

Foundations of Geopolitics

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The Geopolitical Future of Russia

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PART 1 - FOUNDING - FOUNDERS OF GEOPOLITICS

Chapter 1 - Friedrich Ratzel. States as spatial organisms

1.1 Education: German "organic school"

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) can be considered the "father" of geopolitics, although he himself did not use this term in his writings. He wrote about "political geography." His main work, which saw the light of day in 1897, is called the *Politische Geographie*.

Ratzel graduated from the Polytechnic University in Karlsruhe, where he attended courses in geology, paleontology and zoology. He completed his education in Heidelberg, where he became a student of Professor Ernst Haeckel (who was the first to use the term "ecology"). Ratzel's worldview was based on evolutionism and Darwinism and was colored by a pronounced interest in biology.

Ratzel takes part in the war of 1870, where he recovers as a volunteer and receives the Iron Cross for courage. In politics, he gradually becomes a convinced nationalist, and in 1890 joined the "Pan-Germanist League" by Karl Peters. He travels a lot in Europe and America and adds ethnology studies to his scientific interests. He becomes a teacher of geography at the Technical Institute of Munich, and in 1886 transferred to a similar department in Leipzig.

In 1876, Ratzel defended his dissertation on "Emigration in China," and in 1882, his fundamental work *Antropogeography* (*Antropogeographie*) was published in Stuttgart, in which he formulated his main ideas: the relationship of peoples' evolution and demography with geographical data, the impact terrain on the cultural and political formation of peoples, etc.

But his most basic book was *Political Geography*.

1.2 States as living organisms

In this work, Ratzel shows that the soil is the fundamental, unchanging reality around which the interests of peoples revolve. The movement of history is predetermined by soil and territory. What follows is an evolutionist conclusion that “the state is a living organism,” but an organism “rooted in the soil.” The state consists of a territorial relief and scale and of their understanding by the people. Thus, the State reflects an objective geographical reality and a subjective national understanding of this reality, expressed in politics. Ratzel considers the “Normal” State to be the one that most organically combines the geographical, demographic, and ethnocultural parameters of a nation.

He writes:

“At all stages of their development, states are considered as organisms that necessarily remain in contact with their soil and therefore must be studied from a geographical point of view. As ethnography and history show, states develop on a spatial basis, more and more mating and merging with it extracting more and more energy from it, thus, states turn out to be spatial phenomena controlled and animated by this space, and geography should describe, compare, measure them. States countries fit into a series expansion phenomena of life, being the highest point of these phenomena.” (*Political Geography* (1)).

From this "organist" approach, it is clear that the spatial expansion of the state is understood by Ratzel as a natural living process, similar to the growth of living organisms.

Ratzel's “organic” approach is also apparent in relation to space itself (Raum). This “space” is moving from a quantitative material category to a new quality, becoming a “living sphere”, a “living space” (Lebensraum), a kind of “geobiological environment”. From here two other important terms of Ratzel “spatial meaning” (Raumsinn) and “vital energy” (Lebensenergie) follow. These terms are close to each other and denote some special quality inherent in geographical systems and predetermining their political design in the history of peoples and states.

All these theses are fundamental principles of geopolitics, in the form in which it will develop somewhat later among the followers of Ratzel. Moreover, the attitude to the state as a “living spatial organism rooted in the soil” is the main idea and axis of the geopolitical technique. This approach is focused on a

idea and axis of the geopolitical technique. This approach is focused on a synthetic study of the whole complex of phenomena, regardless of whether they belong to the human or non-human sphere. Space as a concrete expression of nature, the environment, is considered as a continuous vital body of an ethnic group, it is the space inhabiting. The structure of the material itself dictates the proportions of the final work of art.

In this sense, Ratzel is the direct heir to the whole school of German “organic” sociology, of which Ferdinand Tönnies was the most prominent representative.

1.3. Raum - political organization of the soil

How Ratzel saw the correlation of ethnos and space can be seen from the following fragment of *Political Geography*:

“The state is formed as an organism attached to a certain part of the earth’s surface, and its characteristics develop from the characteristics of the people and the soil. The most important characteristics are size, location and boundaries. The types of soil along with vegetation, irrigation and, finally, the relationships with the rest follow conglomerates of the earth’s surface, and first of all, with adjacent seas and uninhabited lands, which, at first glance, are not of particular political interest. The verist make up the country (das Land), but when they talk about “our country”, all that a person has created and all the memories connected with the earth are added to this. So, from the very beginning a purely geographical concept turns into a spiritual and emotional connection between the inhabitants of the country and their stories.

The state is an organism, not only because it articulates the life of the people on motionless soil, but because this connection is mutually reinforcing, becoming something single, inconceivable without one of the two components. Uninhabited spaces, unable to feed the State, is a historical field under steam. The inhabited space, on the contrary, contributes to the development of the state, especially if this space is surrounded by natural borders. If the people feel naturally on their territory, they will constantly reproduce the same characteristics that, coming from the soil, will be inscribed in it.”(2)

1.4 Law of expansion

The attitude to the state as a living organism implied a rejection of the concept of “inviolability of borders”. The state is born, grows, dies, like a living being. Therefore, its spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes associated with its internal life cycle. Ratzel in his book *On the laws of spatial growth of States* (1901) identified seven laws of expansion:

1. The extent of States increases with the development of their culture;
2. The spatial growth of the State is accompanied by other manifestations of its development: in the areas of ideology, production, commercial activity, powerful "attractive radiation", proselytism.
3. The state expands, absorbing and absorbing political units of lesser importance.
4. A border is an organ located on the periphery of a State (understood as an organism).
5. Carrying out its spatial expansion, the State seeks to cover the most important regions for its development: coasts, river basins, valleys and generally all rich territories.
6. The initial impulse of expansion comes from outside, since the State is provoked by the expansion of the state (or territory) with a clearly lower civilization.
7. The general tendency to assimilate or absorb the weaker nations encourages an even greater increase in territories in a movement that feeds itself. (3)

Not surprisingly, many critics accused Ratzel of writing the Catechism for the Imperialists. At the same time, Ratzel himself did not at all try to justify German imperialism by any means, although he did not hide the fact that he adhered to nationalist convictions. It was important for him to create a conceptual tool for an adequate comprehension of the history of states and peoples in their relation to space. In practice, he sought to awaken the Raumsinn (sense of space) among the leaders of Germany, for whom the geographical data of dry academic science most often seemed to be a pure abstraction.

1.5 Weltmacht and the sea

Ratzel was greatly influenced by his acquaintance with North America, which he

studied well and devoted two books to: *Maps of North American Cities and Civilization* (1874) and *United States of North America* (1878-1880). He noted that the "sense of space" among Americans is highly developed, since they were assigned the task of mastering the "empty" spaces, having behind them a significant "political-geographical" experience of European history. Consequently, the Americans deliberately implemented what the Old World came to intuitively and gradually. So at Ratzel we come across the first formulations of another important geopolitical concept of the concept of a "world power" (Weltmacht). Ratzel noticed

Therefore, sooner or later, geographical development must come to its continental phase.

Applying this principle, derived from the American experience of the political and strategic unification of continental spaces, to Germany, Ratzel predicted the fate of a continental power.

He anticipated another important topic of geopolitics, the importance of the sea for the development of civilization. In his book *The Sea, the Source of the Power of Peoples* (1900) (4), he pointed out the need for each powerful power to especially develop its naval forces, since this is required by the planetary scale of full expansion. The fact that some peoples and nations (England, Spain, Holland, etc.) was carried out spontaneously, ground power (Ratzel, of course, meant Germany) should do meaningful: fleet development is a prerequisite for the approximation of the status of "world Powers" (Weltmacht).

The Ratzel's sea and "world power" are already connected, although only in later geopolitics (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, especially Schmitt) will this theme become complete and central.

Ratzel's works are a necessary basis for all geopolitical studies. In a minimized form, his works contain almost all the main points that will form the basis of this science. The books of Ratzel were based on the concepts of the Swede Chöllen and the German Haushofer. His ideas were taken into account by the Frenchman Vidal de la Blach, the Englishman Mackinder, the American Machan and the Russian Eurasians (P. Savitsky, L. Gumilev, etc.).

It should be noted that Ratzel's political sympathies are not accidental. Almost all of geopolitics were marked by a pronounced national feeling, regardless of whether it is enveloped in a democratic (Anglo-Saxon geopolitics Mackinder,

Mahan) or "ideocratic" (Haushofer, Schmitt, Eurasians) form.

Chapter 2 - Rudolph Challen and Friedrich Naumann - "Central Europe"

2.1 Definition of a new science

The Swede Rudolf Chöllén (1864-1922) was the first to use the concept of "geopolitics".

Chellen was a professor of history and political science at Uppsala and Gothenburg universities. In addition, he actively participated in politics, was a member of parliament, distinguished by an emphasized Germanophile orientation. Chellen was not a professional geographer and considered geopolitics, the foundations of which he developed from the work of Ratzel (he considered him his teacher), as part of political science.

Chellen defined geopolitics as follows:

"This is the science of the State as a geographical organism embodied in spaces" (5).

In addition to "geopolitics," Chellen proposed 4 more neologisms, which, in his opinion, should have been the main sections of political science:

- environmental policy ("the study of the State as an economic force");
- demopolitics ("the study of dynamic impulses transmitted by the people to the State"; analogue of Ratzel's Anthropogeography);
- sociopolitics ("study of the social aspect of the State");
- cratopolitics ("the study of forms of government and power in relation to the problems of law and socio-economic factors") (6).

But all these disciplines, which Chellen developed along with geopolitics, did not receive wide recognition, while the term "geopolitics" was firmly established in various circles.

2.2 The state as a form of life and interests of Germany

In his main work, *The State as a Life Form* (1916) (7), Chellen developed the postulates laid down in Ratzel's work. Chellen, like Ratzel, considered himself a follower of German "organism", which rejects the mechanistic approach to the state and society. Refusal to strictly divide the objects of study into "inanimate objects" (background) and "human subjects" (figures) is a hallmark of most geopolitics. In this sense, the very name of Chellen's main work is indicative.

Chellen developed Ratzel's geopolitical principles in relation to the specific historical situation in modern Europe.

He brought to the logical end Ratzel's ideas about a "continental state" as applied to Germany. And he showed that in the context of Europe, Germany is a space that has axial dynamism and which is designed to structure other European powers around itself. Chellen interpreted World War I as a natural geopolitical conflict that arose between the dynamic expansion of Germany (the "Axis countries") and the peripheral European (and non-European) states (Entente) opposing it. The difference in the geopolitical growth dynamics downward for France and England and upward for Germany predetermined the main alignment of forces. Moreover, from his point of view, the geopolitical identification of Germany with Europe is inevitable and inevitable.

Chellen secured the geopolitical maxim outlined by Ratzel for the interests of Germany (= the interests of Europe) are the opposite of the interests of the West European powers (especially France and England). But Germany is a "young" state, and the Germans are a "young people." (This idea of "young peoples", which were considered Russian and Germans, goes back to F. Dostoevsky, more than once quoted by Chellen.) "Young" Germans, inspired by the "Central European space", should move to a continental state of a planetary scale due to territories controlled by "old peoples"—the French and British. At the same time, the ideological aspect of the geopolitical confrontation was considered secondary by Chellen.

2.3 Toward a Central European Concept

Although Chellen himself was a Swede and insisted on the convergence of

Swedish politics with German, his geopolitical ideas about the independent integrating significance of the German space exactly coincide with the theory of "Central Europe" (Mitteleuropa), developed by Friedrich Naumann.

In his book *Mitteleuropa* (1915) (8), Naumann gave a geopolitical diagnosis identical to the concept of Rudolf Chellen. From his point of view, in order to compete with such organized geopolitical entities as England (and its colonies), the USA and Russia, the peoples living in Central Europe should unite and organize a new integrated political and economic space. The axis of such a space will naturally be the Germans.

Mitteleuropa, in contrast to pure "pan-Germanist" projects, was no longer a national, but a purely geopolitical concept, in which the main importance was not on ethnic unity, but on a common geographical destiny. The Naumann project implied the integration of Germany, Austria, the Danube states and—in the distant future—France.

The geopolitical project was confirmed by cultural parallels. Germany itself, as an organic entity, was identified with the spiritual concept of "Mittellage," "middle position." As early as 1818, Arndt formulated: "God placed us in the center of Europe; we (Germans) are the heart of our part of the world."

Through Chellen and Naumann, Ratzel's "continental" ideas gradually acquired tangible features.

Chapter 3 - Halford Mackinder - "The Geographical Axis of History"

3.1 Scientist and politician

Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861 1947) is the brightest figure among geopolitics.

Having received a geographical education, he taught at Oxford since 1887, until he was appointed director of the London School of Economics. From 1910 to 1922 he was a member of the House of Commons, and in the interval (1919 1920) the British envoy to southern Russia.

Mackinder is known for his high position in the world of English politics, the international orientation of which he greatly influenced, as well as the fact that he owns the most daring and revolutionary scheme for interpreting the political history of the world.

On the example of Mackinder, the typical paradox characteristic of geopolitics as a discipline is most clearly manifested. Mackinder's ideas were not accepted by the scientific community, despite his high position not only in politics, but also in the scientific community itself. Even the fact that for almost half a century he actively and successfully participated in the creation of the English strategy in international affairs on the basis of his interpretation of the political and geographical history of the world could not make skeptics recognize the value and effectiveness of geopolitics as a discipline.

3.2 Geographical axis of history

Mackinder's first and most striking presentation was his report "The Geographical Axis of History" (9), published in 1904 in the *Geographical Journal*. In it, he outlined the basis of his vision of history and geography, developed in subsequent works. This Mackinder text can be considered the main geopolitical text in the history of this discipline, since it not only generalizes all

previous lines of development of “political geography”, but formulates the basic law of this science.

Mackinder argues that for the State the most advantageous geographical position would be a middle, central position. The centrality of the concept is relative, and in each specific geographical context, it can vary. But on a planetary point of view, the world is the center of the Eurasian continent, and in its center is the "heart of the world" or the "heartland". Heartland is the concentration of the continental masses of Eurasia. This is the most favorable geographical base for control over the whole world.

Heartland is a key territory in a more general context within World Island. Mackinder's World Island includes three continents—Asia, Africa and Europe.

Thus, Mackinder hierarchizes planetary space through a system of concentric circles. In the very center is the "geographical axis of history" or "axial area" (pivot area). This geopolitical concept is geographically identical to Russia. The same "axial" reality is called heartland, "heart of earth."

Next comes the "inner or marginal crescent". This belt coincides with the coastal spaces of the Eurasian continent. According to Mackinder, the “inner crescent” is the zone of the most intensive development of civilization. This is consistent with the historical hypothesis that civilization arose initially on the banks of rivers or seas, the so-called "Potamic theory." It should be noted that the latter theory is an essential point of all geopolitical constructions. The intersection of water and land is a key factor in the history of peoples and states. This topic will be further developed in a specially Schmitt Spikmena[?], however, the first to bring this geopolitical formula is Mackinder.

Next comes the more external circle: “outer or insular crescent”. This area is entirely external (geographically and culturally) relative to the mainland mass of the World Island (World Island).

Mackinder believes that the entire course of history is determined by the following processes. From the heartland's center, a constant pressure of the so-called "sushi robbers." This was especially clearly reflected in the Mongol conquests. But they were preceded by Scythians, Huns, Alans, etc. Civilizations stemming from the "geographical axis of history", from the innermost spaces of heartland, are, according to Mackinder, "authoritarian", "hierarchical", "undemocratic" and "non-commercial in nature." In the ancient world, he is

embodied in a society like Dorian Sparta or Ancient Rome.

From outside, from the regions of the "island crescent", the so-called pressure is exerted on the World Island. "rob the sea"[?] or "island inhabitants". These are colonial expeditions originating from the non-Eurasian center, striving to balance the ground impulses originating from the internal limits of the continent. The civilization of the "outer crescent" is characterized by the "commercial" character and the "democratic forms" of politics. In ancient times, the Athenian state or Carthage differed in such a character.

Between these two polar civilizational-geographical impulses lies the zone of the "inner crescent", which, being dual and constantly experiencing the opposite cultural influences, was the most mobile and, thanks to this, became the place of priority development of civilization.

History, according to Mackinder, geographically rotates around the continental axis. This story is most clearly felt in the space of the "inner crescent", while "frozen" archaism reigns in the heartland, and in the "outer crescent" there is some civilizational chaos.

3.3 The key position of Russia

Mackinder himself identified his interests with those of the Anglo-Saxon island world, i.e. with the position of the "outer crescent." In such a situation, he saw the basis of the geopolitical orientation of the "island world" in the maximum weakening of heartland and in the maximum possible expansion of the influence of the "external crescent" on the "internal crescent". Mackinder emphasized the strategic priority of the "geographical axis of history" in world politics and formulated the most important geopolitical law:

"The one who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; the one who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island; the one who dominates the World Island dominates the world." (*Democratic Ideals and Reality*) (10)

At the political level, this meant recognizing the leading role of Russia in a strategic sense. Mackinder wrote:

"Russia is as strategically central in the world as Germany is in relation to

Europe. It can carry out attacks on all sides and be subjected to them from all sides except the north. The full development of its railway capabilities is a matter of time." ("Geographical Axis of History") (11)

Proceeding from this, Mackinder believed that the main task of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics is to prevent the formation of a strategic continental alliance around the "geographical axis of history" (Russia). Consequently, the strategy of the forces of the "external crescent" is to tear the maximum number of coastal spaces from the heartland and put them under the influence of "island civilization."

"A shift in the balance of power towards the" axial state "(A.D. of Russia), accompanied by its expansion into the peripheral spaces of Eurasia, will make it possible to use huge continental resources to create a powerful navy: so close to the world empire. This will become possible if Russia the threat of such a development will force France to enter into an alliance with the overseas powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will become coastal bases where the flotillas of external powers will moor to disperse the forces of the "axial area" la "in all directions and prevent them from concentrating all their efforts on creating a powerful navy." ("Geographical Axis of History") (12)

The most interesting thing is that Mackinder did not just build theoretical hypotheses, but actively participated in organizing international support for the Entente to the "white movement", which he considered an Atlanticist trend aimed at weakening the power of pro-German Eurasian Bolsheviks. He personally advised the leaders of the white cause, trying to get the maximum support from the British government. It seemed that he prophetically foresaw not only the Brest Peace, but also the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact ...

In 1919, in the book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, he wrote:

"What will happen to the forces of the sea if one day the great continent politically unites to become the basis of an invincible armada?" (13)

It is easy to understand what exactly Mackinder set down in the Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, which became the geopolitics of the USA and the North Atlantic Union in half a century, the main tendency: by any means impede the very possibility of creating a Eurasian bloc, creating a strategic union of Russia and Germany, geopolitically strengthening heartland and its expansion. The steady Russophobia of the West in the 20th century is not so much ideological as

geopolitical. Although, given the connection between the civilizational type and the geopolitical nature of various forces highlighted by Mackinder, one can obtain a formula by which geopolitical terms are easily translated into ideological terms.

“Outer Crescent” liberal democracy; the "geographical axis of history" is undemocratic authoritarianism; the "inner crescent" is an intermediate model, a combination of both ideological systems.

Mackinder participated in the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles, whose basic geopolitical idea reflects the essence of Mackinder's views. This agreement was drawn up in such a way as to secure the character of the coastal base for naval forces (Anglo-Saxon peace) for Western Europe. At the same time, he envisioned the creation of limitrophic states that would separate the Germans and the Slavs, in every way preventing the conclusion of a continental strategic alliance between them, so dangerous for the "island powers" and, accordingly, for "democracy."

It is very important to trace the evolution of the geographical limits of heartland in the writings of Mackinder. If in 1904 and 1919 (respectively, in the article "The Geographical Axis of History" and in the book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*), the outlines of heartland coincided in general terms with the borders of the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, then in 1943 in the text "A Round Planet and the Conquest of the World" (14) he revised his former views and removed from the heartland the Soviet territories of Eastern Siberia, located beyond the Yenisei. He called this sparsely populated Soviet territory "Russia Lenaland"—named for the Lena River.

"Russia Lenaland has 9 million inhabitants, 5 of whom live along the transcontinental railway from Irkutsk to Vladivostok. In the remaining territories, less than one person lives on 8 square kilometers. The natural wealth of this land is wood, minerals, etc. are practically untouched. " ("The Round Planet and the Conquest of the World") (15)

Withdrawal of the so-called Lenaland from the geographical borders of heartland meant the possibility of considering this territory as a zone of the "inner crescent", i.e. as coastal space that could be used by the "island" powers to fight against the "geographical axis of history." Mackinder, who actively participated in organizing the Entente intervention and the “white movement”, apparently considered the historical precedent of Kolchak, who resisted the Eurasian center

considered the historical precedent of Kuchak, who resisted the Eurasian Center, to be a sufficient basis for considering territories under his control as a potential “coastal zone”.

3.4 Three geopolitical periods

Mackinder divides the entire geopolitical history of the world into three stages (16):

1. The pre-Columbian era. In it, peoples belonging to the periphery of the World Island, for example, the Romans, live under the constant threat of conquest by the forces of "heart land". For the Romans, they were Germans, Huns, Alans, Parthians, etc. For the medieval oikumena, the golden horde.
2. the Columbian era. During this period, representatives of the “inner crescent” (coastal zones) set off to conquer the unknown territories of the planet without encountering serious resistance anywhere.
3. Post-Columbian era. Unconquered land no longer exists. The dynamic pulsations of civilizations are doomed to collision, drawing the peoples of the earth into an universal civil war.

This periodization of Mackinder with the corresponding geopolitical transformations brings us close to the latest trends in geopolitics, which we will consider in another part of the book.

Chapter 4 - Alfred Mahan - "Sea Power"

4.1 Sea Power

American Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), unlike Ratzel, Challen and Mackinder, was not a scientist, but a military man. He did not use the term "geopolitics", but the methodology of its analysis and the main conclusions exactly correspond to the purely geopolitical approach.

An American Union Navy officer, he taught Navy History at Naval War College in New Port (Road Island) from 1885. In 1890, he published his first book, which almost immediately became a classic text on military strategy. *Sea Forces in History (1660-1783)* (17). Further, with a small interval, other works follow: *The Influence of the Sea Force on the French Revolution and the Empire (1793-1812)* (18), *America's Interest in the Sea Force in the Present and in the Future* (19), *The Problem of Asia and its Impact on the International Politics* (20) and *Sea Power and its Relation to War* (21).

Almost all books were devoted to one topic, the theme of "Sea Power". Mahan's name has become synonymous with this term.

Mahan was not only a theoretician of military strategy, but actively participated in politics. In particular, he had a strong influence on politicians such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, if we look retrospectively at American military strategy throughout the 20th century, we will see that it is being built in direct accordance with Mahan's ideas. Moreover, if in the First World War this strategy did not bring tangible success to the United States, then in the Second World War the effect was significant, and the victory in the Cold War with the USSR finally consolidated the success of the Sea Force strategy.

4.2 Marine civilization = commercial civilization

For Mahan, the main policy tool is trade. Military action should only provide the most favorable conditions for the creation of a planetary commercial civilization. Mahan considers the business cycle in three ways:

1. production (exchange of goods and services through waterways)
2. navigation (which implements this exchange)
3. colonies (which circulate commodity exchange at the world level) (22).

Mahan believes that the analysis of the position and geopolitical status of the state should be based on 6 criteria.

1. The geographical position of the State, its openness to the seas, the possibility of maritime communications with other countries. The length of land borders, the ability to control strategically important regions. The ability to threaten enemy fleets with their fleet.
 2. The "physical configuration" of the State, i.e. The configuration of the coast and the number of ports located on them. The prosperity of trade and strategic security depend on this.
 3. The length of the territory. It is equal to the length of the coastline.
 4. The statistical population. It is important for assessing the ability of the State to build ships and maintain them.
 5. National character. The ability of the people to engage in trade, since sea power is based on peaceful and wide trade.
 6. The political nature of government. On this depends the reorientation of the best natural and human resources in the creation of a powerful naval force.
- "(23)

Already from this listing it is seen that Mahan bases its geopolitical theory based solely on the "sea power" and its interests. For Mahan's sea power was a model of ancient Carthage, and closer to us historically England XVII and XIX centuries.

The concept of "Sea Power" is based for him on the freedom of "sea trade", and the navy serves only as a guarantor of this trade. Mahan goes even further, considering the Sea Force as a special type of civilization (anticipating the ideas of Karl Schmitt) the best and most effective, and therefore destined for world domination.

4.3 Conquering the United States - manifest destiny

Mahan's ideas were accepted worldwide and influenced many European strategists. Even land and continental Germany, represented by Admiral Tirpitz, accepted Mahan's theses at his own expense and began to actively develop his fleet. In 1940 and 1941, two Mahan books were published in the USSR.

But they were intended primarily for America and the Americans. Mahan was an ardent supporter of the doctrine of President Monroe (1758-1831), who in 1823 declared the principle of mutual non-interference of the countries of America and Europe, and also made the growth of US power dependent on territorial expansion to nearby territories. Mahan believed that America had a "sea fate", and that this "Manifest Destiny" ("Manifest Destiny") (24) lies at the first stage in the strategic integration of the entire American continent, and then in the establishment of world domination.

One must pay tribute to Mahan's almost prophetic vision. In his time, the United States was not yet in the category of advanced world powers, and moreover, even their "marine civilization type" was not obvious. Back in 1905, Mackinder, in an article entitled "The Geographical Axis of History," referred the United States to the "land powers" that make up the "outer crescent" only as a semi-colonial strategic continuation of marine England. Mackinder wrote:

"The United States has just become the eastern power. They do not directly influence the balance of power in Europe, but through Russia" (25).

But already 10 years before the appearance of Mackinder's text, Admiral Mahan predicted America's planetary fate, becoming a leading naval power that directly affects the fate of the world.

In the book *America's Interest in the Sea Power*, Mahan argued that in order for America to become a world power, it must fulfill the following points:

1. actively cooperate with the British maritime power;
2. discourage German maritime claims;
3. vigilantly monitor and oppose Japan's expansion in the Pacific Ocean;
4. coordinate together with Europeans joint actions against the peoples of Asia (26).

Mahan saw the fate of the United States not to passively participate in the

general context of the peripheral states of the "external crescent", but to take a leading position in economic, strategic and even ideological relations.

Regardless of Mackinder, Mahan came to the same conclusions regarding the main danger to "marine civilization." This danger is the continental states of Eurasia, primarily Russia and China, and secondly Germany. The struggle with Russia, with this "continuous continental mass of the Russian Empire, stretching from western Asia Minor to the Japanese meridian in the East", was the main long-term strategic task for the Sea Force.

Mahan carried to the planetary level the principle of "anacondas", applied by the American General McClellan in the North American Civil War of 1861-1865. This principle consists in blocking enemy territories from the sea and along coastlines, which gradually leads to strategic exhaustion of the enemy. Since Mahan believed that the power of the state is determined by its potential for becoming the Sea Force, in case of confrontation, strategic number one task is to prevent this formation in the enemy's camp. Consequently, the task of the historical confrontation of America is to strengthen its positions on 6 main points (listed above) and weaken the enemy on the same points. Your coastal spaces must be in control and the corresponding zones of the enemy must be tried by any means to tear off the continental mass. And further: since the Monroe Doctrine (in its part of territorial integration) enhances the power of the state, the creation of similar integration formations in the enemy should not be allowed. On the contrary, the opponent or rival in the case of Mahan, the Eurasian powers (Russia, China, Germany) should strangle the continental mass in the rings of the "anaconda", squeezing it at the expense of the coastal zones removed from its control and blocking, if possible, access to the sea.

In World War I, this strategy was implemented in support of the Entente to the white movement on the periphery of Eurasia (as a response to the conclusion by the Bolsheviks of peace with Germany), in World War II it was also turned against Central Europe, and in particular through naval operations against the Axis and Japan. But it is especially clearly visible in the era of the Cold War, when the confrontation between the United States and the USSR reached those global planetary proportions with which, at the theoretical level, geopolitics operated since the end of the 19th century.

In fact, the main lines of NATO's strategy, as well as of other blocks aimed at deterring the USSR (the concept of "containment" is identical to the strategic and geopolitical concept of "anaconda"). ASEAN, ANZUS, CENTO are a direct

and geopolitical concept of "atlacnha" / ASIAN, ANZUS, CENTO are a direct development of the main theses of Admiral Mahan, which on this basis can be called the intellectual father of all modern Atlantism.

Chapter 5 - Vidal de la Blach - "France versus Germany"

5.1 Picture of the geography of France

Vidal de la Blach (1845-1918) is considered the founder of the French geographical school. A professional geographer, he was fascinated by Ratzel's "political geography" and built his theories based on this source, although he strongly criticized many aspects of the German geopolitical school.

In his book *The Picture of the Geography of France* (1903), he turns to the theory of soil, so important for German geopolitics:

"The relationship between soil and man in France is marked by the original character of antiquity, continuity (...). In our country, you can often see that people live in the same places from time immemorial. Sources, calcium rocks originally attracted people as convenient places to live and protection. We have a loyal student of soil. Studying the soil will help to determine the nature, customs and preferences of the population. " (27)

But, despite such a completely German attitude to the geographical factor and its impact on culture, Vidal de la Blach believed that Ratzel and his followers clearly overestimate the purely natural factor, considering it to be determining.

Man, according to de la Blach, is also a "most important geographical factor," but he is also "endowed with initiative." He is not only a fragment of the scenery, but also the main actor of the play.

5.2 Possibilism

This criticism of Ratzel's excessive exaggeration of the spatial factor led Vidal de la Blaise to develop a special geopolitical concept of "possibilism" (from the word "possible"). According to this concept, political history has two aspects:

spatial (geographical) and temporal (historical). The geographical factor is reflected in the environment, historical in the person himself (the “vehicle of initiative”) (28). Vidal de la Blach believed that the mistake of the German “political geographers” was that they considered the relief as the determining factor in the political history of states. Thus, according to de la Blach, the factor of human freedom and historicity is downplayed. He himself proposes to consider the geographical spatial position as “potentiality”.

This approach was also taken into account by the German geopolitics of the Haushofer school, who considered the criticism of de la Blach quite justified and important. In this case, the role of the ethnic or racial factor in considering the political history of states obviously increased, and this resonated with the general surge in racial issues in Germany in the 1920s.

The “Possibilism” de la Blach was perceived by most geopolitical schools as a correction of the rigid geogeographical determinism of previous geopolitical authors.

5.3 France for Sea Power

Vidal de la Blach paid particular attention to Germany, which was France’s main political opponent at the time. He believed that Germany was the only powerful European state whose geopolitical expansion was deliberately blocked by other European developed powers. If England and France have their vast colonies in Africa and around the world, if the United States can move almost freely south and north, if Russia has Asia, then Germany is squeezed from all sides and has no outlet for its energies. De la Blach saw this as the main threat to peace in Europe and considered it necessary to completely weaken the development of this dangerous neighbor.

Such an attitude towards Germany logically entailed the geopolitical definition of France as part of the common front of the “Sea Force”, oriented against the continental powers. The position of de la Blach was not the only one among the French geopoliticians, since in parallel there was an opposite Germanophilic trend, represented by Admiral Lavalley and General De Gaulle.

In 1917, Vidal de la Blach published the book “Eastern France”, in which he proved the original affiliation of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to France and

the illegality of German claims to these areas. At the same time, he appeals to the French Revolution, considering its Jacobin dimension to be an expression of the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, seeking to unify and centralize their State through geographical integration. He also explains political liberalism through people's attachment to soil and the natural desire to get it into private ownership. Thus, Vidal de la Blache in his own way connects geopolitical realities with ideological realities: the spatial policy of Western Europe (France) is inextricably linked with "democracy" and "liberalism".

De la Blache's choice of "maritime orientation" fits perfectly into this pattern.

Chapter 6 - Nicholas Spikman - Mackinder Revision, centrality of rimland

6.1 In the service of America

Dutch-born Nicholas Speakman (1893-1943) is a direct continuation of Admiral Mahan's line. Speaker was a professor of international relations, and later director of the Institute of International Relations at Yale University. For him, unlike the first geopoliticians, geography itself was not of great interest, and even less worried about his problems are the connection of the people with the soil, the influence of the relief on the national character, etc. Speakman considered geopolitics as the most important instrument of a specific international policy, as an analytical method and a system of formulas allowing to develop the most effective strategy. In this sense, he harshly criticized the German geopolitical school (especially in the book *Geography of the World* (29)), considering ideas about "[text missing]

Like Mahan, Speakman is characterized by a utilitarian approach, a clear desire to give out the most effective geopolitical formula with which the US can quickly achieve "world domination." This pragmatism determines the structure of all his studies.

6.2 Mackinder Correction

Speakman, who carefully studied the work of Mackinder, proposed his own version of the basic geopolitical scheme, slightly different from the Mackinder model. Speakman's main idea was that Mackinder supposedly overestimated the geopolitical significance of heartland. This reassessment affected not only the current position of forces on the world map, in particular, the power of the USSR, but also the original historical scheme. Speakman believed that the geographical history of the "inner crescent", rimland, "coastal zones", was carried out on its own, and not under the pressure of the "Sushi nomads," as Mackinder believed. From his point of view, heartland is only a potential space

that receives all cultural impulses from coastal zones and does not carry in itself any independent geopolitical mission or historical impulse. Rimland

Mackinder's geopolitical formula "He who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; he who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island; he who dominates the World Island dominates the world" Speakman proposed replacing his "He who dominates rimland dominates Eurasia; he who dominates Eurasia holds the fate of the world in his hands." (30)

In principle, Speakman said nothing new. And for Mackinder himself, the "coastal zone", "outer crescent" or rimland were a key strategic position in control of the continent. But Mackinder understood this zone not as an independent and self-sufficient accurate geopolitical formation, but as a space in opposition to two impulses of the "sea" and the "land". However, he never understood control of the heartland in the sense of power over Russia and the adjacent continental masses. Eastern Europe is an intermediate space between the "geographical axis of history" and rimland, therefore, it is in the balance of forces on the periphery of heartland that the key to the problem of world domination is found. But Speakman presented a shift in emphasis in his geopolitical doctrine regarding Mackinder's views as something radically new. In fact, it was only about a certain nuance of concepts.

6.3 Power Scale

In his books *American Strategy in World Politics* (31) and *Geography of the World* (32), Speakman identifies 10 criteria on the basis of which the geopolitical power of the state should be determined. This is a development of the criteria first proposed by Mahan. They are as follows:

1. The surface of the territory
2. The nature of borders
3. Population
4. The presence or absence of minerals
5. Economic and technological development
6. Financial power
7. Ethnic homogeneity
8. The level of social integration

9. Political stability
10. National spirit

If the total result of assessing the state's geopolitical capabilities by these criteria is relatively low, this almost automatically means that the state is forced to enter into a more general strategic alliance, surrendering part of its sovereignty for the sake of global strategic geopolitical protection.

6.4 Mid Ocean

In addition to reassessing the significance of rimland, Speakman made another important addition to the geopolitical picture of the world, seen from the perspective of "sea power." He introduced the extremely important concept of the Midland Ocean. The basis of this geopolitical view is the emphasized analogy between the Mediterranean Sea in the history of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in antiquity, and the Atlantic Ocean in the recent history of Western civilization. Since Speakman considered "the coastal zone", rimland, the main historical territory of civilization, the Mediterranean area of antiquity seemed to him to be a model of culture, which subsequently spread into the continent (cultivating the Sushi barbarians) and to remote territories, reachable only by sea routes (cultivating the barbarians of the Sea).

The "Midland Ocean" becomes, in this perspective, not a disconnecting, but unifying factor, the "inland sea" (*mare internum*). Thus, Speakman outlines a special geopolitical reality, which can be called the "Atlantic continent", in the center of which, like a lake in the land region, is the Atlantic Ocean. This theoretical "continent", "new Atlantis" is connected by a common culture of West European origin, the ideology of liberal capitalism and democracy, and the unity of political, ethical, and technological fate.

Speakman especially insisted on the role of the intellectual factor in this "Atlantic continent". Western Europe and the East Coast of North America (especially New York) are becoming the brains of the new "Atlantic community". The United States and its trade and military-industrial complex are the nerve center and power mechanism. Europe turns out to be a mental appendage of the United States, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line become the only and dominant for all Western powers. Political sovereignty of European states should gradually be reduced, and power should be transferred to

European states should gradually be reduced, and power should be transferred to a special authority uniting representatives of all "Atlantic" spaces and subordinated to the priority leadership of the United States.

Speakman anticipated the most important political processes of creating the "North Atlantic Union" (NATO), reducing the sovereignty of European powers in the post-war world, the planetary hegemony of the United States, etc.

6.5 American Victory Architect

Speakman made the basis of his doctrine not so much a geopolitical understanding of the place of the United States as the "Sea Power" in the whole world (like Mahan), perhaps because it has already become a fact, how much the need to control the coastal territories of Eurasia: Europe, Arab countries, India, China, etc. led to the final victory in a duel of the continental and naval forces. Whereas in Mackinder's picture, planetary duality was seen as something "eternal", "indeterminable," but Speakman believed that perfect control of rimland by the "sea powers" would lead to a final and irrevocable victory over the land powers, which would now be wholly controlled.

In fact, this was the ultimate development of the "anaconda tactics," which Mahan had already substantiated. Speakman gave the whole concept a complete form.

The victory of the United States as a "Sea Force" in the Cold War demonstrated Speakman's absolute geopolitical rightness, who can be called the "architect of the world victory of the liberal democracies" over Eurasia.

At the moment, it seems that Speakman's theses regarding the strategic supremacy of rimland and the importance of the "Middle Ocean" have been proved by history itself. But it is too early to completely discard Mackinder's theory of the permanent aspiration of the center of Eurasia for political revival and for continental expansion.

On the other hand, some ideas of Speakman (especially his follower Kirk, who developed the rimland theory even more in detail) were supported by some European geopoliticians who saw in his high strategic assessment of the "coastal territories" an opportunity to re-make Europe one of those countries that decide

the fate of the world. But for this, the concept of the "Middle Ocean" had to be discarded.

Despite this theoretical course of some European geopolitics (which, however, remains very ambiguous), Speakman belongs, without any doubt, to the most vivid and consistent "Atlantists". Moreover, he, together with Admiral Mahan, can be called the "father of Atlantism" and the "ideological inspirer of NATO."

Chapter 7 - Karl Haushofer - "Continental Block"

7.1 War and Thought

It was Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) that geopolitics owed much to the fact that for a long time it was considered not only as a "pseudoscience", but also as a "hateful", "fascist", "cannibalistic" theory.

Karl Haushofer was born in Munich into a professorial family. He decided to become a professional military man and served in the army as an officer for more than twenty years. In 1908-1910, he served in Japan and Manchuria as a German military attaché. Here he met the family of the Japanese emperor and the highest aristocracy.

Poor health forced Haushofer to abandon a rather successful military career, and he returned to Germany in 1911, where he lived until the end of his life. He took up science, receiving the title of "doctor" at the University of Munich. Since then, Haushofer regularly publishes books on geopolitics in general, and in particular, the geopolitics of the Pacific region. His first book was *Dai Nihon* (33), devoted to the geopolitics of Japan.

Through his student Rudolf Hess, Haushofer meets Hitler immediately after being imprisoned due to an unsuccessful coup. There is an unconfirmed opinion by historians that Haushofer participated in the writing of *Mein Kampf* in places devoted to certain geopolitical categories. But conceptual analysis shows a significant difference between Haushofer's geopolitical views and Hitler's simplistic racist propaganda passages.

For 20 years, starting in 1924, Haushofer published the most important geopolitical magazine, which had great international significance, *Geopolitik*, later renamed *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*.

He published most of his texts in this edition. Haushofer's relationship with Nazism was complicated. In some points, his views converged with those of the National Socialists, in some they radically diverged. Depending on the periods of Nazi rule and on personal relationships. Haushofer's position in the Third

Reich also changed.

Until 1936 he was favored (the patronage of his younger friend Hess had a special effect), and later cooling began. After Hess's flight to England, Haushofer fell into disfavor, and after the execution of his son Albrecht on charges of participating in the assassination of Hitler in 1944, Haushofer himself was considered almost an "enemy of the people."

Despite the similar ambiguity of his position, he was ranked by the Allies as "prominent Nazis." Unable to withstand so many blows of fate and the collapse of all hopes, Karl Haushofer and his wife Marta committed suicide in 1946.

7.2 New Eurasian Order

Haushofer carefully studied the work of Ratzel, Chellen, Mackinder, Vidal de la Blach, Mahan and other geopoliticians. The picture of planetary dualism "sea forces" versus "continental forces" or thalassocracy ("power by the sea") against tellurocracy ("power by the land") was for him the key that revealed all the secrets of international politics, to which he was directly involved way. (In Japan, for example, he dealt with those forces that made the most responsible decisions regarding the picture of space.) It is significant that the term "New Order", which was actively used by the Nazis, and nowadays in the form of the "New World Order", is American.

The planetary dualism of the Sea Force and the Ground Force confronted Germany with the problem of geopolitical self-identification. Advocates of the national idea, and Haushofer belonged, without a doubt, to their number, sought to strengthen the political power of the German state, which implied industrial development, cultural growth and geopolitical expansion. But the very position of Germany in the Center of Europe, the spatial and cultural Mittellage, made it a natural adversary of the western, naval powers of England, France, and in the future the USA. The "thalassocratic" geopoliticians themselves did not hide their negative attitude towards Germany and considered it (along with Russia) one of the main geopolitical opponents of the sea West.

In such a situation, it was not easy for Germany to count on a strong alliance with the powers of the "external crescent," especially since England and France had historical claims of territorial and economic expansion against Germany. Germany, the

and historical claims of a territorial order against Germany. Consequently, the future of national Great Germany lay in a geopolitical confrontation with the West and especially the Anglo-Saxon world, with which Sea Power was actually identified.

The whole geopolitical doctrine of Karl Haushofer and his followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine is the need to create a "continental bloc" or axis Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo. There was nothing accidental in such a bloc; it was the only full-fledged and adequate response to the strategy of the opposite camp, which did not hide the fact that the creation of a similar Eurasian alliance would be its greatest danger. Haushofer wrote in the Continental Block article:

"Eurasia cannot be strangled while the two largest nations are Germans and Russians in every possible way trying to avoid an internecine conflict like the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics." (34)

There he quoted an American Homer Lee. "The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will strike when the Germans, Russians and Japanese unite."

Haushofer carried this idea in different ways in his articles and books. This line is called *Ostorientierung*, i.e. "Orientation to the East", since it assumed the self-identification of Germany, its people and its culture as a Western continuation of the Eurasian, Asian tradition. It is no coincidence that during the Second World War the British derogatorily called the Germans "Huns." For the geopolitics of the Haushofer school, this was perfectly acceptable.

In this regard, it should be emphasized that the concept of "openness to the East" by Haushofer did not mean at all "the occupation of Slavic lands." It was a joint civilizational effort of two continental powers, Russia and Germany, which would establish the New Eurasian Order and restructure the continental space of the World Island in order to completely remove it from the influence of the Sea Force. The expansion of the German *Lebensraum* was planned by Haushofer not due to the colonization of Russian lands, but due to the development of giant uninhabited Asian spaces and the reorganization of the lands of Eastern Europe.

7.3 Compromise with thalassocracy

However, in practice, everything did not look so straightforward. The purely

scientific geopolitical logic of Haushofer, which logically led to the need for a "continental bloc" with Moscow, was confronted with numerous tendencies of a different nature, also inherent in German national consciousness. It was a purely racist approach to history, which Hitler himself was infected with. This approach was considered the most important factor in racial proximity, and not geographical or geopolitical specificity. In this case, the Anglo-Saxon peoples of England and the USA saw the Germans as natural allies, since they were ethnically closest to them. The Slavs, and especially the non-white Eurasian peoples, turned into racial opponents. To this was added ideological anti-communism, implicated in many respects on the same racial principle, Marx and many communists were Jews.

National-socialist racism was in direct conflict with geopolitics or, more precisely, implicitly pushed the Germans to a reverse, anti-Eurasian, thalassocratic strategy. From the point of view of consistent racism, Germany should have initially entered into an alliance with Britain and the United States in order to jointly oppose the USSR. But, on the other hand, Versailles' humiliating experience was still too fresh. From this duality the whole ambiguity of the Third Reich's international politics follows. This policy constantly balanced between the thalassocratic line, outwardly justified by racism and anti-communism (anti-Slavic attitude, attack on the USSR, the promotion of Catholic Croatia in the Balkans, etc.), and the Eurasian tellurocracy based on purely geopolitical principles (war with England and France, Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, etc.).

Since Karl Haushofer was engaged, to some extent, in solving specific political problems, he was forced to tailor his theories to political specifics. Hence his contacts in the higher spheres of England. In addition, the conclusion of the Anticommintern Pact, i.e. The creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, Haushofer outwardly welcomed, trying to present it as a preliminary step towards creating a full-fledged "Eurasian bloc." He could not fail to understand that the anti-communist orientation of this union and the appearance of a peninsular minor power belonging to rimland instead of the center of heartland (Moscow) is a contradictory caricature of a genuine "continental bloc."

But still, such steps, dictated by political conformism, are not indicative of the totality of Haushofer's geopolitics. His name and ideas were fully embodied precisely in the concepts of the "eastern fate" of Germany, based on a strong and long-term Eurasian Union.

Chapter 8 - Karl Schmitt - "Hippopotamus versus Leviathan"

8.1 Conservative revolutionary

The German Karl Schmitt (1888-1985) is known as an outstanding lawyer, political scientist, philosopher, historian. But all his ideas are inextricably linked with geopolitical concepts, and his main works are *Nomos of the Earth* (35), *Earth and the Sea* (36), etc. It is devoted to the understanding of geopolitical factors and their impact on civilization and political history.

Karl Schmitt was close to the German representatives of the Conservative Revolution, a paradoxical trend that combined national-conservative and social-revolutionary elements. The fate of Schmitt is the fate of his books, his school of law and philosophy. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, his relationship with the National Socialist regime was ambivalent. On the one hand, his theories certainly influenced Nazi ideology. Particularly successful were his political science books *Political Theology* (37) and *Political Theory* (38), in which Schmitt gave extensive criticism of liberal law and the idea of a "rule of law". In these texts, the outlines of Schmitt's subsequent intellectual work are already outlined; they show the ultimate political realism, the desire to free political problems from humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, social demagoguery. This was in line with National Socialist spirit.

At the same time, Schmitt's whole concept was based on the fundamental idea of the "rights of the people" (Volksrechte), which he contrasted with the liberal theory of "human rights". In his understanding, every nation had the right to cultural sovereignty, to preserve its spiritual, historical and political identity. The same approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, who considered this ideology to be universal and applicable to all peoples of the earth. But the dominant line of the regime was precisely pan-Germanism, based on chauvinism and a narrowly nationalist approach. Therefore, Schmitt, with his theory of "rights of peoples", was sharply criticized, especially by the ideologists of the SS (in 1936, an aggressively threatening article was published in the *Schwarze Korps SS*).

Schmitt's ideological formation took place in the same atmosphere of ideas of "organic sociology" as Ratzel and Chellen had, but he was also influenced by the romantic theories of the "Light of the North" (Nordlicht), according to which socio-political forms and state formations are not rooted in mechanical the functioning of atomic personalities united in mathematical conglomerates, but in mythology, in the sacred world of "elements and spirits" (39). In Schmitt's theories, there is everywhere a paradoxical combination of "political romanticism" and "strict rationalism." A refined mental apparatus serves as an expression of spiritual mythologies.

At the Nuremberg trials, an attempt was made to classify Karl Schmitt as a "war criminal" on the basis of his cooperation with the Hitler regime. In particular, he was charged with "the theoretical justification of the legitimacy of military aggression." After a detailed acquaintance of the judges with the essence of the case, the charge was dropped. Nevertheless, Schmitt, like Heidegger, Junger and other "conservative revolutionaries" became a persona non grata in the world scientific community, and his works were completely ignored.

Only in the 70s, thanks to the enormous influence on the legal thought of some leftist, socialist thinkers, did Schmitt's works begin to gradually rehabilitate.

Currently, he is recognized as a classic of political science and jurisprudence.

8.2 Nomos of the Earth

Schmitt, completely in the spirit of a geopolitical approach, asserted the initial connection of political culture with space. Not only the State, but all social reality and especially law derive from the quality organization of space.

From here, Schmitt derived the concept of "nomos." This Greek term "nomos" means "something taken, decorated, ordered, organized" in the sense of space. This term is close to the concepts of "relief" in Ratzel and "location" among Russian Eurasians (Savitsky). Schmitt shows that "nomos" is such a form of organization of being that establishes the most harmonious relationships both within a social ensemble and between these ensembles. "Nomos" is an expression of a special synthetic combination of subjective and objective factors, organically manifested in the creation of political and legal systems. In "Nomos"

significantly influenced in the creation of political and legal systems. In *Nomos* the natural and cultural characteristics of the human collective in combination with the environment are manifested.

In the book *Nomos of the Earth* Schmitt shows how the specificity of a particular earthly space influenced the cultures and states that developed in it. He compares various historical “nomoses” among themselves, especially emphasizing the fundamental dualism between the attitude to the space of nomads and settled peoples.

But the most important conclusion from the analysis of the “land nomos” was that Schmitt came close to the concept of global historical and civilizational confrontation between civilizations of Sushi and civilizations of the Sea. Exploring the “nomos” of the Earth, he was faced with its qualitative, essential opposite of the “nomos” of the Sea. This led him to create a special geopolitical methodology for understanding the political history of the world.

8.3 Land and Sea

In 1942, Schmitt published the most important work, *Land and Sea* (40). Together with the later text “Planetary tension between the East and the West and the confrontation of Sushi[?, land?] and the Sea” (41) this constitutes the most important document of geopolitical science.

The meaning of opposing Sushi[land] and the Sea in Schmitt comes down to the fact that we are talking about two completely different, irreducible and hostile civilizations, and not about variants of a single civilization complex. This division almost exactly coincides with the picture drawn by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives its main elements thalassocracy (Sea Force) and tellurocracy (Land Force) an in-depth philosophical interpretation related to basic legal and ethical systems. It is curious that Schmitt uses the name “Hippopotamus” for “Sushi[land] forces,” and “Leviathan” for “forces of the Sea,” as a reminder of two Old Testament monsters, one of which embodies all land creatures, and the other all water, sea .

The “Nomos” of the Earth exists without alternative for most of human history. All varieties of this “nomos” are characterized by the presence of a strict and stable legalizing (and ethical) form, which reflects the immobility and fixedness

of the Sushi, the Earth. This connection with the Earth, the space in which it is easy to structuralize (fixed boundaries, the constancy of communication paths, the invariance of geographical and relief features), gives rise to essential conservatism in the social, cultural and technical spheres. The totality of the Earth's "nomos" is what is commonly called the history of the "traditional society".

In such a situation, Sea, Water are only peripheral civilizational phenomena, without intruding on the "ethical" sphere (or intruding sporadically). Only with the discovery of the World Ocean at the end of the 16th century does the situation change radically. Mankind (and, first of all, the island of England) begins to get used to the "marine existence", begins to realize itself as an Island in the middle of the waters, a Ship.

But the water area is very different from the land. It is impermanent, hostile, alienated, subject to but constant change. The paths are not fixed in it, the differences in orientations are not obvious. The "Nomos" of the sea entails a global transformation of consciousness. Social, legal, and ethical standards are becoming fluid. A new civilization is born. Schmitt believes that the New Time and the technical breakthrough that opened the era of industrialization owe their existence to the geopolitical phenomenon of the transition of mankind to the "nomos" of the sea.

So the geopolitical confrontation of the Anglo-Saxon world of the "external crescent" takes on Schmitt's socio-political definition. The "Nomos" of the sea is a reality hostile to traditional society. The geopolitical opposition of land and sea powers acquires the most important historical, ideological and philosophical meaning.

8.4 Grossraum

Schmitt developed yet another important geopolitical theory of the theory of "large space" (Grossraum). This concept considers the process of development of states as a desire to gain the greatest territorial volume. The principle of imperial integration is an expression of the logical and natural human desire for synthesis. The stages of the territorial expansion of the state, thus, correspond to the stages of the movement of the human spirit towards universalism.

This geopolitical law applies to both the technical and economic spheres. Schmitt shows that starting at some point, the technical and economic development of a state requires a quantitative and qualitative increase in its territories. However, this is not necessarily a matter of colonization, annexation, military invasion. The formation of Grossraum can take place according to other laws on the basis of the adoption by several states or peoples of a single religious or cultural form.

According to Schmitt, the development of the "nomos" of the Earth should lead to the emergence of a State-continent. The stages of movement to the State-continent pass from city-states through the state of the territory. The emergence of a land state-continent, a mainland grossraum, is a historical and geopolitical necessity.

In a 1940 text, *Space and Great Space in the Law of Peoples* (42), Schmitt defined the "Great Space" as follows: "The sphere of planning, organization and human activity, rooted in the current and voluminous tendency of future development" (43). Refining this somewhat vague wording, Schmitt pointed to the implementation of the Monroe American Doctrine as an example of the strong-willed creation of the "Great Space".

Although the Grossraum can, in a certain sense, be identified with the State, or rather, with the Empire (das Reich), this concept goes beyond the scope of an ordinary state. This is a new form of supranational unification based on a strategic, geopolitical and ideological factor.

In contrast to Hitler's unified pan-Germanist model and Soviet internationalism, Schmitt's Grossraum is based on cultural and ethnic pluralism, on broad autonomy, limited only by strategic centralism and total loyalty to the highest authority. At the same time, Schmitt emphasized that the creation of a new "Great Space" does not depend on the scientific value of the doctrine itself, nor on cultural competence, nor on the economic development of the constituent parts or even the territorial and ethnic center, which gave impetus to integration. It all depends on the political will that recognizes the historical necessity of such a geopolitical step.

Schmitt in this doctrine anticipated the main lines of modern integration policy.

8.5 Total war and the figure of the "partisan"

Schmitt's geopolitical motives are distinguishable in almost all the topics that he considers. In particular, he investigated the connection between the three concepts of "total enemy, total war, total state". From his point of view, a "total state" is the most perfect form of a state of a traditional type, i.e. the peak of the development of land "nomos". Despite the possibilities of the historical evolution of such a state up to the scale of the Grossraum, its essential quality remains unchanged. The "total state" excludes the principle of "total enemy" and "total war", since it builds on the basis of itself the idea of the enemy, "enemy" (and Schmitt attached great importance to the formulation of the concepts of "friend" / "enemy", *amicus* / *hostis*) myself therefore, it puts forward the concept of "war of forms", in which *Jus bellum* operates and only limited contingents of professional military participate. Civilians and private property, in turn, are protected by law and removed (at least theoretically) from the course of hostilities.

The liberal doctrine, which Schmitt uniquely associated with the New Time and, accordingly, with the "marine civilization", with the "nomos" of the sea, denying the "total state" thereby opens the road to "total war" and the concept of "total enemy". In 1941, in an article entitled "State sovereignty and the open sea," he wrote:

"The land war was subject to legal norms, since it was a war between states, that is, between the armed forces of warring states. Its rationalization was manifested in its limitation and in the desire to move civilians and private property beyond its borders. War at sea on the contrary, it is not a war between adversaries who are strictly defined and subject to legal norms, as it is based on the concept of a total enemy. "(44)

The general geopolitical picture described by Schmitt came down to intense civilizational dualism, to the confrontation between the two Grossraums of the Anglo-Saxon (England + America) and the continental-European, Eurasian. These two "Great Spaces", the thalassocratic and tellurocratic, are fighting a planetary battle among themselves in order to take the last step towards universalization and move from continental to world domination. At the same time, Schmitt was pessimistic about the possibility of reducing this conflict to some strict legal base, since civilizational macroconcepts of both "Big Spaces" are based on mutually exclusive "nomos"—"nomos of the Earth" and "nomos of the Sea".

the Sea". The last destructive element is introduced by the development of aeronautics, as "[text missing]

At the end of his life, Schmitt focused on the "partisan" figure. This figure, according to Schmitt, is the last representative of the "nomos" of the Earth, remaining true to his original vocation despite the "liquefaction of civilization" and the dissolution of its legal and cultural foundations. Partisan is connected with the native land by informal ties, and the historical nature of this connection dictates to it the foundations of a war ethic, which are sharply different from more general and abstract standards. With the universalization of the "maritime model" and "trade ethics", which naturally encompass the sphere of hostilities, the figure of the "partisan" acquires, according to Schmitt, more and more civilizational significance, since the "partisan" remains the last protagonist of history, which protects (by all means)."

Chapter 9 - Peter Nikolaevich Savitsky - "Eurasia Middle Earth"

9.1 The fate of the Eurasian

Pyotr Nikolayevich Savitsky (1895-1968) is perhaps the first (and only) Russian author who, in the full sense of the word, can be called a geopolitician. He is an economist by education, a student of V. Vernadsky and P. Struve. Before the war he was close to the cadets. After the revolution he emigrated to Bulgaria, then moved to Czechoslovakia. In 1921, together with Prince N.S. Trubetskoy, he led the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors played a central role. It was Savitsky who, to a greater extent, of all Eurasians was interested in geopolitics.

The worldview of Savitsky, like most other Eurasians, developed under the influence of the works of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. It was a kind of revolutionary Slavophilism coupled with the central idea of the peculiarity of the historical identity of the Great Russians, which could not be reduced to either religious or ethnically Slavic essence. In this aspect, they were closest to Konstantin Leontyev, who formulated the most important thesis: "there is Slavism, there is no Slavism", i.e. "The ethnic and linguistic closeness of the Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis to speak of their cultural and characteristic unity." The Eurasian movement on a set of favorite topics and concepts was surprisingly close to the German conservative revolutionaries. Just like conservative revolutionaries, Eurasians sought to combine fidelity to the origins with a creative impulse into the future, rooted in the Russian national tradition with social modernism, technical development and the politics of non-traditional forms. The cautious positive attitude of the Eurasians towards the Soviet State and the October Revolution is based on this.

Despite the sympathies for the Soviets, which were characteristic not only of the openly pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasians (the Paris circle publishing the newspaper *Eurasia*), with which Savitsky officially broke off, but also for the most moderate and "conservative" elements. After the capture of Prague by

Soviet troops in 1945, Savitsky was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in prison camps. In the camps, he met with the son of the poet Nikolai Gumilyov Leo, who became his student, and subsequently one of the best modern Russian ethnographers and historians.

In 1956, Savitsky was rehabilitated and returned to Prague, where he died 12 years later.

9.2 Russia-Eurasia

The main idea of Savitsky is that Russia is a special civilizational formation, defined through the quality of "middle ground." One of his articles "The Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism" (1933) begins with the words "Russia has much more reason than China to be called the "Middle State"(45).

If the "middle" of Germany, Mittellage, is limited by the European context, and Europe itself is only the "western cape" of Eurasia, then Russia occupies a central position within the entire continent. The "middle ground" of Russia, for Savitsky, is the basis of its historical identity; it is not part of Europe and is not a continuation of Asia. It is an independent world, independent and special spiritual and historical geopolitical reality, which Savitsky calls "Eurasia".

This concept does not mean the mainland and not the continent, but the idea reflected in the Russian space and Russian culture, the historical paradigm, a special civilization. Savitsky from the Russian pole puts forward a concept strictly identical to Mackinder's geopolitical picture, only the abstract "land robbers" or "centripetal impulses emanating from the geographical axis of history" acquire from him a clearly defined outline of Russian culture, Russian history, Russian statehood, and Russian territory. Savitsky's Russia-Eurasia appears in the same light as Raum Ratzel and, more precisely, Grossraum Schmitt.

If Mackinder believes that a mechanical impulse emanates from the heartland's deserts, causing the coastal zones (the "inner crescent") to create culture and history, Savitsky argues that Russia-Eurasia (= Mackinder's heartland) is a synthesis of world culture and world history, deployed in space and time. Moreover the nature of Russia participates in its culture

Moreover, the nature of Russia participates in its culture.

Savitsky understands Russia geopolitically, not as a nation state, but as a special type of civilization that has developed on the basis of several components of the Aryan-Slavic culture, Turkic nomadism, and Orthodox tradition. All together creates a certain unique, "middle" formation, which is a synthesis of world history.

Savitsky considers Velikorossov not only an offshoot of the Eastern Slavs, but a special imperial ethnic formation, which combines Slavic and Turkic substrates. This moment brings him to the important topic of Turan.

9.3 Turan

Appeal to Turan as a positive orientation was scandalous for many Russian nationalists. Thus, Savitsky indirectly justified the Mongol-Tara yoke, thanks to which "Russia gained its geopolitical independence and retained its spiritual independence from the aggressive Roman-German world." Such an attitude to the Turkic world was intended to sharply separate Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its fate, to justify the ethnic uniqueness of Russians.

"Without Tatarism there would be no Russia", this thesis from Savitsky's article "Steppe and Settlement" (46) was the key formula of Eurasianism. Hence the direct transition to a purely geopolitical statement:

"Let's be straightforward: in the space of world history, the West-European sense of the sea, as equal, although polar, is opposed by the only Mongolian sense of the continent; meanwhile, the Russian "explorers", in the scope of Russian conquests and development, have the same spirit, the same sense of the continent." (47)

And further:

"Russia is the heiress of the Great Khans, the successor of the affairs of Chingiz and Timur, the unifier of Asia. (...) It combines both the historical" settled "and" steppe "elements." (48)

The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape, its division into the Forest and the Steppe was noticed by the Slavophiles. In Savitsky the geopolitical

and the Steppe was reduced by the European in territory, the geopolitical meaning of Russia-Eurasia appears as a synthesis of these two realities of the European Forest and the Asian Steppe. Moreover, such a synthesis is not a simple superposition of two geopolitical systems on top of each other, but something integral, original, with its own measure and methodology of assessments.

Russia-Eurasia is not reduced entirely to Turan. She is something more. But with regard to Europe, which considers everything that goes beyond its "coastal" consciousness to be "barbarism", the self-qualification of Russians as "bearers of the Mongol spirit" is a provocation, revealing the historical and spiritual superiority of the Eurasians.

9.4 Location

In Savitsky's theory, the concept of "location development" plays a crucial role. This term is an exact analogue of the concept of Raum, as it is interpreted by Ratzel's "political geography" and German geopolitics (+ Chellen) as a whole. This concept reflects the "organism" of the Eurasians, exactly corresponding to the German "organist" school and in sharp contrast with the pragmatism of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics. If Speckman was familiar with Savitsky's writings, his resentment over "metaphysical nonsense" was even stronger than in the case of Haushofer. So, Savitsky in the text *Geographical Overview of Russia-Eurasia* writes:

"The socio-political environment and its territory" should merge for us into a single whole, into a geographical individual or landscape. "(49)

This is the essence of "local development" in which the objective and subjective merge into an inextricable unity, into something whole. This is a conceptual synthesis. In the same text, Savitsky continues:

"A synthesis is needed. It is necessary to be able to immediately look at the socio-historical environment and the territory occupied by it." (50)

In this, Savitsky is close to Vidal de la Blach. Like French geopolitics, who justified France's indivisibility by a cultural type, regardless of the ethnicity of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lor Ren, Savitsky believes that

"Russia-Eurasia is 'location development', 'a single whole', 'geographic individual', at the same time 'geographic, ethnic, economic, historical, etc., etc.,' landscape". (51)

Russia-Eurasia is such a "local development", which is an integral form of existence of many smaller "local development". This is Schmitt's Grossraum, consisting of a whole hierarchy of smaller Raum's.

Through the introduction of the concept of "local development," Eurasians avoided the positivistic need to analytically split historical phenomena, decomposing them into mechanical systems as applied not only to natural, but also to cultural phenomena. Appeal to "local development", to "geographical individual" allowed Eurasians to avoid too specific recipes regarding national, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, ideological problems. Intuitively felt by all the inhabitants of the "geographical axis of history", geopolitical unity thus acquired a new language, "synthetic", not reducible to inadequate, fragmented, analytical concepts of Western rationalism.

This also showed the continuity of the Savitsky Russian intellectual tradition, which always gravitated toward the conception of "wholeness", "collegiality", "all-unity", etc.

9.5 Ideocracy

A very important aspect of the theory of Savitsky is the principle of "ideocracy." Savitsky believed that the Eurasian state should be built, starting from the initial spiritual impulse, from top to bottom. Consequently, its entire structure must be built up in accordance with the a priori Idea, and a special class of "spiritual leaders" should be at the head of this structure. This position is very close to Schmitt's theories about the "strong-willed", "spiritual" impulse that are at the origins of the emergence of Grossraum.

Ideocracy presupposed the primacy of a non-pragmatic, intangible and non-commercial approach to government. According to Savitsky, the advantage of a "geographical personality" lies in the ability to rise above material necessity, organically including the physical world in a single spiritual and creative impulse of global historical work.

Ideocracy is a term that unites all forms of undemocratic, illiberal rule based on non-materialistic and non-utilitarian motivations. Moreover, Savitsky consciously avoids clarifying this concept, which can be embodied in theocratic collegiality, and in the people's monarchy, and in the national dictatorship, and in the party state of the Soviet type. Such a breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical horizons of Eurasianism, which encompass huge historical and geographical volumes. This is an attempt to most accurately express the intuitive will of the continent.

Obviously, ideocracy is directly opposed to the pragmatic-commercial approach that dominated the doctrines of Mackinder, Mahan, and Speakman. Thus, the Russian Eurasians brought to the final clarity the ideological terms in which the historical confrontation of the Sea and Sushi was manifested. Sea liberal democracy, "trading system", pragmatism. The land is an ideocracy (of all varieties), "hierarchical rule", the dominance of a religious ideal.

Savitsky's views on ideocracy resonate with the ideas of the German sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, who divided all social models and types into two general classes of "heroes" and "traders". At the geopolitical level, the term "hero" and "heroism" lose their metaphorical and pathetic meaning and become a technical term for the legal and ethical specifics of ideocratic rule.

9.6 USSR and Eurasianism

The role of Peter Savitsky and, more broadly, Russian Eurasianism in the development of geopolitics as a science is enormous. And it is strange how little attention is paid to this area in Western textbooks. In Savitsky we have a completely conscious, responsible and competent geopolitics who fully and reasonably express the heartland's position, starting from the most deep-seated Russian regions of it. Savitsky's geopolitical doctrine is a direct antithesis to the views of Mahan, Mackinder, Speakman, Vidal de la Blach and other "thalassocrats." Moreover, only in this case we are talking about a complete and detailed presentation of an alternative doctrine that examines in detail ideological, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. If we use the terminology of Karl Schmitt, then Savitsky and Eurasians are the spokesmen of the "Nomos of the Earth."

A comparison of the ideas of Russian Eurasians with the theories of German

A comparison of the ideas of Russian Eurasians with the theories of German geopolitical continentalists (Haushofer, Schmitt, etc.), who also tried to build their own geopolitical theory as an antithesis to the strategy of the "Sea Power", shows that the Germans have only half the way, and among Russians (primarily Savitsky), we are dealing with a complete and consistent, full-fledged picture of the world. In this sense, a certain law can be deduced: "The closer the views of the German continentalists to Russian Eurasianism, the more fully they accept the Ostorientierung, the more consistent and logical their doctrines, the more effective their political projects created on a geopolitical basis."

In this sense, the closest to Savitsky were the German national Bolsheviks, in particular Ernst Nikisch, who were well aware of the duality of the geopolitical position of Germany, whose "middle" is relative and secondary compared to the absolute cultural and continental "middle" of the Russians. From this they concluded that Germany cannot claim the role of geopolitical synthesis, that it must choose between southwestern, Slavophobic, Catholic and, in some aspects, thalassocratic (bourgeois) Germany (together with Austria) and north German-Slavic, Socialist, Russophile, Protestant and Spartan Prussia. Nikish belongs to the famous geopolitical thesis "Europe from Vladivostok to Flessin ha", and only such an approach on the part of the Germans harmoniously fits into the consistent continental Eurasianism. Naturally, the line of the Austrian Catholic, anti-communist and Slavophobe Hitler, no matter how hard some of the much more historically responsible conservative revolutionaries and geopolitics tried to correct, could not but lead Germany to lose its historical existence for a long time as a result of a nightmare defeat inflicted by precisely those forces, an "eternal union" with which the Germans could only ensure complicity in the world domination of tellurocracy.

In a geopolitical sense, Soviet reality largely coincided with the concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasians, although there is no reliable data on their direct influence on the Soviet leadership. In many respects, the Smekhovekhists and national Bolsheviks close to the Eurasianists, especially Nikolai Ustryalov, clearly influenced the Bolsheviks and especially Stalin, although they never held high posts and often ended their lives in camps. Part of the Eurasians Efron, Karsavin, etc. openly cooperated with the USSR, but also did not receive gratitude. However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy right up to the beginning of perestroika leads to the conclusion that it constantly followed the Eurasian course, never declaring it openly.

And here we can only make assumptions: either there was some unknown

organization within the Soviet regime that was guided by Savitsky's ideas, adapting them to current political realities and clothed in the official "Marxist" vocabulary, or the objective position of heartland forced the USSR to inertia do those the steps that the geopolitically conscious continental state of Eurasia should have taken.

Chapter 10 - Geopolitics as an instrument of national policy

10.1 Planetary dualism is the basic law of geopolitics

Summing up a brief acquaintance with the ideas of the founders of geopolitical science, we can draw several general conclusions.

Despite the variety of points of view, we are still dealing with a certain unified picture of the world, which can be called geopolitical. This picture of the world seeks to include in the analysis of historical processes, international and interstate relations several disciplinary approaches at once geographic, political, ideological, ethnographic, economic, etc. This is the main characteristic of all geopolitical doctrines, the desire for interdisciplinary synthesis.

The most common and shared methodological formula by all geopoliticians is the assertion of fundamental historical dualism between Susha, Tellurocracy, the “Nomos” of the Earth, Eurasia, heartland, the “Middle Earth”, ideocratic civilization, the “geographical axis of history” on the one hand, and the Sea, thalassocracy, Sea Power, the “nomos” of the Sea, the Atlantic, the Anglo-Saxon world, a commercial civilization, an “external or island crescent,” on the other. This can be considered as the main law of geopolitics. Outside of the postulation of this dualism, all other conclusions lose their meaning. For all the differences in particular aspects, not one of the founders of geopolitical science questioned the fact of such a confrontation. In its significance, it is comparable with the law of universal gravitation in physics.

