the magazine end up fleeing? ... The financial aspect isn't important, but at this age, I don't want to hear complaints from people I've collected money from."

Unfortunately, I could not say to this old friend of mine, who demonstrated his loyalty to the nationalist tradition by running as an MHP candidate in the last two elections, "You are wrong in this distrust"... Financial difficulties may be overcome one day, but overcoming this trust issue will require a great deal of effort.

Without reaching the level of the title "el-Emin" (=trustworthy person) before his prophethood, and without even recalling Hacı Bektaş Velî's (k.s.) advice to "control your hands, waist and tongue", as I pointed out in my previous article, there is a close connection between this issue and the need to raise the quality of the 'idealist community's' spiritual personality.

The issue of clean/halal financing for the idealist movement is important.

What Should Be the Moral Standard of MHP Leaders?

I cannot reconcile discussing those who acted as extras in the immoral film "Different Idealists," released online before the 2011 elections, with my idealist upbringing. Today, it has been proven that this vile attack was orchestrated by a "community" from across the ocean. However, this does not mean that I am in the least bit tolerant of those who filmed this movie, which has recorded an unprecedented disgrace in the history of the nationalist movement in the archives. For I know that even approaching adultery is haram, let alone committing it, and although it has been removed as a crime from the Turkish Penal Code by the AKP government, the punishment for adultery is clear in Islamic law.

In my previous article, I explained that one of the qualities required of the MHP General Chairman candidate was "bringing home halal food". The pornographic images circulated in the 2011 elections to bury the MHP at the ballot box also compel me to emphasise this: a person running for the MHP leadership must have not even a speck of fault in their "sexual life" or family relationships, not even the slightest hint of impropriety.

So how can this moral standard be ensured and, more importantly, how can it be verified? More precisely, is it possible to determine whether someone running for the MHP leadership has had an illicit relationship that violates general morality, unless one of the parties confesses? To be honest, these questions are important. The trap set for CHP Chairman Deniz Baykal, who is well known for his sensitivity on national issues, which nullified his political effectiveness, has revealed the importance of this issue for the country's destiny. It is impossible to withstand the blackmail that a person at the top of the MHP, Turkey's and the Turkish nation's most important guarantee in the political arena, might face due to personal weaknesses or flaws.

Any individual who disregards any tradition in order to cover up a moral failing that any candidate at any level of the MHP leadership might exhibit, -if even the simplest sunnah, such as drinking water with the right hand, is repeatedly violated when announcing a candidacy- then talking about a sunnah such as "polygamy" would be nothing short of comical.

At this point, I believe it would be beneficial to obtain a "pledge of commitment to Islamic morality and virtue" from every person aspiring to the central leadership of the MHP and every parliamentary candidate, in line with the tradition of the nationalist movement. The penalty for violating this commitment should be stipulated in the relevant statutes and enforced, and those who are at fault in this regard, as we witnessed before the 2011 elections, should not be left to the discretion of the relevant party to be purged from politics.

As long as an "Imam Hatip graduate President" exists in the political arena, everyone aspiring to lead the MHP must, regardless of their personal relationships, respect the religious and moral sensitivities of society.

must act with caution. Today, the fact that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the CHP, whose religious persuasion is known to everyone, was compelled to host an iftar dinner for certain figures known for their religious identity during Ramadan is an indication that this issue will remain relevant in the coming period. Therefore, it should be understood that anyone announcing their candidacy for the leadership of the MHP will be scrutinised first by nationalists and then by society at large regarding the reflection of Islamic sensitivities in their daily lives.

"Islamic Morality and Virtue" Only in the Bedroom?

Those who mention/will mention the oft-repeated refrain, "Thousands of idealistic seedlings fell to the ground for this cause," and those who proclaim/will proclaim, "We are the descendants of Fatih and Yavuz," from the columns opened for them in exchange for a price, those who wrote/will write in blood-stained lines that "the autopsy performed when Yusuf İmamoğlu was martyred revealed that he had not eaten a single morsel in the last 24 hours"; if any of those who read my words feel offended, let them look closely in the mirror: Is there a wound somewhere, or a suspicious morsel in their stomachs that is difficult to digest?!

The negative examples that occurred prior to the 2011 parliamentary elections, which essentially revealed how Islamic morality and virtue were being recklessly trampled upon by certain figures within the core leadership of the nationalist movement, created a vortex that sucked in and swallowed up thousands who had set out to do good deeds. When we recall how this vortex reflected in the 2011 election results, those who harmed an entire nationalist community with their personal/egoistic weaknesses cannot escape responsibility in both worlds for creating this climate of distrust, even if they had committed no other sins.

I am the plaintiff...

On behalf of those who entered the black earth before they could enter
their beloved's embrace in the spring of their lives...

I am the plaintiff, O Lord...

[1] Şükrü Alınçık, "The Idealist Proletariat," 13 June 2011. <http://ulkucuyazarlarbirligi.org/?p=270>

[2] Kürşat Tecel, "My Words to Capitalist Idealists", 30 July 2011. <http://ulkucuyazarlarbirligi.org-g/?p=40>

[3] It comes to mind whether Taha Akyol and Namık Kemal Zeybek's separation from the nationalist movement and the MHP after 12 September was influenced by their involvement in such "not very pleasant" issues.

[4] To understand this psychology, we must remember the days when the MHP Headquarters was located on Libya Street in Ankara, when the heating could not be turned on during Ankara's cold winters and the building had to be heated with electric heaters.

2.5. "Black-Shirts": Nationalist Movement and Provocations

MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, in his speech at the Group Meeting on 4 June 2013, referred to the "Black-Shirts" by pointing to the threat posed by the words used by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when he was about to go on a trip abroad.

pointed to the threat posed by his words and mentioned the "Black-Shirts". Bahçeli said in his speech: *"Before Prime Minister Erdoğan's overseas trip, which he insisted on going on despite the current environment and agenda, he entered into a polemic with a member of the press, saying, 'At least 50 per cent of this country is currently being held in their homes by force.' These statements are unfortunate and also an example of great irresponsibility. Mr Prime Minister, who are you and who are you threatening? Like a mayor from your own party, are you eager to drown the protests in Taksim in a spoonful of water? Are you boasting about the possibility of turning this noble nation against each other? Where have you deployed your black-shirted men and your mounted troops?"*

This reference to "Karagömlek" in the MHP leader's rather lengthy speech reminded me of the conversation we had during our recent visit as executives of the Ülkücü Writers Association. During the visit on 21 December 2012, Devlet Bahçeli accepted our invitation to become an "Honorary Member" of the Ülkücü Writers Association and signed the ÜLKÜ-YAZ membership form. During the visit, which we carried out together with Şükrü Alnaçık and Kürşat Tecel from the ÜLKÜ-YAZ Management Board, Bahçeli shared his recommendations with us and pointed out some very important issues that needed attention. He spoke about the provocations and attacks faced by the Ülkücü movement,

While advising us to be wary of provocations, he cited the example of the book "Karagömlöklöler" (The Black Shirts), which was circulated among nationalist youth before 12 September. He reminded us that similar provocations and manipulations, such as having this book, which describes how the fascists led by Benito Mussolini came to power in Italy, translated by an "agent" and distributed among nationalists, are being organised for today's nationalist youth, and that it is the duty of senior nationalists like us to warn nationalist youth against these schemes. and that it is the duty of senior nationalists like us to warn the nationalist youth against these schemes.

The Interesting Story of the Book "Karagömlöklöler"

After our visit, I felt the need to examine Bahçeli's reference to "Karagömlöklöler" a little more closely. Before 12 September, during my student years at university, I had bought and read almost all the books published by Töre-Devlet Publishing House, and I was aware of this book among them, but I hadn't read it because it didn't interest me. The research I conducted to obtain this book from online second-hand bookshops revealed an intriguing picture:

Written by Marcel Ouessant (pronounced Marsel Ussan) and published in 1935 under the title "The Black Shirts Revolution (1919-1922)", was translated into Turkish by a translator named Haydar Rifat (?) and published by Tefeyyüz Publishing House in 1937, not long after its original publication. Considering Mussolini's popularity at the time, this rather hasty translation attempt was not particularly surprising. Thirty years later, in 1967, we see a new translation of the same book, signed by Cemal Ali Kurt, published by Çınar Yayınları. The edition Bahçeli cites as an example was published in 1976 by Töre-Devlet Publishing House –trans.

It was a copy of the translation titled "Fascism" by Saffet Üçok, said to be the pseudonym of an academic assigned to the task. The book sold out quickly and went into a second printing in 1978. I decided to obtain this second edition from 1978 for examination. The style of the short preface at the beginning of the book was not unfamiliar to me.^[2] I contacted Prof. Dr. İskender Öksüz, who was associated with Töre-Devlet Publishing House at the time, and asked him who had written this preface. Although he did not remember what was written in the preface, he stated that this book, which had the word Fascism on the cover but contained the words Karagömlekliler İhtilali (The Black Shirts Revolution) inside, had caused him trouble during the days of 12 September. According to Öksüz, immediately after 12 September, the specialist sergeant leading the soldiers who raided the Töre-Devlet Publishing House office saw the "Fascism" books stacked in packages in a corner and immediately called headquarters, saying, "Commander, we found thousands of Fascism books here. Send a truck so we can bring all the 'Fascism' books." According to Öksüz, who recounted this with a laugh, he had to work hard to convince the sergeant that taking one book as a sample for examination would suffice, rather than thousands of books.

Now let's get to the content of the book and, more importantly, why this "interesting" book was circulated among the idealists...

What Are the "Black Shirts"?

As the original title suggests, the book described the emergence of fascism in Italy and how Mussolini rose to prominence on the political stage as a charismatic figure. The Blackshirts were armed fascist units under the command of Benito Mussolini. The paramilitary force that enabled Mussolini to first take control of the streets and then seize power in Italy was called the "Black Shirts".

It is easy to guess that this name derives from the black shirts that young people, who believed they were engaged in an anti-communist struggle that had bloodied the streets of Italy, chose to wear as a uniform.

The first units of the Blackshirts, who got their name from wearing black shirts and carrying black flags at their ceremonies, were formed in 1919. As he rose to power, Mussolini organised Italian youth into a paramilitary structure called the "Blackshirts" to fight against the socialists. Mussolini's Blackshirts were a mixture of adventurers, idealists, former military officers and soldiers, and people from the lower and middle classes. Considered radical nationalists, even racist, in political terms, these militias gained power by using violence to subjugate Italians they perceived as enemies. Glorifying violence, the Blackshirts organised street attacks against all groups they considered hostile.

By the end of 1920, they had begun targeting not only socialists but also republicans and other organisations. The Blackshirts, organised by Mussolini, clashed with communist groups and ruthlessly suppressed those who opposed them using violence. It is said that hundreds of people were killed in clashes between fascist units and socialists even before they came to power. The Blackshirts, in their black uniforms, striking slogans and spectacular parades, succeeded in creating an increasingly powerful social impact. Enthusiastic propaganda throughout Italy directed the Italian people towards the Fascist party.

Following a decision taken at a congress held in Naples on 24 October 1922, armed Blackshirts from across the country gathered and marched from Naples to Rome. Mussolini's general friends 29

October 1922. The Great March on Rome brought Mussolini to power. The King of Italy, helpless, called on Mussolini to form a government. The Italian Fascists thus came to power. Shortly after coming to power, Mussolini shut down all other parties.

On 1 February 1923, the Karagömlükliler, who had been illegal until then, were granted legal status and transformed into national militias. On 4 August 1924, all members of the Karagömlükliler were made to swear allegiance to the King of Italy and were officially registered.

According to Ussan's book, Mussolini established a well-organised, well-liked, obedient, unshakeable paramilitary militia army. Italy was divided into twelve regions to organise the combat teams, generally referred to as militias, and a militia inspector was appointed to each team.

The narrative in the book "Fascism" describes the struggle between the fascists and the red communists, and the glorification of violence and force is so intense that it makes the reader uncomfortable. In fact, scenes of murder are even sanctified in places. (As I do not have the original book in my possession, I cannot say whether this is an exaggeration in the translation.)

I could give dozens of examples of the glorification of violence in the book. However, I will limit myself to quoting one example from Mussolini, who proudly proclaimed himself the "chief executioner": On 3 January 1925, approximately three years after the march on Rome, sensing for a moment that his work was in danger, Mussolini said the following in the Italian parliament.

"I declare before this parliament, in the presence of the entire Italian nation, that the political, moral, and historical responsibility for everything that has happened lies solely with me."

It belongs to me. If fascism is a society of murderers, then I am the head of this society of murderers. If the violence displayed is the product of a specific historical, political, moral, or social climate, then let the responsibility fall on me. Because I created this history, this morality, and this environment. This adventure began with Italy's entry into the world war in 1915 and continues to this day. I worked especially hard to bring things to this point. I drew strength from my experiences. I measured the power of my party. I listened to myself. Then I came before you."

After explaining how the march on Rome was the result of a great revolution, he continued:

"Enough, yes, enough is enough. The day has come to say these words. People fight each other, and if reconciliation is not possible, words are power"
([3])

The key points selected from the Militia Discipline Regulations, which outlined Mussolini's main principles, were listed as follows in the book *Fascism*:

"Article 4. The Fascist militia, with unwavering determination and blind loyalty to Italy, dedicates itself without hesitation.

Article 6. Every Fascist, whether ranked or not, shall be ready to command. The volunteer militia shall have a blind respect for all higher ranks.

Article 7. The fascist militia has its own morality; the usual moral rules are not sufficient for it. It will have a sense of honour characteristic of the knights of old. When necessary, it will be cruel and severe, but always with its face turned towards justice.

Article 18. Every militiaman is bound by the chain of command. All fascists must learn to unite at any moment under a single will.

Article 28. If an army does not fight well, those in command are responsible. A leader who is not faithful to tradition is a disgraced man.

Article 34. During manoeuvres and force tests, civilian leaders also have no command authority. Within militia groups, soldiers are bound by the chain of command. Wherever a militiaman sees it, he shall respect military uniform.

Article 88. Those who wear the black uniform are obliged to live a more honest life than ever before from that moment on.

Article 39. The uniform shall not be worn unless deemed necessary.

Article 40. Those who do not know how to protect their uniform and other insignia of the party at the cost of their lives are not worthy of wearing them.

Article 42. Demonstrations are prohibited without permission from the political party leaders.

Article 48. Every time the Blackshirts appear in public, they shall prove that they are Italy's purest and highest force, people who ask for nothing and know how to die for their country

According to Ussan, the fascists, who were disparaged as "bloody murderers" by their left-wing opponents, voluntarily complied with Mussolini's directives. Ussan wrote the following in praise of the "black shirts": "Sacrificing one's life, enduring various hardships, dying, is not for the spiritually weak. It is these men who broke the backbone of communism in Italy and rendered it incapable of rising again in the autumn of 1922."

Mussolini revived relations between the Fascist Party and the Vatican, the religious centre of the Catholics, and Italy. The Blackshirts were supported by capitalists who financed fascism, including the American banker J.P. Morgan. It is said that traces of these complex relationships can still be seen today. In Italy

there are still neo-fascist youth organisations that identify themselves as Blackshirts.

Why is such a book published for "idealists to read"?

During the period of struggle in Turkey between 1976 and 1980, it was impossible for a nationalist youth who faced "red" communist activists every day not to be influenced by the glorification of violence in this book. The Karagömlekliler's struggle against the "reds" and their subsequent seizure of power could easily be adapted to Turkish conditions without much stretch of the imagination. The rules listed in Marsel Ussan's book contained elements and rhetoric that could very easily be transferred to Turkey.

Evaluating the preparation of this book for nationalists as a 'well-intentioned intellectual endeavour' is, from today's perspective, an utterly unacceptable position. Indeed, in my consultations with my fellow idealists from academic circles who remember t h o s e years, we agreed that such activities were a reflection of a "grey area" that prevailed on both the right and the left before 12 September.

Those familiar with the struggle environment of the 1970s will recall that the number of nationalists who could be swayed by such rhetoric encouraging violence was by no means small. Indeed, by taking part in the left-right conflict and fighting on the front lines, such efforts undoubtedly influenced some nationalists to resort to violence. Almost all senior nationalists targeted by the 12 September coup bear witness to the dire consequences of this influence.

It is probably because of this experience that MHP leader Bahçeli, in his recent speech to the Grand National Assembly, warned the government against the tendency to create its own "black-shirted" forces, emphasising that encouraging such violence would not be in the country's interest.

Another aspect of Bahçeli's words is that, just as yesterday, they constitute attempts to incite nationalist youth to violence, that it is unclear where the violence provoked by these inciters will lead, and that ultimately there will be no gain for Turkish nationalists at the end of the road.

***"Are you sure there isn't a
corpse at the bottom of this
well?"***

Ultrationalism and ultranationalists have a unique blend of experiences spanning more than forty years. Any effort to record this blend of experiences will be a gift for future generations of ultranationalists. If I do not clearly state the message to be taken from this article, which I wrote with this awareness, it will be incomplete.

Around the "Taksim Gezi Park Resistance" process, we see that even today, when the dust has settled, there are still those calling nationalists to the streets and squares. In the streets they will take to and the squares they will gather in, we know from our experience of 12 September that almost all of them will remain "unknown" provocateurs. If a nationalist's nose bleeds in a conflict they instigate, what will be the result? The answer to this question must be carefully considered.

As Bahçeli pointed out in the speech that prompted this article, "we do not drink water from wells whose bottoms cannot be seen." Young nationalists should ask those who invite them to drink water from wells whose bottoms cannot be seen—whatever guise these invitees may take—the following question: "Are you sure there is no corpse at the bottom of this well?"

[1] Marsel Ussan, *Fascism*, Töre-Devlet Publishing House, 2nd Edition, Istanbul-1978.

[2] "Fascism" The Unnamed Preface to the Book of the Black-Shirts Revolution:

"Woe to the defeated!"

The truth conveyed by this phrase is undoubtedly indisputable. Fascism, which dominated Italy after the First World War, suffered a decisive defeat in the Second World War and was wiped out. As in every war

, at the end of this war, we heard that the victor was right and good, and the vanquished was wrong and evil. This theme has been explored in hundreds of films, hundreds of books, thousands of articles; it is still being explored...

There is another indisputable truth: if the Allies had lost the Second World War and Germany, Italy and Japan had won, the stories of atrocities we would hear would undoubtedly come from the other side. Then we would hear with equal vehemence that fascism was good and righteous, and the Allies were evil and unjust.

What is the truth?

No human action can be one hundred per cent flawless or one hundred per cent flawed. So what is fascism, with its good and bad sides? The question to ask, the right question, is this: it is the question of thinking minds.

In the propaganda war we are living through, where savage murders are committed in the name of principles, the culture of newspapers probably makes it impossible for us to find the correct answers to these questions. After the demise of fascism, the propaganda offensive launched against it was so successful that the sins of the communist dictatorship, which was several times more brutal than fascism, were hidden from view amid the dust and smoke of this war of annihilation. The communists' principle that "if you are not a communist, you are a fascist" is currently being attempted to be established in our country, Turkey. Since no one can dispute the evil of fascism, and especially since the defeated have no means of defending themselves, this clever tactic can cause hesitation and confusion in many weak minds.

Fascism was evil! Yes and no... Fascism had its evil sides! Definitely yes... But

The most realistic thing that can be said about fascism in the last quarter of the 20th century is probably that "fascism is not evil, fascism is dead".

So what is fascism? Can we not give an objective, realistic answer to this question? Can we not examine the Italy of the years leading up to fascism throughout a book, not from the perspective of one side, but through the eyes of objective history?

For an objective and passive mind, this question belongs to history. For an objective but active mind, however, it belongs to politics; it is today's question.

Töre-Devlet Publishing House is publishing this work by Marsel Us-san, originally written in French, in order to provide Turkish readers with some insight into this issue. As the work was written before the Second World War, traces of propaganda attacks directed at the defeated side have not been reflected in the author's pen. This increases our hope for realism. By publishing this work, which will bring to life the birth of fascism, its principles, and its state philosophy day by day, we believe we have taken another step towards shedding light on the true nature of a concept, an accusation.

Töre-Devlet Publishing House (1978)

[3] Marsel Ussan, *Fascism*, Töre-Devlet Publishing House, 2nd Edition, Istanbul-1978, p.141.

[4] Marsel Ussan, *Fascism*, Töre-Devlet Publishing House, 2nd Edition, Istanbul-1978, pp. 122-123.

2.6. From the MHP Indictment: Islamic Approach 'Crimes'

1 When the indictment for the MHP and Ülkücü Organisations Trial, which opened in 1981, was published, many Ülkücüs questioned how the documents used as evidence in the indictment had been obtained by military prosecutors.

. It was even understood that even small notes sent to Leader Türkeş were not thrown in the bin where they belonged, but were stuffed into sacks to be presented to the military prosecutors. This situation proved that certain plans targeting the MHP before 12 September had been initiated long in advance, ready to be put into action as soon as the coup stage was reached. Our esteemed nationalist comrade A. Ender Gökdemir also pointed to this situation in his latest article on haberiniz.com, reflecting the nationalist sentiment that still echoes today, asking, "Why didn't you burn those archives?!" ⁽¹¹⁾

In the MHP case indictment, which now only has archival value, some documents seized by force have been sorted and selected as "elements of crime," including some documents showing the MHP's relationship with communities and sects. Among these, a report containing proposals for the MHP to develop relations with broad sections of society stands out. This report contains the following recommendations, which caught the attention of the 12 September prosecutors, for expanding the MHP's sphere of sympathy within society:

* We will engage in dialogue with influential figures (sect leaders/aghhas, prominent Nurcu members, Süleymancı elders, etc.) without compromising our cause, in order to gain their support.

* Neither pro- nor anti-Islamic schools of thought and orders shall be favoured, and no propaganda shall be conducted within the organisation in this regard; the principle of united front and broad front shall also apply here.

* Contact should be made with religious leaders in neighbourhoods, districts and villages to gain their affection and trust.

Alongside these recommendations for establishing contact with Islamic community leaders, some suggestions aimed at addressing the religious shortcomings of the youth group that forms the nationalist base are also noteworthy:

* We should request religious seminars for our nationalist comrades from nationalist or sympathetic religious officials.

* We must ensure that all our ideological comrades attend Friday prayers.

* In particular, our organisation leaders must perform the five daily prayers and convert a small room in the association into a mosque.

* We should ensure that a book on religion and prayer enters every home through our organisation, and we should try to get it into the home, especially through the young people of that home.

