ALEKSANDR DUGHIN

THE FOURTH POLITICAL THEORY

Alexander Dugin

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# Table of Contents

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION:
TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

In today's world, politics appears to be over, at least as we used to know it. Liberalism persistently fought against its political enemies which had offered alternative systems; that is, conservatism, monarchism, traditionalism, fascism, socialism, and communism, and finally by the end of the twentieth century had defeated them all. It would be logical to assume that politics would become liberal, while all of its marginalized opponents surviving in the peripheral fringes of global society would reconsider their strategies and formulate a new united front according to Alain de Benoist's *periphery against the centre.* But, instead, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, everything followed a different script.

Liberalism, which had always insisted on the minimalisation of the political, made the decision to abolish politics completely after its triumph. Maybe this was to prevent the formation of political alternatives and make its rule eternal, or because the political agenda had simply expired with the absence of ideological rivals, the presence of which Carl Schmidt had considered indispensable for the proper construction of a political position. Regardless of the rationale, liberalism did everything possible to ensure the collapse of politics. At the same time, liberalism itself has changed, passing from the level of ideas, political programs and declarations to the level of things, penetrating the very flesh of social reality, which became liberal. This was presented not as a political process, but as a natural and organic one. As a consequence of such a turn of history, all other political ideologies, passionately feuding against each other during the last century, lost their currency. Conservatism, fascism and communism, together with their secondary variations lost

the battle and triumphant liberalism mutated into a lifestyle: consumerism, individualism, and a postmodern iteration of fragmented and sub-political being. Politics became biopolitical, moving to the individual and sub-individual level. It turns out that it was not only the defeated political ideologies that left the stage, but politics, as such, including liberalism, also exited. It is for that reason that the formation of an alternative became so difficult. Those who do not agree with liberalism find themselves in a difficult situation – the triumphant enemy has dissolved and disappeared; they are struggling against the air. How can one then engage in politics, if there is no politics?

There is only one way out – to reject the classical political theories, both winners and losers, strain the imagination, seize the reality of new global world, correctly decipher the challenges of Postmodernity, and to and create something new – something beyond the political battles of the 19th and 20th centuries. Such an approach is an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory – beyond communism, fascism and liberalism.

To move forward towards the development of this Fourth Political Theory, it is necessary to:

Reconsider the political history of the last centuries from new positions beyond the frameworks and clichés of the old ideologies;

Realize and become aware of the profound structure of the global society emerging before our eyes;

Correctly decipher the paradigm of Postmodernity

Learn to oppose not the political idea, program or strategy, but the "objective" status quo, the most social aspect of the apolitical, fractured (post-) society;

Finally, construct an autonomous political model which offers a way and a project in the world of deadlocks, blind alleys, the endless recycling of the 'same old' things (post-history, according to Baudrillard).

This book is dedicated to this very problem – as the beginning of the development of a Fourth Political Theory, through an overview

and re-examination of the first three political theories, and to the closely-related ideologies of National Bolshevism and Eurasianism that came very close indeed to the Fourth Political Theory. This is not dogma, not a complete system, nor a finished project. This is an invitation to political creativity, a statement of intuitions and conjectures, an analysis of new conditions, and an attempt at reconsideration of the past.

The Fourth Political Theory doesn't appear to us as the work of a single author, but as a trend of a wide spectrum of ideas, researches, analysis, prognoses, and projects. Anyone thinking in this vein can contribute some of his own ideas. Notwithstanding, more and more intellectuals, philosophers, historians, scientists, scholars, and thinkers will respond to this call.

It is significant, that the book, *Against Liberalism*, by the successful French intellectual Alain de Benoist, which is also published in Russian by the publisher *Amphora*, has a subtitle *Towards the Fourth Political Theory*. Undoubtedly, many things can be said on this theme by representatives of both the old Left and the Old Right and, probably, even by liberals themselves, who are conceptualizing qualitative changes of their own political platform, where politics is disappearing from.

For my own country, Russia, the Fourth Political Theory, among other things, has an immense practical significance. The majority of Russian people suffer their integration into global society as a loss of their own identity. The Russian population had almost entirely rejected Liberal ideology in the 1990s. But it is also apparent that a return to the illiberal political ideologies of the 20th century, such as communism or fascism, is unlikely, as these ideologies have already failed and historically proven themselves to be incapable of opposing liberalism, to say nothing of the moral costs of totalitarianism.

Therefore, in order to fill this political and ideological vacuum, Russia needs a new political idea. For Russia, Liberalism does not fit, but communism and fascism are equally unacceptable. Consequently, we need a Fourth Political Theory. And if for someone this

is a question of freedom of choice, the realization of political will, which always can be directed both to an assertion and its negation, then for Russia – this is a matter of life and death, Hamlet's eternal question.

If Russia chooses "to be", then it automatically signifies the creation of a *Fourth Political Theory*. Otherwise, for Russia there remains only the choice "not to be", then quietly to leave the historical and world stage, and dissolve into the global world, neither created nor governed by us.

CHAPTER 2. CONCEPT INCEPTION
**THE END OF THE 20ᵀᴴ CENTURY – THE END OF
MODERNITY**

The 20th century has ended, but it is only now that we are truly beginning to realize and to understand this fact. The 20th century was *the* century of ideology. If in the previous centuries, religion, dynasties, estates, classes, and nation-states played an enormous role in the lives of peoples and societies, then, in the 20th century, politics had shifted into a purely *ideological* realm, having redrawn the map of the world, ethnicities, and civilizations in a new way. On the one hand, political ideologies represented early and deeply rooted civilizational tendencies. On the other hand, they were completely innovative.

All political ideologies, having reached the peak of their distribution and influence in the 20th century were the product of the new, Modern Era, embodying the spirit of modernity, albeit in different ways and even through different symbols. Today, we are rapidly leaving this Era. Thus everyone speaks, more and more often of the 'crisis of ideology' or even the 'end of ideology' in this fashion, the existence of a state ideology is explicitly denied in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is past time to address this issue more closely.

The Three Main Ideologies and their Fate in the 20ᵗʰ Century

The three main ideologies of the 20th century were:
• *liberalism*
• *communism*
• *fascism.*

They fought among themselves to the death, forming, in essence, the entire dramatic and bloody political history of the 20th century. It is logical to number these ideologies (political theories) – both based on their significance, and in the order of their occurrence, as was done above.

The first political theory is *liberalism*. It arose first, as early as the 18th century, and turned out to be the most stable and successful ideology, having ultimately prevailed over its rivals in this historic battle. As a result of this victory, it proved, among other factors, the justification of its claim to the entire legacy of the Enlightenment. Today, it is obvious that it was liberalism that was the best fit for modernity. However, this legacy was disputed earlier, dramatically, actively, and, at times, convincingly, by another political theory – communism.

It is reasonable to call *communism,* much like socialism in all its varieties, the second political theory. It appeared later than liberalism – as a critical response to the emergence of the bourgeois-capitalist system, which was the ideological expression of liberalism.

And, finally, *fascism* is the third political theory. As a contender for its own understanding of modernity's spirit many researchers, Hannah Arendt, in particular, reasonably consider totalitarianism one of the political forms of modernity. Fascism, however, turned toward the ideas and symbols of *traditional society*. In some cases, this gave rise to eclecticism, in others – to the desire of conservatives to lead a revolution instead of resisting it and leading their society in the opposite direction i.e. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Dmitrii Merezhkovskii, etc.

Fascism emerged later than the other major political theories and vanished before them. The alliance of the first political theory with the second political theory, as well as Hitler's suicidal geopolitical miscalculations, knocked it down mid-flight. The third political theory was a victim of 'homicide' or perhaps 'suicide' not living long enough to see old age and natural decay, in contrast to the USSR. Therefore, this bloody vampiric ghost tinged with an aura of 'global

evil' is attractive to the decadent tastes of postmodernity, still frightening humanity to a great extent.

With its disappearance, fascism cleared space for the battle between the first and second political theories. This battle took on the form of the Cold War and gave birth to the strategic geometry of the bipolar world which lasted for nearly half a century. By 1991, the first political theory, liberalism, had defeated the second political theory, socialism. This marked the global decline of communism.

As a result, by the end of the 20th century, liberal theory is the only remaining one of the three political theories of Modernity that is capable of mobilizing the vast masses throughout the entire world. Yet, now that it is left on its own, everyone speaks in unison about 'the end of ideology'. Why?

The End of Liberalism and the Arrival of Postliberalism

It turns out that *the triumph of liberalism, the first political theory, coincided with its end*. This only seems to be a paradox.

Liberalism had been an *ideology* from the start. It was not as dogmatic as Marxism, but was no less philosophical, graceful, and refined. It ideologically opposed Marxism and Fascism, not only undertaking a technological war for survival, but also defending its right to monopolize its own image of the future. While the other competing ideologies were alive, liberalism continued on and grew stronger precisely as an ideology, i.e. a set of ideas, views, and projects that are typical for a historical subject. Each of the three political theories had its own subject.

The subject of communism was *class*. Fascism's subject was the *state* in Italian Fascism under Mussolini, or *race* in Hitler's National Socialism. In liberalism, the subject was represented by the *individual*, freed from all forms of *collective identity* and any 'membership' (*l'appartenance*).

While the ideological struggle had formal opponents, entire nations and societies, at least theoretically, were able to select their subject of choice – that of class, racism/statism, or individiualism.

The victory of liberalism resolved this question: *the individual became the normative subject within the framework of all mankind.*

It is at this point that the phenomenon of globalization arises, the model of a *postindustrial* society makes itself known, and the *postmodern era* begins. From now on, the individual subject is no longer the result of choice, but is a kind of a *mandatory given*. Man is freed from his 'membership' and collective identities, and the ideology of "human rights" becomes *widely* accepted, at least in theory, and is practically compulsory.

A humanity under liberalism, comprised of individuals, is naturally drawn toward *universality* and seeks to become global and unified. Thus, the projects of the *'world state'*, *global governance*, and the *'world government'* or *globalism* are born.

A new level of technological development makes it possible to achieve independence from the class structuralization of industrial societies i.e. *post-industrialism.*

The values of rationalism, scientism, and positivism are recognized as 'veiled forms of repressive, totalitarian policies', or *the grand narrative*, and are criticized. At the same time, this is accompanied by parallel glorification of complete freedom and independence of the individual from any kind of limiting factors, including reason, morality, identity (social, ethnic, and even gendered), disciplines, etc. This is the condition of Postmodernity.

At this stage, liberalism *ceases* to be the first political theory and becomes the only *postpolitical practice*. Fukuyama's 'end of history' arrives, economics in the form of the global capitalist market, replaces politics, and states and nations are dissolved in the melting pot of world globalization.

Having triumphed, liberalism disappears and turns into a different entity – into *post-liberalism*. It no longer has political dimensions; it does not represent free choice, but instead becomes a kind of historically deterministic 'destiny'. This is the source of the thesis about the post-industrial society: '*economics as destiny*'.

Thus, *the beginning of the 21ˢᵗ century coincides with the end of ideology – that is, all three of them.* Each met a different end: the

third political theory was destroyed in its 'youth', the second died of decrepit old age, and the first was reborn as something *else* - as post-liberalism and the '*global market society*'. In any case, the form which all three political theories took on in the 20th century is no longer useful, effective, or relevant. They lack explanatory explain power, the ability to help us understand current events, and the capability to respond to global challenges.

The need for the *Fourth Political Theory* stems from this assessment.

The Fourth Political Theory as Resistance to the Status Quo

The Fourth Political Theory will not be just handed to us without any effort. *It may or may not emerge*. The prerequisite for its appearance is *dissent*. That is, dissent against postliberalism as a universal practice, against globalization, against postmodernity, against the 'end of history', against the status quo, against the inertial development of major civilizational processes at the dawn of the 21st century.

The status quo and this inertia do not presuppose any political theories whatsoever. A global world can only be ruled by the laws of economics and the universal morality of 'human rights'. All political decisions are replaced by *technical* ones. Machinery and technology substitute for all else. The French philosopher, Alain de Benoist, terms this *'la gouvernance'*, or 'micromanagement'. *Managers* and *technocrats* take the place of the politician who makes historical decisions, optimizing the *logistics* of management. Masses of people are equated to the single mass of individual objects. For this reason, post-liberal reality, or, rather, virtuality increasingly displacing reality from itself, leads straight to *the complete abolition of politics*.

Some may argue that the liberals lie to us when they speak of the 'end of ideology (this was my debate with philosopher Aleksandr Zinoviev); 'in reality', they remain believers in their ideology and simply deny all others the right to exist. This is not exactly true. When liberalism transforms from being an ideological arrangement to the only content of *extant social and technological existence*, then

it is no longer an 'ideology', but an *existential fact*, an objective order of things, the challenge of which is not only difficult, but also foolish. *In the postmodern era, liberalism moves from the sphere of the subject to the sphere of the object*. This will potentially lead to the complete replacement of r*eality by virtuality*.

The Fourth Political Theory is conceived as an alternative to postliberalism, but not as one ideological arrangement in relation to another. Instead, it is as *an incorporeal idea opposed to corporeal matter*; as a possibility entering into conflict with the actuality, as that which is yet to come into being attacking that which is already in existence.

At the same time, the Fourth Political Theory cannot be the continuation of either the second political theory or the third. The end of fascism, much like the end of communism, was not just an accidental misunderstanding, but the expression of rather lucid *historical logic*. They challenged the spirit of modernity (fascism did so almost openly, communism – more covertly: see the review of the Soviet period as a special "eschatological" version of the traditional society by Mikhail S. Agurskii or Sergei Kara-Murza) and lost[1].

This means that the struggle with postmodern metamorphosis of liberalism in the form of postmodernity and globalization should be *qualitatively different;* it must be based on *new* principles and propose *new* strategies.

Nevertheless, the starting point of this ideology is precisely *the rejection of the very essence of postmodernity*. This starting point is possible – but neither guaranteed, nor fatal, nor predetermined – because it arises from man's free will, from his spirit, rather than an impersonal historic process.

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[1] Translator's note: English speakers may have an easier time accessing somewhat related works on the USSR, modernity, and traditionalism, e.g. David Hoffman's Stalinist Values: the Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (2003) and David Brandenberger's National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of the Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (2002)

However, this essence (much like the detection of the rationale behind modernity itself – imperceptible earlier – which realized its essence so fully that it *exhausted* its internal resources and switched to the mode of ironic recycling of its earlier stages) is something completely new, previously unknown, and only surmised intuitively and fragmentarily during the earlier stages of ideological history and the ideological struggle.

The Fourth Political Theory is a 'Crusade' against:

If the third political theory criticized capitalism *from the Right* and the second – *from the Left*, then the new stage *no longer features this political topography*: it is impossible to determine *where the Right and the Left are located* in relation to postliberalism. There are only two positions: *compliance* (the center) and *dissent* (the periphery). Both positions are *global*.

The Fourth Political Theory is the amalgamation of a common project and in an common impulse to everything that was *discarded*, toppled, and humiliated during the course of constructing 'the society of the spectacle' (constructing post-modernity). 'The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone' (Mark 12:10). The philosopher Aleksandr Sekatskii rightly pointed out the significance of "marginalia" in the formation of a new philosophical eon, suggesting the term 'metaphysics of debris' as a metaphor.

The Battle for Postmodernity

The Fourth Political Theory deals with the new reincarnation of an old enemy. It challenges liberalism, much like the second and third political theories of the past, but it does so under new conditions. The principal novelty of these conditions lies in the fact that of all the three great political ideologies only liberalism secured the right to own the legacy behind the spirit of modernity and obtained the right *to create the 'end of history' based on its own premises*.

Theoretically, the end of history could have been different: a 'planetary Reich', if the Nazis had won, or 'global communism', had the communists been right. However, the 'end of history' has

turned out to be precisely *liberal*. The philosopher Alexandre Ko-
jève was one of the first to predict this; his ideas were later repro-
duced by Francis Fukuyama. But since this is the case, then any
appeals to *modernity* and its assumptions, to which the representa-
tives of the second (to a greater extent) and third political theories
appealed in varying degrees, lose their *relevance*. They lost the bat-
tle for modernity as the liberals triumphed. For this reason, the issue
of modernity, and, incidentally of modernization, may be *removed
from the agenda*. Now the battle for post-modernity begins.

And, it is here that new prospects open up for the Fourth Political
Theory. That kind of post-modernity which is currently being real-
ized in practice, post-liberal Post-modernity, cancels out the strict
logic of modernity *itself* – after the goal had been achieved, the steps
toward reaching it lose their meaning. The pressure of the ideologi-
cal shell becomes less rigid. *The dictatorship of ideas is replaced
by the dictatorship of things*, login passwords, and bar codes. *New
holes* are appearing in the fabric of postmodern reality.

As the third and second political theories, conceived as an escha-
tological version of traditionalism, once tried to 'saddle modernity'
in their struggle with liberalism, the first political theory, today *there
is a chance of accomplishing something analogous with postmoder-
nity,* using these "new holes", in particular.

Liberalism developed flawlessly operating weapons aimed at its
straightforward alternatives, which was the basis for its victory. But
it is this very victory that holds the greatest risk to liberalism. We
must only ascertain the location of these new vulnerable spots in
the global system and decipher its login passwords in order to hack
into that system. At the very least, we must try to do so. The events
of 9/11 in New York demonstrated that this is possible even tech-
nologically. The Internet society can be useful even to its staunch
opponents. In any case, first and foremost, we must *understand post-
modernity* and the new situation no less profoundly than Marx un-
derstood the structure of industrial capitalism.

The Fourth Political Theory must draw its 'dark inspiration' from
postmodernity, from the liquidation of the Enlightenment program,

and the arrival of the society of simulacra, interpreting this as an *incentive for battle* rather than a fatal given.

Rethinking the Past and Those Who Lost

The second and third political theories are unacceptable as starting points for resisting liberalism, particularly because of the way in which they understood themselves, what they appealed to, and how they operated. They positioned themselves as contenders for the expression of the soul of modernity and failed in that endeavour. Yet, nothing stops us from *rethinking the very fact of their failure as something positive,* their vices recast as virtues. Since the logic of the history of the New Era brought us to post-modernity, then it also contained the secret essence of the New Era which was only revealed to us in the end.

The second and third political theories recognized themselves as contenders for the expression of modernity's spirit. And these claims came crashing down. Everything related to these unfulfilled intentions in the previous ideologies is of least interest for the creators of the Fourth Political Theory. However, we should attribute the very fact that they lost to one of their *advantages* rather than their *disadvantages*. By losing, they proved that they *did not belong to the spirit of modernity*, which, in turn, led to the postliberal matrix. Herein lie their *advantages*. Moreover, this means that the representatives of the second and third political theories – either consciously or unconsciously – *stood on the side of Tradition*, however, without drawing the necessary conclusions from this or not recognizing it at all.

The second and third political theories must be *reconsidered*, selecting in them that which must be discarded and that which has value in itself. As complete ideologies, trying to get their own way *literally*, they are entirely *useless* – either theoretically or practically. However, certain marginal elements that were generally not implemented and remained on the periphery or in the shadows (let us recall the 'metaphysics of debris' once again) may unexpectedly

turn out to be extremely valuable and saturated with meaning and intuition.

Yet, in any case, it is necessary to rethink the second and third political theories in a *new* way, from a new perspective, and only after we *reject our trust* in those ideological structures on which their "orthodoxy" rested. *Their orthodoxy is their most uninteresting and worthless aspect*. Cross-reading them would be far more productive: 'Marx through a positive view of the Right' or 'Evola through a positive view of the Left'. This fascinating "National Bolshevik" undertaking, in the spirit of Nikolai V. Ustrialov or Ernst Niekisch, is not sufficient by itself. After all, a mechanical addition of the second political theory to the third will not, by itself, lead us anywhere. Only in retrospect can we delineate their common regions, which were *staunchly opposed to liberalism*. This methodological exercise is useful as a warm-up before commencing a full-fledged elaboration on the Fourth Political Theory.

A truly significant and decisive reading of the second and third political theories is only possible on the basis of an already established Fourth Political Theory. Postmodernity and its conditions (the globalist world, *gouvernance* or 'micromanagement', the market society, the universalism of human rights, 'the real domination of capital', etc.) represent the main object in the Fourth Political Theory. However, they are radically negated as a value.

The Return of Tradition and Theology

Tradition (religion, hierarchy, family) and its values were overthrown at the dawn of modernity. Actually, all three political theories were conceived as artificial ideological constructions by people who comprehended, in various ways, 'the death of God' (Friedrich Nietzsche), the 'disenchantment of the world' (Max Weber), and the 'end of the sacred'. This was *the core of the New Era* of Modernity: man came to replace God, philosophy and science replaced religion, and the rational, forceful, and technological constructs took the place of Revelation.

However, if modernism is exhausted in postmodernity, then at the same time, the period of direct 'theomachy' comes to an end along with it. *Postmodern people are not inimical towards religion, but rather, indifferent.* Moreover, certain aspects of religion, as a rule, pertaining to the regions of hell, the 'demonic texture' of postmodernist philosophers are quite appealing. In any case, the era of persecuting Tradition is over, although, following the logic of postliberalism, this will likely lead to the creation of *a new global pseudo-religion*, based on the scraps of disparate syncretic cults, rampant chaotic ecumenism, and 'tolerance'. While this turn of events is, in some ways, *even more terrifying* than direct and uncomplicated dogmatic atheism and materialism, the weakening in the persecution of Faith may be that *chance*, if the representatives of the Fourth Political Theory act consistently and uncompromisingly in defending the ideals and the values of Tradition.

Now it is safe to institute as a political program that which was outlawed by modernity. And, this no longer looks as foolish and doomed for failure as before – at least because everything in postmodernity looks foolish and doomed for failure, including its most "glamorous" aspects. It is not by chance that the heroes of postmodernity are 'freaks' and 'monsters' ,'transvestites' and 'degenerates' – this is the law of style. Against the backdrop of the world's clowns nothing and no one could look 'too archaic', even the people of Tradition who ignore the imperatives of modern life. The fairness of this assertion is not only proven by the significant achievements of Islamic fundamentalism, but also by the revival of the influence exerted by vastly archaic Protestant sects (Dispensationalists, Mormons, etc.) on U.S. foreign policy. George W. Bush went to war in Iraq because, in his own words, 'God told me to invade Iraq!' This is quite in keeping with his Protestant Methodist teachers.

Thus, the Fourth Political Theory may easily turn toward everything that *preceded modernity* in order to draw its inspiration from there. The acknowledgement of 'God's death' ceases to be the 'mandatory imperative' for those who want to stay relevant. The people of post-modernity are already so resigned to this event that they can

no longer understand it – 'Who died exactly?' But, in the same way, the developers of the Fourth Political Theory can forget about this 'event', 'We believe in God, but ignore those who teach about His death, much like we ignore the words of madmen'.

This marks the return of theology and becomes an essential element of the Fourth Political Theory. When it returns, postmodernity (globalization, postliberalism, and the postindustrial society) is easily recognized as 'the kingdom of the Antichrist' (or its counterparts in other religions – 'Dajjal' for Muslims, 'Erev Rav' for the Jews, and 'Kali Yuga' for Hindus, etc.). Now this is not simply a *metaphor* capable of mobilizing the masses, but a religious fact – *the fact of the Apocalypse*.

Myths and Archaism in the Fourth Political Theory

If atheism of the New Era ceases to be something mandatory for the Fourth Political Theory, then the theology of monotheistic religions, which at one time displaced other sacred cultures, will not be the ultimate truth either (or rather, may or may not be). Theoretically, *nothing limits the depth of addressing the ancient archaic values*, which can take a specific place in the new ideological construction, upon being adequately recognized and understood. Eliminating the need to adjust theology to rationalism of modernity, the carriers of the Fourth Political Theory are free to ignore those theological and dogmatic elements, which were affected by rationalism in monotheistic societies, especially at the later stages. The latter led to the appearance of deism on the ruins of Christian European culture, followed by atheism and materialism, during a phased development of the programs of the modern age.

Not only the highest supramental symbols of faith can be taken on board once again as a new shield, but so can those *irrational* aspects of cults, rites, and legends that have perplexed theologians at the previous stages. If we reject the idea of progress inherent to modernity (which as we have seen, has ended), then all that is an-

cient gains value and credibility for us *simply because it is ancient*. 'Ancient' means good, and the more ancient – the better.

Of all creations, paradise is the most ancient one. The carriers of the Fourth Political Theory must strive toward discovering it anew in the near future.

Heidegger and the 'Event' (*Ereignis*)

And finally, we can identify the most profound – *ontological!* – foundation for the Fourth Political Theory. Here, we should pay attention not only to theologies and mythologies, but also to the reflective philosophical experience of one particular thinker who had made a unique attempt of constructing a *fundamental ontology* – the most summarizing, paradoxical, profound, and penetrating study of Being. I am talking about Martin Heidegger.

A brief description of Heidegger's concept is as follows. At the dawn of philosophical thought, people (more specifically, Europeans, even more specifically, the Greeks), *raised the question of Being as the focal point of their thinking*. But, by thematizing it, they risked getting confused by the nuances of the complicated relationship between Being and thought, between pure Being (*Seyn*) and its expression in existence – *a* being (*Seiende*), between human Being in the world (*Dasein* – being-there) and Being-in-itself (*Sein*). This failure already occurred in the teaching of Heraclitus about the *phusis* and the *logos*. Next, it is obvious in Parmenides' work, and, finally, in Plato, who placed ideas between man and existence and who defined truth as the correspondence thereof, the referential theory of knowledge, this failure reached its culmination. This gave birth to *alienation* that eventually led to 'calculating thinking' *(das rechnende Denken)* and then to the development of technology. Little by little, man lost sight of pure Being and pursued the path of *nihilism*. The essence of technology (based on the technical relationship with the world) expresses this continually accumulating nihilism. In the New Era, this tendency reaches its pinnacle – *technical development* (*Gestell*) *ultimately displaces Being* and crowns 'Nothingness'. Hei-

degger bitterly hated liberalism, considering it an expression of 'the calculation source' which lies at the heart of "Western nihilism".

Postmodernity, which Heidegger did not live to see, is, in every sense, *the ultimate oblivion of Being*, it is that "midnight", when Nothingness (nihilism) begins to seep from all the cracks. Yet his philosophy was not hopelessly pessimistic. He believed that *Nothingness itself is the flip side of pure Being,* which – in such a paradoxical way! – reminds mankind of its existence. If we correctly decipher the logic behind the unfurling of Being, then thinking mankind can save itself *with lightning speed* at the very moment of *the greatest risk*. "Where danger lies, there too grows the chance for salvation", Heidegger quotes Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry.

Heidegger used a special term, *"Ereignis"* – the *'Event'*, to describe this sudden return of Being. It takes place exactly *at midnight of the world's night* – at the darkest moment in history. Heidegger himself constantly vacillated as to whether this point had been reached or – *'not quite yet'*. The eternal 'not yet'…

Heidegger's philosophy may prove to be that central axis threading everything around it – ranging from the reconceived second and third political theories to the return of theology and mythology.

Thus, at the heart of the Fourth Political Theory, as its magnetic center, lies the trajectory of approaching *Ereignis* (the "Event"), which will embody *the triumphant return of Being* at the exact moment when mankind forgets about it once and for all to the point that the last traces of it disappear.

The Fourth Political Theory and Russia

Today many people intuitively understand that *Russia has no place* in the 'brave new world' of globalization, post-modernity, and post-liberalism. First, the world state and the world government are gradually abolishing all nation-states in general. More important is the fact that *the entirety of Russian history is a dialectical argument with the West and against Western culture*, the struggle for upholding our own (often only intuitively grasped) *Russian truth, our own*

messianic idea, and our own version of the "end of history", no matter how it is expressed – through Muscovite Orthodoxy, Peter's secular empire, or the world communist revolution. The brightest Russian minds clearly saw that the West was moving towards the abyss. Now, looking at where neoliberal economics and postmodern culture has led the world, we can be certain that this intuition, pushing generations of Russian people to search for alternatives, was completely justified.

The current global economic crisis is just the beginning. The worst is yet to come. The inertia of post-liberal processes is such that a change of course is impossible: to save the West, unrestrained *'emancipated technology'* (Oswald Spengler) will search for more efficient, but a purely *technical*, technological means. This is the new phase in the onset of *Gestell* spreading the nihilistic stain of the global market over the entire planet. Moving from crisis to crisis and from one bubble to the next (thousands of Americans held a demonstration at the time of crisis with the following slogan, "Give us a new bubble!" Can they be any more blunt?), globalist economy and the structures of the postindustrial society make mankind's night more and more black. It is so black, in fact, that we gradually forget that this is night time. 'What is light?' people ask themselves having never seen it.

It is clear that Russia needs to follow a different path. It's own. Yet herein lies the question and paradox. *Evading the logic of postmodernity in one 'single country' will not be that simple.* The Soviet model tried and collapsed. After that point, the ideological situation changed *irreversibly* as did the strategic balance of power. In order for Russia to save herself and others, creating some sort of a technological miracle or a deceptive move is insufficient. World history has its own logic. And the 'end of ideology' is not a random failure, but the beginning of a new stage, apparently, the last one.

In this situation, Russia's future *directly relies on our efforts to develop the Fourth Political Theory*. We will not go far, and will only extend our time, by locally sorting those options that globalization offers to us and by correcting the status quo in a superficial

manner. Postmodernity's challenge is tremendously significant: it is
rooted in the logic of Being's oblivion and in mankind's departure
from its existential (ontological) and spiritual (theological) roots.
Responding to it with hat-tossing innovation or public-relations sur-
rogates is impossible. Therefore, we must refer to the philosophical
foundations of history and make a *metaphysical effort* in order to
solve the current problems – the global economic crisis, countering
the unipolar world, as well as the preservation and strengthening of
sovereignty, etc.

It is difficult to say how the process of developing this theory
will turn out. One thing is clear: it cannot be an individual effort
or one that is restricted to a small group of people. The effort must
be *shared* and collective. In this matter, the representatives of other
cultures and people (both in Europe and Asia) can truly help us,
since they sense the eschatological tension of the present moment in
an equally acute way and are just as desperately looking for the way
out from the global dead end.

However, it is possible to state in advance that the Russian ver-
sion of the Fourth Political Theory, based on the rejection of the
status quo in its practical and theoretical dimensions, will focus on
the 'Russian *Ereignis*'. This will be that very 'Event', unique and
extraordinary, for which many generations of Russian people lived
and waited, from the birth of our nation to the coming arrival of the
End of Days.

CHAPTER 3. DASEIN AS AN ACTOR
STAGES AND PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH POLITICAL THEORY

Being a supporter of cyclical development and an opponent of Francis Bacon and his idea of data collection, I would still like to suggest that we develop and modify approaches to specific topics and areas of thought in an ongoing manner. We have repeatedly clarified the notion of "conservatism". We conducted a series of conferences and scientific symposia on the "Fourth Political Theory". Let us believe that these efforts, the results of which are published in magazines[1], scientific collections, individual monographs, and websites[2] were not carried out in vain, and that the readers are more or less familiar with them. Therefore, I propose to move on.

I will demonstrate with concrete examples of what has been done to promote the discussion of the "Fourth Political Theory" and, consequently, the observable results of the activities conducted by the Center of Conservative Research at the Faculty of Sociology of the Moscow State University[3] and the St. Petersburg Conservative Club

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[1] Issue #1 of the journal *Russkoe Vremia (Russian Time)*, 2009, completely dedicated to the subject of conservatism. See also A.G. Dugin, "The Fourth Political Theory", *Profile,* #48 (603), 22.12.2008.

[2] Here are some links: http://evrazia.org/print.php?id=779; http://www.evrazia.org/article/755; http://konservatizm.org/news/activity/020409175427.xhtml; http://rossia3.ru/ideolog/friends/hezbali1; http://rossia3.ru/ideolog/friends/hezbali2; http://www.evrazia.org/article/751;http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/theory/160309164752.xhtml; http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/theory/140309014819.xhtml; http://www.geopolitica.ru/Articles/434/; http://www.sorokinfond.ru/index.php?id=552; http://neokons.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=88&Itemid=78

[3] http://konservatizm.org

at the Faculty of Philosophy of the St. Petersburg State University[1].
These results include two books that were recently published in St.
Petersburg, in the wonderful St. Petersburg publishing house "Am-
phora": Alain de Benoist's *Against Liberalism*: *Toward the Fourth
Political Theory*[2] and Aleksandr Dugin's *The Fourth Political The-
ory*[3]. The book by the philosopher Alain de Benoist, who spoke at
the St. Petersburg State University during the Philosophy Days in St.
Petersburg, is a compendium of his views in philosophy and political
science on major issues of our time: globalization, the economic and
social crisis, the process of European integration, the new political
and social trends, the relationship between Europe and Russia, hu-
manism, etc. All these problems are addressed from the standpoint
of criticizing the liberal ideology dominating the world (the first and
the most stable political theory). Having remained without compe-
tition after the collapse of communism, it has become the priority
target for criticism by those who are acutely aware of the negative
aspects of the status quo in politics, the social sphere, economy, cul-
ture, ideology, etc. and who are searching for an alternative. The old
alternatives to liberalism – communism and fascism – have been his-
torically overcome and discarded: each in its own way, yet they have
demonstrated their ineffectiveness and incompetence. Therefore, the
search for an alternative to liberalism must be held somewhere else.
The search area is designated as the domain of the "Fourth Politi-
cal Theory". Such an approach corresponds exactly to the stated
theme: "Conservatism: the Future or an Alternative?" If we think
about an alternative and correlate it with the blueprint for the future,
then we should clearly realize what that alternative is going to re-
place. The answer is simple: *liberalism as the dominant global dis-*

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[1] http://konservatizm.org/regions/leningrad/region.xhtml

[2] Benoist, Alain de. Protiv liberalizma. K chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii, St.
Petersburg, Amfora, 2009. [Against Liberalism. Toward the Fourth Political
Theory]

[3] Dugin, A.G. Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, St. Petersburg, Am-
phora, 2009 (on the web: http://konservatizm.org/konservatizm/amfo-
ra/031209153016.xhtml) [The Fourth Political Theory]

course. Therefore, the only significant alternative should logically be directed against liberalism, hence the title of Alain de Benoist's book. Nevertheless, the question remains: does conservatism fit this role? In part, we heard the answer in de Benoist's speech, in which he criticized the liberal theory of progress. This philosophical approach proposes that conservatism is the most logical candidate for an alternative to liberalism – either as a relativizing worldview or as one rejecting progress altogether. What remains, then, is to specify the kind of conservatism in question: it is obvious that liberal conservatism cannot be considered an alternative to liberalism, being its variant. Thus, through the process of elimination, we can specify a proposition: we must look for an alternative to liberalism in *non-liberal versions of conservatism*. All this is logical, since de Benoist himself is known as a philosopher with conservative views (sometimes he is referred to as one of the pioneers of the European "New Right"), but the particular kind of conservative views he has in mind is obvious from his newly published book.

There is another aspect worth mentioning in regards to the title of de Benoist's book. Many readers will remember another ideological manifesto directed against liberalism called After Liberalism[1] by Immanuel Wallerstein. Despite the similarity of titles and the object of criticism, there is a significant difference. Wallerstein criticized liberalism from the point of view of the Left – from the neo-Marxist position. And, like any Marxist, he saw liberalism (bourgeois democracy, capitalism) as a phase of historical development, which is *progressive* in comparison with the *preceding* phases of development (such as feudalism or slavery), but is inferior to what must come *after* it – socialism, communism, etc. We are talking about the criticism "from the Left" and, in some ways, from the standpoint of the future (which is expressed in Wallerstein's book title – *After Liberalism*). This is a typical feature of Marxism. For de Benoist, neither the superiority of liberalism over the previous historical types of society, nor the advantages of a communist future are obvious.

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[1] Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Posle liberalizma*. Moscow, 2003. [*After Liberalism*]

Therefore, despite the similarity of titles, there is a fundamental difference between the authors' initial positions: with Wallerstein, we have to deal with criticism "from the Left"; with de Benoist, with criticism "from the Right". Another difference involves the relationship to liberalism. According to Wallerstein, the end of liberalism is a foregone conclusion by the very logic of socio-political and socio-economic history, and so he easily spoke of an "after". For de Benoist, the question remains: one must fight against liberalism, yet in this morally and historically justified struggle, there are no guaranteed results. It is important to fight against liberalism here and now; it is important to identify its vulnerabilities; it is important to forge an alternative worldview – but the future is in our hands, and it is open rather than predetermined. Wallerstein, in varying degrees, is a mechanicist, like any Marxist, whereas de Benoist is an organicist and holist, like any (real) conservative.

The last item that I would like to draw attention to in regards to the ideas of Alain de Benoist and their relevance is the comprehension of Carl Schmitt's concept of the "Fourth Nomos of the Earth"[1] – that is, the relationship between political science and "political theology" with geopolitics and the new model of the political organization of space.

On my part, in the book The Fourth Political Theory[2], I had done a review of the three main political theories of the past – liberalism, Marxism (socialism) and fascism (National Socialism), summed up their overall balance, and attempted to identify the horizons for the development of the "Fourth Political Theory" beyond all three ideologies. This, of course, is extremely far from any dogmatism or a proposal of a complete answer to the stated problem. But, nevertheless, these are rather specific steps toward the preparation of closely tackling this issue. Without repeating what was said in my book and the book by Alain de Benoist, I will try to make a number of remarks about the development of this subject.

[1] Schmitt, Carl, *Nomos zemli*, St. Petersburg, 2008. [*The Nomos of the Earth*]
[2] Dugin, A. G. Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, ibid. [The Fourth Political Theory]

What the "Fourth Political Theory" is in terms of negation is now clear. It is neither fascism, nor communism, nor liberalism. In principle, this kind of negation is rather significant. It embodies our determination to go beyond the usual ideological and political paradigms and to make an effort in order to overcome the inertia of the clichés within political thinking. This alone is a highly stimulating invitation for a free spirit and a critical mind. I do not really understand why certain people, when confronted with the concept of the "Fourth Political Theory", do not immediately rush to open a bottle of Champagne, and do not start dancing and rejoicing, celebrating the revelation of a new horizon. After all, this is a kind of a philosophical New Year – an exciting leap into the unknown. The "Old Year" witnessed the struggle of the three political ideologies – one that was bloody and that claimed millions of lives. All the criticism of liberalism was either fascist or communist. This criticism was left in the past, but the oldest of these ideologies – liberalism – is still here. Liberalism is the remnant of the "Old Year"; it is residuo, an uncertain past that was not properly sent into the oblivion. It has already passed, but does not want to leave permanently in any way. In short, it is a chimera, "the dragon that swallowed the sun", or "the diabolical spirits that kidnapped the Snow Maiden" before the New Year. In a sense, liberalism embodies everything that was in the past. The "Fourth Political Theory" is the name for a breakthrough, for a new beginning.

Underscoring the relevance of criticism and especially highlighting the fact that this is a radical rejection of all three political theories (liberalism, communism, and fascism) and their variants, I suggest we contemplate about the positive content of the "Fourth Political Theory". The fact that we have identified the negative content is in itself remarkable and requires a thorough understanding. The very idea to put an end to fascism, communism, and liberalism is an extremely stimulating thing. The negative program of the "Fourth Political Theory" sounds as follows, "Say 'no' to fascism, 'no' to communism, and 'no' to liberalism!" "Liberalism will not work!" It "will not pass!" (No pasara!), much like fascism once failed (no ha

pasado). The Berlin Wall, too, collapsed; only dust remains from the only visible manifestation of communism, separating the communists from the capitalists (liberals). The communists "did not pass" either. Now, what remains is for liberals to "not pass" – and "they will not pass!" (No pasaran!). But in order for them to "not pass", the fragments of the Berlin Wall are insufficient for us, as the Wall itself was insufficient. The Wall existed, but they still passed. Even less helpful are the dark shadows of the Third Reich, its "independent corpses", inspiring only the brutal punk youth and the disturbing, perverted dreams of S&M devotees[1].

Consequently, we suggest moving on in order to advance from the nihilistic phase of the "Fourth Political Theory" toward positivity. Discarding the three political theories as a systematized whole, we can try to look at them from a different perspective. They are being rejected precisely as complete ideological systems – each on the basis of separate arguments. But they – like any system – consist of elements that do not belong to them. The three political ideologies own their unique philosophical systems, groups, explanatory methodologies, their whole – a structure of their "hermeneutic circle", their fundamental epistemes. They are what they are as a whole. Dismembered into components, they lose their significance and become de-semanticized. A particular component of a liberal, Marxist (socialist, communist), or a fascist (National Socialist) ideology is not liberalism, Marxism, or fascism. It is not that they are completely neutral, but outside of the strict ideological context, they can find or discover a different – new – meaning. The positive aspects in the development of the "Fourth Political Theory" are based on this principle. A revision of the three political ideologies and their unconventional analysis can give certain clues to the substantive content of this theory.

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[1]Translator's note: "independent corpses". The author uses the word "nezalezhnye" in reference to the so-called orange revolution in the Ukraine and the Nazi sympathies among certain Western Ukrainians.

In each of the three ideologies there is a clearly defined histori-cal subject.

In liberal ideology, the historical subject is the individual. The individual is conceived as a unit that is rational and endowed with a will (morality). The individual is both a given and the goal of lib-eralism. It is a given, but one that is often unaware of its identity as an individual. All forms of collective identity – ethnic, nation-al, state-based, religious, caste-based, etc. impede an individual's awareness of his individuality. Liberalism encourages the individual to become himself, that is, to be free of all those social identities and dependencies that constrain and define the individual externally. This is the meaning of liberalism (Eng.: liberty, Lat.: libertas): the call to become "liberated" (Lat.: liber) of all things external. Moreo-ver, liberal theorists (in particular, John Stuart Mill) underscored the fact that we are talking about a "freedom from"[1], about the release from ties, identifications, and restrictions that are negative in their content. As to what the purpose of this freedom is – liberals remain silent – to assert some kind of a normative goal is, in their eyes, to restrict the individual and his freedom. Therefore, they strictly sepa-rate a "freedom *from*", which they regard as a moral imperative of social development, from the "freedom *for*" (Eng.: *freedom*) – the normativization of how, why, and for what purpose this freedom should be used. The latter remains at the discretion of the historical subject (the individual).

The historical subject of the second political theory is class. The class structure of society and the contradiction between the exploiter class and the exploited class are the core of the communists' dramat-ic vision of history. History is class struggle. Politics is its expres-sion. The proletariat is a dialectic historical subject, which is called to set itself free from the domination of the bourgeoisie and to build a society on new foundations. A single individual is conceived here as a part of a class-based whole and acquires social existence only in the process of raising class consciousness.

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[1] Mill, John Stuart, *O svobode*, Nauka i zhizn', 1993, #11, pp. 10–15, # 12. pp. 21–26. [*On Liberty*]

And, finally, the subject of the third political theory is either the State (as in Italian Fascism) or race (as in German National Socialism). In fascism, everything is based upon the Right-wing version of Hegelianism, since Hegel himself considered the Prussian state to be the peak of historical development in which the subjective spirit was perfected. Giovanni Gentile, a proponent of Hegelianism, applied this concept to Fascist Italy[1]. In German National Socialism, the historical subject is the "Aryan race"[2], which, according to racists, "carries out the eternal struggle against the subhuman races". The appalling consequences of this ideology are too well known to dwell upon them. However, it was this original definition of a historical subject that was at the heart of the Nazis' criminal practices.

The definition of a historical subject is the fundamental basis for political ideology in general, and it defines its structure. Therefore, in this matter, the "Fourth Political Theory" may act in the most radical way by rejecting all of these constructions as candidates for a historical subject. The historical subject is neither an individual, nor class, nor the state, nor race. This is the anthropological and the historical axiom of the "Fourth Political Theory".

We assumed that it is clear to us who (or what) cannot be the historical subject. But then who (or what) can?

We cleared a space and correctly posed the question. We carried out our theme: we specified the problem of clarifying the historical subject in the "Fourth Political Theory". Now there is a gaping void. This gaping void is extremely interesting and significant.

Heading into the depths of this void, we propose four hypotheses, which are not mutually exclusive, and which can be examined both collectively and individually.

The first hypothesis suggests abandoning all versions of contenders for the role of a historical subject from classical political theory, assuming that the subject of the "Fourth Political Theory" is some

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[1] Gregor A. James, *Giovanni Gentile: Philosopher of Fascism*, Transaction Publishers, 2001.

[2] Rosenberg, Alfred, Mif XX veka. Tallinn, 1998. [The Myth of the Twentieth Century]

kind of a compound – not the individual, class, state (race, nation) on their own, but instead a certain combination thereof. This is a hypothesis of a compound subject.

