

# STOLYPIN

**Russia's Last Great Reformer**



**Alexander V. Zenkovsky**

**BERSERKER**  
**BOOKS**





**Stolypin:**  
**Russia's Last Great Reformer**  
*By Alexander V. Zenkovsky*



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface by Philip E. Mosely .....	v
Foreword by Maria Stolypina Bock .....	vii
Introduction by the Author .....	ix
Chapter 1: Stolypin: A Brief Biographical Sketch .....	1
Chapter 2: Stolypin's Statesmanship .....	4
Chapter 3: Stolypin's Proposal to Reorganize the National Administration .....	30
Chapter 4: Stolypin's Proposal to Reorganize Some Then-Existing Ministries. ....	38
Chapter 5: Stolypin's Proposals Concerning Foreign Policy .....	50
Chapter 6: Stolypin and the State Duma .....	58
Chapter 7: Stolypin and the State Council .....	66
Chapter 8: Stolypin and the Zemstvos .....	84
Chapter 9: Stolypin's Enemies from the Left and the Right .....	97
Chapter 10: Stolypin's Death .....	101
Chapter 11: Attitudes of the Emperor and Other Members of the Imperial Family toward Stolypin .....	104
Chapter 12: Opinions of Public Leaders about Stolypin .....	107
Chapter 13: Conversations regarding Stolypin's Foreign Policies .....	111
Chapter 14: Reminiscences by Former Colleagues of Stolypin .....	113
Chapter 15: Reminiscences by One of Stolypin's Admirers .....	116
Chapter 16: Conclusion .....	119
Appendix I: The Agrarian Law of November 9, 1906 .....	121
Appendix II: The Western Zemstvo Law of March 14, 1911 .....	129
Postword by Serge A. Zenkovsky .....	140

## INTRODUCTION

P.A. Stolypin occupies an indisputably outstanding position among statesmen of the twentieth century. In the responsible posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, he proved himself one of the most energetic, far-sighted, talented, and enlightened of European statesmen and reformers.

Stolypin left no memoirs, and no accurate critique of his published state and reform activities has yet appeared in print. The exceptions have been brief newspaper articles and books by Professor A.D. Bilimovich in both Russian and English. Otherwise there has been only deliberate slander initiated by some groups in Russia, appearing particularly in Russia but also in the foreign press.

Why is Stolypin so hated by those who presently control Russia? It is because when terror reigned, fomented by Russia's internal enemies, and the Caucasus, Poland, the Pre-Baltic frontier, and significant portions of central and southern Russia were flooded by waves of revolution, the government—and specifically Stolypin, as Minister of Internal Affairs—had to take drastic measures to avert overthrow of the existing monarchical state structure.

But Stolypin left, in his desk at his estate, Kolnoberzhe, a monumental work concerning his proposed transformation of the state administration of Russia and his goals for passage of a whole series of reforms. That plan outlined measures which might have averted world war. All of this valuable work for the nation, as is apparent from the Foreword by Stolypin's daughter, Maria Petrovna Bock, mysteriously disappeared in 1911, following his death.

Another copy existed, however, because in May 1911 Stolypin had dictated to me, in the course of four days, the above-mentioned work as a more detailed elaboration of his proposed report to the Sovereign. And in spite of the complications and changes which I have experienced, I have been able to preserve all the notes which I took between 1906 and 1911, in fulfillment of the many commissions which Stolypin entrusted to me.

Professor Baron A.V. Meyendorff, former Assistant President of the State Duma and a first cousin to Stolypin, close to him and familiar with his

## STOLYPIN

ideas, wrote to Stolypin's daughter, M.P. Bock, after learning of my writings, as follows: "Having read them with great interest, I am sending you the reminiscences of Professor A.V. Zenkovsky. I would consider it an infinite pity if these writings were not published. Their veracity is unquestionable and the contents show how your father had planned ahead for five years of state rule. What the Kadets considered impossible without revolution, he planned to accomplish with the approval of the Supreme Authority."

In spite of the exceptional difficulty of publishing anything positive about pre-revolutionary Russia, I feel obliged to write my memories about P.A. Stolypin in at least an abbreviated form.

Professor A.V. Zenkovsky

**Alexander V. Zenkovsky**

**STOLYPIN:  
Russia's Last Great Reformer**



## Chapter 1.

# STOLYPIN: A BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The noble family of Stolypin, which rose in the early sixteenth century, was chronicled in Part VI of the genealogical books of the Penza and Saratov provinces. Senator Arkadii Alekseevich Stolypin (1776-1825) was a friend of Speranskii. His brother, Nikolai Alekseevich (1781-1830), was a lieutenant general. Their sister, Elizaveta Alekseevna Arseneva, was the grandmother of M. Iu. Lermontov.

The sons of Arkadii Alekseevich were Nikolai (1814-1884), an envoy to Stuttgart and The Hague; Aleksei (1816-1858), a friend of Lermontov; and Dmitrii (1818-1893), a writer who served in the Horse-Guards Regiment. After retirement Dmitrii lived abroad, where he became acquainted with the writings of Kant. Returning to Russia he occupied himself with peasant arrangements on his numerous estates and studying economic questions. Since he considered the commune, with its system of mutual responsibility, to be the cause of peasant economic distress, he promoted in his treatises the concept of a private farmstead economy.

Peter Arkadevich's father, Arkadii Dmitrievich, a general of the artillery and a writer, was appointed governor-general of Eastern Rumelia and Adrianople districts in 1878. From 1892 until his death in 1899 he supervised the court quarters in Moscow.

Peter Arkadevich Stolypin was born in 1862. After his graduation in 1885 from the department of natural science in the physics-mathematics faculty of St. Petersburg University, Peter Arkadevich, having served for a short time in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, transferred to the Agricultural and State Property Ministry, where he remained until his appointment as Kovno district and then provincial Marshal of the Nobility. In 1902 he was appointed governor of Grodno and in 1903, governor of Saratov province, the post which he occupied



## STOLYPIN

until April 1906 when he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs. In July 1906 he was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers as well, and he retained both positions until his death.

As he occupied successively more responsible positions, P.A. Stolypin said that he felt the need for intense study not only of law in general but also the specialized field of state law. He seriously studied the entire scope of military and naval science, in order to argue as Chairman of the Council of Ministers before the State Duma and the State Council on behalf of bills presented by the government.

While Stolypin was still Kovno district Marshal of the Nobility and concurrently Chairman of the Congress for Communal Arbitration, he promoted among the Lithuanian peasantry the idea of repartitional communes and consolidating land for peasants as private property, striving toward the merger of strip properties and creation of an independent farmstead movement. Thanks to his exceptional energy P.A. Stolypin was able to achieve many peasant decrees toward realization of his idea.

During his tenure as Saratov governor, Stolypin directed the Sovereign's attention in 1905 toward the concept that the principal cause of peasant agrarian disorder seemed to be the peasant's intense desire for property. If the peasants were given access to small amounts of property, Stolypin felt, they would indubitably become firm supporters of the monarchy. And he pointed out to the Sovereign the desirability of making state land available to the peasants. Stolypin also suggested to the Sovereign as early as 1905 the advantages of full assistance for the zemstvos, to create the conditions necessary for significant improvement of peasant culture and land use. All those goals Stolypin was able to achieve in significant measure in his first years as Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

As Minister of Internal Affairs Stolypin devoted a great deal of time during receptions of governors to drafting agrarian reports and explaining to them that, although both positive and negative aspects existed within the territories of a great empire, one might still significantly improve the cultural and economic conditions of the Russian people. Very often during his conversations with governors, and particularly with representatives of the zemstvos, Stolypin asked questions about the peasants and the village cooperatives, as well as about industry.

Much was done to aid the peasants by the law of November 9, 1906, before the end of Stolypin's career in 1911, but relatively few positive gains accrued to labor. Stolypin repeatedly expressed to me his personal opinion that if the state budget were not drastically increased and a whole series of extremely

essential and serious reforms were not enacted to foster significant improvement of the cultural and economic conditions of the population in general and the workers in particular, then the situation within the nation would always be turbulent in those periods when international complications caused internal disorders. Stolypin increasingly contemplated the vital necessity not only of reform but also of significant rearrangement of the state administration. He well understood that needed reforms would have to be accompanied by drastic increases in the state budget, a measure to which then-Minister of Finance V.N. Kokovtsov and several other ministers would not agree.

Considering the numerous deficiencies in government institutions, especially those at the local level, Stolypin proposed that an entire series of measures be passed by Imperial decree, to give more responsibility to the zemstvos—organizations which, being closer to the people, might take a more active role with great benefit for both the people and the state. But above all Stolypin counted on cooperation from the zemstvos to improve the cultural and economic condition of the workers in order to avert the danger that, in case of complications, workers might again fall under the influence of Russia's internal and external enemies and aspire to revolution, as had been the case in 1905 with its threatened overthrow of the state regime.

P.A. Stolypin well knew that the Emperor sincerely loved Russia and was always concerned when the fortunes of the monarchy or the people were threatened. He also knew that the Sovereign shared his concern about the need to change the state administration of Russia. He decided, therefore, to present to the Sovereign, in the fall of 1911, a plan for administrative reorganization. But an untimely death deprived P.A. Stolypin of the opportunity to accomplish his intended goal.

## Chapter 2.

# STOLYPIN'S STATESMANSHIP

P.A. Stolypin, as governor of Grodno and later Saratov province, proved an excellent administrator, but his statesmanship began to develop after he was named, in April 1906, Minister of Internal Affairs, and especially when he received the appointment in July 1906 to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, which office he held concurrently with that of Minister of Internal Affairs. On receiving a personal invitation from the Sovereign to accept the position of Minister of Internal Affairs in April 1906, when unrest persisted and zemstvo leaders in significant numbers were antagonistic toward the government, Stolypin at first declined, saying that perhaps he should be only deputy minister because he considered himself unprepared for such a responsible post. But since the Sovereign categorically expressed his desire to have Stolypin as minister, Stolypin had no choice but to agree.

The great government work began, and was especially intense before the opening, on April 27, 1906, of the first State Duma. As early as April 29, while Duma members deliberated a reply to the Sovereign's address from the throne, it became clear to Stolypin that most members of the State Duma had no desire to perform normal legislative work for the people's welfare but only to create bitter, aggravated relations with the government out of which might be brought, by propaganda from the tribunal of the State Duma, internal complications for the nation and collapse of the government. During May 1906 Stolypin, after negotiating with members of the moderate party and trying somehow to restore order to legislative activities, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to dissolve the Duma and call new elections. With complete candor he made such a proposal to the Sovereign in July 1906.

Almost simultaneously with the dismissal of the first State Duma and arrangements for elections to the second, Stolypin was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers (while remaining Minister of Internal Affairs). That year, 1906, was especially difficult for Stolypin. A group of Duma deputies, reacting to the dissolution of the Duma, went to Viborg, in Finland, where they pub-



lished an appeal to the people not to pay taxes nor to send the government a single soldier. Ferment again seethed in various parts of Russia, especially in the Pre-Baltic provinces. Robbery and plunder were resumed. Stolypin was responsible, as Minister of Internal Affairs, for keeping order. He found it necessary to employ severe measures which, of course, called forth, both against him and against the government, sharp criticism from the leftist and liberal elements of society.

Stolypin explained his actions satisfactorily, however, as may be judged from his own words. If he had not employed stringent measures during that time, Russia's internal enemies might have taken advantage of a weak government to foment revolution, which would inevitably have led to overthrow of the monarchy and the existing social order. In order to find a more correct way to restore order and to establish a common language with the people, Stolypin hoped to attract into the government several political and private individuals who enjoyed the confidence of liberals. All his attempts failed. Members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, for example, were an active part of society but from their very inception they had assumed an implacable position toward the government; therefore, rapprochement with them proved impossible.

On August 12, 1906, Stolypin suffered a profound misfortune. While he resided with his family in a dacha on Aptekarskii Island, socialists disguised in gendarme uniforms tried to assassinate him. They entered the dacha during his receiving hours and threw down two portfolios containing bombs. General Zamiatin was killed, along with some thirty visitors who had come to the reception. The doorkeeper and both the socialists were also blown into small pieces by the bombs. Much of the dacha was torn apart. Stolypin's children were gravely injured but he, seated in his study at the time of the attempt, remained unharmed.

In spite of the terrible experience, Stolypin worked even more vigorously to solve national problems. Above all he strove to accomplish his long-standing goal to abolish communal land tenure and transfer peasants to private plots. Since the first State Duma had proved irresponsible and the second Duma had not yet been formed, Stolypin issued, by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws and in cooperation with the Emperor, a decree published on November 9, 1906.

The second Duma convened on February 20, 1907, and on March 16, Stolypin set forth a detailed government program. He delivered it calmly but opposition to the program from the leftist parties was so crude and bitter that he had to speak again that same day, to answer the accusations of the leftist deputies. The speech which he made was historic. Answering all objections to those

inevitably stern measures which had been applied, Stolypin recalled how the Baltic provinces blazed, how revolutionary waves inundated the Caucasus and Poland, paralyzing all activities in the southern industrial region, and how terror had threatened the entire nation. He pointed out that the government was obliged to assume its authority—to be custodian of the sovereignty and integrity of the Russian lands and to maintain the legacies and foundations as prescribed in the basic reforms of Emperor Nicholas II. Stolypin declared therefore that the government, in such an exceptionally dangerous time, naturally had to use exceptionally drastic measures. He said that such rude and bitter speeches from various speakers were calculated only to paralyze authority in thought and will, and that some of them had an attitude that might be expressed in two words: "Hands up!" To this threat, he said, the government with complete composure must also answer in two words: "Not intimidated!"

In April 1907, concerning revision of the bill defining the manner of summoning new recruits for the fall of 1907, not only the extreme leftists but also individual members of the Kadet Party began to speak against the bill, declaring the necessity for reducing the army and for passing, instead of expenditures for the army, supplementary expenditures for peaceful construction. One of the Caucasus group, Zurabov, went so far as to say that the army in Russia was maintained only for destructive purposes such as shooting peasants and workers.

After all the harsh speeches by a significant number of Duma deputies, Stolypin realized that, because the law about elections to the State Duma had failed to pass, the composition of the second State Duma, like that of the first, did not serve the interests of the people or the state. Because he wished to preserve the Duma as a legislative institution, Stolypin commissioned Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs S. E. Krizhanovskii to supervise the Department of Public Affairs, especially with regard to elections to the State Duma, and to draft new provisions for elections to the State Duma calculated to make the State Duma a genuine legislative institution and not just a place for chitchat. The deputies had voiced incessant threats and criticisms of the government only in order to cause revolution in the country and to achieve overthrow of the existing regime.

The following May 1907, in the quarters of the Deputy Ozol, a revolutionary organization was created, with State Duma deputies participating. The Social Democratic party proposed to begin wholesale propaganda among the troops, aimed at fomenting a military insurrection. P.A. Stolypin was forced to declare, for the government, that the state guardians must be above political



intrigues, after which he introduced a government proposal to the State Duma which would nullify the immunity of deputies representing the Social Democratic Party.

On May 10, 1907, Stolypin spoke in the Duma on the agrarian question. I observed, and especially enjoyed, that session of the State Duma. I will not actually reproduce his speech since it has been published in various journals as well as in the book of Stolypin's daughter, M.P. Bock. But I will reflect upon it, only mentioning here that in his speech Stolypin expressed himself admirably regarding the ludicrous lack of seriousness in the proposals by members of the State Duma, both Social Democrats and Kadets.

The Social Democrats' conduct and proposals are understandable. They never concealed that their program's principal aim was to overthrow the government and to create chaos and revolution in the country. Attacks by members of the Kadet Party were simply incomprehensible to me, however, coming as they did from more active and intelligent representatives of Russian society. The Kadets proposed a program so absurd that if, subsequently, they soberly studied the stenographic record of all the things they said about the agrarian question, they must have felt shame for their illogical and unrealistic arguments. On that memorable day, May 10, 1907, Stolypin lightly mocked their recommendations on the agrarian question and, pointing out the total lack of realism in their proposals, declared that opponents of the state had chosen the path of radicalism, deviation from Russia's historic development, and aberration from the cultural tradition. Stolypin concluded his speech with the historic words: "You want a great upheaval. We want a great Russia!"

On May 10, 1907, after all that was said in the State Duma on the agrarian question, Stolypin realized once again that a State Duma so composed was completely incapable of handling any normal legislative activities. Upon Stolypin's instructions, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs S. E. Krizhanovskii drafted provisions for elections to the State Duma. After the Sovereign agreed to full modification of the Fundamental Laws regarding election to the Duma, Stolypin drafted the Imperial decree in the matter. The decree stated that the chief reason the first and second Dumas had failed appeared to be owing to a flaw in the electoral laws, causing the State Duma to be filled with members who did not reflect the needs and desires of the people. Trusting therefore in the people's love for their homeland and their Sovereign, and in their intelligence, and relying on the strength of all capable subjects of Russia, by the Manifesto of October 17/30, 1905, and the Fundamental Laws, the Sovereign had decided to change the method of identifying electors from the people for the Duma in order to insure that each segment of the population would be represented and that each

nationality group in Russia would have its needs represented in the State Duma.

Nationalities' representatives, however, must not be sufficiently numerous to influence purely Russian questions. In those border areas where the population had not attained citizenship, elections to the State Duma must be suspended for the time being. The decree further stated that changes in the order of elections would not be enacted by the usual legislative means, through that State Duma whose composition was admittedly unsatisfactory. Only Russia's historic authority, the Sovereign, who had originally bestowed the electoral laws, had the right to revoke the existing law and to substitute his new law.

P.A. Stolypin understood very well that changing the Fundamental Laws without consent of the State Duma would elicit a public outcry. But he also realized that another State Duma elected on the basis of the old law would not approve the proposed changes in elections to the Duma, because the goals of such politicians were not the welfare of Russia and its people but overthrow of the existing regime and usurpation of authority. Although it grieved Stolypin to revise the existing Fundamental Laws, he saw no alternative but to revise conditions for elections to the Duma.

With this in mind, the government designated June 2, 1907, as the deadline for revoking the immunity of Social Democratic deputies. When Chairman of the State Duma F. A. Golovin refused to cooperate, the second State Duma was pronounced irresponsible. An Imperial decree published June 3, 1907, by special order of the Senate and confirmed by the Council of Ministers, set forth as law the new Duma electoral rules, replacing the rules of December 11, 1905.

Members of the Kadet Party met in special assembly after June 3, 1907, in Finland, and drafted a protest resolution against the decree of June 3. By a great majority they repudiated, however, a proposition to boycott elections by the new law.

Although the opposition press emphasized the divergence of the June 3, 1907, decree from the Fundamental Laws, everyone felt that this decree had definitely averted revolution. This was mainly because the leftist coalition, which formerly coordinated opposition forces—zemstvos, municipalities, intelligentsia, and trade-industry circles—fell apart. Two years of unrest had sobered rural and urban leaders alike, just as it had those industrialists who had been sympathetic to the revolutionary organizations in early 1907. Every new zemstvo election moved that organization farther to the right. The Moscow congress of zemstvo leaders expressed on June 11, 1907, loyalty to the Emperor and promised to cooperate fully in reestablishment of peace and prosperity to



the nation, weary from troubles, robbery, and devastation. They also saluted Stolypin and his policies.

A. I. Guchkov spoke at a banquet for congress participants and said that, in that dark time when many were despondent, a person had appeared who, disregarding all difficulties, even the sad experiences of his family during the assassination attempt on Aptekarskii Island, and amid all the slander, understood the situation and stood for the correct way. "Therefore," he said, "as we see the last convulsions of revolution, we are obligated for this exclusively to P.A. Stolypin."

The zemstvo congress in June 1907 deliberated much like a pre-Duma because it reflected the attitudes of that environment which, by the new electoral law, had acquired more significance. Because the Octobrists represented the center, members of the Kadet Party began to promote the desirability of Kadet liaison with the Octobrists to protect the beginnings of constitutionalism. But no Kadet-Octobrist coalition was forthcoming. Many Octobrists supported the government in its struggle against revolution and acknowledged that the decree of June 3, 1907, had strengthened the political structure. Although many members of the Kadet Party had abandoned their previous hostility toward the government, they still insisted that the act of June 3, 1907, had been illegal.

Even so Kadet leader P. N. Miliukov published an article in the Kadet newspaper *Rech* that was sharply critical of the extreme left. He pointed out the grave danger to the Kadet Party, as well as to Russia in general, from leftist revolutionaries, whose representatives displayed the lowest instincts of human nature and actually acted as enemies of Russia.

The majority of deputies to the third State Duma generally favored the government. Out of 442 deputies, besides 154 Octobrists there were 50 from the right, 71 from the moderate right, and 26 representatives of nationalities. Despite the fact that the third State Duma's composition appeared auspicious for the government, in the first days after it convened, during consideration of an answer to the Emperor's welcoming address, unusual political conflict arose over the title "Autocrat." A. I. Guchkov took a strictly constitutional point of view, opposing the use of the title in the address. The resulting vote rejected the use of the word *Samoderzhets* (Autocrat) by a majority of 210 to 146. This vote made a deep impression. The leftist press celebrated; the right was apprehensive.

Stolypin considered it vital to preserve the representative regime and believed that, in spite of the opposition shown by the Octobrists in voting with the left against the title "Autocrat," a no less generally composed State Duma would be able to work compatibly with the government. He therefore gave the



## STOLYPIN

Octobrists clearly to understand that, if they did not wish a rupture with the government, they must avoid siding with open enemies of the government as they had on November 13, 1907, in the vote regarding the Sovereign's welcoming address.

On November 16, 1907, presenting the government's declaration, Stolypin said that the historic autocratic authority and the will of the monarch have proved a precious possession of the Russian state because only this authority and this will, created and protected by the existing administration, can rescue Russia in moments of upheaval and danger and restore it to paths of order and historic justice. He added that the autocracy of the Moscow tsar differed from the autocracy of Peter the Great, just as the autocracy of Peter differed from that of Catherine II and Alexander II. By their actions, as the Russian state had grown, the supreme authority had developed and been modified.

Stolypin also said that it is impossible to graft foreign blooms onto Russian roots and the Russian stem. Let the Russian flower unfold and flourish under the influence of interaction of the Supreme Authority with the capable new representative government.

I attended that session and I could not help noticing what a profound impression Stolypin's speech made on a significant majority of the State Duma members who loudly welcomed his words. When the Kadet deputy F. I. Rodichev, answering Stolypin, indulged in a crude personal attack against Stolypin, most of the deputies shouted, "Out with you! Sit down!" Although Rodichev apologized to Stolypin and Stolypin forgave him, a significant majority of deputies, incensed by Rodichev's bitterness and rudeness, excluded him from fifteen sessions.

The Sovereign had been offended by the Duma vote of November 13, 1907, against the title "Autocrat," but after the sessions of November 16 and 17, seeing that a large number of the Duma members rallied around Stolypin, he was somewhat mollified. On November 19 he even graciously received the President of the State Duma, Khomiakov.

I was present at the Duma session on March 31, 1908, which considered the question of constructing the Amur railroad, and once again I was impressed by Stolypin's exceptional grasp of economic matters. The law concerning construction of the Amur railroad, which had been issued by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, was being presented to the State Duma for confirmation. Some Duma deputies objected, saying that allocation of 238 million rubles to build that railroad seemed impossible because of Russia's weakened financial condition.

P.A. Stolypin pointed out that these remote, harsh outlying districts were rich in gold, forests, furs, and a great expanse of arable land. Because of the presence of a neighboring, densely-populated country, this area would not remain vacant. Foreigners would penetrate it if Russians did not settle there first. If Russia continued to doze in lethargy, this region would fall under alien influence and, while Russia dreamed, it would become Russian in name only. It was necessary to recognize the importance of colonization for this border area and to grasp the implications of the problem not only from the technological, strategic side but in the broader, statesmanlike, political aspects.

But would colonization occur without transportation? Climatic conditions did not seem a hindrance to its colonization. Stolypin pointed out that, after colonization, with destruction of the thick cover of peat and moss, frost would recede deep into the ground. The Ussuri area, an analogous region, was already attracting settlers. Of course, the railroad route must be correlated with locations of the richest lands, suitable for settlement.

The government plan called for penetration of three districts. First, the Amur district: There, between the Zeya and the Bureya, 800,000 desiatines were already colonized with Russian settlers who had achieved a high degree of culture and seemed to exemplify what might be achieved in the future. Westward from the Zeya stretched more than 13 million desiatines of land suitable for settlement, while from Blagoveshchensk to Khabarovsk lay still many more desiatines of useful land.

The second district would be the Trans-Baikal. Its northern part, the Barguzinsk taiga, contained 2 million desiatines of arable land. The third district, the Vitimsk coast, had 13 million desiatines of land. If the government project were accepted and Nerchinsk chosen as the starting point of the railroad, that coast, owing to the proximity of the railroad, might quickly become rich.

As for the financial side, Stolypin explained that maintenance of the road would approach 20 to 22 million rubles a year. Although a large sum, it was essential. Stolypin concluded his speech with the words, "Our eagle, the legacy of Byzantium, has two heads. Of course, there are strong one-headed eagles but, by cutting off the head of our Russian eagle which is directed toward the east, you will not transform him into a one-headed eagle. You will only make him bleed. Your decision will provide an opportunity to find a favorable remedy. This plan will open a new source of financial strength."

Stolypin paid special attention to the passage of agrarian legislation. Since the law of November 9, 1906, had actually been in effect since January 1, 1907, Stolypin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, took an active and personal role in implementing actual work in



## STOLYPIN

local regions. He pointed out that administrators cannot simply plan and passively expect that work will be done. They either want the peasant to benefit from the new law or they do not. Government circles evinced insufficient interest in the law of November 9, 1906. Stolypin suggested, in the Council on March 11, 1908, on a matter of local administration, that many think since there is not yet complete calm in the country, it is necessary to resist any change. But the government believes, Stolypin said, that by breaking off attempts at disorder, ruthlessly suppressing them by physical force, it has also committed all its moral strength to restoration of peace in the country. Restoration of peace and order must begin, however, by replacing the cracked foundation stone. To do this, one must not shake but instead reinforce the entire structure.

Since Stolypin steadfastly emphasized, at every reception of governors and agrarian leaders as well as of permanent members of the Land Tenure Commission, the extreme necessity for energetic activity in all areas by implementing the law of November 9, 1906, he succeeded in the first years in achieving relatively significant results. But Stolypin's activities in regard to the agrarian question were not confined to the law of November 9, 1906. By his constant efforts there was created a land fund from appanage and state-owned lands for cooperative use. Also, at Stolypin's insistence, the Peasant Land Bank acquired in the course of a year and a half about 9 million desiatines of land from large land holders, which was more land than in the preceding twenty-five years. All these lands were sold to the peasants.

P.A. Stolypin's energetic activities on the land question met opposition, of course, from several rightist circles who feared undermining of the economically modern estates and a decline in national economic standards. But Stolypin understood very well the significance of the modernized estates and he employed all possible measures in order, above all, to develop with the assistance of the zemstvos a cooperative movement in the peasant economy and then to create a corollary system among the large landowners. Therefore Stolypin could not overlook the fact that after the agrarian disturbances of 1905-1906, many owners of large landholdings had left their estates, causing a decline of large landholding. So that Russian cooperatives would not decline economically, Stolypin caused the zemstvos to assist them and directed all forces toward a significant economic elevation of the peasant economy.

By the measures contained in the law of November 9, 1906, Stolypin obtained passage of a law about land tenure through the legislative institutions. The Land Tenure Commission was entrusted with the following tasks:

1. securing land for the peasantry as inalienable property;
2. consolidation of assigned land into single plots;

3. creation of farmsteads (that is, special properties); and,
4. developing alternatives to strip farming, and assigning land as property of individual peasants.

Striving toward creation of a private peasant economy, Stolypin directed the attention of the Land Tenure Commission toward the necessity for encouraging, in every possible way, the creation of farmsteads as well as separation from the communes. An individual member of the commune would, upon leaving it, receive that land allotted to him by local tradition, retaining his proportionate share in the pastures, forests, and other conveniences of the commune.

The Land Tenure Commission was composed of the Marshals of the Nobility, chairmen of district land boards, individual representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, members of the district courts, local agricultural leaders, three elected representatives from the peasants, and representatives of the communes where the work was being carried out. In the course of several years it apportioned a total area of some 12 million desiatines to nearly 1.2 million households. The number of land surveyors supplied by the Commission gradually amounted to more than 5,000 persons.

Although the agrarian law of November 9, 1906, actually became effective on January 1, 1907, its deliberation in the general session of the State Duma only began on October 28, 1908. The speaker for the Agrarian Committee, Octobrist S.I. Shidlovskii, pointed out that the new agrarian law represented a return to the true liberal path of reform of Alexander II, the path from which authority had departed in the time of reaction. Nevertheless a large number of speakers from the Kadet Party as well as from the extreme left and extreme right parties objected to the law.

I was present in the general session of the State Duma which deliberated the law of November 9, 1906, and I simply was unable to understand why, since the leftist deputies wanted just the overthrow of the existing regime rather than the welfare of the people, such intelligent persons as P.N. Miliukov, A.I. Shingarev, F.I. Rodichev, and others could make common cause with the extreme left. All speeches seemed aimed toward undermining every effort by the government to enact those reforms so essential to the interests of the people and the state.

Instead of considering the law on its own merits, Kadet speakers, criticizing government policy, began to declare that such an intensive economy was impossible in a state where there was no rule of law; they said that laws were issued in the heated environment of courts-martial and that the alleged authors of the law were representatives of extreme rightist nobility, and so forth. So the



## STOLYPIN

extreme left as well as the extreme right began for some reason to defend the commune. A member of the Union of Russian People, V.A. Obraztsov, over the boisterous applause of the extreme left, stated that the peasant, having received his freedom, would sell his plot and drink up the proceeds.

Octobrist speakers, progressives, and the moderate right gave fully-deserved rebuffs to Kadet speakers, as well as those of the extreme left and extreme right parties. They pointed out that it was necessary at least to give the peasant the feeling that, as a landowner, he was lord and master. If one realizes that the time has come to put the land to progressive economic use, they said, then one must also recognize the need to grant the peasant freedom of property.

P.A. Stolypin personally delivered the representative reading of the agrarian law in the Duma on December 3, 1906, pleading for individual peasant property against an attempt to alter it to family ownership. Replying to speakers of the extreme rightist parties, Stolypin said that in creating laws for the entire country, it is necessary to rely on the sensible and the strong, not the drunkard and the weakling. Moreover, Stolypin said, ~~the people must have faith in the Emperor. Although there have been moments when faith in Russia's future has been shaken, the faith of our Tsar in the strength of the Russian peasant and the Russian plowman has not wavered.~~ Serfdom to the commune and the oppression of family property provide bitter bondage for 90 million people. Stolypin said that in world conflict, a contest of peoples, only those who have fully realized their material and moral strength will occupy an honorable place.

Finally, by a very significant majority, the State Duma not only confirmed the law of November 9, 1906, but even amended it, strengthening it further by aiding the commune in transition to private property. Members of the Kadet Party voted "nay," along with the extreme left and the extreme right. A significant portion of the State Councillors rejected the Duma amendment. Eventually, however, the law of November 9, 1906, was confirmed and promulgated on June 14, 1910. By that time it had actually been in effect three and a half years.

Thanks to Stolypin's persistence, the legislative base was laid in a 1908 law for universal primary education. Along with his concern for popular education and passage of the law of November 9, 1906, Stolypin devoted a great deal of attention, in light of the grievous experiences of the Japanese War, to effecting reorganization of the army and restoration of the navy.

As early as October 1908, the international situation had become somewhat complex, partially owing to military revolution in Turkey. Foreseeing the possibility of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, several governments began to assert claims. The Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand proclaimed full inde-

pendence for Bulgaria, declaring himself Tsar. Austria-Hungary decided to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, citing the fact that Russia had agreed, by the Reichstadt Treaty of 1876 and a special Austro-German-Russian agreement of June 13, 1881, that Austria-Hungary would reserve the right to annex those two provinces whenever necessary.

Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P. Izvolskii erred in a meeting with Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Baron Aehrenthal. Anticipating several concessions from Austria-Hungary, Izvolskii agreed in principle to annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Public opinion in Serbia and in Russia was highly inflamed by rumors about the annexation. International relations were unusually tense for several months.

Germany became involved in order to see that Russia acceded to the annexation. It was clear to Stolypin that Izvolskii had acted improperly by agreeing, even in principle, to annexation. But he realized that if Russia refused its consent, war would be inevitable. Considering the Russian army's unpreparedness and his belief that, if the war ended unfavorably for Russia, revolution would inevitably follow, Stolypin used all his influence to persuade the Sovereign to agree to Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When a statement appeared in the press on March 14, 1909, that Russia had consented to annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian public opinion quite naturally, since unaware of the actual situation, reached fever pitch.

From diplomatic considerations, in order not to complicate the international situation, Stolypin did not consider it possible to clarify the reasons motivating Russia to consent to the annexation, either in the State Duma or in the press. Opposition in the next two months before actual explanations about Russia's concessions to Austrian demands became public, gradually lessened. That is because, by January 1909, everyone was excited about events occurring within the Socialist Revolutionary Party.

By mid-1908 Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats had already begun to lose their hold over the workers, peasants, and student youth. In January 1909 sensational reports were appearing in the foreign press that a member of the central committee of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Evgenii Filippovich Azef, had fled from a party court and was a known provocateur. Until January 19, 1909, the government did not permit the Russian press to comment on this rumor. But after the director of the Police Department, A.A. Lopukhin, was arrested on January 19 for transmitting secret information to V.L. Burtsev about the fact that the chief of the terrorist organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, Azef, had worked since 1893 as an okhrana agent,



the Azef affair naturally became the main topic of conversation in the lobby of the State Duma and in public circles. A leftist party and the Kadets had already entered two inquiries in connection with the affair.

Azef came from a poor Jewish family which lived in Rostov-na-Don. On entering the Socialist Revolutionary Party he went to Germany in 1892 and enrolled in the Polytechnic Institute in Karlsruhe. In 1893 Azef applied to the director of the Police Department, who was then P.N. Durnovo, about engaging him as a secret agent for surveillance of Russian students abroad. Having entered the underground terrorist organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries, Azef was simultaneously a valuable collaborator for the okhrana division of the Department of Police, often informing them about planned terrorist acts of the S.R. terrorist organization. He received pay from the okhrana division and still more significant recompense from the S.R. terrorist organization. As time went on, Azef worked with special zeal for the benefit of the terrorist organization in organizing terrorist acts and became one of the foremost terrorist organizers. Returning to Russia in 1899, Azef worked as an engineer and, entering the okhrana division again, played a large role in the underground organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries as well, propagandizing party aims.