* Those who care for primary school children should "teach them to say Bismillah, teach them prayers, organise religious courses in the neighbourhood, and take the children to Friday prayers together after performing ablutions on Fridays."

I would like to reiterate that these views were taken from reports presented to Leader Türkeş at the MHP Headquarters prior to the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 and discussed there, and were subsequently included in the indictment of the main MHP case.

***Some Interesting Names and
Documents from the MHP
Indictment***

When viewed from the perspective of the subject I have addressed in the MHP Indictment (MHP and Islamic Formations), one will encounter many interesting names and documents proving certain events.

It is noteworthy that while the MHP case indictment attempts to prove the MHP's material and spiritual relationship with religious communities and sects, it does not mention the name of any organisation, except for a few references to Kemal Kaçar, the leader of the Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan community. In particular, the indictment includes the full text of letters conveying the discussions between Harun Reşit Tüylüoğlu, the head of this community's organisation in Germany, and Musa Serdar Çelebi, one of the important figures in the nationalist organisation in Germany at the time, to Alparslan Türkeş. This letter states that 80% of the Süleymançı organisation in Germany consisted of nationalists. Even if this is considered a slight exaggeration, it undeniably expresses an important reality. Documents concerning the funds provided by MHP General Headquarters officials to trusted individuals for the organisation of nationalist mosques, aimed at preventing the recruitment of nationalist-leaning workers who continued to attend their own mosques by the Süleymançı groups in Germany, thereby countering the erosion this relationship caused within the nationalist base, are also noteworthy.

On 4 May 1979, a provincial inspector complained that a group of MHP members collaborating with the Süleymançı group had been involved in establishing the Association for Assistance to Course and School Students, which provided the legal basis for the aforementioned group in the province for which he was responsible. This complaint reflected extremely negative views about this religious group.

In the section devoted to examining the MHP's income and expenditure tables, spanning dozens of pages, a receipt showing a payment of ten thousand lira for Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's accommodation expenses in Ankara during the 1977 congress – at the Mola Hotel, one of the luxury hotels at the time – is noteworthy. Alongside this document, which refutes the claims that certain groups managed Necip Fazıl's relationship with the MHP despite Alparslan Türkeş, receipts showing that thousands of copies of the books *Report-3/4*, *İhtilâl* (Revolution) and *Yeniçeri* (Janissary) were purchased to be sold at the MHP Headquarters also provide insight.

MHP Indictment: Ankara Medical Faculty Organisation

While we are on the subject of the MHP indictment, I would also like to share some details that will be particularly useful to today's nationalist youth. In the indictment of the MHP case opened after 12 September, our school, the nationalist organisation of Ankara Medical Faculty, was included in the indictment as a result of the negligence of our careless nationalist comrades, the spying of zealous provocateurs, and the efforts of prosecutors looking for a needle in a haystack.

Our nationalist organisation, cited as an example of university organisation in the MHP case indictment (along with many other interesting documents), was included in the main case's "Organisation Reports" folder (series: 45) with the following words:

"When examining the organisation at Ankara University Faculty of Medicine as an example of organisation within educational institutions,

* *Chairman,*

* *Vice President,*

* *Hospital President,*

- * *Treasurer,*
- * *Class representatives,*
- * *Student Union President,*
- * *President of the Cultural Association,*
- * *First Year Committee,*
- * *Committee for neutrals and sympathisers,*
- * *Committee on Shantytowns,*
- * *Committee for the Book and Financial Aid Campaign for Ideological Comrades in Prison,*
- * *ÖSYM Committee.*

It is understood that they have established a hierarchical and organised structure in this manner, and that such and similar organisations are referred to as "oba" within their own organisational structure.

If a comprehensive academic study were conducted on the pages filed as evidence in the MHP case, who knows what else might come to light?^[2] Praise be to Allah, although it is still unknown to us why the nationalist organisation at our Faculty, where no blood was shed except for ordinary student fights, was targeted, we assumed that the seminars and educational activities we conducted before 12 September played a role in this.

Aqidah Seminars for Ankara Medical Students

In the nationalist tradition of Ankara Medical Faculty, the position of school president belonged to the fourth year of the Faculty. Therefore, in the academic year when the 1980 coup took place

academic year (1980-1981) when the coup d'état took place.

In general, we discussed the content of the seminars to be held during the 1980-1981 academic year and, as the board of directors of the Ankara University Faculty of Medicine Student Association (AÜTFÖD), one of the legally recognised nationalist university associations, we decided on this seminar programme. However, it is unclear who was responsible for this, somehow ended up in the evidence file of the indictment. Because of such documents, the MHP case was opened on the grounds of "inciting the people against each other and leading to civil war" under Articles 146-149 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) at the time. to "incite the people against each other and cause civil war." In the prosecutor's final opinion, it was converted into a charge of "basing the foundations of the state on religious principles" under the famous Article 163 of the old TCK. ⁽³⁾

I remember very well that we planned a seminar on "The Foundations of Our Faith" for our 1980-1981 academic year seminar programme, based on the book Akaid written by Ömer Nesefti, a Turkistan scholar of Islam. The answer to why we felt this need also reveals the source of the religious education needs of the idealistic youth before 12 September.

We all believed in Allah with a faith so strong that we would sacrifice our lives for it, but how would we establish a relationship with the Allah we believed in? What issues should we be sensitive about in order to protect our faith? What did blasphemy mean? What words and actions led to blasphemy? What should we pay attention to in order to protect ourselves from falling into polytheism and hypocrisy? Who were the people defined as polytheists, hypocrites, and infidels in Allah's Book? Etc., etc.

You will appreciate that these are difficult questions for today's university students—even for theology students...

We would educate each other by sharing the answers to these difficult questions using information obtained from reliable sources. Much later, I would learn that this method was called the "Learning Organisation". Looking at the "formal education" activities carried out by the Idealist Movement at that time through seminars, and considering the goal planned to be achieved by the General Headquarters' staff organised as "Educators," it is clear that the "Learning Organisation" played a major role in the success of the "Idealist Movement."^[3] Today, anyone lamenting the "poverty of knowledge" among nationalist youth need only look back at the rich nationalist tradition to find many examples that will show them the way forward.

Those Who Learn to Perform Ablutions from Their Ideological Comrades

To understand why the suggestions in the introduction to my article were necessary, I would like to give an example of an incident we experienced at our own school, which was discussed at the MHP Headquarters. This example will also make it easy to understand why I describe our nationalist organisation as a "Learning Organisation":

At the Ankara Faculty of Medicine student canteen, we had divided the canteen in two with left-wing militants and shared it. On Fridays, all my friends would go as a group to the mosque at the High Specialisation Hospital right next to our faculty for Friday prayers. One of my classmates, whom we knew as "an officer's son" who had not received religious instruction from his family, approached me when Friday prayer time came and we had cleared the canteen.

and said, "I'll come to the prayer too, but I don't know how to perform ablution..."

Even if this friend of ours did not know how to perform ablution or how to pray, he had to come to Friday prayers; because if he were left alone in the canteen during Friday prayer time, he would certainly be attacked by communist militants. So I advised him to follow my lead in performing ablution at the mosque's washbasin and then stand next to me during prayer. I also told him that when the imam said "Allahu Akbar," it would suffice for him to say, "I follow the imam who is ready."

This example of mine, although a somewhat extreme case, was by no means a rare occurrence. (It is a bitter truth that even today, in a country where a prime minister who graduated from an Imam-Hatip school has been in power for 10 years, there are many young people who come to the faculty gates without knowing how to perform ablution or how to pray.) We had such ideological comrades that all members of their families were CHP members, and the young ones were active members of left-wing militant organisations. Therefore, in accordance with the law of ideological comradeship, we shared our initial religious knowledge with many such friends and remedied our practical shortcomings.

The Truth Is Often Plain to See

Today, those who seriously claim that the nationalist movement is turning towards Islam as part of the US's "Green Belt" strategy, where could they possibly place a nationalist who teaches his comrades how to perform ablutions for Friday prayers in this plan... Or what about the nationalist medical students who, having made their own decision, organise 'Aqidah Seminars' to ensure their beliefs are firmly grounded?

which hold 'Aqidah Seminars' to ensure their beliefs are firmly grounded, what reactionary group could have influenced such a decision?

The truth is sometimes so simple that it can be easily understood, but knowing the truth really does not suit some people.

[1] A. Ender Gökdemir, Delayed 12 September Writings -1,

14 September 2011, http://www.haberiniz.com/yazilar/koseyazisi40050-Gecikmis_12_Eylul_Yazila-ri_1.html

[2] If the six committees in this organisational chart were to be filled with names, approximately 100 names would be required to place 5-10 people in each committee. This would encompass almost the entire core group of idealists at Ankara Medical Faculty. It is clear that some 'busybody' sat down and drew up an organisational chart similar to those found in military schematics and filled it with our names. This 'busybody' was, of course, an official who had infiltrated – or been recruited – into our ranks. Have no doubt that these infiltration and recruitment operations were carried out in all places where nationalist organisations existed. A document filed as evidence in the MHP case was a detailed list showing the names, surnames, addresses, and blood types of our nationalist friends at our school. We had prepared this list as a precautionary measure under the pressure of those bloody days. As medical students who faced the risk of injury or fatal bleeding from an attack anywhere at any time, we knew the panic that ensued when there was an urgent need for blood, so this list was prepared to show who could donate blood to whom. This list was included in the MHP indictment as proof of the nationalist organisation's determination to shed blood. We now know how this critical "blood group list" was obtained, or rather, who delivered it where and when. (You can probably guess.) If today's nationalist youth are aware of such events from the past, they can protect themselves from situations where they could find themselves in legal trouble. That is why I am recording this detail as well.

[3] Readers who are more knowledgeable than me about legal matters, and those who witnessed the legal proceedings of the MHP case, will undoubtedly understand the legal aspects of this issue better. I am astonished, as are those who look on in amazement at what is being done within the scope of the Ergenekon case today. As an example of executions carried out by the law, I would like to record a legal attack we experienced as idealistic medical students. The Ankara University Faculty of Medicine Student Association (AÜTFÖD) was on the list held by the Ankara Public Prosecutor as one of the "Idealistic Associations that Should be Closed". As members of the AÜTFÖD Executive Board, following our interrogation, our association was closed down with a fine of two thousand lira per person, according to the amount applicable at the time, for violating the Associations Law. In the MHP indictment, it was described as "the legal front of an illegal organisation". According to the lawyers who advised us to pay the fine without objection, if the case had been brought on the charge of being "the legal front for an illegal organisation" in the indictment rather than closure, the penalty sought against us would have been decades long and our professional lives would have ended. Today, it is essential that associations and foundations take care to fully comply with legal requirements in their activities.

[4] Learning Organisation: An organisation where people continuously develop their capacities to achieve the results they truly want, where new and innovative ways of thinking are encouraged, where common goals are set free, and where people continuously learn methods of learning together. A learning organisation continuously develops itself to determine its future. As defined by Peter M. Senge in his classic book "The Fifth Discipline" in Management Science, this type of organisation can exist within a commercial company or under the umbrella of an association or foundation.

See Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline*, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul-2011.

THIRD SECTION

*HEROES OF THE NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT*

3.1. Our Master Yesevi and Our Leader Türkes

BOn the 16th anniversary of our Leader Türkes's passing to the eternal world, the most meaningful news for me from this year's 4 April Leader Türkes Commemoration ceremonies was the news from Ülkü

Ocakları's website:

"Leader Alparslan Türkes Honoured in Turkistan

The Turkistan Ülkü Ocakları in the city of Turkistan (Yesi), Kazakhstan, held a series of commemorative programmes on the 16th anniversary of Leader Alparslan Türkes's passing. First, the Yesevili Ülkücüler went to the tomb of Ahmet Yesevi Hz. and recited the Yasin-i Şerif for our Leader Alparslan Türkes. Then our Ülküdaşlar went to the Turkistan Batır Jastar (Heroic Youth) hall and held a commemoration programme there. In his opening speech, Murat Aydın, President of the Turkistan Ülkü Ocakları, said in summary: "Recalling that commemorating our Leader in our ancestral lands is a special feeling, seeing that the 'dreams of our late Leader' have come true in this hall today moves us deeply. Because in this hall today, we have friends from various parts of the Turkish world, and their hearts are also aching on the 16th anniversary of the passing of our leader Alparslan Türkes." ⁽¹¹⁾

This news instantly transported me back to the days we lived in Turkistan, to the years 1994-1995. When Mustafa İhsan Karadağ, one of the last of Allah's friends, learned that I had been assigned to Turkistan, he visited me in Istanbul to bid farewell. Every Friday, I would visit the shrine of Hazret-i Türkistan and recite the Yasin.

He had advised me to give gifts. We endeavoured to fulfil this advice without fail every Friday, as long as we lived in Turkistan, with my wife and my son, who was still in his first year. In the prayers I offered at the foot of the grave of Hazret-i Pir-i Türkistan, I remembered all the Yesevi dervishes, from Süleyman Hakım Ata to Zengî Ata, from Hacı Bektaş to Sarı Saltuk; from Ruhi Kılıçkiran to Gün Sazak, from Yusuf İmamoğlu to Ertuğrul Dursun Önkuzu, all our idealistic martyrs.

Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi and Leader Türkes

When I first heard the news that the Turkistan Ülkü Ocakları had been established, I was overjoyed. In my view, this news signified the return of the descendants of the alperen warriors, whom Hazret Sultan Yesevî had directed to Anatolia, to their ancestral homeland... In 1994, during my first academic year as a lecturer at the International Turk-Kazakh Ahmed Yesevi University, we held canteen chats in the dilapidated dormitory building, a remnant of the Soviet system, with the first group of students enrolled from Turkey (there were about 15 of them). During our canteen chats in the dormitory building, a relic of the Soviet system and now in a state of disrepair, when the number of students coming from Turkey reached forty, we would dream of establishing an Ülkü Ocağı (ideological centre) in Turkistan – even though it was our ancestral homeland, it was still a foreign country, albeit unofficially. Now, following the news of the establishment of the Turkistan Ülkü Ocakları, every event organised by the Turkistan Ülkü Ocakları, led by Murat Aydın, whose writings I enjoy reading, takes me back to those days. ⁽¹²⁾

As someone who has worked with Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi, I believe that the fire sent by the Yesevi movement to Anatolia hundreds of years ago should be used to increase its effectiveness within the nationalist movement.

I have occasionally been subjected to criticism—and even accusations—of fostering an 'exaggerated perception of Ahmed Yesevi' within the nationalist movement. With my belief that the wisdom of Pir-i Türkistan Yesevî, which I have translated into Turkish, will have a similar effect today to its historical role in the formation of spiritual unity in Turkish lands, I emphasise the need to keep the spirit of Yesevî alive wherever I am invited. For reasons unknown to me, this has greatly disturbed some people

Today, the joy I derive from the contribution my work makes to illuminating the spiritual world of every Turk who benefits from the Divân-ı Hikmet, a collection of Yesevî's wisdom published many times by the Turkish Religious Foundation ^[4], is a spiritual feeling that makes it worth enduring any criticism and hardship.

The proof that my feelings regarding Pir-i Türkistan Ahmed Yesevi were shared by Leader Türkeş emerged unexpectedly in the MHP case, in Alparslan Türkeş's "final defence" statement. In his Defence, now a historical document, Leader Türkeş gave a veritable history lesson by very clearly defining the function of Ahmed Yesevi and his dervishes in Turkish history. I would like to share this historical lesson, especially with my young ideological comrades, by reproducing it exactly as it appears in the Defence. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Ahmed Yesevi in Türkeş's MHP Case Defence

"The Turkish nation, from the eastern shores of Asia, from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, and from the glaciers of the northern hemisphere to the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent, the Arabian Peninsula and the great Sahara deserts of Africa, occupies the oldest known lands on earth.

Throughout history, excluding Western Europe, various great states have been established and great civilisations have emerged at different times. In those days, when technology was not as advanced as it is today, when there were no telegraphs or radios, and when motorised land vehicles and aeroplanes had not yet been invented, it cannot be attributed to chance that such vast territories were colonised and great empires were established over various nations and civilisations. By establishing dominance over countries such as China, which has been recognised as one of the world's most powerful states and great civilisations in every era, and India, which is in a similar position, over Iran, one of the world's great civilisations, over the Byzantine Empire and over other various communities, and by synthesising their own culture and civilisation with the local cultures and civilisations, they were able to create new civilisations, which required high qualifications. The fact that our nation was able to achieve this success, synthesising its own culture and civilisation with the cultures and civilisations of the communities it encountered, is a matter that requires high qualifications. and synthesising its own culture and civilisation with local civilisations to create new civilisations requires high qualities. Our nation's ability to achieve this success has been made possible by its respect for human rights wherever it has gone, its reliance on rights and justice, and its path of loving humanity and embracing people. Instead of despising, oppressing or destroying people wherever they went, they always acted according to the principle of "Live and Let Live", treating people with love and compassion, rights and justice, regardless of race, religion, language or colour, and thus succeeded in establishing great civilisations and great states. There are two major disasters in our history that marked the beginning of destructive collapses. One of these is the pagan Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan, which emerged from the east of Asia at the beginning of the 13th century. The other is the defeat suffered during the 2nd Siege of Vienna in 1683. These events, along with their causes and consequences, have been examined in seminars and conferences. However, both in the indictment and in the legal opinion, the prosecution has interpreted these issues in a manner contrary to science and facts, thereby resorting to accusations based on highly flawed interpretations. For this reason, it has become necessary to summarise and explain the subject as concisely as possible before the court.

In the early 13th century, the Mongol armies launched an attack from east to west. At that time, the Khwarezmian Empire ruled over Turkestan, between the Ural Mountains and India. They quickly destroyed this empire, committing mass slaughter and burning, destroying and razing to the ground mosques, madrasas, numerous cultural artefacts and libraries. After this, while some Mongol forces flowed towards Europe from the north of the Black Sea, others trampled the Seljuk states in Khorasan, Iran and Qassas and flowed towards Anatolia, Iraq and Syria. Around this time, the Anatolian Seljuk Empire had been established and was experiencing a golden age under the rule of its great ruler, Alâaddin Keykubat. However, before long, various Turkish tribes, fleeing in terror from the Mongols, began pouring into the interior of Anatolia. Some time later, the Ilkhanate was established by the Mongols who settled in Iran. The Mongol armies began to plunder Anatolia from top to bottom. Alâaddin Keykubat had died, and after him, power struggles began between his brothers, sons and grandsons. Around this time, an 80,000-strong Seljuk army gathered to stop the Mongol raids and confronted the Mongols in the Kösedağı region east of Sivas. However, before the battle even commenced, the Seljuk army fled and scattered as a result of a panic whose causes remain unclear. After this, the entire Anatolia was pillaged down to its remotest villages. It was left in blood and fire. The Seljuk state had disintegrated, and Anatolia was divided into small principalities fighting each other. Across the entire Turkish and Muslim world, massacres, oppression, and fires followed one another.

Around this time, the Mongols who ruled the Chagatai state established in Turkestan and the Ilkhanate state in Iran also accepted Islam and became Muslims. However, over time, these states also fragmented and collapsed. Amidst this prevailing misery and hardship, Hoca Ahmed Yesevi lived in the city of Yesi in Turkestan.

A great man of faith and knowledge emerged, bearing his name and later known as "Hz. Türkistan". This man began to train disciples to dry their tears by re-teaching the great principles of Islam and instilling love, peace, brotherhood, truth, justice, and love for Allah and the Prophet among people. Like Hacı Bektaş Veli, Taptuk Emre, Baba İshak, and Saru Saltuk, and sent them from the Khorasan region to the West. Saru Saltuk came to the Northern Dobruja region, which is now part of Romania, from the north of the Black Sea and opened his dervish lodge there. Ahi Evran also travelled extensively in Anatolia before settling in Kırşehir. Taptuk Emre settled in the Eskişehir region. Mevlâna Celâleddin-i Rumi Hazretleri also left the city of Belh in Khorasan and travelled through various Middle Eastern countries before arriving in the city of Karaman. After residing there for a while, they settled in Konya at the invitation of the Seljuk ruler. These great figures instilled the great spirit of Islam and trained disciples in their dervish lodges.

They spread throughout Anatolia and later to Rumelia. Wherever they went, they worked to establish a spirit of love, brotherhood, rights, law and justice. The esteemed poet and man of faith Yunus Emre, who rendered great services in this cause, was a disciple trained at the dervish lodge of Taptuk Emre. Ahi Evran rendered great services by bringing order to the tradesmen and artisans and establishing social justice and social security organisations. These people, who were raised in this manner and embraced the work of being beneficial to society for the pleasure of Allah (swt), according to historical records, under four separate names and in four separate branches, but in coordination and solidarity with each other, brought Turkish society back to an advanced legal order and a high moral order. These groups were organised under the names Gaziyan-ı Rum, Ahiyan-ı Rum, Bacıyan-ı Rum, and Abdalan-ı Rum, respectively. ⁽⁶¹⁾ Their duties and objectives within society were as follows:

To regulate and develop education, mutual aid, solidarity, social justice, social security and national security services. As a result of these activities, the civilisations of the Ottoman Empire in the West, the Golden Horde State in the North, the Turkistan State in the East, and the Babur Turkish Empire in India emerged in the 14th and 15th centuries. The greatest and most brilliant achievement of the Turkish nation throughout its history is the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman civilisation.

The tradition of "Alp" also existed in Turkish states before Islam. Alps were described as people of high moral character, possessing national culture and national ideals, heroic in nature, and capable of making any sacrifice for the state and nation. In other words, both the Alps and the idealistic and faithful people later known as "Alperen" were individuals who had no connection with the theocratic system. They are a community that has taken its place in our history and national culture. These disciples, trained by the valuable individuals mentioned earlier, were sometimes called "Alperen" and "Dervish Gazis". We have tried to teach about them in order to explain how the Republic of Turkey was formed, where our current society has come from, to instil a sense of national spirit and confidence in our people, and to explain how our national culture developed.

We did not commit any act constituting a crime as alleged by the prosecution. We did it to unite our people, our citizens, around national consciousness and ideals, as envisaged in the preamble to our constitution, and to make them alert and resilient against foreign ideologies and foreign cultural attacks. We did so, in particular, to counter separatist and communist movements, bloody terrorist threats, and to encourage them to embrace the constitutional order more consciously." (...)

Prayer for the Leader of the Turks:

“May Yesevi be your companion in the Field of Resurrection...”

