

# STEPAN BANDERA



## Selected Works

VOLUME 2

# **BERSERKER**

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## **BOOKS**

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the best features of a military organiser-commander. Circumstances did not allow the work to be expanded to its fullest extent. However, what was done under Shukhevych's leadership in the OUN military centre in Krakow, in the officers', sergeants' and riflemen's training courses and camps in Krakow and in all western marginal lands, the quality and results of this work, gave the best successes that could not have been expected given the conditions and means of work.

It is impossible to present all the activities of the Military Branch of the OUN Revolutionary Leadership in this article, but we can only touch upon some of its most important points.

All military personnel were recorded and organisationally covered by the membership and supporters. The work with ready-made professional forces was planned, as well as military training work with personnel who had no military knowledge. All servicemen with army (regular) sergeant major and petty officer training have been assigned their functions and tasks in their current work, and their mobilisation assignments have been planned for the future. Higher military courses, petty officers' courses and specialised courses were organised to supplement, refresh and disseminate the military knowledge of petty officers and non-commissioned officers.

The plans, system and methodology for using military knowledge gained in regular armies for military work in these conditions were developed. Plans and methods of organising and operating revolutionary military formations, partisan and insurgent movements were developed. Studies of military labour were initiated and organised. Lists and sets of military literature were compiled. Work on military textbooks has begun. Programmes and plans for various types of military training have been developed. Several teams of instructors were organised. A number of training courses were held, and training camps were organised, in which a large number of members received basic marksmanship training. The most capable graduates of these courses were sent to further, sub-officer and senior officer training, thus supplementing the cadre of members with military, or at least theoretical, training.

From the ranks of the cadets of that time came many capable officers of the UPA.

. The mobilisation plans of the Military Centre for the deployment of soldiers in the event of a Soviet-German war became the main

the work of the OUN Leadership in preparing the so-called "Marching Groups", in which OUN personnel from the western peripheral Ukrainian lands, Poland, Germany and, partly, Transcarpathia were to move to the Central and Eastern Ukrainian lands. The intensified military work among the general membership had a very positive impact, creating a state of moral and organisational militarisation and mobilisation that enabled the Organisation to carry out the work and struggle on two fronts that filled the period of the German-Soviet war.

The OUN's military training took place in secret. They provided mainly theoretical knowledge, but little practical military skill, which can only be acquired in the army, in the field, with weapons. Therefore, the OUN used the opportunity to fill military and armed units with its members under conditions that did not entail any political or military obligations, but which allowed for proper military training. Such units were, among other things, guard units.

In early 1941, an opportunity arose to train two Ukrainian units, approximately the size of a kuren, in the German army. German military officials who were favourably disposed towards Ukraine's state independence and wanted to have an ally in Ukraine in the fight against Moscow agreed to organise this. They disagreed with Hitler's policies and his imperialist plans. Within the limits of their capabilities, they quietly contributed to the organisation of Ukrainian independence forces, including the military, and to the preparation of their actions, hiding this from the eyes of the Nazi Party as a matter of military and technical importance rather than political. At the same time, they were guided by German military and political advice, realising that Germany's positive attitude to the independence struggle of Ukraine and other nations would give it the most confident allies in the war against Bolshevik Moscow, while Hitler's colonialist plans and the seizure of the so-called Lebensraum would only gain it new enemies, increase military difficulties and make military victory impossible.

Political and conceptual differences between the party, government, and army, in particular over Germany's eastern military policy, although not manifested in an outright political conflict, existed and were active, particularly at the beginning of the war with the USSR.

The Military Staff and the OUN Leadership, discussing the situation and prospects

We unanimously decided to use the opportunity to organise and train the designed Ukrainian units with the help of German military factors. In doing so, we took into account, first and foremost, our own plans, adopted in connection with the military threat from Germany and the USSR. In the midst of military events, we planned to broadly deploy our own anti-Bolshevik struggle, moving from revolutionary underground to insurgent actions. For this purpose, it was necessary to form its own military forces. On the territories where the Bolshevik occupiers would be defeated, to proclaim the restoration of the independence of the Ukrainian state, to form its government and build an independent state life, without looking back at Hitler's plans. Outlining such plans before the outbreak of the war, the OUN leadership considered it the first and most important thing that during the war events and the changes that would begin to develop on Ukrainian soil, the Ukrainian people would take a distinct position, show their strong will to state independence, and shape their own lives. Germany had to reveal its true attitude to the will of the Ukrainian people and the facts they created, so that the shape of the relationship - friendship or enmity - could be immediately clear.

The political meaning of the creation of the Ukrainian military unit in cooperation with the German army was that it was also intended to manifest the will and position of Ukraine, which does not wait passively during a war on its territory, but fights for its independence. The military units of the Ukrainian Nationalist Units (DUN) had to prove that Ukraine was ready, in addition to its own revolutionary struggle, to put its army on the front against Moscow in alliance with Germany, if it respected Ukraine's sovereignty and treated it as an ally.

Germany's final position was to be determined only after at least part of Ukraine had been liberated from the Bolsheviks. If Germany was friendly to Ukraine, the DUN kurin was to be the nucleus of the regular army of the Ukrainian state. In the event of a negative development of events, which was also foreseeable, there would be one practical benefit: modern training of officers, petty officers and riflemen, who would have to find a way to return to the ranks of the OUN underground to create and supplement its revolutionary military forces. But the entire department faced a challenge on this path

an unusually difficult political task - to demonstrate their loyalty to the OUN's independentist line and to break away from collaboration with the Germans.

Such plans were outlined by the OUN leadership in the spring of 1941 with the participation of the Hon. Roman Shukhevych. The entire Organisation was facing a difficult stage, but it was particularly difficult for the planned military department of the Ukrainian Nationalist Squadron. Therefore, the selection of people for it had to be particularly careful. The greatest burden and responsibility fell on the leader of the department. The OUN Leadership appointed Hon. Roman Shukhevych, who volunteered to go with the unit. He decided to take this step because he took into account the great difficulties and responsibility of the tasks facing the OUN. He foresaw that this department would play a special role in the formation of the military force of the liberation movement and in the development of its armed struggle. This was a natural path for Shukhevych. He followed this path with all the determination of his character, leading the entire DUN unit, successfully transferring it through the difficult stage of association with the German army and bringing cadres of excellent, well-trained officers and riflemen under the UPA's battle banner.

When sending a DUN unit to the German army for training, the OUN set its own preconditions, which were accepted by the German military officials who organised the case. The main preconditions were as follows:

The task of the department is to fight against Bolshevik Moscow for the restoration and defence of the Independent Ukrainian State. The entire unit is under the order of the OUN Leadership and is bound by an oath. The OUN Leadership decides on the department's involvement in hostilities, and only with its consent does the department carry out related orders. The unit is subject to the German military authorities within the framework of military training and military life, and is bound by a special oath, but does not take any German military oath.

The department maintains its own internal regulations. The OUN Leadership's Military Reference Board grants military degrees and establishes the command structure of the DUN department.

With the outbreak of the German-Bolshevik war, the DUN department led by Roman Shukhevych moved towards the front. On its way, the department conducted independent political work everywhere, in connection with the action

OUN. In particular, he took an active part in the restoration of Ukraine's state independence and in the organisation of state life in Lviv and other localities in June and July 1941.

The Nazi government quickly laid its occupying hand on Ukrainian statehood and all independent activity. This hand also encroached on the units of the DUN. They were pulled from the front; attempts were made to squeeze them into the framework of German policy and the military machine; they were required to take an oath. Refusal and resistance, mass internment, transfer to Belarus, up to the disbanding of the unit and the arrest of some of its members and the transition of most of the officers and soldiers into the underground. This is a story that cannot be recounted here, even in the most general terms.

The final phase of the war had the right ending: Roman Shukhevych returned to the revolutionary ranks of the OUN, along with a respectable number of officers, petty officers and riflemen of the DUN, having received not only good military training but also solid training and practical military experience. What they brought with them was knowledge of the organisation, strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare used by the Bolsheviks in the Second World War and German methods of defeating guerrilla units. This knowledge was very useful in the creation of the UPA and in the development of its struggle. Thus, the Wives of Ukrainian Nationalists (For more information about the DUN, see the book: "Wives of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1941-1942".

Munich 1953. Published Nasha Knyazbirnya. Pp. 128.) under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych provided the Ukrainian Insurgent Army not only with a core command and military cadre, but also with a basis for developing its own organisational and operational methods.

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When a crisis situation arose in the OUN in 1943, one of the main, perhaps the most significant, reasons for it was the question of the plan, forms and methods of the Organisation's revolutionary struggle in the existing military circumstances. The membership, both grassroots and leading, who led the Organisation's activities on the ground, felt the need of the hour, and were committed to a broad deployment of the political and armed struggle against Hitler's oppression and destruction of Ukraine. In particular, in Volyn, the regional OUN began to switch to insurgent forms of struggle against

participation of the broad masses of the people, given the need to defend the population from being taken to Germany for slave labour, from Hitler's terror and plunder.

The internal crisis in the OUN ended when Roman Shukhevych became the new head of the organisation. Roman Shukhevych became the head of the Organisation and gave it the direction of its activities and struggle that was required by the times. He based his plans primarily on an assessment of the internal state of the OUN's active personnel and the broader masses of the Ukrainian people - their situation, needs, moods, moral readiness and critical capacity for active struggle. It was clear to Shukhevych that at a time when the Nazis were pushing their terror and exploitation in Ukraine to the extreme limits, and at the same time their military successes and strength were beginning to decline, the Ukrainian population was maturing in its readiness and need to launch a broad struggle.

This struggle, in addition to defending the people against Hitler's extermination, was in the plan of further development of the liberation struggle. Among the enormous events and catastrophes of the world war, the underground struggle of small size cannot have greater external significance or response than in times of peace. In such circumstances, only actions of such forms and sizes that are equal to military events or have a significant impact on their development attract attention.

The OUN leadership, and Roman Shukhevych in particular, had this in mind when they shifted the liberation and revolutionary struggle to the broader framework of the UPA insurgency. It reached its peak at the end of hostilities on Ukrainian lands, when German troops were retreating and the Bolshevik occupation was moving further and further west.

The OUN, having left the previous framework and forms of its action, organised the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, giving it the main command and military personnel. The UPA created ever larger formations and moved to larger military operations, which tied up entire enemy divisions. Large swathes of Ukrainian land came under the de facto control of the OUN-UPA, which organised and managed the most important sectors of national life. At first, the Germans tried to stop this development and break the OUN-UPA with large-scale destructive police and military actions. When this, and their situation on the fronts deteriorated further, they were forced to respect the strength of the Ukrainian revolution, avoid clashes with it, and even seek



Armistice. This was used by the UPA and OUN in a situation of shifting fronts to strengthen their forces and supplies and to move on to fight the Bolsheviks better prepared.

Along with the expansion of the forms and size of the struggle, the structure of the liberation and revolutionary movement was also expanded. In addition to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was created as the highest body of revolutionary and state character, with the expectation that organised forces of other Ukrainian political trends would actively participate in it and in the liberation struggle. Every total struggle, including a revolutionary liberation struggle, requires a unified leadership. To ensure such unanimity, the top leadership of the OUN-UPA-UHVR liberation formation was concentrated in one hand: Roman Shukhevych-Tur-Chupryyka, Lozovsky (Lozovsky

- Roman Shukhevych's pseudonym as head of the General Secretariat (Prime Minister) of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council, from 1944 to 1950) was at the same time the head of the OUN leadership, the UPA commander-in-chief and the head of the General Secretariat of the UGVR. This concentration was caused by the expediency and needs of the struggle itself, not by Shukhevych's personal claims, nor by any totalitarianism or dictatorial system of the OUN.

What was the future prospect for the liberation and revolutionary struggle, what was the plan, when, as the military fronts moved westward out of the Ukrainian lands, towards the end of the war with Germany, revolutionary struggles in insurgent forms were massively and widely deployed? There was more than one answer to this question, as there was no single, dominant opinion about how the international situation would develop after the end of the German-Allied war.

Many hopes were linked to the belief that the Western allies, after the victory over Germany, would immediately go to war against the USSR or, at least, threaten to force the Bolsheviks to give up a significant part of their new conquests. Some of the leading figures of the Ukrainian liberation movement also succumbed to such hopes and considered it expedient to develop their struggle and activities in this way. For them, the deployment of loud and widespread insurgency in the final stages of the war made sense because it was supposed to be a good start towards the Western allies. Firstly, it was about demonstrating and emphasising

the fact that the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation movement fought against Hitler and therefore had grounds for allied relations with Western powers. Secondly, it was necessary to show the strength and combativeness of this movement in the fight against Bolshevism so that the West would properly assess the value of Ukraine as an ally against the USSR. From this point of view, that the launch of Western alliances was the most important issue of the liberation movement, there were tendencies to change its internal content and face to suit the tastes and desires of the Western leadership.

The spokespersons of this concept would have been ready to put everything on the line in the hope of an imminent Western war in the USSR and active support for the insurgency in Ukraine. They also took into account the possibility that, if the Western powers did not go to war with the USSR on their own initiative, the outbreak of a broad insurgency in Ukraine, and then in other sub-Bolshevik countries, including satellite ones, could prompt the West to come with active military assistance and get involved in a war with the . Such considerations, without any real basis, were born out of a sense of hopelessness among people who did not see how the revolutionary liberation movement could survive in the sub-Bolshevik reality without external support after its wide deployment in the insurgent forms of the UPA.

But the OUN leadership that remained in Ukraine continued to lead revolutionary and liberation struggle, and in particular its soul and head, Roman Shukhevysh, interpreted the matter differently. His thinking, planning, and actions, as always, and in the situation at the time, were not based on a favourable conjuncture or external assistance, but on the requirement to 'sustain', build up the forces and struggle of the Ukrainian national liberation revolution on their own. Relying on one's own strength, on one's own struggle, which is the basis of the OUN's liberation concept, was a matter of deep conviction and a guiding principle of action for Roman Shukhevysh. He understood the Ukrainian liberation revolution as a deep process that should involve the entire nation, as a continuous struggle, regardless of the situation, as a constant maintenance and renewal of the existing revolutionary forces. This was the basis and necessary prerequisite a victorious liberation uprising in a favourable situation.

The broad struggle of the OUN-UPA under the leadership of Roman Shukhevysh, at the end of the war and now after its end, had as its main goal

to spread the ideas and cries of the Ukrainian liberation revolution among the entire Ukrainian people and among other peoples enslaved by Bolshevism. In particular, the masses of soldiers from the Soviet army moving through the Ukrainian lands had to learn about this struggle.

The UPA's insurgency and the inextricably linked political and propaganda activities and mass anti-Bolshevik actions organised by the Organisation became known in all corners of the USSR. Not only did they spread revolutionary cries and methods of revolutionary anti-Bolshevik struggle everywhere, but also, through the large scale and intensity of revolutionary insurgency, they showed the people the great power of the anti-Bolshevik revolution and convinced them of its real possibility.

Similarly successful were the guerrilla and propaganda raids outside Ukraine - in the Caucasus, Belarus, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. This period of widespread action by the UPA, although it cost many victims of the best fighters, firmly established the foundations for the continuation and later broader deployment of the revolutionary and liberation struggle with the participation of the entire nation and for the development of a common liberation and revolutionary front of all peoples enslaved by Moscow.

Maintaining insurgent forms and sizes of struggle in the years after 1947 was too difficult and no longer finite. Both the international situation and the internal situation in the USSR began to enter a state of relative stabilisation for a longer period of time. After the ideas and actions of the liberation revolution were widely spread, the most important task was to ensure the existence and action of revolutionary forces for a long time, so that they would not be excessively exhausted and the spark of struggle would not be extinguished. It was necessary to limit those forms of revolutionary action that were most difficult to sustain, in which the most strength was lost, and to preserve and develop those that gave the greatest durability.

In this reorganisation, Roman Shukhevych's extraordinary leadership skills were once again revealed. Always looking far ahead, he was able to see and gradually, but consistently, change the tactics of the struggle from insurgent to partisan and then to purely underground. The main emphasis is shifting more and more from the military to the political and propaganda sphere. The UPA units and their operations are constantly shrinking, while the OUN underground and its network are strengthening.

The UPA command and military personnel again move to the organisational

active forms of the OUN. All these changes are made by Shukhevych as the UPA Commander-in-Chief and as the OUN Leader in the Ukrainian Lands. For him, the entire revolutionary struggle, all its forms and active forces are one thing, one process. Just as the UPA emerged from the bowels of the OUN, just as the ideas, plans and cadres of the OUN were active in the UPA's struggle, so again the banners and nuclei of the UPA are preserved in the OUN and through its struggle, in order to unfold in full breadth at the right time.

Ten of the most difficult years of the OUN-UPA's struggle in the post-war sub-Bolshevik reality have passed. To understand its full significance, we must remember: how many people would have believed in 1944-45 that this struggle would last for ten years in such circumstances? And today, there is a widespread belief that the Bolsheviks will not be able to break it in the future, and they are forced to acknowledge its resilience out loud!

This is the greatest merit of the incomparable ideology, heroism, sacrifice and combativeness of all the OUN-UPA cadres and the Ukrainian population, which supports them with full dedication, and the far-sighted, wise and courageous leader, . Roman Shukhevych and the entire leading cadre led by him.

The heroic death of Shukhevych-Chuprynka-Tur is the greatest loss of the Ukrainian liberation movement, which shook it for many years. But it will endure the heaviest blow, because the spirit, faith and courage of its greatest leader and commander, Gen. Chuprynky-Tura.

## **Idea and man in an ideological movement**

*The seeds of the ideological, political, structural and operational conflict between the OUN Central Committee and the UVR, sown in 1945 by some people (Mykola Lebed, head of the UVR Foreign Office, Lev and Daria Rebet, Ivan Fryniokh and others), germinated for years and finally bore its poisonous fruit in February 1954, the "deuce", and with it a split in the OUN ranks. A small number of members of the OUN Central Committee created an opposition to St.*

*Bandera and tried to "reform" the OUN Central Committee in accordance with the "will of the Land", that is, with the confessional demands of the OUN Leadership in Ukraine- As it turned out in later years, this "will of the Land" was a provocation by the Moscow MfB, which was lucky to catch alive: R. Shukhevych's successor, Col. Koval-Lemish (real name: Vasyl Kuk) and a member of the UVR's ZP, Vasyl Okhrymovych, who was exiled to Ukraine. In an attempt to mimic the OUN Leadership in Ukraine, the Moscow Chekists sent a radio dispatch demanding the creation of a "Troika of Commissioners" to carry out a change in the OUN leadership. The dispatch was received by M. Lebed and other oppositionists through American factors and demanded that Stepan Bandera immediately fulfil the "order". Bandera immediately fulfilled the "order of the Krai". The "three commissioners" were to include: Lev Rebet, Zynoviy Matla, and "Byllyho" (Stepan Bandera). However, Stepan Bandera's prudence and quick orientation hit the Bolsheviks. Bandera's prudence and quick thinking defeated the Bolshevik provocation and preserved not only the OUN's leadership, but also the purity of the ideas and programme positions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Oppositionists were removed from the ranks of the OUN, and the extensive information on the actual state of affairs, which was disseminated by the OUN leadership, alienated the Ukrainian public. This information also included articles by St. Bandera's articles published in 1954 were also part of this information.*

*The first of these was an article signed "CAC" - "Idea and Man in the Ideological Movement", published in the weekly "Peremohy Peremohy", Munich, year 1, part 2, 7 March 1954; reprinted in the collection of articles "Bolshevism and the Liberation Struggle", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, part 5, ed. ZM OUN, 1957, pp. 229-233.*

In any ideological or political movement, two main components play a crucial role: the idea and the person. Leading ideas and

ideological principles in an ideological movement and guiding programme statements in a political movement create the "soul", the essence, the inner content of the movement. The people who recognise, disseminate and implement the ideas and programme and actively participate in the movement for this purpose create its living, functioning organism.

The two main components of an ideological and political movement - the idea and the person - are equally important and necessary for its existence and development; without both, it cannot develop and operate. The quality, strength, and historical role of every ideological and political movement depends equally on the quality and dynamics of its ideological composition and its human resources. The best ideas and programmes cannot shape life and development unless they have apostles and fighters, people of strong character, faith, passion, dedication and rank. Similarly, a community of strong, businesslike and fighting people must have some bigger ideas and goals to create lasting value, to be able to shape the life and development of a nation, a part of it, or more nations for a longer time.

Despite the equal importance and necessity of these two factors, there is a difference between them, such that one is permanent and the other is variable. The leading ideas and programmatic positions of an ideological and political movement remain fundamentally unchanged; their change, the rebirth of the internal ideological content of a movement, is in fact the emergence of a new movement in place of the old one. Even if the same human composition, name, organisational forms, field of activity and methods of action remain, a new movement is created with the change of the internal ideological content.

The human composition of ideological, political and social movements is another matter. It is constantly changing. A human unit is a cell in a living organism. New ones arrive to replace some that die or become inactive or leave. How long does a movement have a living force, a ground for its development and a basis for the growth of human forces

- Its personnel is supplemented by new people, new generations of active participants. When this process of growth is slowed down, when it stops for internal or external reasons, then the movement weakens, fades, and dies.

The issue of new human resources is of paramount importance for

maintenance and development of each movement. In particular, revolutionary and liberation movements that engage in direct political and armed struggle and therefore suffer heavy losses in their human resources must, with the greatest tension and amidst the greatest difficulties, replenish their ranks with new personnel. The harder the struggle, the more victims it makes, and at the same time, the higher the demands places on the quality of each participant, including their ideological and moral values, character traits, dedication to the cause, and their comprehensive training. Only those revolutionary movements that are inspired by high, impulsive ideas, whose cadres, their struggle and their entire activity are imbued with the highest ideological intensity - burning - are able to close this scissor blade. Such movements retain their vitality and dynamics even when they go through periods of very significant reduction and weakening of their existing cadres, due to excessive blood loss in the struggle, which is not equal to the gain of new forces. In periods of such quantitative weakening, the action automatically decreases, the size of the direct struggle decreases, and therefore executions also decrease, until it reaches a balance, an alignment. But the surviving vitality, the attracting power of the movement's ideas, which is still alive, even in small cells and in minor manifestations of struggle, hides a great potential force that, in the right circumstances, will burst into a great flame and develop into a powerful revolutionary movement.

The situation is worse with movements whose basic ideas, programme principles or general political line reveal their weakness, fail to withstand the test of life and struggle. In this case, they not only lose the possibility of growth and victory, but also cease to be a source of ideological uplift, faith, sacrifice, and inspiration for competition and rank for the already mobilised, active personnel. This leads to their decline.

It also that the ideological and political foundations of a movement retain their relevance and appeal to the majority of its active participants and to the wider public, but some of its former supporters become disillusioned or, for various reasons, fall under other influences and are drawn to another direction. The normal consequence of this situation is that these people leave the movement.

However, it happens that they form a separate group that remains within the organisational framework of the mothers' movement and begins to act

in the direction of removing from it the previous guiding ideas or political line and replacing them with other, opposing ones. This is a phenomenon of internal ideological or political destruction, the disintegration of the original movement. The emergence and operation of a group with a different political and ideological direction, albeit from the same personnel, within the movement is a phenomenon of ideological or political hype. This alien or even opposing direction tries to develop on the body of the old movement in a parasitic way: to use its personnel, means and achievements, to push out its ideological and political content and take its place.

Such phenomena are rarely a consequence of the internal development and state of a given movement. They usually emerge in the process of and as a result of the ideological and political struggle of a given movement.

In pursuit of its goals, every ideological and political movement has to compete with opposing trends and forces. In particular, the liberation movement is in a protracted struggle not only with the immediate enemy, but also with various forces, currents and factors, both external and operating within the Ukrainian environment, which are hostile to its political goals and actions. The enemy and opponents always attack the ideological and political positions of the movement and the people active in it.

The struggle in the ideological and political plane is not only about directly opposing the ideas and goals of a given movement to those of the enemy. Opponents and enemies aim primarily to weaken the positions and line of the liberation movement by any means necessary. To do this, they use indirect means of internal undermining and ideological disruption. If the liberation movement begins the process of replacing its ideological positions and political line with another direction, albeit one that is also unfavourable and undesirable to the enemy, they rejoice at the very negative, disruptive consequences for the liberation movement.

The attack on an active person in a movement by enemies and opponents is also carried out in different ways. It is not always focused on trying to destroy or paralyse the action of active movement members. Often, the goal of the enemy's actions is to break down the active members of the movement by various ideological and political means. This is followed by efforts to ensure that such



ideologically or politically fractured people to join your side and make them an instrument of internal decomposition in the movement, or at least to involve them in any other direction that, once transferred to the middle of the movement, would create disruptive enzymes. From this side, the liberation movement faces the greatest dangers.

If we take into account the heterogeneous means used by the enemy and hostile forces in attacking a human unit, usually amid extremely unfavourable conditions for the life and work of active participants in the liberation struggle, we must always take into account the breakdown of not only individual units but also entire groups. Creating an ideological and political disconnect within the movement, the emergence of internal ideological and political sabotage, causes the greatest damage. If such internal seating is done in the form of attempts to move the movement not to completely opposite, hostile positions, but only to adjusted, somewhat closer positions, this does not reduce its harmfulness; on the contrary, it is calculated to reduce the healthy reaction of the movement's personnel and to increase the scope for corrupting actions.

In such a situation, preserving the movement, its direction, content and efficiency requires disclosing the essence of destructive tendencies, identifying and eliminating all those elements that for whatever reason have joined the pest action. Every process of decomposition is fraught with the danger that healthy cells will become infected.

It is very difficult to restrain, neutralise and treat diseased cells by the internal action of the movement's vital forces on them in the context of fighting the enemy or countering the onslaught of opponents. And it is completely inappropriate to leave someone else's ideological and political innovation in the middle of the movement, even though it emerged from the movement's own cells, but began to act and develop on its body like a mote under the influence of constantly acting external factors. In such cases, it is necessary to identify and eliminate everything that, while remaining within the movement, has begun to act to its detriment. This is the ultimate way to preserve both of the most important components, the active forces of the movement - the idea and the person - its carrier and fighter. If the elimination of germs and decay products preserves a healthy and capable whole organism, then all losses are compensated for in further development.

## Why not act on the Troika's actions?

*In this article, published under the signature of Stepan Bender in the weekly "The Future of Ukraine", Toronto, year VII, no. 13/254, 27 March 1954, and in "The Way of Victory", Munich, year I, no. 4, 21 March 3. 1954 p., the author publicly clarified many cases related to the sabotage of the ZP UWVR and the "twosome" ("Twosome", two members of the so-called "Collegium of Three Commissioners", Lev Rebet and Zinoviy Matla, who in February 1954 who in February 1954 recognised themselves as the "Collegium" and "acted" to take over the OUN Central Committee by force), which he touched upon in letters to OUN members, or which were discussed during meetings of the OUN Central Committee in January 1954.*

The settlement of the ideological, political, structural and operational conflict between the OUN Foreign Parts and the group of the UHHR Foreign Representation, which was to be carried out by the College of Three, turned into a new schismatic action of the "Two" of L. Rebet and 3.

Matla, which deepens, exacerbates and spreads the existing conflict. This outcome, which is completely opposite to what the College of Commissioners was supposed to aim for, is not accidental, but reveals the true intentions of the forces at work.

Knowing that these intentions will be strongly condemned and rejected by the entire patriotic society, their authors and carriers try to hide them. Therefore, they create a fog of formalism, distortions and false explanations around the case. But this is in vain. The facts of malicious work and unacceptable means in the actions of the "Deuce" are so clear that their nature cannot be obscured by anything. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out the essential points of the preceding development in order to demonstrate the true positions and intentions of the actors. And even more importantly, it is necessary to pay attention to the deeper hidden goals and ultimate consequences of the schismatic action that is being carried out under the name of the UGVR group, in particular its most recent manifestation, the action of the so-called "Deuce".

Attempts to eliminate the differences between the OUN Central Committee and the UHHRU, which equally recognise the liberation and revolutionary movement in Ukraine as their mainland, have a history. In 1950, the OUN leadership in the Ukrainian Lands took on the role of arbitrator in this case, and agreed to

OUN Foreign Parts, which was approved by the Third and Fourth Conferences. However, the group of the UGVR rejected the extensive draft basis for the unification (with clarified positions on all essential issues) presented in the document "The position of the OUN Leadership in the Ukrainian Lands on various controversial or topical issues abroad". Other attempts to resolve the conflict failed, including negotiations in August and September 1953.

In all the negotiations, the two sides presented themselves in two different styles. The OUN foreign units interpreted the conflict and its resolution in terms of substantive - ideological, political, conceptual and structural - issues, seeking a solution in what was the content of the differences. Less attention was paid to formal issues, believing that they should not interrupt the content, but only frame it. Instead, the UHHRU group, through its representatives, always put things in the plane of formalism, looking for solutions, positive or negative, and avoiding substantive confrontation of positions.

However, in their activities, both the OUN Central Committee and the UHHRU group consistently pursued and stubbornly defended their largely opposing positions - ideological, political and conceptual, related to the structure and course of action of the liberation movement. Only the OUN Central Committee openly recognised them and fought for them. The other side pushed their positions, looking for different hazes to do so. Hence their tactics - to hide behind a formalistic staging and use it to ensure the implementation of their concepts, a competition that gave them no chance of victory.

In August 1953, the UGVR Foreign Representation submitted to the OUN Leadership two texts, now published in part 216 of the Ukrainian Samostoynyk, ("Ukrainian Samostoynyk", Munich, year of publication. V, part 10/216 of Sunday, 7 March 1954, "Decision of the OUN Leadership in the Ukrainian Lands in the case of Stepan Bandera"), as a message from the OUN Leadership on the UZ. The first of them contained accusations against me and against some of the personnel in Ukraine, and the content of the second

— There was a power of attorney for L. Rebet, 3. Matla and Byilikha ("Byilikha" — Bandera's pseudonym) to take over the leadership of the OUN.

The origin of these texts is still . Although their content

were addressed to the OUN Central Committee, they did not come from Ukraine through an organisational route (and such a route existed and still exists), nor were they addressed to the OUN Central Committee. The UHHRU did not provide any explanations as to the date of the messages, how they were received, etc.

Instead, the same accusations and statements presented in the above-mentioned document were the content of various oral and written speeches of the UGVR group, and were dissected (or invented) by it even , for example, in a letter from the ZP to the IV Conference of the OUN Central Committee. In addition, documentary evidence from the OUN in the Ukrainian Lands since the summer of 1953 states that the UGVR group has been falsely informing the OUN Leadership on the UZ about the political situation abroad and has been attracting American factors to give the Leadership in Ukraine a negative attitude towards the OUN Central Committee and a positive attitude towards the UGVR, with a tendency to influence the attitude of the OUN Leadership on the UZ.

Nevertheless, the Leadership of the OUN Central Committee continued to make efforts to resolve differences and conflict with the group of the UGWR in order to bring it off the path, in accordance with the wishes of the Leadership in Ukraine and the resolutions of the Fourth Conference. Therefore, when, after unsuccessful negotiations in August-September 1953, the UGWR refused to negotiate with the OUN Foreign Parts other than through the Troika, the OUN ZC Leadership agreed to transfer the conflict resolution to that board, the unclear origin of the project.

The Collegium of the Three Commissioners did not come to the point of resolving the conflict because there was no real agreement on essential issues. "The Troika is trying to hide this fact by specially selecting and compiling some of the relevant documents and their interpretations to create the impression that the Troika broke up for insignificant, formalistic reasons. With this illumination, L. Rebet and 3. Matla are beating themselves up with this light, because it raises the question: why did they take such a harmful, divisive action over some minor, formalistic disagreements?

In the long negotiations of the Troika, in accordance with the resolutions of the Conferences and the position of the Leadership, I consistently argued that the content of the agreement should be the return of the so-called opposition to the nationalist positions of the OUN Central Committee, in particular: the direction of the ideological inclinations of the UGVR group, which is slipping towards Marxism; its return to the line of

the principled independent policy of the OUN Central Committee, the dissociation of the UGVR from any attempts to create a common front with the Moscow emigration imperialists and from foreign influences in this direction; maintaining the intended political role, strength and implementation of the resolutions of the OUN Central Committee Conferences and respect for the activities of the OUN Central Committee and its legal and structural foundations. The inherent task of the Board of Three Commissioners was to bring about ideological, political, structural and operational unity in the foreign part of the revolutionary liberation movement.

L. Rebet and 3. Matla, after long negotiations, formally agreed to such a basis, and the Troika signed a document: "Plan and some clarifications to the activities of the temporary leadership of the OUN Central Committee". The document partially recorded the above resolutions, leaving the rest in the nature of an oral agreement. However, in further development, it became clear that this was not a real agreement on the line of the OUN Central Committee, but only a manoeuvre to seize power from the OUN Central Committee.

According to Rebet and Matla's plan, first of all, the Troika had to obtain dictatorial and uncontrolled power in the OUN Central Committee, and the two of them had to use it, acting in concert against the third. This would have given them the formal opportunity to reorganise the entire OUN- Central Committee in such a way as to change the ideological and political line of the OUN- Central Committee, imposing the line of the ZP group by mechanical dictatorship. It is no longer necessary to prove that this Two really had such plans, because this is most clearly manifested in its current work.

In order to conceal their true plans, and at the same time to ensure that they could implement them against the will and guidance of the integrity of the OUN-USA, Rebet and Matla sought a special legal and formal position for the Board, namely that it acted only the mandate of the OUN Leadership in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, that it had extraordinary, dictatorial competences, superior to all the organs of the OUN Central Committee, and that its task was to reorganise the OUN Central Committee on the basis of the claim that this part of the Organisation had received a vote of no confidence from the Leadership in the Ukrainian Lands. For the same reasons, they did not want to agree to definitions that obliged the Collegium of Three to implement its base, to adhere to the resolutions of the OUN ZC Conferences, thereby preserving the ideological and political line of the ZC, and to respect the laws, structure and will of the integrity of the Foreign Parts. Neither of them wanted to agree to the following binding statements: that the task of the Board was to

conflict; that its temporary assumption of leadership should be based on a mandate also from the OUN Central Committee and should be within the constitutional framework; that the resolutions of the OUN Central Committee Conferences unconditionally bind the Board and that the breakdown of the College of Three, or its inactivity, will not create chaos in the Central Committee, and that the Leadership elected by the Conference will only resume its activities.

Due to disagreements in these cases, it did not come to the constitution and activities, nor to the transfer of the leadership of the OUN Central Committee to it. Negotiations continued in this matter. But L. Robet and 3. Matla, without waiting for their final conclusion, began a separate action of the "Deuce", acting as a Board of Commissioners, without the participation and against the consent of the third, without testing and transfer of functions from the OUN Leadership, contrary to what they themselves had signed in the document "Plan and Clarifications" ... - and creating a new split, contrary to the wishes of the Organisation in the homeland. On 13 February this year, they formally broke off the negotiations on the Troika case.

The schismatic actions of the "Two" - Rebet and Matla - fully reveal the goals that they and their patrons had from the very beginning under the guise of a combination, to capture the OUN Central Command and lead them along the path the UGVR group was following. If they failed, they would break off at least a part of the group, undermine the OUN Central Command, and create confusion. No one familiar with the case could count on the acquisition of the whole or at least a significant part of the Organisation by the separate actions of the "Deuce". This leaves the second plan - the creation of a new subversion within the liberation and revolutionary movement, which would be filed under the name of the OUN Central Committee of the "Dvijkar" type. The first consequence should have been the weakening of the OUN Central Committee and the crippling of its loyalist activities.

This action, which is essentially a continuation of the same previous work of the UGVR group, is deceptively disguised "submission to the authority and decisions of the OUN Leadership in the Ukrainian Lands". This hemming and hawing is not only designed to facilitate the scheduling work and increase its impact abroad, but is also deliberately aimed at much further. Firstly, in this way they want to drive a wedge between the OUN in the Ukrainian Lands and the OUN Central Committee, to distinguish between the two parts of the Organisation. This is what comes to the fore in this action. The "twosome" and the "twosome" are trying to create, in the name of the Leadership in Ukraine, such fait accompli that would be the subject of a conflict between

by both parts of the OUN and shifted the responsibility for that schismatic action and its consequences to the Leadership in the Krayina. In particular, everything is concentrated on creating a contrast between Koval (Koval was the pseudonym of Chuprynka's successor, who, after his death, began to act as the head of the OUN leadership in the Ukrainian Lands, but was soon arrested. This would have resulted in internal struggle, decomposition, and the complete weakening of both parts and the whole of the liberation and revolutionary movement. These would be the final consequences if it were possible to create a conflict between the OUN in the Krai and the ZC.

The harmfulness of the whole plan does not diminish the statement of the "Deuce" group

- The UGVR's ZP said that they wanted to reform the OUN Central Committee and maintain unity with the Krai, and reduce those who did not follow them to the role of an emigrant group cut off from the Krai. They combine this with the instilling of anti-nationalist, pro-Marxist positions in the ideology and programme of the foreign part of the OUN, and through it, the regional part of the organisation, as well as an orientation towards foreign forces, dependence of the Movement on them, and resignation from the independence of the policy of the Liberation Movement. Nationalist cadres will never follow this path, neither in the Krai nor abroad. And if they did, it would be tantamount to the ideological and political liquidation of the nationalist liberation movement. Therefore, nothing can make the intentions of the schismatic group more harmful, except for one thing: their lack of prospects for success.

It is not necessary to find out how strongly the decomposition work of the "deuces" was opposed by the nationalist cadres and the entire patriotic citizenship in all areas. It is visible everywhere. But the OUN cadres in Ukraine also strongly reject the corrupting initiatives of this group. For illustration and in conclusion, I will quote an excerpt from a letter from the Krai in the summer of 1953, with a response to the appeal of the UGVR group to the IV Conference of the OUN Central Committee with the accusations that are now on the pages of the US

("US" - "Ukrainian Self-Reliant", which was seized by the "Dvijkars") is repeated by "Dvijka":

... "Dear schismatics abroad should be informed that none of us has ever opposed the OUN leadership in the Krai or its head . . . We have never received instructions from abroad to disobey the OUN Leader on the Ukrainian Railways, but on the contrary - we received strict

instructions to submit to him completely. And what about the foreign schismatics? They have not only transferred and inoculated the foreign bacillus of schism and rot onto the healthy organism of the OUN-regional organisation, but have sent the OUN leader a position paper on the railway, in which they condemn the policy of the OUN-regional organisation in black and white and express distrust of the leader Bandera. This is where the dog is buried... . How else can one call the "demarche" of the UHHRU at the IV Conference of the OUN Central Committee but another slanderous release of the intelligence market? . We know what kind of hare the authors of that libel intended to shoot ... We have made and will continue to make every effort to preserve the unity of the OUN in the Krai. . . . Conscious of our full responsibility to history and to the shadows of our fallen friends, we must state unequivocally that we will never agree to the OUN becoming a blind tool of those who insist on merging the very concept of Ukraine's independence with the concept of various KCABs or other Committees for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia ...



## **Against the falsification of liberation positions**

*This article, directed against the opposition, was published in the weekly "Pobeda Pole", Munich, year 1, chaps. 13, 18 and 19 of May-July 1954.*

### ***Ukrainian nationalism and religion***

The concepts of ideological, programmatic and political positions of the Ukrainian nationalist, liberation and revolutionary movement should be of interest to all those who have any relation or interest - positive or negative - in this movement. Not only its recognisers, active participants and supporters, but also enemies and foreign forces who have any interest in the modern Ukrainian liberation struggle and its forces, should pay special attention to these issues, and for two reasons. Firstly, because the driving force behind the modern Ukrainian liberation struggle is the idea of Ukrainian nationalism, the main goals of the Ukrainian independence struggle, which are formalised in the movement's programme. Secondly, this area is the most important front in the struggle against Bolshevism in the whole world, and our struggle in particular. Between Moscow Bolshevism-Communism and Ukrainian nationalism is the most important struggle for the soul of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian person. The development and outcome of this struggle largely determines the development and success or failure of the liberation struggle on other fronts.

The ideological and programmatic positions of Ukrainian nationalism are the soul, inner content, main force, and at the same time the most successful weapon of the Ukrainian liberation movement in the struggle against Bolshevism. Therefore, their preservation, nurturing, and dissemination is essential for the development of the liberation and nationalist movement. To the same extent, the enemy is attacking these positions both by direct struggle, trying to devalue and falsify them, and by methods of ideological sabotage. Alongside the enemy are speculative attempts by various factors that have a negative attitude to the ideas and goals of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, seeking to exploit its struggle in various ways.

The most harmful thing for a revolutionary movement, which mobilises people to fight with its ideas, is to dumb down and substitute its ideas, to create confusion about its ideological, programmatic and political positions. When enemies and political opponents do this, their efforts always have less impact. However, much more damage can be done if such work is carried out by factors that are considered part of the movement itself and have any legitimacy to speak on its behalf.

The statement of the UHVR Foreign Representation of April 1954, published in its official publication "Modern Ukraine" ("Modern Ukraine", organ of Ukrainian liberation thought, Munich, yearbook IV, part 9/86 of 9. 5. 1954, "Statement of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council" of April 1954), is another statement by the group that monopolised the institution of the UHHR in terms of distorting the ideological, programmatic and political positions of the liberation and revolutionary movement and creating confusion around them. This compels us to publicly point out some of the fundamentally incorrect statements in that statement so that their harmful consequences do not fall on the entire liberation movement.

In the statement of the UHHRU, in some issues, false interpretations of the movement's positions are presented, and in others, an equation is made between its positions and the tendencies of the UHHRU group, which are completely at odds with the line of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

The aforementioned statement of the UGWR concludes its conclusions on the ideological and worldview positions of the liberation and revolutionary movement with the statement that this movement does not impose a philosophical worldview on the participants in the liberation struggle, but is not indifferent to this issue, and is not anti-Christian in its practical and political activities. Although each of these statements is not untrue individually, when Fr Dr Ivan Hryniokh, under the name of the UGVR, outlines the position of the liberation and revolutionary movement in the matter of its attitude to religion, this is a clear falsification of the truth. A Catholic priest with a doctorate, as the head of the UGVR, is surely able to distinguish between the thesis that the movement is not linked to any philosophical doctrine (or system) and its fundamental ideological positions in relation to religion. Stating that the Ukrainian liberation movement is not anti-Christian in the context of a positive statement, overturning various accusations in that direction, means

the complete indifference and indifference of this movement to Christianity. One could also argue that it is not anti-Mohammedan, .

In fact, the Ukrainian nationalist, liberation and revolutionary movement, as directed and framed by the OUN, is a Christian movement. Its deepest roots are Christian, not just non-Christian. In terms of ideological issues, Ukrainian nationalism considers the spirituality and worldview of the Ukrainian people to be its source. And this spirituality and worldview are deeply Christian, crystallised under the millennial creative influence of the Christian religion. This creative, formative influence of religion cannot be compared with the importance of philosophical systems, because philosophy can fulfil only one part of what religion gives to the human unit, nations and the whole of humanity.

Marxism, communism, and their embodiment, Moscow Bolshevism, are the enemies of every religion, and in particular of Christianity, because religion, religious outlook, and religiosity are the greatest obstacle to the conquest of human spirituality by Marxist materialism, just as the idea and essence of the nation are an obstacle to the consolidation of Russian imperialism under the cover of internationalism. But all the efforts of Bolshevik terror, the extreme persecution and extermination of religion, the totalitarian imposition of a materialist and Marxist worldview through forced education and all the means of shaping human thought and culture, have not and will not succeed in eradicating the deep religious primordia from the human soul and the spirit of the people, even if their essence has been drowned out in the minds of the people.

The statement of the UGVR General Council speaks of "taking into account the conditions created in Ukraine by the long-lasting Russian-Bolshevik occupation". But this consideration must go along the line opposite to Bolshevik attempts, along the line of strengthening and reviving the persecuted and falsified Christian religion, and not along the line of affirming and tolerating the negative consequences, as suggested by the group that took over the UGVR and its statement.

The Christian religion is one of the greatest values in the historical development and life of the Ukrainian people. Therefore, the Ukrainian nationalist, liberation and revolutionary movement not only preserves

Christian principles in its founding principles, maintains the religiosity of its personnel, but also actively fights in defence of religion and both Ukrainian Christian Churches. This is done not only to resist Bolshevik violence, but above all in defence of the nation's greatest sacrednesses and values within itself.

The fact that Ukrainian nationalism, as an organised movement, recognises the faith of Christ and defends it does not mean that this faith is forced on anyone. After all, the Church does not impose faith on anyone, and considers its forced imposition in the past to be inconsistent with Christian principles, even though it preaches it most fervently. The question of faith and active religiosity is a matter of conscience for every person. The OUN does not interfere in these matters of conscience and faith of an individual and does not impose anything on anyone. Anyone who wants to actively compete for the implementation of its programme and national liberation goals can participate in its liberation struggle, even if their personal views on certain worldview issues are different from those recognised by the movement and the general membership.

But, on the other hand, there is no way to justify the demand that, due to the lack of faith and understanding of religious values and needs among some patriotic people, the liberation movement as a whole should put these issues outside its framework. Why should the attitude of this category be decisive, both in the movement and in the state? There can be no doubt that for the vast majority of the people and active fighters of the liberation movement, the Christian religion is a value of the first magnitude. Why, then, should the position of an entire movement be orientated not towards the precepts of this majority, but towards a minority that has nothing to do with religious matters or has a negative attitude towards them? Such demands can be made not by those unbelievers who respect the religious beliefs and needs of their brothers, the great majority of them, but only by the warring atheists, enemies of religion who would like to eliminate it from the life of the nation. In this respect, they are similar to communists, and the liberation movement cannot align itself with them, but rather the opposite: it aims to change their teachings or counteract their influence.

The thesis that the revival of religious life in Ukraine is the task of the Church is correct in terms of the importance of the internal content, forms and organisation of that life. But its protection, the creation of conditions for its revival, is not a matter of the Church alone, but of the whole

The state is the first and foremost the force that organises and leads the entire liberation struggle, and then, after liberation, it is the business of the state. If we were to follow the line of this disinterest of the liberation movement in certain areas of the people's life, we could say that countering Bolshevik destructive work and reviving genuine nationally valuable content in the field of science is the work of scientists alone, in the field of education - of educational institutions, etc.

These tendencies of disinterest in the most important problems of the nation's life and development lead to the emasculation of the liberation and revolutionary movement, its ideological content, and its ideological isolation among its own people and in the world competition. The struggle against Bolshevik atheism and the anti-religious march of communism encompasses the deepest values of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian person and is one of the most important fronts in the struggle for the soul of the nation. Likewise, in the world struggle against the Bolshevik-Communist offensive, the religious front is ideologically the most stable, strongest universal front. Even the Bolsheviks managed to harness the idea and forces of national independence in some places - in Southeast Asia and Africa - to their wagon, but similar efforts in relation to religion have not yet had any significant results. The Ukrainian national liberation movement must impose its struggle on this universal anti-Bolshevik front, and not isolate itself from it by posing as an untouchable.

Where, how, and in what ways are the true positions of the Ukrainian Liberation and Revolutionary Front in relation to religion marked? Are they really the same as they are revealed here, and not the same as the statement of the UGVR? This question is best answered by the living struggle of this movement, the attitude of the generality of its active personnel, manifested in practical life and competition. The entirety of that life and struggle, and each of their acts and sacrifices, document the religiosity of the general Ukrainian nationalist revolutionaries, the preservation of religious practices in the organised life of the Ukrainian liberation underground, its active struggle in defence of religion, the warring Ukrainian Christian Churches, and its sincere relations with them in the native lands.

If the writings of individual publicists and leading figures of the liberation movement contain theses of a different content that are meant to be interpreted in the opposite way, they should be attributed to the separatist movement,

abstract theoretical discussion. In the practical life and struggle of the liberation underground in Ukraine, there were no active attempts to oppose the general positive Christian attitude of the revolutionary movement and put it on a sustainable track. This would be impossible, as it would contradict the deepest essence of the movement and the collective feelings of the Ukrainian people.

The troubled clarifications of the UHHRU Foreign Office are a manifestation and consequence of the stubborn tendencies of the group led by Fr. This is the "a candle to God and a bacon to the devil" attitude, or in a more "modern" formulation, "Don Camillo y Peponismo" in a worse, more caricatured edition. Because Don Camillo, although sometimes going along with the "harmless" communists, persistently and successfully defends the cause of religion and the Church against their attempts, while our "Don Camillo" from the UGVR hides before the onslaught of militant Marxist atheism behind the position of neutrality.

This group tries to explain and justify its tendencies with the thesis of "taking into account the conditions created in Ukraine by the long-lasting Russian-Bolshevik occupation", as if it is impossible to know what the majority of the Ukrainian people, in particular the younger generation brought up by the Bolsheviks, want. Such twisted theses cover up "unresolved" trends in the collective farm system, religion, etc. Now, in addition, there are Russian-American attempts to impose on us another "undecided issue" in the question of independence or federation with Russia. All this is due to the consequences of the processes created in Ukraine by the Bolsheviks. All these "undecided" tendencies, whether driven by Ukrainian or foreign hands, are aimed at one thing: to tear apart the Ukrainian liberation struggle and empty its inner content so that there is an empty anti-regime resistance that can be turned in all directions and used "for every need". But all these tendencies are useless, whether they come from the outside or are repackaged under false legitimations. Because the Ukrainian liberation and revolutionary movement and its current cadres know what they want and what they stand for.

### ***Own strength and the market environment***

One of the main principles of the Ukrainian liberation and revolutionary movement is the reliance of the liberation struggle on the own strength of the Ukrainian people.

Opposite to the concept of is the orientation towards other people's power and the conjuncture created by other states. The difference between these two political directions is often blurred in the realm of theoretical declarations, but is very clear in the practice of political action. Political actors that fully adapt their work to the conjuncture and link it to foreign forces, to the point of complete dependence on them, often claim that they also rely on the people's own forces and avoid explicitly denying the concept of their own forces.

On the other hand, the liberation and revolutionary camp does not completely ignore the importance of the international political situation, tries to use all favourable situations and seeks good allies in its struggle. The essential difference lies in the weight given to internal and external factors in the cause of liberation.

The concept of one's own forces, which the OUN defends and implements in entire activity, considers only the Ukrainian people to be the source, driver and decisive force in the struggle for Ukraine's state independence.

The international situation, the commitment and assistance of outside forces are variable, unstable factors, and they can only play a supporting, transitional, not decisive role. It must be conducted so independently of the current international situation and the attitude of the outside world to it that these factors cannot decide on the very fact of the liberation struggle and its goals, but they are taken into account in the strategy and tactical measures.

Giving external forces and conjuncture a decisive role in the cause of liberation leads to its breakdown, as our own history most clearly demonstrates. Such a concept in itself hinders the development and mobilisation of the people's own liberation forces and dampens the spirit of struggle. External factors are guided by their own goals and interests, and our cause, the liberation forces and struggle of Ukraine are viewed in practical politics from the angle of their own interests, as an object more or less suitable for the implementation of their own plans. When dealing with such factors that

If they have a vague or even averse attitude to the main goals of our liberation struggle, are interested only in anti-Bolshevik action and would like to harness Ukrainian forces to their own ends, then orientating liberation policy towards them will lead to disaster.

For the liberation struggle, such relations and cooperation with foreign forces are of more lasting value, based on their positive attitude to the main goals of our struggle, and in terms of action

— on the basis of reciprocity and partnership. Therefore, the OUN will always resist the tendency to work on the Ukrainian cause as a satellite, a vassal of the policies of other states, or to put its fate in the hands of others. True alliance is based on the fact that the allies mutually recognise and respect their main goals.

In addition to lasting alliances, temporary, limited partnerships can also be worthwhile to achieve mutually beneficial partial goals, for limited assistance or exchange, as long as they do not harm and to some extent help the conduct of their own politics and liberation struggle. But such relationships must be carefully maintained in their proper character, so that they do not become political dependence and subordination, which is at odds with the principles of an independent policy. In order to preserve its inherent role and political independence in partnership with foreign states, the liberation movement must pay very close attention to the following points: full sovereignty in determining and implementing the main goals and programme resolutions of the movement; non-interference of foreign factors in internal affairs; non-interference in areas of the liberation struggle and movement activities that are outside the scope of cooperation; partnerships in cooperation.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement sets out its programmatic goals with full frankness and clarity in its entire political activity. This stems from the principle of self-reliance of the Ukrainian nation. In order to maintain and strengthen the spirit of the liberation struggle among the people, it is imperative to nurture and spread the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism in its purest form, not only in theoretical and propagandistic form, but most importantly in action, with the whole attitude of revolutionary struggle and independent politics. This complete frankness in the proclamation of their goals and the unison of revolutionary political practice with theoretical principles in every situation, regardless of the conjuncture



— is a characteristic feature of the revolutionary nationalist movement.

The political directions of opportunism, opportunism and minimalism do not have this feature. The policy of opportunism, orientation towards foreign forces and waiting for opportune situations, according to its supporters, does not mean resignation from liberation and independence, but only the transfer of the decisive role to foreign forces and the conjuncture they create. As a consequence of this attitude, the main focus is not on the people's own struggle, organisation and development of their liberation forces, but only on the union of the favour and assistance of foreign forces. Adapting to such a foreign policy, which is contrary to our goals, and treating assistance to the Ukrainian forces as a means of using them, leads to a retreat from independent goals. (The latest manifestation of such a policy, which from adaptation leads to capitulation, is cooperation with the American Committee for the Liberation of Ukraine from Bolshevism, which wants to eliminate the struggle against Moscow imperialism from the Ukrainian liberation struggle).

The main and guiding direction of national liberation policy should be the principle of , reliance on the nation's own forces, and fundamental independence. Opportunistic tendencies towards external forces can only be contained within the framework of an independent liberation policy if they are driven by the dominant influence of the revolutionary liberation front. When they become independent of this influence, of the fundamental guidance of their own public, and put everything on the map of someone else's policy, assistance and favour of foreign forces, they easily fall under the dictates of the foreign forces involved, become their vassals rather than their counterparts.

The existence of two main camps in Ukrainian political life, and their opposing directions-concepts on the ways and means of realising national liberation ideals, is a real fact, not of an opportunistic or momentary nature. It also has deeper psychological and historical roots. However, the clear division and sharpness of oppositions that have emerged in recent decades is primarily due to the acuteness of the situation and conditions of the liberation struggle. Both directions, their ways and methods of action and response to external influences

have a fairly well-established, inherent style and place of their own.

Particularly abnormal was the role of a group of renegades from the nationalist movement, which monopolistically took over the UHHR Foreign Office and turned it into its own tool.

Their specific aim is an unnatural political . In fact, having taken the position of orientation towards foreign forces and opportunistic adaptation to foreign policies, this group nominally acts as an integral part of the revolutionary liberation movement and, moreover, tries to impose its own political direction on it.

Since April this year, the statement of the UHHRU has been trying to obscure the fundamental differences between the positions of the nationalist, liberation and revolutionary movement, as formed and replaced by the OUN, and the positions of the UHHRU group, putting an equal sign between them. Using the true statement that the liberation and revolutionary movement is based on the principle of self-reliance of the people, which in its actions is independent of the international situation and outside influences, the above-mentioned statement of the ZP, contrary to reality, applies these statements to the UGVR ZP as well. In this way, the positions of the liberation movement are presented in a crooked mirror - the way they should be reflected in the policy of the UGVR.

The concept of our own forces prescribes the organisation, development and constant consolidation of effective independent forces in all areas, both in the native lands and in emigration. This is what the OUN's Foreign Units have in mind in their internal activities. Instead, a group of apostates in the UGVR has always opposed the development of the OUN ZC personnel, trying to slow it down by all means. It does this by means of internal , first of all, by creating a split in the so-called opposition, and then - in the "dvukars", and even by resorting to denunciations of conspiracy and illegality (by publishing organisational letters from the OUN Leadership on the UZ, despite its express prohibition not to publish!)

In order to preserve the independence of the policy of the liberation movement, it is imperative that all its activities, including foreign policy, be based on its own Ukrainian means and capabilities. The UHHR Foreign Representation,

According to its purpose, would have to represent the affairs of the Ukrainian liberation movement to the outside world and act a partner. For this purpose, in addition to moral and political support in the regional struggle, it would to rely on a strong Ukrainian human and material base in emigration, in particular given the difficulties of communication with the homeland.

Meanwhile, the UHHRU broke with the only Ukrainian political force abroad that fully supported it, and made its political existence and activities based on foreign material and political support. This is the opposite of the principle of organising independent political action. It would have been different if the support of others had only been a supplement or extension of its own basic base, based on Ukrainian funds. However, the UHHRU completely relied on other people's funds and support for its political activities, even in the Ukrainian section. It is known that the publication of "Sovremenna Ukraina", "Do Zbruchu" ("To the Arms", a journal of military and political thought of the Ukrainian military in foreign countries, a monthly published by the Military Centre, later by the UPA Mission to the UGVR, showed opposition to the OUN Central Committee and Stepan Bender, printed in Munich; from 1946 to 1954, 39 issues appeared.) and the current "Druzhkarist" "Ukrainskyi Samostoynyk", paying the apparatchiks of the UHHRU, who make up the majority of all supporters of that group, capturing elements amenable to "ideological influence with material means" to create a new splinter group of the "Druzhkarist" and financing this whole work - all this requires a lot of money and is not paid for with Ukrainian funds. The claim that "Modern Ukraine" is published for money sent to the UGVR by the OUN leadership on the Ukrainian Railways in 1950 is only a cover-up. The money sent at that time was intended for communication needs and partly for foreign policy activities, not for publishing a newspaper for the emigrants. But the amount of money could have been enough to cover the costs of only a few issues of one newspaper.

When a group bases its existence and work in the Ukrainian part of the country on the means and support of foreign factors, it and its work become an exposition of those factors in Ukrainian life. This happens naturally, regardless of whether it is acknowledged or hidden and denied. Because the whole work, its content, its direction, has to be what the "sponsors" involved want and agree to. And when this work

focuses on breaking up the liberation movement, creating new internal sabotage, demoralising existing personnel, and introducing pro-socialist or other nationally indifferent influences that upset the ideological and political inspiration of the liberation struggle, then the most serious doubts arise about the existence of any positive intentions against the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

Having deprived itself of a Ukrainian political and action base abroad and completely dependent on foreign assistance, the UHHRU has thus lost its practical ability to be a partner in representing the Ukrainian cause to the outside world. This is not to say that all foreign assistance is politically discreditable or unnecessary. The value and consequences of such assistance are primarily determined by who it comes from, what its purpose is, and whether it is an auxiliary or decisive factor in a political action. Complete dependence on foreign assistance is tantamount to a loss of ownership and independence of action, and building positions in Ukrainian political life based on foreign forces and their assistance is reduced to the role of an exposition of those forces. Foreign means and influences should not be used for internal Ukrainian political games, because in this way they are introduced into Ukrainian internal political processes as a decisive factor. Instead, it is correct to seek foreign assistance to strengthen the liberation struggle in the immediate anti-Bolshevik action, and without interference from outside forces in internal Ukrainian affairs.

#### **DON'T BE FOOLED BY THE EDGES AND DON'T LED ASTRAY!**

If the false portrayal of the positions of the liberation movement abroad and the perverting of one of its foreign branches brings harmful consequences for the entire struggle, then such efforts directed directly to the Land do even worse damage. The progress of the UGVR group against the OUN in the Ukrainian Lands, as a liberation and revolutionary force operating there, is directed in the same direction. Trying to subdue it to its influence and using foreign factors for this purpose, this group launched a gross political deception of the region and the introduction of foreign influences as a decisive factor in the internal affairs of the movement. A typical manifestation and clear evidence of such attempts is the case of the document

"The political situation of the US government". There was already information about it in the press. However, as much as the UHHRU in its statement makes it clear that the document is false - that it is not signed by anyone and has no date - we must recall its history, when it ceased to be a secret and was known to the enemy from a direct source.

In 1951, the UGVR sent the above-mentioned document, the so-called "Political Situation of the US Government", without date and signature, to the OUN Leadership in Ukraine, which can be easily explained by the motives of conspiracy. The authenticity of the document - that its content was correct and true - was evidenced to the OUN Leadership by the fact that it was handed over by the UGVR, which had the appropriate connections. Especially when it is personally delivered by a well-known figure of the UGWR (Vasyl Okhrymovych) and he provides appropriate comments that elevate the significance of the document. Thus, it was immediately accepted in the Krai and, as the true position of the US government, was brought to the attention of further cells of the revolutionary underground.

The UHHRU is in particular directly responsible for this case, and certain individuals committed a deliberate abuse of trust and deliberate political deception of the OUN on the UZ, sending as the position of the US government a text drawn up only with subordinate foreign factors, and knowing that they are in no way competent to declare the political position of the US government. Likewise, declaring any position of the US government on tangential issues was completely out of place in the constellation of US policy at the time - as well as today. In addition, the very content of the tangential falsification, in its fundamental political guidelines, does not go beyond the line of the ill-fated pro-Russian American Committee for the Liberation of Bolshevism and does not even mention Ukraine's state independence. This means that the authors of the falsification did not intend to present the liberation and revolutionary movement in Ukraine with something truly positive. They signed up under the name of the US government for other purposes.

Firstly, according to their intention, the decisive criterion for the correctness of the ideological and political positions of the Ukrainian liberation movement should be condemnation by relevant foreign factors. This is exactly what this group has been doing since the beginning of its breakaway action, which has been fighting to ensure that the fundamental ideological and programmatic positions of the liberation movement are guided by the winds of the current international trends. Meanwhile, the position of Ukrainian nationalism

originate from Ukraine's own soil, from the national nature, from the conditions and needs of the nation's struggle for independent life and free development.

In the era of ideological and political turmoil created by the wartime and post-war developments, the ease of interpreting ideological and principled political matters became a criterion for the selection and emergence of new groups of opportunists. This is exactly the case with this group; guided by the winds from outside, formerly vocal nationalists became gradual socialists, verbal democrats and haters of the very name "nationalism". The arrow of their concepts, very mobile and responsive to movements from outside magnetic fields, now seems to be moving again towards nationalism, as if it is deviating from socialist "progress". Since the rationale for the political existence of this group and its claims to master the liberation movement should be, among other things, its ideological "gradualism," a foreign factor is called upon to be the arbiter with the decisive voice, according to the Varangian concept of "come and rule over us," and for lack of convincing Ukrainian arguments.

The second main goal of the falsifiers and deceivers of the Krai was — to support the authority of the UGVR and discredit the OUN Central Committee. After the complete compromise of the UGVR group in front of the liberation and revolutionary movement and the entire citizenship, the only thing left was to testify with the trust of other people's factors. But the trust and testimony of such factors, who would like to say something in this matter, would obviously not have the desired effect. That's why the "elevated rank" was mentioned with a broad gesture: "The full confidence of the US government in the leadership of the UHHRU" - this is already something that can be spoken about, which should make an appropriate impression! Having jumped up onto such a high chair with a great acceleration, the authors of the document slammed the OUN Central Committee from there in one fell swoop:

"The U.S. government deplores the current policy of the OUN Central Committee and its leadership by S. Bandera" (by the way, at that time, the head of the OUN Central Committee was someone else).

We are less interested in the question of who was authorised by whom to express "the confidence of the US government in the UGVR". This is not our business. But the fact that the UGVR is using such a foreign - and even false - testimony before the Krai is a Ukrainian matter. From a political point of view, this document is also false because

Such a statement is incompatible with the previous attitude of American policy towards the Ukrainian cause. The declaration of this kind of trust by a foreign government in any factor of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement should have been paired with its positive attitude towards the main goal of the Ukrainian liberation movement - Ukraine's state independence. But this is not the case. American political action in our area is still on the AKVNR-AKVB tracks. Therefore, sending such a statement to the Krai is a political deception. And before that, it is also an ordinary deception - falsification of authorship. If we take into account that the aforementioned trust in the WP does not come from the US government, but from other factors, then the political side of the matter is even more dismal.

The sending of a condemnation against the OUN Central Committee on behalf of the US government to the Krai directly affects us. If we did not know that we were dealing with a fake document, we would have to protest to the US government and wait for clarification. We are talking about the falsity of the document in the sense that the statements and positions presented in it are falsely attributed to the US government, which the "authors" of the document and the people responsible for its transmission knew. But information from the same people makes us now ask an open question: could any factor - and on what basis - on behalf of the US government - have transmitted to the OUN Leadership in Ukraine such condemnations of the policy of the OUN Central Committee? (At this point, we emphasise once again that we are writing about these cases after it became known that the tangential connection of the UGVR has already been revealed, and these cases are no longer a secret).

What kind of policy does the OUN Central Committee condemn in "The State of the U.S. Government?" The policy of treating the Ukrainian cause as a completely independent one, opposed to all Russian, united and united actions.

The policy of the Central Committee of the OUN is opposed to all attempts by the AKVNR-AKVB to subordinate the Ukrainian liberation struggle to the hegemony of the Russian imperialists and their plans to preserve the affiliation of Ukraine and other enslaved peoples with the Russian Empire. Our policy gives a decisive rebuff to all such attempts, both openly made by Russian circles and covertly, under the auspices of American factors, in the form of so-called "undecideds" and a common anti-Bolshevik front. It is not surprising that this policy of ours does not appeal to those American factors who would like to interpret

The Ukrainian case is quite different.

So we can understand their attempts to break our line. Although these attempts, in our estimation, are not only harmful to the Ukrainian cause, but also unhelpful to the general anti-Bolshevik front, such manifestations must be taken as a result of erroneous concepts in American politics.

However, it is impossible to understand and justify the fact that in such a political situation the UGVR ZP saw itself as an instrument of those attempts and began to discredit the policy of the OUN Central Committee in the Krai - from the American point of view. In order to conceal the inherent political meaning of the condemnation of the policy of the OUN Central Committee in the Krai, the aforementioned "Political Position of the US Government" added the sentence that "this policy and leadership alienated many positive elements in the emigration". This manoeuvre is calculated to make up for the lack of information about the situation abroad to the Leadership in Ukraine. However, it is clear to anyone who knows the situation and the development of political events in this period that the authors are not talking about internal Ukrainian affairs. The assertion that the policy of the OUN Central Committee alienated many positive elements in emigration, in contrast to the "unifying" policy of the UGVR Central Committee, looks ridiculous. And such a contrasting comparison follows logically from the structure of the entire document. The UHHRU was indeed supposed to become a centre of unification based on the positions of the liberation struggle, but it was turned into a small party-type political group and an instrument for splitting the organised nationalist movement. Therefore, it is not respectful to talk about the alienation of positive elements by the policy of the OUN Central Committee and their incorporation by the policy of the UGVR in the internal Ukrainian aspect. The above sentence makes sense the alienation of the OUN Central Committee's policy is attributed to the inherent subject matter which we have already mentioned - to attempts to bring Ukrainians into the pro-Russian AKVNR-AKVB.

The 6th point of the document under discussion clearly indicates that its co-authors had to be people from the UHHR. At the same time, they outsmarted themselves by passing on to the Krai such nonsense as "the SELA is convinced that the current leadership of the OUN Central Committee has not taken any serious and sincere measures to implement the proposals of the OUN leadership in the Ukrainian Lands since the summer of 1950".



No less, no more - only the United States, as a state, was involved in the investigation of that case, and in the summer of 1951 it came to the same conclusion as above. American policy would have to pay the greatest attention to the Ukrainian case, even if it was a question of this kind, — whether the OUN ZC Leadership seriously implements the proposals of the OUN Leadership on the UZ was the subject of a state assessment.

It is characteristic that, despite such confessional use of the name of the United States and the US government, and the fact that the authors of the document sent their own statements to Ukraine under its cover, they did not succeed in expressing a positive position (of the United States, or rather its government - D.C.) in the matter of Ukraine's state independence. This most important issue is covered by phrases about self-determination and the free expression of the will of the majority of the Ukrainian people - the same rubbery phrases from the SEC's props. Why is this so? The explanation is simple: the authors of that text did not dare to cross the line drawn and rigorously maintained by US policy until now. That is, the struggle is only against Bolshevism, against the regime, but not a word about national liberation or state independence. This means that even the fake document does not contain anything in the fundamental question that would meet Ukrainian independence aspirations, but which would be considered evil by the Russian imperialists.

Simultaneously with the above-mentioned document, the deputy lieutenant of the OUN Central Committee brought to the OUN Leadership in Ukraine fantastic reports about the political achievements of the OUN Central Committee in relations with the United States. In those reports, US policy in the Ukrainian case was portrayed as entirely positive, in a completely different light than the facts show. Thus, the document "Political Position of the US Government" was interpreted, with the help of appropriate additions and explanations, in such a way as to cover up all the darkness that it contained and to present it as a "great charter".

American political support for the Ukrainian liberation struggle and the prospect of its great rise are described in the best possible terms. This is all credited to the unusually skilful and successful policy of the UHHR. Similarly, the work of the OUN Central Committee is described in rich but dark colours, which, they say, only harms the liberation cause, compromises it in the eyes of the outside world, causes distrust and

undermines the achievements of the ZP. With such illuminations, the UHHR deputy lieutenant governor justified his suggestions to the leadership in Ukraine that the Region, by expressions of confidence in the UHHR and unprecedented recognition of various members of that group for their work abroad, would help consolidate and increase its achievements in gaining the support of the United States.

The actions of the UHHR must be assessed as harmful to the development of the liberation movement. The worst of all is the deception of the region about the fundamental quality of the policy of a foreign state in the Ukrainian cause. All of this stems from the fact that the UHHR made the actual rationale for its existence not so much the representation of the liberation movement's affairs to the outside world, but rather the transfer of foreign influences and attempts to this movement as a prerequisite for uniting their resistance and support.

In an attempt to reclaim a position in the liberation and revolutionary movement through the support of others and unable to make real achievements, the WP group has started to deceive the region. In fact, it is trying to put the liberation movement on the rails of orientation towards foreign forces and its dependence on them and their policies. Such a long-lasting, fundamental change in the foundations of the Movement's existence would give the WP group a dominant position as the factor that "has the trust" of the external forces involved. To knock the liberation struggle off its own foundations and off its own feet is tantamount to overthrowing it, because it will never be able to stand on someone else's feet.

The second most harmful consequence of the UHHRU's concession is the transfer of a foreign conflict to the Krai, and this time, in connection with foreign intervention. Having lost the internal conflict it started on the Ukrainian field, this group is resorting to foreign conflicts and bringing them to the judges. These manifestations are all the more regrettable because they echo historical flaws - scabs, outcasts, ruin. These unhealthy manifestations have caused a very strong general repulsion in the entire liberation and revolutionary movement, in the Krai and abroad, a reaction that shows that it does not allow itself to be decomposed or led astray from its own path. And yet this irresponsible concession has caused many disasters, particularly in the Krai. The conditions of the underground struggle, the difficulties of communication, the enemy's exploitation of every gap in the revolutionary front - all of this leads to the undermining and shaking of the

have far-reaching harmful consequences. We cannot accept the attempts of the UGVR group to make the OUN liberation underground in the Motherland the theatre of extremely irresponsible and harmful games. We must resist the deception of revolutionary cadres in Ukraine, the insidious drag of them down the path of opportunistic orientations and the introduction of foreign factors into the resolution of internal Ukrainian affairs. We are trying to act as much as possible in the foreign, emigrant field in order to remove the harmful influences and consequences of these unhealthy phenomena from the local struggle. Although they do harm the liberation cause abroad, this damage is less than in the context of the struggle in the region. In addition, it is more expedient to eliminate a disaster, or at least to identify and neutralise it where it grows, at its roots. And this disaster is bewitched, and even fed by other people's juices  
— is the very disaster that is trying to bleed out the entire liberation movement.

## People without soil

*This article, signed "A. Vlast" and with the editorial headline "Those who have departed from nationalism," was published in the weekly "Ways of Victory," Munich, year I, chaps. 35 and 36, 24 and 31 October 1954. It is a continuation of V. Teslyar's article "Lack of Faith in the Patriotism of a Ukrainian Nationalist - A Response to the Inquiries and Remarks of Assoc. Bobrovsky", its supplement and further coverage.*

*The author extensively quotes Bobrowski's letter, revealing the contradictions and incorrectness of his statements and accusations against the nationalist liberation movement.*

In the 36th and 37th issues of the biannual Ukrainian Samostoynyk, articles appeared signed by the name of Associate Professor Y. Bobrovsky, which were simultaneously signed in the author's notes with the initials M. S. In the 33rd and 34th issues of our journal, V. Teslyar responded to some of the inquiries and remarks of the highly respected associate professor. But the speech of Mr Bobrovsky, whose personality we treated with great respect and trust, is so sad and symptomatic that we consider it necessary to devote more attention to it. At the same time, we want not only to respond to some of Mr Bobrovsky's statements, but also to throw a light on the change in the milestones of this author.

In the first article, Mr Bobrovsky asks the question: "Was the "recruitment" of a member of the OUN-UPF based on his nationalist outlook, certain character traits, strong will, or rather on his willingness to declare himself a greater nationalist, like S. Bandera, at public meetings".

Obviously, according to the criteria given in the first, but not in the second half of the above sentence. But it is interesting that this question is now being raised by Mr Bobrovsky, who himself belongs to those who joined the ranks of organised nationalists in exile in the DP camps. We do not believe that the mere fact of someone's organisational registration in exile devalues their worldview, ideological and characteristic features.

Only to test their truthfulness, steadfastness and strength in the freer conditions of emigration there are no such hard tests of life as the struggle in their native lands. But both here and there, ideology and willpower

and the character of individual members are of varying degrees. In the hard tests of struggle, some people endure and win, while others break down, fall away, and even become traitors. In addition, a person's worldview, character, ideology, will, abilities and other attributes are not unchanging; they develop, rise or fall, and deteriorate. This is influenced not only by circumstances, but also by the environment, content and forms of life. The stagnation, rise, or fall of a person's attributes is primarily determined by whether and to what extent he or she works on oneself, tries to raise them higher and higher, or slides down without internal resistance. In the rushing stream of our movement, there are also partial and individual processes that, in their intensity, speed, and even direction, are not always the same as the whole movement. The revolutionary liberation movement of the OUN is a dynamic, not a static phenomenon, just as the role and value of each in it is that of a part in a current, in a biological process, not that of a brick in a static building.

Associate Professor Yuriy Bobrovskyi raised the question of the cost of OUN personnel organised in foreign countries in an article and gave a generalised negative answer. He raised the same question and answer in a live setting, by himself, in his speech. Our above remarks are not intended to whitewash the black spots, but only to warn against false and unfair generalisations, so that individual cases of ideological, political and moral decline and the falling away of individuals, which are insignificant in terms of percentage and impact, are not attributed to the whole movement.

In his article, Y. Bobrovsky writes the following: "Was the former camp "UPA" - the camp administration, consisting of 90-95% of the so-called "sympathisers", at all similar to the UPA in the Krai?" With this sentence, the author expresses his angry attitude not only to the "former camp administration", with the participation of sympathisers, but also to the UPA soldiers who arrived from the Krai and lived in camps in Germany in groups.

Instead of polemicising with Bobrowski, we will quote some excerpts from his letter of 29 November. 1949 on this subject:

"In our organisation (especially at the grassroots), they fight hard against the 'trough'. They are right to fight against the fact that our

membership has become "troughs", but it is pointless to run away from paid positions and leave them to the UCC. "If we run away from paid positions, we will not be able to do any organisational work, because first, we will be thinking about our daily bread, and second, we will not be able to move. . Take me as an example. After the reform (the German currency reform that took place in 1949-1950), when I moved to the camp, our camp council gave me the position of technical secretary in the technical department with a salary of 100 marks. It was the custom of the opposition in the camp administration to hold positions with a salary of 150-300 marks."

As we can see, the two quotes reflect two opposing positions of Mr Bobrovsky on the same issue.

In the articles published in the "US" on 5 and 12 September this year, Mr. Y. Bobrovsky, as if from a gramophone disc, repeats the phrases spoken by the OUN apostates with their tendency to provoke and denigrate. After all, what else could such a sentence be intended to mean?

"The communist and fascist underground in the democratic world is due to their struggle to overthrow the democratic world. Why does the OUN Central Committee need an "underground" in the democratic world?"

The conclusion is simple: the 'underground' of the OUN Central Committee is designed to fight against the democratic world, and police in different countries should bear this in mind. That's how Mr Bobrovsky wrote in his newspaper article what his current masters had been submitting "where it should be" only by confidential denunciations. Didn't the associate professor overdo it?

Having sided with the dualist group of the ZP, Mr Bobrovsky tries to convince the readers of his articles that the split and sabotage of the dualists is a positive action of reorganisation and selection of the "most progressive" membership, and that the group of monopolists in the UHHRU ZP is the best and only true spokesperson for Ukrainian liberation politics. At the same time, he stubbornly appropriates the invented and repeated slanders of the "opposition", the same ones that he himself revealed, rejected and condemned, for example, on the iii. Extraordinary Conference of the OUN Central Committee. Making white out of black and vice versa, in accordance with the current situation, is a common characteristic of all perennialists. P. Bobrovsky calls such people

"the most progressive" and intellectuals. This is a special way of arguing, in the opinion of the associate professor. Bobrovsky calls intellectuals those people for whom there are no unshakable principles in life, for whom truth is replaced by dialectics, character by spinelessness, loyalty by venality, for whom the highest achievement of intellect is the ability to convincingly replace, on the basis of internal nihilism, opposing views on the same things. If we understand this, then we agree with Mr Bobrovsky's statement that there is no place for such "the most progressive intelligentsia, complete and growing" (in the words of Mr Y. B.) in the ranks of the OUN Central Committee, and thank God when such people are identified and leave these ranks. Instead, the OUN and, in particular, the ZC, retains and welcomes such intellectuals who cherish and maintain at a high level all the forces and values of the spirit - faith, character and intellect - in whom "faith", "know", "recognise" and "act" go unanimously, in one, straight line.

To illustrate the difference between Mr Bobrowski's previous writing and his current writing and his transition to the binary, we quote an excerpt from his letter of 29 May 1950. Here they are:

" addition, during this time, I have fully thought through a number of fundamental issues in our domestic and foreign policy. 1) We pay little attention to the struggle for clarity and precision of the worldview and ideological and political positions of our Organization.

a) At one time supporting, and now fighting . ....(here Mr Bobrovsky cites the names of writers and critics who have collaborated or are still (one of them) collaborating with "Modern Ukraine" - approx. The editorial board of Shlyakh Peremohy) and the like, although they are still Bolshevik agents and Marxist subversives in the spiritual plane.

б) Tolerance of ideologically and politically hostile elements in our Organisation - Hryshko, Ryabyshenko.

c) Lack of ideological and political clarity in our press. A series of articles in Ukrainian Samostoychnik by P. Olezhko is a subversion of the Moscow Social Democrat. I have a response to this series of articles, but I don't know where I will print it, because I don't want it in someone else's press, and they won't let it go in theirs. And yet I will publish this answer."

As it turns out, back 1950, Associate Professor Yurii Bobrovsky thought of

a number of fundamental questions to one end, and now, four years later, he has changed his mind and come up with another, just the opposite. Today, together with N. Olehko, Mr Bobrovsky has reached out (to use Y. B-kogo's phrase) to the place where the influence of the Sherekhs and Maistrenkos reigns, and he is aligned with N. Olehko in the work of the twins. What further consequences should we expect from the associate professor's "thinking through" of fundamental issues, and what other "ends" will he reach in them?

