

MEN & RUINS



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"There is a pattern fixed in the heavens for anyone who wants to see it and, having seen it, to conform himself to it. But whether it exists anywhere or ever will exist is of no importance, for this is the only state in politics of which he can ever consider himself a part.

Plato, Republic, 592 b

CHAPTER ONE

REVOLUTION - COUNTERREVOLUTION TRADITION

Today, faced with the extreme forms in which the disorder of our age manifests itself in the socio-political field, various forces have tried to assume attitudes of defence and resistance. It is necessary to realise that all this is futile, even to a merely demonstrative end, if one does not attack evil at its roots which, as far as the historical cycle to we shall restrict our considerations here is concerned, are *the subversion brought about in Europe by the revelations of 1989 and 1948*. Evil must be recognised in all the forms and degrees that it presents, so the fundamental problem is to establish whether there are still men capable of rejecting all ideologies, all political and party formations that in any case, directly or indirectly derive from those ideas, which is as much as to say the whole world from liberalism and democracy to Marxism and communism. As a positive counterpart, these men should be given an orientation, the firm foundation of a general outlook on life and a strict doctrine of the state. Strictly speaking, the watchword could therefore be 'counterrevolution'. However, the revolutionary origins are now distant and almost forgotten, subversion has long since stabilised to the extent that it appears as something obvious and natural in most of the existing institutions. So practically that formula would only be valid if one had in view the last stages that, with revolutionary communism, world subversion is trying to cover. Otherwise, another watchword is preferable: *reaction*. Not being afraid to adopt it and thus to call oneself *reactionary* is a touchstone. For some time now, left-wing circles have made 'reaction' a synonym for all nefariousness and infamy, and they miss no opportunity to stigmatise with this term all those who do not play their game and who do not follow the current, what for them would be the 'sense of history'. While this is natural on their part, the anguish complex that the word often arouses, due to a lack of political, intellectual and, one might even say, physical courage, even in the exponents of an alleged Right or 'national opposition', who as soon as they hear themselves labelled as 'reactionaries' protest, exonerate themselves, and set out to prove otherwise, is not. Instead, one would have to ask oneself what it is that while others 'act' by carrying out the process of subversion, one does not 'react' but rather stands by and says to them: 'Well done, carry on', and lends them a hand. Historically, the only thing to be deplored is that the 'reaction' was non-existent, partial or inefficient, without adequate men, means and doctrines, when the evil was still in germ and yet susceptible to being eliminated by immediately cauterising the main foci of the infection: whereby the nations of Europe would have been spared calamities without standards. "A new radicalist line-up should therefore arise, with strict borders between friend and foe. If the game is not yet over, the future will not belong to those who indulge in the hybrid and flaky ideas predominant today in the same circles that do not exactly call themselves left-wing, but to those who will have the courage of radicalism - that of 'absolute negations' or 'sovereign affirmations', to use the words of Donoso Cortès. Of course, the term 'reaction' has, in itself, a certain negative colouring: one who reacts does not have the initiative of action; one reacts, in a polemical or defensive function, in the face of something that has already been affirmed de facto. It must therefore be made clear that it is not a question of parrying the opponent's moves without having anything positive. The misunderstanding could be eliminated by associating the formula of 'reaction' with that of a 'conservative revolution', a formula in which a dynamic element comes to the fore, 'revolution' ceasing to mean the violent overthrow of a constituted legitimate order but rather an action intended to sweep away any disorder that has arisen and restore a condition of normality. De Maistre noted that what we are dealing with here is more than 'counterrevolution' in the strict sense and positive action

harking back to the origins. Strange fate of words, after all, 'revolution' in its original etymological Latin meaning did not mean anything different; derived from *re-volvere*, the term expressed a motion that brings one back to the starting point at the origin. Therefore, it is precisely from the origins that one should draw the 'revolutionary' and renewing force to act against the existing situation. If one then wants to include the idea of 'conservation', one must proceed with caution. Given the interpretation put forward by the Left, saying 'conservative' today is almost as scary as saying 'reactionary'. Evidently, it is a question of establishing what it is that one wants to 'conserve'. Nowadays, there is very little that deserves to be 'conserved', if we refer to actuality, as social and institutional structures. This is true almost without reservation for Italy; it might have been true until yesterday to a lesser extent for England and France, even less so for the nations of central Europe where vestiges of superior traditions had continued to insist even on the level of actuality. Indeed, the formula of the 'conservative revolution' was chosen by German elements immediately after the First World War, even with fairly close historical references (1). For the rest, one has to recognise the reality of a situation that lends itself to the polemics of left-wing forces, for whom conservatives are allegedly the defenders not of ideas but of the interests of a particular economic class, the capitalist class that is more or less politically organised to perpetuate to its own advantage what is supposed to be merely a regime of privileges and social injustice. Thus it was easy to make conservatives, 'reactionaries', capitalists and the bourgeoisie more or less a single bundle. The 'false purpose', as they say in artillery, was created. However, the tactics used at the time when the leading patrols of world subversion did not yet have Marxism and communism as their banner but were represented by liberalism and constitutionalism were no different. The effectiveness of this tactic was due to the fact that the conservatives of yesterday, not unlike those of today, albeit of an unquestionably superior extraction, had been reduced to essentially having at heart their socio-political positions, the material interests of a given class, of a given caste - not, first and foremost, the resolute defence of a superior right, of a dignity, of an impersonal legacy of values, ideas, principles: this was their fundamental weakness. Today, we have descended even lower, so that the 'conservative' idea to be defended must not only have no connection whatsoever with the class that has practically taken the place of a decayed aristocracy, i.e. the capitalist bourgeoisie, and which has only the character of a mere economic class, but it must be resolutely opposed to it. What it would be a question of 'preserving' and 'revolutionarily' defending is a general conception of life and the state that, based on values and interests of a higher character, clearly transcends the plane of the economy and thus everything that can be defined in terms of economic classes. With respect to such values, what refers to concrete orders, to positive situations, to historical situations is but a consequence, it is not the primary element but the secondary one. Having put it this way, by absolutely refusing to place itself in the field in which it would like to exert itself in aiming at the aforementioned 'false goal', the Left's polemic falls completely flat. At the same time, it appears that it is not even a question of artificially and violently prolonging particular forms tied to the past, despite their having exhausted their vital possibilities and no longer being up to times. For the true revolutionary conservative, it is a question of fidelity not to forms and institutions of bygone times, but to principles of both may have been particular expressions appropriate for a certain period and in a certain area. And as much as these particular expressions are to be judged in themselves transient and mutable, because they are connected to historical situations that are often unavailable, the corresponding principles have a value that is not touched by such contingencies, they have a perennial topicality. As from a seed, new forms can always spring from them, homologous to the old ones, so that in their eventual replacement - even 'revolutionarily' - of the former, a continuity will be maintained amidst the changing historical and social, economic and cultural factors. For

Ensuring such continuity, while holding fast to principles, eventually abandoning everything that needs to be abandoned, instead of stiffening up or throwing in the towel almost out of panic and confusedly searching for new ideas when crises occur and times change - this is the essence of true conservatism. In this sense, conservative spirit and traditional spirit make one and the same thing. In its true and living meaning tradition is not supine conformism to what has been, or inert continuation of the past into the present. Tradition is, in its essence, something meta-historical and, at the same time, dynamic: it is a general ordering force in function of principles with the chrism of a superior legitimacy - if you like, you could also say: of principles from above, - a force that acts throughout the generations, in continuity of spirit and inspiration, through institutions, laws, orders that can also present a considerable variety and diversity. A similar mistake to the one now being accused is to identify or confuse one or the other of such formations from a more or less distant past with tradition per se. Methodologically, in the search for points of reference, a given historical form must therefore be considered exclusively as an exemplification and as a more or less adherent application of given principles - and this is an entirely legitimate procedure, comparable to what in mathematics is the transition from differential to integral. In this case, there is neither anachronism nor 'regressivism' to speak of; in this case, nothing has been fetishised, nothing has been absolutized that in essence was not already absolute, because such are the principles. Otherwise, one would be like those who, by chance, would want to accuse those who defend certain particular virtues of the soul of anachronism on the grounds that they also refer to some particular figure from the past in which those virtues were precipitously manifested. As Hegel himself said, 'it is a matter of recognising, in the appearances of the temporal and the transitory, the substance, which is *imminent*, and the eternal, which is *actual*'. With this, the ultimate premises of two opposing attitudes appear. The axiom of the revolutionary-conservative or revolutionary-reactionary mentality is that for the supreme values, for the basic principles of any healthy and normal order - and as such, to be understood, we can already indicate those of the true state, of the *imperium* and *auctoritas*, of hierarchy, of justice, of functional classes and value categories, of the political order in its pre-eminence over the social and economic order, and so on - there is no change, no becoming. In their domain there is no 'history' and to think in terms of history is absurd. Such values and principles have an essentially *normative* character. In other words, they have the same dignity in the collective and political order as the values and principles of absolute morality have in individual life: imperative principles that require direct, intrinsic recognition and that are not prejudiced by the fact that in one or the other case the individual, due to weakness or being prevented by force majeure, is unable to realise them only in part, and at one point and not at another of his existence: because as long as he does not inwardly abdicate, even in objection and despair, recognition will not fail. Equal in nature are the ideas to which we refer and which a Vico would call 'the natural laws of an eternal republic varying in time for various places'. Even when these principles are objectified in a historical reality, they are not at all conditioned by it, they always refer to a higher, meta-historical plane, which is their proper and natural place and where, let us repeat, there is no change. This is how the ideas we call traditional should be conceived. Quite the opposite is the fundamental premise that always, more or less distinctly, betrays itself in the revolutionary mentality. Its truth is historicism and empiricism. According to it, even in the realm of the spirit, becoming would reign, everything would be conditioned and shaped by the epoch and the times, there would be no principles, systems and norms whose value did not depend on the period in which they took shape historically on the basis - it is believed - of contingent and entirely human, physical, social, economic, irrational factors and so on. In the most extreme and up-to-date form of this deviant line of thought, the truly determining factor of every structure and everything that has the semblance of an autonomous value would be the contingency itself.

to the various forms and development of the means of production, according to its social consequences and repercussions. We will return below: to the historicist thesis, which we mention here only to clarify a fundamental gap in premises. It is therefore pointless to discuss where this gap is not recognised at the outset. The two conceptions are as irreconcilable as the style of thought they inform. The one is the truth of the revolutionary conservative and of every line-up that, in its properly political applications, has the character of a true 'Right', the other is the myth of world subversion, the background common to all forms of it, whether extremist or moderate and diluted. The above considerations regarding method and the meaning of any historical references also have practical value. In fact, in a nation there is not always sufficient living traditional continuity so that referring to given institutions that existed or were close enough in the past also directly counts as a reference to the corresponding ideas. On the other hand, it can happen that the continuity is interrupted and the procedure mentioned above becomes necessary, that one has to refer to other epochs, but only to derive ideas that are valid in themselves. This is, in a very particular way, the case for Italy. We have already asked ourselves what there is currently to 'conserve' in Italy. In this nation there is no basis of political forms that have been preserved sufficiently intact from a traditional past, and this is due to the very fact that such a past is lacking, that, unlike in the major European states, there has not been, in Italy, a secular and continuous unitary formation tied to a central, dynastic and political symbol and power. In particular, there is no solid ideal heritage, even if only as the legacy of a few, such that everything linked to the ideologies established with the French Revolution is felt to be extraneous, distorting and dissolving: since it was precisely these ideologies that, in one form or another, propitiated Italian unification, that continued to predominate in unified Italy and that after the period of the fascist attempts were re-pulled in the most virulent forms. Thus there is a hiatus and a *vacuum* - and, in the case of Italy, the reference to the principles we call traditional will necessarily have an ideal rather than historical character; even if historical forms should be referred to, these will only have to be recognised as having the aforementioned significance of simple bases for an integration that will immediately leave them behind, aiming essentially at ideas, the historical distance being - as for example in the case of ancient Rome or certain aspects of the medieval world - too great for the reference to have any other significance. However, such a circumstance is not a disadvantage from every point of view. It means that should the ideas we allude to be asserted by a new movement, they will be presented in an almost pure state, with a minimum of historical dross. Of what some states, especially central European ones, until yesterday presented as a residual positive historical basis or as a predisposition for a conservative revolution, the Italian exponents of it will not be able to benefit. But the positive counterpart to this disadvantage is precisely that if the alignment, which we are thinking of, is realised, it will be able to have characteristics of absoluteness and radicality. Precisely because the material support consisting of a traditional past that is still alive and concretised in historical forms that are not completely obsolete is non-existent, the restorative revolution will have to present itself in Italy as a primarily spiritual phenomenon with the pure idea as its basis. The entire present world, however, appears more and more as a world of ruins, and within a more or less short period of time, the same line will probably impose itself wherever it will be seen, that is, that it is useless to lean on what still preserves vestiges of more normal order, but which is now undermined by multiple negative historical factors, that it is instead necessary to go back more and more to the origins and from there, as from something above history, to start, then carrying on with pure forces in the reconstructive and avenging reaction. Perhaps it will not be useless to make a brief comment on the term 'revolution' in a particular context, i.e. in relation to the fact that in various circles of national opposition to the current system, people *tend* to call themselves 'revolutionaries': a tendency, moreover, already present in movements of the past,

Given the choice of designations such as 'fascist revolution', 'revolution of the Brown Shirts', 'revolution of order', etc., of course, one always has to ask: Revolution against what? Revolution in the name of what? But, that aside, each word has its own soul, and care must be taken that one does not insensitively fall under its influence. We have made it clear that from our point of view one can only speak of 'revolution' in a relative sense - one can say, in Hegelian fashion, as a 'negation of negation' - with reference to the attack against something that has a negative character, to a complex of changes, violent or otherwise, aimed at restoring the normal state, in the same way that one rises up who has fallen, that one rids an organism of its degenerating excrescences by halting a cancerous process. Well, it is necessary that the secret soul of the term 'revolution' does not also act on those who are not left-wingers by leading them astray when they tend to call themselves revolutionaries in a sense that diverges from the one now indicated, to be instead, in a certain way, positive. There is a danger, then, of adopting, more or less implicitly, basic premises that are not different from those of the adversary, with the idea that 'history proceeds', that we must look to the future by creating new things and formulating new principles: then the 'revolution' becomes one of the aspects of a forward motion, a motion that would also involve breaking points and reversals. There are those who believe that in this way 'revolutionary' acquires greater dignity, that it exerts a greater force of attraction as a myth. Now, this is a caveat, and it is difficult that, perhaps without realising it precisely, one does not then succumb to the progressive physique, according to which anything new represents a more and a better than what preceded it. We know what the only foundation of progressivism is: it is the mirage of technical civilisation, the fascination exercised by certain undeniable material and industrial progress, evaluated, however, without an eye for the negative counterpart often derived from it in far more important and interesting domains existence. Those who are not subject to the materialism predominant in recent times, recognising the only sphere in which one can legitimately speak of progress, will beware of any orientation in which the modern myth of progress is reflected any way. In antiquity, the ideas were clear: in Latin, just as the word *revolutio* was not used to designate subversion (but other terms were used, such as *seditio*, *eversivo*, *civilis perturbatio*, *rerum publicarum commutatio* and the like), so for 'revolutionary' in the modern sense circumlocutions had to be used, such as *rerum novarum studiosus* or *fautor*, i.e. he who aims at new things and is the proponent of them, 'new things' for the Roman traditionalist mentality automatically amounted to something negative, something subversive. Thus, as far as 'revolutionary' ambitions are concerned, one must come out of the equivocation and choose between the two opposing positions outlined above, which determine two equally opposite styles. For, on the one hand, there are those who recognise the existence of immutable principles for every true order and, firm in them, do not let themselves be carried away by events, do not believe in 'history' and 'progress' as mysterious superordinate entities, intent on dominating the forces of the environment and recalling them to superior and stable forms. To him, adherence to reality means this. On the other hand, on the other side are those who, born yesterday, have nothing behind them, believe only in the future and give themselves over to baseless, empirical and improvised action, deluding themselves that they can direct things without knowing and recognising anything above the plane of matter and contingency, devising now one system and now the other, the result of which will never be a true order, but rather a more or less refined disorder and a mere juggling. Thought through to the end, the 'revolutionary' vocation belongs to this second line in the very cases where it is not in the service of pure subversion. Here, the lack of principles is compensated for by the myth of the future, with which some go so far as to justify and sanctify the destruction that has occurred in recent times, because it would have been necessary in order to move forward, to achieve something new and better, of which, however, it would be very difficult to point to any positive trace. Once things are clearly seen in these terms, one must examine one's 'revolutionary' ambitions to the full, realising, however, that if one agrees to bring these ambitions back within

their legitimate limitations, one would be limited to being part of the demolition teams. At a higher level are those who are still truly standing. His watchword will rather be *Tradition*, according to the dynamic aspect we have highlighted above. As we have said, his will be the style of those who, when circumstances change, when crises arise, when new factors come into play, when previous dams falter, keep a cool head, who know how to abandon what needs to be abandoned *so that the essential is not compromised*, who know how to move forward by impassively studying forms suited to the new circumstances and who know how to impose themselves with them, so that an immaterial continuity is re-established or maintained, and every action that is baseless and adventurous is avoided. This is the task, this is the style of the true rulers of history, quite different, more virile than simply 'revolutionary'. We will close this order of considerations with a particular application of them. Since, as we have said, Italy lacks a true 'traditional' past, there are those today who, in trying to organise themselves against the most driven ranks of world subversion, in order to have some concrete, historical basis, have made reference to fundamental principles that should remain firmly in place: that if 'fascist' ideas were still to be defended, they should be so not insofar as they are 'fascist', but insofar and to that extent, that they also represented a particular form of appearance and affirmation of ideas prior to and superior to fascism, of ideas that have the aforementioned character of 'constants', so that they can already be found as integral parts of a great European political tradition. To value such ideas not in this way, but as being 'revolutionary', original and peculiar only to fascism, would be to belittle them, to adopt a limiting point of view and, in addition, to make the necessary work of discrimination difficult. Because those for whom everything began and ended with fascism, and also those whose horizons were restricted to the mere polemic between fascism and anti-fascism and who had nothing else to refer to but one or the other of these terms, would find it very difficult to distinguish the highest demands and best tendencies of the Italian world of yesterday from not a few aspects of it that, in one way or another, suffered from the same evils against which we must fight today. (1) Therefore, if in what follows we have to consider ideas that were also fought for in the Italy or Germany of yesterday, it will always be within a revolutionary-traditional framework and our constant care will be to limit as far as possible any contingent reference to the past, to instead assert the principles according to their purely ideal and normative content, not tied to a particular period or movement.

(1 On this see the excellent and well-documented study by A. MOHLER, *Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932* (Stuttgart, 1960).

(1 We have tried to contribute to this work of **separating** the positive from the negative in fascism with our book. ***Il Fascismo- Saggio di una analisi critica dal punto di vista della Destra***, (Volpe, 2nd ed., Rome 1970).

CHAPTER TWO

SOVEREIGNTY - AUTHORITY - IMPERIUM

The foundation of every true state is the transcendence of its principle, that is, the principle of sovereignty, authority and legitimacy. Various expressions have been given in the history of peoples to this essential truth, in disowning which even the meaning proper to all that is political reality is disowned or, at the very least, distorted. But through the manifold variety of such forms, one always finds, as a 'constant', the concept of the state as the irruption and manifestation of a higher order, which takes the form of *power*. Thus every true political unit presents itself as the embodiment of an *idea* or *power*, thus distinguishing itself from any

factual unity, from any form of naturalistic association or 'natural law', from any aggregation determined solely by social or economic, biological, utilitarian or eudemonistic factors. In earlier times, one could therefore speak of a *sacred* character of the principle of sovereignty and power, that is, of the state. Thus it is the sphere of the sacred that essentially belonged to the ancient Roman nation of the *imperium*, which in its specific meaning, before expressing a system of supernational territorial hegemony, designated the pure power of command, the almost mystical strength and *auctoritas* inherent to those who have the function and quality of leader: in the religious and warrior order no less than in that of the patrician family, the *gens* and, eminently of the state, the *respublica*. In the Roman world, even though so intensely realistic, indeed precisely because so intensely realistic, the notion of this power, which is at the same time *auctoritas*, always retained its intrinsic character of a luminous force from on high and of sacred power, beyond the various and often spurious techniques that conditioned access to it in the different periods (1). The principle of sovereignty may not be admitted, but if it is admitted, it is necessary to recognise in the act itself the attribute of *absoluteness*. A power that is both *auctoritas* - *aeterna auctoritas*, one would say in Roman terms - must have in itself the decretative character of something that constitutes the ultimate instance. A power and authority that are not absolute are neither authority nor power - an idea that De Maistre emphasised well. As in the order of natural causes, likewise in the political order, one cannot go backwards indefinitely from condition to condition; the series must have its limit at a point, characterised by unconditionality and absoluteness in deciding. And such will also be the point of stability and consistency, the natural centre of the whole organism. If, without this, a political association would be a mere aggregate, a shaky formation, the aforementioned power in turn refers back to a transcendent order that, alone, can found it and legitimise it in terms of a sovereign principle, autonomous, non-derivative, the basis of every right without being itself subject to interconditioning, and in this way illuminate the nature of the pure political principle of the *imperium* and also the figure of the person who, as true Head, must represent and embody it. The legalistic theory of sovereignty, whatever form it takes, concerns only a *caput mortuum*, i.e. the condition proper to an extinct political organism, to an organism that subsists mechanically at a latency or lack of its centre and its original generating force. For if *order*, the victorious form over chaos and disorder, hence law and law, are the very substance of the state, all this has only in the aforementioned transcendence its sufficient reason and ultimate justification. Thus the principle rightly applies: *princeps a legibus solutus* - i.e. the law does not apply to those who are chief, in the same way as Aristotle's saying about those who, because they themselves are the law, have no law. In particular, the positive essence of the principle of sovereignty has rightly been recognised in the power to decide absolutely, beyond all constraint and discussion, in exceptional cases or emergencies - that is, where existing law and laws are suspended or their suspension is imposed (1). In such cases and junctures, the absolute power from above is rekindled, manifested, which, because it remains invisible and silent at all other times, must not cease to be present wherever the state remains firm in its generating principle, is a living organism and not a mechanism, *routine* (2). (2) 'Exceptional powers' and 'dictatorship' are the expedients of necessity, we would say the 'means of fortune', that are imposed in such conjunctures, when the expected awakening of the central principle of the state does not occur. In this sense, dictatorship is not a 'revolutionary' phenomenon. It falls within legitimacy, it does not constitute a new political principle and a new law. In the best period of Romanity, dictatorship was therefore conceived and accepted as temporary and, far from supplanting the existing order, was a complement to it. In every other respect dictatorship means usurpation. *The state is not an expression of 'society'*. The basis of sociological positivism, the 'social' or 'societal' conception of the state indicates a regression, a naturalistic revolution. It contradicts

the essence of the true state, it inverts every right relationship, it deprives the political sphere of its proper character, its original quality and dignity. The 'anagogical' - i.e. power-draining - purpose of the state is completely negated. The political sphere is defined by hierarchical, heroic and idealistic, anti-hedonistic and, to a certain extent, even anti-eudemonistic values that detach it from the order of naturalistic and vegetative existence; the true political ends are largely autonomous (non-derivative) ends, they are linked to ideals and interests other than those of peaceful existence, of pure economy, of physical well-being; they refer to a higher dimension of life, to a distinct order of dignity. This opposition between the political and social spheres is fundamental. It has the value of a 'category', and the more it is accentuated, the more the state is sustained by a metaphysical tension, presents solid structures, constitutes the faithful image of an organism of a superior type. In fact, in such an organism, the higher functions are not the expression of the biological and vegetative part of it and, apart from cases of evident degradation and imbalance, are not even at the service of that part, they carry out an activity that, although based on physical life, has its own laws and is such that, eventually, it can impose itself on this physical life in order to bend it to ends, actions or disciplines that cannot be explained or justified by it alone. All this therefore has an analogical application with regard to the relations that, in a condition of normality, must exist between the political order and 'society'. The differentiation of the political sphere from the 'physical' one is found clearly in the origins. It is also to be found in what subsisted in various primitive societies, here some fundamental meanings even appearing in a purity, which one would seek in vain in the flat and flaky sociologies of our times. A mention in this regard will provide the best orientation. We know of the doctrine that wants the state to descend from the family: the same principle that formed the family and the *gens*, integrated and extended, would give rise to the state. Be that as it may, one can only think of bringing the state back to a naturalistic level in this way because of an initial misunderstanding: as if, in ancient civilised areas, and especially in those of Indo-European civilisation, the family itself had been a purely physical unit and the sacred, together with a clear hierarchical articulation, had not already played a decisive part in it. Even to hold on to modern investigations, after a Fustel de Coulanges there should be no doubt about this. But if the family is understood in the naturalistic sense, or as it more or less presents itself today, the generating principle of properly political communities must be sought at the level of so-called *societies of men* - and this is precisely the point we wanted to make. In many primitive peoples, the individual at a certain age, in order to be considered as a purely natural being, was left to the family and above all to the maternal care, under the maternal-feminine sign of all that pertains to the material, physical side of existence. But at a certain moment a change in nature and *status* occurred, or rather could occur. Special rites, known as 'rites of passage', which were often preceded by a period of detachment and isolation and which were often accompanied by harsh trials, aroused, according to a pattern of 'death and rebirth', a new being, who alone was considered 'man'. In fact, prior to this, the group member, whatever his age, was believed to have merged with women, children and the animals themselves. Therefore, once the transformation had taken place, the individual was joined to the 'society of men'. And it was this 'society of men', in the qualification of a man thus had an initiatory and warrior meaning at the same time, that held the power in the group or *clan*; differentiated as the tasks and responsibility he had in his own right, was his right; different from that of any other member (1). Contained in this scheme of origins are the fundamental 'categories' that define the political order as opposed to the 'social' one. First among them is a special *chrisma*, that of 'man' in the eminent sense - of *vir*, one would say in Roman terms, and not simply of *homo*; its condition is a 'level break', detachment from the naturalistic and vegetative plane; its integration is *power*, the principle of command in the hands of the 'society of men'. With good reason

we can consider in this one of the 'constants', that is, of the basic ideas that, in very different applications, formulations and derivations are uniformly found in the theory or, to be more precise, in the metaphysics of the state professed even by the greatest civilisations of the past. As a result of the processes of secularisation, rationalisation and materialisation that have become more and more pronounced in the course of recent times, those original meanings had to be veiled and attenuated; but where, albeit in a transposed form, albeit without a background of an initiatory or sacred character, they are completely obliterated, there is no longer even a state or political class in the proper, traditional sense. Not without reference to this, some even today have been able to say that 'the formation of a ruling class is a divine mystery': in some cases, it can be a 'demonic mystery'. **But never something that can be defined** by simple social and, even less, economic factors. *The state stands under a masculine sign, 'society' and, by extension, the people, the demos, stands under a feminine sign.* It is, again, a truth of origins. Maternal dominion, from which political-viral dominion is detached, was also understood as the dominion of Mother Earth and the Mothers of Life and Fertility, under whose power and care existence in its physical, biological, collective-material aspects was believed to develop. The recurring mythological background is that of the duality of the luminous and celestial divinities as divinities of the properly political and heroic world, opposed to the feminine and maternal divinities of naturalistic existence, dear above all to the plebeian strata. Thus also in ancient Romanity, the idea of state and *imperium* - of sacred power - was closely connected to the symbolic cult of virile deities of the sky, of light and of the superworld in its opposition to the dark region of the mothers and chthonic deities. The same ideal line runs from the themes found in primitive communities with their 'societies of men' to the central, luminous strand of the Olympian-state tradition of the classical world and a series of Indo-European higher civilisations. Further into history, this line leads to where, if not of *imperium*, there was the divine right of the king, and if not of groups created by the power of a ritual, there were orders, aristocracies, political classes defined by disciplines and dignities irreducible to social values and economic factors. Then the line breaks and the decadence of the idea of the state, parallel to the decay and blurring of the pure principle of sovereignty and authority, ends with the inversion, by which the world of the *demos*, of the materialised masses, emerges, to scale the political sphere. Such is the primary meaning of all democracy, in the original meaning of the term, and, with it, of all 'socialism'. The one and the other are, in their essence, anti-state, degradation and contamination of the political principle. With them also comes the translation from the masculine to the feminine, from the spiritual to the material and promiscuous. This is an involution, the basis or counterpart of which is an involution in the individual himself, expressed in the upper hand that faculties and interests linked to the naturalistic, obtuse, simply vital part of human being can take. According to the correspondences already recognised by Plato and Aristotle, injustice, i.e. the distortion, the external collective subversion, always goes to reflect the internal one, i.e. that present in a certain human type that has come to prevail in a given civilisation. There are political forms today where such a fall in level and such a reversal are very clear, unmistakable; they are expressed in party programmes and ideologies in unmistakable terms. In other cases, however, it is less visible, and it is in regard to these that a precise stance is necessary. The aforementioned gap between the political idea of the state and the physical idea of 'society' can be found in the *opposition between state and nation*. The notions of nation, homeland and people, despite the romantic and idealistic halo that may surround them, belong in essence to the naturalistic and biological plane, not the political one, and bring us back to the 'maternal' and physical dimension of a given collectivity. Where such concepts have been emphasised and given the dignity of a primary element, this has almost always been in a revolutionary or at least polemical function with respect to the concept of the state and the pure principle of sovereignty. With the passage from the formula 'by the grace of God' to that of 'by the will of the nation', the aforementioned inversion is in fact accomplished in typical form, a passage that is not from a simple

institutional structure to another, but from one world to another, separated from the former by an unbridgeable hiatus. A quick historical review can clarify this regressive significance of the myth of the nation. The beginning can be seen in the deviation proper to those European states that, while recognising the political principle of pure sovereignty, took the form of 'nation-states'. This took place in an essentially anti-aristocratic, as well as schismatic and anti-hierarchical function with respect to the European ecumene, through disavowal of the superior authority of the Holy Roman Empire and through the anarchic absolutisation of the particular political units to which the individual princes were answerable. These princes, ceasing to have support at the top, sought it at the bottom and gave themselves over to a work of centralisation that was to dig their own grave, precisely because more and more space was to be taken up by a more or less uniform and disjointed human conglomerate. They, however, prepared the structures that were to pass into the hands of the 'nation' as the Third State and then of the nation as 'people' and mass. This transition, as we know, took place with the French Revolution; in it the 'nation' was presented in an exclusively demagogic function and from then on, nationalism was to be linked with the revolution; constitutionalism, liberalism and democracy were to be its banner in the uprisings that from '89 to '48 and on to 1918 overturned what remained of the previous order. traditional Europe. These 'patriotic' ideologies are, moreover, the very revolution, according to which a naturalistic datum - such as belonging in fact to a given stock and a given historical society - is transformed into something mystical and rises to supreme value, the individual no longer being worth more than the *citayen and enfant de la patrie*, and their cumulative unity desauthoring, undermining or subordinating to itself - to the 'will of the nation' - every higher principle, starting with that of sovereignty. We know of the part played in communist historiography by the valorisation of social matriarchy, which it conceived of as the constitution of origins, and the state of justice to which the regime of private property and the political forms that would be associated with it put an end. The regression from the masculine to the feminine is, however, equally visible in the revolutionary ideologies mentioned above. Already the image of the Fatherland as Mother, as the Earth of which we are all children and in relation to which we are all equal and brothers, clearly refers to that physical, feminine-maternal order, from which, as we said, 'men' detach themselves to create the virile and luminous order of the State, while the former, in itself, has a pre-political character. For which it is also significant homeland and nation have been predominantly allegorised by feminine figures, even in peoples whose name for the land is of neutral or masculine gender, and not feminine (1). The sacredness and intangibility of the 'nation' and the 'people' are but the transposition of those ascribed to the great Mother in ancient plebeian gynocracies, in societies where the virile and political principle of *imperium* was unknown. Thus it has rightly been said (Bachofen, Steding), that it is the 'men' who stand for the idea of the state, the feminine, spiritually matriarchal natures who stand instead for nation, 'fatherland' and 'people'. From all this comes a particular and sinister light, as to the nature of the influences that have predominated in the political history of the West, precisely since the French Revolution. It will not be useless to also consider this issue from a slightly different point of view. It was also fascism's idea that only in the function of the state does the nation exist, has an awareness, a will, a superior reality. This idea has exact historical confirmation, especially if one refers to what with Vico one might call 'the right of heroic peoples' and the origin of the major European nations. While 'homeland' certainly means 'land of the fathers', the term can only have had this meaning at a very remote starting point, because the homelands and historical nations known to us have almost always been established in lands that were not the original ones and, in any case, in larger areas than those of their origins, through conquests and aggregative and formative processes presupposing the continuity of a power, of a principle of sovereignty and authority, as well as the unity of a group of men who held the same *idea* and loyalty together, who pursued the same end, who obeyed the same

internal law, a law reflected in a precise political and social ideal. Such is the generating principle and basis of every great nation. The political core therefore stands to the nation naturalistically as the soul stands to the body as 'entelechy': it gives it form, unifies it, makes it participate in a higher life. With reference to this, it can also be said that the nation and extends wherever the same 'internal form' is reproduced, that is, the chrism, the imprint given to the superior political force and by those who are its bearers: without geographical, indeed not even ethnic limits in the strict sense. Thus it would be absurd to speak of a 'nation' in the modern sense for ancient Rome; one can speak of it as 'spiritual nation', as a unity defined by 'Roman man'. The same applies to the creations of the Franks, the Germans, the Arab defenders of Islam - to cite but these examples among many others. Perhaps the most significant case remains that of the Prussian state, which originated an Order. The Order of the Teutonic Knights, and which then formed the backbone and 'shape' of the German *Reich*. Only when the tension eases, the differences diminish and the group of men gathered around the overarching symbol of sovereignty and authority weakens and falls apart, only then can that which is merely a result and a formed thing - the 'nation' - become autonomous and detach itself almost to the point of acquiring the semblance of a life of its own. Thus to the foreground comes the 'nation' as people, collectivity and mass, that is, as what this concept has increasingly come to mean since the French Revolution. It is almost the creature that takes its hand over its creator when, proceeding in that direction, no sovereignty is any longer admitted that is not an expression and reflection of the 'will of the nation'. From the political class understood as Order and 'society of men' one can then move on to demagogues or 'servants of the nation', to democratic leaders who presume to 'represent' the people and flattering them and juggling secure one or the other position of power. The natural, fatal consequence of this regression is the inconsistency and above all *the cowardice* of those who make up the so-called 'political class' today. It has rightly been said (1) that in earlier times there was no sovereign so absolute, that against him the opposition of the nobility or the clergy could not arise; whereas today no one is so much as to blame the 'people' and to believe in the 'nation', much less to openly it; which does not detract from the fact that the 'people' will turn, deceive and exploit them, as the Athenian demagogues did, and as the courtiers used to do in less distant times with degenerate and vain sovereigns - because the *demos*, femina by nature, will never have a clear will of its own. But the difference lies precisely in the cowardice and servility of those who today no longer have stature, as *men*, as exponents of superior legitimacy and authority from above. At most, we arrive at Carlyle indicated when he spoke of the 'world of servants that wants to be ruled by a pseudo-hero', not by a lord; to which we will have to return when dealing with the Bonapartist phenomenon. Action through 'myths', i.e. through formulas devoid of objective truth appealing to the sub-intellectual and passionate part of individuals and the masses, is the inseparable counterpart of the political climate now indicated and the rest. Moreover, in the most characteristic modern currents, the notions of 'fatherland' and 'nation' already present to an eminent degree precisely this quality 'myths', showing themselves susceptible to receiving the most diverse contents depending on the wind blowing and the parties, except for the common denominator consisting of the denial of the political principle of pure sovereignty. One may add the observation, that the very system stabilised in the West with the advent of democracies - the majority system with universal suffrage - imposes from the outset the degradation of the ruling class. In fact, the greatest number, free of any restriction and qualitative clause, can only be on the side of the lowest social strata; and in order to captivate these strata and to be brought to power by their votes, it will always be necessary to speak the language that, alone, they now intend to put their predominant interests, which are naturally the coarsest, most material and illusory, always promising, never demanding (1). Thus every democracy is in its very principle a school of immorality, an offence to the dignity and internal integrity befitting a true

political class. Let us now take up what was said earlier about the genesis of the great European nations as a function of the political principle, in order to draw some guidelines from it. So, something like an Order, like a "society of men" having in their hands the principle of *imperium* and conceiving - almost as if according to the saying of the *Saxon Code* - in loyalty the basis of all their honour, is the substance of every true and solid political organism (1). Now, when we find ourselves, as we do today, in a climate of crisis, of general moral, political and social disruption, a generic reference to the 'nation' cannot suffice for a reconstructive task in the same case that this idea does not have a revolutionary colouring and that more or less weakened elements of a properly political order are mixed with it. "The 'nation' will always be something promiscuous, and in the situation now mentioned, it is instead a matter of reawakening the fundamental duality of the origins, namely that of a mass where, apart from changing sentiments, the same elementary instincts and interests linked to the physical and hedonistic plane will always act more or less, and of men who differ from it as witnesses of a different legitimacy and authority given by the idea and by their strict, impersonal adherence to the idea. The idea, only the idea, must be the true homeland for them. Not the being of one and the same land, one and the same language or one and the same blood, but the being of the same idea must be for them what unites and what divides. To dissolve and separate what only apparently or promiscuously, collectivistically, is one, to re-enucleate a virile substance in the form of a political *elite* so that a new crystallisation is produced around it, that is the true task, and also the prerequisite for the 'nation' to be reborn, to regain form and consciousness. We call this *realism of the idea*: realism, because strength and clarity, and not 'idealism' and sentimentalism, is what counts for such work. It is, however, opposed both to the petty, degraded and cynical realism of politicians, and to the style of those who abhor 'ideological prejudices' and for whom reawakening a feeling of 'national solidarity', albeit as a herd, and in frameworks not unlike those of generic techniques to arouse more or less transient 'states of crowd', is all they know how to conceive. All this falls below the level of what is politics in the proper, virile, traditional sense, and is also inadequate to the times. It is also inadequate because a realism of the idea is already present on the opposite front. In fact, today we are witnessing the gradual formation of blocs that give the more than national character proper to units based essentially on political ideas, however barbaric these may be. Such is the case with communism, the quality of proletarian communists adhering to the Third International being that which aggregates and unites beyond what is 'nation' and 'fatherland'. Democracy itself comes next, as it throws off its mask and becomes a 'crusader'. Does the so-called 'Nuremberg ideology' perhaps boil down to something else, if not to enshrining certain principles, which are by no means the only ones conceivable, but which should nevertheless apply categorically, without regard to fatherland or nation, indeed - according to the official formula - 'with precedence over the duty of obedience of individuals towards the state to which they belong'? This also shows the insufficiency of the simple concept of 'nation' as a principle, the need for it to be *politically* integrated, i.e. as a function of a higher idea, which must be the true touchstone, what unites and what divides. The essential task is therefore to formulate an adequate doctrine, to hold fast to rigorously thought-out principles and, from this, to shape something like, precisely, an Order. This *elite*, by differentiating itself on a plane that is defined in terms of spiritual virility, decision-making and impersonality, on a plane where any naturalistic constraint ceases to have force and value, will be the bearer of a new principle of imprescribable authority and sovereignty, will be accusing of subversion and demagoguery in whatever form they present themselves, will halt the descending myth of the summit and ascending myth of the base. From it, as from a seed, a political organism and an integrated nation will be able to come to life, in a dignity not unlike those already created by a great European political tradition. Everything else is nothing but quagmire, amateurism, unrealism, obliquity.

(1 On this, regardless of the point of view followed by certain sociology and history of religions, see **H. WAGENVOORT**, *Roman Dynamism*, Oxford., 1947.

(1 **C. SCHMITT**, *Politische Theologie*, München-Leipzig, 1934.

(2 A specific case of the intervention of the pure, sovereign principle is the one corresponding to the situations mentioned above (c.1, p. 21), speaking of cases in which, in order to ensure traditional continuity, a transition to new forms, possibly including a new law, is required.

(1 This political significance of 'societies of men' was first drawn to attention by **H. SCHURTZ**, *Altersklassen und Männerbünde*, Berlin , 1902. Cf. also, but with reservations. **A. VON GENNEP**, *Les rites du passage*, Paris, 1909.

(1 Conversely, it is significant that rulers and heads of state have often been referred to the symbol not as maternal but as *paternal*.

(1 **V. PARETO** *Treatise on General Sociology*, Florence, 1923, \$ 1713.

(1 Cf. G. MOSCA, *Elementi di scienza politica*, Bari 1947, v. II, c. IV, 4 (p. 121): "It often happens that the parties against whom demagogic propaganda is carried out use very similar means to those of their adversaries. They too therefore make promises impossible to keep, flatter the masses, flatter the crudest instincts and exploit and foment all their prejudices and all their greediness, when they think they can take advantage of them. Disgraceful competition, in which those who wilfully deceive lower their intellectual level to that of the deceived, and morally sink even lower".

(1 One may also recall the uniform of Louis d'Estonteville (during the Hundred Years' War): '*La où est l'honneur, là où est la fidélité, là seulement est ma patrie*'.