On 4 April 2013, following our establishment as the Ülkücü Writers Association (ÜLKÜ-YAZ), we commemorated "Leader Türkeş Memorials" with prayers at his grave and later at Hacıbayram Mosque for the first time, and we are determined and resolute to keep this tradition alive. Despite the centuries that have passed and all kinds of oppression and tyranny, the name of Leader Alparslan Türkeş, like Pir-i Türkistan Ahmed Yesevi, will live on in hearts for generations to come, never to be forgotten or erased. Our faith in this is absolute.

Today, those who consider themselves all-powerful will one day inevitably face death. Afterwards, let us see if any of God's servants will remember their names thousands of kilometres away from the "two square metres" of earth in which they are buried. (Based on my own opinion, looking at the fate of many names that have been consigned to the dustbin of history, I will say without mincing words: Not at all, I don't think so...)

This is what distinguishes Leader Türkeş from ordinary party leaders, both past and present...

“The Leader of every Turk, Türkeş...”

Greetings to Pir Hoca Ahmed Yesevi of Turkistan, wherever a Turk breathes in this world, from Turkistan, which he named after the land he trod upon... "Everywhere is Turkistan for the Turk..."

Greetings to the leader of the Turks, Türkeş; wherever he is kept alive and his name is remembered with respect and heartfelt prayers...

Greetings to the flag of the Turk... Wherever it flies and by whichever
Turk is waving it...

Immortality, if it exists on earth, is precisely this!

[1] For the full story, see <http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/turkistanda-basbug-alparslan-tur-kes-anildi.html>

[2] My experiences during my time at Ahmed Yesevi University have been the subject of my autobiographical novel, "The Turkistan Dream." (Hayati Bice, The Turkistan Dream, Bizim Büro Publishing House, Ankara-2012)

[3] Finally, on 20 March 2013, I had the opportunity to give a talk on Ahmed Yesevi before a distinguished group in Konya, at the invitation of the Selçuk University Literature and Arts Club. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Âlim Gür, Dean of the Faculty of Literature at Selçuk University, Prof. Dr. Ahmet Sevgi, Head of the Turkish Language Department, and the esteemed student managers of the Literature and Arts Club for honouring me with their hospitality on this occasion.

[4] Hoca Ahmed Yesevi, Divân-ı Hikmet (Edited by Dr. Hayati Bice), Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yay. (6th Edition), Ankara-2010.

[5] Although many people, primarily his lawyers, contributed to the preparation of his final defence submitted in the MHP Case, ultimately the signature under this historical text and its content belong to Alparslan Türkeş. Such claims, frequently voiced in relation to Dokuz Işık, are nothing more than an attempt to overshadow Başbuğ Türkeş's historical mission. For the full text provided here, see Alparslan Türkeş ve Ülkücü Hareket, Savunma, Hareket Yayınları, İstanbul-2011, p . 16-20.

[6] This fourfold classification, which Alparslan Türkeş included in his Defence, appears in Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, edited by H. Nihal Atsız. For a current edition of Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, see <http://www.kitapyurdu.com/kitap/default.asp?id=593378>

3.2. *Alparslan Türkeş in All His Aspects*

-The Testimony of Bekir Doğan-

Since its first publication, my article titled *"Our Master Yesevi and Our Leader Türkeş"* has attracted great interest from readers. In it, I discuss how Leader Türkeş was a victim of the legal oppression of 12 September. reflection of the legal oppression of 12 September, the MHP Trial. Today, the "Defence," a historical document, presents not only a wealth of information but also an important example of loyalty.

In this article, I will recount a few scenes that reflect the human side of Leader Türkeş, based on the account of Bekir Doğan, who was the MHP Istanbul-Kadıköy district chairman before 12 September and was attacked with firearms three times.

Loyalty in Türkeş's 'Defence'

During his defence, Türkeş explained where the nationalist movement stood on the question of our country's existence and what function it performed. He also mentioned a teacher who had inspired him 40 years earlier: Judge General Şevki Mutlugil.

I would like to share the passages in Türkeş's 'Defence' about Şevki Mutlugil, one of his teachers at the Military Academy from whom he drew inspiration, and the Leader's observations on the origins of the separatism issue, which continues to dominate our agenda today with all its weight:

"The Soviet Union, which replaced the tsarist regime in 1917 through a bloody Marxist revolution, also continued the tsarist policy of expansion..."

It has continued and continues to adhere to the same policy of partition. This aggressive and exploitative policy has kept Turkey under constant threat. Although no open war has been declared against Turkey, they have attempted to implement plans to divide Turkey into 10 small states with names such as "Republic of Thrace, Republic of Karaman, Republic of Ankara, Armenia, Kurdistan, Lazistan... Republic" and to establish a Marxist regime in order to fragment and seize control of Turkey. We understood and learned about these plans more than 40 years ago from the conferences given by the late Judge General Şevki Mutlugil, who presented convincing evidence. In the years following 1960, when communist activities became apparent in Turkey, we saw Marxists emerge with slogans such as "Freedom for the Peoples..." and "End the National Oppression in the East...", and we understood the words of the late Judge General Şevki Mutlugil even better. Hostility towards Turkey did not come only from states belonging to the communist bloc. Outside the Eastern Bloc, other states, some of which appeared to be our friends and allies, were also directing divisive and destructive provocations against Turkey. Turkey was constantly bombarded with foreign ideologies and cultural attacks by a number of states belonging to various blocs. Various schemes were being orchestrated from all sides to hinder and delay the development of our nation.

In short, Turkey, with its growing population and slow but steady progress towards peace, was attracting attention. Measures needed to be taken against foreign ideological and cultural attacks, but these measures could not be enforced by police force, military force, or brute force. Ideas and ideologies could only be countered with ideas and ideologies, with national culture, national consciousness, faith, and knowledge. To this end, the first task was to teach our country's intellectuals and youth about our history and to instil in our people a sense of national history by drawing lessons from historical events.

It was to explain how our national culture developed and what stages it went through by raising awareness. Our nation had been plunged into poverty and destitution, mired in exhaustion and fatigue in the wake of successive attacks and wars. The incompetence of various administrations, the injustices and oppression caused by backwardness and ignorance, the inequities in income distribution, and the social crises necessitated the adoption of special measures and the initiation of major reforms in the field of honest and competent administration for Turkish society.

Such an environment constituted valuable capital for the foreign ideology and foreign culture attacks directed at Turkey. By exploiting poverty and injustices, making lavish promises, the youth of our country in particular were targeted. Turkey was facing an underground attack and a covert war. However, the country's rulers failed to grasp this and demonstrate the power to find and implement effective measures. In this environment, we saw the need to describe and explain the dangers threatening Turkey and to warn the public. It was urgently necessary to explain the threats and dangers to the Turkish nation in order to protect it from the violent foreign ideological and cultural attacks it was suffering. ⁽¹⁾

“We couldn’t produce ten Türkeşes in the Turkish army!..”

On 4 April 2013, among the broadcasts related to Leader Türkeş, the remarks made by Bekir Doğan, who was a guest on the programme Günün Konusu (Topic of the Day) hosted by Özhan G. Toca on Bengütürk-TV, were very important. Bekir Doğan, who served as the MHP district chairman in Kadıköy, Istanbul for a long time before 12 September, witnessed many moments with Leader Türkeş. Among the stories told by Bekir Doğan, the brother of Cemil Doğan, one of the first martyrs of the Nationalist Movement ⁽²⁾, was a memory related to retired General Şevki Mutlugil, which clearly demonstrates Leader

Türkeş possessed a deep sense of loyalty.

According to the account of Bekir Doğan, now 87 years old, Leader Türkeş heard that Şevki Mutlugil, his teacher at the Military Academy, was unwell and sent Bekir Doğan to his teacher to find out about his health and whether he needed anything. Şevki Mutlugil's words about Türkeş, who helped his teacher, from whom he had learned so much at the Military Academy, to obtain a telephone line, which was important at the time, are also very striking: *"My son, unfortunately, we have not been able to raise ten Türkeşes in the Turkish army!"* ⁽¹³⁾

As I listened to these words online, the television was broadcasting news about dozens of generals and hundreds of officers on trial in the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases. Echoing in my ears were *the words*, *"We couldn't produce even ten Türkeşes within the entire Turkish army!"* As I listened to these words, I couldn't help but compare the "incompetent defences aimed solely at saving their own skins" of those on trial today with the "Defence" of Başbuğ Türkeş, which was like a manifesto, after 12 September. Even today, 30 years later, Alparslan Türkeş's defence file continues to enlighten generations as a book. What will remain in history from today's "Defence of the Generals"?!..

3.2.1. Alparslan Türkeş with His Human Qualities: "The Leader Who Wept Uncontrollably"

-The Martyrdom and Burial of Gün Sazak-

B Among the scenes that most affected me in Ekir Doğan's testimony as a witness was the one where the legendary Customs and Monopoly Director of the MHP, who was martyred by communist militants,

Minister Gün Sazak, who was martyred by communist militants, was laid to rest in his own village of Mihaliçcik.

For our generation, Leader Türkeş is a Turkish hero with an iron will, who never showed his emotions outwardly, and whom we could never imagine admitting weakness. A photograph etched in my memory from before 12 September is that of Türkeş standing beside the coffin of our late martyr Gün Sazak during his funeral prayer in Ankara. The image of Leader Türkeş standing beside the coffin draped in the flag, alongside members of the Sazak family, foremost among them the honourable Nilgün Sazak, with the weight of responsibility bearing down on his shoulders like a mountain, is deeply, deeply saddening.

According to Bekir Doğan's testimony, just hours after this sad photo was taken, when Gün Sazak's body was brought to the village by ambulance to be buried in the family cemetery in the Miha-lıçcik district of Eskişehir, along with his family members, Başbuğ Türkeş suddenly experienced an emotional outburst and began to weep uncontrollably. So much so that Gün Sazak's brothers, forgetting their own grief, tried to console Türkeş. Bekir Doğan recounts that Güven Sazak, who is also deceased today, tried to console the leader, saying, "My leader, don't cry.

This is divine will. You must be patient with what comes from Allah. Don't destroy yourself like this."

At the summit on the "Separatist Leader's Death Penalty File" held on the second floor of the Prime Minister's Office on 12 January 2000, I would like to note here that the then head of the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) threatened that "an assassination attempt could be made on MHP members, including Devlet Bahçeli-kan members could be assassinated" to ensure that the execution file was shelved, I would like to reiterate at this point Bahçeli's reminder of Gün Sa-zak's martyrdom in the nationalist memory.^[4]

Those who make threats against the MHP, the focus of national resistance against the demands of separatist terrorism, should know very well that, as in its history, the nationalist movement will not compromise its national stance today, even in the face of death threats.

This should be known by friends, and by the nationalist enemies of every kind and in every place, no matter what seats they occupy today...

The Final Word on the 12 September Trial:

"Is Insulting Kenan Evren Enough?!"

Another point worth noting from Bekir Doğan's accounts concerning Başbuğ Türkeş is a memory reflecting his true thoughts about Kenan Evren¹⁰ whom he wrote a letter from prison beginning with "My esteemed General".

After visiting Başbuğ, who had been imprisoned for nearly five years during the 12 September oppression and was subsequently released with an acquittal, Bekir Doğan sadly noticed that the imposing Başbuğ of the pre-12 September era had become quite worn down. When he asked why, Başbuğ Türkeş roared again.

When Bekir Doğan recounted those moments, Türkeş's expression reflected an attitude that was completely unexpected from him: *"He cursed Kenan Evren!..."* Türkeş explained the reason for this curse as follows: *"I was a member of the Turkish Army. I cannot condone what was done to the idealists as befitting members of the Turkish Army. The Turkish Armed Forces, which I know as the Prophet's Army, are not the Turkish Armed Forces... Look what they have done to the country."*

I would like to thank my friends who brought Bekir Doğan on screen and recorded the truths about Türkeş, which very few people in the nationalist movement knew. Considering that those born on 12 September 1980 are now 40 years old, it is an indisputable fact that this is a very important task. Alongside the memoirs of important figures in the nationalist movement, such as Ahmet Er, Nevzat Kösoğlu, and İbrahim Metin, recently published video recordings of this kind will also be important building blocks of the nationalist spirit, passed down from generation to generation. ⁽¹⁶⁾

This is a historical duty.

A Poem by the Idealist Martyr Cemil Doğan:

I am Turkish

*I am Turkish! I am both eternal and timeless in this world,
The first universe, the first world, the first land is in my hands,
The first history, the first pen, and the first language is my
language, The first man in the world, my blood flows in the
first human!*

*We made the world our homeland, adorned it with
art, Enriched humanity with science, imprinted the
mark of Turkishness with our bayonets, In the past, in
the future, I have knowledge, I have wisdom*

*The Urals, the Altai, Mount Caucasus are our
mountains, Our flag, with its wolf's head, is planted on
Mount God, Nations are under our command, our
tent spans three continents, I am the Oğuz Khan who
rules over humanity.*

*Nature turned away, the seasons became dry. We left
our homeland, the great migration was sevenfold. The
four corners of the world are filled with my race.
Today, my people are in every nation, everywhere.*

*I beg forgiveness from my lineage; I have no face
before my ancestors. A traitor sold the homeland; I
have no words to say. For now, I have no eyes on
anyone's homeland, but I have great faith in the
future.*

*I will not let the red dog live, I am a man of my word,
Central Asia is the homeland of the Turks, it is the
land of the Grey Wolf, My khans live on, my Grey
Wolves are alive,
I have Black Lady, White Lady, Kül Tigin Khan.*

*I do not fear death, I know death is right. If I live, I live
as a warrior; if I die, my place is in paradise. I worship
only Allah, I bow to Allah. I am an impregnable
fortress, I have religion, I have faith.*

*I am not an aggressor; I respect the Truth. I demand my
right because it is mine.
I bristle, I tremble, I shiver. I cannot contain myself; I am filled
with wild excitement.*

*A dawn will break, it will swallow the darkness,
Night is pregnant with day, the day will surely dawn,
I trust in the Truth, the scales of justice will tip,
My God, my Prophet, my Book, my Quran.*

*This world, these mountains, seas, everything, this sphere of
earth, Belongs to the Turks, yes, our marriage is obligatory, If
we divorce, even if we die on Judgement Day, we cannot bear
it, On Judgement Day, I have my divine shroud to wear.*

*I have come from Khorasan, my lineage is from the Oghuz
tribe, they call my clan Cerit, I am from a branch of the
Turks, my name is Cemil Doğan, my blood is from the Turks, I
am Ceritlioğlu, hey, my Turkishness, I have a title!*

Cemil DOŞAN

[1] Alparslan Türkeş and the Idealist Movement, Defence, Hareket Publications, Istanbul-2011, pp. 12-13.

[2] Cemil Doğan, a teacher who was killed on 15 February 1973, was one of the first martyrs of the Ülkücü Movement. He was from the village of Çiftlik in the Nizip district of Gaziantep. He was the director of the Adıyaman Male Arts Institute. While serving as the president of Adıyaman Ülkü-Bir, he was seriously wounded in an attack on 2 February 1973 and passed away 13 days later in the hospital where he was being treated. The martyr

was 28 years old at the time of his martyrdom, married, and the father of two children.

For further details, see: <http://www.yalniz-kurt.com>

[3] "Interview with Bekir Doğan", Bengütürk-TV, Özhan G. Toca, Today's Topic programme, 4 April 2013.

[4] On this subject, please refer to my article titled "MHP and the Death Penalty - Do Turkish Nationalists Know About the Death Threats at the 12 January 2000 Death Penalty Summit?"

[5] Nevzat Kösoğlu notes that this letter, which was seriously debated within the nationalist movement, was a joint text by MHP members detained at the Language School, primarily Türkeş, and that the final revision was made by Taha Akyol, who was there at the time as a defendant in the MHP Trial.

[6] I recommend to all young nationalists the memoirs of leading figures in the nationalist movement, such as Nevzat Kösoğlu and Ali Güngör, as well as the works written by Mehmet Karanfil (Gül Hüzni), Adnan Şenel (Elma ve Bıçak) and Hüseyin Türkmen (Kara Gün), based on their experiences and the events they witnessed.

3.2.2 Bahçeli Pays Respect to Türkeş: " "

*Devlet Bahçeli's Speech at the Commemoration Ceremony for Leader Türkeş:
"Do not think of yourselves as insignificant." (4 April 2013)*

On 4 April 1997, we gathered at the grave of our late leader Alparslan Türkeş Bey, who passed away from this mortal world to the eternal realm, leaving behind millions of tearful eyes, to commemorate him with prayers.

Filled with boundless admiration and gratitude, we are in the spiritual presence of our late leader, once again overflowing with his unique memories.

Although 16 years have passed since his passing, our love for him has not diminished, nor has our loyalty and devotion waned.

It should be known that Mr Türkeş was a man of conscience, heart and cause who devoted almost his entire 80-year life to his ideals.

Every step he took was for the benefit of the nation, every word he spoke was for the sake of the homeland.

He is a national inspiration, a nationalist guide, and an unwavering defender of Turkish-Islamic civilisation, rising like a sun of hope not only over our homeland but over every place where Turks live.

The late Mr Türkeş was a statesman and politician with broad horizons, a far-reaching vision and a multifaceted approach, too expansive to be confined to the narrow confines of a one-sided era.

He ignited his intellectual and emotional qualities, moulded by his ideals and strengthened by his beliefs, with a passion for serving the Turkish nation, bringing it together with the future of the nation

and aligned them with the sacred aims of Islam.

With every breath he took, he built national and spiritual transition points extending from the present to the future, centred on the depth of the past, thus establishing a fine balance between yesterday, today and tomorrow.

He is not only the architect of a political movement, but also a representative of high morality, strong character, unshakeable faith, and a national foresight that sees beyond the horizon within his life's journey.

He has always demonstrated that he is an exemplary symbol of faith, with an iron will, willing to endure any hardship for the sake of his heartfelt and sincere love for Turkishness.

His cool-headed and sensible analytical ability, his deep sensitivity to the values and interests of the Turkish nation, have always been recognised by his friends and opponents alike, and ultimately, justice has prevailed.

His uncompromising, nationalistic, well-equipped, solid and consistent politics have always been a source of hope for Turkey's future and the brotherhood of the Turkish nation.

We cannot praise him enough for leading the Turkish nation with his ideals and igniting an eternal spark in Turkish history with his idealism.

Through his own life and the principles he established, he showed everyone how faith in Allah, loyalty to the state, and devotion to the nation can coexist in harmony without conflict.

He never gave in to discouragement in his life; throughout his stormy existence, at the time and place where those who lacked the strength fell, he became an example of courage, standing tall and walking alone.

a courageous example of someone who could walk upright and alone.

Starting with one person, he passionately demonstrated how the cause of the ideal, growing day by day, would become ingrained in hearts and national consciences, proving the magic of covering long distances with small, patient steps rather than large, unbalanced ones.

"Ideas, faith, love of ideals. These are what make people strong," he said, showing that faith, conviction and spiritual attachment are the most effective ways to overcome problems.

In every aspect of our blessed cause, he demonstrated with his personality and way of life that setting out with faith is the first condition.

Our late leader never promised easy success, never paid attention to offers of benefit, threats, or a host of obstacles.

For him, quantity was never important; quality always came first and foremost, gaining meaning and value.

Mr Türkeş stood against traitors, those with evil hearts, those with corrupt morals and intentions, those who sought to diminish the nation, those who contemplated surrendering Turkey to the captivity of foreign ideologies; he opposed division, separatism and subversion to the very end.

The indispensability of the nation and the state has always been foremost in his thoughts and life.

How fortunate we are that the views of the late Mr Türkeş, who is appreciated and respected by many people today, regardless of their political leanings, contain very serious messages for the unity of the Turkish nation and the integrity of Turkey.

The most important aspect of Mr Türkeş lies in his success in transforming nationalism from potential into action, from conception into movement, as the "voice of the silent majority".

The Leader has two great works. The first is the Nationalist Movement Party, the sole political force of nationalism in Turkish political life; the second is the Idealist Turkish Youth, whom he cherished, had great hopes for, and entrusted with the future.

These two monumental works have transformed nationalists and idealists from being just any members of society, endowing them with a national and historical responsibility by directing them towards an identity, a sense of belonging, a cause, and a passion.

The Nationalist Movement Party has become a symbol of trustworthiness, prestige, maturity, principled behaviour, honesty and honour throughout the process that began with it, and has been accepted as such.

The Idealist Youth, meanwhile, became the point where martyrdom, loyalty, willpower, faith, and self-confidence converged with nationalism; hundreds of thousands of Turkish youths experienced their first excitement of devotion and service to their nation in the Idealist Youth Clubs.

The magnificent struggle for nationalism, which spanned from the oppression and persecution of 1944 to April 1997, stands as one of the most distinguished examples of dedicating one's life to one's country and nation.

In this respect, Mr Türkeş, as a symbol of the "commitment to a cause" that we need so much more today, deserves his place among monumental figures for this aspect alone.

Turkish nationalists saw in his life that great ideals can only be achieved with great morale and faith, and witnessed in him that lasting and profound victory can only be realised by setting high goals.

The days we live in have once again proven how correct and accurate the direction shown by our late leader Alparslan Türkeş to Turkish nationalists was.

In this regard, we are in the right place, on the right path, and are followers of a straight goal.

Despite years of counter-propaganda and destructive interventions, Turkish nationalism has begun to regain its place in the eyes of our beloved nation, and the legitimacy of the Nationalist Movement has gained increasing acceptance with each passing day.

Turkish nationalists, under the spiritual guidance of our late leader, have the goal of making Turkey a leading country, a strategic power in its region, and a polarising country influencing global developments by 2023, the 100th anniversary of its founding.

And there should be no doubt that we can achieve these goals through the ideas of the late Mr Türkeş and the national and spiritual legacy he left us.

For Mr Türkeş is not only yesterday, but also today, and with his ideas and virtuous character, he is the promise of tomorrow.

The late Mr Türkeş's advice to us is to be vigilant against betrayal, alert against division, cautious against exploitation, and calm against provocation.

In Mr Türkeş's words, "Idealists are the bearers of an honourable flag that accepts neither servitude nor the use of others as servants within the human world."

These honourable recommendations will serve as a compass for Turkish nationalists in achieving their goals.

From here, I would like to repeat another saying of our late leader. "Do not think of yourselves as small. You are a great force. Never forget your duty. Strength lies in unity. The future of our cause lies in unity. Unity means being together."

For this reason, I invite all our brothers and sisters, whose hearts beat for their homeland and whose souls are filled with love for their nation, to gather under the umbrella of the Nationalist Movement Party, to honour Mr T rke 's call, and to fight together against the difficulties facing Turkey.