10.2 Geopolitics cannot but be biased

Another feature of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their constant political engagement. In fact, there is not a single geopolitician who would be excluded from participating in the political life of his state. This implies the

obvious partiality of all, without exception. When embarking on scientific research, a geopolitician must determine his own place on the map of geopolitical poles; that angle of view from which he will begin to analyze all world processes will depend on this. In the entire history of geopolitics, we do not find a single author who would be indifferent to the fate of his state and his people, would not share his main ethical and historical orientation. This is especially pronounced at the extreme poles of the Anglo-Saxon authors impeccably and unequivocally follow the logic and value system of Sea Power, thalassocracy, formulating their theories from the standpoint of unconditional supporters of Atlantism; Russian Eurasians are just as consistent in their fidelity to the ideals of heartland, and they do not even question the absolute ethical and historical superiority of ideocracy and Russia-Eurasia.

The situation is more complicated with the French, who have a theoretical choice of self-identification, either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. In the first case, there follows solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, with Sea Power, in the second Germanophilia. Both options imply unconditional national sympathies. Theoretically, both of these tendencies are present among French geopolitics, but the most coherent geopolitical concept was developed by a group of "Atlantists", followers of Vidal de la Blach, who remains the central figure in this area. From the theoretical point of view, his geopolitical antipodes Laval and De Gaulle are significantly inferior to him.

Germany also has a dual situation. If in general its geopolitical thought is oriented mainly continental and "Eurasian," this orientation is limited to a complex attitude to the Slavic world, to Asia, and especially to Russia. This restriction is so significant that Germany's attempts to voluntarily equalize its mid-European position with that of Middle Eurasia, ignoring the historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, are so stubborn that in both world wars Germany was forced to fight not only against thalassocratic powers, but also against its logical Eurasian ally of Russia (USSR). We can say that "non-Eurasian" continentalism is characteristic of German geopolitics.

The need for geopolitics initially determine its own position on the geopolitical map of the world and its zones (Mackinder scheme in this sense is a very clear illustration) influenced the fact that this science developed almost exclusively from representatives of the major powers, with the ambition to become a "world power" (Weltmacht), "superpowers", achieve planetary domination.

Americans Mahan and Sneakman the Englishman Mackinder represent the

Americans, Spaniards, the Englishmen, the French represent the "island crescent." They are the "speakers" of Atlantism, thalassocracy.

Vidal de la Blach (and his school) represent Atlantic France. Laval and De Gaulle lean towards continentalism, "Europeanism", anti-Atlantism. Hence their mutual Germanophilia, which geopolitically brings them together despite the fact that they belonged to two hostile camps: Laval was the head of the collaborationist government of Vichy, and De Gaulle the head of the anti-fascist French army.

The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer, Schmitt identify Germany with the axis of Sushi, Tellurocracy, and seek to create from Germany a "Great Space", which should oppose the Anglo-Saxon thalassocracy. They are adjoined by the Swede Rudolf Chellen, who, however, thinks more as a representative of Central Europe, the German European space, and not as a "narrow-Swedish" nationalist. The most radical continents are Ernst Nikisch, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Brook, etc. go even further and believe the future of Germany only in strategic integration with Eurasian Russia.

Finally, Russian Eurasians (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) express the most complete version of the continent of Lism, expressing the most radical position of the "nomos" of Sushi, Tellurocracy.

The absence of at least some distinguished names among the geopolitics of other countries (although such were also in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania, the Netherlands, etc.) is explained by the fact that the fundamental geopolitical dualism is of secondary importance to the states only indirectly, their influence on the course of the global confrontation is insignificant, and consequently, the very essence of geopolitics, its acuteness, its relevance, its "fateful" dimension are completely irrelevant for them.

10.3 Fates of the learned destinies of powers

The citizenship of geopolitical scientists directly affects their views. Here the connection is obvious. Geopolitics, in essence, are those people who, with the greatest insight and responsibility, are able to recognize the historical trends of global development in the spatial sphere, understand the place of their state and their people in this context, and formulate a reasonable and most effective

project for the future. Therefore, so often they directly or indirectly affect world history, which is, however, carried out by completely different forces, groups, parties, leaders, acting under completely different, momentarily relevant slogans.

But another regularity is also interesting. The degree of direct influence of geopolitics on power, the feedback between scientific developments and the political course in the international relations of the respective states, varies sharply.

Mahan, Speakman and Mackinder held high posts in their states, their political activity had the most immediate results, their direct influence on Anglo-Saxon politics is obvious and enormous. Despite some friction with the scientific world of their countries and some (tactical) silence of the significance of their ideas for the whole "marine civilization" as a whole, they enjoyed honor during their lifetime, they were given every kind of support, their fate and career were demonstrably successful.

The situation is different with continental geopolitics. Vidal de la Blach was considered only a geographer, seeking to expand the scope of his research to a political scale. The government's attitude towards him is respectful, but generally indifferent, although many practical principles (especially those set forth in "East France") have been adopted. He does not enjoy such prestige as the Anglo-American people, but his theoretical heritage is taken into account.

Among the Germans, especially Haushofer and Schmitt, the situation is already more serious. Both in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, the attitude towards them is changing in waves, moving from a certain attention of the authorities to direct repression. Compared to the "thalassocratic" geopolitics, their fate is tragic, their zigzag careers are different, at certain times they become victims of even those regimes whose national goals in general coincide with their own. There is no longer honor or respect, but hysterical attention, alternating with persecution.

The Eurasians have an even more tragic picture. There is no direct attention, not a single mention in official sources, only camps, exile, arrests, harassment with complete disregard. And although up to a certain point in Soviet history it seems that the main decisions at the international level are made by the followers of Pyotr Savitsky, checking every step with the publications of the Eurasians, there comes a turning point in 1989 when it turns out that no one in the Soviet leadership is able to coherently explain the logic of traditional foreign policy.

and as a result, lightning-fast destruction of the gigantic Eurasian organism occurs, created with such tension by three generations, withstanding wars, deprivations, delights, excessive burdens.

The role of the personality of geopolitics in the sense of their influence on power is sharply reduced along the West-East axis. Respect for Mahan and Speakman is contrasted with the constant threats by Schmitt from the SS sheep and the persecution of Haushofer (his son was shot), and to an even greater extent the camps of Savitsky and Karsavin. It is striking that, in the end, it is precisely those countries that listened most to their geopolitics and appreciated them, achieved amazing results and came close to finally achieving sole world domination. Germany paid for inattention to the theses of Haushofer on the "continental bloc" by the fact that for half a century it fell out of history, suffered a terrible defeat and fell into political oblivion. The USSR, which did not pay attention to the works of the most responsible, deep and perspicacious Russian patriots [text missing]

PART 2 - MODERN GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES AND SCHOOLS

(Second Half of the Twentieth Century)

Chapter 1 - Overview

The development of geopolitical thought in the second half of the 20th century as a whole followed the paths outlined by the founders of this science. The story of Haushofer and his school, over which there was an ominous shadow of intellectual cooperation with the Third Reich, forced authors involved in this discipline to look for roundabout ways so as not to be accused of "fascism." So, the American Colin S. Gray generally suggested using two words to refer to geopolitics: the English "geopolitics" and the German "Geopolitik". The first should indicate the Anglo-Saxon and pragmatic version of this phenomenon, i.e. the works of those authors who succeed the approach of Mahan, Mackinder and Speakman, and the second "continental version", the legacy of the Haushofer school, which takes into account some "spiritual" or "metaphysical" factors. Of course, this division is very arbitrary and serves only as a demagogic move dictated by considerations of "political correctness."

The American and, more broadly, atlantist (thalassocratic) line in geopolitics developed practically without any breaks with tradition. As the American projects to become a "world power" were carried out, the post-war Atlantean geopolitics only specified and detailed the particular aspects of the theory, developing applied spheres. The fundamental model of "sea power" and its geopolitical perspectives has evolved from the scientific developments of individual military-geographic schools into official US international politics.

However, the emergence of the US superpower and the passage to the last stage preceding the final planetary hegemony of thalassocracy, forced American geopolitics to consider a completely new geopolitical model, in which not two main forces, but only one participated. Moreover, there were basically two options for the development of events, either the West's final victory in a geopolitical duel with the East, or the convergence of two ideological camps into something single and the establishment of a World Government (this project was called "mondialism" from the French word "monde", "peace"). In both cases, a new geopolitical understanding of this possible outcome of the history of civilizations was required. This situation has brought to life a special direction in geopolitics, "the geopolitics of mondialism." Otherwise, this theory is known as the doctrine "[text missing]"

European geopolitics as something independent after the end of World War II practically did not exist. Only during the rather brief period of 1959-1968, when the "continentalist" Charles De Gaulle was the president of France, did the situation change somewhat. Since 1963, De Gaulle has taken some clearly anti-Atlantic measures, as a result of which France withdrew from the North Atlantic Alliance and attempted to develop its own geopolitical strategy. But since this state alone could not resist the thalassocratic world, the question of intra-European Franco-German cooperation and the strengthening of ties with the USSR was on the agenda. Hence the famous Gaullist thesis "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was born.

At the same time, by the beginning of the 70s, when geopolitical studies in the United States became extremely popular, European scholars also began to be included in this process, but at the same time, their connection with the pre-war geopolitical school was in most cases interrupted and they were forced to adapt to the norms of the Anglo-Saxon approach. Thus, European scholars act as technical experts of international organizations of NATO, UN, etc., engaged in applied geopolitical research and not going beyond narrow specific issues. Gradually, these studies turned into something independent in the "regional geopolitics", quite developed in France ("Yves Lacoste School", publisher of the journal *Herodotus*). This "regional geopolitics" abstracts from the global schemes of Mackinder, Mahan or Haushofer.

The only continuous tradition of geopolitics that has survived in Europe since the pre-war era was the property of fairly marginalized groups, to one degree or another, associated with post-war nationalist parties and movements. In these narrow and politically peripheral circles, geopolitical ideas developed that went directly to "continentalism," the Haushofer school, etc. This movement collectively received the name of the European "New Right." Until a certain point, public opinion simply ignored them, considering them "remnants of fascism". And only in the last decade, especially thanks to the educational and journalistic activities of the French philosopher Alain de Benoist, serious scientific circles began to listen to this direction. Despite the considerable distance, separating the intellectual circles of the European "new right" from the authorities and their "dissent", from a purely theoretical point of view, their works are a huge contribution to the development of geopolitics. Being free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, such a situation

developed that official European geopolitics (most often immigrants from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the “new right”, their works, translations and studies to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Being free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, such a situation developed that official European geopolitics (most often immigrants from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the “new right”, their works, translations and studies to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture. Being free from the framework of political conformism, their thought developed relatively independently and impartially. Moreover, at the turn of the 90s, such a situation developed that official European geopolitics (most often immigrants from left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the “new right”, their works, translations and studies to restore the completeness of the geopolitical picture.

Finally, Russian geopolitics. Officially recognized as “fascist” and “bourgeois pseudoscience” geopolitics as such did not exist in the USSR. Its functions were performed by several disciplines of strategy, military geography, the theory of international law and international relations, geography, ethnography, etc. And at the same time, the general geopolitical behavior of the USSR in the planetary arena reveals the presence of a rather rational, from a geopolitical point of view, model of behavior. The desire of the USSR to strengthen its position in the south of Eurasia, in the “coastal zone”, penetration into Africa, destabilizing actions in South America (designed to split the space controlled by the North American States according to the Monroe Doctrine) and even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (for that to dissect the American “anaconda,” seeking to bring the strategic borders of “thalassocracy” close to the southern borders of the “geographical axis of history”), etc. Such a consistent and geopolitically substantiated policy of the USSR indicates the existence of some kind of “decision center”, where the results of many traditional sciences should have been brought together and on the basis of this “information”, “synthesis” the most important strategic steps were taken. However, the social localization of this “cryptogeopolitical” center seems problematic. There is a version that it was about some secret department of the Soviet GRU. Such a consistent and geopolitically substantiated policy of the USSR indicates the existence of some kind of “decision center”, where the results of many traditional sciences should have been brought together and on the basis of this “information”, “synthesis” the most important strategic steps were taken. However, the social localization of this “cryptogeopolitical” center seems problematic. There is a version that it

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In fact, geopolitics developed exclusively by marginal "dissident" circles. The most striking representative of this trend was the historian Lev Gumilyov, although he never used the term “geopolitics” or the term “Eurasianism” in his works, and, moreover, he strove in every possible way to avoid a direct appeal to socio-political realities. Thanks to this “cautious” approach, he managed to publish several books on ethnographic history even under the Soviet regime.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, geopolitics became relevant again in Russian society. The abolition of ideological censorship made it possible, finally, to call a spade a spade. Not surprisingly, the first to take part in the revival of geopolitics were national-patriotic circles (the newspaper *Den*, the journal *Elements*). The methodology turned out to be so impressive that some “democratic” movements seized the initiative. Soon after perestroika, geopolitics became one of the most popular topics in the whole of Russian society.

Associated with this is the increased interest in Eurasians and their legacy in modern Russia.

Chapter 2 - Modern Atlantism

2.1 Followers of Speakman - D.U. Maynig, W. Kirk, S. B. Cohen, C. Gray, G. Kissinger

The development of the American, purely atlantist line in geopolitics after 1945 basically represented the development of the theses of Nicholas Speakman. As he began developing his theories with Mackinder corrections, his followers basically corrected his own views.

In 1956, Speakman's student D. Maynig published the text *Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History*. Maynig specifically emphasizes that "geopolitical criteria should especially take into account the functional orientation of the population and the state, and not just the purely geographical relationship of the territory to the Land and Sea." (1) The influence of Vidal de la Blach is clearly noticeable in this.

Maynig says that the entire space of the Eurasian rimland is divided into three types according to its functional and cultural predisposition.

"China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (including Prussia), the Baltic States and Karelia are spaces organically gravitating to heartland. South Korea, Burma, India, Iraq, Syria, Yugoslavia are geopolitically neutral. Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand are prone to a thalassocratic bloc."(2)

In 1965, another Speakman follower, W. Kirk, published a book (3) that reproduces the title of Mackinder's famous article, "The Geographical Axis of History." Kirk developed Speakman's thesis regarding the central importance of rimland for the geopolitical balance of power. Based on the cultural and functional analysis of Maynig and his differentiation of the "coastal zones" with respect to the "tellurocratic" or "thalassocratic" predisposition, Kirk built a historical model in which coastal civilizations play the main role, from which cultural impulses come with a greater or lesser degree of intensity inside continent. At the same time, the "higher" cultural forms and historical initiative are recognized by these centers of the "inner continent" that Maynig defined as

are recognized by those sectors of the inner crescent that maying defined as
“[text missing]

The American Sol Cohen in his book *Geography and Politics in a Divided World* (4) proposed introducing into the geopolitical method an additional classification based on dividing the main geopolitical realities into “nucleus” and “discounted belts”. From his point of view, each specific region of the planet can be decomposed into 4 geopolitical components:

"1) external marine (water) environment, depending on the merchant fleet and ports; 2) the continental core (nucleus), identical to "Hinterland" (a geopolitical term meaning "inland regions remote from the coast"); 3) discounted belt (coastal sectors oriented either inland or from the continent); 4) regions geopolitically independent of this ensemble. "(5)

The concept of "discount belts" was spoken to by leading American strategists such as Henry Kissinger, who believed that the US political strategy for "discounted" coastal zones was to combine fragments into a single whole and thereby ensure complete control over Soviet Eurasia of Atlanticism . This doctrine is called "Linkage" from the English "link". In order for the “anaconda” strategy to be completely successful, it was necessary to pay special attention to those “coastal sectors” of Eurasia, which either remained neutral or gravitated to the interior of the continent. In practice, this policy was implemented through the Vietnam War, the intensification of US-Chinese relations.

As in previous eras, the post-war American Atlantist geopolitical school constantly maintained feedback with the authorities.

The development of geopolitical views in relation to the "nuclear era" we meet with another representative of the same American school, Colin Gray. In his book *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era* (6), he gives an outline of the military strategy of the United States and NATO, in which the planetary location of nuclear facilities depends on the geographical and geopolitical features of the regions.

2.2 Atlantists won the Cold War

The geopolitical development of Atlantism by the beginning of the 90s reaches

its culmination. The Anaconda strategy demonstrates absolute effectiveness. During this period, one can observe the almost "prophetic" rightness of the first Anglo-Saxon geopolitics of Mackinder and Mahan, corrected by Speakman.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR marks the triumph of the orientation of the atlantist strategy, which was carried out throughout the 20th century. The West wins the Cold War with the East. Sea Power celebrates its victory over heartland.

Geopolitically, this event is explained as follows:

The confrontation between the Soviet bloc and NATO was the first pure and unalloyed form of opposition between Sushi and the Sea, Behemoth and Leviathan in history. Moreover, the geopolitical balance of forces reflected not only ideological, but also geopolitical constants.

The USSR as a heartland, like Eurasia, embodied the ideocracy of the Soviet type. From a geographical point of view, it was a fairly integrated "Great Space" with colossal natural resources and developed strategic weapons. The main advantage of the USSR was the "cultural and functional" inclinations of the population living on its expanses or adjacent to Soviet territory, and the presence of difficult to reach inland continental expanses, which made it possible to create reliable defense and technological bridgeheads. In addition, on two sides from the North and East of the USSR, it had maritime borders, which are much easier to defend than land.

Due to the centralized economy of the USSR, it achieved autarky commodity and military status of a superpower. To the extent possible, he sought to extend his influence to other continents.

But the Eastern bloc had several fundamental geopolitical shortcomings. The most important was the vast extent of land borders. If from the South the borders coincided with the ridge of the Eurasian mountains, from Manduria to the Tien Shan, the Pamirs and the Caucasus, then in the West the border passed in the middle of plain Europe, which was the strategic bridgehead of Atlantism, while its central base was on the western shore of the "Middle Ocean "(Midland Ocean). But even in a southerly direction, the mountains served not only as protection, but also as an obstacle, blocking the path for possible expansion and access to the southern seas.

At the same time, the Eastern Bloc was forced to concentrate military-strategic, economic, intellectual, production forces and natural resources in the same geopolitical center.

With this situation, the geopolitical position of the West with the center of the USA was in sharp contrast. (This is especially important, since the position of Western Europe in this alignment of forces was very unenviable; it got the role of the US land base adjacent to the borders of the opposite camp, a kind of "sanitary cordon"). America was completely protected by the "maritime borders." Moreover, by strategically integrating its continent, it gained control of a huge part of the Eurasian coast, rimland. From Western Europe through Greece and Turkey (NATO member countries) the control of the Atlantists extended to the Far East (Thailand, South Korea, strategically colonized Japan), and this zone smoothly passed into the Indian and Pacific oceans the most important military bases on the island of San Diego, in the Philippines, and on to Guam, the Caribbean, and Haiti.

At the same time, the Atlantists created a complex differentiated system of the geopolitical distribution of power "nuclei". The United States directly provided strategic military power. Intellectual, financial and industrial structures, as well as centers for the development of high technologies, were concentrated in Western Europe, free from the burden of ensuring their own military security (except for maintaining the police and purely decorative forces).

Natural resources came from the economically underdeveloped regions of the Third World, from which cheap labor came to a significant extent.

Maintaining the status quo that emerged immediately after the Second World War was an offensive position, since, according to the predictions of the Atlantist geopolitics, such a situation would inevitably lead to the depletion of the continental bloc, doomed to complete autarchy and forced to develop all strategic directions alone at the same time.

Heartland had only two options in this situation. The first to carry out military expansion to the West with the goal of conquering Europe to the Atlantic. After this effort, the USSR could secure calm sea borders and industrial, intellectual and technological potential. In parallel, a similar effort should have been made in a southerly direction, to finally reach the warm seas and break the Sea Power "anaconda ring". This is a tough path that, if successful, could lead to a stable continental world and in the near future to the collapse of America, deprived of

rimland.

The other way, on the contrary, was the withdrawal of the USSR and its armed forces from Eastern Europe in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Western Europe and the creation of a single, strictly neutral European Bloc (possibly with limited "dissuasive" nuclear potential). This option was seriously discussed in the era of De Gaulle.

The same could be done with Asia. To abandon direct political control over some Central Asian republics in exchange for creating with Afghanistan, Iran and India (possibly China) a powerful strategic anti-American bloc, oriented intracontinental.

One could finally combine these two options and go peacefully in the West and force in the East (or vice versa). The only important thing was to start both of these geopolitical actions simultaneously. Only in this case, one could hope for a change in the planetary balance of forces from the apparent positional loss of Sushi to its victory. It was necessary at any cost to break through "containment", the term called the anaconda geopolitical tactics during the Cold War.

But since the USSR did not dare to take this radical geopolitical step, the Atlantic powers could only reap the results of their strictly calculated and geopolitically verified long-term positional strategy.

The autarky Soviet power could not stand it from a comprehensive overvoltage and fell. And the military invasion of Afghanistan without a parallel strategic step in Western Europe (peaceful or non-peaceful), instead of saving the case, finally aggravated the situation.

2.3 Aerocracy and etherocracy

Traditional atlantist geopolitics, putting Sea Power at the center of its concept, is the "geopolitics of the sea." A global strategy based on this geopolitics has led the West to establish planetary power. But the development of technology has led to the development of airspace, which made the development of "geopolitics of air" relevant.

In contrast to the "geopolitics of the sea", a complete and fully developed, full-fledged "geopolitics of the air" does not exist. The ballooning factor is added to the overall geopolitical picture. But some correlations in the actualization of the air environment and related new types of weapons of strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons have changed significantly.

The development of airspace to some extent equalized the land and the sea, since for airplanes and missiles the difference between these spaces is not so significant. (An especially important step was the creation of aircraft carriers, as this completely cut off the air bases from Sushi, making them independent of the quality of the earth's surface.)

At the same time, the development of aviation has changed the proportions of a planetary scale, making the Earth much "smaller" and the distances "shorter". At the same time, rocket science and the development of strategic aviation in many respects relativized traditional geopolitical factors, sea and land borders, intracontinental bases, etc.

The transfer of arms to Earth orbit and the strategic exploration of outer space were the last stage of the planet's "compression" and final relativization of spatial differences.

Actual geopolitics in addition to Sushi and the Sea is forced to take into account two more elements of air and ether (outer space). These elements at the military level correspond to nuclear weapons (air) and the program of "Star Wars" (space). By analogy with tellurocracy (power of Sushi) and thalassocracy (power of the Sea), these two latest modifications of geopolitical systems can be called aerocracy (power of Air) and etherocracy (power of Ether).

Karl Schmitt gave an outline sketch of these two new spheres. Moreover, his most important and fundamental remark is that both "aerocracy" and "etherocracy"

represent the further development of the “nomos” of the Sea, the advanced phases are precisely “thalassocracy,” since the entire technical process of developing new areas is carried out to the side “liquefaction of the environment, which, according to Schmitt, is accompanied by the corresponding cultural and civilizational processes, a progressive departure from the “nomos” of Sushi, not only in strategic, but also in ethical, spiritual, socio-political senses.

In other words, the development of air and space environments is a continuation of purely thalassocratic trends, and therefore, can be considered as the highest stage of a purely Atlantic strategy.

In this perspective, the nuclear confrontation of the blocs in the Cold War is presented as competition in the conditions imposed by the “Sea Force” on the heartland, forced to accept the conditions of a strategic positional duel dictated by the opposite side. This process of active “liquefaction of the elements”, coupled with the logic of the development of the Western world in technological and strategic sense, is parallel to the offensive position of the Atlantists in their policy of separating coastal zones from the continental center in both cases there is an offensive initiative of one geopolitical camp and a defensive reaction of the other .

At the intellectual level, this is expressed in the fact that atlantists at the theoretical level develop “active geopolitics”, engaging in this science openly and systematically.

In the case of the West, geopolitics acts as a discipline that dictates the general contours of international strategy. In the case of the Eastern Bloc, it, not being officially recognized for a long time, existed and still continues to exist as a “reaction” to the steps of a potential adversary. This was and is “passive geopolitics”, responding to the strategic challenge of atlantism more by inertia.

If in the case of nuclear weapons and aviation (in the field of aerocracy) the USSR was able to achieve relative parity at the cost of all internal resources, then at the next stage, structural breakdown occurred in the field of ethocracy, and competition in the field of technologies related to “star wars” led to the final geopolitical loss and to the defeat in the cold war.

To understand the essence of geopolitical processes in the nuclear world and in the development of orbital spaces, the remark of Karl Schmitt that aerocracy and ethocracy are not independent civilization systems but only the development of

sovereignty are not independent civilizational systems, but only the development of the "nomos" of the Sea, is fundamental.

2.4 Two versions of modern Atlantism

The victory of the Atlantists over the USSR (heartland) meant the entry into a radically new era, which required original geopolitical models. The geopolitical status of all traditional territories, regions, states and unions has changed dramatically. Comprehension of planetary reality after the end of the Cold War led Atlanticist geopolitics to two concepts.

One of them can be called "pessimistic" (for Atlantism). It inherits the line of confrontation, traditional for Atlanticism, with heartland, which is considered incomplete and not removed from the agenda along with the fall of the USSR, and predicts the formation of new Eurasian blocs based on civilizational traditions and sustainable ethnic archetypes. This option can be called "neo-Atlanticism", its essence is reduced, ultimately, to the continuation of the consideration of the geopolitical picture of the world from the perspective of fundamental dualism, which is only nuanced by the allocation of additional geopolitical zones (except Eurasia), which can also become further centers of confrontation with the West. The most prominent representative of this neo-Atlantic approach is Samuel Huntington.

The second scheme, based on the same initial geopolitical picture, is, on the contrary, optimistic (for Atlantism) in the sense that it considers the situation that has developed as a result of the victory of the West in the Cold War to be final and irrevocable. This is the basis for the theory of "mondialism", the concept of the End of History and One World (One World), which claims that all forms of geopolitical differentiation are cultural, national, religious, ideological, state, etc. about to be finally overcome, and the era of a single universal human civilization based on the principles of liberal democracy will come. History will end along with the geopolitical confrontation, which initially gave the main impetus to history. This geopolitical project is associated with the name of the American geopolitician Francis Fukuyama, who wrote a programming article with the expressive title "End of History." This mondialist theory will be discussed in the next chapter.

Let us examine the main provisions of the Huntington concept, which is an

ultramodern development of the atlantist geopolitics traditional for the West. It is important that Huntington builds his programmatic article "Clash of civilizations" as a response to Fukuyama's thesis on "The End of History". It is significant that at the political level this controversy corresponds to two leading political parties in the USA: Fukuyama expresses the global strategic position of the Democrats, while Huntington is the mouthpiece of the Republicans. This quite accurately expresses the essence of the two latest geopolitical projects, neo-Atlantism follows a conservative line, and "mondialism" prefers a completely new approach in which all geopolitical realities are subject to a complete revision.

2.5 Clash of Civilizations: Huntington's Neo-Atlantism

The meaning of the theory of Samuel P. Huntington, director of the Institute for Strategic Studies. John Olin at Harvard University, formulated by him in the article "The Clash of Civilizations" (7) (which appeared as a summary of the large geopolitical project "Changes in Global Security and American National Interests"), is as follows:

The apparent geopolitical victory of Atlantism on the entire planet with the fall of the USSR disappeared, the last bastion of continental forces actually affects only a superficial section of reality. The strategic success of NATO, accompanied by ideological formalization, the rejection of the main competitive communist ideology, does not affect the deepest civilizational strata. Huntington, contrary to Fukuyama, argues that strategic victory is not a civilizational victory; Western ideology liberal democracy, market, etc. they became non-alternative only temporarily, since soon civilization and geopolitical features, an analogue of the "geographical individual" mentioned by Savitsky, will begin to appear among non-Western peoples.

The rejection of the ideology of communism and shifts in the structure of traditional states, the collapse of some entities, the appearance of others, etc. they will not lead to the automatic alignment of all mankind with the universal system of atlantic values, but, on the contrary, will make the deeper cultural strata freed from superficial ideological clichés again relevant.

Huntington quotes George Weigel: "Desecularization is one of the dominant social factors at the end of the 20th century." Therefore. instead of discarding

religious identification in the One World, as Fukuyama speaks of, peoples, on the contrary, will feel religious affiliation even more vividly.

Huntington argues that along with Western (= Atlantic) civilization, which includes North America and Western Europe, it is possible to foresee the geopolitical fixation of seven more potential civilizations:

- 1) Slavic-Orthodox
- 2) Confucian (Chinese)
- 3) Japanese
- 4) Islamic
- 5) Hindu
- 6) Latin American
- and possibly 7) African (8).

Of course, these potential civilizations are by no means equivalent. But they are all united in that the vector of their development and formation will be oriented in a direction different from the trajectory of Atlantism and the civilization of the West. So the West will again be in a situation of confrontation. Huntington believes that this is almost inevitable and that now, in spite of the euphoria of the Mondialist circles, the realistic formula should be taken as the basis: "The West and The Rest" (9).

The geopolitical conclusions from this approach are obvious: Huntington believes that Atlantists should do everything possible to strengthen the strategic positions of their own civilization, prepare for confrontation, consolidate strategic efforts, restrain anti-Atlantic tendencies in other geopolitical entities, and prevent them from joining a continental alliance that is dangerous for the West.

He gives such recommendations:

"The West should [text missing] to ensure closer cooperation and unity within the framework of their own civilization, especially between its European and

North American parts;

integrate into Western civilization those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to Western; ensure closer relations with Japan and Russia;

to prevent the development of local conflicts between civilizations into global wars;

limit the military expansion of Confucian and Islamic states;

to suspend the coagulation of Western military power and ensure military superiority in the Far East and South-West Asia;

use the difficulties and conflicts in the relations between Islamic and Confucian countries;

to support groups oriented towards Western values and interests in other civilizations;

to strengthen international institutions reflecting and legitimizing Western interests and values, and to ensure the involvement of non-Western states in these institutions. "(10)

This is a concise and concise statement of the doctrine of neo-Atlantism.

From the point of view of pure geopolitics, this means an exact adherence to the principles of Mahan and Speakman, and the emphasis that Huntington places on culture and civilizational differences as the most important geopolitical factors indicates his involvement in the classical school of geopolitics, dating back to "organic" philosophy, for which initially it was common to consider social structures and states not as mechanical or purely ideological formations, but as "life forms".

Huntington points to China and Islamic states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.) as the most likely opponents of the West. This is directly affected by the doctrines of Maynig and Kirk, who believed that the orientation of the countries of the "coastal zones", rimland and "Confucian" and Islamic civilizations belong geopolitically mainly to rimland more important than the position of heartland. Therefore, unlike other representatives of neo-Atlanticism in particular, Paul

wolfowitz Huntington sees the main threat not in the geopolitical revival of Russia-Eurasia, heartland, or some new Eurasian continental formation.

The report of the American Paul Wolfowitz (security adviser) to the US government in March 1992 says "it is necessary to prevent the emergence of a strategic force on the European and Asian continents that can resist the US" (11), and further explains that the most likely force, which is meant here, is Russia, and that a sanitary cordon should be created against it on the basis of the Baltic countries. In this case, the American strategist Wolfowitz is closer to Mackinder than to Speakman, which distinguishes his views from Huntington's theory.

In all cases, regardless of the definition of a specific potential adversary, the position of all neo-Atlantists remains essentially unified: a victory in the Cold War does not cancel the threat to the West emanating from other geopolitical entities (present or future). Consequently, it is premature to talk about the "One World", and the planetary dualism of thalassocracy (reinforced by aerocracy and etiocracy) and tellurocracy remains the main geopolitical scheme for the 21st century.

Huntington's thesis, The West and The Rest, is becoming a new and more general formula for such dualism.

Chapter 3 - Mondialism

3.1 Background of Mondialism

The concept of "mondialism" arose long before the final victory of the West in the Cold War.

The meaning of mondialism boils down to the postulation of the inevitability of complete planetary integration, the transition from a multiplicity of states, peoples, nations and cultures to the uniform world of One World.

The origins of this idea can be seen in some utopian and chiliastic movements dating back to the Middle Ages and, further, to ancient times. It is based on the idea that at some climax of history, all the peoples of the earth will gather in a single Kingdom, which will no longer know the contradictions, tragedies, conflicts and problems inherent in ordinary earthly history. In addition to the purely mystical version of the mondialist utopia, there were its rationalistic versions, one of which can be considered the doctrine of the "Third Era" of the positivist Auguste Comte or the humanistic eschatology of Lessing.

Mondialist ideas were most often characteristic of moderate European and especially English socialists (some of them were united in the Fabian Society). The communists spoke of a single World State. On the other hand, similar mondialist organizations were created since the end of the 19th century by large figures in world business, for example, Sir Cecil Rhodes, who organized the Round Table group, whose members were supposed to "contribute to the establishment of a system of unhindered trade throughout the world and the creation of a single World Government." Often, socialist motives were intertwined with liberal capitalist ones, and the communists coexisted in these organizations with representatives of the largest financial capital. All were united by a belief in the utopian idea of uniting the planet.

It is significant that such well-known organizations as the League of Nations, later the UN and UNESCO were the continuation of precisely such mondialist circles, which had a great influence on world politics.

During the 20th century, these mondialist organizations, avoiding excessive advertising, and often even having a "secret" character, changed many names. There was the "Universal Movement for a World Confederation" by Harry Davis, the "Federal Union" and even the "Crusade for a World Government" (organized by English parliamentarian Henry Asborn in 1946).

As all the conceptual and strategic power over the West in the United States was concentrated, it was this state that became the main headquarters of mondialism, whose representatives formed a structure parallel to the power, consisting of advisers, analysts, and strategic research centers.

So there were three main mondialist organizations, about the very existence of which the public of the West learned only relatively recently. Unlike official structures, these groups enjoyed significantly greater freedom of design and research, since they were exempted from the fixed and formal procedures governing the activities of UN commissions, etc.

The first "Council on Foreign Relations" (Council on Foreign Relations, abbreviated CFR). Its creator was the largest American banker Morgan. This unofficial organization was busy developing an American strategy on a planetary scale, with the ultimate goal being the complete unification of the planet and the creation of a World Government. This organization arose back in 1921 as a branch of the Carnegie Endowment for the Universal World, and all the high-ranking politicians in it shared mondialist views on the future of the planet. Since the majority of CFR members were at the same time high-ranking digitarians of Scottish Freemasonry, it can be assumed that their geopolitical projects also had some kind of humanistic-mystical dimension.

In 1954, the second mondialist structure, the Bilderberg Club or the Bilderberg Group, was created. It united not only American analysts, politicians, financiers and intellectuals, but also their European colleagues. On the American side, it was represented exclusively by CFR members and was seen as its international continuation.

In 1973, activists of the Bilderberg Group created the third most important mondialist structure, the Trilateral Commission or Trilateral. It was headed by the Americans who are part of the CFR and the Bilderberg Group, and besides the USA, where its headquarters are located (345 East 46th Street, New York), two more headquarters in Europe and Japan.

The Trilateral Commission is named on fundamental geopolitical grounds. It is designed to unite under the auspices of Atlantism and the United States three "large spaces", leading in technological development and a market economy:

- 1) American space, including North and South America;
- 2) European space;
- 3) Pacific space controlled by Japan.

The most important mondialist groups of Bilderberg and Trilateral are headed by a senior member of CFR, the largest banker David Rockefeller, the owner of Chase Manhattan Bank.

In addition to him, at the very center of all mondialist projects are constant analysts, geopolitics and strategists of Atlanticism Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. It also includes the famous George Ball.

The main line of all mondialist projects was the transition to a unified world system, under the strategic dominance of the West and "progressive", "humanistic", "democratic" values. To this end, parallel structures were developed, consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts, etc., which were to prepare the ground before this mondialist project of the World Government could be widely publicized, since without preparation it would come across to the powerful psychological resistance of peoples and states that do not want to dissolve their identity in the planetary melting pot.

The mondialist project developed and conducted by these organizations was not homogeneous. There were two main versions of it, which, differing in methods, should theoretically lead to the same goal.

3.2 Convergence Theory

The first most pacifist and "conciliatory" version of mondialism is known as the "convergence theory". Developed in the 70s by the group of "left" analysts led by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the depths of the CFR, this theory suggested the possibility of overcoming the ideological and geopolitical dualism of the Cold War through the creation of a new cultural and ideological type of civilization

that would be intermediate between socialism and capitalism, between pure atlantism and pure continentalism.

Marxism of the Soviets was seen as an obstacle that can be overcome by moving to its moderate, social-democratic, revisionist version through the rejection of the theses "dictatorship of the proletariat", "class struggle", "nationalization of the means of production" and "abolition of private property." In turn, the capitalist West should limit the freedom of the market, introduce partial state regulation of the economy, etc. A common cultural orientation could be found in the traditions of Enlightenment and humanism, to which both Western democratic regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softened social democratic versions) are built.

The World Government, which could have appeared on the basis of the "theory of convergence", was conceived of as Moscow's admission to Atlantic planet control together with Washington. In this case, the era of universal peace began, the Cold War would end, and the peoples would be able to relieve the burden of geopolitical tension.

It is important to draw a parallel here with the transition of technological systems from "thalassocracy" to "etiocracy": mondialist politicians began to look at the planet not through the eyes of the inhabitants of the western continent surrounded by the sea (like traditional Atlantists), but through the eyes of "astronauts in space orbit". In this case, they really saw One World, One World.

Mondialist centers also had their correspondents in Moscow. The key figure here was Academician Gvishiani, Director of the Institute for System Research, which was something like a branch of Trilite Rala in the USSR. But their activity was especially successful among the extreme left parties in Western Europe, which for the most part embarked on the path of the "Europeanism of Municipalism," and this was considered the main conceptual basis for global convergence.

3.3 Planetary victory of the West

Convergence theories were the ideological foundation that Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers, who carried out perestroika, alluded to. At the same time, several years before the beginning of Soviet perestroika a similar project began

several years before the beginning of Soviet perestroika, a similar project began to be implemented in China, with which representatives of the Trilateral Commission established close relations from the late 70s. But the geopolitical fates of the Chinese and Soviet "perestroika" were different. China insisted on a "fair" distribution of roles and on corresponding shifts in the ideology of the West towards socialism. The USSR took the path of concessions much further.

Following the logic of the American Mondialists, Gorbachev began the structural transformation of the Soviet space towards "democratization" and "liberalization." First of all, this affected the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and then the republics of the USSR. The reduction of strategic arms and ideological rapprochement with the West began. But in this case, one should pay attention to the fact that the years of Gorbachev's reign fall during the presidency of the extreme Republicans Reagan and Bush in the United States. Moreover, Reagan was the only president in recent years who consistently refused to participate in all mondialist organizations. By conviction, he was a tough, consistent and uncompromising atlantist, a liberal marketer, not inclined to any compromises with the "left" ideologies of even the most moderate democratic or social democratic persuasion. Consequently, Moscow's steps aimed at converging and creating a World Government with a significant weight of representatives of the Eastern bloc in it, at the opposite pole, had the most unfavorable ideological obstacles. Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not accompanied by corresponding concessions from Sea Power, and the West made no geopolitical or ideological compromises with self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO did not disband, and its forces did not leave either Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology has further strengthened its position, aimed at convergence and the creation of a World Government with a significant weight in it of representatives of the Eastern bloc, at the opposite pole had the most unfavorable ideological obstacles. Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's mondialist reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Heartland's voluntary concessions were not accompanied by corresponding concessions from Sea Power, and the West made no geopolitical or ideological compromises with self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO did not disband, and its forces did not leave either Europe or Asia.

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In this case, mondialism did not appear as an independent geopolitical doctrine, which was realized in practice, but as a pragmatically used tool in the Cold War, whose logic, based on the theses of Mackinder and Mahan, was never abandoned by the United States.

3.4 "The End of the Story" by Francis Fukuyama

After the collapse of the USSR and the victory of the West, of Atlantism, the mondialist projects had to either die out or change their logic.

A new version of mondialism in the post-Soviet era was the doctrine of Francis Fukuyama, who published in the early 90s a programmatic article entitled "The End of History". It can be considered as the ideological basis of neomondialism.

Fukuyama offers the next version of the historical process. Humanity from the dark era of the "law of power", "obscurantism" and "irrational management of social reality" moved to the most reasonable and logical system embodied in capitalism, modern Western civilization, a market economy, and liberal democratic ideology. History and its development lasted only due to irrational factors, which gradually gave way to the laws of reason, the total monetary

factors, which gradually gave way to the laws of reason, the total monetary equivalent of all values, etc. The fall of the USSR marks the fall of the last bastion of "irrationalism." With this is connected the end of History and the beginning of a special planetary existence, which will take place under the sign of the Market and Democracy, which will unite the world into a harmonious rationally functioning machine.

Such a New Order, although based on the universalization of a purely Atlantic system, goes beyond Atlantism, and all regions of the world begin to reorganize according to a new model, around its most economically developed centers.

3.5 "Geeconomics" by Jacques Attali

There is an analogue of the Fukuyama theory among European authors. So, Jacques Attali, a former personal adviser to French President Francois Mitter for many years, as well as director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for some time, developed a similar theory in his book, Horizon Lines.

Attali believes that at the moment there is a third era of the "era of money", which is the universal equivalent of value, since, by equating all things with tangible digital expression, it is extremely simple to manage with them in the most rational way. Attali himself associates this approach with the advent of the Messianic era, understood in the Judeo-Kabbalistic context (he develops this aspect in more detail in another book specifically devoted to the messengerism "He Will Come"). This distinguishes him from Fukuyama, which remains within the framework of strict pragmatism and utilitarianism.

Jacques Attali offers his version of the future, which "has already come." Dominance on the whole planet of a single liberal democratic ideology and market system, together with the development of information technologies, leads to the fact that the world becomes single and homogeneous, geopolitical realities that have dominated throughout history, recede into the background in the "third era". Geopolitical dualism is canceled.

But the united world nevertheless receives a new geopolitical structuralization, based this time on the principles of "geoeconomics". For the first time, the historian Fritz Roerig proposed to develop the concepts of "geoeconomics" and

popularized it by Fernand Braudel.

"Geeconomics" is a special version of Mondialist geopolitics, which considers priority non-geographical, cultural, ideological, ethnic, religious, etc. factors that make up the essence of the geopolitical approach itself, but a purely economic reality in its relation to space. For "geoeconomics" it doesn't matter at all what kind of people live there and there, what is its history, cultural traditions, etc. It all comes down to where the centers of world stock exchanges, minerals, information centers, large-scale industries are located. "Geeconomics" approaches political reality as if the World Government and a single planetary state already existed.

Attali's geoeconomic approach leads to the identification of three most important regions, which in the One World will become centers of new economic spaces.

1. The American space, which finally united both Americas into a single financial and industrial zone.
2. The European space that arose after the economic unification of Europe.
3. The Pacific region, the zone of "new prosperity", which has several competing centers in Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, etc. (12)

According to Attali, there will not be any special differences or contradictions between these three mondialist spaces, since the economic and ideological type will in all cases be strictly identical. The only difference will be the purely geographical location of the most developed centers, which will concentrically structure less developed regions located in spatial proximity around themselves. Such a concentric restructuring can only take place at the "end of History" or, in other terms, with the abolition of traditional realities dictated by geopolitics.

Civilizational-geopolitical dualism is canceled. The absence of a pole opposite the atlantism leads to a radical rethinking of space. The era of geoeconomics is coming.

In the Attali model, those ideas that lay at the base of the "Tripartite Commission," which is the conceptual and political tool that develops and implements such projects, found their final expression.

It is significant that the leaders of Trilateral (David Rockefeller, Georges Bertouin then the head of the European branch and Henry Kissinger) visited Moscow in January 1989, where they were received by USSR President

Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev, and other high-ranking Soviet leaders Medvedev also attended the meeting. Falin, Akhromeev, Dobrynin, Chernyaev, Arbatov and Primakov. And Jacques Attali himself maintained personal contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

One thing is certain: the transition to geo-economic logic and neomondialism became possible only after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasian USSR.

Neomondialism is not a direct continuation of historical mondialism, which initially assumed the presence in the final model of leftist socialist elements. This is an intermediate option between actual mondialism and atlantism.

3.6 Post-catastrophic mondialism of Professor Santoro

More detailed versions of neomondialization may exist. One of the most striking is the futurological geopolitical concept developed by the Milan Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) under the leadership of Professor Carlo Santoro.

According to the Santoro model, at the moment, humanity is in a transitional stage from the bipolar world to the mondialist version of multipolarity (understood geoeconomically, like Attali). International institutions (the UN, etc.), which for Fukuyama seem optimistic mondialism, seem sufficiently developed to become the core of the "World Government", Santoro seems, on the contrary, ineffective and reflecting the outdated logic of bipolar geopolitics. Moreover, the whole world bears a stable imprint of the Cold War, whose geopolitical logic remains dominant. Santoro foresees that such a situation cannot but end in a period of civilizational disasters.

He then sets out the proposed scenario for these disasters:

1. Further weakening the role of international institutions
2. The growth of nationalist trends among the countries included in the Warsaw Pact and in the Third World. This leads to chaotic processes.
3. The disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not affect Europe) and the progressive collapse of existing states.
4. The beginning of the era of wars of low and medium intensity, as a result of

which new geopolitical formations are formed.

5. The threat of planetary chaos forces the various blocs to recognize the need to create new international institutions with huge powers, which in fact means the establishment of a World Government.
6. The final creation of a planetary state under the auspices of new international authorities (World Government). (13)

This model is an intermediate between the mondialistic optimism of Francis Fukuyama and the atlantic pessimism of Samuel Huntington.

Chapter 4 - Applied Geopolitics

4.1 "Internal Geopolitics" - Yves Lacoste School

The geopolitical renaissance in Europe is connected with the activities of the geographer Yves Lacoste, who founded the journal *Herodotus* in 1976, where geopolitical texts began to be regularly published for the first time in post-war Europe. It should be emphasized that the head was a man close to left-wing political circles, while until that moment only fairly marginal right-wing, nationalist circles were engaged in geopolitics in Europe.

In 1983, *Herodotus* magazine introduced the subtitle "journal of geography and geopolitics" in the title, and from that moment the second life of geopolitics begins, which is now officially recognized as a special political science discipline that helps in a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Yves Lacoste seeks to adapt geopolitical principles to the current situation. Lacoste himself does not share the "organist approach" characteristic of the continentalist school, nor the purely pragmatic and mechanistic geopolitical utilitarianism of Sea Power ideologists. From his point of view, geopolitical considerations serve only to "justify the rival aspirations of the authorities in relation to certain territories and the people inhabiting them" (14). This may concern both international relations and narrowly regional issues.

At Lacoste, geopolitics becomes only an instrument for analyzing a specific situation, and all global theories underlying this discipline are reduced to relative, historically determined concepts.

Thus, Lacoste offers a completely new definition of geopolitics, in fact a new discipline. This is no longer continental thinking, based on fundamental planetary civilizational-geographical dualism and coupled with global ideological systems, but the use of some methodological models that were present in traditional geopolitics in a general context, but taken in this case as something independent. This is the "deglobalization" of geopolitics, reducing it to a narrow analytical method.

Such geopolitics is called "internal geopolitics" (la geopolitique interne), as it is often involved in local problems.

4.2 Electoral "geopolitics"

A variation of such internal geopolitics is a special technique developed to study the connection between the political sympathies of the population and the territory in which the population lives. The forerunner of this approach was the Frenchman Andre Siegfried (1875-1959), a politician and geographer. He made the first attempts to investigate "internal geopolitics" in relation to the political sympathies of certain regions. The first formulations of the laws go back to him, which formed the basis of the "electoral geopolitics" of the new school of Yves Lacoste.

Siegfried wrote:

"Each party or, more precisely, each political trend has its own privileged territory; it is easy to notice that just as there are geological or economic regions, there are also political regions. The political climate can be studied in the same way as the natural climate. I noticed that despite deceptive visibility, public opinion, depending on the regions, retains a certain constancy. Under the ever-changing picture of political elections, one can trace deeper and more constant trends azhayuschie regional temperament. " (15)

At Lacoste's school, this theory was systematically developed and became a familiar sociological tool that is widely used in political practice.

4.3 Mediaocracy as a "geopolitical" factor

Yves Lacoste set out to introduce the latest criteria inherent in the information society into geopolitics. Among the information systems that directly affect the geopolitical processes, the media, especially television, have the greatest value. In modern society, it is not the conceptually rational approach that dominates, but the brightness of the "image" ("image"). Political, ideological and geopolitical views are formed in a significant part of society solely on the basis of telecommunications. The media "image" is an atomic synthesis in which

of telecommunications. The media image is an atomic synthesis in which several ethnic, cultural, ideological, and political approaches are concentrated at once. The synthetic quality of the "image" brings it closer to those categories that are traditionally operated by geopolitics.

An informational report from a hot spot about which nothing is known, for example, a resident of the capitol, should, in the shortest possible time, present the geographic, historical, religious, economic, cultural, ethnic profile of the region, as well as place emphasis in accordance with a narrowly defined political purpose. Thus, the profession of a journalist (especially a television journalist) is moving closer to the profession of geopolitics. Mass media in modern society no longer play a purely supporting role, as before, but become a powerful independent geopolitical factor capable of exerting a strong influence on the historical destinies of peoples.

4.4 History of geopolitics

There is one more direction within the framework of the general process of "revival" of European geopolitics, the history of geopolitics. It is not in the full sense of the word geopolitical, since it aims at the historical reconstruction of this discipline, work with sources, chronology, systematization, bibliographic data, etc. In a sense, this is a "museum approach", not claiming any conclusions and generalizations in relation to the current situation. Such a historical line is represented, first of all, by the works of Pierre-Marie Gollois and authors such as Herve Cuto-Begari, Gerard Schalian, Hans-Adolph Jacobsen, etc.

As part of this initiative, the texts of the historical geopolitics of Mackinder, Mahan, Chellen, Haushofer, etc. are published and reprinted.

Historical studies of this kind are often published in the French journal *Herodotus* and the new Italian geopolitical journal *Limes*, published by Lucho Caracolo and Michel Korenmann, with the participation of the same Lacoste.

4.5 "Applied Geopolitics" is not geopolitics

Applied or "internal geopolitics", developed by Yves Lacoste, as well as other

major specialists, Michel Korenmann, Paul-Marie de la Gors, etc., is characteristic of modern European political science and consciously avoids conceptual generalizations and futurological developments. This is the fundamental difference between this whole area, especially developed in France and Italy, from the atlantist and mondialist schools in the USA and England.

Applied geopolitics retains much less links with historical, pre-war geopolitics than Atlanticism and mondialism, not to mention the “continent of the Listian” tradition. This is a purely analytical, political science, sociological technique and nothing more. Therefore, a distinction should be made between it and the planetary global projects of geopolitics proper. In essence, we are talking about two disciplines that bring together only terminology and some methods. Ignoring geopolitical dualism, considering it either overcome, or insignificant, or simply going beyond the frames of the main subject of study, "applied geopolitics" ceases to be geopolitics in the proper sense of the word and becomes only a kind of statistical sociological methodology.

Real geopolitical decisions and projects related to the fate of Europe and the peoples inhabiting it are being developed in other instances connected with the strategic centers of Atlantism and mondialism. So, the project of European integration was developed exclusively by the efforts of intellectuals who collaborated in the "Tripartite Commission", i.e. in a mondialist supranational organization that does not have either a strict legal status or political legitimacy. The Frenchman Jacques Attali developed his geopolitical theories based on the data of this particular organization of which he was a member, and not on the basis of the “applied” geopolitics of the modern European school.

Chapter 5 - Geopolitics of the European "New Right"

5.1 Europe - one hundred flags - Alain de Benoît

One of the few European geopolitical schools that have maintained a continuous connection with the ideas of the pre-war German geopolitics-continentalists is the "new right." This trend arose in France in the late 60s and is associated with the figure of the leader of this movement, philosopher and publicist Alain de Benoît.

The "New Right" are very different from the traditional French right-wing monarchists, Catholics, Germanophobes, chauvinists, anti-communists, conservatives, etc. on almost all counts. The "new right" advocates of "organic democracy", pagans, Germanophiles, socialists, modernists, etc. At first, the "left camp", traditionally extremely influential in France, considered this a "tactical maneuver" of the ordinary right, but over time, the seriousness of evolution was proved and recognized by all.

One of the fundamental principles of the ideology of the "new right", analogues of which soon appeared in other European countries, was the principle of "continental geopolitics." Unlike the "old right" and classical nationalists, de Benoît believed that the principle of the centralist State-Nation (Etat-Nation) was historically exhausted and that the future belongs only to the "Great Spaces". Moreover, the basis of such "Great Spaces" should be not so much the unification of different States in a pragmatic political bloc, but the entry of ethnic groups of different scales into a single "Federal Empire" on an equal footing. Such a "Federal Empire" should be strategically united, and ethnically differentiated.

The "Great Space" that de Benoît was most interested in was Europe. The "New Right" believed that the peoples of Europe have a common Indo-European origin, a single source. This is the principle of a "common past." But the circumstances of the modern era, in which the tendencies of strategic and economic integration, necessary for possessing genuine geopolitical sovereignty, are active, dictate the need for unification in a purely pragmatic sense. Thus, the peoples of Europe are doomed to a "common future." From this, de Benoît

peoples of Europe are doomed to a common future. From this, de Benoit concludes that the thesis "United Europe of a hundred flags" (16) should become the main geopolitical principle. In such a perspective, as in all the concepts of the "new right", the desire to combine "conservative" and "modernist" is clearly visible elements i.e. "right" and "left." In recent years, the "new right" have abandoned this definition, believing that they are "right" to the same extent as the "left."

De Benoit's geopolitical theses are based on the assertion of the "continental fate of Europe." In this, he fully follows the concepts of the Haushofer school. From this follows the opposition of "Europe" and "West" characteristic of the "new right". "Europe" for them is a continental geopolitical entity based on an ethnic ensemble of Indo-European origin and having common cultural roots. This is a traditional concept. "West", on the contrary, is a geopolitical and historical concept connected with the modern world, denying ethnic and spiritual traditions, putting forward purely material and quantitative criteria for existence; it is a utilitarian and rationalistic, mechanistic bourgeois civilization. The United States is the most complete incarnation of the West and its civilization.

This makes up a specific project of the "new right." Europe should integrate into the "Federal Empire", which is opposed to the West and the USA, and regionalist tendencies should be especially encouraged, as regions and ethnic minorities have retained more traditional features than megacities and cultural centers, struck by the "spirit of the West". France should be guided by Germany and Central Europe. Hence the interest of the "new right" in De Gaulle and Friedrich Naumann. At the level of practical politics, starting from the 70s, the New Right advocated for a strict strategic neutrality of Europe, for withdrawal from NATO, for the development of a self-sufficient European nuclear potential.

Regarding the USSR (later Russia), the position of the "new right" has evolved. Starting with the classic thesis "Neither West nor East, but Europe", they gradually evolved to the thesis "First of all, Europe, but better even with the East than with the West." At a practical level, the initial interest in China and the projects for organizing a strategic alliance between Europe and China to counter both "American and Soviet imperialism" were replaced by a moderate "Sovietophile" and the idea of an alliance between Europe and Russia.

The geopolitics of the "new right" is oriented radically but anti-Atlantic and anti-mondialist. They see the fate of Europe as the antithesis of Atlantic and Mondialist projects. They are opposed to "thalassocracy" and the concept of One

World.

It should be noted that in the conditions of the total strategic and political dominance of Atlanticism in Europe during the Cold War, de Benoit's geopolitical position (theoretically and logically flawless) contrasted so much with the "norms of political thinking" that it simply could not get any widespread distribution. It was a kind of "dissent" and, like any "dissidentism" and "non-conformism", was marginal in nature. Until now, the intellectual level of the New Right, the high quality of their publications and publications, even the large number of their followers in the academic European environment, are in sharp contrast to the negligible attention given to them by the authorities and analytical structures serving the government with geopolitical projects.

5.2 Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin - Jean Tiriär

A somewhat different version of continentalist geopolitics was developed by another European "dissident" Belgian, Jean Tiriär (1922-1992). Since the beginning of the 60s he was the leader of the pan-European radical movement Young Europe.

Tiriär considered geopolitics the main political science discipline, without which it is impossible to build a rational and visionary political and state strategy. A follower of Haushofer and Nikisch, he considered himself a "European National Bolshevik" and a builder of the "European Empire". It was his ideas that anticipated the more developed and sophisticated projects of the "new right."

Jean Tiriär built his political theory on the principle of "autarchy of large spaces." Developed in the middle of the 19th century by the German economist Frederick Liszt, this theory argued that a full-fledged strategic and economic development of a state is possible only if it has a sufficient geopolitical scale and great territorial capabilities. Tiriär applied this principle to the current situation and came to the conclusion that the world significance of the states of Europe would be completely lost if they did not unite into a single Empire opposing the United States. At the same time, Tiriär believed that such an "Empire" should not be "federal" and "regionally oriented," but extremely unified, centralistic, corresponding to the Jacobin model. This should become a powerful single continental State-Nation. This is the main difference between the views of de Benoit and Tiriär

BERLIN AND TIRIAR.

In the late 70s, the views of Tiriär underwent some change. An analysis of the geopolitical situation led him to conclude that the scale of Europe is no longer sufficient to free itself from the American thalassocracy. Consequently, the main condition for "European liberation" is the unification of Europe with the USSR. From a geopolitical scheme that includes three main zones, the West, Europe, Russia (USSR), he switched to a scheme with only two components: the West and the Eurasian continent. Moreover, Tiriär came to the radical conclusion that for Europe it is better to choose Soviet socialism than Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

So the project "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin" (17) appeared. It almost prophetically describes the reasons that should lead the USSR to collapse if it does not take active geopolitical steps in Europe and the South in the very near future. Tiriär believed that the ideas of Haushofer regarding the "continental block Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo" are relevant to the highest degree to this day. It is important that Tiriär set forth these theses 15 years before the collapse of the USSR, absolutely accurately predicting its logic and reasons. Tiriär made attempts to convey his views to the Soviet leaders. But he did not succeed in doing this, although in the 60s he had personal meetings with Nasser, Zhou Enlai, and senior Yugoslav leaders. It's significant that Moscow rejected his project of organizing clandestine organizations in Europe "

The views of Jean Tiriär are at the heart of the now activating non-conformist movement of European national Bolsheviks (the "European Liberation Front"). They come close to the projects of modern Russian neo-Eurasianism.

5.3 Thinking of the Continents - Jordis von Laushausen

Very close to Tiriär is the Austrian general Jordis von Laushausen. Unlike Tiriär or de Benoist, he does not participate in direct political activity and does not build specific social projects. He adheres to a strictly scientific approach and is limited to a purely geopolitical analysis. His initial position is the same as that of the National Bolsheviks and the "new right", he is a continentalist and a follower of Haushofer.

Laushausen believes that political power only has a chance to become durable and stable when rulers think not in momentary and local categories, but in

“millennia and continents”. His main book is called *The Courage To Rule. Think of the Continents* (18).

Laushausen believes that global territorial, civilizational, cultural and social processes become understandable only if they are seen in a "far-sighted" perspective, which he contrasts with historical "myopia." The power in human society, on which the choice of the historical path and the most important decisions depend, should be guided by very general schemes that allow finding a place for a particular state or people in a huge historical perspective. Therefore, the main discipline necessary to determine the strategy of power is geopolitics in its traditional sense, operating with global categories, distracting from analytical particularities (and not the “internal” applied geopolitics of the Lacoste school). Modern ideologies, the latest technological and civilizational shifts, such global categories are space, language, ethnicity, resources, etc.

Lohausen offers a formula of power:

" $\text{Might} = \text{Force} \times \text{Location}$ "

He elaborates:

"Since Power is Strength multiplied by location, only a favorable geographical position provides an opportunity for the full development of internal forces." (19)

Thus, power (political, intellectual, etc.) is directly connected with space.

Lauhausen separates the fate of Europe from the fate of the West, considering Europe a continental entity, temporarily falling under the control of thalassocracy. But for political liberation, Europe needs a spatial (positional) minimum. Such a minimum is achieved only through the unification of Germany, the integration processes in Central Europe, the restoration of the territorial unity of Prussia (torn between Poland, the USSR and the German Democratic Republic) and the further folding of the European powers into a new independent bloc independent of Atlanticism. It is important to note the role of Prussia. Lochhausen (following Nikisch and Spengler) believes that Prussia is the most continental, “Eurasian” part of Germany, and that if Germany had not been Berlin but Königsberg, European history would have gone in a different, more right direction,

Lauhausen believes that the future of Europe in a strategic perspective is unthinkable without Russia, and vice versa, Russia (USSR) Europe is necessary, because without it is geopolitically unfinished and vulnerable to America, whose location is much better, and therefore, whose power sooner or later is much ahead of the USSR. Lauhausen emphasized that the USSR could have four Europe in the West: "a hostile Europe, a subordinate Europe, a devastated Europe and an allied Europe." The first three options are inevitable while maintaining the course of European politics that the USSR pursued during the Cold War. Only the desire to make Europe "allied and friendly" at any cost can correct the fatal geopolitical situation of the USSR and become the beginning of a new stage in geopolitical history - the Eurasian stage.

Lauhausen's position is deliberately limited to purely geopolitical statements. He omits ideological questions. For example, the geopolitics of Rus Boyar, Tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union represents for him a single continuous process, independent of the change in the ruling system or ideology. Russia geopolitically is a heartland, and therefore, whatever the regime in it, its fate is predetermined by its lands.

Lauhausen, like Tiriar, predicted in advance the geopolitical collapse of the USSR, which would be inevitable if he followed his usual course. If the outcome of Atlantist geopolitics was seen as a victory, Lauhausen saw in this, rather, a defeat of the continental forces. But with the nuance that the new opportunities that will open after the fall of the Soviet system can create favorable conditions for the creation of a new Eurasian bloc, the Continental Empire, since certain restrictions dictated by Marxist ideology would be removed in this case.

5.4 The Eurasian Empire of the End - Jean Parvulesco

The romantic version of geopolitics is presented by the famous French writer Jean Parvulesco. For the first time, geopolitical themes in literature arise already in George Orwell, who in the dystopian "1984" described the futurologically dividing the planet into three huge continental blocks "Ostasia, Eurasia, Oceania". Similar topics are found in Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, Raymond Abellio, etc.

Jean Parvulesco makes geopolitical themes central to all of his works, opening in the new genre of "geopolitical fiction "

up the new game of geopolitics again.

The concept of Parvulesco is briefly as follows (20): the history of mankind is the history of Power, power. For access to central positions in civilization, i.e. various semi-secret organizations, whose existence cycles far exceed the duration of ordinary political ideologies, ruling dynasties, religious institutions, states and peoples, strive for Power itself. Parvulesco defines these organizations, acting in history under different names, as the "Order of the Atlantists" and the "Order of the Eurasians." Between them there is a centuries-old struggle in which the Popes, patriarchs, kings, diplomats, major financiers, revolutionaries, mystics, generals, scientists, artists, etc. participate. All socio-cultural manifestations are thus reducible to the original, albeit extremely complex, geopolitical archetypes.

This is a geopolitical line brought to its logical limit, the premises of which can be clearly seen already among the founders of geopolitics as such, which are quite rational and alien to "mysticism".

The central role in the plots of Parvulesco is played by General De Gaulle and the geopolitical structure he founded, which, after the end of his presidency, remained in the shadows. Parvulesco calls this "geopolitical gallism." Such "geopolitical gallism" is the French counterpart of the Haushofer school of continentalism.

The main task of the supporters of this line is the organization of the European continental bloc Paris Paris Moscow. In this aspect, Parvulesco's theories merge with the thesis of the "New Right" and the "National Bolsheviks."

Parvulesco believes that the current historical stage is the culmination of a centuries-old geopolitical confrontation, when the dramatic history of a continental civilizational duel comes to an end. He foresees the imminent emergence of a giant continental construction of the "Eurasian Empire of the End", and then the final collision with the "Empire of the Atlantic." This eschatological duel, described by him in apocalyptic tones, he calls "Endkampf" ("Final Battle"). It is curious that in the texts of Parvulesco fictional characters coexist with real historical figures, with many of whom the author maintained (and with some still maintains) friendly relations. Among them are politicians from De Gaulle's close circle, British and American diplomats, poet Ezra Pound, [text missing]

Despite the fictional form Parvulesco's texts have enormous geopolitical value

Despite the national form, Parvulesco's texts have enormous geopolitical value, since a number of his articles published in the late 70s strangely describe the situation in the world only in the mid-90s.

5.5 The Indian Ocean as a path to world domination - Robert Stoikers

The complete opposite of the "geopolitical visionary" Parvulesco is the Belgian geopolitician and publicist Robert Stoikers, the publisher of two prestigious magazines *Orientation* and *Vuluar*. Stoikers approaches geopolitics from a purely scientific, rationalist perspective, striving to free this discipline from all "random" strata. But following the logic of the "new right" in the academic direction, he comes to conclusions strikingly close to the "prophecies" of Parvulesco.

Stoikers also believes that the socio-political and especially diplomatic projects of various states and blocs, no matter what ideological form they are dressed in, are an indirect and sometimes veiled expression of global geopolitical projects. In this he sees the influence of the "Earth" factor on human history. Man is an earthly creature (created from the earth). Therefore, the earth, space predetermine a person in its most significant manifestations. This is a prerequisite for "geohistory".

Continentalist orientation is a priority for Stoikers; he considers Atlantism hostile to Europe, and connects the fate of European well-being with Germany and Central Europe (21). Stoikers is a supporter of the active cooperation of Europe with the countries of the Third World, and especially with the Arab world.

At the same time, he emphasizes the great importance of the Indian Ocean for the future geopolitical structure of the planet. He defines the Indian Ocean as the "Middle Ocean", located between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Indian Ocean is located exactly in the middle between the east coast of Africa and the Pacific zone, in which New Zealand, Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina are located. Maritime control of the Indian Ocean is a key position for geopolitical influence immediately on the three most important "large spaces" of Africa, South Eurasian rimland and the Pacific region. This implies the strategic priority of some small islands in the Indian Ocean,

especially Diego García, which is equidistant from all coastal zones.

The Indian Ocean is the territory on which the whole European strategy should focus, since through this zone Europe will be able to influence the United States, Eurasia, and Japan, Stoikers claims. From his point of view, the decisive geopolitical confrontation, which should predetermine the picture of the future XXI century, will unfold in this space.

Stoikers is actively involved in the history of geopolitics, and he owns articles on the founders of this science in the new edition of the *Brussels Encyclopedia*.

5.6 Russia + Islam = salvation of Europe - Carlo Terraciano

An active geopolitical center of the continentalist orientation also exists in Italy. In Italy after the Second World War, more than in other European countries, the ideas of Karl Schmitt became widespread, and thanks to this, the geopolitical way of thinking became very widespread there. In addition, it was in Italy that the most developed movement was the Young Europe movement of Jean Tiriard, and, accordingly, the ideas of continental national Bolshevism.

Among the many political science and sociological "new right-wing" journals and centers dealing with geopolitics, Milan Orion is of particular interest, where over the past 10 years geopolitical analyzes of Dr. Carlo Terraciano have been regularly published. Terraciano expresses the most extreme position of European continentalism, closely adjacent to Eurasianism.

Terraciano fully accepts the picture of Mackinder and Mahan and agrees with the strict civilizational and geographical dualism that they have highlighted. At the same time, he unequivocally takes the side of heartland, believing that the fate of Europe depends entirely on the fate of Russia and Eurasia, on the East. The Continental East is positive, the Atlantic West is negative. Such a radical approach on the part of the European is an exception even among geopolitics of a continental orientation, since Terraciano does not even emphasize the special status of Europe, considering it to be a secondary moment in the face of the planetary confrontation of thalassocracy and tellurocracy.

He completely shares the idea of a single Eurasian State, the "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin." which brings it closer to Tiriard. but he

does not share the Jacobinism and universalism characteristic of Tyriar, insisting on ethno-cultural differentiation and regionalism, which brings him, in turn, with Alain de Benoit.

The emphasis on the centrality of the Russian factor is adjacent to Terraciano's other curious point: he believes that the Islamic world plays a crucial role in the fight against Atlanticism, especially the anti-American regimes: Iranian, Libyan, Iraqi, etc. This leads him to conclude that the Islamic world is the highest exponent of continental geopolitical interests. At the same time, he considers the "fundamentalist" version of Islam to be positive.

The final formula, which summarizes the geopolitical views of Dr. Terraciano, is as follows:

Russia (heartland) + Islam against the USA (Atlanticism, mondialism) (22)

Terraciano sees Europe as a springboard for the Russian-Islamic anti-Mondialist bloc. From his point of view, only such a radical formulation of the question can objectively lead to a genuine European revival.

Other employees of Orion and the intellectual center working on its basis (Prof. Claudio Mutti, Mauritsio Murelli, sociologist Alessandra Colla, Marco Battarra, etc.) hold similar views to Terraciano. Some leftists also tend to this national-Bolshevik trend. , the social democratic, communist and anarchist circles of Italy, the newspaper Umanita, the magazine Nuovi Angulacioni, etc.

Chapter 6 - Neo-Eurasianism

6.1 Eurasian passionarity - Lev Gumilyov

The most striking student of the Eurasian Savitsky was the famous Russian scientist historian Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov. He did not touch upon geopolitical topics per se in his writings, but his theory of ethnogenesis and ethnic cycles clearly continues the line of the "organic" approach and partly "geographical determinism", which already constitute the essence of geopolitics in Ratzel, Chellen, Haushofer, etc.

Gumilyov's research is particularly important in relation to the ancient periods of the ethnic map of Eurasia, the steppe, nomadic peoples and their civilizations. From his works, an entirely new vision of political history is formed, in which the Eurasian East acts not just as barbaric lands on the periphery of civilization (equivalent to Western civilization), but as an independent and dynamic center of ethnogenesis, culture, political history, state and technical development. The West and its history are relativized, the Eurasian culture and the constellation of Eurasian ethnic groups are revealed as a multidimensional and completely unexplored world with its own scale of values, religious problems, historical laws, etc.