Although he spent large sums of money and frequented expensive restaurants, Azef was afraid to become intoxicated, fearing that he might talk too much. Since he was under threat of exposure at all times, Azef also feared being sentenced to death by the party. He explained his conduct to the party—such things as spending money in music halls and devoting himself to carousing—by saying that he wished to divert gendarme spies who were monitoring his activities. When, by 1907, further revolutionary developments were successfully prevented, thanks to Stolypin's energetic activities, Azef began increasingly to assist the Department of Police in uncovering plans for terrorism by the S.R. terrorist organization. He actually prevented several terrorist acts. V.L. Burtsev, observing the systematic collapse of the S.R. Party, began to suspect Azef and finally accused him openly. But leaders of the party, considering Azef's past services, ignored Burtsev's accusations. Burtsev was able, however, to arrange a conversation with former director of the Police Department A.A. Lopukhin, to which other S.R.P. members listened. Lopukhin confirmed to them that Azef had been an okhrana agent since 1893. During the ensuing party trial, Azef naturally denied this categorically and, during a court recess, found the opportunity to escape prosecution by the party.

Revelation of Azef's history naturally came as a terrible jolt to the S. R. P. As a result this leftist party, wishing to hide its failure from the public, accused the government of staging provocations in order to justify reactionary

policies. Stolypin, answering the S.R. demands for an inquiry into the Azef affair, spoke on February 11, 1907, in a general session of the State Duma. He pointed out, first of all, that the word "provocation" did not apply to the case at hand. For the government and for the aims of the okhrana, he said, more light was needed, while for the internal enemies of Russia darkness was necessary in order to attain more easily the overthrow of the existing government structure and seizure of power in their own hands. Struggle against revolution was not only desirable for the government but essential. When Russia's internal enemies use bombs in their struggle against the government, the government can respond in only one way, automatically, with strict measures. According to revolutionary terminology any individual who puts the interests of the people and the state first, and hands over to the government information necessary to avert revolution and terrorism, seems to be a provocateur. But in the government's opinion, a provocateur is a person who commits a crime against another person or persons but implicates a third person in his crime.

The Duma majority did not succumb to leftist agitation, realizing that owing to the Azef affair the S.R.P. had been wrecked and defeated and therefore only wanted to avenge itself upon the government, to sling mud at those who cared about the interests of the people and the state. In the end a majority of the Duma deputies, the center and the right, accepted Stolypin's explanation fully, rejecting inquiries by the socialists and the Kadets and settling the Azef affair. Azef's exposure definitely benefited the government, effecting the moral breakdown of the terrorist organization and rendering it incapable of continuing its activities.

In the fall of 1909, while Stolypin was ill with grippe and then pneumonia and during his subsequent rest in the Crimea, there occurred in the State Duma, and in the State Council as well, complications for the government concerning examination of the staffs and credits for the War Ministry and Naval Administration. The government always received full support from the Duma majority regarding army credits. But partly since Russia, owing to its military unpreparedness, had been forced to yield to Austro-Hungarian demands for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, A.I. Guchkov stated in a general session of the State Duma that it was impossible to regard foreign policy questions all the time from a position of military impotence. He therefore posed a question to War Minister A.F. Ridiger: "Are there people in top military circles who can prepare the Russian army in peacetime to perform in battle and lead the troops to victory?"

Considering that, in parliamentary states, legislative institutions lack the right to criticize the composition of the army, it would seem quite proper if



Minister Ridiger had demanded that the President of the State Duma prohibit criticism of the Russian army's high command. But instead of forbidding criticism, Ridiger permitted it. He agreed that, of course, command personnel should be improved and renovated but, he added, candidates selected for high offices must be approved by existing personnel. "In the main," Ridiger presumed to add in that session of the State Duma, "command personnel at this time is not ideal." Of course the Sovereign was extremely displeased. Not only had Ridiger failed to protest against incursions by the State Duma into areas not under its purview but that he agreed with Guchkov's criticisms was particularly galling. Ridiger was therefore replaced as War Minister by V.A. Sukhomlinov.

Somewhat prior to that incident, Naval Minister Admiral Dikov had introduced in the State Duma a bill for credits to upgrade the Naval General Staff. The State Duma approved the bill but the State Council correctly decided that staff considerations were outside the competence of legislative institutions and therefore rejected the Naval Ministry bill. The Naval Ministry again introduced the bill in the State Duma but this time only with regard to credits. The Duma, not wishing to reverse its previous decision, fully reconstructed the bill as it had been presented originally by the Naval Ministry and forwarded it to the State Council.

When the State Council considered the Naval Ministry bill for the second time, V.N. Kokovtsov, substituting for the ill Stolypin, entirely improperly began to petition the State Council to accept the bill in the draft approved by the Duma—that is, simultaneously confirming credits along with changes in the personnel of the Naval General Staff.

Notwithstanding approval of the bill by a majority of the State Council, the Emperor did not wish to give his decision in Stolypin's absence. When Stolypin returned on April 20, 1909, he realized that his position was an exceedingly difficult one. He understood that assumption of competence by the State Duma over personnel and staff of the War and Naval Ministries might create a complicating precedent. Admissions of error by War Minister Ridiger in the State Duma and Kokovtsov in the State Council so distressed Stolypin that he decided to tender his resignation. The Emperor categorically refused to accept Stolypin's resignation, however, or those of any of the ministers.

On April 25, 1909, the Emperor wrote to Stolypin that, all things considered, he had decided not to confirm the bill for the Naval General Staff. By another letter on April 27, the Emperor charged Stolypin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with drafting a rule to the effect that bills from the War and Naval Administration, as well as instructions for bringing matters to the consideration of the State Duma and State Council, must be approved directly by

the Emperor. Then, in a rescript to Stolypin, the Emperor stated that all the activities of the Council of Ministers under Stolypin's chairmanship deserved full approval, directed as they were toward strengthening that foundation which had been established by the administrative structure to serve him, the Emperor, and that Stolypin guaranteed successful fulfillment of the true mission. Thanks to Stolypin's strong influence, a majority of the members of the State Duma, despite the misunderstanding between the government and the State Duma regarding the War Ministry as well as the Naval Staff, finally were able to restore proper relations between the government and the Duma.

Stolypin had described, in one of the State Duma sessions, how the history of revolution and the history of the state teach that an army falls into disorder only when it ceases to be united in obedience to one ultimate, holy will. This principle had been exposed, said Stolypin, to the poison of doubt by suggesting to the Russian army even a fragmentary thought about collective will, or that its strength might cease to be based upon the single, permanent, and united Russian army force, on the Highest Authority. Stolypin pointed out what great respect the majority of the State Duma members felt for the legal Supreme Commander of the army and declared that the government had not encroached on the rights of the State Duma.

To Stolypin's great distress, the State Duma was unable for a long while to comprehend the exceptional significance of a defensive national navy. For two years the State Duma had rejected credits to construct dreadnoughts. Even when the State Council would restore these credits, the Duma continued to reject them.

Stolypin understood very well that there was no alternative so, taking advantage of a recess of the legislative bodies, by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws he issued an Imperial decree to build the dreadnoughts. The State Duma decided not to reject construction credits when the question was brought to their consideration after construction began. There was no initial squabble over reconstruction of the navy, and four new dreadnoughts were launched in 1911.

In June 1909 several events occurred having significance for international relations. For one thing, a group from the State Duma, headed by the President N.A. Khomiakov, went to England. The Russian deputies were met very hospitably in England, except for the appearance of protesters from the Labour Party against a rapprochement with Russia, which they regarded as reactionary. All members of the State Duma objected and Kadet P.N. Miliukov declared that since legislative institutions exist in Russia, Russian opposition remains the opposition of His Majesty and not opposition to His Majesty. Edward Grey, English Minister of Foreign Affairs, used Miliukov's words as



## STOLYPIN

evidence of the existence of a constitutional regime in Russia and was able to ward off the attack by the Labour Party against Russia.

Almost simultaneously, in Finnish waters near Björkö, there was a meeting of the Sovereign with the German Emperor Wilhelm II. At breakfast the German Emperor conversed the entire time with Stolypin, not concealing his favorable impression of the Russian premier.

The Sovereign's meeting with the German Emperor excited the public and press of France and England. Our Russian press noted in reply that the meeting of the two heads of state by no means signalled a change in Russia's foreign policy. Soon after that the Sovereign visited France and England, appearing in naval parades of both countries. And the Sovereign thanked the English King, Edward VII, for the friendly reception accorded members of the State Duma.

In 1909 the improved economic condition of the people as well as the Russian state was evident. Opposition journalists, forced to acknowledge an increased interest in politics by the people, called it reactionary degeneration of the public spirit. But Stolypin thought otherwise. Interviewed by the editor of the Saratov newspaper *Volga*, Stolypin observed that, judging from many newspaper articles, one might think that the people were victims of oppression and general pessimism. Actually, however, there could be seen everywhere in the country a remarkable elevation of a sprightly state of mind, attesting to the fact that everyone in Russia was briskly at work. He added that the vigorous optimism in the countryside coincided with passage of the agrarian reforms. Stolypin believed that it was necessary above all to create a citizenry of private property owners and small landowners, and when this task was accomplished the citizens themselves would accede to the throne of Russia. In conclusion Stolypin said, "Next comes consolidation of the people, the more than 100 million people who constitute the entire might of the country. When the roots of the state become healthy and robust, the Russian government's statements will sound entirely different to Europe and all the world. Give our nation twenty years of external and internal peace and then you will not recognize the Russia of today."

In September 1910 Stolypin and Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Land Tenure A. V. Krivoshein made a long trip through Siberia, which made a strong impression on them. Stolypin told me repeatedly that this meaningful trip had still more reinforced his beliefs about how rich our Russia is, with the vast expanse of its land and the natural wealth in the earth which, if correctly used, might provide essential raw materials for all sorts of industry, not only in Russia but in all of Europe.

Stolypin thought during his trip about new provisions for migration to Siberia and he noted with great satisfaction the rapid growth of large agricultural settlements. But he could not fail to note the negative side of resettlement and concluded that for the peasants, accustomed in many localities to personal property, cultural implantation into the commune had an unfavorable psychological effect. Stolypin and Krivoshein were both persuaded, during their journey, of the correctness of the policy of the Sovereign and the government regarding the assertion of Russian influence in Asia. Kokovtsov reported to the Council of Ministers as early as 1909 about the immense importance for Russia of its Asian possessions. The trip through Siberia enabled Stolypin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to establish a firm and consistent Far Eastern policy, not only in relation to China but also to Northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia.

A meeting of the Sovereign with the German Emperor had been set for October 22 and 23 at Potsdam. Its aim was not only to cement friendly relations but even more to settle some of the controversies that existed between Germany and Russia. Stolypin attached profound significance to the meeting because he considered that until essential reforms had been implemented in Russia and full internal order established, clearing up all of the internal misunderstandings and controversies which might lead to war between Russia and Germany, a collision might easily be triggered by either monarch or government.

An agreement was reached during that meeting by which Germany promised not to support Austria's aggressive policy in the Balkans, and Russia would not participate in any English undertaking against Germany. Simultaneously an agreement was reached concerning the Near East. The agreements elicited only dissatisfaction from the Kadet Party, which considered that Russia had retreated from its offensive position to a strictly defensive one. Kadet objections, expressed by P.N. Miliukov in the State Duma session of March 2, 1911, were entirely inaccurate, however, because Russia, during the reign of Alexander III, had concluded an alliance with France which implied a purely defensive position and France realized that the Potsdam agreement would in no way negate the Franco-Russian alliance. Only England, with which Russia had no agreements, always obstinately expected a Russo-German clash and employed all possible measures to neutralize the results of the Potsdam agreement.

Speeches by several Duma members opposing the Potsdam agreement inevitably fostered an anti-German attitude in the public and in the press. Stolypin, understanding the need to establish harmonious foreign relations so that Russia might gradually enact essential reforms, recognized the clear threat to international relations posed by the attitude of Russian society toward Germany. The government tried, therefore, in every possible way, to divert press attention



## STOLYPIN

toward the need to preserve the government concept of the substance of the Potsdam agreement.

The French press was extremely critical also. In the summer of 1910 an Imperial decree ordered the abolition, for strategic reasons, of four fortresses in Russian Poland. Although the French had been notified beforehand of the reasons for selection of the fortresses to be abolished, as well as about changes in mobilization plans, and their government had been assured that the order would not affect the Franco-Russian alliance, nevertheless questions raised in the press and in public circles unnecessarily complicated the international situation. Only after competent clarification from the French as well as the Russian government was the situation generally calmed.

In the State Duma the Kadet Party also expressed direct opposition to the government's Far East policy. Both Russia and Japan were determined not to allow a new competitor into Manchuria. It was clear to Stolypin and the government that Japan was not considering another attack on Russia but, in fact, was probably looking forward to a cooperative existence. Actually, Japan and Russia reached an agreement on June 21, 1910, which obligated both powers to provide mutual support in the matter of the Manchurian railroad.

In late 1908, after the death of the Chinese Empress Tzu-hsi, under the influence of the revolutionary party, gradual but utter decay began in China. The Russo-Japanese treaty concerning the Manchurian railroad guaranteed the status quo in Northern China. By that agreement, Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan remained in the Russian sphere of influence while Korea and South Manchuria were in the Japanese sphere of influence.

Because the Chinese government openly encouraged colonization of North Manchuria and Outer Mongolia by Chinese from China Proper and made various efforts to restrict Russian rights in those border areas, the Russian government in early 1911 sent the Chinese government an ultimatum, demanding observance of Russian commercial rights and privileges and threatening to transfer troops to the borders of China. China fully capitulated to Russian demands, thus acknowledging Russia's economic predominance in Outer Mongolia as well as Northern Manchuria. Subsequently, after the revolution began in China in 1911, Outer Mongolia expelled Chinese troops and proclaimed its independence under Russian protection.

Leftists and Kadets, seeing that Russia had gained extensive territory as a result of the government's policy, and had attained great economic opportunities without bloodshed, nevertheless spoke out in bitter opposition to Russia's Asian policies.

\* \* \*

The Peasant Bank, entrusted to the Finance Minister's authority, did not display sufficient energy in implementing the government's agrarian policy. Stolypin proposed, therefore, to transfer the bank to the Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Land Tenure. V.N. Kokovtsov, as Minister of Finance, adamantly objected to this proposal and the matter was referred to the Emperor for a decision. In the summer of 1911, while Stolypin was on vacation, the Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Land Tenure, A.V. Krivoshein, yielded to Kokovtsov as Minister of Finance and Acting Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and withdrew the request to transfer the Peasant Bank from the Ministry of Finance to the Chief Administration of Agriculture and Land Tenure, which naturally offended Stolypin.

Since the economic condition of the people and the government had begun significant improvement, and the Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats had gradually lost their influence among the workers and peasants, the Octobrists proposed in the fall of 1910 to change administrative exile and special powers of the governors regarding the press. Stolypin replied to that proposal in the Duma on March 31, 1910, by saying that as long as trains are blown up and peaceful citizens are robbed under the banner of the Socialist Revolutionaries, the government is obliged to maintain order, regardless of outcries about reaction. He added that Russia was of course discontent, considering the afflictions trying its people. It was dissatisfied not only with the government but also with the State Duma and the State Council, and dissatisfied with right and left parties. Russia was discontent because it was dissatisfied with itself. "This dissatisfaction will disappear," he said, "when we awaken from troubled dreams, when self-awareness emerges and strengthens the Russian state, when Russia feels like Russia again."

At the beginning of March 1910, N.A. Khomiakov resigned the position of President of the State Duma and A.I. Guchkov, actually not a suitable choice, was elected instead. Guchkov expected, in this post, to be able to influence the Emperor during reports, in order to implement policies which he favored. But on March 9, 1910, during the first reception, the Emperor was more than cool toward Guchkov. The latter, being very egotistical, felt hostile toward the Sovereign, remaining his implacable foe until the Sovereign's abdication. Even on the first day of his presidency, March 12, Guchkov made reference during his introductory speech to obstacles from the Highest Authority, saying it was necessary to recognize these obstacles and perhaps to begin to settle accounts.

The death of L.N. Tolstoy on November 7, 1910, created numerous complications for the government. No one could deny that Tolstoy, an indisput-



## STOLYPIN

ably outstanding writer and artist, represented the pride of Russian literature; he had great influence, of course, not only in Russia but abroad. But Tolstoy had been excommunicated by the church for blasphemy, and many considered that an Orthodox nation had no right to honor him posthumously. Stolypin discussed this question in a report to the Emperor about Tolstoy's death. The Emperor replied with the following statement: "I sincerely regret the passing of his talents. His works show the native customs of some of the most glorious years of Russian life. The Lord God will be his Kind Judge."

L.N. Tolstoy's death elicited a response in the press and among the youth. Leftist parties, enjoying student favor at the moment, tried to incite them to rebellion. Student riots occurred in St. Petersburg and Moscow for several months but in other cities students did not engage in anti-government disorders.

The question of Russian nationalism had already begun to occupy both the press and various public assemblies in 1909. Because nine Poles were elected to the State Council from nine western provinces at a time when those provinces were only about 3% Polish, Professor D.I. Pikhno introduced a legislative proposal in the State Council to change the form of elections to the State Council from the nine western provinces. Stolypin indicated his sympathy for Pikhno's bill. A number of public leaders and journalists also expressed approval of Russian nationalism, pointing to the fact that a strong non-Russian element in literary and art criticism had become noticeable.

Stolypin generally favored official Russian national representation in the Council. He intended, in his local administration bill leading to elective zemstvos in the western provinces, for Russians to constitute a majority in the zemstvos of those provinces. To achieve such predominance he used Pikhno's idea.

Because almost all large landowners in the western and southwestern provinces were Poles, Stolypin worked even harder to assure that the Russian element would compose a majority in the zemstvos. He proposed to reduce property qualifications by half and to separate the electorate into two curias, Polish and Russian, from which the Russian curia must elect the greatest number of councillors.

Stolypin's idea met quite obstinate opposition from several members of the State Duma, making it necessary for Stolypin to defend his idea in a session of the Duma on April 7, 1910. He explained that the government sought to protect the rights of the majority, the economically-weak Russian population, from the minority of Polish landowners who were indubitably stronger in a cultural and economic sense. The chief aim of the proposed legislation about introducing the elective zemstvos was to establish, openly and without hypoc-

ris, that the western region is and must remain Russian. In answer to Poles who accused him of vengefulness, Stolypin replied that in politics there is no place for such things; instead, all factors must be weighed.

After a lengthy debate the State Duma accepted the proposed legislation but with several amendments which somewhat alleviated its anti-Polish character. In the final voting, both left and right opposed the bill. The State Council proceeded to consider the proposed legislation about extending elective zemstvos to the western provinces only on February 1, 1911.

The extreme rightists in the State Council generally opposed Stolypin because of his desire to carry out some liberal reforms. Individuals such as P.N. Durnovo and especially Count S. Iu. Witte opposed Stolypin because he now occupied the high offices which they had held in 1905—Durnovo as Minister of Internal Affairs and Count Witte, in 1905 and part of 1906, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Witte in particular tried in every way to take revenge because Stolypin had refused to exert any influence on the Emperor to see that Witte Street in Odessa, which the city administration had changed to Peter the Great Street, was changed back to Witte Street. Count Witte tried therefore to foster behind-the-scenes intrigue among State Council members. Usually he did not participate personally but only prompted attacks by other members of the State Council.

The rightists in the State Council opposed above all the reduction of landed property value requirements, fearing that reductions of such requirements in the western provinces would create a precedent for similar reductions in provinces in the rest of European Russia. The bulk of the center and the left, moreover, opposed the national curias. Several members of the State Council did not wish to restrict the rights of the conservative Polish nobility in favor of Russian semi-intelligentsia.

In view of Durnovo's note to the Emperor developing the opposition argument to the bill, the Emperor, at Stolypin's suggestion, sent a request through President of the State Council M.G. Akimov asking the fraction of the right to support the government in the voting. V.F. Trepov then obtained an audience with the Emperor and expounded to him the motives of the opposition to the bill. Trepov asked the Emperor if he wished them to consider his request a direct Imperial order. The Emperor could only answer that, of course, members of the State Council must vote according to conscience. Trepov reported the Emperor's words to the rightist faction on the eve of the decisive vote in the State Council. Stolypin was unaware, however, of Trepov's audience or the Sovereign's words when the voting occurred.



## STOLYPIN

On March 4, 1911, after a brief debate, the State Council rejected by a margin of 92 to 68 the government proposal to extend zemstvos to the western provinces. Stolypin realized that certain circles had intrigued against him. It also became entirely clear that the extreme conservatism of many State Councilors acted as a brake on the government and the State Duma for passage of essential reforms. But it did not occur to Stolypin that this decision by the State Council would diminish his prestige with the Sovereign and deprive him of the opportunity for productive work.

The next day following the State Council's rejection of the western zemstvos bill, Stolypin went to the Emperor with a report and announced his intention to resign. His decision was based on the fact that opponents, citing the will of the Sovereign, had tried by intrigue to undermine his influence and prestige in the eyes of the Sovereign and society. The Sovereign, who valued Stolypin highly, refused to accept his resignation, stating that he did not understand how the Chairman of the Council of Ministers could insist upon resigning merely because of conflict with the State Council. He asked Stolypin to find some alternative. Stolypin then suggested that the Sovereign dismiss both houses for a few days and enact the State Duma's version of the bill about the western zemstvos by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws. In order not to lose Stolypin's services, the Sovereign agreed to this measure as well as to Stolypin's desire to punish the intrigues of Durnovo and Trepov by suggesting that they both leave the State Council and St. Petersburg for awhile. But the Sovereign asked for time to deliberate before making his final decision.

The next day after the audience with the Sovereign, Stolypin convened a private meeting of the ministers and shared with them his conversation with the Emperor. Several of the ministers tried to persuade him to take a more conciliatory attitude toward Trepov and Durnovo but Stolypin refused to compromise. News spread about the crisis, of course, in the press and in public circles.

Public leaders and Duma circles felt deep indignation in those days toward the authors of the intrigue among extreme rightist members of the State Council. Agrarian leaders, who valued Stolypin highly for doing so much to help the zemstvos, were still more irate about the intrigue.

A number of the Grand Dukes, as well as the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, valued Stolypin as an outstanding statesman and tried to persuade the Sovereign not to permit Stolypin's resignation but to accept all of his conditions. The Sovereign, appreciating that Stolypin was irreplaceable as Minister of Internal Affairs and particularly as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, defin-

itely decided after the fourth day of deliberation and long conversations with his mother, the Empress Maria Feodorovna, to accept all the proposals advanced by Stolypin.

Many attitudes changed as soon as it became known that the Emperor had agreed with Stolypin—to dissolve the legislative institutions for three days in order to allow passage of the law extending elective zemstvos to the south-western and western provinces (accomplished by the Imperial decree of March 14, 1911, according to Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws) and to order State Councillors Trepov and Durnovo to leave St. Petersburg and not to attend sessions of the State Council. Many Duma deputies and public leaders who had, several days before March 14, sympathized with Stolypin and shown open indignation at the intrigue by members of the State Council, sharply and immediately changed their views. Among the first to change his mind was A.I. Guchkov, who demonstratively resigned as President of the State Duma and departed for the Far East.

I was present in the Duma sessions of March 15 and April 27, 1911, and I was repelled to the depths of my soul that many members of the State Duma failed to comprehend the situation. All the speeches by individual deputies, the intrigues, and the negative press were definitely reflected in the debates and voting on the inquiry concerning application of Article 87. Stolypin's explanations were pronounced unsatisfactory.

In Stolypin's last speech on April 27, 1911, explaining why the State Duma version of the bill was enacted, he said that it was "not to create an incident nor to find fault with the form acted upon, but one cannot deny that the act of March 14, 1911, actually strengthened the rights of the State Duma."

Russia's internal enemies fully realized that while Stolypin lived and held authority, they could not create conditions to cause chaos in the country and ultimately seize authority. Russia's enemies despised the memory of Alexander II, who had tried to create favorable living conditions for his people. They also hated Stolypin who not only strengthened the nation but tried through reforms to improve cultural and economic conditions. The terrorist organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries attempted by many terrorist acts to eliminate administrators who thought only of the welfare of the people and the state. Because of Stolypin's energetic resistance, the S.R. terrorist organization was reduced to nothing.

By bitter speeches in the press and, in the session of April 27, 1911, from the podium, members of the Kadet Party momentarily undermined Stolypin's prestige with the Sovereign. But while Duma deputies' speeches against Stolypin in sessions of March 15 and April 27, 1911, produced an exceedingly



## STOLYPIN

grievous impression on the Sovereign, many agrarian leaders who understood Stolypin's intent were irate at speeches from such relatively moderate deputies as V.A. Maklakov. The extreme right, closely related to court circles, held a hostile attitude toward Stolypin and used to advantage speeches of Duma members on March 15 and April 27 for still more intrigue against Stolypin. Quite naturally, all those attacks and intrigues affected Stolypin's emotional state.

All subsequent events connected with the intrigue persuaded Stolypin to consider the necessity, no later than fall 1911, of presenting a report to the Sovereign about enacting reforms and renovating the state administration of Russia. In May 1911 P.A. Stolypin dictated to me his proposed report to the Emperor. He said that of course he could not help seeing that in the last few days, because of all the circumstance mentioned above, the Sovereign's regard for him had changed somewhat. Realizing that he might not remain in authority, Stolypin expressed to me his profound belief that both the Sovereign and his mother, the Empress Maria Feodorovna, deeply loved Russia and thought only of its welfare and that of all its people. He felt therefore that the Sovereign would approve his report, in order to restore conditions under which he could, if only the Lord God were willing to spare his life, assume new authority and accomplish all that his report proposed.

Stolypin told me that even if the Sovereign fully agreed to an increased government budget and passage of all his planned reforms, there would still be the inevitable question: Would the legislative institutions consent and allow him to implement all his plans? Of course there were many chances for it, both in the State Duma and the State Council. But so often they objected to any new allocation or any sort of reform to benefit the people and the state. Their objections would hinder the opportunity to renovate Russia's state administration and would prevent passage of essential reforms. If Stolypin could not convince a majority of the State Duma and the State Council that there was no purpose to hindrance, that legislative institutions must agree to use his ideas, there would be only one alternative: to terminate the activities of the third State Duma and wait until a fourth Duma could be convened. Meanwhile everything he planned and the Sovereign approved would be passed by Imperial decree according to Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws.

A case in point was the agrarian law of November 9, 1906. If that law had not been enacted by Article 87, then, considering the debates which took more than three and a half years in the legislative institutions, one might say almost with certainty that the agrarian law would never have passed. "This might also be said," Stolypin added, "concerning extension of the elective zemstvos to the southwestern and western provinces. If I had listened to V.N.

Kokovtsov and other colleagues in the Council of Ministers on March 5, 1911, and agreed with them that I should forget about promulgating that law by Article 87, if I had tried again to guide the bill through the legislative institutions, then of course there never would have been an elective zemstvos in the western and southwestern provinces. As you personally know very well," Stolypin said to me, "the Imperial decree of March 14, 1911, has already been implemented in places and preparations for elections in six southwestern and western provinces are in progress. I do not doubt in the least that ultimately both legislative institutions will fully applaud my position about elective zemstvos in those provinces."

### Chapter 3.

## **STOLYPIN'S PROPOSAL TO REORGANIZE THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (according to the notes of Professor A.V. Zenkovsky, dictated by P.A. Stolypin in May 1911)**

Translator's Note: When the circumstance clearly indicates the need, Professor Zenkovsky's comments will be set apart from Stolypin's words, and the passage will be preceded by the initials A. V. Z.

New ministries which Stolypin intended to create as early as 1912 in the area of internal administration of Russia were:

a. Ministry of Labor

A. V. Z.: Creation of such a ministry then seemed especially critical. The situation of workers in Russia was relatively unsatisfactory. It was intolerable that the workers should remain any longer the landless proletariat which they had been all those years, including 1911. Internal complications of 1905 clearly showed what a grave threat the working class represented for the nation.

The Ministry of Labor must urgently investigate the situation of the working classes in West European nations and America, and anything which is deemed better than other nations in this regard should be reported to the Council of Ministers. The Council will then, in full cooperation with the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Social Security, and Local Self-Government, as well as all the zemstvos, draft legislation to improve the material and cultural conditions of the working class.



The Council of Ministers will bring these needs to the consideration of the State Duma and State Council. Legislation must be enacted to transfer to the control of the Ministry of Labor activities of all the industrial and cooperative enterprises and all zemstvos connected with the matter of improving the conditions of the workers. After the workers' cultural and economic needs are met, they will not be that revolutionary proletariat which they were in 1905 but will enjoy equal rights with the conscientious citizenry and petty bourgeoisie. As participants in the national structure they will not yield to propaganda from Russia's internal enemies. In fact, they will doubtless become defenders of the newly-reorganized regime of Russia.

b. Ministry of Local Self-Government

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin intended in his project gradually to consolidate under the control of this ministry many of those branches of state activity which were at the time being administered by all kinds of public institutions. He considered it essential to establish a special Ministry of Local Self-Government in order to create full cooperation among the government, the zemstvos, and the municipalities. To the new ministry would be transferred all matters then handled by the Department of Local Management of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The new Ministry of Local Self-Government must, he felt, speedily undertake elaboration of new laws concerning the zemstvos.

The law of January 1, 1864, about zemstvo institutions was one of the greatest reforms of Alexander II. By that law zemstvos were given broad responsibilities which had not previously been delegated to organs of local self-administration in any western nation. Unfortunately several subsequent laws, beginning in 1866 and particularly in the time of Alexander III, so curtailed zemstvo rights that the zemstvos could not implement the measures to benefit the people and the nation which had been assigned them in the 1864 law.

The new Ministry of Local Self-Government must consider restoring the law of 1864 and expanding still more significantly the rights of the zemstvos, particularly the provincial zemstvos, adopting as much as possible the state administration of the United States. Furthermore the new ministry must draft laws to authorize agrarian administration in those territories of Russia to which the zemstvos have not yet been extended. In some places agrarian institutions may be introduced by using the law of April 2, 1903, "Concerning Extension of Agrarian Administration to the Southwestern and Western Provinces," but legislation must also be enacted to extend volost' zemstvos throughout Russia.

Property-value qualifications for participation in zemstvo activities must be reduced to one-tenth so that proprietors of farmsteads and workers and

owners of small amounts of real estate will have the right to participate in zemstvo elections. With the exception of lunatics and criminals, all individuals, regardless of nationality or creed, must have the right to vote in zemstvo elections if they have attained the age of twenty-one, own property however small which is independently assessed a land tax, and have lived in the tax district no less than two years. The number of volost' zemstvo councillors must be defined by law, independently from the number of people having the right to participate in elections.

Each volost' zemstvo assembly will elect, by definite rules, a number of uезд councillors from those individuals having the right to participate in elections within the boundaries of the volost'. Each uезд zemstvo assembly will elect, in its turn and according to definite rules, the number of provincial councillors from those individuals having the right to participate in zemstvo elections within the boundaries of the uезд.

A. V. Z.: The volost' zemstvos, according to P.A. Stolypin's proposal, would receive jurisdiction from the uезд zemstvos to manage all zemstvo schools, hospitals, sanitariums, and veterinary and agricultural stations within the borders of the volost'. The volost' zemstvos would also be entrusted with construction, repair, and maintenance of roads, as well as responsibility for all other needs of the people within the volost'. The uезд zemstvos would be responsible for supervising all land measures having significance for needs of the people within the uезд as well as supporting intermediate educational institutions. Moreover, the uезд zemstvos would coordinate agrarian measures among the volost' divisions.

Provincial zemstvos will organize statistical bureaus to determine all the needs of the people, to reevaluate all real estate and to forecast actual revenues for more equitable taxation, not only for national but for land taxes as well. The provincial zemstvos must cooperate fully with volost' and uезд zemstvos, and with the Ministries of Labor, Commerce and Industry, and Social Security, to help workers meet their cultural and economic needs and to build and furnish their homes.

Provincial zemstvos will also convene periodic congresses of doctors, veterinarians, agronomists, engineers, lawyers, accountants, insurance specialists, and other individuals employed by volost' and uезд zemstvos. The Ministry of Local Self-Government must see that provincial, volost', and uезд zemstvos lead the campaign against all epidemics. The Ministry of Local Self-Government must likewise help the zemstvos in every possible way to coordinate their activities with other ministries and be sure that the national budget



includes the sums necessary to subsidize those activities which are beyond their financial capabilities. And the Ministry will arrange periodic All-Russian congresses of specialists in all branches of the local economy to coordinate agrarian measures in the various provinces. But the Local Self-Government Ministry's special concern shall be to cooperate with the Ministry of Finance for investigation of all essential sources which will enable the *zemstvos* and municipalities to distribute revenues as needed to satisfy the requirements of the people.

c. Ministry of Nationalities

A. V. Z.: Russia, an unusually large nation, contains many different nationalities in its population. Besides Russians there are Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Jews, Georgians, Armenians, Tatars, Kirghiz, and so forth. To meet the religious and cultural needs of each nationality, P.A. Stolypin intended to create a special Ministry of Nationalities for Russia which would carefully study the cultural, religious, and social lives of each nationality and create a favorable atmosphere for them, to assure that they be not enemies but loyal subjects of Russia.

All Russian citizens, regardless of nationality or creed, must enjoy equal rights. Any restriction is unthinkable. The existing restrictions on Jews, which are exceptionally disgraceful, must be lifted. The new ministry must create an atmosphere in which the cultural and religious desires of each nationality may be satisfied as completely as possible.

The head of this ministry must be not a bureaucrat but a strong social leader who enjoys definite authority in public circles, both Russian and non-Russian, in order to counteract those foes of Russia who aspire to dismember it. Austro-Hungarians in particular have trained propagandists among the Galicians who are, in the case of any complication inside Russia, to attempt to persuade the Ukrainians that the Russian state oppresses them and that they must aspire to complete independence.

There is an element among the Ukrainians, and among the Poles and other nationalities, which favors separation from Russia. Among the masses in Poland and in the Ukraine, however, there is no unrest at the present time. Before it is too late, it is essential that the new Ministry of Nationalities study very attentively the special needs of each nationality and, at every opportunity, act to satisfy the cultural, religious, and economic needs of all the peoples of Russia.