The solution to protecting Turkey and elevating the Turkish nation is Turkish nationalism, and the political address that will overcome and crush the difficulties we face is the Nationalist Movement Party.

Sixteen years after the passing of the late Mr T rke , the nationalist-idealist will and those who love it are still here, standing tall and embracing all his legacies.

The hearts of the millions who could not be here beat here with us.

The Nationalist Movement Party, having inherited the dignified, principled, and consistent politics of the late Mr T rke , will, God willing, lead our Turkey to its goal of becoming a leading nation in the 21st century and will dismantle all barriers before the Turkish nation one by one.

On this occasion, I remember our late leader Alparslan T rke  and our beloved martyrs with respect, love and mercy, as their place in our hearts and their status in our minds will never change.

While fulfilling this sacred duty, I pray to Allah that the grave of our late leader be filled with light and his place be in Paradise.

I conclude my speech with a quote from the late leader: "You are all Turkish flags. Do not stain the flag, do not defile it, and do not let it fall to the ground." May his soul rest in peace.

3.2.3. *Alparslan Türkeş in American e Documents**

-Fictions and Realities- / Mehmet Akif Okur

It has been quite some time since we left behind the Cold War years, which witnessed one of the most serious polarisations in our recent history. Surrounded by new generations and changing political actors, old conflicts have been relegated to the far corners of our collective memory. However, there are still areas where the effects of this normalisation have not been sufficiently felt. Foremost among these is the writing of history, which deals with the conflicts that deeply shook Turkey during the Cold War and the important political figures involved. Books, magazines, and most recently screens have become arenas where memories of conflicts that have faded from our daily lives due to the evaporation of the context that gave them meaning are constantly refreshed. It seems that in order to consolidate the social bridges that are being repaired, we need to take a few more steps forward in time without falling into new crises that will reopen old wounds. If our journey is accompanied by works that truly enable us to separate fiction from reality, it will be easier for us to scatter the painful ashes of the past into the sky and walk towards the future.

We must begin with claims that are produced as propaganda but leave an impression in the mind as if they were true due to the magnitude of the power behind them. For example, in many popular or academic-looking texts dealing with Turkish nationalism and Alparslan Türkeş, certain claims and accusations, put forward without any concrete evidence, continue to be repeated as if they were indisputable truths. In such writings, Türkeş and the

Nationalist Movement, are presented as actors designed by the US to fight the Soviets, with no need felt to base this on anything other than deep-rooted prejudices.

In our article, bearing in mind the accusations levelled at Alparslan Türkeş in this literature, which awaits confrontation in order for our social memory to be passed on to future generations, we will examine the data contained in documents held in US archives. We will present our readers with examples of references, notes, and assessments concerning Türkeş, selected from internal communications within the American system during the period spanning from 27 May 1960 to after 12 September. In our research, we did not encounter similar critical, even occasionally insulting, negative statements used for other politicians during the same period in the documents we will examine below. Taking this point into consideration, we can comfortably say that the available information paints a portrait of Alparslan Türkeş that is far from being supported by Washington; rather, a constant chasm is placed between them.

The article before you is the first instalment of a broader study conducted around this problematic issue. When the planned work is completed, those interested in the subject will have the opportunity to access information from other documents not included here.

The first document we will examine shows that immediately after 27 May, the Americans believed that Türkeş was taking a "neutral" stance vis-à-vis the DP and CHP. A report dated 30 June 1960, sent by the US Consul General in Istanbul, Robert G. Miner, to the State Department, conveys his assessment of a private meeting he had with journalist Özcan Ergüder. Here, it is stated that Türkeş

was opposed not only to the DP, but also to the CHP and İnönü, and that he intended to enter the elections as the leader of a new party.¹ This information provides explanatory clues about a matter that has been debated in relation to 27 May. Some have attempted to explain Türkeş and his friends' reluctance to immediately hold elections and transfer power to civilians after the coup as anti-democratic and coup-mongering. However, in an environment where the DP had been condemned, going to the polls immediately would have meant handing over power to the CHP through the army. Yet Türkeş and his associates were also opposed to the CHP. Therefore, they may have wanted the military administration to remain in power for a while longer to allow different political profiles to emerge.

The national intelligence assessment prepared 20 days after Miner's report includes statements regarding Türkeş's worldview. While analysing the general framework of the National Unity Committee (MBK), Türkeş is presented as the most influential member of the Committee after Gürsel. The document also states that Türkeş was a fervent Turkish nationalist and was arrested in 1944 due to his pan-Turanist ideas regarding the establishment of Turkish unity through the independence of Turks within the USSR:

A report sent by US Ambassador to Ankara Warren to the State Department on 25 July 1960 mentions an important discussion that appears to have permanently influenced Washington's view of Türkeş. Warren, Gürsel, Türkeş, and Kunalalp held a meeting regarding the credit requested from the US by the Committee. During this meeting, Türkeş stated that they urgently needed credit to force the retirement of certain officers in the army and that if the US did not provide the funds, they could find the money "from anywhere," implicitly pressuring US officials to provide the credit.

has threatened to align with the Yellows. At the end of the report, Warren, in his personal assessment of Türkeş, states that the probable action plan to be prepared by Türkeş, focusing on the needs of the MBK and the US's reluctance to meet them, would be unilateral in style, disregarding the US's position and obligations.³

The CIA's daily intelligence note dated 28 July 1960, marked "Top Secret," also contains the points Warren raised in his letter. It is emphasised that Gürsel and Türkeş informed US Ambassador Warren that they would remain resolute regarding the compulsory retirement of senior officers in the Turkish army, even if American financial aid did not materialise, and that they could "find the money from somewhere" if necessary. However, it is noted that any step taken by Gürsel would not be surprising, but that he would not be expected to move closer to the USSR in order to secure funding. ⁽⁴⁾No similar assessment is made for Türkeş.

We encounter the American ambassador's increasingly clear views on the MBK in a report he sent to the State Department on 11 August 1960. According to Warren, the MBK consisted of young, inexperienced and patriotic officers. After Gürsel, the most influential member of the Committee was Türkeş. Furthermore, Warren described Türkeş as someone with "fanatical ambitions, an inferiority complex and deep emotions." Warren also stated that Türkeş was the person who could replace Gürsel in the event of a split within the MBK.⁵ A good example showing how much deliberate distortion there is in what has been written about Türkeş's relationship with the US is Ömer Gürcan's declaration of Türkeş as an American agent based on this document. Gürcan quotes the statement, "We placed Türkeş as the most important member within the MBK," as if it were Warren's words, even though it does not appear anywhere in the report. ⁽⁶⁾

member of the MBK." as if it were Warren's own words.⁶

A CIA daily intelligence note dated 26 September 1960 and marked "Top Secret" assesses Türkeş's resignation from the post of Undersecretary to the Prime Minister on 22 September. The note states that this event revealed the growing conflict between the young, ambitious nationalist group within the MBK and the broader conservative elements, and that Lieutenant General Madanoğlu emerged as Türkeş's leading opponent.⁷ The assessment that Türkeş's resignation increased unrest within the MBK is repeated in a similar document dated 28 September 1960.⁸

The purge of the 14-member nationalist group led by Türkeş from the MBK was addressed in a CIA daily intelligence memo marked "Top Secret" the following day, on 13 November 1960. The CIA document emphasises that Gürsel eliminated the radical group within the junta and that the remaining 23 members were staunchly pro-Western. Furthermore, although the purge of the 14 was seen as a step supported by the more powerful faction within the MBK, it is also noted that the influence of the group led by Alparslan Türkeş, considered "radical," within the armed forces was seen as a potential threat to the current pro-Western administration.⁹ The language of the report summarises the main points of the US view of the cadre that carried out the 27 May coup. According to this, the MBK consisted of Westernisers and nationalists led by Türkeş. The US sympathised not with the nationalists, whom it described as radical, but with the Westernisers. Ultimately, power remained in the hands of the group favoured by Washington.

Looking at subsequent reports prepared by the CIA, we see how much importance the US attached to the possible consequences of the purge of the 14.

In the weekly intelligence report dated 17 November 1960, it is stated ^{that} Türkeş, the spokesperson for the young officers, would most likely continue his life as a political figure and would receive the support of the 3,500 officers who were forcibly retired from the army.

The title of the section concerning the purge of the 14s in the contents section of the CIA's weekly propaganda guide dated 5 December 1960 is "Difficult-to-Reconcile Members Dismissed by the Provisional Turkish Government". The article states that the 14, led by Türkeş and described as a "stubborn and uncompromising group," were purged from the MBK and focuses on Türkeş's potential entry into politics. Furthermore, it is stated that with the removal of the 14, who had previously shown a tendency to pursue an independent foreign policy, the possibility of a shift in Turkey's foreign policy axis has been eliminated, thus ensuring that the Gürsel administration will adhere to the (pro-Western) foreign policy course pursued before it. ⁽¹¹⁾

As we continue to trace the records in the archives, we see that the purge in the MBK and the subsequent exile did not alleviate the US's concerns about Türkeş. Approximately a month and a half before the 1961 elections, on 2 September 1961, a letter written by the then US Ambassador Raymond A. Hare to Washington discussed the possibility of Türkeş and his team organising a new military intervention. In his letter, Hare stated that they knew Türkeş's supporters within the army were mostly low-ranking officers, but they could not estimate the size of Türkeş's organisation. In the letter, Hare argued that if unrest broke out in Turkey after the elections, Türkeş's team would have an opportunity to intervene, but if the chain of command had already been activated, this possibility would disappear.

had already been activated, this possibility would be nullified⁽¹²⁾

The United States' anxious predictions regarding the possible moves of Türkeş and his associates in exile continued even after the first democratic elections of the post-27 May period, held on 15 October 1961. The CIA's weekly intelligence report dated 17 November 1961 noted that, despite a month having passed since the elections, the failure to form a government was beginning to cause unrest throughout the country and within the armed forces. The report stated that if unrest within the army increased, Alparslan Türkeş and other members of the 14 could return from exile and exert pressure for the continuation of military rule.⁽¹³⁾

The documents show that the US continued to focus on Türkeş even after he entered politics following his years in exile, maintaining its negative stance towards him. In a "Special Report" prepared by the CIA prior to the 1965 General Elections, which examined Turkish political life at the time, it is stated that with Türkeş's rise to leadership, the CKMP became "a potentially semi-fascist organisation that was essentially the personal vehicle of a single dominant leader". Furthermore, it is stated that former members of the CKMP, without naming names, indicated that the party had begun to turn into a "fascist vehicle for a man with a Führer complex". The report also mentions the claim that Türkeş defined himself as a national socialist and gathered extreme right-wing radicals from other parties around him.⁽¹⁴⁾ The report also assesses that although Türkeş appeared to believe in Turkey's existing ties with the West, he was essentially neutral.⁽¹⁵⁾

In American archives, we also find records reflecting the concrete manifestations of Türkiye's foreign policy perspective. A telegram sent to US diplomatic missions in June 1967, informing them of the stance of the Turkish political elite and public opinion regarding the increasing tension between Israel and Arab states, is one such example. The telegram, sent by the US Embassy in Turkey, states ^{that} "while the Turkish Government and political leaders, including those on the extreme left, remained silent during the rising tensions between the Arabs and Israel, only Alparslan Türkeş and Osman Bölükbaşı took a pro-Arab stance."

When we examine documents from the 1970s, we see that there was no change in the US's negative attitude towards Türkiye during this period. An important document reflecting Washington's perspective at that time is a CIA report dated 1 January 1973 concerning student uprisings in various countries. In this report, the CIA states that Turkish youth were rapidly dividing into two camps: on one side, the Marxist youth generally led by the Turkish Workers' Party (TİP), and on the other, the youth referred to as "commandos" led by Türkiye, the "neo-fascist" leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (CKMP).¹⁷ The use of the term "fascist-neo-fascist" for Türkiye in this document, a term associated with Hitler and Mussolini and which, after the Second World War, evoked at least as much horror in the West as the term "communist", is an important sign of the US's view of the MHP leader.

Moreover, these and similar labels are repeated in various documents. For example, the National Intelligence Bulletin dated 1 April 1975, which contains assessments of the MC Government established under Prime Minister Demirel, states that the participation of Türkiye, an "ultra-rightist" who allegedly had 100,000 "commandos", in the coalition could pose a problem for Demirel.¹⁸ The inclusion of Türkiye and

Erbakan in the MC Government would further increase political polarisation in Turkey was also mentioned in the CIA's weekly intelligence summary dated 4 April 1975.¹⁹

The assessments contained in the CIA's report dated 17 April 1975 on the MC Government, which had won a vote of confidence, are also significant in terms of revealing Washington's perspective. The report states that the National Salvation Party's opposition to foreign private investment, tourism, and Turkey's Western-style modernisation, as well as its defence of an utopian and vague economic model, could cause problems. It then assesses that the coalition's other partner, the "Pan-Turkist" MHP, is "an even more radical group than the Salvationists". The CIA report draws attention to the fact that this "radical group" led by Türkeş, who boasted about his "commandos," holds two positions in the government despite having only three deputies in parliament. Furthermore, while Demirel and the foreign and defence ministers belonging to the AP are praised as "experienced and moderate individuals," the report comments that the two "far-right" parties in the coalition (MHP and MSP) pursue a rigid policy on Cyprus. According to the CIA, these two parties will not compromise on the return of the territories currently held by Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, both the MHP and the MSP are opposed to NATO and the EC.²⁰ The American view that the MHP, led by Türkeş, was a "weakness" of the Demirel government and that the MHP was even more radical than the MSP was reiterated and emphasised in the weekly CIA intelligence report dated 18 April 1975.²¹

The CIA report dated 20 June 1975 contains clues showing how America viewed the parties involved in the increasing student violence in Turkey. The report states that in order to secure public support for the harsh measures to be taken, Demirel had to restrict both right-wing and left-wing groups, but that the "commandos" allegedly led by Tür-

(22)²² The National Intelligence Bulletin prepared on 31 January 1976 also suggests that the reason Demirel was unable to use his authority in the face of increasing violence was the claim that factions affiliated with his coalition partner Tür-keş were involved in these incidents.²³ The same view is repeated in the National Intelligence Daily Telegram dated 2 November 1976.²⁴

However, we see that the unabated terrorism in the following months was reported to Washington with more balanced assessments than other examples in the National Intelligence Daily Telegram dated 10 August 1977. The telegram draws attention to the rise of left-wing terrorism in cities and states that right-wingers were targeted not by random campus incidents but by planned assassinations. The document also indicates that Türkeş maintained his composure and adopted a moderate stance, as required by his position as Deputy Prime Minister in the government, in response to these events. However, it is stated that if left-wing terrorism continued, the right would respond and Türkeş could take a hard line against government actions that could influence his supporters. (²⁵)

The 19 January 1978 Biweekly International Narcotics Review Report also refers to the escalating terrorist incidents in Turkey. The report identifies the left-wing Turkish People's Liberation Army as the main centre of violence. It is stated that the "far right" is organised in the Ülkü Ocakları (Ideological Centres), which are under the ideological protection of the MHP led by Türkeş. The allegation that Türkeş subjected his ardent supporters, known as the "Grey Wolves", to paramilitary training in commando camps is repeated. However, it is stated that, in order to strengthen his political position, Türkeş asked his "young warriors" not to retaliate against leftists on a large scale from the previous year onwards, and that this situation could cause some ardent right-wingers to become less loyal to Türkeş

and prompting them to act independently.²⁶

The US closely monitored the Ecevit Government's steps towards closing down the Ülkü Ocakları. The Daily National Intelligence Telegram prepared on 28 November 1978 stated that the mutual exchanges between Ecevit and Türkeş meant that Türkeş could retaliate if a ban on the Ülkücüler were to be imposed, and that this situation would further worsen Turkey's fragile political landscape. Furthermore, it was suggested that if faced with a ban, the "radical right-wingers" could increase their activities even more and even shift their actions from the leftists to the government forces. The intelligence report also mentions that in such a situation, the commercial and political elites could pressure the Ecevit Government to enact martial law. ⁽²⁷⁾The report sent to Washington the following day conveyed that a criminal court in Ankara had upheld the decision to close the Ülkü Ocakları and that events could lead to the declaration of martial law.²⁸ The intelligence telegram dated 30 November 1978 is a fine rhetorical example showing that Türkeş's stance against the Soviets did not change the negative American opinion of the MHP and its leader. ^{The telegram} states that, for the first time in forty years, two Soviet naval vessels arrived in Istanbul between 16 and 20 November, and that while other party leaders and the media remained silent, only the leader of the "neo-fascist" MHP, Türkeş, condemned the visit.

In a report dated 27 December 1978 by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Centre addressing the state of martial law in Turkey, emphasis is placed on the possibility that Ecevit's accusations against Türkeş regarding the Maraş incidents may prove true, justifying the government's ban on the youth movement of the "neo-fascist MHP".³⁰

In a national daily intelligence telegram prepared on 4 January 1979, the label, which had become established in correspondence concerning the MHP, was used again. ^{The} statement by Türkeş, leader of the "neo-fascist MHP," accused of being behind right-wing violence in the country, that the government and Turkish society were turning to communism is relayed by the CIA with the qualifier "so-called." ⁽³¹⁾

In the CIA documents prepared after the coup of 12 September 1980, we see that the American perspective on the MHP and Türkeş and the characterisations used have not changed. For example, an intelligence report dated 22 February 1982 states that the targets of the Evren Administration's political cleansing policies were "communists" and "fascists" affiliated with the MHP, led by Türkeş. ³²⁾ In another CIA report dated 1 September 1984, which dealt with terrorist organisations in Turkey, the Grey Wolves / Ülkü Ocakları were mentioned alongside many Marxist and Kurdish organisations. It is stated that the Ülkücüler, defined as a neo-fascist terrorist organisation, are led by Alparslan Türkeş and a number of other figures, and that the organisation's fundamental goal is Pan-Turanism, which aims for Turkish unity. The report mentions that Syria and Iran support Marxist and Islamist groups in Turkey in order to sever Turkey's ties with the West, particularly Israel, but does not mention any external support received by the Ülkücüler. ⁽³³⁾

The American documents we have examined above, covering the period from the 27 May coup to after 12 September, reveal the following fact in all its clarity. During the Cold War years, Alparslan Türkeş was the person with whom the US felt most distant in Turkey.

It was among the names. Türkiye's reflexes towards the Soviets did not bring about any change in the American state's stance on the matter. This picture provides a clear answer to many questions that have preoccupied a generation, leaving little need for further discussion: the Nationalist Movement, with its mistakes and merits, fought its great struggle with its feet firmly planted on this soil.

Let us conclude our article with a question that allows us to weigh the value of this statement:

When we look back at Turkey's stormy years, is there another great political tradition about which we can say the same thing?

() This important article by Mehmet Akif Okur was published in the April 2015 issue (No. 332) of Türk Yurdu magazine and is reproduced here in its entirety with permission.*

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5 Fletcher Warren, 11 August 1960, Letter for Assistant Secretary of State G. Lewis Jones, Jr. from Ambassador William Fletcher Warren profiling the Provisional Government of Turkey, in power since May 1960, Department of State. CONFIDENTIAL. Declassified: 13 July 1995.

6 See <http://bugun.com.tr/pages/marticle.aspx?id=23791>

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15 Ibid, p. 9.

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3.3. The Loyalty of the Nationalist to "Leader Türkeş"

—Leaders Never Let Themselves Be Forgotten! Even in Dreams... —

Every 4th of April, the anniversary of Lparslan Türkeş's death, I drift away: to the MHP Congress of 1979, to the atmosphere of those days that reeked of blood and gunpowder.

After nearly five years of imprisonment, when he was finally released, I recall visiting him at his home in Ankara's Or-An neighbourhood and kissing his hand. The image of that 70-year-old "fatherly young man" comes to mind in many scenes...

On 4 April 1997, Alparslan Türkeş passed away from this mortal world to the eternal realm. Years later, just as 15 years were about to pass since he was laid to rest in the soil of his homeland, I saw him in a dream. I saw this dream about a month ago, and because certain aspects of it carried signs about the past and the future, I felt I could not simply keep it to myself or share it only within my family circle. I decided to share it with you on the 15th anniversary of his passing.

The Dream:

Başbuğ Türkeş points to the "Turkish-Oghuz Union" as the first goal for Turan.

Türkeş and his family have gone on the Hajj. After Başbuğ's welcome at the airport upon his return from the Hajj, a speech to Turkish nationalists waiting for him

I am among a group waiting for the Leader's transfer from the airport and his upcoming speech. We are waiting for Leader Türkeş with several hundred people in a rather magnificent, triple-storey villa perched on a small hill. There is a dirt road that forks in front of the villa; one fork leads to Türkeş's house behind the hill, while the other ends in front of the villa we are waiting at after a sharp bend.

On the dirt road, an airport transport vehicle appears first, loaded with 20-30 suitcases of various sizes. This 'overloaded' trailer, belonging to Başbuğ's family, turns off the road junction and disappears behind the hill, heading for Türkeş's house. After the disappearance of this luggage trailer, a black, latest model Mercedes with windows covered so that the interior cannot be seen arrives and stops in front of the villa; just as one thinks Türkeş will get out of this vehicle, it becomes clear that Başbuğ is not in it. Some 'mysterious individuals', whom I do not recognise and whose identities are unknown, get out of this vehicle and enter the villa. After this mysterious vehicle drops off its passengers and disappears, an old, very old model white Mercedes appears in the distance. It is a vehicle so wide that it barely fits on the dirt road. This old model white Mercedes also reaches the villa, turning the corner with difficulty: Başbuğ is not in this vehicle either. Moving a little away from the villa to look at the road again, I see Başbuğ Türkeş coming 'on foot, alone' from the dusty road. Walking with the demeanour of a young man, Türkeş appears to be a mature man of 50-55 years of age... Right in front of the three-crescent flag presented in this article, my Başbuğ stands like a passionate Anatolian man, shouting at the top of his lungs: Başbuğ Türkeş...

I run towards him to greet him immediately and reach him quite a distance from the villa. The chieftain looks at me with a very serious expression. I reach out and kiss his hand. In response to my kissing his hand, he takes me by the shoulders and embraces me. This embrace seems to last several minutes, as if it were an eternity; even though he doesn't speak, I feel that he is thanking me. With this feeling, I say, "Commander, we might not have been able to be alone together in the crowd."

