
THE JEWISH PROBLEM



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by

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Introduction.

"Freedom, human rights, emancipation, explation of a thousand year old wrong" - these are such great rights and obligations that the heart of every honest man is certain to respond to their appeal. The mere words are often sufficient to make the cause which is defended by their use popular.

All too often, however, one thinks victory of a cause has been won, if one only uses words which serve so to say as a holy symbol which nobody would dare deny lest he be looked upon as a monster, a scoffer, or a friend of tyranny. Momentary success can be won in this manner, but real victories can not be won this way, nor can real difficulties overcome.

In the course of the present negotiations regarding the Jewish question the great words "liberty, human rights, emancipation" were often heard and applauded; but they did not contribute much to progress in the matter itself, and it will perhaps be useful to abstain for once from using them continuously and instead to give serious thought to the subject under discussion.

The popular interest in the Jewish problem cannot be explained by the merits of its advocates, but only by the fact that the public feels that the emancipation of the Jews is connected with the development of our general conditions.

The advocates of emancipation did not seek out and explain this connection. In a period when not a single power that ruled

the world till now was safe from criticism, Jews and Judaism were left alone. One did not even ask the question as: What are they and whether or not their essence is compatible with freedom were freedom be granted to them.

There is an outcry as if it were treason against humanity if a critic starts to investigate the particular character of the Jew. The very same people' who look on with pleasure when criticism is aimed at Christianity, or who consider such criticism necessary and desirable, are ready to condemn the man who subjects Judaism too to criticism.

So Judaism is privileged: now, when privileges come tumbling down under the blows of criticism; and subsequently after they have fallen?

The advocates of emancipation are therefore in the strange position that they fight against privilege and at the same time grant to Judaism the privilege of unchangeability, immunity, and irresponsibility. They fight for the Jews with the best of intentions, but lack true enthusiasm, for they treat the Jewish problem as a matter foreign to them. If they are partisans of progress and the higher development of humanity, the Jews are excluded from their party. They demand that the Christians and the Christian state give up prejudices which not only have grown into their hearts but which are an essential part of their heart and being, and yet they demand no such thing from the Jews. The heart of Judaism must not be touched.

The birth of the new epoch which is now emerging will cost the Christian world great pains: are the Jews to suffer no pain, are they to have equal rights with those who fought and suffered for the new world? As if that could be! As if they could feel at home in a world which they did not make, did not help to make, which is contrary to their unchanged nature!

Those people who want to spare them the pains of criticism are the worst enemies of the Jews. Nobody who has not gone through the flames of criticism will be able to enter the new world which will soon come.

Besides, you have not brought the Jewish problem to the general public. You have talked about the injustices of the Christian states, but have not asked whether these injustices and hardships did not have their basis in the nature of the old state organizations.

If the treatment of the Jews in the Christian state has its basis in its nature, then the emancipation of the Jews only under the condition that they change that nature - i.e., as far as the Jews themselves change their nature - means that the Jewish problem is only a part of the general problem, the solution of which our age is seeking.

Until now the enemies of emancipation had much the advantage over its advocates, because they considered the contrast between the Jew as such to the Christian state. Their only mistake was that they pre-supposed the Christian state as the only true state and did not subject it to the same criticism that they applied to Judaism. Their opinion of Judaism seemed harsh and unjust only because they did not at the same time look critically at the state which denied and had to deny liberty to the Jews.

Our criticism will be aimed at both sides: only in this way will we be able to find a solution. Perhaps our understanding of

Judaism will appear even harsher than that which used to be expressed by the enemies of emancipation. Perhaps it is harsher: but my only concern can be whether it is correct. The only problem will be whether an evil is thoroughly abolished if it is not torn out by the roots. Whoever insists upon complaining, may accuse Liberty, because it demands not only from other nations but from the Jews as well, that they sacrifice antiquated traditions before they win liberty. If the criticism seems, or really is, harsh, it will still lead to Liberty and nothing else will.

At the outset, we want to pose the problem correctly and remove the wrong formulations it was given before.

The Problem Posed Correctly

What advocates usually do at the end of a trial, namely, appeal to the emotions of the judge and the public, be it only that they explain how their clients were driven by dire necessity to go astray, the advocates of the Jews do right at the start. They either complain about the oppression under which the Jews lived in the Christian world, or, if they admit that some of the reproaches regarding the attitude, the character, and the condition of the Jews are in part justified, they make that oppression appear even more hateful by asserting that it alone was the cause of those characteristics.

The Innocence of the Jews

To defend the Jews in this manner is really to do them a great disservice and it is detrimental to their cause.

One usually says of martyrs that they were killed, though innocent - this is really the greatest insult. Was what they did and for what they died nothing? Was it not contrary to the way of life and the ideas of their adversaries? The greater, the more important they are as martyrs, the greater must have been their deed, which was against the existing laws; therefore, the greater their guilt against the powers that ruled in their time.

Of the Jews it will at least be admitted that they suffered for their Law, for their way of life and for their nationality, that they were martyrs. They were thus themselves to blame for the oppression they suffered, because they provoked it by their adherence to their law, their language, to their whole way of life. A nothing cannot be oppressed. Wherever there is pressure something must have caused it by its existence, by its nature.

In history nothing stands outside the law of causality, least of all the Jews. With a stubbornness which their advocates themselves praise and admire they have clung to their nationality and resisted the movements and changes of history. The will of history is evolution, new forms, progress, change; the Jews want to stay forever what they are, therefore they fought against the first law of history - does this not prove that by pressing against this mighty spring they provoked counter-pressure? They were oppressed because they first pressed by placing themselves against the wheel of history.

Had the Jews been outside this action of the law of causality, had they been entirely passive, had they not from their side strained against the Christian world, there would not be any tie to connect them with history. They could never have entered into the new development of history and have influenced it. Then their cause would be quite lost.

Therefore, give the Jews the honor that they were to blame for the oppression which they suffered, that the hardening of their character caused by this oppression was their own fault. Then you admit them to a place in a two thousand year old history, although a subordinate one; then you make them a member which is capable, and finally has the duty to take part in history's progress.

Sometimes the advocates of Judaism forget that they ascribe to it the purely passive role of the sufferer and boast that it has a very beneficial influence on the life of the states. An example:

Spain

Look, they say, what became of Spain after the Most Catholic Majesties condemned the industrious, enlightened and active Jewish population to exile!

Spain, however, did not decline because of the absence of the Jewish population. The reasons for its decline were the intolerance, oppression and persecution practiced by its government. It sank deeper and deeper under the pressure of these principles and the same would have happened, had the Jews remained. Did the condition of France become desperate because the repeal of the Edict of Nantes sent thousands of Huguenots into exile? No! It was the tyranny of the government, the privileges of the aristocracy and the clergy, the strict police regime, which brought France to the point where only revolution could bring relief. Who knows whether the stubborn Huguenots would have contributed a great deal to the liberation of their country. Enough, France did manage without them.

Spain, too, liberated itself without the Jews from the oppression of the Most Catholic government, and it is very questionable whether the Jews, had they remained in Spain, would have made an important contribution to this liberation.

This proves that the Christian states are alone responsible for the rise and decline of their power, and even if the Jews play some role, it is prescribed by the principle of the Christian state. On the other hand, we can clear the Jews from the accusation that they were responsible for the ruin of a state, for instance, Poland.

Poland

The constitution of Poland was such that there was an immense gap between the ruling aristocracy and the masses of the serfs, a gap which enabled the Jews to settle there in greater numbers than anywhere else. This constitution which by failing to provide an element equivalent to that in Western Europe developed into the third estate, and instead utilized a foreign element which led Poland to its doom.

Poland is itself to blame for its misfortune. It is also itself to blame for permitting a foreign population to settle there and contribute to making more dangerous and fatal, the sore in its national existence.

Although Poland is itself to blame for its fate, it does not, on the other hand, speak favorably for the Jews that they could settle in numbers which about equal their number in all other European countries together, only in the most imperfect state of Europe and gain a position which can almost be called indispensable and a necessary complement. That they could thus make a home for

themselves only in a state which to a great extent is no state, speaks against their ability to become members of a real state; what speaks even more against them is the fact that they utilized the defects in the Polish constitution for their private profit, that they enlarged the gap instead of forming the material to fill it in an organic and politically useful manner.

An enemy of Jewish emancipation remarks and complains that "all distilleries in Galicia are exclusively in the possession of the Jews, and thereby the moral strength of the inhabitants is given in their hands." As if it were the fault of the Jews that the moral strength of a nation is in a glass of brandy or can be lost in a glass of brandy: That enemy of the Jews has to admit himself that the Pole "sees in brandy his only consolation for all his toils and for the oppressions of his landlord." It is therefore the oppression of the regime which drives the peasant to the Jew. It is the mindless materialism of his life which makes the peasant reach for the glass of brandy, so that the minds of the people are in the hands of the Jew if the Jew is in possession of the distilleries.

The constitution has given the Jew his important position and it put the minds of the people in his hands - but is it an honor for the Jew that he utilizes this position to distill the last consequences out of this condition? Does it speak for him that he is ready, that he makes it his only business to oppress the victims of the regime once more? The constitution is to blame for oppressing the peasant, for putting him in the hands of the Jew, but the Jew is culpable if he draws only the worst consequences from the constitution.

This situation repeats itself in civil society in general.

Civil Society

Demand is the mighty spring which puts civil society in motion. Everyone utilizes everyone else to satisfy his own needs, and he in turn is utilized by others for the same purpose. The tailor utilizes my need to support his family. I utilize him to supply my need.

This egotistic activity of civil society has been restricted in the Christian state by forms which take some of its ugliness away and which connect it with the interests of honor. The special ways of supplying certain needs have been brought together in estates; and that class in which the need of the moment had the greatest power, in which, therefore, greed is most rampant, the tradesmen, were organized in the Christian state in the form of corporations. The member of the corporation has as such the obligation to pursue not only his personal interests but the interests of his guild. In this manner certain limits are set to his own interests, and he feels honored because he feels now that he cares not only for the needs of individuals but for the needs of society in general.

But where demand with its accidental caprices and moods rules absolutely, where the satisfaction of the demand is again dependent on accidents of nature, there the individual can personally remain honest, but cannot protect himself against sudden, unexpected changes which are beyond his calculation. Demand, the basis of civil society, which secures its existence and guarantees its necessity, exposes it at the same time to continuous dangers, gives it an element of insecurity, and causes that ever changing mixture of poverty and wealth, misery and prosperity change.

This element of insecurity was not created by the Jews; it belongs to society; they are not to be blamed for its existence. But it is another question whether it should perhaps be counted as a merit that they - by means of usury - have exploited it and have made this their domain to the exclusion of all other activities in the circles of civil society.

Like the gods of Epicure who live in interstellar spaces and are freed from specific labors, so the Jews have struck roots outside the corporate interests in the gaps and crevices of society, and have caught the victims of the element of insecurity in civil society.

But, their advocates reply, they were denied admittance to these estates and corporations. But the question is this, would they, who regard themselves as a nation, have been able to assume a real and sincere position in those circles, did they not exclude themselves? As they, as a nation, stand outside the interests of the peoples, were they not forced to assume a position outside the interests of estates and corporations?

What? they will reply again, you will not acknowledge the industry of the Jews, their frugality, their perseverance in their work, their inventiveness in seeking new sources of profit, their indefatigable endurance? We have acknowledged all this. Now we allow ourselves two more questions.

The Industry of the Jews

Who worked for eighteen hundred years to educate Europe? Who fought the battles in which a hierarchy which wanted to rule beyond its time was defeated? Who created Christian and modern

art and filled the cities of Europe with enduring monuments? Who developed the sciences? Who developed theory of state constitutions?

There is not one Jewish name. Spinoza was no longer a Jew when he created his system. Moses Mendelsohn died of grief when he heard that Lessing, his deceased friend, has been an adherent of Spinoza.

Now the second question! True, the European nations excluded the Jews from their general affairs. But could they have done it, if the Jews had not excluded themselves? Can the Jew as such, that is without ceasing to be a Jew, work for the progress of art and science, for freedom from the hierarchy? Can he take interest in the state and give thought to the general principles of government? On the otherhand: Are art and science subjects which can be made inaccessible by the accidental situation somebody finds himself in by birth? Are they not free goods that cannot be denied to anybody? How many men who had great influence in art and science have come from the lowest classes and had to surmount extraordinary obstacles to gain entry into the realm of art and science? Why did not Jews do this? The reason is probably that their particular national spirit is opposed to the general interests of art and science.

The industry of the Jews is of such a kind that it has nothing to do with the interests of history.

The same is true of the tenacity of the Jewish spirit which is frequently praised.

The Tenacity of the Jewish Spirit

It would not be cruel, it would only be just and fair to tell our adversaries the names of all those tribes that also survived all the storms of history and maintained their identity in the dispersion among civilized peoples. But even without doing this we will be able to put the matter in its true position.

Is it a dishonor for the tribes which were melted together into the French nation to have given up and lost their identity? Certainly not! That they dissolved into the new whole proves their malleability and their ability to make a contribution to the formation of this particular historical national genius.

Have the tribes which formed the population of the great new republic in North America kept their former identities? No! Even now, German immigrants for instance, assume in a short time the character of the whole, and this is certainly not a dishonor. It only proves their ability to adjust to the general direction of national life and to make themselves at home.

Do the European nations in general keep their identity with the tenacity which is praised in the Jews? On the contrary, they change their character and these changes are according to the will of History.

Instead of praising the tenacity of the Jewish national spirit and regarding it as an advantage, one should ask what its basis is and where it comes from.

Its base is lack of ability to develop with history, it is the reason of the quite unhistorical character of that nation, and this again is due to its oriental nature. Such stationary nations exist in the Orient, because there human liberty and the possibility of progress are still limited. In the Orient and in India, we still find Parsees living in dispersion and worshipping the holy fire of Ormuzd.

The individual as well as the nation which in its thought and deeds follows universal laws will progress with history; for universal laws have their base in reason and liberty, they develop with the progress of Reason. This progress is to be expected and it is effected with certainty and easily, because Reason in its laws has to do with its own products, and does not have to ask permission from a foreign, supernatural power.

In the Orient, man does not yet know that he is free and gifted with reason. He does not recognize freedom and reason as his real nature. He sees his highest task in the performance of mindless, baseless ceremonies. The oriental man likewise, has as yet, no history, if only that which is a development of general human liberty deserves to be called history. To sit under his vine and his fig tree, is for the oriental the highest boon man can achieve. He performs his religious ceremonies again and again, he considers their unchanged performance his highest duty, and he is content that they are just so and must be so because he knows of no reason other than that this is so and has to be so according to the will of a higher, inscrutable being.

True, a character, a law such as this must impart a peculiar tenacity to a nation, but at the same time such a character will rob it of the possibility of historic development.

The Jews are right if they talk of a fence around the Law. The Law has fenced them off from the influences of history, the more so, as their Law commanded from the start seclusion from the other nations.

They have survived; but the question is whether the content of the Law is so exalted that they are to be praised because they survived with it without change.

Are the mountains of Greece greater and more worthy of our admiration than the Greek nation because these mountains stand to-day, unchanged, while the Greeks of Homer, Sophocles, Pericles and Aristotle are gone?

Moses Mendelsohn said the advantage of the Jewish religion is that it does not teach universal truths, but gives only positive commandments for which no universal reason can be given. He declared therefore - and he is right, for if something is beyond my horizon and I can give no account of it to myself, then I have no power over it - that the Law keeps it validity for the Jew until Jehovah abolishes it expressly and unmistakably, as He revealed it on Sinai.

Is this tenacity an honor? Does it make the nation, whose existence is due to it, an historical nation? It only keeps it alive against History.

Life under Oppression

If a nation does not progress with History, if it is never caught up in the enthusiasm which is necessary for the fight for new historical ideas, if it keeps aloof from political passions, then it lacks one of the most important incentives to exalted and pure morality. At the end it will lose interest in general human affairs. One's only care will be his private profit, and the feeling for true honor will be lost.

One will reply that because of the oppression under which the Jews lived this could not be otherwise, that it was natural that the nobler sentiments be suppressed. Shall we reproach them for a lack of morality when they were excluded from the affairs and interests which gave ever new incentive to the spirit of the European nations?

It has already been argued that oppression in other instances improves men, that it sharpens their feeling for honor and morality. The oppression under which the Christians lived in the first three centuries of our era was an incentive for them to develop those virtues which helped to overthrow the Roman Empire. The Jews, however, under oppression have never discovered a moral principle which might renew the shape of the world or their own nation.

Now, if the Jews have not been improved by oppression, abolish it, give them full, unlimited freedom, and see if they will not improve then!

experiment. It is not true that oppression really improves character and opens the way to true morality. It only makes men inflexible, isolates them, it cuts them off from the path to true morality by making it impossible for them to take part in the public affairs of the state. As private individuals it will either give them a harsh character or make them egotists who care only for what happens within the four walls of their own home. This cannot be called true morality if the early Christians, unconcerned about the general affairs of the Roman Empire, occupied themselves only with themselves and their own souls, always listening for the rustling of a wind, whether it might not be the messenger of a coming storm.

The more urgent is the necessity to abolish the oppression under which the Jews have lived until now!

Stop! First ask the question whether the Jews as Jews did not have to seclude themselves from other nations, whether they themselves did not want the wheels of history to roll over them.

When they were still a nation in their own country, did they breathe more freely? Did they open their hearts to feelings of universal humanity, did they feel less oppressed?

No! Even then they thought of themselves as the nation most oppressed. And indeed this was a fact, because their pretension, which was their true nature, could never be satisfied. According to their basic view they had to be the nation, the only nation, that is the nation beside which no other people had the right to be a nation. No other people was a real nation compared with them, they were the chosen people, the only true nation, the nation to which the whole world would belong.

The mere fact, therefore, that other nations existed meant oppression. The existence, prosperity, happiness, and progress of other nations meant suffering for them, for the existence of other nations negated, excluded, ridiculed the basic nature of their own existence, its exclusiveness.

Give them complete freedom, and they will always abolish it themselves as long as they remain Jews and regard themselves as the chosen people. Reality not only threatens their Jewish conception of themselves, it proves it to be false. Therefore, they are of necessity oppressed and their suffering is incurable.

After this we will also be able to evaluate correctly the often repeated remark that there are relatively less criminals among the Jews than among the Christians in whose midst they live.

The Number of Criminals

What is important is not the number, but the nature of crimes; not the legal evaluation which is expressed in the degree of punishment, but the moral evaluation which considers the crime in relation to the social conditions.