CHAPTER THREE

PERSONALITY - FREEDOM - HIERARCHY

The beginning of the crumbling of traditional socio-political structures or, at least, of what still remained of them in Europe, took place, as is well known, with *liberalism*. After the stormy and demonic period of the French Revolution, it was precisely under the guise of liberalism that, at first, the principles of it began to act, so liberalism constitutes the very origin of the various concatenated forms of world subversion. It is therefore important to accuse the errors on which this ideology rests, in relation to the 'immortal principles' to which it refers. This, for a need that is not only doctrinal, but also practical. Nowadays, the intellectual confusion is such that liberalism, which for the ancient regimes and for the Church itself was undoubtedly synonymous with anti-tradition and revolution, is presented by some as an even 'right-wing' current that, against Marxism and totalitarianism, would defend freedom, law and the dignity of the human person. It is from the misunderstanding inherent in this that our considerations can begin. The essence of liberalism is *individualism*. The basis of its error is to exchange the concept of the *person* for that of the *individual* and to claim for it, unconditionally and on an egalitarian basis, values that, if at all, can only be attributed to the first and *sub condition*. Because of this transposition, these values turn into as many errors, into something absurd and deleterious. Let us begin with the egalitarian premise. It hardly needs saying that the 'immortal principle' of equality is pure nonsense. On the inequality of beings from a naturalistic point of view, there is no need to mince words. But the ideologues of equality make a point of principle, saying that men, if they are not unequal in fact, are not unequal in law: they are unequal, but should not be. La

inequality is unjust, and in disregarding it, in overcoming it, in recognising every man an equal dignity, therein lies the merit and superiority of the liberal idea. In democracy itself lies the principle of the 'fundamental equality of all that bears human semblance'. Now of all this one has only mere words. It is not a 'noble ideal', but something that, where it is assumed, represents a logical absurdity, and where it is taken as a trend, can only mean regression, degenerescence. Regarding the first point, the concept of 'many' - of a multiplicity of individual beings - is logically contradictory to the concept of 'many equals'. Firstly, ontologically, the so-called 'principle of indiscernibles' wants this, which is expressed as follows: 'A being that was absolutely, in every respect, identical with another would do one and the same thing with it'. In the concept of 'many' equals, completely equal, would be not *molles*, but *one*. Wanting the equality of the many is contradictory in terms, unless it refers to a set of disanimate objects manufactured in series. Secondly, and now deontologically, the 'principle of sufficient reason', which is expressed as follows: 'For every thing there must be some reason for it to be that thing, and not another'. Now, one being absolutely equal to another would be devoid of 'sufficient reason': it would be an utterly meaningless duplicate. From both points of view, therefore, the notion that the 'many' not only *cannot* be equal, but *must* not even be equal, that inequality is true in fact only because it is true in law, that it is real only because it is necessary, is rationally founded. What egalitarian ideology would like to portray as a state of 'justice' would instead, from a higher point of view of humanitarian and democratic rhetoric, be a state of *injustice*. Already a Cicero and an Aristotle recognised this. To posit inequality, however, is to transcend quantity, it is to admit quality. It is here that the two concepts of *individual* and *person* are differentiated. The individual can only be conceived as an atomic unit, as a pure number in the realm of quantity. Absolutely, it is a fiction an abstraction. But one can *strive* for this, one can allow the differences that define individual being to be reduced to a minimum, that promiscuous and uniform qualities prevail, and conceive this as an ideal and desirable condition. Instead, this means degrading, distorting. The pure individual in fact belongs more to the world of the inorganic than the organic. In reality, the law of progressive differentiation applies. By virtue of this law, the lowest degrees of reality are differentiated from the highest degrees by the fact that in the former, a whole can be divided into several parts that retain the same quality, while in the latter, this is no longer possible, for there exists in them a superior *organic* unity that cannot be divided without being damaged and without its parts losing entirely the quality, meaning and function that they had in it. The atomic 'individual', *dissolved* (*solutus*), 'free', is thus in the sign of the inorganic, analogically falling within the lowest degrees of reality (1). Equality can exist on the level of a mere social aggregate or a primordial, almost animalistic promiscuity; moreover, it can be recognised when considering not the individual but the general, not the person but the species, not 'form' but 'matter'. It is not contested that in human beings there are aspects according to which they are approximately 'equal'; but these aspects, in every normal and traditional conception, do not represent the 'more' but the 'less', they correspond to the poorest degree of reality, to what is least interesting in every being. They are part of an order that is not yet that of 'strength', of personality in a proper sense. To value them, to emphasise them as what really matters, would be as much as to consider essential, in various statues, that they are all made of bronze, and not that each one is the expression of distinct ideas, to which bronze has served as a mere material. Such references clarify what a person and the value of a person really is as opposed to the simple individual and the simple element of a mass or social agglomerate. The person is the individual differentiated by quality, with his *own* face, his *own* nature, a series of attributes that make him himself and distinguish him from all others; which therefore make him fundamentally *unequal*. He is the man in whom the characteristics

general take on a differentiated form of expression, articulating themselves in various ways. Every vital process, whether individual, social or moral, that goes in this direction - that leads towards the fulfilment of the person according to his or her own nature - is ascending. Instead, giving prominence and priority to what is equal in every being means regression. The will equality is at one with the will to formlessness. Every egalitarian ideology is either the certain barometric index of a climate of degenerescence, or it is the 'seal' of forces that tend towards an outcome of degenerescence. All in all, this is what one must think about the 'noble ideal' and the 'immortal principle' of equality. Having established this point, it is also easy to recognise the errors and misunderstandings committed to other liberal and revolutionary principles. To begin with, it is singular that the name 'natural law' has been given to what, on the basis of the above, appears to be the most unnatural that can be conceived, or that proper to primitivistic societies. The principle, that 'by nature' men are all free and possess equal rights, is a true absurdity, for the simple fact that 'by nature', men are not equal and that, when we move to an order that is not simply naturalistic, being a 'person' is not a uniform or evenly distributed quality, it is not a dignity that is equal in all and derived automatically from the mere fact that the individual belongs to the biological species 'man'. The 'dignity of the human person', with all that it implies and around which natural lawyers and liberals make so much fuss, must be recognised where it really exists, not in the first coming. And even where it really exists, such dignity - let us repeat - is not to be judged equal in every case. It admits of different degrees, and *justice* means attributing to each of these degrees a different right, a different freedom. The differentiation of right and, in general, the hierarchical idea proceed from the very concept of person, since this concept, as we have seen, is impersonal without referring to difference, to form, to differentiating individuation. Without these presuppositions, respect for the human person in general is just superstition, one of the many superstitions of recent times. In the world of the person there is nothing that can ground the idea of a universal right, of a right that, as natural law would have it, is valid without difference for everyone (1). Whoever has conscience and dignity as a person cannot but feel offended if what is to apply as law to him is the law that applies to everyone. The maxim of ancient wisdom was instead: *suum cuique tribuere* - give to each his own. And according to the same Platonic conception, the supreme office of leaders is to see to it that justice, understood in this sense, reigns. Hence the constraint that the principle 'homeland' itself must undergo. There can only be equality between equals, that is, between those who are objectively at the same level, who embody a similar degree of 'being a person' and whose freedom, right - but also responsibility - cannot be the same as those inherent in other degrees, superior or inferior to theirs. It is evident that for 'fraternity', included as a sentimental complement in the 'immortal principles', the same restriction applies and that it is even an insolence to make it a universal norm and duty in promiscuous terms. After all, because of the recognition of the hierarchical idea precisely that of 'equals' and 'equals' has often been an aristocratic concept in the past: in Sparta the title of *omoioi*, of 'equals', was the exclusive preserve of the *elite* who held power (and was revocable in the case of unworthiness), and a similar idea can be found in ancient Roman times, among the Nordic peoples, in the Carolingian period and the Holy Roman Empire; even in ancient England that of 'equals' - *peers* - was, as is well known, a title of the *lords*. About freedom - the first term of the revolutionary tern - the same idea must be reaffirmed. Freedom is to be understood and defended in no less a qualitative and differentiated manner than the person himself; each person has the freedom to which he is entitled, measured by the stature and dignity of his person or his function, not by the abstract and elementary fact of his simply being a man or 'citizen'. Thus was the classical maxim: *libertas summis infimisque aequanda*, expressing that freedom should be equally distributed above and below. "There is no single freedom but there are many freedoms", it has been rightly written (1). - There is no abstract general freedom but there are

articulated freedoms uniform to one's own nature; it is the idea not of a homogeneous freedom, but of the complex of these differentiated and qualified freedoms that man must make arise within himself'. As for the other freedom, the liberalist and natural law freedom, it, no less than 'equality', is a fiction - in concrete terms, it is only a revolutionary weapon: equality and freedom are the watchwords used by certain strata or social groups to undermine others and come to the fore; having fulfilled this task, they are soon cast aside. Still on the subject of freedom, it is important to distinguish the freedom to do something. The former is, in the political order, an altogether negative freedom that is at one with the essence of constraints, while the self remains essentially uniform; strictly speaking, it locks in arbitrariness and anomie and, where it is attributed egalitarianly and democratically to each, is reduced to an impossibility. Where there is equality, there can be no freedom; where there is freedom, it will not be pure freedom, but the many individual, domesticated and mechanised freedoms that limit each other. If anything, it is in the system most contrary to just liberals that that freedom could be realised approximately: in the system in which the social problem is solved in such a way as to ensure certain privileges for a small group, at the price of the maximum subjection of all others; and the tyrant type would therefore be the most perfect concretisation of such a concept or ideal of a uniform freedom, if thought through thoroughly. Different from this is freedom to do something. Which is linked to one's own nature and specific function, signifying above all the power realise one's own possibilities and achieve one's own particular perfection within a given political or social framework; it therefore has a functional and organic character, it is inseparable from an immanent and unmistakable end. It stands in the sign of the classic *be thyself*, hence also of quality and difference. The only freedom according to justice and according to law is this. In the classical conception, as expressed in an Aristotle, a Plato and a Plotinus, conforming to justice is only that order in which each person does what is proper to him, in which each person has what is proper to him, in which each person realises what is proper to him. Catholicism itself, in the golden age of scholasticism, today deprecated as 'medievalism' by its democratic and 'open left' exponents, did not know any other truth, any other ethics. It had as the cornerstone of its social doctrine precisely the idea of the 'proper nature', different in every being, of freedom, according to that nature 'willed by God', and of adherence to one's own state within an organic and differentiated social whole. Luther also defended this doctrine. Benedetto Croce spoke of the modern 'religion of freedom'. But for what he refers to, one should rather speak of a 'fetishism of freedom'. In this same order of ideas, the question must be considered, whether man comes before society, or vice versa, whether one or the other is the end. From the traditional point of view, it must be decisively resolved in the sense of the primacy of man, not society. Every 'social' thesis is a deviation linked to the same regressive levelling tendency that we have already stigmatised; so much so, that, merely as a reaction against it, individualism and anarchism undoubtedly have their own right, a less degrading character. Everything social falls, at best, within the order of means, not within the order of ends. Society as an entity in itself is a fetish, a personified abstraction; as a reality, the plane proper to society is entirely material, physical, subordinate. 'Society' and 'collectivity' can only be synonyms, and if we exclude their individualistic interpretation as a sum of atoms associated on the basis of a hypothetical contract, all that remains is the idea an undercurrent, before which what is positive, primary and real is the person. It is not enough: there are cases in which this priority of the person is willing to recognise it even in the face of the state - the statolatry of the moderns has nothing to do with the traditional political conception, and the impersonal state as a heavy juridical and bureaucratic entity - Nietzsche's 'cold monster' - is likewise an aberration. Every society and every state is made up men, and men, individuals, constitute its primary element. But which men? Not the men of individualism, men not as atoms or masses of atoms but precisely as persons,

as differentiated beings, to each of whom belongs a different rank, a different freedom, a different right in the hierarchies of creating, building, obeying and commanding. With such men, the true state is set up, namely the anti-liberal, anti-democratic and organic state. The idea of such a state has as its premise the priority of the person over any abstract social, political and legal entity, when - let us repeat - it is not the neutral, levelled person, made into a simple number in the world of quantity and universal suffrage, that we are dealing with. The perfection of man is the end to which every healthy social order must subordinate itself and which it must promote as much as possible. Such perfection must be conceived on the basis of the process of individuation and progressive differentiation, of which we have already spoken. In this respect, the scheme to be considered is the one already traced by one Paul de Lagarde and which is roughly presented in the following terms: everything in the sign of the humanitarian, naturalistic and societal idea corresponds to the lower limit. Simply being a 'man' is a *minus* with respect to being a man of a given nation and a given society; this, however, in turn is a *minus* with respect to being a 'person', a quality that already implies the passage to a more than simply naturalistic and 'social' plane. In turn, being a person represents a gender that is further differentiated in degrees, functions and dignities with which, beyond the social and so to speak horizontal plane, the properly political world is vertically defined in its articulations, bodies, functional classes, corporations or particular units, according to a pyramid structure, at the apex of which should appear types more or less close to the *absolute person* - that is to say, the maximally realised *person*, who as such represents the end and natural centre of gravity of the whole. The 'absolute person' is evidently the opposite of the individual; to the atomic and unqualified, socialised or standardised unity that corresponds to it, there is opposed in it the ongoing synthesis of the fundamental possibilities and in full command of the powers inherent in the idea of man (in the case-boundary) or of the man of a particular race; an extreme individualisation that is identical with a de-individualisation and a certain universalisation of the types that correspond to it. This is therefore also the disposition required to incorporate pure authority, to assume the symbol and power of sovereignty, of force from above, of *imperium*. Passing from humanity, through the 'society' or collectivity of natural law and the nation, and gradually proceeding in the political world to the variously integrated personality and the dominating superpersonality, one thus goes from poorer degrees towards ever more intensive degrees of 'being' and value, each of which is the natural end of the preceding. This is how the principle should be understood, that man is the end of society, the primary element, and not vice versa. As a particular application, one can hint at the hierarchical place that the concept of nation has if it is to have a positive content and a constructive rather than revolutionary meaning. 'Nation' is a plus with respect to 'humanity'. Thus the assertion of the right of the nation to assert an elementary and natural principle of difference with regard to a given human group against all forms of individualistic disintegration, internationalistic mixing, proletarianisation and, above all, against the mere world of the masses and the pure economy, represents something positive and legitimate. This delimitation, almost in the sense of a protective enclosure, requires, however, that further degrees of differentiation be realised within, those mentioned above, concretised in a system of bodies, disciplines and hierarchies, by virtue of which the substance of a *nation* is implemented by the *state*. It will not be inappropriate to note that the hierarchical conception just mentioned has among its foundations freedom in a further, special, ethical sense. The freedom that anti-traditional ideologies have defended has a character that is not only undifferentiated, a-functional and subversive, but also externalistic, almost physical. The emancipation of the individual that consists in being free not with respect to an external game, whether real or imaginary, and, in general, with respect to others, but with *respect to oneself*, that is, to the naturalistic part of oneself, those ideologies instead ignore. Now, it is with such freedom, without having a certain love or taste for which one cannot really call oneself a person, that normally

should legitimise any dignity in qualitative hierarchies. In such an assumption the political sphere interferes with the ethical one. Here, the manly quality of one who, in the event of a conflict between opposing demands, knows how to make the right of certain principles and of a given law prevail over what belongs to the naturalistic and material realm, whether it be self or others, will be decisive. Thus the bonds of the family or of certain affections will no longer be the extreme instance for him, nor will the simple notion of profit and well-being, even if it were defined in collective social terms. It is on the path of the special 'asceticism' required by freedom thus understood, i.e. by internal freedom and superiority over self as a physical individual, that the personality is realised and consolidated, nor are the foundations for the hierarchical connections proper to what may well be called the 'natural law of heroic peoples' to be sought elsewhere. The first of these foundations is that the measure of what one can demand from others is given by what one knows how to demand from oneself; it would not be to rule others justly and give them a law if one did not have the ability to rule oneself first and give oneself a law. The second foundation lies in the idea, already defended by Plato, that those who cannot find their ruler in themselves should find one at least outside themselves, that the discipline of obedience serves as a school for them to command themselves, and that, finally, through loyalty to those who present themselves as exponents of an idea and as living approximations to a higher human type, they endure as faithful as possible to their better nature. All this has always been recognised spontaneously, naturally, and has created a special fluid, vital substance of organic and hierarchical structures, in all traditional civilisations, before the souls had been altered by suggestions or the squalid rationalism of subversive ideologies. All this in normal conditions goes without saying, and it is a folly to say that the foundations of supremacies have been material force, violence and terror, that they have never been obeyed except out of fear, servility or self-interest: to think this is to degrade human nature even in its humblest exponents and to suppose that the atrophy of every higher sensibility now proper to most men of recent times, always and everywhere, has been the rule. Superiority and power should be associated, but power based on superiority and not superiority on power, and superiority linked to qualities that had always been recognised by most as constituting the true basis of what some presume to explain in terms of brute 'natural selection'. The primitive himself essentially obeyed not the strongest, but those in whom he perceived a saturation of *mana* - sacred force and life force - greater than in any other, and who therefore appeared to him qualified for activities precluded to others. A similar situation occurs where men were followed, obeyed and revered for a degree of endurance, responsibility, lucidity, dangerous, vast and heroic life of which others were not capable; decisive here was the ability to recognise a special right and dignity in a free way. In this respect, dependence does not mean the lowering but the elevation of the person, something that in their obtuseness the defenders of 'immortal principles' and the reawakeners of the 'awareness of human dignity' have sense of. For it is only the presence of superior individuals that gives a multitude of beings and whole system of disciplines of material life a meaning and justification that they did not have before. *It is the inferior that needs the surpassing, and not vice versa* (1). And the inferior never lives his life so fully as when he feels that it is taken up in a larger order, in an order that has a centre, and yet when he feels himself to be a man in front of leaders of men, and nurtures the pride of serving to be free in the place that suits him. All that the highest human nature can give, it gives in situations like this, not in the anodyne and grey climate proper to democratic and socialised ideologies. Of past note here is the unrealism of so-called utilitarian sociology, which only in merchant society could find credence. The utilitarian is spoken of, in this doctrine, as the positive foundation of every social-political order. But there is no concept more relative than that of usefulness. Useful with respect to what? In view of what? Because if utility is narrowed down to its most

crude, materialistic, crass, calculated, it must be said that - whether by luck or misfortune - men very rarely think and act according to usefulness in this narrow sense. Everything that has a passionate or irrational motivation has had, has and will have, in human conduct, a far greater space than the smallest utility; and not to recognise this fact would make a large part of human history unintelligible. But in this order of non-utilitarian motivations, which have in common that they carry the individual more or less beyond himself, there is certainly a class that reflects superior possibilities, a certain generosity, a certain elementary heroic disposition. And precisely from these derive the aforementioned forms of natural recognition that animate and support every true hierarchical structure. In these structures authority as power can also have its part, indeed it must have it, and one can follow Machiavelli in recognising that where one is not loved, it is good that one is at least feared. However, it is a complete distortion of reality, it is, let us repeat, to start from a mutilated and degraded image of mankind in general, to believe that, apart from force, in all historical hierarchies the principle of superiority, the direct and proud recognition of the superior by the inferior have not played a part (1). Burke's dictum, that any political system presupposing the existence of heroic virtues and superior dispositions results in vice and corruption, does not so much reflect a cynicism as a myopia in human knowledge. The highest and most real legitimisation of a true *political* order, and indeed of the state itself, lies in its *anagogic* function, in its arousing and nurturing the individual's disposition to act and think, to live, fight and possibly sacrifice himself in service something beyond his mere individuality. Such a disposition is so real that it is possible not only use it, but also to abuse it. Thus, alongside the currents in which the individual is carried beyond himself by something spiritual and metaphysical, we see those in which it is something demonic that promotes such ecstasies of the individual, it is a power that is not anagogic, but categorical: that which, for example, acts in the revolutionary phenomenon and takes concrete form in every collectivist ideology. But in either case, sociology in a utilitarian and individualistic key is refuted, it appears as a sophisticated and intellectualistic construction where human nature taken in its reality and concreteness is in view. And the progress of one form of human organisation with respect to another is not measured by the fact that in it things go materially and socially more or less well, and that the materialistic need for utility is more or less satisfied, but it is measured by the degree to which in it interests and criteria of evaluation have differentiated and become predominant and determined, and increasingly rise above the sphere of mediocre 'utility', from that which positive sociologies alone consider. As for liberalism and all that proceeds from it, completely with the following remarks what has already been said. Liberalism is in antithesis with every organic doctrine. primary element being for it man known as a person, but as an individual, in a uniform freedom, only a mechanical play of forces, of units acting and reacting on each other according to the space each manages to grab, without the whole reflecting any law, any higher order, any sense, is conceivable. The ancient law is, therefore, the only state that liberalism admits has an extrinsic character with respect to its subjects. Power is entrusted to the state by sovereign individuals in order for it to protect the freedoms of individuals, with the right to intervene only when they are even dangerous to each other. Order thus appears as a limitation and regulation of freedom, not as a form freedom itself expresses from within, as freedom to do something, as freedom linked to a quality and a function. Order - the presumed legal order - ultimately resolves itself into violence, because, concretely, it is in function of the majority that, under liberalism and democracy, a government defines itself, and the minority, however 'free individuals', must bend, must obey. The spectre that most terrorises liberalism today is totalitarianism. Well, it can be argued that it is precisely from the premises of liberalism, not those of a state

organic, totalitarianism can arise, as a borderline case. As we shall see, in totalitarianism there is only the accentuation of the concept of an order imposed from the outside, uniformly, on a mass of simple individuals who, not having a form and a law of their own, must receive one from outside and be inserted into an all-encompassing mechanical system to avoid the disorder of an incomposed, selfish extrinction of forces and particular interests. The very force of things has, in recent times, pushed for such a solution after the more or less idyllic conception proper to the euphoric phase of liberalism and liberalism proved to be a pure physique - we mean the conception according to which a satisfactory social and economic equilibrium would arise of itself from the struggle of particular interests: as if some kind of pre-established leibnizian harmony would take care of ordering everything for the best even when the individual only cares about himself, is free of all constraints. Thus not only ideally, but also historically liberalism and individualism lie, as we said at the beginning, at the origin of the various concatenated forms of modern subversion. The person who becomes an individual, ceasing to have an organic meaning and disavowing any principle authority, is no more than a number, a unit of the herd, and its usurpation calls against it a fatal collectivist limitation. It is thus that from liberalism one passes to democracy, and from democracy to socialist forms tending increasingly towards collectivism. Marxist historiography has long seen this concatenation with exactitude: it has recognised that the liberal revolution, or the revolution of the Third Estate, had the function of a breach-opener, that it only served to break up the previous traditional political-social world and to pave the way for the socialist and communist revolution, the exponents of which would leave the rhetoric of 'immortal principles' and 'noble and generous ideas' to the naive and deluded. As a matter of fact, every fall being an accelerated motion, one does not stop halfway, and in the set of currents prevailing in the West, liberalism, once it had fulfilled its preliminary task of disruption and disorganisation, was quickly overthrown - so that the claim of some of its scattered contemporary epigones to stand up to Marxism, which is only the last link in the concatenation of causes, is puerile and such as to demonstrate typical ignorance. There is a sentence by Tacitus that lapidarily sums up what has happened since the 'liberal revolution': *Ut imperium evertant, libertatem praeferunt; si perverterint, libertatem ipsam adgredientur* (1) - that is: In order to overthrow the state (in its authority and sovereignty: *imperium*) they will put liberty forward; once they have succeeded in doing so, they will attack that too. Plato (2) had already said: 'From no other political regiment does tyranny arise and take root than from democracy, that is, from extreme freedom the fullest and most bitter servitude'. Liberalism and individualism have only functioned as instruments in the overall plan of world subversion, to the motion of which they have opened the floodgates. It is therefore of paramount importance to recognise the continuity of the current that has generated the various anti-traditional political forms in the party chaos of today: liberalism, then constitutionalism, then parliamentary democracy, then socialism, then radicalism, and finally communism and sovietism have appeared historically only as degrees of the same evil, as stages that each prepare the next. Without the French Revolution and without liberalism there would not have been constitutionalism and democracy, without democracy and the corresponding bourgeois and capitalist civilisation of the Third Estate there would not have been socialism and demagogic nationalism, without the preparation of socialism there would not have been radicalism and, finally, communism on a national or proletarian-international basis. The fact that today these forms often appear side by side and even in conflict with each other should not prevent a truly observant eye from recognising that they hold together, interlink and condition each other, expressing only different degrees of the same subversion of every normal and legitimate order. It then derives from a logical necessity that, where they clash, of all these forms, it will eventually be the one that is the most extreme, the one corresponding to the lowest step, that will have the upper hand.

The beginning of the process - it bears repeating once again - lies at the point at which western man broke the bonds of tradition, claimed for himself as an individual a vain and illusory freedom, became an atom instead of an organic part of a whole, of a system of hierarchies, and discarded every superior symbol of authority and sovereignty. The movement in this direction, having reached a certain limit, reversed itself, giving rise to the opposite movement, and so the 'totalitarian' forms eventually emerged, which are a demonic and materialistic counterfeit of the previous unitary political ideal and express the 'harshes slavery' that arose, according to the Platonic saying, from uniform 'freedom'. Economic liberalism, under the sign of which the various forms of capitalist piracy and cynical, anti-social plutocracy have developed, is one of the latest consequences of the intellectual emancipation that has rendered the individual *solutus*, i.e. deprived of an internal constraint and function, of a limitation imposed by him on himself to the general climate and the natural hierarchy between values that exists in every organic system. Moreover, it is known that in the most recent period, political liberalism has been reduced to little more than a system at the service of liberalism, i.e. economic liberalism within the framework of a capitalist-plutocratic civilisation; hence the concordant reactions aimed at pushing everything even further down, towards the level of Marxism. The aforementioned connections are also visible in the special area of property and wealth, when one considers the sense of change that has taken place there as a result of the institutions created by the French Revolution. By making that which, in the economic field, was still based on the feudal idea, appear as a sinister regime of privilege, the organic connection (which in feudal systems had a primary manifestation) between personality and property, between function and wealth, between a given qualification and human stature and the just and legitimate possession of goods was broken. It was precisely the Napoleonic Code that rendered property 'neutral' and 'private' in the deterrent, individualistic sense of the term; with it property ceased to have a political function and a political bond, it was no longer subject to an 'eminent right', it was no longer bound to a responsibility and a rank: rank meaning here the objective and normal chrism that, in the hierarchical whole, receives superiority, the differentiated personality formed by a tradition and a super-individual idea. Property, like wealth in general, no longer had any duties before the state other than taxation; for subject, it had the 'citizen' pure and simple, whose dominant concern was soon to be the unscrupulous exploitation of the property itself and without even having too much regard for those traditions of blood, family and people, which had previously been a relevant counterpart of property and wealth (1). (1) However, having reached this point, it was natural that in the end the very right to private property should be contested; where there no superior legitimisation of ownership, one can always ask why some possess and others do not, why some by wealth and property have secured privileges and social pre-eminence (often far greater than those of the feudal system) even though, as men, they present something actually, noticeably superior to others. Thus the so-called 'social question' arises with the abused slogan of 'social justice', where property and wealth have become 'neutral' and apolitical, all values of difference and rank, of personality and authority have been disavowed or undermined by processes of degenerescence and materialisation, the political sphere has been deprived of its original dignity, and no differentiation is visible any more except in terms of mere 'economic classes'. After that, subversive ideologies have a good game in unmasking all the political myths to which, in the absence of any higher principle, the bourgeoisie and capitalism have resorted to try to defend their positions of privilege against the push and final prevarication of the forces from below. Once again, we see that the various aspects of contemporary political and social disorder hold together and that there is no way to truly take a stand against them when do not go back to the origins. To go back to the origins means to deny purely and simply everything in every domain - social, political and economic - as liberating, individualistic and

egalitarian ties to the 'immortal principles' of '89 and contrast them with the hierarchical conception, only within the framework of which the concept, value and freedom of man as a *person* are not reduced to mere words or pretexts for a work of destruction and subversion.

(1 Goethe expressed these principles of 'organic philosophy', which undoubtedly also apply to the political order: 'The more imperfect a living being is, the more the parts resemble each other and reproduce the image of the whole. The more perfect the living being becomes, the more dissimilar the parts are. When the parts are similar, they are less and less subordinate to each other; the subordination of organs marks a creature of a higher order'. In political application the parts would be the individuals, the organic whole would be the state.

(1 On the original background of 'natural law' and the corresponding worldview see J. Evola, *L'arco e la clava*, Scheiwiller. 2nd ed., Milan 1971, c. VIII.

(1 O SPANN, *Gesellschaftslehre*, München-Berlin, 1923, p. 154.

(1 Cf. PLATO (*Rep.* 482 c): 'He who needs to be guided knocks at the door of he who knows how to guide, not he who is a guide and is such that he can expect good from him begs the guided to let themselves be guided'. The principle of the *asceticism of power* is important: "On the contrary of those who now command in each state" - it is said (520 d) - the true leaders are those who only by necessity assume power, because they know of no equal or better than themselves to whom it can be entrusted (347 c). Precisely in connection with this L. Ziegler has rightly said that he for whom power means ascent and increase has already proved himself unworthy of it; that, after all, only he who has broken the lust for power, the *libido dominandi*, in himself deserves power.

(1 With regard to the feudal regime itself, PARETO (*Sociol. gener.*, cit, § 1154), notes: "It is absurd to imagine that ancient feudalism in Europe was imposed solely by force; it was maintained in part by sentiments of mutual affection, which are also observed in other countries where feudalism existed, as, for example, in Japan... In general, this occurs in all social orders where a hierarchy exists, 'which only when it is about to disappear and give way to another, ceases to be spontaneous and is imposed exclusively, or in a preponderant manner, by force. I say preponderant because the mere subsumption of force is never lacking'.

(1 *Ann*, XVI. 20. To which these words of G. B. Vico (*Scienza nuova*, II. 23) correspond: "Men first want freedom of body, then freedom of mind, or freedom of reason, and to be equal to others; then to surpass equals; finally to make themselves under superiors".

(2 *Republic*, 364 BC.

(1 A parallel phenomenon to the individualistic 'untying' of the individual is the prevalence that wealth as mere currency, i.e. 'liquid' wealth, has increasingly acquired, and the fact that this has become increasingly rootless, labile and nomadic ('mobile'). But this order of considerations, to carry it out, would take us too far.

CHAPTER FOUR

ORGANIC STATE - TOTALITARIANISM

One of the formulas that plays a prominent part in the prevailing intellectual confusion among our contemporaries is that of *anti-totalitarianism*. It is mainly used by democracies, especially when they indulge in liberal fixations. The point of reference here is essentially the confused, shapeless concept of the freedom of the individual, which we criticised in the previous chapter; whereby very different things are lumped together in the formula, as is already proven by the fact that, albeit in very primitive terms, a distinction is then drawn between a 'right-wing totalitarianism' and a 'left-wing totalitarianism'. But in the currents

now mentioned, it is clear that very often 'totalitarianism' serves only a false purpose. Just as it is convenient for Marxists and communists to stigmatise as 'fascism' everything that does not fit into their ideology, so too the confusion about totalitarianism serves the aforementioned political alignments of today for tactical purposes and is exploited by them in an attempt to discredit and even make odious the traditional concept of the true state. To put an end to such a misunderstanding, it is worthwhile here to establish a fundamental distinction: that between *the totalitarian state and the organic state*. As for the choice of terminology, it is not in order to make concessions to our opponents that we do not think it appropriate to put the traditional political concept we defend under the banner of totalitarianism. In this respect we are already justified by the fact, that 'totalitarianism' is a term of recent date, it is a modern word, as such inseparably linked to situations in a world, which in no way can and should serve us as a point of reference. Thus it is better to let the word designate precisely the exponents of democracy desire, referring instead to the idea of the organic state what in totalitarianism generically understood may have a positive meaning in spite of everything. By doing so, the one and the other concept can be defined and contrasted with sufficient clarity. The idea of an organic state was not born today. This must be borne in mind against those who have forgotten it as well as those whose horizons are restricted to the polemic between 'fascism' and 'anti-fascism' as if nothing existed in the world before either. The idea of an organic state is a traditional one, so it can be said that every true state has always had a certain organic character. A state is organic when it has a centre, and this centre is an idea that effectively informs the various domains of itself; it is organic when it ignores the division and autonomisation of the particular and, by virtue of a system of hierarchical participation, each part in its relative autonomy has a functionality and an intimate connection with the whole. And it is precisely of 'the whole' that we are talking about in the system in question, of something whole and spiritually unitary that articulates and unfolds, and not of a sum of elements of an aggregate with a disorderly interference of interests. The states that took shape in the space of the great traditional civilisations - be they empires, monarchies, aristocratic republics or city-states - in their best period were all more or less of this type. A central idea, a symbol of sovereignty with a corresponding, positive principle of authority constituted their basis and animating force, and almost by spontaneous gravitation men and social bodies found themselves in synergy, while retaining their autonomy they carried out convergent activities in one fundamental direction; the same contrasts, the same antitheses had their part in the economy of the whole, because they did not present the character of disorganising affections, they did not call into question the superordinate unity of the organism as such, but rather acted as a dynamic and revitalising factor. Even 'opposition' in the English parliamentary system of the early period reflected such a meaning (one could call it: *His Majesty's most loyal opposition*), which disappeared altogether in the later partyocratic parliamentary regime. One need only re-read a Vico and a Fustel de Coulanges to realise the power that the organic ideal had even in antiquity. And it is precisely in the ancient forms that the fundamental point comes to the fore: in them, unity did not have a merely political character, but a spiritual, often without a religious one, the political sphere in the strict sense appearing to be itself formed and carried by an idea, by a general conception that was also expressed in thought, law, art, custom, worship and the form of the economy. A single spirit here manifested itself in a choral variety of forms corresponding to the various possibilities of human existence, and in this framework 'organic' and 'traditional' in a broad sense appear to us more or less as synonyms. It was precisely the *spirituality* of unity that could result in the *integration* of the particular, not its compression and coercion. A relative pluralism is an essential element in any organic system, as is a relative decentralisation, for which the criterion is that it can be all the more advanced the more the unifying centre has precisely a

spiritual and somewhat transcendent character, a sovereign balancing power, a natural prestige. That all of this has been so forgotten, even though almost until yesterday, before the advent of liberalism, individualism and revolution in Europe, political systems still sensitively reflected aspects of the organic idea, systems that in the eyes of most appeared quite normal and legitimate - this is something that to any objective observer cannot fail to appear singular. But this is also the reason for the aforementioned confusion concerning totalitarianism, as well as for the fact that, with an obtuseness like cattle, today, playing the game of the communists, one can only see and accuse 'fascism' wherever it is a question of a system other than the one glorified by the apostles of democracy and 'immortal principles'. But totalitarianism is but the counterfeit image of the organic ideal. It is a system in which unity is imposed from the outside, not on the basis of the intrinsic force of a common idea and a naturally recognised authority, but by means of direct forms of intervention and control exercised by a purely, materialistically political power, asserting itself as the ultimate reason for the system. Moreover, inherent in totalitarianism is the levelling tendency, the intolerance for any partial form autonomy and for any degree of freedom, for any kind of intermediate body between the centre and the periphery, between the summit and the base. In particular, with it comes a kind of sclerosis, a teratological hypertrophy of all that is simple bureaucratic-administrative structure; these structures become all-pervasive, supplanting or compressing every particular activity, knowing no limits due to an insolent intrusiveness of the public into the private, all framing everything in schemes devoid of flexibility and elasticity and, in the end, even devoid of sense, because, starting from a uniform centre of power, a sort of intrinsic and gloomy pleasure is born for this work of levelling out at all costs. On the more material side, i.e. the economic aspect - the predominant aspect in an 'economic age' - super-organisation, centralisation and rationalisation to the bitter end play an essential part in this rigid and mechanistic type of unity. This unity, which, although it has its most prominent manifestations in the contemporary age, was also heralded here and there in other epochs, but always in the terminal, crepuscular phases of a given cycle of civilisation. Among the best-known examples are the forms of bureaucratic-state centralisation that took place at the decline of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and already the Persian Empire; which was to be followed in the one case, as in the others, by the definitive dissolution. Indeed, it is precisely examples of this kind that indicate the very place and meaning of 'totalitarian' centralisations: they follow the crisis and dissolution of prior organic unities, the dissolution and transition to a free state of forces already united by an idea in a differentiated civilisation and in a living tradition, forces that are now being violently and intrinsically taken over and taken over in an order, with nothing more in the nature of true, recognised authority, with nothing more that can truly bind individuals from within. This is how we said in the previous chapter that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian forms often arise as an inevitable reaction to liberalist-individualist disintegration. In other epochs this was reduced to the last, short-lived reactions of an already doomed and senile political organism. In the modern world, due to the predominance of materialistic, economic and technicistic factors, the phenomenon can have a certain stability - the communism of the USSR is the most typical example of this - without, however, the meaning being different. In fact, the appropriate image for these processes is offered to us by the analogy with organisms: after having been living and mobile, they undergo the stiffening proper to the body that becomes a corpse; this state, which in turn gives rise to decay as a terminal phase. One can thus detect, in the forms in question, two processes that while they seem to run in opposite directions and, within given limits, even compensate each other, ultimately agree in a single effect. Totalitarianism, while reacting against individualism and social selfhood, finally brings to an end the devastation of what in a society can still subsist of the 'organic' phase: qualities, articulated forms, castes and classes,

personality values, true freedom, bold and responsible initiative, heroic values. An organism of a higher type comprises multiple functions that maintain their specific character and relative autonomy while coordinating, integrating with each other, converging into a higher unity that never ceases to be ideally presupposed. Thus in an organic state there is both unity and multiplicity; there is gradualness, there is hierarchy, there is no combination of a centre and a formless mass. This is precisely what happens in the case of totalitarianism: in order to assert itself, it levelled out. After all, it is on the organic world of quantity to which individualistic disintegration has led, not on that of quality and personality, that it rests and on which it relies - as we have already said. In such a system authoritarianism is reduced - to use an image from Toynbee - to that of a drill sergeant and a pedagogue with a whip in his hand. An obedience that is not also recognition and adherence, conformism, at best irrational forms of aggregation among which a sinister, fanatical, blind capacity for sacrifice snakes - that is enough. The whole thing has, after all, an anodyne character, because there is a lack of true authority, and yet there is also a lack, in others, of true commitment, sense of responsibility, the dignity of being free that this authority recognises and orders itself in a single efficient array. On this basis, totalitarianism is indeed a school of servility and, in-between, a pejorative extension of collectivism: it is not an influence from above and upwards that transports and unifies, but a formless power that has crystallised in a centre, to absorb, bend, mechanise, control and standardise everything else. In these terms, two perspectives remain clearly visible in their antithesis: antithesis, which elevates everything must be understood as that of the *spirit of* the two systems. This must be borne in mind with regard to those special situations, especially economic ones, that call for a stronger coordinating and regulating intervention by the central powers, as is the case in recent times. Even in such circumstances, in which due to a congestion of forces and a complexity of factors otherwise difficult to control, so-called 'dirigisme' must be given a not inconsiderable margin, it is possible to maintain as an informing principle the organic idea, as opposed to any totalitarianism: this will be seen, for example, when we speak of corporatism. One more note on terminology. *Statolatry* and *statism* are two expressions often used today with polemical intentions, in much the same way as one does with 'totalitarianism'. From what has been said above, everyone can already see what to think about this. The polemical instance falls on deaf ears when it aims to contest the pre-eminence that legitimately belongs to the political principle of the state in the face of 'society', 'people' 'national community' and, in general, the whole economic and physical part of an organisation of men. To disavow such pre-eminence - we said - is tantamount to denying that very principle in its proper reality and function, contrary to what appears instead to be a 'constant' of traditional thought. There is therefore no need to use the newly coined word 'statism', which always has a certain negative undertone, to express the aforementioned pre-eminence. As for 'statolatry', the actual basis of the two fundamental principles of *imperium* and *auctoritas* must be thoroughly examined. It should just be said that there is a profound, substantial difference between the case in which what is profane is deified and made absolute, and the case in political reality draws its legitimacy from even spiritual and, in a certain sense, transcendent points of reference. There is usurpation and fetishism in the one case, there is none in the other, and only where the former is concerned is it licit to speak of statolatry. Statolatry therefore falls within the same framework as totalitarianism; its limit is the theology, or mysticism, of the omnipotent totalitarian state, with the new earthly religion of materialised man as its backdrop. Conversely, the organic conception presupposes precisely something transcendent, something from 'above' as the basis of authority and command; without this, the immaterial, substantial connections of the parts with the centre, the internal order of the individual freedoms, the immanence of a general law that guides and supports without constraining, and finally, the super-individual disposition of the particular, without which every decentralisation and articulation would end up constituting a

danger to the unity of the whole. We admit that nowadays, given the climate of general materialisation and desecralisation, it is not easy to point to solutions that conform to this second perspective. But the fact remains that even in modern political reality there are still not indifferent remnants, which without such a reference would have an absurd character. Such is the case, for example, with the *oath*. The oath transcends the categories of the profane and secular world. But we also see modern states, democratic states, secular states, republican states and the like, demanding the oath and even obliging them to take it; we see magistrates, we see ministers, we see soldiers taking the oath. Which is absurd or even sacrilege when the state, in one way or another, does not embody a spiritual principle: the other alternative would be statolatry. Where the sense of what an oath really means has not been completely lost, how can one agree to swear, or how can one demand to be sworn, if the state is nothing more than what modern 'enlightened' ideologies want? A secular authority - *weltliche Obrigkeit*, to use the Lutheran term - as simply such has no right to demand an oath, under any circumstances. On the other hand, we encounter the oath as a normal and legitimate essential element in organic and traditional political units: and, firstly, such is the case for the oath of allegiance, as a true sacrament - *sacramentum fidelitatis*; the dignity it had, for example, in the feudal world is well known. Precisely under the banner of Christianity, it constituted, at the time, the most terrible of oaths; in the words of one historian, it 'made martyrs of those who sacrificed their lives to remain faithful, and cursed of those who violated it'. Which is not unrelated to a second point. The idea of sacrifice and service recurs in community and democratic conceptions. Altruism, subordination and the very sacrifice of the individual for the general interest are more or less pietistically made watchwords by them. Now, in this there is again a statolatry or at least a sociolatry, in any case a fetishism. We must ask ourselves what sense these appeals can have in the framework of an organisation whose foundation is purely 'positive', contractualist, as is assumed. Of course, there are also completely instinctive, unreflected, irrational forms of the capacity to sacrifice oneself, so much so that this capacity is sometimes found even among animals. But these are dispositions that fall outside the sphere in which the concept of 'person' is defined, hence also within the political sphere in the proper sense. Now, how things present themselves in such a sphere is highlighted by Höfler with a very apt comparison: imagine a joint stock company, which reproduces precisely the type of a community of interests on a purely contractual basis. Well, in such a company, to demand that one of the shareholders sacrifice himself to any extent in view of the common interest and, even more so, that of some other shareholder, would appear to be pure absurdity: because the whole, the common nexus, has the individual utilitarian interest of the individual as its foundation and only sufficient reason. But things are no different in a society or a state devoid of any spiritual chris, devoid of any transcendent dimension; there is nothing but fetishism, statolatry or sociolatry when in such a state one appeals to an action according to a principle other than pure individual self-interest or subjective affective and passionate motivations. And certain surrogates based on the 'ethical state' or similar, with their confused dialectical identifications of the individual with the universal, so that they are all reduced to speculative games, are of no use, because for the whole there is a completely 'secular' and 'humanistic' conception, and whoever is not satisfied with words, as the basis of 'immanent ethicality', 'universal' and the like finds nothing, that is, worse still, finds a rhetoric at the service of the system. Which, when it develops into a coherent totalitarianism, knows that such rhetoric or mystique is not worth as much as a good organised system of terror; in that case, however, everyone knows exactly what it has to do with - and that thus the 'idealistic' mythology created around intimately deconsecrated political forms is liquidated, this is even to be judged as purifying realism. Finally, a

I mention a formula that in democratic polemics today is often associated with totalitarianism: the *one-party* formula. Fascism claimed to be, the state, 'the single party that totalitarianly governs the nation'. This is an unfortunate, let us say hybrid, formula, a remnant of the party-parliamentary conception in which it is associated with an instance of a higher order. Strictly speaking, 'party' means part. Then 'single party' would be either a contradictory or aberrant notion, almost as if the part wanted to be the whole or dominate the whole. In practice, the notion of 'party' belongs to parliamentary democracy and means an organisation that defends a given ideology, as opposed to others supported by other groups, to which the system recognises the same right and legitimacy. In these terms, the 'single party' is the one that, in one or another, 'democratically' or by violence, succeeds in scaling the state and, having achieved this, no longer tolerates other parties, uses the state as its instrument, imposes as a faction its particular ideology on the nation. In these terms, the idea of a 'single party' is undoubtedly problematic. But even here, the opponents lump everything together; they do not consider the case of developments whereby such negative and contradictory aspects can be rectified and from one system to another. Their criticism already loses all weight if, instead of 'party', one simply speaks of a minority; for when it comes to the idea that, not as a party, but as a minority or political *elite*, a given group of men controls the state, there is something perfectly legitimate, indeed a de facto necessity for every political regime. Thus it must be said that a party that makes itself a 'single party' should by the same token cease to be a 'party'. Its men or, at least, the most qualified of them, then it is in the guise of a kind of Order, of a specifically political class that they should present themselves and govern, not by constituting a state within the state, but by going to preside over and strengthen the key-positions of the state, not by defending their particular ideology but by impersonally embodying the pure idea of the state itself. The specific character of the upheaval in this case is to be expressed not with the formula of the 'single party', but with that of the anti-party, organic state. It is thus merely a return to a traditional type of state after a period interregnum and after special political forms of transition.

CHAPTER FIVE

BONAPARTISM - MACHIAVELLIANISM ELITISM

One owes it to R. Michels and also J. Burnham, who borrowed ideas from Michels, the definition of *Bonapartism* as a particular category of the modern political world. The phenomenon of Bonapartism by these authors is referred to as a consequence to which, under certain circumstances, the democratic principle of popular representation itself leads, i.e. the political criterion of number and sheer mass. In his *Sociology of the Political Party in Modern Democracy*, Michels began by pointing out the causes, both technical and psychological, by which the iron law of oligarchies reasserts itself even within the framework of any system of democratic representation: it is fatal that, in spite of formal institutions and democratic doctrines, effective power in democracies themselves ends up in the hands of a minority, of a small group that will in fact become more or less independent of the masses, once it has managed to be brought to power by them. The only distinctive element lies in the idea, that the oligarchy would then represent the 'people', would express their 'will': this is what the famous formula of the 'self-government of the people' boils down to. It is a function, a myth, which becomes increasingly known as such with the developments leading up to Bonapartism. The two sociologists mentioned above point out that, once the principle of representation is admitted, Bonapartism, instead of being the antithesis of democracy, can be seen as the extreme consequence of

it. It represents a despotism based on a democratic conception, which it denies in fact, but which it brings to fruition in theory. There is only to consider, as we shall do later, the ambiguity that results from this with regard to the figure, the type of leaders. Burnham in his work "*The Machiavellians*" is not wrong to have considered Bonapartism as a general tendency of modern times; it is precisely rendered to forms of government in which a small number of leaders, or a chief, claim to represent the people, to speak and act in their name. And because he personifies the will of the people, conceived as the *ultimate* political *rationale*, the leader, says Burnham, ends up arrogating to himself an enlightened authority to consider all intermediate political bodies and all organs of the state as completely dependent on the central power, which alone legitimately represents the people. Such regimes are often democratically legalised with the technique of the plebiscite; once this has been achieved, the formula of the self-government of the people, or equivalent formulae ('the will of the nation' the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the 'will of the Revolution', etc.) are used to destroy or fundamentally limit precisely those individual rights and those particular freedoms that were originally, and especially in the liberal assumptions of it, associated with the idea of democracy. Burnham therefore notes that theoretically, the Bonapartist leader can be regarded as the quintessential democratic type; in his despotism, it is as if the all-powerful people lead themselves and discipline themselves: to the sound of hymns to the 'workers' to the 'people' or the 'nation', these modern autocracies are formed. Hence the 'people's century', the 'people's state', 'classless society' or 'national socialism' - says Burnham again - are so many euphemistic expressions, or cover-ups, the sole and actual meaning of which is the 'century of Bonapartism'. That, from this, where the pace accelerates and the structures stabilise, by a direct line one arrives at totalitarianism, is quite evident. The historical antecedents of Bonapartism are well known: the popular tyrannies that arose in ancient Greece on the decline of previous aristocratic regimes; the tribunes of the plebs; various figures of princes and even leaders of the period around the Renaissance. In all these cases there is already an authority and a power devoid of any superior chrism, something that is accentuated in modern forms, in which leaders flaunt, as never before, that they speak and act exclusively in the name of the people, of the community, even when the practical result is genuine despotism and a regime of terror. Otto Weininger spoke of the type of the great politician as one who is a despot and simultaneously a worshipper of the people, one who not only prostitutes, but who himself is a prostitute, something the plebs instinctively feel despite everything. While it is certainly abusive to extend such a view to any kind of political leader, it nevertheless captures the innermost essence of Bonapartism. Here we have an effective inversion of popularity: the leader only knows how to valorise himself by referring to the collective, to the masses, establishing an essential relationship with them, i.e. with the lower classes. It is precisely for this reason that we do not, in spite of everything, abandon 'democracy': quite the contrary. Whereas the traditional concept of sovereignty and authority is characterised by distance, and it is the feeling of distance that arouses reverence, natural respect and a natural disposition to obedience and loyalism towards the leaders in the inferior, in the phenomenon we are dealing with, it is precisely the opposite: on the one hand the abolition of distance, on the other the impatience with distance. The Bonapartist leader is and holds to be a 'son of the people' - even when in fact he is something else. The principle that the broader the base, the higher the summit must be, he ignores. He is subservient to the 'popularity' complex; thus he cherishes all manifestations from which he can get the feeling, however illusory, that the people follow him' and approve of him. Here it is the superior who needs the inferior, in terms of feeling of worth, rather than vice versa, as would normally be the case. But there is of course the counterpart: at least in the phase of the rise, of the conquest of power, the prestige of the Bonapartist leader depends on the fact that the masses feel him close, feel him as 'one of us'. In such a situation the 'anagogic' power (drawing in

high) that of every true hierarchical system is the essence and superior *raison d'être*. Instead, what Weininger said crude words remains true: a mutual prostitution. To clarify this point, let us recognise that any power, in order to hold itself up for long enough, always needs the basis of a collective feeling; directly or indirectly, it must have a way of gaining given social strata. But this, in the situation mentioned above, has a very special character. Very different faculties of the human being react in political phenomena depending on the nature of what we can call the corresponding 'centre of crystallisation'. In other words, here, as elsewhere, the law of elective affinities applies, which can be formulated as follows: 'Like awakens like, like attracts like, like reaches like'. The nature of the principle on which *auctoritas* is based in the various cases is very important, precisely as the touchstone of elective affinities and as a determining factor in the process of crystallisation. The process has an 'anagogic' character and results in the integration of the individual when the centre of the system, its fundamental symbol, is such as to appeal to the highest faculties and possibilities of the human being, to arouse and move these faculties, to refer to them, or above all to them, in the adherence and recognition by the community. Thus there is a substantial difference between the adherence on which a political system with a warrior, heroic, feudal character, or whose foundation is spiritual or sacred, is based, and the adherence that occurs in the case of movements that bring a tribune of the people, a dictator or a Bonapartist leader to the top. In the direction, which we judge to be negative, the leader appeals to lowest, almost prepersonal strata of the human being, flatters them, manoeuvres with them and has every interest in ensuring that every higher sensibility is inhibited by them; this is also why the leader here democratically presents himself as a 'son of the people', not as the type of a more accomplished humanity and the affirmation of a higher principle. Thus the phenomenon has a regressive character, as far as personality values are concerned; the individual in these movements or collective systems is impaired not so much in this or that external freedom - which is after all of secondary value - as in his internal freedom, in the freedom of self in the face of the lower part of himself, a part that the overall climate, as we have said, here brings out, flatters and nurtures. But then considered as not insignificant is the difference one has when one obtains recognition and possesses prestige through promising, that is, through demanding. In the lowest, modern forms of democracy, it is exclusively the first case that comes into question: it is not so much on the basis of a high ideal tension that the prestige of the leaders is consolidated, as was still partly the case in the early forms - with a character between the revolutionary and the military - of Bonapartism, but on the basis of 'social' and 'economic' perspectives, of factors and myths appealing to the purely physical part of the *demos*. It is not only in the Marxist leaders of 'left-wing totalitarianism' that this occurs: one or other solution to the 'social question' materialistically considered is one of the fundamental ingredients in the modern techniques of the leaders-people in general, which in itself would be sufficient to indicate their stature and level. Totalitarianism and Bonapartism are usually associated with the concept of *dictatorship*. In this way, we are also led to consider the misunderstanding inherent in certain conceptions that would like to be anti-democratic, but of aristocracy they know only a distorted image. According to traditional thinking, it is essential to make a clear distinction between the symbol, function or principle on the one hand, and man as an individual on the other; based on this premise, it is important that man is valued and recognised as a function of the idea and principle, and not vice versa. In the case of the dictator and the tribune, however, we have the other alternative, that of a power resting solely on the individual and his action on the irrational forces of the masses, according to what has been said above. In the last century, under the banner of evolutionism, there were already interpretations of aristocracies and elitism based on 'natural selection', in which the misunderstanding of what was proper to ancient hierarchical societies, and which positive historical research has also sufficiently demonstrated was not understood.

recognised, could not have been greater. Then came the romantic-bourgeois theory of 'hero worship' - *heroes worship* - to which were to be added the more problematic aspects of Nietzsche's theory of the superman. With all this, one remains in the domain of an individualism and naturalism incapable of founding any doctrine of true, legitimate authority. But today, most, even if they admit the concept, the fact of 'aristocracy', more or less stop there: they consider the individual more or less exceptional and 'brilliant', not the one in whom a tradition and a special 'race of the spirit' is expressed, not the one on whom not man, but the principle, the idea, in a certain, sovereign impersonality, confers greatness. And on the level of individualism one remains, of course, even in the case of the Machiavellian model of the 'prince' and its derivatives. Machiavelli's 'prince' does not yet descend as low - towards the 'people' - as the leaders do in the modern age of demagogy and democracy: he naturally does not believe in the 'people' at all, he is instead concerned with knowing the passions and elementary reactions of the masses in order to draw party from them and exercise an adequate technique of power. Authority is no longer from above: its basis is simply force, the *virus* of the 'prince'. Power, as pure power of a man, here counts as the supreme end, everything else - spiritual and religious factors included - only counts as a means, a means to be used without scruples. Intrinsic superiority does not come into question here at all; Machiavellianism only considers political *skill* combined with certain individual qualities of cunning and strength - the well-known image is that of the fox combined with the lion. The leader here does not look at the higher faculties that, under certain circumstances, can be awakened in his subjects, towards man in general he has a contempt and a fundamental pessimism, based on a supposed political 'realism'. This that the Machiavellian type of despot at least does not prostitute himself: he is far from being *dupe* of the means he employs to seize power or preserve it. The fiction, the lie, the actor's own doubling where necessary, preserve him (1). But this does not prevent similar frameworks from having no room for the concept of a true aristocracy and effective authority. Developed, the line leads rather towards 'dictatorial' forms, defined equally by individual pre-eminence and formless power, and towards the era that some have called 'absolute politics'. Machiavellianism can be considered with an application of the very method of the modern physical sciences to the socio-political plane. The modern, profane sciences of nature abstract from it as a matter of principle everything that has the character of quality and individuality, consider its purely material side and subject to necessity, and basing themselves exclusively on it provide knowledge that makes possible, by means of technique, a broad control of the forces of things. Machiavellism does exactly the same with regard to social and political forces: having made a similar abstraction from the qualitative and spiritual factor and the same reduction to what is elementarily physical and material in the individual and in collectivities, it bases dominion on mere *technique*. This is the essence of Machiavellism. This is the essence of Machiavellianism. Now, in the modern forms of Bonapartism - especially those associated with dictatorial totalitarianism - one can discern a mixture of the Machiavellian concept of the 'prince' and that of the demagogue son of democracy, since an inverted mysticism bestowing on the leader the character called 'charismatic' by some has as its counterpart a perfected technique, utterly unscrupulous and sometimes even demonic, in terms of the means to establish power and control the irrational forces of the masses: "absolute politics", to which the possible value of man as a free personality is unknown: just as that respect for oneself, for one's own dignity, which is the primary condition for all aristocratic superiority, is unknown in the leaders. One more point should be briefly mentioned here. The term 'Bonapartism' naturally refers not only to a Napoleon III, but also to Napoleon Bonaparte, a figure about whom one would be unjust if one did not distinguish two aspects, one political and the other military. It is clear that in treating Bonapartism as a political category we have only had in view the first aspect, that whereby Napoleon does not present himself to us so much as a military leader as a son of the Revolution

French, the spirit of which, in essence, in the same 'imperial' culmination was not denied but developed and actualised. On this, there is no need to pause further. As for the military aspect, there is certainly nothing to object about the prestige that a commander can acquire, on the contrary; this has nothing to do either with democracy or demagoguery, it is linked to heroic factors and, like everything related to military order, integrates the very idea of hierarchy. It is all a matter of the aforementioned prestige not going beyond its own level; and we have also touched upon this point with the intention, already expressed, of distinguishing the superior concept of authority and aristocracy from its problematic surrogates and by-products. In order to have clear ideas in this regard, the ancient world again helps us. In the earliest Roman times, as well as among the Germans and other civilisations, a fairly clear distinction was made between *the rex* on the one hand and the *duke* or *imperator* on the other, the latter being essentially the military leader whom certain purely individual endowments made qualified for certain undertakings. In different terms only because of the different scope of application, the same difference existed between the chief and the one who received exceptional but temporary powers to control difficult internal situations and emergencies, and it is known that originally it was in such terms that the 'dictator' was defined, to whom a particular tradition or political idea was attached as little as to the *duke* himself. Of one and the other type, the nature was therefore different, the function different, the prestige different. Not to be put down simply to an anachronistic 'mythological' mentality, statutes such as those in ancient Germanic law, imposing the choice of the *rex* not among those who, as in the case of the *dux* or *heretigo*, stood out for particular human qualities of individuals, but among those who came from a 'divine' line. This idea can be demythologised and, if desired, formulated in terms of a simple typological juxtaposition. What is essential is an upward, not downward, reference of the true leader, something super-personal and non-human must make itself known in him, whatever form this element of 'immanent transcendence', usually connected to a tradition, may take, depending on the circumstances and the historical environment. This is quite different from what is proper to the 'hero' himself and the military or dictatorial leader. To use extreme-oriental terms, one can speak of two forms of authority, in one case referring to those who win or impose themselves without the need to fight, and in the other case to those who win or impose themselves having the need to fight. In the first case, it is essentially a so-called Olympian element that naturally asserts itself in its superiority, as a 'non-acting activity', i.e. exercised not by direct material means, but above all spiritually. In the other case, one is still on a fairly high level when it comes to the *dux*, the commander (especially if formed by a strict tradition, as has been the case, for example, in modern times with the Prussian officer corps), but the level drops if political interference in the sense of dictatorial usurpations is produced, until the lower limit is reached when the bonapartist leader appears in the aforementioned sense of a mixture between the demagogic tribune heir to democracy and the Machiavellian man skilled in a degrading and cynical technique of power. With all this, we have given, we hope, sufficient points of reference to hone in on the phenomenology presented by the idea of the chief, as well as the upper and lower limits that varieties find in two systems that are completely antithetical in spirit. To which a final consideration is linked. 'Aristocracy', after all, is an indeterminate concept. Literally, 'best' is a relative term. One must ask: better, in function of what, in view of what? There can be 'better' *gangsters*, 'better' technocrats, 'better' demagogues and so on: so it is evident that one must first of all specify, on the basis of what values one defines that should give a society or civilisation its face, its superior character: depending on the case, one will have distinct 'aristocracies', and even 'elites'. This shows the limitation of Pareto's sociology with regard to the so-called law of the rotation of *elites*, as Pareto formulated it. The starting point here is the observation of the fatal character élitism, of the iron law of oligarchies. But in Pareto everything remains on the level

formal because, in the changes that the constant phenomenon admits of, the qualifying, spiritual factor is not considered. *The elite* here presents the character of an abstract category, and in the 'rotation', or changing of the guard, that occurs, specific meanings and changes in value are not considered, but processes of an almost mechanical and indifferent social dynamism. In essence, Pareto limits himself to studying the part played, from time to time, by what he calls the 'residues of combinations', i.e., in current words, the forces of conservation and the forces of innovation, renewal and revolution - but, precisely, without being told 'conservation of what' and 'innovation of what'. When the vital possibilities of a given ruling class are exhausted, a circulation of elements takes place - an ascending of some and a descending of others - beyond which the phenomenon of the *élite* is maintained: of the *élite* in general, of the *élite*, as we have said, as an abstract category. This relates to Pareto's own methodology, which gives every principle, idea, value or doctrine the simple character of 'derivation', i.e. the secondary and dependent phenomenon, of something that has no determining force in itself, but which variously expresses elementary, uniform and irrational tendencies (the 'residues', they alone considered as efficient. For us, things present themselves quite differently, because the primary and interesting element for us is represented not by the subsistence of the abstract '*elite*' phenomenon beyond the rotation or change of guard of the individual *élites*, but vice versa, by the change of values and meanings that takes place when one *élite* is succeeded by another, when it is one *élite*, rather than another, that goes to occupy the centre and set the tone for the whole system. Now, precisely about the transformations in this sense, and therefore about the varieties of elitism, the considerations we have made have been intended to give an insight. From the historical point of view, the passage from one form *élite* (or "aristocracy" in general) to another followed a precise law, that of the *regression of the castes*, which we will not dwell on here, having dealt with it exhaustively in our main work, "*Revolt against the modern world*". (1). We will only mention that, on the whole, four stages must be distinguished: in the first the *elite* has a purely spiritual character, it incorporates what can generally be called a 'divine right', it expresses an ideal of immaterial virility; then it has a character of warrior nobility; thirdly comes the oligarchy with a plutocratic and capitalist basis within the framework of the democracies; finally the *elite* is that of the collectivist leaders of the Fourth Estate revolution.