We walk together to the villa; we pass through the door and enter a very large hall. The walls of the spacious hall we enter are covered with maps of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish World, and the Greater Middle East Project (BOP)... Leader Türkeş looks at these maps one by one. He stands for a long time in front of the map showing the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, examining it carefully; I can tell from his expression that he does not like what he sees. In front of a series of maps showing how Azerbaijan's territories were gradually occupied by the Armenians from 1921 onwards, with the phrase "Someday, for sure...", I understand that he is thinking about the Oğuz Union, the first stage on the road to Turan. As if he understood this, Türkeş turns to me and points with his hand to the borders of the Turk-Oğuz Union, stretching from the Aegean coast to the Caspian Sea, across the Caspian Sea to all of Turkmenistan and the lands of the historic Khiva Khanate.

After carefully examining the maps covering the walls of the hall, Başbuğ Türkeş asks me where the washbasin is before proceeding to the venue where those awaiting him are gathered—and where he will address them from a table-shaped platform. Thinking, "It's time for the evening prayer, but he could still pray after his speech," I point to the bathroom. He didn't close the door completely; he began to perform his ablutions. Waiting at the door, thinking, "This could be an order from Leader Türkeş", I thought to myself: "He wants to give his speech after performing his ablutions

He looks at me as if he understands my thought and smiles. After completing his ablutions, he looks at me as if to ask, "My son, where shall I speak?" I open the door to the meeting room for him and say, "Please come in."

I was given the task of inviting and introducing Başbuğ Türkeş to the meeting hall to give his speech. Some important figures from the nationalist community, some of whom I knew, were also milling around; they were looking for an opportunity to approach Başbuğ Türkeş, but he paid no attention to any of them. His expression is still very serious... I move to the venue where the speech will take place and introduce Leader Türkeş to the audience in the hall so he can give his speech.

I tell my wife about this last dream I had, in which I saw Leader Türkeş, whom I haven't seen for years, as soon as I wake up in the morning. Our shared interpretation is that even as he lies in his grave in Beştepe, Leader Türkeş is still concerned about the state of the idealist movement and is troubled by the plight of the Turkish people.

With a sense of sharing and joining in this concern, I promise myself that I will definitely attend the ceremony to be held at his grave on 4 April 2012, the 15th anniversary of his death^[(1)]

After my book "The Dream of Turkistan," which recounts a dream seen and realised in Kazakhstan in 1995, I thought that some readers who follow my writings and books might feel that "our work is left to dreams..." as I recorded this "Dream of Leader Türkeş" that I am now sharing with you.

As my esteemed colleague Dr Ayşe Filiz Yavuz pointed out during the discussion of my book "The Turkistan Dream," serious academic studies are being conducted in Western scientific circles on the meaning and significance of certain dreams. Contemporary psychiatry accepts that some dreams have a "prophetic" quality.

On the other hand, recalling the importance given to the meanings contained in dreams in the Islamic Sufi tradition, I would like to focus on a detail in the "Başbuğ Türkeş Dream".

"The Turkish-Oghuz Union is the union of Dede Korkut's geography."

After seeing the "Başbuğ Türkeş Dream," I pondered at length about the meaning of the maps on the walls and Başbuğ Türkeş's prolonged focus on the Azerbaijan-Turkey map. It occurred to me that the process of the resurgence of Turkishness could only take place on the basis of the development of the "Turkish-Oğuz Union" as the first objective through the Turkey-Azerbaijan Union.

In an article I wrote a few days ago, I mentioned a characteristic of Ziya Gökalp that was not known until now, and this aspect caused quite a stir. Gökalp also points to the Oğuz Union as the first phase of Turkism:

"Today, Turks, especially the Oğuz Turks, i.e. the Turkmen, are culturally easy to unite. The Turkmen of countries such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Khwarezm are also of Oğuz descent. Therefore, our immediate ideal in Turkism should be the 'Oğuz Union' or the 'Turkmen Union'. What is the purpose of this union? Is it a political union? Not for now! We cannot pass judgement on the future today

. However, our ideal today is the cultural unification of the Oghuz." ^[2]

I can say that "Turkish-Oğuz Unity is the unity of the geography of Dede Korkut." If some of our comrades object, saying, "Isn't Western Kazakhstan, where the seat of Korkut Ata is located, also part of the geography of Dede Korkut?", I say, 'Let those who don't want it go to hell'.

‘The Boil Between the Eyebrow and the Eye’ Will Surely Burst!

Quite some time ago, I wrote an article stating that an artificial state called Armenia had been placed between Azerbaijan and Turkey with the aim of severing their physical connection. I also showed, with maps, how Azerbaijan's territories were handed over to Armenia through map drawings made by Stalin at his desk, in order to strengthen this Armenian obstacle

You will see how Armenians have gradually occupied historical Turkish territories from the last century of the Ottoman Empire to the present day. The day it is understood by the Azerbaijani government and, more importantly, by the Azerbaijani Turks that they cannot deal with the Armenians, who occupy 25% of today's Azerbaijani territory, on their own, they will become the most ardent defenders of the Turkic-Oghuz Union.

No form of 'cultural Turkism' that does not take a stand against the Armenian occupation of 25% of Azerbaijan's territory can be effective. The former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's 2003 statement that "the borders of 22 countries will change within the scope of the BOP" ^[4], those who have not uttered a word about the changed administrations and even borders to this day will be upset by my statement that "one day the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey will change within the axis of the Turkic-Oghuz Union".

If they are bothered by my saying, "One day, the borders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey will change within the axis of the Turkic-Oghuz Union," then shame on them for such an understanding of Turkism...

When I described this situation with Bahtiyar Vahabzade's poetic expression, "It is a boil between the eyebrow and the eye," all readers clearly understood that "the eyebrow and the eye" referred to Azerbaijan and Turkey, while "the boil" referred to Armenia. The recent Armenian occupations should be understood as the boil being enlarged. Although they could see that as the boil grew, the time of its bursting was approaching, neither Bahtiyar Vahabzade nor Leader Türkiye could foresee how it would burst.

But those who are alive will see...

*Just as they will see the Turkish-Oghuz Union... Despair is
treason.*

3.3.1. Alparslan Türkeş Monument Complex

-A Project Design-

“Building the Alparslan Türkeş Memorial Tomb is our duty.”

The way in which a person naturally identifies with the social environment that constitutes their national identity, with moral and aesthetic values, and with the history, traditions, customs and way of life of the nation ; the sense of enduring a shared destiny, sharing or changing that destiny; and the way it reflects a shared personality is called cultural identity.

In terms of the cultural existence of nations, tribes and races, identity is the phenomenon whereby the individuals forming a community identify with a common spirituality, share a social ideal and unite around material symbols, sharing common concerns and joys.^[5] One of the foremost material symbols of this shared spirituality is structures built in the form of graves, mausoleums, and memorial tombs, which embody loyalty to past generations.

Looking at Turkish history, it can be seen that tomb structures in the form of monuments were built not only for religious leaders but also for statesmen. The most magnificent examples of this in our country are the Ottoman sultan mausoleums for the Ottoman period and the Anıtkabir for the republican period.

From the tomb of Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan, one of the first and best-known khans of the Turks who embraced Islam, in the town of Artuş in East Turkistan, to the burial place of the Ottoman sultan Murad I, who was martyred in the Kosovo field, every corner of the Turkish geography is like an exhibition of these tangible evidence. The tomb of Fatih Sultan Mehmed in Istanbul and the tomb of Emir Timur in Samarkand were built with these sentiments in mind. In Turkistan, the tomb of Emir Timur in Samarkand is one of the most memorable structures.

Beyond what has been done for the sovereign khans, the tombs and shrines of the friends of Allah, the spiritual sultans of Turkish history, scattered from Kashgar to Bosnia, complete this picture.

From the Ahmed Yesevi complex in Turkistan, recognised as a UNESCO World Heritage Site within the borders of Kazakhstan, to the tomb of Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi in Konya, from the shrine of Sarı Saltuk in Blagay to the Arslan Baba complex in Otrar-we cannot help but consider the relationship between those who sit on the throne and those who establish their throne in the hearts.

Emir Sultan, son-in-law of Yıldırım Bayezid in Bursa, and Yahya Efendi Dergâhı, foster brother of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in Istanbul, are well-known examples of the respectful relationship between sultans wielding material power and spiritual leaders.

Alparslan Türkeş Memorial Complex

On the 15th anniversary of the passing of Alparslan Türkeş, who went down in history as the undisputed leader of the Turkish world in the 20th century, on 4 April 1997 After visiting it with my friends from the 'Idealist Writers' group, I thought for a moment how fitting a memorial tomb built in the Turkish architectural tradition would be for Alparslan Türkeş.

Alparslan Türkeş, the political leader of Turkish nationalism, passed away in Ankara following a heart attack and was laid to rest in Beştepe, Ankara. Since the passing of Leader Türkeş, despite the fact that no monument-like structure has been built over his grave in the 15 years that have passed, it remains a heritage of Turkish world culture that never lacks visitors.

The task of erecting a monument worthy of Başbuğ Türkeş's leadership in Turkish lands over his grave is not only a duty incumbent upon his biological son, MHP Ankara Deputy Yıldırım Tuğrul Türkeş, and other material heirs, but also a debt that must gradually be paid by all idealists who consider themselves Türkeş's spiritual children. The rationale behind the proposal outlined in this article stems from the inspiration provided by the idea of fulfilling the portion of this debt that falls to the author. I have not the slightest doubt that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who visits Türkeş's grave at every opportunity as the representative of his political legacy, shares these sentiments.

Since my last visit, imagining the architectural appearance of this structure, which I have deemed appropriate to name the Alparslan Türkeş Memorial Tomb, has constantly occupied my mind, and it was not difficult for me at all. My visual memory, based on the dozens of tombs I have visited throughout the geography of Turkistan and across Anatolia

, provides me with a visual memory rich enough to give me a good idea of how such a complex could be constructed.

Why is the "Alparslan Türkeş Memorial Tomb" Necessary?

As of today, the grave of Alparslan Türkeş lies alone on a small hill in the Beştepe district of Ankara, in an ordinary marble tomb. With no other graves nearby and no monument, mausoleum, or shrine built around it, the grave stands in a sad solitude, visited only by loyal idealists.

The absence of a mosque where visitors can comfortably perform ablutions and pray, and where they can open the Qur'an and read it for the souls of Başbuğ Türkeş and the martyrs of the cause, is also a significant shortcoming. I believe everyone will agree that, as things stand, the necessary facilities have not been provided for those who come to visit the grave of Leader Türkeş from Anatolia and even from all corners of the world.

As a figure who has become part of Turkish history, Alparslan Türkeş should be laid to rest in a place worthy of his historical stature, where he will be remembered for eternity and commemorated with prayers and good wishes.

What Kind of Tomb Complex Should Be Built?

Taking into account Alparslan Türkeş's indelible traces in Turkish homelands from Orhun to Tuna, a tomb-complex should be built, inspired by the finest examples of Turkish tomb architecture throughout history

and should be a work that recalls the historical mission of Leader Türkiye. This complex must include spaces and infrastructure where visitors to Leader Türkiye's grave can prepare themselves with peace of mind and perform their prayers.

The mausoleum complex to be built should represent both Turkish architecture and Islamic functionality.

It is possible to observe very rare examples of how these two main elements are combined in many tomb complexes along the Turkistan-Turkey route. Based on impressions from many architectural works from Turkistan to the Balkans, an original design should be created, from tombstones to wall tiles.^[6]

Design of the Başbuğ Türkiye Memorial Complex

This project is primarily based on the Arslan Baba Complex near the city of Otrar in Kazakhstan, which was built by Arslan Baba, the spiritual guide of Ahmed Yesevi, a major figure in Turkistan spirituality. It draws inspiration from the Ahmed Yesevi complex in Turkistan, the Tomb of Emir Timur in the city of Samarkand in Uzbekistan, the Tomb of Pehlivan Mahmud in the city of Khiva, the tomb of Sadreddin Konevi, and certain architectural elements from the tomb of Yahya Efendi in Beşiktaş, Istanbul, to create an original work that summarises Turkish history and Islamic spirituality.

The complex will consist of a tomb chamber as the main space, a mosque, and an entrance (medhal) connecting these two units. Separate ablution/purification areas for female and male visitors will be created in a section below the mosque unit.

The road leading to the Taç gate, an element of Seljuk architecture facing the road, will form a preparatory path with elements of Turkish history on the roadside. An example of this can be seen in the Ali Şir Nevai monument recently built in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan.

The absence of any figures other than elements reflecting Islamic unity, from the decoration to the dome inscriptions, in the Tomb Chamber-Mosque complex is important for preserving the simplicity of the structure reflecting unity and will also prevent unnecessary polemics.

In determining the dimensions of the memorial complex, it would be a beautiful touch to use the number 9 metres, evoking the ratios of 3-7-40, which have special meanings in Islamic mysticism, and the intellectual legacy of Alparslan Türkeş, a gift to Turkish culture.

In Tribute to Leader Türkeş...

I delayed putting pen to paper, considering the possibility that what I have written might be seen as mere external praise, given that the heirs of a Muslim who has departed this world as a mortal are still here. However, as I explained in detail in a previously published article ⁽⁷⁾, as detailed, I prepared this proposal with the intention of fulfilling a spiritual debt to Alparslan Türkeş, whom I know to be "a faithful servant of Allah," and with the belief that the Başbuğ Türkeş complex will contribute to preserving Turkish identity in these lands for centuries to come. ([8])

I entrust this proposal, which has been separately presented to his son Yıldırım Tuğrul Türkeş and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli for their consideration, to all idealists for their information and consideration.

Actions are judged by intentions, and undoubtedly, Allah knows best what is in the hearts.

At this point Türkeş I would like to record the words I said to the head of the family Yıldırım Tuğ-rul Türkeş: "The construction of the Alparslan Türkeş Memorial Tomb is the duty of us all."

3.3.2. “*Leader Türkeş*” Must be kept alive

A Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since the death of Alparslan Türkeş. Every year on 4 April, tens of thousands gather at his grave in the Beştepe district of Ankara. young idealists gather at his grave in Ankara's Beştepe district. Most of them were not even born on 4 April 1997. They have learned about "Leader Türkeş" either from their families or from older idealists. Türkeş's national legacy is not the works he wrote. Alparslan Türkeş's legacy is the Nationalist Movement Party and the nationalist youth, which he inherited and developed in a completely new direction.

The idealist youth, under the banner of idealism passed down from generation to generation under the umbrella of the Ülkü Ocakları (Idealist Youth Associations), are keeping alive their legacy as followers of Türkeş's will: "You are all Turkish flags. Do not stain the flag, do not let it fall to the ground." They are developing their presence, which strikes fear into the hearts of the enemies of Turkishness. On the other hand, when our compatriots, who have kept their hopes alive by hearing the legend of "*Leader Türkeş*" throughout all Turkish homelands from the Altai Mountains to the Tuna River, first set foot in Ankara, the first place they visited was Anıtkabir, and their second destination was the Türkeş

Works bearing the name Alparslan Türkeş are now rare items found in second-hand bookshops. Digital copies of these works are available online with the permission of his family. ^[9]

Academic research on the Nationalist Movement Party is also increasing. Although limited in number, international studies have been added to the domestic research.

This honour bestowed upon Türkeş, a retired colonel of the Turkish Armed Forces, has not been granted to many generals. This is a divine gift. On this occasion, I pray to God Almighty that his noble soul may rest in peace

[1] Every year on 4 April, at the Alparslan Türkeş Tomb in the Beştepe district of Ankara, all idealists, led by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli, commemorate their leader.

[2] Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, Elips Publications, 3rd Edition, Ankara, May 2011.

[3] For this article, see: Dr. Hayati Bice, *Notes on Turkish Homelands*, Bilgeoğuz Yay., Istanbul-2010.

[4] See Condoleezza Rice, eight years ago, in 2003, said, 'The borders and regimes of 22 countries will change!', 23 February 2011, <http://haber.gazetevatan.com/rice-sekiz-yil-once-22-ulkenin-siniri-ve-rejimi-de-gisecek-demisti/361082/4/Haber>

[5] Esra Dönmez, *The Influence of Cultural Identity on Architecture in Turkey*, Istanbul-2006.

[6] The Yesevi Complex and other architectural masterpieces of Turkistan can be used in this regard. See Naim-bek Nürmuhammedoğlu, *Hoca Ahmed Yesevi Tomb*, (Trans. Dr. Hayati Bice), Ministry of Culture, Ankara-1993.

[7] Hayati Bice, *The Loyalty of the Nationalist Movement to Leader Türkeş*, 2 April 2012.

[8] After preparing my article, while selecting images from the internet for the article, I saw a news item stating that the architect of the MHP Headquarters building, our renowned architect Ahmet Vefik Alp, wanted to design "a Monumental Tomb and Mosque befitting the late Leader, through the Alparslan Türkeş Foundation established by Seval Türkeş," along with a design in the shape of three crescents. May Allah be pleased with anyone who has put their mind and heart into this.

[9] These works can be viewed on the website <http://www.ulkucubellek.com> and read online.

[10] Important Note: I invite everyone reading this article to recite "three İhlas + one Fatiha with the intention of completing the Quran" for the souls of Alparslan Türkeş and Bah-tiyar Vahabzâde, whose names are mentioned in this article. İnsha'Allah, my late father Dursun Bice and our other ancestors will also benefit from what is recited.

3.4. Dündar Taşer's Great Turkey: The Idealist Youth

-On the Anniversary of TürkmenAğası's Death-

MIt has been exactly 40 years since Dündar Taşer, one of the leading figures of the nationalist movement, passed away on 13 June 1972. The young people of those days idealists of the 1960s are now in their 60s. May God be pleased with him; may His place be in paradise.

The majority of today's nationalists have only heard of Dündar Taşer by name, never having seen him with their own eyes. Some middle-aged nationalists, like myself, first came to know him through the first edition of the book "Dündar Taşer's Great Turkey" by Ziya Nur. Although revised editions of this work are available today, it can be said that Dündar Taşer remains insufficiently known among nationalists in general. Dündar Taşer is undoubtedly the second most important figure in the history of nationalist politics. Taşer was also the architect of Gün Sazak's participation in the MHP, one of the names that added quality to the nationalist movement.

In recent days, the idea of creating a "Digital Idealist Archive in the Internet Environment," initiated as an internet project under the leadership of Prof. Dr. İskender Öksüz, who had the opportunity to converse with Dündar Taşer and get to know him closely, has become a concrete project. Within the scope of Ülkü-Net, the most important publications of the idealist movement's half-century history—the most important publications of the movement—Töre and Devlet magazines—are now accessible and readable online. ^[1]

This has made it possible for a new generation of idealists to read Dündar Taşer's mind-opening, visionary writings.

Ülkücü Youth in the Words of Dündar Taşer

While examining the issue of Ülkü~Net archive published after Dündar Taşer's death ^[2]I came across an assessment he made regarding the idealist youth, who were still in their formative years at the time, at the end of his speech delivered on 20 May 1972 at the MHP Mersin central district congress, which he attended just 24 days before his death. I would like readers, and especially today's young idealists, to share this assessment, which beautifully explains the relationship between Idealist Youth and the survival of the Turkish Nation, its existence until the end of time:

"... Once again, the hope of this new, difficult era of struggle lies with the nationalist masses and the idealistic youth. I take pride in the actions of the idealistic youth. But the idealistic youth are not our creation, our invention; they are your children. I don't even know the names of most of them. There are so many of them! The idealistic youth are an expression of the Turkish Nation's vitality, determination and will, and they demonstrate that Turkish Nationalism is the natural fruit of the Turkish Nation, rooted in its historical origins. Despite all my criticism, communists are weeds, and their fruits are bitter. The sweet fruit, the strong apple of the noble tree of the Turkish Nation is the idealistic youth. (...)

A new era has dawned in Turkey. This will determine Turkey's destiny. Either there will be a nationalist system, a nationalist view, a nationalist policy, and nationalist implementation, or the future of the Turkish Nation, despite its entire great history, will fall under communist domination. But Allah has not decreed the future of the Turkish Nation. The idealistic youth shows that Allah does not wish for this Nation to perish (be destroyed). Therefore, the Turkish Nation will live on." ⁽³⁾

Dündar Taşer Has Not Been Forgotten—Will Not Be Forgotten

During a Ramadan holiday, I visited my father's grave at the Karşıyaka Cemetery in Ankara. My feet took me to a corner where I came across the grave of Dündar Taşer. I paused there to recite a Fatiha in honour of his noble soul.^[4] That day, when I looked at Dündar Taşer's gravestone and saw that he had lived only 47 years in this mortal world, I was truly astonished...

While reading Başbuğ Türkeş's message from the Ülkü~Net archive of Töre magazine, I couldn't help but think about the fate of the "idealist movement". In his message published upon the passing of Türkmen Ağası, Başbuğ Türkeş expressed his feelings about his "idealist friend" as follows:

"...Dündar Taşer was an idealist Turkish nationalist above all ranks and positions. Dündar Taşer understood Turkish nationalism not only as loving his nation, but also as placing this love above all positions, parties and personal concerns, and fearlessly and resolutely doing what was necessary for his nation. With his passing, we have been deprived of an irreplaceable treasure trove of energy, determination, knowledge, love and faith. His comrades are determined to continue the struggle that only death could stop him from completing, with the same determination, and to achieve absolute success

Today, with this message pointing to the "determination" and "resolve" we still need, I must also remember Başbuğ Türkeş, who has a spiritual right over all idealists, with mercy.

I also strongly recommend reading the heartfelt writings of Galip Erdem, Ahmet Kabaklı, and Ergun Göze, all of whom are now in the mercy of the Almighty, in the "Dündar Taşer Special Issue" of Devlet Dergisi in the Ülkü~Net archive.^[6]

Prof. Dr. İskender Öksüz stated that the time had come to announce the activities of the website Ülkü~Net, which aims to become a reference address as the "Digital Ülkücü Archive in the Internet Environment," to a wider audience. "serious and high-quality work" to the public on 13 June 2012, the 40th anniversary of Dündar Taşer's passing. Forty years later, I reiterate this proposal here, hoping that it will serve as data for researchers who will write the history of the nationalist movement today.

I am indebted to Prof. Dr. İskender Öksüz and all my fellow idealists who contributed to the Ülkü~Net project, a concrete example of what can be done online in the name of "*Positive Idealism*," for giving us the opportunity to present it as an example to today's idealist youth. I believe that this work, which has already become a reference point in its current form, will grow richer day by day with active participation and will raise the level of consciousness among the idealist youth.