A crime can be punished very lightly by the law and still be a sign of a great deterioration of the inner moral condition; another crime may be punished severely by the judge, but someone who recognizes the motive may see it as a violent resolution of a deeply moral, inner struggle, of which the lesser criminal may not be capable.

It is further important to find out in which field of moral and legal interests the crimes were committed.

Where various interests of different classes clash, where antiquated laws are at odds with new claims, there are more occasions for crimes than in a region with less frictions and therefore less collisions. Still the greater number of crimes committed under such circumstances will not refute the assertion that in midst of this lawless crowd a new and better moral order is born. On the other hand, it can happen that where less crimes are committed and smaller ones, not only the strength for greater crimes is missing, but also the strength to create a new social order.

We will now consider the question insofar as it touches Christianity and the Christian state from the right point of view.

The hostility of the Christian world towards the Jews has been called inexplicable. Is not Judaism the mother of Christianity, the Jewish religion the predecessor of Christianity? Why this hatred of the Christians, this enormous ingratitude of the consequent for the cause, of the daughter for the mother?

The Behavior of the Consequent toward its Cause.

Why does the blossom break the lock of the bud, why does the fruit cast off the petals of the blossom? Why does the seed break

the capsule of the shell? Because the new cannot be if the old endures. It would never come into existence if the permission of the old were required.

In spiritual things, in history, the cause does in reality still exist and wants to remain in existence, although the consequent is already there. The cause denies the importance of the consequent, it denies that it is its consequence which has correctly interpreted its nature, developed, and perfected it. Not the daughter is ungrateful toward the mother, but the mother does not want to acknowledge her daughter. The daughter has really the higher right, because she represents the true nature of the mother... If one wants to call both sides egotistical, then the daughter is selfish for wanting her own way and progress, and the mother because she wants her own way but no progress.

The old had the seeds of progress in it, but in the fight with its consequent it did not want to permit progress for others, nor did it want progress for itself. It "has the key of cognition, but does not itself enter and defends the entrance against others who wish to enter."

The hostility of the Christian world towards the Jews is therefore quite understandable and is caused by the circumstances. Neither of the two parties can acknowledge the other and allow it to remain in existence. The existence of the one excludes the existence of the other; each one believes herself to be the representative of absolute truth. It would mean denying that it is the truth if it were to acknowledge the other.

But, one will object, does not this exclusiveness of Christianity offend against Love, which it calls its principle? We shall see.

The Zeal and Exclusiveness of Christian Love

Christianity confesses the law of Love, but it has also to observe the law of Faith. Christian love is zealous and comprehensive, but it is both in the interest of Faith only. It embraces the whole world, but only to give to it the treasure of Faith. It does not go forth to men as such, but to men as believers and as persons who can or shall become believers, and have to become believers if they do not wish to be damned.

If it is written that God, as the God of Love, does not look at the person, that anyone who fears him and does the right is acceptable to him, this merely means that God does not discriminate among the nations but accepts into his kingdom everyone who accepts the true faith.

Christian Love is universal in that it does not distinguish between nations and offers to all nations the treasure of Faith. But universal is also its zeal, as it excludes everything that resists and contradicts the faith.

The Christian religion is the abolition of Judaism, therefore it also abolishes Jewish exclusiveness. This is true, however, insofar as it really is the perfection of Judaism and its exclusiveness.

Judaism denied the right of existence of other nations but permitted them to exist. Its fanaticism and exclusiveness were not yet translated into action, the word had not yet become flesh, the fire of a single exclusive religion had not yet been thrown into the world.

"I have come to light a fire on earth," says the evangel, "I wish it were burning already."

Christianity has taken the exclusiveness of Judaism seriously, has put it into effect, and abolished all differences between nations.

Zeal for the Faith means nothing more than the exclusive upholding of the Christian principle or the fire of Christian Love. This fire lights up the whole history of the Christian church and flares up in specially blessed epochs to give them a special splendor. Augustine, for instance, wrote in its light when he fought against the schismatics in North Africa, when he commanded the prosecution of the heretics. This fire lighted the path of the crusaders on their way to the Orient; it shone for the Spaniards when they fought to convert the peoples of America; it shone in the night of St. Bartholomew and in the Dragonades.

Therefore, if Christian zeal is directed also against Judaism, this is not inexplicable and the Jews have no right to complain. From Judaism the Christian religion has taken over the zeal, the exclusiveness, the polemic against all who contradict it. Christian zeal is nothing else but the perfection, the consequent, the serious and effective putting into action of Jewish zeal. So, even if it is directed against Judaism, this means only that it is hurt by its own consequent. It is in the nature of the consequent to battle against that from which it emerged. If Christianity fights Judaism, that means only that zeal exalted to perfection is directed against a zeal which is still limited and less energetic.

From Jews and Christians one hears: "The fact that some Jews and Christians hate each other is not the fault of their religion, but a misunderstanding of their religion." An extraordinary understatement, that some! Is it true, then, that only some Christians

and Jews, hated, persecuted, oppressed during eighteen hundred years? Have they all misunderstood their religion? No, they hated each other because they still had real religion, because they knew the meaning of religion, and really followed the commands of their religion.

If after two thousand years of proof to the contrary some people assert that the hatred between the two religions was only due to a misunderstanding, this proves only that they themselves do not understand any longer what religion is. If the mutual hatred has really abated, the cause can only be that religious zeal is diminished; this means that since real religion has to be zealous, religion itself has lost its power ...

The illusion under which the Jewish and Christian advocates of emancipation are laboring is best shown when they ask, "Why, of all things, should the fact that the Jews are forever segregated from the Christians in their religion and way of life be a reason for robbing them of human and civil rights?"

Human Rights and the Christian State

The question is, rather, whether the Jew as such, that is the Jew who admits himself that he is forced by his true nature to live forever segregated from others, is capable of accepting universal human rights and of granting them to others. His religion and way of life obligate him to eternal segregation: why? because this is his nature, but this nature is in contradiction to what others consider their nature. His nature makes him not a man but a Jew, just as other people's nature makes them not men but Christians or Mohammedans.

Jews and Christians can consider each other and treat each other as men only when they have given up the special nature which separates them and enjoins them to "eternal segregation," when they acknowledge the common nature of man and consider humanity as their true nature.

The idea of human rights was discovered for the Christian world in the last century only. It is not innate in man, it has rather been won in battle against historical traditions which determined the education of men until now. So human rights are not a gift of nature or of history, but a prize which was won in the fight against the accident of birth and against privilege which came down through history from generation to generation. Human rights are the result of education, and they can be possessed only by those who acquire and deserve them.

Can the Jew really possess them as long as he lives as a Jew in perpetual segregation from others, as long as he therefore must declare that the others are not really his fellow men? As long as he is a Jew, his Jewishness must be stronger in him than his humanity, and keep him apart from non-Jews. He declares by this segregation that this, his Jewishness, is his true, highest nature, which has to have precedence over his humanity.

In the same manner the Christian as a Christian cannot grant human rights.

What neither of the two parties possesses it cannot give to or accept from the other.

But surely citizens rights could be granted the Jews? They cannot be deprived of civil rights.

The question is, rather, whether in a Christian state as such there are such universal rights, whether there are not exclusively special rights, that is a greater or smaller sum of privileges which are a right for some and a non-right, but not as such a wrong, for the other; for the other will have his own special privileges, unless one would want to assert that the sum of special rights is at the same time the sum total of wrongs, or that the lack of universal civil rights is the universal wrong.

Do the Jews want to become "Citizens" in the Christian state?
Ask first whether this state knows "citizens" or only subjects;
whether the Jewish quarter is a contradiction if the subjects are
divided into special estates according to privilege; whether it
would even be remarkable if the Jews were commanded to wear special
attire or special badges, if even the estates when formally represented must wear different clothes.

One refers to concessions which the Christian state has made in periods of stress - concessions which were almost as comprehensive as a complete equalization of the Jews with the Christians. One should first ask whether the state was not at such moments in need and danger of its life, and only made concessions to the Jews in order not to perish completely. It had to make concessions to a higher state-idea. Then do not complain that the state later withdrew to a certain extent, the concessions made in times of danger. Are the Jews the only ones who suffer? Is not this a general experience? If they are condemned to an existence under special rights again, is it not because privilege in general is ruling again or is intended to rule again? Ask, rather, what they did in the intervening time, what did they do to show that they had grown out of the status of privileged subjects.

One more question we have to point out from the correct angle.

The solution would seem most difficult, even impossible, if the contrast is conceived of as purely religious; for religion is exclusiveness, and two religions, as long as each is recognized as the highest and as revealed truth, can never make peace with one another.

The Contrast between Judaism and Christianity

The Jews, one says, do not consider Jesus as the Messiah; they deny the highest which the Christian knows, that which for the Christian is the only true tie of all union, therefore they can never have a sincere relationship with him. As they regard the highest good of the Christian as false and a fraud, God himself forbids association with them. No Christian must have intercourse with the anti-Christ.

But: Does the Jew who resists the Gospel really deny a supernatural being? Is his resistance directed against a divine being which no man must contradict lest he be eternally damned? Or is his crime not rather that he does not acknowledge a purely human progress in history, a progress in his own attitude toward the Law? Is the contrast not basically one between different stages of development of the human mind, and only in minds of the two parties does it appear to be religious? Would the contrast not be less sharp and the possibility of a solution greater if it were recognized as human and historical and no longer religious?

If the opposition is no longer religious, if it is scientific and has assumed the form of criticism, if the Jew shows the Christian

that his religious view is only the historical product of certain factors, then a solution has been given, because now the opposition is really not even scientific any more. As soon, namely, as the Jew directs scientific, and not merely crude, religious criticism against Christianity, he must have looked critically at Judaism at the same time, because he must conceive of Christianity as a necessary product of Judaism. As soon, however, as both parties direct scientific criticism against each other, therefore also each against itself, there will be no religious hostility any more, and scientific differences of opinion are solved by science itself.

This is the solution of the contrast, that it dissolves into nothing. The Jews cease to be Jews without the necessity of becoming Christians, or rather, they must cease being Jews and must not become Christians.

What have they done, however, to make this solution of the contrast possible and bring it about? Have they voiced criticism against Judaism and Christianity? Have they shown that the religious difference is a difference in historical development? Or have they refuted by actual criticism of the sacred history, the fable that they have special, secret records about Jesus and his time, (a story which even now is brought up by some Jews), and revealed it as a foolish tale, a dirty product of religious partisanship?

How far are they capable of rising to the level of that point of view from which the religious difference is dissolved?

If the Jew, in the course of criticism leveled by one religion against the other, declares that the Gospel is a fraud, the Christian counters with the reproach that the miserable condition

in which he finds himself since the downfall of his state is the consequence of God's curse on the enemies of the Messiah. But in what consists the misery of the Jews? Only in the oppression they suffer from the Christians? The martyrs too were persecuted and oppressed! Oppression and persecution always were the lot of those who fought for a higher idea against the tenets of their epoch and expected that the future would certainly bring justification of their actions. But how were the Jews oppressed and persecuted by the Christians? Not as martyrs for a higher idea, not as martyrs for the future, but as martyrs of a past, a progress from which, they did not recognize. What one calls the curse of God is only the natural consequence of a Law. This Law is in itself chimerical and incapable of forming the core of a real national life. dition to this it forbids progress which alone would have been able to give it some firm hold. The supposed divine curse is nothing else but the natural consequence of the contradiction which the Jews have created for themselves between History and their Law.

A deputy from Wurttenberg (in 1828) declared that he saw it as a sign of the curse under which the Jews live that even the oppression which they suffered until now did not do them any good. "It is only by virtue of the blessings of Christianity that its adherents are improved and ennobled by oppression, a blessing in which the Jews do not participate."

But even if we were to assume that oppression really ennobles and improves, which in spite of the usual sentimental assumption is not the case - do we have to have recourse to supernatural dispensation if the effects are not always the same? Does the question need a religious answer, must the contrast be perpetuated by a religious slant? It is true, oppression can exalt, fortify, encourage progress; if it did not help the Jews in that manner, the reason was that they did not, like the Christians, represent progress, that they were not linked to the possibility of a step forward in world history. Only if this had been the case could oppression have helped them, if it is at all possible that pressure can be helpful by strengthening the elasticity of a party.

We have shown that the question, posed correctly, makes the right answer an irresistible necessity. We will now give the answer:

II

Critique of Judaism

It is easy to figure out the level a state finds itself, if people are called statesmen who repeat again and again that Jews who disregard the commands of their ancient law and introduce reforms in their religious life, lose the respect of their Christian fellow citizens. In this regard the only question could certainly be whether the Jews are able to obey their ancient law, whether their present relationship to the law raises their morality, whether the relationship can really be a moral one, since it is even doubtful what is really their law.

Is it the Mosaic Law or the Talmud?

In general the Jews boast of their loyalty to the religion of their fathers as a proof of how faithful they are to that which is sacred to them. If they want to refute the adversaries of emancipation they call their religion the most powerful foundation of

civil and social virtues: but which is this religion? The Mosaic law is said to contain the purest moral doctrine; they call themselves adherents of the Mosaic law. If their adversaries use the views and commands of the Talmud as weapons against them, or if they themselves have come under the influence of the ideas of Enlightenment and are disgusted with the talmudic commands, they usually declare that a return to a pure or reformed Mosaism is all that would be necessary to raise their people to a higher standard. But what is this "pure Mosaism?" That old constitution which prescribes certain sacrificial rites, institutes an order of priests and contains laws on distribution of property which could only be effective if there were a sovereign state; that is, they are entirely impossible now. Or what reforms are suggested to "purify" Mosaism? Should everything be dropped that refers to the sacrificial rites, to the priestly order and property regulations? Then what will remain standing? Those regulations are not only a certain, not even an important part of the whole Mosaic code; they are the center to which all other commands refer, the soil which they have to have in order to thrive, the support without which they must collapse.

We do not even mention that the Mosaic code contains, in principle, in its most important regulations, all the hardships of rabbinic Judaism, so that no return to it and no reform short of a complete abolition can mean a real liberation from the commands of the Talmud.

Enough, there is no way in which the Mosaic law can be obeyed. The frustration because of this gives the lie to the praise which is lavished on it. ... What a strange moral code, which remains without influence on real life, the commands of which are not followed!

. . . Therefore, if the Jews praise the Mosaic code as the purest moral doctrine, as the most powerful foundation of the social and civil virtues, then these virtues are indeed in very bad shape. They will have to depend on their own help and inner value, for that "most powerful support" was long ago shattered by history and there is not the remotest prospect that it will ever be restored.

The very wise statesmen, however, who are willing to respect the Jew only if he obeys his ancient laws, should take care to have all the Jews assembled again in the land of Canaan and have them live there according to their old faith. But then they would also have to be surrounded by the other tribes who excited their fanaticism and kept them always in a turmoil. If they cannot recreate for the Jews this old environment, then their talk about loyalty to the old is just as empty as the talk of the Jews about their loyalty to the sacred tenets of their ancestors.

The idea of the Jew that he is obeying a law, which in fact he cannot and does not put into action, is at best, and to say the least, fantastic. It is a self-deception and illusion which can be maintained only by leaving out the mass of commands which cannot be obeyed at present. Finally it must lead to an enormous sophistry if single commands which have become impossible are observed, or if ways and means have to be thought up to make it apparent that they are observed. . . . The commands become the commands of a chimerical world and take on a chimerical form themselves. That idealized, chimerical Mosaic code which lives only in the mind of the sophist, is really the only Mosaism which fits the present age. Well, this Mosaism does not have to be newly invented: it is given in the Talmud. The Talmud is the continuation of the Mosaic law and of the

entire Old Testament, but a chimerical, illusory, mindless continuation. ... There is no real development, just a splitting of the old, a thinned repetition, no new creation. It is mindless and chimerical because it dares not break with the old which has become impossible . . does not have the courage to create a new world out of a new principle . . . a collection of sherds and splinters picked up by the rabbis after a historic revolution which they did not bring about had shattered the old. . . . Real Mosaism has become an impossibility. The Jew who thinks that he simply obeys the Mosaic law lives in an illusion. The Talmud is Mosaism that has lost its Those Jews alone are right who decline a return to foundations. Mosaism. But if they want to put something else in its stead and at the same time intend to go beyond the Talmud, they arrive again at the illusory Mosaism which is the point of union of all Jewish parties.

In an application of the Israelites to the Duke of Braunschweig in 1831, they say: "A return to the Old Testament would be nothing else but regression to a less educated viewpoint. The Talmud is the continuation of Moses and the Prophets and the transition to present continuously progressing Judaism. The point our religion has reached at present is by far higher than the so-called Mosaism." True, it is higher, but only because it is up in the regions of a chimerical world. However, by rising higher, it did not put roots deep in the real world, did not weave itself into the moral interests of mankind. It did rise above prejudice, but at the same time raised prejudice into a more abstract category. Prejudice is dead, but on that higher level it was resurrected to a monotonous eternal life. Its cruder ingredients are lost, but now it leads a perpetual shadow-life.

For instance, Mr. Salomo writes in his "Message to Herr Frankel" (1824) that Israel has given up the idea of "national sovereignty" that it looks no longer to the "possession of some spot on earth" for its salvation. It has even renounced the hope for liberation by the Messiah. Its Messianic time has come with the emancipation. Its only messianic hope is to be liberated from political servitude and political oppression."

Under these circumstances - and these declarations are sincere, on that level Israel really thinks no longer of national sovereignty, Canaan and the Messiah - it would seem that the emancipation could be carried through immediately, if, namely, the states in which the Jews live have, on their part, fulfilled the conditions which are indispensable for this work. But here, where the nationality of the Jew and everything that makes him a Jew seems to have disappeared, the Jewish nature appears in its greatest power. It maintains itself even where it seems lost, it makes emancipation impossible. In the moment when it seems closest to it, it is farthest removed from it.

It would seem obvious that the coming of the emancipation would be exclusively a consequence of the political condition of the states in which the Jews live, of their relationship to the Jews and their capability for progress. But even on that level of enlightened Judaism the eyes of the Jews are closed to the real conditions of the world and remain glued to the chimerical religious and political prerogatives of Israel. "God is planning great things for the Jews," they say - as if the only question were not how much is still missing in the development of political conditions and the education of the Jews before the barrier which now separates the

from the subjects of the Christian governments can be removed. The hope is also expressed "that the name of the Jew would again emerge free and independent" -- this therefore is the idea of emancipation of the enlightened Jew! This should be the result of real participation in the interests of the state, equalization of his status with that of his fellow citizens, that when all this has been achieved the name of the Jew should emerge free and independent again? If the Jew, without knowing it himself, demands instead of emancipation the independent existence of his people - an impossibility, because the clock cannot be turned back, or a superfluous undertaking, for his second history would be the same and end in the same manner as the first - he is in his Jewish consciousness drawing the last consequence of his particularism. In the above mentioned message, Salomo, for instance, declares that the Jewish religion is the world religion, the religion which must abolish the pride and pretensions of the positive religions. . . .