The second hypothesis is to approach the problem from the standpoint of phenomenology. Let us place all that we know about the historical subject outside the framework of classical ideologies, carry out the Husserlian method of epoché, and try to empirically define that "lifeworld", which will open up before us – the "lifeworld" of the political, one free from "metaphysics" or "theology"[1]. Is it possible to consider political history without a subject? History as such? After all, theoretically, there were historical periods when politics existed, but when there was no subject in the philosophical Cartesian sense. Of course, in hindsight, even this "pre-subject" in political history was reinterpreted in accordance with various ideologies. But, if we no longer trust ideologies (the three political theories), then their historic reconstruction is not an axiom for us. If we consider political history in the style of the "Annales school" (Fernand Braudel's method), then we have the chance to discover a rather polyphonic picture, expanding our understanding of the subject. In the spirit of Peter Berger[2], we can open up the prospect of "desecularization" (throughout history, religious organizations frequently acted as political subjects) or together with Carl Schmitt[3], we can rethink the influence of Tradition on making a political decision (in the spirit of Schmitt's doctrine about "decisionism"). Discarding the dogma of progress will reveal a wide range of political actors, operating *up until* and *beyond* the New Age, which fits into the conservative approach. But we are free to continue our liberated search of what may come in place of the historical subject in the future – in the area of exotic hypotheses by Deleuze and Guattari about the rhizome, a "body without organs", "micropolitics", etc. or on the horizon of proto-history with Baudrillard and Derrida (text,

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[1] Schmitt, Carl, Politicheskaia teologia, Moscow, 2000. [Political Theology]
[2] Berger Peter L. (ed.), *The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview*, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1999.
[3] Schmitt, Carl, *Diktatura*, St. Petersburg, 2005. [*Dictatorship*]

deconstruction, "*différance*", etc.). They offer us new (this time, entirely not conservative) capabilities. Therefore, it is not worthwhile to reject them in advance, simply on the basis of their authors' sympathies toward Marxism and their Leftist affiliation.

The third hypothesis is about forcing the phenomenological method and rushing several steps ahead: we may propose to consider Heidegger's Dasein[1] as the subject of the "Fourth Political Theory". *Dasein* is described in Heidegger's philosophy at length via its existential structure, which makes it possible to build a complex holistic model on its basis, the development of which will lead to, for instance, a new understanding of politics. Many researchers have lost sight of the fact that Heidegger (especially, in the middle period – 1936-1945) developed a complete history of philosophy centered around *Dasein,* which can form the basis of a full-fledged and a well-developed political philosophy in retrospect.

Thus, accepting the Dasein hypothesis immediately gives us a broad coordinate system in order to navigate the construction of history necessary for political theory. If the subject is Dasein, then the "Fourth Political Theory" would constitute a fundamental ontological structure that is developed on the basis of existential anthropology. We can map out the direction to specify this type of an approach:

- Dasein and the State;
- Dasein and social stratification;
- Dasein and power (the will to power);
- Dasein and power;
- Being and politics;
- The horizons of political temporality;
- Existential spatiality and the phenomenology of boundaries;
- The Prince and nothing;
- Parliament, the choice, and "Being-towards-death";
- Citizenship and the role of the guardians of Being;
- Referendum and intentionality;
- The authentic and the inauthentic in jurisprudence;

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[1] Heidegger, Martin, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tubingen, 2006.

- • Existential philosophy of jurisprudence;Revolution and the flight of the gods;
- • Urbanization and the house of Being.

Naturally, this merely is a cursory outline of the areas of interest in the new political science.

The fourth hypothesis appeals to the concept of the "imagination" (l'imaginaire). This topic is covered in detail in the works of Gilbert Durand[1], the basic ideas of which I discuss in my new work *Sociology of the Imagination*[2]. Imagination as a structure precedes the individual, the collective, class, culture, and race (if race exists as a sociological phenomenon, which is uncertain), as well as the state. According to Durand, who developed the ideas of Carl Gustav Jung and Gaston Bachelard, the imagination (*l'imaginaire*) forms the content of human existence based on the internal, original, and independent structures that are embedded in it. The interpretation of political processes in history *a posteriori* is of no difficulty for the "sociology of the imagination", and it produces impressive results. If we interpret the imagination (*l'imaginaire*) as an autonomous actor in the political sphere, including the projective component and a sort of a "legal status", then we end up with an extraordinarily fascinating and a totally undeveloped trajectory. Even though the students of 1968 demanded the "freedom of imagination", in that moment they were unlikely to recognize the "imagination" as a contender for special political subjectivity. They remained trapped in the individual (as part of liberalism, even if that "of the Left") and class (i.e., Marxism, although strictly reconsidered on the basis of psychoanalysis).

In search of the subject of the "Fourth Political Theory", we must boldly head into a new "hermeneutic circle". The "Fourth Political Theory" is the whole, which, naturally, is still insufficiently described

[1] Durand, Gilbert, Les Structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire, Paris, 1960.

[2] Dugin, A. G., *Sotsiologiia voobrazheniia. Vvedenie v strukturnuiu sotsiologiiu*, Moscow, 2010. [*Sociology of the Imagination. Introduction to Structural Sociology*]

and defined. Its parts are the subject, which is also established as a preliminary suggestion. But, moving constantly between the uncertainty of the whole and the uncertainty of its parts and back again, we gradually begin to clarify the more precise contours of what is at stake. This process, starting from the base of negative credibility (the rejection of the old hermeneutic circles: liberalism with the individual, Marxism with class, fascism/Nazism with the state/race), will lead to the clarification of a rather positive structure sooner or later. This structure will be further clarified when hermeneutics hits the boundaries of explicitly absurd contradictions (which cannot be resolved) or stops matching empirical data. That is, starting from a certain point, the development of the "Fourth Political Theory" will gain rather scientific and rational characteristics, which, for the time being, are barely discernable behind the energy of groundbreaking intuitions and the revolutionary super-task of destroying the old ideologies.

The entire "hermeneutic circle" of the "Fourth Political Theory" should be included in the "Fourth Nomos of the Earth". This inclusion will specify its content in even more detail and, in particular, will reveal a colossal epistemological potential of geopolitics. The latter, in addition to its purely practical and applied objectives, can be viewed as a broad invitation to think spatially in a postmodern scenario, when historic thinking, which dominated the modern era, is becoming irrelevant. On numerous occasions, I have written about the philosophical and the sociological potential of geopolitics in my works.[1] Spatiality is one of the most important existential components of *Dasein*, so the appeal to the "Fourth Nomos of the Earth" can be tied to the third subject hypothesis of the "Fourth Political Theory".

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[1] Dugin, A. G., *Myslit' prostranstvom. Osnovy geopolitiki*. Moscow, 2000 [*Thinking Spatially. The Origins of Geopolitics.*] New edition: *Sotsiologiia prostranstva. Sotsiologiia voobrazheniia. Vvedenie v strukturnuiu sotsiologiiu*, Moscow, 2010. [*Sociology of Space. Sociology of the Imagination. Introduction to Structural Sociology*]

Now we can approach the problem of content formation in the "Fourth Political Theory" from another direction and examine the contenders for inclusion in this theory from the three classical models.

However, prior to determining the aspects of the three old ideologies that can be borrowed from them having neutralized them and taken them out of context, ripping them out of their own "hermeneutic circle", it is important to briefly mention what aspects must be firmly discarded.

If we begin with fascism and National Socialism, then here we must definitively reject all forms of racism. Racism is what caused the collapse of National Socialism in the historical, the geopolitical, and the theoretical sense. This was not only a historic, but also a philosophical collapse. Racism is based on the belief in the innate objective superiority of one human race over another. It was racism, not some other aspect of National Socialism that brought about the consequences, which led to immeasurable suffering, as well as the collapse of Germany and the Axis Powers, and the destruction of the entire ideological construction of the "third way". The criminal practice of wiping out entire ethnic groups (Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs) based on race was rooted precisely in the racial theory — this is what angers and shocks us about Nazism to this day. In addition, Hitler's anti-Semitism and the doctrine that Slavs are "subhuman" and must be colonized, is what led Germany to enter into war against the USSR (for which we have paid with millions of lives), as well as to the fact that Germans themselves have lost their political freedom and the right to participate in political history for a long time (if not forever) (they are now left only with the economy and, in the best case scenario, with ecology). The supporters of the "third way" were left in the position of ideological outcasts and marginals. It was racism – in theory and in practice – that criminalized all other aspects of National Socialism and fascism, making these political world views the object of curses and vilification.

Hitler's racism, however, is only one form of racism – this type of racism is the most obvious, straightforward, biological, and therefore

the most repulsive. There are other forms of racism – cultural racism (asserting that there are high and low cultures), civilizational (dividing people into those civilized and those insufficiently civilized), technological (viewing technological development as the main criterion of societal value), social (stating, in the spirit of the Protestant doctrine of predestination, that the rich are the best and the greatest as compared to the poor), economic racism (based on which all humanity is ranked according to regions of material well-being), and evolutionary racism (for which it is axiomatic that human society is the result of biological development, in which the basic processes of evolution of the species – survival of the fittest, natural selection, etc. – continue today). The European and American society is fundamentally afflicted with this type of racism, unable to eradicate it from itself despite all the effort. Fully aware of how revolting this phenomenon is, people in the West tend to make racism a taboo. However, all this turns into a witch hunt – new pariahs accused of "fascism" are its victims, often for no apparent reason. Thus, this very political correctness and its norms are transformed into a totalitarian discipline of political, purely racist exclusions. In this manner, the institutionalized French Left-liberal anti-racism itself gradually becomes the distribution center of "racial hatred". Even Africans suffer from being accused of "fascism". Such was the case of the unrestrained defamatory campaign against a well-known black comedian Dieudonné M'bala M'bala, who dared to mock certain hideous features of the contemporary French establishment in his routines, including anti-racism (Ras-le-Front, SOS-Racisme, etc.). And then what?! African comedian M'bala M'bala was admitted into the "brown" category, that is, accused of "fascism" and "racism".

The newest types of racism are glamour, fashion, and following the latest informational trends. The norms are set by models, designers, party socialites, and the owners of the latest version of mobile phones or laptop computers. Conformity or nonconformity with the glamour code is located at the very base of the mass strategies for social segregation and cultural apartheid. Today, this is not associated directly with the economic factor, but is gradually gaining

independent sociological features: this is the ghost of the glamour dictatorship – the new generation of racism.

The very ideology of progress is racist in its structure. The assertion that the present is better and more fulfilling than the past and the assurance that the future will be even better than the present represent the discrimination of the past and the present, the humiliation of those who lived in the past, an insult to the honour and dignity of the previous generations, and a certain kind of violation of the "rights of the dead". In many cultures, the dead play an important sociological role. They are considered to remain living in a certain sense, present in this world, and participating in its existence. Such are all ancient cultures and civilizations. Billions of inhabitants on this earth believe in this concept to this day. In the Chinese civilization, built upon the cult of the dead and upon the reverence toward them alongside the living, being dead is regarded as a high social status, in some ways superior to the status of the living. The ideology of progress represents a moral genocide of the past generations – in other words, real racism. Equally questionable is the idea of modernization, when it is taken as a self-value. It is easy to detect the obvious signs of racism in it.

Undoubtedly racist is the idea of unipolar globalization. It is based on the fact that Western, especially American, society equates its history and its values to universal law and artificially tries to construct a global society based on these local and historically specific values – democracy, the market, parliamentarianism, capitalism, individualism, human rights, and unlimited technological development. These values are local, and globalization is trying to impose them onto all of humanity as something that is universal and taken for granted. This attempt implicitly argues that the values of all other peoples and cultures are imperfect, underdeveloped, and are subject to modernization and standardization based on the Western model.

Globalization is thus nothing more than a globally deployed model of Western European, or, rather, Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, which is the purest manifestation of racist ideology.

As one of its essential features, the "Fourth Political Theory" rejects all forms and varieties of racism and all forms of normative hierarchization of societies based on the ethnic, religious, social, technological, economic, or cultural grounds. Societies can be compared, but we cannot state that one of them is objectively better than the others. Such an assessment is always subjective, and any attempt to raise a subjective assessment to the status of a theory is racism. This type of an attempt is unscientific and anti-humane. The difference between societies in any sense can, in no shape or form, imply the superiority of one over the other. This is a central axiom of the "Fourth Political Theory". Furthermore, if anti-racism directly strikes the ideology of National Socialism (i.e., the third political theory), then it also indirectly reaches communism, with its class hatred, and liberalism, with its progressivism as well as its inherent forms of economic, technological, and cultural racism. Instead of a unipolar world, the "Fourth Political Theory" insists upon a multipolar world, and instead of universalism – on pluriversalism, which Alain de Benoist brilliantly pointed out in his book[1].

Clearly highlighting the main trajectory for the rejection of all forms and varieties of racism, including the biological forms inherent in National Socialism, we can identify what the "Fourth Political Theory" may borrow from it. Rejecting strongly any suggestion of racism, we, in fact, destroy the "hermeneutic circle" of the National Socialist ideology and neutralize its content, undermining its integrity and key foundations. Without racism, National Socialism is no longer National Socialism – either theoretically or practically – it is neutralized and decontaminated. We can now proceed without fear to objectively analyze it in search of those ideas that could be integrated into the "Fourth Political Theory".

We note a positive attitude toward the ethnos, ethnocentrism, toward that type of existence, which is formed within the structure of the ethnos and remains intact throughout a variety of stages, including highly differentiated social formations. This topic has found deep

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[1] Benoist, Alain de, *Protiv liberalizma*, ibid. [*Against Liberalism*]

resonance in certain philosophical directions of the Conservative Revolution (for instance, Carl Schmitt and his theory of "peoples' rights", in Adam Müller, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, etc.) or the German school of ethnic sociology (Wilhelm Mühlmann, Richard Thurnwald, etc.). Ethnos is the greatest value of the "Fourth Political Theory" as a cultural phenomenon; as a community of language, religious belief, daily life, and of sharing resources and efforts; as an organic entity written into an "accommodating landscape" (Lev Gumilev); as a refined system of constructing models for marital unions; as an always-unique means of establishing a relationship with the outside world; as the matrix of the "lifeworld" (Edmund Husserl); and as the source of all the "language-games" (Ludwig Wittgenstein). Of course, ethnicity was not the focal point either in National Socialism, or in fascism. Yet, liberalism as an ideology, calling for the liberation from all forms of collective identity in general, is entirely incompatible with the ethnos and ethnocentrism, and is an expression of systemic theoretical and technological ethnocide.

Marxist ideology did not pay much attention to the ethnos either, believing that the ethnos is overcome in a class-based society, and that no trace of it remains in a bourgeois and, even more so, a proletarian society. Based on the latter, the principle of "proletarian internationalism" becomes absolute. The only place where the ethnos received any kind of attention is in dissident, "third way" currents, rather marginal in the general political mainstream, even though the Nazi orthodoxy blocked the organic development of the ethno-sociological subject area with its racist dogma.

Whatever the case may be, the ethnos and ethnocentrism (Wilhelm Mühlmann) have every reason to be considered as candidates for the status of the subject in the "Fourth Political Theory". At the same time, again and again we must pay attention to the fact that we view the ethnos in the plural, without trying to establish any kind of a hierarchical system: ethnicities are different, but each of them is in itself universal; ethnicities live and develop, but this life and this development do not fit into one specific paradigm; they are open and always distinct; ethnicities mix and separate, but neither one, nor

the other is good or evil per se – ethnicities themselves generate the evaluation criteria, each time in a different way. We can draw many conclusions based on this point. In particular, we can relativize the very notion of "politics", which comes from the normativity of the city, the polis, and, consequently, of the urban model of self-organization within the community (or the society). As a general paradigm, we can review what Richard Thurnwald called "Dorfstaat" – a "village-state"[1]. The "village-state" is an alternative view of politics from the perspective of the *ethnos* naturally living in balance with the environment. This view does not reflect the perspective of the city (projecting its structure onto the rest of the country), but is that of the village, the province. It comes from the standpoint of those regions that have been peripheral in classical politics, but become the center of the "Fourth Political Theory". However, this is only one example of all those possibilities that open up in case we accept the *ethnos* as the historical subject. Yet, even this shows the serious nature of transforming the most basic political concepts, and how drastic the revision of an established dogma can be.

Now let us discuss what could be taken from communism – the second political theory. First, however, let us decide on what should be discarded in order to demolish its "hermeneutic circle". First and foremost, communist ideas of historical materialism and the notion of unidirectional progress are inapplicable to our purposes. We have previously talked about the racist element, which is embedded in the idea of progress. It looks particularly revolting within historical materialism, which not only puts the future ahead of the past, brutally violating the "rights of the ancestors", but also equates the living "human society" (Richard Thurnwald) with a mechanical system operating independent of man and humanity, according to laws that are monotonic and uniform for all. Materialist reductionism and economic determinism comprise the most repulsive aspect of Marxism. In practice, it was expressed through the destruction of the spiritual and religious heritage of those countries and societies in which

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[1] Thurnwald, Richard, *Die Menschliche Gesellschaft*, 1 Band, Berlin und Leipzig, 1931.

Marxism had historically won. An arrogant contempt for the past, a vulgar materialist interpretation of spiritual culture, economic centrism, a positive attitude toward the process of raising the social differential in societal systems, and the idea of class as the only historical subject – the "Fourth Political Theory" rejects all these aspects of Marxism. However, without these components, Marxism (and, more generally, socialism) ceases to be itself, and, consequently, it is rendered harmless as a full-fledged ideology, breaking into separate components that do not represent a single whole.

Marxism is relevant in terms of its description of liberalism, in identifying the contradictions of capitalism, in its criticism of the bourgeois system, and in revealing the truth behind the bourgeois-democratic policies of exploitation and enslavement presented as "development" and "liberation". Marxism's critical potential is highly useful and applicable. It may well be included into the arsenal of the "Fourth Political Theory". But, in this case, Marxism does not appear as an ideology that provides answers to a full range of emerging issues – answers that are rational and axiomatic in their foundation – but as an expressive myth or a witty sociological method. Marxism, which we can accept, is mythic sociological Marxism.

As a myth, Marxism tells us the story about the original state of paradise ("primitive communism"), which was gradually lost ("the initial division of labor and the stratification of the primitive society"). Then the contradictions grew, moving toward the point when, at the end of the world, they were reincarnated in the most paradigmatically pure form of the confrontation between Labor and Capital. Capital – the bourgeoisie and liberal democracy – personified global evil, exploitation, alienation, lies, and violence. Labor embodied a great dream and an ancient memory of the "common good", the acquisition of which (the "surplus value") by an evil minority gave birth to all the problems in life. Labor (the proletariat) must recognize the paradoxes of this state of affairs and rise up against their masters in order to build a new society – a paradise on earth – communism. Only this will not be the "naturally occurring initial communism", but an artificial, scientific kind, in which the differential,

accumulated over centuries and millennia of alienation, will serve the "commune", the "community". The dream will become a reality.

This myth completely fits into the structure of eschatological consciousness, which occupies a significant place in mythologies of all kinds of tribes and peoples, not to mention the highly differentiated religions. That alone speaks in its favour in order for us to treat it with the outmost consideration.

On the other hand, as sociology, Marxism is tremendously useful in revealing those mechanisms of alienation and mystification that liberalism uses to justify its dominion and as proof of its "correctness". Being a myth itself, in its polemical activist form, Marxism serves as an excellent tool to expose the bourgeois "great stories" in order to overthrow the credibility of liberal pathos. And in this capacity – "against liberalism" – it can be effectively used under the new conditions: after all, we continue to exist under capitalism, and hence, the Marxist criticism thereof and the struggle with it remain on the agenda, even if the old forms of this struggle have become irrelevant.

Marxism is often correct when it describes its enemy, especially the bourgeoisie. However, its own attempts to understand itself lead to failure. The first and the most prominent contradiction is Marx's unfulfilled prediction about the type of societies that are the most prone to socialist revolutions. He was confident that this would take place in industrialized European countries with the high level of manufacturing and a large percentage of urban proletariat. Such revolutions were excluded from occurring in agrarian countries and countries with the Asiatic mode of production due to their backwardness. In the 20th century, everything occurred exactly to the contrary. Socialist revolutions and socialist societies developed in agrarian countries with an archaic rural population, while nothing like that occurred in highly developed Europe and America. However, even in those countries where socialism had won, the Marxist dogma did not allow to rethink its basic logical assumptions, to consider the role of preindustrial factors, and to truly evaluate the real power of myth. In its Western and Soviet versions, Marxism's

self-reflection turned out to be questionable and inaccurate. Justifiably criticizing liberalism, Marxism was seriously mistaken about itself, which, at some point, affected its own fate. It eventually collapsed even in those places where it had triumphed. And, in terms of where it was supposed to win, capitalism prevailed; the proletariat dissolved in the middle class, and disappeared inside the consumer society contrary to the expectations and the projections. In the end, European revolutionary communists turned into petty-bourgeois clowns entertaining the bored and the jaded democratic public.

If Marxism itself was unable to look at itself from the proper standpoint, then nothing prevents us to do so in the context of the "Fourth Political Theory". Alain de Benoist has a classic book called Vu de Droite[1] (*A View from the Right*), in which he suggested to re-read various political writers (both the "Right" and the "Left") from the point of view of the "New Right". This book led to the inception of the "New Right" movement in Europe. It contains not only the critique of those ideas which were almost dogmatic for the "Old Right", but also a "revolutionary" and a well-meant reading of such authors as the communist Antonio Gramsci examined from the point of view of the Right. It is precisely this reading of Marx – "from the Right", from the standpoint of myths, and of archaic and holistic sociology – that would be particularly fitting at present.

Finally, what can we take from liberalism? And here, as always, we must begin with those aspects that must not be borrowed. Perhaps, in this case, everything is described clearly and in a fairly detailed manner in Alain de Benoist's work Against Liberalism: Toward the Fourth Political Theory[2], to which I keep constantly and consciously referring in my explanation. Liberalism is the main enemy of the "Fourth Political Theory", which is constructed specifically based on the opposition with it. Yet, even here, as was the case with the other political theories, there is something important and

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[1] Benoist, Alain de, *Vu de droite. Anthologie critique des idées contempo-raines*, Paris, Copernic, 1977.
[2] Benoist, Alain de, *Protiv liberalizma. K chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii,* ibid. [*Against Liberalism. Toward the Fourth Political Theory*]

something secondary. Liberalism as a whole rests on the individual
as its parts. It is these parts that are taken as the whole. It is, perhaps,
for this reason that the "hermeneutic circle" of liberalism turned out
to be the most durable: it has the smallest orbit and rotates around
its subject – the individual. In order to shatter this circle, we must
strike the individual, abolish him, and cast him into the periphery
of political considerations. Liberalism is well aware of this danger,
and therefore undertakes consecutive battles with all ideologies and
theories – social, philosophical, and political – that encroach on the
individual, inscribing his identity into a more general context. The
neurosis and the fears located at the pathogenic core of liberal phi-
losophy are clearly seen in *The Open Society and its Enemies*[1], a
work by the classic of neo-liberalism, Karl Popper. He compared
fascism and communism precisely based on the fact that both ide-
ologies integrate the individual into a supra-individual community,
into a whole, into a totality, which Popper immediately qualified as
"totalitarianism". Having undermined the individual as the constitu-
tive figure of the entire political and social system, we can put an
end to liberalism. Of course, this is not that easy to achieve. Nev-
ertheless, it is now obvious that the weakest (and the strongest) as-
pect of the first political theory comes from the direct appeal to the
individual pleading that he remain himself, by himself in his own
autonomous individuality, uniqueness, particularity, and partiality.
In any case, the "Fourth Political Theory" can interpret Popper's
phobias (which led him and his followers to anecdotal conclusions
– quite telling are his feeble-minded criticism of Hegel in the spirit
of negative PR and the accusations of fascism directed toward Plato
and Aristotle!) in its favour. Understanding what the enemy fears the
most, we propose the theory that every human identity is acceptable
and justified except for that of the individual. *M*an is anything but
an individual. We must look carefully at a liberal, when he reads
or hears an axiom of this kind. I think this will be an impressive
spectacle – all his "tolerance" will instantly evaporate, while "hu-

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[1] Popper, Karl, *Otkrytoe obschestvo i ego vragi,* Moscow, 1992. [*The Open
Society and Its Enemies*]

man rights" will be distributed to anyone, just not the one who dares to utter something along these lines. This, however, I described in more detail in my essay *Maximal Humanism*[1] as well as in my book, *The Philosophy of Politics*.[2]

Liberalism must be defeated and destroyed, and the individual must be thrown off the pedestal. Yet, is there anything that we could take away from liberalism – from liberalism that was hypothetically defeated and has lost its axis?

Yes, there is. It is the idea of freedom. And not just the idea of "freedom for" – that same substantive freedom rejected by Mill in his liberal program concentrating on the "freedom from". We must say "yes" to freedom in all its meanings and in all its perspectives. The "Fourth Political Theory" should be a theory of absolute freedom, but not as in Marxism, in which it coincides with absolute necessity (this correlation denies freedom its very core). No, freedom can be of any kind, free of any correlation or lack thereof, facing any direction and any goal. Freedom is the greatest value of the "Fourth Political Theory", which coincides with its center, with its dynamic, energetic core.

But, this freedom is conceived as human freedom, not freedom of an individual – as the freedom of ethnocentrism and the freedom of Dasein, the freedom of culture and the freedom of society, the freedom for any form of subjectivity except for that of an individual. Moving in the opposite direction, European thought had come to a different conclusion: "man (as an individual) is a prison without walls"[3](Jean-Paul Sartre); that is to say, the freedom of an individual is a prison. In order to attain true freedom, we must go beyond the limits of the individual. In this sense, the "Fourth Political Theory" is a theory of liberation, of going beyond the prison walls into the outside world, which begins where the jurisdiction of individual identity ends.

[1] Dugin, A.G., *Maksimal'nyi gumanizm*, Russkaia vesch', Moscow, 2001. [*Maximal Humanism*]
[2] Dugin, A.G., *Filosofiia politiki*, Moscow, 2004. [*The Philosophy of Politics*]
[3] Sartre J. P., *L'age de raison*, Paris, Gallimard, 1945.

Freedom is always fraught with chaos, and is open for opportunities. Placed into the narrow framework of individuality, the amount of freedom becomes microscopic, and, ultimately, fictitious. An individual can be given freedom because he cannot handle it properly – it will remain contained within the system of his individuality and its order. This is the flip side of liberalism: at its core, it is totalitarian and intolerant of differences and the implementation of a great will. It is only prepared to tolerate small people; it protects not so much the rights of man, but, rather, "the rights of a small man". This "small man" can be allowed to do anything, but he, despite all his desire, will be able to do nothing. Yet, beyond the "small man", on the other side of "minimal humanism"[1] everything just begins revealing the first horizon of freedom. However, it is also there that the great risk and serious dangers are born. Having left the limits of individuality, man can be crushed by the elements of life, by dangerous chaos. He may want to establish order. And this is entirely within his right – the right of a great man ("homo maximus") – a real man of "Being and Time" (Martin Heidegger). And, like any order, this possible order, the coming order may be embodied in individual forms. Nonetheless, this is not individuality, but individuation; not empty rotations around that which is given and which is meaningless, but the execution of tasks as well as the taming of the restless and the exciting horizons of the will.

The bearer of freedom in this case will be Dasein. The previous ideologies – each in its own way – alienated Dasein from its meaning, made it restricted, imprisoned it in one way or another, made it inauthentic. Each of these ideologies put a cheerless doll – das Man[2] – in the place of *Dasein*. The freedom of *Dasein* lies in implementing the opportunity to be authentic: that is, in the realization of "Sein" more so than of "da". "There-Being" consists of "there" and of "Being". In order to understand where this "there" is located, we should point it out and make a basic, foundational gesture. Yet, in order for "Being" to flow into "there" like a fountain, we must place

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[1] Dugin, A.G., *Maksimal'nyi gumanizm*, ibid. [*Maximal Humanism*]
[2] Heidegger, Martin, *Sein und Zeit*, ibid.

all of this together – place this entire "hermeneutic circle" into the domain of complete freedom. Therefore, the "Fourth Political Theory" is, at the same time, a fundamental ontological theory which contains the awareness of the truth of Being at its core.

Without freedom, we cannot force anyone to exist. Even if we build the optimal society, and even if we force everyone to act appropriately and to operate within the framework of the correct paradigm, we could never guarantee the latter outcome. The latter result is a man's freedom to choose Being. Of course, most often, man leans toward the "inauthentic" existence of Dasein, trying to dodge the issue, to succumb to gossip (Gerede) and to self-mockery. Liberated Dasein may not choose the path to Being, may hide in shelter, may, once again, clutter the world with its hallucinations and fears, its concerns and intentions. Choosing Dasein may corrupt the "Fourth Political Theory" itself, turning it into a self-parody. This is a risk, but Being is a risk, too. The only question is who risks what (whom). You risk everything, or everything (everyone) risks you. Yet, only the multiplier of freedom will make the choice of authentic Being a reality – only then will the stakes be truly great, when the danger is infinite.

Unlike other political theories, the "Fourth Political Theory" does not want to lie, soothe, or seduce. It summons us to live dangerously, to think riskily, to liberate and to release all those things that cannot be driven back inside. The "Fourth Political Theory" trusts the fate of Being and entrusts fate to Being.

Any strictly constructed ideology is always a simulacrum and always inauthentic, that is to say, it always is the lack of freedom. Therefore, the "Fourth Political Theory" should not hurry in order to become a set of basic axioms. Perhaps, it is more important to leave some things unsaid, found in expectations and insinuations, in allegations and premonitions. The "Fourth Political Theory" should be completely open.

CHAPTER 4. THE CRITIQUE OF
MONOTONIC PROCESSES

The idea of modernization is based on the idea of progress. When we use the term "modernization", we certainly mean progress, linear accumulation, and a certain continuous process. When we speak of "modernization", we presuppose development, growth, and evolution. This is the same semantic system. Thus, when we speak of the "unconditional positive achievements of modernization", we agree with a very important basic paradigm - we agree with the idea that "*human society is developing, progressing, evolving, growing, and getting better and better*". That is to say, we share a particular vision of *historical optimism*.

This historical optimism pertains to the *three classical political ideologies* (liberalism, communism, and fascism). It is rooted in the scientific, societal, political, and social worldview in the humanities and the natural sciences of the 18th-19th centuries, when the idea of progress, development, and growth was taken as an "*axiom*" that was not subjected to doubt. In other words, the entire set of axioms, the whole historiography, and predictive analytics of the 19th century in the humanities and the natural sciences were built on the idea of progress. We can easily trace the development of this subject – the idea of progress – in the three political ideologies.

Let us turn to the classical liberalism of the sociologist Herbert Spencer. He claimed that the development of human society is the next stage that fits into the evolution of the animal species, that there is a connection – a continuity – between the animal world and social development.[1] And, therefore, all the laws of the animal world lead-

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[1] Spencer, Herbert, Opyty nauchnye, politicheskie i filosovskie, Seriia:

ing to development, improvement, and the evolution in the animal world – within Darwin's framework – can be projected onto society. This is the basis of the famous method, "Social Darwinism", of which Spencer was a classic representative. If, according to Darwin, the driving force behind the evolution of the animal kingdom is *the struggle for survival and natural selection*, then the same process takes place in society, argued Spencer. And, the more perfect this struggle is for survival (inter-species, intra-species, the struggle of the strong against the weak, the competition for resources, pleasure) the more perfect our society becomes. The question is about improving the struggle for survival. According to Spencer, this is the central theme of the liberal model, and this is the meaning of social progress. Therefore, if we are liberals, then in one way or the other, we inherited this "zoological" approach to social development based on the struggle and the destruction of the weak by the strong.

However, Spencer's theory contains one important point. He argued that there are *two phases* of social development. The first phase occurs when the struggle for survival is conducted crudely – by force; this is characteristic of the ancient world. The second occurs when the struggle is carried out more subtly by using *economic means*. At the moment when the bourgeois revolution takes place, the struggle for survival does not stop. According to Spencer, it acquires new, more advanced, and more efficient forms; *it relocates into the sphere of the market*. Here, the strongest survive, that is, the richest. Instead of the most powerful feudal lord, a hero, a strong person, a leader, who simply seizes all that is "up for grabs" around them, takes away all that belongs to the other nations and races, and shares it with the ruling ethnicity or the ruling caste, now comes the capitalist, who brings the same aggressive animal principle to the level of the market, the corporation, and the trading company. The transition from the order of power to the order of money, according to Spencer, does not mean the humanization of the process, but only underscores greater effectiveness.

Klassicheskaia filosovskaia mysl', tr. N.A.Rubakin, Minsk, Sovremennyi literator, 1999. [Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative

That is to say, the struggle in the market sphere between the strong (= rich) and the weak (= poor) becomes more efficient and leads to the higher level of development until the super-rich, super-strong, and super-developed countries appear. Progress, according to Spencer, and, more broadly speaking, according to liberalism, is always the growth of the economic power, since it continues to refine the struggle for survival of the animal species and the warfare methods of the strong nations and castes within the framework of pre-capitalist states. Thus, *the concept of animal aggression is embedded in the liberal idea of progress, which is regarded as the main trajectory of social development*. With more economic freedom, there is greater power for takeovers, attacks, as well as mergers and acquisitions. The liberal discourse – the analysis of the liberal ideologist – is a totally *animal* discourse. In this case, the "more advanced" law or the more advanced, "more modernized" methods of production do not mean that they are more humane; what it means is that they give more opportunities for the strong to realize their power, to become more effective, while the weak can only admit defeat, or, if there is any strength left, to fight on. In this manner, the modern idea of economic growth, as we see it with liberals Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, has its foundation and origins in the idea of the struggle between the species, that is, the feral destruction of the weak by the strong, or the validation of the strong at the expense of the weak. Only instead of the idea of predators and herbivores, we have the golden billion, and in that gold billion – their own "kings of beasts" (the New York Stock Exchange and the World Bank bankers, who devour all that is up for grabs and, at the same time, develop a "societal infrastructure" of the world forest).

Therefore, when we speak of "modernization" in the liberal vein, we necessarily mean the enhancement of the social, political, cultural, spiritual, and informational scenario within which *the total aggression of the strong against the weak can be implemented*.

American liberal Ayn Rand (Greenspan was one of her great-est admirers) has created an entire philosophy ("Objectivism")[1] based on the following blunt idea: *if one is rich, then he is good.* She reached the limits of Weber's idea about the origin of capitalism in the Protestant ethic and said that the "rich" is always and necessar-ily the "good" – almost a "saint", while the "poor" is evil, lazy, bad, and corrupt – a "sinner". Being poor, according to Ayn Rand, is to be a sinful villain, whereas to be rich is to be a saint. She proposed to establish the "conspiracy" of the rich (= the strong, bright, sacred, and powerful capitalists) against any kind of labor movements, the peasants, against all those who stand for social justice, or those who are simply poor. Such a "crusade" of the rich against the poor is the basis of the "Objectivist" ideology. People like Greenspan and the current head of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Bernanke, are "Objectiv-ists" – that is, those who interpret modernization, progress, econom-ic growth, and development in the liberal vein.

If we understand modernization like liberal democrats, then that means that we are invited to join in this terrible struggle for survival at its highest peak, that is to become just like them and to snatch a place at the globalization feeder. Globalization, in this case, is the new avenue in the struggle for survival, *the struggle of the rich against the poor*.

Naturally, the ideologically philosophic and moral premise of this version of modernization is entirely alien to the Russian people in terms of our history and our culture. We reject this type of "mod-ernization" unconditionally, and those who might try to impose it upon us will pay dearly for doing so.

In communism, the idea of unidirectional progress is also pre-sent. Marx argued that the change of formations, which leads to the improvement and the development of societies and economies, sooner or later, will result in the communist proletarian revolution, redistributing the products accumulated as the result of develop-ing alienating technologies. The expropriation of the expropriators

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[1] Rand, Ayn,,Apologiia kapitalizma, Moscow, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2003. [Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal]

will occur. Nevertheless, while this has not happened, Marxists say, let everything be as it may in the development of capitalism. Marx also saw history positively – as development – he viewed history as growth and improvement, from the minus to the plus, from the simple to the complex.

It is telling that the lion's share of *The Communist Manifesto*[1] by Marx and Engels is devoted to criticizing specifically those anti-bourgeois political philosophies that differed from Marxism, first and foremost, those that are feudal, reactionary, and nationalistic. By doing so, Marx and Engels strove to emphasize that their "communism" was directed against the bourgeoisie in a manner different from the criticism by the Right-wing anti-capitalists. In reality, compared to all the other "reactionary" and "conservative" projects, Marxists stand on the side of the bourgeoisie and seek to bring its victory closer, since it translates into historic progress and the logic of modernization. For this reason, Marxism rejects conservatism in all of its forms. The contradictions between the communists and the capitalists acquire a particularly acute character as the triumph of capitalism becomes irreversible and complete. It is here that the communists enter history as the vanguard of the proletariat and push historic progress further along – toward socialism and communism.

Once again, we see Darwinism in Marxism, including the full acceptance of the evolutionary ideas and the belief in the miraculous power of scientific progress and technological improvement.

We lived through this kind of "modernization" in the 20th century, paid for it more than in full; the people clearly do not have the slightest desire to repeat such experiments. Therefore, this version of modernization will not work – moreover, no one is voicing it.

Oddly enough, fascism, too, is an evolutionary movement. We may remember Friedrich Nietzsche, who spoke of the "blond beast" and of the "will to power" that drives history. Nietzsche was an evo-

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[1] Marx, Karl, Engels, Friedrich, Manifest Kommunisticheskoi partii, in Marx, Karl, Engels, Friedrich, Works, 2nd edition, vol. 4, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1955, pp. 419-459. [The Communist Manifesto]

lutionist and believed that, based on the logic of species' development, man will be replaced by the "Superman", much like man first came to replace the ape. He wrote,

"What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame."[1] The National Socialists added a racial point to this idea: that the white race is "more developed" than the black, yellow, or some other kind, and on this basis "has the right" to rule the world. Here, we encounter the same progressivist outlook along with the idea of development and improvement, which lead to the assumption of racial superiority on the grounds that the white nations own sophisticated instruments of machine production, while other ethnic groups do not.

Today, we reject and criticize fascism for its racial component, but we forget that this ideology is also built on the ideas of progress and evolution just like the other two political theories of modernity. If we were to visualize the essence of the Nazi ideology and the role of progress and evolution in it, then *the connection between racism and evolution* would become obvious to us. This connection – in a concealed form – can be seen in liberalism and even in communism. Even if not biological, we see cultural, technological, and economic racism in the ideology of the "free market" and in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In one way or another, all three ideologies originate from the same trend – the idea of growth, development, progress, evolution, and of the constant, cumulative societal improvement. They all view the world, the entire historical process as *linear growth*. They differ in their interpretation of this process; they attribute different meanings to it, but they all accept the irreversibility of history and its progressive character.

Thus, modernization is a concept that directly sends us back to the three classical political ideologies. Furthermore, we can see the common ground that unites the three ideologies in the idea of pro-

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[1] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Tak govoril Zaratustra, in Nietzsche, Friedrich, Collected Works, vol. 2, Mysl', Moscow, 1990. [Thus Spake Zarathustra]

gress and in the positive evaluation of the "modernization" concept itself. Nowadays, all three of these ideologies are being gradually discarded. This is evident with regard to fascism and communism, and is somewhat less obvious with regard to liberalism, but even liberalism gradually ceases to satisfy the majority of the world's population and, simultaneously, turns into something other than what it was during the classical era of modernity. Consequently, it is about time that we pose the question of searching for the "Fourth Political Theory"[1] beyond the first three. And, the radical rejection of the three classical theories reflects our attitude toward what is common to them all – that is, our attitude toward modernization, progress, evolution, development, and growth.

American scientist Gregory Bateson, a theorist of ethno-sociology, cybernetics, and ecology, a psychoanalyst and a linguist, described the *monotonic process* in his book *Mind and Nature*[2]. The monotonic process is the idea of constant growth, constant accumulation, development, steady progress, and the increase of one particular indicator. In mathematics, this is associated with the notion of the *monotonic value*, i.e. the ever-increasing value, hence, the *monotonic functions*. Monotonic processes are the type of processes that always occur in one direction: for example, all their indicators consistently increase without cyclical fluctuations and oscillations. Studying the monotonic process at three levels – at the level of biology (life), at the level of mechanics (steam engines, internal combustion engines), and at the level of social phenomena, Bateson concluded that *when this process occurs in nature, it immediately destroys the species*; if we are talking about an artificial device – it falls apart (explodes, collapses); if we mean a society – the society deteriorates, degenerates, and disappears. The monotonic process

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[1] Dugin, A. G., Chetvertaia politicheskaia teoriia, St. Petersburg, Amfora, 2009. [The Fourth Political Theory]; Benoist, Alain de, Protiv liberalizma. K chetvertoi politicheskoi teorii, St. Petersburg, Amfora, 2009. [Against Liberalism. Toward the Fourth Political Theory]

[2] Bateson, Gregory, Razum i priroda, Moscow, KomKniga, 2007. [Mind and Nature]

(in biology) is *incompatible with life* – it is an anti-biological phenomenon. Monotonic processes are completely absent from nature. All the processes of accumulating something in particular, one particular trait, result in the death of the others. Monotonic processes do not exist in any biological species, from cells to the most complex organisms. As soon as this kind of a monotonic process initiates, deviants, giants or dwarfs, and freaks of nature appear – they are incapacitated, not compatible with life, cannot produce offspring, and life itself casts them out.

Solving the problem of monotonic processes was the main goal which arose in the development of steam engines. It turns out that the most important subtlety in steam engines is the relay feedback. When the process reaches cruising speed, it is necessary to reset the fuel supply, otherwise the monotonic process initiates, everything begins to resonate, and the speed of the engine increases causing it to explode. It was precisely this *solution of avoiding the monotonic process* in mechanics that was the principal theoretical, mathematical, physical, and engineering problem during the early stage of industrialization. It turns out that the monotonic process is not only incompatible with life, but also – with the proper mechanical functioning of a device. The task of designing a functioning device is one of avoiding the monotonic process, that is, the prevention of one-dimensional progress, evolution, development, and the placement of growth into a closed cycle.

By analyzing sociology, Bateson showed that there are no monotonic processes in real societies. Monotonic processes, such as population growth, in normal cases led to wars, as a rule, which cut the growing population in half. In our society today we see an unprecedented level of automated technological progress along with unbelievable moral degradation.

If we look at all this evidence without the evolutionary bias, then we will realize that monotonic processes exist only in *people's minds*, i.e. they are purely *ideological models*. Bateson demonstrated that they do not exist in biological, mechanical, and social reality.

Marcel Mauss, a well-known French sociologist, criticized the monotonic process as well. In his book, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions*[1] and especially in his essay, *The Gift*[2], he showed that the traditional society paid great attention to the *ritual destruction of the surplus*. The surplus was seen as excessive, *likho*, usury**.** *Likho* personifies evil, usury is the interest charged on borrowed capital, and excess is that which is obtained beyond one's need, beyond necessity. For instance, *surplus crops* were seen as disastrous in traditional society. The ancient worldview was based on the belief that an increase in one area translates into a decrease in another. Therefore, the surplus had to be destroyed as soon as possible. For this purpose, the community organized an orgy, a feast, a sacrifice, consumed all the additional food, choking, or gave it to the gods, handed it out, or destroyed it. This is the origin of a special ritual – the *potlatch*, which constitutes the deliberate damage of personal property. It presupposes the destruction of the surplus[3].

Marcel Mauss proved that the *belief in the destructiveness of monotonic processes lies at the foundations of human sociality*. The society remains strong only through the rejection of the monotonic process and by turning growth into a cycle.

Emile Durkheim, Pitirim Sorokin, and Georges Gurvitch, the greatest sociologists of the 20th century, the classicists of sociological thought, argued that *social progress* does not exist, in contrast to the 19th-century sociologists, such as Auguste Comte or Herbert

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[1] Mauss, Marcel, Sotsial'nye funktsii sviaschennogo, in Selected Works, tr., ed. I. V Utehin, St. Petersburg, Evraziia, 2000. [Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions]

[2] Mauss, Marcel, Ocherk o dare. Obschestva. Obmen. Lichnost': Trudy po sotsial'noi antropologii, tr. A. B. Gofman, Moscow, Vostochnaia literatura, RAN, 1996. [The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies]

[3] Translator's note**:** *likho* is the personification of calamities and misfortune in eastern Slavic mythology. This archaic word is the equivalent of "evil", and is etymologically related to *lishnii*, that is, "excessive". The author also uses the original meaning of the term *likhva,* an archaic word which signifies "usury", and is also linked to *likho*.

Spencer. Progress is not an objective social phenomenon, but rather, an artificial concept, a kind of a "scientifically formulated myth". When we study societies, we can only speak of the different types thereof. There is no general criterion to determine which is more developed, and which is less so. Lucien Lévy-Brühl attempted to prove that savages think pre-logically, while modern humans – logically[1]. However, Claude Levi-Strauss demonstrated[2] that savages think in the same way as we do; only their taxonomy is built differently, so they do not have less logic than we do – maybe even more so – and they think in a more refined manner.

As for the phases of social development, the greatest U.S. cultural anthropologist Franz Boas and his followers as well as Claude Levi-Strauss and his school proved that we cannot look at modern humans as ones evolved from the archaic and primitive hordes within the framework of anthropology. Primitives and primitive societies are simply *different* people and *different* societies. Modern humans are one group, the archaic humans another. But, they are *people*, too, no worse than we are. They are not an "underdeveloped version of us". They have different children, who do not know myths and fairy tales (they are not introduced to them), in contrast to our children. They have different adults – their adults do know the myths, whereas ours do not believe in them. *Our* adults, our sober and practical society, are similar to *their* children. The adults in primitive tribes are capable of telling mythical stories, sincerely believe in them, and embody the feats of their "ancestors" and "spirits" in their life, making no distinction. In contrast, the children of primitive societies are characterized by cynicism, pragmatism, scepticism, and the desire to attribute everything to material causes. This does not mean that modern societies had grown from the state of primitivism and superseded it; it is just that we configured our society *differently* (no better or worse), built it upon other foundations and on other values.