Gumilev develops and brings to a logical limit the common Eurasian idea that ethnically Great Russians, Russians are not just a branch of the Eastern Slavs, but a special ethnic group based on the Turkic-Slavic merger. This indirectly implies the validity of Russian control over those Eurasian lands that are inhabited by Turkic ethnic groups. The Great Russian civilization was formed on the basis of Turkic-Slavic ethnogenesis, which was realized on a geographical plane as a historical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe. It is the geopolitical combination of Forest and Steppe that makes up the historical essence of Russia, predetermining the nature of its culture, civilization, ideology, and political fate.

Gumilev, following Spengler and Toynbee, identifies the cycles of civilizations and cultures, as well as the corresponding ethnic groups. From his point of view, the ethno-cultural formations of the nation, state, religious communities in everything are like living organisms. They go through periods of birth, youth

everything are like living organisms. They go through periods of birth, youth, maturity and aging, and then disappear or become so-called. relics. In this again, the influence of "organic philosophy", common to all continentalist geopolitical schools, is clearly noticeable.

Gumilyov's theories regarding the causes of ethnogenesis are extremely interesting. birth of a nation or state. To describe this process, he introduces the term "drive" or "drive" (23). This is an inexplicable synchronous surge of biological and spiritual energy, which suddenly sets in motion the sluggish historical existence of the "old" peoples and cultures, capturing various established ethnic and religious groups in a dynamic burst of spatial, spiritual and technical expansion, which leads to the conquest and fusion of diverse residual ethnic groups into new active and viable forms. High and full-fledged passionarity and the dynamic process of ethnogenesis in the normal case lead to the emergence of a special superethnos,

Passionarity is gradually decreasing. Instead of "passism" (for Gumilyov this is a positive category, which he equates to "heroism", to the ethical desire for selfless creation in the name of fidelity to the national tradition) comes "actualism", i.e. preoccupation only with the present moment in isolation from tradition and without regard to the fate of future generations. In this phase, "passionary breaking" occurs and ethnogenesis enters the negative stage of conservation and the onset of decay. This is followed by the "futuristic" phase, in which the type of powerless "dreamers", "dreamers", and "religious escapist" dominate, who lose faith in the surrounding being and tend to go into the "otherworldly". Gumilev considers this a sign of final decline. Ethnicity is degrading

This situation continues until a new "drive", when a new fresh ethnos appears and provokes a new ethnogenesis in which the remnants of old structures are remelted. Moreover, some ethnic groups remain in a "relict" state (Gumilev calls them "chimeras"), while others disappear in the dynamics of a new ethnogenetic process.

Gumilyov's assertion that the Great Russians are a relatively "fresh" and "young" ethnic group, rallying the "superethnos" of Russia-Eurasia or the Eurasian Empire around it, is especially important.

The following geopolitical conclusions suggest itself from Gumilyov's Eurasianism (which he himself did not make for obvious political reasons,

preferring to remain strictly within the framework of historical science).

1) Eurasia is a full-fledged "local development", a fertile, rich soil of ethnogenesis and cultural genesis. Therefore, we must learn to consider world history not in the unipolar optics of "the West and everyone else" (as is characteristic of Atlantist historiography), but in multipolar, with northern and eastern Eurasia being of particular interest, since they are the alternative source of the most important planetary civilization processes to the West. . In his works, Gumilyov gives a detailed picture of Mackinder's thesis about the "geographical axis of history" and gives this axis concrete historical and ethnic content.

2) The geopolitical synthesis of Forest and Steppe, which underlies Great Russian statehood, is a key reality for cultural and strategic control over Asia and Eastern Europe. Moreover, such control would contribute to a harmonious balance of East and West, while the cultural limitations of Western civilizations (Forest), with its desire for domination, accompanied by a complete misunderstanding of the culture of the East (Steppes), leads only to conflicts and upheavals.

3) Western civilization is in the last descending stage of ethnogenesis, being a conglomerate of "chimeric" ethnic groups. Consequently, the center of gravity will necessarily move to younger nations.

4) It is also possible that in the near future there will be some unpredictable and unforeseen "drive", which will dramatically change the political and cultural map of the planet, since the dominance of "relict" ethnic groups cannot last long.

6.2 New Russian Eurasians

Gumilev himself did not formulate geopolitical conclusions based on his picture of the world. This was done by his followers during the period of weakening (and then cancellation) of Marxist ideological censorship. Such a direction as a whole was called "neo-Eurasianism," which, in turn, has several varieties. Not all of them inherit Gumilyov's ideas, but on the whole his influence on this geopolitical ideology is colossal.

Neo-Eurasianism has several varieties.

The first (and the most basic and developed) is a complete and multidimensional ideology, which was formulated by some political circles of the national opposition, opposing liberal reforms in the period 1990-1994. This is a group of intellectuals, united around the newspaper *Day* (later *Tomorrow*) and the magazine *Elements* (24).

This neo-Eurasianism is based on the ideas of P. Savitsky, G. Vernadsky, Prince. N. Trubetskoy, as well as the ideologist of Russian National Bolshevism Nikolai Ustryalov. Analysis of historical Eurasians is recognized as highly relevant and fully applicable to the current situation. The thesis of a national ideocracy of an imperial continental scale is opposed both to liberal Westernism and narrow-ethnic nationalism. Russia is seen as the axis of the geopolitical "large space"; its ethnic mission is unambiguously identified with imperial construction.

At the socio-political level, this trend clearly gravitates toward Eurasian socialism, considering the liberal economy a characteristic feature of the atlantist camp. The Soviet period of Russian history is seen in the shift perspective as a modernist form of the traditional Russian national desire for planetary expansion and "Eurasian anti-Atlantic universalism." Hence the "pro-communist" tendencies of this version of neo-Eurasianism.

The legacy of Lev Gumilyov is accepted, but at the same time the theory of passionarity is coupled with the doctrine of the "circulation of elites" by the Italian sociologist Wilfred Pareto, and Gumilev's religious studies are corrected on the basis of the school of European traditionalists (Genon, Evola, etc.).

The ideas of traditionalists are "crisis of the modern world", "degradation of the West", "desacralization of civilization", etc. are an important component of neo-Eurasianism, supplementing and developing those moments that were presented by Russian authors only intuitively and fragmentarily.

In addition, European continentalist projects (Haushofer, Schmitt, Nikish, the "New Right", etc.) are thoroughly studied, due to which the horizons of the Eurasian doctrine extend to Europe, understood as a potential continental force. This motive is completely alien to the historical Eurasian émigrés who wrote the main works in a situation when the United States did not yet have independent geopolitical significance, and the thesis of the difference between Europe and the West has not yet been properly developed. Neo-Eurasianism, while listening to European continentalists, recognizes the strategic importance of Europe for the geopolitical completeness and usefulness of the Eurasian "Great Space".

especially considering that it was the unstable division of the geopolitical map of Europe that led to the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.

Another feature of neo-Eurasianism is the choice of Islamic countries (especially continental Iran) as the most important strategic ally. The idea of a continental Russian-Islamic alliance lies at the heart of the anti-Atlantic strategy on the southwest coast of the Eurasian continent. At the doctrinal level, this alliance is based on the traditional character of Russian and Islamic civilizations, which unites them in opposing the antitraditional, secular-pragmatic West.

In this direction of neo-Eurasism, the picture of all geopolitical projects, as applied to the current situation, is being completed to its fullness, since ideologically, strategically, and politically, and positionally, the Neo-Eurasian project is the most complete, consistent, complete and historically substantiated opposition to all varieties of Western geopolitical projects (both Atlantic and mondialist).

Mondialism and Atlantism express two varieties of the geopolitical ideology of the extreme West. Europeanism and moderate continentalism of European geopolitics is an intermediate reality. And finally, the neo-Eurasianism of The Day, and especially the Elements, expresses a radically anti-Western point of view that fits with all other alternative geopolitical projects from European national Bolshevism to Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamic "socialism") up to national liberation movements in all corners Third World.

Other varieties of neo-Eurasianism are less consistent and represent an adaptation of the whole complex of the above ideas to changing political reality: either we are talking only about pragmatic economic "Eurasianism", designed to recreate the economic interaction of the former republics of the USSR (project of the President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev), or justification expansionist theses (the "great-power" project of V. Zhirinovsky), or a purely rhetorical appeal to the "Eurasian community" to preserve the unity of the Russians and national minorities (mostly ethnic Turks and Muslims) as part of the Russian Federation (a draft of some figures of the government of B. Yeltsin), or of a purely historical interest in the heritage of the Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Suvchinsky, Karsavin circle, etc. in exile. But all these versions are necessarily artificial, fragmented, inconsistent, and cannot claim independent and serious geopolitical ideology and methodology. Therefore, to dwell on them does not make much sense.

We only note that any appeals in Eurasianism and Eurasia, no matter how limited meaning those people use them, directly or indirectly refer precisely to that neo-Eurasian project that was developed in opposition circles and framed in the works of the authors of the Day "and" Elements ", since only in this context the use of the word" Eurasianism "is justified both by the continuity of the Russian geopolitical school and its correlation with the general fan of geopolitical projects of a planetary scale existing outside Russia.

6.3 Toward a New Bipolarity

Neo-Eurasianism, in addition to its intellectual heritage and the general principles of continental geopolitics, faces the latest problems posed in the form of the latest geopolitical projects of the West. Moreover, this geopolitical direction is gaining importance precisely to the extent that it can not only explain the geopolitical logic of current historical events, but also develop a coherent futurological project that can withstand Western projects.

The victory of the West in the Cold War conceptually means the end of the bipolar and the beginning of a unipolar world. At the same time, if pure Atlantists (Huntington) assume that this unipolarity will be relative, the winning West (The West) will be forced to constantly settle growing inter-civilizational conflicts with "the rest of the world" (The Rest), then the mondialists (Fukuyama, Attali) see a problem-free domination The West needs the whole planet as something already happened. Even the most controversial version of Professor Santoro presupposes, in the end, the establishment of a World Government.

These are projects of geopolitical winners, which today have undeniable advantages and a strategic initiative, which must be reckoned with in the highest degree. All of them agree on one thing: sooner or later, Western-style universalism must prevail on the planet, i.e. an atlantic, thalassocratic value system should become dominant everywhere. The bipolar world of the Cold War is considered to be completely overcome. Eurasia and Eurasianism in this picture simply does not have a place. All this is logical and follows directly from the works of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians who sought to weaken the forces of Sushi in every way, undermining their power and restraining their development by various strategic methods, especially the "anaconda" strategy,

that is tight control over the large and large sectors of the world.

Neo-Eurasianism cannot, while remaining itself, recognize the validity of this state of affairs and is doomed to seek opportunities to reverse all these processes. And it begins with the most central question with the question of unipolarity. Unipolarity (the dominance of Atlantism in any form, either in its pure form or through mondialism) dooms Eurasia as a heartland to historical non-existence. Neo-Eurasianism insists that this unipolarity should be resisted.

This can only be done through a new bipolarity.

This requires clarification. There is a point of view that after the confrontation between the USA and the USSR, the world itself will go over to a multipolar device, China will rise, demographic processes will bring Islamic countries to the category of geopolitically central, the Pacific region will declare its competitiveness with Europe and America, etc. All this is possible, but it does not take into account that such a new multipolarity will be held under the sign of the "Atlantist value system", i.e. it will be only territorial varieties of the thalassocratic system, and in no way a genuine geopolitical alternative. The challenge of the West, the market and liberal democracy is universal. After the victory of heartland, all attempts of peoples and states to follow some other way, except for the west, lost their main support. And pro-Soviet regimes, and all "[text missing]

This is well understood by Western strategists, who are well aware that the main geopolitical task of the West at this stage is to prevent the very possibility of forming a large-scale geopolitical bloc of continental volume, which could be comparable in some way with the forces of Atlanticism. This is the main principle of the military-political doctrine of the United States, which is formulated in a report by Paul Wolfowitz. In other words, the West most of all does not want a return to bipolarity. That would be mortally dangerous for him.

Neo-Eurasianism, based on the interests of the "geographical axis of history," asserts the exact opposite of the West. The only way out of this situation can be only new bipolarism, since only in this direction could Eurasia gain the prospect of genuine geopolitical sovereignty. Only a new bipolarity can subsequently open the way for such multipolarity, which would go beyond the framework of the thalassocratic liberal democratic system, i.e. the true multipolarity of the world, where each nation and each geopolitical bloc could choose its own system of values, has a chance to be realized only after being liberated from

global Atlantic domination through a new planetary confrontation.

Moreover, it is important that the Eurasian continental bloc cannot become a simple recreation of the Warsaw Pact. The collapse of the former geopolitical continental structure is irreversible and rooted in its very structure. The new continental alliance should either include all of Europe to the Atlantic and several important sectors of the southern coast of Eurasia, India, Iran, Indochina, etc., or ensure friendly neutrality of these same spaces, i.e. get them out of control of atlantism. A return to the old bipolarism is impossible for many reasons, including ideological ones. The new Eurasian bipolarism should proceed from completely different ideological premises and be based on completely different methods.

This theory of "new bipolarism" is sufficiently developed in neo-Eurasian projects, being a theoretical justification for all non-conformist geopolitical theories of Europe and the Third World. Just as heartland is objectively the only point that can be a springboard for a planetary alternative to thalassocracy, neo-Eurasia is the only theoretical platform on the basis of which a whole fan of planetary strategies can be developed that deny the world domination of Atlantism and its civilizational system of values: market, liberal democracy, secular culture, philosophy of individualism, etc.

PART 3 - RUSSIA AND SPACE

Chapter 1 - Heartland

From a strategic point of view, Russia is a gigantic continental mass that is identified with Eurasia itself. After the development of Siberia and its integration, Russia unequivocally coincided with the geopolitical concept of Heartland, i.e. "Central Earth" of the continent. Mackinder defined the Russian Great Space as the "Geographical Axis of History." Geographically, landscape, linguistically, climatically, culturally and religiously, Russia is a synthetic unity of the Eurasian West and the Eurasian East, and its geopolitical function does not boil down to summarize or mediate Western and Eastern trends. Russia is something Third, independent and special, neither East nor West. Culturally interpreting the "middle" position of Russia, Russian Eurasians spoke of a special culture "Of the Middle Empire, where geographical and geopolitical opposites are removed in a spiritual, vertical synthesis. From a purely strategic point of view, Russia is identical to Eurasia itself, if only because it is its land, its population and its industrial and technological development that have sufficient volume to be the basis continental independence, autarchy and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which, according to geopolitical laws, should happen with each "island", including the "World Island" itself (World Island), i.e. with Eurasia. its population and its industrial and technological development are large enough to be the basis of continental independence, autarchy and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which, according to geopolitical laws, should happen to every "island", including the "World Island" itself (World Island), i.e. with Eurasia. its population and its industrial and technological development are large enough to be the basis of continental independence, autarchy and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which, according to geopolitical laws, should happen to every "island", including the "World Island" itself (World Island), i.e. with Eurasia.

In relation to Russia-Heartland, all other Eurasian states and lands are coastal, Rimland. Russia is the "Axis of History", because "civilization" revolves around it, creating its most striking, expressive and finished forms not in its life-giving continental source, but in the "coastal zone", in the critical strip, where the land of Sushi borders the space of Water, sea or ocean. From a strategic point of view, Russia is an independent territorial structure, whose security and sovereignty are identical to the security and sovereignty of the entire continent

sovereignty are identical to the security and sovereignty of the entire continent. This cannot be said of any other major Eurasian power, neither about China, nor Germany, nor France, nor India. If in relation to its coastal neighbors or to the states of other "Islands" or continents China, Germany, France, India, etc. can act as continental forces, in relation to Russia they will always remain "coastal strips", Rimland, with all the corresponding strategic, cultural and political consequences. Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with a complete geopolitical foundation. Only its strategic interests are not only close to the interests of the continent, but are strictly identical to them (at least at the current stage of development of the technosphere, this is the case). Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with a complete geopolitical foundation. Only its strategic interests are not only close to the interests of the continent, but are strictly identical to them (at least at the current stage of development of the technosphere, this is the case). Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with a complete geopolitical foundation. Only its strategic interests are not only close to the interests of the continent, but are strictly identical to them (at least at the current stage of development of the technosphere, this is the case).

Chapter 2 - The Rimland Problem

Russia's attitude to the neighboring continental Romano-Germanic civilizations in the West and the three traditional civilizations in the East (Islamic, Hindu and Chinese) has at least two planes, which in no case can be mixed together, as this will inevitably lead to a multitude of misunderstandings. Firstly, the cultural and historical essence of Russia, its spiritual self-determination, its "identity" are certainly determined by the formula "neither East nor West" or "neither Europe nor Asia, but Eurasia" (as Russian Eurasians put it). Spiritually, Russia is something Third, something independent and special, which has no expression either in terms of the East or in terms of the West. At this level, Russia's highest interest is to preserve its uniqueness at any cost, defending its identity before the challenge of the culture of the West and the traditions of the East. This does not mean complete isolationism, but nevertheless limits the range of possible borrowings. Historical realism requires us to courageously acknowledge that the affirmation of "our own", "ours" always goes parallel to the denial of "alien", "not ours". And affirmation and denial are fundamental elements of the national, cultural, historical and political independence of the people and the state. Therefore, the denial of both the West and the East in cultural terms is a historical imperative for the independence of Russia. In this matter, of course, there can be a variety of nuances and discussions, recognizing the identity, some believe that it is better to open more for the East than for the West ("Asian direction").

At the strategic and purely geopolitical levels, the situation is completely different. Since Russia-Eurasia at the present historical stage, as its planetary opponent, has not so much "coastal civilizations", Rimland, but the opposite "Island", Atlantic America, the most important strategic imperative is the transformation of "coastal territories" into its allies, a strategic penetration entry into the "coastal" zones, the conclusion of a pan-Eurasian pact, or at least ensuring the complete and strict neutrality of as many Rimland as possible in a positional confrontation with the transatlantic West. Here, the strategic formula of Russia should definitely be the formula "both East and West", since only the continental integration of Eurasia with a center in Russia can guarantee all its peoples and states real sovereignty, maximum political and economic autarchy. At the strategic level, today there is only one opposition: either mondialism (the

At the strategic level, today there is only one opposition: either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlantism), or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces that enjoy political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Rimlands are necessary for Russia to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical force. At the moment, with the current development of the military, either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlantism), or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Rimlands are necessary for Russia to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical force. At the moment, with the current development of the military, either mondialism (the planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlantism), or continentalism (dividing the planet into two or more Large Spaces enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Rimlands are necessary for Russia to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical force. At the moment, with the current development of the military, strategic and economic technologies, there can simply be no other, noncontinental, sovereignty: all sorts of "ethnocratic", purely "isolationist" projects to solve the state problem of Russia in the strategic sphere give a result strictly corresponding to the mondialist plans for total control over the planet and for full strategic , political and economic occupation of Eurasia and Russia.

Obviously, the transfer of the cultural and historical problems of Russia to the strategic or geopolitical level (i.e., endowing the formula "neither East nor West" with a purely geopolitical meaning) is nothing more than a political sabotage aimed at strategic disorientation of Russia's foreign policy. Whatever the basis of the "narrow-ethnic", "racial-nationalist", "chauvinistic" models of Russian statehood ignorance, naivety or conscious work against their people and their independence, the result is complete identity with the mondialist goals. Without turning Russia into an "ethnic reservation," the United States will not be able to gain full control of the world.

The Rimland problem is posed in this way only today, when behind us is the entire strategic history of the bipolar world and the planetary cold war of the USSR and the USA. At the time of the peak of political activity of Russian Eurasians, the strategic situation was completely different, and very few could look into the future. Therefore, some geopolitical projects of Eurasians should be considered with caution. In particular, the problem of Rimland was interpreted by them more culturally than strategically. All this must be taken into account in order for Russia to develop a serious and justified geopolitical program, realistic and promising, which should be put at the forefront of the main geopolitical

imperative of independence, sovereignty, independence, autarchy and freedom of Great Russia.

Chapter 3 - Gathering the Empire

One of the main tenets of geopolitics is the assertion that the geopolitical position of a state is much more important than the features of the political structure of this state. Politics, culture, ideology, the nature of the ruling elite and even religion are considered in geopolitical optics as important but secondary factors compared with the fundamental geopolitical principle of the attitude of the state to space. Often (especially in Russia) such a specificity of geopolitics as science is considered almost a "cynicism" or even an "anti-national" approach. This, of course, is completely untrue. Geopolitics simply does not pretend to be the only and highest authority in determining the state and political interests of a nation. Geopolitics is one of several basic disciplines that make it possible to adequately formulate the international and military doctrine of the state along with other equally important disciplines. As physics, in order to be an exact science, must abstract from chemistry and its laws (this does not mean that physics denies chemistry), so geopolitics, in order to be a strict discipline, must leave aside other non-geopolitical approaches which can and should be taken into account in the final conclusions regarding the fate of the state and people along with geopolitics.

One of the most urgent geopolitical requirements of Russia is the "gathering of the Empire." No matter how we relate to "socialism", the USSR, the Eastern bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries, etc., no matter how we evaluate the political and cultural reality of one of the two superpowers, from the geopolitical point of view, the existence of the Eastern bloc was clearly a positive factor for a possible Eurasian unification, for continental integration and the sovereignty of our Greater Space. It was geopolitical logic that made Belgian theorist Jean Tiriard speak of the need to create a "Euro-Soviet empire from Vladivostok to Dublin." Only the Eastern bloc could become the basis for the unification of Eurasia into the Empire, although the division of Europe and the inconsistency of Soviet politics in Asia were serious obstacles to this goal. According to many modern geopoliticians, the collapse of the USSR was largely determined by its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States controlled Rimland West and East so skillfully and consistently that, ultimately, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of Eastern bloc. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow

Eastern bloc. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. The collapse of the USSR was largely determined by its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States that controlled Rimland between the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, ultimately, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states. The collapse of the USSR was largely determined by its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern borders of the United States that controlled Rimland between the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that, ultimately, they did not allow continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty of all Eurasian states.

The imperative of Russia's geopolitical and strategic sovereignty is not only to restore the lost regions of the "near abroad", not only to renew allied relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but also to include the states of the continental West (first of all, in the new Eurasian strategic bloc) , the Franco-German bloc, which gravitates towards the liberation from the Atlantic guardianship of pro-American NATO) and the continental East (Iran, India and Japan).

For Russia, the geopolitical "gathering of the Empire" is not only one of the possible ways of development, one of the possible relations of the state to space, but a guarantee and necessary condition for the existence of an independent state, and, moreover, an independent state on an independent continent.

If Russia does not immediately begin to recreate the Great Space, i.e. to return the temporarily lost Eurasian expanses to the sphere of its strategic, political and economic influence, it will plunge itself into a catastrophe and all the peoples living on the World Island.

The course of possible events is easy to foresee. If Russia chooses some other way than the "way of gathering the Empire," the new powers or blocs of states will begin to take on the Heartland continental mission. In this case, the vastness of Russia will be the main strategic goal for those forces that declare themselves the new "citadel of Eurasia." This is completely inevitable, since control over the continent is inconceivable without control over the space of the "geographical axis of History." Either China will make a desperate rush to the North to

Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia, or Central Europe will move to the Western Russian lands of Ukraine, Belarus, Western Great Russia, or the Islamic bloc will try to integrate Central Asia, the Volga region and the Urals, as well as some territories of Southern Russia. This new continental integration is impossible to avoid, since the geopolitical map of the planet itself resists its unipolar, atlantist orientation. In geopolitics, the sacred law "a holy place does not exist is empty" is quite competent. Moreover, the expansion into Russian lands by other Eurasian blocs is prompted not by "territorial egoism" or "Russophobia", but by the inexorable logic of space and Russia's geopolitical passivity. In the field of continental strategy, it is foolish to expect other nations to stop territorial expansion into Russian lands only out of respect for the "originality of Russian culture." In this area, there are only territorial power impulses and positional advantages. Even the fact of hesitation in the matter of the immediate "gathering of the Empire" it is already a sufficient challenge, a sufficient basis for alternative geopolitical Large Spaces to move into Russian borders. Naturally, this will provoke a reaction of the Russians and entail a terrible and unpromising intra-Eurasian conflict; unpromising because it will not even have a theoretically positive solution, since in order to create non-Russian Eurasia it is necessary to completely destroy the Russian people, and this is not only difficult, but actually impossible, as history shows. On the other hand, such a conflict will lay the front line between neighboring states of a continental and anti-Atlantic orientation, and this will only strengthen the position of a third force, i.e. USA and their colleagues on mondialist projects. Lack of action is also a kind of action, and behind the delay in the "gathering of the Empire" (not to mention the possible abandonment of Russia's geopolitical expansion) inevitably, great Eurasian blood will follow. Events in the Balkans provide a terrible example of what can happen in Russia on an incomparably more grandiose scale.

The reunification of Eurasian territories under the auspices of Russia as the "axis of History" is fraught with certain difficulties today, but they are insignificant in the face of the catastrophes that will inevitably come if this "gathering of the Empire" does not begin immediately.

Chapter 4 - Warm and Cold Seas

The process of "gathering the Empire" should initially focus on the distant goal, which is Russia's access to the warm seas. It was thanks to the containment of Russian expansion in the southern, southwestern, and northwestern directions that Atlantic Atlantis was able to maintain its control over all the "coastal spaces" surrounding Eurasia. Russia was geopolitically a "complete" power in the East and North, where its political borders coincided with the natural geographical borders of the Eurasian continent. But the paradox was that these coasts are adjacent to the cold seas, which is an insurmountable barrier to the development of seafaring to the extent that it would seriously compete in the seas with the fleets of the Western Island (England, and later America). On the other hand, [text missing]

Be that as it may, access to the cold seas of the North and East should be supplemented by access to the warm seas of the South and West, and only in this case Russia will become geopolitically "complete". For this, in fact, numerous Russo-Turkish wars were fought, the fruits of which, however, were not reaped by Turks or Russians, but by the British, bloodless the last two traditional empires of the three (the third Austria-Hungary). The last jerk to the vital Russia of the South was the unsuccessful expansion of the USSR into Afghanistan. Geopolitical logic unequivocally shows that Russia will definitely have to return there again, although it would be much better to come as a faithful ally, defender and other than a cruel punisher. Only when the coastline becomes the southern and western borders of Russia, we can talk about the final completion of its continental construction. In this case, it is not necessary to talk about conquests, expansion or annexations. A strong anti-Atlantic parity strategic alliance with the continental European and Asian powers would be sufficient to achieve this goal. Access to the warm seas can be obtained not only through a bloody war, but also through a rational peace beneficial to the geopolitical interests of all continental powers, since the Eurasian strategic integration project will enable all these powers to become really sovereign and independent in the face of an alternative Atlantic Island, combined, in turn, with the strategic doctrine of Monroe. Straits and warm seas were inaccessible to Russia when such an obvious Atlantic factor as the United States, threatening the interests of all of

Europe and all of Asia, did not yet exist, and the various powers of the mainland challenged each other's superiority in opposing England and leadership in the territorial strategic association. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America highlighted the whole geopolitical significance of Russia, and therefore the alliance with Russia became a self-evident emperor for all realistic geopolitics of the continent in whatever political forms it was embodied depending on circumstances.

The threat of mondialism and atlantist globalism theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through a self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against overseas invaders. and the various powers of the mainland challenged each other's superiority in opposing England and leadership in the territorial strategic alliance. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America highlighted the whole geopolitical significance of Russia, and therefore the alliance with Russia became a self-evident emperor for all realistic geopolitics of the continent in whatever political forms it was embodied depending on circumstances. The threat of mondialism and atlantist globalism theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through a self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against overseas invaders. and the various powers of the mainland challenged each other's superiority in opposing England and leadership in the territorial strategic alliance. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America highlighted the whole geopolitical significance of Russia, and therefore the alliance with Russia became a self-evident emperor for all realistic geopolitics of the continent in whatever political forms it was embodied depending on circumstances. The threat of mondialism and atlantist globalism theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through a self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against overseas invaders. and therefore, the alliance with Russia became a self-evident emperor for all realistic geopolitics of the continent in whatever political forms it incarnated, depending on the circumstances. The threat of mondialism and atlantist globalism theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through a self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against overseas invaders. and therefore, the alliance with Russia became a self-evident emperor for all realistic geopolitics of the continent in whatever political forms it incarnated, depending on the circumstances. The threat of mondialism and atlantist globalism theoretically opens Russia access to the warm seas through a self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against overseas invaders.

PART 4 - GEOPOLITICAL FUTURE OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1 - The Need for a Radical Alternative

In our society today there are two fundamental projects regarding the Russian future. To one degree or another, they affect all aspects of national life, economy, geopolitics, international relations, ethnic interests, industrial structure, economic structure, military construction, etc.

The first project belongs to radical liberals, “reformers” who take Western society, the modern “trading system” as an example, and fully subscribe to projects about the “end of history” developed in the famous article by Francis Fukuyama. This project denies values such as people, nation, history, geopolitical interests, social justice, religious factor, etc. Everything in it is built on the principle of maximum economic efficiency, on the primacy of individualism, consumption and the “free market”. The liberals want to build a new society on the site of Russia that has never existed historically, in which those rules and cultural coordinates will be established, according to which the modern West and, especially, the USA live. This camp can easily formulate an answer to any questions regarding a particular aspect of Russian reality on the basis of models already existing in the West, using Western liberal terminology and legal norms, and also drawing on the developed theoretical structures of liberal capitalism as a whole. This position, some time ago, almost dominated ideologically in our society, and even today it is it that is most famous, since it generally coincides with the general course and principle logic of liberal reforms.

The second project of the Russian future belongs to the so-called the “national-patriotic opposition,” which is a diverse and diverse political reality, combined with an rejection of liberal reforms and a rejection of the liberal logic advocated by the reformers. This opposition is not just national and not just patriotic, it is “pink and white”, i.e. it is dominated by representatives of communist statesmen (who have largely departed from the rigid Marxist-Leninist dogma) and supporters of the Orthodox-monarchist, tsarist type of statehood. The views of both components of the “united opposition” differ quite significantly, but there are similarities not only in the definition of a “common enemy”, but also in some mental, ideological clichés shared by both. Moreover, the patriotic “opposition” overwhelmingly consists of the leaders of the pre-perestroika system who bring

overwhelmingly consists of the readers of the pre-perestroika system, who bring elements of a purely Soviet mentality even to the "white", "tsarist projects", to which most often they did not have any historical, family or political relationship before the beginning of perestroika, feeling great in Brezhnev's reality. Be that as it may, the opposition project can be called "Soviet-tsarist", as it is based on some ideological, geopolitical, political, social and administrative archetypes that objectively bring together the Soviet and pre-Soviet period (at least in the framework of XX century). The ideology of patriots is much more controversial and confused than the logical and complete constructions of liberals, and therefore, it often does not manifest itself in the form of a complete concept or doctrine, but fragmentarily, emotionally, inconsistently and fragmentarily. Nevertheless, this grotesque conglomerate of mixed Soviet-tsarist mental fragments has some integrity, which, however, is sometimes not easy to structure rationally.

Both of these projects, both liberal and Soviet-tsarist, are essentially dead end for the Russian people and Russian history. The liberal project generally involves the gradual erasure of the national features of the Russians in the cosmopolitan era of the "end of history" and the "planetary market," and the Soviet-tsarist effort is trying to revive the nation and state precisely in those historical forms and structures that, in fact, gradually led the Russians to collapse.

On the other side of the liberalism of the "reformers" and the Soviet-tsarism of the "united opposition" there is an urgent need for a "third way", for a special ideological project that would not be a compromise, not "centrism" between the two, but a completely radical innovative a futuristic plan breaking with hopeless dualistic logic "either liberals or opposition" where, as in a maze without a way out, the current Russian public consciousness rushes about.

It is necessary to cut the Gordian knot and establish a true alternative, opposing both of them. At stake is the great nation, its interests, its fate.

Chapter 2 - What are “Russian national interests”?

2.1 Russians today have no State

In the current political situation, it is impossible, strictly speaking, to discuss the “strategic prospects of Russia”. Moreover, it is impossible to propose any projects regarding Russia's foreign and domestic policy, since the main question is what is Russia today? It remains not only unsolved, but also not taken seriously.

The rapid changes in the entire political, geopolitical, ideological and social order that occurred in the former USSR completely overturned all existing legal and political criteria and norms. The collapse of the unified socialist system and later of the Soviet state created a field of complete uncertainty in the former Soviet territories, in which there are no more clear guidelines, no strict legal framework, or concrete social prospects. Those geopolitical structures that were formed "automatically", by inertia after the collapse of the USSR, are random, transient and extremely unstable. This applies not only to the republics that separated from Moscow, but, first of all, to Russia itself.

In order to make plans regarding the “interests of the state”, it is necessary to have a clear idea of which state is in question. In other words, this makes sense when there is a clearly identified political subject. In the present situation, there is no such subject in the case of Russians.

The existence of Russia, understood as the Russian Federation (RF), clearly does not satisfy any serious criteria in determining the status of a "state." The scatter in assessments of the status of the Russian Federation in international politics clearly testifies precisely to this state of affairs. What is the Russian Federation? Heir and successor of the USSR? Regional power? Mono-national state? Interethnic Federation? The gendarme of Eurasia? A pawn in American projects? Areas intended for further fragmentation? Depending on the specific conditions, the Russian Federation acts in one of these roles, despite the absolute inconsistency of such definitions. At some point it is a state with a claim to a special role in world politics, at another it is a secondary regional power, in the third field for separatist experiments.

and need for separatist experiments.

The Russian Federation is not Russia, a full-fledged Russian State. This is a transitional formation in a broad and dynamic global geopolitical process and nothing more. Of course, the Russian Federation may in the future become the Russian State, but it is not at all obvious that this will happen, and it is also not obvious whether this should be sought.

Be that as it may, it is impossible to talk about the "strategic interests" of such an unstable and temporary phenomenon as the Russian Federation in the long run, and all the more ridiculous to try to formulate a "strategic doctrine of the Russian Federation" based on the current state of affairs. The "strategic interests of the Russian Federation" can be clarified only after the political, social, economic, and ideological subject of these interests appears, develops, and develops. So far this has not happened, any projects in this direction will be a momentary fiction.

The Russian Federation does not have a state history, its borders are random, its cultural landmarks are vague, its political regime is shaky and vague, its ethnic map is heterogeneous, and its economic structure is fragmented and partially decomposed. This conglomerate is only the result of the collapse of a more global geopolitical entity, a fragment taken out of the whole picture. Even in order to create something stable on this skeleton of the Empire, a real revolution will be needed, similar to the revolution of the Young Turks, who created modern secular Turkey from a fragment of the Ottoman Empire (although the question again arises here: is it worth it to strive for?).

If the Russian Federation is not the Russian State, then the CIS is not such. Despite the fact that almost all the territories of the CIS countries (with rare exceptions) were part of the Russian Empire and, therefore, were once part of the Russian State, today the CIS countries have a sufficient degree of autonomy and are de jure classified as independent political entities. With regard to these countries, one can affirm (and with even greater reason) the same as with respect to the Russian Federation these entities do not have any serious signs of true statehood, are devoid of attributes of actual sovereignty and are more a "territorial process" than stable and certain geopolitical units. Even if we ignore the growing nationalism of the CIS countries, which is often anti-Russian, from unnatural, unstable and contradictory fragments per se, it is not possible to add a harmonious picture. The Belgian geopolitician Jean Tiriart gave one exact comparison about this. "The USSR was like a bar of chocolate, with the boundaries of the lobes-republics marked. After the slices are broken off, they

are no longer enough to be put together to restore the whole bar. From now on, this can only be achieved by re-melting the whole bar and re-stamping."

The "strategic interests of the Russian Federation" is the same empty figure of speech as the "strategic interests of the CIS countries." This has a very indirect relation to the "strategic interests of the Russians."

2.2 The concept of "post-imperial legitimacy"

Despite the non-existence of the Russian State in the full sense, certain legal principles operate throughout the post-Soviet space, on which both the Western reaction to certain actions of the Russian Federation and the momentary logic of the steps of the Russian leadership are based. These principles, at first glance, keep the Russian Federation and, more broadly, the CIS from total chaos. It is a doctrine of "post-imperial legitimacy." In order to understand the essence of today's geopolitical processes in Eurasia, it is necessary to briefly outline the main theses of this concept.

"Post-imperial legitimacy" is a set of legal norms that are closely related to the immediately preceding phase of the political development of the region, i.e. with "imperial legitimacy" ("legacy of empire"). An empire (at least "secular" liberal or socialist) is most often guided by the territorial structure of its colonies with purely administrative and economic signs, without taking into account either ethnic, religious, or national factors. The administrative borders within the Empire are rather arbitrary, since they obviously represent conditional barriers created only for the convenience of centralized control of the metropolis. The empire during its existence forces the rest of the powers to recognize its internal administrative system as legitimate.

In the process of "postcolonial" transformations, an international legal concept was formulated, which formed the basis for the classification of the legitimacy and incompetence of post-imperial territorial and political entities. This is the concept of "post-imperial legitimacy." Its meaning boils down to the fact that despite the absence of the Empire as a whole, its purely administrative components receive a full legal status, regardless of whether this entity meets the criterion of a full-fledged state or not. This approach is based on the secular liberal idea of the arbitrariness of any state formation as a historical randomness. According to this logic ethnic, religious, cultural and social components are

According to this logic, ethnic, religious, cultural and social components are insignificant and insignificant, since the population is understood here as a simple set of economic and statistical units. This is reflected in the inertia of the "imperial", "colonial" approach, accustomed to considering the "colonies" and "provinces" as something secondary and inconsequential, "additional" in the context of the general context.

As a rule, "post-imperial formations" never (or almost never) become full-fledged states and continue to exist as economic and political appendages of the former (or new) metropolis. Almost always, the ruling elite in them is the direct successor (often a protege) of the colonial administration, the economy depends entirely on external factors, and the political and social structure adapts to the model of the former center. The preservation of such "post-imperial legitimacy" often leads to the fact that the same autochthonous ethnic group inhabits the territories of different post-imperial states, and several ethnic and religious groups live in the same state. In fact, the relative balance of interests is maintained in such cases only by appeal to an external factor, most often to the sheer or hidden power of the former metropolis (or that developed state that can replace it). It is very significant that at the last stages of the "liberation" of Africa, the Pan-African Congress decided to apply the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" in all newly formed states, although many large African peoples in particular, Bantu, Zulus, etc. turned out to live immediately in two or three states. This was done under the pretext of avoiding ethnic, tribal and religious wars. In fact, it was about the desire of the leaders of the post-imperial administration to keep their artificial elites in power, not allowing the creation of new representatives of an organic national hierarchy in the process of national upsurge. Given the strategic and socio-economic backwardness of Africa and the lack of fresh and vibrant state traditions, this approach has worked quite successfully.

The principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" is applied today to countries that emerged from the ruins of the USSR. In the former "union republics" almost everywhere in power are the heirs of the "colonial administration", compartments broken into parts of a single administrative structure, which was formed entirely in the imperial Soviet context. This elite is alienated from the national-cultural traditions of its peoples and is oriented by inertia to maintain economic and political dependence on the metropolis. The only exception is Armenia, where the logic of "post-imperial legitimacy" has been violated (in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh), and where, accordingly, purely national political forces have more weight than in all other CIS countries. In addition, Armenia is

the only mono-ethnic republic from the CIS countries.

At first glance, it may seem that the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" plays into the hands of the Russian Federation and Moscow, as it creates the prerequisites for maintaining the influence of the Russian Federation in the "near abroad" and simplifies political and economic relations with geographical neighbors. But in reality, everything is somewhat more complicated. As in the case of "decolonization" of the Third World countries, the collapse of the Empire weakens the geopolitical power of the metropolis, and part of the colonies and dominions come under the implicit control of another, more powerful power, which uses the system of "post-imperial legitimacy" for its own purposes. A vivid example of this is the United States, which in fact seized under its influence most of the former British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch colonies during the process of "decolonization".

On the other hand, the "post-imperial legitimacy" of the Russian Federation itself is on a par with other CIS countries, since in this case the national-cultural, religious and ethnic interests of the Russian people, which fall under the abstract norms of the "post-imperial", purely administrative law and scattered around alien pseudo-state and quasinational entities. The remains of the imperial administration within the framework of the Russian Federation (the party-bureaucratic apparatus) turn out to be just as alien to the national context of Russians as in other republics, since the system of the Empire itself was built on other, purely administrative and economic, rather than national and cultural principles. Russians, "freed" from the republics, do not receive freedom and independence, but they lose a significant part of their national community, maintain a dependent position on the remnants of the previous nomenclature and, in addition, are exposed to a new danger of falling under the influence of external political forces of more powerful powers. This last danger was not so close during the period of the Empire, but as a simple "regional power" the Russian Federation is fully exposed to it.

All these considerations cast doubt on the usefulness under the current conditions of the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy," since this largely contradicts Russian national interests.

But what criteria should be followed in determining what are "Russian national interests"? Who should be taken as the main subject in relation to whom it would be possible to determine what is profitable and what is unprofitable? In what categories should Russia be understood today?

categories should remain to be understood today.

2.3 Russian people center of geopolitical concept

The collapse of the Soviet Empire, the fragility and state failure of new political entities on its territory (including the Russian Federation) compel us to search for a more specific category for understanding “Russian national interests”. Only the Russian people can be the only organic, natural, historically rooted reality in this matter.

The Russian people is a historical community that has all the signs of a full-fledged and stable political entity. The Russian people are united ethnically, culturally, psychologically and religiously. But not only this is the main reason for putting it at the center of the geopolitical concept as a subject of political and social strategy. The Russian people, unlike many other peoples, has developed as the bearer of a special civilization that has all the distinctive features of an original and full-fledged planetary-historical phenomenon. The Russian people is the civilizational constant that served as the axis in the creation of not one, but many states: from the mosaic of the Eastern Slavic principalities to Muscovite Russia, Peter's Empire and the Soviet bloc. Moreover, this constant determined the continuity and connection between entities that are so politically, socially different, territorially and structurally. The Russian people not only provided an ethnic base for all these state formations, they expressed in them a special civilizational idea, unlike any other. Not the state formed the Russian nation. On the contrary, the Russian nation, the Russian people experimented in history with various types of state systems, expressing differently (depending on circumstances) the specifics of their unique mission.

The Russian people are certainly among the messianic peoples. And like any Messianic people, it has a universal, universal significance that competes not only with other national ideas, but with types of other forms of civilizational universalism. K. Leontiev and Russian Eurasians quite fully developed this idea.

Regardless of the troubles, transitional periods, and political cataclysms, the Russian people always maintained their messianic identity, and therefore, always remained the political subject of history. After another state shock, the same ancient and powerful Russian power created new political structures, clothed its spiritual impulse into new geopolitical forms. Moreover, as soon as state

structures developed to a critical point, beyond which the final loss of the connection of the political form with the national content snapped, crises and catastrophes ensued, after which a new geopolitical and social construction began, investing the civilization mission of the Russian people in new images and political designs.

And in the current transition period, it is the Russian people that should be taken as the main political entity, from which the scale of geopolitical and strategic, as well as socioeconomic interests of Russia should be put off. The Russian people today are Russia, but not as a clearly defined state, but as a geopolitical potentiality, real and concrete on the one hand, but not yet defining its new state structure, either its ideology, its territorial limits, or its socio-political structure .

Nevertheless, the "potential Russia" today has much more fixed characteristics than the ephemeral RF or CIS. These characteristics are directly related to the civilizational mission, the implementation of which is the meaning of the life of the Russian people.

First, the Russian people (= Russia) are, without a doubt, responsible for control of the north-eastern regions of Eurasia. This Russian "Drang nach Osten und Norden" is a natural geopolitical process of Russian history in recent centuries, which did not stop under any political cataclysms. Mackinder called Russia the "geopolitical axis of history," and this is absolutely true, since the Russian people really traditionally gravitated toward the civilizational development of all those intracontinental Eurasian spaces that are located in the very center of the mainland mass. From this we can conclude that the strategic interests of the Russians are inseparable from the vast expanses of North-East Eurasia.

Secondly, the Russian people (= Russia) are endowed with a special type of religiosity and culture, which are very different from the Catholic-Protestant West and the post-Christian civilization that developed there. As the cultural and geopolitical antithesis of Russia, it is the West that should be taken as a whole, and not just one of its constituent countries. Modern Western civilization is universalistly oriented: in all its compartments there is a special cultural unity based on a specific solution to the main philosophical and worldview problems. Russian universalism, the foundation of Russian civilization, is radically different from the West in all main points. In a sense, these are two competing, mutually exclusive models, opposite poles. Hence, [text missing]

Thirdly, the Russian people (= Russia) never set themselves the goal of creating

a mono-ethnic, racially homogeneous state. The mission of the Russians was universal in nature, and that is why the Russian people systematically went in history towards the creation of an Empire, the borders of which were constantly expanding, encompassing a larger and larger conglomerate of peoples, cultures, religions, territories, regions. It is absurd to consider the systematic and pronounced "expansionism" of Russians a historical accident. This "expansionism" is an integral part of the historical life of the Russian people and is closely linked to the quality of its civilization mission. This mission carries a certain "common denominator" that allows the Russians to integrate a wide variety of cultural realities into their Empire. However, the "common denominator"

Fourth, the Russian people (= Russia) proceeds in their being from an even more global, "soteriological" perspective, which in the limit has universal significance. This is not about the unlimited expansion of the "living space" of the Russians, but about the establishment of a special "Russian" type of worldview, which is accented eschatologically and claims the last word in earthly history. This is the supreme super task of the nation as a "God-bearing people".

Therefore, theoretically there is no such people on the planet, such a culture or such a territory, whose fate and whose path would be indifferent to Russian consciousness. This is manifested in the unshakable faith of the Russians in the final triumph of Truth, Spirit and Justice, and not only within the framework of the Russian state, but everywhere. To deprive the Russians of this eschatological faith is tantamount to their spiritual accumulation. The Russians care about everything and everyone, and therefore, in the final analysis, the interests of the Russian people are not limited to either the Russian ethnic group, the Russian Empire, or even all of Eurasia. This "transcendental" aspect of the Russian nation must be taken into account when developing a future geopolitical strategy.

Obviously, under the current conditions and with generally accepted Western, secular, quantitatively liberal norms of the legal approach, there is no objective possibility not only to legally consolidate the status of the "Russian people" as an independent political entity, but even to introduce such a term into legal and diplomatic use as a "people". Modern international law (copying Roman law in its main features) recognizes only the state and the individual as full-fledged political entities.

And therefore, there is a code of "state rights" and "human rights", while the very concept of "people's rights" is absent. This is not surprising, since the secular and quantitative approach cannot take into account such cultural spiritual categories as ethnos, people, etc. A similar quantitative attitude characterized both the Soviet system and the "democratic" world. And since the Russian people are in the current period in a territory where either "post-imperial" or liberal-democratic principles of legitimacy operate, there can be no question of any automatic recognition of the political status of the "people". Therefore, the logic of clarifying and defending "Russian national interests" requires serious changes in existing legal practice, and moreover, [text missing]

Such a transformation would not have been possible if we were talking about any one people, underdeveloped and not technologically equipped. In the case of the Russians, this, fortunately, is not so. Today, we still have the opportunity of political transformations quite independent from the rest of the world, since the presence of strategic types of weapons in Russia allows us to withstand, to a certain extent, Western pressure. And here everything depends only on the political will and determination of those persons who will take responsibility for the fate of Russia and the Russian people.

Be that as it may, the first step towards identifying the "national interests of the Russian people" is the recognition of this people as an independent political entity, which has the right to decide for itself what is beneficial and what is not, and to take geopolitical, socio-economic and strategic strategies accordingly steps.

Chapter 3 - Russia is unthinkable without the Empire

3.1 The lack of Russian "nation-state"

Russia has never been an analogue of those "nation-states" that are characteristic of modern Europe and whose model was projected onto Asia and the Third World as a whole in the colonial and postcolonial era.

The "nation-state" is based on administrative unity and bureaucratic centralism, which form the political community created by the state and closely connected with the state. Without a doubt, the first model of the "state of the nation" was formed in absolutist France, and then it was fixed in the Jacobin revolutionary model. The "nation-state" was originally of a secular nature and was primarily a political unity. In such a concept, the term "nation" was understood as a "totality of citizens", and not as a "people" or "peoples" in an organic, "holistic" sense. This type of state is based on ethnic, confessional and estate leveling of the population, on the approval throughout society of similar legal and procedural standards that do not take into account either regional, religious, or racial characteristics. Nominally, "nation-state" can be monarchic, democratic, and socialist. An essential element in it is not the specificity of the political system, but the understanding of the state as an administrative-centralist authority, put above all socio-ethnic and cultural-religious differences. It should be emphasized that the "nation" in this case has a purely and exclusively political meaning, which differs sharply from that which the nationalists put into this concept. may be monarchical, and democratic, and socialist. An essential element in it is not the specificity of the political system, but the understanding of the state as an administrative-centralist authority, put above all socio-ethnic and cultural-religious differences. It should be emphasized that the "nation" in this case has a purely and exclusively political meaning, which differs sharply from that which the nationalists put into this concept.

The "nation-state" historically arose in Europe during the final collapse of imperial unity as a result of the destruction of the last remains of the imperial system, preserved in the form of feudal regional structures. The "nation-state" is inherently associated with the dominance of profane, bourgeois values that reduce qualitative social differences to a simplified quantitative administrative structure. The "nation-state", as a rule, is governed not by a "divine idea" (like theocracy or the Holy Empire), not by a "heroic aristocratic person" (like a feudal system), but by a "dictatorship of the law" ("nomocracy"), which gives enormous power jurists and legal bureaucracy. In fact, the "nation-state" [text missing]

In Russian history, the "nation-state" did not arise. When this model began to take root in Europe from the 18th century, Russia desperately resisted it by any means. The tsarist regime sought to keep the imperial structure as intact as possible, although some concessions to the European model were constantly made. Despite the pro-European Petrine reforms, the Russian Empire retained both theocratic elements and the aristocratic principle, and the transfer of priests and nobility to the rank of state bureaucrats was never carried out in practice to the end (in contrast to the countries of Western Europe). The national element opposed such a degeneration of the Empire into a "nation-state" that regularly generated waves of spontaneous or conscious reaction from both the people and the elite.

Only at the beginning of the 20th century did Russia come close to the realization of a "nation-state" according to the European model. However, this time too, the process was thwarted by a revolutionary outburst, which absorbed (albeit unconsciously) an in-depth national protest against a type of state structure in which there would be no place for the manifestation of a spiritual popular mission. Beyond the modernist rhetoric of Bolshevism, the Russians vaguely recognized their own eschatological ideals, the triumph of Idea, Justice, Truth. The Soviet state was perceived by the people as the construction of the "New Empire", the "kingdom of the world", the "monastery of spirit", and not as the creation of the most rational device for administering and managing quantitative units. The tragedy and fanaticism of the Bolshevik cataclysms were caused precisely by [text missing]

The USSR did not become a "nation-state", it was a successor of purely imperial national traditions, clothed in extravagant external forms and contrasted with the later tsarist model, sliding down to the ordinary bourgeois society, to the "dictatorship of the law." The Soviet Empire, like any political construct, knew

dictatorship of the law. The Soviet Empire, like any political construct, knew the three stages of the “revolutionary stage” of building a unique system (Lenin’s youth), the stable stage of strengthening and expanding the state (Stalin’s maturity) and the stage of collapse and decrepitude (Brezhnev old age). Moreover, it was the Late Brezhnev period that created the political and administrative structure that closely resembles the bureaucratic centralism of a typical “nation-state”. During perestroika, the life cycle of this entire Soviet formation ended.

It is important to note that in Russian history there is such a pattern: when it comes to turning Russia into a “nation-state”, disasters follow, and in a new round the nation finds another (sometimes quite extravagant) way to escape from the seemingly inevitable transformation. The Russians are striving at all costs to avoid such a turn of events, since their political will is incompatible with the narrow standards of rational and averaged quantitative existence within the framework of a bureaucratically effective mechanism. Russians are ready to make unthinkable sacrifices and hardships, if only the national idea, the great Russian dream, were realized and developed.

And the nation sees the borders of this dream, at least in the Empire.

3.2 Russian people of the Empire

Not a mono-ethnic state, not a nation-state; Russia was almost originally a potentially imperial state. From the unification of Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes near Rurik to the gigantic scale of the USSR and territories under its influence, the Russian people have steadily followed the path of political and spatial integration, imperial construction and civilizational expansion. It should be emphasized that Russian expansion had precisely a civilizational meaning, and was by no means a utilitarian pursuit of colonies or a banal struggle for “living space”. Not the lack of this “living space” and not the economic necessity encouraged the Russian people to expand their borders more and more east, south, north, west. The lack of land has never served as the true cause of Russian imperialism.

The political integrity of the Eurasian space is completely independent for Russian history. We can say that the Russians feel responsible for this space, for its condition, for its connection, for its integrity and independence. Mackinder

rightly considered Russia to be the main land power of our time, which inherits the geopolitical mission of Rome, the Empire of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, etc. This is the "geographical axis of history", which simply cannot but fulfill its geopolitical mission, regardless of external and transient factors.

The Russian people are so connected with geopolitical reality that space itself, its experience, its awareness, its spiritual perception shaped the psychology of the people, becoming one of the most important definitions of its identity, its essence.

Real earth space is not a purely quantitative category. Climate, landscape, geology, waterways and mountain ranges are actively involved in the formation of an ethnic and, more broadly, civilizational type. From the point of view of geopolitics, civilization and its specifics are generally strictly determined by geography and are subject to special qualitative laws with necessity. The Russians are the land, continental, North Eurasian people, and the cultural specificity of the nation is such that its "soul" is maximally predisposed to "openness", to the implementation of the "integrating" function, to the subtle and deep process of developing a special continental, Eurasian community.

The cultural factor is a natural complement to the purely geopolitical predestination of Russia. The geopolitical mission is recognized at the cultural level, and vice versa, culture conceptualizes, shapes and activates the geopolitical impulse. Space and culture are two of the most important components of the Russian people as a people-imperial builder for the most part. Not blood, not race, not administrative control, and not even religion, made the Russian people a special, incomparable community from part of the Eastern Slavs. It was made by the endless Eurasian expanses and the ultimate cultural, spiritual openness. Under the sign of "space and culture", ethnic, political, ethical, and religious aspects were rethought. The Russians have formed, developed and matured as a nation precisely in the Empire, in the heroism of its construction, in the exploits of its defense, in campaigns for its expansion. The abandonment of the imperial-building function means the end of the existence of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such a denial is national suicide.

Unlike Rome (the first Rome), Moscow, Russia have in their imperial impulse a deep teleological, eschatological meaning. Hegel developed an interesting concept that the Absolute Idea in an eschatological situation should manifest itself in a final "conscious" form in the form of the Prussian state. However on

...and a final, conscious form in the form of the Russian state. However, on a planetary scale, Prussia, and even Germany, taken separately, are geopolitically insufficient to be taken seriously in this concept. Russia, the Third Rome, both religiously, culturally, spatially, and strategically perfectly corresponds to a similar teleological view of the essence of history and clearly seeks to fulfill this very mission. The absolute idea of Hegel in the case of Russia is the spiritual root of Russian imperial construction, gravitating towards the civilizational development of the continent-Eurasia. It is absurd to apply such serious Hegelian criteria to a "nation-state", which obviously implies other "nation-states" next to it with their own goals, myths and interests. To communicate such a relative structure to the quality of absolute significance is rather absurd. But in the case of a gigantic Empire based on specific, largely paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clarified principles, it's a completely different matter, and it was not by chance that the ancient Empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness" was communicated to them by the fulfillment of a special spiritual mission, tentatively representing the "Empire of the End," the continental Kingdom of the Absolute Idea. which obviously implies other "nation-states" with their own goals, myths and interests. To communicate such a relative structure to the quality of absolute significance is rather absurd. But in the case of a gigantic Empire based on specific, largely paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clarified principles, it's a completely different matter, and it was not by chance that the ancient Empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness" was communicated to them by the fulfillment of a special spiritual mission, tentatively representing the "Empire of the End," the continental Kingdom of the Absolute Idea. which obviously implies other "nation-states" with their own goals, myths and interests. To communicate such a relative structure to the quality of absolute significance is rather absurd. But in the case of a gigantic Empire based on specific, largely paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clarified principles, it's a completely different matter, and it was not by chance that the ancient Empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness" was communicated to them by the fulfillment of a special spiritual mission, tentatively representing the "Empire of the End," the continental Kingdom of the Absolute Idea.

The Russian people moved step by step precisely to this goal. At each stage of the expansion of their state, the Russians went to the next stage of messianic universalism, first rallying the Eastern Slavs, then including the Turkic stream of the steppes and Siberia, then moving south into the deserts and mountains, and finally forming a gigantic political bloc controlling in the Soviet period, literally, half the world. If you realize that the Russian people in their essence are this

imperial-building process, the strong-willed geopolitical vector of creating a "state of the Absolute Idea," it will become completely obvious that the existence of the Russian people directly depends on the continuation of this process, on its development, on its intensification. By trimming or suppressing this vector, we will hit the Russians in the heart, depriving them of their national identity, [text missing]

3.3 The trap of a "regional power"

The Russian people, with their civilizational and geopolitical mission, has traditionally been (and is) a serious obstacle to the widespread dissemination on the planet of a purely liberal Western model. Both the tsarist and Soviet regimes, obeying inexorable national logic, impeded the cultural and political expansion of the West to the East and especially deep into the Eurasian continent. Moreover, the seriousness of the geopolitical confrontation has always been reflected in the fact that Russia federated within itself and around itself different countries and peoples into a powerful strategic imperial bloc. It was as a continental Empire that Russia participated in world politics and defended its national and civilizational interests.

At present, after the collapse of the USSR, the West seeks to impose another geopolitical function on Russia, to turn Russia into such a political structure that would be unable to directly participate in world politics and have a broad civilizational mission. A 1992 report by Paul Wolfowitz to the U.S. Congress unequivocally states that "the main strategic objective of the United States is to prevent the creation of a large and independent strategic entity in the territory of the former Soviet Union capable of pursuing a policy independent of the United States." It was on the basis of such an urgent need of the West of Russia that the role of a "regional power" was proposed.

A "regional power" is a modern geopolitical category that characterizes a large and fairly developed state, whose political interests, however, are limited only to areas that are directly adjacent to or included in its territory. For example, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China, etc. are considered regional powers. The specificity of a regional power is that it has a greater political weight than an ordinary ordinary state, but less weight than a superpower or Empire. In other words, a regional power does not have a direct influence on planetary

civilization and global geopolitical processes, being subordinated in the main strategic lines to the balance of forces of more powerful Empires.

The status of a “regional power”, proposed (imposed) by the West on Russia today, is tantamount to suicide for the Russian nation. The point is to artificially and under strong external influence reverse the vector of Russian national history, reverse, interrupt the coherent process of the geopolitical formation of Russians as an Empire. Russia as a regional power will constitute a rejection of the deepest impulse of the nation that underlies its highest and deepest identity. For Russians, the loss of imperial scale means the end and failure of their participation in civilization, the defeat of their spiritual and cultural value system, the fall of their universalist and messianic aspirations, the depreciation and debunking of the entire national ideology, which revived many generations of the Russian people and gave strength and energy for exploits,

Given the specifics of the national imperial self-identification of Russians, it becomes quite obvious that the adoption of the status of a "regional power" by Russia cannot become the last line of defense. The blow thereby inflicted on the national identity of the Russians will then be so strong that the matter will not be limited to the framework of the Russian Federation or a similar territorial space. Having lost their mission, the Russians will not be able to find the strength to adequately affirm their new, “diminished” identity in a “regional state,” since the assertion of this identity is impossible in the state of the affect that logically arises when the nation loses its imperial scale. Consequently, the processes of disintegration are likely to continue in the "regional power",

Even in order to fix the “regional status” of post-imperial Russia, it will be necessary to awaken a powerful wave of nationalism, and nationalism of a completely new, artificial, based on energies and ideas that have nothing to do with the traditional and only genuine and justified Russian imperial tendency. One can compare this with the small, “secular” nationalism of the Young Turks, who created modern Turkey, a “regional power” through the “national revolution” through the “national revolution”. But the nationalism of the Young Turks had nothing to do with the geopolitical and religious nationalism of the Ottoman Empire, and in fact, present-day Turkey, both spiritually, ethnically, and culturally, is a completely different reality than the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the century.

The same, if not worse, threatens Russia, and most likely attempts to gain a foothold as a "regional power", abandoning the civilizational mission and

universalist values, will bring to life the politicians of the "Young" type (similar to the Young Turks), which are very likely will profess a special sectarian ideology that has nothing to do with the main line of the Russian national idea. Such Russian "non-imperial" nationalism, secular and artificial, will only play geopolitically in the West's favor, since it will secure a "regional" status for Russia, lead to an illusory and short-term internal stabilization, and at the same time lay the foundation for future domestic Russian ethnic and religious conflicts. But if Turkey has two or three large ethnic communities, capable of actively opposing Young Turk centralism, hundreds of peoples live in the Russian Federation, perfectly coexisted in the imperial model, but do not fit into the framework of "small Russian nationalism". The conclusion is obvious: Russia will gradually become drawn into an endless chain of internal conflicts and wars, and, in the end, will disintegrate.

This will be a natural result of the Russians losing their imperial mission, since this process cannot be limited to a relative reduction of territories and must necessarily go to its logical limit to the complete destruction of the Russian nation as a historical, geopolitical and civilizational subject.

3.4 Criticism of Soviet Statehood

Last in a row of imperial form of organization of the Russian people was the USSR, and it depended on geopolitical area (the Warsaw Pact). In the Soviet period, the sphere of influence of Russians expanded geographically to previously unimaginable limits. Land development and military campaigns included vast territories in the geopolitical zone of the Russians.

In the spatial sense, such an expansion, it would seem, should represent the highest form of Russian statehood. And it is impossible to deny the fact that the axial construction of the Soviet Empire was precisely the Russian people, who embodied their specific universalism (at least partially) into the Soviet ideological and socio-political model.

Today, at first glance, it seems that the prospect of genuine Russian national development in the current conditions should coincide with the restoration of the USSR and the reconstruction of the Soviet model and Soviet statehood. This is partly true and logical, and in this case the neocommunist movement, which advocates the reconstruction of the USSR, is closer to understanding the

advocates the reconstruction of the USSR, is closer to understanding the geopolitical interests of the Russian people, more clearly and more clearly represents the essence of its strategic and civilizational aspirations than some neo-nationalist circles inclined towards the "Young Russian" (similar to the "Young Turk") model of "small," "trimmed", "ethnic" nationalism. Of course, geopolitical restorationism neocommunists justified, and their nationalism is more organic and "National" rather than romantic and irresponsible in form (and subversive in results) narrow-nationalist projects of the Slavophile, Orthodox-monarchist or racist wing of the patriots. If the choice lay between the reconstruction of the USSR and the construction of a mono-ethnic or even monocultural Great Russian state, then it would be more logical and correct for the Russian people to choose the USSR project.

However, the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire need an objective analysis, which in no case can be reduced to the identification of external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influence, i.e. to the "conspiracy theory." External pressure -demokraticeskogo liberal West to the Soviet Union was really huge, and the activity of "subversive elements" in the country is extremely effective and harmoniously. But both of these factors became decisive only in such a situation when the existence of the Soviet Empire entered the stage of an internal crisis with deep and natural causes, rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without understanding of these internal causes of decay and analyzing any attempt restorations USSR tion (and hence create New Empire) will be in vain and futile. Moreover,

We will reveal several factors that led the Soviet Union to a geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

First, at the ideological level during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional, spiritual elements have not been introduced into the general complex of communist ideology. Being largely a national-communist de facto, it never transformed into such a de jure, which impeded the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, generated a double standard and ideological contradictions, and undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, "educational ethics", etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people as a whole. In practice, these provisions borrowed from Marxism (by the way, and in Marxism itself, which are rather arbitrary elements of a tribute to the old-fashioned positivist

humanism in the Feuerbach style) were recognized by the Russian Communists in the spirit of folk mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspirations, and not as rationalistic fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of national Bolshevism, which could find more adequate, more Russian terms for the new socio-political system, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later, the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory design should have a negative effect. This was especially evident in the late Soviet period, when senseless dogmatism and communist demagoguery completely crushed all ideological life in society. Such a "freezing" of the ruling ideology and the stubborn refusal to introduce components organic, national and natural for the Russian people into it, resulted in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologists of both the "progressive" and the "conservative" wing. The Soviet Empire was ideologically and practically destroyed by the Communists. It is now not only impossible to recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology, but it is also pointless, since even the same premises, which already once led to the destruction of the state, will be reproduced hypothetically. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologists of both the "progressive" and the "conservative" wing. The Soviet Empire was ideologically and practically destroyed by the Communists. It is now not only impossible to recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology, but it is also pointless, since even the same premises, which already once led to the destruction of the state, will be reproduced hypothetically. The responsibility for this lies not only with the "agents of influence" and "anti-Soviet", but, first of all, with the central Soviet ideologists of both the "progressive" and the "conservative" wing. The Soviet Empire was ideologically and practically destroyed by the Communists. It is now not only impossible to recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology, but it is also pointless, since even the same premises, which already once led to the destruction of the state, will be reproduced hypothetically.

Secondly, at the geopolitical and strategic level, the USSR was uncompetitive in the long run for resistance to the atlantist western bloc. In terms of strategy, land borders are much more vulnerable than sea borders, and at all levels (the number of border troops, the cost of military equipment, the use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After the Second World War, the USSR was in an unequal position compared with the Western capitalist bloc grouped around the United States. The United States had a gigantic island base (American

continent), completely controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were not difficult to defend. Plus, the US controlled almost all coastal zones in the south and west of Eurasia, creating a gigantic threat to the USSR, while remaining virtually out of reach for the potential destabilizing actions of the Soviet Union. The division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) only complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing the volume of land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential adversary, and in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who were held hostage in a geopolitical duel whose meaning was not obvious to them. The same thing took place in the southern direction and in Asia and the Far East, where the USSR had immediate neighbors or control over West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran dohomeynist sky), or rather hostile powers with Soviet-SKO-socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could buy relatively stable only in two cases: either rapidly advancing to the oceans in the West (to the Atlantic) and the South (the Indian Ocean), or by creating in Europe and Asia neutral political blocs which have no camping under the control of neither the one of the superpowers. This concept (of neutral Germany) was still proposed by Stalin, and after his death, Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact), from a geopolitical point of view, was too large and too small at the same time. Maintaining the status quo was in the hands of only the United States and Atlanticism, since the military, industrial, and strategic potentials of the USSR were becoming increasingly exhausted, and the power of the United States, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later, the Eastern bloc would inevitably collapse. Hence,

Thirdly, the administrative structure of the USSR was based on a secular, purely functional and quantitative understanding of internal division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account either the regional, let alone ethnic and religious features of the internal territories. The principle of leveling and purely economic structuralization of society led to the creation of such rigid systems that suppressed, and at best "canned" the forms of the natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian people themselves. The territorial principle acted even when nominally it was a question of national republics, autonomies or districts. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling became more and more distinct as "aging" of the entire Soviet political system, which towards its last stage was more and more inclined toward the type of Soviet "nation-state", and not the Empire. Nationalism, which in many respects contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, at the end became a purely negative factor, since excessive centralization and unification began to generate natural protest and discontent. The atrophy of the

unification began to generate natural protest and discontent. The adrophy of the imperial principle, the ossification of bureaucratic centralism, the desire for maximum rationalization and purely economic productivity gradually created a political monster from the USSR, which lost its life and was perceived as a center imposed by force on totalitarianism. Some communist theses of the literally understood "internationalism" are largely responsible for this.

Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, operating not with specific ethnic groups, culture, religion, and with the abstract "population" and "territory" should not be revived in any case. On the contrary, we should get rid of the consequences of such a quantitative approach, whose echoes so tragically affect the issue of Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transnistria, etc., as soon as possible.

Fourth, the economic system in the USSR was based on such a "long" socialist cycle that gradually the return of society to a specific person ceased to be felt at all. Ultimate socialization and detailed state control are necessary over all economic processes, up to the smallest, as well as the delegation of redistribution functions only to a centralized, purely top-level authority, creating a climate of social exclusion, apathy, and disinterest in society. Socialism and all its advantages became unobvious, invisible, faded into the background before the gigantic construction of the bureaucratic state machine. A man and a specific team were lost in front of abstraction by the action of "society", and the cycle of socialist distribution lost touch with reality, turned into an inexplicable, alienated and outwardly arbitrary logic of a soulless machine. Socialism itself is not responsible for this state of affairs, but its version that has historically developed in the USSR, especially at its later stages, although the sources of such degeneration should be sought already in the doctrine itself, in the theory itself. Totalitarian state socialism deprived the economy of flexibility, people's enthusiasm and a sense of complicity in the creative process, contributed to instilling a parasitic attitude towards society, which was absolutized today in a mafia-liberal style. Communists were also responsible for this post-Soviet excess, who were unable to reform socialism in relation to the national element and maintain a decent life in it.

These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors in the collapse of Soviet statehood, and it is they who are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is quite natural that, with a hypothetical reconstruction of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this respect and radically destroyed the reasons that have already historically doomed the great people to a state catastrophe.

However, if the restoration of the USSR will take place under the banner of an ideology that has abandoned materialism, atheism, totalitarianism, state socialism, the Soviet geopolitical space, administrative structure, internationalism, centralism, etc., is it right to speak of "USSR" or "Soviet state", about "communism", "restoration", etc.? Would it not be more correct to call this the creation of the "New Empire"?

3.5 Criticism of Tsarist Statehood

Today more and more often you can hear calls for a return to the royal, monarchical model. This is quite natural, since the discrediting of Sovietism forces the Russians to turn to those forms of statehood that existed before the communist period of Russian history. This model has some positive and some negative aspects. Regardless of the incredible difficulty of restoring the pre-communist state system, this project is being discussed more and more seriously.

Given the historical logic of the geopolitical development of the Russian nation, it makes sense to talk about the late periods of the Romanov rule, when Russia reached the borders of its maximum territorial imperial volume.