All assurances of the most enlightened Jew that he is not dreaming of a sovereign nation for "his people" are illusory however sincerely they may be meant. As long as he wants to be a Jew, he can and must not deny his nature, the exclusiveness, the idea of a special destiny, the kingdom, in short the chimera of the most enormous privilege. The worse for him if he cherishes this chimera even at the moment he protests against it. This is a proof that the idea of privilege is intertwined with his nature.

And even if he would abstain in his utterances from all expressions which give the lie to his assurances - but once more, it is not possible- he would still by his actions refute his prettiest speeches about equality and humanity, for he holds everybody else but the Jew to be unclean. His dietary laws are a proof that he regards non-Jews not as his equals, not as fellowmen.

In short, Mosaism has always maintained its rule over the Jews. In the Talmud it is Mosaism that has become sophistry. It is illusion if some reformers think they can return to pure Mosaism; it is illusion, if those who think that equalization with the citizens of free states is very close, try to hold on to the privilege which Mosaism grants its believers while they think they have renounced it. All here is illusion!

But even at the time when the Jews still had a sovereign state and a history, even then Mosaism was an illusion. We shall show how inconsistently the Jewish national consciousness reacted to the consequences of its historical development, how it made an illusion of its own development.

The Inconsistency and Inflexibility of the Jewish National Consciousness

With every step one takes in religious negotiations, one has to expect that theological prejudice will make an effort to resist progress. This happens to us now. We have the Christian and Jewish theologians against us who assert that the Old Testament teaches universal love for one's fellowman and morality.

I think I have treated this matter in my letters about Dr. Hengstenberg (Berlin, 1839) in a way which makes refutation impossible and that those who want at any cost to make the Code a moral law have been proved wrong.

As far as our present problem is concerned the following remarks should suffice:

To the Jew only another Jew is his brother and neighbor, and all other nations appear to him, and must appear to him according to the Law, as outside the law and without justification.

If the other nations have no right to exist beside him, then the difference between them and the nation which alone has this right and is in possession of Truth, must disappear, and the foreign nations must be absorbed into the one, true, nation. This has, in part been achieved in regard to the stranger who is frequently mentioned in the Law. It is assumed that he is inclined toward the Jewish way of life and that this is the reason for his sojourn. This means that he is, in part, no stranger anymore, and as far as this is the case he is recommended to the sympathy of the people. But at the same moment when the Law seems to get closer to the idea of universal love for one's fellowman, it takes a step backward and withdraws again behind the barrier of nationality. The charity, or rather the single, friendly acts toward the stranger, are to be performed for him as a stranger. He is and remains a stranger. If the Jew enters into a relationship with him, it is not a relationship of man to man. If he acts kindly toward him it is not a favor a man does to his fellow man; the Jew remains a Jew, the stranger a stranger. He remains a stranger, just as the Jews - and the Law expressly remind them of that relationship - were strangers in Egypt.

It does not help the stranger that he inclines toward the Jewish law. At the end it does not even help that the Law itself regards the difference between Israel and the nations as an illusion; the difference is always restored when it regards the stranger as a stranger....

This contradiction develops even more when it is said that Jehovah - at the time of the Messiah - will reveal himself as the God of all nations and receive them into his community. The same contradiction appears in the declaration that Jehovah rejoices in love, not sacrifices.

All these views and declarations are of no help at all in vindicating Judaism, for which purpose Jewish and Christian apologists wish to use them. They serve only to increase its guilt and show up its hardnesses in its fullest severity.

They are infringements on the specific principle of the Jewish code, views which were developed in a revolt against the fanaticism, the narrow-mindedness, the formality of the Law - efforts of Judaism to overcome its original limitations, therefore inconsistencies of Judaism towards itself.

But they remain inconsistencies. It is the nature of Judaism to be inconsistent. . . . Those declarations are infringements of the existing law, an attack against what is valid among the people. Therefore, the men who were guilty of such infringements were abandoned by the people, denied, persecuted, and stoned. The entire Jewish history has treated them as inconsistencies, that is, the Jewish national spirit was during its historical development so inconsistent that it did not think of putting into action, those reformatory ideas which were offered to it. Even though it was written that Jehovah wanted to accept all nations, the exclusiveness of the Law and the Jewish way of life remained in full force, and the idea that Jehovah rejoices in love, not sacrifice, did not move one Jew to put the law of love in the place of the sacrificial rite. The

inconsistency was overcome by the consistency of exclusiveness, narrow-mindedness, and the soulless mechanism which is the fate of all formal sacrificial rites. The power of consistency was so great that it was victorious even in that same individual consciousness in which those higher views had been formed. The same author who repeatedly and explicitly abolishes any difference between Israel and the nations, the author of the so-called Deutero-Isaiah, finds it possible to restore this difference in the severest manner by saying the nations would serve Israel in the future.

There is no more vacillating and inconsistent national spirit than the Jewish spirit, - it develops in contradiction to its limitations, it progresses to ideas which would mean the abolition of its Law, but then it stops in its progress, does not really go forward, postpones the realization of that which seems the real truth to a faraway future, so that it won't disturb the present life. At the same time it takes care that also in the future the truth will not be taken seriously, that its exclusiveness will prevail - that means, there is no more consistent national spirit than the Jewish one, its progress is not really progress, its development is no development, and despite the higher ideas which were urged upon it, it remains what it is. This consistency is nothing but selfish tenacity which denies the true consequences of historical development and persecutes them as inconsistencies.

If the Jewish religion was the faith of this particular people in its uniqueness, then its historical development must have caused the loss of faith of the people in itself. For as it thought to possess universal truth, it had to bring this truth to all peoples and so break out of its national limitations. But insofar

Jewish and wants to remain Jewish, it must never reach this aim and must never admit that it has been reached. Jewish history must not put an end to itself. His faith in himself forbids the Jew to have a history, and if he cannot escape historical development he must deny it. His faith in himself, that is, his religion, which would logically lead to the loss of this faith, commands him at the same time to remain what he is.

But under these circumstances he is no longer what he was (the Jew who was capable of this particular development and had of necessity to go through it). After it has happened and after he has refuted it, he is now the Jew who exists against the intent of his history, in contradiction to his destination - in short the anti-historical Jew.

The Jew is tenacious and consistent, but only in unsteadiness and inconsistency. He has to be tenacious and unsteady because he could no longer be the loyal and exclusive, that is the real Jew, if he would put the ideas into action to which his history and his faith in himself have led him. And this makes his whole nature contradictory and his existence an unsound thing, yes, even a wrong.

By persisting in his exclusiveness, by following the petty prescriptions of the Law as if they were the highest and eternal commands, although this, his exclusiveness and his legalism, had been recognized as false, he debases the truths pronounced by his prophets to an untruth; and the prophets themselves being products of the Jewish national spirit and sharing the need of the national spirit, place the coming of those truths in the future.

What kind of truths are these which being divine and eternal and bound already to be valid now, should come into their own in the

future only? What ideas that are not allowed to influence the life of the people if the people was not to give up its privilege! There was a contradiction under which the people had to suffer and which finally destroyed it.

The moral development of a people can only consist in this, that it seriously acts out the most exalted ideas which were born in its consciousness, works for them passionately, and if necessary sacrifices itself for them. The Jewish people have rebelled against this development, if it got excited - and it could get excited very often and to a high degree - it was only for its privilege, and when it finally sacrificed its national existence it suffered only because it wanted to hold fast to a point of view which the result of its own development proved false.

If this was the fate of the higher ideas to which Jewish consciousness had risen, let us investigate whether the positive, the existing law, could make them a moral nation.

The Law in the Life of the Jews

If we want to pose the question correctly, according to the findings of modern research on the manner in which nations and religious communities develop, we should ask whether a people that brought forth a law like the Mosaic law could know and possess true morality.

Religious laws are the expression of what a nation thinks is its true nature as given, for example, in the sacred histories of the patriarchs, the prophets, and kings. ... In their laws and sacred histories the nations have uncovered, betrayed and put in words the secrets of their innermost nature, and if this expression of their nature casts a shadow on them it is their own fault.

What is the nature of the Jews according to their own record, as we possess it in their law and their sacred history?

First of all, an unfree people. They did not understand yet that laws originate from the nature of circumstances and are then regarded as the natural laws for these circumstances. Therefore, they could not give an account of what they called law. While we connect with the word law the idea of worldly conditions, what they had was regarded as something alien, inexplicable, as the will of Jehovah, an order which is not connected at all with the nature of the circumstances in which it was given. The law is the ruler and they are its servants who have to obey unconditionally without knowing why, without any questions.

A national spirit which accepts a law given in this manner is dumb and mindless. It develops, but the development is unconscious; therefore it is without general human value. Sometimes the Spirit breaks through the bars of taciturnity to pronounce what it regards as right and true, but only momentarily, and then it shuts its mind again to its own words. Its own work it regards now as the will and act of an alien, i.e., the divine, power.

No universal truths can emerge from such a shut-in and imprisoned mind. If it happens that universal tenets are set up in the Old Testament, as for example, the biblical command: "You shall be holy, for I am holy," these sentences are like sudden violent utterances without any inner transition, without connection and justification. Why, for example, should the people be holy because Jehovah is holy? In short these general tenets are themselves arbitrary.

All the laws are from this point of view arbitrary and their

contents quite accidental. For example, that oil should be the means by which the character of holiness is imparted to a person, is based neither on the nature of oil nor the nature of holiness that the oil for anointing should be composed of such and such ingredients, in such and such quantitites, that the attire of certain persons should be made of certain cloth of such and such material and color, that one should atone for sins by sacrificing animals, and certain animals for certain specified cases, and that such and such parts should be burned - all this is pure abitrariness.

Modern research has explained many of these rites and ceremonies. But first, there are still many quite arbitrary rites, and others which can be explained but which still are very unsuitable to express human sentiments and where the connection with human feelings is limited to slight symbolic hints. Finally, the loyal Jew is not even allowed to question the regulations of the Law. His life consists in the obeying of unintelligible and arbitrary commands. The arbitrary and accidental must not be treated as such. There is no difference at all between the accidental and the necessary. The accidental is the true and necessary, and the essential is the unimportant and minor thing. The building of a house, its repair, the handling of cooking utensils, diseases, the diet, all this is removed into the region of religion and represents the only contents of it. The healing of diseases is not a matter of medicine; the selection of food, not a matter of diet; the cleaning of pots and pans not a matter of housekeeping - all these belongs to the highest concern of life, to religion.

The same unfree attitude and dependence upon unimportant things is proved by the Jewish view that the soul, the human mind.

can be influenced by exterior things, for instance certain foods, physical activity, or by touching a corpse. If one is afraid of nature and thinks that there is danger that the soul could be contaminated, then one has not quite grown out of nature yet, nature is still looked at as a power, and a superior power.

The Jew has no talent for art and science, for his spirit lacks the liberality and dimension which is necessary for entering into free human relationships with other nations as well as for the theoretical, free study of nature and human affairs. His whole being is from the start limited and compressed, and locked in the occupation with strange, petty and unimportant things like pots and pans, house furnishings, clothes. ... One of the ways in which the Jewish national spirit has fettered itself is through its hierarchy. Always there is hierarchy where the national spirit is not yet strong enough to manifest its power and capabilities in all members of the people. Within the nation there has to be a separate nation, and within this again there is the one individual representing the true and real existence of the people, the high priest. Only He is really the true, the real people.

The Supreme Being of the loyal Jew - or rather the One in whose exclusive, particular, and accidental existence it is compressed - this Supreme Being is Himself unsteady. He does not prove by His actions that He is universal, His interest is in little things only and He reveals Himself in despotism. He is a contradiction Himself and He has to make great efforts and fight a great deal to maintain Himself. The zeal of this God shows therefore no rational development of His general importance. He takes the form of angry outbreaks and vengeance and He shows no capability for theory except in the

fixing of the punishments. The theory exists for the penal code only.

The nation expresses the unsteadiness of its nature in its whole history, in its language, in its entire character. It wants to be everything, the unique, the only one, the universal. But it is unique only in that it compressed its whole nature with such violence into this one point, that no room was left for general interests and everything else had to be refuted as sin, idolatry and wrong.

The conceit and arrogance of a nation which believes only in itself, which wants to be the one chosen people, is naturally irritated by the fact that there are other nations besides it, and at the same time this fact causes it uneasiness and a feeling of insecurity. The unique people is not, as it should be, the one and only people, if there are others. It begins to doubt itself if there are happy and powerful nations, and in order not to sink into utter misery and despair, it has to stick even more tenaciously to the idea of its uniqueness and to its conviction of the wrongness of the other nations - it is already wrong that they exist as nations; this is the right of the one, true nation only.

Hardness, bestiality, cruelty were shown by the Jews in their wars - a natural result of their conviction that they were fighting against peoples who had no right to exist.

One has spoken of Jewish courage: but courage, that is, calm and fortitude in the midst of the battle, the consciousness of fighting for a goal which one knows to be safe and inviolable even if the individual succumbs or if a battle is lost - this courage is found in the Greeks and Romans only. What has been called Jewish courage was only wild attack against an adversary who had no

a rage to annihilate, the consuming passion of animal spirits, and then in case of misfortune and defeat an immense dejection, a desperate retreat into the idea of the exclusive prerogative of the people. At no point and in no sense therefore, morality, an ethical attitude, true humanity - a defect which we will show in its full meaning when we look at the relationship of the people toward its Law.

The first condition for a consolidation and a settling down of the national spirit was lacking. Reality, the existence alongside other nations, did not measure up to the idea that this people was the only real people. Every day every historical event proved that the people was infinitely far removed from its idea; the continued national existence of the nation itself was a continuous defection from its idea.

If it did feel like a real nation for once, if it felt the passions and experienced the emotions which are the lot of all nations, then it found itself in contradiction to its idea which commanded it to be holy, to live apart and secluded from the natural feelings of other nations. As it could feel like a real worldly nation only at the cost of its idea, the result was that these feelings, remote from any idea and any universal law, were chaotic and confused, full of dark broodings and inner strife. The Jews never achieved unity, an organized state, and inner order.

Finally the Law itself was already a defection. At the moment it was given it appeared to the people as an alien command that was forced on them and by this it was excluded from the hearts in which it was to live and from the life of the people. At that moment already it repels the people and the people rejects it. The history

of the Jewish people is the history of a continuous series of revolts against the Law; defection followed defection. Only for short moments the law attained a sort of recognition, but this was only so that the revolt could start again.

The Jews are thus the only people in history which never came to terms with its own Law, and lived according to it only after it had ceased to be a nation and had lost its sovereignty. It was, therefore, natural and to be expected, that the Law could only maintain itself remote from the national life. It could not rationally influence the real affairs of the people, it could only have created the utmost confusion in the life of the people. Law, if this can really still be called law - exists in a fairyworld. The equal distribution of property prescribed by the Law is impossible and was never carried through by the Jews. scriptions given in the Pentateuch with respect to the maintenance of this equality are so many arithmetic fantasies. A sabbatical year as the law prescribes it is impossible and has never been celebrated in this manner. The whole relationship of the national life to the Temple is not only an impossibility - only in a fairy world could all males leave their homes to celebrate the holy days in Jerusalem and leave the frontiers undefended - most of these laws were thought up and put into the code only after the Temple had long ceased to exist.

Nation and law were absolutely opposed to each other and had to be, without any possibility that this gap could ever be filled or reconciled. The law was an irony on national and world conditions, but the people thought it was its destiny to be no real people, that is, no people alongside other peoples. It wanted to be the nation

of miracles and to have only the law of miracles; it did not wish to be at home in this world with its real and moral laws.

If the Law is to be maintained and Judaism as such kept alive, then Rabbinic Judaism is the true form of the Law, and life in prison the true fulfillment of the Law. The Jewish nation did not want to be like other nations. All right; it has become what it wanted to be, a nation like none other. No longer a nation among nations, it still did not cease to exist as a nation. Now it is really the people of the miracle, the nation of illusion and chimera. And the Law also has become what it basically always was, the Law of a fantasy world, absolutely opposed to the real world in which its servants live, the Law of illusion and a fantastic or sophistic calculation and combination. This answers the question about the moral viewpoint of later Judaism. We will now just say a few words about this.

The Moral Standpoint of Later Judaism

The Law remains impracticable and incapable of giving the people an inner moral support.

As it consists of arbitrary regulations and does not consider the real conditions under which the people live, it imparts to the people an extraordinary tenacity and enables it to live on, unchanged, in the midst of other nations. But it can achieve this purpose only by preventing the people from sharing the interests of other nations, or by preventing them from even getting an idea of what is going on in the historical development of other nations.

Since actual obedience to the whole Law is indeed impossible - as it always was - only theoretical obedience remains: casuistry, sophistry, musings. The hardness and severity of this sophistry will

be the greater since the regulations in question have nothing to do with universal human conditions but with this particular nation, and with this particular nation in its peculiar situation in Palestine, surrounded by nations whose religions were still nature religions and who were still closer to primitive animal life.

Only a few of the regulations - such as refer, for example, to the observation of holy days, the rituals concerning physical hygiene and the dietary laws, which could be transferred to other countries - only these can be obeyed by the Jews in exile. But no! It is not possible. Their observation has become an empty illusion, since their real sense, the contrast to nature religion, and also, therefore, their connection with it, has been lost. For example, the command of cleanliness and abstention from certain foods makes sense only in a world where those who obey it, as well as the opponents who do not obey it, see in nature a spiritual enemy, the evil principle. In Europe it has lost its original meaning.

In order to maintain the meaningless illusion one has to resort to hypocrisy. On the Sabbath, for instance, the Jew needs Christian servants to keep the fire in his house burning, as if he were not responsible for the work the servant is doing for him and on his command.

But now, when the performance of these rites has become meaningless, they create an even greater gap between the Jew and the other nations than at the time when he was surrounded by Canaanitic tribes. For he treats the illusion with enormous and false seriousness. He sees in it his true, highest nature, and this in the face of the seriousness with which European nations pursue the important affairs of their countries. Now that he lives in

other nations the exclusiveness of the Jew has not only had occasion to prove itself again; it has even reached its highest degree. He is still one of the chosen people for whom the world was created, for whom the sun rises and sets, until the time arrives when it will come into its kingdom. The present life in exile is only a time of trial which will end when the Messiah comes.