[1] Lévy-Brühl , Lucien, Pervobytnoe myshlenie. Psikhologiia myshleniia. Moscow, MGU, 1980. [Primitive Mentality]

[2] Lévi-Strauss, Claude, Pervobytnoe myshlenie – issledovanie osobennosti myshleniia, Moscow, Respublika, 1994. [The Savage Mind]

With regard to cultural studies and philosophy, Nikolai Danilevskii, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, and Arnold Toynbee showed that all the processes in the history of philosophy and the history of culture are a *cyclical phenomenon*. The Russian historian Lev Gumilev suggested in his version of cyclical history that he explained in his famous theory of passionarity. They all acknowledge that *there is development, but that there also is decline*. Those, who place bets *only* on growth and development, act *against* all norms of history, against all sociological laws, and against the logic of life. Such unidirectional modernization, such growth, such development, and such progress do not exist. Piotr Sztompka, a contemporary Polish sociologist, stated[1] that, in terms or progress, the following change occurred in the humanities – in the 19th century, everyone believed that it exists, and that was the principal axiom and a scientific criterion. But, if we examine the paradigms of the 20th century in the humanities and the natural sciences, then we will see that almost everyone rejected this paradigm; no one is guided by it any longer. Nowadays, the paradigm of progress is considered almost "antiscientific"; it is incompatible with contemporary scientific criteria, as it is incompatible with the criteria of humanism and tolerance. Any idea of progress is in itself a veiled or direct racism, asserting that "our" culture, for instance, the "white culture" or American culture is of higher value than "your" culture, than, for instance, the culture of Africans, Muslims, Iraqis, or Afghans. As soon as we say that the American or the Russian culture is better than that of the Chukchi or the inhabitants of the Northern Caucasus, we act like racists. And, this is incompatible with either science or with respect toward different ethnicities.20th-century science uses cyclicality as a scientific criterion, or, according to Sztompka, we have moved from the *paradigm of evolution*, modernization, and development to the *paradigm of crisis*, the paradigm of catastrophes. This means that all processes – in nature, society, and

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[1] Sztompka, Piotr, *Sotsiologiia sotsial'nykh izmenenii*, Moscow, Aspekt Press, 1996. [*The Sociology of Social Change*]

technology – must be conceived as relative, reversible, and cyclical. This is the most important point.

In terms of its methodological base, the "Fourth Political Theory" must be rooted in the fundamental rejection of the monotonic process. That is to say, the "Fourth Political Theory" must assert that the monotonic process is *unscientific, inadequate, amoral, and untrue* as its future axiom (without specifying how the monotonic process must be rejected). And, everything that appeals to the monotonic process and it variations, such as development, evolution, and modernization, should, in the very least, be placed into the cyclical mode. Instead of the idea of the monotonic process, progress, and modernization, we must endorse other slogans directed toward life, repetition, the preservation of that which is worth preserving and changing that which should be changed.

Instead of modernization and growth, we need the direction of balance, adaptability, and harmony. Instead of moving upward and forward, we must adapt to that which exists, to understand where we are, and to harmonize socio-political processes.

And, most important, instead of growth, progress, and development, there is *life*. After all, one is yet to prove that life is linked to growth. This was the myth of the 19th century. *Life, in contrast, is connected to eternal return.* In the end, even Nietzsche incorporated his idea of the will to power into the concept of *eternal return*. The very logic of life to which Nietzsche was dedicated told him that if there is growth in life, the Apollonian movement toward the logos, then the balance of the nocturnal Dionysian world exists as well. And, Apollo is not just opposed to Dionysus, they *complement* each other. Half of the cycle constitutes modernization, the other half – decline; when one half faces up, the other half faces down. There is no life without death. Being-towards-death, careful attention to death, to the flip side of the sphere of Being, as Heidegger wrote, is not a struggle with life, but, rather, its glorification and its foundation.

We must put an end to the antiquated political ideologies and theories. If we have truly rejected Marxism and fascism, then what

remains is to reject liberalism. Liberalism is an equally outdated, cruel, misanthropic ideology like the two previous ones. The term "liberalism" should be equated with the terms "fascism" and "communism". Liberalism is responsible for no fewer historic crimes than fascism (Auschwitz) and communism (the GULAG): it is responsible for slavery, the destruction of the Native Americans in the U.S., for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the aggression in Serbia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, for the devastation and the economic exploitation of millions of people on the planet, and for the ignoble and cynical lies which whitewash this history.

But, most important, we must reject the base upon which these three ideologies stand: *the monotonic process in all its forms*, that is, evolution, growth, modernization, progress, development, and all that which seemed scientific in the 19th century but was exposed as unscientific in the 20th century.

We must also abandon the philosophy of development and propose the following slogan: *life is more important than growth*. Instead of the ideology of development, we must place our bets on the *ideology of conservatism and conservation*. However, we not only require conservatism in our daily lives, but also *philosophical conservatism*. We need the philosophy of conservatism. Looking toward the future of the Russian political system; if it is going to be based on monotonic processes, then it is doomed to failure. No stability will ever come from a new round of unidirectional growth (from the energy prices, real estate, stocks, etc.) or from the growth of global economy as a whole. If this illusion persists, then it may become fatal for our country.

Today, we find ourselves in a transitional state. We roughly know *what* we are moving away *from*, but do not know *what* we are moving *toward*. If we head toward that which directly or indirectly implies the presence of the monotonic process, then we will reach a dead end.

The "Fourth Political Theory" must take a step toward the formulation of a coherent critique of the monotonic process; it must develop *an alternative model of a conservative future*, a conserva-

tive tomorrow, based on the principles of vitality, roots, constants, and eternity.

After all, as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck once said, "Eternity is on the side of the conservative".

CHAPTER 5. THE REVERSIBILITY OF TIME

Three political theories have been produced from the ideology of Modernity. They were all based on the topography of Progress. Progress implicates the irreversibility of time, a forward-moving and predetermined evolutionary process. Progress is both an orthogenetic and a monotonous process. Inevitably, all three are based on Hegel's philosophy. After Hegel, the meaning of history has become the fact that Absolute Spirit has become estranged from itself, emphasizing itself into the substance, which has externalized itself into history, dialectically, until it turns into Enlightened society, enlightened Monarchy.

Marx has accepted this topography, and after Kozhev and Fukuyama, liberal thinkers have accepted it as well. In the framework of National Socialism, Hegelianism was externalized in the concept of a Final Reich, with the Third Reich as the Third kingdom of Joachim de Flore, and in the concept of Social Darwinism, where natural selection theory has been adapted to apply to society and races. Social Darwinism is also inherent in Spenser's liberalism. Each of these three ideologies of Modernity utilizes the ideas of the irreversibility of time and of unidirectional history. They implicitly acknowledge the totalizing imperative of Modernization. Modernization can be liberal, communist, or fascist. An example of the effectiveness of fascist Modernization would be the success, however brutal, of Hitler's industrial modernization of Germany in the 1930's.

The 4th political theory is a non-modern theory. As Bruno Latour has said, "We have never been contemporary". Theoretical axioms of Modernity are harmless because they are not in reality executable. In practice they are permanently and very spectacular self-abnegated. 4th political theory completely discards the idea of the irreversibility

of history. Theoretically this idea was interesting, as substantiated by Georges Dumézil, with his anti-euhemerism, and Gilbert Durand. I have written previously about sociology and the morphology of time in my books *Postphilosophy*, *Sociology of the Imagination*, and *Sociology of Russian society*. Time is a social phenomenon; its structures don't depend upon object characters but upon the domination of social paradigms, because the object is assigned by society itself. In Modern society, time is seen as irreversible, progressive and unidirectional. But this is not necessarily true inside societies that do not accept Modernity. In some societies without a strict Modern conception of time, cyclic and even regressive conceptions of time exist. Therefore, *political history* is considered in the topography of plural conceptions of time for the 4th political theory. There are as many conceptions of time, as there are societies.

4th political theory does not just discard progress and modernization, however. This theory contemplates progress and modernization relative to and intimately connected with current historical, social and political semantic *occasions,* as in Occasionalist theory. Progress and modernization are real, but relative, not absolute. We are talking here about specified stages, but not about the absolute trend of history. That's why 4th political theory suggests alternative version of political history based on systematized Occasionalism. Karl Schmitt was very close to this in his work. Fernand Braudel and "École des Annales" have also been inspired by this in their writing. In discussion of the political transformation of society we place them in their specific semantic context: history, religion, philosophy, economics, and culture, with its ethnic and ethnic-sociological specifics considered. This demands a new classification of social and political transformation. We acknowledge these transformations, but we do not place them into a broad-based scale that could be the common "destiny" for all societies. This gives us political pluralism.

4th political theory uses a societally-dependent conception of reversible time. In the context of Modernity, turning back from some point in history to a previous one is impossible. But it is possible in the context of 4th political theory. Berdyaev's idea of the "New Me-

dieval" is quite applicable. Societies can be variously built and trans-
formed. The experience of the 90's is quite demonstrative of this:
people in the USSR were sure that socialism would proceed from
capitalism, not vice versa. But in the 1990's they saw the opposite;
capitalism following socialism. It is quite possible that Russia could
yet see feudalism, a slave-owning society, as well as communism or
primordial society emerge after that. Those who laugh at this are the
captives of the Modern and it's hypnosis. Having acknowledged the
reversibility of political and historical time, we've arrived at a new
pluralist point of view of political science and we have reached the
advanced perspective necessary for ideological construction.

4th political theory constructs, and reconstructs, society behind
Modern axioms. That's why the elements of the different political
forms can be used in 4th political theory without any connection to
the time scale. There are no stages and epochs - but only pre-con-
cepts and concepts. In this context, theological constructions, an-
tiquity, caste and other aspects of traditional society are only one of
the possible variants; along with socialism, Keynesian theory, free
markets, parliamentary democracy, or "nationalism". They are just
forms, but they wouldn't be related an implied topography of "ob-
jective historical time". There's no such thing! If time is "historical"
it is cannot "objective". Dasein says the same. Dasein is the subject
of 4th political theory. Dasein can be recovered by the refinement of
the existential truth from the ontological superstructure. Dasein is
something that institutionalizes time. Durand institutionalizes time
by *Traiectum* in his topography. Traiectum/Dasein is not a function
of time, but time is a function of Traiectum/Dasein. That's why time
is something that is institutionalized by politics in the context of 4th
political theory. Time is a political category. *Political time is a pre-
concept of a political form.*

4th political theory has opened a unique perspective: if we com-
prehend the principle of the reversibility of time, we are not only be
able to compose the project of a future society, but we would also
able to compose a whole range of projects of different future societ-

ies – thus we would be able to suggest some non-linear strategies for a new institutionalization of the world.

4th political theory is not an invitation to traditional society again; ie., it is not conservatism. There are many characteristics of our chronological past which are pleasant, and many which are not. Forms of traditional society are also different from each other. Finally, ethnic and sociological matrixes and contexts of different contemporary societies are different too. 4th political theory shouldn't impose anything on anyone. Adherents of 4th political theory should act step by step: if we simply argue the reversibility of time and Dasein as the subjects of 4th political theory, it would be the first and main step. We would thus free space for the pre-concepts. We can define several pre-concepts with regards to the reversibility of time and Dasein/Traiectum, therefore we can define several political concepts of time and each of them can be plugged into the current political project, according to the principles of 4th political theory.

CHAPTER 6. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE FUTURE

Is there a future? The question is legitimate because it provokes thinking about the ontology of time. What is or is now, and precisely because of being now, it is considered as being proper according to the multitude of direct empirical perceptions, or it was, and the fact of past existence is certified by the reliable documents. But in both cases forgery is possible. The being of that which is only to be is highly questionable.

Martin Heidegger spoke about three ecstasies of time: The past, the present and the future. Apparently there are three ontological arguments relatively to those three: ecstasies - immediacy (there is/ there is not) is related to the present; Documentary (there was/ here was not) is related to the past; Probabilistic (there will be/ there will be not) is related to the future. It seems that we could create a hierarchy, based on the evidence: there is, there was, there will be. "There is" is most evident. "There will be" is most doubtful. "There was" is in middle of them. The future is most hesitating among the three ecstasies of time. The future is in a lesser scale comparing with "there is" or "there was". "There was" was, or they think that there was at least. Concerning the future you never know for certain. It could happen, but probably will not. The future lacks being compared with the other ecstasies of time.

From this point we could proceed in several different directions. For example we could put in question the solidity of ontological arguments concerning the most evident moment – the present. Recalling Kant and his doubts about the inner being of the object. The fact of perception of something is not enough for the declaration of its being (the Ding-an-sich problem). Nor pure reason but only practical reason gives the being to the object, based on moral imperative.

The object should have being. It would be good when it has it. It has to have it.

If the present as most evident of all moments of time, it can be questioned rather deeply, we are arriving at an interesting point: all three moments of time are ontologically improvable and unverifiable and concern only the gnoseologic level. It is pessimistic concerning the present whose reality we habitually take for granted, but rather optimistic concerning the two other moments, the past and future. The future and past acquire equal consideration with the present. The present, past and future for pure reason have equal phenomenological value. The future in this case is the phenomenon, and hence it phenomenologically is. Being the phenomenon it is and it is real. It is actual.

Kant, analyzing the a priori forms of sensibility, puts time nearer to the subject, and space nearer to the object. It indicates that time belongs to the closest orbit of the subject. Time is hence subjective. It is the transcendental subject that installs time in the perception of the object.

Now let change the perspective and consider the time in a phenomenological way. Husserl proposed to study time with the example of music. The consciousness of hearing the music piece is not based on the strict identification of notes sounding in a concrete discrete moment. Hearing music is something different that hearing a note that sounds now, in the present. The consciousness of music, is accessed by recalling the past note as well that are dissolving little by little in to nothingness, but their resonance, the echo continues in the consciousness and gives the musical phrase the esthetical sense. Husserl calls it "the continuous instance". The past is present in the present. The present thus becomes continuous and includes the past as a vanishing presence.

This is the methodological key for the understanding of history. History is awareness of the presence of the past in the present. The vanishing events continue to sound in the recalling of them. Clio and Polyhymnia are sisters. This recalling is necessary to give the present the sense. The anamnesis of Plato has the same function. The

soul should recall the hidden past of its past existence in order to reconstruct the wholeness of the melody of destiny. Only thus could it be played harmoniously.

Therefore, the future should be placed in this context. It is continuous in the present. Not the moment of "novum", but the process of the vanishing of the present, that is now. The future is the tail of the present, its resonance. We live the future just now, and already now, when we play the note of the melody of life. The future is the process of the death of the present, the attention of the dissolution of melody in the main frame of harmony. The "novum" appears in the future only when the harmony is lost, when our attention falls asleep, and then suddenly we awake and cannot identify the sounds that we hear. They momentarily simply don't make sense. That is the "novum" -- spontaneous incomprehension of what is going on. It is the nature of discreet discontinued events. The moment of being without history, hence without sense of awareness.

Husserl is digging much deeper in the phenomenology of time. He discovers the new instance of consciousness laying under the level when the musical history of time is perceived. According to Husserl beneath this level there is another one, ultimate one that is responsible for our perception of what is now with the force of evidence and the taste of reality much more intensive that in the case of the recalling the ever dying past. This instance is the consciousness itself , the consciousness as such that precedes the intentionality and the dualist topic of apprehension being necessarily divided in two parts – the perceived and the perceiving. In the present the consciousness perceives itself and nothing else. That is the ultimate experience of the last source of reality. According to Husserl the base of all is the transcendental subjectivity; whence it conceives itself, it is a kind of «short circuit». This experience is autoreferent one. In it there is the perception of pure being as the presence of the subjectivity of consciousness.

This short circuit cause all kind of dualities to be born – the logical ones and temporal one. The necessity to stop this trauma is manifest in the creation of time, the articulation of three time moments.

The time is necessary to hide the present which is the traumatically experience of the autoreferency of the pure consciousness. Intentionality and logical judgements all are rooted in this evasion of the consciousness from the pain of the void present in which the consciousness is presented to itself.

Such an attitude to the levels of consciousness explains the genesis of time as the evasion from the present and unbearable tension of pure presence to the same. The tension is immediately relieved by the expansion in all imaginable kinds of the dualities that constitute the textures of the continuous processes. The model of all this process is the three moments time. The logical and spatial symmetries follow – the couples   yes/no, true/false, high/low, right/left, here/there and so on. Before/after belongs to the same cadence. The consciousness constitutes the time running from unbearable meeting with itself. But this meeting is inevitable, so the present and its high precision of existential perception is born.

What is most important in this interpretation of morphology of time? The idea that the time precedes the object, and he root of time we should seek in inner depth of consciousness not in the outer things constituted by subjective procedure of traumatically self-experience. The world around us becomes what it is by the fundamental action of presencing accomplished by mind. If a mind sleeps the reality lacks the taste of present existence. It is fully immersed in the continuous and interrupted dream. The world is created by time, and the tine in its turn is the manifestation of the self-encountering subjectivity.

These remarks lead us to the scientific topic of the study of future – the prognostic, projecting, the futuro-analysis.

Moving from the man to the society (from the anthropology to the sociology) we could affirm the future as something absolutely subjective in nature, so in out context as something social. The future is social because it is the historical feature and not the immanent to the object inherent quality. The object has no future. The earth, the animals, the stones, the machines have no future. Only those who are included in the human social context can indirectly take part in

the future. Without autoreferent consciousness there can be no time. The time that is what is inside us, what makes us what who we are. The time is man's ultimate identity.

This subjectivity of time doesn't mean that any prognostic will be self-fulfilled prophecy (R.Merton), nor that any project is realizable a priori. The future is strictly determined and is not something voluntary. The time being historical is predefined precisely by its historical content. The subject is not free from its structure, more than that it is absolutely enslaved by it. The time needs the future as the void space for the continuous vanishing of the present and partly of the past. If the future lacks the subject will not have the space to evade, to run from the impossible encounter with itself, from the short circuit mentioned above. The frozen moment of he present without the future is that of death.

The society needs the future to run from itself further and further. The chronicle of such a run is the sense of history. To make it effective we need the rests of the past episodes. The future is predefined by he structure of the subject. That is why is strictly defined. The subject cannot not to deploy the chains of reasoning, not to think, not to constitute the temporal cadences. The future is in the same measure as the present and past. Where the time is the future is also.

The future makes sense. It has the sense even before it becomes present. More than that the future make sense even it will never happen. It is the semantic value of the prophecy or the prognosis: if it doesn't happen it also is something loaded with the sense and helping to explain what is going on. The prophecies and the prognosis are working to discern the meaning of the future. When the future refute the expectations the fact of the refuting gives the sense to what it really happens because the sense of it partly consists in what wasn't realized. Unfulfilled prophecy has exactly the same importance as fulfilled one.

The future can be analyzed with the same accuracy as the present and past. The only thing the future will have in its private possession is the flash of the self-encounter of the deepest consciousness and the intensive shock of the discovery of the present as what is really

actually is. What is – is the note that sounds now. But it is not music and can be analyzed. The isolated note says nothing. It conveys us nothing. It acquires the sense only with the other notes. The context gives it sense. So concerning the content of time it is something whole that is disposed in the tree moments of time a priori. We live the time in its wholeness. So the future dimension is already given with the sense of music. The history is not only the memory of the past. It is also the explication of the present and the experience of the future. When we understand well the history and its logic we could easily guess what will follow, what is going to happen, which note should go next. Knowing the society we could identify in its history the harmony, the periods, the refrains, the structure of the piece. Sure we could encounter surprises but most surprising would be the possibility of one authentic moment of the experience of the self-identity of the pure consciousness. It is possibility to be awaken by the bold of inner light. In this traumatically situation we discover the identity between most inner and most outer. We live on the creation of the external world by internal self. But that is not the history anymore, it is break through it, the intrusion to the centre of time where the time is being eternally made. From this point it goes out. There it exists in the undifferentiated unity of all three ecstasies – past, present and future.

The time can be organized in different ways. The past can be intrincated with the present and with the future by the different links. Here is the circular time based on the eternal refrain pattern. In the centre of circular time there is experience of the consciousness linked to itself in manner short circuit. The power of the trauma rejects the attention and the life world to the periphery, which became the circle-time with the future becoming past and so on eternally. It is the eternal return of the same.

The time could be arranged as regress line. The experience of the short circuit is placed here in the past. The ear tries to capture the distant sounds of the past and truly reproduce it. It is traditional society based on the everlasting effort of platonic anamnesis. The most important here is to remember and transmit. In this time the future

and the present are constructed by the past. The reality and actuality
are sent to the past and are remembered, recalled.

There is the time taken as the perpetual waiting of something
to come. It is chiliastic messianic time. The shirt circuit experience
is here appointed to the future. The history is going to accomplish
itself in the future where the reality fulfils. This kind of time is cen-
tred on the thing to come. The tomorrow is the focus of the historical
sense. The being is oriented to the future life.

There is another time installed in the object, moved to the ex-
treme periphery of the subject where the objective world is fixed.
This time is presumable material time, the time introduced in the
substance of thing. This is the time of slaughter, of the death of the
subject.

The consciousness could construct different kinds of times and
their combinations. Before create the world filled with forms the
subject creates the time where the world is to be.

The histories of different societies are different. Exactly as differ-
ent are the pieces, musicians, the compositors, the instruments, the
musical genre, and the kinds of notations. That is why the humanity
as whole cannot have a future. It has no future. The future of human-
ity is quite senseless because it lacks for completely the semantic
value, the sense. Every society is separate fact of the consciousness,
expanded in the rational and temporal horizons. All is strictly super-
individual and open. But before hearing the real history of concrete
society we should immerse in the depths of its identity. The fact that
every people, every culture, every society have its own history, turn
time in local phenomenon. Every society possesses its own tempo-
rality. All moments if it are different – past, present, future. The soci-
eties can cross, intersect. Their historical senses cannot. The senses
are local. The common sense is possible only on the base of the
seizure of one society over other one and imposing its own history
on the enslaved one.

That means if the society has future it should be its own future.
The future is through the appurtenance to the expanding forces of
the constituent subject. The society can be united through the struc-

tures of their consciousnesses. It means we should unite the semantic ranges of the respective pasts. It means further to prove the harmonious correspondences of the notes and melodies, the symphonic nature of concerned societies. The past is extinguishing, yes it is, but never extinguished. Being extinguished the present looses the sense, and the future the possibility to happen, to come. Being vanishing is the form of existence of time. Vanishing is necessary for the morphology of time at the same scale as the flash of the present and the vagueness of the future.

So the people should ask themselves today about their future. If they have the history they could have the future. If they have history and the future they are. If they are the future is here, in the present. It is being made now.

We can establish on this basis the prognosis and the projects. According to Heidegger the throwness (Geworfenheit) of the subject (Dasein) is forcing him to project itself. Etymologically it is clear: the subject is formed by sub-jectum (sub-jacere), the project – by pro-jectum (pro-jacere). In both cases we have the verb «to throw.» The analysis of the future is rooted in this: apprehending the future we are making it. It is a work on the history and the consciousness of time as such.

It is doubtful that one society is capable to comprehend the other society at the same level as it is comprehended by its own members. Such possibility presupposes the existence of the meta-society, the society-«God», which could operate with the ultimate depths of the consciousness in the same manner as the consciousness operates with the attention, noesis, intentionality, the logic and the time and finally with the world. Obviously the Western society is particularly marked by such an ethnocentric approach and universalistic pretension rooted in the racist and colonialist past. But in the XX century it was certainly proved that it is completely unfounded and false. The structuralists, the sociologists, the cultural anthropologists, the postmodernists, the phenomenologist, the linguists, the existentialists, and so on have deployed convincing argumentation demonstrating the inner nature of such attitude rooted in the will to the power and

paranoid imposition of the its own identity to the other. The illness called Western racism.

The West is the local and historical phenomenon. It is very acute civilization, very particular, very arrogant, very smart. But it is one among many others. The West has history and is because of its history. The attempt to abdicate this history in favour of pure universalism and in favour of metaculture and meta-language is doomed. There are two out of it:

- • or the West will loose its own identity and will turn into the automaton;
- • or it will try to impose its own history given as universal own on all the existing societies destroying them and creating new kind of planetarian concentration camp for the cultures.

First version implies the struggle of the cyborgs with the men. The second one the planetarian liberation fighting against new imperialism. It is for the West to decide how manage the consequences of its proper history and its implications. The West can try to close its history but it is little probable that it will succeed n closing the history of the other.

So now it is the moment to begin fight for the historical being of the people. This historical being is the time the sense of which is constituted subjectively. The sense can reside only in the society itself. The West cannot intersect with the sense of the other non-Western societies. The non-Western people cannot understand correctly the West and its values. There are in permanent error thinking they can. It is false. They cannot. But the Western people cannot understand the non-Western societies. The structures of the subjects, the time, the music are different. The past, the present and the future of the historical societies can not be exposed by no meta-culture: they are lying too deep and are defended from the foreign eyes by the destructive might of the autoreferential moment, by the bold of the greatest tension. What for the West is, for the other cultures is not. So we are dealing with different times always and with different futures.

So we have come to «the end of the history» and the globalization. The end of history is the logical finalizing of the universalism. The end of the history is the abolition of the future. The history proceeds and reaches it terminal state. There is no more space to go on. So with future all structure of time is abolished – not only future, but also the past and the present. How it can be possible? We could compare it with the simultaneous playing all existing notes, sounds, melodies that will give us cacophony, clanking and grinding of teeth. At the same time it will provoke absolute silence, deafness and sourness. Hence there will be no space for the temporalization of inner tension of transcendental subjectivity; the short circuit would grow exponentially without possibility of being dissipated. That means the inflammation, the ignition and fire. The same fire goes usually in pair with the sword.

In order to prevent the ignition and the blow potentiated by the closing the temporal and logical perspective of the relief the global world will strive to trap the consciousness in the networks and the virtuality, where it could run away from the inner pressure of self-encountering without issue. If it succeed the new world of the machine kingdom would be created. The global network and digital cyberspace are suitable only for the existence of post-humans, post-society, post-culture. Instead of fire we will get the electricity. Some people believe Fukuyama is already a robot.

The globalization is the same as the end of history. Both go hand in hand. They are semantically linked. The different societies have different histories. That means different futures. If we going to make «the tomorrow» common to all societies existing on the planet, if we are going to propose global future we need previously to destroy the history of these societies, to delete its pasts, to annihilate the continuous moment of the present virtualizing the reality consisting from the content of the historical time. The common future means deleting of particular histories. But that means no histories at all including their future part will rest. The common future is no future. The globality cancels the time. He globality cancels the transcen-

dental subjectivity of Husserl or Dasein of Heidegger. There is no more time, nor being.

So we are to deal with the bifurcation of temporal constructions. It is time to put this question with all implicit weight. Now being on the eve of the entrance in the zone of the end of history, into the post-history, we could make the decision and to give different ontological responses.

When we want to have the future it shouldn't be global. It couldn't be one future, we will have to have many futures. The transcendental subjectivities/cultures/societies can preserve the space for the scattering of energies born by the self-encountering, the short circuit in question through its temporalization: that will, grant the existence of the outer world and the duration of (always and necessarily) local histories. The time will last and the world as the experience of the real presencing will be supported by the structure of the deep subjectivity. The history will rest local. The common history consists of the local histories being made by the unique chronological cadence.

There are the next question: the formalisation in the national State does reflect correctly and exhaustively the structure of transcendent subject as the creator of history? Will be the future historical time necessarily national (as in the modernity), or it will find out the new ways? Or maybe it will return to the pre-modern forms? When Huntington evokes civilizations he admits the possibility of emergent localities and local identities being different than nation States. The civilizations are cultural and religious communities – not the national ones. We could imagine the step backward – in the pre-national direction (Islamic integration); the step forwards – in the post-national direction (European Union or Eurasian Union); or we could tolerate the civilization in the form of national State (so with India, China or Turkey).The historical narratives and political formalisations of the time could be somewhere changed. It means there is the lot of work that should be done historically. When someone is alive he could change not only the future but also the past. The gesture or meaningful motion accomplished in the present will add new sense to the past. Only after resolute death the past of someone

become the property of other. Hence the history of peoples, societies and cultures is open they could make the amazing and dazzling turn obliging the conceive their past in the new perspective. So the history is music and the work of Muse.

Are the civilizations destined to shock with each other? It is not sure: the history has not linear rules. Difference doesn't mean automatically the shock and struggle. The history knows the war. The history knows the peace as well. The war and peace were always. The war and peace will always be. They serve torelive the tension, the stress of present. They liberate and subjugate the horror and the death.

The pure war and pure peace are equally murderous.

The continuation of the history of local societies will lead to the preservation of the being and hence to the possibility of the future to happen.

The second option is globalization. It cancels the future. It requires the arrival of post-human. It constructs post-world consisting of simulacra and virtual structures. In place of transcendental subject, Dasein, society becomes a huge computer center, a matrix, a supercomputer. Instead of time its doubles make appearance. The doubles of the past, present and future. Counterpart of the past is a false memory, the product of artificial influence on the historical recalling. Blockade of the transcendental subject allows you to change the past as alternate video disc in player. An alternate version of society could be loaded as prequel. It is technically possible - the substitution of the past. Sufficient control over the present allows it to be produced easily.

Substitution of the future follows this manipulation. Two disparate tracks mixed one with another produce the cacophonic repercussions in the future. Future is stoned, the semantic of time blurs, forks, triplicates.

To deal with the present is a little more complicated and sophisticated. To remove it, we should not simply block transcendental subjectivity, we must eradicate it . That presumes the transition from the human to the post-human.

The working on the genome, the cloning, the enhancement of the robots and the new generations of cyborg – all this is close enough to the advenement of the post-human. The goal is to produce the creatures that would lack existential dimension with zero subjectivity. The simulacra can be made not only of the reason but also of the inconsciousness. The most important operation is the abolition of the present. Non-human creatures - animals, vehicles, plants, stones and so on – don't know the taste of present.

If globalization continues, what is the fate of the subjectivity?

What is the ontology of the future that (probably) will never happen?

Here we could suggest one no orthodox theory.

Let us assume that the multipolarity disappeared, the history ended and the project of globalization has become a reality. How will be organized the final exorcism of transcendental subjectivity? How will be implemented "the final decision" concerning the abolition of Dasein? After all, as long as a society and a man are present they should make this decision regarding themselves. It is impossible to make appeal to the someone *othe*r which could be to blame for that or praised. The reference to the other is acceptable only when we have the same. If we are going to loose any identity, we will no more have tha alterity. So the end of histoty is made by us and concerns ourselves and nobody else.

So the figure of other being excluded there rests to explain how the man can accomplish the last gesture of auto-dissolution and how can he transfer initiatives of existence to the posthuman world, that will disappear immediately after last man – there wiil be no more the witness.

This is a great problem, and requires even deeper insight into the structure of the transcendental subject that generates time and its types.

Nobody else can make decisions about how to reset the time and its liquidation. And of the self liquidation by the way. Of the final self-immolation by the exaltation of a short circuit. Hence, the subject itself carries in himself the possibility of such a chronocide plan.

Globalization and the end of the story can not be reduced to the will of someone who would have been different from the one who is the source of the time. At least in limits of immanent philosophy. Consequently, this means only one thing: in the depths of transcendental subjectivity, there is another layer to which Husserl had not dug. Husserl was convinced that one discovered by him was the last. But it turns out that it wasn't. There had to be another dimension around, the most hidden one.

We can designate it as the Radical Subject.

If Husserl's transcendental subjectivity constitutes reality through the experience of self-referencing manifestation, Radical Subject is to be found not on th way out, but by the way in.

He shows itself only in the moment of ultimate historic catastrophe, in the drastic experience of «short circuit» that lasts for a moment longer and mightier than it is possible to endure.

The same experience that makes the transcendental subjectivity manifest itself and deploy its content creating thus the time and with its intrinsic music is regarded by Radical Subject as the invitation to show itself by in the different manner – in the other side of the time. For him the time – in all forms and configurations – is nothing more than a trap, the trick, the bogus, delaying the real decision. For Radical Subject not only the virtuality and network but already reality is the prison, the concentration camp, the suffering, the torture. The mild dozing of the history is something contrary to the condition where he could be, complete itself, become. All creation of the subjectivity being the secondary formation of temporality is the obsctacle for its pure will.

If we accept the hypothesis of Radical Subject we acquire immediately the instance that explains us who has taken the decision of the globalization, the suicide of humanity and the end of history; who has conceived this plan and brought it in the reality. It can be therefore the drastic gesture of Radical Subject interested in the liberation from time and in the construction of non-temporal (impossible) reality. The Radical Subject is incompatible with all kinds of the

time. He vehemently demands the anti-time, based on the exalted fire of eternity transfigurated in the radical light.

When everybody is gone there rests only those that could not be gone. Maybe that is the reason of greatest probation.

CHAPTER 7. GLOBAL TRANSITION
AND ITS ENEMIES

"What are the historical, political, ideological and economic factors and actors that now define the dynamics and configuration of power in the world and what is the U.S. position in what is known as the New World Order?"

The World Order Questioned

The New World Order (NWO) as a concept was popularized in a concrete historical moment, precisely when the cold war ended in the late 1980's and genuine global cooperation between the USA and Soviet Union was considered not only possible, but very probable. The basis of the NWO was presumably a realization of convergence theory predicting the synthesis of the Soviet socialist and Western capitalist political forms and close cooperation of the Soviet Union and USA in the case of regional issues – for example first Gulf War in the beginning of 1991. However, as the Soviet Union collapsed soon after this, the project of a NWO was naturally set aside and forgotten.

After 1991 the other World Order was considered to be something under formation before our very eyes – a Unipolar World with the open global hegemony of the USA. It is described well in Fukuyama's political utopia, 'The End of History'. This world order ignored all other poles of power except the USA, with its allies; Europe and Japan. It was conceived as a universalization of free market economics, political democracy, and human rights ideology as the global system accepted by all countries in the world.

Skeptics, however, thought that this was rather illusionary and that the differences between countries and peoples would reappear in other forms, for example, in Samuel Huntington's infamous 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis, or ethnic or religious conflicts.

Some experts, in particular John Mearsheimer, regarded unipolarity not as a 'proper' world order but, rather, as 'unipolar momentum'.

In any case, what is questioned in all these projects is the existing order of nation-states and national sovereignty. The Westphalian system no longer corresponds to the current global balance of powers. New actors of transnational and subnational scale are affirming their growing importance and it is evident that the world is in need of a new paradigm of international relations.

So, the actual contemporary world cannot be regarded as a properly-realized NWO. There is no definitive world order of any kind. What we have instead, is the *transition* from the world order we knew in the 20th century to some other paradigm whose features are yet to be fully defined. Will the future really be global? Or will regionalist tendencies dominate? Will there be one unique world order? Or will there instead be various local or regional orders? Or, perhaps, what we are going to have to deal with is global chaos? It is not yet clear. The *transition* is not accomplished. We are living in the middle of it.

If the global elite, and first of all the US political and economic elite, has a clear vision of the future, which is is rather doubtful, circumstances may and can prevent the realization of it in practice. If, however, the global elite lack a consensual project – the issue becomes much more complicated.

So only the fact of *transition* to some new paradigm is certain. The paradigm as such is to the contrary, quite uncertain.

World Order from the US Point of View

The position of the USA during this shift is absolutely assured but its long-term future is under question. The US is now

undergoing the test of its global imperial rule and has to deal with many challenges – some of them quite new and original. This could proceed in three different ways:

Creation of an American Empire *stricto sensu* with a consolidated and technically and socially developed central area, or imperial core, with the periphery kept divided and fragmentized in a state of permanent unrest, near chaos. The neo-cons, it would seem, are in favor of such a pattern.

Creation of multilateral unipolarity where the USA would cooperate with other friendly powers (Canada, Europe, Australia, Japan, Israel, Arab allies, and possibly other countries) in solving regional problems and putting pressure on 'rogue states' (such as Iran, Venezuela, Belarus, or Northern Korea) or preventing other powers from achieving regional independence and hegemony (China, Russia, etc). It would seem that the democrats and President Obama are inclined to this vision.

Promotion of accelerated globalization with the creation of a world government and swift de-sovereignization of nation-states in favor of the creation of a 'United States' of the world ruled by the global elite on legal terms (for example - the CFR project represented by the strategy of George Soros and his foundations). The colored revolutions are viewed here as the most effective weapon of destabilizing and finally destroying states).

The US often seems to be simultaneously promoting all three strategies at the same time, as part of a multi-vector foreign policy. These three strategic directions of the USA create the global context in international relations, the USA being the key actor on a global scale. Beyond the evident differences of these three images of the future, they have some essential points in common. In any case, the USA is interested in affirming its strategic, economic and political domination; in strengthening the control or other global actors and in weakening them; in the gradual or accelerated de-sovereignization of what are now more or less independent states; in the promotion of supposedly 'universal' values reflecting the values of the Western

world, i.e. liberal democracy, parliamentarianism, free markets, humans rights, and so on.

Therefore we face a contemporary world in a strong and seemingly permanent geopolitical arrangement where the US is the Core and where the rays of its influence (strategic, economical, political, technological, informational and so on) permeate all the rest of the World, depending of the strength of their will to accept or reject it in the case of different countries, ethnic or religious particulars. It is a kind of 'global imperial network' operating on a planetary scale.

This USA-centric global geopolitical arrangement can be described on several different levels:

Historically, the USA considers itself to be the logical conclusion and the peak of Western civilization. Once it was presented in terms of the 'Manifest Destiny' of the USA and then the Monroe Doctrine. Now they speak in terms of enforcement of 'universal' human rights norms, promotion of democracy, technology, and free market institutions and so on. But in essence we simply deal with an updated version and continuation of Western universalism that has been passed down from the Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, Modernity with the Enlightenment and colonization, and up to the present-day postmodernism and ultra-individualism. History is considered to be a univocal and monotone process of technological and social progress, the path of growing liberation of individuals from all kinds of collective identities. Tradition and conservatism are thus regarded as obstacles for freedom and should be rejected. The USA is in the vanguard of this historical progress and has the right, obligation, and historical mission to move history further and further. The historical existence of the US coincides with the course of human history. So, 'American' means 'universal'. The other cultures have either an American future or no future at all.

Politically: there are very important trends in global politics that define the *transition*. The peak of the political thought of Modernity was the victory of liberalism over the alternative political doctrines of Modernity: fascism and socialism. Liberalism has gone global and become the only possible political system. It is now progressing

further towards a post-modern and post-individual concept of politics, generally described as post-humanism. The USA again plays here the key role. The form of politics promoted globally by the USA is liberal democracy. The US supports the globalization of liberalism, thus preparing the next step to political post-modernity as described in *Empire*, the famous book by Negri and Hardt. There remains some distance between liberal ultra-individualism and properly postmodern post-humanism, promoting cybernetics, genetic modification, cloning and the chimeras. But the world's Periphery we still faces the universalizing process – the accelerated destruction of any holistic social entities, the fragmentation and atomization of society including via technology (internet, mobile phones, social networks), where the principle actor is strictly the individual, divorced from any natural and collective social context.

An important testimony to the dual use of democracy promotion has been explicitly described in an article by the American military and political expert, Stephen R. Mann[1], who affirmed that democracy can work as a self-generating virus, strengthening existing and historically ripe democratic societies, but destroying and immersing in chaos traditional societies not properly prepared for it. So democracy is thought to be an effective weapon to create chaos and to govern the dissipating world cultures from the Core emulating and installing the democratic codes everywhere. Evidence of this process can be seen in the chaotic aftermath of the heady events of the so-called 'Arab Spring'. After accomplishing the full fragmentation of societies to individualization and atomization, the second phase will begin: the inevitable division and dissolution of the individual human itself via technology and genetic tinkering to create a 'posthumanity'. This 'post-politics' can be seen as the last horizon political futurism.

Ideologically: There is a tendency for the US to increasingly link ideology and politics in their relations with the periphery. Before, US foreign policy acted on the basis of pure pragmatic realism.

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[1] Mann, Stephen R. (1992). "Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought," Parameters 2U3, Autumn.

If the regimes were pro-US they were tolerated without regard to their ideological principles. The longstanding US-Saudi Arabia alliance represents the perfect example of this foreign policy realism in practice. Thus some features of this schizophrenic and dual morality were ideologically accepted. However, It seems that recently the US has began to try to deepen democracy, supporting popular revolts in Egypt and Tunisia whose leaders were trusted allies of the US as well as corrupt dictators. The double standards in the US's political ideology are slowly vanishing and the deepening of democracy progresses. The culminate point will be reached in the case of probable unrest in Saudi Arabia. At this moment the practice of democracy promotion on an ideological basis, including in politically difficult and inconvenient circumstances, will be tested.

Economically: The US economy is challenged by Chinese growth, energy security and scarcity, crippling debt and budget deficits, and the critical divergence and disproportion between the financial sector and the zone of real industry. The overgrowth or bubble of the American financial institutions and the delocalization of industry have created a discontinuity between the sphere of money and the sphere of the classical capitalist balance of industry supply and consumer demands. This was the main cause of the financial crisis of 2008. The Chinese political-economy is trying to reestablish its independence from US global hegemony and may become the main factor of economic competition. Russia, Iran, Venezuela and some other relatively independent countries control over large reservoirs of the world's remaining natural resources puts a limit on American economic influence. The economy of the EU and Japanese economic potential represent two possible poles of economic competition to the US inside the economic and strategic framework of the West.

The USA attempts to solve these problems using not only purely economic instruments, but also political and, at times, military power, as well. We could thus interpret the invasion and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the interventions overt and covert in Libya, Iran and Syria from a geoeconomic and well as geopolitical perspec-

tive. Promotion of domestic political opposition and insurgents in Russia, Iran and China are another similar method towards the same goal. But these are only technical solutions. The main challenge is how to organize the post-modern and finance-centric economy with continued growth, overcoming the widening critical gap between the real economy and the financial sector whose logic and self-interest become more and more autonomous.

It has been asserted that the USA is the main and asymmetric actor in the center of the present *transition* state of world affairs. As Vidrine has noted, this actor is a true hyperpower and the strong current geopolitical arrangement that includes all the levels and networks examined above is structured around this American Core. The question raised here, then is: Is this actor fully conscious of what it does and does it fully understand what it will obtain at the end, that is, which form of international system or world order it is going to achieve? Opinions on this important point are divided. The neocons proclaiming the New American Century are optimistic as to the future American Empire, but in their case it is obvious that they have a clear, if not necessarily realistic, vision of an American dominated future In this case the world order will be an American Imperial Order based on unipolar geopolitics. At least theoretically, it has one redeeming point: it, at least, is clear and honest about its goals and intentions.

The multilateralists are more cautious and insist on the necessity to invite the other regional powers to share the burden of global hegemony with the USA. It is obvious that only societies similar to the USA can be partners, so the success of democracy promotion becomes an essential feature. The multilateralists act not only in the name of the USA but also in the name of the West, whose values, are or must be made, universal. Their vision of a future world order dictated by global, but US led, democracy is foggier and not as clearly defined as the neocon's American Empire.

Even hazier is the extreme vision of global governance envisaged by promoters of accelerated globalization. It might be possible to effectively overthrow the existing order of sovereign nation-states

but in many cases, this will only open the door to more archaic, local, religious or ethnic forces and conflicts. The vision of a single open and, by necessity, largely homogenous society on the scale of the earth is so fantastic and utopian that it is much easier to imagine the total chaos and Hobbes' 'War of All Against All' in the state of nature of a world without states.

The visions of possible future world orders from the perspective of the US and West differs among competing factions of American elites, ideologists, and decision makers. The most consequent and well-defined strategy, the neocon's unipolar world order, is at the same time more ethnocentric, openly imperialistic and hegemonic. The other two versions are much more dimly conceived and uncertain. Thus, it is as likely they could lead to an increase in global disorder, as order. Richard Haass has termed the paradigms of an international system according to these two visions, as being characterized by 'non-polarity'.

So the *transition* in question is, in any case, American-centric by its nature and the global geopolitical arrangement is structured so that the main global processes would be moderated, orientated, directed, and sometimes controlled by the unique hyperpower actor performing its work alone or with the help of its Western allies and regional client states.

The World Order from the Non-US Point of View

The Americano-centric world perspective described above, despite being the most important and central global tendency, is not the only one possible. There can be and there are alternative visions of world political architecture that can be taken into consideration. There are secondary and tertiary actors that are inevitable losers in the case of the success of the US-strategies; the countries, states, peoples, and cultures that would lose all, even their own identity, and gain nothing if the USA realized its global aspirations. They are both multiple and heterogeneous, and can be grouped into several different categories.

The first category is composed by the more or less successful nation-states that are not happy to lose their independence to a supranational exterior authority – not in the form of open American hegemony, nor in the Western-centric forms of world government or governance, nor in the chaotic dissolution of a failed international system. There are many such countries – foremost among them China, Russia, Iran, and India, but including many South American and Islamic states. They don't like the *transition* at all, suspecting, with good reason, the inevitable loss of their sovereignty. So, they are inclined to resist the main trends of the global American-centric geopolitical arrangement or adapt to it in such a manner that it would be possible to avoid the logical consequences of its success, be it via an imperialist or globalist strategy. The will to preservation of sovereignty represents the natural contradiction and point of resistance in the face of American/Western hegemonic or globalist trends. Generally speaking, these states lack an alternative vision of the future international system or world order, and certainly do not have a unified or common such vision. What they all want and share in common is a desire to preserve the international status quo as enshrined in the UN Charter and thus their own sovereignty and identity as nation-states in the present form, adjusting and modernizing them as an internal and sovereign process as necessary.