The problem of nationalities in both European and Asian Russia is most complex and serious. The new Ministry of Nationalities must, on the one hand, attend to the social and political problems of each nationality but, on the



other, it must not ignore all the external and internal enemies who strive to dismember Russia. Government vacillation and hesitation toward the various peoples who are influenced by propaganda from Russia's enemies might easily create internal complications.

d. Ministry of Social Security

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin considered creation of such a ministry extremely essential. Workers in industrial cooperatives, as well as those in industry, banking, public, state, and other institutions, had absolutely no guarantees in case of disability, illness, unemployment, and so forth.

It is necessary that the new ministry, after carefully studying social security of workers as it is handled in the nations of Western Europe and America, draft suitable legislation and present it to the Council of Ministers for further deliberation in the legislative institutions.

e. Ministry of Creeds

A. V. Z.: The Church, then headed by the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, was, in Stolypin's judgment, in an extremely unsatisfactory condition. It was essential, he felt, to create a special Ministry of Creeds to take charge of our Church (and, of course, to supervise activities of other creeds as well).

The Minister of Creeds, as well as his colleagues in the ministry, must be a person with the highest spiritual education, an individual profoundly devoted to the Orthodox faith. His position would be equal to that of the other ministers. For the ministry there must be a council (the present Holy Synod) composed of metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops. The ministry, in cooperation with this council, must discuss and elaborate proposed legislation to restore the Patriarchate in Russia. The ministry must take decisive measures not only to increase significantly the number of ecclesiastical schools, seminaries, and academies but also, primarily, it must expand the programs of ecclesiastical educational institutions.

Priests, particularly in poor villages, live in unusually depressed material circumstances. Priests who teach the laws of God in rural schools are paid 60 rubles a year while at the same time, in the zemstvos, doctors, agronomists, engineers, veterinarians, insurance specialists, and other workers from the intelligentsia earn anywhere from 1,500 to 3,000 rubles a year. Such an affront to priestly dignity must not continue. Because priests in villages everywhere eke out a beggarly existence, it is not surprising that the more talented and capable individuals, upon graduating from ecclesiastical seminaries, do not become

priests but continue their educations in higher institutions or seek other positions. The Russian people, with their inbred faith in Orthodoxy, need good priests who, by their guidance and steadfast sermons, instruct them in God's laws, holding the Russian people to that Christian path which has no place for those dreadful acts which occurred during the 1905 revolution. The Ministry of Creeds must assure, above all, that priestly salaries compare favorably with those established for other professionals.

The number of ecclesiastical academies must be increased so that all priests may be fully trained before being assigned. Secondary educational institutions must prepare students for ecclesiastical seminaries just as gymnasias prepare students to enter universities. It would also be desirable if the ecclesiastical educational institutions would direct special attention toward decreasing the ratio of students to lecturers.

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin had become interested in priestly education because governors and zemstvo representatives had noted in their reports the extraordinary impact in 1905 and 1906 of speeches by educated and clever priests toward calming the peasants. Such priests enjoyed great authority among the peasants by their sermons and instruction of the people, and they successfully averted the atrocious phenomena which occurred in other villages where the priests lacked such popularity or such absolute authority.

No other religion can provide such spiritual serenity, such an impetus toward the ideal Christian way of life. Our Orthodox Russian masses are profoundly religious and it is essential that the Ministry of Creeds create conditions in which the religious life of the Russian people will always remain properly uplifted. Restoration of the Patriarchate in Russia would contribute immeasurably to such an atmosphere.

f. Ministry for Investigation, Utilization, and Exploitation of the Natural Resources of Russia

No other country in the world possesses as much natural wealth as Russia. In the earth of European and especially Asian Russia, there is an infinite quantity of coal, oil, iron, tin, zinc, wolframite, nickel, copper, gold, silver, and so on. Inadequate railroad facilities and financial resources prevent us from enjoying the country's wealth and from creating industry which might, because of the wealth of essential raw materials, provide good earnings for millions of people and, at the same time, enrich the nation and elevate the standard of living for the entire Russian population. Because of various unfortunate circumstances, there has been no individual in the government able to find a viable approach to

utilizing Russia's natural wealth. The new Ministry for Investigation, Utilization, and Exploitation of the Natural Resources of Russia must be an institution capable of correctly changing the economic life of Russia.

A. V. Z.: Count S. Iu. Witte was, in Stolypin's opinion, a great statesman to whom Russia was deeply indebted as former Minister of Finance, but Witte failed to find the means by which the nation and the people might long ago have been enriched, by creating the necessary state budget whereby we might not only utilize all the natural resources of the Russian land but also meet all the cultural and economic needs of the people. Consider restrictions on Jews for example: Stolypin was convinced that as soon as Jews were granted full rights they would immediately form large joint-stock banks and concession enterprises to exploit the natural wealth of Russia.

g. Ministry of Public Health Care

Medical science in Russia certainly deserves great respect, but inadequate financial resources prevent the zemstvos from extending medical assistance to the entire population, desirable though this would be. In addition to the outlined plans for free medical aid from the zemstvos to workers in industrial enterprises, the zemstvos must significantly increase their allocations for medical aid to the rest of the population.

In those provinces to which the zemstvos have not yet been extended, medical aid available to the population is rather deplorable. The proposed Ministry of Public Health Care, following the example of the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Agriculture, must go beyond aiding the zemstvos in development of their activities. Of course the Ministry of Public Health Care must annually enter significant sums in the national budget for distribution to the zemstvos in grants and donations to expand their activities in construction and support of zemstvo hospitals. But the Ministry of Public Health Care must also take necessary measures in those provinces to which zemstvos had not yet been extended, to guarantee complete medical assistance to the people. The new ministry, in full cooperation with all zemstvos, must also concentrate special attention on the struggle against epidemics.

The new ministry must then, on the one hand, coordinate zemstvo medical aid for the people and, on the other, arrange frequent district and All-Russian congresses of doctors in provinces both with and without zemstvos to work out general programs to fight epidemics as well as to render free medical assistance to the people.

The ministry must, in full cooperation with all provincial zemstvos, direct special attention to psychiatric hospitals in provinces both with and with-



*Reorganization Proposal*

out zemstvos. And the new ministry must, without fail, receive necessary sums from the national budget for assisting the zemstvos to send doctors abroad for familiarization with the practice of medicine in other countries.

## Chapter 4.

# STOLYPIN'S PROPOSAL TO REORGANIZE SOME THEN-EXISTING MINISTRIES

### a. Ministry of Finance

A. V. Z.: Stolypin believed that, to some extent, the Minister of Finance was the key minister because all essential reforms in the interests of the people and the country as well as strengthening of Russia's military might, both army and navy, depended on the sound operation of this ministry. Stolypin regarded Minister of Finance V.N. Kokovtsov as an industrious and honest statesman, sincerely devoted to Russia and the Emperor but, at the same time, entirely unsuitable to be Minister of Finance in such a large and tremendously wealthy nation as Russia. His chief defect, according to P.A. Stolypin, was his conceit, his obstinate desire to take under personal consideration each and every piece of evidence offered by financial specialists for Stolypin's immediate concern, as for instance the proposal to increase the national budget from 3 to 10 million rubles. The project for increasing the national budget was primarily proposed by Kokovtsov himself in the spring of 1911 but, since Kokovtsov later voiced such bitter and argumentative opposition in the Council of Ministers, Stolypin concluded that only full reorganization of the national administration might provide the opportunity to implement the plan he had outlined for raising national revenues from 3 to 10 million rubles.

According to P.A. Stolypin's plan for the Ministry of Finance, several special commissions would be formed from experienced financiers, men of practical experience as well as scholars of financial theory. These commissions must also include experienced agrarian leaders,

reflecting P.A. Stolypin's constant awareness of that source of investment which could significantly increase budget revenues for both the nation and the agencies of local self-government.

Among the measures proposed by Stolypin for increasing the national budget were the following:

1. To assist the statistical bureaus of the zemstvos and the municipalities, a full re-evaluation must be made of real estate subject to national and local taxes in order to fix both the actual value of the property and actual revenues from it. In almost all of Russia, the actual value of real estate in 1911 was at least 10 times greater than the assessment value used by national and local governing bodies. After determining actual value of and actual revenue from real estate, direct taxes would increase sharply.
2. There must be a significant increase in excise taxes on vodka and particularly on wine, liquor, and champagne. The increased tax on vodka might to a large extent lessen its use by the people. Many leaders and organizations have proposed full prohibition of the sale of vodka but this would result in many individuals being poisoned by drinking home-brew instead of vodka.
3. A relatively small tax must be established on all manufactured products, to be applied equally to the national budget and those of local self-government. The Ministry of Finance jointly with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry must, of course, assure that prices of manufactured items not be substantially raised above that amount indicated by increases in salaries and wages and increased duties.
4. A progressive income tax must be instituted, so calculated as to exempt the poor entirely. The chief burden of the progressive tax must fall upon prosperous people and large industries. The higher the income of private individuals or businesses, the greater percent of progressive tax must be levied.
5. The Ministry of Finance must form a special commission to set criteria in all ministries for a fixed salary scale for all civil servants in the ministries as well as in the various local institutions. This commission would establish minimum wages based on figures representing the minimum living wage for families of three individuals. If the family has more than three members, then supplementary wages must be set for each additional family member. Proceeding from the minimum living wage, salaries for higher ranks must be determined, enabling each ministry to project precisely the sums needed for official salaries at



both central and local levels. Such salary norms must be established by this commission for employees in local administration and for workers in industry and agriculture. Salary increases for individuals in higher categories of work must be implemented gradually, so as not to complicate the national financial situation. In calculating the living wage, the commission must consider subsequent cost of living increases because costs of all items and products required by the people will naturally increase in relation to increased wages and salaries for workers and increased taxes on manufactured goods. All ministries will take into consideration the new tax rates established by the Finance Ministry's commission when presenting their estimates for inclusion for the national budget. The Ministry of Finance, after determining the general total of expenditures submitted for the budget, must compile estimated revenue figures for the national budget. Above all, direct taxes on real estate must be significantly increased by the new evaluation, and determining actual value of and revenues from real estate. Differences between the expenditures of all ministries and income from direct taxes must be defrayed by the levy of indirect taxes and from sales taxes, taxes based on the amount of production, and from other sources.

6. Expenses for increased salaries of railroad employees must be defrayed from increases in railroad tariffs. Expenses for increased salaries of postal-telegraph employees must be offset by new postal rates.
7. Essential loans must be made available to the proposed Ministry for Investigation, Utilization, and Exploitation of Natural Resources. The special commission of financial experts from the Ministry of Finance must draft proposals for obtaining foreign and domestic loans, confining those loans to the extremely essential business of developing Russia's natural resources and covering those expenditures. In this way the initial imbalance in the national and local budgets may be reconciled.

b. Ministry of Education

A. V. Z.: The Russian people, compared with those of other large countries, lacked at that time sufficient education. Much had been done for lower educational institutions, the so-called zemstvo schools, in recent years (especially since 1908). The Ministry of Education annually presented an estimate for the national budget of the necessary sums, including subsidies for construction and maintenance of zemstvo schools. In compliance with the plan for school networks in Russia, all

children of school age had to receive free minimal education but there were considerable shortcomings in secondary and even more in higher education.

The Ministries of Education and Local Self-Government must coordinate whatever measures are necessary so that the course of 20 or 25 years (that is, by 1933 or 1938) secondary schools in all Russian territories would number about 5,000 and the higher educational institutions about 1,000 or 1,500. Tuition at both levels must be reasonable so that the poor will have the opportunity to provide their children with at least a secondary and possibly a higher education.

The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with other ministries, must also establish an academy for training personnel to occupy responsible positions in the various ministries, such training to be of two or three years' duration. Applicants to the academy must have completed their higher education with distinction and have shown themselves to be most gifted and capable throughout their higher educational experience. Each candidate must know at least two foreign languages.

The academy will train officials for various branches of government service in its separate divisions. After this academy has been in operation for a time, we should have fully qualified persons filling responsible posts in the ministries. Examples of specialized prerequisites follow, illustrating the requirements to enter various divisions of the academy:

1. Ministry of Education: graduation from a university in either the school of history and philology or the school of physics and mathematics.
2. Naval Ministry: graduation from a special higher naval institution
3. Ministry of Transportation: graduation from the Institute of Transportation or a corresponding educational institution
4. Ministry for Investigation, Utilization, and Exploitation of Natural Resources: graduation from a mining or technological institution
5. Ministry of Justice: graduation from the school of law of a university or a corresponding higher educational institution
6. Ministry of Finance, State Bank, State Comptroller, and Ministry of Commerce and Industry: graduation from the school of economics and business of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute or a similar institution
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: graduation from a special higher educational institution

8. Ministries of Labor, Nationalities, Social Security, Local Self-Government, and Internal Affairs: graduation from a school of law of a university or an equivalent higher educational institution
9. Ministry of Creeds: graduation from an ecclesiastical seminary

c. Ministry of Transportation

Transportation facilities in Russia, particularly the highroads and unpaved roads, are less than satisfactory. The chief reason for such miserable conditions is the insufficient sum assigned them not only by the national but especially by the zemstvo budget. Besides everyday inconvenience, such road conditions may present a grave danger in time of war because of the difficulty of moving troops and supplies. Another serious shortcoming is the insufficient number of rail lines connecting such an immense territory as Russia. Lack of railroads prevents the nation from enjoying all its riches both above and beneath the ground. Each new railroad network will contribute to the economic enrichment of the nation and of the people themselves. One cannot fail to notice the large difference in the prices of basic products such as bread, butter, meat, milk, and other provisions in regions where railroad transportation is more or less satisfactory, as compared with those where railroads are completely lacking, even when there are satisfactory highroads. Our means of transportation produce a wretched impression on all those who have had the opportunity to observe transportation in Western Europe, especially in Germany. We must allocate tremendous sums in the national and zemstvo budgets, and we must promote large loans, both domestic and foreign. Western powers many times poorer than Russia have found the means for large-scale development of railroad networks and construction of good roads for all sorts of movement.

In Russia the majority of highways and especially the unpaved roads are so poor that to travel by them, even by carriage or on horseback, is exceptionally difficult. Count S.Iu. Witte in his time called attention to the poor condition of roads and, by legislative order, initiated a number of compulsory expenditures from the zemstvo budget to build and maintain local roads with sums assigned for formation of road capital, but these sums were so relatively insignificant that virtually no improvement was accomplished in local road conditions.

In the future, for the reorganization of the national administration of Russia and for promotion of significant domestic and foreign loans, when we draft the national and zemstvo budgets, we must allocate more significant sums so that in 10 or 15 years (that is, by approximately 1930) both the railroad network and highways in all of Russia but especially in the European part will not be inferior to the roads of the central European countries.



The Ministry of Transportation must develop no later than 1912 an overall plan for the period 1913-1930 to construct railroads and highways linking several regions, and roads having strategic importance must be given priority in the national budget. Construction costs of highways, unpaved roads, and railroads, and their maintenance in each separate province, must be borne by the zemstvo budget. The Ministry of Transportation must also direct serious attention to all waterways. Plans already exist for construction of canals by which it seems possible to link rivers and seas, but work on these projects has not begun because the Minister of Finance, V.N. Kokovtsov, has failed to find the essential revenues.

Considering Russia's size and all its natural resources, the national budget by rights should long ago have included sufficient sums to have provided adequate transportation and utilization of Russia's wealth to satisfy the economic and cultural needs of the people. The Ministry of Transportation must not hinder those industrialists who agree to serve as concessionaires in the construction of railroads.

d. Ministry of Commerce and Industry

No other country has at its disposal such a quantity of known raw materials essential for the development of industry as does Russia. But if one compares Russian industry with that of such countries as Germany, Austria-Hungary, England, and others, the picture is dismal. Our feeble development of industry, particularly in metallurgy and machine construction, seems the result, on the one hand, of the economic policy practiced by the Ministry of Finance and, on the other, restrictions of rights of the Jews.

One cannot deny that Jews are talented financiers and merchants. In the central European countries, industry and commerce and banking operations quickly advanced when Jews were granted full rights; therefore it seems desirable to remove all restrictions on Jews in Russia, enabling them to form new joint-stock undertakings. The industry of Russia would immediately begin broad development. Development of industry in Russia would create a large demand for workers, and some hired agricultural workers who receive less compensation for their work might improve their material conditions by working in industry where pay is always higher than in agriculture. Besides, all industrial workers would benefit from the social activities of the zemstvos and the Ministries of Labor, Social Security, and Commerce and Industry. The fact is also indisputable that development of domestic industry would decrease the need for imports, thereby alleviating the flow of gold and currency from the country. By the same token our exports would increase, swelling the flow of gold and foreign currency coming into Russia.

e. Ministry of Agriculture and Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Agrarian Reorganization

The Ministry of Agriculture must, by the proposed reorganization plan and in full cooperation with all zemstvos and the Peasant Bank, have as its chief purpose expansion of land available for peasant households. Simultaneously the Ministry of Agriculture must sharply increase appropriations for the national budget, to distribute funds to the zemstvos so they may provide large scale agricultural aid to those peasants who have left the communes to form their own households.

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin was firmly convinced that, because of the law of November 9, 1906, and the energetic activities of Chief Administrator of Agriculture A.V. Krivoshein, significant aid from the zemstvos would make possible not only a noticeable increase in the area of peasant farms but an increased yield in the peasant fields from 30 or 35 poods per desiatine to 55 per desiatine. The average annual harvest of wheat would rise from two and a half billion poods to 4 billion poods, providing grain for increased exports as well as increased consumption of wheat by the Russian people, even considering rapid population growth. The Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Agrarian Reorganization must continue the policy of developing peasant households in the spirit of the November 9, 1906, law, and must do still more, in cooperation with the zemstvos, to increase the area of peasant farms and to increase yields by more agronomical aid to the peasant farmers. And P.A. Stolypin planned to make the Resettlement Department, then under the authority of the Chief Administrator of Agriculture and Agrarian Reorganization, into a special independent Ministry for Resettlement.

f. State Bank

The Imperial bank in Germany plays a large role in developing credit for industry and agriculture as well as in domestic and foreign trade. Unfortunately the State Bank of Russia has lagged behind in this regard. By reorganization, our State Bank should be divided like England's into two departments: The first will be solely for emission, for issuing notes of credit secured by gold, foreign currency, and State Treasury bonds. The second department must be exclusively for credit, to conduct those operations which in all other European nations are handled by large commercial banks.

The Imperial bank in Germany, in a relatively small territory, has about 500 branches. Our State Bank, in a territory many times larger, has approximately 100 branches. Branches of the credit department must be established in

all parts of Russia, not only in all provincial and district cities but in all those localities where trade and industry are developing. Branches of the credit department will operate like private commercial banks, promoting expansion of industry and agriculture and developing the means to promote more credit in the manner of the most privileged private commercial banks.

The head of the credit department of the State Bank must be an outstanding financial and banking leader, not a bureaucrat, and branches of the credit department must be managed by financial leaders, not mere functionaries. Russia does not lack clever and talented trade, industry, finance, and banking specialists but at the present time the most gifted and outstanding specialists prefer positions in private commercial banks rather than in the State Bank because the salaries in private banks are usually five to ten times greater.

g. State Comptroller

The interests of the nation require accurate control of all sums expended from the state budget. Central officials as well as those in the provinces operate, however, strictly by rules laid down almost a hundred years ago. Officials are more concerned with adherence to regulations prescribed in outdated laws than with careful control of activities of their offices or personnel. To correct this situation, the State Comptroller must develop (and introduce in the legislative institutions, via the Council of Ministers) those regulations which would assure not just observance of accounting procedures but that regular examinations would be conducted to prevent any abuses of sums dispersed from the national budget.

h. War Ministry

A. V. Z.: In 1909, during the international tension concerning Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, P.A. Stolypin, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, had occasion to become rather closely acquainted with the War Ministry activities and with conditions in the army. On learning the state of our army, he asked the Emperor to agree to the annexation because otherwise war with Austria-Hungary and Germany seemed inevitable. Because our army was unprepared for war, complications might easily have developed which would have led Russia into revolution and even collapse of the monarchy. P.A. Stolypin considered it essential, therefore, that the War Ministry present a plan to the Council of Ministers for full reorganization of the army which would, in case of war with the Central Powers, assure victory for Russia. P.A. Stolypin considered it intolerable that those relatively small allocations in the national budget designed to strengthen the army had not been utilized at the proper time by the War Ministry.



The War Ministry should assess the condition of the Central Powers' armies and see that our army is equipped with more and better military supplies than those of Germany and Austria-Hungary combined. The War Ministry must take urgent steps in cooperation with the Ministry of Transportation to construct strategically essential roads in case of war with the Central Powers. Command personnel must be of a quality which members of the State Duma (namely A. I. Guchkov) cannot criticize and for which the War Minister need not apologize. Then Russia would not again be forced to yield, as it did to Austria-Hungary with Germany's support in the matter of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

i. Naval Ministry

Since the crushing defeat of the Russian fleet during the war with Japan, 1904-1905, a great deal has been done to augment our military strength. But all of this, compared with the battle-readiness of the navies of such nations as England, Germany, and Japan, seems wholly inadequate. To correct the situation we must not only appropriate significantly larger allocations in the national budget but we must generate internal credits as well.

j. Military Commissariat

During the 1904-1905 war and especially during all the disgraceful cases against the commissaries, there came to light the urgent need for serious reform in the commissary department. One reason for the shameful bribery of commissary officials was certainly their very low salaries. It is necessary, first of all, to review all salaries of commissariat officials with a view to improving them so that better educated and more conscientious individuals will be attracted to employment in the commissary department in the future.

Future provisioning of the army should be handled by the provincial zemstvos. With the assistance and full cooperation of the Military Commissariat, the provincial zemstvos will maintain army supplies at the proper levels. In the forty-seven years that the zemstvos have existed, there has been not a single case of bribery there. With helpful cooperation from the Office of Small Credit, the zemstvos will furnish a substantial portion of the army provisions from domestic articles.

k. Ministry of Justice

Judicial institutions, thanks to the reforms of Alexander II, have shown positive development, but the low salaries of our examining magistrates, assistant prosecutors, and judicial personnel have caused the most talented and capable lawyers often to go into private practice where earnings are many times greater than the salaries at all ranks in the Justice Ministry. A radical increase in

the national budget must be allotted to maintain salaries of all Justice Ministry employees at such a level that the most capable lawyers will not defect to private practice.

l. Ministry of Internal Affairs

A. V. Z.: As Minister of Internal Affairs for five years, Stolypin clearly saw that there were many defects in his ministry as well as in the others. His ministry was a complex apparatus, responsible for internal order in the huge Russian Empire.

After reorganization of the national administration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must retain only those operations directly related to the okhrana, national internal security, and guidance of the political life of the people. A significant number of the Russian people are poorly educated and easily fall prey to propaganda from Russia's internal enemies who wish to overthrow the monarchy and the existing social order.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs must take complete responsibility for quelling internal disorders in the countryside. Although Jewish pogroms have been squelched in places by the police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs must take unusually stern measures to stamp out both pogroms and internal disorders.

All matters directly related to the interests of the people—for example, the food problem and many others now handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs—must be transferred to the zemstvos. All matters directly connected with local administration now under the authority of the ministry as well as matters relating to the local economy must be transferred to the Ministry of Local Self-Government, so that the Ministry of Internal Affairs will have more time to devote to maintaining order within the nation.

As should other institutions, some departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, especially the police, must make a special effort to improve the educational level of their personnel. But this will be possible only after enactment of a much larger national budget, so that police salaries may be increased. Then it will be possible to assign responsible posts in the police ranks to intelligent individuals with higher educations or, in extreme cases, with secondary educations. Police in junior ranks must also be better paid so that they will not feel justified in accepting bribes because of salary inadequacies.

m. Department for Administration of State-Owned Property

The state has at its disposal many forests and much land. Although large amounts of these lands have already been transferred to the peasantry, still more energetic measures are needed to make available more state-owned lands for peasants who come from the overpopulated rural regions of the nation. Some

state lands are entirely unsuitable for agriculture. By assistance from scientific agronomical and technical forces of the state and the zemstvos, we must find a way to use these lands. The state also has forests not presently suitable for exploitation, though their value is great. We must utilize these riches by granting concessions to private industrialists and building the necessary railroads. Along with utilization of forests, we must create industries able to provide the nation with products in which forest materials are used. But all of this requires, of course, the aid of specialists in the government and zemstvos, and careful study and research.

n. Administration of the Possessions and Holdings of the Imperial Family

Lands and forests of this department are in almost the same situation as those belonging to the state. Although, by the Emperor's wishes, many lands administered by this department have already been transferred to satisfy the land needs of peasant households, the Sovereign has repeatedly expressed his desire to transfer still more in the future. Forests of this department must be used on the same basis as those in the Administration of State-owned Property.

o. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The government of every nation is obliged to consider international relations when formulating its internal policies, not only international relations in general but relations with specific countries. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia reports to the Sovereign about general international relations as well as about Russia's relations with this or that nation. But the Minister of Foreign Affairs is not obliged to provide that same information to the Council of Ministers or to its chairman.

A. V. Z.: In conjunction with plans for reorganizing the Council of Ministers, P.A. Stolypin desired a program for reconciling internal and external government policies whereby the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be obligated to inform the Chairman of the Council of Ministers about the general international situation and relations to Russia of specific nations.

In Stolypin's opinion, the Sovereign was completely responsible before God and his people to select as Chairman of the Council of Ministers the most capable of national leaders. The Chairman would then be responsible to the Sovereign and would select all needed ministers, presenting them for confirmation by the Sovereign. Of course, if the Sovereign did not confirm a certain minister, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers would have to suggest another individual to him. Each minister designated by the Chairman for confirmation by the Sov-



ereign must be, above all, the outstanding expert in that branch of government administration which he would direct.

All ministers presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers to the Sovereign must be responsible to the Chairman. And reports by specific ministers to the Sovereign must always have prior approval of the Chairman.

Under rules then existing whereby ministers were named by the Emperor, ministers were sometime unsuccessful or acted independently, presenting reports directly to the Sovereign and ignoring the opinions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. This often created unnecessary complications in the Council.

P.A. Stolypin was convinced that the Emperor, who warmly loved his homeland and thought only about the welfare of his people and the nation, would not object to the new conditions for the Council of Ministers. And when the proposed academy was formed, there would gradually be available fully trained individuals to direct the respective ministries.

## Chapter 5.

### **STOLYPIN'S PROPOSALS CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY (measures planned by Stolypin in 1911 for the prevention of world war)**

A. V. Z.: International complications arising periodically always automatically caused anxiety to the Sovereign as well as to the government of Russia. The Balkans seethed like an active volcano and had triggered misunderstandings among various states of Europe. Although the Sovereign's suggestion about creation of an international tribunal in The Hague to resolve misunderstandings among individual states by peaceful means was not welcomed by several large countries, the Sovereign asked P.A. Stolypin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, conjointly with S. D. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to draft a concrete proposal for solving such misunderstandings by peaceful means. After prolonged deliberation with Sazonov, Stolypin drafted a preliminary plan in 1911 for creating an International Parliament, in which all nations without exception, large or small, would be represented.

Such an International Parliament, composed of representatives of all states, should meet in one of the small European states and remain in session year-round, except for brief holidays. From this International Parliament there would naturally evolve a number of commissions for preliminary discussion and examination of various questions. Members of the commissions would also have to be representatives of nations.

The International Parliament should deal with appeals by individual states about this or that need, or about misunderstandings with other countries. Requests would be handled from both independent countries and from protectorates.

A special statistical bureau should be created for the International Parliament which would assemble exhaustive information from each nation about the quantity and movement of the population, about subsistence wages, about the growth in each state of industrial and commercial enterprises, about natural resources, uninhabited lands, and opportunities for expansion of trade among various states. It would assemble as well information about satisfaction of the broad economic needs of the various states, the social condition of the population, popular education (the system of instruction in lower, secondary, and higher educational institutions and the number of these institutions), the quantity of workers engaged in industry and agriculture, the per capita taxes both for the state budget and that of local administration, the average salaries of workers and employees in state, industrial, and public enterprises, the percent unemployed, the income of average groups of the population and various industrial and cooperative enterprises, the prosperity of the people and the state of the national economy, the indebtedness of the state's population, organs of local government, industry, and cooperatives, and it would compile statistics about popular savings, capital invested in banks and in various industrial and agricultural enterprises, and so forth.

If such statistical data, gathered from all countries on the same basis, were published annually, these data would allow the commissions and the plenary sessions of the International Parliament to find ways to aid individual nations which might be in depressed economic conditions. Since wars are very often caused by unfavorable economic situations, the timely adoption of necessary measures by the International Parliament might avert war. There are many shortcomings in each state but still more defects and difficulties exist in international relations. Neither existing international law nor international treaties are able to avert war.

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin planned to dispatch a special memorandum in the Sovereign's name to the heads of all nations. The memorandum would request the head of state to express his opinion about the idea of organizing the International Parliament.

The memorandum from the Sovereign would point out that innumerable disasters occur in wars and that the more scientists of the world work on inventing new weapons and new military lore, the greater will be the probability that more powerful states will annihilate not only more enemy soldiers but also more civilians, compelling the weaker state to capitulate to the more powerful state. Aviation, just beginning to develop, will doubtless play a large role in future wars, inflicting grave injuries from the air not only at the front but also on the population. Although previous wars have given this or that victory to the



belligerent nations, new and inevitably more devastating military innovations will result in less and less victors until finally all belligerent states will be the vanquished.

More sophisticated war equipment may cause disasters in which systems of state administration may easily be changed to worse forms. And there will be devastation in each of the belligerent states, consuming not only many lives but colossal expenditures. The larger states of the world will be assured that if they wish to subordinate a weaker state, they may succeed by war or threat of war.

In 1908 Austria-Hungary, taking advantage of Russia's peace-loving nature and its unpreparedness for war, was able to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Austria-Hungary should commit a similar unlawful act toward some weaker state, Russia would, although it would be burdensome, be forced to go to war, which would bring us into conflict not only with Austria-Hungary but also with Germany. Of course, if Austria-Hungary and Germany should become involved in any adventure against a weaker state, then not only Russia but other great powers would step forward against the Central Powers. This naturally would provoke a world war which would yield no profit but only grave destruction to all belligerents. Reflecting upon the utter miseries which result from war, it is to be hoped that a majority of nations will respond favorably to the Sovereign's memorandum.

The International Parliament must also take the initiative in solving economic problems of those states which, because of overpopulation or lack of natural wealth, find themselves in difficult circumstances. Both the Sovereign and the Russian government are anxious to avoid war so that we may pursue peaceful construction. If an International Parliament should be formed, the Sovereign and the Russian government would not only take a large part in its creation but would gladly do whatever possible to assist states whose situations are difficult.

Russia, possessing unusually vast territories and natural wealth, does not need territorial expansion nor exploitation of colonies and peoples as do other states. Russia is concerned only with gradual improvement of its state administration in order to elevate the cultural and economic circumstances of its people.

All governments seek to secure a favorable existence for their people and to avoid war. Many states, especially the large ones, spend a great deal of money on armaments for both army and navy. An International Parliament could easily, by general agreement, establish a definite limitation of armaments for each individual state, thereby reducing expenses of individual state budgets.

But the most important service which the International Parliament might provide would be complete prohibition of the manufacture and use of those types of weapons whose aim is greater destruction and mass annihilation of the population in order to compel the adversary to capitulate to the more powerful state.

We must realize that if we neglect this opportunity to create such an International Parliament for settling disputes and misunderstandings which arise from time to time among states and threaten to destroy the entire world, then with the aid of aviation and other inventions of especially destructive weaponry, world war would bring indescribable disaster to all the peoples of the world. It is appalling that not one mighty power has previously proposed a way to solve international complications by peaceful means.

Diplomats of all nations unfortunately think not about general world welfare but only about securing their particular states by military treaties and military alliances, or wreaking greater destruction upon their adversaries in case of war. Periodic meetings of heads of state are generally rather fruitless. Each meeting of the Russian Sovereign with the German Emperor, for example, immediately triggers rumors in both the press and government circles of England and France. And after any meetings or the conclusion of purely economic treaties between Russia and England or France, ominous rumors quickly abound in the press and government circles of Germany and Austria-Hungary. An International Parliament would serve to protect the interests of the entire world population.

To create such an international organization and to settle all international complications seems, of course, impossibly complex and difficult. And it is possible that even an international organization cannot prevent the inevitability of war among various states. But this appears to be our only hope for halting those military confrontations which occur periodically.

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin was authorized to draft, in the fall of 1911, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a memorandum from the Sovereign to the heads of all nations. After dispatching the memorandum and allowing time for the governments to become familiar with its contents, the foreign ministers of all nations would meet and work out the final text of the conditions for an International Parliament.

Every state seems periodically to experience financial and economic difficulties. An International Bank might be created to solve these problems; shareholders would be the emission banks of all states. This International Bank, the capital for which would come from collective deposits of all states, might finance or generate credits to develop necessary industry to satisfy popular needs as well as to improve cities and means of transportation. An economic



council might be created for the International Bank to use data gathered by the statistical bureau of the International Parliament, to provide assistance and advice to individual states and to avert those periodic economic crises in both industry and agriculture which inevitably occur first in one state and then in another.

Increased productivity in industry or agriculture, without favorable export conditions, might easily cause economic and financial ruin, while other states experience shortages of essential goods. An international economic council, with data from the statistical bureau at its disposal, might forestall this by warning the state involved that a crisis was approaching in industry or in agriculture. The state, upon receiving data from the economic council about unfavorable conditions in production, could take timely measures, first to reduce production and second, with the aid of the International Bank, to export surpluses to those states which need corresponding goods or products but are unable to obtain them for lack of funds. The International Bank could aid both the first and second states in their difficult economic or financial situation.

A.V.Z.: Stolypin considered it impossible to foresee every advantage that such an international organization might offer all nations. It would be difficult to persuade all states to agree to such an international organization, particularly the most powerful states, but the attempt was critically essential. Those states declining to enter such an International Parliament would clearly demonstrate that they did not wish to avoid war but preferred to improve their existing situation by war. But even if a few states should decline to participate, as long as a significant majority of states did take part, then such an organization might be effective in preserving peace for all.

Concerning relations of individual nations toward Russia, P.A. Stolypin noted that nations such as England and Germany were not especially pleased watching Russia strengthen its economic and military situation from year to year. Germany in particular, with its large population, was choking in its relatively small territory. Germany's aspiration to expand its territory to the east might easily cause war with Russia. Only Bismarck, having known Russia rather well, had often warned the German Emperor that war with Russia might easily lead to the collapse of the German monarchy.