(1 MACHIAVELLI (*Prince*, XVIII) says precisely that of the prince it is more important the *opinion* than the *being*, because the opinion affects most, while the being can only be recognised by a few. A certain anticipation of the type of popular leader can be found in Machiavelli's precept that the prince must rely more on the people than on the 'great' (the 'barons'), who, of course, would not bow to his absolutism. Even before Machiavelli, Philip the Fair had developed the consolidation of his power in this anti-aristocratic sense. (1) Edizioni Mediterranee, 3rd ed. Rome 1969

CHAPTER SIX

LABOUR - DEMON OF THE ECONOMY

We have previously referred to the analogy between the individual and a collective entity, an analogy whose legitimacy has been recognised since the highest antiquity. On this basis, we have noted that in recent times, in terms of social-political organisation, we are descending from the plane of a being in which the vital and material part is subordinated to superior faculties, forces and ends, to that of a being in this superior sphere is lacking or, even worse, through an inversion, is deprived of all reality of its own and is placed at service of inferior functions, to

those corresponding, in the individual, to his simply physical part. In the other term, i.e. in the state, this part generally consists of the *economy*. And from particular aspect we now want to consider the phenomenon in question. Sombart's thesis, according to which the present is an *era of the economy*, expresses exactly the indicated anomaly. It is first and foremost the general type of an entire civilisation. And all the external aspects of power and technical-industrial progress of contemporary civilisation change nothing in the involutory character of it. Let us say more, they depend on it, because all this apparent 'progress' has been achieved almost exclusively in function of economic interest as it has taken over everything else. Today, one can certainly speak of a *demonisation of economics*, the basis of which is the idea that in both individual and collective life, the economic factor is the important, real, decisive one, that the concentration of all value and interest on the economic and productive plane is not the unprecedented aberration of modern western man, but rather something normal and natural, not an eventual necessity, but something to be accepted, desired, developed and exalted. According to what has already been said, there is no hierarchy, or only a counterfeit of one, when the right and primacy of higher values and interests is not affirmed beyond the socio-economic level - consequently, when men and the groups or bodies that these values, these interests represent and defend are not accorded a higher authority. If this is the case, then by definition an economic era is already fundamentally anarchic and anti-hierarchical; it represents a subversion of the normal order. And the materialisation and de-animatisation of all the domains of existence, which are proper to it, deprive of all superior meaning all those problems and conflicts that are considered the only important ones in it. This character of subversion is presented as much by Marxism as by its apparent antagonist, modern capitalism. and the worst absurdity is that of those who today presume to represent a political 'Right' without leaving the dark and closed circle, determined by the demonisation of the economy, within which both Marxism and capitalism, together with a whole series of intermediate degrees, move. This should be held firmly in place by those who today stand against the forces of the left. Nothing is more evident that *modern capitalism is subversion than Marxism*. Identical is the materialistic view of life that underlies one and the other; identical, qualitatively, are the ideals of both; identical, in both, are the premises linked to a world the centre of which is technology, science, production, 'output' and 'consumption'. And as long as one only knows how to speak of economic classes, of profits and wages, of production, as long as one believes that true human progress is conditioned by a particular system of distribution of wealth and goods and that, in general, it has to do with wealth or indulgence, one will not have even touched on the essentials, even if new theories were to be devised, either as a transitional between Marxism and capitalism, or as a transitional between one and the other. Instead, the starting point should be the outright denial of the principle, formulated by Marxism, that sums up the whole of the subversion mentioned above: '*The economy is our destiny*'. It must be stated in no uncertain terms that everything that is economy and economic interest as the satisfaction of material needs and the more or less artificial appendages of these, has had, has and always will have a subordinate function in a normal humanity, that beyond this sphere an order of higher, political, spiritual, heroic values must differentiate itself, an order that neither knows nor even admits of simply economic classes, that knows neither 'proletarians' nor 'capitalists', an order, only in function of which the things for which it is really worth living and dying must be defined, a true hierarchy must be established, dignities must be differentiated and, at the summit, a superior function of command, of *imperium*, must dominate. But where is the just battle being fought in these terms nowadays? 'The 'social question' and the 'political problem' are increasingly losing all superior meaning to be defined on the basis of the most primitive conditions of physical existence, conditions that are absolved and dissolved by every

highest requirement. The concept of justice is traced back to one or the other system of distribution of economic goods, the concept of civilisation is measured by little more than that of production, labour, performance, economic classes, wages, private or socialised property, 'labour sellers' and 'labour exploiters', 'class claims' and so on. For one and the other, it really seems as if nothing else exists in the world. That is, for Marxism the rest exists, yes, but the title of a 'superstructure' and derivation. On the opposite side, one is shy to express oneself in such drastic terms, but, in fact, the horizon is no different, the *standard* is always the economic one, the central interest is always the economy. All this attests to a true pathology of civilisation. As has been said, it is a hypothesis, a demonisation that the economic fact is exerting on modern man. And as is often the case with hypothesis, what the mind focuses on ends up becoming real. The man of today is making true what in any normal and complete civilisation would have appeared as an aberration or a bad joke - namely that the economy and the social problem as a function of the economy are a destiny. Thus, for a new principle to be posited, it is not a matter of opposing one economic formula to the other, but of fundamentally changing attitude, of absolutely rejecting the materialistic premises from which the absolutization of the economic fact was produced. *Not the value of one or the other economic system, but that of the economy in general must be put question.* Thus the very antithesis between capitalism and Marxism, despite its giantisation against the backdrop of our times, must be regarded as a pseudo-antithesis. The myth of production with all that it implies in terms of standardisation, monopolies, cartels, technocracy and so on obeys, in capitalist civilisations, the same demonisation of the economy and constitutes as a primary factor the material conditions of existence no less than in Marxism: in both cases, civilisations that are not reduced to a 'civilisation of labour and production', those that, through a fortunate combination of circumstances, are not yet so caught up in the paroxysm of the all-out industrial exploitation of every natural resource, of the social and productive subjugation of every human possibility, of the exaltation of technical and industrial *standards* - those civilisations, in short, that still know a *space* and a certain free breathing space - are considered 'retrograde' or 'underdeveloped'. The true antithesis is therefore not that between capitalism and Marxism, but that which exists between a system in which the economy is sovereign, whatever form it takes, and a system in which it is subordinated to extra-economic factors within a much broader and more complete order, one that gives human life a profound meaning and allows the development of its highest possibilities. This is the prerequisite for true restorative reaction, beyond both 'right' and 'left', from both capitalist prevarication and Marxist subversion. The condition for this is an internal detoxification, a return to normality in a higher sense, an ability to distinguish again between what is low interest and what is higher interest. No external action is helpful here; external action can at best be an adjuvant. For a removal, it is first of all a matter of rejecting the 'neutral' interpretation of the economic phenomenon proper to a deviant sociology. Economic life itself consists of a body and a soul, and internal moral factors have always determined its meaning and spirit. This spirit - and Sombart has emphasised this well - must be distinguished from the forms of production, distribution and organisation of goods; it can vary and, depending on the case, gives the economic fact a completely different scope and meaning. The pure *homo oeconomicus* is either a function or the product of obvious degenerative specialisation. Therefore, in every normal civilisation, the purely economic man - that is, the one to whom the economy counts not as an order of means but as an order of ends, so much so that he constructs the domain to which he devotes his main activities - always counts, and rightly so, as a man of inferior extraction: inferior, spiritually, even before being socially or politically. In essence, it is therefore a matter of returning to normality, i.e. restoring the natural dependence of the economic phenomenon on internal, moral factors, and acting on

such factors. If one recognises this, one will also readily recognise the internal causes that in today's world, with the economy as common denominator, preclude any solution that not result in an ever-worsening fall from level. We have already said above that the uprising of the masses was to a large extent provoked by the fact that every social difference was reduced to that proper to mere economic classes, by the fact that, under the sign of anti-traditional liberalism, property and wealth, freed all constraints and higher values, have almost become the only bases of social differences. But outside the narrow limits - the limits that were previously set to the economy general in the overall hierarchical order - the superiority and entitlement of a class insofar as it is simply an economic class can rightly be challenged in the name of elementary human values. It was precisely here, however, that the subversive ideology was to insert itself, absolutizing an anomalous and degenerative situation and making it as if nothing else ever existed and nothing else can exist other than economic classes, other than extrinsic and unjust social superiority and inferiority based on mere wealth. But all this is false, such conditions occurring precisely and only in a truncated society; Only in such a society can the concepts of 'capitalist' and 'proletarian' be defined, concepts devoid of any reality in a normal civilisation because *in it the counterpart of extra-economic values makes the corresponding human types appear, in principle, as anything but what is today designated as 'capitalist' or 'proletarian'*, and it also in the domain of economics confers a precise justification for certain differences in condition, dignity and function (1). It must then be recognised what in the present disorder is due to an inferior ideology. It is not so much true that Marxism arose and took root because there was a real social question (this could at most occur at the beginning of the industrial age); Rather, it is true that the social question arises to a large extent in today's world only because Marxism exists, i.e. artificially, through the organised work of agitators, the so-called 'class-consciousness reawakeners', about whom one Lenin expressed himself very clearly in teaching the communist party the task not of supporting the 'workers' movements where they naturally exist but of provoking them, of arousing them wherever and by whatever means. Marxism gives birth to the proletarian and 'class' mentality where it did not exist before, provoking agitation, resentment and dissatisfaction where the individual still kept to his place, contained his needs and aspirations within natural limits, did not aspire to become other than what he was, and precisely on this basis ignored that 'alienation', that *Entfremdung* put forward by Marxism, which, moreover, can only overcome it with a much worse form of it, namely with the 'integration' (i.e. the disintegration) of the individual into a 'collective'. Here we are in no way advocating an 'obscurantism' for the benefit of the current 'upper classes', because we have already said that the superiority and entitlement of a class insofar as it is simply an economic class in a materialistic world, we dispute them. However, we must take a stand against the idea, or myth, of so-called 'social progress', which another of the pathogenic fixations characteristic of the economic era in general, because it is not only left-wing currents that have it in their own right. In this respect, the eschatological views of Marxism do not, in fact, differ a great deal from the 'western' views of *prosperity*: both the vision of life at the beginning and the consequences are, after all, the same. Fundamentally, here the anti-political materialistic societal conception returns to assert itself, which detaches the social order and man from any higher order and purpose, which for its sole purpose places profit in the physical, vegetative and terrestrial sense and which by making it the criterion of progress inverts the values proper to every traditional structure because the law, the meaning and the sufficient reasoning of such structures have always consisted in referring man to something beyond him, economy and wealth or material destitution having, in relation to this, subordinate importance. Thus it can legitimately be said that the so-called 'elevation of social conditions' is to be considered not as a good, but as an evil, when price is the subjugation of the individual to the productive mechanism and to the social conglomerate, the

degradation of the state into a 'labour state' and of society into a 'consumer society', the elimination of all qualitative hierarchy, the atrophy of all spiritual sensitivity and 'heroic' capacity in the broadest sense of the word. It has been written by Hegel that 'universal history is not the terrain of happiness, the periods of happiness (in the sense of material well-being and social prosperity), are in it, blank pages'. But even individually, the qualities that are most valuable in a man and that make him truly such often arise in a harsh climate, even destitution and injustice, which challenges him, and by which he is spiritually challenged, while they almost always grieve when the human animal is assured a maximum of a comfortable and secure life and a fair share of a cattle-herd's welfare and happiness, which do not cease to be so when they are countered by radio, television and aeroplanes, Hollywood and sports arenas or a *Reader's Digest* culture. Let us repeat: spiritual values and degrees of human perfection have nothing to do with economic and social prosperity or lack thereof. That destitution is always a source of abjection and vice, and 'progressive' social conditions represent the opposite, is the fola of materialistic ideologies, which then contradict themselves when they set up the other myth, according to which the 'good' are all on the side of the 'people', the oppressed and destitute workers, the wicked and vicious all on the side of the corrupt and exploitative rich classes. It is a fairy tale both one and the other. The reality is that true values have no compulsory relation to better or worse social and economic conditions and that, as has been said, only where those values are at the forefront can one approach an order of effective justice on the same material plane. Selfhood, the style of an active impersonality, a love of discipline, a generic heroic disposition are also to be considered as such values. What is important is that in the face of all forms of resentment and social competition, each person knows how to recognise and love his own place, the place that conforms best to his own nature, recognising also in this way the limits within which he can develop his possibilities, give an organic meaning to his life, achieve his own perfection: because a craftsman who fulfils his function perfectly is certainly superior to a ruler who discards and does not live up to his dignity. It is only when factors of this kind come to the fore that one or the other reform on the socio-economic level can be studied and implemented without danger, according to true justice, without the essential being exchanged for the accessory. Unless, first of all, there is an ideological detoxification and a rectification of attitudes, any reform will only be superficial, it will not touch the deepest roots of the crisis of contemporary society, it will be to the advantage of the forces of subversion. In terms of general attitudes, it is worth pointing out the one that fuels the demonisation of the economy more than any other. It is said that in a land not of Europe, but of ancient civilisation, an American company, noting the low level of competition from the locals hired for certain jobs, thought it had found the right means to spur them on and doubled the wages. The result was that most of the workers showed up for work for half the hours as before. Believing that the original wages were approximately sufficient for their natural and normal needs, these men found it absurd to have to work more than what, according to the new criterion, was needed to obtain it. It is also recounted that Renan, after a visit to a sample industrial exhibition in his time, came out with these words: 'But there are such things I can do perfectly well without! Compare this with what is nowadays stakhanovism, economic 'activism' and 'civilisation of well-being' and 'consumption', with its applications. Better than any abstract consideration, such anecdotes provide the touchstone for two fundamental attitudes, one to be judged healthy and normal, the other deviant and psychopathic. To refer, to the first anecdote, to a non-European country, let us not adduce the clichés about the inertia or indolence of races that are not the 'dynamic' and 'achieving' races of the West. In this, as in other domains, such contrasts are artificial and one-sided. Indeed, it is enough to turn away from 'modern' civilisation - which, moreover, can no longer be said to be

exclusively Western - to find the same conception of life, the same inner attitude, the same valuation of profit and work. Before the advent in Europe of what is significantly referred to in the textbooks as the 'mercantile economy' (significantly, because this expresses that the tone of the entire economy was set exclusively by the type of merchant and money-lender), from which modern capitalism was to develop rapidly, it was a fundamental criterion of economics that external goods should be subject to a certain measure, that work and the pursuit of profit were only justifiable in order to secure a subsistence corresponding to one's status. Such was the Thomistic and, later, the Lutheran conception. The ancient corporative ethic was also no different, where the values of personality and quality were emphasised and where, in any case, the amount of work was always a function of a determined level of natural needs and a specific vocation. The fundamental idea was that work should not serve to bind, but to disengage man in order to allow him to follow more worthy interests, once the needs of existence had been regulated. No economic value appeared to be worth sacrificing one's independence to it, and the search for the means of existence over-committed existence itself. On the whole, the aforementioned truth was recognised, i.e. for human progress must be defined on an economic and not even a social level, but on an inner level, for it does not consist in stepping out of the ranks to 'step up', in multiplying the amount of work to gain a position other than one's own. At a higher level, *abstine et subistine* was a norm of wisdom that echoes back to the classical world, and one of the possible interpretations of the Delphic saying: '*Nothing is too much*' could equally apply to this order of ideas. All these, then, were perfectly Western views: of European man, when he was still healthy, not yet - we might say - *bitten by the tarantula*, not succumbing to an insane agitation that was to pervert every criterion of value and lead to the paroxysms of contemporary civilisation. It is from the alteration that has taken place in this regard - hence in the moral sphere, so that all responsibility falls unapologetically on the individual - that the 'demonisation of the economy' has developed through chain processes. The turning point was the advent of a conception of life that, instead of keeping needs within natural limits in view of the pursuit of what is truly worthy of human effort, had as its ideal the artificial increase and multiplication of the same needs, but also of the means to satisfy them, regardless of the growing slavery that, by virtue of an inescapable law, this was to constitute, first for the individual and then for communities. The limit of this derivation is to be found in the internal situation from which the forms of high industrial capitalism have developed; here the activity aimed at profit and production, from means, has become an end, it has taken man body and soul and in the end condemned him to a relentless race, to an unlimited expansion of acting and producing, a race imposed, because stopping, in the economic system in motion, would immediately mean going backwards, if not also being undermined and overwhelmed. In this motion, which is not 'activism' but pure and senseless agitation, the economy enchains thousands and thousands of workers no less than the great entrepreneur, the 'producer of goods', the 'possessor of the means of labour' and determines concordant actions and reactions that generate ever greater spiritual destruction. The background of the 'disinterested' love of that American politician, who set 'the economic upliftment of the least developed parts of the earth' as the basic formula of his international political programme, is revealed precisely in this light: the meaning of this is to bring about the new barbarian invasions - the only real ones - the brutalisation in the economic gyres of parts of humanity still spared from the bite of the tarantula - this, because growing capital seeks employment and investment and the production mechanism degenerated into super-production seeks ever larger markets. Of what Lenin was able to recognise by seeing in such upheavals one of the characteristic features of 'dying capitalism', i.e. that which is digging its own grave, doomed as it is by its

same law to create, with industrialisation, proletarianisation and Europeanisation, forces that eventually react against it and the corresponding white nations - of this the exponents of 'progress' do not realise, and so it is that the landslide process encounters no limits. In the socialist systems that proclaim themselves the successors of capitalism condemned to perish by its own internal contradiction, the enslavement of the individual, in fact, instead of being alleviated, is reaffirmed, and it no longer occurs as a matter of fact, but as a matter of law: here it corresponds to a collective imperative. If the great entrepreneur gives his all to economic activity, making it a kind of drug - of vital importance to him - out of an unconscious self-defence because if he were to stop he would see emptiness around him, he would feel all the horror of a meaningless existence (1) - a similar situation, in the ideologies of the opposite side, it is made to correspond to a kind of ethical imperative, with the counterpart of anathemas and absolutely crushing measures for anyone who intends to raise their head and reaffirm their freedom in the face of all that is work, production, output and social constraint. And here we must accuse another of the pathogenic fixations of the economic age, another of its fundamental slogans. We allude to the *modern superstition of work*, which is now characteristic of both 'right-wing' and 'left-wing' currents. Like the 'people', 'work' has become one of those sacred and intangible entities about which modern man dares say nothing but praise and exaltation. One of the characteristics of the economic era in its most squalid and plebeian aspects is precisely this kind of autosadism, which consists in glorifying work as an ethical value and an essential duty, and in conceiving any form of activity as work. To a future, more normal humanity, there is no perversion that will appear more singular than this, whereby the new, the means becomes the end. Work ceases to signify something that is imposed solely in view of the material necessities of existence and to which no more space is to be given than the normality of such necessities, depending on the individual and his rank, requires, but it is made absolute as a value in itself, associating it simultaneously with the myth of paroxysmal productive activism. What is more, we come to a veritable inversion. The word 'work' has always designated the lowest forms of human activity, those precisely that are most uniquely conditioned by the economic factor. Anything that is not reduced to such forms, it is illegitimate to call work; the word to be used is instead action: action, and not work, is that of the leader, the explorer, the ascetic, the pure scientist, the warrior, the artist, the diplomat, the theologian, the law-maker or the law-breaker, the elementary position or principle-driven, the great entrepreneur and the great organiser. Now, while every normal civilisation, thanks to its upward orientation, tended to give a character of action, of creation, of 'art' even to work (for which, for example, we can refer again to the ancient corporative world), exactly the opposite is happening in the present economic civilisation: even action - to what may have remained worthy of the name - tends today to be given a character of 'work', hence economic and proletarian, almost out of a sadistic pleasure in degradation contamination. This is how one has come to formulate the 'ideal' of a 'labour state' and to fantasise about a 'humanism of labour' even in circles that claim to be anti-Marxist. One Gentile began by glorifying 'the humanism of culture' as a 'glorious stage in the emancipation of man' - in which the liberal, individualistic-intellectual phase of world subversion is to be understood; an insufficient stage, he says, because 'it was necessary that the worker also be recognised as having the high dignity that man had discovered in thought'. Thus there would be 'no doubt that the social upheavals and the parallel socialist upheavals of the 20th century created a new humanism - the humanism of labour - whose establishment as actuality and concreteness is the work and task of our century'. The logical development of the liberal deviation, as we have indicated it above, is clear here. This 'humanism of labour' is fact one with 'integral' or 'realistic' or 'new humanism'.

of the communist intellectuals (1) and the 'ethicality' and 'high dignity' claimed for work are only an insulting function of man forgetting all higher interests and willingly accepting his obtuse and senseless framing in barbaric structures: barbaric, because they know nothing but work and production hierarchies. The most singular thing is that this superstitious and insolent cult of work is banished precisely at a time when the irrevocable mechanisation to the bitter end takes away almost without residue from the main varieties of work (of what can legitimately be called work) what in them could have had a character of quality, of art, of spontaneous expression of a vocation, making it instead something unexamined and devoid of any immanent meaning. Thus those who advance the just demand for 'deproletarianisation' are deluding themselves if they see only a social problem in this. The task is first of all to *deproletarianise the vision of life*, a task without which everything remains oblique and constrained. But the proletarian spirit, the spiritually proletarian quality (1), subsists when one cannot conceive of a human type higher than that of the 'worker', when one fantasises about the 'ethicality of work', when one praises the 'society' or 'state of work', when one does not have the courage to take a firm stand against all these new contaminating myths. An old image is that of a man who, running laboriously in the blazing sun, at a certain point asks himself: But why am I running? If I went slower? and going slower, he asks himself: But why am I running in this heat? If I stood under a tree? and in so doing recognises his running as a senseless fever. Such an image indicates the internal change, the *metanoia* necessary to strike at the base of the demon of the economy and to regain the whole of freedom: this, certainly not in order to move towards a renunciatory, utopian and miserable civilisation, but to desaturate every domain from insane tensions and to restore a real hierarchy of values. The fundamental point here is precisely to be able to recognise that there is no external economic growth and social prosperity that is worth the pain and whose flattery one should not absolutely resist when the counterpart is an essential limitation of freedom and of the space needed for everyone to realise what is possible for them beyond the sphere conditioned by matter and the needs of ordinary life. Moreover, this applies not only to the individual, but also to a community, to a state, especially when its material resources are limited and foreign economic forces are pressing in on it. Here, *autarky* can be an ethical precept, because what weighs most in the balance of values must be the same for an individual and for a state: it is better to renounce the blandishments of an improvement in general social and economic conditions and to adopt an *austerity* regime where necessary, than to join the bandwagon of foreign interests, than to allow oneself to be involved in global processes of unbridled economic hegemony and productivity that are destined to strike those who have unleashed them, when they no longer find sufficient space. The current situation as a whole is of course such that all these considerations of ours go against the current. While this does not in any way affect their intrinsic value, it must nevertheless be recognised that, in practice, the individual today cannot react and escape individually from the overall gearing of the economic era except within narrow limits and given certain more or less privileged conditions. A general perceptible change can only be expected when a superordinate power intervenes. Having recognised the fundamental principle of the primacy and sovereignty of the state with respect to the economy, a limiting and ordering action in the economic field can proceed from the state, which facilitates what can derive from the essential and unavoidable factor, constituted, as has been said, by the detoxification, the change of mentality and the return to normality of men who know anew what is sensible activity, right effort, something worthy of pursuit, loyalty to themselves. 'Contestants' in an integral and legitimate sense on the one hand, 'realisers' in a superior sense on the other, one can only be on this basis. On the relationship between state and economy, we will return shortly. Here we would still like to recall these words of Nietzsche, to set the record straight and cut the so-called 'social question' short: "Workers must live a

day as the bourgeois live today - but *above* them, distinguished from them by a lack of needs, will be the upper caste: poorer, simpler, but possessing power' (1). A differentiation in this sense will be the principle for the rectification of the inversion we accuse, the principle for the defence of the idea of the state and for the resurgence of dignity and superiority that, beyond the world of the economy, through a continuous struggle, *internal* and external, through the confirmation of one's own being by means of a conquest of every moment, must be consolidated and validated.

(1 One may recall here the Aristotelian conception of social justice, understood not as the *equal* distribution of goods, but as distribution proportionate to the different dignity of the function and qualification of individuals and groups just economic *inequality*.

(1 On this, see **W. SOMBART**, *The Bourgeois*, transl. fr, Paris, 1926, p. 419.

(1 Gentile, among other things, defined communism as an 'impatient corporatism'. This was tantamount to saying that between the corporatism of the fascist period as he interpreted it, and communism, there would be no qualitative difference, but only that of two stages and two times in the same direction. (1 It is essentially in these terms that the problem must be posed, because the social proletariat in the old Marxist sense is now almost non-existent in the West: the already proletarian 'workers' today often have an economic position above that of the middle bourgeoisie.

(1 **F. NIETZSCHE**, *Wille zur Macht*, &

764. CHAPTER SEVEN

HISTORY - HISTORICISM

When we dealt with the premises of the revolutionary-conservative idea (p. 24) we proposed to return to historicism. This is what we will do now, also by way of introduction to the topics we will have to deal with - choice of traditions, the third dimension of history, intranational selections - since what we are going to say may give rise to some difficulties in those who have not got rid of the historicist mentality. Let us begin by pointing out that the emphasis on the concept of 'history' is quite modern, foreign to any normal civilisation, and even more so is the personification of history in a sort of mystical entity, made the object of a superstitious religion, so much so that many other personified abstractions that have come into fashion precisely in an era that would like to be 'positive' and 'scientific', many people like to write it with a capital letter, as they used to write the name of the divinity. That being said, the first, more generic meaning of historicism is to be referred to that subsidence or landslide, whereby from a *civilisation of being* - that is, of stability and, form, with adherence to super-temporal principles - we have passed to a *civilisation of becoming*, that is, of change, of flowing, of contingency (1). This, as a starting point. In a second phase, the values were inverted, and this breakthrough was given the character of something that has a positive meaning and therefore should not only not be opposed but rather accepted, exalted, desired. On this basis, the idea of history and that of 'progress' and 'evolution' have often been intimately associated, and historicism has often appeared as an integral part of the progressive and Enlightenment optimism that characterised the entire 19th century and formed the backdrop to traditionalist, scientist and technical civilisation. This aside, historicism in a specific sense is the basic conception of philosophy, referring above all Hegel, whose main exponents in Italy were Croce and Gentile It is in this special regard that it is worth indicating here the spirit and 'morality' of historicism. As is well known, Hegel wanted to make the sphere of reality coincide with that of rationality, hence his famous axiom: 'All that is real is rational and all that is

rational is real'. It is not the case here to examine the problem from a metaphysical point of view and, so to speak, *sub specie aeternitatis*. What is certain, however, is that from a concrete and human point of view, that principle is as equivocal as ever, for two reasons. The first is that, in order for it to serve any purpose, one would first of all have to be able to know directly, *a priori* and determinately what is to be called 'rational' and which should be valid as the order or law that History and every event always reflect. Now, the discordance between the various historicisms is already significant in this regard, it is that, in fact, each one refers to its own, subjective speculations, at the level of a university philosophy, here of the superior power of vision necessary to grasp not let us say what lies behind the world of phenomena but already what is concealed beyond the most apparent causes of historical developments, lacking even the principle. The second reason is that, even if we give credence to what one or the other postulates as 'rational', in common experience we never find the complete identity of rational and real, so that we have to ask ourselves whether he who claims it calls something real because it is rational, or whether, on the contrary, he calls it rational only because it is simply real, because it imposes itself on him as factual reality. Even without going into a properly philosophical analysis - which, moreover, we have taken the trouble to do elsewhere, generally criticising so-called 'transcendental idealism' (1) - this is enough to make the ambiguous and labile character of historicism apparent. Since we find ourselves in the world of becoming, to which is proper a mutation - which has become increasingly chaotic and rapid in modern times - of events, situations and forces, historicism, as A. Tilgher rightly pointed out, on the one hand reduces itself to being a "passive philosophy of the fait accompli", the theory that to everything that has succeeded in imposing itself, and for this fact alone, goes on to recognise its "rationality" (2). (2) But on the other hand it can equally promote "revolutionary" instances, when one does not like to recognise the real as "rational"; in this case, in the name of "reason" and "History" interpreted for one's own use, one condemns what is. A third solution is possible as a mixture of the two previous ones, namely to call "anti-history" everything that tries to assert itself, that tends to realise or restore an order different from the one in force, without succeeding; except to justify it and lend it a "rationality" in the case that it wins and imposes itself, because then it has become "real". Thus, depending on the case, historicism can equally well serve either conservatism in the deterrent sense, revolutionary utopias, or - most often - those who know how to juggle and adapt to situations, changing flags according to the changing wind. As such, 'history' and 'anti-history' become slogans devoid of any concrete content, which can be used either in one sense or the other, depending on personal preference, in the framework of a veritable game of bingoes, to which the exponents of this direction give the name dialectics' ('historical dialectics'). A typical case of this has been the proceeding, in Germany, of the premises of Hegelian historicism, both of a theory of authority and the absolute state (a coachman's concern for a system that, rooted in traditional values, had no need of a 'philosophy'), and of Marxist revolutionary and 'dialectical' ideology. Another more recent example was in Italy, with the brothers of discord, Croce and Gentile. Croce and Gentile were convinced historicists in equal measure. But Gentile, assuming as rational what he had been able to impose himself politically in Italy, had granted the consecration of 'historicity' to fascism, putting his own philosophy at its service. For Croce, the 'rational', given his personal ideological preferences, corresponded to liberal anti-fascism, and the fascist order, although 'real' at the time, was stigmatised by him as 'anti-historical'. Many gentlemen who, due to the change of the wind, changed things for force majeure, fascists yesterday, later woke up as anti-fascists, could be considered exponents of the third possibility, of that of unscrupulously putting oneself *up* to date, of bringing oneself up to date with 'History' and its 'rationality' want from time to time (1). Already from these hints we can see what historicism boils down to. Essentially it is a formless, useless and vain ideology, when it is not cowardly and opportunistic; an ideology

unrealistic or grossly realistic, as the case may be. But, in a more important domain, apart from the lucubrations of historicism as philosophy and the corresponding mental deformation for which certain Italian academic culture is responsible, *it is the very myth of 'History' with a capital 'History' that must be attacked, especially* when it foments the narcosis of those who do not realise the forces to which they have succumbed, and when it panders to the watchwords of those who want the current to get faster and faster, that no one should oppose it, that the last dams should be broken - and who to this end stigmatised as 'anti-historical' or 'reactionary' any different attitude, and appeal to the 'sense of History'. This historicism, when it is not a mindless drudge of castaways, is evidently the smokescreen behind which the forces of world subversion work. It is astonishing that even among those who cultivate ideals of reconstruction there are those who do not realise this, those who are not so much as to reject, in all its forms, the historicist myth, recognising that it is men, as long as they are truly men, who make and unmake history, having their way. To oppose any consecration and 'rationalisation' of the state of affairs, to grant no recognition to forces or currents that have taken over - this must be the principle. Because there it is, and it has already been said: the anathema of being 'anti-historical' and 'outside of history' is precisely being hurled at those who can still remember the state of affairs, who call subversion subversion instead of adhering to the processes that are driving the whole world ever lower. Having made this clear, a fundamental freedom of movement is restored to mankind and, at the same time, the premises are given for a possible investigation to judge the actual influences that, in history, have promoted one or other upheaval. With regard to the first point, what has been said will serve as an introduction to the subject we will immediately discuss, namely the *choice of traditions*. Having overcome all historicism, the idea of the past as something mechanically determining the present falls away, as does the concept of a transcendent finalist and evolutionist law which, in practice, leads back to determinism no less than that first idea. Any historical factor would then appear at most as *conditioning*, never as *determining*. The possibility of an active attitude with respect to what has already been will be safeguarded, especially that of normatively and electively enforcing in history, at every point in history, what refers to supertemporal values. After this general overview, let us consider some historical problems that particularly concern Italy.

(1 On the civilisations of being and those of becoming see **J. EVOLA**. *The Bow and the Clave*, cit., c. 1.

(1 Cf. our books *Teoria dell'individuo assoluto* (Bocca Turin 1927) and *Saggi sull'idealismo magico* (Atanòr, Todi-Roma 1925).

(2 It is worth noting that the spirit of Hegel's original philosophy was nevertheless a kind of *decretism of pure reason*, so much so that Hegel, almost Platonically or Eleatically went so far as to accuse nature, reality, of 'impotence' wherever it did not conform to the decreed a priori rationality. The complete collapse of 'ethical rationalism', in the historicist sense of a passive adaptation of will and reality, of idea and fact, occurred rather in the epigones of Hegelism, especially in Gentile's so-called 'actualism'.

(1 While Gentile's philosophy - bolsa, presumptuous and confused philosophy - is to be deplored, it was Gentile's attitudes of authoritarian paternalism and monopolisation during fascism that were to be deplored, however, Gentile himself as a man of fact must be positively credited with having remained on the side of fascism when it, being the losing game by then, should have been considered by him more or less as 'historically outdated'.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHOICE OF TRADITIONS

In the case of every historical nation, we cannot always speak of 'tradition' in the singular, if we take this term in its most current sense, not in the superior one we have already mentioned. Almost always, the processes that have taken place within a nation over the centuries are complex in character, influenced by multiple influences that have sometimes harmonised, but sometimes clashed and neutralised each other. What was the predominant force in a given period may subsequently have passed into a latent state, and vice versa, and only a vicious 'historicism' can presume to recall everything to a linear development. And since historicism is inherent - as seen before - in the passive acceptance of the state of affairs, legalised by it with the myth of the 'ideal necessity of history' and similar formulas, it considers a nation as a unity in time, which admits no revisions. A freer gaze, on the other hand, can recognise multiple and sometimes even conflicting possibilities in the history of a nation, which in a certain way reflect so many 'traditions', and realises the precise importance of such a recognition from a practical point of view: because especially at turning points and crises, at points where it is necessary to react, to lead, to organise according to a central idea, forces of a people that are discarding and wavering, a *choice of traditions* is necessary. In one's own past, one must choose the ideas felt most congenial by the people whose task it is, at times like these, to initiate a new cycle. If these general considerations are applied to the case of Italy one is faced a problem that is not easy to solve, with multiple factors hindering the task of discrimination and choice. The greatest impediment is the existence of a certain 'patriotic' historiography that, with its tendentiousness, its suggestions, its buzzwords, precludes the objective understanding of many aspects of the past and is often responsible for outright falsifications. Moreover, the character of the history that has generally been 'fabricated' (one cannot use any other word) in the last century is no different. As a whole, such a history is nothing but the alibi that revolutionary liberalism, democracy, Enlightenment and Masonic thought have created for themselves. Later, the interpretations proper to Marxist historical materialism and its 'revolutionary progressivism' had to be added. Because of this situation, the choice of traditions for the purposes of a true reconstruction presents a special difficulty, since a certain way all possible measures have been taken in advance to ensure that certain values are no longer recognised, that the actual meaning of certain fundamental historical upheavals is distorted, that, in short, only one direction is in front of us, the direction desired by those who conditioned and disseminated such historiography. This tactic is clearly visible, especially with regard to Italy: rhetorically coating everything that has had a subversive and anti-traditional tendency in the past with a national character, so that, once certain taboos have been constituted, it is possible to cry sacrilege and mobilise an impassioned 'patriotic' reaction as soon as someone steps forward to spoil the party. Things, then, are not easy. It is necessary to have the strength to curb the tendency, whereby for many, the fact of being 'ours', of being part of 'our history', automatically and indiscriminately lends a character of intangibility to upheavals, men and facts. This is all the more necessary because, unfortunately, after its earliest history, which is linked to the Roman civilisation and its extensions, it can be said that there is a 'tradition' of the Italian past, which goes right up against the subversive ideas that shaped the ultimate political world, a tradition from which there should be no reason to step outside, quite the contrary. It is important to realise this, thus 'dismantling' the patriot myth constructed in this regard by the aforementioned historiography. Here we will limit ourselves to briefly pointing out a few specific points, i.e. the actual meaning of the revolt of the Communes, the Risorgimento, the interventionism of 1915. It is customary to glorify the Italian civilisation of the Communes and give a meaning of Italian national awakening to the rebellion of the Communes against the Empire. Another myth has been habitually associated with

this, with good reason: the *anti-Germanic myth*, the idea, that is, that the German was the 'secular enemy' of the Italian people. The insurrection of the Communes would have constituted the dawn of the new national consciousness, the first attempt by Italy to break the secular yoke, to unify itself, to free itself from the tyranny of the hated foreigner, of the 'barbarian' from beyond the Alps. All this is pure fantasy. On the contrary, the truth is that the nation factor did not and could not enter into the struggle. The conflict was not between two nations at all, but between two ideas and, if you like, between two supernational castes. A Frederick I fought against the Commons not as a Teutonic prince, but as a 'Roman' emperor and affirmer of a supernational and sacred principle of authority derived exclusively from this quality and function of his. It was not to defend the interests of his lineage, which he indeed neglected, but to prevent the authority of the empire from being undermined, for which Barbarossa took the field; having been requested to do so, moreover, by certain Italian cities oppressed and harassed by others: thus less out of a right than out of his own inescapable duty. "To re-establish royal and imperial authority to the highest degree, to vindicate rights lost or fallen into neglect, to enforce the law, to re-establish order and peace" - in these precise terms Frederick understood his task. And in the peace he dictated, it was to the principles of Roman law that he referred. Had they remained faithful and retained their rightful hierarchical place in the mediaeval ecumene, the communes would have had their own place in the empire, nor would they have been opposed. What Frederick could not tolerate, and what no other representative of the Empire could have tolerated, had he been Spanish, Italian or French rather than German, was the anti-hierarchical pretension of the Italian Communes to emancipate themselves, to constitute themselves, to arm themselves, almost as states within the state, revoking their natural dependence on the upper caste, the warrior and feudal mobility, in the spirit of a new civilisation, tending towards democracy and capitalism, in the sign of which modern peoples were not to deny any principle of legitimate authority, i.e. from above, than to submit to the power of the various kings of a faceless and stateless finance and industry. It was not without reason that Sombart called Florence, for example, 'the New York of the Middle Ages'. The real terms of the conflict are these. The Communes anticipate the revolution of the Third Estate, and the 'tradition' of the Communes is the one that was to find its continuation in the anti-traditional world that came to life with the French Revolution. The Battle Legnano is given so much prominence in 'patriotic' historiography not because it was a national fact, nor even because it was a truly great military success (it was very little, if one thinks of the peace conditions that followed), but precisely because it rose to the value of a revolutionary symbol (1). As far as the national factor is concerned, it should be noted that Italians fought both on the side of the Emperor and on the opposite side; almost all the Italian nobility fought for the Emperor, the Ezzelino, the Monferrato and the Savoy fought for him, while a prince of the same lineage as Frederick, Henry the Lion of Bavaria, abandoned him at the decisive moment, making himself largely responsible for the reversal of Legnano. And as for the Communes, it is hard to see why Lodi should be considered any less Italian than its rival city, Milan: Lodi preferred certain ruin so as not to break the faith sworn to the Emperor at a time when it was known that he could not come to its aid. Thus the war of the Communes was to a large extent a fratricidal war between Italians, between Italians who were loyal to that "Roman" symbol of the Empire, to which even a Dande had to give his full recognition and which he regarded as a principle of health for Italy itself - and Italians who did not want this symbol or had repudiated it (1). Nor, after the struggle against Barbarossa, can anything resembling an awakening of Italy and a unification of it be seen. Least of all one sees what would impose an unconditional adhesion to the thesis of 'homeland history': one does not see Italians capable of opposing the German prince *in the name of the same idea, the same ideal, the same 'Roman' symbol of the Emperor*. To what the 'Romans' of the time were reduced instead, Frederick himself had to tell them in harsh words. None of this can be seen. To the League of Commons