As long as there is such a communication medium as the internet in the world, every idealist—old or new—who does not make an effort to contribute to this work, even if only as an observer, should be careful when speaking about the idealist movement. I must remind those who do nothing but spread rumours—if they feel even the slightest sense of shared history with their fellow idealists who are still labouring on the path of ideals—that they should be ashamed of themselves compared to those who have created such lasting works. I would like to remind them, especially and for the last time, that while you watch the work you have not contributed to from some obscure corner, with whatever feelings you may have, at least the new generation, masters of the digital world, with their sparkling intellects, hope for the future.

Reconsider your petty calculations and plans to grab a share of the spoils, which confuse the minds and narrow the hearts of the idealistic youth who nourish us. If you cannot practise positive idealism, then step aside and at least do not cast negative shadows over the idealistic movement...

"Forgetful are forgotten" slogan, I remember and remind the idealist movement of all our elders who contributed to it and have passed away, and I would like to conclude my writing with the verses written by the late Refet Körüklü for "Türkmen Ağası" (Turkmen Chief), which express that he will be remembered forever:

ETERNAL MOURNING

*-To the sacred soul of my friend Dündar Taşer-
This sorrow is unbearable; this grief; this
anguish The sacred friend remains unchanged,
eternal mourning,
Your sudden departure has burned our
very essence. When they see us, they will
understand our hearts...*

*Those who forget my friend are surely
mistaken. The name Turkmen will be
remembered forever.
You too are a brave warrior like Şahin.
My friend, you now live on in our
hearts.*

*The martyrs of the ideal welcome you
The land we love is our most faithful
companion. Do not think the banner you
left behind will fall, There are hearts and
arms to raise your banner high.*

Refet Körüklü

On the Passing of Dündar Taşer / Alparslan Türkeş

Dündar Taşer

(15 May 1925 Gaziantep – 13 June 1972 Ankara)

*Roaming from district to district, searching for him on
the road, a traveller on the path of life
Someone who looks upon him says: "In this land you
have traversed, Dündar Taşer has laid to rest in his final
sleep!"*

Arif Nihat Asya

Following the passing of Mr Dündar Taşer, Deputy Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Party Chairman Alparslan Türkeş issued the following circular to the MHP organisation:

"We have lost Mr Dündar Taşer, Deputy Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party, on 13 June 1972 at 20:30 as a result of a collision with a van."

A distinguished officer of the Turkish Army. Dündar Taşer, who devoted his life to serving his nation as a member of the National Unity Committee, a member of the General Administrative Board of the Nationalist Movement Party, and Deputy Chairman, was, above all these ranks and positions, an idealistic Turkish nationalist. Dündar Taşer understood Turkish nationalism not only as loving his nation, but also as placing this love above all positions, parties and personal concerns, and fearlessly and resolutely doing what was necessary for his nation. With his passing, we have been deprived of an irreplaceable treasure trove of energy, determination, knowledge, love and faith. His comrades are determined to continue the struggle he left behind only through death

with the same determination and are absolutely resolved to achieve absolute success.

The body of the great Turkish nationalist Dündar Taşer will be laid to rest tomorrow (15 June 1972) at the Hacıbayram Mosque in Ankara, after noon prayers, with military honours.

All members of the Nationalist Movement Party and other ideological comrades from within and outside Ankara will be present at the ceremony.

We wish the members of the Nationalist Movement Party and our ideological allies well, and we pray for God's mercy and forgiveness for our dear comrade Dündar Taşer.

Alparslan Türkeş (Töre, Issue: 14, July 1972, p.6)

[1] The websites at <http://www.ulkunet.com/>, which are actively maintained, provide access to the archives of the Töre and Devlet magazines, as well as the full texts of many important books.

[2] Devlet Dergisi, Issue: 148, 26 June 1972, pp. 8-9. <http://www.ulkunet.com/SureliYayin.aspx>

[3] Dündar Taşer, "The Hope of the New Era of Struggle is Once Again the Idealistic Youth," <http://ulkucuyazarlar-birligi.org/?p=1641>

[4] Hayati Bice, Hasbihal: Bayram Impressions, http://haberiniz.com.tr/yazilar/koseyazi-si39199-Hasbihal_Bayram_Izlenimleri.html

[5] For the full text of Türkeş's message, see: TÖRE, Issue: 14, July 1972, p. 6. <http://ulkucuyazarlarbirligi.org/?p=1573>

[7] For Galip Erdem, Ayhan Tuğcugil, Ahmet Kabaklı and Ergun Göze's articles on Dündar Taşer, see: <http://ulkucuyazarlarbirligi.org/>

3.5. *Gün Sazak: A Different Minister*

Ü One of the most unforgettable names in the martyrs' army of the Nationalist Movement, Gün Sazak was born on 26 March 1932 in Ankara. A renowned politician and military leader, Emin Sazak, a member of parliament, was from the village of Sazak in the Mihalıççık district of Eskişehir, while his mother, Ayşe Hanım, was from the village of Kayı. He completed his primary, secondary and high school education in Ankara and graduated from Ankara Maarif College. He studied in the United States between 1951 and 1959, graduating from California State Polytechnic Institute.

On 27 February 1971, witnessing the riots of extreme left-wing organisations during the Chamber of Civil Engineers elections, Gün Sazak decided to join the MHP. His decision was largely influenced by hours of conversation with Dündar Taşer, Deputy Chairman of the MHP, which increased his interest in MHP politics. At the 10th MHP congress held at the Selim Sırrı Sports Hall on 9-10 May 1971, he was elected to the General Administrative Board and, at the suggestion of Dündar Taşer, was appointed Deputy Secretary General. At the next 11th Congress on 9-10 June 1973, he was elected Deputy Chairman and became Alparslan Türkeş's most authoritative deputy until the day he was martyred (27 May 1980).

One thing that remains in the memory about Gün Sazak is that in his speech on 27 May 1977, he defined nationalism as follows: "Nationalism means loving the nation to which one belongs. In order for a person to love their nation, they must know the values that their nation carries."

On 21 July 1977, he became Minister of Customs and Monopolies from outside parliament, despite not being a member of the tripartite (AP-MSP-MHP) coalition government. During his tenure as minister, he launched an effective fight against smuggling with the idealistic staff he had assembled. Gün Sazak, father of two daughters and two sons, was martyred on Sunday, 27 May 1980, by Dev-Yol militant terrorists who ambushed him in front of his home.

Mehmet Doğan, the long-standing General Treasurer of the MHP before 12 September, recounts Gün Sazak's last day as follows: he had chatted and drunk tea with him that morning.

Until the coup of 12 September, 27 May was celebrated as Constitution Day. Both the late Mr Türkeş and Gün Sazak attended the official ceremony at the Anıtkabir, and from there they came together to the party headquarters. The three of us sat in front of the party. Hasan Kozan, a veteran of the party who has also passed away, brought us freshly brewed tea. We each had a cup of tea. The General Chairman (Türkeş) was going to Istanbul by road that day. He asked Gün Sazak to accompany him to Istanbul for half an hour. "Come, Gün, let's go together, don't leave me alone," he said. But Gün Sazak said, "Sir, please excuse me today. I have work at the farm; I'll take the children and go to the farm." In the end, Mr Türkeş couldn't persuade Gün Sazak. "Very well then, I'll set off," he said. He got up, got into his car, and set off for Istanbul. Mr. Gün Sazak and I sat for about 15 minutes and had another cup of tea. The late Mr. Türkeş got up. "Well then, Godspeed, Mehmet Ağa," he said. (He usually addressed me that way.) He got into his car; he hadn't brought his driver that day, so he drove off himself. I returned home from the party that evening, and half an hour later, Hasan Kozan called to say, "They shot Mehmet Bey Gün Sazak." Upon hearing the news, Türkeş returned from Istanbul to Ankara that very night. Our grief was immense. We had lost someone of great value. Türkeş was devastated.

The pain did not end there. Communist circles had sunk so low that their sympathisers in the press wrote that Gün Sazak was opposed to Türkeş and had been shot by Türkeş because he had turned his back on the cause. I was saddened to see that even some individuals who claimed to be party members had conformed to the trend to the extent of saying that Gün Sazak was opposed to Türkeş. Was this the truth? Of course not.

As someone who was close to both of them, I am writing the truth here for the first time. When Mr Türkeş and I were alone in the party, he said during our conversation: "People are mortal. After I am gone, someone must be groomed to take my place so that our cause can continue uninterrupted." He personally told me that he was considering Acar Okan, who was the Deputy Secretary General of the MHP in 1974, to be his successor. I confirm this with my honour. Then, when we reached 1976, when Mr Türkeş's marriage came up, Okan and him fell out. Acar Okan opposed this. There was a rift between them. Acar Okan was left out of the leadership. When we reached 1979; -I also confirm this with an oath- while talking in his office, the conversation turned to the subject of proxy, and he said, "I am considering Mr. Gün Sazak to replace me, and I trust him." Was Mr Türkeş so blind and deaf that he did not know or hear that Gün Sazak was opposed to him, that he would keep someone who opposed him as his deputy, the Number One Deputy Chairman, and consider him as the person to whom he would hand over his position in the future? Even crows would laugh at this. The late Gün Sazak's funeral was laid to rest in his final resting place with the takbirs of the idealists, as befitting his honour. That day, salat prayers were held across the country. It was a day of mourning for the idealists. Ecevit described it as an uprising.

Meanwhile, the MHP parliamentary group met on 7 June 1980 and decided to "return to the people". The MPs would resign from the Grand National Assembly, returning their salaries. General Chairman Türkeş

convened the party's governing body, the General Administrative Council, for a meeting. The General Administrative Council did not approve the parliamentary group's decision, and we returned to parliament"⁽¹²⁾

In Himmet Kayhan's valuable book on Gün Sazak, compiled with the documented contributions of the Sazak family, a dream recounted by Ahmet Er, one of Türkeş's friends from 27 May and known for his interest in Sufism, is recorded prior to Gün Sazak's martyrdom:

"One day in mid-May, when Ahmet Er entered Gün Bey's room, a few friends were chatting inside. Sitting and listening to the conversation, he kept turning his head to look at Gün Bey. There was a strangeness in his demeanour. There was a different depth, a different light in his eyes. One would look like that at someone they loved very much, whom they had not seen for a long time and missed. For a moment, he would avert his eyes, look down, then turn his same longing, loving gaze back to Mr Gün. He seemed a little bewildered and timid.

After a moment, he began to speak, swallowing hard and choosing his words carefully: "Mr Gün, I saw you in my dream..."

"Hopefully it's a good sign..." Mr Gün felt a special closeness to Ahmet Er. He knew his turbulent, passionate, charming, often childlike ways well and often teased him. He listened with great pleasure when he sprinkled drops from the ocean of Sufism. Most of the time, chatting with him meant spreading one's wings to boundless worlds. He enjoyed having Mr Ahmet as a guest in his home and would take him there whenever he had the chance. Now he waited with a smile for him to tell him about the dream.

"I saw you in an assembly. A peaceful, serene, beautiful, magnificent realm; Allah knows, I cannot describe the atmosphere there, the light, the colours, and the people there. You were among the chosen, the blessed,

praised people. Everyone's face was radiant, peaceful; it was clear that everyone loved everyone else. You were one of them; the clothes you wore showed your high rank.

I was close to you but couldn't reach you, couldn't hear what you were talking about; it wasn't allowed. I could only watch, observe. I envied you so much, I longed so much to be among you that a strange ache stretched out inside me. But seeing you among those chosen ones, my heart rejoiced...

When I woke up and remembered the dream, I felt the same joy. I thought that you had a closeness to God that we couldn't perceive..."

Those at the MHP headquarters who heard about Mr Ahmet's dream made comments that matched Mr Gün's honesty, purity of heart, and generosity. That evening, Mr Gün told his wife at home, "Our Dervish Ahmet saw me in his dream..." and recounted what he had heard⁽¹³¹⁾

Shortly before his martyrdom, Sazak, who had been diagnosed with lymphatic cancer and was undergoing treatment in England, is said to have remarked, "I wish I could die as a martyr rather than from illness," upon hearing news of the martyrdom of other nationalist youths. It could be said that this heartfelt wish was granted. In fact, fate had woven its web. On 25 May 1980, Gün Sazak cancelled a business trip to the United States via London for unknown reasons. The day before his martyrdom, his business partner İrfan Karaoğlu described the situation at work as follows:

"On the evening of 26 May, Mr Gün remained at work until the evening hours. He read some files in his office. At one point, he came to Karaoğlu's side, but did not sit down and turned away. Shortly afterwards, he came back and turned away again. He seemed to be pacing. He appeared troubled. He had secured Turkey's biggest business deal; he should have been in high spirits. But the troubles the country was going through did not allow him to enjoy those days.

Karaoğlu cannot ask him anything. They part around 7 p.m.; this is their last meeting'" ([4])

According to Marmara University lecturer Associate Professor Mahmut Hakkı Akın the vast majority of those affiliated with the MHP and Ülkü Ocakları who were killed in the streets were targeted by *Aydınlık* magazine.

Unable to hold back his tears upon hearing the news of Gün Sazak's martyrdom, Alparslan Türkeş advised Turkish nationalists "not to fall for the provocations of civil war instigators, to be patient, and to abide by the law."

In the MHP Indictment, Gün Sazak's activities as a minister were transformed into a crime as follows:

During the period when the MHP was in power and Gün SAZAK was Minister of Customs and Monopolies, in parallel with the filling of positions within the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies with individuals known to be nationalists, the unused customs inspectorate regulations were removed or forced through, and individuals known to be good nationalists and organisers in various provinces and districts, such as Türkeş, Gün Sazak, and Namık Kemal Zeybek. These individuals, some of whom had completed higher education courses but had no prior involvement with customs and monopoly legislation, were provided with accommodation and training at a building rented by the ministry on Sıhhiye Bayındır Street in Ankara, under the name of the Customs and Monopoly Ministry Training Centre, thereby ensuring their integration. Gün Sazak, Undersecretary of the Ministry, Namık Kemal Zeybek, and their allies in the Ministry gave courses on professional and social issues without a specific programme. It is clear from their statements that these courses were insufficient and that not everyone followed them continuously.

In fact, while the Customs Inspectorate institution existed, only certain individuals known to be nationalists were recruited to the inspectorate by amending the regulations governing their appointment, clearly demonstrating that they would be used for purposes other than their original intent, and indeed, they were subsequently employed for this purpose.

MHP leader Alparslan Türkeş, while on trial on 12 September, described the mission of Hergün Newspaper, which was the publication organ of the nationalist movement at the time, and made the following statements about Gün Sazak: *"The late Gün Sazak, Deputy Chairman of our party, was also Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hergün Gazetecilik A.Ş. While serving as Minister of Customs and Monopolies, he took extensive measures against corruption and smuggling and waged a fierce fight against them. The late Gün Sazak, in his capacity as Chairman of the Board of Directors of Hergün Gazetesi A.Ş., was working to develop the newspaper. To this end, he undertook to establish correspondent offices throughout Turkey for the newspaper. He proposed assigning the staff he had prepared as controllers to this task. The aforementioned controllers would both work as correspondents for Hergün Newspaper in their regions and assist the party. They would strive to prevent MHP members from becoming involved in anarchic events at the instigation of provocative agents. To this end, they would give conferences and seminars in their locations, providing informative details about the party programme and constitution, and would always advise and recommend following the path of law and justice. In other words, this group, referred to as educators, had two tasks. One was to work as correspondents for the Hergün Newspaper and be involved in newspaper work, and the other was to advise and encourage party groups not to be drawn into anarchic events.*

S. Ahmed Arvasi, who learned that his wife and child had been martyred before his eyes as he stepped out of Gün Sazak's vehicle, expressed his deep sorrow and grief at their martyrdom as the *'Blue-Shirted Devil'*.

He penned these harsh lines for the Prime Minister of the era he described: *"Aziz Gün Sazak was also murdered. While you were spewing venom at Turkish nationalists with the treachery of a Babrak Karmal in the corridors of power, now you are writing fake messages of sorrow on stage. You two-faced bastard! Despite all the nationalist and idealist blood you have spilled, are you still not satisfied? What is it? Why is this hatred endless? (...) Do you know who Gün Sazak was? He was a Turk, a Muslim, a brave man, a noble man, an honourable statesman. Are you aware that by killing him and having him killed, you tore our hearts apart? Do you know what that means? Have you thought about the consequences of your actions? Are you at ease now? Will you be at ease from now on? Have you ever thought about this? So, you say you are 'in favour of peace', that is why you torment us; that is why you applaud those who torment us. (...) Did your face flush a little in the presence of a statesman who loved his country and his people to such an extent? Did you get a glimpse of what peace and humanity are? Or did these words serve to suppress the fear in your heart? Or will you be looking for a suitable opportunity for new murders? Yes, 'Blue-Shirted Devil', you and your red maniacs will be destroyed, by Allah's permission, in the red empire you rely on. ^{We} will hope that our state will give you the response you deserve, with patience and on legitimate grounds, and we will wait for Allah to manifest His attribute of 'Kahhar'."* ([6])

The demonstrations that could occur at Gün Sazak's funeral had alarmed Nihat Özer, the commander of martial law in Ankara at the time. Despite Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's mediation, he did not permit the funeral procession to be carried from the Bahçelievler 3rd Street headquarters building to the Hacıbayram Mosque, where the funeral would be held. Leader Türkeş, however, was determined that his comrade-in-arms should be given a dignified send-off without confrontation with the military. Prof. Dr. Celal Sungur, Dean of Ankara Medical Faculty, a friend of Gün Sazak and former CHP Yozgat MP, intervened and obtained permission for the procession. Tens of thousands of nationalists carried his coffin from Bahçelievler to Hacıbayram, chanting takbirs. After the funeral prayer at Hacıbayram Mosque, Gün Sazak was taken to his hometown and laid to rest. ([7])

and then taken to his hometown to be laid to rest.^[7] From that day on, on the instructions and with the participation of Leader Türkeş, the idealist martyrs gathered at Gün Sazak's grave every year on 27 May to commemorate him. In subsequent years, once the Monument to the Idealist Martyrs was completed near the Kızılcahamam district of Ankara, the commemoration ceremony was moved there.

Gün Sazak was a name synonymous with the fight against smuggling, bribery, organised crime and corruption during his time as minister. Throughout his tenure, he worked tirelessly to deal significant blows to the drug and arms trade. This made Sazak the number one target of terrorist organisations. According to Batuhan Çolak, who made this observation, "The assassination of Gün Sazak was carried out with the approval of the organisation's leader, Dursun Karataş. Ten months after the attack, three Dev-Sol members were arrested. One of those arrested received a life sentence, while the other two received prison sentences of five and six years. However, the actual perpetrators of the attack had fled abroad. The actual perpetrators were Dev-Sol Ankara leaders Mehmet Edip Eranıl, Hacı Eliaçık, Cengiz Gül and Cemal Kemal Altun. Altun was arrested in Germany some time later. During the trial, he committed suicide by jumping out of the courtroom window under suspicious circumstances. It is known that one of the killers, Cengiz Gül, lives in Belgium. But what is really interesting is that traces of Mehmet Edip Eranıl, the most important figure in the assassination and the person who planned it, the then Dev-Sol Ankara leader, were found in Germany in 2008. Efforts were made with the German authorities to have him extradited. However, the German authorities did not extradite Eranıl to Turkey. Unfortunately, remembering Sazak on the anniversary of his death and feeling sad does not fulfil our duties. The real issue is to bring those who killed Sazak to Turkey, bring them before justice, and hold them accountable" (^[8])

[1] Himmet Kayhan, *Gün Sazak*, pp. 271–303.

[2] Mehmet Doğan, Alparslan Türkeş, the MHP and the Man in the Shadows, pp. 57–60.

- [3] Himmet Kayhan, op. cit., pp. 567–568.
- [4] op. cit., p. 568.
- [5] Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Hakkı Akın: "Sazak had a significant impact on young people" <http://www.dunyabizim.com/soylesi/17162/sazakin-genclerde-muhim-bir-karsiligi-vardi>, 28 May 2014.
- [6] Hüdavendigar Onur, Asrın Yesevîsi Ahmet Arvasî, Biyografi Net Yayınları, İstanbul.
- [7] Mehmet Doğan, op. cit., p. 60
- [8] Batuhan Çolak, Gün Sazak's Killers Are Running a Café!
<http://www.haberdokuz.com/2014/05/27/gun-sazakin-katilleri-kafeterya-isletiyor>

3.6. Two Alp-Eren

-The Sanctification of State Officials in
Turkish Historical Tradition-

While revising the Yesevi wisdom for the fifth edition of the Divan-i Hikmet, which will be published in Uzbekistan enriched with newly published wisdom, a very interesting name caught my attention: This name was Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan, who went down in history as the "First Muslim Turkish Ruler". Another aspect as intriguing as this name was that Hazret-i Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi referred to this historical figure as a "perfect guide".

In the 215th Hikmet of Hazret-i Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi's Divan-i Hikmet book, in the order of publication:

*"Is Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan
the Pir of the people?" (**)*

This verse refers to this historical Turkish hero who passed away approximately 200 years before him.

Upon reading these lines, based on my historical knowledge, the question echoed in my mind: "Did Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan, who accomplished great deeds in the apparent sense, perhaps have a mystical dimension that had been overlooked until now, one that would entitle him to the title of 'Pir-i muğan' (Supreme Pir)?"

To find an answer to this important question, I revisited the sources.

3.6.1. Satuk Buğra Khan

Who was Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan?

The father of Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan, whose date of birth is unknown and who passed away in 955 after ruling for 31 years, was Karahanlı.

D He was Buğra Khan from the Khan family. Following his father's death, he grew up under the protection of his uncle and stepfather, Oğulçak Kadir Khan. Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan facilitated the conversion of hundreds of thousands of people of Turkish descent to Islam around 1100 years ago.

When Satuk Buğra was just twelve years old, a dispute over the throne arose among the princes of the Samanid Empire, which ruled over Mâverâünnehir and the Khorasan region, the heartland of Turkestan. Ebû Nasr bin Ahmed, one of the Samanid heirs, sought refuge with Satuk Buğra's uncle, Oğulçak Kadir Khan, the ruler of the Karakhanids. Oğulçak Kadir Khan treated the Samanid prince Nasr bin Ahmed well and left him in charge of the town of Artush in Eastern Turkistan. Thanks to Nasr bin Ahmed's great efforts and the activity generated by Muslim merchants travelling to and from the region, the city of Artush quickly became an important centre in Turkestan. Around this time, Satuk Buğra, who had recently entered his rebellious phase, visited Artuş for reasons unknown to us. He met Abu Nasr bin Ahmed and learned from him—and more likely from the religious scholars under his patronage—the principles of Islam.- and was honoured to become a Muslim, taking the first name "Abdülkerim" and henceforth being known as Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan.