The most positive in this project is the ideological foundation of tsarist Russia, where (albeit nominally) allegiance to the national spirit (Nationality), religious truth (Orthodoxy) and the traditional sacred political system (Autocracy) was declared. However, according to the just remark of the Russian Eurasians, the Uvarov formula (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality) in the last periods of tsarist Russia was more an idealistic slogan than a real content of political life and social structure. Russian Orthodoxy, shocked by secular reforms of Peter, during this period was quite far from the ideal of "Holy Russia", being virtually subordinate to state control and largely losing its sacred authority and harmony of the Orthodox symphony. Having lost spiritual independence, [text missing]

Autocracy, for its part, has increasingly lost its sacred significance, being drawn into the solution of purely political problems, sometimes forgetting about its highest mission and religious mission. Although the desacralization of tsarist power never, up to the abdication of the last Emperor, never reached the level of that empty parody in which the European monarchies, primarily the French and English, turned the influence of Europe in this area was very great

English, indeed, the influence of Europe in this area was very great.

And finally, the "Nationality" of the famous slogan was rather purely declarative, and the people themselves were deeply alienated from political life, which was manifested, for example, in general indifference to the February and later October revolutions, which radically destroyed the monarchist model.

A direct appeal in our conditions to the restoration of this triad is likely to lead to the restoration of the skinny and more demagogic compromise that in practice was hidden behind these three principles in the late Manomanian era (in which, by the way, they were formulated). Moreover, given the absence of unambiguous claimants to the Russian throne, the unstable and uncertain state of the present Orthodox Church, as well as the abstract meaning of the term "nationality" (which is often understood only as a superficial, folkloric style or even a fake of fantasizing intellectuals as a people), it is easy to foresee that a return to Uvarov's ideology will become even more a parody than the pre-revolutionary tsarist regime.

The tsarist model also has a serious geopolitical flaw, which led to the collapse of the Russian Empire in the same way as the Soviet Union seventy years later.

Return to the tsarist and, consequently, the whole "Slavophile" geopolitics, fraught with terrible threat. The fact is that in the last half century of the Romanov's reign, the foreign policy of the ruling house was determined not by the Eurasian traditions of Alexander the First and the prospects of the continental Holy Union (based on the alliance of Russia and the powers of Central Europe), but by pro-British and pro-French projects for which Russia was drawn into suicidal conflicts on side their natural geopolitical rivals and against their natural allies geopolitiche Sgiach. Support for Serbian demands, the irresponsible myth of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the involvement of French Masons in European anti-German intrigues, all of this forced Russia to fulfill a political role, not only not peculiar to it, but straight to her destructive. Trying to settle in Eastern Europe on a Slavophile basis and constantly getting involved in a conflict with the Central European powers (Russia's natural allies), the tsarist regime systematically undermined the foundations of the Russian state, led Russia straightforwardly to geopolitical suicide. The Turkish wars and the war with Japan also belong to this. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia has sought to best serve the Atlantic interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England, instead of fulfilling its natural Eurasian mission and seeking alliance with all similar (both politically and spiritually) conservative and imperial

regimes. Slavophile geopolitical utopia cost Russia the Tsar, the Church and the Empire,

An attempt to follow such a Late Manomaniac, "Slavophil" line in our conditions cannot but lead to a similar result. And even the appeal to pre-revolutionary Russia itself carries potentially suicidal political motives that are much more dangerous for the Russian people than the projects of Soviet restoration.

There is another factor that is extremely dangerous in the case of monarchical tendencies. We are talking about the capitalist form of the economy that was inherent in Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. Although this was a variation of national capitalism, limited by state, social, and cultural boundaries, rather than a "wild" free market, the effect of economic alienation inherent in any capitalism was extremely strong. The Russian bourgeois firmly took the place of the state and military aristocracy, the clergy, displacing officials and employees. This type of Russian bourgeois (quite different from the representatives of the traditional, pre-capitalist, feudal merchants) actually opposed the cultural, social and ethical norms, which were the essence of the system of Russian national values. Accepting the lessons of English economic liberalism, feeling the taste of financial and stock speculation, cleverly using economic inefficiency still shackled by the code of honor of the Russian aristocracy, the Russian bourgeois came to the forefront of Russian political life, perfectly fitting into the general picture of the popular monarchist pseudo-patriarchy, which had lost all its life sacred content. That Russian capitalists (and often nationalistic, "Black Hundred" orientation) are the first agents of the British and French influence in Russia, the natural agents of the Atlanticist trading model that has evolved and took shape in the Anglo-Saxon and French societies. cleverly using economic neeffek ciency still constrained code of honor of the Russian aristocracy, Russian bourgeoisie came to the forefront of Russian political life, perfectly fit into the overall picture woodcut psevdopatriarhalnosti monarchist, has lost all of his life, the sacred contents.

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The late-Manoman political system is a combination of a desacralized-monarchist facade, suicidal Slavophil geopolitics, and Atlantic-oriented market capitalism. In all cases, national rhetoric was only a screen and a figure of speech, behind which there were political and social trends, not just far from the true interests of the Russian people, but directly opposite to these interests.

Another element of this model is rather doubtful is the principle of the provincial administrative division of the Russian Empire. Although in practice this did not interfere with the free development of the peoples that were part of the Russian Empire, and in the normal case, the Russians only helped ethnic groups to form and develop their own specific culture, legal rejection of cultural-ethnic and religious autonomies, some tough state leveling centralism were not the best methods of involving nations into a unanimous and free continental imperial construction. Elements of the "nation-state" appeared in the last periods of the Romanovs in exactly the same way as in the last decades of the USSR, and the effect of this was very similar to the alienation of ethnic groups from Moscow (St. Petersburg) and the Russians, separatist sentiments, a surge "[text missing]

In monarchist Russia, it was precisely the cultural and religious side, the nominal fidelity to sacred traditions, the memory of the ideal of Holy Russia, the Holy Kingdom, and Moscow the Third Rome that was positive. The Orthodox Church as a bulwark of dogmatic Truth, a symphony of Autocracy, an awareness of the historical mission of the God-bearing Russian people are spiritual symbols of the true Russian Empire, which have archetypal, enduring value, which, however, should be cleared of formalism, demagoguery, and the Pharisee raid. But unnatural geopolitics, compliance with capitalization, underestimation of the ethnic and

geopolitics, compliance with capitalization, underestimation of the ethnic and religious factors among small intra-imperial peoples, anti-German, anti-Japanese and anti-Ottoman orientations of the late Romanov Empire, all this should be recognized as a dead end political path that has nothing to do with the genuine interests of the Russian people, which was proved by the historical collapse of this model.

3.6 Toward a New Eurasian Empire

Based on the foregoing considerations, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the prospects of the coming Empire as the only form of worthy and natural existence of the Russian people and the only opportunity to complete its historical and civilizational mission.

1. The coming Empire should not be a "regional power" or a "nation-state." It is obvious. But it should be especially emphasized that such an Empire can never become a continuation, development of a regional power or a nation-state, since such an intermediate stage will cause irreparable damage to the deep national imperial tendency, involve the Russian people in the labyrinth of insoluble geopolitical and social contradictions, and this, in turn, it will make impossible a planned and consistent, logical imperial construction.

2. The new Empire should be built right away just like an Empire, and the foundation of its project should now be based on fully-fledged and developed purely imperial principles. This process cannot be attributed to the distant future, hoping for favorable conditions in the future. There will never be such conditions for the creation of a great Russian Empire if already now the people and political forces striving to speak on his behalf will not consciously and clearly affirm their fundamental state and geopolitical orientation. Empire is not just a very large state. This is something completely different. This is a strategic and geopolitical bloc that surpasses the parameters of an ordinary state; it is a Superstate. Almost never did an ordinary state develop into an Empire. Empires were built immediately as an expression of a special civilizational will, as a super-goal, as a giant world-impulse. Therefore, today it should definitely be said: not the Russian State, but the Russian Empire. Not the path of socio-political evolution, but the path of the geopolitical Revolution.

3. The geopolitical and ideological contours of the New Russian Empire should

be determined on the basis of overcoming those moments that led to the collapse of historically previous imperial forms. Therefore, the New Empire must:

1. to be not materialistic, not atheistic, not economic-centric;
2. have either maritime borders or friendly blocs on adjacent continental territories;
3. have a flexible and differentiated ethno-relational structure of the internal political and administrative structure, i.e. take into account local, ethnic, religious, cultural, ethical, etc. features of the regions, giving these elements a legal status;
4. make state participation in economic management flexible and affecting only strategic spheres, drastically shorten the social cycle, achieve organic participation of the people in distribution issues;

(These first four points follow from an analysis of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Empire.)

1. to fill the religious-monarchist formula with truly sacred content, lost under the influence of the secular West on the Romanov dynasty, to carry out the Orthodox "conservative revolution" in order to return to the roots of a true Christian worldview;
2. to turn the term "nationality" from the Uvarov formula into the central aspect of the socio-political structure, make the People the main, fundamental political and legal category, contrast the organic concept of the People with quantitative norms of liberal and socialist jurisprudence, develop the theory of "people's rights";
3. instead of Slavophile geopolitics, turn to Eurasian projects that reject the anti-German policies of Russia in the West and anti-Japanese policies in the East, to end the Atlantic line disguised as "Russian nationalism";
4. impede the processes of privatization and capitalization, as well as the stock market game and financial speculation in the Empire, focus on corporate, collective and state control of the people over economic reality, and discard the dubious chimera of "national capitalism";
5. instead of the gubernial principle, proceed to the creation of ethno-religious areas with the maximum degree of cultural, linguistic, economic, and legal autonomy, strictly restricting them to one thing in political, strategic, geopolitical, and ideological sovereignty.

(These five points follow from criticism of the tsarist model.)

The builders of the New Empire must actively resist the “Young Russian” tendencies in Russian nationalism, striving to consolidate the status of a “nation-state” for Russia, as well as with all nostalgic political forces containing in their geopolitical projects an appeal to those elements that already led the Empire to disaster.

The existence of the Russian people as an organic historical community is unthinkable without imperial, continental creation. The Russians will remain a nation only within the New Empire.

This Empire, according to geopolitical logic, this time should strategically and spatially surpass the previous version (USSR). Consequently, the New Empire must be Eurasian, great continental, and in the future World.

The battle for world domination of the Russians did not end.

Chapter 4 - Redivision of the world

4.1 Land and sea. Common enemy

The new Empire, which the Russian people are to create, has its own internal geopolitical logic, inscribed in the natural structure of the geographical space of the planet.

The main geopolitical law, formulated most clearly by Mackinder, states that in history a constant and basic geopolitical process is the struggle of land, continental powers (with the natural form of an ideocratic political system) against island, sea states (commercial, market, economic systems). This is the eternal confrontation of Rome to Carthage, Sparta Athens, England, Germany, etc. From the beginning of the 20th century, this confrontation between two geopolitical constants began to acquire a global character. The United States became the sea, trading pole, drawing all other countries into its orbit, and Russia became the land pole. After World War II, the two superpowers finally assigned civilizational roles. The United States strategically swallowed the West and the coastal territories of Eurasia, and the USSR united around itself a gigantic continental mass of Eurasian spaces. From the point of view of geopolitics as a science, the ancient archetypal confrontation of the Sea and Sushi[land?], plutocracy and ideocracy, the civilization of merchants and the civilization of heroes (the dualism of “heroes and merchants”, as expressed by Werner Sombart, author of the eponymous book) found expression in the Cold War.

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc, and then the USSR, upset the relative geopolitical balance in favor of Atlantism, i.e. The Western bloc and market civilization as a whole. However, geopolitical tendencies are an objective factor, and it is not possible to abolish them in a voluntaristic, “subjective” way. Sushi trends, continental impulses cannot be unilaterally canceled, and therefore, the creation of a new land, eastern, continental Empire is a potential geopolitical inevitability.

The Atlantic, maritime, commercial pole of civilization today is certainly extremely strong and powerful, but objective factors make the continental

extremely strong and powerful, but objective factors make the continental reaction of the East practically inevitable. A land Empire potentially always exists and seeks only convenient circumstances to be realized in political reality.

The New Empire should be built on a clear understanding of this geopolitical inevitability. In this Empire, it is the Russians who will have the natural key function, since they control those lands that are axial in the Eurasian continental mass. The New Empire cannot be any other than the Russian Empire, since both territorially, culturally, civilizationally, and socio-economically, and strategically, the Russians naturally and organically correspond to this planetary mission and go to its realization throughout its national and state history. Mackinder called the Russian lands the "geographical axis of history", i.e. the space around which the coastal civilization of Eurasia was created (often identified with "civilization" in general) under the influence of the dialectic opposition of marine (external) and land (internal) cultural and political impulses. Some other people or some other country can act as a pole of the Eurasian continental Empire, only taking control of the totality of Russian lands, and for this it is necessary to fulfill the almost unbelievable condition of destroying the Russian people, wiping off the Russian nation. Since this seems unlikely, the Russians need to recognize, recognize and take on once again the complex role of the center of the Eurasian Empire.

The geopolitical construction of this Empire should be based on the fundamental principle of the principle of "common enemy." The denial of Atlantism, the rejection of the strategic control of the United States and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, market-liberal values are the common civilizational base, the general impulse that will open the way to a lasting political and strategic alliance, create the axial backbone of the coming Empire. The vast majority of Eurasian states and peoples have a continental, "land" specificity of national history, state traditions, and economic ethics. The overwhelming majority of these states and peoples perceive American political and strategic influence as an overwhelming burden that alienates nations from their historical fate. Despite all the internal civilizational, religious, and socio-economic differences between the Eurasian powers, they have a strong and unshakable "common denominator" of hostility to the totality of Atlantic control, a desire to free themselves from the overseas guardianship of that Merchant System, which the USA is strenuously planting, a stronghold of the "sea" civilization.

Differences in the regional interests of the Eurasian states, in religious, ethnic, racial and cultural orientation are all important factors that cannot be ignored.

However, one can speak about them seriously and fully only when the suffocating economic and strategic influence of the “common enemy” disappears, imposing a model that is alien to almost all Christians, socialists, Muslims, national capitalists, and Buddhists, and Communists, and Hindus. In the meantime, US dominance remains, all intra-Eurasian conflicts and contradictions are artificial, since such a clarification of relations makes sense only in the absence of a more global factor that, in practice, organizes and controls these conflicts in order to maintain disunity and fragmentation in Eurasia. In this sense, all the “regional powers” in Eurasia logically serve the interests of the Atlantists, since, being unable to provide them with large-scale resistance (and this is possible only in the imperial strategic context), they are entirely dependent on a single Superpower and direct their energy to neighbors only with the sanction of overseas rulers.

The “common enemy,” Atlantism, should become the connecting component of the new geopolitical structure. The effectiveness of this factor is beyond doubt, and all the arguments against this consideration either naively do not take into account the objective seriousness and totality of the Atlantic domination, or deliberately divert geopolitical attention from the only responsible and realistic perspective in favor of secondary regional problems that have no solution at all without taking into account the global alignment forces.

Eurasia is predetermined by geographical and strategic unification. This is a strictly scientific geopolitical fact. Russia must inevitably be at the center of such an association. The driving force of unification is inevitably but must be the Russian people. The civilization mission of the Russians, their universalist ideal, and the logic of the historical formation of the nation and state are in full harmony with this mission. The new Eurasian Empire is inscribed in the geographical and political predetermination of world history and world geopolitics. There is no point in arguing with this circumstance. The interests of the Russian people are inseparable from the construction of such a continental structure.

The Eurasian geopolitics of the New Empire is not just a geographic abstraction or expression of a hypothetical will for unlimited expansion. Its principles and main directions take into account geopolitical constants, and the current political situation, and really existing international trends, and the strategic balance of forces, and economic and resource patterns. Therefore, the Eurasian imperial project carries simultaneously several dimensions of cultural, strategic, historical, economic, political, etc. It is important from the very beginning to

historical, economic, political, etc. It is important from the very beginning to emphasize that in one or another "axial" geopolitical alliance, when creating the Empire, it is a completely different degree of integration depending on the level. In one case there can be cultural or ethnic rapprochement, in another religious, in the third economic. These issues have a specific solution in each case. The only universal integrating reality in the future Eurasian Empire will be the categorical imperative of strategic unification, i.e. such a geopolitical alliance that will allow in all strategic directions to effectively resist Atlantic influences, American geopolitical pressure and political and economic dictatorship.

The strategic unification of the continent in question should ensure control over the sea borders of Eurasia on all sides of the world, continental economic, industrial, and resource autarky, and centralized management of the Eurasian armed forces. All other aspects of intra-Eurasian integration will be decided on the basis of flexible, differentiated principles, depending on each specific case. This fundamental consideration must always be kept in mind in order to avoid unreasonable doubts and objections that may arise if, instead of a strategic association, someone erroneously considers that the matter concerns a political, ethnic, cultural, religious or economic association. By the way, representatives of "small nationalism" of all peoples will quite consciously carry out such a substitution, reproaching the Eurasians and continental imperial builders for wanting to dissolve their ethnic groups, religions, cultures, etc. in the new "internationalist utopia". The Eurasian project in no way leads to the leveling of nations, on the contrary, it proceeds from the need to preserve and develop the identity of peoples and cultures, but it does not refer to the irresponsible romantic dreams of "small nationalists" (which in practice lead only to chauvinism and suicidal ethnic conflicts), but about a serious and objective understanding of the current situation, where this goal can be achieved only under the condition of a radical undermining of the world influence of the Atlanticist West with its market, liberal ideology ogiey aspiring to world domination.

Now it remains only to find out the specifics of this continental project, taking into account the negative factors that foiled the implementation of this grandiose civilization plan in previous periods.

4.2 West axis: Moscow-Berlin. European Empire and Eurasia

In the West, the New Empire has a strong geopolitical bridgehead, which is Central Europe.

Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as Germany, Prussia, and part of the Polish and West Ukrainian territories. The consolidating force of Central Europe is traditionally Germany, uniting under its control this geopolitical conglomerate.

For natural-geographical and historical reasons, central Europe has a pronounced "land", continental character, opposing the "sea", "Atlantic" spaces of Western Europe. In principle, the political influence of Central Europe can also spread south to Italy and Spain, which has many historical precedents. It is most logical to consider Berlin as the geopolitical capital of Central Europe as a symbol of Germany, which, in turn, is the symbol and center of this entire entity. Only Germany and the German people possess all the necessary qualities for the effective integration of this geopolitical region with a historical will, a well-developed economy, a privileged geographical position, ethnic homogeneity, and the consciousness of their civilizational mission. Terrestrial and ideocratic Germany has traditionally opposed merchant-marine England, and the specifics of this geopolitical and cultural confrontation noticeably affected European history, especially after the Germans finally managed to create their own state.

England is geopolitically the least European state whose strategic interests are traditionally opposed to the Central European powers and, more broadly, continental trends in Europe. However, in parallel with the strengthening of the role of the United States and their seizure of almost complete control over the English colonies, the strategic role of England has significantly decreased, and today in Europe this country acts more as an extraterritorial floating base of the United States than as an independent force. Be that as it may, within Europe, England is the most hostile to the continental interests of the country, the antipode of Central Europe, and therefore, the New Eurasian Empire has in her person a political, ideological and economic adversary. It is unlikely that it will be possible to voluntarily reverse the civilizational path of this particular country, which at one time created a gigantic trade-colonial empire of a purely "marine" type and which contributed to the emergence of the whole modern Western civilization based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and stock market play. This is completely unrealistic, and therefore, in the Eurasian project, England will inevitably become a scapegoat, as the European processes of continental integration will necessarily take place not only without taking into

of continental integration will necessarily take place not only without taking into account English interests, but even in direct opposition to these interests. In this context, a considerable role should be played by European and, more broadly, Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism, up to and including the promotion of separatist tendencies and the political destabilization of Great Britain.

Another controversial geopolitical entity is France. In many ways, French history was atlantist in nature, opposing continental and Central European trends. France was the main historical adversary of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, strongly supported the fragmented state of the German principalities, gravitating to the "progressism" and "centralism" of the antitraditional and unnatural type. In general, from the point of view of undermining the European continental tradition, France has always been at the forefront, and in many cases, French politics has been identified with the most aggressive Atlantism. At least, this was the case until the United States assumed the planetary function of the main pole of Atlantism.

In France, there is an alternative geopolitical tendency that goes back to the continental line of Napoleon (which Goethe still perceived as the leader of the land integration of Europe) and clearly embodied in European politics de Gaulle, who was looking for an alliance with Germany and the creation of a European confederation independent of the United States. Partly the same line inspired Mitterrand's Franco-German projects. Be that as it may, it is hypothetically possible to imagine such a turn of events that France recognizes the supremacy of the factor of Central Europe and voluntarily accepts complicity in the geopolitical European bloc with an anti-American and continental orientation. The territory of France is a necessary component of the Eurasian bloc in the West, since control of the Atlantic coast and, accordingly, the security of the New Empire on the western borders directly depend on this. In any case, the Franco-German Union is the main link of Eurasian geopolitics in the continental West, provided that the interests of Central Europe, namely its autarchy and geopolitical independence, are priority here. Such a project is known as the "European Empire". The integration of Europe under the auspices of Germany as the basis of such a European Empire fits perfectly into the Eurasian project and is the most desirable process for a more global continental integration.

All tendencies towards European unification around Germany (Central Europe) will have a positive meaning only if one fundamental condition is observed for the creation of a solid geopolitical and strategic axis for Moscow Berlin. Central

Europe alone does not have sufficient political and military potential to gain real independence from US Atlantic control. Moreover, in the current conditions it is difficult to expect from Europe a genuine geopolitical and national awakening without the revolutionary influence of the Russian factor. The European Empire without Moscow and, more broadly, Eurasia is not only unable to fully organize its strategic space with a shortage of military power, political initiative and natural resources, but also in a civilizational sense does not have clear ideals and guidelines, since the influence of the Trade System and market liberal values deeply paralyzed the foundations of the national worldview of the European peoples, undermined their historical organic value systems. The European Empire will become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilizational reality only under the influence of a new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. In addition, only Russia and the Russians will be able to provide Europe with strategic and political independence and resource autarky. Therefore, the European Empire should be formed precisely around Berlin, which is on a direct and vital axis with Moscow.

The Eurasian impulse should come exclusively from Moscow, transmitting the civilizational mission (with appropriate adaptation to European specifics) of Russians to Berlin, and that, in turn, will begin European integration on the principles and projects inspired by the deep geopolitical continental impulse. The key to the adequacy of the European Empire lies in the unequivocal prevalence of Russophile tendencies in Germany itself, as the best German minds from Müller van den Brook to Ernst Nikisch, Karl Haushofer and Jordis von Lauhausen understood. And as a continuation of such geopolitical Russophilia, the rest of Europe (and, first of all, France) should follow the Germanophile orientation. Only under such conditions will the western vector of the Eurasian Empire be adequate and strong, strategically provided and ideologically consistent. But it should be recognized that no other unification of Europe is simply impossible without deep-seated contradictions and internal divisions. For example, the current unification of Europe under American, NATO control will very soon make it feel all its geopolitical and economic contradictions, and therefore, it will inevitably be frustrated, or suspended, or spontaneously acquire the unexpected, anti-American (and potentially Eurasian) dimension that was foreseen Jean Tiriard.

It is important to emphasize right away that the unification of Europe around Germany must take into account the major political miscalculations of previous attempts, and first of all, the failure of the epic of Hitler and the Third Reich. In no case should the geopolitical unification of Europe around Central Europe

no case should the geopolitical unification of Europe around Central Europe (Germany) imply the ethnic domination of the Germans or the creation of a centralized Jacobin structure in the form of a gigantic German State. According to Tyriar, "Hitler's main mistake was that he wanted to make Europe German, while he had to strive to make it European." This thesis remains completely relevant at the present stage, and in general can apply to all neo-imperial processes, including in Russia. The European Empire, organized around Germany, should be precisely European, free from the ethnic and linguistic domination of any one people. To be the geopolitical heart of Europe, Germany must acquire a supranational, civilizational, imperial character in itself, abandoning the contradictory and impossible feasible attempts to create a racially homogeneous "nation-state". European nations should be equal partners in building the western bridgehead of Eurasia and adapt the common imperial impulse to their own national and cultural specifics. The European Empire should not suppress European nations, not subordinate them to Germans or Russians, but, on the contrary, liberate them from the yoke of quantitative, consumer, market civilization, awaken their deep-seated national energies, return them to the bosom of history as independent, living and full-fledged political actors whose freedom will be guaranteed by the strategic power of all of Eurasia.

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the western supporting structure of the Eurasian Empire involves several serious steps in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe lying between Russia and Germany. The traditional atlantist policy in this region was based on Mackinder's thesis about the need to create a "sanitary cordon" here, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone, preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance, which is vitally dangerous for the entire atlantist bloc. To this end, Britain and France tried in every possible way to destabilize the Eastern European peoples, to instill in them the idea of the need for "independence" and liberation from German and Russian influences. In addition, the Atlantist diplomatic potential by any means sought to strengthen Russophobic sentiments in Germany and German-Phobic in Russia in order to draw both of these powers into a local conflict over the division of spheres of influence in the intermediate spaces in Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and Western Ukraine etc. The current NATO strategists are pursuing the same line, putting forward the idea of creating a "Black Sea-Baltic Federation" of states that would be directly related to Atlanticism and potentially hostile to both Russia and Germany.

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis presupposes, first of all, the disruption of the organization of the "sanitary cordon" in Eastern Europe and the active

struggle against carriers of Russophobia in Germany and Germanophobia in Russia. Instead of being guided by regional interests in a zone of mutual influence and unilaterally supporting politically and ethnically close peoples of this region, Russia and Germany should resolve all disputed issues jointly and in advance, developing a common plan for redistributing the geography of influence in this region, and then rigidly suppress all local initiatives of the East European nations to revise the Russian-German plans. Moreover, the main thing to strive for is the categorical elimination of any semblance of a “sanitary cordon”, the deliberate dispelling of the illusions of intermediate states regarding their potential independence from geopolitically powerful neighbors. It is necessary to create a direct and clear border between friendly Russia and Central Europe (Germany), and even with the prospect of creating a unified strategic block along the Berlin-Moscow axis, this border must retain its geopolitical significance as a limit of cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity in order to deliberately exclude ethnic or confessional expansion on border spaces. Russian-Ukrainian, Russian-Baltic, Russian-Romanian, Russian-Polish, etc. relations should not initially be considered as bilateral, but as tripartite with the participation of Germany. The same applies to relations between Germany and the East European countries (peoples); they should also be of a tripartite nature with the obligatory participation of the Russian side (and with the exception in all cases of extraneous, Atlantic, American intervention). For example, German-Ukrainian relations must necessarily be German-Russian-Ukrainian mi; German-Baltic German-Russian-arrived Tiy; German-Polish German-Russian-Polish mi, etc.

The Moscow-Berlin axis will help solve a whole range of the most important problems that both Russia and Germany face today. Russia in such an alliance receives direct access to high technology, to powerful investments in industry, and acquires guaranteed European complicity in the economic expansion of Russian lands. In this case, there will never be economic dependence on Germany, since Germany will participate in Russia not as a charitable party, but as an equal partner, receiving strategic cover in return from Moscow, guaranteeing Germany political liberation from US domination and resource independence from energy the reserves of the Third World controlled by Atlanticism (the energy blackmail of Europe by the USA is based on this). Germany today is an economic giant and a political dwarf. On the contrary, Russia is a political giant and an economic cripple. The Moscow-Berlin axis will cure the affliction of both partners and lay the foundation for the future prosperity of Great Russia and Great Germany. And in the long run, this will

lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of the entire Eurasian Empire of the European Empire in the West and the Russian Empire in the East of Eurasia. At the same time, the welfare of individual parts of this continental structure will serve the prosperity of the whole.

As preliminary steps in the formation of the Moscow-Berlin axis, it makes sense to carefully clear the cultural and historical perspective of mutual relations from the dark sides of the past history of the Russian-German wars, which were the result of the successful subversive activities of the Atlantic lobby in Germany and Russia, and not an expression of the political will of our continental peoples. In this perspective, it is advisable to return the Kaliningrad region (East Prussia) to Germany in order to abandon the last territorial symbol of the terrible fratricidal war. In order for this action not to be perceived by the Russians as another step in geopolitical surrender, it makes sense for Europe to offer Russia other territorial annexations or other forms of expanding the strategic zone of influence, especially from those states that stubbornly seek to enter the "Black Sea-Baltic Federation." Issues of restitution of East Prussia should be inextricably linked with the territorial and strategic expansion of Russia, and Germany, in addition to maintaining Russian military bases in the Kaliningrad region, should, in turn, contribute to the diplomatic and political strengthening of Russia's strategic positions in the Northwest and West. The Baltic countries, Poland, Moldova and Ukraine as a potential "sanitary cordon" should undergo a geopolitical transformation not after the restitution of Prussia, but at the same time as elements of the same process of final fixing of borders between friendly Russia and Central Europe.

Bismarck's words "Germany has no enemy in the East" should once again become the dominant German political doctrine, and the reverse maxim should be accepted by the Russian rulers "on the Western borders, in Central Europe, Russia has only friends". However, in order for this to become a reality, and not just good wishes, it is necessary to ensure that it is geopolitics and its laws that become the main basis for the adoption of all significant foreign policy decisions in both Germany and Russia, since only from this point of view is necessity and inevitability the closest Russian-German union can be fully realized, understood and recognized to the end. Otherwise, an appeal to historical conflicts, misunderstandings and disputes will frustrate any attempt to create a solid and reliable base of the vital Moscow-Berlin axis.

4.3 Axis Moscow-Tokyo. Pan-Asian project. To the Eurasian Trilateral Commission

The New Empire should have a clear strategy regarding its eastern component. Therefore, the eastern borders of Eurasia for this Empire have the same strategic significance as the problems of the West.

Proceeding from the fundamental principle of a "common enemy," Russia should strive for a strategic alliance with those states that are more burdened by the political and economic pressure of the Atlantic superpower, have a historical tradition of geopolitical projects that are opposed to Atlanticism, and have sufficient technological and economic power to become the key geopolitical reality of the new bloc.

In this perspective, the need for maximum rapprochement with India, which is our natural geopolitical ally in Asia in terms of both racial, political, and strategic parameters, seems completely unconditional. After decolonization, India sought to avoid entering the capitalist bloc by any means and actually led the movement of "non-aligned countries", who were looking for opportunities in the narrow "no man's" geopolitical space to adhere to the Third Way policy with undisguised sympathy for the USSR. Today, when harsh communist dogma has been abolished in Russia, there are no obstacles to close rapprochement with India.

India itself is a continent. The sphere of its geopolitical influence is limited, however, by Hindustan and a small zone in the Indian Ocean, located south of the peninsula. India will necessarily become a strategic ally of the New Empire, its southeast outpost, although it should be borne in mind that Indian civilization is not prone to geopolitical dynamics and territorial expansion, and in addition, the Hindu tradition does not have a universal religious dimension, and therefore this country can play an important role only in a limited part of Asia. At the same time, the rather weak economic and technological development of this country does not allow fully relying on it, and therefore, the alliance with it will not solve any problems of the New Empire at this stage. India can serve as a strategic outpost of Eurasia, and this is where its mission is actually exhausted (if you do not take into account its spiritual culture, familiarity with which can help to clarify the most important metaphysical landmarks of the Empire).

India is an important ally of Eurasia, but not the main one. In today's world, two geopolitical realities claim to be the true east pole of Eurasia: China and Japan. But between these countries there is a deep geopolitical antagonism, which has a long history and is consistent with the typology of two civilizations. Therefore, Russia must choose one thing. The problem cannot be posed in this way: both China and Japan at the same time. Here you need a choice.

At first glance, China is a continental land mass, its civilization is traditional authoritarian (non-trade) in nature, and the very preservation of communist ideology during the liberal reforms in modern China seemed to finally contribute to the choice of China, as opposed to capitalist, island Japan. However, history shows that it was China, and not Japan, that was geopolitically the most important base of Anglo-Saxon forces on the Eurasian continent, while Japan, on the contrary, supported an alliance with Central European countries of the opposite orientation.

In order to understand this paradox, you should carefully look at the map and note on it the geography of the last two world wars. In the northern hemisphere, four geopolitical zones can be distinguished, corresponding to the main participants in world conflicts (countries or blocs of states). The Far West, Atlantism, unites the USA, England, France and several other European countries. This zone has a completely defined geopolitical orientation, uniquely identical to the "marine", "Carthaginian" lines of world history. This is the space of maximum civilizational activity and the source of all anti-traditional, "progressive" transformations.

The second zone is Central Europe, Germany, Austria-Hungary. From the East, from the geopolitical point of view, this space, directly adjacent to the Atlantic bloc, has all the signs of an anti-Atlantic, continental, land orientation and geographically gravitates to the East.

The third zone is Russia itself, which lies at the center of gravity of the continent and is responsible for the fate of Eurasia. The land and illiberal, "conservative" essence of Russia is obvious.

And finally, the fourth zone is the Pacific area, where it is Japan that has a central role, developing rapidly and dynamically and having at the same time a rigid system of traditionalist values and a clear understanding of its geopolitical role. At the same time, Japan is oriented essentially anti-Western and anti-liberal. since its value system is something directly opposite to the ideals of

"progressive" Atlantist humanity.

The Western world (Atlantism) in the person of its deepest ideologists (Mackinder, Mahan, etc.) was well aware that the biggest threat to planetary Atlantism would be the consolidation of all three zones of Eurasia from the Central European to the Pacific with the participation and central role of Russia against the Anglo-Saxon and French "progressivism." Therefore, the main task of the atlantist strategists was to contrast the three Eurasian zones with their immediate neighbors and potential allies. And the Russo-German and Russo-Japanese conflicts were actively provoked precisely by the Atlantists, acting both within the Eurasian governments and from the outside, using diplomatic and power levers. Opponents of atlantism, starting with Haushofer, finally came to the conclusion that an effective opposition to atlantism is possible only by rejecting the logic imposed on the three Eurasian zones, i.e. with the categorical rejection of the Russians from German- and Japanese-phobia, and the Japanese and Germans from Russophobia, no matter what historical precedents the proponents of these "phobias" may have resorted to.

Moreover, it is Japan, as a symbol of the entire Pacific space, that is of paramount importance in these anti-Atlantic projects, since Japan's strategic position, the dynamics of its development, and the specifics of its value system make it an ideal partner in the planetary struggle against Western civilization. China, for its part, did not play a special role in this geopolitical picture, being deprived first of political independence (English colonization), and then of geopolitical dynamics. It was only during the period of active Maoism that a purely soil, Eurasian tendency manifested itself in China itself, when the projects of "peasant socialism", all-China nationalism and pronounced Sovietophilia prevailed. But this state did not last very long, and China, under the pretext of disagreeing with the development of the Soviet model, returned to the dubious geopolitical function of destabilizing the Far Eastern interests of Eurasia and escalating conflicts with Russia. There is no doubt that the Chinese perestroika that began in the 1980s was the final turn from the Maoist period to the pro-Atlantic model, which should have finally fixed the gap between China and the USSR and its orientation towards the West. At the same time, the "Atlantization" of modern China was much more successful than in Russia, since economic liberalism without political democratization made it possible to make China dependent on Western financial groups without conflict, preserving a totalitarian system and the appearance of political independence. L

liberalism was propagated in China by totalitarian methods, and that is why the reform was fully successful. The political power of the party oligarchy was supplemented by the economic power of the same oligarchy, which had successfully privatized the national industry and national wealth and fused with the international cosmopolitan elite of Torgovy Stroy. China's economic successes are a rather ambiguous reality, since they are achieved at the cost of a deep compromise with the West and cannot be combined with any clear geopolitical concept that could serve as a guarantee of political independence and independence. Most likely, the new liberal China, which has two serious competitors next to it, economically powerful Japan and strategically powerful Russia will again, as many times in history, return to a purely Atlantic function in the Far East, combining the political dictatorship and the potential of capitalist development. Moreover, from a purely pragmatic point of view, the strategic alliance of Russia with China to create a single bloc will immediately push Japan away from the Russians and, accordingly, will again hostile that key Pacific region on whose participation in the common Eurasian project the ultimate geopolitical success of the confrontation between Sushi and the Sea depends.

In the New Empire, the eastern axis should be the Moscow axis of Tokyo. This is a categorical imperative of the East, Asian component of Eurasianism. It is around this axis that the basic principles of the Asian policy of Eurasia should take shape. Japan, being the northernmost point among the islands of the Pacific Ocean, is located at an exceptionally advantageous geographical point for the implementation of strategic, political and economic expansion to the South. The Federation of the Pacific around Japan was the main idea of the so-called The "pan-Asian project," which began to be implemented in the 1930s and 1940s, was interrupted only due to the defeat of the Axis countries in the war. It is necessary to return to this Pan-Asian project today in order to undermine the expansion of American influence in this region and deprive the Atlantists as a whole of their most important strategic and economic bases. According to some futurological forecasts, in the future the Pacific area will become one of the most important centers of civilization as a whole, and therefore the struggle for influence in this region is more than relevant is the struggle for the future.

The Pan-Asian project is the center of the eastern orientation of the New Empire. An alliance with Japan is vital. The Moscow axis Tokyo, in spite of the Moscow axis, Beijing is a priority and a promising one that opens up horizons for continental imperial construction that finally make Eurasia geopolitically complete, and the Atlantic empire of the West will weaken, and possibly

destroy, it completely.

The anti-Americanism of the Japanese, who perfectly remember the nuclear genocide and are clearly aware of the shame of political occupation, which has been going on for several decades, is beyond doubt. The principle of a "common enemy" is here. In the book by American Serge Friedmann, "The Coming War with Japan" (the book is called "Coming war with Japan") seems inevitable. The economic war between Japan and the USA is already underway. Russia, building the Eurasian Empire, cannot have a better ally.

Axis Moscow-Tokyo also solves a number of critical problems in both countries. Firstly, Russia is getting into the allies of the economic giant, equipped with highly developed technology and huge financial potential. However, Japan lacks political independence, a military-strategic system, and direct access to resources. Everything that Japan lacks is abundant in Russia, and everything that the Russians lack is in abundance among the Japanese. By combining efforts to build a continental Empire, the Japanese and Russians could as soon as possible create an unprecedentedly powerful geopolitical center covering Siberia, Mongolia, Japan itself and, in the long run, the entire Pacific region. In exchange for strategic protection and direct access to Eurasian resources, Japan could quickly and efficiently help the Russians in the technological development and development of Siberia, laying the foundation of an independent regional organism. Japanese technological and financial assistance would solve many problems in Russia.

In addition, Russia and Japan together could restructure the Far Eastern part of continental Eurasia. Indicative in this regard is the ever-increasing intensity of Mongolian-Japanese contacts based on unity of origin, racial affinity and spiritual and religious kinship. Mongolia (possibly even Inner Mongolia and Tibet, which are currently under Chinese occupation), Kalmykia, Tuva, Buryatia form the Eurasian Buddhist enclave, which could serve as a strong connecting element between Russia and Japan, and provide intermediate links for the Tokyo axis of Moscow. On the one hand, these regions are closely and inextricably linked with Russia, and on the other hand, they are culturally and racially close to Japan. The Buddhist bloc could play a crucial role in creating a solid geopolitical structure in the Far East, which would be the continental link of the Pacific Pan-Asian Union. In the event of an aggravation of relations with China, which will inevitably happen when the Tokyo axis begins to realize, the Buddhist factor will be used as the banner of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Tibet and Inner Mongolia for the expansion of Eurasian and

continental spaces to the detriment of pro-Atlantic China.

Generally speaking, China has every chance of becoming a geopolitical "scapegoat" in the implementation of the pan-Asian project. This can be accomplished both when provoking internal Chinese separatism (Tibetans, Mongols, the Muslim population of Xinjiang), and when playing on regional contradictions, as well as with the active political support of the anti-Atlantic, purely continental forces of the potential Buddhist (and Taoist) lobby within China itself, which in the future may lead to the establishment of such a political regime in China itself, which will be loyal to the Eurasian Empire. In addition, China should offer a special vector of regional geopolitics directed strictly south to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Southward expansion partly offset the loss of China's political influence in the North and East.

China in the eastern regions of the New Empire should be compared in the West not to England, but to France, since in relation to its Eurasian Empire will be guided by two criteria in case of active opposition to Eurasian projects, China will have to be treated as a geopolitical adversary with all the ensuing consequences, but if it succeeds to create a powerful pro-Japanese and pro-Russian political lobby at the same time, in the future China itself will become a full-fledged and equal participant in the continental project.

The Moscow axis Tokyo and the western axis Moscow Berlin will create such a geopolitical space that is directly opposite to the main model of the atlantist ideologues, whose Trilateral, Trilateral Commission, has become today the highest instance. The Trilateral Commission, created by the American circles of the highest political establishment, implies, as a new configuration of the planet, the strategic unification of three geopolitical zones that exactly correspond to the three geopolitical elements of the four that we spoke about above. The three sides of this commission, which seeks to fulfill the functions of a "World Government", correspond to:

1. the American zone (USA, Far West, pure atlantism),
2. the European zone (continental Europe, Central Europe, but under the auspices of France and England, not Germany)
3. Pacific zone (united around Japan).

Trilateral, therefore, seeks to construct such a geopolitical model in which Eurasia (= Russia) itself will be surrounded on both sides by reliable US geopolitical partners i.e. three of the four zones that encompass the northern

geopolitical partners, not three of the four zones that encompass the northern regions of the planet fall under the direct control of the United States. In this case, between the potential Eurasian adversary of the Atlantists (Eurasia) and the very center of Atlantism (USA) there are two official geopolitical spaces (Europe and Japan). It is also important to note that perestroika in China at the beginning of the 1980s began precisely with the submission of representatives of the Trilateral Commission, who sought to finally bring China back to the mainstream of Atlantic politics.

The Eurasian project offers something directly opposite to the plans of Trilateral. The New Empire is anti-Trilateral, its reverse, inverted model. This is the union of three geopolitical zones with a center in Russia, oriented against America. According to the same logic, according to which the United States seeks to geopolitically keep Europe and Japan under its control, realizing all the strategic benefits for American power in such a balance of power, Russia during the construction of the New Empire should strive in every way to create a strong strategic alliance with Europe and Japan, so that to achieve their own geopolitical stability, power and guarantee political freedom to all Eurasian peoples. In principle, we can talk about the creation of our Eurasian “Trilateral Commission” with Russian, European and Japanese branches, in which, however, not politicians of the Atlantic and pro-American type, but intellectual and political leaders of a national orientation, understanding the geopolitical logic of the current situation in the world. At the same time, of course, in contrast to the Atlantic Trilateral, the Eurasian Tripartite Commission should not have a Frenchman, but a German as the main representative of Europe.

Given the strategic need for the Japanese factor in the Eurasian project, it becomes clear that the issue of restitution of the Kuril Islands is not an obstacle to the Russian-Japanese alliance. In the case of the Kuril Islands, as in the case of the Kaliningrad region, we are dealing with the territorial symbols of the Second World War, alliances and the entire course of which was a complete triumph of the Atlantists, who dealt with all their opponents at the same time by the extreme depletion of the USSR (when imposing such a geopolitical position on it, which could not in the long run lead to perestroika collapse) and the direct occupation of Europe and Japan. The Kuril Islands are a reminder of the absurd and unnatural fratricidal massacre of Russians and Japanese, the earliest oblivion of which is a necessary condition for our mutual prosperity. The Kuril Islands must be returned to Japan, but this should be carried out as part of the general process of the new organization of the Eurasian Far East. In addition, the Kuril restitution cannot be carried out while maintaining the existing alignment of

political forces in Russia and Japan. This is the business of only Eurasian, imperialist-oriented politicians who will be able to fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the understanding of the geopolitical need for the Kuril restitution among the Eurasian elite should be present now.

4.4 Axis Moscow-Tehran. Central Asian Empire. Pan-Arab project

The policy of the Eurasian Empire in the south should also be guided by a solid continental alliance with the strength that satisfies both the strategically, ideologically, and culturally common Eurasian tendency of anti-Americanism. The principle of a "common enemy" here should be a decisive factor.

In the south of Eurasia, there are several geopolitical entities that could theoretically act as the south pole of the New Empire. Since India and China should be attributed to the East and connected with the prospect of pan-Asian integration, only the Islamic world remains, stretching from the Philippines and Pakistan to the Maghreb countries, i.e. West Africa. In general, the entire Islamic zone is a naturally friendly geopolitical reality with respect to the Eurasian Empire, since the Islamic tradition, more politicized and modernized than most other Eurasian denominations, is well aware of the spiritual incompatibility of Americanism and religion. Atlantists themselves consider the Islamic world as a whole as its potential adversary, and therefore, the Eurasian Empire has loyal potential allies in it, striving for a common goal, undermining and, in the long term, the complete cessation of American, Western domination on the planet. It would be ideal to have an integrated Islamic world as the southern component of the entire Eurasian Empire, stretching from Central Asia to West Africa, religiously unified and politically stable, basing its policy on the principle of loyalty to tradition and spirit. Therefore, in the long term, the Islamic Empire in the South (the "new caliphate") may become an essential element of New Eurasia along with the European Empire in the West, the Pacific in the East and the Russian in the Center.

However, at the moment, the Islamic world is extremely fragmented and within it there are various ideological and political trends, as well as opposing geopolitical projects. The most global are the following trends:

1. Iranian fundamentalism (continental type, anti-American, anti-Atlantic and geopolitically active),
2. the Turkish secular regime (of the Atlantic type, emphasizing the Pan-Turkist line),
3. pan-Arabism, preached by Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, partly Egypt and Saudi Arabia (rather diverse and controversial projects in each case),
4. the Saudi Wahhabi type of fundamentalism (geopolitically solidarity with atlantism),
5. various versions of "Islamic socialism" (Libya, Iraq, Syria, models close to left-wing pan-Arabism).

It is immediately clear that the purely Atlanticist poles in the Islamic world, whether they are "secular" (as in the case of Turkey) or Islamic (in the case of Saudi Arabia), cannot fulfill the functions of the south pole of Eurasia in the global project of the continental Empire. Remains "Iranian fundamentalism" and "pan-Arabism" (left wing).

From the point of view of geopolitical constants, Iran, of course, has a priority on this issue, since it satisfies all Eurasian parameters, it is a major continental power closely connected with Central Asia, radically anti-American, traditionalist and emphasizing at the same time a "social" political vector (defense) mustazafov ", " destitute "). In addition, Iran occupies such a position on the map of the mainland that the creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis solves a huge number of problems for the New Empire. If Iran were included as the south pole of the Empire, Russia would instantly achieve the strategic goal to which it went (in the wrong ways) for several centuries, access to the warm seas. This strategic aspect of the absence of such an exit from Russia has been the main trump card of the atlantist geopolitics since the time of colonial England, which completely controlled Asia and the East, taking advantage of Russia's lack of direct access to the southern coast of the continent. All Russian attempts to enter the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were a desire for complicity in the political organization of the coastal regions of Eurasia, where the British reigned supreme, easily suppressing any attempts of Russian expansion through control of this coastal zone. However, even if Russia had succeeded in doing this, Atlantic control over Gibraltar would always remain an obstacle to truly large-scale naval operations and would not have allowed Russia to undermine British power. Only Iran, continental adjoining Russia and going directly to the Indian Ocean, could then and can be a radical solution to this most important geopolitical problem. Having gained strategic access, first of all, naval

bases on the Iranian coast, Eurasia will be completely safe from the “anaconda ring” strategy, i.e. from the implementation of the traditional Atlantist plan to “strangle” the continental expanses of the continent through the seizure of coastal territories throughout Eurasia, and especially in the South and West.

The creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis at once dissects the “anaconda” in the most vulnerable place and opens up unlimited prospects for Russia to acquire more and more bridgeheads inside and outside Eurasia. This is the most significant point.

On the other hand, there is the problem of the former Soviet Central Asia, where today the three geopolitical tendencies “pan-Turkism” (Turkey, Atlantism), “Wahhabism” (Saudi Arabia, Atlantism) and “fundamentalism” (Iran, anti-Atlanticism) compete. For obvious reasons, “pan-Arabism” cannot be among the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia for the most part. The presence of a powerful pro-Russian orientation in parallel should also be taken into account, but it is difficult to imagine how these Islamic regions with an awakening national self-consciousness can again join Russia bloodlessly and painlessly. It is clear that among the “non-Moscow” trends, the New Empire can rely only on the pro-Iranian orientation, which will remove this region from the direct or indirect control of the Atlantists. At the same time, the solid axis of Moscow Tehran will remove all the contradictions between Russophilism and Islamism (Iranian type), make them the same geopolitical tendency, oriented both to Moscow and Tehran at the same time. In parallel with this, such an axis would automatically mean the end of the civil conflict in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which are fueled only by the geopolitical uncertainty of these entities, torn by contradictions between the Islamic-Iranian fundamentalist vector and gravitation towards Russia. Naturally, against the backdrop of such a contradiction, petty-ethnic frictions are also aggravated, and the activities of the Atlantic “influence agents”, which directly or indirectly (through Turkey and Saudi Arabia) seek to destabilize the Asian territories in their key centers, are also facilitated.

Iran is geopolitically Central Asia, just as Germany is Central Europe. Moscow, as the center of Eurasia, its pole, should delegate to Tehran the mission of guiding the “Iranian world” (Pax Persica) in this space, the organization of a strong Central Asian geopolitical bloc that can withstand Atlantic influence throughout the region. This means that the pan-Turkic expansion, as well as the financial and political invasion of the Saudis, will be abruptly interrupted. Iran, traditionally hostile to both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, will fulfill this function much better than the Russians, who will solve their geopolitical problems in this

complex center only with the strategic support of the Iranian side. But here, as in the case of Germany, we should not talk about the creation of the Iranian Empire or the Iranization of Central Asia. We should talk about the creation of a "Central Asian Empire", which on a federal basis could integrate various peoples, cultures and ethnic groups into a single southern geopolitical bloc, thereby creating a strategically homogeneous, but ethnically and culturally diverse Islamic formation, inextricably linked with the interests of the whole Eurasian Empire.

The Armenian question occupies an important place on the Moscow axis issue, as it traditionally serves as a center of destabilization in the Transcaucasus. It should be noted that the Armenians are the Aryan people, clearly aware of their Japhetic nature and relationship with the Indo-European peoples, especially Asian i.e. with Iranians and Kurds. On the other hand, the Armenians are Christian people, their Monophysite tradition fits precisely with the general mood of the Eastern Church (although it is recognized by Orthodoxy as a heretical trend), and they are very vividly aware of the geopolitical connection with Russia. Armenians occupy lands of extreme strategic importance, as the route from Turkey to Azerbaijan and further to Central Asia lies through Armenia and Artsakh. In the axis of Moscow, Tehran, Yerevan automatically becomes the most important strategic link, additionally fastening Russia to Iran, and cutting off Turkey from the continental spaces. With the possible reorientation of Baku from Ankara to Tehran in the general Moscow project, Tehran will quickly resolve the Karabakh issue, as all four parties will be vitally interested in the immediate establishment of stability in such an important strategic region. (Otherwise, that is, while maintaining the pro-Turkish orientation of Azerbaijan, this "country" is subject to dismemberment between Iran, Russia and Armenia.) Almost the same applies to other regions of the Caucasus, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Dagestan, etc. , which will remain zones of conflict and instability only if the geopolitical interests of Atlantic Turkey and Eurasian Russia clash in them. The connection of the Iranian geopolitical line here instantly deprives the visibility of a clash between "Islam and Orthodoxy" in the Caucasus, which Turkish and Russian "agents of influence" of Atlantism are trying to give to conflicts, and will restore peace and harmony.

In this project of restructuring Central Asia, it should be noted that Russian ethnic interests can be best protected, since the Central Asian Empire will not be built on the basis of artificial political structures, fictitious "post-imperial legitimacy", but on the basis of national homogeneity, which implies a peaceful

transition to the direct Moscow jurisdiction of all territories of Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan), compactly populated by Russians. And those territories whose ethnic composition is controversial, will receive special rights on the basis of Russian-Iranian projects within a given Empire. Consequently, through the Eurasian geopolitical project, the Russians will be able to achieve what appears to be the goal of “small (ethnic) nationalism,” but that this nationalism itself will never be able to fulfill.

It is also important to take into account the need to impose the role of a scapegoat in Turkey in this project, since the interests of this state in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not be taken into account at all. Moreover, support for Kurdish separatism in Turkey itself, as well as the autonomous demands of Turkish Armenians, in order to wrest peoples ethnically close to Iran from secular-atlantic control, should probably be emphasized. To compensate for Turkey, one should offer either southward development into the Arab world through Baghdad, Damascus and Riyadh, or provoke pro-Iranian fundamentalists in Turkey itself to radically measure the geopolitical course and to enter the Central Asian block under the anti-Atlantic and Eurasian sign in the long run .

Axis Moscow-Tehran is the basis of the Eurasian geopolitical project. Iranian Islam is the best version of Islam for joining the continental bloc, and this version should be given priority but supported by Moscow.

The second line of the Eurasian alliance with the South is the Pan-Arab project, which covers part of the front of Asia and North Africa. This block is also vital for continental geopolitics, since this zone is strategically important in terms of control over the southwestern coast of Europe. That is why the English, and later the American presence in this region is a historical and strategic constant. Controlling the Middle East and North Africa, the Atlantists have traditionally held (and are holding) continental Europe under political and economic pressure.

However, the integration of the Pan-Arab project with the common Eurasian Empire should be entrusted to purely European forces, returning to the projects of the Euro-Africa, which, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is not two continents, but one. The European Empire, which is vitally interested in penetrating the south of the African continent as deeply as possible, must in the future fully control, relying on the Pan-Arab block, Africa right up to the Sahara, and in the future try to strategically infiltrate the entire African continent. In the perspective of Euro-Africa, the Mediterranean Sea is not a genuine “sea”, but

only an internal "lake", which represents neither a barrier nor a defense against Atlantic influence. Beyond the borders of Arab Africa, a detailed multi-ethnic project should be developed that would help restructure the black continent according to national, ethnic and cultural characteristics, instead of the controversial post-colonial conglomerate that modern African states represent. A nuanced pan-African (non-Arab) national project could become a geopolitical addition to the pan-Arab integration plan.

Given that the model of a purely Iranian foundation of Islam is unlikely to become universally acceptable in the Arab world (in many respects due to the specifics of the Shiite, Aryan version of Iranian Islam), the Pan-Arab project should strive to create an independent anti-Atlantic block, with Iraq and Libya as priority poles and liberated Palestine (under certain conditions also Syria), i.e. those Arab countries that are more aware of the American danger and more radical than others reject the market-capitalist model imposed by the West. At the same time, in the Pan-Arab project, the scapegoat will be, first of all, Saudi Arabia, too rooted in Atlantic geopolitics to voluntarily enter the Pan-Arab block friendly to Eurasia. As regards Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, the situation is somewhat different, since the ruling pro-Atlantic forces in these states do not express national trends, do not fully control the situation and rely only on American bayonets and American money. When the Pan-Arab Liberation War begins at a fairly intense level, all these regimes will fall in one hour.

But it is necessary to clearly understand that the most harmonious construction of the pan-Arab space is not so much Russia, as Europe, Central Europe, Germany, and more precisely, the European Empire. Russia (more precisely, the USSR) intervened in Arab problems only when it alone represented a Eurasian state in the face of Americanism. In the presence of a powerful European base of Eurasian orientation, i.e. after the creation of the Moscow Berlin axis, this function should be delegated to Berlin and Europe as a whole. The direct concern of Russia in the Islamic world should be precisely Iran, on the union with which the vital strategic and even narrowly ethnic interests of Russians depend.

Iran, which controls Central Asia (including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the remains of Turkey or "Turkey after the pro-Iranian revolution") together with Russia, is the center of Moscow's priority interests. In this case, one should use the traditional influence of Russia among the "left" pan-Arab regimes (primarily Iraq and Libya) for the rapprochement between the Arab countries and Iran and the early oblivion of the artificial and Atlantic inspired Iran-Iraq conflict.

the early oblivion of the artificial and Atlantic-inspired Iran-Iraq conflict.

4.5 Empire of many Empires

The New Empire, the construction of which would meet the global, planetary civilization mission of the Russian people, is a super-project with many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have a complex differentiated structure, within which there will be various degrees of interdependence and integration of the individual parts. It is obvious that the New Empire will not be either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Empire.

The main integrating moment of this New Empire will be the struggle against Atlanticism and the tough rebuff of that liberal-market, "marine," Carthaginian "civilization, which the USA and planetary political, economic and military structures that serve Atlantism embody today. creation of a giant geopolitical continental bloc, united strategically. It is the unity of strategic continental borders that will be the main integrating factor of the New Empire. This Empire will be united and an identifiable organism in a military-strategic sense, and this will impose political restrictions on all internal sub-imperial formations. continental security. At this and only at this level the New Empire will be an integral geopolitical entity.

At the next, lower level, the New Empire will be the "confederation of Large Spaces" or secondary Empires. Of these, four main European Empires in the West (around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the East (around Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the Center (around Russia) should be singled out. It is completely logical that the central position is the main one in such a project, since the territorial coherence and homogeneity of all the other components of the gigantic continental block depends on it. In addition, separate independent Large Spaces will exist, in addition to the indicated blocks, India, the Pan-Arab world, the Pan-African Union, and also, possibly, a special region of China, whose status is still difficult to determine even approximately. Each of the secondary Empires will be based on a particular racial, cultural, religious, political or geopolitical integrating factor, which in each case may be different. The degree of integration of the Empires themselves will also be a variable, depending on the specific ideological base on which this or that Empire will be created.

A confederate principle will also operate within these secondary Empires, but this will apply to smaller ethnic, national and regional units to what, with greater or lesser approximation, can be called a "country" or "state". Naturally, the sovereignty of these "countries" will have significant limitations in the first place, strategic (arising from the principles of the entire continental New Empire), and in the second, related to the specifics of those Large Spaces into which they will be included. And in this matter it will be applied the principle of differentiation is extremely flexible, conductive take into account historical, spiritual, geographic, racial characteristics of each region.

Great Russians, for example, can be considered as a separate people or even a "country" within the framework of the Russian Empire, along with Ukrainians, Belarusians, possibly Serbs, etc., but at the same time they will all be closely connected with the jurisdiction of the Slavic-Orthodox type embodied in a specific state system. At the same time, the Russian Empire will depend on the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, whose strategic interests will be placed above the national - racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs.

The same can be said, for example, of the French, who will remain a people or a "country" within the framework of the European Empire, along with Germans and Italians associated with them by a common European imperial tradition, Christian religion and belonging to the Indo-European race. But the European Empire itself, in turn, will obey the strategic imperatives of the entire great continental New Empire.

The same was not the case in Central Asia, and the Pacific area, and in the Arab world and black Africa, and India, etc.

At the same time, at the global level, the construction of the planetary New Empire will be the main scapegoat for the United States, whose power (up to the complete destruction of this geopolitical structure) will be realized systematically and uncompromisingly by all participants in the New Empire. In this regard, the Eurasian project involves Eurasian expansion into South and Central America with a view to removing it from the control of the North (here the Spanish factor can be used as a traditional alternative to the Anglo-Saxon one), as well as provoking all types of instability and separatism within the United States (it's possible to rely on the political forces of African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula "Carthage must be destroyed" will become

thereby, the ancient Roman formula "Carthago must be destroyed" will become the absolute slogan of the Eurasian Empire, since it will incorporate the essence of the entire geopolitical planetary strategy of the continent awakening to its mission.

The specifics in ascertaining the status of this or that people, this or that "country", this or that "Empire of Large Spaces" within the framework of the common continental bloc will become relevant only after geopolitical unification, after the creation of the necessary axes, and only then can the Eurasian peoples and states solve their internal problems completely freely, without pressure from the Atlantic forces, which are fundamentally interested in only one thing, to prevent peace, harmony, prosperity, independence, dignity and prosperity in Eurasia that tradition.

Chapter 5 - The fate of Russia in imperial Eurasia

5.1 Geopolitical magic for national purposes

Russian national interests can be considered at several levels on the global, planetary, geopolitical, civilizational (this was discussed in the previous sections) and narrowly national, concrete, socio-political and cultural (this will be discussed in this part). How do the macro projects of continental imperial construction and the ethnic line of the Russian people relate to each other? Something has already been said about this. Here you should consider this problem in more detail.

"Imperialism-building orientation", "continent of lism", "Eurasianism" all these terms and corresponding projects often frighten away those Russians who are poorly familiar with the symbolism of Russian history, do not understand the meaning of the historical trends of the nation, are used to operating banal everyday clichés when comprehending what are people and what are their interests. This gives rise to many misunderstandings among the nationalists themselves, provokes empty discussions and meaningless polemics. In fact, the specifics of Russian nationalism consists precisely in its global nature; it is associated not so much with blood as with space, soil, and land. Outside the Empire, the Russians will lose their identity and disappear as a nation.

However, the implementation of the Eurasian plan should in no case lead to the ethnic erosion of Russians as the "axial" ethnic group of the Empire. The Great Russians need to maintain their ethnic identity, without which the center of the continent will lose its civilizational and cultural certainty. In other words, within the framework of the supranational geopolitical Empire, there must be special norms (including legal ones) that would ensure that Russians maintain their ethnic identity. The specifics of the New Empire should consist in the fact that with the central role of the Russians in the matter of geopolitical integration, this should not be accompanied by the "Russification" of non-Russian territories, since such "Russification", on the one hand, will pervert the meaning of the Empire, reducing it to the level of a giant "nation-state" and, on the other hand, it will dissolve the Russian community in a different national environment.

With regard to the Russian people, within the framework of the continental bloc, it should be emphasized that its role will not be “isolationist” (contrary to the projects of “small nationalism”) and not ethno-expansionist (contrary to the “ethnic imperialists” and, in part, to the Slavophiles). Of these two projects, it is necessary to take individual parties, discarding the others. At the strategic level, we will really talk about “expansionism,” but not of an ethnic but a geopolitical nature, which obviously excludes any form of Russian or Slavic racism. On the purely ethnic level, on the contrary, the “isolationist” option should be realized to one degree or another, with the rejection of the isolationism of the political and state. Russians will exist as a single national community in the space of a supra-national imperial complex. Ethnic reality will be consolidated within the people, and a superethnic mission will be expressed within the Empire. Only with this combination can one achieve at the same time the preservation of a healthy national core and the maximum expansion of geopolitical influence. In other words, the national factor will be determined on the basis of a completely new combination of ethnic and political, which was not in any of the previous stages of the national-state history of the Russians. Ethnic homogeneity existed in Russia only in the early stages of statehood within fairly limited territories. The tsarist model was based on the principle of a certain “Russification”, and the Soviets, expanding the geopolitical boundaries of Russia, on the contrary, neglected the ethnic quality of the Russian people. In the New Empire, these factors should appear in a new proportion, corresponding to modern geopolitical and ethnographic conditions, as well as necessary to establish a stable ethno-political balance in the Russian people.

Russians in the New Empire act simultaneously in two roles:

1. as one of the great nations that are political entities of the Federal Empire of the Nations,
2. as the initiator of continental integration into this Federated Empire of Nations.

Consequently, the Russians find themselves in a privileged position, since, on the ethnic side, being one of several more or less equal ethnic components of the Empire, they geopolitically become the center of the entire political process. Such a dual function allows, during the implementation of the same imperial-building action, to simultaneously increase its non-ethnic influence and consolidate intra-ethnic forces. Imperial building is the only way to preserve, strengthen and unite the Russian ethnic group, without resorting to ethnic conflicts, wars, and the revision of political borders. All the political borders of

conflicts, wars, and the revision of political borders. All the political borders of Eurasia in the process of building the New Empire will be gradually abolished as political boundaries, and instead of them, natural, organic ethnic borders will appear that do not have the strictly dividing value, as is the case with state borders. These ethnic borders will have nothing to do with what is meant by the word "border" in the current situation, since they will be held on an ethnocultural, confessional basis that does not imply political domination of minorities for the sole reason that these ethnic groups will not have full political sovereignty, being limited by the strategic interests of the whole Empire, which, in turn, is vitally interested in maintaining peace and harmony within its borders. In other words, within the framework of such an Empire, the Russians will not find their national state as a political expression of an ethnic community, but will acquire national unity and a gigantic continental state, in the management of which they will receive a central role.

The very advancement of such a project immediately removes the threat of those potential conflicts that are ripening due to the division of Russians at present among the various newborn "states" within the CIS. The imperial construction vector instantly translates the problem of the correlation of Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, or Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, or Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan into a completely different plane than ethnicity. This ratio ceases to be a political and state problem, which can be resolved only if a certain political and territorial damage is done to one side or another (for example, the ethnic division of Kazakhstan, separatism within the Russian Federation, military suppression of Chechnya, confessional and national fragmentation of Ukraine, Crimea problem, etc.), and it becomes a question of the coexistence of various ethnic groups within the framework of a single political space. And in this case, the ethnic consolidation of, say, Russians in Kazakhstan with Russians within the Russian Federation will not be seen as undermining the political sovereignty of the "Kazakh national state" in favor of the "Russian national state", but will become an organic cultural and ethnic process that does not infringe, but and not elevating any of the parties for the reason that no "Kazakh national state" or "Russian national state" will simply exist. The Soviet model was somewhat similar to this project, but with one important caveat the concept of "ethnos" was considered in it as a kind of rudiment, as historical atavism, which was also deprived of the status of an internal political subject. In the framework of the New Empire, on the contrary, an ethnos, without direct state expression, will be recognized as the main political value and supreme legal entity in all intra-imperial issues.

Summarizing this question, we can say that operations with global geopolitical projects, which at first glance have nothing to do with achieving the narrow ethnic goals of the Russians, in fact, will lead to the best satisfaction of these specific national goals. By abandoning the insufficient and too small (the “Russian state within the framework of the Russian Federation”), without trying to increase this small in conquest and annexation in a bloody, fratricidal war, offering the peoples of Eurasia the construction of a continental bloc on equal terms, the Russians will be able to acquire that big and worthy of them that otherwise would remain forever an unattainable dream.

Having abandoned the ethnic state, we will gain the unity of the people and the Great Empire. Under current conditions, only in this way and in no other way can one save the Russian people from political weakness and ethnic degeneration, awaken it in all its grandiose volume for planetary achievements, and finally give it what it really deserves.

5.2 Russian nationalism. Ethnic Demography and Empire

The Russian people, in a narrowly ethnic sense, are in a difficult demographic situation. In the long run, this threatens with terrible consequences both for the nation itself and for the future Empire, since the replacement of the Russians as the main bearer of the continental unions by some other nation will inevitably lead to the deviation of the continental bloc from its natural civilization mission, will cause chaos and conflicts in Eurasia, will deprive the geopolitical structure of the most important cultural and political component.

Such a weak demographic position of Russians is especially alarming in comparison with the demographic growth of the Eurasian South, which, on the contrary, is developing rapidly in a quantitative sense. If these tendencies are maintained in the existing proportions, the Russians will inevitably be displaced from a central position in the Empire, the homogeneity of the nation will be eroded, and the ethnos will be absorbed into the sea of southern peoples, or it will turn into a relict reminiscent of existence only on a reservation. Added to this is the lack of compact settlement of large Eurasian spaces by Russians, controlled by them only politically and administratively. This last factor can cause a violation of the ethnic balance in the Eurasian Empire and push the rapidly developing demographically peoples of the South to national expansion into Russian territories (Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East).

into Russian territories (especially in Siberia and the Far East).

This problem should be solved immediately, but it should be especially emphasized that its solution should not precede the creation of the Empire and not follow this creation. The implementation of geopolitical plans from the very beginning must be accompanied simultaneously by actions aimed at the demographic growth of Russians and their ethnic regrouping in order to compactly master the fullness of the "living space" of the nation. This goal can be achieved exclusively by political methods, which should lead directly to the desired result and predetermine economic measures in this area.

A political decision can only be one highlighting the concepts of Russian nationalism. This nationalism, however, should use not state, but cultural-ethnic terminology with a special emphasis on such categories as "nationality" and "Russian Orthodoxy". Moreover, this Russian nationalism should have a completely modern sound and avoid any attempts to directly restore those forms that have historically exhausted themselves. It is nationalism of the populist, ethnic, ethical-religious type, and not "statehood" and not "monarchism" that should be priority in this situation. All Russians should be inspired with the basic idea that the personal self-identification of each individual person is a secondary, derivative value from the national self-identification. Russians should realize that, first of all, they are Orthodox, secondly Russians and only third people. Hence the hierarchy of priorities in both personal and public life. Above all, the Orthodox self-awareness of the nation as a Church, then a clear understanding of the indivisibility, integrity, totality and unity of the Russian ethnic organism, consisting not only of living, but also of ancestors and future generations, and only then, last but not least, the experience of a specific person as an independent atomic unit.

In practice, the implementation of such nationalism in politics should mean the total churching of Russians and the transformation of all cultural institutions into a continuation of the One Church, not in the organizational and administrative, but in the spiritual, intellectual and ethical sense. Such a churching should deprive culture and science of their profane isolation from the foundations of life, draw them into the process of spiritual homebuilding, turn pragmatic and decentralized technical development into the realization of the central provincial covenant of the Church, into a subordinate tool of the supermaterial plan. Only in such a radical way can Russians really be returned to the bosom of the Church, which lies at the basis of their historical national existence and which, in its basic features, has shaped what is called Russian in the highest sense. It is the

total restoration of the Orthodox worldview with all the ensuing consequences that can bring people back to their spiritual source. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrowly confessional, religious structure, any limited to cults and external rituals restoration will be ineffective. Churching in the framework of Russian nationalism is not subject to individuals, but all Russian culture, science, thought combined. Only in this way will the collective vertical identity of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics, which prohibits, for example, contraception and abortion.

The next level is ethnic identity itself, the idea of people as a single body and one soul. Moreover, the existence of this single organism should be understood as something super-temporal, not limited by either spatial or temporal categories. Russian nationalism must appeal not only to the present nation, but also to its past and its future, taken simultaneously as the totality of a single spiritual being. This "creature" the great Russian people in its superhistorical totality must be realized by every Russian and recognized in himself. The fact of belonging to the Russian nation should be experienced as a chosen one, as an incredible existential luxury, as the highest anthropological dignity. The propaganda of this national exclusivity (without the slightest touch of xenophobia or chauvinism) should become the axis of the political education of the people. First of all, the demographic surge will be provided ideologically, culturally, ethically. The people should be led to the idea that, by giving birth to a Russian child, each family participates in the national mystery, replenishing the spiritual and mental wealth of the whole people. Children should be understood as a national treasure, as a physical expression of the internal energy of a great nation. At first, the Russian child should be understood as Russian, and then as a child.