Among this group of nation-states seeking to preserve their sovereignty in the face of US/Western hegemonic or globalist strategies are:

1) Those states who try to adapt their societies to Western standards and to keep friendly relations with the West and USA, but to avoid direct and total de-sovereignization; including India, Turkey, Brazil, and up to a certain point Russia and Kazakhstan.

2) Those states who are ready to cooperate with the USA but under the condition of non-interference in their domestic affairs; such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

3) Those states who, while cooperating with the USA, strictly observe the particularity of their society by permanent filtration of what is compatible in Western culture with their domestic culture

and what is not, and, at the same time, trying to use the dividends received by this cooperation to strengthen their national independence; such as China, and, at times, Russia.

4) Those states who try to oppose the USA directly, rejecting Western values, unipolarity, and US/Western hegemony; including Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea.

However, all of these groups lack an alternative global strategy that could be symmetrically comparable with American visions of the future, even if without consensus or a clearly defined goal. All these states generally act individually on the world state and in their own direct interests. The difference in foreign policy among them consists only in the amount of radicalism in their rejection of Americanization. Their position can be defined as reactive. This strategy of reactive opposition, varying from rejection to adaptation, is sometimes effective, sometimes not. In sum it doesn't give any kind of alternate future vision. Instead, the future of the world order or international system is considered as eternal conservation of the status quo, i.e. – Modernity, nation-states, the Westphalian system of state sovereignty, and strict interpretation and preservation of the existing UN Charter and UN configuration.

The second category of actors who reject the *transition* consists of subnational groups, movements, and organizations that oppose American dominance of the structures of the global geopolitical arrangement for ideological, religious, and/or cultural reasons. These groups are quite different from one another and vary from state to state. Most such are based on the basis of an interpretation of religious faith incompatible with the secular doctrine of Americanization, Westernization, and globalization. But they can also be motivated by ethnic or ideological (for example. socialist or communist) considerations or doctrines. Others may even act on regionalist grounds.

The paradox is that in the process of globalization, which aims to universalize and make uniform all particularities and collective identities on the basis of a purely individual identity, such subnational actors easily become transnational – the same religions and

ideologies often being present in different nations and across state borders. Thus, among these non-state actors we could potentially find some alternative vision of the future world order or international system that can stand opposed to the American/Western led *transition* and its structures.

We can roughly summarize the different ideas of some of the more important sub-national/trans-national groups as follows:

The most recognized is the Islamist world vision which represents the utopia of an Islamic World State or global Caliphate. This project is as opposed as to the American-led transitional architecture as it is to the existing status quo of modern nation-states. Osama Bin Laden remains symbolic and archetypal of such ideas, and the attacks which brought down the towers of the World Trade Center in New York on 9/11, and which are supposed to have 'changed the world', are proof of the importance of such networks and the seriousness with which they must be taken.

Another such project can be defined as the transnational neo-socialist plan represented in the South American Left and personally by Hugo Chavez. This is roughly a new edition of the Marxist critic of capitalism, strengthened by nationalist emotion, and, in some cases, such as the Zapatistas and Bolivia, in ethnic sentiments or Green ecological critiques. Some Arab regimes, such as until recently the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya under Quaddafi, can be considered in the same vein. The vision of the future world order here is presented as global socialist revolution preceded by anti-USA liberation campaigns in every country across the globe. The US/Western-led *transition* is envisioned by this group as an incarnation of the classic imperialism criticized by Lenin.

A third such example can be found in the Eurasianist (aka multipolarity, Great Spaces, or Great Powers) project, proposing an alternative model of world order based on the paradigm of civilizations and Great Powers. It presupposes the creation of different transnational political, strategic, and economic entities united regionally by the community of common civilizational areas and shared values, in some cases religious and in others secular and/

or cultural. They should consist of states integrated on regionalist lines and represent the poles of the multipolar world. The European Union is one such example, the nascent Eurasian Union proposed by Russia's Vladimir Putin and Kazakhstan's President Narsultan Nazarbayev, another. An Islamic Union, a South-American/Bolivarian Union, a Chinese Union, an Indian Union, a Pan-Pacific Union are other possibilities. The North-American Great Space, covering today's NAFTA, would be regarded as just one among several other more or less equal poles, nothing more.

This is not an all-inclusive list of such non-state actors or theories with alternate visions of world order. There are others, but they are of smaller scale and thus beyond the scope of this work.

In the present state of world affairs there is a serious divide between the nation-states and the sub-state or transnational actors and ideological movements operating on different levels, mentioned above. The nation-states lack vision and ideology, and the movements lack sufficient infrastructure and resources to put their ideas into practice. If in some circumstance it were possible to bridge that gap, taking into consideration the increasing demographic, economic, and strategic weight of the Non-Western world or 'the Rest', an alternative to the American/Western-led *transition* could obtain realistic shape and be regarded seriously as a consequent and theoretically-founded alternate paradigm of world order.

CHAPTER 8. THE NEW POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: THE POLITICAL MAN AND HIS MUTATIONS

Man as a Function of Politics

What man is, is derived not from him, but from politics. It is politics, being the dispositive of violence and legitimate power that defines the man. It is the political system that gives us our shape. Moreover, the political system has an intellectual, conceptional, power and shape-shifting potential that can turn us into everything. The answer to the anthropological question rests on the configuration of power in the society. The power itself consists of two elements: it is the power to shape the *paradigm*, integrated in the society through state institutions, and the *dispositive of violence*, which serves as a means to integrate this very paradigm into the society in every concrete case. Consequently, the one, controlling power and its structure, controls our concept of the man. The sphere of political anthropology emerges here, the sphere of the political view on the man. But there is also the concept of *the political man*. The difference between these two categories is that the political concept of the man is the concept of the man "as such", which is installed in us by the state or the political system. Whiles the political man is a particular, a proposed way to correlate with this very state. At first the state or the political system installs us, and then it grants or takes away our rights.

However, on the pre-conceptional level, on the level of political anthropology, it takes to install us to give (or to take away) our rights, to add (or remove) a political status. We believe that we are causa sui, and only then we find ourselves in the sphere of politics.

In fact it is politics that constitutes us. Whether we are given birth in a maternity hospital or in an open field, whether we are carried into an electrified ward or a dark smoky hut later, depends on politics. Politics grants us our political status, our name, our anthropological structure. The man's anthropological structure shifts when one political system changes to another. Consequently, the political man, the political anthropology is given another shape after the conversion from the traditional society to the modern society. If we remain in the bounds of the conventional polit-anthropological structures, which were described rather in detail in the textbook "The Philosophy of Politics", we may set a stress on two notions. First of all, we may say: "Look, how tremendous the shift in the political anthropology, resulted from the conversion from the traditional state to the modern state, is". We may be astonished by it, we may be amazed, as along with political institutes the man mutates on the fundamental level. But later we inevitably encounter the fact that right now we are in the state of the shift from the political mode of modernity to post-modernity and we realize that a completely new sight surrounds us. It becomes clear from our perspective,that the parameters of both the traditional and modern society interflow. In fact, the political man, Homo Politicus, the political animal was postulated in both of these paradigms. Of course, on the pole of Modernity we have the rational autonomous individual, and we have a particle of a certain holistic ensemble on the other pole. As for postmodernity, it declares that there are no differences as such between these two types of society, politics and concepts of the man. It matters not, whether this very man is constituted according to the liberal individualistic approach or by the holistic eidos, it is the Man which is the outcome.

The Boundaries of Post-anthropology
and the Origin of Post-politics

At this very stage we are able to single out completely new signs of the man, constituted by the politics of post-modernity: depolitisation, autonomisation, microscopisation, sub- and transhumanisation.

That is, today the man is not regarded as a whole – his parts are considered to be independent. It is his desires, emotions, moods and inclinations that matter. At the same time, on the one hand the attention is transferred from the individual to sub=individual level, and on the other hand, the sub-individual level merges with other sub-individualities, that is it enters the domain of the trans-individual. A contemporary discotheque, chaos, can be regarded as a metaphor for this trans-individuality. It is possible to distinguish between pairs, figures, passes, expressions, sexes during quadrille or even rock-n-roll dance, which is late Modernity. But as for discotheque, there are creatures of uncertain sex, undefined appearance, and vague identity, slowly and regularly shaking to the tact of music. Moreover, the shaking has an over-individual nature: the people aren't shaking, they are being shaken. What shakes each concrete discotheque visitor, shakes the others. In this case, are all they shaking together? No, their parts are shaking simultaneously, giving in to a common resonator. Something like this is happening in politics: the de-individualisation of the individual and the sub- and transindividualisation of political institutions and structures.

Thus, we are confronting a completely new politics, which essence is the denial of politics as a certain distinct political authoritative line. No matter how we solve the question of power (as to whom it belongs – to the elite, to the caste, to the priests, to the warriors, or to the democratic parliament), - it will still be a formalization of political relations. Interests, positions, levels, statuses, roles are always visible. We are dealing with a political society (modern or traditional). But if one proposes to remove the question of power, if one says there is no such concept, if we are ordered to withdraw this question, if the notion of the subject of the political process is forbidden, it will be ousted by a rhizomatic entity, which Negry and Hardt name "multitude". These "multitudes" act for both subject and authority. Consequently, the concept of the State is replaced by the concept of the post-State. What is the post-State? It is the notion of the abolition of the State. The process of the demonization of the State starts, which basis is the thesis that the state interferes with pri-

vate property. The state becomes a swearword sometime late, and its abolition becomes an obvious measure. After that, everything that interferes with absolute freedom is abolished.

In the end, all forms of vertical symmetry (the orientation "top-bottom", hierarchy) are subjected to destruction, and it becomes horizontal. Similarly, the vertical line of power and the state becomes horizontal, and thus the political anthropology, implying this or that constitution of the individual, dissipates and disperses in the space of rhizomatic dust. One could call it apolithea. But if it really were apolithea, we would observe a gradual fading of the Political, its entropy. But we are not speaking about apolithea or indifference towards politics. We encounter a deliberate, axiological trend. That is the liquidation of political structures, or the structure of the political, if we include the structures of both political Pre-modernity and Modernity there. That is, while confronting Postmodernity, both of them are rejected. At the same time, to actively denounce the Political, political will is required. It turns out that Postmodernity is loaded with political meaning. And at that, it is loaded with an imperious, epistemologically obsessional and the obligatory political meaning of a-politization. That is, this is not pure entropy of the political structure, it's a revolutionary contr-project, a theoretical scheme of political postanthropology. And the core of this postanthropology is, of course, this rhizomatic sub and trans-individual network. It is this dispersed nebula of multitude that is deliberately destroying the structures of the will that belong to the Political (das Politische) in its classical Schmitt meaning.

The Core Subjects of Postpolitics

Today we may sum the situation up in this way: we add the destructive, corrosion strategy of political post-modernity (possessing the same authoritative, offensive dispositive) into the sphere of the Political (which is Schmitt's classical politics, including Pre-modernity and Modernity), and we receive politics in its widest meaning, in its absolute meaning. This is the Absolute Political (absolut

Politische) in the boundaries of which we can place two basic an-
thropological models. It sounds natural: on the one hand we are
dealing with the contemporary man, constructed by the Political,
struggling against politics as such, that is the aforesaid "shaker"
from House – discotheque. He has his blog, his presence on the TV,
he pretends he votes for the opposition (that is, he latently identi-
fies himself with the destructive, anti-state political trend, even if
he doesn't have a well-thought political conception). That is, when
confronting any integral political concept, he starts saying "no", his
advance is very aggressive, and it creates a specifically aimed radial
influence. The other figure is the political soldier (Das politische
Soldat). "The political soldier" is a different concept, formed in the
30-ties, which is a personality, summing up what we have called the
classical approach to das Politische, the classical approach to the Po-
litical. Its definition is very picturesque: the political soldier differs
from the common one in the fact that he kills and dies for politics.
His killing and personal death become an existential element of the
manifestation of the Political, thus, for him the Political acquires
the existential dimension. The politician, unlike the political soldier,
deals with the Political, but doesn't kill or die for it. When the politi-
cian confronts death and murder, he says: "No, I'd better rethink my
convictions".

This is a wonderful romantic image, employed by Modernity and
the XX century, where we could see these splendid political soldiers.
Nietzsche's words can illustrate their role in the history of the XX
century: "Today, in the XIX century, people make wars for resources
and material values, but I foresee a time when they will be killing
each other for ideas". Where is this time? It's in the XX century.
All this century was filled with political soldiers killing each other
for their beliefs. They killed and were killed. Besides, every tradi-
tional society (like that of Genghis Khan's) was founded by political
soldiers. The Russian Empire was also built by political soldiers.
Modernity was very sensitive to this figure. They say the political
soldier fights for only elevated and spiritual ideas. But that is not the
case. Even a liberal can become a political soldier (although there is

nothing spiritual or noble in liberal ideas). He may die for quite fishy ideas, but he remains a political soldier, and that is very important. The political soldier is an instrumental notion, don't hyperbolize it. It's a charming, but technical position of Modernity.

We believe that on the level of political anthropology this political soldier is confronting the decomposed rhizomatic posthuman android. We register this reading, and it may seem that we are ready to throw away our ideological differences for the political soldier to confront postmodern world. But my thesis is that from the perspective of the phase shift, we are living in a society where this conflict is possible, but, at the same time, the outcome of which is predetermined. In fact the figure of the political man is removed. And his anthropological space is being occupied by a new personality, a very cunning and fishy personality, which is not the political soldier, but, at the same time, is not related to the hissing, rhizomatic Twitter-sub-individual. This personality is the political man's simulacrum. It's something that imitates the political soldier, in the same way as Postmodernity imitates Modernity. In the final analysis, the readings do not give us the "human vs posthuman" picture. What we see is the undisguised rotten liberal posthuman and the pseudo-human, the pseudo-soldier, within whom the general phase substance of history found itself. That's why we have this phenomenon of contemporary fascism, which is an excellent illustrator of this condition. Every last bit of the fascism, that constituted the structure of the political soldier, ran out in 1945. Each and every declared fascist after 1945 is a simulacrum. The liberals' fears, taking the form of fascists, is a complete parody, they don't differ much from decomposed and half-dissolved masses. Communism (which has held out longer that fascism) created its simulacrum within itself. The late communists already were pseudo-political soldiers. Today there are no chances for communism to return to life, the same goes for fascism. Just a little more time, and we will see that liberalism rests nearby. At least our liberals demonstrate it (who are not liberals at all): give them some money, and they will declare everything. We are dealing with entities, lacking the classical political anthropology.

The Fatalism of Postanthropology and Angelpolis.

As for me, we are dealing with Deleuze's "fold": we have the confrontation of postpolitical anthropology and the pseudo-political soldier. In this case, the antithesis of the post-human is the non-human. If we face it, we will get a very complex and intriguing perspective. It's either phantasmagoric despair, to which Baudrillard, describing the world with radical post-historical categories, gave away, or the feeling that we are not satisfied with this fold, this postanthropological perspective. However, if we do grasp the fatality of this pair we are discussing, we will cool down. Having raised the question of anthropology we must look for a solution, and at the same time we must acknowledge this postanthropology, that is, not to wait for the coming to come, but to consider that it is here. What do we get in this perspective? I think that Schmitt, who have created the classical approach to the Political, might give us some hints. He spoke about political theology. Schmitt said that all political ideologies and systems are integral theological models with religions, dogmatic, institutions, and rites of their own. That is why to understand politics one must grasp it as a certain religious phenomenon. But political theology presupposes the existence of the political telos, which can be human-made, like Gobbs's Leviathan, or it can be of non-human making, like the catholic model of "imperium", which was near Schmitt's heart. Naturally, in the post-anthropological structure, in Postmodernity, this appeal to telos as a political factor which unfolds the system into an integral theology, won't me much of a help, as we have crossed the boundaries of political theology.

It is impossible to speak about political anthropology while describing the post-anthropological model of today's politics. We are forbidden to speak about an integral political theology because we have witnessed this fundamental mutation if the fold. What are we allowed to speak about? Because you know, we have political processes, sources of power and dispositives of influence, we observe paradigmatic epistems, which are pushed and promoted in the same way as they were in the frames of classical politics. They remain

here, they are staying, and it means that the Political in its wider sense is here, it's just that neither man nor God is there. Who is the actor of this post-politics? There is a certain hypothesis, that I call the concept of *Angelopolis*, ('the city of Angels') or *Angelpoliteia* (angelic politics), that is a turn from political theology to political angelology. What we mean, is that the sphere of the Political is starting to be controlled by and is starting to ground on the confrontation of over-human entities. That is neither human, nor divine (or not divine at all). Angelopolis possesses a huge potential to distribute political roles without taking humanoids and post-humanoids into the account. You probably think that the man sends an SMS, but it's the SMS that sends itself. Considering the growing level of the standardization and stereotyping of these messages, its over-individual essence is getting more and more evident.

There really is a command center in Postpolitics, there are actors, there are decisions, but they are totally dehumanized in Postmodernity, they are beyond the frames of anthropology. We can find a certain proof of this hypothesis in traditional teachings, in traditional eschatologies, which state that the End Times won't be triggered by the human hand, that it will stand still prior to the final hour. The rest will not depend on the man, that will be a war of angels, a war of gods, a confrontation of entities, not tied by historical or economic laws and patterns, which don't identify themselves with religions or certain political elites. And this angelic war can be thought over politically. That is Angelopolis, or Politische Angelologie, which I bring forward as a concept, devoid of mysticism and esotericism, which has the same sense and nature as Schmitt's metaphor of "political theology". Political angelology must be thought over as a metaphor which is both scientific and rational. Angelopolis is a method to understand, to interpret and to make hermeneutical deciphering of the contemporary processes, which surround us and are regarded as being alienated from the political anthropology, from human as a specie, a politically institutionalized and constituted notion.

CHAPTER 9. FOURTH POLITICAL PRACTICE

Having chosen this subject of a seminar I realized a very simple plan. The plan is based on the following idea: if we have Fourth Political Theory as some concept, set of concepts and theoretical definition, we should have the realization of this political theory because every theoretical construction either can be brought to life, or cannot because of some circumstances.

So, I conceived of a rather simple and primitive idea – if we theorize and talk about the Fourth Political Theory, we should also think about how it could be realized in practice. However, when I almost had come around the necessity of enunciating some proposals on realization of the Fourth Political Theory some halting happened. It has happened because Fourth Political Theory strains to finish up with the political topography of Modernity and with all implicit hidden there dualistic models in accordance. I've made a scheme representing the correlation between the theory and the practice in different fields of knowledge: science, metaphysics, religion, philosophy, technologies and common use. I've got two columns concerning "Term 1" and "Term 2". First column contains all that about theory, and the other one is about practice range.

Field	Term 1	Term 2
science	theory (contemplation)	practice (things)
metaphysics	principle	manifestation
religion	myth	ritual
philosophy	mentality	activity
technology	idea (project)	realization (implementation)
common use	thinking	action

Of course, contemplation of these columns by itself can bring us to some very interesting conclusions starting with the question what is theory in the terms of science (i.e. contemplation, vision) and what is praxis (the term, formed after greek "pragma", i.e. object, objectification, acting). When the problem of what is "thing" ("res", hereof "reality") had been arised few years ago, the attempts to come across the conterpart of this basic term in contemporary philosophy led to the revelation that there's no acceptable adequation of this Latin word in Greek at all. There is a "pragma" as an "action" and the "act" at the same time, it is an active object, but not accomplished as we consider it to be. And there is an "existent" after Aristotel, which is expounded as "res" in further Latin translations.

Therefore, there is no such a word "thing" in Greek and it is very important, because it means that the concept of the reality is also absent. Reality is formed on the base of "res", reality is a property of "res", reality is (whose? what?) – something referred to the thing, "thingness". Therefore, there are Greek words "pragma", "existent" and "practice" for Latin "res". "Pragma" is the action and the object at the same time.

It is very interesting: the whole Greek metaphysics evolves between "theory" as contemplation and "action" (praxis) keeping short of severe Latin subjectivity, "thingness" hidden in the term of "res".

If we amplify mentioned duality of the aforecited chart we would come across Guenon's model of "priciple-manifestation". Notably that manifestation here is more close to the practice, but not to the something manifested; we can see the activity at the second term. If we make some more further profounds in history and sociology of religion we would come across functionalism and human sociology of Malinovsky where mentioned division between myth and ritual exists.

Let's remember original Greek definition of myth: myth is some story being told during the rithual. The duality of myth and ritual is one of the basic items both in history of religion and social antropology and it is extensively discussed. Then we go to philosophy and we see "mentalty-activity" (this pair of terms is much alike "theory-

practice") And finally, technology is rather simple – this is the duality of project and its realization.

So, we have two columns. If Fourth Political Theory expands the first column "Term 1", then we should probably find some specify concept in for the Fourth Political Practice to expand the column "Term 2" in accordance with it. If Fourth Political Theory was an ideovariation or some combination of the elements of political theories of Modern, we should have done that strictly. I mean, if we create additional concept made-up of the same elements and based on the the same topograhy as political ideologies of Modern are, we should talk about the column "Term 2"

And generally, it would be interesting to do that because talking about semantic fields associated with Fourth Political Theory in connection with column "Term 2" could be very resourceful. But I leave this problem for somebody else and suggest another way.

The point is in that fact, that if we talk about the very core of the Fourth Political Theory and it's fundamental problems we would comprehend that the main idea of the Fourth Political Theory is to wander off the dualism between the subject and the object, between intention and realization and from the dual topography which philosophy of Modern, science of Modern and politology of Modern are based on.

It is no mere chance that we talk about Dasein as about the subject of political theory. Dasein is the instance, suggested and proposed by Heidegger as an aspiration to overcome the subject-object dualism that is an aspiration to find the root of ontology.

Let's remind that Heidegger mentioned the "inzwischen", i.e. "between" while talking about existence of Dasein. The principal character of Dasein is being "between". Dasein is «inzwischen». We shouldn't use the system of classical political dualism, the scientific topography of both New and Aristotle's time while talking about Fourth Political Theory and presuming that fact that the subject and the core, the basic instance of the Fourth Political Theory pole is Dasein

Talking about Fourth Political Practice we should act in another way considering Heidegger's critics of forming up non-fundamental onthology, i.e. onthology as is. Heidegger said that if we want to understand Dasein we should realize and form up fundamental ontology which would not lose contact with ontic roots of Dasein and would not ascend or sublimate (sooner or later) to anything correlated with 2000years old (if we follow the way from Platon or even latest Pre-Socratic philosophers up to Nietzsche) general philosophical construction on which Modern time is based on.

We should centralize Dasein as the center and the pole of Fourth Political Theory. What does it mean in the context of practice? It means that we shouldn't qualify Dasein neither as theoretical construction, nor as principle. Should we use it like a myth, like a narrative? It may be so because it is much closer, but it should be carefully thought over. We shouldn't exactly use it like a mentality (at least as onthologic mentality). We cannot exactly use it like idea or anything concerning the subject.

Keeping this universal and pre-dualistic status of Dasein at Heidegger's philosophy in our mind I want to suggest to refer to some root, to something that antecede this dualism to define Fourth Political Practice. In other words – where's that something interesting, what is the center of Fourth Political Practice? This is something between the columns, between "Term 1" and "Term 2". But I don't mean their's combination or happy medium. Nothing at all. Happy medium is a nonsense that we should keep away from. We should not look for happy medium or compromise of column 1 and column 2 polarity, but we should find the root these pairs grow from, their common root. From the point of Dasein analytics both subject and object are ontological constructions, grown from "between", "inzwischen" ontic.

So, we are interested in that kind of instance both theory and practice appeared from, the instance where theory and practice are not divided yet and, a fortiori, are not opposite. We are interested in that kind of instance both principle and manifestation have common root at (they can never have common root, not for a moment, and

that is the most interesting for us), that kind of instance myth and rithual are not channeled off yet at and that kind of instance mentality and activity are common at, where idea means relization and realization is idea, and where thinking and acting have one source.

We are interested in this very intermediate level not achieved by horizontal attitude toward these pairs, but only by new non-horizontal dimension. Unlike Hegelianism, Marxism, communicational theory and whole modern structure in principle we are not interested in anything upon the line between theory and practice. We are looking for something that does not belong to horizontal subspace or to some ratio configuration of the columns or to the line between theory and practice. We are interested at something hidden under the theory and practice, somewhere in their common root they both grow up from. From this point of view the question of priority of either conscience or matter during the Soviet period is absolutely idiotic. The priority for us is the problem of the common root and we should grow Fourth Political Theory and Practice from this root.

Having subtracted this instance as basic we can say that Fourth Political Theory is the theory to the same degree as it is the practice and it is the practice to the same degree as it is the theory.

In other words, if we can feel the "between" related with depth over these two columns, if we can seize geometry of this political vector (that is, of course, philosophical and metaphysical vector for real) we will see that these two trees grow up from the same root.

If we fix on the subject of Fourth Political Theory, i.e. Dasein, or what is "inzwischen", we will understand that it does not belong to the horizontal disposition between these two columns. Why do we talk about roots but not head? This is very serious and deep moment because we should realize the reduction. If we realize horizontal reduction first and we get unsatisfactory result, we will reach a conclusion to realize vertical reduction, to move towards ontic roots but not ontological heights. So we should postpone such items as spirit and divine dimension and move toward chaos and other vertical and depth oriented items.

Nietzsche said "The cognizer hesitantly step into the water not when it is dirty but when it is shallow". According to that how can we try to form a clear view of what Fourth Political Practice is? - Having reversed the order of these two columns at least! We should obtain practice as theory, take principle as manifestation, mentality as activity and thinking as action. What is the Fourth Political Practice. It is a contemplation. What is the manifestation of the Fourth Political Practice? It is a principle to be revealed. In what aspect the myth is realized as a rithual? It becomes teurgical fact (let's recognize that neoplatonic teurgy is vivification of the statues) What is activity as mentality? It is a suggestion that thoughts are magic, that thoughts can change the reality; it is a suggestion that thoughts replace reality by fact. Fourth Political Practice brings us to the nature of charmed world, to the antithesis of Webber's metaphor in realization of it's technological aspect of the project. What the charmed world is? It is a world where is no barrier between idea and realization. It is a principle of magical attitude to the world itself based on the idea that thinkable is the only one we come across with, and everything we come across is nothing more than a thought. What kind of thought it is? Pure thought. The vehicle of Fourth Political Theory and practice lives in a charmed world. What is "mentactivity"? It is a trans-substance, spirit into body and body into spirit transformation and it is the main problem of hermetism.

So, we came across that fact, that Fourth Political Practice isn't a rough realization of Fourth Political Theory in some space suggested to be different to the space of Fourth Political Practice. There is no more space, no more topos and even no more topology in Fourth Political Practice besides theory; we had annihilated any other spaces before we stated, not in the consummation but in the very beginning, before we started in a per-onthologic context. In other words, we should not look forward (it will never be changed) or backward if we really want to change that squalor we live in, because all that crumbs that have made this ultimate form of degeneration possible and existent have been appeared and stored there. These roots are not mere chance. That scrap-heap we have manifested in is not acci-

dental and has a profound logic. Primordinal metaphysics, primordinality is expressed in technics, modern and post-modern. According to it the only way for real political struggle is appealing to the Fourth Political Practice as to the roots, free from the evolutionary process from the conception to the last point where we are now, because either our political struggle is soteriological and eschatological or it has no sense.

And the last one. Bring to notice, what does it look like: world avoiding any duality? Of course, it looks like Postmodern, like virtuality. Contemporary virtual wired world just says: this is not a theory and not a practice, not a principle and not a manifestation, not a myth and not a rithual, not a thought and not an action. Virtuality is just a spoof on Fourth Political Theory and Practice. It is counterintuitive enough, but this postmodern reality is more close to us then all previous topologies incl. theological and prototheological. Virtuality is closer to that very unique model of Fourth Political Theory and Practice than any other element. And according to that we can raise the question how does our traditionalism or new metaphysics relate to Postmodern. I consider them to be very close. Virtuality tries to mix semantic fields of columns on the horisontal level up to the indistinguishability. We can say that Deleuze's rhizome is postmodern and postsrtucturalism spoof of Heidegger's Dasein. They are alike and they are described with the same words very often. But pay your attention to the fact how does Postmodernism solve the problem of reversing the column's order. It solves the problem by the appealing to the surface and it is the main idea we see at Deleuze's. Remember his interpretation of Artaud's "body without organs", his interpretation of destruction necessity, structure flattening and his interpreation of man's epidermic coat (the skin) as a basis for the screen where image is projected on. It is a point of spoof where Fourth Political Theory and Postmoren meet each other. If columns mix horizontaly some demetia appears, that means madness. We can use the thesis that Homo Integros, i.e. complete integral man consists of Homo Sapiens and Homo Demens. Deleuze says: «Free Homo Demens!». He says that madness should escape from under Homo

Sapiens and realize the transgression between these two columns in political sphere. Here comes "desire machine", here comes rhizomatic process, ionic and chrionical temporality ideas. This Postmodern dementia much alike Fourth Political Theory differs from it only with its principle horizontality and flatness.

So, the main problem of Postmodern is eliminating of any vertical orientation both height and depth. Finally I want to say that the end of times and Eschatological meaning of politics wouldn't realize on their own, we wait for the end for vain. The end will never come if we wait for it and it will nerer come if we don't. It is essential because history, time and reality have special strategies to avoid Judgement Day, or, rather they have a special strategy of a reversionary maneuvere that will make an impression that everybody have taken a grip over themselves, have realized and have understood. This is a huge arsenal of so-called after Heidegger "Noch Nicht". Eternal "not yet.." If Fourth Political Practice will not be anle to realize the end of times it would be invalid. The end of days should be made, it will not come by itself, this is a task, it is not entity, it is active metaphysics, it is a practice. And it can be high-potential and rational solution of enigmatic layers, discovered while talking about Fourth Political Practice.

CHAPTER 10. GENDER IN THE FOURTH POLITICAL THEORY

To begin with let's analyse, what gender tenet is characteristic for three political theories of the Modern. If we attentively look at with what standard figure operates both a socialism, and liberalism, and nationalism, and to a large extent the various forms of what is called a third political theory – fascism, national socialism - we will notice some feature which makes specificity of classical understanding of a gender in all political theories of the Modern. *On the one hand*, it is not originality of the Modern, because Modern follows here the traditional European society (even Pre-Modernistic, Christian), which was primarily patriarchal. Even before Christianity, it was also patriarchal, till those immemorial times which were studied in the Mediterranean by Bachofen in his "Mother Right" (Johann Bachofen, *"Das Mutterrecht"*). In other words, behind Modern, behind Modern's gender is Western or global patriarchy. This patriarchy has influenced gender structure of Modern and political understanding of gender in Modern. But in fact, that patriarchy has undergone certain modifications in the final formulation of gender norms in the political theories of the Modern.

Note that it is accepted to name "a gender" a sociological gender, gender as a social phenomenon. In contrast to the anatomical sex inherent in an animal, the gender is a social convention which can change from a society to a society. At the same time, the political gender - it is the social norm, which is approved as an imperative on the basis of political power. Thus, in archaic societies, only who undergo the initiation can be regarded as a man, otherwise he has no social sex, i.e. a gender, and is deprived man's social functions (marriage, participation in hunting and ritual). Depending on

a society requirements gender tenets change. For example, in some slaveholding societies slaves weren't identified with men, they wore women's clothes. Slaves were used as women because they did not have the social status of men. Hence the phenomenon of castration - deprivation of physical attributes of men on a par with the social. Therefore, gender - it is a social phenomenon and a political one. Political, because we are dealing with the management of social norms, regulated by a society: community, police, the retreat from which leads to a variety of sanctions.

For the three political theories of the Modern ask the question: "Who is the political person, what is the political gender?" First, the person is the man. While from the sociological point of view, the woman became the person more recently, and till now sharply raises the question of the women's political rights. From the viewpoint of Modern, a woman - not the person, not a human being. The person can be a man only, but not every man, and a special social man. The characteristics of a real man: the availability of money, wealth (until the end of the 19th century in Europe, the property requirements was necessary attribute of *citizenship*, ie, a political gender), rationalism / reasonableness (thrift), city dweller (the peasant was not considered mature in the socio-political significance). Thus, on elections in the first State Duma in 1905, the voice of one townsman was equal to 100 peasant's voices. In a Modern peasant - it is not quite person. Another characteristic - maturity, age. These socio-professional and age categories are included in concepts of *a gender* and *gender functions*. The last characteristic is also a man belonging to European civilization, or white skin color. Taken together, this is a political man, *l'home politique*, from an anthropological point of view.

Such gender tenet is an axis for all three political ideologies of the Modern. However, within these ideologies there are differences in relation to this figure of the man. The most "male-affirming" is the theory of liberalism, as considers this figure of the rational, rich, adult white man as the norm and as a natural phenomenon. Liberalism canonize this gender and standardize it, trying to eternize this bourgeois social system, typical of 18-19 cc. Liberalism ascertains

factuality of this gender and projects it on the future: "The modern world is constructed by men, conceived and anticipated by men, and will belong to men, *homo economicus, homo faber*". Such understanding of a gender is undergoing changes with time: the area of gender men increases, the standard archetype begins to involve the peasants, the poor, women, and then the non-white. How does this mechanism is the case of women? To women regulatory properties of "man" start to be attributed: business lady is a woman who manifests male quality, female - citizen, a woman - white. Thus, the woman starts to be thought as the man. So, liberal feminism, or aspiration to give women freedom means to identified a woman with a man and equalize them sociopolitically, that is, represent social a woman as a man. The same procedure is to represent the peasant as city dweller, non-white as white, poor as rich, stupid as reasonable. A woman who sits behind the wheel is a man or a caricature of a man. However, as though liberalism didn't expand the influence, in gender sense it remains adhered to its own archetype.

The second political theory starts with the same position that gender - is a bourgeois political man. But while this situation is criticized, and expressed the need to change this setting. From here there is an idea of total equality, including gender. The concept of gender equality of the second political theory qualitatively differs from understanding of equality in the first political theory. The feminism, or gender egalitarianism of Marxism believes that both men and women who will be engaged in Marxist ideology, as a matter of fact, cease to be men and women who constitute standard and imperative gender pair of liberalism. That is, we see a desire to move beyond gender in bourgeois interpretation. In fact, the man here loses the rationality. So, the Hungarian Neo-Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács said that "the proletariat is in whom the subject and object are the same". Proceeding from such formulation, consistent Marxists call for the insanity, to a schizophrenia, to schizo-revolutionary (Deleuze). They rely on urban poor, the proletarians, who could never become full-fledged bourgeois, they turn to non-white urban strata, however, ignore the country, seeing it through the prism of bour-

geois perception. But on the whole, in the gender policy of communists we see a new tendency: they recognize the gender status quo and offer to change it under the banner of the matter. This means the transgression of bourgeois man in downward direction and the appeal to the material substance (literally "what stands below" -- sub-stare), to the undifferentiated realm of the work, where there is no qualitative difference between the "good cooking woman"[1], the sailor or the masculine hero. Marxists offer even lower down, where nothing is left of gender hierarchies and strategies. Thus, in the most extreme Marxist ideas have a desire to destroy the bourgeois archetype. In reality, however, was different: in Stalin's Russia this man's archetype, the rational, domineering man, despite attempts to recreate gender Marxist equality right after revolution of 1917 has prevailed. But the idea of overcoming of the man through the reference to a body, to the desiring-machine, is characteristic for Marxism.

The fascism accepts known model of townspeople, white, European, reasonable, wealthy man, and exalting it. If liberalism accepts this model as the norm, that fascism begins to fill a man with additional properties. He should be not simply white and the Nordic white, not just reasonable, but the unique reasonable (in the form of that only Germans possess rationality). This is similar to the position of Lévy-Brühl, who postulated that only the Europeans have a logos, and the others guided by pre-logical social structures. Further, the masculinity exalted, and women were urge to be engaged in *kinder, kirchen, küchen*. On periphery other gender tenets were offered also: for example, Julius Evola and his "The Metaphysics of Sex", where it is a question of the superiority of masculine over feminine, argues that the fact that the men are dormant potential Gods, and women are dormant potential Goddesses, but standing a little lower in the hierarchy of the sexes. Also for the third political theory should be mentioned marginal direction associated with the "Nordic matriarchy": there was an ontology of the feminine. Herman Wirth, a dis-

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[1] V.Lenin said once: "Under socialism any good cooking woman could with the same ease rule a state".

ciple of Bachofen, argued that the supreme being is a woman, but woman is completely different from men, a woman in her ontology, *weisse Frau*. However, in the third political theory an image created by as far back as liberalism remained as a mainstream.

The Fourth Political Theory represents aspiration to overcoming of three political theories. In this case, what is its gender strategy, its imperatives? First of all, the Fourth Political Theory puts outside the brackets the man, i.e. that man with which gender installations we have got acquainted in the Modern. To such last man the Fourth Political Theory doesn't address, as he represents the closed archetype of the Modern. Outside of space of a gender of the Modern the Fourth Political Theory gropes contours of its "man". If we see reason, wealth, responsibility, city, white skin color, we took out a gun and shoot. This man must die, he doesn't have chance to survive as he is closed at the Modern's historical deadlock, he reproduces the small hierarchies and can not go beyond his own borders. Such man is immortal, in the self-reflection he creates permanent realities, the mirrors looking in mirrors. The same goes for all those whom the man of the Modern has included: a business-woman, children, non-white.

Positive attribute of man, beyond the paradigm of Modern: non-adult. The subject of the Fourth Political Theory is a non-adult male. For example, *"Le Grand Jeu"* (the name of the literary group close to surrealism) of Gilbert-Lecomte and René Daumal who offered to build life without maturing to remain playing children. This can be considered as an invitation to develop gender tenets of the Fourth Political Theory, system of esthetic and political philosophy. Under the non-white man meant the world pre-logical systems of Lévy-Brühl, where the logos is not the only means of social organization. Here we draw from Lévi-Strauss, social anthropology, ethnosociology, that is, from the analysis of experience of many non-white societies. Further, the madness: it's all forms of intellectual transgression, the practice of voluntary insanity from Friedrich Hölderlin and Nietzsche to Bataille, Artaud. Madness is a gender arsenal of the Fourth Political Theory. In general, non-white, insane, not city

or entered in a landscape. For example, the ecologist, the representative of a community, that is, the person who not broke with the nature, Redfield with his "The Folk Society". Thus, we create a search entourage, woven of those elements that are ignored by the Modern. These elements make a huge field of existence and the metaphysics, a field of the intensive being of the Fourth Political Theory. Supplementing the Fourth Political Theory, we should refuse all gender tenets, which a liberalism carries in itself. In gender sense from the second political theory it would be possible to borrow idea of "the desiring-machine", idea of overcoming of the man through global egalitarianism within the limits of a matter. From classical fascist gender model of the third political theory, as well as liberalism, there is nothing to learn, while the marginal areas may be of great interest, namely sex ontologization (Evola), Nordic matriarchy.

What is the subject of the Fourth Political Theory? The subject of the Fourth Political Theory is *Dasein* or *Zwischen*, the "between" in the space between the subject and object which it is possible to identify with the traject of Gilbert Durand. And here *Dasein*, traject, *l'imaginaire*, whether it has a sex? And what is the gender of *Dasein*? Let's describe a normative and imperative gender of the Fourth Political Theory. A gender of the Fourth Political Theory same as a sex of *Dasein*, that is, we have explained one unknown through another. *Dasein* somehow can be sexualized, but that sex which it has, can't be neither man's, nor female in gender sense. Perhaps, it makes sense to speak about androgyne? The Fourth Political Theory may be addressed to the androgynous being, and it's gender is androginat? Maybe, but only if to not project on the androgynous obviously split models of sexes as a halfs. Sex, according to Plato, is that is follows unity division. But also traject which, on Durand, is between the subject and object and it is primary in relation to them, and *Dasein* which, on Heidegger, is in *Zwischen*, on border between internal and external, constitutes the finding on border existentiells which belong to the sphere previous division. And *l'imaginaire* in itself contains division (*Greek.* διαίρεσις), as one of it's possible regimes. So, if we understand androginat in this way, not as something that

is composite, but as something rooted or radical, then we can talk about a radical field, which is not sex in the sense that it is half of what else. That is it is that half, that sex which is simultaneously the whole and doesn›t need its antithesis, as self-sufficient within itself. About this gender we can get an idea is not so much from an analysis of sexual or gender archetypes, but because of thinking (philosophical, political) on the subject of the Fourth Political Theory. Thus, we change the formulation of the question, we do not ask what kind is a sex of *Dasein*, we answer that the gender of the subject of the Fourth Political Theory is the same as that of *Dasein*. In this case, we can also talk about the radical ("root" – *from the Latin. Radicula*) androginate, which exists not by addition of the men and women, and represents the primordial unity.

How the gender in the conditions of the Postmodern changes? The Postmodern represents a combination of all three political theories. *On the one hand,* this is an accomplished Modern, which has reached the logic end as *hypermodern* (or "ultramodern"). Thus, all three political theories projected on Postmodern their gender archetypes, which represents the limits of their own strucrures. It is expressed in an institutionalization of a gender of the Postmodern. What is the Postmodern gender? It is a maximization of liberal men, the archetype of which applies to all of its antithesis: the stupid, the poor, not white, little. It also is the gender of globalization, when properties of certain type extend as social standards on all other types. Hence the idea that the proletarians are the bourgeoises who have not grown rich yet, black are not modernized white, women are not fully liberated men. That is, we see that this all-consuming archetype becomes meaningless. The reextension of gender sexual models can lead to that the hypermodern will explode like rotting fungus and a gender archetype will fail. Now we are in the moment of a reextension and final break of a gender. Stages of this break are feminism, homosexuality, sex-change operations.

The second political theory in the West had a great influence on the elites, the creative professions (actor's, philosophical). This is a "the desiring-machine", left feminism with its ideas of freedom from

the sex (Donna Haraway - feminist, rather loosely a neo-Marxist and
a postmodernist). In the words of Donna Haraway, "as a woman
liberate, it in the best case would be a man, and all". Therefore it
is necessary to overcome both the man, and the woman - through
a cyborg. According to her, the sex can be overcome, only having
overcome the person. One more way: Foucault and his concept of
"sexuality", that is, sexuality prior to the sex, as a neutral disposi-
tifs, sexuality, spreading along the surface of the screen, the "Body
without Organs" (a concept adopted by Deleuze from Artaud). This
pansexuality, which is a smooth surface of sexual arousals of un-
clear whom, for what reason, and most importantly - no matter what
orientation & direction. As a whole, to erosion, to destruction of a
gender of the Modern, the Marxist thought introduces the consider-
able contribution. Elements of fascism in Postmodern are represent-
ed by the practice of BDSM. Moreover, contemporary fascism - that
is sado-maso, and perverted fascism comes to Postmodernism as an
essential attribute, along with feminism, cyborg, a "Body without
Organs", etc.

Eventually we found ourselves in an interesting situation: the
predominant gender of Modern is exposed to a reextension, erosion
and, in some sense, is about to explode, or perhaps has already ex-
ploded. We stand on transition between a hypermodern and the Post-
modern, and we don't know, where *the truth, and where the reality*.
So, in a postmodern gender will not be any men. Let us imagine this
situation: the archetype of male flies into pieces, which do not con-
stitute parts of the whole anymore, but symbolize only themselves.
Conservative forces can stand up for this archetype, demand "to re-
turn the man", this reasonable, wealthy white person, but, thereby,
they only try to continue the Modern. This position seems hopeless,
here again the Fourth Political Theory, in our opinion, goes forward.
We suggest to take a step towards gender that belongs to *Dasein*,
without notorious representations that we will receive. Going be-
yond the limits a gender which we know, we get to the domain of
uncertainty, androgyny, sex of angels. In the same sphere it is neces-
sary to search for a gender of the Fourth Political Theory, namely in

sphere of as much as possible absolute risk behind a limit of the collapsed chimera of the Modern. We can outline only lines: we know that it is gender of *Dasein*, traject, that this gender represents a root reality, that it belongs to *l'imaginaire*. By extending the chain of our reflections, we can raise the question about a gender of the Radical Self, which is beyond the basic paradigms.

CHAPTER 11. CONSERVATISM
AND POST-MODERNITY

We are in postmodernity

A process that has a really global nature is the process of pre-vailed Modernity turning into Postmodernity. There are centres, seats, locuses, regions, where this process goes by logically and sequentially. These centres are the West, the Western Europe and especially the USA. The US had a historical opportunity to create in the laboratory conditions an optimal Modern society on the ground of principles that were developed by occidental thought. It was an opportunity to create a society by turning over a new leaf, without burdening european traditions, starting from scratch (American indians, as is known, were not referred to people). In the work "Empire"[1] by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri it is shown that american constitution initially regarded negroes as second-rate people and American indians were not regarded as people at all. Thereby, a specific american system has been an ideal place for implementation the maximum of liberty but only for whites and at the expense of defined exclusion of all others. Anyway, the United States of America are in the vanguard of liberty and the locomotive of moving to postmodernity.

The pole of liberty and the liberty of channel choosing

We've spoken about a pole that west european civilization appears to be but in the space of thought, in philosophy, in geography of human spirit the pole of the unipolar world is something different than the USA or Europe as simply geopolitical formations. It is

[1] Hardt M, Negri A, Empire, Moscow, 2004

exactly the idea of maximum liberty. A movement to achievement of this liberty is the meaning of human history in the understanding of west european humanity. The west european society succeded in imposing this understanding of the meaning of history on all the other humanity.

