


COLLECTED WORKS OF

ARNE NÆSS

DEEP

ECOLOGY

VOLUME 6



BERSERKER

BOOKS



IV

DEEP ECOLOGY PRACTICES: INTEGRATING CULTURAL AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY

The Encouraging Richness and Diversity of Ultimate Premises in Environmental Philosophy

Those who join efforts to support basic changes of human attitudes and policies in our relations to nature have different philosophies and religious creeds. The richness and diversity of ultimate positions within these creeds is a source for future deep cultural diversity. It is one of the central tasks of environmental philosophers to study different positions, but not to try to reduce the ultimate differences.

This article is motivated by my opposition to looking for a single environmental philosophy or one environmental ethics. There are some agreements we should note with satisfaction, others that we should note with concern: has undue conformity, calcification, lack of imagination, closed-mindedness, or lack of a critical attitude set in? It happens in science, but Thomas Kuhn and others have made people aware of it there.

Supporters of the deep ecology movement in the so-called Second, Third, and Fourth worlds have in part widely differing cultural backgrounds from those of the First World. It is quite natural that the different religious, metaphysical, and philosophical trends color the ultimate premises in systematizations from which the ultimate parts of an environmental ethics are derived. Should all groups within the fairly homogeneous First World have a set of ultimate premises in common? Recently, some Christian groups have made use of the normative statement that all that is directly created by God has intrinsic value. There are other groups who cannot make use of such an ultimate or penultimate norm. I find it encour-

This article was reprinted with permission from *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9 (Spring 1992): 53–60.

aging that considerable differences exist, and I hope this situation will continue. Even Max Oelschlaeger, after a careful account of different ideas of wilderness, ends his book by expressing the need for a single “postmodern” paradigm (Oelschlaeger 1991: 350ff.). I have the feeling that he has the whole world in mind, that is, a paradigm that the human inhabitants on this planet have in common.

The influence of the deep ecology movement—*roughly* the movement by people who act in favor of a change “in everything” in order to overcome the ecological crisis—is dependent on activism in the sense of decisions and actions in particular (dated) situations, indirectly motivated by religious or philosophical fundamental premises. The influence does not depend on all supporters agreeing on the ultimate premises. It is not even dependent on mutual understanding at this level. I do not clearly understand Gary Snyder’s ultimates, and I probably never will.

In most cases of joint action or effort, it is irrelevant which premises are used as ultimates as long as they are considered to imply the principles of the movement (“level 2”) and, together with other premises, the concrete decisions.

Let us consider the Leopold formula as an example: “A thing is right where it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.” Some might use this sentence as a formulation of a fundamental normative premise; that is, they would try to derive other norms from it, and not try to derive it from other norms. Others might take it only as a convenient point of departure and spell out a set of sentences that they think are more precise but that may still be considered plausible interpretations of the Leopold sentence. Then they would specify one or more of the “precizations” indicating agreement, with one or more reporting disagreement. What is of greater interest is that some supporters of the deep ecology movement would strongly disagree, or would find the Leopold formula difficult or impossible to understand clearly. Personally, I belong to the latter category of supporters, but I do not feel motivated to argue, because the so-called “fascist” implications obviously can be avoided by suitable interpretations. The Eight Points that G. Sessions and I have tentatively proposed as formulations of a set of principles of the deep ecology movement can then be derived (Devall and Sessions 1985: 70). *What is more pressing than debating ultimate norms is to work out consequences for priorities of certain kinds of action.*

As an example, let us consider the problems facing the introduction of

wolves in areas in which they were common x years ago, x being specified on the basis of a set of criteria for desirable restoration of ecosystems.

The protracted, emotionally intense debate on wolves in Norway covers thousands of pages in articles and books. Every area of economic, social, political, and ethical policies is involved. The debate shows how environmental ethical views make up only a part of a total and can only be understood internally when related to a *total view*.

There is not in this connection room for a careful introduction of a concept of a total view. I distinguish a total view from (always partial) verbal articulations of a total view. One of the several ways to articulate parts of total view is to focus on the premise-conclusion relations. This is what ecologist Ivar Mysterud and I do. Of the relatively deep norms implied are some concerning suffering. We take the suffering of sheep more seriously than do most of those who write strongly in favor of introducing wolves. We also take more seriously the rights of small sheep owners in big forests to continue living "where they belong" on a traditional level that is ecologically on a higher level than that of their urban critics. I suggest that the study of fundamental ethical norms that we attempt to use in the ecological crisis should be "operationalized" to a higher degree than is habitual among professional philosophers. The point is well argued by Bryan G. Norton (1991: 186). It would be interesting to see an application of the Leopold formula to the problems facing the introduction of wolves in a certain area. I make extensive use of the norm 'Self-realization!' but it is more a sketch of how one must proceed than a set of careful, step-by-step derivations, which would involve hundreds of descriptive and normative sentences (Naess 1986e; chapter 45 of this volume).

Even the style of the above deliberation reveals that I belong to a somewhat different tradition of meta-ethical discussion and methodology than the chief participants in the ethical monism/pluralism debate. It may be of interest to continue by extending the perspective, leaving the narrow concern for task-minded theorizing within the deep ecology movement.

Can deeply different total views be compared as to the validity of norms and descriptions? The answer affects comparability of environmental philosophies.

Suppose that a philosophical genius manages to articulate a consistent set of answers to a list of basic questions of formal logic, general methodology,

epistemology, ontology, ethics, . . . (the list is supposed to include all areas of inquiry comprising questions that are posed as ultimates).

The above formulations include the terms *basic* and *ultimate*, which of course admit of various interpretations. The same holds for the term *consistent* in the expression “consistent set of answers to a set of basic questions” because of the varieties of systematizations of formal logic, including deontic logic. Let us, however, try to set aside for a moment the complication resulting from the lack of preciseness of the above-mentioned terms.

Suppose now that the superphilosopher succeeds in using a philosophy of life and lifestyle to derive decisions about how to act in concrete situations. For this purpose he (of course) needs hypotheses about the particularities of each situation. I shall then say that our superphilosopher applies a total view verbally articulated in a total system. It is not required that the systematizer keep the same view all the time. His methodology may furnish room for changes through renewed reflections and deliberation. His total view is not static, but dynamic.

The analogy to a vast hypothetico-deductive system in natural science is limited, but instructive. The derivations as to how to act start with abstract, general sentences, some descriptive and others normative—for example, in the form of grammatical imperatives. The system itself is “normative.” That is, it contains at least one ultimate norm, but is more likely to contain many. Observational tests in natural science rest on sentences describing the experimental setup and other particular features of the test situation and procedures. In applying the normative system, the experimenter derives a concrete decision describing an action (or inaction). It is a normative sentence derived from the set of ultimate premises, plus a description of the concrete situation at hand.

If the system is to an important degree inspired by ecology in a certain fairly wide sense of the term, the superphilosopher must be supposed to have (miraculously) succeeded at a given date in developing a *full* articulation of what I call an *ecosophy*, and achieved full consistency between theory and practice. He practices what he teaches. The limitation implied in “at a given date” reminds us that the incessant stream of events poses an incessant stream of new questions. They may imply corrections to one or more hypotheses within the system—hypotheses only tentatively assumed to be tenable. This threat-

ens norms that have the hypotheses as part of their sets of premises of daily decisions. Changes of hypotheses normally result in changes of norms.

Suppose now the ecological superphilosopher derives norms telling him that he should convince his colleagues. He may find their writings fully understandable but false, or at least not entirely true. The conclusion “false” he derives from the articulation of *his own* total view.

The superphilosopher is justified in formulating a critical conclusion based on his own premises. How could he do otherwise? Let us assume, though, he is willing openly to acknowledge that he interprets the texts of the others using his own rules of interpretation, that is, his own system of hermeneutics. A second superphilosopher may legitimately do the same, arriving at the same kind of, but opposite, conclusion to the first. The two seem to disagree, but do they really? It is not established that they disagree about the correct answer to any *definite* question, because, among other obstacles, differences in the hermeneutics of the two many cause differences in interpretations of any formulation of the question.

Furthermore, I cannot conceive of a third superphilosopher who could, on neutral ground, decide that a theorem asserted by the first and denied by the second, was right, valid, or true. To do this he would have to do it on a basis not dependent upon the contested ultimate or other premises of the two rivals. Even the meaningfulness of a comparison as to validity is problematic.

Peaceful coexistence of deeply different cultures seems to thrive on communicational imperfection, or sheer practical incomparability joined with some mutual tolerance and norms of nonviolence—or, more simply, by the cultures being scattered through practically impenetrable space, as they were some thousand years ago on this planet. We need not assume theoretical incomparability or impenetrability.

Historians of philosophy have produced texts that trace the long, complex development of mutually incompatible interpretations of the writings of Immanuel Kant and others. One thing that emerges is that there is rarely, if ever, a development suggesting future agreement or even future mutual deep understanding. This holds even when there is an increase in the number of interpretations that seem to be definitively rejected by everybody.

What is especially important is the tendency of seemingly extraordi-

narily competent researchers of successive generations to disagree. Therefore, we cannot explain away all the discrepancies by insinuations of incompetence. The history of ideas furnishes some help in explaining long-range trends, but there is no indication that general trends will stabilize. The same applies to reconstructions of old philosophies: Kantian, Spinozist, Buddhist, and so forth.

The question may be put, Do continued disagreements point to a basic weakness of the program of systematic articulation of total views? Are the disagreements or signs of lack of complete comparability a weakness? Especially since the time of Auguste Comte, it has been common among scientists to answer yes, but scientists trying to go beyond the more or less arbitrary limitation of the deepness of their questions posed by the particular sciences, have been less sure. Their answers to foundation problems, or their rejection of the meaningless of posing foundation problems, have elicited a spectrum of diverse, often clearly mutually incompatible answers.

Even if there were ways to show that reality is “one”—in the sense of “one” that can be clearly conceived—it does not follow that adequate, verbal accounts of this oneness should or must converge, or be practicably translatable into each other. On the contrary, that may be a sign of stagnation, as it is in physics when basic theories are translatable into each other. It is difficult for me to believe that future cultural richness and diversity can continue under conditions of increasing similarity of ultimate views. *This applies to ultimate ethical and meta-ethical views.*

There are less abstract reasons for welcoming some disagreements, incompatibilities, and incomparabilities, reasons suggested by the development of cultural anthropology. It tells us about the genesis of a philosophy and a total view: the social matrix, the influence of personal experiences, including the reading of other philosophers. Further, it teaches us of unresolved, persistent mutual “misinterpretations,” unsuccessful polemics, and other phenomena manifesting the precarious character of the vast, unfinished, and perhaps unfinishable hermeneutic enterprise.

Let me change perspective from the systematic to the historical. Starting about 1870 a variety of deeply different interpretations of Kant’s texts saw the light. An astonishing series of brilliant neo-Kantian philosophies appeared. I do not see any likelihood, nor any desirability, of a narrowing

down of the range of interpretations and reconstructions of Kant's philosophy. They may all have a fairly short life of strong impact, but the range may not narrow down because of the many abandoned enterprises.

I appreciate philosophers strongly inspired by Kant who spontaneously answer all major "refutations" or "doubts" with fresh and interesting counterattacks. Or consider the reaction of a young Heideggerian when confronted with one of the most atrocious sentences of the Heidegger idiom: he laughed heartily and offered a still more atrocious one, adding that "Heidegger does not admire his own style, he regrets that he does not find any better." So we are invited to find out what he means and to do a better job of expressing it. Or consider the variety within the phenomenological trend started by Edmund Husserl. The trend, I hope, will continue. My own "gestalt ontology" belongs here (Naess 1985c; chapter 40 of this volume). The task has no end.

The long history of interpretations of Spinoza now covers more than 300 years and shows as wide a divergence as the Kantian. Famous and inspiring are the interpretations by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and other "Romantics." Hegel's interpretation is very much alive among the Spinoza interpretations within the Hegel-Marx-Frankfurt School tradition. I see no prospect of, nor desirability of, a narrowing down of *divergence* of Spinoza interpretations, and I expect new variations to appear along future paths of human ethical exploration. The greatness of a philosophical text consists largely in its capacity to elicit and lead the creativity of generation after generation. Biographical research shows that Spinoza was heavily inspired by medieval Jewish and Arabian philosophies. It suggests a perception and apperception of animals largely, but not completely, in tune with his contemporaries. What some people assert today, "The dog is man's best friend!" Spinoza might have found in principle impossible. Even in biographical interpretations, however, differences are considerable, perhaps greater than at the time of Goethe.

Philosophers may look for the best interpretation of a text, but in metaphilosophical hermeneutics, as in the history of ideas, variety is considered a cultural asset.

A trend toward a uniform, not to say monolithic, way of conceiving reality may be an ominous sign of stagnation of the total human enterprise on this planet, a sign of cultural conformity. Environmentalism and the

quest for a greener society will not, I hope, contribute to conformity, but it might! That is the reason I take these abstract themes seriously and hope that many others will do the same.

The discussion about a green society's ultimate premises and norms, its political and social philosophy, and about the conceptual basis of sustainable development and economic growth, proceeds without proper attention to the desirability of deeply different green societies, including significantly different ways of realizing economic progress rather than growth. General economic anthropology, which studies contemporary industrial economies from the outside, is highly relevant.

The danger of conformity increases when attempts are made to merge three main social movements into one, into a gigantic quasi-green movement comprising the peace, social justice, and deep ecology movements. Until the late 1970s many deeply concerned peace workers did not quite trust the concerned environmentalists, but obviously the threats of war, the armaments, not to speak of wars themselves, have consequences that necessitate close cooperation between activists of the two movements. Until the late 1980s a similar lack of trust existed in some quarters between the deep ecology movement and the social justice movement. (Under the social justice title I arbitrarily class international humanitarian efforts and political movements of the Marcuse and Frankfurt School type, as well as antihegemonic political groups.) The overlap with the political efforts of green parties is obvious. The deep ecology movement has an inseparable ecopolitical aspect, assuming as it does that significant societal changes will be required in any long-range effort to overcome the ecological crisis. Some competition for recruitment is unavoidable between the two movements, but it should not be allowed to cause theoretical disputes.

Mutual support and global solidarity within the deep ecology movement are called for in the fight for significant change of policies, but it is counterproductive to try to narrow down the variety of religious and philosophical ultimate premises. The only reason to attack a religious or philosophical ultimate premise seems to be the assumption that a particular environmentally unacceptable position follows with necessity from it. I do

not find, however, that such necessity, or even likelihood, is established in contemporary ecological debates.

An instructive example of a comparison of very comprehensive systems, each with aspirations of totality, is offered by Susan Armstrong-Buck (1986: 241–59). Her introductory sentences admirably describe a problematic situation.

That the natural world has intrinsic value—value in and of itself, independent of human preferences—is intuitively and emotionally acknowledged by many people. I believe that this recognition is crucial to the maintenance of the beautiful, life-giving ecosystem which is our planet. Yet the growth of this apprehension into a widely shared ethos capable of guiding human activity has yet to happen. It requires, among other things, an adequate metaphysical theory, since a metaphysical theory can give penetration to and a wider and consistent application of our intuitive and feeling-based apprehension. . . . What would such a theory be like?

Her answer is that Alfred North Whitehead provides such a theory.

My point is, roughly, that “a widely shared ethos” is desirable, but not at a deeper level than that of such assertions as “The natural world has intrinsic value.” The questions are, of course, philosophically relevant: On what ultimate basis does one *conclude* that the natural world has intrinsic value? What are the ultimate rules of inference that permit one to arrive at such a conclusion? Disagreement at this level may be deep and may last indefinitely. One may talk of four levels of premise-conclusion relations: the rock bottom, an ultimate first level, a second level, and a third level. The principles of the deep ecology movement are contained as tentative formulations at the *second level*. Here, the attributions of intrinsic value, inherent worth, and so on, enter. At a *third level*, there are consequences of the second level (plus, of course, a lot of additional descriptive premises about the “state of the world”—a World Watch Institute expression). A fourth level is of extreme importance in total views: this is the level of decisions in concrete situations. When it is said that to find ultimate premises is the main problem of environmental philosophy, I think it makes such philosophy much too narrow and also destructively isolated from environmentally

valuable total views ("ecosophies"). A Zen Buddhist, after many years of intense study and practice, said that *basically* he personally would *not mind* if the whole planet were covered with asphalt. He supported ecologically responsible policies, respected nature, but considered human ultimate freedom to be completely independent of what happens to the planet. That is, to my mind, going too far!

I refer to "a richness and diversity of cultures" rather than to "the richness . . ." of cultures because the actual history of human cultures exemplifies horrors of war, cruelty, and injustice. I do not here even try to discuss the difficult question of where to draw the lines, and what to do when war threatens.

From the above point of view it is appropriate to answer Susan Armstrong-Buck: Yes. Whitehead, or better, a Whiteheadian approach among many possible approaches, offers *a kind of* theory you are looking for—and it does so in an outstanding way at a high level of contemporary Western philosophy. Potentially, however, there may be indefinitely many other approaches that also offer such a kind of theory. A Spinozist approach is only one of them. I am glad to say that Armstrong-Buck does not directly or explicitly contest such a pluralist view. The study of often-crude polemics of Stoics against Epicureans, Kant against Hume, Kierkegaard against Hegel, antimetaphysicians against metaphysicians, seems to me to substantiate the view that formidable philosophical insight requires only a moderate level of clear interpersonal cognitive discourse. A philosopher may offer new insights, but his refutation of others may be far off the mark.

Armstrong-Buck's exposition of Whitehead's metaphysics contributes to the understanding of a kind of metaphysical view that provides ultimate cognitive foundations of actions elicited by "our intuitive and feeling-based apprehension" (Armstrong-Buck 1986: 241). She compares this view with Spinoza.

Her description of Spinoza's system is of interest insofar as it shows that within the manifold interpretations of Spinoza are some that make his text inadequate where Whitehead's may be adequate. Those, however, who feel at home with some kind of Spinozist approach, will not find it reasonable to choose Armstrong-Buck's interpretation of Spinoza's texts.¹ The same holds for Genevieve Lloyd's (1980) interpretation.² The situation is

not lamentable from the point of view of the ecological crisis because people with seemingly deeply different religious or metaphysical ultimate views may work together in practical efforts to improve the ethical standard of human environmental interaction. Different religious and metaphysical views need not weaken, and may significantly strengthen, the deep ecology movement. Conformity would limit the appeal to a small section of humanity.

I shall not defend my personal Spinozistic approach “against” a Whiteheadian one but take as a point of departure the following statement by Armstrong-Buck: “Spinoza has recently been presented by deep ecologists as a guide in our development of environmental ethics” (1980: 258).

What has happened is that Spinoza’s texts have functioned as a major source of inspiration for a tiny group of theorists within the deep ecology movement. I am glad to see that other classical Western philosophers—Hegel, Schelling, Bergson, Heidegger, Whitehead, Wittgenstein, among others—have also made an impact. Recently even Nietzsche, including a *rather original* interpretation of his theory of the Overman (*Übermensch*), has been found at least compatible. Most supporters of the deep ecology movement have never heard of any of the names mentioned here. I don’t think they ever need to.

According to Armstrong-Buck:

Spinoza’s metaphysics suffers from the fatal defect of deterministic monism: . . . all entities are understood as modes of this one substance and hence as causally determined. While Spinoza argues convincingly for the peace of mind obtained by means of determinism (since no one is ultimately responsible for what he or she does), his theory leaves no room for creative individuals. Indeed, the modes themselves are arbitrarily introduced into the system.

(Ibid., p. 259)

It is difficult for me to determine why Armstrong-Buck chose just this interpretation among a great richness of interpretations. I shall only mention some reflections to show why I do not favor the selection.

In medieval Latin, *causa* has many connotations of relevance for understanding Spinoza’s usages of the term. One has to consult dictionaries of medieval Latin. That *substantia*, conventionally translated as “substance” in English, causes the *modi* (“modes”) in the sense of “cause” famil-

iar to us today when we talk about determinism, is highly doubtful. The *modi* of *substantia* may not be caused by *substantia* in any such sense. Maybe, if *substantia* causes a human being to act in such a way, the effect does not come after the cause, that is, perhaps there is no time relation in such a case. Why not think of the relation as an internal relation rather than an external one? In any case, why interpret the relation in such a way that human beings must lack responsibility for their actions, or lack creativity? Spinoza says that human power is part of God's power, so why not add to this that human creativity may be part of *Deus's* creativity as *natura naturans*? Why not interpret the term *homo liber* and the "road to greater freedom" (part V) as consistent with what we today would call the road to human freedom?

I use the Latin terms to remind us that the mutual relations of the connotations of the key Latin term in the *Ethics*³ are clarified through several hundred explicatory sentences. The originality of Spinoza's system is scarcely appreciated without a study of the "Spinozistic color" of the connotation of key terms, including *causa* and *determinata*. Such a study reveals, I think, that what Spinoza calls determination does not imply fatalism.

What I suggest is, in short, that if a contemporary environmental philosopher *A*, including myself, feels at home with a classical philosophy *P* and another philosopher, *B*, has another philosophy, *Q*, *A* will tend to adjust the interpretation of *P* in the direction of *A's* environmentalism. As a side issue, *A*, perhaps a little too eagerly, points to interpretations of *Q* as inconsistent with environmentalism, whereas *B* will tend to do the opposite, defending *Q* and mildly attacking *P*. This can be done without violation of the hermeneutic rules of historical research. Considering the great problems and opportunities that confront philosophers in the ecological crisis, a side issue should remain a side issue. Like another side issue: to point out, if we feel we are competent, to supporters of the deep ecology movement who are inspired by Heidegger or by Whitehead something that may strengthen their own interpretation—in short, a kind of mutual aid in the sense of Krapotkin. The widening cooperation of supporters across national borders and cultural differences depends on open-mindedness, tolerance, even positive appreciation of religious and metaphysical differences. Few social movements can boast of such a vast area of agreement on

nonultimate levels—down to the hundreds of specific direct environmental actions going on at any one time. Philosophers are well equipped to help articulate clearly and convincingly the complex premise-conclusion relations between the ultimate and the practical levels.

Mechanical acceptance of the derivation of ethically relevant decisions on the basis of a set of norms and hypotheses, I agree, must be out of the question. Our ethical decisions are, in principle, always “at the depth of 60,000 fathoms” (Kierkegaard). At a point where we must make a choice, we may exclaim “No!” to any concrete decision derived from cherished beliefs, and make a decision of actually going squarely against “everything” we so far have considered established. When the application of a fairly general guideline elicits a stormy “No!” in a particular situation, there is mostly a need to inspect sets of hypotheses (beliefs) the acceptance of which are the implicit premises of “No!”—and also to consider normative guidelines. Perhaps the derivation of the less basic guideline is uncritical, or maybe both guidelines have relevant ambiguities in their tentative formulations. In short, there are indefinitely many factors involved, but this does not detract from the value of a systematization as a surveyable set of guidelines. I envy those who can work adequately without such systematization.

It does not matter whether our attempt to systematize ethical rules or principles starts with 100 or only one ultimate general rule. If we start with only one, a great many comments as to how to interpret its formulation will presumably be needed; if we start with 100, comments will focus on the many questions of internal consistency. In both cases indefinitely many relevant hypotheses are needed to describe the world that motivates the establishment of an environmental ethics. Some philosophers will presumably do as I do and continue to search for rather general principles adapted to new moral perceptions among people who are not professional philosophers. This I find compatible with what Eugene C. Hargrove says: “New moral perceptions will not be brought about by moral philosophers, but rather by everyone in general and by no one in particular” (Hargrove 1985: 36). This is also compatible with a strong tradition in applied ethics that tries to improve perception and apperception in fairly narrowly defined classes of situations, rather than to construct more or less general rules. Hargrove’s reference to progress in playing a game is helpful here: the gen-

eral rules are few, but the kinds of particular problematic situations are overwhelmingly rich and demand creativeness in their application.

The pluralism, or manifold, I am talking positively about in this article is not completely unrelated to recent monism-pluralism discussions. The concept of an ecosophy, a total view in part inspired by the ecological crisis, implies an affirmation of coherence and consistency of ethical views, including their relation to concrete decisions in particular situations. Complete articulation of a total view is out of reach, but perhaps a useful fiction. A mature, integrated human being somehow has to assume an integrated way of thinking and acting.

Articulated ethical and meta-ethical views, including ultimate premises about the nature of ethics, make up an ingredient within a systematization of a total view. A sort of "monism" may here be said to be implied. The human-nature relation is an ecosophy treated as a subordinate whole, in part ethical, in part nonethical. The effort to be coherent and consistent is, of course, only a fragment of the efforts of ethical reflection and deliberation. Any systematization is a kind of tool, and frequent changes are normal.

So a kind of monism is compatible with a positive evaluation of a manifold of total views, each constituting an organic whole, a "oneness," a monism.

In the major area of ethics and metaphysical questions of central ethical relevance, J. Baird Callicott has pointed to a Hume-Darwin-Leopold line of social, human, and environmental ethics. In essence, he seems to maintain that work along that line will furnish the coherent, adequate theory that supporters of the environmental movement need. This is excellent if "one" is substituted for "the." From my systems-oriented point of view, an invitation to work along that line is valuable and will hopefully be accepted by many who align themselves with the principles of the deep ecology movement. There are, however, other lines that need to be further explored, among them the Kantian—in a wide sense. The norm that a person should never be treated merely as a means may be generalized to cover all living beings, not just people. Kantian ideas in biology were long ago suggested by von Uexkull (1909, 1920). Philosophical Buddhism offers lines as well—for example, the one suggested by Gary Snyder (see Devall and Sessions 1985: 251–53). Gandhi sometimes considered Buddhism a reformed Hinduism. His interpretation of the Gita and metaphysics of Self-realization may fur-

nish some ultimate premises of a total view in part inspired by the ecological crisis. He was a firm defender of animal rights.⁴

Supporters of the deep ecology movement belong to different cultures and subcultures. Their social backgrounds vary, but they are able to cooperate because of a remarkable similarity of attitudes, remarkable similarities of slogans, remarkable similarity in practical situations.

When one works with systematization, as do some of us who are engaged in an ecological movement, it is useful to look into Vaihinger's great work, *The Philosophy of "As If"* (1935). There is not, of course, and will not be, any systematically articulated total view in terms of premise-conclusion relation. It is a fiction. However, in our attempt to act in a totally responsible way, we may be said, when we use arguments, *implicitly* to assume a consistent view. What we leave out of consideration is that we implicitly assume a consistent total view.

What we *explicitly* say in ethical conflicts is a different question. Word-by-word reports for or against certain decisions may well be characterized as derivations from "a hodgepodge of conflicting and unrelated moral principles, much like the principles of a good play developed out of chess theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (Hargrove 1989: 287). Cultural anthropologists studying an ethics as a set of moral customs will sometimes offer analyses of such observed verbal articulations. I find it encouraging that Hargrove is a kind of "moral pluralist . . . who is content to work with jumbles of somewhat unrelated, and sometimes conflicting, views and attitudes from various sources, without succumbing to the urge [which I perhaps have] to transform them into a unified system" (ibid.). Nevertheless, some of us view our environmental ethic as a source for further studies, as material for a cultural anthropology, and here articulation of fragments of total views is of practical and theoretical importance.

In the fight to implement a decision on the level of concrete situations, the supporters of the deep ecology movement cooperate with everybody who sincerely supports such a decision. What could the supporters achieve without cooperation with people whose general argumentation pattern—for example, in terms of premise-conclusion relations—is shallow or merely concerned with reforms? It is of interest to note that there are people who explicitly reject any definite proposal, such as that of Naess and Sessions, of a formulation of the principles of the deep ecology movement, but are inspired by the same philosophers as are many of the supporters.

A. T. Nuyen advocates a “kind of anthropocentrism” and “the view that nature has no value independent of human beings.” He derives these points from Heidegger, who is often used to derive the opposite conclusion. He professes a kind of instrumental view. “Only within the framework of that ethics [the Heideggerian existential ethics] does any practical policy toward the environment *make sense*, in much the same way as it makes sense for a pianist to care for his or her instrument, and for the Indians to cherish and preserve the forests” (Nuyen 1991: 366).

A question of the following kind has been asked: How does our idea of at least partly or occasionally incomparable differences at the ultimate level (of premises) of a total view, relate to “the case against untranslatable languages” as conceived by Donald Davidson?