The Karakhanid Dynasty, the first Muslim Turkic state to establish sovereignty in Turkestan and Transoxiana, ruled the region for 372 years between 840 and 1212.

Following the destruction of the Uyghur State by the Kyrgyz in 840, Bilge Kül Kadir Khan founded the Karakhanid State in the steppes of Central Asia. The Karakhanids and the Samanid State fought for supremacy in Transoxiana.

After Bilge Kül Kadir Khan's death, his empire was divided among his sons as his legacy. Of Bilge Kül Kadir Khan's two sons, Bazır Arslan Khan ruled as the "Great Khan" in Balasagun, while his brother Oğulçak Kadir Khan ruled as the "Middle Khan" in Taraz. Oğulçak Kadir Khan, in the west, fought continuously with Ismail bin Ahmed, ruler of the Samanids, for supremacy in Turkistan. When the Samanids captured Taraz in 883, Oğulçak Kadir Khan retreated eastward, establishing his base in Kashgar, where he launched raids on his former homelands that had fallen under Samanid rule.

When Abdülkerim Satuk Bugra Khan reached the age of twenty-five, he declared himself a Muslim and began a struggle for the throne with his uncle Oğulçak Kadir Khan, who was in power. He first won the "Fergana War" and captured the "Atbaşı Castle". He then marched on Kashgar with an army of three thousand men, conquered the throne centre of Kashgar, and Oğulçak Kadir Khan lost his life.

In 924, Bazır Arslan Khan, who ruled the eastern part of the Karakhanid Empire, sought help from the Chinese against Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan and launched the "Balasagun War," in which Satuk Buğra Khan emerged victorious. After the victory in the Balasagun War, Satuk Buğra Khan converted all of Turkistan to Islam.

Abdulkerim Satuk Buğra Khan then, through subsequent wars, quickly captured the Turkestan cities where Turkic tribes such as the Yağma, Çiğil, and Oğuz had settled, one by one.

Abdülkerîm Satuk Buğra Khan achieved political unity throughout Turkistan as the sovereign ruler of his country. Islam, the religion of Turkistan's powerful ruler, spread rapidly throughout the Turkish lands under the guidance of Islamic scholars such as Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad and many others whose names are unknown.

Abdülkerîm Satuk Buğra Khan, who died in 955 in the town of Artush near Kashgar, was buried in Artush. After him, his sons, first Musa Tunga and then Baytaş Süleyman Arslan, ruled the Karakhanid throne.

His sons followed in the footsteps of Sultan Abdulkerim Satuk Buğra Khan, and during their reign, many scholars and Sufis came to Turkistan to preach Islam and carry out their work of guidance. While Oğulçak Kadir Khan was engaged in raids against the Samanids, his nephew Satuk Buğra Khan won the throne struggle against his uncle with the help of the Turkic peoples who had converted to Islam, becoming the sole ruler of the Karakhanid state. At the beginning of the tenth century, he announced that the Karakhanid state had adopted Islam as its religion.

It is clear that during this historical period of Abdulkerim Satuk Buğra Khan's life, his character as an "alp" (warrior) was more prominent than his character as an "eren" (saint). For this reason, it is more understandable to seek the roots of Hazret-i Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi's acceptance of Abdülkerîm Satuk Buğra Khan as a 'conqueror of hearts' with the title of 'Pir-i muğan' in the Abdülkerîm Satuk Buğra Khan Menkıbesi.

The Legend of Abdulkirim Satuk Bugra Khan

-1000 years ago-

During the Mi'raj, our Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was shown the stations of certain souls. Among these souls were all the previous prophets, as well as the stations of some saints. One of these saints occupied a station as magnificent as that of the prophets, accompanied by a group of forty people. The Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) asked Gabriel (peace be upon him) who that person and the forty heroes around him were. Gabriel replied: "This person is not a prophet. He is a sultan who will descend to earth three hundred years after the day you entrusted your soul to the Almighty God and will spread your religion in Turkistan."

Upon receiving this joyful response from Gabriel (peace be upon him), indicating that Turkistan would be honoured with Islam, the Messenger of Allah, Muhammad Mustafa (peace and blessings be upon him), rejoiced greatly. After returning from the Mi'raj, he began to pray day and night for the soul of this blessed Sultan who would open Turkistan to Islam. Meanwhile, he had also mentioned this blessed Being to his generous companions, and they wished to see the spirit of this Being. Upon this request, the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) prayed that the spirit of the Being he had seen during the Mi'raj would be made visible to people. By the blessing of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) and his prayer for this purpose, one day, while he was sitting with his companions, forty armed horsemen suddenly appeared before them. They approached the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his companions, greeting them respectfully. These horsemen were the spirits of forty warriors, led by Satuk Buğra Khan. Thus, the companions' wish was fulfilled.

Years after this miraculous vision, a son was born to Bazır Buğra Khan, the Sultan of Kashgar in Turkistan. They named him Satuk Buğra Khan. On the day Buğra Khan was born

there were great earthquakes; water sources dried up. When the fortune tellers, who were asked to interpret these unusual natural events, realised that Satuk Buğra Khan would abandon the religion of his ancestors and become a Muslim when he grew up, they advised the Sultan to have his son killed. However, Satuk's mother cried out that the fortune tellers were lying and protected her son. She begged the Sultan, saying that one day, when Satuk Buğra Khan grew up, the fortune tellers' prediction would come true, and if her son became a Muslim, she requested that he be killed on that day. Thus, she prevented Satuk Buğra Khan from being killed.

When Satuk Buğra Khan reached the age of twelve, he went hunting with forty friends. In the forest where they went hunting, he began chasing a rabbit that appeared before him. He became so engrossed in chasing the hare that he lost track of his friends and got lost deep in the forest. Satuk Buğra Khan watched in amazement as the hare, which had been running away from his horse, suddenly stopped and transformed into an old man before his eyes. It became clear to Satuk Buğra Khan that this old man was Khizr Aleyhisselam, and he listened intently to his advice. Khizr Aleyhisselam invited Satuk Buğra Khan to Islam, made him bear witness, and explained to him one by one all the requirements of the religion and what he would do to spread Islam.

Some time later, Satuk Buğra Khan's father passed away, and according to Turkish custom, Satuk Buğra Khan's uncle, Oğul-çak Kadir Khan, became the new khan. Some time later, Satuk Buğra Khan received a spiritual sign and invited his uncle to convert to Islam. When his uncle rejected his nephew's invitation to Islam, the place where he sat on the throne split open, and Satuk Buğra Khan's uncle was buried in the split and disappeared. As his uncle died in such a cautionary manner and had no heir to succeed him, Satuk Buğra Khan was enthroned. And Satuk Buğra Khan became ruler, just as Hızır Aleyhisselâm had indicated years before.

Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan won all the wars he waged against his enemies. In battle, his fiery shouts scorched his foes; when he turned his sword against the enemy, it instantly grew forty arshins long. For this reason, the fame of Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan's sword not only subdued his enemies but also spread throughout the four corners of Turkistan and as far as China and Machin. In this manner, Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan, who had established his dominion throughout all of Turkestan, died in 955, shortly after returning to his homeland of Kashgar in obedience to a divine command.

3.6.2. “Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata”

-1000 years later-

Following the tragic accident on 5 March 2009 that claimed the life of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, the events that unfolded during his grand funeral ceremony, particularly during his burial and/or The alive spiritual climate that prevailed among our people afterwards gave me the impression that a process similar to that which elevated Satuk Buğra Khan to the status of a perfect guide within the two centuries following his death could occur. Especially since Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's body was entrusted to eternity at the Taceddin Sultan dervish lodge, a place where the roots of Anatolia's spiritual source are planted, deepened these feelings even further...

Who knows, perhaps without waiting two centuries, the "Legend of Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata" will echo in the spiritual skies of this country...

As I watched with misty eyes the hundreds of thousands of worshippers gathered in the courtyard of the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara, and the people of the country filling the courtyard of the Taceddin Sultan dervish lodge, part of the Hacettepe Karacabey complex, and the surrounding roads to capacity, I believe some must have shared my feeling: As Remzi Oğuz Arık succinctly put it, the process of transformation from "geography to homeland" is still ongoing.

Who knows, perhaps some people have already begun to see "Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata" in their dreams, or have started making vows to dedicate their good deeds to his soul in order to open up their daughters' fortunes...

How can we create a 'Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata Legend' based on what has been written about Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu today? To guess this, we need to read the Legend of Abdülkerim Satuk Buğra Khan over and over again...

Truthfully, it is worth reading—and even writing about...

***The Nationalist's Loyalty to 'President Muhsin': The
Epic of 'Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata' Has Been Written***

As in every anniversary year, with 25 March approaching, commemorative events and radio/TV programmes have begun in various circles to mark the anniversary of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's death. I was informed of such a commemoration by an email signed by Prof. Dr. Turan Güven, President of the Selçuklu Foundation. While watching the TV programme mentioned in the email, what was said would have implications for me beyond memories related to President Muhsin. In this state of mind' on the night of 19 March 2012, I set everything else aside and began watching the programme.

Assassination? Accident? And so on...

TV-Net presenter Veyis Ateş's "Gündem Özel" programme featured Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's brother-in-law, AKP MP Nevzat Pakdil, along with Lütfi Şahsuvaroğlu and Burhan Kavuncu, two of the leading nationalist youth figures from before 12 September. For me, what Lütfi Şahsuvaroğlu and Burhan Kavuncu had to say about 'Muhsin

President." I was particularly expecting Şahsuvaroğlu to expand on the discourse he had partially touched upon in his article titled "Our Muhsin" and say something new.

However, after Nevzat Pakdil's lengthy interview, which consisted of some familiar repetitions, perhaps due to certain sensitivities arising from his family and the political circumstances he found himself in, host Veyis Ateş's questions to his nationalist guests focused on the "accident" in which Muhsin President lost his life; and his insistence on the conspiracies behind this accident confined the topic to a detective story-like analysis, I would say.

Finally, in the last part of the programme, Muhsin Başkan's words, consisting of a few sentences explaining his ideological position, and the very brief mention of Kavuncu and Şahsuvaroğlu's memories and comments dashed my expectations at the beginning of the programme. Neither Kavuncu addressed the reasons for his shift towards radical Islamism and his subsequent break with the nationalist movement and, in a sense, with Muhsin Başkan; nor did Şahsuvaroğlu address the process of the evolution of the Islamic nature of the nationalist movement, which I define as the "influence of Nizâm-ı Âlem in the nationalist movement". (In fact, it has long been a source of frustration for me that in many TV programmes, a few people are invited as guests, but the programme ends without ever getting to the heart of the matter, without anyone being able to say what they want to say.)

Towards the end of the programme, some sections of an interview conducted by Ateş on 24 February 2009, approximately one month before Muhsin Başkan's martyrdom, were broadcast, along with a recording of a telephone conversation with his daughter Firuze Yazıcıoğlu at the very end of the programme.

Muhsin Başkan's Political Identity or "Nationalist Nationalism"

In the programme I mentioned was played back – recorded on 24 February 2009, about a month before Muhsin Başkan's death – Yazıcıoğlu expressed his discomfort with the positioning of the party he founded (and led throughout his life) somewhere between the RP and the MHP. Among his remarks, one sentence struck me as significant. In this noteworthy sentence, Muhsin Başkan defined himself as follows: "I am not a 'statist nationalist'; I am a 'populist nationalist'..."

Listening to President Muhsin's words, I couldn't help but wonder whether, after the "positive/negative nationalism" I mentioned in my previous article, we would now have to deal with the distinction between "populist/statist nationalisms".

I am certain that when Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu says "statist nationalism," he is referring to the claims of secularist/elitist cadres, now called the "nationalist movement," who are distant from religion and even, in some cases, racist. However, articulating such a distinction also implies discomfort with the state/nation dichotomy.

As idealistic youths, we once had a discourse that implied the "sacred state" could do no wrong, arguing that the source of all evil was the "system that must be destroyed". How often was our slogan, "Down with the System, Long Live the State," written on magazine covers, walls, faculty benches... (Now, based on President Muhsin's words, should we also pray for Dadaloğlu and say, "*If the state belongs to others, the nation belongs to us*"?!...)

Just as our expectation of a "sacred state" before 12 September was a fantasy, today is not the time to dream of a "sacred nation" either.

The best thing is not to add new pages to the "book of confused minds"; neither "statist nationalism" nor "nationalist nationalism" appeals to me... Nationalism is simply nationalism; the nationalism of the Turkish nation: Turkish Nationalism...

"The Turkishistan Yeast"

During the programme, which lasted nearly an hour and a half, my dear friend Lütü Şahsuvaroğlu once again spoke the original three or five words: While explaining President Muhsin's world of ideas, he mentioned the "Turkistan Yeast" analogy he used to describe his idealistic attitude, which was exquisite. When defining the 'Turkistan yeast', he gave the example of the yeast that turns milk into yoghurt: Regardless of its origin or the container it is placed in, this yeast transforms all milk into a single entity, yoghurt... Throughout a thousand years of Turkish history, the "Turkistan Yeast" was a yeast that made every person of every race and creed who touched the Turks into Turks; a blessed yeast that transformed those it touched into a single identity, our yeast...

Şahsuvaroğlu, constrained by the programme's time limit, was unable to say it, but I know he was aware that the patent for the "Turkistan Yeast" he referred to as the "yeast that touched the Turk" was registered by Hz. Pir-i Türkistan Yesevi...

Şahsuvaroğlu, hastily listing them off, barely managed to salvage from the host the statements: "the necessity of possessing a thousand-year-old lineage for devotion to the path of Allah"; "embracing the future together with the past," and especially "why the 'Oğuz beys' could never become 'hans' in this country."

***An Incident That Must Now Be Forgotten –
and Remembered for Being Forgotten***

A topic repeatedly brought up in almost every programme commemorating Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu is why Muhsin Chairman left the MHP to establish another party. It is now tiresome that those who keep bringing up this debate about the split with the MHP, which no longer has any theoretical or practical meaning or significance, are people who have not the slightest idea about the inner workings of either community.

It is now time to abandon the recklessness of certain figures who have endured the trials of idealism – for whatever reason – falling into the trap of those who stir up this issue and saying things they believe to be meaningful.

One should fear the consequences of the damage this recklessness causes in the minds of today's young nationalists. It is beyond saddening that the youth of today's nationalist movement, whose values have become meaningless, hurt each other as advocates of a meaningless division; it also weakens Turkish nationalism and causes our country to bleed.

As someone who has personally questioned the two highest-ranking figures involved in this matter, I am addressing this issue for the first and last time: From the "Call for National Consensus" process that led to Muhsin Başkan's departure from the MHP to his death, there was virtually no theoretical or practical justification for maintaining the split during the last 10 years of the 16-year period.

To readers who will rightly ask, "Then why was the separation maintained?", I will say only this, noting that there are aspects of the issue that concern both sides: Psychological reasons...

‘The Epic of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu’

Yusuf Akgül, drawing on my article titled "Two Alp-Eren: Satuk Buğra Khan and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu" ^[3], made the following promise to the idealists:

"Turkic World researcher Hayati Bice's; Karahanid khan Satuk Buğra Khan and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu between

*-Despite the long period of approximately 1000 years between them-
established various connections both in terms of statesmanship and
spirituality with "Two Alp-Eren: Satuk Buğra Khan and Muhsin
Yazıcıoğlu; The Sanctification of State Officials in Turkish Historical
Tradition" is an extremely noteworthy work in terms of evaluating the
"Turkish Tradition of Legendary Narrative" and revealing a historical
truth. (...) In a piece of wisdom from Hoca Ahmed Yesevi, who lived two
centuries after him:*

"Is Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan / The Great Pir?"

(Is Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan not the "Great Pir"?)

*ra Han was both a statesman and a spiritual leader; the late Muhsin
Yazıcıoğlu was both an organisational politician and a man of heart and
spirituality. (...) I have witnessed such accounts, events, and legends
about him that if I were to collect and write them down, it would become
an epic... As an epic poet, I will, God willing, compile and evaluate these
and write the "Epic of Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata."*

Now, let's get to the surprise of that night that I never expected: I learned that Yusuf Akgül had fulfilled his promise to write "Muhsin Ata Destanı" on the TVNet programme I mentioned. Many of the poems he wrote after Muhsin Baş-kan's death were recited to me by Lütü Şahsuvaroğlu, and a section of the book "Şiir Şiir Muhsin Başkan" (Poem Poem Muhsin President), which Yusuf Akgül and Lütü Şahsuvaroğlu created together, was "Muhsin Ata Destanı". Now, reading this book, especially the section "The Epic of Muhsin Ata," as a cherished memory is a debt of loyalty for every idealist.

The loyalty of an idealist should be as noble as his cause...

May the Almighty be pleased with Yazıcıoğlu Muhsin Ata; Muhsin Başkan's sacred spirit is also with us...

[1] "Is Sultan Satuk Buğra Khan not the 'Great Pir'?"

The term "Pir-i muğân" appears 49 times in the Divan-i Hikmet. "Respected," "Exalted" Pir ; used in the sense of "pioneer of Sufism," this term is sometimes used in certain hikmets to refer to the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.v.), but generally describes the "earlier spiritual guides" in the lineage of Ahmed Yesevi.

See Hoca Ahmed Yesevi, Divan-i Hikmet, (Edited by Dr. Hayati Bice), Expanded Fifth Edition; Published by Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, Ankara-2009.

[2] You can watch the recording of the programme at the following address: <http://tvnet.tv.tr/> (Agenda Special Programme archive / 19 March 2012)

[3] My article received very interesting responses. Many people informed me that they named their sons "Muhsin Ata" because of my article and that they saw "Muhsin Ata" in their dreams, as I mentioned in my article.

<http://www.haber10.com/makale/15127/>

3.7. *‘Muhsin President’s Modest Legacy’*

Z How quickly time flies... In an article in this book, I predicted that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu would become a symbolic figure in Turkish history, like Satuk Buğra Khan. 25
March 2000, and exactly eight years have passed since his martyrdom in a helicopter crash that has been clouded by new allegations every day. The scenes I witnessed on the day we laid Muhsin Chairman to rest in his eternal resting place, the grave in the Taceddin Dergâh cemetery, after the magnificent funeral prayer we held for him at Kocatepe Mosque, still linger before my eyes. That day, we did not just bid farewell to a political figure, but to a youth leader; a man of conviction, a shining star of our generation.

Since that day, we have often remembered our dear Muhsin; the unexpected departure of one of the most important individuals who stood ready to overcome our nation's ill fortune has left a deep, lingering ache in our hearts. There are still many among our long-suffering generation who feel this pain has not subsided, despite the years that have passed...

In these days when the heart-wrenching sorrow fuelled by the emotionally charged atmosphere following the helicopter crash has somewhat subsided through submission to divine will, I have some important testimonies to share regarding Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's political mission and the influence of sect-community connections on the shaping of the right-wing political climate in Turkey. I believe it is beneficial to record these testimonies, especially on the eve of an important election.

The name "Fetih Party" is supposedly 'radical'!

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who always proudly declared his affiliation with the "idealist movement," left the MHP, the main political body of that movement, and following the publication of a declaration entitled "Call for *National Consensus*," travelled around Anatolia to meet with various opinion leaders to organise a new "party." Ultimately, the decision was made to organise a new political party centred on the "Turkish-Islamic Ideal." During the party's founding meetings, the name "**Fetih Party**" gained traction. ⁽¹⁾ It was later learned that an academic figure who had contributed to the drafting of the "Call for *National Consensus*" declaration, which announced the split with the MHP, had objected to this name, pointing out that the word "*Fetih*" had a background that would particularly irritate Western circles, and that the political organisation of the 'Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu Movement' was named "*Great Unity*."

However, presenting the word "*conquest*" solely as "military capture, invasion" reflected a narrow perspective that would never be acceptable to an academic. This is because the root of the word "conquest" comes from the verb "to open," and, as indicated by the name "el-Fettâh" from Allah's Beautiful Names, it carries the meaning of spiritual conquest rather than physical conquest. The phrase "conquering hearts" in our language had already permeated everyday speech as an expression that perfectly reflected this spiritual meaning of the word and held great potential for opening doors to fill the messages to be conveyed to the public with Islamic content. On the other hand, the word "Fatih" (Conqueror), which is automatically associated with the word "conquest," would also be a key that would facilitate work in front of society as a code name for a symbolism that is unparalleled in Turkish history.

Ultimately, what was to be happened, and the name "Great Unity Party" was registered. With the symbol of the "rose" representing the Messenger of Allah (s.a.v.) within the "crescent" signifying Allah, "Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's Party" took its place in our political history. In the sufficiently long period that has passed since then, it has not been possible to realise the grand Unity initially targeted with this party, nor has it been possible to provide a roof for unity among the various organisations of the Islamic segment. The esteemed academic who opposed the name "Fetih"—it is unknown where he stands today—but the "Great Unity" party has never managed to break out of the "others" category in elections. ⁽²⁾

Yet, What Promises Were Made When Setting Out?

In fact, before the establishment of the "Great Unity," all the large and small centres of the Islamic community that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu had contacted had conveyed their sympathy to him and, mostly implicitly, expressed their promises of support. ^[3]

It was fascinating to hear about his connections with the prominent figurehead of a community that has now become very famous—and consequently very powerful—based solely on the account of a friend who witnessed that meeting. The community leader who has now attained a level of influence that is taken seriously even across the oceans

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, interestingly welcomed him with some intriguing individuals by his side and said: *"We have never been distant from your community. This friend's elder brother was the provincial chairman of the MHP in Izmir; the other person beside me, our college director, the 'wrestler captain of the sea', was raised in the Ülkü Ocakları (ideological youth organisation)".*

According to those present, with these words, the community leader encouraged Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu to launch a political movement and leave the MHP; or, at least, that was the impression formed by those who visited him.