Those who call for immediate emancipation of the Jews, e.g., Mirabeau, say that the expectation of the Messiah will not prevent the Jews from being good citizens, just as the expectation of the Second Coming did not prevent the early Christians. They should have proved first that the early Christians really were good citizens of this world despite their expectation, whether the expectation did not rather make them indifferent toward the affairs of the Roman Empire - actually they were indifferent except that they took note of every event as to whether it might not be a messenger of the end of the world. These advocates of smancipation would first have to prove the impossible, namely that a community which sees its salvation in the future or in heaven can participate whole-heartedly in the affairs of the state and the events of history. Can the heart be in heaven and on earth at the same time? . . .

The Jews as such cannot amalgamate with the nations and cast their lot with them. As Jews they must expect a special future, one which will be theirs alone as the Jewish nation, world dominion. As Jews they believe only in their own nation; this is the only belief of which they are capable and which is their duty. For the other nations they have only disbelief, and that disbelief is necessary lest they lose their belief in their privilege. . . .

The manner in which we treated the matter - - - and we have

only recorded it as past history has done - - - and as it was necessary according to the nature of the problem, seems to place the affair of the Jews in an almost desperate state. Nor will a solution seem easier when we point out the attitude of Christianity to Judaism and when we prove that the treatment of Judaism by Christianity is a consequence of its own principles put into actual operation.

III. Christianity's Attitude toward Judaism

The orthodox teaching was always that Judaism was the preparation for Christianity and Christianity the completion and perfection of Judaism. It seems, therefore, correct for us to call Christianity a Judaism which has effected its own completion, and to call
Judaism an uncompleted, unfinished Christianity. The goal that
Judaism had set for itself was that at the coming of the Messiah,
the Temple rites would cease to exist and the Law would become the
inner law of morality and personal conviction. But Judaism did not
have the courage to reach this aim.

The Christian community was born - we assume here that modern critical research is correct - when Judaism declared that it had finished its course. Judaism said: Period. The goal has been reached. I am what I was meant to be, I have what I was meant to have. The community which drew this forceful line was, therefore, expelled, and it seceded from the Judaism which wanted to remain as it always had been, and which did not want to reach its goal and finish line.

If, however, Christianity is Judaism perfected, then it is not sufficient for it to declare that the Messiah has come, that the Law was fulfilled. It has also to create a counterpart for that endless development which Judaism regards as its nature and destiny.

It must at the same time declare that the goal has <u>not</u> been reached, that the coming of the Messiah, which has now become the Second Coming, is still in the future. That the Messiah was there, but the true revelation in which he will appear in his true splendor and rule the whole world is still to come. The community has, therefore, not become yet what it was meant to be - like Judaism it expects all fulfillment from the future.

Judaism is the disbelief which directs itself against all other nations and national conditions. It is, therefore, inconsistent if it maintains its belief in this one nation and tries to find support in national conditions.

Christianity abolishes this inconsistency. It cancels the belief in any nationality, not excepting the One People; it rebels against all state and national conditions; one has to leave "house, sisters and brothers, parents, wife and children" for the sake of the Gospel, to win everything back a hundred-fold. But this home, these parents, sisters and brothers and children, this wife, are no longer the real persons, they are only the illusion of what one has given up and lost: its other-worldly illusion. Christianity has completed what Judaism had done incompletely and inconsistently: it has driven man out of house and home, from his worldly environment and connections, from his ties to the state and the nation, in order to restore to him all he has lost as an other-worldly reward: a heavenly home, a heavenly family.

Christianity was born when the nations lost their belief in themselves and despaired of their political existence. It is the religious expression of this loss of faith, the disintegration of political and civil life in the hope of finding its counterpart in the other world.

The Jewish people was the nation which was not really a nation, the people of the chimera, inconsistent only in that it wanted to exist as a real nation. Christianity abolished this inconsistency, this deceptive illusion of national existence. It created the miraculous holy nation, the nation of the "royal priesthood". Christianity abolished national barriers, but at the same time it carried the Jewish idea to its perfection by making the particularism, the exclusiveness complete and general. Juda1sm excluded the other nations only: the Christian community excludes all the nations, every national individuality. It condemns every nation that believes in itself, and trusting its own genius wants to establish its own laws. It excludes everybody who relies on himself, on his rights as a human being, on the rights of humanity. What it wants is not the real man, but man who has lost his true humanity, the re-born, spiritual man.

According to the Jewish law man cannot escape contamination by unclean things. The natural world in which he lives is full of unclean things; they persecute him, and he has to liberate himself by sacred cleansing ceremonies. Christianity takes the inescapability of contamination even more seriously. It says that man is unclean by nature. He needs cleansing not to remove single spots but to free himself from that original taint. For that purpose baptism was established. Judaism distinguishes between clean and unclean foods, overlooking that they all come from the same source. Christianity permits all foods which nature provides, but carries the distinction between clean and unclean foods to perfection by opposing to the ordinary, everyday food the one, real, truly nourishing food which is received in holy communion.

The Jew is segregated from others by his dietary and hygienic laws, the Christian by Baptism and Eucharist. He alone is miracu-lously cleansed, all the others live in uncleanliness, which according to his faith is part of human nature.

The Jewish people was not capable of creating a real state and nation; it was just a collection of atoms. This isolation, founded in the character of Judaism, was carried to perfection in Christianity; it became the duty and supreme destiny of the believer. For the believer his own life is his private affair, and it is his supreme concern. Nothing is more important to him than his own soul and salvation, and in case of need, he has to give up for its sake everything that men hold most dear.

The Jew must live in perpetual hypochondria, watchful lest he contaminate himself by accident, worrying whether he has not contaminated himself. The Christian lives in a world which is unclean from the start; man has been corrupted by original sin. He has even more reason for worry and hypochondria. His only concern has to be whether he is clean or unclean, chosen or damned. Nothing else should interest him, for nothing else should he care.

On account of this hypochondriac isolation, this spiritual and holy community of the elect is even less a real people than the Jews. In itself the Jewish people is nothing, its existence is concentrated in its high priest, in the chief who does its thinking and makes all decisions - in the Messiah.

If the people as such are nothing and everything happens through the high priest alone, then the general moral laws also which have been formed in this nation are valid not because the people have voted for them and sees its own will manifested in them, not because the people hold them to be true, but only because the one who alone thinks and decides has commanded and revealed them. They cease therefore, to be moral; they form rather the peak which the positive nature of Judaism was able to reach.

Art and science had no place in Judaism: still less in its successor, because here everything which obstructed the free and sincere study of the world and all its laws was carried to the extreme. Art and science are possible only when one's time is not entirely occupied with the care for immediate personal needs. In this community, however, man is supposed to be forever thinking of his needs; he is never to become free. Art and science which would exalt him and raise him above this paltry existence, this selfish and hypochondriacal concern about himself are impossible and forbidden. The new law is the perfection of the old; therefore, it also carries to the extreme the opposition of the law to the world and its real conditions. Further: if the old Law contradicted itself and refuted its own consequences, this contradiction will be carried to the extreme in the new law. It will have to refute the conclusions which would lead to universalism because the universalism it teaches is basically only exclusiveness carried to the extreme. The logical result of the old Law is casuistry. Let us see what the result of the new Law is. The treatment of the Jewish problem is the best way to find out.

We are going to prove our impartiality by quoting the words of a man who undeniably expounded the law of the Gospel correctly.

The convert Frankel says in his essay, "The Impossibility of Emancipation in the Christian State"(1842): "Christianity is not at all opposed to the worldly emancipation of the Jew as a human

being; to the contrary, Christianity preaches and teaches love of one's neighbor, and petty questions such as the opening of the professions of teacher, official or merchant to the Jew are far beneath its exalted concerns." . . .

But does Christianity act in accordance with its teachings?

Does it really look at the human being only in the various appearances under which he is found? Or does it let the man suffer for his accidental destiny? Does it not withdraw its love for the neighbor because of these differences? Or does it forget that Jews, Turks, heathen, are men?

Herr Frankel gives us the right answer: "Christianity is not opposed to the worldly emancipation of the Jew as a man, but it is opposed to his emancipation if he, as a Jew, wants to assert the truth of his religion which does not recognize the Christ"; that is, a distinction is made between man and Jew, the abstract and the concrete, chimera and reality. Where the real world is concerned, where it should be proved that he takes the idea of charity seriously, there he pulls back. The man suffers for the Jew. Or rather, the man does not really exist in his opinion. Only the Jew; and he cannot claim, cannot receive, what the man would be granted were he really in existence. The Jews are not considered yet as human, also not as Jew and human, only as Jew, that is, a being different from the Christian, as a being with whom the Christian as such can have nothing in common.

But why must charity be denied, why is the man ignored in the Jew? "Because", according to Herr Frankel, "according to the Gospel, there is no salvation for man except in the Christ." Because the Christian has this salvation he must consider all those

who do not have it as alien beings. The charity he vowed for his fellowman as a Christian, he must, as a Christian, withhold at the same time. He must, because as Herr Frankel remarks, "the egotism of the world must and will finally succumb to the Christian striving for unity [that is, the holy and only justified egotism]."

"Now, however," Herr Frankel continues, "the liberal ideas of our age (to which belongs also the idea of emancipation) are identical with the egotism of the world and have a common basis outside Christ, while Christianity preaches a charity rooted solely in Christ and gets its nourishment from that eternal fount of justice, truth and equality. This charity, miraculously nourished and miraculous itself, is not founded on the nature of human conditions... its striving for equality does not spring from vivid sympathy with all that is human (homo sum, nihil humanum a me alienum puto) - it is a superhuman, not a human love, it is supernatural and the equality which is its aim is a heavenly condition. It can condemn the distinctions existing in this world but not really abolish them, that is, it cannot recognize the men who live under these conditions."

The Jews regard themselves as a special people. "Christianity, however," Herr Frankel remarks, "recognizes no other nationality besides the one rooted in Jesus Christ." The real national character is usually based on natural characteristics which develop in the course of history. If nations fight each other they do it because their interests have collided; they make peace if they acknowledge their mutual interests; they unite for common action if a higher idea unites them which requires that combination of natural characteristics to find realization; in the real state, in real history,

the Jew must always remain a foreign element, not because of his nationality, but because his nationality is chimeric, not real, and he, therefore, cannot fraternize or amalgamate with the real nations. Christianity looks at this matter from a different angle. Here all the real nationalities are considered unreal, as mere chimera, and the Jewish one just as one more chimera, just as little valid as the others, because only one nationality, the one "rooted in Jesus Christ" is known to Christianity. ...

"The Jews refer to their morality, to the progress of culture and civilization," but Herr Frankel tells them, "Christianity holds Christian charity higher than all worldly knowledge". Christianity can, therefore, take the matter easy, it does not have to investigate whether the morality of which the Jews boast is real morality, such as would make them capable of partaking in state affairs: it has merely to put charity in opposition to civilization and let it be victorious.

"The Jews pretend that they believe in God." One has often heard the opinion expressed that the belief in one and the same God must unite Jews and Christians. "However," Herr Frankel remarks quite correctly, "Christianity declares any spirit who does not confess Jesus Christ is God incarnate for the spirit of the anti-Christ." The God of the Christians is different from the God of the Jews. The Jews deny the God of the Christians, and the Christians must not have any communion with those who deny their Supreme Being.

"The Jews," Herr Frankel continues, "are charitable and grateful to non-Jews, but Christ says, 'Who is not for me is against me;'" that is Christian charity remains exclusive, unmovable, incorruptible, inexorable.

Tt does not do the Jews any good that they "assimilate in customs and habits to the Christians, agree with them in their political views, in literature, art, and science, that they trade with them, even that they serve with them in war"; all this does not help them because "all these qualities, attributes and efforts" Herr Frankel remarks, "are of this world, and although the world pays attention, and indeed has to pay attention to all this, we have been told by the Apostle Paul how we are to hold and to consider all such, when he, in Romans 12:2 "warned very seriously against considering the world of equal importance."

The only correct relationship between Jews and Christians is one of mutual exclusiveness. The Jews were the first to practice exclusiveness. What they did to the nations they are receiving back in full measure from the Christians. ...

The Christian state cannot alter the relationship between Jews and Christians from the one determined by their religious stand.

There can be no doubt about our impartiality if we let a Jew determine the status his nation should have in the Christian state.

Another Frankel, who speaks in the name of the Jews (Order of the Jewish Cult in Prussia, 1842) writes the following: "Not by abolition of our special characteristics will the state profit, but by their preservation. For the man who obeys the commands of his religion will also obey his superior and anyone who acknowledges the sacredness of his religion will also hold human rights and the laws of humanity sacred. Religion is the totality, the comprehensive, and whoever accepts it and is loyal to it will also respect the partial, the individual, morality.

So morality, ethical norms in affairs among men, human rights and the laws of humanity, all that is merely something partial, individual, particular? Man is only something partial, religion the comprehensive? But why waste more words? The religious man who thus reveals his true character declares at the same time that humanity is not his main concern, that it has to take second place to the really essential, and that in case of collision, has to be denied entirely.

All right! The Jew wants to see his religion preserved, it is his real nature, his totality. He wants to make the acknowledgment of human rights dependent upon the acknowledgment and preservation of his religion. The Christian state therefore, is only doing what he himself wishes; it acts according to his words. His fate in the Christian state will be of his own doing; he will suffer the consequences of his own actions and therefore will no longer be able to complain.

IV. The Status of the Jew in the Christian State

The Christian state is doing what the Jew wants, what the

Jew himself tried to do when his theocracy still existed: It de
clares religion as the foundation and essential characteristic of

the state; only this religion is Christianity, the successor of

Judaism.

The Christian state evangelizes, or as the convert Frankel expresses it: "In the Christian state evangelizing is regarded as a divine command - as the most important one - and it is practiced." If the Gospel is the perfection and completion of the Law, then the Christian state is the ideal of the theocracy of the Law. Not an

iota from the Law was lost or overlooked in its constitution.

Recently, to prove the impossibility or non-existence of a Christian state, there have been frequently, quoted those sayings in the Gospels which the state not only disobeys, but which it could not obey without the danger of complete disintegration.

But this is not the end of the matter. What do those sayings of the Gospel command? They enjoin superhuman self-denial, submission under the authority of Revelation, turning away from the state, abolition of worldly order. Well, all this is commanded and done in the Christian state. It has incorporated the spirit of the Gospel. If it does not act quite according to the letter of the Gospel, the reason is that this spirit has to be expressed in forms which are appropriate for worldly affairs, but in their necessary religious rebirth these forms become illusory. It is the turning away from state affairs which for its realization assumes the form of a state.

The reborn people have the duty to remain remote from all real national affairs, to become de-nationalized. It has no longer a will of its own, is not self-sufficient, it shall be nothing in itself. It is the "people of property" but the property of another. Its true existence is only in its chief who rules over it, who, however, was originally alien to it and was given by God without the people doing anything on its part. Its laws are not of its own making but were given by revelations which it has to obey unconditionally and without being allowed any criticism. The ruling power needs a great number of intermediaries to represent it in all kinds of places to the non-nation, the subjects. These intermediaries form a privileged class. One belongs to it either by birth or by the grace of the

ruler or after fulfillment of certain conditions, which, however, are not necessarily connected with the aptitude for the position of intermediary. Finally, since the mass of the non-nation is just a faceless crowd without rights, without consciousness, it it divided into a number of groups which differ in interests, special demands and prejudices, and which, as a privilege, get permission to form separate corporations for the furtherance of their special interests, and in such a crowd there are none but special interests. They have no general idea, they are not even allowed to have one. So that they might not one day get the idea that they have one, they are allowed a slight measure of authority in the administration of their special affairs, but always in a way that no group will have enough power to rule over other groups.

Herr Hermes was quite right when he said in the Kölner

Zeitung: "The Christian state must not be based on general principles, its institutions must be organized taking into consideration passions and prejudices." If Herr Philippson in the <u>Rheinische</u>

Zeitung remarked, "because men have passions and prejudices the law has to stand above those", he was right as far as the conception of law is concerned, but wrong with respect to real conditions where laws are not in the realm of ideas but exist in and regulate the concrete world of reality. If a prejudice here is strong enough to be regarded as the essential basis, then the law can be only a sanction and justification of the prejudice. Now, the Jew regards himself as something special compared with the Christian - so the law will treat him as something special. The Jew has the prejudice that certain foods and contacts contaminate. To keep himself free from such contamination which he regards as his nature he separates

himself from all non-Jews, - should the law not take this peculiarity of the Jew into consideration, should it not sanction this prejudice of the Jew and segregate him from others? It acts only according to his own wishes. ...

Herr Philippson says that "religion is used as a pretense to cover hypocrisy, oppression, suppression of freedom of conscience." What does he mean? Is he using the Jewish dietary and hygienic laws as a pretense to keep away from non-Jews while his real reasons are different? He would never admit that, nor would we make an assertion as absurd as that; but just as little should he say that the Christian state uses religion as a "pretense for oppression" only. No, the Jew keeps himself aloof because he does not esteem humanity higher than his own nature; he does not even recognize the nature of humanity as his own nature. In the same manner the Christian state knows only the exclusiveness of power, of hierarchical organization, because the state and the ruling class know only force and class as their nature.

Like Hermes, the Frankel from Elberfeld has explained the nature of the Christian state quite correctly when he said: "No doubt - certainly there is no doubt: - the government has the right to make the granting of certain prerogatives, privileges and jobs dependent on certain conditions, for instance, an oath on the Old and New Testaments."

It is wrong to object that "the performance of certain church ceremonies does not give the state any guarantee or measure of the ability of its citizens." If that which was by nature a universal right and universal obligation has been usurped by the state and is now granted as a privilege and prerogative, then the government can

impose any condition it chooses for bestowing it, and the condition need not have more meaning than the ceremonies the liegeman had to perform in the middle ages on certain occasions. It is even logical that the conditions are quite independent of the occasion so that the privilege is recognizable as a pure gift by grace.

The most universal, therefore also the most exclusive privilege, is faith. ... Man cannot acquire it by himself, he cannot develop it from reason, he cannot manipulate it according to his will. It is, rather, a gift of grace, given to the chosen. The Christian must, therefore, acknowledge it as his privilege, make it his rule of conduct and regulate his intercourse, his behavior, his charity, according to its rules. The apostle says, and Herr Frankel quotes him correctly: "Let us act kindly towards everyone, most of all, however, towards our fellow Christians!"

Like the community of the believers, Israel boasts of a special privilege. Therefore, one privilege confronts another: one excludes the other. The Christian state is under the obligation to respect privileges, to protect them, to base its organization upon them. The Jew regards his special character as a privilege. Therefore, his only possible position in the Christian state is that of a privileged one, the Jews can only exist as a special corporation.