The framework within which Davidson discusses untranslatability is conspicuously different from the one within which I am inclined to assert at least practical, if not theoretical, untranslatability as well as the more radical practical incomparability of sets of ultimate premises of an articulated total view. In what follows I refer to the text of Davidson’s essay “On the very idea of a conceptual scheme” (1984). Here are the most relevant passages:

There can be no doubt that the relation between being able to translate someone’s language and being able to describe his attitudes is very close. Still, until we can say more about *what* this relation is, the case against untranslatable languages remains obscure. . . .

By imagining a sequence of languages, each close enough to the one before to be acceptably translated into it, we can imagine a language so different from English as to resist totally translation into it. Corresponding to this distant language would be a system of concepts altogether alien to us. . . .

We may identify conceptual schemes with languages, then, or better, allowing for the possibility that more than one language may express the same scheme, sets of intertranslatable languages. . . .

The idea is then that something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not, if it stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing, or fitting) experience (nature, reality, sensory promptings). The problem is to say what the relation is, and to be clearer about the entities related.

(Davidson 1984: 185, 186, 191)

A small minority of deep ecology supporters have articulated ultimate or near-ultimate premises of their total views. Thus, Gary Snyder accepts the sentence "The universe and all creatures in it are intrinsically in a state of complete wisdom, love and compassion" (Devall and Sessions 1985: 251). What is intended by the sentence may become successively clearer by years of study of philosophical Buddhism, and through a life spent with people who try to live according to expressed Buddhist principles. I feel lost. Personally I use sentences expressing ultimate and near-ultimate levels of a total view of a Spinozist kind. Perhaps Snyder would feel lost listening to those.

Let us suppose it is asked, Can the Buddhist example be *translated* into a sentence within my Spinozist vocabulary? My answer, if shortness is required, is no. This, of course, is not a question of logical impossibility. I take the hypothesis of translatability to be an empirical one. The negative answer is not obviously relevant to what Donald Davidson is trying to clarify.

I have to do mostly with sets of premises of Spinozist, Kantian, Heideggerian, and Whiteheadian character (the S-K-H-W premises, for short). One set of premises is supposed to be expressed in Latin, two in German, and one in English sentences. What about their translatability? They may tentatively be said to express conceptual schemes.

The translatability of whole languages into each other need not be discussed. For me, it is not a major problem whether my Norwegian or my English can fairly well *convey the content* of philosophical texts written in other languages. It is crucial, though, to what degree the *content* of the S-K-H-W premises can be fairly well conveyed and be roughly compared in terms of agreements and disagreements. This does not imply translatability.

Sometimes a conventional quasi-translation into English is enough as a starting point. The problem then is whether extensive *comments* on the quasi-translation can convey the content. Let us consider an example. "There is or can only be one substance" (*substantia*) and "that you are" (*tat tvan asi*) present good quasi-translations of parts of a Latin and a Sanskrit text. The problem is to what extent a couple of pages or volumes of comments can convey fairly adequately what is intended to be expressed by the two sentences as conceived by their authors. Moreover, there is the problem of comparison of contents of the crucial sentences. Attention has to focus on the terms *substantia* and *tat*, that is, on fragments of vocabularies, not so much on grammar and syntax. Some philosophers think that the differ-

ences in the structures of languages narrow down the range of metaphysical positions that can be articulated and compared. That is not my experience. It does not affect my thesis that a moderate degree or extent of comparability is present. The “Whorfian approach” connects with my problem concerning understanding and comparability of ultimates. I am for the guarded optimism of Masson-Oursel (1926) and his conception of a *philosophie compare*: there is a *limited* comparability.

Does the S-K-H-W character encompass or imply four conceptual frames, for example, frames of general methodology (rules of logical inference, rules of testing hypotheses, rules of assessing “intention,” and so on)? How are they related to the question of comparing validity or adequacy of the rules? What is the outlook for introducing a vocabulary such that the S-K-H-W premises could be described by means of that definite, fairly sender- and receiver-precise vocabulary?

From my experience of attempting to translate Spinoza’s *Ethics* from the Latin into English and into Sanskrit (in the latter case, only the very beginning of part I), I conclude that there is *no chance* of providing an adequate translation. This conclusion holds, however, only for certain interpretations of the term *translation*. As an adequate translation of a text consisting of three sentences, I require here that it consist of three sentences, each being a translation of one of the originals. If each of the sentences requires comments, perhaps even books, to elucidate what was intended to be conveyed—implying, for example, comprehensive cultural anthropological studies—the resultant total document does not include an adequate translation in the sense adopted here. It is more like the “*that* you are” of *tat tvam asi*. It is placed in an English text and made the object of extensive commentary.

What about the terms *substance*, *substantia*, *Substanz*, and *dravya* as used by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Heidegger, Whitehead, and Sanskrit writers? I do not see much chance of a vocabulary into which what these authors try to convey by their term can be adequately rendered in a translation in a sense with which I am familiar. This does not imply that someone may not adequately *understand* what all of them try to convey by their term. (Personally I am at a loss.) What I suggest is that one may build reconstructions of ultimate premises of various philosophies delimited through definite texts, like that of the *Ethics* of Spinoza. The reconstructions try to keep

near that of the original in certain essentials but do not pretend to be historically accurate.

Put in a crude way: I believe that Spinoza may be said to have “had” a total view (a combined *Weltund Lebensanschauung*), which colors the meaning of all his key terms. We cannot in a few words articulate that color “itself.” People who have not studied his texts thoroughly seem to catch something of it. Lifelong study (like my own) need not help as much as might be expected: a law of diminishing returns seems to operate. This makes it excessively difficult to translate Spinoza adequately in the sense suggested. One has to offer complex commentaries, but the more these are philosophically non-neutral, the less they are helpful for readers with different basic views from the commentator’s. As to Sanskrit translation of the definitions found in Spinoza’s part I, learned Sanskritists with knowledge of Western philosophy tend to regard a program of adequate translation preposterous in its arrogance. The purely conventional translation of *dravya* as “substance” is useless except as a signal of which word is found in the original text.

In surveys of the history of philosophy, including my own, in which philosophers’ ultimate views are presented through quotations, or conventional translations, undergraduates may acquire a sort of vague understanding of various philosophies. I tend to think, though, that such surveys may also inoculate them against deeper understanding. Fortunately, the force of the inoculation tends gradually to diminish.

The sentence quoted from Davidson, “There can be no doubt . . . ,” I am inclined to reject. In at least one sense of translatability, and a very common one, every important attitude relevant in the ecological crisis can be understood and described by the activists in their different languages—this in spite of the complications that arise when they try to convey the meaning of the sentences they use when formulating their ultimate premises of a philosophical or religious kind. There is then no practical, and perhaps no theoretical, translatability. Basic structures of their conceptual schemes, if they can be said to “have” something like that, are not comparable because they lack a neutral total view, which can act as mediator or frame of common reference.⁵

One source of my attitudes within the philosophy of language and communication is the work of Bronislaw Malinowski and the “tribe” of an-

thropologists who are indebted to him. His work implies a tendency to be sceptical about a clear correlation of deepness of differences of language (as a certain kind of system of rules) and deepness of differences of cultural or total views. This sceptical attitude also influences the view of how linguistic systems relate to general or basic conceptual schemes or frameworks. Cultural anthropology and comparative linguistics affirm that there is an intimate relation between vocabulary, cultural value systems, and ontology, but not so much between this and syntax and other more abstract aspects of language. There may be something “dynamic” about the abstract linguistics of Hebrew (e.g., the position of verbs) that contrasts with the more “static” character of Greek, and this may, for example, correlate with the dynamic character of the Hebrew general ontological view and the more static character of the Greek. Interesting, yes, but consistent with the opinion that language (still in the sense of a certain kind of set of rules) has only indirect and limited influence on general or basic conceptual schemes.

Returning to the question of limitations of the comparability of conceptual schemes, I think they show up in every effort (the first being Ernest Cassirer’s) to describe the relations between Spinoza’s and Kant’s ethics. Spinoza was scarcely a conceptualist, whereas Kant was. Already that creates certain complications. Perhaps Spinoza cannot be said to have a *conceptual* framework, nor an ethic in the sense of Kant. He certainly avoided using the term *ethica* in his *Ethics*, limiting it to the general title and the set of expressions “part *x* of the *Ethics*” (*Ethicae pars x*). On the other hand, I do not see how one could possibly *prove* limited comparability.

Even within the Indo-European family of languages, there are languages such that the term *nature* and the expression “humanity’s relation to nature” cannot be translated into them except fairly conventionally. Classical Greek and its important term *areté* is an example. When *areté* is conventionally translated into “virtue,” it requires commentary. If we consider languages far outside the Indo-European family, metaphysical and religious texts are a source of wonder. What corresponds to environmental ethics? We may understand—vaguely. I should like to refer to stories and poems translated in Kenneth Katzner’s delightful *The Languages of the World* (1977). A translation from the Hamito-Semitic language Hausa: “One day it was raining, the hedgehog greeted the squirrel saying, ‘How do you like the cold?’ . . .” The story has a philosophical point I think we readily un-

derstand. From the language Zulu of the Bantu branch of the Niger-Congo family: "Bury me where the grasses grow / Below the weeping willow trees. . . . Then as I lie there, I shall hear / The grasses sigh a soft behest: / 'Sleep, beloved one, sleep and rest.'" From texts we may infer traits of an environmental ethics, but how can we pretend to be able to compare in a methodologically neutral and adequate way meanings and validity of the ultimate premises of the total views?

The above seemingly pessimistic view of the feasibility of adequate translation and comparison does not rule out marvelous feats of effective intercultural understanding. Consider this case. A mountaineering expedition has a leadership of Westerners and a number of Muslim porters. There is no common language, but the Westerners understand that at a certain fairly late time of the day there is intense discussion among the Muslims concerning when to prepare a meal. It is Ramadan, and there should be no eating before sunset. This is all the Westerners know about the situation. Gradually, though, verbal and, more often, nonverbal signals are established that make intercultural "discussion" effective. The main point is, Where is the horizon? Eating requires the sun to be below the horizon. In extremely rugged country, there is no proper horizon and the view changes often and erratically. Another point, somewhat more difficult to handle by signals, is, Does the sunset rule apply strictly under every condition, and if not, what is legitimate now? My experience is that considerable differences in ultimate premises do not *significantly* affect most interpersonal interactions under "ordinary" kinds of problematic situations.

What would be a suitable general conclusion to this article? Perhaps it is this simple metaphysical thought: *the richness and diversity of philosophical and religious ultimate premises suitable for action in the ecological crisis may be in themselves considered part of the richness and diversity of life-forms on Earth.*

The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology

This article is motivated by listening to some people from the Third World who express a suspicion that deep ecology is a new variant of Western domination or neocolonialism: they fear that people of the Third World will be pushed out of their homes to make more room for spectacular animals. Some authors have expressed the opinion that deep ecology is for the rich nations that can afford the luxury of vast wilderness as habitat for wild species. In my opinion, however, it would indeed be tragic if such ideas spoiled the much-needed cooperation among supporters of the deep ecology movement around the globe, including in the Third World.

Throughout most of human history, human beings have lived in what we now call wilderness. As Gary Snyder (1990: 7) points out:

Just a few centuries ago, when virtually *all* was wild in North America, wilderness was not something exceptionally severe. Pronghorn and Bison trailed through the grasslands, creeks ran full of salmon, there were acres of clams, and grizzlies, cougar, and bighorn sheep were common in the lowlands. There were human beings, too: North America was *all populated*. There were people everywhere. . . . All of the hills and lakes of Alaska have been named in one or another of the dozen or so languages spoken by the native people.

Until they became agriculturalists, our ancestors left few traces. Ecosystems were not appreciably changed, except by large fires, and probably through the extermination of some large animal species. For the most

This article was reprinted with permission from *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1995), 397–407.

part, though, landscapes and ecosystems were not irreversibly reduced in richness and diversity, and the basic ecological conditions of life were maintained. There is not today, nor was there ever, any essential conflict between human beings in moderate numbers and a state of wilderness or wildness. There are reasons today, however, for some areas to be left entirely devoid of human settlement, and for limiting even short, carefully arranged visits by scientists to a minimum, but this should be looked upon as an exceptional situation.

At present, there are old-growth forests in Australia, for example, that are inhabited by ecologically conscious and careful people. This situation illustrates the essential compatibility of people living in wilderness with a presumably high quality of life—a “rich life with simple means.” They use plants for food and other purposes, but they do not, of course, engage in subsistence agriculture.

What is considered a normal lifestyle in industrial countries is clearly incompatible with living in wilderness. Industrial people interfere so severely with natural processes that even a very small number of them can significantly alter the landscape. For example, it is widely recognized that people doing research in the Antarctic should use extreme care not to damage the ecosystems, but it is also clear that the rules are widely disobeyed.¹ Bad habits are difficult, but not impossible, to change!

It is unavoidable that some people concerned with the protection of wildlife and natural ecosystems tend to see a direct and global antagonism between human settlement and wilderness. Supporters of the deep ecology movement, however, like many others, know that wilderness, or wildness, need not be destroyed by people living in these areas (or nearby), and that they may enjoy a high quality of life.

It is not possible for people living in the United States to interfere as little with the wilderness as did the traditional American Indians, and Gary Snyder (and other articulate American supporters of the deep ecology movement) insist that there should be no further destruction of wilderness in America. Even what is now set aside in the United States as designated wilderness is interfered with too much. The traditional point of view of the U.S. Forest Service still has a lot of influence: “Wilderness is for people. . . . The preservation goals established . . . are designed to provide values and benefits to society. . . . Wilderness is not set aside for the sake of its flora or

fauna, but for people."² It is not only the "*but for people*" that makes all the difference, from Gary Snyder's point of view, but also the term *society*. People who live in wilderness, or who have their roots in wilderness, form *communities* rather than "societies." There is a vast difference between the slogan of the World Wildlife Fund ("Wilderness for people") and the meaning of the U.S. Forest Service's phrase "wilderness for American society."

Those people in the United States who are actively trying to stop the destruction of wilderness do not tend to publish *general proposals on how to treat apparently similar problems in the Third World*. At least this is true of theoreticians of the deep ecology movement. Nevertheless, there are writers who look upon "radical environmentalism," including deep ecology, as a threat to the poverty-stricken people of the Third World. The opinion is not uncommon that people in the rich Western world tend to support wild animals and wilderness rather than poor people. However, the real question is, *How* can the poor be helped in a way that is sustainable in the long run?

Close cooperation between supporters of the deep ecology movement and ecologically concerned people in the poor countries requires that the latter trust the former's concern for the economic progress of the poor. What is progress in this case? Is consumerism progress?

The principle formulated by Gary Snyder is applicable in Third World countries: that is, there is no inherent antagonism between human settlement and free nature, for it all depends on the *kind* of culture the human beings have. It should be a universal goal for mankind to avoid all kinds of consumerism and concentrate, instead, on raising the basic quality of life for human beings, including the satisfaction of their economic needs.

The number of poor people in Third World countries is too large for all of them to dwell nondestructively in the tropical forests; more and more subsistence agriculture in these forests neither serves the best interests of the poor nor protects the forests from destruction. Millions of people now live in the tropical forests in a broadly sustainable way, that is, without reducing the richness and diversity of life-forms found there. What is now happening, though, is an *invasion* of those areas, resulting in major disruption of the people and the communities who have been living there in harmony. The forests are clear-cut and burned, and subsistence agriculture is introduced. These practices cannot help the poor reach the goal of long-

term economic progress. This is true as well of the large industrial operations in the forests and along the rivers.

The present ecological world situation requires focusing attention on *urban* settlements, changing them in ways that will make them appropriate and habitable places for the thousands of millions of people who now, and in the next century, will need a place to live. This gigantic effort will require mutual help between rich and poor countries. Significant economic progress for the poor is not possible through the extensive use of less fertile lands for agriculture. *There is no way out except through urbanization*, together with the willingness of the rich to buy products from the poor.

It has been pointed out that, from an ecological long-range perspective, the economies of some traditional North American native cultures were superbly sustainable in a broad sense. It has been noted that the philosophical, religious, and mythological basis for these economies, and for their social relations in general, was expressed through sayings that are eminently consistent with the fundamental attitudes found in the deep ecology movement. Similar sayings found in Eastern cultures have had an even greater impact. As the Indian social ecologist Ramachandra Guha (who has published what he sees as a Third World critique of deep ecology) claims, "The coupling of (ancient) Eastern and (modern) ecological wisdom seemingly helps consolidate the claim that deep ecology is a philosophy of universal significance" (Guha 1989: 74). The total views suggested among supporters of the deep ecology movement do, in a sense, couple "(ancient) Eastern and (modern) ecological wisdom," although there are reasons to be cautious here.

To cherish some of the ecosophic attitudes convincingly demonstrated by people from the East does not imply the doctrinal acceptance of any past definite philosophy or religion conventionally classified as Eastern. Heavy influence does not imply conformity with any beliefs: the history of ideas and contemporary philosophizing are different subjects. At any rate, there is ample reason for supporters of the deep ecology movement to refrain from questioning one another's ultimate beliefs. Deep cultural differences are more or less cognitively unbridgeable and will remain so, I hope.

Desperate people (including desperately poor, hungry people) will naturally have a narrow utilitarian attitude toward their environment, but overall, the people of the Third World, apart from the desperate minority,

manifest a positive concern for the protection of free nature, and a respect for nonhuman living beings. At least, this has been my experience while living among poor people in India, Pakistan, and Nepal (and others in the Third World agree with me on this point). Without these experiences, I would not have talked about the international basis of a deep ecology movement.

Temporarily pressing problems of material need might monopolize the attention of people of the Third World, but this is also true of people in similar circumstances in the West, despite their affluence. In short, there is a sound basis for *global* cooperation between supporters of the deep ecology movement and ecologically concerned people in the Third World, and also with people who try to understand and lessen the poverty in those regions. These people cooperate in movements against poverty that do not entail further large-scale deforestation, and there is no tendency to support animals at the expense of human beings within the framework of this cooperation.

To social ecologists in countries less affluent than the United States, it may look threatening when environmental activists in the United States declare "an unflinching opposition to human attacks on undisturbed wilderness" (Guha 1989: 74).³ Some activists even engage in un-Gandhian ecotage; for example, destroying vehicles and other machinery while making sure that no one gets hurt in the process. So far, there have been very few authenticated cases of anyone being seriously hurt. Considering the vehemence of these struggles, and the passions involved, this should be considered a great victory.

Clearly, these intense, personally involved activists are speaking primarily about wilderness in the United States, not necessarily about the situation on other continents. At least, this is true of supporters of the deep ecology movement. This point, however, can be easily overlooked by observers in the Third World. Unflinching oppositions to the cutting down of *any* trees, or to the establishment of *any* new human settlements in any wilderness *whatsoever*, is a preposterous idea presumably held by no one. The real issue here for the Third World is, How much wilderness and wildlife habitat is it acceptable to continue to modify and destroy, and for what purposes?

In the richest nations of the world, the destruction of old-growth

forests still goes on. There is ample justification for activists in the United States to focus on these destructive, mindless, irreversible activities. The term *ecocriminality* is a suitable word for this forest destruction, and a question of great importance arises here: given their own unecological practices, do the rich nations deserve any *credibility* when preaching ecological responsibility to the poor countries?

One has to distinguish among three things: (1) the current dismal situation concerning the lack of protection of wilderness; (2) the estimates published by conservation biologists concerning the size of wilderness areas needed for continued speciation; and (3) the more-or-less realistic plans put forth by established environmental organizations (e.g., the World Wildlife Fund and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature) concerning how to improve the existing state of affairs for protecting wildlife and wild ecosystems. (It should be pointed out that, given the estimates of Frankel and Soulé that an area on the order of 600 square kilometers is necessary for the speciation of birds and mammals, of course nothing *specific* follows concerning how to achieve what is deemed necessary for this purpose.)

Is the idea that "the biosphere as a whole should be zoned" considered threatening to some in the Third World? Actually, it should be considered more of a threat directed against First World practices than toward any other nations. For, according to Odum and Phillips, establishment of protection zones "may be the only way to limit the destructive impact of our technological-industrial-agribusiness complex upon the earth" (Sessions 1992). This is clearly a warning directed more toward the destructive practices of the First World. Of course, if Third World elites try to copy First World excesses, then the situation will change.

The movements supporting the establishment of "green" societies, and a global green movement, have their origin among people in the rich countries. It is understandable both that they have not had much impact so far among people in the Third World and that they are met with suspicion. The priorities among First and Third World countries are, and to some extent must be, different. Furthermore, "green utopias," and even everyday conceptions of what constitutes greenness, tend to be rather uniform, as if green societies would look very much alike in spite of the deeply different

cultures and traditions of the world. It is to be hoped that there would be no standard green societies, no *Gleich-schaltung* of human institutions and behavioral patterns; that economically sound societies of Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia would not resemble present-day rich countries except in certain superficial ways.

Some people think that "ecological sustainability" will be attained when policies have been adopted that will protect us from great ecological catastrophes. It is beneath human dignity to have this as a supreme ecological goal! Ecological sustainability, in a more proper sense, will be achieved only when policies on a global scale protect the full richness and diversity of life-forms on the planet. The former goal may be called "narrow"; the latter, "wide" ecological sustainability. In short, it is my opinion that *a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion of the fully attained greenness of a society is that it is ecologically sustainable in the wide sense.* (The Bruntland Report admits of various interpretations, but it does envisage a sustainable "developed" country to be one that satisfies the wide sense of ecological sustainability.)

A small digression: When I do not go into complex argumentation but just announce that, for example, it is beneath human dignity to aspire to less than *wide* ecological sustainability, I intend to express a personal view (and as with other assertions) thought to be *compatible* with the views of the deep ecology movement's supporters. My assertions *that* supporters of the deep ecology movement have such and such attitudes or opinions are, of course, more or less certain, and should not be taken as assertions that strictly everybody has those attitudes or opinions.

It should be clear that the realization of wide ecological sustainability will require deep changes in the rich societies of the world having to do, in part, with their policies of growth and their overconsumptive lifestyles. If we accept that the realization of the goals of the deep ecology movement implies wide sustainability, two questions immediately arise: (1) does the realization of wide sustainability presuppose or require acceptance of the views of the deep ecology movement? and (2) does the realization of wide sustainability require significant changes in Third World societies?

If we answer yes to the first question, this might be interpreted as an assertion that the realization of wide sustainability would require that most members of the relevant societies accept the views of the deep ecology

movement. As I see it, this is not necessary (and it would imply a change of heart of an extremely unlikely kind!). A "yes" to the first question might also be interpreted as the assertion that a sufficiently strong minority would be needed to bring about wide sustainability. This situation may well arise. (I do not mean to claim here that a definite answer to the first question is conceptually implied. A decisive no to this question is thinkable. It does seem clear, however, that the more people who explicitly or implicitly accept the views of the deep ecological movement, the better.)

As to the second question, a "yes" answer seems warranted as far as I can judge. In Third World countries today there is a general tendency to attempt to follow an "economic growth and development" path that emulates the rich countries. This must be avoided, and to avoid it requires significant changes in the orientations of those societies.

What kinds of changes are necessary? A discussion of the nature of these changes has intentionally been left abstract and general in the deep ecology platform. Point 6 of the platform states that "Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present."

It is obviously pertinent to ask, Exactly which changes need to be made? It is also pertinent to note that times change. A short answer to this question seems much more difficult to provide in 1993 than it was in 1970. Practically every major concrete change envisaged in 1970 today seems either more difficult to realize or not unreservedly desirable in the form in which it was proposed in 1970.

As a preliminary to serious practical discussion, one must specify which country, state, region, society, and community one has in mind. The distinction among First World, Second World, Third World, and Fourth World is still relevant, but practically all deep ecology literature has focused on rich countries, even though there are many supporters in other kinds of countries. The "sustainability" literature is fortunately more diverse.

As an example of social and political change that was highly recommended in 1970, but not in the 1990s, one may mention various forms of decentralization. Today, the global nature of all the major ecological problems is widely recognized, along with the stubborn resistance of most local, regional, and national groups to give global concerns priority over the less-

than-global, even when this is obviously necessary to attain wide global sustainability. To the slogan "Think globally, act locally" should be added a new one: "Think globally, act globally." Even if we take it for granted that your body is geographically at a definite place, nevertheless every action influences the Earth, and many of these may be roughly positive or negative. Actions are global whatever the locality in which you act. Many fierce local or regional conflicts have a global character, crossing every border and standard-of-living level.

The moderately poor people in the Second and Third worlds may seem more helpless, for example, than the coastal people of rich Arctic Norway, but the ecological conflicts are, to a remarkable degree, of the same kind. Communities in Arctic Norway that live largely by fishing within a day's distance of land are in extreme difficulties, because the resources of the Norway Sea, and even of the vast, uniquely rich Barents Sea, have been badly depleted. For the coastal people it is "a question of sheer survival" but, because Norway is a rich welfare state of sorts, there is no chance that they will go to bed hungry. If the policy makers had seen the intrinsic value, the inherent greatness of the ocean with its fullness of life, and not *just* its narrow usefulness as a source of big profits—trawling, ocean-factories—then the coastal people could have retained their way of life. They would not have lost their self-esteem by having to migrate to the cities. The supporters of the deep ecology movement in the rich countries are not in conflict with deep ecology supporters in the Third and Fourth worlds. Such behavior would be strange indeed, because the global perspective reveals the basic similarity of the situation among poor and rich.

The Sami people (wrongly referred to as Laplanders), a Fourth World nomadic people living in the Arctic Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, and Norway, have resisted being completely dominated by these four powerful states for the last 400 years. When a big dam was proposed in their lands (as part of an unnecessary hydroelectric development), thousands of First World people joined them in protest. When a Sami was arrested for standing "unlawfully" on the shore of the river, the police asked him, "Why do you stay here?" He answered, "This place is part of myself." I know of no major ecological conflict anywhere that has not manifested the power and initiative of people who are not alienated from "free nature," but who protect it for its own sake as something having meaning in itself, independent

of its narrow human utility. This kind of motivation for protection of "free nature" adds substantially to the strong, but narrow, utilitarian motivation.

Sometimes the environmental concern of poor Third World communities seems to Westerners to relate to the "environment per se." As an example, the people of the Buddhist community of Beding (Peding) in the Rolwaling Himalaya live with the majestic holy mountain Gauri Shankar (Tseringma) straight above their heads. It has long been the object of religious respect. Some of us (mountaineers and deep ecology supporters) asked the people whether they wished to enjoy the profits they would get from expeditions by Westerners and Japanese trying to "conquer the mountain," or whether they preferred to *protect the mountain itself* from being trodden upon by human beings with no respect for its cultural status. The families of the community came together and unanimously voted for protection. I had the honor of walking for a week with the chief of the community, Gonden, to deliver a document addressed to the King of Nepal in Kathmandu, asking him to prohibit the climbing of Gauri Shankar. There was no reply. The rich Hindu government of Nepal is economically interested in big expeditions, and the opinion of the faraway Buddhist communities of poor people carries little weight.

The work of Vandana Shiva and others shows how women in rural India continue to try to protect an economy that is largely ecologically sustainable. Do they have the power, though, to resist Western-inspired uneconomic development?

Consider an example from Africa. Large areas in which the Masai live may be classified as areas of "free nature," if not wilderness. The Masai are not disturbed by the vast populations of spectacular animals on their lands, such as lions and leopards, together with hundreds of others, nor are these animals severely disturbed by the Masai. For a long time, there has been a remarkable compatibility between people and wild animals. As more or less nomadic herders, the Masai do not need land set apart for agricultural purposes.

What holds true for the Masai holds as well for a great number of other peoples and cultures in the Third World. Ecologically sustainable development may proceed in direct continuity with their traditional culture as long as population pressures remain moderate.

Lately, the Masai have been spending more and more money for motor

vehicles and other products they don't make themselves. This makes it tempting to sell parts of their territory to farmers looking for land for their many children. From the point of view of economic development, such sales are unfortunate because the relevant kind of subsistence agriculture does not lead to economic progress. The Masai can obtain sufficient cash through very carefully managed tourism and still have the traditional use of the land and preserve their cultural continuity. Some supporters of the deep ecology movement are working with the Masai to help them keep what is left of their land intact. An increase in subsistence farming, in this situation, is a blind alley, but the alternatives are all problematic and there are no easy answers to be found anywhere.

Individual arguments can be singled out and used and misused to defend a variety of mutually incompatible conclusions. In his paper, Guha warns that such is the case with arguments used by supporters of the deep ecology movement. Nor does this happen just to deep ecology supporters in the United States.