Given the difficult demographic state of today, it is necessary to start national propaganda as quickly as possible and use any political and ideological methods. At the same time, it is necessary to push nationalist tendencies to the limit, provoking a dramatic and rapid awakening of a great and powerful ethnos.

It should be noted that no economic measures by themselves will ever give a positive demographic result without appropriate religious, ethical and ideological support. The demographic decline can be stopped to zero, and then the reverse process can only be provoked with the help of an appropriate ideology that would focus on changing people's consciousness, transforming their thinking, introducing hundreds and thousands of characters into the

everyday sphere that explicitly or implicitly orient people towards national interests. Within the framework of the Russian ethnos, Russian nationalism should be the only and total ideology that can have its different versions and levels, but always remains constant in everything that concerns the setting of the category of "nation" over the category of "individuality". Ultimately, a radical slogan should be put forward: "the nation is everything, the individual is nothing."

This political orientation towards nationalism should also be supported by measures of a purely economic nature, since purely material instruments are also needed to achieve the national goal. Support will be provided to mothers and large families, and social conditions will be provided for a large male working man. But this economic component will have an effect only under the condition of domination of the national ideology, which should not only economically support the demographic growth of Russians, but generally orient the economy in a purely national way, put the material interests of the ethnos above the individual interests of the individual. In other words, economic support for fertility is a special case of a general trend in the economy, which as a whole should be derived precisely from national interests, and not from individualistic egoistic motivations or utopian abstractions.

Applying to nationalist ideology, at first glance, it seemed, it should have provoked ethnic conflicts, worsened ethnic relations between Russians and neighboring ethnic groups, and generated many unsolvable contradictions. This would indeed happen if Russian nationalism spread its claims to statehood in the classical sense of the term. Representatives of other ethnic groups and religions would hardly want to live in a Russian nationalist Orthodox state. But living alongside the Russian Orthodox people professing a national ideology, within the framework of a single continental Empire, united geopolitically and strategically, but flexible and differentiated in its internal structure, on the contrary, does not present any difficulties for anyone, since there will always be a higher authority in the face of which ethno-religious communities have equal status and which is guided by the impartial principles of imperial harmony and justice. The project of the New Empire at the ethnic level consists precisely in the fact that not only the Russian people should triumph and establish a clearly expressed national-religious ideology, but this also applies to all other peoples that will be part of the Empire. Thus, there will be a conglomerate of "positive nationalisms" with a common denominator vertical imperial orientation.

It is important that only in this way the most radical Russian nationalism can be

fully realized, since the main obstacles to its development in this case will be eliminated; none of the neighboring peoples will feel humiliated or depressed by the Russian nation, since cultural and ethnic the confessional borders between the peoples of the Empire will not have any political significance. Russians will live in their national reality, Tatars in their own, Chechens in their own, Armenians in their own, etc. even if we are talking about ethnic enclaves or national minorities among other people. Nationalism, free from the problem of statehood and borders, will only strengthen the mutual understanding of nations, giving them both freedom of contact with each other and freedom of ethnic isolation.

For the survival of the Russian people in the current difficult conditions, for the demographic takeoff of the Russian nation, for the improvement of its difficult situation in the ethnic, biological and spiritual senses, it is necessary to turn to the most radical forms of Russian nationalism, without which all technical or economic measures will remain powerless. But this nationalism will be possible only in organic unity with the principle of the geopolitical continental Empire.

5.3 Russian question after the coming Victory

Apparently, from a theoretical point of view, one should consider the position of the Russians in which they will find themselves after the possible victory of the Eurasian Empire over Atlantism. Of course, this is such a distant prospect that seriously analyzing the problems that arise in this case is now almost pointless. However, it should be borne in mind that the collapse of Atlantism can occur almost instantly at any stage of Eurasian imperial construction, since the geopolitical stability of the West is based solely on the correct and skillful handling of geopolitical categories, and by no means on real industrial, economic or military power. The Atlantist construction is in fact extremely fragile, and it only takes one of the strategic axes out of it, for example, Central Europe, the Pacific Range or the Eurasian continental South, as the whole gigantic building of Atlanticism, so powerful and stable at first glance, collapses. At a time when the geopolitical strategy of the Tripartite Commission will be at least somewhat blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, a serious malfunction in the functioning of the entire Atlantist complex can be expected, and further events can unfold rapidly and collapse, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although the victory over Atlantism

is an extremely distant prospect, several theses should be formulated regarding the position of Russians in the hypothetical post-Atlantic world.

First of all, it should be emphasized that the geopolitical defeat of the United States will pose many problems for the Eurasian Empire itself. At that moment, the main factor that underlies the project of geopolitical unification of nations and peoples into the New Empire will disappear. The principle of "common enemy" will disappear. This consolidating energy will lose its significance, and even the very meaning of the continued existence of the Eurasian Empire will be called into question. In such a situation, the transition from a new bipolar world order of Eurasia against the Atlantic to a multipolar model may begin. In this case, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that a multipolar model will become possible only after the victory over Atlanticism, and not before. As long as Atlantism, as a force claiming to be universal, exists, there can be no talk of any multipolar device. Only within the framework of the New Empire, within the framework of the global Eurasian project and during the strategic confrontation with Atlanticism, objective prerequisites can arise for the emergence of a more or less balanced multipolarity and not before that. Embryos of multipolarity will be formed only when the differentiated imperial model is adopted that affirms the status of a political subject behind certain organic, cultural and spiritual categories of people, ethnic group, religion, nation, contrary to the current dominant system, which deals only with the legal status of states and individuals ("human rights"). A "clash of civilizations" (as Huntington puts it) in a multipolar world will only be a reality if these civilizations can establish themselves and claim their right to exist in the context of an anti-Atlantic strategic alliance. At present, there is only one "civilization" of the Atlantic, Western, liberal-market, opposing all other historical organic cultural models.

The collapse of Atlantism will pose the peoples of the New Empire, its individual sectors, with a serious problem: will geopolitical unity continue to be maintained or will large civilizational blocs within the Empire be consolidated as an independent geopolitical reality? But in any case, national differences between peoples and faiths will come to the fore.

In this case, the best option would be to maintain the imperial structure as the most harmonious system for resolving all internal contradictions. By analogy with the once-existing doctrine of *Jus Publicum Europeum*, i.e. The "European Civil Law" common to all the peoples of Europe, the Eurasian Empire in the post-Atlantic era could be based on a similar but expanded doctrine of *Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum*. Having lost its military-strategic importance, the

imperial continental complex could act as the highest legal authority, which would relieve tension between the Eurasian nations, whose connection after the victory over the “common enemy” will inevitably weaken. Such an exit would be ideal.

But one can also assume the collapse of continental unity and the formation in Eurasian spaces of several civilizational blocs of the Russian-Slavic (wider Orthodox), European, Far Eastern, Central Asian, Islamic, etc. The correlation of each of them with the rest, and even their boundaries and structures, is now, of course, impossible to foresee. However, in such a hypothetical perspective, a model should be laid in the design of the Russian nation today, taking into account in the distant future (and only after the end of Atlantism) the independent participation of Russians in world history, which returned to its organic and natural course after a long period of Atlantist anomaly. In this case, the Russian nation must be prepared for the creation of its own statehood or for the formation of a wider natural ethno-state formation, held together by the unity of tradition, culture, religion, fate. The question of the Russian state may arise fully, but this refers exclusively to the post-Eurasian period, which in itself is problematic and hypothetical.

But already at the present moment, Russians should put all their efforts into national consolidation, spiritual, cultural and religious revival of the people, their final formation and full awakening so that in the future (if necessary) they could defend their national Truth not only from enemies, but also from allies in imperialism, who have their own historically predetermined national worldview. The Russians do not just have to maintain their identity in the imperial context, they must affirm it, heat it up and deepen it to the utmost. And in the long run, after the collapse of Atlantism, the Russians must be prepared to defend their own civilizational mission, to defend their universal industrial national path.

Be that as it may, the Russians will in any case find themselves in a strategically central place in the Eurasian imperial space, and therefore, in the matter of the civilizational priorities of the Empire in the post-Atlantic period (if the Empire still survives) they will be in a privileged position. Consequently, to some extent, this entire Empire will be connected with the Russian Idea, which is indeed eschatological and universal by definition, merged with gigantic spaces and cosmic sense. If the continental bloc begins to disintegrate into its constituents, the Russians, who have regained their strength due to the nationalist period and the vigorous process of imperial construction, will again be in a geopolitically

advantageous position, occupying a central position among the liberated peoples and states of the continent, which will make the possible Russian State, Russian Empire, stable and a stable geopolitical reality based on strong national soil.

Both of these opportunities should be considered today.

PART 5 - DOMESTIC GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA

Chapter 1 - The Subject and Method

1.1 Russia's internal geopolitics depends on its planetary function

A geopolitical analysis of domestic Russian geopolitical problems cannot be carried out without taking into account the more general, global picture of Russia's place in the geopolitical ensemble. Only by constantly bearing in mind the planetary role and significance of Russia can one efficiently and consistently disassemble and describe its internal geopolitical structure. Unlike the European school of "internal geopolitics" (Yves Lacoste, etc.), which tends to isolate local and regional problems from taking into account the disposition of forces on a planetary scale, in the case of Russia one cannot ignore its world significance, and therefore, all the particular ones. Its internal problems are adequately formulated (not to mention their solution) only within the framework of a more general, integral geopolitical field.

Russia is not just one of the mainland countries. It is a category that belongs to the basic principles of all geopolitics. Russia heartland, "geographical axis of history", Susha. Russia is Eurasia. Such its importance does not depend on blocs, ideology, political orientation, the specifics of the regime: its continental nature is historical, geographical and geopolitical fate. In the case of Russia, the question cannot be raised about the choice between "Atlantism" and "Eurasianism". It is a Eurasian force and cannot but be such. The refusal of Russia to fulfill its role in the ensemble of the planet is possible only if it is completely destroyed geographically, because if the Russian state refuses to fulfill this mission while maintaining the Eurasian continental mass, a political formation will nevertheless sooner or later arise in the same boundaries, which will take on the functions of the "geographical axis of history." As long as Russia exists, it remains the axis of the Eurasian vector on a planetary scale.

This character determines the angle of consideration of its internal geopolitical problems. These problems stand only in the following vein: how and on what natural (or artificial) prerequisites to preserve the maximum geopolitical volume of Russia, if possible to increase it, distributing all internal geopolitical factors so as to best provide the possibility of planetary geopolitical expansion?

Such a statement of the problem in itself sets the conditions for analysis, it is necessary to emphasize and prioritize research:

1. the possibility of centripetal trends in the regions;
2. the possibility of expanding the spatial influence of the center on the periphery and beyond.

This suggests a clear separation of the two basic criteria of the concepts of a geopolitical center and geopolitical periphery. The relationship between them is the essence of the study of Russia's internal geopolitics.

1.2 Internal geopolitics and military doctrine

The military-industrial complex plays a huge role in the geopolitical organization of Russian spaces, since in many (especially sparsely populated) territories civilian settlements are attached to military towns and bases. The location of the most important industrial centers, also associated with the needs of the so-called. "Defense industry." The whole geopolitical configuration of Russia depends on the model of military doctrine.

This military doctrine, in turn, has two components. The political orientation of the leadership (which may vary depending on domestic and foreign policy factors) and geopolitical constants that establish the framework within which political course variations are possible. This second component (the geopolitical position of Russia) unequivocally affirms the continental significance of the Russian Armed Forces, the orientation to the fact that the main "potential opponent" of Russia is the Atlantic bloc. And this automatically entails the continental orientation of the entire military doctrine, the unconditional priority of strategic types of weapons, focus on a global conflict of a planetary scale. Moreover, it does not matter at all what the political design of the regime will be. The geopolitical confrontation will not necessarily be duplicated by an ideological confrontation. This depends on the specific situation and may affect the verbal design of the political course, mitigating or, conversely, emphasizing the geopolitical confrontation, which persists under any circumstances. Without pretending to the final formula of military doctrine, geopolitics sets its framework, the violation of which immediately entails a total socio-political crisis and the territorial collapse of the state.

Even in the case of a complete ideological understanding with Atlantism, the Russian military doctrine should still define the USA and the western camp as potential number one enemy, and only on the basis of this principle build the entire structure of the Armed Forces. And this, in turn, will affect the general structure of Russia's internal geopolitics in a broader sense.

Russia's military doctrine must be absolutely Eurasian. Only in this case, and from this angle, can we responsibly analyze Russia's internal geopolitics and outline priority development vectors. Without this, any analysis will only predict the catastrophic degradation of Russian regions, territorial disintegration, a chain reaction of destruction and geopolitical self-liquidation. Theoretically, such a turn of events cannot be ruled out, and the modern "military doctrine" of the Russian Federation, which does not mention the US and NATO bloc among "potential adversaries", but including them among the potential geopolitical allies of Russia in the Eurasian bloc, gives many reasons for this. However, based on a more general historical and geographical perspective, this condition should be considered as a "temporary anomaly", which will soon be eliminated under any political regime as an excess of a difficult transition period. It is possible to describe the scenario of "geopolitics of disasters", which would highlight the phases of the collapse of the "geographical axis of history." But such a position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and therefore it is quite natural if such models are studied by the geopolitics of thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should accordingly be guided by positive prospects, analyzing the current and future situation, based on normal historical and geopolitical laws of the development of continental and civilizational dualism. And in this case, an admission should be made (even if at the moment it is not so) that the "military doctrine" of Russia corresponds to the general continental logic and is based on strict geopolitical constants.

This circumstance should be borne in mind in the course of further exposition.

1.3 Center and periphery

The heartland's historical center is not a permanent geographic area. The current capital of Russia, Moscow, inherits at the same time the line of Slavic capitals (Kiev, Vladimir) and the line of steppe rates of Chingiz. Being a geopolitical synthesis of Forest and Steppe, Russia immediately has two historical and

geopolitical traditions, the combination of which underlies the originality of the Russian path.

The Petersburg period was also associated with territorial expansion, although the Baltic location of St. Petersburg embodies the European orientation of the state, "geopolitical Westernism." In the Petersburg period, the territorial expansion of Russians was less organic and more artificial than before. The nature of the synthesis was not so obvious, although many Eurasian peoples of Asia and Siberia adopted the power of the "white king" on the basis of ancient continental traditions.

Moscow is geographically most responsible for the Eurasian mission of Russia. It is equidistant from all the main geographical areas that make up the originality of the Russian landscape. Distances to the polar north, east European west, steppe and subtropical south and taiga east are approximately the same. Therefore, the "normal" (from a geopolitical point of view) Eurasian capital, the continental center should be considered it. In this regard, the current state of affairs coincides, in general, with geopolitical constants. Moscow is the natural capital of heartland.

A cursory cartographic analysis of Russia at the same time immediately reveals in this position some asymmetry. The fact is that beyond the Urals (which, however, is not a natural internal Russian border due to the low mountain height and the homogeneity of the climate on both sides of the ridge), a rather homogeneous taiga zone extends thousands of kilometers inland to Siberia, thus turning Moscow into the center of only "European Russia". Such a purely quantitative view is balanced, however, by other geopolitical considerations.

First, Siberia does not represent the climatic and relief structural diversity that characterizes pre-Ural Russia. From this point of view, all this gigantic space is only a disproportionate extension of the eastern landscape, the scale of which far exceeds the zonal picture of Russia itself. Thus, in the landscape sense, the gigantic spatial volume is reduced to a limited climatic quality.

Secondly, the exact same imbalance is present at the demographic level. Behind the Ural ridge, the same population lives that is characteristic of each of the landscape zones of European Russia that are vividly distinguished by nature.

Thirdly, the development of this region in terms of communications, cities, communications, etc. also not comparable with its spatial volume.

Therefore, in the current situation, the geopolitical role of Siberia cannot be considered in proportion to its space. This is a special, “reserve space”, which represents the last “undeveloped” part of the Eurasian continent.

Thus, taking into account the special quality of Siberia, Moscow is indeed identified with the geopolitical center of the “geographical axis of history”. Note: it was the undeveloped Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) that forced Mackinder in his later works to include “Lenaland”, i.e. the space to the east of the Lena River, into a special geopolitical entity that, strictly speaking, does not belong to heartland.

But Spengler already noted that moment that Siberia is a geographical space, the role of which can become clear gradually and prove crucial in the historical process. He foresaw that it was from Siberia that a special unique culture could develop that would put an end to the “decline of the West” and its “Faustian” civilization. The same idea was supported by the Russian “Asians”, an extreme branch of the Eurasianists, who believed that the East (Asia) was more important not only of the West, but also of Eurasia itself (in particular, V. Ivanov and some “Pacific”, Pazifik, Haushofer school Kurt von Beckmann, etc.). Thus, in the distant future, which implies a change in the demographic and informational state of the development of Siberia and its equalization with other Russian (or European) regions, it can be assumed that the geographical position of Moscow will lose its centrality, and the geopolitical center of Eurasia will shift to the east.

But at the moment this should be taken into account only as a futurological perspective. (More on this in the chapter on the Russian East).

From the center (Moscow) it is possible to draw rays to various areas of the peripheral Russian lands. These rays are not segments, since their length is not fixed. Centrifugal and centripetal forces act on regions with a variable magnitude, depending on many historical factors. In addition, physical distances from the geopolitical center (Moscow) do not always correspond to “geopolitical distances”. These distances depend not only on the quantitative, but also on the qualitative side of relations, on the independence of regional entities, their form, their cultural and ethnic specificity.

All these rays converging toward the center can be reduced to four main categories or “internal axes”:

1. Moscow–Vostok
2. Moscow–West
3. Moscow–North
4. Moscow–South

On the other hand, the corresponding peripheral spaces are “zones” or “bands”, each of which has specific characteristics and a special structure. These bands can be called, respectively, “Russian East”, “Russian West”, “Russian North” and “Russian South”. The definition of “Russian” in this case has not ethnic, but geopolitical meaning, emphasizing the connection of the region with the central “continental axis” of Moscow.

The main content of the topic of “internal geopolitics” of Russia will be the elucidation of the geopolitical structure of these four “peripheral zones” and the quality and nature of the “rays” that connect them with the center. The structure of the zones will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The nature of the rays, in the most general terms, can be considered now.

1.4 Internal axes ("geopolitical rays")

Four geopolitical rays connect Moscow with the periphery of the "Russian space". These rays have different quality.

They can be divided into two pairs: rays Moscow West and Moscow South, on the one hand, and rays Moscow East and Moscow North, on the other.

The first two rays, from a geopolitical point of view, are “unfinished”, “open”. They run into a complex geopolitical system of significant territorial volume, which separates the continental mass of Russia from the ideal border of the coastline. From the geopolitical point of view, the southern and western borders of Russia are wide belts that separate the central part from the coastline. In this regard, these two rays represent the most vulnerable directions for Russia, and all the geopolitical dynamics along these axes is extremely intense, complex, with many levels and dimensions.

The axes Moscow-West and Moscow-South combine both domestic and foreign policy aspects, since here the regions of Russia-Eurasia itself smoothly move into zones under the control of other states. and some of these states belong to

the opposite planetary block, to the camp thalassocracy.

The second two rays: the Moscow-North and Moscow-East axes are very different from the first pair. Here, the Russian border coincides with the coastline, there are no "laying states", and therefore the political dynamics in these areas is limited to domestic political themes. In the North and in the East, Russia has complete geopolitical borders. And the main task in this case is to maintain the status quo.

Moreover, the North and the East, due to the oceanic borders, are reserve and perfectly protected rear areas of the "geographical axis of history", where at critical moments you can always create additional spatial platforms for geopolitical and strategic restructuring.

The difference between the West and South axes and the North and East axes is not a consequence of historical accident. The geographical landscape itself, and later the ethnic and cultural map of the respective regions, is a matrix that, as the course of political history, is filled with specific state content. In the western and southern outskirts of Russia and in adjacent territories of neighboring countries, developed inflorescences of cultures, states and ethnic groups have developed, with their political and spiritual traditions, statehood, etc. This is a zone that enters rimland on one side. Objective and artificial prerequisites for "separatism" are actively developed here, and that, in turn, is identified on a planetary scale with thalassocratic strategy.

The North and East of Russia, on the contrary, are extremely landscape homogeneous, and are not densely populated by peoples who do not have developed political and state traditions or have long lost the historical initiative of imperial construction (for example, Altai Turks, Buryats, etc.). Here, Moscow has free access to the seas, but the quality of the seas is appropriate. They are poorly navigable, cold, covered with ice for a significant part of the year, torn from the central part due to poor communications, their ports are underdeveloped. Certain strategic advantages are offset by corresponding disadvantages.

Two pairs of rays give complete geopolitical symmetry. The length of the northern and eastern coasts of Russia is associated with demographic tensions and communication underdevelopment. The western and southern borders are land, densely populated, landscape-diverse and are voluminous bands of considerable area

CONSIDERABLE AREA.

Thus, the geopolitical relations of the center with the periphery in Russia are divided into two types: purely internal axes with oceanic linear boundaries (North, East) and semi-internal axes with land borders of "strip" ("zonal") quality (West, South). The dynamics of "South and West" implies entry into the sphere of international relations, diplomacy, etc. The dynamics of the "North and East" is limited by internal political problems. However, a purely geopolitical approach makes this picture, to some extent, relative. Where the "independent" state is currently located, the geopolitician sees the "future province", and vice versa, the coastal part of the territory of one state at some point may become the coastal bridgehead of an alternative geopolitical force (that is, the new "sovereign" state)

The rays going from the center to the periphery, "impulses of continental expansion", are constantly faced with the opposite force pressure. The Atlantic bloc seeks to limit the centrifugal energy of Moscow, using the "separatist" tendencies of the marginal peoples or neighboring states, based on those coastal zones that are already under the sure control of thalassocracy. In the South and in the West this opposition is quite distinguishable in concrete political reality. In the North and East, the counteraction is less obvious and obvious. But, nevertheless, it exists in the form of a strategic military presence of the Atlantists in the oceanic coastal zone (especially nuclear submarines), and in certain critical periods it can be expressed in direct political interference in domestic affairs and support (or provocation) of separatist ethnic and cultural minorities.

Chapter 2 - The Way to the North

2.1 Analysis Model

The geopolitical ray of Moscow-North, to a large approximation, splits into a whole spectrum of rays diverging from a single center along the entire length of the coast of the Arctic Ocean. Thus, we get a complicated model in which three problems arise:

1. the ratio of the sectors of the North to each other;
2. their relationship with the Center (Moscow);
3. correlation with other areas of Russian space (South, East, West)

Geopolitical analysis is divided into several sectors and problems at once. Moreover, the main task is to, if possible, taking into account regional specifics and details, not to lose sight of the general complex of “internal geopolitics of Russia” and an even wider planetary context.

The Center’s geopolitical imperative for the North is to strengthen strategic control over these areas as much as possible. Given the sparsely populated territories located in the Arctic Circle, and the lack of developed political and state traditions of ethnic groups living there, cultural and political aspects recede into the background. The most important side is the military control over the coast (military, air and naval bases), information communication, energy supply and provision of food and housing.

2.2 The geopolitical nature of the Russian Arctic

The climatic nature of the northern territories implies a point, rather than a "strip", of its settlement. Hence the role of the centers, which acquire the most important value and become, to some extent, the equivalent of what is defined as “territory” in other areas. This identity of the “center” and “territory” in the North is maximal, since the intermediate spaces are not only unsuitable for housing, but the tundra, cold, lack of villages, roads, etc. are mortally dangerous

housing, but the tundra, cold, lack of villages, roads, etc. are mortally dangerous.

Thus, geopolitically, the North is a system of points located in the Arctic zone, a constellation of discrete settlements scattered throughout a rather homogeneous (climatically and relief) space. The vast majority of the northern lands is the tundra, i.e. northern desert with rare vegetation (lichens). This is the permafrost zone.

The nature of the northern space is somewhat close to the “water element”. In it, the boundaries between territories have practically no serious significance, since control over a particular land does not provide any particular advantages. Given the sparsely populated, the question of “competition for nomads” among reindeer-breeding peoples is automatically removed.

The population of the North is a variety of ancient Eurasian ethnic groups that have lived in these territories for millennia without any particular cultural, migratory or ethnic dynamics. It is interesting that it is in the north of the western border of Russia that ethnic division also takes place: northern Europe, Scandinavia, Germany, Denmark right up to England, Ireland and Iceland are inhabited by “developed” peoples of Indo-European origin (young ethnic groups); and starting from Finland and Karelia and up to Chukotka, the Russian North is inhabited by ethnic groups that are much more ancient and archaic than the population of the European North (Ugrians, archaic Turks and Paleo-Asians of the Chukchi, Eskimos, etc.). Moreover, as you move east along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, the archaic nature of ethnic groups increases. Younger Indo-Europeans (or Turks), dynamically moving along the most inhabited parts of Eurasia, “shifted” the autochthons to the north in waves.

From west to east: after the Karelians and Finns (who nevertheless took quite an active part in modern history, albeit in secondary roles), the archaic Nenets and Komi, then the Khanty and Mansi, Dolgans, Evenks, and then the Chukchi and Eskimos. The vast sector of Eastern Siberia is occupied by Yakutia (Sakha), but the Yakuts themselves (one of the branches of the Türks) live much south of the Arctic Circle, and the north of the region is almost uninhabited.

From the Ugrians to the Eskimos, the space of the Russian North shows us historical time slices of civilization.

The concept of “Russian North” is a trapezoid that repeats the outlines of Eurasia as a whole. To the west it narrows, to the east it expands. On the Russian-Finnish border, this trapezoid is about 10 degrees along the meridian

Russian-Finnish border, this territory spans about 10 degrees along the meridian, while Chukotka and Kamchatka already cover 20 degrees. But this spatial expansion has little effect on the geopolitical nature of the territory; and by demographic characteristics, and by the degree of development, and by the quality of communications and the frequency of settlements, this trapezoid, geographically expanding to the east, gives a mirror picture, since the "narrow" western flank of the northern sector is mastered and populated more than the opposite eastern flank.

If Siberia is the geopolitical "reserve" of Russia, then the North, and especially the Siberian North, is the "reserve" of Siberia itself, being the region of Eurasia that is the most remote from civilization. This is an icy, uncharted land, formally described on maps, but not representing any historical sign, without any global cultural dimension (at least within the foreseeable historical limits accessible to the study of the past). This situation strangely contrasts with the role that the "north" plays in the mythologies of many peoples. There he is endowed with the quality of a "great ancestral home," "promised land," "ancient paradise." At this historical moment, it is rather the opposite of a cold, inhospitable, hostile to people, alienated space with rare interspersed artificial centers of civilization.

2.3 North + North

Administratively, the majority of the northern lands are autonomous regions of the Russian Federation, except for Karelia, Komi and Yakutia, which have a more independent political status (republics). Politically, the regions are located this way (from west to east): Karelia, north of the Murmansk region, the Arkhangelsk region, the Komi Republic and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), the northern sectors of Yakutia, the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Magadan Territory, Koryak Autonomous Okrug and Kamchatka.

The similar geopolitical quality of all these territories is a sufficient basis for them to form a certain territorial-strategic block based on certain integration structures. All of these areas face typologically similar problems; their development follows the same paths. This natural similarity, so pronounced even in the most cursory geopolitical analysis, shows the need for some consolidation. This consolidation, a kind of pact of the "Arctic lands", can have several levels from spiritual and cultural to practical and economic.

You can initially outline the general directions of such a block.

A purely Eurasian theory of rethinking traditional civilization as a positive model of a social structure that has preserved the memory of cosmic proportions can become its cultural base. This means that the archaism of the peoples of the North (underdevelopment, lagging behind, primitiveness, etc.) is not a minus, but a spiritual plus. Ancient ethnic groups are not only not subject to "re-education" and inclusion in the "modern civilization", but, on the contrary, need their living conditions to be as close as possible to their traditions. Moreover, the care for these traditions should be partially shifted to the state, which seeks to secure strategic control over these lands.

In parallel, the "mythological" aspect of the North as the oldest homeland of mankind should be adopted, and the project of the "spiritual revival of the North" would have acquired a worthy historical scale. The emphasis should be on the seasonal specifics of the Arctic year, the polar day and the polar night, which were considered by the Hindus and ancient Persians to be "days of the gods". Existence in arctic conditions (common to the whole Eurasian North) returns a human being to a special cosmic rhythm. Hence the spiritual and therapeutic significance of the Arctic zones.

At the material level and especially in relation to the conditions of existence of migrants from the South, i.e. for the most part Russians, it is necessary to rally the efforts of all the northern centers in the development of optimal models of cities and villages, taking into account climate specificity. In this aspect, the application of the latest technologies of non-traditional energy sources (solar energy, wind power plants, etc.), building know-how for permafrost, communications and transport systems, development of interregional sports aviation countries, etc. is required. The initial project should be a general Arctic development, the development of a single and most effective formula that would make it possible to modernize the settlements as soon as possible and make their existence more dynamic and interconnected.

Given the importance of this problem, it would be logical to provide a solution to the Arctic regions themselves, providing state support for the entire project as a whole from the center. The development of the "Arctic formula" is up to the northerners themselves.

Since the North is a geopolitical "reserve of reserves" of Russia its regions

Since the North is a geopolitical reserve or reserves of Russia, its regions should be prepared for possible active migration of the population from the South. This concerns the other side of the problem of a new settlement of the North. Sooner or later, given the demographic processes, this will become necessary, and it is better now to begin to create structural prerequisites for this.

Of particular note is the military aspect. The North is a gigantic strategic military zone of Russia, the most important belt of its security. Here are concentrated many missile bases and strategic aviation bases; Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are the largest naval bases in Russia. This situation is not a consequence of the arbitrariness of the ideological confrontation between the two camps in the Cold War era. The strategic importance of the North in the military sense is preserved for Russia in any case, since it is a matter of observing the interests of Eurasia and heartland. The meaning of a military presence in the North of Russia follows from the continental nature of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and from the natural awareness of themselves as a continental camp opposing the "forces of the sea". The main significance of these military installations is to protect the coastal zone from possible sea and air intrusions and to ensure, if necessary, a nuclear strike on the American continent through the North Pole. This is the shortest distance from Russia to the United States. For the same reason, this territory is a priority zone for the development of missile defense.

Currently, the North provides a huge percentage of the total industrial product of Russia. Moreover, its central importance in the military industrial complex is not taken into account. Many minerals in particular, salt, nickel, etc. mined mainly in the Arctic regions. But there is a huge gap between such industrial development of the North and the lag in other areas of development. Geopolitical logic requires an active alignment of the situation. Moreover, it is most convenient to do this precisely within the framework of the Arctic Pact. In this case, it would be necessary to designate the capital (or several capitals) of the North, in which the intellectual and technological potential would concentrate, where the main economic, financial and engineering levers would come down. This would give the North considerable independence from the center, freedom from control in detail, reserves for flexible regional development and rapid industrial and economic reaction.

At all these levels, the need for integration of the North is clearly advocated. It is important in spiritual, ethnic, cultural, military-strategic, industrial, social, financial terms. The result of such a multi-level integration (existing only potentially so far) would be the creation of a completely new geopolitical reality

in which a significant increase in autonomy and regional independence would not weaken the strategic connection with the center. The development of the North would become a path to the future, a springboard for a completely new (based on geopolitics) understanding of space in the long term.

The Northern Earth from a barren desert would again turn into a polar paradise, strengthening the planetary weight of the continent and creating a model of a “Eurasian future” society based on a combination of tradition and development, fidelity to the roots and technological modernization.

2.4 North + Center

The first approach to the geopolitical analysis of the North (North + North) is based on the separation of the “polar trapezoid” into a single connected region, which can be considered as an independent spatial figure. Such a vision of the North allows us to develop the most flexible model of its development, since the most stable geopolitical structure is that which consists of self-sufficient autarky-autonomous (in a limited sense) elements. But even such a relative autarky requires a certain territorial scale. The “trapezoid” of the Russian North meets all the necessary conditions in order to form an independent domestic Russian “large space”. Moreover, such integration autonomy can largely compensate for the strategic centralism inevitable for the state.

The second geopolitical approach is to analyze the system functioning along the Center North axis. This axis has been and in many respects to this day remains the only and main one in the administrative organization of the northern territories. Separate regions and centers of the North were directly subordinate to Moscow, which controlled all the main development vectors of these territories. Such an unambiguous centralism did not allow the most efficient development of the internal geopolitical potentials of the North, deliberately made the specialization of the regions one-sided and focused on the scale of the whole country. This made it possible to maintain a regime of strict centralism, but significantly slowed down the opening of internal capabilities.

Geopolitical logic suggests that the question of the relationship between the Center and the Periphery (and in our particular case, Moscow of the North) should obviously be divided into two components:

1. strict centralism in the field of macro-politics and strategic subordination;
2. maximum emancipation of internal capabilities due to the utmost cultural and economic autonomy.

In other terms: strategic centralism + cultural and economic regionalism.

To develop the most effective model for such a geopolitical distribution of roles, the question again arises of the "capital of the North", which could serve as an intermediate authority between the Center and all areas. All military ties from bases, military units, ports, etc., would converge to this point. In addition, there could be a "government of the North", a flexible instance of political coordination of all parts of the "polar trapeze", reporting directly to Moscow, but speaking on behalf of the whole North. It could be the "parliament of the peoples of the North" and the corresponding executive structures. Moreover, the most important thing would be to achieve a harmonious combination of military leadership with regional representatives, since the centralist nature of strategic control would in this case be coupled with the expression of the regional will of the northern lands. The tandem of the military representative of Moscow with the civilian representative of the "peoples of the North" in such a geopolitical capital could become the ideal prototype of the most effective and efficient, flexible, but tightly connected with the center organization of the entire Eurasian space. At the same time, interethnic and cultural frictions between the peoples of the North in such an integration process will be minimal due to historical and geographical reasons for the fragmentation and mosaic distribution and small numbers of ethnic groups.

It is in the North that this model of reorganization of space should be tested, based on purely geopolitical premises. In this case, all the conditions for such a project are evident in the fact that all regions of the North belong to Russia, territorial and demographic tension, an urgent need for restructuring industrial and economic systems, some of which fell out of the general system of national "labor distribution", demographic crisis, and critical situation with the peoples of the North, the collapse of energy supply systems and communications, the necessary reform of the armed forces, etc.

The attitude of Moscow North directly depends on the general integration of the northern regions into a single bloc and for another reason. Russia has a latitudinal geographic structure; it is elongated along the parallel. The main trends in its development were precisely latitudinal dynamics. The Russian State was built on the integration of spaces along latitudes. For this reason, the main

was built on the integration of spaces along latitudes. For this reason, the main communications and communication systems within Russia evolved in accordance with this model. The latitudinal process was especially vividly expressed in the development of Siberia and the “breakthrough to the Ocean”. Therefore, the stability of the internal structure of Russia directly depends on the completeness and dynamics of latitudinal integration. If we take Russia as a whole, then for its continental strategic usefulness, development along the North-South axis is necessary. This applies primarily to expansion beyond its borders, since any geopolitical organization of space vertically gives the maximum degree of strategic autarky. But within Russia itself, such a complete autarky is completely inexpedient. Here, on the contrary, one should insist on the utmost strategic centralism, on the interconnection of regional spaces with the Center. Therefore, a geopolitical law can be formulated: within Russia, the West-East integration axis is priority, and the North-South axis is outside Russia. (This law is formulated more nuancedly as follows: tightly ethnically and politically controlled by Russia and Russian spaces require wide integration, while domestic Russian lands, compactly populated by other ethnic groups with historically fixed traditions of political separatism, on the contrary, need integration along the meridian basis.) Dynamics along the meridian makes a political entity independent of its neighbors left and right. This is necessary for the country as a whole, but unnecessarily for individual sectors of this country. Dynamics along a parallel, on the contrary, rigidly connects the Center with the periphery; this is useful for the internal political organization of the state, but leads to conflicts and imbalance at the interstate level.

Based on this regularity, one should insist precisely on the latitudinal integration of the Northern regions, taking into account their belonging to a single climatic and relief zone, and not their purely geographical (and even in some cases ethnic) proximity to other (southern, eastern, or western) regions. The wide association of the North will contribute to its cultural and economic development, but will hinder the creation of prerequisites for potential political and strategic sovereignty. Only such a structure will solve the problems of the Center Peripheral in the most positive, from a geopolitical point of view, vein.

2.5 Finnish question

The only international problem related to the Russian North is the problem of Karelia (and Finland). The Karelian ethnic group is close to Finnish and is

connected with it by cultural and historical unity. Based on the logic of latitudinal integration, the Karelian question seems, at first glance, an anomaly. Two approaches are possible here.

The first is to absolutize the Karelian-Finnish border geopolitically and offer the Karelian Republic to integrate along the North-South axis with the native Russian regions around Lake Onega, Ladoga. Such a vector of development is unnatural and should be resorted to only in the worst case, since the artificial rupture of ethnic unity along the administrative line of a purely political border never gives the region geopolitical stability. The matter is compounded by the fact that the Karelian-Finnish border is an easily passable forest and marshy relief and has a huge length; it is extremely difficult, cumbersome and expensive to reliably protect such a border.

The second approach involves the creation of the Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, culturally and partly economically unified, but representing a strategic pillar of the Eurasian Center. In European languages there is the term “Finnishization”, which appeared during the Cold War. It is understood as a nominally neutral state with a capitalist economy, but strategically inclined towards the USSR, i.e. to heartland. Finland as a state is a highly unstable and far from autarchy entity, naturally and historically entering the geopolitical space of Russia. This was manifested at various stages of history. The center could go for wide autonomy of the Karelian-Finnish association with the only condition being strategic control over the Gulf of Bothnia and the deployment of Eurasian border troops on the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders. The length of the border would be halved despite the fact that the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders are much less uniform and easily passable than Karelian-Finnish. In addition, Russia would be able to control the Baltic from the North.

The second approach is preferable in all respects, and it is precisely such tactics that should be used by the continental Center in all ethnically and culturally mixed zones on the borders of the state. Broken ethnic unity automatically means instability of the border zone, instability of borders. The Atlanticist adversary will sooner or later try to adopt this circumstance in order to carry out ethnic integration for their own purposes i.e. strengthen control over rimland^{om} and weaken heartland. Therefore, continental forces must actively and aggressively use similar tactics and not be afraid to cede cultural and even economic sovereignty to border nations in exchange for a strategic presence and

политическую.

When stable borders cannot be achieved through direct military or political expansion, an intermediate flexible option should be applied which, in the anti-Eurasian sense, thalassocracy constantly and successfully uses.

2.6 North and Non-North

The specifics of the geography of the Arctic coast of Russian Eurasia reduces the problem of correlation of the regions of the North with other regions to a more simplified North-South formula, since latitudinal problems (namely, with the West) arise only in the case of Karelia. The only exception is the problem of Yakutia, which stands out here, since Yakutia has, albeit an extremely artificial, but still historically fixed tradition of political separatism. This aspect is also reflected in the later classification by Mackinder of Eurasia, where he distinguished "Lenaland", "the land of the Lena River", and Yakutia (Sakha) constitutes the axis of this region, stretching from the Laptev Sea to the Amur Region and Altai in the south. But the case of Yakutia must be considered separately.

Let's start from the western part of the "northern trapezoid". The Kola Peninsula, Murmansk and the Karelian Republic stand out here. Together with Finland, all this makes up a single geographic and geopolitical sector, which would be most efficiently integrated into an independent and complete system in which the Murmansk region and Murmansk itself would have strategic priority and the quality of a military decision center, and the Karelian-Finnish space would be endowed with a wide cultural and economic sovereignty. In this case, the Murmansk region could be increased due to the northern regions of Finland, Finnish Lapland. The balance between Murmansk (the strategic projection of Moscow) and the Karelian-Finnish space would be a concrete expression of the Eurasian arrangement of the continent as an example of "new Finnishization" in the conditions emerging after the end of the Cold War.

Further movement to the south of this block we will consider in the chapter devoted to the Russian West. It should be noted that in any case, the fundamental strategic axis in this case will be the Murmansk-Moscow axis.

Next: Arkhangelsk Territory. An exception to the general rule should be made

here and the importance of integration not only in the North-North latitude, but also along the meridian should be indicated. The fact is that the Arkhangelsk Territory is located strictly above the Central European part of Russia, and therefore, the very idea of the possible sovereignty of this vertical sector from the White Sea to the Black Sea regarding Russia as a whole is excluded, since this region is Russia itself. Therefore, Arkhangelsk and the Arkhangelsk Territory are in that strategic position, which most of all meets the principle of strategic integration of the North in the interests of the Center. The Moscow axis Arkhangelsk is the only one from the entire spectrum of internal “geopolitical rays” that is not just a military-strategic structure. Here it is necessary to achieve maximum and diverse integration with the South, up to Moscow, to try to create a smooth transition from the (relatively) densely populated areas of the Vologda Oblast to the point settlements of Pomerania. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development, development and transformation should begin precisely from Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, therefore it is most logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the “capital of the Arctic Pact”. The development of the Moscow axis Arkhangelsk should be comprehensive and priority. The consistency and effectiveness of the entire “Arctic Pact” will depend on the quality and dynamics of this only (from the whole North) meridian integration.

To the east of the North zone are two administrative entities of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Republic of Komi. The integration of these spaces among themselves has no contraindications, especially when taking into account the low population of the Nenets Autonomous District. The proximity to Arkhangelsk allows us to actively and priority develop this region within the framework of a common project. Of particular importance is the development of the islands of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land. These Arctic lands have tremendous strategic importance in the context of intercontinental confrontation. These are the Russian territories closest to the pole, and, accordingly, to the USA, which are used as military strategic bases. As in the case of Karelia and Murmansk, the northernmost spaces are controlled mainly by the military, while to the south the civil administration is more developed. The whole region as a whole has the center of Vorkuta, to which the main communications and communication lines converge.

Vorkuta is a large industrial and strategic center, which is located not far from the Yamalo-Nenets okrug, where there is no center of similar scale. Consequently, Vorkuta could also control the gigantic territory of the Kara Sea

Consequently, Vorkuta could also control the gigantic territory of the Kara Sea coast up to the mouth of the Yenisei and the basin of the mouth of the Ob. In this region, the Yamal-Nenets okrug is geographically close to the Khanty-Mansiysk okrug, and both of them are part of a single geopolitical sector.

It should be emphasized that the southern border of the Northern Trapezoid in the case of the Komi Republic has a very important geopolitical significance. In this case, the integration processes of this north-Ural region with the rest of the Urals (and the northern Volga region) are not only inexpedient, but frankly harmful, since Tatarstan is located southwest (beyond the Komi-Permyak okrug), where separatist tendencies have a long history. Being placed in the middle of Russian lands, Tatarstan does not pose any particular danger, but in all similar cases, the “separatist logic” forces us to seek access to the seas or foreign territories, and any vertical integration processes in this case sooner or later can be extremely dangerous. Here you should go the opposite way (rather than in the case of the Arkhangelsk region) and try to tear off the entire north-Ural region and its neighboring sectors in the east and west of the Volga and Urals. In this case, the “northern trapezoid” should be strictly separated from the entire continental space located to the south.

Even to the east lies the lands of the Yenisei Basin, which are administratively located in the Taimyr and Evenki Autonomous Districts and the former Turukhansk Territory in the northern part of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. In this area, Norilsk stands out, which can be defined as the center for this entire gigantic region. In this case, meridian dynamics along the North – South axis is not excluded, since South Siberia from Omsk to Lake Baikal is densely populated by Russians, and integration in this direction cannot be of particular danger. This whole block lies on the intermediate territory, where the zone of more or less even settlement of the territory ends and Lender Mackinder, the “no man’s land” begins. This zone and increasingly eastern territories are a giant continental desert, lifeless tundra in the north and impassable taiga in the south. This is a “potential space.” From the south, it is partially mastered by both the Russian and ancient Turkic-Mongolian peoples with a relatively developed political culture. But in the North itself, it is “no man land”. This situation cannot be changed quickly and with one jerk, and, therefore, a gigantic region with a center in Norilsk for some time to come will be the “internal border” of continental Russia in the northeast, a strategic outpost of the Center in the North. This logically leads to the need to specifically develop precisely Norilsk, which has extremely important geopolitical significance. The function of control over Taimyr (and the island of Severnaya Zemlya) in the north and the Yenisei basin

in the south lies on it, and in addition, a zone of a less wide one, i.e. more precise, narrowly focused control of the Center over the “far North-East” of Eurasia, over Lenaland.

Lender Mackinder includes Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka, Magadan Territory, Khabarovsk Territory, Amur Region and Primorsky Territory, Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. The whole space is divided into two geopolitical regions, a fragment of the “northern trapeze”, on the one hand, and South Yakutia, Amur Region, Primorsky Territory and the southern half of Khabarovsk Territory, on the other. Both spaces are completely different in quality. The southern part, especially the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, is relatively densely populated, has ancient political traditions, is the place of residence of fairly active Eurasian ethnic groups. From the point of view of technical development and, at the same time, in the climatic sense, this southern sector is a continuation of southern Siberia.

The exact opposite is the northern part of Lenaland. This is the most undeveloped and “wild” part of Eurasia, a giant continental layer, with rudimentary infrastructure and almost no population. The only large center of the entire region is Magadan, but it is a port very poorly connected with the vast continental expanses of Kolyma, Northern Yakutia. Anadyr in Chukotka is also not a center in the full sense of the word and is also not connected with the continent. This sector is a separate continent, brilliantly protected by sea borders, possessing numerous minerals, but at the same time completely undeveloped and not developed, in potential condition. This part of Siberia is beyond the scope of history, and it is precisely to it that Spengler’s futurological prophecy regarding the “coming Siberian civilization” applies to a greater extent. This unique sector of the Old World, has not yet spoken in the history of civilizations and has not yet shown its geopolitical function.

This underdevelopment of this region is explained on the basis of the so-called “The Potamic theory of civilization”, according to which the cultural development of a region occurs much faster in those cases when the main river channels in it are not parallel to each other, but intersect. Siberia (especially Eastern) is the classical confirmation of this principle, since all major rivers in it flow in the same direction and do not intersect. However, developmental delay is not a purely negative characteristic. Historical lag helps to accumulate (based on a rational understanding of the history of other territories and nations) the most important historical experience. Under certain circumstances, this may become

the key to an unprecedented take-off.

The northern half of Lenaland, from a purely geographical point of view, involves consideration as a single geopolitical complex. And here a very important question arises. What center will this future geopolitical formation be able to form around? What orientation will it adhere to? The fact of Mackinder's doubts as to whether or not Lenaland is classified as the "geographical axis of history" indicates the possibility of alternative solutions to the situation. This is enough for the continental strategy to pay particular attention to this sector.

It is clear that the maximum objective is to include this area in the "Arctic Pact" under the control of the Center (Moscow) and correlation with other secondary centers of the Northern Belt. But two obstacles arise here:

1. the absence in the center of this region of some major strategic point around which integration systems could be built;
2. the axial position of Yakutia (Republic of Sakha) in this region, which is especially complicated by the presence of Yakuts, albeit nominal, but historically fixed "separatism".

In this case, the ratio of the northern half of the "Arctic trapezoid" with the South for the first time takes on a truly dramatic character, since Yakutia has such a strategic location that provides all the prerequisites for becoming an independent region independent of Moscow. This is ensured by the long coastline and the meridian structure of the republic's territories, and its technical isolation from other Siberian regions. Under a certain set of circumstances, it is precisely Yakutia that can become the main base of the atlantist strategy, starting from which the thalassocracy will restructure the Pacific coast of Eurasia and try to turn it into a classic rimland controlled by "sea power". The increased attention of the Atlantists to the Pacific range and the highly indicative allocation by Mackinder of Lenaland to a special category, and then the inclusion of this territory in the rimland zone in the maps of the Atlanticists Speakman and Kirk, all this indicates that, at the first opportunity, all this is weakly connected with the center of the region, anti-continental forces will try to get out of Eurasian control.

In this regard, the following measures should be taken:

1. Dramatically limit the legally political sovereignty of Yakutia.
2. Divide Yakutia into two or more regions, and the most important thing is to

administratively separate the region of the coast of the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea from the continental basin of the Lena River. It is also important to maximize the zone separating the borders of Yakutia from the Pacific coast and strengthen strategic control over these coastal zones.

3. Establish special strict control over the representative of Moscow over this entire territory.
4. To organize the industrial and financial integration of Yakutia in the Neyakut regions, to make the region as dependent on the Center as possible or on its projections in the North and South of Siberia.

The above steps suggest such a reorganization of this territory that would create a completely new geopolitical structure here, a new center and new radial links. In other words, without waiting for the reorganization of Lenaland according to the atlantic scenario, while this region remains a part of Russia, we should immediately proceed to the construction of the continental Lenaland according to the Eurasian model.

The problem of North – South correlation has a particular solution for this sector; here, one should not only limit contacts along this axis, but reorganize the entire northern space, tearing its polar and coastal zones from the continental spaces of Yakutia. This is not only a preventive geopolitical move, it is a geopolitical attack, a positional war for Lenaland, for future Siberia, for its continental, Eurasian fate. So far, this issue may have domestic political significance. It must not be allowed that it has acquired international significance and become foreign policy.

2.7 Summary

The northern belt of the Eurasian continent, which is part of Russia, represents the most important geopolitical reality, the value of which will steadily increase with the development of planetary dynamics. Moreover, this region is especially important for the adoption by Russia of its global geopolitical status as the “geographical axis of history”.

Only when defining Atlantism, thalassocracy as its main geopolitical adversary does the whole system of the North acquire real strategic content. When refusing to recognize geopolitical dualism at the level of military doctrine or international politics, this whole topic instantly loses its meaning. Moreover, not only the

points, this whole topic instantly loses its meaning. Moreover, not only the rapid degradation of the Russian North is inevitable, but also in the future, its fragmentation and even the exclusion of individual regions from Russia.

The general rhythm of geopolitical processes at present is such that the question of the geopolitical reorganization of the North in accordance with the geopolitical constants listed above is highly relevant and urgent. Even in order to maintain the status quo, it is necessary to immediately begin the geopolitical reorganization of all these spaces.

The fate of Russia is directly related to the geopolitical fate of the North. This law is the basis of its future geopolitics.

The North is the future, this is fate.

Chapter 3 - The Challenge of the East

3.1 "Inner East" (the scope of the concept)

Analyzing the geopolitical problems of the Russian East, we apply the same method as in the case of the North, dividing the issue into three components:

1. Center - East
2. Relations between the sectors of the East among themselves
3. Relations of these sectors with other regions and geopolitical zones of Russia.

But first you need to determine what is meant by the "Russian East". It is necessary to immediately emphasize the difference between the East as a purely geographical concept and the East cultural, civilizational, historical. Thus, it is customary to include in the cultural East all the territories of North Africa, the Middle East, Western Asia, Central Asia all the way to Pakistan and further to the Philippines (Islamic world) and India, while the concept is applied to China and Indochina, as well as to the countries of the Pacific region "Far East". From the position of Russia, geographically, all this represents the South, stretching from the distant Maghreb West to the Pacific Far East.

On the other hand, within the framework of Russia itself, the "East" is completely different geographical and geopolitical realities - this is a territory stretching from the Volga region (Tatarstan) through the Urals and Siberia, right up to the Pacific Ocean. This geopolitical category may be called the "Russian East" or the "Inland East". Studying the internal geopolitics of Russia, it is necessary to take as the "East" precisely this second concept, the "internal East", the geographical territories lying east of the Center (Moscow).

In this case, the Caucasus and Central Asia will fall into the category of "South" and will be considered in the corresponding chapter.

Considering that we consider the internal geopolitics of Russia as an "open system" that does not coincide with the administrative borders of the Russian Federation. based on the "geopolitical ravs" method. the allocation of

geopolitical zones often falls on the territory of neighboring states, if there is a geopolitical, ethnic and geographic landscape unity. For this reason, both the Southern Urals and Northern Kazakhstan from Aktyubinsk to Semipalatinsk at approximately the 50th latitude should be included in the "inner East" of Russia. In addition, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria are geopolitically included in the South sector in relation to Russia. Consequently, all of South Siberia, Altai, Tuva, Buryatia, Amur Region and Primorye (plus the southern half of the Khabarovsk Territory) enter the strip of the "Inland East" along with the Central Siberian regions located south of the "Northern Trapeze".

So, the "inner East" should be considered a rectangle extending from Kazan and the Urals to the Pacific Ocean.

3.2 Belt of "Russian Siberia" (structure)

Climatically, the Russian East is very different from the North. This is a zone with a temperate continental climate. In the Volga region and in the Urals, as well as in Siberia and Primorye, a forest zone is predominantly located. From northern Kazakhstan to Lake Baikal there is a narrowing wedge of the steppes. Altai and Amur Region massifs of low mountains. Most of the territories are quite densely populated and are reliefs favorable for living and managing.

The ethnic composition of the inner East of Russia is as follows: the vast majority are Russians, distractedly living in national republics and compactly in most Siberian lands. Several ethnic zones can be distinguished that coincide in general terms with the corresponding autonomies and republics.

Tatarstan is located in the Volga region, a rather monolithic ethno-national entity that preserves the traditions of political independence and a certain rivalry with Russia. This is the most vulnerable region (from the point of view of preserving the integrity of Russia), since the national identity of the Tatars is very developed. The most important factor that makes the problem of "Tatar separatism" nevertheless secondary, is the geographical location of Tatarstan in the middle of the continental space without maritime borders or proximity to a non-Russian state. As long as this geopolitical situation persists, this does not pose a particular danger to Russia. But in any case, the historical tradition of the Tatars requires increased attention to this region and pursuing such a policy of

the Center regarding Kazan, thanks to which the geopolitical system of Tatarstan would be connected with purely Russian regions (possibly not geographically adjacent). At the same time, on the contrary, integration processes with Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Mordovia and Mari-el should be hindered. In addition, it makes sense to emphasize the territorial division of Tatarstan according to cultural and ethnic characteristics, since the Tatars are an ethnic group both by racial and cultural-religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to this republic.

Tatars are Turks and Muslims, and this makes them a geopolitical part of the Turkic-Islamic world. In this regard, the Center is confronted with a problem that is the dominant factor in the entire geopolitics of the South (which will be discussed in the corresponding chapter). Tataria's complete separation from this reality is impossible either by assimilation or by active geographical isolation. Therefore, the "Tatar question" is included as a separate article in the broader problem of Russia and Islam. The common denominator in solving all similar situations is the search for a geopolitical balance of interests of the "geographical axis of history" and the Islamic world. In this regard, anti-Atlanticism is, in all cases without exception, a common denominator that allows the founding of a long-term planetary alliance. In the case of Tatarstan, the natural continental nature of the Tatar nation, whose historical fate is inextricably linked with Eurasia, and when identifying the geopolitics of Eurasia with the geopolitics of Russia under the present conditions, a conscious and voluntary union is a deeper imperative than ethno-confessional differences should be especially emphasized.

More broadly, the Eurasian power of Russia is based on a combination of Slavic and Turkic elements, which gave rise to the Great Russian ethnos, which became the axis of the "continental state", identified with heartland. Therefore, in the future, these two ethnic groups, Slavs and Turks (+ Ugrians and Mongols) remain the pillars of Eurasian geopolitics. Their future in the development of political and ethnic integration, and therefore the emphasis on ethnocultural differences, and especially the desire to give these differences a political form, contradict the logic of the historical fate of both Russians and Tatars. This topic should become the axis of relations between Moscow and Kazan, and it is possible that this will require the creation of a special "geopolitical lobby" that expresses the interests of Eurasia also politically (or metapolitically).

Almost the same considerations apply to Bashkiria, located south of Tatarstan. It also has a Turkic ethnic group professing Islam. The only difference is that the Bashkirs do not have such a manifested separatist tradition and such a developed

national identity as the Tatars, who were the most active and “advanced” ethnic group in the entire Volga region. For this reason, Tatar-Bashkir ties can in no way contribute to geopolitical stability in this sector of the “inner East” of Russia, and the Center should do everything possible to integrate Bashkiria into the southern Urals regions inhabited by Russians and tear it from its orientation to Kazan . At the same time, it makes sense to emphasize the uniqueness of a purely Bashkir culture, its uniqueness, its difference from other Turkic-Islamic forms. Strengthening the geopolitical ties of Tatarstan with Bashkiria is extremely dangerous for Russia, since the southern administrative border of Bashkiria lies not far from Northern Kazakhstan, which (given the most unsuccessful development of the geopolitical situation) could theoretically become a springboard for Turkic-Islamic separatism. In this case, the heartland is in danger of being torn apart by a Turkic (pro-Turkish, i.e. pro-Atlantic) wedge right in the middle of the mainland. In this sense, the orientation of Tataria to the south, attempts to integrate with Bashkiria, and even the rapprochement of Bashkiria with the Orenburg region, are extremely negative trends that the continental policy of the Center should prevent at all costs. Bashkiria should strengthen latitudinal ties with Kuybyshev and Chelyabinsk, and meridian contacts with Kazan and Orenburg should, on the contrary, be weakened.

Further, from the Southern Urals (Chelyabinsk) to Krasnoyarsk, a strip of land stretches actively occupied and developed by Russians. A geopolitical axis is clearly emerging from west to east, which historically corresponded to the Russians conquering Siberia: Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk Tomsk Kemerovo Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk. This entire belt is a developed industrial zone, and a city such as Novosibirsk is also the largest intellectual center. Moreover, in the ethnic sense, it is almost a purely Russian zone. A similar situation is repeated on the eastern side of Lake Baikal, where along the Baikal-Amur Railway from Chita to Khabarovsk and further south to Vladivostok, there is a continuation of the same strip, starting in the Southern Urals. The only deviation is Buryatia, which borders Lake Baikal from the north and tears the continuity of the rest of the homogeneous belt of “Russian Siberia”.

A parallel zone with a significant admixture of the Turkic (east of the Mongolian) population lies strictly south of this purely Russian belt. It begins in Northern Kazakhstan, from Aktyubinsk it flows through the territory of Kazakhstan to Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk and continues on the Russian territory in Altai (cradle of the Turkic ethnic group), in Khakassia, Tuva

and Buryatia. At the same time, from Altai to Transbaikalia (Chita), this Turkic-Mongolian belt landscapeally and to a large extent ethnically smoothly passes into Mongolia, with no obvious geographical border with which actually exists. From a geopolitical point of view, this entire lower belt is an integral part of the strategic space of “Russian Siberia”, and therefore it should be considered as a continuation of the “Russian East” to the south. The only exception is a fragment of Chinese territory (Chinese Manchuria), located from the eastern border with Mongolia to the Ussuri River. Based on logic, it should have been strategically controlled by Russia, since otherwise it would inevitably become an occasion for positional conflicts between the “geopolitical axis of history” and territories geopolitically included in rimland, while China undoubtedly belongs to the rimland category (in this which geopolitics have never had a shadow of doubt).

The same geopolitical principle holds true with respect to the named strip of “Russian Siberia”: the entire territorial sector must be actively integrated into a single geopolitical field, and the priority here will be latitudinal integration along the long axis of Chelyabinsk Khabarovsk (the meridian short axis Khabarovsk Vladivostok is a continuation of this line in a particular geopolitical sector). All this vast space is the main strategic advantage of Russia as a truly Eurasian power. Thanks to this South Siberian corridor, Russia is able to firmly connect the regions of the Center with the Pacific coast, thereby providing a potential highway for the full development of Siberia and the final exit of Moscow to the Pacific Ocean. This strip is the lever of control for all of Eurasia, including Europe, since the organization of high-tech continental communication from the Far East to the Far West allows us to restructure planetary reality in such a way that thalassocratic control of the oceans from the outside will lose its key significance. The resources of Siberia will be connected in the future with the high technologies of continental Europe and developed Japan, and when this can be realized, the planetary domination of thalassocracy will come to an end.

The latitudinal integration of Siberia (the Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk axis) is the most important strategic advantage that only Russia has. With the development of this area, the whole geopolitical history of the future can begin, in which case Spengler's prophecies will come true.

In a narrower, “internal” sense, the development of the integration of “Russian Siberia” makes it possible to expand geopolitical control along the meridian. The southern “Turkic-Mongolian” belt will be associated with more northern purely Russian territories, while the broadest ethnocultural autonomy will be accompanied by economic integration and strategic domination of the Russian

accompanied by economic integration and strategic domination of the Russian axis East Chelyabinsk. Moreover, such heterogeneous entities as Kazakhstan, autonomous okrugs and republics on the territory of the Russian Federation, Mongolia and, possibly, some areas of Chinese Manchuria should be included in this process.

Along with this, a similar meridian vector is also assumed in the north, where the situation differs only in that the autochthonous non-Russian population is much more discharged, politically less developed and does not have a fresh historical experience of political sovereignty. In the Khanty-Mansiysk and Evenk districts, as well as in the Khabarovsk Territory, the limit of the northern expansion of the belt of "Russian Siberia" is established by a parallel process of internal integration of the "northern trapezoid". This integration, unlike the complex geopolitical function of "Russian Siberia" (the Chelyabinsk – Khabarovsk axis), which has three development vectors (latitudinal, northern, and southern) and, in some cases, encounters prevailing and rather independent political forms (states), has a simple, purely latitudinal character. Therefore, both geopolitical processes will develop in a different rhythm, and therefore, the specific resulting boundary between the development of "Russian Siberia" to the north and the general integration of the "northern trapezoid" will depend on unpredictable factors.

All these geopolitical development vectors are not essentially something new and unexpected, since they turn out to be only a continuation of large-scale historical processes of Russia's movement to the east and the formation of the Eurasian power. The Russian path to the Pacific Ocean is not accidental, and the territories of Russian exploration of Siberia also follow clear geographical logic. This path corresponds to the relief border of the Forest and the Steppe, on the geopolitical synthesis of which the Russian State itself is based. On the "edge" of the northern taiga forests bordering the steppe (or forest-steppe), the Russian explorers of Siberia moved, settling on the lands most suitable for housing and agriculture. From Chelyabinsk to Lake Baikal, this landscape sector is a narrowing wedge. And from Baikal to the Pacific coast it is a continuous zone of northern forests, gradually and imperceptibly turning into tropical forests. At the same time, the percentage of uplands and mountain ranges increases.

This zone from Baikal to the mouth of the Amur again returns to the Lenaland problem, which was already arising when we dismantled the Yakut sector of the Northern Trapeze.

3.3 Positional battle for Lenaland

As in the case of Yakutia (when analyzing the geopolitics of the Russian North), when approaching Eastern Siberia, extending east of the Yenisei, we are faced with a number of geopolitical problems. Looking ahead, we note that for the third time we will encounter difficulties even when we get to the analysis of the eastern sector of the “Eurasian South”.

Already from a purely geographical point of view, behind Baikal, a serious change in relief begins in comparison with all the more western sectors of Eurasia. There, between the continental forests in the north and tropical (mountain) forests in the south, steppe zones necessarily ran, which created natural symmetry, with the identification of the central region, the first (steppe) peripheral circle and the boundary reliefs of tropical forests and mountains. This picture is preserved from Moldova to Altai, to the north the steppe layer simply disappears. In the case of Eastern Siberia, we are dealing with a completely new geopolitical and landscape region, requiring other positional solutions. Parallel to the unexpected landscape “challenge” (a smooth transition of continental forests to tropical ones against the backdrop of mountains, hills and hills), an extremely unfortunate ethno-political picture is also revealed of the presence of several internal and external national entities in the region, whose geopolitical loyalty to Russia is not so obvious. Against the backdrop of the extremely weak population of the entire Lenaland region by Russians, the geopolitical picture becomes extremely alarming.

Firstly, the territory of Buryatia. It violates the continuity of the actual Russian Siberian belt, protruding far north of Lake Baikal. Buryats are Lamaists, and at critical moments in Russian history they tried to establish an independent theocratic state on their territory, oriented to Mongolia and Tibet. In itself, this does not yet give cause for concern, but here a new problem arises, the territorial proximity of the southern borders of Yakutia to the northern borders of Buryatia. The Yakuts belong to the Turkic group, are significantly Christianized, but often preserve the ancient shamanistic traditions. However, some groups profess Lamaism. If Yakutia has access to the sea and the border of Buryatia with Mongolia, all this poses a danger of the emergence of a potential geopolitical bloc that would have more prerequisites for relative geopolitical independence than Tatarstan or some North Caucasian peoples, whose separatism is obvious. If we add to this the proximity of the Pacific coast which is extremely poorly

we add to this the proximity of the Pacific coast, which is extremely poorly populated by Russians, the danger doubles due to the possible control of the thalassocracy over the coastal zones (or sectors of the zones, potential corridors from Lenaland to the Pacific Ocean). And finally, the matter is further compounded by the fact that the south of Yakutia from the northeastern border of China is separated by a rather thin strip of the Amur region, which gives reason to open a direct geopolitical corridor from the southern Chinese coast of the Indian Ocean to the Laptev Sea in the North.

All these potential geopolitical configurations are extremely alarming. There is no doubt that such a picture cannot but seem extremely tempting to the Atlantic strategists, since the rich land, resources and unique in terms of strategic opportunities Lenaland finds itself in a very vulnerable position, from a geopolitical point of view, and any weakening of Russian control over this region can immediately cause irreversible rejection of a giant piece of the Eurasian continent from the very geographical axis of history. To prevent these events, it is not enough just to strengthen the military contingent located in the Far East or in the Amur region. It is necessary to take large-scale geopolitical steps, since it is no more and less like a potential positional war. What should pay special attention to:

- 1) It is important to strengthen the strategic presence of the Center representatives in the south of Yakutia. This is achieved through directed migration and systematic "colonization" of lands by peoples from more western regions.
- 2) The same thing should be done with the lands lying north of Lake Baikal. In this case, the dangerous borders will be moved apart.
- 3) At the same time, it is necessary to intensively develop the north of the Irkutsk region and the entire Amur region, implementing a plan of purposeful "colonization" of these territories.

These three measures must be reinforced by strengthening the military presence in the designated zone and by intensifying strategic, economic and technological expansion to the west and east. All this is intended to smooth out the dangerous narrowing of the "Russian belt."

- 4) It is necessary to intensify positional pressure on northeastern China, to take preventive pressure on this area, which would initially prevent any geopolitical

incursion of China to northern expansion.

5) It is necessary to maximally strengthen the demographic and strategic sector located between the cities of Blagoveshchensk Komsomolsk-on-Amur Khabarovsk in order to create a massive shield here from potential thalassocratic (from the sea) or Chinese (from land) geopolitical aggression.

6) It is important to back up all these measures with the maximum activation of Russian-Mongolian relations, since Mongolia is barren and not very attractive in other respects for the geopolitics of this region as a key and most important territory. The massive military presence of Russia along the entire Mongolian-Chinese border, and especially on its eastern part, would minimize the geopolitical risk of Lenaland rejection.

Recall that the geopolitics of the North intended to concentrate special efforts in the same sector only from the north, from the coast of the Arctic Ocean. The combination of both geopolitical strategies and their parallel implementation will allow Russia to lay a positional foundation for the distant future, when the importance of these lands will be so obvious that the planetary significance of Eurasia as a whole will depend on their control.

The geopolitical battle for Lenaland should begin now, although widespread attention will be drawn to this region later. But if you do not lay down the correct geopolitical and strategic model initially, resolving the conflict after it begins will be much more difficult, or maybe it will be impossible.

In geopolitics, major battles are won long before they become an open form of political or international conflict.

3.4 Capital of Siberia

The Siberian integration project raises the question of the geographical center of this process, i.e. about the point that could become the authorized representative of Moscow beyond the Urals and fulfill the function of attraction for all other regions. Novosibirsk is most suitable for this role, which is not only the largest city in all of Siberia, but also the most important intellectual center of a national scale.

From Novosibirsk, the western axis goes to Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals, and the eastern axis to Irkutsk, then Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Thus, the most important communication function of the entire “Russian belt of Siberia”, in which it is the main link, falls to Novosibirsk. The Moscow axis Novosibirsk becomes the most important power line of Russia’s “internal geopolitics”, the main “beam” along which the reciprocal process of exchange of centrifugal energy flows from the Center and centripetal from the periphery is carried out.

It makes sense to close the Urals region with a center in Yekaterinburg directly to Moscow rather than make an intermediate authority out of it in the communication between the central part of Russia and Siberia. The geopolitical position of Novosibirsk is so important that this city and the regions adjacent to it should have a special status and special powers, since it is from here that secondary geopolitical rays should disperse throughout Siberia to the north, south, east, and west.

It makes sense to make an exception to such secondary centralization only for the Primorsky Territory and the southern sectors of the Khabarovsk Territory. This is a very special area, tightly connected with Lenaland and the positional struggle for control over it. In this regard, a special status should be granted to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and they should be directly linked to Moscow (like Yekaterinburg).

To interact with the “northern trapeze” it is convenient to organize additional strategic axes Novosibirsk Norilsk and Khabarovsk Magadan. Thus, the East will be strategically linked to the North.

The East, like the North, is a springboard for the geopolitics of the future. Here lies the fate of Eurasia. At the same time, the favorable climate of “Russian Siberia” makes it more prone to start the grandiose project of creating a new continental model from here. Here, new cities should be built and new highways laid, new lands and deposits developed and new military bases created. It is important to initially lay in the project a harmonious combination of the two principles of relief, landscape, ethnocultural factor, and finally, ecology, on the one hand, and technical and strategic criteria, on the other. Archaic traditions should be combined with the latest technological developments. It is necessary to take into account the places of the most ancient human sites in these lands and correlate the choice for the development of industries and military bases with them

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Such logic leads to an open prospect of the emergence in Siberia of a new center, not yet manifested and conceived. And with the development of the entire Russian East, with the actualization of the Pacific Ocean as the “ocean of the future”, it is possible that the question will arise of transferring the capital of all Eurasia to these lands to the unprecedented and still non-existent brilliant capital of the New Millennium.

The time will come when Moscow will lose its “middle” meaning, become insufficient in the geopolitical sense, too “western”. And then the question of the New Capital in Siberia will receive not just a national, but continental, global significance.