V. Conclusion

The demand for emancipation from the side of the Jews and the support it has found from the Christians are signs that both sides are beginning to break through the barrier which until now has separated them. The orthodox Jew should not even ask for emancipation, because it would lead him into conditions and situations where he would be unable to observe his law. If the Christian

emancipation, it is a proof, whether he knows it or not, that the man has conquered the Christian. Finally, that several states - during the revolutionary wars - made important concessions and even went so far as to give or promise the Jews full civil rights: that was only possible because in those tempestuous times the form of the Christian state disintegrated and at least part of the privileges had to be sacrificed. This changed again with the restoration. The promises were withdrawn, concessions already given were limited, privileges were restored, there were even new persecutions of Jews. But they were not the only ones who suffered. Everything suffered: reason, common sense, universal human rights.

It had to happen, this epoch had to become a time of general suffering. The error had been that one thought emancipation possible while the privileges of the religious barriers remained standing, even acknowledged in the emancipation itself. The Jew received concessions as Jew, was allowed to continue to exist as a being segregated from all others, and this in itself made true emancipation impossible. Everybody still lacked courage to be simply a human being. Some privileges were sacrificed at that time, but the main privilege, the heavenly, god-given, supernatural privilege remained in force and this in turn must always generate all the others.

The emancipation of the Jews in a thoroughgoing, successful, safe manner will only be possible when they are emancipated not as Jews, that is as forever alien to the Christians, but as human beings who are no longer separated from their fellowmen by barriers which they wrongly consider to be all-important.

Therefore, the emancipation can also not be made dependent upon their conversion to Christianity, for by this they would only

exchange one privilege against another. It would remain a privilege, even if expanded to everybody, to all mankind.

The emancipation problem has until now been treated in a basically wrong manner by considering it one-sidedly as the Jewish problem. Neither was it possible to find a theoretical solution in this manner, nor will it be possible to find a practical solution. Without being free oneself, one cannot help another to freedom. The serf cannot emancipate. The minor cannot help another to get rid of his guardians. One privilege can limit another, that is, by the very act at limitation it recognize and designate it as a privilege, but it can never replace the privilege by universal human rights without abolishing itself.

The problem of emancipation is a general problem, it is the problem of our age. Not only the Jews, but we, also, want to be emancipated. Only because nobody was free, because privilege was the ruling power, the Jews could not have freedom either. We all were surrounded by barriers; the Jewish quarter is right next to the police-supervised quarters where all of us are registered.

Not the Jews only, we, too, are no longer content with the chimera. We want to be real nations.

If the Jews want to become real - they cannot achieve it in their chimerical nationality, only in the real nations of our time living in history - then they have to give up the chimerical prerogative which will always alienate them from the other nations and history. They have to sacrifice their disbelief in the other nations and their exclusive belief in their own nationality. Only then will they be able to participate sincerely in national and state affairs.

We, however, have to give up our skepticism regarding the world and the rights of man, the exclusive belief in monopoly, and our immaturity, before we can think of becoming real nations and within the life of the nation, real human beings.

It is impossible that the demands of modern criticism, the general cry for emancipation and liberation from absolute government should remain unheard for long. How great the success will be depends upon events the scope and result of which cannot be figured in advance. But one thing is certain: All reforms will be palliatives only and will lead only to new discord as long as one remedy is not used. This one remedy is: complete disbelief in servitude, belief in freedom and humanity. This belief will finally prove its zeal, a great and unconquerable zeal, just as man is greater than privilege and monopoly.

"But that is extreme! Too extreme!" one will say perhaps.
Well, let us investigate the wisdom of the juste milieu!

VI.

The French Jews in relationship to the Religion of the Majority of Frenchmen

"Just let things go their way." That is the admonition one hears from people who, on the one hand, do not like to see the indecision and discomfort of the present continue indefinitely, but on the other hand, cannot make up their minds to take decisive and extreme measures. "Just let things go their way and everything will come out all right." Especially, don't believe that you will get anywhere with theory. Theory is cruel, it creates collisions out of little difficulties, it enlarges little complications until they choke both parties, theory carries everything to its extreme.

Life, however, has many means of circumventing difficulties, to dull their edges and remove the dangers. It cools the fever of excitement and pours oil on the wounds made by theory.

So we shall hear reproaches that we have in this essay exaggerated the difficulty and disregarded means which are at hand in real life and which in life are always applied successfully at the right moment, while in theory the situation looks so dangerous that one would expect darkest tragedy at any moment.

We do not hold ordinary life in contempt, but we do not esteem it very highly either, as we esteem only that which stands in free and sincere relationship to its law, which regards the expression of its highest consciousness as its law and abolishes a law which it disavows in reality.

In this respect the so-called real life to whom the enemies of theory appeal as a wonder healer, is not admirable. On the contrary, it will always come to a point where it is despicable in the highest degree.

and threatening theory, not only the theory of the thinker, but at the same time its own theory. So the Christian can be benevolent, charitable, and friendly towards the Jew, that is, he disavows his theory which obligates him as a Christian to have no intercourse with the Jews; he can recognize the Jew as a human being and so prove himself not a Christian but a man. Ordinary life, however, is so inconsistent that although it ignores the theory in deed, it does not annul the law by a conscious decision. It does not follow up its action by making it the new law. It leaves the old law which denies the Jew human rights, in the books that is, it is

still incapable of acknowledging universal human rights by law.

Only momentarily, in a moment when human sympathy moves the heart,
the human being in the Jew is recognized. But the law sticks to
the cruel theory. ...

Ordinary life can, therefore, be opposed to theory only insofar as it sometimes and for a few moments deviates from its own
hard-hearted theory; but basically and in the ordinary course of
things it is ruled by its theory, and this theory can only be overcome by the real cruel one, that is by the theory which has the
courage to make an end of the cruelty.

For some moments, life is opposed to its own theory, but it is forever opposed to the true theory; for even when it ignores its own for once it is afraid to acknowledge this abolition as law and as the true theory.

The higher, the more liberal the level of ordinary life, the more barbaric, the more cruel will be its theory, if it will not recognize as its highest law, the freedom in which it exists. In this case will not solve the complications which arise by making freedom its law, but will invent ways and means to limit the existing freedom. The law which is to solve the complication will then give the lie to the ruling liberties. But a freedom which can be mocked in this manner is only an illusion, even if it seems to be the law of the land.

These contradictions which plague ordinary life were not thought up by theory, but by life itself. The danger of the collision is not in the theory, but in ordinary life, because it refuses to admit the contradictions and to dissolve them in the true theory. ...

Recently, France has shown us in regard to the Jewish problem - as in all other political problems since the July revolution - a kind of life which is free but revokes its freedom by law, making it thereby an illusion, while on the other hand its free law is contradicted by its deeds.

The July revolution abolished the state religion as such, emancipated the state from the Church, liberated it from every clerical influence, and made participation in all political and civil rights independent of religious and church affiliation. Consequently the French Jews are perfectly free citizens and can be elected to represent their fellow citizens in Parliament. Mr. Fould has made a name for himself as a member of the Chamber of Deputies, and this problem in the eyes of our theoreticians and politicians in Germany seems actually to have been solved.

But in reality this is not yet the case, neither in the law nor in real life.

The Jew would have to cease being a Jew if he would not permit his law to interfere with his duties toward the state and his fellow citizens, if he would, for instance, go to the Chamber of Deputies on the Sabbath and participate in the public discussions. Every religious privilege, therefore, also the monopoly of a privileged church, would have to be abolished; and if some persons or the great majority, still believed in the performance of certain religious rites, this would have to be regarded as a purely private affair.

But this general liberty is not yet law even in France.

The Jewish problem is not yet solved, because the general freedom (that all citizens are equal) is still subject to limitations in

real life where religious privileges are still powerful, and this limitation influences legislation and creates a division of the citizens into oppressors and oppressed.

The discussions in the Chamber of Deputies about the Child Labor Law, which is to regulate working hours of children in factories, showed the unresolved collision in all its difficulties. When Article 4 was discussed in the session of December 26, 1840, that children under 16 must not be employed for work on Sundays and legal holidays, Mr. Luneau proposed the following wording: "Children under 16 can only be employed six days a week." This wording was in accordance with the principles of the July revolution. What is the meaning of holidays after this revolution? Either all of them are recognized or none. In both cases it would mean that the state knows no holidays, subordinates everything to the interest of the state and leaves it to private arrangements to establish holidays, so long as there is no collision with the interests of the state.

"A day of rest is necessary" the <u>Journal des Debats</u> says on December 27, but may the law proceed to determine which day? Why choose Sunday and the holidays of the Catholic cult? Is it not better to leave the choice of a day of rest to the individual? All "deviating" cults are recognized in France - hear: "deviating" dissidens - and have equal rights. Why force the manufacturer to close his shop on Sunday if his day of rest is Saturday?"

The Journal des Debats is of the opinion that the Chamber nevertheless was right in rejecting the amendment of Mr. Luneau: "For although all cults are equal before the law, although there is no longer a privileged religion, there still is a religion of

the majority, whose interests must not be sacrificed to the Jew. To eliminate the mention of Sunday from the law would be a declaration that there will be no religion any more in France."

Right! There is no religion any more as soon as there is no privileged religion. Take its exclusive power from religion and it ceases to exist.

Mr. Martin du Nord, who gets special praise in the Journal des Debats for his opposition to the Luneau amendment, remarked that the Article was not in contradiction to the constitution of 1830 and contained nothing against the freedom of conscience of the citizens. Just because Sunday is mentioned in the law does not mean that anybody is forced to work on a day which his religion holds to be a day of rest. If the Jews are not permitted to work on a certain day of the week, the law does not prevent them from abstaining from work. But it still remains true that they are forced to observe the Sunday and the Christian holidays which for them are no holidays. They have to do what the Christian religion, the religion of the majority of Frenchmen, commands. Therefore, the liberty of the Jews is limited to this, that they are not forced to break their Sabbath law - if they want to they can work on the Sabbath - but the Christian religious law, which is explicitly acknowledged by the state as the norm for its laws, forces them to observe other days besides their holidays. The law does not force an active infringement of their law on them, but if they want to observe their Sabbath as conscientuously as the Christians observe their holidays they are put at a material disadvantage. ... You cannot serve two masters, says the Bible. The Christian has to be religious - that is the law of the land; the Jew can act as

he wishes: as if, when the Jew is left to his own devices and the state seemingly is not afraid of harmful consequences, the Christian could not be left just as free.

But why is Christianity so privileged? Why does the state protect it to prevent the decline of religion which is feared if the holidays are not specially authorized by law? Why is a law which originally was only to prevent the exploitation of children in the factories, brought in accordance with church regulations? Why the preference against Judaism? Because it is the religion of the majority; because almost all Frenchmen belong to this religion.

Freedom of religion, therefore, does not mean that all religions have equal rights or that different religions have equal status; it means the monopoly of one religion which is almost the only one of all citizens. The relatively "infinitely" few are ignored, the disadvantage, the pressure under which they are put are disregarded, the decree which, as far as the state is concerned, regards them as non-existent is no wrong, because they are so infinitely few. Their suffering is ignored, they have no right to complain, because for the whole, or rather for the infinite majority, the pressure under which they suffer is outweighed by the advantage for the whole.

In the Christian state which confesses its Christian character and where the Christian religion is designated as the state religion, the oppression of the Jews is no wrong, or only the wrong of monopoly. If, however, a religion oppresses the other solely because it is the religion of the majority, then the

right of the stronger, the pure right of the greater number takes the place of right, the simple fact that the Christian Frenchmen are so much more numerous than the Jews means that in case of conflict the Jews have to give way.

Is this now the quiet solution which life supposedly always has ready in cases of conflict, according to the panegyrists of the juste milieu? Can that be called a solution if the rights of the minority are simply suppressed? Is this putting salve on their wounds if the minority is told that they have no right to complain, that liberty is only for the majority? No, that is mocking the patient who wanted to complain about his pain to tear open his wounds.

The July revolution was directed against privileges, therefore, also against the state church. If the wording of the revised Constitution reads that the Christian religion is the religion of the majority of Frenchmen, this simply states a fact that cannot impair the right of adherents of another religion to participate in civil rights. After the July revolution one did not dare to still talk of a privileged religion. But, on the other hand, one did not have the courage to profess the liberty which the revolution had conquered. Since liberty which one dares profess is no liberty, one simply did not have the courage to be free. One was afraid of the Church; on the other hand, complete liberty seemed no less dangerous. Therefore, one chose the seemingly harmless expedient to take the fact ad acta that the majority of Frenchman belong to a certain religion.

In ordinary life, of course, there is liberty. The Jew, for instance, who belongs to a minority religion, meets no obstacle-

in regard to his civil rights, since the majority as such has no special privileges. But this absence of obstacles is not due to an explicit law, it is only by silent agreement that the mere expression "state church" is suppressed, and because the majority is kind enough to forget the preponderance which its number gives it or at least could give it. The moment the interests of majority and minority diverge - and this is up to the majority, no law prevents it from asserting such special interests at any time then the majority alone has rights and the minority has simply to obey its will. Therefore, although liberty exists - the Jew, for instance, is in possession of full civil rights - this liberty is based only on an arbitrary convenience of social organization. has an inexorable enemy in the theory, in the law, in the category of the majority - an enemy who can prove his superior power in every conflict, and who can create a conflict under any pretense at any moment.

What can the minority do? If it is courageous and conscious of its right, should it be content with the status which the superior power of the majority allows it and which is not even guaranteed explicitly by law? If the law is against it and if it has progressed far enough in its education to want no privileges, not even for itself, then it should propose that the law be abolished, and should fight against the privileged majority. If the law bestows privileges on the adversary not in an open but in a concealed manner, the minority should bring the matter out into the open and propose an amendment.

If it is unsure itself, however, and claims a religious privilege itself, which it can not bring into power only becaus-

it is a minority, then it will remain silent and find comfort in the thought that it is experiencing only what it would have done to others had it been in the majority.

Finally, if it lacks decision to rebel against every privilege and lacks the courage to admit that it adheres to a religious privilege itself, if it suffers from the same incompleteness and split personality which is characteristic of the majority, then it will observe the forms of civilized society, bear its wrongs with composure, will act as if nothing had happened and abstain from bothering the majority with complaints or protests in order to get the issue out into the open. It will do everything - even to complete self-denial - to hush up the affair, in the sure hope that afterwards everything will continue in the same manner of incompleteness and indecision and that everybody will take care not to create conflicts.

Mr. Fould played this latter part. As the <u>Journal des</u>

<u>Debats</u> remarks approvingly, he rejected "with decency and nobility"

an opportunity to discuss the problem seriously offered by Mr.

Luneau.

"The Jews, as a minority in this nation," he said, "do not want to trouble the conscience of 33 million inhabitants of France. The Sunday is the holy day of the majority: to my co-religionists it must at least be a day of rest. They are content with the status given to them. They do not ask for more. It has been said that this means that they are forced to observe two days of rest. That is an error. True, they have to perform religious duties on another day; but one hour suffices for this and in no factory will they be denied this tolerance."

The Journal des Debats reports that at the end of the discussions, Mr. Fould rejected "in the name of the Israelitic religion" the succour offered him as superfluous and unnecessary. It should also have reported whether Mr. Pould presented an authorization which would have entitled him to such an official declaration. It should also have told its readers how it was at all possible for Mr. Fould to give such a declaration. Its sense, if it is taken seriously, is no less than that the religion of his denomination does not exist anymore. Mr. Fould, however, was not elected by Jews only, not as a Jew to represent the Jews. He had no authority to speak for his co-religionists and interpret their views; he was elected and sent to the Chamber of Deputies as a representative of the French people. Therefore, he has no right to make the one-sided declaration that for the Jews of France the Sabbath no longer exists - because it would no longer exist if the law of complete rest were abolished and the time of rest reduced to one hour - he also has no right to declare that Judaism has ceased to exist in France. Just as Mr. Martin du Nord saw in the proposal to omit the mention of Sunday in the law a motion to declare that Christianity does not exist any more, by the same right the declaration that the Sabbath law is no longer binding for the Jew would be a proclamation that Judaism has ceased to Mr. Fould, however, had no authority for such a one-sided declaration. As a deputy of France, he had only a duty to keep the general interests of the country in mind, to present the issue clearly in case of conflict. If one party - and even if it was the party of the great majority - wanted to grant privileges to one religion and subordinate law to privilege, he should have protested and insisted on abolition of the religious principle;

and just as he gave up the rights of the Jewish religion when it came in opposition to the law, he should have proposed a complete separation of Christianity from the state and have insisted upon declaration that Christianity, just as Judaism, is a mere private affair of the individual and is left to the private judgment of the individual. He thus would have preserved the inviolability of the interests of the state.

But he could not do this because he had no right to do
it, because he was conscious of not being in the right, because
he could not seriously be of the opinion that for the French Jews
in general the Sabbath law has no binding force any more. Had he
been sincerely convinced that this binding force had ceased to
exist for his co-religionists, he would have acted differently
and put the Christian Chamber to shame by demanding that in return
for the sacrifice of the Jewish privilege, they should make the
just counter-sacrifice on their part. But he acted in the same
spirit in which the majority acted when it rejected the amendment
of Mr. Luneau, as a representative of the juste milieu. In the
sense of this system he gave in and consented to let his coreligionists sacrifice a privilege: in the same spirit the majority accepted the sacrifice.

The juste milieu is the reaction against the Christian state, against religious and clerical privilege, against the rule in general, but it does not yet go all out for liberty, against all religious norms. It stops half-way. It cannot do otherwise, because it is only enlightenment in religion, but not freedom from religion and privilege: therefore, it will always restore the monopoly it has overthrown, but in a crude, lawless form, for it does not recognize the true, the exclusive right of religion.

Life in the <u>juste milieu</u> is free, monopoly is overthrown, all citizens have equal rights - but the law is not free, it does not avow liberty, and it opposes to the religious minority a majority as a threatening power.

The juste milieu has freedom in theory, for its laws ignore the fact that the great majority of the citizens have a different religion from the minority; in practice, however, and if specific laws are in question, it is unfree and sacrifices the minority to the majority. In principle, the juste milieu does not admit the possibility of a conflict between religious interests on the one hand and civil and state interests on the other: in practice it ignores the conflict arguing that the minority is so small that a wrong done to it can hardly be called a wrong.

The victims of the <u>juste milieu</u> who have to suffer for the sake of the principle to which they themselves subscribe, hand the dagger to one another with the words: <u>non dolet</u>, and comfort themselves with the thought that in reality there is no conflict, because they are not only in the minority but could not even be the cause for a conflict. In practice, however, and in ordinary life they stick to the principle which distinguishes them from the majority and which will always cause new conflicts. For they dare just as little as the majority to bring the question to open discussion whether the thing that separates them really has the right to separate them, whether it is legitimate at all under the law of the state.

