

HUNGARIAN TRADITIONALISM



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ON THE SACRED CROWN OF THE KINGS OF HUNGARY

A In recent years, opinions based on fundamental insights have been born and formed in relation to the origin of the Hungarian Holy Crown, its material presence in our history, its date, the creation of the crown from a single or two separate parts, and the "official" position of the time. It is not necessary to go into the main issues here, as they are well known. The question was again raised as to whether the Holy Crown could have been the crown of Saint Stephen (I), and it was suggested that *the Corona Graeca* and *Corona Latina* were of two different origins - Byzantine imperial and papal - and that the later artistic unification of the two parts of the crown might be questionable. In this respect, an engineering team made some remarkable findings, and even more remarkable are the insights and conclusions that emerged from the Vosges-Arian side, especially from Lajos Csomor, which shed new light on the study of the corona. From the investigations it can be concluded that the Holy Crown could have been the crown of St. Stephen (I.), the two parts of the crown are in all probability of the same origin, and not of different ages, from different places - later artificially

is a part of the system that has been merged.

In the following, we present an assumption that is relevant to unbiased coronal research. We are aware ,

that our hypothesis is a bold one, but will only be alarming and utterly unacceptable to those who are completely absorbed in the rationalism and materialism of modern times, which barely touch the level of rationality.

Our assumption - we have to say this up front - is completely unconvincing. For us - regardless of its provability and unprovability - it is an absolute certainty: in the sense of the principle "it could not be otherwise". We obviously cannot expect this of anyone. In fact, what we hope for is not the acceptance of our hypothesis, but that the most unquestioning of the researchers who have summarised it will not finally dismiss it as a complete absurdity, that we can only the faintest hope that some of them will perhaps reflect on what follows.

We said that we would present our hypotheses in relation to the results of the latest unbiased coronal research. We must interpret this statement. We accept that the Hungarian St. Crown could have been the crown of St. Stephen (I), and that it was certainly his crown. We accept that the too sharp separation of the Corona Graeca and the Corona Latina is unjustified, and that they were in fact created together. We neither accept nor reject the possibility that the Holy Crown was created either in the occupied Carpathian Basin or by the Hungarian fifths of the (supposed) First or Second Conquest; this possibility is - for the purposes of our argument - virtually eliminated.

There can hardly be any doubt that the Hungarians came into looser and closer contact with religions related to and subordinate to the most diverse traditions, partly directly, partly through Hun mediation, which is nowadays hardly disputable. The Huns' own tradition and their own ancestral certainly incorporated, albeit partially, three forms of *Taoism*: Lao-Taoism, Lao-Taoism, and Taoism.

-tse Taoism, and the Kung-fu-tse Taoism (the latter of which is known as universalism in the history of religion). A connection with Buddhism is less likely. The Hun-inhabited and Hun-dominated area - in the heyday of the Hun Empire

Buddhism had not yet , and the people on the move were too far away the spiritual sphere of Buddhism. Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that both the Huns and the Hungarians had some kind of indirect contact with Buddhism, and that the spiritual influences of Buddhism may have had an indirect impact on Hun and Hungarian spirituality.

It is vaguely likely that the very high forms of Bon tradition and Bon religion that emerged from Tibet, following the shamanistic ancestral religion of Tibet (although later also passing into shamanism), may have had a transmitting influence on the spiritual life of the Huns. That the religions and traditions of Iran may have influenced both the Huns and can hardly be doubted. The influence of both Zoroastrianism's *magi*- *daisyism* and *Zervanism* is to be assumed, and it is highly probable that both *Manichaeism*, *Catharism* and, after the Hungarian conquest, *Bogomilism* had their indirect but nevertheless explicit influences

and its effects.

There is no doubt that the Huns came into contact with *Christianity*, and as they marched westwards, their conquest grew in strength. Apart from a small fraction of them, they did not become Christians, but - like the Hungarians who later also moved westwards - they were also introduced, partly indirectly and partly directly, to the Nestorian form of Christianity, Byzantine Christianity (i.e. later Eastern Christian Orthodoxy) and Latin-Roman Catholic Christianity. There is also some likelihood that the Huns at least may have been in contact with other, mainly Germanic and disappearing, descendants of the other religions of Europe, and even more that the Hungarians after the Conquest did indeed come into contact with the esoteric deep and high levels of Christianity represented by the knightly orders. There is neither proof nor disproof that either the Hungarians or the Huns in contact with the so-called monophysite tendencies of Christianity. Since it is by no means our aim to make this hegemonic

In order not to deal with the Huns' and prehistoric' religion, which is extremely interesting, of crucial importance for the work but unfortunately very little clarified, we have mentioned only those probable traditional and religious features which may be important for the hypothesis to be developed.

Attila, as king of the Huns, was opposed to the Christian Nyugat. He was also opposed to the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) and Western Roman Empire, which was in its final period. In later times, it was no accident that Attila became such a fearsome and demonic figure in the memory of the Christian West. But Attila's anti-Christianity, and even anti-Romanity, was not endless. It is also possible that the Huns were influenced by Christianity, shamanic, and even more so the Taltos, as a substrate, as well as the other religions that came into contact with them, were significantly influenced by Christianity, without the Huns becoming Christian. For the Huns of the highest spiritual level, and for Attila himself, it is almost certain, Christianity had an influence not only on the surface but also on the depth and height of its influence; perhaps the Christian gnosis, which was then disappearing but had not yet completely ceased to be esoteric, was not unknown to him. Attila did not become a Christian, but he certainly foresaw the spiritual future of the Christianity - a controversial spiritual future - and we may assume that he also saw that this was not the path to follow for the Huns today, but that it would become the path almost alone for his dynasty and the successor nation of his people in the future.

Ancient traditions and religions were (and still are) inseparable from magic; both the lower order of goetic magic or demonic magic, and the higher order, the true, theurgic magic. The shamans and the taltos also possessed pre-existing and developed magical abilities, mainly at the level of demonic magic, but also, at their greatest, at the level of true magic.

The highest degree of magic, according to the magical theory of beings is related to the realisation of omnipotence. The path leading to this is also the path of the fulfilment of the great magical power (*magnipotencia*), which is universal. One of the magnipotencia, on every path of magical realisation, is the possession of the magical faculty of *resurrection* (*resurrectio*). From the point of view of the esoteric approach, resurrection is far from being the same as resurrection. (When Jesus Christ resurrected Lazarus, it in fact a magical revival, but Jesus Christ's *own* resurrection can be considered a true theurgic-magical resurrection.) Resurrection is the complete restoration of Being in the triple unity of human body-spirit-spirit. The gross material body, transfigured, disappears. The resurrected human magician also has the ability to appear at any time, in any degree of materialization. It can be experienced only by the "clairvoyant", it can become visible but not tactile, it can become tactile but not visible, and - obviously - it can be visible and tactile; and then it can disappear again in all respects. A magical resurrection is also possible which does not have the appearance of a bodily remnant that can be experienced by others.

Among the highest stages of the initiation-realization path of Taoist magic was the resurrection of the Taoist magician. Placed in a crypt or rock tomb and biologically completely dead, the magician, according to the Taoists, would after a time disappear from his tomb, leaving in his place a *sceptre* or a sceptre-handled *sword*. There have been Taoist magicians who have been resurrected several times, but those whose sceptre or sword remained in their tombs have usually never reappeared. Taoism teaches - but so do other traditions, such as the Hindu tradition - that resurrection can coincide with the realisation of Oneness with the Absolute, but can also be at a lower (though still very high) level.

The plausible and immeasurably flat objections that in such cases, the fraudulent misrepresentation of disciples

can be counted, they only testify to the fact that their proponents can neither imagine nor conceive of the type of spiritual and traditional man, and do not deserve our reflection on their objections. Suffice it to say that the famous Shroud of Turin, which bears the 'imprint' of the body of Jesus Christ and is also the exoteric proof of the transubstantiation and dematerialisation of the resurrection, has very often been described as the result of a bona fide or less bona fide misunderstanding (most recently in 1988). Forgery is out of the question, and the refutations of the Shroud's validity are now, as always, shattered by the persuasive force of recent evidence and counter-evidence.

Having said all this, we can now move on to stating our historical assumptions. Once kings always sacral kings, in varying degrees of sacrality, but with the power of 'true charisma'; in later times, sacral kings, as the successors of ancient god-kings, became more and more exceptional: the Hungarian Saint Lazarus and the French Saint Louis are among the last. Attila, king of the Hun Empire, was certainly a sacral ruler, probably a very high priest of sacrality. Sacrality, in its original sense, meant not only the dignity of sanctity, but also a real theourgico-magical power, as a *true* royal power, which extended beyond the external power of the king, establishing it from within.

There can be little doubt that Attila was a sacral king and a *magician-king*. Where Attila got his initiations, from whom, who was his guide on the path of transcending initiation: we do not know. He certainly possessed all the prerequisites for initiation, and it is likely that his master was either a Taoist magus or someone who had followed a path close to the Taoist magical path. Our hypothesis is that *the Hungarian Holy Crown is not "made" nowhere*. It must have been in the legendary tomb of Attila the Magician, in the triple coffin, on the resurrected body of Attila the Magician-king, as an imprint of the presence of royal power and rule, and also to serve purpose of royal lords of Attila's dynasty, the At-

The kings of the descendants of the people of tila will be able to crown themselves with it, and it will be the crown of the Christian Hun-Hungarian kings and of the new kingdom.

What the archaeologists will probably never find - Attila's tomb - has been found by the loyal initiates and visionaries of the Turul dynasty. We don't know where, and we don't know when. It may be that the crown was taken eastwards by the Huns shortly after Attila's death, possibly with Attila's three coffins, and brought back the Hungarians who carried out the first or second conquest, and kept secretly, perhaps reburied. Árpád (who should be regarded not as a prince or a leader, a *kende* or a *gyula*, *but as a kagan*, or *king*, after the end of the Khazar dependence) may have been in possession of the crown, but he did not crown himself with it, because the time had not yet come for him to do so. We assume that, conceptually or otherwise, there were those who knew - and King Árpád was one of them - that the conquest and the founding of the state were not yet sufficient; the Christian foundation of the state would be the appropriate time for the Attila crown to appear, and the first Christian king to found the state would be the first to wear it. It would hardly be reasonable to suppose that the Holy Crown would first have gone to the Byzantine Emperor or the Pope, and from one of these two it would have come to the nascent Hungary.

We do know that the Hungarians who migrated westwards, partly as a result of their dependence on the West, were familiar with Judaism-Israelitism and Islam, but as we have already mentioned, they were not unfamiliar with Nestorian Christianity. In fact, Christian influence can be explicitly assumed, which may have partly influenced the ancient religion of the Táltos as a substrate of religion, and partly - to some extent - built on it (mixed with many other influences). With due caution, the "Praechristianism" of the Hungarians can also be assumed.

For the Hungarians, the adoption of Christianity was obviously traumatic, despite favourable pre-dispositions, and the after-effects of the trauma continued - almost unarticulated - for centuries.

lived below the surface like a latent disease. Naturally, it was not only the after-effects of the trauma that continued to operate, but also the remnants of ancient religion, ancient knowledge-elements, symbols, the forces of *ethno genius* or ethno-genius. These motifs, which lived on, were necessarily positive. The growing Christian and Western influence, which in many respects was peripheralising, particularly when it underpinned by power, pushed ancient motifs into the background in all areas. Protestantism, perhaps less spiritual in many other respects, was to some extent liberating in this respect. Catholicism, in some areas, had a

Instead of the "oppressive power" of the Reformation, a less oppressive religious movement - at the same time a Christian movement - emerged, which resonated more with the ancient secular religious orientation. As a result, ancient Hungarian traditional and religious motifs surfaced, forces and elements that had been dormant for a long time and without this influence might have disappeared forever. However, Christianity - both Catholicism and, even more so, Protestantism - was the way forward Hungarians, despite the Christian trauma. After the Conquest of Hungary, Christianity - apart from small sects - still essentially united (for a very short time): the country of Stephen, the Turul-dynasty would not have survived, spiritually or otherwise, if it had not joined Christianity. Attila certainly foresaw and knew this - through his powers of clairvoyance. He bequeathed his visible - but transcendent - imprint, the Holy Crown, to the future Christian kingdom, the Christian King of Tula. The Holy Crown is therefore - a Christian crown.

Hungary and the Hungarian nation must preserve the consciousness of its traditional Eastern origins and connections, it must preserve and revive its Catholic, Protestant, and possibly Eastern Orthodox Christianity, it must reaffirm its belonging to both the East and the West, to Europe. It must preserve and awaken in itself the affirmation of the Kingdom of Hungary.

and integral spiritual-metaphysical Traditionalism - as a resolving consciousness.

This is the legacy of Attila, which he bequeathed to the successors of his people, the successors of his kingdom: this is the material and ideal reality of the Holy Crown, and all that follows inalienably and inextricably from the ideal reality of the Holy Crown.

It is the legacy of Attila, Almos, Árpád, St Stephen, St Imre and St Lazarus, the legacy of Kings, Kingdom and Royalty.

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III. THE SPIRITUAL MISSION OF HUNGARIANS

*"A strange shriek breaks from my
lips, the Turanian fever
shudders in him, three
sacraments have taught him: the
Blood, the Wine and the Wheat-
grass", Gyula Somogyváry*

1.

NOMADISM, EAST, FIGHT, HOLY KING

As a starting point, I have deliberately chosen some of the basic phenomena that are indisputably part of the existence of the prehistoric Hungarians, although opinions are strongly divided as to their interpretation. In writing these lines, leaving aside the mental distortions and degenerations of the present day, I have based my explanation of the spiritual mission of Hungarianism on the principles of the universal metaphysical tradition (including the form of the close relationship between Hungarianism and the Christian tradition), the mythical-symbolic forms of the original Christian tradition and some Sanskrit cosmological-metaphysical expressions). Accordingly, I have had to reject out of hand the fundamentally flawed views of modern science, ethnology and sociology, which are infected by rationalism, materialism and evolutionism, and which assume that man 'emerged from the animal world' and that ancestorsmodern civilised peoples are to be found in the communities of savages called 'primitives'; the truth is, in fact, the exact opposite.

If, within the present human world-cycle, the maha-yuga of the Indo-Hindu tradition, one were to identify the first, more essential difference between major human tribes and peoples, it would be the difference between *migratory* and *settled* life-forms. As we have already pointed out, the difference between the nomadic and the settled forms of life and the corresponding ways of life is indeed fundamental and has existed since the earliest times; in relation to these, all other human activities are subordinate and secondary. Since the primitives were warriors

-The nomadic nature of the region is hardly debatable, and further intellectual understanding of nomadism is crucial here.

According to the biblical myth, in the earthly world, Adam Harrison - the 'First Man' - the sons of Adam Harrison, who represents the Man of the Beginning, Cain and Abel, embody the archetypes of two different ways of life: '*And Abel became a shepherd of sheep, and Cain a farmer*'¹. As is well known, Abel's animal sacrifice, whose smoke rises perpendicular to the sky, is welcomed by God, whereas Cain's offering of smoke, which is spread horizontally *on the* ground, is rejected. The personification of nomadism, Abel, is thus associated with the sky, the apex of the world triangle symbolising universal manifestation, i.e. the primordial, luminous, positive, masculine self, in short, with essentiality (, Cain is associated with the earth, the base, and therefore with the dark, negative, feminine archetype, the substance horizontally spreading, earthly smoke).² this way, from the point of view of manifestation, the nomad is basically higher than the settled; its relationship is more direct with the Sky, with the Golden Age, characterised by an uncontained consciousness and an almost total absence of time, by freedom. The Golden Age man

¹Genesis 4:2

²Of course, settlement is not in itself a negative, and here we must think first of all, in the language of biblical symbolism, of the initial, Edenic, and the final, heavenly, "static" existence in Jerusalem; there is no contradiction in the double meaning of the symbols. Also cf. *Evolving Existence*. Chapter XII. The Metaphysical Dual.

lives in the boundless space, the significance of time is negligible for him, he does not experience its oppressive character, which is also indicated by the fact that the Golden Age is the longest of all the world ages, the yugas. The man of space does not create anything permanent, he is mainly in contact with the animal world, which moves like him, and his traditions, symbols and art are decisively audible and audible. "The nomadic, pastoral peoples," says Guénon, "do not build anything timeless, they do not think in terms of the future, which escapes their attention; they have space before their eyes, in which they are not confronted with any boundaries, on the contrary, space always opens up new possibilities. Thus is revealed the interconnection of cosmic principles in the order to which the symbolism of Cain and Abel is linked: the principle of *contraction*, represented by time, and the principle of *expansion*, represented by space. In practice, both principles are simultaneously in time and space, as they are in everything else; it is necessary to point this out in order to avoid unduly simplistic identifications or generalisations and to resolve the occasional contradictions; it is undeniable, however, that the activity of the principle of contraction is predominant in temporality, while that of extension is predominant in spatiality. Moreover, if one may say so, *time expands space*; and accordingly, the settled peoples gradually absorb the nomads over time; and this is what gives social and historical significance to the fact that Cain conquered Abel."³ *"And it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain attacked Abel his brother and killed him."*⁴

In the sense of the above, the pre-Christian Hun-Hungarian kings' abstention from, and even aversion to, a settled way of life can be a profound spiritual positive, if it is on the metaphysical truth that the settled way of life is a promoter of the

³See René Guénon: *The rule of quantity*, chapter 21. I. m.

⁴*Genesis* 4:8. Cf. Endre Ady: *Cain killed Abel*.

The "freezing" of the world, which is one of the main driving forces behind the universal darkening of consciousness and existence. In this light, both the wars of the Hun king Attila (Atilla, Etele) against the Kali-Yugai tendencies, against Christian Nyugat, the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) and the Western Roman Empire, which were imbued with the above-mentioned aspects earlier, and the so-called 'adventures' of the conquering Hungarians can be seen in a positive light; This is apparently Abel's heroic struggle against the 'murderous' Cainites who were 'freezing' the world.

Esoteric esoteric geography provides the basis for the evaluation of the north-eastern origins of the nomadic Hungarians and their conquering migration from north to south and from east to west. In general terms, it can be said that, from a metaphysical point of view, *the North is superior in position and the South in orientation*. North-south migration is thus always primary and strongly spiritual, while east-south movement is secondary and mainly spiritual.

To clarify the reasons for a nation-wide undertaking such as the medieval Hungarian conquest would obviously require an examination of a number of extremely complex factors, many of which are of such a nature that they are beyond the scope of conventional methods of investigation. In any case, we can practically exclude from the scope of evaluation those flat and banal 'realpolitik' explanations which suggest that the contemporary Hungarian had been frightened off by an "unexpected Beseny attack" and set out for the West; well, this alleged Beseny attack, which only hit the rear guard of a Hungarian tribe on the road, was a minor event, the only historical basis for which is a record of Emperor Constantine - from a Beseny source - on the eve of Botond's threatened Byzantine campaign. The Hungarian mon-dai tradition itself does not mention the plight of the people, the 'crusade' of the Besenyans or others from which they should flee, but instead speaks of a visit by the 'bird of the market', the messenger of the Deity, to Álmos

mother, Emesa (a name which - and this deserves a separate study - denotes '*mother boar*', and as such was intended to express the presence of the spiritual caste - or the force that constituted it - at the origin of the Árpáds, since the boar is the primordial symbol of *the Brahmanas*). The great western journey is thus driven not by earthly necessity but by celestial mission. At the same time, for some of the leaders, it may have been motivated an intuitive realisation that, in the face of the increasing tendency to freeze, the nomadic way of life must be replaced by a settled one, of their own free will and willpower; in other words, the people either become chaotic and, although converted, live, or remain nomadic and are destroyed. Whether the decision to do so - depending on the degree of familiarity with the current situation in the West - was taken in advance or was merely formulated here is another question. In any case, the Árpáds, and thus the Hungarians, made the right choice at the decisive moment.

In the time-space ensemble, the space element is related to constant movement, and the people element to the non-settled way of life. Space is the element that is symbolically closer to the origin, in which everything is present in simultaneity in the eternity that precedes time. Life in space, with its infinite horizon, gives man a freedom, a greater temporality. The time element becomes predominant in the settlement associated with the loss of origin; with the predominance of the time element, time gradually and increasingly 'speeds up', the cyclical end is approaching, when time, which has almost complete victory, virtually annihilates space: the "end of the world" not least *the end of space*; Cain murders Abel... But, as Guénon points out, when time seems to be almost completely victorious, that is, when the contraction of time is almost to the point of being finite, time is finally reduced to a single moment. Then, in fact, all duration ceases to exist, because there can obviously be no succession within the moment. "So what happens is that the devouring time
"by devouring itself it ceases to " and in such a way that the "world

at the end", the final limit of cyclical manifestation, "there will be no more time".⁵ As the *Apocalypse* says of the *seventh* angel, who represents the restoration that follows the cyclical end, "*And the angel whom I saw standing on the sea and on the earth lifted up his hand to heaven; and I swore by him who lives forever and ever, who made heaven and those in it, and the sea and those in it, that there would be no more time*".⁶ Here the number seven represents the centre, which, in the sense of the above, can be said to be the centre, the centre where time becomes space; the ultimate triumph of space over time is expressed here. To the detriment of time and advantage of space, there finally a reversal: when time seems to have almost completely absorbed space, space absorbs time; and this can be expressed in the cosmological sense of biblical symbolism as Abel's final revenge on Cain. The murderer, because of the curse upon him - and this will be relevant to our study later - is forced to commit suicide...