Where can we find the decisive criterion that motivates Mr Bobrovsky's change of heart? A clue is given by his second article, published in part 37 of the Ukrainian Samostoynyk, and especially by its significant headline: "To Whom Belongs Other People's Help". In this article, apparently commissioned by the ZP and to prove his "progressiveness" and suitability, the associate professor tries to prove that the ZP UHHRU, due to "support and assistance from certain factors of the democratic world", is conducting the right liberation work and that this is exactly what is needed. It is unnecessary to go into a detailed explanation of Mr Bobrovsky's argumentation, which tries to turn the specific question of what the UHHRU is doing with the help of others into a theoretical discussion what the UHHRU should be doing. Meanwhile, the UGWR Liaison Office has been in existence for six years and has been operating with the help of external factors, and the balance of its work over that time gives undoubted evidence of its goals, purpose, and use of that help. Does the UHHRU really, as Associate Professor Y. B. says, "expediently use the assistance of foreign factors to build its own forces of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people" and to "expand and strengthen ties with the forces of the free world that want to support the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people"? What do the facts say? What did the ZP group do to build up the Ukrainian liberation forces, to strengthen their ideological, moral, political or organisational bonds? What positive actions did it carry out among the Ukrainian emigration, and which forces did it join the liberation front? What ideas did it disseminate and how did it influence the consolidation of the Ukrainian independence front, its cohesion, and the rise of its ideological and moral state? What work did the UHHR group do, with the financial assistance of others, to promote the Ukrainian cause in a foreign world, where there are those foreign-language publications and foreign policy actions that should be among the primary tasks of the UHHR Foreign Office?



The content of the work of this group in the midst of the revolutionary liberation movement was and is the creation of division and decomposition. One split in 1948, and the second, two-fold split in 1954. The theft, through denial of the formal ownership of the OUN Central Committee's press organ, the Ukrainian Tribune, its use against the Organisation, against the nationalist movement, as a platform for ideological and political chatter, and finally its collapse.

Repetition of the same practice with the "Ukrainian Samostoynyk". Defeating the OUN by means of slander, defamation, denunciation and provocations (e.g., alliance with the provocateur Yablon (See "Provocateur Petro Yablon-Yarovyi and his friends!", "Surma", part 29 of March 1951, pp. 16-19 and part ZO of April 1951, pp. 21-23) in inventing a "plan to eliminate the opposition"). The "decomposition and re-recruitment" of people of weaker character by means of bribery and blackmail. Creating demoralisation and division among the UPA members who arrived from the Krai, causing a double split among them. Creation of parallel pseudo-organisations out of the apostates from the OUN Central Committee and the Brotherhood of B. UPA soldiers to create permanent discord, to tie up energy in the internal struggle and to compromise the liberation movement. In relation to the Krai, persistent attempts to transfer the germs of schism there, using the situation created by the death of the late General Chuprynka for this purpose, up to the point of heraldic success. Consistent denial and distortion of the true nationalist content in the ideological, programmatic and political-conceptual positions of the revolutionary liberation movement and the substitution of a Maistrenko-orientation to the so-called ideological communists, approximation to the positions of national communism, imposing worldview neo-traditionalism on the movement, denying the Christian foundations of the movement.

This sabotage in the ideological plane was carried out not only abroad, but mainly from abroad to the Krai in order to impose appropriate changes on it with a false response to the dominant trends abroad, to "the great, strongest Eastern Ukrainian party of Maistrenko", etc.

A great political deception and blackmail against the Leadership in the Krai, with the help of a false document, the so-called State of the U.S. Government (The text of this "Political Position of the US Government" was published in the weekly "Ukrainian Time", Paris, . 11/375 of 14 March 1954.), and the accompanying false promises of large and comprehensive assistance on the condition of supporting the line of the UGVR against the OUN. Co-operation with the UCCA's attempts to break the uncompromising attitude of all

of Ukrainian political factors abroad against white Moscow imperialism and its trampling by the action of the OAU (at a time when everyone, including the UNRada, rejected any talks with Moscow imperialists, Fr I. Hryniokh proposed the creation of a Committee for Psychological Struggle to talk and cooperate with the same Moscow Committee under the omophorion of the ). Negative attitudes towards the ABN, compromising our actions in that period in front of outsiders and attempts to break the ABN are in tune with the same subversive efforts of Tlaskov and his accomplices.

Here is a brief overview of the "work" of the of the UHHRU's "work". If you put it all , then the nature and plan of this work and its goals become quite clear. This work is non-Ukrainian, extremely harmful to the liberation movement. If we take into account that it is funded by foreign factors, then the question arises: what can be the rationale for a Western state, which is in sharp conflict with Bolshevism, to put its hands and means to destructive sabotage within the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation movement, the most respected anti-Bolshevik force within the USSR? Can this be done in order to this force into its own hands, to make it its own tool? Can serious factors in any state expect positive consequences from this, or should it not be obvious to them that such actions result only in the destruction of the existing anti-Bolshevik factor and the weakening of the general anti-Bolshevik front, with the only benefit for Moscow? Or was the help of those factors being provided in a different way, with different goals, truly favourable to the Ukrainian liberation struggle? Then, which hand within the UHHRU group put everything on such a track that the outcome was so obvious to everyone? And who, and how, justifies such a development to the foreign factors involved, when their assistance to the UGWR is positive, not destructive?

These were the questions that Mr Bobrowski, an intelligent and deeply thoughtful man, had to ask himself when he was about to turn the direction of his ideological and political action one hundred and eighty degrees. But is what he wrote in those articles and what he is doing now really the result of his inner conviction? Let the second, rather first, self of Associate Professor Yuriy Bobrovsky answer. To do this, we reprint a letter from Mr Bobrovsky to Stepan Bandera from

8 March 1954:

*"Dear Stepan Andreyevich!*

*I have not written to you for so long for three main reasons, namely:*

- 1. I did not want to take away from your time to read my letters and respond to them.*
- 2. I am the one who is working hard on my book, which should be finished soon and, I hope, will bring some benefit to our movement and will show the politicians of the Western world that we understand not only the essence of Bolshevism, but also the essence of the Western world.*
- 3. There were no issues so important that I was forced to divert my attention from my main work.*

*The situation is somewhat different now, and that is why I am writing this letter to you.*

*First of all, I would like to introduce you to a section of my work, which I will soon finish and will be published Ukrainian and, I hope, slightly modified, in English. The book will be called: "The Path to Victory over the CCP and World Communism". The book's chapters are as follows:*

- 1) on the history of Moscow imperialism;*
- 2) from the history of the struggle of the peoples oppressed by Moscow for their state independence;*
- 3) the essence of Bolshevism and Bolshevik imperialism:*
  - a) the understanding of the essence of Bolshevism by different ideological and political camps and our criticism of them;*
  - b) our understanding of the essence of Bolshevism;*
- 4) the strength and weakness of the CCCP and world communism;*
- 5) ways to defeat the CCP and world communism.*

*I have a lot of documents, so that each of my statements is based on sources.*

*The size of the work will be from 450 to 500 pages, or 25-30 printed sheets.*

*Immediately after finishing this work, I will take up the topic: "The role of worldview*

*in the national liberation struggle of Ukraine".*

*I hope that you will be satisfied with my work. In this matter, I dare to ask you to be my guardian and to assist me in my work with all the power of your authority. But I think that there will be no need for this, because I have a good guardian here, who understands the matter. (A hint that Bobrovsky was paid approx. 1800 dolars for writing his work - note by the editorial board of the "ShP").*

*And now let me express a few thoughts on our "internal" affairs.*

*I put "internal" in quotation marks because that's the meaning of the word. In "internal" matters, I have always been plagued by two questions.*

*1) Understanding the primacy of the Krai over the emirates;*

*2) In the decision of the PI. Grand Assembly that our movement can include people of different worldviews (idealistic and materialistic), that is, that we are "tolerismo" and materialists (Marxists).*

*First. I recognise the primacy of the Krai only in the sense that the main role in the (armed) struggle is played by the forces of the Krai, not the emirate. But the worldview, ideological and ideological-political weapons for the Territory should be provided by the emigration part of our movement only. Why? in the history of mature political movements of all times and all nations, it has always been the case that in times of revolutionary situation, the movement's leadership has always been sent abroad so it would not be destroyed by the enemy. And this leadership abroad conducted international politics, because it better versed in international circumstances than those in the Land, and provided the ideological, ideological and ideological-political weapons for the regional struggle. The leadership had to return to the Krai no earlier and no later than on the eve of the outbreak of the revolution. If the leadership arrived in the region before the eve of the revolutionary explosion, it would be destroyed by the enemy, and if it arrived later, the enemy forces could lead the movement astray. Therefore, the leadership of a revolutionary movement must always be where and when it is needed at different stages of the preparation and implementation of the revolution. It is only the leadership, not the membership, only the general staff of the revolution (or conventional army), not the rank and file (or soldiers) of the masses, who determine when and where it should be.*

*Second. No revolutionary movement has ever won anywhere in the world,*

*if it was not monolithic in outlook, ideology, and action-politics. Without this, a revolutionary movement will not be coherent and cemented by the will to act, but a gathering, a herd or a flock. To preach that it is best to fight Bolshevism from the standpoint of Marxism (Fornovoy) means to fight Bolshevism in the name of Marxism, because from whatever position one attacks the enemy, it is that position, not other positions, that one defends against the . In short: from which positions you attack, you defend the same positions.*

*I understand why Poltava and Fornovyi might have thought so (before the Great Assembly). Because during the war and after the war, the nationalists of the West.*

*Ukraine, having met the "outcast" communists of the Naddniprians (Bahrianyi and Maistrenko, because the nationalists of the Naddniprians who not destroyed were outside Ukraine) fell under the ideological influence of the latter, and the "outcast" communists found a "blanket" for themselves on the part of Western Ukrainian nationalists.*

*This was carried over to the emigration. The so-called ZP UVR turned out to be a very convenient nationalist form for filling it with Maistrenko's content. Therefore, our masses' struggle is not against the so-called "opposition" and its representatives (Lebed, Rebet and others), but against the Maistrenkoism that the UWFR's ZP has embodied in emigration and the same in the Krai. In order for our struggle to be successful, we must not dissociate ourselves organisationally from the "opposition" and the ZP of the UVR, and in the future from the UVR and the regional leadership, but on the contrary - to be in unity (organisationally) with and thus push out the Maistrenkivshchyna and fill them with Ukrainian nationalism. Fortresses are best taken from within.*

*And we can and must do this, because history has not given us any other way, there is no other way.*

*Moreover, this path asks us to take it. In the "Samostoynyk" (plucked) of 21. 11. 1954, the "Plan and some clarifications to the activities of the temporary leadership of the OUN Central Committee" was published, in which, among the complete eclecticism, one can find a hook to grab onto in order to pull everything along.*

*And this hook is point 12 and 13:*

*"12. Within 3-4 months, the Conference of the OUN General Council will be held (convened by the "two men" who detained*

*This name) - to consider current cases".*

*"13). "After completing its tasks, the interim leadership of the OUN will convene a Conference, before which it will report on its activities and which will call for new governing bodies of the OUN.*

*I don't really believe that the "board" will convene the Conference in 3-4 months, but I still hope that it will convene it within a year. Sometimes, in order to get on the clear path, it is inevitable that you have to go through a muddy swamp, because there is not even a narrow path to avoid the swamp. We have to walk through the mud, then clean our shoes from the mud and walk on the clean path. If we do not go through the mud ourselves, we may be pushed into it by forces that are working against us, and those forces will come out on the clean path and pollute it.*

*Where you can't win through a formal attack, you have to go in from the rear. As far as I am concerned (and I am probably not wrong), ordinary membership in our field will help us to achieve our goal.*

*I warmly welcome you, Stepan Andreyevich.*

Neither Stefan Bandera nor the entire OUN Central Committee took Mr Bobrovsky's advice. Firstly, because the UGVR group was not a stronghold worth entering, let alone conquering. Secondly, they were not going to go into the swamp, as Mr Y. B. says. And thirdly and most importantly, history has given the OUN another, its own path, difficult and full of victims, but straight and clean. Morally, ideologically, and politically, it has no swamps, no detours, no twists and turns. This is the path that the nationalist, liberation movement has followed so far and will continue to follow until victory, despite the obstacles and stakes placed on it by various parties, and despite the fact that the weak-minded fall away along the way.

Mr Bobrovsky answered in the same way and went through the swamp. Was it because he wanted to take over the "fortress" from within, or perhaps for some other reason? It is a pity, a great pity for such a person. Because that swamp was not Mr Bobrovsky wrote in his letter. His first step was to splash mud on everything he had recently treated with respect and, we want to believe, sincerely, not in a human way, pretend. And it's not just the boots of a worthy associate professor that have to be muddied. Ideological and ideological beliefs, political credo, consistency in life, personal honour, dignity and good name are not boots that can be cleaned, or even

throw them away and replace them with new ones. This is not the case!

## **For a correct understanding of the liberation and revolutionary process**

*This article, with Stepan Bandera's full signature, was published in the Christmas issue of the weekly "Ways of Victory", Munich, year ii, chs. 1-2/46-47 of 7 January 1955, reviewed Ukrainian post-war political activity over the past 10 years and asserted lack of more important achievements and missed many opportunities due to the pursuit of illusory alliances with Western powers; at the same time, it warned against the mistake of viewing the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation movement as a political and military campaign designed to be conducted for a limited time, rather than as a deep multifaceted process.*

*This article was reprinted in the collection of articles "Bolshevism and the Liberation Struggle", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, part 5, ed. 34 the OUN, 1957, pp. 184-190. An excerpt of the article "The most important thing in the life and development of the nation" was published in the journal "Liberation Way", year of issue. Xi (XVII), no. 10/200, October 1964.*

A decade since the end of the Second World War is approaching. In that time, many reassessments have had to be made when it comes to the international balance of power and the initiative and shaping role of the main factors.

The lines and methods of Bolshevik expansion, which was carried out with unusual consistency and success at the time, were no surprise to anyone familiar with Moscow imperialism, and Bolshevism in particular. However, the fact that the free world, mainly the Western powers, allowed this to happen so easily caused deep disappointment for everyone who wanted to see the West as a defender against Bolshevik enslavement. Not only did the UPA struggle take place with the complete indifference of the Western powers. Similarly, the West's allied commitments and guarantees against those peoples who found themselves under Bolshevik occupation as a result of the war were not honoured and did not help those peoples in the least. The credibility of the Western great powers was undermined to the core by the fact that they not only failed to successfully support the anti-Bolshevik struggle of other peoples, but also allowed an unusual



the dangerous growth of Bolshevik power.

The entire post-war development has clearly shown that the blind focus on the liberation of the peoples enslaved by Moscow Bolshevism by Western forces has no real basis. The Western powers do not pursue any policy in this direction, and even more importantly, they do not show any aspirations. Their policy does not go beyond the concept of "peaceful coexistence" on the basis of preserving the existing state.

That is why all movements and groups that base their liberation struggle on the decisive assistance of Western powers and would like to align Ukrainian politics with their policies are going down a blind alley. What should have been a realistic expectation is only an empty wish, quite far from reality.

Over the ten years of Ukrainian post-war political activity in exile, the pursuit of illusory alliances with Western powers and their assistance has wasted a lot of energy, caused many harmful conflicts, and destroyed many valuable achievements and important positions of Ukrainian independent policy. There are effects that can be taken into account as a valid reason for the liberation cause. If the entire foreign part of the liberation and revolutionary movement had followed the path of blindly relying on external forces and bending to their wishes, the whole of Ukrainian independence abroad would be in a hopeless dead end today. We would not have gained a more solid base for the liberation struggle from the Western powers, just as those groups that sought it at all costs did not. The general policy of those states did not allow for this. Instead, we would have used up our own strength and the base of the independence movement, which is created by the concept of our own forces, and complete independence in shaping its internal content and actions.

Even worse consequences for the liberation movement would have arisen if its struggle in the native lands had been reoriented towards external forces and their assistance. In that case, we would be facing its effective breakdown today. The Western powers, in their policy, neither dare nor are they able to give real support to the anti-Bolshevik revolutionary struggle in Ukraine. Ideological and political discrediting of the movement before the people through its focus on politics

The West, which is always looking for coexistence with Bolshevism, would have destroyed the entire basis of the movement's influence and liberation action.

Reviewing the developments of the last decade, we find in it a very clear statement that the concept of our own forces, full identity and independence of the Ukrainian liberation movement, both at home and abroad, are the only certain and real ones. It is true that our own forces and capabilities, which in our current situation can be mobilised for the liberation struggle, are small in comparison with those forces and means that come into play on both sides of the world front. But they are certain, they can be used to build a liberation action in every situation, and they can move the whole nation to the struggle for independence.

The ten-year post-war development of events has shown that the concept of overcoming the USSR regime alone is a mistake. Both Western pro-Tsarist propaganda and the political and public work of some Ukrainian circles focused on Stalinism as a system based on the dictatorship of one man and his supportive clique. In this way, the very source of the disaster, the communist doctrine, was lightly and sometimes whitewashed. And it, as a worldview and socio-political system, mated to the historical Moscow imperialism, gave rise to all the horrors of Bolshevism.

Behind this attitude to the problem was the hope that personal changes or other internal upheavals at the top of the regime could lead to the breakdown or a major rebirth of the Bolshevik system. In the meantime, Stalin died, Beria eliminated, and no cataclysmic event or deeper change towards the weakening of Bolshevism occurred. This demonstrated the groundlessness of any hopes for a weakening of Bolshevik pressure as a result of internal changes in the regime itself.

Bolshevism is a totalitarian system not only in the sense of the regime's all-encompassing and unchecked dictatorship in all spheres of life, but even more so in the sense that all elements of Bolshevism, from doctrine to practice, form a single whole, are inextricably intertwined, so that one emerges from the other and supports the other. Bolshevism can only be defeated by completely neglecting all of its components, in particular, by opposing its theoretical basis

The values of the Christian religion and spirituality and the national political and social ideas based on them.

It would be a complete mistake to consider the modern Ukrainian liberation and revolutionary movement as a political and military campaign designed to implement the adopted strategic plans within a limited time and in the appropriate situation, and to end with victory or failure. Such a movement would have neither the right nor the opportunity to develop in the existing post-war situation if it were set in motion only in a situation that gave the appearance of eliminating Bolshevik occupation by a general armed uprising, using international or internal imperial complications to its advantage.

In a one-sided understanding of an exclusive military strategy, the development of the liberation and revolutionary struggle in Ukraine over the past decade would look completely unsuccessful. For although a significant revolutionary military force was mobilised at the end of the war - the UPA and its actions created a great rise in revolutionary sentiment among the people, especially in the Western Lands - it was not possible to raise a general armed uprising. It was also not possible to maintain the integrity of the mobilised forces, keeping them for armed struggle in a more favourable situation. In the post-war years that followed, from 1948 onwards, in the most difficult conditions of underground life and struggle, the active revolutionary cadres in Ukraine, including UPA units and their armed actions, gradually decreased significantly. However, assessing the problem of the national liberation revolution exclusively from the angle of military and strategic expediency is completely wrong, because it does not take into account the whole essence of the revolution.

The Ukrainian liberation movement, as defined by the OUN, is a multifaceted process of the inner-spiritual and political rebirth of the nation and the struggle against Moscow Bolshevism for its own content, identity and free development in all spheres of life, for national and state independence. The process of internal formation of the people, from the deep, spiritual foundations to ideological, political and action-revolutionary mobilisation, is an essential, fundamental component of the liberation revolution, without which the technical struggle itself would have become as dry as a river with dried up springs.

It could have been different if the enemy had enslaved Ukraine only in the political, state-administrative and economic spheres, as is the case in some colonial systems, and the internal substantive life and development of the nation had not been deeply affected by the occupation. Then it would be justified to place the full weight of the liberation struggle on the material, armed political struggle.

Such a focus on this aspect and the prioritisation of operational, strategic and tactical expediency is also applied in the insurgent phase of the liberation revolution, when it comes to mobilising all possible forces, rallying the entire nation to direct, armed struggle and achieving victory over the enemy in the most rational way.

However, in our situation and at the present stage of the liberation and revolutionary struggle, the laws of a continuous, long-term revolutionary process, a protracted struggle that is waged primarily for the soul of the people, rule the development. The entire system of the Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement of Ukraine is aimed at destroying the soul of the Ukrainian nation, the spiritual identity and independence of the Ukrainian people. All the most brutal and insidious methods of Bolshevik totalitarian tyranny serve this purpose: the destruction of religion, the content of national culture, the elimination of the educational and spiritual functions of the family, the forced imposition of a false communist doctrine by totalitarian methods of education and propaganda, extreme material oppression, exploitation, the most brutal terror, mass imprisonment, exile and resettlement, the physical destruction of all resistant elements, etc. д., Bolshevik Moscow is trying to turn the physical substance of the Ukrainian nation into the newest janissaries - the "Soviet people" - by decomposing and destroying the spiritual essence of the Ukrainian nation.

n this plane we must wage our main struggle. First and foremost, it is about preserving from destruction, about keeping alive what is most essential in the life and development of the nation, what constitutes the inherent content of its identity, the meaning of its development as a collective unit. It is about protecting the highest universal values - faith in God, freedom, dignity, rights and free development of the people and the individual. After all, the entire liberation struggle is waged precisely to ensure, develop and elevate all these values in their own independent state to the fullest extent possible.

The most important content of the OUN's current liberation and revolutionary activity must be the defence, maintenance, nurturing and dissemination of the most important spiritual values of the people, which are being attacked by the enemy. Through this struggle, we repel the devastating attacks of Bolshevism, maintain the spark of the unkillable independent life of the Ukrainian nation, and continue to build the future liberation. All three of these points are crucial, they are necessary for Ukraine's independence and are inextricably linked.

In this sense, the process of the liberation and revolutionary struggle at the present stage is not just a step on the road to liberation. It is, above all, the most important factor and evidence of the life and vitality of the nation. In order to develop, in order to fulfil one's goals, one must first of all live. Both human and national organisms live until their own vital engines are extinguished. Each individual and national community competes for the physical preservation of the nation incessantly and, one might say, automatically; the instinct for physical self-preservation is everywhere and with great intensity. But the spiritual preservation lies in the responsibility, efforts and struggle of the elect. to cultivate them, to prepare, organise and guide them to revolutionary action among the people, against the deadly onslaught of the enemy, is one of the main and most responsible tasks of a revolutionary, nationalist Organisation.

If we consider the liberation and resolution movement in this light, when we are talking not only about the plan and strategy of the liberation struggle, but also about the very basis, about keeping the vital fire for the nation's independence, then all the components and manifestations of this struggle acquire their inherent meaning. Having realised that such a struggle is necessary, inevitable, that only through it can all the highest ideas, impulses, aspirations that are concentrated in the idea of the Ukrainian Independent State be realised, we will be able to apply the proper measure to all elements of the revolutionary process.

## **No matter how great the sacrifices, the struggle is finite**

*The topics of some articles by St. Bandera's articles were sometimes determined by the wishes of the editors of the Liberation Front's magazines in foreign countries, who asked him to write on the occasion of major religious or national holidays. One of these articles was "No matter how great the sacrifices, the struggle is finite," published in The Way of Victory, Munich Year III, pp. 2-3 /98-99, Christmas Day, 7 January 1956. In it, the author discusses the expediency of the anti-Bolshevik struggle, despite the great sacrifices it entailed.*

During the Christmas holidays, we take our minds off our everyday activities and worries, as if we are rising in spirit to look around us, to cast our eyes into time and space. Then our thoughts search in the darkness of the unknown, first of all, for our dearest ones - our relatives and closest friends, whose unknown fate worries our hearts. In search of them, our thoughts wander from our homes to the terrible Bolshevik prisons, concentration camps and all the countless places of inhuman hard labour and exile, across the vast expanse of the kingdom of suffering, captivity and horror near Moscow. The Siberian system of Bolshevik torture even blurs the line between the worlds of the living and the dead, so that not only we in foreign lands, but also our relatives in Ukraine do not know about many of the closest people who fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks, who is still alive and who was killed by slavery and hard labour.

When we think about the countless losses of the best sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people, who were being killed by Bolshevik Moscow day after day, year after year, the question of the expediency of the anti-Bolshevik struggle looms large. This question always arises in connection with the problem of the victims of the Bolshevik regime. The revolutionary liberation struggle itself cost a lot of victims, including the best Ukrainian patriots. But in addition, the enemy associates its inhuman methods of total terror and mass extermination with this struggle and with the widespread resistance to Bolshevism, which is strengthened by this struggle. The enemy is re-evaluating its position in this matter - or, in view of the enormous sacrifices,

whether it is expedient for the Ukrainian people to continue their resistance and liberation struggle against Bolshevik Moscow, we always come to the same, affirmative answer. Despite all the most painful and very heavy sacrifices that have fallen and are still falling, despite the most horrific methods of Bolshevik oppression and terror, the entire past and present revolutionary liberation struggle and all the anti-Bolshevik resistance of the Ukrainian people, whether spontaneous or organised, are expedient because they are necessary to maintain the foundations of the original existence and development of the Ukrainian nation.

When considering these issues, we must first of all bear in mind Russia's larger intentions for Ukraine. They are not limited to the state, political and economic conquest of Ukraine, to the full use of all the strengths and resources of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian land. Bolshevik Moscow wants to devour Ukraine and transform it completely. It aims to systematically grind down the Ukrainian national substance, to gut the entire national content from the soul and life of the Ukrainian people so that, having sacrificed their national identity, the Ukrainian person and the entire Ukrainian people would accept the Moscow-communist content and forms of existence and become part of Soviet Russia and the Soviet-Russian people forever. Moscow is pursuing this ultimate goal consistently and without hesitation. Knowing full well that such a digestion of entire conquered peoples cannot be completed in one go, the Bolsheviks are splitting it into a longer gradual process, into a series of transitional stages.

The main principle of Bolshevik progress at all stages is comprehensive terror and the reckless destruction of everyone and everything that stands in the way of the Bolshevik plans for this period, that does not lend itself to Sovietisation and does not want to or cannot serve Moscow's invasion campaign.

The knowledge of the ultimate goals of the total Bolshevik offensive and the recklessness of its translation leads us to the realisation that the entire Ukrainian people are faced with an inexorable either/or. Either to raise the struggle for the existence and independence of the Ukrainian nation and carry it on unbendingly under any circumstances, or to succumb, accepting the death of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian culture, saving only the physical existence of the people of the Ukrainian cro

of Ukrainian land would have increased the strength of Bolshevik Muscovy. This either/or applies to the whole nation, to all its parts. With the consistent implementation of Bolshevik plans, every Ukrainian would have to choose, individually or collectively, either to undergo radical Sovietisation, which is tantamount to renouncing Ukrainian identity, or to be destroyed.

At each stage of their policy, the Bolsheviks put some part of the Ukrainian people before a deadly alternative - physical destruction in a Bolshevik torture chamber or national self-destruction through the adoption of the Moscow-Communist ethos. At each stage, the enemy destroys some branch of Ukrainian national life, Ukrainian spirit and culture. If the Ukrainian people, or some part of them, wanted to avoid the final alternative by not putting up resistance and yielding to the Bolshevik onslaught to the extent that they could escape destruction and at the same time preserve what they could of the national good and content, then under the Bolshevik system such tactics would be unsuccessful for a longer period of time, and could be used for as long as it was profitable for the Bolsheviks to use it in their own way, to carry out part of their plans without difficulty, to gain a foothold in their original positions. But in its further development, Bolshevism would have tightened the screws of its system of oppression to such an extent that it would have forced complete Sovietisation and denationalisation to the very foundations. In this way, the people would not have escaped the final either/or, but the postponement would have ended with the people facing that critical moment in a completely hopeless situation.

Moscow's policy against many nations provides many telling examples in this regard.

The victims of the Bolshevik extermination system are not only those who oppose it and actively fight it, but also all those who, for whatever reason, do not meet all Bolshevik requirements and aspirations when they come into the regime's field of focus and pressure. The Bolsheviks exterminate anyone who is suspected of being dangerous or disadvantageous to them. The implementation by the Bolsheviks of their national, economic, anti-religious, cultural, and educational policies at different stages and shades, in relation to different peoples, indicates that such methods of indiscriminate, mass extermination of people follow from the very nature of



Moscow Bolshevism, rather than being isolated, temporary or localised manifestations.

If we classify the victims of the Bolshevik terrorist system among all the peoples enslaved by Moscow, it is clear at first glance that there are more passive victims, people who were killed only because they were in some way disturbing or disliked the Bolsheviks by their nature or quality, without intentional, active resistance. For a nation, every loss of people who die at the hands of the enemy, no matter what the circumstances, is painful. However, when it comes to the fate of the nation, its defence and its further existence and development, the impact and significance of losses in active struggle and resistance to the enemy are completely different from those of passive victims killed by the enemy.

Every active resistance to an enemy offensive, every sabotage and active overcoming of enemy plans aimed at harming the nation, at any part of the country and in any form, also useful for the defence of the nation, even if it is not possible to disfigure the enemy action at this part. The mere complication and slowing down of an enemy action has a beneficial effect on the defence of national interests and values on other segments, and gives them a delay.

Increasing the difficulties and resistance to the enemy requires concentration of his energy, means and attention on that segment at the expense of others and hinders and complicates the integrity of the enemy's plans.

The Bolshevik totalitarian system is particularly vulnerable to any disturbances in the implementation of plans because of the chain-linking of all functions into one complex mechanism. Even when the Bolsheviks finally succeed in breaking through resistance and destroying the resistance forces in isolated areas it is at great cost to them. Because of this, the Bolsheviks can never get out of the cyclical breakthroughs and failures of their planking system. And every failure of the enemy, including in the plots aimed at strengthening the regime's power and tightening the pincers on the larynx of the enslaved nations, prolongs and facilitates the existence of these nations.

The consequences of the national liberation, revolutionary struggle and anti-Bolshevik resistance are not limited to such defensive, deterrent and delaying actions. Even more important is the offensive significance of this struggle and resistance, which forces the enemy to change its plans and make concessions. Terror and destruction are the Bolsheviks' main means of breaking down all resistance,

However, it cannot be the only way to achieve the goals of Bolshevik imperialism. In its imperialist campaign, Moscow needs not only the very land of the conquered peoples and their forests, but no less people; it needs to take possession of the souls, minds and hands of the conquered peoples and harness them to its goals. That is why the Bolsheviks, destroying some people, are trying with the same persistence to unite, educate, and remake others in their own image.

The Bolshevik system serves this purpose through propaganda, which has been developed to unprecedented forms and sizes, using all possible means. Propaganda is, next to terror, the second main form of Bolshevism's action against enslaved peoples. However, Bolshevik propaganda cannot feed people endlessly with lies and promises, but must have some tangible facts to which it can refer. That is why the Bolsheviks must satisfy the vital needs and aspirations of the peoples to at least a minimum extent. This applies not only to the elementary material, domestic and cultural needs of the human unit, but also to the enduring aspirations of peoples who cannot be immediately deprived of all national life. The so-called Sovietisation, that is, the denationalisation and Muscovization of peoples, must, according to Bolshevik plans, take place in stages, because it is impossible otherwise. At that time, the Moscow imperialist character of Bolshevism had to be concealed, of course, allowing at least some national forms and content. The Bolsheviks would like to regulate the norms of what is left to them in such a way as to dilute the national content of their lives step by step, to kill the peoples' own national character and turn them into loyal servants of Bolshevik Moscow.

However, the national liberation struggle and all manifestations of national resistance interrupt the systematic implementation of this plan. The intensification of terror and the increase in destructive actions expose the true nature and goals of Moscow Bolshevism inside and out, alert the unwitting and complicate its insidious actions. The revolutionary struggle and underground propaganda campaigns reveal the true state of affairs even . This forces the Bolsheviks to make concessions to the national aspirations of the Ukrainian people, which are in no way in line with Moscow's wishes. It is clear that the Bolsheviks are trying to turn all their concessions in their favour, including

they were forced to, or to treat them as temporary attractions. This would probably have been the case if the continuous continuation of national resistance and active revolutionary struggle had not kept the tension constant, preventing Bolshevik Moscow from systematically pursuing its goals against Ukraine.

In this way, the anti-Bolshevik resistance and the revolutionary liberation struggle, despite heavy losses and enemy victories on the immediate battlefield, successfully defended the life of the nation and made possible the significant achievements of Ukrainians in various fields. Thanks to all the sacrifices of the fallen fighters, the national substance and the basis for the liberation and free development of the Ukrainian people are preserved.

## **Khrushchev continued his imperialist course**

*Stepan Bandera critically examined Khrushchev's policies in three articles: "Khrushchev Continued the Imperialist Course," "In National Policy Khrushchev Follows in the Footsteps of Stalin," and "Khrushchev's Stalinism in Domestic Policy."*

*The first of these articles: "Khrushchev continued the imperialist course" was published in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year iii, pp. 18/114 of 29. 4. 1956, reprinted, together with the article "Khrushchev's Stalinism in Domestic Politics", under the joint title "Moscow's Policy is Unchanged", in the collection of articles "Bolshevism and the Liberation Struggle", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, part 5, ed. ZM OUNI 1957.*

*The English translation of this article was published in , 1956.*

Bolshevik propaganda, followed by all the Sovietophile liars, is trying to spread throughout the world the belief that the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (a critical examination of this Congress is presented in the book: "XX Congress of the CPSU without a mask", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, series two, part 1, ed. OUN Central Committee, 1956, 166 pages.) launched a new, completely changed course of Bolshevik policy. However, such speculations are rejected by a sober distrust of all Bolshevik manoeuvres, born of bitter experience. However, among many nations, there is no shortage of gullible people who, despite this experience, are inclined to expect the Bolsheviks to make serious improvements in various respects. However, anyone who wants to develop a correct view of the matter need not confine himself to his subjective judgement, nor should he wait for further, more definite developments.

After all, this very XXth Congress of the CPSU and the Kremlin's post-congress efforts, which together should indicate a change in the course of its policy, provide too much material to verify where the Bolshevik "collective" dictators are actually heading; whether they are changing course, and if so, in what way and how. To do this, it is enough to analyse the lengthy report of the "most collective

The book is the most authoritative and comprehensive explanation of the content and direction of the entire Bolshevik policy now and in the future.

The truth is, as in all Bolshevik speeches and statements, a lot of content is "encoded" in such phraseology, "behind which the Soviets hide a completely different meaning. But over the decades, Bolshevik practice has established quite certain keys to unlocking the true meaning of those worn-out turns of phrase in Bolshevik political speech. If these keys are used to correctly understand the materials of the XXth Congress of the CPSU and recent Bolshevik statements and aspirations, then Moscow's policy line is quite clearly visible.

These issues have already been covered quite extensively and clearly in our journal. However, we believe that it will be appropriate to consider the more essential manifestations of this Bolshevik policy in this light and draw the appropriate conclusions.

The goals of the USSR's foreign policy remain unchanged. The last Congress of the CPSU, including Khrushchev's report, within the decorative framework of statements about the "peacefulness" of the USSR, reiterated many times and in many ways that the Bolsheviks' unwavering goal is the mastery of communism throughout the world. All Bolshevik policy, domestic and foreign, in all respects and in all areas, is subordinated to this main goal of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism.

The broad talk of the historical and developmental inevitability of the world victory of socialism-communism, of its superiority over all opposing political and socio-economic systems, as a doctrine, is intended to morally bind the communists, justify their actions, and at the same time to morally oppress and confuse their opponents. However, the main emphasis is placed on the forceful expansion of the communist bloc with the cooperation of proxy communist forces within the attacked nations. True, the Bolsheviks are trying to hide this fundamental principle, but it is clearly reflected in the materials of the XXth Congress of the CPSU.

The entire economy and the entire internal system of the USSR and the countries dependent on Moscow continue to be directed, and even more so, towards building the world's largest military power. Talk about the aggressive intentions of the so-called capitalist states should serve to justify and

to cover up their own Bolshevik plans.

Khrushchev clearly stated that "more favourable conditions for the victory of socialism in other countries have been created because socialism has won in the Soviet Union and is winning in the countries of people's democracy". True, he also spoke of different forms of transition to socialism, but at the same time he gave a completely unambiguous interpretation of his recipes in sense that other forms take place when national forces voluntarily surrender to the communists, or when a nation is completely decomposed by communism. In all other cases, when the Bolsheviks fail to win over peoples by trickery, calculation and intimidation, they intend to use the well-known practices of the Bolshevik revolution - "the transition to socialism in conditions of acute class revolutionary struggle".

Elsewhere, Khrushchev is even more explicit: "The greater or lesser severity of the struggle, the use or non-use of violence in the transition to socialism, depends not so much on the proletariat as on the degree of resistance of the exploiters." to him, the basis for the education of the masses and Bolshevik national policy is an organic combination of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. An organic combination indeed, since the invasive expansion under the slogans of proletarian solidarity and socialist internationalism constitutes the main programme of action of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism.

In comparison to this, all Bolshevik phraseology about non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, about separating ideological struggle from interstate relations, and about the peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems is just a hollow rhetoric for stirring up other peoples. The 20th Congress of the CPSU stated that the entire foreign policy of the USSR in the post-war period was peaceful and should be continued. Thus, the "peaceful policy" was the enslavement and forced socialisation of the peoples of Central Europe and the Baltic States, the division of Germany, the incitement of communist wars in China, Greece, Korea, Indochina, the massacre and mass destruction of many peoples, . Stalin spoke of peaceful coexistence and non-exportation of communist revolutions in the same way as Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's plan to further strengthen economic centralism, self-sufficiency and the closeness of the Bolshevik, socialist bloc is a clear indication that the Bolsheviks are planning to continue their current policy in the long run. If Moscow's plan was to eliminate opposition and hostility, then at least from an economic perspective it would allow, instead of unilateral bloc building in the "countries of socialism," the development of their economies with consideration for normal economic relations with non-communist states as well.

The programme and main lines of Bolshevik policy and action aimed at the conquest of all peoples and the destruction of everything incompatible with materialist communism and Moscow imperialism were outlined by Lenin, who combined the imperialist aspirations of tsarist Russia with the Marxist doctrine of the world communist revolution. Completely false attempts to drag Lenin and under this umbrella and attribute the aggressive expansion of Moscow communism to Stalin alone lead only to disorientation of peoples and a decrease in their resistance. The Bolshevik imperialist aggressions were launched on a full scale by Lenin and Trotsky from the very beginning of communist rule. Stalin merely continued this imperialist campaign in a sequential manner and was only a consistent implementer, not its founder. Therefore, the debunking of the cult of Stalin, initiated at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, does not in any way prove that the Bolsheviks renounced aggressive imperialism. On the contrary, in order to prevent such a view from undermining the Bolshevik scope, the Kremlin "collective" simultaneously initiated historical corrections in the sense of reducing the personal contribution and role of Stalin in the spread of the USSR's power and in the development of communist doctrine. The XXth Congress of the CPSU emphasised continued loyalty Leninism and the international aspirations of communism, which in practice means continuing communist subversion and rebellion around the world and Moscow's aggressions wherever the opportunity arises.

The tactics of the current Bolshevik policy also show no fundamental changes compared to the Stalinist period, if we consider it as a whole, and not just the last stage.

Mobility and changeability of tactics with a consistent strategy for the future

The goal is a characteristic feature of Bolshevik politics, established by Lenin and brought to the utmost "perfection" in its practical application by Stalin. In this respect, Khrushchev, with his collective leadership in the Kremlin, is only an imitator of Stalin, in particular when he continues the line of the past and tries to create the impression through artificial political tactics that he is changing the course of the whole policy.

It was Stalin who, a few years before the Second World War, introduced the "peacekeeping" course of Soviet policy. He used Litvinov's "peace-loving" diplomatic salesmanship, which Khrushchev and Bulganin later followed. The resolution of the Cominform was also an imitation of Stalin's trick of breaking up the Comintern, with much less political effect. Because repeating the same trick has no effect, and everyone knows that it was done primarily out of concern for Titov, whose liver was bitten by the Cominform.

In the end, neither the Comintern nor the Cominform were the leaders of the international communist action; the Kremlin itself was in charge, and their task was to do its bidding and give the impression of an independent international leadership. The Bolsheviks have dozens of forms and methods to do the same; they never reckon with hired, traitorous puppets when it comes to removing them from the stage.

Stalin also gave an example of how the Bolsheviks would, with a "peaceful policy and without interference", foment an internal war with the help of their agents, emissaries, trained military specialists and a supply of weapons, and then, when they were losing, pull back. Why 't Khrushchev and Bulganin repeat Stalin's models in the Middle East with appropriate application, especially if their master provided different types of models: Spanish, Greek, Chinese, Korean, Indochinese, or even Iranian?

Looking at all the current Bolshevik moves and measures in relation the outside world, we see a consistent course of policy that prepares for the further expansion of Moscow communism, deceives, deceives, decomposes different nations, creates and seeks out favourable moments to strike at the weakest point. Only those who are unable or unwilling to consider Moscow Bolshevism can fail to see this consistency and long-term goal can fail to see it.



as it really is, in all its actions, both past and present.

## **In national politics, Khrushchev follows in Stalin's footsteps**

*Discussing Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, St. Bandera, in this, the second of his articles on the subject of the Congress (published in the weekly "Ways of Victory", Munich, year iii, pp. 19-20 (115-116) of 6 May 1956) revealed the true face of the Communist Party leaders, including Khrushchev, as disguised followers of Stalin, particularly in the national question.*

The publicised break with the cult of Stalin by the current Kremlin dictators gives the impression that this change is associated with plans to mitigate the system of comprehensive terror and oppression that has existed up to now. However, the name Stalinism, like Leninism, should be understood as a whole Bolshevik system that derives from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, developed and applied on the basis of indigenous Moscow imperialism and tyranny. It was Lenin who implemented it as the basis of the Moscow-Bolshevik empire, and Stalin, during his long rule, consolidated it and "improved" it to the extreme. Therefore, there can be no real break with Stalinism without significant, fundamental changes in the state-political, social, and economic system, and above all in national politics.

What does the Bolshevik national policy look like now, in the time of renunciation of the Stalinist cult, in the light of their fundamental statements and directives at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and their proclaimed messages? When considering these questions through the prism of official Bolshevik positions and messages, one must bear in mind their propagandistic tendencies. It is well known that the Bolsheviks completely disregarded the truth and tried to present information in such a way as to portray their plans and their system in the best possible light. Therefore, in every estimate based on Bolshevik sources, it is necessary to consider significant downward adjustments if one wants to bring it closer to the actual sub-Bolshevik situation.

The Bolsheviks try to talk as little as possible about the national and political issues of the enslaved peoples, both within the USSR and the so-called socialist camp of people's democracies. However, what Khrushchev said about these issues at the XX Congress of the CPSU clearly indicates

Kremlin's intentions to maintain and further entrench Stalin's Moscow-imperialist, anti-people course. Khrushchev repeatedly emphasised that "the Communist Party tirelessly ensuring that fraternal friendship between all the peoples of the Soviet Union grows and develops, for this friendship is the unshakable foundation of the power of the Soviet state system". And it is well known that the Bolsheviks cynically call the most destructive Moscow enslavement of peoples fraternal friendship. For Khrushchev, it turns out that "the formerly oppressed and backward nations of old Russia have made enormous progress in their development and have taken an equal place in the friendly family of peoples of the Soviet Union". In other words, the Communist Party's policy under Lenin and Stalin's rule was beneficial to these peoples and should be consistently pursued.

Khrushchev emphasised the Moscow-imperialist nature of the CPSU's national policy most clearly when explaining the issue of patriotism and internationalism. Referring to a quote from Lenin, he praised as a positive phenomenon the "sense of national pride among the Great Russian proletarians" and their love for their language and homeland. Khrushchev gives a similarly positive assessment and assignment to the so-called Soviet or socialist patriotism, that is, the love of all enslaved peoples and people for their prison, the Moscow-Communist empire of the USSR. Khrushchev's third main feeling and guideline is socialist or proletarian internationalism, which the Bolsheviks use to cover up their expansionary and aggressive tendencies and actions in the form of subversive communist actions and direct military aggression. The Bolsheviks recognise only the USSR as the homeland of all peoples chained to it and only one Soviet patriotism.

Muscovites, as the dominant nation, have the right to their own patriotism. But Khrushchev did not even mention the possibility of Ukrainian, Belarusian, Georgian, Turkestan and other national patriotisms of all "equal peoples in a friendly family of nations" in the USSR. After all, the Bolsheviks branded such patriotism-nationalism of all peoples, except for the Russian one, as "bourgeois".

The framework left by Bolshevik Moscow for the national development of the enslaved peoples is defined by the Stalinist formula: "culture - national in form, socialist in content". And socialist in the Bolshevik dictionary means Moscovised, materialistic,

Marxist. Khrushchev emphasised in no uncertain terms that this Stalinist formula was still important and binding and that there would be no change in this regard. In order to avoid any ambiguity about the continuation of the anti-national, Moscow-imperialist course, Khrushchev stated with pressure the following: "We must give a decisive rebuff to all manifestations of bourgeois ideology, including nationalism, protect the purity of our communist ideology, and tirelessly seek even greater unity of the peoples of the USSR and further strengthening of their great friendship."

Moscow's attitude to economic affairs is no better. Even though the Bolsheviks use the same methods of concealment and distortion of facts in these matters, Moscow's colonial-imperialist policy is very clearly reflected there. Khrushchev's statements at the XXth Congress of the CPSU clearly indicate that the Bolsheviks' economic policy introduces a colonial system in relation to the countries of the so-called people's democracy. This policy tends to create a single socialist bloc under Bolshevik rule, completely cut off from and opposed the rest of the world. Under the guise of mutual cooperation and specialisation, an ever-increasing centralisation is being carried out, with Moscow's dominant position and the complete dependence of all countries on it. In his speech, Khrushchev emphasised that the economies of the socialist countries should develop in a "specialised manner", i.e. one-sidedly, not on the basis of their own needs and capabilities, but only depending on Moscow's imperialist plans and imposed demands, covered by "business coordination of the plans of the national economy of the entire socialist camp".

Two separate measures are the position of the metropolis for Moscow and the colonial dependence of the countries of "socialism and popular democracy". Khrushchev tries to justify this change by saying that the USSR stood alone "among capitalist surroundings" and therefore had to develop all branches of heavy industry, while now there is cooperation between socialist countries and their security rests on the industrial power of the entire socialist camp. The dominant position of the Moscow "metropolis" is supported by the claim that the USSR is generously helping other socialist countries to develop their industries, contrary to the principles of capitalist economic policy. In reality, Moscow is trying to do the following

The Russian Federation is trying to make the most of the economic capabilities of its vassal states by distributing partial tasks of its economic plans among them. At the same time, it wants to make these countries completely dependent on it under economic control, depriving their economies of the opportunity to develop independently and exist without a functional connection to it and the entire Bolshevik bloc.

Moscow applies the same principles of economic centralism, complete economic dependence and exploitation to non-Russian peoples within the USSR. All economic planning and management is fully concentrated in Moscow, in the so-called Union ministries. Khrushchev says : "While the Union Ministries retain general management, the definition of new tasks, control over their implementation, the supply of equipment, and the financing of capital investments, the rights of the republican ministries should be significantly expanded."

Thus, all management functions in the economy are listed in detail, so that there is no gap and they must remain directly in the hands of the Moscow central government. Khrushchev talks about these matters in more detail, reinforcing Moscow's economic supremacy in every way possible, for example: "Speaking of the need to expand the rights of the Union republics, we must emphasise the need for a centralised plan principle . . . The most important condition for the successful development of our country and each republic of the Soviet Union is the unity of efforts of all the peoples of the USSR, a certain centralisation of our national economy..." The distribution of budgetary funds between the union republics should also be centralised in Moscow.

What are the "expanded rights" of the Union republics and their republican ministries? Khrushchev gives a very clear answer: "They should, within the framework determined by the all-Union national economic plans, solve specific issues of the development of certain sectors of their economy themselves." That is: Moscow sets the plans, imposes the tasks, and the republics have to decide for themselves how to fulfil and exceed them. Khrushchev calls this "further strengthening the sovereignty of each republic". But at the same time, he does not conceal what he is really talking about with this "expansion of sovereignty": it will "help the whole breadth of

to take the initiative in using local resources" - that is, to further strengthen the overfulfilment of Moscow's exploitation plans.

The so-called Union republics within the Soviet Union are, as everyone knows, merely administrative expositions of the Moscow authorities, carrying out the instructions of the Bolshevik centre. Even so, Moscow is afraid to delegate to them even the entirety of their original functions in the administration of the economy, including industry. Its most important branches in all the "Union Republics" are directly under Moscow's control, and they are managed by Union ministries in administrative and executive terms. And so, according to Khrushchev's report, of all industrial production in Ukraine, only 62% was under the control of the so-called republican industry. In this way, Moscow wraps and binds Ukraine and other nations to the Moscow empire with many cross-knits.

Stalin's national policy, inherited from tsarist Russia and improved by Joseph Visarionovich, culminated in methods of genocide, mass exile to spaces far from national territories, dispersal and mixing of nations to gradually weaken and destroy their biological substance and transform them into the Soviet people. These same methods were adopted and are being continued by Stalin's successors. It is no coincidence that immediately after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and during the campaign to debunk Stalin, the Moscow dictators, led by Khrushchev and Bulganin, announced a plan to resettle hundreds of thousands of young people from Ukraine and the Baltic states. This was done at a time when it was deliberately done to document the immutability of Bolshevik anti-national policy, in line with the traditional plans of Moscow imperialism.

## Khrushchev's Stalinism in domestic politics

*The third article in the series, about the immutability of Moscow-Bolshevik "Stalinism", i.e. the economic exploitation of the population, was published, signed by St. Bandera's signature, in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year iii, pp. 21/117 - 23/119, May-June 1956. It was reprinted together with the previous article "Khrushchev continued the imperialist course" (under the joint title "Moscow's policy is unchanged") in the collection of articles "Bolshevism and the Liberation Struggle", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, part 5, edition 34 of the OUN; 1957, pp. 350-368.*

A characteristic feature of the entire Bolshevik totalitarian system and policy is the unquestioning subordination of all spheres of life to one plan: the consolidation of communism and Russian imperialism at the expense of all the peoples it enslaves and its ever-distending expansion. Since the imperialist aims of Bolshevik foreign and national policy have not changed, there is no need to look for fundamental changes in the orientation of domestic policy, which serves the same goals. However, if the goal is unchanged, there may still be different paces and different tensions in practical action. In this respect, the most reliable indicators of the general Bolshevik policy agenda can be found in an analysis of the Kremlin's current domestic policy.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU confirmed the immutability of Bolshevik economic policy, which puts the entire economy at the service of imperialist expansion, in particular the exorbitant increase in the USSR's military potential, rather than raising the living standards of the population. It is true that the main statements at that congress contained a lot of talk about welfare in the USSR and its rise, but specific economic policy directives indicate the opposite intentions.

Khrushchev emphasised that "the CPSU has shown and is showing constant concern for the predominant growth of important industry". Thus, it is not the harmonious, balanced development of all sectors of the national economy, but only the predominant growth of heavy industry that characterises Bolshevik economic policy. In words, heavy industry is interpreted as "the basis for the development of all sectors of the social economy,

strengthening the defence capability of the homeland, improving the welfare of the people". In reality, however, the Bolsheviks were focused on the importance of heavy industry in boosting their military potential, and the improvement of the people's welfare was only for propaganda and decoration. According to Khrushchev, industrial production in the USSR increased by 26 , from 1929 to 1955, from 100 to 2049 per cent, i.e. more than 20 times. However, he did not even try to compare figures on the growth in the supply of at least the most important consumer products over the same period. After all, it is known that under many surveys, the shortcomings and poverty of the USSR population would have become even greater than before 1929.

If the Bolsheviks were building heavy industry to create the basis for the development of all sectors of the economy, then they would have taken care to bring these other sectors up to the level already achieved by heavy industry, at least in stages and to some extent. Meanwhile, their economic planning rule has been to consistently push heavy industry along with the same consistent suppression of consumer goods production. This was the case throughout Stalin's rule, and Khrushchev pursued the same course with unrelenting stubbornness. Whereas Malenkov had at least bequeathed some changes in favour of the population (the development of light and consumer industries to better supply consumer goods), one of the main slogans of Khrushchev's course, put forward after he seized power and approved by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, was precisely the return to the Leninist-Stalinist forcing of heavy industry.

Khrushchev himself admits that "the level of production is still insufficient to ensure a prosperous life for all members of society, that there are still many shortcomings and disorganisation in the country's economic and cultural construction".

But at the same time, he draws a conclusion that is contrary to the economic advice and needs of the population. He says the following with a sneer: "There were "wise men" who began to oppose light industry to heavy industry, assuring us that the predominant development of heavy industry was necessary only in the early stages of the Soviet economy, and now we only have to force the development of light industry."



A related resolution of the XXth Congress of the CPSU reaffirmed Khrushchev's position with the following resolution: "The Communist Party considers it absolutely necessary to continue to ensure the outstripping growth of heavy industry, primarily ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil industry, energy, machine building, chemical products and construction materials." The same resolution goes on to read the following significant statement: "At the same time, the Congress believes that the level of social production currently achieved allows for the rapid development of not only the means of production, but also consumer goods."

This is pure mockery of the people. Officially, it is claimed that there is already a sufficient industrial base for the proper development of consumer goods production, it is claimed that it is far behind and does not meet the needs of the population, and at the same time it is decided to continue the same course of forcing the heavy industry at the expense of further oppression of the light industry.

This is happening at a time when, for example, according to Khrushchev's own figures, in 1955 the USSR produced "as much as" 251 million metres of woollen fabrics, i.e. slightly more than one metre per capita, and 299 million party shoes (including rubber and house slippers), i.e. not even one and a half pairs per person. Why is this so? There is only one answer - because for the Bolsheviks, both under Stalin and Khrushchev, the vital needs of the peoples they conquered did not matter, but only the growth of the USSR's military potential and its economic capacity for further expansion.

The entire Bolshevik economic policy is based on the premise that the Soviet economy must serve Moscow-Communist imperialism, not the people and the people. For the Bolsheviks, people and nations are at the service of the Soviet economy, as one of the operating factors, as the object that can be treated most recklessly, from which the most can be squeezed and at its expense all the shortcomings and shortages of other economic factors can be levelled out.

Khrushchev reported to the 20th Congress of the CPSU that "labour productivity in industry in 1955 was almost twice the pre-war level. During the years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, more than two-thirds of the total increase in industrial output was obtained by increasing the productivity of the

labour productivity". It is well known that this increase in the Soviet system is not due to technical improvements and rationalisation, but mainly due to the unprecedented increase in the terrorist pressure on workers and the extreme exploitation of all their powers. The means of increasingly oppressing and exploiting the workers is to maintain the so-called discipline of labour through the system of terror, the constant increase in mandatory labour standards, the system of collective and individual social competitions, Stakhanovism and similar methods of chordal labour.

Whereas in other countries the contribution of labour to social production is constantly growing and wages and living standards are rising along with production, in the "country of socialism" only poverty, oppression and exhausting labour are increasing. Khrushchev boasts that "the cost of industrial production has been reduced by 23 per cent in five years". But during that time, workers' wages were not raised accordingly, nor were prices for consumer goods reduced to the same effect. The entire increase was used to consolidate the power of the Bolshevik state and to benefit the ruling class of the state and party bureaucracy.

Since Bolshevism in all its practice proved to be an anti-people system, this character of Bolshevism is most brutally manifested against the peasantry, for whom it became the worst enemy and destroyer. Stalin's policy consistently followed the line of the complete elimination of the peasantry and its replacement by a new class of collective farm serfdom. Khrushchev, who was one of the main initiators and leaders of Stalin's policy against the peasantry, now insists on its consistent continuation. Here are some examples of his policy:

"Many thousands of engineers, technicians, party and Soviet workers have been sent from cities and industrial centres to work at MTS (Machine and Tractor Stations in the USSR), collective and state farms... More than 20,000 communists from the cities have been sent to the countryside and recommended to the heads of collective farms." Khrushchev thus presents as a new Bolshevik achievement the invasion of the countryside by communist instructors and administrative bureaucrats, who are supported by the collective farms and are supposed to further tighten the serfdom system. This is a repetition of the Stalinist practice of communist gangs from the city raiding the countryside during the "dekulakisation" campaign.

Machine and tractor stations should be one of the enforcement factors over collective farms. To strengthen this function of the MTS, Khrushchev recommends that they should also be given the operational management of procurement in the collective farms. And to ensure that they fulfil their task of putting pressure on the collective farms more accurately, Khrushchev demands that their funding be transferred to "economic calculation" at the expense of the collective farms, instead of being financed by the state.

In the resolutions of the XX Congress of the CPSU, there is a resolution to "create a direct material interest of the heads of district party and Soviet bodies in the results of economic activity of the MTS and collective farms". That is, all these communist hype-mongers who oppress collective farmers and are paid for at their expense should be separately rewarded, according to how much they manage to squeeze out of the village for the Soviet state.

The elimination of the remnants of homestead land, which is often the main source of subsistence for a poor collective farm family, initiated after the XX Congress, shows that Khrushchev is going to surpass even Stalin in his anti-peasant policy. For him, too, the collective farm system is only a transitional one. At the XXth Congress of the CPSU, he said it clearly: "In solving the urgent tasks of further developing agriculture, we must pay special attention to the development of state farms, which represent the highest form socialist ." The Bolsheviks have been moving consistently towards this "highest form of socialist agriculture". So that there is not even a suggestion that a peasant has any right to be a co-owner. All agriculture is the property of the Soviet state, everything is managed by a bureaucratic apparatus instructed by the Bolsheviks, and in the place of the peasant, he is no longer even a collective farm worker, but a state farm serf.

In the Bolshevik system, the organisation of concentration camps plays a particularly important role. True, the basic principle of this institution is not an invention of the Bolsheviks, but belongs to the traditional methods of Moscow imperialism and tyranny, used by the Russian tsar in slightly different forms. But the Bolsheviks perfected this method to an unprecedented level of "perfection" and mass scale.

The concentration camp system was designed to fulfil two main tasks in

Bolshevik policy. Firstly, it serves to exterminate enemies and opponents of the Bolshevik regime and people who are unprofitable to it in the middle of nowhere and in darkness. And secondly, it is intended to squeeze out of the victims doomed to make amends all their strength in hard labour for the benefit of Bolshevik economic plans, including those that would be impossible to implement by normal means in such conditions. Thus, on the one hand, the system of concentration camps was one of the means of Bolshevik national and domestic policy, the policy of Moscow's enslavement of other peoples and the communist class struggle. On the other hand, this system became an important factor in Bolshevik economic policy. One or the other of these two aspects prevails as a motive for isolated waves of mass imprisonment and exile to concentration camps. In the end, the actions and consequences of both are woven into an inseparable whole, for both the political and economic system of Bolshevism is of the same imperialist and anti-national character.

The Kremlin has always tried to hide the truth and any information about the system of concentration camps and hard labour from the world, both from the political and economic point of view. Therefore, it would be in vain to look for a direct reflection of the size and importance of this system in Bolshevik politics and economy in any official Bolshevik documents. However, sometimes official Bolshevik data do provide a mediocre but clear reflection of the economic effect of this system. This was the case at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

At that congress, much was said about the development of the Soviet economy in Siberia, in the far eastern regions. The resolutions included, among other things, the following resolutions:

"The further development of the country's productive forces urgently requires the attraction of new sources of raw materials, fuel, electricity and, above all, the mobilisation of the vast natural resources of the eastern regions of the country. Over the next 10-15 years, the country's largest coal mining and power generation base, the third largest metallurgical base with a production capacity of 15-20 million tonnes of pig iron per year, and new machine-building centres should be created in the eastern regions."

This resolution only mentions the economic goals of forcing industrialisation in those sparsely populated areas without an adequate communication network. But it is well known that such plans to move the bulk of the USSR's industrial potential ever further east were driven primarily by military, not peaceful, economic motives. However, in this discussion, we are interested not so much in the military-political aspect as in another point, namely: on what economic factor did the Bolsheviks mainly rely in transferring these plans? The answer to this question is found in Khrushchev's report, although he gives it in a guilty form.

He says the following: "Experience shows that coal mining and electricity production in the East is more cost-effective than in the European part of the USSR. Suffice it to say, for example, that the cost of capital investment per tonne of increased coal production in the fifth five-year plan in the Eastern Siberian basins was two and a half times less, and in Kuzbass (Kuzbass, Kuznetsk coal basin in the Siberian part of the USSR, which produces mainly coal and iron ore, occupies the Kemerovo region, east of the Altai Territory.) are one and a half times smaller than in the Donbas (Donbas, Donetsk Basin, Donetsk Oblast), the main fuel base and the most important industrial area of Ukraine and the whole of Eastern Europe, an area of powerful coal and metallurgy, lies in the south-eastern part of Ukraine, between the middle and lower reaches of the Donets River in the north and south-east and the Priozivska Upland and Priozivska Lowland in the south; it covers an area of 23.000 square kilometres.

Donetsk region is mercilessly exploited by Moscow).

In 1960, 80 million tonnes of coal are to be produced in Kuzbass. These 80 million tonnes would cost the state 2.4 billion rubles less than the same amount of coal mined in Donbass. The second example is of the same order. The Bratsk hydroelectric power station is being built on the Angara River... It will generate 22 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, the same amount as the two largest hydroelectric power stations in the European part of the USSR - Kuibyshev and Stalingrad. Meanwhile, the construction of the Bratsk hydroelectric power plant will cost twice as much as the construction of the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad hydroelectric power plants combined, and the cost of electricity produced by the Bratsk hydroelectric power plant will be 200 million

The cost per kWh is lower than at the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad hydroelectric power plants. Comrades, this is how profitable it is for us to develop the energy resources of the East to a greater extent!"

Khrushchev goes on to generalise that within 10 years, Siberia should be turned into the largest base for other industries as well.

Why, then, should the construction of large industrial facilities in Siberia, with the enormous cost of long-distance and heavy transport, be so much cheaper than in the industrialised "European part of the USSR"? Why should industrial products of various sectors in the poorly developed Siberian territories cost so much less?

Khrushchev did not need to answer these questions, because all the participants in the CPSU Congress knew very well what was going on. But it is also known to everyone else who is aware of the Bolshevik system of slave labour. It is enough to compare the location of the Soviet concentration camps with the territorial location of the aforementioned new construction projects and industrialisation projects in Siberia to get a very clear answer. This is a bet on the slave labour of prisoners and exiles, which is so very cheap for the Russian state and the communist regime, at least until the final payment and the great reckoning that is yet to come!

Meanwhile, Khrushchev and his comrades are not worried about this, confident that the bones of the murdered convicts will not rise from under the giant hydroelectric power stations and other construction projects. Similarly, the Moscow tsars were not afraid of the bones of the Cossacks on which Petrograd was built. Yet the descendants of those Cossacks from the Volyn regiment started the revolution that buried the tsarist regime with their protests in Petrograd.

Khrushchev's argumentation makes it quite clear that in their plans for the industrialisation of Siberia, the Bolsheviks take into account not only the natural resources of the country, but above all slave labour as the main factor in the economic development of these resources in the cheapest and most favourable way for the regime. From this perspective, the Khrushchev-Bulganin Kremlin regime has consistently used the same methods that marked the Stalin era. Knowing that the XXth Congress of the CPSU adopted the same plans as the foundation of new "achievements" in socialist construction, one cannot hope that

Bolsheviks will voluntarily renounce the system of slave labour. Instead, we can say from above that any Bolshevik efforts to give the impression of abolishing the concentration camp system, such the message given to the French socialists, are calculated only for propaganda effect, without substantive change. The Bolsheviks can make a lot of noise about changing the external forms, names, regrouping, ostentatiously dissolving some concentration camps and releasing some prisoners. But the Bolsheviks will try to maintain the system of slave labour and the mass extermination of undesirable elements, while using their forces to the fullest, as long as they have the power.

The second difference between this system of using and destroying people is the so-called development of virgin lands. In this, Khrushchev is not only an imitator, but has the right to be the author. This new method is based on the same principle as the concentration camp method: a person is nothing, he or she must do the work and become dung for the transfer of such plans of socialist construction that would not otherwise be possible or paid for. The form of organisation of these "enterprises" differs considerably from the concentration camps. The destructive aims and consequences are concealed with the utmost care, and instead of being punitive, the work is given the appearance of voluntariness and heroic fervour.

This change in appearance is due to political rationality, taking into account the environment against which these destructive intentions are directed. When the Bolsheviks' national and class struggle, which is served by the concentration camps, clearly speaks of the destruction of political and class enemies, one no longer wants to apply these clichés to the youth against whom the "mastery of the whole" is directed. After all, it is essentially a systematic weeding out of the most valuable elements among young people, in particular the youth of enslaved peoples, who could pose a serious threat to Bolshevism. But to explicitly classify the colour of the youth brought up by communism as enemies of Bolshevism would be to admit its failure.

Therefore, Khrushchev believed that it was better to rot such young people in virgin lands with praise. After the XXth Congress of the CPSU, events took place that clearly indicate that the action of resettling young people is not so much about the development of sparsely populated areas as it is about a form of mass uprooting from the midst of enslaved nations and

its destruction in foreign lands. For what other purpose does the resettlement of young people by the hundreds of thousands from southern Ukraine to the far North, including the northern Baltic states to the South, to Kazakhstan, serve?

Speaking about the economic side of virgin lands, Khrushchev cynically said that with such methods, at low cost, the Bolsheviks are paid to conduct grain farming in Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals, if two out of five years have two good harvests and one average harvest. Thus, the Bolsheviks are paid to tear Ukrainian youth away from the fertile Ukrainian land and plough deserts and arid virgin lands with them, because they have their own account and "socialist" economy.

With regard to the democratisation of the USSR, the XXth Congress of the Communist Party gave no grounds for serious expectations in this direction. Khrushchev emphasised the course of further consolidation of the Party's dominant role in the state and in all spheres of life. This is a mild form of expression of the Party's firmest dictatorship and unrestrained Soviet totalitarianism. Much attention has been paid to improving intra-party relations, but this should strengthen, not soften, the dictatorship and the Communists' domination of the people. Likewise, consolidating party control over the Soviet security services does not mean reducing their anti-people, terrorist practices. It was just a struggle between two cliques and two apparatuses for primacy, for who had the upper hand over the masses. When only Khrushchev's party apparatus defeated the ambitions of Beria's circles and took control of the entire KGB apparatus, then this apparatus became "flawless". Here is what Khrushchev says in this case: "In connection with the revision and cancellation of a number of cases, some comrades began to show a certain distrust of the state security officers. This is, of course, wrong and very harmful. We know that the vast majority of our Chekists are honest, dedicated to our common cause, and we trust these people."

Of course, Khrushchev trusts them and wants to continue to base the Moscow-Communist tyranny on their devotion to the Bolshevik cause of national hatred. It is no coincidence that he uses the most notorious and hated name of "honour" when expressing his recognition and trust in them. In this way, he emphasises his recognition for the entire Chekist system, for the entire period of its existence, through all the changes backwards, from Cheka to NKVD to KGB. This is Khrushchev's most essential "credo" and his calling card.



mode.

It may seem paradoxical to argue that the Khrushchev-Bulganin regime should be supposed to continue Stalin's course at a time when it is trying to create the exact opposite impression. But this paradox is inherent in the system of Moscow's absolutism, both Tsarist and Bolshevik, which always tries to cover up its anti-national and inhuman character.

The incessant, comprehensive oppression of the tyrannical regime over the centuries has not been able to completely break the aspirations of enslaved peoples and enslaved people for national, political and social freedom and independence, for the free development of the spirit and the whole life, for just relations between people and peoples. Because of this opposition between the natural struggles of nations and people, on the one hand, and the imperialist goals and tyrannical system of the Russian prison of peoples, on the other, there is an unusually high level of tension.

Both the Tsarist and later Bolshevik autocracy tried to master and subdue this internal pressure primarily by means of comprehensive mass terror, poverty and slave relations in social and economic life, privileging the ruling class - the regime's pillar - once the nobility, now the communists, at the expense of the rest of the population, winning the imperialist sentiments of the Russian people, maintaining and spreading Muscovite domination over other peoples, relentlessly persecuting and exterminating all pockets and forces of national, political, religious, cultural and social resistance and struggle for freedom. However, all these means could not and still cannot crush the natural striving of the nation and the individual for freedom. Neither the tsarist regime nor Bolshevism ever managed to eliminate internal tensions or to completely destroy their opponents. That is why both variants of the Moscow imperial system are forced to make partial concessions from time to time or manoeuvre with confessed compromise in order to reduce internal tensions for a while.

In this regard, the Moscow autocracy has already developed its own traditions and methods, which Bolshevism also uses in a way adapted to the new circumstances. These systematic methods include the blame for the crime of the system itself and the entire regime on individual exposed persons who became

unprofitable and should be eliminated. This method was used most widely by Stalin, but his successors are not proud of it either, as can be seen in the case of Beria and others. Similar goals of "throwing off the ballast" to deceive general public and reduce internal pressure on the regime are served by the introduction of new leading slogans, shock campaigns, and the deliberate creation of a new atmosphere and situation in foreign and domestic policy.

A traditional manoeuvre of Moscow's imperial policy, particularly on the domestic front, used as a great release valve, is to create a great deal of propaganda noise about far-reaching reforms in connection with personal changes - once on the tsarist throne, now at the top of the Communist Party. Particularly sharp cases of this category, which went so far as to condemn previous autocrats, were associated not only with personal and dynastic matters, but also with deep crises that shook the entire empire and its system.

In the traditions of the tsarist system, we find the precedents of the Bolshevik system. The death of Stalin and the succession to his "secretary's chair" entailed similar political phenomena as the earlier succession to the tsarist throne. Malenkov's leadership, feeling the increased pressure of anti-Bolshevik sentiments and forces and the loosening of the regime system, was forced to declare and begin some economic easing. At the same time, the entire policy of the preceding period was not touched, in an attempt to preserve the belief that the general line and the system itself were inviolable.

Khrushchev's rise to power was marked in the internal party debate by a turn towards a firm Stalinist course in economic policy, which was most clearly manifested in the push for heavy industry at the expense of further suppression of consumer goods production. But at the same time, the Bolshevik Party has become all too aware of the shaky position of Bolshevism, which is maintained exclusively by total terror, which also has limits to its influence. The entire party realised that some measures had to be taken to reduce internal tensions. Khrushchev could not overcome this either. But in order to prevent Bolshevism from making real concessions, Nikita Sergeevich adopted the following manoeuvre: to abandon Stalin's glory, renounce his cult and confess his

practices, to add to this sensation a pro-propaganda hype about supposedly respectable reforms in all politics, and, having washed away the general dismay with this crackle, quietly continue and consolidate the same Leninist work. Perhaps the cunning Nikita has another, perhaps the most important, thought: that by debunking the cult of Stalin, he will clear the way for the cult of Khrushchev. But this is beyond the party's official plans.

If we look closely at the essence of Khrushchev's "reforms", we can see that they are all limited to consolidating the positions of the Communist Party, to its internal consolidation and strengthening. There is not a trace of any liberalisation in them that would affect the "ordinary" people, their living conditions and rights. Internal party democratisation, collegial leadership at the top of the party, party control over the Chekist system, audits of trials and sentences against prominent party members - all this does not affect the dictatorship of the party over the people, the system of communist terror, oppression and exploitation.

By condemning the methods of mutual extermination in the games between party leaders, Khrushchev is trying to consolidate his influence and power in the party. With the communist cadre completely stratified from top to bottom into February cliques for mutual support and cover, every party member is under constant threat that some personal jockeying at the top could lead to his unexpected downfall. By eliminating this fear, Khrushchev hopes to win over the party as a whole.

In a similar way, the current Kremlin dictators are trying to consolidate communist cadres outside the USSR, and these measures have real meaning. However, this is not an introduction or part of any general reform of the Soviet policy and system that would benefit the peoples oppressed by it. According to Bolshevik plans, it should be just the opposite. Moscow intends to use the internal consolidation of the communist regime and personnel during the period of detente to gain further peoples and to squeeze the communist pincers in the countries it has conquered.

## **Bolhevik tactics and the liberation struggle**

*This article is a supplement to the three previous ones. The author's assertions as to why the Kremlin leaders must make concessions and why return to Stalinist terrorist methods is not possible make all three articles acutely relevant even today.*

*This article was published, with the full signature of St. Bandera, in the journal "The Way of Victory", Munich, year iii, chaps. 24/120 and 25/121, June 1956.*

A closer look at Moscow's so-called new course strengthens our conviction that the Bolsheviks are not going to change their system or their policies, either domestically or internationally. At the same time, when communist propaganda makes so much noise about the departure from Stalinism and the new direction in the policy of the communist bloc, all these changes must be attributed to its tactics. But even such changes in tactical order have their own significance if they are viewed in relation to the development to date and to future developments. In order to properly assess this significance, we must first consider the objective reasons that led the Bolsheviks to introduce such changes in their tactics, then their goals, which they would like to achieve in this way, and finally the consequences of such aspirations of the Kremlin.

Speaking of the reasons, we can state at once that the communist leadership in Moscow had to realise the futility and dangers of continuing to use the tactics of the past. Hence the plan for a wide-ranging tactical manoeuvre that would create an atmosphere more favourable to Bolshevism, both in internal and external relations.

From the beginning of their rule until recently, the Bolsheviks systematically and consistently kept the USSR in a state of siege.

Regardless of all the changes in the foreign policy situation, which now allowed and then again excluded any external threat to the USSR, Moscow for three and a half decades did not release the military and the highest internal tension, as if under

time of immediate military threat. For the most part, this was a feigned fear, as the Bolsheviks were well aware of the current international situation, which rarely gave grounds to suggest that anyone was preparing a war against the USSR. With this pretence, Moscow, among other things, covered its own military preparations for further imperialist expansion. But an even more important goal of this tactic was to create an excuse for the Bolshevik system of total dictatorship and terror, which had to be explained to some extent by the state of siege and an acute external threat. Thus, the hype of a military plot against the USSR became a permanent feature of Bolshevik domestic policy.

After the Second World War, Moscow felt compelled to reconsider its political tactics of the "besieged stronghold". It was forced to do so by the extraordinary growth of national revolutionary anti-Bolshevik forces and their liberation struggle, which became a serious threat to Bolshevik domination of the conquered territories. On the one hand, the revolutionary liberation movements of the previously enslaved peoples, among which the insurgency in the Pale of Nations developed most strongly, and on the other hand, the still untamed national forces of the newly acquired countries posed a difficult front for the Bolsheviks to overcome.

It is not known how events would have developed if Moscow had not been able to use the huge military forces mobilised in the war against the national liberation movements and take advantage of the unusually favourable external situation created by the short-sighted policies of the Western powers at the end and after the war.

In preparing the ground for further communist expansion, driven by the military might of the USSR, the Bolsheviks continued their "threatened peacemaker" tactic, sewing their own aggressive intentions onto their recently loyal allies. But at the same time, they observed that this tactic was dangerously backfiring on them. The belief, maintained by Bolshevik propaganda, that a new war was being prepared against the USSR, that the Western powers were ready for an active, armed attack, weakened the sense of isolation among the peoples fighting the Bolshevik occupation for their independence and morally strengthened their resistance.

In order to prevent the consequences of such propaganda about external threats that are not beneficial to Bolshevism, Moscow simultaneously uses a variety of methods to demonstrate its military power. This is also done for dual purposes, for external and internal effect. To further reinforce this political tactic, the Bolsheviks launched a large-scale rambling campaign of so-called peace actions in the postwar years, not only in the countries they conquered but also around the world.

In this way, Moscow is trying to spread another disturbance and sabotage in the outside world, to draw disoriented, weak and decayed elements within different nations into the spiral of its influence. But even more important for it is the internal political effect, to show the enslaved peoples how far the Soviet influence reaches, how strong it is, and that in the event of war the Bolsheviks will have their helpers everywhere. Under the same cry of defence of peace, the Communists launched another round of repressive actions to crush anti-regime forces and activities, particularly in the countries of so-called popular democracy.

This explains the absurd contradictions in Bolshevik policy and propaganda: on the one hand, the screeching about encirclement, the military conspiracy against the "countries of socialism" and their peacefulness, and on the other hand, the world's largest mobilised armies, a total military powerhouse, not only maintaining but also demonstrating unprecedented military power. Internally, the former was to justify the military-totalitarian system of the "besieged stronghold", while the latter was to extinguish the revolutionary liberation and anti-Bolshevik processes. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks' distinction between domestic and foreign policy is very conditional, not in line with the concepts of other nations, and is more about quantity than quality, both in terms of goals and means.

After taking power, the leaders of the Postalinist regime had to make an inventory, to create a kind of balance of the pre-Bolshevik legacy. At the same time, they had to assert that the pre-Bolshevik tactics were increasingly losing their effectiveness and were not leading to internal stability. And the Kremlin would like such stability very much, if only it not change the Bolshevik system in any way, and did not reduce the dominance of communism and Moscow's conquests.

It is true that in foreign affairs, the USSR achieved unprecedented power, gained a strong international position, and reached a very

The Bolsheviks were able to build up their economic and military potential with considerable technical equipment. All this, coupled with an international constellation favourable to Moscow, should seem to assure the Bolshevik empire and system of internal strength, durability and inviolability. Meanwhile, constitutes the basis of every state - the relationship between the state, its system and authorities on the one hand, and the people and the individual citizen on the other - is in the worst possible shape in the Bolshevik kingdom. In this respect, there is no amendment to be made, nor is there any sign of improvement in relations.

Bolshevism wreaked terrible devastation among peoples, but it did not win any real victories on the main front, in the internal mastery of man and people. It failed to eradicate religion or nationalism, and it did not succeed in destroying the human soul, the individual human being. The Bolsheviks failed to Russify the enslaved peoples, to turn them into one "Soviet" people, or to raise generations of communised herd people. After thirty-five years of indiscriminate destruction of all opposing, disobedient elements, after an equally long period of monopoly shaping of people's lives and education, the communist regime is struggling with the same, ever-growing opponents.

Violence and terror, as it turns out, were not a temporary means of "war communism", but remained an integral part of the Bolshevik system, the basis of its rule. However, the terrorist system began to decline, despite the spread of its influence and the continued pressure it exerted. This manifested itself clearly at the very time when Bolshevik Moscow had reached the height of its power and enjoyed the most favourable external situation. The revolutionary liberation struggle of the OUN-UPA and the massive heroism of the Ukrainian people in the course of this struggle, as well as similar struggles of other nations in an extremely unfavourable post-war situation, most convincingly demonstrated that the ideological motivations of the national liberation struggle were stronger than the influence of the Bolshevik terrorist system. The strike riots and uprisings in East Germany were the most telling indicators that the omnipotence of Bolshevik terror had been broken. (The riots and uprisings began on 16 June 1953 in East Berlin with the protest of German workers who protested with demonstrations and a strike against the

to raise their labour standards, and later to demand free elections and a change of communist government; on 17 June, these protests took on a broader scope and involved a strike by almost all of the workers who had started the uprising. Bolshevik troops crushed the uprising with tanks and guns and by shooting workers' leaders; according to the West German parliament (Bundestag), 62 people were shot and 25,000 imprisoned.), and in Siberian concentration camps (On the uprisings and strikes in Siberian concentration camps, which were usually initiated and led by Ukrainian prisoners from the ranks of the OUN and UPA, and which began in 1946, more details are given in the book: "Bandera's Moscow Murderers on Trial", (Ukrainian Publishing House in Munich, 1965), in the section "Materials and Documents", part 5: "Uprisings and Strikes in Bolshevik Concentration Camps and Exile in 1946-1959", pp. 455-456). The equivalence of these outbreaks at the two ends of Soviet rule, at the two treadmills of the terror system, has gained symbolic significance. In particular, the massive active struggle of political prisoners, whose soul and vanguard are Ukrainian nationalists, in distant Siberian camps, in the very crucible of absolute terror, raises waves of intense emotional turmoil that spread among peoples and awaken liberation energies.

These are all clear signs that the influence of the terrorist system is losing its omnipotence, that it is being overcome by the ideological drivers of the struggle for freedom. This breakdown is all the more important it was clearly manifested in the circumstances that were most beneficial to Bolshevism and most difficult for the liberation struggle. The moral consequence of this fracture is quite the opposite of the ratio of physical strength on both sides. This phenomenon was too threatening to Bolshevik domination, and the Postal leaders in the Kremlin could not leave it without due attention.