no national unification followed, not even of the purely political, schismatic and anti-aristocratic kind that Philip the Fair was to set an example of in France. Instead, from the Communes, the Seignories would develop, with their suspicious figures of tyrannical princes and condottieri - while Florence witnessed the unprecedented case the elevation of a family of money-lending merchants to the dignity of a princely dynasty to which the political government of the city was entrusted. In general, it was to be a political chaos, an agitation and struggle under the sign not of the nation, but of faction and of the most limited particularism. But all this for patriotic historiography counts as non-existent. All it cared about was endorsing a 'choice of traditions' that would meet the revolutionary, secular and democratic thinking that inspired it. The fact that there existed a Ghibelline Italy, to which the idea of the Empire was not at all foreign, is barely referred to, without giving it any national importance, whereas it represented traditional, non-degenerate Italy. On the actual significance of the Italian Renaissance we have already had occasion to say elsewhere, so here we will limit ourselves to mentioning what, in this regard, has more to do with the political sphere. With regard to the Rinascenza, the aforementioned 'history of the fatherland' sees, after all, more acutely than does the history of culture, which glorifies that period solely from the point of view of the humanities and the arts. Homeland history' also considers and exalts all this, but in a precise polemical function with respect to the previous medieval civilisation, presented as 'obscurantist', disowned, in its authentic greatness and in the high metaphysical tension that permeated it. Hence, according to this historiography, a single current would run more or less from the Italian Renaissance to what was later to be the Enlightenment, the 'free thought', the 'modern spirit' (i.e. rationalist and anti-traditional), so that it would happily come to port. So, in the same respect that the Italy of the Renaissance is made the mother of geniuses and artists, it is also made a forerunner of subversion. And just as the Communes would represent an initial uprising against an alleged political despotism, so the civilisation of the Renaissance would represent 'the discovery of man', of the freedom of the spirit of the individual creator, the principle of intellectual emancipation that constitutes 'the basis of human progress'. These are views in which quite different things are confused; however, it cannot be denied that the 'direction of effectiveness' of the civilisation of the Renaissance responds to a good extent to an interpretation of this kind, so that from the traditional point of view precise reservations should be made in the face of everything that, in purely laudatory terms, is heard about the Renaissance from the point of view of the history of arts and culture. Moreover, it is not arbitrary to see a parallelism between the individualism expressed in the more or less showy and brilliant creations of the artistic Renaissance, and the individualism that raged in the same period, in the political field, in the aforementioned regime of factions, rival cities, the regime of condottieri, in short, in a complex of phenomena that testify to the absence, in Italy at the time, of a single shaping political force and a national conscience. The inheritance that comes to us from the 'tradition' of the Renaissance, apart from that which pertains to the galleries, museums and civic monuments, therefore presents quite clear and not exactly edifying traits. So here, too, perspectives have been distorted by a one-sided view and, again, what the historiography in question ascribes to the glory of Italy's Renaissance is also what those who hold to traditional values, to more austere values, should often draw suspicion from when considering the other side. Turning to the third point, the Risorgimento, it is in this regard that the tendentious interpretations of Masonic-inspired historiography intended to cover its cherished ideas with the alibi of a generic and rhetorical patriotism have been and are being applied with particular virulence. In the Risorgimento, its aspect of national movement must be clearly distinguished from its ideological aspect. To the Risorgimento we owe the unification of Italy, and here we do not think to put on trial the men and the movement to which, thanks to a fairly complex set of circumstances, Italy owed its unification and political independence. Things change, however, and a lot, when

consider the main ideas according to which all this was to be achieved (discarding, among other things, a federalist-legitimist solution such as that with which Bismarck built the German *Reich*) and which continued to predominate in Italian political life until the Fascist period. From this second point of view, the Risorgimento was not a national movement by accident; it was part of the revolutionary uprisings that took place in a whole group of states as a consequence of the importation of the ideas of the Jacobin revolution. 1948 and 1949, for example, had an identical face in the Italian movements and in those that were ignited in Prague, Hungary, Germany, and in Habsburg Vienna itself, on the basis of a single watchword. Here, there were simply so many columns of the advance of a single international front, commanded by the liberal-democratic and Masonic ideology, a front that also had its leaders in disguise. Not dissimilarly the current communist uprisings are, in the various nations, merely so many aspects of the action of the Third International and the network of 'cells' at its service. And by the exponents of Europe's still traditional liberalism and Mazzinianism at that time were considered just as today liberals and democrats consider communism in turn; in reality the subversive purpose of them then was no different. It was just that the national and patriotic myth was being used and the disruptive action was in its early stages. There are significant documents, so far only partially used appropriately - example those collected by the Papal State Police - which show, to those who want to explore the third dimension of Italian history of that period, how things actually were: for the forces that were behind the scenes and that, let us repeat, acted internationally, the unity and independence of Italy were secondary things and, in any case, constituted not the end, but rather the means. The real end, which the Italian patriots and idealists did not need to know (and if they had been too curious - it is said in one of the most interesting of the documents mentioned above precisely with regard to Mazzini - "the dagger would have spoken") was to deliver a mortal blow to Austria as the representative of the imperial idea, and to the Church, in Rome: it is not for nothing that in the Masonic degree of Knight Kadosh the neophyte to seal his oath ritually strikes with a dagger the tiara and the crown, symbols of the traditional dual authority (1). And the relations existing between Freemasonry and the Carboneria, which played such a large part in the Risorgimento, are well known. Things in Italy, due to a combination of factors, did not go precisely this way; but neither were the parties reversed, i.e. the ideologies borrowed to unify Italy were by no means liquidated after they had fulfilled their function. They continued to predominate in Italy, unified by means of a policy that today would be called 'possibilism', without the new state being matched by an idea of its own, a raised symbol, a shaping force, the monarchy presenting itself as little more than a superstructure and almost with 'private' characters that were merely representative. And the touchstone was laid in 1915, with the break-up not only of the Triple Alliance, but of neutrality itself. Thus, one can see that the 'tradition' of the Risorgimento is reduced. Quite apart from the absurd thesis of its continuity with the spirit that had already animated the League of Italian Communes in the Middle Ages, it is hard to see where its 'Italian' character lies; to put the national question, it is, if anything ideologically, a matter of tendencies whose origin is Gallic French, and which later characterised an international revolutionary front. It is enough to glance at the writings of the time, especially those inspired more or less directly by the secret societies, to see that while people were happy to talk about Italy and the fight against foreigners, they were more interested in exalting the Jacobin principles of liberty and equality, i.e. the cause of the French Revolution, and the fight to the death 'against tyrants' (in the oath of the Carbonari neophytes, this appears most explicitly), regardless of whether the alleged tyrant was Italian or foreign. For this same ideological reason, it has already been seen that in the case of the medieval League of Communes, the Italians who fought for the emperor are worth, for 'patriotic' historiography, almost as insistent or as non-Italians. Even in the Risorgimento it is largely against a principle, against a political idea and

social struggle, while invoking the nation. The same anti-German myth, like that of the foreign oppressor, which is an integral part of the Risorgimento idea, is artificial, because, if anything, it was not Germans, but the House of Austria, and a dynastic bond intended to order in a common space different strains - Bohemians, Hungarians, Croats, for example, no less than Italians - to whom a regime of partial autonomy was recognised (1). Moreover, in the 'possibilism' of the concrete politics of the Risorgimento, the Franco-Prussian war was a particularly important factor and the words of one Cavour: 'The alliance with Prussia is written in gold letters in the book of future history' (2). However, this was not the direction desired by the forces that controlled unified Italy most profoundly. Certainly, even if they are not willingly spoken of, there was no shortage of Italians who, once national unification had been achieved, sought to disengage the new state from French influence and, in general, from that of the heir currents of Jacobinism. In this respect, the Triple Alliance could have had a decisive significance if the reasons of realistic politics that had fostered it had been supplemented by a corresponding, decisive spiritual orientation. In fact, the Triple Alliance appeared, for a time, as the partial concretisation of an incipient super-national coalition on an ideological and traditional rather than simply political basis, in which the demands that had shaped the Holy Alliance sought to be refined. Already in 1893, referring precisely to the Triple Alliance, a Wilhelm II had put forward to who later to be Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, the idea of a *league of the three emperors* (of Germany, Austria and Russia, with Italy at their side), not only as a mutual guarantee of territories and for the defence of the interests of the participating states, but above all as a traditional united front against socialism, radicalism and anarchism, as solidarity of the authoritarian and monarchical European states against the Marxist international and against the revolutionary and liberal currents of which France was the centre. And indeed Nicholas II was to return to this idea even in 1906, approving a memorial by the Count of Lamsdorf, his foreign minister, in which the foundations were laid for an alliance and crusade against all anti-Christian and anti-monarchical forces; for which, in addition to Germany, the Vatican itself was to be gained (1). Moreover, this idea goes back to Bismark who, in a memorial presented to Wilhelm I in 1887 on the occasion of the visit of Alexander III of Russia, wrote amongst other things: "The struggle today is not so much between Russians, Germans, Italians, French, as between revolution and monarchy. The revolution has conquered France, it has undermined England, it is strong in Italy and Spain. There are only the three empires that can resist it... Any future war will have less the character of a war of governments against governments than that of a war of the red flag against the elements of order and conservation' (1). These words were prophetic, just as far-sighted were the aforementioned plans for defensive solidarity of those who, by affirming the principle of authority (then realised in the monarchical form), had promoted the Triple Alliance. This also gave Italy the direction for its natural development in the sense of a strong, anti-revolutionary state, after the liquidation of the dross and unhappy ideological legacy of the previous period. Instead, the Triple Alliance remained, for Italy, a superficial thing, less a diplomatic fact, it was not an incentive for a creative *internal* development that would bring this nation to the same level as its allies; it was not 'felt', it was intimately sabotaged and the decision became clear when it was tested in 1915. The nationalistic alibi must also be dismantled with regard to the 1915 intervention. It is well known, in fact, that Italy, with appropriate diplomatic transactions, even by simply remaining neutral, could have obtained a good part of its new democratic allies then had to concede with gritted teeth; likewise, it is clear that, even in terms of a simple 'realistic' policy, Italy's national interests could not agree with those of France and England for the purposes of controlling the Mediterranean, so it was precisely the scheme of the Triple Alliance that presented itself as the only reasonable, coherent and efficient one. Thus it was not so much national and realistic considerations, but rather the

"tradition of the Risorgimento" - we mean that ideology - to act in 1914 and 1915; it was it that, in addition to igniting anti-German animosity at all costs, saw in the Central Empires almost "fascist" oppressor and "aggressor" states *avant la lettre* and established the collimation of Italian "national interests" with the true aims of the First World War. These aims were declared at a secret international congress of Freemasonry, held in Paris in 1918, in these precise terms: a crusade to bring democracy, guardian of the principles of the French Revolution, a great step forward by eliminating the remnants of intolerable obscurantist regimes, such as those of central Europe, because they actually still retained - despite the power that finance and capitalism were acquiring - structures based on hierarchy, authority and tradition. Moreover, at the very moment Italian intervention on the side of the Allies, our Freemasonry voted an agenda in which it expressed its satisfaction with this decision, because it corresponded to the ideas it had always supported. Only at the last moment, for reasons of prudence, was the text modified and it was content to say that the intervention reflected the ideals for which patriots and prophets of the Risorgimento had fought, "always held up as an example in the lodges". Given all these precedents, one cannot disregard the significance that fascism had, in that it manifested a break, a different, bold choice of traditions, the will to take a new direction, only on which, among other things, the reference to Rome as a political symbol could be legitimate ("We dream of a Roman Italy", Mussolini said). This direction was followed after overcoming a final pitfall because - a little-known detail - the Freemasonry of the Scottish Rite initially hoped to take advantage of Fascism itself and in view of this subsidised it in the period around the March on Rome, counting on its republican and, in general, left-wing tendencies, which, however, Mussolini's subsequent policy was able to neutralise. With the 'Axis' and with the war against the democracies (the problem of the timeliness or otherwise of the preparation and mistakes in this war cannot be discussed here) they went on to do exactly what should have been done in 1914, if Italy, at that time, had not been swayed by the unhappy ideological legacy of the Risorgimento and the international influences connected with it. Some have wished to see a kind of historical nemesis, a secret relationship of agreed actions and reactions in the fact that Italy won a war it should not have fought (1915-1918), and lost the one it should have fought (1940-1945). There may be some merit in such a view. However, it is clear that with Italy of defeat, or 'liberated' Italy as it may be, there was a full relapse in the most problematic direction of its history, in that of vocations, of which there is little to be proud. And so it has been possible to speak of a 'fascist parenthesis', as if the 'constant' of the Italian tradition were to be interpreted in terms of anti-tradition and as if ideas that were not born with fascism, that pre-existed it in one or another European nation and that, apart from the contingent designation of 'fascism' and what was added to it, on the assumption of a suitable climate and an inner adjustment, would certainly continue to manifest themselves in history. It is thus that the so-called 'Resistance' intended to claim for itself the glory of a 'second Risorgimento' and that for the ally betrayed in 1943 - betrayed in almost the same terms as in 1915 - even in legal terms the anti-Germanic myth could be exhumed with the singular formula of the 'German invader'. Precisely because this is the current situation, it is necessary to free oneself from the aforementioned suggestions on the subject of 'homeland history' and, having regained an acuity and objectivity of outlook, to ask oneself, if it is still possible, the problem of the choice of traditions. As mentioned at the beginning, this implies renouncing nationalistic infatuation. In fact, if the criterion were to be quantitative and historicist, that is, if one were to endorse what in the Italian past - after the Roman period and its Ghibelline extensions - has in fact played a predominant part, one would certainly not find oneself in a position of advantage, the scales would be tipped

Rather on the side of those who see no higher goal than that of inserting a democratic Italy, anaesthetised with respect to any higher ideal of authority, hierarchy and aristocracy, into the bloc of powerful democrats grappling with the borderline forms of subversion, i.e. the communist bloc.

(1 For this order of ideas cf. E. MOMIGLIANO, *Federico Barbarossa*, Milan, 1940.

(1 The fact that the Church consecrated the League of Lombard Communes can be left aside; the Church, which supported the Communes against the Emperor, oppressed them in its own territory, had nothing national in mind but only the defence of its hegemonic pretensions, in view of which it did not back down from any means. The most flagrant case was to be had with the League of Cognac: where the Church was seen siding with the House of France, the Protestants and the Sultan in order to undermine the Empire, and this, just as the Turks, having conquered Constantinople, were threatening Europe and Protestantism was threatening the heart of Europe itself.

(1 This degree of Scottish Rite Freemasonry in some lodges is also called the Knight Templar and is sometimes associated with the formula "The Templars' Revenge". This highlights a sinister distortion of the spirit of Templarism and Ghibellism itself, which we examined in *Il mistero del Graal e l'idea imperiale ghibellina* (Edizioni Mediterranee, 3rd ed. Rome 1971).

(1 An English biographer of Metternich, D. CECIL. (*Metternich* tr. Ital., Milan, 1951, concluded,) rightly points out that with the idea of the Holy Alliance defended by Metternich - by this black beast of men of '48, who could well be considered as the last great European (De Poncins) - 'the ancient Roman and Latin idea of a system of supernational order and balance' returned. But the vocations of Rome's natural heirs at that time were well otherwise oriented.

(2 It might also be recalled that the house of Savoy had attained royal dignity because, in a U-turn, it broke away from France and allied itself with Austria, for which the famous Prince Eugene, a Savoy and one of the greatest military leaders of all time, fought.

(1 This very interesting document was published in the *Mercure de France* of October 1918, pp. 547-551 (cited by H. ROLLIN, *L'apocalypse de notre temps*, Paris 1930, pp. 468-9). It is also interesting that, on the more concrete side, Wilhelm II's project was a development of the Triple Alliance not only anti-French, but also anti-English (according to the meaning of the secret treaty concluded in Bjorkoe between Germany and Russia) and anti-American; the Triple League was to fight jointly against the pan-American projects of the United States that threatened European trade (*Official German Documents*, v. VIII, pp. 284-285, with references by Baron von Martschall - ROLLIN, pp. 415, 418). The same demands, but already with a noticeable drop in level, were to reappear in the 'Axis' period.

(1 See: ROLLIN, *op. cit.*, p. 417.

CHAPTER NINE

MILITARY STYLE - 'MILITARISM' - WAR

It is well known that for modern democracies, *militarism* constitutes a kind of black beast. The fight against militarism has been one of their favourite watchwords, coupled with hypocritical pacifism and the claim to legitimise the 'just war' solely in terms of a necessary international police operation against an 'aggressor'. In the period of the First and Second World Wars, a very special prick in the eye was, for the democracies, the so-called 'militarism

Prussian', which appeared to them as the prototype of the deprecated phenomenon. Here we find ourselves before a characteristic antithesis, which does not so much refer to relations between groups of rival nations, but to two general conceptions of life and the state, indeed even to two distinct, irreconcilable forms of civilisation and society. Now, in concrete historical reference, this antithesis is reflected in the antithesis between the conception proper to the Germanic-Prussian tradition and the point of view, or orientation, that first asserted itself in England, from which it was to pass on to America and, in general, to the democratic nations, in close connection with the predominance of economic and mercantile values and their decisive development in the direction of capitalism. As for the other direction, we have already mentioned that it drew its first origin from an ascetic-warrior organisation, from the ancient Order of the Teutonic Knights. In essence, the antithesis in question refers to the different relationship with which the military element stands in relation to the bourgeois element, and also to the different significance and function that the former is recognised as having in society and the state as a whole. The conception of modern democracies that, as has been said, first took hold in England, in the forerunner of mercantilism, is that in society, the primary element is the bourgeois type and peacetime bourgeois life, a life determined by physical concern for security, for material well-being and prosperity, as an ornamental frame serving the 'development of letters and the arts'. Thus according to this view, as a matter of course and as a matter of principle, it is the 'civilised' or 'bourgeois' element, as it may be, that must govern the state. It is true that between politics and - to use the well-known expression of Clausewitz - when politics, as international politics, must be continued by other means, it makes use of the armed forces. As such, the military and generally warrior element has a subordinate meaning that of a mere tool: no particular influence or interference it should have in associated life in general. Even if it is recognised that military element has its own ethics, from such a viewpoint it is deemed undesirable that these ethics apply to the overall normal life of a nation. view is in fact closely connected with the humanitarian-liberalist persuasion that true civilisation has nothing to do with that sad necessity and 'useless slaughter' that is war, that it has for its foundation not warrior virtues but 'civic' and 'social' virtues informed by 'immortal principles', that 'culture' and 'spirituality' are expressed in the world of 'thought', the sciences and the arts, while that which has to do with war and militariness is reduced to mere force, to something materialistic and spiritless. It therefore appears that, in this framework, one should speak of a 'soldierly' element rather than a warrior or military one. In fact, 'soldier' originally meant one who exercised the profession of arms for the money (almost in the sense of a 'hired man'), it is a term that referred to the mercenary troops that one or other city enlisted and maintained to defend itself or to attack, the actual citizens not waging war, instead looking after their private affairs as bourgeoisie (1). Opposite to the 'soldier' in this sense was the type of warrior and member of the feudal aristocracy, since the class constituted by this type acted as the core of a corresponding social organisation, was not at the service of a bourgeois class, had instead the bourgeois in subjection, the defence of it implying dependence, not the supremacy of it over those entitled to arms. Despite compulsory conscription and the creation of standing armies, the part recognised for the military in modern democracies themselves remains more or less that of the simple 'soldier'. As has been said, for them military virtues are one thing, civic are another, it is on the latter that the emphasis is placed, it is these that are essentially in view for the formation of life. According to the most up-to-date formula of the corresponding ideology, armies would only serve as an international police force intended to defend 'peace', which at best, means the undisturbed life of the richest nations. Otherwise, masquerades aside, what was already true of the East India Company and similar enterprises is repeated: armed forces serve modern democracies to impose or

to maintain economic hegemony, to secure markets and raw materials, and to create space for capital seeking investment and profit. There is no talk of mercenaries, many fine and noble words are uttered, appealing to the ideas of fatherland, civilisation and progress, but, all in all, the situation does not differ a great deal: we still have the 'soldier' at the service of the 'bourgeois' in the specific function of 'merchant', the 'merchant', if taken in the broadest sense, being the social type or caste that stands at the forefront of the civilisation in question, which is precisely a substantially capitalist civilisation. In particular, the democratic conception does not admit that the political class has military traits and structure; in this it would see the worst of evils and, indeed, a 'militarism'. The bourgeoisie must, as politicians and representatives of a numerical majority, govern political affairs; how often in democracies such a ruling class, in turn, is practically at the service of economic, financial, labour or industrial interests and groups, is well known. This whole order of ideas is countered by the truth of those who recognise *the superior right of a warrior conception of life*, with the spirituality, values and ethics proper to it. Such a conception has, yes, a specific expression in everything that has particular relevance to war and the profession of arms, but it is neither reduced nor exhausted in this; it is also likely to manifest itself in other forms and in other domains, so much so as to give the overall tone to a given, unmistakable type of political-social organisation. In this framework, 'military' values come close to those of the *warrior* and it is considered desirable that they join political and ethical values and give the state **its firmest foundation**. The anti-political bourgeois conception of what is 'spirit' is rejected here, and the humanist-bourgeois ideal of the so-called 'culture' of 'progress' is also rejected. Instead, a limit is to be set for the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois spirit in the articulations and overall order of the state. Now, this is not to say that proper militaries must have the direction of public affairs in their hands, regardless of emergencies (so, recently, this has appeared to be the only solution to halt the advance of subversion - Spain, Greece, Turkey), but it is to recognise a pre-eminence, a superior dignity to virtues, disciplines and sentiments of a military type with respect to all that is generically bourgeois. It is worth adding that one does not even think of the 'barracks as an ideal', of a casermisation of existence (which is one of the traits of totalitarianism), a synonym for stiffening, of mechanical and obtuse discipline. Love of hierarchy, relations of command and obedience, courage, feelings of honour and loyalty, specific forms of active impersonality capable of developing to the point of anonymous sacrifice, key and open relations from man to man, from comrade to comrade, from leader to follower - all these are the characteristic, living values to which the aforementioned conception recognises the right to predominate in life - these are the very values that what we have called the 'society of men' has in itself. What is uniquely related to the army and war, let us repeat, in relation to all this constitutes only a particular domain. This, however, does not prevent that, as a borderline case, properly heroic values are accorded a precise recognition, that the phenomenon of war in this framework appears according to a different meaning from the merely negative one attributed to it by democracies and humanitarianism, but also by a mendacious 'anti-imperialist' and pacifist communism; that certain spiritual, indeed metaphysical, dimensions of this phenomenon are felt to be possible. No antithesis, but rather identity, between spirit and superior civilisation on the one hand and, on the other, a world war and warriors, in the generalised sense now made clear. It may be noted that, in a certain respect, the contrast mentioned regarding the significance of the military element also reflects that between two epochs. Here there is no need to repeat what we have already had occasion to expound at length elsewhere (1), namely how often in the traditional world the interpretation of life as an eternal struggle between metaphysical powers recurs, on the one hand the urànic forces of light and order, and on the other the dark and telluric forces of chaos and matter. This struggle for traditional man was to be fought and won in both the inner and outer worlds. And as a true war

Just on the outer plane was considered to be that which reproduced in other terms the same struggle to be fought within oneself: it was the struggle against forces and peoples that in the outer world presented the same characteristics as the powers that, in the individual, must be subjugated and dominated within oneself until the achievement of a *pax triumphalis* (2). There follows from this an interference of the warrior idea with that of a certain 'asceticism', of an inner discipline and of such a superiority with respect to oneself, or self-control, which in varying degrees recurs in the best warrior traditions and which is maintained on the same military plane in a restricted sense, with the authentic value of a *culture*, in the anti-intellectualistic sense of formation and self-possession. Contrary to what the bourgeois and liberal polemic pretends, the warrior idea is not reduced to materialism, it is not synonymous with the exaltation of the brute use of force and destructive violence - but the calm, conscious, dominated formation of the inner being and conduct, the love of distance, hierarchy, order, the faculty to subordinate the passionate and individualistic element of oneself to higher principles and ends, in particular, under the banner of honour and duty, are essential parts of it and the basis for a precise 'style', which was to be largely lost when from the states that are considered 'militaristic', where all this corresponded to a long-standing, almost caste-like tradition, we moved on to democratic and nationalistic states, in which the *duty of* service to arms took the place of the *right* to arms. The antithesis, therefore, is not between 'spiritual values' and 'culture' on the one hand, and 'military materialism' on the other, the antithesis is between two ways of conceiving what is spirit and culture, and one must resolutely oppose the democratic, bourgeois and humanist conception of the 19th century, which, in correspondence with the advent of an inferior human type, only wanted to present its interpretation as legitimate and unimpeachable. In reality - and this is also what we wanted to come to - there existed a whole cycle of civilisations, particularly in the Indo-European area, in which elements, sentiments and structures of an analogical warrior type were decisive in all domains of existence, right up to that of family and gentilitial law, naturalistic, sentimental and economic factors being limited. The hierarchical idea certainly does not end with the military or warrior-based hierarchy, the most original form of hierarchy being defined by values of an essentially spiritual order - etymologically 'hierarchy' means nothing other than 'sovereignty of the sacred' (*ieros*). However, it should be borne in mind that even spiritually-based hierarchies in many civilisations took on hierarchical support more or less similar to the virile and warrior hierarchies, or outwardly reproduced their form. Thus when the original spiritual level could no longer be maintained, it was precisely warrior-type hierarchical structures that formed the backbone of the major states, especially in the West (1). Prussianism, this black beast of the democracies, should therefore not be considered as the anomaly of a given people; on the contrary, we should see in it the same style that, present elsewhere in a more or less defined manner on the basis of a general ideal of civilisation and culture, due to a set of propitious circumstances in the Germanic countries has been able to be preserved until recent times - as an 'intolerable obscurantist residue', according to the progressive exponents of this era. And in confirmation of what has been said above, it should be noted that Prussianism as a style did not only concern the military; it, defining itself appropriately as Federichianism, did indeed shape one of the strictest and most aristocratic European military traditions, but at the same time manifested its influence in all that is service to the state, in all that is loyalism and anti-individualism; it has educated a class of civil servants along lines quite different from mere bureaucracy, travesty, listless and irresponsible administration of public affairs (2). Moreover, this style did not fail to act often in the same sector of the economy, ensuring, as the industrial era took over, an intimate cohesion to large industrial complexes run almost by dynastic lines of entrepreneurs who were respected and obeyed by the workers almost in terms of military loyalty and solidarity. Thus in the controversy over the significance of the warrior and military element, the antithesis between two epochs reflected, but, in addition, it also betrays the controversy between the two parts of an effective organism, social part and the

political side. Anti-militarist democracy is an expression of 'society', which with its physical ideals of peace and, at most, defensive war for peace, is opposed to the political principle, to that of the 'society of men', the state-forming force that has always relied on a warrior or military element, having other ideals of its own, not physical but of honour and superiority. It is therefore still a suspicion of the regressive phenomena and aggressive emergence of the inferior that we have already studied, what took shape internationally in the democratic ideology mobilised in the two world wars. That aside, from a practical point of view, it must be acknowledged that in modern times, as sensitivity to purely spiritual values and dignity has largely atrophied in western peoples (and spiritual, traditionally, does not at all mean 'intellectualistic' or 'cultural'), the model of a military hierarchy, while not being, as we have said, the highest and most original, is almost the only one that can still serve as a basis and act to emphasise hierarchical values in general and thus, in many cases, to save what can be saved. That model still retains a certain prestige, it still exerts a certain attraction on every human type that is not completely flaky, and 'socialised'. Because, despite all the anti-militarist propaganda culminating in today's squalid invertebrate 'conscientious objectors' protesters, there is a heroic fund in the Western soul that cannot be totally eradicated. To it, with an appropriate outlook on life, one can perhaps still appeal. In connection with this, a further consideration concerns a general attitude and a certain level of tension, which in many areas of contemporary life are necessary, with the effect of relativising the distinction between a life of peace and a life of war. We are not alluding to party political struggles, phenomena that only relate to a period of decadence and lack of the idea of the state. Rather, we are talking about all those aspects of modern living that, in order to be mastered, in order not to have a destructive effect on the individual, require a complete assumption of one's position, a being in place such that, as in the soldier, one does not shy away from making risk and discipline an integral part of one's way of being. Here, too, it is a question of the opposite attitude to that of the bourgeois man. It is certainly not possible to demand that such a climate of tension be in force at all times and that it be present in everyone at the same rank. However, in today's times, in many cases there is no other choice, and it is precisely on the basis of the varying capacity of individuals to adapt to this climate, to *love* this climate, that new selections and hierarchies can be determined in every domain, real, existential hierarchies, which find natural recognition in every healthy human being. It is then obvious that the nations where such premises are sufficiently realised will also be the best prepared for war, not only that, but they will also be those for whom war will acquire a higher significance. It is the equivalent, with regard to the first point, of what applies on the material plane, where the war efficiency of a nation is measured by the virtual possibility of peace industries and economy to immediately convert into war industries and economy. That is, there will exist a certain continuity of spirit and attitude, a common moral denominator in peace and war to facilitate the transition from one state to the other. It has rightly been said that war shows a nation what peace has meant to it. The 'military' formation of the spirit has, as has been said, a value independent of 'militarism' and war; however, it creates the necessary potential so that, should a war impose itself, one is equal to it and to fight it a sufficient number of men arise to reproduce in a new form, of which we shall soon speak, the type of the warrior rather than that of the 'soldier'. The whole order of ideas set out so far is therefore ignored or distorted by the polemic against 'militarism'. Yes, as in other cases and that of 'totalitarianism' itself, 'militarism' only serves as a false purpose. What one wants to hit and discredit is, in reality, a whole world that the merchant and the bourgeois abhor, hate, feel unbearable even when it does not directly threaten democracy. Thus it becomes convenient to focus attention on what is only a degenerescence of militarism, i.e. on cases in which a certain class of narrow-minded and narrow-skilled professional soldiers exerts an artificial influence

on the politics of a nation, pushing it towards war ventures in cahoots with what is known as the warmongering element. Such cases can certainly be deplored without detracting from the value of the generically warlike conception in the terms outlined above. But this means even less following the democracies on the ground of theoretical pacifism and sharing their solely negative judgement about the phenomenon of war and the meaning of fighting. On this last point it is now the case make a few brief remarks. First, let us see how things stand in today's democracies. They find themselves in a contradiction that undermines their very existence. After having endeavoured to make people believe all over again that their last anti-European 'crusade' was a 'war against war', and yet more or less the last of the wars, they now find themselves in the necessity of re-arming themselves, for it is not with solemn proclamations of principles and - as Cosimo dei Medici put it - with paternosters that they can defend their interests against the new 'aggressors' and troublemakers. The situation, therefore, is this: that the democracies theoretically continue to deprecate war, to conceive of war only as 'defence' or as 'aggressor', to abhor 'militarism' and to almost identify the warrior with the criminal - and precisely with such a demoralising and defeatist ideological preparation they should arm themselves to face their adversaries, i.e. the world of the Fourth Estate organised into a power bloc by communism. Of course, the ideal of the democracies would be to find those who would wage war for them, as their 'soldiers' in the sense hired hands, they merely provide armaments, funding and well-known propaganda ('defence of the free world', 'defence of civilisation', etc.). But such propaganda appears more and more discredited every day; secondly, one should not create too many illusions about the value of a technical and industrial superiority (as long as it is not overwhelming) when it does not find in the fighters the counterpart of a moral factor and, in general, of the warrior spirit, lastly; Since it is no longer so easy to find the naive person who will believe in the 'last of wars is so altruistic as to risk and sacrifice his own life for those who will come after him in the hypothetical, idyllic democratic era with no more wars, the situation arises of the one who will be forced to fight while his whole 'bourgeois' and democratic mental training makes him detest war, makes him see it as the worst of scourges, as something that brings only ruin and abjection. The best chance will still be that of a fight out of desperation to save one's skin, not to say one's purse, because plutocratic democracies today have almost thought precisely of the situation of those who, faced with the alternative of giving up their purse or their life, prefer to risk their life at last, in order not to give up their purse. Where, therefore, nothing remains but to fight on one's own behalf, i.e. where it is the directly threatened and cornered elements who are more or less put to the wall in these existential terms, one can clearly see the blind alleys into which democratic 'anti-militarism' leads today. The civilisation of the bourgeois and the merchant that only exalts 'civic virtues' and identifies the *standard of values* with material well-being, with economic prosperity, with a safe and conformist life based on work, production, sport, cinema and sexuality, has the effect of involuting and extinguishing the type of warrior and hero, leaving only the military as 'human material' with a very problematic performance due to the said lack of the internal factor, i.e. a corresponding warrior tradition and vision of life. However, one may ask oneself whether, after recent experiences, one should not have enough of it, whether one should forget all that a modern 'total war' implies, and one may also point out the extreme technicalisation of such a war, such that it appears not so much as a war of man against man, but of the machine, the material, and all that a science enlisted for purposes of radical destruction can do against man. It has often been asked what margin remains, in such a war, for the traditional type of warrior and hero. The answer is that what the Orientals would perhaps call *karma* operates here. Modern man is left with no other choice. One can certainly accept the views of Ernest Jünger, for whom modern man, by creating the

technique to dominate nature, has signed a promissory note that is not presented at a discount, even through a type of war in which technique turns against him and which threatens him with not only physical but also spiritual destruction (1). (1) Thus there is nothing but to face his own creature, nothing but to measure himself against it, which is impossible unless he almost creates a new inner dimension, which, in the extreme case of war, will manifest itself in the form of a cold, lucid and complex heroism, a heroism in which the romantic, instinctive or patriotic element is absent, in which the most precise technical preparation is matched by a dimension that is, so to speak, sacrificial, i.e. man's capacity to face, indeed to love, the most destructive situations because of the possibility that they, in their elementary nature, offer him to grasp, as in an apex, what one might call the 'absolute person'. And all this, to a certain extent at least, cannot but extend to the whole of a nation, since in modern 'total war' the distinction between combatants and non-combatants becomes relative. It can therefore be said that modern warfare will only lead to a transformation of the heroic disposition and that its technicalisation will constitute a kind of trial by fire for this disposition to take on a quintessentialised form, to become purified and almost de-individualised, uniting itself with particular and complex forms of control, lucidity and domination. Such a purely spiritual and naked assumption of heroism is perhaps the only one still possible. Of course, in these terms heroism takes on an *autonomous* value as pure experience, as individual realisation. Now the circumstances in modern times seem to be such that those who still want to be heroes and warriors, precisely this value must come to the fore. In a novel written in the climate of Second World War, a character ends up saying: 'It is a luxury to be able to fight for a just cause'. This is a significant testimony to the deep mistrust that has spread towards the ideological background of the latest wars, a background that is as much made up of lies and fictions as ever. Thus, it may well be that wars will increasingly present the characteristics assumed for them by certain sociologists, characteristics similar those of ineluctable elementary phenomena of nature, thus relativising the meaning and value of the 'cause' in the name of which, in one case or another, one fights. One might think that to conceive of things in these terms, a demoralising and defeatist effect cannot be avoided. Of course, it will be so - but only in those who are passive in the face of phenomenon of war and are, in spirit, merely bourgeois. For others, it will only be a matter of reversing the relationship from means to ends: the value of the 'cause' will consist in its susceptibility to becoming, in turn, a simple means: a means for the realisation of experience as an 'autonomous value'. Beyond all destruction, beyond all ideology, beyond 'ideals', this realisation will remain as something tangible and inalienable. But it is not the vision of life under the sign of which modern democracies stand that can propitiate this possible reversal of perspectives, while the times that may be brewing despite the euphoria of the 'second industrial revolution' make it very likely that a spiritual standing, a finding oneself even beyond extreme trials and extreme destruction will only be possible under such a condition. As a final point, we would point out that the situation now mentioned could, a certain extent, propitiate a return to the style that was proper to warrior states and that was lost in the age of democracies, revolutions and nationalism. To a warrior tradition and even to an outspoken military tradition, *hatred* as the basis of *war* is unknown. One can recognise the need to fight and even exterminate another people; but this need not necessarily be associated with hatred, anger, animosity, contempt. All this, for a true soldier, is degrading: in order to fight, he does not need to be moved by such low sentiments, nor does he need an exaltation based propaganda, smoky rhetoric, lies. All this has come about with the plebeicisation of war, since men formed by an outspoken aristocratic warrior or military tradition have been replaced collectivistically by the 'nation in arms', i.e. the mass indiscriminately recruited by universal conscription, while, in parallel, the traditional state

waned and national states arose, driven by the passions, hatreds, and pride proper to a collective. In order to make the masses march, it is necessary to intoxicate or deceive them, with the consequence, precisely, of poisoning the war with passionate, ideological, and propagandistic factors that have given it and continue to give it the most odious and deplorable character. Traditional states did not need this; they did not need to fabricate a chauvinist *pathos* and almost a psychosis to mobilise their forces and give them a 'morale'. The pure principle of *imperialism*, the appeal to the principles of loyalty and honour, was sufficient. Clear, positive aims were set for the necessary war, which, it can be said, was done coldly, so as not to leave a trail of hatred and contempt among the combatants. Therefore, one can see that the perspectives are reversed in this respect too: in the age of democracies, war itself is degraded, it is accompanied by an exasperation and radicalism that the age of alleged militarism and 'military states' did not know. What is more, wars increasingly appear to be triggered by uncontrollable factors, precisely because such are the passions and interests that predominate in democratised states lacking a principle of pure sovereignty. And the inevitable consequence of this is that conflicts acquire an increasingly irrational character, that they lead to what was least foreseen and desired, that their tragic balance sheet often ends in the negative, precisely in terms of a 'useless slaughter' or a further contribution to universal disorder. Now, the technicalisation of modern warfare on the one hand, the increasing dissolution of the fabric of democratic myths on the other, may initiate a purification of war in those who cannot avoid it in spite of everything, and where corresponding political factors operate, it is not excluded that the overall effect may be a partial return to normality. Here we have not considered it appropriate to dwell on 'nuclear war' in particular for several reasons. Firstly, it seems that for long enough the thermo-nuclear weapon will still have a part to play today as a 'deterrent', dissuading each of the opposing blocs from taking initiatives whose risk would in any case be great and precise. Secondly, the partial use of it will inevitably also entail, as a complement, a war waged with conventional weapons in a complex, for which the considerations made so far generally retain their value. The extreme case of an absolute nuclear war, with which it is often customary to associate apocalyptic views, can be left out because it would seal the fate of an entire doomed civilisation in the cosmic economy. Nor was there to be considered, here, the idea of a 'world state' or 'universal' as an alternative: an utopic alternative before the moment when, after further collapse, the complete levelling of humanity has become a fait accompli.

(1 It is also significant that in both England and the United States, until recently, there was no compulsory conscription; the armed forces were made up of volunteers, who were paid a not inconsiderable amount of money. Thus it was ensured that the nation's proper bourgeois and mercantile body had nothing to do with the craft and discipline of arms.

(1 Especially in the aforementioned *Revolt against the Modern World*.

(2 In the same Christian doctrine of a St. Augustine (*De civ. Dei* XV.

5) Such a view just war is preserved quite distinctly: '*Proficientes autem nondumque perfecti ita (pugnare) possunt, ut homines quisque ex ea parte pugnet contra alterum, qua etiam contra semet ipsum; et in uno quippe nomine caro concupiscit adversus spiritum adversus carnem*'.

(1 Moreover, the ancient world is, in general, full of examples of states in which the political and military elements were united in the highest hierarchies: from ancient Rome to China. This remained the case in European monarchies with regard to the sovereign, who usually, as the supreme political leader, also held the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

(2 In this spirit, it is known that in several traditional European states, state officials wore a uniform, like soldiers.

(1 On Jünger's views, see, EVOLA, *"L'operaio" nel pensare di Ernest Jünger*, Volpe, Rome 1974. It is not without interest to note that Jünger was not just a 'writer', but also an officer, a volunteer fighter, repeatedly wounded and awarded, among other things, the highest German decoration for valour.

CHAPTER TEN

TRADITION - CATHOLICISM - GIBELLISM

In what precedes, references to all this and tradition and the traditional spirit have been frequent and explicit, and to the term 'tradition' we have given a sense that is not empirical, that is currently historical, but spiritual. Thus some might think that when we speak of tradition, we are alluding to religious traditions and, in the specific case of most western peoples, to the Christian-Catholic tradition (1). This is not correct. We recognise that especially in Latin countries certain traditional and conservative forces have drawn on Catholicism and that there was a period when Catholicism gave a chrism to the principle of authority and sovereignty. However, when we speak of tradition, we are referring to something broader, more austere and universal than mere Catholicism, such that only by being integrated into it could Catholicism claim a character of true traditionality. It must therefore remain firm that being traditional and being Catholic are by no means one and the same thing. Not only: paradoxical as this may seem to some, those who are traditional *are only half traditional*. Let us repeat: the true traditional spirit is much broader category than all that is simply Catholic. Developing this point would take us quite far, however; referring back to what we have already said in this regard in other works (1), here we will limit ourselves to a few considerations relevant to the political field and current times, for the purposes of a general orientation. Firstly, the true traditional spirit recognises a superior, metaphysical unity beyond the individual religious traditions, of which unity these represent various historically conditioned expressions, more or less complete and 'orthodox' (hence a superior measure for 'orthodoxy' itself). Although each religious form has the right to claim a certain exclusivism in the area of its pertinence, the idea of this superior unity, even if under the title of an 'esoteric' truth (i.e. not destined for the common man, for whom it might be a reason for conclusion) should be recognised by its most qualified representatives. Without this, one would be left with a kind of schismatic automatism and hence a relativism in which the individual religious traditions would find it impossible to truly establish the principle of their own authority. Now, it must be acknowledged on the one hand that Catholicism has been one of the most exclusivist traditions, not to say sectarian, furthest removed from this super-traditional awareness; but on the other hand, it must be noted that the very development of civilisation and knowledge of the history of religions means that this exclusivist position cannot be maintained without the danger of serious discredit for traditionalist Catholics who would become rigid in it. In fact, today there is no person of a certain culture who can truly believe that 'outside the Church there is no health' (*extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*), in the sense that both the great civilisations that preceded Christianity, as well as millenary non-European traditions still exist, such as Buddhism, Islamism, Hinduism and so on, knew neither the supernatural nor the sacred, but only distorted images is confused 'prefigurations', were and are nothing but 'paganism', polytheism and 'naturalistic mysticism'. At the recent Second Vatican Council, moreover, albeit reticently, this viewpoint was somewhat modified and it was possible to speak of an 'ecumenism'. In particular, it will be difficult to find anyone who still believes that the Jewish people were the 'chosen people' of all, the only repository of the true and perfect revolution, so much so that they must be considered as non-existent or relegated to a sphere

inferior all that is known to have pertained to, for example, the light cycle of the great Indo-European civilisations and religions. This is not a matter of 'faith' or not, but of knowledge or ignorance. The persistence of sectarian and dogmatic exclusivism, in this regard, in today's Catholics would constitute a nonsense no less than that of those who would defend certain views of physics and astronomy contained in the Old Testament and completely outweigh the current state of knowledge the comparative science of religions, mythology and even ethnology, which instead calls for a revision and an appropriate broadening of horizons. Thus it remains the case that everything we say in relation to 'tradition' and 'traditional spirit' may or may not have a reference to Catholicism, and if it does, it will only have it *sub conditione*. Generally speaking, today the 'traditional man' must present himself to us as a type that is much freer in terms of external constraints and forms, but all the more firmly rooted in what is the common, invariable, perennial ground of every great historical tradition. After this, we move on to the particular problem of the relationship between Catholicism and the political idea, and the so-called *Ghibellinism*. This term has resurfaced in Italy itself, in certain party polemics, to designate the attitude of those who take a stand against certain political Catholicism and certain secular interference by the clergy, defending the authority and the right of the political-state idea before the Church. However, given the level of politics today, a degradation of the meaning of Ghibellinism is inevitable in such usage. Accusing it is important for the whole order of ideas we are expounding. Such an order of ideas would be, in a way, deprived of its sufficient reasoning as the foundation of the true state and the system of its hierarchies is not adequately recognised in its spiritual nature; something, however, impossible without addressing the problem of the relationship between the principle of sovereignty and religious principle in general. This is precisely the problem of Ghibellism. As for the essence of this tendency, it will only become sufficiently clear if we go back to the historical period in which it originally defined itself, the Middle Ages, in which it was by no means a question of defending the right of a secular, secular and national type of political organisation like those of today, but rather the right of the Empire, which meant something quite different at the time. According to Ghibelline theology, the Empire was an institution as supernatural in character and origin as the Church. It had its own sacred nature, just as, moreover, quasi-priestly (and in fact established by means of a rite that differed only in certain details from that of the ordination of bishops) had been, in the early Middle Ages, the dignity of kings themselves. It is on this basis that the Ghibelline emperors, exponents of a universal and supernatural idea, having the figure, according to a characteristic expression of the time, of *lex animata in terris*, of living law on earth, opposed the hegemonic pretensions of the clergy, intending to have only God above them once they had been duly invested with their function; they did not oppose them on the sole level of a political revolt, as the historiographical myopia underlying common scholastic teaching would have it. The political contention was merely consequential and occasional to that between *dignitates* who both referred to the spiritual plane. For the realisation of the human personality in the Middle Ages, a distinction was made between the path of *action* and that of *contemplation*, the two paths being habitually referred to as empire and church respectively. As is well known, this was also Dante's idea. Ghibellinism, in its deepest aspect, more or less argued that through the concept of earthly life as discipline, militia and service, the individual can be led beyond himself and already pursue the supernatural end of the human personality by the ways of action and in the sign of the Empire. This was in relation to the aforementioned character of a non-naturalistic, but "providential" institution recognised to it; and in the same relationship with which the clergy and the ascetic Orders stood in relation to the Church, chivalry and the great orders of chivalry stood in relation to the Empire, based on a less political than ethical-spiritual and, in part, also ascetic idea: according to an asceticism that was not cloistered and contemplative, but warlike. In the latter regard, the most typical example was the Order

of the Templars, partly also from that of the Teutonic Knights (1). (1) Now, it is important to bear in mind that medieval Ghibellinism, in this respect, merely took up a more ancient tradition. Elsewhere, we have dealt with the subject at length, citing a body of evidence. Here we will limit ourselves to highlighting just one point. *Pontifex maximus* is, as we know, the title assumed by the supreme head of the Catholic Church. However, it had already been a royal and imperial title; this was the name given to the leaders of early Rome and, later, to emperors from Augustus onwards, so that we find this title recurring on Roman coins themselves. *Pontifex* literally means 'bridge-builder', in which ancient authors also agree. Evidently, it was not the construction of material bridges, but the function of establishing a link - a symbolic 'bridge' - between the human world and the supernatural world. No different function was therefore originally attributed to chiefs. A Nordic saying is precisely: 'Let him who is chief there be a bridge'. The popes, intending to exercise the same function, therefore took over that title from the ancient Roman imperial tradition, in which, in a way, one could even see a usurpation. In any case, both the symbol and the 'pontifical' function pre-existed Christianity and were intimately associated with the pre-Christian Roman idea of sovereignty. In the book already cited, we have shown that what was proper to ancient Rome was equally proper to many other non-Christian or pre-Christian civilisations. The conflict between the 'Ghibelline' view and that of Guelphism existed in germ as early as the rise of Christianity because of the contrast between two general conceptions, the irreconcilability of which was clearly visible at the time. The first was a dualistic conception characterised by the formula 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, to God what is God's', and thus by a separation between human institutions and the supernatural order. The second - the Roman one, and one can also say traditional - was a hierarchical conception that considered the leaders of men to be the representatives of a power from above, because - the words, moreover, are those of St Paul himself - "every power comes from God - *non est potestas, nisi a Deo*: with the consequence of recognising a spiritual, religious value too, to every loyalty and every political discipline (1). Here too, common historiography has distorted the truth in its treatment of the "persecutions" against Christianity. What the exponents of the ancient Roman tradition, such as, for example, a Celsus and an emperor Julian, reaffirmed to the Christians was an anarchic doctrine: with the excuse of wanting to pay homage only to the supreme God, they refused to do so also in the person of those, as the legitimate heads of men, were his representatives and drew from him, according to the same Pauline saying quoted above, the principle of their power. This amounted, for a Celsus, to true impiety. The starting point was therefore a metaphysics or theology of the *imperium* with a non-dualistic character, not at all a 'pagan idolatry' opposed to the 'true faith', as the aforementioned historiography claims. The original tension between the two attitudes later subsided, but at first, even the Christianised empire, anything but in the sense of Guelphism. In fact, in the first centuries of the Vulgar Era, as well as in the Byzantine Empire, the clergy was subject to the emperor not only in the temporal and administrative domain but also in the theological one, if it is true that the formulas of the councils were often submitted to the emperor himself for final decision and sanction (1). It was only in the European Middle Ages that the priest nurtured the ambition not to be king, but to be the one in subjection to whom kings must stand. It was then, as a reaction, that Ghibellinism proper arose and the antagonism was rekindled, from a point of reference now making the authority and right claimed by the Holy Roman Empire. Returning now to our starting point, such an antagonism is completely disregarded in its true nature when one has in view a purely political, 'secular' concept of the state or, even worse, the absolutization or deification of it. This was by no means the case for the Ghibelline emperors; that, rather, was the direction first taken by Philip the Fair, one of the most sinister figures in European history. And the line, starting with him, and passing through the variety of secular states with an Enlightenment-Masonic character and, lastly,

anti-clerical, it leads up to those 'totalitarian' forms in which religion is eventually tolerated only if it passes into the service of the state, which here amounts to the complete subjugation of the spiritual to the temporal, the material and the collective. All of this represents an almost diabolical inversion of Ghibellinism, in which, however, one must also recognise a kind of *boomerang* reaction to the Church's anti-Ghibelline polemic. Already the Christian formula of 'Give to Caesar', if it did not sanction political insubordination, it did however start from an utterly degraded and secular concept of the Caesar, a concept unknown to the Roman theology of the state, and reduced loyalism to a simple acquiescence, almost as if one were to tell a girl to give her body, but without involving her soul. And the Catholic Church, from the late Middle Ages onwards, in order to secure its exclusive monopoly in the dominion of the supernatural, increasingly sought to strip the political idea of any spiritual character, to interpret sovereignty solely in the same way as 'natural law', aiming to have a secular arm at its service in the states and administrators obedient to Catholic morality. Only in this way did it promote and support, after the Counter-Reformation, the absolutism of the person of sovereigns who, despite the formula of 'divine right', were little or less than atheists, imbued as they were with the Enlightenment ideologies that were to pave the way for the French Revolution. Nor did much change in the period of the Holy Alliance. The so-called alliance of throne and altar had, on both sides, purely tactical reasons, and thus provided weapons to the anti-traditional, nationalist and revolutionary front. But the secularised state, after having left freedom to the Church for all that is spiritual, had to move on to an aggressive attitude towards Catholicism, not to be confused at all with Ghibelline opposition; Ghibellinism - it must be respected - had not in fact pursued: the subjugation of spiritual authority to temporal power, but had claimed, against the Church's exclusivist claim, a value and a right for the state that was different from those proper to an organisation of a purely human and material nature. These are therefore two entirely distinct attitudes towards the Church, and it is clear that it is quite incongruous to speak of 'Ghibellinism' as it is today in the context of mere anticlerical and secular-liberal party polemics. To really take up Ghibellinism would be to take up the problem of the supreme foundation of the principle of sovereignty in its relations with Catholicism in general. Now, it is hard to see how such a problem could be posed today, given the general historical conditions. For orientation, the following hints will suffice. It must first of all remain firm that the secular state, in any of its forms, including that already mentioned of the so-called 'ethical state', contradicts every highest political ideal. A clerical or clericalising state, however, is equally unacceptable. The religious factor is an indispensable element in the vision of life that can shape a reconstructive movement, because of the heroic dimension required for this. Generally speaking, it must be felt as evident that beyond the earthly life there is a higher life, because only he who feels this has an intangible and unfathomable force, only he who will be capable, where necessary, of active sacrifice and absolute impetus; holding one's own life in low esteem is only possible, otherwise, in moments of exaltation and unleashing of irrational forces, nor would disciplines, which aim at a higher meaning beyond the individual, be given chance to justify themselves. On this last point, moreover, we have already said (cf. c. III): there is no overcoming of the solutions inherent in a utilitarian and contractualistic sociology and there can be no climate of high political tension without such a direct reference to a more than human reality. However, for such an orientation a particular religious confession can only be of value as a support, simply in terms of a stirring action. But in the case of Catholicism, precise reservations are required. As far as the political side is concerned, if Catholicism, sensing that decisive times were approaching, had had the strength to truly detach itself from the plane of contingency and follow a line of high asceticism, if it had precisely on this basis, almost in a revival of the spirit of the Crusader Middle Ages, had not hesitated to make faith

the soul of a compact and inexorable armed bloc of forces, directed against the currents' chaos, subsidence, subversion and political materialism in today's world, certainly, in which case there could be no doubt whatsoever for a judgement. But this is not the case at all. from the general relativistic Catholic thesis that no particular political regime can be considered 'willed by God' and yet receive special recognition, past the days of a De Maistre, a Bonald, a Donoso Cortes and the *Syllabus*, Catholicism has simply been a matter of juggling, of profiting from various situations while avoiding any overly demanding stance. Congenitally, however, the Church's sympathies cannot but go towards a demo-liberal political system. On the other hand, Catholicism had long ago espoused the theory of so-called 'natural law', which has little to do with the positive and differentiated law that can underpin a strong and hierarchical state. Nowadays, the situation has precipitated in the sense of a rapid, impressive subsidence of Catholicism in what it still seemed to have of value, of a desire to catch up with the times, with the 'modern world' and the 'direction of history'. Already militant Catholics, such as Maritain, had taken up Bergason's formula that 'democracy is, of evangelical essence' and had set out to prove the thesis that the democratic impulse in history appears as a temporal manifestation of the authentic Catholic spirit. But it did not stop there; in the climate of the so-called 'opening to the left', it seems that not only individual intellectuals, but the highest Catholic hierarchies themselves are not averse to giving this chrism to Marxism itself and to entering into 'dialogue' even with communism in order not to let themselves get carried away. Long gone are the days of categorical condemnations of modernism and progressivism. Teilhard de Chardin, with his updated Catholicism with respect to scientism and evolutionism, is about to be rehabilitated. And, Bonaiuti, an apostle of a purely societal conception of Catholicism, and Mounier, who while he would like to oppose both capitalism and Marxism cannot conceal his sympathy for the latter and not regret that it was not the Church that took an initiative similar to that of the proletarian-communist revolution (this is the same thesis as Maritain). And when one sees today's Catholics rejecting the 'medievalist remnants' of their tradition, when destructive forms of 'aggiornamento' have been brought about by the Second Vatican Council and its prolongations, when one sees popes pointing to the UNO - in this ridiculous hybrid and bastard association - as almost the foreshadowing of a future Christian ecumene, about the direction in which the Church today appears to be dragged, there can be no doubt, and its ability to provide any support for a revolutionary-conservative and traditionalist movement must be flatly denied. Rather, it is to be thought of as a sort of return of the Church to its origins, that is, to that climate of early Christianity that effectively presented very "moderate", socialist and communist characteristics, of "white communism", so much so that it could very well serve today's Catholics to catch up with the "sense of history" (as subversion interprets it) while keeping away from any "reactionary" and, as they say, "integralist" attitude. If then one were to attribute a tactical intention to this deviation of current Catholicism, almost as if one wanted to open up only to absorb, to gain Christianity from the left-wing currents, one would have to think of a very singular short-sightedness on the part of those who in theory should be more or less enlightened by the Holy Spirit of their belief: because the assumption of this would be that left-wing movements have a purely social and economic character, whereas in their deepest dimension they instead imply a religion, an inverted religion, and because it is a constant teaching of history that one does not come to terms with subversion; those who go along with its course presuming, by so , to manoeuvre it, will sooner or later be overwhelmed by it. The situation of the modern world is such that it is irresponsible to indulge in experiments, even if this were to be a mere tactic and not a resigned surrender. But apart from these political aspects or, rather, in correlation with them, the modern Church's fall from grace is undeniable due to the fact that it a