It is difficult to determine from today what traditional spirituality influenced, directly or indirectly, the development of the traditional doctrinal and ritual complex of the nomadic Hungarians of the time of the conquest. As far as the antecedents are concerned, it is a fact that, ever since the Chinese chronicles became known, the Huns have been inhabited by the *Hiung-nu* or *hun-nu*, whose connection with *Taoism* is almost certain. Somewhat more distantly, the Tibetan *Bon tradition* and its forms which have passed *into* shamanism, and in other respects Zoroastrian *mas-daisyism* and *Zervanism*, as well as *Manichaeism*, and *Christianity* itself and some heterodox forms of it, *Catharism* and, after the Hungarian conquest, *Bogomilism*, may also be mentioned in clarifying traditional spiritual links. Of course, it is not possible to discuss the teachings of these traditions here, and in order to clear up any misunderstandings, we will only discuss the so-called *shamanism*

⁵Guénon: *The rule of quantity*. chapter 23.

⁶*Apocalypsis Ioannis* 10:5-6.

few comments on. Shamanism, which has a very high cosmological background, undoubtedly includes rituals similar to the most ancient traditional rites. Some shamanistic symbols, such as three worlds or number seven in general, the world tree, the tree and the swan, are considered to be the purest derivatives of the ancient tradition, not to mention the paranormal powers that were once essential to the shaman's work and which gave true shamans a real sphere of influence. In shamanism, as in all the old religions, priestly power had to be by direct magical powers; the priests had to prove the existence of these powers from time to time, and when this did not for various reasons, it was an indication that the religions were gradually on the way to exhaustion.

Some of the characteristics of the Hungarian occupation also show very ancient traditional aspects. The origin of the triple leadership itself - the *Árpád* (*kagan* or 'king'), the *horka* and the *gyula* - seems to go back to the same ranks and ancestors known as 'world priest-king' (*brahmatma*), 'world priest' (*mahatma*) and 'world king' (*mahapga*) in the Indo-Hindu spiritual tradition. The number seven of the blood tribes, or more precisely the six plus one chief tribe, also carries the most ancient symbolism, referring to the wholeness represented, among other things, by the six directions in space, the central seventh region, the non-spatial centre. But to emphasise the positive aspects, we could mention, among others, the symbol of the turul, the cult of the bow as the most ancient "Edenic" royal weapon⁷, the cult of the sun, the sacrifice of the white horse, the raising of shields, or the wonderful ritual dance, music and singing, which in many respects has survived until recent times, as well as countless elements and data that prove the existence of a predominantly *ksatriya* or warrior-horse doctrine and ritual system. It is not negligible,

⁷ Cf. A. K. Coomaraswamy: The Symbolism of Archery. In *Studies in Traditional Archery*. A.K. Aroomarwamyamy, Theory of Archery, Debrecen, 2009, Quintessence Publishing House.

that the occupying Hungarians, like all nomadic peoples, were originally *soldiers*. In the eyes of the foreign peoples, the warriors were particularly distinguished by their tenacity and perseverance. The Hungarian, writes Leo the Wise in his *Tactics of the Emperor*, *'endures toil and toil with dignity, tolerates the burning heat and the freezing cold and the other privations of nomadic life. They do not give up the fight, as other nations do, when they are beaten in the first battle, but, until they are perfectly humiliated, endeavour in many ways to strike their adversaries.'*" This is consistent with Arab accounts of the Levoèdian Hungarians as *'brave, good-looking and respectable. Their clothing is made of coloured seerskin, their armour is silver-plated, and they are light-armoured.'*" The warrior-militant way of life, in the caste system established by the metaphysical archetypes, corresponds to *the ksatriya caste*. The ksatriya, following the Sel-lem caste, is primarily associated with the solar quality of being solar; the mythology of the Sun seems to be supported by the fact that the Hungarians who occupied land turned their faces towards the rising Sun. The rite of rising expressed the correct spiritual orientation, the orientation towards the imprint of the spiritual centre in the earthly world.

However, it is important to distinguish the people themselves from the dynasty that rules among them, and not the people. In our case, the Turul dynasty, which gave the kings of the Árpád dynasty their birth, cannot in fact be considered Hungarian, just as, for example, the Habsburgs are not in fact Austrians; *the dynasty is essentially a supranational reality*. The turul bird itself is the expression of the irrepressible will of a supranational dynasty, which is also manifested on another plane in an animal species. The Atilla tradition and the Turul myth together confer magical authority on the truly sacral House of Árpád, and from the very beginning there was a sense of community of destiny among the Hungarians, linking the supra-national dynasty with the people for centuries, according to which the subjects were animated and nourished solely by the metaphysical, professional leadership of the king and his descendants. This power gives the royal house extraordinary abilities, wisdom, heroism and

nobility; these distinctive qualities are inherited in the blood, and thus the Hungarian monarchical institution in its first form corresponds entirely to the typical doctrine of rule of the warrior nomadic peoples of the East. All traditions, whether emphatically or less emphatically, teach that *kingship* is linked to the primordial reality of man. The Golden Age man is a kingly man, in the Golden Age all men are at the level of consciousness corresponding to royalty, that is to say, they are kings. At the beginning of the times after the separation from the origin, after the multiplication and confusion of peoples and languages, there is still the need for a king of distinction to be at the head of the community, a testimony and embodiment of the normality of the past in the eyes of others. Everyone has a sense of kingship, and more or less everyone's nature is that a king, but not everyone is a king in his or her entirety. And that is when the need arises for an honoured king who represents normality, the beginning and the Origin in the eyes of the people. For the sacral king - such as the Hun Great King Atilla or King Árpád - continues to embody in some sense what follows from the specific compact unity of kingship, kingship and the Universal Man. This unity expresses primordial nature of man himself.

2.

FROM CHRISTIANITY TO THE CURRENT DOMINANCE OF ANTITRADITIONALISM

Above I have referred to the exhaustion of the original religions, when the religious magi no longer possessed the actual magical powers necessary for priestly authority. This is in fact a stage of universal eclipse of consciousness, which is the main characteristic of the present world age, the so-called *Kali-yuga*. In the case of the probably very complex Hungarian ancestral, it is this exhaustion that has enabled Christianity's prospects of conversion to increase. The adoption of Christianity was traumatic for all peoples, but the old forms could no longer be maintained. Ese-

In our country, the absorption itself difficult, due to the different solar tradition of the *Kshatriya* Hungarians in the main lines, but was also easy, mainly due to the presence of metaphysical ideas that the settled Hungarians undoubtedly firmly possessed. The so-called 'pagan' rebellions (of Vata and John the son of Vata), although still very much associated with many people, were largely suppressed by the negative aspect that they were exhausted by opposition to Christianity, without being able to demonstrate anything of truly universal validity. At the same time, different level, a complete misunderstanding of the political situation in Europe in the 10th century and of the real balance of power can only lead to the naive claim that the Hungarians, as a 'pagan' and nomadic people, could have continued their 'Turanian' life in opposition to the West. The conversion to Christianity and the exchange of nomadic life in the Aabel for settlement in Cain were obviously traumatic, and the after-effects of this were to live on for centuries among our people; but Christianity was the way of the future. It was the path which the appropriate visionaries - and perhaps even King Atilla the Hun himself - had marked out well in advance for their successors, and for the Hungarian people, who were also under the sign of traditionalism.

From present time, when darkness in the metaphysical sense has - as a result of general involution - gained far more ground in the earth-human world than in the Middle Ages, the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between Koppány and Vajk (later *Sanctus Primus Stephanus de genere Turul*) and Hungarian primitive and Christianity is not in fact at all extreme. Two different forms of *traditional* spirituality were at odds here, but which, despite all the superficial contradictions, were by no means irreconcilable in their very essence, in their basic principles. The truly irreconcilable opposition, the most powerful opposition imaginable in the terrestrial-human world, between the anti-traditionalism of metaphysical 'darkness' and the tradition and traditionalism of metaphysical 'light'

stretched. Translated into our case, this conflict is not between Koppány and Vajk, but between St Stephen's Hungary and modern Hungary. And those who recognised this in the 11th century knew well that the murderer of Abel was not Christianity, which, although essentially a characteristic product of *Kali-yuga*, is indisputably the depository of Tradition in its principles. They in Christianity, instead of Cain, the lineage of Seth: *"And Adam knew his wife again, and she bare him Son, and called his name Seth: for God gave me, saith he, another seed for Abel, whom Cain slew... Then began they to call upon the name of the Lord."*⁸ And this realisation proved to be of life-saving importance.

In the sense of the above, the adoption of Christianity undoubtedly caused serious damage, both on a secular and spiritual level, to the Hungarian nation and to what the Hungarian people were called to manifest in history, but on the other hand, it had incalculable positive effects, due to the long-term transmission of the light of Tradition. In symbolic terms, the demise of the House of Árpád (1301), which was associated with Christianity, cannot be separated from the fact that by this time the Hungarian people had largely lost the status of a sacral dynasty. Nevertheless, the royal dynasties of Hungary that followed the Turul dynasty (House of Árpád), namely the dynasties of Anjou, Luxembourg, and to a lesser extent Jagello, as well as the Habsburg and Habsburg-Lothringen dynasties, were all steeped in traditional metaphysics and their operations were governed by traditional principles; their rulers, with a few counter-examples, provided the Hungarian people with spiritual light. Since, as indicated above, the dynasties were the depositories of supranational realities, the anti-kingly uprisings after the demise of the Árpád dynasty were antitraditional in their foundations. The fate and destiny of the Hungarian people was expressed in these efforts, which lasted for centuries and were ostensibly aimed at independence. What was really at stake here was the Ábel

⁸Genesis 4:25-26

memory of the lost golden age which the Pushtan warrior in medieval Europe had been searching vain for; this gave rise to the peculiar *titanism* which, in a negative sense, became a characteristic feature of the Hungarian soul: the placing of high abilities at the service of a misguided goal. It is as if the warrior who cannot rest finds a suitable opponent only in the possessor of majesty. The solution is not, of course, to take up arms, if not to correct the enemy's image and thus *to fight a legitimate battle*: and it is precisely this correction that is one of the main tasks of this study.

It seems that the decline of Hungarianism, which has continued with minor and major interruptions practically up to the present day, is taking place in parallel with the decline, or rather the eclipse, of traditional spirituality. I have already indicated the symbolic meaning of the demise of the House of Árpád, which roughly coincides with the end of the Christian Middle Ages in the traditional sense. The darkening of the consciousness of the whole of Europe could not, of course, have Hungary, although the pathologies here - due to its more easterly location - were somewhat delayed.

The anti-traditional obsolescence that darkened the world in the West, and when it really manifested itself, it was "renaissance", although there was no rebirth, but rather the rapid destruction of the surviving traditional remnants all over Europe. The destruction of the universality of consciousness, which the 'Renaissance' had in art and social life, was completed in the field of reality by the 'Reformation'. 1526 is not only the tragedy of the Hungarian nation, it is also the tragedy of the universal intellectual revolution. Without going into the critical phenomenology of the 'Renaissance' or Protestantism, it is worth noting that the spiritual exhaustion of the classical Christian denominations also contributed to the successful emergence of Protestant sects, most of which appealed, and still appeal, to human capacities of such low order that they are still in the process of being

which pro- vocate ecstatic states in the wrong sense, while *religion is reduced to a purely human, social, moral plane*. The fact is that the strictly anti-traditionalist reform, and within it Calvinism, swept through Hungary the fastest, and the fact that some people still regard Calvinism as the 'true Hungarian religion' anything but positive. The rebellion against authority, as a consequence of the titanic deviation that characterised many, quickly found a home in Calvinism, although it is undisputed that the Counter-Reformation also had its greatest successes in Hungary. At the same time, *'the "oppressive power" of Catholicism, which was felt in some areas, was replaced by a less pressurised religious movement - at the same time a Christian movement which resonated more with the basic religious orientation of the ancient Hungarian people. As a result, ancient Hungarian traditional and religious motifs surfaced, forces and elements that had been dormant for a long time and without this influence might have disappeared forever.'*⁹

The next major phase of the anti-traditionalist action launched from the West was the "Enlightenment", which was in fact *a blackout*, bringing to its conclusion only the misconceptions that had surfaced in the "Renaissance" and the "Reformation". The European bourgeois revolutions were well received by the majority Hungarians, although there were also a number of calm but firm supporters of the rebellion against the king in 1848 (Dessewffy, Szécsen, Szögyén, Zichy); to call these events a war of independence is in fact a left-wing dilettantism. (In Hungary, the only real and indisputable series of events that can be called *a struggle for freedom* has taken place so far, starting on 23 October 1956.) Both the Rákóczi uprising and the 1848 civil revolution, however, were based on the traditional principles of the Habsburgs, who ruled Hungary legally, sometimes with controversy, but who represented the traditional principles of the Habsburgs.

⁹ András László: Some remarks on the sacred crown of the Hungarian kings. In *Sword, Cross, Crown*. Some remarks on the card and the crown of the Holy Roman Emperor. 11-19. o.

house, and instead, the first was able to offer, at best, the institutions of a national kingdom and the second a republic, both, despite all good intentions, to be anti-traditional, i.e. left-wing in the political plane, i.e., aimed at increasing, knowingly or unknowingly, the reign of Darkness in the metaphysical sense in the world of the earth-human. All in all, and despite all appearances, it was not some kind of "true democracy" that lay behind the forces of the Kurucz or the Kossuth party, but the current episode in the occult war of existence, the rising *nationalism*, in which the delusion was set in motion that, regardless of merit and status, it is the only and supreme value to be born among a given people; Rather, by lulling the insurgents into the illusion of a vaguely defined and nationally based national independence, it worked to shake one of the last strongholds of the traditionalist state idea.

In the Middle Ages, and also for a certain period in the modern age, in Europe as well as in Hungary, the nation, the *nation*, only the nobility, not the individual inhabitants (*regnicola*) of the empire or the country. *Ordinary nationalism*, essentially ignoring all qualitative distinctions, begins to treat all the inhabitants of a country as members of the nation; in its eyes, belonging to a given nation is the highest conceivable dignity, while it regards all other dignities as quasi non-existent. On a more serious scale, this was first reinforced as a companion of the Reformation, and then greatly favoured by the increased obscurantism that was to be called 'the Enlightenment'. From there, it was only a step down to *internationalism*, which its most destructive expression in the revolutions in Russia in 1917, in Hungary in 1918 and 1919, and in Germany (Bavaria); in internationalism, which is a textbook example of downward levelling, the main positive is no longer belonging to a nation, but the fact, hardly complex, that everyone is human; no matter what kind, the point that he is human. And this

At this point, we could list almost endlessly the anti-traditionalist delusions that have flowed into Hungary from the *modern* West, and their disastrous consequences, which is hardly possible here. The conclusion that can be drawn from what has been said is that the Hungarians, losing sight of their undoubtedly lofty traditional aims brought from the East, have gradually sunk into the rationalist and materialist mire of the modern world, and have not even realised - except in the case of a few clear-sighted minds - that the long-standing 'misfortune' is the inevitable consequence of this desolation. Koppan (Abel) rebelled against the Christianized Vashti, mistaking him for Cain, the accursed murderer, whereas Vashti had become the depositary of the Seth principle. But the centuries have now confirmed the warning of Coppin: for the people have been reduced to the minions of the once-hated Cainites of the West; but Cain is cursed, and his curse is coming to an end, and he will bring them to a terrible ruin. In other words, it is only a matter of time before the demonic tendencies unleashed by the modern West will have their disastrous and destructive consequences for the West - and indeed for the whole world. And while there are peoples who feel at their best in this fateful death march, the few 'king-minded' Hungarians, unable to find their place, are suffering irredeemably. As Dezső Szabó says: *"The other nations have arrived at the twentieth century in progress, with all the complexities of their external and spiritual life. We fell into it like a jackpot. If we have a man in whom the strength of the race is pent up in any talent: he is a man of luck and condemned in his mother's womb. For there are no proper avenues in which to crush his powers, to live his life in great enterprises, so he must waste himself in bizarre things, in room science, in ragging, lest he should burst. The Hungarian, with his temperament and cursed kingly spirit, did not even reach the democratic race. Look at who are the leaders in politics, literature, commerce, art, who are the bureaucrats, who rule, who enjoy. German, Slavic and Jewish Hungarians. Because these are the competitive, strong, middle-class people. He reads one book, writes ten books, writes a hundred*

talks a book. The Hungarian, with his treasures buried in the depths, sulks away like a dog with a punch in the nose. Strong-willed, middle-aged: that's the democrat type, with a callous heart and a callous face. The Hungarian needs someone to love him, to encourage him, to acknowledge him, otherwise he will be discouraged, he will become disenchanted. There is no sadder sadness in the world than a Hungarian talent! We have the spilling of blood, the bruised brow, the pain of hard work, and the milk-flower of the little clever ones who have stumbled upon us... We must grow old early, and long after our death we must still wake our days..."¹⁰

In the spirit of anti-traditional subversion, a significant group of Jewish intellectuals "emerges in turn-of-the-century Hungary", says György Litvinen, "as the initiators and leaders of a new national ideology, claiming that traditional nations must be destroyed and that a new history and a new historical perspective must be given to the country and the nation. Not Werbőczy, but Dózsa, not the high priests and kings, but Martinovics and others who have been excluded from history by the national memory of the gentry, must be brought to the fore and commemorated with dignity."¹¹ Apart from the considerable conceptual confusion, this brief extract shows that the agents of the forces of subversion not only sought to falsify history in an unprecedented way - with, it must be added, extraordinary success - but at the same time infiltrated the vast majority of the country's key political, cultural and 'scientific' positions. This anti-traditionalism, which is spreading like a deadly disease, in which the nomadic and anti-traditionalist¹²

¹⁰ Dezső Szabó: *The washed away village*. Debrecen, 1989, Csokonai, pp. 61-62. (I quote this work more for its mood than for the correctness of its principles.)

¹¹ György Litván: *On the Jewish question*. László Németh Szakko- légium, Szombathely, 1989, p. 24.

¹² Here the "tiger" is a metaphysical symbol of the Darkness, which a certain part of Judaism (mainly apostate, "free-thinking"), because of its feminine nature, "" in order to serve its demonic, subversive purposes. On legitimate , see Julius Evola. Budapest, 2009, Persica.

The unpatriotic and apostate Jews, associated with the harmful image of the world - could not stop halfway, and despite all the heroic struggle, the fate was fulfilled in 1945. The Second World War was certainly not a battle of pure traditional light and darkness; nevertheless, in the eyes of a sane person, defying more than half a century of monstrous suggestion, there can be no doubt as to which of the Third Reich and the so-called allied powers was less representative of the forces that served subversion. In both world wars, the Hungarian Apostolic Kingdom fought on the more positive (or, more accurately, less negative) side, and this is completely independent what the enemy, but still hegemonic, world propaganda would have naive people believe to be the relevant facts. The presence of the enemy Red hordes meant that from 1945 to mid-1991, Hungary was *under hostile Soviet military occupation*. In the first stage of this period, the murderous brigands and their vile henchmen, dubbed "people's courts", liquidated or expelled the entire Hungarian intellectual and social elite⁽¹³⁾ and then the communist terror and propaganda apparatus systematically poisoned and oppressed almost the entire Hungarian people, mentally and spiritually. The gravity of the facts can perhaps only be appreciated by stating emphatically that the negative significance of the 150 years of Turkish occupation of the country dwarfs reign of terror of the communists "led" by Béla Kun (Kohn), Rákosi (Rosenfeld) and Kádár (Csermák): however alien the Turkish-Muslim spirituality was to the Christian Hungarian soul, it still represented a traditional order and culture.

¹³ Cf. Ödön Málnási: *Hungarian Mátyrok*. (ed. 1999, Hemet Interhun Publishing); all the works of Lajos Marschalkó, but especially *Welthódítók* (Munich, 1958, Süli) and *Országghódítók* (San Francisco, 1986, Hídfő Friends of the Fountainhead); Viktor Padányi: *The Great Tragedy*, especially Chapters XI-XII (ed. 1995, Gede Testvérek Bt.); Mihály Berki: *The State Protection Authority* (Budapest, 1994, ed.). See also Chapter XII of this volume.

in contrast to the extremely anti-traditional and openly subversive Bolshevism, which, together with socialism, also of the extreme left, was intended to carry out a demonic occult offensive of the darkest subhuman forces against the human world. The glorious (though by now well castrated) 1956 Hungarian uprising for freedom and struggle for freedom against the mortally hostile occupiers proved once again that Soviet-style communism and Western democracies, also ruled by occult forces, are of the same root: and that is the seemingly irremediable, full-blown antitraditionalism, or, to put it in lower terms, so-called materialism. But after the greatest tragedy in the history of the Carpathian Basin (1945), one of the greatest disgraces of the history of the Carpathian countries, which has lasted at least a thousand years, when the most accused enemies of the country, the cosmeticised successors of the former prisoners, in 1994

were "freely" re-elected: it was then shown that the country with the "changed system" could still be easily put at the service of a global metaphysical blackout and subversion, in a subtle and manipulated way, in the broad lines of the country: now under the banner of *globalism*, in the name of an even more aggressive offensive of subversion. In spiritual terms, all this is first to the almost total loss of tradition, then of reality, and finally of culture, to the darkened and massively materialistic vision and practice which made possible both the communist reign of terror and the so-called democracy which paved the way for the rule of the demons. There is no doubt that the modern West, and with it today's Hungary, is profoundly anti-Christian, because it is anti-traditional in an even broader sense. And the goal which the elements who rule the country legally - in subservient obedience to the dictates of the Masonic and other forces that also control the financial circles - are imposing on the previously humiliated and dumbed-down Hungarian people is, according to tradition, the construction of a worldwide *civitas diaboli*, the 'devil's country'. For the time being, we see only a faint forerunner of this, among others, of the deeply anti-intellectual sects

which are quietly but increasingly taking their toll in post-communist regions among generations raised on "dialectical materialism" as the official worldview after the war. All this in a cloud of delirious steam of a morbidly over-stretched economism, the demon of the economy, where almost any loss of face can be certified by the claim that it 'meets the requirements of the "European Union"'.