In short, both sides have given up their privileges, and yet they prove at every point where it should be obvious that this has really happened, that, on the contrary, they still are holding on to them.

None of the two parties dared to attack the privilege of the other in earnest. They were afraid for their own, because they would indeed have to give up their own privileges in order to be able to attack that of the other successfully. The technique of the juste milieu is to let things go as they may, ignores the contradiction between theory and real life, and if a conflict occurs one tries to shove it up, hoping that there will not be another too soon - until the next day shatters this hope and until a day of judgment comes when the true, sincere theory regains power.

The Christian state avows its loyalty to privilege and acts accordingly in practice when it assigns a privileged existence to the Jew. The juste milieu is full of contradictions. It has freedom in theory but in practice disavows it, and it has freedom in practice which in theory, in the law, is ignored. Thus it was not able so far to resolve the conflict of which the so-called Jewish problem forms only a part.

The faint-heartedness to which humanity has been educated until now, this faint-heartedness in which man is afraid to confess to himself that he is man, that he is free and above all and any privileges, the cowardice which seeks to hide the fact that the religion one still confesses has been dealt a death-blow by the very manner in which it is confessed ... this faint-heartedness and cowardice which fights one sort of oppression without considering the general lack of freedom under which humanity still suffers, these are the reasons why there has so far been no answer to the

Jewish problem and to the general problem of emancipation of our age. In order to find the right answer we will have to dissolve the last illusions, to make an end to the last possibility of any illusion.

VII. Dissolution of the Last Illusions

The first and last illusion remains: that the Jew who confesses his religion which is in the last stage of disintegration is still truly religious, still a Jew. It is true, and our whole essay proves this assertion, that his religion has reached its perfection in the very stage of its disintegration; the Jew who, with his enlightenment, with his demands on society, indeed under the present conditions still wants to be a Jew, is the true Jew and proves in the highest degree the stability and truth of Judaism. His illusion consists in this - that he does not recognize in this perfection of religion, the disintegration of religion. Can self-deception be carried any farther than it is done, for instance in the following:

The Illusory Judaism

It does not help, for instance, that Mirabeau and innumerable other Jews and Christians assert that the expectation
of the future Messiah could not keep the Jews from being good
citizens of their country. It is also a quite unsatisfactory
expedient if, for instance, during the discussions of the Wurttemberg Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Schlaier, remarked facetiously:
"Let the Jews only be good citizens for that time till their
Messiah comes." This complacency of the Christian, who believes

himself so safe from the Messiah of the Jews, cannot provide an answer to the question whether people who hope to be in the future citizens of a heavenly or a miraculous earthly state can participate in the affairs of the worldly state with all their heart. The Christian thinks he has solved the problem if he, as a Christian, believes himself safe from the arrival of a Jewish Messiah. For the state, for the liberty of mankind, however, it is quite irrelevant whether the Messiah will actually establish the Jewish Kingdom of the World, or whether it is just the idea of that kingdom which keeps the Jews estranged from the world, from history and from human interests.

The question remains unanswered until it is answered decisively in the negative, that is, until it is recognized that those who hope for their true society in a miraculous future can not feel at home in the real human society. This is the only right and permanent answer, not the one which is usually tried by the modern Jew.

The author of the book The Jews in Austria (1842) II, 185, says: "If there are parts in the prayers of the Jews which express the hope for the Messiah and yearning for the Holy Land, these are indeed not the parts which are recited with the greatest fervor in our days." This only shows up the contradiction in which the modern Jews finds himself against himself and Judaism but it does not remove the contradiction. It would only be removed if the Jew declares that he is no longer and can no longer be a Jew, when he no longer acknowledges the last consequence of his religion, the consequence in which the essential character of his religion is perfected and the religious contradictions reconciled. But can

we call that preserving Judaism if its adherents are represented as men whose hearts are no longer in their prayers, whose lips profess dogmas which their hearts deny, who, as the author of that book dares to say "would only be frightened if they heard the call" to take possession of their promised heritage?

Although those hopes have been abandoned, should "the great antiquity of those prayers, many of which date back to the time after the destruction of the second temple and contain memories of a sacred and glorious epoch" be a reason for letting them stand? "You hypocrites," Isaiah has prophesied against you and said: "This people approaches me with its mouth and honors me with its lips, but its heart is far from me."

Should not every honest person discard such a hope immediately, a hope born from the greatest effort of Jewish consciousness, a hope which was the anchor tying the Jewish people to time and eternity, and which now has declined to a mere nonentity "owing to which not one action is undertaken or omitted."

The modern Jew has discarded this hope and yet he clings to it, does not dare to give it up! Because its age is too venerable? No! He clings to it still, he still separates his lot from the lot of humanity, he still wants his apartness, wants to reserve for himself, uncertainty and just in case, the possibility of a special destiny. He asks (p. 186): "Is the servant who hopes to get a new position unable for that reason to fulfill his present duties loyally?"

History has already answered this question.

When a religion is close to disintegration, when it feels its end coming and once more gathers all its strength to live on,

then it is capable of formidable feats of strength. But after such a hectic effort it falls back exhausted. The fight has exhausted its last reserves of strength.

Every effort the advocates of Judaism makes is of that deadly, hectic kind. What is more terrible than the attempt of the Jew to separate his cause from the cause of his supposed law-giver?

The author of <u>The Jews in Austria</u> (I, 220) says: "In order to accuse the Jews of deep-rooted immorality one was not ashamed to go back as far as the hard mosaic decrees ordering the expulsion - this should read: extermination! - of the Canaanitic tribes, an accusation which indeed is directed less against the people (and least of all against the late descendants) than their great leader."

For the critic, the whole mesh of those narratives about the wanderings of the patriarchs and the people and the invasion of Canaan is nothing but the mythical and fantastic expression of the feeling of estrangement, bitterness and passionate hatred which the Hebrew tribe felt for the Canaanitic hordes, their relatives. The critic looks on the command to exterminate the Canaanites as only the result, the last peak of the battle in which the monotheistic consciousness of the Jews tore loose from the nature worship of their neighbors, without, however, reaching a level where it could conquer the adversaries by other means than fire and sword. To the critic, and to the observer who looks at history and humanity as a whole, the laws which meant in fact the expression of their highest duty to a nation are the laws which grew out of the life of the nation itself, they are what the nation regarded

as its destiny, just as the sacred history expresses what the nation would like to be its destiny were it not for the fact that natural laws and the power of other nations prevent it.

Everything in this view of history is clear, simple, human and coherent... The enlightened Jew, however, who still believes in biblical history and calls Moses the lawgiver, is capable of committing this enormous hardness, to assert that the lawgiver gave a direction to the spirit of the nation of which the latter was quite innocent. The Jew renounces the lawgiver, but he remains a Jew, hailing Moses as lawgiver, announcer of the truth, founder of a new, of the highest moral principle. If, however, Moses is the lawgiver - can the Jew basely deny him? It is a denial, even if he rejects a single law only. Anybody who is ashamed of the extremes of the Law is ashamed of the whole Law also, for in the extremes the strong spirit of life is revealed, by its extremes the law is preserved.

Therefore, the Jew rejects not an unimportant part of the Law; if he disavows an extreme, the pudenda, he rejects the whole law. Why? Because the pudendum is nothing but the alter ego of the law and an expression of its nature. The passion, the hardness, the bestial cruelty expressed in the decree of the extermination of the Canaanites animates the whole body of the Law.

The modern Jew expresses this feeling of shame by stressing the purity of the moral principle in the Mosaic law, that is, he mocks and minimizes the narrative after the entry into Canaan as a meaningless appendix.

The Jew, if he still wants to be and remain a Jew, can only be a Jew in illusion; he no longer has the true Law, he

embraces a shadow. Of the extreme, the characteristic part of the law he is actually ashamed.

But he wants to remain a Jew, and he is indeed a Jew in the full sense of the word. In his illusion about the whole history of mankind, even in his illusion about Judaism, he is a true Jew. He refutes history and its progress, he carries on a war of annihilation against history by passing off his Judaism as the highest principle of morality - and this fight is a worse crime than the war his ancestors waged against the Canaanite hordes. It is a war against humanity - but this war is in truth the perfection of Judaism.

The modern Jew is capable of self-denial in quoting favorable testimonials about the law given by some Christians, in order to defend it against supposed "vilifications." Judaism is really in bad shape if it steps down to seek an attestation of its excellence from Christianity. It has lost belief in itself if it lets Christian clergymen testify (not only the Archbishop of Canterbury but all true theologians do it this kindness) that its moral and social laws are identical with the moral and social laws of the Christians.

But the Jew is preserving himself even at the moment when he seems to have given himself up; for those very Christians whose testimony he invokes are as uncritical as he is himself and, therefore, represent within the Christian world, as far as this is possible, the Jewish character which he, the Jew, has so much at heart or which is, rather, the only thing he has at heart.

True, Christianity is the perfection of Judaism, its morals are Jewish morals, its views of the world and human society are

derived from the Jewish view -- but, as we have proved above, this perfection is at the same time necessarily the negation of the specific Jewish character. Those Christian theologians, however, deny this, the thorough negation of the Old Testament character, because they do not not want to admit that divine revelation has progressed with world history, that the continuous thread was broken at one point. Those Jewish Christians do not want progress, historical development, negation of the old order; they do not care whether they make Judaism Christian or Christianity Jewish. They do not care, because they never progress farther than to a Jewish Christianity, therefore, an incomplete Christianity, or according to the above proof, to Judaism, the illusory Christianity.

The Jew who knows himself to be in accord with the Christian is not a Jew any longer, since he has renounced his exclusive privilege. But in his illusory Judaism he has only become a Jew in the full meaning, even as he in the belief that he renounced his privilege, in fact has kept it. With those Christians he is in accord only insofar as he, too, wants no history, no development no real abolition of the old.

Under these circumstances, we will know what to believe when we hear that the Jews are "fighters for truth."

The Jews as "Fighters for Truth"

Because the Jews remained loyal to the religion of their ancestors and sacrificed everything, home and material possessions for their faith and lived through "centuries of misery and disgrace," they have, according to the author of the above mentioned book, (I, 248) made the name Jew a synonym for "fighter for the truth." However, if we do not want to give this honor likewise to the name of the Parsees who even today live according to the belief of their ancestors in India, it would first have to be proved that the Jewish law is even today enduring, eternal and exclusive and nothing but the pure truth.

As if there were one exclusive truth encrusted in commands, which could be handed down through the centuries as a petrefact or preserved as an eternally young (what a contradiction!) relic.

A truth is true only once - at the moment in time when it is conceived by human consciousness, and only as long as it fights side by side with the spirit of history, until it is assimilated completely by the latter, that is, subjected to criticism, and its dissolution becomes the fertile soil for the growing of a new form of truth. The fire worship of the Parsees, too, was once truth! So was the law of Jehovah.

But Truth there is none, it does not exist like a rock, a mountain, a planet or a solar system - and not even of these things can we say that they are always and forever unchangeable, - Truth does not exist, it is forever in the process of growing, therefore, it exists only in history and through history, and through criticism. So far history has brought forth no truth that withstood the fire of criticism, and the highest truth which just

now is emerging-through criticism-man, liberty, self-consciouness, this truth will least of all become a petrefact and resist criticism and historical progress, for it is nothing other than the finally liberated progress.

Judaism, too, was truth once - but what a great number of truths have since appeared on the tablets of history, how many truths which had to be added to the total - hence, also dissolved - so that the newest truth, the truth of our day, man, liberty, could become possible!

Only those heroes are fighters for truth who discover a new truth, make it known, get it recognized, and dissolve the old, lower truth which through the new, higher truth has become untruth, so that it becomes the soil in which the new truth may sink its roots. Fighters for the truth must, therefore, fight and criticize the old! Have the Jews fought? Have they fought for any truth which might have raised humanity and history - we mean, after Christianity had replaced it - above an older truth?

They have suffered but they have not fought. They suffered for a truth, but for one which had long ceased to be true. They suffered for their private truth, not for the universal truth of humanity.

The author of the book The Jews in Austria quotes a long list of Jews who excelled in the arts and sciences. For the private history of the Jews these names are of interest - for history, the history of the world - (the concept of the world is simply unknown to the Jew) they are of no interest.

None of the Jews listed by the author of that book has creatively influenced the history of mankind. None of these names

is connected with the discoveries which unveiled to us the mysteries of the physical and spiritual universe.

They did not even creatively influence the history of their own people. Since the completion of the Talmud, which itself would have been impossible without the influence of the church upon the synagogue, the Jews have had no history. Since the beginning of the middle ages the Jewish people has been a conglomeration of atoms characterized by the same law and the same opposition to history. But there was no unity of consciousness as it exists in other nations and which is necessary for the creation of new interests and opinions. Not once did it produce a man who would have been able to embody the character of the people in his being and give the whole people a new impulse, new energy and a higher self-consciousness.

Moses Mendelssohn did have an impact on a part of his fellow-Jews - but even this influence was fruitless, an unsuccessful game, for it was not based on a new, human idea. He did not create a new nation - if we wanted to quote examples of creative geniuses in which and through which nations created and developed themselves, we would have to tell the story of the century which opened with Voltaire and closed with the heroes of the political and scientific revolution. And what was Mendelssohn's contribution? He used the stale remainder of a philosophy (Wolf's popular philosophy) which had long been on the decline and which was to receive a blow from Kant that shook the consciousness of the epoch and drove it in a new direction. With this gift he could help neither humanity nor his own people. He had to feed them with hopes for a time when Jehovah would himself announce its liberation

from the yoke of the Law just as explicitly as he had spoken thousands of years ago on Mount Sinai.

The other Moses - Maimonides - with his unclear, confused and servile sophistry, can only be an object of curiosity, while the Christian scholastics - many of them stars of first magnitude-belong to world history. What clarity in their questions and deductions compared with the mumbling of the Jewish dialectician! The Christian scholastic is an idealist, his work is idealistic. It cannot be compared with the work of the Jewish scholastic and the penny-pinching which is the material of his mindless game.

The Christian fights and wrestles with his subject which is humanity. This battle is worth the trouble and worth thousands of years of history. The battle itself is victory, triumph of the light when compared with the brooding over thousands of senseless commands. It is the school of perfect idealism which masters the alien subject and makes it human, that which it really is.

The history of the Christian world is the history of the most exalted fight for truth, for it, and it alone, is concerned with the discovery of the last or the first truth - man and liberty.

This lack of any idealism explains also the fact that the Jew cannot attack Christianity successfully - (if by an attack on a religion one understands more than the clumsiest lie and rash mockery) still less can be recognize it and discover its true nature.

Judaism and Christianity Discovered

It is an empty threat if the author of <u>The Jews in Austria</u> takes up the question previously brought up by others, "that a Jewish Eisenmenger if he examined the literature of Christianity with the same satanic logic and devilish love, would certainly succeed in adding to the gallery of literature a counterpart to the heading <u>Christianity Discovered</u>." One should think that the Jews would have had enough time to make this discovery had they been capable or destined by history to make it. Why did they not make any preparations for this? Where are even their first preparatory steps for a work like <u>Christianity Discovered</u>? They are unable to make this greatest of discoveries, because they do not possess the freedom of spirit, the ideality, and the theoretical interest which is necessary for it.

They do not have to make the discovery, because it has been made already. Since de la Serre's Examen de la Religion and Boulanger's Christianisme dévoilé - do they not sound like Christianity Discovered? Following these courageous and extremely fortunate experiments discovery has followed discovery until today we can say in truth and forever: "Christianity has been discovered, its true nature unveiled, its origins clarified: le Christianisme est dévoilé!"

There is not one Jew among these discoverers. ... At the present moment even the enlightened are forced to reveal that this discovery and the preparatory study for it are impossible for him. The study of a system in all its parts - therefore, the study of Christianity in its most significant aspects, the writings of the church fathers, the annals of the crusades, the

chronicles of the Inquisition, the writings of the theosophists and mystics, the study which explores the spirit of Christianity in those epochs when it exerted a decisive influence upon history, this study seems to the enlightened Jew only possible for one with a "devilish love" for the subject. So the student of natural science is moved also by a "devilish love" for the subject of his study when he distinguishes the nature of the beast from the claws with which it invades his world!

Judaism has not even been able to create a comprehensive history of itself. It has been unconscious of its own nature and will remain so. It would be able to give a clear description of itself only if it understood itself as a foundation for Christianity. It could understand its own nature only if it recognized itself as imperfect Christianity, and that its true dissolution is only possible in Christianity.

The Jew as Jew is incapable of assuming a theoretical attitude towards Christianity. His only reaction is practical, according to his narrowminded religiosity, and it is expressed in scoffing, lying and cursing.

Also in fighting criticism the Jew is incapable of assuming a scientific attitude. Eisenmenger has not been refuted yet, and the Jews will never be able to refute him as long as they merely quote some passages from the Talmud against a work of solid theological scholarship. He will be refuted only when they meet him on his own ground, when the petty theological contradiction between some passages in the Talmud and the impressive number of Jewish quotations lined up by him are cleared up.

Jews as well as Christians are incapable of theoretical

argument and scientific attitude because they regard every effort to discover their nature as a personal insult, as an attack, as a presumptuous invasion of privacy. Noli me tangere is their slogan. Actually, every scientific exploration of their character is an attack on their privilege, an attempt to deprive them of their happiness, and an annoyance, because their nature is satisfaction of their own personal need and is never looked at as a free, general character apart from the anxiety and need of personal self-preservation. They are not free because they never allow themselves freedom.

On several occasions, the author of the book that we mentioned, mixes up two different things when he says: "Jewish writers have scarcely ever expressed themselves with so much hostility against Christianity as a Christian author of our age did," namely, Goethe in the well known poem to Suleika. Jewish polemic against Christianity and criticism of Christianity expressed by educated Christians - be it artistic or scientific - are two entirely different things in quantity as well as in quality. The religious attack of the Jew on Christianity is narrowminded, full of hate, the fight of one privilege with another, therefore, selfish. It is futile, its only effect is to make for bad blood on both sides, aside from the fact that for the Jew it is the fight of a lower level of limited understanding against a higher one.

If the Jews stood where Goethe stands, where the criticism of Christianity means the fight of freedom against barriers, of humanity against a distortion of humanity, then they would not be Jews anymore, would no longer aghere to a special privilege!

They would discover the true nature of Christianity, therefore, also of Judaism; and then the entry into the realm of liberty, which the next epoch of history will bring, would be certain to them.