It would have been too difficult and dangerous for Stalin's successors, both Malenkov and Khrushchev, to begin their reigns by tightening the screws on the general oppression and terror. This would have been all the more impossible because, in the tradition of Moscow's autocracy, the change of emperor brought some relief, at least at first. Likewise, Stalin's death cemented anti-regime sentiment and raised expectations of an improvement in the internal situation. In addition, it would have been difficult



to come up with successful methods of strengthening Stalin's terror and pressure when the previous methods began to lose their effectiveness. Therefore, the communist dictators were forced to look for other, additional ways to counteract the moral strengthening of liberation movements and freedom-loving sentiments that threatened the Bolsheviks.

One of these means, introduced by Khrushchev and Bulganin, was to defuse the external situation. The precursors to this new tactic were the cessation of the wars in Korea and Indochina, and from the first Geneva Conference (The first post-World War II Geneva Conference of Ministers of the four great powers: USA, Britain, France and the USSR on "detente and peace" was held 16 April 1954), Moscow began to strengthen and publicise this tactic.

The introduction of a new tactic in the Kremlin's entire policy was also dictated by foreign policy reviews. The previous course of the Cold War had led to the consolidation of fronts that halted further successes of communist expansion. It would have been difficult and inexpedient to continue it indefinitely without any tangible results. It was either necessary to further exacerbate and expand the conflicts, moving closer to World War III, or to seek a different solution. Moscow did the latter, trying to keep the initiative in international development in its hands. By creating a disconnect between the communist bloc and the Western powers, it was counting on more favourable circumstances for communist penetration and the spread of its influence by peaceful means, and on its benefits from expanded economic relations. However, the mobility and variability of tactics is an important way of retaining the initiative in political games and forcing opponents to keep a defensive posture. Moscow is vigilantly trying to use this tried and tested method.

However, internal motives were no less important than foreign policy ones in this change of tactics in Soviet politics. By straining relations with the Western powers and exaggerating this reversal in propaganda, the Bolsheviks wanted to create a general belief, contrary to their previous tactics, that their position was not threatened by any external threat, that they had no opponents to fear, and that this situation was sustainable for the long term.

At the same time, through its policy of normalising relations with the West, Moscow is trying to oblige Western states to show no sympathy or support for anti-Bolshevik, national liberation movements. Both, according to the Bolsheviks, should have a hindering effect on the development of these movements, create an even more difficult foreign policy and the psychological situation. In such circumstances, the enslaved peoples should have been convinced that the position of the USSR was permanently stabilised and that there was no possibility of the liberation struggle being combined with any external complications for the Soviets.

The second part of this manoeuvre, designed to internally consolidate the Bolshevik system, is to create the impression the system is undergoing important reforms that will bring about a marked improvement in living conditions and more freedom. Such beliefs are supposed to be aroused by the announcement of the CPSU's break with the cult of Stalin and some internal urges specifically designed for propaganda purposes. In this way, the Bolsheviks want to unite sympathy, arouse hope among the enslaved peoples for the evolution of the Bolshevik system and divert their attention from the liberation struggle.

These are the reasons for the tactical manoeuvres in the Kremlin's recent policy. They have been caused, to a large extent, by events that signal a dangerous process for Bolshevism, that the main basis of its rule - the system of total terror - has passed the peak of its power and its influence has begun to decline. In order to prevent this threatening development, the Bolsheviks are trying to that the enslaved peoples come to terms with the inviolability of Bolshevism, link their fate to the Russian Empire and communism, and see the only way out as positive participation in its further development.

At the same time, the Bolsheviks are not going to introduce significant changes or reform their system. A closer look at the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the CPSU shows that the goals of Bolshevik domestic, national and foreign policy remain fundamentally unchanged, with all efforts being made to consolidate the Bolshevik system and spread communism. Similarly, the new tactics in Moscow's politics

should only serve to successfully pursue the same goals. There is a direct opposition between the reasons that caused the change in Moscow's political tactics and the goals it is trying to achieve with the changed tactics. The Bolsheviks want to outwit the causal factors that force them to change and neutralise them.

Will they succeed? Will the consequences of the Bolshevik tactical manoeuvres be in line with their goals, or will they be more in line with the inherent causes that caused them? Life itself will undoubtedly give an answer to these questions. But even now there are sufficient grounds for predictions in this direction.

First of all, we can be sure that very soon everyone will see the difference between the actual content and goals of the Bolsheviks' new tactics and their propaganda account. This lie can only bring the Bolsheviks a small gain in time. But its negative consequences will be much greater. With their propaganda about the extraordinary benefits and privileges for the peoples and for every citizen of the USSR from the new plans and "reforms", the Bolsheviks only confirm the validity of such demands and reinforce them. When the reality turns out to be the opposite, as unbearable as it was before, this not only increases the people's hatred of Bolshevism, but also their disgust with the regime for its deceit and mendacity. It is true that deceitfulness has been one of the main pillars and characteristics of Bolshevism from the very beginning. Therefore, it seems to the communists that adding to a long-overflowing measure no longer hurts. Meanwhile, by doing so, the Bolshevik regime documents its commitments, and when it does not any way abide by them, it further strengthens the moral and psychological bonds of all those currents and forces that have a negative attitude to the existing situation and do not want to accept it.

Khrushchev's methods of whitewashing himself through partial admissions that Bolshevik practices under Stalin were criminal must similar consequences, fatal to Bolshevik prestige. Everyone knows that today's leaders of the CPSU and the USSR were co-decisive in those practices and are responsible for them.

Secondly, the Stalinist methods now condemned constitute the backbone of the entire Bolshevik system. Unless the current regime in Moscow would really break with the pre-Bolshevik methods and

had adopted a more humane course, in line with the vital needs of peoples and individuals, it could have partially redeemed itself for its previous crimes. But this is impossible.

Changes that would be at least somewhat in line with the justice and aspirations of the peoples of the former Soviet Union would be tantamount to the radical elimination of Bolshevism, the communist system and the Russian Empire, the prison of the peoples. Such changes could only be brought about by a relentless struggle against and victory over the Bolsheviks, not by their hands. When the Communist Party now renounces some of its previous atrocities, attributing them to Stalin alone, but at the same time continues to use these same methods, it gives itself the worst possible evidence of not only extreme immorality, but also of a complete waste of political sense. Because in the eyes of the people, the change or immutability of Bolshevik methods is evidenced by the entire Bolshevik system, which everyone experiences in their daily lives, not by the rehabilitation of old Bolshevik leaders, or by administrative reforms or isolated efforts made for show. No one can deceive the people under this review, and when the Kremlin thinks that it can do this with a Khrushchevian bounce, it is only deceiving itself.

At the XXth Congress of the Communist Party, its leaders documented the only display of personal insignificance and subordination in history. Khrushchev, in describing the insane criminality of Stalin's dictatorship, was shameless enough to admit that he and other close "associates of Stalin" saw and understood all this criminality, but silently participated in it, out of fear to save their skin and positions. I don't know what to be more surprised at: the self-exposed insignificance of Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan and other "stars", or the total meanness and irresponsibility of all the participants in the congress, that such clichéd nobodies were put in charge of the USSR and world communism. This is a truly historic congress that revealed the moral rot of communism, the head and core of the Moscow empire!

The Bolsheviks are counting on the fact that the peoples they have enslaved have suffered the same decline in common sense, dignity and responsibility, and that their tile-cunning manoeuvres will be accepted face value. In this they will be very much rewarded. The consequence of such tactics will be not only an increase in general hatred, but also the spread of

disdain for them. This will be a new, very strong factor that will play an important role in the psychological overcoming of the consequences of terror. In the Stalinist period, Bolshevism, for all its predatory ugliness, appeared in the guise of satanic fanaticism, which further cemented the freezing effect of its terror. Now Khrushchev turned the tables and showed everyone his true gut, lined with falsehood, lust for domination, and cowardice. The adaptation of Stalin's methods of terror, but with a Khrushchevian mask, would no longer have the same paralysing effect, but would arouse even greater resistance and hatred.

Since the Bolshevik tactics of fertilisation do not bring about a significant improvement in living conditions, nor do they satisfy the national liberation aspirations of peoples for freedom, this continues the resistance and struggle of the nations enslaved in the USSR against Bolshevism.

The above-mentioned points will add moral strength to the anti-regime resistance and liberation struggle. In the same direction, the consciousness that it was the struggle up to now that forced the Bolsheviks to give up their seemingly unshakable positions will act as a boost. So far, they have been trying to control the situation with manoeuvre tactics, but in vain. The struggle for freedom will continue with increased energy. The Bolsheviks will not be able to hold back this pressure with manoeuvres alone, and it would be difficult to turn it back with a counter-offensive of intensified terror. Contrary to its initial plans, Bolshevik Moscow will be forced to begin a strategic retreat, making actual concessions. This will only benefit and strengthen the struggle for freedom in every respect, including the national liberation struggle of Ukraine and other peoples for their state independence and a just order.

## **Moscow's unchanging strategy**

*Moscow's constant strategy is constantly manifested in the duality of its policy: to appease those who oppose it with confessional concessions, and at the appropriate time, or even together with the concessions, to rush at them and deal with them quickly. She used these methods against the Poles during their riots in Poznan and against the Magyars during their national uprising. So, in this article, St. Bandera warned in this article that "every reliance on hopes for other, milder forms and means of Moscow's progress is treacherous and disastrous".*

*The article was published in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year iii, no. 47/143 of 18. 11. 1956 p. An excerpt from it under the heading "Traditions and Methods of the Moscow Imperialists" appeared in the monthly "Liberation Path". London, year ed. XI/XVII for October 1964, on the fifth anniversary the death of St. Bandera, pp. 1057-1065.*

The Bolsheviks' stance against the last manifestations of the Polish communist regime's self-sufficiency and the reckless suppression of the liberation revolution in Magyarland clarified a number of problems related to the so-called evolution and democratisation of Bolshevism and the anti-Bolshevik struggle.

At first glance, it may seem that the Kremlin's attitude to these trends in Poland was dictated by completely different, opposing goals and springs operating in the Bolshevik system than in the case of Magyar. That is why some people think that behind such a brazen leap in Bolshevik tactics - from compromise in the face of developments in Poland to extreme brutality against the Magyar uprising

- There must be some far-reaching internal changes, including personal movements within the Bolshevik leadership. But if we take into account the consistency of Bolshevik imperialist policy, we come to the conclusion that in both cases the Bolsheviks were acting according to the same general plan. This does not exclude the possibility that internal upheavals within the Bolshevik leadership could also have come into play. But these would have been derivative phenomena, rather consequences than the main reasons for the use of these two opposing tactics.

From the very beginning of its occupation of these countries until the last period of so-called de-Stalinisation, Bolshevik Moscow pursued the same goals of aggressive policy and used the same methods in relation to Poland and Magyar. The revolutionary boiling in Poland and the explosion of the revolutionary struggle in the Magyarshchyna were born simultaneously, on the same basis. And the methods of Bolshevik reaction in both cases were decided by the same collective leadership of the CPSU.

So there is no reason to think that the use of two different tactics was the result of a change in the international situation, due to the military actions of Israel, France and England against Egypt. These actions, however, in moral and political terms, created a more favourable situation for Moscow's predatory attack on the Magyars. But the Kremlin is well aware of the policy orientation of the Western powers and takes into account the fact that at the present time they would not have been able to take an effective, military action in defence of the Bolsheviks' crushing liberation revolution of any people enslaved by Moscow, not even if there had been no unfortunate episode in Egypt.

Thus, if the development of events in Magyarshchyna had been of similar importance in Moscow's estimation as the development in Poland, then there would not have been such a sharp difference in the Bolshevik reaction. When, in these two cases, Moscow took,

- as Bolshevik norms - diametrically opposed attitudes, this indicates most clearly that for her these were two completely different, opposite affairs in their consequences, despite their identical genesis.

This divergence of assessments and the use of two opposing tactics reflects the strategy of Bolshevik policy in its inherent, deep, rather than flattened, reflection.

Moscow's attitude to the October events in Poland was still within the framework of the coherent, "de-Stalinised" course of Bolshevik policy. The Kremlin's attempts to build and spread the legend of a break with pre-Stalinist methods in domestic and national politics had to affect the satellite countries as well. In order to make this tactic look like a genuine change of political course, the Kremlin had to make such stretches and repeatedly allow such phenomena to occur, which caused dangerous cracks in the Bolshevik system of total suppression of all freedom. When Khrushchev decided to switch to such tactics, it was under the pressure of anti-Bolshevik sentiment and forces that cannot be mastered by terror alone for the long term.

The Bolsheviks are desperately trying to turn their forced tactical concessions into a successful means of furthering their expansionary policy aimed at bringing the peoples of Asia and Africa under their influence.

That is why the current collective dictators in the Kremlin are so careful to preserve and spread the belief that in the post-Stalinist period the goals of world communism were achieved by the will of the people, by humane, democratic methods.

This is how Moscow framed its restrained reaction to the Communist Party's emancipatory aspirations in Poland, once it realised that they did not cross the lines that the Kremlin considered acceptable. This tactic, despite its minor losses, provided Moscow with strong arguments to reinforce the legend of the evolution and democratisation of the "backward-looking" Bolshevik system. Even in the midst of the Magyar uprising, the Kremlin tried to keep this legend alive and reinforce it with a statement from October 26 about correcting previous mistakes in relation to the so-called people's democrats and about its readiness to establish relations with these countries on the basis of equality and sovereignty.

When, after this statement, Moscow discarded the so carefully preserved mask of "backwardness" and switched to the specific Moscow-Bolshevik tactics of pogroms with complete brutality, it was the result of a thoughtfully planned, unchanging strategy of Moscow imperialism.

The Kremlin dictators must have that with this sharp turn they themselves were shattering the legend of Bolshevism's internal rebirth and largely undermining the benefits already achieved or planned. This is a clear indication that they considered it impossible and futile to continue using evil tactics against Magyar. For Moscow, keeping this country in the Bolsheviks' clutches is more important than all the benefits and pledges associated with the course of "de-Stalinisation". It is likely that Moscow has in mind not only the crushing of the national liberation revolution in Magyar. With this practical pogrom of the liberation struggle, the Bolsheviks want to paralyse the independence and anti-Communist movements and sentiments in all the enslaved countries.

How the recent condemnation of Stalin's methods and pretended appeasement



The Bolshevik system, and the latest overt turn to the condemned method, is a consequence and proof that neither tactic can permanently consolidate Moscow's domination over freedom-loving peoples and eradicate their independence and anti-communist aspirations. The Bolsheviks have to change tactics or combine them because, if they constantly maintain one system, anti-Bolshevik forces adapt to its climate and grow to a size that threatens the Moscow empire. But the variability and combination of these will not protect anti-people and inhuman Bolshevism from inevitable failure.

The Bolsheviks' turn to the methods of reckless terror and pogrom in crushing the Magyar liberation revolution has clearly shown that these methods remain the unchanging basis of Bolshevik tactics, the main and final means of their national policy. there is a serious threat to the maintenance of Moscow's domination over any enslaved people, Moscow uses its pogromist methods, developed over the course of the entire development of Russian imperialism and "perfected" by its culmination, Bolshevism, in the most brutal way. This is always the case in such cases, regardless of the external situation or other plans and motivations of Moscow's policy. It is only the assessment of the tyrants ruling in the Kremlin that decides whether they consider it necessary and desirable to serve this main factor of Moscow's imperialism. All other means and methods are of auxiliary, secondary importance. Moscow can put them aside at any time when it wants to operate with the naked bones of a predator.

Accordingly, all peoples who have to deal with Moscow, including those fighting for their liberation, must orientate their forces and efforts, tactics and strategy of their struggle towards the underlying mode of action of Moscow imperialism, its reckless predatory tactics. Any reliance on hopes for other, gentler forms and means of Moscow's advance is treacherous and disastrous.

## First conclusions

*On the basis of Moscow's complaisance in the Poznan riots and its predatory reaction to the Magyar uprising, the author of this article "First Conclusions" reveals the limits, carefully disguised by the Bolsheviks, at which the influence of tactical considerations ends and the demands of Moscow's invasive imperialism alone decide.*

*The correctness of the statements and conclusions in this article could be observed years later, when Moscow was confronted by such satellites as Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.*

*This article was published, signed by St. Bandera, in "The Way of Victory", Munich, year iii, M 48/144 from 25. 11. 1956; reprinted in the collection of articles "Bolshevism and the Liberation Struggle", Library of the Ukrainian Underground, part 5, ed. ZM OUN, 1957, pp. 455-460.*

The brutal, overt murder of the people that Moscow's barbarians are committing in Magyar in front of the whole world is, in fact, nothing new in the Bolshevik and, in general, Moscow's practice of conquering peoples and destroying the disobedient. After all, from the beginning of their rule, the Bolsheviks have systematically used the same methods against Ukraine and other enslaved peoples, and on an even larger and more brutal scale. The mass extermination of freedom-loving people, including women and children, with military weapons; the starvation of an entire nation by systematically organised starvation, cold, hard labour and deprivation of the most basic of life; mass evictions and exile to countries of terrible slow death - all these are old practices of Moscow-Bolshevik atrocities.

The world remained indifferently silent when Bolshevik Moscow has been torturing and destroying Ukraine, Belarus, the peoples of the Caucasus and Turkestan for almost forty years. And surely this indifference was not caused by ignorance or misunderstanding of what was happening in the terrible Soviet Union! Even now, the repetition of Bolshevik atrocities in Magyar region has caused

the moral and political shock and reaction of the Western world, as it were learning about such methods and crimes of Moscow for the first time, or as if it had woken up from a stone sleep.

This awakening was caused by two main reasons, firstly

The Western European nations felt the immediate proximity of the terrible claws of the Moscow bear and realised that the Bolshevik threat would be directed directly at them. Secondly, the Bolshevik pogroms in the Magyarshchyna dispelled all illusions that Bolshevism had begun to reborn after Stalin's death, that its methods were becoming milder and more humane, and that the aggressiveness of Moscow's imperialism had begun to dull, at least in terms of militarily violent forms of action.

It was not only Bolshevik tactics and refined propaganda that were used to sow such soporific delusions in the world political opposition. It was the entire corrupt, corrupting international mafia, which was always in secret alliance with Bolshevism, that did the same. And all the cowardly, accommodating policies of the Western powers against Bolshevik Moscow were also aimed at completely confusing their own peoples.

And at a time when the lulled political sensitivity of the Western nations was falling into the deepest sleep, there came a rude awakening from the Bolshevik strike in the Magyars. It was not the brutality of the Bolshevik atrocities that caused the shock, for the world has become indifferent to the misfortune of others when it is distant, but the proximity and unexpectedness of the blow. The deep anti-Bolshevik excitement took hold of the moods of the Western European masses, who were not prone to such excitement. Moreover, even various conscious and unconscious henchmen and accomplices of Moscow communism in the West, who were disgraced by the unexpected reversal of Bolshevik tactics, began to renounce communism and condemn Moscow's concessions in the Magyarshchyna.

The Bolshevik pogroms to crush the liberation revolution of the Magyar people showed most clearly that the nature of Moscow's imperialism and communist regime has not changed, that Moscow does not want to let any victim out of its clutches, and that when a nation rises up against communist oppression and Moscow's exploitation, it shows its predatory claws. By brutally drowning the uprising of the Magyar people in their blood, the so-called collective leadership of the Kremlin showed itself to the whole world in a true light, as a consistent successor and imitator of Leninist-Stalinist methods. All the noise about the change of course and the decline of Stalinist methods turned out to be an insidious lie.

Such consequences were certainly not the intentions of the Kremlin dictators. This is clearly indicated by the simultaneous use of the latter tactics against Poland. When the Bolsheviks crossed out their tactical plans with their brutality against the Magyars, this indicates that other, more important motives were at work here.

A comparative study of these two cases - the Bolshevik reaction to the events in Poland and in the Magyarshchyna - reveals the carefully disguised limits where the influence of tactical considerations ends and only the naked calculations of Moscow's invasive imperialism decide. This question should be considered more thoroughly, because the answer to it provides the basis for understanding Bolshevism's strategy and for predicting Bolshevik concessions in critical situations. In a newspaper article, one can only note the most important points.

What was the main difference between the devastation in Poland and in the Magyars in their initial stages? We emphasise: in the initial stage of relative events in both countries, because in the further development the difference became quite obvious. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik reaction was immediately different, despite the superficial similarities of the first uprisings. In Magyar, the Bolsheviks initially responded with tanks and salvos against the demonstrations, while in Poland, after the CPSU leadership met with the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which had begun the rebellion, they stopped preparations for a military response.

In Poland, the Communist Party was able to use cunning tactics to control the masses' agitated independence sentiments, to bring them into its own channel and keep them within favourable limits for Moscow. Tomulka and his supporters, using their brand of national communists, played the role of spokesmen for Poland's national and independent aspirations. In reality, their claims to Moscow did not go beyond the demands for some autonomy for the Polish Communist Party, a reduction in the Kremlin's centralising pressure, and in particular, intra-party settlements with those most compromised by past communist practices. What they advocated for the national aspirations of the Polish people was limited to the minimum concessions that the communist regime had to make in order to at least partially defuse the tension of anti-communist and anti-Moscow sentiment and prevent an inevitable explosion.

Moscow's leaders realised that such internal rebellion by tried-and-tested communists did not go too far beyond Khrushchev's tactics of "backwardness", and that the Communist Party and regime they led and their modest reforms would act as a safety valve. In a threatening situation, Moscow also agrees to minor concessions, a "step back", if this ensures that it can later take "two steps forward". Of crucial importance to the Kremlin was Tomulka's guarantee that the communist system, the dictatorship of the Communist Party, and the outposts of the Soviet army would remain in Poland. These are the main pillars of Moscow's rule over the defeated peoples. If these pillars remain intact, then everything else, temporarily, of secondary importance to Moscow.

In contrast, the first demonstrations in the Magyars immediately set events in a completely different direction. In Budapest, the masses took to the streets with a clear revolutionary, anti-Moscow and anti-Communist attitude and with the same slogans. The Communist Party - neither as a whole nor as any part of it, had any data to stop or saddle the popular movement. The Bolsheviks, together with their agent, the top of the Communist Party in Magyar, immediately decided that there was no other way to maintain their dominance than to crush the revolution by violence. They followed this line consistently. They made temporary concessions and compromises against the demands of the revolution only for tactical reasons, in order to take advantage of the time and not be completely eliminated at the most critical moment.

The first conclusion from this comparison is that for the Bolsheviks, the most important thing, and at the same time the critical line beyond which political tactics are irrelevant, is to maintain the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the conquered countries. The stabilisation of the Soviet outposts is the main pillar of Moscow's occupation. The army bears the main burden of Soviet rule only in the initial and critical stages of conquering a country, and normally it plays the role of a supportive pillar. Moscow's permanent domination of each country is exercised through the total communist system, which shackles all areas of life, the entire nation and every individual.

The Communist Party and the Communist regime provide the surest guarantee of subordination to Moscow. Because of their opposition to the will, desires and vital needs of their own nation, they must rely on violence

communist apparatus and the power of the Moscow empire to maintain its power. And from this comes a long-term dependence on Moscow and the ultimate obligation to serve it.

As soon as these guarantees of Moscow-Bolshevik domination over a country are in place, the Bolsheviks can make various temporary concessions to the national, political, economic, religious and cultural aspirations of the people under pressure of necessity. Under both Lenin and Stalin, there were such thaws and easing of the regime when times were tough. There was NEP, there was "Ukrainisation", there was a second round of "Ukrainisation" during the last war. And then, when the Bolsheviks consolidated their position, a new tightening of the regime's grip came. For Moscow, the most important thing is to keep the reins in its hands, at least for a while, and let them go.

The second conclusion from the comparison of the development in Poland and Magyar is another statement: when it comes to the disruption of the communist system and the dictatorship of the communist party, the Bolsheviks massed their military forces and dealt with the people in question in the most brutal way.

Some would like to justify this view by saying that a revolutionary path to liberation is impossible and inexpedient in the Bolshevik conditions, and that the people can achieve freedom by a step-by-step evolutionary process. This is a self-deceptive view. The nearly forty-year history of Bolshevik enslavement of peoples provides many examples of Bolsheviks seemingly indulging in the gradual spread of freedoms of a people in various spheres of life for some time, and then brazenly sharpening the course and crushing not only all the achievements of that process, but also all the national forces that manifested themselves in it. For the Bolsheviks, the question of the transition from softened tactics to reckless destruction depends primarily on the content and degree of the independence process. When it comes to shaking Moscow's domination and the communist system, Moscow acts without a mask, regardless of whether it is dealing with a revolutionary breakdown or evolutionary development.

The simultaneity of the pogroms in Magyar with the concessions to Poland shows clearly that the are always ready to jump from their moorings. Each evolutionary development allows them to act in a planned manner and choose the most suitable time and method for a devastating

of the Bolsheviks. The revolutionary struggle, on the other hand, creates a situation of two warring parties, and the Bolsheviks lose their undivided dominance over the situation. But most importantly, the national revolution destroys the entire apparatus that Bolshevism uses to control the nation from within. The revolution establishes a front line between the people and the traitorous Communist Party, which serves the enemy. Every revolutionary breakdown undermines the Bolshevik system of enslavement and improves the situation of the people in their protracted struggle for liberation, if they continue this struggle despite the sacrifices.

## The forgotten science

*The attempts of Western politicians to find coexistence with imperialist Moscow also left traces among some of the Ukrainian community in foreign lands. The main spokespersons for this "coexistence" and the reliance on communist-Komsomol cadres in the struggle against Moscow were the right wing of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), led by Ivan Bahrianyi, and its left wing with Ivan Maistrenko, as well as the environment of the UDFR Foreign Office- So in his article "Forgotten Learning" (published with full signature in the "Ways of Victory", Munich, year iii, chaps. 50/146 and 51/147 of 9 and 16 December 1956). Stepan Bandera, on the basis of historical examples from the recent past and the present, revealed the harmfulness of modern Sovietism and its service to foreign factors. The author wrote about the inherent cadre of fighters in his article "On the Question of the Core Personnel of the National Liberation Revolution" (see p. 284 of this collection).*

The coexistential course, which a month ago dominated international politics and seemed to determine its development for a long time, has also caused a related, decaying clamour to grow in Ukrainian political life in a foreign land. The newest Sovietophilia, put forward by new minions, has reared its head, and using the stifling international situation, it has taken on a new form. It is true that in the current atmosphere, cleansed by the psychological and political shifts caused by the national revolution in Magyar, all Sovietophile forces and currents have become very quiet. But this was only a pause. Bolshevism and its henchmen will do their best to feed these ferments of ideological and political decomposition and to make use of them at the first opportunity.

It is therefore advisable now to shed some light on the soil and roots of this corrupting phenomenon, on the way and consequences of its action, in order to neutralise it.

Modern Sovietophilia has many similarities with the once vocal Sovietophilia. In fact, the current version of this phenomenon is much worse than the original. This applies equally to its



to the background, pathogens and consequences. Of particular significance is the fact that the current relapse arose after the experience of the past revealed the inappropriateness and harmfulness of Sovietophile tendencies. Therefore, in order to properly assess this manifestation of political degeneracy, it is advisable to recall the development and consequences of its initial appearance more than thirty years ago.

The movement of Sovietophilism developed in the Western Lands of Ukraine under Polish occupation and among Ukrainian political emigrants during the NEP era and the so-called Ukrainisation of the former Soviet Ukraine. Various political and public figures who had no particular sympathy for communism or Muscovism, but were looking for some kind of "orientation", some easier way out, support and help in the then protracted and seemingly hopeless situation, were caught up in its vortex.

The psychological basis for Sovietophilism was the moral and political breakdown after the defeat of the national liberation struggle and the unusual reaction to the oppression of the Polish occupation in the Western Ukrainian Lands and the indifference of Western powers to the Ukrainian cause. The political fodder for this trend was the development of various areas of Ukrainian national life in the Central and Eastern Lands during the NEP and "Ukrainisation" period.

Sovietophilism of the time was based on the following main ideas: a new form of Ukrainian state was developing in the Ukrainian SSR. Although it has considerable shortcomings, in particular with regard to sovereignty and because of the communist system, it offers Ukraine great benefits and carries important for amendment and improvement. The Ukrainian SSR provides the basis and framework for the development of all aspects of the Ukrainian nation and should be a pillar for the preservation and development of Ukrainianness in other parts of Ukraine and abroad. Therefore, Ukrainians outside the Ukrainian SSR should recognise it as a Ukrainian state and build on it, not deny it.

The spread of such views and sentiments in the Western Lands and among part of the political emigration was facilitated by the coordinated course of Bolshevik policy, and in particular the so-called Ukrainisation. However, conscious, patriotic circles from the OSSUZ did not have a hand in this. They were well aware of the essence of Bolshevism and had no illusions about the sincerity and durability of Bolshevik relief.

Obviously, Ukrainian patriots, active in various spheres of national life, tried to develop it as best they could under Bolshevik conditions, using all opportunities to do so. The period of NEP and softened national policy created more favourable circumstances, and the great pressure of the awakened Ukrainian national element expanded them, forcing concessions from the Bolsheviks that Moscow did not want. Thus, the era of "Ukrainisation" yielded important achievements in various areas of national life. There were also efforts by Ukrainian figures in the Ukrainian SSR, particularly in the areas of national culture and the economy, to support and consolidate the development of Ukrainians in other Ukrainian lands. There were even attempts by Ukrainian officers of the Red Army to establish secret ties with the revolutionary Ukrainian Military Organisation in the ZUS.

But all these efforts of Ukrainian patriots were not aimed at creating Sovietophile orientations and sentiments among Ukrainians outside the USSR. This was already a matter of Bolshevik political propaganda and special actions. This was done not only by the Communist Party, but also by Soviet diplomatic, trade, cultural, scientific and military missions. For example, the deliberately created Consulate of the Ukrainian SSR in Lviv had as its main task the spread of Sovietism in Galicia.

In line with this policy, the Bolsheviks conveniently used all the facts of the development of Ukrainian national life in the Ukrainian SSR to spread their influence. In their propaganda, they not only exaggerated and painted Ukrainian achievements in glowing colours, but also attributed them to the Soviet state and the communist system. Bolshevik propaganda portrayed the rise of the Ukrainian national element and the vigorous work of Ukrainian cultural figures, which were in fact awakened by the Ukrainian national revolution, as a consequence of the communist revolution and as manifestations of Soviet patriotism. The Bolsheviks exploited the fact that Ukrainian patriots in the Ukrainian SSR could not openly express their true, hostile attitude to Moscow and communism.

When some Ukrainians outside the borders of the USSR did not understand, or rather did not try to understand, the real situation and accepted with faith the cunning

the lies of Bolshevik propaganda, it is their fault, their guidance. Because they were looking for such an orientation and did not treat hostile communities with due criticism and caution.

As is well known, the change of course inside the USSR was accompanied by a Bolshevik political and propaganda offensive outside. The two had common causes and the same plan. The period of wartime communism did not give Moscow a final victory over all national-independence and anti-communist forces. To save themselves from complete failure, the Bolsheviks had to make concessions to the peoples' irresistible aspirations for freedom. The NEP and a softened national policy were supposed to stabilise the internal situation, bring economic recovery, and give the Bolsheviks time to prepare for the transition from a party-military dictatorship to a dictatorship of the party-police apparatus and a total communist system.

The intensified outward campaign was intended to break the political and economic isolation of the USSR and spread Bolshevik influence.

In this regard, the cultivation and strengthening of Sovietophile sentiments among Ukrainians outside the USSR was of triple importance to Moscow. First, it was intended to defuse anti-Bolshevik sentiment among the Ukrainian people. The information about the favourable attitude of Ukrainians outside the USSR to Soviet rule in Ukraine was supposed to undermine anti-Bolshevik forces and actions in the Ukrainian lands under Moscow's occupation. Second, Sovietophile sentiments among Ukrainians in the non-Menshevik world would have greatly helped the Bolsheviks to break out of their previous moral and political isolation. It was the testimony of Ukrainians that should have convinced the world that the Soviets were not so bad, when Ukrainian independents, known for their hostility to Moscow and Bolshevism, changed their attitude to the Ukrainian SSR and thus to the political system established by Bolshevik Moscow. Moreover, Sovietophilism, in any form, creates a fertile atmosphere and fertile ground for the growth of communist cells and heterogeneous Bolshevik agents outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR.

The Bolsheviks failed to instil the disease of Sovietophilia in Ukrainian political life outside the USSR on a larger scale. But even those manifestations of it that took place in the ZUS and in exile in 1924-33 did much damage to the Ukrainian cause.

The greatest disaster was the stab in the back of those independence forces that held the anti-Bolshevik liberation front. The unwavering patriots-independents in the OSSUZ understood the essence of Bolshevik policy and realised that all the national achievements of the NEP and "Ukrainianisation" period had a very fragile basis and could be eliminated at any time. Therefore, they focused their attention and work on the preparation and organisation of national liberation and revolutionary forces, political, military, and youth. Every manifestation of Sovietism and agreement with the Bolsheviks that Ukrainians outside the borders of the USSR were allowed to commit inflicted much heavier moral and political blows on this front than similar manifestations under Bolshevik coercion.

Similarly, in Ukrainian political life in the Western Lands and in exile, Sovietophile tendencies caused many riots, disruption and demoralisation. Suffice it to recall that they led even some prominent figures of Ukrainian statehood to unforgivable aspirations that were harmful to the Ukrainian cause and useful to the Bolsheviks. They also tried to disintegrate the liberation and revolutionary forces (the creation of the underground ZUNRO - Western Ukrainian People's Rev. Organisation with a Sovietophile orientation, as opposed to the uncompromisingly independent UVO - Ukrainian Military Organisation).

Sovietism died out in the ZUS and among Ukrainian emigrants in the early thirties, when Moscow, with the extreme escalation of its terrorist and destructive system, knocked all ground from under its feet. The Bolsheviks showed in the most dramatic way that the so-called government, the entire state apparatus and system of the Ukrainian SSR were only instruments of Moscow's enslavement, exploitation and destruction of Ukraine. There was no longer a greedy point of support for the thesis that the Ukrainian SSR was a Ukrainian state, nor for oscillating between independence and Sovietism. Between the national, independence front and the hostile, Bolshevik front, which includes all the traitors, communist traitors to Moscow, there is no longer a greedy defensive place, only a field of fierce struggle. And only people of this breed who seek cover and protection from all sides can be Sovietophiles.

The Bolsheviks were not at all worried that Stalin's policy would bury the lifelong Sovietism they had embraced. They even eliminated the leading figures of that movement, who had moved with confidence

to the Soviet "paradise", but were no longer needed by Moscow. For Sovietism, like NEP, "Ukrainisation" and the whole of Bolshevik policy, was only a temporary measure in the Kremlin's plans. Having fulfilled its service to Moscow, it was scrapped, because it was time for Lenin's "two steps forward".

However, the consequences of Sovietism, which were corrosive to Ukrainian political life and harmful to the liberation cause, remained in place for a long time.

When we speak of manifestations of Sovietophilia in Ukrainian political life, we mean such Ukrainian groups that declaratively identify themselves as belonging to the Ukrainian national, independent camp, but by the content of their concepts and the results of their work act on isolated segments of the national front the direction of deflecting anti-Bolshevik attitudes and reconciliation with the Bolshevik system. We do not take into account those who clearly support communism or Ukraine's affiliation with Russia. Such elements belong to the hostile, anti-Ukrainian camp, regardless of their Ukrainian ancestry or whether they consider themselves Ukrainians.

Modern Sovietophilia does not openly aim to eliminate the anti-Bolshevik struggle on the frontlines it fuels. These manifestations are always supported by patriotic motives, the demands of the current situation, the need for changes in the attitude of the Ukrainian liberation policy to it successful, . The actors and groups of this movement are fiercely protective of any sympathies or weaknesses towards Bolshevism and defend their affiliation with the national, independentist camp.

But the essence of the political phenomenon under consideration here is the action within the Ukrainian national camp in such a way as to soften and weaken the sharpness of the anti-Bolshevik edge, to erase the opposition and irreconcilability of this camp to the Soviet system, to prepare its psychological, ideological and political approach. Such phenomena should be interpreted on the basis of the statements of their spokespersons, or even the good faith of some of the performers, who do not understand the consequences of their actions.

One manifestation of the ideological filling of the gap between

national and Bolshevik front is to disseminate the following views: a distinction must be made between the attitude to the theory and practice of Bolshevism. The practice should be condemned, but the communist doctrine itself should be treated with restraint. The October Bolshevik Revolution should be viewed positively, its achievements should be celebrated, and only Stalinist methods should be attacked, which destroyed the achievements of the October Revolution and spoiled Marxist-Leninist ideas, which have much value.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU clearly showed that these theses are related to the main content of the second line of the Bolshevik ideological front, in which Stalin's heirs dug in when the first Stalinist line was too hardened. And these same positions were pushed on the Ukrainian independence movement in 1943, allegedly as a tactic of successful anti-Bolshevik propaganda. The Bolshevik upbringing was so deeply ingrained in the worldview and thinking of the younger generation that they did not accept the fundamental rejection of communism. When the Ukrainian liberation and revolutionary movement in the native lands got rid of these "progressive reformers" and shook off their influence in the direct anti-Bolshevik struggle, these trends, along with their spokespersons, spread abroad. Only what had been put forward in the Krai as a tactical tool, these same people put forward abroad as a fundamental change in the ideological and programmatic positions of the liberation movement, referring to the Krai. An eloquent indicator of the political direction of this trend is the fact that its main inspirer and ideologist during its formation into a separate political group was I. Maistrenko-Babenko, who, as a national communist, consistently promoted Marxist positions.

The stubborn move towards communism led this group of "progressives" to break with the Ukrainian nationalist, revolutionary movement. Fighting this movement, in particular by means of sabotage and slander in the eyes of foreign factors, became the main content of its "practical politics". It is better to know a tree by these vegetables than by digging up its roots.

The crystallising centre of the second, related current (the author is referring to Ivan Bahrianyi's Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party - The URDP), which within the Ukrainian national camp creates

open to enemy attacks, the emphasis was on the Communist Party cadre. Former activists in the Soviet system, who, having found themselves in exile, wanted to play a prominent role in Ukrainian political life, as spokespersons for the national asset in Ukraine, put forward the thesis that the entire leading, creative and active element of Ukraine is united in the cadres of the Communist Party. Therefore, the Ukrainian independence struggle and the projection of state-building should be oriented towards this element, towards its decisive and leading role. And since these cadres are deeply imbued with the ideas of communism, the concept of independence must be in line with these ideas.

A political party that was founded abroad and builds its entire programme, structure, staffing and political action around this axis goes through a considerable evolution. In accordance with the changes in its own ideological and political positions, the "requirements of the Ukrainian national asset" also change in its interpretation. But the assertion that the engine and leader of the Ukrainian national revolution can and must be an asset from the Communist Party remains unchanged. In this way, this "revolutionary" party is trying to keep the gates of the Ukrainian national camp wide open for the penetration of communist influences. The specific slogans that it pushes there change, but there will always be a lot of good from the "great October" among them.

This phenomenon cannot be interpreted lightly, nor can it be considered an accidental product of emigrant political life. Of course, the thesis about the outstanding and positive participation of party cadres in the national, anti-Bolshevik revolution must be taken in the right direction, and then it contains the whole truth.

The national liberation revolution can and will be out fundamentally by the anti-Bolshevik masses of the Ukrainian people, who are filled to the brim with hatred of communism, Moscow's enslavement and its instrument, the Communist Party. The organisers and leaders of this revolution will be those strongest, best characters who, even in the Bolshevik system of total oppression of the people and the individual, did not take the path of betrayal and crime, whose lives are filled with the hardest efforts to neither fall into the destructive nets of the Communist Party, which are set for every talent, every outstanding person, nor perish from its

hounds.

The party cadres, who are blood-bound to the Bolshevik regime, will help it crush the liberation revolution as long as they feel strongly enough to do so. When they are convinced that Bolshevism is doomed to fail and the revolution is gaining the upper hand, they will join it. Only a few can get better, and the majority of communists can be expected to be treacherous and betrayal. The purpose of their switching sides will be, first of all, to try to be back on top, in power, and then to destroy the results of the revolution and preserve as many communist "achievements" and the domination of the bureaucracy over the people as possible.

The Bolshevik school of party cadre formation trains an element that will always try to seize and keep power in its hands, while keeping the people and their entire life in captivity.

In this sense, the aforementioned party of "revolutionaries" knows exactly who to bet on. By the way, it has itself, by its appearance, its content and its practices, shown quite clearly what to reckon with in the future. The Communist Party has prepared a big "Trojan horse" for the Ukrainian revolution to bring it into the middle of the national camp. But this time we know what is hidden in it...

The coexistential course has activated a typical, so to speak, universal form of Sovietism, which has been quiet in recent years, although has repeatedly tried to gain citizenship in Ukrainian political life. This is the thesis that the Ukrainian SSR was still a Ukrainian state, albeit an enslaved one with many shortcomings. The groups that have become its spokespersons persistently persuade those in foreign lands to take Ukrainian citizenship, and that liberation politics should shift from negation to recognition of the "existing Ukrainian legal and formal statehood" in the form of the Ukrainian SSR, with all the political conventions that this implies.

What are these conventions for the attitude of Ukrainian politics? Let's point out at least some of the most important ones: the liberation struggle is not for the acquisition of a Ukrainian state, because we already have one, but for the liberation of this state from Moscow's domination. If there is a Ukrainian state, then there is a Ukrainian state government, because in the understanding of law, government is one of the basic elements without which there is no state. Those who recognise the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian state must also recognise its government. Ukrainian



The national liberation struggle would then have to be a struggle not only against Moscow, against its enslavement of Ukraine, but also against the existing Ukrainian government, against the current structure of the Ukrainian state, and for the change of both. In the understanding of the "progressives", this would be an elevation of the Ukrainian liberation struggle to a higher level in international politics, not its degradation. There are such "politicians". They are silent about the fact that the recognition of the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian state is tantamount to the unequivocal recognition of all the obligations of international legal significance that the Bolsheviks are incurring the name of the Ukrainian SSR, including the international legal conventions of when the Ukrainian SSR will enter into a Bolshevik war against other states. No one can think that the spokesmen for this concept do not understand all the harmful consequences for the Ukrainian liberation cause.

How is it explained? The desire for the Ukrainian case to have the same status in international politics as the case of "satellite" countries. They seem to believe that Western powers are normalising their attitude to the Ukrainian cause in relation to the way it is being raised by Ukrainian political groups. Or that the issue of Ukrainian state independence is primarily an international legal issue. Or does the status of "satellites" help relative nations in their liberation struggles? And if someone considers the attainment of such a status in an international political forum to be such an important matter, shouldn't he or she draw conclusions from the fact that the independent policy of those peoples who have found themselves in the position of "satellites" is conducted precisely along the lines of denying the so-called people's democracies and their governments, denying them the right to national state institutions. No, this is not the case here.

If the spokespersons for the concept of recognising the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian state really depended on such a foreign policy attitude towards Ukrainian affairs, they would have directed their activities in that direction. Meanwhile, all their work in this area is focused on the internal Ukrainian context. Newspapers for Ukrainian readers publish entire treatises in which they argue that the Ukrainian SSR has the attributes of a Ukrainian state. Numerous articles convince Ukrainian citizens that the key to the success of Ukrainian politics is the recognition of the Ukrainian SSR as a Ukrainian state, recognition - obviously - by the Ukrainian independence movement.

camp. Such "harbingers of a new stage" promise to level and take over the entirety of Ukrainian political life. We understand that. But why do they call themselves harbingers of a new stage? A quarter of a century ago, the same New Ways promoted the same Sovietophile concepts, and did so more honestly and openly. They served the same master, and they "got there".

The harmfulness of this corrupting, Sovietophile work is further exacerbated by the fact that its main proponent is a group that, in the eyes of the Ukrainian and foreign world, claims the right to speak and act on behalf of the Ukrainian liberation and revolutionary movement in Ukraine.

The fact that people and newspapers funded by Americans are spreading such decompositionist concepts is also of no small importance. On the one hand, the ACLU (American Committee for the Liberation of Bolshevism) draws Ukrainians into a united, non-divisive, Muscovite camp under the slogan: everything that is against communism and does not violate Russian imperialism is good in the common front. On the other hand, the propaganda of pro-communist and Sovietophile tendencies is supported when they are obtained through subversive actions against the Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary movement. What is the common denominator of these two-fisted actions? Could it be in the interest of American policy to spread disintegration in the Ukrainian national liberation camp and support such phenomena that benefit Moscow in the first place? The question of what arguments are used to justify the spread of Sovietophile tendencies among Ukrainians to foreigners is of secondary importance.

For us, one thing is important: everything that happens in Ukrainian life to the detriment of the Ukrainian liberation cause and in favour of the Bolsheviks must be overcome and eliminated from Ukrainian political life. This includes all forms of Sovietophilia. The independence camp will cope with its existing manifestations in the same way as it has defeated similar diseases in the past. But this will require the sensitivity and resistance of all national forces.

## **From an inexhaustible source**

*The source from which Stepan Bandera drew strength for himself, his work, and the overcoming of all difficulties was his deep faith in God, My truth and justice. This faith was a spiritual need for him, which is why he advised others with such great conviction to look to the source of faith for the strength that conquered even death.*

*The article "From an inexhaustible source" was written on the occasion of the Christmas holidays and published in the weekly "Ways of Victory", Munich, year IV, no. 1-2 (150-151), 7 January 1957.*

The struggle against Bolshevism is a real life-and-death struggle not only for active fighters, but for the entire nation that will fall under the Bolshevik yoke. The radical extermination of all disobedient, freedom-loving elements who do not want to serve Bolshevism, systematic massacres are the main means of the Bolshevik policy of conquering peoples. It consists in keeping every enslaved nation, all its strata, every individual under constant pressure of a steady either/or: submit, accept the communist doctrine as truth and serve the Kremlin's goals without resistance, or be destroyed.

At the beginning of communist rule, it was said that it was only a matter of destroying the "class enemy" and educating the new generation in the communist spirit, without any "gossip", and then the system of violence and terror would be eliminated as unnecessary, because the re-educated peoples would be convinced that communism was right and would voluntarily support it. Over the course of four decades, the Bolsheviks managed to exterminate everyone who could be defined as a "class enemy". Today's middle and younger generations have been brought up from childhood under the exclusive influence and supervision of the Bolshevik total system, in complete isolation from all influences from the outside world, but there is no reconciliation or reconciliation between the people and Bolshevism.

The Bolsheviks did not succeed in reincarnating people according to the recipes of communist doctrine, nor in imposing the belief that their criminal, anti-people system and the similar goals of communism were truly noble, and that they met the needs and desires of the peoples. Not many

The tightest possible fencing of the enslaved peoples from the free world and the unsurpassed falsity of communist propaganda about the terrible poverty and misery of peoples in capitalist countries and the happy, free life under the Soviets helped them in this. Similarly, Moscow's ruthless persecution and destruction of religion and national traditions, the devastation of all literature, history, and all areas of national culture and creativity, and the eradication of everything that shapes and elevates the spirit of a person and a people, rather than meets Bolshevik theses and goals, did not bring it the hoped-for success.

With these methods, the Bolsheviks created the most favourable circumstances for themselves to successfully carry out their experiment of transforming man and people. But the fact that it failed precisely under those most favourable conditions made it quite clear that the Bolshevik concept itself was false and unrealisable. It is based on a materialistic view of man and of the human community, the belief that human spirituality is a product of life circumstances and conditions of development.

The Bolsheviks themselves were convinced that the implementation of this fundamental plan of theirs did not yield positive results. On the contrary, the results of those consequences negate all hopes for the future. Having realised this, the Kremlin leaders drew their own conclusions. These conclusions are peculiar, in line with the unchanging goal of the Communist Party: to maintain, consolidate and extend its dominance by any means necessary. Everything else is a matter of means, including the plan to reshape man and people. This was supposed to be the ideal means, but when it is not feasible, one must stick with what has proved successful so far. Therefore, the CPSU stopped treating its current system of rule as a transitional stage. Moscow's domination over the enslaved peoples and the totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist Party must always be maintained by coercion and terror, and everything disobedient must be destroyed. Accordingly, a layer of communist ruling bureaucracy is formed in the Communist Party. It selects an ideology-free and reckless element with special "abilities" required in such a system.

Communist education, the shaping of human thought and character, must continue in the same direction and by the same methods as before, although it is no longer expected to have the same effects as

system of violence and terror. It should help to justify this system, to disintegrate any resistance and, most importantly, to counteract the formation of undesirable and hostile to communism worldviews, concepts and trends.

When Bolshevik measures to re-educate enslaved peoples in the communist spirit did not yield positive results, it was certainly not due to insufficient persistence, insufficient pressure, or other "neglect" on the part of the Bolsheviks. They did everything they could, particularly in the destructive part, in cutting off the people from all the roots of their original development and spiritual life. Similarly, their methods in creating coercive circumstances that would have a decisive influence on the formation of a person and a people cannot be surpassed.

An essential reason for the failure of Bolshevik engineering in the spiritual realm is that it has encountered such primordial elements in the soul of man and people that can be neither changed nor destroyed, and whose origin, power and influence extend beyond the boundary of life and death.

The final argument of the Bolshevik system, also in the "re-education" of people, is death, the threat of destruction, and then the indiscriminate destruction of all those who are disobedient and unprofitable. But even this argument is not all-powerful.

The test of death cannot be withstood by something that is a creation of life itself. And here are millions of people, entire nations, in the face of death, defending the truths and values that are dearer to them than life itself! For the human soul comes from the One who was before life and will be after life, forever, and the defence of great truths brings the human soul closer to God than life itself.

The Bolsheviks waged the worst struggle against religion, persecuting and destroying the Church of Christ, making religious life impossible. But they could not destroy the foundation of faith in the human soul: the longing for God and the search for the Divine.

Bolshevism succeeded in depriving peoples and individuals of all freedom, but it could not crush the very desire for freedom. It is inherent in every person and nation, always alive and motivating to strive, because free will is a gift given by God.

The communist system imprisoned the truth in prisons and concentration camps, drove it underground, and replaced it with falsehoods and lies. But it failed to wrest from the human soul the understanding of what truth is, the longing for it, the desire to defeat it. Because truth is the road that leads the human soul to God. And no one and nothing can turn humanity away from this path.

Similarly, the Bolsheviks could not extinguish the love of neighbour, the sense of justice and the desire for its triumph. For these are the basic laws of God for the human community, the foundations of relationships between people, which always resonate with the voice of conscience in the soul.

The Bolshevik offensive against nations in order to disintegrate them and turn them into a soulless herd of "Soviet people" is centred on attempts to kill national consciousness and national feelings in people. And in this respect, the enemy fails to reach the very depths, because national feelings and signs have not only entered the human bloodstream, but are organically inherent in the human soul.

All these indestructible first principles of the human soul do not allow a person to become a weak-willed and obedient tool of communism, full of hatred for God, nation and man. They motivate people to resist the criminal acts of Bolshevism and to actively fight for its elimination.

But the strength of this resistance and the readiness for active liberation struggle depends primarily on the inspiration of the movers and shakers themselves. Relying on their mere existence and the automaticity of their reaction is tantamount to a passive attitude to the cause. The forces of the soul of each individual and of the whole nation also need to be nurtured and encouraged, especially when they are overwhelmed by constant excessive stress. Everyone who cares about the fate of his or her people must bear this in mind.

Faith is the most powerful bond of the soul. Through true and deep faith in God, the Saviour, each person and nation can continuously draw from the ever-living source as much strength as their souls can take. Especially in the most difficult situations of life, in great misfortune, suffering and struggle, faith in Christ provides the strongest, often the only and certain help. In this direction we must first of all turn our thoughts and hearts when we think about helping our people in their difficult but noble struggle for

truth and freedom.

The matter of religion, its defence against the onslaught of godless communism, the true confession and maintenance of a living Christian faith is the most important matter not only for the Church itself, but for the entire nation, all national forces, including the national liberation movement. We must not separate the defence of the Christian faith and the Church from the national liberation struggle, but only focus our attention and efforts on those most important statements against which the enemy is launching the strongest offensive.

At Christmas time, our thoughts, full of concern for the fate of the people, all our relatives and friends in Ukraine, in prisons, concentration camps and exile, first of all dwell on the mystery of the incarnation of God.

The realisation of why God came into the world first of all to the lowest, the poorest, as a helpless, persecuted baby, fills the soul with faith and love. The most important thing in this is not humiliation, because the greatest humiliation for Christ was the company of sinners, not the poor. Our hearts are captivated by the symbolism that Jesus came first to those who needed God's help and care the most, and by seeking protection among them He raised them to the top. We feel that this Christmas symbolism is directly related to the current situation of our people and the faith of Christ in the enslaved homeland.

From this source of faith we must draw most of our strength to persevere on the right path. The consciousness that God is with us is the surest and greatest help for all of us, including all the fighters and sufferers of the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

## **Ukraine will not be an ally of Moscow**

*The fanciful celebration, on Moscow's orders, of the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Agreement, and the emphasis on Kisva's allegedly independent role in the so-called CCCR, indicated that the Bolsheviks had once again adapted the means of deception and trickery to appease a rebellious Ukraine, whose fire of resistance had been carried to the distant Siberian concentration camps in those years and had sparked an uprising. In his article "Ukraine will not be Moscow's accomplice," Stepan Bandera revealed the insidious attempts of the Bolsheviks to make Ukraine an accomplice to Moscow's crimes through confessional condominiums.*

*The article was published in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year IV, no. 16-17 (165-166), for 21. 4. 1957 p.*

Moscow has to admit that, despite all the consistency and recklessness in pursuing its imperialist goals, it is zealously looking for new ways to reach its chosen goal if the old ones are unsuitable. This is particularly evident in all attempts to permanently secure Ukraine's affiliation with the Russian empire.

Tsarist Russia's policy was based on the belief that the conquest of Ukraine was already sealed. Therefore, it firmly adhered to the formula "there was no such thing as Ukraine, there is no thing as Ukraine!", which applied not only to state and political independence, but also to the national and cultural separateness of Ukraine. The national and political awakening of Ukraine and the beginning of the Ukrainian national revolution in 1917-19 surprised and shocked Moscow's imperial policy. The enemies of tsarist imperialism tried to defeat it with a military strike, sending their main forces and allied assistance to the war against Ukraine.

The temporary successors to power, with Kerensky at the helm, tried to take advantage of the time with the help of tricks. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks, as a young, dynamic force determined to preserve and consolidate the entire empire by any means necessary, realised that they could not win Ukraine by violence or cunning alone.

The success and victory of Bolshevism in its first conquest of Ukraine was based on a special combination of subterfuge and violence.



By falsely using slogans of national and social liberation, which were to some extent in line with the aspirations of the Ukrainian people, but which they had no intention of realising, the Bolsheviks weakened the unanimity and determination of the national resistance in Ukraine. This greatly helped their military offensive to win the victory over the forces of the Ukrainian state, which was being built amidst the blizzard of war and revolution.

The Bolsheviks immediately wanted to consolidate their domination of Ukraine through terror and the indiscriminate extermination of nationally independent elements. This has remained the basis of Moscow's national policy against enslaved peoples. However, the Bolsheviks were unable to subdue Ukraine by these means in the early years of their still weak power. As a result, they had to make significant concessions to Ukrainian aspirations for freedom. This led to a softening of the Bolshevik regime during the so-called NEP and Ukrainisation period. The Ukrainian national element pushed far beyond and overlapped the boundaries that Moscow wanted to set for a temporary detente. This element filled all areas and forms of life with Ukrainian national content and the struggle for independence from Moscow. It even captured some of the communists and led them to the slogan "away from Moscow" (this slogan was put forward in the 1930s by the Ukrainian communist writer Mykola Khvylovyi).

The Bolsheviks also used the several-year lull to organise their forces internally and to prepare a new, terrible wave of destruction of everything that was hostile and unprofitable to Bolshevik Moscow. Ukraine suffered the worst blows of Stalin's destruction and terror. Starting with the attack on the Ukrainian revolutionary underground and all political independent forces, through the crushing of Ukrainian national and cultural life, Stalin's terror took on the character of refined genocide unprecedented in human history through organised famine and the systematic physical destruction of all rebellious elements.

The torturous actions of Kaganovych and Khrushchev, Postyshev, Yezhovshchyna, famine, collectivisation, the Five-Year Plans, the Cheka-TPU-NKVD, prisons, concentration camps, exile, Solovki, Kolyma, Vinnytsia's corpse storages overflowing with the bodies of the dead Brigidka, and many, many other torture chambers will remain forever as bottomless jaws of Bolshevik atrocities and

Ukraine's suffering.

But all the Bolshevik cruelties, liquidations and exterminations during the fourth decade could not break the Ukrainian people's striving for freedom and truth. In the Second World War, it flared up again with a spontaneous force that Bolshevik Moscow had never expected.

Filled with a deeply hidden but enduring hatred of Moscow and its communism, the Ukrainian soldiers in the Soviet army broke down the fronts. In the face of the invasion of the armies of Hitler's Germany, the Ukrainian people manifested their unbreakable will to independence by proclaiming the restoration of the Ukrainian state and building an independent life. Even in the most tragic situation, under the blows of the two hostile colours of the USSR and Germany, the Ukrainian people did not stop the liberation struggle and waged a heroic struggle on two fronts. As the Soviet army victoriously pushed its fronts further west, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army operated on its rear and in the frontline areas. The struggle of the Ukrainian underground, the OUN-UPA, did not stop after the war ended either. It continued for several more years in the form of guerrilla operations and gradually switched to underground revolutionary tactics.

Moscow has once again seen that all its attempts to completely absorb Ukraine into Bolshevik imperialism have failed. Even the unsurpassed executioner Stalin realised that he could not subdue Ukraine through destruction and terror alone. In a difficult military situation, he felt compelled to make some concessions to Ukrainian statehood aspirations. This was the main reason for the various tactical steps that culminated in the promotion of the Ukrainian SSR on the international scene, including its inclusion in the UN. The Bolsheviks, as usual, made sure that these changes were of no benefit to Ukraine, only to be used by Moscow for its own purposes. Nevertheless, this concession under pressure from the limb remains a fact, and the Kremlin would prefer not to do so.

Although in the post-war period Moscow again intensified its system of terror and destruction of Ukrainian national forces to the extreme, it did not dare to eliminate all Ukrainian life as openly as in the previous period. The deep-rooted and widespread revolutionary struggle of the nationalist underground forced Moscow to be more circumspect in this regard. The Bolsheviks

had to direct their main offensive against it. And in order to divert Ukrainian forces from the revolutionary struggle, they had to leave somewhat greater opportunities for manifestation and development in another direction, in particular in the area of national and cultural development. In national politics, even under Stalin, the Bolsheviks had to gradually abandon the too unsuitable path of direct political Russification of enslaved peoples through the formation of the so-called Soviet people. They were forced to sometimes recognise the identity of the Ukrainian nation in political terms as well. In contrast, the Bolsheviks began to emphasise the dominant position of Muscovites in the USSR more clearly to appease their imperialist feelings. Thus, the formula of "two fraternal peoples" - the "older brother", Russia, and the "younger", Ukraine - was increasingly used to replace the "one Soviet people". But this Moscow seniority, displayed with Bolshevik impudence, had to be hidden again.

All the Bolshevik tricks with the pretence of respecting Ukrainian national feelings did not lead the Ukrainian people off their own path. Similarly, the all-out attack on the revolutionary liberation movement failed to destroy it. The scattering of the rebellious element in different countries spreads the flames of the liberation revolution throughout the empire. Even in the concentration camps, a desperate struggle unfolded. And these Bolshevik villages of torture, destruction and fear were lit by a fire of unparalleled heroism and indomitable revolutionary spirit that was visible throughout the USSR. Moscow is increasingly convinced that Ukrainian national aspirations cannot be eradicated. This is followed by the realisation that just as the conquest of Ukraine opened the way for the growth of the Russian empire, so this empire faces a mortal threat from the implacable struggle of Ukraine and other enslaved peoples.

Now, in Bolshevik politics, a new plan for the role of Ukraine in the communist bloc was born. It was to be a kind of condominium of Ukraine with Russia, particularly in the European part of the sub-Bolshevik space. Just as the dominance of Moscow and Beijing is manifested in the leadership of the whole complex mastered by communism, and in particular its Asian part, so in the European part of Russia, Kyiv is increasingly coming forward next to Moscow.

Moving from the older and younger brother formula to tactics

he implementation of condominiums in Bolshevik national policy was carried out in stages. The start was the celebration of the three-hundredth anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty. In recent months, this tactic has been clearly manifested in the visits to Kyiv by all party and state delegations from satellite countries. These delegations return to Kyiv on their trips to Moscow and hold similar diplomatic ceremonies to those in Moscow, and the Bolsheviks want to demonstrate that Kyiv plays the role of a second capital. This same note about the friendliness of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, not only as the foundation and main body of the USSR, but also as hosts, is noticeable in various speeches and speeches by Soviet leaders. It is most striking in Voroshilov's speech at the funeral of the Czech delegation last month.

The Kremlin wants to use this new tactic in national politics to eliminate the threatening processes of empire disintegration that have been manifested in the satellite system and the USSR. Moscow attaches a special role to Ukraine in reconciling the warring satellites with Soviet supremacy. This is based not only on Ukraine's size and potential, but also on its well-known freedom-loving and anti-imperialist attitude. From this point of view, the manifestation of Ukraine's equality with Russia, the demonstration of its prosperity and the satisfaction of the Ukrainian people with their situation should have a calming effect on the peoples of the so-called people's democracies. Such moods of reconciliation with their fate should especially cement among them the tightening of relations with Ukraine, ostensibly in opposition to Moscow. Bolshevik directors and propaganda act with such goals in mind, promoting Ukraine in relations with satellites.

The new tactic is even more important for Moscow because of its focus on Ukraine itself. The condominium of Ukraine with Russia, both in the USSR and in relation to its satellites, should be the new ideal and goal of the political aspirations of the Ukrainian people. This would have to keep Ukrainian nationalism and the desire for a break with Russia and state independence alive and well. The emergence of the belief among Ukrainians that in an alliance with Russia, Ukraine would become a co-host of the USSR and acquire imperial significance and power was supposed to unite the Ukrainian people with Moscow imperialism, make the most ardent enemy a defender of the

imperialism. The current satraps from the Kremlin want to drugged the Ukrainian people so that they do not feel their captivity, forget their souls and become obedient tools of their imperialist plans.

In this aspect, the resettlement of Ukrainians to various countries that Moscow treats as its colonies, in particular to Kazakhstan, takes on a new meaning. Initially, the main goal of these forced resettlements was to weaken Ukraine's revolutionary and biological potential, destroy the national monolithicity of the countries being settled and involve rebellious elements in protracted conflicts between settlers and the indigenous population. Now Moscow wants to give Ukrainian settlers the character of colonisers and carriers of Bolshevik imperialism on a par with Muscovites. The corresponding feelings should be aroused by the impression of condominium between Ukraine and Russia.

But all of the Kremlin's cunning schemes have failed. The Ukrainian people have learnt too well about Moscow's deceitfulness and communist hypocrisy to allow themselves to be fooled by any tactical game. In the end, nothing changes in the actual situation of Ukraine, enslaved, oppressed and destroyed by Moscow. False propaganda and deceitful tactics can only overwhelm party and bureaucratic traitors who have long since broken with their own people not the people themselves, who painfully feel their enslavement by Bolshevik Moscow at every turn.

The Ukrainian nation will not be taken in by the lure of condominium not only because it is falsely presented without any real content. The desire for freedom and truth, the sense of justice and high idealism have always been and will always remain the basic principles of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian person, the main driving forces of Ukrainian life and Ukrainian spirit. Our people have always strived for freedom for themselves and wanted it for other peoples. It has fought and is fighting for truth and justice. We want to live in harmony and mutual respect with all peoples of good will. We recognise the same rights of other peoples that we fight for ourselves. We do not want to be either the object or the cause of enslavement, exploitation and injustice. We are actively fighting for freedom and truth not only because we need them for ourselves, but above all because God gave people these treasures and these laws, and the basis

Our will is to follow the will of God. Such ideological and moral principles will never allow Ukraine to become an accomplice of Moscow in its anti-national, aggressive imperialism.

## Another illusion of peace

*An article published under the initials "C. A. C." (Stepan Andreyevich Gray) in the monthly magazine "Surma", Munich, part 5 of 24 April 1949, was written on the occasion of the conclusion of the Atlas Pact by the Western powers. The observations and conclusions on this topic are drawn from the situation of the peoples fighting against their enslaver, Moscow.*

The signing of the Treaty of Atlanta is at the centre of contemporary international politics. The contracting, Western powers explain it as a defensive act that serves the cause of peace, should prevent war, and does not violate the UN system. Instead, the USSR, the communists and their echo chambers around the world claim that this treaty is intended precisely to prepare and incite a new war, an aggression of the Western powers, especially America, against the USSR and the "people's democracies" it subjugated. We leave the clearing of the propaganda smoke around this case to another day. In this article, we will make a few observations and conclusions from our position, from the position of the peoples who have always been in a continuous defensive and liberation war against Bolshevik Moscow.

The entire international politics of our time is centred primarily around one main question: war or peace? For us, this question does not exist in the same sense as in official international politics and in the political thought of free nations. For Ukraine and other nations enslaved by Bolshevism, there was no peace and there is no peace, so there is no question of peace or war. For us, the only question is whether to continue the relentless struggle for freedom and life of the nation against Moscow imperialism, enslavement and extermination, or to succumb to it and go defenselessly to the destruction of the nation, to the return of the people to the dung of further growth of Moscow imperialism? Ukraine and other peoples fighting Bolshevism have always given the same, decisive answer to this question: fight until victory.

In the minds of the Western independent nations, the conviction prevails that this is a question only for us, for the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism. For them, the question of war or peace with the USSR has not yet been resolved,

is not broken. And they believe that it will still be possible to achieve a peaceful solution. The Treaty of Atlanta was drafted with this in mind.

In our opinion, this position is misleading, based on a misunderstanding of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism and, on a false assessment of the situation. Bolshevism is the most aggressive form of Moscow's imperialism, which will never give up its attempts to conquer the entire world, destroy all states, and subjugate all peoples. The nature of Bolshevism cannot be destroyed or changed except by destroying it. The Western powers are still under the illusion that Bolshevism's aspirations are merely desires, that they can be quelled. They do not realise that these are not only desires, but a concrete direction of all the energy, life and action of the USSR towards this goal. It is a real, systematic and consistent march, which is incessantly moving in the same direction, like the march of termites.

The Bolsheviks are always at war with the rest of the world; they cannot imagine their role in any other way. Therefore, in practice, they do nothing more than wage a continuous war against peoples, enslaving some and digesting them into their power, attacking others or preparing to attack them.

When one of the two sides is at war, there is a war, whether the other side wants it or not. So the issue that the Western world is dealing with is essentially non-existent, it is a non-issue. The war has been going and is going on because it has been waged by Moscow all along. There is no choice between war and peace. The only question is: in what forms, in what size, when, where will the individual stages, segments of Moscow's permanent war play out?

Our assessment of the current political situation is not about us. It equally touches upon the fundamental question of the future free existence of all other peoples, including the Western powers. For them, as well as for us, there is really no choice between war and peace. They are faced with the following question: do they dare to fight Bolshevik Moscow, or will they passively accept its constant, ever more acute offensive, calling this state peace until Bolshevism finds the most suitable moment for itself, for the final military massacre?

Western nations face the same inevitable finality as



We have to fight Moscow in defence of our independent existence. Only in our country, this very clear situation appears in its most acute, direct form, while in theirs it is not so clear, not so acute. These are only its initial phases. They create an illusion, lead one into delusion, creating a confessional existence of peace and hopes to continue it. Meanwhile, the situation is developing consistently, naturally, along the line of increasingly greater aggravation, in the direction of armed violence. This is happening despite the various efforts of Western powers to direct the development of events in the opposite direction, to choose and stabilise peace.

And not only in spite of Western efforts, but to a large extent because of persistent peaceful efforts, the consequences were the opposite: the dynamics, aggressiveness and audacity of Bolshevik imperialism increased.

In the overall development of international relations between the Western powers and the USSR, the Treaty of Atlanta was an important stage, although not as it is generally explained. The Western powers attach a double meaning to it: first of all, it should prevent an explosive war by uniting the states of Western Europe, the United States and Canada in a united military bloc that would provide a united response to Russian aggression. In this way, it should deter Moscow from attacking any of these states with the expectation of easy success. Secondly, if this method failed to prevent Bolshevik aggression, then, according to the treaty, a unanimous military bloc, a single front of the contracting powers, should come into effect.

In the minds of the Western nations and in their politics, both of these points are indeed treated with respect. And the prevailing opinion is that the first precautionary act of the Treaty of Atlanta will be so successful that the second - the need for war - will remain theoretical, on paper... But still, the aspect of peace and war with the USSR is explicitly and equally addressed in that treaty. This is the first time since the Second World War that such a respectable interstate act of the Western nations has been made. This is its main significance as an important, new stage in the international situation. It could be called the spring equation of day and night in the politics of the Western powers. Until then, the idea of the possibility of war with the USSR had no place in the official policies of the Western powers, in their important acts. It only wandered the pages of the press as a heresy that did not

The "deeper" political thought was not to be disturbed. This heresy was prompted by a healthy political instinct.

At the same time, the entire policy of the USSR, including the Bolshevik "ordering" of the newly acquired countries, the formation of a unanimous political, economic and military eastern bloc, had only one goal: further Bolshevik expansion and preparation for military reprisals against other states.

The first purpose of the Treaty of Atlanta - to preserve the existing international situation, which is wrongly called peace - cannot be viewed positively. This is because it is no peace at all, but only the passive attitude of the Western powers to the Bolshevik war against the whole world, against the freedom of peoples and the human unit. This "peace" is an indulgence in the Bolsheviks' constant offensive in various forms and in various ways. And secondly, the Treaty of Atlanta itself does not counter Bolshevik aggression by preparing a joint defence of the Western powers. In this respect, the Treaty of Atlanta is still on the line of the old policy of deceptive calculations. It is a further stage of the old deceptions.

If we look at the entire development of the post-war policy of the Western powers towards the USSR, we see that, having proceeded from a false assessment of Moscow Bolshevism, it has been retreating from the path of false calculations in stages, more and more. There have already been many such stages, and the most important one was not a sharp turn, the end of the path of political illusions, but a slow retreat and approach to political realism. Let us recall only the most important of those illusions.

After the end of the anti-German war, the Western allies sought a cordial alliance with the USSR. In close cooperation and mutual exchange in all areas, they hoped to blunt Bolshevik hostility and bring about the evolution of the Bolshevik system, which, having shown its teeth, soon cooled those desires and hopes.

The second great disappointment came to the world of Western democracies in the expectation that it would be very difficult for the Bolsheviks to master and subdue the newly acquired nations - Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Magyarshchina, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Albania, and Finland. Great hopes were placed on those nations that had independent states,

democratic and parliamentary methods will be able to put up such resistance to Bolshevism that Bolshevism will spend a lot of effort and time to overcome them. Moreover! They hoped that a wave of democratisation would spread from there to the USSR. The basis of such considerations was the belief that the state peoples of Central Europe were not the same as those of Eastern Europe, and would put up much stronger resistance to Bolshevism, along with the illusion that the methods of democratic and parliamentary struggle could be successfully used to resist Bolshevik totalitarianism and terror.

The same category of erroneous calculations includes the concept that the Chinese war would exhaust a significant part of the material and military potential of the USSR without decisive success for Bolshevism, that the expansionary energy of the Soviets would be drawn in, stretched, and largely exhausted, and that this would cause a backlash in other areas.

Similarly, the account, which was one of the leading ideas of the Marshall Plan, that economic assistance in the reconstruction of Western and Central Europe would stop further Bolshevik expansion in the West, and in particular would paralyse communist action and sabotage there, does not hold true. There is no denying the great importance of this plan for the economic reconstruction of Western Europe as a whole for further development. It also contributed to the Treaty of Atlanta and prepared the ground for it in some Western countries. But it was precisely the failure of the Marshall Plan to stop Bolshevik expansion in the West that made the Western powers look for a different line of policy and a more certain security against Moscow's expansion.

Through these stages, the policy of the Western powers against the USSR reached the Treaty of Atlanta, to the point where the possibility of war with the USSR due to Bolshevik military aggression was put in the basis of a respectable international act and real defence and military measures were outlined. We regard the precautionary value attached to it, that it should ensure the present "peace", as an unrealistic, worthless part, as the remnants of a stale policy of illusions. Instead, we are more interested in the fact that in that treaty the Western powers laid down the real political foundations for preparing a joint war against the USSR in the event of its armed aggression. Anyone who has dealt with Bolshevik imperialism and knows its nature and ways welcomes this step

Western states, as a return to political realism. However, it cannot be interpreted as a complete, correct statement, but only as a choice of the right direction and as the first step on the path that will lead to further development.

As long as the Treaty of Atlanta is the only act of that order in international life, the error of narrowing the problem to the Western powers is clearly shown. Unless there is further progress in that direction, unless the defensive war against Bolshevik aggression is treated as a unanimous whole, on all fronts and in all its forms, the Treaty of Atlanta would remain an isolated, timid step, without greater significance. If the Western powers wanted to limit its scope, it would be a worse mistake from the point of view of their own defence than the one made by France before the Second World War, when it relied on the Maginot Line for its defence. It would be quite disrespectful for the longer term to think of the front in Western Europe in isolation, without caring what is happening on all the other fronts on which Bolshevism is being fought, where it is being resisted, or where it is attacking. It would be just as if a part of the front were to take care of its own section only, without co-operating with the others, without paying attention to what is happening there and what the strategy of the whole front requires. But there are more and more signs that a sobering voice is coming to the fore in this respect, and that the peoples of the West will see that just as each of them cannot think separately about their defence until they are directly attacked, so too the defence of all the Western powers must be linked to the whole defensive war against Bolshevism of all peoples.

The Treaty of Atlanta contains another fundamentally flawed premise: that war with the USSR would begin as soon as Bolshevik aggression against a Western state took place. Meanwhile, there is already a war, waged by Moscow against all the nations of the world, in various forms.

Against some peoples it wages war by occupying their countries and destroying their distinctive existence in all its forms; against other peoples it wages a sideways war by methods of internal aggression and subversion by communist forces. And other peoples are attacked by Bolshevik imperialism directly with military aggression: China and Greece. It is clear that Moscow does not need and does not want to ignite a full-scale war on all fronts at the same time. It has too many of them. But if you give it

To give Russia the ability to decide on the timing and strength of the activation of individual fronts means to give it full initiative in the current war. There is no peace now, there is only war and its quiet, or rather "cold" form on individual fronts, including the front of the Western powers. All the more forcefully it is waged on others. But this war is indivisible, and those who do not want to understand this are deceiving themselves.

The struggle of Ukraine and other peoples enslaved by Moscow constitutes the first front in this war, and is very important for the defence of the whole world. This is something that the Western powers do not yet want to fully understand and take into account. They still think like a unit on the front line that cares only about its own security. They still have the illusion and desire that all the evils of Bolshevik imperialism and aggression will pass them by, sprinkled on our peoples. But the whole development shows more and more clearly that such hopes are vain. And the Western nations are maturing in their awareness of the true situation. That there is already a war, that it is being imposed by Bolshevik Moscow on the whole world and that it is not escaping them either, that they are already caught up in it, albeit in its "cold" wing.

The realisation of this will be followed by a corresponding reshuffling of the world and a deeper revision of views. Then all anti-Bolshevik peoples will realise that it is no longer possible to maintain a passive, waiting posture until they are directly attacked by Moscow, but that the war against Bolshevism must be taken seriously. Therefore, we must deal with the whole, first of all, with active fronts and such areas where Bolshevism can be finally defeated and destroyed. And this is primarily the front of the liberation revolutionary struggle of Ukraine and other freedom-loving peoples enslaved by Moscow.

## **Conclusions from recent events and processes for the Ukrainian liberation struggle**

*The death of Stalin, the struggle for power among the Kremlin leaders, and the events in Moscow's so-called satellites: the uprisings in Poznan and the popular uprising in Magyar, provided rich material for drawing relevant conclusions for the benefit of the national liberation movement. The most important of these conclusions were: even in the sub-Bolshevik reality, revolution is not possible; if the liberation revolution of a people enslaved by Moscow takes place in isolation, it can be suppressed; the West's passivity to the events in the CCCP and its satellites clearly proves that limiting liberation policy to the external aspects - informing the foreign world and gaining its sympathy for the liberation struggle - can be fatal.*

*The most important one is the policy of.*

*The article "Conclusions from Newer Events and Processes for the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle", signed by St. Bandera, was published in the journal "The Liberation Path", London, UK, year IV (X), book 6 (42) 116, June 1957.*

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After Stalin's death, the Bolshevik leadership began to look for other, more successful tactics in its national and domestic policies.

The reason for this was the realisation that the Bolshevik policy of the past, pushed to its limits by Stalin, had ceased to be successful. The system, based on all-encompassing terror, had failed to root out freedom-loving aspirations. Swept away by terror from the surface of life, they live in the depths of enslaved peoples. There was nowhere else to clamp down on the system of terror, and keeping it in one, albeit extreme, form began to lose its effect, because people were getting used to that system.

The continuous action of the underground pockets of the liberation revolution of the enslaved peoples, albeit in a reduced size, but throughout the Bolshevik empire, led to a massive increase in revolutionary sentiment. An important psychological turning point occurred when

The fear of Bolshevik terror began to lose its paralysing power in the masses. The influence of communist doctrine already proved incapable of changing the attitudes of the conquered peoples.

The ever-widening gap between the accursed goals and the real consequences of communism has forever destroyed the hope that there could be any reconciliation between the communist system and the desires and needs of the peoples. As a result of these processes, the irreconcilable hatred of Bolshevism emerged from the depths of its greatest suppression and concealment and began to take the form of ever stronger resistance to the Bolshevik system. Stalin's death created a moment of crisis for the regime. There was a shift in anti-Bolshevik sentiment throughout the USSR under the influence of a general conviction that radical change was coming. The Communist Party and the regime felt the strain of this general pressure so strongly that they considered it impossible to continue their previous course without changes.

Malenkov tried to stabilise the domestic situation with some changes and relief in economic policy. The increase in consumer goods production at the expense of the slowdown in the heavy, mainly military, industry was intended to raise the material standard of living of the population, create prospects for further improvement, and defuse anti-Communist sentiment. At the same time, Malenkov's regime tried to preserve signs of the Bolshevik system's immutability and inviolability, particularly in national politics. The main role in this was probably played by the fear that changes in imperial policy and in the communist totalitarian system could start a whole series of decomposing processes that would be impossible to stop. After all, the entire Bolshevik system of the modern Russian empire was built and maintained by reckless violence. Any weakening or reversal of this system in certain parts does not eliminate or calm down the anti-Bolshevik forces and aspirations for freedom that are being violently suppressed, but only awakens their vitality.

For these reasons, Malenkov's regime emphasised that the pre-existing Stalinist policy in the general empire, including national policy, was not changing. This was, in fact, the significance of Beria's accusation that he was trying to indulge the nationalist struggles of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, including Ukraine and the Caucasus. This accusation of Beria was the most fantastic and

most inappropriate, because Beria had been the implementer of the most reckless Stalinist oppression for many years. For this reason alone, he not have become a serious spokesman or even a partner for independent, anti-Russian movements. Beria's elimination was a matter of personal reckoning and a power struggle within the Kremlin elite. When Malenkov brought forward the two main charges: Beria's attempts to bring the party under the dictatorship of the MGB and flirting with separatist tendencies, it was not about the very background for Beria's liquidation, but rather about further political goals. Sacrificing the head of the most senior oprichnik to delay the regime and the entire state system when tensions between it and the people are rising too much is an old practice of Russian autocracy, which Stalin repeatedly used. By adding the issue of national independence aspirations to Beria's fraud, Malenkov's regime wanted to demonstrate its sensitivity and intransigence in this regard. At the same time, sensing a serious internal crisis in the empire, it mobilised the imperialist sentiments of the Moscow people in order to lean on them in times of need.