England, considering itself the premier power of the world and always wanting to play first violin in the concert of nations, no doubt fears that Russia, gradually improving its economic and military situation, might interfere in England's colonial policy. Above all, England fears that Russia might penetrate



into India, although Russia has absolutely no desire to do so. But England, always trying to expand its colonial possessions with the aim of exploitation, after losing its colonial rights in the United States naturally feared losing its influence and opportunity for further enrichment in such countries as India, South Africa, and Australia. The English also, to the annoyance of many of our aristocrats, believe that they are a head taller than anyone else and therefore are in a better position to dispense justice throughout the world.

Russia, which is indisputably wealthy in territory and vastly rich in raw materials, is in a favorable position to elevate its position (simultaneously improving the cultural standards of all its people). It could easily surpass England's international standing.

England fears that its exploitation of such countries as India will someday end and that it not only will be unable to play first violin in the international concert but might become like those great empires of the past which have appeared and declined. England therefore hates Russia above all and will sincerely rejoice if the monarchy in Russia should fall and Russia itself should no longer be a great nation but disintegrate into a number of independent republics.

France, too, profoundly despises the monarchical regime in Russia. There is neither love nor respect toward Russia in France but since France hates and fears Germany, naturally it aspires to remain connected with Russia by military alliances and treaties.

The United States has a completely different situation. Having, like Russia, vast riches in raw materials at its disposal, the United States does not aspire, as Russia does not, to enlarge its territory nor to seize any colonies nor to exploit people. But because of propaganda from Russia's internal foes, the United States has entirely inaccurate notions about the Russian people and especially about the Russian government.

A. V. Z.: P.A. Stolypin wanted the government and public circles of the United States to understand Russia and its people. He planned, with the Sovereign's approval, soon to visit Washington personally, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by conversations with the President and the Secretary of State find a way to achieve more intimate and friendly rapprochement of Russia and the United States.

P.A. Stolypin planned to ask the President and the Secretary of State to influence the press and public circles by allowing personal visits to Russia by large groups of representatives of the legislative institutions, correspondents, and public leaders so that Americans might see for themselves that freedom exists in Russia and not oppression of nationalities as charged by Russia's foes.

P.A. Stolypin believed that the President and the government of the United States, like the Sovereign and the Russian government, sought neither conquest nor any good for their people by means of war. They were only interested, he felt, in creating favorable conditions for broad development of domestic culture and urban prosperity, as well as maintenance of conditions which would significantly improve the circumstances of the population.

Although the United States is a relatively young nation, it is developing its industry by using its native wealth, and both the country and its people display exceptional energy. By creating a substantial number of institutions of higher learning in a rather short time, it has already outstripped a number of West European states. P.A. Stolypin foresaw that England would gradually lose its primary role and the United States would systematically, owing to its wealth and growing power, assume the number one position in the world. P.A. Stolypin hoped that the President and the United States government would become more closely acquainted with the Sovereign's plan to create an international organization to eliminate war and to improve economic and cultural conditions for all peoples of the world, and that they might assist in realizing the Sovereign's idea.

Having spoken with Russian representatives in western Europe and in America, as well as with individuals who had the opportunity to observe closely the attitudes toward Russia and the Russian people in public circles of western Europe and America, P.A. Stolypin was fully convinced that if, through protracted war, the monarchy should perish and Russia cease to exist as a united and powerful state, the Russian people could not depend on any sort of aid from the West European states. He considered it entirely possible that in the future, in Russia as in other states, the form of government might be changed. But the Russian people, he said, in their character, their outlook, their relations to people, will not change, nor will they forget who are their enemies and who are their friends.

The peoples of western Europe are certainly better educated than the Russians but our sincere friends they will never be. Perhaps only across the ocean may the Russians find people who will meet them halfway in a bad situation. The people of North America may always be assured that the Russians, with their Russian hospitality and their responsive, kind souls, will always reach out with sincere hearts to America, which Russia aided earlier.

Perhaps in our unruly and insufficiently educated stage of development, under the influence of propaganda from Russia's internal enemies, the Russian people sometimes change into brutes, but this brutish face appears only briefly. Afterward this same Russian is as friendly and goodhearted as the Russians have always been.



## Chapter 6.

# STOLYPIN AND THE STATE DUMA

From the moment he became Minister of Internal Affairs and then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, P.A. Stolypin always hoped that, with the assistance of the State Duma, he might actually be able to satisfy the cultural and economic needs of the people of the immense Russian Empire. By enacting essential reforms, he intended to improve the condition of the people and to fortify the internal and external position of Russia as a great and powerful nation. Stolypin trusted that the Duma members, as representatives of the Russian people and the state, would find a way, conjointly with the government, to implement necessary improvements and to eliminate all those inadequacies and defects which are inevitably present in every state. In other words, Stolypin did not expect Duma deputies to use the Duma tribunal for incessant conflict with the government or, in secret party congresses, to discuss measures aimed at overthrow of the existing state regime. Stolypin thought that because the franchise was almost universal (especially in the villages) and the vote was secret, and, in both capitals and the five largest cities, direct (only in the provinces were there two and three stages), that members would actually represent the population and would promote the welfare of the people.

But as he attended the general sessions and listened attentively to speeches by Duma deputies from the tribunal and carefully read the stenographic reports of both commissions and general sessions of the first and second Dumas, P.A. Stolypin concluded, to his sorrow, that the electoral laws stipulated in the Fundamental Laws could not provide a Duma composed of members who would consider the welfare of the people and the state. It was clear to Stolypin that the authors of the Fundamental Laws had not considered the fact that the people of Russia were not as advanced nor as educated as many peoples of western Europe.

Having analyzed the rhetoric of deputies to the second Duma, P.A. Stolypin gradually came to believe that if the Fundamental Laws were not

changed with respect to electoral rules, no legislative leadership was possible. But agreement of both legislative chambers was necessary, plus confirmation by the Sovereign, for passage of all new laws as well as for changes of the old. If the second Duma were dissolved and a third one elected by the same rules, the results would be the same as in the first and second State Dumas. And members of the third Duma would again be persons who would not accept legislative leadership but would only criticize the existing state regime and try to seize authority in their own hands.

Stolypin also realized that neither a second nor a third Duma so composed would agree to change the Fundamental Laws in regard to suffrage. But since he considered it necessary to preserve the legislative institutions, Stolypin concluded that only the Emperor, who had given Russia the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, as well as the Fundamental Laws, could legally change the order of calling elections to the State Duma. He knew, of course, that changing the electoral law section of the Fundamental Laws by Imperial decree would inevitably elicit protest from both the public and the press. But there was no alternative. It was necessary, after dissolution of the third or fourth State Duma, either to abandon legislative institutions entirely, as advocated by the extreme right, thereby creating favorable conditions for revolution, or to preserve the legislative institutions by changing the electoral rules of the Fundamental Laws by Imperial manifesto.

Although many individuals elected to the third State Duma cooperated with the government in general, activities of the third Duma did not fully satisfy P.A. Stolypin. This may be explained mainly by the fact that during the third Duma, Stolypin was already acquainted, on the basis of facts presented him, with the energetic activities of a number of zemstvo councillors, especially in such provincial zemstvos as Kiev, Viatsk, and many others. Stolypin expected, because the third State Duma included so many zemstvo leaders, that in both commissions and plenary sessions members of the third State Duma would display the same initiative and zeal for improving economic and cultural conditions of the population as did the zemstvo councillors in zemstvo sessions. In many provinces, in the zemstvo assemblies, zemstvo councillors worked to avoid unnecessary and harmful involvement of the zemstvo in political questions as the best way to promote expansion and improvement of economic and cultural conditions of the people.

To Stolypin's profound grief, many members of the State Duma quite often and in large numbers, in commissions and plenary sessions, blocked bills presented to the Duma by the government, bills which were extremely vital to the interests of the people. A great deal of time was devoted in both commis-

## STOLYPIN

sions and plenary sessions to political questions which only strained relations between the government and the State Duma. And many deputies, in aggravating actions, directed inquiries to the government, often to the Minister of Internal Affairs, concerning petty political questions connected with the activities of this or that district administrator.

Looking over the permanent stenographic record of commissions and general sessions of the Duma, Stolypin noticed that the most businesslike leaders, especially in the commissions, were such men as Baron V.F. Meyendorff, N.V. Savich, and Count A.A. Uvarov, as well as many other Octobrists and members of the moderate right, especially, of course, those who were experienced in zemstvo and city leadership. Stolypin told me many times how he wished that more members of the State Duma had come from those zemstvo leaders who proved to be advocates of real economic and cultural aid to the people. This would have helped the government to improve the circumstances of all strata of the population.

But in general P.A. Stolypin was to some degree gratified that those elected to the State Defense Commission did not include members of the State Duma who supported the leftist parties and usually voted against government proposals. The Duma majority believed that it was impossible to entrust secret military information to those members of the State Duma who usually opposed the government. Stolypin was also thankful that members of the extreme right groups were relatively few in number, since they were frequently in contact with the Union of Russian People, often in opposition to the government, and were as strongly opposed to reform as were many leftist groups.

P.A. Stolypin gradually succeeded in establishing a good relationship with the Duma majority. But as soon as he noted any vacillation in decisive questions having national significance, he would offer to resign if this were the only way in which the Duma majority could decide on bills presented by the government.

A.I. Guchkov, as well as other party leaders belonging to the Duma majority, understood that P.A. Stolypin was not only an outstanding statesman but, of all the ministers, he alone was in a position to save Russia from future calamities. Majority leaders knew too that P.A. Stolypin was best qualified to administer the state and that he alone might save the third State Duma from possible dissolution by the Sovereign at the insistence of the extreme right, which generally opposed the Duma. As Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, Stolypin could rely on the Duma majority. His friendly cooperation with the Duma majority was perfectly natural and allowed him to direct legislation in the interests of both population and state.



The first conflict between the government and the State Duma arose over the construction of four dreadnoughts. Since both the Sovereign and P.A. Stolypin considered expansion of our navy extremely vital, the government introduced in the State Duma a bill to authorize the construction of four of these new-type ships of the line. The Duma believed that before anything else, serious reforms in naval administration were needed; therefore, without denying the necessity to augment the fleet, the State Duma nevertheless refused credits to build the dreadnoughts, since no reforms in the Naval Department were contemplated.

P.A. Stolypin also believed that serious reforms were needed in the Naval Department, and began personally to study naval administration and those reforms advocated by many young and distinguished naval officers. But Stolypin was distressed that the State Duma refused credits for construction of the ships.

The government again introduced the bill for credits to construct four dreadnoughts and the State Duma again rejected it, demanding that reforms in the Naval Department be made first. So as not to jeopardize cooperation between the government and the Duma, P.A. Stolypin suggested that the Sovereign utilize a legislative recess and, in accordance with Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws, authorize credits by Imperial decree, which was done. After construction of the four dreadnoughts had already begun, the government submitted the Imperial decree for confirmation by the State Duma. Since construction was underway, the Duma decided not to reject the credits. Thus the controversy between the government and the State Duma dissipated.

The agrarian law of November 9, 1906, underwent such prolonged consideration in the Agrarian Commission of the State Duma that its discussion in a general session began only on October 23, 1908. P.A. Stolypin spoke in the Duma on behalf of the law on December 9, 1908. The law of November 9, 1906, finally passed the State Duma by a significant majority, the Duma having introduced a number of amendments which further strengthened the pressure on the commune to assist with transfers to private property.

The Duma majority favoring this law consisted of Octobrists, the moderate right, part of the right, and portions of the Progressive and Polish blocs. Voting against the law were the extreme right, the extreme left, and, of course, members of the Kadet Party.

A substantial majority of the State Duma deputies supported the government by passing legislation related to popular education. This law provided for the introduction of universal primary education over a twenty-year period, from 1909 through 1928.

## STOLYPIN

A definite majority of the State Duma also approved the bill to construct the Amur railroad, which had been promulgated by Imperial decree according to Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws. During debate on this issue, the Duma majority fully agreed with all arguments presented by Stolypin in a speech of March 31, 1908, before the State Duma, about the necessity for Russia to assert a powerful position in Asia. A peaceful agreement was concluded at that time with England as well as the convention with Japan which enabled Russia to extend its influence to Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan.

A tempest arose in Duma circles, however, and chiefly among the Duma majority, over Russia's assent to annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because of the many intricate international political considerations, P.A. Stolypin did not consider it wise to speak openly in the State Duma and in the press on this question, but he was able to calm the Duma majority by personal conversations with majority leaders. Stolypin was also able to quiet the Duma majority when they were alarmed by terrifying talk in the State Duma concerning the Azef affair. As a result of Stolypin's candid explanations about Azef's activities, the State Duma accepted his investigation as exhaustive and rejected demands for an inquiry by members of the extreme left and the Kadet Party.

In the area of national defense, the Duma majority refused, despite its good relations with the government, to vote credits and took the wrong approach regarding command personnel. The majority, especially the Octobrist Party leader A.I. Guchkov, always took great interest in the matter of national defense but they reached an inaccurate conclusion regarding the army, ignoring the truism that an army ceases to be strong when its command personnel depends not on a single will but on some sort of collective will. The revolution of 1917, when A. I. Guchkov was Minister of War for the Provisional Government, clearly showed him how wrong he had been in the spring of 1909 when he criticized command personnel in the State Duma.

In emigration in Paris, while discussing the collapse of the Russian army in 1917, Guchkov repeatedly told me how right Stolypin had been in 1909 to support the Sovereign's prerogatives in regard to our army, saying that collective administration or even collective discussion by command personnel would inevitably have led to degeneration of the army. This actually occurred in Russia in 1917 during the Provisional Government period.

Thanks to P.A. Stolypin, the conflict between the State Duma and the government over the naval staff matter was resolved amicably. The Duma majority agreed with the regulations published on August 26, 1909, which explained



in detail precisely what questions concerning the army and navy were to be decided by the Sovereign and what was subject to consideration by the State Duma and State Council. The Social Democrats demanded an inquiry concerning these rules but after an explanatory speech by P.A. Stolypin the State Duma rejected their demand by a definite majority.

Although the regulations concerning the army and navy cleared up misunderstandings between the government and the Duma majority, nevertheless, judging from Stolypin's words, the government was not confident that the Octobrist Party, headed by A.I. Guchkov, could be depended upon to support the government in all legislative matters brought to the State Duma's consideration. A more reliable party for the government subsequently was that of the Nationalists, composed of 105, although it was smaller than the Octobrist Party which at first had over 150 members in the State Duma but gradually dwindled to 117.

After his election on March 8, 1910, as President of the State Duma, A.I. Guchkov for some reason believed that he could influence the Emperor. But the Sovereign generally disliked Guchkov and had not trusted him since his first presentation on March 9, 1910, as President of the State Duma, when the Sovereign gave him a cool reception. A.I. Guchkov, an excessively conceited and vengeful person, could never forgive the Sovereign for that reception. This no doubt influenced his attitude toward the government and in particular toward Stolypin. Repeatedly, especially in late 1909 and early 1910, Guchkov spoke in the Duma about the need to mitigate stern attitudes of the government and local administration toward the leaders of the Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary Parties.

After one of Guchkov's speeches in the State Duma session of March 31, 1910, Stolypin indicated that if members of the terrorist-socialist parties, under the banner of social revolution, continued to break into banks and treasuries, and to blow up trains, then the government, in the interests of both the people and the state, would be obliged to take all necessary measures to maintain order in the country.

But relations between the government and the State Duma were normal until March 14, 1911, when the law was enacted by Imperial decree on the basis of Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws to provide elective zemstvos in the southwestern and western provinces. It was only afterward that the attitude of the Octobrists toward P.A. Stolypin drastically changed. Of course A.I. Guchkov, who was extremely influential in the party, gave the definite signal by resigning as President of the State Duma.



## STOLYPIN

Until Guchkov resigned, the Octobrist Party displayed indignation toward rightist deputies who tried to diminish Stolypin's prestige with the Sovereign by intrigue and going to all lengths in the State Council to wreck legislation from the Chairman which had already been passed by the State Duma. But in the Duma session of March 15, 1911, Octobrist S.N. Shidlovskii was one of the first to speak against P.A. Stolypin.

Naturally members of all those parties which generally opposed the government immediately sided with the Octobrists. As a result of their speeches, several Duma factions demanded inquiries of the government into the reason for violation of the Fundamental Laws. Stolypin received his saddest disappointment in the Duma session of April 27, 1911, on that occasion when he made his last speech. What astonished and offended Stolypin most was the rude and extremely unpleasant speech V.A. Maklakov made against him in that session.

The extreme right, supported by court circles, naturally used against Stolypin the fact that in the State Duma on April 27, 1911, because of V.A. Maklakov's speech, the majority voted 202 against 82, dooming Stolypin's efficacy. They worked even more energetically to diminish Stolypin's prestige in the Sovereign's eyes. Stolypin naturally felt that, in the main, his enemies on the right had influenced the Sovereign somewhat. He also understood that, because of the campaign initiated by A.I. Guchkov, the government might lose the Duma majority needed to pass essential legislation. This might, in turn, create a difficult situation such as had existed in the first and second State Dumas. Also, if the necessary majority were lost in the Duma, the extreme right would ask the Sovereign to dissolve the third State Duma and attempt to persuade him to return Russia to pre-October 1905 conditions. This chain of events might culminate in that revolution about which the extreme leftist parties dreamed.

Because Stolypin passionately loved Russia and the Sovereign, he began intensively to consider after April 27, 1911, how to preserve the third State Duma from attempts by the extreme right to wreck it. Noting that his prestige with the Sovereign had diminished somewhat after condemnation of his activities in the Duma on April 27, Stolypin realized that the time might come when he would not be in power. He decided therefore not to postpone presentation of his report to the Sovereign about reorganizing the state administration of Russia, the plan on which he had already worked for several years.

P.A. Stolypin knew that the Sovereign warmly loved the Russian people and Russia and was always solicitous in seeking ways to improve the economic and cultural circumstances of all the people and to strengthen Russia's position internally and externally. Stolypin believed that the Sovereign would agree to all his proposals about reorganizing the state administration.

Stolypin knew A.I. Guchkov well also, both the negative and positive aspects of his character. Stolypin believed that Guchkov would return to work in the Duma and would employ all measures to rebuild the necessary majority in the State Duma. Stolypin was therefore convinced that Guchkov, in spite of his dislike for the Sovereign and in spite of his protest against Stolypin's action in passing the law about zemstvos in the southwestern and western provinces by Article 87, would in time understand all those reasons which prompted Stolypin to request the Imperial decree of March 14, 1911, authorizing extension of zemstvos to the southwestern and western provinces, as well as the temporary removal of P.N. Durnovo and V.F. Trepov from the State Council.

Stolypin's words show that he was well aware of all the conversations in the legislative chambers and in various court and government circles concerning his loss of prestige with the Sovereign. But he was nevertheless convinced that not only would his stock rise again but that he would be able to persuade the Sovereign of the extreme necessity for reorganizing the state administration of Russia. In May 1911, while dictating to me the draft of his report to the Sovereign, he repeatedly, almost involuntarily, said that all this might come to pass only if the Lord God were pleased to spare his life.

Between 1908 and 1911, P.A. Stolypin often mentioned to me the problem connected with the activities of Kadet deputies in the State Duma. Stolypin was surprised that, although members of the Kadet Party comprised the most active and intelligent representatives of Russian society and were undoubtedly concerned about the popular welfare, nevertheless in their speeches and their voting in the Duma, they clearly demonstrated unwillingness to assist the government in enacting legislation which would benefit the people culturally and economically.

P.A. Stolypin was unconvinced by those Kadets who tried, in the press and in public speeches, to prove that they had initiated most of the legislation in both the first and second State Dumas. "If an impartial historian ever studies the legislation which members of the Kadet Party introduced in the commissions of the first and second Dumas," Stolypin said, "he will realize that nearly all of their proposals were impractical and unrealistic."

## Chapter 7.

# STOLYPIN AND THE STATE COUNCIL

Between 1906 and 1911, as Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council on Ministers, Stolypin did not encounter in the State Council's discussions of bills such unpleasant speeches as those in the State Duma. Yet he could not help feeling that the State Council seriously hindered speedy passage of some measures, delaying them intolerably at times. Stolypin began to sense a somewhat different attitude in early 1911 when the general assembly of the State Council considered the proposed legislation to extend elective zemstvos to the southwestern and western provinces.

All the speeches by various members of the State Council in commissions and in the general assembly, from Kadets and especially from the extreme right, made it clear that intrigue was afoot against Stolypin, definitely aimed at undermining his position with the Sovereign by wrecking this particular bill.

Objections voiced to the proposed legislation clearly showed that some members of the State Council were not thinking of the good of the state. One may judge how consciously members of the State Council promoted intrigue against Stolypin in early 1911 from speeches by the bill's adversaries, distorting the actual situation. I will not trouble the reader with a detailed exposition. As a brief illustration I will only cite Stolypin's answer to his opponents.

That Stolypin was right may be judged from the fact that the elective zemstvos in the western provinces, finally authorized by Imperial decree on March 14, 1911, by Article 87, not only brilliantly executed all of Stolypin's ideas but initiated agrarian projects on an incomparably larger scale than did the old zemstvos. In particular the Kiev provincial zemstvo did much more during the war in the interests of the state and the people than all the zemstvos of the central provinces combined.

On March 4, 1911, the day the bill was introduced, there was obvious intrigue afoot among a number of State Council members. This may be judged



by the actions of some of them who still believed, even after Stolypin's assassination, that the bill should have been rejected in order to strike a blow at Stolypin.

In the State Council general assembly on February 1, 1911, Stolypin, having listened calmly to objections by various members against the proposed legislation to introduce elective zemstvos in the western provinces, pointed out in his speech that in 1910 the State Duma had accepted the bill in its general features, after lengthy and rather sharp debates but with only minor alterations.

A special commission of the State Council incorporated in its proposal the original government version regarding land value, participation of the clergy in the zemstvos, and compulsory election of a certain percentage of representatives of Russian origin for the zemstvo administration. Only one principle remained unrestored, that of establishing a specific ceiling on individuals of Polish origin to serve in the zemstvos.

In spite of their apparently firm position on the matter, Stolypin did not foresee that in the general assembly of the State Council, the government bill would be assailed from all sides. The question it raised could not be ignored, that historical problem which had engaged Russian social thought from ancient times, Russian-Polish relations. Stolypin said that it would perhaps be better not to deal with this delicate matter, but to ignore it was possible only if the proposal for elective zemstvos in the western provinces were withdrawn. Opponents of the government hoped for just this.

The Poles asserted that the question of elective zemstvos in the western provinces had arisen by chance, following a legislative proposal to alter rules for electing members to the State Council from the western provinces. The government had seized the opportunity to change district administration, they said, in order to restrict the ratio of individuals of Polish origin. Russian members of the State Council argued that the revision of April 2, 1903, functioned quite satisfactorily and that any modification of it would only reduce Russian influence in the western provinces.

To those objections Stolypin replied that the government had considered introducing elective zemstvos in the western provinces since 1906, but the government proposal had been delayed because the first and second State Dumas had definitely opposed introduction of the proposed legislation in the version which the third State Duma had accepted. Delay in establishing the final version of the bill had occurred because, in the original 1906 version, the government had noted the principles of apportionment. Meanwhile, experiences of 1906 and 1907 had shown the Polish element to be so well organized and entrenched that elections to the State Council in the western provinces produced only Polish

representatives. Russian interests were jeopardized thereby. The present zemstvo institutions organized according to the rules of April 2, 1903, seem most satisfactory, Stolypin said, by comparison with previous provincial committees. Certainly the economic improvement in the western provinces is striking. But we must also consider the fact that these individuals are appointed, not elected. People who are ordered to protect local interests are in no position to exercise initiative and strive for imaginative improvements as would actual, true representatives of the local populace.

In many cases zemstvo budgets must be confirmed by legislative order, as foreseen by the Imperial decree of April 2, 1903. This system became a hindrance, a brake on the development of zemstvo affairs. But there are other localities for which district zemstvo estimates are lacking, where there is no interest in producing an accurate zemstvo budget. State Council member N.A. Zinoviev compared the Kovno zemstvo, according to the conditions of April 2, 1903, with the old zemstvo of Saratov province to demonstrate that the Saratov zemstvo had higher incidences of arson and hooliganism. To this Stolypin, familiar with both provinces, replied that the old Saratov zemstvo was also richer in hospitals and schools. Then Stolypin said that perhaps the advocates of the Imperial decree of April 2, 1903, are right to believe that Russian landowners in the western provinces are not yet sufficiently involved in local affairs, that there are few Russians with sufficient landholdings to vote in the western provinces, and that it is difficult to find suitable individuals of Russian origin to take over the duties of district Marshal of the Nobility, land captains, and justices of the peace.

The argument was correct but the conclusion was not, said one opponent of the bill. The beautiful western border sleeps, said others. It cannot be awakened, they said; therefore, we must leave it in those circumstances which induce sleep. Stolypin repeatedly voiced his conviction that, beyond the Russian border, the people live in conditions of equality. They are trying to work hard, grow rich, create new assets, amass them, and not bury their talents in the ground but invest them in their native land.

"Even in countries recently considered barbarous and untamed," he said, "the standard of living has risen because people are provided with economic independence and personal initiative. Why must we leave people in a hibernating condition and then wonder that they do not move? Persons familiar with the western provinces may say that there are not less but far more suitable conditions for development of zemstvo objectives there, even more than in the old zemstvo provinces of Russia." Objections and doubts expressed by opponents of the bill revealed apprehension that the zemstvo would not promote



economic self-improvement but ethnic conflict. To this Stolypin answered that if the zemstvos had been introduced in the western provinces by the law of 1890 but without those restrictions regarding curias, then the western provinces would already have bloomed and revived economically, as Polish representatives had pointed out.

But it was impossible to forget that the Poles, former lords of those western provinces, had lost their authority there while preserving their wealth, their culture, and memories which gave them the habit of ruling, the custom of being master. "Although the Poles constitute no more than 4% of the population there," Stolypin said, "we must remember that sometimes only one person in a district or even in a province, one very rich person connected with the region by family tradition, can exert influence and give the province his own stamp, especially when he has no opposition and when there is no other concentration of power around. This will occur in the western provinces where there are so few influential individuals, all of them Poles, who naturally defend their national interests. We must understand that each question there will be infiltrated and permeated by elements of nationalist local politics. There are moderates, far removed from politics but unable to go against the current who, unnoticed, make policy anyway, as in Moliere, not yet Diasphorius but Jourdin, not knowing how, still wrote prose."

Stolypin went on, "Any institution in this western region, even a credit cooperative society, or exhibition, or bank, even the Vilna bank which in its time was the foundation for maintaining Russian landowners' interest, in the end will be changed to a Polish national institution." Stolypin said, "You want the government to close its eyes so that, in introducing the zemstvo to the western provinces, nothing will stem this avalanche of impending political problems. What you advocate would inject politics into the zemstvo, but I propose preventive inoculation, insurance against politics, insurance against the predominance of one small portion of the population over another, predominance which unregulated, without being held in check by the government, would give an ethnically-imbalanced tone to zemstvo institutions and, through them, to the entire region."

Stolypin felt, in short, that to introduce zemstvo institutions in the western provinces according to the law of 1890, without any amendment, would cause feverish political conflict; therefore, he felt that some restrictions were needed. Opponents of the government, on the other hand, pointed out that if the Polish cultural element were restricted in the zemstvo, then the remaining element would not provide a suitable basis for creation of solid zemstvo cadres. It was impossible to ignore the pro-Polish element existing at that time but still



zemstvo strength, evaluated on the basis of statistical material assembled from all provinces, produced a positive impression. Data showed that the number of wholly-Russian taxpayers everywhere exceeded the number suggested by the members of the State Council.

In order to reinforce the Russian curia, the State Council had added amendments reducing the zemstvo property value qualifications by half. The government found that the amendment improved the bill and therefore agreed to its adoption. Two objections raised against reduction of qualifications were that it lowered the cultural level of the electorate and that it did not discriminate sufficiently. But considering the data, the concept of a lower land value was obviously benign. Only in rare cases would individuals having completed higher and secondary learning institutions be disqualified, and most illiterates would still be ineligible.

"Land value, the feature which appeared indiscriminate, should be made permanent to be fair, and equal for the various districts. Land value should be a constant feature, because it increases or decreases uniformly. Other features, such as correlation of electors to the number of zemstvo members, are temporary, giving to the qualifications of electors the character of chance and creating extreme inequality in districts which may even be contiguous. All these considerations," said Stolypin, "show that reduction of qualifications of voters will result in rallying not only the majority, those of average circumstances, but also educated Russian property owners, who otherwise would be inundated in the sea of petty electorate."

"I know," Stolypin added, "that the Polish representatives will still have one objection. They will say that from stratification of the petty electorate, their upper stratum will be challenged by officials and the category of peasants qualifying for election who have been given this status. They would say that the official element is not of the zemstvo type while the peasants have not developed sufficiently to handle zemstvo affairs. But I do not share this opinion. I have seen officials, new owners of land, who constituted a highly useful element for the zemstvo and, as for the zemstvo peasant, I think everyone knows what the zemstvo people have accomplished."

"Far more difficult to vindicate is the justice and logic of reducing qualifications to be an elector and giving the petty electorate the right to participate in elective congresses. My personal opinion," said Stolypin, "is that less prosperous people, the less educated, will take less part in zemstvo work while the development of peasant ownership will improve guidance of zemstvo affairs. One cannot deny the ignorance present in this category of landowners who own from 1/10 to 1/20 of the qualifying amount of real estate and will receive voting

rights for the first time. The general level of informed and educated petty electors will be reduced. But there is sufficient material in the western region to create absolutely efficient zemstvo members, ones no less capable than in central Russia."

"The suggestion of Count S. Iu. Witte, to use for the peasants of the western region not the conditions of 1890 but those of 1864, would give if not predominant, then almost equal significance to the peasantry, that Russian and Orthodox element on whom we must finally depend. The idea is that, without any artifice, without restricting Polish rights, it would be possible to have an independent Russian zemstvo in the western region."

"But it is not entirely as Count Witte supposed. Although by 1864 conditions, 40% of the peasants could vote and by 1890 conditions about 33-35%, at the same time, by this proposed legislation, peasants have the additional opportunity, as small landowners, to participate in the local zemstvos through elective congresses. Thus the new legislation will place the situation of the peasant closer to 1864 conditions than to those of 1890."

"There was another difference between 1864 and 1890 conditions with regard to the peasant: By 1864 conditions the peasant freely elected zemstvo councillors; by the conditions of 1890, the governor confirmed zemstvo councillors from a list presented by the peasant assembly. But the Emperor Nicholas II, by the decree of October 5, 1906, equalized peasants with other classes, thereby changing 1890 restrictions on the peasants."

That is why Stolypin declared that he was a warm supporter of attracting the peasant class to zemstvo work, and recognized no special significance of one class over another. Stolypin also reminded them that election rules for the first State Duma were constructed toward the broad masses without regard to education, but this plan was defeated.

Speeches by Count Witte and M.M. Kovalevskii on behalf of the peasants were based on the sharp-witted Ukrainians, but Stolypin also had in mind the peasants of Belorussia and immense Polesye, both well known to him as former governor of Kovno province, and in his opinion, dreams about future zemstvo gatherings of good-natured Belorussians with a small number of politically-experienced magnates appeared premature. Rejecting dreams in favor of action, he insisted that even without the Polish element, future zemstvo leaders would be sufficiently capable. Stolypin pointed out the necessity to revive the zemstvos and still more the necessity to destroy those obstacles which hindered unity of the local Russian populace. One of the barriers appeared to be the absence of elected clergy in zemstvo assemblies. A deputy formally elected to represent the clergy could not substitute for an elected priest.



Pointing to the historic accomplishments, the historic feats of Russian clergy in the west, and their contributions to popular education (the everyday side of the matter), Stolypin said that no one could deny that families of Russian clergy in the western region tend to live in one place or another for a hundred years, becoming intimate with the local folk. They would, therefore, in future assemblies unite both the electors with real estate qualifications and peasant electors. But it seemed that, in the opinion of the bill's opponents, the state must ignore these conditions so favorable for self-administration, being unable to use them, and must, from stereotyped wisdom, postpone extension of the zemstvo arrangement of the central provinces to the western regions.

Several members of the State Council, having set as their purpose to wreck the bill about zemstvos in the western provinces, would have the government (or, more accurately, the state) forget that the one individual in the zemstvo whose nationality had the most significance was the chairman of the zemstvo council. He was obligated by law not only to direct the work of the zemstvo council and to answer for its decisions, but he had preeminent influence in hiring personnel. He represented the zemstvo to the government, participating in provincial zemstvo assemblies and in school councils.

In the future in the provinces of Russian Poland, as in the central provinces at present, individuals of Polish origin would of course occupy this high rank with dignity and honor. But at the same time, especially in the western regions, it was natural that they would unconsciously express national desires. Only the state might prevent this. The question was not one of trusting this or that group of individuals, or group of zemstvo members, or group of electors; the question concerned the state's responsibility to protect its people. If one considers any act of national expediency to be a gesture of distrust, then so it will be with every facet of national life, beginning with any barrier in the road and ending with restrictions provided by law for elections year by year of members of the State Council.

If it is possible to establish that half of the provincial council members will be Russians, then the state will have the right to require that chairmen of the zemstvo councils will be elected from that half. "Under such circumstances," Stolypin said, "those brought into the zemstvo will probably be educated, efficient, and statesmanly. But even more than culture and efficiency will emerge in zemstvo assemblies which contain a 16% Polish element when it is known that the Polish population in the western region does not exceed 4%."

Later Stolypin replied to those opposed to the government version of the zemstvo bill, those whose speeches had indicated that it seemed insulting and offensive to elect Polish and Russian zemstvo councillors from different



assemblies, in different curias. He pointed out that even after establishment of a definite number of Polish and Russian zemstvo councillors, the Russians would still elect Russians and the Poles Poles; therefore, some persons elected would not be concerned with the economy but with extreme nationalism. Councillors elected in one general assembly would tend to support one another in economic work. "Why some members of the State Council reason so," said Stolypin, "I do not understand."

"I have already shown that politics has entered each issue in the western regions. Why does an assembly that is purely technical address itself to political matters? Perhaps you believe that in such elective assemblies the Polish electors will assess only the economic capability of the Russian elector and not judge him by his degree of sympathy toward Polish culture?"

"It is necessary to look at things directly. Why do Poles in every assembly, in any institution, segregate themselves by nationality? And why do Polish representatives in the State Council and in the State Duma not align themselves with the major parties? Why do they not join the Octobrists or the Kadets or the commercial-industrialists, but instead, fashion for themselves the rallying point of a nationalist Polish caucus? Because, gentlemen, they belong to a nation forged by national grief, united by historic misfortune and long-time ambitious dreams. Because they belong to a nation which has only one aim: a political homeland. These exalted incentives have given the Polish population great political endurance. You wish to set a weakly organized group of electors, consisting of recent landowners and peasant small property owners, against a group so motivated, on equal terms? This main group of naive, politically-uneducated persons, not yet able to swim, you would cast into a sea of political conflict?"