After all this, the question can rightly be raised as to what Hungarians faithful to tradition can do to avoid ruin. Is it possible to turn away from the modern, anti-Christian West and path of modernity that leads to nothingness, rushing towards certain destruction? Or, importantly, given the changed circumstances, can it return to the path of Atilla, Álmos, Árpád, Szent István, Szent Imre and Szent László?

3.

THE FALL OF THE WEST

AND THE SPIRITUAL VOCATION OF HUNGARIANS

Knowing the spiritual significance of the *Tradiconal* East¹⁴, when we ask the question what is the highest spiritual mission of the Hungarians, we must start from the fact that the Hungarians are the only people in the West, in the heart of Europe, who - at the same time as they are currently and with all the deviations connected with it, a Western people - can claim a not too distant Eastern origin and thus a latent Orientalism. From this intermediate-central position, a twofold advantage can be derived in spiritual terms.

¹⁴ Although it is obvious from the foregoing, it should be pointed out, in order to avoid misunderstandings, that we are not referring here to something like modern, anti-traditional and "secular" westernized China or post-communist Russia, etc. The Ke-let in this consideration is primarily a *spiritual* reality, which is - in the sense of an analogy - the quasi-horizontal counterpart of the North, and where traditional spirituality has survived somewhat longer than in the West.

On the one hand, the catabasis ('descent', 'hell') which the modern world represents today - those who look down into the abyss, and which the peoples of the East - although antitraditionalism is escalating there with extraordinary speed - will only be able to experience after long wandering and suffering, can be actually from the Western position. A possible consequence of this cataclysm is the catharsis that the re-invention of the sacred, the revival-revival of the universality of the sacred tradition, can bring. Closely linked to the first is the second great advantage, as an opportunity: the reawakening of the principality of the Eastern power as a traditional mentality from the memory of the individual and the community, which, after the descent and purification, can be of invaluable help in the repossession and realisation of tradition and thus of holiness.

For a discerning understanding of the above, it will not be useless to summarise the insights of the great traditionalist thinker René Guénon on the future of the West, the future towards which, in the spirit of a completely mistaken idea, the millennial Hungarians, freed from the direct terror of Bolshevism, are being led hand and foot by their illegitimate "blind leaders". (Although, it must be, today the progress towards the West can also have a positive meaning, as detailed below, in so far as it means progress towards the West not in opposition to the traditional East, but in the spirit of it.)¹⁵ Well, for Guénon, the 20th century was not a time of the West, but of the West. For Guénon, it was obvious at the beginning of the century that if the catastrophe which was rapidly approaching as the result of the anti-traditionalist action were to find the Western world at the intellectual level he had experienced (which was, of course, much less lower than today), there would be nothing available to

¹⁵ Many have already pointed out the obviously symbolic and not accidental fact that the movement to revive the universal tradition of humanity has been in the West, thanks in particular to the invaluable work of the Frenchman René Guénon, the Hindu A. K. Coomaraswamy of England, the Italian Julius Evola, the Swiss-German Frithjof Schuon and others.

could survive the inevitable shipwreck of material civilization, and thus what might survive of the collapsing Western world would necessarily sink into the lowest forms of barbarism. Of course, the same fate awaits Hungarians, who will continue to be the unconditional servants of the modern tendencies which threaten to destroy the whole of humanity. Guénon also said that by taking possession of authentic Eastern traditional teachings and principles, the West could, if not disaster, at least possess in embryonic form the elements that could form the basic building blocks of the new world to come. Since Guénon, the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the hegemony of traditionalism in the East has virtually disappeared, and the East, once still alive, has become a 'spiritual memory'. However, before the East 'bowed down to the West deep contempt', it handed over its spiritual treasures to a few suitably qualified Westerners, those who, over the last hundred years or so, had laid down the foundations of metaphysical traditionalism in a way that the West could understand. That is why what yesterday had to be researched in the East, today is mostly to be found in the West's latest, reborn intellectual creations. Whether, however, the West in general will be more in need of adopting yesterday's traditional Eastern teachings and thus universal metaphysical principles is of course open to question (and we have not even mentioned the problem of the 'boomerang-like' East, which has since been made non-traditional by the West). At the same time, it is not a negligible problem that those who have acquired the metaphysical knowledge necessary for a change of direction through a possible in-depth study of the principles have at present a minimal sphere of influence in the Western world (and perhaps only a well-developed, grandiose series of *ksatriya* actions could help). And Guénon has already explained that, if nothing prevents it from having the necessary impact on the masses, by eliminating the current sources of suggestion, the elite will only have a few

if their number is minimal at the beginning, and then they have a positive

are acting as "leaveners" for the future of the course-changing West, and the lion's share of the work will be done by the "force of truth" itself. The task facing the West in averting the disaster that is still looming ever closer is therefore twofold: On the one hand, to acquire/strengthen *an intellectual elite* with the necessary skills, by taking possession of the traditional principles from the East of yesterday, which have been largely reworked and processed by Western traditional authors over the last hundred years and thus made available, could, in principle, be organised along the lines of the medieval Ascetic-Lovagian orders (adapted, course, to the conditions of time and space), in keeping with Julius Evola's view of the nature of the Western mentality. On the other hand, it would be necessary to maximise the influence of the intellectual elite that had emerged, so that it could guide the masses' seriously distorted mentality in the right direction. With the emergence of a proper mentality based on traditional principles, order would reappear in all other areas, without any direct intervention being necessary, since everything in the world depends on principles. The task is therefore an intellectual one, but any proposal for socio-political or even economic reform is like trying to treat cancer with laxatives.

At the same time, it is clear from the foregoing that the possibility of the conquest of the West by traditional Eastern civilisations armed with Western pressure can now be completely ruled out; in this case, the task of the intellectual elite is to ensure that the traditional principles of the

would have been limited to helping the "conquerors" with their remedial work. The most favourable option - a third Guénon option - would be a complete change of direction and a new unfolding of the West

would happen spontaneously, as if from within.

To return to the enormous work of transposing traditional teachings from the East into Western ways, which, being a *traditional* doctrine, of course, is a personal realization of the

the role of a strengthening *Hungarian intellectual elite* could be of great importance in this, for a specific reason. Regardless of the fact that, as I have mentioned, the majority of Hungarians today are typically Western, i.e. anti-traditionalist, in terms of their mentality, some of their members have great intellectual potential because of their Eastern origins. This potential is not, of course, linked to a specific tradition, as it is unfortunately hardly possible today to fully revive and revive the ancient and religion Eastern Hungary, but to the *spiritual memory* of the whole of traditionalism. It is to that intuitive memory, without which a comprehensive restoration of traditional spirituality is absolutely unthinkable. For the task today is not simply to revive this or that partial traditional form or religion, but to see together and re-possess, as far as possible, the whole of Tradition and traditional spirituality. Today, at the level of the intellectual elite, it is no longer enough to be just Christian, just Muslim, just Hindu, just Buddhist, and so on, but, in the light of the recognition of the *transcendent unity* of religions and *traditions*, to be the depositaries of a true universality and *universal orthodoxy* for all those who wish to confront effectively the murderous drift of the modern world.

For the Hungarian intellectual elite, this task could be greatly aided by the ancient oriental origins and knowledge, which, by repossessing them in tandem with the restoration of the traditional way of life, could become a central place of implementation, in addition to forming an *intellectual* bridge between East and West (although overcoming the language barrier is a serious difficulty). For at least a thousand years of its history in the Carpathian Basin, the Hungarian people have been almost constantly at the point of collision between East and West, precisely because of its central position, and although it suffered terrible losses, it has been a force that has held everything in check. But where forces can, forces can also synthesise, and this is the great opportunity for Hungarians: the East and the West,

an autonomous universal *synthesis of* beginning and end. For this, the really topical spiritual task is: after the catabasis in the anti-traditional, Western aberration, its radical rejection, and then the recovery of the Haggyagyan to metaphysical levels, and thus, by awakening the consciousness of the nomadic Eastern Origin, the construction of the Holy City of the settled Western End and thus the coming Golden Age.

This is the goal that made the acceptance of Christianity acceptable to the Hungarians who had settled down from nomadism; it is no longer the vertical journey of Abel (Vajk), but of Seth (István) to the celestial city, or, the language of New Testament symbolism, to the transcendent heavenly Jerusalem, the true City of Peace. In its creation, the Beginning and the End meet. Prince Chaba the warrior leads his people to victory. The "long-ripping calamity" ends forever.

*"And God shall wipe away every tear from their eyes;
and death will be no more."
Apocalypsis Ioannis 21:4*

*B. T. I.
(1995)*

VERTICAL NOMADISM

H Róbert orvát's "Western Europe and Eastern Europe" : "And a land that wants to be the geographical expression of the metaphysical Middle, in the highest sense of the , must possess both the meaning and the harmonised characteristics of *nomadism* and of *settlement*. And these were simultaneously possessed by the reality of the Primordial Tradition, which Gué non was in the process of revealing'.¹ Indeed, the simultaneous possession of nomadism and settledness, of the Old Testament principles of the *Abel* and *Cain*² - the Koppányi and Vojvodka archetypes - can be conceived as a *spiritual* task, which we have in the form of the exaltation of the Seth³ - or Istvanic - archetype in the Old Testament symbolism of the *Sel- lem* mission of *Hungarianism*, and which we have some further clarification will not be superfluous. Seth⁴ was born in place of the "murdered" Abel and his "son" (Enos) was born here. "they began to call on the name of the Lord"⁽⁵⁾ This "calling on the name of the Lord

¹ RÓBERT HORVÁTH: *Western Europe and Eastern Europe*. Pannon Front 13. pp. 4-5.

² Cf. *Genesis* 4; and RENÉ GUÉNON: *The rule of quantity and the signs of the times*. H. n.d., Szigeti /Books of Ancient History I/, ch. 21.

³ To avoid any misunderstanding, *it is not*, of course, the nominally similar Egyptian *Seth*, who is one of the antitheses of dissolution.

⁴ "Seth has been granted permission to return to "Paradise on earth" [...]. The name Seth denotes the qualities of "fidelity" and "constancy"; consequently, it also denotes the restoration of the primordial order which was destroyed by the fall of man." RENÉ GUÉNON: *The World King*. Budapest, 1993, Farkas, Chapter V. See also *ibid.*, notes 8 and 9.

In a certain sense (in relation to Abel), "vision" can be seen as a "nomadism" that suggests an intellectual movement "upwards" along a vertical rather than an ordinary "horizontal" trajectory. This presupposes, of course, a stasis and permanence ('settledness') with regard to all possible horizontality (and what it symbolises). This can only be realised at the intersection of the spheres of being marked by the vertical and the horizontal planes, at the centre.

It is obvious, however, that *only* this "settled" form of existence is free from the curse of the Kain, and that *the city* - the primary place of settlement - is legitimately possible only where this ideality - that is, the spiritual-metaphysical realisation - is the living and defining one. In view of its close connection with the World Axis, it is also closely linked to the 'possession of the axe'⁶, since *the action* which the latter expresses differs from mere action in that, unlike the latter, it does not involve a mere modification of life circumstances in a horizontal sense, but a continuous and definite ascent, which unfolds along a vertical axis. The 'damaging' face of ordinary nomadism consists mainly in cutting off the possibility of this higher order of 'nomadism', which can also be represented as a settledness in the human form of existence, and in destructively attacking its crystallized outcome (which can also appear in existence as a Turkish city where the dragon has been 'slain'⁷) and "goodness" in its destruction of the kainite "idols" (the absolutisation and preservation as such of non-absolute beings).

⁵ *Genesis* 4:25.

⁶ The axe, or what it and similar terms refer to, is the traditional power-rule symbol of those who, through action, restore the primordial state and the Primordial and Infinite that precedes and transcends it. The etymological affinity between the Latin *ascia* ('axe') and axis ('axis') also known, symbolising, among other things, the principled immobility that corresponds to the original and, in fact, the only normal situation.

⁷ But the same way, *the* Traditional Doctrine itself, and its corollaries: the Sacred Books, are created.

However, it is also possible to imagine the parallel existence of common (horizontal) and semi-nomadic (vertical) nomadism, which could be the result of a *conquest*, for example, which in this case appears as a *rite of reconquest* of the ancestral state. In this case, the historic migration is an accompanying activity, even a rite, of spiritual ascent, while the conquest is a mundane imprint of the culmination of the realisation⁽⁸⁾

Originally, Christianity undoubtedly possessed the primordial self symbolized by Seth, that is, the ability to restore the "primordial state", in Guénon's terms, and this is confirmed by many things, from Christian doctrine itself to perhaps not purely historical facts, such as - to take an example close to us - the meeting of the Hun king Attila (Atilla, Etele) with the Great Saint (I.) Leo of Rome and the result: Attila's pardon to Rome. Obviously, not many people understand what is meant by the apparently unwise mission of destruction embodied by the leaders of the 'migration' era of the Iron Nomadic peoples, such as King Attila: the nomad (Abel - Attila) necessarily condemns everything that appears as a limitation in space (Cain - West), a positive necessity of existence, but surrenders whatever is superior (Seth - Leo). Attila undoubtedly saw this in the Christian tradition and in contemporaries, and it was this insight, and not merely some kind of political or military necessity, that turned him back at Ravenna (the accounts emphasise at this point that he was so full of power that he was about to conquer Rome, and indeed all of Italy and Africa, with every chance of conquering them);⁹ at the time of the encounter, a

⁸The rite of the sacral sacrifice of the leader of the conquest, who leads his people to the "new land", but cannot enter it, is not entirely independent of this. Cf. the sacrifice in Transylvania of King Almos, the son of Oved, before the final entry of the Hungarians into the Carpathian Basin (which, on a purely spiritual level, can be linked, for example, to the interchangeable relationship between John the Baptist and the New Testament principles symbolised by Christ). Cf. also Second Book of the Law: 34 (the death of Moses).

⁹Cf. e.g. "*Pictorial Chronicle*": *about the old and recent deeds of the Hungarians, their origins and*

he saw a man in the air above the Pope, holding a sword (a symbol of the sun, which, in relation to the Pole and the World Cylinder, is only in relation to the earth-human world, but is undoubtedly the representation of the centre, the realisation of which is a prerequisite for spiritual realisation in the vertical sense). In the language of our own symbolism, it was this *vertical* or 'settled' nomadism that 'God's scourge' saw as the precondition for Christianity in the first place, and it was on the basis of an intuition in this direction that he could that 'in the future, this path will be almost the only one open to his dynasty and the people of his successor nation'¹⁰, when, because of the general involution, the realisation of solarly will also become a serious task. What we are talking about here, and always, is the highest *potential* of Christianity, a potential which links Christianity to the Primordial Tradition itself¹¹ (a characteristic which, of course, to a certain extent, specific to all regular traditions and not merely and exclusively Christianity). The fact that Attila's secret testament included the baptism of the later Hungarian kings and their acceptance of Christianity is thus due not only to political factors but also to the fact that he must have seen in the Christian tradition the *vertical nomadism* and all that it as a precondition, and if this had not been the case,

"king of the Hungarians, [...] by the grace of God, son of Bendegúz, grandson of the great Magor, king of the Huns, Medes, Goths, Danes, the terror of the land, the scourge of God, etc."¹² in no case will he turn back and leave Rome unscathed...

As I indicated above, a city can only be founded where the dragon has been "slain" - a traditional proposition. The word 'dragon' used here in a negative sense⁽¹³⁾ and in the context of the founding of a town, it refers to the

of their growth, triumphs and valour; Chapter on the upheaval of Germany.

¹⁰ László A.: *On the sacred crown of the Hungarian kings*. [Here pp. 11-19 - The editor].

¹¹ On the relation between Christianity and the Primordial Tradition, see, among others, R. GUÉNON, *The World King*, chap.

¹² "Pictorial Chronicle": chapter "On the election and victories of Attila as King of Hungary".

¹³ Cf. 666. *Pannon Front* No. 10, pp. 8-9.

stopping (settling down) in a "any" region of space (not only in the physical sense) is not in itself a positive, but has a downright "cursed" face: in each "any" region there is a "dragon" of chaos, and stopping here means falling out of realization and thus being subjected to the cycle of cyclical necessity. To put this in concrete terms, it should be pointed out that all the known modern 'founded' cities of the world today have this cursed character, and that the pre-modern ones have become so almost without exception. The 'dragon' in its negative image is thus a symbol of the subversive force that pushes the creatures into ever deeper regions of the existential law (*sa s□□□ ra*). The 'city' in which the 'dragon' has not been slain, or in which this act is not repeated over and over again, is under the domination of the Kainian principle, and it is this that time, which has come to dominate space, will eventually destroy in any case.

This "city" is not the gateway to eternity, the triumph of simultaneity over all-consuming time, symbolised by the boundlessness of space, but the "hell of the damned", "Babylon", "the dwelling place of devils" and "the dungeon of unclean souls".¹⁴ In contrast, there is the true "holy" city of vertical nomadism, where the mania of being has been overcome, where the act of slaying the "dragon" is constantly taking place, as *in illo tempore*, and which, at a very high climax of realization, re-manifests itself as a crystallized hyperreality, as a new Being, recreated and new in the golden age, and as an act of unlimited freedom.⁽¹⁵⁾ The city of the "holy" city is the "city of the holy", where the mania of being has been overcome, where the act of slaying the "dragon" is constantly taking place, as *in illo tempore*, and which, at a very high climax of realization, re-manifests itself as a crystallized hyperreality, as a new Being, recreated and new in the golden age, and as an act of unlimited freedom. It goes without saying, however, that for this to happen, all the illegitimate, cursed "cities" that

¹⁴ *Apokalypsis Ioannis* 18: 2. "Cecidit, cecidit Babylon magna: et facta est habitatio demoniorum, et custodia omnis spiritus immundi, et custodia omnis volucris immundae et odibilis".

¹⁵ One can recall here above all the "New Jerusalem" of the *Apocalypse* (*Apokalypse Ioannis* 21), as well as the holy cities with deep analogies to it, such as the Paradise of *Vaiku--ha*, home of *ViTM-u* (cf. *Ska--a Pur□a*, for details of which see T. BURCKHARDT: *Sacral Symbols* Budapest,

put differently, it means that man, abandoning the aberration of absolutizing relativities (idolatry), must embark on the path of spiritual self-realization expressed by vertical nomadism, all partial states of being and consciousness

"burned" behind him - in the fire of the Absolute⁽¹⁶⁾

In addition to the problem of nomadism-settlement, it should be that migration (nomadism) in its ordinary image begins directly at the expulsion from Paradise, which represents the primordial state (as is known, the initial or Edenic state is to the primordial state of "settlement"). As the negative image of nomadism comes to the fore, the distance between the wandering man and the primordial state increases, or at least does not decrease, which corresponds, in religious terms, to the so-called 'wandering'. This can also be understood as *a relative* humiliation in the sense of the plurality of different traditional symbolisms, and therefore as "relative", because in this case, in fact, a horizontal transformation takes place, which, by means of a *conversio*, can, as it were, *directly* positive, made possible by the still living memory of the original and only normal state.

In view of the above, settlement can take with two decisively opposite signs: in its *negative* (kaini or cursed) image, the

1995, Freshwater), chapter 3. There is also a symbolic-mythical account of Amphi  n, the son of Zeus and Antope, who set the 'scimitars' in motion with his 'music', raising the walls of Thebes - once a spiritual centre - with the sound of his lute. It can be suggested here that the real, archaic cities - like the pyramids and similar structures - were not actually built by anyone, but are the worldly outgrowths of a successful metaphysical realisation, which simply 'became'.