Malenkov's tactics did counteract the concentration and explosion of anti-Bolshevik sentiment in the revolutionary boiling after Stalin's death, but they did not and could not resolve the essential issue. The sources of tension remained active. In the cracks that Malenkov had opened as safety valves, tendencies to change the entire system were concentrated. The Kremlin considered the gaps in the system too dangerous. The general order against the MTB, activated by the pogrom of the Beria clique, struck at the very foundations and the main pillar of Bolshevism. Similarly, a reversal in economic policy was used to emphasise consumer production on the basis of the already achieved level of heavy and extractive industries. Unauthorised attempts were made that would have led to a complete revolution in the Bolshevik economic system. The very essence of this system is the extreme exploitation of all the forces and means of the people and the individual for the development of the state's economic and military potential. This is the only means used by the ruling communist clique in its quest for the expansion of Bolshevik imperialism. Keeping peoples and individuals in constant poverty and in slavish economic dependence on the state bureaucracy is, along with police terror, the main means of Bolshevik domination.



In order to justify this system, the Bolsheviks put forward the premise that the development of the socialist economy comes before the satisfaction of the vital needs of the population. In this development, they tarnish more and more distant goals, so that the moment when the national economy will serve the actual vital needs of the people is pushed further and further into infinity. Under this economic policy, serving the needs of the population is reduced to the bare minimum and is the subject of various propaganda speculations.

Malenkov's thesis that the achieved level of industrialisation allowed for more attention and resources to be devoted to consumer products was disadvantageous to the Bolsheviks, as it deprived them of their main argument in justifying the previous course and, in conclusion, would have required a far-reaching rearrangement of the entire economic policy. This was used by Malenkov's rivals in the struggle for power, including Khrushchev. The fact that these issues were the main subject of internal play in the Kremlin clique is evidenced by Khrushchev's first major statements and measures after coming to power, which were a turn from Malenkov's tactics.

Like Malenkov, Khrushchev saw the need to make some concessions to the general desire for change in order to avoid the outbreak of a general anti-Bolshevik revolution. His tactics sought to circumvent the finiteness of more significant real concessions, to shift attention from the economic to the domestic political plane and thereby defuse tensions. These were supposedly far-reaching changes, but in reality they lacked any real substance. Khrushchev's plan to reduce the widely publicised changes to insignificant matters and deceive the people with such tactics is only one side of the story. The other, on the other hand, shows very clearly the danger that the Kremlin added to the growth of anti-Bolshevik attitudes in all the seemingly finally conquered nations. For it is impossible to assume that Khrushchev and the entire top of the CPSU did not realise that by condemning Stalinism, or at least some of its practices typical of the Bolshevik system, they were shaking the foundations of the system. When they did so, it was only because they hoped to calm anti-Bolshevik sentiment, to turn it only against the past and to defuse tensions with promises to reform and democratise the entire system. In national politics, the Kremlin considered it necessary to at least

to create the impression of far-reaching reforms in the direction of increased autonomy of the Union republics. In addition to various measures of a legal and constitutional nature, various political and propaganda measures are being taken in this direction to create the impression that other peoples in the USSR, in addition to Muscovites, are enjoying ever greater rights. In particular, in relation to Ukraine, this Bolshevik propaganda is increasingly strengthened.

A common feature of Malenkov's and Khrushchev's tactics is a deviation from the reckless course of the Stalin era. The reason for this was the unanimity and growth of anti-Bolshevik sentiment to the point where it could no longer be controlled by the Bolshevik system through violence and terror alone. The replacement of Malenkov's tactics with Khrushchev's stemmed from the Kremlin leadership's attempt to reduce the inevitable concessions to the regime to the most insignificant. However, although Khrushchev removed Malenkov in order to reduce his concessions, he was soon forced to proclaim a much more far-reaching and dangerous retreat from the seemingly unshakable course. His attempt to bring Bolshevism out of the crisis by tactical manoeuvring and propaganda effects alone failed. The attempt to outwit the people turned into self-deception. The measures to strengthen and consolidate the Communist Party internally by rehabilitating and bringing to influence the unconvicted communist leaders and introducing the so-called collective leadership were not taken as genuine concessions to the people. Instead, the propagandistic presentation of these tactics, which were intended to give the impression of far-reaching reforms but lacked any real substance, was rightly interpreted by the people as a manifestation of Bolshevism's internal wobble, covered by its constant deceitfulness.

Thus, Khrushchev's tactics in Moscow's national and domestic policy revealed other weaknesses of Bolshevism. The onslaught of nationally independent, anti-Communist forces directed in that direction began a series of processes that brought deeper and deeper decomposition to the system of the Bolshevik empire and prepared suitable ground for a general anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution.

In this development, individual phenomena and entire processes of faltering, retreat and decay in the Bolshevik imperial system are the result of the development and action of opposing, national forces and movements. The main forces are

the individuality, the identity of each nation, which has been formed over the course of its historical development and at every historical stage, under all conditions, struggles for its independent life, for the free development and expression of its creative forces and properties in various spheres of human life. The struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow for freedom and their resistance to all the corrupting acts of communism is born from this source and is constantly renewed.

However, the spontaneous struggle of nations against Bolshevik enslavement, without a planned organisation and leadership of the liberation struggle, would have been a very difficult and unusually protracted affair. The resilience and effective resistance of peoples to Bolshevik enslavement in the post-war period was largely supported and intensified by national liberation and revolutionary organisations, primarily the OUN and UPA, and similar revolutionary forces of other nations.

The struggle and the whole activity of organised liberation movements played the role of an agent, ideological leadership and crystallising centre of revolutionary processes, which in the course of events were enriched by sympathy, support and active cooperation, and then by spontaneous revolutionary activity of the broad masses. The example of the revolutionary liberation struggle spread to other nations. Even where there was no immediate response, revolutionary actions and ideas leave seeds that later germinate.

The liberation and revolutionary process, which in the first postwar years had its active foci only in the insurgent and underground struggle of the OUN-UPA and among similar revolutionary organisations of other nations, was significantly strengthened and spread by two new revolutionary factors. The first of these was the struggle of Ukrainian nationalists in Bolshevik concentration camps, which began spontaneously in various locations and eventually spread to the entire concentration camp system. The significance of this struggle goes far beyond the concentration camps themselves and becomes one of the central factors in the development of the entire revolutionary process.

The institution of the concentration camps is central to the entire Bolshevik system of violence and terror. Concentration camps serve the Bolsheviks not only to neutralise and exterminate the prisoners themselves when using their forces; they are meant to be a fear for all citizens of the USSR. The struggle of Ukrainian nationalists in concentration camps, extended to political prisoners in other countries

nationalities, led to an important psychological break. Every news that even in the terrible Bolshevik concentration camps, freedom fighters did not lose heart and put up organised resistance to the hard labour system had a very strong encouraging effect on the enslaved peoples. Thus, the concentration camps ceased to be exclusively an instrument of Bolshevik terror and began to act as hotbeds of the indomitable struggle for freedom.

The second factor in the revolutionary process was the spontaneous struggle of young people and workers in the cities in the form of strikes and mass destruction. This struggle began first of all in Berlin and other cities of East Germany and set an example for the population of the so-called satellite countries to follow. Already in those events, it became clear that this form of struggle was not only possible, but also successful in a totalitarian communist system. These events showed how the general tension of revolutionary sentiment can flare up from small sparks into a fire of revolutionary disruptions that the Bolshevik regime cannot suppress with conventional police forces and means and that grow into a form of liberation war. The further development of revolutionary disruptions in the satellite countries was largely a consequence of the impact of the uprising in East Germany. Although it was crushed by the fire of Bolshevik tanks and artillery, the revolution still had the moral victory. The potential of the revolution was very convincing and unexpectedly large in those events. From a logistical point of view, it appeared out of nothing, without any preparation, with nothing. From the workers' demonstrations emerged revolutionary forces against which the Bolsheviks had to put up whole armoured formations. These were simply spontaneous explosions that can only be regarded as trial alarms. But those trials showed such a potential for revolution that all the enslaved peoples gained a sense of self-reliance and the understanding that a coordinated revolutionary uprising of all peoples would wipe out the hated communism from the face of the earth.

The workers' revolutionary outbursts in East Germany and later in other countries are a promotional demonstration of the situation of workers in the countries of so-called popular democracy (Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Magyarshchyna, Bulgaria, Romania, which are satellites of Moscow, with communist governments imposed and supported by Moscow). After several years of communist rule and the subordination of those

countries to Bolshevik Moscow, the workers showed through their active struggle that they were on the side of the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution, and that the communist system and regime's hiding behind the name of the workers was groundless. The labour unrest also improved the material and political situation of the general population, forcing the communist regime to make various concessions.

The events in Poland and Magyar in the last months of 1956 had the same origin in both cases. The anti-Bolshevik revolutionary sentiments of the masses had reached such a level of spread and intensity that even minor causes could cause an explosion and active struggle. The growth of revolutionary sentiment was caused by all manifestations of Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement, unbearable conditions and oppression imposed and maintained by the communist regime. The Bolsheviks themselves caused the temperature of revolutionary sentiment to rise to a boiling point by feigning a turn away from Stalinism and smoothing out their course. The masses immediately became convinced that this Bolshevik tactic was motivated by the regime's sense of weakness and uncertainty in the face of the increasingly intransigent attitude of the enslaved peoples. On the other hand, it clearly showed that the Bolsheviks were trying to get out of the difficult situation with empty tricks, that the so-called destalinisation and collective leadership did not give the people anything, did not bring any significant improvement or coherence in the interpretation of the course by the people, but only sought to normalise relations and consolidate within the Communist Party itself, within the ruling Communist clique. This falsity, the Bolsheviks' deceitfulness, combined with obvious manifestations of internal wavering and weakness, had a particularly irritating effect on the mood of the masses, which had reached an expansive level of tension.

The events in Poland and in the Magyarshchyna had similar beginnings, but then went on to take completely different paths. This shows how differently the revolutionary potential of a spontaneous, rather than a planned and controlled revolutionary movement can be developed. In both of these countries, the situation and attitudes of both the national and Bolshevik sides were broadly similar. They were inherent opponents, facing each other in extreme hostility and with the consciousness that an outright confrontation between them must come. Communists, too.

The parties and regimes in both countries were in the same initial situation and in a similar state. Previously, they had been obedient instruments of the enslavement of their own peoples. their place was on the side of the enemy. However, under the growing pressure of anti-Bolshevik, national liberation energy and as a result of internal turmoil and decay in the communist camp, a fermentation began in both parties that shook their monolithic and unanimous guidance. The struggle between the national-independence front and the Bolshevik occupation caused cracks, decomposition and internal contradictions along the same lines in the communist parties of both countries.

In the Communist Party in Magyar, this process took place "without sails and rudder", as it was carried by the prevailing waves of struggle. Coupled with the offensive and ever new victories of the national liberation revolution, the decaying and sinking Communist Party (to the extent that it could still be interpreted as a united force) tried to keep in touch with events and assure itself of any role in them. This was no longer the role of an instrument of the Bolshevik leadership, but that of a buffer or a brake.

When the Bolsheviks launched a general counter-offensive to crush the national revolution with concentrated military forces, the Magyar Communist Party immediately shifted from the tactics of concessions and adaptation to the previous position of an obedient Bolshevik tool.

Meanwhile, similar events in the Communist Party in Poland at the beginning took a different path. The Tomulka group had a negative attitude to the previous course of regime policy, both for their own group political reasons and also out of a desire to meet the national-independence element at least partially. This group was so determined that in a crisis situation it took the initiative and directed the development of events. In the intra-party showdown against the wing of the party that was unconditionally obedient to Moscow, the so-called Stalinist group, Tomulka and his supporters relied on the national-independent element and became, to a certain extent, spokespersons for resistance to the Moscow occupation. Because of this, they managed to control and somewhat contain the national element that was close to a revolutionary explosion. On the other hand, Moscow had to accept the victory of that group and its policies, even though this led to a significant narrowing of the

weakening Bolshevik rule in that country. The Kremlin realised that otherwise it would have to reckon with the serious revolutionary devastation that could not be overcome without military action. Such actions would not have played into the hands of the Kremlin's policy at the time.

A simultaneous outbreak of uprisings in Poland and Magyar would be too dangerous for the Bolsheviks. Meanwhile, the Tomulka government gave guarantees that it would control the situation, prevent the revolution from spreading further, and, at the cost of some concessions, would maintain the communist system and help Moscow preserve its main positions and the main means of its possession. Tomulka's regime and policy were not and are not a satisfactory and lasting solution to the self-determination of the Polish people, nor to Bolshevik imperialism. Both sides interpreted it as a temporary transient phenomenon that could be tolerated for a certain period of time. By quiet pressure, they are trying to move it in a direction that is beneficial to their interests.

Once again, the Tomulka regime is surely not lacking in a sober understanding that it is in the typical role of a buffer between two irreconcilably hostile forces, without a base of its own. However, Tomulka is not thinking of resigning from the leadership of events and sees the prospect of stability ahead. Such an assessment may be based on the belief that both opposing forces, despite their mutual hostility, will always exist alongside each other and neither will be able to destroy the other. The very phenomenon of the national-communist group Tomulka is a mishmash of Polish national independence and Moscow communism. His desire is to preserve his breed: a communist Poland, but if possible, independent of Moscow. His hopes are based on the fact that he has much in common with both opposing camps, both in terms of his background and interests, and can count on the support of one side when it comes to opposing the far-reaching demands of the other.

The Tomulka regime and its policies introduce an element of lingering disorder and tension into the system of Moscow's satellites. Although it to some extent resists the pressure of the national liberation element, it is also subject to that pressure and transmits it to the entire satellite system. This creates a danger for Moscow. Since it is more convenient for the Bolsheviks to fight direct actions of independence under the political and propaganda umbrella, tarnishing them with "fascism" and

"counter-revolution", it is unprofitable to oppose the policy of the communist regime in a satellite country by dramatic means. Meanwhile, the "own path to socialism" is an infectious example to be emulated in other satellites, leading to a softening of the communist system and its regime and a weakening of Moscow's dictates.

The so-called national communism in those countries where communism spreads, is imposed or consolidated under the influence of Moscow is a transitional phenomenon between national identity and subordination to Bolshevik imperialism. The cost of this phenomenon determines the overall development of events. National communism is useful for Moscow where it decomposes and weakens the nationally independent forces and sentiments of a people. National communism plays an entirely different role in those countries that have already been mastered by Bolshevism and where communism prevails in its original form, as an instrument of totalitarian Moscow imperialism. There, the tendencies of national communism are a consequence of the pressure of the nationally independent element and a transitional phenomenon from subordination to Bolshevik Moscow to national independence. The communist element that still maintains a connection with Bolshevism is doomed to complete disappearance if it continues to be under the triumphant influence of the national element. In such cases, national communism determines the process of limiting and gradually eliminating Bolshevik domination.

The Kremlin's concession in favour of the Tomulka policy was caused by the events in Poland, and even more so by the simultaneous national revolution in Magyar. In order not to provoke a revolutionary explosion in other satellite countries, Moscow considered it temporarily beneficial to open a second path for national elements. Obviously, it will continue to make efforts to keep the remaining satellite states in the same dependence as before. This is the goal of various political and economic measures towards the satellites, various concessions or promises made by Moscow. However, attempts to isolate the events in Magyar and Poland from the rest of the satellites have been unsuccessful. Therefore, Moscow will continue to have to tolerate Tomulka's "own way" with its various deviations from the course set by the Kremlin, in order to balance and weaken the dangerous example of the Magyar revolution with the less threatening example of Gomulka's evolution. All of this creates a considerable upheaval in the Bolshevik sphere of the so-called popular democracies. There is unanimous agreement,



It seemed that the stabilised pattern of Bolshevik rule had begun to lose its ground and take on a floating appearance. It is impossible to restore the previous situation. And it is also difficult for Moscow to establish a homogeneous and stable system to fully control and manage life in all the satellite countries. The irresistible national energies that have overturned the previous state and pushed in the direction of reclaiming greater freedom will fight for national independence with increased zeal. Whether it will be outright revolutionary explosions or a gradual regaining of freedom, it does not matter; what is certain is that the struggle of the so-called satellite countries against Moscow imperialism and communism has entered a new stage of development.

All these processes in the countries of the so-called people's democracy have a significant impact on the mood and the formation of the entire internal situation within the USSR. They, and in particular the Magyars' uprising, are responsible for reviving and spreading among all enslaved peoples the belief in the possibility and success of a liberation revolution. Despite the fact that the Bolsheviks crushed the uprising in the Magyarshchyna with their massive military force. This did not freeze the revolutionary mood and did not cause despondency and resignation among the peoples. For in the Magyar region, the unexpected strength, not the weakness, of the national revolution was revealed. The great dynamic of this revolution is that it unfolded without much organised preparation, spontaneously; from protest demonstrations of youth and workers, it turned into a nationwide uprising in an improvised manner. This happened in a small country that had been enslaved by the Bolsheviks for twelve years and in which Moscow had shackled the people and their entire lives to a communist regime, a total slave system. So the very emergence of a general revolutionary breakdown in such conditions is of unusual historical significance. The question of whether a revolution is possible in sub-Bolshevik conditions, under a total communist system, was resolved in Magyar in an undoubtedly positive sense. And this outcome, accomplished in living reality, not in theory itself, is important for every country enslaved by Moscow Bolshevism.

The universal significance of the Magyar example for every anti-Bolshevik, national liberation revolution is due, in particular, to the following circumstances: the Magyars are a small people; the Bolshevik regime in Magyar was not only comprehensively

was consolidated, but also additionally secured by the Soviet occupation forces, which, being unrelated to the Magyar people, should have been completely devoid of any sympathy for their liberation aspirations. These circumstances did not facilitate the emergence of a revolutionary breakdown in Magyar, but rather the opposite. That is why every nation that wants to fight Bolshevik enslavement for its own freedom can look to the example of Magyar and draw from it faith in its own strength.

When it comes to the success of the Magyar Revolution, the conclusions are also quite positive. The revolutionary breakthrough itself was successful, despite the unusual external difficulties and considerable internal malaise in the development of the revolutionary process. The revolutionary breakthrough was successful because it actually removed and defeated the hostile communist regime and the political and social system it had established, and it neutralised and defeated the regime's power support - the secret police and the communist party. He even made an initial fight against the occupying Soviet army, partly through successful armed struggle, and even more through the ideological and political influence on the soldiers of the Soviet army units stationed in Magyar. The actual power in the whole country was entirely in the hands of revolutionary forces, in the forms in which these forces manifested themselves and acted on the ground.

The victory of the national revolution was not completed by the formation of a unified and distinctly revolutionary government, as would have been appropriate to the situation and needs of the whole country. The reason for this was the spontaneity of the revolution, the lack of a leadership that had a clear concept and plan for liberation and would have implemented it. But this internal shortcoming of the revolutionary process is not proof of defeat in the fight against the enemy, the Moscow occupation and its instrument, the Magyar communist forces. The most expressive manifestation of the victory of the revolution was the transition of the entire Magyar army to its side, despite the fact that this army was formed by the communist regime, which for ten years had made every effort to turn it into a certain support for the communist system. The destruction of the enemy government and the system it had created, the paralysis of all its components and power factors, the construction of a new state power, a new revolutionary social and political system, and the unanimous support of the whole nation for the liberation revolution are indisputable facts that formed the initial victory of the anti-Bolshevik revolution in Magyar. When, after that

When Bolshevik troops eliminated the hard-fought independence of Magyar and re-imposed a communist regime, it was not due to a failed , but to a new military aggression by the USSR against the isolated small country.

Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks could not crush the Magyar liberation revolution with the units of the Soviet army that were permanently stationed in this country for this task. They had to replace them with new and much larger military units. It would have been difficult for even an orderly state to resist such aggression, given the balance of power. And the new Bolshevik aggression took place at a time when the revolution had just won and there was no time to prepare for war with the enemy troops coming from outside.

The Magyar Liberation Revolution was defeated in the war with the USSR mainly because it took place in complete isolation. The Bolsheviks were free to throw huge military forces against Little Magyarshchyna, and the Western powers looked on with indifference. Similarly, the revolutionary forces of other enslaved peoples did not mount revolutionary actions in a timely manner on a scale that would have tied the Bolsheviks' hands and delayed the Magyar struggle.

The conclusions from those events, firstly, strengthen the conviction that even in the most difficult conditions, a revolutionary breakthrough is possible and that even a small people can overthrow the totalitarian communist system and slavery if they decide to fight to the death. Secondly, the example of the Magyars proved once again the experience of our liberation struggle - when the liberation revolution of a nation takes place in isolation, it is difficult to hold on to its gains before a new enemy attack from outside. Therefore, since revolutionary disruption is possible even in a small area, the main task in further development is to spread the revolutionary struggle as far as possible so that it grows into a common anti-Bolshevik revolution of all enslaved peoples.

Such conclusions are self-evident to anyone who is interested in the course of events and tries to understand their meaning, to learn from them. We can be sure that a great many people from all nations who have found themselves under Bolshevik rule are doing this. The Bolsheviks know this, so they are trying to show the events in a completely distorted way and

to turn people's minds in the opposite direction. But the peoples are already well acquainted with Bolshevik propaganda methods and know how to use them to reveal exactly what Moscow is trying to hide from them. In addition, true information about the developments in the Magyar region is being spread through thousands of channels and reaching all corners of the Bolshevik prison of the peoples. In particular, the Red Army soldiers who took part in the events spread experiences and opinions that were very dangerous for Bolshevism. And today, the Kremlin can no longer deal with them in the same way as it once did with the participants in the disastrous campaign against Finland.

Thus, under the influence of the events of the past year, revolutionary moods, revolutionary consciousness and confidence are rapidly maturing in all the peoples under Bolshevik rule. First and foremost is the strengthening of the belief that a liberating revolution by the enslaved peoples' own forces is actually possible and that it can unexpectedly awaken the colossal forces of the people. It was not only the Magyars who discovered their previously unforeseen strength. All the peoples enslaved by Moscow experienced this feeling. Among these peoples, a distinct political awareness began to crystallise that the liberation revolution was a common cause of all peoples, all of whom were bound by the same Bolshevik bondage. This consciousness had already manifested itself in a dynamic form during the Magyar Uprising. It guided those Ukrainians and other soldiers of the Soviet army who sympathised with the rebels and nipped Bolshevik attempts to stifle the revolution in the bud. Many of them actively sided with the uprising. Numerous manifestations of intensified revolutionary activity, direct revolutionary actions to support the Magyar struggle, mainly in Ukraine, sabotage acts against the transfer of troops to Magyar, etc. were of this origin. Similarly, various expressions of sympathy with the Magyar insurgents in the so-called satellite countries, although they had no practical consequences for the Magyar struggle, led to the general spread of the idea of a common liberation revolution of all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. This process of maturation of the idea of a common anti-Bolshevik struggle in the minds of the peoples did not stop with the suppression of the Magyar revolution. It continued to develop under the influence of reflections on the great opportunity that had been wasted.

The special significance of Magyar for the approach of the general liberation revolution lies in the fact that the workers and

all young people as the main fighting force and engine of the revolutionary struggle. This has a strong attractive effect on workers and young people in all countries enslaved by red tyranny. These facts also shock some of the former Soviet youth, who, due to opportunism or other reasons, have become indifferent to the causes of the liberation struggle.

In summing up the lessons of the Magyar Revolution for the future liberation struggle, we must also take into account the influence that the attitude of the Western powers can have. The position of these powers in the face of the heroic struggle of the Magyar people and the brutal Bolshevik aggression showed what can be expected of them in such cases. On the one hand, there was an unusually keen interest in Magyar events and extraordinary manifestations of the touching sympathy of all Western nations for the fighting Magyar people, though mostly only in the platonic or charitable sphere. On the other hand, the passivity of Western policy remained unshakable, avoiding any hint of active opposition to the brutal Soviet intervention. This was a very instructive example of the fact that awareness and sympathy of the Western powers is one thing, and effective policy is another matter, completely independent of the first. This leads to a serious warning that concentrating liberation policy on informing the foreign world about the liberation struggle and placing the main emphasis on winning sympathy for this struggle can lead to fatal self-deception. Obviously, such activities are necessary and can also have some consequences, and they should be carried out as soon as possible. But it cannot be interpreted as the main factor in politics, as a factor on which base the plans of the liberation struggle. There is no doubt that the Western powers are well aware that the independence of Magyar from the USSR would be very beneficial for them as well. But the main guideline of their active policy is the principle of not opposing the aggression of Bolshevik imperialism more decisively, except when it further encroaches on their immediate interests.

They stay away from any actions that could lead to a conflict with the USSR. So, in another similar case, we cannot count on their support.

For a revolutionary organisation that has long built its liberation programme on the concept of its own strength, another confirmation of this reality cannot come as an unexpected blow. But we are also interested in the question of what

How will this review affect the mood of the masses; will the unfortunate experience not cause despondency and resignation? Life has already answered this question. The political consciousness and attitudes of the broad masses of the peoples enslaved by Moscow are dominated by a sober assessment of the real world, not by some kind of compiled speculation, as is often the case with routine politicians. Following the voice of the so-called common sense, these peoples have long since developed a sober assessment of the policies of Western powers, their goals and means. Starting with the Second World War and the division of the world between the USSR and the West into spheres of influence, through all the subsequent manifestations of the West's indifference to the fate of enslaved peoples and their struggles, the entire development of international politics has repeatedly shown that these peoples have no reason to place their hopes in the West. In the political consciousness of these peoples, there is no longer any hope of salvation or even respectful support from Western powers.

It is well known that the West would not go beyond expressions of verbal sympathy and tactical and political games with the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the West's inactivity in the case of Magyar deepened the bitterness of the peoples enslaved by Moscow towards the Western powers, but did not cause despair or despair. This is because the political attention of these peoples had already turned not to outside help, but to their own struggle and to favourable developments within the Bolshevik empire.

Proof of this same attitude can be found in the reaction of peoples to events in international politics. We can see that the international situation - the aggravation or ease of tensions between the USSR and the Western powers - did not have a major impact on the rise or fall of revolutionary sentiment in the sub-Bolshevik area. For example, during the height of the so-called Cold War and the Korean and Vietnamese proxy wars, there were no revolutionary outbreaks in the USSR or its satellite countries. Instead, the revolutionary events of autumn 1956 occurred in the era of the so-called Geneva spirit, during the coexistential courtship between the West and the USSR, but after the XXth Congress of the CPSU and the confusion in the communist ranks caused by the so-called de-Stalinisation course. The manifestations of the internal crisis in the Bolshevik camp provoke a very lively, spontaneous and massive reaction of the population in the sub-Bolshevik countries. This indicates that a healthy political instinct is coming to the fore, finding the only way to liberation in its own revolutionary struggle. This is the main essence of the psychological maturation of the revolution.

In the communist camp itself, confusion and contradictions are not diminishing, but . As already noted, this confusion is caused mainly by the growing resistance and pressure of the enslaved peoples, and then by the futility of the Bolsheviks ever being able to eliminate this hostile influence. Khrushchev's tactics were calculated to be a more respectable rebound, a new ideological start for communism without the burdens of the past. However, subsequent events undermined these calculations and forced the Bolsheviks to show in practice their unchanged nature, which they wanted to disguise with new tactics. The growing contradictions between words and deeds, the uncoordinated jumps from one tactic to another, and the failure of all attempts to gain the trust and unwilling obedience of the conquered peoples increased the ideological confusion of the communist leadership, causing further loss of political balance.

The Kremlin sees the main opponent of Bolshevik imperialism in the irresistible nationalism of the enslaved peoples. Although the strongest revolutionary developments have recently been seen in the so-called satellite countries, the Bolsheviks also see a great threat in the revolutionary nationalism of the peoples of the USSR, primarily in Ukraine. Since the experience to date has shown that repression alone, even the best, cannot radically eradicate independent tendencies, Moscow is trying to defuse their tension with further concessions. This is all done in such a way as to create the impression of a far-reaching expansion of the autonomy or even Soviet sovereignty of the Union republics, to hide the colonial subjugation of the peoples to Moscow, and to delay and consolidate the main means of Moscow's domination. Such propagandistic acts of ostensible extension of the rights of the so-called Union republics have recently included the recognition of the competence of these republics to establish their own criminal and civil codes based on directives issued by Moscow, the competence to establish administrative divisions, and, finally, the transfer of some economic planning functions to the republics. The need to delay the absurdity of Soviet bureaucratic centralism may play a role in these changes; but the Bolsheviks present these changes as factors in the far-reaching isolation of the so-called Union republics in order to stifle the independent aspirations of the enslaved nations. To emphasise that

These acts are a manifestation of a new course in national policy, and they include resolutions on the restoration of the republics of those Caucasian peoples who have been evicted after the war for "collaboration with the Germans". Such measures, designed for propaganda effect and devoid of any greater political significance, will not confuse anyone and will not stop the peoples' struggle for genuine independence. But they do have their value as evidence that, after brutally crushing the Magyar revolution, the Kremlin is trying to defuse nationalist sentiment with a marked concession.

These points are indicators of the maturation of the general anti-Bolshevik revolution. It is safe to say that this process has passed the initial stage in which the independence struggles of different peoples developed separately, individually seeking their own way. In shaping the political attitudes and moods of the enslaved peoples, the previous deceptive influence of the orientation towards a favourable development of the international situation and liberation with the help of Western powers has lost its previous deceptive influence. All the attention of the peoples of the former Soviet Union is directed in one direction, the direction of their own liberation and revolutionary struggle. All the rivers of the liberation and revolutionary struggles of different peoples flowed in the same direction, determined by the same political situation, from which there is only one way out. The revolutionary energies of all peoples will increasingly be directed into the same channel of a common liberation revolution. The paralysing influence of the Bolshevik terrorist system has been broken in many places. The spirit of fearless liberation struggle is spreading. The peoples have felt their strength and realised the artificiality of the Bolshevik dictatorship, in which a small handful dominates the people by dispersing national energy. The growth of revolutionary consciousness and readiness for struggle is taking place unnoticed, under the surface of life. Sporadic spontaneous explosions indicate the accumulation and intensity of revolutionary energies. These explosions do not exhaust these energies, but only increase and accelerate the process of their maturation in many other places.

Bolshevik attempts to defuse the pent-up revolutionary moods by the tactics of minor concessions remain unsuccessful, just as terror fails to eradicate the struggle for freedom. The regime's more significant concessions, made under the pressure of national elements, are perceived as partial achievements of the liberation revolution and contribute to its further consolidation. The growth of revolutionary



The moods of the people are not easy to assess in detail. The first main stage of this process often takes place in the subconscious of the people and has almost no spontaneous manifestations. However, the maturation of revolutionary energy ready to act on such prepared soil can occur at lightning speed. A shock can be caused by a minor factor.

From the analysis of the entire internal situation in the post-Soviet complex, it appears that the process of a thorough build-up of revolutionary energies and sentiments is taking place in the whole complex on a wide scale and in different planes. It is not possible to predict whether this process will remain in a potential state in the depths of life for a longer period of time, or whether it will soon come to the surface and become a state of active struggle. Both possibilities must be taken into account. And from this follows the requirement for the leading organised revolutionary forces to be prepared for major shifts that can give a one-time chance for the full unfolding of the liberation revolution and bring it to victory.

Spontaneous revolutionary upheavals can grow from small beginnings into large-scale insurgencies, involving entire nations and destroying all enemy forces in a given territory. However, consolidating the achievements of the revolution and ensuring its final victory largely depends on whether the revolutionary struggle takes on organised forms and has a single-minded leadership that acts according to an expedient plan. It is very difficult for the plan, strategy and leadership of the revolution to be formed on the spur of the moment in the midst of the revolutionary struggle if there are no pre-prepared foundations for this. This leads to the ultimate requirement to keep the nucleus of the organised revolutionary force of the OUN in the Krai by all possible means. The activity of the Foreign Units in this direction is in the first place among all other tasks. (After this ending, the editors of the "Liberation Path" omitted the following sentences that motivate the preparation of practical action at that time:

"It is equally important to prepare in this direction so that whenever events in Ukraine or in the neighbouring territories of Ukraine require it, groups of organisers of the liberation revolution will be sent from abroad to act directly. Such groups, even if they are small, can play a very important role if they provide the revolutionary process with apt slogans, a reasonable plan and good

a strategy of struggle. We need to have all of this in place so that we are not caught unprepared at the crucial time!)

## **The question of nuclear war and the liberation revolution**

*Considering whether modern advances in military technology, atomic and hydrogen bombs, intercontinental missiles, etc, increase or decrease the possibility of a world war, the author concludes that this technology does not necessarily have to cause a total, atomic war that would destroy half or even all of humanity; however, there may be smaller localised wars with the use of so-called conventional weapons (compare the article "The Third World War and the Liberation Struggle"). What chances for the national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people could an eventual world war caused by Moscow's aggression give? According to the author of the article, such a war could bring benefits, but to achieve them, it would require extensive and joint preparation of the entire Ukrainian people and their emigration to a foreign land. In addition, the author once again points out what our attitude towards the West should be then.*

*The article entitled "The Question of Atomic War and the Liberation Revolution" was published in four parts, signed by Stepan Bandera, in the journal "The Liberation Way", London, Great Britain, year IV/X, book. 7/43/111 for July 1957, Year V/XI, p. 1/49/123 for January, and p. 2/50/124 for February 1958. The long break in the publication of certain parts of the article was due to the author's work on preparing the expulsion of the liaison group to Ukraine.*

*An excerpt of this article was published once again in the above-mentioned journal, Yearbook. XI /XVIII/, no. 10/200, October 1964, under the title "There were no illusions".*

### **I**

Wars often trigger major shifts and complete major changes in the political and social structure of individual states, entire continents, and even the world. In some cases, such changes are created - quite mechanically, so to speak - by the war itself and its aftermath. In other cases, wars create more favourable conditions for the unfolding and completion of processes that had already been troubling society before. That is why revolutionary movements that strive for a fundamental restructuring of society are often associated with the expectation of war.

But such calculations do not always come true. Of course, history has recorded many cases where a foreign war did help a revolution to break free from the depths to the surface and implement its programme. At the same time, there are no fewer examples in history of revolutionary ideas and undertakings that were calculated in advance for the outbreak of war, disappearing without a trace. Therefore, in order to link revolution to the outbreak of war, preconditions are always needed, which must take into account the purpose of the external war, and then its development and possible outcome. A note of caution: the course of military events often changes the nature of the war, and even the policy agenda of the warring parties, so it is extremely difficult to predict the development of the conflict in advance and thus to give direction to the projected revolution.

When a state decides to implement its policy by means of war, it naturally strives to ensure that the war takes place on someone else's territory. This is understandable: in this way, it protects its own territory from destruction. As a rule, defensive wars are only initiated by an aggressive enemy. The attacked nation must fight in order not to lose what the enemy is encroaching on and what is more valuable to it than peace. Thus, under normal circumstances, no nation wants to wage a defensive war on its own territory. The exception in this regard may be enslaved peoples. Provided that war can bring about liberation, an enslaved people may seek war, even if it is to take place on their territory and even if it threatens them with casualties in population and devastation in property. The calculation is simple: once an enslaved nation becomes involved in an external conflict and is defeated, it loses the power to control the enslaved.

An enslaved people may seek an external war against its enslaver for two reasons. First, when its own liberation cause closely fits the war programme (or even includes the programme of external allies). In this case, the enslaved people may consider the enemy of their enslaver to be their ally, and the war to be a common cause; then they can coordinate their struggle with their ally, and launch a national revolution according to a common plan, in close coordination with the frontline operations. The second possibility is the one where the programme of the belligerent party is not covered by the goals of the liberation struggle and simply has nothing to do with it, does not support it, although it does not deny it. In this case, the enslaved people can

apply the negative principle - "the enemy of my enemy is my ally" - and make their cause equal to an external conflict. The enemy must then divide his forces in two, and this benefits both partners. On this basis, even an understanding of cooperation can emerge - a kind of temporary alliance, pushed as far as both sides are interested in being bound by the condition of coordinated action and mutual assistance. Because - it should be noted - the mere tactical expediency of such a link does not solve the whole issue here.

Sometimes, belligerent states have a well-defined war agenda and, in order to prevent it from escalating beyond certain limits, do not want to enter into a formal alliance with a more radical and broader revolutionary movement. Such restraint can be dictated to a belligerent state by the appearance of a completely foreign third power, a desire to win over the enemy, or even its own internal situation. Similarly, it may be disadvantageous for a liberation and revolutionary movement to be bound by the policy of a foreign state, either because of political contradictions or because it is not interested wasting the attention and energy of an uplifted people. In such situations, only a de facto, non-contractual alliance is formed.

A revolutionary movement and a foreign country fighting on the front line use each other, each in its own way and for its own purpose.

Such a war of a foreign state against an enslaver can be useful for the liberation struggle of an enslaved people, but only to the extent that it creates suitable circumstances, makes it possible or easier to launch a national movement, which - beyond that - must struggle towards its goal by its own means and forces. Even the complete defeat of the enslaver in a war with foreign powers in such a situation does not bring liberation to the enslaved people unless they simultaneously gain and secure their interests through their own struggle.

The peoples enslaved by Moscow Bolshevism greeted Germany's war against the USSR in June 1941 with the hope of liberation.

Anxiety about the horrors of modern warfare could not outweigh joyful feelings, because the hateful enemy domination surpassed every foreseeable disaster. And the hopes of the enslaved did not stem from any one-sided political orientation towards Germany. On the contrary, they remembered the bitter experience of the German

The war was primarily about ending Bolshevik slavery, and compared to this goal, the war against the USSR seemed to be a secondary concern. The main goal was to put an end to Bolshevik slavery, and compared to this goal, the kind of power that was becoming a war against the USSR seemed a secondary matter.

Revolutionary liberation movements in the USSR, such as the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and similar organisations in other countries, including the Baltic states, did not confine themselves to passive contemplation. They interpreted the war as an opportunity the enslaved peoples to actively shape their destiny by fighting on their own.

The experience of the last war has clearly shown that the principle of "the enemy of my enemy

- A "friend" does not always have to be a good one. For if such a "friend" in a war aims to wrest enslaved peoples from an ancient enslaver only to impose his own domination on them, then neither the "friend" nor the "friendship" can be relied upon for liberation. Then it does not matter which of the warring parties wins and which is defeated. Replacing one slavery with another, even though it may bring certain benefits to the enslaved people in one respect and increase difficulties in another, is equally contrary to the basic principle: the restoration of independence! In such a war, the enslaved people can only hope and make efforts to ensure that neither of the actually wins the war; that both, exhausted by the war, do not have the power to rule the peoples for whom they fought. To this end, he mobilised his forces and launched a two-front struggle, not allowing any of the occupiers to gain a foothold on his land and keeping his eyes on the ultimate goal: to clear the country of the occupiers at the right time and begin to restore and strengthen his own state. This was the plan of the OUN-UPA's revolutionary insurgency during the Second World War, a plan of struggle on two fronts: against communist Moscow and against Nazi Germany.

This plan was only half fulfilled. As a result of the war, the power of Hitler's Germany fell, but the old Moscow imperialism survived and grew into a threat to the entire free world. Tragic and paradoxical as it may seem, Moscow was helped to achieve victory and to capture new territories under its domination

It was the Western powers that, in fear of a separate understanding between the USSR and Hitler's Germany, forgot the main thing: that not only were the peoples enslaved, but they also had a vested interest in the destruction of both.

The question of the Third World War automatically arose from the outcome of the previous war, from a new pattern of opposing trends and forces. And this question has been open for twelve years now. The development of international relations and events over that time has not brought it any closer to a solution

- positive or negative - not by a single centimetre. And that junction at the end of the last war was at a distance of an outstretched arm.

If the policy of the Western powers were to develop according to the laws of simple logic - and this line coincided with the line of expectations of the peoples enslaved by Moscow - they would have to seek a decisive reprisal against the USSR now, after the defeat of Germany.

The vital interests of the Western powers, along with the interests of the enslaved peoples, demanded the defeat, or at least the suppression, of the Moscow-Bolshevik invasion. The conditions for this were uniquely favourable: the military machine of the West was in full , with millions of experienced soldiers at arms, while the Soviet army, despite its size, was completely depleted and lacked the most basic ammunition. In addition, the West in the Bolshevik backwater could count on the support of the agitated national liberation movements, in particular those nations that were allied with the West and, as such, had every right to expect help from it.

However, the West's policy went against common sense, far from respecting the interests of not only the enslaved peoples, but also its own. And, obviously, in the course of the post-war Allied-Moscow fraternisation, the peoples enslaved by Moscow ceased to focus on the West's war against the USSR. It became clear that, in the name of a dubious peace, the Western powers deliberately handed over to the Bolsheviks a number of Eastern and Central European nations, including their recent allies against Germany. It is true that in the political declarations of Western governments, there was still an interest in the situation of these peoples, and even a desire to help them. But Western commitment never came close to (let alone crossed) the line of threatening conflict with Moscow, military or even diplomatic. And without a conflict with the Bolsheviks, assistance to the enslaved peoples was virtually impossible.

Moreover, the post-war development of international relations has shown that Western powers lack the will and determination even to secure their own interests by putting up a dam against the growth of Bolshevism.

Time passed, however, not necessarily to the West's advantage. In the initial period after the war, the numerical superiority of the Soviet divisions was not only balanced but surpassed by the significant technical and material superiority of the military machine of the Western powers. And if these powers did not use their advantage (not necessarily for war, but, in fact, to avoid war by putting appropriate pressure on Moscow), then so much the worse for them. As time went on, the balance of power began to change in favour of the USSR, and it was then that talk of a new war began. The Western powers largely demobilised not only their armies, but also their military production, shifting their industries to peaceful products. The opposite was true of Moscow, where the development of the economy and, in particular, industry in preparation for the war had been going on all and where the pressure on armaments had increased. The USSR never carried out its own demobilisation. It only carried out certain regroupings, reorganisations and rearmament, which were publicised as part of disarmament. The Bolsheviks used peacetime for internal ordering, and the programme of this ordering included the suppression of all kinds of "enemies of the people", and above all the revolutionary liberation movements of enslaved peoples. In the face of massive military and political actions, their own heavy losses, and the stabilisation of the international situation for a longer period of time, the enslaved peoples had to stop fighting with rebel armies and confine themselves to underground activities.

On the other hand, the Soviets received a significant boost to military potential from the newly conquered countries in Europe and Asia. By making extensive use of material and human resources - ordinary workers and peasants, and above all scientists, designers, technicians and specialists in various fields - the Bolsheviks achieved successes in a relatively short time that the West had not foreseen.

The greatest impact on the change in the military potentials of the West and the USSR was made by Soviet achievements in the development of modern weapons: missiles, nuclear and hydrogen. Moscow's acquisition of nuclear weapons had a very fatal impact on the whole



The monopoly of nuclear weapons by the United States has had a negative impact on the post-war policies of Western powers, and it seems likely to continue to do so. The United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons created a lulling sense of security in the Western bloc as a whole. Not only the Americans, but also others relied on the fact that nuclear weapons could deter Moscow and its armies of millions from aggression. It was hoped that Moscow would not understand the mystery of atomic fission and would never be able to catch up with the West in the development of atomic research. The same calculation turned out to be wrong. It is now common knowledge that Moscow has both an atomic bomb and a hydrogen bomb, with the atomic weapon being introduced into conventional army armaments, and that it has long-range missile and flying and stealth capabilities that, at least in terms of numbers, do not lag behind the West. The Western calculators miscalculated, firstly, because they did not properly take into account the scientific and technological and industrial strength that the Soviets had gained by conquering new Western countries, including parts of Germany. Secondly, the Western security system failed, and Bolshevik intelligence and agents received a lot of important secret material from Western powers themselves. Finally, it was also lost sight of the fact that, although the level of development of Soviet industry was low, Moscow was able and willing to make up for its shortcomings by means of violence and pressure in the right direction.

The previous exclusive position of nuclear weapons was a factor for Western powers that ensured their security in case of emergency. The use of the destructive power of the atom came into play only in the event of military aggression directly against the West, or more specifically, against Western Europe. And perhaps in that respect, the calculations were to some extent justified, perhaps the threat of atomic bombing deterred the Bolsheviks from a luring aggression against Western Europe. However, further reliance on the power of the atom did not pay off and ultimately worked to the Bolsheviks' advantage. First, by adopting a defensive posture under the cover of nuclear power as the ultimate means of countering aggression, the West completely abandoned its offensive strategy.

Secondly (and in connection with the first), out of a sense of security from the use of nuclear weapons, the West has reduced its military forces, which use so-called conventional weapons. As a result, the West's ability to confront Moscow with conventional weapons without resorting to nuclear weapons has disproportionately diminished. In turn, this has become

This is the reason why Western powers have fallen even deeper into passivity and defensiveness.

Defining the conditions under which the West was ready to use nuclear weapons had the disadvantage of giving Moscow a free hand to expand in all directions except the West. Because the Western powers, being self-sufficient at home, "forgot" to define a clear limit to their compromise on the continent of Asia. Moscow took advantage of this. Always taking care not to cause a serious itch, it has mastered China and fuelled a series of "local conflicts" and "civil wars", as in Persia, Greece, Korea, Indo-China, the Middle East, etc. Moscow's imperialism has been left with a large field for growth.

So, without denying the assumption that the West's acquisition of nuclear weapons postponed the outbreak of World War III, we can safely say that it did not prevent it. Quite the contrary, the West lost without a war, while Moscow won, perhaps more than it could won in the World War. The fact is that nuclear weapons gave the Western powers a sense of security disproportionate to the power they actually represented. It is very possible that without this sense of security, the West would have taken the threat more seriously and would have exerted more energy to be able to put an end to Moscow's expansion. It seems to us that there would be as many arguments to justify such a thesis as there are for the second one, that nuclear weapons, in the monopoly of the West, saved the . Both theses go back to theorising in the plane of "what would have happened if things had been different".

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American exclusive possession of nuclear weapons, combined with the full mobilisation of the entire military potential of the Anglo-American bloc at the end of the Second World War, gave the Western powers a military advantage over the Soviets. If these states, including the United States, had been guided by the same moral and political principles against Bolshevik imperialism as they were in their interpretation of Hitler's Germany and Japan, their advantage in the first postwar years would not have been so wasted. In that situation, the initial atomic bomb was already a very powerful

a means of offensive, not just defensive, policy and strategy. The successful use of this weapon in the war against Japan demonstrated its great military importance. After that, the mere threat and readiness to use it in a new conflict would be a means of very strong pressure and could force Bolshevik imperialism to retreat. Thus, the firm and offensive policy of the Western powers, based on military superiority, gave the appearance of reducing the Bolshevik threat and of eliminating the danger of a new war in the long term. It remains a historical fact that the US has not even tried to this line.

The defensive, if not downright defeatist, policy of the Western allies reduced nuclear weapons to the role of providing the West with a defence against direct military aggression by the USSR. However, the policy of deterring aggressive war, based on the unilateral use of the atomic bomb, proved to be effective only in the short term. The Bolsheviks managed to extend their dominion over large areas of Asia through small, peripheral wars and approaching expansion. At the same time, they were able to work safely and with full intensity on the development and use of thermonuclear and other new types of weapons.

Contrary to the predictions and assurances of the leading political and military circles of the West, the USSR unexpectedly quickly caught up with the United States in those areas of military technology in which the Americans had long considered themselves uncompetitive pioneers. Now there is no doubt that the USSR has not only the scientific and technological keys to the production of various thermonuclear weapons, but has already passed the stage of initial experimentation, and is producing and stockpiling hydrogen bombs and other means of long-range and mass destruction. True, the race is not over yet and continues in terms of the strength, quantity and heterogeneity of thermonuclear weapons production. But now, even the significant differences in the achievements of the two sides are no longer decisive. What is important is that both America and the USSR have such bombs ready for use and in such quantities that they can destroy huge countries. When both sides have reached this level, further "improvements" in the types and strength of thermonuclear weapons are of secondary importance.

After the approximate equalisation of capabilities to produce thermonuclear weapons, the problems of their use and

defence against it. It seems that the weakest point is in the area of nuclear defence, i.e. the invention of sufficiently successful means and methods of active defensive countermeasures. And these issues are becoming very burning for the West, because the aggressive and reckless Bolshevik Moscow has terrible means of mass destruction in its hands. As for the practical ability to attack the enemy with different types and calibres of thermonuclear weapons, both rivals are already far ahead of the game.

The issue of bases for using these weapons has been largely resolved on both sides. Further development and improvement of such bases may cement the strength and readiness of one or the other bloc, but there are no signs of fundamental changes in this regard. The Western powers have the advantage of having a stronghold and operational base around the sub-Bolshevik space. However, the size of this latter largely diminishes the significance of this advantage. Domestic and foreign strategies have their own positive and negative aspects in every war. is likely to be the case in the nuclear age. When both sides operate with roughly equivalent technical means and prepare for war in a known environment, there will be benefits and difficulties for warfare both around and in the environment, particularly in vast areas.

Both blocs, the Western and the Soviet, already have a large number of aircraft capable of throwing atomic and hydrogen bombs or small arms. The air forces of both blocs are developing more or less equally from a technical point of view. But the USSR has an advantage in their numbers, keeping aircraft production under the greatest strain. There is also no reason to assume that the Soviets are inferior to the Americans in the design and production of medium- and long-range bombers adapted to drop thermonuclear bombs, if the known achievements of their flying products show a respectable level.

The Western powers probably still have a significant advantage over the USSR at sea. The combined naval forces of the West are far more numerous, and in terms of their quality the Bolsheviks will not easily catch up. In this respect, the general level achieved by the great naval nations over the centuries, carefully nurtured further, means a lot. In addition, the geographical location significantly worsened the naval situation of the USSR, forcing it to divide its

The world war will be fought in three separate naval complexes: the Northern, Southern and Far Eastern. In fact, in a naval war, the geographical location will give more favourable conditions to the Western powers, which will operate with combined naval forces on all sides. The Bolsheviks could not match them with their distributed naval forces.

Given this situation, Moscow is trying to compensate for its weakness at sea with an extremely strong submarine fleet. Western experts say that the USSR has the most submarines and, from this perspective, far exceeds the former strength of Hitler's Germany. We must also take into account the fact that the Bolsheviks used the experience of the last war, the achievements of German technology and apply various new inventions. Because of this, could be very dangerous in an atomic war, not only for sea but also for land-based targets. If the Soviets were to use their great advantage in submarines in an atomic war, they could largely compensate for the lack of permanent bases near the American continent, which the Americans have at their disposal, for nuclear missile attacks on the enemy.

In the latest arms race, the main focus of both sides is on missile weapons. Not only are new types of missiles appearing in design laboratories and on test fields, but they are already in production and in military depots. Alongside the production and testing of the heaviest, long-range, or so-called intercontinental missiles, the military industry is already producing a large number of different medium-range and close-range missiles. At this year's October parade in Moscow, large-calibre rocket artillery was already on display, supposedly far exceeding the power and reach of the famous Katyushas (a type of Moscow-Bolshevik rocket artillery used by the Bolsheviks during World War II against the Germans, also called "Stalin's organs"). These were connected rocket launchers fired together). The diversity and widespread use of missile weapons indicate a general belief in the Soviet and Atlantic blocs that this type of weapon could provide the ultimate advantage in overall armaments.

In particular, medium- and long-range missiles will be of great importance for the wide-area destruction of enemy territories with heavy thermonuclear bombs. Under this review, long-range

Long-range missiles, and even more so battlespace missiles, offer almost unlimited possibilities for bombing enemy territory. Defending against them is much more difficult than defending against bombing by air and sea.

Initially, it seemed that America was far ahead of Moscow in the design of long-range missiles. This gave the West a sense of superiority in modern weapons for some time after the Soviets broke the American monopoly on the atomic and hydrogen bomb. Unexpectedly for the West, the USSR overtook the United States and, by launching "satellites" around the Earth, took first place in the production and successful use of long-range missiles. At the same time, it became public knowledge that the Soviets had a new, unknown to the West, explosive material of extraordinary power. This gave their achievements in the field of missiles and artillery even more weight and durability.

The Bolsheviks, as usual, are making great noise about their current advantage in certain areas of military technology, raising political and propaganda capital for their further expansion. But, looking at the matter coldly, Bolshevik achievements cannot be considered factors that fundamentally change the balance of power in Moscow's favour. Temporary achievements or even longer-term superiority in certain areas of armaments do not give either side an absolute advantage, since military potentials are composed of many factors, and different types of modern weapons complement and equalise each other.

Looking at the main achievements in the production of modern military equipment, we come to the conclusion that the two opposing blocs, the Atlantean and the Soviet, are wielding approximately equal military equipment. The time when the United States monopolistically possessed nuclear and hydrogen weapons, which, although not yet perfected, gave the Western bloc a one-time advantage over the USSR that could not be levelled by other factors, has passed without a trace. Further weapons development went against the West's expectations. It brought improvements in thermonuclear weapons and other heterogeneous military , from jets to missiles, not only to the United States but also to the USSR, thus enabling the comprehensive use of massive and long-range destruction. Now, both sides, the US and the USSR, are more or less equally prepared to fight with those modern

the most terrible means of destruction. We can say that thermonuclear warfare is technically mature in both opposing camps. By aligning, at least roughly, the latest technical means of mass destruction on one side and the other, the circle is closing.

There is still a large gap between modern offensive and destructive weapons and the methods and means of defence that are opposed to them. But this gap is also the same for both sides, so it is not decisive, especially since shortcomings in one's own defence do not usually stop an aggressor from provoking war.

This development gave nuclear and hydrogen weapons a completely different meaning than they originally had. Possessing it monopolistically, the United States interpreted it as the ultimate defence against Soviet aggression, as a deterrent that was supposed to prevent the outbreak of World War III. The US atomic and hydrogen bombs were supposed to be suppressive means against a great military fire. Now, when thermonuclear bombs and arrowheads can fall on both sides, they become the material that can turn every major military fire into a plutonic catastrophe for the whole of humanity.

The principle underlying the design and operation of nuclear weapons, i.e. the principle of a chain reaction, also applies to the consequences of the use of these weapons. If one side were to start a war with thermonuclear bombs, it would automatically trigger the same response from the enemy. The final outcome of such a war cannot be predicted in detail, but its consequence would surely be terrible devastation on the territories of both warring blocs. Competent political experts also agree on this.

The question of whether and to what extent modern advances in military technology increase or decrease the possibility of a new war is of great importance in our consideration. If the American monopoly on atomic weapons reduced it exclusively to a defensive weapon against Bolshevik aggression, there is no doubt that such weapons in the exclusive possession of the Soviets would have been the impetus and instrument of Bolshevik aggressive war. For the driving force behind the use of its power and means in both cases was and will continue to be the fundamental political and volitional determination of the state in question. External circumstances and the capacity of its own forces in

The comparison with the enemy's forces only strengthens or weakens the direct action in the sense of inner guidance.

Considering this question on the basis of real political reality, we must consider the constant action of the dominant factor in contemporary international relations, which is the expansion of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism. In its unrestrained efforts to further expand its dominions and subjugate new peoples through communisation, red Moscow is using all possible means that give it a chance to succeed. This includes covert or open aggressive warfare, when the Bolsheviks hope to win, and other attempts fail due to the resistance of the attacked people.

If atomic weapons in the hands of the Americans alone did not stop Moscow's imperialist expansion there is no reason to think that this will happen now that the Bolsheviks also have them. On the contrary, Moscow's imperialism will manifest an even greater scope and sharpness under the influence of a sense of increased power. This feeling, and the expansionism it spurs, will not be dampened by the knowledge that the opposing bloc has equivalent modern weapons. The Bolsheviks are more likely to be influenced by pride that in some technical areas in which the West had an absolute advantage until recently, it is now barely equal.

But it is possible to think that the strengthening and aggravation of Bolshevik imperialist aspirations do not have to increase Moscow's readiness to start a war in the current situation. It can try to pursue its imperialist plans exclusively by peaceful means, avoiding military adventures. The decisive factor in this should not be the question of the balance of power, but the conviction that an atomic war cannot benefit anyone, but must bring catastrophic casualties and devastation to both camps - aggressor and attacked, defeated and victor - and thus almost equal, absolute defeat.

These are the arguments used by many responsible and influential people in the West. Not wanting war, they try to prove that it is impossible. The basis of such reasoning is the thesis that the next world war would have to be nuclear, with the full use of modern technology. It would be a terrible mutual



destruction, which would be a grave for both warring parties, not just for the defeated. Therefore, no one, no state can incite such a war, because no one would want to voluntarily commit suicide. In this way, they say, the development of military technology has made war absurd and therefore impossible.

This kind of argumentation is not devoid of logic, and it undoubtedly corresponds to the prevailing mood of humanity. But events do not always follow the line of dominant desires and logical predictions. It is more important to guess how the factor that holds the initiative and on which the question of whether or not there will be a new war depends, understands the situation and how it is treated. In other words, what the Soviet elite in the Kremlin is planning and doing. To have an accurate answer, we must look at the facts that reveal the true attitude, character and way of acting of red Moscow.

We have already mentioned that the exclusive American possession of the atomic bomb did not deter the Bolsheviks from provoking new military conflicts in different parts of the globe. The Greek Civil War, the Great Communist War in China, the Korean War, the Indo-China War, and the Indonesian War were all rings in an unbreakable chain of military intrigues inspired and directed by Red Moscow. The United States could have responded with atomic bombs, and this would certainly have forced Moscow to renounce its aggressive imperialist policy. Was Moscow confident that the United States would not use its strongest military argument in such cases? If such a calculation was in Moscow's calculus on the first plan, then the second possibility was also considered. The extent and method of Moscow's incitement of small, peripheral wars clearly indicate that the Bolsheviks always reserved the possibility of withdrawing from a war and ending it if removed an undesirable and threatening development. The nuclear reaction of the West was surely counted in Moscow as one of those unwanted and undesirable possibilities that would force it to change its policy.

After this comparative examination, there are serious doubts whether, now that Moscow also has nuclear weapons, it will be more cautious in starting military fires. The decisive point of such restraint in Moscow should be the conviction that, in today's

Given the state of armaments on both sides, every war must automatically develop into a nuclear war. But are Moscow's leaders also guided by this belief and do they have the same fear of nuclear war as the West? It is true that lately, threats of nuclear war have been made on both sides much more clearly and frequently than in the past, but the purpose of these threats is not the same.

During the Communist peripheral and localised wars in Asia, Western powers were wary of directly threatening with atomic bombs, although they had the opportunity and good reason to do so, as they were themselves involved in military conflicts. It was only later that they began to announce that they would use nuclear weapons in the event of new aggression, adopting a strategy of deterrence and retaliation.

At first, Moscow used the nuclear weapons of Western countries for propaganda purposes, removing the posture of a "humane" defender of peace. When it managed to catch up with the West in the production of nuclear, hydrogen and missile weapons, it turned the threat of these weapons into a tool of its policy of intimidation and blackmail. Now, Soviet propaganda and diplomacy on all sides use the assertion that every military conflict must necessarily turn into an all-destructive nuclear war. At the same time, Moscow clearly emphasises its interest in, and inevitably active intervention in, emerging conflicts. It declares that it will fire all-destructive atomic bombs, missiles and missiles at all parts of the Earth's surface. In this way, it is trying to stereotype the entire world with threats and force all peoples and states to make ever greater concessions to Moscow's aggressive expansion. If a nation succumbs to the suggestion and pressure of Soviet scaremongering and takes the path of ever greater concessions and surrender, it is led, without a fight or resistance, into the Moscow-Communist net, where it will perish worse than in the craters of atomic bombs.

What will happen when Moscow's offensive with threats fails, when it encounters the intransigence and resistance of Western states? Will Moscow still be guided by the same slogans that it uses in its current missile and nuclear diplomacy? Will it renounce further imperialist expansion if it has no other option but war, or will it incite a thermonuclear cataclysm?

The preceding considerations lead to the conclusion that neither the Western nor the Communist bloc has any hope immediately defeating and paralysing the enemy with modern weapons to the point where he could not retaliate with the same weapons. If the Western powers had attacked the USSR with the concentrated forces of their various military bases spread around the former Soviet Union, such a strike would not have paralysed the enemy's military power.

Obviously, this kind of military initiative does not fit in with the guidelines and policies of Western powers. So in this case, this possibility must be ruled out. But here we are taking it into account purely theoretically, in order to have a purely military assessment.

While the Western Allied offensive would stretch the Soviet ground and air forces, these forces would attempt to launch offensives in Western Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Southeast Asia. The thermonuclear weapons bases, including missile launchers, not destroyed by the first Allied offensive would be immediately used by the Soviets in their offensive to the West - by water and air. The Atlantean bloc is hampered in its efforts to conduct a lightning-fast war that would crush the enemy by the enemy's vast expanses of territory, where its military bases and forces are located. These obstacles are compounded by the helpless weakness of Western military intelligence, which cannot provide good and accurate information about the state of the Soviet military forces, their deployment and movements, and also does not have sufficient information about the location of Soviet military bases.

But the Soviets do not have the best prospects for the success of a lightning-fast nuclear war against the Western powers. The main obstacle for them is the deployment of enemy frontline and reserve forces and bases on an intercontinental scale, so that even the elimination of one front does not end the war. The Western Bloc would be able to deal the Bolsheviks crippling blows from other directions. An all-out war on a global scale and with the use of modern means would not be resolved by initial successes, even if they were of great strategic importance. If such a war were to continue until one side was completely exhausted and surrendered, the victorious side would also suffer such heavy losses with modern means of mass destruction that the cost of winning would be questionable.

The logical conclusion, which seems to prevail on both sides, confirms the belief that neither the Western powers nor the USSR are planning for a nuclear war with the expectation of a lightning-fast and victorious outcome. If Moscow itself does not dare to go to nuclear war, it is simultaneously counting on the fact that the fear war in general, and of nuclear war in particular, has a much stronger, decisive influence in Western countries. And it is on such calculations that Moscow's very bold and risky speculations can be based. Every manifestation of fear war in the West will further strengthen Moscow's aggressive policy of scaremongering. But it is likely that it will not end there.

The Bolsheviks may, contrary to their own claims and Western opposition, believe that war in the current situation does not have to turn into an atomic world war in terms of form and size, and that it will continue to be a successful means of expansion if kept within certain limits. Adopting this principle, Moscow can once again launch a series of limited conflicts to break through resistance where other means fail and to gradually extend its dominance over other nations.

What are the grounds for this assumption? The first is the aforementioned calculation that the Western powers fear a major nuclear war more than the Bolsheviks. Consequently, they will delay the reaction with nuclear, thermonuclear and missile weapons at all costs, i.e. they will use them only in an absolutely necessary situation. However, the Bolsheviks hope that the limited wars they provoke and their equally aggressive intentions will not provoke an extreme reaction from the West and will allow them to continue their expansion without much risk. The extreme reaction of the West to Bolshevik aggressiveness will depend primarily on the territory, size and nature of the military conflict, i.e., on factors that the Bolsheviks can control themselves as aggressors.

If they were to go to war directly against a Western state on its own territory or start fighting with heavy thermonuclear weapons, then the West would be forced to launch a nuclear defensive and retaliatory war. But they probably do not take into account such a reaction of the West in a situation where peripheral wars limited to the use of conventional weapons will be sparked, in which Western states will defend their interests and positions to a limited extent, because they will not be of primary vital importance to them.

Moscow hopes that in such cases the West, as in the past, will not expand the size and severity of the conflict and will not use weapons of mass destruction.

The second factor that could push the USSR to limited military aggression is the ratio of the potential capabilities of the standing-by military forces to the so-called conventional weapons. From this perspective, the Soviets have an advantage over the Western powers. Therefore, the Soviet initiative in a limited war, in which both sides would fight only with conventional weapons without heavy means of long-range, mass destruction, promises Moscow, as the aggressor, an initial advantage. It can also count on the fact that Western powers would prefer to lose a smaller, peripheral war and again suffer some limited casualties outside their own countries than to expand the war or start a global nuclear conflagration.

In order not to provoke a total military response from the West, Moscow is likely to use tactics of covering up and reducing the scope and severity of military conflicts. This tactic is in line with Moscow's strategy of gradual imperialist expansion and undermining. In its application, it has many possibilities. A typical example of this tactic is that Moscow does not officially engage in the war it provokes, but only wages it indirectly, through its satellites or so-called "volunteers". And Moscow's direct, overt involvement in the war can be disguised by allegedly "humane" motives for armed intervention.

As we can see, the current development of military technology on both sides is by no means a guarantee against the outbreak of limited military conflicts. The decisive factor here is the political and volitional attitude on both sides, in particular the unabated dynamics of Moscow's imperialism, which does not meet with the corresponding determination of Western powers. The dominance of Soviet expansion, with the ratio of military potentials explained here, gives the Bolsheviks the main initiative in shaping the international situation and allows them to use not only threats of war but also military gamesmanship.

The main change in the issue of war may come when the balance of power between the two opposing blocs changes, not only in terms of military equipment, but also in terms of overall capability and readiness

to war. The state of political decisiveness of states and the moral and volitional resolve of peoples are always of central importance. The possibility of using heavy modern weapons in war increases when one side achieves absolute superiority in this respect, or when it has the appropriate means and methods of successful defence against the effects of these weapons. In addition, there is also the possibility of its desperate use in a desperate situation.

When we write about the latest military technology as a separate factor that affects the issue of war, we do not mean all military inventions and technical improvements, but only long-range missiles. Some of the new military inventions are part of conventional weapons, as a supplement or upgrade to them. For example, nuclear and rocket artillery, close-range missiles, . have already been incorporated into conventional, tactical weapons. They have been incorporated into the structure of armies and the new principles of strategy and tactics as inseparable factors, and this development cannot be stopped or reversed. Therefore, in every new military conflict with direct or indirect participation of the great powers, modern weapons of lighter calibre and tactical frontline reach will surely be used.

Also, heavy, long-range thermonuclear and missile weapons, although not used in combat, will by their very existence influence the nature and development of warfare, strategy and tactics. None of the warring parties can be sure that the enemy will not unexpectedly attack them with these weapons, and, taking into account this possibility, they must deploy their forces accordingly. In general, it can be predicted that future wars will be characterised by large, mobile, discontinuous and unusual depths of front lines, and tactics will be closer to guerrilla warfare than to positional warfare.

Reflecting on the development of modern military technology, one can come to sad conclusions. The general development of technology puts the machine and various technical means at the service of man, making it easier for him to work, produce and master various areas of life. Instead, the latest military technology plays the opposite role, making man its slave, the object of its destructive power.

Due to its development, war is becoming more and more sophisticated, involving not only huge armies, but also entire peoples and their countries in its direct destructive actions. The image of modern warfare reveals all the tragedy

of modern civilisation, the reason for which is that material and technical progress is not accompanied by a corresponding spiritual and moral uplift of people and nations. While non-mechanised warfare had positive effects on the development of peoples, along with negative ones, and cultivated heroic traits, modern, purely technical warfare, as a process of machine-based mass murder and destruction of human property, has degenerated into a senseless crime. The Second World War repeatedly removed this character. The newest types of weapons, if fully used in war, would have brought this development to a final catastrophe.

When states have failed to control the arms race and keep the development of military technology within reasonable limits, this state of affairs, which gives the appearance of withdrawing from the most important types of weapons through balancing and mutual checkmating, must be viewed positively. But this state of affairs and its inhibitory effect have no signs of certainty or durability, because the arms race continues. If Moscow were to gain absolute superiority in thermonuclear weapons, the deterrent effect of balance would be lost and the dangers of using them in war would increase dramatically.

The latest development in nuclear military technology is shattering the Western powers' misguided focus on their unchanging superiority in modern technology, which seems to assure them of a costless war. When the West fails to recapture this advantage and what was supposed to be a protective shield turns into the greatest threat, then a healthy change in the political and strategic thinking of Western nations may occur, leading a reassessment of all factors, including the post-Soviet area.

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The anti-Bolshevik, national liberation revolution relies on a different, opposite mode of action than modern mechanised warfare.

The decisive force of the revolution is the individual who, in the name of the highest national and universal ideals, fights against Moscow-Soviet imperialism and man-hating communism. The process of revolution must wrest the people and the human unit from the grip of the Soviet regime and make them conscious, active fighters for freedom and truth. This process must disempower the entire mechanism of Soviet-Moscow power, including military power. Soviet military

The equipment will be spared if the people who produce and maintain it cease to fulfil the will of the Soviet regime and direct their forces, united in revolutionary fashion, bonded by military equipment, to the defeat of the command centres of the Soviet-Moscow aggressors and their loyal executive and combat units.

Of course, war contributes to the development of revolutionary struggle. If the mechanisation of war reduces the direct influence of the masses on the development of events, turning them into an object of war, then the balancing of technical means and the removal of the most difficult ones from the operation are useful phenomena, because they at least to some extent increase the importance of the human soldier.

The possibility of a world war caused by the Soviet-Moscow aggression to conquer more countries does not bode well for the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle. Nevertheless, such a war could create favourable conditions for a broader revolutionary struggle. Each war unfolds its own dynamics and often goes far beyond the boundaries initially drawn by the initiating party. The revolutionary struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, with its independent development and energy, can give the war a different course and outcome than the plans of the foresee.

For this to happen, the revolutionary forces of the enslaved peoples must make every effort to launch the revolutionary struggle in a timely manner and in such forms and sizes that can be of great importance in the entire military situation. This requires appropriate preparatory and revolutionary activities among the peoples enslaved by Moscow - ideological and political, organisational and operational, and military.

The most important thing is that the liberation and revolutionary forces seize the initiative. Of course, the unfolding of a broad revolutionary struggle in a war situation must be adapted to the development of military events. But this adaptation is based on anticipating and sensing the coming moments of a suitable situation, on the independent consolidation of the revolutionary armed struggle. It is necessary to use all the difficulties of the enemy, his defeats, the tying of his hands by war and revolutionary actions, to mobilise the growth of revolutionary sentiment among the people and the army.



We have already noted that the current moral, political and military state of the West and the balance of power do not give reason to hope that the Western powers will take the initiative in the development of the international situation. In particular, in the issue of the war with the USSR, it is difficult for them to break the deadlock and take decisive steps. This requires a major change. Even if the Western powers are drawn into a military conflict with the Soviets, they will try to limit it to the smallest possible scale. This applies not only to the territorial claims and severity, but also to the intended outcome of the war. The Western powers will first of all try to end every military conflict with a compromise with Moscow, if possible, without too many losses.

If the West's attitude does not change, then in the event of a war between the USSR and the Western powers, the enslaved peoples could not interpret this war as a war of liberation. This means that the revolutionary struggle for liberation cannot set as its main task cooperation with the military actions of the Western powers, unless they include the liberation of enslaved peoples in their military aims. Tactical cooperation in individual cases and situations, mutual exchange of support and services can and should take place, obviously to the extent appropriate and possible, in this case as well. However, limited cooperation will not have the same effect as the coordination of the goals of the liberation revolution and war and the directing of the entire anti-Bolshevik struggle, with all forces and on all fronts, into a united struggle.

If the states at war with the USSR do not include the liberation of the peoples enslaved by Moscow in the aims and plan of the war, then the revolutionary liberation forces must organise the revolutionary struggle on their own, according to their own plan, and treat the war only as an opportune, facilitating international factor. In this case, the main focus is on the war itself, on its development, not on its final outcome. This distinction is essential for planning a liberation revolution. It is a question of taking advantage of all the consequences and influences of military events that are useful for the revolutionary process, and in particular of capturing the most useful moment for a broad-scale struggle. All war-related phenomena and events that shake the internal positions and strength of the occupying regime and strengthen revolutionary sentiments are essential for the revolution

of the people. However, they do not always coincide with the development of external military events taking place on the frontlines. More than once, the opposite happens

- The internal processes and aspirations of the regime, which are not directly reflected at the front, create fertile ground and provide "fuel" for the liberation and revolutionary struggle. This internal, behind-the-scenes aspect of the military situation is more important for the revolution than the external, frontline aspect, especially in a war that does not encompass the goals and actions of the liberation revolution.

In such a war, it would be completely false to pin all liberation hopes on its final outcome, or to abandon the independent revolutionary struggle. In the current international balance of power, there is no basis for concepts that assume that in the next war the Western powers will easily defeat the USSR and establish a new order in the countries liberated from communism on their own terms.

Western powers do not want such a war and are making all possible concessions to Moscow to avoid it. If Moscow imposes a war on the West, but leaves the possibility of waging it on a limited scale and ending it with a compromise that is beneficial to it, the West is likely to continue to make concessions and follow a path that leads to a blind alley. It is true that every war creates a different situation than in peaceful circumstances, and its development is not controlled by just one warring camp.

The outbreak of war could in a short time bring about a profound moral and political change in the West, which in turn could direct the military policy of the Western powers in a direction that would be beneficial to the entire anti-Bolshevik front, including the liberation struggles of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. Such a change is possible, but it is not so certain that we can rely on it now.

In planning the revolutionary and liberation struggle, one should take into account, first of all, the prospects for the development of the situation that have the most realistic potential. It is always easier to move to better conditions and a more favourable position than vice versa. In any case, we must firmly reject the idea of passively waiting for the final outcome of the war in the hope that the victory of the Western bloc will bring us automatic liberation. Without an independent active struggle, no war, in the current international balance of power, would bring us liberation.

Limited localised military conflicts fuelled by Moscow's

expansion, can be of great importance for the liberation revolution because of their internal consequences, not because of their external, military and political effect. Such wars cannot be expected to produce the kind of Bolshevik defeat that would shake the external position of the USSR. When there is no certainty of success of military aggression, Moscow will act more cautiously, so that in times of failure it can easily retreat and extinguish the conflict. Therefore, it would be an unreasonable self-deception to wait for the final outcome of a limited war and hope that it will bring benefits to the national liberation struggle.

Revolutionary activity must be aimed at exploiting the internal consequences of each Bolshevik military adventure.

The fomentation of war reveals to the peoples the deceitfulness of Moscow-Soviet policy and propaganda, which uses the "defence of peace" in the form of deceptive slogans. Each Moscow-Soviet aggression provides good material for revolutionary anti-Soviet propaganda, and the heterogeneous military burdens on the population exacerbate anti-Communist sentiment. Revolutionary activity should not only increase the tension of sentiment, but also mobilise it to active resistance and sabotage of the regime's plans.

The most important revolutionary work during the war is directed to the army, to active and mobilised soldiers, to frontline and reserve military units, and they must be urged not to fight for anti-national, imperialist Bolshevik goals, to use good opportunities and turn their weapons against the hated regime in order to win freedom for their people.

Martial law usually causes a special intensity of mood and readiness for revolutionary action. An organised revolutionary action has the task of moving the potential revolutionary energy among the people, in particular among the army, and creating crystallising centres for its growth. One cannot wait until the ripe and accumulated revolutionary energy begins to manifest itself. Then it may be too late to capture it and direct it to the appropriate path of organised struggle. Acting spontaneously, revolutionary energy can explode and melt away in chaotic, scattered outbursts, without any greater significance or effect. That is why constant organised revolutionary work is necessary, which most definitely detects the growth of tension and directs it towards the mainstream of the liberation struggle.

of the struggle.

When the Kremlin launches an aggressive, invasive war, the slogan "war on war" will be an anti-regime, revolutionary slogan. It is true that the Bolsheviks will not abandon the methods of lying and will continue to try to cover up the true nature of their progress with this slogan. But the contradiction between reality and their propaganda will be too obvious. It will discredit the Bolsheviks to the rest of the world.

When the anti-Bolshevik revolution raises cries against the war, gives them their proper effective meaning and mobilises the people, including the military, to actively resist and sabotage the Bolshevik military plans, this will simultaneously move the general revolutionary struggle forward.

An aggressive war on foreign territory also brings great sacrifices and losses to the people. Therefore, it provides fertile ground for revolutionary action, sometimes no less than a war on one's own territory, unleashed by an enemy attack, particularly when the other belligerent is not supportive of the independent liberation aspirations of the people. Modern weapons also contribute to the consolidation of anti-war, and thus anti-regime sentiments. The use of some types of these weapons in warfare increases the human toll enormously, and the responsibility for this will fall on the aggressor. Atomic and hydrogen bombs and long-range missiles are a constant fear for the entire population in times of war, even when they are not being used. The cause of all these disasters is the Moscow-Soviet imperialist policy and intervention in the war against the wishes and interests of the peoples. This fact provides a good basis for the spread of the influence and action of the liberation revolution, because the removal of the communist regime and liberation from Moscow imperialism will automatically end the war, eliminating all the slavery and misery brought by communism.

We have already mentioned some of the changes in the way warfare is conducted that nuclear, hydrogen and missile weapons impose. These changes are of considerable importance for revolutionary struggle, with a predominance of useful, though not equal, aspects. Revolutionary forces in armed struggle must use guerrilla and insurgent tactics. The basic principles and forms of this struggle have been tested in practical action many times and they remain important. The latest weapons also impose the need for large, regular armies to get closer together

to guerrilla tactics rather than positional warfare. In particular, it will be necessary to avoid large concentrations of troops, operating in fairly independent military formations. New wars that will be marked by thermonuclear weapons, even if only under the threat of them, cannot have old-style front lines. They will be marked by discontinuous and highly mobile, but extremely deep fronts. The boundary between the frontline and the backline zones will often be blurred, and only at long distances, inland, will the differences between them be visible. This applies to the grouping of military forces and the combat operations themselves.

In such conditions, it will be easier to conduct guerrilla warfare, and in particular revolutionary propaganda in the army, than it was before in the frontline areas, which are densely populated and thoroughly controlled by enemy forces. However, the depth of the new type of war zones has some disadvantages, as well as advantages. Nevertheless, it can be said that such zones will be more convenient than the old frontline zones, but more difficult than the usual zones of the backwater.

Changes in the way military groups and operations are organised are most important for revolutionary action within the army itself and for cooperation with individual units. Under these conditions, there will be easier access to military units and to the soldier. The internal control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs over the army in the frontline zone cannot be as tight as in another situation. And most importantly, there will be somewhat better opportunities for revolutionary actions of military units and their transition to the side of the liberation revolution.

New types of weapons raise another important question for the revolution during the war. Namely, to what extent will the revolutionary forces be able to fight with the new weapons and to what extent will the enemy be able to fight the liberation revolution with them? The main source of weapons for the revolutionary forces will be the Soviet army - its warehouses and supplies. The acquisition of weapons by various means is one of the most important and difficult tasks in the development of the revolutionary armed struggle. The Bolsheviks are trying to make it impossible by special measures. In peaceful conditions, they succeed to a large extent, because they can withdraw weapons, including ammunition, from the areas where insurgent units operate, leaving only the amount they need under their tightest control. But the situation is different in times of war, when troops in the frontline must have

place ammunition. Changes in military tactics dictated by new weapons and new mechanisation - in particular, the unusual depth of frontline zones and the widespread use of rear landing operations - would not allow the Bolsheviks to use the practice from the last war, when even frontline units outside of direct combat operations were left without ammunition.

This change in military conditions somewhat increases the ability of revolutionary forces to obtain ammunition in the frontline areas. Similar opportunities will open up in the areas through which supply routes to the front will pass and where strategic reserves and ammunition will be located. When the revolutionary military forces acquire weapons and ammunition from the Soviet army, they can expect to have access to the same weapons the Soviet army, including lighter modern weapons for wide tactical use. This will constitute, from this point of view, the main and most confident base that can be foreseen in the liberation struggle.

The second source of weapons, ammunition and other military supplies for revolutionary guerrilla forces could be supplies from the USSR's military enemies. From a technical point of view, this can be arranged during the war if there is an understanding and practical connection between the revolutionary forces and the relative powers. This question depends primarily on the whole military policy.