"I am sure," Stolypin said, "that those of Russian origin would be exalted in time but this new experiment is not occasioned by conflict of people but only searching and errant political thoughts. The government's opponents also indicate that it is shameful for the Russian state to fashion on Russia's periphery, on Russian land, special alien national groups or curia. But you forget that these groups, these curias, are not political but preparatory, and that this is a measure of caution, a measure of restriction."

As Stolypin later expressed it in correspondence with a member of the State Council, Prince A.D. Obolenskii, formation of curias seemed to him equivalent to formation within our army of a special Polish regiment or battalion. "The Prince has evidently forgotten," he wrote, "that such special complements of troops exist. For the Tatars and for Jews we have a special method of recruitment, a special casting of lots, and special examinations. Although they

are recruited separately, they must later fight in battle together. Such segregation has never been deemed a threat. No one has yet seen in it danger that there will be a revival of an Israeli kingdom in Vilna or a Tatar kingdom in Kazan. Abolition of these restrictions would, on the contrary, cause many tears from Christian mothers, not only Russians but also Poles."

Returning to the general situation, P.A. Stolypin said that he found quite intolerable the State Council's disagreement with the Duma on a question toward which the Duma had evinced a high degree of understanding of Russia's national origins. "I do not wish to believe that Russian and Polish electors will be plunged into unnecessary and fruitless political conflict. Even if they fear to tread a firm Russian path, development of the excellent and rich region will not cease, even should introduction of zemstvo self-administration in the region be delayed for a long while. If opponents of the government bill wish to kill it, then still another page will be written in the history of suffering by the Russian west, a page of Russian defeat not on the battlefield, not by strength of the sword but by unworthy thoughts, theoretical hypnosis, and strong, beautiful phrases."

Stolypin made a brilliant speech in the State Council general assembly, arguing with total conviction against various incorrect conceptions of those who had spoken against the proposed legislation to introduce elective zemstvos in the southwestern and western provinces. In view of all the arguments presented, he said, members of the State Council, as national intellectual leaders, should confirm the bill by a significant majority. But unfortunately, many State Council members were not thinking at that moment about the welfare of the people and the nation, but about how to wreck the proposed legislation in order to diminish Stolypin's prestige and to effect his dismissal from the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs.

None of Stolypin's arguments were seriously considered. Stolypin realized this. In one of his reports he directed the Sovereign's attention to the attitude which prevailed among members of the State Council who were trying in every way possible to block the proposed legislation about elective zemstvos for the western provinces. The Sovereign, deeply grieved by such an attitude among several members of the State Council, addressed himself by letter to the President of the State Council, asking him to cooperate and to use his influence to obtain favorable resolution of the bill in the general assembly.

State Councillors P.N. Durnovo and V.F. Trepov, on learning about this letter from the Sovereign to the President of the State Council, took counter-measures to negate its impact. Trepov used his influence in court circles to obtain an audience with the Sovereign and asked him this question: How must



one view his letter to the President of the State Council? Was it an Imperial decree or were members of the State Council to vote according to their consciences? The Sovereign had no choice, of course, but to say that members of the State Council must vote according to conscience. After this answer from the Sovereign, P.N. Durnovo, V.F. Trepov, Count S.Iu. Witte, and other State Councillors aligned themselves against Stolypin and began speaking to others, asking them to vote so that by rejection or by amending individual articles of the bill, the proposed legislation would fail completely and publicly.

When a paragraph-by-paragraph study of the bill about western zemstvos began on March 4, 1911, Stolypin, who was present at the session but as yet unaware of Trepov's conversation with the Sovereign, recognized after discussion and rejection by a majority of the most important articles of the bill that intrigue against him had definitely begun. And when the State Council rejected the western zemstvos bill by a majority vote, Stolypin had no alternative but to ask the Sovereign to enact the bill by Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws. Members of the State Council, trying to strike at Stolypin any way they could, decided to direct an inquiry to him as Chairman of the Council of Ministers regarding his alleged illegal application of Article 87. The State Councillors who were conspiring against Stolypin expected by wrecking the bill to damage his prestige in the Sovereign's eyes. But they erred grievously; precisely at that moment Stolypin's position with the Sovereign was strengthened still more.

So as not to burden the reader with details of the inquiry and the related speeches in the State Council, I will merely cite Stolypin's speech to clarify the actual situation. In his brilliant speech of April 1, 1911, in a State Council session, Stolypin adequately rebuffed all those who had tried to engineer his dismissal as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Stolypin said:

From the text of the inquiry presented to me, I see that an explanation is demanded of me as to why, during the recess of the legislative chambers, a recess created by the government itself, I applied for Imperial confirmation of that law which only hours before had been rejected by the State Council.

I will begin by saying that if the government has committed any illegality by this act, any violation of the Fundamental Laws, the responsibility for it rests squarely on me as the individual presenting this action in the name of the Council of Ministers for confirmation by the Sovereign Emperor to circumvent rejection of the true meaning of the law.

Addressing himself to the authors of the inquiry, Stolypin asked the State Council to recognize that the government was guided, in applying Article 87, only by national necessity as it understood it, and not in the least by emotions of scorn or disrespect toward the rights or the opinions of those high



institutions before which he had the honor to present his explanation. He continued:

Having read the speeches by the members of the State Council, the arguments expressed might be divided into three categories. The first category contains arguments of a legal nature. The second category cites creation of a precedent and an offensive, even insulting, attitude of the government toward legislative institutions. And the third category objects that the issue was not characterized by emergency, which alone may justify application of Article 87. Determination of the presence of extraordinary circumstances is not the province of the legislative institutions and cannot be a subject for their inquiry. The extraordinary circumstances represent the subject of reports by the Council of Ministers to the Monarch alone.

Concerning the legal aspect, Stolypin said that he was firmly convinced that legislative institutions had no right to present inquiries to the Council of Ministers, a body not subordinate to the Governing Senate. Especially had they no right to inquire about questions of legislation. Regarding Article 87, the State Council considered as indispensable legal conditions for its application the origination of extraordinary circumstances after dissolution or recess of the legislative institutions. But the government interpreted the article differently, considering that extraordinary circumstances might arise before dissolution and might cause dissolution or recess of legislative institutions for the purpose of taking extraordinary measures. Stolypin said:

I intentionally emphasize this situation because it has primary significance. Meanwhile, in essence, I absolutely consider that questions about expediency, correctness or incorrectness, about errors or even abuse in the government's evaluation of extraordinary circumstances are not a matter for consideration by the legislative institutions.

I stand in principle on the theoretical side of the question. Violation of the law by the government is, of course, absolutely intolerable—not only violation of the Fundamental Laws in particular but also of the law in general. The government must respect itself and must demand respect. But above all the government must protect the prerogatives of the Crown and must not permit precedents to be set which might in future belittle or diminish them.

The question raised is not a new one. It has produced a whole body of literature in western Europe. In the west, each time the chamber is recessed or dissolved for passage of any legislative measure, heated controversies arise, heated debates relative to the substance as well as the regularity of the measure taken. The main current in western literature is revealed, however, in the teachings of those jurists and scholars for whom absolutely, clearly, and indisputably, the following fundamental conditions apply: In the first place, the monarch has the right at any time to prorogue legislative institutions, without being subject to any kind of control, and all recesses present the possibility to promulgate extraordinary legislation. An extremely competent jurist in this area, Spiegel, holds this opinion. And the opinion serves as the basis for all subsequent work by scholars such as Glatzer, Neiger, Scholger, and a whole galaxy of German and Austrian scholars. This is also the opinion found in a majority of textbooks and most legal encyclopedias.

A second basic premise which has attained more prominence in the west holds that circumstances justifying the use of extraordinary measures are sub-

ject to the free, subjective estimation of the government alone. Legislative institutions cannot evaluate the circumstances justifying the use of extraordinary measures, since this is not within the scope of their legal rights. Therefore, the statement made by one of the State Councillors that appraisal of these events is subject to control by legislative institutions not only contradicts the spirit of our Fundamental Laws but the practice in western European states as well.

Exceptional measures are subject to control by legislative institutions only when they are referred for confirmation by legislative institutions within the specified legal terms—that is, within two months. Then, of course, the legislative institutions can reverse exceptional measures already taken, even without justification. There would seem, on the face of it, to be *quaestio facti* answers to which there are no legal rules. The solution would have to result from a subjective evaluation of the totality of the actual situation.

The third basic condition which leads directly to the subject of the State Council's inquiry is this: The emergency may be determined before or after dissolution of the legislative chambers. The construction of the Austrian Article 14 seems as ambiguous as our Article 87, but Austrian jurists do not consider it a subject for inquiry by the State Council.

The well-known jurist Spiegel feels that neither recess nor dissolution of the Chamber may be discussed *in fraudem Legis* because such discussion concerns the rights of the monarch, absolute in this case. The question does not involve the monarch's motives in using these rights, whether good or bad. The issue concerns political aims. The crux of the question is not at what moment the measure was found to be necessary, but when it actually became necessary. The question is not why the measure was not foreseen, but why it could not be further postponed. Therefore it is wholly understandable why in Austria, when the obstructionist chamber would not accept the budget, an event which occurred while the legislative institutions were convened, it served as cause to dissolve the Chamber and to apply Article 14.

If you feel (Stolypin continued) that I am citing only the opinions of Austrian scholars referring solely to Austrian practices, then I will point to an immense majority of German scholars, beginning with Bornhack and ending with Geld, who agree with the opinion of the well-known scholar Glattser. They all concede the right of the monarch to issue decrees when emergency circumstances arise before dissolution of the Chamber and serve as a cause for dissolution. It is interesting, also, how history repeats itself. Consideration of Article 63 of the 1848 Constitution, an article corresponding to our Article 87, kindled extremely instructive debate in the Prussian Chamber. A speaker on that article, a certain Wentzel, literally took the point of view of the State Council inquiry when he questioned if, after recess of the chambers and any circumstances of extraordinary circumstances arose, the monarch would have the right to issue emergency decrees. Passionate debates followed. Wentzel and the deputies sympathetic to him (Fubel and Grodek) energetically asserted their support of an amendment to restrict and narrow the prerogatives of the monarch in issuing extraordinary decrees. But the amendment was rejected as making illusory the right of the monarch to issue extraordinary decrees.

Stolypin told members of the State Council that those jurists and scholars who do not share this view argue, of course, that they stand for the necessity to develop parliamentary and popular authority. They try to prove that the right of the monarch to prorogue the legislative institutions, in order to issue



Imperial decrees, violates the rights of the people. But Stolypin said:

This is the theoretical, academic side of the question. Examples of articles analogous to our Article 87 are innumerable. Everyone knows that in Austria, for many years, recruits and budgets were produced by Article 14. But many additional existing laws were passed by Article 14, such as control reforms and reforms of legal and customs fees and many other duties introduced by the Austrian Crown in Hungary.

But I think that the most interesting foreign examples and our Russian life and brief legislative experience all indicate the same thing: They acknowledge the legitimacy of applying Article 87 to circumstances which arise before dissolution of the chambers. Take, for example, the law about personnel for the Ministry of Transportation, issued by Article 87. The emergency arose at that moment when the State Duma took a position unacceptable to the government. The government immediately requested the monarch's permission to disperse by decree those who were occupying the legislative chambers during the Christmas holidays and, during the recess, passed the law by Article 87. Immediately after the session reconvened, the Kadet Party demanded that the State Duma present an inquiry to the government as to its motives. That situation was very similar to the State Council's present inquiry which indicates that exceptional measures may be taken only if the extraordinary circumstances arise when the State Duma is not in session. This inquiry was not even discussed in the State Duma; in fact, it was withdrawn by its signers. The first to sign the withdrawal request was a member of the Kadet Party, A.I. Shingarev.

Less than a year ago, another law was passed in the same way which concerned special steamship travel on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Extraordinary circumstances arose during the State Duma session of June 4, 1910, when the Duma refused to provide relief to the extent requested by the government for the Russian Steamship Line and Trading Society. The State Duma would not approve as much subsidy as was needed which meant that, on July 1, steamship travel on the two seas was to cease. When the law was brought to the State Council for consideration, the vote indicated that the government must take all measures to see that this travel continued. By Imperial decree the Duma was dissolved and, on June 18, a law was signed by Article 87 to provide the subsidy to the Russian Steamship Line and Trading Society. This incident illustrates that only a few months ago, right here in the State Council, the opinion prevailed that national interests could not be allowed to suffer because of a disagreement between the government and the legislative institutions.

Legislative institutions may discuss and vote, but they are responsible to the government for their activities. They cannot evade this responsibility. And the government cannot evade this responsibility. And the government cannot take refuge in the letter of the law but must, as State Councillor N.S. Tagantsev put it, *understand the law*—meaning, of course, the clear meaning of the law, guided by that mighty will inherent in it.

What causes a tradition to develop? Or a theory? Two opinions exist, pointing in two directions. One, consciously or unconsciously, inclines toward parliamentarism, reducing to mere illusion the right of the monarch to issue decrees. The other regards as basic the precise meaning of the law which gives the monarch the opportunity to use Article 87 when extraordinary circumstances arise which cause dissolution of the legislative institutions.

To reject this right means to create a precedent which may be profoundly dangerous in grievous, extraordinary moments of national life. To reject this



right is to restrict the right of the monarch to issue decrees to a limit unknown in those states where there exist laws similar to our Article 87 for issuing extraordinary decrees.

Stolypin answered statements by several State Council members who had said that the government's action placed the State Council in a humiliating position because temporary dismissal of the State Council by Article 87 nullified the right of the State Councillors freely to express their thoughts. They had said that the State Council would be required to render unquestioning submission, without discussion, to higher administrative institutions which buttress an evil will. A member of the State Council representing the Russian provinces of Poland actually ventured to say that Council members had to be a bulwark against the vindictive and malicious volition of the Cabinet, chilling the fever of arbitrary willfulness. Stolypin replied to these comments as follows:

Members of the State Council can scarcely see government actions as representing an evil will. The chief misunderstanding lies in insufficient mastery of new legislative norms. It is impossible, of course, to require that legislators always have the same opinion as the government, but we must remember that the role of government has been somewhat altered at the present time.

In light of the present situation, government does not seem to occupy an exceedingly high administrative position. A political objective has been attributed to it. On the government's shoulders lies the important and responsible task of recommending to the Imperial Authority, in exceptional moments, the necessity for taking exceptional measures. But the west, to which we so love to refer, never attributes any personal motives to the government in such cases.

I will not cite the numerous examples when the west has dissolved legislative institutions subsequent to their disagreement with the government. I will mention only one historic case—when a prime minister, having lost hope of passing a law in the upper chamber, a law which had already passed the lower chamber, suggested to his monarch the need for passing this measure by royal decree, without waiting for the decision of the upper chamber. Gentlemen, that did not happen in Patagonia. That was in England, and not long ago, during the reign of Queen Victoria. And the minister who presented this measure was not a representative of crude tyranny, violence, or personal egotism—he was the liberal, Gladstone. The law which passed in that manner was the bill to abolish the sale of ranks, a measure less principled than the one about the western zemstvos. No one accused Gladstone in that case of insulting the upper chamber.

I cite the incident not to compare the present government or myself with that great statesman but in order to show that such cases occur in the west, not just on impulse and not just to achieve political aims. The government which has ideals not only believes in what it does, it does that in which it believes. It is scarcely possible, therefore, to complain to the government when it does not agree with the legislative chambers in those cases when their political aims diverge. And a measure dictated by a sense of obligation cannot accurately be said to stem from frivolous anger. This government, while it maintains a high esteem for the State Council, cannot declare once and for all that the State Council is infallible. It cannot become involved in a deadlock which, because of existing law, may perhaps be broken only from above.

## STOLYPIN

Such a decree is sometimes politically necessary. Sometimes it is politically inevitable, as is a tracheotomy when the patient is gasping and must have a tube inserted for breathing. Such a decree is inevitable when frictions paralyze all progress in yet-immature representative bodies. As political acumen develops, of course, such an arrangement gradually disappears and vanishes into the air.

In any case, I reject with indignation the reproach that we wish to humiliate our legislative institutions.

Then Stolypin proceeded to outline the problems which had arisen in the given case, the extraordinary circumstances which had required exceptional measures causing issuance of a temporary law about the western zemstvos. The issue, as Stolypin had stated early in his speech, was not actually subject to the competence of the legislative institutions but represented only the subject of a report by the Council of Ministers to the Sovereign. Stolypin felt bound to comment on the question, he said, only in order to explain internal connections among events flashing before the eyes of the State Council members.

The government is actually inspired by thoughts, approved by the Sovereign, of transformation, not by radical means but by gradual progress and regular measures. Underneath this steady, strong Russian political drive, there is a motive force. Destroy it and the work stops.

Certainly we have worked under unfavorable conditions before. Just remember the frictions, the vacillation, before the majority passed the law of November 9, 1906. Remember the fate of many bills toward which the State Council had a negative attitude. Conditions seemed to indicate reorganization from the start. The government enjoyed no success but we continued to work, believing in the eventual productive limits of our labors. We understood that sometimes laws entering the State Council from the State Duma require radical alteration, wholesale improvement, but we hoped for and expected results.

The work went on so that in the fundamental questions of Russian life, the motive force was not destroyed. I speak about the motive force of government work, the basic Russian source of our internal policies.

I know that you gentlemen view this differently, that you see Russian ideals in a different way. But deviation from government policy, which receives approval and direction not on its own but from its Inspiration, is not an everyday event, nor is its policy narrowly nationalistic and partisan. Rather, it speaks to the general feelings of people of the most diverse political convictions, homogeneous only in their understanding of Russia's past and its future.

You have expressed your opinions; you have expressed them candidly. But acknowledging as just your view on the western zemstvos question about national curias would signify not only rejection of the present draft law but the breakdown of a whole world of concepts. I do not wish to deal with the essence of our difference of opinion. I speak only of the consequences of your vote. I have always declared frankly that I consider Polish culture to be a valuable contribution to the general treasury of human perfection. But I know that this western culture has vied for centuries with another culture dearer and closer to me—that is, with Russian culture. I know what the result of dreams about the western zemstvos would be if St. Petersburg refused, in this dangerous moment, to support those who have constantly stood and will continue to stand for the preservation of western Russia—the Russians.



I know the news that the State Council had rejected the western zemstvo bill will stun many people. They were all confident that this measure would pass since it had attracted a majority in the State Duma and in the commissions of the State Council, and especially since it enjoyed the support of the Emperor. I know, too, your overriding thoughts and opinion of the government in this matter. We are as two worlds, holding two divergent understandings of the state and the state organization.

For that vast region, this may be a turning point in its historic destiny. Russia's national future may be predetermined here. Law and its exponents—law, the bearer of perhaps false and erroneous (in your view) Russian hopes and Russian traditions—were buried forever here in the State Council and a heavy tombstone planted on them. The government's aims and ideals were shattered. Further struggle is pointless. To count on the initiative of the State Duma is illusion. Indeed, in your eyes, these may be mere words, vain incantations which cannot revive the dead bill. But the State Council is not lacking in persons of high motives. In two or three months it will change its opinion and its decision.

By hard work, gradually and imperceptibly Russia is approaching a turning point in its domestic national policy. Are these ordinary or extraordinary circumstances? Each person must, of course, decide according to his inner convictions. But neither you nor we, gentlemen, have been called upon to solve this question for Russia. The vacillation has ended and the law was executed by the Senate in agreement with Article 87. Let us not forget that the Senate is the only institution which, according to Article 2 of its statutes, could declare the execution of this law to be a violation of our Fundamental Laws.

It pains me that actions of the government offend the Governing Senate. But the government recognizes its responsibility and must rise above this. The same feeling of responsibility compels me to state that the government considers the interpretation of Article 87 leading to the inquiry by the State Council to be incorrect and unacceptable. The government will not allow the legislative institutions to judge the gravity of extraordinary circumstances in this matter; thus, I have only spoken about the western question. The government sees the peril of allowing desperate conditions to develop before carrying out laws necessary to Russia by temporary policy not in keeping with the Russian national path.

Stolypin's speech was so brilliant, so clear in answering all questions posed by the State Councillors' inquiry that under normal circumstances, the government explanation would have been declared quite satisfactory. But at that time several members of the State Council were motivated not by national interests but by the desire to obtain the dismissal of Stolypin from the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs.

After Stolypin's death and even more after the downfall of the monarchical regime in Russia in 1917, several State Councillors acknowledged to me in personal conversations, both in 1917 and later abroad in Paris, that many members of the State Council who voted against the western zemstvo bill in March 1911 as well as on April 1, 1911, claiming that the government's answer was unsatisfactory, were definitely influenced by those swayed by Count S. Iu. Witte, who had a personal desire to lessen Stolypin's prestige. Only after Stoly-



## STOLYPIN

pin's death did members of the State Council begin to wonder if they had been right on March 4 and April 1, 1911, in voting against the bill for such motives.

On October 15, 1911, the first session of the State Council after Stolypin's death, the President of the assembly addressed members of the State Council in the following words:

I feel obliged to direct the attention of this high assembly to those personal qualities and activities of Stolypin which cannot be disputed. Russia has lost a distinguished and honorable man who ardently loved his homeland. All that which might, in his opinion, serve to develop Russia's strength, to improve and exalt it, he welcomed with enthusiasm and immediately acted upon. We have all heard or read his firm, strong, and sincere speeches to the second State Duma, whose members he challenged to set about calm legislative work for the benefit of Russia. Later, when the Sovereign found it impossible to secure cooperation from the clearly-revolutionary second Duma, he charged Stolypin with drafting a new electoral law, which the Sovereign approved.

Stolypin worked hard to achieve mutual understanding with the third State Duma and, because of his efforts, our legislative assembly began to fulfill its destiny. It is impossible to forget the extremely difficult, the grievous and at times terrible conditions under which Stolypin began his duties in 1906. Shortly after he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers on July 8, 1906, anarchists blew up his dacha on Aptekarskii Island, leaving behind a graveyard of murdered and mutilated victims. Among the injured were Stolypin's own children. Nevertheless, in spite of this atrocity, horror, and disaster, P.A. Stolypin did not flinch. Firmly, with that courage which typified him, he remained at his post for five years, until the treacherous hand of a despicable villain ended his life with a bullet.

These are the acts and the qualities for which Russia will preserve grateful memories of P.A. Stolypin.

In May 1911, while Stolypin was dictating to me the draft of his report to the Sovereign about reorganizing the state administration of Russia, he reverted several times a day, as if involuntarily, to talking about the State Council and everything connected with its rejection of the western zemstvo bill. It became clear to me as Stolypin spoke so frequently about the State Council that all those speeches by State Councillors on February 1, March 4, and April 1, 1911, as well as by deputies to the State Duma from March 15 to April 27 of the same year, had caused him great distress, and that they had the definite character of attempts to lessen his prestige with the Sovereign. Beyond any doubt, the Sovereign was influenced in those sad days, on the one hand by whispers in his ear from court circles hostile to Stolypin and, on the other, by conversations regarding speeches by Stolypin's enemies in the legislative institutions. And the Sovereign somewhat changed his attitude toward Stolypin.

It was especially unpleasant to Stolypin that he was misunderstood not only by legislators but by various ministers as well. Stolypin told me in those May days of 1911 that it especially disturbed him that his colleagues in the

Council of Ministers did not wish to understand that he had so firmly urged the Sovereign to enact the western zemstvo bill by Article 87 because he considered promulgation of that law totally essential to the interests of the people and the state.

It is obvious that if the agrarian law of November 9, 1906, had not been enacted by Article 87, then it would never have been passed by regular means. "The misfortune lay," Stolypin said, "in the fact that very often various members of legislative institutions, when considering certain legislation, were guided not by state interests but by the desire to strike, one way or another, at the government or individuals in it."

The blow dealt Stolypin in those months by various members of our legislative institutions indubitably affected Russia's destiny. In subsequent chapters the reader, too, will understand that the defamation directed against Stolypin in that period caused Russia to lose a unique and irreplaceable statesman, an individual who might have averted war in 1914 and revolution in 1917.

## Chapter 8.

# STOLYPIN AND THE ZEMSTVOS

One of Alexander II's greatest reforms was the introduction of zemstvo institutions in Russia by the law of January 1, 1864. Until creation of these local institutions, certain needs of the populace were met and norms for local taxes were established by provincial government agencies through the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

In the several years following publication of the 1864 law, zemstvos were introduced in 34 provinces, mainly in central and southern European Russia. Responsibility for zemstvo activities was divided by law between district and provincial zemstvos. The district zemstvo was charged with care of the people within its borders in the areas of popular education, medicine (including veterinary medicine), and sanitation, as well as agronomy, road building and maintenance, administration of justice, and so on.

The provincial zemstvos had the same duties as those in the districts with this difference, that provincial zemstvos handled cases beyond the financial means of the district zemstvos and when the project involved more than one district. The provincial zemstvos were also responsible for insuring village buildings. Insurance of village structures was compulsory to an amount fixed by law but voluntary for amounts exceeding the obligatory sum. The provincial zemstvos also provided care for the mentally ill, foundlings, and orphans within the respective provinces, as well as maintaining almshouses and homes for the aged.

Provincial and district zemstvos were divided into two institutions: provincial or district assemblies and provincial or district zemstvo councils. Provincial and district assemblies managed all local projects and passed and implemented decrees, and elected executive boards from their members in the form of chairmen and members for the zemstvo councils.

All voters in the zemstvo provinces were divided into three curias. To the first curia were assigned owners of large amounts of real estate in the



district; to the second, owners of real estate in the cities; and to the third, peasants. In the first two curias, individuals of less than full qualifications (but owning land on a scale of no less than 1/20 of full qualification) elected representatives from among themselves. The number was determined by dividing those with full qualifications by the number of representatives lacking full qualifications.

The number of district councillors from each curia was established by law so that the overwhelming majority would be from the larger landowners (that is, from the nobility). From the district councillors were elected provincial councillors, one for each six district councillors.

Zemstvo representatives were divided into three categories. To the first element were assigned all councillors of zemstvo assemblies to manage the zemstvos. The second category consisted of the chairman and members of the zemstvo council. The third element contained all directors of departmental branches of the local economy as well as all specialists, such as engineers, agronomists, physicians, veterinarians, statisticians, and so on—these were the professional men who guided the everyday work of all branches of the local economy.

In each district zemstvo councillors were elected, their number prescribed by law, from those individuals owning real estate taxed by the zemstvo assembly. In the zemstvo assemblies, these persons deliberated, confirmed budgets presented by the zemstvo council, and established (within limits of the law) the obligations which people were required to fulfill, fixing the taxes which owners of real estate were required to pay to defray all expenses stipulated by the annual budgets.

The original law of January 1, 1864, gave the zemstvos exceptionally broad powers. Had they not been subsequently restricted by laws beginning as early as 1866, the zemstvos might have done a great deal to further the interests of the people and the nation.

All zemstvos were empowered to carry on a number of activities chiefly in the interests of the peasant economy. But funds used by the zemstvo assemblies, especially in the 1860's, 1870's, 1880's, and 1890's, came from large estate owners and industrial and cooperative enterprises. Under pressure from the extreme right, large landowners, and industrial interests, the state gradually curtailed the powers of the zemstvos so that eventually the zemstvos were unable to implement those responsibilities delegated to them by the law of January 1, 1864.

The government of Alexander III still more drastically abridged the rights of the zemstvos in the late nineteenth century. Governors received orders

from the Ministry of Internal Affairs not to confirm budgets for which tax increases by the assembly would exceed 3% as compared with the previous year. Progressive zemstvo leaders, realizing that restriction of yearly tax increases to 3% would prevent the zemstvos from aiding the peasants to the extent necessary, naturally developed gradual opposition to the government.

An Imperial decree of April 2, 1903, introduced provincial assemblies and provincial councils into six western and southwestern provinces to manage the business of local economy. By this law members of the provincial assemblies as well as chairmen and members of zemstvo councils were no longer elected; instead, they were appointed by government officials. Chairmen and members of zemstvo councils were made civil servants, responsible to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but the responsibility for carrying on local projects remained the same in the old zemstvo provinces where they were introduced in 1864.

The Kiev provincial zemstvo was especially effective. It provided aid to its people in medicine and health care, in primary and vocational education, road construction, fire prevention, agronomy, cattle breeding, cooperatives, and other local activities from year to year, notably outstripping a number of the old zemstvos.

There was a marked distinction between the old and the new zemstvos. In the old zemstvos, the district assemblies vigorously implemented all local projects within the district, while provincial zemstvos took only those measures which were either beyond the financial capabilities of the district zemstvos or which involved several districts. But in the new zemstvos created by the law of April 2, 1903, the provincial zemstvos had to manage some of the district zemstvos' problems. It happened because this new law of April 2, 1903, restricted the personnel of the district zemstvo to a director and a small number of secretaries and clerks. For this reason the personnel of the provincial zemstvos mushroomed, being burdened with additional duties. The Kiev provincial zemstvo, for instance, eventually exceeded 1,000 employees.

The still very young Marshal of the Nobility and Ceremonies-Master of the Imperial Court P.N. Ignatiev was appointed to administer the local economy as first chairman of the Kiev provincial council. Later, during World War I, he was Minister of Education. Count Ignatiev correctly perceived that the young zemstvo of Kiev province could soon accomplish all that the old zemstvos had achieved in the course of 40 years, and he proceeded to recruit the most outstanding specialists in each field of zemstvo activities. In a very short time he enticed many prominent specialists to serve in the Kiev provincial zemstvo who had previously worked in the zemstvos or other large social organizations and who had achieved success in the local or public sectors. Count Ignatiev chose



me to administer all the financial, economic, and budgetary sections of the Kiev provincial zemstvo, because he knew my work as head of a large social-cooperative organization of which he had been a member.

When I outlined the first budget of the Kiev provincial zemstvo, I realized that it was utterly impossible to restrict zemstvo tax increases in relation to the previous year. To meet the most essential needs of the provincial economy I was forced to draft a budget based on an increase of more than 65% over the previous year. The Kiev provincial committee unanimously confirmed that budget. After approval by the provincial assembly the budget went through the governor and governor-general to the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Finance.

Both ministers, without approving the budget, sent it to the State Council, which rejected it. Instead it was returned through the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Kiev provincial zemstvo with orders to emend the expense estimates so that the tax increase on real estate would not exceed the 3% established by law. When the budget was returned, the provincial assembly met again. Since they could not agree on budget changes, they directed Count P.N. Ignatiev and me to go to St. Petersburg and ask the State Council to approve the expense estimate with the 65% tax increase.

Among the members of the State Council that year were Count Ignatiev's father, Count N.P. Ignatiev, as well as his uncle, Count A.P. Ignatiev. Count P.N. Ignatiev, after the provincial assembly's decision, sent the following telegram to his father and his uncle: "I am profoundly shocked by the arbitrary action of the State Council. I am leaving for St. Petersburg today and will insist on approval of the full expenditure estimate of the Kiev provincial zemstvo with taxes increased by 65%."

Count Ignatiev and I left that day for St. Petersburg. For two days we argued before the Finance Commission of the State Council the extreme necessity for confirming the budget with taxes increased by 65%. Finally the Finance Commission and the State Council approved the budget with our original tax increase. The next year, when the Kiev provincial zemstvo budget was again significantly increased (with a corresponding increase in taxes by 70% over the previous year), we heard no objections from the State Council.

P.A. Stolypin was then governor of Saratov province. He knew about the incident and was extremely interested in it. In April 1906, when Count P.N. Ignatiev was introduced to Stolypin, the newly-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, Stolypin asked Ignatiev to share with him all the data which had persuaded the State Council to agree to such a significant tax increase for two consecutive years. Count Ignatiev asked permission to introduce me to him, as



the specialist in this purely financial question. Stolypin agreed, asking that I meet with him in May 1906.

In preparation for my trip to St. Petersburg, I compiled for Stolypin numerous charts, diagrams, and tables, and assembled all possible data to show the complete picture of the economy in Kiev province, before and after introduction of the zemstvo institutions, as well as what the Kiev provincial zemstvo had accomplished for the people with such a significant increase of expenditures. I also presented information about several of the old zemstvos which I had visited in order to ascertain why those zemstvos had been unable to satisfy the local needs charged to them by the law of January 1, 1864.

I reported to Stolypin in Count Ignatiev's presence. Stolypin was so intrigued that he kept us for three hours. That same day Stolypin asked Count Ignatiev to agree that, concurrent with my work for the Kiev provincial zemstvo, I might periodically continue my visits to the old provincial and district zemstvos. He commissioned me to provide him information to assure that all the zemstvos were able to develop their activities to meet the needs of the people and the nation. Count P.N. Ignatiev not only agreed to Stolypin's request, but expressed delight that the Minister of Internal Affairs understood the tremendous importance of the zemstvos and the many benefits they could provide when the government supported broad development of their activities.

Stolypin gave me a specific assignment that very day and for five years, after fulfilling each of his commissions, I presented detailed reports to him, along with all the data which acquainted him with the gradually-expanding activities of the old zemstvos in 34 provinces as well as in those new zemstvo institutions which were introduced in the six western and southwestern provinces by the Imperial decree of April 2, 1903.

Along with presentation of data about activities of all district and provincial zemstvos, I reported to him about my conversations with chairmen of the provincial and district zemstvo councils. Many zemstvo chairmen revealed, during my visits for Stolypin, how highly they valued his actions as Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers and all that he had done for the people during his five years in office.

In the years 1906-1911, Stolypin became increasingly familiar with all the zemstvo activities and was able to introduce many decrees and bills in the interests of the people and the zemstvos alike. For example, by the law of June 12, 1890, chairmen of the district and provincial zemstvo councils could not be elected from the lower taxpaying groups. Stolypin changed this legal requirement by a special decree on October 5, 1906. And before passage of the law of June 12, 1890, district councillors were elected from the peasantry by vote in

volost' village assemblies. But the 1890 law switched election of district rural councillors from the peasantry to designation by government officials from a list of candidates selected by volost' assemblies. Stolypin restored the condition that had existed prior to June 12, 1890, by the decree of October 5, 1906, and district councillors were once more elected from individuals selected by volost' assemblies.

The requirement of the June 12, 1890, law, that the governor could not approve zemstvo budgets which increased taxes on real estate more than 3% over the previous year was also changed. Stolypin ordered the governors not to prevent the zemstvos from preparing budgets which increased taxes on real estate significantly more than 3%.