Thus, there is a pole of unipolar world – the pole of liberty that came from Modernity and now is coming to a new stage, to Postmodernity, where a man starts to free himself from himself. Because he is an obstacle in the way of himself, he disturbs and bothers himself. A man falls to individual schizomasses as it has been depicted by Deleuze in "Anti-Oedipus".

People have become the contemplators of television, they have learned how to switch channels better and faster. Many of them don't stop at all, they click the remote control and it's already not important what is on TV – is it actors or news. The spectators of Postmodernity don't understand anything at all in principle of what is going on. It's just a stream of impressive pictures. The spectator gets used to microprocesses, he becomes a "subspectator" that watches not the channels or programmes but separate segments, the sequences of programs. In this case the ideal movie is "Spy Kids 2" by Rodriguez. It is made up like there is no any sense. But it is possible to be distracted from this fact because as soon as our consciousness is bothered with it, at the same instant appears a flying pig and we are bounded to watch where is it flying. And likewise when the flying pig bothers us the next moment a little dragon comes out from a pocket of the main character. This work of Rodriguez is perfect. Roughly the same effect reaches a person that tirelessly clicks a remote control all the time. The only channel that works in the other rhythm is the "Culture" (Russian channel) because there are still some unhurried stories about composers, art workers, students, theatres – the remains of Modernity. If you take it from the list, you can go on calmly switching the channels and not expecting to meet something that is shown not in the rhythm that is necessary to live in.

Paradoxes of liberty

So, Postmodernity is coming. What can resist it? Is it possible to say it "no"? This is a question of principle.

By the way, on the assumption of the same liberal proposition about a statement that a man is free, it is implied that he is always able to say "no" to whatever he wants. This is the most danger-ous moment of the philosophy of liberty that starts to withdraw the freedom to say "no" under the auspices of absolutization of liberty. West european model says: do you want to resist us? Please, you've got a right, but you cannot "uninvent" a shearing machine, do you? A shearing machine is the absolute argument of progress defenders. Everybody wants to have a shearing machine – negroes, american indians, conservatives, the orthodoxes. By other logic communists also said that socialism would come after the capitalism. Socialism has come but we hadn't had capitalism plainly. It has been for a little time, it has destroyed many people and disappeared. The same thing is about the shearing machine. If you think about the metaphysics of a shearing machine, how much it is joined with the real values of the philosophy system, you can come to a conclusion that in general a human life is possible without a shearing machine and could be fully happy.

But for a liberal society it is a scary thing, almost a sacrilege. Everything could be understood but a life without a shearing ma-chine? This is a real unscientific statement: a life without a shearing machine is impossible. There's no life. Life is a shearing machine. This is the power of liberal argument on stream that turns out with its totalitarian side. In a liberation there is always an element of con-straint – this is the paradox of liberty. At least it is a constraint to think that liberty is the supreme value. Imagine that a man says: «liberty – is the supreme value». The other man objects: «nothing of the kind». Then the first answers: «Are you against the liberty? I will kill for the liberty».

The idea that there could not be any alternative to it lays in the liberalism. And there is some truth in it. If logos stands in the way

of liberty, if the social logos got mixed up in the adventure of total liberation, where had been the first push in this way? It should be searched not in the time when Descartes, Nietzsche or XX century came but somewhere in pre-socratic philosophy. Heidegger has seen this moment in the concept of "physis" and in the sufficient disclosure of Plato's study of ideas. But the other thing is important – the movement of logos to the liberty is nonrandom and yet it is possible to say it "no".

Conservatism as a rejection of the logic of history

Yet there is still an ontological opportunity to say "no". Here sets in conservatism.

First of all, what is conservatism? It is "no" said to everything all around. In the name of what? In the name of something that was earlier. In the name of something that was overcome during the socio-political history. Conservatism means stranding an ontological, philosophical, socio-political, individual, moral, religious, cultural, scientific position that denies the course of things that we are dealing with now, that we had identified and described earlier.

Now we will talk about conservatism and about how it is possible to deny the logic of history leading to Modernity and Postmodernity by basing on specific socio-philosophical topic. We take the Early modern period with its linear vector of progress and its postmodern bend taking us away into the labyrinths of dispersion of individual's reality in the rhizomatic subject or postsubject. We can include here even earlier stages that made this trend possible and predominant. Conservatism builds its position by opposing to the logic of development of historical process. An argument in this opposition is a phenomenology of Modernity and nowadays Postmodernity that conservatism use to push from. But conservatism as a structure is not reduced to contestation of phenomena. Negatively evaluated phenomenology is nothing more than pretence. Conservatism builds a topic, a negating topic, a work and a direction of historical time.

Conservatism is able to construct its opposition to historical time differently. It has three fundamental opportunities of using the conceptual trend – Modernity-Postmodernity. This is where starts a systematization without any preferences because what is at issue is a scientific not valuation judgement.

Fundamental conservatism: traditionalism.

First approach is so-called traditionalism. Conservatism can well be traditionalism. Some politological patterns differentiate traditionalism and conservatism as in Mannheim's theory, for example. Yet an urge towards leaving everything the same like it was in a traditional society, saving its lifestyle, is undoubtedly conservatism.

The most logical traditionalism - substantial, philosophical, ontological and conceptual – is the one that criticizes not various sides of Modernity or Postmodernity but denies fundamental vector of historical progress, that is per se opposes the time. Traditionalism – is the form of conservatism that affirms: the separate moments that arouse our rejection are not bad, everything that is modern is bad. "The idea of progress is bad, the idea of technical development is bad, the philosophy of subject and object of Descartes is bad, the Newton metaphor of watchmaker is bad, modern positive science, education and pedagogy based on it are bad". "This episteme, - says the conservator-traditionalist further, - does not do at all. This is a totalitarian, false, negative episteme that we should fight with". And next, if to continue his thought: "I like only what had been before the beginning of Modernity". It is possible to go further and subject to criticism those tendencies that made possible the emergence of Modernity in the traditional society. Right up to emerging an idea of linear time.

When monarchies fell down and church was separated from state, when all socio-political, cultural and historical peoples picked up the baton of Modernity, such traditionalist conservatism was considered to be non-existent. In Russia it was brought down by militant atheists. As it was considered to be fully eliminated it was

stopped being talked about, no more social groups standed for it and soon it disappeared even from some politological reconstructions (Mannheim). That is why we don't see the conservatism and don't start from it. And we shouldn't. If we want to trace back a genealogy of conservatism and build a complete topic of conservative positions, we should study exactly such an approach on a priority basis. In the traditionalism we have a full-fledged and the most complete complex of conservative attitude to history, society, world.

In the XX century, when it seemed to be that for such conservatism there had been left no social platform, suddenly appeared an entire pleiad of thinkers, philosophers, that started to defend this traditionalist position as if nothing had happened. It was defended radically, sequentially and persistenly that was inconceivable in XIX or XVIII centuries. Those thinkers are: René Guénon, Julius Evola, Titus Burckhardt, Leopold Ziegler and all those who are called "traditionalists" in the narrow sense of a word. It is significant that in XIX century when there were monarchies and churches, when the Pope had made some decisions, there were no people with such radical opinions. Traditionalists suggested a programme of fundamental conservatism when Tradition was not going well at all. Thus, fundamental conservatism could develop into philosophical, political and ideological model when Modernity had almost conquered all of the positions but not when it was in a process of conquering and when it was being stuggled against by specific political and social forces.

In XX century a number of politologists attempted to identify or to attribute the phenomenon of fundamental traditionalism with fascism. Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier, the authors of "The Morning of the Magicians"[1] wrote: "fascism is guenonism plus such divisions". Of course this is absolutely wrong. We spoke that fascism is rather philosophy of Modernity that was affected by elements of traditional society to a considerable degree but it does not act neither against Modernity nor against time. Moreover, both Guénon and Evola rigidly criticised fascism.

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[1] Pauwels Louis. Jacques Bergier. The Morning of the Magicians. Moscow, 2008.

Guénon and Evola gave in their works an exhaustive description of fundamental-conservative position. They have described a traditional society as a timeless ideal and modern world (Modernity) and its main principles as a result of decay, degradation, degeneration, blending of castes, decay of hierarchy, carrying over the attention from spiritual to material, from celestial to terrestrial, from eternal to transient etc. Traditionalists' positions are notable for blameless symmetry and a large scale. Their theories can serve as a model of conservative paradigm in its pure form.

Of course some of their assessments and prognoses turned out to be wrong. In particular, both of them anticipated the victory of "the fourth caste" that is proletariat (USSR) over "the third caste" (capitalist camp) which proved to be wrong. They disputed communism not quite understanding how much traditional elements it had. Some of their assessments need to be corrected. At one of the congresses in Rome dedicated to the 20th anniversary of Evola's obituary I gave a lecture "Evola – visto da sinistra" ("Evola – a view from the left") where I suggested to have a look at Evola from the left positions (though he considered himself to be right, even the extreme right).

Fundamental conservatives today

In our society we also have fundamental-conservatism. Firstly, the islamic project – is fundamental-conservatism. If you detach it from negative publicity, it will be possible to see how in theory should feel and think muslims struggling against modern world and that they stand for the position of fundamental conservatives. They ought to believe every word of the Koran ignoring any comments from tolerance preachers that blame their views finding it cruel and obsolete. If a fundamentalist meets such a commentator on a tv, he arrives at a conclusion: the tv must be thrown out with the commentator.

In the US there are also movements of this kind – among fundamentalist protestant groups. Strange as it may seem, considerable percentage of Republican party electorate of the US holds roughly

the same views. Millions of tv viewers in the USA watch tv shows with these protestant fundamentalists who criticize everything of Modernity and Postmodernity from a protestant perspective razing it to the ground. There are crowds of televangelists like Jerry Falwell Sr. who criticize in medias res all of the foundings of the modern world and interpret all of the events from a protestant version of chiristianity.

Such people can be found both in orthodox and catholic environment. They negate Modernity structurally and completely considering religious prescriptions as absolutely topical and Modernity with its values as an expression of a kingdom of antichrist where nothing good can exist. These tendencies are widespread among russian old believers. "Paraklitovo Soglasiye" (one of old believers' trend) on Ural refuses to use light bulbs so far. Light bulbs are "light of Lucifer", that's why they use only the light of a splinter and candles.

Sometimes it reaches very profound penetration into the essence of things. One of old believers' authors claims: "who drinks coffee, will be attacked by evil "coff", and God will be in despair of who drinks tea" (untranslatable pun: coffee and "coff", tea and "be in despair" sounds alike in russian). Others claim that it is not allowed to eat a buckwheat kasha (boiled buckwheat) because it is sinful (in russian words buckwheat and sinful sounds alike). "Grechnevaya", "greshnevaya" – therefore "greshnaya" ("buckwheat" – therefore "sinful").

Coffee was strongly prohibited. This may sound silly. But silly for whom? For the modern rational people. «Coff lukavij» (evil «coff») is silly indeed. But imagine that in the world of fundamental conservatives there could be found a place for the "evil coff". Some kind of old believers' congress can be dedicated to "evil coff". There will be defined to which sort of demons it belongs. In XVIII century there were "shtanniye sobori" ("pants councils"). When a group of old believers' young people picked up a habit of wearing checked pants, fedoseyans assembled a council in Kimry that is sometimes called "pants council". There was discussed whether those who wears checked pants should be isolated from communica-

tion because at those times it seemed to be indecent to wear checked pants for a christian. A part of councillors voted for isolation and the other – not to. These searches are not that ridiculous indeed. Old believers look "retarded" for us but they are not so. They are different, they act within other topic. They deny time and progress as well. Time for them is regress and people of Modernity are victims of evil obsession.

Here we can give Claude Lévi-Strauss' ideas[1]. He proves that "initial logic" that Lévy-Bruhl and scientists-evolutionists studying «primitives» talked about does not exist. A society of aborigines or a structure of indians' myths are as much complex in their rational relations, taxonomy of enumerated and compared objects, and as dramatic as cultural forms known to contemporary europeans. It is just different. We deal not with "initial logos" but with other logos where a system of relations, nuances, recognitions, diversities, building models works in the other system of hypotheses. But in its complexity and main setting of structure (hence the structuralism) it is absolutely comparable with consciousness, thinking and social models of socialization and adaptaion of developed peoples.

In the fundamental conservatism a renunciation of Modernity has absolutely rational and organic form. If we accept this point of view, we will see that everything perfectly fits, everything is logical, rational but it is other logos. This is logos in which space there is "evil coff", "pants council", "Paraklitovo soglasiye" living with splinters – everything that evoke a contemptuous smile of a modern man, does not evoke any smile. This is a totally different mode.

Conservatism status quo – liberal conservatism

There is a second type of conservatism that we've called conservatism status quo or liberal conservatism. It is liberal because it says «yes» to a main trend fulfilling in Modernity. But at every stage of this fulfilling trend it tries to slow down: "let's make it more slowly, not now, let's postpone it".

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[1] Levi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow. 1983.

Liberal conservative argues like this: it's good that there is a free individual but free postindividuum is too much. Or a question of "the end of history". At first, Fukuyama thought that politics have disappeared and it is just about to be replaced with "global market"6, where there will be no nations, states, ethnoses, cultures and religions. But then he decided that it would be better to slow down a bit and implement Postmodernity more calmly, without revolutions. Because revolutions could be accompanied with something undesirable that can foil a plan of "the end of history". So Fukuyama began to write that it is necessary to strengthen the nation states for a time – this is liberal conservatism.

Liberal conservatives don't like lefts. They don't like rights as Evola and Guénon as well. They take no notice of the rights but when they see lefts, they stand up.

Liberal conservatism is notable for the following qualitative structural characteristics – a consent with a general trend of Modernity but a disagreement with its most vanguard manifestations that seem to be too dangerous and too harmful. For example, at first, an english philosopher Edmund Burke was in sympathy with the Enlightment but after the French Revolution he rejected it and developed a liberal conservative theory with a frontal criticism of a revolution and the lefts. Hence it appears liberal conservative programme: defending liberties, rights, a human independence, progress and equality with a help of other means – evolution but not revolution. This is for not letting out from some basement the dormant energies that had spilled over into the terror in the jacobinism and then into antiterror and so on.

Thereby, liberal conservatism does not dispute the tendencies that are the essence of Modernity and even Postmodernity on principle. Though liberal conservatives in the face of Postmodernity will push the brake pedals more often than before. They can even scream at some moment: stop! Seeing what Postmodernity is bringing and looking hard on the rhizome of Deleuze they feel being in the wrong box. In addition, they fear that an accelerated dismantling of Mo-

dernity disappointing in Postmodernity can free the Pre-modernity. This is what they write about frankly.

For example, the liberal Habermas[1], once the left, says that if "we don't save a hard spirit of the Enlightment now, a fidelity to the ideals of a free subject, a moral liberation, if we don't hold the humanity on the verge, not only will we fall down into chaos but we will come back into the shadow of tradition the meaning of struggling with is the Modernity itself". In other words, he fears that fundamental conservatives will come.

Bin Laden as a symbol

A figure of bin Laden, whether he exists in reality or he was invented in Hollywood, has a fundamental philosophical significance. It is a perspective of transition from Postmodernity to Premodernity filled with grotesque. It is a sinister warning that Premodernity (Tradition) as a faith in the values that have been piled and brought to junkyard at the very beginning of Modernity can get up and come to the surface. The face of bin Laden, his gestures and appearance on our screens and in fashion magazines – it is a philosophical sign. It is a sign of warning to humanity from liberal conservatives.

Simulacrum of Che Guevara.

Usually liberal conservatives don't do an analysis of liberalism and communism correlation that we've done and so they continue to fear of communism. We have already said that events of 1991 – the end of USSR – have enormous philosophical and historical significance that has few analogues. There are only several events like this in the history because in 1991 liberalism proved its exceptional right for orthodox legacy to a paradigm of Modernity. All the other versions – and above all, communism – turned out to be the deviations in the way of Modernity, the branchings leading to another aim. Communists thought that they were going on the road of Modernity

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[1] Habermas J. Modernity: An Unfinished Project? 1992

in a direction of progress but as it became clear they were going to some other aim that was located in the other conceptual space. But some liberals do believe today that "communists lost ground just temporarily" and can return.

Extrapolating wrong fears, contemporary anticommunism creates chimeras, ghosts, simulacra to an even greater degree than contemporary antifascism. There is no communism (as there's no fascism for a long time) – istead there is still a grotesque replica, a safe Che Guevara advertising mobile phones or adorning with himself the t-shirts of idle and comfort petty bourgeois boys and girls. In the age of Modernity Che Guevara is an enemy of capitalism. In the age of Postmodernity – he is on giant billboards advertising mobile communication. This is a look of the communism that may return – the look of simulacrum. A meaning of this publicity gesture consists in postmodern mock of communism claims to alternative logos within the bounds of Modernity.

Yet liberal conservatism as a rule is alien to this irony and is not inclined to make fun of «red» or «brown». The reason of it is that liberal conservatism fears of relativization of logos in Postmodernity while being uncertain that the enemy is completely destroyed. It dreams that a thrown down corpse is still moving and that's why it does not recommend to approach to it closely, to mock at it and to play with it.

Conservative Revolution

There is also third conservatism. From a philosophical point of view it's the most interesting. This is a family of conservative ideologies that is usually called a Conservative Revolution (CR). It is a constellation of ideologies and political philosophies that regards a problem of correlation between conservatism and Modernity dialetically.

One of Conservative Revolution theorists was Arthur Moeller van den Bruck whose book was recently translated into Russian[1]. Other

[1] Moeller van den Bruck, The Third Reich, Moscow, 2009

thinkers that belong to this school are: Martin Heidegger, brothers
Ernst and Friedrich Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler, Werner
Sombart, Othmar Spann, Friedrich Hielscher, Ernst Niekisch and an
entire pleiad of mostly german authors. Sometimes they are called
"the dissenters of national socialism" because the majority of them
in some periods of time supported national socialism but soon they
have got into in-emigration and some even in prison. Many of them
participated in underground antifascist activity and helped jews to
rescue. Particularly, Friedrich Hielscher, a first-rate conservative
revolutioner and supporter of german national renaissance helped
very famous jewish philosopher Martin Buber to escape.

Conservatives must lead a revolution

It is possible to describe a general paradigm of conservative
revolution world-view in a following way. There is an unbiassed
process of degradation in the world. It is not just an aspiration of
"evil forces" for making tricks, it is the forces of faith and fate that
lead the humanity on the path of degeneration. From conservative
revolutioners point of view, the peak of degeneration is Modernity.
At this moment everything matches with traditionalists. As opposed
to them, conservative revolutioners start to think: why is it turned
out to be that the faith in God that created the world, in divine provi-
dence, in sacral, in myth in a certain period started turning into its
own opposition. Why does it weaken and why do God's enemies
gain? Then they have a suspicion: maybe that wonderful Golden
Age defended by fundamental conservatives contained some kind of
gen of further perversion? Maybe not everything was good in reli-
gion either? Maybe those religious, sacral, holy forms of traditional
society that we can discern before coming of Modernity had kept a
specified element of decay in it? And then conservative revolution-
ers say conservative fundamentalists: "you suggest to go back to
the state when the first symptoms of an ill man revealed, when just
first hacking appeared. Today this man is at death's door and you
state how well he felt before. You oppose a hacking person and a

dying person. By turn we want to find out where an infection came from, why he started to cough? And the fact that he does not die coughing and that he goes to work does not convince us of his health. The virus should had had its seat somewhere in the past…" "We believe, - continue conservative revolutioners, - that in a very source, in deity, in a very initial cause lays an intention to organize this eschatological drama". In this point of view Modernity acquires paradoxical type. This is not just an illness today (in the denied present), this is a disclosure in a today's world of what had been prepared in yesterday's world (so valuable for traditionalists). Modernity does not become better because of this, but tradition by the way looses its definite positiveness.

One of the main formulas of Arthur Moeller van den Bruck was: "conservatives tried to stop a revolution previously but we must lead it". This means that by expressing solidarity with destructive tendencies of Modernity, partly for practical reasons, it is necessary to reveal and discern the bacillus that had gave rise to the tendencies of further decay, that is Modernity, initially. Conservative revolutioners want not only to slow down the time (like liberal conservatives) or to go back to the past (like traditionalists) but to pull out the root of evil from the world structure, to abolish the time as a destructive charactetistic of reality by fulfilling some secret, parallel, non-obvious plan of the Deity.

Dasein and Ge-Stell

Heidegger's history of philosophy is constructed with the same model. At dawn of philosophy Dasein as a finite and localized objective reality of a man took a path of stating a question about an objective reality, that is about itself and surrounding. One of first such concepts expressing this stating of question was a concept of "physis" assimilating an objective reality with nature and comprehending it as a chain of "risings". The second concept was agrarian metaphor of "logos" – a concept formed from the verb "legein" – that is "crop" and later obtained the meaning "think", "read", "speak". Accord-

ing to Heidegger, the pair physis-logos defining an objective reality included it into too narrow bounds. These bounds got even more narrow in Plato's study about ideas. And further, european thought only worsened an alienation of objective reality through increasing rationalism – up to oblivion of the thought of objective reality at all. This oblivion at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries developed into nihilism. A general term in Heidegger's philosophy describing the essence of growing domination of technics is "Ge-stell", that is erection of more and more alienating and nihilistic models.

But for Heidegger Ge-Stell is not a fortuity. It is an expression of that the opposite side of an objective reality is nothing as its internal perspective. In the authentic Dasein the objective reality and nothing are to co-exist. But if a man makes an accent at an objective reality as a "universal" (koinon), just on what exist (idea of "physis"), he looses sight of nothing that reminds of itself bringing philosophy to nihilism – through Ge-Stell. Thereby, the contemporary nihilism is not just evil, but news of objective reality inversed to Dasein and given in such a complicated way. Therefore a goal of conservative revolutioners is not just to manage with the nothing and nihilism of Modernity but to unravel a tangle of history of philosophy and decrypt the message maintaining in Ge-Stell. Thus, nihilism of Modernity is not just an evil (as for traditionalists) but also a sign indicating profound structures of objective reality and paradoxes laying in it.

Sad end of Spectacle

Conservative revolutioners hate the present so much that they are not satisfied only with opposing the past to it. They say: «the present is awful but it should be lived out, carried through to the very last end».

Liberal Postmodernity assumes an «infinite end». The «End of history» of Fukuyama – is not just disappearance – economic transactions and markets continue to carry out, hotels, bars, discotheques continue to twinkle inviting, stocks continue to work, dividends for

securities continue to be paid off, computer and tv displays continue to glow, securities continue to be produced. There's no history but there are TVs.

Conservative revolutioners make it in a different way. In the end of history they mean to appear at the opposite side of Dasein, from the dim space of «other side», and turn the Postmodernity game into not-game. Spectacle (the Guy Debord's «society of the spectacle») will end something very unpleasant for the spectators and actors. In due time this logic was followed by a group of surrealists-dadaists (Arthur Cravan, Jacques Rigaut, Julien Torma, Jacques Vaché) who glorified a suicide. But critics considered it to be a vacuous bragging. At one moment they commited suicide publicly which proved that art and surrealism were such a grand thing for them that they gave their lives for it. Here we can remember about Kirillov from Dostoyevsky's "The Possessed" (original russian title "The Demons") for whom a suicide became an expression of complete freedom that was revealed after the "death of God".

There were not less terrifying events in Russia lately. – For example, «Nord-Ost». An obscene untidy comic actor Sasha Cekalo stages a spectacle attended by imposing Moscow audience. Here chechen terrorists appear and at first people think that it's a part of a perfomance. And then they realize with a horror that there is something wrong at the stage and next begins a dreadful, real tragedy.

Roughly the same conservative revolutioners imagine: let the buffoonery of Postmodernity take its course, let it dilute the definite paradigms, ego, superego, logos, let the rhizome, schizomasses and divided consciousness enter, let nothing carry along with it all of the world content so then the secret doors will be opened and ancient, eternal ontological archetypes will come to the surface and terribly finish off the game.

Left conservatism (social-conservatism)

There's one more orientation – so-called left conservatism or social-conservatism. A typical representative of social-conservatism

is Georges Sorel (his work «Reflections on Violence»[1]). He adhered to left views but in a certain period he found out that the lefts and rights (monarchists and communists) fight against a common enemy – bourgeoisie.

Left conservatism is close to russian national-bolshevism of Nikolay Ustryalov. Under the pure left marxist ideology he found out russian national myths. Even more disticly it is recounted in left national-socialism of Strasser and in german national-bolshevism of Niekisch. Such left conservatism could be attributed to the family of Conservative Revolution or sorted out as a separate orientation.

Interestingly that "United Russia" party adopted social-conservatism as a component of its ideology. This orientation is being developed today by Andrey Isaev. On the other pole of "United Russia" there is a liberal-conservatism of Pligin.

Eurasianism as an episteme

Eurasianism – is both a political philosophy and an episteme. It applies to a category of conservative ideologies and has features both of fundamental conservatism (traditionalism) and of Conservative Revolution (including social-conservatism of left eurasianists). The only thing that is not acceptable for eurasianists – is liberal conservatism.

Realizing a claim of western logos on universality, eurasianism denies to admit this universality as an inevitability. This is a specific character of eurasianism. It considers Western culture as a local and temporary phenomenon. It affirms a plurality of cultures and civilizations that coexist in different moments of a cycle. For eurasianists, Modernity – is a phenomenon that is peculiar only to West, and other cultures should unmask these claims on universality of western civilization and build its own societies with its inherent values. There is no unified historical process, every people has its own historical model that moves in different rhythm and sometimes in different directions.

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[1] Sorel Georges, Reflections on Violence, 1906

Eurasianism is per se gnosiological pluralism. A plurality of epistemes built on a basis of every existing civilization (Eurasian episteme is for Russian civilization, Chinese – for Chinese, Islamic – for Islamic, Hindu – for Hindu etc.) is opposed to an unitary episteme of Modernity including science, politics, culture, anthropology. And only on a basis of these epistemes purified from the western non-optionality should be built further political-social, cultural and economical projects.

We see a specific form of conservatism in it differing from other close conservative versions (excluding liberal-conservatism) by taking an alternative to Modernity not in the past or in an unique revolutionary-conservative coup. We take it in societies that historically coexist with the western civilization and geographically and culturally differ from it. Here eurasianists partly draw closer with Guénon's traditionalism who also considered that "modernity" is a "western" concept, when there are still forms of traditional society in the East. No coincidence that the first among russian authors who referred to Guénon's book "East and West" was a eurasianist N.N. Alekseev.

Neo-eurasianism.

Neoeurasianism arised in Russia in the end of 80s of XX century completely grasped the main points of episteme of former eurasianists but also added the use of traditionalism, geopolitics, structuralism, Heidegger's fundamental-ontology, sociology, anthropology. It has done much work on harmonization the basic points of eurasianism with actualities of the second half of XX century – beginning of XXI century – taking into account new scientific developments and researches. Eurasian journals are published today in Italy, France, Turkey.

Neoeurasianism is based on philosophical analysis of thesis about Modernity and Postmodernity. A detachment from western culture allows to determine a distance owing to that it is possible to comprehend the whole Modernity and say it all a fundemental "no".

In the XX century Modernity and western civilization were subjected to a similar systemic criticism. The criticism came from Spengler, Toynbee and especially from structuralists, Levi-Strauss in the first place, the one who created structural anthropology. This structural anthropology is based on principle equality of different cultures from primitive to very developed that deprives west european culture of any kind of superiority over the most «wild» and «primitive» unwritten tribe. Here it should be recalled that eurasianists, the founders of phonology and the greatest representatives of structural linguistics Roman Jakobson[1] and Nikolay Trubetzkoy[2] were the mentors of Levi-Strauss and had taught him the skills of structural analysis. And Levi-Strauss gladly admits this fact. Thus, an intellectual chain can be retraced – eurasianism-structuralism-neoeurasianism. In this sense neoeurasianism becomes a restoration of wide range of ideas, insights, intuitions that had been outlined by first eurasianists and that have naturally included the results of scientific work of schools and authors (in most cases it had conservative orientation) simultaneously developing throughout the whole of XX century.

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[1] Jakobson R O, Role of linguistic indications in the comparative mythology - VII

[2] Trubetzkoy N S, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, Moscow, 2000.

CHAPTER 12. CIVILIZATION AS A CONCEPT

The Need for a Specific Definition

Dealing with the definitions of "civilization" in several intellectual, scientific and wide social aspects the agreement appears to be unattainable. Though, the same situation is for some other basic terms. This stems from the fundamental sense of our epoch, the period of transition from the Modern to the Postmodern and this affects some semantic fields and linguistic forms. And, since we are living in the period of incomplete transition - there is a great confusion in terms: some people interpret the basic terms according to their principal historical meanings, some people already looks to the future feeling the need of semantic shifts (that has not come yet), some people dream (and may be approaching the future or simply indulging in individualistic irrelevant hallucinations) , some people are simply confused.

Anyway, for the correct use of terms (especially principal terms) including the term "civilization", nowadays it is necessary to make a simple deconstruction that would create meanings according to their historical perspective and examine some semantic shifts.

Civilization as a Stage of Society's Development

The term 'civilization' has gained a wide use in the epoch of a hectic development of the theory of progress. And this theory is a result of the two paradigmatic axioms of the Modern - the progressive and unidirectional nature of human development (from minus to plus) and the universality of man as a phenomenon. In this con-

text, the American GL Morgan defines "civilization" as the stage in which "humanity" (in the 19th century everybody uncritically believed in the obvious existence of such a thing as "humanity") comes after the stage of "barbarism" and that, in turn, is replaced by the stage of "savagery"

The Marxists easily took this interpretation by putting it into a theory of economic change of the formations. According to Morgan, Taylor and Engels, "savagery" characterizes the tribes that hunt in a primitive way."Barbarism" refers to nonliterate societies engaged in the simplest forms of agriculture and animal husbandry - with no clear division of labor and the development of social and political institutions. "Civilization" is known as a stage when writing appears, social and political institutions, cities, trades, technological improvements, the stratification of society into classes, the emergence of advanced theological belief systems."Civilization considered to be historically stable and could easily continue to develop, but without changing the essential characteristics for thousands of years (Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Hindu, Chinese and Roman).

Civilization and Empire

However, along with the historical concept of "civilization" - though less explicitly –a territorial sense was also put in it. "Civilization" implied rather extensive area of distribution that meant a significant amount of time as well as the wide territorial distribution. In this sense, the territorial boundaries of the term "civilization" have partly coincided with the meaning of the word "empire", "world power". "Empire" in a civilized sense does not refer to the feature of the political and administrative structure, *and the fact that active and intensive dissemination of influences emanating from the centers of civilization of the surrounding territory, inhabited by supposedly "barbarians" or "savages." In other words, the term of "civilization" is already possible to identify as the nature of expansion and export of influence which are common to "Empire" (ancient and modern).*

Civilization and the Universal Type

"Civilization" has created a new generic type, completely different from models of the "barbarian" and "savage" societies. This type is built mostly on the "globalization" of the ethno-tribal or religious basis, which stood at the origins of this civilization. But in the course of this "globalization" and namely through equating a particular ethnic, social, political and religious image of the "universal standard", came the very important process of transcending ethnic group, the translation of its natural and organic - often unconsciously transmitted - to the rank of a man-made traditions and conscious rational system. A citizen of Rome, even in the early stages of the Empire have differed significantly from the average resident of escalation, and the diversity of Muslims praying in Arabic, is far gone beyond the Bedouin tribes of Arabia and their direct descendants of the ethnic. Thus, the transition to "civilization" has a qualitatively different social anthropology: a person belonging to a "civilization" had a collective identity, embodied in a fixed body of spiritual culture, which he was obliged to a certain degree to master.

Civilization implied that person should make a rational and forceful effort– and in the 17 century after Descartes philosophers named "subject". But the necessity of such effort and culturally fixed example to a certain extent equalized both representatives of heart ethnicity (religion), which is the basis of "civilization" and those who fell in the zone of influence of different ethnic contexts. It was easier to Learn basics of civilization than to be accepted into the tribe, because it was not required to learn huge reservoirs of unconscious archetypes, but to do the rational number of logical operations.

Civilization and Culture

In some aspects (depending on the country or a particular author) in the 19th century the term "civilization" was identified with the concept of «culture». In other cases, some hierarchical relationships were established - more often culture was considered to be a spiritual

base for civilization, and civilization itself meant a formal structure of society that answered for general points of the definition.

Oswald Spengler in his famous book "The Decline of the West", opposed "civilization "and" culture ", considering the last as an expression of the organic life spirit of the humanity and the first as the product of this cooling spirit in the mechanical and technological shapes. By Spengler civilization is a product of cultural death. However, such a witty observation, that correctly interprets some features of modern Western civilization, has not received universal acceptance, and more often today the term "civilization" and "culture" are used as synonyms.

Anyway, each researcher can have his own opinion

Postmodern and synchronic understanding of civilization

Even the most fluent review of the term 'civilization' points that we are dealing with a concept which is deeply connected with the spirit of the Enlightenment epoch, progressivism and historicism that was principal for the Modern epoch in its non-critical stage, before fundamental reconsidering in the XX century. Belief in the progressive development of history, in a universal way of humanity by means of principal logical development of humidity from savagery to civilization was the hallmark of the XIX century. But since Nietzsche and Freud, the so-called "philosophers of suspicion, this optimistic axiom was questioned. And throughout the XX century Heidegger, existentialists, traditionalists, structuralists, and finally, post-modernists have left no stone unturned.

In the Postmodern critique of historical optimism, universalism and historicism has acquired a systematic character and created the doctrinal prerequisites for a total revision of the conceptual apparatus of Western philosophy. The revision itself is not fully implemented, but what is done (Levi-Strauss, Barthes, Ricoeur, Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, etc.) are already sufficient to ensure that the inability to use the Dictionary of the Modern without its thorough and meticulous deconstruction .

P. Ricoeur, generalizing the thesis "philosophers' suspicion", shows the following picture: man and human society consist of the rational-conscious component (that Bultmanu named "kerygma" , Marx named "superstructure", and Freud considered it as "ego") and the unconscious component (in fact the "structure" in the structuralist sense, the "basis", "will to power" ;"subconscious") . Though it seems that man's way leads directly from the unconscious prison to the realm of the mind and it just represents the progress and content of stories, in fact, upon closer inspection, it appears that the unconscious ("a myth") is much stronger and continue to be significantly prejudge the work of consciousness. Moreover, the intellect and the conscious logical activity almost always have nothing but a great work for the repression of unconscious impulses - in other words, the expression of the complexes, a strategy of displace, the replacement of the projection, etc. Marx considered "productive forces" and "productive relations" as unconscious.

Consequently, "civilization" does not fully exclude "Savagery" and "barbarism" but it bases on them itself that turns into the unconscious area but at the same time they do not disappear but gain unlimited power over mankind – mostly because they are considered to be already "overcoming" and more "non-existent.". This explains the striking difference between the historical practice of the life of nations and societies, full of wars, violence, cruelty, full of worsening mental disorders and the intention of mind to a harmonious, peaceful and enlightened existence under the shadow of progress and development.

Thus, the critical tradition, structuralism and philosophy of postmodernism forced to move from a predominantly diachronic (stadial) interpretation of "civilization" that was the norm for the XIX century and gradually continued to prevail in wide use, to the synchronic. Synchronicity implies that civilization does not come to replace "savagery" and "barbarism", not after them, and with them, and continues to coexist with them. One can imagine the "civilization" as the numerator, and "savagery" - "barbarism" as the denominator of the conditional fraction. "Civilization" affects conscious-

ness, but unconsciousness for a moment through the ongoing "work of dreams" (Freud) continually misinterpret everything in their favor. "Wild Things" - is what explains the "civilization" is the key to it. It turns out that mankind hastened to announce the "civilization" as that had really happened, while it remains no more than an unfinished plan, constantly crashing under the onslaught of clever energy unconscious (no matter how we understand it – psychoanalytically or as Nietzsche named it "the will to power").

Deconstruction of "civilization"

How is it possible practically to apply structural approach to deconstruct the concept of "civilization"? In accordance with the general logic of this operation we should question the irreversibility and the novelty of what constitutes the main characteristics of "civilization" in contrast to the "savagery" and "barbarism."

The main characteristic of "civilization" is often considered to be an inclusive universalism – and namely openness of civilization package for those who would like to join it from outside.

At the first glance, inclusive universalism appears to be a complete antithesis of the exclusive particularism that is general for clannish and tribal communities of the "pre-civilized» period.

But historically, the claim to universality of civilization - ecumene and, accordingly, the uniqueness - constantly meet with the fact that, in addition to the "barbarian" peoples, beyond the borders of this "civilization" there were other civilizations with their own and an excellent version of "universalism." In this case, there was a logical contradiction: either "civilization" had to admit that the claim to universality is insolvent, or enlist other civilization in the category of the barbaric.

With the recognition of insolvency different solutions can follow: either to try to find a syncretic model of combining the two civilizations (at least theoretically) into the overall system, or to take that another civilization is right. Typically, when faced with such a problem, "civilization" comes on the basis of an exclusive (not

inclusive) principle –it considers the other civilization to be defective, namely "barbaric", "heresy", "particularism" In other words, we are dealing with the transfer of customary tribal ethnocentrism to a higher level of generalization. Inclusion and universalism, in fact results in "savage" exclusions and particularity

It is easy to recognize in these vivid examples that the Greeks, who considered themselves as "civilization", referred the rest to the "barbarians." Origin of the word "barbarian" actually goes as a description of someone whose speech has no meaning and is a collection of animal sounds. Many tribes encountered a similar attitude to strangers- not knowing their language, they think that they do not have it at all, and therefore they do not consider them human beings. Hence, by the way, the Slavic tribes were called "the Germans", or "dumb", because they didn't know know the Russian language.

The ancient Persians with civilization's claim to the universal mazdian religion, it was expressed even more clearly: the division of Iran (people) and Turan (demons) was performed at the level of religions, cults, rituals and ethics. It came to the absolute endogenous connections and normalizing incest - to sunny spirit of the Iranians (Ahura Mazda) has not been desecrated by an admixture of the sons of Angra Magno.

Judaism as a world religion that claims to universalism and founded the theological base of monotheism – Christianity and Islam, built several civilizations simultaneously - until now almost ethnically restricted blood and a tribal code of "Halacha".

Tribes are based on the initiation, during which the neophyte is informed about the basis of tribal mythology. At the level of civilization, the same function is performed by religious institutions, and in more recent times – by a system of universal education, clearly ideological. Myths of the Modern neophytes learn in different circumstances and in other backgrounds, but their functional significance remains unchanged, and the logical validity (given the Freudian analysis for repressive activities of intellect and ego) is not far away from the legends.

In short, even a rough deconstruction of "civilization" shows that claim to overcome the previous phases is no more than an illusion, but in fact great and "developed" groups of people united in the "civilization», which actually repeats the behavior and value systems of «savages». Hence the endless and increasingly bloody wars, double standards in international politics, rampant passions in private life, always cracking normative ethical codes of moderate and rational society appear. Developing the idea of "good savage" of Rousseau (who strongly criticized the civilization as a phenomenon and considered it to be the source of all evil), we can say that so-called "civilized" man is a "ugly savage" corrupted and perverted "barbarian"

*Nowadays synchronistic and plural understanding
of "civilization" prevails*

With these preliminary remarks we can finally come to what we are implying today in the concept of "civilization", when we develop the thesis of Huntington about the "clash of civilizations" or object to him along with former Iran's President Khatami, by insisting on a "dialogue of civilizations."

The fact that almost no consensus in the use of the term "civilization" clearly indicates that the stadial (purely historicist and progressistskoy) interpretation of the concept that prevailed in the era of modernity and common in the first half of the XIX and XX century. Now obviously lost its relevance.

It seems that nowadays only conservatives may oppose "civilization" and "barbarism" who stuck in the noncritical Nouveau Compte, or Bentham's researchers. Although instrumentally in the historical analysis of the term "civilization" it is reasonable to use when describing the types of ancient societies, but an ideological strain as the global plus compared with a global net (of barbarism and savagery), it has lost. Universalism, sustainable development and the anthropological unity of human history - all this on a philosophical level, has been questioned.

Levi-Strauss by means of his research in structural anthropology, based on a rich ethnographic and mythological material life of the tribes of North and South America, had convincingly shown that the conceptual and mythological system of the most "primitive" societies in their complexity and richness of colors, links and functional differentiations of maturity does not inferior to the most civilized countries.

In political discourse, "benefits of civilization" are still widely discussed, but it already looks like an anachronism. We have faced with such a surge in non-critical ignorance when liberal reformers tried to present the history of Russia as a continuous chain of the persistence in the face of barbarism. However, not only was it the result of induction of networks of influence, but also a form of Russian cargo-cults: the first McDonald's, private banks and movies of rock bands on the Soviet television is perceived as "sacred objects".

Except for these promotional stamps or hopeless retardation in even remotely colored acquaintance with modern philosophy, but not contrary to the mainstream discourse, the concept of "civilization" is treated without any moral burden, but rather as a technical term, and implies not something opposed to " barbarism "and" savagery", but other "civilization. "

In the above-mentioned article of Huntington, there is no word about the "barbarism", he speaks exclusively about the boundaries, structure, features, frictions and differences between different civilizations, opposing each other. This features are not only his position, or a line that goes back to Toynbee, which is followed by Huntington. The use of this term in a modern context implies a deliberate pluralism, comparative research and matching. It directly affects philosophical criticism and rethinking of the Modern carried thousands of different ways throughout the twentieth century.

So, if we discard the recurrence of uncritical liberalism and narrow-minded naive pro-American (wider - Atlanticist) Advocating, we will see that today the term "civilization" in the operational and up to date political analysis is used mainly synchronic and functionally to denote a broad and stable geographical and cultural ar-

eas, united around common spiritual, values, stylistic, psychological attitudes and historical experiences.

Civilization in the context of the XXI century. means exactly that: a zone of stable and rooted influence of certain socio-cultural style, often (but not necessarily) coincide with world religions. Moreover, the political design of the individual segments belonging to a civilization can be quite different: civilizations are usually wider than a single state and they may consist of several or even many countries, moreover, the boundaries of some civilizations pass through the country, dividing them into parts .

Ancient "civilizations" often coincided with empires and were somehow politically united, but now their boundaries are invisible lines irrelevantly superimposing on the administrative borders. Some of these states were once part of a unified empire (such as Islam spread almost everywhere in the conquests of the Arabs, who built the world caliphate). Others didn't know the general state(общей государственности), but were united among themselves differently - religiously, culturally or racially.

The crisis of classic models of historical analysis
(class, economic, liberal, race)

So we established that the use of the term " civilization " in the twentieth century . and in the criticism of modernity there was a qualitative shift in the direction of synchronicityand plurality. But you can make one more step and try to understand why, in fact, this usage has become so relevant nowadays?

In fact, earlier the concept of civilization has not been a subject of deliberate problematization, and only Humanitarian usual academic classes could think by means of such categories . In the political science and discourse another attitudes dominated and namely-economic, national, racial, class and social. Today we observe that thinking economically, talking about the national state and national interests, let alone putting at the head of analysis class or racial attitudes are less and less accepted. Conversely, rarely any politician's

speech can do without mentioning the word "civilization", and surely in every analytical text this term is perhaps the most common.

Huntington made an attempt to "civilize" the central feature of political,historical and strategic analysis. We are obviously going to think "civilizationally. "

Here we should pay more attention to the fact what actually the word 'civilization' in the trunk versions of the political discourse means. To talk seriously about race is not confirmed after the tragic history of European fascism. Class analysis has become mainstreamly irrelevant after the collapse of Soviet bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It might seem that the only paradigm of political science is liberalism. This has created the impression that national borders of homogeneous, essentially liberal-democratic states no longer face with any other system that may claim to be a planetary-scale alternative (after the fall of Marxism), and soon would be abolished, so that the world government and one world state with a homogeneous market economy, parliamentary democracy (World Parliament), liberal system of values and a common information technology infrastructure will be created. An image of the "wonderful new world" was made in the 1990 by Francis Fukuyama in the program book (and his first article) "End of History". Fukuyama put an end to the development of stadial interpretation of the concept of "civilization": the end of history, according his version, means that "barbarism" was finally defeated by "civilization" in all its forms and variations.

It was Fukuyama who Huntington argued with, suggesting as the main argument the fact that the end of the conflict between clearly defined ideologies of the Modern (Marxism and liberalism) does not mean the automatic integration of humanity into a unified liberal utopia, because by the formal structures of national states and ideological camps the deep tectonic plates were found - sort of the continents of the collective unconsciousness, which, as it turned out, were by no means overcome by modernization, colonization, ideology and education and continue to predetermine the most important aspects of life - including politics, economics and geopolitics - in a

particular segment of society, depending on belonging to a civilization

In other words, Huntington offered to introduce the concept of "civilization" as a fundamental ideological concept, designed to replace not only class analysis, but also a liberal utopia, seriously and uncritically apprehending demagogic propaganda of the Cold War and, in turn, became her victim. Capitalism, market liberalism, democracy seem universal and common only in appearance. Each civilization misinterpret the content of its unconscious templates, where religion, culture, language, psychology play an important, sometimes considerable role. In this context, civilization gains a central importance in political analysis, moving to the foreground, and replacing a liberal cliche "Vulgates". Developments in 1990 have shown that Huntington was closer to the truth, and Fukuyama was forced to revise his views having recognized that he had obviously hastened. But this Fukuyama's revise of thesis about the "end of history" requires a more careful consideration.