Therefore, for the revolutionary liberation forces, such a source of supply can only be an additional, auxiliary base.

The availability of weapons from the other side of the front is, under the right political conditions, of great importance to the revolutionary struggle. The most important thing is that these weapons can be adapted to the conditions and needs of guerrilla and insurgent operations, using the latest military inventions and improvements. The production of such special weapons should be included in the armaments plans of the respective states, since airborne, guerrilla and rear-guard operations will be increasingly used in modern warfare. Specialised modern weapons can give the fighting of revolutionary forces an extraordinary impact. They could destroy and paralyse important centres of Bolshevik power. This would be of great importance for the development and outcome of the revolutionary struggle and war.

When it comes to the enemy's use of modern weapons against revolutionary forces, it can generally be said that it cannot be decisive, because the practical possibilities are quite limited in this respect. The Bolsheviks will surely fight revolutionary military units and their actions with modern close combat weapons, which are provided for this purpose. However, the use of heavy modern weapons such as atomic bombs and large rocket launchers against revolutionary forces is not included in this consideration, since the enemy's own forces will also be operating in the areas where they operate.

Weapons of far-reaching mass destruction can only be used against completely hostile territories. Such a danger may become relevant when the liberation revolution wins in a certain larger area and cleanses it of hostile, Bolshevik forces and turns into a liberation war. By attacking a country that has already been liberated with a new foreign aggression, Moscow can attack it with all the means at its disposal. But this is a matter of a defensive war of an independent state, not a revolutionary struggle.

The modern tactical weapons that the Bolsheviks will use against the revolutionary military forces will be used more widely and will have more severe consequences the larger the concentration of these forces is under such fire. This circumstance makes it necessary to select appropriate tactics in the armed struggle. The revolutionary forces will be least exposed to large-scale devastating enemy attacks when they operate in small units that quickly conduct combat operations and disappear. Improved guerrilla tactics will therefore have the widest application as long as the enemy remains strong. The transition to insurgent tactics may be appropriate when there are prospects for holding the territory occupied, for successful defence against enemy overwhelming attacks, or for the insurgency to spread quickly to further parts of the country and people. In a protracted situation, when the first thing to do is to undermine the enemy's strength through long-term armed struggle and to mobilise more and more people to the revolutionary struggle, guerrilla tactics will be the most reliable - combined with broad political and revolutionary action in a single-minded struggle.

#### **IV**

When the independent forces of enslaved peoples consider the question of

war and the liberation revolution as the two factors that, if coordinated, could overthrow Bolshevism most quickly, these issues are often treated quite differently in Western political circles. There, interest in the cause of the anti-Bolshevik revolution, in connection the question of war, focuses on whether this revolution can protect the West from a Soviet war of aggression. Driven by the desire to avoid war, some Western circles view the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow as a factor that ties the Bolsheviks' hands and stops them from starting a major war. The inhibiting effect may be due to the fact that the actual revolutionary struggle is already absorbing the regime's attention and energy.

The very threat of a revolution breaking out in the post-Soviet world in a war situation also acts as a deterrent.

It is true that a revolutionary action, among other things, produces such consequences to some extent, but they do not belong to its main goal. The interest in the revolutionary and liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow from this angle alone cannot be considered truly friendly. For those factors who are interested in the anti-Bolshevik struggle only within the above-mentioned framework, the existence of revolutionary action is enough, and its final outcome is a matter of secondary importance to them. This attitude repeatedly turns into a desire for a state of equilibrium between the Bolshevik regime and the liberation and revolutionary forces.

Then the West would feel safe from Bolshevik aggression.

Still other political circles in the West wish the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow to be a complete success because a victory over Bolshevism would eliminate the greatest danger the West forever. But they would like to see the entire anti-Bolshevik struggle of the enslaved peoples carried out by their own forces and sacrifices, without the active assistance of the West. The Western powers would limit themselves to verbal expressions of sympathy. The same circles, however, exclude active intervention in this struggle - support for the enslaved peoples - because the revolution is of value to them when it frees the Western powers from war, not when it draws them into it.

This and other, completely negative attitudes in the West towards the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution are related to the issue of war. Some influential Western politicians believe that any revolutionary processes within the USSR could be the cause of



of Bolshevik military aggression against other states, and therefore undesirable. They justify these fears by saying that dictatorial totalitarian regimes repeatedly cause military conflicts in order to muffle and cover up internal difficulties. There is no need to dwell on such theses, because they are based on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism.

After all, the Bolsheviks know no moral laws and use the most horrific terror and repression indiscriminately to overcome their internal opponents. They do not need any justification of military necessity or to draw attention to external events.

Other western opponents of the anti-Bolshevik revolution, terrified of war, believe that the revolutionary and insurgent outbreaks of enslaved peoples make it necessary for the western powers to come to their aid actively, which would lead to a military confrontation with Moscow. This is what they fear most.

While ruling out active engagement on the side of the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution, they are also aware that a passive posture in a situation that requires active intervention and action is not to West's advantage. In fact, they do not want to make such a choice, which is conditioned by the anti-Bolshevik revolution.

A passive policy would have shown the inability of the Western powers to actively influence the development of the situation in the former Soviet Union and provide assistance to those forces that could direct the development of revolutionary processes in the USSR in the direction desired by all freedom-loving peoples. Failure to use this opportunity would indicate the West's weakness, which would further worsen its position against Bolshevik expansionist offensive.

In order to avoid a situation in which Western powers would be forced to take a clear position, the spokespersons of this trend would like the enslaved peoples to abandon their revolutionary struggle and embark on an evolutionary softening of relations in the Soviet bloc. Instead of the revolutionary overthrow of communism and Moscow's enslavement, they propose to find a way to cooperate with them in order influence their gradual liberalisation and evolution. This concept should be the goal of the policy of enslaved peoples. Only then could the Western powers support, in various ways, their efforts to

The Ukrainians have been able to achieve gradual emancipation without coming into direct conflict with Moscow.

There is no need to prove that such an attitude of some political circles in the West is completely harmful and unacceptable to liberation movements. But in favour of this direction, it should be noted that these political circles openly show their attitude to the fate of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, and therefore do not create any false hopes. In this respect, they have a clearer and more consistent line than those politicians who show commitment to the struggle of enslaved peoples but exclude any personal risk or sacrifice. Obviously, the independent policy of the peoples enslaved by Moscow cannot alone change the unfavourable attitude of some Western circles to the cause of the liberation revolution. This is because this direction is an integral part of the so-called coexistence policy, which must first of all show its inappropriateness and harmfulness for the Western states themselves in matters that violate their interests more directly and acutely than the case of the peoples enslaved by Moscow.

In our article, we focus on the areas of favourable attitudes towards the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle, for which the issue of military conflict with the USSR is the main driver or brake. In practice, both of these directions converge in the fact that commitment to the liberation cause of enslaved peoples cannot entail greater sacrifices for Western powers, and in particular cannot lead them to war with the USSR. This attitude has a predominant influence in Western politics, and the independent policy of enslaved peoples has the most to do with it.

The true value of such commitment to the liberation struggle has been demonstrated in living reality on many occasions, including a year ago during the Magyar uprising. Sympathy and compassion alone are not enough when it comes to practical support by free peoples for the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples. The armed struggle against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism requires comprehensive assistance from the outside. When a state declares its support, but quietly adheres to the principle that this support cannot pose a threat of war with the USSR, in practice this means that this support will not be available in the most crucial situation and in the most important sector, and the liberation revolution that counts on it will be let down and left to its own devices.

forces. It is enough for the Bolsheviks to threaten war, and the commitment to the revolutionary and liberation struggle on the part of states with such an attitude will be limited to verbal sympathy. For a people raising a liberation revolution, it is better to know the true situation at once, to rely only on their own strength, rather than to rely on unrealistic external assistance. Accordingly, the revolutionary movement either spreads its struggle on the basis of its own capabilities or holds back on the launch of an outright, armed uprising until the international situation is appropriate.

The fear of war with the USSR and the desire to avoid it at all costs is the factor that has always paralysed Western policy against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism, depriving it of initiative and determination in all the key issues of the modern international order. For this reason, various opportunities for cooperation between the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle of enslaved peoples and Western powers in their efforts to curb the further expansion of Moscow imperialism remain unused. The cooperation of external anti-Bolshevik forces and actions with internal forces operating in the USSR and its satellites, with appropriate tension, would lead to the defeat of Bolshevism-Communism, that is, to the elimination of slavery for the former and a constant threat to the latter. Therefore, the joint struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow and the still free, but already threatened by Bolshevik aggression, states is equally necessary for both. To deviate from it, relying on the other partner in the common destiny to bear its full burden, is harmful and irresponsible not only against the common cause, but also against one's own destiny.

The anti-Bolshevik revolutionary struggle is as important an auxiliary factor and a good opportunity for the Western powers to destroy Moscow-Soviet imperialism as their war with the USSR would be for the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples. The expedient use of such an opportunity by both sides is primarily due to the fact that by launching a simultaneous struggle, we divide the enemy's power into two fronts, internal and external. Neither one nor the other needs to be guided by altruistic motives, national egoism is enough as a driving force, if it is combined with a correct understanding of the situation and a steady historical

limb, which commands us to accept the struggle against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism and to wage it with the full force of our strength until final victory. When the Western peoples, and in particular their leading political circles, have a correct understanding of the situation and the tasks it dictates, then the proper interpretation of the war and the anti-Bolshevik revolution will come.

By supporting the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow by all means, Western powers can free themselves from the Bolshevik threat at a much lower cost than they will have to pay when the USSR itself gives them a choice: war or surrender. And support from the West can only be fully successful if it is the result of a firm decision to see the liberation cause through to victory and the defeat of Bolshevism-Communism by all possible means. The risk of war and Bolshevik threats cannot stop active assistance to the revolutionary struggle of the enslaved peoples. If Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism poses the Western powers with the steady prospect of an armed challenge, it is better for the West to take up the fight in a situation that is more favourable to it, when the Bolsheviks are busy on a second, domestic front, than to wait passively until Moscow itself chooses the most favourable time and circumstances to deal with the West.

If we think carefully about what a terrible enemy Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism is for all freedom-loving peoples and how much strength and sacrifice is needed to defeat it, then we can clearly see the madness of all the cowardly conceptions of those politicians who are looking for ways to get out of their share of the struggle so that other peoples will bear the burden and sacrifices of the anti-Bolshevik struggle without them. Such concepts, as we have already mentioned, include the interpretation of the anti-Bolshevik revolution only in terms of protecting the West from the Bolshevik war of aggression, that is, a limited commitment that ends where the risk of conflict with Moscow begins. Such directions are completely false and harmful both to the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples and to the correct policy of Western powers. Therefore, such concepts must be clearly and decisively opposed, which should be implied by the foreign policy of independence of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. Unfortunately, under this review, there are very respectable

Delusions. We often see the far-reaching adaptation of our own political tactics to the prevailing moods among the Western peoples, which leads to consequences contrary to the rationale of the liberation struggle. It is inexpedient and harmful to portray the issue of the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution in a wrong light, adapting it to the desires of the Western nations in order to win their sympathies.

Of course, Western society may like the hope that the peoples enslaved by Moscow will defeat Bolshevism through their own revolutionary struggle and free the West from the spectre of a terrible war. It is more acceptable to him to say that it is enough to support mainly foreign independence actions, and to give the regional struggle only such support as will not lead to a more serious conflict with Moscow. However, this approach ignores the most important question: what effect should such a policy have, and who benefits from it?

When our peoples themselves have to bear the brunt of the anti-Bolshevik struggle, when our liberation revolution has to rely on its own strength, then the verbal sympathies of the Western powers, passive observers, will have little influence on the development of the situation. Obviously, sympathy should not be neglected, but it should not be exaggerated. The external independence campaign should be aimed primarily at reaching a more important stage in the liberation struggle, at gaining real allies for the common struggle. This cannot be achieved by falsely portraying the case, because the result of such a course of action is only mutual disappointment. Revolutionary forces remain deceived if they count on the respectful assistance of foreign powers, which will be lacking at the most important, critical moment.

The independence forces must completely eliminate from the concept of their foreign policy work the thesis that the revolutionary anti-Bolshevik struggle will protect the Western powers from war with the USSR. This is not the task of the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, especially if the war situation can create more favourable conditions for its widespread deployment. Instead, our external action should awaken the awareness of the Bolshevik threat among all free peoples. It should point out that all free states will fall victim to Bolshevik military aggression if they remain passive to the ever-increasing strength and

greater expansion of Moscow's imperialism. A prerequisite for avoiding Bolshevik aggression is a decisive offensive policy of the Western powers and mutual support of all anti-Bolshevik forces in the world. The liberation revolution can then prevent the Bolsheviks from unleashing a war of aggression if the Western powers support it with all their might, treating it as a common struggle. To ensure that such support does not interfere with the victorious outcome, they cannot retreat at the risk of armed conflict with the USSR. An independent foreign policy cannot take the opposite position on this issue. But it has other strong arguments that are in line with the advice of the Western bloc states on the issue of war. For a conflict that would arise from active, armed support for the revolutionary struggle would be much smaller and easier for the West to deal with than a war imposed by Bolshevik aggression. In particular, when it comes to the use of nuclear, hydrogen and long-range missile weapons, the Bolsheviks would not have been able to fight with those means in a conflict related to the anti-Bolshevik revolution. In such a situation, states that actively assisted the liberation struggle would have been treated by all anti-Bolshevik forces as true allies. Revolutionary action would be aimed primarily at ensuring cooperation with them. Revolutionary action in the middle of the enemy camp would be the most successful way to spar the Bolshevik war machine. From this perspective, the anti-Bolshevik revolution can be a real safeguard against Bolshevik nuclear war if the Western powers decide to give it full support - including armed confrontation with the USSR if necessary.

It is not easy to put the matter in this way before outsiders, but only such frankness and clarity can produce lasting results that are truly useful and worthwhile for the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. The tile sympathies gained by deceptively portraying the liberation issue to suit the myopic desires of the Western public are of no use to the liberation cause. In addition to the foreign policy work of the independence forces, which are trying to open the eyes of the Western peoples to the true state of the situation and point out a way out of it, the developments that make the Western peoples feel the Bolshevik onslaught and threat more and more painfully are much more influential in this context. Our foreign policy action must be addressed first of all to those circles which already understand the difficulty of the situation and

are looking for the right solution, how to get out of it. It must constantly remember that to overcome Bolshevism, the forces of independent states and the peoples enslaved by Moscow must be united. No one can shy away from this struggle. Those who do not take part in it, that is, those who refuse to help other peoples who are on the first front of the struggle against Bolshevism, are exposed to the possibility that the front will come to their own borders, and then the struggle will be much more difficult. The peoples enslaved by Moscow want to coordinate their liberation struggle with the anti-Bolshevik actions of free peoples in order to jointly overcome Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism, which is the enemy of all mankind.

If the Western powers do not change their attitude towards the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples, then it will be impossible to form a common front of all anti-Bolshevik forces. In this case, it would still be possible to create such a common front during a war, sooner or later imposed on the Western powers by the Bolsheviks. Then the Western powers would bear the brunt of the struggle, and the enslaved peoples would be able to launch their revolutionary liberation campaign, adapting it to the development of military events according to their own expediency. A joint anti-Bolshevik front with the state nations would be most useful for the liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples, although the current policy of the Western powers does not favour its implementation, but future developments may be more useful in this regard. More than once, misfortune forces peoples to take the necessary path, which previously seemed too difficult and dangerous for them. But this is a question of future possibilities, not of the present reality.

Without abandoning their efforts to form a common anti-Bolshevik front with the free state peoples, the enslaved peoples must conduct their liberation struggle on their own in such forms and sizes as are possible and appropriate in each situation. External conditions and external forces can be an important factor in facilitating revolutionary and liberation struggles, but they do not decide on the possibility and expediency of the struggle itself. Under this perspective, the internal situation and internal processes in the post-Soviet countries are of primary importance. Although the Bolshevik system creates very difficult conditions for liberation revolutionary activity, it causes all

of the enslaved peoples and in all spheres of life there are so many anti-Bolshevik sentiments, aspirations and enzymes that the outbreak of a general liberation revolution must inevitably come.



## **For a wrapped-up political structure**

*This is the work of St. Bender's work is about the problem of political unification of all creative Ukrainian forces in a foreign land for comprehensive assistance to the warring Ukraine. The author touched upon this topic in his first article ("To the Problem of Political Consolidation") and returned to it over the years. Until his tragic death, he was convinced that an "Elective National Liberation Centre" could be created and made the leading centre of a close political action outside Ukraine, in which all independence, revolutionary and non-revolutionary forces could participate and which would be supported by the Ukrainian people. At the same time, this Centre, without pretending to be any kind of government or parliament of Ukraine, would be a spokesman for the independence and liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people before the free world.*

*The article "For a complete political structure" was published in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year V, pp. 1-2, 4, 6, 7, 8, January-February 1958, with the following subheadings for the individual parts: in part 4 - "For an elected National Liberation Centre"; in part 6 - "Possibilities of elections to the Foreign Centre"; in parts 7-8 - "An elected Centre is the most appropriate solution". Subsequently, these articles were published in a separate 20-page brochure under the title: "Stepan Bandera - For an Elected National Liberation Centre", Munich 1958, (reprinted from the magazine "The Way of Victory").*

*In , this article was published in the weekly "The Future of Ukraine", Toronto, Canada: "For a Complete Political Structure", part H, p. 25-1. 1958, "For an Elected National Liberation Centre", part 7, p. 8. 2. 1958, "Possibilities of Elections to the Foreign Centre", part 9, p. 22. 2. part 10, from 1. 3. and part 11 of 8. 3. 1958.*

The current state of Ukrainian political life in foreign countries is often the subject of critical scrutiny and a cause of discontent among the emigrant community. This is not without good reason. Ukrainian political activity abroad, its ideological and political level, and the tension in the field leave much to be desired.

Considering the state of Ukrainian political life abroad,

we have to consider two sets of questions. The first is the question of its ideological and political content, which permeates individual movements, environments and groups, their activities and the relationships between them. The second set covers the question of structure.

The ideological and political activities of individual movements and groups are the inherent content of their development, and at the same time they fulfil the content of the entire Ukrainian political life abroad. The ideological and political processes within Ukrainian political forces are also influenced by external circumstances, developments in the international situation, similar processes in other nations, and, in particular, the occasional interference of outside forces in the orbit of Ukrainian politics. However, the main significance is still the indigenous, basic ideological and political orientations of individual Ukrainian movements and environments. They are the ones who decide how each movement and group treats everything it deals with, how it perceives various external influences, and how it reacts to favourable and unfavourable developments in the world around it. When it comes to the original maturation of the ideological positions and political concepts of each environment, the interaction between them, and the significance of each of them in the whole structure of our political forces, the laws of organic development, not mechanical constructions, rule.

Therefore, any plans and measures to change or improve the ideological and political content of Ukrainian political life abroad should be directed towards the path that is inherent in this field - the path of direct ideological and political action. This applies equally to domestic and foreign policy and to the anti-Bolshevik front. Every political grouping that has its own ideology and political concept must confront them openly and directly in the whole process of Ukrainian political life. Because each environment considers its own ideology and political concept to be the right one and the most appropriate for the nation. That is why it competes for their fullest realisation in the liberation struggle, in relations with the outside world and in the internal formation of the Ukrainian people. This is the rationale for the existence of political movements and organisations. Along with positive activities towards the implementation of its ideology and political programme, every living political force

reacts simultaneously to the actions and influences of other forces, Ukrainian and foreign, which it encounters in its field of activity. In this way, each Ukrainian political factor determines its nature, gains a place and influence in the whole system of Ukrainian political forces, implementing its ideology and programme through its political activity. The ideological and political work of each political factor should be direct and immediate. In national life, each environment must perform its inherent function within the limits, forms and means that it can do on its own and that correspond to its actual influence in Ukrainian society. Every serious environment must operate under all internal and external conditions, regardless of other factors.

From this point of view, the structure of the whole political life should not have any influence on its ideological and political content. Structural relations affect only the forms and methods of ideological and political interaction between different political formations, but not the content itself. Therefore, we consider all projects and attempts to solve the issue of ideological and political content through structural combinations to be false. In particular, this category includes various concepts of erasing ideological and political differences and contradictions through structural and operational ties. This approach turns things around and indicates a disrespectful interpretation of ideological and political content in political life. Therefore, when we consider the issue of building Ukrainian political life in a foreign country, we do not treat it as a factor that should shape the qualitative content of this life.

But there are other important issues in Ukrainian politics for which the structure of the masses is of great importance. It is these issues that prompt us to raise this topic for discussion. We have three main aspects in mind:

Firstly, it is about making Ukrainian political life abroad and independent political activity more coherent and structured. This will greatly enhance their success and give them greater strength and resilience in facing external forces and in the fight against the enemy.

Secondly, a single-minded and complete structure of the political life of the masses will lead to a better channeling of the energy of the entire Ukrainian people to

foreign countries and directing them to independent political action. Such a structure would best bring together the unidirectional activity of all political forces on the anti-Bolshevik front and in defending the cause of the Ukrainian liberation struggle to the outside world.

Thirdly, the healthy development of national political life requires a general framework and forms for crystallisation, manifestation and verification of all its constituent phenomena and processes, from the angle of their national value and expediency. It is not only about the accumulation of homogeneous forces and phenomena, but also about a general framework for the development and manifestation of heterogeneous processes, including ideological and political distinctions and rivalries.

When it comes to the first aspect, there is probably no need to prove that, from this perspective, our contemporary political life in foreign countries, as a whole, has the greatest structural deficiencies. Individual ideological and political movements, organisations, parties, groups, or inter-party centres, with their broader or narrower structural bases and superstructures, cannot replace would bind them all together into one whole. This requires at least the most subtle but general framework of construction and an authoritative, representative end. As things stand today, from the outside, it appears that each established political environment conducts its own politics and political action, with political differences and convergences among them, but no structural linkage to a single whole, no common political representation.

In such a situation, even great political unanimity is no substitute for a structurally formed united front, and any differences acquire a significantly increased foreign policy significance.

External factors have the opportunity to interfere in domestic political affairs from afar. Hostile foreign forces take advantage of this situation and, referring to it, try to neglect or degrade the Ukrainian cause. And even its supporters among foreigners believe that the appearance of Ukraine's breakdown is a major obstacle to treating Ukrainians as a full-fledged political partner.

This foreign policy aspect is the most important obstacle to the need to improve our current situation. It is not about eliminating or

concealment of ideological and political differentiation in Ukrainian political life from the outside world. It is also not a question of having only one representative factor in foreign policy activity, and of excluding individual organisations and groups from direct activity in that area. As in domestic Ukrainian politics and on the anti-Bolshevik front, so also in foreign policy work and foreign relations, it is impossible and unnecessary to create any restrictions or obstacles to the structural order for political forces. It is only necessary for each factor to act and perform in its inherent role, which it really plays in the structure of Ukrainian political forces. Even in nation-states, in addition to governmental external relations, there are various connections and interactions of political organisations and parties with the outside world.

The structure of our political life abroad should only to some extent correspond to some sectors of the state organisation but it imitate it. It has neither the prerequisites nor the capacity to do so. But we can adapt the essential principles of the organisation of political life in democratic states to our conditions and create our own forms of unanimous and complete construction for the entire Ukrainian political life in exile and for all nationally independent actions.

This would allow us to mobilise the considerable energies and resources of the entire emigration, of which only a part has so far served national political action. A significant part of Ukrainian citizenship in a foreign land shies away from active participation in and support for political independence work. The most frequent motive, or justification, for this attitude is political disunity. This is why those actions that have a national, liberation and independent character in their purpose, content and design, rather than a group character, and which, as a result of our political system, must be organised and led by a single political environment, are very tolerated.

In this view, separate agreements by different or even all groups for joint actions would not help much. Such separate agreements are not very functional, they do not change the internal

situation, nor the instruction of an entire citizenship. Moreover, the existing ideological and political differences and contradictions always remain the same. This will continue to be the case, because changes in this area occur only through their own organic development, not through mechanical measures. Structural solutions also have mechanical elements, but with the right approach, they bring an orderly system into the whole.

In fact, we are talking about a general structure of our political life that would fully take into account the internal political reality, rely on this reality, and not try to move above it to the agenda. It is not a question of erasing ideological and political-conceptual distinctions and rivalries with a general structure. On the contrary, these drivers of political life and development must have their proper place and field of expression within it. The framework structure of the whole cannot neither level nor stop the development and activities of individual movements, organisations and groups. It must be built on such principles and in such forms as to provide a framework, a possibility of development and manifestation for all creative, dynamic and nationally useful concepts and movements, so that they can combine their own development with their contribution the national liberation struggle.

When the entire political life and activities of all political environments are based on a common structural framework that also covers the entire political differentiation and processes of political rivalry, then all those affairs, efforts and actions that are of a national character and stand outside the boundaries of differentiation will automatically be summed up in it. The result of such an organisation and mechanics of our political life will be a reflected unanimity in fundamental matters, and at the same time, independent political action will be significantly strengthened in practice. It will mobilise the energy of the general Ukrainian population in a foreign land on a much larger scale than before.

The general situation of the Ukrainian liberation cause and, in particular, the state of our political life and independent action in foreign lands, put on the agenda the burning need to establish a Ukrainian National Liberation Centre abroad by means of general elections. Such a centre and elections to it, as a normal, not exceptional, institution, should give Ukrainian political life a closed and complete structure. This will be followed by the consolidation of this life and

The success of its external action, and the extent to which structural improvements have had an impact in this regard.

Everyone feels the lack of one common National Liberation Centre abroad and understands the need for its existence, so there is no need for argumentation here. There is also no need to go into detail about its tasks, it is enough to outline the most important ones.

The main task of the Centre will be to pursue Ukrainian independence policy and national liberation activities in foreign lands. This does not mean launching an entirely new political activity, as if it had never existed before. Nor is it a question of taking over the national liberation and political work that has been carried out by existing political organisations and groups for a number of years. In this respect, the newly created centre should not be a successor, a rival, or any kind of hindrance to active political and liberation forces, and to their development and activities. But the distinction of Ukrainian political life abroad, both in terms of ideology, political and conceptual, as well as in terms of domestic and foreign political activity, requires the presence of one common centre.

Its first task will be to carry out independent political work that is outside the scope of our political differentiation. This Centre should initiate and conduct such political actions that are nationwide in nature, that reflect the unanimous attitude of all Ukrainian national political forces in their direction and content, and that have the support of the general Ukrainian population in foreign countries. This centre will coordinate such initiatives and actions of individual political organisations and groups that are of national importance and deserve the support of other political environments. In this way, the National Liberation Centre should unite and lead the unanimous struggles and actions of all national political forces.

This will greatly strengthen the independent political activity and multiply its successes. In addition to merging the already activated forces, the dynamics of the common national liberation front will capture and activate new energies of Ukrainians in foreign lands, including

those who have become indifferent to the Ukrainian liberation cause.

However, the political initiative and activities of the Centre cannot be limited by the line of absolute unanimity of all political environments existing abroad and in Ukraine. This principle, inherent in inter-party coordination centres, makes them too weak, incapable of proactive and energetic action, because every disagreement creates an alternative: either the conspiracy will break down or there will be inactivity in controversial matters. In contrast, a National Liberation Centre that stems from elections rather than inter-party collusion will have a firmer foundation. The very outcome of the elections defines its political face and determines its political line. The Electoral Centre must be guided by the will of the majority and act in accordance with it. This gives it, its policies and activities greater efficiency, the ability to initiate and make decisions regardless of intergroup relations, while maintaining the proper character of the policies and actions of the National Liberation Centre, not of individual political environments.

On the other hand, this does not exclude or paralyse the political activity of a minority, which can freely express its position and act on it, but only in its own name and under its own responsibility. This distinction is of great importance in political life, both internally and externally.

One of the main tasks of the Centre will be to authoritatively represent and advocate for the independence aspirations and liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation to the outside world. It is precisely the lack of one authoritative, universally recognised culmination and representative of Ukrainian independence in foreign lands that makes it necessary to create a Foreign National Liberation Centre.

Its foreign policy activities should not neglect the extensive work of the political forces already operating in that area. Where this work is in line with its policy, the Centre will rely on it and at the same time give it a boost and completion. In cases of divergence, a clear distinction will be drawn, even for external factors: here is the all-Ukrainian, official independent policy represented and led by the National Liberation Centre, and there are individual political positions, concepts and actions of political organisations and groups that speak only in their own name.



The definition of the tasks of the Foreign National Liberation Centre, and thus its character and prerogatives, must correspond to the real reality, the state and situation of the integrity of Ukrainian political life and the liberation struggle, and the requirements that follow. It is necessary to accept such tasks that the Foreign Centre can and should actually perform and not to ascribe to it distant nominal prerogatives that depend on future development. The role and significance of a political work in the future depends primarily on its actual development and work, not on the initial statutory definitions.

The attitude of the Foreign Centre to the revolutionary liberation forces in Ukraine, to their struggle and actions must be consistent with the fact that the national struggle is of primary and decisive importance in the integrity of the liberation struggle. Therefore, the Foreign Centre should stand in solidarity with it and fully support it, considering its foreign activities to be a complement to the liberation struggle in the homeland. The question of specific relations and cooperation must be resolved depending on the practical conditions at the time.

The direct structural connection of the Foreign Centre with the liberation forces and bodies operating in Ukraine is not relevant. In today's conditions, it would be more theoretical than practical. In this regard, the issue of structural hierarchy also disappears. If, under changed conditions, real life puts this issue on the agenda, then political reality will also show the most appropriate solution. At the present stage, the fact that the struggle in Ukraine cannot be managed from abroad is decisive, just as it is impossible to manage foreign activities from the Krai. Both branches of the independence and liberation campaign must develop and operate autonomously. It is important that the political unity between them is preserved.

And the Foreign Centre will fulfil its tasks under this review if its policy and activities consolidate and manifest to the outside world the political unity of the regional and foreign independence forces and actions. Maintaining closer, operational ties between the region and abroad will continue to be the task of the revolutionary liberation organisation, which has been doing this all along, simultaneously conducting its activities in the Ukrainian lands and abroad.

The Overseas National Liberation Centre shall not assume the attributes of a state government, pre-parliament, or any other state body. It should act in a manner determined by its inherent tasks and its actual activities. If the Foreign Centre is nominated and fully supported by the entire Ukrainian society in a foreign land and the main political forces, and is based on the liberation struggle in the homeland, it will have a position and competencies that are fully sufficient to fulfil all its tasks. Instead, adopting the marks of a state body would not increase the prominence and authority of this Centre, but rather the opposite, and would put it in a false position. For when a political factor ascribes to itself a role and competence that in no way corresponds to its actual position, it casts a shadow of fictitiousness over it and obscures its true value and capabilities.

In this article, we will not deal with the question of whether the consequences of maintaining and forming exile state bodies have a cost for the preservation of state traditions. For us, the starting point is the indisputable fact that an independent Ukrainian state can only be won through the consistent struggle of an entire nation, and cannot be achieved by the strongest legal claims and arguments. Experience, our own and that of other nations, teaches us that exile governments play a prominent political role only for a short time after leaving for a foreign land, but in a protracted liberation struggle for a long term goal, they prove to be unsuitable as leadership centres. This is understandable, because every political factor must have structural foundations and forms adapted to its actual action. The functions of state organisation and state bodies are different from those of organisations and bodies of the liberation struggle. Comparisons as to which system of political organisation of the people is higher and more valuable - the state system or the liberation and revolutionary system - are completely inappropriate. Each of them is correct and necessary in its place, but equally unsuitable when it is used as a substitute for the other, applied in an inappropriate situation where the other is needed.

If the Foreign Centre is to play a useful role in Ukraine's liberation struggle, its nature and structure must be adapted to its inherent tasks. It cannot be a creation of

claims to universality, with dual foundations structure, policy and action. On the other hand, it cannot become an organ of direct revolutionary liberation action, including its leadership.

The formation of the leadership of the liberation revolution is the work of a revolutionary organisation that itself conducts direct struggle and mobilises the entire nation.

The National Liberation Centre Abroad should be the leading centre of that national political action outside the homeland in which all independence forces, revolutionary and nonrevolutionary, can participate, and which will be actively supported by the general Ukrainian society in foreign countries in order to contribute to the successful completion of the national liberation struggle. In conjunction with this, the Foreign Centre, relying on its political unity with the liberation struggle in Ukraine and on its own work, speaks to the outside world as a spokesman for the independence and liberation struggle of the entire Ukrainian people.

By proposing the project of establishing a National Liberation Centre abroad through general elections for consideration by Ukrainian citizens in foreign countries, we mean not only the lack and need for such a Centre, but also the conclusion from the development to date that various attempts to fill this gap in other ways have been unsuccessful.

Putting forward the concept of the Overseas National Liberation Centre, we present a project for the creation and maintenance of this Centre on the basis of general elections. Elections are a basic and integral part of the whole plan. Knowing that the project of holding general elections is not favoured by some political groups, we consider it necessary to put it under consideration and discussion not only by political organisations, parties and groups, but also by the entire Ukrainian citizenship in foreign lands. After all, this is a matter in which the Ukrainian public is directly interested and which is of great importance for the further development of not only internal Ukrainian political life, but the entire foreign independence movement.

In expressing our views on the possibility of postponing the general elections, we will basically follow the order which the relevant measures should be alternated in practice.

First, political groups need to agree on a plan

transfer of elections. This is not to say that all political environments should be unanimous, which would be desirable, but not necessary. The practice of our political life has shown that it is very difficult to find unanimity among all groups, and every case that should be based on such unanimity drags on forever and often ends in failure. We must take into account the fact that various groups will try by all means to prevent the elections from taking place, so that the will of the general Ukrainian citizenship in a foreign land does not find a clear expression and does not establish a binding order. Therefore, the affairs of the elections and the Foreign Centre should not be dependent on narrow party egoism and combinations of various political groups and individuals, which, if the principle of absolute unanimity were applied, would be able to torpedo the elections. When the general Ukrainian patriotic citizenship in a foreign country understands and supports the concept of elections, the position of those parties and groups that fear the verdict of their own society in elections and would like to prevent it from happening will no longer matter. If Ukrainian political life in a foreign land begins to be normalised through general elections, then each group will face an inevitable alternative: either to join the new order and seek a place in it, or to remain outside its framework and behind it.

Therefore, first of all, an understanding is needed among those political organisations and groups and socio-political organisations and societies that, while supporting the project of establishing a Foreign Centre through general elections, would be willing and able to take the initiative in its implementation. In this understanding, more precise arrangements would have to be made on such specific issues that need to be resolved before the elections are held. Since there is no other competent factor that can resolve these matters, they, as initiators, must make these necessary pre-decisions by way of agreement. For better maturity and credibility of such preliminaries, it would be advisable to present the most important issues and draft solutions in the press for public information and discussion, and to discuss them at separate meetings. Agreed preliminaries of the initiators should be limited to such issues as the Centre and the elections, which of course must be settled in advance.

The final approval of the charter of the Foreign Centre, the election of its head (president), presidium and other bodies, the establishment of its structure and the distribution of functions will be up to its constituent assembly after the elections. However, more important matters should be planned in advance as a basis for the elections. This includes, among other things, the following issues: the Centre's tasks, the principles of its structure, the duration of one term, the rights and obligations of the elected members of the Centre, and their number. This last question requires a precise solution before the election, and its solution must be consistent with the envisaged tasks, structure and mode of operation of the Centre.

The Ukrainian National Liberation Centre Abroad (which, for the sake of simplicity and, of course, conventionally, will be referred to as the UZNLC) could be elected for a period of approximately five years. As the head and representative of the liberation political action abroad, the Centre should, in our opinion, consist of two main bodies. All the members of the USNWC would form a general body with legislative prerogatives, which would work in sessions and commissions. It will be responsible, among other things, for determining the general guidelines and policies of the Centre, determining the structure and composition of the executive body, electing and dismissing its chairman and members, reviewing and evaluating its activities and deciding on other fundamental matters. The executive body (Executiva), called by and responsible to the plenary of the entire Foreign Centre, would be responsible for the operational management of the Centre's activities and policies. The Executiva of the Foreign Centre (we use this term loosely) should have such resort departments (referents) that cover specific areas of the Centre's real activities, and not exist only on paper to imitate state ministries. The reference departments are managed by members of the Executive Board. The Executives are headed by a chairman elected by the Centre's plenary. The members of the Centre's Executives should also be appointed by the plenary on the proposal of the elected Chairman of the Executives.

With such a structural and operational division, the Foreign Centre cannot be too large in number, lest it become a paper body that is not functional in practice. In this regard, we cannot imitate state parliaments. We have to take into account our real conditions, and therefore the number of elected members of the UCIPR as a central body should not exceed three, at most five dozen.

At the same time, the requirements for candidates for the UCIPR membership should include such clauses that would assure the real possibility of their participation in meetings and work of the Centre in the place where its main seat will be. This should also be the subject of coordinated decisions of the initiating political environments.

The structure of the NECC and the elections to it could simultaneously incorporate the creation of elected National Regional Committees in countries with a larger Ukrainian population, including in complexes of countries such as Western Europe and South America. The National Committees would have similar tasks to the NECCs, at a lower level and with a narrower scope. Politically and operationally, the Country Committees would recognise the primacy of the RRNVCentre. In the approval of generally binding resolutions and in the resolution of fundamental matters of Ukrainian political life, the Regional Committees should have an advisory or co-decisive vote.

The issue of the Regional Committees is only touched upon as an eventuality, not as an integral part of the whole project, and should be considered in relation to the situation and needs of individual countries. In some cases, it may be advisable to restructure existing similar institutions on the basis of general elections. If elected Country Committees were to be established, they would be elected at the same time as the Overseas Centre, but from separate lists and separate ballots in each country, including in country complexes.

Further agreements between the initiating political and socio-political organisations should establish the principles of the election itself, which should be formalised in the election rulebook. This includes, among other things, the following issues: active and passive election management; legal, organisational and technical norms for the transfer of elections and the consolidation of voting results; approval and calling of election bodies; and definition of terms. In this article, we try to gradually outline solutions to the most important of these issues to the extent necessary to clarify the real possibilities of the whole plan.

Every adult Ukrainian who has active voting rights and is not burdened with national, public or personal (criminal) offences is entitled to become a member of the UCEC.

Political and socio-political organisations and groups can nominate candidates. Under this overview, no restrictions can be placed from above, because every organisation that nominates candidates for elections defines itself as a political organisation. It is also necessary to allow for the creation of ad hoc groups to nominate and support candidates and to defeat individual candidates. It would be advisable to establish a rule that, in addition to the candidate's application and management, a certain number of signatures of the managed voters who support the candidate is required to accept the candidacy, see the candidate list.

Voting for lists best suits our conditions, and this system should be used as a basis. Voting for individual candidates from the same list could also be combined with it. But this issue requires a comprehensive discussion, taking into account inter-party agreements on joint lists. On both coalition and single-party lists, not only members of these environments can run for office, but also other people who agree to jointly defend the political concept of the list of candidates.

Another important decision to be agreed upon by the initiators of the elections will be the appointment of the electoral bodies. These should be: The Central Election Commission. Regional Election Commissions, one in each state where Ukrainians live, and Local Election Commissions - in the main centres of large concentrations of Ukrainian emigrants and settlers.

The Main Election Commission, as the highest electoral body, will have the following tasks, among others: to receive nominations of candidates and candidate lists; to receive candidate statements (the text of which must be pre-approved) and verify the management of each candidate; to officially announce the submitted and verified candidate lists, giving them numerical designations; to approve the previously agreed electoral rulebook and monitor its observance; to determine and announce the beginning and end of elections; to consider and decide any proposals and protests against the list of candidates; to

This will be further).

Regional Election Commissions manage the transfer of elections in their respective countries. In accordance with the general electoral rulebook, and within the timeframes and norms set by the Chief Election Commission, they establish specific arrangements for the transfer of elections, taking into account the conditions of the country. The Provincial Commissions convene Local Election Commissions, supervise their activities and accept election results from them; consider and resolve complaints and protests in the management of the polls, the election campaign and the transfer of elections in the provinces, and transmit feedback to the Main Commission. The Regional Commissions collect, verify and summarise the results of the voting and forward them to the Main Commission.

The Local Election Commissions will verify and check each voter's voting record; conduct the local elections by accepting votes cast in person or sent by post and voting-related fees; and, after the polls close, hand over everything to the National Election Commission.

Thus, the Election Commissions will be entrusted with a great public and political responsibility and the main burden of the practical transfer of elections. This work, in particular, the organisational and technical preparation and transfer of elections at the level of Local and Regional Commissions, should involve various civil society institutions that can greatly assist the Commissions.

The Main and Regional Election Commissions can call to life those political organisations that initiate elections themselves, or they can ask central public, religious and scientific institutions to do so at a joint meeting. The Main and Regional Election Commissions should include prominent and well-known citizens, figures from various spheres of national life, who will guarantee the conscientious fulfilment of their tasks. Members of political organisations and parties cannot be members of election commissions. Instead, groups that submit their own lists of candidates to the Central Election Commission should delegate their trusted men to the Election Commissions, without the right to cast a decisive vote.

The appointment of the Election Commissions ends the first, preparatory stage, in which the main work was carried out by political and socio-political



Organisations and parties initiating the elections. The Election Commissions take over the further conduct and conclusion of the elections to the PECs.

Political groups continue to play their inherent role during elections, selecting candidates, putting forward candidate lists, developing their election campaign plans, and drawing up their political election programmes. Election campaigns of all groups and candidates are launched. Each grouping addresses the entire citizenry in written and spoken word, in the press, at meetings, with reports, and with individual explanations of its ideology, programme and political concepts, its understanding of the current issues of the national liberation struggle and independent policy, its successes and contributions to date, and its plans and projects for the future.

This will greatly revitalise domestic political life, and the negative manifestations and consequences of intergroup polemics will be levelled out by creating a clear pattern of political forces in the wake of the elections. The important thing is that the entire Ukrainian patriotic citizenship, which has a healthy and sensitive political instinct, will not be a passive listener and observer of everything that political groups are saying this time. It will have the best opportunity to express its condemnation and choose who, what concepts and actions, which groups and people, and to what extent should have its trust and support.

The pre-election propaganda campaign of the groups will simultaneously mobilise the Ukrainian public, every person, to political activity. Participation in the elections to the Foreign Centre will be a manifestation of active support for the national liberation cause. In an attempt to win as many votes as possible, political groups cannot limit themselves to campaigning for activated people, because these people, of course, already have their own political sympathies. Campaigning must be directed primarily at the masses of people who stand aside from organised national life, awakening in them a desire to participate in it. This will benefit not only this environment, but also the entire independent political action.

The main stage comes next - the elections themselves, which should be simultaneously in all countries of settlement and residence of Ukrainians outside

the encroachment of Bolshevik power. Given the conditions of life and work in exile, a longer period of time should be allowed for the elections. Voting is best done by ballot cards, on which all the candidate lists will be presented. Each voter will receive one ballot paper from the Local Election Commission (for the Overseas Centre and eventually for the Regional Committee), mark the list of candidates for he/she is voting in a standardised manner, and then cast it in a ballot box or send it to the Election Commission.

The broadest possible number of Ukrainians should participate in the elections to the UCEC. The right and civic duty to vote is exercised by every adult person who is recognised as belonging to the Ukrainian nationality (regardless of current state affiliation) and who contributes to a foreign action in favour of the liberation of Ukraine. These requirements for the right to vote must be fulfilled by each voter and approved by the voter when he or she is admitted to the polls. People of Ukrainian origin who have joined a hostile, anti-Ukrainian camp, e.g., the Communist or Moscow camp, are not eligible to vote.

All possible and credible evidence should be admitted to prove affiliation with Ukrainians. For example, lists of members of various institutions, membership certificates and all kinds of certificates, testimonies of trusted witnesses, . Voter registration is the responsibility of the Local Election Commissions, which carry it out in cooperation with Ukrainian organisations and institutions on the ground. The pre-registration of managed voters cannot exclude the admission of persons who have not been registered in advance, as is the case in national elections.

The second essential prerequisite for active suffrage is that each voter must have made some contribution to a foreign national liberation campaign. This prerequisite is quite understandable if we bear in mind that we are talking about elections to the governing and representative centre of such an action, not about state elections. The question of what Ukrainian foreign national liberation action and policy should be like and who should lead it can be decided by those Ukrainians who themselves contribute to this cause and actively support it. At the same time, we are talking about the broadest, most general framework possible, so that as many people as possible can join in the active support of the cause of Ukraine's liberation and give

The UCPNV Centre needs to build the broadest possible base through mass participation in the elections. To do this, we need to adopt a general, fairly simple and specific criterion that can be applied in elections.

For a practical solution to this issue, we propose the following draft: each voter pays a self-assessment tax to the Election Commission in the amount established for all voters for the operating fund of the URPI and for the costs of the election. Only in cases of inability to pay the self-assessment, the Election Commission may grant partial or full exemption on the basis of a reasoned proposal. The level of self-taxation should be regulated by the electoral rulebook on a uniform basis for all countries.

The payment of self-taxation during elections should not be a symbolic act, but a real donation to support the national liberation activities to be carried out by the Overseas Centre. This self-taxation has the meaning that each voter, by participating in the decision on the composition of the OCNEC and the direction of its activities, takes on a part of the common burden and makes the activities of the chosen Centre possible. Financial means are not everything for an independent political action. But they are one of the most important factors, especially when it comes to foreign work and to maintaining political independence in the activities and policies of the Foreign Centre.

The final result of the election will be summarised by the Central Election Commission and will establish the distribution of mandates. The key number to this distribution will be the number of votes per mandate. This number will be obtained by dividing the total of all the important votes cast by the number of elected mandates that will be set in advance by the agreed electoral rule, as discussed here.

The number of mandates assigned to each candidate list is calculated by dividing the number of votes received by the list in the election by the key number. The division of votes into individual lists results in surplus votes, i.e. the number of votes that is less than the key number and therefore not enough to obtain a mandate with the required quorum. For the same reason, after dividing the mandates by the full quorum (i.e., the key number), several mandates may remain. These remaining mandates are

is divided one by one into those lists that have the largest surplus votes. It does not matter whether a list has already received mandates in the distribution by full quorum or not. The distribution of the remaining mandates is decided only by the alternating number of extra votes.

We do not write about the generally accepted rules for the transfer of elections, such as secret ballots, etc., as we consider it self-evident that they are applied as far as practicable.

The project of creating an elected Foreign Centre aims to structurally complete Ukrainian political life abroad and at the same time strengthen its entire structure by introducing a system of general elections as a foundational, periodic institution.

We are convinced that this is the most successful way to eliminate the worst anomalies of a lifetime, which can be called emigration structural diseases.

No political grouping can develop and operate normally without the ground under its feet. The basis for political life is a direct connection with the people, working among them. This is what most political groups in foreign lands lack. On the one hand, they would like to look like political groups and institutions in normal conditions, but on the other hand, not having, by force of circumstances, a living connection with their native lands, they have not been able to put down roots at least among the emigrant society. As a result, some political groups do not live, develop or work, but by their half-dead existence poison the political atmosphere and distort the appearance of our entire political life. Once again, other groups are trying to replace their groundlessness with foreign support and use this base to gain influence in Ukrainian political life. This leads to its dependence on foreign forces and influences.

When political groups do not base their existence on a common basis - their own citizenship, do not care about the expression of the political will of the general public, but arrogate to themselves the right to make the highest decisions on its behalf without it, it is impossible to organise the whole of political life. In this case, party arrogance is , and the principle of "equal to the lowest" prevails in intergroup mutual and joint actions.

The introduction of general elections as a normal institution in our political life abroad would be the most appropriate means to eliminate these anomalies. Elections establish a general ordering principle that assigns to each grouping a position in the overall structure, in proportion to its influence and importance, among the citizenry. What is most important is what the whole society decides as an arbiter, and political environments must accept its decisions as binding. This would force them to face their own society and earn its recognition and trust with their values, work and achievements, instead of speculating on petty inter-party combinations, intrigues and foreign interventions. Then intergroup rivalry must have a more serious meaning and operate on real values, based on the actual situation, and not revolve in a vicious circle of self-esteem, self-promotion and the ideas of certain environments about their unverifiable values, their exceptional importance and exile.

It would, of course, be a mistake to idealise the political maturity of the emigrant community as a whole and to attribute absolute and infallible correctness to all its decisions. However, recent decades have shown that our people usually choose the right path when it is indicated by political leadership. Thus, the Ukrainian emigration is guided by a healthy national instinct and supports liberation actions and a consistent policy of independence. When there are manifestations of false orientation and wrong attitudes among our citizenship, it is usually the parties themselves that are to blame.

One of the main tasks of political groups is to work among the public, to work on its political development.

If the elections give impetus to such activities, then there will be undeniable benefits. Although different groups will provide the public with both healthy and harmful ideas, correct and incorrect concepts, true and false information, we can hope that in the end, all that is healthy and in line with the needs and best characteristics of the nation will prevail. And the ideological and political attitude of the people is the main issue of liberation and the entire future of the nation. Therefore, good work and healthy competition in this area are the most important in all political work.

This also applies to political activity among Ukrainians in

It is a part of the entire Ukrainian nation and has important tasks in the liberation struggle. It also creates an organic national soil for the existence and development of Ukrainian political life in a foreign land. Therefore, the good cultivation of this soil is the main task of political organisations. The introduction of the institution of general elections in our political life abroad will be very useful for it. In particular, because general elections revitalise the interaction between citizenship and political environments and at the same time specify its outcome.

Opponents of the elections use the so-called assertion that the emigration and the "average" emigrant do not have the right to choose a political centre that would lead Ukrainian political action abroad and represent the Ukrainian liberation cause before a foreign court. The centre, they say, is called by general elections in a foreign land, can only lead and represent the emigration itself, but cannot act and speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people. This statement is further supported by the argument that the composition of our emigration is too one-sided in terms of territorial origin and that emigration cannot stand in for the affairs of the whole nation. These arguments against the elections are intended to defend the thesis that the UPRada and its Executive Body are and must remain the only full-fledged political centre abroad.

The question of the role and competences of emigration cannot be considered in the abstract, as the answers will vary from case to case. Since the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism were deprived of any ability to freely express their will, their emigrants have much greater political obligations than in other cases. The emigrants must make full use of the freedom and opportunities that the people do not have in their own land and work with all their might in various fields, including national liberation and political action. Emigrants' obligations are determined primarily by the needs of the nation, the circumstances in the homeland and the capabilities in the foreign country.

Whether a particular emigration, as a whole or as a part of it, is a political emigration or not depends primarily on its current state and activities, and less on the reasons for its departure from the homeland. An emigration that was initially only labour and settlement can become political if it engages in national and political work in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the whole nation. Similarly, the former political emigration

ceases to be such if it does not fulfil the relevant political objectives. In this respect, the function is more important than the genesis itself.

According to our project, all Ukrainian politically active citizens abroad should be able to vote for the Foreign Centre. The very participation in such elections defines each voter as a member of the national, political emigration, because people who are indifferent to national and political affairs will not participate in the elections. Furthermore, not participating in elections is inextricably linked to a concrete testimony by each voter that he or she is taking on a part of a common national duty.

It should be remembered that the election, the establishment of the elected Foreign Centre, as well as the entire foreign political action, have one goal: to serve the Ukrainian nation, in particular its liberation struggle, and for it to gather, organise and use the energy, means and all the forces of Ukrainians abroad as successfully as possible. It is the duty of every person of Ukrainian blood to serve his or her homeland, in particular when it is fighting for its existence and freedom in the struggle against the worst enemy of all mankind, regardless of whether he or she has a second, eliminated homeland or not. If only everyone would be willing to fulfil this duty and sacrifice the appropriate part of their strength and labour for it. All organised national forces, and political forces in particular, should take care of this.

From this point of view, the territorial origin of emigrants is not of fundamental importance. The circumstances in which the Ukrainian people are waging their liberation struggle oblige every Ukrainian to perform those functions for which they have greater capacity than the rest of the nation. None the Ukrainian patriots in Ukraine would depend on the role of emigration in the free struggle on territorial origin, considering such an approach to be completely inappropriate. On the contrary, the Ukrainian people under Bolshevik occupation hope and expect that the entire Ukrainian community in a foreign land will unite in the strongest and most comprehensive liberation action possible. There have been repeated regional calls for emigration in this regard.

Some political groups in foreign countries have a completely different approach to foreign political action. They view it not from the point of view of a duty against the liberation cause, but only from the angle of

Acquiring the right to political leadership and representation, not only in the context of the current foreign action, but primarily for the future, in the Ukrainian Independent State. For them, every political activity should be a rebound (springboard) to gain the most favourable group and personal positions.

This attitude is particularly harsh and harmful when it comes to the formation of a political centre. The question of representation, of the largest and most exclusive prerogatives, is put first, even though they usually remain on paper. If there is a centre, there must be a government with a president and ministers. And most importantly, such a centre should automatically become the first, at least temporary, parliament and government in the Ukrainian state. When such questions, devoid of political relevance and real content, push the demands of vivid political activity and try to move to an agenda over the current factors of the liberation struggle, over its driving ideas and forces, this clearly shows that some people are not concerned with serving the liberation cause, but only with its political use. This understanding of this problem also leads to the denial of the right of the emigration to choose the Foreign Centre, as if it was created with the aim of being a government in Ukraine, establishing binding laws in the future Ukrainian state, and not to lead and conduct the foreign liberation campaign with the united efforts of all Ukrainians in a foreign land, and in unity with the liberation struggle in the native lands.

The project of creating a Foreign Centre by means of general elections will probably meet with the strongest resistance in the circles of the UNRada. The parties united in it stand on the position that the Ukrainian National Rada and its Executive Body create a State Centre, which is the only one competent to lead and represent the Ukrainian independence struggle.

In reality, the UNRada has long been an inter-party centre for the groups that participate in it. Apart from supporting these groups, it has no other basis, both structurally and politically. This is a political fact that is already too well known and has been confirmed by the whole development to the point where it is no longer necessary to challenge or prove it. In view of this situation, the resistance of the UPRad factions to the creation of an elected Foreign Centre on a much broader



basis and with different tasks than those actually performed by the UNRada would not be justified. After all, a part of political groups cannot create their own inter-party centre and recognise the competence of the State Centre, while at the same time denying the right of Ukrainian society in a foreign country, together with political groups, to form a functioning Foreign Centre through general elections.

We delayed for a long time in putting forward the project of an elected Foreign Centre so as not to create even more disorder in our political life. But one day, eventually, this matter would have to be moved forward and settled. Because the need for a functioning National Liberation Centre abroad will become more and more urgent, and it would be inappropriate to postpone this matter until the last moment, when events will force us to hurry. As for the Ukrainian National Rada, we see no prospects for it to reform itself accordingly, to direct its political orientation and structure so as to fulfil the tasks of the National Liberation Centre Abroad.

To the extent that the UNRad initially had political credibility among the public and had chances to become a serious centre, it wasted and destroyed them. The first thing that fundamentally undermined its moral and political value was the negative attitude of most of the UNR Rada's parties to the revolutionary liberation struggle in Ukraine and its formation, the OUN-UPA-UGWR. Instead of supporting the struggle and using it as a basis for relevant foreign work, the UNRada took a course of neglecting it and thus confirmed its worthlessness for the national liberation cause.

This very attitude - disregard for the rationale of the liberation struggle - led the UNRada to deviate from the principles of its independence policy, which it had recently signed. Cooperation with the non-decisive action compromised the UNR with the others.

The structure of the UNR Rada made it equally unsuitable for the role of a national political centre. The mere collusion of political groups can only give rise to the formation of such a centre, but it is not enough as the only and permanent basis for its existence. This requires at least the complicity of the general emigrant population.

So, when it comes to an inter-party centre, which, however, be doing more important political work, not just coordinating

If the centre is to be responsible for the policy and activities of the parties involved, its structure should also correspond to the power relations of the groups and allow for periodic checks and renewals of its membership. The use of parity of groups, or artificially combined, and in political practice, non-existent sectors, as a permanent structural basis of the centre is an unprecedented curiosity.

The principle of parity can be introduced only in such heterogeneous political structures that must operate on the basis of absolute unanimity of all participating groups (i.e. with the right of veto) and have a very limited task. In other multi-party structures, this principle, as contrary to the nature of political life, leads to decay or unsuccessful stagnation. In addition, the principle of parity leads to and intensifies the process of fragmentation. If small and inactive groups have the same position and importance as large, strong and active groups in a respected political centre, then these latter are tempted to divide into many smaller groups and thus equalise the differences between this structure and the real balance of power. Such processes lead to the decomposition and dilution of the whole community.

Every healthy national organism ensures that its structure is dominated by such incentives that encourage and sustain the processes of growth and strengthening and the harmonious development of its constituent parts. If this principle were followed in the formation of a political centre, then each political environment would have to have a number of seats in it that corresponds to its true quality and strength.

But is it possible to apply the principle of proportional representation in such a centre, whose only basis is the agreement of the participating groups? Even if they agreed to the principle, it would be unrealistic to implement it in practice. For if the groups themselves have to mutually classify themselves, they will not be able to come to any satisfactory conclusion on which to build. It is not just a matter of deliberately overvaluing themselves, but also of devaluing other groups. But subjectivism, one-sidedness of conviction, is most pronounced in political life, in inter-party relations. Moreover, it is difficult to reduce the assessment of the strength, importance and value of individual groups to specific values.

Only that assessment is accepted as objective and binding, which is made by the third factor, and to which all environments must submit. The factor that is most called upon to do so and that has the most data to decide for the good of the nation is the general public. This train of thought leads us again to the conclusion that general elections are the right and only way to create and maintain a national political centre built and operating on a sound . There are two other points worth noting that assure such an outcome of the elections to the Overseas National Liberation Centre, which would be in line with the liberation cause. Firstly, in this case, there is no possibility of bamboozling voters with false promises and party propaganda based on private interests, contrary to the advice of national policy, as is often the case during state elections. Secondly, general elections minimise the possibility of foreign influences that are not in line with the good of the Ukrainian liberation cause. It is much more difficult for such influences to reach a large number of voters than for individual groups.

Opponents of the elected Foreign Centre also put forward arguments that it is not possible to hold general elections in a foreign country. When it comes to the practical, organisational and technical aspects, the above plan provides a sufficiently positive answer to this question. Of course, the implementation of this plan requires a lot of work, the unanimous support of the whole society and various national institutions in all countries. We are confident that the whole of society will respond with sincere commitment and sacrificial support. For it is eager to streamline and complete the structure of our political life in a foreign land.

The first word will be for the political groups to take a similarly positive attitude. The fear of some political environments of an electoral plebiscite should not have a decisive influence. After all, our citizenship already has a fairly clear view of the true value, power and activities of certain environments. And the groups' own propaganda about their value, strength and work, no matter how much it diverges from reality, has no greater significance in society, except to create self-deceptive thoughts and feelings within the groups themselves. Every political factor, which is important

interprets itself and its tasks, should seek to verify its positions and influences in society in order to draw appropriate conclusions, instead of building on unknown or faulty foundations. In the end, sooner or later, every political environment will have to take a citizenship test.

Smaller groups can bloc with other groups to avoid being completely defeated in elections. The integrity of political life will benefit if the brakes on unbridled atomisation are put in place and the processes of fusion and growth of viable and active political forces are strengthened.

Responding to the assertion that it is impossible to hold general elections abroad, I have to touch on the right side of this issue. Some opponents also put forward this argument, saying that the governmental factors of the states in which the elections are to be held will not allow it. When considering this issue, we must first of all take into account its political essence. There is no need to argue that the Ukrainian independence campaign against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism, aimed at the liberation of Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian Independent State, does not contradict the interests, laws or principles of any of the states where the elections will take place. On the contrary, the Ukrainian national liberation struggle against Bolshevism is in line with the political rationale of all freedom-loving Western nations. The independent political action carried out by Ukrainians in various Western countries is also in line with this rationale. This also applies to the various organisational measures taken to conduct and strengthen this action, including elections and the creation of a political centre.

Some people think that the very transfer of elections creates a conflict with state laws, because elections are a function of the state category. However, responsible state authorities in Western countries take into account not only the formal side of the matter, but also its political content.

A legal conflict would arise if Ukrainians in foreign countries created, through elections or otherwise, bodies and formations that, by their functions or goals, would interfere with the state authorities. The National Liberation Centre should manage such political actions of Ukrainians in foreign countries that relate to the Ukrainian liberation struggle and are within the framework of civil rights and

of freedoms in Western . These boundaries are quite broad, and if they were properly used, much good could be done for our liberation cause. However, it is not the aims and objectives of the Foreign Centre to interfere in such matters, which are part of the obligations of every Ukrainian against the country of settlement, against the state and its laws. Matters of this category may be the content of the activities of other registered organisations whose statutes and regulations are in line with the laws of each country in particular.

If we wanted to formally legalise the elections to the Higher Independent Electoral Commission in individual states, it would, of course, be too difficult to translate. But it would also be unnecessary, and measures in connection with the legalisation of elections would be surprising. The reason for the difficulties in this area is that this is an extraordinary, exceptional case that has no analogues in normal political life within the state. Meanwhile, the state laws and other legal norms correspond to the real or foreseen phenomena of life in a given country.

In order to dispel unnecessary fears of legal complications in relation to elections, it is necessary to realise that in our political life over the years and in different states there have been many organised forms of action that, from a formalistic point of view, were outside the framework of legal norms. It would be a mistake to think that the competent state actors did not look into such cases or did not understand their essence. Quite the contrary. This tolerance should be attributed to their wisdom, understanding and benevolent attitude to a good cause. Wise state actors look first at the essence of the matter, whether it is correct and possible from the point of view of state reason, and then consider the formal legal side.

We are confident that the transfer of the elections, the formation of the Foreign Centre and its activities will not encounter any obstacles on the other side. The main thing is,

- that such an action will not harm the states in which Ukrainians live, but rather will be useful for the frontline of the struggle against Moscow imperialism and communism, on a global scale and in each country in particular. Based on this and on our previous experience in similar cases, we can safely implement the plan for the general elections. But we should not create difficulties for ourselves and other factors by excessive formalism.

Finally, let us touch on another issue raised by circles that are not favourably disposed to the concept of elections. They say that comparing the number of those who will take part in the elections with the total number of Ukrainians in a foreign country will be a negative aspect of the elections that can be used by political opponents and enemies. Some will argue that all the other Ukrainians who will not vote are opponents of the cause for which the election is being held. Thus, the enemies of Ukrainian independence will say that the majority of Ukrainian emigrants reject the concept of independence and the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle. Ukrainian opponents of an elected Foreign Centre could also use the argument that the elections would have a negative effect. If, for example, a group had a negative attitude to the elections and issued a call to citizens to boycott the elections, then, according to opponents, this group would count all those who do not vote as its supporters. If several thousand people take part in the elections, the ratio of this number to the several hundred thousand Ukrainians will give rise to all sorts of speculation. This is what some people think.

Such arguments may seem convincing on the surface, but when examined more deeply, they do not hold up. Non-participation in elections is not equivalent to boycotting them. Even in state elections, under normal circumstances, no one counts those who do not vote as opponents or protesters, they are usually considered indifferent. Only in a totalitarian system, when elections are not conducted freely, only under conditions of coercion and fraud, can abstention from voting have the meaning of a boycott. When elections are completely free, then boycotting them must also have an appropriate and effective manifestation, such as handing over clean, unmarked voting cards.

Opponents of the election to the UNVZCentre could only speak of a negative effect if a significant number of managed voters showed their negative attitude to the election itself, or in a similar parallel action. If the opponents of the elections documented their position and numbers in the same way as the participants of the elections do with their votes, then comparisons and reasonable conclusions could be drawn. We

are convinced that no political environment would be able to turn such negative evidence against the elections, because Ukrainian society will not allow itself to be fooled. So there is no reason to fear the so-called negative effect of the elections. Of course, it is easy for various groups to declare their negative attitude to the election campaign and issue a call in this sense. But when they fail to achieve positive and concrete success in doing so, it will be the most telling proof of their ultimate political bankruptcy, far worse than failure in the elections themselves. And counting all those who do not vote out of indifference, who are as uninterested in the opponents of the elections as they are in the elections, on their side is a completely disrespectful fooling of themselves. No one serious will treat this as a political quest. If someone wants to substitute fictions for facts, they always have unlimited opportunities to do so.

After all, elections to the UCIPR Centre cannot be equated with ordinary elections in the state under any circumstances. The very nature of the elections to a political centre in a foreign land and the circumstances of life and activity in exile mean that only the nationally and politically active part of the Ukrainian population takes part in the elections. Therefore, the very comparison of the number of voters and non-voters can only be seen as a quantitative ratio of national and political activists to the part of the Ukrainian population that stands completely apart from national life and political activity.

We shouldn't be scared or ashamed of such an indicator. On the contrary. Let at least a few thousand voters document themselves as a Ukrainian national-political asset in a foreign land, forming and effectively supporting the national liberation and independence campaign. This will be a respectable and real political base for this action, which should be led and managed by the Foreign Centre. In foreign policy, such a specific indicator of an asset is much more important than the unfounded argumentation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, who are usually already included in foreign state organisms and are not considered a separate political factor.

For the strength and success of the Ukrainian independence campaign abroad, it is important that it has a broad human base, but that this base

was at the same time lively, active and unwavering, 'not a sterile mass. Under this perspective, the elections should have a significant positive impact.



## **Prospects for the Ukrainian National Liberation Revolution**

*This larger work by St. Bandera was intended only for "internal organisational use", as stated in the booklet "Perspectives of the Ukrainian National Liberation Revolution" (Educational materials from the course organised by the OUN Central Committee), book I. Edition of the Organisational and Personnel Reference, 1958, p. 144, where this work is printed up to and including page 122, with the indication "processed by Byilycho" (Bandera's pseudonym).*

*The purpose of these training materials was to "give a new impetus and direction to the preparatory work among the OUN Central Committee personnel, that is, to activate our leading and rank-and-file personnel in the preparation phase ... for direct participation in the organisation and conduct of the national liberation revolution in the Native Lands". The editorial introduction to the book clearly clarifies the initial doubts about the expediency of such a publication: "...we must once again confirm our unchanging principle: planning and preparation should be done not when the situation requires direct action, but in advance, in advance preparing for it. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists cannot, under any circumstances, take a passive position and wait for the international situation to develop. On the contrary, we will try to influence the development of the international situation, in particular when it comes to the internal situation in Ukraine, through our work and struggle. And in order to conduct them (revolutionary and liberation activities and struggle - DM) in the right way and with the right methods, we must have in mind the general plan, that is, the image of how the revolutionary and liberation struggle can and should develop, what the highest stage of this struggle should look like - the general revolutionary and liberation breakthrough, and to what extent and by what means we, foreign cadres, can take a direct part in it."*

*From this point of view, it is advisable that all Ukrainians become familiar with the author's work.*

*Sections of this work were also published in the magazine "The Liberation Way", London, UK: in the November 1959 book under the title "The Anti-Bolshevik Revolution - the Second Way to Liberation",*

pp. 1210-1218; in the January 1960 issue, under the heading "The Significance of the War for National Liberation," pp. 12-22; in the October 1960 issue, under the heading "Development of the Revolutionary Process," pp. 1101-1112; in December 1961, n.p., "Evolution of Bolshevism and Partial Achievements of the Struggle," pp. 1245-1250; in 3(252), March 1969, n.d., "The Problem of the National Communist Front," pp. 274-283; in the April 1969 issue, "The National Liberation Revolution and the Russian Anti-Communist Forces," pp. 387-396; in May 1969 issue, "The Common Front of the National Liberation Revolutions," pp. 515-522; in the June 1969 issue, "The Development and Factors of the Revolutionary Process," pp. 643-663; in the book of July-August 1969, the section "The Necessity of the National Liberation Revolutionary Struggle", pp. 771-774.

### **1. The need for national liberation revolutionary struggle**

Before clarifying the prospects of the Ukrainian national liberation and anti-Bolshevik revolution, it is necessary to establish the starting point of this issue from our point of view.

People with an opportunistic attitude to life, with an opportunistic way of thinking and acting, consider the starting point in this matter to be questions: Is such a revolution possible, and what are the realistic conditions for its development and successful outcome? Depending on the answers to these questions and on the basis on which these answers are based, it is necessary, in the understanding of these people, to accept or reject the concept of a national liberation revolution. To the extent that such thinking is closer to scepticism, passivity and resignation than to volitional activity, risk and struggle, the arguments for revolutionary struggle are, in their estimation, too weak and uncertain.

We constantly encounter this approach in the course of our independent political activity. Opponents of the revolutionary concept raise the question of the possibility and expediency of an anti-Bolshevik national revolution in different ways, but always with doubt, distrust and negative prejudice. In particular, in the protracted international situation, in the period of coexistence politics, the negation of the revolutionary struggle is intensifying. Its spokespersons are required to prove that the anti-Bolshevik revolution is possible, that

it has the prospects for successful development and victory. This issue is of crucial importance, in particular, for unstable, opportunistic political environments, which, under the influence of doubt and despair, are always ready to abandon independence and adapt to what is easier and more profitable, following the line of less resistance.

Similarly, in spreading the concept of national liberation revolution among the masses and mobilising them for revolutionary struggle, it is often necessary to overcome passivity, inertia and lack of faith in their own strength. At the same time, it is necessary to find out not only the purpose and need for revolutionary struggle, but also the possibilities of its successful deployment. Therefore, a revolutionary liberation organisation must have a crystallised answer to the question of the possibilities of a liberation revolution and, accordingly, well-founded arguments to dispel doubts and cement the correct guidance. But the OUN does not take this question as a starting point for the formation of its liberation concept. For us, it also takes on a different meaning, because the Ukrainian nationalist puts another question as his main one, namely: how to conduct the revolutionary struggle, what methods and means will best ensure the success and victory of the liberation revolution. This question is posed from a pre-established positive and decisive attitude to the cause of the revolution and measures up to the most appropriate way to conduct the revolutionary action. The answer to this question immediately contains arguments and proofs that a successful revolutionary struggle is quite possible.

The starting point for the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in choosing a revolutionary path to national liberation is the question: is revolutionary struggle necessary? Having come to a clear positive answer, the OUN takes it as the basis for its liberation concept and its action posture. Since the liberation and revolutionary struggle is necessary for the life and development of the Ukrainian nation, there is no need to dwell on the question of whether it is possible, but to immediately look for appropriate ways and means to successfully conduct it. This attitude is in line with the basic laws of life. Every viable creature, when it has at least one way to save its threatened life, gathers all its strength and directs it to that path.

The Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement of Ukraine is not only contradictory

with the aspirations and vital needs of the Ukrainian nation, not only hinders its natural, free development, but also threatens its existence. Moscow is consistently trying to destroy the identity of the Ukrainian people under every possible circumstance and to enlarge the Russian national organism at the expense of the Ukrainian national substance. These imperialist goals and the destructive effects of Bolshevism can only be countered by struggle, especially since Bolshevism is the worst, most dangerous form of Russian imperialism. Its totalitarian, most reckless methods of consistent and comprehensive destruction of the enslaved nations, their spirit, biological substance and material basis for independent existence leave no other possibility for preserving their independent life and development.

In order to rescue the Ukrainian nation from this situation and to end the process of its constant enslavement and destruction, it is necessary to overthrow Moscow's rule in Ukraine, to eradicate Bolshevism-Communism in Ukraine and to remove from the Ukrainian lands all factors of Russian imperialism and all its supports. This can only be achieved through the decisive liberation struggle of the entire Ukrainian people, through a national revolution. For every action, every attempt in this direction, and even the attitude of such a goal, the recognition of such ideas, is already an act of anti-Bolshevik struggle, an integral factor in the national revolution.

## ***2. Moscow imperialism and communism are two forms of the same enemy***

The liberation struggle of Ukraine, waged by the nationalist, revolutionary movement, is equally directed against open Moscow imperialism and international communism, as two forms in which the same enemy, Moscow, operates.

The imperialism of the Russian people is a phenomenon of historical order that changes its forms and methods of action, but remains unchanged in its essence. Its essence is the incessant attempt to support other peoples and, through their exploitation and destruction, to constantly increase its power, to claim its dominion, to grow Moscow's

nation and its empire. This Imperialism sometimes appears openly, as Russia's power and action, and sometimes in a hidden, disguised form.

Communism is now the most important form of covert Moscow imperialism. Despite the non-Russian origin of the communist doctrine, communism has become a de facto instrument of Moscow imperialism, one of the main forms and the main means of its disguised manifestation and action. This applies not only to Bolshevism, i.e., to clearly Russian, but also to international communism.

The distinction between separate forms of the same enemy in our struggle is necessary in view of its multifaceted action and the separate fronts it creates. Open Moscow Imperialism acts against the independence of Ukraine not only in the form of Bolshevism, but also as anti-communist Russian Imperialism. The main front against the former is in the Motherland, and against the latter - so far only in foreign lands. But in the future this system may change and both fronts of open Moscow imperialism may become equal. Moscow's anti-communist imperialism may replace Bolshevism.

International communism is not limited to the Bolshevik domination. It operates all over the world, among different peoples, and from this perspective is a global phenomenon. At the same time, it is at the service of Moscow imperialism, has its main, accidental base in Bolshevism, and receives constant nourishment from Moscow. For the Ukrainian liberation movement, as well as for other anti-Bolshevik forces, international communism creates additional fronts, alongside the Bolshevik one, opening up hostile actions from many other directions. Therefore, we must give the front against international communism a special place in our struggle.

### ***3. Possibilities for fundamental change in the sub-Bolshevik area***

The destruction of the Bolshevik enslavement of Ukraine and the restoration of the Ukrainian Independent State will be a major geopolitical change of such an order that will create a completely different order not only in the space neighbouring Ukraine, but will also

of global significance. The liberation of Ukraine will paralyse the aggressiveness of Moscow's imperialism and deal a fatal blow to international communism.

But in proportion to the enormous, global significance of the Ukrainian liberation cause, there are equally great obstacles to its implementation. These obstacles come primarily from the enemy.

Moscow, the Bolshevik regime, all variants of Moscow imperialism and world communism are well aware of the importance of Ukraine and the threat posed by its liberation struggle. Therefore, they are trying by all means to keep Ukraine in a state of enslavement, to destroy the Ukrainian national liberation movement, or at least to block its path to victory. At the same time, the Ukrainian liberation cause encounters considerable difficulties in the free world, in the camp of anti-Bolshevik states. We mean the real anti-Bolshevik forces, not the hidden accomplices of Bolshevism, in the role of those international mafias that openly act against Ukraine's independence, serving Moscow. These should be included in the enemy camp. When anti-Communist forces in the free world, including the leadership of Western countries, do not support the Ukrainian cause, it is largely because of its great importance. On the one hand, there is the force of inertia, and on the other hand, there is the fear of involving themselves in a sharp conflict with Moscow. Because supporting Ukraine's independence is an offensive action against Russia at the most sensitive point for it.

Aware of the great obstacles and hostile forces that stand against our struggle and the great changes that the victory of the Ukrainian liberation cause will bring about, we must consider all the possibilities and factors that can help in the liberation of Ukraine. From this point of view, we are interested in all the major changes in the sub-Bolshevik space and the possibilities of their occurrence, not only those that are causally related to the Ukrainian liberation cause, but also those that come as a result of other forces and circumstances and that may have an impact on the conditions of our struggle.

First of all, we ask ourselves what possibilities for major changes in the sub-Bolshevik area are envisaged in the various concepts. We have in mind how the general situation in the countries now enslaved by Bolshevism could come to major changes. In doing so, we consider

not only our concept, but also others, in order to compare all the theoretical solutions to this issue, solutions that should have some real basis when political concepts are based on them and certain political factors are behind them.

There are three main theoretical possibilities for change in the sub-Bolshevik space.

The first possibility is the removal of Bolshevism by external forces. Practically speaking, in the present balance of power, this can only happen in one way - by war. There is no hope that other states can remove the dominance of Bolshevism without war, by their own pressure through peaceful means, or by the mere threat of the use of military force. A war with the USSR and a victory for the states of the opposite bloc could enable them to destroy the dominion of Bolshevism and establish a new system in its place.

The second possibility is the internal evolution of Bolshevism, profound changes in the Bolshevik system, changes in the regime and in its national, social, economic, and cultural policies.

The third possibility is the anti-Bolshevik revolution, primarily the national liberation revolution of the peoples enslaved by Moscow.

We treat these three possibilities as the main ones because in each of them the subject, the driver of change, is a different force, or rather a different set of forces, striving for its own goal. Consequently, in each of these three options, changes would take place in a different, peculiar way and would have a different character, although their consequences could converge in different points.

The three main possibilities presented here are not merely the result of theoretical considerations. Each of them has a place in some political concept, which is being pursued by Ukrainian or foreign political forces.

In addition to these three main possibilities, there are various other combinations. Such combinations are, in fact, prevalent in a variety of political concepts. Few concepts are limited exclusively and unambiguously to one of the three basic possibilities. But a closer look at a particular combined concept reveals the predominance of one of the three main possibilities and the secondary role of the others. The various political concepts that are striving for fundamental changes in the current sub-Bolshevik space would like to consider

all possibilities, rather than putting everything on one bet. The differences between related concepts are in the greater or lesser emphasis on the capabilities that come second, as a complement or reinforcement of the main capability.

In this discussion, it would not be appropriate to deal with various complex concepts, as this would only make it more difficult to arrive at a clear assessment and clear conclusions. It is more appropriate, and quite sufficient, to reflect on each of the three main possibilities and develop an estimate of their value, and then we will have the key to evaluating different combinations of those basic elements.

By focusing on the individual possibilities of fundamental change in the sub-Bolshevik space, we do not intend to verify whether and to what extent each of them has a real basis. The qualification of political trends by the criterion of reality or unreality is generally of dubious value, since behind these trends there are living forces ready and able to fight for their implementation. This also applies to the assessment of various predictions of future development. Our assessment of the possibilities discussed here does not refer to their reality or objective value, but has a distinct, subjective definition: we are primarily interested in whether this possibility corresponds to the Ukrainian liberation struggle, whether our case can be linked to it, whether there are grounds for it.

#### ***4. The significance of the war for national liberation***

A victorious war between the Atlantic and other anti-Bolshevik blocs and the USSR would have caused very large changes on a global scale, and in particular would have created a completely new situation in the countries enslaved by Moscow. The Third World War would have shifted the entire world order even more than the two previous wars. This can be predicted with great certainty, because in such a war all the expansive forces would come to voice and the various shaky, artificial structures that are now numerous in the world and which are most concentrated in the entire sub-Bolshevik space would collapse. The great upheaval caused by the new world war will stir up the revolutionary forces and processes that have been imprisoned or inhibited by the current international situation so that they will enter the arena of events on an equal footing with the forces and struggles of both warring blocs. This is what revolutionary action is all about



major wars, in which not only do both belligerents clash with their own forces and directions, but also other forces and processes are unleashed that develop beyond the plans and control of one or the other belligerent. The larger the war, the more difficult it is for the belligerents to control its development and consequences.

We have already mentioned that it would be inappropriate to base our liberation struggle only on the possibility of a world war. Only a state that is planning a war can know for sure about the outbreak of war, and only it has full initiative. Given the current balance of power and the current international situation, no one can say for sure if and when a war might break out, because no state has full initiative and all the decision-making power. In addition, it is not just a question of whether war will break out at all, but an even more important question is when it might come.

Without having a firm basis for a definite answer to this question, one cannot orientate one's plans unilaterally towards only one possibility. We must take into account the possibility of war and be prepared to use it to the fullest for the national liberation revolution, but the main plan must be built regardless of the possibility of war.