As Chairman of the Council of Ministers, P.A. Stolypin insisted that the Ministry of Education annually include in the estimated national budget substantial sums for distribution to the zemstvos for construction and maintenance of zemstvo schools. At the same time Stolypin asked the Ministry of Education to draft an emergency law for submission to the State Duma about universal public education, to build over twenty years an adequate number of zemstvo schools so that all children of school age might receive minimal primary education in zemstvo schools. This law became effective in 1908 and, with government subsidies, the zemstvo were able annually to build and maintain a large number of schools.

As Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stolypin insisted that the Administration of Agriculture include in the estimated national budget substantial sums for the zemstvos to subsidize broad development of zemstvo agronomical assistance to the peasant economy. With subsidies to expand agronomical aid, all the zemstvos significantly increased their personnel each year—specifically in cattle breeding, truck farming, bee keeping, horticulture, vineyards and wine making, poultry breeding, experimental fields and experimental stations, reclamation and prevention of soil erosion, prevention of epizootic disease among animals, and so on. Thanks to those subsidies, the zemstvos were able to establish experimental stations and fields, warehouses, and rental stations for cooperative machines on a broad scale. They were also able to create credit banks for small loans, credit associations, village cooperatives, artels, and so on.

Insurance agencies were established to insure village buildings against fire, introducing various fire prevention methods. Stolypin not only kept abreast of developments in insurance and fire prevention but also participated personally in All-Russian congresses which he instigated for specialists in those branches of the local economy.



## STOLYPIN

All zemstvo chairmen who reported to Stolypin between 1906 and 1911 on their activities commented about his remarkable interest in all questions which affected them. They mentioned above all his total concern for zemstvo affairs and his desire to meet all essential needs of the people.

Until P.A. Stolypin was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs, many members of the old zemstvos not only opposed the government but were openly hostile toward the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their opposition and hostility stemmed chiefly from the fact that governors constantly blocked broader development of zemstvo activities in many areas of the local economy and that the Minister of Internal Affairs, on the basis of the governors' reports, created unnecessary complications. A quite different attitude toward the government emerged among zemstvo leaders in the first months after Stolypin acceded to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs. It became clear to all active (and not just political) zemstvo leaders that Stolypin's plans were definitely counter to the policies followed by his predecessors and the governors. All genuine leaders of the zemstvo economy also saw that Stolypin attached exceptionally great importance to broad development of zemstvo activities in all areas.

This was especially true after Stolypin was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Zemstvo elections in 1906 clearly demonstrated the effect which the designation of Stolypin as Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers had on zemstvo activities. Many zemstvo political leaders who remained in opposition to the government after Stolypin's appointment were blackballed in zemstvo elections and in their stead individuals were elected who not only eschewed conflict with the government but actually cooperated with the government to expand zemstvo activities in the interests of the people and the country.

There was never any opposition to the government in the western and southwestern provincial zemstvos, provided by the Imperial decree of April 2, 1903, through all the years they existed before introduction of elective zemstvos by Article 87 on March 14, 1911. That was because government officials appointed zemstvo leaders—chairmen and members of provincial boards as well as active members of the district councils. The government wisely selected men who dedicated their efforts to local welfare with sincere enthusiasm, not from fear but from conscience. Although zemstvo councillors received no recompense for participation in local assemblies, they always attended the meetings and applied themselves singlemindedly to their duties.

In addition to the annual assembly, several special sessions were held each year, usually every two or three months. The annual as well as the special zemstvo assemblies often lasted six to eight days. They usually convened at 10



A.M. and continued until 7 P.M. Then after 8 P.M. various commissions often met, such as financial, budget, roads, insurance, agronomy, medicine, legal, public education, cattle breeding, fire prevention, etc., until 3 or 4 A.M.

All the councillors participated in several commissions. Besides participation in zemstvo assemblies and commissions, many councillors visited district schools, hospitals, experimental stations, experimental fields, and other local institutions. They became familiar with specific matters in localities and quite often, seeing inadequacies in landed plots, certain construction materials, or financial resources, being prosperous individuals and large landowners, they willingly provided personal assistance to broader development of zemstvo projects.

P.A. Stolypin especially appreciated those sacrificial acts by zemstvo leaders in the western and southwestern provinces and he therefore made a special effort to honor their requests. The Kiev provincial zemstvo administration in particular twice directed requests to the Minister of Finance, Kokovtsov, and simultaneously to Stolypin as Minister of Internal Affairs. The first case concerned changing the fiscal regulations for the zemstvos introduced by Alexander II. According to the rules, all money accounts (and there were about a hundred of them) at the disposal of the provincial zemstvos in cash or Treasury bonds were to be held in the State Treasury. Zemstvo taxes however were usually received only biennially, at the end of June and the end of December. Meanwhile, expenditures from zemstvo budgets were usually made monthly, scaled to 1/12 of the zemstvo budget. The zemstvo was not authorized to use cash on hand from the State Treasury, even though that money belonged to the provincial zemstvos. Instead, it could only use some securities for which the State Bank would establish a special miscellaneous account. The zemstvo would then use credit from this account, repayable at 5.25% per year.

By a decision of the Kiev provincial zemstvo assembly, I devised a special, rather intricate plan by which all the capital of the provincial zemstvos was combined into a single fund; thus, the zemstvos benefited over several years by sometimes as much as 10,000 rubles. My plan, complete with tables and illustrations, was directed through the governor and governor-general to Minister of Finance Kokovtsov and Minister of Internal Affairs Stolypin. A week after this petition was dispatched from the Kiev provincial zemstvo, I reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs. Stolypin greeted me warmly and said that he was already acquainted with the petition and approved of it a hundred percent, but he asked me to speak to Minister of Finance Kokovtsov on behalf of the petition two days later, since he wanted to converse with him personally beforehand and persuade him to approve the Kiev provincial assembly petition.

When I went to Kokovtsov two days later, he greeted me with a smile and said, "You know, I am definitely opposed to changing the existing funds regulations, but Peter Arkadevich presented your petition to me with such conviction that I finally instructed my secretariat to approve it."

The subsequent change, by which all capital and ready cash were lumped into a single fund, was especially significant for the Kiev provincial zemstvo in World War I. During the period 1914-1917, the Kiev provincial zemstvo was entrusted with organizing the sugar industry of Russia so that no sugar factory could sell even a single pound independently. All sugar was consigned to the so-called "Centrosugar," operated by the Kiev provincial zemstvo. Transactions in the sugar industry amounted to 100 million rubles a month, or more than a billion per year. "Centrosugar" distributed sugar throughout Russia through special representatives. The representatives paid "Centrosugar" (the Kiev provincial zemstvo), which in turn paid the sugar manufacturers.

Later in the war, the Kiev zemstvo assumed the obligation to build hospitals for 20,000 sick and wounded soldiers, as well as purchasing all essential items for the army on the Southwestern front. The Kiev zemstvo manufactured and delivered to the Southwestern front more than 3 million pairs of boots. Through the single fund the Kiev provincial zemstvo handled payments by cash and checks amounting to 5 million rubles a day. It is quite obvious, therefore, how significant for the Kiev zemstvo was the creation, thanks to Stolypin, of a single fund for all zemstvo capital and resources.

The second case involved a petition from the Kiev provincial zemstvo about evaluation of real estate on which zemstvo taxes were imposed. We asked that taxation by the zemstvo levy be determined not just on the basis of value but also by actual income. By conditions then existing, owners of land valued at 1 million rubles paid the same local and national taxes as owners of a sugar factory valued at 1 million rubles. Yet income from peasant land was about 3% per 100 rubles, income from large landowners' land about 5 or 6%, and income from most rural industries about 8 to 10%, while income from sugar factories was about 20%. A system of taxation by income would change the situation drastically. Sugar factories, by the new system, would have to pay six times more than peasant households for equivalent property. By taxing on an income basis, land taxes would decline sharply but, at the same time, taxes on all sorts of industrial enterprises would increase.

In the second case, as in the first, the petition drawn up by the Kiev provincial assembly was relayed to the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Finance. A week after dispatch of the Kiev provincial zemstvo petition, I reported to Stolypin on the matter and persuaded him that the zemstvo assembly



had accurately assessed the interests of the less prosperous classes. Again he asked me to see Kokovtsov two days later.

When I called on Kokovtsov, he informed me that he had yielded to Stolypin's urging and agreed to approve the petition. But he added that he feared determination of actual income from all real estate was almost impossible and that industrial interests would object to the new system. Kokovtsov was right about the latter apprehension. After the statistical bureau of the Kiev provincial zemstvo determined actual income of all real estate and began to tax by income, industrialists protested to the legislative institutions. But the legislative institutions, after prolonged discussion, rejected the industrialists' protests and confirmed taxation of real estate on the basis of actual income.

Activities of the zemstvo institutions in the southwestern and western provinces went smoothly but, at the same time, zemstvo assemblies were repeatedly asked to petition for elective zemstvos. Many were offended because zemstvo councillors were not elected by the people but designated by government authorities. And considering the intensive work needed to carry out local projects and the significant annual increase of zemstvo taxes, it seemed wise that such decisions be made by elected, not appointed, representatives of real estate owners. Introduction of elective zemstvos was chiefly desirable (adapted to the law of January 1, 1864) because provincial zemstvos were finding it more and more difficult to implement independently all those local projects which, in the old zemstvos, were shared by the various districts.

Chairmen of zemstvo assemblies in the six southwestern and western districts organized general conferences several times in 1909 and 1910 in which the question was raised concerning the extreme necessity to introduce elective zemstvos in those provinces, adapted to the law of January 1, 1864. During the conferences the desire was expressed to decrease the qualifications for participation in zemstvo elections and to have electors divided into curias—that is, into Russian and Polish sections.

A general conference of chairmen addressed Stolypin as Minister of Internal Affairs, requesting that he consider drafting a bill to introduce elective zemstvos in those provinces where most landowners were Poles and the individuals of Russian origin who owned land sufficient for participation in zemstvo elections were relatively few. To assure that Russian people in Russian provinces would constitute a majority in zemstvo assemblies, chairmen of zemstvo assemblies in those six provinces wanted Stolypin to arrange an audience for them with the Sovereign.

Stolypin devised a plan to introduce elective zemstvos in the southwestern and western provinces. It took into consideration the wishes of those who



## STOLYPIN

had been closer to the populace for six years and thus had the opportunity to ascertain the actual needs of the majority.

How much the attitudes of zemstvo leaders had changed toward the government after Stolypin's first year as Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers may be judged by the election of zemstvo representatives to the State Duma. In the first State Duma, deputies from the zemstvos were: 5% leftists, 78% Kadets, and 17% Octobrists and rightists. In the second Duma there were 7.5% leftists, 54% Kadets, and 37.8% Octobrists. And in the third State Duma there were 12.7% Kadets, 87.3% Octobrists and rightists, and not a single one from the left.

Zemstvo congresses, All-Russian as well as regional, were divided into two categories. First there were congresses of provincial assembly representatives. Questions discussed during the congresses mainly concerned the political situation in the country and zemstvo-governmental relations. In the second category were the All-Russian, regional, and many provincial congresses. These congresses included chairmen and members of zemstvo councils as well as zemstvo economic specialists who were actively involved in local projects. All these congresses exclusively discussed specialized questions such as medicine, sanitary measures, the struggle against all sorts of epidemics including epizootic diseases, agricultural progress, education, cattle breeding, insurance operations, fire prevention, financial and bookkeeping problems, legal questions, road construction, and so on.

The character of all these congresses radically improved after Stolypin became Minister of Internal Affairs. Until he assumed this post, and especially that of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, all political congresses of zemstvo representatives demonstrated an obviously hostile attitude toward the government. But after Stolypin took over they were amiable toward the government, and obviously wished to help Stolypin enact all those reforms which promised to improve the situation of the people and to strengthen the existing state structure. All sorts of congresses of specialists in various branches of the zemstvo economy showed similar improvement during Stolypin's administration. Before Stolypin, participants in zemstvo congresses, specifically the third element, were hostile toward the government.\* But by the end of 1906 their attitudes became increasingly favorable toward Stolypin and the government which he headed.

The third element of the old zemstvos, being most familiar with the needs of the people, opposed the government because they saw so clearly all the restrictions which the government had begun to impose as early as 1866, and especially after passage of the law of June 12, 1890, depriving the zemstvos of any possibility to satisfy the people's needs. But the third element realized

immediately that Stolypin understood zemstvo activities, and they watched as he gradually, by official and unofficial means, reversed the restrictions imposed earlier. Stolypin was candid in his conversations with zemstvo leaders about his desire to restore all rights provided the zemstvos by the law of January 1, 1864, and even to expand them.

The 1911 intrigues against Stolypin by State Council members were onerous and despicable to zemstvo leaders who eschewed politics to concentrate on actual benefits for the people and the nation. Stolypin's untimely death caused profound regret and intense despondence in zemstvo circles because they knew that P.A. Stolypin had been not only an outstanding reformer and statesman but also that unique person who could have led Russia, after all its sad experiences, to the correct path of national development and prevented the revolution about which Russia's internal enemies dreamed. After Stolypin's tragic death, practical and energetic zemstvo leaders considered that he had no peer among Russia's national leaders, either in statesmanly acumen or in an accurate understanding of zemstvo activities.

Although zemstvo activity in Russia continued to evolve according to Stolypin's legacy until the October revolution, there was no longer the enthusiasm and faith in still greater expansion of zemstvo work which Stolypin had inspired by his conversations with zemstvo leaders. From March to late October 1917, the Provisional Government period, zemstvo activities actually lessened significantly. By orders of the Provisional Government, zemstvo assemblies and zemstvo councils were supplemented by Social Democrats who had no previous experience in zemstvo activities. Many of them had been in exile until the 1917 revolution for their attempts to overthrow the Imperial regime. Now zemstvo assemblies in the old zemstvos discussed, along with expansion of zemstvo activities, questions dealing with expansion of revolution. When the Bolsheviks seized power, zemstvo assemblies in most provinces of central Russia ceased and were replaced by soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies.

In the summer of 1918 in Kiev, during the Hetman [Skoropadsky] government, some of the most outstanding zemstvo leaders of central Russia gathered and asked the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hetman government, F. Lizogub (who had previously been chairman of the Poltava provincial zemstvo council), for permission to arrange a private conference of zemstvo leaders to discuss plans to reactivate zemstvo activities in the majority of Russian provinces. F. Lizogub readily agreed and asked the Kiev provincial council to organize such a conference.

Many zemstvo leaders present at the conference had often spoken with Stolypin between 1906 and 1911, and were familiar with his plans. They said

## STOLYPIN

that his ideas about reorganizing zemstvo self-administration represented the ideal about which the most far-sighted zemstvo leaders had dreamed for half a century. Many said that Stolypin planned not only to restore the law of 1864, but actually to expand zemstvo rights. They expressed the opinion that if they were able in the future, after the downfall of Soviet authority, to recreate the zemstvo institutions, then Stolypin's ideas would provide the basis for local self-administration agencies. Participants in that congress unanimously acknowledged that Stolypin's death had been a great tragedy for Russia.

Stolypin ascribed special significance to future activities of the zemstvo. Before dictating his report to the Emperor Nicholas II to me in May 1911, he explained precisely why he had decided to trust me to work out his project. Having secured my word of honor that I would tell no one about it, Stolypin said:

Among the individuals subordinate to me in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Council of Ministers, there are certainly talented and capable colleagues but, for the main role in reorganizing the national administration of Russia, I plan to transfer to the zemstvos many of those activities presently handled through local public institutions by departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

My colleagues have lacked the opportunity to become as fully acquainted with overall activities of zemstvo institutions as you have. You are not only a zemstvo leader but, because of your frequent and systematic visits to provincial and district zemstvos all over Russia and your direct participation in the various All-Russian zemstvo congresses, with their discussions of purely technical rather than political questions, you understand what is needed to enable agencies of local self-administration to meet the requirements of the people.

I have observed you for five years and have studied all the reports which you have presented to me in fulfillment of commissions I have given you on questions of the proper activities of zemstvos in Russia. And I have concluded that you are not a mere bureaucrat like many of my colleagues but a genuine zemstvo leader who can draft my project of a report to the Emperor and accurately illustrate my ideas to expand zemstvo activities as well as to transfer to them responsibility for many measures now carried on not by zemstvo workers but by state officials.

---

\*Professor A. V. Zenkovsky apparently understood the first element to be conservative owners of large landholdings and the second element were wealthy urban merchants and industrialists. The third element consisted mostly of intellectuals.

—Serge A. Zenkovsky



## Chapter 9.

# STOLYPIN'S ENEMIES FROM THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT

Stolypin's leftist enemies were mainly Socialist Revolutionaries, Social Democrats, Trudoviki, and members of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets). When government-sponsored bills were under consideration in the State Duma, members of those parties customarily voted against them, in order to strike at Stolypin.

Socialists revealed open opposition to the existing state regime both in their programs and in their speeches in the State Duma, and tried in every possible way to overthrow the regime and seize authority for themselves. They especially wanted to eliminate Stolypin. The Socialist Revolutionary terrorist organization constantly prepared assassination attempts, from the moment Stolypin became Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers until his death.

Dmitri Bogrov, who shot Stolypin in the theater on September 1, 1911, did not deny in his testimony that he had become an okhrana agent purposely in order to be informed of Stolypin's movements. With this aim, Bogrov had offered his services to the chief of the St. Petersburg okhrana division, von Koten, but von Koten suspected Bogrov's connections with certain provocateurs and therefore rejected him. When Bogrov learned that Stolypin would attend the Imperial celebration in Kiev, he again offered his services, this time to the chief of the Kiev okhrana division, Colonel Kulyabko, indicating that he personally knew individuals who planned to kill Stolypin.

During Bogrov's interrogation before his execution, he was asked if he had not planned to kill the Sovereign during the Imperial celebration. He absolutely and steadfastly denied this because killing the Sovereign, he said, might cause a Jewish pogrom. His principal motive for killing Stolypin seemed to be that, in his opinion, Stolypin was the state leader who, by reforms which

## STOLYPIN

improved conditions for the peasants and workers, prevented socialists from seizing authority. Murder of the Sovereign, he felt, would have had no result because Stolypin would squash revolutionary attempts and reinforce still more strongly the existing monarchical regime.

Although the Socialist Revolutionaries denied their part in Stolypin's assassination, they openly praised Bogrov and called Stolypin's assassination a significant event for creating confusion in ruling spheres. Those same socialists later candidly acknowledged that had Stolypin not been killed in 1911, the revolution in Russia would have been conclusively stifled. Stolypin seemed the chief enemy to the Socialist Revolutionaries because the peasantry, having always aspired to acquire more land as private property, saw their desires increasingly satisfied, after passage of the agrarian law of November 9, 1906, and because of Stolypin's later activities.

The Social Democrats well understood that Stolypin was not only an outstanding reformer but a statesman who could radically improve the economic and cultural situation of the working class so that the workers would gradually be transformed into petty bourgeoisie. When that happened, their propaganda would no longer affect the workers.

After the February 1917 revolution, all opponents of the Imperial regime spoke candidly. They said that if Bogrov had not fired that shot on September 1, 1911, there would have been no World War nor February revolution because Stolypin would have found a way to avert the war, just as he had successfully averted world war in 1909 during the tensions over annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And because Stolypin was able, over several years, to enact necessary reforms in the interests of the people and the state, and significantly to strengthen both the internal and external position of Russia, then, of course, during Stolypin's lifetime, revolution would have been completely inconceivable.

Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats adamantly opposed all of Stolypin's policies until his death. They considered him to be a member of the Black Hundreds, a pogromist, and anti-semitic, in spite of the fact that Stolypin was the positive foe of pogroms and anti-semitism and all Black Hundreds-like organizations.

Members of the Constitutional Democratic Party were also Stolypin's implacable foes. Despite the fact that Kadets represented the most active element of Russian society, and doubtless sincerely desired the welfare of the people and the state, they nevertheless, during consideration of bills unquestionably favorable to popular and state interests, consistently voted against any bill sponsored by the government which Stolypin headed. Members of the Kadet

Party considered generally unacceptable any bill sponsored by that government which took strict measures to combat revolution and anarchy and to guard the Emperor from Russia's internal enemies.

Since members of the Kadet Party were such active representatives of Russian society, P.A. Stolypin repeatedly sought a common language in order to negotiate with them for joint work in the interests of the people and the nation. He even suggested that they enter the government but they summarily rejected his proposal. Members of the Kadet Party evaded responsibility, preferring to remain in opposition and criticize the government.

When the Kadets, particularly the well-known zemstvo and public leader A.I. Shingarev, addressed Stolypin concerning alleged illegal actions by the administration, Stolypin listened attentively and ordered speedy and completely unbiased investigations. But when Shingarev requested exemption from arrest for active members of the extreme left party who were irreconcilable enemies of Russia and the regime, Stolypin said to him, "You speak on behalf of individuals who definitely aspire to seize power and yet, as soon as such people take over, then, believe me, you will be the first person they execute." And what Stolypin predicted actually occurred. Shingarev was one of the first victims of those individuals for whom he had interceded. Many of the most honest and orderly members of the Kadet Party who participated in the Viborg Manifesto—men such as Baron F.N. Steinheil and V.D. Nabokov—realized only after Russia's downfall what Stolypin had represented and how correct he had been in taking necessary measures against Russia's implacable internal enemies.

Stolypin's enemies from the right were members of the Union of Russian People and the Union of the Archangel Mikhail. The extreme right and those most hostile to him usually belonged to court circles. These circles opposed Stolypin because of his liberalism and his aspirations to eliminate all those injustices inevitable in every state.

The extreme right nobility opposed the agrarian law of November 9, 1906, and especially Stolypin's energetic personal activity toward securing land as property for the peasantry. Nor did the extreme right nobility favor Stolypin's granting permission to the zemstvos to increase zemstvo taxes to provide broader economic aid to the peasants in order to secure additional land for them and to increase their economic productivity.

Court circles were divided into several groups. There were court circles closely surrounding the Sovereign himself and his mother, the Empress Maria Feodorovna, as well as the Grand Dukes Alexander Mikhailovich, Nikolai Mikhailovich, and others, who were favorably inclined toward Stolypin. In March 1911, when the State Council rejected the western zemstvo bill and



## STOLYPIN

Stolypin offered his resignation, these members of the Imperial family and their followers told the Sovereign that Stolypin was the only leader who could direct the state regime along the correct path and save Russia from internal as well as external enemies. They begged the Sovereign not to accept Stolypin's resignation but to accede to all his demands.

One of Stolypin's foes was the Palace Commandant, Adjutant General Dediulin, but a more dangerous enemy was the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of Gendarmes General Kurlov, whom the Sovereign assigned to these posts in 1906 against Stolypin's wishes. General Kurlov was aware that Stolypin intended to ask the Sovereign to dismiss him, Kurlov, from his posts. Palace Commandant Dediulin and Chief of Gendarmes General Kurlov tried by every possible means to humiliate Stolypin during the Imperial celebration in Kiev in 1911. For example, they did not reserve a place for him, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in the automobiles reserved for the Imperial family and those nearest to the Imperial court.

Stolypin told me in May 1911 that he fully understood the basis for the hostility manifested toward him by those on the extreme left, who hoped to assassinate him, but that he could not comprehend the animosity toward him from members of the legislative chambers from the Kadet Party and the extreme right. He had no doubt that Kadets and members of the rightist parties sincerely desired Russia's welfare. The Kadets were, in Stolypin's opinion, unjust in their hostility toward him. They simply did not wish to understand that he was compelled to take stern measures in order to avert revolution, which would ultimately have meant seizure of authority by extreme leftist elements and brought greater misfortune to Russia and all of its people. Members of the Kadet Party refused to acknowledge all those considerations which had forced Stolypin to enact the electoral law of June 3, 1907, by Imperial manifesto. "I am profoundly convinced," Stolypin said, "that the law of June 3, 1907, saved Russia from revolution that might easily have broken out in 1907 or 1908, a revolution many times more dreadful than 1905."

As for the extreme right, they refused to understand that, in order to avoid extremely harsh revolution, Russia could not maintain conditions existing prior to October 1905. Reforms were essential. "Although it grieves me," said Stolypin, "I must confess my conviction that when the bill for reorganization of the state administration of Russia, which I dictated to you, is presented for consideration by our legislative institutions, the extreme right will vote against it, because they do not want all the people of Russia to enjoy equal rights."

## Chapter 10.

### STOLYPIN'S DEATH

In late August 1911 a restless mood prevailed among many individuals occupying responsible positions in Kiev. The Governor-General of Kiev, F.F. Trepov, learned that Palace Commandant Dediulin and his friend Kurlov would organize security for the Imperial household and members of the government during the ceremonial dedication of a memorial to the Emperor Alexander II.

Kurlov subsequently governed Kiev province for several months and his administration as governor, characterized by his negative personal nature, left unpleasant memories. It became known, moreover, that Kurlov had been named Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Chief of the Corps of Gendarmes against Stolypin's wishes.

It was also known in 1911 that some court circles were definitely campaigning for Stolypin's removal from the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs. Stolypin planned to ask the Sovereign to dismiss Kurlov as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. It was also known that persistent rumors circulated about the preparation of an attempt on Stolypin's life, to occur during the festivities.

When Governor-General F.F. Trepov learned that he had not been named Chief of Security for the Imperial household and members of the government, but instead it was to be Adjutant General Dediulin and aides named by General Kurlov, he sent an indignant telegram to Stolypin requesting release from his duties as governor-general. Stolypin replied by begging F.F. Trepov not to sadden the Sovereign's festive days in Kiev, adding that he was also personally distressed by the appointment.

Adjutant General Dediulin and Kurlov were shockingly inattentive to Stolypin during the festivities. Not only was there no place designated for Stolypin, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in the automobiles provided for the Imperial family and those close to them, but he was not even supplied with a

## STOLYPIN

carriage. Stolypin was obliged to hire a cabman. Appalled by this lack of regard for security, the Mayor of Kiev, I.N. Dyakov, placed his own carriage at Stolypin's disposal.

Everyone who knew Stolypin personally and conversed with him during those days could not help noticing that Stolypin was mentally depressed. In conversations with Trepov, Stolypin did not conceal his knowledge of intrigues against him, and mentioned the possibility that he would soon be released from his duties.

Several days before the attempt, Professor Academician Rein tried to persuade Stolypin to wear a coat of mail during the festivities as a precaution against an assassin's bullet, a bullet-proof device invented by Chemerzin. But Stolypin, thinking only of a bomb, replied that no coat of mail could protect one against a bomb explosion. Had Stolypin been wearing Chemerzin's coat of mail on the day of the attempt, of course, his life would have been spared. And on the day of the assassination attempt, I as well as others present in the theater could not help noticing the melancholy expression on Stolypin's face.

The assassination had an exceedingly grave effect on everyone. As Stolypin lay dying in the clinic on Malo-Vladimirskii Street, many zemstvo leaders as well as various state officials occupying responsible posts crowded outside. Any medical person who emerged, such as Professor Volkovich or Professor Rein, was surrounded and questioned about the condition of Stolypin's health. The first question was always, "Is there hope that he will live?"

When Stolypin's death was announced, those who clearly understood Russia's internal and external situation involuntarily sank into despondency. It was obvious to everyone that statesmen of Stolypin's stature appear on the world's horizon perhaps once in a century. It would hardly be possible to find a successor who could steer the ship of state so that Russia might be saved from its enemies, domestic and foreign.

In the days following Stolypin's death and burial, Kiev Governor-General Trepov revealed to many individuals the facts he knew about the Bogrov incident. The okhrana had indisputably demonstrated a singularly strange negligence toward Stolypin, in view of the repeated attempts on his life. It was well known to the head of the okhrana division, Kulyabko, as well as to General Kurlov, that Bogrov was by conviction a Socialist Revolutionary terrorist and a definite enemy of the existing regime, particularly of Stolypin himself. Although Bogrov was a known provocateur, he was for four years nominally an agent of the okhrana division while simultaneously enrolled in the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He had shown no desire to render any additional service;



nonetheless Kulyabko, with General Kurlov's approval, had given Bogrov tickets to enter the Kiev gardens and theater on the day of the Imperial festivities.

Trepov reported, and it was confirmed, that on the day of the assassination, Bogrov had dined in the Metropole restaurant, located opposite the city theater, with a known enemy of the regime, Lev Trotskii-Bronstein. However, all searches for Leon Trotsky after Stolypin's assassination led to nothing.

Many public and state leaders who had spoken against passage of the western zemstvo bill by Article 87 understood after Stolypin's death how wrong they had been for condemning him, because in his demands and his actions he had thought of and worked only for the interests of Russia and the Russian people. Lev Tikhomirov, who had also condemned Stolypin for his actions during March 1911, after his death wrote in the press:

The great ship has been broken in pieces, its engines destroyed, with leaks on all sides, with holes along the bottom from the demoralizing attacks, the unceasing bombardment by foes of the Sovereign and the nation. P.A. Stolypin fulfilled his duty with tremendous exertion of his inexhaustible strength and his acute talent for governing; he knew how to swim and how to lead the passengers to relative prosperity. I see no one as brilliant, no one who can govern with such self-sacrifice, such intensely sincere love for Russia as is necessary at this time.

Almost from the moment he was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers and particularly after the attempt on his life in August 1906, on Aptekarskii Island, P.A. Stolypin had a distinct sense of impending doom. He said repeatedly that whenever he went on the street, he never knew whether he would return home alive or be brought home murdered. Several years before his death Stolypin had asked to be buried wherever he might be killed. To honor his request P.A. Stolypin was buried in Kiev.

Several months after Stolypin's death, the Chief Military Prosecutor summoned Stolypin's son-in-law, B.I. Bock, and told him that the person primarily responsible for Stolypin's murder seemed to have been Kurlov, at whose initiative the attempt was committed. But the Chief Prosecutor also told Bock that, by instructions from the Sovereign, the business about Kurlov was closed.

## Chapter 11.

# ATTITUDES OF THE EMPEROR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE IMPERIAL FAMILY TOWARD P.A. STOLYPIN

Former Kiev Provincial Marshal of the Nobility and Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court F.N. Bezak, with whom I enjoyed exceedingly good relations, in Berlin in 1921 and 1922 and in Nice in 1926, confided in me a number of his conversations in Kiev in 1915-1917 and in Copenhagen in 1921-1922 with the Empress Maria Feodorovna, mother of the Emperor Nicholas II, regarding relations between the Sovereign and P.A. Stolypin. Both the Empress Maria Feodorovna and the Sovereign valued Stolypin highly as a statesman and considered that D. Bogrov's fatal shot in Kiev on September 1, 1911, was a great tragedy for Russia.

The Empress Maria Feodorovna, speaking in grave confidence with F.N. Bezak, not only related to him her conversations with the Sovereign about his attitude toward Stolypin but showed Bezak several letters in which the Sovereign repeatedly wrote that the tragic assassination deprived him of a person not only truly devoted to Russia and the Throne but a far-sighted statesman who, during the 1909 conflict with Austria-Hungary over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had correctly predicted the burdensome consequences which would beset Russia in the event of war with the Central Powers. During the World War the Sovereign often mentioned delicate matters both in personal conversations with and letters to his mother, saying that among his ministers, he had no one capable of replacing the late Stolypin, not a single person who could find a way to avert the approaching catastrophe.

How highly the Sovereign esteemed Stolypin and how correctly he assessed Stolypin's abilities as a gifted and outstanding statesman is apparent

from the Empress Maria Feodorovna's account to Bezak of her last conversation with the Emperor the day after his abdication. The Sovereign shared with his mother his troubled impressions concerning the treachery of all those close to the Throne and, at the end of their conversation, said with deep conviction that P.A. Stolypin would never have tolerated the actions of those whom the Sovereign had trusted and drawn near to him during the war.

According to the Empress Maria Feodorovna, the Sovereign was most distressed to recall how, influenced by court circles from April 1911 until Stolypin's death, he had somewhat lost that exceptional trust which Stolypin had enjoyed during his five years in power. After Stolypin's death, the Sovereign had closely perused the stenographic records of the State Council sessions of February 1, March 4, and April 1, 1911, concerning the western zemstvo bill and became convinced that Stolypin had been correct to defend the interests of the Russian people in the western region as well as the right of the monarch to use Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws. It also became obvious to the Sovereign after Stolypin's death that many of the State Council members who spoke against the government, and especially against Stolypin, were thinking not of the interests of the state and the Russian people in the western provinces but only how to strike a personal blow at Stolypin.

The Grand Dukes Alexander Mikhailovich, Nikolai Mikhailovich, Dmitri Pavlovich, and many others valued Stolypin not only as a remarkable statesman who skillfully steered the ship of state but also as one who unselfishly devoted himself to the monarch and the Throne in his concern for the welfare of Russia and the Russian people.

The German Emperor Wilhelm II was profoundly impressed by Stolypin's personality. He expressed his delight to B. I. Bock after the fortunate resolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem and marveled at Stolypin's strength and power. Three months later, when the Sovereign met with the German Emperor at Björkö, Wilhelm II sat opposite the Sovereign at dinner, with Stolypin on his right and the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna on his left. The German Emperor was engrossed in conversation with Stolypin and paid little attention to the Empress. He spoke with Stolypin all through dinner as if reluctant to waste a moment with him. The German Emperor's interest in Stolypin was boundless and after dinner, he said frankly that if he had such a minister as Stolypin, Germany would be elevated to new heights.

The Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich told me in the summer of 1938 about an extremely interesting conversation which he had with the former German Emperor Wilhelm II in May 1938. Sharing with the Grand Duke melancholy memories of all those events which led, by the grievous war of



## STOLYPIN

1914-1918, to the ruin of three great empires, at the end of the conversation Wilhelm II reminisced about Stolypin. Wilhelm said to the Grand Duke:

Almost 20 years have passed since I was forced to give up my throne. During all the years of my reign and for the past 20 years as well, I have attentively observed international events and those statesman who have remained in authority for a long while. I still have never seen a statesman so farseeing, so devoted to both his monarch and his Homeland, so sincerely striving for a peaceful world as the late Stolypin. Bismarck was undoubtedly a great statesman, devoted to the Throne and his Homeland, but without a doubt Stolypin was more far-sighted and capable than Bismarck.

He repeated to the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich his conversation with Stolypin in 1909 during the Björkö meeting with the Emperor Nicholas II, and recalled how Stolypin had forestalled an intolerable war between Russia and Germany. He acknowledged that if God had allowed such a disaster, the enemies of the Imperial regime would have employed the inevitable wartime economic complications to achieve revolution.