After a speech I gave in Norway in favor of considering the Barents Sea seriously as a whole, complex ecosystem (together with treating the living beings, including the tiny flagellates, as having intrinsic value), the politician considered to be the most powerful proponent of big fishing interests is said to have remarked, "Naess is of course more concerned about flagellates than about people." My point was that the tragic situation for fishermen today could have been avoided if policy makers had shown a little more respect for all life, not less respect for people. In every such case, one has reason to say that communication on the part of the supporters of deep ecology was imperfect. In this case, I certainly should have talked more about people than I did, but not to the exclusion of flagellates, radiolarians, and all the other life-forms that attract the interest of only a minority of people—and certainly not to the exclusion of ecosystems as a whole.

In 1985, at the international conservation biology conference in Michigan, a representative of a Third World country stood up and asked, "What about *our* problems?" Of course, it was strange for this person, and other representatives of the tropical countries, to hear discussions, day after day, on the future of biological processes in their countries without mention being made of the main social and economic problems facing those countries. If the conference had been organized by the Green movement, the agenda

would have been somewhat different. The discussions concerning how to deal with the ecological crisis would have taken up, let us say, only one-third of the time. The other two-thirds would have concerned mainly social problems ("social justice," I would say) and peace. The representatives of the Third World could have introduced the latter two areas of concern and could have stressed that efforts to protect what is left of the richness and diversity of life on Earth must not interfere with efforts to solve the main problems they have today.

Supporters of the deep ecology movement, however, might have raised the following question for discussion. "How can the increasing global interest in protecting all life on Earth be used to further the cause of genuine economic progress and social justice in the Third World?"

Such questions will inevitably bring forth different and, in part, incompatible proposals. As we explore these incompatible proposals, we must never lose sight of the importance to all human beings everywhere of preserving the richness and diversity of Life on Earth.

Cultural Diversity and the Deep Ecology Movement

The New Cultural Anthropology

Cultural anthropology and the general history of the major families of cultures on Earth reveal vast differences of attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, and premises as well as of individual, social, political, and metaphysical patterns.¹ How deep or basic are these differences? That is an open question. Inevitably, tentative answers require that we also answer questions about what precisely is meant by “deepness” in this context.

Since the 1940s there have been theories about the future of humankind that emphasize the need for continued richness and diversity of human cultures in order to avoid stagnation of human development. Development in terms of biological evolution may take thousands or even millions of years, but the extreme flexibility of human beings may ensure development through deep cultural changes rather than through manifest biological divergence. Such changes may, however, in part depend on the sheer plurality of cultural differences, regardless of their deepness.²

Plurality requires moderation of the contemporary rapid cultural invasion of other cultures, a process we have seen accelerate in the twentieth century. I look on these efforts of moderation as part of the general effort to maintain richness and diversity of life on Earth. At least, in some easily observable ways there is a convergence of cultures rather than diversification. Here, however, we have to take into account the present-day diversification of subcultures—rapidly changing groups of people trying out

This article was written in 1988. It is being published here for the first time.

“new” ways of life in conscious opposition to what is “customary” within a particular culture.

From the very start of the deep ecology movement in the industrial, materially rich societies, an obvious question was raised: are there or have there been cultures with a more ecologically responsible relationship between the human and the nonhuman worlds? In the United States various North American Indian cultures were studied with special care and furnished a clear answer: yes. At the same time, Europeans with a critical attitude toward industrial societies began with renewed interest to study African cultures. Did members of those cultures really work harder? Did they have less time and opportunity for cultural achievements beyond those serving mere survival? Marshall Sahlins answered no. His main work appeared in English under the title *Stone Age Economics* (1972)—an excellent kind of economics. In his opinion, the most *affluent* Stone Age societies were able to support rich cultures.

A new generation of cultural anthropologists grew up in the 1960s with rather ambivalent feelings toward the basic politics of industrial societies. Many of these cultural anthropologists favored new concepts such as “postindustrial society” and “green society” as well as a new conception about “development”: the “underdeveloped versus developed nations” terminology was largely given up as a near-synonym for “poor nonindustrial versus rich industrial nations.” The basic question was raised, How can the poor nations get rid of the kind of poverty that has a negative influence on life quality? How can they develop *without* following the tracks of the rich, consumerist Western nations?

From the point of view of the deep ecology movement, these new vistas were of prime importance. If the majority of human beings tried to live as the average person in the rich industrial societies does, the doomsday prophecies might come true. When we appreciate a manifest cultural difference, do we react in the same manner as when we appreciate a difference between groups of plants or animals? We do not look upon human beings as animals in a zoological garden.

People active in the various life sciences may easily go too far in finding similarities between phenomena in human societies and those in the animal and plant worlds. One has to be clear about the many pitfalls. In the history of ideas the important line of ideas from Protestantism through

Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School has contributed to an acute awareness of this tendency. On the other hand, there is in this thinking a kind of spiritual arrogance that may hide important analogies and counteract the process of identification with life-forms other than one's fellow human beings. In the worst concentration camps of the twentieth century, the conscious efforts of tyrants to educate guards in brutality consisted mainly of teaching them to look upon inmates as animals. "They are only animals!" Brutes should be handled with brutality—they don't understand decency. One must expect that a combining of human cultural diversity with non-human diversity will sometimes elicit deep-seated repugnance. The recent, somewhat confusing debate over E. O. Wilson's sociobiology (1975) illustrates both tendencies, exaggerating similarities or letting repugnance take over.

Julian Huxley, the biologist and leader of UNESCO in the late 1940s, and many others at that time, worked out the hypothesis that in the very long run, cultural diversity and cultural "evolution" will play for the species *Homo sapiens* a role *analogous* to the role of mutations and species variation among nonhuman beings. Cultural evolution has been thought to result in a development much faster than real speciation among nonhuman beings. This is made possible through the extremely loose programming of human beings: their options in life are more varied, "instinctive" determinants are less dominating even if very strong. The term *analogous* is used rather than *similar* because some differences are deep and important.

Deepness of Cultural Differences

If we subsume human cultural diversity under the concept of intrinsically valuable diversity of life-forms, the adjective *deep* is appropriate. Differences in details are not often important. If people in culture *A* must put something on their heads when entering a church, whereas people in culture *B* must take care not to wear anything there, the difference in behavior is not deep. The attitudes toward a church may be very much alike.

What we are mostly concerned about today is the continued existence of deep cultural differences, not just small variations of mores and habits. From the point of view of the science of cultural anthropology, the criterion of deep versus shallow cannot be precise, but the literature of that sci-

ence shows clearly the presence of a distinction between deep and shallow or, rather, between deep and less deep, big and small, essential and nonessential. Classifications of cultures into groups attest to such discriminations.

Scientists are able to describe fairly precisely differences between societies as wholes. Human cultures as wholes are more elusive. Researchers may point to a great manifold of particular differences between cultures, but the characterization of cultures as wholes is an ambitious undertaking with many pitfalls.

It is understandable that efforts to furnish a cultural taxonomy—with species, genera, families, and so on—are scientifically and philosophically doubtful. In any case, some applications of the distinction between deep and less deep are obvious: the cultural differences among Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are less deep than those among England, France, and Germany. Within the territories of Norway and Sweden there was not very long ago, however, a deeply different, extremely decentralized nation and homogeneous culture: that of the Sami people (generally known as Laplanders). Here we have three levels of deepness that are uncontroversial. It is perhaps unfortunate that the term *deep* is used both here and in the expression “deep ecology movement.” There are, however, similarities of connotation: one line of interpretation of “deepness of cultural difference” makes it synonymous with “cultural difference affecting cultural *premises*,” and premises are at stake when we distinguish between deep and nondeep questioning (problematization) within the general ecological movement. The term *premise*, like *presupposition* (Collingwood), is fairly common in cultural anthropology. Furthermore, there is a movement to defend cultures threatened with extinction. Within the movement is an awareness that, other things being equal, a culture more deeply different from others has a priority. The threatened cultures are small and so-called underdeveloped—i.e., not on the (wrong) way to becoming like us. Their resources are “underutilized.” Conflicts are going on all the time between those who will profit from “helping” them on the way to being like us, and those who try—mostly with little effect—to help the minorities who are critical of this “help.” It is a good sign that the term *development* now is more of a dyslogism than a eulogism.

From the point of view of economic growth and consumerism, no-

madic people are a nuisance for the extremely rich nations. The Sami people protested in vain against roads and dams in their Arctic territories in Norway and Sweden. The movements of their reindeer were impeded and their ecologically sustainable ways of living were undermined. Those young people who wish to adapt to the ways of the powerful invaders, for example, to the ways of the Norwegians, should be helped by the invaders, but those who wish for a development, not abandonment, of the Sami people should not be impeded in their efforts.

One way of clarifying the deepness of a cultural difference is to evaluate the success of efforts to translate a culturally significant text in one culture into a text in the vocabulary of another. (For important reasons I avoid discussing translating one language into another.)

The culturally important Greek term *areté* is only by an old convention translated into English by the term *virtue* and into Scandinavian languages even less adequately by *dyd*. The meanings of the Greek term are laboriously explained in footnotes and in special texts about texts. It is hopeless to find a single word or complex expression that would come near to expressing what is conveyed by *areté*. Therefore, it is better to use one and the same inadequate word in every context. Its occurrence *signals* the Greek untranslatable word. The informed reader knows that in the Greek text there is an occurrence of the term *areté*.

Similarly, the Sanskrit term *deva* is translated "god," but the informed reader knows that this is not a translation in any precise sense but merely a conventional indication that in the text there is an occurrence of *deva*. A ten-word, not entirely inadequate "translation" might be: a power different from that of human, and mostly greater.

When a Bororo utterance is rendered as "I am a parakeet," the translation is sometimes thought to be adequate. The Bororo clearly have a term designating the sort of bird we call a parakeet. Of course, the English sentence is misleading, except to cultural anthropologists. Many people with severe mental disturbances say "I am Jesus," and we conventionally consider their statements false in a historical sense. When hearing the sentence "I am a parakeet" (if not asserted by a parakeet!), we similarly tend to reject the statement as false. The cultural anthropologist will try, perhaps through a couple of semesters' lectures, to convey—still more or less inadequately—*what is meant* by the sentence when uttered by a Bororo. Conclu-

sion: if a translation of one sentence, *A*, into another, *B*, is an adequate translation only if what is meant by *A* within group *C* is conveyed to *B* within group *D*, then there cannot be any translation of the Bororo sentence into English. This holds true even if we write “approximately conveyed” instead of just “conveyed.”

A different criterion of deepness is the extent to which cultural premises differ. It is a common methodological norm within cultural anthropology to try to “understand each culture on the basis of its own premises.” The assertion of such a norm is justified only if the researchers have means to test properly hypotheses of the kind “*x* is a cultural premise of culture *y*.” If premises are articulated systematically, they form sets of more or less *different* fundamental hypotheses and norms. The more the set of premises explicit or implicit in culture *A* differs from the set in culture *B*, the deeper is the difference. This may be a useful criterion, but the fierce conflicts between cultures often concern very special applications of the premises, rather than the premises themselves.

Whatever the reasonable criteria of “deeply different cultures,” there were more than 100 deeply different cultures about the year 1650. Given some of the sets of reasonable criteria, the number would be much greater.

The number of human beings at that time was about 500 million, less than one-tenth of the world’s human population today. One hundred cultures among 500 million means five million for each culture, on the average. The way some cultural anthropologists reckon, we may say that there were more than 100 deeply different cultures with significantly different “premises.”

In about 1650 Scandinavia was inhabited by two deeply different cultures, the Sami and the dominant Scandinavian culture with its three languages—which are, surprisingly enough, classed as major languages in the supremely interesting book *The Languages of the World* by Kenneth Katzner. The Sami language is still used by more than 10,000 people, but the culture is rapidly degenerating under pressure from powerful industrial neighbors. Until recently, such pressure was blatantly coercive; now there is a tendency to listen to a minority in the dominant culture who want the Sami to be offered a high degree of independence. In other areas of the world, such as in the remaining tropical rain forests, the extermination of cultures deeply different from the dominant ones goes on practically unhindered.

If we use language as a criterion of deepness of difference, Katzner's classification includes nineteen families of languages, plus an "independent" category to represent those not easily put into any family. Some families have many members; the American Indian, for example, has more than 1,000, "the vast majority spoken by small tribes numbering a few thousand people or less" (Katzner 1986: 34).

There are some deep differences in cultures corresponding to different American Indian languages spoken in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Central America, and South America. There are, however, by far fewer deeply different cultures in these areas than the number of languages. Sixty-eight languages are listed as Indo-European. From the point of view of an American Indian, these languages would perhaps be found to be similar and so also the corresponding cultures. From the point of view of a Norwegian, they seem to contain considerable differences. I would vote for the existence of more than ten deeply different cultures when we work through the many branches of the family, the Indo-Iranian, Slavic, Celtic, Germanic, and so on. Again, though, without fairly precise criteria for assertions of forms such as "The cultural difference between *A* and *B* is greater than between *A* and *C*," not much is gained from the above reflections.

Enough number games? The main point is to make available for our imagination and appreciation the still considerable number of deep cultural differences. It is also my intention to heighten awareness of the decrease, even extinction, that is going on, especially outside the sphere of big, rich nations, but also inside them through harassment of subcultures deviating "too much" from the establishment. Life is made difficult for people who try to live in an ecologically responsible way, i.e., an ecologically universalizable way—not from malevolence but from sheer friction.

In the words of the cultural anthropologist Fredrik Barth, cultures are mowed down as with bulldozers. This metaphor and many others suggest a widespread similarity of attitude both toward destruction of diversity of cultures and diversity of animals and other kinds of life-forms.³

Cultural Diversity and the Deep Ecology Platform

It is not common to link the movement to protect nonindustrial cultures to the ecology movement. There are, however, good reasons to do so as long as

we do not neglect the obvious great differences between our relations to human cultures and those to any animal or plant culture (or society). In what follows I shall mention some of the areas in which there are obvious analogies or even similarities.

In the eight-point deep ecology platform proposed in 1984, considerations of diversity of life-forms include diversity of human cultures.⁴ Human cultures constitute complex forms of life on the planet. Or, less dogmatically formulated, the way supporters of the deep ecology movement conceive the *diversity* of cultures is in certain ways very much like the way they conceive the *diversity* of plants and animals and human beings. This justifies mentioning deep cultural differences in point 2.

Point 3 emphasizes that the rich nations with great coercive power have no right to reduce the diversity of cultures with less power, less ability to survive invasion—whether territorial, technical, economic, or cultural. Here it should be added that a lot of this reduction is not intentional, and, as in the case of most invasions, there are fifth columns eagerly supporting the invasion. Furthermore, reduction of cultural diversity is carried out within the poor nations, with powerful tribes or groups suppressing “weaker” cultures.

Point 4 puts forward the contention that the flourishing of human cultures is compatible with a “substantial decrease” of the human population. *Just to provoke*, I have sometimes suggested 100 million as “sufficient.”⁵ With one million as the average membership of a culture, this only provides for a maximum of 100 deeply different cultures. The main point, however, is that there are no vital needs, no ultimate goals that require a gigantic number of people. In a small population the investment per capita would be prohibitive in terms of ensuring broad scientific progress, including progress in mathematical physics and cosmology. Therefore, one would have to think of the future scientific endeavor as a joint enterprise of several deeply different cultures.

The relevance of point 5 of the platform is terribly clear. There are today cases of violent extinction of cultures. More often, there are constant, more or less easily observed pressures from surrounding powerful societies. In *The Careless Technology* (1972), Farvar, Milton, and colleagues describe cases of mindless introduction of Western technology. The ideology of “progress,” Western style, is still used when cultures are invaded. Tourism is permitted

to take forms clearly destructive of cultures. One must admit that it is sometimes very difficult to find out where to draw the line: starving children must be helped even if most kinds of help so far have undermined the culture.

Some serious students of the problems have given up hope that certain cultures can be saved. To support the forces that try to prolong their lives may be brutal toward young people who should learn new things required when their culture gets closer to death. There are no easy solutions to these problems. I just mention them here.

Point 6 was written primarily with the rich countries in mind. To prevent what is generally called neocolonialism, many of the same changes are necessary that are also necessary to protect nonhuman life on the planet. It must be conceded by the rich that efforts to protect East Africa's fabulous fauna were more energetic and better administered than efforts to protect its cultures. Norms announcing that human beings have special obligations toward their own kind were violated, as were norms expressing concern about extreme poverty and about cultural diversity. The situation is different now. The World Wildlife Fund successfully combines concern for people and animals, to mention an example. Much remains to be done, though, to clarify the ethical questions involved and to find tenable solutions.

Point 7 was also written primarily with the rich countries in mind, but if the reports about the lifestyles of the power elites in the poor countries are fair, the situation is precarious there also. Ecologically universalizable lifestyles must be the norm for all groups, including those in the poor countries.

Point 8 is particularly relevant in a time of mass tourism and worldwide economic penetrations. Millions of people who are not trained to contact vulnerable cultures visit them and cause the young to get the impression of an easy life without any obligations, and an opportunity to roam around at will. In all cultures the young are under at least some pressure to conform and to learn a profession. Foreign tourists seem to come from countries without any restrictions except those imposed by the police.

Economic forces operate largely without restrictions, penetrating more or less helpless countries ruled by power elites profiting from foreign domination. Those who essentially agree to the descriptive and normative views outlined have, according to point 8, an obligation to try to assist the implementation of the necessary changes.

The above survey of the Eight Points has not considered "richness" of cultures. The intended concept of richness as applied to the animal and plant world implies, for example, not only preservation of species but also the wide distribution of habitats of the species and the multiplicity of individuals. If we map out bioregions and, in general, different areas of the biosphere, the questions posed are mainly, Have the population and distribution of such and such species diminished in this area? Why? Can we restore these areas?

With cultures, such questions are less applicable. The members of a culture may, of course, belong to a large set of tribes and the tribes will, if nomadic, spread out geographically. At any minor place there cannot easily be large numbers of members of deeply different cultures. Members may come together at big trade centers (Fredrik Barth) and live together at the center without much conflict, but in general, different cultures occupy different territories.

This brings up the large question of the relation of minorities and subcultures to a main culture, and the pseudo-richness of cultures within the borders of a metropolitan area like Los Angeles. Is there a South Korean culture within Los Angeles? The answer, as I see it, is a clear no, although there is a cultural minority and a subculture within the cultural unity of the United States.

Is it ethically legitimate to support minorities in foreign cultures? Must we either support dominant tendencies or try to keep neutral? A philosophy of compassion makes it difficult not to lament the vast amount of suffering in nature. When we contemplate cultures in their splendid diversity and their accomplishments, the same philosophy makes it doubly difficult not to lament the sufferings and indignities manifested there. It is scarcely possible not to utter "How unnecessary, how meaningless!"

The anthropologist and historian offer explanations, trying to show that the vast suffering has been unavoidable. It remains a painful side of human development, but it does not diminish the appreciation of the deep diversity and the great accomplishment under difficult circumstances. Lamentation is a passive emotion in the terminology of Spinoza. Self-preservation makes us try out an active attitude in regard to extreme prolonged suffering in animals as well as in the cultural context, in spite of our limited ability to foresee the overall and the long-term consequences of our actions.

Some cultures, like that of the Chiricahua Apache, are conventionally looked down upon because their technology is “ridiculously” simple and their institutions astonishingly undeveloped. What is mostly forgotten is the great achievement of *a culture shared by practically all adult members*. They are competent in practically every culturally important activity. There are no occupational secrets, no carefully cultivated specialties, no hierarchical structures that leave some members out in the cold; there are no second-rate citizens. The culture as a whole is alive, whereas with us the whole is merely an abstraction, nothing experienced by anyone. It is in deep contrast to conditions in our giant industrial society where we can do practically nothing worthwhile culturally without the clear knowledge of others doing it professionally and much “better.” With us there are no cultural generalists, whereas in the Fourth World cultures there are few specialists. There is simplicity of means combined with an astonishing richness of ends. So it is wise not to look down upon them! They have their shortcomings, we have ours, but ours generate tremendous global impacts.

Concluding Remarks

The movement in the rich countries to protect against their own destructive influence on nonindustrial countries, and therefore on cultural diversity in general, strengthened remarkably in the same years that the deep ecology movement strengthened. Whereas the latter movement depends heavily on grassroots support, people in general rightly feel that they cannot so easily demonstrate their willingness to change the current rapid deterioration, for example, of the conditions of the tropical rain-forest cultures.

Nevertheless, there is some overlap between the two movements. If we look at the efforts within the three great contemporary movements that demand strong grassroots participation—the peace, social justice, and deep ecology movements—the strength of the movement to protect cultural diversity depends on all three.

Population Reduction: An Ecosophical View

The population issue raises such diverse and deep questions that we need a total view as a conceptual framework. When the articulation of such a view is largely inspired by ecology, I call it an ecosophy. We need various ecosophies. I call mine Ecosophy T. In what follows I do not defend any controversial part of that view but very briefly formulate certain views that are widespread today, and try to support them ecosophically.

- (1) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of human population.
- (2) The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.

Taken together, these two propositions form point 4 of what has been called a platform of the deep ecology movement (see, e.g., Naess 1986b: 10–31; chapter 5). The acceptance of the first proposition is, I have reason to believe, much more widespread now than it was only twenty years ago. The last part of formulation (1) is perhaps not the best phrasing of what is intended to be conveyed. An alternative is “*compatible with a substantially smaller human population.*” The critical period of decrease is then in a clear way left out of consideration. Its problems need separate treatment.

Against the second proposition it is sometimes objected that if humanity adopted an entirely different way of life, the present high number of people would not necessarily encroach upon the flourishing of nonhuman life, or at least not much more so than do other species. I agree. However, if we try to imagine how this way of life would look, the result is likely to be that we despair of its early realization. At the very least, it is irresponsible to as-

This article was written in 1987. It is being published here for the first time.

sume its realization and today reject stabilization and subsequent reduction as a distant albeit important goal. In addition to goals of change of general behavior, we must have the long-range reduction in view. Every year that goal increases in importance, every day it is relevant.

Propositions (1) and (2) concentrate on the flourishing of life. Even if "life" is taken in a wide sense, it does not cover the full range of concerns of the deep ecology movement, which of course is concerned about the Earth as a whole, including landscapes valued independently of the life-forms that sometimes live there. We are seriously concerned about the ecosphere in its widest sense, not only the biosphere (in its widest sense).

It is characteristic of the deep ecology movement that great efforts at conservation are argued *not only* as something good and profitable for human beings, but also as a task that should be carried out for the sake of what is intended to be conserved. It is worthy of conservation, independently of any narrow human interests. This is often called the nonanthropocentric or biocentric or ecocentric view. Nevertheless, in the current social and political milieu, success in conservation efforts depends heavily on arguments that *do* stress narrowly human interests, especially the requirements of human health. The supporters of the deep ecology movement combine such arguments with those that are independent of narrow human interests.¹ It is essential that "experts" and others who influence policies agree about this combination and that the public be made aware that basically there is agreement. Otherwise, the public is deceived.

Applying the above discussion to the question of human population, I shall tentatively defend a more radical proposition than (1):

- (3) The flourishing of human life and cultures requires that the human population be substantially smaller than at the present time.

With a global population of 5,000 million now and possibly 10,000 million within a couple of generations, the process of even a very slow reduction would be a formidable undertaking, perhaps a terrifying project for many. Should we, or even *can* we, contemplate such reduction over the centuries or millennia in realistic detail? Obviously not, but very long-range perspectives are necessary for the choice of wise policies *now*.

For the present discussion it is perhaps best to get rid of the term *flour-*

ishing. Instead I ask, What are the kinds of ultimate goals for humankind? Is one or more of them such that very great numbers of participants are required to maximize the prospect of realization?

The goals may be divided into individual, social (communal), and cultural. As one of the ultimate goals—that is, goals not having just instrumental character—I postulate a rich manifold of deeply different cultures. Looking back some thousand years, and imagining some distant futures, I reach a conclusion that seems to me rather certain: on the average, no very great population is required in each culture. On the contrary, huge numbers tend to reduce the manifold.

The goals of each individual are to a high degree dependent on the community, the larger social setting, the nation or people. If, however, we try to go from subordinate to ultimate goals, we may tentatively simplify our reflections by subsuming individual ultimate goals under three headings: pleasure, happiness, and perfection.² By the term *pleasure* I refer to what in the history of philosophy has often been called hedonism. Momentary, intense, positive feelings, especially sensual, are by the hedonist seen to be the only ultimate good and value. By the still more ambiguous term *happiness* I refer to endaimonism, which differs essentially from hedonism in taking time seriously—a happy *life*—and recognizing that happiness requires deep and complex positive feelings not reducible to sense experience. By *perfection* I think of ultimate goals defined independently of pleasure or happiness, for example, “authenticity,” “doing one’s duty in life,” “letting God lead,” “self-realization.” Usually, those proclaiming a kind of perfection (in my terminology) as an ultimate goal assume that attaining or seriously seeking the goal has a satisfactory degree of happiness as a consequence.³ Others admit that no happiness is assured, or that they expect unhappiness from seeking perfection.

The importance of focusing on ultimate goals stems in part from *decrease of ecological destructiveness with decreasing distance from the ultimate*. An example may be useful.

In Benito Mussolini’s years as *Il Duce*, most—perhaps more than 90 percent—of his proclamations about war suggested that he considered warfare an ultimate goal for mankind. Sometimes, though, he clearly classed wars started by Italy as instrumental: the best means to improve the Italian “race.” He had contempt for what he considered the sloppy, pleasure-loving, and unwarlike qualities of Italians. As long as he lived, he said, he

would see to it that Italy was always involved in at least one war. The ultimate goal, therefore, seemed to be a kind of perfection—to realize certain qualities of character—rather than an endless series of wars. Since he did not shun man's pleasure of "conquering" women, the ultimate goal seemed for him to be a sort of masculine character, including nonsloppy "masculine" pleasures. There are many ecologically innocent ways of realizing masculinity short of war! Mussolini's destructive choice is not a necessary one.

Why not be content with one's own masculinity? Why spend time perfecting the masculinity of millions of others? Here, of course, we discern motives of ambition centering on coercive power. The many ways of satisfying ambition reveal perfection goals of various kinds. What this whole example is meant to illustrate is that there are scarcely any ultimate goals that *inevitably* require ecologically destructive outlets.

Our first conclusion must be that the ultimate goals of humankind do not presuppose very large numbers of human beings on Earth. A population significantly below the present-day 5,000 million would be viable.

The next question must be, Given the geographical and other limitations of the Earth, will maximization of the prospect of realizing the ultimate goals be hindered rather than favored by a total population as large as 5,000 million?

For those who accept Self-realization as one, or the, ultimate goal, and accept the tendency to identify with all life as an inevitable consequence of maturity, the answer is clear: it is vastly more difficult to reach the goal with a population of 5,000 million than with a substantially smaller population—other conditions being held constant.

In line with the very limited aim of this paper, I shall now jump to a couple of conclusions, the first of which presents a softening of (3):

- (4) The optimum conditions for the realization of the ultimate goals of humankind require a population that is substantially smaller than at present.
- (5) There are no ultimate goals of humankind the realization of which requires a reduction of the richness and diversity of life on Earth.

Given today's large population and given that a great part of it for natural reasons is eager to reach a much higher standard of life, pollution and re-

source depletion will inevitably assume grave proportions. It is tempting to object, With soft and intermediate technology, with stabilization of energy consumption, with the realization of the major goals of green politics, ecological sustainability is assured even with 5,000 million human beings! We may agree, but we must repeat that it is irresponsible to neglect the population question in the *mere hope* that a radical green movement will be victorious.

Considering the immense pollution per capita in the rich industrialized countries, population reduction in those countries has at least as high a priority as in the poor countries. Our lopsided share of the reduction of life conditions on the planet should make us careful of trying to press the poor countries toward greater ecological responsibility. Furthermore, the large increase in the material standard of living in the last half-century in the rich countries may not have increased the level of attainment of the ultimate goals in life.

In Europe only about 8×5 square kilometers (near the Polish-Russian border) are left of the old forest that covered Europe after the last ice age. As a philosopher I may be permitted to say that we Europeans have made surprisingly little use of our brains to attend to our ultimate goals in life. That might have saved a lot of nature and added to our quality of life. Paying more attention to the ultimate is facilitated through thinking in terms of a total view rather than in fragments.

The Period of Transition in Rich Countries: Economic Consequences

A period of transition from higher to lower population will have a different character in different countries, and a different character in different parts of individual countries or regions.⁴ Let me leave out the smaller units—parts of a small country—and concentrate on rich countries.