There is also the question of the extent to which the anti-Bolshevik liberation movements can influence the outbreak of war, or hasten it, through their political action and struggle. If there were any signs in this direction, it opens up an important avenue of action for the liberation movements and allows them to include the war in their own plans with greater certainty. In the current international situation, the answer to the above question must be no. The liberation movements of enslaved peoples could only provide a spark that would ignite a military fire in an international atmosphere saturated with a military atmosphere. This requires not only hostility and political tension between opposing states or blocs, but, most importantly, also the necessary military readiness and determination on the part of at least one side. And this latter depends not so much on the absolute level of armaments as on a clear and comprehensive superiority over the enemy. If in the existing international order, under this view, any party is more ready for war, it is the Soviet bloc.

The whole development of events after the Second World War shows that the case

of the peoples enslaved by Moscow and their liberation struggle in the assessment of the Western powers does not carry such weight that it could have a decisive influence on their policy towards the USSR, much less on their attitude to the question of war or peace. The same applies to the vital issues of smaller states. Even the Bolshevik threat and offensive against important positions of the Western great powers did not provoke such a decisive response that would bring the West's war of aggression significantly closer. There had already been many events and situations, in a sober assessment, required the military intervention of the Western powers in the interest of protecting the world, not only enslaved but also free peoples, from Bolshevik aggression. For example, let us recall the broad insurgency of the UPA-OUN, the Polish armed underground AK (Armia Krajowa, Polish underground army), which Poles began to organise immediately after the fall of Poland in 1939, under German occupation. After many attempts, the Polish underground leadership contacted the Polish government in exile in London and began to receive assistance from it. The AK was finally formed in 1943, and in 1946 the London government ordered its members to come "out of the woods" and report to the Moscow-Bolshevik "allies" - the Bolsheviks killed a large number of those who turned up, and sent even more to their concentration camps or prisons. According to Polish sources ("Polish Village Armed", volume III, Armia Krajowa, ed. The Polish Army of the Krajina, vol.

In March 1944, the AK's strength was estimated at 6,287 chota (plutons), each with 50 men, i.e. over 300,000 soldiers, but this may be an exaggeration. From the government in London, the AK received a large number of weapons and millions of dollars in American, Polish and German currency, which were flown in from Polish bases in England by planes that made 483 flights to Poland during the AK's existence. The AK was credited with organising the Warsaw Uprising against the Germans in 1944. At the initiative of the UPA command, there were attempts to mend the strained Polish-Ukrainian relations, so both sides set up special commissions for negotiations to coordinate underground actions against the Bolshevik enemy), the underground of the Baltic countries - the culmination of this struggle in the first postwar years, and then the burnout of armed, partisan actions with the indifference of the West; then the communist armed aggression in China and its conquest, and finally the Hungarian revolution and its suppression by the Soviet army with the West's passivity.

All these developments lead to the conclusion that in the current international situation and in the current state of the Western powers, the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples is not able to shift the passivity of the free world to such an extent that it would take the path of

military intervention. In such circumstances, there is no reason and it is inexpedient to include in the plans of the liberation struggle the possibility of causing a war by revolutionary action. This possibility could only be relevant in a situation where the anti-Bolshevik bloc of states was sufficiently prepared, that is, ready for war.

In the current situation, liberation movements have to treat the issue of the outbreak of war as a factor independent of them, a factor that lies beyond their capabilities and influence, difficult to predict and calculate. It should be emphasised here that this applies only to the outbreak of war, to its beginning, and not to its development and outcome, if it has already begun.

Next is the question of what value a war between the USSR and the Western powers could have for the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. This question should be divided into two parts: the first is the significance of the military situation itself for the liberation struggle; the second is what the opponents of the USSR would bring to the enslaved peoples, what their war would have in relation to these peoples.

A war between the USSR and other states would surely have brought the Ukrainian people new great human sacrifices and, most likely, great devastation to the country. Nevertheless, such a war would have been welcomed not only by active revolutionary fighters, but also by the entire nation, if it gave a qualitative view of the destruction of Bolshevik enslavement and the achievement of national and state independence. The sacrifices and comprehensive losses suffered by Ukraine in Bolshevik captivity are generally much greater and worse than would have been the result of war.

Taking this circumstance into account, the outbreak of war between the USSR and the Western Bloc is considered desirable, in view of the useful chances it would bring to the liberation cause. Here are the most important points that add up to our argument.

The war would have shifted the stagnant international situation, which was very unfavourable for the liberation struggles of enslaved peoples. Inertia and fear of greater change play an important role in international relations. In particular, in the current situation, the passive posture and compromise of the Western powers against Bolshevik expansionism is due to the desire to avoid confrontation with the USSR and the fear of war. With the outbreak of war, these motives would disappear, as

that had previously held back, will give rise to initiative and vigorous action by the USSR's opponents. Although the current international order does not meet the interests and desires of the West, the West is still afraid of a major shift, lest things get even worse. In particular, it is afraid of a war high casualties. Thus, resistance to major international shifts, especially those that would develop with explosive force, comes from many different directions, including from states dissatisfied with the current situation. Therefore, shifting the status quo is a very difficult task and requires a lot of effort. War would do it immediately.

During the war, the liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples will become more important in the assessment of the USSR's opponents, in accordance with its inherent weight. Despite the fact that in a world war there are armies in the millions on both sides and huge battles taking place, revolutionary actions and forces can play an important role, much greater than normal frontline armies, if we measure the ratio of their active forces. Proportionally small insurgent and guerrilla units can tie up and destroy large armies in the enemy's backcountry. All the more important for the development of war are national revolutionary movements, which, in conjunction with insurgent, armed struggle, deploy various forms of revolutionary action and, by their actions, disrupt and fundamentally decompose most of the enemy force. The history of the Second World War and the subsequent local wars in East and Southeast Asia show the great, often decisive importance of revolutionary movements. It is to be hoped that this experience will not be disregarded in the future by the enemies of the USSR as it was in the last war.

As a result, revolutionary struggles can more easily find allies and support. True, a true alliance does not require fighting against a common enemy, it also requires a common goal, or at least agreement on positive goals on the part of the contracting parties. But when this is not the case, there is still a possibility of temporary and limited mutual assistance based on the agreement of tactical goals of both sides. The war with the USSR will certainly be neither easy nor short-lived. Therefore, it is hoped that during the war, the enemies of the USSR, regardless of their political plans for the future, will not allow themselves to be as hostile or frivolous towards the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation movement as they are now. When we cannot count on true allies, we can at least get weapons and other technical equipment,

necessary for the struggle, from the enemies of a common enemy. But we cannot exclude the better possibility that, as the war progresses, the Western bloc will develop a political attitude that will provide a common platform for the anti-Soviet war of third powers and for national liberation revolutions, and thus will lead to the coordination of all anti-Bolshevik fronts in one strategic plan.

The most important benefits of the war for the national liberation struggle are those circumstances that facilitate the struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. First of all, the fact that the war ties up the Bolsheviks' main attention and forces on external fronts and makes it impossible for them to concentrate their energy against the revolutionary liberation forces. In particular, in the use of mass terror and repression, which are the means of Bolshevik rule, war imposes narrower limits than in peacetime. From this perspective, the Bolshevik system is in a completely opposite position to states that retain some sort of legal norms. In those states, wartime justifies, if not requires, a greater restriction of civil rights and a sharper interpretation of the duties and norms dictated by wartime circumstances.

Therefore, in states with a genuine rule of law, the internal system is much stronger in times of war than in peacetime. The Bolshevik regime fundamentally does not respect any rights and freedoms of the citizen, does not obey any legal norms, although it establishes them. It treats all areas and all matters of the internal life of the countries it occupies completely arbitrarily, subordinating everyone and everything to its desires and its understanding of expediency. Bolshevism does not need any excuses for its lawlessness, violence, total terror and exploitation, and applies them equally in times of war and peace.

In fact, the entire internal system under the Bolsheviks is a permanent military system. However, the war with other states forced the Bolshevik regime to reckon more with the people and with the consequences of its progress, which harmed its military operations and undermined its military potential.

War forces the regime to conscript large numbers of people into the army, and it cannot keep them under such tight individual control as in times of peace. In particular, during military operations and troop movements, the political and police control of the military is significantly weakened.

Psychological guidance for the general population in war, especially at the front,

makes it more capable and ready for opposing action and struggle than in normal post-Soviet conditions. The development of the war creates many situations favourable to the military, instead of defending the hated regime and system, turning its weapons against them. In fact, this weapon, which during the war falls into the hands of the great mass of the army, can be a great danger to the Bolsheviks, it can become a weapon against the Bolshevik liberation revolution.

These would be the circumstances created by the military situation that favoured the revolutionary liberation struggle, gave it the best opportunity to expand it and to conduct it with a respectable, successful effect.

The circumstances that would have arisen as a result of the war situation are important for the national liberation struggle to the extent that they are used by the people and their revolutionary force to fully develop their own liberation struggle. Without the appropriate use of the war situation and without our own revolutionary liberation struggle, the war itself would not have brought us liberation from Moscow-Communist imperialism.

But in our political life, we also encounter other concepts, in particular those that shift all liberation hopes to war, as if a military victory of the Western powers over the USSR would automatically bring Ukraine national liberation. In order to be clear on this issue, we must first understand the policies of the Western powers. We should be interested not only in the war itself, but also in the plans of the Western powers regarding the future order in the territory of the USSR, which was defeated by the war.

We do not yet have a clear official answer to this question, but the policy of the Western powers shows their basic attitude, both in the matter of the conflict with the USSR and in the matter of the liberation problems of the peoples enslaved by Moscow. On this basis, we can draw conclusions about the plans of the Western bloc in the event of war, since those plans cannot diverge much from the current attitude.

A war, which will be a great armed confrontation between the Western bloc and the Bolshevik bloc, must have not only military but also political and psychological preparation, and consistent preparation during peace.

As we know, the main and predominant concept of instruction in Western countries is along the lines of minimal changes to

The programme of the Western bloc included the following tasks: to eliminate the communist regime and its system. The programme of the Western bloc included the following tasks: to eliminate the communist regime and its system, to establish a democratic system and to restore independence to those states that had it before the Second World War. Instead, the national liberation of other peoples enslaved by Moscow before the Second World War and the creation of independent national states on the territories of non-Russian peoples occupied by Moscow do not have a positive solution in the West's concept. The main tendency of the West is to fight communism only, with a clear and consistent attempt to avoid the issue of Russian imperialism, thus contributing to the reconstruction of the former Russian empire.

The motives for this Western attitude are also related to the issue of war. Firstly, Western states do not want to raise issues that are even more vulnerable to Russia, such as national problems, in order not to aggravate relations with the USSR. This stems from a desire to avoid war. Secondly, if war does come, they want to win the favour of a part of the Russian people by putting forward a programme to destroy communism alone, without violating the integrity of the current Moscow empire. The prevailing belief in the West is that in this the Muscovites can have allies against the regime, and the concept of the collapse of the empire into nation-states would help the Bolsheviks mobilise the full potential of the Russian people to defend their empire.

The experience of our twelve years of foreign action shows that our persuasion of Western political circles that it is unrealistic and inexpedient to bet on the Russian people has not had any significant results. Apart from a certain number of politicians who understand and sympathise with our situation, the majority of leading and responsible political factors consistently hold the view that the Russian empire should be left intact, "democratised" by the very elimination of communism. It should be borne in mind that this trend will be the general line of the Western bloc in wartime as well.

Military developments are unlikely to change these pro-Russian views. Even if there are no manifestations of anti-regime actions by Muscovites, the spokespersons of this tactic will not want to renounce their views. After all, such tactics are not only designed for the active anti-regime struggle of the Russian people. According to its spokespersons, already

It is the demobilisation of the Russian people's enthusiasm for the war against the West and the moral undermining of the success of Bolshevik war propaganda that will bring significant benefits. In retrospect, however, it is difficult to assess the extent to which this policy has had any actual impact and consequences on the other side of the front. Therefore, the political line of the war, prepared in the pre-war period and clearly applied at the beginning of the war, will likely be maintained in the further development of the war. This will be ensured by the factors that have a decisive influence on the determination of the political line. The Russian emigrant forces, which, despite their internal differences, are acting in unison on the foreign policy front, trying to influence the West to act only against communism without violating the entire Russian empire, will also have a lot to do with this.

During the war, these forces will use various means to create the impression that this political line is the only correct one, that it is the only one that will bring great benefits to the war effort of the West. We know from the experience of the Second World War (Vlasovschina) and from the current Russian fake "anti-Bolshevik revolutionary action" of the NTS (National Labour Union, a White Moscow emigration organisation whose history dates back to the 1918s. After the fall of Kerensky's government, a large number of opponents of the Bolshevik regime left the borders of the Moscow Empire, over 1,200,000, and settled in large numbers in various European countries. In 1925, White Muscovites in Yugoslavia created the Russian Union of National Youth, or RSNY, which in 1931 changed its name to the National Union of the New Generation, or NSNP. As this organisation soon became infiltrated by red agents, opposition to it arose among the Moscow emigrants in France, which led to the name being changed again to the National Labour Union of the New Generation (NTNP). The newly renamed organisation worked closely with Hitler's Gestapo; in 1941, the Union's headquarters were moved from Yugoslavia to Germany, once again changing its name to the National Labour Union of Russian Solidarists. After losing to Germany, the NTS moved its headquarters to Frankfurt am Main, where its official name, "Sowing", was born. The NTS was linked to various intelligence services, American and otherwise, and was not free from Moscow-Bolshevik agents. In the 1950s, it experienced many scams involving agents in its ranks. The NTS considers itself an anti-Bolshevik organisation and therefore enjoys financial support from various Western circles. For more information about the NTS, see Stepan Mikhailovich, "Allies of the CPSU", "The Path of Victory", Munich, ed. V, pp. 10/211 to 13/214, in March 1958) that the Muscovites are perfect fakers in such matters and are no less successful with the Americans today than they were with Hitler. It should also be borne in mind that the Bolsheviks will present such compressed facts and



information that will provide fodder and arguments for Moscow's action in defence of the empire. This information will be measured in order to maintain the appropriate, pro-Russian line of Western military policy.

It pays the Bolsheviks to cause disorientation in the enemy camp in a fundamental matter.

On the domestic front, the main danger for the Bolsheviks is the national liberation revolution of the enslaved peoples, not Russian anti-Communist sentiment. In a wartime situation, the Soviet regime will use the tactic of not trampling on Muscovites' anti-regime sentiments with various promises and softening the communist system. Therefore, when it comes to satisfying Russian imperialist sentiments and desires, the Bolsheviks have an unrivalled advantage in this regard, and any flirtations by their opponents on this string will only strengthen their position. For Moscow, the most important thing is to drive a wedge between the national liberation forces of the enslaved peoples and the military actions of the Western bloc. For the union of the liberation forces of enslaved peoples and the military forces of free Western states in political and operational terms would seal the defeat of Bolshevism and the defeat of the Russian Empire.

What explains this, from our point of view, ridiculous political conception of the Western bloc? It is caused by many heterogeneous factors, but in our consideration, secondary and temporary reasons can be ignored, because they can be eliminated in time. These could include, for example, the lack of awareness of anti-Bolshevik forces and sentiments among responsible Western politicians, their misunderstanding of the problems and opportunities of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, or the tendentious Russian and pro-Russian influences in the governmental cabinets of Western states. Such factors may even be important for a certain period of time, but reality and developments, as well as the actions of national anti-Moscow forces, paralyse and limit their influence. We are primarily interested in factors that are rooted in the very foundations of Western policy and strategy, and therefore have a deep and lasting impact. And these factors include the following principles of Western policy:

1. To try to have as few opponents as possible in the war with the USSR, so that the enemy's forces could be weakened, in particular in terms of military morale;

2. to bring as many forces as possible, if possible military allies, to his side, or at least to gain their favourable neutrality. This applies in particular to the forces on the other side of the front;

3. to draw up the most general, universal blueprint for a common anti-Bolshevik front, based only on what all those elements that could be involved in it have in common. Instead, everything (most importantly for the peoples enslaved by Moscow) that could cause disagreement or disputes among the members of this front should be rejected.

In connection with these principles, the assessment of the actual or potential opponents of Bolshevism in the policy of Western states is of crucial importance. Therefore, in order to understand the basic principles of the Western, or rather American, concept of the anti-Bolshevik front, it is necessary to clarify the question of how the West assesses anti-Bolshevik national liberation movements and Russian anti-communist forces. We cannot accept the claim that the West is ignorant of the problems of enslaved peoples. Such ignorance is indeed evident in the public discourse of the West, but the political and military experts who primarily study these matters and have a decisive influence on the establishment of political lines probably have a fairly correct view of the strength and significance of the liberation movements of enslaved peoples. In any case, they have enough collected and studied materials that provide the basis for a proper assessment of this anti-Bolshevik potential. Thus, in those circles, there should be no underestimation of the liberation movements of the peoples enslaved by Moscow and the consistency in their oppression.

However, the weakness of the revolutionary potential of the enslaved peoples, according to the West, is the peripherality of this potential in relation to the entire USSR, that is, the view that the revolutionary forces of the peoples enslaved by Moscow cover only their national territories and focus their liberation struggle on them, but have no basis in the indigenous Russian territories, the centre of Bolshevik power.

Under this perspective, Western politicians pay more attention to Russia's anti-Bolshevik potential. They ascribe great importance to any Russian anti-communist

factor, even with its minimal strength and activity, they are particularly dependent on having an ally everywhere, and especially in the heart of the enemy camp. And if there is any hope that a Russian anti-Communist revolutionary front could emerge, the West is trying to do everything possible to bring it about, even at the cost of non-Russian enslaved peoples.

The attitude of Western politics to the national liberation movements of the peoples enslaved by Moscow is probably influenced by the political determination of these movements. Given that the liberation movements are imbued with an unwavering determination to fight Bolshevism and all Russian imperialism under any circumstances, the West counts on them as a stable, unchanging factor in the common anti-Bolshevik front and is not afraid that its policy may lose an ally in them. But such a calculation by the West is completely unethical. The position of the West and its assessment of the revolutionary liberation forces of the enslaved peoples would surely be different if these forces could choose between the anti-Bolshevik struggle and another path to

its goal. At that time, it would have been an important question for the policy of the Western powers, including military policy, how to maintain or activate national liberation movements in the anti-Bolshevik front. Given the current international order and the resolute determination of national liberation movements to fight communism under any circumstances, this question does not exist as an open political problem. When the enslaved peoples wage their liberation struggle on their own in the most difficult situation, without the support of the West, it is all the more possible to count on the activity of their anti-Bolshevik front in more favourable circumstances - during the war.

Not bothered by the above question, the policy and strategy of the Western bloc is concerned with another issue, namely, how to involve and use the national liberation movements of the peoples enslaved by Moscow for their own purposes. Hence the reasons for the attempts to subordinate national liberation movements to the West's policy and strategy in the fight against communism. The liberation movements had to, firstly, accept the political platform of a united anti-Bolshevik front, which was being maintained by the Western bloc, and adapt their own concept and policy to it. Secondly, their strategy of struggle and revolutionary action would have to be guided by the following general guideline: to serve

to the implementation of the strategic and tactical plans of the Western bloc in all phases of their game with the Bolshevik bloc - a political game, and then, if it comes to that, a military game. The own rationale of the national liberation movements, the expediency and success of their anti-Bolshevik struggle are of far less importance to the Western powers than the benefits that their policies and strategies derive from the actions of the liberation movements. They equate the general anti-Bolshevik struggle with their policies.

Since the involvement of Russian anti-Communist forces in the anti-Bolshevik struggle is one of the main elements of the Western concept of a united front, the liberation movements of the enslaved peoples should have served the interests of this concept. They, as already mentioned, adapt their concept and policy to the platform of a common front with the Muscovites, and thus, in our case, give up Ukraine's independence or at least postpone this issue until the overthrow of Communism. The revolutionary liberation forces of the enslaved peoples in the USSR would have to conduct their actions and struggle within the framework of the so-called all-Russian or "all-Union" front under the dominant leadership of Muscovites. In this way, the opposites between the national independence forces and the Russian anti-communist but imperialist elements would be untrammelled. The impression created by such a powerful all-Russian movement was supposed to attract Muscovites with anti-regime sentiments and activate them to fight.

For decades, we have been witnessing the incessant attempts of the Americans to implement their plan. They do not retreat from it, despite its unsuccessfulness in the face of the independent forces of enslaved peoples. This shows how deeply rooted this concept is in US political circles.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian liberation movement, the OUN and national forces in tune with it, in alliance with the national liberation movements of other peoples enslaved by Moscow, have also proved steadfast in their fundamental principles, so there is no reason for Western politics to have illusions that it may yet be possible to join the national liberation forces to the common front of Russian imperialists. But the West's concept of a single anti-Bolshevik front is inherently adapted only to the participation of Muscovites and is not at all dependent on

the position of the liberation forces of the enslaved peoples. At the same time, it can be argued that this concept has moved beyond the stage of experimentation and has become established as the general line of the Western bloc in this .

These are our statements. At the same time, we must clarify the conclusions drawn from them by the planners of the Western bloc's policy and strategy:

1. All active or potential opponents of communism in the sub-Bolshevik territories cannot be reduced to one common platform, to one framework of the anti-Bolshevik struggle;
2. Russian anti-communist elements can only become an active factor in the Western bloc's anti-Bolshevik, in particular military, actions when the West provides appropriate incentives for this through its programme, policy and tactics. Therefore, the Western bloc, counting on the Russian anti-communist movement, must nurture and feed it;
3. The national liberation movements of enslaved peoples constitute an original political and power factor. They have enough vitality of their own to exist and act independently;
4. Although the national liberation forces are not allowed to be included in the Western plan on the same front with the Muscovites, their independent struggle creates a separate front that binds and destroys the forces of the common enemy and can deal him a fatal blow. Therefore, the existence and action of these forces is useful, at least as long as the world struggle against Bolshevism is ongoing;
5. there is no danger for the West that national liberation movements will cease their anti-Bolshevik action due to the lack of external support;
6. The possibility of strengthening these movements and their struggle remains open to the Western powers, and they can address this issue at any time, according to tactical expediency, in particular in the event of a war with the USSR. It will depend on how much they see as necessary to consolidate such an independent front with their own goals and actions.

This is the final conclusion, which seems to normalise the attitude of the Western bloc, in particular the United States, to national liberation movements.

of the independent struggle of enslaved peoples.

This is not the place to consider the appropriateness of the Western bloc's policy and strategy towards the former Soviet Union. We are concerned with clarifying the actual state of affairs, its causes, and the question of how stable it is and what are the prospects for changing it.

Summing up this discussion, we come to the conclusion that the main concept of the Western bloc counts on and places the Russian map, and treats national liberation movements as a side factor. It was the same during the war. Our arguments about the inappropriateness of this concept and its harmful consequences for the anti-Bolshevik struggle do not influence the Western 's instructions, despite their objective validity. The determination of the national liberation movements in terms of the immutability of their anti-Bolshevik struggle does not allow the Western powers to put forward an alternative: to bet on the enslaved peoples or on the Muscovites. The primacy of the anti-Bolshevik front and the demand for independent liberation struggle over the issue of relations with the West does not allow for tactical manoeuvring to achieve a change in its attitude.

In answering the main question of what the war would have brought to the peoples enslaved in the USSR, we must accept as the first possibility the following: national liberation struggles must be carried out independently, without the support of the Western bloc. This leads to the conclusion that in such a situation, the war itself would not have brought independence to Ukraine and other peoples enslaved by Moscow. In this case, the support of Western powers for national liberation movements would be limited to the technical strengthening of the anti-Bolshevik struggle itself, but without any real commitment to the political content of national independence struggles.

However, the development of the war could also lead the Western bloc to a complete change of line. The protracted nature of a very difficult war with the USSR will not allow Western strategy to treat real and respectable anti-Bolshevik forces lightly and to rely on problematic concepts and the dubious factor of Russian anti-communist forces. For us, the most important thing is that the war situation will create more favourable conditions for the development of our independent revolutionary struggle and for the creation of facts that are in line with the rationale of the liberation cause. And in war, the real facts and the forces at work have a different meaning than during

of armchair planners. The war opens up much wider opportunities for the initiative and respectable influence of national liberation forces not only within their own separate struggle, but also in the broader context of the development of the whole war.

While envisaging more useful for the national liberation of the country the faults in the war itself than in its preparation, we must also bear in mind the worst possibilities caused by the Western bloc's guidance. We may have to deal with attempts to forcefully impose a new Moscow regime and system on the lands of Ukraine, which is not communist, but equally imperialist. The support of the Western powers, intended for the cultivation and activation of the Russian anti-communist movement, could be turned by the Moscow imperialists against national liberation movements, instead of against the Bolsheviks. This would create a second Russian front against the independent struggles of the enslaved peoples, this time supported by the Western powers, as it was forty years ago with Denikin, only in a modified form.

In this consideration, we are not concerned with conjectural theoretical possibilities, but only with the possible development and consequences of the principles that already exist and are manifested in the policies of Western states. Among them, some are favourable, others are unhelpful for the national liberation struggle. We cannot be guided by our subjective preferences or desires and consider some opportunities and ignore others. There is also no specific criterion for sorting them into more and less realistic ones; the principles of logic do not provide a solution. Everything that exists today in the foundations may develop further in the future, if circumstances are favourable.

So what are the final conclusions about the value of war for national liberation and what stance should we take in this matter? The answer to these questions can be formulated in the simplest way as follows:

1. The war between the Western and Bolshevik blocs alone would not have brought national liberation to the enslaved peoples. The state independence of the peoples enslaved in the USSR is not part of the West's concept, and its victory in the war against Bolshevism does not interrupt the fall of Russian imperialism;
2. Such a war would create more useful conditions for the liberation struggle

enslaved peoples than a peaceful situation;

3. As the war progresses, national liberation movements may have new fronts against them;

4. national liberation movements must use the military circumstances and develop their own anti-Bolshevik struggle, including armed struggle, with such vigour and in such a scale that, in the most appropriate situation, they can raise a revolutionary uprising of the whole nation, destroy the enemy occupation and consolidate their state independence;

5. is the general guideline for enslaved peoples in all stages of the development of war: to create their own revolutionary, armed force, to take an active stance against all military events on their land, both hostile and friendly, to show their own initiative and create perfect facts, in accordance with the radio of national independence struggle.

### ***5. Evolution of Bolshevism and partial achievements of the struggle***

When we considered the three main possibilities for profound change in the sub-Bolshevik space, we noted the evolution of Bolshevism, its system and regime as one of those possibilities. In Ukrainian political life abroad, there are also concepts based on the belief that the evolutionary development of the Bolshevik system leads to increasingly freer and better living conditions for the people and the human unit, and that such step-by-step changes will eventually completely eliminate the current unbearable situation. Similarly, in democratic states, we often encounter hopes for the evolution of Bolshevism in the direction of increasing freedoms within the USSR and blunting Moscow's expansion against other states. Therefore, we need to reflect on this issue, as it is central to some political concepts.

As in all life, so in the sub-Bolshevik situation and in the Bolshevik system, changes occur. No state, social and political system is absolutely and unshakable, and neither is the Bolshevik system. Among the changes that are taking place in the USSR, there are also those that, in comparison with the pre-existing situation, create somewhat freer, better conditions for the life of man and the people in individual areas. But on this basis, it is not yet



can assess the evolution of Bolshevism, its direction and significance. For not all the changes that take place in sub-Bolshevik life stem from the evolution of the Bolshevik system.

First of , we must clarify what we mean by this concept. By the evolution of Bolshevism we mean those stepwise changes in the Bolshevik system that occur at the prompting, will, or by design of factors belonging to the Bolshevik system and regime. The main emphasis is not on the fact that the initiative for change must be of Bolshevik origin, but only on the inherent content of this change, its direction and consequent effect. Thus, the evolution of Bolshevism also includes such changes as those carried out by the Bolshevik regime, adapting to external influences or to the internal situation in the countries it occupies, without, however, changing the general course of pursuit of its goal.

From evolutionary changes in the Bolshevik system, we distinguish changes forced by the struggle of enslaved peoples, internal opponents of the regime, or by the pressure of external forces, changes contrary to the Bolsheviks' goals and desires, which they make out of necessity. The essential difference lies in the quality of the changes of the first and second categories, in their significance and consequences for both Bolshevism and its opponents.

The Bolsheviks interpret changes of an evolutionary nature positively, regardless of whether they are made on their own initiative or under external influence, or even from the , under pressure. The important thing is that the content and consequences of those changes fit into their plans, do not contradict their goals, and help them to maintain and consolidate their positions. Although other factors often give impetus to changes in the Bolshevik system and politics, the Bolshevik regime always tries to maintain its main line and to put such a meaning into new methods and tactical aspirations that they benefit Bolshevism, not its opponents. When it succeeds, the Bolsheviks can interpret such changes as their success, as a further step towards achieving their goals in domestic or foreign policy.

When it comes to changes tainted and initiated by the Bolsheviks themselves, they always serve exclusively Bolshevik goals. Even when it comes to the internal struggle between the

rival groups in the Communist Party, the motive and object of this struggle is always the rationale of Bolshevism itself, the interests of the Communist Party and the regime, and not the good of the people. Each group competed for dictatorial power for itself and for the most successful consolidation and spread of Bolshevism's domination over the peoples. There were and are no currents or groups in the Communist Party that would defend the people, their rights, freedom and welfare by mitigating the Bolshevik system, limiting communist totalism and dictatorship. Similarly, there are no anti-imperialist or at least less imperialist tendencies or groups in the USSR Communist Party that would aim for the freedom of peoples rather than their enslavement by Moscow imperialism and that would resist its tyranny and further expansion.

Non-imperialist, freedom-loving currents and forces that care about the good of the people cannot arise and develop in the Bolshevik Party for two reasons: first, because Bolshevism in its fundamental foundations disregards the will and good of man and the people and, with its materialistic, totalitarian and dictatorial attitude, strives to subjugate all people and all nations, their whole being, to the machine of the communist totalitarian state, which is owned by Moscow. Secondly, the Communist Party is built on the basis of a strict selection and verification process, so that only those elements accepted by the Communist doctrine and Bolshevik guidance are gathered and retained in it.

The Communist Party is the bearer of Bolshevism, the Bolshevik system, and it is looking forward to the Bolshevik regime as its end. Since it has no ideas or people who would strive for the freedom and good of the people and the human unit, everything in it is geared towards the maintenance and spread of Bolshevik slavery and exploitation, all efforts and actions that come from it must be the . This applies equally to what the Bolsheviks do on their own initiative as it does to their aspirations, which are a reaction to a Menshevik initiative, when the Bolsheviks take them in their own direction, at their own will.

This category of changes in the Bolshevik system, in the methods and tactics of the regime, which belongs to the evolution of Bolshevism, is important

a factor thanks to which Bolshevism is maintained and spread in time and space. Variability of tactics and forms of action is one of the most important principles of Bolshevik practice, and is used in particular when it comes to insidious deception and weakening the pressure or resistance of forces hostile to Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks are in constant struggle with those peoples they have already ordered to be enslaved, as well as with others they are reaching. The direct use of violence does not always and everywhere succeed in defeating the healthy, freedom-loving forces of peoples. Subterfuge must help where violence does not work, or where there is no strength for a frontal struggle.

As we can see, Bolshevik methods of changing tactics and bringing their opponents into the field by planetary changes are giving Moscow the desired success, despite the fact that these methods are already well known. The nations that fall into Bolshevik captivity or are threatened by it are unwilling and unable to benefit from the bitter experience of those nations that have long since learned the true nature of Bolshevism. Both in the politics of foreign countries and in some circles of enslaved peoples, the orientation towards fundamental changes in the Bolshevik system has not faded. Against this background, new, false hopes are being raised that various changes in Bolshevism will lead to the rebirth of its predatory nature. The main goal of the Bolshevik tactic of "respectable change" is precisely to create and reinforce such false hopes and to use them to disintegrate anti-Bolshevik forces in the world.

We have previously concluded that the evolutionary changes in Bolshevism do not lead to its transformation into a non-imperialist and popularly acceptable system because it does not have the ideological foundations or the corresponding human material. This conclusion from a theoretical point of view is fully confirmed by observations from the entire preceding Bolshevik practice.

The almost forty-year period of Bolshevik rule provides too many grounds for a final summary. During that time, many shocking events took place in the countries under Bolshevik rule and in the Bolshevik regime itself. But among them one cannot find any evidence or even a sign that the Bolshevik system is introducing or even allowing development in the direction of freedom, respect for the rights and needs of peoples and human beings. If some events give rise to glimpses of hope in this direction at the beginning, then the

Their development always reveals the unchanging nature of Bolshevism. Behind the scenes of the supposedly great changes in the Bolshevik system are either meaningless tactical manoeuvres to confuse the people and opponents, or cunningly concealed plots to further tighten the system of slavery and extreme exploitation. This applies to all areas of life. The Bolsheviks have always consistently and recklessly pursued one goal - the comprehensive expansion and consolidation of their imperialist machine, especially its military, economic and technical potential, in order to conquer and subjugate the whole world. The entire so-called evolution of Bolshevism is guided and adheres to this direction.

Against this situation, there is no basis for pinning hopes on evolutionary changes in the Bolshevik system towards ever greater freedom for peoples and the human unit. Any political concepts built on such hopes must be classified as utopian or false concepts. Insofar as they are put forward as a basis for the guidance of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, or for the formation of free states against Bolshevik imperialism, such attempts conceal a grave danger of stirring up the freedom-loving forces in the world, from which Bolshevism would take the greatest advantage.

It has already been mentioned that we do not count changes forced on the Bolshevik regime by the struggle of enslaved peoples or by the pressure of external forces, contrary to Bolshevik plans and desires, as part of the evolution of Bolshevism. The first question that arises in this case concerns the very possibility of such changes. The reality of the Soviet Union gives a positive answer to this question. For example, let us recall the period of so-called Ukrainianisation and the NEP from the first achievement of the Bolshevik regime, the softened course of Bolshevik national and economic policy during the Second World War and in the postwar years, and the softening of policy towards the so-called satellite countries after the Magyar uprising. All the changes in this category were imposed on the Bolsheviks by the indomitable struggle and resistance of the enslaved peoples and by circumstances that were too difficult for them, so that the regime could not cope with violence alone. The fact that it was forced not only to make some changes to appease the opposing forces, but that it had to make actual, if partial, concessions is crucial. In these cases

The Bolsheviks are forced to make changes in their system, in national or socio-economic policy, which in terms of content are a deviation from Bolshevik plans and to some extent meet the demands of the people. This is the essential difference between these forced genuine changes and changes in the tactical order, also made under pressure, but without actually deviating from the Bolshevik line. We can see that when the resistance and struggle of enslaved peoples, or external pressure forces the Bolsheviks to make changes, in some cases they make only tactical changes, putting in them the content corresponding to their own plans, and in other cases they have to retreat from their plans. It is the strength of the struggle or the circumstances with which the Bolsheviks are dealing that decides whether they are forced to actually retreat.

Furthermore, we observe that the Bolsheviks always try to wrap up all concessions made under duress. Whether this is done in a completely open way, or whether the very forms of the changes made remain, and a different content, desired by the Bolsheviks, is put into them - this is a secondary question of tactics. However, the Bolsheviks never reconcile themselves to the constant consolidation of the actual achievements of anti-Bolshevik forces and actions and, whenever possible, try to eliminate them. Therefore, all changes that do not meet the Bolshevik goal and benefit the people can only be maintained through incessant struggle, just as only through struggle can they be won back from the regime. The beginning and end of the era of "Ukrainisation" and the NEP are classic examples. The Bolshevik regime was forced to abandon its own course in national and economic policy when it was brought to a catastrophic situation by the peasantry's resistance to the collectivisation that had begun and the unabated insurgency in Ukraine. When the regime later consolidated its forces and the revolutionary struggle in Ukraine was lulled into submission by the channeling of national energy into the development of national life within the Soviet state, a new wave of Bolshevik onslaught and the elimination of all previous mitigations came.

It is a fatal political mistake to confuse such changes resulting from the anti-Bolshevik struggle with changes within the evolution of Bolshevism. It is not just a matter of misunderstanding whether

shedding light on historical phenomena, their driving causes and the mechanics of their development. We are primarily interested in the false foundations for conclusions for the future. We are talking about the fundamental stance against Bolshevism. The thesis that the evolution of the Bolshevik system is moving towards the harmonisation of Bolshevism, its adjustment to the needs of the free development of man and the people, is the basis of the concept of passive waiting for the consequences of automatic development. This conception is in contrast to the conception of a continuous active struggle against Bolshevism, that is, (in the case of a people enslaved by Bolshevism) a revolutionary conception. For this purpose, we need to have a sharp eye in those cases in which the confusion of causes and effects of two completely different categories leads to false conclusions.

These considerations can be summarised in the following statements:

1. The evolutionary changes in the Bolshevik system, which take place under the overwhelming influence of Bolshevik elements, are aimed at consolidating Bolshevism, at spreading and strengthening its domination over the peoples. Such changes have no value for the liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism and do not contribute in the slightest to the attainment of freedom and better living conditions;
2. significant changes in the direction of freer circumstances for the people and the human unit can only be won from the Bolsheviks by the invincible anti-Bolshevik struggle of the people;
3. Both winning and maintaining any concessions by the regime in favour of the people's freedom depends on the nature and continuity of this struggle;
4. The significant changes in the sub-Bolshevik conditions, won by the people's liberation struggle, although they bring only partial relief, constitute important achievements on the path to freedom. They halt the implementation of Bolshevik plans, strengthen the independent aspirations and forces of the enslaved people.

## ***6. Anti-Bolshevik revolution - the only way to liberation***

In the previous chapters, we came to the conclusion that the war of other states against the USSR could not be the main bet for the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples, and the evolution of the Bolshevik system does not offer any respectable prospects under this view. It remains

The third possibility is revolutionary struggle.

First of all, let's clarify our understanding of revolution in general terms. The essence of a revolution is a fundamental change that encompasses the content and structure of the state-political, social, spiritual and economic life of one or more nations. New ideas, new forces and new systems rise up against the ideas, forces and systems that have prevailed in the hitherto existing order in order to eliminate them, to take over the reins of the life and development of their people and give it a new direction and new forms.

Struggle is an essential element of revolution. If in a certain state and social organism there are changes in the system, changes in the leading ideas and changes in the ruling forces, but without a sharp and general struggle, only in a normal way, for example, through a change of government, elections, plebiscite, etc., then such processes are not called revolution, even if their far-reaching content corresponds to the content of revolution. A revolution develops against such forces and such a system that, once they have gained power over the people, use it comprehensively in such a way as to make it impossible for other ideas to win, for another system to be created, and for power to pass into the hands of other forces.

A revolution is a whole process of struggle, from its beginnings to its final conclusion. Limiting the concept of revolution to the stage of its greatest development and completion, i.e. the final state or social , is as as calling a tree a crown without roots and trunk.

We consider the beginning of a revolution to be the moment when, under the influence of crystallised revolutionary ideas, the revolutionary forces begin a purposeful struggle to eliminate the existing, hated system and to create in its place a new, better one, outlined by the revolutionary ideology and programme. The development of a revolution is determined by the duration and development of its struggle. It can take the form of a long, protracted process in which the struggle unfolds in stages, with stages of greater and lesser tension, or it can have a short, brash course.

Only successfully completed revolutions, which end in the victory of revolutionary forces and ideas, have historical significance. And it is the final stage that decides whether a revolutionary process fully deserves the name of revolution. That is why in a simplistic, inaccurate

In this sense, the notion of revolution is equated with the stage of its completion. An unsuccessful revolution is a revolutionary process, having reached the stage of the final, decisive struggle - the stage of outright failure - is defeated and ends there. In contrast, such processes that, after the initiation and continuation of the revolutionary struggle, fail without even reaching the stage of final failure, are not fully defined by the name of revolution, but rather by its attempt.

Every full-fledged revolution has two main functions. The first is the destruction of the pre-existing system, the removal of the pre-existing system and those forces that established it and are trying to maintain it, the removal from influence of those ideas and doctrines that justify the old, destroyed system. This function of the revolution in relation to the old, pre-revolutionary system is destructive and destructive. But it must be emphasised that this definition is only conditionally applicable when it comes to defining the attitude and action of the revolution against the pre-revolutionary system, in our case the Bolshevik system.

The absolute, objective value of this destructive action in any revolution depends mainly on the qualities of the system it eliminates and on the value of the new ideas, the new order it introduces in place of the eliminated one. This can be explained more clearly by the following comparison:

Treatment is based on eliminating the disease state, the causes and consequences of the disease, and on promoting health. In relation to the disease itself, all treatment is a destructive action, but for a given organism, successful treatment is beneficial, beneficial. On the contrary, a treatment that, although it is true that it eliminates one disease, simultaneously causes another, even worse one, is harmful. For example, the Bolshevik revolution not only destroyed the national liberation revolutions that overthrew the tsarist regime and destroyed the Russian prison of the peoples, but it also introduced the Bolshevik system, which, according to various reviews, was much more difficult and worse than even the tsarist regime. The assessment of a destructive revolutionary action depends not only on its consequences, but also on its means and methods. The means and methods by which the revolutionary forces overcome the ruling regime and system and their defenders must be justified not only by expediency, but also by a necessary end.

The second function of the revolution is to build a new system in place of the overthrown one, that is, to implement a positive programme of revolutionary



movement. This constructive action completes the whole revolutionary process.

Both functions of revolution - the destruction of an intolerable, hostile system and the construction of a new, better one - are intertwined in one inseparable whole, they cannot be divided into two separate stages in action, nor can one of them be considered the goal and the other preparatory to it. Similarly, in revolutionary ideology, the negation of a hostile system goes hand in hand with the positive outline of one's own conceptions of a new order.

Revolution is possible only where the people are simultaneously extremely dissatisfied with the existing state and have a strong desire to create a new, defined order. And the destruction of the existing hostile order and the creation of their own, desired order is the goal of the revolution. In the course of the struggle, both aspirations are equal, inseparable drivers, and if at least one of them does not have the appropriate acuteness, then the revolutionary power does not have the appropriate tension. As mentioned above, both functions in revolutionary action go hand in hand, not one after the other.

Only the real completion of the construction of a new order comes after the final destruction of the enemy. Until then, the action that is carried out from the beginning of the revolutionary process is based on the fact that the struggle against the enemy state simultaneously mobilises and prepares the people to build a better system according to the revolutionary concept.

The different kinds of revolutions are defined, first of all, the basis of what is the active force of the revolution and, secondly, according to its content and the area of life that is the main subject of the revolutionary process.

A national revolution is a revolutionary struggle of a nation against foreign enslavement, exploitation, deprivation of rights and opportunities for free development. Every national revolution has two main features. The first is the active and solidarity participation in it of the whole nation, all the main parts and social strata of a given nation. The second main feature is the struggle for a fundamental change in the situation of the entire nation, in the conditions of its life and development in various areas. This distinguishes a national revolution from social, class revolutions, which are primarily concerned with the situation of a particular part of the nation and in which the active force is the specified social strata - part of the nation. A national revolution has a much broader scope and deeper meaning than internal revolutions, which aim to change the state and social system, remove ruling circles or layers from power, etc.

II.

By presenting a few general outlines, we do not intend to develop an entire theory of revolution here. An introductory clarification of these concepts is necessary for greater clarity in the coverage of specific issues that are the subject of further consideration.

The main real basis of the revolutionary concept of liberation is the own strength and struggle of the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism. In this way, it fundamentally differs from all orientations towards foreign forces, including, in particular, the bet on a war between the Western powers and the USSR, and from hopes for a beneficial spontaneous evolution of the Bolshevik system. The revolutionary conception neither denies nor disregards the importance that the commitment and assistance of foreign powers, and in particular their war against the Bolshevik bloc, can have for the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle. Only these factors are considered to be entertaining and auxiliary, not the main ones in the liberation.

Firstly, because it is not certain whether and to what extent they will act, and secondly, because their aims may be at serious odds with the liberation goal of the enslaved peoples. The revolutionary concept does not accept such uncertain external factors as the basis of liberation struggles. It also rejects the reliance on the evolution of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik system. Its inherent evolutionary development, normalised by Bolshevik goals and factors, is measured against the consolidation of Bolshevik enslavement. Changes in the Bolshevik system that bring some relief to the people are only the result of pressure from anti-Bolshevik forces and unfavourable circumstances for the regime, and in particular the achievements of the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the peoples enslaved by it.

According to the revolutionary concept, the subject of the liberation process must be the enslaved peoples themselves. In a schematic simplification, the liberation revolution is based on the reversal of the existing order: now Ukraine and other peoples are the subject-object of oppression, exploitation and destruction, and the subject that imposed, maintains and benefits from this state is the Bolshevik regime, the Communist Party and the Russian imperialist forces. In the revolution, the enslaved peoples become the subject of action, the shaper of the new order, and the Bolshevik regime, the Bolshevik party and system, and all other imperialist factors become the subject of destructive revolutionary action. Obviously, the process of

of the anti-Bolshevik, national liberation revolution is too complex and multifaceted to be fully captured by a simplistic, schematic outline. However, this definition corresponds to the main principle in the mechanics of revolutionary struggle.

The reliance of the liberation cause on the enslaved peoples' own strength and struggle is based primarily on the invincible desire for national independence and personal freedom, for better living conditions and free development in all areas, and on the fact that the existing state, forcibly imposed and maintained by the Bolshevik system, is completely opposed to the aspirations, vital needs and very nature of these peoples.

The starting point of the revolutionary concept is the situation of the peoples created by Bolshevism. It is true that other concepts also proceed from this point, which aim to eliminate Bolshevik enslavement and fundamentally change the whole situation. But the carriers of other concepts look for solutions outside the complex of forces in our space, wait for liberation from outside forces, or even worse, hope for useful changes in the enemy camp itself, in the Bolshevik system. Instead, the concept of self-liberation of enslaved peoples takes into account primarily the autochthonous forces of the sub-Bolshevik space, which are inextricably linked to it and have a vital interest in its development. Since the state created by Bolshevism and Russian imperialism is unacceptable and hostile to the peoples it enslaves and causes a desire for change, for its elimination, according to the revolutionary concept, these aspirations are the main actor and the only unchanging force that can move the liberation cause forward and bring it to victory.

The main accent of the revolutionary concept lies in the strong-willed determination of the peoples oppressed by Bolshevism. It is true that the difficult living conditions, Bolshevik oppression and exploitation create a suitable ground for the emergence of anti-Bolshevik sentiment, but this is not enough to generate a revolutionary spirit of struggle. History, the recent past and the present provide many examples of how peoples have endured the most severe regimes, hardships and even systematic extermination without resistance. For a nation to rise up to fight against a regime unfavourable to it, or foreign enslavement, it requires, in addition to negation of the existing state, a contrast

He needs to have his own life ideals, his own goals and aspirations, which are shared by the people, and, above all, the appropriate willpower and readiness to fight.

The concept of the destruction of Bolshevism and the liberation of the oppressed peoples from Moscow's imperialist enslavement by their own struggle is based on the existence of the above factors.

The Ukrainian nation and other peoples in the same situation not only see Moscow's domination and the communist system as the greatest disaster and are aware of the extreme opposition between their ideals, aspirations and vital interests on the one hand and Bolshevism and communism on the other. They are also imbued with a hostile attitude towards Bolshevism, a desire to destroy it and to develop their lives in independent national states according to their own understanding and ideals. This urge, which stems from the spirit and nature of these peoples and is rooted in their history, filled with the struggle for freedom and identity, remains alive and well, despite all Bolshevik efforts to destroy and silence it. The enemy failed to kill the indomitable spirit of fighting evil and violence for truth and freedom in Ukrainians and other enslaved peoples.

It is now possible to state that the Bolshevik plan to change the spirit, character and attitudes of the enslaved peoples by systematically destroying the disobedient and leading national elements and educating new generations in the communist spirit, in complete isolation from and in opposition to national traditions, was frustrated and proved to be unrealisable. Despite the undoubtedly very heavy losses suffered by the national substance of the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism as a result of these practices, the roots of national identity live on and new healthy shoots are constantly growing from them.

The resistance and struggle of Ukraine and other peoples against Moscow's imperialist and communist enslavement has been going on in various forms for four decades now. The continuation of this struggle, despite the most unfavourable and difficult conditions, testifies to the indomitable perseverance that lives in these peoples. From this point of view, it is not only the organised and systematically waged liberation struggle that is important, but also its various spontaneous, spontaneous manifestations, which

indicate that resistance to the enemy and the struggle for national independence stem from the deepest essence of the nation. A particularly important indicator of this is the massive scale of anti-regime resistance in various areas and in a variety of forms, stemming from the unanimous internal guidance of the people.

When considering the general foundations of the revolutionary concept of liberation, it is necessary to touch upon the question of the power relationship between the potentialities of the liberation and Bolshevik camps. This is the very question that causes some of the opponents of Bolshevism (who also want its fall and national liberation) to disbelieve in the possibility and success of an anti-Bolshevik revolution. They look at the existing situation and, on this basis, assess the potential possibilities quite pessimistically. It is true that the Bolshevik regime has enormous ready-made forces and means in the hands of the largest totalitarian state. In particular, the military and police forces, the entire state apparatus, and the fact that all sectors of the economy are at the complete disposal of the Bolshevik regime and under the strict comprehensive control of the Communist Party give the impression of an impregnable fortress.

However, the concept of revolution does not rely on a struggle from the outside against the forces wielded by the Bolshevik regime. The revolutionary struggle is directed against the inherent enemy - against the communist party and regime, against the ruling centres and the voluntary, decadent carriers and defenders of the Bolshevik system and Russian imperialism.

On the contrary, in relation to those forces that under normal circumstances are under the orders of the regime and carry out its will, but which the Bolsheviks mobilise, keep in obedience and in action only by means of coercion and deception, the revolutionary movement does not take a hostile position, but only tries to bring them to its side. First and foremost, the aim is to pull all such people away from obedience to the Bolshevik regime, which would paralyse a significant part of its power. When a significant number of those people who have been obedient executors of the regime's will become active on the side of the revolution and use all the means their disposal, including weapons, in the struggle against it, then the balance of power between the two opposing camps will immediately turn in favour of the liberation cause.

Is such a development possible? Giving a positive answer to this question

In answering this question, we must rely on the real world. The Bolshevik regime, the Communist Party and their loyal defenders and servants make up a very small part of the total population of the countries they have conquered. The vast majority of this population not only does not admire communism, but considers it a great evil and is inherently hostile to it, to the Bolshevik regime, to the party and their system. However, the Bolshevik totalitarian system is structured in such a way that not only the entire political and police power is concentrated in the hands of the party and the regime - the state bureaucracy - but also the complete control of the entire national economy and all spheres of life, so that the entire nation and every human unit is under comprehensive control and completely dependent on this system. This situation creates the impression of Bolshevism's omnipotence, of the complete powerlessness of the human unit and the entire nation when it comes to any action independent of the regime, let alone any resistance to it. But this is only one side of reality, which the Bolsheviks are deliberately trying to generalise and portray as unchanging.

Meanwhile, the totalitarianism of the Bolshevik system also has the opposite effect. The state organisation and management of all areas of life and at all levels, from the most basic to the smallest economic activities, entails not only a functional but also an organisational interweaving of all the cells and links of this life, so that any disturbance of function in one place has far-reaching negative consequences for the whole. By encompassing all the links and institutions of collective life with its direct disposition and control, the Bolshevik regime made them not only an instrument but also the basis of its power and its dominion. In such a situation, any slowdown, distortion, or damage to the functioning of any cell or institution acquires far-reaching significance as an undermining of the entire Bolshevik system. Everything that is part of Bolshevism's power and dominance becomes a factor in its faltering and decline when it ceases to fulfil the function that the plan defines for it.

Looking at the Bolshevik system from this perspective, we see that the people and every human unit are not only the object of Bolshevik domination and exploitation, but also an active factor on which the functioning of the components of the entire state mechanism depends. If the overwhelming majority of the citizens of the former Soviet Union, who hated the

the Bolshevik regime, stopped doing its bidding and, its own instruction, unanimously opposed it, then the giant state mechanism it controlled would have been sparred and the Bolsheviks would have been left powerless, deprived of the tools of their trade.

The communists and loyal defenders of the regime occupy mainly only leading positions in various parts and cells of the total state life, and the labour force is a non-party and mostly anti-communist element. From the moment it actively opposes the communist leadership and the whole regime, this element will be cut off from important vital bases. And there are very few sectors and institutions where communists and their loyalists would form not only the commanding but also the main acting cadre.

The state administration bureaucracy and the Bolshevik police, which are almost entirely staffed by Bolshevik cadres, are the outliers in this respect. By concentrating their forces in the state administration and the police, the Bolsheviks have made them not only their main base, but also the most important force factor, which is to dominate all spheres of life with total dictatorship and unbridled terror and to crush all anti-Communist activities. The success of this Bolshevik terrorist system is also due to the fact that it deals mainly with a passive mass. The peoples suppressed by Bolshevism, despite their general hatred of it, are a mixed, dispersed and weakly active force due to their lack of organisation in the anti-Bolshevik struggle. The enormous revolutionary potential of the people lies dormant and unactivated.

In such a situation, the human unit feels isolated and powerless against the regime's violent system in its daily encounters with the regime in various areas. And the struggle of active anti-Bolshevik forces does not have the same success with the passivity of the general population as it would if it were with its active support. Under such conditions, the practice of individual sabotage of Bolshevik plans and their substitution with the opposite content developed widely. This practice, applied in daily work in various areas, is the most common manifestation of the general anti-Bolshevik attitude. Despite its small and difficult to detect forms, it undermines various Bolshevik

This is one of the main reasons for the constant crisis in the life of the former Soviet Union. This causes serious difficulties for the regime and undermines its position, but it cannot completely overthrow it and lead the people to liberation.

A complete change in the situation in favour of the liberation cause will come when the majority of the hidden, potential opponents of Bolshevism come forward to actively fight. When, instead of quiet, fragmented resistance and isolated unauthorised actions, the entire nation, together with organised revolutionary forces, takes up a systematic struggle, then the method of separate subjugation and destruction of opponents one by one will not give the Bolsheviks success. In the situation of a general revolutionary breakdown, the deployment of loyal police forces will not help them either. Cut off from control of various spheres of life and deprived of a broader organic base, Bolshevik cadres concentrated in anti-revolutionary police and military formations will be a closed island in a sea of anti-Bolshevik elements, their fate sealed by the final offensive of the growing military revolutionary forces.

Therefore, the main problem of the liberation revolution is the mobilisation and organisation of the existing, but dispersed and inactive potential of the anti-communist-minded people and the creation an effective force for the revolutionary struggle. Since there is suitable soil and material for this, the task of the organised forces is to solve this problem through planned and consistent revolutionary action.

## ***7. The National Liberation Revolution and Russian anti-communist forces***

When we speak of the liberation revolution, we often mean all the anti-Bolshevik factors that can play an active role in the struggle. This can give the mistaken impression that we are talking about a single revolutionary, anti-Bolshevik process that will cover the entire USSR and the so-called satellite countries. This is the same concept that Moscow's emigration circles, as well as some foreign factors, are advocating. Therefore, we need to have a more precise understanding of our position in these matters.



First of all, the question arises: are there any real grounds and possibilities all the anti-Bolshevik forces in the former Soviet Union to wage their struggle on a united, coordinated front? In this matter, we are faced with two incorrect and mutually opposing theses.

The first of them is replaced by Muscovites and foreign pro-Russian factors. It gives a positive answer to this question and is based on the fact that, despite all the oppositions between peoples and their liberation forces, all have a common enemy whom they all want to eliminate, and this provides the basis for a joint coordinated anti-Bolshevik struggle. Therefore, all matters that are the subject of disagreement and enmity, including the question of the future order in the place of the USSR, must be set aside until Bolshevism is destroyed.

The second, opposite thesis speaks only of a common and united anti-Bolshevik front, created by the liberation forces of the enslaved non-Russian peoples. As for Moscow's anti-Communist forces and aspirations, there are two variants of this concept. The first of them states that Moscow's genuine anti-Bolshevik currents find common ground with the enslaved non-Russian peoples on the basis of anti-communism and anti-imperialism and are therefore (at least theoretically) included in this common front. According to the second option, there are no real, active anti-Bolshevik currents or forces in the Russian people, because all Muscovites are imbued with an imperialist attitude that drowns out even hostility against the communist system and regime, so that when it comes to active struggle, all Muscovites, also anti-communists, will defend the indivisibility of the Bolshevik empire. Both of these theses were exposed by emigrant political activity, and the climate for their development was created more by external action than by direct anti-Bolshevik struggle.

In determining our position in this matter, we take as our starting point the assessment of the existing anti-Bolshevik forces and processes and are guided by the expediency of the liberation struggle. Given that the revolutionary struggle against Bolshevism and the liberation of the peoples enslaved by it is a very difficult task, we must take into account all those factors - forces and tendencies - that can take part in this struggle or play any useful role in it.

There is no reason or need to deny that the Russian people also have anti-Bolshevik sentiments and tendencies, and that there are many Muscovites who are convinced opponents of the communist system and regime and who wish to eliminate and change it. Despite the Moscow roots of Bolshevism and its close association with Moscow imperialism, these anti-communist sentiments and aspirations are a significant factor that complicates the regime's position and, in certain situations, can play an important role in the active anti-regime struggle. It is in the interest of the general anti-Bolshevik struggle, and in the interest of the liberation revolution of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, that these anti-communist tendencies and forces in Russia are activated and strengthened as much as possible.

On the other hand, it would be a big mistake to assume that these anti-regime sentiments among the Russian people could be the engine of the same revolutionary struggle as among other peoples struggling for their national liberation. The political attitudes of Muscovites, the general Russian people, have been and continue to be dominated by imperialist tendencies. If Muscovites are hostile to the existing system and are ready for revolutionary struggle, this applies only to the elimination of the communist system and regime in the USSR while preserving the existence of the Russian Empire. They do not think about its collapse and the creation of independent national states in its place. On the contrary. Most of those Muscovites who are ready to actively fight against the communist regime will defend the empire themselves, either as a new imperialist force or even in the Bolshevik ranks, depending on the overall situation.

Thus, in the classification of all anti-Bolshevik processes and forces that are active or still exist only in potential in the sub-Bolshevik area, we have to distinguish between two main groups: the first is the national liberation struggles and revolutionary forces of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, who are fighting for their liberation from Russian imperialism, for the destruction of the Bolshevik system and for the construction of their own national states with their own non-communist system. All of these liberation movements have a common denominator in both their negative and positive goals: they are all fighting against Russian aggressive imperialism and its carriers of all political colours, in particular against Bolshevism and communism.

regime and system. Each nation fights primarily for its own state independence, without limiting its liberation goals. The collapse of the Russian empire, the restriction of the Russian state on Russian ethnographic territories and the complete liberation of all peoples from Russian domination are the common goal of all, because only this will create certain preconditions and guarantees for the long-term liberation of each nation in particular. The national liberation struggle of the enslaved peoples is the main and most confident force in the anti-Bolshevik revolution. The proportion of this factor is determined by the great zeal and unanimity of these peoples in their struggles.

The second, much weaker, but completely separate group is made up of Russian anti-communist elements. As already mentioned, their anti-Bolshevik attitude stems from their negation of the communist system and doctrine and leads to the struggle against the regime for the creation of a new state and social order, but with the preservation of the empire. Determining the proportion of this factor in the anti-Bolshevik struggle on the basis of the total number of Muscovites and their dominant position in the empire would be a mistake. And this is not only because of the problematic percentage of anti-communists to elements loyal to the regime. It is primarily about the quality of that potential in the anti-Bolshevik struggle, about its psycho-political split, and thus its low inspiration and even uncertainty. Although the anti-communist Muscovites share with the national liberation movements a negative attitude against communism, they are also inspired by and equal to the Bolsheviks by an imperialist attitude and hostility to the independent struggles of enslaved peoples.

In this state of affairs, there is no common ground for a common front of national liberation and Russian anti-communist forces. The fact that both are against the communist regime and the communist system does not constitute sufficient grounds for any political and operational coordination to allow us to speak of a common front. When it comes to positive goals, there is a diametric opposition and mutual hostility between the national liberation struggles of the enslaved peoples and the anti-regime aspirations of the Russian people. But even in negative terms, there is no connection between them

common denominator. In the struggle against Bolshevism, the enslaved peoples are fighting not only the communist system and regime, but also the Moscow imperialist power and its domination. It is not possible to separate these two natures and two functions of Bolshevism, in particular in the foreign, non-Russian countries that it forcibly keeps within the USSR, because they are organically intertwined. Even if there were a practical possibility to fight Bolshevism in such a way as to destroy only communism, and not to affect the imperial structure and its institutions, this would be completely contrary to the liberation aspirations of the enslaved peoples.

However, such half-heartedness in practical revolutionary action is completely impossible. Revolution is the destruction, the elimination of one system and the construction of a new one at once, in a unanimous, consistent process. The revolution does not develop in such a way that it first eliminates one state, creates an empty, clean place on which a new structure, a new order, is built later. The revolution does not create an empty space even for a short period of time, both in terms of the integrity of the state-social structure and in relation to its main . When the revolutionary forces defeat the enemy in any area so that they become masters of the situation there, then, destroying the enemy's organs of power, they immediately establish revolutionary power and introduce new content, system and new people in place of the Bolshevik content, system and Bolshevik elements in various state and social institutions. This applies to state, social, economic, military, cultural, and other institutions, in short, to the whole of life, which is covered by the state and social structure. The new revolutionary system and revolutionary institutions are built not only in accordance with the actual requirements of the period of revolutionary struggle, but also with an eye to the future. Although their design will have many features of temporariness, in their basic foundations they correspond to the projection of a long-lasting post-revolutionary system.

Thus, if the revolution in the enslaved countries was to eliminate only communism and preserve the imperial state structure, then instead of building an independent, national-state life, Bolshevik institutions and elements would have to be replaced by similar ones, although not communist, but equally loyal to Moscow. It is no longer possible

to expect the peoples enslaved by Moscow to be so naive that, after the most painful historical experience in this regard, they would throw off one Moscow yoke and impose a new one with their own hands.

Those who understand the essence of revolutionary changes, the quality and nature of their drivers and the mechanics of revolutionary processes understand that every revolution can only develop by its own driving force in the direction outlined by its own leading ideas. Ideas that meet the aspirations, needs and character of the people can raise a nation to revolutionary struggle, i.e. become the driving force behind a national revolution. If different peoples simultaneously wage revolutionary struggles in the name of opposing ideas, pursuing opposing goals, then there can be no question of their unity or any coordination between them, and the points or segments of the effective junction between them become foci or fronts of mutual struggle.

The final conclusion from higher considerations is that the national liberation revolutions of the peoples enslaved by Moscow and the anti-Communist struggle within the Russian people do not and cannot create a single front, a single revolutionary process.

Each of these two processes has different goals and must develop in its own way. The national liberation struggle could have a common language and a common front only with such Moscow anti-Communist forces that would not have imperialist tendencies and would not oppose the independent goals of the enslaved peoples either in concept or in practice. But there are neither such forces nor such a concept with more influence among Muscovites.

Any attempts to unite the mutually opposing anti-Bolshevik forces and movements into a single entity would only bring harm to each of them and to the general anti-Bolshevik struggle. Since there is no middle ground on which they could come together and cooperate, one side would have to accept the concept of the other side, to some extent renouncing its own goals in order to find common ground. Such a solution is possible only if the issues that are the subject of the opposition are of secondary importance to the conceding side and do not belong to the main driving ideas of its revolutionary struggle. Otherwise, such a resolution discharges the revolutionary inspiration and relative forces become incapable of

of the struggle. As a result, this leads to the demobilisation of one partner from such an unnatural common front, and at the same time weakens the other, because cooperation with an unfriendly ally always has a corrosive, demoralising effect. And ideological and moral factors are of paramount importance in a revolution.

To elaborate on these considerations, we argue that the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the enslaved peoples would have been exhausted if national liberation and independence goals had been removed from it and reduced to exclusively anti-communist terms, along with Moscow's anti-regime, but equally imperialist action. The greatest hatred of these peoples for the communist system and regime would not have stopped this fall of the revolutionary spirit, for it is inextricably linked to the same hatred of Moscow's invasive imperialism and the desire for complete and comprehensive liberation. When a living soul is split in two, or a living organism is cut up, then neither half is capable of life. To the extent that the national and independent aspirations of Ukrainians and other peoples enslaved by Moscow cannot be stifled, they would be planting, instead of strengthening, a common front with the Moscow imperialists.

Likewise, Russian anti-Communist but imperialist forces would not accept or voluntarily cooperate with the independence movements of enslaved peoples. If they were on the same front as these peoples, they would be an uncertain and dangerous ally for them, who, despite their hostility to communism, could act in favour of the Bolsheviks to preserve the integrity of the empire.

At this point, it is necessary to touch upon the concept of the so-called non-predetermination. Its meaning is that the question of the future geopolitical order on the territory of the present-day USSR should remain open until the elimination of Bolshevism, and the anti-Bolshevik forces, both of the enslaved peoples and Russians, should refrain from any measures to resolve this issue in one direction or the other: independent national states or the preservation of a multinational empire.

The preliminary findings clearly show that such a concept has no ground either among the enslaved peoples or among Muscovites, the very idea of indecision on the fundamental question of the future order

is completely incompatible with any liberation struggle. This concept is the product of foreign forces that want to influence the present and future development of anti-Bolshevik forces and actions, but do not take into account their nature and aspirations, only their own political rationale. These foreign factors would like to mechanically unite the two opposing camps in the anti-communist struggle, which are discussed here, on the basis of unpredictability. At the same time, they are primarily concerned with not having to face any compliments or difficulties in their own political action at this stage, so as not to face the alternative of which side to take in the anti-Soviet action.

Several years of attempts by outside factors to instil the concept of non-determination in emigrant political circles have not yielded any significant success, despite their important contributions and measures. Such attempts are even less meaningful when it comes to the liberation struggles of peoples on their own land. The state envisaged by the non-settlement concept can only be brought about for a transitional period by a foreign force - a military occupation. By temporarily managing the territories occupied in the war, it could prevent autochthonous tendencies from voicing themselves for some time. But this has nothing to do with the independent liberation struggle of peoples.

We have seen that the national liberation struggles of the peoples enslaved by Moscow cannot form a common front with Russian imperialist, albeit anti-communist, actions. How, then, does the arrangement of these unconnected forces and processes correspond to the rationale of the general anti-Bolshevik struggle? The answer to this question arises from the same preliminary findings: Firstly, they must form two completely separate fronts and, secondly, the spheres of action of each must be delimited so that there are as few planes of contact as possible, and thus no friction between them.

In such a situation, each of these factors can conduct its struggle against Bolshevism in accordance with its own ideological and political . In any case, both the enslaved peoples and the Moscow anti-communists can and should in such a situation direct all their efforts to the main front - against Bolshevism. In such a scenario, the full unfolding of the struggle on two separate fronts, with all the forces belonging to them, would have the same

effect on the general anti-Bolshevik cause, as the concentration and coordination of all these forces on one common front. Some of the negative consequences of the division of forces into two separate and completely uncoordinated, neither politically nor operationally, fronts are offset by similar compliments that arise for the Bolsheviks. In particular, from a political perspective, it is difficult for the Bolsheviks to reduce the struggle against such mutually opposing enemies to a common denominator: on the one hand, they have to cite Moscow's opponents as a response to Russian imperialist sentiments, and on the other hand, they need to take the wind out of the sails of national independence aspirations with opposing cries.

The problematic nature of this concept of two separate and distinct anti-Bolshevik fronts is due to the unquenchable imperialism of the Muscovites. Since they do not want to confine themselves to their own field of activity - the Russian ethnographic territory and the Russian national environment - but only try to interfere in the affairs of other peoples, impose their will on them and act as their superior, this must provoke a sharp reaction and struggle.

But this issue has deeper roots and a broader scope, and is not limited to the stance of Moscow's anti-communist forces against the peoples enslaved by Moscow and their liberation struggles. The main question - the extent to which imperialist motives, on the one hand, and anti-communist motives, on the other, are at work within the Russian people. When the imperialist tendencies are the strongest and dominate the anti-communist ones, even among such Moscow factors as are considered to be extreme anti-communists, this puts a question mark over the value of Russian anti-communism for the general anti-Bolshevik front. It cannot, then, be counted among the factors for whom the destruction of Bolshevism is a primary, vital concern and who, on this basis, can find common ground with other anti-Bolshevik forces. Moscow's anti-communism can be compared to opposition in other countries, which has a negative attitude towards the government and its policies but treats these differences as a purely internal matter.

When it comes to the anti-Bolshevik struggle of non-Moscow forces, which



is directed not only against the communist system but against Russian imperialism, then Moscow's opponents of communism usually leave aside their enmity to the communist system and regime and defend their imperialist positions together or in parallel with the Bolsheviks.

Considering all these doubts and contradictions, we must consider the Russian anti-communist potential to be an uncertain factor in the overall anti-Bolshevik struggle. Nevertheless, the activation of this factor on a separate, purely Russian front, in the Russian environment and on Moscow lands is expedient and useful.

Even the weak anti-Bolshevik actions in Muscovy itself, which substitute for the enemy's main base, are important. A prerequisite for a positive assessment of the action in this direction is that it cannot be carried out at the expense of any weakening of national liberation and anti-imperialist forces and actions.

What are the conclusions for the independence policy and national liberation struggle that emerge from the clarified assessment of the Russian anti-Communist factor? The first, main conclusion has already been presented - the principle of complete separation of Moscow's anti-communist forces and actions from the national liberation movements of the peoples oppressed by Moscow. Adhering to this premise, we have a positive attitude to Moscow's anti-communist actions carried out in the Russian environment and on Russian territory.

First of all, we are trying to direct Moscow's anti-communist forces to actively fight against the Bolshevik regime on indigenous Russian territory and for power in Russia itself. Since non-Russian, national liberation forces have the ability to influence and strengthen Moscow's anti-regime actions, they should also develop their activities in this direction. But such opportunities are very limited. Basically, we have to accept that the development of Moscow's anti-regime actions, both now and in the future, will go completely beyond our influence and will be directed against us.

The implementation of the postulate of the separation of the two anti-Bolshevik fronts - the national liberation front and the Moscow front - is met with resistance and neglect on the Russian side. Only the peoples enslaved by Moscow want to avoid conflicts with Moscow's anti-communist forces, limiting themselves to their inherent right to act and

and dissociating themselves from the Russian sphere. On the other hand, there is a clear and consistent aggressive attitude on the part of Russia against these peoples. All Moscow political forces that somehow manifest their organised existence and activity, regardless of their more or less anti-Communist orientation, take an equally hostile stance against the independent struggles of the enslaved peoples. They all strive to maintain Russia's supremacy over Ukraine and other subjugated countries, to preserve the Russian empire at the expense of the enslavement of other peoples. This imperialist attitude prevails over the anti-communist attitude of all organised Moscow forces and pushes them to an aggressive, irreconcilable attitude towards national liberation movements. It manifests itself sometimes in open negation and hostility, and then again in attempts to subordinate the anti-Bolshevik liberation forces and actions of non-Russian peoples to the Russian imperial concept and the Russian leadership in the form of the so-called non-prejudice and a common anti-Communist front.

Moscow's anti-Communist forces exist and operate today only in foreign countries. However, it should be borne in mind that in a situation suitable for the wider anti-communist forces, they will also deploy their activities in the former Soviet Union, in particular with the support of external factors. Then their actions in the region could follow the same line as now abroad, turning not only against communism, but even more sharply against national liberation movements.

The possibility of creating a second Moscow front against the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples has important merit and should be taken into account in the plans for the revolution. This second Moscow front would be under anti-Communist slogans, but against the independence struggle, and would be as aggressively imperialist as Bolshevism. When the national liberation movements are challenged from this side, then we must accept it and fight on two fronts. But as long as it does not come to immediate confrontation, and in the midst of the struggle, we must bear in mind the opposition and mutual hostility between the two Russian imperialist fronts.

The main guideline of the policy and strategy of national liberation movements in this regard is to take measures to ensure the existence and activity of

Moscow's anti-communist front, even when it simultaneously turns against them. The crucial question is whether the Moscow forces involved are really engaged in an active, respectable struggle against the Bolshevik regime, apart from their imperialist fight against the independence movements, or whether anti-independence struggle is their inherent and only action, and anti-communist slogans serve only to cover them and deceive them. In the latter case, we are dealing with hidden Bolshevik accomplices, and they cannot be classified as anti-communist forces. When we have genuine anti-communist Moscow forces against us, which are actively fighting the Bolsheviks and at the same time forming a front against the independence of enslaved peoples, then we treat this front as secondary, while the Bolsheviks remain the main, most formidable and powerful enemy. This is our second conclusion from the assessment of the importance of the Moscow anti-Communist factor.

In order to understand this instruction correctly, one must always keep in mind that the main and constant enemy of the independence of the enslaved peoples is Moscow imperialism, all the imperialist forces of Russia. But these forces can oppose the national liberation struggle as a monolith, as a single front, or they can be so divided, so divided by internal struggles that the strength of their collective offensive against other peoples is greatly reduced. This second situation is more useful for the liberation struggle and is actually about its emergence and maintenance. If there is a serious internal rebellion and fierce mutual struggle within the Russian people, who are the bearers of invasive imperialism, then it is easier to wage the liberation struggle separately against the former and the latter than when the Bolsheviks are in control of all Russian forces. In the future, anti-Communist forces may prevail in Russia and again create a monolithic force of imperialist Moscow against the independence of the enslaved peoples. Then they would become the main enemy.

When we talk about the main and secondary fronts created by Moscow's imperialist forces against the independence of the peoples that are yarmulated or threatened by Russia, we take into account, first of all, the power relations between them. It would be a mistake to treat some Moscow imperialists as formidable and others as milder on the basis of their programme, system and methods of action.

Because under this review, changes may occur in one or the other direction, but these changes are of an internal Russian nature, while the relationship of Russian imperialism to other peoples is not affected. The struggle against this imperialism be measured only in terms of getting rid of it, or in terms of securing one of its abolitions, leaving other abolitions to hold on and develop into a terrible enemy again. The peoples waging a liberation or defensive war against Russian imperialism must aim at its complete defeat, or at least at pushing it away from their borders, treating all its forms of difference and all Moscow's imperialist forces as equally dangerous components of the same enemy.

The distinction between the main and secondary fronts in the struggle against the Moscow imperialist forces is only of tactical, time-limited importance. It is about creating, strengthening and using such a division of the Russian imperialist forces into mutually hostile camps so that the struggle between them weakens their joint offensive against foreign peoples. At each time, we consider the front against the dominant Moscow camp, which is now Bolshevism, which controls the forces and means of the entire empire and mobilises all the imperialist aspirations and energy of the Russian people against the national liberation struggle, to be the main one. We consider the front against Moscow's anti-communist forces to be secondary, since they are fuelling the breakdown and internal struggle in the camp of Moscow imperialism. If the relationship of forces between the Bolsheviks and the Russian anti-Communists were resolved in the development of the struggle, then the tactic of distinguishing between a primary and secondary front would cease to be relevant and the struggle against both would require the same amount of energy. When the struggle between the opposing Russian imperialist forces, the Bolsheviks and the anti-Communists, reaches the final stage of victory for one camp, then the victorious camp will again be the unchanging imperialist camp, which will become the main enemy of the independence of the oppressed peoples and must be fought against with the greatest possible force.

### ***8. Common front of national liberation revolutions***

It has already been said that all peoples fighting for their national liberation against imperialist Moscow are mutually

are natural allies and their competition creates a common front.

By emphasising the term "natural allies", we mean that the basis for alliance between the liberation struggles of these peoples is the similarity of their situation, the consonance of the goals of their independent policy and struggle, and the objective benefit to all these peoples from the anti-Bolshevik struggle of each nation in particular. A natural alliance based on such grounds is not fundamentally dependent on the existence of political and organisational-operational ties between the existing liberation forces of individual nations. It can be formalised and sealed by political and strategic blocs, but even without them, and even in the presence of overthrown political opposites for other reasons, it does not lose its power and significance. For example, Ukrainian-Polish relations: the Poles' stubborn insistence on unjustified claims to western Ukrainian lands makes any Ukrainian-Polish understanding and cooperation impossible. However, both peoples and their liberation forces are positively interested in the anti-Moscow and anti-Communist processes of the other nation and sympathetic to its national and independent struggle.

All the peoples enslaved by Moscow have the same enemy. In this respect, there are no such differences between them as there are with Moscow's anti-communist currents and forces. For the kneeling people under Bolshevik oppression, the deadly enemy is equally Moscow's invasive imperialism in all its manifestations, as well as communism - its currently strongest and most formidable form.

The national and independent struggles of every people enslaved by Moscow have not only an anti-communist content, but they are essentially directed against Russian imperialism, against its essence and power, its expansion and its dominant position in international political life. This internal orientation of the anti-Bolshevik struggles of each enslaved people and their importance in the international forum is the result of the entire development of the last decade. Various deviations from this basic line, which sometimes manifest themselves in the policy of certain groups or representative centres of various emigrations, are not of greater importance; they are usually due to opportunistic motives.

The remnants of older Russophile orientations and the resulting

different interpretations of communism and Russian expansionism have lost all influence and ground in the national independence movements of the enslaved peoples. Now, for everyone, communism and Moscow imperialism are the same enemy.

There is also a fundamental agreement in the positive liberation goals of all enslaved peoples. It lies in the fact that each nation seeks not only freedom for itself, but at the same time wishes to liberate other peoples from Bolshevism. Not only idealistic motives play a role in this, but above all cold political rationality. Due to the enormous growth of imperialist Russia's power and predatory nature, it would be much more difficult for each nation to gain and secure its independence from it if it were not on a common front with other nations. The more peoples are fighting at the same time, the more similar fronts Moscow has, the easier the struggle is and the more certain the victory of each nation in particular. And each successful completion of the independent struggle reduces the ambition and strength of Moscow's imperialism and increases its defences against new expansions. For the reasons that enslavement by Bolshevik Moscow is the most terrible disaster, and liberation and security from it is the most important, at the same time very difficult, thing equally for every nation, every nation must wish success in the anti-Bolshevik struggle of all other nations, not excluding those with whom it has enmity or disputes.

A common destiny, the same situation, the struggle against the same common enemy, the consonance of positive goals of the liberation struggle and mutual benefit are factors of natural alliance of all the peoples enslaved by Moscow in their anti-Bolshevik, liberation war. It is further strengthened by the same path to liberation that all these peoples must follow. This is the path of revolutionary struggle by the own forces of each nation and the unification of the revolutionary and liberation struggles of all peoples into a united anti-Bolshevik front.

The question may arise as to whether there is a contradiction between the concept of a common liberation front and the reliance on each nation's own strength. We answer this question in the negative on the basis of the following points:

The concept of a common liberation front is fundamentally different from the

The dependence of the liberation struggle on foreign states that are in a different position and have different goals and interests in relation to Russia;

The basis of the common front is the same position, the fight against a common enemy and the unanimity of the goal of each nation;

A common front does not require any people to renounce or limit the goal of their liberation struggle. On the contrary, it gives recognition and support to the liberation goal of each people by all other peoples fighting in a common front;

the common liberation front does not stop or limit the initiative and decisiveness of each nation in its anti-Bolshevik struggle and all actions.

The planning, organisation and conduct of the revolutionary struggle of each people belongs to its own liberation forces. Mutual assistance and coordination of actions shall be maintained in such forms and within such limits as are appropriate and beneficial to each national liberation movement in particular;

A common front of struggle does not require any nation to spend its revolutionary forces on actions, on such fronts and at such times that do not correspond to the expediency of its own struggle, and are not beneficial to it. Instead, a common front increases the possibilities, significance and success of the struggle of all national liberation forces;

By uniting the anti-Bolshevik, liberation struggles of the enslaved peoples in one front, not only are the revolutionary potentials of all these peoples and the consequences of their struggles summed up, but the fronts for Bolshevik Moscow are also stretched, which must simultaneously wage an imperialist struggle on all these fronts and divide its forces between them. In such a situation, each nation can count on the fact that it is not alone in the struggle and does not have the entire force of Russian imperialism against it, but only some part of it, which stands in a certain proportion to its size and strength. In this way, the common front strengthens the concept of liberation by one's own forces and one's own struggle and makes it more perceptible and realistic for small peoples as well.