Until 1939 the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich for many years represented the House of Romanov in several countries during various festivities. At such events, during conversations about Old Russia, the Grand Duke was constantly reminded how popular the name Stolypin remained as a statesman. He heard from many royal persons and national leaders that Stolypin had been the outstanding statesman of the early twentieth century. According to general opinion, if he had lived and remained in power, World War I would not have occurred nor the revolutions and resulting overthrow of the monarchies. Among the statesmen of 1914 there was neither in Russia nor in the west an individual who could have predicted the distress and misfortune created by the World War.

During my visits with the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich in Paris, he repeatedly reminisced about Stolypin, of whom he preserved clear, bright memories as a person of remarkable character. He considered P.A. Stolypin the most consummate statesman not only in Russia but in all of Europe. He told how the Emperor Nicholas II, in moments of especially difficult internal and external conditions for Russia, had said sorrowfully that among his ministers there was no one to equal Stolypin, who might have kept Russia at peace.

## Chapter 12.

# OPINIONS OF PUBLIC LEADERS ABOUT STOLYPIN

Ariadne V. Tyrkova-Williams, a member of the Kadet Party, wrote on pages 369-370 of her book *Na putyakh k svobode* (On the Road to Freedom) about Stolypin:

There were no inconsistencies in Stolypin's character. He was whole, made of one piece. In him there was no Shcheglovitskii with dangerous cravings toward life. Stolypin mounted the tribunal aware of his rectitude, with firm confidence that he would receive support in the Duma and in the country from those whom he considered to be sensible citizens.

Stolypin was a unique minister, gifted with a genuine talent for oratory. He spoke easily but firmly; in his words one could discern a deep inner gravity. Immediately one felt that he, no less than the eloquent ideologues of liberalism and socialism, was dedicated to his convictions, that he believed in his work, in his mission, and in his ideology. He was a courageous person. If he felt fear, it was not for himself but for Russia. Anxiety for Russia very often resounded in his words. He stood before the opposition not as a bureaucrat, carrying out chancellery directives, but as a high-principled adversary, a patriot defending Russia from all the passions of its nature. His words showed concern. It was with grief that he addressed himself to the left, saying: 'You want a great upheaval. We want a great Russia!'

Former Chief Commander of the Volunteer Army General Denikin, in his book *Put' russkogo ofitsera* (The Path of a Russian Officer), wrote on pages 289-292 about Stolypin:

Stolypin's fate was tragic. A profound patriot, a strong, intelligent, and authoritative person, he liquidated the first revolution and reestablished order in the country with little bloodshed and without shock to the foundations of the state. Although he bound his destiny to the concept of a State Duma, he was forced to dissolve the first two assemblies which were leading the country directly to revolution. Although he was a supporter of the state regime, he nevertheless violated the Fundamental Laws by enacting a new electoral law, that of June 3, 1907, which placed a property qualification on representation, essentially to rescue the very concept of a parliament, which was then threatened with abolition.

## STOLYPIN

He passed agrarian reforms allowing the peasant to leave the commune and strengthening him on his own plot of land. Those reforms, had they been carried to conclusion, would have ended the isolation of the peasant class and solved one of the sharpest and most delicate social questions of Old Russia. In opposition to Stolypin were radical circles which demanded immediate expropriation of the landlords' land for the use of the peasant, as well as Slavophile and noble circles which demanded the preservation of the commune.

Stolypin sincerely sought public support for his government, but he met with incomprehension and rejection. From the radical democrats came demands to transfer all authority to them, from the moderate right declarations that the government was impotent and connected with 'dark forces behind the scenes.'

By the leftists Stolypin was considered reactionary, by the right (court circles, the right sector of the State Council, the unified nobility) as a dangerous revolutionary. Quite simply, there was something suspicious about the fact that Stolypin was killed by a member of a revolutionary battle organization who was working simultaneously for the *okhranka*. In those days not only among Kievans but all over Russia went the rumor that Stolypin 'was killed by the *okhranka*.' There is still no proof of this, or at least I have never encountered it in print. But it is necessary to recognize that the *okhranka* displayed criminal negligence bordering on connivance in this affair.

Although Stolypin attempted in every possible way to support the already wavering throne, he had incurred the Sovereign's displeasure by the end of his career. And if he had not been killed, he would soon have been dismissed.

Stolypin died on the night of September 5. I was in Zhitomir the next day and attended the requiem at which Volynsk Archbishop Antonii served. A remarkable person, highly educated, and a member of the extreme right wing of Russian society, as a member of the Holy Synod he took an active part in St. Petersburg politics. Subsequently, in emigration, Antonii was a dignified metropolitan heading the section of the émigré Orthodox Church, the so-called 'Karlovtskii jurisdiction,' which proved the most resistant to American Orthodox subordination to the Soviet patriarch. But he still showed a reactionary political tendency.

Archbishop Antonii said a few words before the requiem. He coolly reproached the deceased for following 'a policy too far left' and said that Stolypin 'had not deserved the sovereign's confidence.' He stated that he was consoled only by the fact that after being fatally wounded, Stolypin, 'realizing his error,' had turned to the tsarist logo and blessed it with the sign of the cross. The archbishop ended his speech with the phrase, 'We pray that the Lord has forgiven his sins.' Having previously had a high opinion of the archbishop's intellect, I was shocked that he found it necessary to speak in this way about the great statesman who attempted to save the Russian ship of state from sinking, flooded as it was by waves raging from both left and right.

V.A. Maklakov, a member of the Kadet Party and a State Duma deputy, mentioned Stolypin's activities as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in a number of his memoirs. Like A.V. Tyrkova-Williams, he considered Stolypin an outstanding state leader genuinely gifted with oratorical talent and profoundly devoted to Russia. V.A. Maklakov felt that, although it violated the Fundamental Laws, if Stolypin had not passed the act of June 3, 1907, revolution would have occurred in 1907 and 1908. Because of this act, revolution was therefore postponed for ten years.



Addressing himself to demands of the opposition parties in the State Duma about granting full political freedom, Stolypin said in one of his speeches: "If a lunatic were found who, with one stroke of the pen, could accomplish political freedom in Russia at the present time, then tomorrow in St. Petersburg there would be a Soviet of Workers' Deputies which would lead Russia to a fiery holocaust in six months." The truth of Stolypin's prophetic prediction became apparent in March 1917 when the Provisional Government, with one stroke of the pen, accomplished that political freedom upon which leftists and the Kadets insisted. Immediately the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was convened under whose leadership and control the Provisional Government was forced to work. After seven and a half months, the Provisional Government capitulated and terror began. The first victims were members of the Provisional Government, A.I. Shingarev and F.F. Kokoshkin, who had worked so zealously for complete political freedom.

## Chapter 13.

# CONVERSATIONS REGARDING STOLYPIN'S FOREIGN POLICIES

All those individuals who expressed their opinions about P.A. Stolypin to me in oral and written form called him an outstanding statesman only in the area of internal policy. The only person with whom I conversed who referred to P.A. Stolypin as a leader in foreign policy was S.D. Sazonov. It happened in Prague in 1923-1924 during meetings in K.P. Kramarz's home.

During those conversations, a number of Czech political leaders who were sincerely devoted to Russia before its breakdown forced Sazonov's attention to the fact that, although he had always personally, until the revolution, trusted England and France and believed in their friendship toward Russia, after all that had happened in late 1919 and the following years, he had probably changed his attitude toward Russia's former allies. Those conversations about Russia's former allies were obviously extremely burdensome and unpleasant for Sazonov. Kramarz as well as other persons present during these conversations referred to the false friendship of Russia's former allies—England, France, and Italy—which, in late 1919, in the name of the Supreme Council, assisted the dismemberment of Russia by recognizing the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The State Department of the United States in its note of February 7, 1920, stated that the U.S. could not recognize the decision given to the Supreme Council by England, France, and Italy. The United States made its own decision and commissioned Rear Admiral Newton McCauley as its representative to the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia. Concerning the final definition of frontiers for independent Armenia, the United States notified the allies that without the consent of National Russia, no decision could be made. The State Department added that the United States did not want Russia, helplessly caught in the hands of a government which did not represent the nation but enjoyed authority by the sole sanction of brute force, further weak-

ened by a policy of dismemberment planned by other states for their own interests and to the detriment of National Russia. In that spirit, Secretary of State Colby made a statement on March 24, 1920, concerning the Near Eastern question. The United States government categorically declared that no agreement undertaken at that time relative to administration and control over Constantinople and the Straits could be permanent unless it provided for and fully protected the interests of Russia in these questions by stipulating that when Russia should again have a government recognized by all the civilized world, Russia might claim its rights and be heard concerning the measures taken.

Secretary of State Colby sent a similar note to the Italian government on August 10, 1920, concerning Polish claims. He stated firmly that friendship and honor demanded that Russia's interests be magnanimously guarded and, as far as possible, all decisions having vital significance for Russia, especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territory of the former Russian Empire, be postponed.

In October 1919, when the Lithuanian National Committee petitioned the government of the United States to recognize its independent status, the U.S. State Department replied that, consistent with the feeling of friendship and unflinching honor toward that great nation whose brave and heroic self-sacrifice had effected the successful conclusion of the war, the United States could not recognize the Baltic states as separate and independent from Russia.

S.D. Sazonov, after conversations about the U.S. attitude toward Old Russia after the 1917 revolution, so definitely and firmly defending the interests of National Russia in contrast with its former war allies, England, France, and Italy, remarked with great sadness that the late P.A. Stolypin had been correct in concluding that if Russia encountered disaster, all its allies would desert it and only the United States, being disinterested in the dismemberment and ruin of National Russia, would remain its defender.

Recalling Stolypin's statesmanship, Sazonov said that Stolypin rarely interfered, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, in questions of foreign policy. In designating Sazonov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stolypin asked only that Sazonov should avoid any international complications which might provoke war. Stolypin had told Sazonov repeatedly that Russia desperately needed ten to twenty years of peace. After essential reforms had been effected, then Russia need fear no external enemies. For that reason, Sazonov added, not long before his death in 1911 Stolypin had expressed anxiety about the possibilities of international complications and had commented on the extreme necessity to renew the Sovereign's idea about an International Tribunal at The Hague for peaceful settlement of any misunderstanding arising among various states. When



## STOLYPIN

the conversation turned to the League of Nations, still existing then in 1923-1924, Sazonov said sadly that Bogrov's shot on September 1, 1911, had prevented Stolypin from bringing his plans to fruition, his aims that were incomparably broader than those of the League of Nations.

## Chapter 14.

### REMINISCENCES BY FORMER COLLEAGUES OF STOLYPIN

During thirty years in emigration in Constantinople, Berlin, Prague, Paris, London, and Munich, I talked with a large number of persons who were acquainted with Stolypin's activities from business contacts with him in Kovno, Grodno, Saratov, or St. Petersburg. Although many of the individuals with whom I conversed were Stolypin's political opponents, having belonged during the period 1906-1911 to those political parties which consistently opposed him, there was nonetheless not a single person who spoke ill of Stolypin. All his political opponents acknowledged that Bogrov's shot was a great tragedy, depriving Russia of a remarkably wise statesman. They expressed the opinion that if he had lived and remained in authority, he would not have permitted World War I nor the 1917 revolution to occur. Nor would all those people, in spite of their different nationalities, creeds, and political views, have suffered torment in emigration in various countries. They would have remained in their native land, in a Russia developing year by year economically and culturally, especially with such wise leaders as Stolypin who always knew how to handle international relations for the good of the Homeland, and would not have permitted the World War to occur.

Forty-five years have elapsed since Stolypin's death and naturally, few of those persons whom I interviewed are now living. But some of Stolypin's former colleagues who are still in good health, on learning that I planned to publish reminiscences about P.A. Stolypin, have written their recollections of him to me.

Prince A. V. Obolenskii, who presently lives in Stockholm, was Chief Secretary for Governor P.A. Stolypin in Grodno in 1902. He wrote this to me on May 17, 1956:

Peter I was called the Great because of his state activities. Suvorov, with his profound Christian spirit, performed miracles because of his love for Russia,

## STOLYPIN

and its glory meant everything to him. Stolypin combined the positive nature and the good deeds of both Peter the Great and Suvorov. Stolypin thought not of himself but of the welfare of the people and a great Russia. Everyone knows about Stolypin but not everyone pays the respect due him. His statesmanlike courage overwhelmed his enemies and forced them to respect him. But dark forces and treason killed him; by this act Russia was destroyed along with the symbol of its greatness, the Sovereign.

Your book about Stolypin is badly needed. We all die in time, events go on, people change. Meanwhile, few remain of those who knew him and revere his memory. Russians must know their outstanding statesman.

Another former colleague of Stolypin, S.V. Iuriev, wrote to me on August 3, 1956:

In emigration fewer and fewer remain who witnessed the turbulent years of the so-called 'first revolution' of 1905-1906. Especially few are those who are able to pay impartial tribute to the revered memories of those statesmen of Imperial Russia whose firmness and wisdom saved Russia from the fate which befell it after the 'February revolution' in 1917.

The most outstanding figure of that stormy epoch was, without a doubt, Peter Arkadevich Stolypin, whose great form stands before me as if he were still living. It was my good fortune to know him intimately. Everyone should value and sincerely love that man who, in the spring of 1906, was named Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire. As officials in the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, we performed duties for him jointly with officials of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although he was still relatively young, we noticed immediately his sincere and simple manner with us, in direct contrast to his recent predecessor in the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Count S.Iu. Witte, who presented a figure of swagger and arrogance.

Stolypin daily invited those on duty in the two Secretariats to lunch, at which all of his children were present. He was an amiable and hospitable host to us, freely conversing with all present.

I particularly recall the day following the attempt on his life in August 1906 at his Aptekarskii Island dacha. Twenty-six were killed and 27 wounded of those present at Stolypin's reception. Among the gravely wounded were two of his children: his daughter Natalia Petrovna and, less seriously, his small son Arkasha. In spite of family grief and anxiety for his daughter's life, Stolypin did not neglect his duties. He continued to work late into the night in his study at the Winter Palace where, by Imperial order, he and his family resided after the dacha was seriously damaged. God prevented disaster then and preserved Russia's most brilliant statesman.

Especially memorable to me was his speech before the State Duma in the Hall of the Nobility, where Duma sessions were held during repairs to Tauride Palace. While advocating some bill or answering some inquiry, I do not recall which, P.A. Stolypin produced his historic phrase: 'You want a great upheaval; we want a great Russia,' evoking a stormy ovation from the nationalist-inclined deputies but howls from the left wing of the Duma. From the left a certain homely orator stepped forward and began in the rudest and most intolerable expressions to criticize Peter Arkadevich's speech and unequivocally to threaten his life. P.A. Stolypin listened patiently and when the speaker left the platform, he rose from his place in the loge, majestically mounted the platform, and answered with righteous indignation. His reply to the orator rang clearly through the hall, and those two famous words



resounded like the crack of a whip, 'Not intimidated!' The din which filled the hall from both sides is difficult to describe. When we returned to the automobile, P.A. was just as calm and restrained as before. By this calmness and by the gentility of his majestic figure, he commanded respect not only from friends and colleagues but from his political opponents as well.

I recall the envious expressions on certain faces at the wedding at Tsarskoe Selo Palace of the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna and the Duke of Ziedermaland on April 20, 1908. Before the formal dinner which followed the wedding ceremony, Peter Arkadevich was summoned by the Sovereign to an audience with the Swedish King, who attended the marriage of his son to the Russian Grand Duchess. The audience was lengthy. At last the doors opened and out of the Sovereign's study walked P.A. Stolypin in his Hofmeister uniform with a blue ribbon across his shoulders. Those present stood transfixed, thinking that, in spite of its restriction to members of the Imperial family, he had just received the highest order of the Russian Empire, Saint Andrew the First-Called. But it proved to be the ribbon of the highest Swedish order, Serafim, which the Swedish King has just bestowed upon Stolypin.

The shot of a traitor-revolutionary ended the life of that noble and faithful son of Russia in Kiev in 1911. With aching hearts four of us, officials of the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, performed the last of our nocturnal duties, standing watch over Peter Arkadevich's coffin before his burial.

Two years later I paid my final respects to his serene memory, representing the Secretariat at the unveiling of his memorial in Kiev, the monument built with swiftly-gathered popular subscriptions. The Russian people understood what a loss they had suffered in the person of Peter Arkadevich Stolypin and paid respect to his memory by constructing that splendid memorial. But the gravediggers of Russia, from whose bosom had sprung his actual murderer, would not allow the Stolypin memorial to survive. At the very beginning of the February revolution, Stolypin's statue was destroyed and its pedestal as well, under howling directions from dark elements of an unbridled mob.

## Chapter 15.

# REMINISCENCES BY ONE OF STOLYPIN'S ADMIRERS

Few are living today who heard P.A. Stolypin's speeches in legislative sessions and value him as a statesman because of them. But one such person, P. N. Verkovskii, artist, architect, and sculptor, wrote to me on August 15, 1956, relating his memories of P.A. Stolypin under the title, "Landmarks of Life," as follows:

In the life of each person some moments flash like lightning in a dark sky, branded in the memory forever. There have been two such events in my life, parallel and equally impressive. One was the experience of seeing Shaliapin in *Don Quixote*, quietly sinking to earth by a tree saying, 'Sancho, I am dying.' Four words, that was all, but shocking and profoundly moving, indelible, fixed in the memory forever. The other moment came when I learned of the death of Peter Arkadevich Stolypin, perhaps the last prophet sent to us from above who, being killed, was unable to save us and we perished.

The Russian land has suffered forty years of punishment unprecedented in human history. There is confusion today and anxiety for the tomorrow of the whole world. And tens of millions have died innocently, bearing witness to the perspicacity of one who perceived, feared, and was correct to do so. Time has rendered an inexorable verdict. Now on the scales of history are all those who wanted to 'alter the balance of the world' in Great Russia, who worked toward a 'great upheaval' and committed overt crimes in their tragic errors. Stolypin, that great Russian patriot, hero, and martyr, recognized and struggled against the miserable ambition and decadent nationalism of his opponents.

Human history is prepared at times to forgive even crime when committed, for example, by an Ivan the Terrible or a Peter the Great, but it can never forgive meanness, servility, and treason. Stolypin consciously went to his death. And he went in the name of a lofty slogan: 'You want a great upheaval. We want a great Russia!'

He fell in single combat, as a hero at his post. With his profound consciousness of wholesome nationalist emotion and dignity, Stolypin noted the alien western ideology imported by his opponents, intriguing and pompous persons to whom Stolypin always, though at times with secretly wounded ego, referred politely. 'Reading between the lines, I see something nobler, loftier, in everything.'

The immorality and criminality of those political party members lay in their conscious sabotage. Although they could have served both the state and the people, they did not. And what were the wages of treason? Contagion infected the healthy body of the state, spread by the 'germ' of mental confusion, by the fraud of provocation. Oh, of course, there were problems—that of Finland, for example, and several similar 'questions.' But on the other hand we must note that the Tatars remained loyal even in the period of collapse.

There can be no doubt that in the Imperial period, subsequent to Stolypin and up to the 1917 revolution, the Russian state actually made gigantic strides toward wealth and prosperity in all areas of national life, amassing a grandiose material inheritance. This tremendous growth extremely disquieted England and Germany as well as the communist conspirators who realized that accomplishment of Stolypin's plans for peasant reforms would eliminate any possibility for future revolution.

Germany trembled from its neighbor, but the 'allies' wished to extort Russian fruits as the chief victors in the Great War when the material opportunity for this became evident in 1916. Then these forces plus the millions in financial support from remote private sources were united with the 'sealed train' from Germany. They calculated the advantages of the moment well—the psychologically-demoralizing acts by nationalist traitors (today we would say 'fifth columns') and the petty personal ambitions of the political party stratum willing to achieve its goals at any price, even in the feverish conditions of the dreadful war.

The inevitable occurred. The millenium of the state system came crashing down.

But to return to Stolypin and the great days of the State Duma regarding the 'Finnish question.' Was not the Finnish border then the Promised Land? They were obligated to Russia for everything. Russian force of arms had freed the Finns from Swedish slavery wherein they were deprived of the right to own property and to use their own language. A century earlier than Russia, Finland had received its parliament from the Sovereign Alexander II. Its sons were freed from military duty for half-kopecks while at its doorstep lay the gigantic Russian capital with its many potential customers for Finnish products.

Thousands of summer residents and tourists from St. Petersburg brought Finland their tribute. Was this not a harmonious relationship? But treason always finds a path to provocation and here, among the peaceful population, revolutionary corruption was engendered. They basely killed representatives of state authority on the threshold of the Senate which Russia had given them.

Under such conditions, in an 'international arena,' the 'question about Finland' was presented in the State Duma. Only exceptional individuals had access to the audience. After a speech by Duma member Count E. P. Benjigsen, Stolypin stepped forward.

The hall was absolutely packed and one could feel the general strain of nerves and attention. When Stolypin emerged, he did not merely walk, it would seem, but appeared like a vision, with the almost mystical movement of a figure cast in bronze, his characteristic dignity nearly epic in its triumphant simplicity. Only ancient Athens or Rome might have presented a similar sight. His black, double-breasted, tightly-buttoned frockcoat, his dark tie, snowy white collar, the blue-black wings of his hair and beard framed and emphasized his high, noble forehead and the pale hue of his face.

He rose in the center of the hall by the tribunal as if in mystical contemplation and spoke with profound prophecy of the terrible destiny approaching Russia.



## STOLYPIN

Everyone was literally transfixed, petrified in expectation. He spoke simply, calmly, in a muted voice. Quietly, but each sound reached the remote extremities of the huge amphitheater. Having briefly outlined the essence of the situation, he laconically but with inexorable logic depicted the disgrace before all the world of our moral vacillation and national decay in even the greatest state issues. The blackmail and provocation of the trusting masses, the shame of a people great for a thousand years bowing with servility before alien western ideologies, cringing before the outside world.

He paused significantly, then quietly, ever so quietly but with the same inimitable inner strength as the dying words of Don Quixote said, 'They despise us!'

The shock was tremendous, devastating. Everyone was stupefied, as if in superstitious horror. And the confused, morally destroyed Constitutional Democrats, wallowing in despair, began wildly to yell, 'Miliukov, Miliukov!'

From this disgraceful epoch of universal vacillation by the unfortunate Russian 'progressive' political intelligentsia, we were all swept down the slope into the abyss. Miliukov and his associates were finally able to replace Stolypin in the so-desired ministerial armchair but, alas for them, only for a moment before they were dismissed by the ragings of drunken sailors and tossed overboard, along with their 'chairman,' out of the country where they concluded their pathetic earthly pursuits.

'I am cold, I am afraid,' whispered 'minister' Kokoshkin when, ill and abandoned by his disappeared brothers-in-arms, he was caught up in the 'great upheaval.' They found him and they killed him.

This is not only my landmark but the fateful landmark of all the Russian people, a landmark of both spiritual grandeur and vanity.

May the national memory remain of that great citizen, that hero and martyr, Peter Arkadevich Stolypin, in glory everlasting.

## Chapter 16.

### CONCLUSION

I am gratified to publish this small book about Peter A. Stolypin, in order to enable the Russian people, particularly the Russian youth, to become acquainted with the work of the last outstanding statesman of Russia.

More than fifty years have passed since I first knew P.A. Stolypin and recognized that he was not only a remarkable statesman but a great Russian patriot whose principal aim was the welfare of the Russian people and the prevention of possible cataclysm for Russia. During his five years (1906-1911) as Minister of Internal Affairs and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stolypin clearly saw all the shortcomings of the state and, being exceptionally far-sighted, he repeatedly pointed, like a prophet, to the grave disaster approaching not only Russia but all the world unless he was able to implement all those reforms and changes in his plan for reorganizing the national administration of Russia before a world war began.

Especially memorable to me was the last day on which Stolypin received me, in May 1911. After Stolypin had approved what I had written under his direction regarding his projected report to the Sovereign, he told me, "All my plans are directed, on the one hand, toward enacting all my designed reforms within ten to twenty years and, on the other, to finding a way to prevent world war. I am convinced that if we can accomplish all the changes which I have outlined in my report to the Sovereign, then absolute calm will prevail in Russia and perhaps in the entire world. Only a great and powerful Russia, striving neither for conquests nor for subjugation of any peoples, can enjoy regular and peaceful interrelations with all of Europe."

From 1904 on, throughout my life I have become closely acquainted with many ministers and statesmen not only of Imperial Russia but of other nations. I have also read the memoirs of statesmen of Imperial Russia as well as Germany, England, France, and other states. Not one of the statesmen whom I

## STOLYPIN

have encountered, either personally or by reading their memoirs, demonstrated such an accurate understanding of state administration and proper maintenance of its interests and its people as Stolypin possessed. All those individuals who had frequent business dealings with Stolypin found him exceptionally affable and attentive to them, and they have retained warm memories of him through their lives.

I wish to dispel a misconception of many people who knew P.A. Stolypin—the idea that had P.A. Stolypin not been killed in September 1911, he would not long have remained in power because the Sovereign had lost confidence in him dating from April 1911. During his stay in Kiev Stolypin mentioned to Governor-General F.F. Trepov with deep bitterness that he planned to see the Sovereign after the conclusion of the Imperial festivities and ask to be released from the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs. But Stolypin still believed that the Sovereign, warmly loving Russia, would, after careful perusal of his report about reorganizing the Russian state administration, ask him to retain both posts, convinced that no one else could fulfill the plan.

In conclusion I ask the reader to forgive me for several literary errors contained in my memoirs. It has been necessary to abbreviate the contents up to the last moment in order to reduce publication costs.



## Appendix I.

### THE AGRARIAN LAW OF NOVEMBER 9, 1906

28528. November 9. Inscribed Imperial Ukaz Presented to the Senate (Collection of Statutes. November 11, 1906, Book I, page 1859). Concerning the Addition of Several Decrees to Laws in Force regarding Peasant Ownership and Land Tenure.

Our Manifesto of November 3, 1905 (26871), levying dues from the peasant for allotted land, will be abolished effective January 1, 1907. After that date, the designated land will be exempt from redemption dues and restrictions, and the peasant will acquire the right of free withdrawal from the commune, with consolidation of allotments from the communal plots transferable to the householder as his personal property.

It is acknowledged that the legal right to withdraw from communal land tenure will create practical difficulties in most village communities because of such problems as the impossibility to determine dimensions of apportioned sections. Nor is there any law establishing a specific procedure for alienating plots of allotted land to homestead ownership in cases in which owners were not subject to the separate serf act of possession.

Recognizing the necessity to remove from existing statutes the obstacles to actual realization by the peasant of the right due him of separate land, and having added conditions on this subject to the special journal of the Council of Ministers, We, by Article 87 of the Fundamental State Laws published in 1906, do command that:

- I. In addition to Article 12 of the General Regulations concerning Peasants and the footnote to it (Code of Laws, Special Supplement to Volume IX, published in 1902), We decree the following regulations:
  1. Each householder holding allotted land in communal rights may at

any time demand consolidation for himself as personal property the portion due him from the aforesaid land.

2. In communities having had no general repartition in the twenty-four years preceding the application by the individual householder to transfer from communal to personal ownership, there will be assigned for each such householder as personal property, besides the farmhouse plot, all plots of communal land included in his permanent portion (but not including land leased by him).
3. In communities having had general repartitions in the twenty-four years preceding application by the individual householder to transfer from communal to personal ownership, there will be assigned to each such householder as personal property, besides the house plot, all plots of communal land granted him by the community in permanent use ("permanent" meaning until the next general repartition). But if the householder wishes to transfer to personal ownership more land than would be due him on the basis of the last apportionment, then there will be assigned to him in personal property that amount of common land due him by instructions of settlement according to the number of allotment units in his family at the time of the aforementioned application. Surplus land will be assigned as personal property only on condition of payment to the community of its value, based on the average value per desiatine originally imposed on the communal plot as annual redemption dues. Otherwise all aforesaid surplus land will be regarded as communal property.
4. To the householder for whom plots of communal land are consolidated as personal property (Articles 1-3) will be reserved the right to use permanently those haying, forestry, and other lands handled on a special basis (for example, because of productive soil or by special arrangements in the general repartition or on other bases) as well as the right to participate in the communal use of non-repartitional lands such as communal manor land, grazing land, pasture, quitrent matters, and others.
5. The extent of peasant participation in using lands repartitioned on special bases (Article 4) will be determined for householders expressing the desire to transfer from communal to personal ownership to the extent of their participation in using the aforementioned lands at the time of submitting such an application.
6. Requests to assign portions of communal land as personal property

(Article 1) will be presented through the village elders to the community, which will render a verdict decided by a simple majority vote within a month's time from the day on which the application was rendered, indicating the plot being transferred on the basis of Articles 2 and 3 to the personal ownership of the householder and stating also the amount of additional payments, if any (Article 3), and the permanent participation in lands handled on a special basis (Articles 4 and 5). If the community has not reached a decision within the indicated term, then, by petition of the householder making application, all the aforesaid activities will be the responsibility of the local Land Captain, who will investigate any controversial points and render a verdict in the case.

7. Verdicts and decisions of Land Captains mentioned in Article 6 must indicate:
  - a. the number of separate plots assigned as personal property to landholders, as well as the dimensions and the kind of land of each of them;
  - b. the quantity and description of the conditions under which community plots are designated on a special basis (Article 4), and conditions for participation in these lands by the householder transferring to personal ownership; and,
  - c. a description of the unapportioned lands reserved for general use by all members of the community (Article 4).
8. Those involved and interested individuals may appeal community verdicts and decisions of the Land Captains (Article 6) to the District Congress within thirty days from the time such verdicts and decisions were rendered. Complaints regarding community verdicts will be routed through the Land Captain and presented by him, along with his conclusions based on investigations on the spot, to the District Congress. Both appealed and unappealed community verdicts and decisions of the Land Captain will be presented to the District Congress for confirmation.
9. Decisions of the District Congress, based on investigations of complaints regarding community verdicts and decisions (Article 6), will be considered conclusive and will be implemented by village elders or volost' chairmen. Decisions of the District Congress may be appealed to the Provincial Office only in cases exceeding the limits of that department or use of authority in obvious violation of the law.



10. In localities not yet converted to the conditions of the law of July 12, 1889 (6196), those duties entrusted by present regulations to the Land Captain, District Congress, and Provincial Office will be carried out by corresponding officials and institutions.
11. When the householder to whom allotted plots have been assigned as personal property requests it or the commune wishes to delimit the nature of the plots or apply some alternate arrangement to them, land surveying and establishment of the plan will be made by the government in cooperation with the private landowners for whom it is considered necessary to impose restrictions on a localized basis.
12. Each householder to whom separate plots of allotted land are assigned according to Articles 1-11 of the present regulations may at any time demand that the community allot him a consolidated property as soon as possible instead of those plots.
13. When demands for allotments in a single plot do not coincide with general repartition and the allotment indicated is considered inconvenient or impossible by the community, the householder's request may be satisfied with money by mutual agreement. When such an agreement is unattainable, the value will be determined by appraisal of the Volost' Court. However, if the householder making the request considers the value as defined by the Court disadvantageous, he may decline the money and retain the property originally assigned to him.
14. Householdors having already requested property in a single plot before the verdict, as established in Articles 1-11 of the present regulations, has attained legal force, must be granted a single, unified plot by the commune in general repartition. The commune will not be allowed, in this case, to satisfy allotments with money.
15. Disputes arising from plots allotted in one place will be decided on the basis established by the footnote to Article 12 of the General Conditions concerning Peasants published in 1902.
16. The householder transferring from communal to personal possession and his heirs will use the plots assigned as their personal property on the basis of the present regulations until there can be a plot allotted to them in one place and will enjoy equal rights with owners of selected plots. The heirs will also have the right to participate in the use of lands repartitioned on a special basis to the extent that this right was established for the original owners of the

plots, as well as to participate in non-repartitional lands retained on a communal basis.

17. Assignment of allotted plots as personal property will be carried out in accordance with and on the basis of Articles 4-16 of the present regulations and prescheduled redemption on the basis of Article 165 of Regulations concerning Redemption, published in 1876.
  18. Acts of the present regulations (Articles 1-6) will be extended to peasants of all types, and plots from communal land assigned to individual householders as personal property before discharge of redemption dues will be permitted on condition of discharge of part of the debt remaining on the assigned plots.
- II. In addition to effective statutes regarding alienation of allotted land constituting homesteads, it is decreed that:
1. Alienated plots of allotted land occupied as homesteads will be handled according to the general serf regulations (Article 65, Public Regulations, published in 1892).
  2. Ownership of plots alienated to individuals as mentioned in Article 1 may be certified in notarial institutions by one of the following documents:
    - a. serf acts;
    - b. ownership records, various land tenure acts, and statistics of the peasant institutions;
    - c. decisions legally established by the Volost' Court and District Congress of property rights for immovables composing the allotment as well as inheritance in this property (General Regulations concerning Peasants, Article 125, items 1 and 4, and Articles 142, 159, and 161);
    - d. arrangements about alienation, complete to June 25, 1883, in Volost' Administration (General Regulations concerning Peasants, Article 110, item 1, footnote 1);
    - e. confirmation by the District Congress of community verdicts or decisions of Land Captains about assignment in communal use (Table of Statutes, Section I, Articles 6, 7, and 9);
    - f. having attained legal force and been introduced into execution by verdicts of village and settlement meetings about granting plots from communal land as homestead lands of separate householders, as well as about transfer from communal use to

homesteads, division of communal land as permanent, hereditary plots and farmsteads, and verdicts about transfer of an entire community from communal tenure to private ownership of separate plots (General Regulations, Article 62, item 8; Article 66, items 1 and 2; Regulations concerning Redemption, Article 111; Regulations concerning Peasant Ownership, Articles 20 and 21; and Regulations concerning State Peasants, Articles 32-34 inclusive).

In communities with homestead tenure and in communities with communal land use, by confirmation of the Land Captain or a responsible person corresponding to him, or by verdict of village or settlement meeting, alienated plots actually belong to the individual to whom the land is alienated as private property.