Liberal utopians step back : state building

The fact is that Fukuyama, analyzing the inconsistencies of his predictions about the "end of history" through the prism of the global victory of liberalism, still tried to stay within the logic that he had originally created. Consequently, at the same time he had to do reality check («reconciliation with reality"), and to avoid recognizing the correctness of his opponent - Huntington, who by all appearances was in his prediction closer to the truth.

Fukuyama then made the following conceptual approach: he offered to postpone the end of history for an indefinite period, and to strengthen the socio-political structures, which were the core of liberal ideology in the previous stages. Fukuyama then put forward a new thesis - «state-building»

As an intermediate step for moving towards global state and world government, he suggested strengthening the nation-states

with a liberal economy and democratic system of governance, in order to prepare the ground for the final victory of global liberalism and globalization. This is not a rejection of the perspective, but a simple postponing it with a concrete proposal concerning a relative stage.

Fukuyama says almost nothing about the concept of "civilization", but explicitly keeping in mind Huntington's thesis, indirectly responding him: the sustainable development of national states, which was crumpled in the era of colonialism, and in an era of national liberation movements, and in an era of ideological confrontation between the two camps, - now has to go through properly. This will gradually lead to the fact that different societies, which have taken the market, democracy and human rights, will take away the remnants of the unconsciousness, and prepare more reliable (than now) way for globalization.

The world as a network (by Thomas Barnett)

There is a new edition of a purely globalist theory, presented by Thomas Barnett's works in American political science and foreign policy analytics. The meaning of his concept appeals to the fact that technological development creates the zonal division of all territories of the world into three regions: the core zone (the core), the zone connectivity (the zone of connectedness) and the off-zone (the zone of disconnectedness). Barnett believes that the network processes penetrate freely across borders of states and civilizations, and somehow structure the strategic space of the world. The U.S.A and the EU form the core, where all the codes of new technologies and decision-making centers are concentrated.To the "zone of connections" - most other countries belong, doomed to "users' " attitude to the networks (they are forced to consume ready-technology tools and to adapt to the rules produced by the core). Countries and the political forces that are in a direct opposition to the U.S., West and globalization belong to the "zone of disabled".For Thomas Barnett (and D. Bell) "technology - is fate", and it embodies the

quintessence of civilization, that understood technically, almost like Spengler did, but only with a positive sign.

The American view of the world order (three versions)

In the American political analysis - and we must admit that the Americans set the tone in this area - co-exist, all three concepts of the selection of subjects on the world map. Globalism and civilization (singular), in the spirit of early Fukuyama, are reflected in the construction of the Burnett. Here the subject is core, the rest is subject of external administration - that is de-subjectification and de-sovereignty.Fukuyama himself, critically examining his early optimistic statements, occupies an intermediate position, insisting that the subject should still be the "national states", that development should prepare a more solid ground for thefuture of globalization.

Finally, Huntington and supporters of his views, believe that civilizations - are too severe and profound realities that may claim to be global actors in world politics in a situation where the old ideological models have collapsed, nation-state is rapidly losing real substance of sovereignty under the influence of some effective dimensions of globalization. But globalization itself, breaking the old broads, is not able to penetrate deeply into traditional societies with stable components. It is significant that for Huntington's thesis hold those forces in the world that seek to escape from globalization, Westernization and American hegemony, in order to preserve and re-strengthen the traditional identity. Only instead of dark catastrophic discourse of Huntington's "clash" and "conflict", they began to talk about "dialogue".But this moralistic nuance should not mislead us about the main task of those who generally take Huntington's model. First of all, it's an Iranian Khatami. "Crash" or "dialogue" –is a secondary question, and principle agreement that "civilization"   is now the main subject of the conceptual analysis of international politics is much more important. In other words, unlike the globalists and the maximalists (such as Bar-

nett), and moderate liberal-étatist, supporters of civilized method explicitly or implicitly take the position of structuralist philosophical approaches to understanding global processes.

Declaring civilization as the main subject of the pole and as an actor of world politics is the most promising ideological course for those who want to estimate the real state of affairs in world politics, for those who seek to find an adequate tool for political science generalizations of a new era - the era of postmodernism, for those who seek to defend their own identity in terms of progressive confusion, as well as real-world attacks, the network of globalization. In other words, appealing to civilization allows organically fill the vacuum created after the historical crisis of all theories, opposing liberalism, and after the internal crisis of liberalism itself, unable to cope with the tutelage of the modern world space – and it can be proved by the unfortunate experience of utopias of Fukuyama. Civilization as a concept, interpreted in contemporary philosophical context, is the center of a new ideology. This ideology can be defined as multi-polarity.

Boundedness of opponents' ideological globalization arsenal and the unipolar world

The opposition to globalism, which is declaring itself at all levels and everywhere on the Earth, has not formed a specific belief system yet. And it is weakness of the anti-globalization movement - it is not systematized, lacks ideological harmony, in this system fragmentary and chaotic elements dominate and often represent vague mixture of anarchism and irrelevant leftism, ecology and even more extravagant and marginal ideas

Losers from the western goshizm are aimed to play the main role. In other cases globalization encounters resistance from the nation-states that do not want to transfer some sovereign powers to an external control.

Finally, representatives of traditional religions, the proponents of ethnic and regional identities (especially in the islamic world) ac-

tively resist globalism and its Atlantist Western liberal-democratic code, its network nature and value system (individualism, hedonism, laksizm). The three existing levels of opposition to globalism and American hegemony cannot lead to a common strategy and a coherent ideology that would unite various and scattered forces, often disparate in size.

Anti-globalization movement suffers from "childhood disease of Leftism" and blocked by a series of defeats by the world's leftist movement in recent decades.

Nation-states usually do not have sufficient scale to challenge the highly technological power of the West, and in addition their political and economic elites are very often involved in transnational projects.

Though sometimes local, ethnic and religious movements and communities can effectively oppose to globalization, at the same time they are too disjointed to change the basic trend of the world or even to correct the course.

The meaning of the concept "civilization" as an opposition to globalism

In such situation "civilization" appears to be a real panacea and a fundamental category for the organization of a full-fledged alternative project in the world.

If this concept is put in the spotlight, we can find a basis for harmonious putting governmental, public, social and political forces in one system.

Taking the plurality of civilizations into account, we can unite the peoples, religious and ethnic communities living in different states, to offer them a general centralized idea (within a particular civilization) and leave a wide selection to find the identity within it, allowing the consistent existence of other civilizations that differ on key parameters.

And that prospect does not necessarily lead to «conflict of civilizations», contrary to Huntington. Conflicts, and alliances are possi-

ble here. The multipolar world that arises in this case, will create real prerequisites for the continuation of the political history of mankind, as to adopt the regulatory diversity of socio-political, religious, values, economic and cultural systems.

Otherwise, a simple and sporadic resistance to globalization at the local level or on behalf of the ideologically amorphous mass of anti-globalization (and in the best case) would only postpone the "end", but will not be a viable alternative.

To the "Large space"

Making civilization as a subject of world politics in the XXI century will allow for "regional globalization" - a union of countries and nations belonging to the same civilization. This will take advantage of social inclusion, but not with respect to all indiscriminately, but primarily to those who belong to a common type of civilization.

An example of such integration into a new political entity is the European Union. It is the prototype of a "regional globalization" that includes the countries and cultures that share common culture, history and value system.

But, recognizing the undoubted right of Europeans to form a new political entity on the basis of their civilizational differences, it is natural to assume similar processes in the Islamic civilization, and in China, and Eurasia, and Latin America and Africa.

In political science, after Carl Schmitt it is common to call all similar projects of integration as "integration of large spaces". In economy Friedrich von List, even before Schmitt, theoretically comprehended, and with great success into practice the creator of the model of German "customs union". "Great Space" is another name for what we mean by "civilization" in its geopolitical, cultural and spatial sense. «Great Space» differs from the currently existing national states precisely because it is constructed on the basis of a common value system and historical relationship, and combines several or even many different states of «common destiny».

In various large spaces integrating factor may vary - somewhere religion will dominate, somewhere some ethnic origin, somewhere cultural form, somewhere the socio-political type, somewhere a geographic location.

The following precedent is important: the creation of the European Union shows that the embodiment of «large space» in practice, the transition from state to supra-national education, built on the basis of civilized community, is possible and constructive and develops positively in reality.

Roster of Civilizations

Unlike the nation states, we still can argue about the number and boundaries of civilizations. Huntington identifies the following:

1) Western,
2) Confucian (Chinese)
3) Japan,
4) Islamic,
5) Hindu
6) The Slav-Orthodox,
7) Latin American and possibly
8) African civilization.

However, several ideas are questened. In Western civilization Huntington includes the U.S. (with Canada) and Europe. Historically, this is true, but still nowadays, from a geopolitical point of view, they form in relation to each other two different "large space", and their strategic, economic and even geopolitical interests diverge more and more.

Europe has two identities - "atlantist" (that can be identified with Europe and North America) and "Continental" (which tends, by contrast, not to be just military springboard for the North American "big brother" but to conduct an independent policy and the return of Europe's history as an independent actor)

Evroatlantizm bases in Britain and in the Eastern Europe (directed by inertial Russophobia) and evrokontinentalizm bases in France and Germany, with the support of Spain and Italy (it's a classic Old Europe). Civilization in all cases is the only one, and namely Western, and talking about "large space" it must be admitted that it may be organized somewhat differently.

it is reasonable to match the Eurasian civilization with the Slavic-Orthodox civilization, which organically, historically and culturally includes not only the Slavs, and not only orthodox, but also other ethnic groups (including Turkic, Caucasian, Siberian, etc.) and considerable part of the population professing Islam.

The Islamic world, of course, united religiously with growing awareness of its identity, in turn, is divided into several "great spaces" - the "Arab world ", "continental zone of Islam" (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan) and the Pacific region with spread of Islam.

A special place in this situation belongs to Muslim Africa, as well as the ever-growing communities in Europe and America. And yet, Islam is civilization, more and more conscious of its peculiarities and distinction from other civilizations - and primarily from liberal Western civilization, that is actively attacking the Islamic world in the course of globalization.

It is difficult to establish the boundaries between the zones of influence of Japanese and Chinese civilizations in the Pacific, whose civilizational identity remains largely open.

And of course, it is difficult to talk about the general consciousness of the inhabitants of the African continent, although in future this situation may change, because this process has at least two historical precedents: League of African countries and pan-African ideas.

Rapprochement of countries in Latin America is evident, but given the pressure of the North America within the last few years, we cannot speak about any integrational processes there.

There are no significant obstacles for the integration of the Eurasian space around Russia , because these areas for centuries were

politically, culturally, economically, socially and psychologically integrated.

The western boundary of the Eurasian civilization is somewhat east of the western border of Ukraine, making this new state fragile and unsustainable.

Enumeration of Civilizations, in fact, gives us an idea of the number of poles in a multipolar world. All of them - except the west - are being in a potential state, but at the same time, each of these civilizations have serious grounds for moving toward integration and formation of high-grade actors in the history of XXI century.

Multipolar ideal

The idea of a multipolar world, where the number of poles and civilizations are the same, will offer humanity a wide range of cultural, philosophical, social and spiritual alternatives.

We will have a model with the presence of a "regional universalism" in a particular "large space" that will give to large bands and significant segments of humanity necessary social dynamics (that is typical for globalization and openness), but devoid of the shortcomings that globalism has taken on a planetary scale.

However, regionalism can also develop in this situation, as well as local, ethnic and religious communities, since the unifying pressure inherent in nation-states will be significantly weakened.

(We see it in the EU, where integration contributes substantially to the development of local communities and the so-called Euroregions).

In addition to everything else we can finally resolve this fundamental contradiction between exclutizivizm and incluzivizm of "imperial" identity: the planet does not appear as one single "oikumen" (with uniqueness of this "cultural racism" in the distribution of titles of "civilized nations" and, on the contrary, the "barbarians" and "savages"), but as several "eykumens" several "universes", where they will live at their own pace, in their context, with its

own time, with his consciousness and his unconscious during several generations.

It is impossible to say in advance what relations between them will be. Maybe both dialogue and confrontation will take place. But thing is of greater importance: the story will continue and we will remove the fundamental historical impasse, where we were brought by uncritical belief in progress, rationality and progressive development of mankind.

With time something is changing in man, but something is eternal and unchanging. Civilization can severely dilute everything in its place.

Reason and created by it philosophical, social, political and economic systems will develop according to their laws, and the collective unconscious will be able to keep their archetypes and base untouched.

And in every civilization, rationality and the unconscious are free to assert their own standards, to keep them faithful, to strengthen them, or modify.

There no universal standard - neither material nor spiritual - will be. Each civilization will finally proclaim that it is a measure of things. Somewhere it will be a man somewhere - religion, somewhere - ethics, somewhere - matter.

But for realization of this project we have to endure a lot of fights. First and foremost, it is necessary to cope with the main enemy - Globalism and the desire of the Atlantic western pole once again to impose all the peoples and cultures of the Earth its sole hegemony.

Despite the deep and true observations of his best intellectuals, many of the political establishments in the United States still use the term «civilization» in the singular, implying the «American civilization».

That is the real challenge that we all, all nations of the earth, and especially Russian, should simply have to give an adequate response for.

CHAPTER 13. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE LEFT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Left philosophy in crisis

The present day gives no opportunity to speak of any strictly defined space for any leftist (social, socialist or communist) project, if compared with the contrast of the situation which for a century ago predominated the field of political ideas and projects. The case is that the leftist movement, leftist ideas, leftist philosophy and left politics saw a fundamental expectations crisis. First of all, it was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Socialist camp as well as by the decline of influence and prestige of the European Marxism, which virtually became for a certain period of time a "spare ideology" in the Western Europe.

However, the left project even in its better days was not uniform and universal. The fate of left ideas implementation in a specific political practice of different nations showed that even from purely theoretical point of view there are several main trends within the left philosophy itseft that should be studied separately.

Initially the left-winged philosophy was thought to be fundamental, unifying and systematized criticism of liberal capitalism. In the middle of the 20 century such phenomenon as systematic criticism of the left project arose (from both Liberals – Hayek, Popper, Aron, etc, and Neomarxists and Freudian Marxists). Philosophical schools did the same to the leftist ideology as what the left project did to the liberal capitalism 100-150 years ago.

Three Varieties of the Left Ideology

From the perspective of today's historical experience, there are three basic trends in the left political philosophy, which either continue previous ideological projects in a new stage, or reconsider the past, or suggest something radically new. That is:

- Old Leftists ("Vetero-Gauchiste": "vetero" (veterant) – old and "gauchiste" – "left" (French));
- Left Nationalists ("National Communists", "National Bolsheviks" and "National Gauchiste");
- New Leftists ("Neogauchiste", "Postmodernists").

The first two trends have been existing since the end of the 19 century and throughout the 20 century and to some extent they are present in today's world. The third trend appeared in 1950-1960s. It developed from the criticism of Old Leftists and was gradually formed itself into a Postmodernist concept, which to a large degree influenced aesthetics, stylistics and philosophy of the modern Western society.

- Old Leftists today (orthodoxy deadlocks, evolutional strategy's perspectives and pro-Liberal revisionism)
- Nowadays Old Leftists are divided into several directions:
- Orthodox Marxists;
- Social Democrats;
- Post-Social Democrats (advocates of the "Third Way", according to Giddens).

European Orthodox Marxists

Inertia keeps up their existence in the European countries, the United States and the Third World where they continue to stick to basic foundations of the Marxist doctrine. Oftentimes being politically embodied in Communist parties they profess the relevant ideology. Generally, these Orthodox Marxists slightly mitigate (in the spirit of Eurocommunism) the radicalism of the Marxist doctrine and reject the appeal for social upheaval and establishment of proletariat dictatorship. Trotskyism movement (Fourth International) proved to be

the most stable form of the Marxist Orthodoxy, as it was left almost unaffected by the falldown of the USSR and collapse of the Soviet system, as it initially kept to harsh criticism of the Soviet regime.

Typically, the most orthodox followers of Marx can be found in the countries that have undergone no proletarian socialist revolutions, while Marx himself predicted that it should be the most industrialized countries with a settled capitalist economy where those revolutions are destined to be a come-true. The European Marxism to a certain extent put up with the fact that Marxist visions had not been implemented in the countries where they were to, according to all the logic, but on the contrary where they (strictly according to Marx and Engels) in no way stood any chance for that. This version of Old Leftists rejects the Soviet experience as a historical stretch and does not believe in the success of Marxist previsions. However, it continues to uphold their beliefs as adherence to "moral feeling" and "ideological tradition" rather than really expects a revolt of proletariat (which does not seem to exist as a class in the modern Western world – to that extent it has merged with petty bourgeoisie).

The main defect of the Western Orthodox Marxists is that they continue to use terms of the industrialized society, while the Western European and particularly the US society has passed to the brand new stage – the stage of post-industrial (information) society. And it was mentioned by none of the Marxist Classics, except for vague intuition of young Marx about "real dominance of capital". The latter – in absence or in case of failure of Socialist revolutions – can replace "formal dominance of capital", inherent in industrialized stage. However, Orthodox Marxists as a rule do not take interest or focus on these fragmentary remarks.

Gradually Old Marxist discourse loses its prognostic and politological meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to present these ideas as a "project" – a "left project". At the same time their criticism of the capitalist system, ethical views, solidarity with the destitute, as well as criticism of liberalism can arouse some interest and sympathy. Almost all adherents of this ideological direction distrust other anti-liberal forces, and are closed for dialogue and degenerate into a sect.

European Social Democrats

European Social Democrats are slightly different from Ortho-dox Communists. This political trend separated from Marxism, and since the time of Kautsky it has chosen evolutionary rather than revolutionary way, rejecting radicalism and aiming at making the left influence (social justice, Welfare State – Etat-Provedance and so on) by political means and organized trade union movements. This version of the Old Leftists has achieved prominent results in the European countries and determined social and political appearance of the European society – unlike the US society where by contrast dominates a right-winged liberal model.

Nowadays the meaning of the Old Leftists' socio-democratic trend boils down to a number of economic theses, opposite to liberal tendencies. Social Democrats advocate:

progressive income tax rate (Liberals advocate flat tax rate);

nationalization of big monopolies (Liberals – privatization);

resting bigger responsibility on the state in public sector;

free medicine, education, pension provision (Liberals – reduc-tion of state interference in the economy, private medicine, private education and retirement insurance).

Social Democrats try to implement these demands through par-liamentary electoral mechanisms, and if confronted with critical situations through mobilization of trade unions and public organiza-tions right up to strikes and turnouts.

It is significant that Social Democrats use libertarian (do not con-fuse with liberal!) slogans:

- legalization of light drugs;
- protection of sexual and ethnic minorities and homosexual marriages;
- extension of individual civil rights and freedoms;
- ecology;
- mitigation of legislation (abolition of death penalty), etc.

For Classical Social Democrats it is mandatory to combine left economy requirements (social justice, emerging role of the state)

with extension of individual civil rights and freedoms ("human rights"), democracy development, internationalism (today it is accepted to speak about "multiculturalism" and "globalization").

Classical Social Democrats' future aimed project consists in continuing this policy of concrete steps on socio-political evolution and arguing with both liberals (about economy) and national-conservatives (about politics). Besides, classical Social Democrats often advocate:

- progress;
- struggle against archaic and religious prejudices;
- science and culture.

Nevertheless, there are no serious theoretical elaborations regarding new conditions of the postmodern society and there is almost no criticism of classical Marxism and thematization of capitalism in the new historical phase (unlike postmodernists and "New Leftists").

"Third Way" socialists

There is another version of the Old Leftists – Social Democrats that in the face of increasing popularity of liberal ideas in 1990-2000s decided to make a compromise with Liberalism. Theorists of this trend (particularly, an Englishmen Antony Giddens) called it the "Third Way" – something between classical European Social Democracy and American (wider – Anglo-Saxon) Liberalism.

The advocates of the "Third Way" suggest finding a compromise between Social Democrats and Liberal Democrats on the grounds of common roots stretching back to the Enlightenment and common rejection of both Conservatism and left extremism. The compromising platform is based on mutual concessions regarding concrete agreements on to what extent the Social Democrats agree to lower the progressive tax rate, as well as Liberals – to lower the flat tax rate. Regarding the human rights, the guarantee of minorities protection and multiculturalism they have no fundamental disputes (except for Liberal Conservatives who combine the idea of flat income tax

rate with conservative principles of family, morale, religion, like American right-wingers – Republicans and "Neocons").

According to Giddens, the point of the "Third Way" is to make Liberals and Social Democrats to cooperate on building the European Community based on extension of freedoms, preservation of private property by varying the participation of state and mechanisms of income distribution in each specific case within preestablished limits. Unlike the classical Social Democrats, not to mention the European Communists, the advocates of the "Third Way" sympathize with the US and insist on the Atlantic community consolidation (while the Leftists, both old and new, tend to criticize harshly the US and American society for Liberalism, inequity and imperialism).

It is the advocates of the "Third Way" that are renegades of the left movements indeed. And only former Trotskyites go farther than that (the American Trotskyites – main neocon theorists, and the European Trotskyites, for instance, Barroso, the Portuguese President of the European Commission), who have changed their views from extremist Communism and revolutionary Socialism for equally radical defense of Liberalism, market and economic inequity.

The "Third Way" Socialists view the left project as maintenance of status-quo.

National Communism (conceptual paradox, ideological discrepancies, underground energies)

"National Gauchism" should be considered a very special phenomenon. Unlike Orthodox Marxism and Social Democracy this trend has been underexplored and its correct interpretation is a matter of the future. The case is that "National Gauchism" itself almost never advertises its national idea, conceals or even openly criticizes it. Consequently, the studying of direct and open discourse of National Communist movement, parties and regimes is complicated due to the fact that the discoursed theses either correspond with the reality to the half or not at all. We can meet realized, open and integral National Gauchist discourse only on the sideway of those

regimes and political parties that in fact profess and implement this very ideological model, and refuse to admit it. Therefore, National Gauchism avoids frontal rational research, preferring to keep half of this phenomenon: "everything connected with ''National'' – in the shadow.

National-Communists consider themselves "just Communists", "Orthodox Marxists", who strictly follow Marxist classics' ideas. In order to understand what it all really is about it is enough to establish the following criterion: only those countries underwent the Socialist (proletarian) revolutions, which, according to Marx, were not ready for it due to the following reasons:

- agrarian structure of these countries;
- underdevelopment (or even absence) of capitalist relations;
- small number of urban proletariat;
- weak industrialization;
- preservation of traditional society basic conditions (as a re-sult of the fact that these countries belonged to premodern).

That is the fundamental paradox of Marxism: in those countries where Socialism should have won and where the conditions were favorable, it has not; although purely theoretically it is in those countries where Orthodox Marxist trends and parties existed and are still there. And they won in those countries where, according to Marx, could not have won. The victorious Communists themselves – in the first place, Russian Bolsheviks – did their utmost to conceal and retouch this obvious discrepancy with the forecasts of their teacher, without analyzing it conceptually. On the contrary, they preferred to voluntaristicly adjust the reality to their theoretical conclusions – to adjust the society, politics and economy to make them artificially and mechanically agree with abstract criteria. Only outside observers (sympathizers or critics) noticed National Communist character of the success Marxist revolutions and recognized their driving force and factor that had opened for their success and steadiness within national archaic element, which was mobilized by Marxism as a nationally interpreted eschatological myth. One of the first sympathizers that noticed it was Sorel, then – Ustrialov, Savitsky, Ger-

mans Niekisch, Petel, Lauffenberg, Wolfhaim, etc; on the part of the critics – Popper, Hayek, Kon, Aron.

National Communism predominated in the USSR, communist Chine, Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Kampuchea and in a number of Communist movements in the third world countries – from Mexican "Chiapas" and Peruvian "Camino Luminiso" to the Kurdistan Workers' Party and Islamic socialism. Leftist – socialist – elements are present in Mussolini's fascism and Hitler's National Socialism, however, in this case these elements are fragmented, non-systematic and shallow; they constituted themselves more in marginal or sporadical ideas (left Italian fascism in its early futuristic phase and Italian Socialist republic, brothers Schtrassers' left anti-Hitler National Socialism or anti-Hitler clandestine organization of National-Bolsheviks Niekisch and Schulz-Boysen, etc). However, it should seem that on the face of it and by its name we should ascribe National Socialism to this category, still there was no Socialism as such in National Socialism – there was more likely etatism multiplied by invocations of archaic energies of ethnos and "race". However, the Soviet Bolshevism, which was recognized by smenavekhite Nikolay Ustrialov as "National Bolshevism", did contain both principles: social and national, though the latter did not have a conceptual definition.

Up to now a lot of political movements, for example, in Latin America are inspired by this idea-complex; and political regimes in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia (Evo Morales is the first Latin American leader of Indian origin) or Ollanta Humala, whose supporters nearly seized the power in Peru, and other National Communist movements are full-fledged political reality. State system is either based on them or it may well happen in the near future. When Communism contains left ideas multiplied by national (ethnic, archaic) energies and implemented in terms of traditional society it has real chances. Actually, it is unorthodox Marxism, a kind of National Marxism (however it assesses itself). And those countries, where are all classical preconditions for implementation of Communism (industrialized society, developed industry, urban proletariat) are

fulfilled, did not undergo Socialist revolution (except for ephemeral Bavarian Republic), are not undergoing and, probably, will never do.

The meaning of the Left Nationalism (National-Gauchism) consists in mobilization of archaic basis (local as a rule) in order to set free onto the surface and realize itself in social and political creativity. Here comes Socialist theory that serves as a kind of "interface" for these energies, which without Socialism remain as a local phenomenon; and due to Marxism – though understood and interpreted in a specific way – these energies get an opportunity to intercommunicate with substantially similar, but structurally different phenomena and even lay a claim to universality and planetary scope, transforming Nationalism, warmed-up due to Socialist rationality, into a messianic project.

Grand experience of the USSR shows how large-scale a National Communist initiative can be, having created almost for a century a fundamental headache for the whole global Capitalistic system. And Chine in current conditions, more and more focusing on national component of its social and political model, proves that this basis, transformed in proper time and in a delicate way, can remain competitive even after the global triumph of Liberal Capitalism. On the other hand, experience of Venezuela and Bolivia shows that National Communist regimes appear nowadays and demonstrate their viability even in the face of serious pressure. North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba have been preserving their political system since the Soviet time without undertaking any market reforms like Chine and without losing grounds like the USSR.

From theoretical point of view in case of National Gauchism we deal with Marxism which was a bit changed in the spirit of archaic eschatological expectations, deep national mythology connected with waiting for "the end of the world" and return of "the golden age" (cargo cult, Premilennialism). Thesis about justice and "state of the truth", which is a basis for Socialist utopia, is religiously realized and awakens fundamental tectonic energies of an ethnos.

Has National Gauchism got a future project? Not in a complete form. As there are a number of obstacles:

- a shock after the collapse of the Soviet National Communism (as far back as in the 1920s Russian Eurasianists predicted this collapse unless the Soviet authorities realize the importance of direct appeal to national and religious element);
- absence of conceptualization and rationalization of the national component in the whole idea-complex of National-Communist movements and ideologies (most of the adherents of this ideological direction consider themselves "just Marxists" and "Socialists");
- poor institutional communication between National Bolshevik circles around the world (there are almost no serious and large-scale conferences on this issue, no theoretical magazines or they remain somewhat marginal, no philosophical elaborations).

Nevertheless, to my way of thinking, National Gauchism may well have global future, as most of human segments have not yet spent their archaic, ethnic and religious energies, unlike the citizens of the modernist enlightened and rational West.

New leftists (antiglobalism, postmodern routes, labyrinth of freedoms, to the advent of posthumanity)

Something that today most fully correspond with the word combination "left project" is called "new leftists" ("Neogauchism") or "Postmodernism". In the whole spectrum of left ideas at the beginning of the 21 century this direction is not only the brightest, but also the most thought-out, intellectually regulated and systematized.

"New leftists" appeared in 1950-1960s in Europe at the periphery of the left-winged Marxists, Trotskyites and Anarchists. Marx was sine qua non for them, however, they used actively other theoretical and philosophical sources and unlike "old leftists" they unhesitatingly introduced borrowed elements into their own theories. Therefore, Marxism rapidly expanded in this direction, developed,

was constantly juxtaposed with other philosophical concepts, reconsidered, subjected to criticism – in one word, it became an object of concentrated reflection. This loose attitude of "new leftists" towards Marxism yielded ambiguous results: on the one hand, it has been diluted, on the other hand, it was significantly modernized.

However, "new leftists" were influenced to a large degree by so called "philosophers of suspicion" including not only Marx, but also Freud and Nietzsche. Through Sartre, "new leftists'" classic, Martin Heidegger and existentialist problematic have profoundly influenced the left movement. Structuralism has had a telling impact on it – from the main theorist of structural linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure to Levi-Strauss. In the philosophical sense "new leftists" were structuralists, however, since mid-1980s they have passed to "poststructuralism", further developing this philosophical impulse, and have begun to criticize their own views of 1960-1970s.

"New leftists" took Marxism from structuralist point of view – they considered Marx's idea about basis' fundamental impact (usually – bourgeois society, concealed from ideological recognition) on superstructure the most important. Marx's analysis of ideology as a "false consciousness" became for "new leftists" a key to interpretation of society, philosophy, man, economy. However, they discovered the same approach of idea with Nietzsche, who derived the whole spectrum of philosophical ideas from the initial "Will to power" (that was the "basis", according to Nietzsche) and Freud, who used "subconsciousness" and "unconscious impulses" rooted in foundation of human sexuality and in its initial structuralization in the early childhood as a "basis". Heidegger's model with "pure existence" – Dasein as a "basis" was put over it. "New leftists" reduced all versions of deciphering of the "basis" to the integrating scheme, where the role of "basis" as it is – regardless the specific philosophical trend – was shifted to the concept of "structure". "Structure"– is at the same time production forces, reflected in production relations, subconsciousness, "Will to power" and Dasein.

The basic idea of "new leftists" was about the bourgeois society being a result of many-sided "violence" and "suppression" by "su-

perstructure" (bourgeois political system, everyday consciousness, power elites, generally accepted philosophical systems, science, society, market economy, etc) of "basis" and "structure" (also widely understood – including the "unconscious", "proletariat", "body", the "masses", authentic existence experience, freedom and justice). Thereby, "new leftists" in contrast to old leftists have waged a systemic critical attack on capitalistic society in all directions – from politics (the May 1968 events in the European countries) to culture, philosophy, art, conception of man, intellect, science, reality. In the course of this huge intellectual work (which, by the way, was noticed by neither old leftists nor National Gauchiste) "new leftists" came to the conclusion that Capitalism is not only "socio-political evil", but also a fundamental expression of global lie about a man, reality, intellect, society; therefore, the whole alienation history is focused on Capitalistic society in a resultant moment. "New leftists" reincarnated Rousseau's ideas about a "noble savage" and offered a deployed panorama of the ideal society, where one can find no exploitation, alienation, lie, suppression, exclusion, by analogy with archaic groups with "gift economy".

The analysis of "new leftists" showed that Modern era not only did not implement its "liberation" slogans but made the dictatorship of alienation even more cruel and disgusting, putting a façade of "democracy" and "liberalism" to hide it. So the postmodern theory was formed. It was based on the assumption that at the heart of worldview, science, philosophy and political ideologies, formed in the early modern era or in the course of its development, lie stretches, errors, delusions and "racist" prejudices, that even theoretically block a possibility of liberation of "structure" ("basis") from dictatorship of "superstructure". It led to revision of philosophical tradition of the Modern era and "disclosure" of those mechanisms that are focused on the knots of alienation. Such practice was called "deconstruction", which implies attentive and thorough structural analysis of the context, from where any given idea is generated, with detailed exarticulation of meaningful core from strata of pathos, moralizing, figures of speech and deliberate distortions. Foucault in his "Mad-

ness and Civilization" and "The Birth of the Clinic" showed that modern attitude to mental insanity and even to the disease itself has all signs of intellectual "racism", "apartheid" and other totalitarian prejudices. It becomes obvious in equating ill men with criminals, as well as in structural identity of penitentiary and therapeutic institutes, that used to be one and the same thing during the early Modern era.

Bourgeois society despite its mimicry and "democratic" façade turns out to be a "totalitarian" and "disciplinary" society. Though "new leftists" put deep and hardly ever called in question normative ideas about intellect, science, reality, society, etc, as well as political and economic mechanisms, which are a far-reaching consequence of deeper alienation mechanisms, in the center of this liberal dictatorship.

That is the main difference between "new leftists" and "old leftists": "new leftists" cast doubt on intellect's structure, dispute profundity of reality concept, disclose positive science as a mystification and dictatorship of the "science world" (Feyerabend, Kuhn) and harshly criticize the concept of a "human" as a "totalitarian abstraction". They do not believe in possibility of changing anything by evolution of the current system in left way; what is more, they dispute the effectiveness of radical Marxism, remarking: in those countries where Marxism should have won, it has not, and in the countries where Marxism has won, it is not orthodox Marxism (they borrow criticism of Stalinism and Soviet experience from Trotsky).

Thus, "new leftists" define a large-scale project of the "right" future with the following requirements in the centre:

- refusal from intellect (appeal for conscious choice of schizophrenia by Deleuze and Guattari);
- abolition of a man as a measure of all things ("the death of the man" by Levy and "the death of the author" by R. Barthes);
- overcoming of all sexual taboos (freedom to choose the sex, repeal of the ban on incest, refusal from considering a perversion as perversion, etc);

- legalization of all kinds of drugs, including hard drugs;
- passing to new forms of spontaneous and sporadic being ("rhizome" by Deleuze);

destruction of structured society and state in favor of new free anarchic communities.

The book by A. Negri and M. Hardt "Empire", where "new leftists'" theses are simplified up to primitiveness, may be considered a political manifesto of these trends. Negri and Hardt call the global Capitalistic system "Empire" and equate it with globalism and American global domination. According to them, globalism creates conditions for universal planetary "revolution of multitudes", which by using universal globalism and its opportunities of communication and spreading open knowledge will create a network of global sabotage – for passing from human (that acts as subject and object of violence, hierarchical relations, exploitation and "disciplinary strategies") to posthuman (mutant, cyborg, clone, virtual), who can chose sex, appearance and individual rationality in one's own way and for any period of time. According to Negri and Hardt, it will lead to liberation of creative potency of "multitudes" and one day will blow up the global dominance of "Empire". This topic has been played up in many popular films, for instance, "The Matrix", "Fight club", etc.

Antiglobalization movement in whole is oriented towards such future project. And such events as "Conference in San-Paulo", where globalists for the first time tried to lay down a general strategy, indicate that the new left project tries to form a specific political implementation. A number of concrete activities – Gay Prides, ecological actions, antiglobalization actions and strikes, unrest in emigrant suburbs in the European cities, the riots of "autonomists " in defense of squats, widespread protests of new trade unions, more and more reminiscent of carnival, movement for legalizing drugs, etc – fit in this trend.

Furthermore, postmodernism as an art style, which has become a mainstream in modern Western art, expresses just this "new left" political philosophy, entering our everyday life through paintings,

design and Tarantino and Rodriguez films without preliminary po-
litical and philosophical analysis, leaving behind a conscious choice
and imposing itself against our will. It is accompanied by spread-
ing of virtual communication technologies, which carry an implicit
invitation to postmodern and dispersal into posthuman, hedonistic
fragments. SMS and MMS messages, blogs and video blogs in the
Internet, flashmobs and other usual activities of modern youth is
in fact implementation of some aspects of "new left" project, yet
controlled by the bourgeois system, which is making profit out of
fashion – though the fashion is now introduced not by the bourgeois
system, but by its hidden opponent.

Here we should dwell on attitude of "new leftists", antiglobalists
to modern liberals and globalists. Like once Marx thought that Capi-
talism with all its horrors was more progressive than Feudalism and
the Middle Ages (as it brings closer the advent of Socialism), today
modern postmodernists and "new leftists", harshly criticizing "Em-
pire", support it to a certain extent, as "Empire", according to them,
aggravating alienation and toughening its planetary dictatorship,
prepares "global revolutions" of multitudes.

Leftists in modern Russia

In conclusion we should dwell on positions of left forces in Rus-
sia. In practice, we see that there are no "old leftists" in full sense
in this country at all, as well as in the Soviet time. The group of the
Soviet dissidents (Zinoviev, Shchedrovitsky, Medvedev) does not
count, as they did not manage to develop any outstanding school.

On the other hand, National Communists represent broad social,
psychological and political strata with Communist Party of the Rus-
sian Federation at the helm. Since the whole Soviet history – marked
with victory of Socialism (a sure sign of archaic basis) – is the his-
tory of unconscious National Gauchism, this trend is hardly surpris-
ing.

At the first stage of establishing the Communist Party Zyuganov
(not without my participation and participation of Prokhanov, which

was expressed in position of the newspaper "Den'" ("Day") ("Za-vtra" – Tomorrow) in the early 1990s) tried to comprehend and con-ceptually assess National component in the Soviet ideology (Nation-al Bolshevism); however, the authorities of the Communist Party shortly after gave up this initiative, dealing with some other – prob-ably more important – matters. Though, at the level of rhetoric and primary reaction Russian communists speak as National Conserva-tives and sometimes as "Orthodox Monarchists".

What is more, average Russians – especially, of middle and older generation – on the whole are unconscious National Gauchiste. They always support this idea-complex at the fist opportunity (the Party "Rodina" ("Motherland")) and thereby interpret a lot of things that have nothing to do with it (Social Conservatism of United Russia and Putin). While the marginal groups that imitate European neona-zism and try to use "National Socialism" in their names, have never been "National Gauchiste", as they imitate (as a result of inferiority of mind) Hitler regime's gadgets, continuing to play soldiers and watch TV series "Seventeen Moments of Spring", admiring raven uniform of Bronevoy-Mueller. The project of NBP (National Bol-shevik Party), which at one time I was going to develop in authentic Russian National Gauchism based on ideas of Ustrialov, Niekisch and left Eurasianists, unfortunately, by the end of 1990s had degen-erated into rowdy, meaningless formation and later it began to serve antirussian "orange" ultraliberal forces, fed-up by the West (it con-tradicts fundamental aims of "National-Bolshevism", which is both in theory and in practice conscious left – consequently inflexibly antiliberal, Russian patriotic – and therefore antiwestern – project.

"New leftists" and postmodernists are almost absent in Russian political spectrum; philosophical discourse of postmodern is too complicated for them. A small group of "conscious" ("representa-tive") antiglobalists exist, but they are more famous in the Western countries and do not represent anything serious (neither in organi-zational, nor theoretical sense). In the Russian art – in particular in "Vinzavod", Guelman's gallery, as well as in the Russian films – postmodern trends are clearly visible, and their artistic expression

is sometimes impressive. The books by Sorokin or Pelevin represent postmodern in a literary form.

Furthermore, an average artistic or even technological (which is more important!) Western product carries a hidden part of post-modern, thereby occupying Russian cultural space with active signs, elaborated in "new leftists'" creative laboratories, and then churned out by global industry, which takes a short-term advantage of it (and gradually undermines its bases). Russia plays a role of inactive con-sumer, which does not understand political and ideological meaning of what it automatically consumes – following fashion and global trends (and forgetting that, according to postmodernists, every trend has trend-setters – the subjects that launch a particular trend with a specific aim).

CHAPTER 14. LIBERALISM
AND ITS METAMORPHOSES

In 1932 the German National-Bolshevik Ernst Niekisch, whose ideas were remarkably similar to both the Russian National-Bolsheviks (Ustryalov) and the Eurasianists, wrote a book with the revealing title: *Hitler: Disaster for Germany*. The book went almost unnoticed but after a few years led him straight to the concentration camps. He turned out to be absolutely right – Hitler in fact had appeared precisely to be a fateful figure for Germany. Fateful, meaning not accidental; well founded, engrained in the course of things, joined with the logic of Fate, but embodying her darker aspect. And in this book, as in other of his works, Niekisch repeated: "In human society there are no fatalities such as those inherent in nature – the changing of the seasons, natural disasters. The dignity of man consists in the fact that he can always say "no." He can always rebel. He can always rise and fight against even that which seems inevitable, absolute and unbeatable. And even if he loses he gives an example to others. And others take his place. And others say "no." That's why the most fateful and fated occurrences can be defeated with the strength of the soul."

Niekisch fought with Nazism and Nazis, and predicted earlier and more precisely than others what will be the consequences of their bloody rule for Germany and mankind. He did not give up. He threw down a challenge to "evil fate", not letting down his fists. Most importantly: he resisted a strength that seemed invincible with a handful of like-minded anti-Nazis. A group of Niekisch's followers – one of them the National-Bolshevik Harro Schultz-Boysan – became the core of the "Red Orchestra." It was he, almost blind

then, that the Soviet troops freed from a concentration camp in 1945. He did not see he physical victories for which he gave his life, but until the end of his days he remained convinced that it is necessary to stand opposed to the evil fate of human history, even if it comes forth from its deepest flywheels.

Today the same could be said about liberalism as an ideology, which was victorious in the West and which spreads its influence – using many old and new ways – across the entire world, supported by superpower number one, the USA. It seems again that this might is inevitable, not accidental, and follows the fundamental fateful law and to argue with this power is useless. But again, as in the case of Ernst Niekisch, people are found who are ready to carry out that same program, only this time not as regarding a separate country but rather all mankind: "Liberalism is the evil fate of human civilization." The battle with it, opposition to it, refutation of its poisonous dogmas – this is the moral imperative of all honest people on the planet. At all costs, we must, argumentatively and thoroughly, again and again, repeat that truth, even when to do so seems useless, untimely, politically incorrect, and sometimes even dangerous.

Liberalism as a Summary of Western Civilization, and its Definition

In order to adequately understand the essence of liberalism, we must recognize that it is not accidental, that its appearance in history of political and economic ideologies is based on fundamental processes, proceeding in all of Western civilization. Liberalism is not only a part of that history but its purest and most refined expression, its result. This principal observation demands from us a stricter definition of liberalism.

Liberalism is a political and economic philosophy and ideology, embodying in itself the most important lines of force of the modern age, of the epoch of Modernity:

- The understanding of the individual as the measure of all things;

- Belief in the sacred character of private property;
- The assertion of the equality of opportunity as the moral law of society;
- Belief in the "contractual" basis of all social-political institutions, including governmental;
- The abolition of any governmental, religious and social authorities who lay claim to "the common truth";
- The separation of powers and the making of social systems of control over any government institution whatever;
- The creation of a civil society without races, peoples and religions in place of traditional governments;
- The dominance of market relations over other forms of politics (the thesis: "economics is fate");
- Certainty that the historical path of Western peoples and countries is a universal model of development and progress for the entire world, which must, in an imperative order, be taken for the standard and pattern.

It is specifically these principles which lie at the base of historical liberalism, developed by the philosophers Locke, Mill, Kant, later Bentham, and Constance, right up to the neoliberal school of the 20th century, Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper. Adam Smith, the follower of Locke, on the basis of the ideas of his teacher adopted to the analysis of business activity, laid the foundations of political economy, having written the political and economic "Bible" of the Modern epoch.

'Freedom From'

All the principles of the philosophy of liberalism and the very name "liberalism" are based on the thesis of "freedom" - "liberty." At the same time, the liberal philosophers (in particular Mill) underscore that the "freedom" they stand up for is a strictly negative freedom. Moreover, they separate freedom from and freedom to, suggest using for these things two different English words: "liberty" and "freedom." "Liberty" implies freedom from something. It is

from here that the name "liberalism" is derived. Liberals fight for this freedom and insist on it. As for "freedom to" -that is, the meaning and goal of freedom – here liberals fall silent, reckoning that each individual can himself find a way to apply his freedom, or he can neglect altogether to search for a way to use it. This is a question of private choice, which is not discussed and which has no political or ideological value.

On the other hand, "freedom from" is defined precisely and has a dogmatic character. Liberals propose to be free from:

- Government and its control over the economy, politics and civil society;
- Churches and their dogmas;
- Class systems;
- Any form of common areas of responsibility of the economy;
- Any attempt to redistribute with one or another government or social institutions the results of material and non-material labour (the formula of the liberal philosopher Philip Nemo, a follower of Hayek: "Social justice is deeply immoral");
- Ethnic attachments;
- Any collective identity whatsoever.

One can think that we have some kind of version of anarchy here, but that's not exactly right. Anarchists – at least those like Proudhon – consider as an alternative to government free, communal labour, with a complete collectivization of its products, and they come out strongly against private ownership, while liberals, on the other hand, see in the market and in the sacredness of private property a pledge for the realization of their optimal socio-economic model. Besides, theoretically considering that the government must sooner or later die out, opening up a place for the world market and world civil society, liberals, for pragmatic reasons, support the government if it is bourgeois-democratic, facilitates the development of the market, guarantees to "civil society" safety and protection against aggressive neighbours, and staves off "the war of all against all" (T. Hobbes).

In everything else liberals go rather far, repudiating practically all social-political institutions, right up the family and sexual differ-

entiation. In the extreme cases liberals support not only the freedom of abortions but even the freedom from sexual differentiation (supporting the rights of homosexuals, transsexuals, and so on). The family, as another form of society, is thought by them to be a purely contractual thing, which, as other "enterprises," is conditioned by legal agreements.