The common front of the national liberation and anti-Bolshevik struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow is manifested in the political and strategic planes.

The latest political manifestations of the common front are as follows:

International organisations of national liberation movements, primarily the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples;

agreed political platforms, general or specific, as the basis for joint political actions and speeches; organising joint anti-Bolshevik actions, with the participation of different national forces and groups, to combat Bolshevik actions and aspirations in different areas and countries;

organising joint foreign policy actions and speeches to counter Bolshevik influences and to manifest the solidarity of all peoples enslaved by Moscow;

awakening, maintaining and spreading interest in the liberation struggles of other allied peoples in the Kolomna people and demonstrating sympathy for them by responding in their own political action;

links and cooperation between individual national liberation organisations and movements for mutual support and assistance;

understanding between national liberation organisations and centres of neighbouring peoples to resolve various problems of mutual interest in a way that would enable and facilitate cooperation between these peoples in the anti-Bolshevik struggle.

Similarly, in the strategy of the revolutionary struggle for liberation, each nation must consider the requirements of a common anti-Bolshevik front. This conclusion is reached by reflecting on the history of Moscow's imperialist conquests and on the possibilities of liberation. Here are the most important points.

Moscow's conquests of foreign countries took place in stages. Moscow enslaved one country at a time, not all at once, and usually took advantage of the internal weakness or difficult external situation of the attacked nation.

Now the situation is such that Bolshevik Russia far exceeds each of the enslaved peoples not only in the combined forces it commands thanks to its dominant imperial position, but also in the autochthonous power potential of the Moscow people. On the other hand, this Moscow potential is much less than the sum of the power potentials of all the enslaved peoples.



Moscow's oppression of peoples seeking national independence. This factual situation indicates clearly what conclusions must be drawn for the success of the strategy of the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle, just as Moscow draws its conclusions for the maintenance of its empire and its domination.

The basis of Moscow's imperial policy and strategy is to divide the enslaved peoples, isolate the national liberation struggle of each nation, and deal with each nation individually, preventing all the peoples it has enslaved from forming a united front. In addition, Moscow has always created internal conflicts and fronts in the enslaved people to make it easier to break them. From this perspective, the Bolshevik system of the so-called class struggle appeared to be the most refined. The Bolsheviks are afraid to admit the very fact that there are national liberation struggles of the peoples they have enslaved and try to bring them under the false notions of internal, class struggle or the agent actions of foreign forces. The main motive for this Bolshevik tactic is the belief that the mere knowledge of a nation's national liberation struggle can awaken and consolidate similar aspirations among other oppressed peoples and create a united front for these movements.

The situation of the peoples enslaved by Moscow, in particular the ratio of power potentials, on the one hand, and the tactics of Bolshevik imperialist enslavement, on the other, prove that the unanimity of the anti-Bolshevik, national liberation struggle of all enslaved peoples must be the main basis of its strategy.

The strategy of united liberation struggle will make it impossible for Moscow to deal with each national liberation movement separately and in turn, and will force it to divide its forces on all fronts simultaneously. Because of this, the pressure and strength of Moscow's imperialism, which acts on a section of each enslaved nation, must be correspondingly reduced as a result of fragmentation. In this way, the revolutionary and liberation fronts of individual peoples create a mutual drag on themselves, as they act simultaneously and unanimously. Thus, the struggle of each nation in particular for its liberation from Moscow-Bolshevik bondage becomes easier and has better prospects of success when it is waged simultaneously with similar struggles of other nations and strategically creates a unanimous action with them.

Second, the revolutionary and liberation struggle of one people mobilises other peoples to the same struggle by example. This is the second way of automatic mutual assistance between the liberation movements of different peoples.

The next question is: how to ensure the unanimity and simultaneity of the revolutionary and liberation struggle of all enslaved peoples, which is the main point of the strategy of a common liberation front?

Before we can formulate our answer to this question, it will be advisable to first understand the real limits that cannot be crossed in this regard. A superficial interpretation of this matter suggests that, in addition to the general political and strategic principles of a common front, it can also be solved on the plane of organisational fusion, so that the planning, organisation, management and conduct of the revolutionary and liberation struggle of different peoples would be centralised in the international organisation of liberation movements. Such thoughts were sometimes expressed in relation to the ABI, adding to it not only a tool for coordination and joint political action of various national liberation organisations, but also a kind of superstructure with superordinate leadership functions and competences.

Such political, organisational and operational centralisation would, at first glance, seem to have been the most successful way to ensure the unanimity of the liberation struggle of all enslaved peoples and to create an appropriate counterweight to Moscow's imperial centralism. But in reality, this would not lead to the intended goal. The main reasons for this are as follows: First, such a concept is inconsistent with the identity of the national liberation movements of individual peoples in fundamental and practical terms.

Second, it does not meet the conditions of revolutionary struggle. The organisation, planning and operational leadership of the revolutionary struggle must be kept in a tightly controlled manner. For this reason, it is natural to apply far-reaching decentralisation even within a single national revolutionary movement. And centralisation on the international level would be completely impossible. If it were to be forced, it would lead to a complete paralysis and a stagnation of the struggle. From this perspective, the conduct of revolutionary struggle is fundamentally different from the conduct of state wars, in which the military

coalitions can have one centralised leadership. The centralised leadership of multinational revolutionary movements could only be realised on the model of military coalitions if these movements were inspired and directed one centre outside the countries of struggle, as is the case with communist revolutionary actions in non-communist countries, which are fed and directed by the Bolshevik central government. This does not correspond to the actual situation, nor to the internal nature of the anti-Bolshevik national liberation movements, nor to the conditions of their action.

The third point that speaks against organisational and operational centralisation is the danger that it will lead to a decrease, rather than an increase, in the intensity of the struggle of the individual peoples participating in the union. Such manifestations are not uncommon in closer interethnic alliances with combative goals. Individual allies often try to shrug off larger obligations and burdens, assuming that they are being fulfilled by other partners. In this regard, we also have a rather unfortunate experience with the DEA, in which almost the entire financial burden and the vast majority of all activities fall on Ukrainian shoulders. In this arrangement, centralised blocs do not activate all the forces that are considered to be involved, and the effectiveness of the work is not in proper proportion to the external design. These shortcomings cannot be attributed to the indifference or inferiority of individual national movements, but rather to the very system of centralisation of international organisation. In foreign activities, which are mainly political and propaganda, one can still accept these ailments and the uneven activity of allies. But to transfer such a system of cooperation to the actual revolutionary struggle would be too inappropriate and inappropriate.

There is another important political point that prevents us, Ukrainians in particular, from striving for overly centralised forms of common front action. Given the position and size of the Ukrainian potential and the activity of the Ukrainian revolutionary force, Ukraine automatically plays a leading role in the liberation struggle of the peoples. When this is combined with attempts to consolidate this position in a lasting way, our partners must have serious suspicions and fears that we are seeking hegemony

in the common struggle, and then the dominant position of Ukraine in the new order of states in place of the USSR. Along with this, the belief that the common front of enslaved peoples is primarily a Ukrainian affair, in which Ukrainians are most involved, most benefiting from it, and therefore should bear the main burden of its maintenance, is spreading. Such an attitude leads to a cooling of allied relations and indifference in work and in the common struggle.

This knowledge and experience lead to the conclusion that the action of a common liberation front should be based primarily on the independent struggle of all peoples in the same direction and on their own measures of unanimity in the common struggle. Sustainable organised forms of inter-ethnic cooperation should play a supporting role in this, being a tool for joint actions and political coordination, not a driver or centralised leadership of national liberation movements. The aspirations of each nation to conduct its liberation struggle within the framework of a united liberation front, together with other nations, must stem from a correct understanding of the benefits for its own cause. This does not require any altruistic motives; cold national egoism is enough. A united front gives the liberation struggle of every nation involved a good chance of being successful and ending in victory. Only those nations that actively participate in the common front can benefit from this. The most important thing is that the only valid way to participate in a common liberation front is each nation's own struggle, not the formal organisational affiliation itself.

Summing up the main conclusions from these considerations, the following fundamental guidelines for the strategy of the joint anti-Bolshevik, national liberation front can be established:

- a) The national liberation movement of each people must constantly and intensively pursue its struggle on its own, using such forms, methods and tactics of struggle as are appropriate to its conditions. The struggle of one people mobilises other peoples and facilitates their struggle;
- b) when the revolutionary struggle of a nation becomes highly intense, in particular when it develops into a broader armed uprising, then other nations must also strengthen their

revolutionary actions and, under appropriate conditions, to move to armed action. Such responsive revolutionary actions are both support for the struggle of the initiating people and the use of the favourable situation created by them to give their own struggle greater scope and significance;

c) in the armed forms of revolutionary struggle, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between limited combat or guerrilla actions of special militias and military units and broad insurgencies conducted with the aim of raising an uprising of the whole people. Limited combat and guerrilla actions can be carried out at different stages of revolutionary activity as the strongest expression of the general anti-Bolshevik, national liberation aspirations of the people and the actual revolutionary of the struggle. When launching a broad insurgency, one must take into account the level of revolutionary readiness of the whole nation, as well as the state of other nations, the general situation in the sub-Bolshevik countries and the international situation. The main guideline in the development of an uprising is to spread it over as large a space as possible, to cover all the sub-Bolshevik countries, and to prevent the enemy from confining the insurgency to a small area;

d) for the unanimity of the common liberation front, the most important thing is the simultaneous strengthening of the intensity of revolutionary action by different peoples, not the uniformity of forms and methods or areas in which individual peoples currently concentrate their anti-Bolshevik actions. This is important in view of Moscow's tactics of systematic, increasingly more subjugation, use and decomposition of individual peoples. Different enslaved countries have different conditions at the same time, and the most pressing tensions often lie in different areas of life.

Therefore, when the revolutionary struggle of one people manifests itself with high intensity in one area, the revolutionary movements of other peoples must simultaneously intensify their struggle in such forms and in such areas where the conflicts between the people and the Bolshevik regime are currently the most acute;

g) the revolutionary organisations of different nations maintain mutual contacts and cooperation for mutual assistance and to coordinate the practical anti-Bolshevik struggle;

e) in areas and environments mixed nationality,

In particular, in the Soviet army, in concentration camps and in exile, international revolutionary organisations operate in the sense of a common struggle against communism and Moscow imperialism and for the national liberation of all peoples oppressed by Moscow.

The common front of the peoples enslaved by Moscow exists as a result of the similar situation imposed on these peoples by Bolshevik Moscow, with the main aim of gaining the independence of each nation by joint efforts. At the same time, this common front has ties of future friendship and cooperation between the independent states of these peoples, in particular for long-term security against new offensives of Russian imperialism. As long as the roots of this invasive imperialism remain, it will pose a constant threat to the independent life of our near and far neighbours. Therefore, one of the fundamental, unchanging elements of the policy and defence of the liberated peoples must be a constant effort to close Russian imperialist tendencies within Russian ethnographic borders with an inseparable defensive ring and to prevent its expansion in any direction through joint countermeasures.

### ***9. The problem of the National Communist Front***

In the process of the national liberation revolution, in particular in the stage of its victorious development, we may still have to deal with the national communist front. In this aspect, it is necessary to consider the possibility of its emergence, its role and significance in different circumstances and to determine the appropriate line and tactics of our attitude towards it.

National communism is an ideological and political concept aimed at building and maintaining an independent state of a people with a communist system. The attitude to the outside world, to other states and peoples should be based on the principles of sovereignty, i.e. the independence and autonomy of this national communist state. Instead, the entire internal life - the state-political, social and economic system, the content and structure in all spheres of life - must conform to the principles and methods of world communism as they have developed in the development of communist theory and practice.

It is impossible to speak of national communism as an original

ideological, political, and social concept, or even as a crystallised difference from international communism, as a separate communist sect. National communism does not have its own separate doctrine, ideology, social or political, it grows out of the same root as all other communist sprouts and considers itself a faithful follower of international communism. Even the name national communism is alien to it, although it is generally accepted in political terminology. But the related political creations, which are usually referred to by this term, do not recognise it themselves.

National communism is the process of imposing and maintaining communist parties, the communist system and regime on the territory of a nation, as a reaction of local communist elements to the recklessness of Moscow's invasion, centralism and dictatorship. The motive for this reaction-resistance is mainly the ambition, struggle for power and influence of the communists of a given country, who do not agree to be exclusively servants and executors of Moscow's will, but only want to have power themselves and rule the country in their own way. In addition, there are national movements that affect the entire nation and are a source of general resistance to Moscow's imperialism. If the communist elements of a given country are completely devoid of patriotism, they are acting under the pressure of two irreconcilable and unyielding forces - Moscow imperialism and national independence. Having the possibility of initiative and power in their hands, they repeatedly try to play between these two forces, seeking a compromise between them, or to use one side to cement their position against the other.

Regardless of the motives behind the national communist tendencies of the communist elements involved, whenever tensions or even hostility arise between them and the Moscow Bolshevik metropolis, they try to find support and encouragement among the people, playing on their national and independent aspirations. In such a situation of conflict with Moscow, national communist circles can stand in different relationships to nationally independent forces and currents in their country. They can act under the influence of national independence, or they can only try to use it, having no other power base.

National communists can never be true and genuine expressors or fighters of national aspirations, since communism, which they do not renounce, always remains the enemy of the nation, its values and its distinctive life. Therefore, the national-independence movement can never reconcile itself with national communism, nor can it follow its path. If national forces in certain circumstances support the anti-Soviet protests of national communist circles, it is a tactical use of them as a form of tactics, from the point of view of one segment of the overall national struggle against the pressure of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism.

The important thing is that, being in sharp conflict with Moscow, national communists become dependent on the support of national forces and, in order to have it, must to some extent follow the line of national aspirations. Standing between two irreconcilable forces - between the nation and Moscow Bolshevism - national communism can play a prominent role only for a short time, ending up either completely defecting to one of these sides or withering away for lack of its own ground.

The phenomenon of national communism can have other origins and play a different role. It can be a tactical manoeuvre by the communists of a given country, less or more coordinated with or controlled by Moscow, in order to lull the sensitivity and reduce the anti-communist resistance of a people. Emphasising national aspects and labelling independence from the Moscow centre should give the impression that the coming to power of a particular breed of communists and their introduction of the communist system is a matter of internal order, not of loss of state independence and submission to Moscow. In such a situation, national communism must play the role of a Trojan horse, because after its power is consolidated, complete enslavement of the normal Bolshevik type comes. Bolshevism uses national communist tactics especially when it cannot break the resistance of a people by other means. This is the case in particular where Moscow cannot act by military superiority, or when a nation remains unanimously resistant to communist influence, despite all the violence of the Bolshevik occupation.

When assessing the significance of national-communist phenomena in the struggle of a nation against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism, one must first consider the situation in which they appear and their



consequences. In certain circumstances, such phenomena can bring some benefit, apart from the inevitable harmful consequences that are associated with any trace of communism. It can be useful if national-national communist action really turns its point against Moscow imperialism, which is the essence of Bolshevism, and if it gains some positive results for the national cause on such grounds and in such circumstances where there is no corresponding action in a purely national spirit, or where it lacks a proper environment.

Most manifestations of national communism are extremely harmful to the nation, in particular to the national liberation struggle against Bolshevism. This applies to all such concepts and actions that open an active front against national values and forces, and put up their alleged national signs and anti-imperial attitudes only for show, to deceive. Similarly, we consider extremely harmful such national-communist actions that, although they actively oppose Moscow imperialism and do not submit to the Bolshevik centre, at the same time open a front against the national liberation movement and, operating in the national environment, introduce rebellion and sabotage into the liberation front.

The difference in the assessment of different national-communist phenomena can be reduced to the following simple question, which we ask when considering each specific national-communist action: Does it draw people away from the Bolshevik camp and from Bolshevik influences, attracting them, bringing them closer to the national-independence camp and forming them into fighters against Bolshevism in the defence of the nation, or, on the contrary, does it lure people from the national-independence camp to communist positions and weaken the liberation front? A similar criterion can be adopted in the assessment of the National Communists, considering their political orientation in terms of the struggle against Bolshevism for the independence of the nation. Treating the national-communist mentality as intermediate or transitional between the national and communist mentality, we ask the question: Does a given group of people with a national-communist orientation move from communism to nationalism in their development and actions, or vice versa?

While the former is a positive process of recovery, the latter is a negative, harmful process.

The above are general considerations on the topic of national communism

We rely on observations from Ukrainian and foreign soil. They should serve as our main guides in determining the direction of our progress if we this kind of phenomenon on our way.

It is not within the scope of this paper to examine historically those currents, processes, and individual phenomena that fit the definition of national communism we have adopted, which have been numerous in the rapid development of political life in Ukraine over the past forty years. To summarise the most generalised idea in one sentence, we can say that in this development there are two categories of national communism, and even the same people have gone against national values and interests, serving Russian communism, and then again disagreed with it in more than one way, defending, at least partially, Ukrainian national interests. In modern times, there are no more important national-communist tendencies and actions in Ukrainian political life that would manifest themselves openly as a separate political direction and as a significant factor. We will not deal here with isolated small groups that acted in exile with national-communist concepts. Nor will we mention the latent national-communist tendencies that nestle in some emigrant groups, which are more likely to be small, covert subversions.

When considering the prospects of the Ukrainian national liberation revolution, we are interested in the possibility of the emergence of more important national-communist forces and actions in the course of its struggle, which in a certain situation could become a significant factor. First of all, we are concerned with the situation in which the national-communist factor can appear on the scene.

From the preceding consideration of the internal nature of national communist phenomena and the history of such processes in Ukraine, we conclude that there are no prerequisites or forms for the original emergence of a more respectable national communist movement in Ukraine, regardless of the general situation, and for its own ideological and political motives. It can emerge and develop into a separate force only under special favourable circumstances. This can happen, first of all, when Bolshevism and the structure of the USSR are seriously shaken by the liberation struggle of enslaved peoples or by military conflict with other states. The third possibility, which is not yet more likely, is the shaking of Moscow's centralism in

communist bloc and the spread of national-communist processes among communists in various post-Soviet countries as a result of intra-party conflicts and contradictions. The unfolding of larger national-communist actions during a national revolution, especially in a military situation of crisis for the Bolsheviks, can take place in two fundamental ways, which correspond to the previously described differences in national communism.

The first option is that the communists of Ukrainian blood, in the crisis situation of Bolshevism and in the face of the victorious development of the national revolution, actually break with Moscow Bolshevism and open a front of struggle against it. By doing so, they join the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the national liberation forces, but do not fully and unconditionally join the national revolution, only try to act within its framework in the sense of the national communist concept.

Full accession to the national revolution is based not only on the anti-Russian struggle, but no less on the recognition of the purpose and basic principles of this revolution, and therefore on the rejection of communism as a whole, as it is fought by the national liberation movement. Whoever does this in reality and in practice fully joins the ranks of the national revolution, even if he had previously belonged to the hostile, communist camp. This clarification is essential to ensure that the concept of national communism is not confused with the celebration of the political past of individuals and groups. In political formation, in particular in revolutionary times, the current active position is of paramount importance. When former communists completely break with communism and actively engage in the anti-Bolshevik struggle for national liberation, it is neither appropriate nor possible to exclude them as a separate political category in the course of the struggle.

A separate national-communist category and problem in the national revolution will therefore not be those elements that will fully and actually switch from communism to its side, but only those who, having joined the fight against Moscow, do not renounce communism but continue to defend communist positions adapted to the new circumstances and try to obtain for them the right of citizenship in the national camp and in an independent, national state. In doing so, they are guided by two main motives, either equally or with a predominance of one of them.

Firstly, they adhere to these communist principles out of conviction and habit, considering them to be the best for the development of the people. Secondly, they continue to seek to preserve for themselves (not only individually, but for the communist class as a whole) a leading and privileged position in the national state. And this would be possible only if the communist system in this state were to survive, so the communist stratum of local origin would have to remain in power to a large extent.

In order to gain the right to do so, communist Ukrainians could, in a suitable situation, move in an organised manner, in whole groups, to the side of the national liberation struggle and fight against Moscow. It cannot be ruled out that the most prominent units of the Soviet state system would do so in an organised and top-down manner, with Ukrainians taking over the leadership apparatus. In particular, the situation could be catastrophic for the Bolsheviks if the Ukrainian command of military units with a majority of Ukrainians, or the same leadership of larger territorial-administrative or state economic units, proclaimed and actually implemented the breakup of the units they led from the USSR and their incorporation into the system of an independent Ukrainian state formed by the revolutionary order. Such acts of coup d'état, carried out by the leaders themselves, who were trained in the Soviet system, can be not only accommodated by changing the flag, but also documented by actions that testify to their seriousness and close the road to returning to the Soviet camp. Actions of this kind include, first and foremost, the active struggle against Bolshevik forces, the elimination of Moscow-Bolshevik elements and influences, active resistance to Soviet attempts to further subjugate relative territories and units, and the solid fulfilment of obligations against the national revolution.

Here again, we emphasise the difference between full commitment to the national revolution and national-communist content in different cases. For in the above examples of a compact transition to the side of the revolution led by leaders from the Soviet system, we can also deal with a consistent renunciation of communism, which is made by leaders who have been advanced in the communist system, and not only non-party professionals, but also members of the Communist Party. In other cases.

There may be attempts to preserve what is left of the communist system. A significant feature of this variant of national communist actions during the national revolution is that the elements involved in them, despite their attachment to communism, begin to actively fight against Moscow imperialism, including its Bolshevik abolition. In addition to the above motives for such a move, they may also be reacting to the various persecutions that even non-Moscow communists have repeatedly suffered as a result of Moscow's "seniority".

The second variant of national-communist manifestations in the catastrophic situation of Bolshevism, as a result of the liberation revolution or military events, differs from the first variant in that the communist elements operating in it do not actively fight Moscow, but try to limit their declarative break with Bolshevism and transition to nationally independent positions to the necessary forum for adaptation to the new order. In reality, such manifestations are not the result of any more important changes in internal attitudes, but only a tactical means of external pretence to transform circumstances, in order to hold on to what is left of the communist past, and in particular to maintain their favourable and influential position.

It can be foreseen that from the moment Bolshevism breaks down, either in general or in one country, under the pressure of hostile forces, communists will try to find ways and forms to keep themselves on the surface by a confessed break with Bolshevism and to gain influential positions in the changed circumstances. Communist theory, and even more so the practice of the Bolshevik system, despite its professed straightforwardness and integrity, in reality shapes people in such a way that they develop an unusual tendency to adapt to changes in political course created by violence, to hide their own opinions and to reveal only what is useful and profitable. In particular, the category of people who make their way to the surface of political life in the Bolshevik system and stay there must be particularly spineless and cunning. When Bolshevism collapses, most of these communist elements will, in every circumstance, be annealed to those Bolshevik principles, signs, and actions that are

most hated. At the same time, these same elements will try to hold on to what they can re-purpose from the Bolshevik system with the appropriate tactics of adaptation. These attempts to implant at least some of the political and social system and methodology of Bolshevism into the new system can be explained by the most selfish of motives. People who are completely merged with a system, as its carriers and shapers, and not as its victims, feel helpless and incapable without it, without some part of it. To have a chance to be in a position of leadership again, they need a system that they know and can master. This is the view of the already established routine of the huge Soviet bureaucracy, which, by the force of its powerlessness, seeks to preserve the structure of the USSR and the Bolshevik system, regardless of ideological orientation or political beliefs.

The tactics of communist activists and the Soviet bureaucracy to adapt to new circumstances by rejecting one part of Bolshevik principles and methods in order to preserve another part of them can be of various types and combinations. From the point of view of the national liberation and anti-communist struggle, two main directions should be borne in mind. The first is the overthrow of the Moscow-imperial balance and the retention of elements of the communist system in an adapted form of national communism. The second direction, the opposite, will be preserve the imperial structure, in slightly modified, adapted forms, in order to maintain the state connection of the former Soviet countries with Russia, but to reject the communist system as a ballast. This splitting of Bolshevism into two opposing directions and keeping both of its constituent elements in separate complexes may be its main way out of a situation that would threaten to completely destroy it. This possibility already has noticeable underpinnings today. In order for development to follow this pattern, a specially devised and prepared plan is needed. It can happen automatically, because some elements in the Bolshevik complex tend to look for a way out of a catastrophe in one direction, while others tend to look in another. Similarly, on the side of the opponents of Bolshevism, not everyone is striving for the equal elimination of Moscow Imperialism and communism, but there are differences in the question of who is the real and main enemy.

In line with this situation, the design of these two areas

The splitting of Bolshevism for the sake of mimicry and for further dismemberment can occur under the simultaneous influence of internal instructions in the Bolshevik camp and in response to the pressure of enemy forces. Both directions could exist side by side, or one could prevail in one area and in one situation, and then the other could prevail elsewhere. Among Russian communists and bureaucrats, the tendency will be to preserve the integrity of the empire at the cost of retreating from the communist system. In non-Russian countries that will gain national independence, local communists will rather break away from Moscow, trying to keep the communist primordia within the national framework. When it comes to adapting to the victorious anti-Bolshevik camp, where the forces of national liberation revolutions dominate, there will be the most difficult conditions for any concealment and preservation of Russian imperial positions. Again, foreign forces may be more tolerant of, and even supportive of, Russian imperialist forces and actions when they operate under the anti-communist cloak, even if it is falsely removed.

Consideration of such possibilities raises the need to consider the action of this kind of factors in the plans of the liberation struggle, which are no longer manifested in a significant way, but may enter the arena of events with the moment of the collapse of Bolshevism, as if it were its coffin-patel, but in reality as its continuators in a dismembered form. In order to correctly assess such phenomena and immediately meet them accordingly,

- The whole nation, not just its organised revolutionary force, must be prepared for this. In assessing each such phenomenon, one must look first and foremost at its actual content and direction, and not at verbal declarations, which, in the tactics of adaptation and disguise, will cover rather than reveal true intentions. It is necessary to create such situations that the newly formed Bolshevik forces will have to actively fight against Bolshevism, participate in the fight against the remnants of Moscow imperialism and communism, and at the same time reveal their true face. We must not allow the emergence and growth of such forces and actions that only in declarations dissociate themselves from Bolshevism, but in practice try to preserve its remnants - through the imperialist structure or the communist system - and to unite elements that have been advanced in the Communist Party and the Soviet bureaucracy. This also includes national communist

phenomena of the second variant, which would be only noisy pests in the process of national revolution and the basis for an anti-people communist relapse. These kinds of manifestations and attempts must be nipped in the bud and rendered harmless.

In the case of national-communist phenomena of the first variant, which actually turn against Moscow Bolshevism and push their communist tendencies to the national-independence framework, the national revolutionary front must implement its fundamental guidelines in a way that properly considers the situation and the requirements of the liberation struggle itself.

Ukrainian nationalism has a fundamentally negative attitude towards national communism, considering it contrary to the nature and good of the Ukrainian nation and a harmful consequence of hostile influences. The goal of the national liberation revolution is to eliminate communism from Ukraine in its entirety and in all its forms. We have consistently demonstrated this message at all times and everywhere, including in meetings with adherents of national communist concepts. When we deal with the very beginnings of the creation of national-communist groups and actions on Ukrainian national soil, we try to prevent these initiatives from being paralysed. If they do develop and act in such a way as to disrupt the liberation struggle or draw national forces away from the proper national front, then the nationalist movement must actively combat these attempts, trying to eliminate them from Ukrainian political life altogether.

We tolerate only those national-communist phenomena that operate in such an environment and on such a field where the national liberation movement does not reach or find ground, but instead successfully mobilise new forces against Moscow Bolshevism and wage a real struggle for Ukraine's state independence. During the revolutionary liberation struggle, this moment of the anti-Bolshevik struggle has a decisive influence on the attitude towards all other acting forces, including ideological and political opponents.

In the face of such tolerance, given the equal struggle against the same enemy, nationalist forces should take positive measures to ensure that those individuals and groups who prove their



value in the anti-Bolshevik, national liberation struggle, to draw them away from national communism and fully join the national front. With such groups, which cannot be convinced of this, we are trying to establish the basis for their participation in an independent national life. This basis will be their submission to the will of the whole nation and respect for the system and law and order established by it.

Instead, with such groups that do not think to fit into this framework, but only compete to impose the national-communist system on the nation by violence and communist methods to gain power, and which also wage their own struggle against Moscow imperialism from this angle - a decisive crackdown was inevitable. As soon as the victorious outcome of the anti-Bolshevik struggle was allowed, the fight against these national-communist forces would come next, if they could gain a foothold and grow into a new communist threat.

As for the means of combating national-communist manifestations, we put ideological, ideological and political arguments in the first place. On the one hand, we prove the falsity, inconsistency and contradiction of communist theses and principles with the laws of life, and in particular with the nature and life guidance of the Ukrainian person and the Ukrainian people; on the other hand, we oppose them to the principles and goals of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. We direct the ideological and political struggle against national communism both to its carriers and confessors, trying to turn them away from the wrong path, and to the whole nation, in particular to those environments where national communism manifests itself, in order to deprive it of its soil.

However, the driving force behind national-communist phenomena is not only and not always ideological and political beliefs, but also the struggle to maintain favourable personal and group positions, as has already been discussed. In order to remove this motive from the action, it is necessary to point out the inherent flaws of the national-communist path. Because national communism will be rejected and destroyed by the people in the same way as Moscow Bolshevism, and thus its stubborn defenders, instead of saving it, are only sealing their fate. Instead, it is necessary to point to another, correct path, which is open to everyone, including the active elements of the Soviet-communist system. With the exception of responsibility before national justice for personally committed crimes,

communists and servants of the communist regime have the best opportunity to confess their mistakes and sins to the people during the national liberation struggle, by actively engaging in it and proving by deeds that they are breaking with the bad past. Such an attitude should not be an empty propaganda argument, but a real guideline implemented in practice. The point is to open up respectable and convincing chances for everyone to link their fate to the national liberation struggle and to actively participate in it, to gain a position or justification for the future. However, it must be borne in mind that there will be communists who will not be persuaded by any of these arguments and who cannot be converted to the right path in a kind way. In such cases, the methods and means of combating pro-communist (also national-communist) forces and actions harmful to the liberation cause must be commensurate with their methods and means, taking into account the whole situation and the degree of their threat and harmfulness. All attempts to use criminal communist methods - to oppose the national liberation movement and its actions in the process of the liberation struggle with violence and armed force - must be radically destroyed by revolutionary means.

### ***10. Development and factors of the revolutionary process***

The foundations and main content of the revolutionary liberation concept were clarified in Chapter 6. There we came to the conclusion that the national revolution has suitable natural ground for development, but its main problem is the creation of an active revolutionary force from the raw potential of the anti-Bolshevik masses. Thus, most of the driving revolutionary energy is spent on mobilising, organising and leading the dormant potential of the people to fight.

The forces of revolution, which are the subject of the whole revolutionary process, can be divided into two groups. The first group is the original, driving forces of the revolution. The second group includes those forces that are driven and organised for revolutionary struggle by the original, driving forces. There are three main, initial drivers of the revolutionary process: the revolutionary idea, the revolutionary organisation and the revolutionary action.

Ideas of Ukrainian nationalism as a product of spirit and worldview

of the Ukrainian people, as an expression of its aspirations in life and a guide to its direction on the historical path, is at the same time a sharp rejection of the theory and practice of Bolshevism, a rejection of the reality that the Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement of Ukraine forcibly creates and imposes on the Ukrainian people. This fundamental opposition to Bolshevism and its internal qualities, its dynamics, make the idea of Ukrainian nationalism the main, most general, largest and longest-lasting engine of the Ukrainian national liberation and anti-Bolshevik revolution.

The revolutionary organisation, which aims to implement the postulates of the revolutionary idea through its activities and struggle, becomes the main and guiding, consciously acting subject of the revolutionary process. Since the revolution is not an automatic process, but only a struggle against an organised and planned enemy force, the precondition for its success is planning and organisation. The entire nation must take an active part in the national liberation struggle. This requires a strong leading force to direct and organise the struggle of the whole nation. In the modern liberation struggle of Ukraine, such a leading revolutionary force was formed and grew up - the OUN, which proactively covers all the main areas and forms of revolutionary struggle. The maintenance, further consolidation and development of the OUN is essential for the consistent and successful development of the national revolution.

Revolutionary action - struggle - is the third main driver of the revolutionary process. Without it, ideas lose their vitality and revolutionary dynamism. A revolutionary organisation without a corresponding action does not fulfil its purpose and comes to a standstill. Struggle is a manifestation of the vitality of the revolutionary idea and the viability of the revolutionary organisation. Revolutionary activity can take different forms and vary in intensity, depending on the circumstances. The most important thing that the revolutionary organisation consistently continues its activities as an unwavering struggle for the realisation of the unchanging ideas that animate it.

The three driving forces of the liberation revolution are inextricably linked, so that the absence of one of them fundamentally reduces the effectiveness of the others. Only with the full-fledged action of all three drivers does the revolutionary process consistently develop against all odds

the enemy's attempts to stop it, break it, or decompose it.

The development of the liberation revolution is marked by two main processes: the revolutionary struggle against the enemy, its forces and actions, and the mobilisation of new and growing forces of the people for the revolutionary struggle. Both of these processes merge into one action and reinforce each other. Every act and every action of direct struggle against the enemy gains new sympathies, new adherents and new fighters for the cause of the revolution. Likewise, the mobilisation of more and more forces on the side of the revolution causes the direct revolutionary struggle against the enemy to spread and intensify.

The schematic plan of the development of the liberation revolution is based on the gradual, consistent aggravation and expansion of the anti-Bolshevik revolutionary struggle, with the active participation of more and more masses, so that it encompasses the entire nation, the entire country and all spheres of life, reaches the highest intensity and turns into a general, national armed uprising. But in practice, revolution does not develop in a straight line according to such a schematic plan, which is designed to ensure a favourable arrangement of all the important factors that influence its development. The actual development of a revolution usually follows a wavy line, with downturns, slow and faster upsurges, like any other complex process. It is not, however, these variables of excitement in the developmental line that are of decisive importance, but only the highest points reached by the revolution in the individual stages of its development, which must reveal ever greater achievements in the sense of a schematic plan.

Taking into account the real conditions of the development of the anti-Bolshevik, national liberation revolution, we distinguish two main phases in it. The first phase is the protracted or permanent revolution, which covers all its stages-periods in a situation unfavourable for a general armed uprising. The second decisive phase of the liberation revolution is created by a national armed uprising. The armed uprising struggle waged by the entire nation on the largest scale for the final destruction of all Moscow-Bolshevik exhibits and all forms of Bolshevik enslavement in Ukraine must be the end of the entire revolutionary struggle up to that point.

A general insurgent uprising requires maximum concentration and tension of all the independent forces of the people and will certainly entail large

sacrifices. Such a great effort cannot be made by the people several times in a short time. In view of this, the transition to a general armed uprising should be the result of the maturation of the revolution, in particular the readiness of the whole people, with the useful conclusion of other factors that influence the development of the liberation struggle and determine its success.

The factors that influence the development of the revolutionary process, alternation of its various stages, have already been discussed. Considering them in such a way that we start from the most distant and move on to the closest ones for revolutionary action, we can divide them into three main groups. The first group includes all those factors that affect the general international situation, in the long and short term. The second group consists of those factors that shape the internal situation in the USSR and the entire sub-Bolshevik camp. The third group includes everything that affects the strength and activity of the revolutionary front, the state of the revolutionary struggle in a given period.

When we consider the current international situation from the perspective of the interests of the liberation struggle, we have two main points in mind. Firstly, to what extent do the relations between the USSR and other states tie the Bolsheviks' hands, force them to concentrate their forces in playing games with other states, to conceal their inhuman methods before the world and, in this regard, to restrain their destructive recklessness in the struggle for freedom. The second main question is whether and to what extent our anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle can find help and support from foreign countries.

The attitude of the revolutionary forces to the international situation cannot be passive and wait-and-see. They must constantly develop active political activity in order to recruit friends and helpers to their cause and at the same time to activate the enemies of Moscow imperialism and communism in the world. In addition to special foreign policy work, all actions of direct anti-Bolshevik struggle work in the same direction, if they are brought to the attention of the outside world through appropriate propaganda. Understanding how important external circumstances can be for the liberation struggle and trying to influence their beneficial development, we must at the same time be aware of the following

our very limited capabilities in this regard. The general limits of these possibilities can be outlined as follows.

Revolutionary actions can accelerate and exacerbate the development of anti-Bolshevik tendencies in the international situation, to the extent that these tendencies already exist and come to the fore in the conflict of interests between the USSR and other great powers. But even on a large scale, revolutionary actions cannot shift or change the fundamental course of international politics to such an extent that under their influence the great powers would change their attitude to the USSR. The possibilities of exacerbating international tensions by anti-Bolshevik revolutionary actions are also quite limited. For example, it would be difficult to provoke a military conflict between the Western powers and the USSR, or their armed intervention in the competition between the liberation revolution and Bolshevik Moscow, if these states, despite their political conflicts and heterogeneous relations with the USSR, did not decide to go to war for their own reasons.

Historical experience, and in particular the entire post-World II development to date, convinces us of this. In the first post-war years, the revolutionary potential of Ukraine and other peoples enslaved by Moscow, including the newly enslaved, reached its maximum military mobilisation, but it was clear that it would be difficult to keep it active in this form and at this level for a longer period of time unless there were more significant changes in the international situation that were beneficial to the anti-Bolshevik revolution. Thus, if the Western powers had taken this factor of the world anti-Bolshevik front into account, not only the benefits of its existence, but also the prerequisites for its maintenance, then their attitude to the anti-Bolshevik, national liberation movements and their policy towards the USSR would have to be different. While the inadequate attitude of the Western powers in the early postwar years can still be attributed to their lack of orientation in these matters and their unpreparedness to play a more serious game with a recent military ally, further developments, and in particular their position during the Magyar uprising, point to other reasons.

Two conclusions should be drawn from this experience. The first is that the Western powers can use the situation created by revolutionary and liberation movements in tactical games with the Bolsheviks, but do not try to help these movements to victory in a more serious way.

The second conclusion, already mentioned, is that revolutionary anti-Bolshevik movements in the current international order cannot count on their larger actions to change the international situation in such a way as to encourage the great powers to take decisive anti-Bolshevik action. These conclusions should be borne in mind so that in the development of the liberation struggle and independent foreign policy action, one does not harbour unjustified illusions, nor count on effects and support that are not seriously possible.

The situation will be different in a situation where the free peoples, in particular the Western powers, on the basis of their own experience with the Bolsheviks, will mature in the conviction that a total crackdown on Bolshevik imperialism on a global scale is inevitable and necessary. When this is followed by their moral, political and military preparation, the influence of revolutionary anti-Bolshevik actions on the development of the international situation will increase significantly.

There is a constant interaction between the internal situation in the USSR and the revolutionary liberation struggle. On the one hand, the general internal situation in the entire sub-Bolshevik area creates external conditions for the development of the revolutionary process. On the other hand, revolutionary actions are one of the most important factors influencing this situation. The elements of the revolution - revolutionary ideas, revolutionary forces and actions - influence the development of the internal situation in the sub-Bolshevik countries in different ways. The main form of this influence is the direct impact on the people, on their attitude towards the enemy and its actions. Also, the Bolshevik response to the revolutionary actions of the masses not only has counter-revolutionary consequences, but also leads to the further spread of revolutionary ideas. Since the internal situation in the countries under Bolshevik rule creates the proper ground for revolutionary processes, and revolutionary actions shape it accordingly, revolutionary forces must direct their attention and activities to this in the first place. The national liberation movement acts in this direction in two main ways. The first is its own, subliminal activity: nurturing and spreading the ideas and cries of the nationalist liberation movement, anti-regime revolutionary actions of the underground, initiating and directing mass sabotage of Bolshevik actions and the aspirations of the population in general. The second way was to use

revolutionary propaganda of various phenomena and processes of sub-Bolshevik life, the Bolshevik system and politics, internal relations in the Bolshevik camp, and Bolshevik reaction to various events independent of the regime.

The most important topics of this branch of revolutionary propaganda include, among others.: Bolshevik imperialist expansion - political, economic and military - at the expense of extreme exploitation and poverty of its own population; the falsity of Bolshevik internal and external propaganda, contradicting the real Bolshevik goals, the nature of Moscow imperialism and communism and the internal situation in the USSR; the Bolshevik regime's conflicts with other states, the military threats posed by the Bolsheviks, the huge arms and total militarisation of sub-Bolshevik life, contrary to the false propaganda of peace; manifestations of anti-communist and anti-Moscow struggles in various sub-communist countries, manifestations of anti-Bolshevik sentiment and actions around the world; the dominant class, anti-people character of the Communist Party and the Bolshevik bureaucracy, their decay and internal conflicts; the flawed Bolshevik system, the contradiction between its theory and practice, the inability of the system and the regime to properly solve the problems of the people's life and raise it to the proper level; breakthroughs of various Bolshevik plans; the existence of general anti-Bolshevik sentiment, quiet resistance and sabotage of the communist system; Bolshevik voices about the existence and action of enemies of the regime, despite all the Bolshevik destructive measures; the regime's forced concessions to the national-political, economic, religious and cultural needs of the people as the achievements of the organised and spontaneous anti-Bolshevik struggle, falsely portrayed by the Bolsheviks as the consequences of socialist development; purges in the Communist Party and the regime apparatus, reorganisations of the Soviet system in various areas, advertised as major changes of course, but in reality tactical manoeuvres to deceive the people and reduce anti-regime pressure.

By pointing to specific facts of the above and similar content, anti-Bolshevik revolutionary propaganda breaks down false Bolshevik interpretations, reveals their true meaning, their causes and consequences. The purpose of this work, conducted in various forms and



means, is to dispel Bolshevik suggestions that the Bolshevik system is correct and unshakable, and the internal and external position of the USSR is unshakable, and instead to identify, and at the same time deepen and expand, all the cracks and contradictions in the structure of the Bolshevik empire.

The main factor on which the development of the revolutionary process depends most of all is the operating forces of the revolution. We have already distinguished among them the initial driving forces and the second ones mobilised by them. The first of them were also discussed there. The mobilisation of the potential that lies dormant in masses takes place in different forms and in different sizes, depending on the stage of the revolutionary struggle and the tactics involved. The main and most general method of revolutionary mobilisation of the people is ideological and political mobilisation, which is used in every period of revolutionary struggle. It is based on the dissemination of positive ideas, programmes and cries of the national liberation movement and on broad anti-Bolshevik propaganda, as previously explained. In the ideological and political mobilisation of the people, the moral aspect is of particular importance - fostering idealistic and strong-willed attitudes, readiness to fight, to sacrifice one's own safety, good and life in the historical struggle of the nation.

The most important factor in revolutionary education is the struggle of the revolutionary organisation, which is most powerful through the living example of heroic figures.

The second form of revolutionary mobilisation is action mobilisation - the joining and involvement of individuals, groups and the general population in active participation in revolutionary actions and struggle. In this category, we can distinguish different degrees of action mobilisation, depending on the kind of revolutionary actions someone is involved and the nature of the actions, or rather the power. For example, acts of active resistance, existing demonstrations, strikes, or armed revolutionary action require a completely different kind of revolutionary readiness than the petty, subtle sabotage of Bolshevik plans. Also, direct participation in military actions and other direct confrontations with the enemy is a much higher degree of revolutionary activity than the occasional fulfilment of auxiliary revolutionary tasks.

The breadth of effective revolutionary mobilisation must be adjusted to the plan of active struggle in a given

period. It cannot be an end in itself in the sense that it translates into some revolutionary actions mainly to involve and fuel wider popular circles in the struggle. This approach leads to disappointment and loss of confidence in the responsible revolutionary leadership. The real need and expediency of any revolutionary action, in particular of a mass nature, must be the basis for its planning, preparation and translation. The third and highest type of revolutionary mobilisation is the mobilisation of organisational and personnel. It combines the two previous types to the best extent possible and imposes maximum obligations on the mobilised people. By this mobilisation, we mean the individual involvement of each mobilised person in the membership of a revolutionary formation.

Since the revolutionary struggle for liberation belongs to the highest struggles of the nation and includes all forms of struggle - from ideological, political, and military, inclusive, and a revolutionary organisation must combine elements of ideological, political, military, and at the same time conspiratorial formations in its system, active membership in such an organisation is the most complete and difficult service to one's nation. To be a member of a revolutionary liberation organisation means to put yourself, your life and everything at the service of the liberation cause, to put yourself completely at the disposal of the organisation and to be ready to carry out every order and every task at all times, regardless of difficulties and dangers. Each revolutionary member is subject to maximum demands, primarily in terms of his character, ideology, personal courage and combat activity. That is why organisational and personnel mobilisation is based on the principles of voluntariness, testing and selection of the best and most suitable candidates.

Organisational and human resource mobilisation also has different distinctions. Firstly, we distinguish between full or complete mobilisation, i.e. recruitment into the membership ranks, and partial mobilisation in the form of joining supporters, sympathisers, youth and membership candidates. Next, there is membership in the main revolutionary organisation, which in our case is the OUN, and membership in special revolutionary formations created and led by it, which are more limited in terms of territory, time, or types of action.

Organisational and human resource mobilisation takes place throughout the existence of the

and activities of a revolutionary organisation, such as replenishing and increasing its membership. A large and rapid increase in organised revolutionary cadres is usually associated with a rapid expansion and intensification of revolutionary action. At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind the plan for the future. Demobilisation of cadres once organised and put into action is extremely difficult and impractical in the context of underground struggle. Therefore, it should be avoided in the context of the dissolution of revolutionary actions. Organisational and personnel mobilisation on a large scale should only be carried out when there is a plan, justified by the relevant preconditions, to deploy ever broader forms of revolutionary struggle for a longer term goal, with the prospect of turning to guerrilla and insurgent action. For short-term, trial and tactical expansions, or even massive expansion of the revolutionary struggle, mass organisational and personnel mobilisation cannot be used. In such cases, it is necessary to use the methods of effective revolutionary mobilisation, including special combinations of it with signs of organisation in limited or temporary forms.

As for the question of which segments of the population should be recruited as active fighters of the liberation revolution, Ukrainian nationalism does not have one-sided instructions in this regard. Our fundamental approach, determined by ideological principles and previously established guidelines for mobilising the forces of the people, says to pay attention not to the origin, but only to the personal characteristics and value of each person. Both the ideological, political, propaganda and mobilisation activities of the nationalist liberation movement address the whole nation, all its parts and strata, and try to find a positive response everywhere. Therefore, the remarks made here on this issue are not intended to direct our attention in mobilisation activities in one particular direction or to divert it from other areas. It is about highlighting some of the more important or under-emphasised issues in the current development.

In the history of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, and not only of the recent era, but also of previous periods, there is a characteristic fact that the main acting force in this struggle was the Ukrainian peasantry.

While in earlier times this may have been less important, in the

n the modern era, this one-sidedness is associated with serious negative consequences. The city is not only the centre of the main enemy force, but it is also the centre of almost all areas of life. Therefore, the conquest of a country cannot be limited to the conquest of its countryside, but must require the complete conquest of its cities. This is a fundamental issue for the Ukrainian national revolution. How to solve it? The method of conquering a city by attacking from the outside, from the countryside, does not meet our needs or conditions. It can take place in cases where the city is alien and hostile to the cause of the revolution, due to its nature, or because of the composition and attitudes of the population. For example, revolutionary movements with a one-sided social focus can rely exclusively on one social stratum, the peasantry or the workers.

Instead, a national liberation revolution must involve the whole nation, all its strata. There are key prerequisites for this. On the one hand, cities in Ukraine have a sufficient composition of Ukrainian patriotic population. True, as a result of a special hostile policy, its percentage does not correspond to the natural development and reasoning of the Ukrainian people, but it is not so bad that the national liberation struggle would not find natural ground and support in the city. On the other hand, the aims, ideology and programme of Ukrainian nationalism correspond to the attitudes and aspirations of the Ukrainian urban element no less than those of the peasantry, and have all the data to plunge it into active revolutionary struggle. Therefore, the strategy of the nationalist revolutionary movement must be orientated towards the conquest and mastery of the Ukrainian city from within. This is in line with our ideological and political concept and greatly facilitates the victory of the liberation cause.

The method of capturing a city from the outside, so to speak, by siege, makes the struggle much more difficult, leaves the city as the exclusive domain of the enemy's domination and operation for a longer period of time, and leaves the vast potential of the Ukrainian urban population, which can play an important role, almost completely inactive.

Mastering the national revolution of the Ukrainian city from within requires stubborn, consistent revolutionary activity among the Ukrainian urban population in all periods of the revolutionary process. This activity is much more difficult than among the monolithic patriotic peasantry. First, because of the concentration of hostile Bolshevik forces and activity in the city. Secondly, because of the large number of alien and hostile population, which has a demoralising and

depressing effect on the Ukrainian population. And it is necessary because, as a result of the two previous factors, the average moral and patriotic level of the urban element is much lower than in the countryside. But despite this, or because of it, it is precisely because of this that we need to work on it with the greatest persistence, regardless of any difficulties and sacrifices. The special qualities and high qualifications of the urban revolutionary element and its important role in the overall development of the revolutionary struggle, and in particular in its decisive stage, are worthy of great labour and sacrifice.

It is about the deployment of ideological, political and propaganda work in the city, the conduct of revolutionary actions and organisational and personnel work. The aim of this activity is to acquaint the Ukrainian population of cities with the ideas of Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism, to form them into a breakthrough asset of the liberation revolution so that they could become a respectable counterforce to the concentration of hostile, Moscow-communist forces on the ground. In the unfolding of the revolutionary struggle, in particular in the decisive stage of the general armed uprising, the strategy of the final conquest of cities, the elimination of enemy bases in them and their transformation into centres of revolutionary action and state building will be based on the effective cooperation of autochthonous urban revolutionary forces with those that have mobilisation and operational bases in the countryside. They will be joined by revolutionary military formations of underground origin or created from soldiers of the Soviet army.

In mobilising the urban population for the liberation revolution, the main attention should be paid to the youth and the workers. Young people of all walks of life, including students and workers, are naturally inclined ideological impulses, struggle and revolutionary changes. Young people have always been, are and will be the main dynamic, fighting element in the national revolutionary struggle. The activities of the nationalist movement must be addressed primarily to young people, activate them, educate and organise them, and build their future on them.

The Ukrainian working class constitutes the bulk of the Ukrainian urban population and, along with the youth, has the natural potential to be the main reservoir of revolutionary assets in the city. It does not have the negative traits of the proletariat, which was a fertile ground for Bolshevism, and it has not acquired "bourgeois" skills,

that make people unfit for the revolutionary struggle. An important factor is the close ties, exchange and everyday proximity of a large part of the present-day workers with the peasantry. This contributes to the development among the workers of those national elements that are more strongly held by the peasantry, facilitates the spread of nationalist revolutionary ideas from the city to the countryside and vice versa, and helps to coordinate the development of the revolutionary process in the countryside and in the city into a single, coherent national liberation movement.

Our emphasis on the need to pay more attention to the intensification of revolutionary activity among the urban population is in no way intended to weaken the intensity of the same work in the countryside. The point is to keep it at a high level, but not to be the only one, in order to strengthen and bring the influence and action of the nationalist movement in the city to the same level. This strengthening and supplementation should take different forms. First of all, in the further development of the movement's ideological and programmatic positions, its ideological and political face, the emphasis placed on the problem of the city, in particular the Ukrainian workers, must be properly reflected.

Secondly, the action of direct revolutionary struggle against the enemy must be transferred to a greater extent to the city. All revolutionary acts carried out in the city acquire greater political significance, hit the enemy system harder and are more likely to revolutionise the general population.

In the question of the elements mobilised for active revolutionary struggle, the case of the soldiers of the Soviet army occupies a separate and important place. Among these soldiers, as well as among the entire population of the USSR, including non-Russian countries, there are many conscious enemies of Bolshevism. This is a great revolutionary potential, which is all the more important because in a certain situation of war or general uprising, the fate of the Bolshevik empire and regime will depend on the attitude of the army, and the army can turn its weapons against the Bolsheviks, taking the side of the liberation revolution.

However, the corresponding movement of this potential in the plan of the liberation revolution is unusually difficult. The military system itself makes it very difficult for the army to act in a planned manner, contrary to the plans and orders of the command. This is compounded by special Bolshevik methods

- mixing of national composition, actions of the party organisation,

the system of political advisers, sex work, the provision of special military units loyal to the Bolsheviks, etc. Therefore, we cannot expect that the Soviet army will initiate revolutionary movements, or that they will come about in so-called normal, peaceful circumstances. The soldiers of this army can only oppose the regime in larger smaller groups during war, and then in unusual conditions, or in the midst of a general revolt created by respectable anti-Bolshevik revolutionary movements.

In planning the involvement of the soldiers of the Soviet army in the anti-Bolshevik struggle, the first place should be given to the possibility that these soldiers will take up arms individually and in larger groups, eventually joining the existing revolutionary insurgent forces, or on the other side of the military front and there be reorganised into units of the anti-Bolshevik, liberation army. A revolutionary upheaval in the army itself, in terms of its being taken over by the revolution in its entirety, or at least its larger units, sections of the front, entire garrisons, ., may be realistic already the stage of the far advanced disintegration of the Bolshevik system as a result of the victorious development of the revolution, or as a consequence of military events.

The fundamental method of mobilising the troops of the Soviet army for the anti-Bolshevik revolutionary struggle is an initiatory action from the outside, i.e. a corresponding action by organised revolutionary forces operating outside the army but directed towards it. The existence of revolutionary military units is of fundamental importance, as their struggle and areas of operation are communicated to the soldiers of the Soviet army. When these soldiers are confronted with specific calls and instructions from the insurgent units as to what they should do and where they should go, this provokes a much more lively reaction than general calls for revolutionary actions that the soldiers themselves would have to initiate and organise.

Even in an emergency situation and with a corresponding revolutionary action from outside, the initiative and organisational and leadership work of determined units with revolutionary attitudes within the army itself is necessary to lead more soldiers to anti-Bolshevik actions. For this purpose, it is important that the Soviet army, in its various formations and units, in different territories, has as many people with a conscious revolutionary attitude and the appropriate

The first and foremost is the training of officers who will be able to take the initiative in an appropriate situation, to become organisers and leaders of revolutionary liberation actions among the military, in frontline or rear units of the Soviet army. First and foremost, it was about political organisers who would be able to capture and join not only ordinary soldiers, but also qualified officers. With the spread of revolutionary ideas and revolutionary activities, including organisational and personnel activities, among the whole nation, the number of revolutionary elements in the Soviet army also grows, one might say automatically.

In the matter of special revolutionary propaganda and organisational work within the Soviet army, one must be very restrained. In normal times, in times of peace, it is advisable to abandon all underground activities, including organisational activities within the army itself, so as not to arouse the enemy's suspicion and not to contribute to the elimination of the active revolutionary element. It is true that the Bolsheviks destroy not only the active but also the potentially dangerous element. However, any manifestation of the existence and actions of an anti-Bolshevik organisation within a military unit causes an unusual intensification of Bolshevik countermeasures. In normal times, conscious and organised revolutionaries serving in the military, or who are professional soldiers in the Soviet army, should not carry out direct revolutionary activity in the army itself, but only study their surroundings and conditions and prepare for future tasks.

Direct revolutionary action, political-propaganda, organisational and combat-operational, should be launched in the units of the Soviet army when the time comes for raising a general revolutionary disruption, including anti-Bolshevik actions by individual military units in connection with the current situation (e.g. at the front, revolutionary uprisings in the occupied country, etc.).

Instead, in all periods of revolutionary action, every effort should be made to spread anti-Bolshevik revolutionary consciousness and training among its active and future soldiers through appropriate work outside the Soviet army.

When considering the elements that have the qualifications to become part of the active forces of the liberation revolution, we must also mention the large masses of political prisoners, exiles and other politically repressed people. This is a large one,



The majority of the revolutionary potential has been prepared, and there is no problem of moral, political or organisational mobilisation, but there is a difficult question of liberating it and enabling it to take an active part in the struggle. In this regard, we will focus on two general areas.

Firstly, in the case of larger combat operations, including insurgency in a particular area, the first operations include actions to rescue and release all political prisoners from prisons, concentration camps, forced labour camps, prisoner of war camps, etc. Secondly, in the general planning of the revolutionary struggle, not only in the Ukrainian Lands but also beyond their borders, in particular in cooperation with other enslaved peoples and with favourable foreign states, it is necessary to form special departments and transfer special operations for the purpose of communication, liberation, assistance and supplies for prisoners and those imprisoned in distant concentration camps and territories of forced settlement. In a certain situation, large pockets of revolutionary action may arise there, and then establishing communication with them, supplying them, helping to connect isolated pockets into larger complexes, creating ways to move to more suitable areas, etc., will be a great and difficult task that will require concentrated action on all sides.

On the tactics and forms of revolutionary struggle. During the course of the Ukrainian national liberation movement, three fundamental tactics of struggle developed, which were applied at different stages and found their distinctive form at the end of the last world war and in the first post-war years. They are: underground, guerrilla and insurgent tactics. In addition to these three main types, there are also combinations of them: underground guerrilla and underground insurgent tactics. Let us briefly examine the characteristic features of these types.

With clandestine tactics, an entire revolutionary organisation and all its internal activities are deeply concealed. Only the acts of its direct struggle against the enemy and some forms of its ideological, political and propaganda work on a mass are revealed. These existing forms of revolutionary activity of the underground include, in particular, various military actions, such as sabotage, counter-terrorism and others; mass political and propaganda activities, such as underground publications, leaflets, dissemination of revolutionary slogans with inscriptions, placards, etc.; mass actions initiated and organised by the underground organisation,

Demonstrations, strikes.

In guerrilla tactics, the main form of revolutionary activity and struggle is the action of guerrilla units. Guerrilla actions are usually of a combat nature, but their purpose may be dominated by political propaganda or military aspects. A characteristic feature of the guerrilla form of struggle is that military guerrilla units do not have a permanent base in the area of their operations, operate by raids or have support from external bases.

Guerrilla and underground tactics are based on a combination of these two types of tactics in the same area, or on the use of one tactic in one area and another in another. Thus, alongside the underground organisation, which conducts its activities as usual, there are simultaneously military guerrilla units formed, maintained and led by the parent underground organisation, or at least in close cooperation with it if they are units of other origin (for example, raiding guerrilla units from other territories, units of allied nations on the march through a given territory, parachute units during the war, etc.). Guerrilla and underground guerrilla tactics and forms of struggle are usually used in wartime in the transitional stages, before the insurgency period, or when it is narrowing. This form of struggle is distinguished by the fact that it can deal serious blows to the enemy and break its plans, including military ones, with relatively small means. But in a liberation revolution, it does not provide a final solution - the elimination of enemy occupation and the takeover of the country by revolutionary forces. For this, it is necessary to move to insurgent forms of struggle.

Insurgent tactics and the form of revolutionary action are marked by two main features. The first is the formation and deployment of larger military units, which are closer to the regular army in terms of their organisation, weapons and methods of action than guerrilla units. The second characteristic is that insurgent struggle is aimed at the complete capture, cleansing of the enemy and holding of a territory, if not the whole country at once, then at least a part of it. The insurgency, if it unfolds in full swing, covers the whole country and has a victorious development, constitutes the final stage of the liberation revolution. It borders directly on

the period of state-building, which begins during the struggle, soon only a significant part of the national territory is in the hands of revolutionary and insurgent forces. The rapid transition from insurgent to state forms of action and to a war of liberation is important in the sense of international law.

Insurgent tactics can also be used on a smaller scale and may only be an attempt to move to a general uprising. In such cases, it is most appropriate to use combined forms and tactics - underground-insurgency, or underground-partisan-insurgency. This means that, alongside the insurgent units and their struggle, the underground system, organisation and underground tactics are maintained in full operation, including partisan actions in some areas.

In the overall development of the revolutionary process, we have distinguished two main phases-periods. The first period of protracted revolutionary struggle encompasses all the preceding stages and continues until the time of the decisive uprising of the whole nation. In the preceding development, there were stages of purely underground, underground-partisan and underground-insurgent forms of action, from which it was necessary to return to purely underground struggle again, given the unfavourable international situation and the same internal situation in the USSR.

The revolutionary struggle in this phase has the following main goals:

- 1) Preparing the entire nation and its organised revolutionary forces for the decisive battle - a national uprising and the accession of allies of our anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle. To this end, we are working on: spreading the ideas and liberation concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, anti-Bolshevik sentiments and revolutionary actions in all Ukrainian lands, among all parts and strata of the Ukrainian people; spreading the concept of a common front of national liberation revolutions among other peoples and building the political and organisational foundations of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples as a factor in this common front; foreign policy work to promote the Ukrainian national liberation struggle and to join the pleasant
- 2) Defence of Ukrainian national values and the state of national position in all spheres of life before

by the Bolshevik crushing offensive and deprivation.

3) Winning concessions to the enemy and better conditions for the life and development of the people in various areas.

The active forces in this phase of the revolutionary struggle are:

1) The main revolutionary force is the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which bears the main burden of the liberation struggle, is the inspirer and leader of the entire revolutionary liberation process. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is the armed framework of the liberation revolution, created by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in the process of extensive development of its military sector, which operated in all periods of the OUN's existence as the link in the armed forces of the national revolution. During the largest deployment of armed struggle in guerrilla and insurgent forms, in 1943-48, the UPA covered with its personnel and actions the bulk of the OUN membership and newly mobilised cadres. With the turn to purely underground tactics, the UPA's personnel and actions were gradually narrowed and brought into the OUN's parent framework. Within this framework, the UPA continues to exist as a military sector and the main backbone for the development of the armed forces of the revolution in the future.

2) The active supporters and sympathisers of the OUN who cooperate with the underground create a second, very important ring in the chain of forces of the national liberation revolution.

3) The third force, grouped in a wide ring around the revolutionary core, is that part of the Ukrainian population that has no direct technical connection with the underground OUN, but acts under its ideological and political influence and tries to implement its directions in various spheres of life and in various forms.

4) The fourth group, and the third ring in the concentric structure of revolutionary forces, is the masses imbued with revolutionary, nationalist sentiments, which are still limited to quiet, elusive, but powerful resistance-sabotage of the Bolshevik system and plans because of their massive numbers. They constitute a great revolutionary potential, which is waiting for the right time and a wide-scale revolutionary and insurgent action to be actively involved in them.

Summarising the results of the pre-modern revolutionary struggle of the nationalist era is beyond the scope of this paper. Here

Let us briefly mention only two main points. Firstly, today the ideas and liberation concept of Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism are widespread and rooted not only in all the lands of Ukraine, but also throughout the USSR, where Ukrainians and other peoples live and fight for their liberation from Moscow's enslavement. The OUN has become not only a well-known, but also a recognised, influential and leading force in the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution, which the masses are guided by. As the struggle to date has paid for itself with very great sacrifices of organised and well-trained OUN cadres and supporters, the base of the national liberation movement has expanded far beyond its previous boundaries and has grown a revolutionary potential suitable for mobilisation. The task of further revolutionary activity in this period will be to properly use and harness these positive effects for the liberation cause.

The second success of fundamental and lasting significance is the breaking of the paralysing influence of the Bolshevik terrorist system. The possibility and success of the revolutionary liberation struggle in the post-Soviet reality, proven for the second time after the insurgency and guerrilla struggle in the twenties in the Naddniprians and finally consolidated by the OUN-UPA struggle, deeply entered the consciousness of the people and transformed their attitudes. The fearless revolutionary posture in the face of the most horrific Bolshevik terror became a mass phenomenon, not just a singular act of isolated heroes. The attitude of the general population of the ZUZ during the Bolshevik pogrom and eviction repressions against the liberation movement will remain a historical merit under this review. And the second unprecedented, massive and final gap in the Bolshevik terror system is the desperately heroic actions of Ukrainian nationalists imprisoned in concentration camps.

As a supplement to the methods of revolutionary action of the past, it is advisable to mention several topical means that are appropriate to the current post-Soviet situation. In political propaganda work, one should make the most of various Bolshevik actions and movements that have the character of changing the course and methods in certain areas of life. At the same time, the true Bolshevik goals, motives and reasons for these movements should be revealed and what is hidden behind the Bolshevik disguise should be revealed. In some cases, this will be an attempt to

deceive the people and, under the guise of new achievements, make it easier to impose new and greater burdens, worsen earnings, living conditions, etc. In other cases, we have to deal with involuntary concessions forced by the general popular demand; still other times, we have the opportunity to reveal catastrophic breakthroughs and shameful failures of Bolshevik plans, which the Bolsheviks disguise as successful completion of tasks and transition to new stages.

Similarly, the various Bolshevik campaigns that they carry out during various internal crises, purges, changes in methods, etc. should be used. The usual accusations, criticisms and condemnations of formerly responsible and now dismissed leaders, or changes in methods, in such Bolshevik campaigns provide a good opportunity to compromise the Bolshevik regime, the Communist Party and their system as a whole in any way possible. In doing so, one should use the method of deliberately, seemingly naively, or bending the Communist Party's campaigns and directives.

The general trend in modern political propaganda work should be to use, alongside the methods and means of direct revolutionary propaganda, all the possibilities for implicit subversive work, which is sewn into Bolshevik plans and actions, to the maximum extent possible. It is also necessary to use the various changes in Bolshevik methods of communist and anti-nationalist propaganda. Such changes are usually the result of the absolute abandonment and inaction of the previous methods of visual lies, denial, silence and distortion of facts. The new methods of easily touching upon problems that are dangerous for the Bolsheviks, which they have not dared to mention until now, and now are trying to give them their own light and deal with them propagandistically, clearly indicate that the hitherto methods of terror and gagging have lost their power of action. These new methods in Bolshevik propaganda in national and cultural policy expose so many weaknesses in the Bolshevik system that it provides a very good opportunity to spread anti-Bolshevik views and sentiments by skilful, overt action within the Soviet system. Many times it is enough to compare or emphasise various news, comments and problems from the Soviet press, literature, various speeches, criticism, etc., so that the listeners will have a clear picture of

distinct anti-regime conclusions, reflections and sentiments. The general guiding principle of all revolutionary work, and especially in the field of political propaganda, is to keep our hand on the pulse of actual life and to adapt our methods and means so as to make full use of everything that is suitable for our plans, including everything that the enemy himself is doing in that direction, including what he is doing.

Before we even get to the question of a general revolutionary uprising. We have already discussed the factors that create the appropriate preconditions for such an uprising. To elaborate on our previous thoughts on this topic, we can envisage four types of situation in which a general revolutionary struggle in the broadest and most open forms of insurgency can be realistic and successful. The first is a war between the USSR and other states and the crisis situation for the Bolsheviks created by military events. Secondly, the massification of revolutionary actions organised by the underground and the rise of revolutionary sentiment among the entire nation to a boiling point, while the overall tension in the internal situation in the USSR and the undermined position of the regime. Thirdly, the outbreak of a large-scale anti-Bolshevik revolution in other post-Soviet countries, including the satellite states, which turned into a war of liberation against Moscow. Fourthly, a major crisis and disintegration in the Bolshevik regime itself, an open struggle between rival groups that spreads to the entire state structure of the USSR. There may still be combinations of the types of situation mentioned here that reinforce each other.

These predictions are purely theoretical at the moment. However, some elements of each of these possibilities are in place, so that in the future, each of them may become a reality.

Taking into account all the possibilities, we take the following as a real basis for the prospective planning and deployment of the liberation revolution

The second type of situation. This is the most realistic opportunity for us because we have the greatest ability to influence its development through our activities and struggle.

Taking into account genetic development and the situational circumstances of the emergence of a general revolutionary breakdown, two schematic plans for its unfolding are possible. The first scheme is appropriate for a military situation. It is immediately dominated by the military factor of the revolution - all revolutionary forces create as large military units as possible, and the main form of

of revolutionary action is armed struggle. The second scheme corresponds to other, non-military situations. In this case, the period of general disruption does not begin immediately with armed struggle on a big scale, but the socio-political forms of revolutionary action, mass demonstrations, strikes, etc., are in the first place, and their forms and content are adjusted to the actual internal situation. This method is advisable for the reason that in times of peace, albeit in a turbulent situation, it is more difficult to immediately raise the masses to armed struggle. As soon as the unarmed revolutionary actions spread and their tone becomes more and more aggravated, the armed struggle is launched by militias and military units of the underground, which quickly spreads to all the revolutionised masses.

The most important factor in the general revolutionary breakdown is the creation of a high psychological uplift of the masses, which reaches an expansive point. The general revolutionary breakdown must have such an expansive character, because otherwise it is difficult to rouse the masses to fight. When an explosive psychological state is created in the masses, it spreads brazenly and breaks out such elements that would be impossible to move to struggle. At that moment, the revolutionary organisation must direct the dynamic energy of the masses towards a purposeful, planned struggle, and provide it with the impetus, direction, leadership, appropriate forms and methods of struggle. Without the appropriate organising and guiding action of the organisation, the entire revolutionary dynamic of the masses can soon become confused and sharpened in chaotic explosions and extinguished by the enemy's planetary countermeasures.

As for the question of where and in what environments the hotbeds of broad revolutionary disruption could arise, there are several options to consider. The first, basic option is a revolution in the indigenous Ukrainian lands. The schematic plan is as follows: complete capture and cleansing of the territory where the centre of the revolution is located; rapid revolutionary and military mobilisation of all national forces in the occupied territory; formation of revolutionary state power on the ground; movement of the most important areas of collective life, in particular those necessary for the struggle; transfer of revolutionary actions to other, larger spaces, spreading the territory fully occupied; creation of defensive and offensive



The frontline on the border with the territories occupied by enemy forces; then the struggle is deployed by a combination of frontline actions and revolutionary ones.

The second option is to create pockets of revolutionary disruption in large concentrations of prisoners, exiles, or among Soviet units with a majority of Ukrainian soldiers on Ukrainian territory. While the first tasks of the revolution are generally binding for all situations - the destruction of the enemy's power and forces and the formation of one's own revolutionary force - further plans must be adjusted to the territorial and situational circumstances. When there are opportunities for this, the plan to move the Ukrainian revolutionary forces formed in foreign lands to the Ukrainian lands to participate in the liberation struggle comes first. When there are no such opportunities, two other options remain. The first is to continue on the scene in the context of the general anti-Bolshevik revolution and in order to retain and consolidate the national revolutionary force. The second possibility is to move or break through to another field that is more suitable for holding and acting.

In addition, revolutionary activity on a foreign national territory must be commensurate with its character. When it is the national territory of another nation fighting against Moscow for liberation and in this struggle are allies of Ukraine, then our forces take part in their liberation struggle, preserving their internal autonomy and having a plan for the transition to Ukraine. In areas with a mixed or uncertain national-political character, in particular in Siberia, Ukrainians, together with other national forces, are engaged in proactive activities and struggle for the state separation of this country from Russia. In Siberia, we are advocating and trying to implement the concept of creating an independent federation of autonomous countries, like the United States of Siberia.

Revolutionary actions within the Soviet army units with mixed nationality and a significant number of Muscovites should be carried out primarily under general anti-Bolshevik slogans, without a special emphasis on Moscow imperialism. Where there is a larger number of Ukrainians and other non-Russian national groups, the postulate of forming national revolutionary military units with full internal autonomy should be put in the forefront from the outset. When this is required

local situation, they conduct joint revolutionary actions (e.g. in the Far East, in the front lines on foreign soil), creating appropriate joint bodies for this purpose. The main goal of all these national military formations is to move to their native land to participate in its liberation struggle.

The same principle should be applied by local revolutionary forces and bodies to the units of the Soviet army that are in Ukraine during the revolutionary breakdown. That is, the revolutionary removal of the Bolshevik command and Bolshevik elements, the dismantling of the Soviet military system, the separation, disarmament and separation of all hostile or dangerous elements for the liberation revolution as prisoners of war, and the formation of national military units or civilian groups from the rest. Some of them can be involved in revolutionary actions on the ground, while others are immediately sent in the direction of their countries, depending on the circumstances. All weapons and military supplies belong primarily to the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army and the allied units operating within it. The military formations of the allied peoples that go back to their countries for the liberation struggle should be armed and provided with the necessary equipment as far as possible.

The principles of relations with the revolutionary and liberation forces of other nations in a particular action must correspond to the general political guidelines that have been clarified in other chapters. Three situational categories can be distinguished in these relations. The first category is neighbourly relations between peoples bordering each other. The cause of the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle of the peoples, mutual support, or at least mutual non-harassment, should be in the first place during the revolution, and all other matters, including all disputes between these peoples, should be relegated to the second place.

The second category is the relationship between the liberation forces of different peoples during revolutionary actions in a foreign land. These relations should be regulated by the principles of equality, independence, internal autonomy of each party and their close cooperation in the development and implementation of joint anti-Bolshevik liberation operations.

The third category is the relationship between the liberation forces operating in one's own country and similar forces of another nation, as a result of events, found themselves operating in the same, alien territory. The norms of such relations are dictated by the following three main points: the requirements of a common liberation front against a common enemy; the rights of the host country; and the principles of mutual assistance and hospitality in political and military terms. In matters of planning and transferring military and revolutionary operations and in all domestic matters - staging, observation, disturbance of foreign and allied forces, etc. - the liberation forces of a given country, as its host, have the first say. In matters of internal order, allied forces have full autonomy and independence. They also decide on their future goals and plans outside the territory of the country concerned, and coordinate with its hosts only what concerns this foreign country: the affairs of their stay, actions on the ground, the time and direction of their marches, etc. Foreign national forces take part in the liberation struggle of a given host country on the basis of voluntary agreements and alliance.

The attitude towards Muscovites during the liberation revolution should also be in line with the principles of our liberation policy, which have already been generally clarified. More specifically, we will have to distinguish three main categories in this matter. The first is the case of those residents of Ukraine of Russian nationality who deserve to be treated as citizens of Ukraine, not only on the basis of their mere presence, but also on the basis of when, how and why they arrived in Ukraine, how they treated the Ukrainian people and the rights of Ukraine in the past, and, most importantly, how they currently relate to the Ukrainian liberation struggle and the Ukrainian state. The requirement of full loyalty to Ukraine and its liberation struggle is in the first place. Those Muscovites who meet these requirements must be assured and ensured full and complete equality in all civil rights and full freedom of national development, in accordance with international principles on national minorities. The same applies to other national groups in Ukraine. The participation of this category of Muscovites in the liberation struggle on the basis of voluntary or compulsory mobilisation should be individual in nature, based on the principle of territoriality, and not in separate

Moscow formations.

The second category is Muscovites from outside Ukraine, mainly soldiers of the Soviet army who are not fighting against the Ukrainian liberation forces. During their necessary stay on Ukrainian territory, we help them to create anti-Bolshevik formations, larger or smaller, which should leave Ukrainian lands as soon as possible and move to Russian territory to actively fight against communism. At the same time, care must be taken to ensure that they do not join the fight against Ukraine's independence.

The third category includes all Muscovites who are active or potential enemies of Ukrainian statehood. Active enemy forces must be destroyed and neutralised by means and methods available in a given situation, in accordance with international rules of engagement in time of war. The general guideline is to try to eliminate as many hostile Muscovites as possible from Ukraine, so as not to burden ourselves with the maintenance and provision of a large number of enemy elements as prisoners or internees in difficult conditions of struggle.

The completion of the national liberation revolution should be the restoration and consolidation of an independent united Ukrainian state.

A prerequisite for the restoration of independent state life is the destruction of the Soviet government, its organs and instruments of power in the Ukrainian lands, the destruction of the Communist Party and system, and the removal from Ukraine of all forces that defend Russian imperialism and oppose the independence struggle. These preconditions should be created by a national armed revolutionary uprising.

A victorious uprising immediately turns into building and consolidating an independent life as a unanimous, consistent process.

The proclamation of the restoration of the USSR and the creation of Ukrainian state power, at least of a temporary nature, should be translated as soon as the national liberation revolution gains victory in part of the Ukrainian lands, when it takes over and liberates part of the Ukrainian territory from the enemy with the expectation of further victorious development.

Initiative and leadership in state-creative actions belong to the same revolutionary liberation forces that raise, organise and lead

people to a victorious struggle. The basis and decisive factor in state-creative acts is the general expression of the will of the people, carried out in the most appropriate form under the given conditions. When only a part of the people in the liberated territory takes part in the first state-creative acts, then with its further expansion, complementary popular decisions are made.

We cannot count on the fact that the victory of the Ukrainian national revolution over the Moscow imperialist forces in all Ukrainian lands will immediately guarantee peaceful conditions for further state-building. We must take into account, first of all, the possibility that a new war of aggression by Moscow imperialism will be immediately prepared against the young Ukrainian state outside Ukraine and waged from there. A period of national defence war may immediately follow the revolutionary liberation period.

Therefore, the entire reconstruction of independent state life must be conducted primarily from the perspective of liberation and defence requirements.

The programmatic principles of Ukrainian nationalism determine the guidelines against which the revolutionary restructuring of all spheres of life is measured. However, the necessary transitional stages and forms of this restructuring in the liberation and war period must be maximally matched to the requirements dictated by the liberation and defence strategy in the broad sense - military, political, economic, and ideological and spiritual.

The questions raised here do not exhaust the very broad issues of the national liberation anti-Bolshevik revolution. The purpose of this work was to raise and clarify at least some of the questions that need to be answered, or their projection in current educational work. These materials should at the same time provide a basis for further systematisation and elaboration of this issue.

## Where the planks should meet

*Ukraine's own forces and the proper role of Ukraine are requirements for the Ukrainian liberation movement to be able to gain true allies for its struggle, rather than rely on someone else's help. Stepan Bandera never tired of talking about this, convincing both his own countrymen and foreign politicians. If the West wants not only to stop Moscow's aggression but also to destroy it as a source of disaster, it must take into account the anti-Bolshevik struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow and communism. For the national liberation struggle of these peoples is "the weakest, most vulnerable point of Bolshevik Moscow". And at this point, the paths of free and enslaved peoples seeking freedom can "converge".*

*The article "Where the paths must converge" was published, signed by St. Bender, in the weekly "The Way of Victory", Munich, year of publication. VI, no. 1-2 (254-255) from 7 January 1959. In brackets are the omissions made by the author himself, adapting his article to the newspaper size, and which were not printed in the "Shchyli Peremohy".*

*As a reprint from "ShP", the article also appeared in the weekly "Family of Ukraine", Toronto, Canada, year of publication. Xi, no. 5 з 24- 1. 1959.*

All the independent forces of the peoples of the nations oppressed by Moscow are closely monitoring the development of the international situation, and in particular the development of relations between the Western powers and the USSR. None of us is indifferent to this development. No one can consider himself or herself a disinterested, outside observer, because everyone understands the importance of this factor for the national liberation struggle of every nation.

Yet there are very important differences in its assessment. For revolutionary forces, it is true that this is a very important but not decisive factor. A favourable international situation and favourable guidance from external powers can greatly help the liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples. But this assistance will only have useful and lasting consequences for the independence of a nation when it conducts an independent liberation struggle on its own. Only under the greatest intensity of their own struggle and with full

he enslaved people will be able to use a favourable external situation and outside help to gain and consolidate their state independence. Liberation by someone else's forces may free a people from some bondage, but it will not give them true independence.

That is why national liberation struggles cannot depend on foreign forces and the external situation. For foreign peoples and states, the cause of liberating a people from the Moscow-Bolshevik yoke can only be a means, an auxiliary factor in their own political, strategic, or other plans, and not an inherent goal and life's end, as for this people. As their plans change, or as other, more convenient ways of implementing them are discovered, so does their attitude to the liberation struggle of the enslaved people.