3. Verdicts of village and settlement meetings aforementioned in points of Article 2 of the present section (II) will be established by petition of the owner of the homestead and household plots, and confirmed according to the following regulations:
  - a. the aforesaid verdicts, by simple majority vote, will certify ownership by separate householders registered according to the Land Tenure Act not only of full homestead plots but also of portions of them belonging by indisputable possession to separate individuals;
  - b. in obligatory verdicts there will be included information about the number of separate plots, their dimensions, from whom they came, the size and type of land in each plot, as well as detailed descriptions of the location of each plot and its boundaries;
  - c. when precise description of boundaries seems impossible, the verdict must include a plan of the plot drawn up from the account of the landowner;
  - d. the verdict must be registered in a book established for recording verdicts of village meetings (General Regulations concerning Peasants, published in 1902, Article 69), and a copy of it maintained for general information in the Volost' Administration as well as in that settlement where the specific plot is located;
  - e. volost' elders must make, within a week of the verdict, a complete inspection of the site in the presence of three competent persons and, with due haste, present the verdict, with their



- conclusions, for confirmation by the Land Captain;
  - f. within the month following the inspection by volost' elders, the terms of the verdict may be appealed by interested individuals to the Land Captain; and,
  - g. the verdict will not be subject to confirmation if found to be technically inaccurate, or if the requirements stated in the present regulations have not been met, or if controversy about the rights of citizens has arisen, subject to the decision of the court.
4. Copies of the notarial acts indicating allotted lands subject to confirmation by the Senior Notary may be mailed by him to the notary.
- III. In addition to effective statutes determining the rights of peasants to allotted plots as homesteads, it is decreed that:
- 1. homestead plots granted in homestead ownership to the peasant as his allotted land, as well as assignment of the latter as personal property of the individual from communal land, as well as homestead plots held in communal tenure, will compose the personal property of the householder specified by the Land Tenure Act, by community verdict, by decision of the peasant institutions, by the Act concerning Alienation, and by decision of the local courts. Householders and their legal heirs will have such rights to the plots as are mentioned above; and,
  - 2. in cases of plots owned in common by several individuals not related by kinship in directly descending lineage, the plots will remain their common property.
- IV. In addition to Articles 62 and 66 of the General Regulations concerning Peasants and Article 15 of the Regulations concerning Land Tenure of Peasants which settled various titles to lands possessed (Code of Laws, Special Supplement to Volume IX, published in 1902), it is decreed that: transfer of an entire community from communal or homestead tenure to ownership in separate plot will be effected by a verdict established by a two-thirds majority of the peasants having the right to vote in meetings.

The Governing Senate will not delay fulfillment of this decree for more appropriate orders.

**STOLYPIN**

Signed by the hand of His Imperial Majesty:

**Nikolai**

At Tsarskoe Selo

November 9, 1906

Countersigned: Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stolypin

## Appendix II.

# THE WESTERN ZEMSTVO LAW OF MARCH 14, 1911 (the Imperial Decree, verbatim)

## TO THE GOVERNING SENATE

For almost half a century the Russian western provinces have awaited reorganization of the local economy on the basis enacted in the Imperial Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions.

We find it timely to extend to the people of the western region the benefits of local self-administration so long enjoyed in other areas of Russia, recognizing that it is essential to eliminate variations in internal relations. Local conditions in this region are presently administered according to the Imperial Decree of June 12, 1890, the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions. With some modifications, We will undertake to grant these deprived persons a zemstvo administration true to the interests of the Russian population, proper from their historic legacy, and of especially prime importance to the people of this region.

To this end, having approved the special journal of the Council of Ministers presented to Us, We decree on the basis of Article 87 of the Fundamental State Laws, published in 1906, that:

- I. The Imperial Decree of June 12, 1890, the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions (Code of Laws 3, No. 6927), will be extended to the provinces of Vitebsk, Volynsk, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, and Podolsk, with the additions and changes outlined below.
- II. As changes and additions to articles of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions for the six provinces mentioned in Section I, it is decreed that:



1. In the cities of Kiev and Minsk, zemstvo affairs previously managed by the municipalities will be transferred to their public administration, so that the city dumas will exercise the rights and varied duties of district zemstvo assemblies and city councils those of district zemstvo councils. The districts of Kiev and Minsk will have special zemstvo assemblies and councils from these cities.
2. In Kiev and Minsk, provincial zemstvo councillors from these cities will select local city дума members from among themselves.
3. The number of councillors of the provincial and district zemstvo assemblies and the same quantity (in desiatines) of land which grants participation in elective assemblies for election of district councillors will be formed by the attached seven lists.

Qualification on the basis of value of other real estate granting participation in local elective assemblies for election of district councillors (Code of Laws, Volume II, Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, published in 1892, Article 16) will be fixed at 7,500 rubles.

Footnote. The number of provincial zemstvo councillors will be regulated in each district, with at least one councillor elected from rural communities.

4. Priests and other Christian clerics will participate in zemstvo elections equally, on the same basis as other electors.
5. As to the right to participate in elective congresses, besides individuals indicated in Article 24 added to the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, females will be content with conditions outlined in that article and Article 8 of this section, participating only through their representatives. Females will empower their fathers, husbands, sons, sons-in-law, grandsons, natural brothers, or nephews to represent them in elective congresses.
6. Jews, until statutes concerning them are revised, will not be allowed to participate in zemstvo elections and cannot be elected as zemstvo councillors.
7. In each district, elections will be decided by one zemstvo elective assembly and two zemstvo elective congresses.
8. For election of representative landowners to the zemstvo elective assemblies as outlined in Article 24 added to the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions and Article 5 of this section, there will be summoned local assemblies on the conditions determined in the province by representation to the dis-

trict zemstvo councils and zemstvo elective congresses (two). In the first congress will participate individuals having the right to participate in zemstvo elective congresses and owning taxable land in a quantity no less than one-fifth of the number of desiatines fixed for each district in the lists supplemented to Article 3 of this section or by other real estate (not excluding those located in city precincts) evaluated for zemstvo tax purposes no lower than 1,500 rubles. In the second congress, individuals will participate who have the right to participate in zemstvo elective congresses and who own taxable land in a quantity less than one-fifth but no less than one-tenth the number of desiatines determined in the same lists, or other real estate (not excluding those located in city precincts) evaluated for zemstvo tax purposes at less than 1,500 rubles but no less than 750 rubles.

9. Zemstvo elective assemblies and zemstvo elective congresses will be divided into two sections in each district. Each section of the elective assembly will select from its number district zemstvo councillors to the quantity indicated in the lists appended to Article 3 of this section. Over both sections of assemblies and congresses will preside the district Marshal of the Nobility or an individual designated by the governor in agreement with the provincial Marshal of the Nobility.
10. In Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhitsk districts of Vitebsk province, the first section of the zemstvo elective assembly and zemstvo elective congress will consist of individuals of Russian origin. The second section will include other individuals having the right to participate in the elective assembly or congress, based on property qualifications. In the remaining districts of Vitebsk province and in the districts of Volynsk, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, and Podolsk provinces, the first section of the elective assembly or congress will be composed of individuals having the right to participate in the assembly or congress on the basis of property qualifications, with the exception of persons of Polish origin. The second section will include individuals of Polish origin.

Footnote: Those having the right to participate in the zemstvo elective assembly from an institution, community, association, or company (Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, Article 16, item 1) will participate in separate elective assemblies according to their nationalities.

11. In Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhitsk districts of Vitebsk province, the congress for election of volost' candidates to be councillors

from village communities will be divided into two sections, with each section electing from its midst district zemstvo councillors to the quantity indicated in the table appended to Article 3 of this section. The first section of the congress will include candidates of Russian origin and the second will include all remaining candidates.

12. In the lists published on the basis of Article 34 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, individuals having the right to participate in elective assemblies and congresses will be distributed to the district zemstvo councils by section, according to Article 10 of this section.
13. In Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhitsk districts of Vitebsk province, lists of those elected by the volost' meeting as their candidates for councillors will be forwarded by the volost' elders to the district zemstvo council no later than twenty-four hours after conclusion of the election. On the basis of these lists, the council will compile a special list of candidates for each separate congress.
14. Any question regarding irregular compilation of lists will be decided conclusively in the Main Department of the Governing Senate, at a hearing conducted by the Ober-Procurator, by majority vote of the Senators present; in case of a tie, the opinion of the individual serving as chairman will be decisive.
15. Sections of the elective assemblies will proceed with elections only when two-thirds or more of the councillors subject to election and no less than three persons are present. In case the indicated number of electors is not present, all individuals present in the separate elective assemblies will be admitted as councillors. If only one individual is subject to election, there must be at least two electors in the section and one will be designated by lot.
16. If all the councillors are not elected in the separate elective assemblies by the procedure indicated in Article 43 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, either in the congress of candidates or its sections, then by the final ballot on that same day or, at the discretion of the assembly, on the following day, there will be additional elections in which the individuals receiving the most votes will be considered elected.
17. In the case of additional elections, indicated in Article 16 of this section as well as in Article 50 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, individuals may be



elected as councillors who have already undergone voting without receiving a majority of the votes.

18. Candidates for councillor from village communities will be elected in volost' meetings to the number of two from each meeting.
19. In the Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhinsk districts of Vitebsk province, by decision of the provincial zemstvo and city affairs office, volost' meetings from areas with householders of different ethnic origins may be divided into two sections in the same manner as that outlined in Article 11 of this section for separate congresses, each to be composed of no fewer than three householders, for election of candidates from among them.
20. In cases specified by Article 53 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, the Minister of Internal Affairs may acknowledge the need to prolong the term of representative councillors elected in the preceding three years, applying this measure only in case of an insufficient number of councillors from those separate elective assemblies or congresses of candidates from village communities or final sections which elected less than two-thirds the number of councillors subject to election. Councillors whose terms are to be continued another three years, as indicated in the present article, will be enrolled by elders receiving them for election by electoral points; in case of equal points, the councillors will be chosen by lot.
21. For election of provincial zemstvo councillors, the district zemstvo assemblies in each of the districts listed below will be divided into two sections:
  - a. all districts of Minsk provinces;
  - b. all districts of Volynsk province (excluding Kovelsk and Ovruchsk);
  - c. all districts of Podolsk province (excluding Letichevsk);
  - d. the districts of Vitebsk, Drissensk, and Lepelsk in Vitebsk province; and,
  - e. Berdichevsk, Vasilkovsk, Lipovetsk, Rogachevsk, and Senninsk districts in Mogilev province.

The first section will be composed of district zemstvo councillors not of Polish origin and the second, councillors of Polish origin. In the Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhitsk districts of Vitebsk province, the first section will include district zemstvo councillors of Russian origin and the second, other councillors. Each section will

- elect provincial zemstvo councillors to the quantity indicated in the schedule which is Supplement I to Article 3 of this section, from among those individuals composing the section.
22. Personnel of the zemstvo council (Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, Article 96) will be so elected that the majority vote in the council will belong to individuals registered in the electoral lists of the first-nationality section and to councillors elected from village communities. In the Dvinsk, Liutsinsk, and Rezhitsk districts of Vitebsk province, the majority voice in the council must belong to individuals of Russian origin.
  23. In cases indicated in Article 119 of Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, the chairman and members of the council must be persons possessing the property qualifications fixed for participation in zemstvo elective assemblies or in zemstvo elective congresses.
  24. Besides the individuals specified in Article 56 (1906 revision) and Article 57 (1906 revision) of Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, managers of sections of the Peasant Land Bank will participate as individual representatives of it in the provincial zemstvo assembly and district assembly subject to it, if the Peasant Land Bank manager possesses full qualifications determined for each district according to the schedule appended to Article 3 of this section.
  25. Besides the individuals specified in Article 56 (1906 revision) of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, the Kiev provincial zemstvo assembly will include the city head of the city of Kiev, and the Minsk provincial zemstvo assembly will include the city head of the city of Minsk.
  26. Representatives of the Department of State Property and Appanages (Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, revised 1906, Articles 56 and 57), managers of sections of the Peasant Land Bank or its individual representatives (Article 24 above), and delegates from the Ecclesiastical Department cannot be selected as chairmen or members of councils or as provincial zemstvo councillors.
- III. It is decreed that, in the six provinces specified in Section I of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, zemstvo assemblies will be opened after measures specified in Articles 48-50 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo

Institutions have been taken, and two-thirds of the district councillors have been elected.

- IV. Upon formation of new zemstvo institutions in the six provinces specified in Section I, there will be abolished:
  - a. provincial and district committees and councils for matters of zemstvo economy;
  - b. itinerant units of senior and junior engineers established on the basis of Article III of the Imperial Affirmation of May 3, 1899 (Code of Laws 3, No. 16829) according to the opinion of State Council offices; and,
  - c. state offices to provide village medical and veterinarian aid as well as schools for medical assistants and midwives.
- V. To the newly-constituted zemstvo institutions will be transferred matters of local economy now handled by local committees and councils.
- VI. The newly-constituted zemstvo institutions will receive matters of local economy now handled by local committees and councils.
- VII. The Minister of Internal Affairs shall:
  - a. determine terms and order of transfer to newly-constituted zemstvo institutions of matters to be placed under their jurisdiction, and arrange to acquaint them with the latest instructions concerning the original acts of the specific institution, conforming to the Imperial Affirmation of May 25, 1864 (Code of Laws 3, No. 40934), establishing the rules for implementing Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, and
  - b. arrange for elections of zemstvo councillors for the first three years in the six provinces specified in section I for the abbreviated terms published in the electoral lists, making statements about correction of them, handling complaints, and finally publishing the lists (Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions, Articles 34, 35, 36 [1906 revision], and 37).
- VIII. Individuals occupying abolished offices have the right to government employment, and will receive new appointments or remain as staff personnel on a general basis, with the following exceptions:
  - a. individuals appointed to serve in newly-constituted zemstvo institutions of these provinces at a salary no less than that of the position which they occupied will lose the right to retention of government employment, and
  - b. individuals occupying abolished offices, by continuing service in



newly-constituted zemstvo institutions of these provinces, will retain the rights and privileges appropriate to their previous offices, not excluding rights indicated in the Statute concerning Pensions and Single Grants (Code of Laws, Volume III, published in 1896, and revisions of 1906 and 1908).

- IX. Provincial officers for city affairs in the six provinces specified in section I will be reappointed to provincial offices for zemstvo and city affairs, with personnel composed as indicated in Article 8 of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions.
- X. There will be extended to the provinces of Vitebsk, Volynsk, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, and Podolsk, instead of Article 51 and footnote 2 to Article 52, and Articles 3512-3521 and 3533-3548 of the Code of Statutes of Institutions of Learning and Boarding Schools Department of the Ministry of Education (Code of Laws, Volume XI, part 1, published in 1893 and revised in 1906), active Articles 50 and 3469-3511 of this Code, by the 1893 edition, with subsequent additions and changes.
- XI. In addition to the subjects of articles of the Code of Statutes of Institutions of Learning and Boarding Schools Department of the Ministry of Education for the six provinces specified in section I, it is decreed that:
  1. Only individuals of Russian origin may preside over school councils. If the Marshal of the Nobility or that individual who is authorized by law to preside does not meet this requirement, then he shall be removed from office and the presidency shall be entrusted to the senior official of the civil administration who is of Russian origin.
  2. In cases of schools with Roman Catholic, Evangelical Lutheran, or Evangelical Reform pupils, individuals of these creeds shall participate in the council with the right of decisive vote, these individuals to be selected by the Roman Catholic bishop or by members of the Evangelical Lutheran consistory or the Evangelical Reform synod.
- XII. For secretarial expenses of school councils in the six provinces specified in section I, there will be assigned by a projected estimate for 1912 250 rubles per year from facilities of the State Treasury to each provincial and district school council. For 1911, secretarial expenses for newly-constituted school councils will be handled from the state expenditure budget for 1911.

- XIII. In Vitebsk, Minsk, and Mogilev provinces, to the provincial and district school councils constituted to replace the present management of public schools will be transferred the business of the abolished department as well as its personnel.
- XIV. In addition to the rule in Article 2 about traveling expenses in the province, introduced in the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Institutions (Code of Laws, Volume IV, Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes, published in 1899, footnote 2, Article 33), it is decreed that: In Vitebsk, Volynsk, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, and Podolsk provinces, capital for special travel expenses will be produced annually by compulsory deduction from provincial zemstvo revenues in an amount corresponding in percent to sums assigned according to Article 1 (1906 revision) appended to Article 124 (footnote 2) of the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes, according to zemstvo taxes in 1910, with formation in each province of special capital accounts, the general sum to be calculated by estimates subject to the provincial zemstvos.
- XV. Relative to values of real estate and arrangements for apportionment of the zemstvo tax levy in 1912 in Minsk province, it is decreed that:
1. In case, at the time zemstvo institutions are introduced, the value of real estate for zemstvo taxation according to the rules of supplement 341 (1906 revision) of the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes has not been determined, then the acts of the aforementioned rule will be postponed until its determination, but no later than December 1, 1911, with the following changes:
    - a. In case the bill for the common basis of value of real estate is not confirmed by the state chambers, then the order indicated in Article 32 of the rules appended to Article 341 (1906 revision) of the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes will be considered and confirmed by a special commission consisting of personnel determined according to point b below; if the governor or administrative state chambers disagree with the opinion of the majority of the members of the commission, the matter will be presented for a decision to the Minister of Finance, by agreement with the Minister of Internal Affairs and the department involved;
    - b. The commission mentioned in point a, above, will be composed, under the presidency of the governor, of the provincial Marshal of the Nobility, the vice-governor, officials of the

administrative chambers, the head of administrative land matters and state property, the district Marshal of the Nobility, permanent members of the provincial office for zemstvo and city affairs, the chairman and members of the provincial council on matters of local economy until its abolition, the city head of the city of Minsk, and individuals designated by the governor (two from each district chosen from persons residing permanently in the district and owning real estate taxed by the zemstvo levy); and,

- c. Permanent members of the district council on matters of local economy will participate in the district evaluating commission until abolition of these councils.
2. By final district evaluating commission estimates, various real estate and city dwellings in accordance with Articles 33-35 of rules appended to Article 341 (1906 revision) of the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes, the order and terms of appeals indicated in Article 36-41 of those regulations as well as the institutions in force for objections and complaints will be handled until their resolution independently from the terms specified in Article 1 of this section.
3. On the basis of apportionment of the zemstvo tax, zemstvo institutions will, in 1912, apply the value produced according to rules stated in Article 1 of this section, without waiting for their conclusive confirmation in the order indicated in Articles 36-41 appended to Article 341 (1906 revision) of the Regulations concerning Zemstvo Taxes.

XVI. Until January 1, 1912, expenditures of the zemstvos of the six provinces specified in section I will be maintained as were those of provincial zemstvos introduced in acts of the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions, exempted by Section II of the Imperial Affirmation of June 12, 1900 (Code of Laws 3, No. 18862), subject to the opinion of the State Council about establishment of maximum limits of zemstvo taxation, and in the provinces where the Regulations concerning Provincial and District Zemstvo Institutions have actually been introduced, facilities of the State Treasury on the basis of Section V of the Imperial Affirmation of May 5, 1903 (Code of Laws 3, No. 22906), subject to the opinion of the State Council about institutions in the forty-six provinces of European Russia about police guards, Section VI of the Imperial Affirmation of April 19, 1904 (Code of Laws 3, No.



24389), subject to the opinion of the State Council concerning increased figures in the forty-six provinces administered by the General Institutions, Section III of the Imperial Affirmation of December 29, 1905 (Code of Laws 3, No. 27166), and the opinion of the State Council about introduction of police guards in all provinces administered by the General Institutions.

- XVII. Fixed monetary zemstvo taxes in the provinces of Vitebsk, Volynsk, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, and Podolsk, as well as future special expenditures, will be provided for these provinces by special statute, with the exception of expenses indicated in Article 6 of Section XII of the Imperial Affirmation of April 2, 1903 (Code of Laws 3, No. 22757), subject to the opinion of the State Council about reorganization of institutions managing matters of local economy in nine western provinces.

Signed by the Hand of His Imperial Majesty:

Nikolai

March 14, 1911. At Tsarskoe Selo.

Countersigned: Chairman of the Council of Ministers,  
State-Secretary

Stolypin

## POSTWORD

### About Alexander Zenkovsky

It was really by coincidence that my father, Professor Alexander Zenkovsky, head of the financial and budget division of the Kiev Zemstvo from 1903 to 1919, met Chairman of the Council of Ministers Peter A. Stolypin. Unlike Stolypin, who belonged to a highly aristocratic and wealthy family, my father was a self-made man. He came from minor South Russian (or what is now called Ukrainian) nobility. His grandfather, a cavalry officer, ruined himself helping to pay, according to the custom in several Russian regiments, the gambling debts of a fellow-officer, and later became a priest. My paternal grandfather, the principal of a gymnasium, died at age forty when my father was only thirteen years old. My grandmother decided that my father would have to work to support the family (retirement pensions were small and the family was large). So my father found work as a court clerk. Even so he graduated from the gymnasium, then from the University of Kiev, and soon became a leading financial specialist for nearly all of southwestern Russia. I remember that his friends used to say, "The real specialists in local and state taxation, budget, and finance were Blatov in St. Petersburg, Ivanov in Moscow, and Zenkovsky in Kiev."

In 1903, when the Kiev Zemstvo was created, Count Ignatiev was its chairman. He knew my father from the Syndicate of Landowners, where my father was head of the financial division, and invited him to take over all the fiscal, financial, and budgetary affairs of the Kiev Zemstvo. In subsequent years when Ignatiev went to St. Petersburg to discuss problems of zemstvo taxation, he took my father with him. In discussions with the financial commission of the State Council, Ignatiev and my father were able to persuade the State Council to permit zemstvos to increase taxes in order to broaden the activities of the self-government. In 1906, when Stolypin became Minister of Internal Affairs, Ignatiev again took my father to St. Petersburg. The idea of providing the zemstvo with a broader financial base greatly impressed Stolypin. Afterward, when my father would go to St. Petersburg to defend allocations to the Kiev Zemstvo or to

obtain higher taxes to improve the zemstvo's work, he would meet Stolypin. Despite the discrepancies in their positions and ages (Stolypin was 48 in 1910 and my father was 32), they apparently had a great deal in common. Both were ardent patriots, both cared primarily for improving the conditions of the Russian people, and both were practical, no-nonsense persons. Moreover, my father was one of the best genuine financial specialists in Russia while Stolypin had little experience in that field.

Besides Count Ignatiev, Stolypin learned about my father from my father's brother-in-law, A. Delov, a high official in the Ministry of Finance and one of the foremost specialists in the field of taxation. But Delov's specialty was state taxes while my father's was zemstvo taxes and, more broadly, business organization and general financial problems.

During my father's visit to Stolypin in May 1911, Stolypin dictated to him his ideas for reforming the Russian government. He asked my father to prepare a more detailed report, with further elaboration of financial arrangements. My father set to work but, unfortunately, Stolypin was assassinated that September in Kiev. Since Stolypin's policies had been sharply attacked both by the left and the extreme right, my father decided to keep the notes secret and not forward them to anyone in St. Petersburg. That his caution was well-founded may be judged from the introduction to this book by Stolypin's daughter, Maria Petrovna Bock. She writes that immediately after Stolypin's death officials from St. Petersburg confiscated all of her father's papers, including his notes about the proposed reforms.

In the fall of 1912 my father accepted the chair of state and Zemstvo finance and business organization in the Business Institute of Kiev. While teaching there he continued his work in the zemstvo and many other organizations until his departure from Russia in 1920. Subsequently he was professor of Business Administration in Berlin and Prague. He published several books in Russia on zemstvo organization and zemstvo finance, taxation, and budget. He also authored several articles in Russian professional financial periodicals and numerous reports to the zemstvo congresses in the pre-revolutionary years. His last work in the financial field, *THE TECHNIQUES OF BANKING*, was published in Paris in 1928.

Stolypin's notes dictated to my father became his most valued treasure. He kept them in a safe deposit box in Kiev and upon leaving Russia he took them with him. A difficult life in emigration and other circumstances prevented my father from publishing those remarkable documents. But as he felt the end of his life approaching and because he was living in the freer atmosphere of the United States, he decided to publish the notes, supplementing them with his and



## STOLYPIN

others' reminiscences of Stolypin, as well as Stolypin's speeches in the Russian Parliament, both in the State Duma and in the State Council. That is how my father's book, *PRAVDA O STOLYPINE*, now appearing in English translation, came to be.

When my family left Russia I was still a boy, and I knew nothing about the notes my father cherished. Later, when I was a man, my father talked to me quite often about his encounters with Russia's greatest statesman of the twentieth century and about Stolypin's role in Russian politics. He was firmly convinced that had Stolypin not been killed by a revolutionary (who was, strangely enough, simultaneously an agent of the secret police), Russia would never have become involved in the war of 1914 and would have been spared revolution and subsequent catastrophes. On a couple of occasions he showed me the green notebooks in which he had recorded Stolypin's dictation of the government reorganization plan. When he decided to publish his book about Stolypin and the proposed reforms, he asked my cooperation since I was a historian of Russia. Unfortunately, I was too involved in building my own life in the United States, a new country for me, and I lived too far away to help him. My father resided in New York while I served on the faculties of several universities quite far from him—in Bloomington, Indiana, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in Florida, and in Colorado.

In 1964, after the Russian edition of his book had already appeared, I received a telephone call from New York. It was a policeman who told me that my father's neighbors had called, having learned that my father was gravely ill, and he urged me to come to New York immediately. Arriving there, I found my father in the hospital. From an oxygen tent, he asked me to do several errands for him and to take care of his second wife (my mother had died in 1954), who was also gravely ill and in the hospital. Preoccupied with the illnesses of my father and my stepmother, as well as the sale of their house in Queens, I did not think about the green notebooks which my father treasured, nor did I think to ask him about them. Perhaps he turned them over to the East European Archives of Columbia University, for which he had done research on pre-revolutionary Russia and the Russian *zemstvo*, or, perhaps, I overlooked them while clearing out the house, which was sold very rapidly after my father's illness. My father lived another two years and he passed away in 1966, being almost 88 years of age.

I am convinced, as a historian and not only as the son of Alexander Zenkovsky, that his book about Stolypin is of profound historical importance. It contains extremely valuable ideas of P.A. Stolypin. Unfortunately, these ideas

and his reforms never materialized and, six years after Stolypin's death, Old Russia disappeared.

Serge A. Zenkovsky  
Professor Emeritus,  
Vanderbilt University  
Daytona Beach, Florida

February 1984

From the Translator:

This English-language edition of PRAVDA O STOLYPINE is a tribute to the memory of three devoted Russian patriots: Alexander V. Zenkovsky, Peter A. Stolypin, and Maria Petrovna Bock. It is dedicated to those who have encouraged its production: Victor A. Patoski and Serge A. Zenkovsky. All royalties will go to the St. Pantaleimon Monastery on Mt. Athos.

Margaret Patoski  
Texas Wesleyan College

# INDEX

- Aerenthal, L. A., 15  
 Agrarian Law of November 9, 1906, 2,  
     5, 7, 11-14, 20, 28, 44, 61, 80, 83,  
     121-128  
 Agriculture, Ministry of, 36, 44, 89  
 Akimov, M. G., 25  
 Alexander Mikhailovich, Grand Duke,  
     99-100, 105  
 Alexandra Feodorovna, Empress, 105  
 Amur Railroad Construction Law, 1907,  
     10-11, 62  
 Antonii, Archbishop, 108  
 Archangel Mikhail, Union of, 99  
 Army Staff credits controversy, 17-18,  
     61-63  
 Arseneva, Elizaveta Alekseevna (Stoly-  
     pina), 1  
 Article 87 controversy, 27-29, 75-83,  
     103, 105  
 Azef, Evgenii Filippovich affair, 15-17,  
     62  
 Bennigsen, E. P., 117  
 Bezak, F. N., 104-105  
 Bilimovich, A. D., ix  
 Black Hundreds, 98  
 Bock, Boris Ivanovich, vii-viii, 103, 105  
 Bock, Maria Stolypina, vii-viii, ix, x, 7,  
     141  
 Bogrov, Dmitri, 97-98, 102-103, 112,  
     115  
 Bosnian crisis, 15, 17, 45, 52, 62, 98,  
     105  
 Burtsev, V. L., 15-16  
 Centrosugar, 92  
 Colby, Bainbridge, 111  
 Commerce and Industry, Ministry of,  
     30, 32, 39, 41, 43  
 Creeds, Ministry of (proposed), 34-35,  
     42  
 Dediulin, General, 100, 101  
 Delov, A., 141  
 Denikin, Anton I., 107-108  
 Dikov, Admiral, 18  
 Dmitri Pavlovich, Grand Duke, 105-106  
 Durnovo, P. N., 16, 25-27, 65, 74-75  
 Dyakov, I. N., 102  
 Education, Ministry of, 36, 40-42, 89  
 Education, Primary Law, 1908, 14, 61,  
     89  
 Edward VII, England, 20  
 Electoral Law of June 3, 1907, 6-8, 9,  
     58-59, 100  
 Ferrero, Gulliermo, viii  
 Finance, Ministry of, 33, 36, 38-40, 41  
 Finnish "question," 117  
 Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 41, 48-49  
 Fortresses, abolition of in Russian  
     Poland, 1910, 22  
 Franco-Russian alliance, 1894, 21  
 Golovin, F. A., 8  
 Grey, Sir Edward, 19-20  
 Guchkov, A. I., 9, 17-18, 23, 27, 46,  
     60, 62, 63, 64-65  
 Ignatiev, A. P., 87  
 Ignatiev, N. P., 87  
 Ignatiev, P. N., 86-88, 140-141  
 Internal Affairs, Ministry of, 31, 42, 47,  
     90  
 International Parliament, The Hague  
     (proposed), 50-54, 111-112  
 Investigation, Utilization, and Exploita-  
     tion of Natural Resources, Ministry  
     of, 35-36, 40, 41  
 Iuriev, S. V., 114-115



- Izvolskii, A. P., 15  
 Jews, restrictions on, 33, 36, 43, 73-74, 130  
 Justice, Ministry of, 41, 46-47  
 Khomiakov, N. A., 10, 19, 23  
 Kokoshkin, F. F., 109, 118  
 Kokovtsov, V. N., 3, 18, 21, 23, 28-29, 38, 43, 87, 91-93  
 Kovalevskii, M. M., 71  
 Kramarzh, K. P., 110  
 Krivoshein, A. V., 20-21, 23, 44  
 Krizhanovskii, S. E., 6, 7  
 Kulyabko (police head), 97, 102-103  
 Kurllov, General, 100, 101, 102-103  
 Labor, Ministry of (proposed), 30-31, 32, 42, 43  
 Land Tenure Commission, 12-13  
 League of Nations, 111-112  
 Lithuanian National Committee, 111  
 Lizogub, F., 95  
 Local Self-Government, Ministry of (proposed), 30, 31-33, 41, 42, 47  
 Lopukhin, A. A., 15-16  
 McCauley, Rear Admiral Newton, 110  
 Makarov, A. A., vii  
 Maklakov, N. A., viii  
 Maklakov, V. A., 28, 64, 108  
 Maria Feodorovna, Dowager Empress, 26-27, 28, 99-100, 104-105  
 Maria Pavlovna, Grand Duchess, 115  
 Meyendorff, A. V., ix-x  
 Meyendorff, V. F., 60  
 Military Commissariat, 46  
 Miliukov, P. N., 9, 13, 19, 21, 118  
 Mosely, Philip E., v  
 Nabokov, V. D., 99  
 Nationalities, Ministry of (proposed), 33-34, 42  
 Navy, Ministry of, 41, 46  
 Naval Construction, Dreadnoughts, 19, 61  
 Naval General Staff controversy, 1909, 17-18, 61, 62-63  
 Nikolai Mikhailovich, Grand Duke, 99-100, 105  
 Obolenskii, A. D., 73  
 Obolenskii, A. V., 113-114  
 Obrastsov, V. A., 14  
 October Manifesto, 7  
 Ozol, I. P., 6  
 Patoski, Margaret, 143  
 Patriarchate, restoration of, 34-35  
 Peasant Land Bank, 12, 23, 44  
 Pikhno, D. I., 24  
 Possessions and Holdings/Imperial Family, Administration of, 48  
 Provisional Government, 62, 95, 109, 118  
 Public Health Care, Ministry of (proposed), 36-37  
 Rein, Academician, 102  
 Resettlement, Ministry of (proposed), 44  
 Ridiger, A. F., 17-18  
 Rodichev, F. I., 10, 13  
 Russia's Relations with  
     Austria-Hungary, 15, 17, 21, 33, 45-46, 52, 53, 62, 98, 104  
     Bulgaria, 14-15  
     China, 21-22, 62  
     England, 19-21, 53, 54-55, 62, 110-111, 117  
     France, 20, 21-22, 53, 55, 110-111  
     Germany, 15, 20-22, 45-46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 106, 117  
     Italy, 110, 111  
     Japan, 22, 46, 62  
     Lithuania, 111  
     Serbia, 15  
     Turkey, 14  
     United States, 55-56, 110-111  
 Russian People, Union of, 14, 60, 99  
 Russian Steamship Line and Trading Society, 78  
 Russo-Japanese War, 46  
 Savich, N. V., 60  
 Sazonov, S. D., 50, 110-112  
 Shidlovskii, S. I., 13, 64  
 Shingarev, A. I., 13, 78, 99, 109  
 Skorapadsky regime, Ukraine, 95  
 Social Security, Ministry of (proposed), 30, 32, 34, 42, 43  
 State Bank, 41, 44-45

- State Comptroller, 41, 45  
 State-Owned Property, Department for  
     Administration of, 47-48  
 Steinheil, F. N., 99  
 Stolypin  
     Aleksei Arkadievich, 1  
     Arkadii Alekseevich, 1  
     Arkadii Dmitrievich, 1  
     Arkadii Petrovich, 5, 82, 114  
     Dmitri Arkadievich, 1  
     Elizaveta Alekseevna (see Arseneva)  
     Natalia Petrovna, 5, 82, 114  
     Nikolai Alekseevich, 1  
     Nikolai Arkadievich, 1  
     Maria Petrovna (see Bock)  
 Sukhomlinov, V. A., 18  
 Tagantsev, N. S., 78  
 Tikhomirov, Lev, 103  
 Tolstoy, Leo N., 23-24  
 Toynbee, Arnold, viii  
 Transportation, Ministry of, 41, 42-43,  
     46, 78  
 Trepov, F. F., 101-103, 120  
 Trepov, V. F., 25-27, 65, 74-75  
 Trotsky, Leon, 103  
 Tyrkova-Williams, Ariadne V., 107, 108  
 Uvarov, A. A., 60  
 Verkovskii, P. N., 116-118  
 Viborg Manifesto, 4-5, 99  
 Volkovich, Professor, 102  
 War, Ministry of, 45-46  
 Western Zemstvo Law of March 14,  
     1911, 24-29, 63, 65, 66-83, 88, 90,  
     93-94, 99-100, 103, 105, 129-139  
 Wilhelm, II, Germany, 20-21, 105-106  
 Witte, S. Iu, 25, 36, 42, 71, 75, 81  
 Zamiatin, General, 5  
 Zenkovsky, Serge A., 96, 140-143  
 Zinoviev, N. A., 68

**BERSERKER**  
**BOOKS**