Social and moralistic concerns give much more weight than what has to do the true supernatural life, with asceticism and contemplation, essential points of reference of every superior form of religiosity. When one sanctifies a Don Bosco and other figures along the same lines, one is no longer very far removed from the Protestant spirit, according to which religion has no value other than in terms of social service, every truly transcendent interest being put more or less aside. And for many other recent 'sanctifications', similar considerations could be made. As a matter of fact, the main concerns of Catholicism today seem to be a petty bourgeois sexual virtuist moralism and a watered-down welfarist paternalism: whereas faith would be called to quite different tasks in these times of crisis and emergency of elementary forces. The predominant level in today's catechism is parochial, and the worthy counterpart is the figure of those latter-day popes who, preoccupied with making themselves popular, wander here and there, completely losing that superior prestige that only distance and a certain unapproachability can guarantee. But one can also not stop at these contingencies, one can pose, regardless of the times, a basic problem concerning those typical values that must shape an indeterminate human type. Since this shaping work is claimed by the Church no less than by any true state, it must be seen whether incompatibilities arise from our point of view. With regard to the aforementioned values, it is opportune, however, to distinguish between pure Christianity, i.e. evangelical Christianity, and Catholicism, and to point out the reservations that are necessary with regard to the formula - considered acceptable by many - of 'Christianising politics' and 'giving a Christian foundation' to the state. It is evident that the principles of pure Christianity, to a large extent, if they can be of value on the level of a special type of asceticism, in the political domain would instead exert an action to say the least problematic; they could, yes, mitigate certain hardships of life in terms of a kind of mystical welfarism or fraternalism, but certainly not promote the *ethos* most suitable for those in fighting positions. Indeed, there is no point in concealing the antithesis that exists between the pure Christian morality of love, remission, humility, and mystical humanitarianism, and ethical-political values such as those of justice, honour, difference, and a spirituality that is not the opposite of power, but of which power is the normal attribute. The Christian precept of repaying evil with good is countered by the principle of striking the unjust, of forgiving and being generous yes, but with the vanquished enemy, not with the one who stands strong in his injustice. In a virile order, such as the ideal of the true state presupposes, there is little room for love in the sense of a need to communicate, to embrace and take care of those who may not even ask for it or may not be worthy of it; relations of equals can, yes, be conceived, but without anything communistic-social or fraternalistic, on the basis of loyalty, mutual recognition and respect, each maintaining his own dignity and a certain love of distance. Nor is it necessary here to indicate what the consequences would be politically if one were to take to the letter evangelical teachings such as those referred to in the parables of the lilies of the valley and the birds of the air, along with all the others, more or less nihilistic, that were based on the overturning of earthly values and the idea of the imminent advent of the *Regnum*. Historically, pure Christianity, as is well known, has to a large extent been rectified and rectified in Catholicism through the aggregation and assimilation of principles of different origins, especially Roman and classical, which appears in the same theological domain in the case of Thomism, which would be inconceivable without Aristotelianism. It is precisely because of this that in the past, and especially in the Middle Ages, the Roman Church was able to exert a certain traditionally formative influence. But this did not, and could not, go so far as to entirely neutralise the original basis of the Christian religion; even in the best Catholicism there is a residue that is sufficient to give ambiguous, problematic traits to any ideal of a 'Christian state' and 'Christianised politics'. A dualism, in this respect, will always undermine the synthesis proper to the Ghibelline conception and

to the aforementioned universal tradition, to which this conception belongs; not because - and this is very important to note - Christian values are 'too high' for real life, but because of their special nature, which only in part, and in the compromise already inherent in the 'Give unto Caesar', allows for a spiritual assumption of political values. This, from the point of view of principles. If one also considers the role that Catholicism plays in current militant parties such as the open Christian democracy on the left, the aforementioned moralistic, bourgeois and parochial level to which Catholicism is practically reduced as 'care for souls', and the deplorable modernist modernisation of the Church, it is clear that a distance from Catholicism is required when it comes to the worldview and lifestyle that one must decide on. For them, indeed, reference to a transcendent reality and order, to a transcendence beyond what is merely human and worthwhile in terms of mere individual earthly existence, will suffice; a reference that will not propitiate pietistic evasions and humanitarian alibis, but will serve for the grafting of another force of human forces, to attract an invisible consecration on a new articulated world of men and leaders of men. Where Catholicism in general may be valid in these terms, or vice versa, where certain categories of men need Catholicism in order to come to so much and do not suffer from the negative factors of it that we have pointed out, a Ghibellinism will not need to take a stand against this particular religion that has come to predominate in the West and has strong roots in Italy. This, however, exclusively concerns a personal problem of individuals and, precisely in the case of the nation in which we find ourselves living, has a justification in the lack of a concrete historical tradition of men and groups that have been and are the defenders of a precise Ghibelline doctrine in the non-secular or liberal terms specified beforehand. Today in Italy it seems that some small groups have not been insensitive to the problem mentioned at the beginning, that of integrating those aspects of Catholicism that are susceptible to it into the broader reality of Tradition (this is the task that R. Guènon, although he did not at all believe - as he confided in us personally - in its feasibility): at the same time, these elements demand the resumption of a line of thought analogous to that which led some Catholics of other times to defend the idea of Authority and Order, to fight revolutionary ideas. In this regard, however, two precise reservations must be made. The first concerns the doctrinal level, and refers to the fact that in these Catholics an inversion of the legitimate way of proceeding is almost always to blame: Instead of starting from Tradition as a superordinate reality, one does the opposite, one assumes as a basis and as a primary element Catholicism understood in its exclusivist claim to be the only true revealed religion, and one seeks to enhance it with peregrine references to one or another traditional idea, used as a means and almost as an ingredient, thus placing the universal at the service of the particular. Such a perversion must definitely be denounced (1). Secondly, these elements, even if they were to proceed in the doctrinal field in the right way, would have to be well aware of the entirely 'private' nature of their initiatives. In order for them to be taken seriously enough to lead to changes in what we have said in the preceding pages, it would be necessary that they be taken not by them, but by the higher hierarchies of the Church vested with authority. But this is clearly not the case at all, the direction taken by the Church being, as have said, the descending and anti-traditional one, that of modernising and coming to terms with the modern world, with democracy, with socialism, with progressivism and with everything else. So they are not at all authoritarian to speak in the name of Catholicism, which to them, coach flies, takes no notice, and to try to give it the dignity it rejects. The 'eternal Church', to which some would like to refer, distinguishing it from the real one that acts in history, is but a digression not without heretical overtones. So when one does not have in view what personally and progressively a given belief may be worth to the individual, but has in view a movement, following an autonomous one, abandoning the Church to its fate, given its current inability to give an official christening to a truly great

Traditional and super-traditional right, this is the norm that, in our opinion, is required, for both intrinsic and contingent reasons. If one were to decide in this direction, however, one would have to bear in mind that in the present age the danger is as great as ever that where the political world has recourse to the forces that are usually aroused by religions, these forces are degraded in order to create a kind of music around things that, in their existence, remain profane: for which there are well-known and deplorable examples along the lines of 'totalitarianism'. We have already clearly denounced the gap that exists between the case in which a human reality receives a spiritual chrism, which changes its nature, and the case in which it instead replaces the spiritual, usurping its place and right. While bearing this in mind, the danger now mentioned must be faced because there is no other choice: as we have said repeatedly, a state that does not have a spiritual dimension and legitimisation from above cannot even call itself a state, and it is in a state of helplessness in the face of all the arguments put forward by rationalist, revolutionary, societal and subversive polemics. The problem to be solved is particularly arduous, given that nowadays the continuity of dynastic and, in general, traditional lines is broken and that, in the case of a purely Ghibelline orientation, it is from a pure idea that one must start, without the basis of some not remote historical factuality. As in so many other domains, so too in this one it will be necessary to make do with provisional solutions. On the one hand, one must hold fast to rigorously formulated principles; on the other, practically speaking, one must be enough to follow them and make them count, even if the basis they may have for the moment is inadequate - more or less as happens, institutionally, in the case of an interregnum or regency: the symbol remains, it conserves its prestige and authority, it receives recognition, even if at the moment there is no one who can fully embody it and the royal head only has a vicarious function. In our case, the reference generally concerns the spiritual centre of gravity of a political organism; it would be a matter of well defining and recognising its dignity and function in the terms previously mentioned, while waiting for it to be effectively implemented in certain circumstances. In history, however, this has always corresponded to a mysterious fact, one that is not simply human in nature, a fact that a given general disposition and a given collective climate can propitiate, but never determine.

(1 Protestantism can be left aside, as it is less of a character of organised tradition than of a simple religious confession, on an individualistic-social basis, in addition to Roman Catholicism, one should consider, if at all, the Greek Orthodox Church, or Church of the East, if its jurisdiction does not concern peoples who fall outside the framework of the problems dealt with in this book.

(1 Especially in ***Revolt against the Modern World***, Edizioni Mediterranee, 3rd ed., Rome 1969; and ***Mask and Face of Contemporary Spiritualism***, Edizioni Mediterranee, 3rd ed., Rome 1971. (1 Here we had a typical case of those 'societies of men', exponents of the political principle as opposed to the physical-social principle, of which we have already spoken. As far as the Templars in particular are concerned, they also had their own initiation and an esoteric doctrine, reserved for the high ranks, which could not be ascribed to the simple Christian religiosity administered by the Church. On this see J. EVOLA, ***Il mistero del Graal e la idea imperiale ghibellina***. cit.

(1 St. Paul ***Rom.***, XIII, 2) even wrote: ***Qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit***. And it has been affirmed by some theologians that even the unjust political leader does not cease to be God's representative and must therefore be obeyed. Cf. DONOSO CORTES, ***Saggio sul cattolicesimo, liberalismo e socialismo*** (tr. it., Milan, 1854, p.19: "The peoples, in the very fact of not obeying in the person of the prince other than God alone, expressed the highest and most glorious human prerogative, that of submitting to the yoke of divine authority".

(1 This relationship was to be preserved for a long time in the states of the Greek Orthodox rite, i.e. of the so-called Eastern Church, which were directly connected to the tradition of the Byzantine Empire; in them, the political leader is also the supreme head of the religious community, which has a national character and is not subject to an extra-state authority, that of the Roman curia, for spiritual matters, as is the case in the countries of the Catholic confession.

(1 Just because the case is typical for such an inversion (because otherwise the person who made such an assertion is a nobody, in bad faith to boot), in a review of the elements in question, **Advenia Regnum**, it was claimed that the limited success of our traditionalism in Italy would have stemmed from the fact that they had 'sought tradition outside of Tradition'. Tradition' with a capital 'Tradition' would of course be Catholicism. If we remember well, the sin of intellectual pride is one of those most stigmatised by Christians: it is precisely this that underlies such presumptions.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

REALISM - COMMUNISM - ANTI-BOURGEOISIE

One of the reasons why we see some intellectuals today paradoxically sympathising with communism (paradoxically, because we know what part the contempt for type of true intellectual has in communism) is linked to the anti-bourgeois theme that communism has made its own. Among other things, communism would like to represent the overcoming of the 'bourgeois era' also in the sense of initiating a new realism, beyond subjectivism and individualism, the romantic cult of the ego and the varieties of idealistic rhetoric. It is these instances that, when one does not realise the materialistic and exclusively economic level on which communism is being enforced, exert a certain fascination on the intellectuals now mentioned. It is undoubtedly the case that in the current era, multiple processes are acting in this direction, which had already had characteristic manifestations after the First World War - one may recall, in Germany, the *Neue Sachlichkeit*, or new objectivity (1), in France, the current that, even then with communist tendencies, was headed by the *Esprit Nouveau* and which, especially in the field of architecture, had a not inconsiderable influence. Today, in some circles, communism sympathises with such demands; hence it is not surprising that some unprincipled intellectuals, who do not grasp the ultimate and contaminating significance of communism - known only from afar and in theory - join it, thinking of thus placing themselves in avant-garde positions. With this, one falls into a serious misunderstanding. In fact, it must be conceded that, in itself, the watchword of the anti-bourgeoisie as an economic class, as much as of its counterpart, there exists a whole intellectual world, an art a custom, a general conception of existence that, formed in the 19th century parallel to the revolution of the Third Estate, now present themselves as something flaky, empty and outdated. A decisive overcoming of all this would be one of the conditions for moving beyond the present crisis of civilisation. Thus those vague attempts to react against the most extreme aspects of world subversion, which can only refer to ideas, habits and institutions of the bourgeois era, are very dangerous. This means supplying weapons to the adversaries. All that as a bourgeois mentality and bourgeois spirit with its conformism, its psychological and romantic appendages, its moralism and its preoccupation with a safe little life in which a fundamental materialism finds its compensation in sentimentalism and the rhetoric of great humanitarian and democratic words - all that, can only have an artificial, peripheral and precarious life however tenacious its survival through inertia may be in large social states in many countries of the so-called 'free world'. We therefore take it for granted that reacting in the name of the idols, lifestyle and mediocre values of the bourgeois world, such as it is

the case for most of the supporters of contemporary so-called 'parties of order', means having lost the battle already at the start. However, just as the bourgeoisie in earlier traditional civilisations was socially something in between, having had the warrior and political aristocracy above it, and the simple 'people' below it, so there is a twofold possibility - one positive, the other negative - of overcoming the bourgeoisie in general, i.e. of taking sides against the bourgeois type, bourgeois civilisation, bourgeois spirit and values. The first possibility corresponds to a direction that leads even lower than all this, towards a collectivised and materialised sub-humanity, precisely in the sign of Marxist realism; social and proletarian values against so-called 'bourgeois decadentism'. It is indeed possible to conceive of a liquidation of everything related to the conventional, subjectivistic and generically bourgeois 'unrealistic' world, which leads not above but below what is proper to the normal ideal of the personality: and this is precisely the case when the point of arrival is the man-mass, the 'collective' of Soviet ideology, in the essentially mechanistic and soulless climate inseparably and explicitly connected to it. The result of such a liquidation of the bourgeois world can therefore only be a further regression; one moves towards that which lies below the person, and not above it. This is the opposite of what was seen in the great traditional and, as Goethe would say, 'objective' civilisations, in which anonymity and contempt for the individual was also seen, but against the backdrop of higher, heroic, transcendent values. Likewise, if the demand for a new realism is right, the error of those who assume as real only those that of reality in the full sense represent only the lower degrees is visible. Now, when it is essentially in terms of economics that realism is formulated (as is the case with communism), this is precisely the case. But the same is also true of certain tendencies that have made their mark in art or on the fringes of philosophy, equally flanking, on a non-conformist line with respect to present-day society, left-wing movements. Of these tendencies, one has qualified precisely as neo-realism, another is that of extremist existentialism referring to Sartre and his milieu. Existentialism' here is precisely identified with the bleakest forms of it, it is an existence detached from any higher principle, absolutized and enforced in itself, in its anguished and lightless immediacy. Moreover, it is not only by this route that one has ended up on such a level. The existentialism now mentioned has, for example, its counterpart in psychoanalysis itself according to its aspect as a doctrine that desauthorises and declares the conscious and sovereign principle of the person as unreal, as real being instead considered the irrational, unconscious, collective and nocturnal part of the human being; on this basis, every superordinate faculty is deemed derivative and dependent, just as on the level of society and civilisation Marxism strives to present everything that is not reduced to social and economic processes as a mere 'superstructure'. Where existentialism proclaims the primacy of 'existence' over 'essence' instead of recognising that existence only acquires meaning when it is referred to something beyond it, one is evidently on the same line of thought. There is thus an exact, visible parallelism between such intellectual currents and revolutionary socio-political currents, because it is the manifestation in the individual domain of what in the social and historical domain manifests itself as the subversive shift of power towards the masses, as the substitution of the inferior for the superior, as the destination of every principle of sovereignty that is not from below. Existentialist and psychoanalytic 'realism', along with other tendencies of the same kind, refers to a human image that in the individual reflects exactly such relations, thus presenting itself as mutilated, distorted, subversive. It is therefore the effect of a kind of congeniality of sympathy of many intellectuals of these tendencies with the social currents of the left, even when such sympathies are little reciprocated by political leaders of these currents. However, the opposite possibility also exists - we mean that a realistic demand and struggle against the bourgeois spirit can be conceived. Individualism and false idealism,

decisive even more so than in left-wing currents, but directed to the side, not downwards. According to what has already been said in a previous chapter, this different possibility is linked to a revival of heroic and aristocratic values when they are assumed naturally and clearly, without rhetoric and without grand words: in retrospect, typical aspects of the Roman and Romano-Germanic worlds have already provided an example of this. One can keep one's distance from all that is merely human and above all subjectivistic character, one can have contempt for bourgeois conformism and its petty selfishness and moralism, one can adopt the style of an active impersonality, one can prefer what is essential and real in a higher sense, free from the mists of sentimentality and intellectual superstructures - but all this *while standing on one's feet*, feeling the evidence of what goes beyond living and drawing from it precise principles for action and behaviour. All that is anti-bourgeois in this sense does not go against the communist world, but, on the contrary, is the prerequisite for the emergence of new men and stature of leaders capable of creating real barriers against world subversion, in correspondence with the establishment of a new climate, which cannot fail to have its own peculiar expressions also in general terms of culture and civilisation. It is therefore very important to recognise exactly in their opposition the two aforementioned possibilities or directions of the anti-bourgeois attitude. It is then particularly so where it refers to Italy. Fascism had already made the formula of anti-Bourgeoisism its own and had hoped for the renewal of which it would constitute the principle, the advent of a new man who would have to break with the bourgeois style of thinking, coming and behaving. Unfortunately, this one of cases where fascism stopped at the formula, and what remained bourgeois in that movement, despite everything, and became bourgeois by contagion, was one of the causes of its weakness. As far as current events are concerned, with rare exceptions, the Italian communist himself is basically nothing but the bourgeois in the square (Lenin, moreover, recognised that the proletarian, left to himself, tends only to become a bourgeois) in the same way that the false Christian and the Christian Democrat are nothing but the bourgeois in the temple. Even those who still profess to be monarchists, in principle cannot conceive of anything more than a bourgeois king. Italy's worst evil is still the bourgeois: bourgeois-priest, bourgeois-worker, bourgeois 'lord', bourgeois-intellectual almost sawdust, substance without form, in which there is no longer either a 'high' or a 'low'. Away with it all, should be the watchword. Only if it can be followed, motion in *the other* direction will not prevail.

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Having spoken of intellectuals and realism, it will be good to clarify one more point. It has been mentioned that the sympathies of some intellectuals with communism have certain paradoxical character, in that communism despises the type of intellectual as such, a type that for it belongs, essentially, to the world of the hated bourgeoisie. Now, such an attitude can also be shared by those on the opposite side of communism. given what they mean in the contemporary world, one can oppose any over-valuation of culture and intellectuality. To have almost a cult for them, to define with them a superior stratum, almost an aristocracy - the 'aristocracy of thought' that would be the real one, legitimately supplanting the previous forces of the *elite* and the nobility - is a prejudice characteristic of the bourgeois epoch in its humanistic-liberal sectors. The truth is instead that such culture and intellectuality are merely products of dissociation and neutralisation from a totality. Because this has been felt, anti-intellectualism has played a prominent part in recent times, by way of an almost biological reaction that has, however, too often followed wrong or at least problematic directions. We will not dwell on this last point, however. We have already dealt with it elsewhere, talking about the misunderstanding of anti-rationalism (1). Here there is only to

emphasise that there is a third possible term of reference beyond both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, for overcoming 'culture' of bourgeois intonation. Such is the *world view* - in German *Weltanschauung*. The world view is not based on books, but on an inner form and sensibility with a character that is not acquired but innate. It is essentially a disposition and attitude, not theory or culture, a disposition and attitude that do not only concern the mental realm but also invest that of feeling and willing, inform character, manifest themselves in reactions with the same certainty as instinct, give evidence to a given meaning of existence. Normally the world view, rather than being an individual thing, proceeds from a tradition, it is the *organic* effect of the forces to which a given type of civilisation owes its form; at the same time, *apart from subject*, it manifests itself as a kind of 'inner race', as an existential structure. In every civilisation other than the modern one, it was precisely a 'worldview', not a 'culture', that interpenetrated the most diverse strata of society. And where culture and conceptual thought were present, they did not take primacy; their function was that of mere means of expression, of organs at the service of the world view. It was not believed that 'pure thought' had to detect the truth and provide meaning to existence; instead, the part of thought was to clarify what was already possessed and existed as meaning and direct evidence, before any speculation the products of thought therefore only had a value as a symbol, as a signpost - in this respect conceptual expression did not have a privileged character compared to other possible forms of expression. In earlier civilisations these were rather evocative images, symbols in the proper sense, myths. Today, things may be different, given the increasing, hypertrophic cerebralisation of Western man. What is important, however, is that we do not exchange the essential with the accessory, that the relationships mentioned are recognised and maintained, i.e. that where 'culture' and 'intellectuality' are present, they only play an instrumental and expressive part in relation to something deeper and more organic, which is precisely the worldview. And the vision of the world may be more precise in a man with no particular education than in a writer, in the soldier, in the member of an aristocratic stock and in the peasant faithful to the land than in bourgeois intellectual, the 'professor' or the journalist. As far as all this is concerned, in Italy we find ourselves in a very unfavourable position, and not as of today, because those who make the best and worst of, those who dominate the press, academic culture and criticism, organising veritable monopolising masonries, are precisely the lowest type of intellectual, who know nothing of what is truly spirituality, human wholeness, thinking in accordance with firm principles (1). Culture' in the modern sense only ceases to be a danger when those who make use of it already possess a world view. Only then will one be active with respect to it: precisely because one will then already have an internal form as a sure guide as to what can be assimilated and what instead must be rejected - more or less as happens in all differentiated processes of organic assimilation. It is quite evident that this has not been systematically disregarded by liberal and individualistic thinking; and among the evils of the 'free culture' that has been put within the reach of all and which such thinking advocates is the fact that many minds lacking the faculty to discriminate according to right judgement, many minds that do not already have their own form, their own 'world view', find themselves in a state of fundamental spiritual helplessness in the face of influences of all kinds. This deleterious situation, vaunted as a conquest and progress, proceeds from a premise that is the exact opposite of the truth: that is, modern man is assumed to be spiritually adult, unlike that of previous, so-called 'obscurantist' epochs, and therefore capable of judging and doing for himself (and the very premise of modern 'democracy' in its polemic against any principle of authority). This is pure infatuation: never, as in modern times, has there been an equal number of inwardly formless men, men who are open to every suggestion and every ideological intoxication, to the extent that they become succubi,

often without suspecting it in the least, of the psychic currents and manipulations inherent to the intellectual, political and social environment in which they live. But on this, the discourse would be long. These hints on the 'world view' complement the terms of the problem dealt with when speaking of the new realism, because they specify the plane where this problem must be posed and resolved, in the sign of anti-bourgeoisie, since there can be nothing worse than an intellectualist reaction against intellectualism. If the fog lifts, it will become clear that it is the 'world view' that, beyond any 'culture', must unite or divide by drawing insurmountable frontiers of the soul, that even in a political movement it constitutes the primary element, because only a world has the power to crystallise a given human type and thus set the specific tone for a given community. Now, along the lines of communism, there have been instances in which something has penetrated to such a depth. He is not wrong when a contemporary politician has spoken an internal and profound change that, manifesting itself almost in the terms of an obsession, occurs in those who truly adhere to communism they are changed in their thinking, in their acting. In our opinion, it is indeed a fundamental alteration or contamination of the human being: *but it reaches, in the cases in question, the plane of existential reality*, which does not happen at all in those who react from bourgeois and intellectualist positions. The possibility revolutionary-conservative action depends essentially on the extent to which the opposite idea, i.e. the traditional, aristocratic, anti-proletarian idea, can act in the same terms - so much so as to give rise to a new realism and to give shape, acting as a vision of life, to a specific type of anti-bourgeois man, as a cellular substance of new: *élites*; beyond the crisis of all individualistic and unrealistic values.

(1 On the *Neue Sachlichkeit*, cf. J. EVOLA, *Riding the Tiger*, Scheiwiller, 2nd ed., Milan 1971, & 17.

(1 Cf. *The Bow and the Club*, cit., c.VII.

(1In relation to this, on 'intelligent stupidity' see *The Bow and the Club*, c. XIV.

CHAPTER TWELVE

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS - CORPORATIONS WORK UNIT

It was said in Chapter VI that breaking the demonisation wielded by the economy in the modern western world is one of the fundamental prerequisites for a return to a general condition of normality; the change internal attitude necessary for such a breakthrough was also briefly indicated. However, in the current state of affairs, due to the urgency of forces in the economic-social domain that tend to drive one ever lower, one cannot rely on internal factors alone, although they will always remain the truly decisive ones. In addition, it is necessary to consider those forms through which the economy can in the meantime be curbed and ordered and the factors of disorder and subversion inherent in its more recent developments limited. That this cannot be achieved today by virtue of a spontaneous process is quite clear. Political intervention is indispensable. There are two basic premises: firstly, *the state*, as the embodiment of an idea and a power, *is a reality above the world of the economy* - secondly, *the political instance has primacy over the economic* and, one might add, the social-economic *instance*. With regard to the second point, after what we have said above, it is not necessary to point out that according to the traditional conception, the political instance is legitimised by spiritual and super-individual values. The state is the power that is intended to give these values the weight they are due in a normal overall order, thus realising the idea of 'justice' in a superior sense. Having said this, it must just be said that the first step to be taken to normalise the economy is to overcome classism, in which lies the root cause of the disorder and crisis of our time. To this end, it is not necessary to search for new ideas, even at

In this respect, it is sufficient to draw on the traditional heritage, which in the *corporatist principle* already offers the guiding idea that, suitably adapted, can still be the best point of reference today. The fundamental spirit of corporatism was that of a community of work and productive solidarity, to which the principles of competence, qualification and natural hierarchy acted as firm cornerstones, all with a style of active impersonality, selflessness and dignity. All this was clearly visible in the mediaeval artisan guilds, in the *Zünften*, taking us even further back, we have the example of the ancient Roman professional guilds. These, according to a characteristic expression, were constituted *ad exemplum reipublicae*, i.e. in the image of a state, and in the very designations (e.g. *milites* or *milites caligati* for the simple corporates before the *magisteri*) they reflected the military order on their level. As for the corporative tradition as it flourished in the Roman-Germanic Middle Ages, in it the dignity of *free* beings in the members of the corporation, the pride of the individual in belonging to it, was particularly emphasised; The love for work considered not as a mere means of earning money but as an art and an expression of one's vocation, and the commitment of the workers were matched by the skill, care, and knowledge of the masters of the art, their effort for the strengthening and elevation of the overall corporative unity, their protection of the ethics and laws of honour that the corporation had in itself (1). (1) The problem of capital and the ownership of the means of production almost did not arise here, so natural was the combination of the various elements of the production process for the realisation of the common goal. Moreover, these were organisations that had the instruments of production 'in their own right', instruments that no one thought of monopolising for the purposes of exploitation and that were not tied to finance extraneous to labour. The usury of 'liquid and rootless money' - the equivalent of what today is the banking and financial use of capital - was considered a Jewish thing and left to them, it was far from condemning the system. That all this corresponds to a condition of normality is that the problem boils down to finding forms and conditions in which the basic ideas of the corporate order can be made to apply again in the modern age, disrupted by the 'industrial revolution' (parallel to that of the Third Estate and the Hebraicisation of the economy) - all this should appear quite clear to any person with sound discernment. In this respect, the fundamental point is precisely the overcoming of classism. Fascist corporatism itself had set itself this goal, but achieved it imperfectly, in two respects. Firstly, because in it subsisted the basic idea of an extra-corporatist duality, that of the workers' and the 'unions: the unions continued to be recognised as class organisations, even though, after the so-called unblocking of the General Confederation Labour, they had been split up and distributed according to the various corporations. Secondly, the unity of labour was not reconstituted, in fascist corporatism, in the very place where capitalist prevarications on the one hand, and Marxism on the other, had broken it up, i.e. *within each company or complex of companies*, but externally, within the framework of a bureaucratic-social system, with bodies that were often reduced to mere cumbersome superstructures. It was the German national-socialist labour legislation that came closest to the goal in this regard, because it realised that what mattered most was precisely to achieve organic solidarity of the managerial forces of business and labour *within companies*, preceding a downsizing that to a certain extent reflected the spirit, mentioned before, of traditional corporatism. Indeed, the company managers in that German system assumed the figure and responsibility of 'bosses' (*Betriebsführer*), the workers, of their 'followers' (*Gefolgschaft*), in a solidarity, which various measures guaranteed and protected, and with an emphasis on the ethical moment: both the manager and the worker were asked to rise above purely individual interests (maximum profit and economic surplus value in the one, maximum salary without regard to either the conditions of the company, the country or the situation

general, in the other), thus also setting limits to mere economic interest (among other things, a so-called 'court of honour' was competent for any disputes). Thus in the same period of rapid economic recovery after the Second World War, it could be said of German workers that they 'worked with the same spirit of sacrifice as a soldier', despite the harsh living conditions, strikes for wage demands in this period were almost non-existent, while a wide margin of liberalism and non-protectionism tested the responsible initiative of every company boss who wanted to assert himself. But organic-corporative experiences were also made in Austria, Spain and Portugal. The elementary conditions for the restoration of the aforementioned condition of normality are therefore on the one hand (below) the *deproletarianisation* of the worker, and on the other (above) the elimination of the deterrent type of capitalist, a simple parasitic beneficiary of profits and dividends, extraneous to the production process. In this last regard, one has rightly spoken of a double defection of the capitalist in the course of recent times. At first the capitalist-entrepreneur was differentiated from the capitalist-only financier or speculator, estranged from the technical management of the enterprises he controls, and thus no longer the effective and personal centre of the work complexes; at a later stage, we even arrived at the type of capitalist who is not even the speculator but the one who merely collects dividends, hardly knowing where they come from and using them for a vain worldly life. It is evident that against these types the agitators have an easy time of it, nor is there any way to really get to the bottom of their minds without eliminating the reason for the scandal, i.e. without fighting the representatives of such deterrent capitalism. In a new corporatist system the capitalist, the owner of the means of production, would instead have to resume the function of responsible boss, of technical manager and organiser at the centre of the company complexes, and keep in close, personal contact with the most trusted and qualified elements of the company as a kind of his, having around him solidarity workers, free from union ties proud instead of belonging his company. Moreover, the authority of such a type of capitalist-entrepreneur should be based not only on his specialised technical competence, on his control of the instruments of production, and on particular, wide-ranging capacities of initiative and organisation, but also on a kind of political *chrism*, as we will discuss below. Indeed, this point leads to a consideration of the relationship between the economy and the state, a consideration to which, however, some observations should be made beforehand. One of the main obstacles to the revival of the corporatist spirit and the overcoming of the proletarian one certainly lies in the changed working conditions to which the industrial revolution has led. In the variety of essentially mechanical work, it is very difficult for the character of 'art' and 'vocation' to be preserved, and for the expressions of it to bear the imprint of personality. Hence the danger, for the modern worker, of being led to consider work as a simple necessity and his services as the sale of a commodity to strangers against maximum remuneration, losing the lively and personal relations that existed in the ancient guilds, and still in many complexes of the early capitalist period, between bosses and workers. Faced with this difficulty, the only thing that could help would be the emergence of a new type, defined by a particular kind of impersonality not unlike that which, in much broader frameworks, can characterise the new type of fighter we have already mentioned. In this respect, a disposition not unlike that of someone who knows how to hold his own even in the wear and tear of a position war would be decisive. In some respects, the test, among machines and industrial complexes developed to monstrous proportions, may be more difficult for the average man to overcome than in the case of war experiences, for while in the latter physical destruction is the possibility of every moment, nevertheless a combination of moral and emotional factors provide man with a support that is largely to insist on the grey,

monotonous modern labour front. Returning now to the properly economic domain, we must consider some modern instances of the organic reintegration of companies, which, however, follow the wrong directions. We will therefore refer to the so-called 'socialisation', the name given to an economic system in which (in contrast to what is proper nationalisation and the collectivist statehood of the economy) the firms would maintain their autonomy, their internal unity having to be cemented, however, by the participation of the workers in the management (the right of co-direction, co-management and co-determination) and by the distribution among them of the profits of the exercise, minus a certain quota considered as the just interest of capital. The first thing to consider in this regard is that, as far as profit-sharing is concerned, the system in question could only represent something fair within the framework of a broader principle of solidarity, so that, if profit-sharing is to be spoken of, it would also have to be spoken of a distribution, to the detriment of the workers, of any *deficit in* the financial year, which would already deprive the socialisation formula of the appeal it exerts on the level of certain demagoguery. Moreover, in large enterprises the share of profit-sharing will never be significant in relation to base salaries, which reveals the less social, rather than political, purpose of the trend in question. Far more important would rather be the differentiated determination of wages, removed from the uniformity of trade union impositions, concertedly agreed upon in each enterprise in view of its particular conditions. With regard to a co-partnership with a non-utilitarian-individualistic, but truly *organic* purpose, to a co-partnership in ownership: one should study the forms by means of which the worker could gradually become a small-scale owner - the only way to really proletarianise him and to break the backbone of Marxism - by having him take possession of intransferable shares in his company-corporation (so-called 'labour-shares' have been spoken of), though not beyond the extent required to ensure that the right hierarchical links are not perverted. This would be the best means to 'integrate' the individual worker into his enterprise, to interest him in it and elevate him even beyond his more immediate interest as a mere, uprooted individual, reproducing the type of organic belonging, almost 'in life', to a given working community, which was precisely proper to the ancient corporative formations. As for co-management or co-direction (by means of 'management councils', 'internal commissions', 'factory committees', etc.), this is pure nonsense where it is anything other than more direct and personal relations limited to the general conditions of work and, in general, to the subordinate, administrative part of a given company complex. On the other hand, as far as management itself and the last instance are concerned, wanting to establish a kind of 'economic parliamentarism' in companies (this is how Carlo Costamagna has effectively characterised the aim of the 'socialising' tendency), would mean ignoring the extremely differentiated, almost 'esoteric', character that technical and managerial functions have in contemporary high industry, a character that would make any interference from below harmful, disorganising or at least disturbing. It would be the same absurdity to think that committees of soldiers should have their say in matters of high strategy, general mobilisation, conduct and organisation of a modern war (1). Apart from the technical consideration, there is another, at least as important, against co-direction: One is that in the system of an integrated company, as we have it in view, it is precisely from the top that not only utilitarian, but also political considerations must eventually be asserted, as a superior instance, and this on the basis of an equally superior and unquestionable authority, whereas it is fatal that with control by the workers, purely economic and utilitarian considerations would predominate, or political considerations, yes, but in a deterrent, Marxist and classist sense. Indeed, as a spirit, 'socialisation' is nothing but crypto-Marxism, almost a Trojan horse that one would like to introduce into a non-communist system of economics at first, as the beginning of that escalation of enterprises that in its declared and complete form corresponds to the tendency of a 'trade unionism

integral' and which for its final phase has a communist economy with which the climb-down is given not only to the corporation but to the state itself. Such radical instances had already announced themselves on the fringes of fascist corporatism. According to some, the dualism that existed in this system should have been overcome, with the corresponding 'parity' of the workers' and employers' representations, by means of a rigorous differentiation of competences, the technicians, differentiated as 'work that directs' from 'work that executes', should have ceased to be organs of capital to become themselves the leaders and managers of the organic unity of the union-controlled corporation. According to others, not only should the so-called 'proprietary corporation' have been established (an idea that, within certain limits and under certain conditions, could even be considered), but also the full absorption of the state bureaucracy into the corporative organs was advocated, the identification of political representations with the corporative ones in the sign of the so-called 'Integral State of Labour'. In this respect, the watchword of 'introducing the worker into the citadel of the state' was followed. It was, that is, the way of the involution of politics in the economy, which was indicated here as the goal of true corporatism, of an 'integral and revolutionary corporatism'. We have referred to these tendencies in order to make it clear that where there is a tendency towards organic, anti-dualist forms, two possibilities, two directions present themselves to this effect: one can proceed from above and one can proceed from below, one can make the centre of gravity of the structures, corporately reorganised and according to the principle of competency, fall in the lower sphere, material and union, or in the higher, properly political sphere. The conditions of the present age are such that a completely autonomous activity of corporate complexes is impossible. However powerful and vast they may be, such complexes have to reckon with forces and monopolies that largely control the fundamental elements of the production process. Thus there are those who have rightly pointed out that today the truly topical and serious problem is no longer the classist one in the narrow sense, but that of the frano to be imposed on the wild and unscrupulous struggle between various monopolies, essentially between the monopoly of goods and materials (consortia), that of money (finance, banking, stock exchange speculation) and that of labour (*trade unions, trade unions, etc.*). (1). As things stand in present-day society, in order to avoid the destructive effects of this struggle, to limit the power of these extra- and supra-company groups and thus ensure the same companies conditions of security and regulated production, only the intervention of the state can be effective - naturally where the state asserts itself as a power above such as to be able to confront and explain any subversive force, however powerful it may be. In particular, it is therefore of the utmost importance, in the present age, that *the process against degenerate and prevaricating capitalism be conducted from above*, i.e. that it is the state that takes the initiative to fight this phenomenon mercilessly and to bring everything back to an order of normality, instead of leaving the right of accusation and protest to the left for the benefit of subversive action. Now, a modern state, integrated in the aforementioned sense, would have sufficient powers for such action. The situation of the contemporary economy is such that a strict ostracism by the state would be fatal for any capitalist group, however powerful it may be. The prerequisite would of course be to overcome the situation inherent to democracies, where the political element makes promiscuous alliances with the plutocratic element by being open to all sorts of corruption and in just such terms claiming to represent a 'Right' vis-à-vis Marxism. Let us repeat, pure political power must be freed from all constraints - firstly from the constraints of capitalism, then from the constraints of economics in general. And even practically speaking, if we want to take 'too human' into account. we see no reason why the representatives of pure political principle should prostitute themselves, should enslave themselves to those of capitalism, since they, having the power - and power *they can* have - also have the possibility of dominating wealth and dictating the law

to the lords of capital and industry. A regime of corruption is possible, indeed inevitable, where a strong and traditional state is non-existent, where the state is reduced to an instrument that the activist and unscrupulous politician born yesterday exploits individually to negotiate the advantages one political office or another. At the point at which a real state would arise against degenerate and prevaricating capitalism, the polemic of the left would fall by itself and any attempt of the economy to take over the state in a Marxist or semi-Marxist sense (syndicalism, labourism, etc.) under the pretext of putting things in order and promoting a supposed 'social justice' would be crushed. Thus the decisive thing is whether or not the state, as a truly sovereign state, is able to prevent subversive forces by supplanting them with a timely *revolution from above* (1). (1) After that, the great problem would be to establish organic, but not totalitarian, relations between the state and the corporate-corporations, ousting or limiting as far as possible every power, every line-up, monopoly and interest extraneous either to a sound economy or to pure political reason. In this respect, it is again the traditional heritage that could offer the guiding idea: one could refer, no more and no less, to the *feudal system*, suitably transposed and adapted. What in the feudal system was the allocation of a given land and a corresponding jurisdiction or partial sovereignty, in the economy would be equivalent to the recognition by the state of economic complexes under private law performing certain productive tasks, with a wide margin of free initiative and autonomy. Recognition would imply protection in the event of necessity, but also, as in the feudal regime, the counterpart of 'bond of loyalty' and responsibility with respect to the political power, the statution of an 'eminent right' to this proper, even limited, in its exercise, only to cases of emergency and particular tension. On these basis could be organised a system taking up unity and plurality, the political factor and the economic factor, planning and various articulated spaces of free initiative and personal responsibility. Thus, neither totalitarian centralism on the part of the state, nor interventions that disrupt or coarticulate the groups and economic processes where these take place in an orderly manner. General directives and overall schemes can be given, but as for execution, maximum space for the spirit of initiative and organisation (1). On the whole, there will be a hierarchical system: 'work units', i.e. organically integrated companies, with workers gathered around their managers, who in turn are gathered around the state power, within the framework of a rigorous regime of skills and production, with the elimination of all classist ideological intoxication and irresponsible activism. Moreover, proceeding, even if only in part, along such a direction would also mean moving beyond the climate of the 'economic era', thanks to the special *ethos*, both anti-proletarian and anti-capitalist, that all this presupposes. The ultimate aim of the corporative idea, understood in this way, would indeed be to elevate the lower activities, linked to production and material interest, to the level that in a qualitative hierarchy comes immediately after, in an ascending direction, the economic-vital one; in the ancient caste system, or 'functional classes', this level was that of the warrior caste, elevated above the caste of the bourgeoisie and the workers. Now it is evident that, with the takeover of the system, which we have spoken, the clear, virile and personalised *ethos*, proper to a society based on the general type, not of the 'merchant' or the 'worker', but rather, as a character and general disposition, in terms of analogy, of the 'warrior', would be reflected in the world of the economy itself. It would be the beginning of a revival. These brief hints, relating to an overall orientation, will suffice here; the study of the concrete formulas with which the indicated requirements could be realised in part would fall outside the limits of the present discussion. It will only suffice to reiterate the principle that the economic order must never be anything other than an *order of means*; hence it must, in principle, be subject to an order of ends that transcend the economic plan and that are as much a part of it as the higher purpose, and even the passionate life of the individual, is of the elementary conditions of his physical existence. It is for this reason that the formula of a

'State of work' represents a pure aberration, something inverted, degrading and degraded: the opposite of the traditional conception. In this regard, it will be good to add a few more considerations. Against the party-political demoparliamentary system, the fascist reform that led to the establishment of the Chamber of Corporations certainly had various titles to its legitimacy; it was intended to establish a regime of competences as opposed to the political incompetence that does good and bad in the demoparliamentary regime, not failing to exert disruptive influences in the very sphere of the economy. Such a line can be resumed, unless the fascist system of corporatist representation is revised with a view to a different arrangement that will include the corporation in the fascist bureaucratic sense, but corporations in the aforementioned sense of organic corporate units and complexes, variously coordinated or hierarchised, of such units depending on the branches. As a basis, the aforementioned principle of the depoliticisation of socio-economic forces should apply here. The application of the strict principle of competences should take away from any corporatist representation what could be called its political plus-value. The 'corporative chamber' should therefore not have the character of a political assembly. It would only constitute the 'lower chamber' and the political demands would have to be asserted in a second chamber, in an 'upper chamber', above it. Once the economy has been brought back within its normal limits, it is evident that when, within the framework of the aforementioned corporatism, it affects the legislative order and, in general, when those problems of large-scale organisation that are now fundamental to the modern economy and that affect the very power of a state must be addressed, it is necessary to adequately enforce higher criteria through a separate and more complex body, endowed with a higher authority and incorporating, in controversial cases, the supreme body. Such an organ would be precisely the Upper Chamber. While the corporative chamber would represent the economy and all that pertains to the professional world, the political instance (politics in the higher sense) should concentrate on acting in the upper chamber through men who represent and defend more than just economic and 'physical' interests, i.e. spiritual, national, prestige and power interests, and who ensure that a constant overall direction is maintained in the solution of all the main problems concerning the corporeal-material part of the political organism. A mixed system of election and nomination, not dissimilar to what was already studied for the fascist political-corporate representations, could be admitted for the lower chamber. But similarly to what was proper to those existing in the past in other nations, the democratic principle should be excluded for the upper chamber; one should belong to it not contingently, and temporarily, by 'vote', but by designation from above and for life, almost as to an Order, by natural dignity and inalienable qualification. In fact, stability and continuity must not only be ensured at the top, where the pure, firm political principle of the *imperium* resides, but, almost by participation, also for a selected class having in their own right the characteristics and functions of a political class already possessed by the traditional nobility. Institutionally, this would find its concretisation precisely in the upper chamber. And when the same strict impersonality, the same distance from the simple necessities and contingencies of the moment, the same neutrality with respect to every particular and partisan interest (naturally, for 'parties' in the current ideological sense there would be no place here), incorporated eminently by the pure symbol of sovereignty, would be reflected in those who are part of the upper chamber, there would be no doubt as to the monolithic nature of a structure that is truly capable of asserting itself against any subversion of the subversive forces of the 'economic era'.