¹⁶ This is the esoteric mission of, among others, JULIUS EVOLA's "black ser- sioners" who "burn the city" (*Ra   ga blanda* 1916-1922). According to GOTTFRIED BENN in his review of EVOLA's *Rebellion against the Modern World*, EVOLA was counting on the 'black monks' carry out the actions described in the book, who await the coming of midnight, when 'the time will be ripe to direct the forces of resurrection'. Cf. RICHARD H. DRAKE: Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy, in *Political Violence and Terror*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986, University of California Press, pp. 79 and 89.

when the memory of the primordial state fades and fades out, and the experience of the shock (*du- kha*)¹⁷ that afflicts man from the moment he falls out of this state becomes, so to speak, "habitual". It is in fact the consequence of a meta-physical "forgetting" (*léthé*), and what is

"the city of demons" and the influential operation of "the devil's towers"⁽¹⁸⁾. Man then takes ("settles down") a partial and possible state of being as final, which, through the dialectic inherent in all the partial states that inevitably arise, sooner or later sets out on a path of self-subordination. It is therefore these cities of 'forgetfuls' and 'sleepers', such as the gigantic modern macropolises, which finally open the gates to the invasion of the already truly demonic and subhuman (counter-radical) influences, the most radical of which are the 'subhuman' and the 'subhuman'.

in their "form" also along a vertical: only that they appear "from below", from the direction of the inferno of non-being, carrying out the final poisoning of man's world. And it is because of the ever-increasing density of these points of entry that one can

¹⁷ Usually translated as 'suffering', the Sanskrit word *du- kha* is a basic concept in Buddhism; it means 'communion of being': a 'shock' associated with the whole of existence as it is. Cf. The four Aryan truths. *Ancient Tradition* 19-20.

¹⁸ Cf. MIKLÓS KÖRLEÓNISZ: *Occult Geography of Europe. Pannon Front* 13, 17-21.

o. The words of the author of these lines are quite remarkable on this subject: the "oldest hotspots of antitraditional infection are associated with: first of all, the appearance of a single counter-centre or counter-tower (this could be, for example, 'life' itself, opposed to 'Being'); and secondly, the 'oldest foci' are linked to *the multiplication-multiplication of the 'towers' themselves*; then with the "turn-over" [of the former spiritual centres]; finally, with what in a sense relates back to the first mentioned criterion", which we have understood to mean that at the very end of the *Kali-yuga* the whole Earth becomes a single monstrous "devil's tower". Furthermore, "the Grail Tradition of the Middle Ages speaks of only two towers. A true Tower, where the Grail is guarded, and a 'false Tower', which must be passed through', which is 'struck by the lightning of God', which is 'associated with the fall', and which at the very end (very end of *Manvantara*) 'immediately destroyed after it is built'. The 'false tower' is also often identified in the tradition in question with the human body, which, according to DANTE, 'grows gigantic' and is thus identified with the 'hellish titans' that are fused with it.

to say that finally, at the very end of *Kali-yuga*⁽¹⁹⁾ for a moment, the whole earth becomes one monstrous "devil's tower".²⁰

Settlement *in the positive* sense, on the other hand, means: as the end result of the spiritual-metaphysical realization of a transcendental "vertical nomadism", Someone has re-actualized the primordial state and this realization - as a recapitulative theurgico-magical creation - manifests itself in the human world as a sacral city. This City is in this case the "gate of heaven", so to speak, "which came down from God out of heaven"²¹, through which people who have cultivated the right aspiration in themselves can return to the perfection of originality. It is precisely for this reason that a city dweller cannot be a city dweller, for he who is 'within the walls' must necessarily be free from the forces of *chaos* that surround the walls of the city from the outside ('from the sides' and, above all, 'from below'). In every true city there must also be a being who is both king and high priest, who, as *king*, has reconquered the primordial state and, as *high priest*, as 'bridge-builder', is able to connect it as a road to the actual earth-human world. The dwelling place of this being is the centre of the city, and who is thus the earth-centred representative of the Ultimate Reality. The Way that the inhabitants of the city are presented with is the spiritual path of vertical nomadism in the above sense, and they themselves, as 'the highest sense of "middle", the [human] expression of the metaphysical CENTER, possess both the meaning and the harmonized signatures of *nomadism* and of *settledness*'.

B. T. I.
(1998)

¹⁹ According to the traditional conception, as represented by GUÉNON in the Indo-Hindu tradition, the present *Kali-yuga* (Dark Age), which lasted 6480 years, will end in 2299 AD.

²⁰ At this point, let us also consider the role of the body ('devil's tower') at the time of death (the equivalent of the end of *Kali-yuga*). To do this, consider that 'body' in the esoteric sense is *limes*: 'boundary' and 'extinction'.

²¹ *Apokalypsis Ioannis* 20:10.

TRADITIONAL NOTES AND COMMENTARIES OF SAINT IMRE THE LEGEND OF THE ROYAL PRINCE

Lhe precise meaning of the word "tradicio- nal" in the title, and the emphasis on the "royal" character of Prince St. Imre, which terms are used one and the same reason. The text of the legend, probably written down by Deák Fulkó⁽¹⁾, is now ga says that the prince was from a "glorious lineage". It does not say "Hungarian" descent, but emphasises the descent of Saint Imre (*Emeri- cus, Hemericus, Henricus, Aimeric, Eimerik, Emrech, Imrech, Imbre, Imre*) from Saint Stephen, the "*King of the Hungarians*". His descent from the dynastic clan, his being of the house of Árpád, Turul (*princeps serenissimus de genere Turul*).

According to the restored traditionalist spiritual principles, the king cannot of the people over whom he is king;² this is at least

¹ *The legend of Saint Imre*. Ed. by Dr. László Erdélyi. Budapest, 1930, Atheneum. The same translation in *Pannon Front*, no. 20 (Apr. 1999), pp. 27-29. Translation. Bertalan Bíró. In *Hungarian legends and gestures*. Budapest, 1997, Argumentum, pp. 79-85. Translation. Gáspár J. Csóka, in Hungarian. In *Árpád-era legends and exhortations*. Budapest, 1999, Osiris /Millennium Hungarian tradition/, pp. 56-62.

² "...he was adorned with great virtues..." , says the first chapter of the legend.

is as impossible as if the leading people of a given region were not different from the peoples it conquered. The *Turul*, and all other dynasties, can thus be considered as a separate clan, and should in no way be confused the leading clan, which is the most powerful and important, but not dynastic, clan of the ruler's empire. Thus, the 'Hungarians' in the legend of King Prince Imre are the people with whom Prince Imre's life was intertwined in a special way: the people whom the Lord God 'graciously provided' through the works of Imre, so that 'the example of this holy man may stand before us as a half-mirror'.

The difference between a dynasty, which can be understood as a separate genus, and non-dynastic genera is that the former *are trans- and supranational* in their orientation, while the latter *are national*. Since the actions of all spiritual and sacred greatness also transcend nationalities, it can be concluded that to understand the significance of a tradition in any country, among any nation, as well as to fully understand the actions of exemplary personalities, one must adopt a *trans- and supranational* perspective. This is particularly evident in relation to the life stories of individuals of royal descent and quality, who were themselves in all cases descendants of supranational - transnational - dynasties. Just as the higher cannot derive from the lower, so the 'transcendental care' of a particular nation cannot derive merely from the level above which this divine care takes place.³ Traditions are therefore of transnational and transnational origin.



³ The closeness the analogy between divine providence and royal providence is, of course, a matter to be decided in the particular case. The individual cases, however, should in no way affect the truth that there is a correspondence between the two.

It goes without saying that it is legitimate to try to understand universal spiritual traditions beyond nationality, *first* through the lives of people who, for one reason or another, have been associated with the nation with which they identify at the moment.

It must also be said, however, that this is a legitimate claim only as long as what is "local" is not "particular" in what is "local" in the "spiritual" and the "universal". The latter case would correspond to a reduction of the sacred and the spiritual to the emotional, the particular, etc.

The legend of the royal prince St. Imre tells us that "even the barbarian nations are not without the visitation of the Lord". In this way, it is situated in the perspective of universal spiritual traditionality,⁴ not in a specifically "national" or "popular" perspective. "Let no one's poverty be burdensome," says the text of the legend, (...) "but let no one claim that the rich should be excluded from the kingdom of God". Here 'poverty' is equivalent to the particular and 'wealth' to the universal. Our text thus says that the *particularities subordinated to the universal* and the *regionalities subordinated to the spiritual* make the Holy Church "as formidable as an army of a camp arrayed in ranks."

The extent to which national traditions cannot be separated from or extracted from a more universal tradition is illustrated by the recent case of Imre Szabics, who found that the figure and legend of St. Lazarus was able to contribute to the spread of the Western European legend of *Lancelot*,⁵ which was clearly impossible

⁴ The view of *universality, or spiritual* traditionalism, because that which is truly *universal* can only be realized strictly in the *spiritual* order. What is "", for example, is not universal, but merely "globe-spanning". The

In this illegitimate use of the term "universal", the pernicious activity of the agents of "terrestrial globalisation" and "mondialism" is clearly visible - which, however, should not be a reason for us to renounce the use of this important term and category.⁽⁵⁾ IMRE SZABICS: Hungary in the novel *The History of the Knight Antoine de la Sale by Jehan de Saintré*. In *The Love of the Middle Ages (Historical Studies by Sz. Jónás)*. Budapest, 1999, ELTE, pp. 444-446.

if its legend were purely regional and national values.



In essence, a similar result to the above-mentioned relationship between national traditions and spiritual traditionalism must be reached in finding the right relationship between the Catholic Christian Sacred Tradition and the Fundamental-Universal Tradition (between the traditionalism belonging to the Christian Sacred Tradition and the traditionalism belonging to the Primordial Tradition). The word 'catholic' etymologically means 'universal', so that the original and deepest layers of the Christian tradition can only be rediscovered - faithfully and worthily preserved - if we can take into account the spiritual factors *outside the Christian tradition* which played a part in its development and later on. In other words, if we examine Christianity on the basis of a universal spirituality and we follow.

The universality and autocratism of fides, the "active mysticism" of the Church (*Templum*) like the Empire (*Imperium*), the *theocratism* of the order, the *aristocratism* of the order, the *justice (iustitia)* or the patience (*patientia*) are not exclusively Christian principles. But let us go on: the deep *imperialism* of the Saint Stephen's institution of 'welcoming with kindness and treating even more kindness the newcomers who enter the country';⁶ the royal law of 'always bearing in mind the good example of one's ancestors'; the most varied forms of *devotio*;⁷ and 'the

⁶ As István Kocsis, despite his many errors, has rightly noted (*The Sacral Prince*. Budapest, 1999, Püski, pp. 11-16), Chapter VI of *the Intelme of St. Stephen* on "the reception of guests" can only be correctly explained by the aspiration to *imperialism* and *universalism*, not by some kind of altruism and democratic internationalism.

⁷ On non-Christian forms of *devotion*, see J. EVOLA, "Faces of heroism". In EVOLA. Budapest, 1998, Stella Maris, p. 35.

to attain the degree of perfection with *the* greatest care" are in fact all pre-Christian traditionalist principles.⁸

When the Christian man was at the height of his active loyalty to God and his position, he respected every high spiritual teaching he had ever encountered, which was directed to God and which truly traditional⁽⁹⁾ But this did not require the Christian liberalism and democracy of his day, but something that was also perfectly beyond the often rigid Christian dogmatism and "femininity": *a universal faith in God and self*. The principle *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, 'No salvation outside the Church', is true only insofar as by *Ecclesia* we understand and live a Church, a symbolic-real Temple, which embraces all legitimate traditional values and spiritual traditions and is as ruthless against all particularism as it is against modern pseudo-religions, against a 'globalism' that is essentially secular and moral.

In fact, it is the supranational, supranational, supranational, supranational¹⁰ and *supranationalist*¹¹ of St Stephen and others. *onal* heritage.



⁸ See chapter 1 of the *legend of St. Imre*, where the text of the legend summarizes the Intentions of King Stephen. Cf. our article "The Metaphysical Tradition and the 'political tradition'". *Pannon Front* 9, pp. 20-23. István Instituto's Institutes. Á. Kurcz. Budapest, 1982, Magvető /Gon- dolkodó magyarok/, pp. 9-22. Trans. Bíró B. In *Hungarian legends and gestures*. Budapest, 1997, Argumentum, 45-47. o. King Stephen's admonitions to Prince Imre. Translation. Kurcz Á. In *Árpád-era le- gendas and exhortations*. Budapest, 1999, Osiris /Millennium Hungarian History/, 47- p. 55 (For earlier editions, see *King Stephen's Intelmei*. *ibid.* pp. 23-24.)

⁹ Here we would remind the reader of the case of the *Templars* who became acquainted with the Islamic orders of knights.

¹⁰ "...the emergence of nations within a civilisation undoubtedly marks a partial disintegration, due to the loss of the element which ensured the unity of the civilisation", wrote René Guénon. And this is precisely the proof of the importance of the *trans- and supranational* ('dynastic') nature of the dominant.

(Continued on the other sideÖ)

The text of the legend of Saint Imre and some of the events it contains have an "anti-democratic" character. This is evident from what happened on the occasion of the visit of Prince Imre and his father King Stephen to Pannonia, or more precisely to Saint Martin of the monastery, and then on the occasion of Saint Stephen's return to Pannonia. The text emphasises that Prince Imre the King gave his kisses to the monks who received them 'unequally'. The practice of traditional meritocracy and hierarchical *obedience*, which is not at all a rigid system, is also evident in the behaviour of Stephen I, who 'to honour his son, he asked to be greeted first'. The *Pictorial Chronicle* also testifies to this: 'King Stephen planned and firmly resolved to lay aside all the splendours of worldly glory, to lay down the crown of a kingdom that would last for a time, and to devote himself to the service of God alone. He was to leave external things, to spend his life in quiet peace and contemplation; and he was to give the crown of royal majesty to his son, Prince Imre, who was endowed with holy virtue.'¹¹

Prince Imre tells his father that the reason for the meritocracy practised here - the equal sharing of kisses - was the monks' *knowledge of their merits*: a kind of "relative omniscience", an *omniscientia in tempore*. 'In the extremely rich world of thought of the Middle Ages

The supranational, universal and spiritual loyalty to Tradition cannot be replaced by an "international" or "popular" conception of Tradition. As Guénon has noted, inferior elements of tradition, of popular origin, later become a give the appearance of "relative permanence", elements and appearances that create a "tradition" outside the scope of the original Tradition. The nationalism behind this process thus a precursor and a counterpart of the later anti-traditional globalism or *mondialism*, which, whatever the words, is completely devoid of any real supranationalism, as it will lead not to the transcendence but to the disappearance of nations. See RENÉ GUÉNON: *General introduction to the study of the doctrines of the nation*. Debrecen, 1999, Quintessence, p. 55 ("Principles of the Unity of the Civilizations of the Past" chapter).

¹¹ *Pictorial Chronicle*. Ford. László Geréb. Budapest, 1993, Magyar Hírlap-Maece-nas, p. 41. Translation. Translation by Bertalan Bíró. *Hungarian legends and gestures*. Budapest, 1997, Argumentum, pp. 235-344.)

and symbolic system, kisses and sudden *enlightenment* were related, because in both, the hitherto hidden reality is revealed the soul."¹² This observation seems to be correct. The written text of the legend comments on the final reason for the unequal distribution of kisses by Prince Imre, saying

"by a manifestation of divine grace". The grace which, through its own spiritual merits, was revealed in the royal prince St. Imre is defined in the text as (1) "abundantly [completely?] surpassing the frailties of our nature", (2) revealing the deep secrets even to children, (3) enabling us to freely know the secrets of our world, (4) and finally, to sum it all up, "the reality of the inner [divine] revelation".

If this reality of *inner revelation* is to be approached in an adequate way, we can speak of *intuition*, *intuitio intellectua-* lis, since the reality of intellectual intuition is the reality in which the four characteristics listed above are perfectly united. It is only in those who have a high spiritual life that it is realised and becomes, if not always permanent, then in any case essential. For pure men, as the text says of Imre, it is their "master teacher".

It is a reflection of *the everlasting* respect for hierarchy and meritocracy that St Stephen preserved these virtues even after his death. When the Teutonic Knight Conrad seeks purification at his tomb, St Stephen, *post mortem*, directs the knight to the tomb of Prince Imre: 'I am not sufficient to intercede for you. (...) let him be your intercessor'.



It should not be forgotten that the surviving text of the legend of St. Imre - the royal in-

¹²József Török: *Saints of the Hungarian land*. Tulipán, 1991, p. 58.

Apart from a summary of the main themes of the book - it is primarily religious and religious in nature. The *Pictorial Chronicle* provides the necessary additions: Imre 'was endowed with the virtues of justice, wisdom, valour, moderation, prudence, science, gentleness, mercy, goodness, generosity, humility and patience, and was also well-versed in the virtues of Catholic life and the conduct of public affairs'.¹³ He says, therefore, *politicis virtutibus adornatus* - 'adorned with the virtues of a politician'. Our text also notes, 'he learned all the sciences which in his day were taught to young men at school'. And after the death of his brother Otto, he became the leader of a heavy armoured force, the *Dux of Nitra*⁽¹⁴⁾

"Prince Imre's delicately chaste face smiles into Hungarian history like the rising sun into the May morning. His life is an eloquent testimony to the fact that our nation, already in the second Christian generation, understood and transformed into a programme of life the higher asceticism that was just then blossoming in Western Europe. (...) Moreover, in his father's environment he had the opportunity to meet day after day those men of great heart and firm character, priests and monks, who sacrificed their sweat and blood to strengthen the tender seedlings of Hungarian Christianity, and who sought to establish the deep, self-conscious life of faith and the hard and manly asceticism of the Cluny spirit in the Hungarian lands. (...) *In the royal court of Esztergom, in addition to the holy priests and monks, he had constant contact with the secular rulers who were as indispensable pillars of the new order of things as the bishops and abbots.* Then, alongside the old men, there were the young, the contemporaries, with whom he practised chivalric skills and the noblest sport of the Middle Ages, hunting. For it was only the liberal age's false view of the world that made St. Imre a world-hating, thin-natured and sickly young man.

¹³ *Pictorial Chronicle*. I. m. *ibid*.

¹⁴ According to Béla Hamvas, *dux ruziorum* means "Lower Austrian general".
See BÉLA HAMVAS. *Budapest Hírlap* August 1924.
31. 4. o.

nak. Neither the chronicles nor the legends give any basis for such a supposition. On the contrary..⁽¹⁵⁾

The religious authority of Prince Imre was thus complemented by the political-secular power of *full spiritual authority*. It was René Guénon who, in his works, very precisely defined the place of politics in the traditionalist ethos and the place of the religious perspective. Both were subordinated to higher forms of spiritual authority, doctrines of religion over religiosity, from which, by analogy, traditional political principles were derived. This, therefore, is a perfectly accurate and correct definition. Unfortunately, however, some drawn the erroneous conclusion from some of Guénon's formulations that politics should be subordinated not to principles beyond religiosity but to validity itself. In fact, the 'political virtues' are a necessary complement to the 'political virtues' generally known in the West.

to "religious virtues": the simultaneity of these two is the necessary precondition for inferring true spirituality, for understanding what was the characteristic of the greatest traditionalists, basis of *spiritual authority*.

As we have seen, Prince Saint Imre had both the "political virtues" and the well-known "religious virtues". There is a particularly significant and, we believe, enigmatic phrase in the text of the legend: '*he had before him the flame of two candles burning* (as befits son of a king)'. Here, there is probably a reference not only to the unity of the 'religious' and 'political' virtues, but also specifically to the 'two candles' of *spiritual authority* and *temporal power*, the unity of knowledge and faith (or action)⁽¹⁶⁾



¹⁵ *Lives of the Saints*. Ed. by Antal Schütz. n.d., 1995², Pantheon, pp. 734-735 [emphasis ours] Unfortunately, precise and apt formulations such as the one quoted do not fully permeate this work.

¹⁶ See RENÉ GUÉNON: *Autorité spirituelle et pouvoir temporel*. Paris, 1984, Guy Trédaniel.

The primordial-universal Tradition is the harmonious unifier, integrator and origin of traditional paths that are extremely different in their outward forms.

To use the Indian example, we should think of it as the unity of the spiritual paths of *j-ñāna* and *karma yoga*, knowledge and action, or, for example, as the common principle of the very different paths of the so-called 'right hand path' (*dakṣiṇī i-acāra*) and the 'left hand path' (*vāmācāra*), which can be seen as a duality of the 'dry' and 'wet' paths in the West.¹⁷ (Based on a sacral physiology that follows the reality of the non-manifest Universal Man: the distribution of blessings and the exercise of mercy were associated with the right hand; the distribution of justice and the exercise of rigour with the left hand.⁽¹⁸⁾)

It must be emphasized that these paths, which are almost entirely different in character, *are united only in the Primordial Tradition*. The distinctive paths of contemplation and action, of 'spiritual power' and of 'temporal power', lead exclusively to the same goal (God in the Christian tradition) in the lives of persons who live, in essence, in the spiritual reality of the Primordial Tradition.

¹⁷ Although *dakṣiṇī i-acāra* and the "dry way" are usually associated with knowledge-introspection, and *vāmācāra* and the "wet way" with power-action, in fact both had both images. (This is probably due to the frequent interchangeability of right-left and dry-wet.)

The left hand path and the 'wet' paths had a more 'magical' and 'dangerous' character, but which attached great importance to the principle and aspect of power in a spiritual rather than political sense. Earlier, the 'right hand path' (*dakṣiṇī i-acāra*) paid more attention to temporal power and politics, while the 'left hand path' (*vāmācāra*), despite its power theory, often ignored socio-political laws. This situation later changed somewhat, and, in view of its confusion, politics was integrated more by the way of the left hand. This process can be observed in the case of 'Guelfism' and 'Ghibellinism', the latter of which appears to be a Western representative of the Left Hand path.