In rich countries with “mixed” economies, neither markedly “socialist” nor markedly “capitalist,” slight decreases of fertility have already been experienced and have elicited public discussion. The main reaction has been *alarm*, probably mostly of a rather instinctive character (“Are we dying out?”). Few conferences, if any, have been organized with the aim of discussing theories about various consequences of a slow decrease.

With regard to economic consequences, the main concern has been the increasing percentage of old, “unproductive” people. These have to be given food and shelter; they “cost” a lot. If their numbers increase by 10 percent, productive people have to work more and produce more. Against this, economists (and here I think of people doing economic research without being hired by a public institution or a private firm) point out that children “cost” as much or more. So if 10 percent fewer children are born, the percentage of productive people is affected at least as heavily the other way. They might have to work less and produce less in the transition period. (By “work” is here meant salaried work. Much work of eminent social value is done today without salary, whereas much destructive production is paid for.)

Of great political importance is the difference between public and private budgets. With the disappearance of the extended family as an economic unit, old people are paid for largely out of public budgets. Children are paid for mostly out of private budgets. (In this discussion, I have in mind a mixed economy, like that of Scandinavia.) Some of the alarm about a slow decrease is therefore alarm about higher taxes. On the other hand, the more than ten years’ schooling, now paid for mainly by the public budget, will during the transition period cost less. Further, as it is now, people in economic charge of children pay lower taxes. A decrease of their number would increase public income. It is, therefore, an open question whether taxes would need to be increased or could be lowered.

Here is not the place to go into details. Suffice it to point out that the economics of slow population decrease is a fascinating theme for professional economists and population experts. Politicians have so far mainly asked for professional advice on how to *avoid* a decrease, not on how to think about its consequences, both good or bad, in relation to a value system. The advice of economists has largely ignored the economically important impact of population upon ecosystems—the forests, to mention an example. Traditionally, there has been little cooperation between the social and the natural sciences. It is difficult to find up-to-date literature.⁵ What seems clear is that it is extremely difficult to predict the economic consequences of a slow decline, and that a great number of factors must be taken into consideration.

If your personal motivation for preaching long-range human popula-

tion reduction is primarily concern for rapidly diminishing nonhuman life-forms, for continued evolution, and for the survival of the planet, is it not dishonest to concentrate on population reduction for the sake of human beings themselves?

It is not dishonest even if 90 percent of your argumentation is for the sake of human beings, provided you honestly believe what you say. Using argumentation in favor of a great long-range goal, we select (from among the many we believe in) those arguments that carry the most weight; such arguments must be used for what they are worth. Arguments in favor of human beings carry immeasurably more weight than those in favor of anything else.

Migration and Ecological Unsustainability

Before entering the discussion of migration, I shall mention a sort of emigration that is uncommon, but of increasing importance. There is a movement of emigration that roughly may be described as follows.

People from the rich, consumerist countries emigrate to poor countries and settle down for life. They live a rich life using simple means compared to what they did before leaving their native country, and certainly using simpler means than the rich in the poor countries. They and their children adapt to the new culture to an extent sufficient to enjoy good and close relations with the local people.

This kind of rich-to-poor emigration does not involve many people but is a highly instructive subject for research and not completely without influence both in the rich and in the poor countries. In the rich countries the influence is in part due to the fairly large literature created by the emigrants and by the work of social scientists and analysts.

There is also a movement from poor to rich and back. In this case the emigrants return to their own country after some years away, traveling once or several times, continuing to live in harmony with the same principles. Both migrations favor reduction of unsustainability.

Ecological unsustainability in the richest countries is still increasing. In 1983 *The World Conservation Strategy* pictured an equation: on the left-hand side was one man, a Dane; on the right-hand side were forty Somalis. The meaning: during the lifetime of one member of a rich industrial state, he interferes as much with the ecosystems of the planet as do about forty Somalis. Each of the children of one young Somali who emigrates to Den-

This article was written in 1993. It is being published here for the first time.

mark interferes forty times as much as they would have done if this young Somali had stayed at “home”—if we presume he had a sort of home. The unsustainability in his new home increases. Perhaps, though, people in the rich countries could learn from immigrants to downscale consumption? Unfortunately, the outlook for this is very bad, and not much can be expected in the near future. What happens is that because children of immigrants have low-paid jobs, they do not quite reach the average consumerism level.

From an ecological point of view, it is convenient to distinguish the three cases, the settling and movement of individuals from one of high unsustainability increase to one of low unsustainability increase, and the opposite, and that relating to roughly equal status. If the movement does not stretch over generations, the negative effects of the poor-to-rich movements are less serious, because the adoption of the consumerist lifestyle often is incomplete during the first generation. Children of immigrants adapt more closely to the established norms.

Let us approach the ethical aspect of immigration, and tentatively distinguish three categories of immigrants from poor to rich countries. The first contains migrants who *prefer* to live in country *A* rather than *B*, perhaps love, wish, and long to live in *A* rather than *B*, most often for economic reasons.

The second category equates to “refugees” according to more or less international criteria. Most of them are classed as refugees for political or religious reasons. They often maintain that there is a fair chance that they will be imprisoned or otherwise seriously discriminated against if they remain in their home countries. Hundreds of millions of people live where nobody can be sure that he will not suddenly be imprisoned or shot, even if he does not belong to organizations trying to overturn the government, even if he does not criticize the established order.

In what follows I focus on those refugees whose intention it is to *remain indefinitely* in the new country. At the moment (1993), conditions in former Yugoslavia are such that there is a great need for temporary emigration, but not to leave their communities for good. I am not talking about them as immigrants in the new country.

The third category contains two very different groups: the desperately needy from a material point of view, and members of the active political

and social nonviolent opposition to brutal authoritarian regimes. They are regularly imprisoned, tortured, or killed, and their families are threatened in a most infamous way.

The weight of purely ecological considerations seems to me indisputable only when applied to the first category. Any responsible ecological policy will discourage or tend to minimize migration of the first kind. The two great goals, reduction of total consumption and reduction of population, become more difficult to reach. The economic pressure to maintain or even increase private per capita consumption is so strong, in part because it is believed to be the decisive means to reduce unemployment, that reduction of population must be seriously considered.

It takes strong nerves to live under brutal authoritarianism without serious loss of life quality. It shows ethical strength when people aware of the increasing ecological unsustainability nevertheless insist that rich countries ought to accept more immigrants of the second category. How can we reject unfortunate people *knocking at our door*? Apart from the ethical argument, it has been (seriously?) suggested that if a hundred million people from the poor world settled in the rich, the per capita consumption might decrease even if the governments desperately tried to keep it up. If what is maintained in the following is tenable, a gigantic poor-to-rich-country migration does not solve any major problems.

The third category of people live under conditions materially so terrible or so dangerous that they must be accorded the highest priority. The desperately needy are mostly not able to reach our airports or even our borders. Many are in a condition that precludes even being transported to our countries, but there are also many families who would stand transportation and who would with great certainty be helped out of a status of *extreme suffering*. As I see it, they must be accorded a priority over people who are having a bad time, who certainly suffer, but are not in a state which we cannot but assume is truly terrifying.

The same level of priority must, as I see it, be accorded the active opposition and their families, people who courageously risk their lives fighting some of the causes of the miserable state of affairs in a large number of countries.

Not very long ago, it was fairly generally accepted as a good and important thing to hand out some money to beggars. Their need was so obvi-

ous and so near. Then came a period of reflection: the community must try to help in a way less arbitrary than by handouts to people able and willing to ask for small coins. Today, I think we have to consider how we can best decrease extreme suffering, whether the victims are able to knock on our doors or not.

A similar need for reflection makes itself felt when we assess the urgency of stopping the increase of ecological unsustainability. It has to do with "discounting" the future, the ethical abnormality of not taking seriously the life conditions of our children and grandchildren, pushing problems over to them—and doing this in spite of the insight that if we continue to support irresponsible policies, the problem of reaching sustainability will only become much greater. We refuse to carry a small load, thereby making it necessary for the next generations to carry a very much larger one.

The Third World countries suffer from migrations on a scale unknown in the rich countries. That from Bangladesh to India some years ago is a case in point. The rich countries have the means to help in such cases, but they do practically nothing. They could, for example, help solve the housing and school problems. Applying the cost-benefit criterion, one can do more for more people in that way than by putting Third World people in a rich country. Thus, the ethical question has a solution. It requires, however, that geographical distance be taken less seriously and that the increasing ecological unsustainability be taken more seriously. To help the Third World with its formidable migration problems provides us with the opportunity to help people increase their quality of life from a very low level to a significantly higher one while remaining within a culture in which they can feel at home, and feel competent and adequate.

Why do we have to give the people who must be assumed to be in a state of extreme suffering the highest priority? Why can we not just say that suffering is suffering? Why actively search for the worst cases, which presumably will require much work and an intolerable amount of arbitrariness? As to the latter, immigration officers already face that problem in assessing applications from people of the first and second categories. Active search may decrease arbitrariness, because those who are picked out are primarily those whose conditions *without doubt* are extreme.

The first question leads inevitably to the philosophical *problematique* of intensities versus quantities. (If we add warm water to a bathtub contain-

ing warm water, this will not make the water hot. Temperature is an intensity. Addition does not count.)

Suppose we are in a position *either* to relieve one human being of a moderate pain *or* to relieve another human being suffering an evidently stronger or more intense pain. If other relevant conditions are equal, we naturally focus on the one with the more intense pain. Suppose, however, that we are in a position to relieve either ten people of a moderate pain or one person of a more intense pain. What would we do? We assume that the case clearly permits a comparison of the degrees of pain. If we decide to relieve the one suffering intensively, we follow what we may call the principle of intensity applied to pain. It is necessary here to use *pain* in the sense of *felt* pain. We are concerned with feelings. *Felt* pain has intensities, and the calculus of adding and subtracting quantities of pained people does not apply. That is, when two people are in pain, that does not create a greater or more intense pain. (What about mutual influence? It changes feelings. Yes, but consideration of such influences belongs to the assessment of causes and effects of the felt feeling, not to the felt feeling itself.)

If by chance 1,000 people each sit down on a sharp nail (independent of one another and assuming for the sake of simplicity that there is a definite standard of pain associated with sitting down like that, and also a common pain threshold), no terrible pain is created. No pain a thousand times stronger, or even just a little more intense, emerges. That is, there is no stronger pain than if only one person at that moment had sat down on a nail. Because it is often difficult and resource-consuming to conclude rationally who suffers the worst among people we are in a position to help, we tend to let numbers decide. Often, we are *not* confronted with excessive difficulties. The same holds for assessing the graveness of threats involving clear risk of extreme suffering. A freedom fighter under some of the cruel regimes risks torture all the time, repeated torture until he breaks down definitively or dies. That is *evidently* a much more severe threat than the threat experienced by the average citizen of the country.

When we have to decide which categories of refugees to help, the principle of intensity may be applied without great arbitrariness. There are a multitude of people who are more or less helpless and who with great certainty can be understood to suffer greatly. The conditions in certain Third (and Fourth) World countries are such that, in my opinion, we in many

cases have to give them priority. Typically they are people with no formal education, often old and attached to big families. They adapt only with great difficulties to conditions in the rich countries. They must be helped where they are, in their own countries. Many young people in the rich countries are willing to help by spending a few years in a poor country, but then they must be assured that they get jobs when they return home.

Experience tells us that foreign aid rarely manages to reach satisfactorily those who need it. This owes to some extent to the low priority given to the organization of the aid. When high priority, including appropriate education of people sent into the country, is afforded, and no war going on, the aid is not less effectively distributed than aid in one's own country. Foreign aid must be increased, not decreased.

If these guidelines are followed would there be less migration from poor to rich countries? Not necessarily, and not in some cases—for example, Norway and Sweden. Norway experienced what it meant to live under a tyrannical government during the Nazi occupation of 1940–45. People who worked in the resistance movement against the occupiers could be helped to escape to Sweden or Great Britain when in great danger of being caught by the Gestapo. Appropriate secret organizations saw to that. Thousands escaped concentration camps and repeated systematic torture. Nobody could be sure that, under torture, he or she would be able to keep silent about things the Gestapo wanted to know. Escape was important for the “homefront.” Sweden was aware of the value of its help. What I am driving at is the paramount importance for freedom fighters in countries not just mistreating people but using systematic torture, to know that organized escape routes exist to other countries. Norway and some other countries might organize escape routes, receiving freedom fighters in grave peril and their threatened family members. This would be a kind of *active* immigration policy.

The tyrannical governments would not like this “emigration.” They would protest vigorously, but to no avail. Information about freedom fighters in grave danger can be obtained through normal international channels. Amnesty International provides one of them. Amnesty International must not get into trouble. Therefore, it can only do what it always has done: keep its files open for those who need information. What I propose is simply a more active refugee policy for a category of people who desperately need to

leave their country for good or for a time. It is at the same time a demonstration against torture, which many of us consider ethically to be on a more sinister level than straight killing of opponents. Torture is a fundamental attack on human dignity.

A main philosophical basis of the above proposal is, in my opinion, to be found in the acceptance of the intensity principle and some of its limited consequences of relevance to the immigration policies of the rich countries. I would find it of considerable value to get the proposal widely discussed.

Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Human Beings, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves

This paper assumes as a general abstract norm that the specific potentialities of living beings should be fulfilled. No being has a priority in principle in the realization of its possibilities, but norms of increasing diversity or richness of potentialities put limits on the development of destructive lifestyles. Application is made to the mixed Norwegian communities of certain mammals and human beings. A kind of *modus vivendi* is established that is firmly based on cultural tradition. It is fairly unimportant whether the term *rights (of animals)* is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna.

In recent years academic philosophers have paid increasing attention to the relations between human beings and other living creatures. One of the reasons for this is a tragic paradox. In the industrialized states the average material standard of living (measured conventionally) has reached a fabulously high level, the highest in the history of humankind. At the same time the number of animals, especially mammals, subjected to suffering and a severely restricted lifestyle in the richest countries has increased exponentially. Never have so many highly sensitive beings been cruelly treated for such flimsy reasons. The fact that the main effort against this trend has been organized by professionals engaged in lessening the economic crisis in Scandinavia has rendered it even more difficult than usual to make an impact on the political level. It is to be expected that cruel practices supported through economic considerations will flourish in spite of mounting public concern.

This article was reprinted with permission from *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group) 22 (1979): 231–41.

The way animals are treated is determined not only economically and politically, but also through sets of general attitudes and beliefs, some of which are philosophically relevant. Academic philosophers have here a great variety of problems from which to choose. "Do animals have rights?" is one that has been at the forefront.

In what follows I shall outline the skeleton of a pattern of argument, *T*, which concludes with a version of the maxim "Every living being should have an equal right to live and flourish." If we wish to avoid too expensive an egalitarianism, "equal right" might be replaced by "equal right in principle." The argument starts with "Potential ought to be maximally realized" or a similar sentence. Relying on various uses and connotations of "self," we can also employ an expression such as "Maximal self-realization!" These formulations are (of course imperfectly) expressive of the single normative premise needed in *T*.

The potentialities of human beings in the form of achievements and lifestyles, and in other ways, are more complex and therefore greater than those of any other living beings on earth, at least at the present time. The maximal realization of these potentialities depends, however, on a vast number of conditions. Ecology (and especially human ecology) teaches us daily more about certain kinds of decencies. The manifestations of the capacity of sympathy and symbiosis teach us that there is a vast variety of ways of living together without destroying others' potentials of realization.

Maximal realization of potentials implies the utilization of the existing *diversity* of life-forms and capacities. Among the factors reducing diversity are the relations of "exclusivity," the dependence of the maximal realization of the potentials of one life-form on the nonmaximal realization of potentials of some other forms. Clearly, a policy of restraining certain forms and lifestyles in favor of others is called for—in favor of those with high levels of symbiosis, or more generally, good potentialities of coexistence.

This seems to suggest a very active interference in nature: defending the hunted against the hunters, the oppressed against the oppressors. Here, though, ecology has taught us a very brutal lesson: our vast ignorance of the interdependence of life-forms and the often tragic consequences, for the hunted and the oppressed, of the elimination of the hunters and the oppressors. Interference has to be carried out with the utmost care.

There are various concepts of diversity in the ecological literature.

Here I shall rely on a fairly narrow concept such that one may assert, "Maximal realization of potentials implies maximal diversity."

Complexity, in the qualitative sense of many-sidedness of lifestyle and of manifestations of life in general, may be safely said to increase from protozoans to vertebrates. Increase of complexity makes increase of diversity possible. Maximal realization of potentials thus implies maximal development of levels of complexity and maximal diversity at each level.

In the argumentation pattern *T*, "Maximal complexity!" is derived either directly from the basic norm or indirectly through asserting "Maximization of diversity implies maximization of complexity."

Among the classes of jointed-legged animals (*arthropoda*), insects may safely be said to show the most pronounced diversity. Scolopendrids are on roughly the same level of complexity, but do not show comparable diversity.

The development of the nervous system is generally taken as proof of development of a capacity of joy and suffering, from vague feelings of lust or pain to extremely *complex* sentiments of positive, negative, or mixed kinds.

The relation of joy and suffering to self-realization is differently conceived with different philosophies. Our argument pattern makes use of Spinoza's theories, asserting an inner relation between joy (*laetitia*) and increase of power of realization (*potentia*). Joy is not felt *because of* the realization of a potential but is part of the very process of its realization. Spinozist theories are important when linking utilitarianism to self-realization conceptions of ethics.¹

In spite of what has been said about the elimination of hunters and oppressors, we may safely assert as general maxims that "Exploitation reduces realization potentials" and "Subjection reduces realization potentials," and derive "No exploitation!" and "No subjection!" Strict application of such slogans is, of course, utopian in the worst senses of the term. The formulation of the slogans may be said both to point to possibilities of argumentation and to suggest impasses and absurdities.

Diversity implies self-determination in one important way: the more each particular being acts out of its own particular *conatus*—to use Spinoza's term—the greater is potential diversity. On the other hand, self-determination at high levels of complexity implies complex societies with complex relations. (I presuppose that the ecological difference between

complexity and complication is taken into account. Complicated social relations reduce many-sidedness.)

To the maxims already introduced we now tentatively add "Maximum self-determination!"

The way in which I have talked about life-forms and lifestyles suggests that it is species and other collective units, not particular living beings, that realize potentialities. I do not rule out the possibility of self-realization of collectivities but prefer to think only of particular beings, particular human beings, frogs, hookworms.

Many ecologists lament the preoccupation of ethics with particular specimens instead of populations. They demand a greater ethical concern for populations, for animal and human societies, and less preoccupation with the fate of individuals. Some add that the highest concern should be for ecosystems, not individuals, societies, or species. What is most needed is system ethics, especially strict ethical norms concerning the destruction of ecosystems. I presuppose in what follows that the arguments of these ecologists are taken seriously, but I nevertheless persist in thinking of the realization of the potentials of *particular* living beings.

So much for argument pattern *T*. Many contemporary authors reason along similar lines, as, for example, the author of "The right not to be eaten," in evaluating diversity, symbiosis, and other factors. One of his conclusions is that

The natural *telos* is a diversified environment in which organic beings are capable of symbiosis as well as spontaneity (localized autonomy) and . . . any practice which inhibits the development of this type of environment ought to be discontinued. Since meat-eating is a conspicuous example of a human practice which has this effect, it should be discontinued, and a right not to be eaten should be *ascribed* to animals.

(Auxter 1979: 227)

Auxter's ought-sentence may be derived from the basic norm of argument pattern *T*. The general ascription today—for example, by a resolution of the United Nations Assembly—of a right not to be eaten would, I think, elicit considerable mirth and some ire. Our author surely did not, however, have such a possibility in mind. More informal declarations of animal rights might well contain the ascription.

The assertion that "It is wasteful to sacrifice a more highly organized being when a lesser being will do" might be taken as a guideline indirectly derivable from the slogan "Maximize complexity!" Completely to destroy a highly organized being's possibilities of realization is to eliminate more possibilities than when a less organized, and therefore on the whole less complex, being is sacrificed.

If the highly organized specimen is old and sick, people would tend to sacrifice it rather than the young, healthy, but somewhat less complex specimen. At this point I hope that most readers will feel a certain disgust at suddenly seeing the implication of a rigid application of such "measurements" of possibilities within the framework of human societies. Social Darwinism is just around the corner!

The relations of the "potentialities of realization" guideline to Donald VanDeVeer's criterion of "two factor egalitarianism" are rather complicated.² Let us, for example, take the relation of bears to sheep and to human beings. The eating of sheep flesh is not taken to be of a high "level or importance of interest" to bears in general. To some bears, however, it clearly is. Unfortunately, we are not able to help a bear give up that interest. Sheep owners, on the other hand, have a strong economic *interest* in keeping their sheep alive. Even if the compensation they receive for the loss of a sheep is enough to buy two new sheep, and they thus make a profit out of the killing, sheep owners have an *interest* in avoiding the killing. This has to do with local sheep owners' personal relations to their sheep, their rejection of cruelty, and many other factors. They also attribute intrinsic value to bears, and thus, letting bears live is an *interest* in favor of maintaining intrinsic values. So much for adapting the terminology of "interest" to my own analysis. The transition to "potentialities of realization" terminology is not very problematic. Damage to interests corresponds to reduction of potentialities. Thus, severe threats to economic interests correspond to possibilities of severely reduced self-realization.

It belongs to the special capacities of human beings to recognize similarities and differences between themselves and other life-forms. Some differences elicit feelings of strangeness, fear, or dislike and favor attitudes of hostility, avoidance, or indifference. Similarities, like sensitiveness to pain or to behavior as if in pain, elicit sympathy and attitudes of identification. Relying on accounts of human nature like that of Spinoza, especially his

account of free human beings in the later parts of part IV of the *Ethics*, I favor high levels of realization of human potentialities in terms of both intrinsic values and equal right (in principle) to live and flourish. Upon this general attitude, however, is superimposed a vast differentiation according to which form of life or which lifestyle is under consideration or—better—met with in action.

Remaining at the rather abstract level, I assert as part of argument pattern *T*: “the higher the level of realization of the potentials of a living being, the greater the dependence of further increase in level upon the increase of the level of other living beings.” What this says, in its extreme form, is that the absolutely highest level of self-realization cannot be reached by anyone without all others also reaching that level. (It is a kind of parallel to *mahāyāna* theories of highest levels of freedom.)

The view that human nature is such as ultimately to demand a sort of egalitarianism of life-forms in the biosphere may, of course, be judged simply wrong without disturbing the other arguments of the argument pattern. The view is mentioned here simply because, if tenable, it lends support to the ultimate normative premise stated at the beginning of this article.

How, if the above is accepted, are we to implement or give expression to the norms stated? How are our policies toward animals to be stated and carried out in particular cases?

There are many ways of approaching these vast problems. I shall confine myself to mentioning, in order to illustrate one approach, the procedures of wild-animal “management” in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway, and I shall limit myself to considering two not very important species, the brown bear and the wolf.³

Bears and human beings live in overlapping territories in southern Norway. Conflicts arise because some bears develop a habit of killing sheep. No sheep owner thinks that all bears in his area should be killed. The cultural pattern is such that bears are considered to have a right to live and flourish. They are considered to have a value in themselves. The problem is one of coexistence with human beings and with sheep.

When sheep are killed in southern Norway and a bear seems to have been responsible, an expert is called in. He investigates closely how the

sheep have been killed and notes all signs of the presence of the bear. Knowing the various habits of practically all the bears of the area—even if he has not actually seen them—he is generally able to tell not only whether a bear has been there, but also which bear.

The sheep owner is paid an indemnity if the expert decides that a bear is responsible. If that bear has been guilty of similar “crimes,” a verdict may be reached that it has forfeited its right to existence. An expert bear hunter is given license to kill it, but if he does not succeed, a whole team of hunters is mobilized. (Somewhat inexplicably, bears are able under such circumstances to hide for years, which is deeply embarrassing as well as mystifying for the hunters.)

Many factors are considered before a bear is condemned to death. What is his or her total record of misdeeds? How many sheep have been killed? Does he or she mainly kill to eat, or does he or she maim or hurt sheep without eating? Is particular cruelty shown? Is it a bear mother who will probably influence her cubs in a bad way? Did the sheep enter the heart of a bear area or did the bear stray far into established sheep territory?

Even if the terminology of the argumentation for or against the death warrant differs from that of human trials, the social and ethical norms invoked are similar. One may speak of the area’s life community, a community comprising wild animals, domesticated animals, and human beings.

The use of the term *community* in this way does not satisfy the strong requirement proposed by Passmore (1975), but it satisfies that of Clark (1979: 183–84). I myself accept broader senses of the term as perfectly legitimate.

The interaction among the members of the community is not systematically codified. How to do that, and in what terminology, is an interesting philosophical problem.

Sheep owners and others are interested in clarifying the norms because of an increasing friction between bears and human beings. For economic reasons sheep are no longer tended; the norm that sheep be protected against wild animals by the presence of a shepherd is invalidated through higher norms of profitability. The economy is capital-intensive, not labor-intensive.

As a result of the norm to make Norway more “self-reliant,” there is also now a government-supported norm to increase the number of sheep and the area of their grazing. Very old, established bear territories are being

invaded. Added to this is the further complication that the number of bears is increasing.

If our current economic crisis does not worsen, a *modus vivendi* comparatively favorable to bears may ensue. If the crisis deepens, however, the bear territories will probably be “developed.” It will be found “necessary” to introduce more sheep. Bears will meet sheep more often—with bad consequences for both.

Ecologists who assess the destruction caused by bears, and who give advice to both sheep owners and representatives of the public, try to fulfill the wishes of sheep owners fully enough to ensure that the latter do not begin breaking the law by killing bears without a warrant. As professional students of bears and of impressive, old ecosystems, the ecologists think it would be wise for the public to give greater support to the interests of the bears than at present. The realization of such a policy presupposes that the public become better informed and that the economic crisis does not deepen.

Comparing Regan’s approach (1979: 189–219) to my own, I see mine as more *a posteriori* and less elitist. The ascription of rights to animals frequently occurs among “ordinary” people, that is, people without special formal education. It is their use of the term *rights*, rather than that of people versed in law or philosophy, that guides my own. Philosophers might find inconsistencies and obscurities in ordinary ways of using *rights* and similar terms, but I think that this is mostly because they do not acknowledge the intricacies of everyday usages.

A widely read Norwegian book on the rights of animals (*Dyrenes rettigheter*, 1974) and a pamphlet called *Universal Declaration of Animal Rights* (1978) elicited counterarguments, not complaints, that the key terms (*rett*, *rettigheter*) were meaningless when applied to animals. Thousands subscribed to the declaration contained in the pamphlet. Others found its sweeping character utopian in the sense of completely unrealistic. Empirical, semantic analysis would, I think, make it plausible that *rett* as used in the texts and debates had fairly definite connotations. On the basis of such empirical work, I think philosophers may tentatively introduce conceptual frameworks incorporating the concept of animal rights.

It may be wise, however, not to introduce the term *right* in codifications of norms covering animal-human interaction, or only to assert condi-

tionals: "if we recognize that there are rights (at all), then . . ." (cf. Regan 1979: 189–219).

We will mention wolves only briefly. Their cultural setting is very different from that of bears. There is a great respect for bears, whereas wolves are more dreaded than respected. A bear's character traits are considered more sympathetic. Some people consider wolves dangerous: hungry wolves may attack human beings. (Most or all stories of such attacks in the last hundred years, however, have been found false or extremely doubtful.)

The very *right to live* is brought into the debate. In recent years, however, wolves have not been guilty of a single verified misdeed. They are rarely seen and very careful to keep out of trouble. There is, therefore, a reasonable chance that the life communities comprising a (fairly small) number of wolves will persist.

In referring to animals here, I have used the terms *responsible*, *guilty*, *misdeed*, *crime*, *cruelty*, and *careful*. They belong, together with the term *right*, to the vast number of words with connotations mostly found in debates on purely human behavior but also found in fairly precise argumentation involving the attitudes and behaviors of other species. It is sometimes important to be strict in keeping the two uses apart, but never wise to try to eradicate the wider ones.

People speak of the right of certain animals to hunt within certain territories, to drink at certain places along rivers, and to use certain trails. Thus, if the human use of such trails or the cutting of a road prevents the animal from using them, those actions are forbidden. There is also talk about the right to light and to movement, to free air, and so on, in mechanized agricultural societies. Instead of rejecting the possibility of there being such rights, I would recommend arguing for the same goals without using the terminology of rights.