If they understood Christianity and the nature of the Christian state, they would not even want emancipation. They would work for real freedom. At present they still live in the illusion that the Christian state withholds from them not only certain important rights but freedom itself, or that they are the only sufferers and oppressed ones in the Christian state.

The author of The Jews in Austria tells in a separate chapter about the discrimination to which the Jews in Austria are subjected and how the oppression under which they live is in contradiction to acknowledged legal norms valid in Austria. We shall prove that all other subjects suffer under these conditions also, that it is, therefore, the greatest self-deception if the Jew thinks that if only the special oppression under which he lives were lifted he would be a free man. Everybody is unfree in an absolute monarchy. The Jew is only unfree in a particular manner. The hope and wish of the Jew should be not for the removal of his special misery but for the downfall of a principle.

The Jew in the Absolute Monarchy

The author of <u>The Jews in Austria</u> says that the Jew lacks some essential civil rights. But who has these rights in an absolute monarchy? Nobody. There are not only Christian Pariahs in the state but even those who seem to possess these rights either by birth or by special grace are not exempt from the

general misery. Their misery just has a coating of glamor, and that makes it even worse. The official who fills out painstakingly the columns of his ledgers which he has not even drawn himself, can not be called a free man. He has no essential civil rights as long as his whole life consists of filling out those columns. The privileged, that means he who is privileged by birth and property, can occasionally express his opinions at a session of the diet. But does this constitute eivil rights, if his opinion has not the least influence on the development of the state? if his opinion is and has to remain purely personal? For the whole, and for himself, it is quite irrelevant whether he utters his opinion in his own four walls or whether, if he still has the ridiculous pretension to attribute more weight to it, and makes a special trip to be able to express it to a larger audience and have it added to a number of other just as meaningless opinions. How can there be talk of civil rights where the state is no commonwealth yet, where its main aim is under no circumstances to become a commonwealth, that is a common affair of all. Even the most important acts in the life of such a state, for instance, wars, or treaties are not ruled by any positive idea, but are only reactions to the ideas of other states and their only aim is isolation from the historical development of the state-idea.

"The Jews are burdened with special taxes beyond the ordinary obligations of the other citizens." But so are we. If taxes are our only, or our main obligation as citizens, and if juties and rights should be in just balance, then our obligations are excessive and out of all proportion, because we have

no rights at all. Or, if we call "ordinary obligations" that which the lower classes should pay in just proportion to what the upper classes pay, then the former are still carrying an excessive load.

"The Jews are subject to different regulations in different provinces." We are, too. The absolute monarchy knows no general law of the land, no state - at the most provinces or states which, as counties, duchies, or principalities have their special laws.

In Galicia the Jewish cult is taxed in for the smallest details. So, for instance, the Jew has to pay a tax for Sabbath candles even if he is too poor to buy the candles. But we are still worse off. We have to pay taxes to the church, have our children baptized, get married in church, even if we have ceased to have any relationship with the church. We are forced to perform religious acts.

"The Jewish status is in contradiction to general principles of law recognized in Austria." The same is true for the status of the Christians. It is a necessary consequence of the whole organization.

The absolute monarchy must cater to the spirit of the epoch and put at the head of its laws or treaties some general principles of justice, dealing with the welfare of the whole and with human rights. But in the special decrees and paragraphs, these are subjected to numerous limitations and fenced in by so many special clauses that in the end these general principles completely disappear. In general, for instance, the principle is recognized that there should be a just balance

between rights and duties. In fact, however, in the individual cases, privilege can easily ignore this principle, or it decrees simply that the principle has to stand back where the advantage of the individual case is concerned. So it can happen that in a code of law where a balance of rights and duties is recognized as a norm, a regulation states quite without scruples, that if a nobleman and a commoner of equal capability apply for an office, preference is to be given to the former. It seems that the law is quite satisfied and content even if the nobleman is preferred to a commoner whose ability is superior to his. So the Jew is not the only one to complain that the principle of equal rights and obligations has become so weakened on the long way down to him that it can not protect him from special annoyance and discrimination.

"The Law of the land guarantees freedom of religion."
Good. It does this for the Christian also. Everybody is guaranteed freedom of conscience in the absolute monarchy. There shall not be discrimination against anybody on account of his religion. Well, let one, or more, step forth and declare that he renounces any religion, that he can no longer perform any religious acts, and suddenly, just where it should declare that it really means what it says, the principle of freedom of conscience does not have the energy left to prove itself.

"Prejudice is denounced explicitly in the law as invalid." But it is valid, as we have proved; and it is the most powerful determining factor in the inner life of the Christian state.

The author of The Jews in Austria further cites the general promises and concessions made repeatedly to the Jews. But, as in all other cases, and just like the other advocates of the Jews, he was very wrong not to think of his fellow sufferers, the Christians. We also have been given promises but the fulfillment was delayed, and in the meantime there have been declarations which hinted openly that there would be no fulfillment, ever. Rightfully, we add: We are not yet mature, not true, complete men, we are still timid, cowards, serfs - in our souls - we want to be serfs. After what we have said here it should be clear to anyone what the Jew should say. "The Austrian Jews in those provinces which were occupied by the French during the revolutionary wars have lost many of the advantages and rights they had under the dominion of the conqueror." Is it always the Jews alone who have won and lost in historical events? Are there no other nations with such experiences? If the Jews had been the only ones who had these bitter experiences, they could wait a long time before their wrongs would be righted. If they were alone, then their cause would indeed be hopeless. Their situation is actually miserable and desperate as long as they isolate themselves in their thoughts and feelings and do not recognize that the only hope for their cause is in its connection with the cause of all humanity and history. The absolute monarchs in Europe were of the opinion that the power which had brought liberty and human rights during a quarter of a century was an alien power. With one stroke of the pen they declared those "alien" decrees as null and void; or they wrested the most important and most liberal regulations one after the other from

their subjects. The Restoration did not hit the Jews alone, and in this very fact, that they do not stand alone, is the only hope for their salvation. We, the historical nations, will save ourselves by proving - this is the final aim of science and critique - that the principles which since the end of the last century have changed the form of Europe are by no means alien to us, that they rather are part of human nature. ...

There can be no question about what the Jew has to do under these circumstances - beside us and with us - if he is serious in his wish for freedom, if he does not want to lose himself in illusions which will keep him forever from becoming free. He must prove that the principles from which he profited during the revolution, which brought him momentary relief, were not alien to him, that their benefits were not an accidental gift. But has he got the courage to take the side of freedom from prejudice? He has to make the cause of humanity his own; his own cause the cause of humanity. But can he do it if he always fights for himself as a Jew and does not recognize that he can become free only if he gives up the idea that he can stand alone, conquer freedom for himself? He has to tear up by the roots the idea that he is the only one who is oppressed, the idea that his fate in the Christian state is an inconsistency, a repudiation of its basic principles. He must recognize that his prejudice, that he as a Jew want to be something special, is only one of the prejudices which determine the form of the absolutistic state. He has deceived himself until now about his status. But that was a general illusion. We all have until now not had a clear insight as to what our status was in the world.

The time has come to throw off this illusion. The power of religious prejudice which caused our illusion, or which was the illusion itself, has been understood, interpreted, explained and thrown from its throne. We believed that religious prejudice is a supernatural power, which is beyond our influence and rules our lives - but it is nothing else than a special expression, a formulation of the conditions which we created ourselves. It is nothing but the veil which we throw over all our prejudices in an effort to hide them, or to embellish and justify them.

This last illusion will now dissolve. The veil is ragged with old age, the prejudices show themselves in ugly nakedness.

The Basic Deception

During the discussions in the Bavarian Chamber of Deputies in 1831, on the status of the Jews, somebody remarked, "only religious hatred" in some quarters prevents the emancipation of the Jews-an obstacle, therefore, to the conquest of which, our enlightened age points with pride. How is it possible then, that religious hatred is silent when the Jew enters the ranks of the army as a common soldier to spill his blood for the country, and flares up only when he aspires to the rank of an officer? Is it nothing but religious fanaticism if, for instance, the millers and bakers guilds in Vienna conspire to keep Jews out of their guild. Why, then, is religious fanaticism forgotten when a Jew erects the first steam mill and the competition is thus moved beyond the petty barriers

of the guilds to a field where it can move freely and achieve enormous success?

Also: Was it just in a weak moment of religious fanaticism that the Teamsters Guild in Vienna wanted to exclude Jews for all time. Was it because religious fanaticism just happened to have had a weak hour that a Jew undertook the construction of the first big railroad in Austria and thereby defeated the whole Teamsters Guild which had wished to prevent this entrepreneur's people from making a small profit? Finally, is it religious fanaticism that makes it hard or impossible for the commoner to attain the rank of officer or high officer? A commoner knows as well as a nobleman how to spill his blood, and his love for his country is often more unselfish because his reward is smaller and his devotion cannot be suspect since it is not nourished by special privileges. Is it perhaps a special religious fanaticism which makes it quite impossible for a commoner to get a regiment in the Guard? Has that religious fanaticism particular reasons for lying low when officers are needed in the artillery corps? Correct! That is it. Religious fanaticism moves the nobility to isolate itself from the middle class. Religious fanaticism separates the wealthy from the poor who have nothing to rely upon but their intelligence. Herr Bulow-Cummerow found the correct religious and clerical expression for this relationship when he said that that element in the state which represent the intelligentsia is merely a tolerated one.

The times are past when the separation of castes, the distinction of priviledged from non-privileged, hence also the

oppression of the Jews, could be explained by purely religious or by any religious reasons at all. Even in the Middle Ages, when one still believed and still could believe because there were many splendid revelations, even then, the cities and their guilds did not act only in the interest of religion when they excluded and persecuted the Jews and solicited or assumed the privilege that no Jew should be allowed to settle there. They acted in the interest of their profession and their guild. Religious and political prejudice went hand in hand. Purely for the sake of religion men have never done anything historical, never invaded foreign countries, never waged war. When they believed that they acted and suffered for God's sake only, we, with our modern insights into the "things divine" can say that they acted and suffered for their idea of what man is and should be. In all religious enterprises, battles, tragedies, big or little, it was always political interests which moved and determined the actions of men. We would misjudge the history of religion, that is, we would take it on its own terms, if we believed that what it was about was the cognition of a divine, heavenly world. That heavenly beyond is nothing but the world of human interests transformed. ... The true belief of the past was an expression - in a roundabout manner through exalting it to a heavenly kingdom - of the servitude and oppression prevailing everywhere on earth. The fire of religious zeal was just the religiously disguised clash in which privilege ran head-on into other privileges. Not religious fanaticism blocks the way to emancipation of the Jews, but privilege. Not their religion makes it impossible for the Jews to find

freedom, but their idea that they are specially privileged by being born as Jews. Privileges, however, work only as long as the spirit has not broken through the barrier, only where religious prejudice is still powerful; they are supported by the prevailing religious beliefs. The idea of the Jew, too, that he is specially, uniquely privileged is only possible through his religion, and based on his religion. If the Jew breaks out of the barriers of his religion and recognizes the world and human society, he will also give up his pride in his privilege.

when the Christians will open their minds to the thoughts and impressions of human society and emerge from the barriers of the church, then all privileges, from first to last, will be threatened.

Religious prejudice and religious segregation certainly have to cease and disappear if civil and political class distinctions and privileges are to be ended. Religious prejudice is the basis of civil and political prejudice, the basis which the latter has created, even though unconsciously, for its own benefit. ...

The method of the fight against civil and political injustice has therefore been until now, and it still is, to attack and abolish the religious basis of that injustice. As soon as the belief in the religious sanction of civil and political prejudice is shaken, the political prejudice loses its self-assurance. Only rarely is it shameless enough to admit its pure worldliness, to confess that it is nothing but striving after personal advantage. It will rather endeavor

to regain the religious basis which in earlier times seemed to guarantee its permanent rule.

This effort to restore privilege, this declaration that religious prejudice, religious segregation, and adherence to religious belief are guarantees for the continuation of the old order (as if the old order were still in existence at a time when the rulers who are still in power are arguing and discussing how the old order can be put on its feet again) all this forced hurry and determination to recreate and appeal to religious prejudice betray the secret which was hidden behind the naive belief of earlier times. The secret is, as we said above, that religious prejudice is a creation of man himself, it mirrors his weakness, his servitude, the narrow compound of his civil and political life, or rather dream. Political and religious prejudice is inseparable; it is identical. The Jew, least of all, can refute this. Even the most enlightened Jew, i.e., enlightened within his prejudice, will have to admit that this is correct. If he speaks of the excellency of his religion, the purity and sanctity of his moral code, he can hope for an audience only if he addresses his words to a world where prejudice in general still rules. What self-deception, what arrogance that he hopes to have success with his appeal from those who, on their part, are just as convinced as he that they are the only privileged ones! He appeals to prejudice hoping that his will prevail! But one prejudice must exclude the other! Each one believes that his religion is the only true and justifiable one. Cooperation between such individuals is

therefore absolutely impossible. The Jew believes that as a Jew, because of the excellency of his true and supreme God, he is entitled to everything that is good in the world. But as a Jew he is different from all who adhere to another supreme being and who regard themselves as different. He excludes them and they exclude him. The more enlightened he becomes, the more his character loses its specific traits, the more his argument is reduced to the assertion that he is only a Jew and as a Jew has all these rights the more does he too betray on his side, the fact that his religious prejudice is only the pure, abstract idea of privilege itself.

When in 1831 the Jewish problem came up for a moment in the Chamber discussions in Hanover, Herr Stuve said that the empty and hollow Deism of the educated Jews gives the state even less guarantees [of their loyalty] than the positive religion of the uneducated Jews.

If this is the accepted viewpoint, that religion is a guarantor of the state, and if one compares various religious beliefs as to how far they constitute such guarantees, then one should be consistent and ask the question how much guarantee to the state does the Christian religion contain? This question is of the greatest importance, for, after thousands of answers in the past recent historical events have brought a new answer.

It is indeed true that religious belief gives guarantees to the state. But to which state, what kind of a state? History has answered this question; it has answered also for Mr. Stuve.

And Deism, the "empty, hollow" Deism? Why should that give no guarantees to the state, namely a certain kind of state? The moment Deism is the ruling religious system, it will also be the ruling system in a certain form of the present state. In Deism religious belief has been weakened to such an extent that it has become a mere idea of religion, a postulate of religion, a concept of its usefulness and indispensability. From Deism we can therefore expect the most reliable admissions of the religious state about its character and its maxims. Here it will clearly appear whether religious belief is concerned about itself only, whether its interest is religious only, whether religious privilege and prejudice is just religious exclusiveness and zeal. In short, it will become clear whether the religious exclusiveness of the state is something else than the theory and postulate of its imperfection and servitude.

We will find a sufficient answer in the discussions of the Baden Chamber of Deputies in 1831.

Confessions of the German Juste-Milieu

Two phrases, and these two phrases only, are the mainstays of the true representatives of Liberalism in the treatment of the Jewish problem. Each and everyone of them uses these two phrases with the pomp and self-satisfaction of the Gotha Reichsanzeiger; and the resolution which was finally adopted by these advocates of the <u>juste milieu</u> and in which these phrases are combined, provides an interesting testimony of what they regard as freedom.

In 1831 the Baden Chamber of Deputies was bombarded with petitions of Jewish communities asking for civil and political equality with Christians. When Rotteck personally handed in the petition of the Jewish community of Carlsruhe, he used the occasion to utter one of these two phrases. He declared: "On this, as on every other occasion, he would follow this double principle: first, to find out with the greatest zeal and faithfulness what should be done according to justice, humanity and the welfare of the state, but second to pay appropriate attention, as far as it is compatible with justice, to the known wishes, attitudes and intentions of his constituents, i.e. the more intelligent part of them -- what an insult to the others! -- and the people of Baden in general." The "but" at the beginning of the second part of this double principle is, however, very dangerous. It pre-supposes that the principle of justice and humanity is probably not in accordance with the wishes, attitudes, and intentions of the people of Baden. If there is such a dissonance, we will not immediately regard it as a discredit to the people, if only it will not resist history and legislation intended to amend things. Rotteck also intends to abolish this dissonance which he assumes; he wants, as far as possible, to combine justice with consideration of the views of his constituents: but according to which principle shall this compromise be made? What is the norm for the juste milieu? There is no such norm! The mediator is thrown upon his own resources, or rather (and this is the whole wisdom of that double principle which is hidden in that "but") he will be bound by the known wishes

and views of his constituents, even if they are in contradiction to justice and humanity. These wishes and views, however, are unsympathetic to emancipation. Therefore, one must first preen oneself with assurances and declamations about the beauty and excellency of humanitarianism only to neglect humanitarianism in the concrete individual case and side with the people.

This was the way Herr Mittermaier acted when the problem was discussed. In the first half of his diffuse and endless speech, he talked to the assembly about the "voice of humanitarianism and civilization," but in the second part prudence moves him to "listen to the voice of the people" and pay attention to the attitude of the people. "The people still regards the Israelites as a closely knit separate caste, distinct by their customs which forbid the Jews to regard the Christians as their brothers." According to Mittermaier's view this popular view is just a prejudice. He should, therefore, have thought of a new decree to break the prejudice instead of bending the law to the prejudice.

It is not even mere prejudice if the people still see in the Jews an alien caste. As Jews, they are an alien caste. The task of the lawgiver, should therefore, have been to find our whether the people is right in regarding the Jews as a caste, and if it is not, to raise the people to a level where it will be able to assume a human attitude towards the Jews.

The Jews as such are a caste. But the Christians are unreasonably sensitive to this barrier behind which they are

Living themselves. They have no human understanding of the narrowmindedness of the Jews; they are not really above the Jewish wish for segregation; they are themselves not yet free enough to be capable of true, free criticism. The task of the law, therefore, is not to fortify the barriers between the two groups, but to give the people the liberty which will enable it to give the Jew the possibility of emancipation, so that the Jews can prove whether they are capable of being free or whether they have to punish themselves and perish in the universal liberty.

Herr von Itzstein assures us that in accordance with the phrase prescribed by the principle that "from the view-point of the man and citizen he knows no difference between rich and poor, between Jews and Christians." But [he likewise pointed out] that Rotteck who talked before him was right in remarking that the poor, too, have no rights in the state and cannot complain about the privilege of the higher classes. So the government is doing no wrong if it does not grant all civil rights to the Jews.