¹⁸ See RENÉ GUÉNON: *The World King*. Budapest, 1993, Farkas /Metaphysical Writings.

many II., Chapter 3. The expression "compassionate right hand" is also found in the *Pictorial Chronicle*.

and draw from it, not just from a particular tradition.

This primordial spirituality is perhaps most evident in the lives of saints from the Christian tradition, such as *St. George*, *St. Eustace*, *St. Sebastian* and *St. Martin*, who went from warrior to monk, who were the first soldiers of Christ, and whose lives were marked as much by action as by contemplation.⁽¹⁹⁾

Royal Prince Saint Imre served the first witness of his sainthood in the monastery dedicated to *Saint Martin*.



According to legend, he took his vow of chastity in the town of Veszprém,

"built in honour of *St George*" church.

Since the text calls George "the dearest martyr of Christ", the events in Veszprém involving King Imre must have been the greatest battle imaginable, *against an enemy not external, if not internal*. This is one of the points of reference can guide us in understanding St Imre's vow of chastity. The second and final clue lies in the fact that traditionally every vow and vow had the *deepest possible reason and antecedent*. Every outward act was preceded by an inward spiritual event which was the essence and cause of the outward act. The modern reader will probably find it superfluous to inquire into the reason for a virgin vow; but such a decisive act, according to the laws of tradition, always had its own reason, not only real but also metaphysical. When St. Imre commanded his body to be virgin, it could not have been for moral reasons alone, nor could it have been a fact in itself. Before that, he had probably experienced and realised the very essence of 'virginity', of 'virginity': the reality of 'divinity', of 'divine purity'.

¹⁹ In India, besides the *br*□ hma-as, this was usually the case for the *r*□ janyas ('royal, princely warriors').

The "virginity vow" could thus be the result of the experience of *virginity* and nothing else (an idea, an asceticism for its own sake, etc.); in mythological symbolism, it could be the experience of the Virgin, which is also only a symbol of actual *virginity*.

"... *he* prayed long and hard, *asking himself* what he would offer", the text says. From this we can infer a search for purity, for incorruptibility, 'worthy of God', which, as the text says, 'is easy to lose'.

Connecting this "inner search" of *St George with* the his battle against the "dragon"²⁰ - which, as we have noted, is the same as the greatest and most inward enemy of all: what in India is called *avidya*, "non-knowledge", the "darkness"²¹ that obscures metaphysical knowledge, it can be concluded that St. Imre, in his spiritual deepening and asceticism, had an experience that brought him to a stage where, on his return from this state, he chose the path of "bodily virginity" and took a vow to be an eternal reminder of the reality he had experienced.

All this is confirmed by the fact that the text speaks not only of "virginity of the flesh" but also of "*virginity of the mind*". It also records what the writer calls "intention", and says that "*stick with it*". The latter seems to refer to the "state" on which "bodily virginity" is based, and it is this "state" to which the vow and fact of bodily virginity is intended to remind us.



²⁰ More precisely, the "dragon of the waters". Cf. ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ, *Tradition Yearbook 1999*, p. 145.

²¹ That is, the "darkness" that obscures the Truth, the "not-knowing" - captured as a "dragon" - that *the tman is one with Brahman, the Overself is one with the Godhead*.

The real struggle with the "dragon": the inner search for the imperishable purity of "worthy of God", the state of essential *virginity*, and in the next phase, the preservation of its primacy over all else. It is to this struggle that the text refers when it says: 'though he carried the flame in his bosom, he was not consumed by its fire'; or 'a great multitude of evil spirits were there'.

The spiritual battle of St Imre is a victorious battle. Seeking posterity is in a worse position: the figure of the *Virgin Mary* is no longer a sufficient ideal for modern man to understand the essential, "inner" side of the state of *virginity*, its real metaphysical meaning. The West, with its infinite respect for its own traditions, needs all the precise guidance of the East, through which it can at least in principle come to know the 'Virgin' principle - the 'pure' and 'uncorrupted' aspect of the Principle. He needs the ideas of *um□kum□ri*, *mah□'akti* (*nirv□-a 'akti*) or the supreme *Brahman* (*nirgu-a-Brahman*). "...the pure and impeccable principle of the Virgin (...) is the mastery over the centrifugal energy of desire and *samsara*." "... the possession of the "Virgin" leads to the realm of the neutrality of all antitheses" ⁽²²⁾



"...great indeed is the struggle of virginity, but greater still is the reward; the keeping of it is only for a time, but its reward is *eternal*. (...) In the heavenly court no place will be shut off from them, but every door of the various quarters will be open to them."

²² J. Evola: The Virgin. Breaking the shackles. *Tradition Yearbook* 1999. pp. 245-253 This paper presents a tantric understanding of the "Virgin" principle. It is worth quoting from the text of the *legend of St. Imre* (chapters 5-6): "Then an extraordinary light flooded the whole temple building and in this light the divine voice said: "The most excellent virtue is virginity..." (...) to understand still better how this virtue is worthy of God, we must remember that *when our Lord and Saviour, for the salvation of the human race*

By taking possession of the "Virgin" principality - and confirming it with the vow of "bodily virginity" - the royal prince Saint Imre has achieved one of the three states belonging to the reality of the Primordial Tradition.⁽²³⁾

Later, "by the inscrutable will of God, death snatched him away, lest 'wickedness should change his mind, and false images deceive his mind' - as the Book of Wisdom says of early death."⁽²⁴⁾

He was killed by a *wild boar* on a hunt, the sacred animal of the druids and *br□h- ma-as*, and most closely the symbol of the third, supreme degree of the Primordial Tradition, the *mauna*, the person in the state of 'silence', 'perfect solitude', the *muni*. The death of the royal prince St. Imre may give rise to much speculation,⁽²⁵⁾ but let us content ourselves for now with relying on the Book of Wisdom. kodo, with the somewhat simplified explanation just given.⁽²⁶⁾



The life and the legend of the royal prince Saint Imre, whatever the questions of the interpretation of his death, strengthen us in the realisation of the Principle *that remains indestructible behind all*.

was worthy to body, he chose none other than a virgin womb (...) She was his mother, and was herself a virgin, and was permanent (...) thus showing that both sexes had in them the happy and complete perfection of divinity, when the mother had in her all that the son had in himself."

⁽²³⁾ See R. GUÉNON: *The destiny of man according to Vedanta*. Budapest, 1998, Farkas, pp. 197-198. The first state to the golden age or primordial state; the second is the state of building on and completing it, called the state of "knowledge"; the third is the state of "solitude" which perfectly completes the first two.

⁽²⁴⁾ *Pictorial Chronicle*. I. m. p. 37.

⁽²⁵⁾ It may be a matter of conjecture, since are we to interpret the event as meaning that he was killed by the boar because he had reached the level symbolized by the boar, or because his kingly-hereditary duties prevented him from realizing the spiritual level symbolized by the boar (which is why he was killed by it)?

⁽²⁶⁾ Examples of this kind of thought abound in two Old Testament books, *Proverbs* and *The Book of Proverbs*.

Jesus Christ "suffered" and then died on the cross. But since He was the "Son of God", His suffering could not have been ordinary suffering. The later Templars' principle of *crucifixus non est Christus* meant that he did not identify himself with the suffering body. So the question may be asked, *in what way, by what means, did he know that he was God, even when he suffered and even when he died?*

The result of this writing and the life of the royal prince Saint Imre: *the possession of the incorruptible "Virgin" principality.*

That is why St. Bernat of Clairvaux said: 'O my friend, (...) if you see yourself tossing and turning in the waters of the world, and not solid ground, and do not want to be swallowed up by the foam, do not take your eyes off the shining light of this star! When the wind of temptation blows, when the storm of trial surrounds you, look to the star, call upon Mary, the "Star of the Sea."



The life of Saint Imre also attracted a great deal of attention among the princes and his mystery of the prince. The wisdom of his father²⁷ destined him to a better fate than that of a prince, and he particularly careful to ensure that his fate was clearly towards spirituality, which Imre fully embraced. Life, however, tests him, Otto dies, and he has to fulfil his royal-hereditary duties, his political and worldly tasks, which he fulfils in such a way that they do not in the least hinder or contradict his most spiritual life. He has kept his vow of chastity married life.

H. R.
(1999)

²⁷ In connection with this wisdom, we quote again the lines of the *Pictorial Chronicle* quoted earlier: 'King Stephen planned and firmly resolved to lay aside all the splendours of worldly glory, to lay down the crown of a kingdom that would last for a time, and to devote himself to the service of God alone. He would abandon external things and spend his life in quiet peace and contemplation...'

THE MEANING OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE ARISTOCRACY

When we talk about aristocracy, we have to go to the extreme of separating the general concepts and "compulsions" of the people from what *aristocracy* in its original sense means. In fact, it is a good idea to forget everything and try to reconceptualise on the basis of relative purity. This would be a good thing, because the situation is so critical that the processes from the 17th to the 18th centuries up to the present day can be understood, on the one hand, as processes which have sought to eliminate, first and foremost, people's faith in the aristocracy, through which other neo- have also been able to unravel gative processes.

In social terms, the aristocracy originally represented the order *the most loyal subjects of the sacral ruler*. Loyalty here implies a specific commitment, adherence, qualitative activity. This social dimension - being a direct follower of the ruler - is of course not a fact in itself, but an imprint of inner spiritual orientation and reality. (Political views, positions, social rank and position and objectives are never things in themselves, but are the result of inner orientation and principled affiliation.)

Like all existing significant concepts, first and foremost, aristocracy referred to a *spiritual* quality, and after its existence, it appeared to be a

as a concept of spiritual and then physical reality. this way, aristocracy primarily denotes an aspiration and reality that seeks to assert and asserts greatness, spiritual and intellectual greatness, through the grades. It is an order which devotes its life to the achievement of 'ever greater goals' and which, once its goals have been achieved, sets itself new and 'higher goal', even though it has already set itself the fullness of its goals at a very early stage. The fact that he is the most devoted subject of any ruler - not as a servant, but as a ruler - is a consequence of all this. For what in the world is signified by 'king' and 'kingship' is in an inner world analogous to 'ultimate ends'.

The presence of the aristocracy in the world means *the presence and domination of the best*. Its proper social presence - that is, above all and below the ruler - means that the aspirations of the best prevail in a social order. The denial or denial and reduction of the aristocracy's vital importance is the opposite, in various degrees of denial. Aristocracy as a term already implies *the dominance of the best, the biggest, the most wealthy, the happiest* - in connection, for example, with the concept of *क्षत्रिया*". The presence of aristocracy as a quality in the world has long been associated with social position. If the aristocracy cannot occupy its proper place at the social level, an extraordinary quality disappears from the world. The fact that in the world, in society, importance is not attributed to the best, the greatest, the most distinguished, means that *individual people do not themselves attribute importance to the best, the greatest, the most worthy*, they do not assert it, but to some extent the opposite. Because people are not these - that is, not the "aristocratic" - they do not give themselves, neither in society nor in the world is the reality of these supreme values prevailing. This is how the belonging and aspirations of individuals determine the more immediate - social - and wider - secular - environment, and how these then influence their aspirations.

In contrast to all this, they raise the totally unhealthy leftist question of whether throne certainly belonged to the king, whether the king is certainly king, whether the aristocracy is certainly ruled by the best - that is, whether the best is certainly the best. These are subversive questions, which seem difficult to answer only because they are so simple; the evidence cannot be understood by those who do not see it in the first place. The superiority of something or someone cannot be doubted from below, since it cannot be seen in its entirety from below. Superiority - but also any kind of positivity and greatness - can only be understood when one reaches it, or at least approaches it. And the old man had the decency to take what he did not understand as his own fault, and the distance from something or someone - any distance - if not a spur his own betterment, at least inspired in him a respect.

Since the relationship with the world as a whole was based on such an obvious and orderly relationship, the relationship with the ordering of society functioned in the same way. The great traditional world order, of which 'respect for domination' was by nature only one aspect and one face, gradually fell apart over time. But why should these theoretical and attitudinal validities be called into question today? Has the traditional order not been betrayed solely in individual views? Is it not the compromises made in abandoning these foundations that are further collapsing and chaosising the world order - socially and, by implication, in all other respects?

The aristocracy as an intellectual dignity and quality originally had its own characteristics manifested at all levels. It covered various aspects of lifestyle - spiritual - and material - physical. In the truly living organisations of traditional society, it was in the immediate vicinity of the king, 'preceding' the nobility, which also represented greatness but was more general. This only meant injustice of any kind for the most noble aspirations,

for they were once able to see, even in general, the transcendent principle governing the world, which the highly intellectual "souls" in generational chains and offers them the physical and spiritual aspects they deserve. It is this coherent and, at the same time, far superior physical-spiritual-mental ordering that has broken down in the world for the first time. This disintegration *first* unfolded in the minds of those who, without spirituality, desired for themselves various spiritual attributes and material goods. Power did indeed become less and less the property of those who were entitled to it by virtue of their spiritual capacities - but this became decisive much later than is usually said. The social ordering according to actual capacities and inner qualities was still quite normal until the end of the feudal system - apart from one or two special cases - and was not in the 19th century largely at odds with spiritual reality. Later, in the disintegration of the secular order, another type of aspiration emerged which was truly decisive: it could be described as not only wanting goods which were not theirs, but not even attaching importance to the positive aspects of physical origin.

Descent is a value, qualitative difference that has a serious reason and significance in existence. Anyone who is superior to me in origin, who possesses qualities that I do not possess, I place above myself in that area. It is this attitude which is not opposed to the laws of existence and points towards their creator. It is that which belongs not to rebellion but to domination, not to the left but to the right. It is what distinguishes dictatorial power from the power of "rule by the grace of God", and it is also what shows, in the form of a positive, what cannot be achieved in democracy.

In defending and making sense of the aristocracy, it is worthwhile to discuss the "aristocratic" in the context of the nature of the people. In this respect, one of the most striking facts is that until the French Revolution, the *people's* most prominent

even the more minor figures were considered only as "inhabitants of the kingdom", and only the nobles were considered as "members of the nobility". This distinction even implied the perception and understanding of the qualitative differences on the basis of which the distinctions of rank - and the legal distinctions that went with it - were fully accepted. It indicated that the people belonged essentially to quantity, the nobility to quality.

Nevertheless, the tension between the *aristocrateia* and the *demonic* was once not as irreconcilable as it is now thought to be in the case of an extreme exaltation. Rather than a definitive opposition, it is more appropriate to use the distinction in which the one represents 'the unexploitation of the possibilities of being' and the other 'the exploitation of the possibilities of being' in its aspirations (or, in the case of non-essential realisation, the former can act against the full potential of being, the latter does not act against it in its most extreme forms).

The aristocracy has always been associated with a striving for universality, while the people, on the other hand, with a 'contractedness', a 'landlockedness'. If the aspirations of the people do, for whatever negative reason, come into contact with universality, they are purely quantitative, purely apparent "universality" is achieved. Even in the case of the awakening of popular aspirations, it cannot become a representative of a truly all-embracing universality, but can only implement a nivellative uniformity.

It is precisely here, in characterising the aristocracy as a striving for universality, that we should note that there were areas in which the people could achieve a higher level of achievement than the aristocracy. However, these areas must always be said to be sub-areas of some kind. Obviously, when one is a master of one's profession, it is a laudable and honourable thing, but it does not affect the level of the aristocracy, which, though master of none in particular, must ensure the combined honour of levels and areas. is not, however, a criticism of the nobility that it is not a master of its profession.

areas. The nobility, and even more so its elite, are masters of the co-insight of several territories - not to mention the monarch, who is *master of the co-insight of all territories* - and for them, immersion in sub-regions can be a failure in the pursuit of universality.

The different levels and territories also divide the people themselves into qualitative categories: for the Greeks, in order of importance, this was the *ethnos*, then the *demos*, and for the Romans the distinction between *populus*, *plebs* and, at the bottom, *vulgus*.

All of this together should make it clear what happens when the aristocracy is not in charge, i.e. when the best do not rule. It should be possible to see what happens when aspirations are not universal, but particular and personal - personal in the lower aspects of the person - when the representatives of the latter, i.e. the people, decide on matters that do not concern them; when they are given too much space in the debate, gradually moving away from the 'private sphere' where they should really be.

If the aristocracy does not lead nation following the ruler, then that nation *is not* dominated by *the best*. If the leadership is that of the people, the contingency that prevails is that the "less bad" versus the "worst". This is the general situation in Hungary today in all respects.

The rule of the *demoniac* (democracy), because of the inferiority of the people, without autocratic and aristocratic leadership, is associated with the rule of demons. When the true aristocracy isolates or confronts itself with the various manifestations of people, or proclaims its own superiority, it does so not for its own sake, but against the realisation of this negative domination. (When people talk about the anti-nationalism and the subjugation of the aristocracy, they do not see this motive.)

The assumption of aristocratic character and its perception in the representatives and then as an idea, and the original

is therefore of paramount importance for a nation. No one but the legitimate ruler and the real aristocracy can know precisely the connational or supranational principles by which the various aspects of a nation's life-space - cultural, religious, spiritual - would be equally and highly . As the aspirations of the Hungarians' destiny - beyond the most general carelessness - are rather unfolded *in the* titanism associated with 'New Paganism' and 'Tartarism', whose main characteristics are failure to achieve a high level of ability, disunity and excess (a kind of 'domination' and kind of 'domination before achievement'), so that the role of aristocratic characteristics would be particularly important. The 'stopping and restraining', i.e. the *principled* traits, play a major role in these. It is clear that, as history progressed, the 'nominal aristocracy' was less and less in the ascendant, that is to say, less and less aware of the qualities to be retained and achieved in order to ensure its own supremacy. Nonetheless, the question must be understood in such a way that the affirmation of 'merely aristocratic in origin' - although far below 'aristocratic in realisation' - is also very important, since affirmation here means the maintenance in the world of a qualitative *possibility*. The malicious rumours with which aristocracy has been discredited, and whose centuries-long work has given rise to a multitude of antipathies to aristocracy, must be regarded as not affecting the actual, or 'realised aristocracy' - only 'aristocracy of possibility', 'aristocracy not yet realised', 'aristocracy of mere origin', 'aristocracy of the aristocratic" were his vague criticisms.

The aristocracy must be assessed in a similar way to the Eastern phenomenon of belonging to a caste: accordingly, a true member of the aristocracy is a person who is not only born into a particular order, but who, seizing this opportunity, can also realize his origin throughout his life and who meets the above-mentioned characteristics.

(In the East, this was ensured by caste initiation.) The aristocracy of the past cannot therefore be dismissed at all, because its qualities are ineradicable. What can be corrupted is the 'pre-aristocratic' character that has not yet been realised, that has been acquired by descent and that has abandoned this descent. Aristocratism and aristocracy, as we have noted, become a reality in a post-birth incarnation. Nevertheless, the exaggerated critique of the 'merely aristocratic in origin' is a highly damaging, entirely *left-wing* manifestation, an act which can lead to the disappearance of a positive and superior quality from the world, just as the aristocracy today has no serious dignity, and as this real quality has been replaced by the pseudo-quality of the *people*. To question the minimal superiority inherent in 'aristocratic descent', whatever else, is therefore impiety, even if aristocracy is primarily a spiritual quality.

Today, this real aristocracy, unassailable from below, can still be found in Hungary, although in terms of persons it may only be ten or twenty representatives. Its situation is only made more difficult by the fact that this genuine intellectual aristocracy is trapped in a particularistic living environment, and from this position below the middle level it is unable to assert its legitimate intellectual superiority at the social level. (In this respect, the situation is likely to get worse as time goes on.) This realised and constantly re-realising aristocracy should in fact be supported by the entrepreneurial and 'material elite' which usurps the material assets of the real elite. However, regardless of this reality, the emergence of this supporting factor, the aristocracy, deprived of its 'worldly power', or more precisely of certain aspects of it, continues to live itself in the reality of the aristocracy, its difficulties being dwarfed by its visible or invisible aspirations.

A few years ago, aristocratic attitudes also began to take hold outside the aristocracy proper. This

on the one hand, this trend is positive, because it contributes to the defence and promotion of the idea of aristocracy (not that the aristocracy needs it, but rather who have not yet found themselves but who have essentially aristocratic potential), but on the other hand, it seeks to destroy the characteristics of the aristocracy proper by means of pseudo-characteristics. In this sense, we see this writing as a criterion, which in its intentions was determined to shame the faltering notions of 'nationalist aristocracy' and 'liberal aristocracy', the illusion of a 'liberal aristocracy', a 'material and financial aristocracy' or a purely 'generative aristocracy', consisting in the search for family trees, dress, a circumspect and modest manners and self-conscious acceptance of social conventions.

The aristocracy is *an intellectual elite*, in which the intellectual adjective is understood not in an intellectual sense, but as the possession of a *transcendent inherent consciousness*, as a coherent aspiration and its achievement at all levels. For a given territory and its inhabitants, it is through them that a more than ever 'connection with the sky' can be secured.