McCloskey argues very carefully that animals cannot have rights if they do not have the relevant *moral* capacities:

Although there is limited evidence in respect of certain animals of a capacity for seeming "self-sacrificing," "disinterested," "benevolent" actions in limited, somewhat arbitrary areas, there is no real evidence of a capacity to make moral judgments, morally to discriminate when self-sacrifice, gratitude, loyalty, benevolence is morally appropriate, and more relevantly, to assess their

moral rights and to exercise them within their moral limits. However, further research on animals such as whales and dolphins, although seemingly not in respect of monkeys, apes, chimpanzees, may yet reveal that man is not the only animal capable of being a bearer of rights.

(McCloskey 1979: 42)

What seems to be lacking is a noncircular, convincing argument for the conclusion that animals must have certain moral capacities in order to have rights. In fact, I do not find any pro-arguments in McCloskey's paper. Here, as in the case of Regan, I would study occurrences of the term *right* among ordinary people and inspect with interest its possible connotations, some of which seem noncontradictory and useful within certain limits.

Favoring a Spinozist ethics without a separate realm of morals, I would adhere to views expressed by ordinary people who ascribe rights to bears without attributing moral capacities to them.

I do not see any inconsistency in maintaining both the general maxim of species egalitarianism in principle ("the equal right in principle of all species to live and flourish") and the norms that make it more difficult for a wolf than for a bear to be accepted as a member of a mixed community. The general maxim is a vague abstract guideline that has to be embedded in a philosophy of culture. This philosophy is again to be embedded in a social (including economic) framework connecting philosophy with daily life.

The codification of interrelationships between large, wild mammals and human beings is an interdisciplinary task calling for intimate cooperation among people from many walks of life. The same holds for other areas of present-day conflict between animals and human beings. Sprigge (1979: 134) stresses that "the details of an acceptable code" of a certain kind "cannot be worked out solely on the basis of philosophical first principles" and requires the "combination of appropriate expertise with a developed moral sense." I, too, would like to underline the importance of layman participation.

It is a good sign for those of us who represent academic philosophy that people seek an opportunity to talk over the problems from a wide perspective, including the religious and the philosophical.

Philosophy of Wolf Policies I: General Principles and Preliminary Exploration of Selected Norms

Coauthored with Ivar Mysterud

We, as philosopher and biologist, here present some preliminary explorations of values and norms of importance in the wolf-human relationship. The presentation is centered on problems as we see them from the modern wolf range in Norway, where there *should* be a mixed community of sheep, wolves, and human beings. At present we have 3.2 million sheep, 4.1 million human beings, and 5–10 wolves. The wolves are confined to a small area containing small scattered sheep farms. The owners, with local approval, do not accept the wolves. What norms should be considered in the process of changing this wolf/sheep ratio slightly in favor of wolves? How can we work today for a viable population of wolves? This article presents some general principles and philosophical methods for discussion in the spheres of ethical attitudes and opinions in norm conflicts concerning wolves. Important is an understanding of the logical priority of the normative system, and the need for it in a systematic analysis. This should be used extensively as an analytic tool in the many intricate problems of wolf management, some of which go all the way down to the rock bottom of philosophy and political ideology.

Wolves (*Canis lupus*) and human beings are carnivores, and domestic sheep (*Ovis aries*) are food for both of them. Depredation of sheep might therefore be interpreted as competition for food between wolves and human

This article was reprinted with permission from *Conservation Biology* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing) 1 (May 1987): 22–34.

beings. The raising of sheep, however, is also economics for the sheep-holder, who in Norway is part of a farming culture that has traditionally invested in bounties to get rid of wolves. Other groups identifying with trends in modern industrial culture invest money in the opposite, to experience and enjoy wolves. A collision of subcultures?

The wolf is today nominally protected by law in Norway and Sweden. Nevertheless, what man should and should not do to sheep and wolves is a grave question that illustrates well the problems of letting large predators live in sparsely populated areas. The problems are at present under intense debate.

The debate goes all the way down to the rock-bottom problems of philosophy and political ideology. The practical solutions to the so-called wolf problem reveal philosophical premises as much as they reflect concrete economic and other mundane interests. Philosophical research attempts to codify our deepest and most comprehensive attitudes and beliefs. This philosophical aspect is essential when we try to codify our attitudes toward nonhuman living beings. We recognize a "wolf problem" as well as a "human problem."

"Live and Let Live!" Inescapable Identification

The basic development of human behavior patterns seems to have provided us with an inescapable feeling of kinship with all living beings, but only if our culture, society, or group membership does not actively inhibit this feeling. From an early age we "identify" and perceive ourselves in something else.¹ The proposition that we only perceive *similarity* with other kinds of living beings is based on a misunderstanding. The spontaneous experience of relatedness is better expressed by the term *sameness*; that is, *identity*. It is, of course, an identity with awesome differences: we can change our attention and immediately be aware of profound differences. One's dog is vastly different from oneself, but we intuitively identify strongly with it as "a member of the family."

One of the most compelling cases of identification is furnished by our awareness of suffering. Even if we do not think that plants suffer, plants have traits that we spontaneously perceive as symptomatic of imperfect

conditions of well-being. We actually see them suffer from dryness, heat, cold, or lack of nutrition as we see the suffering of human beings.

Identification need not result in love. We may see our own bad characteristics in an animal. Except in people who are well acquainted with them, rats elicit disgust for obvious social reasons. The cultural setting of wolves is similar but formidable in its complexity and variation. Naturalists and mammalogists have “lived with” wolves and followed up with extensive reports.² Not surprisingly, the process of identification has been intense and positive in these cases. So far, however, the general public inside wolf localities has scarcely been influenced by the rapidly increasing prowolf literature.

Even exquisitely “ugly” animals such as the Tasmanian devil (*Sarcophilus ursinus*), which seems to be unflinchingly aggressive toward human beings and completely devoid of gratitude for whatever we do to satisfy its hunger and other needs, elicit sympathy and respect not only when considered *sub specie aeternitatis*, a natural wonder, part of the richness and diversity of life on the planet, but also when regarded as a symbol of our own aggressiveness and lack of gratitude. The Tasmanian devil permits us to laugh at ourselves.

Identification motivates norms of at least partial protection: rules of how to respect the dignity and stature of even an obnoxious animal are similar to our rules of respect for the dignity of murderers in prison. Such norms are, of course, also established through the operation of other motives, but identification must be considered if we are truly to understand both the strength of protective efforts in favor of wolves and the passionate urge to exterminate them.

Mixed Communities with Wolves, Sheep, and Sheep Owners

Sociology distinguishes *Gemeinschaft* (community) from *Gesellschaft* (society). The distinction is somewhat differently defined by different authors. In sociology, “community” is defined in such a way that only human beings are considered members. Concepts of human community are obviously needed, but today broader concepts are also required. We need to break down some of the barriers commonly erected between humankind and other forms of life within our common space. We need a concept of mixed

community, defined in such a way that human beings and *limited groups* of animals that play a more or less well-known role in human affairs are included as members.³

It is unfortunate that the organizational cleavage between the social and natural sciences has made many students of the former seemingly incapable of conceiving mixed communities. Dogs and cats have long been considered sort of members of the family, not quite on par with children and the mentally handicapped, but certainly the subject of privileges and status not accorded people or animals outside the family. The same holds true of sheep, cows, pigs, and other mammals of the same category in traditional herder communities.

The concept of "mixed community" may be seen as a subconcept of a general "life community" embracing all kinds of life. Considering that human beings know about only a microscopic part of the living beings to which they are hosts and even less of those living beings in their nearest environment, human relations with all other members of a "life community" are significantly different from those within mixed communities.

We do not favor the term *life community* because of the abstractness of its relations. We follow ways of thinking conceptualized in phenomenological philosophy. It is presumed that there are conscious relationships between members of a mixed community and an occasional awareness of one another even when there is no physical nearness. This concept of mixed community does not compete with concepts within biology. Plant ecology and animal ecology embrace the collection of species populations in a given space and treat them collectively in the field of community ecology.⁴

For thousands of years the wolf has been part of mixed communities in the Nordic countries. Until this century, the fairly large number of wolves and the limitations of available weapons made wolves a threat. This has totally changed. Furthermore, the deep ecological movement, the recent extensive prowolf literature, and the material richness of Nordic countries have, as an inevitable consequence, influenced the willingness of people outside wolf localities to give wolves a new and better chance to survive.

Here are a few facts about our Norwegian mixed community. At present (1987) we are 4.1 million human beings and 2.3 million sheep on 323,886 square kilometers of land (Spitsbergen and Jan Mayen excluded). Norway is part of the great Fenno-Scandinavian mountain range, and 50

percent of the land area of the country is bedrock. A mere 2.8 percent of the land is cultivated soil, 5 percent is lakes, 20 percent is productive forest, and less than 1 percent is populated. Norway is the country with the second lowest population density in Europe, although it is the fifth largest in terms of area. The human population density is 13.1 inhabitants per square kilometer.

The wolf has been regarded as nearly extinct and is at present directly threatened in Norway. Wolf numbers were estimated at five to ten during the 1960s and 1970s and at fourteen to twenty during the early 1980s.⁵ Today these "Norwegian" animals roam a limited area covering part of Sweden and perhaps part of Finland. Probably five to ten wolves share the Norwegian area with sheep and human beings; this corresponds to a wolf population of fewer than 0.0005 individuals per square kilometer. They kill at present about 400 sheep per year, fewer than 0.2 per thousand of the country's total sheep stock.

It is paradoxical that this very small sheep loss compared to the total sheep loss and the minute population of wolves has elicited such vigorous debate and socially important plans of action at local and central levels of administration and management. The paradoxical situation can only be explained by searching much wider and deeper than the biology and economics of wolves. It leads us to consider the unique position of wolves within Norwegian and many other cultures.

It is irrelevant that the total number of sheep in Norway is vastly greater than the number of wolves. The same holds true when comparing the number of sheep killed by wolves with the large number of sheep that die or disappear because of inadequate efforts to protect them. What counts is the attitude in local communities within the wolf area. Here people live and support themselves through small-scale agriculture and husbandry. They wish and demand to continue with what they have done for generations. They are not willing to go into agribusiness or any other large-scale business in "safer" areas; they are not interested in living in cities, not eager to acquire power as members of the bureaucracy or by other kinds of "success." They consider the loss of thousands of sheep from traffic accidents, the sudden onset of winter, and so forth, as inevitable, but the loss of twenty sheep to wolves as easily avoidable. Just kill the wolf! The comparison, though, is not quite fair. If an owner of forty sheep lost twenty in traffic, he

understandably would make a fuss about it and ask for full compensation. The actual situation is that a small-scale sheep owner suddenly loses a considerable part of his herd by wolf attack and the *whole community* is outraged.

"So what?" officials in many countries would say, but Norway is a welfare state and supports a cultural philosophy stressing intense respect for old, local, nonurban communities. Communities that mobilize to fight any policies protecting wolves are in ecologically long-term-sustainable *Homo sapiens* habitats. Northern and western Europe, which suffers increasing ecological destruction through unsustainable development, is an example. These communities exemplify subcultures in danger of being destroyed for reasons not very different from those that are bringing wolves to the verge of extinction: habitat deterioration and shrinkage. That is the awkward situation in the question of wolf policy: respect for wolves, but also respect for old, ecologically unobjectionable human communities.

Wolf Policies Reflect Philosophies as Total Views

A philosophy of the wolf-human relationship must be part of a more general philosophy. How general? *Philo-sofia* is love of wisdom, and wisdom must show up in wise action as implementation of wise decisions. Knowledge is not enough. Decisions, if they are to be wise, must take *everything relevant* into account. Because knowledge of what will be the immediate, not to mention the remote, consequences of an action is limited, the decision will be made on the basis of uncertain premises of very different kinds. Therefore *in principle* the premises of any decision are *all-embracing*. In wolf-human philosophy we neglect astronomy and astrology, implicitly asserting the first irrelevant and the second perhaps a more complicated verdict. We cannot neglect politics, and politics is from a cognitive (knowledge- and acquaintance-related) point of view based on a political philosophy. An example concerns the justification of a central government or a national majority decision to make illegal the shooting of wolves by locals. Hypotheses in sociology, psychology, and cultural anthropology are clearly relevant.⁶ They concern our decisions, and are expressed here by sentences ending with a period. A philosophy is needed that connects the hypotheses with norms—sentences ending not with a period but with an exclamation mark. We believe that the normative aspect of the basis of wolf policies

needs more comprehensive and clear articulation. We shall, therefore, be somewhat pedantic in our use of exclamation marks.

It is a common notion that every animal, however fierce and destructive, has a place in the whole of nature (Naess 1985a: 68–76). The notion is especially forceful when we talk about the larger ones and not “animals” such as bacteria. The idea that each species of animal has a place in nature has a strong implicit normative aspect. We might reformulate and express this in many ways: “Every kind of animal rightfully possesses a place in the whole!” “Mankind cannot violate this right!” “However, we may defend ourselves against attacks and hunt for purposes of food and clothing!”

Empirical studies suggest that such a normative view is prevalent in Norway, and we guess it prevails in many other countries as well. This should be taken into account when planning controversial conservation measures.

The view clearly applies to wolves, but it does not automatically apply to wolves in every particular region, say, in Norway. People know that there are plenty of wolves in other countries, for example, in the Soviet Union. There is no question of global extinction of the species. However, there is an awareness that wolves have, until the twentieth century, been common in Norway. They “belonged” there, but there were no norms discouraging killing, no limitation of the right to kill on sight. Today we think one may say that the prevalent, if unformulated, view is that the wolf is not only a genuine part of Norwegian nature but a genuine part of mixed communities.

No empirical studies have been done about this, and, unfortunately, such studies of opinions about wolves in Norway have little chance of revealing genuine attitudes. Those for or against wolf protection seek principally to influence government policy one way or another. Opinions are “mobilized” as in wartime. The general philosophical and ethical attitude in favor of having a viable population of wolves in Norway is strong, but so is that of people concerned with protecting their livestock and economy. The resulting norm conflict is common in other countries,⁷ but the long-range concern has, for simple reasons, not been clearly or repeatedly formulated in the conflict.

To what extent *should* prejudices, unreasonable fear, and cultural stereotypes of wolves be taken into account in policy decisions? A direct answer will properly end with an exclamation mark: “We *should* do such and such!” Are we really in a position to judge the threat to children, for ex-

ample, from immature wolves straying near settlements? A direct answer may end with a period: "No." This is a *hypothesis* in the form of a negation, but is the direct answer certain enough to *justify* our including it in a research report? Direct answer: "No!"

The decisions of wildlife managers have intricate, nonnormative economic aspects.⁸ To what extent, though, is it *justifiable* to "commercialize" wolves through safaris and placate local communities by finding ways of making wolves as "profitable" as sheep are today? What is the normative relevance of the pain inflicted on sheep? Should their owners or the Department of the Environment or some other institution or group finance protection of some sort? The ethical and legal problems are difficult and of necessity *involve a fundamental priority of values*.⁹

For simplicity of discussion we need some kind of model to facilitate the complex pattern of argument. We propose an ecosophic model in the form of a normative system. A normative system is not a psychological system showing how we actually think and how people or institutions actually arrive at decisions. It is not a causal or genetic system. It shows logical priority: a premise is logically prior to a conclusion. In it, fundamental value priorities form ultimate *premises*. The term is used for a set of norms and hypotheses arranged to show what is derived from what—rarely by *strict* logical inference, but derived in a looser way from premises.¹⁰

In a normative system *three levels* may be distinguished. One contains ultimate or fundamental norms and hypotheses. A second consists of intermediate norms derived from the first-level sentences plus further hypotheses. A third level contains sentences expressing concrete decisions in specific situations. The situations are described by factual assertions, or hypotheses (figure 7).

A model of such a system is not constructed once and for all but is articulated as we continue to debate the merits and demerits of alternative decisions, using what we have already articulated and adding what is needed to reach new decisions.

Two Norms About Suffering

Our first example is of a norm of fairly high standing within a model of what we call Ecosophy T:




Figure 7. Normative System Diagram Showing Logical Priorities. This is not a diagram picturing the genesis of a decision; it only traces the logical derivation. It does not explain decisions on the basis of biology, sociology, or psychology, nor is it causal or motivational.

A_1 Severe suffering endured by a living being x is of no less negative value than severe suffering endured by a living being y , whatever the species or population of x and y !

The term *living being* is ambiguous. It includes the human species, but, until further notice, we shall think mostly of nonhumans. The norm A_1 is highly relevant in discussing the severe pain of mauled sheep and of other domestic animals attacked but not killed by wolves or other large carnivores. We believe that, among certain groups of wolf enthusiasts, these pains are not taken seriously enough. Suffering¹¹ comprises not only all sorts of extreme fear, panic, and terror, but also an increase in general nervousness. It may affect a whole herd, even if only one sheep is physically attacked.

A second example of a norm in Ecosophy T:

A₂ Human beings have an obligation not to place their domestic animals in situations in which there is a significant risk of severe suffering!

Who is responsible for the suffering of sheep in a mixed community including wolves? Laws against killing the wolves may be thought to make the lawmaker to some extent responsible, thereby obliging him to help protect the sheep by, for example, financing shepherds.

Scarcely covered by norm A₁ is the general *decrease of life quality* of a group or herd of sheep that has suffered after a wolf attack. This decrease is, in part, reflected in a decrease of economic value of the affected sheep on the market.¹² That, however, is another matter. As for a definition of "life quality," we limit ourselves to referring to recent literature on the subject.¹³

Rational Policies Rest on Ultimate Norms

A₃ Long-range global concern for the life conditions on our planet requires national announcement and acceptance of long-range global norms for directing conservation strategies!

Standard cost-benefit analysis cannot do the whole job. Factual analysis presupposes norms in order to arrive at proposals for decisions. For example, we must ask "Benefit for which ethically acceptable goals? for which long-range global goals?" Adequate wolf policies require consideration of ultimate or fundamental norms and their application to local and global strategies of action. The ultimate question is, Cost-benefit in relation to which ultimate norms?

The appropriate concerns correlate with levels of education. It is clearly the responsibility of the highly educated (in the limited sense of university education) to articulate the norms and hypotheses beyond standard cost-benefit analysis. Unfortunately, though, experts and researchers have a tendency to avoid norms and values at a fundamental level.¹⁴ One way they justify this is to proclaim that technology and science are based

only on facts and hypotheses, not norms, not on sentences with unavoidable, irreducible exclamation marks. This claim of “objectivity” is an illusion well worth inspecting in some detail.

Given that chains of derivation cannot be infinite, they must start with definite statements.¹⁵ One can justify *A* with *B* and *B* with *C*, but at a definite time in a definite situation one has to stop somewhere—taking certain norms as ultimate or fundamental. In methodology there are *rules* of procedure; in logic, *rules* of inference. These rules can be derived from fundamental rules. A rule as a kind of norm is properly expressed with an exclamation mark, not a period. That a rule, *if followed*, has certain consequences may be expressed by a sentence ending with a period, but a sentence saying that the rule or the consequence is good should properly end with an exclamation mark. Most rules assumed to be fundamental seem to be absolutely obvious, but sometimes derived rules seem more intuitively obvious (e.g., in arithmetic). In normative systems, the fundamental norms, which constitute kinds of rules, normally appear to be obviously valid to those accepting the system. One may say that they tend to be accepted through *intuition*, like the basic rules of logical inference. In the philosophy of mathematics and metamathematics, controversies exist about competing systems (constructivist, logicist, formalist, intuitionist, etc.) in which intuitive acceptance plays an inescapable role.

The importance of the above stems from the widespread, unsupportable view that if one is a scientist one starts and ends with factual statements—sentences ending with periods. To the contrary, one never gets going without methodological and logical *rules*, and some of them cannot be validated *within* one’s system. *Unvalidated rules are necessary to validate a claim that such and such is a fact.* To show that a fundamental rule (R_1) is useful, successful, or valid, one must include these properties in the conclusion one infers from premises—say, observation sentences—but how, from those premises, does one reach a conclusion? Only by rules. So one either uses R_1 , going in circles, or a new fundamental rule, R_2 , whereby the same problem of how to “prove” that rule is encountered.

Appreciation of the necessity of taking some rules as fundamental in scientific work makes it easier to accept that we have to do the same in handling normative systems. Here the most important rules are of an ethical

character. However, that should not make one call them subjective or expressions of feeling. There is less agreement, it seems, and certainly less *clear* disagreement, on fundamental ethical views than on methodology and logic. The *statistics* of agreement or disagreement do not, however, make them subjective or objective in any strict sense.

Some researchers think that by sticking to science and avoiding open, clear *announcements of ethical views* in questions of wolf management they can remain safely within the realm of what can be shown and tested, but by definition, *if* rule R_1 is taken as fundamental it cannot be tested. It can be exchanged with R_2 , and this change may be psychologically *motivated*, but there is no question of showing and testing in a methodological sense. Changes of paradigm in research furnish ample examples (see Kuhn 1970).

Speaking as a scientist is not like speaking as a machine; the scientist cannot avoid speaking as a responsible person. He is not in a social and ethical vacuum. Researchers dealing with the "wolf problem" inevitably take part in discussions both locally in wolf territory and centrally among policy makers. They can, of course, artificially avoid explicit announcements of norms by always using an if-sentence: if we accept the norms (and hypotheses) such and such, then the decision D_1 ! will lead to contradiction, but not D_2 ! This use of conditional sentences in research reports will not and should not prevent one from revealing which norms one personally accepts as valid. To do this today is a social obligation. The deterioration of life conditions on this planet as seen by researchers necessitates activity at the social and political levels. For some of us, the fundamental basis of this obligation is provided by norms elicited inevitably through the process of identification: we cannot subscribe to the motto "Man apart!" At least one sociobiologist has found it problematic as to how social obligations expressed by sentences with an exclamation mark can enter the system. Obligations belong to social philosophy, and their normative premises are requirements announcing what is considered a good society and what must be done to keep it functioning (Rawls 1971: 108, 344–48). In industrial societies obligations (and duties) attach to all public offices, but even today many researchers and experts seem to think that they have no social obligations for the actual consequences that their publications and expertise produce.

Members of the ministry of environment have, in Scandinavia and

elsewhere, obligations either to refrain from severe criticism of their government or to resign. In their nature conservation policy they usually try to push their government in the right direction, but they are narrowly limited in what they can do. Researchers and experts have no such obligations. On the contrary, we believe they have a valid obligation never to act as mere functionaries. The successful performance of their task in modern society depends upon their ability to remain independent from government *in their public views* and, in general, from those who finance their activity. The public has a right to know where it stands as people. The more research and expertise contribute to public policies concerning wolves and other matters, the more important it is that the public be properly informed. The obligation is heavy but inevitable.

Protection of Sheep Against Suffering

If x and y are calamities and *more* people suffer in y than in x , then y is properly called a greater calamity. Applied to wolf depredation of sheep, we tentatively (as always in handling norm systematizations) accept the following:

A_4 If, of two decisions, the first is more likely than the second to contribute to the probability that a greater number of animals will suffer, then the second is to be taken *pari passu* (other things being equal)!

We should be careful when talking about *greater* suffering. Referring to consciously experienced suffering, including simple pain, we have to do so with a *quality* admitting to degrees of intensity, but in an important sense unquantifiable and nonadditive.

Strictly speaking, *experienced* suffering is not additive. If suffering could be measured and two geographically unrelated animals suffered with an intensity of degree 3, this would not result in a suffering of degree 6. Suffering at other places in the Milky Way does not add to our suffering as long as we do not have any relation to that suffering. Here is a very simple case of nonadditivity: if we experience the water in a tub as pleasantly warm, it does not get hotter if we add more water of the same temperature.

Suffering is a quality, so we must be careful or we get into a lot of philosophical trouble. Of course, there are clear cases in which we can prop-

erly speak of more or less, mainly when it involves more or less *intense* suffering. Qualities admit of differences in intensity. In our decisions we are justified in making number relevant, and we ask, Exactly how significant is number in judging suffering among animals?

These reflections have to do with the crucial point that shooting or continually harassing a single wolf results in the suffering of only one, whereas the decision not to shoot a wolf sometimes has the suffering of a great number of sheep as a result. Exactly how relevant is number? We say very little in terms of *experienced* suffering, but if a wolf attacks a herd of twenty sheep, at least one of them is likely to suffer more than a hunted wolf. Most important of all, we are responsible for not making sheep suffer unduly.

Let us look at yet another norm favorable to the defense of sheep. It is argued among people eager to support conservation of wildlife that, given that there are more than two million sheep in Norway but only a handful of wolves, the violent death or suffering of a sheep should not be taken as seriously as that of a wolf. This is a very doubtful norm. We would rather accept the following:

A₅ The negative value of the severe suffering of an animal belonging to a large population has a no less negative value than that of an animal belonging to a small population!

This norm goes against the grain. It is human to treat animals more coldly when there are masses of them. In years when lemmings are abundant, people hiking with their dogs are more likely to let the dogs "have fun" with the lemmings than in years when lemmings are interesting as a rarity. We also reject the view that the sheep is a less developed, dumb animal compared to the superbly intelligent and beautiful wolf and that it therefore deserves less consideration. Beauty or intelligence is completely irrelevant in the application of the norm. There are considerable differences in identification among people. Some tend, we are glad to say, to identify positively with the underdog or ugly duckling; others identify with the winner, the clever, the intelligent, the beautiful. This influences our attitudes toward spectacular predators. Some, not all, take into account the suffering itself and our responsibility.

Let us now introduce the third of the *dramatis personae*, the local sheep-holders. When anger prompts them to go public, they tend to stress

both their economic loss through wolf predation and the suffering of sheep. They also express deep frustration and guilt because of their entirely natural feeling of responsibility for the sheep. The extreme aggression against wolves and wolf conservationists by concerned sheep-holders that is sometimes reported in newspaper articles may, in part, be explained by these feelings of guilt. Some sheep-holders even cry in hopelessness and become severely depressed when they witness the suffering of sheep but are physically and economically unable to protect them from repeated carnivore attacks. Repeated perception of the intense suffering of sheep due to wolf attacks, plus the culturally formed aversion to wolves, brings some sheep-holders into such a state of emotional agitation that they sometimes relinquish their sheep ownership and work fanatically against any kind of protection of the wolf. One may safely say that letting domesticated sheep be exposed to wolves tends locally to brutalize and dehumanize the human-animal relationship.

Man has domesticated, modified, and pitifully degraded an animal once capable of taking care of itself in wolf ranges. The result is a pathetically helpless being—the modern, economically profitable sheep, “the meat and wool producer.” When Norway was poor, sheep-holders could afford to hire shepherds; today, it is economically impossible. An ethical impasse has developed.

In recent years, organized use of grazing lands has expanded in many parts of Norway. Sheep-holders in local areas have organized in groups, each selecting a board that develops common supervision, with inspectors patrolling the grazing area and a common sheep-gathering operation during the fall. About 60 percent of the country’s sheep stock is today organized in such units,¹⁶ but because the sheep population is large and many parts of the country are rugged or bushy, it is impossible to prevent carnivore attacks. Many sheep-holders experience carnivore problems every year.

The above five norms and nonnormative statements tend to favor sheep at the expense of wolves. Now let us look at some views favoring wolves.

Protection of Wolves as Members of Mixed Communities

The scarcity of wolves in many European countries and the decrease in number of habitats—qualitatively and quantitatively—in this century is

well known (Pimlott 1975). It may be of help, however, to note that protection of a species may mean vastly different things.

In the narrowest interpretation, the sentence "Protect the wolf!" is conceived as only protecting the wolf's structural biology. The survival of specimens in zoological gardens is considered enough. Then there is an interpretation asking for at least one area on this planet where the wolf is protected, completely or at least to the extent that its natural way of life is not disastrously disturbed. A yet wider interpretation asks for the protection of areas wherever there now are wolves.

What Soulé says about relative preciousness of different populations of the same species should be borne in mind:

Returning to the population issue, we might ask if *all populations of a given species have equal value*. I think not. The value of a population, I believe, depends on its genetic uniqueness, its ecological position, and the number of extant populations. A large, genetically polymorphic population containing unique alleles or genetic combinations has greater value, for example, than a small, genetically depauperate population of the same species. Also, the fewer the populations that remain, the greater the probability of the simultaneous extinction (random or not) of *all* populations, and thus of the species. Hence, how *precious* a population is is a function of how many such populations exist.