On the whole, liberals insist not only on "freedom from" tradition and sacrality (to speak of previous forms of traditional society), but even on "freedom from" socialization and redistribution, on which Left – socialist and communist – political ideologies insist (if to speak of political forms that are contemporaries of liberalism or even pretenders to its throne).

Liberalism and the Nation

Liberalism was engendered in Western Europe and America in the epoch of bourgeois revolutions and strengthened as Western political, religious and social institutions that preceded the imperial-feudal periods gradually weakened: monarchy, the church, estates. In its first stages, liberalism dealt with the idea of the creation of contemporary nations, when in Europe they conceived the "nation" as a uniform political formation founded on a contractual basis, opposing the more ancient imperial and feudal forms. "The nation" was understood as the totality of citizens of a state; a totality in which is embodied the contact of a population of individuals connected with a common territorial residence and common level of economic development. Neither ethnic, nor religious, nor class factors had any significance. Such a "nation-state" (Etat-Nation) had no common historical goal, no determinate mission. It conceived of itself as a "corporation" or business that is founded through the reciprocal agreement of its participants and that can theoretically be dissolved on those same bases.

The European Nations kicked religion, ethnoses and classes to the curb, believing these to be remnants of the "dark ages." This is the difference between liberal nationalism and other versions there-

of: here, no values of ethno-religious or historical communities are taken into consideration; the accent is put only on the benefits and advantages of the collective agreement of individuals, who have established a government for concrete, pragmatic reasons.

The Challenge of Marxism

If with the dismantling of feudal-monarchic and clerical regimes everything was going smoothly for liberalism and no ideological alternatives stemming from the European Middle Ages were able to oppose liberals, then in the depths of the philosophy of the modern era there appeared a movement contesting with liberals for the right to first place in the process of modernization and coming out with a powerful conceptual criticism of liberalism not from positions of the past (from the right) but from positions of the future (the left). Such were socialist and communist ideas, receiving their most systematic expression in Marxism.

Marx carefully analyzed the political economy of Adam Smith, and, more broadly, of the liberal school, but he made from these ideas an absolutely original conclusion. He recognized their partial correctness – in comparison to feudal models of traditional societies – but he offered to go further and in the name of the future of mankind to refute what are for liberals the most important postulates.

In liberalism, Marxism:

- Denied the identification of the subject with the individual (thinking instead that the subject has a collective-class nature);
- Recognized the unjust system of the appropriation of surplus value by capitalists in the process of a market economy;
- Reckoned "freedom" of bourgeois society a veiled form of class supremacy, masking under new clothes the mechanisms of exploitation, alienation and oppression;
- Called for a proletarian revolution and abolition of the market and private property;

- Pinned its hopes on the aim of the social collectivization of property (expropriation of the expropriator);
- Claimed creative labour as the social freedom of the communist future (as the realization of man's "freedom to");
- Criticized bourgeois nationalism as a form of collective violence over the poorest layers of their societies and as an instrument of international aggression in the name of the egoistic interests of the national bourgeoisie.

Thus, over two centuries Marxism transformed into the most important ideological opponent and competitor of liberalism, attacking its system, and ideologically following and sometimes scoring important successes (especially in the 20th century, with the appearance of a world socialist system.) At some point it seemed as though precisely the leftist powers (Marxists and socialists) would win the argument over the heritage of modernity and for the "orthodoxy" of the new age, and many liberals began to believe that socialism is the unavoidable future, which would correct considerably the liberal political system, and maybe altogether abolish it. From here the tendencies of "social-liberalism" begin, which, recognizing certain "moral" theses of Marxism, strove to smooth over its revolutionary potential and to combine two foundational ideologies of the new era for the price of rejecting their cruelest and most pointed affirmations. Revisionists on the side of Marxism, in particular right-wing social-democrats, moved in the same direction from the opposite camp.

The question about how to relate to socialists and leftists reached its most difficult moments for liberals in the 1920s-1930s, when the communists first proved the importance of their historical intentions and the possibility of seizing and holding power. In this period the neo-liberal school arises (von Mises, Hayek, and a little later Popper and Aron), formulating a very important ideological thesis: liberalism is not a transitional stage from feudalism to Marxism and socialism, but rather an entirely completed ideology, holding an exclusive monopoly on the heritage of the Enlightenment and the Modern Era; Marxism itself is no development of Western thought but rather a

regressive return under ("modernist slogans") to the feudal epoch of eschatological uprisings and millenarian cults. Neo-liberals proved this by the systematic critique of the German conservative philosopher, Hegel, as well as by references to the totalitarian Soviet experience, and called for a return to the roots, to Locke and Smith, standing firmly on their principles and by criticizing social-liberals for their concessions and compromises.

Neoliberalism as theory was most clearly formulated in Europe (Austria, Germany, England) but its large-scale realization happened in the USA, where liberalism dominated in politics, ideology and economic practice. And although at the time of Roosevelt there were strong social-liberal tendencies even in the USA (the New Deal era, the influence of Keynes, and so on) the indisputable advantage was with the liberal school. In a theoretical sense this tendency received its greatest development in the Chicago school (M. Friedman, F. Knight, G. Simons, J. Stigler, and others).

After the Second World War, the deciding stage of the battle for the heritage of the Enlightenment began: liberals supported by the USA fought the final fight with Marxism, personified by the USSR and its allies. Europe occupied the third-place in the ideological war: social-liberal and social-democratic tendencies prevailed there.

The Definitive Victory of the Liberals in the 1990s

The fall of the USSR and our defeat in "the Cold War" signified from an ideological point of view the final distribution of roles in the fight for the heritage of the Enlightenment, for the way of the future. Exactly on the strength of the fact that the USSR lost and fell apart, it became obvious that the historical right was on the side of the liberals - especially of the neoliberals, who prevented socialism and communism from claiming the future as "the progressive tomorrow." Soviet society and other socialist regimes turned out to be carefully disguised versions of archaic structures, having interpreted in their own way the "mystically," "religiously" understood Marxism.

This all important moment in the political history of mankind first of all put the dot on the i with respect to the most important question of the times: which of the two central ideologies of the twentieth century would follow the past (the spirit of the Enlightenment) and automatically receive the future (the right to dominate by ideological means the coming days). The question of the goal of the historical process was principally settled.

In the middle of the 20th century the French philosopher, a Hegelian of Russian origin, Alexander Kojeve, suggested that the Hegelian "end of history" would mark a communist world revolution. The traditionalists (R. Guenon, J. Evola) who rejected the Enlightenment, defending Tradition and foretelling "the end of the world" through the victory of "the fourth caste" (The Shudra of Proletarians) thought similarly. But in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR it became clear that "the end of history" would carry not a Marxist but a liberal form, about which the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama hurried to inform humanity, proclaiming "the end of history" as the planetary victory of the market, liberalism, the USA and bourgeois-democracy. Marxism as a possible alternative and project of the future became a meaningless episode of political and ideological history.

From that moment there not only begins the take-off of liberalism, and that in its most orthodox, fundamentalist Anglo-Saxon and anti-socialist forms, but also the laying bare of the fundamental fact of the ideological history of man: liberalism is destiny. But this means that its theses, its philosophical, political, social and economic principles and dogmas should be looked at as something universal and absolute, having no alternatives.

On the Threshold of the American Century

As a result of the political history of the 20th century it was discovered that liberalism won the war for the contemporary times, having beat all its opponents on both the right and the left. The

huge cycle of the modern era was completed with the triumph of
liberal ideology, which received henceforth a monopoly on the con-
trol and direction of historical development. Liberalism was left
with no symmetrical enemy, no large-scale subject with an adequate
historical self-understanding, a convincing and orderly ideology, se-
rious material and military resources, and comparable technological,
economic and military foundations. All that still opposed liberal
ideology showed itself as a chaotic collection of simple nuisances,
mistakes, in a word "noises", opposing through inertia the builders
of "the new liberal order." This was not a rivalry of alternative civi-
lizational and geopolitical subjects, but the reactive and passive re-
sistance of a disorganized environment. Thus, the structure of soil,
rain, karstic emptiness or marsh land bothers the builders of roads –
the discussion is not about the pushing of another route that another
company insists on, but about the resistance of materials.

In this situation the USA, as the citadel of world liberalism, took
on a new quality. From this time on, it became not only one of two
superpowers, but the single planetary hero, suddenly pulling away
from its rivals. The French critic of the USA Hubert Vedrin sug-
gested that the USA should henceforth be called not a superpower
but a hyperpower, underscoring its solitariness and its asymmetrical
superiority. From an ideological point of view, the victory of liber-
alism and the rise of the USA is not an accidental coincidence but
two sides of one and the same occurrence. The USA won "the Cold
War" not because it amassed more potential and got ahead in the
technological competition, but because it based itself on the liberal
ideology, proving both its technological competence and its histori-
cal rightness in the ideological war, substantiating the balance of the
modern era. And just as liberalism displayed its fated dimension,
the USA received a visual confirmation of its messianism, which in
the ideology of the "Manifest Destiny" was, since the 19th century,
an article of faith for the American political elite.

American neoconservatives recognized this arrangement of mat-
ters more clearly than anyone else. In the words of one of their
most important ideologues, William Kristol, "the 20th century was

the century of America, but the 21st century will be the American century." Let us consider that statement: what difference is there between "the century of America" and "the American century"? "The century of America" signifies that in that period the ideology of liberalism fought with its rivals (residual traditionalism, fascism, socialism and communism) and smashed them to bits. America, having been one of a few world powers, transformed into the only one. And now, according to the thinking of the neoconservatives, America is due to affirm the American model – "the American way of life" - as a world order obligatory for all. Before one's eyes the USA stops being a national government and becomes a synonym for world government. The entire planet must henceforth become a "World America", "World Government", "World State". This is what they call "the American century", the project of globalizing the American model on the world scale. Not simply colonization or a new form of imperialism, this is a program of the total implementation of the one and only ideological system, copied from the American liberal ideology. America henceforth has pretensions to the universal spreading of a unitary code, which penetrates into the life of peoples and governments in a thousand different ways – like a global network – through technology, the market economy, the political model of liberal-democracy, information systems, the model of mass culture, and establishment of direct strategic control of Americans and their satellites over geopolitical processes.

The American century is thought of as a remelting of the existing world order into a new one, built up on strictly American patterns. This process is conditionally called "democratization", and it is directed to a few concrete geopolitical enclaves that are in the first place problematic from the point of view of liberalism. In this way, there came to be the projects of "the Great Middle East", "Great Central Asia" and so on. The meaning of them all consists in the uprooting of inertial national, political, economic, social, religious and cultural models and their replacement by the operational system of American liberalism. But it is not that important whether the discussion is about the enemies of the USA or their allies: both friends

and enemies are subject to re-formatting, as are those who wish to remain neutral. This is the meaning of "the American century": liberalism, having defeated its formal enemies, penetrates completely. And now it is not enough to be on the side of the USA in local conflicts (as many countries behaved that were not liberal – those like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). Henceforth, liberalism must penetrate into the depths of all societies and countries without exception, and the slightest resistance will be, by the thoughts of the neoconservatives, broken – as happened in Serbia, Iraq or Afghanistan.

American critics of such an approach – for instance, the classic conservative, Patrick Buchanan – declare: "America acquired the whole world, but lost itself." However, this does not stop neoconservatives, inasmuch as they take the US not only as a national government but also as the avant-garde of the liberal ideology. And it was no accident that the neoconservatives emerged from Trotskyism. Just as Trotskyites sought a global communist revolution, mercilessly criticizing Stalin and the idea of building socialism in one country, contemporary neoconservatives call for a global liberal revolution, categorically rejecting the call of "isolationists" to limit themselves to the American borders and their historical allies. Precisely the neoconservatives, setting the tone for contemporary American politics, most deeply understand the ideological meaning of the fate of political teachings at the dawn of the 21st century. American neoconservative circles most adequately perceive the significance of the large-scale changes happening in the world. For them "ideology" remains the most important subject of attention, although today it also turns into "soft ideology" or "soft power."

Liberalism and Post-Modernity

Having gone over from the formal opposition to the alternative ideologies to the new phase of introduction on the world scale, the liberal ideology changes its status. In the epoch of modernity liberalism always coexisted with non-liberalism, which means that it was

an object of choice; like with modern computer technology, where one can theoretically select a computer with a Microsoft, Mac OS or Linux operating system. Having defeated its rivals, liberalism brought back a monopoly on ideological thinking; it became the sole ideology, not allowing alongside itself any other. One could say that it switched over from the level of a program to the level of an operating system, having become something common. Notice, coming to a store and selecting a computer, we more often than not do not say: "give me a computer that runs Microsoft." We simply say: "give me a computer." And in accordance with our silence we're sold a computer with a Microsoft operating system. So it is with liberalism: It is implanted in us by itself, like something standard, which it would be absurd and pointless to contest.

The content of liberalism changes, switching over from the level of expression to the level of speech. Liberalism becomes not proper liberalism, but sub-audition, silent agreement, consensus. This corresponds to the switch over from the epoch of modernity to postmodernity. In post-modernity, liberalism, preserving and even increasing its influence, ever more rarely projects an intelligent and freely adopted political philosophy; it becomes unconscious, self-understood and instinctive. This instinctive liberalism, having pretences to transform itself into the generally non-conscious "matrix" of contemporariness, gradually acquires grotesque characteristics. From the classical principles of liberalism, which have become unconscious ("the world reserve unconscious" along an analogy with the dollar "world reserve currency"), the grotesque ways of postmodern culture are born. This is already a *sui generis* post-liberalism, following from the total victory of classical liberalism, but leading it to an extreme conclusions.

Thus there arises the panorama of post-liberal grotesques:

- The measure of things becomes not the individual, but the post-individual, "the dividual", accidentally playing an ironic combination of parts of people (his organs, his clones, his simulacra – all the way up to cyborgs and mutants);

- Private property is idolized, "transcendentalized", and transforms from that which a man owns to that which owns the man;
- Equality of opportunity turns into equality of the contemplation of opportunities (the society of the spectacle – Guy Debord)
- Belief in the contractual character of all political and social institutions grows into an equalization of the real and the virtual, the world becomes a technical model;
- All forms of non-individual authorities disappear altogether, and any individual is free to think about the world whatsoever he thinks fit (the crisis of common rationality);
- The principle of the separation of powers changes into the idea of a constant electronic referendum (electronic parliament), where each internet-user continually votes on any decision, which leads to the multiplication of power to the number of separate citizens (each is his own branch of government);
- "Civil society" completely displaces government and converts into a global, cosmopolitan melting pot;
- From the thesis "economy is destiny" it takes up the thesis "the numerical code – that is destiny", so far as work, money, the market, production, consumption – everything becomes virtual.

Some liberals and neoconservatives were terrified at that prospect, which opened up as a consequence of the ideological victory of liberalism, before the transition to post-liberalism and post-modernity. Thus, Fukuyama, the author of the thesis of the liberal "end of history" in the last decade, has called on the US and the West "to turn back" and to hold over on the previous phase of "vintage" classical liberalism, with the market, the nation-state and the customary scientific rationalism, in order to avoid sliding into the post-liberal chasm. But in this he is contradicting himself: the logic of the transformation from normal liberalism to the liberalism of post-modernity is neither arbitrary nor voluntary; it is written in the very structure

of the liberal ideology: in the course of the gradual liberation of man from all that which is not himself (from all non-human and supra-individual values and ideals), one must sooner or later free a man from his own self. And the most frightening crisis of the individual does not begin when he is fighting alternative ideologies that deny man is the highest value, but when he attains his conclusive and ir-reversible victory.

Liberalism in Contemporary Russia

If we were to juxtapose all the aforementioned about liberalism with what is understood by liberalism in Russia, we would have to admit that there is no liberalism here. There are liberals, but no liberalism. Until the beginning of the 90s, Marxist ideology for-mally dominated in Russia, having brought up the outright majority of those people who one way or another influence the decisions of government today. The principles of liberalism, in the first place, were foreign to the instinctive foundations of Russian society, they were severely persecuted by the ideological organs in the USSR; were either unknown or else construed in a caricatured and fragmen-tary way. The sole meaning of "liberalism" in Russia in the 1990s was freedom from Russian-Soviet political-economic traditions and an uncritical, ignorant and parodic imitation of the West. Practically none of the post-Soviet elite selected liberalism consciously and de-liberately: until the last moment of the fall of the USSR, the leaders of Russian liberalism eulogized the Communist Party, the ideas of Marx, the Plan and Socialism, while the oligarchs made a living in the Committee of Komsomols or served in the KGB. Liberalism as a political ideology interested no one; not a penny was paid for it. Such a cheap and crooked liberalism was maintained in the 1990s as an ersatz-ideology of post-Soviet Russia. But instead of mastering liberal principles its supporters and preachers engaged in careerism, privatization and setting up their own little deals – in the best case fulfilling the guidelines of the Western curators of the breakdown of Soviet and Russian state. This was an ideological disintegration of

the previous structure without erecting anything new at all. No one even really chose the dubious "freedom from."

When Putin came to power and attempted to turn the process of Russia's disintegration around, he encountered, to a large measure, no ideological opposition. He was challenged by concrete economic clans, whose interests he discerned, and the more active agency of influence, deeply entrenched in espionage in the service of the West. The absolute majority of liberals quickly transformed themselves into "backers of Putin," adapting themselves under the individual patriotic sympathies of the new leader. Even iconic figures of Russian liberalism – Gaydar, Chubais, etc. - behaved like banal opportunists: they could not care less about the ideological content of Putin's reforms.

In Russia, irrespective of the whole period of the 1990s, liberalism did not penetrate deeply and did not spawn a political generation of authentic, convinced liberals. It operated on Russia mainly from without, which led in the end to a worsening of relations with the US, to the obstruction of Putin and his course in the West, and, in response, to his Munich speech.

But insofar as the number of conscious liberals in the critical moment of change in Russia turned out to be not more than the number of conscious communists at the end of the 1980s, Putin did not insist on their ideological harassment, opting to control only the more unbridled of the liberal oligarchs and the direct agents of influence who became impudent from lawlessness. Intuitively striving to preserve and consolidate Russian sovereignty, Putin entered into a conflict with the liberal West and its plans for globalization, but without forming his actions into an alternative ideology. This was mostly because there were so very few convinced liberals in Russia.

The real liberal is the one who acts in compliance with the fundamental principles of liberalism, including in those instances when to do so could lead to serious consequences, repressions and even deprivation of life. If people turn out to be liberals only then when liberalism is permitted, in fashion or even obligatory, ready at the first difficulty to repudiate these principles, such "liberalism" has

no relation to the real kind. It seems Khodorkovsky, the "icon" of contemporary Russian liberals, understood that, having spent some time in prison. But in this, it seems to me, he is an exception among the liberals who remain free.

CHAPTER 15. THE POSSIBILITY OF REVOLUTION IN POST-MODERNITY

The Morphology and Semantics of Revolution

There is a very important addition to the concept of revolution. It is exactly this, that should immediately lead us to the center of the aforementioned problems. Revolution is an empirical fact. This means, that revolution was, is and will be. Having realized that, we get in the mediastinum of the topic, since we discuss not something abstract, but quite specific. Recent years, a sociological "paternoster", which says that Russia has exhausted its limit for the revolution, became very relevant. This is an absolutely mere assertion, which essentially means, that Russia has exhausted its limit for the history, historical existence, thought, and that it must be content with what it has. In fact, revolution is not just something that can be, but it is something, that always is, something that historically happens, and something that lies in the very core of human being. According to Arnold Gehlen's thesis, the man is a "Mangelwesen", an "insufficient being", that essentially misses something. Moreover, the definition of man lies not in its identity, but in its counter-identity, in its oppositeness to identity. One never defines himself as "this", but defines himself as "not this", which is fundamentally important. According to it, one knows only what he is not. This is due to the fact, that in the center of a human being stands "Mangel" (deficiency, scarcity), that's why a man is an unbalanced being, he carries the emptiness of nothingness in self, that's why he is scienter focused on a revolution as a statement of something "that there is not". In fact, according to T. Kuhn (referring "The Structure of Sci-

entific Revolutions"), revolution is dismantling of the old order and establishing another one.

From the revolution perspective it doesn't matter that the question is about establishing new order. Substantional part of revolution is that, what will be denied by the subsequent revolution. The new order, which revolution brings, is not principal, this order is needed just to be overthrown once. However, the sense of revolution is not about to remove the bad and replace it with good, or even to remove the old order and put in its place a new one. The sense of revolution lies in dissatisfaction with what exists, and in the statement, which states that there must be something else. Revolution is a striving to overcome what is present now. And this fact is more important than what revolutionaries offer instead of the old order. In this regard, the destructiveness of revolution becomes its constructive power. Why is it so? The question lies in a figure of "Mangelwesen", the essence, which main feature is insufficiency and deficiency. If man would not be such a like, then his revolution would aim replacement of one regime with another. Really, in order to be himself, one must be in revolution. His very existence is a process of revolution, that embodies deficiency of identity rather than striving for a new identity. Thus, a revolution is more a human existence, than interims between revolutions. One lives in revolution only, at other times he is delirious, dreaming, lives waiting for the revolution. That's why being in a revolution is a humane being.

Thus, the revolution, on the one hand, is an empirical fact, but on the other – an anthropological characteristics, that reflects the essence of the man. Accordingly, it is both possible and real, both potential and actual. If we were talking about the revolution as of something impossible, as of something that never took place before, as of something that just may happen, then we would have talked about its some idealization. But we talk of revolution as of empirical fact, and certainly, for our country, that had experience of such a great revolution in XX century, it should be obvious. We are tried to be convinced that there was no October Revolution, the last one

being called an overturn, a conspiracy, a "dark forces" influence, with conspiracy tools being used, with everything being translated to the plane of economic models. We are tried to be said that there was no revolution, but was a commercial deal. Naturally, the revolution in Russia was, and deficiency was manifested as the essence of man. When one starts to live his essence, that is, insufficiency, when identity withdraws, when disidentification takes place, only then one begins to live in genuine humane time. Only revolutionary time is a time really, because it has no duration, since it is shift time, a break, a time of appearance of the new, a time of Ereignis. According to Heidegger, the notion of "Event" (Ereignis) – is routine rupture, an encounter with something, what had not been. This is anthropological, ontological and temporal essence of revolution. That's why the time of revolution is the opposite to any other time, because one becomes himself in this time. The rest of time one is essentially asleep waiting for revolution. The rest of time – is anti-time, that separates two revolutions, it is a moment of break. And this anti-time is maximally alienated from one. During this dreamy period between two revolutions one considers his identity as positive, that means he starts to associate himself not with deficiency, but with something present (with the food, welfare, care, fine details of reality). According to Heidegger, this exact condition is defined as unauthentic existence. One does not live as part of this existence, he is being replaced with das Man, and genuine humane existence, Dasein, is absent. Dasein is revealed only in revolution, the rest of time – is the time of das Man, a framework, which limits within one identifies himself with a fiction, with a fetish. But this is not a man's figure, this is not a man in his true sense.

Technology of revolution

Thus, the revolution is empirical, ontological, and conceptual in nature. Now we can address revolution perspective in its technological aspect. Here we move to the field of sociology, and switch attention to the figure of Vilfredo Pareto, who spoke about mechanics of

revolution. He describes it very cynically after Leon Walras, Robert Michels and Gaetan Mosca, representatives of neomachiavellistic direction. Inheriting Machiavelli Pareto says that a political institution itself and its structure are a matter of primary, and the ideology is secondary. Pareto calls to drop the issues of revolution teleology, attention should be focused on a formula, according to which there are two categories: those, who rule, and those, who obey (a similar model of Hegel's "master and slave"). According to his theses, the elite is a sociological master, a social type, which can only rule, and cannot refuse to rule. And mass is a category, whose members can only obey, and can never rule. Pareto insists that any society is built precisely on this model. And much of his work was dedicated to description of how liberal elites camouflage their true goals (to rule and control) under the names of democracy, human rights and economic freedom.

But the question arises: if the situation is such a like, then society should be absolutely stable, since the top is strong and the bottom is weak. According to it, in such a society the revolution is impossible, however, historically it happens. And Pareto has to say how revolution can occur in such conditions. For this purpose he introduces the concept of counter-elite. That is that some part of the elite doesn't have the powers and takes its place, which is not a rightful one. And according to Pareto, such an elite, deprived of access to power, however, is not a mass. In a situation where a part of the elite is thrown into a mass (historical example – younger children f nobility, who didn't receive an inheritance), it becomes the source of revolution. Such an elite constantly feels that it doesn't take its rightful place. Then the attention of counter-elite switches to the elite, which takes this place. There appear options out of this situation. The first one is integration of counter-elite into a vertical of authority, its introduction to powers implementation. Thus, sources of social instability are removed. According to Pareto, such a mechanism is most characteristic of democracy. In this context, it acts as a selection instrument of the most active, passionary, irreconcilable ones from counter-elite and their elevation to the rank of the ruling class. The

recognition of such characters stems almost instantly: the one from the elite is the closest one to Mangelwesen category, so he is more humane. One wants to rule over others, because he is disgustful of himself, is insufficient of himself, he needs to express himself somehow, to put his figure over the society, otherwise his life is entirely dissatisfactory. Mass, in turn, pays for its tranquil and relatively safe life with its status of a slave. And the elite is a master, that faces a choice between death and power: either death or power. One from the mass never seeks for such an issue.

The second way to deal with counter-elite, according to Pareto, is to thoroughly ignore it, paying attention only to a mass. This is the way to a suicide of ruling elite, because the counter-elite, being among the masses, starts to transform it, and accretes with the anti-elite. Anti-elite, in turn, which is a complex of perverts and deviants, starts to corrupt broad masses. The next stage of counter-elite's action is its rallying on the basis of postulation of what it dislikes of the ruling elite. Moreover, these claims can be both substantiated and baseless, it is not of decisive importance, as long as the claim is common. The next step is knocking the masses out from the elite with the help of anti-elite elements, and taking the elite's place by the counter-elite.

Revolution and modernity. The challenge of conservative revolution

Here we must note, that in the frames of democracy modernity loved revolution. Modernity is a regime, that said "yes" to the revolution, that made it acceptable and casual. Prior to this political regimes regarded the revolution with negative emotions and tried to prevent it. Because of such an openness to revolution, modernity overlooks one very important point: appearance of the idea of conservative revolution. In contrast to conservatism, which protects the old, the past, conservative revolution shows its creative origin. We could say, that this is the exact moment when modernity ends, the idea of revolution manifests its deterioration, and reach potential of

conservative revolution reveals. An absolutely new situation arose – a situation of post-modernity, where a "thought after Auschwitz" takes place.

The possibility of revolution in post-modernity

The revolution was not only sanctioned by modernity, it was its very point. Recognition of insufficiency of a man, as of an anthropological or ontological outset, likewise, was recognized and declared as a gain, as a reconquest of authorities' negative identity from petit bourgeois tales of positive identity of man. Herewith, modernity came to its own exhaustion itself and was reborn in post-modernity by the end of the 20th century. Accordingly, everything, that was empirical, adequate, obvious in modernity, has ceased to be so in post-modernity. But if revolution was a point of modernity, in post-modernity it becomes impossible, as modernity became impossible itself. Moreover, getting out of modernity and entering post-modernity, we go beyond the possibility of revolution, revolution is factored out. Herewith post-modernity does not deny modernity head-on, it doesn't say "no" to modernity and revolution, but it says "yes" to their simulacra. It understands well, that in order to prevent revolution, the last one should be simulated. Thus, the sense of post-modernity is a permanent simulation of revolution. Its brand and its face can be considered as Che Guevara, touting mobile phones. If in modernity Che Guevara is a call for armed struggle against capitalism, in which one exposes his life to a real risk, then now, a man, wearing a T-shirt with Che Guevara does nothing, except the simulation of revolution. And this is the most effective strategy for fighting the revolution and modernity. In current conditions it is very difficult to get to the fact, that man is a Mangelwesen, because the boundary between what is empty and what is not empty, between presence and absence today is diluted. Today there exists some "lifedeath", where that facet is absent. Modern man, that is involved in the dynamics of the internet and television, no longer

knows whether he lives or already not. Whole culture and society of post-modernity leads exactly to this.

The revolution in modern Russia

Does the modern Russian elite let in its ranks those ones, who want to rule? Definitely no. By and large the change of the elite to the counter-elite took place only once in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin came to power. With this "the door closed" (we can rank only Abramovich and Mamut as exceptions). Those, whom we now call "orthodox chekists" were not taken there, because in fact those were "unorthodox non-chekists", St. Petersburg's company, who were moved from one cabinet to another. In fact, they do not exist, in modern Russia there are all prerequisites (according to Pareto line) for revolution to happen, because ruling elite doesn't let in its ranks younger, accumulating passionaries, who become aware of themselves as of a kind of a social power. Thus, in terms of classical analysis a revolutionary situation develops in Russia.

Thus, the "cold" structural preconditions for revolution to take place in Russia are to the fore. What this revolution can be alike? Probably, a unique model, that lets to annihilate current political elite simply and effectively, will be carried out here. This is counter-liberalism. Whatever current elite is in its particular manifestations, as a most adequate definition for it the adjective "liberal" will serve. Collective representation of the Russian elite is completely limited to liberalism. If we want to deepen the ideology of this revolution, we have to fight not even liberalism, but its origins and paradigms, which are individualism and individual philosophy. And if the ruling elite positions itself as liberal, then the counter-elite will have to be anti-liberal. Here, the most appropriate platform will be Louis Dumont's ideology and his work "Essays on individualism". In this work author insists that the main opposite force to individualism is not Marxism, but (holistic) sociology as a scientific discipline. In the frames of (holistic) sociology a thesis about the primacy of society in relation to the individual has a revolutionary potential.

Holism, even taken in pure and crude form, can be opposed, on the one hand, to elites' individualism, and on the other hand, can attract the dormant masses, who will recognize themselves in it. Only post-modernity can prevent it, tending to change in places the elite and the masses. In this regard, we should pay attention to Christopher Lasch's work – "The revolt of the elites". If previous version of the sociological pattern of Ortega y Gasset was the fact that on the forefront of society appear new social types, which are unable to make history, then Lasch points out that new elites in fact reflect the content and main qualities, characteristics of the masses. In fact, masses and elites swapped. Our new elites actually consist of ordinary people, of middle class, of petit bourgeois, of people with meager worldview. Moreover, modern elite avoids its elitist duties, and becomes a double simulacrum. Thus, post-modernity will avoid revolution, and already does. Our task is to understand and develop a description of situation of post-modernity and possibility of revolution in it. For this purpose I invite all participants of Conservative Studies Center.

CHAPTER 16. AGAINST THE POST-MODERN WORLD

The Evil of Unipolarity

The *current world is unipolar* with the *global West* as its centre and with the United States as its *core*.

This kind of the unipolarity has *geopolitical* and *ideological* characteristics. Geopolitically, it is *the strategic dominance of the earth by the North-American hyperpower* and the effort of Washington to organize the balance of forces on the planet in such a manner as to be able to rule the whole world in accordance with its own *national (imperialistic) interests*. It is *bad* because it deprives other states and nations of their real sovereignty.

When there is only one instance to decide who is right and who is wrong and who should be punished and who not, we have a form of *global dictatorship*. I am convinced that this is not acceptable. Therefore, *we should fight against it.* If someone deprives us of our freedom we have to react. And we will react. The American Empire should be destroyed. And at one point it will be.

Ideologically unipolarity is based on *Modernist and Post-Modernist values* that are openly *anti-traditional* ones. I share the vision of Rene Guenon and Julius Evola who considered Modernity and its ideological basis (individualism, liberal democracy, capitalism, consumerism, and so on) to be the cause of the future catastrophe of humanity and global domination of the Western lifestyle as the reason for the final degradation of the earth. *The West is approaching its terminus* and we should not let it drag all the rest of us down into the abyss with it.

Spiritually globalization is the *creation of the Grand Parody*, the kingdom of the Antichrist. And the United States is the centre of its expansion. American values pretend to be "universal" ones. That it is new form of ideological aggression against the multiplicity of cultures and traditions still existing in the rest of the world. I am resolutely against Western value which are essentially Modernist and Post-Modernist, and are promulgated by the United States by force of or by obtrusion (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, soon Syria and Iran) .

So, *all traditionalists* should be against the West and globalization as well as against the imperialist politics of the United States. It is the only logical and consequent position. So traditionalists and partisans of traditional principles and values *should oppose the West and defend the Rest,* if the Rest shows signs of the conservation of Tradition whether in part or entirety.

There can be and there really exist people, in the West and even in the United States of America itself, who don't agree with the present state of affairs and don't approve of Modernity and Post-Modernity. They are the defenders of the spiritual traditions of the Pre-Modern West. They should be *with us* in our common struggle. They should take part in our revolt against the Modern and Post-Modern worlds. We would fight together against the common enemy.

Another question is the structure of a possible anti-globalist and anti-imperialist front and its participants. I think that we should include in it *all forces* that struggle against the West, the United States, against liberal democracy, against Modernity and Post-Modernity. *The common enemy* is the necessary instance for all kinds of political alliances. Muslims, Christians, Russians and Chinese, both leftists and rightists, the Hindus and the Jews *who challenge the present state of affairs*, globalization and American imperialism. They are thus all virtually *friends and allies.* Let our ideals be different but we have in common one very strong feature: hatred of the present social reality. Our ideals that differ are *potential* (in potentia). But the challenge we are dealing with is actual (in actu). So, that is the basis for a *new alliance*. All who share negative analysis of globalization, westernization and post-modernization should coordinate their

effort in creation of a new strategy ofresistance to the omnipresent evil. And we can find common allies within even the United States, as well – among those who choose the path of Tradition over the present decadence.

Towards the Fourth Political Theory

At this point we should raise a very important question*: what kind of ideology* should we use in our opposition to globalization and its liberal democratic, capitalist, and Modernist (Post-Modernist) principles? I believe that all previous anti-liberal ideologies (communism, socialism, and fascism) are *no longer relevant*. They tried to fight liberal-capitalism and they failed. This is partly because in the end of time it is evil that prevails; and partly because of their inner contradictions and limitations. So it is time to begin a *deep revision* of the illiberal ideologies of the past. What are their *positive* sides? – Their positive side is the *very fact* that they were *anti-capitalist* and *anti-liberal*, as well as also anti-cosmopolitan and anti-individualist. These features should be accepted and integrated into a future ideology. But the communist doctrine is, itself, Modern, atheist, materialist and cosmopolitan. That should be thrown out. On the other hand, communism's social solidarity, social justice, socialism and general *holistic* attitude to society are *good* in and of themselves. So we need to separate the materialist and Modernist aspects of communism of and reject them, while preserving and embracing the social and holistic aspects.

As for the theories of the Third way (dear up to certain point to some traditionalists such as Julius Evola) there were many unacceptable elements, foremost among these being *racism*, xenophobia and chauvinism. These are not only moral failures but also theoretically and anthropologically inconsistent attitudes. Differences between ethnos don't equate to superiority or inferiority. *The differences should be accepted and affirmed without any racist sentiments or consideration*. There is no common or universal measure to judge different ethnic groups. When one society tries to judge an-

other it applies its own criteria and so commits intellectual violence. This ethnocentric attitude is precisely the crime of globalization and Westernization, as well as of American imperialism.

If we free socialism from its materialist, atheist and Modernist features and if we reject the racist and narrow nationalist aspects of the Third way doctrines we arrive at a comepletely *new kind of political ideology.* We call it the *Fourth Political Theory,* or 4PT, (The first being liberalism, that we essentially challenge, the second being the classical form of communism, the third being national-socialism and fascism). Its elaboration starts *from the point of intersection* between different anti-liberal political theories of the past (namely communism and the Third way theories). So we arrive at the *national-bolshevism* that represents socialism without materialism, atheism, progressivism, and Modernism, as well as the Third way theories without racism and nationalism. But that is only the *first* step. The mechanical addition of deeply revised versions of the anti-liberal ideologies of the past doesn't give us a final result. It is only a first approximation and preliminary approach. We must go further and make an *appeal to Tradition* and to Pre-Modern sources of inspiration. There we have the *Platonic* ideal state, medieval hierarchical society, and theological visions of the normative social and political system (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Jewish or Hindu) . These Pre-Modern sources are a very important development to the national-bolshevism synthesis. Therefore, we need to find a *new name* for this kind of ideology, and "Fourth Political Theory" is quite appropriate. It doesn›t tell us what this Theory is, but rather what it isn›t. So it is a kind of invitation and appeal rather than dogma.

Politically we have here an interesting basis for conscious cooperation of the radical Left-wingers and the New Right as well as with religious and other anti-modern movements, such as the ecologists and Green Theorists for example. The only thing that we insist on in creating such a pact of cooperation *is to put aside anti-communist as well as antifascist prejudices.* These prejudices are the *instruments* in the hands of liberals and globalists with which they keep their enemies divided. So we should strongly reject anticommunism

as well as antifascism. Both of them are counter-revolutionary tools in the hands of the *global liberal elite*. At the same time we should strongly oppose any kind of confrontation between the various religious beliefs – Muslims against Christians, the Jews against Muslims, the Muslims against the Hindus and so on. The inter-confessional wars and tensions work for the cause of the kingdom of the Antichrist who tries to divide all the traditional religions in order to impose its own pseudo-religion, the eschatological parody.

So we need *to unite the right, the left and the world's Traditional religions in a common struggle against the common enemy*. *Social justice, national sovereignty and Traditional values* are the three main principles of the Fourth Political Theory. It is not easy to put together such a varied alliance. But we must try if we want to overcome the foe.

In France, there is a saying: "la droite des valeurs et la gauche du travail" (Alain Soral). In italian it goes: "La Destra sociale e la Sinistra identitaria". How exactly it should sound in English we will see later.

We could go further and try to define the *subject*, the actor of the Fourth Political Theory. In the case of the communism the central subject was *class*. In the case of the Third way movements, the central subject was either the *race* or the *nation*. In the case of religions – it is the *community of the faithful*. How could the Fourth Political Theory deal with this diversity and the divergence of subjects? We propose, as a suggestion, that the main *subject of the Fourth Political Theory can be found in the Heideggerian concept of Dasein (being-t/here)*. It is a concrete but extremely profound instance that could be *the common denominator* for the further ontological development of the Fourth Political Theory. What is crucial for consideration is the *authenticity or non-authenticity* of the existence of the Dasein. The Fourth Political Theory insists on the *authenticity* of existence. So it is the antithesis to any kind of alienation – social, economic, national, religious or metaphysical.

But the Dasein is a *concrete* instance. Every individual and every culture possesses their own Dasein. They differ between each other but they are *present* always.

Accepting Dasein as the subject of 4PT, we should progress to the elaboration of a common strategy in the process of the creation of the future that fits to our demands and our visions. Such values as *social justice, national sovereignty and traditional spirituality* can serve us as the foundation.

I sincerely believe that the Fourth Political Theory, and its secondary variations, national-bolshevism and Eurasianism can be of the great use for our peoples, our countries, and our civilizations. The key manager of differences is "multipolarity" in all senses – geopolitical, cultural, axiological, economical, and so on.

The important concept of Nous (Intellect) developed by the Greek philosopher Plotinus corresponds to our ideal. The Intellect is one and multiple at the same time, because it has multiple differences in itself – it is not uniform or an amalgam, but taken as such with all their distinct particularities. The future world should be *noetic* in some way – multiplicity; diversity should be taken as the richness and the treasure and not as the reason of inevitable conflict: many civilizations, many poles, many centres, many sets of values on one planet and in one humanity. Many worlds.

But there are some who think otherwise. Who are aligned against such a project? Those who want to impose uniformity, the unique thought, the one (American) way of life, One World. And their methods are force, temptation, and persuasion. They are *against* multipolarity. So they are against us.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I. POLITICAL POST-ANTHROPOLOGY

Part 1. Introduction

1. The topic of this seminar is political post-anthropology. Each type of political system/stage of political history operates with the normative political type of the political human. We say "a man of the Middle Ages", "a man of Modernity", etc., describing the specific historical and political constructs. These constructs are directly dependent on the organization and formalization of *power relations* in a society and relate to the axis of power, which is the essence of the Political, and with *collective* friend/foe *identification* (C. Schmitt), which is also the essence of the Political. The Political is power and political identification (ours/not ours). Each political form provides a different model of power and such identification. However many political systems, there are that many political anthropologies. Political theology (C. Schmitt) suggests that the policy reflects, and in certain cases constitutes, a standard of Political Anthropology.

2. The political human is transformed from one form of Political to another. This is sufficiently traced in the "Philosophy of politics" and "Post-philosophy". Now we focus on which form of Political Anthropology meets Post-modernity.

3. Post-modernity is something that sets in, *steps on*. Steps on us. But it has not stepped yet. Therefore, the study of Postmodernity has a hilarious creative gap. Although it steps on, it may also not step on, we can (or cannot, it is not clear) wriggle out of it. So, talking about Post-modernity is interesting, exciting and at the same time risky. It is a process with an unknown end and uncertain meaning. It is still possible to affect this end and this meaning. The history (apparently) has ended, and the post-history is only "beginning" and

one have to search in it for a space of struggle, to win back this space and expand it.

4. Political post-anthropology is forecasting/constructing the political human in Post-modernity. We do not just study what exists; we follow the process and try to affect it. Wishful thinking and self-fulfilled prophecy is quite legitimate and welcome here. Exploring the political postanthropology, we call it back to life.

Part 2. Political post-human and Post-State

1. Absolute features of the (post-) human of Postmodernity are:
- Depoliticization;
- Autonomization;
- Microscopization;
- Sub- and transhumanization (as a special form of dehumanization);
- Dividualization (fragmentation).

That is, the rejection and denial of something that was Political on the previous phases becomes politics as the dominant form. The politicization meets with the depoliticization, politics of the human of Postmodernity is in the escape from the element and structure of the Political into the new area. The human of Postmodernity declares war on the Political: first, based on the economy (homo economicus against homo politicus), then against the classical subject-object economy in the name of the network dynamics of the free (creative) game of disengaged "sets" (Negri, Hardt). Industry of fashion, glamour and show business exhibits that for material prosperity one does not need to earn money, he must enter the relevant social set, become a member of the sliding glamorous network. Gloss pages, on which a body without organs is sliding right and left, is like a concrete embodiment of Deleuze's "l'espace lisse" – an image of post-economics. For example, to get money one enough to be a gay (in this case, working is not necessary, it is optional).

2. The postpolitical human overthrows the power and the collective, and then the individual, identity. He does not recognize the

power relations not over or under him, does not know ours or not ours, and does not accept any long narratives that go beyond his microcosm. His policy is expressed in the form of desires and vegetative impulses of unknown ownership and aims. Maybe it is "desire", but it is no one's and nowhere specifically addressed.

3. It is from a random game of subindividuality and transindividuality post-human creates a model of Post-State. Post-state is an ironic parody of State, it is State vice-versa. State-phantom, State-mockery. In the Post-State, institutions are mobile and ephemeral, policies and legal principles are continuously rapidly changing. It has neither vertical, nor horizontal symmetry, aiming to merge with the network. It is sort of a pirate republic placed in cyberspace. Or a Brazilian carnival, which replaced the routine. In the Post-State, the serious and frivolous swap, and it is a kind of permanentized Saturnalia. In politics, post-human constitutes this Post-State being amused by its deadly hallucinatory game.

4. In political postanthropology all is reversed: leisure and work (the most serious occupation, actual *work*, is watching comic and entertainment shows), knowledge and ignorance (complete idiots are assigned as academics and correspondent members), public and private (in the center of attention, including political debate, are the tiniest details of personal life), male and female (the rapid growth of women and homosexuals in politics), senators (elders) are assigned out of schools (if, for example, they are the relatives of influential figures), a victim and an offender (leniency towards criminals is increasing, and the victim is assigned all the blame), etc.

5. Why are we talking about politics when it is obviously about something directly opposite to the Political? Because such an anthropological type of Postmodernity in theory and social practice *steps on*, i.e. attacks, persistently imposes itself, introduces itself and is gradually becomes normative, i.e. acts as a basic personality (A. Kardiner). And for such an attack and such an advance, dispositif of power and collective identification, i.e. the Political again, is required. But, in this case, models of counter-power tend to affirm their power and those models that deny all forms of a *type* as such

insist on universalization of their *type* (type, in this case, is a synonym to eidos or universal). Apolitical singulars and divids compose a sort of *a ruling party* of Postmodernity. Influential one and close to seizure of power or already in power.

6. This "party" has a stylistic and strategic arsenal. This is fashion and interactive information technologies (Twitter, mobile phones, social networks, blogs). In French, "fashionable" is transferred by a slang word "branche", literally, "connected". Fashion and technology are changing rapidly, and "connected" (branche) is the one who is changing along with it, here and now, rapidly and dynamically. There is no yesterday and tomorrow, not even today. There is only *now*. Now it is Google and Twitter, but in a moment they will be prehistoric events, such as word processor Lexicon or PC 286. Herein is a dromocratic aspect (Virilio – what was discussed at the seminars).

7. Twitter-revolution in the Arab world or iPad presidents are clear signs of political postanthropology and phenomena of Post-State. The revolt of the elites and the oscillation of the intensity level of consciousness of the ruling groups are "near-zero". A classic example is a drug addict – political strategist.