However, one cannot forget for a moment that such a prospect is possible only if you win the positional struggle for Lenaland, without which the geopolitical revival of Eurasia is unthinkable.

Chapter 4 - The New Geopolitical Order of the South

4.1 “The New Geopolitical Order” of the South

The geopolitics of the southern regions (as well as the western ones) is connected with the planetary mission of Russia-Eurasia to an even greater extent than the problems of the North and East. If even when considering the North and the East, which belong geopolitically to the Russian territories, the foreign policy factor arose constantly, in the case of analyzing the problems of the South (as well as the West), it's simply not worth talking about “internal geopolitics” of Russia, since all domestic Russian realities are so connected with foreign policy here that their separation is simply impossible without completely violating the rigor of the overall geopolitical picture.

In relation to the South, the "geographical axis of history" has only one imperative geopolitical expansion up to the shores of the Indian Ocean. This means the centrality and uniqueness of meridian development, the unambiguous domination of the North-South axis. From a geopolitical point of view, the entire space separating Russian territory from the southern coastline of Eurasia is a strip whose area must be reduced to zero. The very fact of the existence of rimland, which is not a line, but a strip, is an expression of thalassocratic influence, the opposite of the basic impulse of continental integration. If the rimland of Eurasia in the north and east of Russia is reduced to zero volume, and the continent here is geopolitically complete (the only thing left is to maintain the positional status quo by warning in advance of the possibility of turning the line into a strip under the influence of a thalassocratic impulse), then rimland in the south (and west) is an open problem. In the east and north, Russia rimland has a current line, but a potential line, and in the south and west, on the contrary, an actual line, but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defense and defense, preservation, conservation of things and precautionary geopolitical moves. In the second case, we are talking, on the contrary, about actively offensive geopolitics, about expansion, a totally “offensive” strategy.

In the south of all Eurasia, Russia must establish a “new geopolitical order” based on the principle of continental integration. Therefore, all the established

political formations of the South, Islamic countries, India, China, Indochina should obviously be considered as a theater of continental positional maneuvers, whose ultimate task is to strategically tightly connect all these intermediate regions with the Eurasian Center and Moscow.

This implies the concept of “open rays” going from the Center to the periphery, which do not stop at the actual Russian borders, but should be drawn up to the southern ocean coast. Those segments of the “rays” that fall on Russian territories are relevant, those countries that are strategically in solidarity with Russia are semi-relevant, and those states that follow their own geopolitical path or (in the worst case) fall into the direct atlantist control zone have the potential by The general logic of Eurasian geopolitics in this direction comes down to ensuring that the entire length of the rays becomes relevant or semi-relevant.

On this basis, the entire coast of the Eurasian continent from Anatolia to Korea should be considered as a potential “Russian South”.

4.2 Zones and border mountains

The imperative of geopolitical expansion in a southerly direction also determines the composition structure of those areas that are part of the administrative borders of Russia or part of allied states (CIS). Therefore, the analysis of the periphery of relevant and semi-actual geopolitical rays should not for a moment be distracted from the initial trend dictated by the laws of geopolitics.

The “Russian South”, in a more limited sense, are the following zones:

1. The north of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria;
2. Moldova and Southern and Eastern Ukraine;
3. Rostov Region and Krasnodar Territory (port of Novorossiysk);
4. the Caucasus;
5. The eastern and northern coasts of the Caspian (territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);
6. Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
7. Mongolia.

Continental strategic control is established over these zones. But all of them

should be considered as bases for further geopolitical expansion to the south, and not as “eternal” borders of Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the presence of coastal strips that are not controlled by heartland is a constant threat of reduction even of the territories that are currently connected to the Center of Eurasia quite tightly. The collapse of the USSR and the emergence of independent political entities on the basis of the former Soviet republics provide an impressive example of how the refusal to expand outside the southern coast of the continent (the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan) inevitably entails the rollback of Moscow's reliable borders far north, deep into the continent. But the weakening of the continental presence never creates a vacuum or the strengthening of the sovereignty of the “liberated” territories, since their provincial status deliberately excludes their geopolitical autarchy. The thalassocratic influence of Atlantism (in one form or another) automatically takes the place of Moscow's tellurocratic influence.

Consequently, the structure of the entire inner belt of the “Russian South” should initially be considered as a potential offensive bridgehead.

However, the matter is complicated by the fact that almost all border territories fall on mountainous (often highland) regions.

In the north of the Balkan Peninsula it is the Balkan Mountains, east of the Caucasus, then the Kopetdag and Hindukush Ranges, then the Pamir, Tien Shan, Altai. The mountainous topography of the southern border of Russia-Eurasia, which largely predetermined the entire history of the East, is currently one of the most important geopolitical trump cards of Atlantism. The ancient Indo-Europeans divided the entire Eurasian East into two components: northern Turan (all that is higher than the Eurasian ridge of the mountains) and southern Iran (lying below this ridge). In fact, this division strictly corresponds to the modern geopolitical terms heartland (Turan) and rimland (Iran). After several millennia, the southern front of Russia poses the same geopolitical problem that was characteristic of the dialectic of relations “steppe nomads against the settled farmers of Persia.”

But in this case, the situation has changed dramatically in the sense that the settled Slavic northern Forest was added to the steppe Turan, balancing and fixing the dynamics of the Turanian nomads. Settled Indo-Europeans (Slavs) closed the steppe from the north with cultural forms that largely repeated the archetypes of the Iranian south. Russia as Eurasia, as a synthesis of Forest and Steppe, is qualitatively superior to Turan, and therefore, the Iranian problem

(wider than non-Russian Central Asia) takes on a different civilizational and geopolitical meaning. This is especially evident since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which radically broke with the atlantic thalassocratic policy of the Shah regime.

All these geopolitical aspects suggest the need for a radically new approach to the problem of the “Eurasian mountains”, which should lose the function of the strategic border, become not a barrier to continental integration, but a bridge to it.

The need to change the function of the mountains in southern Russia (and its strategic range) is a pillar of future Eurasian geopolitics. Without such a preliminary operation, Eurasia will never achieve real world domination; moreover, it will never even come closer to a genuine equal dialogue with thalassocracy.

4.3 Balkans

Since the majority of the southern lands of Russia and its strategic range fall on lands that are racially, culturally, and religiously different from the Russian civilization (except for the Balkans and Ukraine), the geopolitical axes must be strictly meridian. Hence the conclusion: all vertical (longitude) integration processes should be promoted and all horizontal (latitudinal), i.e. in a sphere ethnically and politically different from the actual Russian spaces, one should apply the principle directly opposite to the principle that dominates in conditions of ethno-cultural homogeneity.

We outline the main forms of the geopolitical structure of the “Russian South” (in the broad sense), alternately considering all local geopolitical systems from west to east.

Balkan Peninsula. There are four special areas here:

- a) Bosnian-Croatian (the most western and Atlantic oriented, pure rimland);
- b) Serbian (located east and clearly Eurasian oriented);

c) Bulgarian (even more eastern, having elements of the “Levantine version of rimland”, this model is most clearly represented by Turkey and continental Eurasian synthesis);

d) Greek (Orthodox, but part of the Atlantic bloc).

The “new geopolitical order” (continental and Eurasian) in this area (as elsewhere) is based on the promotion of all integration processes along the North-South axis. This means that Belgrade Athens and Sofia Athens should be promoted as much as possible. Since the entire Balkan region is a mosaic and extremely complex configuration, the project of the all-Slavic southern federation consisting of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbian Bosnia, which would be a theoretically ideal solution, is hardly feasible in the near future. Moreover, it involves a dangerous process of latitudinal integration, which is always problematic in such ethnically complex regions. Let us recall, for example, the fierce Balkan wars of the beginning of the century between the Orthodox states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and the constantly arising problem of Macedonia, which is the “apple of discord” within potentially continental and Eurasian Orthodox powers. Therefore, the example of the medieval Serbian “empire” of Nemanichi can be taken as a positive geopolitical paradigm. Moreover, all the significant successes of Greece in global geopolitical projects (in particular, the conquest of Alexander the Great) were fed by energies coming from the north of the Balkans, the Macedonian dynasty, and the earlier Dorian type of Indo-European Sparta. Within the framework of the small model of the entire Balkan Peninsula, the Serbs (and, in part, the Bulgarians) represent a Eurasian impulse, act as carriers of the idea of heartland. South of Greece, it is geopolitically stretched between this northern continental impulse and a stable historical identification with rimland. Therefore, all unification integration projects of Greece with the north of the Balkans can contribute to the strengthening of intracontinental impulses in Greece, which could be based on confessional proximity with Orthodox Russia.

If in the distant future you can imagine a common Balkan Federation, Eurasian oriented, then the minimum geopolitical program can be formulated as the creation of the wrong rhombus Sofia Moscow Belgrade Athens (and again Sofia), in which two rays emanate from the Center: Russian-Serbian and Russian-Bulgarian, but they converge in Athens. Moreover, the issue of Macedonia could be resolved by granting it special status in order to remove the stumbling block between all three Orthodox Balkan and potentially Eurasian (to varying degrees) states. This logically implies the vital interest of Moscow in the

varying degrees) states. This logically implies the vital interest of Moscow in the problem of Macedonia.

If you look at the whole picture from the opposite point of view, from the position of the Atlantists, it will immediately become obvious that it is important for thalassocracy to give all geopolitical processes the exact opposite character.

Firstly, for the "sea power" it is important to support the pro-Atlantic forces in the north of the Balkans (Croats and Muslims), and in addition, to tear Serbia and Bulgaria from a geopolitical alliance with Greece. For this, it is most convenient to use Macedonia, which will be able to destroy all continental projects in this region. And if you connect Turkey to the Bulgarian problem, i.e. to contribute to the improvement of Turkish-Bulgarian relations to the detriment of the Bulgarian-Russian, then the whole Eurasian continental policy here will be defeated. This must be taken into account by the geopolitics of Eurasia.

4.4 The problem of sovereign Ukraine

Next comes the Ukrainian question. The sovereignty of Ukraine is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it can easily provoke an armed conflict. Without the Black Sea coast from Izmail to Kerch, Russia receives such an extended coastal strip, really controlled by no one knows that its very existence as a normal and independent state is being called into question. The Black Sea is not a substitute for access to the "warm seas" and its geopolitical importance drops sharply due to the stable Atlantic control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, but it at least makes it possible to protect the central regions from the potential expansion of Turkish influence, being extremely convenient, reliable and inexpensive border. Therefore, the emergence of a new geopolitical entity on these lands (which, moreover, seeks to enter the Atlantic alliance) is an absolute anomaly, which could be led only by completely irresponsible, from a geopolitical point of view, steps.

Ukraine as an independent state with some territorial ambitions poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia, and without solving the Ukrainian problem, it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics. This does not mean that the cultural-linguistic or economic autonomy of Ukraine should be limited, and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralized state (as, to some extent, things were in the tsarist empire or under the USSR). But

strategically, Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow in the south and west (although more on the possible models of restructuring will be discussed in the chapter on the West).

The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is the total and unlimited control of Moscow throughout its entire length from Ukrainian to Abkhaz territories. You can arbitrarily split up this entire zone according to ethnocultural grounds, providing ethnic and confessional autonomy to Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc., but all this only with absolute control of Moscow over the military and political situation. These sectors should be radically divorced from the thalassocratic influence of both coming from the west and from Turkey (or even Greece). The northern coast of the Black Sea should be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinate to Moscow.

4.5 Between the Black Sea and the Caspian

The Caucasus proper consists of two geopolitical levels: the North Caucasus and the territory of the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Closely adjacent to this sector is the entire area of Russian lands from Taganrog to Astrakhan, i.e. all Russian lands located between the Black Sea and the Caspian, which also includes Kalmykia's wedge.

This whole region is an extremely important strategic hub, since the peoples living in it have enormous social dynamics, ancient geopolitical traditions, and it directly borders on Atlantic Turkey, which strategically controls, for its part, the border zone, which, from view of the relief, belongs to a single space of the Caucasus mountain range.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of the Russian geopolitical space, and it is not by chance that these territories have traditionally been the scene of fierce hostilities between Russia-heartland and Turkey and Iran. In the first approximation, control over the Caucasus opens up access to the "warm seas", and each (even the most insignificant) movement of the border to the south (or north) means a significant gain (or loss) of all continental strength, tellurocracy.

The three horizontal layers of this entire region, the Russian lands, the North Caucasus as part of Russia and the Caucasus proper also have their potential

Caucasus as part of Russia and the Caucasus proper, also have their potential continuation further south. This additional, purely potential belt, located not only outside Russia but also the CIS, consists of South Azerbaijan (located on the territory of Iran) and northern regions of Turkey, which are largely inhabited by Kurds and Armenians. This entire region presents the same ethnocultural problem for Turkey and Iran as the Caucasian ethnic groups that are (or were) part of Russia. Consequently, there are all objective prerequisites for expanding continental influence deeper into the Caucasian range.

So, between the Black Sea and the Caspian, four levels or strata stand out, suggesting a differentiated approach from the side of the Center.

The first stratum, actually Russian, should be connected as much as possible in latitudinal orientation, creating a rigid structure of Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan. This is the most important link in the Russian space as a whole, since to the north it rests against the central part of Russia, and even further north into Arkhangelsk, the most important northern port and the potential capital of the “northern trapeze”. Due to the relatively close distances from the Central European part and due to the demographically dense population and technical development, the triangle Rostov-on-Don Volgograd Astrakhan is the most important outpost of Russia in the South. This is a kind of substitution of the Eurasian Center itself, a secondary center connected by a continuous territory with deep spaces. That is why this region should become the geopolitical core of the entire Caucasian strategy of Eurasia, and for this it should be strengthened technologically, strategically and intellectually. It is desirable to create here a special cohesive Russian zone, integrated administratively and politically.

However, some problems arise with the northern regions of Kalmykia, which, however, are quite poorly populated. It makes sense to include these northern steppe regions in a common integration belt, geopolitically “stretching” them directly between Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan in order to close the bottom triangle with a peak in Volgograd. This will reproduce geographically and geopolitically the borders of ancient Khazaria, which controlled this entire region at the beginning of the first millennium. We can arbitrarily call this geopolitical entity the “Khazar triangle.”

In the transition from the purely Russian zone of the “Khazar triangle”, which should follow the latitudinal (horizontal) logic, although closely connected with the north and with the Center itself (Moscow), the vector of integration radically changes its character. The entire North Caucasus and everything that lies south

or it should be subject exclusively to meridian orientation. The strategic centers of the “Khazar triangle” should develop independent geopolitical chains that are deployed strictly to the south. From Rostov through Krasnodar to Maykop, Sukhumi and Batumi. From Stavropol to Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze, Tskhinval and Tbilisi. From Astrakhan to Makhachkala.

Any latitudinal demarcation of the ethnic regions of Transcaucasia should be supported, while longitude integration, on the contrary, should be strengthened. So, it is important by any means to tear off the active separatist Chechnya from Dagestan (and Ingushetia), blocking access to the Caspian. If Chechnya is left only to Georgia lying in the south, then it will be geopolitically controlled from all sides, and it will be possible to control it from the side of Orthodox Georgia. Partly, Dagestan and Ingushetia should also be tied to Georgia, which may lead to the creation of an autonomous North Caucasian zone, developed economically, but strategically completely controlled by Russia and Eurasian oriented. A general redistribution of the North Caucasus could also solve the Ossetian problem, since new ethnic entities (for example, united Ossetia) would lose the meaning of national-state formations, acquiring a purely ethnic and cultural, linguistic and religious meaning. Following the same meridian logic, it is important to link Abkhazia directly with Russia.

All these steps are aimed at the same geopolitical goal of strengthening the Eurasian tellurocratic complex and preparing its planetary triumph in a duel with Atlanticism. Therefore, this whole plan can be called the “new geopolitical order in the Caucasus”. It implies a rejection of the traditional approach to existing political entities as “nation-states,” that is, strictly fixed administrative entities with permanent borders and a complete power structure. The “new geopolitical order in the Caucasus” presupposes a complete redistribution of existing political realities and a transition from a model of relations between the state-state or nation-nation to a purely geopolitical system of the Center of the periphery, and the structure of the periphery should be determined not by political, but ethno-cultural differentiation.

This can be done through a plan to create a “Caucasian Federation”, which would include both the three Caucasian republics of the CIS and internal Russian autonomous entities. At the same time, the center would be inferior to the entire cultural and economic autarchy of the whole region, but would provide the most severe strategic centralism. This would lead to an extremely flexible system that would not be based on violence, occupation or uniformization of Caucasian diversity, but on the awareness of the unity and commonality of continental fate.

A special geopolitical role is played by Armenia, which is a traditional and reliable ally of Russia in the Caucasus. Armenia serves as the most important strategic base for preventing Turkish expansion of the north and east into the regions of the Central Asian Turkic world. On the contrary, in an offensive geopolitical aspect, it is important as an ethnocultural community, continuously continuing to the south, on the territory of Turkey, where a significant part of ancient Armenia and its main shrine, Mount Ararat, are located. Racial and linguistic kinship also connects Armenians with the Kurds, another important ethnic factor that can be used to provoke geopolitical upheavals within Turkey. At the same time, it is extremely important to create a land corridor that crosses the entire Caucasus and reliably connects Armenia with the "Khazar triangle".

Armenia is important in one more sense. Based on historical and ethnic affinity with Iran, it was Armenia that could serve as one of the most important links for the spread of the Eurasian impulse from the Center to Iranian rimland. This means the creation of the Moscow Yerevan Tehran axis.

Azerbaijan should be attached to Iran (and by no means to Turkey), emphasizing Shiism, ethnic affinity with Iranian South Azerbaijan and historical ties. Thus, the most important strategic beam Moscow Tehran through Yerevan would be duplicated by the Moscow Baku Tehran beam, forming a rhombus, largely symmetrical to the Balkan rhombus. In general, there are many geopolitical parallels between the Balkans and the Caucasus. And the most important thing: it is here that the most important geopolitical law manifests itself most clearly, latitudinal processes provoke terrible conflicts, long-range connections lead to stability and sustainability. This is especially expressive in the Yugoslav war and in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Karabakh problem itself is somewhat similar to the problem of Macedonia. And therefore, to stabilize the entire region, Moscow should establish the most direct ties with Karabakh in order to make this territory a point of equilibrium for the entire Caucasian geopolitical system. For this, four parties should optimally have Karabakh negotiations: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Iran, with the exception of all Atlantist participants, whose political presence in the region is inappropriate for geopolitical reasons.

4.6 The New Geopolitical Order in Central Asia

Central Asia is considered to be a huge fragment of the Eurasian land, stretching from the North Kazakhstan steppes to the coast of the Arabian Sea. From the former Soviet Central Asian republics, this zone extends through the Kopetdag and Pamir Ranges to the south to plain Iran and to the southeast to Afghanistan. Central Asia is that geopolitical space that, rather than everyone else, can bring heartland to its cherished goal to the Indian Ocean. If Moscow managed to win a positional war with thalassocracy in this direction, many parallel issues would automatically be resolved: integration into the Indian continental bloc, strategic support for Iraq against Turkey, direct corridor to the Middle East, etc. All this makes this area central to the issue of geopolitical restructuring of the Eurasian South.

Note that Central Asia shares a ridge of mountains not only politically and geopolitically, but also racially. The former Soviet zone of Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) is populated by Sunni Turks, the heirs of Turan, many of whom continue to predominantly engage in nomadism and animal husbandry. "Non-Soviet" Central Asia Iran, Afghanistan (and even ethno-culturally related Pakistan) is inhabited by settled Indo-Europeans. Thus, geopolitical unity has a distinct racial boundary.

This whole area is divided into three parts:

1. Central Kazakhstan (south of the 50th parallel, since the lands included in the "Russian East" are located north of it);
2. Desert Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and mountainous Kyrgyzstan (these are purely Turanian lands);
3. Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (this is Iran in the expanded sense of "Ariana", "land of the Aryans").

The new Eurasian order in Central Asia is based on linking all these lands from north to south with a rigid geopolitical and strategic axis. Moreover, as always in such cases, it is important to structure the space exclusively in the meridian direction, contributing to the longitudinal convergence of individual regions.

Starting from the north, we are talking about the connection of all of Kazakhstan with the Russians in the Southern Urals and Western Siberia. This connection should serve as the supporting structure of the entire Central Asian area. The consistent and thoughtful integration of Kazakhstan into a common continental bloc with Russia is the basis of all continental policy. In this case, the most important point from the beginning is the task of strictly interrupting any

influence of Turkey on this region, hindering any projects of "Turanian" integration emanating from Atlantic Turkey and offering a purely latitudinal geopolitical development of the former "Soviet" Central Asia, opposed to the Indo-European North (Russia) and the Indo-European South (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India). Turanian integration is a direct antithesis of geopolitical Eurasianism and consists in splitting the tellurocratic forces into three components: western (European Russia), eastern (Russian Southern Siberia and the Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). A similar "tuninism" is intended to split the racial and geopolitical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe, giving rise to both the Russian State and the Great Russian ethnos, and with regard to Iran and Afghanistan, it tears apart the religious unity of the Islamic world. Proceeding from this, heartland should declare a rigid positional geopolitical war in Turkey and the carriers of "panturanism" in which Islamic Aryan Iran will be Russia's main ally. Central Asia should be "stretched" vertically between two global Indo-European realities between Russians and Persians. At the same time, every effort should be made to highlight local autonomous cultural trends throughout the Turkic space, support regionalist forces in the autonomous regions, exacerbate friction between clans, tribes, "uluses", etc. Everywhere in this area, one should try to close territories, districts, industrial complexes, economic cycles, strategic objects in territories located outside the Turkic area, or in a strictly meridian direction. So, for example, Karakalpakia in the west of Uzbekistan should territorially integrate not in the east (Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent), but in the north (Kazakhstan) and south (Turkmenistan). On the same principle, the border regions between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be restructured Samarkand, the Ferghana Valley, and are historically and ethnically connected with Tajik territories no less than with Uzbek ones. The same is true for southern Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan should become the geopolitical hinge of the entire Central Asian geopolitical strategy of tellurocracy. This area combines the most important aspects of the whole Russian "Drang nach Süden", "jerk to the South". Tajiks are Muslims of Indo-European descent, ethnically close to Iranians and Afghans. Those. they represent a fragment of the "Iranian" world in this region. At the same time, Tajikistan was part of Russia and the USSR, i.e. was integrated into the continental, Eurasian geopolitical system itself. Therefore, the fate of this small alpine country, ancient Sogdiana, symbolizes the success (or failure) of the establishment of a new Eurasian order in Central Asia.

The actual border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan should not be taken as a

strict line. This is not a historical fact, but a geopolitical task, since it would be in the heartland's interests to completely cancel any strict restrictions here, moving the strategic line far south, and rebuilding the entire intermediate area on the basis of ethno-cultural, tribal and regional borders. Afghanistan does not have a tradition of complete centralized statehood. It is inhabited by many nomadic and sedentary tribes (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.), linked more by religion (Islam) than by statehood and politics. Therefore, Russia's geopolitical return to Afghanistan is inevitable and predetermined by geography itself. The only thing that needs to be relied upon is not so much on military power as on a sound geopolitical strategy, on the preparation of a conscious and voluntary strategic alliance on both sides, caused by the need for a common confrontation between thalassocracy, the "forces of the West", and "Atlanticism", which automatically brings the Russians and Muslims. Tajikistan plays the role of the main base in this process, and its territory becomes a geopolitical laboratory in which two multidirectional impulses converge the Islamic impulse of the Indo-European Eurasian South and the Russian geopolitical impulse coming from heartland from the north. Here, in Tajikistan, in Dushanbe or in another city, a joint Russian-Islamic strategy for the reorganization of the more northern "Turan" should be developed. This land is called upon to work out an epoch-making decision on the creation of New Eurasia, in which the thesis about the accomplished synthesis between the Steppe and the northern Forest, on the one hand, and between the same Steppe (Turan) and Iran, on the other, would be finally and irrevocably fixed.

Thus, it is logical to draw another ray from the Eurasian Center: Moscow Dushanbe Kabul Tehran, along which an unprecedented geopolitical reality should take shape.

Part of Tajikistan Mountainous Badakhshan is located very close to Pakistan and India, which converge to almost the same point with China (Xinjiang). Despite the fact that these zones are almost impassable, since they are located very high in the Pamir mountains, the Gorno-Badakhshan region itself has a deep geopolitical meaning. It is populated by the Ismailis, an Islamic heretical sect, which is an expression of the most extreme Shiism, i.e. the most Indo-European (from a spiritual point of view) version of Islam. The Badakhshan Ismailis are settled near the Pakist regions, and this state (although officially Sunni) is ethnically a Hindu convert to Islam. And this indicates that they are certainly closer to Indo-European tendencies within the framework of this religion, if not frankly "Shiite", then "cryptoshi". Not far away is Indian Kashmir, also populated by Hindu Muslims and Shaivites. Uzbeks Muslims inhabit the

populated by Hindu Muslims and Shaiwists. Uyghur Muslims inhabit the Xinjiang region in China. Therefore, the religious specifics of Badakhshan and its strategic position enable the heartland to actively participate in solving the most important geopolitical problems that converge just in this area, the Pakistan-Indian wars, the potential Uyghur Islamic separatism in China, the national liberation struggle in Tibet, the Sikh movement in somewhat more southern Punjab, etc. All threads of this critical knot of Asia converge in Tajikistan, and more precisely, in Badakhshan. From here the additional and independent axis Moscow Khorog (the capital of Badakhshan) suggests itself. Moreover, since Badakhshan's connection with the rest of Tajikistan is not very strong (ethno-religious and clan contradictions), Moscow should separate this region into a separate geopolitical reality like Macedonia or Karabakh, since the strategic importance of Khorog is central for a gigantic region not exceeding the scale only in Tajikistan, but throughout Central Asia.

This entire complex area should be restructured under the most active influence of the "geographical axis of history" of Russia on the basis of the tellurocratic model, i.e. contrary to the plans that the thalassocratic Atlantic elements have in this regard. It is known that it was England that supported the separatist movement of Indian Muslims, which led to the secession of Pakistan. Indo-Pakistani conflicts are also beneficial to the Atlantists, as this allows them to strengthen their political and economic influence in both regions, taking advantage of geopolitical contradictions and making the whole region dependent on the military-strategic presence of Americans and British. Currently, Pakistan, India, and China are steadily entering the thalassocratic-controlled rimland. The geopolitical role of Tajikistan and Badakhshan is to radically change this state of affairs and organize a Eurasian system of continental integration throughout this space. At the same time, in the ideological sphere it is extremely important to take into account the slightest ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic nuances, and in the sphere of military-strategic it is necessary to strive for tough and uncontested centralism.

In the political sense, the anti-Americanism of the fundamentalist Iran and the strict "neutrality" of India provide serious grounds for the success of the Eurasian strategy. The rest depends on the geopolitical will of Moscow and, more broadly, Russia-Eurasia.

4.7 The Fall of China

China is Russia's most dangerous geopolitical neighbor in the South. In some ways, his role is similar to Turkey. But if Turkey is a member of NATO openly, and its strategic atlantism is obvious, then with China everything is more complicated.

China's geopolitics was initially dual. On the one hand, it belonged to rimland, the "coastal zone" of the Pacific Ocean (on the eastern side), and on the other, it never became a thalassocracy and, on the contrary, always focused on continental archetypes. Therefore, there is a strong political tradition of calling China the "Middle Empire", and this term characterizes the continental Tellurocratic formations. At the same time, China is separated from the Indian Ocean by the Indochina Peninsula, on which an inflorescence of states with an open thalassocratic orientation is located.

In the course of the development (colonization) of the West by the East, China gradually turned into a semi-colony with the last generation of emperors of the Qing dynasty, the marionette with the exact pro-British government. From the beginning of the 19th century until 1949 (the CCP's victory over the Kuomintang), China's geopolitics followed purely Atlantic trends (while China did not act as an independent thalassocracy, but as the Eurasian coastal base of the West). The victory of the Communist Party changed the situation, and China for a short time (1949-1958) reoriented itself to Eurasian pro-Russian politics. However, due to historical traditions, the Eurasian line was soon abandoned, and China preferred "autarchy." It remained to wait for the moment when the Eurasian orientation weakened so much that the potential atlantism and the geopolitical identity of China as rimland would become obvious. This happened in the mid-70s, when China began active negotiations with representatives of the Mondialist "Trilateral Commission." This meant a new entry of China into the structure of the Atlanticist geopolitics.

While not denying the possibility of China under certain circumstances again embarking on the path of the Eurasian Alliance, this should not be particularly counted on. Purely pragmatically, it is much more profitable for China to have contacts with the West than with Russia, which cannot contribute to the technological development of this country, and such a "friendship" will only bind China's freedom of geopolitical manipulation in the Far East, Mongolia and South Siberia. In addition, China's demographic growth poses the problem of "free territories" for this country, and the lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia (almost unsettled) seem highly attractive in this perspective.

(almost unsettled) seem highly attractive in this perspective.

China is dangerous for Russia for two reasons as the geopolitical base of Atlantism and in itself, as a country of increased demographic density in search of "no-man's spaces." In both cases, heartland has in this case a positional threat, the location of which is extremely dangerous. China occupies the lands located south of Lenaland.

In addition, China has a closed racial and cultural specificity, and in historically visible periods it never participated in Eurasian continental construction.

All these considerations, regardless of the political specifics, make China a potential geopolitical adversary of Russia in the South and East. This should be recognized as a geopolitical axiom. Therefore, the geopolitical task of Russia in relation to the easternmost sector of its "internal" southern zone is to maximize the area of its influence to the south, creating the widest possible "border zone". In the future, Eurasia should extend its influence up to Indochina, but to achieve this through a mutually beneficial alliance is almost unbelievable. And this is the fundamental difference between China and Islamic Asia (with the exception of Turkey) and India. If the Eurasian alliance with other southern sectors of Eurasia should be based on consideration of mutual interests, i.e. being the result of a conscious and voluntary alliance based on the recognition of a common geopolitical mission, in the case of China we are talking about force-based geopolitical pressure, provoking territorial disintegration, fragmentation, and political and administrative redistribution of the state. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical opponents. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This involves the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of opponents, one should strive to do harm; in the case of allies, it is necessary to identify a common geopolitical goal.

Now it is easy to deduce the priorities of Russia's "internal geopolitics" in the space from Badakhshan to Vladivostok.

The main model here is the separation of the north of Thai territories from more southern lands. Geopolitical analysis immediately gives serious reasons for this. Xinjiang, the oldest country with a long history of political autonomy, accounts for northwest China. Numerous states that succeeded each other historically existed here. Moreover, at the moment these lands are inhabited by the Uyghurs of the Turkic ethnic group professing Islam. The Chinese maintain control in

these areas through direct force pressure, direct colonization, oppressing the local population and suppressing all its attempts to defend religious and ethnic autonomy. The ideas of annexation of Xinjiang to Russia already existed among the Russian emperors as part of the project for the development of Siberia. This line should be returned. To the south of Xinjiang lies Kun Lun and Tibet, where we again encounter a similar situation. Tibet is a separate country with a special population, a specific religion, and ancient political and ethnic traditions. Beijing's power here is also artificial and based on direct violence, as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and in the beginning of the anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in this entire area. In the future, all these territories would harmoniously fit into the Eurasian continental federation, since neither geography nor history connects them with Atlanticism. Xinjiang and Tibet must enter the belt of tellurocracy. This will be the most positive geopolitical decision and will create reliable protection for Russia even if China does not abandon anti-Eurasian geopolitical projects. Without Xinjiang and Tibet, China's potential geopolitical breakthrough into Kazakhstan and Western Siberia becomes impossible. Moreover, not only the complete liberation of these territories from Chinese control, but even the first stages of destabilizing the situation in these regions will already be Russia's strategic gain.

To the east is the sector of Mongolia Russia's strategic ally. It is important here to act proactively and not to allow the very possibility of strengthening the Chinese factor in Mongolian politics. Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect southern Siberia from China. At the same time, Mongolia's ties with Xinjiang and Tibet should be intensified in order to create the prerequisites for a new configuration of the entire region with a focus on the gradual displacement of China and its geopolitical influence. For this purpose, a project of the Mongol-Tibetan Federation can be put forward, which could also include Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia and the Altai Republic. The unity of the Lamaist tradition of these peoples for Moscow is an important tool for anti-Chinese geopolitical strategy.

The last zone of the southern zone is Manchuria territory located in the north-east of China. And here we are faced with a weak (for China) geopolitical link. There were also ancient states on this territory that had a tradition of political independence. Already in the 20th century, Japan again recreated the Manchu state with its capital in Harbin, which was the continental bridgehead for Japan's invasion of China. For Russia, the existence in Manchuria of a special political state, not controlled by China, is highly desirable. Since Japan itself is one of the

state, not controlled by China, is highly desirable. Since Japan itself is one of the potential geopolitical allies of Eurasia, efforts could be combined on this issue.

Tibet-Xinjiang-Mongolia-Manchuria together constitute the security belt of Russia. The main task in this region is to make these lands controlled by my heartland, using the potential geopolitical allies of Russia, India and Japan, as well as the local population suffering from the Beijing dictatorship. For China itself, this belt is a strategic springboard for a potential “breakthrough to the North,” to Kazakhstan and Siberia. These are lands adjacent to Lenaland from the south, around which a positional geopolitical confrontation with the leading world forces will inevitably unfold. Russia should tear this bridgehead away from China, push China south and offer it, as a geopolitical compensation, the development along the North-South axis in the south direction of Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia.

4.8 From the Balkans to Manchuria

Eurasia must “push” southward over the entire space from the Balkan Peninsula to Northeast China. This entire belt is a strategically important zone of Russia's security. The peoples inhabiting different sectors of this space are ethnically, religiously, culturally diverse. But all, without exception, have elements that bring them closer to the heartland's geopolitical formula. For some, this is Orthodoxy, for others, historical belonging to a single state, for third, ethnic and racial affinity, for fourth, the adversary's community, for fifth, pragmatic calculation. Such a diversity of the South dictates the need for extremely flexible geopolitics and extremely developed argumentation, justifying the need for ties, alliances, etc. None of the criteria is a priority here. You cannot rely on only one of the factors of ethnos, religion, race, history, profit, etc. In each case, it should be done differently. At the same time, the highest criterion remains geopolitics and its laws, which should subordinate all other considerations to themselves, and not become only an instrument of foreign (or domestic) policy based on some separate and independent principles. Only in this case Eurasia can achieve stability, and Russia reliably ensure its continental security and the implementation of its tellurocratic mission.

Chapter 5 - Threat of the West

5.1 Two Wests

The problem of organizing space in the West of Eurasia is the topic that forms the basis of all geopolitics as a science. Western Europe is the rimland of Eurasia, with rimland the most complete, unambiguous and historically identifiable. Regarding Russia itself as a heartland, the West as a whole is the main planetary adversary in that sector of “coastal civilization”, which fully assumed the function of a complete thalassocracy and identified its historical fate with the sea. England was at the forefront of this process, but all other European countries that took the baton of industrialization, technical development and the value standards of the “trade system” also entered this thalassocratic ensemble sooner or later.

During the historical formation of the final geographical picture of the West, the championship from the island of England passed to the continent of America, especially to the United States. Thus, the USA and the NATO bloc controlled by them became the maximum embodiment of thalassocracy in its strategic, ideological, economic, and cultural aspects.

This final geopolitical fixation of planetary forces places the pole of Atlanticism and thalassocracy behind the Atlantic, on the American continent. Europe itself (even Western, including England itself) from the center of thalassocracy becomes the “buffer zone”, “coastal belt”, and “strategic appendage” of the USA. Such a transfer of the thalassocratic axis overseas slightly changes the geopolitical configuration. If a century ago Europe (England and France) was the main opponent of Russia, then after the Second World War this region lost its independent strategic importance, turning into a strategic colony of the United States. Such a transformation strictly corresponds to the “view from the sea” that characterizes the typically colonial attitude to the mainland of any thalassocracy. Earlier, the “coastal” nature of Europe was a potential characteristic, activated by a special geopolitical formation “the island of England”, but now it exactly corresponds to the current picture of the distribution of forces. The USA, the geopolitical reality that emerged from Europe as its almost artificial projection,

became a completely independent pole, the West in the absolute sense of the word, turning Europe from a metropolis to a colony. All this is in full accordance with the classical logic of thalassocratic geopolitics.

Thus, at present, the geopolitical problem of the planetary West in the broadest sense is breaking up for Russia into two components: the West as America and the West as Europe. From a geopolitical point of view, these two realities have different meanings. The West as America is the total geopolitical opponent of Russia, the pole of the trend directly opposite Eurasia, the headquarters and center of Atlantism. The positional geopolitical war with America has been and continues to be the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics, beginning in the middle of the 20th century, when the role of the United States became obvious. In this regard, the heartland's position is clear, it is necessary to oppose the US atlantic geopolitics at all levels and in all regions of the earth, trying to weaken, demoralize, deceive and, ultimately, defeat the enemy. In this case, it is especially important to bring geopolitical disorder into intra-American reality, encouraging all sorts of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements of extremist, racist, sectarian groups, destabilizing internal political processes in the United States. At the same time, it makes sense to support isolationist tendencies in American politics, the theses of those (often right-republican) circles that believe that the United States should limit itself to its internal problems. This state of affairs of Russia is highly beneficial, even if "isolationism" will be carried out in the framework of the original version of the Monroe Doctrine if the US limits its influence to two Americas. This does not mean that Eurasia should at the same time refuse to destabilize the Latin American world, trying to bring certain regions out of US control. All levels of geopolitical pressure on the United States should be involved simultaneously, just as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlantism simultaneously "sponsors" the processes of the collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, under the guise of Russia's regionalization its progressive decay up to complete destruction. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and justified. All this is the central task of Russia's "external geopolitics" relative to the United States, so a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this work.

The second reality, also denoted by the term "West", has a different meaning. This is Europe, the geopolitical meaning of which has changed dramatically in recent decades. Being traditionally a metropolis for other parts of the planet, Eurone first found itself in a situation of a colony of strategic. cultural.

economic, political, etc. American colonialism differs from the more explicit and rigid forms of the past, but its meaning remains the same. Europe at the moment does not have its own geopolitics and its own geographical will; its functions are limited to the fact that it serves as an auxiliary base for the United States in Eurasia and the site of the most likely conflict with Eurasia. This situation automatically leads to the fact that the anti-American line becomes a common geopolitical alternative to European states, combining them with a single project that has never existed before. The unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as a whole and independent organism, claiming to regain its historical significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe does not want to be either Russian or American. After the end of the Cold War, this will manifested itself in its entirety.

Now the question arises: what, in general terms, is the attitude of Eurasia to its western peninsula?

From a purely geopolitical point of view, Eurasia is clearly interested in bringing Europe out of the control of Atlantism, the United States. This is a priority. In the West, Russia should have maritime borders; this is a strategic imperative of the geopolitical development of Eurasia. It is the absence of such borders, the presence instead of them of a land line that crosses Europe in the middle, artificially and forcefully, which ultimately led to the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Therefore, the task is not to repeat mistakes and correct the situation. Eurasia will only be free from Sea Power when the oceans will become its strategic borders in the North, East, South and West as in the case of America. Only then will the duel of civilizations proceed on an equal footing.

Therefore, Russia has two options, either the military occupation of Europe, or such a reorganization of the European space that will make this geopolitical sector a reliable strategic alliance of Moscow, preserving its sovereignty, autonomy, and autarchy. The first option is so unrealistic that it should not be discussed seriously. The second option is complicated, but feasible, since half a century spent by Europe in the position of an American colony left a serious mark in European consciousness.

Friendly Europe as a strategic ally of Russia can arise only if it is united. Otherwise, the Atlantic adversary will find many ways to bring crushing and schism into the European bloc, provoking a conflict similar to the two world wars. Therefore, Moscow should contribute as much as possible to European unification, especially by supporting the Central European states, primarily Germany. The alliance of Germany with France, the axis of Paris Berlin (De Gaulle's project), is the backbone around which it is most logical to build the body of New Europe. Germany and France have a strong anti-Atlantic political tradition (both right and left political movements). Being potential and hidden for the time being, at some point she will declare herself in all her voice. Moscow should be guided by this line right now, without waiting for the final development of events.

Moscow's task is to wrest Europe from the control of the United States (NATO), promote its unification, and strengthen integration ties with Central Europe under the sign of the main foreign policy axis of Moscow Berlin. Eurasia needs an allied friendly Europe. From a military point of view, it will not pose a

serious threat (without the United States) for a long time, and economic cooperation with neutral Europe will be able to solve most of the technological problems of Russia and Asia in exchange for resources and strategic military partnership.

Based on this foreign geopolitical task, one should analyze the domestic political situation of Russia in its western regions.

5.2 Destroy the “sanitary cordon”

The basic formula for analyzing the geopolitics of the “Russian West” is the principle: “European Europe, Russian Russia”. Here, in general, one should act in the same way as in the case of the Islamic world, new borders are inevitable, some regions should be divided again, but in all cases the main task remains to create friendly neutral entities in the West, with maximum ethnocultural, economic and social freedom but with strategic dependence on Moscow. The task is to “Finlandize” the whole of Europe as much as possible, but one must begin with the reorganization of spaces adjacent directly to Russia.

Here a complex problem immediately arises: the “sanitary cordon”. Atlantist geopolitics are well aware of the strategic danger of the alliance between Russia and Europe (especially Germany) and traditionally seek to prevent this in every possible way. The most effective method of thalassocracy is the “sanitary cordon”, i.e. a strip of several border states hostile to both its eastern and western neighbors, and directly related to the Atlantic pole. The role of such a “sanitary cordon” is traditionally played by Poland and the East European countries located south of Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc. The idea of such a “cordon” was developed by the geopolitician Mackinder and was very successfully implemented at the beginning of the century and before the Second World War. Moreover, in both cases, the goal was achieved in the end, a conflict ensued between the two continentalist powers Russia and Germany, as a result of which the Atlantists got strategic victories. America owes its place at the head of the West precisely to two world wars that bled Europe and whether Germany and Russia (the main rivals of the Atlanticism) were especially depleted.

Obviously, such a “sanitary cordon” will arise even now, created from small, embittered, historically irresponsible peoples and states, with manic claims and

servile dependence on the thalassocratic West.

We are talking about the emergence of a geopolitical strip between the Baltic and the Black Sea, consisting of states that are not able to enter a full-fledged component into Europe, but are heavily repelled from Moscow and Eurasia. The applicants for the members of the new “sanitary cordon” are the Baltic nations (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians), Poland (including western Prussia), Belarus (the Catholic anti-Eurasian minority is lobbying for this idea), Ukraine (especially the Western Uniate Catholic), Hungary, Romania (also influenced by Uniates), Czech Republic and Slovakia. It can be seen that almost everywhere we are talking about the Catholic sector of Eastern Europe, which traditionally belonged to the zone of influence of the West. Moreover, we are dealing with the same countries that have acted more than once in geopolitical history as levers of destruction of the continental formations of the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and recently the USSR.

The task of Eurasia is that this cordon does not exist. This is in the interests of both Europe and Russia. These entities themselves, if we consider them as state entities, are untenable, ethnically and religiously contradictory, strategically and economically underdeveloped, and devoid of resources. In other words, these fictitious states make sense only as strategic zones artificially supported by Atlanticism. Everywhere there are factors that tie them to Eurasia (either Orthodoxy, or awareness of Slavic kinship, or the presence of the Russian population, or historical proximity, or several components at once, etc.), but there are also opposite factors that bring them closer to the West (Catholicism, uniatism, ethnic differentness, political traditions of sovereignty, etc.). As long as these formations are something integral, they cannot prefer either of the two orientations, and that is why they become, in the full sense of the word, a “sanitary cordon”. Integration with the East is hindered by some elements, integration with the West by others. Hence the constant internal and external instability provoked by these countries, which plays into the hands of the thalasso and is a constant obstacle to Eurasian geopolitics and the continental bloc.

The only way to eliminate the “sanitary cordon” is to completely redistribute state neoplasms based on purely geopolitical factors. This does not have to automatically mean the annexation of territories to other states. It may be about creating in place of the states of the federations or several states, whose geopolitical orientation will, however, be unambiguous. It will be easier for small entities, ethnically, culturally and religiously, to integrate into large

geopolitical blocs, and if there are strong allied relations between Russia and Europe, the new borders will not mean a real threshold, a break. Moreover, only the absence of a “sanitary cordon” can make these pan-Eurasian relations normal, turn the space from Dublin to Vladivostok into a zone of Eurasian cooperation, cooperation and strategic partnership.

5.3 Baltic Federation

Let us consider in more detail the entire western belt adjacent to Russia. All space is divided into several sectors. To the north lies the Scandinavian belt extending from Norway to Finland. With regard to Finland, we examined the general geopolitical project in the chapter on the North. Here we are talking about creating a Karelian-Finnish ethno-territorial entity with maximum cultural autonomy, but strategic integration into the Eurasian bloc. Norway and Sweden, as well as the Baltic republics, belong to a different geopolitical context, broader than the Karelian-Finnish problems.

Here we are faced with a more general topic of geopolitics of the Baltic and Scandinavia. In this case, it would be most convenient to follow the Swedish geopolitician Rudolf Chellen (who invented the term “geopolitics”) and consider the entire Baltic region as a northern extension of Central Europe, structured around Germany. Chellen believed that Scandinavian geopolitics could have no other development than a strategic union with Germany, based on ethnic, cultural and geographical community. But the connecting element of the whole construction should be Prussia, the German state with the dominance of the Protestant denomination common to the Scandinavians. The Protestant-Scandinavian bloc should be the northern extension of Prussia, Berlin. Therefore, all this space, having begun to realize itself as a whole, cannot do without the geopolitical restoration of Prussian unity. At the moment, Prussia does not exist, its lands are distributed between Germany, Poland and Russia. Consequently, the most important prerequisite for creating a “neutral” politically and friendly Moscow Baltic Federation is absent. Hence the practical impossibility of organizing this region in accordance with Eurasian principles.

At a purely theoretical level, the problem is solved in two stages:

1. A new ethno-confessional space is being recreated within the framework of

historical Prussia. The initiators are Moscow and Berlin. This implies the loyalty of the axial figure referred to in relation to Russia, which will give life to this education, losing some of the Prussian lands acquired during the Second World War (Kaliningrad Region).

2. Around Prussia, the process of strategic unification of the Baltic states into a single bloc begins. The block includes Norway, Sweden, Germany, Estonia, Finland-Karelia, Denmark, possibly Holland. Special status is delegated to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. A prerequisite is the withdrawal of all countries from NATO and the creation of a demilitarized zone in the Baltic. In the future, strategic control passes to Moscow and the armed forces of "neutral" Europe, i.e. to the Eurasian defense complex.

The only weak elements in this system are Poland and Lithuania, where Catholicism is the predominant denomination. These lands were the main lever of thalassocratic geopolitics directed against Eurasia and the possibility of creating a continental bloc. Moreover, there is a precedent in history for the significant political independence of the Polish-Lithuanian principality, and some historians (in particular, Spengler) even spoke of the existence of a special "Baltic civilization" that geographically coincides, in general terms, with the historical borders of Poland and Lithuania. Only certain historical conditions did not allow this civilization to develop completely and made it "abortive" (Spengler's term). Admittedly, this problem does not have a positive solution at all, as it is formulated as follows: either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle to pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with an axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocks, and it will be divided and crushed in the bud. Any Catholic-based integration in this region will create tension both in relation to the East (Moscow), and in relation to the North (Protestant world of Scandinavia), and in relation to the West (Germany). Consequently, in Poland and Lithuania, the main geopolitical partner of Eurasia should be forces insisting on the non-Catholic orientation of the policies of these countries, supporters of secular "social democracy", "neopagans", "ethnocentre", Protestant, Orthodox religious circles, and ethnic minorities. In addition, ethnic tensions in Polish-Lithuanian relations are an extremely valuable element that should be used and, if possible, exacerbated.

If the reconstruction of Prussia would solve, for the most part, the problems with Poland, which in such a situation would only have a way to the south (since the Baltic region would be under German-Russian control), then with Lithuania the situation is even more complicated since it is the southernmost fragment of the

situation is even more complicated, since it is the northernmost fragment of the Catholic world, has a long coastline in the Baltic and separates the Russian space from the northern end of Central Europe, not belonging to either one or the other world. Obviously, Atlantist geopolitics will not fail to take advantage of this circumstance and try to make Lithuania the cause of discord and the main obstacle to the reorganization of Europe. It is only partially possible to limit the negative consequences of Lithuania's geopolitical location for the Eurasian project, strengthening the strategic unity of this entire area and trying to close it from the north-west through the Swedish-Danish link.

5.4 Slavic Catholics enter Central Europe

Descending south, we find ourselves in the Slavic-Catholic or Uniate region, which extends from Poland through Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Volyn, Galicia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Croatia and Slovenia in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. Hungary, Austria and Bavaria adjoin this space geopolitically, populated, respectively, by Catholics Hungarians and Germans. The Uniate Church also exists in Orthodox Romania. This predominantly Slavic space, despite its ethnic and racial kinship with Russia, never identified itself with the East Slavic statehood, and to an even lesser extent with the Eurasian empire of Moscow. Ethnic kinship in this case is not a sufficient basis for geopolitical integration. The ambiguity of this factor historically gave rise to conflicts and wars of Russia and Germany (wider than Europe), and hindered the organic and consistent organization of the geopolitical ensemble of Central Europe.

Culturally Slavic Catholic peoples developed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and ethnic friction with it, which led to disintegration, arose only when Vienna itself lost its idea of its supranational imperial geopolitical mission and became more and more identified with the ethnic "Germanism". The only exception is Bohemia, Moravia and Bosnia, where the Slavs initially realized their spiritual difference from the German-Catholic principle, which was expressed in Hussite wars, reformation fermentations and outbursts of sectarianism (in the case of Bosnian Bogomil Serbs). From a geopolitical point of view, all these peoples belong to Central Europe and should be structured around the Central European Center, which Germany naturally is. A direct impact on these areas of Moscow can never become a priority, since ethnic closeness only emphasizes cultural, historical and spiritual-religious differences

historical and spiritual religious differences.

Based on these considerations, Russia needs to abandon direct control over the countries of Eastern Europe, leaving them to German control. At the same time, Moscow should not only passively wait until this happens by itself, but actively contribute to organic processes in this area in order to become together with Berlin the initiator and implementer of the whole process, thereby acquiring a geopolitical share in solving all delicate problems. In this case, one will have to abandon domination over some regions of Western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, compactly populated by Uniates and Catholics. The same applies to some regions of Belarus. Refusing direct political dominance over certain territories, in return, Moscow should receive the right to strategic presence on the westernmost borders of the entire Central European region. This is the meaning of the entire reorganization of Eastern Europe. Moscow should go on providing the whole Catholic Slavic space with the possibility of integration into Central Europe under the leadership of Berlin, i.e. close this zone on the North-South principle. The only important thing is to remove Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons we have already said that the entire Central European structure should be patronized strictly by two sides (Russia and Germany)), with the complete exclusion of the West, the thalassokratiya, since otherwise this whole belt will get the opposite meaning, turning into a "sanitary cordon" (although it is created just in order to prevent the occurrence of such a "cordon").

5.5 Association of Belarus and Great Russia

On a map that takes into account the confessional structure of Eastern Europe, one can clearly see how, as they move south, the Orthodox population is moving ever more westward, crowding the Catholic. Some Serbian lands reach the Adriatic coast, and in addition, there is a certain percentage of Orthodox among Albanians (the founder of independent Albania was the Orthodox priest Fan Noli).

These territories, which include Belarus, central Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria, have a dual geopolitical nature, geographically they belong to the southern sector of Central Europe, and culturally and religiously to Russia-Eurasia. The spiritual identity of these peoples consisted of opposition to Islam in the south and Catholicism in the west, their national idea is inextricably

linked with Orthodoxy. In such a situation, Moscow can neither fully delegate geopolitical control over the German region, nor declare its direct political influence on these countries. Moreover, in the Russian-Moldavian and Russian-Romanian relations (not to mention Ukraine), not everything is going smoothly. The closest historical contacts are between Russia and Serbia, but it is impossible to build tactics for integrating the entire region on them, since Serbia also traditionally has rather strained relations with its Orthodox neighbors. In addition, we covered the general picture of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Balkans in the chapter on the South. Here we should more specifically consider the territories occupied by Belarus, Ukraine and Romania (with Moldova).

With regard to Belarus, the geopolitical picture is quite clear. With the exception of a small part of the Polonized Belarusians (Catholics and Uniates, as well as Poles), the overwhelming majority of the population clearly belongs to the Russian space and should be considered as a subject of the central Eurasian ethnic group, i.e. as "Russians" in the cultural, religious, ethnic and geopolitical senses. Linguistic specificity, some ethnic and cultural features do not change the overall picture. Therefore, Moscow should integrate with Belarus in the closest way, while not forgetting that the promotion of the cultural and linguistic identity of Belarusians is an important positive moment in the entire system of Eurasian integration. With regard to ethnic groups belonging to a single state, this principle should be observed as strictly as with respect to border peoples or neighbors. The only painful step in Belarus that must be taken to prevent centrifugal and disruptive tendencies is to single out into a special administrative category certain regions compactly populated by Catholics and Uniates, up to providing them with significant autonomy sufficient to enter the Central European space. The desire to keep Belarus at all costs wholly under the direct and strict control of Moscow will lead to the fact that in it and from its western neighbors Russia will have smoldering embers of a potential geopolitical conflict, which in this case (unlike, for example, Lithuania) may be decided in the interests of all interested parties.

Belarus should be considered as part of Russia, and therefore integration with it should be carried out along the West-East axis, which is a priority in all cases of the internal organization of an ethnically homogeneous space. The real western border of Russia should lie much westward, therefore, in a full-fledged geopolitical picture, the Belarusian lands are more likely to belong to the central region than to the western outskirts.

5.6 Geopolitical decomposition of Ukraine

The issue of Ukraine is more complicated, although the model of the geopolitical composition of this state is very similar. Here, however, the geopolitical scale of Ukraine plays an important role, which is represented by a gigantic territorial entity that exceeds the size of many major European powers. The separatism and tendencies of political sovereignty are incomparably more active in Ukraine. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical meaning. It has neither a particular cultural message of universal significance, nor geographical uniqueness, nor ethnic exclusivity. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name "Ukraine", i.e. "Outskirts", "border territories". In the era of Kievan Rus, the territory of present Ukraine was the center of statehood of the Eastern Slavs, for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts ("Ukraine"), and Novgorod was northern. But as Russia turned from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the largest centers radically changed their meaning. Moscow became the capital of the empire, and Kiev turned into a secondary center in which Eurasian and Central European influences converged. There was no question of any synthesis of cultures. Most likely, the more archaic, purely Russian Orthodox strata were subjected to the dynamic more "modernist" influence of Western Europe, especially through Poland in the west and Austria-Hungary in the southwest. Of course, Ukrainian culture and language are peculiar and unique, but they are deprived of any universal significance. Cossack settlements, which formed, to a large extent, the Ukrainian ethnic group, were distinguished by independence, a special ethical, economic and social structure. But all these elements are not enough for geopolitical independence, and the popamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc.) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

For this reason, the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its modern borders) can only make sense as a "sanitary cordon," since elements opposite in geopolitical orientation will not allow this country to fully join either the eastern or western bloc, that is, neither to Russia-Eurasia, nor to Central Europe. All this dooms Ukraine to a puppet existence and geopolitical service of the thalassocratic strategy in Europe. In this sense, the role of Ukraine is similar to the role of the Baltic republics. On this basis, at one time, the project of creating the "Black Sea-Baltic Federation" was seriously discussed, i.e. a typical "sanitary cordon" of subversive geopolitical formation which serves to provoke

unitary system of sovereign geopolitical formation, which serves to prevent instability in Eastern Europe and to prepare the prerequisites for a series of armed conflicts. The existence of Ukraine within its current borders and with the current status of a "sovereign state" is identical to delivering a monstrous blow to Russia's geopolitical security, which is tantamount to invading its territory.

The continued existence of unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several zones corresponding to the gamut of geopolitical and ethnocultural realities.

1. Eastern Ukraine (everything that lies east of the Dnieper from Chernigov to the Sea of Azov) is a compactly populated territory with a predominance of the Great Russian ethnic group and the Orthodox Little Russian population. This whole territory is certainly close to Russia, culturally, historically, ethnically, religiously connected with it. This well-developed, technically developed region may well constitute an independent geopolitical region, with broad autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Here, meridional integration is preferable, the connection of the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) proper Russian territories and the spread of the structure to the south.
2. Crimea is a special geopolitical entity traditionally distinguished by ethnic mosaicism. Little Russians, Great Russians, and Crimean Tatars are resettled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and are three geopolitical impulses that are quite hostile to each other. The Great Russians are emphasized pro-Moscow (more aggressively than in the rest of Ukraine, even Eastern). Little Russians, by contrast, are extremely nationalistic. Crimean Tatars are generally oriented more towards Turkey and are quite hostile to Russia. There can be no talk of taking into account the geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars, since Turkey is in all respects a direct geopolitical opponent of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be ignored either. The direct accession of Crimea to Russia will provoke an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and create problems of integration of this peninsula into the Russian system through Ukrainian territories, which is not very realistic at all. It is also impossible to leave Crimea to "sovereign Ukraine", since this poses a direct threat to the geopolitical security of Russia and creates ethnic tension in Crimea itself. Given all these considerations, the conclusion suggests itself that it is necessary to give Crimea a special status and ensure maximum autonomy with direct strategic control of Moscow, but taking

into account the socio-economic interests of Ukraine and the ethnocultural requirements of the Crimean Tatars.

3. The central part of Ukraine from Chernigov to Odessa, where Kiev also falls, is another completed region, where the Little Russian ethnos and language are ethnically dominant, but Orthodoxy is the predominant denomination. This Orthodox Little Russia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and certainly included in the Eurasian geopolitical system.
4. Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the North is Volyn, a separate region, south of the Lviv region (Galicia), further south of Transcarpathia (western ledge), and finally, the eastern part of Besarabia. All these regions are quite independent areas. In Volhynia, Uniates and Catholics predominate; this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. Almost the same picture in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southern lands represent a separate geopolitical reality. Volyn is historically connected with Poland, and Galicia and Transcarpathia with the Austro-Hungarian empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are populated by a mixed population, where Little Russians and Great Russians alternate with Romanians and Moldavians. This region is almost entirely Orthodox and is an Orthodox belt, obliquely extending from Great Russia to the Balkans to Serbia. The entire sector from Besarabia to Odessa should be referred to the Central Ukrainian geopolitical to the space, so it is logical to include in the left bank of the Dnieper meridional belt, western boundary which extends from Rivne to Ivano-Frankivsk on the north-south axis and then along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.

Thus, Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of this concept, consists of three regions of Volyn and Galicia and Transcarpathia. Being geographically close, they differ in relief (Transcarpathia is a mountain range, like Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These areas, which are now actively influence the general political atmosphere in Ukraine, is actively pursuing anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be given considerable hydrochloric degree of autonomy (up to the policy) in order to separate these "subversive" territory of the orthodox and generally pro-Russian all-Ukrainian space as a central so eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the place of passage of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border. This strategic border should lie much to the west, at least at the western tip of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the entire geopolitical restructuring of

this region is undertaken, since, acting as the initiator of geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition of removing this entire area from under the Atlantist control and the creation on this site of a complex of Eurasian continental defense, consisting of strategic military cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole.

Volyn, Galicia and Transcarpathia can constitute a common “Western Ukrainian Federation”, the degree of integration within which can be set arbitrarily depending on specific circumstances. The most important thing here is to draw the cultural and confessional border between Central Ukraine (actually Kiev land) and Western Ukraine in order to avoid the disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on the Orthodox territories.

The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable spot in the western zone of Russia. If in other places the danger of the destruction of heartland’s geopolitical viability is potential, and the positional struggle for the Eurasian geopolitical system sets only preventive goals, then the existence of a “sovereign Ukraine” is at a geopolitical level a declaration of a geopolitical war in Russia (and this is not so much Ukraine itself, how much Atlantism and Sea Power). The point is not that Ukraine itself consciously chooses the role of the atlantist “sanitary cordon”, although in some cases this cannot but be a deliberate step, but that it begins to play this role in practice, as long as it does not turn on actively into integration processes with Moscow or (at least) it does not break up into separate geopolitical components.

The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow. If the problems of the North and the "polar trapezoid" are connected with the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are important for the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy for reorganizing the Asian South is relevant for Russia, the geopolitics of the West and the center of this geopolitics, the “Ukrainian question”, requires Moscow to respond immediately, since we are talking about delivering Russia in the present strategic strike, which the “geographical axis of history” simply does not have a response to rights.

Given that the simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not give a stable geopolitical system, even if this happens despite all objective obstacles, Moscow should be actively involved in the reconstruction of the Ukrainian space according to a unique logical and natural geopolitical model.

5.7 Romania and Moldova integration under what sign?

Romania and Moldova are two parts of a single geopolitical region, inhabited by a single Orthodox ethnic group, descendants of the Dacians, who speak the language of the Latin group and largely absorbed the cultural, linguistic and racial elements of the Slavic environment. From a geopolitical point of view, the integration of Romania and Moldova is inevitable, but Moscow should strive to carry out this association for its own purposes in order to include this space in the zone of its direct strategic control. The culture of Romania is generally a typical Orthodox model that directly connects these lands with Eurasia. The only obstacle to the perfect integration of these lands into Russia is the language factor and geopolitical proximity to the Catholic regions. In addition, in western Romania, Banat has a significant percentage of Catholic Hungarians and Romanian Uniates.

Through Romania, Moldova and Central Ukraine runs a continuous strip inhabited by Orthodox peoples, connecting the lands of Russia with Serbia, the outpost of Eurasia in the Balkans. It is in the interests of Eurasia to turn this entire region into a single strategic and cultural region into virtually one country. This requires Moscow to be the initiator of the Moldovan-Romanian integration, the sign of which should be initially defined as Orthodox and Eurasian. At the same time, it is important that the Slavic Orthodox peoples of Ukraine and Serbs close the Romanian Orthodox enclave from the east and from the west, thus ensuring the continuity of territorial integration based not only on ethnic, but on religious grounds and cultural kinship. At the same time, such an "Orthodox bloc" from the Dniester to Montenegro, in the center of which should be a united Romania, should develop in cooperation with Berlin, which is provided with the more western part of Central Europe from Prussia through the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Hungary, and Austria, and then to Croatia, i.e. to the Adriatic. If we add to this the eastern ledge of Poland and East Prussia, which Germany takes north, the natural extension of Russia to the west in the Balkan region will be logical and acceptable, not violating the geopolitical balance of Central Europe, which geopolitically belongs to the sphere of influence of Germany.

5.8 Condition: soil, not blood

All these actions follow from the general picture of European geopolitics, in which the regions of Central Europe (under the auspices of Germany) and Western Europe in the narrow sense are clearly distinguished. Russia has no points of direct contact with Western Europe, therefore, the implementation of the Eurasian strategy in this region (of which France is a key element) depends on building a pan-European structure along the axis of Berlin Paris. But the Eurasian factor in Western Europe cannot be directly the line of Moscow. Moscow speaks here only through Berlin, and Eurasian continentalist and anti-Atlanticist tendencies are described here by the single term "Germanophilia". For the French, one cannot demand a more distinct "Eurasianism" than "Germanophilia", since Western Europe comprehends heartland's problems through German continentalism. Russia, in this case, is a "geopolitical abstraction."

However, this does not mean at all that Russia should be indifferent to Western European problems. It is in her interests to bring all of Europe out of the Atlantic influence, which means that Moscow should actively contribute to the alignment of Western Europe with Central Europe, i.e. to Germany.

At the same time, Germany itself should initially put forward a fundamental requirement: all integration processes in Central Europe, where the geopolitical dominance of Berlin is frank, as well as all transformations in Western Europe that aim to orient European powers to Germany, should exclude the principle of ethnic domination of Germans in cultural political, confessional or ideological field. Europe should be European, and Central Europe Central European, i.e. the whole linguistic, ethnic and spiritual identity of the peoples of Europe should flourish and be encouraged by Berlin, whose priority should be exclusively geopolitical and social, and in no way racial. For many Central European ethnic groups, Moscow is also responsible due to racial kinship with them (Slavs). Moreover, it was ethnocentrism and the national, racial arrogance of the Germans more than once that led to bloody conflicts in Europe. Throughout the geopolitical reorganization of Europe, Russia must act as a guarantor that Berlin will strictly separate geopolitics and race, "soil and blood", in order to deliberately exclude tragedies like Hitler's adventure. Any signs of German nationalism regarding the geopolitical reconstruction of Europe should be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes should be conducted on the basis of the strictest observance of the "rights of peoples", the full autonomy of cultures, religions and languages

cultures, religions and languages.

Moscow must make the same demands on itself and on its allies. The ethnic principle should be encouraged and actively supported by the geopolitical center only in a positive aspect, as an affirmative reality, as a national self-identification. Of course, one cannot expect a complete disappearance of interethnic friction and the manifestation of the negative aspects of national self-affirmation, but just at this moment the principle of geopolitical centralism should be actively taking effect as the supra-ethnic arbiter, solving internal problems based on the vital political and strategic interests of the Eurasian whole.

This principle is universal for all regions in which the New Eurasian Order should be established, both internal for Russia and external. But in the case of the West, Europe, this is especially important, since ethnic problems in these spaces underlie all the most terrible conflicts that shook the 20th century.

PART 6 - EURASIAN ANALYSIS

Chapter 1 - Geopolitics of Orthodoxy

1.1 East and West Christian eikumena

The most significant point in determining the geopolitical specifics of Orthodoxy is that we are talking about the Eastern Church. Within the boundaries of the Christian world, before the discovery of America, which geographically coincided with the northwest of the Eurasian continent, the Middle East and North Africa, a demarcation line is clearly traced between the Orthodox space and the Catholic space. This division, of course, is not a historical accident. The Orthodox world is spiritually and qualitatively related to the East, while Catholicism is a purely Western phenomenon. And if this is so, then the theological formulations themselves, which lay at the basis of the final separation of the churches in 1054, should contain elements of a geopolitical nature.

The dispute about the filioque, i.e. about the descent of the Holy Spirit only from the Father or from the Father and the Son (1), in theological terms, anticipates the further development of two types of Christian and post-Christian civilizations of the rationalistic-individualistic western and mystical-collectivist eastern. The adoption by the West of an amendment to the Nicene Creed regarding the “filioque” finally consolidated the orientation towards the rationalistic theology of the so-called "subordinateism", i.e. on the introduction into the Divine reality of hierarchically subordinate relations that belittle the mysterious and superintelligent nature of the Trinity.

In parallel with the question of the filioque, an important point of disagreement was the idea of the supremacy of the throne of Rome and the highest theological authority of the Pope. It was also one of the consequences of Catholic "subordinateism", which insisted on a strict, straightforward hierarchy even in those matters that are under the sign of the providential action of the Holy Spirit to save the world. Such a position completely contradicted the idea of linguistic autonomy of the local Churches and, in general, the ultimate freedom in the field of spiritual realization, traditional for Orthodoxy.

And finally, the last and most important aspect of the separation of churches into

And finally, the last and most important aspect of the separation of churches into Eastern and Western was the rejection by Rome of the patristic teachings about the Empire, which is not just a secular administrative apparatus, roughly subordinate to the church authorities, as the Pope wanted to imagine, but a mysterious soteriological organism actively involved in the eschatological drama as “an obstacle to the coming of the Antichrist,” “catechon,” “holding,” as indicated in the Second Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians.

The superintelligence of divine action (the primacy of apophatic mystical theology), the spiritual and linguistic freedom of the local churches (going back to the glossolalia of the apostles on Pentecost) and the doctrine of the sacred role of the Empire and emperors (the theory of the Orthodox symphony) are the main points that determine the specifics of Orthodoxy in contrast to Catholicism, actually denying these aspects of Christianity.

All these differences were noticeable long before the final break, but it was possible to maintain a certain balance until 1054. From that moment, the geopolitical dualism of Christian ecumenism was fully determined, and both the Orthodox and Catholic worlds went their own ways.

Until 1453 (the date the Turks took Constantinople), the Orthodox Church geopolitically identified itself with the fate of the Byzantine Empire. The world of Catholicism swept Western Europe. Until that time, Rome and Constantinople were two Christian “large spaces” (in geopolitical terminology) with their geopolitical, political, economic and cultural interests, as well as with a clearly fixed and unambiguous theological specificity, reflecting and predetermining the difference between churches and all intellectual dogmatic uniqueness and logical relationship. The West was based on the rationalistic theology of Thomas Aquinas, the East continued the line of mystical theology, apophaticism and monastic clever work, most strikingly embodied in the texts of the great Athos hesychast St. Gregory Palamas.

The Palamas against Thomas Aquinas is a theological formula that reflects the essence of the geopolitical dualism of the Christian East and Christian West. The mystical contemplation of the Tabor light, the symphony of authorities and the liturgical glossolalia of the local churches (Orthodoxy) are against rationalist theology, papal dictatorship in the worldly affairs of European kings and the dominance of Latin as the only sacred liturgical language (Catholicism). There is a geopolitical confrontation between two worlds that have a multidirectional cultural orientation, psychological dominance, and a different, specific political

structure.

Such is the most general outline of the foundations of Orthodox geopolitics. Obviously, in such a situation, the main task of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church was to maintain its structure, protect the limits of its political and spiritual influence, and defend its independence. Moreover, Orthodoxy in this situation had two main geopolitical opponents:

1. the non-Christian world, whose pressure was manifested both in the raids of the barbarians on the outskirts of the empire, and in the massive pressure of the Islamized Turks;
2. the Christian world of the West, regarded not only as the land of the "Latin heresy", but also as a world of apostasy, apostasy, as a country of people who knew the truth and salvation, but abandoned them, betrayed them.

In such an initial and complete picture of the geopolitical place of Orthodoxy, it is very easy to discern all those geopolitical problems that the Eastern Church and Orthodox states will worry for many centuries after the collapse of Byzantium. The Byzantine emperors at some point faced the double threat of a "Turkish turban or Latin miter." Given the peculiarity of the theological attitude towards the West and Rome, it is easy to understand those Orthodox who made the choice in favor of the "Turkish turban" in those cases when a third was not given. By the way, many Orthodox perceived the fall of the Constantinian field as God's punishment for the geopolitical step of Byzantium, which tried to draw closer to Rome through the adoption of the "filioque" in the so-called "Florence Union" (although upon the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople, this confession was denounced).