(Soulé 1985: 730)

A still wider interpretation says that, when at all feasible, protection of wolves implies protection of existing ranges plus introduction into past habitats (e.g., those prior to 1850). Protection is sometimes proposed for traditional wolf ranges. Of course, this poses considerable problems in Europe. There are vast traditional ranges in the Soviet Union, but what about stray wolves occasionally "invading" Norway and other countries where they obviously occupied areas with considerable populations 100 years ago? Are these areas still traditional ranges? How are we to understand tradition? Clearly, where during the last 100 years sheep have been foraging and local people have been active as sheep-holders, one might as well label the area a traditional sheep range. So how do we delimit areas of some wolves, mainly strays, dispersing with no fixed home range? What is the minimum viable population size for the maintenance of "fitness and adaptive potential" among wolves? According to Soulé:

A useful device for considering the relevance of population and evolutionary genetics to conservation is the "time scale of survival." Employing this scale, one can see, somewhat arbitrarily, three survival problems or issues: 1) the short-term issue is immediate fitness—the maintenance of vigor and fecundity during an interim holding operation, usually in an artificial environment; 2) the long-term issue is adaptation—the persistence of the vigor and evolutionary adaptation of a population in the face of a changing natural environment; 3) the third issue is evolution in the broadest sense—the continuing creation of evolutionary novelty during and by the process of specialization.

(Soulé 1980: 151)

A norm may here be tentatively formulated as

A₆ If a traditional sheep area, by decree from central authorities, is to be considered an area in which wolves are protected, it is up to the central authorities to arrange for fair and swift compensation for losses and/or financial support for hiring shepherds!

The word *fair* here denotes compensation properly adjusted to the economic level at the time of the argument.

This norm presupposes a kind of political philosophy that favors local communities in their conflict with nonlocal authorities. As for the idea of compensation by *central* institutions, it is important to add that the norms seem to imply both decentralization and centralization. This makes them controversial because local community philosophy in Scandinavia leans strongly toward decentralization. *Decentralization* ought to remain one of the key terms, but it is becoming more and more clear that strong, central authorities are also needed in matters of both local and global conservation. Cases have occurred in which local communities, not to mention local *administrative* units, have successfully opposed environmental points of view put forth by central authorities.¹⁷

It is difficult to impose wolf protection on people who give up traditional sources of income such as gathering berries and keep indoors for fear of wolves in their mixed community. People deriving income from pearl diving or other occupations in shark-infested waters acquire knowledge of the habits and signals of these predators and work out a kind of coexistence. Norway, however, has no income from wolves. Compare mixed communities with snakes. A market for snakes—e.g., Hong Kong—has elimi-

nated fear, or at least significantly influenced tolerance, of poisonous snakes within the areas of profitable snake catching or hunting. Rules of coexistence have been established. A similar development could materialize in human-wolf relations, yet it has not, so far.

If the coexistence of wolves and sheep farmers causes insolvable problems in the future, territorial changes must be considered: the removal of wolves or sheep or farmers. It now seems that moving the sheep away is not enough because of the farmers' anxiety, not least for the safety of their children. The farm families might accept moving with their sheep out of a territory if very substantial financial and other compensation were guaranteed. This solution is ethically debatable. The territorial question is not the only one, however. To "remove" farmers involuntarily is, in Norway, totally out of the question—least of all in favor of an animal! (Enforced removal because of motorways or for other purposes of development is another question.) Sheep-holders, therefore, must agree upon changing their resource regime from sheep raising to other forms if they are guaranteed economic activity by which they can secure a reasonable income during the transition period.

In any case, *if* there is to be a protected wolf area in Norway, considerable sums of money must be set aside centrally for that purpose. This might be appropriate even if the local communities gradually gain economically from their own activity due to the presence of wolves.¹⁸

So much for the vague and ambiguous sentence "Protect the wolf!" We must remember to ask specifically, Just what *degree* of protection? and just *where*? There are many pitfalls to avoid when discussing the means of protection.

Norms of protection do not follow from hypotheses about scarcity. Among many needed premises, we require general norms concerning the protection of life-forms on this planet. We can use the following three norms, which are derived directly from three still more general norms.¹⁹ Their subject is living beings in general, but these norms have a particular kind of living being as the subject, *Canis lupus*.

A₇ The well-being of the species wolf as part of human and nonhuman life on Earth has value in itself (intrinsic value, inherent value)! The value is independent of the narrow usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes!

- A₈ Richness and diversity of wolf races and habitats as part of the general richness and diversity of life-forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves!
- A₉ Human beings have no right to reduce this richness and diversity, including wolf habitats and races, except to satisfy vital needs!

These norms are meant to furnish important *guidelines*. When we codify norms, as in the case of laws, certain expressions with carefully calculated ambiguity are essential for the realization of wise applications.

We shall limit ourselves to commenting on norm A₉. The general aim of this norm is to remind us that human beings are not alone on this planet and that solidarity with other forms of life requires that we consider their needs. Interference with each other's lives is, of course, unavoidable. Some things, however, we do not consider ethically justifiable to do to others, and the simple expression "You have no right to . . ." is well known from infancy to death. The same holds true for the expression "He (she) really needs such and such!" Instead of *real needs* we use in norm A₉ *vital needs*.

The term *vital need* permits considerable latitude in judgment. Differences in climate and related factors, together with differences in structures of societies as they now exist, must be considered (Maslow 1970; Kaufman 1971).

Many authors have tried to classify basic or vital needs and to clarify the philosophically important but often elusive distinction between vital needs and mere desires, wishes, and habitual inclinations. For some sheepholders, the need to protect their sheep from wolves or to be in some way compensated is today vital. It means protecting the basis of their economy and the home where they have lived for generations.²⁰

The three norms are slight reformations of the first points in an eight-point formulation of basic traits of the so-called deep ecology movement—a convenient name for a class of tendencies in contemporary environmentalism.²¹ Are we going to give up a search for still more basic views justifying our intense concern for life on Earth?

What is more or less basic or deep when applied to views? If an old lady falls into a ditch, our view is that we should do what we can to get her out. Why? We have norms of politeness, but more basic are norms saying that we should help others survive. Why survive? We have most of us a notion

that it is *good* to be alive and that suicide should be explained away—that attempts to quit life are not basically motivated by a clear rejection of being alive but are a kind of cry for help. These examples indicate a direction from less to more basic. In general, if a view as expressed by a norm, for example, is justified by another norm that bestows validity on the first one, the latter is more basic. It belongs to a deeper level of a total view.

From the point of view of philosophy, and especially the part of it sometimes called metaphysics, it is desirable to go as “deep” as possible. This does not imply, however, that we all should end up with the same metaphysics. Here only one possible position will be mentioned briefly, namely the fundamental sentences of a version of Ecosophy T. Starting from “Self-realization!” clarifications explain that the “self” here is a metaphysical entity—something perhaps being realized in the development of the cosmos. The process is one of realizing individual potentials, and this implies diversity of life-forms, including diversity of cultures. Diversity is gained by complexity; therefore, development of complexity is implied. The self is of a kind that implies the process of identification. This means that a level of complexity that fosters sensibility, the conscious goal, inevitably takes place to protect the self-realization process of all living beings—a goal of “symbiosis”—“Live and let live!” in a philosophical sense.²²

The main thing to note is that we need value strategies to guide our behavior. Otherwise, our thought has no home; we stroll around in a metaphysical nowhere on a meaningless, vast, flat plain (Devall and Sessions 1985). The articulation of these strategies of thought in the form of norms and of basic hypotheses about ecological systems can be the job of only a few, but the job is of increasing importance. It involves survival of human beings and their environment.

In conflicts about conservation policies, the supporters of Ecosophy T (the authors included) and, more generally, supporters of far-reaching, radical policies meet practical, economic, and political objections but rarely philosophical or metaphysical ones. It seems that the conscious effort to bring in the most basic questions of a philosophy of life and of our relation to nature weakens the objections to far-reaching, radical policies. The practical, economic, and political objections are in a sense admitted to be inadequate for long-range planning and policy choice. This is one of the reasons we must support training of conservation specialists in argumentation on a

philosophical level. We are not confronted with any well-articulated, anti-conservation philosophy, but with myriad conflicts of interest. Without neglecting them, we are trying to bring wide, long-range perspectives into focus.

The *dignity* of wolves has, in modern literature, been persuasively conveyed to an increasingly wide audience.²³ This opens still other spheres of debate. Do paid safaris—for example, those centering on the wilderness experience of chorus howling²⁴—commercialize the wolves and interfere with their dignity, degrading them to showpieces? Some certainly believe so, and the corresponding norms are not difficult to formulate, but they are perhaps not so easily derived from the norms and hypotheses of ecosophy. Wolves in our view are sufficiently aloof in their dignity that they are not easily ruffled by tourists well hidden in bushes. Elsewhere (Mysterud 1985), we conclude that *if* Norway is to establish preserves and areas where wolves are protected, an attempt must be made to market wolves in the broad, modern sense of the word. One way is to somehow make them economically interesting to people living inside wolf ranges. Income from safaris must be reserved for people traditionally living with the wolves.

Respect for International Agreements

Still another theme of high relevance is respect for international agreements. Considering the irrelevance of national borders in ecological matters, such agreements are of decisive importance for the future of life on Earth. The Norwegian government has ethical and tactical reasons to obey.

A tactical reason concerns repercussions if we violate agreements. For example, if Norway insists that migratory birds on their way to Norway should not be hunted in Italy, Norway's voice is little heeded if it violates international conventions concerning whales and wolves. Suppose Norway nevertheless says "No!" to wolf protection for welfare and economic reasons. Would norms of international solidarity to some degree be satisfied if Norway contributed heavily to the maintenance of protected European (e.g., Swedish or Finnish) wolf areas that have a significantly less dense human population inside wolf ranges? Our tentative answer is yes.

International opinion is probably not quite aware of the kind of scattered settlement typical of Norway and the high priority accorded to the

indefinite continuation of that structure. It belongs to one of the most outstanding features of the Nordic lifestyle and does not resemble the pattern found elsewhere in Europe. Many farmers have no close neighbors; "neighborhood" does not exist. This sometimes causes a feeling of isolation and insecurity in forested areas. The mere thought of wolves frightens isolated families. However, the international community will not be overly impressed by the difficulties cited by Norway, because the implementation of international agreements has always gone against some interests. Thousands of people and large local communities were hurt in their vital interests when nations accepted the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

If Norway or another of the world's richest nations decides to go, at least temporarily, against a wolf protection convention, it might be more easily condoned by the international public if that country instead contributed heavily to one of the many other goals of the "world conservation strategy"—such as point 12 in Section 15 in WCS:

Assistance should be made available to enable requesting nations to develop the capacity to carry out national conservation strategies, ecosystem evaluations and environmental assessments. . . .

In view of catastrophic deterioration outside Norway, millions might possibly be better spent elsewhere rather than in establishing and maintaining wolf protection areas in Norway. This possibility is mentioned here to emphasize the importance of always having both the local and the global point of view.²⁵

In accordance with our basic philosophy (Ecosophy T), a long-range goal of humankind is to let evolution on Earth continue and, to some extent, restore or at least save many wildlife habitats that are now suffering from human encroachment. Without the slightest doubt, we recommend wolves as members of the Nordic life community, but this clear theoretical acceptance of wolves on the basis of our philosophy of nature does not imply any definite practical wolf policy.

Given the complicated philosophical, cultural, political, and economic situation, a realistic and vigorous prowolf policy in Norway and Sweden may have to be accorded low priority compared with other major, central conservation efforts. Such efforts may, however, prove even more difficult to

put into practice, and in that case we would recommend going ahead with the strong wolf policy. This is a tentative, preliminary conclusion based on the argumentation in this article.

There is no end to the areas of relevance with regard to wolf policies. Here we have focused on the cultural and general philosophical aspect, neglecting the intricacies of wolf ecology and wolf conservation strategy and action programs in general. In other articles we shall consider these subjects.

Deep Ecology and Conservation Biology

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, many of us believed that most ecologists would concentrate on research clearly related to the solution of the ecological crisis. At the universities, however, the atmosphere encouraged “pure” research—research without definite, practical goals. Moreover, those who get jobs within the range of interest of big corporations work with goals in mind but rarely focus on the crisis and rarely “go public.”

Most high-level papers in ecological journals are extremely specialized and only remotely relevant for critical issues. In the early 1970s, those who focus on the general crisis warned supporters of the deep ecology movement not to expect much help from established researchers in scientific ecology.

Then came conservation biology! It started as scientists and managers from many quarters realized that they profited by working together to combine theory with practice in their efforts to save the planet from further destruction. They were in a sense practitioners of ecology. They came from “biogeography, systematics, genetics, evolution, epidemiology, sociobiology, forestry, fisheries, wildlife biology, and the auxiliary sciences of agronomy, veterinary science, resource economics and policy, ethnobiology, and environmental ethics” (Soulé 1986: 5).

Conservation biology is a movement. “The idea of conservation biology seems to convey several things at once, including scholarship, a common purpose, and the potential for making a significant personal contribution to the world. For students and established scientists alike, conservation biol-

This article was reprinted with permission from *Earth First! Journal* (March 20, 1990): 29.

ogy seems to represent a community of commitment, and something of value to identify with" (Soulé 1986: 5). "Consensus can also define a discipline. Disciplines are not logical constructs; they are social crystallizations which occur when a group of people agree that association and discourse serve their interests. Conservation biology began when a critical mass of people agreed that they were conservation biologists. There is something very socialized very human about this realization" (*ibid.*, p. 3).

Insofar as conservation biology is a scientific discipline, it is a crisis science like AIDS and cancer research. That is, it uses certain goals and values as axioms. The intrinsic value of diversity of life-forms and the meaningfulness of a struggle to save life-forms from extinction are taken for granted. Conservation biology is therefore not purely descriptive; it is "a prescriptive science" (Norton-Griffiths, in Sinclair and Norton-Griffiths 1979: 237). Consequently, it is activist-oriented and personal: "The planetary tragedy is also a personal tragedy to those scientists who feel compelled to devote themselves to the rescue effort" (Soulé 1986: 11).

Despite conservation biologists' intense commitments to rescue the nonhuman world, they see the precarious situation of millions of people. "For example, the implementation of 'biosphere reserves' as sites for the harmonious coexistence for humans and nature (UNESCO-UNEP, 1984) depends on both a good grasp of the local biology and on the enthusiastic support of the indigenous peoples. In fact, the survival of many natural biological communities is going to require the creative cooperation of biologists, social scientists, and politicians, especially in the tropics. It won't be long before many conservation biologists are spending more time at community meetings than in the field or laboratory" (*ibid.*).

From all this it is clear that members of the conservation biology community are supporters of the deep ecology movement—provided that movement is characterized along the lines of the Eight Points of the Naess-Sessions platform. On the other hand, very few deep ecology supporters can boast of being conservation biologists. Many supporters may be ignorant of conservation biology. They may be local activists trying to save a small forest, say, in India.

Some supporters of the deep ecology movement are active in the efforts to save the cultures of nonindustrialized communities. The slogan "Wilderness for the people" attests to the goal of letting people in who do not de-

stroy or degrade wilderness and letting people who already are there remain. It is sad that some Third World authors feel that "American deep ecology" threatens to save spectacular animals at the expense of human beings. It must be clearly stated that the average lifestyle in the United States is such that wilderness and the American way of life are incompatible. The fight to save what remains of U.S. wilderness does not teach anybody how to save Third World wilderness. Conservation biologists in the Third World try to preserve wilderness, but in cooperation with people who determine policies.

Conservation biologists "go public." That is, they try to make people aware of the perilous state of affairs. Here they part from the main body of earth scientists, who tend to avoid propagating their strong views—if they have any—in public. Why do most scientists avoid voicing strong views? I have made a tentative list of reasons:

1. Time taken away from professional work.
2. Consequent adverse effects on promotion and status.
3. Feeling of insufficient competence outside their area of "expertise."
4. Lack of training in the use of mass media and in facing nonacademic audiences.
5. Negative attitude toward expressing "subjective" opinions and valuations, or violating norms of "objectivity"; reluctance to enter controversial issues.
6. Fear that colleagues or bosses will think they dabble in irrelevant controversial fields and go public for glory or publicity.
7. Fear of fellow researchers, institutional personnel or administrations; fear of the stigma "unscientific" (*ibid.*, p. 513).

One of the dangers common to the two movements is elitism. It "lurks whenever a field has a strong academic foothold. Whether the root of elitism is arrogance from within the ivory tower or fear from without, it is always a danger. There is no hiding the fact that much of the current interest in conservation biology is occurring within academic circles" (*ibid.*, p. 5). The deep ecology movement faces a danger of being too closely associated with the small group of deep ecology theorists, thereby obstructing the insight that the overwhelming mass of supporters do not publish papers or speak over the radio. These supporters form the backbone of the move-

ment. Their commitment manifests itself in the direct actions going on all over the world. We need the activism of millions of people with the basic attitude of supporters of the movement.

The two movements have another danger in common, "isolation—elitism's child." We should seek contact with groups competing with us in making an impact on the public, avoiding false pretensions and sectarianism. Some supporters of the deep ecology movement, like myself, are professional philosophers and theoreticians. We ask about the ultimate premises of sayings such as "Every living creature has intrinsic (or internal) value (or worth)." We may ask, Why is it so and what exactly does it mean? What does it mean that we do something for its own sake, and why should we do it? What is the relation of Aldo Leopold's criterion in his *Sand County Almanac* (1966)—"A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community"—to general ethics, for example, dealing with friends stuck in the mud or babies starving? Answers differ. According to supporters who are not inclined to ask such questions, nothing much comes out of philosophical speculation. Nevertheless, the unphilosophically minded, as much as the professors, somehow assume when acting in grave conflicts that their decisions are compatible with an ultimate basis, whether religious or otherwise. We assume some kind of "ecosophy," some kind of wisdom, which we are able to verbalize only imperfectly and fragmentarily. (A recent attempt to verbalize such wisdom is offered in Alan Drengson's *Beyond Environmental Crisis* [1989].)

Whatever happens in the years to come, one may expect conservation biology, as a distinguished "mission oriented crisis discipline," to inform us of great successes as well as great failures. Let us hope the former will color the news!

The Tragedy of Norwegian Whaling

Response to a Norwegian Environmental Group's Support for Whaling

There is a minority everywhere—as far as I know—who sees in other living beings something like themselves: something that wishes to live, something that rejects interference, something that has a kind of right to live, a kind of right they all have in common. This right does not negate the right to satisfy vital needs, a circumstance that implies killing. What, though, is a *right*? Philosophers disagree. Perhaps the term should not be used, but as long as human beings say they have a right to something, I think we might also use the term when referring to nonhuman life-forms. Most people belonging to the above-mentioned minority have little formal education and they have not heard talks about ecological sustainability. Those who have, like myself, insist that the biodiversity and *abundance* of living beings should not unnecessarily be reduced. *Full* ecological sustainability presupposes that as long as vital needs do not require serious interference, we respect the norm “Live and let live!”

In the 1980s there was a strong movement in favor of protecting marine mammals, even those that were not obviously in danger of extinction. It is not clear how this movement developed strength and led to international agreements. It seemed, though, that one of the most barbaric principles ever concocted by human beings would be overcome and repudiated. I refer to the principle that human beings, because of their special status on

This article was reprinted with permission from *North Sea Monitor* (December 1993).

Earth, have the right to kill off the population of whatever kind of living beings they encounter—as long as they *respect the limit of extinction*. Human beings have the right to “harvest the surplus”—that is, the unnecessary members of the community of marine mammals. Why should they live? No reason.

One way to convince people that there is something gravely undignified in this way of thinking is to confront them with the following little tale:

Representatives from a faraway planet land on Earth. Their technology is overwhelming. It is clear that we cannot arrest them. They carefully explain that they respect all living species. They study the limit of extinction and, just like Earthlings, protect species in danger of extinction. They simply want more resources and territory. “You must agree,” they tell us, “that there is a surplus of human beings. You let thousands of other species perish.” They admit, however, that the accomplishments of humankind are astonishing, and so they promise to let many more live than is necessary for species survival. Moreover, they are proud that their technique of killing is even better than those used by Earthlings when they mercifully kill whales. “You just hear a couple of wonderful notes from Mozart’s *Requiem*, and all is over. Trust us, we are humane and respect you highly.”

I imagine most people would find the way the invaders talked to us human beings shocking and outrageous. People would consider them barbarians for treating us as if we were mere animals. I belong to the minority that considers the expression *mere animals* questionable. Whatever our brilliance, our unique achievements, we should apply the maxim “Live and let live!” Or better, *because* of our unique endowments, we should at least try to apply that aphorism.

Preliminary investigations suggest that when asked explicitly about these questions, the majority of Norwegians maintain that living beings have intrinsic value, that it makes sense to do something for their sake, that poisonous snakes “belong” just as we belong, that animals have a right to territory (but that we “take” the right to expel them), that killing mammals is justified in order to satisfy vital needs but killing for pleasure is somewhat problematic. Some doing research on attitudes talk, though, about a certain kind of “schizophrenia”: people seriously proclaim that they subscribe to certain values but vote for political parties that they know will

not respect those values once they seem to conflict with "near" economic or other basic group interests.

The tiny Norwegian whaling community is, of course, in favor of continuing its traditions. It is located in the north of the country where there exists a tradition of solidarity, of standing up against decisions made at the power center in and around Oslo. It is, therefore, natural that the whole of north Norway supports the whalers.

The whalers have boats of very high quality, and their seamanship is on the same excellent level. They are used to the storms of both the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. It is, therefore, suggested that they should be invited to partake in the fight against overfishing and criminal use of life-destroying fishing techniques in the Atlantic Barents Sea. It is generally acknowledged that there is a great need for control. In the 1980s there seemed to be a basis for agreement between whalers and the authorities, agreement that a change of jobs would be of interest to all parties, but politicians at the time considered it "politically impossible." It is of interest to note how often plans that require a new way of thinking are quickly considered politically impossible by modern Western democracies. A considerable number of Norwegians have in the twentieth century had to change their jobs, however traditional, but the international pressure to stop whaling, in spite of eager demand from the market, is perceived as a threat to Norwegian sovereignty. As for the painfulness of the methods used to kill whales, they are believed less painful, because of the low level of shooting ability required, than the methods used to kill moose. So, it is sometimes argued, restrict the shooting of moose before further restricting whaling!

The minority I belong to is uncomfortably aware of the dominant position of the world's richest nations. Norway is not only economically rich but also has no severe internal problems to cope with. We cannot in any way justify interference with the life of marine mammals along our coast and in the ocean to the north and west. If we announce that we are not able to join in international protective measures because of the threat to jobs, what can we say against countries in the Third World that may now consider starting whaling? Norwegian periodicals make it clear that within the foreseeable future a series of species, other than minke whales, will no longer be threatened and that harvesting of the surplus in tightly controlled numbers ought to start. It is at the same time obvious that tight

control is out of the question. There is not even a realistic plan as to how to implement close and effective inspection of our vast oceans.

The decision of the Norwegian government to continue commercial whaling deserves to be called a tragic decision because it reminds people in power all over the world that the ban on whaling, even if there is a surplus of whales, goes squarely against policies most of them have adhered to. It collides with a belief in the right of human beings to use everything non-human purely as a means, for whatever purpose.

There is reason to believe that the Norwegian government's vast and costly effort at persuading the world to see the whaling issue from its point of view will be successful in the long run. With a surplus of whales, how can they be left *untaxed* when there is such hopeful demand in the markets?

A potent weapon in Norwegian propaganda is the continuous repetition that they have science on their side. Science enjoys a high reputation compared to "mere" feelings, and it has certainly made an impression. The reference to science is a reference to the agreement of experts that there are more minke whales than necessary to avoid the chance of extinction. For years I have trusted that this is the case.

Truly remarkable is the implicit opinion here that the norm against extinction of a species is "scientific." If Norway has science on its side, but opponents have not, because of their (more general) norm, what makes the narrower norm scientific? One way of answering this is to maintain that a species may have as yet undiscovered properties of usefulness to humankind, for example for medical purposes. However, feelings are still implied, perhaps: a feeling that whatever serves humankind is good, or a pretension that such a feeling exists.

It is unfortunate that on the whole the larger environmental organizations have felt it appropriate to focus their arguments on the reliability of estimates of whale numbers. Apparently it is not enough to hold that whales ought to be protected whatever their numbers. Besides, why adopt a stance that sooner or later, with rising whale numbers, would have to be given up? The answer, of course, is clear: protection is the main thing, not the question of numbers. Unfortunately, it seems that many environmental groups are not prepared to take this more radical stance.

The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (NNV) is an umbrella organization that attracts support from a broad cross section of

the Norwegian people. It is comparable to the Sierra Club in the United States. The NNV has discovered that to be officially against whaling alienates a considerable number of its 60,000 members. Having said this, it is not quite clear to me why, in their published material, they have found it necessary to adopt such obnoxious terminology: "Our basic attitude is that humans should be allowed to *harvest* the *surplus* of a species when this can be done without depleting the stock" (my emphasis). This language is of the kind used in relation to organized agriculture, not wild entities. It does nothing to reveal that we are involved with fellow creatures that quite possibly have value in themselves, some interest in being alive, creatures it would be natural for us to help not only to live but to *blossom*. "[T]he North Eastern Atlantic *stock* of minke whales is large enough to be able to withstand a limited *taxing*" (my emphasis again). We would shudder if somebody talked about taxing human beings! "For many in Western Europe and America the whale has a special symbolic status. . . . Whaling opponents do not have the right . . . to demand that others see the whale as a holy animal." Here NNV is on safe ground.

The terminology of the NNV majority is that of the economy of material resources. A wholesale store may possess a small or large stock of books and pencils of different kinds. Fellow beings like wild animals are not the "property" of human beings. The store may own a surplus of textbooks on mining, hundreds of copies that could go on sale or be put in the dustbin. If a species develops into a formidable threat to other species, ecological measures, agreed upon internationally, may be put into action. This is not a question of "surplus."

Economic and technological development in the world's richest countries has resulted in the loss of a great many traditions. Mostly the losses have not been considered a tragedy even if the result has been difficult times of transition for large groups of people. The Norwegian budget includes substantial subsidies of various kinds and there is plenty of opportunity to help the whalers with their excellent boats to obtain year-round work of a dignified, internationally valuable kind. Support would also be appropriate for larger vessels capable of duty off the coast of Third World countries. Norway need not oppose the decision of a great many countries that the time has come to protect more whales than are needed to avoid extinction. Unfortunately, a national society for nature conservation in a na-

tion bent on whaling must accept so-called careful, humane whaling or face financial ruin.

The minority with whom I sympathize finds neither the existence of people who consider whales (and only whales) as sacred animals nor *their* support for the protection of whales as arguments *against* protection. It so happens that for the first time in the history of the industrialized world it has been proposed that a large group of mammals be protected from *more* than extinction. It may be that the proposal came too early. I hope not.

Conclusion

The twentieth century will not see defeat of the arrogant free-for-all killing, down toward the level of extinction, of large groups of mammals. There is a chance this will happen in the next century, if vast hunger is overcome, and whaling thus not strictly necessary, or if the dominance of the rich industrial countries continues and they find they can “afford” to protect whales in spite of market opportunities. We must hope that hunger does not take a form that would make it difficult to argue against the protection of any nonhuman species. Paradoxically, such a global state of affairs may well result in warlike conditions, at the cost of considerable human life as well.

As to Norwegian whaling, what is politically impossible today may be politically possible in the twenty-first century: the mobilization of whalers and others in the global battle against the theft of ocean life.

Letter Sent October 1971 to the King of Nepal

Great mountains have since remote antiquity been the object of religious cults. They have been symbols of the highest, the sublime, the perfect, the imperishable, the unsurpassable and unreachable. And of course, symbols of deity.

Those who look upon the great mountains as temples may not hesitate to climb them, only they do it with an attitude acceptable in or on a temple. But to those who rather feel them as symbols of the highest and the unreachable and who reject climbing the summits: it only shows the vanity and impudence and also dullness of mankind to carry out an act symbolizing the dethronement of God and the conquest of the unreachable.

I have belonged to the former group, thinking of mountains as temples and symbols of what is both good and greater than man. Like many others I have spoiled a lot of mountains that could have remained unclimbed, undesecrated.

On behalf of a large section of mountaineers I beseech your Majesty to declare some of your still unclimbed mountains to be holy and not to be climbed.

One of the most holy mountains still left in your country is Gauri Shankar. I propose that the whole mountain be declared holy and untouchable, or its upper parts, let us say above 6,700 meters. The summit is 7,143 meters.