(1 Something that will appear quite singular to our contemporaries, among these principles was, until a certain period, the condemnation of everything that corresponds to modern advertising with its impostures,

because it was seen as an unfair means to undermine competitors, who were instead to be beaten by fairly gaining the buyer with the best quality of artefacts.

((1 Having mentioned this, we will recall that the development of communism itself in Russia eliminated such illusions. Just as the councils of soldiers who were supposed to replace or supplement the high commands in the army were very quickly liquidated, the same thing happened in the economy. In the first, euphoric and utopian phase of the communist revolution capitalists and business leaders were quickly eliminated and 'factory committees' with unlimited powers were set up. However, this phase was soon to give way to one in which technical management was once again monopolised by a minority, the workers' committees being left with only an advisory function and competence in working conditions, with the added right of veto. But at a third time this same right appeared incomparable with the autonomy needed by the technical-directive *elite* to co-ordinate economic and production processes in view of the various 'plans' of Russian economic reconstruction and the corresponding interests, not only economic but also political. Hence 'workers' control', which had been the watchword from the outset, ended up being devoid of any factual reality. This is what, by the very force of things, will always occur in the modern era.

(1 C. COSTAMAGNA, *Discourse on socialisation*. Rome. 1951.

(1 It was Bismarck who spoke of a 'revolution from above' in a similar vein. Whereas with the legislation of 1878, which remained in force until 1890, he had banned Marxist social-democracy accused of aiming at the overthrow of the existing social-political system, of breaking social peace class harmony, Bismarck ensured that in Germany, before in any other European state, initiatives were taken by the state to provide social security and social insurance for the working classes. It is highly significant that these initiatives served little purpose, making it clear that Marxist agitation - then as now - did not pursue objective positive aims of a purely social nature at all, but had overtly subversive political intentions. In discussing the 'tactics and strategy of world revolution' Lenin wrote that the revolution must begin with economic demands (i.e. economic pretexts) and then move on to *political* demands.

(1 O. SPENGLER has rightly written (*in Jahre der Entscheidung 'Regulation (of the economy)*) is like the training of a thoroughbred horse by an experienced rider and not the constricting of the living economic body as in a bust and the transformation of it into a machine whose keys are tapped'.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

OCCULT WARFARE - WEAPONS OF OCCULT WARFARE

Various causes are adopted for the crises that have plagued and still plague the lives of modern peoples: general historical, social, economic, political, moral, cultural and so on, depending on one's point of view. The part due to each of these causes is not to be disputed. However, a higher and essential problem must be posed: are these *always* the first causes and do they have an automatic character like those of the physical world? Should one stop at these, or should one in certain cases go back to influences of a higher order, such that much of what has happened and is happening in the West does not appear merely coincidental, and that beyond the manifold variety of individual aspects presents a single logic? It is within the framework of such an issue that the concept of *covert warfare* is defined. This is the war waged insensitively by what can generally be called the forces of world subversion, by means and under circumstances ignored by current historiography. The notion of covert war

It therefore belongs to a three-dimensional conception of history, which does not regard the two surface dimensions comprising visible causes, facts and leaders as essential, but also the dimension *in depth*, the 'subterranean' dimension where forces and influences are applied whose action is often decisive and which not infrequently cannot even be ascribed to what is merely human, individually or collectively human. Having said this, it is worth clarifying above all the meaning of the expression 'subterranean' used just now. In this regard, one must not think of a dark and irrational undercurrent that is related to the known forces of history in almost the same way that, according to a certain psychology, baptised precisely as 'depth psychology', the unconscious is related to the individual's waking consciousness. If anything, one can only speak of the unconscious with regard to those who, according to the three-dimensional conception of events, appear to us more as the *objects* than as the *subjects* of history, since in their thinking and acting they are scarcely aware of the influences they obey, of the true goals they end up realising. In these people, the centre therefore falls more in the unconscious and preconscious than in the clear reflected consciousness, despite what they - often men of action and ideologues - may believe. But if we consider the real agents history in the special aspects of history that we are now dealing with, things are different: here we can speak neither of the subconscious nor of the unconscious, here we are dealing with intelligent forces that know very well what they want and what are the most suitable means for achieving - almost always indirectly - what they want. The third dimension of history must therefore not be allowed to fade into the mists of abstract philosophical and sociological concepts, but must be thought of as a 'backstage' where precise 'intelligences' operate. An investigation of secret history that wants to be positive, scientific, must not lose ground and go too high. However, it is necessary to assume, as the ultimate term of reference, a dualistic scheme not unlike that found in more than one ancient tradition. Catholic historiography itself has been taught to see history not as a simple mechanism of natural, political, economic and social causes, but as the unfolding of a plan - the 'providential' plan - opposed by enemy forces sometimes moralistically called 'forces of evil', sometimes theologically called 'forces of the Antichrist'. Such a view has a positive content if it is purified and essentialised, bringing it back to the less religious and more metaphysical framework in which classical and Indo-European antiquity already knew it: forces of the *cosmos* against the forces of *chaos*, with the former corresponding to all that is form, order, law, tradition in the superior sense, spiritual hierarchy, and the latter being linked to every influence that disrupts, subverts, degrades, promotes the prevalence of the inferior over the superior, of matter over spirit, of quantity over quality. This, then, as to the ultimate points of reference of the various influences that act from behind known history on the order of tangible causes. They must be kept in mind, but with caution. Let us repeat: apart from this metaphysical background, contact with concrete history must never be lost. Today, it is more necessary than ever to refer back to such perspectives, which are not to be regarded as mere speculation and which are not only valuable for knowledge, but also provide weapons for right action. In a document, which we will have to deal with shortly, we read: 'The mentality of the non-Jews being of a purely animal nature, they are incapable of foreseeing the consequences to which a cause may lead when presented in a certain light. And it is precisely in this difference between Jews and non-Jews that we can easily recognise that we are God's chosen ones, as well as our superhuman nature, in comparison with the instinctive and animal mentality of the non-Jews. They see the facts, but do not foresee them, and are incapable of inventing anything except the material'. Leaving aside the reference to the Jews, of whom this document would like to make the only secret agents of world subversion (how things stand in this regard, we will say later), such considerations generally apply to those we have called the 'objects' of history.

Measured against that of their masked opponents, the mentality of most modern men of action appears primitive. They focus their energies on the tangible, on the 'concrete', and are incapable of grasping, or even of assuming, the interplay of concordant actions and reactions, of causes and effects, beyond an extremely limited and almost always crassly materialistic horizon. The deepest causes of history - and here we can refer both to those that act in a negative sense and those that can act in a positive balancing sense - operate predominantly through what, with an image taken from the natural sciences, can be called the 'imponderables'. They bring about almost insensible changes - ideological, social, political, exceptional, - destined to bring about considerable effects, like the first cracks in a snowdrift, which end up producing an avalanche. They almost never act in a direct way, but rather by giving an appropriate *direction* to certain existing processes that leads to the intended purpose, which even everything that resists ends up serving. Men and groups, who believe they are only pursuing something they want, thus become the means by which something else is realised and made possible, in which a superordinate influence and 'meaning' is revealed. This did not escape Wundt, when he spoke of the "heterogeneity of effects", and Hegel himself, when he introduced the concept of the *List der Vernunft* in his philosophy of history; however, neither thinker was able to enforce their intuitions in adequate frameworks. In contrast to what - at least to a large extent - occurs in the domain of physical phenomena, the discerning historian encounters numerous cases in which the 'causal' explanation (precisely in the deterministic physical sense) fails, because the accounts do not add up, the sum of the apparent historical factors does not equal the total - like someone who, having a five added to a three and a two, does not find a ten as a result, but a fifteen or a seven. Precisely this differential, especially when it presents itself as a differential between what was intended and what happened, between ideas, principles and programmes on the one hand, and their actual consequences in history on the other, offers the most valuable material for investigating the secret causes of history itself. Methodologically, what must be taken care of here, however, is that acumen does not degenerate into reverie and superstition, due to the tendency to see a hidden background everywhere and at all costs. In this respect, every assumption must have character of what in positive enquiry is called a 'working hypothesis': as when something is admitted provisionally, in order to collect and order a given group of apparently isolated facts, only to give it a character no longer of hypothesis but of truth when, at the end of serious inductive work, the whole converges to validate the assumption. Whenever an effect surpasses and transcends its tangible causes, a suspicion must arise; an influence from behind the scenes - for good or ill - must be presented. A problem arises, but great caution must be exercised in investigating it and seeking a solution. The fact that those who have ventured in that direction have instead failed to put the reins on a rambling imagination has brought discredit on a possible science, the results of which could hardly be overstated. And this, too, goes in the direction of what the masked adversary desires. All this, about the general premises proper to a new three-dimensional study of history. After that, let us return to what we said at the beginning. Considering the state of modern society and civilisation, the question arises as to whether we do not have a specific case here that calls for the application of the method in question; that is, whether certain situations of open crisis and profound upheaval in the modern world can be fully explained by 'natural' and spontaneous processes, or whether we must refer to something concerted, to a plan, nevertheless in the making, put into action by forces that are kept in the shadows. In this particular domain, more than one alarm has already been sounded, too many elements competing to the less superficial observers suspicious. At the end of the last century, one Disraeli wrote these significant and oft-quoted words: 'The world is ruled by more people than those whose gaze is not behind the scenes can imagine'. The Malinsky and the De Poncins,

Desiring in general the revolutionary phenomenon, they pointed out that precisely in the present times, where it is recognised that every disease of the individual organism is caused by bacteria, it is claimed that the diseases of the social body, i.e. revolutions and disorders, are instead spontaneous phenomena, arising of their own accord instead of being the effect of invisible agents, as microbes and pathogenic germs are in the organism of the individual. Still others, at the turn of the century, wrote that the public does not realise that 'in all conflicts both within nations and between nations and nations there are, apart from the apparent authors, hidden promoters who by their self-interested calculations make such conflicts inevitable. Everything that happens in the confused evolution of peoples is secretly prepared to ensure the domination of certain men, and it is such men, now illustrious and now unknown, who must be sought behind all political events' (1). In this order of ideas, an interesting document is the well-known *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. We have already dealt with the nature and scope of this document in the introduction to the last Italian edition (2). So here we will limit ourselves to mentioning a few fundamental points. The document in question was presented as a protocol that, taken from a secret Jewish-Masonic organisation, would reveal a plan devised and implemented for the subversion and destruction of traditional Europe. A very violent and complex controversy has been unleashed over the authenticity or otherwise of the *Protocols*, which can, however, be dismissed by Guènon's just observation that a truly occult organisation, whatever its nature, never leaves behind written documents, 'protocols'. Thus, in the most favourable hypothesis, it could have been a writing compiled by people who had had contact with some exponent of this alleged organisation. But neither can one follow those who would certainly dismiss such a document as a vulgar mystification, as a forgery and indeed as plagiarism. The main argument put forward by these people, namely that the *Protocols* at various points reproduce or paraphrase ideas from a booklet written in the period of the Second Napoleonic Empire by Maurice Joly (3), and that unidentified agents provocateurs of the tsarist secret police would have put their hands on it, is indeed irrelevant. Those who speak of plagiarism should bear in mind that we are not dealing here with a literary work and sound copyright. To explain, a general in drawing up his plan could also make use of pre-existing material and writings, not his own, that contained ideas suitable for the purpose: this would be plagiarism, but the question of whether or not such a plan was conceived and implemented would remain completely unaffected. To cut a long story short, leaving aside even the 'authenticity' or otherwise of the document in terms of real protocols stolen from an international secret centre, the only important and essential point is the following: this text is part of a group of various others that in different, more or less fantastic and even fictional forms, have translated the feeling that the disorder of the end times is not random, that it corresponds to a plan of which the text now cited in particular precisely indicates the phases and fundamental instruments. Hugo Wast rightly wrote: 'The *Protocols* may well be false, but they are wonderfully realised' - and a Henry Ford added: 'The only appreciation I can make of the *Protocols* is that they agree perfectly with what is happening. They date back sixteen years, have corresponded to the world situation since then, and still indicate the pace today' (1). If one wanted, one could speak of a prophetic presentiment. But in one way or another, the document's value as a working hypothesis is indisputable: it presents us with the various aspects of the world upheaval - including many of those that were to emerge and assert themselves many years after the *Protocols* were published - as a whole, in which they find their reasoning and are presented in a logical concatenation. As has been said, it is not the case here to proceed to a detailed analysis of the text. It will suffice to recall the main points. First of all, the main ideologies to which we owe the modern disorder are not said to have arisen spontaneously, but were suggested and supported by forces that knew their falsity (1) and had exclusively in view the

destructive and demoralising effects of them. This would already be true of liberal and democratic ideas; the Third Estate, the bourgeoisie, would rightly be mobilised to destroy the previous feudal and aristocratic society, while the world of the working masses was to be mobilised to overthrow the bourgeoisie itself. Another, basic idea of the *Protocols* is that capitalist international and proletarian international are in solidarity despite everything, almost like two columns with distinct goals used tactically to realise a single strategy. The economicisation of life, especially in the context of industry developing to the detriment of agriculture and wealth being concentrated in liquid capital and finance, likewise proceeds from a design, which the phalanx of modern 'economists' have obeyed no less than those who spread demoralising literature, who attack ethical and spiritual values, who deride every principle of authority. Among other things, one speaks of the success that the secret front has rightly ensured not only for Marxism, but even for Darwinism and Nietzscheanism (2); one even goes so far as to consider, in certain cases, anti-Semitism itself as suggested, while more generally, one speaks of the secret monopoly of the press and opinion-forming organs in democratised countries, and of the power capable of paralysing and blowing up the most powerful banks, a power that centralises rootless financial wealth in a few hands and through it controls people, parties and governments. An important goal of all is to strip human personality of the support provided by spiritual and traditional values, knowing that after this it is not difficult to make man a passive instrument of the forces and influences directed by his own secret. The action of cultural demoralisation, materialisation and disorganisation has as its counterpart that which aims to make ever more serious social crises inevitable, collective situations ever more desperate and unbearable, a general conflict being finally seen as the means to finally overwhelm the last, eventual resisters. It is therefore difficult to dispute that such an 'imaginary' plan made known at the beginning of this century did not reflect and anticipate precisely much of what has happened in the contemporary world, not lacking anticipations of what the future itself holds in store for us. It is therefore not surprising that the *Protocols* were given the attention they deserved by various movements of the past that had proposed to react and stem the tide of national, moral and social dissolution of the time. But here they often ended up in dangerously one-sided positions due to a lack of proper discernment, which, again, played into the hands of the enemy. It is not without relation to this that the problem raised by the document question about the leaders of covert warfare must be addressed. As has been said, according to the *Protocols*, the world conspiracy would have the Jews at its head and the work of destroying traditional European and Christian civilisation would have been planned and carried out by them in order to bring about the universal empire of Israel, God's chosen people. This undoubtedly goes beyond the mark, and it is even worth asking whether fanatical anti-Semitism, inclined to see the Jew as the *deus ex machina* everywhere, does not unwittingly play into the hands of the enemy, because as we will say below, one of the means used by the masked forces to defend themselves consists in making all the attention of their adversaries focus on those who are only partly responsible for certain upheavals, in order to understand the rest, that is, to conceal a broader order of causes. One could certainly show that even if the *Protocols* were a forgery, and their authors were agents provocateurs, this does not mean that they do not reflect many ideas congenial to the Law and the spirit of Israel (1). Secondly, it is a fact that many Jews have figured and figure among the promoters of modern disorder, in its most extreme cultural, political and social phases and forms. This should not, however, preclude a more in-depth investigation, capable of presenting forms, to which modern Judaism itself may have served only as one of the instruments. On the other hand, however many Jews are found among the apostles of the main ideologies considered by the *Protocols* as instruments of world upheaval - liberalism, socialism, scientism, nationalism - it is also evident that these ideas would never have arisen and would never have been affirmed without historical antecedents, such as

Reformation, Humanism, naturalism and individualism of the Renaissance, Cartesianism, etc. - phenomena, which certainly cannot be put down, in themselves, to Judaism, but refer to a broader set of influences. It is true that in the *Protocols* the concepts of Judaism and Freemasonry interfere, so that in the ensuing literature there is often promiscuous talk of a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. But even here one must proceed with caution. While recognising the Jewishness of many sectors of modern Freemasonry, while acknowledging the overtly Jewish origin of not a few elements of Masonic symbolism and rituals, the anti-Semitic thesis, according to which Freemasonry is a creature and instrument of Israel, must be considered unacceptable. Modern Freemasonry (and by this designation we are essentially alluding to that which developed from the creation of the Grand Lodge of London in 1717 was certainly one of the societies that promoted modern political subversions, especially in the field of their ideological preparation. However, one also runs the danger of being distorted if, by exaggerating, one brings it all back to the action of mere Freemasonry. Among those who consider the *Protocols* to be a forgery, there are those who have pointed out that several ideas in this writing are akin to those implemented by centralist and dictatorial regimes, so much so that this document is recommended as an excellent manual for those who aspire establish a new Bonapartism or totalitarianism. There is some merit in this observation. This is tantamount to saying that the 'hidden war' from a positive point of view should be conceived within broad and elastic frameworks, such that the part that seemingly conflicting phenomena can also play in it can be understood, and very little recognisable to the basically simplistic formula of the Jewish-Masonic world conspiracy (1). (1) Although the part played by Judaism and Freemasonry in modern subversion is not insignificant, one must therefore be able to recognise the true historical place of action of both, and be aware of the limit beyond which the occult war is destined to develop, using forms that are no longer either Judaism or Freemasonry, and which could even turn against Jews and Freemasons. To realise this, we need only refer to that *law of caste regression*, which we have elsewhere placed as the basis for interpreting the actual meaning of ultimate history (2). (2) From a civilisation ruled by spiritual leaders and a sacred kingship, we have moved on to civilisations ruled by simple warrior aristocracies, these, especially in the form of dynasties, having been overthrown by the civilisation of the Third Estate, the next phase being that of the collectivist civilisation of the Fourth Estate. Now, looking closely at things, modern Judaism as a *pòtere* (i.e. disregarding the concomitant, but scattered and instinctive, disintegration and demoralisation action referable to certain individual Jewish elements and authors) is inseparable from capitalism and finance, which are part of the Third Estate civilisation. Things are not different with modern Freemasonry; it ideologically prepared and supported the advent of the Third Estate and still presents itself today as the guardian of the principles of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, its doctrines serving as a kind of secular religion of modern democracy, along which line it has exercised and still exercises its militant action, now overt and now semi-secret. But all this is part and parcel of the penultimate phase; and if this phase - if, that is, the overall cycle of democratic and capitalist civilisation of the Third Estate - is to give rise to the final, collectivist phase for which it unwittingly paved the way, it is logical that the central guiding force of world subversion in this final period will no longer be played by either Judaism or Freemasonry, and that the main current may even turn against both, almost as if they were residues to be liquidated: as, moreover, can already be seen occurring here and there in countries where regimes controlled by the Fourth Estate (Marxists) are beginning to consolidate, although Jews and Freemasons often contributed to their advent at first. On the other hand, regarding the general extremist Jewish-Masonic thesis that was defended by some quarters yesterday, the current situation confirms its inconsistency. It would indeed be to indulge in fantasy to suppose that the leaders of the great powers in struggle today, the USA, the USSR and Red China, receive agreed orders from a

international centre of Jews and Freemasons (by the way, non-existent in the case of China), acting accordingly to achieve a single end. Again, it is to a much broader order of influences that one must possibly refer by directing one's research in this direction. Also of particular importance for practical purposes is knowledge of the instruments of covert warfare, i.e. the means used by the secret forces of world subversion to conceal their action, prevent that of their adversaries and continue to exert their influence. We will say something about this, warning that for some of the points we will now indicate, the cue was given to us by considerations made on various occasions by Renè Guènon, who among other things was one of the most sensitive minds behind the secret scenes of many of the upheavals of modern times. We will begin with the instrument constituted by the *positivist suggestion*, taking up some hints already made. It is to be assumed that the so-called 'positive' way of considering events and history is more the consequence of a suggestion spread in modern culture by anti-traditional forces to conceal their action, than the orientation proper to a very narrow mentality. Those who believe that history is made solely by the men of revolt and is determined by the most conspicuous economic and political, social and cultural factors, do not see and do not look for the other; but this is precisely what every force that wants to act underground desires. A civilisation dominated by positivist prejudice offers the most propitious field for action from what we have called the 'third dimension'. To a large extent, such is precisely the case with modern civilisation. It is a civilisation rendered short-sighted and helpless by positivist, rationalist and scientific prejudice. It is still a long way from being able to tear the mask off many ideas that continue to form basis of modern mentality and education, ideas that are far less errors and limitations than widespread suggestions promoted with good reason by the forces of anti-tradition. Mention has already been made of certain non-positivistic conceptions of the course of events, which bring in various entities, the 'absolute Spirit', the vital impulse and History itself, hypostatised and capitalised. In this we can see an example of the possible application of a second tool of occult warfare, which is the *tactic of substitutions*. It is used whenever there is a danger of an awakening of the 'objects of history', certain ideas that facilitate the occult play of the forces of world subversion having lost their force. In the case mentioned those confused conceptions serve as a kind of bait for those who are dissatisfied with positivist schemes, so that their eye does not turn where it should. From the fog of such nations the field remains no less hidden than from positivist blindness. One plays with 'philosophy' while the plan continues to unfold. Often the *tactic of substitutions* develops effectively under the guise of the *tactic of counterfeits*. This is what it is all about. It can happen that the effects of the destructive work, having reached the material plane, become so invisible as to arouse a nation, for which ideas and symbols sought for defence and reconstruction, and may even be found. In the best case these are values from the traditional past, which come back to life precisely because of this existential reaction of a society or civilisation threatened by dissolution. In such cases, the secret struggle is not conducted in direct forms; instead, care is often taken to ensure that only certain falsifications and counterfeits of such ideas are spread and enforced. In this way, the reaction is stemmed, diverted or even reversed in the opposite direction, a direction in which the same influences acting in that against which one wanted to defend oneself can be applied. Such tactics can take place in various domains, in the spiritual and cultural field no less than in the political one, and are often used today. one example is 'traditionalism'. It has already been said what 'tradition' means in a superior sense: it is the shape that the overall possibilities of a given cultural area and a given period are given by forces from above, through super-individual and, in essence, also super-historical values, and through *elites* that are able to derive authority and natural prestige from these values. Now, in our times it often happens that a confused desire to return to 'tradition' is wisely diverted into the form of 'traditionalism', which as content has the

custom, *routine*, survival, the mere vestiges of what has been, without understanding their spirit and discarding that which in them is not merely factual but has perennial value. Therefore, such non-traditional but traditionalist attitudes offer a good target to the adversary, whose easy attack against traditionalism is only the cover for an attack against tradition: for which they support the slogans of anachronism, anti-history, immobilism, regressivism and the like - as we have already seen. Thus the reaction is paralysed and the manoeuvre happily leads to the desired result. From the general scheme it would be easy to move on to particular cases. Recent history is full of them. Thus in the same political sphere - the Roman idea with its symbols, the 'Aryan' idea, the very concept of the Empire or *Reich*, and so on - the tactic of falsifying substitutions and counterfeits has often been applied to all this, with deplorable effects that cannot escape any discerning observer. One can thus understand the precise *raison d'être* also of the speculations we made in the first chapter. Fourthly, the *tactic of aversion* must be pointed out. Let us take a typical example. The secret forces of world subversion knew exactly that the basis of the order to be destroyed was the supernatural element, i.e. the spirit, conceived not as an abstraction of all that is human. After limiting the influence that religion, which had come to predominate in the West through the spread of materialism and scientism, could still exert in this respect, the forces of subversion set about ensuring that every tendency towards the supernatural that arose outside the dominant religion of the narrowness of its dogmas was appropriately diverted. So-called 'neo-spiritualism', not only in its worst spiritualist forms, but also in its orientalist and occultist tendencies, plus all the theories about the unconscious, the irrational and the like, is greatly affected by the tactic of inversion. Instead of rising to that which as a truly supernatural element lies beyond the person, here one ends up in the sub-personal and the infra-national, according to an inversion that not infrequently has even sinister characters. The result achieved by this route is twofold. In the first place, it has been easy to extend the discredit that in many cases should rightly have affected these deviations to many ideas that are implicated in them, but that in their essence have nothing to do with them; thus these ideas are placed in a condition where they are no longer too dangerous. Much of what has hitherto been known in the West of the East outside the arid and sterile domain philology and academic specialism itself suffers from such manoeuvring, presenting itself to a large extent as something distorted that limits the positive influence that various aspects of the heritage of authentic Eastern spirituality could exert, and which in reaction provokes the most obtuse and unbalanced 'defences of the West'. As another example, think of the circles that, as soon as it comes to symbols and esotericism, can only think of Freemasonry or theosophism, even when the reference is to ancient, narrow traditions that have nothing to do with either - and the positivist and rationalist prejudice, which in all this only shows superstition and fantasy, does the rest in a certain 'critical' culture. Not much different is the case with militant Catholic apologetics, which sees only naturalism, pantheism and even worse anything that does not fall into its line; these are confusions, the effects of a play of concordant actions and reactions, suffered by not a few representatives of Catholicism itself. The second result does not concern the field of ideas but the practical and concrete one. One is that inverted tendencies towards the spiritual and the supernatural can foster the emergence of dark forces, resulting in devious action against the personality. Many reactions against rationalism and intellectualism, and especially the aforementioned theories of the unconscious, which with psychoanalysis have by now given rise to a vast practice or, at the very least, propitiate various forms of morbid fascination, lead exactly to this. One more tactic: that of the *rebound stroke*. It is used in cases where traditional forces that one wants to strike take the initiative for an action against other equally traditional forces, an action that backfires on its promoters. For example, secret forces

of world subversion through appropriate infiltration or suggestion can make the representatives of a given tradition even think that the best way to strengthen it is to undermine or discredit other traditions. Those who are unaware of the game and because of material interests attack the tradition in the person of a related people, must expect to see it attacked sooner or later also in their own country, by a, shall we say, rebound movement. The forces of world subversion rely heavily on this tactic, whereby they seek by all means to ensure every superior idea succumbs to the tyranny of particularistic interests, proselytising tendencies, and, in other fields, pride and lust for domination. They know perfectly well that this is the best method for destroying all true unity and solidarity and for fostering a state of affairs in which their play will be greatly facilitated. That there is an objective law of immanent justice and, as they say, that the mill of Heaven grinds slowly but grinds fine, they know this well, and they adjust themselves accordingly: they wait for the fruits of such unconsidered initiatives to ripen, and then intervene. This includes, in the political field, the case of any Machiavellian utilisation of revolutionary forces. Short-sighted statesmen have often believed that stirring up or supporting revolution in enemy nations is, in given circumstances, an excellent means of benefiting their own people. Without realising it, or realising it only too late, it is the opposite result they have often arrived at. While they thought they were using the revolution as a means, it was the revolution that was supposed to make them its instruments; after it, through those politicians, had had its life smoothed out in other countries, the revolution almost always caught up with and overwhelmed the former as well. Modern history has been in notable part the theatre of a subversion that spread tragically precisely by this route. Thus it cannot be insisted too strongly that only unconditional loyalty to an idea can protect against covert war; where such loyalty fails, where one obeys the contingent aims of so-called realist politics, the front of resistance is already undermined. In a similar framework is to be seen the rebound action of, for example, the principle of 'self-determination of peoples', which after being used by the democracies as an ideological tool in the Second World War, went on to affect all white peoples by first putting an end to the prestige and pre-eminence of Europe. When the secretive forms of world subversion fear that they have exposed themselves too much or realise that, due to special circumstances, the direction given from behind the scenes has become apparent at least in its greatest effects, they deploy the *tactic of the scapegoat*. They try to make all the adversary's attention be brought to and concentrated on elements that are only partially, or only subordinately, responsible for their illnesses. All reaction is then unloaded on such elements, who become expiatory leaders. And the secret front, after a pause, can resume its game, because the adversaries believe they have now identified the enemy and have nothing else to do. Speaking of the *Protocols of the Elder Saviours of Zion*, we mentioned earlier a possible case of such tactics, with reference to the part attributed to Judaism or Freemasonry. One must therefore beware of any one-sidedness, one must never lose sight of the overall picture of the real secret front. Let us turn to the *tactic of dilution*. It constitutes a particular aspect of the 'tactic of surrogates'. For the particular example we shall now indicate, the following must be premised: the process that led to the current crises has remote origins and developed through several stages

(1). At each of these stages, the crisis was already present, albeit in a latent, potential and non-current form. The theory of 'progress' can be seen as one of the suggestions disseminated by the secret forces of world subversion to turn our gaze away from the origins and the process of falling further and further towards the mirage of the achievements of techno-industrial civilisation. The tragic events of recent times have, however, caused a partial awakening from this hypnosis. Many have begun to realise that the supposed progress was running parallel a race towards the abyss. So stopping and returning to the origins as the only means to restore a normal civilisation, such , for many, the watchword. Then the front

occult has mobilised new means to prevent all radicalism. First of all, here too it put its hand to the slogans of anachronism and reactionarism; then it made the forces that tended towards stages in which crisis and evil were present in less driven, and therefore less recognisable, forms. This trap was also successful. The leaders of the world upheaval naturally know that, having done so, there is no longer much danger: all they have to do is wait, they will soon find themselves back at square one through processes similar to those that have already taken place, but now almost always without the possibility of further resistance to the disintegration. Numerous historical examples could also be given of this tactic, which should be particularly instructive for anyone wishing to take the initiative in a reconstructive action. As a first example, certain features of modern rationalism should be well examined. We know of the revolutionary, subversive and anti-hierarchical function that the collectivist-democratic concept of the nation had in the face of previous forms of European civilisation and political organisation. Now, the point of reference of many who have fought against the various internationals - especially the communist international - has been precisely the concept of the nation, and there has seldom been any concern to define this concept in such a way that it no longer signifies a stage in life that eventually led to precisely what it is that one wants to fight. On this point, it suffices to recall what we have already said about the opposition existing between mass nationalism and the spiritual nation, between the nation-state and the traditional state (c. III). In the first case, nationalism has a levelling and anti-aristocratic function, it is almost a prelude to that wider levelling, the common denominator of which will no longer be the nation, but the international. In the second case, the idea of the nation can also serve as a basis for a resurgence, and serve as an initial reaction against internationalist dissolution; with it, a principle of difference is asserted, which nevertheless must be further applied for an articulation and hierarchy within each individual people. But where knowledge of this opposition is lacking, with indiscriminate nationalism there is a danger of succumbing precisely to the tactic of dilution: a danger that has already occurred. It is in view of this, i.e. of this possible significance of the nationalist orientation, that among other things Soviet Communism, while combating nationalism as a counter-revolutionary phenomenon in its own area, encourages and supports it in the as-yet un-Marxistised areas of the so-called underdeveloped peoples, the supposed victims of colonialism, waiting for further developments to lead to the stage where it can reap its rewards. Let us mention two other examples of the tactic of dilution. One concerns the socio-economic domain and is connected to all 'national' and social-reformist variants of Marxism; it is the same evil in a diluted dose. This also applies to the 'socialist' theories, which, as already mentioned, are like Trojan horses to be introduced into the citadel, in order to conquer it not by a direct attack, but through a natural, logical internal development. The second example concerns the cultural field. The significance of psychoanalytic theories in the whole of modern subversion has already been mentioned. Now, among those capable of sound discernment, a reaction has emerged to the crudest forms of such pseudo-science, corresponding to pure, or 'orthodox' Freudianism. Then the tactic of dilution was used again, the formation and spread of a spiritualised psychoanalysis for the use of the most sensitive palates was propitiated. The result is that those react in the face of Freud and his disciples no longer react, for example, in the face of a Jung, not realising that it is the same inversion, indeed in a more dangerous form because it is more subtle and because a contaminating exegesis here leads more resolutely than the Freudian into the domain of spirituality. Yet another tactic: *exchanging a principle for representatives of it*. In various respects the decadence of traditional institutions began with that of their representatives. But the actual dissolution and destruction was made possible by the confusion between principles and persons - and this is still a weapon of the occult war. When the representatives of a given principle prove to be unworthy, the case against them is made

extend immediately against the principle in itself does not lead primarily against it. Instead of merely noting that given people do not live up to the principle and demanding that they be replaced by qualified men so that normality can be restored, it is asserted that the principle in itself is false, corrupting or expired, that it must be replaced with a different principle. In almost all revolutions, this tactic has played a prominent part. It can also be defined as making a crisis in the system appear as a crisis *of the system*. Examples in this respect are so much within everyone's reach that it is hardly worth reporting here. The attack against the monarchies and aristocracies took precisely this route. Marxism used the same expedient, taking the prevarication of capitalism as a pretext to assault the private economy and banish a collectivist economy. In the spiritual field, too, the examples are numerous. Did not the Lutheran Reformation itself take the corruption of the representatives of the Roman Church as a pretext to question the very principle of authority and a number of fundamental ideas of the Catholic tradition, moving precisely from people to principles? Finally, we would like to mention one last instrument of secret warfare, although it relates to a very particular domain is that of *infiltration by supporters*. It is used in cases where a given organisation of a spiritual or, in general, traditional type enters such a state of degenerescence that its exponents know little more than its internal foundation, the basis of its authority and prestige. The life of such an organisation can then be compared to the automatic life of a being in a somnambulant state or a living body but deprived of its soul. As it were, a spiritual 'vacuum' has formed at the centre, a vacuum that can be occupied, by means of infiltration, by other forces, by subversive forces, which, while leaving appearances unchanged, make the organisation serve ends that are absolutely different, if not opposed to those that were originally its own. It is then not excluded that such subverted elements work to the ruin of what they have come to control, for example by shrewdly creating scandalous reasons to provoke reactions; and in such a particular case, the tactic mentioned earlier, that of confusing principle with people, is naturally brought into play externally. Knowledge of all this can also shed light on many phenomena of yesterday and today. Having spoken of modern Freemasonry as a subversive force is due precisely to this tactic of supplanting and inversion, which is exercised within certain older organisations, of which structures, symbols and hierarchies have subsisted in modern Freemasonry as mere vestiges, while the actual guiding influences have long since been of a completely different nature.

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Let us hope that the fact that we have limited ourselves here to a few examples and have dealt mainly with the principles does not prevent us from recognising the manifold possibilities of the application of these same principles in various domains; for there can be said to be not a single field in which secret warfare has not in some way taken place and does not continue to take place. The most important field for the application of the knowledge of the weapons of covert warfare is, however, the internal one, one's own thoughts. It is here that one should be on one's guard, it is here that one should be able to recognise the subtle influences that try to suggest certain ideas and certain reactions at given junctures. Having reached this point, even if it were not yet possible to detect the adversaries in the environment, they, whatever they may be, would gradually find the main paths of their secret action blocked. We therefore repeat that all this is not philosophical speculation or fantasy, but serious and very positive matters. And we are convinced that no leader or fighter on the front of counter-subversion and tradition can consider himself mature and equal to his tasks before having developed within himself the faculty to present this world of

subterranean causes enough to confront the adversary in the appropriate terrain. Let us remember the myth of the Saviours of the *Protocols*: faced with them, men who only see the 'facts' are like dull animals. There is little hope that anything can be saved when the leaders of a new movement do not also include men capable of complementing the material struggle with a secret and inexorable knowledge, which will now not be at the service of dark forces but of the luminous principle of traditional spirituality.

(Distraeli's sentence is found in his novel *Sybill*; Malinsky and De Poncins' remarks were developed in their book entitled *La guerre occulte* (Paris 1935, also translated into Italian, 2nd ed. Casa Editrice 'Le Rume', Milan 1961), while the last quotation is from NIET, *La Russie d'aujourd'hui* (Paris 1903).

(2 Editions 'Vita Italiana' Rome 1937.

(3 *Dialogue aux enfers entre Montesquieu et Machiavel, ou la politique de Machiavel au XIX siècle, pur contemporain*, Bruxelles 1864.

(1 H. WAST, *Oro*, Buenos Ayres, 1935. p.20. The passage by Ford (the well-known industrialist) is from an article already published in *The World* newspaper (17 February 1921) and developed in his well-known work *The international Jew*. The 1921 article, speaking of the edition of the *Protocols* that came out "sixteen years earlier", alludes to the one edited by Nilus in 1905; but the first draft, a polygraph, seems to date back to 1897.

(1 For example, about communism we read: 'The fact that we have been able to make the non-Jews conceive such an erroneous idea is manifest proof of the petty concept they have of human life compared with ours; on this rests the hope of our success.

(2 As an interesting detail, it should be noted that Darwin, for example, witnessed the triumph of his ideas like few others and immediately found a singularly large number of proselytes for the development and vulgarisation of his subversive theories.

(1 For documentation this see the cited Italian edition of the *Protocols*, pp. 194-208. (1 At the time, we came across a curious pamphlet published almost clandestinely in Paris in 1937 under the title: *La dernière perfidie de la race perfide: Hitler instrument d'Israel*. It supported the thesis that the real occult 'Saviours of Zion' were using the anti-Semitic Hitler himself to provoke a world upheaval, which, in its consequences, would go along with their ultimate aim of striking at the remnants of the values of personality and freedom. It cannot be denied that this writing, which came out before the Second World War and was otherwise full of errors and digressions, reflected, itself, the feeling of something not entirely fantastic, provided one disregarded the reference to Israel and distinguished the various influences, positive and negative, that acted in the Third *Reich*.

(2 See our *Revolt against the Modern World*, cit., part II.

(1 See *Revolt against the Modern World*, cit., part II (*Genesis and Face of the Modern World*).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

LATINITY - - MEDITERRANEAN SOUL

In a previous chapter, we recalled the part that anti-Germanic prejudice played in a certain 'patriotic' conception of Italian history obedient to the suggestions of Masonic and demolitionist ideology. This prejudice can also be found in the cultural domain, especially in the circles of those intellectuals who cherish the myth of Latinity. In this regard, the watchword is that one is 'Latin' and Mediterranean, so our natural tendencies, our elective affinities would go towards other nations of Latin culture, while spiritual barriers would separate us from everything Germanic. Italian and German - it is said - can never

understand each other. Our Latin civilisation and mentality is at odds with everything Germanic. There are those who have brought in the same religious factor by emphasising the Protestantism of the German peoples against the Catholicism of the Latin ones. The fact that Rhenish Germany, Austria and Bavaria are Catholic is rightly not taken into account. This is a misunderstanding due largely to catchphrases and ideas that one does not care to examine in depth, but also to instinctive impatience due to racial components of the Italian people that are not very well ordered, so much so that it is important to be clear on this point for those who want to contribute to a revolutionary-conservative work. Let us begin by asking: what is properly meant by 'Latin'? And to which domain does one refer when using this expression? That in Italy, as mentioned, the myth of 'Latinity' is cherished mainly by literati and intellectual circles is not the case. In fact, it is almost exclusively on the level of literature and the arts, of culture in the most externalistic and flaky sense of the term, that so-called 'Latinity' can in some way be defined. For the rest, however, it would be more economical to speak of a 'Roman element', because it is a matter of reflections of the late classical civilisation preserved among the peoples who had already been brought back into the orbit of the Roman Empire, such as the language of Rome, the Latin language, and of that late civilisation retained various forms. But in fact this 'Latinity' is little more than a plaster, beyond which profound differences, both ethnic and spiritual, not infrequently led to bitter antitheses. In any case, it is important for us to point out that the 'common Latin heritage' cannot be said to be Roman; in the aforementioned aesthetic and humanistic features, in aspects of customs and even in certain legal forms, what is 'Latin' proceeds from a world that is 'Roman' only in name, from a world for which ancient, heroic, native and Catonian Rome would perhaps only have nurtured contempt. Some general considerations would be important here, in terms of values, because from our point of view we would have to specify the very meaning of that 'classical' Greco-Roman world in which Latinising humanists nurture an almost superstitious cult. Without going deep into such a problem, we will only note that the 'classical' myth is a myth very similar to the Enlightenment myth that it was only with the 'conquests' and artistic creations of the Renaissance and all that followed that true civilisation began, after the darkness of the Middle Ages. This aestheticising and anti-traditional mentality can also be found in the classical myth, as it was formed by the aforementioned circles. With regard to both Greece and Rome, a period of civilisation is asserted as 'classical' that, despite its external splendour and refinement, in many respects represented a decadence: it is the civilisation that arose and prevailed when the cycle of the previous heroic-sacred civilisation of both Hellenic and Roman origins was already in its downward arc. And when one does refer back to the origins, the Patino myth itself becomes relative, 'Latinity' appears not to concern the fundamental creative forces of the peoples it would unite. Already in philological terms, it can be observed that while the Romance languages are essentially based on the ancient language of Rome, i.e. Latin, the Latin language, in turn, famously belongs to the general trunk of the Indo-European languages, to which the German idiom itself belongs in equal measure; indeed, it is a fact that the ancient Latin language, if not in terms of vocabulary, then in terms of articulation and syntax (starting with the declensions) is more akin to the Germanic language than to the Romance languages. Things are no different with regard to the ethnic domain, since it has been recognised that both the early Roman as well as the early Hellas were creations of forces from the same Indo-European stock, from which the properly Germanic peoples later broke away. Not only that. It is important to note that there is a reference to this world of origins, the expression 'Latin' takes on a meaning that even overturns the thesis of the current speakers of anti-Nordic Latinity. One of the results of recent investigations into prehistoric and pre-Roman Italy is that the progenitors of the 'Latins' were a people whose ethnic and spiritual parentage with the group of Nordic-Aryan peoples is indisputable. They were an offshoot of the 'war-axe people' practising the rite of burning the dead, , having spread as far central Italy, contrasted with the Oscan civilisation.

sabella characterised by the funerary rite of burial, the relationship of this inhumation civilisation to pre-Indo-European and non-Indo-European Mediterranean and Asian-Mediterranean civilisations is itself visible. Among the oldest vestiges left by such strains are those discovered in Val Camonica. Such vestiges have a significant correspondence with prehistoric races of both North-Atlantic (Franco-Cantabrian Cromagnon civilisation) and North-Scandinavian (Fossum civilisation) primordial races. We find in them the same symbols of a 'solar' spirituality, the same style, the same absence of traces of those telluric-maternal feminine cults) that instead abound in non-Indo-European or Paleo-Indo-European Mediterranean degenerated civilisations (Pelasgians, Crete, etc. . . . In Italy the Maiella civilisation, the Etruscans, etc.). Not only that: there also an affinity between the traces of Val Camonica and the civilisation of the Dorians, which is as good as saying the civilisation of the people who came to Greece from the north and created Sparta, having in their possession, among other things, the cult of Apollo as the Hyperborean god of light. Hence, it could be argued that the movement of peoples from which the Latins derived, and the conclusion of which in Italy had to be Rome, was analogous to the Achaean-Doric migration, which in Greece ended with Sparta: corresponding manifestations - Rome and Sparta - in turn related to the proper northern ones (1). But with the first Romanity and with Sparta, we find ourselves before a heroic-sacral world with its own severe *ethos*, its love of discipline and a virile and dominating hold on the soul, a world that was very little continued in the later so-called 'classical' civilisation (2), from which, in turn, one wants to derive 'Latinity' and the 'unity of the peoples of Latin civilisation'. If, instead, we use the term 'Latin' to refer to the origins, we see a complete reversal of the 'Latin' thesis. The Latins were among the people who carried the influences to which early Romanity owed its greatness and its specific face, having in their own right forms of worship, civilisation and life that were not opposed to, but rather akin to, those that even the Germanic peoples, in their best aspects, had to present in the face of a decadent world that was more than 'Latin', it was now only 'romantic' and largely bizarre. On the other hand, the subsequent "Latinity", beyond the outward vertex and mere vestiges, included heterogeneous forces, susceptible of coming together only when faced with nothing more serious than the "world of letters and the arts, apart from Catholicism and apart from certain forms of feeling, to which not even the term "Latin" can be applied, but if anything, the term "Mediterranean" (1). We will return to this in a moment. For now, we would like to emphasise the importance, not simply historical and retrospective but also practical and normative, of what we have briefly outlined: the similarities between the early Roman way of life and the Spartan way of life are evident and acknowledged, just as, however, are the similarities between both and certain characteristic traits that the Germanic peoples, due to a set of circumstances, retained longer than other nations of the same Indo-European stock. So it is no paradox if those who as 'Italians' are so keen on feeling only 'Latin' and 'Mediterranean' could be brought face to face with the Romans of the heroic period, their intolerance for the latter, for their style of discipline, honour, hierarchy, uprightness, virility, antiexhibitionism and anonymity, would be no less than that aroused in them *by the* anti-Germanic and especially anti-Prussian *animus*. (It is significant that L. Aldington was able to call the Romans 'the Prussians of their time'). That is why we have mentioned that suspicious racial influences certainly play their part in such *animus*; indeed, here we have a touchstone for what is not in order in all too many Italians and for which the thesis of, 'Catholic Latinity' or 'Mediterranean-ness' is but a specious alibi. It is worth noting that in turn, this alibi has not infrequently been associated with the polemics of militant Guelphism, to which it has become convenient to identify, in an anti-Germanic and anti-Ghibelline function, Romanity, Latinity and the Catholic Church ('Roman, Latin and Catholic are an inseparable whole'). Thus there have been those who have come to speak of an antithesis between "Temple" and "Selva", where the "Temple" would represent the Latin-Catholic conception of life, with the principles of authority, order, of transcendence that the would be characteristic, and the "Selva", instead, the chaotic ,