1.2 Post-Byzantine Orthodoxy

After the fall of Constantinople, the whole geopolitical picture changed dramatically. Despite the fact that the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the head of the Orthodox Church, the harmony of the whole structure was disrupted. Recall that one of the cornerstones of Orthodoxy was the doctrine of the soteriological function of the Empire, and since the Orthodox Empire (and, accordingly, the Orthodox Emperor, Vasilevs) no longer existed, the Church was forced to enter a new, special and rather paradoxical period its existence. From this moment on the entire Orthodox world is divided into two parts which have

At this moment on, the entire Orthodox world is divided into two parts, which have profound differences not only from a geopolitical, but also from a theological point of view.

The first sector of the post-Byzantine Orthodox world is represented by those Churches that find themselves in the zone of political control of non-Orthodox states, especially in the Ottoman Empire. These churches administratively entered until the collapse of this empire in the so-called Orthodox "millet", which included Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians and Arabs. The Patriarch of Constantinople was considered the supreme figure among these Orthodox, although along with him there were the Patriarch of Alexandria (the archpastor of Orthodox Greeks and Arabs living in Egypt) and the Patriarch of Antioch (the head of the Orthodox Arabs in the territory of modern Syria, Iraq Lebanon). The small Jerusalem Patriarchate, as well as the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Mount Sinai, had special status. The Patriarchate of Constantinople was considered to be spiritually dominant in the entire Orthodox world, although there is no such direct hierarchy as in Catholicism, and the autocephalous churches had a significant share of independence (2). The Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in the Phanar quarter, and from this word comes the collective name of the Greek clergy, subordinate to this Patriarchate "fanariots". Note that since 1453 this sector of the Orthodox world has been in an ambiguous position both at the geopolitical and theological levels, since the absence of Orthodox statehood directly affects the eschatological vision of Orthodox political history and means the Church's presence in the world as in a "sea of apostasy", where nothing is stopping the mystical coming of the "son of perdition". The inevitable rejection of the Orthodox symphony by the authorities turns the Greek Orthodox Church (and other political destinies, churches associated with it) into something other than what it was originally. This means that its theological and geopolitical orientations are changing. Its sacred nature is also changing.

A clear understanding of the relationship between theology and politics in a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine forced Russia to take the path that it has been following since the 15th century, and which is closely connected with the theory of "Moscow of the Third Rome." Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church are the second sector of post-Byzantine Eastern Christianity, which has a completely different geopolitical and even spiritual nature.

The establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia and the proclamation of Moscow as "Third Rome" is directly related to the mystical fate of Orthodoxy as such.

After the fall of Constantinople, Russia remains the only geopolitical "large space" where Orthodox politics and the Orthodox Church existed. Russia becomes the successor of Byzantium both for theological reasons and at the geopolitical level. Only here all three basic parameters were preserved that made Orthodoxy what it was, in contrast to the Latin West and the political dominance of non-Christian regimes. Consequently, together with the mystical status of "a barrier to the arrival of the son of perdition," Moscow inherited the full geopolitical problems of Constantinople. Like Byzantium, Russia was faced with two hostile geopolitical realities with the same "Latin Miter" and the same "Turkish Turban". But in this case, the fullness of historical responsibility fell on the Russian tsars, the Russian church and the Russian people. The fact that this responsibility was transferred to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople endowed the whole situation with special eschatological drama, reflecting not only on the psychology of Russians in the last five centuries, but also on the specific geopolitical orientation of the Russian state and the Russian Church. In parallel with this, the concept of the Russian people as a "people-bearer" was formed.

But at the same time, a new problem appeared: relations with the Orthodox world beyond the borders of Russia and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople as applied to the Patriarch of Moscow. The fact is that non-Russian Orthodox faced a dilemma: either recognize Russia as the "ark of salvation", the new "Holy Land", "catechon" and, accordingly, submit to the spiritual authority of Moscow, or, on the contrary, deny the possibility of the existence of an "Orthodox kingdom" as such and treat Moscow as an illegitimate usurpation of the Byzantine eschatological function. Accordingly, this choice was to build its relations with the rest of the churches and Moscow. We can say that, in fact, from that moment on, the Orthodox world was divided into two parts, which differ both geopolitically and theologically. It is known that the anti-Moscow line won in the Constantinople sphere of influence, which means that the clergy of the Phanariots adapted the Orthodox doctrine to those conditions when there was no question of political projection. In other words, Greek Orthodoxy changed its nature, turning from an integral spiritual-political doctrine into an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. And henceforth, the rivalry of Constantinople with Moscow was, in fact, a confrontation between the two versions of the full-fledged Orthodoxy, in the case of Moscow, and reduced, in the case of Constantinople.

Moreover, changes in the quality of Greek Orthodoxy brought him, in a sense, closer to the line of Rome, since one of the three main points of dogmatic

closer to the line of Rome, since one of the three main points of dogmatic contradictions (the question of "catechon") fell away by itself. The spiritual rapprochement of the fanariots with the Vatican was accompanied by their political rapprochement with the Turkish administration, in which many Orthodox Greeks traditionally held high posts. Such a split existence, coupled with rivalry with the Russian Church for influence over the Orthodox world, in fact, deprived Greek Orthodoxy of an independent geopolitical mission, making it only one of the secondary geopolitical factors in the more general non-Orthodox context of the political intrigues of the Ottoman authorities and papal legates.

Be that as it may, from the 15th century the term "geopolitics of Orthodoxy" has become almost identical to the term "geopolitics of Russia".

At the same time, it would be wrong to consider the whole non-Russian Orthodox world as controlled by the politics of the fanariots. In its various parts, opposing sentiments also existed, recognizing theological and eschatological primacy of Orthodox Russia. This was especially true for Serbs, Albanians, Romanians, and Bulgarians, whose Russophile and Fanariotic geopolitical tendencies traditionally competed. This manifested itself with full force in the 19th century, when the Orthodox peoples that were part of the Ottoman Empire made desperate attempts to restore their national and political independence.

1.3 Petersburg period

But between the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of the struggle for the independence of the Orthodox Balkan peoples, an event occurred that is of great importance for Orthodoxy in the broadest sense. We are talking about the Russian schism and the reforms immediately following it of Peter the Great. At this moment, a qualitative change in the status of Orthodoxy took place in Russia, and from now on the dogmatic foundations of the Eastern Church, which remained unshakable for about 200 years, were shaken. The fact is that the transfer of the capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg and the abolition of the Patriarchate together with the establishment of the Synod meant that Russia ceased to be a dogmatically legitimate Orthodox Empire in the theological and eschatological sense. In fact, a transition was made from the Orthodox Orthodox geopolitical model to a kind of Protestant state. From now on, Russian Orthodoxy also turned into a kind of ambiguous reality, which only partially

coincided at the geopolitical level with the Russian State. But although the dogmatic background was frankly shaken, the general logic of Russian geopolitics continued its initial line, although at a different level, since secular and purely political interests began to clearly dominate religious and eschatological issues. In parallel, and in the West itself, the traditional Catholic model also gave way to the strengthening of purely national-political formations, state-nations, so that theological issues were erased there and faded into the background in the face of more practical, mercantile and narrowly political interests. However, the geopolitical alignment, predetermined dogmatically in the schism of the churches, remained totally the same, except for the appearance of Protestant countries.

Protestantism is geopolitically divided strictly into two sectors: Prussian Lutheranism and Anglo-Swiss-Goland Calvinism. With the outward similarity and synchronism of both outbursts of protest against Rome, Lutheranism and Calvinism are almost polar opposite. The Lutheran camp, which was concentrated in the Prussian state, was based both dogmatically and mystically on criticizing the Vatican from the point of view of radicalizing the premises of the New Testament, and in general terms it reproduced the traditional claims to Catholicism for Orthodoxy. Lutheran Prussia was geographically located between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Western Europe. Calvinism, which became the state religion of England (and later greatly influenced the political system in the United States), was based, on the contrary, on the emphasized Old Testament approach and criticism of Rome from these positions. It is no coincidence that geographically Calvinism and the sects arising from it gravitated toward the extreme West both in Europe and on the other side of the Atlantic.

The post-Petrine Russia of the Romanovs was closer to the Prussian model, i.e. departing from the Orthodox dogma proper, she stopped halfway to Catholicism, which, moreover, was gradually losing ground to the nation-states. At the same time, the main geopolitical tension was concentrated between Russia, on the one hand, and the Austrian Empire and the British Empire, on the other. At the religious level, this was a confrontation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism (Austria) and Calvinism (England). Absolutist, and then revolutionary France played a special role in all this, trying to spread republican ideas and Enlightenment. At the same time, it is important to note that, while Russia had some common geopolitical interests with Austria (in particular, the confrontation of Turkey), the British strategy was almost completely opposite to the Russian

strategy right up to the support of the Ottoman Empire by the English.

Be that as it may, even post-Petrine Russia inherited the basic features of Byzantine geopolitics, although the dogmatic completeness of the Third Rome concept was violated. From now on, it was possible to speak only about the inertial continuation of what was once a full-fledged and theologically sound way of the "God-bearing people" in history. Parallel to this transformation, material and narrowly political interests began to play an increasingly important role in foreign policy, and religious factors themselves were often used as an excuse for a particular political course, focused solely on the good of the state in its secular aspect.

1.4 National Liberation of Orthodox Peoples

In the 19th century, many Orthodox peoples were Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, etc. began to actively liberate themselves from the political control of the Turks. The religious factor played a significant role in this, turning into one of the main motives of the national liberation struggle.

The emergence of new Orthodox states and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was the result of several geopolitical and ideological factors:

1. The degradation of the political power of the Turks allowed the national feeling of the Greeks and other Balkan peoples to develop, which, in turn, contributed to the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment; in this important role played France, the cradle of "modernist trends."
2. Russia, as a geopolitical adversary of Turkey, actively used the situation to undermine its enemy from the inside; Russian agents in Greece and the Balkans concentrated their efforts on supporting the demands of the Orthodox, which was also accompanied by external geopolitical pressure from Russia.
3. A peculiar religious renaissance of the Orthodox peoples began, and the idea of a struggle for political and national independence was accompanied by messianic forebodings of an eschatological nature.

During this period, political and ideological concepts of Greater Greece (or the Great Idea, Megale idea), Greater Bulgaria, Greater Serbia ("mark"), Greater Romania, etc. were formed.

1.5 Megale Idea

Supporters of Greater Greece sought to completely conquer the Greek territories from the Turks and recreate the "New Byzantium", restore tsarist power and return the Patriarch of Constantinople to his dominant role in the entire Orthodox world. Due to the fierce struggle and national uprising, the Greeks were able to regain in 1830 a small independent state around the Pelopones and Morea, which after the Balkan Wars in 1913 actually doubled its territory. At the same time, the implementation of the Great Idea encountered the geopolitical interests of other Orthodox peoples, since the Greeks demanded the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace, and other territories, which were also claimed by the Bulgarians and Serbs. The culmination of this plan was the liberation of Constantinople (Istanbul) from the Turks. But the whole project ended in disaster after the defeat of Greece in the war with Turkey Atatürk, who defeated the Greeks and forced the Greek population of Anatolia to relocate to Greek lands in a massive way.

It is very important to note that the national liberation struggle of the Greeks was not at all welcomed or inspired by the Phanariotic clergy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, who were politically in solidarity with the Ottoman Empire rather than with Russian geopolitics or the Balkan peoples striving for freedom. Moreover, the collapse of the Turkish empire was a disaster for the spiritual supremacy of the fanariots in the Orthodox world outside of Russia. Therefore, Greek nationalism and the Great Idea, although they had a distinctly Orthodox character, were initially promoted by some special secret organizations of the Masonic type, in which the Russian agents of influence and, at the same time, supporters of the French Enlightenment, played. In other words, the Orthodox idea in Greece during the critical period of its liberation from Turkish domination was the property of some parallel religious structure associated with the Greek diaspora in Russia and other Mediterranean regions. It is also curious that the Greek aristocracy, genetically and politically connected with the Fanariots, after gaining independence, was oriented more towards Austria and Germany, while the Greek bourgeoisie, in the midst of which the Great Idea matured, was a fierce supporter of an alliance with Russia. This again clearly distinguishes some solidarity of official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line.

1.6 "Drawing"

The idea of Greater Serbia, based on the historical precedent of a huge Balkan state created in the XIV century by the Serbian dynasty Nemanic, was revived again during the Serbian liberation struggle. Initially, the rebelled Serbs liberated a small territory, Shumadiyya, from Ottoman rule, and after that they began the struggle to create an independent Slavic state in the Balkans, with the domination of the Serbs and the Orthodox dynasty. Since 1815, the Serbs achieved some independence, which, however, carried with it two different geopolitical orientations, embodied in the two Serbian dynasties of Obrenović and Karageorgievich. Obrenovichi, although they were Orthodox, focused on close Austria, and the activity of some political and intellectual circles from Vojvodina, the territory closest to Austria, played an important role in this matter. Karageorgievichi, on the contrary, gravitated exclusively to Russia. In 1903, not without the participation of Russian special services, the Obrenovic dynasty was overthrown, and Serbia turned to the pro-Russian line. By 1920, Yugoslavia was created under Karageorgi Vichy, a huge Balkan state, uniting under the Serbian rule many Balkan peoples, including Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Macedonians, Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians. In addition, in the north of Yugoslavia, Hungarian Catholics fell under Serbian control. However, this geopolitical construction turned out to be unstable, since the non-Orthodox peoples of Yugoslavia (not without the help of Austrian and Turkish agents of influence) began to resist the ethnic domination of the Serbs and the religious primacy of Orthodoxy. This confrontation reached particular intensity during World War II, when the pro-German Croatia and Bosnia actually carried out the genocide of the Orthodox Serbs.

1.7 Greater Romania

The project of Greater Romania also appeared in the Orthodox environment, and it was not only about the complete liberation from Turkish control (although Moldova and Wallachia were never officially part of the Ottoman Empire), but also about opposing the politics of the fanariots, who sought to subordinate the Romanian clergy to their influence. In this current, anti-Turkish and anti-fanatical sentiments were supported by Russia, which was facilitated by the

belonging to the Russian territories of Bessarabia, populated by Romanians. At the same time, in Romania, from the 18th century, the Uniate trends intensified. Unity is the idea of subordinating the Orthodox Church to the Vatican while maintaining Orthodox rituals, but, in fact, the Vatican wins geopolitically exclusively, and Orthodoxy clearly loses. It is no accident, therefore, that Uniatism was considered by the Orthodox as a tactical move of Catholicism, seeking to expand its missionary, political and spiritual influence in the East at the expense of the Orthodox peoples. And in Romania itself, the Uniate, especially prevalent in Transylvania, was initially accompanied by cultural tendencies of Latinization, the glorification of the Romanesque essence of Romania, the Latin roots of the language, etc. Uniatism in Romania was based on Catholic Austria, and Orthodoxy was naturally supported by Russia. It is indicative that the Greek Orthodox, fanariots, carried out in Romania, in fact, a pro-Turkish policy, contrary to both Austro-Catholic and Russian-right glorious geopolitical interests. The idea of Greater Romania had an unambiguously Orthodox subtext, and under this banner the Romanians fought for national independence. At the same time, it is important that Romanian nationalism is openly anti-Greek in nature, and in the confessional sphere, Uniatism, coupled with an orientation toward Latin culture, gravitates toward Rome and Western Europe, while Romanian Orthodoxy follows the pro-Moscow line. It is interesting that after the Sovietization of Romania in 1948, the formally atheistic communist regime took unequivocally the position of Romanian Orthodoxy, subjugating the Uniate faiths and subjecting Catholic minorities to certain repressions.

1.8 Greater Bulgaria

The beginning of the movement of the Orthodox and at the same time national revival of the Bulgarians can be dated to 1870, when, under pressure and with the support of Russia, the Bulgarian exarchate was created, which aimed to unite the Orthodox living in the Balkans into a geopolitical block politically hostile to the Ottoman Empire and spiritually opposing the Patriarchate of Constantinople and dominance of fanariots.

In parallel with gaining geopolitical independence, Bulgaria developed the nationalistic project “Bulgaria of the Three Seas,” which implied the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace, and Constantinople. Being traditionally Russophile, Bulgarian Orthodoxy at some points in history deviated from this line in order to

Bulgarian Orthodoxy at some points in history deviated from this line in order to achieve narrowly national goals, and just like the Uniates of Romania, the Obrenovic dynasty in Serbia, the Greek aristocracy and some other Eastern European forces, sided with Central Europe, speaking as an ally of Austria-Hungary against Russia.

Interestingly, as new Orthodox states emerged in the Balkans, their geopolitical orientation constantly fluctuated between Russia and Austria, i.e. between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Moreover, some disputed territories, and first of all Macedonia, were a formal reason for such sustainable dualism. Because of Macedonia, tensions between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia constantly arose, and Russia's support for one side or another in this conflict automatically threw the opposite side into the arms of Austria.

1.9 Orthodox Albania

According to the resettlement of the Albanians, there passed the traditional border between the Byzantine and Catholic world. There are 4 faiths in this nation: Sunni Albanians (ousted Albanians), Bektashi Albanians (members of a Sufi organization, which, as in some exceptional cases, has a clan, and not just an initiative character), Catholic Albanians, and Orthodox Albanians. Despite the fact that Orthodox Albanians are a minority, it was this group that stood at the center of the national liberation struggle, and the independent state of Albania arose thanks to the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli, who became the first Albanian ruler in 1918. Fan Noli was an unambiguous supporter of Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy actively supported him in all endeavors. Orthodox Albanians united under their control the whole nation, regardless of faith, but their main opponents and rivals were not so much Catholics as the Greek Orthodox clergy, traditionally rooted in Albania! And again, using the example of Albania, we are faced with geopolitical dualism in the post-Byzantine Orthodox world, where the geopolitical interests of the Greek and Russian Churches are opposed.

Fan Noli retained his pro-Russian orientation after the October Revolution, for which he was overthrown by Ahmed Zog, the future king of Albania. During the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy, the Albanian Orthodox were persecuted by the pro-Catholic authorities, but after "Sovietization" again the Orthodox Church received state support now from the communist authorities. Only in 1967 during the "cultural revolution" and the Maoist deviation did Soviet Albania

declare itself “the first exclusively atheistic state in the world” and began direct persecution of believers of any faiths.

1.10 Geopolitical lobbies in Orthodox countries

A general overview of the geopolitical trends of the Balkan Orthodox countries reveals the most important regularity: in each such state there are at least two geopolitical lobbies, the nature of which is associated with some religious features.

Firstly, there is a pro-Russian lobby everywhere that focuses on the geopolitics of the Russian Orthodox Church, which, in turn, inherits (albeit with reservations) the line “Moscow the Third Rome”. This lobby is oriented against Rome and any rapprochement with it (and therefore, against Austria, Hungary and Catholic Germany, that is, against the Catholic sector of Central Europe), but at the same time, it is in anti-Turkish and anti-“fanariotic” positions, opposing itself to one degree or another, the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In some cases (as, for example, in Greece itself), this lobby includes not only Orthodox circles, but also some secret Masonic-type societies.

Secondly, in the same countries there is an opposite lobby, which, whether or not Orthodox, sympathetically refers to rapprochement with Rome, to orientation towards Central Europe, Austria, to the extent of Uniatism or even Catholicism.

Thirdly, everywhere there are traces of Turkish influence, which was supported by England in this region, which means that Anglo-Saxon geopolitics in this case has a southern orientation and is based on fanariotic tendencies in modern Orthodoxy in the Balkan countries, traditionally associated with the Ottoman administration.

The collapse of Yugoslavia gives us an example of the geopolitical alignment in the Balkans. The Russophile line is embodied in the position of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia and Slovenia are oriented towards Central Europe, and the Anglo-Saxons (USA and England) actively support Bosnian Muslims, the heirs of the Turks. At the same time, the question again arises of Macedonia, about which disputes arise again between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Albanian problem, in particular in Kosovo, is making itself felt with renewed vigor. The Transnistrian tragedy and anti-Russian sentiments in present-day

vigor. The Transnistrian legacy and anti-Russian sentiments in present-day Romania and Moldova again make us pay special attention to the Uniate and pro-Catholic lobby, which can only be the bearer of anti-Moscow sentiments and Latin trends in these areas.

1.11 Russian Orthodox Church and Councils

The relationship between Orthodoxy and the Soviet regime is an extremely difficult question. On the one hand, there is a point of view that the Soviet period, in spite of everything, inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a geopolitical line that strictly coincided in the most important aspects with the geopolitics of the Russian Church. We can conditionally define this as “Sergianism” by the name of Patriarch of Moscow Sergius, who formulated the famous thesis, which became the starting point of intramural disputes that have not abated even today: “Your successes are our successes” (referring to the atheistic anti-Christian regime of I. Stalin). This “Sergian” formula is far from as paradoxical and monstrous as the Orthodox conservatives want to imagine. The fact is that the Bolshevik Revolution entailed such changes in the church life of Russia that are striking in their symbolism. The Patriarchate was restored at the same time, the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of “Moscow the Third Rome”), the miraculous acquisition of the icon of “Sovereign” in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of Russian tsars, marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of tsarist power restored in its supernatural dimension after a bicentenary of the St. Petersburg period. Along with this, the Bolsheviks inherited all of Russian geopolitics, strengthened the state and expanded its borders. At the same time, there was a spiritual renewal of the Church, through persecution and suffering, which restored the forgotten fiery religious feeling, the practice of confession, the feat of martyrdom for Christ.

The second point of view considers Soviet Russia as the complete antithesis of Orthodox Russia, and considers “Sergianism” conformism with antichrist and apostasy. This approach excludes the possibility of considering the Soviet period as a continuation of the geopolitics of Orthodoxy. The bearer of such an ideology in its most distinct form is the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and the sectarian True Orthodox Church, whose positions stem from the eschatological identification of Bolshevism with the advent of antichrist. It is curious that this approach refuses Orthodoxy in the political dimension and

typologically coincides with the position of “fanariots” who deny the need for the Orthodox Church to be related to politics, which is the basis of a full-fledged Orthodox doctrine. At the same time, this approach is combined with sympathies for the “white” movement, which was geopolitically based on the support of the Entente, West European and, especially, Anglo-Saxon countries. And it is no accident that the center of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is located in the USA. Geopolitically, such "Orthodox" anti-Sovietism and "anti-Sergianism" coincide with the traditional for the West atlantist line directed against Russia (Soviet, tsarist, patriarchal, modernist, democratic, etc.) regardless of its ideological system.

1.12 Summary

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the geopolitics of Orthodoxy was deprived of the unambiguous theological and eschatological function that it had in the era of the "millennial kingdom" from the 5th to the 15th centuries. Two hundred years of “Moscow of the Third Rome” adjoin this “holy” period, which for the Orthodox consciousness is not identical with the period of a full Tradition. After the split and Peter’s reforms, a more ambiguous period begins, throughout which Russia nevertheless follows, in the most general terms, the previous geopolitical line, while losing its doctrinal rigor. The entire post-Byzantine period is characterized by dualism within the framework of Orthodoxy itself, where Russian Orthodoxy, directly related to the geopolitics of the Russian State, opposes the Greek-Phanariotic line of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which embodies the type of Orthodoxy, strictly separated from political realization and performing instrumental functions in the overall structure of the Ottoman system.

Russia itself is adopting the Byzantine tradition of confrontation with the “Latin Miter and the Turkish Turban” and is forced to defend the interests of Orthodoxy alone at the geopolitical and state levels. This line forces Russia to participate in Balkan politics, where it is confronted with a number of geopolitically hostile tendencies, including constant “fanariotic” anti-Russian influence.

And finally, in the Soviet period, geopolitics, paradoxically as it may, continues the general planetary strategy of Russian Statehood, expanding the sphere of influence of Russia at the expense of countries and peoples traditionally hostile

to the Orthodoxy. Of course, there can be no talk of the dogmatic continuity of the Soviets in relation to the Russian Orthodox Church, but one should not forget that dogmatic evidence was hopelessly lost already under Peter, and shaken during the split. And if one takes the point of view of "sergianism," one can consider the geopolitical successes of the Soviet superpower, which conquered half the world, traditionally hostile to Russian Orthodox Christians and our state, as the successes of the Russian Church and Orthodox geopolitics. This last thesis is, without a doubt, very controversial, but equally controversial, strictly speaking, is the identification of Romanov post-Petrine Russia with a truly Orthodox state. Although in the first and in the second case there is a clear geopolitical continuity.

In our time, when there is no tsarist or Soviet Russia, but there is a country dying and crippled, plundered and sold to the West, our eternal enemy, we are able to comprehend the whole geopolitical history of Orthodoxy impartially and objectively and to reveal its constants, which should be drawn on the tablets of the new statehood of power, wishing to be called "Russian."

Chapter 2 - State and Territory

2.1 Three critical geopolitical categories

Most disputes regarding the new geopolitical picture of the world are centered around three fundamental categories:

1. "nation-state" ("Etat-Nation"), i.e. traditional historically developed centralist state (such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.);
2. region, i.e. such an administrative, ethnic or cultural space that is part of one or more nation-states (Etat-Nation), but at the same time has a significant degree of cultural and economic autonomy (for example, Brittany in France, Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque country in Spain, etc.);
3. A large Space, "commonwealth" or "community" that unites several nation-states ("Etat-Nation") into a single economic or political bloc.

Many "Europeans", both left and right, believe that the category of "nation-states" (Etat-Nation), i.e. the traditional centralist state has generally outlived itself, and that emphasis should be placed precisely on two other modalities on regionalism and even autonomism, on the one hand, and on the continental unification of regions into a single bloc, on the other hand. It is significant that the points of view of the polar political spectra converge here: the "new left" consider the Etat-Nation too "right", too "totalitarian" and "repressive", too "conservative" education, which should be abandoned in the name of progress, and "the new right", on the contrary, the same nation-state (Etat-Nation) is referred to too "modernist", too anti-traditional stage of European history, when the truly traditional European Empire was destroyed by nihilistic and secular French absolutism. In addition, the "new right" see regionalism as a return to ethnic traditions and to the principle of ethnocultural differentiation, which is the axis of all "new right" thought.

On the other hand, there is a rather broad category of politicians who, on the contrary, upholds the values of the "nation-state" (Etat-Nation). And again, commitment to state centralism can unite the "right" and "left". But, as a rule, in this position are not "new" but "old" right and left. It is characteristic that in

these positions are not new, but old – right and left. It is characteristic that in France the opponents of the European unification were three political forces: the National Front of Le Pen (extreme right), the communists of Marche (extreme left) and the socialist centrist with national sympathies of Jean-Pierre Chevènement. It follows from this that within the framework of the same geopolitical project the most distant ideological and political sympathies can be combined.

And yet, each political force has its own understanding of the three fundamental versions of the geopolitical structure of modern society. It would be interesting to build a diagram of how all three projects of different forces evaluate their own ideologies in the future. For clarity, we will talk about extreme positions, which, of course, are surrounded by nuances and shades as we approach the political center.

2.2 Regionalism of the right and left

The general complex of left-wing ideologies focuses on weakening the influence of the state, administrative and political structures on public life. This implies the principle of decentralization, gradual evolution from one center of power to several and, in the future, to a large number of them. At one time, this theory was developed by the famous anarchist Proudhon. Leftists seek to weaken and gradually abolish totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government, which means that their geopolitical orientation is directed against the preservation of the traditional state, with its borders, the bureaucracy, repressive bodies, etc. All this follows from the main ideological orientation of the left on “humanism”, on the value of the atomic individual, and not on some super-individual structures that limit his freedoms. On this ideological basis, modern European regionalism has developed as a fairly stable tendency to socio-economic decentralization, to abandon the principle of the State-Nation, which is traditional for the West of recent centuries.

This liberal tendency of the left in the limit denies the very concept of “state”, and the very concept of “nation” as a historical relic. These principles are opposed by the “humanistic” idea of “human rights”, which has long ceased to be an abstract philanthropic slogan and has turned into a rather aggressive ideological complex openly directed against the traditional forms of collective existence of people as members of a nation, people, state, race, etc. Hence, the

leftist emphasis on regionalism is logical, since the administrative independence of the territorial parts of the state, from their point of view, brings the value standard closer to the individual, removes the halo of unconditional authority and control function from wide social categories.

Obviously, this tendency of the left contradicts national-state ideologists, i.e. "etatists" and "nationalists", for whom it is the historical and political unity of the people embodied in the Etat-Nation, is the highest value. The confrontation between nationalist nationalists and regional liberals is a constant of heated debate about the main geopolitical projects in almost all countries where political processes are developing actively and dynamically.

But there is also "right-wing regionalism," which is closely related to the problem of tradition and ethnos. In such a regionalism assumes that the modern centralist state is only an instrument of cultural and ideological leveling of its members, that it has long lost its sacred functions and turned into a repressive apparatus, oriented against the remnants of genuine cultural, ethical and ethnic traditions. "Right-wing regionalists" see decentralization as an opportunity to partially restore the ritualistic, cultic form of life of peoples, traditional crafts, and restore such forms of government that were characteristic of traditional civilization before the advent of a purely modern world. In fact, such "right-wing regionalism" exactly matches the concept of "soil cultivation." In principle, the right-wingers implicitly have in mind some "natural" differentialism, characteristic of the inhabitants of the provinces, who are much more acute and hostile to foreigners than the inhabitants of large cities.

Thus, a second line of political confrontation is taking shape: "right-wing regionalists," who often appeal to ethnic racial purity, and "left-wing statist," who believe that the best way to introduce "progressive", "liberal" values into society is state centralism, which protects society from the possible restoration of the "overlooked by progress" relics.

2.3 The New Large Space: Mondialism or the Empire?

With regard to supra-state integration, there is also a rather controversial political layout. On the one hand, there is a "mondialist project", which envisages the complete abolition of traditional states and the creation of a

planetary civilizational field controlled from a single center, which can conditionally be called a “world government”. In principle, such a project is the logical conclusion of liberal tendencies that seek to destroy all traditional social structures and artificially create a single “universal” space, consisting not of peoples, but of “individuals”, not of states, but of technocratic associations and industrial laborers. It was in this light that the United States of Europe mondialist of the beginning of the century saw the liberal capitalists (Monet, Kudenof-Kalegri, etc.) and the communists (Trotsky, etc.) dream of. Later, these same ideas inspired both the designers of Maatstricht and the ideologists of the “new world order”.

But in parallel with such a mondialist perspective, there is an alternative that is defended by non-conformist political forces. We are talking about the theoreticians of the New Empire, who consider modern nation-states to be the result of the tragic collapse of traditional empires, which can only fully correspond to the truly sacred organization of society based on qualitative differentiation, on a spiritual hierarchy, on a corporate and religious basis. Such an understanding of the “New Large Space” does not follow from a purely quantitative approach to integration (as among the Mondialists), but from a certain spiritual and supranational principle that would be transcendental to existing historical formations and could combine them in a higher sacred synthesis. Depending on the circumstances, the “imperial project” takes as its basis either the religious factor (Catholic supporters of the restoration of the Austro-Venus Hero Empire), or racial (ideologists of the European Empire, united by the unity of origin of the Indo-European peoples, in particular, the French “new right”), or geopolitical (theories of the Belgian Jean Tyriar), or cultural (projects of Russian Eurasians).

Consequently, there are two opposite political poles here, which see similar geopolitical realities, but in the opposite perspective.


LEFT (Democrats)

RIGHT (Conservatives)

small space

regionalism, separatism
science

ethnism, traditionalism, soil



So, in each of our geopolitical projects, we have identified two radically different, opposite approaches, which in aggregate predetermines all the main possibilities of the ideological struggle around fundamental issues. Thanks to such a scheme, various political alliances between fairly distant forces can be classified.

2.4 Geopolitics of Russia

The general problems of the geopolitical structure of the modern world are directly related to Russia, where we meet with the same basic geopolitical projects. The three categories of regionalism, nation-state and Great Space have direct analogues in our geopolitical reality.

Regionalism corresponds to separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation, both in the case of national republics and districts, and in the case of claims for complete autonomy of purely territorial entities (projects of the Siberian, Ural and other republics).

The centralist-state model is advocated by supporters of the geopolitical project "Russia within the Russian Federation."

Those who advocate the restoration of the USSR, the reconstruction of the Russian Empire within the framework of the USSR, or the creation of the Eurasian Empire, belong to the category of ideologists of the New Large Space.

As in the general scheme, supporters of a project do not necessarily adhere to the same political convictions. Moreover, each project can have two polar signs,

which, conditionally, are defined as "right" and "left".

Let us try to identify the positions of the "right" and "left" in Russian political life in their relation to the three geopolitical options.

Separatist tendencies on the extreme "left" flank are used by those forces that also stood behind the collapse of the USSR. Considering the Soviet state as a bulwark of "reactionary" and "totalitarianism", Russian liberals have long put forward the ideas of "Russia within the borders of the XIV century," etc., which implies the fragmentation of Russian territories into separate fragments, both on ethnic and purely geographical principles. For such "leftists," the unity of the Russian nation and the power of the Russian state not only do not represent any historical value, but, on the contrary, are considered as an obstacle to universal human "progress". This regionalist project is upheld by some extreme liberals who openly want the collapse of the Russian Federation.

Such an ultra-liberal version is consonant with some ideas of a certain part of the opposite, extremely nationalist camp, which believes that the Russians need to create a compact mono-ethnic state based on the principles of racial purity and ethnic isolationism. This is the idea of creating the "Russian Republic". Among non-Russian ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of the Russian Federation, there are essentially similar projects for creating independent mono-ethnic states.

The "left" version of the national-state program within the framework of the Russian Federation embodied the post-Gorbachev Russian leadership, convinced that it was most advantageous to use centralist methods for carrying out reforms, subordinating all Russian regions to Moscow's hard line. According to these forces, state centralism is the best and quickest way to transform Russia's socio-political reality in such a way as to bring it to "universal," "progressive," and, in fact, "western" and "atlantist" standards. In regionalism, "left" centralists naturally see a danger to the realization of their goals, since decentralization and autonomy of regions can contribute to the creation of such regimes that would reject the logic of liberal reforms and propose other alternative (conditionally "right") socio-political projects. Imperial expansion is also unacceptable to these forces, since the restoration of the USSR may entail corresponding ideological consequences.

There is and is actively gathering strength movement of "right" statesmen. These are patriots who reconciled with the collapse of the USSR and who believe that the creation of a powerful centralized Russian state from the Russian Federation

will serve to unite the nation and organize a powerful independent autocratic space. The “right-wing” statesmen reject both separatism and imperialism, believing that the fragmentation of the Russian Federation means the loss by the Russians of their territories, and the imperial expansion will bring many foreign elements and threaten the national domination of the Russians.

Among the theorists of recreating the Empire, there are also two poles. The “left” Russian mondialists, who are mainly oriented towards Gorbachev and his lobby, consider it necessary to create the “united democratic space” as soon as possible both in the CIS and wider within the Eurasian space.

The “right” understanding of the New Large Space was embodied in the political programs of the opposition, irreconcilable in relation to the regime. Most representatives of this opposition, both national communists and traditional imperialists, believe that Russia within the framework of the Russian Federation is not only a territorially insufficient geopolitical entity, but a fundamentally false decision to protect the strategic interests of Russia as a great power. “Right-wing” Eurasianism proceeds from a purely imperial understanding of the historical mission of Russia, which should either be an independent autarky “continent” or deviate from its historical and geopolitical mission.

So, we can reduce all the options for geopolitical projects regarding the future of Russian statehood into one scheme that takes into account the ideological orientation of various forces.

Russian conservatives, patriots

Russian liberals, reformers

Russian regionalism

"Russian Republic"

"ethnic republics", separatism in the framework of the Russian Federation

Russian centralism

patriots in the framework of the Russian Federation

"liberal reforms under authoritarian center "

Eurasian Large Space

"Eurasian Empire", "restoration of the USSR"

"left mondialism", "united democratic space"

Chapter 3 - Geopolitical Problems of the Nearest Foreign

3.1 Laws of the Great Space

The fundamental law of geopolitics is the principle of Greater Space, highlighted by Mackinder and Haushofer and developed by Karl Schmitt. According to this principle, the national sovereignty of a state depends not only on its military strength, technological development and economic base, but on the size and geographical location of its lands and territories. The classics of geopolitics wrote down hundreds of volumes, proving that the problem of sovereignty directly depends on the geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, autarky of the region. Those peoples and states that really strive for sovereignty must first solve the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our era, only very large states located in regions strategically protected from possible attacks (military, political or economic) of other state entities can possess such self-sufficiency.

In the period of the confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the need for blocs, Greater Spaces was obvious. No one doubted that a country could be “nonaligned” only at the cost of its removal from the sphere of planetary geopolitics due to marginalization and displacement to the periphery. In addition, all the “non-aligned” all the same made a choice in favor of a particular camp, although less radical than direct supporters of socialism or capitalism. The destruction of one superpower, of course, seriously changes the geopolitical space of the earth. But at the same time, the principle of Large Spaces does not lose its strength. On the contrary, today the geopolitical project of “mondialism” is becoming more widespread, the meaning of which is to turn the entire surface of the earth into a single large space, controlled from the American center.

3.2 Pax Americana and the geopolitics of mondialism

The project of the pro-American, “atlantist” Great Space, the creation of the planetary Pax Americana or the establishment of a “new world order” with a

single “world government” are, in fact, geopolitical synonyms. It is such a plan that is being developed and implemented today in the international politics of the West, and first of all, the USA. It is obvious that the mondialist concept of the Great Space completely excludes any form of genuine state and political sovereignty of any peoples and states. Moreover, the bipolar world gave incomparably more degrees of freedom (sovereignty) to the states included in the sphere of influence of one of the two Large Spaces than is planned in the mondialist project, if only because the planetary confrontation forced not only to suppress satellite states, but also to bribe them. The single planetary Great Space of Mondialist futurologists will mean the complete disappearance of even the faint shadow of any sovereignty, since the power (military or economic) suppression of fragmented and atomized “small spaces” will become the only way to control (the need for bribery and deceit will disappear by itself in the absence of a possible geopolitical competitor).

The current situation poses for every state and every nation (and especially for states and peoples that were previously part of the geopolitical bloc opposite the Atlantic West) a viable alternative to either integration into a single Great Space under the leadership of the Atlantists, or the organization of a new Great Space capable of resisting the last superpower. The question of genuine geopolitical sovereignty is directly related to this alternative, but at the same time there can be no full sovereignty for an individual people or state in either of two cases. When adopting the mondialist model, all sovereignty is generally deliberately excluded, since “world government” becomes the uncontested and only center of power, and in this case only the planetary pseudo-empire of the “new world order” is sovereign. All its parts become colonies. When organizing a new Large Space, we are dealing with relative sovereignty within the framework of a large geopolitical formation, since this possible Large Space will be relatively free in determining the ideological and ideological dominant. This means that the peoples and states that will be included in this bloc will be able to count on at least ethnocultural sovereignty and direct participation in the creation and development of a new macroeology, while the mondialistic version of the “new world order” is already ideologically complete and elaborated and proposed to all the peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model.

3.3 Paradox of Russia

The peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is that the initiative to destroy the Eurasian Greater Space, which existed until recently in the form of a socialist camp, came from the very center of this camp, from the capital of Eurasia, Moscow. It was the USSR, represented by Gorbachev, who initiated the inclusion of the Eurasian bloc in the mondialist project. The ideas of "perestroika", "new thinking", etc. at the geopolitical level, meant the complete adoption of the model of a single Greater Space and a conscious transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar. At first, the socialist camp was destroyed, the Eastern bloc was cut. Then, geopolitical self-liquidation was continued, and those regions that today are called "neighboring countries" were discarded from Russia.

Be that as it may, Russia, as the heart of the Eurasian Island, like Heartland, in the current geopolitical situation, could better withstand all other regions than Atlantic geopolitics and be the center of an alternative Greater Space. But the fact of her geopolitical self-liquidation made her temporarily (hopefully for a short time) leave the central roles in the geopolitical confrontation. Therefore, it is necessary to consider other possibilities of creating an alternative Greater Space so that states and peoples refusing the mondialist project could take some independent steps, not expecting Russia's geopolitical awakening. (By the way, these steps could only accelerate such an awakening).

3.4 Russia remains the "Axis of History"

The geopolitical choice of an anti-Mondialist alternative outside temporarily paralyzed Russia should nevertheless take into account the key strategic and geographical function of precisely the Russian lands and the Russian people, which means that the confrontation with the modern mondialists, who to some extent control the Russian political space, should not become general Russophobia. Moreover, the basic geopolitical interests of the Russians, both culturally, religiously, economically, and strategically, coincide with the prospect of an alternative anti-Mondialist and anti-Atlantic Great Space. For this reason, the national trends of the political opposition within Russia will necessarily be in solidarity with all the antimondialist projects of geopolitical integration outside of Russia.

3.5 Mitteleuropa and the European Empire

One of the possible alternatives to the new Greater Space is Europe, which is opposed by certain political and ideological circles to the West to the Anglo-Saxon world, and above all, the United States. Such an anti-Western Europe is not a pure utopia, since such a project has been repeatedly implemented in history, although each time with certain errors or distortions. So, in the XX century, the Axis countries were the backbone of just such a Europe, although Anglophilia and Francophobia of certain circles in the German leadership (along with other circumstances) prevented the full implementation of this project. After World War II, a similar attempt was made by De Gaulle, and France owes this policy to the fact that it is not today officially a member of NATO. Be that as it may, the idea of anti-Western, traditional, imperial Europe is becoming more and more relevant today, when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of the "Soviet threat" and becomes an open American occupation. Europe in terms of its technical and economic development is a serious opponent of America, and with increasing pressure from below the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans, the Mondialist and pro-American elite of the European states may recede, and Europe will begin an independent geopolitical life. Trends in political emancipation and in the search for an ideological alternative are growing in Europe every day, in parallel with this, the chances of creating an independent European Greater Space are increasing.

3.6 Germany - the heart of Europe

The European Great Space should be formed around the most continental of the European powers around Germany, and more precisely, around Mitteleuropa, i.e. Middle Europe. Germany's geopolitical interests have traditionally been opposed to the atlantic tendencies of the West. This concerned both the continental and the colonial aspects of geopolitics. Germany has always been an opponent of the Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests and sought to create a purely land, continental, autarkic civilization based on traditional, hierarchical and soil values. Mitteleuropa represented by the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire was the last European trace of the Great Roman Empire, to which European civilization dates back to its state-social aspect. As a matter of fact, the Roman Empire was the Great Space, uniting Western and Central Europe into a single geopolitical

organism. And today, the idea of the European Empire is directly connected with Germany and the countries included in the zone of German influence.

From these theses, one important geopolitical conclusion can immediately be drawn. For all Western countries of the "near abroad" (both the Baltic republics, Ukraine and Moldova), an antimondialist geopolitical union is possible only when entering the block of Central Europe (unless, of course, the situation in Russia itself does not change) with orientation to Germany. In this case, the western regions of the USSR will have a chance to become the eastern border regions of the European Greater Space and will be able to have some semblance of sovereignty (although much less than in Russia or in a possible new Eurasian Bloc centered in antimondialist Russia).

The European Empire will be able to guarantee certain cultural, linguistic and economic autonomy for these regions and save them from a leveling Mondialist System, which destroys even hints of distinction, autarchy and preservation of national identity in a liberal-market, plutocratic structure. However, there will be no talk of any political and state independence. Moreover, the European Empire with the German center will always be in danger of an outbreak of German nationalism, although this is fraught with its collapse, as was the case with the defeat of "pan-Germanism" by Hitler.

3.7 "Join Europe"

Most of all, this prospect is close to Western Ukraine and Estonia, since only these areas really belong historically and religiously to Western culture and consider their geopolitical interests identical to those of Central Europe. As for the other "countries of the near abroad," Belarus and the eastern and central regions of Ukraine belong politically and culturally to the Russia-Eurasia zone, and if there is a cultural difference in some ways, then it can be reduced to particular details, by no means which does not imply a change in the geopolitical bloc from the East to Central (Central Europe) and can be settled within the framework of ethno-cultural (but not state!) autonomy. Lithuania, for its part, has always played a special role in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, performing a dual function in relation to Russia, it acted as a carrier of Western culture, in relation to Central Europe, on the contrary, it manifested itself together with Poland as an Eastern force, defending the Baltic West Slavic independence from

German pressure. From a geopolitical point of view, in recent centuries Lithuania has become either German or Russian, and the only thing that it has not been for a long time (and cannot be) is Lithuanian, since it does not have sufficient geopolitical prerequisites to meet the conditions sovereignty advanced by modernity.

In part, the same can be said about Latvia, although unlike Lithuania, it never played any independent role in geopolitical history, being a periphery of extraneous influences in the Baltic.

As for Moldova, this territorial entity also never had its own statehood, and any independent political and state tradition among the Romanians, like the Moldovans, is completely absent. However, historically, Romania (including some lands of Moldova) was included in the geopolitical block of both Russia-Eurasia and Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary), therefore Romania had a definite precedent for an alliance with Central Europe. Although the Orthodoxy of the overwhelming majority of Moldovans and Romanians brings them closer nevertheless to the East and Russia.

3.8 The Limits of “Freedom” and Lost Benefits

The prospect of the entry of Western countries of the "near abroad" into the European Empire and their adjoining to Central Europe is possible and historically justified, although in almost all cases (excluding Estonia as the colonial lands of the Teutonic Order, inhabited by descendants of silent and submissive autochthonous Ugro-Finnish workers, and Western Ukraine) The eastern bloc of Russia-Eurasia, from a purely geopolitical point of view, is much more preferable, since culturally these regions are more connected with the East than with Central Europe. Thus, the union of the Western “near abroad countries” with Central Europe can serve as an interim version of the antimondialist geopolitical orientation if Russia continues to abandon its integration mission.

It should be noted that, of course, these countries will not receive any political sovereignty if they become part of the hypothetical "European Empire", since the Great Space, providing geopolitical, economic and military patronage, requires its citizens, in turn, to abandon political -national independence, from the right to pursue one's own ideological or diplomatic policy, which runs

counter to the interests of the Empire. No matter how it affects the representatives of “small nationalism”, in our situation sovereignty can only be superstates, continental Empires, taken as a whole.

3.9 "Sanitary cordon"

The geopolitical problem of the Western “countries of the near abroad” has another aspect: the Atlantic factor, which acts directly and imposes political moves on these countries that are beneficial to mondialism and Americanism. There are several levels to this question. Let's start in order.

The USA has the prospect of real world domination only if there is no other Large Space on the planet. It follows that American geopolitics, as its main goal, is to destroy a potential geopolitical strong bloc and create obstacles to its formation. In history, we have a precedent for such a policy in the person of England, which has always sought to create a “sanitary cordon” or “sanitary cordons” on the continent. A “sanitary cordon” is a territory of states and peoples located between two large geopolitical entities, whose union or mutual entry into the Great Space could constitute a dangerous competition for an interested power (formerly England, today the USA). The countries of the “sanitary cordon” as a rule are simultaneously the cause of conflicts between the two continental powers, and their geopolitical independence is de facto impossible, and therefore they are forced to seek external, political and military support. The essence of the policy of the third major geopolitical force in this situation is to make the “sanitary cordon” a zone of tension between two close Large Spaces, provoking an escalation of the conflict through diplomatic influence on the governments of the “intermediate” countries. The most radical variant of the “sanitary cordon” is the situation in which the “intermediate” country strives for complete independence from both continental neighbors, which in practice means the transformation of a third “distant” power into a colony.

The most famous example of a “sanitary cordon” was at the beginning of the century the countries located between Russia and Germany and controlled by England. They defeated the Great Space of Central Europe and the Great Space of Russia-Eurasia, serving as direct agents and satraps of the countries of the European West. The same move was repeated more than once in other more

local situations. Nowadays, the United States, due to direct geopolitical necessity, is forced to make the "sanitary cordon" the main instrument of its foreign policy. A report by the American Security Adviser Paul Wolfowitz to the US government (March 1992) explicitly stated "the need to prevent the emergence of a strategic force on the European and Asian continents that can counter the US," and in this sense it indicated that the countries had a "sanitary cordon" (in particular, the Baltic countries) are "the most important strategic territories, an attempt on which by the Russians should entail an armed rebuff from the NATO countries." This is an ideal example of the geopolitical logic of a third power in the zone of mutual interests of Germany and Russia.

3.10 Transformation from province to colony

The policy of the "sanitary cordon" can be expressed in the formula "independence from the neighbor and dependence on the far". At the same time, one must clearly understand that there can be no talk of any genuine independence or sovereignty, although the shortsighted "petty nationalism" may at the level of the layman temporarily identify such "colonial dependence on a third power" with success as a national liberation fight. " It should also be recalled that in the case of small states in our well-governed world there can be not only victory, but also a full-fledged, unanimous struggle.

The countries of the "near abroad", which got out of control of Moscow by the will of various geopolitical circumstances, among which their internal struggle for independence played a negligible role (if any), have every chance of becoming the "sanitary cordon" of the US Mondialist policy on the continent, and it means losing the trust of its neighbors and incurring the curse of "double betrayal." Moreover, in this case they will turn from provinces to colonies. What will happen in this case with their national culture is generally scary to imagine, since mondialism will instead propose a universal colonial surrogate, a cultural "coconization". As rulers, the "sanitary cordon" will have puppet warders. These countries will be completely deprived of political independence, and the security of their people will be constantly threatened by continental neighbors who will not fail to take revenge.

Thus, for the countries of the "near abroad" the prospect of becoming a "sanitary cordon" means the loss of any geopolitical independence, since for the possibility of a "sanitary cordon" to tease the "continental elephant" the cordon itself

possibility of a "sanitary pig" to tame the "continental elephant", the pig itself will pay full political, cultural and economic slavery to overseas chefs "new world order" (and plus the completely logical reaction of the "elephant" in the very near future).

The prospect of a "sanitary cordon" in relation to Western countries of the "near abroad" is obvious. Its formula is "neither Germany nor Russia" (ie, "neither Central Europe nor Eurasia"). Since Germany, as an independent geopolitical force, is today a pure potency, it is fair to assume that the concept of "independence" ("sovereignty") of the Western countries of the "near abroad" should be seen as a transition to the service of mondialism and Americanism. At least, this is the current geopolitical picture. In other words, the Western countries of the "near abroad", really striving for "independence" (and not "doomed to independence" by the treacherous policy of Moscow), most likely, consciously choose the role of "sanitary cordon" in the service of the United States. This is especially characteristic of those "countries" that have traditionally had rather hostile relations with Germany.

The countries of the "sanitary cordon" from the "near abroad" enter into an alliance with the West (with Western Europe), bypassing Central Europe, and this is the clearest sign of their Atlantic, mondialist orientation.

In principle, the same is true for the eastern countries of the "near abroad". However, in order to adequately understand their geopolitical prospects, it is necessary to dwell in more detail on the geopolitical forces of the East.

3.11 Asia before a choice

In the East, there are the following potential geopolitical forces that can claim to become Large Spaces: China, Iran, Turkey and the Arab World. Let us briefly analyze the specifics of each of these Large Spaces as applied to the eastern countries of the "near abroad".

I must say that China's geopolitics is a special topic that cannot be covered in several lines. Since the "near abroad" of the East is a region of the spread of Islam, the prospect of forming a single Greater Space with China fades into the background before the possibilities of Islamic geopolitical coalitions. At least, this is the case at the moment, which does not exclude, however, a sharp

activation of the Chinese factor as an integrating factor in the near future.

Within the Islamic world itself, three geopolitical factors that have global prospects are relevant for the eastern countries of the “near abroad”, each of which has its own distinct ideological features. It is continental but Islamic, revolutionary Iran; secular, atlantist, professionally-nationalistic Turkey; and the Arab “Saudi” theocratic version of Islam. Of course, in the Arab world there are other geopolitical opportunities (Iraq, Syria, Libya), but none of them at the moment can claim to be an integrating Greater Space in relation to the countries of Central Asia. Generally speaking, an orientation toward Saudi Arabia can be conditionally and geopolitically equated with an orientation toward “Arab (non-socialist) Islam.”

The eastern countries of the “near abroad” have the prospect of three possible geopolitical integrations within the framework of the Asian bloc.

3.12 Continental Perspectives of the “Islamic Revolution”

Iran is today a unique country that plays the role of Central Europe in the West in Asia. It is characteristic that the Iranians themselves sharply distinguish themselves both from the West and from the East, meaning by “West” the “profane mondial civilization of Europe”, and by “East” are “India, China and ... Russia.”

Iranian Islam is a dynamic and powerful force that has a vivid anti-Mondialist orientation and claims to the global World Islamic Revolution. In a geopolitical sense, Iran is a purely continental power, which has both strategic, economic and ideological chances to become the core of a large Eurasian bloc.

Orientation of the Central Asian republics to Iran (and, first of all, Azerbaijan with its oil and giant nuclear Kazakhstan) could well create the preconditions for genuine continental sovereignty. The pro-Iranian coalition would be a Central Asian analogue of Central Europe (compare: Central Asia Central Europe), since historical precedents, and ideological principles, and cultural and religious homogeneity of these continental regions provide a sufficient basis for the strength and effectiveness of such a union.

It is important to note that the pro-Iranian Large Space potentially includes

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this, in turn, opens up a strip of territorial continuity with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran has direct borders with Turkmenistan.

3.13 The Trap of "Pan-Turkism"

The orientation toward Turkey, often accompanied by "pan-Turkism", has a completely different character (since the Central Asian peoples of the "near abroad" are predominantly "Turkic").

Turkey as a state arose on the site of the Ottoman Empire, not as its continuation, but as a parody of it. Instead of the polycentric imperial multinational Islamic structure, Kemal Atatürk created the eastern version of the French Etat-Nation, the State-Nation, with a secular, atheistic, professional and nationalist system. Turkey was the first state in the East to abruptly break with its spiritual, religious and geopolitical tradition. In fact, Turkey, today a NATO member, is the eastern outpost of Atlanticism and Mondialism, the "sanitary cordon" between the Asian East and the Arab world. The geopolitical model that Turkey offers is integration into the Western world and atheistic, mondialist civilization. But since Turkey itself, striving to enter "Europe", so far remains only a "political-ideological" colony of the United States, and not a full member of the European Greater Space (which could theoretically imply Turkey's participation in the Central Europe bloc), orientation to Turkey means for the countries of the "near abroad" integration into the mondialist project as a "sanitary cordon", as a "colonial laying" between the eastern continental mass of Eurasia (with Iran, China and India) and the explosive Arab world, is constantly striving schimsya reset mondialist puppet leadership.

Turkey's path is the path of serving the Atlantic superpower and adopting the mondialist model of a planetary Greater Space controlled by a "world government". It may be objected that the card of "pan-Turkism" played out by Turkey has an outwardly traditionalist character. This is partially true, and the projects of "Greater Turkey from Yakutia to Sarajevo" are really actively developed by Turkish propaganda. It should be noted that seriousness of these projects could be given only by a radical change in the political, ideological and economic course of today's Turkey, and this implies nothing less than a revolution and a 180 degree turn of geopolitical interests. Not excluding this possibility, it should be noted that there is a low probability of such a course of

possibility, it should be noted that there is a low probability of such a course of events in the near future. But at the same time, such a perspective, propagated in the present, can lead to a very concrete geopolitical result, to turn the eastern countries of the "near abroad" from Iran, to choose a secular, atheistic model of society, to gradually integrate into the pro-Atlantic "sanitary cordon". "Pan-Turkism" is as ambiguous as "Pan-Slavism" or "Pan-Germanism", i.e. like all ideologies that place a national attribute above the geopolitical, spatial and religious interests of peoples and states.

3.14 Oil dollars and mondialism

Saudi Arabia, the stronghold of purely Arab Islam and Islamic theocracy, at the ideological level is a special "Wahhabi" model of authoritarian, moralistic and "purist" Muslims, typologically very close to Protestant forms of Christianity. East Asian contemplation, asceticism, and religious passionarity are replaced here by ritualism and the dominance of almost secular ethics. According to the Islamic fundamentalist Heydar Jemal, "Saudi Arabia in its current state is the exact opposite of the world of" continental Islam. "Geopolitically, the interests of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia completely coincide with a specific version of the Mondialist project, since the country's economic and military well-being is based on US support. who defend the dynastic interests of the Saudi kings in the military and economic spheres. An example of military support is the war against Iraq. Economic " Support "is as follows. The entire economy of Saudi Arabia is oil. All Arab oil traditionally enters the world market through Anglo-American hands. The development of Eurasian deposits and their development could theoretically compete with the Saudis, enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent. from the US Thus, the US, which controls Europe's economy through control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economies on American petrodollars, have only one same interests.

Saudi Wahhabi theocracy has many times acted as an obstacle to the creation of the Arab wide space proper, since this is contrary to the interests of the dynasty and the interests of the Atlantists. The Saudis have even more reason to fear the Eurasian continental Islamic Greater Space. Revolutionary Iran is generally considered the number 1 ideological enemy of the Saudis. Thus, the geopolitical interests of Saudi Arabia in the eastern countries of the "near abroad" are directly opposite to the emergence of the Asian Islamic Large Space. So, the path to Arab-Islamic integration under the "Wahhabi" banner for the Asian

republics will in fact also be included in the Mondialist project, but not in the secular-nationalist version of "pan-Turkism", but in the moral and theocratic version. In a sense, this path is also nothing more than inclusion in the "sanitary cordon". Only in this case, the "temptation" is not nationalism, but the religious factor (and money).

Summing up all these considerations, we can say that the eastern countries of the "near abroad" have only one positive way to create a new Greater Space - this is the path of the "Islamic Revolution" with a focus on Tehran. At the same time, national conflicts can be resolved and the religious tradition and religious system restored. At the geopolitical level, this will mean the creation of a powerful continental bloc, quite capable of resisting the mondialist projects in these regions. Moreover, even the first steps taken in this direction will cause a chain reaction in the Arab world, which threatens the Mondialists with a loss of control in the entire Islamic Ummah. In addition, such a geopolitical alliance will inevitably awaken the antimondialist forces of Central Europe (the natural and main ally of Iran in the West) and Russia-Eurasia.

3.15 At least two poles or ... death

In the current geopolitical situation, the question is extremely acute: either the planetary "new world order" under the leadership of the United States, where all states and peoples will be impersonal and obedient "cogs" of the Mondialist technocratic, atheistically-trading "Disney Land" cosmopolitan model, or the immediate creation of a geopolitical opposition to Atlanticism and mondialism and the organization of potentially antimondialist, traditional and soil peoples and states in an alternative bloc (or in several blocs). Today the situation is so critical that it is almost unimportant how and under what sign an alternative Large Space can arise. If it arises, and if it really opposes mondialism, then this alone will be enough to expand, diversify and multiply geopolitical alternatives in order to increase internal degrees of freedom within the framework of the anti-mondialist opposition. It should always be remembered that for the United States "the main task is to prevent the emergence of a geopolitical alternative" (any alternative). Therefore, it is completely fair for all antimondialist forces to put forward the exact opposite thesis: "the main task is to create a geopolitical alternative" (whatever).

The situation today is so serious that it is not necessary to choose between “good” and “best” in it. If Russia can restore its geopolitical independence and get rid of the Atlantic leadership perfectly. In this case, the countries of the "near abroad" will have a wonderful opportunity to re-enter Russian Eurasia, this time devoid of the ideological negativity of ambiguous Marxism. In addition, the voluntary and conscious return of the current “near abroad” will be the guarantor of the coming cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, and even, perhaps, political (but not state) autonomy. This would be the easiest and best option. Moreover, the exposure of the true colonial goals of the Mondialists during this catastrophic transitional period will certainly become a prerequisite for an even greater increase in the number of allies and satellites of Russia-Eurasia (both in the East and in the West).

If this does not happen, the detonator of the antimondialist geopolitical project may be a different Large Space, either Central Europe under the flag of Germany, or united Central Asia under the sign of the Islamic Revolution. In principle, there remains the prospect of an anti-Mondialist uprising in the Arab world and in Latin America, although militarily these potential Large Spaces are not equipped enough to compete with the Superpower.

For the countries of the "near abroad" the problem of the Great Space is central and vital. Today, the whole future of the nation, religion, culture, freedom, prosperity, security depends on the choice of geopolitical orientation. The question is as acute as possible. Today, all responsible people must understand that the adoption of the mondialist model means no more and less than the complete and final destruction of the identity, identity, historical face of their states and nations, the end of their national history.

Chapter 4 - Perspectives of Civil War

4.1 National interests and the Mondialist lobby

The problem of a possible civil war in Russia is becoming more and more urgent, and today it is necessary to study this terrible issue from an analytical point of view on the other side of both alarmist emotions and pacifist exhortations. Worst of all (if a civil conflict in Russia does break out) is to be completely unprepared for it, confused in a complex and contradictory disposition of forces that can mislead even the most penetrating and ideologically consistent patriots.

In this matter, as in all other important aspects of the political life of the nation and the state, we must begin by recalling the fundamental points that determine the general contours of the current state of the geopolitical situation. The main imperative of the existence of the state and nation is the principle of sovereignty, independence and political freedom. And it is precisely the requirements of national sovereignty that are synonymous with national interests. In the context of the political history of the world, Russia and the Russian people have their own unique place, their mission, their role, and the free and full-fledged fulfillment of the national state mission is the main meaning of the very existence of the people as an organic community.

But we are living in a special era when the state's internal national policy is inextricably linked with the foreign policy context, and perhaps never before in history the external pressure on national-state formations has been so strong and persistent. Moreover, the theory of mondialism, that is, almost the main doctrine in the modern political establishment of the West, has become such an organization of life of people all over the world, in which there should not exist national-state formations, no sovereignty, national interests. The mondialist world community is led by the cosmopolitan elite, which governs not the societies, but the mathematical sum of atomic individuals. Consequently, the mondialist vector is initially oriented against any national-state formations, and its main task is to abolish the old traditional world, divided into peoples and countries, and to establish a "new world order" that denies all forms of historical

and organic social and social formations.

The Mondialist factor, of course, is directed not only against Russia (other nations and states are also obstacles for it), but it was Russia, as a powerful geopolitical entity, that until recently was the main bastion preventing the gradual spread of Mondialist control from the West to the whole world. Of course, the Soviet system in its certain aspects also possessed Mondialist features, and one of the projects of the Western Mondialists consisted in the gradual, “evolutionary” inclusion of the USSR in the planetary system of the “new world order”. This well-known theory of convergence, most likely, was the main reference point for those forces that began perestroika. But the soft version of “mondializing” Russia for one reason or another did not work, and then the mondialist policy towards Russia took the form of aggressive pressure and openly subversive activities. The harsh and superfast collapse of the USSR deprived the proponents of “convergence” of control levers, and the mondialist policy turned to openly aggressive, Russophobic forms.

Mondialist vector is an extremely important point for understanding the current situation of Russia. If earlier external influence on our country was exerted by other national-state formations seeking to weaken the power of the Russian state or to incline it to its side in various international conflicts; if earlier the potential opponents of Russia (obvious and secret) were geopolitical forces, generally comparable in structure to itself, now the main external factor has become a special form of pressure that does not have any clear national-state or geopolitical outlines and represents It's a supranational, global utopian socio-political project, behind which there are invisible manipulators who possess gigantic economic and political power. Of course, traditional foreign policy factors also continue to operate (the mondialist project has not yet been fully implemented), but their significance and weight pales in comparison with the totality of mondialist pressure, and fade into the background. For example, Russia's relations with Germany, Japan or China today are not a matter of two parties, but of at least three of Russia, another state and the world mondialist lobby, speaking directly and through their "agents of influence" in political entities, clarifying between themselves bilateral problems. Moreover, it is precisely the “third force”, mondialism, that most often turns out to be decisive, since its means of influence and structures of influence are incomparably more streamlined and effective than the corresponding mechanisms of archaic national-state formations.

Thus, in Russia, both in domestic and in foreign policy, two fundamental

elements can be identified that are behind the adoption of certain decisions, the organization of various processes, and the determination of various orientations of Russian political and socio-economic life : these are mondialist “agents of influence” and groups guided by national-state interests. Based on the foregoing, it is obvious that both poles are opposite to each other in the most important thing: some seek to minimize the sovereignty and independence, autarky of Russia (up to its complete abolition in the mondialist cosmopolitan context of the "new world order"), while others, on the contrary, are oriented towards affirmation, strengthening and expansion of national-state sovereignty, to the maximum removal of the nation from the planetary Mondialist structure, hostile, by definition, to the existence of any valued autarky society. Of course, in real politics, these two poles almost never occur in their pure form, most power structures are mixed systems where both trends are present, but, nevertheless, these two poles determine the main power trends that are constant and rigid counteraction veiled by compromises, naivety, nearness or corruption of "uninitiated" extras from politics.

So, we have identified two poles in the current political picture of Russia. Two different points of view on the possibility of a civil war in Russia correspond to them. And it is precisely these two forces that will ultimately be the main subjects of potential conflict, the main opponents, the main parties, although their confrontation may be hidden under a more private and confused distribution of roles. An example of the first civil war in Russia shows that in this case, national and anti-national forces acted not under their own banners, but under a complex and contradictory system of social, political and ideological orientations that hide true geopolitical motives and tendencies. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, we must objectively analyze the terrible prospect of a new civil war, beyond political or ideological sympathies.

4.2 Power balance options

Let us single out the main plots of the civil war in Russia, define the acting forces and direct motivations, and outline its supposed options.

1) The first (and most unlikely) version of the civil war could develop along the line of confrontation: national-state forces against the mondialist lobby.

2) The second version of the civil war could develop along the line of confrontation:

indeed, such a separation of roles would be very logical, given the complete incompatibility of the main orientations of both. Mondialists strive in every way to weaken Russia's sovereignty, undermine its economic and political independence, make it dependent on the cosmopolitan mondialist establishment, and deprive it of the ability to freely carry out its national mission. Nationalists and state officials, on the contrary, want to strengthen autarky, achieve maximum political independence and economic and social self-sufficiency. Naturally, it is impossible to combine these two trends peacefully, since they contradict each other in everything in general and in particular.

However, such an option of a civil war ("cosmopolitans against nationalists") generally cannot become nationwide and global, since mondialist ideology is fundamentally incapable of instilling mass fanaticism and raising at least a significant part of the population to defend their ideals. In a peaceful environment, of course, inertia, indifference and general passivity can be auxiliary factors for the Mondialists, but in the event of a bloody conflict, shooting and murder, an appeal to the deeper layers of the human psyche is necessary, fanaticism and sacrifice are necessary. Nationalists, on the contrary, can easily count on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people in the event of an open and widespread armed confrontation with the Mondialists, provided, of course, the conflict acquires a nationwide character and is not localized in special centers strictly controlled by Mondialists.

In other words, the civil war according to the "Mondialist Nationalists" scenario will in any case not become a real and total civil war, since the Mondialists in their pure form do not and will not have a solid ideologically cohesive and politically active foundation capable of organizing the masses to oppose the nationalists. If such a conflict had flared up, its outcome would have been quick and unambiguous: national-state forces would have quickly dealt with the anti-national lobby, designated as such and becoming face to face with the people who had risen behind the patriotic idea. In principle, such a civil war would be almost bloodless and very short, and after the destruction of the Mondialists, the internal source of conflict would be eliminated, and the political and social life of the state would develop strictly within the boundaries of national interests, as is the case in traditional states and nations .

But the mondialist lobby hardly understands its true position and the suicidal nature of such a scenario, which means that it will try to avoid such a turn of events at all costs. That is why this option is almost unbelievable.

2) The second version of the civil war is determined by the formula: the Russian Federation against one (or several) of the republics of the near abroad. This situation can easily arise due to the extreme instability of new state formations in the territory of the former USSR. These states, the vast majority of which have no more or less stable state and national traditions, created within completely arbitrary borders that do not coincide with the ethnic, social, economic, or religious territories of organic societies, will inevitably be cast into deep internal and external crisis. In principle, they will not be able to gain any true sovereignty, since their strategic capabilities do not allow them to defend their independence without resorting to external assistance. The collapse of the political, social, and economic systems in them is inevitable, and naturally, this cannot but affect their attitude both to the Russian (or pro-Russian) population and to Russia itself.

In this case, it is most likely that Russia will be challenged on their part, to which the Russian Federation will be forced to respond with varying degrees of aggressiveness. This process will most likely be of a chain nature, since an explosion of interethnic or territorial contradictions, affecting Russia and the Russians, will inevitably respond in other former Soviet republics.

Obviously, the national interests of the Russians and the orientation of the Mondialist lobby within Russia (and within the new republics) in this case will not clash directly and openly. The main adversary in such a war will be direct neighbors for the Russians. Moreover, it is absolutely not necessary that the mondialist lobby will play in this case to the defeat of the Russian Federation. Such a conflict, called “low-intensity wars” (or even “medium (!) Intensity”) by American strategists, may well satisfy the interests of the Mondialist lobby if it destabilizes the strategic and geopolitical situation in Russia and, more broadly, Eurasia, becoming local, protracted and ambiguous. In this case, Russian national interests will not necessarily be fulfilled, even if the civil war takes place under patriotic and nationalist slogans. As in the case of Afghanistan, an armed conflict between Russia and neighboring regions will only weaken Russian influence in these states and will undermine the attractiveness of the integration impulse of neighbors to unite with Russia into a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. Moreover, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics will make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (primarily Ukraine), this will also be an internal national tragedy.

Thus, this version of the civil war is controversial and ambiguous. Russian

Thus, this version of the civil war is controversial and ambiguous. Russian national interests, the imperative of sovereignty, will not necessarily be strengthened in such a development of events, and the mondialist, Russophobic lobby, for its part, can even benefit from this by creating a belt of "low intensity wars" around the Russian Federation, discrediting Russians internationally and undermining and so shaky social and economic stability of the state. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should not act as a defender of Russian and pro-Russian peoples in the near abroad. But in doing all this, it should especially care about expanding its geopolitical and strategic influence. Even if the Russians manage to win back part of the original Russian lands from their neighbors, the price for this may be the appearance of new hostile states that will be thrown into the camp of the main opponents of Russia, i.e. Mondialists, in which case the new imperial integration needed by Russia will be postponed indefinitely.