And the prerequisite for using an opportune situation or external assistance for liberation is the existence of independent forces and the people's own struggle. Only those who exist, act and strive for something consciously can use it. If the liberation forces and struggle of a people were mobilised only under the influence of external forces or a situation created by them, this would interrupt their dependence.

Instead of being used, they would be exploited. It is true that there are relationships and co-operation between nations on the basis of mutual benefit and advantage. But only a nation that represents a certain distinctive and effective force can be a partner for others.

(That is why the revolutionary forces of the peoples enslaved by Moscow consider the external situation and the attitude of foreign states to be an auxiliary, albeit very important, but not decisive factor in the national liberation and anti-Bolshevik struggle).

But in Ukrainian political life, just like in other nations, there is also a second view of the matter. There are those political circles that, regardless of their theoretical declarations, do not believe that the struggle on their own can be successful (or even more important. However, while they also want national liberation from Bolshevik captivity, they place all their hopes in the Western powers). They see the only possibility of liberation in the fact that the Western powers will defeat the Bolsheviks in a military conflict and give

enslaved peoples to independence (or otherwise force Moscow to change its internal system and policies in the direction of greater freedom). For them, the enslaved people's own forces and their own struggle are of secondary importance. (Some consider them necessary under the condition of full adaptation to the international situation and to the plans of those foreign forces that are supposed to bring liberation. Others don't want to do that either, saying that there is nothing we can do, we must wait until the game between the great powers of both sides changes the situation).

In line with the fundamentally different attitudes of these two political directions, their understandings and assessments of the development of international relations also differ.

For the camp of the foreign power orientation, the most important question on which the cause of liberation seems to depend entirely is whether and to what extent the Western powers include the Ukrainian cause in their future political plans and in their current political action. This question is not indifferent to the front of the independent revolutionary struggle either. (And we are conducting a corresponding external action to ensure that the cause of Ukraine's liberation is properly assessed and interpreted by different states as an important factor in the current global competition between the two worlds.) But we are talking about the role of Ukraine and the rights inextricably linked to it. However, the inclusion of the Ukrainian case in the political agenda of the West in the sense that it becomes one of the subjects of its play with Moscow cannot be considered an inherent or main task of Ukrainian independent policy. (And this has just become the highest goal of some Ukrainian political factors. Some people think that if they could only somehow tie the Ukrainian cause to the wagon of Western politics, this would ensure liberation. Consequently, the whole political interest and all the seemingly independent activity of such factors is reduced to somehow arousing and retaining the interest of foreign states.) As a result of their instruction, supporters of the orientation towards foreign powers focus their attention on the current political situation and are disproportionately concerned with all its fluctuations. Every tension in relations between the Western powers and Moscow revives their moods and activity, while detachment or stagnation causes disproportionate depression. Focusing on conjunctural fluctuations is often combined with



(And reducing one's own policy to reacting to the changing conjuncture cannot replace a consistent, targeted political action).

The revolutionary liberation nationalist movement looks at the development of the international political situation mainly from the angle of the possibilities to include the liberation struggle of Ukraine and its allies in this development as a factor of its own. It is well known that every state is guided primarily by its own national interests in relation to the outside world, to its allies and opponents. (This nationally selfish motive is also the basis of such political ties and aspirations that seem to contradict it, subordinating national interests to the voice of the wider community. In such cases, the national voice comes to the fore in terms of development for a longer-term goal, and the closer ones have to submit to it, because of the seemingly greater, but actually less important interests of the current situation). This is what the OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) takes into account when assessing international political development and the policies of individual states in such matters that are of greater importance to us. Under that review) puts the question of whether and to what extent international development and the policies of individual states create conditions objectively suitable for the anti-Bolshevik revolutionary struggle in the first place.

From this point of view, a conflict between the Western and Bolshevik blocs and a firm Western policy against Moscow's aggressive imperialism would be of great importance. This is more important than empty propaganda and declarations of support for national liberation struggles on the part of the West, when these declarations are in practice paired with a policy of reconciliation and concessions against the Bolshevik empire. If only the Western powers defend their own vital interests with the proper drive and foresight, then this posture will create a situation suitable for revolutionary struggle.

The task of the national liberation forces is to take advantage of the favourable conditions, in particular every difficult situation of the Bolsheviks, and to develop the revolutionary struggle on their own initiative and according to their own plans. This is the right path to partnership and mutually beneficial cooperation. With this attitude, we can more easily consider international development and

pay close attention to key issues.

Considering the development of relations between the Western and Bolshevik blocs over the entire postwar period, we argue that the reconciliatory and coexistence policy of the Western powers was harmful not only to the enslaved peoples, but also to the West itself. What is important is that this understanding is being established in the political thought of Western nations and is leading to a significant turn in the direction of the West. The belief that Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism is not so terrible, which was nurtured as a result of the military alliance, is giving way to a more and more correct knowledge of its true nature. The Western nations becoming increasingly aware that unquenchable expansion and predatory conquest are a permanent, organic feature of Bolshevik Moscow. The harmful illusions about the possibility of a stabilised peaceful coexistence are disappearing, and it should be based on the following: calming Bolshevik expansion; dividing the world into spheres of influence and mutual non-interference; settling disputes; and building a comprehensive and mutually beneficial exchange. In reality, however, the concept of coexistence is more and more clearly reduced to a statement of fact, i.e. the existence of two irreconcilable systems and hostile state blocs alongside each other and against each other. Their immediate geographical contact in vast areas and mutual opposition in almost all areas make this coexistence similar to the coexistence of wolves and sheep. Western nations have learned the hard way that nothing can change the wolfish nature of Bolshevik Moscow, and thus any hopes for coexistence are ultimately futile. No nation wants to be like sheep torn apart by wolves.

Thus, instead of a peaceful coexistence, an armed coexistence is being stabilised. It has actually existed all along. its stabilisation should be based on the alignment or balancing of military potentials. But along with measures in this direction, there are even more intense attempts by both sides to overtake or outwit the enemy and assure themselves of superiority. It does not matter whether this is done with aggressive or only defensive intentions in the form of armaments or disarmament negotiations - the effect is the same: instead of stabilisation, there is constant movement, a race. These are already elements of a quiet but very dangerous struggle, which becomes more fierce the more

The potentials of both sides are equalised.

Nevertheless, the equalisation or even stabilisation of technical and military potentials does not resolve the issue of war or peace. For there are many other factors that, along with the quantity and quality of troops, weapons, and technical equipment, have an equally decisive impact on the greater or lesser ability and readiness of a nation to fight. These are factors of objective and subjective categories that can never be equalised or balanced. As a result, assessments of one's own chances and the enemy's chances of victory are usually quite different on both sides. The element of will has a wide scope and often plays a decisive role.

The content of the coexistence, as it has been shaped for a decade and a half, has been and is a struggle waged by various means. Since there are no prospects for the imperialist-aggressor nature of Bolshevik Moscow to change, the struggle between the two blocs remains a permanent element of the current international order. It is not a means to stabilise this order, or to make any amendments to it, because stabilisation is possible only after its fundamental change.

An armed coexistence filled with permanent tension and struggle, not only in the form of propaganda, diplomatic and economic conflicts, but also with significant, albeit localised, armed itches, is the opposite of what the West imagines as a peaceful coexistence. This state is the so-called Cold War. The original journalistic catchphrase is gaining more and more full and formidable meaning as an apt description of the current protracted situation.

For the Bolsheviks, this state of affairs is quite beneficial. It meets their internal needs to justify a permanent paramilitary system. At the same time, they continue their expansion in different directions, being able to freely select and change the means and methods of political, economic and military penetration, without the great risk that a third world war would have been for them. For the Western powers, however, the Cold War is too undesirable and burdensome. It contradicts the peaceful system of democratic countries and the needs of their normal life. That is why the West is trying so hard to find some kind of solution to the situation in the direction of peaceful coexistence. But.

All the experience to date cannot remain without consequences. The hopelessness of the concept of peaceful coexistence is becoming more and more evident due to the unchanging nature of Moscow's imperialism. For Western powers, peaceful coexistence, as Moscow understands it, is tantamount to constant concessions, the loss of one position after another, and capitulation to the Bolshevik aggressive offensive.

If this possibility of gradual suicide is excluded, then the alternative remains: armed coexistence with constant struggle, i.e. a cold war, or a great hot war. This alternative stems from the actual geopolitical order and the balance of power, and it must become the basis of the plan policy of free peoples. As a consequence, this alternative should be an instrument of Western policy to put pressure on Moscow, and not just a means of Bolshevik threats and blackmail.

Although the question of peaceful coexistence may still be relevant in international politics repeatedly and in different ways, each new failure, which must be taken into account, will increasingly erase it from the real plans of the West. Its relations with the Bolshevik bloc will not be able to escape the field of constant tension and struggle that stretches between the two runners (poles), between the cold and hot war.

When the conviction that the struggle against Bolshevism is necessary and inevitable is established in the political thought of the Western nations, then, alongside the question of its size and severity, which is now the most important concern of these nations, the second main question will be put forward more and more insistently over time: how long can and should this state of tension continue? The nations that are not deprived of their vitality must reach a turning point when they see the need for struggle, wage it with appropriate energy and forge the will to fight to its victorious conclusion. If the Western powers decide to move towards a fundamental solution, it will be a reversal in international development. After the concept of peaceful coexistence is buried, the solution can only lie on the line of a fundamental change in the balance of power between both sides, a change in the entire international order. And this will hopefully become the main goal of the entire policy of the Western powers. Instead of coexistence with the Bolshevik expansionist

imperialism, it will strive to at least cut off its predatory claws and fangs and create a situation in which it ceases to be a destroyer of and a threat to peace and freedom in the world.

The most radical way to achieve this is a total world war destroy Bolshevism and break the back of Moscow's imperialism.

But Western powers will not quickly or easily decide to choose war as a way out. But they are more likely adopt a planned offensive strategy in the Cold War, which should lead to the same goal in a slower and less radical way.

Until now, the initiative in the Cold War has been entirely on the side of the Soviets, who, using an offensive strategy and elastic, variable tactics, have been making new gains and pushing back the Western powers in many important areas. With an appropriate change in its attitude and with the straining of forces, the West can move to offence, successfully attacking the weaknesses of the Moscow empire and the anti-people communist system. There are great opportunities in this direction, the appropriate use of which would fundamentally change the international situation and direct its development in the opposite direction to that which has been the case so far. (A prerequisite for this is the West's decision to fight Moscow and communism offensively and consistently and not to be afraid of Bolshevik threats of a major war, nor to give in to them. The line between the Cold War and the present war is quite fluid. It can be completely breached when, in a cold war, one side advances firmly, with a determination to achieve its goal at all costs, and encounters the enemy's determination not to retreat. Such a possibility always exists and depends primarily on the attacking party, on the extent to which it encroaches on the vital interests of the other party). Whoever has the initiative in a cold war also has control over the possibility of a hot war. This is another important argument that calls for Western powers to make every effort to take the initiative in the development of events. And a well-considered threat to their own vital interests and the ultimate need to counter it is a very strong driver in the politics of nations.

The considerations outlined here lead to the conclusion that in the further development of events, the West should oppose the Bolshevik offensive with increasingly firmness and move from defence to offence. This will create a more useful situation for national liberation movements.

of the competition.

The anti-Bolshevik struggle of the revolutionary forces will become increasingly important in international politics the more the conflict between the two blocs intensifies and deepens. This applies not only to the Great, Hot War, but also to the Cold War.

When victory cannot be won on the fronts that have been fought so far, and you do not want to go to a hot war, then you need to new forces and new parts of the struggle with the enemy. This is what the Bolsheviks have done so far with great success. If the West wants to take the initiative without going to a world war, it must look for the same opportunities. National liberation struggles of enslaved peoples

- This is the weakest, most vulnerable point of Bolshevik Moscow. It has so far been almost ignored by the West. Meanwhile, this is precisely the area where free and enslaved peoples can most successfully break the aggressiveness of Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism by working together.

## At half a metre

*This is the last article Stepan Bender ever wrote about the new tensions between the West and the CCCR over the Berlin case, wishing that the defeatist sentiments that were emerging among the public and politicians of Western countries at the time would not affect the Ukrainian community in a foreign land. The article was published under the heading "On the Halfway Point" in the Easter issue of the "Path of Victory", Munich, year VI, pp. 19-20 (271-272) for 3 May 1959 and revealed the groundlessness of the fear of an atomic war. In May of the same year, Moscow-based agent Stashynsky made his first attempt to kill the OUN leader Stepan Bandera with a gas pistol, but he hesitated and fled Munich.*

**Tensions over Berlin** The Berlin question arose with the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945. Both its territory and Berlin itself were divided among the four victors: the Americans, British, French and Bolsheviks, although the unanimity of city government and representation was still delayed. According to the decrees of the Western allies, the reconstruction of Germany was to be carried out in stages, over an appropriate period of time. First, permission was given to form German political parties, and in 1946, and partly in 1947, the first elections were held in communities, districts and countries. When the Allies could not agree with Moscow on a further joint policy towards Germany, they decided to create a separate German state with its capital in Bonn. On 7 June 1948, a conference of the Western Allies was held in London, where it was decided to call into being a West German constitution with the task of creating a "federal form of government with a suitably adapted central administration". In further developments, the Allies carried out a monetary reform in the part of Germany under their control, which led to even greater tensions between the West and Moscow: the Bolsheviks declared a blockade of Berlin, preventing the Allies from reaching it by land, the British and Americans responded by creating an "air bridge" and for one year supplied Berliners with food, goods, supplies, etc. The Bolsheviks withdrew their representatives from the four-member Allied commandant's office in Berlin, and soon the Communists attacked the Berlin City Parliament, which was based in the eastern part of the city, with a demonstration. On 30 November 1948, the Bolsheviks established their own city administration in the sub-Soviet part of the city; elections to the city council were held in the western part of the city at that time, but the Soviets boycotted them and declared them invalid. In May 1949, the Bolsheviks ended the blockade of Berlin, and the Allies countered the blockade of the German sub-Soviet zone. Since then, Berlin has been permanently divided into two parts: the eastern part under Moscow-Bolshevik influence, and the western part, which has the rights of a West German allied country.

The Berlin case is constantly resurfacing and causing friction between Western allies and

Bonn on the one hand, and Moscow on the other. In 1959, it escalated again and even threatened the possibility of a world war) brought to light deeper currents and drivers that influence the formation of public opinion and policy in Western countries. The central place among them is occupied by the issue of war. It is being considered more seriously, in terms of the natural development of an inevitable conflict between the two worlds. This issue is also the subject of internal conflicting attitudes in the West.

On the one hand, the Western powers' stance against the plans of Soviet accessory aggression has become much stronger and more clearly manifested. The decision not to give in and not to surrender positions on the Berlin section is no longer limited to diplomacy and the legal page. The case is examined frankly in terms of Bolshevik unilateral violent aspirations and the corresponding military reaction of the West. The possibility of a war arising from such conflicts, the rejection of the idea of their localisation, and the warning against their gradual escalation into a major nuclear war are all put on the agenda by authoritative political statements. If the Western powers stand firmly and unwaveringly on the positions they took in the Berlin case, this will be an important step forward in countering the offensive of Moscow's imperialism.

And this process of crystallisation in the West's guidance has a second page. No less pronounced are the defeatist tendencies, the manifestations of complete surrender to the Bolshevik threat. This is not to mention those elements and currents that, having some affinity with communism, do not consider Bolshevism to be the worst of all evils, do not see its threat. But there are also those who are well aware of what Bolshevism is and what it brings to threatened nations, but do not hesitate to stubbornly oppose a consistent struggle against its advance, including military countermeasures, their main motive being the fear of nuclear war.

In public discussions of the war, considerations taken to the extreme are brought to the forefront. An alternative is considered: Bolshevik slavery or nuclear war? One or the other is seen as the final consequence of choosing one of the opposite paths. Taking into account such an extreme situation, which leaves no other way out, should show the final



The consequences of two opposing attitudes in Western policy. That is, a firm course of opposition to all Bolshevik aggression, not excluding war, and a conciliatory policy of constant concessions. However, it is not a question of purely theoretical discussions, of conventional situations and arguments. These discussions and arguments should serve and shape actual, actionable policy.

The alternative: "surrender to Bolshevism or nuclear war" is put forward by opponents of military defence to justify and emphasise its futility. Some of them do not deny the terrible danger that Bolshevik Moscow is preparing for the nations threatened by its aggression. But they motivate their stance with the following reasoning: Even if the Western nations, in particular the European ones, fell into Bolshevik captivity, they would at least save their physical and biological substance, despite the most severe hardship, terrible devastation in their spiritual, economic, social and political life. Later life would have had prospects for improving their situation.

Instead, nuclear war would bring physical and biological destruction of peoples and civilisation. Regardless of the military superiority of one side or the other, an atomic war would bring untold, if not total, destruction to both, especially in Europe. Therefore, nuclear war is not a good chance.

These arguments, presented here in a very general way, are the basis of various defeatist and capitulatory movements that operate in Western political life under the slogans of anti-nuclear weapons and war. Some defeatists say in no uncertain terms that a war against an enemy that is willing to fight with heavy nuclear weapons is impossible and unacceptable. So, in the current situation, the possibility of war with the USSR must be completely ruled out. In the event of a direct Bolshevik military threat or aggression, there is no other option but to surrender.

Such instructions markedly demobilise the moral, political and military capacity of the Western powers to confront the Bolshevik imperialist offensive with determination and consistency. They have a paralysing effect on Western policy towards Moscow in all its aspects and stages. On the other hand, it emboldens the Bolsheviks to no end and encourages them to be ever more aggressive.

Verbal arguments against the war, based on the development of military technology, should be of equal importance to both sides. Meanwhile, we see that the Bolsheviks do indeed make extensive use of arguments against nuclear war in their foreign policy and propaganda, but they are not guided by them. In fact, the USSR's position is no better than that of the Western powers when it comes to the potential of nuclear weapons and vulnerability to nuclear attack.

It would also be a mistake to explain the difference in attitudes by the fact that the West is dominated by a mood of resignation and fear, while the Bolsheviks are full of dynamism and desperation. The main reason for the difference in the way the Western powers and the Bolsheviks interpreted the issue of war (in policy and in the formation of public opinion) is that the Bolsheviks developed their military forces, plans and preparations for war according to different concepts.

The basis of Bolshevik military training remains the principles established and tested in the last war, and new types of weapons, new tactical means and reorganisations in line with them are being gradually introduced as a supplement and improvement. The Soviets are trying to be ready for war in different conditions at all times, with maximum use of their current material, technical and human potential.

Their own military initiative, the offensive, is the basis for their training and education.

Meanwhile, after the Second World War, the Western powers directed their military measures in a defensive direction, or rather, to prevent war. Atomic and hydrogen bombs became the main deterrent and the basis of the whole strategy. This had to have a significant impact not only on current Western policy, but also on the attitudes of nations to the problems of war and defence.

As long as atomic weapons were at the disposal of the Western bloc alone, this influence was manifested mainly in the paralysis of the defiant spirit and in the creation of a false sense of lasting security in the shadow of the atomic bombs. When it became known that the Bolsheviks were also producing atomic and hydrogen bombs, the fear of atomic war deepened in the West and the aforementioned defeatist sentiments became more pronounced. The blame for this cannot be attributed solely to the cowardice and short-sightedness of those elements among the Western nations who oppose

against nuclear war. Some of the arguments of this guideline are based on post-war development and the current state of military in the West.

Recently, in the wake of the Berlin crisis, very respectable and authoritative statements were made that an armed conflict would automatically develop into a major nuclear war. Such statements are primarily of political importance, as a warning to deter the enemy from frivolously provoking war. But, regardless of their intent, they also have another meaning, as a serious conclusion drawn by a competent authority from a comparative analysis of the military forces of one side and the other.

For when it comes to the fact that America is not thinking of waging a land war in Europe, it is not just a matter of American strategy, which is fully justified given its situation. This is, first of all, a conclusion from the completely unsatisfactory state of military training of European partners in the Atlantic bloc. They, being directly threatened by Soviets, would have to have adequate military forces ready for a land war, commensurate with their situation and proportional to their combined human, material and technical potential.

The insufficient state of affairs in this regard, the overly one-sided military preparations of the Western bloc with a shift in the centre of gravity to modern technical weapons, seriously undermined its ability to fight the USSR with the help of so-called conventional weapons, in particular, to conduct a land war.

The official conclusion, as mentioned, says that every armed conflict must take the form of nuclear war.

However, there are also other conclusions from the same situation, and this greatly weakens the position of the Western powers. Some of them have already been discussed here. For it is precisely this state of affairs that, if not generates, at least feeds all those paralytic currents that are ready to grasp every alternative to nuclear war, including complete surrender to the Bolshevik offensive.

The Kremlin, as we can assume, draws other conclusions. The Bolsheviks have reason to doubt whether the West would really dare to respond with atomic bombs to every violent action, which, as an aggressive offensive, would look limited and not very dangerous. Therefore, Moscow can continue to manoeuvre freely on

The tactics of small-scale aggressions and spoils, which are moved from one place to another, have been successful until now.

Such considerations are justified by the current structure of the military forces of both blocs, in particular, the state of heavy thermonuclear and missile weapons, air power, naval, naval and submarine forces and the location of bases. These data negate the expectation that a concentrated application of heavy thermonuclear bombing would spiralise a military adversary to the point where it would no longer be able to respond with similarly total-destructive nuclear strikes. Even a large difference in the number of heavy nuclear strikes on one side and the other is not decisive, as long as a small number of them are enough to destroy entire countries. This is particularly important for the European territories on both sides of the front, perhaps to a lesser extent for America and the former Soviet Union, especially Central Asia.

In such a situation, heavy nuclear weapons cease to be the first means of defensive or aggressive warfare against an enemy that also has them. It is relegated to the role of a last resort, a last resort in a desperate, desperate situation. Above all, it becomes a means of deterring the enemy from nuclear bombing.

The thesis that every provocation of war is tantamount to the outbreak of nuclear war is outdated. It dates back to the time when only the Americans had the atomic bomb, although they themselves deprived it of its convincing power during the Korean War. Now, in the situation of a nuclear weapons equilibrium, this thesis is unconvincing. It causes more fear in our own ranks than in the enemy's. When the resolute determination to repel every Bolshevik aggression is based on such a nuclear strategy, it does not strengthen it, it only weakens it.

The Western powers are faced with the need to supplement the neglected areas of their military training and to take care of strong land armies and air forces in Europe. These states have all the data to put up forces, also in terms of so-called conventional weapons, that can successfully oppose the Soviet army.

This task belongs first and foremost to the European partners in the Atlantic bloc. they are most threatened by nuclear war, and the alternative to it is no less terrible. Awareness of the situation

should help to eradicate the reluctance of Western European nations to maintain large military forces. And this reluctance goes hand in hand with a false sense of security in the direction of a strong American partner, its resources and technical capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

It is to be hoped that these peoples will be completely overcome by sober views of reality and a healthy desire to secure the foundations of their free life in the face of the greatest threat in history. These are important signs that a healthy change is coming to fruition. When, in conjunction with the military use of the latest achievements of science and technology, the Western bloc rebuilds and develops the fundamental, and by no means obsolete, branches of its armed forces, its policy and posture will become strong and full-blooded. Then the manifestations of internal weakness in the face of danger and feverish jumps in policy towards Moscow will give way. This process of healing and consolidation of the Western bloc, which is undoubtedly taking place, is very important for the overall anti-Bolshevik struggle for the freedom of peoples and people.

## **Interview by a German radio station in Cologne with Stepan Bandera**

*"Interview of a German radio station in Cologne with Stepan Bandera". "The Way of Victory" chaps. 43 and 44 from 1954, also in: "The Family of Ukraine", Toronto, pp. 1-2 (294-295) from 7. 1. 1955, n.d. "Interview with Stepan Bandera by a German radio broadcaster".*

I am sitting in front of you, my listeners, and I dare not describe him to you. Few people know what he looks like, where he is, and what his surname is today. This man is Stepan Bandera.

Stepan Bandera, today a legendary figure in the national liberation struggle of enslaved peoples, like Abdel Krim, is one of the most dangerous and powerful enemies of Soviet imperialism alive today, because 40 million Ukrainians stand behind him as the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Bandera embodies their desire for national independence.

1941, when he proclaimed Ukraine's independence after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union and when the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, led by him, took up arms, the Soviet secret service tried to catch him. However, to this day, the Soviets have not been able to reach Bandera. He lives unrecognised in a secret place.

Stepan Bandera met the end of the war in 1945 in a German concentration camp. The uprising of the Ukrainian people in 1941 did not fit Hitler's own concept of Eastern policy. He invited Bandera to Berlin for political discussions and ordered his arrest. Bandera's supporters, the glorious Banderaites, continued their struggle on two sides - against Hitler and against Moscow - further. Stepan Bandera remained their undisputed Leader.

In 1945, the Soviets conducted a thorough search for Stepan Bandera throughout Western Europe. Although Bandera was then in an area that was within the sphere of influence of the Soviets, he was not recognised. To this day, the Soviets have not found him. Bandera lives on. This may one day cost Moscow dearly.

For long, the greatest threat to the unity and strength of the Soviet Union has been the desire of the peoples enslaved by Moscow for independence, especially the Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian question was and is the weakest point of the Soviet Union, and the existence of the entire Soviet empire may be shaken here. This summer's speeches by Khrushchev, Kaganovich and others on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's annexation to Russia, accusing the West of "supporting Ukrainian nationalism out of imperialist intentions", prove that Moscow, despite having won the war and the most acute terrorist steps in Ukraine, has not completely dealt with the Ukrainian problem. These speeches show, more than any other argument, that the resistance of the Ukrainian people against Moscow continues and grows. Stepan Bandera, who is sitting here in front of me, is the head, the aspiration and the conscience of the Ukrainian resistance.

I met with Bandera to ask him a few questions about the organisation, methods and goals of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Would you be kind enough, Mr Bandera, to explain first of all what the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which you lead, is and how it operates?

BANDERA: The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which organises and leads the struggle of the Ukrainian people, develops its activities as much in Ukraine as it does outside its borders, mainly in the Western countries where Ukrainian emigration has settled. The connection between these two parts of the Ukrainian liberation movement is maintained through an iron barrier, based on the courier principle. Armed groups of couriers recruited from members of the OUN and the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) are sent from Ukraine to foreign countries and vice versa, and they make their way through secret routes, in a way that is known only to the relevant authorities, but often break through with weapons from one part of the organisation to the other.

GOPE: Mr Bandera, can you give us some details on how you keep in touch with your underground groups in Ukraine?

BANDERA: The members of this liaison group receive and study comprehensive oral reports, explanations of the general situation and individual important events, trends in their development, as well as reports on the status, activities and plans of the units of the liberation

movement. From time to time, leading members of the Organisation move with liaison groups from and to Ukraine to strengthen personal contact between the leadership at home and abroad and to carry out special tasks. These leading members carry the most comprehensive oral information. In addition to oral reports, liaison departments also carry written mail in both directions, including various documents, reports, encrypted instructions, important publications in originals and copies, copies of periodicals, magazines, etc. Due to the extreme difficulties, courier service and communication cannot be carried too often. The bases of the march on both sides are more than a thousand kilometres away from each other. This distance, which runs through Bolshevik-occupied territory, is crossed by numerous, refined obstacles to prevent uncontrolled infiltration.

Two or three borders and border zones with wire fences, depopulated, and ploughed belts, electric and barbed wire fences, barbed wire fences, mined fields, camouflaged and hidden allarming structures, missiles and a large number of border guard troops and their trails are particularly difficult to cross.

GOPP: I can imagine that maintaining your ties with Ukraine requires a lot of sacrifice...

BANDERA: Maintaining the link between the homeland and abroad is one of the most difficult tasks that the Organisation must fulfil in its revolutionary struggle and underground activities against Bolshevism. For this service, the best members of the Organisation, both at home and abroad, with the best character, ideological and moral values, the bravest, the most sacrificial and the practical, are selected. The members of the liaison are trained and equipped comprehensively and specially. Despite our best efforts and full training, about half of our liaison officers are killed in the line of duty. Sometimes the losses are even greater. It happens that entire groups of the best freedom fighters, trained and educated with great difficulty and expense, are completely destroyed by the enemy. However, the broken ties are re-established by new groups. In place of the destroyed communication routes, other ones are created, with the expenditure of new funds.



In addition to this so-called "live" connection maintained through couriers, the Ukrainian liberation movement found other ways and means to keep in touch with half of the Organisation at home and abroad. The courier service, however, is of the utmost importance because it is the most reliable and comprehensive means of communication.

The messages, documents and explanations of individual events and trends transmitted in both directions are not only important for their content. They make it possible to understand correctly the messages transmitted through the Iron Curtain in both directions through radio, the press and various publications. Thanks to their own information about the processes and events in the Soviet Union, which the government conceals from the West, the OUN's media outlets are able to correctly comment on official information from the Soviet government, which is disseminated through the radio and press in a distorted and one-sided manner.

For these reasons, our assessment of the various processes and events of political life in the Soviet Union differs from that of Western observers and politicians, who are mostly based on official Bolshevik news and sources.

On the other hand, news and comments brought to Ukraine from foreign units help OUN units in the homeland to correctly assess political developments on the other side of the Iron Curtain and to counter Russian propaganda.

HOPE: Mr Bandera, what do the vast majority of Ukrainian people think about communism and Moscow's imperialism?

BANDERA: The Ukrainian people are extremely hostile to Bolshevism, communism, the communist system and regime. This hostile attitude also applies to all enslavement and exploitation of Ukraine by the Russian imperialists. Only a small number of Ukrainian captives and servants of the Bolshevik regime are an exception to this attitude.

The revolutionary anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Ukrainian liberation movement is the true expression of the attitudes and aspirations of the Ukrainian people. The broad masses of the Ukrainian people give this movement all possible support and its political leadership. As a result, the Bolshevik government is faced with massive passive resistance and active sabotage of its plans and actions in various

areas. This is especially evident in the areas of national and cultural life and the government's social and economic policy.

HOPE: What methods does Moscow use to maintain its dominance over Ukrainians?

BANDER: The ultimate goal of Bolshevik policy is to destroy the substance of the originality of the Ukrainian people under every scrutiny, and to drown the Ukrainian people in the sea of the so-called Soviet people, or rather in a new form of Russian imperialism that devours other peoples. In this way, Ukraine would turn into one of Russia's provinces. However, the Bolsheviks do not dare to set this goal openly and go straight to it. On the contrary, they are forced to resort to very composite means, and in some areas even make retreats. Moscow is forced to do so, on the one hand, by the indomitable position of the entire Ukrainian people in the struggle against Russian imperialism and communism and the revolutionary struggle of the Ukrainian nationalist liberation movement, and, on the other hand by the size of the Ukrainian people and the comprehensive potential of Ukraine. The Ukrainian people's aspirations for independence were not broken by Moscow, neither through the mass extermination of leading national figures, nor through the horrific terror against the entire Ukrainian people waged by the Soviets between 1930 and World War II through artificially induced famine, mass deportations and executions. Now, in addition to those terrorist steps aimed at all opponents of Bolshevism, Moscow is trying to use a new tactic: to shift the unbent Ukrainian national-state aspirations to the path of Soviet patriotism. This tactic is particularly evident in contemporary Soviet propaganda, which has recently been emphasising the role of Ukraine as the second largest Soviet republic, stressing the greatness of the Ukrainian people and the importance of Ukrainian culture and everything associated with Ukrainianness.

GOPE: What do you think, Mr Bandera, about the subjugation of the Crimean peninsula by the administration of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic after 1945, about this year's demonstrative celebrations of Ukraine's entry into the Russian Empire on the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, about the nomination of communists with Ukrainian surnames loyal to Moscow to prominent government posts

and everything that Moscow's tactics are showing against Ukraine today?

BANDERA: Moscow is trying to make Ukrainians believe that Ukraine and the Ukrainian people could have the best opportunities for development within the USSR, the opportunity to satisfy their national and political aspirations and even become a dominant nation. This latter point is particularly strongly emphasised by Soviet propaganda, saying that the "great Russian people" want to share their dominant hegemony with the "great Ukrainian brotherly people". Behind this attempt is Moscow's attempt to tie Ukraine to Soviet imperialism and to encourage it to spread and defend it together with the Russians, to make Ukraine's fate dependent on its fate.

The insidious plans of the Russians against Ukraine are manifested in the resettlement of Ukrainian people, especially young people, to sparsely populated areas of Soviet Asia, which has recently become widely known. This resettlement is carried out under the pretext of settling virgin lands and turning them into fertile land. This whole action is supposedly done on a voluntary basis. However, in reality, this new form of forced eviction of peoples is primarily a means of implementing Soviet national policy.

At the same time, economic issues are relegated to the back burner. With these measures, the Soviets are trying to reduce the number of Ukrainian youth and weaken the population potential of Ukraine.

The settlers in the new regions are to play the role of colourisers, who, on the one hand, are completely at the mercy of the Soviet regime and must implement its colourisation policy, and on the other hand, must incur the hatred of the native population. This policy aims to weaken the national totality and the strength of resistance in Ukraine as well as in the colonised countries, and to sow national hatred between the peoples enslaved by Moscow, primarily Ukrainians and Turkestanians.

Bolshevik Russia will not, however, achieve its goal. It will backfire on Russia. Just as the Siberian concentration camps and forced expulsions will not be able to break the spirit of Ukrainians and their hatred of Bolshevism and Russian imperialism. Nor will they be able to affect the deep friendship between those enslaved by Moscow

by the peoples.

In the hearts of Ukrainians, there is no feeling of hatred against the allied peoples. On the contrary, they wish for a friendly union and a joint struggle of all peoples against the enslaver, against Moscow Bolshevism.

GOPE: Mr Bandera, what are the political goals of your organisation?

BANDERA: The anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle in Ukraine, waged by the nationalist underground, has been going on for 10 years without a break. The most important goals of this struggle are:

1. the destruction of Bolshevik rule;
2. the removal of Ukraine from the USSR and the elimination of the Russian Empire in general;
3. Elimination of communism, the communist system and regime;
4. the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state within national ethnographic borders with a democratic system of government that would guarantee democratic freedoms to all citizens of Ukraine in all areas of life, especially in the sphere of spiritual, cultural, political and social existence.

HOPE: Could you please explain the concept of Ukrainian nationalism in more detail, Mr Bandera?

BANDERA: Today in Ukraine, the anti-Bolshevik liberation struggle is organised and led by the OUN, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. The concept of a "Ukrainian nationalist", a "nationalist movement", has a completely different meaning than similar terms in the West. The Ukrainian nationalist movement has nothing to do with Nazism, fascism or National Socialism.

Ukrainian nationalism fights against imperialism, against totalitarianism, racism and any dictatorship or use of violence.

The name "Ukrainian nationalist" is in tune with "Ukrainian patriot", who is ready to fight for the freedom of his people, to sacrifice everything he holds dear, even his life.

Ukrainian nationalism opposes the so-called Bolshevik internationalism with the idea of independence and free development of each nation. We are fighting the Bolsheviks' attempts to impose Russian domination on other nations. We will oppose the Russian

Bolshevism in all spheres of life in all forms.

GOPE: In what forms does the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fight for its goals in Ukraine today?

BANDERA: During the Second World War and in the first years afterwards, the Ukrainian liberation struggle was conducted in the form of a guerrilla war of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, in which the broad masses of the Ukrainian people participated. Since about 1949, the military activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have decreased. However, its cadres were retained as the germ of its units for future operations. The revolutionary anti-Bolshevik struggle of the Ukrainian people continues in the form of the political underground. The task of the underground is to transform the existing latent hatred of Russian-Bolshevik imperialism and the enslavement of non-Russian peoples living in the Soviet Union into active resistance to Moscow.

The Ukrainian liberation struggle is an integral part of the general liberation struggle of all peoples enslaved by Russian imperialism. For us, Bolshevism is only one form of traditional Russian imperialism. In the struggle against Russian-Bolshevik imperialism, we feel allied with all freedom-loving nations. We have opposed Russian-Bolshevik imperialism, we will oppose it now, and we will oppose it in the future.

## **Speech at the fifth meeting of Ukrainians in the United States and Canada in 1954**

*A speech recorded and delivered during the Vth Meeting of Ukrainians in America and Canada, held on 31 July and 1 August 1954 in Toronto, Canada, North Mork, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the creation and activities of the OUN and the 10th anniversary of the existence of the UVF.*

*The text of this speech was published in the weekly "The Future of Ukraine", Toronto, No. 33/274 of 14 August 1954 and "The Way of Victory, weekly, Munich, Year I, No. 26 of 22 August 1954: "The Liberation Struggle and Our Tasks", and in the "SP" - "The Current International Situation and Our Tasks".*

On the occasion of the Ukrainian Canadian Reunion, I extend my sincere greetings to my dear countrymen! In doing so, I would like to share with your esteemed listeners a number of thoughts on Ukraine's current liberation struggle in the current international situation.

The threat of the Bolshevik imperialist offensive has become directly close to almost all the peoples of the world. However, Ukraine's liberation struggle against Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement has not yet been properly understood and supported by the Western powers, which have the main role and responsibility in the current world competition. This situation does not stem from ignorance of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, its existence, development and manifestations, its purpose and driving forces. The ruling and influential political circles have the necessary information. Likewise, the policies of Western states cannot be unwilling to support the cause of Ukraine's liberation and state independence for their own reasons.

The indifferent, and sometimes even hostile, attitude of the policies of the leading Western powers to the Ukrainian cause is a consequence of the fundamental mistakes of these policies towards Moscow. In some of these states, hopes and attempts to find a way to peacefully coexist, or at least coexist, with Bolshevik Moscow and its satellites, which are infected with communism, still prevail. That is why they are afraid to show any favour to the most sensitive for Moscow Ukrainian

business.

But even the policy of those states which are most ready to put a firm limit to further Bolshevik conquest does not yet dare to treat the struggle against Bolshevism in a straightforward and consistent manner. The peoples who are directly dealing with Bolshevik subjugation or threat would like to see the United States of America as the leading and most decisive force in the anti-Bolshevik defensive struggle. This is the role that falls to this country as a consequence of its world position and the current international balance of power.

But the US policy also has internal demobilising forces. In , it is hampered by the position of its European allies. Therefore, it is unable to move to the path of consistently defeating the Bolshevik imperialist offensive, it lacks what is the main, internal prerequisite for success in this historic competition, that is, a firm decision to defeat and neutralise the most formidable enemy in the history of Christian culture.

This policy is working in the wrong direction, and therefore in a failed direction. It tries only to restrain further Bolshevik conquest to the extent that the security and interests of the United States and its allies are directly threatened. As a result of this policy of exclusive defence, and one that is concentrated only in certain areas, the Bolsheviks are always given the initiative to shape the international situation. The peoples who have fallen under Moscow's communist enslavement are left to the mercy of the invader, and their revolutionary and liberation struggle is left without eager support by unequal forces. At the same time, the Western powers support in their declarations the right to independence of those countries that the Bolsheviks have occupied since 1939. But this has no practical consequences.

But in the case of the peoples subjugated by Moscow before the Second World War, there is not even such support, despite the fact that they have the same rights to independence, and despite their long struggle against Bolshevism for independence.

The indifference of the free world to the fate of the conquered peoples thrown to the Bolsheviks allows Moscow to do so without external interference,

to crack down on freedom-loving, nationalist forces and movements, to exploit the spiritual and physical strength of those peoples and all the goods of their lands.

In this way, Bolshevik Moscow is constantly increasing its forces and resources and using them in the greatest detail, in a planned and consistent manner to build a huge apparatus of oppression and exploitation of the population and to exorbitantly increase its own military power - a tool for further attacks. At the same time, Moscow is spreading communist, subversive and spy fifth columns around the world.

As the factors of power of the Moscow Empire grow, does the direct threat of Bolshevik aggressive imperialism to the free peoples of the world. This process is taking place at a rapid pace. At the end of the last World War, the USSR was extremely exhausted, shaken and kept on its feet only by the remnants of the Allied technical and material assistance. With the friendly guidance of their Western allies, the Bolsheviks took over other Central European countries, flooding them with their troops and NKVED units. And the huge military supplies captured in China and Manchuria, left behind by the Japanese army, which was defeated by the Americans, became a means of strengthening China's communist aggression.

What an enormous change in the situation and balance of power, to the disadvantage of the West, has taken place in such a short time! Today, the USSR has many times more divisions ready for war than all the Western powers combined. With thousands of airmen, the largest fleet of submarines, the use of the latest technical inventions, and atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Bolshevik ranks, it poses a direct threat even to American land. And over the whole of Western Europe hangs the spectre of a flood of not only Bolshevik but also Chinese communist hordes.

The policy of cordial alliance with Bolshevism during the war, a passive attitude to Bolshevik aggression and indifference to the fate of enslaved peoples brought this state to this point. Regardless of this catastrophic development and terrible experience, Western powers have not yet stopped their policy of seeking peaceful coexistence with Bolshevism on the basis of preserving the existing state.



Moscow conveniently exploits the weaknesses of Western policy and skilfully plays them up. The alternation of stages of temporary tension with stages of various exacerbations of the communist aggressive offensive on different partial fronts is the content of Moscow's strategy. This strategy serves to spread imperialist subterfuge, to occupy and exploit the conquered territories and to prepare for the next attacks.

Although the United States of America is more inclined than the other Western great powers to prevent the Bolshevik offensive from advancing further in the greedy field, it is unable to fundamentally and decisively change the course of events due to the short-sightedness and weakness of its allies. In such a pattern of divergent trends in the Western world, it is far from clear that the policies of the Western powers will wrest the initiative from the Bolsheviks and move to a counter-offensive, instead of continuing the hopeless strategy of holding the enemy at an ever-worsening position. Such a hopeless attitude of the West towards its mortal enemy is the basis for its frivolous attitude towards the liberation struggle of Ukraine and other peoples enslaved by Moscow.

The Ukrainian national liberation struggle is essentially a defence of the original existence and free development of its own nation. But at the same time, it strikes at the very heart of Bolshevik imperialism. The victory of the Ukrainian liberation struggle, the destruction of Moscow's communist rule in Ukraine and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state would mean a major breakdown in the forces of Moscow's aggression.

Western politics knows this all too well, and therefore considers outright support for the cause of Ukraine's liberation to be an attack on the main defensive positions of USSR imperialism. And it still cannot make up its mind to do so. When, in some places, particularly in the United States of America, there are tendencies to move to a policy of offensive against Bolshevism, they are immediately overwhelmed by another weakness. Instead of deciding to fight Moscow imperialism as a whole, artificial and unrealistic attempts are being made to separate Bolshevism from the root Moscow imperialism. Certain American circles are advocating the idea that if the imperialist tendencies peculiar to the Moscow people are not touched, and only the communist regime and communist system are fought, then it will be possible to join the majority of

Moscow people to fight Bolshevism on the side of the West.

The main price for such an alignment of Moscow's sympathies must be the recognition that Ukraine and other countries enslaved by Moscow belong to an indivisible Russia and that the West is not interested in their independence struggle. To this end, the liberation struggle of these peoples must be squeezed into the framework of only anti-regime resistance led by Muscovites. These are the tendencies that some American circles are trying to impose on the whole policy and subjugate the anti-Bolshevik liberation movements of the peoples enslaved by Moscow.

The predominant influence of these tendencies is to create an unfavourable attitude towards the Ukrainian independence movement. These tendencies are harmful not only to our cause but also to the entire world anti-Bolshevik front. In this way, it will not be possible to involve the Moscow people in the broader anti-Bolshevik struggle. This only creates illusions and a false strategy for Western policy and further complicates the struggle of the independent movements of the enslaved peoples.

In such an unfavourable foreign policy situation, the liberation and revolutionary struggle of the nationalist underground in Ukraine has continued for the tenth year since the Second World War. Without the support of Western powers, both moral and political, as well as material and technical, our revolutionary liberation movement has held out against all Bolshevik attempts to destroy it.

The Bolsheviks used mass terror, mass executions, imprisonment and torture, exile and forced eviction, the creation of artificial famine, huge raids and blockades, unprecedented provocations and all sorts of other cunning and cruel methods. In such circumstances, the revolutionary liberation struggle, which relies solely on its own strength, is sustained thanks to the unsurpassed heroism of all its participants and the unusually sacrificial support of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine's modern political and revolutionary struggle is led by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army was organised within the framework of the OUN and joined its actions. The UPA now retains the main core of the revolutionary military force and at the appropriate time will mobilise insurgent personnel and deploy

guerrilla actions.

It is true that the current liberation and revolutionary struggle in Ukraine does not have such broad forms and manifestations as during the war and in the first post-war years. But its ideological and political influence and echoes are spreading throughout the USSR. It mobilises the revolutionary sentiments of the broad masses of the people, awakens, strengthens and directs the hidden but successful resistance to Bolshevik efforts in various areas. The massive and intense nature of this resistance, with its anti-Moscow and anti-Communist ideological orientation, forces the Bolshevik regime to make at least conscious concessions in favour of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement bases its revolutionary and liberation struggle on the own forces of the Ukrainian people. And to further expand and strengthen the anti-Bolshevik front, it seeks allies primarily among those nations that share a common destiny with Ukraine, have the same goals, and are fighting for their independence. This gives our liberation struggle internal strength, independence from changes in the international situation and from the attitude of outside forces to us. Thanks to this, our movement has been able to sustain and develop on its own, while some anti-Bolshevik forces of other nations, which relied too much on external assistance, had to endure great breakdowns and upheavals in the changed situation, as a result of the shakiness of their unstable allies.

The fact that our liberation struggle is based on the concept of self-reliance does not mean that it does not need external support. It is necessary and very useful, since it does not change the political ownership and effective independence of the liberation movement. But it is not just about the political or logistical support given to the regional struggle. The most important thing is that the liberation struggle of Ukraine and other enslaved peoples should not be the only active anti-Bolshevik front. The point is that the free world, having recognised the whole threat posed by Bolshevik imperialism, should finally focus its own efforts and measures on defeating this global enemy.

If the free nations take up this task with full respect, a united front of their anti-Bolshevik efforts will be created at once and

of our liberation struggle. Then there will be one front, one common goal, one competition. The revolutionary and liberation struggle of the peoples enslaved by Moscow can greatly strengthen the anti-Bolshevik efforts of free peoples and benefit from them if they are driven by the same goal: to free the world from the most terrible Bolshevik slavery and threat.

All over the world, among all nations, there are forces that are well aware of the threat of the current international situation. These forces are growing in number. The ever-increasing danger makes them sound the alarm, mobilise peoples to take action against Bolshevism and influence the corresponding change in their policies. The first among those forces should be Ukrainians living among foreign nations. Organised Ukrainian action abroad to mobilise and strengthen the irreconcilable struggle against Moscow-Bolshevik imperialism serves the most important cause of our time. It is equally important and salvific for Ukraine and for every other nation, for all of humanity. Every Ukrainian should take an active part in it, support it with all his or her strength and means, regardless of whether he or she will meet with understanding and recognition or difficulties. Every person of Ukrainian blood is obliged to do so by his or her patriotic duty to the homeland, Ukraine, and the duty to protect universal ideals.

## **On the 25th anniversary of the OUN**

*The speech was recorded on tape and first published in the journal "Liberation Path", London, year XXii, book 10 (259), October 1969, pp. 1155-1158.*

The battlefield of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists is far from over. The liberation struggle of the nationalist movement continues in accordance with the plan of the Ukrainian national revolution as it crystallised in its development up to that time. We are now experiencing a protracted stage in the liberation struggle, and it is not known when the next phase will come, because it also depends on the development of the world political situation. Therefore, it is not yet time to draw final conclusions about the activities and development of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, its achievements and failures, victories and defeats. It is also not the time for it to celebrate anniversaries such as those that have already completed their activities or have completed their most important period. However, it is generally accepted to celebrate such dates as the twenty-fifth anniversary of important events and similar periods of activity. When the 25th anniversary of the 1st Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists is celebrated according to this custom and the path travelled by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists is reviewed, it is necessary to bear in mind, first of all, its further activities and development. All the wreaths of merit and glory of the OUN belong to those of its creators and fighters who not only gave all their strength and hard work to the liberation struggle, but also made the ultimate sacrifice, the sacrifice of blood and life. This is not only an expression of the deepest respect for the memory of the fallen heroes, but also a cold statement of reality. Without those great and heavy sacrifices, the OUN would not have been able to come this far and give such a direction to that period of the liberation struggle. Only through the sanctification of the hardest struggle and the great price of blood will the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism gain the meaning of invincible truths in the life of the Ukrainian people, and the path of liberation and revolutionary struggle, outlined and glorified by the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, however difficult, appeared in reality to be passable and the only way in Ukraine's current situation to achieve independence.

Looking at the development of the OUN's activities over 25 years,

We can best test the value and viability of the movement we are creating. The test of life gives the strongest testimony. The first Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, held just before the 25th anniversary, formalised the creation of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Its actual birth dates back much earlier. The OUN grew out of another revolutionary and liberation force, the Ukrainian Military Organisation, and became the successor, continuation and expansion of its struggle.

Just as after the overthrow of the Ukrainian state by enemy troops and after the seizure of Ukrainian lands by horsemen, the Ukrainian Military Organisation was created, which - along with insurgent organisations - continued the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian armies using revolutionary methods. This continuity is best embodied in the majestic figure of the initiator and leader of the liberation and revolutionary nationalist movement. Colonel Sygen Konovalets was of blessed memory, first of all, the commandant of the Sich Riflemen corps, then the organiser and chief commandant of the UVO, and finally the creator and leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists.

The creation of the OUN at the 1st Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the formation of its ideological and ideological foundations, political programme and guidelines for liberation and revolutionary action, provided a solid foundation, a steady direction and framework for the entire liberation nationalist movement. In the course of further development, additions and improvements were made, but the fundamental principles of the founding Congress remained the basis of everything.

Thus ended a long process of internal revival of Ukrainian nationalism and the formation of a new spiritual and political movement. Over the 25 years of its activity, the OUN has passed very tough tests. The liberation and revolutionary struggle for the destruction of enemy enslavement and the restoration of state independence of united Ukraine was and is its vital element. In this struggle, it was born, developed and grew stronger, and through this struggle it shaped the spirit and face of a freedom-loving and invincible Ukraine fighting its enemies.

From its original base, created in the anti-Polish and anti-Communist struggle in western Ukraine, the OUN in a very short time, at the beginning of the Second World War, launched an anti-Bolshevik revolutionary front throughout united Ukraine. When the two

he greatest military powers, between Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union, broke out in a war on Ukrainian land for the possession of it, the OUN expressed the unwavering will of the Ukrainian people by proclaiming the development of an independent state life, despite the plans of the new occupier.

In the midst of the terrible blizzard of the Second World War, Ukraine showed by its posture and struggle that in a greedy situation it would not agree to be a passive object and colony of anyone, but would fight for its independence. The two-front struggle against Hitlerism and Bolshevism at the same time demonstrated this most clearly. This struggle was organised, directed, and carried its main burden by the OUN. Its widest deployment was the actions of the UPA, which was the creation of the OUN's military department, the successor to the older UVO. The UPA's guerrilla struggle during the war and the first postwar years was the most powerful manifestation of the Ukrainian liberation struggle in this historical period. It best contributed to the inculcation and spread of the ideas and cries of the national liberation anti-Bolshevik revolution not only throughout Ukraine, but among other peoples throughout the expanses of the Bolshevik prison of nations

- USSR. The creation of the UGVR in the final phase of the anti-German war by the OUN and UPA created a political and organisational framework for the active participation of other political forces and movements in the liberation and revolutionary movement. Similarly, on the eve of the German-Soviet war, the OUN initiated the creation of the Ukrainian National Committee for a unanimous independent policy.

But the most difficult and important task faced the OUN in the postwar situation. In the face of a very unfavourable international situation and complete isolation, it was necessary to maintain the liberation and revolutionary struggle against Moscow Bolshevism, despite the fact that the enemy was able to direct all its forces to its destruction. Not many people believed that this would be possible for a longer period of time. But the impossible became a reality.

We owe this to the incomparable heroism and hardening of all the cadres of the nationalist underground, to the highly patriotic and sacrificial, active support of the broad circles of the Ukrainian people. Particular merit in this belongs to the unwavering, courageous and very skilful leadership of the liberation revolutionary underground in all its links on

headed by the highest and best leader-commander, General Chuprynka-Tur-Roman Shukhevych. He led the OUN movement at its most glorious and difficult stage and left the stamp of his great spirit on its development not only in that period. In the revolutionary struggle for the freedom of Ukraine, General Chuprynka-Tur himself, most of his best accomplices and commanders, and many, many of his best friends in the ranks of the OUN and UPA died heroically.

But despite all the painful sacrifices, the OUN's revolutionary struggle against Moscow-Bolshevik enslavement in Ukraine does not stop. It continues with unrelenting ideological intensity and with respectable results. Although the form and size of direct revolutionary actions, in accordance with the current situation, narrow their significance, the political influence is very important and the Bolsheviks can neither keep silent nor eliminate it. In ideological and political unity with the revolutionary underground of the OUN, following its secret instructions, the overwhelming patriotic majority of the Ukrainian people is putting up an elusive but very noticeable and vicious resistance to Moscow Bolshevism in all spheres of life.

The ideological influence of the OUN's actions is manifested even in places where the Bolshevik system of total terror and trampling on everything human reigns in its purest and most brutal form. In the concentration camps of Vorkuta and other areas, desperate outbursts of active mass resistance, inspired and organised by fearless fighters for freedom and truth - Ukrainian nationalists - erupt.

A review of the 25-year journey of the OUN gives us confidence that its ideas, its liberation concept, its plan for organising the revolutionary and liberation struggle, and the principles of its straightforward independent policy are quite correct and successful. This confidence is even stronger when we compare the path and results of the OUN's struggle with those of other political movements and formations that existed in Ukrainian life at that time, which had a much easier start and chose other, seemingly more convenient methods and paths. Thus, looking at the development of the last quarter-century, so rich in important events and great changes, we find that all the fundamental principles of Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism have withstood the test of life and stood up to the most difficult struggles. They give ideological and moral inspiration to the fighters



revolutionaries in the most difficult situation, they are creating the most successful weapon against the most insidious enemy of all mankind, against Moscow Bolshevism. By continuing along the steadfastly tested path, the OUN and the entire liberation front of the Ukrainian people have the means to reach the great goal of liberating Ukraine.

All we need is steadfastness and unwaveringness on the right path and the concentration of all our best efforts in continuing the just struggle under the banner of the Cross-Sword.

(Speech at the Academy to mark the 25th anniversary of the OUN in Manchester, England, 1954)

## Over the grave of Yevhen Konovalets

*The speech was delivered on 25 May 1958 over the grave of the late reg. Sven Konowalczyk in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The text of the speech, with some abridgements, was published in the weekly "Ways of Victory", Munich, no. 22 (223) of 1 June 1958; for a variant, see "Miscellaneous"; in the weekly "Family of Ukraine", Toronto, Canada, year X, no. 24 (473) and 25 (474) of 7 and 14 June 1958, under the title "Over the grave of Svhen Konovalets".*

Twenty years is usually a short period of time in the life of nations. Of course - but not this twenty years, which lay between the present and the tragic May 1938. No ordinary measure of time can be applied to it. It is filled with such events of historical significance that its weight can be compared to entire centuries of other eras. And world history will record this period of the outbreak, course and consequences of the Second World War as one of the most important. And in the history of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian land, this twentieth anniversary was marked by such events and processes, far-reaching changes and tragic upheavals that would be enough for many generations.

This own rich and difficult content of that relatively short time creates a prism through which we can see events and figures in the long , not in contemporary but in historical proportions. Many of the affairs and problems that captured the attention of the people twenty years ago now look small and unimportant. How many of the figures who were in the centre of public attention at the time have faded into oblivion? But this perspective of a time rich in great events and changes not only reduces and levels the paintings. It also brings to the fore and brings to the fore such figures and deeds that have gained lasting significance and influence in the life of the people.

And here we are, standing over the grave of such an extraordinary man, Colonel Svhen Konovalets. Twenty years have passed since the body of one of Ukraine's greatest sons was buried in this foreign land, far from his homeland. But all the tumultuous events that rolled across the lands of Ukraine and left even this cosy Dutch country untouched, could neither drown nor quench

dust of oblivion of the memory of Svhen Konovalets. They seem to have raised it to a height, as if they had cleared the viewpoint around it, so that it appears even more monumental, even brighter against the background of our era.

When we think about why this is so, why the time did not shadow this figure, we come to the conclusion that this is due to the greatness and value of Colonel Konovalets' life, which ended in his death as a fighter.

Svhen Konovalets, the commandant of the Sich Riflemen Corps, is one the greatest and brightest figures in the period of the construction and armed defence of the Ukrainian state in 1917-20. After the destruction of the Ukrainian State and the capture of the lands of Ukraine by an enemy military invasion, he became the founder, organiser and leader of the nationalist liberation movement, first of all, in the Ukrainian Military Organisation, and later in the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, which continues the national liberation struggle for Ukraine's state independence by revolutionary methods.

The content of the entire life of Svhen Konovalets of blessed memory was full of dedication and consistent struggle for the freedom of his people, for the implementation of Christian principles, universal and national ideals - freedom, truth and justice - on the Ukrainian land, in the Ukrainian state. The immortality of the great idea perpetuates and illuminates the memory of the late Colonel, for he did much to consolidate and defeat this idea.

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and the entire national liberation movement stood firm in the struggle against Bolshevik Moscow and other invaders of Ukraine, consolidated and spread their influence among the Ukrainian people because they faithfully and consistently followed the path of Svhen Konovalets.

He taught us how to serve a great idea with our whole lives. Recognising their national ideals, which are in accordance with God's eternal laws, and rejecting everything that is inconsistent with them, which the enemy imposes on us, in particular anti-Christian Bolshevism, the Ukrainian people must fight for them in all circumstances, not just in a situation of opportunity.

The struggle for freedom and truth, for God and for the Motherland must be the main content of the life of the enslaved people, not just a means,

The road to a better life in the future, as there are signs that this goal is not far off. Given its geopolitical location, Ukraine can only achieve and maintain its independence through its own efforts and struggle. At the same time, it will fulfil an important mission of wider significance for other nations, implementing and defending the universal slogan: "Freedom for the peoples, freedom for the people!"

Bolshevik Moscow appreciated Colonel Konovalets' unwavering commitment as the leader of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle and the Ukrainian nationalist movement. By killing the Leader, the enemy hoped not only to behead this movement, but to destroy it entirely. However, the Bolsheviks failed to destroy the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists and stop its struggle even by killing its leader. The source of its vitality and strength lies in the entire nation, and from it comes the constant renewal and consolidation of the national liberation struggle and its active factors.

First and foremost, we owe it to the late Leader himself that even after his tragic death, the OUN did not stray from its path and found its independent fighting power in the subsequent important and difficult period of its activity. Colonel Konovalets, as the leader of the revolutionary struggle against the occupiers of the Ukrainian lands, in particular against Bolshevik Moscow, was as exposed to enemy destructive actions as the underground fighters, and always took this into account in his work. Personally undaunted, he was most concerned about the fate of the liberation movement if he were to pass away.

To this end, he tried to instil as many of his ideas, guidelines and principles of liberation action as possible in the entire Organisation and all its personnel. The future development of world events and, in connection with them, the conditions for further liberation struggle cannot be predicted with certainty for the foreseeable future, and therefore it is impossible to determine the appropriate specific courses of action. But what Colonel Konovalets could do in this direction was to prepare the OUN for the correct action and struggle in various possible situations.

When in 1941 a war broke out between two aggressive, totalitarian imperialisms on Ukrainian land and for its occupation, the OUN, remembering the conclusions of Svhen Konovalets from events of 1917-1918, gave rise to the initiative and framework for the active participation of the Ukrainian nation in the historical arena. By proclaiming

The restoration of the Ukrainian state in June 1941 and the construction of an independent state life have shown that the Ukrainian people, in a desperate situation, do not renounce their rights as masters of their own land, and only respect for these sovereign rights of Ukraine by other peoples and states can be a pledge of friendship with them.

When Hitlerism clearly demonstrated its aggressive plans and colonial methods against Ukraine, the OUN, despite the tragedy of the two-front struggle, moved to widespread armed action, organising the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The broad armed and political struggle against Hitler's destruction of Ukraine and against the renewed Bolshevik occupation, which the OUN-UPA launched during the Second World War and in the first post-war years, constitutes the highest rise of the Ukrainian liberation struggle after the 1917-20s. The organisational and political foundations and guidelines for this were provided by the regiment, the organiser and leader of the nationalist movement. Konovalets.

The most unfavourable external circumstances did not allow for a national uprising against Bolshevism and the achievement of Ukraine's independence. The international situation helped Moscow to throw the armies mobilised in the war to suppress the liberation struggle of Ukraine and other peoples oppressed by Bolshevism. However, the OUN-UPA did not lay down its arms and did not stop fighting, following in the footsteps of the glorious memory of Colonel Konovalets. Just as he and other leaders of the independence struggle, with Chief Ataman Symon Petliura at their side, began fighting with revolutionary and underground methods after Ukraine was flooded by enemy occupation, so again the OUN-UPA under the leadership of Roman Shukhevych-Chuprynka switched from insurgent tactics to underground ones.

The liberation struggle continues, and its steadfastness is the surest guarantee of future victory. The entire Ukrainian people are now passionate about the nationalist ideology of Ukraine's independence and the consistent struggle against the godless and anti-people Bolshevism. The nationalist movement has become a national liberation movement. And along with the rooting of its ideas among the people, the memory of its great leader and founder, Svhlen Konovalets, is living and spreading. All Bolsheviks are in vain

attempts to desecrate and wrest this great glory from the soul of the people, just as the enemy fails to destroy faith in God and other national sacrednesses.

Today, as before, we can affirm that the enemy of God, Ukraine, and all freedom-loving humanity failed to destroy the OUN and the Ukrainian liberation movement by killing its Founder and Leader. But at the same time, we are aware that this is a huge irreplaceable loss that we have not been able to overcome for twenty years. The development and struggle of the OUN would have gone much better and further if it had continued to be led and guided by Colonel Konovalets. An enemy bomb tore him out of the liberation struggle just before the period in which the independent front needed him, an experienced and unflappable political and military leader, the most. His heroic death as a fighter on the highest and most important post strengthened the power of the nationalist idea, the faith and zeal of Ukrainian nationalists. But nothing can equalise his loss.

When we stand over the grave of the One who was the First, the Greatest, the Furthest in our common struggle, our hearts are filled with regret and pain with the same uncomfortable acuteness as twenty years ago, when for the first time, in different circumstances and not at the same time, but with the same storm, we were struck by the terrible news of the Colonel's death. And the time that has passed since then, with so many great and difficult, heroic and tragic events, cannot drown out this grief.

And yet, even this regretful pain does not turn into despair. Because we are strengthened by our faith. The inexhaustible source of strength of our souls - Christian faith in God, His justice and boundless goodness, faith in the immortality of the human soul - gives us the certainty that our unredeemed Leader participates in a new, higher and indestructible life. From this same belief we derive the conviction that he and other fallen freedom fighters are inextricably linked to our future liberation struggle. This connection is not only based on their contribution to the liberation cause in life, but continues on in another, mystical way. Separated by the border of death, but united by the bond of faith, idea and love, the living and the dead can mutually help each other before and through God.

On the twentieth anniversary of the death of Svhen Konoalets, hundreds of sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people arrived in the city of his death to lay wreaths and honour his blessed memory at the grave of this Great Ukrainian Patriot, Fighter and Leader. Those who have arrived are like a delegation from the whole nation, which holds the memory of its Great Son in the highest esteem. Our memorials, prayers and wreaths express the most sincere feelings of all the faithful children of Ukraine, and in particular all the active fighters and sufferers for the idea for which Colonel Konoalets lived and died. Although only a small number of Ukrainian patriots have the opportunity to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of his death together, and many do not even know this date, all of us pay the best tribute to his memory with our loyalty to his idea. And each of us will complete the honouring of his memory when we add to the prayer for the eternal happiness of his soul a vow over his grave: to follow in his footsteps, to work sincerely for the good of Ukraine throughout our lives and to fight to the death for its freedom. May the victory of the great idea and truth forever secure the memory and glory of their Great Fighter and Hero Svhenii Konoalets.

## **The first interview of the OUN leader Stepan Bandera with foreign journalists**

*On 31. 3. 1950 OUN leader Stepan Bandera gives an interview to five foreign journalists, in which he reveals the main postulates of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian revolutionary liberation forces.*

*The meeting took place in secret, in a small hotel. The location and access to it were closely guarded by Ukrainian security, and the name of the area on the outskirts of Munich was not known to the participants, but was announced in the press as "a nearby unspecified location". These special precautions were taken because St. Bandera was living at that time under constant, intrusive surveillance by enemy agents, who, either on their own or with the "friendly assistance" of certain Western intelligence officers, killed or forcibly removed (i.e. "repatriated") to the CCCR political figures who were particularly dangerous to the Russian-Bolshevik allies. That is why St. Bandera lived in a secluded area under a false surname and under the constant armed guard of a UPA sergeant who was sent by General Muprynka with a combat group through the MCCR to the OUN Leadership.*

*The press conference was widely reported in the world press in Europe, North America and Argentina. The dailies of 72 countries reported the press conference as a kind of sensation. In some newspapers (including some Ukrainian ones), the content of the interviews was misrepresented or deliberately distorted. The text of the press conferences is based on the report of a correspondent of the "Way of Victory" (part 15 of 1950).*

Greeting the journalists, Stepan Bandera said that, in response to the frequently expressed wishes of foreign journalists, he wanted to provide them with information and clarification about the modern liberation struggle of Ukraine so that they could correctly inform Western nations about it.

Question: What is your position?

Answer: Chairman of the Leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. What are the goals of the OUN?



The liberation of Ukraine, the overthrow of the state of enslavement of Ukraine by Bolshevik Russia, the restoration of an independent Ukrainian state on Ukrainian ethnographic territory, the destruction of Russian imperialism, the division of the USSR into independent national states of all peoples enslaved by Moscow.

What kind of state system is the OUN striving for?

To democracy and social justice. The OUN fights against Bolshevik dictatorship, totalitarianism, communist social enslavement and exploitation. In the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian people should decide on its state and social system by their own free will. The Ukrainian state will guarantee the free development of all spheres of life - religion, culture, economy, and will ensure comprehensive personal freedom and justice for all citizens of Ukraine, freedom of individual and collective activity of citizens in the socio-political, economic, cultural and other spheres.

How do you want to achieve your goals?

The revolutionary, armed political struggle of the entire Ukrainian people in a common anti-Bolshevik front with other enslaved peoples.

Is the OUN a political or a military organisation?

The OUN is a liberation and revolutionary organisation that combines elements of political and military organisations, in accordance with the fact that the Ukrainian liberation struggle is both a socio-political process and an armed military action. The OUN's activities are aimed at directing and organising anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian processes and actions with Ukrainian national and independent content in all spheres of life. OUN members are equally prepared for political and military struggle and conduct it in both forms.

What are the forces of the Ukrainian liberation movement?

The Ukrainian liberation struggle is led by the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, which emerged in 1944 and operates in Ukraine as the revolutionary supreme body of the Ukrainian people in opposition to the Moscow exposition, the so-called government of the Ukrainian SSR. The UHVR, which has the character of

The Revolutionary Parliament and its executive body, the General Secretariat, are based in Ukraine at all times.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is an underground revolutionary military formation that wages military struggle as part of a whole revolutionary action.

What is the relationship between the OUN and the UPA?

The closest cooperation. The UPA emerged from the armed units of the OUN during the Second World War, when the military struggle unfolded on a large scale, on two fronts, against the Germans and the Bolsheviks.

The basis of the UPA was the military units of the OUN, but the UPA also includes non-members of the OUN, all those who want to participate in the armed struggle against the enemy for the freedom of Ukraine. The UPA is built and operates on purely military principles in relation to underground conditions. The UPA conducts military operations within the framework of the entire revolutionary struggle, which is practically organised and led by the OUN.

Are you the commandant of the UPA?

No. The Chief Commandant of the UPA is General Taras

Chuprynka. What is his relationship to the OUN?

He is the second Chairman of the OUN

Leadership. What were the actions of the

UPA?

The UPA's operations, their size and form were always appropriate to the situation. During the war and immediately after its end, the UPA operated with larger military units, conducted military actions, and completely occupied large swathes of territory.

In the current, more stable situation, the forms of action of the UPA are different from those during the war. In the years 1945-1948, the Bolsheviks carried out massive actions to eliminate the political underground in several ways. Many divisions operated for several months across the entire territory of Ukraine. When the divisions of the Soviet army proved to be very unreliable, the Bolsheviks used almost exclusively NKVD troops from 1946 onwards. The Bolsheviks failed to destroy either the UPA units or the entire revolutionary OUN underground.

The UPA now operates in smaller, more fragmented units. Main goals

The main goals of the UPA's modern military actions were to strengthen the overall socio-political revolutionary process; protect the population from exterminatory actions of the NKVD, such as mass deportations; paralyse and destroy centres of police and economic terror; revolutionary propaganda raids to other sub-Bolshevik countries to strengthen the revolutionary movements there; development and improvement of methods of armed revolutionary struggle; demonstration to all peoples in the USSR that armed revolutionary struggle is possible and successful in all circumstances, despite all the efforts of Bolshevik terror; to exert a revolutionising influence on the Soviet army; to keep the main cadres of the revolutionary army in constant action, which at the appropriate time will be able to organise and lead the masses of revolutionised soldiers to fight.

Were there other attempts on the part of the Bolsheviks to bring the struggle to an end, such as appeals?

Yes. Between 1944 and 1947, the Bolshevik government repeatedly made official appeals to Ukrainian revolutionaries to abandon the struggle, promised "amnesty", and talked about a Ukrainian state. Ukrainians know the Muscovites too well, and such appeals were not heeded.

In other countries, for example, in Poland, where the underground forces partially succumbed to such insidious Bolsheviks' attempts and came out of the underground, this led not only to a significant weakening and demobilisation of the anti-Bolshevik underground, but also to the gradual imprisonment, deportation and liquidation of all detected underground members (here we mean members of the Polish underground, mainly the AK - "Armia Krajowej" - D. C.).

What is the quantitative state of the UPA? It is a mystery.

Can you give us an indication from the past of the quantitative status and size of the larger UPA operations?

At the turn of 1944 and 1945, our enemies, the Germans and Bolsheviks, estimated in their intelligence reports that the UPA was about 200,000 troops strong.

In one of the larger several-day battles against one UPA unit, 3 divisions took part on the Bolshevik side (the battle in the Black Forest

in Subcarpathia in 1945). The UPA units, having dealt heavy blows to the Bolsheviks, managed to break through the encirclement.

What weapons does the UPA have and where did they come from?

The UPA acquires all its weapons from the enemy. In particular, large stockpiles of weapons date back to the war. The main weapons are machine guns and pistols, various grenade launchers, hand-held anti-personnel weapons, and light anti-personnel guns.

Does the UPA have tanks, planes, artillery, and do the Bolsheviks use them against the UPA?

The Bolsheviks, like the Germans, use tanks, planes and artillery against the UPA. The UPA has no aircraft. Tanks and grenade launchers were used by UPA units only occasionally, in isolated battles, having captured them from the enemy.

How strong is the OUN?

The strength of the OUN is not measured by the number of its organised members. It lies in the fact that we mobilise, organise and direct the independence aspirations and anti-Bolshevik mentality of the entire Ukrainian people to the struggle. The OUN's struggle the majority of the Ukrainian people in various forms and is supported and sympathised with by the entire nation, with the exception of a small handful of communists and their minions.

How can we assess the anti-Bolshevik potential in Ukraine?

Half of the 45 million Ukrainians will take a direct active part in the anti-Bolshevik liberation revolution (the rest are incapable of direct struggle).

How did you become a leader of the OUN?

He was elected head of the OUN Leadership. In 1940 he was elected temporarily by the Conference, and in 1941 by the Great Assembly, the highest institution of the OUN, which sets the programme, organisational laws and calls the Leadership. He was elected for the last time after his release from a German concentration camp by the OUN Conferences in Ukraine in 1945 and in 1947 abroad. (The decisions of both conferences have the force of resolutions of the OUN Grand Assembly - Ed. Ed.)

When, where and why were you imprisoned by the Germans?

In 1941, after the proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian state against the will and plans of Nazi Germany. He was imprisoned until 1943 in a Gestapo prison in Berlin, and then until September 1944 in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in Oranienburg.

When and why were you fired?

In the autumn of 1944, as they were retreating from Ukraine, the Germans released me and a small number of Ukrainian nationalists, trying to win the favour of Ukrainians. I rejected offers of cooperation, as others. The Germans kept me under police surveillance, from which I escaped in early 1945.

Did the Germans offer Ukrainians cooperation, promising state independence?

During the war, Nazi Germany never really had a positive attitude towards the cause of Ukrainian state independence, only trying to lure it with dubious promises in the long .

Does the Ukrainian people not hope for liberation from the war between America and the USSR?

We are counting only on liberation through our own struggle, the anti-Bolshevik revolution. The war can create favourable circumstances and help. But Ukraine is not counting on liberation by foreign forces.

When will there be a revolution in Ukraine?

A general revolutionary breakthrough in Ukraine and other sub-Bolshevik countries would come at the right . Of greater importance will be the maturation of the revolutionary process among the broad masses of the people, including other nations, and the growth of revolutionary sentiment in the Soviet army. And secondly, the right moment will play a role.

Does your movement also operate in the Soviet army?

Yes. A successful propaganda and preparatory campaign is being conducted among the soldiers of the Soviet army, Ukrainians and other nationalities, so that instead of defending the Bolshevik regime and Moscow imperialism, they would stand against it at the appropriate time, in the struggle for freedom, on the side of the liberation revolution.

How do you imagine the right moment for a revolution to break out?

It can be internal, in the form of the extremely difficult situation of the entire Bolshevik system and regime, including economic refraction. The internal development of the USSR is progressing along this line. Or the second possibility: an external crisis, a war, or some other form of major pressure on the USSR from the outside.

Or do people in Ukraine not America to wage war on the USSR?

No. People here know what America's attitude and policy towards the USSR is. But they know that such a war will come inevitably. The USSR is preparing for it and will cause it.

How do you know and what are the signs that the USSR is preparing for war?

We have information about what is happening in Ukraine and throughout the USSR. The Bolsheviks are preparing for war in various areas: a) psychological mobilisation under the guise of the slogan "for peace"; the Bolsheviks are propagandising that America is preparing for aggression and the USSR must repel it, destroy Anglo-American imperialism; b) the USSR keeps many young people under arms, conducts intensive military training for all young people, not only in the army, but also in the Komsomol and various paramilitary organisations; c) the entire economy of the USSR and its satellites is aimed exclusively at preparing for war, developing military industry, d) the intensive development of a huge air force, naval fleet, including submarines, the construction of roads exclusively for the needs of aggressive war, the intensive construction of airfields, large underground military stores, their placement on the outskirts of the USSR, along the routes of attacks and in satellite countries - all this clearly indicates that the USSR is preparing for war outside its borders, for aggression.

When do you think the USSR will start a war with America?

When it will no longer be able to gain in the "quiet war", when it will no longer be successful in its communist, subversive and subversive activities in the West, and when it will encounter firm resistance in its advance to the east, in Asia, as it has in the Middle East. Now the USSR does not need an outright, full-scale war, as long as it gains more easily and without great risk with the passivity of the Western powers.

Or do you want to provoke a war between the USSR and America?

We are not in a position to do so, nor is it within our tasks. We are waging our own struggle and are taking care of the common liberation front of all the peoples enslaved by Bolshevism. And the question of the Western powers' war with the USSR is a matter of protecting their vital interests.

If it came to a war between the US and the USSR, would a revolution break out in Ukraine?

If the states at war with the USSR had clearly and bindingly declared their support for the Ukrainian independence struggle, recognised Ukrainian statehood as one of the goals of the war, and actually treated Ukraine and its allies, our liberation struggle as an ally, then our revolutionary struggle would have been conducted in such a way as to contribute as much as possible to the rapid and complete overthrow of the common enemy and the establishment of peace.

If the attitude of the states fighting against the USSR had been different, we would have treated their war as a foreign affair and would have conducted our own struggle exclusively on our own terms, as would be most useful for us, without any reason to coordinate it with the military plans of the USSR's opponents.

Does the OUN receive assistance from the Americans? No.

Does he cooperate with the SIS?

No. Instead, we know that various people were masquerading as the Organisation's company and misleading American factors.

Were the Bolsheviks trying to make an attack on you?

Yes. The Security Service exposed three NKVD agents who were tasked with this.

Could any journalist go to Ukraine and see your struggle there?

Fundamentally, yes. The prerequisite for this is complete mutual trust and the requirement to take risks. Approximately half of the people who perform the task of liaising between the region and abroad die.

Approximately how many UPA fighters from Ukraine are in the raid to Germany? Are there more units coming?

Two years before, about 300 UPA soldiers and members of the OUN from the western Ukrainian outskirts near Poland raided Germany and Austria (not "the outskirts", as some foreign newspapers reported - Ed.) They were ordered to move here when, after a two-year struggle, the entire Ukrainian population had been evicted from those areas.

Only small groups came from the Ukrainian motherland to communicate.

In conclusion, Bandera drew the attention of Western correspondents to the following issues:

The Western powers' policy and tactics against the USSR up to that time many flaws that were detrimental to the fight against Bolshevik offensive throughout the world.

The distinction between Bolshevism and Russian imperialism is wrong. You cannot destroy one while leaving the other, and the concept of having one of them as an ally against the other is completely unrealistic.

Such a false concept is the reliance on Russian forces that oppose Bolshevism but are themselves in favour of maintaining an empire that enslaves other peoples.

It is equally wrong to rely on the so-called Titoism, national communism, in the hope that it will be possible to have it as an ally against the USSR. This is the second Trojan horse. In the world competition, the communists will find common ground with the USSR. By pacting with Tito, etc., the Western world is depriving itself of an ideological face in the fight against Bolshevism.

The concept of countering the Bolshevik system through legal methods, parliamentary elections, . caused much damage to the anti-Bolshevik front. In the countries newly occupied by the Soviets, including the so-called satellites, the direction of national and anti-Bolshevik struggles towards the path of legal struggle brought heavy losses, demobilisation and the breakdown of anti-Bolshevik forces. This was caused by the policy of the Western powers, which pushed those nations to this path. Against Bolshevism, a system of reckless terror, lawlessness, and totalism, there is a possible



There is only one way for an enslaved people to fight for liberation - an uncompromising revolution.

The Western world is missing and underestimating the most confident and firm forces in the global struggle against Bolshevism - the revolutionary liberation movements of enslaved peoples.

Just like Ukraine, many other nations are Bolshevism and Russian invasive imperialism.

The national idea, the struggle for independence and free development, gives those peoples the strength to withstand the most difficult competition when powerful states are pacting with the USSR.

Now the struggle of our peoples is not going on in isolation. All independent, revolutionary forces are united in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples, forming a common front of the liberation struggle. The ANB includes the liberation movements of the following peoples: Azerbaijanis, Belarusians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Estonians, Idel-Uralians, Cossacks, Lithuanians, Lotis, Magyars, Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks, Turkestans, Ukrainians, Czechs, and Croats.

Why are there no Poles in the DEA?

Because Polish political actors abroad do not agree to the principle of independent national states within ethnographic borders, which has been accepted by all the peoples of the ABN. They want to annex parts of Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian and other lands to Poland. But in their native lands, there is cooperation between the Ukrainian revolutionary movement and the Polish anti-Bolshevik underground, which does not advocate imperialist positions.

S. Bandera's interview with foreign journalists ended with an appeal that the anti-Bolshevik forces of the Western nations should support the liberation struggle of the peoples of the ABN, not only in the name of universal ideals, but also in their own interest.

# **BERSERKER**

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## **BOOKS**

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