There are, of course, other mountains that in deference to a widespread attitude all over the world should be declared out of reach. In this letter I

This letter first appeared in *The Autobiography of a Shipping Man*, edited by Earling D. Naess (Colchester, England: Seatrade Publications, 1977), 252–53.

DEEP ECOLOGY PRACTICES

speak of Gauri Shankar because a group of Norwegian climbers and philosophers have wished to stay on the slopes and precipices of Gauri Shankar, combining veneration of that great mountain with climbing and enjoyment of its surroundings.¹

We make up only one of the many groups that try to change the attitude of highly industrialized societies toward nature. Climbing as a kind of conquest and subjection of mountains under the power of man belongs to the sick ideas of people out of touch with nature. It was a great moment when Sherpas and others from your part of the world asked that the highest points on certain peaks should remain untouched. But the rapidly diminishing number of untouched great mountains in the Himalayas, as well as in other parts of the world, has shown that their requests have been all too modest. It is time now, in the international year of nature preservation, to make bold steps forward before it is too late.

Most respectfully,
Arne Naess

V

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLACE:
AT HOME IN THE MOUNTAINS

An Example of a Place: Tvergastein

The Global Place-Corrosive Process

When the majority of people lived on the land, with little mobility, it was natural to feel at home at certain places. One stayed at home, left home, went home—but home was not a building. The advertising of “homes” for sale is not an offer of a home in the connotation relevant to our analysis. Home was where one belonged. It was “part of oneself,” that is, it delimited an ecological self, rich in *internal* relations to what is now called environment. Humanity today suffers from a place-corrosive process.

Urbanization, centralization, increased mobility (although nomads have proved that not all sorts of moving around destroy the relation of belonging somewhere), dependence on goods and technologies from where one does not belong, increase of structural complication of life—all these factors weaken or disrupt the steady belongingness to a place, or even hinder its formation. There seems no place for PLACE anymore.

Nevertheless, the loss of place is felt, the longing persists, and this emphasizes the need to articulate what it means to belong to a place. Doing so strengthens the movement toward the development of a sense of place to reinvigorate the internal relation of the self to the environment. This movement is of prime importance for the motivation to partake in the deep ecology movement. Most supporters of the movement are people who are intimately acquainted with urbanization; it actually facilitates their capacity to think globally. People who are completely absorbed in the land have

This article was written in 1992. It is being published here for the first time.

no need for high levels of abstraction and articulation, nor do they have the training to make their *implicit* global attitudes a basis for action.

The *implicit* global attitude does, sometimes, show itself in action. In the 1950s, when people in Norway were asked to contribute money to help fisheries in the south of India, the nonurbanized, relatively poor people in extreme arctic Norway contributed the most. Of course, what is of *most* importance to these nonurban people is their homestead. It is clear that only the destruction of fisheries through overkill, and the destruction of local and provincial markets, would make them consider leaving their homestead, their *hjemsted* (home-place).

It is important for those who have experienced the place-corrosive process but somehow saved their belongingness to a place (at least in somewhat modified form) to tell others about how their sense of place survived. This may help others strengthen their motivations, and it may also strengthen and purify how those who still feel belongingness act out their chosen way of life and priorities.

This introduction may seem somewhat bombastic in relation to what I am going to say about the place Tvergastein. Not many people are in a position, or would have the inclination, to identify with a place like Tvergastein. However, the development of a place for a person to feel at home, and to belong, shows exceptionally clearly *some of the forces at work in the establishment of a place* (or perhaps I should say establishment of a place as a Place). Unfortunately, the reader will have to consider some autobiographical details. I have to say some words about how I came to look toward Tvergastein as my future place.

Geography

About 200 kilometers east of Bergen are two great landmarks, the Hardangerjøkul (a dome-shaped glacier of about 80 square kilometers, a remnant of the time when Norway, like Greenland, was covered with ice) and a 40-kilometer-long broad mountain called Hallingskarvet, running from east to west. This mountain is composed of hard eruptive rocks laid bare millions of years ago through the erosion of softer mountains. From its southeastern slopes, one may survey an enormous part of southern Norway (tens of thousands of square kilometers). On these slopes we find a place called

Tvergastein, 1,500 meters above sea level, with a lake named Tvergasteintjernet. Softer rocks have been protected by the overlaying, hard, 200-meter near-vertical part of Hallingskarvet.

The stupendous, majestic Hallingskarvet captured my imagination from the time I was about five years old, staying during Easter and summers in a cottage at Ustaoset, a tiny village about 8 kilometers from the mythogenic mountain where I developed my place.

In *documents*, “Tvergastein” is the name of the cottage at Tvergastein, the place. In terms of *geography*, the “place” is the name of the cottage *and* its immediate surroundings, that is, about 40 meters in all directions from the walls of the cottage. A wider usage, referring to a greater gestalt, treats the place as comprising the lake, Tvergasteintjernet, and a whole shelf on the slopes of Hallingskarvet as seen from the cottage (which is situated directly under the precipices of Hallingskarvet). Geographically, this is an area of a couple of kilometers in length, and rich in contrasts. Compared to the region of *seter* (mountain pastures), it is a world apart, reflecting arctic conditions at 1,500 meters at 60°51' north latitude and very different from the 1,000-meter level (arctic yes, but influenced by the Gulf Stream from the west). From Tvergastein, the mountains and glaciers around the great Hardangerfjord are clearly seen—and appreciated.

Even from a distance Hallingskarvet looks greenish, but this is clearly not the result of grass. The Place asked to be studied and the greenish cliffs asked to be recognized as such. When looked at closely, it revealed innumerable patches of beautiful green lichen. The Tvergastein Naturalist Library indicated that a particular species, *Geographicus*, was responsible for the green color. There were lots of other lichens, but a study of them required the use of a microscope and was rather technical compared to the study of flowers. Anyhow, the most “barren” parts of the visible surface of Hallingskarvet were alive even in the narrow sense of consisting of organisms—myriads in every square foot. The lichens are strangely connected beings: algae intimately interrelated with fungi. A still stranger connection: algae, fungi, human beings.

In the early summer mornings (at 3 or 4 A.M.) the huge shadow of Hallingskarvet keeps the landscape toward the south and west sleeping in semidarkness, but by 5 A.M. the sunshine brightens hundreds of small lakes and tiny patches of water on the plateau below Tvergastein, and at about 7

A.M. the sun appears over the mountain and penetrates the east window of the library, hitting a wooden plate painted stark black, thus contributing to the heating up of the small room.

The early morning sun also illuminates a faraway, 30-mile-long string of metallic electric masts and thick wires—hydroelectric power destined for Oslo, 200 miles away. Each mast is an elegant structure revealing much love and ingenuity on the part of the engineers, but such a string of masts transforms the landscape. If only a few mountainous landscapes were changed in this way, we probably should not complain and feel sorrow. However, the number of landscapes without these strange beings diminishes rapidly. There are now more than two million gigantic masts around. The masts would have a less disturbing character if the power were used to increase the quality of life. As it is, the power is to a large extent wasted, which contributes to making people unaware of their fantastic material richness. What does a gallon of boiling water mean in the cities? Nothing. At Tvergastein it is a formidable luxury, enough to satisfy a host of essential services, a gift of nature of the most astonishing character.

Flowers

Arriving at Tvergastein from below, some people might call its flowers small, inconspicuous, unspectacular, even poor or insignificant. Let us say we point to green patches of *Salix herbacea* (mouse-ears). If we say “Look!” some people would answer “What? What do you see?” They see tiny unspectacular leaves like ears of mice (*musøre*). These plants (“huddling together”) rarely reach more than an inch from the rock—you see no soil. In front of the cottage, they reach half an inch. Of course, they are not “huddling” together; they are probably having a very good life together. Their flowers—hardly detectable until one is very near the plant—are well formed, their reddish seeds very conspicuous after a while.

These plants seem to delight in tiny cracks in the stony ground, sometimes much less than an inch wide. They join the lichen and “dominate” where no organic life is capable of having a good time. *Salix herbacea* seems to be “everywhere” at Tvergastein. We walk on them without the slightest regret. We make soup of them without thinking about extinction or interference with their habitat.

Whereas we human beings only gradually come to appreciate the mouse-ears, there are tiny creatures, a kind of wasp, that make red apple-like houses on the mouse-ears. Opening the walls of the “house,” we see a tiny white worm, which will probably die from exposure, but, as they are so tiny, we don’t care very much. At least we must be allowed to inspect one of the million interesting red dots on the leaves? Note our ineradicable inconsistency! When interested, I would still (even after writing about this “cruelty”) disturb such worms.

There are fraction-of-an-inch flowering plants of unsurpassed beauty, the *Gentiana nivalis*—a typically ethnocentric Nordic name: “Jesus blue-eyes.” In the most authoritative botanical reference work, that of Johannes Lid, the height of the flower is given as “7 cm,” nearly 3 inches! Most of the specimens in front of the cottage are less than 1 centimeter. The dark blue color is so intense, though, that on a windless sunny day in late July, they look *great* and clamoring for attention. Unfortunately, there are few such days, and on most days in the latter half of July, the flowers are closed. The plant is then difficult to find. The rest of the year—where is it? The plant lives only one year. In order not to become extinct at Tvergastein, *Gentiana nivalis* must somehow start a new generation in July next year (or the July after that, if next July is cold). Obviously, the existence of the plant at Tvergastein is precarious.

Other flowers are typical arctic plants, like *Dryas octopetala* (the “Reindeer rose”), which has big beautiful white flowers—often bigger than the rest of the plant. They have a good time where there is no soil to be seen, keeping together so that there may be several hundred within a single square meter. Still richer with white flowers: a square meter of well-shaped downy-haired *Cerastium alpinum*. There were more than 600 *Cerastiums* (3–4 inches tall) within one square meter at a spot near the famously windy northeast corner of the cottage—a sight of overwhelming richness!

Before I leave the “tiny” flowers, a particularly delicate, beautiful, modest one must be mentioned, the *Cassiope hypnoides*. Thousands of them create a carpet of green with white spots. The plant’s shape is misleading; it bends as if not being worthy of looking at us. It has fragility but no weakness, flowering even in dry summers in spite of its shallow roots, and growing where there is no soil to be seen. It does not creep but turns its stem straight out into the air—even as high as an inch.

After dwelling with some of the small flowers, when we first glance at a kind of dandelion (*Taraxacum alpinum* and similar arctic species) it looks not only crude, but downright indecent. It need not be higher than an inch, but it produces a flower 2 inches in circumference. To be just, the “flower” is really a basket of flowers, about a hundred of them. From its seeds each dangling from a parachute, we should all understand that the “flower” is a luxurious basket.

When one arrives at Tvergastein, more than a few easily changeable attitudes have to be more or less unconsciously modified. Everything is different from Ustaoset (8 kilometers away), and vastly different from the coast (50 kilometers to the west). Conversely, the adjustment again to the seacoast (not to mention the adjustment to the tropical rain forests of the south) is immense, if not terrifying. The differences scream at you. A rose is seen as a caricature of beauty. A tree is unnecessarily tall, grossly overdone, obstructing your alpine freedom of movement. While staying at Tvergastein, one's attitudes change, and one's personality changes, at least temporarily. After one week, there is a noticeable difference; three weeks—that is a very good stay. The last two weeks, the effects of mere contrast are largely gone. You are genuinely *there*. You are not seeing things through glasses from somewhere else. After a month, or two months, getting back down, and to town, is exciting but painful, harassing.

The distribution of snow is peculiar in windy arctic mountainous landscapes. If we are asked, “What is the snow depth at Tvergastein now?” there is no answer. There is no definite thickness, no small area with even distribution. The wind shapes the snow. After a strong west wind, there may be 2 meters of snow east of the east wall, but if “the same wind” reaches hurricane force, all the snow is carried away. There is no snow anywhere near the cottage. There is practically no snow *anywhere* at Tvergastein, even in January, but not far away there are usually 5–10 meters of snow in a wind-protected valley or gully. This makes skiing in August possible!

A highly romantic consequence of the uneven distribution of snow is that certain protruding cliffs with tiny cracks are normally snowless, and a “tiny” flower, which tolerates freezing cold, uses the cracks and occasional twenty-hour sunshine to bloom in the middle of May. It is the famous *Saxifraga oppositifolia*, so well known and cherished in the Arctic. It is the very first flower in spring, and its red color stands out vividly in a world of snow

and rock at Tvergastein. And so, you go skiing and, at the same time, enjoy the flowery season. *Farther down, at 1,200 meters or 1,000 meters, there are no flowers*; they appear much later (one reason: the soil is deeper and frost keeps it rock-hard).

In the precipices of Hallingskarvet, above Tvergastein, the *Saxifraga* also blooms in May because the sun's rays heat up the rocks. When the sun stands at 20° above the horizon, the plants on 70° cliffs (with a minimum of soil) enjoy rays coming in at a 90° angle; again, this is a story of the special quality of the arctic mountain climate. There are beautiful flowers combined with below-freezing temperatures, a hot sun warming cliffs, and deep crystalline new snow in protected areas. With this story about *Saxifraga oppositifolia*, a hero that may even have survived the Ice Age in Norway, we must close the chapter on flowering plants.

Animals

Many animals live at Tvergastein and belong there. The mountain mice deserve to be mentioned first. Soon after the cottage was built, some families established themselves under the cottage. Later, when the cottage was made larger, they were welcomed to the big western room. Sometimes a family makes a nest there, but mostly they just like to investigate everything in peace and at their leisure. The mice have access to other rooms only by special invitation. They are never invited to the kitchen.

When a human being enters their room, the mice hide for a couple of minutes, disturbed by the excessive noise, but then go on with their business. Sometimes there are things that the human occupiers of the place do not like them to nibble or eat. It is a joy to find out how to limit their access to these things.

When caught, the Tvergastein mice reveal an astonishing diversity of character. Some are very shy, others more easily pacified. One liked to rest on the downy slippers of the human occupier—something that made his moving around very awkward. Another was mainly interested in climbing and other sports; another was a great eater but did not show many other interests; still another was far more inquisitive and alert. Most tend to bite when handled, making neat small holes in the fingers. It is better not to “caress” them!

The mice are at home all the way to the top plateau of Hallingskarvet, that is, as high as there are shelves with vegetation. In wintertime, their nests under the snow keep them warm, or at least above freezing temperatures.

After the mice, the reindeer should be mentioned. From time to time, as long as there is snow around Tvergastein, herds of reindeer, 100–500 individuals, appear near the cottage. One evening the leaders decided they had been traveling enough and lay down between the cottage and the precipices. Most of the others leisurely lay down behind the leaders, but some restless youngsters kept on moving and lay down in front of the leaders. These found that they had to get up and place themselves ahead of the insubordinates. This happened again, but then the leaders did not bother. One should not take the youngsters too seriously.

Among the carnivores, the *Mustela erminea* is exceedingly popular but rarely seen. If seen, it tends to jump around from rock to rock with unbelievable elegance, speed, and tenacity. Exhibitionism? The tiny *Mustela nivalis* is just as unpopular as its relative is popular: it is capable of getting through the established official mice entrances into the cottage, and can also track down the mice under the cottage. Result: indiscriminate slaughter. Now there have been no mice for about three years. The place is not as it should be without mice children carefully inspecting the world outside the cottage every morning for several seconds and then running with lightning speed back to safety.

Sightings of the strong, sinister *Gulo gulo* (wolverine) are very rare, and bears have not been seen around Hallingskarvet in a century. Anyhow, it is too high for them to live here. Neither *Gulo gulo* nor bears belong here, but several big birds do—the *Haliaeetus albicilla* (ocean eagle) being the biggest and most regal. If its nest is above, or near, climbing routes behind the cottage, the male may treat the climber to an exquisite dive, keeping its wings close to its body and aiming at the intruder's head. It turns away just above the head at the first dive, then gets less interested and impressive, turning away much too soon. Once, the human occupier of Tvergastein felt the eagle had shouted "Abominable!" after a really bad dive. We do not approach their nests.

All in all, compared to mountains in milder climates, the richness and diversity of big animals—animals bigger than mice—is poor. This is

scarcely because of human interference, I suppose. Lots of ptarmigan are shot, but it is said, apparently with the support of some evidence, that this is not a main reason for their scarcity.

Genesis of a Place-Person

How did we, who belong to a place, get to belong there in spite of not being raised there, and in spite of not always having lived there? Here is one example of a genesis of place-person, reconstructed from evidence some of which has an inevitable character of being speculative.

My father, who died a year after I was born, had a small cottage above timberline (1,000 meters above sea level) at Ustaøset, a station on the railway between Oslo and Bergen. From the time I was a small boy, my mother, sister, and two brothers (ten and eleven years older than I) lived in the cottage in summertime and at Easter.

Largely rejecting my mother and sister as persons to imitate, I was happiest when my brothers played with me, sometimes in a rough way. When I was still only five or six years old, for example, they had great fun on a cold, windy day at Easter seeing whether the wind could physically push me up a small hill on skis. Their love was particularly manifest, or so I thought, when I was on the verge of crying because of their wild ways of playing. Perhaps I felt loved mainly through such play.

The steam engine of the train carrying us from below to above the timberline barely managed to do the job. The grade was steep. The vast world above the trees, and the process of getting through the timberline, made on me an impression so profound and deeply gratifying that it left an intense longing to get back to that world just as soon as I was again in my usual surroundings—a big house on a fairly large, partly forested property in the hilly suburbs of Oslo.

The dense landscape I could see from my window in Oslo was completely dominated by big dark spruce trees whose branches sorrowfully pointed slightly downward. When it was windy, these sinister trees rocked slowly back and forth murmuring what I would much later articulate as “Damned, damned, you are damned, damned.” The feeling of being imprisoned and damned was vivid. It reflected a not entirely happy life

situation that I need not discuss here. I mention the fateful trees blocking the view because the contrast with the free view above the timberline is obvious.

Whatever the influences, the experience of elevation (of moving from darkness to light, from being hemmed in to a life in a seemingly unlimited and friendly world) was so strong that I attached myself too much to this free-floating longing for the land beyond and above the forests. It promised to be a land of freedom beyond anything imaginable lower down. This is what I felt living at my parents' cottage.

Along the distant horizon toward the north lived the massive Hallingskarvet. It looked different every day while still retaining its supreme poise. Greeting it in the morning, during August, I might see that it had suddenly turned white from autumn snow, sometimes from the summit plateau down to 1,500 meters, sometimes all the way down to its foot at 1,200 meters. This is one of the grand characteristics of great mountains: their ability to turn brilliant white in the summer.

This faraway, supreme, powerful, serene, aloof, beautiful mountain gradually gained in status, revealing itself to me as the benevolent, protecting father or even divine being. I made Hallingskarvet into the symbol of everything good that was lacking in the world and in myself. When still a boy, I was able to reach its knees; later I roamed around on its shoulders and on the vast summit plateau with its surface of big greenish rocks, rounded through erosion.

It got to be a great dream to be able to stay *on* the mountain—not compelled to come down before dark or because of rain and thunderstorms. In 1937, when I was twenty-five years old, I chose the best possible place to build a cottage: not too high and difficult to reach for transporting materials over snow, but high enough on the flank of Hallingskarvet to feel that I was living on the mountain, and to have a superb view of a large part of Norway through the window.

A friend at Ustaoset who had a horse promised to transport enough materials for a very sturdy wooden cottage 8 × 5 meters in size. He indicated that fifteen trips would be needed, but it actually took sixty-two trips because of the difficult terrain and uneven snow. "Madness!" was the judgment of people at Ustaoset: the highest private cottage in northern Europe and in a climate unsuitable for "normal" cottage life.

Human Life at Tvergastein

After one has stayed there awhile, Tvergastein is experienced as teaming with life. In summer and early autumn, even the snow slopes are alive, turning reddish from the great populations of the green algae *Cblamydomonas nivalis* (the red pigment is the same as we know from salmon). After a while, we get a much more realistic view of the excellent living conditions at such arctic places. Even ecologists sometimes talk about extreme, destitute, difficult, marginal, poor, stressful, disadvantaged, harsh, or even hostile, conditions of life. This is improper, shameful language! Some species of flowers do not become as tall as lower down, but what has tallness got to do with well-being? Where the living beings use the excellent microclimates close to the soil, and behind rocks, why bother to climb high into the atmosphere? Most flowers at Tvergastein simply dislike rich soil. Some flourish where no soil is seen. The lichen and the mosses grow big and dominate even where snow covers the ground nine or ten months of the year. *Ranunculus glacialis* grow large and fat at such places, and nowhere else. The snow does not hurt things; it makes life sleep and wait. Admittedly, in winter there is not much life to be seen, but mammals, like the fox, know where to push away snow and find mice and lemmings. In short, there is nothing wrong about life in general at Tvergastein—but what about human beings?

The choice of the geographical place was based more or less on a set of requirements, but now the question was, What would the place require of me? What kind of lifestyle, activities, and ceremonies would be appropriate for this place? What would be a life worthy of Hallingskarvet and in solidarity with, and respect for, the other life-forms?

The difficulty and cost of transporting things by horse, together with obvious peculiarities of the place, clearly suggested a simple lifestyle with maximum self-reliance. Clumsy attempts on my part to produce some vegetables were complete failures. Of the native plants, only the mouse-ear was both eatable and present in sufficient quantities to serve the human occupier of the cottage. Hunting was possible farther down, but distasteful. In short, I had to rely on “importing” things, mostly by rucksack.

The question of heating the cottage was central, but the few junipers at 1,400–1,500 meters were small and rarely more than 5 inches high. Obvi-

ously, they should be protected, living precariously at the upper limits of their range. Again, the obvious solution was to "import." So there were two major unpleasant conclusions. There was no question of living on the land by the land.

Wind power, of course, was a possibility investigated early on. Inquiries suggested that because of the terrific downslope winds from the precipices of Hallingskarvet, the windmills would have to be specially built and of great bulk. I was sorry that this idea had to be reluctantly given up. Solar power was a possibility, but here also there were complications to overcome.

In 1937 a little firewood was transported by horse, and during the war, by rucksack. Then storms more or less regularly carried away major parts of the roof, despite increasing conservation measures, including cables to hold it down. This roof loss, however, resulted in a splendid byproduct: enough wood for austere use of firewood through the end of the twentieth century!

When I attempt to trace psychological and social determiners of my professional philosophy, some key terms stand out: unruffledness, equimindedness, austerity, distance, aloofness, nonviolence, diversity, egalitarianism. Most of them seemed to help in forming a lifestyle appropriate to the place.

Temperature: obviously very low inside the cottage. Below 9°C, however, everything gets wet, including paper, and the interesting fungi thrive *too well*. A marvelous effect of low indoor temperature for weeks or months is increased blood circulation near the surface of the skin, a feeling of physical activeness and fitness akin to that achieved after a hike. During short stays, though, it is not possible to adapt completely and so in 1960 came a revolution: acceptance of a rule not to let the indoor temperature drop below 14°. The temperature is much lower only in the morning, but on the rise.

Rooms heated: normally only one room 2.5 × 2.5 meters. In this room there is space enough for two, a little strenuous for a family life of three or four.

Food: simple, nourishing. Appetite inevitably strong.

Keeping warm: If one slowly gets uncomfortable, some strenuous exercise. Five minutes of very vigorous muscular movements is enough to heat the human body. A person occupies less than 1 percent of the volume of the room. Why heat more than 99 percent in order to heat that little volume?

Indoor occupations: research, reading, writing. Also listening to the wind and to other kinds of music. The usual housework is kept at a minimum.

Given that transporting food and other essentials is fairly complicated, the *reuse* concept is central. It is amusing to make extended and surprising use of everything brought up. Important result regarding quality of life: everything brought up is looked upon as having more value than before, an increasing feeling of quality and richness.

Water carried by hand from sources 200–300 meters away becomes more valuable. If snow is melted, it is of prime importance to remember that the calories needed to bring snow to the melting point—that is, a temperature increase from -1°C to $+1^{\circ}\text{C}$ —and the calories needed to bring water to the boiling point (92° at Tvergastein) are the same. For the last twenty years, I have found water under the deep snow but *above* the thick ice along the shore of Lake Tvergastein. Consequently, we carry water from there instead of melting snow. I am surprised that cottage people do not know about the presence of such water under deep snow along the shores of lakes.

When a person who has *grown up* in a city *grows into* a nonurbanized personal place, how does this affect his friends and relatives? Obviously, there are potential sources of tension and personal tragedies—or the extension of influence so that one's nearest also establish a relationship with the same place. For thirty years there were no serious problems of this kind associated with living at Tvergastein. My nearest felt positively about the area and its lifestyle. Then, with increasing mobility and other factors, steady life in good company at Tvergastein became less frequent. Evidently, the more peculiar and isolated a place, the less are the chances to establish satisfactory social relationships. It is impossible to deny that the climate of Tvergastein negatively affects the main outdoor activities, hiking, skiing, climbing. The high winds, more than the low temperatures, require toughness and hardiness. With increasing age, fewer people are able or willing to adapt. The eleventh big storm is not as romantic as the first ten.

What is remarkable about Tvergastein and similar places is their capacity to furnish the basis for a life of simplicity of means and richness of ends. The latter is dependent upon their development from being a place to being a *Place*. With increasing intensity of commitment, the Place will satisfy an increasing variety of needs and will allow for an increasing variety of cher-

ished goals to be reached. The little time and effort spent on the simple means frees time for dwelling in situations characterized by intrinsic values.

For most of us, though, the Personal Place cannot permanently satisfy every need. Perhaps the time spent there decreases over the years or is never more than a minor part of each year. This holds true for Tvergastein. Nonetheless, it is remarkable how a Place, even when it is uninhabited most of the year, largely determines one's attitudes, one's likes and dislikes, and one's general outlook. One is caught up in the Place, hopefully with good consequences, but inevitably causing some maladjustments in localities very different from the Place.

A Person-Place occasionally tyrannizes, imposes itself, gives orders. To disobey those "orders" creates a feeling of guilt or weakness of character. This is unavoidable. Phenomenologically speaking, the orders given by the Place and the orders given by oneself are inseparable. Only philosophies that impose a sharp subject-object dualism try to trace a border between the self and "its" geographical surroundings.

In psychology, the concept of superego is common and, using this terminology, one may say that the orders given by the Place are parts of the orders given by the superego. This conceptualization is not incompatible with the concept of Person-Place.

One example: *disposal of trash*. In the 1930s, given the geographical remoteness of Tvergastein from human habitation, together with the mild norms among people enjoying cottage life, solid trash was placed beyond a moderately large rock 150 meters from the cottage. For twenty years, the trash was the object of joyful study because of the enormous number of interesting changes of the flora within a meter of the trash. One plant, the *Cerastium alpinum*, benefited tremendously and multiplied and grew to inordinate size, at least 5 inches. Further, the delicate alpine and arctic grasses were largely suppressed by coarser, darker species. There were at least 100 clearly discernible changes within the radius of 1 meter. Outside this area, no change was to be seen.

Liquid trash was placed nearer the cottage in a crack between two smaller rocks. The effect was the same, but on a grander scale. There was a new world of excessive growth, luxurious but clearly foreign to the general character of the landscape.

There were problems, however. Big solid things fell to pieces—often

smashed when carried away by the wind—which necessitated some kind of burying ground. This was found in deep black holes between enormous boulders in a region without any life-forms except lichens.

Then came the 1960s with the environmental conflicts. Evidently, those engaged in the battle to clean up trash *everywhere* had to be very careful what they did themselves. So a disagreeable situation arose. More and more trash was carried down the mountain in rucksacks and sometimes transported all the way to Oslo.

The trash example illustrates some relations of importance:

1. “With increasing quantity, quantity changes into quality.” This Hegelian slogan is admirably illustrated. With increasing quantity of trash, it sooner or later degrades a wild place, a mountain, a landscape. Before this happens, when quantities are microscopic, the quality of a Place is not disturbed. In environmental conflicts, we must conserve our sense of proportion.
2. The defenders of wild nature against further encroachments by human beings tend to view any kind of trash (however diminutive in size or “innocent” in kind) as an evil. Of course, a piece of orange peel has a color and coarse fabric that cries out as a foreign element in the Tvergastein landscape, but there are limits beyond which it begins to be ridiculous to demand a “cleaning up of the trash.” In short, beware of fanaticism, beware of allowing admirable feelings to run amok. Personal relations with antagonists in environmental conflicts should not be threatened by fanatical demands.
3. “Absolute consistency is impossible.” Suppose we wholeheartedly accept the following. P_1 : Remove trash from wild places! P_2 : Tvergastein is a wild place. P_3 : x is a piece of trash. P_4 : x is at Tvergastein. C : Remove x !