"Nibelung", individualistic Germanic and then Protestant world. Pure amateurism on the part of sectarian intellectuals, who evidently only know Wagner and a few German romantic philosophers, not knowing, or acting as if they did not know, of all that in the Central European peoples was practically preserved in many social strata as an innate disposition very recent times, before the latest catastrophes. Even as far as the more external dominance is concerned, a Pareto rightly pointed out how in Germany, although it is largely Protestant, feelings of order, hierarchy and discipline are very strong, while in Italy, although it is Catholic, all this is present to a very low degree and individualism, disorder, instinctiveness and indiscipline prevail (1). In this lies the true root of the intolerance that a certain Italian type has nurtured for the Germanic element. It is not only a question of a way of life, but also of ethics. An example: in a Germanic heroic saga there is a characteristic episode: a prince, invited to the court of King Etzel, is warned that he is likely to lure him a trap. The prince replies: 'I will go anyway, because if I do, so much the worse for Etzel'. He meant that he might lose his life, but Etzel might lose his honour. Instead, according to a certain 'Mediterranean' mentality, the one who knows best how to deceive others enjoys the highest esteem: without any regard for the respect he owes to himself. And here a typical case comes to mind, concerning one of the main speakers of the anti-Germanic Latin Catholic myth, Guido Manacorda. In one of his lectures, he thought it would be in good taste to make some witticism about the 'gloomy' Germanic conception of loyalty. He related one of the legends about Faust, according to which he sealed the well-known pact with his word of honour. A hermit warns Faust of the abyss towards which he was heading and of the need to break that pact. Faust knows this and is about to act accordingly, when he remembers that he has given his word. Then everything falls apart, he feels he can do nothing. Manacorda, with sinister wit, commented here: 'One of us Latins would have found a way to do the devil too! But on the problem of ethics and style we will immediately return to the subject. For now, let us note that the myth of the Italian-Germanic 'Axis' could have had a special significance not only from a political point of view but also from a moral and spiritual one, for the purpose of a mutual integration of the two cultures (1). This is one of the reasons why the 'Axis' was sabotaged and was said to be 'unpopular', the contrast between the confused nationalistic and patriotic myth linked to remnants of Risorgimento ideologies, and the aspiration towards a strong and 'Roman' state having its own share, in such intolerances, nurtured even by not a few who then called themselves fascists. All of them can be happy now that Italy has returned to being itself, that is, to being the little Italy of mandolins, museums, 'Sole mio' and the tourist industry (apart from the democratic quagmire and the Marxist infection), having been 'liberated': freed from the hard task of giving itself a form inspired by its highest tradition, not to be called 'Latin', but Roman, when speaking of racism many think of nothing but anti-Semitism, that is, they refer to the simple anthropological and biological domain, only a few have an idea of the significance that such a doctrine can have from a practical and formative point of view; and yet also of its political importance. However, no more will be said about this here than is necessary for the specific order of ideas I am dealing with. First of all, it should be noted that in modern racism, race is not considered within the framework of those general classifications, whereby school textbooks speak of white, yellow, black and the like. Instead, race is conceived of as a more elementary r more specialised unit, so that within the white race itself - to limit ourselves to it - and therefore also within all white-race peoples, various races are considered to be present and acting. These elemental races, moreover, are defined in terms that are not only biological and anthropological, but also psychological and spiritual. Each of the racial components corresponds to its own differentiated dispositions, forms of sensitivity, values and conceptions of life (1). There are currently no civilised peoples or nations composed of pure individuals of a single race. All peoples are now made up of more or less stable racial mixtures. From

theoretical domain one moves to the practical one, to 'active racism', when one takes a stand against the racial components of a given nation not recognising them all as having the same value, the same dignity and above all the same right to set the tone and shape the whole. Then a choice, an election and a decision are imposed. One of the components will be given pre-eminence, referring to the values typical of the human ideal that correspond to it. For the Germanic peoples as a whole, this, a superior race component to the various others mixed with it, has been inclined to attribute it to the Nordic element. Wanting to consider Italy, the same part of strength that is superior, by right, over the rest, could be attributed to the Roman element. And here we can take up what was said earlier. As a premise, it is essential to overcome the frivolous boastfulness of that certain nationalism, according to which the mere fact of having the same homeland and, behind it, the same history would constitute the extreme criterion, hence the custom of an indiscriminate exaltation at all costs of all that is 'ours'. In fact, just as in every great historical nation, so too in the Italian nation, despite a certain uniformity of a common type, there are very different components, and it is important not to create illusions, but to recognise objectively what, while being 'ours', very little corresponds to a superior vocation. As we can see, this is the counterpart of what we have already considered, in the politico-cultural field, in terms of "choice of traditions" (c. VIII). The creation of a new state and a new civilisation will always be ephemeral when the one and the other do not have a new man as their substratum. In the case Italy, if this problem were to be tackled by a revolutionary-conservative movement, the differentiation of such a man presents itself as arduous, indeed problematic, due to the presence of suspicious ethnic components, chaotic and anarchic inclinations, character defects, unfavourable activism, and mistaken vocations. Having already developed the myth of Latinity, another element must now draw our attention, a less intellectualistic element, a more concrete element than the 'common Latin civilisation'. This element can be called 'Mediterranean'. The Italian oscillates between two limits constituted one by the Roman element, the other by the Mediterranean element: they are the upper and lower limits of possibilities he generally holds within himself, and of a heritage handed down to him over the centuries. To come to an internal decision, to favour the crystallisation and ever sharper formation in the sense of the first element - such would therefore be the task, both individually and collectively and politically. this task implies a twofold analysis. On the one hand, it would be necessary to highlight the style and character that, regardless of any form of expression linked to the past, can be considered typical for the Roman component. On the other, one would have to identify the undesirable 'Mediterranean' qualities equally present, not to say prevalent, in the Italian complex, and then see in what sense their rectification is possible. With regard to the first point, one should be able to extract from Romanity a living content, not having to do with rhetorical assumptions, with museums and erudite dissertations, but such that even a simple man would find it intelligible, without the need for culture and historical notions. This is why we have spoken of 'elements of style'. These are elements to be extracted from what is known of Roman tradition and custom, knowing also in this respect how to distinguish clearly, because - and we have already mentioned this in connection with the classical world - there is Romanity and Romanism. Alongside the Romanity of the origins, which reproduced in a special and original form a type of culture and custom common to the main Indo-European higher civilisations, there is a 'Ciceronian' Romanity, an Asiatic Romanity, a Catholic Romanity, and so on. Points of reference are *not* to be sought in them. What may be valid in them, for our purposes can be traced back to the former. This original Romanity had its basis in a human figure defined by a certain set of typical dispositions. First and foremost, a dominating attitude, enlightened audacity, concise speech, precise and consistent as well as meditated action, and a cool sense of dominance, free from personalism and vanity, are to be desired. To the Roman style belong *virtus* not as moralism but as virilism and

courage, *fortitudo* and *costantia*, i.e. strength of mind; *sapientia*, in the sense of reflexivity, awareness; *discipline*, as the love of one's own law and form; *fides* in the specifically Roman sense of loyalty and fidelity; *dignitas*, which in the ancient patrician aristocracy was strengthened in *gravitas* and solemnitas, in measured, serious solemnity

(1). To the same style belong the precise action, without grand gestures; a realism that does not mean materialism but love for the essential; the ideal of clarity, which only in certain Latin peoples had to turn into rationalism; an internal balance and a distrust for any abandonment of the soul and for any confused mysticism; a love of limits; the attitude to unite without confusion, in view of a higher purpose or an idea, as free beings. We can also add *religio* and *pietas*, which do not signify religiosity in the most recent sense, but instead signify, for the Roman, an attitude of respectful and dignified veneration and at the same time, of trust, of reconnection with the subvertible, felt to be present and acting with individual, collective and historical human forces. We are of course far from thinking that every Roman incorporated these traits; they nevertheless constituted, so to speak, the 'dominant', they were consubstantial in the ideal felt by each as specifically Roman. Likewise, these elements of style have their own evidence, they are not tied to past times, they can in any period act as character-forming and responsive forces. They have a *normative* value. At worst they have a *measuring* value. Moreover, it is not the case that they should be and, for that matter, required to set the tone for the rest, incorporate them. After that, we need to identify the other pole, namely the 'Mediterranean' style elements. As we use it, the term 'Mediterranean' requires clarification. People have often spoken of Mediterranean civilisation, of the Mediterranean spirit, even of the Mediterranean race, with little concern to indicate what is meant by such vague and elastic designations (1). 'Mediterranean' simply indicates a space, an area, in which very different cultures, spiritual and racial forces have met or clashed, without ever having arrived at a single typical civilisation. In anthropology, the 'Mediterranean' myth was launched in the last century by Giuseppe Sergi; he had sustained the existence of a Mediterranean race of African origin to which many Italic peoples would have belonged, but also the Pelasgians, Phoenicians, Levantines (2) and other semi-semitic peoples: unflattering kinships, for which the designation of 'bastard brotherhoods' already used by Mussolini with regard to the myth of Latinity is appropriate. Sergi's theory is now outdated. We, too, believe it appropriate to use the term 'Mediterranean' to designate certain suspicious ethnic and spiritual components, which, in addition to other more or less mixed Mediterranean and 'Latin' peoples, are also present in various strata of the Italian people, in opposition, however, to its nobler and more original core, not to be called 'Mediterranean', which reflects the 'Roman' element. Psychologists have attempted to define the Mediterranean type not so much anthropologically as in terms of character and style

(3). Well, in such descriptions we can recognise without difficulty the other pole of the Italian soul, negative aspects that the Italian substance also presents and which, if we were to devote ourselves to the selective task mentioned above, should be rectified in it. Firstly, the love of exteriority and gesture is 'Mediterranean'. The Mediterranean type needs a stage, if not in the worst sense of vanity and exhibitionism, at least in the sense that he often draws the impulse and animation even for noble, notable and sincere things from a relationship with others who see him, and that concern for the effect he will have on them plays a very important part in his conduct. Hence, precisely, inclination to 'gesture', that is, to give action the character of something that attracts attention and imposes itself, even where the person acting knows that he only has himself as a spectator. In the Mediterranean man, therefore, there is a certain splitting between an 'I' that performs the part and another 'I' that considers it from the point of view of a possible spectator or observer, and takes pleasure in it: more or less as the actor does (1). Let us repeat: it is a matter, here, of style, the action or work having, in itself, an actual value. But it is a style that is not very Roman, it is a flailing and

an alteration, it is the antithesis of the ancient maxim of *esse non haberi*, of the style by which the ancient Roman civilisation could be called that of the anonymous heroes. In broader frameworks, the opposition could be formulated as follows: the Roman style is monumental, monolithic, the Mediterranean style is instead choreographic-theatrical, spectacular (see also the French concept of *grandeur* and *gloire*). Therefore, should this 'Mediterranean' component of the Italian man be rectified, the best model would be that of the ancient race of Rome, the sober, severe, active style, free of exhibitionism, measured, with a calm awareness of one's own dignity. To have a sense of what one is and of one's own worth regardless of any external reference, to love distance as much as actions and expressions reduced to the essential, to denude oneself of all scenography and concern for effect - all these elements are surely fundamental to the eventual formation of a superior type. And if, with the Mediterranean man, the Italian type has in common the aforementioned splitting (of actor and spectator), this splitting should be used for the careful surveillance of one's conduct and expressions, which would shed all primitive immediacy and study the expression itself not for the 'impression' made on others and with concern for their judgement, but for the style one intends to give oneself. The inclination to exteriority is easily associated with a personalism that degenerates into individualism. Here we have another unfavourable characteristic aspect of the Mediterranean soul, the tendency, precisely, towards a restless, chaotic, undisciplined individualism. Politically, it is this tendency that, by gaining the upper hand, by fomenting continuous struggles and contrasts, led the Greek city-states to ruin, while it had already contributed, as a positive factor, to their articulated formation; it is this tendency that we find again in the turbulence of the lower empire, and it is this tendency that finally bursts out in medieval Italy in particularisms, schisms, struggles, factions, rivalries of all kinds. And if the Italian Renaissance has its sides of splendour, there is also no lack of problematic aspects proceeding precisely from this Mediterranean individualism intolerant of every general and strict law of order, dissipating often precious possibilities in purely personal positions and in the fireworks of a creativity detached from every higher meaning and every tradition: the author, rather than the work, here constituting the centre. Thus, going down a level, the same 'Mediterranean' component can be found in the contemporary genialoid type, critical at all costs, always ready to assert a contrary thesis in order to show off, adept at finding way around an obstacle and circumventing a law. Lower still are the malice, the cunning (knowing how to make the other 'fool') that are almost synonymous with intelligence and superiority for the man in question, whereas the 'Roman' man would feel it a degradation, a lowering of his dignity. This point has already been touched upon above, in the episode relating to the Faust legend. The 'Roman' chastity or sobriety of speech, expression and gesture is contrasted with the gesticulating, boisterous and disorderly exuberance of the Mediterranean type, its mania for communicativeness and expansiveness, its poor sense of distance, hierarchy and silent subordination. As a counterpart to these characteristics one often has a poverty of character, a disposition to take fire - or get drunk - with mere words, a 'Spanishness' in a bad sense: verbosity, an ostentatious and conventional sense of honour, susceptibility, a preoccupation with appearances but with little content (what could be said of the old Spanish aristocratic type: *pobre in palabras pero in obras largo* - poor in speech rich in deeds, to be compared with this characterisation of Many: 'Speak little, do much, be more than seem' - leads back to the 'Roman' line. With the so-called 'desert race' of Clauss's psycho-anthropological classification, and perhaps as an effect of the presence of something of that race in him, the Mediterranean man often has in common a temperament as intensive and explosive as it is changeable, tied to the moment, the flare-ups, the immediacy and vehemence of desire or effect in the passionate life, the occasional intuitions in the intellectual one. a style of psychic balance and measure

is not his strong suit. While in appearance, especially when in company, he seems cheerful, enthusiastic and optimistic, in reality, when alone, the Mediterranean man experiences sudden downturns, discovers gloomy and disconsolate inner perspectives that make him shy away from solitude with anguish and push him back towards exteriority, into noisy sociability, effusions and passion. While noting this, it is obvious that in any rectification one should not proceed by simple antitheses. Nietzsche's saying: 'I measure a man's worth by his power to delay his reactions' can certainly serve as a general basic principle against disorderly impulsiveness and 'explosiveness'. But Nietzsche himself warned against any morality that aimed to dry up, rather than channel, every impetuous current of the soul. The capacity for control, balance, continuity in feeling and wanting must not lead to a drying up and mechanization of being, such as appears in certain negative aspects of Central European or Anglo-Saxon man. It is not a matter of suppressing passionality and giving the soul a beautiful, regulated and homogeneous, but flat form, but rather of organising one's being integrally at the capacity to recognise, discriminate and adequately utilise the impulses and lights that spring from the depths. That possibility has a preponderance in many Italian Mediterranean types cannot be disputed, but this disposition is resolved not in a defect, but in an enrichment, where it finds its corrective in a firmly organised life. A more clearly negative element in the Mediterranean type is sentimentalism. Here it is worth distinguishing sentimentalism from true sentimentality, the former being, of the latter, the debunking and rhetoric. Now, it is the former that plays a preponderant part in various expressions typical of the Mediterranean soul. As an example, one can point to a whole set of corny songs of yesterday and today; the success and echo they have in the popular soul despite all that is profoundly insincere in them, are significant. The Mediterranean man would always be inclined to set himself up as the defender of himself, just as the Nordic man would be inclined to set himself up as the judge of himself. The former would always be more lenient with himself than with others and impatient to examine the background of his inner life in a clear and objective light. This opposition is somewhat one-sided. Generally speaking, one must not overlook the dangers inherent in morbid introspection - think of the line that leads on the one hand to psychoanalysis and the psychology of Dostojewskian types, and on the other to certain guilt complexes or existential angst. A style of simplicity and sincerity above all with regard to one's own soul is nevertheless essential for a superior human type, as is the precept of being strict with oneself, understanding and friendly with others. Specific connections with the racial factor, however, exist only partially in this regard. Rather, one should consider the importance that matters of sex have for the Mediterranean type. The sexualisation of morals on the one hand, and on the other the constitution of women and heroism almost as fixed ideas, are certainly not only 'Mediterranean' things; in the latter, rather, one of the general phenomena of every degenerating civilisation is to be seen. However, one cannot deny the prominence that this inclination has in the average Mediterranean and Mediterranean-southern type, in contrast to what was proper to the best Roman ethics which gave woman and love their rightful place, neither too high nor too low, and knew how to point out the truly fundamental values for a clear and virile formation of character and existence, without puritan moralisms (1). In general, relations between the two sexes in Italy are far from satisfactory. "Southern 'temperament' with its primitivisms or its updated type of the *Latin lover*, subsisting regime of bourgeois prejudices with hypocrisies, inhibitions, conventionalisms and, on the sidelines, a certain petty corruption as a consequence of the times - all this is far from a line of clarity, sincerity, freedom and courage. But the subject would require special treatment, for which this is not the place (2), since it involves more general problems than those of Mediterranean characterology alone. Having briefly outlined these opposing elements of style, it is worth repeating that they are

two limits. The 'Roman' type qualities represent the *positive limit* of latent dispositions in the best parts of our people, just as 'Mediterranean' corresponds to the *negative limit* and to the less noble part of it, and is likewise found as a component in other peoples, especially of the 'Latin' group. However, it must be realised without pretence that all too often behaviour close to the 'Mediterranean' limit has been regarded, especially abroad, as typically Italian, and that it is precisely the 'Mediterranean' component that seems to have gained the upper hand in Italian life as a whole since the Second World War. But a process in the opposite direction would not be inconceivable, under certain conditions. However, as has been said, it alone could create the basis for a new state and a new society, since there is no doubt that formulas, programmes and institutions are of little use when they are not matched, at least in a dominant *elite*, by a given human substance. In every man of today, various possibilities are present in principle, sometimes referring back to primordial inheritances. While in the heights of our history we recognise the Aryo-Roman component, in the periods of crisis and obscurity of it we can discern the emergence and prevalence of what we have conventionally called, because, after all, it is rather a matter of Mediterranean detritus and residue, of influences of non-Indo-European races with almost no history, or products of ethnic breakdown and erosion. In the rectifying and shaping action, the political myth, in the Sorelian sense of the galvanising force idea, will always play a fundamental part. The myth reacts on the environment by enacting the law of elective affinities: right, it frees up those possibilities of individuals and the environment that correspond to it, while the others are silenced or neutralised. Selection also naturally occurs in reverse, depending on the nature of the myth. Thus the communist myth and the democratic myth are such that they appeal to what is most promiscuous and degraded in today's man, and it is to the mobilisation of this element with the inhibition of every different, higher possibility and sensitivity that corresponding movements owe their successes. If rectification were to come into question, results could clearly not be expected overnight. In addition to the aforementioned condition, consisting of the presence of a political myth capable of creating a given climate and a well-defined human ideal, a persistent action over a sufficiently long period of time would be required, stronger than the fallout and possible re-emergence of opposing possibilities. As we know, attempts had been made yesterday in Italy to initiate developments, the most serious need, although only felt by a minority, having been to bring a 'Mediterranean' Italy increasingly towards a 'Roman' Italy, an adequate integrative counterpart having been the initiated detachment of the 'Latin sisters' and the rapprochement with the Germanic people if one did not limit oneself to the level of mere political interests. It goes without saying that given Italy's current climate of democratic slums and Marxist intoxication, to re-propose such problems today would be pure utopia. This does not, of course, touch on the intrinsic and normative value of these and other 'outdated' ideas: outdatedness, which can only fail at the point of fracture and reaction from the depths, which not infrequently manifest themselves in almost organic terms on the verge of dissolving processes.

(1 In this respect, one can essentially refer to the research of F. ALTHEIM, see, e.g., his work *Die dorische Wanderung in Italien*.

(2 Here we adhere to the meaning given by the humanists to the term 'classical'; for us, however, things are in the opposite sense, as 'classical' we consider precisely the pre-humanistic and elementary world of the origins, having in view less the arts than the worldview and the general style of life.

(1 Moreover, reactions against 'Latinity' seen as a factor of decadence and distortion with respect to the most authentic and valid forces of the race were not lacking in peoples of the same 'Latin' group - for example, in France itself.

(1 V. PARETO, *General Treatise on Sociology*, Florence²1923 \$, 1856.

(1 Cf. also J. EVOLA., *The Bow and the Club*, c. XIII (Romanity, Germanicity and the Light of the North) where this order of ideas is taken up and developed.

(1 We ourselves have made a contribution to the development of the doctrine of race in this not merely biological sense, by asserting the concepts of race of the soul and race of the spirit over and above that of the body: cf. *Synthesis of the doctrine of race*, Hoepli, Milan 1941. In Germany, L. F. Clauss in particular carried out his research in a similar sense.

(1 Such are the elements of style highlighted by H. F. K. GU'NTHR, *Lebensgeschichte des römischen Volkes*, Pàhl, 1957.

(1 In one of our early writings *Pagan Imperialism*, Atanòr, Todi-Roma 1928) we ourselves spoke of a 'Mediterranean tradition'. What we actually meant was to be clarified in later works, especially in *Revolt against the Modern World*. Already the German edition of that book no longer bore that designation.

(2As for erroneous myths, it may be recalled that Gioberti argued for the primacy of the Italian race on the basis that, according to him, it was 'a noble descendant of the Pelasgians'. The Pelasgi, in reality were archaic Mediterranean degenerate peoples and in any case foreign to those who later created the Hellenic and Roman civilisations.

(3 The most notable contribution has been made in this regard by the aforementioned L. F. CLAUSS (see especially *Rasse und Seele*, München, 1937). In what follows we will frequently take our cue from his typology, supplemented with that of other authors. In such research we often speak of 'western man' or 'vèstide' (*westiche Rasse*) more or less in an equivalence of meaning with 'Mediterranean'.

(1 In this respect, D'Annunzio's 'Mediterranean' style according to this trait can be seen as one of the most characteristic phenomena, if one does not consider in it only the aspect of art, but a certain style, unmistakable in everything Gabriele d'Annunzio did, even as a soldier and leader.

(1 Cf. V. PARETO, *La mythe vertuiste*, Paris, 1911, p. 166: Many authors are misled (about Romanity) by not sufficiently distinguishing three very different things: virtuosity, temperance, dignity. The Romans ignored the first, held the second in great consideration, in even greater consideration the earth'.

(2 For this we refer to our book *Riding the Tiger*, Scheiwiller, 2nd ed, Milan 1971.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE PROBLEM OF BIRTHS

Among the factors in the disorder and crisis of modern times, apart from those due to processes of subversion that, in part, as mentioned above, cannot be considered as spontaneous, there are undoubtedly other events of a natural character and which are only efficient because man does not take a stand against them. A particularly important factor of this second kind is *population growth*. There is no doubt that, if it were possible to bring the world back to the population density that existed - say - three centuries ago maintain the current degree of material civilisation the social and economic issues that plague peoples today would be rendered almost irrelevant, a large part of the situations from which the revolutionary forces benefit their action would be removed, would move towards a détente and decongestion that would limit any activist frenzy - first of all, and greatly propitiate, with a new free space, the return of the world to conditions of normality. That instead we proceed in the opposite direction, and at an accelerated pace, is well known.

The alarm that was left yesterday with the formula: 'races die', proved false. Nor have the destructions of a war on a 'total' scale, sparing neither defenceless towns, nor women and children, been worthwhile, if we see that, apart from Italy, the countries of Central Europe themselves - the hardest hit by the destruction of the last conflict - are increasing in population compared to the anti-war figures. We find ourselves, then, as if faced with an ever-increasing flood, which has the effect of exacerbating crises and unrest of all kinds - and one suppress a movement of revolt in thinking that in this we are not dealing with a fact, but with something that men could very well dominate. Here we are presented with a typical case of the arrangement that exists in modern Westerners between control in the outer and inner realms: The elemental forces of nature are bent by technology to suit man's ends or not to be harmful; but nothing is done about the spread of births, because, to intervene, man must act on himself, on his own prejudices and instincts. It is well known that the danger of superpopulation had already been denounced during the last century, especially by Malthus. The point of view from which he started, however, was entirely materialistic, as well as being of relative consistency; in any case, it is *not* for us the decisive one for a serious consideration of the subject. The only danger is not, as Malthus believed, that the means of subsistence and food at a given moment become insufficient in the face of the increased population of the earth. Given all the expedients that might eventually be resorted to, it would only present itself in the distant future, at a point, before reaching which many unpleasant things not foreseen by the speakers of continuous and uninterrupted progress might occur. On the material plane alone, the crisis arising from superpopulation for the age in which we live and the times to come presents itself in different terms. With superpopulation, the problem of the occupation of the labour force is exacerbated, just as the production processes are inevitably intensified, which in turn, through their determinism, lead to the strengthening of the demonisation of the economy with the effect of the increasing subjugation of the individual, the reduction of all free space, of all autonomous movement in modern cities teeming, as in rotting, with anodyne being in 'mass civilisation'. This is the most important aspect of the problem. Sombart had rightly seen that the decrease in population would be one of the few ways to deal a death blow to high capitalism, to this 'unleashed giant' and destroyer, without having to make changes that would be fatal to any normal social-economic order. Instead, as has been said, the current, after a few setbacks, has continued to move in the opposite direction, so it is the prospects mentioned before that are in store for us in the near future if we do not decide to react. For this reaction, we should first of all clear the ground of errors and prejudices that still foment a passive attitude in the face of the scourge of superpopulation. As far as political domination is concerned, one must take a stand against the myth expressed in the formula: 'Number is power'. The attempt to set up an imperialist policy on the basis of a demographic campaign was one of the distortions, which must certainly be recognised as such, of fascist ideology. The power of numbers is that of mere brute mass, a power in itself very relative, because even hordes need to be properly led. Every true empire was born of a race of conquerors who did not because they 'had no place in the sun', but because they suffered from demographic excess, but rather on the basis of a superior vocation and qualification subjugated lands and peoples, preserving themselves as a dominating minority. Was it perhaps the very impulse of a compressed and swarming superpopulation that led the Romans, the Achaemenids, the Franks, the Spaniards, the first Islamic armies, the English themselves of yesterday to domination? Considering then the phase in which factual domination should integrate

with spiritual factors, so that mere subjection gives rise to a natural recognition in a system thus acquiring a superior legitimacy and stability, even greater is the emphasis to be placed on factors irreducible to mere numbers and the power of numbers. There is more, as the internal problems of a people are concerned. Wherever indiscriminate population growth is promoted, or even not fought against, the deleterious effects of the law of counter-selection are to be expected. In fact, it is the inferior races and the lowest social strata that are the most prolific. Thus it can be said that while the number of the higher, more differentiated elements increases in arithmetic proportion, that of the lower elements grows in geometric proportion, resulting in a fatal involution of the whole. The crumbling and then the collapse of the great imperial organisms has often occurred precisely as a result of this: as if by a tide from below, by a teratological expansion of the base, constituted by a promiscuous and 'proletarian' element derived from *proles* and leading back to the idea of an animalistic prolificacy. As Mereshkowsky rightly noted, it applied above all to those whose only creative capacity was to beget children - men in body but almost eunuchs in spirit; such a direction, in its logical development, leading towards that 'ideal' society in which there are no longer any classes, indeed neither men nor women, but comrades and companions, almost asexual cells of an immense anthill. Politically, the demographic increase cannot but cause a logjam that creates critical international situations, up to possible wars that no right and no superior idea can justify: to the simple quantity, to the simple condition of 'proletarian nation' corresponds neither a right nor an idea. Regardless of war solutions (for the outcome of which it must also be in mind that the importance of the numerical potential alone has been relativised due to the technical type of warfare of recent times), demographic excess can only be worth forcing or begging for a 'space' among other peoples for the emigratory export of 'labour sellers' destined more or less to become denaturalised and disperse among other peoples. If the logjam persists, the fatal effects will be internal crises and social tensions representing manna from heaven for the minds of the leaders, of Marxist subversion. What particular, deleterious consequences the indiscriminate demographic increase has - which, as we have said, results in a numerical superiority of the lower, 'proletarian' strata - when a democratic regime is in force, everyone can easily see: because in a democracy, with 'universal suffrage', it is precisely the number that ensures power, breaking down the limits by which, in other regimes, the numerical growth of the 'base' could have little effect on the minority, the *elite* that firmly occupied the key positions in the state. Leaving aside the aforementioned political considerations on both religious and bourgeois prejudices that make people shy away from birth control, we will limit ourselves to a few brief observations. The Catholic religion, as is well known, has made the biblical religious precept concerning the multiplication of the species its own. It is, this. One of the instances in which the Church has gone so far as to confer an ethical value on things that have only a practical, relative and, in the present times, outdated value. The Jewish precept was justified only by the conditions of peasants in which - as is still the case today in those few rural areas where similar situations still exist in part - since there was a need for labour, a numerous offspring seemed desirable and providential. This has nothing to do with religion or ethics. From a certain religious, rather ascetical point of view, one can even condemn the pleasures of sex in general, and the ascetical line of early Christianity ran predominantly along these lines. But for ordinary life and, in general, wherever ascetic vocations are not present, to legitimise and sanctify sexual union and marriage only when they aim at procreation, declaring them sinful in all other cases, is a real enormity. In practice, what does this mean, except that the religious viewpoint here goes approve, if not encourage, the most primitive and animalistic course of an instinct? Fertilisation essentially implies a state of complete abandonment of man to the sexual act, while one of the most natural means of evading fertilisation implies a certain

renunciation, a certain predominance of the will, a control in the face of the most primitive impulse of instinct and desire. Well, precisely this second disposition, in every other case, the Church formally praises and approves: the predominance of intellect and will over sensibility. Instead, when it comes to sexual union, to hold obtusely to the ancient, outdated precept of Jewish law, out of hypocrisy or out of a theological hatred of sex as such, and the opposite line that Catholic morality has approved: that of those who supinely play the game of the Schopenhauerian 'genius of the species', through truly *more ferarum* conjunctions. Let us repeat: one could understand the precept of celibacy and chastity, with the condemnation en bloc of the pleasure of sex and the use of women, from the point of view of an ascetic morality and for supernatural purposes. Even the libertine, who elevates pleasure to an art, to say nothing of what may be proper to a line of 'Zionism' (a line that may have had a religious chrism in antiquity) is undoubtedly above those who would follow the Catholic view to the letter. Moreover, the Church seemed to be willing to make some concessions. While the Second Vatican Council's concern to 'keep up with the times' has had a number of regrettable consequences, on the positive side, however, one can ascribe to the explicit recognition that not procreation alone, but 'love' alone can be the legitimate foundation of marriage, and revisionist tendencies have also made their way into 'birth control', where it seems that for the Church, the problem is now not so much the thing itself, but the means to be declared lawful. However, it is enough to see what, for example, a Catholic existentialist philosopher like Gabriel Marcel was able to write in horror about repressive measures against birth control, measures that are "blasphemous against Life", to realise the tenacious persistence of the prejudices proper to Catholics even outside official doctrine. Apart from these religious prejudices, the failure to take a stand against births stems from a mentality in which the power of catchphrases and sentiments contained with a long margin of hypocrisy and lies plays a large part. For example, there is a whole slurry of bourgeois rhetoric regarding children, child-worship, and the desire to have children. In the vast majority of cases, it is not at all true that one wants children and that this is the essential motive when a man joins a woman. Children simply 'come'. A referendum held in central Europe, for example, gave this result: 45%, on getting married, had not thought about having or not having children: 30% *did not* want them; only 25% men and women definitely wanted them. As far as a revolutionary-conservative and resistance movement is concerned, there is first and foremost a need for men for being free of bourgeois sentimental complexes should be a matter of course, and who, having to follow a line of absolute militant commitment and be ready for anything, should feel that 'starting a family' is almost a betrayal. Moreover, there were ancient Orders in which celibacy was the rule. For the rest, it must be recognised what is rightly contained in the well-known Nietzschean maxim: 'Man must be educated for war, woman for the warrior's rest (or refreshment = *Erholung*); the rest is nonsense'. In any , the ideal of the 'society of men' clearly cannot be the parochial, petit-bourgeois ideal of 'home and children'; on the contrary, we believe that in the personal sphere, the right to a wide margin of sexual freedom, for the men in question, can certainly be recognised, as opposed to moralism, social conformity and heroism in slippers. However, a further instance could be considered. Without succession, this *elite* would begin and end without leaving anything behind: it would seem natural that it should also concern itself with its descendants and that, by multiplying through procreation, it should cope as much as possible with the threatening growth of the lower strata. But there are various reservations to be made about this. First of all, the example of those secular Orders

religious who had celibacy as a principle indicates that a continuity can also be ensured by means other than physical procreation. Apart from those who should constitute available shock force, the formation of a second group that would take care of the hereditary continuity of a selected and protected bloodline as the counterpart of the transmission of a political-spiritual tradition and worldview would certainly be desirable: the ancient nobility presented the example. But to pursue such an end today would be quite utopian, it would mean closing one's eyes to reality, disregarding the general social and existential conditions now prevailing. However, within this framework, if one wishes, one can run the adventure of paternity, where something of the meaning and dignity of paternity can subsist in a modern family, *having, however, well ascertained, with a precise examination of conscience, whether the other end is not by chance a pretext for giving free rein to one's own pro-ecrative incontinence.* It is obvious, in any case, that there is little thought of exercising a formative action on the offspring, in a family that to a certain extent is not brought back to the traditional, almost 'Roman' type: an indispensable counterpart, this, which is, however, very difficult to achieve in the West today, which is almost non-existent. But even in the best hypothesis, one cannot sensibly think of competing for prolificacy with the lower strata, in order to contain them: however much trouble one may give oneself, and always on the assumption that blood alone is not passed on in descent, in our case being a matter of an *elite*, hence of a minority, one can never, ever counterbalance the demographic thrust of lower strata and strains. Other means should also be employed, as has been said: the elimination of the democratic and egalitarian system being the first unavoidable prerequisite; another, being an appropriate attitude to be summarised jointly with respect to, for example, the so-called Third World. From ancient Indo-European traditions, only the procreation of a child was considered as 'duty' (generally, the rule did not apply to those with ascetic vocations); hence the first-born was called the 'child of duty', as opposed to any other offspring. It goes without saying that a similar precept, while it would ensure the principle of patrilineal descent with whatever it might still save, would automatically make the demographic process follow the desired downward trend. Having said that which is proper to the group that should keep itself absolutely free from constraints, and that which may concern another group that would attempt, by procreating, by forming offspring, to provide even a biological basis for a spiritual reality and the structure of an Order, referring instead to the great mass of our contemporaries give life to other beings in whom the same inconsistency will be repeated, the same vanity of a life devoid of any real meaning, feeding the threatening flood of the formless world of quantity just because one is passive with respect to the materialistic part of oneself and the most primitive drive of sex, or because one is a slave to prejudices, this is irresponsible, given the collective consequences that ensue and that are now becoming more and more precise in the deleterious terms mentioned before. The truth, therefore, lies exactly the opposite of those who accuse those who shun generation of selfishness and individualism: Rather, it is others who think only of themselves, without caring about the contribution they unwittingly make to the general disorder; hence, it is not even of themselves that they think, after all, except in the most immediate and obtuse way, and in considering the effects of the scourge of births they might well limit themselves to saying, 'It is what they deserve,' if the consequences were not such as to involve even those who do not belong to the flock. Thus, in this regard, rigorous and systematic prophylactic, repressive and coercive measures on the part of the state, however deplorable such interventions in the private sphere might be in any other case (they certainly were when the absurd so-called 'demographic campaign' was launched), would be desirable axes to grind, even in the present situation. For our part, we believe that the anti-demographic policy cannot be insisted on enough because, almost out of an internal ambition even in fairly qualified circles, one cannot see all the

Therefore, in a new movement, the anti-demographic orientation cannot but be part of the general struggle against the world of quantity and against the aforementioned fatal processes of counter-selection. Within the framework of a true state, in modern times themselves, the task will be twofold: to stem the cancerous looming of a promiscuous and anodyne mass, and to create the preconditions for the enucleation and consolidation of a stratum in which qualifications are stabilised such that they are capable and worthy of firmly holding power (here, in part, we could also refer to what we said in the previous chapter). In all of this, the need for a balance, for a limit, is in the foreground, almost to no lesser extent than in the struggle against the demonisation of the economy: the two, moreover, being, as we have mentioned, mutually supportive.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

EUROPE A FORM OF ASSUMPTIONS

In various quarters today, the need for European unity is being raised. A distinction must be made between those cases in which this demand is asserted on a purely material and pragmatic level and those in which the problem is also posed on a higher level, with spiritual and traditional values intervening first. In the best case, demands arise from an inner revolt against the existing situation, from the spectacle of a Europe that, as a result of a play of concerted actions and reactions (in which we must also recognise the part played by what we have called the 'hidden war'), from the subject of great world politics that it was, has become an object conditioned by foreign influences and interests, so much so that it has had to juggle between the two major powers fighting for world domination, America and the USSR, and ultimately has had to accept American and 'Atlantic' tutelage in order to avoid the worst, i.e. complete enslavement to communism. and it is clear that the state of disunity of the European nations can only maintain and strengthen this situation. However, so far, as far as concrete initiatives for unification are concerned, as is well known, everything has been reduced to the creation of the Common Market, the Coal and Steel Community, and the like: partial initiatives restricted to the purely economic level and lacking a binding political counterpart. Otherwise there is nothing, and the situation is such that there is no room for illusions. The disastrous consequences of the two world wars, themselves an effect, to a large extent, of the disunity and blinding of the European nations, are not easily removed. The measure of concrete freedom, independence and autonomy is, first and foremost, *power*. Europe could still have been the third great force in the world if it had made a blockade, if it had retained all the immense sources of raw materials and the vast extra-European markets, if a settled principle of strict solidarity had made *all* European nations immediately and absolutely side with the one that was threatened in any case. But this line was not followed, which, moreover, had little antecedent even in Europe's most recent history (thus leaving aside the Roman period and, in part, that of the Ghibelline Middle Ages and the Holy Alliance). And one capitulation was followed by another. Today there are those who have spoken of Europe as a possible empire of more than four hundred million men and as such capable of facing both the United States, which currently has one hundred and seventy-nine thousand, and the USSR, which has two hundred and twenty-five thousand (1). That figure, however, includes the countries, which are difficult to recover, on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But even if we limit ourselves to Western Europe, it would, with its three hundred and sixty-four million, constitute a sufficiently strong bloc if we did not also have to consider the industrial potential, conditioning the military one, with the consequent need for raw materials for which the non-European countries already in European subjection have been largely lost, while in the mere

influences are exerted by the anti-European American, Russian and now even Chinese menaces. To move towards a one Europe, the first step should be for all European nations to leave the UNO, this promiscuous, bastard and hypocritical association, en bloc. An equally obvious imperative would be to emancipate ourselves in all respects and equally from America and the USSR. However, this would require a very subtle and prudent political art for which it is by no means certain that qualified European statesmen exist today. Indeed, a considerable interval between the rejection of American and 'Atlantic' tutelage and the effective establishment of Europe as a unitary bloc capable of defending itself (where this is possible) could be enough for a Europe that is still materially and spiritually half-weak to fall prey to communism and the USSR as a result of internal upheavals and external aggression. Thus all preparatory work should precede such initiatives. But these concrete political problems fall outside the framework this book. Here we can only touch on what concerns the form and spiritual and doctrinal assumptions of a united Europe. Vaguely federalist and aggregative situations can only be of a contingent nature, and even defensive political and economic unity should only be a consequence. The only real solution should have an *organic* character, the primary element should be the shaping force from within and from without belonging to a common idea and tradition. In some quarters, instead, an activist and pragmatic point of view has been defended, in which one has referred to the idea that nations did not down out of the sky, that they formed on the basis of a common task imposed scattered forces and also in the face of a kind of environmental or historical challenge. It is thought that things could go the same way with regard to the 'Europe nation' to be born, that it would suffice to refer to a myth and the idea of a common destiny, defended by a revolutionary European alignment. This point of view seems insufficient to us, and even in the interpretation of the genesis of historical nations one must not forget what was essentially due to dynasties representing a tradition and the loyalty of a group around them (as in the birth of Prussia). For Europe One, these assumptions are non-existent. One can only refer to the situation of necessity, which should give rise to a unitary impulse, a momentum that - it must be acknowledged - in European history corresponds to the Hundred Years' War, the wars of religion, the wars of succession and so on up to the last two world wars. There is also to be noted, among pro-Europeans, the oscillation between the concept of 'empire', albeit taken in an approximate sense - an expression used by Thiriart and already by Varange (1) - and that of 'Europe Nation' (the title, among other things, of a German pro-European journal). This calls for a clarification. The concept of nation can in no way be applied to a super-national organic type of unity. When rejecting the formula of a 'Europe of homelands' and a simple federation of European nations, one must not fall into a misunderstanding. As we have indicated in another chapter, the concepts of fatherland and nation (or ethnicity) belong to an essentially naturalistic, 'physical' plane. Homelands and nations can exist in Europe (ethnic communities were respected, to some extent, even in the totalitarianism of the USSR). What should rather be excluded is nationalism (with its teratological appendix, imperialism) and chauvinism, i.e. any fanatical absolutization of a particular unit. Empire, therefore, and not 'Europe Nation' or 'European Homeland' would be doctrinally, the right term. One should appeal, in Europeans, to a feeling of a higher order, qualitatively quite different from that of 'national' character and rooted in other strata of the human being. One cannot call oneself a 'European' on the basis of a feeling of a similar kind to that for which one feels Italians, Prussians, Basques, Finns, Scots, Hungarians and so on, and think that a single feeling of an equal nature can establish itself, erasing and levelling out these differences and replacing them, in a 'nation Europe'. But if by the mere term 'empire' one is not immediately led to think of an anachronistic and unworkable fantasy, even to consider an adaptation of the principle to the times, with that

serious problems arise. The scheme of an empire in the true and organic sense (to be clearly distinguished from any imperialism, in which, as we have said, a deplorable exasperation of nationalism is to be seen) is what, for example, the medieval European ecumene already presented. It incorporates unity and multiplicity. The individual states have the character of partial organic units, gravitating on a *unum quod non est pars* (to use Dante's expression), i.e. on a principle of unity of authority and sovereignty of a different nature from that which each particular state has in its own right and can claim. The limitations of sovereignty of the individual national units in the face of an "eminent right" of the Empire have as their unequivocal condition such transcendent dignity of the Empire itself, and in terms of structure, the whole will present itself as an "organism made up of organisms" or, if you prefer, as a federalism, an organic federalism however, to a certain extent similar to that realised by Bismarck in the second German Reich, and not acephalous. The essential features of the Empire in the true sense are these. What are now the possibilities, what are the conditions for the realisation of such an idea in today's Europe? Obviously, one would have to be willing and able to go absolutely against the current. As has been said, the idea of a 'nation Europe' must be set, as if in the end it were the amalgamation of the individual European nations into a single nation, in a kind of promiscuous European community substance erasing linguistic, ethnic and historical differences. Since this would have to be an organic unity, the premise would indeed be the integration and consolidation of each individual nation as a hierarchical whole into the firm form of individual unity, and once the nationalistic *hybris*, the Vichian 'glory of nations', which almost always parallels a demagogic and collectivising fact, had been broken, a virtual direction would be given that would continue beyond the individual national areas and lead towards the higher unity. This, then, by its elevated nature would be such as to leave ample room for nationalities according to their natural and historical individuality. It is a well-known principle of the organic conception that the more the higher unity is firm and perfect, the more the individual parts are differentiated and enjoy autonomy. What is important is the synergy, the precise readiness for any common action. Every organic unity has in itself a principle of stability. However, one cannot think of a stability of the whole if this not guaranteed in its own parts. Even from this point of view, the elementary prerequisite for any European unity appears to be the political integration of the individual nations. European unity would always be precarious if on the one hand it rested on something-something, such as an international parliament without a single higher authority, with representatives of individual political regimes of a democratic type, regimes which, because they are constantly and mutably conditioned from below, can in no way ensure continuity of will and political direction. In a democratic regime, state sovereignty is ephemeral, a nation no real unity, it is by the sheer number grabbed now one party and now by the other through its manoeuvres in the absurd system of purified universal suffrage that the political will is conditioned from one day to the next; the characteristics of an organic 'partial whole' are lacking. It would certainly not be a matter of imposing a model regime on every European nation; however, even if in various forms adapted to local conditions, an organic and hierarchical, anti-individualistic and anti-democratic principle would have to be properly enforced. Hence, the prerequisite of a general anti-democratic brainwashing, an undertaking, however, that at present appears almost utopian. Democracy on the one hand, on the other a European parliament that would reproduce on a grand scale the desolate and pitiful spectacle presented by Europe's democratic parliaments: all this would make a mockery of the idea of Europe One. In general, one should think of an organic unity that is realised through summits, not through bases. Only *elites* of the individual European nations could understand and coordinate with each other, overcoming particularism and the spirit of schism, making

assert, with their authority, higher interests and motives. And so that in other times it was the Sovereigns, the Heads, who made the great European policy and they considered themselves almost as of one family

) (they were in part de facto so, because of dynastic affiliations) even when serious disagreements arose momentarily between one and the other of their peoples. A 'centre' should therefore exist, firmly established, in each nation, and as a result of the harmony and synergy of these centres, the superior European unity should be organised and operate. Overall, a twofold process of integration should therefore be promoted: national integration, through the recognition of a substantial principle of authority, the basis for the organic, anti-individualistic and corporatist formation of the individual national political and social forces; supranational, European integration, through the recognition of a principle of authority that is as superior to that proper to the individual units, i.e. to the individual states, as it is to the individuals comprised in each of these units. Without this, there will be no need to speak of an organically one Europe. But set out in such terms the problem presents serious difficulties concerning the not merely political but spiritual basis required for this European unity. Where is such a basis to be found? On the highest and most appropriate level, which would be the religious one, there is little to be done. One cannot refer to Catholicism, asking it for sanction and a precise chrism for a higher principle of authority, firstly because Catholicism is only the faith of some of the European nations, secondly because of the democratic and modernising breakdown of the current Church, and all that we have said in chapter X, and finally because one must bear in mind the effects of the general and driven processes of desacralisation and secularisation that have taken place in Europe. Even less can one appeal to a generic Christianity: that would be too little, something too disempowering, incorporeal and uniform, moreover not specifically European, not monopolisable for European civilisation alone: Christians are the same as the negroes of the two Americas. In addition, we should refer to what we said, again in Chapter X, about the lack of reconciliation between pure Christianity and a 'metaphysics of the state'. From this level, we move on to a lower level. We often speak of 'European tradition' and 'European culture'. Unfortunately, here we often content ourselves mere words. As for 'tradition', Europe - and the West - no longer knows what it is in its highest sense. It could be said that 'tradition' in the integral sense, which is familiar to those who have followed us so far, and which is quite distinct from mere 'traditionalism', is a category belonging to a world that has almost disappeared, to eras in which a single shaping force manifested itself in both custom and faith, in law and in political forms and culture, in short in every domain of existence. No one would argue that there is a 'one tradition' in this sense in Europe, that it can be used today to legitimise the European idea - while the inexistence of the animating centre that should be its indispensable prerequisite must be noted. Of 'tradition' in this profound sense in Europe there are currently only a few historical vestiges. As far as 'European culture' is concerned, the reference to it at present is mainly the preserve of Europeanists in the drawing room, of amateur intellectuals with liberal and humanist tendencies, who indulge in dissertations on 'personality', 'freedom', the 'free world', etc., in a tone entirely in keeping with the democratic, disaffected climate of the post-World War II era, flirting with UNESCO and other sleazy organisations. In general, we do not believe that anything serious can come of bringing together and discussing 'culture' representatives from various European nations either. It must be borne in mind that what is understood today as 'culture' is but an appendage of the bourgeois civilisation of the Third Estate, to which was also given the not obvious myth of the so-called 'aristocracy of thought', an aristocracy that is more or less that of the anti-traditional liberal and secular oriented *parvenu*. This is why, from our point of view, 'intellectuals', whether Europeanising or not, should be held in no greater esteem than Communism even in its origins. The authority proper to the repositories and exponents of a superior idea, can in no way be granted to the exponents of the so-called