Rotteck, namely, after paying attention to "considerations of humanitarianism and justice" that is, after he had placed it behind the "wishes and interests of the intelligent and educated among his constituents" had been sincere enough to declare openly that the will of the people can be exerted quite freely in the granting of political rights. "It grants rights to this or that class, or withholds them for more or less cogent reasons (how sincere!) according to the advantage or disadvantage for itself. "In short, he appeals to the

arbitrary power which grants the right to vote to a selected few, to a power which subjects an overwhelming majority to the power of a few privileged people, to the power of monopoly and privilege. This power of privilege for which the subject in the Christian state has only heaven as consolation, this power which rules all groups down to the individual family where the woman is subject to the barbarity and rudeness of the man, this power is sovereign and irresponsible if it excludes the Jews from civil rights for the simple reason that it is general and the Jews are not the only sufferers, and therefore, must not complain especially, if they suffer too. Constitutional Liberalism is the system of privileged, of limited and selfish liberty. Prejudice is still its basis, its character is still religious.

It is a worthy conclusion of these discussions that Herr Rindeschwender, after his colleagues cited popular prejudice as their last argument, told them to raise their eyes to heaven and he adjured them by heaven to remain faithful to their principles. He reduced the result of the discussions to the religious and clerical, therefore, the correct formula.

"The European state," exclaims Herr Rindeschwender, "is a Christian state; all its institutions are more or less based on Christianity or at least sanctified by it. If you won't preserve the Christian state all will be lost! Or put something else in the place of Christianity; but it must, just like Christianity, be a firm tie between heaven and earth; you have to find a safe counter-poise against the selfish nature of man, but you can do this only if you restore the sacredness of the state." Amen!

What these gentlemen understand by the sacredness of the state has been explained openly and Mr. Rindeschwender does not conceal it. It is a bombastic word which pretends to rise from the earth to higher regions; a hypocritical word, thought up for the exclusiveness of private interests and privileges. And this principle of selfishness you call a "counterpoise against the selfish nature of man?" Egotism should put a stop to egotism? For a short time the law may be able to secure privilege against non-privileged egotism. But there is in the world not egotism alone. There is history, which will bring victory to the general interests of humanity and liberty over privileged egotism. Only then Herr Rindeschwender will permit us "to put something else in the place of Christianity" when that other thing "is a tie, just as firm as Christianity, between heaven and earth?" We believe it is time, at last, to establish something which will be a tie between men and men.

We come now to the second phrase used by the deputies to reject the demands of the Jews. The criticism of that phrase is contained in the saying about the mote and the beam. Herr Paulus used the phrase in his letter which he addressed to the Chamber referring to his memorandum about the segregation of the Jews.

He writes: "Even the worthiest Liberalism has its dangers." One should not proceed too far too soon. The Jews should do something too, mainly improve themselves. "The yoke of that alien code, the whole pharisaic-talmudic rabbinism, must absolutely be abolished."

Is that so? Only the Jews have to do something? But even the most enlightened rationalism regards it as its most sacred duty to dig into the Bible and torture reason to such as extent that to save its life from this torture, it bows under the yoke of a book which has become even more alien to reason by the explanations of the rationalists. ...

When the Christian still believed in the magic power of baptism and believed that he really consumed the body of the Savior in holy communion, it made sense when he had his children baptized and sought his true nourishment in holy communion. But after Rationalism robbed baptism and communion of those miraculous powers, and the rationalist view of the former sacraments is now the ruling one - these customs have lost every meaning and the law which commands them subjects the spirit to the yoke of "an alien code."

The Committee Report which was accepted by the majority after the discussions of June 3, is completely in accord with the phrases we find in Mr. Paulus' letter. It says: "The Jews can become obedient, and, if treated right, also grateful and useful subjects, but never real members of the nations among which they are now living. Still less can they have real enthusiasm for the national honor and constitution of the country." The Committee Report enumerates the following conditions that have first to be fulfilled if Jews wish to become able to be real members of the nation.

They have to renounce:

(1) Their national language. The instruction of their youth in Hebrew should cease entirely." Although

the sources of our own religion are in also foreign languages, we do not make the study of these languages an absolute necessity in our elementary schools.

This does not improve the matter; at best we have suppressed it so long as we connect the first ideas, the soul and life of those who are to become our fellow-citizens, to books which are alien to modern and humanitarianism education and contrary to all political and social interests.

(2) Circumcision. The sons to be born to them in future shall no longer be circumcised.

But why should baptism continue if circumcision is ended? Does not baptism also segregate us from the first days of our life, and without waiting for our approval, from the state, the world, the rest of mankind?

It is known, the report continues, "that circumcision takes possession of the individual so thoroughly, that even if he sincerely and publicly converts to another religion he does not cease to belong to the nation of the Israelites and can never be released. Any moment, without formal reconversion, he can again regard himself as a Jew and be accepted as a member of their community."

Just as in our church! The ceremony performed on us in the first days of our life takes such

thorough possession of us that even if we have renounced the faith we still do not cease to belong to the community. The church does not give us our freedom and we must look on when many weak souls are forced by the mere memory of baptism to flee back into the circle to which they belong by their second birth.

(3) The Dietary Laws. The Jews shall finally renounce their dietary laws and the commands regarding association with non-Jews.

And shall we have the exclusive rights to segregate ourselves from our fellowmen by our miraculous heavenly communion? "Why dost thou see the mote in thy brother's eye and dost not see the beam in thy own?" ...

The Committee Report wants all negotiations with the Jews declared impossible unless they first fulfill these demands, to which a fourth is added, that they keep their Sabbath on the same day as the Christians.

Since no one can jump out of his skin in a moment just because someone demands it, the Jews can not possibly fulfill these demands. As they are better judges of their skin than others who are not in it, they can not even acknowledge the demands. One does not throw one's good skin away like an old rag, and nobody has yet convinced the Jew that he is quite sore and sick. ...

The Baden deputies could not give the Jews the freedom which they themselves did not possess. The right which they

too defend against the Jews is precisely this right of privilege, and they might have the same experience of being attacked if other privileged parties fight them just as these deputies fight the Jews.

We are not dealing here with conditions where the individual as such is alone responsible for his actions and
their consequences. The sphere of life in which the individual moves and the principle which he serves are the main culprits and will receive their just reward from history. We
can, therefore, say without fear of being misunderstood and
without wishing to irritate anyone unduly, that the punishment for the exclusiveness of constitutional privilege is in
the futility of the fight of the deputies against another
privilege. If they had the courage to renounce their privileges and devote themselves to the idea of human rights, they
could prevail against any other privilege. Even if they
could not overthrow privilege immediately, they could make
it ashamed of itself until history in its might and power
makes an end of it.

The religious state can not and dares not give the Jew his freedom. Its more or less brutal sophistry fights for privileges only, and if it gives the Jew any rights they are again privileges only.

Now we have yet to describe the sophistry of the Jews, which makes it impossible for them to accept freedom sincerely even if it were to be given to them.

The discussions of the Great Sanhedrin under Napolean gives us occasion to get acquainted with that sophistry.

The Great Sanhedrin in Paris

The decree of the National Assembly of February 27, 1791, which gave to the Jews who took an oath on the constitution all civil rights, did not have much influence on the development of their status. They remained as before outside the nation and its major interests; the history of the Revolution passed them by; none of them took an important part in it or imprinted his name on its tablets. The only thing the Revolution meant for them was that they had occasion for usury without fear of punishment.

The complaints about usury became finally so threatening -- especially in the departments on the Rhine -- that Napolean thought decisive action necessary. He called an assembly of Jewish deputies to Paris and laid before them, through his officers, several questions: whether their law permitted them to regard the laws of the people in whose midst they are living as their own, and the people as their brothers, and to arrange their life accordingly. After the deputies had answered in the affirmative, Napoleon called a Great Sanhedrin in 1807, in order to give the resolutions of the Jewish deputies the authority of legal decrees.

The deputies and the Sanhedrin looked at their task as an apologetic one. They could not and must not say -- they were not critics and not pure theorists -- "Judaism looks at the world in such and such a manner." The sincerity of the critic was not possible for them because they had a practical purpose and in their opinion this purpose, acceptance into

the state society was compatible with their religious prin-. ciples. As apologists and apologetic theologians -- again, they were neither critics nor pure politicians -- they had therefore to make an effort to represent their religious principles and the acknowledgment of the political laws of France as compatible and to prove that there was no basic contradiction between the two. A desperate undertaking! his closing address the President of the Sanhedrin said: "You have recognized religious and political regulations, but you have also declared that to overstep the former means only confusion, sacrilege, desecration of the holy." If this sentence were to stand alone as a guiding line, without reference to other issues, it could be argued that it was well meant although it would be false even then; for it is in the nature of the religious principle to overstep its limits and seek power. But if the sentence is at the same time meant to be -- as it was the case here -- an interpretation of the Old Testament Law, then it is twice wrong and the theological way out that it was supposed to open is immediately blocked again.

The declaration of the Sanhedrin is nothing less than an accusation of the Law of Jehovah that it overstepped the limits which all religious commands must observe. Therefore, Jehovah's own law, written down by God's hand, was guilty of sacrilege, the law which owes its origin to the Holy One has desecrated the holy? Everything in Judaism is divine, nothing human. Everything is religion. Politics must not be politics, it is nothing but religion -- just as the cleaning of cooking

pots, if it is to be regarded as a religious rite, cannot be regarded as a household chore.

The President (Nasi) continued: "You have recognized that the rank of sovereign includes the right to decree certain political institutions. You have recognized the authority of the sovereign and commanded obedience."

According to the Law, however, there is only One sovereign -- Jehovah -- and if He, in consideration of the weakness of his subjects tolerates a worldly prince, it is far from conceding to Him sovereignty and the power to give His own laws.

"You have recognized the authority of certain civil decrees. You have also confirmed that there is no connection between them and religious things."

In itself, very good and praiseworthy. But pretty bad
if it is meant to express accord with a law which regards all
civil affairs as religious and which does not know any purely
civil affairs.

When the deputies gave the answers to the questions put to them, they started out with a declaration that "their religion commanded them to regard the law of the sovereign in civil and political matters as the highest law." Their religion? Their religion which is only the Law and nothing but the Law, which continues to exist only as long as the Law continues to be the only and highest Law?

The deputies and the Sanhedrin quote a passage -- one which the Jews have quoted innumerable times -- in the letter

which Jeremiah wrote to the prisoners in Babylon. But when the prophet writes: "Seek the welfare of the city to which I caused you to be led away, pray for it to the Lord; for in its welfare will be your own welfare," then the motive is, first of all, entirely selfish and the command is for an interim period only. Nevertheless, despite all the prayers for the city in which the servants of Jehovah dwell until the time of salvation, it remains a certainty that Babylon is to be destroyed.

The deputies remark that that admonition of the prophet was heeded so well that only a few, and only "people from the poorer class," made use of the permission of Cyrus to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple.

But these few are praised and the rich who stayed are blamed for their lack of zeal. The few who returned to Jerusalem were "awakened by the spirit of the Lord."

The Jew who makes a distinction between civil and religious laws and still believes himself to be a Jew is under an illusion. We will, however, show immediately how the illusory Judaism becomes the true Judaism, how the Jew makes himself immortal in his illusion.

"You have recognized," the Nasi of the Sanhedrin says in his speech at the close of the sessions, "that man has various obligations to fulfill in society; obligations toward the Creator, obligations towards His creatures; obedience and reverence toward the sovereign."

The Jew, however, knows no social ties -- as remarked above, he has no concept of the world and human society.

Judaism does not admit that distinction between various obligations; it knows only -- and rightfully as long as man means nothing to him -- only obligations toward God.

The Nasi says so, too. In fact, in the same breath when he mentions the distinction between various duties, he says, "You have recognized the nullity of the creature before the Creator." So man is nothing! Therefore, there are also no obligations towards man, at least not for his own sake. There are only obligations toward God, before whom the creature is nothing, and against creatures there are only obligations for the sake of God...

"Full of awed reverence for his works" -- what this reverence means we have just heard -- "you have taken care not to take up any unworthy, sacrilegious idea which contains even the slightest infringement of His commands."

This lie -- for the Sanhedrin has certainly neglected the reverence for the "Creator" when it declared that a part of the Law is no longer binding and has to take second place behind man-made decrees -- this backhanded attack on Christianity (if the words have any sense at all and are not merely a rhetorical phrase) -- finds its just punishment later in the same speech of the Nasi.

"And thou, Napoleon," he says at the close of the speech,
"Comforter of mankind, father of all nations, Israel erects
a temple to thee in its heart!" A fine obedience to the
principle that the creature is nothing before the Creator!

It is the same, whether the temple which Israel erects to Napoleon, the father of all nations, is in stone or in less

tangible material. This temple proves in any case apostasy from the One God who is -- according to Jewish opinion -- the only true father of all nations.

But the religious Jewish consciousness arises from this unsteadiness and want of principle. It reappears even bigger and stronger, just as virtue after a fall seems more worthy, like a sinner who, in his repentance, is more agreeable to God than hundred righteous men who do not need to repent.

Jews and Christians which have been performed according to the laws of the civil code are valid and binding, but can not be solemnized by religious rites. Obviously this distinction means that a marriage which has civil validity only lacks that sanctity which alone would make it a true marriage. Such a marriage is, as the Jewish deputies declare, "without validity according to the laws of the church." In this view of marriage the Great Sanhedrin is not alone. Also in the following point it is not alone, because in another church system also, the most important acts are performed in a foreign language, different from the one used in ordinary life.

The most important speeches in the Sanhedrin were made in Hebrew and then read in a French translation. This characterizes very well the manner in which these men wish to enter the ranks of French citizens. The Hebrew is the original, the real, the true, the kernel; the French is the translation, the unreal, the offprint, the illusion, the shell.

The pure Jewish spirit appears, however, in its perfection, when the Sanhedrin can not talk enough about the "disgrace" with which one wanted to cover Israel untilnow, about the "popular prejudice which presents the Jewish code as anti-social." They, the Jews, stand alone in the world with their eternal treasure of truth, in a world which could only misjudge and vilify them but could not prevent their final victory. They, the Jews, are "God's faithful flock." God has always protected them; His protection is proved especially by the fact that they lived to see this moment. Now the "future happiness of Israel" is their concern. Always Israel, always only Israel! Israel remains always something special -- the discussions of the Sanhedrin are not concerned with general human interests, not with France and Frenchmen, always only with Israel!

At the close of the sessions the Nasi says in his speech:
"Our assembly is a vivid picture of the revered tribunal the
origin of which is lost in the darkness of antiquity" -- what
a senseless rhetorical phrase! -- "it has the same authority,
it is animated by the same spirit, the same zeal, the same
faith."

A dangerous praise -- aside from the silly talk which pretends to know all about an institution the history of which is still very little known. If the French deputies in the Constituent Assembly and the Convention had had the idea to boast that their assemblies were animated by the same faith and spirit as the assemblies of the ancient Gauls and Franks, wouldn't they have made themselves ridiculous?

The religious self-admiration of the Sanhedrin; the way in which it adores its own glamour and lets deputations of foreign Jews admire its splendor; the continuous self-praise of the assembly which is surrounded by glory, reverence and solemnity, in contrast to the "disgrace" heaped on Israel in the past -- all this is in its continuous repetition tiresome and at the end disgusting.

The Constituent Assembly and the Convention would not have created -- as they did -- new concepts, new laws, new human beings, if they had only admired themselves all the time and seen the hand of God in their glory "with a holy trembling in the heart."

Conclusion

In the manner tried by the Sanhedrin the servants of the Mosaic Law will not be helped to freedom. The distinction between religious and political commands in the revealed law, the declaration that only the former are absolutely binding while the latter lose their power in changed social conditions, is in itself an outrage against the Old Testament Law and an admission that it contains commands and regulations which are contrary to our concept of human society. This admission is however, withdrawn by the assertion that all objections made in the past against the Law are based on prejudices and are an outrage against the most holy. Sophistry and Jesuitism and a clumsy exegesis have brought out now, for instance, that the Law did not intend to distinguish between the Israelite and the stranger in the way asserted until now by the "enemies" of Judaism.

The same lie appears in the distinction between religious and political commands. This distinction is an admission that the adherent of a law like the Mosaic law can not live in the real world and participate in its interests. It would be fine if the Jew openly declared: "I want -- since I wish to remain a Jew -- to keep only that much of the Law which seems to be a purely religious element; everything else which I recognize as anti-social I shall weed out and sacrifice." But instead he pretends to himself, and he wants to make others believe that in this distinction between religious and political commands he remains in accord with the Law, that the Law itself recognizes and establishes this distinction. Instead of breaking with a part of the Law he remains a servant of the whole, and as such he must give up that distinction again and alienate himself through his religious consciousness from the real world.

Judaism cannot be helped, the Jews cannot be reconciled with the world, by the lie.

But neither can force liberate the Jew from his chimerical tyrant, the Law, and restore him to the world; especially not if that force is used by slaves who obey the same tyrant. So, how can he be helped?

We have to be free ourselves before we can think of inviting others to freedom. We have to remove the beam from our own eye before we have the right to call the attention of our brother to the mote in his eye. Only a free world can liberate the slaves of prejudice.

The lie in the sophistry of the Jews is a sure sign that Judaism, too, is near its disintegration. It is, however, a dishonest state of affairs if in theory political rights are withheld from the Jew, while in practice he wields great power and exerts political influence wholesale while he cannot assert it in small things. For instance, while the Jew in Vienna is only tolerated, his financial power decides the fate of the whole monarchy. The Jew who may have no political rights in the smallest German state rules the fate of Europe. While corporations and guilds close their doors to him or are still unfriendly, the inventiveness of industry scoffs at the stubbornness of the medieval institutions. The new movement has long broken through the barriers of the old; their existence can now be called theoretical only. The power of the old is a sophistic theory, opposed to the theory of sincerity and the immense superiority of a practice, the importance of which can be seen in our daily life.

Judaism has followed Christianity on its path of conquest around the world. It has always reminded it of its origin and of its true nature. It is the incarnate doubt in the heavenly origin of Christianity, the religious adversary of the religion which announced itself as the perfect, the only true religion, and could not even overcome the small number of those in the midst of whom it had been born. Judaism was the proofstone on which Christianity proved most clearly that its nature is the nature of privilege.

Both religions could torture each other, scoff at each

other, embitter each other's life, but none could overcome the other. The crude religious criticism voiced by Judaism, and Judaism itself, is at last made superfluous by the free, human critique which has demonstrated that Christianity and revealed Judaism were a medieval luxury. Judaism was a mere appendix to the history of Christianity, and its critique of Christianity was unjustified because it needed Christian scholarship to make the critique possible.

Theory has now completed its task, it has dissolved the old contradiction between Judaism and Christianity and can look confidently to History, which pronounces the final judgment on principles which have lost their validity.

BERSERKER