3) The third option is similar to the first in its structure, only here a civil war can begin within the framework of the Russian Federation itself between representatives of Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups (3). The scenario may be similar to the previous one: the Russian population is subjected to aggression by foreigners in any national district or internal republic; ethnic solidarity encourages other Russians to take part in the conflict; other national non-Russian regions are drawn into armed confrontation on ethnic grounds; the civil war takes on the character of a "low-intensity war." In this case, this is even more dangerous for Russia, as the result may be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or, at least, provoking ethnic hostility towards Russian foreigners where they can be "suppressed". At the same time, other state and national entities will inevitably be drawn into the conflict against the Russians, which may make it protracted and long-term. Such a conflict will translate the position of Russians from national-state to narrowly ethnic, which will further narrow the geopolitical quality of Russia, which, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and then the USSR, has already lost its imperial quality.

This version of the civil war is generally contrary to the national interests of the Russians, since it will, in fact, legitimize the further disintegration of the Russian space into ethnic components, which in the future will reduce the geopolitical quality of the once imperial people to a purely ethnic, almost "tribal" level. For tough Russophobic mondialism, aimed at undermining Russian national state autarchy, this option would be quite attractive, since it involves instilling in Russians not a state but a narrow ethnic self-identification, which will inevitably narrow Russia's strategic scope. On the other hand, in this case there is a certain risk for the Mondialists, since an explosion of ethnic self-awareness can also hit

the "agent of influence". But such a conflict is disadvantageous to Russian patriots from any side.

4) The fourth option is also domestic Russian, but based not on ethnic hatred, but on regional, administrative-territorial contradictions. The centralist policy of Moscow in matters of political, economic and social cannot but provoke a powerful confrontation between regions, which in the general process of disintegration seek to gain maximum autonomy. Here, as in the case of ethnic friction, the collapse of the Soviet empire deprives the centralist and integration idea of its legitimacy, evidence and attractiveness. In addition, the current policy of the center, adopting the command totalitarian style of the previous system, actually abandoned the second half of the center-region relationship, which consisted of assistance and social and administrative support.

The center also wants to take and control, as before, but now it actually does not give anything in return. Economically, the regions only lose from this, since the field of their capabilities is narrowing and depends on the center. But the political peculiarity of the regions is added to this, where the anti-national character of the mondialist reforms is felt much more painfully than in the cosmopolitan megacities of the capitals.

The first steps towards separatism by the regions have already been taken, although these attempts were suppressed by the center. However, it is very likely that at some point the Russians in southern Russia, in Siberia or elsewhere will want to create an "independent state" free from the political and economic dictatorship of Moscow. This may be based on purely economic feasibility. The sale of regional resources or locally produced goods bypassing Moscow in some cases can drastically improve the local situation. On the other hand, the "regional revolution" can also put forward political tasks, for example, abandoning the extreme liberal policies of the center, maintaining social guarantees, strengthening the national dimension in ideology. All this makes the possibility of civil conflict at this level quite real. At some point, the regions can seriously insist on their own, which, naturally, will cause opposition from the center, which does not want to lose control over the territories.

This version of the civil war is no less ambiguous and contradictory, like the two previous ones. Indeed, on the one hand, the demands of the regions wishing to isolate themselves from Moscow, the center of reform, have some features of patriotism and nationalism, and meet the interests of the people; the mondialist forces of the center, sneaking out against the regions, will at the same time

forces of the center, speaking out against the regions, will at the same time defend not national, but anti-national interests, since the control of liberals over the entirety of the Russian territories is beneficial, first of all, to the designers of the "new world order". But, on the other hand, regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of Russian state territories, weaken the nationwide power, and prepare the fault lines within the united Russian people. Mondialists can consciously go on to provoke such a conflict if their control over Russia weakens, and in this case, the territorial collapse of the country will be the last step in weakening national-state autarchy.

National forces should act in this matter, proceeding from the exact opposite logic. As long as the power of the center is strong, it is necessary to identify with regional requirements, supporting their desire for autonomy from the center. But at the same time, from the very beginning, the need for strategic and political integration of all regions based on the prospects for the reconstruction of the empire should be emphasized. As the mondialist lobby in the center weakens, patriots should gradually change their orientation, insist on the inadmissibility of a civil conflict, and urge the regions to unite.

Be that as it may, the civil war on a regional basis can in no way correspond to national interests, as well as the two previous scenarios.

The next point should be specifically noted. The fifth version of the civil war suggests itself, in which the forces would be distributed not according to ideological, national and territorial, but according to socio-economic grounds, for example, "new rich" versus "new poor". In principle, this option is not excluded, and in the future all the preconditions for it may develop. But in the current state of society, the purely economic factor is obviously not dominant. Despite the terrible economic cataclysms, the general impoverishment of the working strata and the grotesque enrichment of the "new Russians," Russian society has not yet formulated its demands in economic terms. Geopolitical, national, ideological aspects are incomparably more effective and relevant. It is they who are able to withdraw the masses in the square and make them take up arms. The economic crisis serves as an excellent background for civil conflict, it can serve as an impetus for cataclysms in certain cases, but other non-economic theses will be the main lines of force. Appeals to the nation, ethnos, patriotism, freedom today are able to relativize the purely material side of life, to make it secondary. But even in the case where the material side is dominant, it, by virtue of discrediting the Marxist and socialist doctrines, will not be able to express its demands in the form of a consistent and fiery political ideology. Most likely, the

economic factor in possible conflicts will be a concomitant rather than a determining category.

4.3 Summary of analysis

The civil war in Russia, unfortunately, is possible. The fundamental contradictions between national-state interests and the plans of mondialism can hardly be resolved peacefully and amicably. In order to seriously talk about a "consensus" or "truce" between these forces, it is necessary either to permanently destroy the bearers of national-state tendencies (and this is possible only together with the destruction of the Russian state and the Russian nation), or to end representatives Mondialist lobby.

That is why the outbreak of a civil war in Russia or the creation of a belt of "low intensity wars" on its territory can at any time become the main project of the Mondialist lobby. At the same time, there is no doubt that the representatives of this lobby will try their best to stay in the shade themselves, speaking under some other banner (both separatist and centralist).

Three variants of the civil war of the Russian Federation against the near abroad, the Russian population of the Russian Federation against foreigners, the regions against the center are fundamentally unacceptable to all those who are really concerned about the national-state interests of Russia and the Russian people. All three of these options are fraught with a further split in the geopolitical and strategic space of Russia, even if certain territories come under Russian control. Consequently, the patriots must prevent a civil war in these three scenarios in any way. Not to mention the fact that from a moral point of view, it is not beneficial to them. And if this is so, then it is logical to assume that it is the Mondialists who will have a hand in provoking such conflicts (if they start to flare up).

For the Mondialist lobby, something like a civil war in Russia could be beneficial for several more reasons. The outbreak of a military conflict with the direct participation of Russians would allow liberals from the center:

1. introduce a political dictatorship under the pretext of "saving the fatherland" and forcibly get rid of political opponents;

2. write off the economic collapse to war and make the economy function under the direct control of the center;
3. to distract public attention from the activities of the "reformers", which is becoming dangerously obvious today;
4. deliberately suppress a possible future union of Russians with neighboring national-state Eurasian and European entities under the sign of continental solidarity against the Atlantic domination of the West and mondialist projects.

All this leads us to believe that the carriers of the hard version of mondialism in Russia will sooner or later resort to a "civil war", especially if the position of the liberal regime becomes more and more precarious. It is important to note that in this case, "structural adjustment" will necessarily occur within the mondialist lobby itself, and part of it will appear under patriotic, and perhaps even nationalist and chauvinistic slogans.

It is difficult to say exactly when the first explosions can occur. It depends on many spontaneous and artificial factors. But even if nothing of the kind happens for a while, the potential threat of such a turn of events will be more than relevant since the mondialist lobby not only exists in Russia, but also controls the most important levers of state-political power.

Only the first version of the "civil war" Mondialists against nationalists could be short, almost bloodless and beneficial for patriots, for Russia. Moreover, a direct clash of the nation with its internal enemies would inevitably give victory to the national forces. In fact, this would not be a "civil war" in the full sense of the word, but a short flash of active confrontation, as a result of which the possibility of a full-fledged civil war, if not completely destroyed, would be postponed indefinitely. But for this it is necessary to provoke the Mondialist lobby to appear under its own banners, and on behalf of clearly defined and precisely named Russians of national state interests, patriotic forces would also have to unite. This is certainly not easy to do (almost impossible). On the one hand, the Mondialists themselves are not so naive as to publicly talk about hatred of the country in which they operate and their desire to destroy it, but on the other hand, representatives of national-state forces are often not able to intelligently and consistently, but at the same time, briefly and convincingly, formulate the foundations of their ideological position. This is hindered by the adherence to obsolete Soviet-communist clichés, increased emotionality, a weak ability for analytical thinking, ignoring the fundamental principles of geopolitics, etc.

A genuine civilian world cannot be based on compromise if the two sides of this compromise are in all direct opposites. As long as the mondialist value system is dominant, then all its flanks are right, left, centrists, with all the differences, do not cast doubt on the general orientation. Yes, in such a situation, "peace" is possible, but at the cost of the death of the state and the radical exclusion of national forces from the dialogue. If the national-state system of values becomes dominant, then we can talk about finding a compromise between the national capitalists, national socialists, national communists, national monarchists or national theocrats, but also in this case, anti-national, mondialist, Russophobic forces will be excluded from the dialogue, ideologically placed outside the law.

Our society is fraught with a terrible civil conflict. If we still have the ability to influence the course of events, to choose, then we must choose the lesser of evils.

Chapter 5 - Geopolitics of the Yugoslav Conflict

5.1 Symbolism of Yugoslavia

It is well known that Yugoslavia is the territory in Europe with which the most serious and large-scale European conflicts begin. At least that was the case in the 20th century. The Balkans is a knot in which the interests of all the main European geopolitical blocs converge, and that is why the fate of the Balkan peoples symbolizes the fate of all European peoples. Yugoslavia is Europe in miniature. Among the peoples inhabiting it, one can find exact analogues of the largest continental forces.

Serbs represent Orthodox Russia (= Eurasia) in the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes Central Europe (i.e. Germany, Austria, Italy, etc.). Muslim Albanians and Bosnians are remnants of the Ottoman Empire, which means Turkey and even the Islamic world as a whole. And finally, the Macedonians are a mixed Serb-Bulgarian ethnos, which is a symbol of the Great Orthodox Yugoslavia (based on the unification of Serbia and Bulgaria), which failed to develop historically, despite the Serbo-Bulgarian projects that existed at the beginning of the century.

5.2 Three European forces

In the most general terms, we can say that the geopolitical map of Europe is divided into three fundamental areas.

The first range is the West. The continental West proper is represented primarily by France and Portugal. More broadly, it includes England and the transatlantic non-European USA. Although there may be internal contradictions between the continental West (France), the island West (England), and the transatlantic West (America), the West acts most often as a single geopolitical force in relation to other European geopolitical entities.

The second range is Central Europe (Mitteleuropa). It includes the states of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, the former lands of Austria

former Holy Roman Empire or the German Nations, the former lands of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, etc. Central Europe is characterized by a geopolitical confrontation with both the European West and the East.

And finally, the third range is Russia, which appears in Europe not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of all the Eurasian peoples of the East.

Generally speaking, the fourth Islamic geopolitical area from the Maghreb countries of North Africa to Pakistan and the Philippines could be distinguished, but this geopolitical bloc is non-European, and in addition, in the 20th century its geopolitical influence on Europe was not too significant, although it is possible that in the future, the Islamic world will again (as it was in the Middle Ages) become an important component of European geopolitics.

Three geopolitical European entities on the continent create permanent zones of tension that extend along the conditional and constantly changing borders between the European West and Central Europe (Mitteleuropa), on the one hand, and between Central Europe and Russia-Eurasia on the other.

Schematically, one can single out a certain number of geopolitical alliances or, on the contrary, confrontations that constitute constants of European international politics.

The European West can confront Central Europe as its closest neighbor to the East. Most clearly, this geopolitical tendency is embodied in the confrontation between absolutist France (Etat-Nation) and imperial Austria-Hungary. Later this contradiction was expressed in numerous Franco-German conflicts. On the other hand, there is a theoretical possibility of a Franco-German geopolitical union, the ideas of which inspired both Vichy and de Gaulle. It is significant that the West can sometimes in the struggle against Central Europe enter into an alliance with the European East (Russia-Eurasia). In other cases, it is Russia that becomes the main geopolitical adversary of both the European West and Middle Europe.

In relation to its eastern geopolitical neighbor, central Europe (Germany) can be both in a state of confrontation (which is always directly or indirectly beneficial to the European West), and in a state of union (which always creates a danger to the West).

And finally, Russia's geopolitical preferences in European politics can be oriented both in the anti-German vein (France, England and even the United

oriented both in the anti-German vein (France, England and even the United States logically become allies in this case) and in the anti-Western (then the Russian-German alliance is inevitable).

These, in the most crude approximation, are the main geopolitical factors of European politics. They absolutely must be taken into account when analyzing the Balkan problem, since all three of these trends clash with each other in the Yugoslav conflict, creating a potential threat to a new major European war.

5.3 True Croats

The Croats (as well as the Slovenes) were traditionally part of Austria-Hungary, they were an ethnos fully integrated into the Catholic sector of German Central Europe. Their natural geopolitical fate is connected with this European bloc. Therefore, the Croatian attraction to Germany and Austria is by no means an accidental opportunistic arbitrariness, but the adherence to the logic of the historical existence of this people. The collapse of Austria-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia was the result of a long struggle of the European West against Central Europe, and this explains the pragmatic support of the Serbs by the French. (Option: West along with East vs Central Europe). Those Croats who welcomed the creation of Yugoslavia went, in a sense, against their geopolitical and religious traditions, and it was no accident that most of them, through Masonic institutes, were guided precisely by the "Great East of France" and its geopolitical projects aimed at the triumph of Western forces in Europe. During the creation of Yugoslavia, as in the entire balance of power during the First World War, the dominance of precisely the Western tendency is traced, which successfully uses the forces of the East (both Serbia and large Russia) against Central Europe.

The Croats during the creation of Yugoslavia became the first victims of such a policy, and it is not surprising that they later met the Germans as liberators (as, indeed, Ukrainian Catholics and Uniates, who always gravitated to the zone of Central European influence). But Western support by France for the Serbs (by the way, this support was also provided, first of all, through the Masonic channels) was very ambiguous, since the Serbs themselves, in turn, became hostages of such a geopolitical formation in the Balkans, whose integrity could be preserved only by force control.

With the current crisis of the eastern bloc (i.e., the entire zone of influence of Russia-Eurasia) during the perestroika period, the integration forces in Yugoslavia somewhat weakened, and the Croats (along with the Slovenes) were not slow to declare their geopolitical alienness towards Serbian Yugoslavia, understood in two ways and as an artificial creation of the West, and as an outpost of the East in Central Europe.

Thus, Croats at the geopolitical level uphold the principle that Central Europe should remain itself, i.e. an independent, independent and territorially united European region. Although it should be noted that the idea of transforming Croatia into an independent ethnically homogeneous dwarf Balkan State-Nation (Etat-Nation) of the French type already knowingly lays a mine under the geopolitical unity of the Central European space, which can harmoniously exist only as a flexible but integral structure, and not as a fractional one conglomerate of egoistic microstates. In other words, the geopolitical tendency of Croats will be complete only if it is supranationally oriented, and this also implies a peaceful solution to the problem of the Serb minority in Croatia. Croatian nationalism, going from a geopolitical plane to a purely ethnic plane, loses its justification and changes its sign to the opposite.

5.4 True Serbs

The geopolitical perspective of the Serbs has a uniquely pro-Russian, Eurasian character. Through the religious and ethnic factor, Serbia directly adjoins Russia, being its geopolitical continuation in the south of Europe. The fate of the Serbs and the fate of the Russians at the geopolitical level are one and the same fate. Therefore, in order for the Serbs to return to the origins of their European mission, they need to turn to the East, to Eurasia, to understand the meaning and goals of Russian geopolitics. At the same time, it is not naive and artificial pan-Slavism, the failure of which was perfectly demonstrated by the Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev, namely, the project of Great Eurasia with the axis of Russia, a kind of ecumenical-continental Orthodox neo-Byzantism, should be the guiding star of truly Serbian geopolitics. Only in this case, the Serbian tendency will return to its own roots and cease to play the role of a puppet in the hands of the Atlantists, used only for the struggle against Central Europe and the German world.

In the geopolitical history of Europe, one constant trend can be traced, the

in the geopolitical history of Europe, one constant trend can be traced, the clarification of which will help to understand what is a positive decision for Serbia. This trend is this: the union of the East and central Europe against the West is always beneficial to both sides. As well as beneficial to the continental West (France), an alliance with Middle Europe (Germany) against the West of the insular and transatlantic (Anglo-Saxon world). In other words, the priority given to the geopolitical East (even relative to the East because Central Europe, for example, is the East in relation to France) is almost always beneficial not only to the East itself, but also to the western member of this union. And vice versa, a geopolitical alliance with a priority of the western trend (France with England and the USA against Germany, France with Germany against Russia, etc.) is tying knots of more and more European conflicts and wars.

Given these considerations, we can say that the geopolitical orientation of the Serbs should turn as a guide to Bulgarian geopolitics, which almost always combined Russophilia with Germanophilism, creating in South Europe a space of political stability and harmony, which could gradually open the way to Central Europe for the Muslim south, and therefore put an end to dominance in this region of the Atlanticist West. Moreover, Serbia must recognize the ambiguity of the support that the West once provided and whose price is clearly visible in the anti-Serb sanctions of Western countries. Only geopolitical unity with other Orthodox Eastern European peoples (and, first of all, with Bulgaria) into a single pro-Russian and at the same time friendly to Central Europe block will create a zone of stability in the Balkans and will remove from use the shameful term "Balkanization".

Just as in the case of Croats, the idea of a purely Serbian State-Nation will also not solve any problems if this Serbian state takes in its Germanophobia and orientation toward the West created by the Freemasons of Yugoslavia.

5.5 True Yugoslav Muslims

The Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians are the Islamic, "Ottoman" geopolitical factor in Europe. It is important to note that Turkey, the influence of which is most felt among the Yugoslav Muslims, is certainly in Europe the spokesman of the extreme Western Atlantic tendencies. If the West, which tried to use the European East (Russia) against Central Europe, still could not completely suppress the independent geopolitical self-manifestation of this

continental region and often encountered, on the contrary, the expansion of Russia-Eurasia (either through the Russian-German Union, or directly through the creation of the Warsaw bloc), then secular pseudo-Islamic Lama Turkey became a reliable tool in the hands of atlantist politicians. And wider, the atlantic influence on the geopolitics of Islamic countries is extremely large. Therefore, the anti-Serb performances of the Yugoslav Muslims outline an incomparably more global continental conflict between Northern Eurasia (Russia and its geopolitical area) with the South. It is important to note that such a conflict is contrary to the interests of the South itself, since in this case it becomes the same instrument in the hands of the Atlantic West as the Eurasian East (represented by Serbs) versus Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary and its representatives from Croats)

The only logical way out for the Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and Albanians would be to appeal to Iran and the continuity of its policy, since only this country is currently pursuing a geopolitics oriented towards independence, independence and continental harmony, acting in accordance with its own logic, regardless of the interests of Atlantis Stov in this region. Turning to Iran, Yugoslav Muslims will be able to gain a proper geopolitical perspective, since the radically anti-Western, continental, and traditionalist Iran is a potential ally of all Eastern European blocs from Russia-Eurasia to Central Europe. Moreover, the orientation toward Iran of the European eastern Greater Spaces could dramatically change the situation in the entire Islamic world and sharply weaken American influence there, which would not only be in the hands of the Europeans, but would also free the Islamic peoples from the economic and military dictates of the Anglo-Saxon Atlantists.

Only with this orientation of the Yugoslav Muslims, their geopolitical presence in Europe could become harmonious, logical and conflict-free. We can say that this problem is divided into three stages. The first stage: the reorientation of Muslims from Turkey to Iran. The second stage: strengthening the geopolitical alliance of Central Europe with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. And the third stage: the geopolitical Eurasian alliance of the East and Central Europe. Moreover, these steps can take place in parallel, each at its own level. It is especially important to understand here that the problem of the small Balkan people cannot be resolved geopolitically without the most serious and global geopolitical transformations. It should never be forgotten that it is with small in size, but gigantic in symbolic significance, local conflicts that all world wars begin.

5.6 True Macedonians

The Macedonian problem of modern Yugoslavia is rooted precisely in the artificiality of the really existing “Yugoslavia”, which was a “state of the southern Slavs” only by name. The Macedonians, who are an ethnic group intermediate between Serbs and Bulgarians and professing Orthodoxy, should have been included as a natural component in real Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Bulgaria. But the existence of two Slavic states of the Jacobin type in the Balkans instead of one federal, "imperial", Slavic state of Eurasian orientation led to the fact that the small Macedonian people found themselves on the border between two political regions with rather different political specifics.

At the present moment, the matter is compounded by the fact that Jacobin nationalism is growing in present-day Bulgaria, which has repeatedly clashed the Orthodox Balkan powers among themselves and hindered access to the only true Neo-Byzantine geopolitics. Initially, the Atlanticist lobby (both Catholic and English) was also actively involved in this process, which makes itself felt in modern Bulgaria, although in different forms.

In essence, Western tactics here remain the same as at the beginning of the century. Then, having destroyed Austria-Hungary, the West did not allow the creation of a large Slavic community by playing the card of "Balkan nationalisms" of the Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian, etc. Today, the same geopolitical forces of the West again strike a double blow at Central Europe and Yugoslav unity, provoking Croatian separatism in the West and Macedonian in the East.

In the case of Macedonia, as in all other Balkan conflicts, a way out can only be found through the global integration process of organizing the European Large Spaces, and not through straightforward separatism and the creation of dwarf pseudo states. The accession of Macedonia to Bulgaria will not solve the problem in any way, but will only prepare a new, this time truly interstate, inter-Slavic conflict.

5.7 Priorities of the Yugoslav war

Being deeply symbolic and extremely significant, the Yugoslav conflict requires each country, each European political and geopolitical power to determine and identify its priorities in this matter. Here we are talking not only about the sentimental, confessional, historical, ethnic, or political leanings of various people, peoples, and states. It is about the future of Europe, about the future of Eurasia.

Supporters of the priority of Central Europe and the German philo initially took a pro-Croat position. This choice was based on a geopolitical analysis of the reasons for the creation of Yugoslavia, on the rejection of the Masonic policy of France in Central Europe, on the understanding of the need for a natural reconstruction of a single Central European space after the end of the "Yalta era", during which Europe was artificially divided into two rather than three geopolitical camps. This explains the presence among Croats of many European national revolutionaries.

But the logic of preference in Middle Europe did not take into account one very important consideration. The fact is that in addition to the instrumental role of the geopolitical East in the execution of the West's plans against Central Europe, there is and always has been a root, deep and soil Eurasian geopolitics of this Greater Space, geopolitics of Orthodox Russia, focusing on its own continental interests, and in the distant future, on new holy union. When, in the course of a fierce internal conflict between Serbs and Croats, Serbian self-awareness was fully awakened, when the blood of the Serbian people again caused the most ancient geopolitical, national and spiritual archetypes from unconscious depths, when the idea of Greater Serbia, Spiritual Serbia became relevant, the instrumental mission of Yugoslavia ended, and on it the place entered the Great Eurasian Idea, the Idea of the East.

While the Serbs fought with Central Europe (in the person of the Croats), the atlantists from Paris to New York applauded the Federal Yugoslavia everywhere, or at least reproached the Croats with "nationalism" and "pro-fascism". As soon as the Serbs crossed a certain line, and their struggle took on the character of a struggle against the very idea of the West, with Atlanticism, Serbia was immediately declared the main obstacle to building the New World Order, and severe political and economic sanctions followed.

To make the final choice, we must again turn to the geopolitical law that we have already formulated above, according to which continental harmony is real only with the priority of the East with Eurasia chosen as a positive orientation

only with the priority of the East, with Eurasia chosen as a positive orientation, since even the idea of Central Europe, which is positive in itself, when opposing Russia, Eurasia is becoming negative and destructive, as it was clearly revealed in Hitler's deep and tragic mistake, which began anti-eastern, anti-Russian expansion, which, after all, is It became profitable only for the western, Atlantic bloc, destroyed Germany and gave rise to the embryos of the crisis in Russia. Therefore, in the Yugoslav conflict, geopolitical priority should be given to the Serbian factor, but, of course, to the extent that the Serbs follow the Eurasian, pro-Russian geopolitical tendency, gravitating towards the creation of a powerful and flexible South Slavic bloc, recognizing the importance of Middle Europe and contributing to the establishment of a German Russian alliance against the West. Serbian Germanophobia, combined with the Masonic francophile, no matter what plausible pretexts they used to hide, can never provide a basis for a positive solution to the Yugoslav problem.

In other words, the greatest preference should be given to traditional Serbs, rooted in the Orthodox faith, conscious of their Slavic spiritual heritage and oriented towards creating a new harmonious pro-Russian geopolitical structure with a clearly anti-Western and anti-Atlantic orientation.

On the other hand, you should carefully consider the requirements of the Croats and their gravitation in the region of Central Europe. If they have anti-Atlantic tendencies, Croats can in the long run become a positive intra-European force.

The Bosnian factor in the reorientation of Yugoslav Muslims from Turkey to Iran should also be taken into account in order to "turn poison into a medicine" on this basis to begin a completely new European policy in the Islamic world, directly opposite to US economic and military imperialism in Islamic countries.

And finally, the Macedonians, instead of being the bone of contention of the southern Orthodox Slavs, should become the embryo of the Serbian-Bulgarian association, the first step to creating a true Great Yugoslavia.

An impartial geopolitical analysis of the Yugoslav problem leads to such conclusions. Of course, in the horror of a fratricidal war, it is difficult to maintain common sense, the blood flows awaken in the hearts of only rage and desire for revenge. But sometimes, perhaps only a cold, sensible analysis, taking into account historical roots and geopolitical patterns, can offer the right way out of the impasse of fratricidal war, while emotional solidarity with one or another will only aggravate the hopelessness of a bloody nightmare. In addition, such an analysis clearly shows that the true enemy that threatens the entire intra-Slavic

analysis clearly shows that the true enemy that provokes the entire intra-Slavic genocide remains in the background, behind the scenes, preferring to watch from afar how one Slavic people destroys another, spreading discord, blocking the possibility of union and fraternal peace for many years, the Great The spaces of the most powerful, but now fragmented continent.

The true initiator of the Yugoslav massacre is the atlantic forces of the West, guided by the principle "in the camp of the enemy, one must be set against others and in no case should unity, union and fraternal unity be allowed." This must be understood by all participants in the complex Yugoslav war for Europe so that it does not become a final war against Europe.

5.8 Serbia is Russia

The importance of the Yugoslav events also lies in the fact that, as an example of a small Balkan country, the scenario of a gigantic continental war that could erupt in Russia seems to be played. All the geopolitical forces participating in the Balkan conflict have their analogues in Russia, too, only in an incomparably larger spatial volume. Croats and Slovenes, aspiring to enter Central Europe, have their geopolitical synonyms for Ukrainians, although the affinity of these latter with Great Russia dates back not several decades, but several centuries, and confessional friction, except for Uniates and Ukrainian Catholics, does not exist here. Be that as it may, judging by certain trends, some of Kiev's forces are beginning to "be weighed down by the Russian East" and are striving to draw closer to the European space economically controlled by Germany. Russian and other nations living in Ukraine may become hostages to the "mid-European" policies of these republics, in which case their fate will be similar to the fate of the Serbs in Croatia.

Such a comparison, among other things, shows that in geopolitical and diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia should be guided by its fundamental understanding of the problem of Central Europe, i.e. First of all, Germany. In order to be realistic in this matter, one should proceed from the pathetic slogans about the "unity of the blood brothers of the Slavs" (how this "unity" can be seen in the Serbo-Croat war massacre), but from an in-depth analysis of the logic of Russian-German relations since both Ukraine and even Poland are not independent geopolitical entities, but only the border regions of the two Great Spaces of Eurasia-Russia and Central Europe. We must not forget

that the conflict in this border zone is extremely beneficial to another West geopolitical force. It is no coincidence that Anglo-Saxon diplomacy always regarded all territories from Romania to the Baltic states as a "sanitary belt" protecting the West (and especially the Anglo-Saxon world) from the Russian-German union that was extremely undesirable for it.

The Serbo-Muslim conflict is an analogue of a possible Russian-Islamic confrontation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and it is important to note that in this case, the Muslim republics that were part of the USSR are a zone of competitive geopolitical influence of Turkey and Iran. As in the case of Yugoslav Muslims, this comparison shows that republics oriented towards Iran are more likely to come to geopolitical harmony with the main Russian bloc of the Eurasian continent. Conversely, the geopolitical factor of Turkey, which currently plays the role of a conductor of the Atlantic policy in this region, is necessarily associated with dramatic and conflict situations.

The example of Yugoslavia shows what threatens Russia in the event of a similar course of events, and the fact that these events are really unfolding in the same direction today is no longer in doubt. The whole difference is only in speed, which is greater, the smaller the space and the smaller nations. In order to prevent a gigantic "Yugoslavia", monstrous in scale and consequences of a bloody massacre, in Russia, it is necessary to give an answer to fundamental geopolitical questions in advance, determine the Russian continental strategy, which should be guided by a knowledge of the Russian political tradition and an understanding of the main geopolitical tasks of Russia-Eurasia, "Geographic Axis of History." Moreover, inertia and passive following the fatal course of events will be not only destructive for the entire system of continental security, but also fraught with the death of all mankind.

Chapter 6 - From Sacred Geography to Geopolitics

6.1 Geopolitics "intermediate" science

Geopolitical concepts have long become the most important factors in modern politics. They are based on general principles that make it easy to analyze the situation of any particular country and any particular region.

Geopolitics in the form in which it exists today is certainly secular, "profane", secularized science. But, perhaps, it was she who, among all other modern sciences, retained in herself the greatest connection with Tradition and with the traditional sciences. Rene Guenon said that modern chemistry is the result of the desacralization of the traditional science of alchemy, and modern physics is magic. In the same way, it can be said that modern geopolitics is a product of secularization, desacralization of another traditional science of sacred geography. But since geopolitics occupies a special place among modern sciences, and it is often ranked as a "pseudoscience," its profanization is not as perfect and irreversible as in the case of chemistry or physics. Connections with sacred geography are visible here quite clearly. Therefore, we can say that geopolitics occupies an intermediate position between traditional science (sacred geography) and profane science.

6.2 Land and sea

Two initial concepts in the geopolitics of land and sea. It is these two elements, Earth and Water, that underlie the qualitative representation of man about the earth's space. In experiencing land and sea, land and water, man comes into contact with the fundamental aspects of his existence. Land is stability, density, fixity, space as such. Water is mobility, softness, dynamics, time.

These two elements are the most obvious manifestations of the material nature of the world. They are outside of man: everything is dense and fluid. They are also inside it: body and blood. (Same thing at the cellular level.)

The universality of the experience of earth and water gives rise to the traditional concept of the firmament of Heaven, since the presence of the Upper Waters (source of rain) in the sky also presupposes the presence of a symmetrical and obligatory element of the earth, land, and heavenly stronghold. Be that as it may, the Earth, Sea, Ocean are the main categories of earthly existence, and mankind cannot but see in them some basic attributes of the universe. As the two main terms of geopolitics, they retain their meaning both for civilizations of the traditional type, and for purely modern states, peoples, and ideological blocs. At the level of global geopolitical phenomena, the Susha and the Sea gave rise to the terms: thalassocracy and tellurocracy, i.e. "power by the sea" and "power by land".

Every state, every empire bases its strength on the preferred development of one of these categories. Empires are either "thalassocratic" or "tellurocratic." The first assumes the presence of a metropolis and colonies, the second capital and provinces on "common land". In the case of "thalassocracy", its territories are not united in one land space, which creates a discontinuity factor. The sea is both a strong and weak place of "thalassocratic power." Tellurocracy, in contrast, has the quality of territorial continuity.

But geographic and cosmological logic immediately complicates a seemingly simple scheme of this separation: a pair of "land-sea" when superimposed on each other of its elements gives the idea of "sea land" and "earth water". Sea land is an island, i.e. the foundation of the maritime empire, the pole of thalassocracy. Ground water or land water is a river that predetermines the development of a land empire. It is on the river that cities are located, and therefore the capital, the pole of Tellurocracy. This symmetry is both symbolic and economic-economic and geographical at the same time. It is important to note that the status of the Island and Continent is determined not so much on the basis of their physical size, but on the basis of the specifics of a typical population consciousness. Thus, US geopolitics is of an island character, despite the size of North America, and island Japan geopolitically represents an example of a continental mentality, etc.

Another detail is important: historically, thalassocracy is connected with the West and the Atlantic Ocean, and tellurocracy with the East and the Eurasian continent. (The above example of Japan is thus explained by the stronger "pull", the influence of Eurasia.)

Thalassocracy and Atlantism became synonymous long before the colonial

Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy became synonymous long before the colonial expansion of Great Britain or the Portuguese-Spanish conquests. Even before the beginning of the wave of sea migrations, the peoples of the West and their cultures began to move east from the centers located in the Atlantic. The Mediterranean also developed from Gibraltar to the Middle East, and not vice versa. On the contrary, excavations in Eastern Siberia and Mongolia show that it was here that the oldest centers of civilization existed, which means that it was the central lands of the continent that were the cradle of Eurasian humanity.

6.3 Symbolism of the landscape

In addition to the two global categories of Land and Sea, geopolitics also operates with more specific definitions. Among thalassocratic realities, marine and oceanic formations are divided. Thus, the civilization of the seas, for example, the Black or Mediterranean, is very different in quality from the civilization of the oceans, i.e. island powers and peoples inhabiting the shores of open oceans. River and lake civilizations associated with continents are also more private.

Tellurocracy also has its own specific forms. Thus, one can distinguish between the civilization of the Steppes and the civilization of the Forests, the civilization of the Mountains and the civilization of the Dales, the civilization of the Desert and the civilization of Ice. Varieties of landscape in sacred geography are understood as symbolic complexes associated with the specifics of the state, religious and ethical ideology of certain peoples. And even in the case when we are dealing with a universalistic ecumenical religion, anyway its concrete embodiment in a particular nation, race, state will be subject to adaptation in accordance with the local sacred-geographical context.

Deserts and steppes are a geopolitical microcosm of nomads. It is in the deserts and steppes that the tellurocratic tendencies reach their peak, since the “water” factor is minimized here. It is the empires of the Desert and the Barrens that logically should be the geopolitical bridgehead of Tellurocracy.

The empire of Genghis Khan can be considered a model of the steppe empire, and the Arabian caliphate, which arose under the direct influence of nomads, is a typical example of the empire of the Desert.

Mountains and mountain civilizations most often represent archaic, fragmented formations. Mountainous countries are not only not sources of expansion, but, on the contrary, victims of the geopolitical expansion of other tellurocratic forces are drawn to them. No empire has mountain centers as its center. Hence the so often repeated motive of sacred geography: "the mountains are inhabited by demons." On the other hand, the idea of preserving the remnants of ancient races and civilizations in the mountains is reflected in the fact that it is in the mountains that the sacred centers of tradition are located. You could even say that in Tellurocracy, mountains are related to some kind of spiritual authority.

The logical combination of both concepts of mountains as an image of a priestly and plain as an image of a regal became symbolism of a hill, i.e. small or medium elevation. The hill is a symbol of royal power, rising above the secular level of the steppe, but not beyond the limits of sovereign interests (as is the case in the case of mountains). The hill is the seat of the king, duke, emperor, but not priest. All capitals of large tellurocratic empires are located on a hill or on hills (often seven in the number of planets; five in the number of elements, including ether, etc.).

Forest in sacred geography, in a sense, is close to the mountains. The symbolism of the tree itself is related to the symbolism of the mountain (both mean the axis of the world). Therefore, the forest in Tellurocracy also performs a peripheral function; it is also a "place of priests" (druids, magi, hermits), but also a "place of demons," i.e. archaic remains of a disappeared past. The forest zone also cannot be the center of a land empire.

The tundra is a northern analogue of the steppe and desert, but the cold climate makes it much less significant from a geopolitical point of view. This "peripherality" reaches its peak in the ice, which, like mountains, are zones of deep archaic. It is significant that the Eskimo shamanic tradition presupposes a lonely removal to the ice, where the other world opens up to the future shaman. Thus, the ice is a priestly zone, the threshold of another world.

Given these initial and most general characteristics of the geopolitical map, it is possible to determine the various regions of the planet in accordance with their sacred quality. This method is also applicable to local landscape features at the level of a particular country or even a particular locality. You can also trace the similarity of ideologies and traditions among the most, it would seem, different peoples in the event that the same underlying landscape of their habitat.

6.4 East and West in sacred geography

The cardinal points in the context of sacred geography have a special qualitative characteristic. In various traditions and at different periods of these traditions, the picture of sacred geography can change in accordance with the cyclic phases of the development of this tradition. Moreover, the symbolic function of the cardinal points often varies. Without going into details, one can formulate the most universal law of sacred geography as applied to the East and West.

East in sacred geography on the basis of "cosmic symbolism" is traditionally considered the "land of the Spirit", the land of paradise, the land of fullness, abundance, the "homeland" of the Sacred in the most complete and perfect form. In particular, this idea is reflected in the text of the Bible, which refers to the eastern location of "Eden." Exactly this understanding is also characteristic of other Abrahamic traditions (Islam and Judaism), as well as many non-Arabian traditions of Chinese, Hindu and Iranian. "East is the abode of the gods," says the sacred formula of the ancient Egyptians, and the word "east" (in Egyptian "neter") meant both "god". From the point of view of natural symbolism, the East is the place where the sun rises, "rises" the Light of the World, the material symbol of the Divine and the Spirit.

The West has exactly the opposite symbolic meaning. This is the "land of death", "world of the dead", "green country" (as the ancient Egyptians called it). The West is the "kingdom of exile," the "well of alienation," as Islamic mystics put it. The West is an "anti-East", a country of "sunset", decline, degradation, the transition from the manifest to the unmanifest, from life to death, from fullness to poverty, etc. West is the place where the sun sets, where it "sets".

In accordance with this logic of natural cosmic symbolism, ancient traditions organized their "sacred space", founded their cult centers, burials, temples and buildings, comprehended the natural and "civilizational" features of the geographical, cultural and state territories of the planet. Thus, the very structure of migrations, wars, campaigns, demographic waves, imperial construction, etc. determined by the original, paradigmatic logic of sacred geography. Peoples and civilizations lined up along the East-West axis, possessing hierarchical characteristics, the closer to the East, the closer to the Sacred, to Tradition, to spiritual abundance. The closer to the West, the greater the decline, degradation and mortification of the Spirit.

and mortification of the Spirit.

Of course, this logic was not absolute, but at the same time, it was not secondary and relative, as many "profane" scholars of ancient religions and traditions today mistakenly believe. In fact, sacred logic and adherence to cosmic symbolism were much more conscious, meaningful and effective among the ancient peoples than is commonly believed today. And even in our antisacral world, at the level of the "unconscious", the archetypes of sacred geography are almost always preserved in integrity and awakened at the most important and critical moments of social cataclysms.

So, sacred geography unambiguously affirms the law of "quality space", in which the East is a symbolic "ontological plus", and the West is an "ontological minus".

According to Chinese tradition, the East is the yang, masculine, light, solar principle, and the West is the yin, feminine, dark, lunar principle.

6.5 East and West in modern geopolitics

Now let us see how this sacred-geographical logic is reflected in geopolitics, which, being a purely modern science, fixes only the actual state of affairs, leaving behind the scenes the sacred principles themselves.

Geopolitics in its original formulation by Ratzel, Chellen, and Mackinder (and later by Haushofer and Russian Eurasians) was based on the particularities of various types of civilizations and states depending on their geographical location. Geopolitics have recorded the fact of a fundamental difference between the "island" and "continental" powers, between the "western", "progressive" civilization and the "eastern", "despotic" and "archaic" cultural forms. Since the question of the Spirit in its metaphysical and sacred understanding in modern science is never posed at all, geopolitics leave it aside, preferring to assess the situation in other, more modern terms than the concepts of "sacred" and "profane", "traditional" and "dietary antitra", etc.

Geopolitics record a fundamental difference between the state, cultural and industrial development of the regions of the East and the regions of the West in recent centuries. The picture is as follows. The West is the center of "material"

and "technological" development. At the cultural and ideological level, it is dominated by "liberal democratic" tendencies, an individualistic and humanistic worldview. At the economic level, priority is given to trade and technical modernization. It was in the West for the first time that theories of "progress", "evolution", "progressive development of history" appeared, completely alien to the traditional world of the East (and those periods of the history of the West, when there also existed a full-fledged sacred tradition on it, as, in particular, this took place in Middle Ages). Coercion at the social level in the West acquired a purely economic character, and the Law of Idea and Power was replaced by the Law of Money. Gradually, the specifics of the "ideology of the West" poured into the universal formula of the "ideology of human rights," which became the dominant principle of the westernmost region of the planet of North America, and especially the USA. At the industrial level, this ideology corresponded to the idea of "developed countries", and at the economic level, the concept of "free market", "economic liberalism". The totality of these characteristics with the addition of a purely military, strategic combination of different sectors of Western civilization is defined today by the concept of "Atlantism." In the last century, geopolitics spoke of the "Anglo-Saxon type of civilization" or the "capitalist, bourgeois democracy." The formula of the "geopolitical West" found its purest embodiment in this "atlantist" type.

The geopolitical East is the direct opposite of the geopolitical West. Instead of modernizing the economy, it is dominated by traditional, archaic forms of production of the corporate, shop type ("developing countries"). Instead of economic coercion, the state most often uses "moral" or simply physical coercion (the Law of Idea and the Law of Power). Instead of "democracy" and "human rights," the East gravitates toward totalitarianism, socialism, and authoritarianism, i.e. to different types of social regimes, the only ones being that the center of their systems is not "the individual", "person" with its "rights" and its purely "individual values", but something non-individual, non-human, whether it's a "society", "nation", "people", "idea", "worldview vision", "religion", "cult of the leader", etc. The West opposed Western liberal democracy with the most diverse types of illiberal, non-individualistic societies, from authoritarian monarchies to theocracy or socialism. Moreover, from a purely typological, geopolitical point of view, the political specificity of a particular regime was secondary in comparison with the qualitative division into the "western" (= "individual-trade-trading") system and the "eastern" (= "non-individualistic-power" system) Typical forms of such an anti-Western civilization were the USSR, communist China, Japan until 1945, or Iran
Khomeini

It is curious to note that Rudolf Chellen, the author who first used the term "geopolitics" for the first time, illustrated the difference between West and East. "A typical American sentence, Chellen wrote, is "go ahead," which literally means "forward." This reflects the internal and natural geopolitical optimism and "progressivism" of American civilization, which is the ultimate form of the Western model. Russians usually repeat the word "nothing" (in Russian in the text of AD Chellen). This shows the "pessimism", "contemplation", "fatalism" and "commitment to the tradition," characteristic of the East. "

If we return now to the paradigm of sacred geography, we will see a direct contradiction between the priorities of modern geopolitics (concepts such as "progress", "liberalism", "human rights", "trade system", etc., have become positive for most today terms) and priorities of sacred geography, evaluating the types of civilization from a completely opposite point of view (such concepts as "spirit", "contemplation", "submission to superhuman strength or superhuman idea", "ideocracy", etc. in sacred civilization were purely by positive and still remain so for the peoples of the East at the level of their "collective unconscious"). Thus, modern geopolitics (with the exception of Russian Eurasians, German followers of Haushofer, Islamic fundamentalists, etc.) assesses the picture of the world in exactly the opposite way than traditional sacred geography. But at the same time, both sciences agree in the description of the fundamental laws of the geographical picture of civilization.

6.6 Sacred North and Sacred South

In addition to sacred-geographical determinism along the East-West axis, the problem of another, vertical, axis of orientations of the North-South axis is extremely important. Here, as in all other cases, the principles of sacred geography, the symbolism of the cardinal points and the continents corresponding to them have a direct analogue in the geopolitical picture of the world, which either develops naturally during the historical process, or is consciously and artificially constructed as a result of targeted actions by leaders of other geopolitical entities. From the point of view of "integral traditionalism", the difference between "artificial" and "natural" is generally quite relative, since Tradition has never known anything like Cartesian or Kantian dualism, which strictly divides between "subjective" and "objective" ("phenomenal" new "and"

noumenal "). Therefore, the sacred determinism of the North or South is not only a physical, natural, landscape-climatic factor (that is, something "objective") or only an "idea", "concept" generated by the minds of certain individuals (i.e. something "subjective"), but something third superior to both the objective and subjective pole. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, in history bifurcates into a northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and into the idea of the North, "Nordism", on the other.

The most ancient and original layer of the Tradition is unequivocally affirmed by the primacy of the North over the South. The symbolism of the North relates to the Source, to the original Nordic paradise, where all human civilization originates from. Ancient Iranian and Zoroastrian texts speak of the northern country "Aryan Vaedzha" and its capital "Vara", from where the ancient Aryans were driven out by the glaciation that Ahriman, the spirit of Evil and the enemy of the bright Ormuzd sent to them. The ancient Vedas also speak of the Northern country as the ancestral home of the Indians, of the Light-Dvipa, the White Earth, lying in the far north.

The ancient Greeks spoke of Hyperborea, a northern island with the capital Tula. This land was considered the birthplace of the luminiferous god Apollo. And in many other traditions, traces of the oldest, often forgotten and fragmented, Nordic symbolism can be found. The main idea, traditionally associated with the North, is the idea of the Center, the Fixed Pole, the point of Eternity, around which not only space revolves, but also time, the cycle. The North is a land where the sun does not set even at night, the space of eternal light. Every sacred tradition honors the Center, the Middle, the point where the opposites converge, a symbolic place that is not subject to the laws of cosmic entropy. This Center, whose symbol is the Swastika (emphasizing the stillness and permanence of the Center and the mobility and variability of the periphery), was called differently in each tradition, but it was always directly or indirectly associated with the symbolism of the North. Therefore, we can say that all sacred traditions are the projections of the Unified Northern Primordial Tradition, adapted to various historical conditions. The north side of the Light, chosen by the original Logos in order to manifest itself in History, and any subsequent manifestation of it only restored the original polar paradise symbolism.

Sacred geography correlates the North with spirit, light, purity, fullness, unity, eternity.

The south symbolizes something directly opposite to materiality, darkness

THE SOUTH symbolizes something directly opposite to materiality, darkness, confusion, deprivation, multiplicity, immersion in the stream of time and formation. Even from a natural point of view, in the polar regions there is one long semi-annual Day and one long semi-annual Night. This is the Day and Night of the gods and heroes, angels. Even degraded traditions remembered this sacred, spiritual, supernatural side of the North, considering the northern regions the abode of "spirits" and "otherworldly forces." In the South, Day and Night of the gods split into many human days, the original symbolism of Hyperborea is lost, and memory of it becomes a factor of "culture", "tradition". In general, the south is often related to culture, i.e. with that sphere of human activity where the Invisible and Purely Spiritual acquires its material, coarsened, visible outlines. The south is the realm of matter, life, biology and instincts. The South decomposes the northern purity of the Tradition, but retains its traces in a materialized form.

The North-South pair in sacred geography does not boil down to the abstract contrast of Good and Evil. Rather, it is a confrontation between the Spiritual Idea and its coarse, material embodiment. In the normal case, with the primacy of the North recognized by the South between these parts of the world, harmonious relations exist. The North "spiritualizes" the South, the Nordic envoys give the Southerners a Tradition, lay the foundations of sacred civilizations. If the South refuses to recognize the primacy of the North, a sacred confrontation, the "war of the continents" begins, and, from the point of view of tradition, it is the South that is responsible for this conflict with its crime of sacred norms. In Ramayana, for example, the southern island of Lanka is considered the abode of demons who have abducted the wife of Rama, Sita and declared war on the continental North with the capital Ayodhya.

It is important to note that the North-South axis in sacred geography is more important than the East-West axis. But being more important, it correlates with the most ancient stages of cyclical history. The great war of the North and the South, Hyperborea and Gondwana (the ancient paleocontinent of the South) refers to the "antediluvian" times. In the last phases of the cycle, it becomes more hidden, veiled. The ancient paleocontinents of the North and South also disappear. The relay race passes to the East and West.

The change of the vertical North – South axis to the horizontal East – West, which is characteristic of the last stages of the cycle, nevertheless, preserves a logical and symbolic connection between these two sacred – geographical pairs. The North-South pair (i.e. Spirit-Matter, Eternity-Time) is projected onto the

East-West pair (i.e. Tradition and Profanism, Source and Sunset). East is the horizontal projection of the North down. West is a horizontal projection of the South up. From this transfer of sacred meanings, one can easily obtain the structure of the continental vision characteristic of the Tradition.

6.7 People of the North

The sacred North defines a special human type, which may have its biological, racial incarnation, but may not have it. The essence of "Nordism" is the ability of man to erect every object of the physical, material world to his archetype, to his Idea. This quality is not a simple development of a rational beginning. On the contrary, the Carthusian and Kantian "pure reason" is just not able to naturally overcome the fine line between the "phenomenon" and "noumenon," but it is this ability that lies at the basis of "Nordic" thinking. The man of the North is not just white, "Aryan" or Indo-European by blood, language and culture. Man of the North is a specific type of being endowed with the direct intuition of the Sacred. For him, the cosmos is a fabric of symbols, each of which points to the Spiritual Principle hidden from the eyes. The man of the North is a "solar man", Sonnenmensch, who does not absorb energy like black matter, but releases it, pouring out streams of creation, light, strength and wisdom from his soul.

Purely Nordic civilization disappeared along with ancient Hyperborea, but it was its ambassadors who laid the foundations of all existing traditions. It was this Nordic "race" of the Teachers that stood at the origins of religions and cultures of the peoples of all continents and skin colors. Traces of the Hyperborean cult can be found among the Indians of North America, the ancient Slavs, the founders of Chinese civilization, the Pacific Aborigines, the blond Germans, the black shamans of West Africa, the Red-skinned Aztecs, and the high-skinned Mongols. There is no such nation on the planet that does not have the myth of the "solar man," Sonnenmensch. The true spiritual, suprarational Mind, the divine Logos, the ability to see through the world its secret Soul are the defining qualities of the North. Where there is Sacred Purity and Wisdom, the North is invisibly present, no matter what time or space point we are in.

6.8 People of the South

Man of the South, gondvanic type is the exact opposite of the "Nordic" type. The Man of the South lives surrounded by effects, secondary manifestations; he abides in the cosmos, which he reveres, but does not understand. He worships the external, but not the internal. He carefully preserves traces of spirituality, its embodiment in the material environment, but is not able to move from the symbolizing symbolizing to symbolizing. The man of the South lives in passions and impulses, he puts the spiritual above the spiritual (which he simply does not know) and honors Life as the highest authority. The man of the South is characterized by the cult of the Great Mother, matter that generates a variety of forms. Civilization of the South is the civilization of the Moon, receiving its light from the Sun (North), preserving and transmitting it for some time, but periodically losing contact with it (new moon). Man of the South Mondmensch.

When the people of the South are in harmony with the people of the North, i.e. recognize their authority and their typological (and not racial) superiority, civilizational harmony reigns. When they claim the primacy of their archetypal attitude towards reality, a distorted cultural type arises, which can be defined collectively as idolatry, fetishism or paganism (in a negative, derogatory sense of the term).

As in the case of the paleocontinents, pure northern and southern types existed only in ancient times. The people of the North and the people of the South opposed each other in the primordial era. Later, entire peoples of the North penetrated the southern lands, sometimes establishing the pronounced "Nordic" civilizations of ancient Iran, India. On the other hand, southerners sometimes went far to the North, carrying their cultural type of Finns, Eskimos, Chukchi, etc. Gradually, the original clarity of the sacred-geographical panorama became clouded. But in spite of everything, the typological dualism of the "people of the North" and "people of the South" persisted at all times and in all eras, not so much as an external conflict of two different civilizations, but as an internal conflict within the framework of the same civilization. The type of the North and the type of the South, starting at some point in sacred history, are opposed to each other everywhere, regardless of the specific place of the planet.

6.9 North and South in the East and in the West

The type of people of the North could be projected both to the South, and to the East, and to the West. In the South, the Finns of the North, according to most

East, and to the west. In the South, the Light of the North gave rise to great metaphysical civilizations, like the Indian, Iranian or Chinese, which in the situation of the "conservative" South for a long time kept the revelation entrusted to them. However, the simplicity and clarity of northern symbolism here turned into complex and diverse intricacies of sacred doctrines, rituals and rites. However, the farther to the South, the weaker the traces of the North. And among the inhabitants of the Pacific islands and southern Africa, the "Nordic" motifs in mythology and rituals are preserved in extremely fragmentary, rudimentary and even distorted form.

In the East, the North manifests itself as a classical traditional society based on the unequivocal superiority of the super-individual over the individual, where the "human" and "rational" are erased in the face of the superhuman and super-rational Principle. If the South gives civilization the character of "sustainability", then the East determines its sacredness and authenticity, the main guarantor of which is the Light of the North.

In the West, the North manifested itself in heroic societies, where the West's pervasive tendency toward fragmentation, individualization, and rationalization overcame itself, and the individual, becoming a Hero, went beyond the narrow framework of a "human-too-human" personality. The North in the West is personified by the symbolic figure of Hercules, who, on the one hand, liberates Prometheus (a purely Western, Godless, "humanistic" tendency), and on the other hand helps Zeus and the gods defeat the giants who rebelled against them (that is, serves the blessing of the sacred norms and spiritual Order).

The south, in contrast, is projected onto all three orientations in exactly the opposite way. In the North, it gives the effect of "archaism" and cultural stagnation. Even the northern, "Nordic" traditions themselves, under the influence of the southern, "Paleo-Asian," "Finnish," or "Eskimo" elements, acquire the character of "idolatry" and "fetishism". (This, in particular, is characteristic of the Germanic-Scandinavian civilization of the "Skald era".)

In the East, the forces of the South are manifested in despotic societies, where normal and fair eastern indifference to the individual turns into a denial of the great Superhuman Subject. All forms of totalitarianism of the East are both typologically and racially related to the South.

And finally, in the West, the South manifests itself in extremely gross, materialistic forms of individualism, when atomic individuals reach the limit of

antihero degeneration, worshipping only the "golden calf" of comfort and selfish hedonism. Obviously, it is precisely such a combination of two sacred-geopolitical tendencies that gives the most negative type of civilization, since in it two orientations overlap each other, which themselves are negative South vertically and West horizontally.

6.10 From continents to metacontinents

If, in the perspective of sacred geography, the symbolic North unambiguously corresponds to the positive aspects, and the South negatively, then in the purely modern geopolitical picture of the world, everything is much more complicated, and in some way, even vice versa. Modern geopolitics under the terms "North" and "South" refers to completely different categories than sacred geography.

Firstly, the paleocontinent of the North, Hyperborea, has not existed on the physical level for many millennia, remaining a spiritual reality, to which the spiritual view of the initiates seeking the original Tradition is directed.

Secondly, the ancient Nordic race, the race of "white teachers" who came from the pole in the primordial era, does not coincide with what is commonly called the "white race" today, based only on physical characteristics, on skin color, etc. The north of the Tradition and its original population, the "Nordic autochthons" no longer represent a concrete historical and geographical reality. Apparently, even the last vestiges of this primordial culture disappeared from physical reality several millennia ago.

Thus, the North in Tradition is a meta-historical and metageographic reality. The same can be said of the "Hyperborean race", it is a "race" not in a biological, but in a purely spiritual, metaphysical sense. (The theme of "metaphysical races" was developed in detail in the writings of Julius Evola).

The Continent of the South and the South of Tradition as a whole have long ceased to exist in their pure form, as well as its most ancient population. In a certain sense, practically the whole planet became a "South" at some point, as the influence on the world of the original polar initiative center and its envoys narrowed. The modern races of the South are the product of numerous mixtures with the races of the North, and skin color has long ceased to be the main hallmark of belonging to one or another "metaphysical race".

In other words, the modern geopolitical picture of the world has very little in common with the fundamental vision of the world in its super-historical, over-time section. Continents and their population in our era are extremely removed from those archetypes that corresponded to them in primordial times. Therefore, between real continents and real races (as the realities of modern geopolitics), on the one hand, and metakontinents and metaraces (as realities of traditional sacred geography), on the other hand, today there is not just a difference, but almost the opposite.

6.11 The Illusion of the "Rich North"

Modern geopolitics uses the concept of "north" most often with the definition of "rich", "rich north", as well as "developed north". By this is meant the entire totality of Western civilization, which focuses on the development of the material and economic side of life. The "Rich North" is rich not because it is more intelligent, more intelligent or spiritual than "South", but because it builds its social system on the principle of maximizing material benefits that can be derived from social and natural potential, from exploitation of human and natural resources. The "Rich North" is racially connected with those peoples that have white skin color, and this feature underlies various versions of overt or covert "Western racism" (especially Anglo-Saxon). The successes of the "rich North" in the material sphere were elevated to the political and even "racial" principle precisely in those countries that were at the forefront of industrial, technical and economic development i.e. England, Holland, and later Germany and the USA. In this case, material and quantitative well-being was equated with a qualitative criterion, and on this basis the most ridiculous prejudices of "barbarism", "primitiveness", "underdevelopment" and "subhumanity" of the southern (that is, not belonging to the "rich North" developed ") peoples. Such "economic racism" was especially evident in the Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests, and later its embellished versions entered into the most rude and contradictory aspects of the national-socialist ideology. Moreover, often Nazi ideologists simply confused vague speculations about purely "spiritual Nordism" and the "spiritual Aryan race" with the vulgar, mercantile, bio-commercial racism of the English sample. (By the way, it was this substitution of sacred geography categories with the categories of material and technical development that was the most negative side of National Socialism, which led it, in the end, to political, theoretical, and even

military collapse). But even after the defeat of the Third Reich, this type of racism of the "rich North" did not by any means disappear from political life. However, its carriers were primarily the United States and its Atlanticist employees in Western Europe. Of course, the issue of biological and racial purity is not emphasized in the latest mondialist doctrines of the "rich North", but, nevertheless, in practice in relation to the undeveloped and developing countries of the Third World the "rich North" still displays purely "racist" arrogance, characteristic of for the British colonialists, and for the German national-socialist orthodox Rosenberg line.

In fact, "rich North" geopolitically means those countries in which the forces that are directly opposed to Traditions, the forces of quantity, materialism, atheism, spiritual degradation and mental degeneration triumphed. "Rich North" means something radically different from "spiritual Nordism," from "Hyperborean spirit." The essence of the North in sacred geography is the primacy of spirit over matter, the final and total victory of Light, Justice and Purity over the darkness of animal life, the arbitrariness of individual addictions and the filth of low selfishness. The "rich North" of Mondialist geopolitics, on the contrary, means purely material well-being, hedonism, a consumer society, the trouble-free and artificial pseudoray of those whom Nietzsche called "the last people." The material progress of technical civilization was accompanied by a monstrous spiritual regression of a truly sacred culture, and therefore, from the point of view of the Tradition, the "wealth" of the modern "developed" North cannot serve as a criterion of genuine superiority over material "poverty" and the technical backwardness of the modern "primitive South."

Moreover, the "poverty" of the South at the material level is very often inversely related to the preservation of truly sacred forms of civilization in the southern regions, which means that spiritual wealth is sometimes hidden behind this "poverty". At least two sacred civilizations continue to exist in the spaces of the South to this day, despite all the attempts of the "rich (and aggressive) North" to impose their own measures and development paths on everyone. This is Hindu India and the Islamic world. There are different points of view regarding the Far Eastern tradition, since some even see, under the cover of "Marxist" and "Maoist" rhetoric, some traditional principles that have always been decisive for Chinese sacred civilization. Be that as it may, even those southern regions, which are populated by peoples who adhere to very ancient and half-forgotten sacred traditions, still in comparison with the atheized and extremely materialistic "rich North" seem to be "spiritual", "full" and "normal", while the "rich North" itself, from a spiritual point of view, is completely "abnormal" and

rich North" itself, from a spiritual point of view, is completely abnormal and "pathological."

6.12 The Paradox of the Third World

"Poor South" in mondialist projects is actually a synonym for "Third World". This world was called the "third" during the Cold War, and this concept itself suggested that the first two "worlds" of the developed capitalist and less developed Soviet are more important and significant for global geopolitics than all other regions. In principle, the expression "Third World" has a derogatory meaning, since according to the logic of the utilitarian approach of the "rich North", such a definition actually equates the countries of the "Third World" with the "draw" bases of natural and human resources, which should only be subordinated, exploited and used for their own purposes. At the same time, the "rich North" skillfully played on the traditional political, ideological and religious characteristics of the "poor South", trying to put at the service of its purely materialistic and economic interests those forces and structures that in spiritual potential far exceeded the spiritual level of the "North" itself. He almost always succeeded, since the cyclical moment of the development of our civilization itself favors perverted, abnormal, and unnatural tendencies (according to the Tradition, we are now in the very last period of the "dark age", Kali-yuga). Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, the autochthonous traditions of the "non-white" peoples became only obstacles for the material conquerors of the "rich North" to achieve their goals, but at the same time they often used certain aspects of the Tradition to achieve mercantile goals while playing on contradictions, religious characteristics or national problems. Such a utilitarian use of aspects of the Tradition for purely anti-traditional purposes was even more evil than a direct denial of the whole Tradition, since the highest perversion is to make the great serve nothing.

In fact, the "poor South" is "poor" on the material level precisely because of its essentially spiritual orientation, which assigns always a secondary and unimportant place to the material aspects of existence. The geopolitical South in our era has retained a broadly purely traditionalist attitude towards the objects of the outside world, a calm, detached and, in the end, indifferent in direct contrast to the material obsession with the "rich North", contrary to its materialistic and hedonistic paranoia. People of the "poor South", in the normal case, while living in the Tradition, still live fuller, deeper and even more luxurious, since active

participation in the sacred Tradition gives all aspects of their personal life the meaning, intensity, richness that they have long been deprived of representatives of the “rich North”, tormented by neurosis, material fear, inner emptiness, complete aimlessness of existence, which is just a languid kaleidoscope of vivid, but meaningless pictures.

It could be said that the ratio between the North and the South in primordial times is polar opposite to the ratio between them in our era, since it is the South that still retains ties with the Tradition, while the North has completely lost them. But nevertheless, this statement does not completely cover the fullness of the real picture, since the true Tradition cannot allow such a derogatory treatment with itself as is practiced by the aggressively atheistic “rich North” with the “Third World”. The fact is that Tradition is preserved in the South only inertially, fragmentarily, partially. She takes a passive position and resists, only defending herself. Therefore, the spiritual North does not fully transfer to the South at the end of time, in the South only the spiritual impulses that came from the sacred North once accumulate and remain. In principle, active traditional initiative cannot come from the South. And vice versa, the mondialist “rich North” was able to strengthen its corrupting influence on the planet in this way thanks to the very specifics of the northern regions predisposed to activity. The North has been and remains a place of power for the most part, therefore geopolitical initiatives coming from the North have true effectiveness.

The “Poor South” today has all the spiritual advantages over the “rich North,” but it cannot serve as a serious alternative to the profane aggression of the “rich North”, nor can it offer a radical geopolitical project that can disrupt the pathological picture of modern planetary space.

6.13 Role of the Second World

In the bipolar geopolitical picture of “rich North” and “poor South”, there has always existed an additional component that was independent and very important. This is the second world. By “second world” it is customary to mean a socialist camp integrated into the Soviet system. This “second world” was neither truly “rich North”, since certain spiritual motives implicitly influenced the nominally materialistic ideology of Soviet socialism, nor really the “Third world”, as a whole orientation to material development, “progress ”and other

purely profane principles lay at the heart of the Soviet system. The geopolitically Eurasian USSR was also located both in the territories of "poor Asia" and in the lands of a rather "civilized" Europe. During the period of socialism, the planetary belt of the "rich North" was opened in the east of Eurasia, complicating the clarity of geopolitical relations along the North-South axis.

The end of the Second World as a special civilization suggests for the Eurasian territories of the former USSR two alternatives either to integrate into the "rich North" (represented by the West and the USA), or slide into the "poor South", i.e. turn into a "Third World". A compromise is also possible for some of the regions to leave for the North, and some for the South. As always in recent centuries, the initiative to redistribute geopolitical spaces in this process belongs to the "rich North", which, cynically using the paradoxes of the Second World concept itself, draws new geopolitical boundaries and redistributes zones of influence. National, economic and religious factors serve the Mondialists only as tools in their cynical and deeply materialistically motivated activities. It is not surprising that, in addition to deceitful "humanistic" rhetoric, almost openly "racist" arguments are used more and more often, designed to instill in the Russians a complex of "white" arrogance towards Asian and Caucasian southerners. Correlated with this is the reverse process of the final rejection of the southern territories of the former "Second World" to the "poor South" accompanied by a game of fundamentalist tendencies, the people's craving for Tradition, for the revival of religion.

The "Second World," disintegrating, breaks down along the line of "traditionalism" (southern, inertial, conservative type), "anti-traditionalism" (actively northern, modernist and materialistic type). Such dualism, which is only planned today, but will soon become the dominant phenomenon of Eurasian geopolitics, is predetermined by the expansion of the Mondialist understanding of the world in terms of the "rich North" and "poor South". An attempt to save the former Soviet Great Space, an attempt to simply save the "Second World" as something independent and balancing on the border between the North and the South (in a purely modern sense), cannot succeed until the very basic concept of modern geopolitics is put into question, understood and realized in its real form, on the other side of all deceptive statements of a humanitarian and economic nature.

The Second World is disappearing. In the modern geopolitical picture, he no longer has a place. At the same time, the pressure of the "rich North" on the "poor South" increases which remains alone with the aggressive materiality of a

poor South" increases, which remains alone with the aggressive materiality of a technocratic civilization in the absence of the intermediate authority that has existed so far in the Second World. Some other fate than a total split according to the rules dictated by the "rich North" for the "Second World" is possible only through a radical rejection of the planetary logic of the North-South dichotomous axis, taken in a mondialistic vein.

6.14 The Resurrection of the North project

The "rich Mondialist North" globalizes its domination of the planet through the split and destruction of the "Second World". This is called modern world order in modern geopolitics. The active forces of anti-tradition consolidate their victory over the passive resistance of the southern regions, at the cost of economic backwardness preserving and protecting the Tradition in its residual forms. The internal geopolitical energies of the Second World are faced with the choice of either integrating into the system of the "civilized northern belt" and finally breaking off ties with sacred history (the project of left mondialism), or turning into occupied territory with the partial restoration of some aspects of the tradition (project of right mondialism). It is in this direction that events are unfolding today and will unfold in the near future.

As an alternative project, one can theoretically formulate a different path of geopolitical transformations, based on the rejection of Mondialist North-South logic and on the return to the spirit of genuine sacred geography as much as possible at the end of the dark age. This is a project of the "Great Return" or, in other terminology, the "Great War of Continents."

In the most general terms, the essence of this project is as follows.

1) The "rich North" is not opposed to the "poor South", but the "poor North". "Poor North" is the ideal, sacred ideal of returning to the Nordic origins of civilization. Such a North is "poor" because it is based on total asceticism, on radical devotion to the highest values of the Tradition, on complete sacrifice of the material for the spiritual. The "Poor North" geographically exists only in the territories of Russia, which, being essentially the "Second World," socially and politically opposed to the last moment the final adoption of the Mondialist civilization in its most "progressive" forms. The Eurasian northern lands of Russia are the only planetary territories that have not been fully developed by

the "rich North", inhabited by traditional peoples, and constituted the terra incognita of the modern world. The path of the "Poor North" for Russia means a refusal both to integrate into the mondialist belt and to archaize their own traditions and to bring them to the folklore level of the ethno-religious reservation. The "Poor North" must be spiritual, intelligent, active and aggressive. In other regions of the "rich North", potential opposition of the "poor North" is also possible, which can manifest itself in radical sabotage by the intellectual Western elite of the fundamental course of "mercantile civilization", an uprising against the world of finance for the ancient and eternal values of the Spirit, justice, and self-sacrifice. The "Poor North" begins a geopolitical and ideological battle with the "rich North", abandoning its projects, blowing up its plans from inside and outside, undermining its impeccable effectiveness, disrupting its socio-political frauds.

2) The "Poor South", unable to independently confront the "rich North", enters into a radical alliance with the "poor (Eurasian) North" and begins the liberation struggle against the "northern" dictatorship. It is especially important to strike at representatives of the ideology of the "rich South", i.e. by the forces that, working for the "rich North", advocate for the "development", "progress" and "modernization" of traditional countries, which in practice will mean only an ever greater departure from the remnants of the sacred Tradition.

3) The "Poor North" of the Eurasian East, together with the "poor South", extending around the circumference of the entire planet, concentrate their forces in the fight against the "rich North" of the Atlantic West. At the same time, the ideological forever puts an end to the vulgar versions of Anglo-Saxon racism, the chanting of the "technical civilization of the white peoples" and the accompanying mondialist propaganda. (Alain de Benoist expressed this idea in the title of his famous book "Third World and Europe: we are united in the struggle" "L'Europe, Tiersmonde même combat"; it naturally refers to "spiritual Europe", "Europe of peoples and traditions" and not about "Maastricht Europe traders".) The intellectuality, activity and spirituality of the genuine sacred North returns the traditions of the South to the Nordic Source and raises the "southerners" to a planetary rebellion against a single geopolitical enemy. The passive resistance of the "southerners" thereby acquires a fulcrum in the planetary messianism of the "northerners", who radically reject the vicious and antisacral branch of those white peoples who have embarked on the path of technological progress and material development. The planetary supra-racial and supranational Geopolitical Revolution erupts, based on the fundamental solidarity of the Third World with that part of the Second World that rejects the

solidarity of the Third World with that part of the Second World that rejects the project of the "rich North".

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