H. R.
(1993)

ON QUESTIONS OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY

Mhe situation of the Republic of Estonia from 1945 to the present day is rarely correctly assessed and interpreted. The communists are not worth - this place - because for them the desecration of our Country and our Nation was the basis for the "construction of socialism". However, it is regrettable to note the distorted views that are still being held by adults and mature people who otherwise seem to understand the political context. One of them must be singled out, one which is considered intolerable and which a criterion value, since failure to accept it either indicates that the person concerned does not really understand anything and should not say a word about politics, or that his love of his country and nation, which was previously beyond doubt, is now being called into question. So what is this really about?

Today, with the exception of the feral communists, everyone admits that Hungary was under Soviet occupation from 1945 to mid-1991; some - more cautiously - dare to speak only of Soviet military presence. But anyone who does not want to define his or her place on the political left cannot be content with this. We must say, and say it with the firmest determination imaginable: From 1 April 1945 to 24 hours on 30 June 1991, Hungary as a whole was a SINGLE CATHONIC CONSTITUTION.

'Hostile' - that's the emphasis! was not a military presence 'here', but a hostile and reign of terror invasion of the most vile enemy, the subjugation of our country by the enemy.

The hostile presence of the hostile Red hordes on a hostile basis cannot be qualified as such, but this indisputable fact had, and still has, implications which must be discussed, albeit briefly. The enemy invasion was an illegal usurpation of power, aided and abetted by politico-economic scum - in the role of servants and puppets, lying to themselves as representatives of state power and administration. A country under enemy occupation, whose every move was determined and by the enemy occupiers, could not conclude any valid treaty or agreement, because the only basis for this could only be sovereignty, but a country under enemy occupation and determined by the enemy occupiers cannot be sovereign. - in fact, it had no government of any kind. There was no real parliament within the borders of the country, nor a real head of state.

Accordingly, the treaties, as we have noted, could not have had any validity, i.e. they could not be considered treaties then, nor can they be considered treaties now, in retrospect. In this respect, we must first and foremost mention the so-called 'armistice agreement' itself, which, as stated above, can in no way be considered a valid treaty, even invalid, because to refer to this degree of invalidity as ordinary invalidity would be the most absurd euphemism.

The enemy invasion began there and then, when the Soviet hordes invaded. Much has already been written about their beastly presence, so we will not go into it here. The country

its total occupation could have been perfected between 4 and 10 April 1945, but let's accept the "official" opinion - 4 April. It was the first absolutely clear day of mourning in the country's history. By comparison, the Battle of Mohács and the beginning of the Turkish occupation, though also disasters, pale in significance. There, too, the enemy triumphed, but an enemy which, even if it represented something totally alien, was not fundamentally alien to God and man, as the Soviet and Communist opponents did, in the most terrorist way and by the most terrorist means.

The Trianon Peace Treaty was also completely illegitimate - and completely unjust - but there and then, respectable and qualified politicians with legal authority were present, and with a broken heart, they gave in to coercion and signed this shameful "peace treaty", composed by Masonry. The so-called "Paris Peace Treaty" was quite "different, even compared to Trianon, because in Hungary, as we have already noted, there was no government, no parliament and head of state, because what there was did not have the same rights as those who "take power" in a pub when drunk. The Bolshevik villains put in the velvet chair by the enemy (in 1919) and their treasonous lackeys who collaborated with the enemy had no real authority to make peace, and the enemy was an enemy with whom no peace could ever have been made: no legitimate Hungarian state would have made peace with the Bolshevik-Communist Soviet rule; with the British and the Americans, perhaps - with far-reaching reservations - but never with the Soviets.

Legally elected or appointed statesmen of Hungary were handed over by the allies of the Soviet Union - as "war criminals" - Hungarian - by no means Hungarian - power usurped by the Soviets. The "people's courts" were not, of course, courts of law, but the most vile and repulsive teratomas of the terror machine. Many legitimate Hungarian statesmen were , - because the execution

was usually carried out on those who had been legally convicted, and here there no question of a legal conviction or any kind of conviction, because that would have required a real court.

In Hungary, there are no simple illegalities or violations of the law, because in order to break the law, there must be some legal right, at least in principle. Real legality in Hungary has been sunk by the beastly enemy and their even more abominable servants, and what they have put in its place has not the slightest connection with any law or legality.

The supposedly "pacified" enemy once again went to open war against the 1956 uprising and struggle for freedom. There were and are those who, even after this, did not open their eyes, or if they did, not enough.

We - and this is obvious - have not accepted Imre Nagy, nor will we ever accept him. The former Minister of the Interior, Beria's minion, during his time as Minister of the Interior, surpassed Gábor Peter, and this well known at the time, but the degree of vile behaviour that János Kádár produced is almost unique even in the circumstances here. Who did what willingly and gladly, or what they did on command - this may be interesting from the point of view of the investigation of the causes, or perhaps from the psychological approach, but it is not essential. Kádár may have done what he did voluntarily, he may have been obliged or forced to do it - in the end, either way. No decent man can be asked to take on the role of executioner of the nation or be forced to do so, and this is no different for roles that are incomparably smaller than his.

Hungary - through the turbulent internal movements of 1988 and 1989 - arrived at 1990, the year of the so-called regime change. There can be no question that changes have indeed taken place, but that the system has not really changed is certain. If the total regime change can be regarded as a 180-degree turn - symbolically - then the change cannot be regarded as a 45-degree eighth turn either,

is more like a 30 degree twelfth turn. That much change may have happened, and in the "system", but no more, but in 1990 this was not even possible, as the country was still under hostile military occupation. It was more than a year after the 'free elections' that the enemy occupying troops left Hungary. By then, it had already been internally ensured that no real and significant regime change could take place. Thus the present parliament has no real legitimacy either, since it is based on the succession of the communist system secured by the enemy occupation.

It is approximately after the next elections that our country and our nation will be in a position to have a real and complete change of order, not automatically, because elections do not yet become truly legitimate due to the temporal distance from occupation, only if the Parliament and government of the time had absolutely distanced themselves from their predecessors, which would otherwise be a prerequisite for these institutions to be considered *de facto*, *de iure* and *de veritate* as a *de facto* Parliament and government.

Because of the failure to distance oneself from the alliance with the enemy and from the creators of this alliance, it is not possible to speak of a real and complete regime change. Those who collaborate with the enemy occupiers, the collaborators, are not considered enemies according to the generally accepted official judgement; those who oppose the enemy are still considered enemies. The change to the enemy - the most vile and accused enemy possible - and the backstabbing of those who oppose the enemy is still considered a political merit, according to the generally accepted official judgement. Paying homage and wreaths at monuments erected to the enemy is still a common and official act. For the 'resisters' (i.e. the insidious backstabbers of those who fought on the side of the enemy), the "respect" - is still practically compulsory today.

The dark forces that control the world - the Freemasons and their associates, and those who are organically linked to them - are still bound by

Hungary's official policy-makers to severely limit anti-communism - much to the delight of communists and "ex-communists" - but to take action against the perceived or real right, especially the extreme right, as hard as possible. The dark forces in Hungary are not yet aware of what ultra-rightism is and how it differs from extreme rightism, but once they do, they will know who they are really up against, 'the dark forces', *scotazmokratism*.

The sovereignty of a country and of the nation living in it can only be discussed if it cannot be interfered with by foreign and coercive forces. This is particularly true in relation to the coercive role of foreign and hostile forces. Hungary has been under enemy occupation for more than forty-six years. Hungary was part of the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, after which it was not automatically removed from the sphere of interest of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and if the Soviet Union were restored, by whatever name, Hungary would again be part of that sphere of interest.

Since the spring of 1990, Hungary has been under the economic influence - and a very decisive influence - of the Western countries, especially the United States, without having completely broken away from the Soviet Union. The Western countries and the United States, on the other hand, are under the influence of (secret forces) (in a very different way, but under the influence of the same forces as the Soviet Union), as strongly as possible.

The forces of darkness and their agents in Hungary have the current political opposition - and through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank - they can keep the coalition government and government itself under their influence. Within the ranks of the governing coalition parties and among quasi-right opposition and independents, there are those who reject these vicious interventions and even attempt to oppose them. They are in fact - in this context - our allies.

The road to sovereignty is a long one. A road that can be seen as largely a struggle, a fight. The restoration and realisation of sovereignty, and its subsequent consolidation, must represent - symbolically - a 180-degree turn from the period immediately preceding the 1990 elections, and a more than 150-degree turn from the current situation. This implies a *de iure* restoration, if only momentarily, of the situation before the hostile occupation. From this base, the restoration of the country in its entirety could be launched. But this must be preceded by the self-assertion of state power and administration, which would begin with a definitive and declarative break with all the consequences of the enemy occupation and the economic occupation with hostile motives. To this end, the existing 'constitutionality' and could be achieved by the means of "legitimacy"; no sooner than the elections of 1998, which will presumably be held, but no sooner than the elections of 2002. In the meantime, everything must be done - however modest our means and possibilities - to ensure that fundamental moral, human and national values are strengthened, not only in Hungary but also in Europe and throughout the world.

L. A.
(1993)

ON THE QUESTION OF THE FORM OF THE STATE AND THE VALIDITY OF THE FORM OF THE STATE IN RELATION TO HUNGARY

A *The Sword-Cross-Croix-Croix Alliance** has taken the most definitive position on the question of the form of the state and the validity, enforcement and enforceability of the form of the state, both in general and in Hungary. It is primarily with the latter that we wish to deal here, in this short paper, with the to deal with.

Let it be said in advance that we were, are and will be steadfast supporters of the utterly committed pro-Habsburg-Lorraine successionist monarcho-legitimism. We think of monarchism in relation to the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty in terms of Hungary, Hungary and Austria, Hungary and the German Empire, and Europe as a whole.

Statehood in Hungary was abolished between 10 and 15 April 1945. It remained functional within the borders of the Greater German Reich until about 7 May. Although never legally

* The Alliance founded by the Author, which is the organizational embodiment of the Traditionalis Ultradextroconservative (Ultra-right Ultraconservative) Imperio-Monarchist and Monarcho-Legitimist United Front. Its ideologico-political and political organ is the journal *Sacrum Imperium*. [- Ed.]

was not , but it was no longer able to assert itself - by its very functioning. The legitimate head of state and government, Ferenc Szálas, the leader of the Hungarian nation and prime minister of the Hungarian royal family, was assassinated on 12 March 1946.

The continuity of law in Hungary was never broken, nor even broken in its enforcement, but the latter did happen - when the beastly Soviet hordes invaded Hungary (and of course not an insignificant part of Europe).

The alpha and the omega of statehood is the head of state - the factual existence of the head of state and the unquestionable absolute legitimacy of the head of state.

The legitimate - and indisputably legitimate - leaders of Hungary in the 20th century (until today) were:

I. FERENC JÓZSEF - Apostolic King, 02.12.1848 - 21.11.1916;

KÁROLY IV - Apostolic King, 21.11.1916 - 01.04.1922;

II. OTTÓ - Eternal King, 01.04.1922 - ?.

Meanwhile, partly by substitution, partly in the sense of a dual legitimacy:

Archduke JÓZSEF (ÁGOST) HABSBURG-LOTHRINGEN, Royal Prince-Prince General - as (temporary) Governor, - 05.08.1919 - 25.08.1919;

VITÉZ HORTHY MIKLÓS, Lieutenant-Governor of NAGYBÁNYAI - as Governor, - 01.03.1920 - 16.10.1944;

FERENC SZÁLASI - as National Leader, - 16.10.1944 / 1944.
11. 04. - 1946. 03. 12.

(Note: Ferenc Szálasi was the Prime Minister of the Hungarian between 16.10.1944 and 04.11.1944, authorized to exercise the operational power of the Governor. On 04.11.1944, on the proposal of the National Council, both Houses of Parliament unanimously and legally, without dissenting votes or abstentions, adopted the Hungarian Parliament's resolution.

and at the same time approved all the measures taken by Ferenc Szálasi and his government between 16.10.1944 and 04.11.1944, and them into law.)

The remnants of the Hungarian Parliament in emigration met in 1947 in Altötting, - and elected Ferenc Ferenc Kisbarnaki, a Hungarian general, as the (temporarily) appointed Hungarian prime minister, a position which he resigned from in 1949, mainly because of the attacks on his government, but also for other reasons. Although Ferenc Farkas's election and credentials as governor for a certain period of time were not disputed in terms of his legal eligibility, his clarity was not absolute. Nevertheless, his legitimacy ultimately trumped everything that had happened here since 1945.

We have often said what Hungary's dream form is. Let us recapitulate our position:

The form of government of Hungary in 2000 AD:

de more et veritate - supra-officialiter: Regnum Apostolicum [Apostolic Kingdom];

de iure - officialiter: Regnum Apostolicum [Apostolic Kingdom]; *de iure - legitimali-factualiter*: Interregnum [the interval from the death of the last King to the coronation of the next]; *de facto - operationaliter*: Usurpatio Illegitima [Illegitimate usurpation - (The ed.)].

Accepting the above is critical in our view. Anyone who does not accept it cannot claim the right to call himself a right-winger, nor can he claim that others do.

The current statehood is not a real statehood. Explicit non-statism, pseudo-statism and counter-statism in the middle of the "triangle" of constitutional law and constitutional law, which characterises and expresses today's Hungary.

Between 1945 and 1991 Hungary was not simply a foreign country, but a country under enemy occupation. The enemy occupiers created the so-called state apparatus from their puppets between 1945 and 1990. This was clearly an illegal and illegitimate bias. The 'government' that came to power in 1990 saw itself and sees itself as the successor and continuer of the previous times, which a continuation of the illegal usurpation, and cannot be seen as anything else.

In retrospect, we respect Hungary's legitimate heads of state to the highest degree, even if not quite to the same degree, and those who have come to power through dual legitimacy cannot be exceptions to this - not in the slightest sense.

We also support in the greatest possible way Miklós Horthy, the Grand Dignitary Governor of Hungary, and in the light of our historical retrospection we oppose any attack on him from the left.

At the same time, there were two aspects of Governor Horthy's activities as Head of State with which we cannot under any circumstances agree, and which we must classify as serious, one might even say criminal, errors.

The first and the second concerns the second return of King Charles IV and his attempt to take the throne. There can hardly be any doubt that this return and attempt to take the throne was completely premature and totally unprepared. It is more likely that the Little Entente would not have intervened militarily after all, but only threatened to do so. Nevertheless, the possibility of this possibility becoming a reality could not have been ruled out, which would not only have ruled the King's seizure of the throne, but could have ended the existence of the Kingdom of Hungary, and indeed of Hungary itself.

Governor Horthy is to be blamed not for not accepting the date of the King's restoration to the throne, but for resorting to methods which were known to be unworthy of the crowned Apostolic King

but, on the other hand, they were also unworthy of the Lieutenant-Governor and the Governor.

Governor Miklós Horthy, in the company of the Grand Royal Princes living in Hungary, the Cardinal Primate and the government, should have gone to the King immediately to clarify the situation and persuade the King to postpone his attempt to seize the throne. If it too late, it would not have been possible to allow the King to be captured by foreigners, but would have had to prevent from going abroad again. Finally, he would have had to use the weight of his authority to prevent the submission and/or adoption of the dethronement law, which was invalid anyway because of its lack of legal basis.

On 11 November 1918, Emperor and King Charles / IV issued the so-called Schönbrunn Declaration (not to be confused with the Schönbrunn Manifesto issued earlier), and on 13 November 1918 the so-called Eckartsau Declaration (known as the Eckartsau Letter), in the former renouncing the rights of the Austrian Emperor, and in the latter the rights of the Hungarian King. The renunciation of the throne did not even occur; the Eckartsau Declaration was not countersigned by a minister, either after the transfer or later.

So there was no resignation - yet it was a serious mistake to make these statements.

King Charles IV attempted his return to Hungary because he did not consider the Letter of Eckartsau (which was not countersigned) as a resignation, he knew that the National Assembly of Hungary still considered Hungary as an Apostolic Kingdom, and that he was the crowned, unresigned Apostolic King, *that the most moderate circles thought so, being informed of this not only by the aristocracy and the high clergy, but also by the Governor himself.*

Charles IV's two returns and his attempt to take the throne were neither unjustified nor incomprehensible. The second return

(The first, despite its failure, was not flawed, since it was a clear declaration of his own intentions), because the safeguards which should have been expressed in the Entente's resolution were not in place (Charles IV had trusted in Briand's - allegedly pronounced - good intentions, which, however, were not manifested after the failed attempt.) By failing to make a second return, Charles I / IV could have avoided - the unjustified but still ominous dethronization that affected him and the dynasty as a whole, and also avoided his exile and perhaps his early death.

Returning to the person of Governor Miklós Horthy, we must also point out his second guilty error. This was his proclamation of 15 October 1944, and the fact that the prisoner transfer to the Soviets almost took place, as he had intended.

We can't doubt that some kind of - completely misconceived - over- or under-thought good intentions led him to this point. We must know that the surrender of arms would not have been a simple 'cop-out', although that would not have been acceptable either, from a right-wing point of view, but that the declaration of our allies - primarily the Greater German Reich - as enemies and their immediate attack a condition for accepting the surrender. Governor Horthy omitted from the text of the proclamation - out of caution - the announcement of the German invasion, but this did not matter much; if it had been possible to

na, this would have happened.

The Hungarian Defence Forces did not follow the Government in this intention, just as neither did the gendarmerie, nor the police, nor most of the Hungarian political "elite". Ferenc Szálasi and the Arrowhead Party-Hungarian Movement, in alliance with the other extreme right-wing forces, took power with revolutionary impetus, but peacefully, not at all in a coup-like manner, within the legal framework.

Ferenc Szálasi and his Hungarian Nation - in alliance with the German Reich - could not defend Hungary itself, but Europe - and Western Europe in particular - could not defend Hungary.

West Germany - has done a great deal to protect it. The Soviets - if Hungary had dropped out of the defensive resistance - might have in Berlin by February, and then would have occupied most Germany before the slowly advancing Western Allies, with the result that West Germany - the Federal Republic of Germany - have been confined to the western fringes of Germany, and East Germany - German Democratic Republic - might not have been surrendered by the Soviets or their successors to this day.



In 1945 and after 1945, there was a relative revival of interest in pro-Hapsburg-Lorraine successionist monarcho-legitimism, not independently of the commitment of the new Cardinal Archbishop József Mindszenty, the Archbishop of Esztergom.

I./Otto II was the Eternal Emperor and the Eternal King, and clearly considered himself to be one. This created a clear situation. The right wing in Austria and Hungary had reservations about I. /

II. Otto, given that during the Second World War, instead of taking a neutral stance at least, openly sided with the allies of the West, who were hostile to his countries or their successors.

These circumstances may have weakened Otto's legitimacy, but they certainly could not have eliminated it. This is clear and unequivocal.

On 31 May 1961, Emperor-King Otto I of Habsburg-Lorraine renounced his claim to the Austrian imperial throne. However, neither at the same time nor since then, nor to this day, has he renounced his Grand Dignity of the Order of the Golden Fleece and the title of Dynasty, nor his claim to the Hungarian royal throne.

This has a public and constitutional anomaly - especially in Hungary, but also in general - which has led to a continuous

has persisted ever since, in ways and to an extent that can hardly be dissolved.

Merely because Otto II did not abdicate the Hungarian royal throne, we could and should say that Otto II is the current Hungarian King. Unfortunately, the situation is not so simple.

Otto I/II certainly did not abdicate the Hungarian royal throne, but his abdication of the Austrian imperial throne on the basis of *the principle of co-ownership* virtually rules out the possibility of his being regarded as the King of Hungary. On the other hand although he did not abdicate the Hungarian royal throne, Otto I of Habsburg-Lorraine did not consider himself the Eternal King of Hungary at all, and in fact did not consider Hungary an Apostolic Kingdom at all, but a republic, republic that had formerly been a republic of the people, which he recognised and respected as a commonwealth, and which he considered himself a citizen of. The violation of *the principle of co-ownership* and the fact that Otto II, despite his non-denial, does not consider himself King of Hungary, together almost exclude the possibility of Otto II being respected as the Eternal King of Hungary. He was undoubtedly an Eternal King, but today it certainly seems that he is no longer one. On the other hand, we cannot say with the clearest conceivable certainty that Otto II is in any case not the Eternal King.

This anomaly of public law, constitutional law and constitutional law - on an international scale - seems to be of almost fatal gravity.

might even get the impression - against our will - that this anomaly in public and constitutional law has been achieved in a very concrete way. The fact that Otto I/II renounced one of his claims to the throne but not the other, but does not consider himself either King or Tsar, while at the same time considering himself Head of the Dynasty and Grand Master of the Order of the Golden Fleece - with the consent of the Dynasty - is not only the cause of the anomaly mentioned, but also the cause of the anomaly, which is the result of the fact that he is not only the head of the Dynasty but also the Grand Master of the Order of the Golden Fleece.

and by extension - that no one could act as emperor or king within the Dynasty.

In accordance with the will of Otto I/II, the future Grand Master of the Order of the Golden Fleece and future Head of the Dynasty will be his eldest son, Archduke Charles. Whether or not this will be accepted unreservedly by all members of the Dynasty is not yet known.