Part 3. Political soldier and his simulacrum

1. Like any political model, the political postanthropology can be accepted and may be rejected – doesn't matter how much it would insist on its "naturalness". A person can choose both the structure of power and his identity. Post-State and Twitter-presidents – just a single trend, stepping on and intruding; may it be mainstream, but not unique. There may be alternatives.

2. The first alternative is the political anthropology of previous forms. In the face of the political postanthropology, it can be generalized by the figure of a "*political soldier*". This is an anthropological concept. It doesn't give any idea of what political ideology the "political soldier" follows. But this concept implicitly contains a belief in the existence of political *ontology*: the political soldier fights for a model of power relationships, and directly and openly

identifies himself with a particular group ("ours"). And fundamental distinction of the political soldier is that he is ready and able to die for his *political idea*. It tells him from an ordinary soldier and an ordinary politician. A soldier dies but not for the idea. A politician fights for an idea, but to die for it he is not ready.

3. The political soldier may be a communist, a nationalist, and even a liberal. But in any case, he personalizes Modernity. Modernity in its specific political form. The political soldier is a mediastinum of the political anthropology of Modernity. And as such (in theory), it can fight the political postanthropology. This will be *a conservative answer*. An individual fights a dividual. Ending present rejects the atemporal post-historical "future". The drama of last Humans clashing with Post-Humans in a political opposition. Very heroically, tragically, poetically and hopelessly.

4. But (!): the political postanthropology makes such a position almost impossible. The political soldier in the unique conditions of corrosive waters of Postmodernity is immediately converted into a simulacrum. This is the main delicacy of Postmodernity: it carries *an ironic mutation* in regard to all aspects of Modernity, in regard to anthropology – in the first place. Today we don't have a chance to meet with the political soldier; we can only meet with his *double*, his simulacrum, with his fake.

5. In anthropological series of political and anthropological forms, Postmodernity installs *a vicious link*. All the threads that connect the political arena of Postmodernity with Modernity and deeper into political history are broken at the moment of Postmodernity and have a knot. After that knot (with all the visible continuity), *a fake segment* is situated.

6. Today there is no political soldiers. There is only its shell.

Part 4. Alternative in political postanthropology:
Pre-Human and RS

1. The edge of my thesis is reduced to the following affirmation: *in the context of the political postanthropology, Postmodernity and*

Post-Human (Dividual) cannot be opposed to Modernity and Human (Individual). A couple will not be like dividual vs. individual and post-human vs. human, but like dividual vs. pseudo-individual and post-human vs. pseudo-human. There is the anthropological fold (Deleuze) of the postmodern anthropology in this: *a simulacrum meets with a simulacrum.*

2. *A political soldier in Postmodernity is impossible.* It can only be a simulacrum.

3. Consequently, the opposition must be different. It is not a previous anthropological link that is designed to collide with a postanthropological segment of anthropological series, which is located *after* the substituted element (knot), but an entirely *different* figure. That is, one should speak of *political expression* of the Radical Subject.

4. This topic should be somehow integrated with the 4PT. There is no space and time here to develop it. But generally we can say: *an alternative to the political postanthropology is also postanthropology, but different.*

5. Human's bounds violation, the routes of transgression may not be such as in the case of the dividual. It is not the human really meets with the post-human in the political postanthropology, but *Pre-Human*, Pre-Concept of the human. That origin that was before the human is parallel to him and will be after him.

6. Here we concern subjects of the previous seminar and the delicate theme of angelomorphosis. There is no accident that in the eschatology of most religions and traditions we are dealing with the Endkampf panoramic view, which necessarily involves angels' participation. In blockbusters, indeed, it is also suffer from simulation. But it is inevitable.

The political expression of the Radical Subject can be defined not as the area of the political theology (C. Schmitt), but as the area of the political angelology. This topic requires further development.

APPENDIX II. GENDER IN THE THREE POLITICAL THEORIES OF MODERNITY

Part 1. Introduction

1. Before we start to study the 4-th PT (political theory, PT) it is worth having a look at an issue of gender problematic in Modern Age, which means to find out the way gender topic of Modern Age affects three classical political theories.

2. *The concept of a rational and adult well-to-do man, mostly citizen* (bourgeois – the third estate) is placed in the basis of gender paradigm of Modern Age. It makes a start from this particular normative figure of a man. The basic anthropologic thesis is "*a political man = a man-bourgeois*".

3. Further each of three political theories of Modern Age works with the thesis differently, but how?

4. 1 PT absorbs the normative as *a general measure* and agrees with it as with *an optimum*. An adult and well-to-do (culturally "white"), clever citizen (bourgeois) is *the measure of* (political) *things*. But further the liberalism brings forward to project the idea on *more wide anthropologic areas* which are structured around the figure. So earlier suffragettism proposes to include in the political area of such "maskulinoidny-bourgeois" normative – adult and clever well-to-do women-townsmen (female citizens), and later democrats stands for including also peasants, immigrants, little by little widening an area of localization (from city to village), gender, survival rates, demands for rationality, ethnic characteristics (the semi black Obama is a step toward the direction). But it's important for us that not adult and not white, not well-to-do (not very rational)

not men are being thought in 1PT *as* "adult" "well-to-do" "rational" "men" (potential).

5. From here – *liberal* (1 PT) *feminism*: to give to women fully equal politically-social form with a standard liberal man-citizen-bourgeois. The concept of "*a female citizen*". A female citizen is a citizen with separate anatomic peculiarities which are subject to socially-political *minimization*. A liberal egalitarianism of sexes is however a trend, but not a condition of business in practice, although in theory – normatively – this is basic aim of 1 PT and regimes which are based on it. But alongside with it a masculinity of the aim is in the idea that *a woman here is approximating to a man*, thinking like a potential (virtual) man; equalization is a stylization to a man. There're "blue stockings" and "business lady" from here. (Everybody knows that women drive a car unusually; it seems that somehow in a feminine way; no, they drive in a masculine way but exaggeratedly, that is why men are angry at them – they recognize but do not reflect consciously that *a driving woman simply imitates the way men drive*; she *copies* him – from here there's its annoyance; at the same time so imitationally solders, Caucasians and provincials drive a car).

6. Communism (2 PT) originates from the same position that 1 PT, but insists *on the other attitude* towards bourgeois masculine normative. Communism proposes do not leave normative type *as it is* (as opposed to 1 PT), but *to transform it in post-bourgeois (proletarian) way*. It is quite difficult politically-social and anthropologic operation. In a gender sense it assumes an establishment of *radical equality of sexes* (more rigorously than liberals do it), importantly – organized *differently*. And a bourgeois man and a bourgeois woman as *a subordinated construct* of a bourgeois man must be transformed *into something another*. Egalitarianism of sexes here is an expression of egalitarianism of people in society and represents *the measure of liquidation of the line of command*. If the line of command is liquidated in practice the vertical symmetry man/woman is liquidated as well. A *proletarian* man is *not more* a *bourgeois* man as well as a woman. Gender relationship in context of emancipated proletar-

ian admits not liberation of essence of man/woman, but for instance according to Bourdieu or Negri/Hardt *the liberation of proletarian from gender as a social convention*. What is *post-gender communistic proletarian*? Many postmodern authors answer the question in the following way – this is "mechanism of wishes" (Deleuze/ Guattari), "dispositif de la sexualite non-polaire" (Foucault), "rhizome networks" (Deleuze), «not utilized sexually mutants» (Negri/ Hardt), "cyborgs" (Donna Harraway). *Ultra-leftism's (gauchisme's) feminism is program of liberation from sex as from a social hierarchical construct*. And we are speaking here not about liberation of woman's essence, *but about overcoming a sex as it is*. If an attention is stuck to particulars of another sex (by Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva or Luce Irigaray), but only for *relativization of masculinity* on the way to liberation. Wish is sexless. *Liberty is a liberty from a sex*.

7. 3 PT had a few options toward gender. First of all it's *an ultra-masculinity heroism*. Exaltation of patriarchy. There's also a white well-to-do urban adult rational man who was like a normative, but further was being exalted and expanded to *exaggerated* proportions. This is *a masculine hyper bourgeois. The aristocratic masculinity of Evola* is placed at a distance from others, The June Club (Gleichen, van den Bruck) and Conservative Revolution. Here we have a deal with *masculine essentialism premodernistic sense* (a man in The Tradition as a bearer of ontological superiornost – yan, Heaven, objective reality by contrast with yin, Earth, nonexistence). Secondly, simultaneously there were in 3 PT stratums of *Nordic matriarchy* (H.Virt, follower of Bachofen, Mathilde Ludendorff, Marthe Kunzel, etc.). *Nordic matriarchy is symmetric by ontological masculinity* of Evola and onservative Revolution. Here we are speaking about liberation of *essence of woman's*. It's a woman such a particular ontological type with its particular substance; feministic theurgy, heathenism until matriarchy eschatology ("advent of Wife"). That means that in 3 PT there were a few versions of gender policy: from hypertrophy of bourgeois masculinity (as well as liberals have, but

exalted) until aristocratic ultra heroism and marginal Nordic feminism.

Part 2. Approaching to a sex in 4-th PT. Radical gender

1. To create an idea about socio-political status of gender in 4-th PT we have immediately reject a basic normative of Modern Age – the adult well-to-do white rational urban man-bourgeois. 4-th PT does not know the type like this and doesn't want to know. That is why we get field of a *residual principle*. The field is a not adult and white peasant (not urban) and not rational (reckless) no-man. This is everything which is placed *behind* the near or even distant concentric border of the gender anthropology of Modern Age.

2. *Not adult* (for example the concept "Big Game" R. Daumal, R. Gilbert-Lecomte, R. Vaillant je , etc.). This is the concept of "brothers-simplists".

3. *Not white* (the concept of ethnic polycentrism examines the white world as a one possibility from infinite number of others – cultural and structural anthropology of F. Boas, C. Lévi-Strauss, ethnosociology).

4. *Peasant* (for example an idea of ethnos as a folk-society by Redfield, again ethnosociology, Russian narodnik movement, socialist revolutionarists).

5. *Reckless* (a concept of intellectual transgression, an opposition between intellectual intuition according Guenon, and mind, also G. Bataille with its "Atsefal", and practice of philosophic and poetic mindless – from Hölderlin and Nietzsche to Artaud).

6. And finally – *no-"man"*. No-"man" in the socio-political sense as Modern Age usually understands a "man". The previous characteristics approximate us to cultivation of the field of main thesis about a gender archetype of 4-th PT, – to no-"man". They specify of its sense. Childishness, non-whiteness (or wildness), ethnicalizm and mindless (or absence of classical European rationality) prepare a platform for no-"man" of 4-PT. How it can be defined more concretely?

7. First of all 4-th PT can *capitalize in this field a vector of anti-bourgeois gender models of 2 PT and 3 PT*. It can be considered as a *preparatory* phase. This is quite possible. A proletarian idea of post-gender identity is interesting as a promptly critical project; in the post-modernistic context it can be added to the arsenal (but only without its materialistic connotation) in the spirit of earlier Dadaism (anti-art), Marinetti or Nietzschean "rogue". Also it's interesting extremes of gender projects of 3 PT – ultraheroism of Evolaism with its superhuman ontology of warrior and simultaneously Nordic feminism. All these tendencies were marginal in 2 PT and 3 PT being in internal opposition to Modern Age. All of them can be incorporated in 4-th PT as a pleasant aesthetic background. The proletarian post-gender is breaking open a bourgeois citizen from below; ontology of sex – "metaphysics of sex" by Evola does the same but from above, ontologinizing a sex in superhuman and super bourgeois, *super civil* perspective of theurgic-Tantrika's realizations of male and female extra human essences (provoked possession), Muses and musicality of culture by A.Blok).

8. But all of them are only preliminary operations, yet by its own quite intensive and captivating. An essence of *no-"man"* of 4-th PT is placed still aside. This aside is of The Radical Subject. He is no-"man" because he is no-human and being outside of paradigms which define rules and rows, including rows of divine ontologies. A man surely presupposes a woman, and *The Radical Subject presupposes nothing on the outside, that is why he is not symmetric to nothing*.

9. Is he an androgyne or not? But why not… An androgyne is a root human, before the sex human and his *radicalism* is in it, meaning (radix = root) belonging to the roots. We were speaking about it at a seminar which was about 4-th PT. And we approached there to the theme of the unusual zone where practice and theory coincide *even* not distinguishing. *Chaos precedes dual structures of order in the same way*. The Radical Subject in gender sense precedes differentiation between male and female but does not exist a product of

their joining. He *precedes* them but do not follow. We can define its sex of The Radical Subject – radical gender.

10. In the spirit of angelomorfism of political anthropology of 4-th PT we can describe a sex of subject of 4-th PT as a sex of angels. The sex can in due time establish in (masculinity) wish of Bene Elohim enticed by beauty of human's daughters or can be presented as a female android – "nymph of polar star" by Siliany, Atalanta Fugiens or Beatrice.

11. And else: the question which Heidegger didn't raise – whether Dasein has *a sex*? Which sex Dasein has? It must be very fundamental one…

Part 3. Radical gender and gender's transformations of Postmodern Age. Entropy of Eros

1. We can now examine the problem: *how* (approximately and tentatively described by us) radical gender of 4-th PT correlates *with gender transformations the era of Postmodern Age*?

2. In Postmodern Age *the convergence* of three gender trends – neoliberal, neomarxist and (very fragmentary) neonazi exists.

3. The neoliberal trend aspires to maximize *the normative of a citizen-bourgeois transferring it on all population of the Earth*; this is the theory of human rights. A masculine rational citizen is conceptualized as a "human" or "individual" losing touch with anatomic and social sex and turning into a global imperative normative. A man-bourgeois is coming so total and universal that he replaces all other types: from here there's industry for youth and childhood and fashion for dogs and cats.

4. The neomarxist trend insists on *social conventionalism of sex* and actively becomes apparent in proliferation and legitimization of homosexual and transgender codes. *The liberty from sex is realized through its game and permanent character*. The both trends join in *the left liberalism* (li-li) with its transgressive sexuality (fr. gauchisme or ultra-leftism), multiplied by individualism (classical liberalism).

5. The other direction of ultraliberalism is freak out sado-mazo *nazi-satanism*; exaltation bourgeois masculinity in individualistic sexual sovereignty of atomic individual. These are Crowley's "do whatever you wish" and "with whom you wish" with adding a financial compensation and a principle of voluntariness. "Neonazi" today is a pathological parody which came from crude pasquinade Visconti ("The Damned") or weak-minded trash-exploitation in the style "Night receptionist". In the area of gender "neonazi" there's ever-present entertainment attribute – gay club and classical decorations of sex-shop.

6. That means that a gender panorama expanding in front of a face of keeper of 4 PT represents an *explosion of bourgeois man*, he flies away by bits saving only virtual visibility of his domination. The sex of Modern Age *is coming to the end* in our faces. The center is being dispersed; concentric areas lose its orbits. An eccentric sex of uncoordinated network dispersion exists. *The swift entropy of Eros* is happening.

7. But the subject of 4-th PT (Dasein) is not a conservator. He does not insist on (impossible) return to a bourgeois urban white adult clever well-to-do man, who just on the point will hide in historical horizon, making way for a carnival mutants in the spirit of the Howard Stern Show or figurants from "Apocalypse Culture" by Adam Parfey; but even on more attractive but a lot of time ago sank into oblivion archetypes (for instance medieval knights and erudite beautiful Ladies with elegant philosophical books in pale palms and tender unicorns near legs). 4-th PT here as usual suggests to make *a step forward*.

8. Gender obscurantism of Postmodern Age and global entropy of Eros have to be recognized in the spirit of the eschatological scenario *non dual eschatology* (for example as in Indian "Kalki Purana" presented so elegant and convincingly in eschatological camp "Finis Mundi") as anticipating a new transformation of gender, *a rash and preemptive parody*, like farewell making grimace by retinue of Antichrist in the last death agony of the finally getting cold world. Gender disappears quickly, differentials are made equal, dynamic of op-

positions is made wipe and transforming into nothing. The Radical Subject attentively looks after these transformations easily defining in them something that they *are being* a parody and that *the point* on which they are being a parody which means a parody on His Own.

Appendix III. 4PTh and Praxis

Part 1. The Term 'Praxis' and its Meanings

Stating the seminar topic, I didn't know how will it be disclosed. It was fuzzily seen, that being realized, fourth political theory should lead to fourth political practice. This is starting point. Beyond this free thought development begins.

Separation of theoretics (contemplation) and practice (operations on objects – «pragmata»), or thought and action, or idea and implementation, or principle and manifestation, or intellection and action, or myth and ritual – is the subject of dual topics of many disciplines. All these pairs have different semantic geometry. But all of them are constitutive.

Area	Term 1	Term 2
Science	Theory (contemplation)	Practice (objects)
Metaphysics	Principle	Manifestation
Religion	Myth	Ritual
Philosophy	Intellection	Action
Technology	Idea (project)	Realization (implementation)
Trivial usage	Thought	Activity

Now we discuss second column of terms. Since fourth political theory is not something dividual, but claims to be at the same time "political science", "political metaphysics" (Angelopolis), "political theology" (political eschatology), "political philosophy", and

political technology (least developed area so far), we should think about second column of terms altogether.

At once objection. As we found, but not decrypted yet, fourth political theory's actor is Dasein. Dasein was lined up by Heidegger as radical exit from any similar dualities. Same here what we said on another occasion at seminars related to holism of imaginaire. What these two columns are? – this is typical ontological differentsializm or the work of logos. In fourth political theory diurne and logos are not excluded, though, both are deprived of exclusivity. Dasein requires an appeal to "new logos" - to fundamental ontology. It means, that for solution (rather, formulation) of fourth political practice's problem we previously need to go down to the area, where theoretics (contemplation) and practice (operations on objects - pragmata), thought and activity, idea and realization, principle and manifestation, intellection and action, myth and ritual – *match*.

It is important. Fourth political practice is not simply application of fourth political theory to "reality", as in the case of three previous political theories. Fourth political theory itself is not direct analogue of other three political theories. The radical difference is that fourth political theory *seeks to overcome the dual topic of modernity.* The theoretics itself in fourth political theory – is something different. And it is nothing else, than practice. To understand fourth political practice it is necessary to go down to the roots of fourth political theory. And touch those roots, where division into two columns yet doesn't exist. This is appeal to "preconcept", to "preontology" or to "prehuman being" (concerning anthropology).

Part 2. Political Theories of Modernity and Their political Practices

In three classical political theories of modernity theory and practice are identified quite clearly.

Liberalism as the first political theory has economy and market as appropriate political practice. Within the framework of first political theory market is the politics. Hence appears Weber's homo eco-

nomicus. Realizing the market cycle, representative of first political theory implements his theory.

Marxism endows praxis a great value: this is revolution, class struggle and (under socialism) and activity theory (labor, that creates a human being again and again). According to Heidegger, first and second political theories are manifestations of "Machenschaft" phenomenon. Pay attention to "Machen" - "to make". That is, according to Heidegger, praxis is the core of first and second political theories. Hence appears "techne" as destiny and metaphysics. That is, according to Heidegger, generally, political practice is the essence of first two political theories.

In third political theory praxis is more complex. Firstly: the most bright and monstrous praxis was praxis of holocaust and realization of racial politics by Nazism. Secondly, Italian or Spanish "praxis" in the context of third political theory was related to the "state" and was reduced to "corporate state-building" (not gone far from classical, but keen and modified bourgeois nationalism). Heidegger, who himself was in the context of the third political theory, but rather represented a cast into fourth political theory, sighted "Machenschaft" in third political theory also. And drafted to outdo and refuse it. There are expressive passages about this in «Geschichte des Seyns».

These praxises of first, second, and to some extent third political theories represent embodiment of projects by itself . That is more a *technological section* of term matches, that we are interested in. However, there are attempts of wider interpretation. Marx's idea of "changing the world" is a close to Heidegger's comprehension of Marxism concept of its *technological* essence. On the other hand, Louis Dumont's analysis of Marxism as a theory, which is based on methodological individualism, hence, on the technics, is demonstrative.

In all cases "Machenschaft" is a common point of three political theories of modernity. And this "Machenschaft" axiomatically postulates dual topics of subject – object. Subject conceives (thought)

and realizes in object (action and reality). Praxis - as production, Herrstellung.

«Techne» and "Machenschaft" – is a model of subject and object ratio, of theory and practice in three political theories of modernity. And they are based on strict differentiation. The differential betwixt theory and practice, which reflect differential between subject and object, is the essence of all three political theories of modernity. Pay attention, that geometry of this differential in modernity is horizontal.

Part 3. Geometry of Dasein and Virtual Reality (ad Profundum)

Dasein is a subject (actor) of fourth political theory. Dasein *precedes* constitutioning of subject-object topics (which is the point of modernity). Dasein precedes division into theoretics and practice. The theoretics of Dasein is a practice of Dasein. Practice of Dasein is theoretics of Dasein.

How can it be understood? There are several ways. For example, by simply rearranging columns of our table. As a practice we take the next variety:

theoretics (contemplation) principle
myth
intellection
Idea (project)
thought

It is this which is practice, that has no need in operations on objects. At first glance it seems to be solipsism and subjective idealism. BUT.

We call it exactly PRAXIS. And this means, that we perceive practice as theoretics, in other words, we emphasize that common, which is in their root;

- principle as manifestation;
- myth as effective ritual;

- intellection as action;
- idea as realization;
- thought as activity.

We get a series of pre-concepts (not post-concepts!):

Theoretical practice (practical theory) — not duality?

Manifested principle (principled manifestation) — avatar?

Mythological ritual (ritual, sacral myth) - theurgy?

Intellective activity (active intellection) — intellectual intuition (according to René Guénon)?

Real idea (ideal reality) — charmed world?

Thought-action (action-thought) — transubstantiation?

Beyond dual topics of subject-object only these pre-dualistic series work.

Eyeing carefully? Doesn't it remind you something?

Yes, it does: *virtual reality*. The very one, in which postmodernity rapidly involves us.

Part 4. Trans Subject-Objective Plan, Transgression, Dimension of Depth

Postmodernism and poststructuralism define the horizon of virtuality in *surface*. This stratification and merger of subject-objective, consciousness/corporeality on the *surface* is a screen, a skin, an epidermic coat, a glass of a showcase, a glossy magazine cover, a television set, a sensor, an Ipad. Here transgression implements at the cost of vertical axis loss. The sense of rhizome is in its *absolute horizontality* (as modernity before insisted on strict *horizontality* of subject-object topics).

Fourth political practice is being constructed in *other* way: it is a *union of two abysses* – top and bottom, absolutization of vertical symmetry, BUT without a gap, which gives a birth to logos and rationality.This is a prelogic matrix of heroic spirit, which saves in itself free chaos's breath, which unites pain of the earth and heavenly blue's cold irony. Abissus abissum invocat. This is fundamental-ontology and its (not dual) implementation. *Fourth political practice*

deploys new fundamental-ontological layout. It is transgression of the exit higher above and below the lower. Where hidden are back of the sky and face of the earth. This is practice of short-circuiting of ontology.

If postmodernity is immanentiation and surface, then fourth political practice appeals to *integration of last two depths.* Here the convergence of all forms of maximal takes place. This is invocation (clamatio) de Profundis et ad Profundum.

Fourth political party *does not change* the existing world and *doesn't build* new one. It *refuses the world in being*, existence, recognizing it as chimaeric, shaky and unsuccessful *construct*. With first action fourth political practice sets the world aside, abolishes it. Heidegger thought a lot on the problem "noch nicht", "yet not". «We stand close to the point of great midnight. Or still, yet not… (in it). Always this eternal "yet not…" (he wrote in "Holzwege").

If we place fourth political practice in overcoming insurmountable distance (Zeno's paradox about Achilles and tortoise - watch Guénon's "The principles of infinitesimal calculus") of "yet not", we will stay forever in the labyrinth of "infinite ending of time". *Fourth political practice doesn't end by taking of the problem of "not yet", with this it only takes its beginning.* The start of fourth political practice is a thesis about taking the world off, as well as those one, who witnesses it. Videlicet carthusian "cogito" and its conclusion on "sum".

Part 5. Practices of Vertical Dementia (anoia, anoesia)

Remember Edgar Morin with his "homo demens". Morin modestly asks not to forget about him. There are those (Bataille, Artaud, and after them Foucault, Barthes, Deleuze, Sollers, Blanchot and many others), who talk about value of dementia more open and convex.

But most of all postmodernists view dementia in *horizontal geometry*. According to Durand, it means they view it in *nocturne* sec-

tion. This is purely passive feminoid dementia, which enjoys exemption from repressive vertical of logos.

Fourth political practice suggests another model of *vertical dementia*. This is pre-logical, heroic-diurne dementia. This form of liberative dementia implies total control. But not from the side of consciousness, but from the side of Angel – those one, to whom the trader gives a scalepan in Rilke's "Duino Elegies".

Vertical dementia is integral, inasmuch as is based on complete coverage of *whole* imaginaire. Night and Day do contact with each other in *other* way, than it is in culture, that leads to logo-centric systems. This is a *short circuit* of imagination modes. Extension of vertical axis of heroic diaeresis to *both* sides – is above the top and below the bottom.

Part 5. Fourth Political Practice and Eschatology

The end time will never happen, if someone will not implement it. Though everything leads to it, it doesn't mean anything. It can lead to the end infinitely. For the end to happen, finiteness must be.

According to Heidegger, existence is finite. Its highest and last mystery is in this finiteness. Finiteness manifests in Ereignis. Ereignis exactly is facticity of praxis.

Ereignis is eschatology. In "Holzwege" Heidegger wrights so right – "eschatology of existence". Fourth political practice is eschatological practice par excellence.

APPENDIX IV. THE METAPHYSICS OF CHAOS

The modern European philosophy began with the concept of Logos and logic order of being. During two thousand and some hundreds years this concept was fully exhausted. All the potentialities and the principles laid in this form of logocentric way of thinking were now exhaustively explored, exposed and abandoned.

The problem of Chaos and the figure of Chaos were neglected, put aside from the very beginning of this philosophy. The only philosophy we know at present is the philosophy of Logos. But the Logos is something opposite to Chaos, its abslolute alternative.

From the XIX century with most important and most brilliant European philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and up to the contemporary postmodernists the European man affirm began to suspect that Logos was approaching to its end. Some of them dared to affirm that from now on we are living in the time of the end of logocentric philosophy, approaching something else.

The European philosophy was based on the logocentric principle corresponding to the principle of exclusion, the differentiating, Greek diairesis. All this corresponds strictly to the masculine attitude, reflects the authoritative, vertical, hierarchical order of being and knowledge.

This masculine approach to the reality imposes order and principle of exclusivity everywhere. That is perfectly manifested in Aristotle's logic where the principles of identity and exclusion are put in the central position in the normative manner of thinking. A is equal to A, not equal to not-A. The identity exclude non-identity (alterity) and vice versa. There we see the male who speaks, thinks, acts, fights, divides, orders.

Nowadays all this logocentric philosophy has come to an end and we should think about the other possibility of thinking not in the logocentric, phallocentric, hierarchical and exclusivist way.

If not any more Logos satisfies us, fascinates us, mobilizes us, so we are inclined to try something else and to address the Chaos.

To begin with: there are two different concepts of Chaos. The modern physics and philosophy refers to complex systems, bifurcation or non-integrating equations and processes using the concept "chaos" to designate such phenomena. They understand by that not the absence of order but a kind of order that is difficult to perceive as such, so it rests to be the order but very complicated one, that *seems* to be not order at all, but in the essence it *is*. Such «chaos» or «turbulence» is *calculable* in nature but with more sophisticated theoretical and mathematical means and procedures than the instruments the classical natural science is dealing with.

The term "chaos" is used here in the metaphorical manner. In modern science we are continuing to deal with an essentially logocentric manner of exploring the reality. So the "chaos" here is no more than a dissipative structure of Logos, the last result if its decay, fall, decomposition. The modern science is dealing not with something other than Logos but with a kind of post-Logos, the ex-Logos, the Logos in the state ultimate dissolution and regression. The process of the final destruction and dissipation of Logos is taken here for "chaos".

In the reality it has nothing to do with Chaos as such, with the Chaos in original Greek sense of term. It is rather a kind of utmost confusion. René Guénon has called the era we are living through now*, a era of Confusion.* The Confusion means the state of being that goes next to order and preceds it. Thus we should make a clear distinction between two different concepts. On one hand we have the modern concept of chaos that represents post-order or a mixture of contradictory fragments of being without any unity and order, linked among them by highly sophisticated post-logical correspondences and conflicts. Gilles Deleuze has called this phenomena a non-co-possible system composed by the multitude of *the monades* (using

the concept of monads and co-possibility introduced by Leibnitz) becoming by Deleuze "*the nomades*". Deleuse describes postmodernity as a sum of non-co-possible fragments which can coexist. It wasn't possible in the Leibnitz's vision of reality based on the principle of co-possibility. But within the postmodernity we can see excluding elements coexisting. The non-ordered non-co-possible monades («nomades») swarming around could seem to be the chaotic, and in this sense we usually use the word chaos in the evereday talk. But strictly speaking we should make difference.

So we need distinguish two kinds of chaos, the postmodernist "chaos" as an equivalent to the confusion, a kind of post-order and the Greek Chaos as pre-order, as something that exists before the ordered reality has come into being. Only the latter can be considered as Chaos in the proper sense of the word. This second (but actually the original) sense the concept of Chaos should be examined carefully in the metaphysical way.

The epic vision of the rise and fall of Logos in the course of the development of the Western philosophy and the Western history was exposed by Martin Heidegger who argued that in the context of the European or Western culture Logos is not only a main philosophical principle but also the basis of religious attitude forming the core of Christianity. We can also notice that the concept of *kalam* or intellect is in the centre of Islamic philosophy and theology. The same is valid for Judaism (at least in The Philo the Jew vision and above all in the Medieval Judaism and the Qabballah. Thus in the high modernity where we are living we assist the fall of Logos accompanied by the corresponding the fall of classical Greco-Roman culture and the monotheistic religion as well. These processes of decadence are completely parallel to that Martin Heidegger considers the present condition of the Western culture in whole. He identifies the origin of this state of thing in of some hidden and hardly recognizable error committed at the early stages of the Greek thought. Something went wrong in the very beginning of the Western history and Martin Heidegger sees this wrong point precisely in the affirmation of the exclusivist position of exclusivist Logos in the thinking as such. The

shift was made by Heraklites, Parmenides but above all by Plato from the thinking to the philosophy that was equal to the installing of two level world vision where the existing was perceived as the manifestation of the hidden. Later the hidden was recognized as the Logos, the idea, the paradigm, the example. From that point the referential theory of truth proceeds. The true is the fact of the correspondence of the given immediately to the presumed invisible essence ("the nature that likes to hide" according to the Heraklites). The presocratics were in the beginning of the philosophy. The unfettered explosion of the modern technique is its logical result. Heidegger calls it "Gestell" and thinks it is the reason of the catastrophe and annihilations of the mankind that inevitably approaches. According to him the very concept of Logos was wrong so that he proposed to radically revise our attitude to the very essence of philosophy and the process of thinking and to find another way which he called "the Other Beginning".

So Logos appeared first with the birth of the Western philosophy. The earliest Greek philosophy arose already as something that *excluded* Chaos. Precisely at the same time Logos has began to flourish revealing a kind of mighty will to power and the absolutisation of masculine attitude to the reality. The becoming of the logocentric culture ontologically annihilated the pole opposite to Logos itself – i.e. the feminine Chaos. So the Chaos as something that preceded the Logos abolished by it and its exclusivity was manifested and dismissed by the same move. The masculine Logos ousted the feminin Chaos, the exclusivity and exlusion subdued the inclusivity and the inclusion. So the classical world was born stretching its limits for 2 thousands and 5 hundreds years – up to the Modernity and the rationalistic scientific era. This world has come to its end. But nevertheless we are still living in its outskirt. At the same time in the postmodern dissipating world all the structures of order are degrading, dispersing and confused. It is the dawn of Logos, the end of order, the last chord of the masculine exclusivist domination. But still we *are inside the logical structure but not outside it*.

Stating this we have some basic solutions concerning the future. First one – the return to kingdom the Logos, the Conservative Revolution, the restoration of the male "full scale domination" in all realms of the life – the philosophy, the religion, the everyday life. It could be done spiritually and socially or technically. This way where the technique meets the spiritual order was fundamentally explored and studied by Ernst Junger, the Martin Heidegger's friend. The return to the classicism accompanied by the appeal to the technical progress. The effort to save falling Logos, the restoration of traditional society. The eternally new Order.

The second way is to accept the current tendencies and to follow the direction of the Confusion involving more and more in the dissipation of the structures, in the post-structuralism and trying to get the pleasure of the comfortable glide into the nothing. That is the option chosen by the left or liberal representatives of the Post-Modernity. It is modern nihilism at its best – originally identified by F.Nietzsche and explored thoroughly by M.Heidegger. The concept of nothing being the potentially present in the principle of the identity proper to the Logos itself is here not the limit of the process of the fall of the logic oreder but rather consrtucted rationally realm of the illimitate expansion of the horizintal decay, inculculable multididues of the flowers of putrefaction.

However, we could choose the third way and try to transcend the borders of Logos and step out *beyond the crisis of the Post-Modern world*, literally Post-Modern, i.e. laying beyond the Modernity, where dissipation of Logos reaches its limit. So there the question of this very limit is crucial. Seeing from the standpoint of Logos in general, including the most decayed one, beyond the domain of order lays nothing. So cross the border of being is ontologically impossible. *The nothing is not*: so speaks after Parmenides all logocentric Western ontology. This impossibility asserts the infinity of the outskirt ob Logos and grant to the decay inside the realm of order eternal continuity. Beyond the border of being lays nothing and the movement to this limit is analytically infinite and unending (here is

fully valid aporia of Zeno of Elea). So nobody can cross the frontier into the non-existent not-being that simply is not.

If we insist nevertheless in doing this we should *appeal to the Chaos* in its original Greek sense, as to something that preceeds being and order, something preonthological.

We stand in front of a really important crucial problem. Great number of people today isn't satisfied with what is going on around us, with absolute crisis of values, religions, philosophy, political and social order, with the Post-Modern conditions, with the confusion and perversion, with the age of utmost decay.

But considering the essential sense of the becoming of our civilization to the present state we cannot look to the precedent phases of the logocentric order and its implicite structures because it was precisely the Logos itself that has brought the thing to the state where they are now, bearing in itself the germs of present decay. Heidegger identified with the extreme credibility the roots of the technique in the presocratic solution of the problem of being by the means of the Logos. In fact Logos can not save us from the conditions installed by itself. The Logos is of no use here anymore.

So only the preontological Chaos can give as a hint how to go beyond the trap of the Post-Modernity. It was put aside on the eve of the creation of the logical structure of being as a corner stone. Now it is its turn to come to the play. Otherwise we will be doomed to accept the postlogical dissipated Post-Modernity that pretends to be eternal in some way because it annihilates time. The Modernity has killed eternity and Post-Modernity is killing time. The architecture of the Post-Modern world is completely fragmented, perverse and confused. It is a kind of the labyirynth without exit, folded and twisted as the Moebius trip. The Logos that was the guarantee of stictness of the order serves here to grant the curvature and crookedness, being used to preserve the impassability of the ontologically border with nothing from the eventual trespassers.

So the only way to save us, to save humanity and culture from this snare is to make a step beyond the logocentric culture, addressing to the Chaos.

We could not restore the Logos and the order addressing to them because they bear in themselves the reason of their eternal destruction. In other words, to save exclusive Logos we should make an appeal to the alternative inclusive instance that is Chaos.

But how could we use the concept of Chaos and base on it our philosophy if philosophy has always been for us something logical by definition?

I order to resolve this difficulty we should approach the Chaos not from the position of Logos but from that of Chaos itself. It can be compared to the *feminine vision*, the feminine understanding of the figure other that is not excluded but, on the contrary, included in the sameness.

The Logos regards itself as what is and as what is equal to itself. It can accept the differences inside itself because it excludes the other that itself outside itself. So the will to power is working. The law of sovereignty. Beyond Logos, Logos asserts, lays nothing, not something. So the Logos excluding all other than itself excludes Chaos. The Chaos use different strategies – it includes in itself all that it is but at the same all what it is not. So the all inclusive Chaos includes also what is not inclusive as it and more than that what excludes Chaos. So the Chaos doesn't perceives the Logos as the other as itself or as something non-existent. The Logos as the first principle of exclusion is included in Chaos, presents in it, enveloped by it and has a granted place inside of it. So the mother bearing the baby bears in herself what is a part of it and what is not a part of her at the same time. The man conceives the woman as external being and seeks to penetrate her. The woman considers the man as something internal and seeks to give him a birth.

The Chaos is eternal nascency of other, that is of Logos.

To sum up, the chaotic philosophy is possible because chaos itself includes Logos as some inner possibility. It can freely identify it, cherish it and recognise its exclusivity included in its everlasting life. So we come to the figure of the very special *chaotic Logos*, that is completely and absolutely fresh Logos being eternally revived by

the waters of Chaos. This chaotic Logos is at the same time exclusive (and it is why is properly Logos) and inclusive (being chaotic). It deals with the sameness and otherness differently.

I could suggest, as an example, the philosophy of Japanese thinker Kitaro Nishida, who has constructed "the logic of basho" or the "logic of places" instead of Aristotle's logic.

The Chaos can think. It thinks. We should ask him how it does it? We have asked the Logos. Now it is the turn of the Chaos. We should learn to think with the Chaos and within the Chaos.

We should explore other cultures rather than the Western one to try to find the different examples of the inclusive philosophy, the inclusive religions and so on. The chaotic Logos is not only the abstract construction. If we seek well we find the real forms of such intellectual tradition. In archaic societies as well as in the Eastern theology and mystical currents.

To make appeal to the Chaos is the only way to save Logos. Logos needs a saviour for itself, it couldn't save itself, it needs something opposite to itself to be restored in the critical situation of Post-Modernity. We could not transcend the Post-Modernity The latter can't be overcame without appeal to something that has been prior to the reason of its decay. So we should resort to other philosophies than the Western one.

In conclusion, I would like to say that it's not correct to conceive the Chaos as something belonging to the past. The Chaos is eternal, but eternally coexisting with time. So the chaos is always absolutely new, fresh and spontaneous. It could be regarded as a source of any kind of invention and freshness because its eternity has in itself always something more than was, is or will be in time. The Logos itself cannot exist without Chaos like fish cannot live without water. When we put a fish out of water, it dies. When the fish begins to insist excessively that it is something other than water around it (even it is true), it come to the shore and dies there. It is a kind of a mad fish. When we put it back in the water it jumps again. So let it die this one if it wants. There are other fishes deep in water. Let us follow them.

The astronomical era that is coming to the end is the era of the Fish constellation. The Fish on the shore. The dying one. So we need water now very badly.

Only the completely new attitude to the thought, new ontology and new gnoseology can save Logos left water, on the shore, in the desert that grows and grows (as Nietzsche foresaw).

Only the Chaos and the alternative philosophy based on inclusivity could save the modern humanity and the world from the consequences of the degradation and decay of the exclusivist principle called Logos. The Logos has expired and we all can be buried under its ruins unless we make the appeal to Chaos and its metaphysical principles and use them as basis for something new. This is maybe "the Other Beginning" Heidegger spoke about.

APPENDIX V. THE GREATER EUROPE PROJECT

(A geo-political draft for a future multi-polar world)

1. Following the decline and disappearance of the socialist East European Block in the end of the last century, a new vision of world geopolitics based on a new approach became a necessity. But the inertia of political thinking and the lack of historic imagination among the political elites of the victorious West has led to a simplistic option: the conceptual basis of western liberal democracy, a market-economy society, and the strategic domination of the USA on the world scale became the only solution to all kinds of emerging challenges and the universal model that should be imperatively accepted by all of humanity.

2. Before our eyes this new reality is emerging – the reality of one world organised entirely on the American paradigm. An influential neo-conservative think tank in the modern USA openly refers to it by a more appropriate term – the 'global Empire' (sometimes 'benevolent Empire' – R. Kagan). This Empire is uni-polar and concentric by its very nature. In the centre there is the 'rich North', Atlantic community. All the rest of the world, –the zone of underdeveloped or developing countries, considered peripheral, – is presumed to be following the same direction and the same course that the core countries of the West did long before it.

3. In such a uni-polar vision, Europe is considered the outskirts of America, the world capital, and as a bridgehead of the American West on the large Eurasian continent. Europe is seen as a part of the rich North, not a decision maker, but a junior partner without proper interests and specific characteristics of its own. Europe, in

such a project, is perceived as an object and not the subject, as a geopolitical entity deprived of autonomous identity and will, of real and acknowledged sovereignty. Most of the cultural, political, ideological and geopolitical particularity of European heritage is thought of as something passé: anything that was once valued as useful has already been integrated into the Global Western project; what's left is discounted as irrelevant. In such circumstances Europe becomes geopolitically denuded, deprived of its own proper and independent self. Being geographically a neighbour to regions with diverse non-European civilisations, and with its own identity weakened or directly negated by the approach of the Global American Empire, Europe can easily lose its own cultural and political shape.

4. However, liberal democracy and the free market theory account for only part of the European historical heritage and that there have been other options proposed and issues dealt with by great European thinkers, scientists, politicians, ideologists and artists. The identity of Europe is much wider and deeper than some simplistic American ideological fast-food of the global Empire complex – with its caricaturist mixture of ultra-liberalism, free market ideology and quantitative democracy. In the cold war era, the unity of the Western world (on both sides of the Atlantic) had more or less solid base of the mutual defence of common values. But now this challenge is no longer present, the old rhetoric doesn't work anymore. It should be revised and new arguments supplied. There is no longer a clear and realistic common foe. The positive basis for a united West in the future is almost totally lacking. The social choice of European countries and states is in stark contrast of Anglo-Saxon (today American) option towards ultra-liberalism.

5. Present-day Europe has its own strategic interests that differ substantially with American interests or with the approach of the Global West project. Europe has its particular positive attitude towards its southern and eastern neighbours. In some cases economic profit, the energy supply issues and common defence initiative don't coincide at all with American ones.

6. These general considerations lead us, European intellectuals deeply concerned by the fate of our cultural and historical Motherland, Europe, to the conclusion that we badly need an alternative future world vision where the place, the role and the mission of Europe and European civilisation would be different, greater, better and safer than it is within the frame of the Global Empire project with too evident imperialistic features.

7. The only feasible alternative in present circumstances is to found in the context of a multi-polar world. Multi-polarity can grant to any country and civilisation on the planet the right and the freedom to develop its own potential, to organise its own internal reality in accordance with the specific identity of its culture and people, to propose a reliable basis of just and balanced international relations amongst the world's nations. Multi-polarity should be based on the principle of equity among the different kinds of political, social and economic organisations of these nations and states. Technological progress and a growing openness of countries should promote dialogue amongst, and the prosperity of, all peoples and nations. But at the same time it shouldn't endanger their respective identities. Differences between civilisations do not have to necessarily culminate in an inevitable clash between them – in contrast to the simplistic logic of some American writers. Dialogue, or rather 'polylogue', is a realistic and feasible possibility that we should all exploit in this regard.

8. Concerning Europe directly, and in contrast to other plans for the creation of something 'greater' in the old-fashioned imperialistic sense of the word – be it the Greater Middle East Project or the pan-nationalist plan for a Greater Russia or a Greater China – we suggest, as a concretisation of the multi-polar approach, a balanced and open vision of a Greater Europe as a new concept for the future development of our civilisation in strategic, social, cultural, economic and geopolitical dimensions.

9. Greater Europe consists of the territory contained within the boundaries that coincide with the limits of a civilisation. This kind of boundary is something completely new, as is the concept of the

civilisation-state. The nature of these boundaries presumes a gradual transition – not an abrupt line. So this Greater Europe should be open for interaction with its neighbours in the West, East or South.

10. A Greater Europe in the general context of a multi-polar world is conceived as surrounded by other great territories, basing their respective unities on the affinity of civilisations. So we can postulate the eventual appearance of a Greater North America, a Greater Eurasia, a Greater Pacific Asia and, in the more distant future, a Greater South America and a Greater Africa. No country – except the USA – as things stand today, can afford and defend its true sovereignty, relying solely on its own inner resources. No one of them could be considered as an autonomous pole capable of counterbalancing the Atlantist power. So multi-polarity demands a large-scale integration process. It could be called 'a chain of globalisations' – but globalisation within concrete limits – coinciding with the approximate boundaries of various civilisations.

11. We imagine this Greater Europe as a sovereign geopolitical power, with its own strong cultural identity, with its own social and political options – based on the principles of the European democratic tradition – with its own defence system, including nuclear weapons, with its own strategic access to energy and mineral resources, making its own independent choices on peace or war with other countries or civilisations – with all of the above depending on a common European will and democratic procedure for making decisions.

12. In order to promote our project of a Greater Europe and the multi-polarity concept, we appeal to the different forces in European countries, and to the Russians, the Americans, the Asians, to reach beyond their political options, cultural differences and religious choices to support actively our initiative, to create in any place or region Committees for a Greater Europe or other kinds of organisations sharing the multi-polar approach, rejecting uni-polarity, the growing danger of American imperialism and elaborating a similar concept for other civilisations. If we work together, strongly affirming our different identities, we will be able to found a balanced, just

and better world, a Greater World where any worthy culture, society, faith, tradition and human creativity will find its proper and granted place.

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