"culture". A Goethe, a von Humboldt and all the other exponents also of great culture must be high recognition, but to think that from this world could come the arousing and animating force for revolutionary forces and *élites* fighting for one Europe, would be absurd. All this can only fall within the domain of a 'representation' meant almost as a European 'living room', essentially historical in character. On the other hand, every time one goes beyond generalities and tries to give a concrete and precipitous content to the concept of a 'common European culture', one is faced with an arduous task. Already the Volta Convention held in the previous period by the Accademia d'Italia on the very subject of 'Europe', inviting well-known representatives of various nations, showed this difficulty because nothing conclusive was reached, there were only many more or less divergent personal interpretations. But this is not the most important point. Yes, it is that one passes lightly over the guilt complex that should burden Europe, precisely with regard to its 'culture'. Apart from that culture which has only a peripheral literary and humanistic character, devoid of any relation to deeper historical forces (in respect to which we had to remind ourselves that European history presents us with the far more frequent spectacle of phenomena of wearisome disunity than of union and synergy), how can we ignore that it is precisely Western culture and civilisation (which to a large extent is equivalent to saying European) and anti-traditional spirit that have been at one almost since the Renaissance, that the very thing that almost all liberal and progressive defenders of European culture, civilisation and tradition put forward as a title of European glory, starting from that period and in the modern era, ultimately constituted the greatest factor in the spiritual crisis of Europe itself, and that the Europeanisation of the world amounted to the spread of a wound of decomposition and subversion, of arousing forces that were then to rebound against Europe? Europe was the birthplace of the Enlightenment, liberalism, democracy (the American democratic precedent having had little impact on the European continent), and finally of Marxism and communism. Unfortunately, in modern history this has been the most significant contribution of 'European culture': that of intellectuals, humanists, 'elevated spirits', the arts and letters being, in comparison, nothing but pale and sideways. Unfortunately, it is in these terms - almost in the terms of what the Orientals would call *karma* - that there is a danger of having to conceive of the 'community of destiny' invoked by some pro-Europeans. At the aforementioned Volta Congress, one of the valuable contributions was that of academic Francesco Coppola, who spoke precisely of Europe's guilt complex and 'bad conscience'. How can we think of a basis for the defence of Europe against forces and ideologies that can rightly be considered barbaric and anti-European, when in them we have to see the extreme and matured developments of tendencies and evils that had their home in Europe? This is the reason for the European world's lack of immunity to the so-called present-day 'leader-civilisations', the American and the Soviet-Communist. Thus the problem of the spiritual foundation for an organically one Europe remains unsolved, and the eventual impetus of activist and revolutionary forces under the banner of such a Europe would lack, so to speak, secure spiritual backing, would leave behind it a shaky and undermined terrain, if we did not begin to combat internally, in all their forms, acute or diluted, the evils that today appear to us in macroscopic magnitude, and almost in a Nemesis, in the non-European and anti-European powers. The unavoidable need would therefore be an internal detoxification carried out as far as possible, when even this would have to be paid for dearly. For instance, apart from the political and economic sphere, how can one disregard the extent to which practical Americanisation has spread in the customs, tastes, and infatuations of the European masses? This is tantamount to saying that the problem of the European attitude to what can generally be called the modern world must be addressed, tackled in the 'reactionary' and revolutionary-conservative terms that we have already indicated above all in chapter one. Stating instead that militants should not be asked what 'the

their ideological horizon', that it is enough for them not to collaborate with the non-European powers, that they unite to fight for Europe in a 'communitarian party', setting aside the problem of a single, precise world view, would mean placing themselves on the plane of an irrational activism without flag and backbone, such that even if the practical purpose were realised, schisms and antitheses could later resurface within the European bloc. Generally speaking, assuming that Europe One were to be realised by this route, apart from the fact that the premise already indicated for an organic and not 'communitarian' structure would be insistent, this Europe would not be the pruning of any particular idea, it would present itself as another power bloc alongside the American, Russian, Chinese and possibly even Afro-Asian ones: alongside or antagonistic to them, without any qualitative differentiating factor, because in the climate of 'modern' civilisation - on the European responsibility for the advent of which, we have already said - no such factor can be decisive. Of course, it would be pure utopia to want to oppose practically everything that is materially modern civilisation; among other things, this would entail giving up the factual means necessary today for every defence and every attack. But can always set a distance and a limit. One can circumscribe what is 'modern' in a well-controlled material and 'physical' domain, in the plane of mere means, in order to superimpose on it a higher order adequately defended where revolutionary-conservative values should have unconditional recognition; yesterday's Japan had already demonstrated the possibility and fruitfulness of such a solution. Only then could Europe represent something different, could stand out, could take on a new dignity within the set of world powers. When it is said that the peoples of Europe today have a common culture and that would be one of the conditions for making them a single nation, it has to be answered that, irrespective of the past and of what we have just said, this culture is now increasingly common not only to Europeans but also to a large part of the 'civilised' world in general. It has no borders. European contributions - with books, writers, artists, studies, etc. - have been absorbed by non-European countries. - European contributions - with books, writers, artists, studies, etc. - have been absorbed by non-European countries, and those of non-European countries by European countries, and a similar general factual levelling (extending lifestyles and tastes) coupled with that propitiated by science and technology, has been advanced as an argument by those who do not want one Europe but a unified world, in a super-national world organisation or state. It is evident that only by addressing the aforementioned problem and after having given it a serious solution could Europe One be spiritually differentiated, be something unchangeable and different, and even a guide if the whole modern world were to go into crisis in the future. Returning to less general problems, at the beginning of this book we spoke of the need to overcome the false fascism-anti-fascism dilemma, a binomial in which everything that is not democracy, Marxism and communism is stupidly defined as fascism. This can also be repeated with regard to the European idea. It goes without saying that with everything summed up in the formula 'anti-fascism' there can be no compromise or 'talks' in any form. The first European detoxification should have as its object precisely this 'anti-fascism', an idea-fixed and already the watchword of the 'crusade' that has reduced Europe to a field of ruins. However, one cannot follow those Europeanised groups only know how to refer to what was attempted yesterday in Germany and Italy for the creation of a new order without taking into account that these were movements and regimes in which different and even conflicting tendencies were present, a definition of them in the right, positive, revolutionary-conservative sense that could only have been achieved if circumstances had made possible an adequate, further development, which was instead cut short by the barely mediated war and the subsequent defeat. Thus, at the very least, a precise discrimination should be made, when one wanted to draw points of reference from those movements. Apart from the doctrinal difficulties we have reviewed, practically speaking a European action in the integral sense finds its greatest obstacle in the lack of something existing to serve as a starting point, as a firm

support and as a centre of crystallisation. Yesterday we had the admirable spectacle of the principle of a super-national European army, with the legionarism of volunteer elements from multiple nations consisting of the divisions that fought on the eastern front against the Soviets, but then the Third *Reich* was the basis. Today, the only concrete, albeit partial, pro-European initiatives of governments are taken on a purely economic level, without any ideological, ideally demanding counterpart. Those who might be sensitive to the idea of Europe one in a higher sense are only scattered elements, not supported but often fought by the regimes of the countries to which they belong - and even more so they would be harshly opposed if their necessary anti-democratic and anti-Marxist profession of faith were openly declared. Indeed, as has been said, European action cannot but go hand in hand with the conservative-revolutionary revival and reorganisation of the individual European countries: but to recognise this, is also to recognise the staggering scale of the task that would be imposed. Despite this, one could envisage the idea of an Order whose members would act in the individual nations by doing what is possible, even under such unfavourable conditions, for the eventual unity of Europe. The enthusiasm of young militants with their propaganda efforts is worthy of recognition, but this cannot suffice. It would be necessary to have elements with a particular qualification who, in addition, in one way or another, would occupy or have the prospect of occupying key positions in the various nations. Which men would fit the bill? Taking bourgeois society and civilisation as a point of reference, we believe that people who are spiritually either still on this side of them, untouched by them, or now beyond them, should be won to the cause and enlisted. To explain ourselves, a first group should consist of members of ancient European families who are still standing and who are worthwhile not only for the name they bear but also for who they are, for their personality. We recognise that it is very difficult to find such men: but exceptions do exist, and even in recent events in the Second World War and afterwards, some such figures have appeared. Sometimes it can be a matter of reawakening something in the blood that has not yet been completely lost but has only become latent. In these elements one would particularly expect the presence of congenital, 'racial' dispositions (in the elitist, non-biological-racist sense of the term) that allow one to act and react according to a precise and certain style, outside of theories and abstract principles, in spontaneous and complete adherence to those values that every well-born man considered obvious before the evasions and prevarications of the Third Estate revolution and all that followed it. As far as a second and more numerous line-up for the Order is concerned, we would have in sight men corresponding to a human type formed here and there through selections and experiences of a mainly warlike character, at special disciplines. Essentially, this type is characterised by 'demythologisation': it knows how to recognise as an illusion and hypocritical lie all the tenacious legacy of ideologies that have already been unscrupulously used as instruments to bring down not one or another European nation, but to deliver, through interlinked processes, a mortal blow to Europe itself as a whole. From them one must expect intolerance of all rhetoric, indifference to all intellectualism and the politics of politicians and partyocracies, a realism of a superior character, the propensity for an active impersonality, the capacity for precise and resolute commitment. Yesterday in certain special *elite* formations of fighters, today among paratroopers and similar units (*paras* and the like) certain disciplines and certain experiences propitiate the formation of the type in question, which presents common traits in different nations. An equal way of being therefore acts as a potentially connective element, beyond nationalities. By gaining these elements for the European cause, the cadres of the Order in its most active aspects could be constituted with a "force at hand". If direct and integrative contacts were established between this group and the other - which is less difficult than one might think - the fundamental basis would be laid. For them, in the front line should therefore come the idea

European in terms of values and worldview, then the Order, then its own nation, in this succession. Naturally, the figure of a true leader at the centre and summit of the Order would be of paramount importance. Unfortunately, such a figure does not exist today: it would be dangerous and inconsiderate to recognise it in one or other of those who, albeit with the best of wills, with disinterest and with commitment, strive here and there to organise Europeanist groups. There are those who, on this point, have pointed out that at the beginning no one would have been able to recognise this potential quality in one or other of the men who were later to become the leader of large movements. However, the great advantages of having a man in whom the titles of authority and prestige were already evident from *the outset* are evident. There is no need to repeat, however, what is the preliminary and general condition for European action in the terms indicated to have any result: it would be necessary to overthrow the political class that in the present period of European interregnum and serfdom holds power in almost all European countries; this, thanks to a reawakening of sufficient strata of their peoples from the state of narcosis and inebriation methodically created by the predominant political and social ideologies. The most serious difficulty facing the true European idea is the profound crisis of the principle of authority and the idea of the state. This may seem a paradox to some: because it is thought that strengthening that principle and that idea would lead to schismatic particularism, a rigid anti-European pluralism. We have already stated to what extent this is not at all true, in speaking of 'societies of men' and in defining the plane above all that is mere 'people' and 'nation', precisely the idea of the true state and its authority. Pure political loyalism implies, in the individual, a certain degree of transcendence, something non-naturalistic, a certain heroic disposition. There is no discontinuity but continuity when one moves from the national to the supernational level: the quality of the necessary disposition is the same - as in the Indo-European origins, as in the best feudal regime, the ready uniting of free forces, proud to be part of a superior order that does not diminish them but integrates them. Only fanatical nationalism and societal and communal splintering are the real obstacles. To sum up, in the most conscious minds there is the idea that, given the current situation, for Europe to form a bloc, to become one, is the unavoidable condition for its subsistence otherwise than as an empty geographical designation on the same material plane among the powers tending to control the world. For all the reasons stated above, however, this situation of necessity gives rise to a twofold internal problem if, starting from it, one wishes to give the possible Europe a firm basis, a profound sense, an organic character: on the one hand, it is a matter of taking a stand against what is, in general, 'modern civilisation', with corresponding initiatives in the sense of a spiritual and mental detoxification work; on the other hand, it is a matter of the problem of that kind of 'metaphysics' with which a principle, both national and super-national, European, of true authority and legitimacy can be founded today. The twofold problem can be translated into a twofold imperative. It remains to be seen which and how many men are still standing, despite everything, amidst so many ruins, to understand it.

(1 J. THIRIART, *Un Empire de 400 millions d'homme: l'Europe*, Brussels 1964. The book was also published in an Italian translation by the publisher Volpe.

(1 U. VARANGE, *Imperium*, Westropa Press, L'ondon 1948. Moreover, in this book the 'empire' is exchanged for those power blocs with a 'Caesaristic' character that Spengler had predicted as the final phenomenon of a period of Zivilisation, i.e. a twilight period.

APPENDIX

ON THE MYTHS OF OUR TIME

ON 'TOTAL CONTESTATION'

'Total contestation' is a formula that has come into vogue. Taken up in various 'protest' circles, especially by young people, there are those who are inclined to recognise its validity. In this, as in so many other cases, little care is taken to investigate the ideas. Protest, of what? It is said of the 'system', 'system' being another expression that has become current, referring to the set of structures and ideologies of Western society and civilisation, with particular reference to the most advanced forms of industrial consumer and technological civilisation, with their conditioning; for which, usually, one can only borrow the ideas of Marcuse and the like. In reality, if one wants to be serious, one should rather speak of modern 'civilisation' and 'society' in general, the other being merely a derivation, a particular aspect and, if you like, a reduction to the absurd, whereby the meaning of a true 'total contestation' should be a revolt against the modern world. Given the current situation, one would have to see, however, what in this regard does not boil down to fantasies and unconstructive agitations. The prospect, sketched out in his time by Alexis Carrel, of a world devastated by a beautiful total war, where on an island the only group of survivors of the catastrophe (of a 'good race', Carrel supposed, with a few genius minds among them) begin again to create a civilisation, but in a different direction, having finally learnt their lesson, would be seductive but must be put aside. Those who only take issue with organised technological society should ask themselves, after all, whether they would sincerely be willing to give up all the practical possibilities it offers in order to exhume, more or less, Rousseau's state of nature. In our opinion, any man with self-domain can always balanced use of such possibilities, reducing the corresponding levelling and spiritually deleterious 'conditioning' to a minimum. If, however, one were to pose the problem to the masses, it is utopian to think that one can detach them from the largely realised ideals of generalised comfort and bourgeois hedonism unless one finds a way to arouse in them a spiritual tension along the lines of the climate that, to a certain extent, nervousised the nations that yesterday threw down the gauntlet to both plutocracy and communism. Delving deeper into the problem, one can see that the object of legitimate protest and revolt should generally be a civilisation pervaded by what we have called the 'demon of economics', i.e. where economic and production processes are in the foreground prevaricatingly stifling all true values. We have already mentioned that in his examination of high capitalism. Werner Somhart used the image of the 'unleashed giant': it refers to the economic-productive process that in a certain way autonomises itself, transporting, along with those who suffer it, its very subjects, i.e. the *managers*, promoters and organisers of it, into consumer society. In the name of 'contestation', there are those who have affirmed the just need to 'downsize needs, also in the sense of reducing those parasitic and artificially created by production, and to contain production processes, putting the screws on them, so to speak. Now, it is clear that nothing can be done in this sense in a climate of democracy and apparent liberalism. We have already said it: the economy can only cease to be that 'destiny' that Marx saw in it, can only be controlled and curbed by a higher power and authority, which can only be a political power and authority. This is what Oswald Spengler had also considered for the terminal phase of a civilisation cycle. But this is tantamount to recognising a true 'revolution of the Right' as an indispensable condition, with a new anti-democratic valorisation of the idea of the state as an autonomous power with, precisely, the chrism of a higher authority and the appropriate means to keep the world of the economy in subjection and break tyranny, and limit the Prussians. (Amongst other things, it is evident that in order to have an adequate liaison and control body, one would have to replace the

partyocratic a system of 'corporate' representation, in the sense already indicated). Now, we would really like to see how many among the 'protesters', who poorly disguise their subjection to anarchist and left-wing tendencies, would be ready to recognise that, outside of apocalyptic utopias, this would be the only path to take, for a revolution worthy of the name. But action in the internal field would be no less necessary than action in the external, socio-political field. The problem of worldview and life would have to be posed, and one of the main objects of a 'total contestation' would have to be the questioning of the worldview that underpins and presupposes the modern world in general. A much broader field than just economics would have to be considered here, and the discourse would be lengthy. We will limit ourselves to recalling that the perversion of modern culture began with the advent science, with which rationalism and materialism were immediately associated. And in this regard, too, one can speak of autonomised processes, which have taken hold of man who, as it were, cannot keep up with his own creatures. This is not, of course, a matter of practical denial, but of what has affected the worldview, which has long since been conditioned by science; philosophy and religious beliefs themselves having practically passed into a secondary and irrelevant plane. It is the 'myth' of science that should be combated, i.e. the idea that it leads to what is truly worth knowing, that in its applications goes beyond the realm of mere means and some contribution to the solution of the fundamental problems of existence. 'Progressivism' and 'scientism' go hand in hand, and today we often see a revival of the obvious pathetic motifs from the time of the *Excelsion* ballet, with science as the victor over 'obscurantism' and the initiator of a bright future. That such ideas are not only echoed by mental provincials is evident from various symptoms. Just one example: Ugo Spirito, former Fascist and Gentile, now a communist professor at the university, is, as a thinker, a nobody, but symptomatic is his banishment of a 'new humanism' in which science is given the value of a metaphysics (1) and in which the basis for the true renewal of a unified humanity is indicated. In this physique, however, he encounters the so-called "socialist humanism infected to the marrow of scientism; nor is there missing, in the Spirit, a sympathetic reference to Maoist China, which marks the limit of intellectual deviation and mystification. Indeed, what would come into question in an authentic total contestation would indeed be a 'cultural revolution', but not of the kind of that of the Chinese Red Guards, which was rather an 'anti-cultural revolution', not realising that the first target it should be aiming at is so-called 'scientific Marxism', which remains one of the unassailable fundamental dogmas of Mao Tse-tung's doctrine (if it can be called that). Together with an awareness of that critique of science which already has a serious tradition (starting with a Poincaré, a Le Roy, a Boutroux, Bergson himself, etc.) to which have been added the valid contributions of a traditional thought (Guénon, Schuon, Burckhardi, but already a De Maistre had said their piece to the *savants* and scientisms of his time), one should therefore assume an attitude of detached coldness with respect to the whole world of science and technology itself, the same special devilry having to be considered as a kind of plaything for big kids that can only impress simple spirits. Hence, anti-scientist demystification and the fight for a different worldview. In correlation, the same problem of teaching and training of youth should be addressed in far more serious terms than certain university contestations of today, which only focus on problems of structure and didactics. Here the real contestation, the 'cultural revolution', should more or less take up the terms of the policy pursued by W. von Humboldt and his group, about a century and a half ago, in the early basis of industrialism, against everything that is mutilating specialisation and the practical instrumentalisation of knowledge. One should demand forms of teaching that instead of tending solely to train new recruits for inclusion in the technological society

of consumption and overproduction, had as its goal, not a 'humanism', in the dull and literary sense of the term, but the formation of the integral man, dropping the emphasis on spiritual values, considering as added and, in a certain sense, detached, all the specialised knowledge that lends itself to instrumentalisation in function of the 'system', with the related conditioning of the individual: while, unfortunately, no different is the motive that drives the vast majority of young people today towards higher studies: to secure qualifications in order to fit in as best and as profitably as possible. This would be the only serious way to conceive of a 'cultural revolution' today, which would then have incalculable consequences and in which the word 'culture' would regain its most authentic meaning. But, apart from the low vocational level and the dulling of the majority of today's youth, where, if at all, can one find teachers capable of adapting to such demands? Needless to say, these are only the sketchiest hints about the directions that a serious 'total contestation' should take, as a serious and systematic action quite different from the vague ambitions of today's exaggerated 'protestors', who do not know what they really want and too often give the impression of angry wasps in a glass vessel vainly banging and banging against its walls.

II

THE MARCUSE MYTH

The case of Marcuse is interesting as an example of the world in which a myth is formed in our times. Even in Italy there has been much talk of Marcuse: this is almost *de rigueur*, to be *à la page*, in certain 'intellectual' circles on the fringes of *café society*, while elsewhere the myth is already beginning to decline. Thus in Germany, after Marcuse had been included, without his having wanted it, in the three M's (Marx, Mao, Marcuse) formula of the 'student movement', seems to have been booed. The strength of the Marcuse myth lies in having crystallised a confused impulse of revolt that, lacking principles, believed it would find its philosopher in him, without bothering to see clearly, to separate the positive from the negative as a serious study. In reality, Marcuse may have made a valuable contribution to the critique of modern civilisation, but in this respect he presents himself only as the epigone of a group of thinkers who had long since initiated it, without Marcuse offering anything substantial as a counterpart, so much as to serve as a flagship. It is known that Marcuse painted a crude picture of the technologically 'most advanced industrial society' and 'consumer civilisation', denouncing its forms of levelling, subjugation and oppressive conditioning, a system of domination that, by being anodyne, by not resorting to terror and direct imposition, and instead being realised in the name of well-being, maximum satisfaction of needs and an apparent democratic freedom, has no less 'totalitarian' and destructive character than that of communist systems. The result is a 'one-dimensional man' - it would be better to say: two-dimensional, because what he lacks is precisely the third dimension, the dimension of depth. Marcuse also takes his analysis to particular domains and shows, for example, that 'functionalism' today has invested the very field of speculative and scientific thought, stripping knowledge of all metaphysical character, inserting everything into an instrumentalist, elastic and all-encompassing 'rationality', so much so that it also comes to grips with every centrifugal and anti-conformist force. With all this, Marcuse has said nothing really new. The antecedents of such a critique can already be found in a De Tocqueville, in a J.S.Mill, in an A. Siegfried, in Nietzsche himself. We ourselves had indicated the idea of the destructive convergence of the communist system and the American democratic system in the conclusion of the book *Revolt against the Modern World* published in 1934 in Italy, in 1935 in Germany. We had also spoken of two, homologous forms of levelling 'totalitarianism' one 'vertical' defined by a pressure

direct exercised by a visible power, the other 'horizontal', due to social conformism. It can be said that Nietzsche had foreseen from the very beginning of the century the development accused by Marcuse, in the short, incisive sentences dedicated to the 'last man': *'the time is coming for the most despicable of men, who no longer know how to despise himself', 'the last man of the teeming and tenacious race'. 'We have invented happiness,' say, winking, the last men', they have abandoned 'reason where life is hard'*. But what a different background lies behind these formulations by a true aristocratic rebel of high stature! Marcuse's specific contribution boils down to a careful examination of the specific forms by which the technological civilisation of affluence has brought about a systematic breeding of this race of the 'ultimate man'. Also positive in his arguments (although, for obvious reasons, not always well evidenced) is the determination of Marxist ideology: technological civilisation eliminates Marxist proletarian protest; by raising the material level of life of the working class more and more, by satisfying its needs and desire for bourgeois affluence it swallows it up and incorporates it into the 'system', destroys its mordant and revolutionary potential. All this seems to lead down a dead-end street. On the one , Marcuse speaks of a world that tends to become that of a total administration that absorbs the administrators themselves, which therefore almost acquires a life of its own. On the other hand, he says that it is no longer the case to speak of 'alienation' because we have a human type that has existentially adapted to its situation by making what it has become coincide with what it wants to be, so there is no point of reference to perceive 'alienation'. Freedom in a non-mutilated sense, other than that still allowed in the 'system', would have to be paid an absolutely exorbitant and absurd price. Nobody thinks of giving up the advantages of the civilisation of well-being and consumption for an abstract idea of freedom. Thus one would paradoxically have to *force* man to be 'free'. So what human substance can be counted on and what ideas can be invoked for the 'global contestation', for the 'Great Refusal'? Here in Marcuse's known everything becomes insubstantial. He does not want to attack technology but calls for a different use of it; for example, to reach out to dispossessed and destitute peoples and social strata. He does not realise that this, after all, given the promises, would be doing them a disservice; it would eliminate their 'protest', absorbing them into the 'system'. In fact, one can see that the 'Third World' in freeing itself and 'progressing' does nothing but take as its model and ideal the type of advanced industrial society, thus heading for the same trap. Hence, also, the illusion of the Maoists: One stops at the 'heroic' phase of a revolution that wants to *wipe the slate clean*, as if such a phase could be eternalised and as if one could instil in the masses a constant contempt for the 'putrid well-being' of 'imperialist' civilisations, should it be feasible (on the other hand, China is not only that of the Red Guards who are the unrestrained enemy of party superstructures, but also that which is industrialising to the point of possessing the atomic bomb, all things that Marcuse makes part of a 'repressive civilisation'). In Russia, we have seen how that 'heroic' phase gradually gave way to a technocracy in which, again, it is the prospect of bourgeois 'well-being' that is used as a stimulus. As effects for the revolution, having excluded proletarian Marxism, concrete Marxism converging today as a goal more or less in the 'system' in the countries where it has already established itself, very little remains. Marcuse only knows how to refer to the layers of the dispossessed existing even in the opulent world, and to the underground, the *underground*, of anarchic and individualist elements or groups, of intellectuals and the like, which in fact can do little or nothing against the compact defensive organisation of the 'system': which also has the means to crush any sporadic possible terrorism. Marcuse is certainly right when he says that needs should be 'redefined' and resized' by excluding the parasitic needs that propitiate man's increasing voluntary subjugation, and that super-production should be curbed. But by whom and in the name of what? As we have already said, containing the 'system' would only be possible from a higher power, from a power

superordinate politician, the very thought of which would horrify Marcuse, a sworn enemy of all forms of authoritarianism. Marcuse makes it clear that for him 'liberation from the opulent society is not a return to a healthy, vigorous poverty, to moral cleanliness and simplicity!' What he proposes instead is much like a flimsy reverie (with the obsessive complex of 'pacification' at any cost), because he recognises no higher values as motivational reference points. To convince oneself of this, one need only read one of his lesser-known books, *Eros and Civilisation*. It unequivocally shows that the only man he conceives is Freud's man, a man constitutionally determined by the 'pleasure principle' (*Eros, libido*) and by the principle of destructiveness (*Thanatos*; that any ethics other than that of satisfying these impulses would have a 'repressive' character, would derive from the internalisation, in the so-called 'Super-ego' (the inner tyrant), of external inhibitions and those linked to ancestral complexes. Marcuse traces a whole sociology that deduces every social-political structure from the Freudian man, in terms that are sometimes truly rambling. In the name of what, then, would the 'Great Refusal' be called for, given that every heroic and ascetic principle is stigmatised and struck down with aberrant Freudian interpretations? Isn't the ideal 'personality' for Marcuse, who opposes the 'revisionist' psychoanalysts (Jung, Fromm, Adler, etc.), that of *'a broken individual who has internalised and successfully used repression and aggression'* (sic)? An example for all. Hendrich spoke of an army that continues to fight *'without thinking of victories or of a pleasant future, for one reason only, because the soldier's task is to fight and this is the only motivation that has any meaning...and another proof of the human will'*. Well, for Marcuse it would instead be the height of alienation, the *'complete loss of all institutional and intellectual freedom'*, *'repression becoming not the second but the first nature of man'*: in a word, an 'aberration'. Any comment is superfluous. Freedoms and happiness for Marcuse go hand in hand with satisfying the demands of the unchanging institutional nature of proof, the *'libido'* element naturally being in the foreground. All that Marcuse can envisage is a development of technology that gives man an increasing amount of free time, not subject to the 'performance principle', then he will be able to bring his instincts not to those direct satisfactions that would be catastrophic for any ordered society, but to vicarious or transposed satisfactions, in terms of play, imagination, an 'orphic' orientation (pantheistic-naturalistic with Rousseauian overtones) or 'narcissistic' (aestheticising - this is the terminology used). These are more or less the same marginal fields that Freud had indicated, in terms of a sublimation or compensation, and basically an evasion, in the case of the individual. Marcuse overlooks the fact that technological society already systematically organises these occupations of 'leisure time', offering mankind the standardised and stupid forms that are associated with sport, television, cinema, magazine culture and *Reader's Digest* and the like. To draw from all this a valid banner for the 'Great Refusal' is, of course, ridiculous. What everything else depends on is the conception of man. The Freudian one, followed by Marcuse, is aberrant. So if one takes stock of the myth, the result is more or less this: a legitimate revolt but without a positive counterpart and without hope. Therefore anarchy is the only logical outlet. Perhaps this is why Marcuse did with being booed in Berlin, certainly by the protest radicals. Once the Marxist and workers' 'protest' has expired, the revolution of nothingness remains. It is significant that in the revolutionary and protesting uprisings that took place in France in May 1968, the black flags of the anarchists appeared alongside the red communist flags, just as it is significant that in such demonstrations, but not only in France, there were forms of pure savage and destructive unrest. It is useless, therefore, to have optimistic illusions even with regard to the so thickly feted 'youth', student or otherwise, if the basic situation does not change. Any revolt without those higher principles that Nietzsche himself had in his own way evoked in the valid part of his

thought, not to mention the contributions made by the exponents of a Right-wing revolution, leads fatally to the emergence of forces of an even lower order than those of communist subversion, even if the latter seeks to instrumentalise them. With eventual assertion of these forces, the whole cycle of a doomed civilisation would come to a close, unless a higher power arises and the image of a superior human type is reaffirmed.

III

THE MAOIST INFATUATION

A curious phenomenon, worthy of examination, is the suggestion that 'Maoism' has exerted on certain European circles, in that it is not only a matter of groups of declared Marxist profession. In Italy one can even mention certain circles that claim a 'legionary' experience and a 'fascist' orientation, while opposing the Social Movement because they consider it not 'revolutionary', bourgeois, bureaucratic, and ensnared by Atlanticism. They also speak of Mao as an example. Such a phenomenon induced us to take the trouble to read Mao Tse-tung's famous booklet to try to see clearly, to find out what could possibly justify such suggestions. The result was negative. Incidentally, it is not even a kind of breviary written with a certain systematicity, but a heteroclite collection of passages from various speeches and writings over a long period of time. A true, specific *Maoist doctrine* is not to be spoken of at all. What is there to think about when from very first page of the booklet one reads categorical phrases like the following: '*The theoretical foundation on which all our thinking is based is Marxism-Leninism*'? Would this suffice to set aside the new gospel where, moreover, the usual forbidden *slogans* of world subversion - 'struggle against imperialism and its servants', 'liberation of the people from the exploiters', etc. - are encountered at every turn? - are encountered at every turn. This being the case, if there are disagreements, divergences and tensions between Russian Soviets and Chinese Communists, one has to assume that these are pure family quarrels, internal Communist matters (apart from very prosaic realistic motives: the vast under-populated territories of Asian Russia which are a temptation for over-populated China), which should be of no interest to us, except for the hope that the two comrades will eventually couple up. What is suggestive, therefore, is a pure *myth* of Maoism, from which precise ideological formulations, reckless interpretations and, above all, an emphasis on the so-called 'cultural revolution', are excluded. Let us examine the main components of this myth. From some of the 'pro-Chinese' circles mentioned before, 'nationalism' is considered as the basis of Maoist doctrine. But apart from the fact that nationalism had already asserted itself with Tito's 'heresy' and seems to be making its way among other satellites of the USSR, the essential point is overlooked, namely that in Maoism it is unequivocally *communist* nationalism, the basis being the mass collectivist, almost horde-like conception of the nation, not different, after all, from the Jacobin one. When Mao wants to combat the process of concretising rigid party-bureaucratic structures for a direct connection with 'the people', when he speaks of an '*army that was one with the people*', taking up the well-known formula of 'total mobilisation', he manifests more or less the same spirit, or *pathos*, of the masses of the French Revolution and the *levés des enfants de la Patrie*, while the mass-leader binomial (the 'cult of personality', fought in post-Stalinist Russia, is resurrected, enhanced, in the person of Mao, idol of the fanatical Chinese masses) reproduces one of the most problematic aspects of dictatorial totalitarianisms. Communism plus nationalism: it is the exact opposite of the superior, articulate and aristocratic conception of the nation. But if it is such a formula that attracts 'pro-Chinese' groups that wish they were not Marxists, it is hard to see why they do not revert to

rather to the doctrine of National Socialism of yesterday, where that combination was already present in the formula: "*Führer-Volksgemeinschaft*" (=leader + national community). We say 'to the doctrine', because in practice in the Third *Reich* different elements from Prussianism and the tradition of the Second *Reich* always made their rectifying force felt. And even of 'voluntarism', another element that would define Maoism, there would have been enough there. There would have been no need to wait for Mao for the 'active conception of war' as a '*means of affirming and making one's truth triumph*', as if before the advent of conscientious objectors, hypocritical pacifism and the twilight of the warrior spirit and military honour, it had been thought differently in all the great western nations. However, it is necessary to look at things more closely and listen to what the great Mao says, verbatim: '*We fight against unjust wars that stand in the way of progress, but we are not against just wars, that is, against progressive wars*'. There is no need to say what 'progress' means in this context: facilitating the advent of Marxism and communism in every country. Moreover, it is hard to see what's stopping us from using the 'active conception of war' for *our own* 'just war', which is the war to the bitter end against world subversion, while letting others let off steam in denouncing 'imperialism', extolling the 'heroic Viet Cong', the generous Castroism and so on, all nonsense good only for brains that have been 'washed' and deprived of all capacity for discernment. Here are other elements of the Maoist myth. Maoism would trust man as the architect of history, it would stand against the technocracy in which both the USSR and America converge. The 'cultural revolution' would be positively nihilistic, it would aim at a renewal that starts from ground zero. All these are but words. First of all, it is not man that Mao properly addresses, but 'the people': '*the people, the people alone are the motive force, the creator of universal history*'. The contempt for the person, for the individual, in Maoism is no less violent than in the early Bolshevik ideology. It is known that in Red China, the private sphere, family upbringing, every form of life per se, effects and even sex itself (if not reduced to its lowest expression and most primitive forms) are ostracised. The integration (i.e. disintegration) of the individual into the fanatical 'collective' is the watchword. The cultural revolution itself is, properly speaking, an anti-cultural revolution. Culture in the western and traditional sense (but also traditional Chinese: remember the Confucian ideal of *jen*, which could well be translated as *humanitas*, and *kiun-t seun*, or 'integral man', as opposed to *siao-jen*, or 'vulgar man'), i.e. as a formation of the self that is not in collective function, is opposed. Mao stated that as a point of support he took the destitution, the poverty of the broad masses, which is, he says, a positive factor '*because poverty generates the desire for change, the desire for action, the desire for revolution*'; you have like 'a blank sheet of paper' where you can write anything. This is also trivial, and no one will want to mistake such a situation for a 'zero point' in the spiritual, positive sense. It may impress, on the naive, that it is precisely at the initial, activist, euphoric stage that Maoism as a revolutionary movement. But such a phase does not constitute a positive solution, it cannot be eternalised. What is interesting is not the starting point, but the end, the direction, the *terminus ad quem*. Now, as countless as precise are the statements of Mao, who in the 'construction of socialism' points to such an end. So far from being able to discern a regenerative resolution, with only 'man' in view, and starting from the anti-cultural zero point, we find a movement on which, from the very beginning, there is a present mortgage, that of Marxism. No sleight of hand can change this state of affairs, and it then remains for Mao to tell us how he reconciles the idea that man (as we have seen: the 'man-people') is the active subject of history, determining the economy itself, with the basic dogma of Marxism, historical materialism, which is exactly the opposite. Anyone who feels attracted to a revolution that truly starts from the zero point, from a nihilism with respect to all the values of bourgeois society and culture, proves to be precisely a fool if he does not know other

to take inspiration from, other than the great Mao. When more valid points of reference could offer him, for example, the ideas on 'heroic realism', formulated outside any instrumentalisation and Marxist derivation, by Ernst Junger already in the period after the Great War! As for the other element of the 'pro-Chinese' myth, the antitechnocratic stance that, starting more or less from Marcuse's well-known analyses of the forms of the most advanced industrial societies, he would like to enhance, is an illusion. Is it not the case that Mao tends to industrialise his country to the point of securing the atomic bomb and stockpiling all the necessary means for his 'just war' in the world, thus setting himself on the same path whereby communist Russia was finally forced to create technological and technocratic structures analogous to those of advanced bourgeois industrial societies? Apart from a fanaticisation, which cannot be maintained as a permanent state, we would really like to know whether Mao, if he could secure for the mass of his followers and his people, revolutionary because, as he said, they are miserable, the living conditions proper to a 'civilisation of well-being', would see the whole of China, disdainful of the 'demure happiness of imperialist societies', turn against him. And if, hypothetically, a kind of asceticism could be aroused in an entire nation by values on the level of those proper to Marxism, the only conclusion to be drawn is that one would find oneself on the brink of an almost unimaginable but very dangerous degree of regression and bastardisation of a certain portion of humanity. The complete inability to conceive real values as opposed to those of the 'civilisation of well-being' and the 'consumer society' is, moreover, the characteristic feature of all the so-called 'protest' movements of our time. With observations like these, it would be easy to continue. But the considerations made so far already indicate that the pro-Chinese infatuation is based on myths that, to those who know how to think things through and to those who refer precisely to Mao's gospel-booklet, appear groundless. Those who, while believing themselves not to be Marxists and communists, are infatuated with Maoism, indeed show anything but intellectual maturity, the nature of their 'total contestation' and their ostentatious revolutionary vocations is more than suspicious, if they can only find such points of reference.

IV

TABOOS OF OUR TIMES

1.

In spite of the vogue for 'demythologising' when it comes to authentic and traditional values, the process of creating new taboos is far-reaching today. Profane entities are 'tabooed', they are constituted to sacrosanct realities that should only be spoken of with the deepest respect and veneration. Woe betide anyone who dares to say anything against them: a chorus of indignant protests will cover him with infamy, in the name, of course, of the super-taboo, of Holy Democracy. To two such taboos, we wish to bring attention here. The first refers to the negro. It was the dumb white race itself that tabooed the nigger. By outlawing the principle of peoples' self-determination and by using black troops in senseless fratricidal wars, it had already created a weapon that backfired against it taken as a whole, a weapon that would not have been too dangerous if the whites had not suddenly been seized by anti-colonialist psychosis, disregarding all that was really positive that colonisation, to counterbalance its negative aspects, had brought among the African peoples, leading them to a level to which they would never, ever have reached by their own strength and capacity. Secondly, it was white, leftist French intellectuals and artists along with the *clan* of J. P. Sartre, who invented and extolled *nègritude*, creating a myth that never would the negro have come to think of *nègritude*, an absurd concept that would

something akin to what for Italy is Italianism, for Germany Germanism, and so on, whereas the niggers have never constituted a single people with their own common civilisation because there is no such thing as a 'nigger nation' but there is a multiplicity of strains, tribes, ethnic groups with very different traditions, customs and beliefs. Of course, those negroes who made culture solely from attending white educational institutions were quick to embrace that myth and to go further, even to the point of asserting not only that *nègritude* corresponds to a unitary civilisation and culture but even that whites should learn from it. Thus the Negro Carmichael, former head of a paramilitary organisation of 'Negro Power' (the *Black Panthers*), was heard to state verbatim: 'It is the whites who must try to rise to the level of Negro humanism', the Negro writer James Baldwin and others more or less chorusing him. One should be surprised if again, it is a white, or rather a German (i.e. German racists of yesteryear, don't rock in your graves!), J. Jahn, who in a book entitled *Montu* (which the leftist publisher Einaudi hastened to bring out in Italian in two editions), besides making an apologia for *nègritude*, besides attributing to the African negroes a unified philosophy and metaphysics, claimed that precisely a reference to the negro vision of the world and of life could help to overcome the materialism and mechanism of modern civilisation created by the whites? That unheard-of infatuation of the many whites and the tabuarization that goes so far as to avoid the use of the designation "nigger" because of its "offensive" implications (something, for example, not once encountered in the entirety of Jahn's now-quoted book on niggers), has as its counterpart the drive towards both cultural and social promiscuity. With regard to the former, we have had occasion elsewhere (1) to point out the cultural negritization detectable in the United States, clearly visible in the field of dance music, art, dances, certain typical behaviours, etc.: the infection having then partly passed among the European peoples. By the way, did not some exponents of the American protesting *beat generation* (in its period of vogue) come to make the nigger a model and a comrade, if a Norman Mailer in one of his well-known writings spoke of the *beat* type as a 'white nigger', while white girls made sleeping with niggers one of their protesting manifestations? As for social promiscuity in America, one knows of the raging 'integrationist' infatuation (against which only Wallace had the courage to take an open stand), which among other things shows one of the absurdities to which democracy and fanatical egalitarianism lead. Indeed, wanting to impose 'integration' is an open outrage against that principle of freedom, which in other respects is so extolled. No one will ever deny a family the right not to welcome and keep away strangers they dislike (whatever the reasons for this dislike), but promiscuity with blacks in public life is to be imposed by law in the name, ironically, of freedom, a freedom conceived in only one sense. The *apartheid* regime in South Africa is spoken of as an abomination, tendentiously interpreting it as an "inadmissible segregation", whereas in reality it is only "separation": the literary meaning of the term is precisely "to keep apart", to keep to oneself, together with one's own, not in a regime of oppression but to the democratic violence of the pure number of a black majority not overriding the whites and not putting itself at the head of states that only whites have created and that only to whites owe their prosperity and civilisation. Moreover, it is overlooked that it has always been natural and proper for ethnic minorities to form more or less closed communities, 'islands', in large metropolises and that this was true of the American Negroes themselves before they were socially fanaticalised by communist-backed agitators. That at this point even the niggers have taken up 'racism', a racism against which no one raises their voice while all white racism is branded as 'Nazism' and worse, is a well-known fact, and it is indeed in connection with this that the 'race problem' is taking on an ever more acute and threatening character. But there would be a very good solution: get one of the smaller states of the Union cleared of whites and put all US Negroes in it to

that they enjoy their intact *négritude*, administer themselves and do whatever they want. As for another solution, which would be to invite the racist blacks and those of the "Negro Power" to leave among their own in their homelands, in the new African states, there is no need to even think about it: no one would accept this, for the blacks often have an even worse opinion of their fellow Africans than the whites do; they are happy to stay among the whites and take advantage of the structures and institutions of a society that was not created by them, but by the whites. What can happen when the nigger has power, we have already seen in America with the experience of the so-called *carpet-baggers*, when the northern demagogues in 1968 let the niggers democratically come to power in the administration of the defeated southern states. There was a regime of squandering, corruption, unconscionable carelessness and incompetence, so much so that it soon had to be turned back to avoid complete ruin. And if this example seems old-fashioned, look at what happens in the African states that have become 'free' as a result of the anti-colonialist psychosis: next to ridiculous aping of European democratic institutions, there are repeated conspiracies and coups d'état, rebellions, tribal fights, massacres, administrative disorder, primitive depostications barely disguised. Saint-Paulien (*La contre-révolution africaine*, Paris, 1967) has compiled an impressive list, week by week, starting in 1960, of all these events. African states do not go into complete economic ruin merely because they exploit the antagonism between the US and the USSR with regard to grabbing areas of influence, exports and investments, and raw material reserves. But apart from all that, as far as we are concerned, it is high time to say: Enough of the nigger, and to oppose the tabooisation of the nigger and the corresponding surrenders. At least, this should be the attitude of men of a true Right. In fact, even among us, a corrosive action aimed at dulling what little is left in the way of a sense of distance and healthy natural instincts is gradually gaining ground. And, apart from the reception of the negroes that one encounters among the students and who are often distinguished by a provocative arrogance, and as individuals with shady activities in common with 'protesters' and hippies, the commitment of television, which only knows how to say good things about the negroes and loses no opportunity to take their side with distortions of all kinds, is to be disdained, which shows American films in which blacks are seen as judges, lawyers, actors, policemen and so on, which enlists black singers and mixes white dancers with black dancers, so as to habituate the public to a bastard commonality not without dangers, given the moral level of such a large part of our population. And a disruptive factor in addition to many others

2

Another taboo of our times is the so-called 'working class'. Woe betide to touch it, woe betide to speak of it except with deepest respect. Flattering it, pampering it, making it every promise, obligatory in the practice of all democratic parties. Everything is permitted to it, because its cause is sacrosanct. Did not Marxism and its companions proclaim that the working class is the true subject of history and that the progress of civilisation is identified with the advance and rise of the working class? The intangibility of the working class is now not only moral but also physical. The most patent demonstration is given by an episode not so ago, the so-called Avola events in which in a conflict between a police monopoly and angry hordes of demonstrators a 'worker' lost his life and a few others were injured. Well, even before carrying out an enquiry, to ascertain the truth of the facts and the actual responsibilities, a quaestor was dismissed and RAI-TV immediately presented the whole thing, verbatim, as a deplorable 'police repression of the trade union struggle, synonymous with civil progress', a whole chain of newspapers doing the chorus. Who cares about the casualties among the police who, on the verge of being lynched by the peaceful

proponents of the 'trade union struggle', who of course had met them with chants and flowers, had been forced to make use of their elementary right to defend their lives? Only the 'worker' is sacrosanct and intangible. If it is not considered as such, the watchword will be: *écrasez l'infâme*. But here it is above all on the general aspect of this taboo that we want to make a few remarks. First of all, we must denounce the generalisation of the concept of 'worker' is closely related to the modern myth of 'work'. Work has ceased to be what it has always been and always should be in any normal civilisation: an activity of a lower order, conditioned from below, anodyne, essentially connected to the material, 'physical' part of existence, to a need and a necessity. And so, by a kind of historical nemesis, by a rebound stroke, that by the hypertrophy of that material part of the social organism to which work refers, the exponents of this have been increasingly able to impose themselves, to dictate the law: more and more, the more they have organised themselves with the trade unions. Hence, the yielding, the fearful general homage to the 'working class', the adulation of it, the taboo 'working class'. However, it is precisely the myth of work that should first be rejected, clearly distinguishing activity from activity, opposing material, opaque activities, linked to material interests, to free and disinterested ones. The term 'work' should be reserved exclusively for the latter, regardless of any factual extension they may acquire and of the circumstance that today every activity, almost without exception, is enlisted, directly or indirectly, by a 'consumer civilisation'. But if one establishes what properly and legitimately is to be understood as the 'working class', its desacralisation is imposed. It is a joke, in Georgers Sorel, to speak of the 'heroic asceticism' of the working class. Today the worker presents himself to us only as a 'seller of the commodity labour', a sale from which he seeks to make as much profit as possible, without scruples, aiming only at a bourgeois standard of living. Gone are the days of the miserable proletariat of the early industrialist era, who certainly justified a protest in the name of humanity. And while there are still areas of indigency here and there, the line of development is clear. Whether specialised or self-employed, a 'worker' today is better off than many an intellectual, a teacher, a lower-ranking civil servant, or many a member of the middle class (one knows the fear one has when forced to have a worker come home for some repairs). The modern worker thinks only of himself, and his organisations only look after the 'interests of the class'. Poisoned by classical Marxist or more or less equivalent social ideologies, the modern worker no longer knows the solidarity of the unit of production and the environment of being part of it, he no longer knows relationships of devotion and free, personalised commitment, he despises so-called 'paternalism' as an offence, he does not see beyond his own small horizon. He cares nothing that his disordered 'demands' aggravate the imbalance and disruption of the national economy, indefinitely develop the deleterious spiral of wage increases and price rises. Already rigid and uniform trade union wage scales are enforced coercively and inorganically, without any consideration for the diversity of companies and their differing performance, thus not caring if by this means some of them at given junctures find themselves in critical situations and are forced to retreat and retaliate in a way that disrupts the market. The use to the bitter end of strikes increasingly takes on the appearance of genuine social blackmail, in which the very capitalist or 'bourgeois' system against which Marxist ideology rails is blatantly profited: because should this system be abolished, should the pretexts offered by the myth of the 'exploitation' of the worker be taken out of the way and work be strictly planned and framed precisely in a Marxist and totalitarian 'State of Labour', with no more strikes, trade unions and 'claims', with everyone put in their place, to go straight, the good party would be over. One should see this clearly. The one-way 'social justice', for the use and consumption of the 'working class' alone, should be opposed by a broader and more comprehensive conception

of justice, based on an effective, qualitative hierarchy of values and activities. What can still be done in this regard, given the situation, given that the green light has been given to deplorable developments, is difficult to establish. But the least that can be asked of the men of a true Right is to not give in on the ideal level, to fight the tabuisation of the 'working class', to desacralise this new plebeian deity, to lay bare its grey reality. For the rest, go ahead and recite a *mea culpa*. An extreme oriental proverb says: 'The meshes of the net of Heaven are wide, but no one passes through them'. The achievements of a materialistic civilisation, of a civilisation in which, as R. Guènon put, man has detached himself from the heavens with the excuse of dominating the earth and, in general, has given primacy to material goods, had to be paid for sooner or later. As we have said, one of the heaviest prices is precisely the growth, advancement and power of the 'working class' in the modern world. It has reached the point where, today, it can block the entire organism of a state when it wants to: especially when, as in Italy, it is in the hands of fearful, irresponsible, spineless men, absolutely incapable of creating those organic structures in which even the most material activities can personalise themselves and participate, in a certain way and to a certain degree, in a supra-dinary significance.

Julius Evola

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