There are many that I/II. Otto, the former Hereditary Emperor and the Hereditary King of uncertain status - even if we were not right in this - do not feel in one respect closer to themselves as representatives of forces which were and are working against the traditional aspirations of the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty, as representatives of those forces which also wish to remain faithful to the Dynasty and to those traditional principles which have always been close to the Dynasty's basic aspirations.

The Dynasty still has - in every respect - excellent members. First of all, we must mention Archduke Joseph Árpád of Habsburg-Lorraine, Prince Royal, Head of the Dynasty's Aegis Náadori, Grand Master of the Order of the Knights of the Vitéz, - but there are others.

We are not aware of any of the Archdukes of Habsburg-Lorraine seeking to declare themselves Emperor and King after Otto I/II, by setting aside Archduke Charles. There may be a chance of that, but the likelihood of it is quite small.

is very low.

In this respect, legitimate succession and successionist legitimacy should prevail together, but also the fact that "whoever fulfils the above conditions" really wants to be Emperor and King, preferably not a "constitutional monarch", but a real Emperor and King, - a supra-legal Sovereign. The historical-political background forces - and this, unfortunately, is certain - do not move and act in a direction that would favour the rise to prominence of such a supernatural 'irradiated' personality.

As long as there is no Habsburg-Lothringen Archduke who meets all the dynastic conditions, whose qualities and intentions meet at least the minimally adequate conditions of the Emperor and the King, we must - while and in spite of our Habsburg-Lothringen pro-Habsburg succesional monarcho-legitimism - remain fully open to other - temporary - solutions.

It has been noted elsewhere that the maintenance (and actual restoration) of the monarchical form of government must be ruled by a Ruler or Ruler-Governor - Regnator or *Regnator-Gubernator* (and not *Regens-Gubernator*, as Miklós Horthy actually was). The German name for this dignity is *Herrscher* or *Herrscher-Reichsverweser*. Its title is: Fel- sheit. A King with imperial rights must have all the rights of an Emperor, and that in the sense of supremacy of law (i.e.: he should have no less rights than Árpád, than Saint Stephen I, than Saint Laszlo, or than the Emperors-Kings of the Habsburg and Habsburg-Lorraine dynasties had until 1867.)

The Ruler or Ruler-Governor would be the one, and only the one, who would be truly superior in idoneity to all his subjects. The fact that there are few such people does not mean that there is no such personality, for there can be, and certainly is, one.

L. A.
(1997)

THE INTELLECTUAL CORRECTION OF NATIONALISM

A Looking at the general *social* climate in Hungary at the beginning of the third millennium - transcending party political and economic considerations - a sad picture emerges. Most of the life of society at this time about TV shows, shopping, and the consumption of luxury goods and pleasures. Along with the characteristic obsession with music, the general social atmosphere in the country is depressingly empty, 'nothing to talk '. This emptiness is filled with flat collegiate ideals, unquestioned modern ideological premises, individualistic ambition and *practical materialism*.

Washing powder, the news, the evening movie, the car, etc., at least in terms of social level and dominance, wash away any mar-cant image. And the reality of this *social* climate cannot be denied by those who are still bound by religion to something higher, nor by those who are active in cultural or political spheres: the lifestyle in question is not sufficiently questioned by these people either. When they return from churches, congresses, congregations, cathedrals and editorial offices, they give themselves over to the collective pleasures of television and shopping, just as the man in the street, the businessman or the poorer rural man, just as they rejoice in the mushrooming of consumer goods, the anti-theses of medieval churches, the proliferation of the buying centres than anyone else.

Despite all this, we cannot in any way the situation would have been better under the communist-socialist system before 1989.

Those who lived then can testify that this is not true.¹ However, everyone can feel and think that the change of regime in Hungary in 1989-90 was not backed by positive forces that wanted to and could have achieved a significant rise in standards at the social level. In short, we were disappointed. *Material progress*, where it has been made, has been achieved without any *support for development in broader sense*,² which is a general trend throughout the world. And Hungarians have not tried to avoid negative world processes.³

Claudio Mutti, a prominent figure in contemporary Italian intellectual life, when asked in an interview about the fundamental contradictions of contemporary Western society and the crisis in its artistic life, said: '...it must be made clear that *Western* culture, not *European* culture, is merely a monstrous offshoot of it. What is more, the very essence of *Western* civilisation, the reception of the impulses coming from America, shows its detachment from *European* civilisation. In fact, the greatest tragedy is that the basic conflict is not present, that is, the conflict with the West is, as it were, absent in Europe. And the absence of this conflict has had a major impact on European culture and artistic trends, because, in the sense of this conflict - which has become the salvation of Europe

¹ Those who were alive then and who were not affected by the MSZP's propaganda after 1990. Those who were alive then and are not just looking at things from a material point of view.

² This would be the *original* role of material progress and the meaning of keeping it within certain limits. On the contrary, modern man, without using the possibilities of material progress for a higher, spiritual unfoldment, has as much material achievement and as much source of enjoyment as a ruler would have refused to have in the past.

³ "...the various "achievements of technical civilization and the modern economy ... the individual with new and new fetters: he is increasingly integrated into the collective cogs of the economy, against which "political liberties" are ridiculous." JULIUS EVOLA: *Il Fascismo visto dalla Destra*. Roma, 1970², Volpe, Chapter X.

would - by learning the cultural models of the *West, Europe* would reject its own detachment from its true artistic forms."⁴

From the TV channels, from the news papers - everywhere - we see the need to propagate *a mass man with* the same ideology, the same views and the same values, whose traits are sought and imitated in a small village in Turkey as they are in New Zealand and Hungary. This man, for all *his outward* colouring and individual pluralism, lives or wants to live in the same way everywhere in the world. He wants democratic prosperity and nothing else. To work, to live well - and then to die. While being thought of as an "individual".

As we have noted, this atmosphere has not been resisted in Hungary. If they had done something about it, if they had done enough about it, the above would not be as dominant at the social level as they are.

Examined in a collective framework, the only recent nationalism that has perhaps put up any kind of a fight against *leftist internationalism, pseudo-nationalism, and the globalism that* is dressed up in the guise of individualism - in Hungary as elsewhere - is perhaps the nationalism of the most recent times.

Nationalism is understood here not in historical perspective and not as the property of particular parties, but *as a factor and a tendency found in the most diverse parts of a given contemporary society.*

The task of this study is to examine this *nationalism*. A critical examination, but a critical examination in an appreciative and appreciative way, because this contemporary nationalism seeks to preserve national borders, nations, peoples, nations, that is, *differences, values, qualities*, as opposed to a general mentality that brings everyone and everything on the same level. That our method - in the original Greek

⁴ Short interview with Claudio Mutti. *Pannon Front* No. 13, p. 3. Republished in *Nem-zeti Sajtószemle* 15 Feb. 1998.

critical in the sense that the preservation of certain qualities and values cannot be regarded as a priori *spiritual*, i.e. as something that is radically opposed to and quite different from the social atmosphere described above. Nationalism thus requires certain adjustments in the spiritual sense and at a certain level.

As we have noted elsewhere,⁵ the historical context of nationalism-patriotism is ominous in that, as a conceptual idea, it originated in the French Revolution. It is also the source of the desire to abolish and bring to one level the qualities and differences just described. So if nationalism is to do anything to change this climate, it must first and foremost be a different kind of nationalism from the left-wing nationalism of the French Revolution. This requires reflection, research and self-study. Among other things, an awareness that the emotion of patriotism, the patina of the concept of homeland, an uncontained idea of a 'nation', a patriotism based on emotions, feelings, emotions and instincts *is not enough* or *does not* lead to the desired result. At the very least, the opposite of what the French Revolution showed us is necessary.

We cannot even mention here all the lessons that the French Revolution must teach contemporary nationalism. There is now a fairly extensive literature on the genesis and history of nationalism, from which we must single out the relevant ideas of twentieth-century traditionalists.⁽⁶⁾ While we do not exclude the possibility that further research into the history of nationalism may be necessary, we must not exclude the possibility that the history of nationalism may be a subject of further research.

⁵ RÓBERT HORVÁTH: Teaching to Nationalists (The Role of Hungarians in Maintaining the Idea and Reality of Biro- dalom). *Pannon Front* 21. pp. 34-40.

⁶ See for example, RENÉ GUÉNON: *The crisis of the modern world*. N.d., n.d, S.S. /Books of Ancestral Tradition IV/, p. 19. JULIUS EVOLA: *Rebellion against the modern world*. Nyíregyháza, 1997, Volume /Books of the Cinóberösvény/, Part 2 Chapters XII and XV. From *Cavalcare la tigre*. Milano, 1973³, Scheiwiller. Chapter XXVI. LÁSZ-

ANDRÁS LÓ: *Traditionalism and the concept of being. Traditionalism and tradition*.

the events and ideas of 1789 in France, we will now highlight only one connection in this respect.

One of the essential features of the French Revolution was *its dismemberment, fragmentation and atomization* (which *by analogy and in concreto* also included individualization). The arises: what were the separatist nationalisms and national independence movements in Croatia, Serbia, Albania and Russia in the 20th century? Are they the heirs of *left-wing internationalism* or an opposite - *right-wing* - tendency? Do they represent the interests of a levelling globalisation of the earth or of a modern nationalism with the opposite motive? The answer is clear. These movements - and 'separatism' in general - can never be considered right-wing, and are often specifically supported by the forces of left-wing internationalism today. Just as the French patriots of the time had destroyed or had begun to destroy a *de facto* supranational traditional unity, so these movements were similarly distorted: they destroyed the principle of a higher unity and the European national aspirations that were organically subordinated to it. Their values and aspirations not 'eternal values', nor are those of the general liberal intelligentsia. In the face of these aspirations to secession, nationalism was everywhere identified with particularism, discord and hatred. They clearly had a negative mission: in the eyes of many, they obscured the contemporary potential of nationalism and national aspirations. Once again, they have succeeded in discrediting the principle of affirming differences.

Evola and András László have also discussed the phenomenon of nationalism in several articles.

"Nationalism was originally a left-wing manifestation: from the very end of the 18th century to the very end of the 19th century. Only from that time, but rather from 1917-1918-1919 ... was it embraced by the far-right tendencies ... and rejected by the internationalism that developed after nationalism, which in many respects followed from nationalism and became far-left." (LÁSZLÓ ANDRÁS: Right-wing observations and comments. *Pannon Front* No 9, p. 3)

Our intention with this example was to show how easily the forces of globalisation and mondialism can distort nationalism. The very forces against which it is supposed to be opposed. Turning to the sphere of culture, we encounter the same phenomena. We are talking about certain nationalist tendencies that are out of control and which also seem to be aimed at reducing nationalism: the demonisation of national consciousness, of a nation, of a people, but in such a way that those who achieve this are, in the process, the greatest nationalists of all time.

They present themselves as the "most nationalist".

What else, if not the *nolens*-

-For example, it can be seen as *a discrediting of the people* when some people, as a consequence of modern ennoblement and their own madness, try to prove that

"the most ancient of all peoples is the Hungarian", that "the ancestor of all languages is the Hungarian", or that "Petőfi was a deified, Christian personality"? Since such aspirations are now, to our great regret, *a trend* that actually exists, we shall illustrate this with the following quote, which is not too blatant: 'the Greek goddess of fertility, the hundred-breasted [sic!] *Cybele* or *Kübele* [?]. Two great words. *Cübele* [?]= *csű-bele*, i.e. the Feminine God (womb) [so far nothing more beautiful], while *Kübele*= is the name of the god of the Pair [?], *Kü-* god+ *Bél-* god= . A very important reading of the above is the *triple-word family Cső and csöcs, as well as Csök*, which are again cultic ancestralrepresenting gender [cső as ?]."⁷ In other words, *Kübelé* would be a word of Hungarian origin. I wonder what this is, if not an attack on the opponents of nationalism and Hungarianism.

⁷ ISTVÁN PRÁCZKI: Stars - Bees and Hungarians (The history of the Gods and the twin people). In *Breaking out of Hell (Lectures of the 1998 World Meeting on National Defence and /Ancestral/ Historical History of the Sittya in Budapest)*. H. n., 1999, NAP. p. 74. (Typical of such excesses, the author also considers the name Honolulu to be of Hungarian origin: he derives it from the expression "the horse that is native there" in his obsessive insistence. *Ibid.* p. 85.)

in the hands of the *Hungarian people*, which - demonstrating the irrationalism of *the Hungarian people* - can be used for good? This only lead to the discrediting of Hungarians and nationalism.

We know that the fate of the world - in whatever direction - has very often been influenced by individuals, determined by one or other of them, even if their influence was necessarily temporary and did not last forever. There are also more or less well-known leading thinkers in contemporary Hungarian nationalism. The work of such leaders provides further valuable insights and corrections on the subject of nationalism. All the more so because the study of leading personalities is more important than the study of the *social milieu*.

All the shortcomings and deficiencies of the leading figures of contemporary Hungarian nationalism, who were thought to be the defining figures of Hungarian nationalism both culturally and intellectually, are present in the work of Zoltán Bencsi, a figure active in the 1930s and 1940s. We therefore believe that it is useful to recall his work from the perspective of correcting nationalism. However, it must be said that *we are not dealing with individual personalities, but with tendencies, aspirations and trends which, in our opinion, require correction. Our intention is therefore that the reader should not merely associate these with certain individuals, but should seek them out, examine them and then pursue them.*

Zoltán Bencsi was a lawyer, leader of the *Unitarian Church of Turan* from 1934, and considered himself the "chief apostle". His movement was banned in 1935 as being hostile and offensive to other religious denominations (not only to their historical and institutional implementation, but to their more or less original teachings), and from 1941 to 1945 his movement seems to have been banned again.⁸ From 1935 to 1945, his movement was banned again.

⁸ BENCSEI ZOLTÁN: *Our Ancient Faith*. Budapest, published in the year 1503 [1937?] after Atilla's accession to power, the *Turanian Monotheists*, p. 39. Budapest, 1507th anniversary of Atilla's accession to power [1941?], Bencsi.

⁴ Although the existence of a similar movement with such a number of members is hardly conceivable in Hungary today, the number of those commit similar errors of principle as Bencsi and his movement is much higher.⁽¹⁰⁾

Before we move on to the negative criticism, let us not forget that Zoltán Bencsi was one of the first in the country to broaden the religious perspective, not only from an external and intellectual point of view, but also from an interior and believer's point of view. Nor should we forget that he was partly transcending the fragmenting, atomizing and specializing particularism, thinking in terms of *an imperial perspective*,¹¹ and speaking of a "Turanian confederation of people and state". The pages of his narrative "*Koppány-e oder István?*", which is undoubtedly rich in historical and psychologising distortions, reflect the figure of a deeply felt Hungarian man, a non-conformist thinker⁽¹²⁾ whose positive aspects are, however, much less followed today than his negative ones (whether they are known or not).

We must first turn to his opposition to the monarch, king and emperor, which is in radical contradiction with his idea of *empire* and any endorsement of imperial horizons. The denial of monarchs, the criticism and denunciation of monarchs in the critical method of liberalism, which is characteristic of so many nationalist circles, has the serious consequence of denying the dignity of *monarchy* as a perpetual dignity. And what is a nation worth if its best lack the quality of *sovereignty*, of kingship?

⁹The data is published in MARX TIBOR ISTVÁN: On the religion of the Turanian Uniate Church led by Zoltán Bencsi. *Tradíció évkönyv* 2000, p. 153.

¹⁰On the history of the Turanian monotheistic movement after 1945, see ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ, LÁSZLÓ: The Spirit, Right-Wingism and Tradition. *Hunnia* No. 43, p. 20.

¹¹Perhaps the most striking example of his (Eurasian) imperialism is his essay "The Question of Russian Spaces". In *Turanian Thought*. 10-15. o.

¹²BENCISI ZOLTÁN: *Is it Koppány or István?* (*Historical chronicle*) Budapest, in the year 1504 of our lord Atilla [1938?], Bencsi.

In our eyes, it is indisputable that all *Hungarians* are adherents of *the idea of the Holy Crown*, and thus *the Holy Crown of the kings of Hungary* in particular. We not know enough to form *a doctrine* in the ancient sense of the word. Still less should we talk about "The Holy Crown Pledge". Adding up all the knowledge of all of us would not create all that makes a religion a religion. (Compare it with any historic world religion.) But we must be aware that some people even use the idea of the *Holy Crown* to destroy the idea of *royalty* and to diminish the importance of the people who represent it. A decisive correction is needed in this area. István Kocsis, in his most interesting book, writes: "Let us consider here that (...) the doctrine of the Holy Crown actually *transmits to later ages the great ideals of the age of sacral kingship*... This is perhaps the greatest merit of the doctrine of the Holy Crown..."¹³ Apart from the term doctrine, this is indeed the case. The *kingdom* as such (and precisely by virtue of the quality of *kingship*) is not only a historical *reality*, but a *spiritual and iniciative reality*. By its supra-personality, the *Holy Crown* is able to express, preserve and suggest this in an extraordinary way. However, certain efforts are *against* the idea of kingship, the idea of kingship and the person of kings⁽¹⁴⁾ They fetishise it, deprive it of its *living symbolism*, *what* it symbolises. It is tragic, terrible and extremely dark. The Hungarian people must clearly recognise these efforts and distance themselves from them. *The Holy Crown* and its ideals must not be turned against the person of the rulers. This must be acknowledged and stated, if only because - as András László's completely rational historical explorations have shown¹⁵ - Hungary is still a kingdom by law.

¹³ ISTVÁN KOCSIS: *The Sacral Prince*. Budapest, 1999, Püski, p. 202.

¹⁴ The supra-personal, the *suprapersonal*, is defined as: that which so transcends the plane of personality as to embrace it in fulfillment. That which is truly supra-personal and therefore cannot be anti-personal.

¹⁵ ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ: A few remarks on questions of sovereignty. *Hunnia*

For some obscure reason, the misconception has spread in nationalist circles that *kingship* or *monarchy* is a "distinctively Western quality and formation" and must therefore be as supposedly "Western".⁽¹⁶⁾ In fact, *king*, *kingship* and *kingship* are neither Western nor Eastern, but a perennial principle. The alliance of tribes, for example, the nomadic order of the tribal chieftains, would never have been realized, could the order of the family ever have served as a paradigm, if the dignity of *kingship* had not been present in them. What has made today's West the symbol of a genuinely negative, anti-traditional quality is precisely and precisely its opposition to *intellectual authority* and to *the sovereignty*, the *rulers*, the *kingdoms*. We must not fall into the same error for pragmatic or fictitious reasons. Behind the idea of independence and freedom which, for example, is emphasised as the characteristic of nomadism, wrongly contrasted with the settled existence of *kingdoms*, there must in fact have been *royalty*, the dignity of *the monarch*. Hence freedom. The *seven chiefs* represented a royal-royal dignity. Our kagans, our Árpáds, our gyulas, our chiefs, even our shamans, our tallis and our heads of families, were all people who had, and affirmed, more or less *royal-royal* dignity. Kingship, kingship - and all that follows from it - is therefore not just a Western European characteristic and privilege. It is as much a feature of the East as of the West,¹⁷ and although it was and made spectacular by the peoples and civilisations that have passed away,

No. 42, pp. 40-42 [Here pp. 75-82 - *Ed.*] And *ibid.*, Some remarks on the question of the form of the state and the validity of the form of the state in Hungary. *Sacrum Imperium* [Internet journal] No. IV (September 1998) [in print:] pp. 3-7 [Here pp. 83-92 - *Ed.*].

¹⁶ See, Zoltán Bencsi: *Koppány or István?* p. 8, para 6, p. 20, para 6, p. 22.

3, p. 49 and p. 59 § 5. See *Turanian Thought*. For the importance of the idea of kingship, see DÁVID MÉSZÁROS, Kingdom and Empire (The Kingdom of Hungary in Europe), *Sacrum Imperium*, issue II (March 1998), pp. 7-16.

¹⁷ On the differences between the Eastern and Western types of ruler, see HUBERT DE MIRLEAU: *Is democracy a fatality?* Budapest, 1999, Stella Maris, pp. 38-47.

as a principle was originally an intrinsic property of the nomadic peoples.

Like Zoltán Bencsi, far too many people believe that nonconformism and mere anti-Westernism alone are sufficient and decisive factors for the intellectual supremacy of contemporary nationalism and the victory of the struggle against mondialism-globalism. This is a false position; claims it. Neither nonconformism nor Western-ness is sufficient in itself; neither is principled. Moreover, any opposition presupposes the influence of an opponent.

But let's say a few words about the provocations and adequate frameworks of anti-Westernism.

Béla Hamvas, in a youthful genius¹⁸, assessed our social position as oscillating between the opinions of "Balambér of the East" and "Arthur of the West". The former is of the opinion that Western culture is ruining the country, and that it is therefore necessary to blow up iron roads and - as Hamvas writes - to throw paprika on the

in the eyes of "strangers". And the latter's position - who will say the final word in Hamvas's caricature - is of empty coldness, cynicism, veiled arrogance and general restlessness. Although the writing is humorous and journeyman-like, it shows Hamvas's insight, except for some 'Westernism'. Most people today are still largely familiar with only these two extremes.