It is said that what most convinced Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu that the political movement he would initiate would be a 'Great Unity' umbrella in the Islamic community was his contact with this community leader.^[5]

The Hypocrisy in the Relationship Between Politics and Sufi Orders

All of this is not new information for anyone familiar with the relationships within the right-wing political sphere in our country. It is also known that during the formative phase of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's political movement, he included individuals representing certain Islamic groups in his party's administrative bodies, and that some of these individuals were appointed to senior positions within the party leadership. However, to understand how all this close contact and display of sympathy was reflected at the ballot box, one need only look at the election results achieved by the Great Unity movement. Islamic group and community leaders, who almost always appreciated, encouraged, and praised Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, both openly and behind his back, have always shied away from supporting Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's party with their votes at the ballot box. This is due to these groups' habit of always siding with the powerful and pragmatically protecting their immediate and long-term interests. It is known that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, who was initially deeply saddened—and even sometimes angered—by this hypocrisy that he could not reconcile with Islamic personalities, eventually came to view the situation as an '*end-time disease*' with the indifference of a wise man, reaching the point where he said, "***We are responsible for the journey, not the victory.***"

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and the Great Sufi Masters

Everyone close to Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu knows that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's contact and relationship with religious communities and orders was not limited to that community alone. There is hardly any Sufi leader living in our country, nor any Islamic organisation, large or small, that has not come face to face with Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu on one occasion or another... The period of cooperation between him and Prof. Dr. Mahmud Esad Coşan, who carried the İskenderpaşa tradition to new horizons in the last years of his life, was a period witnessed by almost everyone, and the quality of this cooperation was high in every sense. (In the picture accompanying our article, Coşan and Yazıcıoğlu appear together in the same frame during a programme they attended together in Australia). After his death, Ahmed Mahmud Ünlü, known as Cübbeli Ahmed Hoca, also stated in various TV programmes as a living witness that he had met with the spiritual leader of Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's sect, known as the 'İsmailağa Community', on several occasions in environments where he himself was also present.

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's interest in Sufism cannot be explained solely by political expediency. After the coup d'état of 12 September 1980, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu spent 7.5 years in Mamak Prison, 5.5 of them in solitary confinement, during which time he developed a dervish-like resignation.

Looking at the books he read in prison, which the nationalist prisoners called the "Medrese-i Yusûfiye," it is immediately apparent that, in addition to his efforts to develop his Islamic consciousness, he also gave considerable thought to both the theory and practice of Sufism.

Therefore, it is necessary to understand that his words, recorded in one of his last conversations, *"In a life where we have no guarantee for the next two seconds, where we cannot control even one second, there is no need to be a spin doctor!"* were not spoken by chance, but reflected a state of mind reflecting a contented soul.

there is no need to be a spin doctor!" were not spoken by chance, but rather reflected a state of mind that was the expression of a contented soul.

Our Chairman Muhsin honoured the first session of the *Divan-ı Hikmet Readings* programme, which I began at the Selçuklu Foundation in Ankara in 2004, with his presence. In his eloquent speech, he pointed out the importance of Hazret Sultan Yesevî in Turkish history and showed that his interest in Sufism continued to deepen.

To Be a Muhîb, Not a Mürîd...

About a year before his martyrdom, on Tuesday, 19 February 2008, I visited Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and discussed with him my book ***İşaret Taşları*** (***Signposts***), which I had written on the relationship between spiritual leaders and state officials in Turkish history. While signing the book, the conversation turned to the role of Sufism in Turkish history and the relationship between the spiritual guide and the leader, as exemplified by Ak Şemseddin and Fatih. and the mürşid-leader relationship, as exemplified by Ak Şemseddin and Fatih. At that particular moment, a friend abroad had contacted me with information that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, along with all members of his organisation, would be affiliating with a Sufi leader who had a significant group of followers worldwide. He asked me to verify the accuracy of this important news directly from the source. Therefore, during our conversation, I wanted to ask him directly about the accuracy of the news: *"Is this news about collective affiliation true? Do you consider such an organic relationship between a political organisation and a religious order to be appropriate?"*

I would like to quote Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's response verbatim, as it is now a moment that should be recorded in history: *"I have met with the Sufi master whose name has been mentioned on various occasions, both abroad and in Turkey. He is a person I love and respect, a friend of Allah, a master whose hand I have kissed. **Many people know that I have met with many friends of Allah and kissed their hands.**"*

is already known to everyone... After leaving Mamak, it was always said that I had joined a friend of Allah whom I visited; but I did not join any sheikh in the sense of becoming a disciple of a tarikat. I did not take an oath to join a tarikat. If you say Muhib, then so be it..." Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's words came as a surprise to me too.

Because throughout the nationalist community, it was said—sometimes with negative connotations, but generally as a compliment—that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu was a disciple of Muhammed Raşid Erol ^[6], known as the 'Menzil Sheikh', one of the leading figures of the Naqshbandi community in our country.

More important than Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's explanation of his personal situation were his remarks on the relationship between politics and religious orders. His opinion, based on his experiences in this regard, was as follows: Both communities that could be described as Sufi and other Islamically-oriented groups acted with concrete expectations from the political leaders and organisations they supported. Therefore, they behaved in a calculating rather than a sincere manner; although this ultimately led to disappointment in terms of serving the greater good, their attitude did not change.

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu expressed how the relationship between politics and religious orders should be, with observations that everyone involved in politics should carefully examine, in the following words:

"The Relationship Between Politics and Sufi Orders Must Be 'Secular'"

"I cannot say to what extent politicians derive power from the political support of sectarian circles, but from our party's perspective, we have not seen any benefit from sects and communities reflected in the ballot box. They always flattered us, saying 'you are lions, you are tigers', but when it came to voting, they supported all political parties up to Ecevit's DSP

in any election; they never openly supported any of our candidates—not even once.

When it comes to the relationship between politics and religious orders, based on my 15 years of political experience, I believe that the relationship between politicians and spiritual leaders should be conducted on a secular basis. In other words, to use the well-known expression, **religious orders should not interfere in politics, nor should politics interfere in the workings of religious orders.** Any relationship developed between politicians and members of religious orders based on mutual interest will eventually become detrimental to both the order and politics. Members of a community within a party organisation eventually begin to act like a party within a party and, **perceiving every decision taken outside their own initiative as tantamount to apostasy, reflect this view to others, causing incredible discord.** I never imagined that Sufi people could cause such disruption that no one else could, but unfortunately, I have seen it in my political life..."

Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu later named some of these examples of disruption, but I do not wish to name names on this subject so as not to cause controversy that would hurt his noble spirit. I can only say that he remembered Prof. Dr. Mahmud Esad Coşan ⁽¹⁷¹⁾, a well-known Naqshbandi spiritual guide in our country's religious circles, with feelings of loyalty, his eyes filled with tears, and with mercy and gratitude during our conversation. -he has since passed away in a suspicious accident-

The Stance of Sufi Orders in the 2011 Elections

As much as this article sheds light on history, it also prompts reflection on the question: *"What direction will the influence of communities and Sufi orders take in our country's social life in the upcoming elections and beyond? Or what direction should it take?"*

I hope it will also be useful for those who wish to do so. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who is running for his first election as the leader of the CHP, has indicated during his public statements that sects and religious orders should be legalised and their social functions monitored within a more legal framework, suggesting that this issue will be debated in the political arena in the coming days. It is possible to view as a positive development the fact that the left-wing political circles in our country have also recognised the "*sect* reality," which all right-wing political parties face with sometimes unpleasant demands during every election period, as a "*social* phenomenon." There is no doubt that discussing this issue primarily at an academic level will make Turkish political practice more rational and understandable.

While it is almost entirely unknown how influential the votes associated with 'community and sect circles' will be in shaping the 2011 election results, the actions and statements of the political actors vying for these votes will be followed with interest in the coming period.

[1] The Zaman newspaper reported that Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu would submit the founding declaration of his party to the Ministry of the Interior on 29 January 1993, under the headline "Fetih Party is being established".

[2] Let no one infer from my words that I underestimate Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's superhuman efforts in carrying his party for years – almost single-handedly – and especially his heroic resistance during the 28 February process.

[3] If Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu kept a diary documenting his political contacts, I am certain that the notes he took about those days contain extremely illuminating elements for the present. I also hope that the esteemed researcher and writer Hakkı Öznur, who documented the history of the "Ülkücü Movement" in five large volumes, will produce a separate study on the subject of "Great Unity" that sheds light on those days.

[4] In this regard, reports by US embassy officials on the aforementioned community and its leader were selected from the Wikileaks documents and made public in recent days through the Taraf newspaper.

[5] Although allegations have been made that the leader of the community in question provided Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu with support beyond mere verbal encouragement, these claims have not gone beyond being rumours aimed at political undermining.

[6] Muhammed Rasid Erol, leader of the religious group known as the Menzil community, passed away in 1993. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's visit to this Naqshbandi sheikh in the village of Menzil in the Kahta district of Adıyaman immediately after his release from Mamak Prison indicates Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's

It was understood as pledging allegiance to the spiritual guide. In fact, in some statements made to the press following the death of President Muhsin, leading members of the community presented Yazıcıoğlu as a follower of the community, a disciple. It is known that many members of the nationalist community belong to this community and that some members of this community held positions in the upper management of the BBP during Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's lifetime. Some of these managers later lost their status and managerial positions during Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's lifetime.

[7] The cooling of relations between the Welfare Party and Prof. Dr. Mahmud Esad Coşan played a role in his political rapprochement with Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu. For an important article explaining Prof. Dr. Mahmud Esad Coşan's stance on this matter, see: "A Party and Us," *Islam Magazine*, July 1990, Editorial;

<http://www.iskenderpasa.com/A25FF411-8956-4C62-B528-8824B72EB7DE.aspx>

3.8. The Dark-Haired Youth of the Taurus Mountains: Ali Güngör

A Like many other nationalists, I could not accept Güngör's departure from the MHP. I first met him during the 12 September period when Mayaş launched the Töre magazine. As a witness to Ali Güngör being one of the symbolic figures of the nationalist movement, it could not have been otherwise.

Ali Güngör, who held the title of MHP İçel Deputy, took the floor in the General Assembly during the discussions on the conditional release law and delivered a speech in which he heavily criticised Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. According to the decision of the Disciplinary Committee to which he was referred, dated 10 January 2001, Güngör was expelled from the MHP indefinitely and subsequently severed his ties with the party by not responding to invitations made personally by Devlet Bahçeli. However, he always lived as the elder brother of the idealists – and of course mine too – and thus completed his life.

After Güngör changed the agenda with his brief speech in the Grand National Assembly and left the MHP in an undesirable manner to become an independent member of parliament, my wife and I visited him in his private office to discuss the consequences of his speech and how his relationship with the MHP could be repaired. Ali Güngör, who was reluctant to return to the MHP, emphasised that he would continue in politics on his own path. I asked him if there were any names who would join him on this path, as he said it could not be walked alone.

At that time, the MHP was represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly by more than 120 MPs, and if two of them could have joined forces with Ali Güngör, it could have opened up a new chapter in the political arena for the nationalist movement. Ali Güngör responded to my question with a smile that his friends knew so well and that suited him perfectly, saying, *"Doctor, all my friends are preoccupied with securing a place on the list for the upcoming elections. Who would join me on a journey with an unknown destination?"*

Political developments changed direction rapidly, the coalition Ali Güngör criticised crumbled, and early elections became inevitable. And most of those calculating MPs who shied away from standing shoulder to shoulder with Ali Güngör never saw the Grand National Assembly again. It is my duty to record this here as a note that should be noted in history.

Ali Güngör's relationship with the MHP reaching breaking point did not escape the attention of Ruşen Çakır, known for his analyses of the nationalist movement. He recorded his notes from his meeting with Ali Güngör, whom he interviewed for his work *"Where Have These Nationalists Gone?"*, as follows:

"One of the most interesting MPs elected to Parliament from the MHP lists in 1999 was Ali Güngör, MP for Mersin. Sentenced to 12 years in prison before 12 September, Güngör was released two years later after benefiting from an amnesty. Years later, Güngör took the floor in Parliament to speak personally on another amnesty bill and levelled harsh criticism at Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. Güngör's expulsion from the MHP divided the nationalist base. With his popularity rising following the election defeat, Güngör answered our questions as follows:

"I have always had the support of patriots who want justice, who are in favour of the country's independence and the unity of the nation. But it is true that I was largely abandoned by the officials, responsible persons and members of parliament in the MHP.

it is true that I was largely left alone by the authorised and responsible persons and members of parliament. Of course, I am pleased and happy that everyone is talking now. I am not mistaken, and I am proud and hold my head high because I did not participate in the wrongdoings. Ali Güngör was expelled because of a speech he made from the parliamentary podium, a speech that the whole nation agreed was right. In fact, it was not Ali Güngör who was expelled. With this decision, the MHP leaders expelled justice and loyalty. They separated the MHP from its essence, its spirit. A body separated from its essence and spirit becomes a corpse. The Turkish nation is surely not looking for a corpse to govern itself. It is looking for a movement formed by people who are knowledgeable and courageous, filled with the fear of God, as a whole with their essence, spirit and body. It will continue to search until it finds it. (...)

As idealists, we must first be able to answer the following questions correctly:

** How can we become representatives of an understanding that places the country's independence, the unity of the nation, justice and loyalty above all else, and how can we make the nation believe in this again?*

** What is needed to give people confidence that the Turkish state can be honourable and that our people can be happy and proud to be citizens of the Republic of Turkey?*

** What is needed for the people to believe again when they say what they will and will not do?*

** Can the issue of unity be resolved with phrases like 'let's come together' or 'let's be one, let's be strong'?*

** When one of the groups running for office wins, can signs be given that the others will not break away?*

** What must be done to become an institutionalised movement rather than one based on individuals?*

Responsibility lies with the central administration of the MHP, provincial and district administrators, mayors, grand congress delegates, the general chairman, and our friends who are candidates for the general chairmanship. Turkey continues to need projects developed on the basis of a nationalist ideology and idealists. ^{Again}, it is quite clear that there is also a need for a party that will take on the politics of this system of ideas. The answer to whether the MHP will be this party depends on the foresight and decision of the delegates to the grand congress

Ali Güngör, who stated that he had been continuously involved in politics and all the work of the MHP between 1967 and 2000, but that his goal in politics had never been to become a member of parliament, a minister or prime minister, explained the conditions for serving the MHP "without expecting any position or office" as follows:

At every meeting where the late General Chairman of the MHP, Alparslan Türkeş, addressed the public, he would say, "Political parties are established to serve the country and our nation. In this regard, we respect all parties and their leaders. As citizens, we should look at these parties and give our vote and support to whichever one presents the programme and project that will best serve the country and the nation and works towards it. We have seen that many have made numerous promises, come to power, but have not done any of what they said they would do. Instead of serving the nation and the country, they are pursuing other things. We must immediately abandon such parties and find a party that will serve. Parties are not religions, and the idea that 'I would renounce my religion but not my party' is very wrong. You don't support a party like you support a football team."

Ali Güngör understood politics and the party in this way, and accepted it as such. He conveyed this to our people in his party activities. He won over citizens who were voting for other parties to his own party in this manner.

I was in this party, the MHP, and held positions of responsibility. Because this party defended universal justice against all forms of imperialism and aimed to achieve it. It stated that oppressed nations and people under capitalist and communist exploitation, including the Turks, who were among the most oppressed in the world, had the right to live a humane, free and honourable life, that realising this was a historical and moral duty of the Turks, and it presented this as its "Ideal".

The MHP stood firm and resolute like a rock.

This party aimed to carry the ideas of Ziya Gökalp and the great leader Atatürk, who declared, "Complete independence is my character," into the 21st century. While respecting the independence of all nations, it adopted the principle that the dignity and honour of the Turkish Nation could only be protected and elevated through complete independence. For this reason, it argued that joining communities such as the EU, thereby transferring sovereignty to some extent to other states and communities, was unacceptable.

This party stood firm and resolute against any words or actions that could harm national unity and brotherhood. It asserted that, apart from the minorities recognised at Lausanne, the people living within the borders of the Misak-ı Milli, including northern Iraq, were one people, that the name of the nation formed by this people was the Turkish Nation, and that its language was Turkish. It was the voice of the man who would say, "What mosaic, damn it?" to those who claimed that the people living in this geography were a mixture, a flower garden, a mosaic.

Because this party stated that the regime implemented in the country was not democracy but deception, saying, "I am calling you not to the democracy sold on the streets for the price of spinach, but to the path of justice, the path of truth, the Third Way, in short, the path of Allah," and promised to bring national democracy that would ensure our people's organised participation in governance and in the decisions to be taken in governance.

Because this party was opposed to both the Communist-Marxist system and the Liberal-Capitalist system. It was aware that selling the country's resources to multinational corporations under the guise of privatisation, turning Turkish capitalists into overseers and our people into labourers, would above all be a betrayal of humanity.

I was a member of this party and worked within it. Because, etc., etc., etc. And that is what I thought and believed."

(...) From 1967 to 1999, I was a member and part of the leadership of the MHP, whose views and ideas I outlined at the beginning of this article. These views and ideas are diametrically opposed to the views, ideas, and practices of the MHP leadership I listed above between 1999 and 2002. To remain silent in the face of these practices, to accept them, or to speak out and oppose them! This is a matter of character. I could not remain silent, I could not accept it. I did not accept it, I did not remain silent. I said that Nationalists and Idealists would never accept any of this under any circumstances, but as Mr Bahçeli said, I don't know if I was a little mistaken here. He said, "Never mind, they'll forget."

Have they forgotten? What I see is that they are making a great effort to forget, pretending that none of this ever happened. Their hearts ache and their consciences bleed, much like those who have committed a grave sin. They want to forget, forget, forget, to stop the pain in their hearts and the bleeding of their consciences, by resenting everything and everyone that reminds them of this sin. But it is impossible to escape any sin by pretending it was never committed and forgetting it.

Some may say, "Are you the only idealist?", "Are you the only one who knows the truth?" To them I say: No! The thoughts I expressed at the beginning of my article are my own thoughts. Between 1967 and 1999, I was a member of the MHP and worked for that party because I saw this system of thought there at the time. If any party today were to convene a Grand Congress and adopt these ideas as its programme and project, committing itself to the Turkish nation, then we would set aside the work we are currently doing with my friends under the name "Turkish Brotherhood Centre," despite our limited resources, and we would work for that party with all our might.

I feel indebted to this land where I eat my bread and to this nation. I believe we have a responsibility towards our ancestors and our children. I both fear and love Almighty Allah. I find the words of Sheikh Edibali, who said, "Not everything is about this world," to be very true. 'Every soul shall taste death.' I cannot and will not be a slave to anyone for three morsels to eat in this world.

Many people who call themselves idealists and nationalists are calling me. They ask if I am joining the MHP, if I will join. Some say they will complain if I join, others say they will be upset if I don't, because they say we need to save them from this administration.

Although the vast majority choose a party based on which party will benefit them as individuals, which party will get them elected as MPs, which party will get them contracts, for me, parties are established and chosen to serve the country and the nation.

Parties are not religions. I look at the projects and programmes they put forward in terms of service and the policies they implement when they are given authority. Today, I cannot see any party that is even remotely close to the ideology that the MHP, which I was a member of in the past and still believe to be correct, advocates. All parties

I see that they have become identical, that they have all turned into defenders of the liberal-capitalist system of thought. That is why I have no affiliation with any party."

About two years after these interviews, Ali Güngör, a heavy smoker, took stock of his life in a private conversation we had about a month before he was diagnosed with lung cancer. In a reactionary mood brought on by bitterness, he said he would chart his own course, referring to the article entitled "The Third Way" published in the 1960s in the Milli Yol magazine-published article titled "*The Third Way*," stating that he would chart a new path for himself. To ease the tension, Ali Ağabey, I am 53 years old. How old are you?" He understood my intention in asking this question and, smiling, replied, "I am 62 years old, doctor," thus sweetly closing the topic that had caused the tension, and we parted ways.

Finally, on 25 March 2012, we gathered to sign his memoir *My Struggle* ⁽¹²⁾. In his memoir, he courageously recounted his experiences during the process of breaking away from the MHP and noted that despite Bahçeli's sincere invitations on two occasions, he closed the MHP chapter with the stubbornness of a Toros lad. When I pointed out that he himself was not happy about this stubbornness, as evident in the important lines he wrote, he smiled again and gave the evasive answer, "*What had to happen happened, what should have happened happened*," which is still vivid in my memory.

May his soul rest in peace.

[1] Ruşen Çakır, "Where Have These Idealists Gone?", <http://rusencakir.com/Nereye-Gitti-Bu-Ulkucu-Ier-10/29>

[2] Ali Güngör, *My Struggle*, TKM Publications, Ankara-2012.

[3] It is known that in the final stages of his illness, he reconciled with his old friend Devlet Bahçeli, who visited him in hospital. After his death, Bahçeli maintained his relationship with the Güngör family with his characteristic nobility; but even today, I cannot help repeating: If only some things could have been different...

3.9. The Nameless Heroes of the Nationalist Movement

Since the nationalist-idealist movement entered the political arena as the MHP, there have been thousands of heroes besides the few whose names I have mentioned. Some of these heroes sacrificed their lives, while others sacrificed their wealth in the effort to achieve the goal of Turkish nationalism succeeding in politics.

I have pointed out the significance of the martyrs of the idealist movement in the conceptual world of *the idealist movement* in my article titled "*Martyrdom in the Formation of the Idealist Consciousness*" in my book *Notes on the Idealist Movement*.^[1] The following words of Leader Alparslan Türkeş should remain in the minds of everyone who is involved in politics within the MHP or is considering becoming involved: "*They often appear in my dreams. They pass before my eyes as if in a parade: Yusuf İmamoğlu walking arm in arm with Oruç Reis, Dursun Önkuzu, Süleyman Özmen, Erdem Arabacı, Ercüment Yahnici, and Gün Sazak, all martyrs... My sleep is disturbed, I rise and seek refuge in God, reciting prayers for their souls. Ercüment comes to mind; even the grave was too small for my child; he did not fit in the grave. Their souls are the guarantee of our existence. May Allah be pleased with them all, may their resting place be paradise.*"

The idealist movement, with its caravan of martyrs stretching from Ruhi Kılıçkiran to Fırat Yılmaz Çakıroğlu, along with thousands of victims, is a social organisation that has paid a heavy price.

Every person who wants to play a role in the political arena within this organisation must be aware of the price paid and must be sensitive in fulfilling the requirements of nationalist morality in their every action.

If this sensitivity is not shown, not only will the souls of the martyrs be tormented, but the lives of those involved in both worlds will be ruined.

This is precisely why engaging in politics within the MHP is a grave responsibility. Those who cannot bear to combine the inevitable worldly calculations of the ruthless arena of politics with the final, unappealable divine reckoning should steer clear of Turkish nationalist politics.

It should be known that the cries of the mothers who sacrificed thousands of children, whom they cherished in the springtime of their lives, for the sake of raising the three crescents, will instantly reach the heavens.

This must be known; for the nameless heroes of the idealist movement, who will never diminish, inform those who do not know.

[1] Hayati Bice, Notes on the Idealist Movement, KD Publishing, 2020.

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