There is also extreme chaos in nationalist circles over Hungary's traditional relationship with Europe. This is well illustrated by the article in which the author boasts that Hungary was "the bulwark of Europe" and "the only guarantee of Europe's survival", but contradicts himself when he wrote a few lines earlier: "this country has never, in any historical period, received anything from the West."¹⁹ This is not

¹⁸ "-vas": East and West. *Budapesti Hírlap* 17 Dec 1924, p. 7.

¹⁹ LAJOS SZÁNTAI: The coronation and death of King Matthias. *Pannon Front* No. 22, p. 3.

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is not only an individual contradiction, but also that our ancestors did not know what they were protecting and what they were doing.

Let's look at the *traditional* relationship between Hungary and Europe, and identify the *original* reasons for the distinction between Western and Eastern Europe before the "Iron Curtain".

When we look at the traditional relationship between Hungary and Europe, we are obviously not dealing with the political problem of Hungary's accession to the European Union. What we want to understand is the spiritual significance of the settlement of our ancestors in Central and Eastern Europe, alongside Christianity. We believe and we know that a correct understanding of this and the inner preservation of this ancient will is more than joining the modern West, which *is not* the same as traditional Europe, and more than not joining modern Europe. If man possesses eternal principles - independent of changing circumstances, never modified by earthly events - he can join just about anything, without affecting the essence, but he must carefully refrain from everything, without eternal principles, measure of restraint and protection is worth a single cent.

Once upon a time, *in the Golden Age of Western myths and texts*, and in the first half of it, man lived in a way of life that transcended the two main ways of life we know today, that of *settledness* and *nomadism*. From this primordial state of being, around the beginning of the so-called Silver Age (or slightly earlier),²⁰ two different ways of life were born: *settled* and *nomadic* - the two ways of life into which all the peoples of history and the

²⁰ Gaston Geogel puts the historical events corresponding to the mythical symbol of the "fall", the expulsion from Paradise, at about 37 000 BC, and the beginning of the Silver Age at about 37 000 BC. The place of the civilisations belonging to these periods is the so-called Lemurian and then the Gondwanan continent. See GEORGEL GASTON, *The Four Ages of Mankind (An Introduction to the Traditional Doctrine of the Cosmic Cycles)*, Budapest, 2000, Stella Maris /Athamor Books/, 154-158. and p. 212 (In Hungarian, this book gives the most valid ancestral history.)

all ancient activities can be classified without exception. All farming peoples, all agricultural activities, town-building, painting, sculpture, all static qualities and their aspirations fall within the scope of *settlement*. *Nomadism* includes all animal-keeping peoples, animal husbandry, the nomadic way of life, poetry, music, all changing and moving qualities and their tendencies. The dominance of the nomadic way of life has now disappeared because of the increased role of cities, but this does not mean that nomadic qualities have disappeared completely. The Judaeo-Christian tradition - and all nomadic traditions - dramatised the situation: Cain, the 'murderer', the representative of settledness, killed Abel, the representative of the nomadic way of life. *If* this were the case, and the ancient qualities of nomadism had disappeared completely, the settlement, the settledness, which led to such a situation, would indeed be condemnable. The traditions of settled peoples, however, also condemn the representatives of nomadism: from within (as in the case of Judaism) or from without (as in the case of the hordes of Gog and Magog) they disrupt the structure they have created through sacred art. *Where* this is the case, and the values of settlement are indeed compromised because the negative, disruptive aspect of nomadism is being argued, this position, this way of thinking, is also correct, and nomadism in this sense may also be condemned. However, in the context of a settled way of life, *both the nomadic and the settled characteristics remain until the very end of the present cycle*. Settledness predominates in the western half of Europe and nomadism in the eastern half (the most profound reason for the 'Balkan character', for example), but since the whole of Europe is now settled, this is true within the framework of settledness. This is the traditional justification and original reason for the distinction between Eastern and Western Europe.

A deeper view of history, a higher understanding of history, allows us to see more than a contrast between *settlement* and *nomadism*. This is all the more true because, as we have seen.

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all golden age states are identical in their integration and upper synthesis. The absence of which results in the internal conflict between the originally nomadic peoples and the settled peoples.

A settled way of life - transcending a distinctively nomadic perspective - does not necessarily imply *involution*. Its prevalence is primarily due to the nature of settledness itself, to the fact that this way of life has a strong formative drive and readiness. The *nomadic* nature of is not necessarily a negative thing either, since it is by its very nature that it does not require impressions, that it is detached from forms and that the sound that is the basis of poetry is by its very nature 'hidden'. It does not therefore need to be temporally permanent. This is why it is true that the nomadic traditions themselves are being violated by those who want to force them into writing and into tangibility. As such, nomadism alone needs space, and a large settled civilisation may be appropriate for it if it provides it with enough space and ensures that it can carry out activities that correspond to its nomadic characteristics.

In his works, Zoltán Bencsi between "Turanian" and "non-Turanian" peoples, and attributed all virtues, even the virtue of monotheism (although his conception in more than one case verges on *pantheistic* deviation) to the Turanian peoples.⁽²¹⁾ He was reluctant to bring to the attention of his readers that among the "non-Turanian" peoples there are also such as the *Aryan* peoples, who were even considered in the *Turanian* tradition to be of the same rank as the Turanians. Unfortunately, modern science has now

²¹ BENCISI ZOLTÁN: *A guide for Turanian monotheists on the teachings of the revived ancient religion*. Budapest, in the year of Atilla's accession to the throne, 1501 [1935?], Turanian Monotheists, pp. 3 and 16. pp. 32 and 43 (Although there are many traces of anti-Germanism in Bencsi's writings, in the dualist situation of World War II he knew whose side to take. See *Turanian Thought*. 2. o.)

forgot or unduly "outdated" theories of the traceability of different peoples to *Iranian* and *Turanian* origins. He rejects this without justification, since *Arya* - from which the word *Iran* (*Airya-na*) is derived - and *Turan* denote *settled* or *nomadic* peoples⁽²²⁾ This also means that the (formerly) settled peoples were mostly *Aryan*, and the nomadic (or later settled) peoples mostly *Turanian*.

Here again, although there is a significant difference between them, the only way forward is not to contrast the Aryan and Turanian races and their representatives. However, those who can only be "Hungarians" at the expense of the values of others necessarily do so. In order to do so, for example, the late descendants of the Indo-European Aryans (e.g. the Habsburgs) and the Jews of Semitic origin are often mentioned in the same breath. They can only be moderns by misrepresenting something (while attributing this trait to the 'Indo-Europeans'). Their aim is to show that any form of Indo-European tradition is inferior to the "Hungarian ancestral tradition". They are not fighting for a higher goal, but for the beginning of something called Indo-European. Thus, of course, most of the historians of the Indo-European peoples are also believed to have had the aim of destroying the Hungarian people, rewriting their history, etc. This vision, however, is believed to stem from their own motivations. There is no other explanation for the malice with which the descendants of the Indo-European peoples are often associated with the Semites⁽²³⁾

²² Either the territory of present-day Turkmenistan and Iran was the intermediate point of a later, now definitive, separation of the two ways of life, or it was here that the representatives of settlement and nomadism first came into contact with each other after a long period of time.

²³ See, for example, GÁBOR PAP: Our Mission in Europe and in the World (On Hungarian national consciousness in a nutshell). 11, pp. 12-13 and 18. Here we are talking about a person for whom, for example, Imre Makovecz resigned from his position as editorial board member of the former *Magyar Nemzet* (see *Magyar Nemzet* 2 March 1999). Meanwhile, there is still no conclusive proof that the Semitic peoples are not of Turanian origin.

We must also distance ourselves from this method and mentality because the most outstanding nomadic and the most outstanding settled nations have always had a purpose and a mission that went beyond their own nomadic or settled way of life.²⁴ They have preserved as a spiritual heritage and a living memory the reality of a golden age where the two forms of life not only did not confront each other, but both transcended and from which all the great traditions had descended. There is only one piece of evidence to support this. If one does not have, as a non-intellectual heritage, ancestral state of being beyond the two forms of settledness, it is not possible to switch from one form of life to the other. Without knowledge of the ancestral state and its associated universal tradition, such a transition would mean annihilation. (If one is nomadic and one's nomadic status ceases, one can no longer live.)

At the time of the conquest, the Hungarians settled down: they changed from a nomadic to a settled way of life. This decision can only be made in the minds of people who were more than nomadic, who possessed a level of transcendence beyond the dualism of settledness and nomadism. They were therefore able to lead their people, their peoples, through the crisis of transition, of moving to a radically different way of life. They were able to this transition for precisely two reasons: they recognised, almost clairvoyantly, that only through autonomous settlement could the Hungarians survive as a united and powerful force.

²⁴ The term "Aryan" has been used very often in this sense, especially in Buddhist circles. That is to say, it was used not only to designate the race of the settled, but also to designate those who possessed something more than the idea of settlement and the race of the settled, and something more primordial. Julius Evola also used the term in this sense, if not always, then in most cases. István Kocsis knows this, since he quotes Evola's lines on the subject (p. 265), but in the above-quoted work he nevertheless portrays Evola as representing a biased view of history (p. 263).

to remain (this is generally known); on the other hand (and this is less well known), they wanted the Hungarians to survive in the long term because there was a spiritual eternity in some of them that transcended both nomadism and the later proven ability to settle.²⁵ They defended Europe not out of subservience or merely to protect their lives and their nation, but because the most distinguished ancestors considered it their mission to transmit to Europe and the world primordial tradition in which the harmony of settlement and nomadism is achieved.

This harmony has rarely been achieved historically. On the one hand, the Hungarians shifted to a settled way of life and lost their nomadic traditions; on the other hand, what remained of nomadism survived in a haphazard, instinctive, residual form, and in many cases had a disruptive effect on the new way of life. In some, however, there was, or at least a flare-up of, this legacy of transcendental synthesis, primordial tradition. For example, the theory of "vertical nomadism", according to which nomadic characteristics must be sought to be developed for spiritual purposes in order to conquer transcendence.⁽²⁶⁾

From all this, concrete lessons can now be drawn in terms of an appropriate approach to and corrective action on Europe. On the one hand, we have to accept Zoltán Bencsi's thought that "*Hungarians have no reason to be ashamed of their Asian relatives or even of their Asian origins.*"²⁷ On the other hand, we must remain faithful to the deliberate will of our ancestors to settle and to the connection to Europe that this entailed. Even if this Europe has changed substantially, today we must not be *against* Europe.

²⁵ This heritage comes from an era before the birth of nations and peoples, and thus transcends *all* national consciousness.

²⁶ BARANYI TIBOR IMRE: Vertical nomadism. *Pannon Front* 14, pp. 9-11 [Here pp. 41-48 - Ed.]

²⁷ BENCSI ZOLTÁN: *Turanian thought*. 5. o.

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we have to. Of course, not *for Europe*, as most people suggest, but the remaining European spirituality still provides a framework for our intellectual life where we can our inner nomadic characteristics properly, because it gives us the necessary space, a space that still far exceeds the framework of Eastern European spirituality. In a sense and in a way, this is what our best artists, composers and thinkers have done. They did not become Western, but they did not turn against the European spirit. The best of them have realised the deepest aspirations of Europeanism, while maintaining their independence. They created a universal perspective and preserved Hungarian characteristics. Such was Béla Hamvas, for example, who has recently come under attack from nationalist-nationalist quarters, God knows why.⁽²⁸⁾ It should be understood that not all comments that attempt to draw attention to the specific faults and shortcomings of Hungarians are "anti-Hungarian". One must be able to exercise self-criticism. This is the basis of all higher self-realisation. Obviously, Hamvas's comments on all things Hungarian and Hungarian history are not correct, but we believe that, unfortunately, he is not being attacked for this, but for any criticism he has made at all. This is a big mistake. It shows that the Hungarian people have little awareness of the possibility of higher self-fulfilment. Nevertheless, this attack is also fair to the author of *The Philosophy of Wine*, *Bakony*, *The Five Geniuses* and other works which preserve much of Hungarian *genius*, and - and this is important (and unfortunately exceptional) - in a way that also meets the criteria and perspectives of European thought, and in which Hungarian *genius* is also given a place in the

²⁸ Béla Hamvas received a strong Hungarian upbringing, which can be traced throughout his life's work. He preserved all that was worth preserving and transcended much that was worth transcending. Unfortunately, many of the articles in his collection of essays on Hungary (*A magyar Hüperion I-II*. H. n., n.d., Medio /The Works of Béla Hamvas 15-16), although less well written and with a narrower intellectual horizon than his later writings, are proof of this.

for. Since the spiritual limitations of Hamvas's oeuvre are not dealt with here, in the present context we can say that Béla Hamvas was one of those who understood what it meant to settle in Central and Eastern Europe outside of Christianity. To settle in Europe, between the West and the East, on the borderland between settled and nomadic tendencies within European culture. With all these reflections, we may have contributed to clarifying the vast field of the traditional relationship of the European continent with Europe, where questions of geography, culture, intellectual-political orientation and origin are closely intertwined. Our ancestors did not attack the traditional West, they abandoned nomadism, opted for European spirituality and turned the preservation of their original characteristics to its advantage. The most outstanding ones had a mission that came from a reality that predated the nomadic origins of Hungarians, and was related to 'primordial origins' and the absence of hands. For the thoughtful reader, all this should provide enough examples to shape his or her individual orientation. As the title of this paper suggests, there are several views that need to be corrected.

can be switched on with the help of these lines.

Yes, but what about today's relationship with Western Europe, which no longer traditional at all? We have already touched on this subject in a previous article²⁹ and we believe that the basic nature of the trends cannot change in today's context. It is respect and service to Western Europe that is limited. The energies thus released will continue to be devoted not to the nomadic traditions of Eastern Europe and 'Middle Asia', but rather to the traditions of Europe's golden age and the traditions of the great world religions. In this way we can strengthen our centrality and our independence. Moreover, the reality of the Primordial Tradition can emerge in the process. According to András László: "Hungary and the Hungarian nation, the Hungarian Nation, must preserve its traditional Eastern

²⁹RÓBERTHORVÁTH: Western Europe and Eastern Europe. *Pannon Front* 13, pp. 4-6.

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awareness of its origins and its context - it must preserve and revitalise its Catholic, Protestant, possibly Eastern Orthodox Christianity, its sense of belonging to both East West, to [traditional] Europe. It must preserve and awaken in itself the very existence of the Kingdom of Hungary - it must kindle in it *a universal and integral spiritual-metaphysical Traditionality*."³⁰ "...the task today is not so much to revive this or that traditional form or religion, but to seek out and re-introduce, if possible, the whole of Tradition and traditional spirituality. Today it is no longer enough to be Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and so on, but, in the light of the recognition of the transcendental unity of religions and traditions, to become the depositaries of a *true universality* for all those who wish to confront effectively the murderous drift of the modern world."³¹ These are the two positions with which we can agree on the most important trends of today. We believe that we must use the advantages of Hungary's central position, its view of both Western and Eastern Europe and its relative independence to achieve the highest possible goals. This volume is born in this spirit. It is in the spirit of realising our Hungarianness and of showing the possibility of a higher self-realisation. The two are not separated.

Why we are not just about loyalty to Christianity is partly clear from the above, and partly for another time. What we need to examine here for the last time is why we do not speak of "Hungarian ancestral religion" and why we can that our energies are primarily

³⁰ ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ: Some remarks on the Holy Crown of the Hungarian Kings. *Zománc* 1990 No. 28. p. 28. *Hunnia* No. 80 (1996. Jul.) p. 13 [Emphasis ours] [Here pp. 17-40 - Ed.]

should not be devoted to learning about nomadic traditions in Eastern Europe and "Middle Asia".

First of all, we note that Central and Eastern Europe can generally be said to be fortunate in that it has not been the scene of a Christian-neo-pagan debate such as that which occurred on several occasions in some countries of Western Europe in the 20th century. This debate closes and limits rather than opens up possibilities. Western European neo-pagan movements are generally caricatured, based on appearances, few elements of ancient knowledge and, as their name suggests, lack any traditional derivation. Despite the general situation, it cannot be said that neo-pagan influences are completely absent in Hungary (and Central and Eastern Europe). Since the settlement of the region took place later, it is not so much a new movement as a more general trend that is less virulent and more widespread in society.

What Zoltán Bencsi presented in *the Guide* and in *Our Ancient Faith* "modern " is not half a religion, but it does not make a single religion either. If all the knowledge of all the people seriously engaged in this subject were added together, it would not even amount to half a religion. To want a *in the™ atriya* way does not make it a . It would be better to use *our* remaining *k™ atriya abilities* for what they are meant for, not for meddling in the things of the spirit and then, as a direct consequence, rebelling and ha- dak- ing against it. Spiritual things require primarily not *k™ atriya-qualities* but *br□hma-ai* qualities, and the former must respect and serve the latter even if the latter do not command what the former wanted and desired. The nomadic traditions that are often referred to by the umbrella term 'Scythian-Hungarian-Hungarian tradition' have survived only in *their fragmentary* forms. These fragments stand in such a relation to the earlier nomadic traditions, lost or disappeared in their entirety, that they are still intact.

traditions, the relationship between a *ghost and the living personage* in whose image it appears after death. These fragments, these elements of knowledge, *are remnants*. Any remnant is obviously only a part in relation to that of which it is a remnant. We know that it is only a 'corporeal' part, but we do not even know exactly which 'corporeal part'. René Guénon calls these remains

"⁽³²⁾ For every corpse has a certain emanation, or more precisely, every corpse can be brought to "life" (life corresponding to its "emanation"), but this life and this emanation are only psychic. They no longer have the soul that once animated them and of which they were once a living, integral part. The remains of a living, supernatural organism, which was the whole of an original tradition, can therefore only retain certain psychic aspects alongside their most physical characteristics. There is no longer in them and behind them the spirit that animated them before, and which is superior to the psychic aspects and influences.

When we deal with, examine or idealise the surviving fragments of a tradition that has passed away, we are in a sense in contact with corpses and psychic corpses, and we can say, in a way that transcends common morality, that we are trying to bring a dead person back to life, or that we are conjuring up a dead person. Everything here depends on the spiritual qualities and ambitions of the operator. If it is true that such a resurrection or revival can principle lead us to the time of metaphysical Awakening, it is no less true that people who practice dark necromancy ['necromancy'] can also operate along this line.

"And if this person belongs to the world of the dark powers, he will obviously use these influences in a manner diametrically opposed to all the activities originally carried on by qualified representatives of a regular tradition." "...ready to take on such a

³² René Guénon: Secret war. *Tradition Yearbook* 2000, pp. 135-138.

³³ Thus arises what Guénon called "pseudo-traditionalism" ["pseudo-tradition"], and thus it is possible that many of those who are no longer dealing with living traditions become psychologically ill. They are subject to the psychic influences of the 'psychic corpses', wandering in a world without hierarchy, without knowledge of the Absolute, without traditional assumption of its availability, in a supposedly organic, cosmological web of vegetative connections, woven around the psychic corpses by who knows what motive.

In the necromancy line, it is in fact *his irrationalism* that makes a magician "dark". It is his inexplicable attachment to what he is working with. Similarly, irrationalism is the biggest problem with those committed to regional - tertiary and quaternary - traditions. ³⁴ As a result, they do not make use of the tools of logic, consistency or prudence - because these influences and attachments have already become too much in their lives. Such 'thinkers' are in fact pushing people into the of 'academicism', where they can finally read something dry and data-like. Again, this is wrong. Academicism is just as wrong as popularism: dilettante 'professionalism' and dilettante 'amateurism' are two stems from the same biting pincers.⁽³⁵⁾ One is driven by rationalism, the other by irrationalism.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 137 It is clear that what is is what is quoted above, when *New Age elements* are included alongside remnants of an ancient tradition. Unfortunately, this has already occurred in some recent cases of Crown research.

³⁴ *Suprarationalism*, not irrationalism, is the transcendence of rationalism. Many nationalist authors (such as Adorján Magyar) have stood/stand on the side of irrationalism, while many have stood/stand on the side of rationalism (which stems from the "Enlightenment" era).

³⁵ This is explained in more detail in the Preface to Julius Evola's *Orientations*. Budapest, 1998, Stella Maris /Athamor Books/, pp. 9-10.

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lism. Both shut off and distance us from what is truly intellectual and spiritual.³⁶

There is also the problem of dealing with "ancient religions" on a purely cultural level. This is clearly insufficient to answer religious-spiritual questions. And there is also the increasingly serious problem (in the case of Zoltán Bencsi, who still wanted to base his research on natural science) that many people use modern, *New Age* elements and methods in this kind of research, perhaps even hating *New Age*. All this makes it clear that from the available material on the "Hungarian ", it is becoming increasingly difficult to filter out results that are not obtained by radiesthesia, "shuttling" or other similar methods. And that is enough.

The rejection of irrationalism - the dissolution and then the elimination of irrational attachments - was the final focus of our study.

In some places in the views that need to be corrected in terms of the intellectual life of Hungarians, we should have referred to many authors and writers who have played an influential role in the nationalist culture of recent times. We trust that by understanding our thoughts and insights, the majority of readers will be able to place these personalities in their proper place.

H. R.
(2000)

³⁶If not intellectual, then what Pál Földi has done in his recent books (who also fulfils the criterion of acknowledging the nationalism of other countries) seems to be a more appropriate intermediate solution. A.N., n.d., Alter-Natív.

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