What holds concerning the remove-the-trash norm holds as well for hundreds of other norms that are important in environmental conflicts. The formulations are short and, of course, vague and ambiguous to some extent. They have an indispensable function as slogans, but to use logic before they are made more precise is to ignore important aspects of slogans. Even after they have been reformulated, formal logic of consistency, in any strict

sense, is only moderately applicable (because of the nature of a normative system, which we cannot avoid. "All things hang together"—even in thinking!). It is not here a question of the validity of formal logic of consistency, but rather of the limitations of application in concrete situations.

Climbing

Classical European music consists of pieces of varying degrees of difficulty to perform. In concerts performers are supposed to follow the notes of the compositions, but sometimes they improvise. Improvisation by individual performers and small bands is also very popular today. There are professionals and there are amateurs, and the latter form the great majority of music lovers who do more than just listen to music. In dancing there are highly structured definite kinds of sequences of steps, but free improvisations are more popular than ever.

In climbing there are also definite routes of varying degrees of difficulty on the one hand, and the freedom to improvise on the other. Children climb stairs, chairs, and tables and advance to trees and boulders if any are available. No special equipment is used. Climbing on Hallingskarvet is more closely related to informal dancing, musical performances, or childish play than to climbing by established routes described in climbing guides. Let me be more specific about the Tvergastein variety, now a fifty-year tradition of climbing.

Hallingskarvet has more than 30 kilometers of precipices, most of them between 50 and 200 meters high and all of them very steep. The rock itself is hard (eruptive), but there are often loose stones and moss. This, in addition to its isolation from roads, makes it rarely visited by climbers, although the climbing, a 15-minute walk from Tvergastein cottage, is excellent. Many routes are described, *but never published*. Some are among the most difficult done in Norway at the time they were first climbed. Improvisation, however, is the rule.

Full security when climbing is axiomatic. There is no question of taking chances, not even the temptation to do so, but full security from serious injury is not the same as absolute security (the absence of even the *possibility* of serious injury). The same applies to skiing: neither Tvergastein climbing nor Tvergastein skiing is "dangerous."

In Norway, climbing but not skiing is supposed to be dangerous. This is because skiing, especially the cross-country variety, is part of the general culture and the vast majority of skiers are not tempted to risk life or limbs (although sometimes limbs!). There is always a *possibility* of getting seriously hurt, but the joy of skiing is not seen as looking for extremes of physical challenge. Climbing, on the other hand, is done by a small minority and *looks* dangerous to most people. Whereas concern for safety when learning to ski is a subordinate theme, it is rather central in climbing. At Tvergastein, though, the result is the same as with skiing: full security.

It should be unnecessary to discuss the metaphysical background of mountain climbing.¹ It plays a role at Tvergastein, but so does the simple joy of rhythm and movement, of exciting challenges, and of the appreciation of lichens, rocks and stones, flowers, animals, the sky.

The high precipice, 15 minutes from the cottage, has fairly broad shelves in its lower part. The exuberance of the vegetation is astonishing. Flowers are much taller than at the cottage and even farther down. Some plants grow on the shelves that one ordinarily sees only much farther down (below 1,000 meters). The reason is largely unknown to the public but is very clear: the climate in the precipices of Hallingskarvet is generally much milder than below because there is less wind. The steepness also favorably affects this growth. If the shelf is angled at 30°, the rays of the sun strike the vegetation at about a 90° angle at 60° north latitude.

The nearness of the climbs, the informality, the fabulous view, the beautiful vegetation among the sheer rock formations, the milder climate—all make it natural to go climbing rather often. In summertime, one *may* go climbing several times during the day, being away each time for a couple of hours or less. (Daylight is from 3 A.M. to 10 P.M.)

In short, climbing is normally integrated into life at Tvergastein, but it is a sort of climbing that differs from the risk- and competition-colored image of climbing propagated by the mass media.

Tvergastein Amateur Research

It is difficult to separate unimportant biographical details from an adequate biographical description. The main thing is that a favored place relentlessly and remorselessly determines details of one's life. It may enrich

life, but it may also lead to a manifold of habits and ways of thinking that are peculiar and a source of irritation to anybody not adapted to that special life. I find that attachment to places should not be uncritically praised.

In contrast to some of my ecosophically inclined friends, I do not regard science, and above all, research, as incompatible with profound positive feelings toward nature. Tvergastein as "object" of botanical, zoological, mineralogical, meteorological, and other scientific research did not at all detract from the immediate experience of togetherness, of identification and appreciation. On the contrary. In the great naturalist tradition, exemplified by systematics (taxonomy) of butterflies, the motivation is not mainly cognitive, but conative. Feelings, just as much as abstract thinking, direct the research.

In Einstein's scientific thinking, very different from that of a typical naturalist, the external world as a field of lifelong research was essentially nonpersonal. Its very impersonal character in part determined his strong motivation as a scientist:

It is quite clear to me that the religious paradise of youth, which was thus lost, was a first attempt to free myself from the chains of the "merely-personal," from an existence which is dominated by wishes, hopes and primitive feelings.

Out yonder there was this huge world, which exists independently of us human beings and which stands before us like a great, eternal riddle, at least partially accessible to our inspection and thinking. The contemplation of this world beckoned like a liberation, and I soon noticed that many a man whom I had learned to esteem and to admire had found inner freedom and security in devoted occupation with it.

(Schilpp 1949: 5)

This way of liberation leads to abstract thinking and imagination of a special kind: "[A]ll our thinking is of this nature of a free play with concepts; the justification for this play lies in the measure of survey over the experience of the senses which we are able to achieve with its aid" (ibid.).

The way of liberation through "natural history" is different: very little abstract thinking, very much seeing, listening, hearing, touching. The secondary and especially the tertiary qualities are in focus, the world of concrete contents, not the primary as in physics.² There are worlds of minerals, rocks, rivers and tiny rivulets, plants, hardly visible or big (larger than 1 centimeter) animals, plant or animal societies, tiny or great ecosystems—all more or less easily available for enjoyment, study, and contemplation.

The meaningfulness inherent in even the tiniest living beings makes the amateur naturalist quiver with emotion. There is communication: the “things” express, talk, proclaim—without words. Within a few meters of the gnarled wooden walls of Tvergastein cottage are rich and diverse changing worlds big enough to be entirely unsurveyable.

When I was only fifteen years old, I met among the highest mountains of Norway, Jotunheimen, the paleontologist Johan Kiær. He was eager to talk about his exciting search for fossils in Svalbard (Spitsbergen). Clearly, he was engaged emotionally, describing how groups of animals trapped in ash from volcanic eruptions sought to be together in death. He was *yearning* for closer understanding of evolution. Two years later, in Norway's biggest library, I found thick volumes with beautiful drawings of one-celled organisms. Evidently scientists were the only persons who really loved nature and life, with the smallest forms being taken care of with unbelievable accuracy! Poets, in contrast, appreciated only a small fraction of living beings. It took decades to rid myself of this illusion about scientists, and to understand that what I had admired was found among only a small minority of them.

At Tvergastein I could wholeheartedly engage in amateurish research. Collections of stones could be seen at the Tvergastein petrographical institute; a few quartz crystals and other items formed its mineralogical institute. Thanks to low indoor temperatures and poor ventilation, the institute of fungiology (mycology) had several branches. Temperatures in the kitchen in winter were below freezing, which resulted in interesting glacial formations down the walls. Glaciological institute! Hundreds of questions were formed; few were answered. This intensified wonder. This state of mind plus appreciation of the richness and diversity of phenomena within reach seems to be an essential trait of free research—however amateurish.

To develop a taste and appreciation for what there is enough of—this has always been a pillar of ecosophical education. With growing insight into the “limits of growth,” that is, growth of material production and interference, this educational motto becomes ever more important. With this introductory note I shall describe more closely a new branch of amateur research—Tvergastein chemistry.

With the kerosene lamp on my work table it was practicable to heat chemical solutions above the lamp and in clear view. The smooth waves of colors in never-repeated variety cannot but make a profound impression on

anyone willing to spend a little time in this occupation. In short, the most elementary chemical processes reveal a fascinating world. Tvergastein chemistry requires very few raw materials, very little heating. Boiling of more than a few seconds is prohibited because the room has little ventilation. Gases must be under strict control. So "the game" has rules that conform to strict ecosophical norms. There is one, and only one, *main* Tvergastein method of making exciting new chemical substances: mixing two substances that are soluble in water, with the more or less well founded hope that a certain new nonsoluble substance will appear. It is, however, somewhat difficult to obtain fairly pure substances straight from nature. The valuable self-reliance of the Tvergastein institute of chemistry was severely undercut after a talk with the president of Oslo University, who happens to be a chemist. Hearing my concern about self-made, very impure chemicals at Tvergastein, he naturally was delighted to help create the new branch of (amateur) chemistry by offering me free access to the resources of pure chemicals at his own institute. A helping hand from one institute to another!

Compromise and inconsistency! Consider, for example, the 25 grams of bismuth trichloride I acquired—enough for twenty-five experiments at the level of Tvergastein ecological resource utilization, but presumably made by one of the worst gigantic chemical-factory polluters along the Rhine. I supported the poisoning of this magnificent river and added a little to the North Sea! Worse still, the stuff had from an amateur point of view a ridiculously high level of purity. The impurity from arsenic, for example, was *guaranteed* to be less than one in a million. This implies that a great deal of energy from coal or gas had been used in a series of wasteful operations aimed at cleaning the substance of any kind of impurities whatsoever. Anyhow, such chemicals are far removed from nature: from cliffs to stones, from stones to minerals, from minerals to abstracts some of which are not found in free nature at all. There is nothing "wrong" about such new substances, but we may note the distance of their study from that of a consistent naturalist.

Whatever the inconsistencies, the Tvergastein chemistry is an example of something of central importance in rich industrial societies: to assist youth in the warm *appreciation* and understanding of basic natural processes such as beautiful solutions, the miraculous transformation of one substance

into others, the re-creation of thousands of beautiful colors and dyes. Those who are offered the opportunity for such experiences are changed, their life quality enhanced. They can live with less dependence on what there is *not* enough of for all.

Unfortunately, the large-scale realization of ecoeducation requires a new politics, a green politics, a politics that does not systematically favor people who concentrate mainly on getting more of what there is not enough of.

Taking naturalist science and research, professional or amateur, as the paradigm of science and research, ecosophies may without inconsistency hail these human undertakings. It is counterproductive, I think, to make *science* and *research* into negative terms, dyslogisms. There are from the amateur naturalist-researcher's point of view immense opportunities at Tvergastein, as at other places. Research fits in with the conception of a Personal Place.

What can we learn from each other? Can tragic developments be avoided? The classic case of belonging to a place is that of being born and raised somewhere—somewhere just in the geographical sense—and then the place develops into the Place. When the place is physically destroyed or unfit for living because of other factors, can a different place develop into the Place? Certainly it can, and that is what happened for me with the Tvergastein area. The same will happen to many people in the future—they experience a longing and a satisfaction that elicits such utterances as “Here I belong!” It may even happen that there are two places to which we are drawn, and a conscious choice is possible. In such cases, certainly one thing can be inferred on the basis of my experience at Tvergastein: choose what has a reasonable chance of also being satisfactory to a life companion and to close friends. Don't choose the place that is so particular that that chance is small. Furthermore, don't choose the place where there is little chance that you yourself will be capable of mastering it when you reach an advanced age. Then it is not a place where you can live and die. Tvergastein is extreme in many ways and unfit for many purposes. The development of a hut and life there could only be more or less tragic, but even so it is difficult for those of us who have a place where we feel we belong not to be glad and grateful to have one. Why so? That is difficult to say.

Some Ethical Considerations with a View to Mountaineering in Norway

Norway is one of the few areas of Europe in which unspoiled mountain regions may still be found. I feel that climbing in such areas should be regarded as a privilege. When industry and organized “welfare tourism” are let loose on nature, visitors to the areas touched will be robbed of the special delights that only an original wilderness can offer. Those who are privileged to experience the unique qualities of a nature still bearing no marks of human activity are given a special obligation—an obligation to those coming after them (who may be themselves on the next tour). If they feel this privilege, their conduct should be colored accordingly.

I may be accused of regarding the “plain” rock masses of my country as precious gold. The accusation will be accepted. It is a view that for years some of us have been trying to impress on our politicians, power engineers, and promoters of commercial tourism as something other than absurd or hysterical. Most people, if asked, would even deny that gold—or electricity, or cars—were values *in themselves* to them, *in contrast to* the range of deep and personal experiences a visit to a wilderness area may call forth.

It is not a good thing in itself that a peak is climbed—rather the opposite, since the mountains belong to the last remnants of nature not completely subjugated by man through exploration, charting, and utilization. Unknown territory is a source of inspiration that I would be sorry to see completely lost.

To protect mountain areas, then, is part of general wilderness preservation. From this follow such norms for the climber as that he should limit as

This article was translated and edited from an original draft by Sigmund Kvaløy. Reprinted with permission from *The Alpine Journal* (London: The Alpine Club) (1969): 230–33.

much as possible the amount of gear and rubbish left behind during climbs and while camping, and even have it in his mind to minimize scars made on rock surfaces ("Avoid signs revealing your visit!" may serve as a slogan here). Speaking generally, we could say that his actions should be as little noticeable as possible. This formulation is here made to cover, in addition, the related ideal of minimizing the use of "artificial aid" (without loss of safety) at any moment of the climb ("Pursue simplicity of method!"), as well as the ideal of avoiding all unnecessary (unmusical!) sound while in the mountains ("Seek noiseless conduct!").

Behavior observant of wilderness preservation may profitably be viewed as aiming at protecting for the individual (the next visitor) his possibilities for freedom, solitude, and concentration on nature in its original form.

From this perspective, the value of guides and publicity for new areas is limited. The delights in finding the way by oneself should not be destroyed through an unlimited and indiscriminate publication of detailed itinerary and communications information. Climbing guides circulated among those who already take a special interest in the sport and the areas described are an entirely different matter. To help *one* person get a full and personal experience of unspoiled mountain nature is more important than to open up new areas to a hundred looking only for new excitements and stronger spice, or a new spectacular collection for their photo albums, or a boost in esteem among their fellow men—in short, people who lack the ability to linger, to experience their visit as a value in itself.

Let us at least write and publish our guides with this in mind. What we write, how we publish, are factors open to great variation even if the subject on the surface appears to be the same. The result is dependent on our different goals. Those goals, and the consequences of what we do, should be made as clear as possible.

Those whose intention it is to do climbs of value measured by the ideal standards of the sport, should feel a special responsibility to the sport's traditions and its future. The way guides are published is within this field of responsibility. A further point to remember is that delight in experiencing nature and in its exploration—traditionally valued highly by mountaineers—should entail an attitude of keeping mountaineering from being a competitive sport. This goes for competition among individuals as well as

among nations. On a practical level, the impossibility of comparing achievements, on account of differences in weather conditions and in the use of technical aids, contributes to holding the competitive element in check.

All the same, mountain climbing challenges one's physical condition and requires earnestness of purpose and perseverance, of the individual and the team. It is natural that the individual seeks to improve his physical achievements. Instead of competing with others, one may say that the climber competes with himself, and the individual rope team with its earlier achievements. Further, since an achievement in climbing has so many dimensions, and many of these are unsuitable for objective measuring, only the individual or the team will be in a position to judge what is progress and what is retrogression.

I have mentioned responsibility in the area of publicity. Besides writing guides, climbers often tell stories of particular eventful climbs, since what a certain person experienced during an ascent is often of interest to others. It should be kept in mind, however, that neither the sport as it exists today nor the recruitment of new climbers in the future is well served by distorted renderings of such experiences given for publicity effect or in the interest of commercial tourism. Because climbing teams often get into great financial difficulties in planning arduous and lengthy ascents, we have often tolerated descriptions and publicity that are unworthy, measured by the ideals of the sport, and that are also at direct variance with the cause of wilderness preservation. As for Norway, however, we are in the lucky position such that ventures leading to economic difficulties of this kind are among the rare exceptions. One always has the option of borrowing equipment from the various mountaineering organizations.

A major part of Norway consists of precipices and ridges. So far, only a very small part of the population has realized how rich a source of physical and spiritual joy and rejuvenation is represented here. In the future thousands more may be introduced to the sport and, through that, to moments of a fuller inner life in *co-action* with nature. This development will be greatly retarded if what is said and done under the eyes of the public is not guided by responsibility toward the sport, the cause of nature preservation, and the individual. Alternatively, we may see an unhealthy concentration on goals consisting of doing difficult and risky things, keeping away those

who have a genuine love for the high country but no motivation for cragsmanship of the most extreme sort. There is, however, nothing in the nature of mountaineering prohibitive to its development along lines similar to those of the sport of skiing. By choosing equipment carefully and by observing a slow progression in the degree of difficulty, one need not encounter any of the dangers that would make it correct to label climbing a very dangerous sport. Cross-country ski touring is comparable to touring on foot in the mountains: no special effort is made either to avoid or to seek out precipices or sharp ridges, and climbing and glacier crossing at intervals are welcomed as part of the total experience.

Through publicity focusing on the objective and impersonal marks of achievements, that is, reports of particular peaks that have been climbed or routes that have been mastered, those who take up climbing are brought to overlook the most important factor in choosing climbs of a particular difficulty: one's own stamina, form, and experience from earlier tours, the stamina, form, and experience of one's companions, and the climatic conditions at the time the tour is to be undertaken. Efforts and performances and the quality level of the sport in general are intimately connected to a correct choice here. Only through a well-advised choice in these respects will there be a basis for satisfying what should be considered one of the first norms of climbing if responsibility is felt to the ethical standard and future development of the sport: that a margin of safety be kept up for the duration of any type of climb.

Well, I am sorry to be so "prophetical" in tone here. Dishing out dos and don'ts is a nuisance. In earlier climbing history, a stern-faced erection of guideposts would have been ill advised, but as wilderness areas diminish, the crowds gather, and as the publicity angle gains in accepted importance, something of this nature seems easier to defend. My concern, after all, is that future generations will be given a chance to have experiences of the kind that have meant much to me during years of nosing around on the more jagged features of Norway's rocky faces.

Modesty and the Conquest of Mountains

There are many ways of *experiencing* mountains. I would rather assert, however, that mountains have innumerable aspects or, even better, that the term *mountain* may be used to designate vastly different entities. What I describe in what follows are *mountains*. They are connected with what other people call mountains through some sort of interpersonal, social structure, a marvelous common frame of reference. Thus I may *locate* the mountains I speak about, may give details about the minerals of which they are said to consist, may even discuss their age—all this without getting into trouble with identification. The common frame of reference, however, is *not* the mountains themselves—not the mountains *I know*. The motive here for trying to describe mountains as I know them is not the rather indifferent detail that *I* know them, but that many others know them the same way but do not always or consistently act upon their knowledge.

Now what *are* they?

The words I use must come as an anticlimax, perhaps. They are very common words, they are crude, and only the reader's intense willingness to go along with me can help me convey what I know.

Mountains are big, very big, but they are also great. Very great. They have dignity and other aspects of greatness.

They are solid, stable, unmoving. A Sanskrit word for them is *a-ga*, that which does not go. Curiously enough, though, there are lots of move-

This article was reprinted with permission from *Earth First! Journal* (November 1, 1990): 30. It first appeared in *The Mountain Spirit*, edited by Michael C. Tobias and Harold Drasdo (New York: Overlook Press, 1979), 13–16.

ments in them. Thus, a ridge is sometimes ascending; there is a strong upward movement, perhaps broken with spires and towers but resuming the upward trend, toward the sky or even toward heaven. The ridge or contour not only has movement up and up, but may point upward, may invite elevation.

When we are climbing a mountain, it may witness our behavior with a somewhat remote or mild benevolence. The mountain never fights against us, and it will hold back avalanches as long as it can, but sometimes human stupidity and hubris and a lack of intimate feeling for the environment result in human catastrophes—that is, catastrophes for mothers, fathers, wives, children, and friends. (The climbers themselves die in a way that I cannot class as catastrophic.)

So much for mountain appreciation and worship, or the cult of mountains. Many people may have similar sentiments but perhaps will not feel the same way about mountain people. On the other hand, there are many who basically feel the same way about mountain people but have no tendency toward mountain worship. This may perhaps be most simply explained through a short account of my own first encounter with mountain people.

When I was fifteen years old, I managed through sheer persistence of appeals to travel alone in early June to the highest mountain region of Norway—Jotunheimen. At the foot of the mountain, I was stopped by deep rotten snow and could find nowhere to sleep. Eventually, I came across a very old man who was engaged in digging away the snow surrounding and in part covering a closed cottage belonging to an association for mountaineering and tourism. We stayed together for a week in a tiny nearby hut. So far as I can remember, we ate only one dish: oatmeal porridge with dry bread. The porridge had been stored in the snow from the previous autumn—that is what I thought the old man said. Later, I came to doubt it, to believe that I had misunderstood him. The porridge was served cold, and if any tiny bit was left over on my plate, he would eat it. In the evenings he talked incidentally about mountains, about reindeer, about hunting and other occupations in the highest regions. Mostly, though, he played the violin. It was part of the local culture to mark the rhythm with the feet, and he would not give up trying to make me capable of joining

him in this. How difficult it was! The old man's rhythms seemed more complex than anything I had ever heard.

The effect of this week, along with similar experiences later, established my conviction of an inner relation between mountains and mountain people: a certain greatness, a cleanness, a concentration on what is essential, a self-sufficiency; and consequently a disregard of luxury, of complicated means of all kinds. From the outside, the mountain way of life seemed spartan, rough, and rigid, but the playing of the violin and the obvious fondness for all things above the timberline, living or "dead," bore witness to a rich, sensual attachment to life, a deep pleasure in what can be experienced with wide-open eyes and mind.

It is unnecessary to add that local mountain cultures are incompatible with those that are cosmopolitan and urban. The intrusion of new values and lifestyles rapidly undermines the alpine culture. In the Himalayas, individual Sherpas and their families have enhanced their wealth and status through expeditions, but their communities and culture have suffered unduly. Their great festivals and religious life are fading. There is, however, some cult of mountains still remaining. Thus, Tserigma (Gauri Sankar) is still worshiped. When we suggested to the Sherpas of Beding, beneath Tserigma, that they might like to have its fabulous peaks protected from "conquests" and big expeditions, they responded with enthusiasm. A special meeting was announced, and the families voted unanimously to ask the central authorities in Kathmandu to refuse permission for climbing expeditions to Tserigma. Gönden, the leader of Beding, walked all the way to Kathmandu to contact the administration.

In Nepal, though, as in so many other countries far away, local communities have little chance of being heard. The Sherpas would not mind "losing" the money they could earn from expeditions to Tserigma, but central administrations do not think the same way. As is to be expected, the great alpine clubs the world over have largely ignored Gönden's initiative. Perhaps the organizers of expeditions tend to think that mountains, being great stone heaps, need no "protection" and that the "enlightened" Sherpas certainly would *tolerate* their climbing friends going anywhere. They are in part right, but I do not think we should in this case make use of their tolerance.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PLACE: AT HOME IN THE MOUNTAINS

These reflections are supposed to serve the idea of modesty—modesty in human relationships with mountains and with mountain people. As I see it, modesty is of little value if it is not a natural consequence of much deeper feelings and, even more important in our special context, a consequence of a way of understanding ourselves as part of nature in a wide sense of the term. This way is such that the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared with the mountain, the nearer we come to participating in its greatness. I do not know why this is so.

The South Wall of Tirich Mir East

Tirich Mir, in northern Pakistan, is the name not only of a mountain with two main peaks, but also of a mountain massif. The massif resembles an octopus, the head of which comprises the twin peaks of 25,263 and 25,237 feet, while the tapering tentacles are mountain ridges with peaks of 24,564, 24,076, 23,150, and 22,237 feet and down to 15,000 feet. Like the tentacles of an octopus, these ridges curve from side to side, but unlike tentacles, they divide into lateral ridges. From the town of Chitral three main ridges are visible, but naturally only the very highest: the South Ridge (more correctly, the Southwest Ridge), which we reached at a height of 23,000 feet in 1950 and followed to the summit at 25,263 feet; the Southeast Ridge, which I visited in 1949 at 20,000 feet; and the East Ridge, so far unvisited. The last-named ridge runs in an unbroken line from approximately 18,000 feet to the top, hence the impressive, although not very steep, appearance of the east profile. If we include the long ridges leading up to the twin summits, the Tirich Mir Massif covers about one hundred square miles. Apart from the two highest peaks, the area includes about fifteen other peaks of more than 20,000 feet.¹

The second-highest peak in the Tirich Mir Massif, 25,237 feet, unclimbed until 1964 and dazzlingly beautiful, towers up, as seen from the south, immediately above the South Barum Glacier, its distinctive feature being a tremendous wall of rock reaching up to the very summit. There are also ice fields in the wall, but more rock than usual at that height. From about 17,200 feet it rises sheer to the southeast summit ridge. The wall is

This article was reprinted with permission from *Himalayan Journal*, no. 26 (1965): 97–106.

more than a mile wide and 8,000 feet high. In short, it is an unusually large rock precipice, even by Himalayan standards.

In 1950 I reached the highest summit of Tirich Mir. Why did I set out for the neighboring summit, which is 26 feet lower, in 1964? Actually, the aim of the 1964 expedition was not to reach a summit. The aim was to explore the possibility of continuous, sustained technical rock climbs at very high altitudes.

Long ribs were rejected because of excessive wind. Rock walls with hanging glaciers above, sending enormous ice boulders down at irregular intervals, were out of the question. After inspecting hundreds of pictures of walls, I decided that, after all, the South Wall of Tirich Mir East was the most suitable. Thus, the good old friend of Norwegian expeditions, Tirich Mir, was again selected as the object of athletics and devotion.²

Owing to the smoothness and high angle of the wall, there is no hanging glacier—actually no glacier at all—on the south face of Tirich East. On the other hand, the angle of ice fields makes it difficult for new snow to keep quiet. During heavy snowfall, small avalanches will sweep down practically everywhere.

In 1950 we tried out the easiest route on Tirich Mir; in 1964 we looked for the most difficult. There was, however, also a difference of expedition philosophy from the expeditions of 1949 (the reconnaissance) and 1950: I was determined to judge the expedition a failure if the members were not happy practically all the time, and if the exertions were not within the margin of that of competitive athletic games. That is, one could “give one’s all,” but without imperiling values such as life (including toes) and aesthetic enjoyment.³

The adventure should be such that there would be no alien pressures (naturalism, heroism, romanticization of death, dread of not reaching the summit, and so on). In short, what ultimately mattered should be the way of life during the expedition, not an abstract concept, such as physical presence at a definite point—that of 25,237 feet in our case.

Whether an easygoing expedition, with unfailing high spirits and peace of mind, can be carried out or not depends essentially on the team. I was lucky to have a team ideally suited for the endeavor: three young civil engineers, Anders Opdal (age 26), Ralph Høibakk (26), and Per Vigerust (31), with very impressive and convincing lists of climbs in the Alps and in Nor-

way. Number four was a man with indispensable qualities to us: Kjell Friis Baastad (48), a doctor, accomplished climber, especially on ice, professional iglooist, and equipment specialist. These are surface qualifications. Picked out to travel halfway around the world and climb one of the giants among mountains, they were overmotivated—from *the* moment the mountains could be seen far above the horizon of minor peaks, they were eager to exert themselves beyond sensible considerations or the bare necessities to keep the project moving.

The “duty to be happy” seemed rather strange and paradoxical to the young expedition members. Their exuberant minds did, however, possess qualities that made the satisfaction of the severe norm possible and even likely. I shall limit myself to mentioning only one of the ways we used to live up to the norm. During expeditions in the Himalayas there is a constant exhibition of extreme manliness without the extra impetus. Per Vigerust acted in a “soft” way and gave vent to all kinds of anxieties (without *ever* really undermining the necessary efforts): “This tower looks ugly and may overturn at any time. And I am tired and hungry! Enough for today, let us have a grand meal!” When he said something like that, we could turn on him furiously, insisting that no tower could be more beautiful, that it is grand to take certain risks, that we had never felt less tired and more uninterested in food. We might even add that just for the sake of good comradeship we would give in and take the big meal. Thus, we were led to feel how strong and daring we were, instead of taking it for granted and risking demoralizing frustrations. Owing to the exceptional resourcefulness of the actors, the drama of contrasting comfortable safety and manly endurance went on day after day.

The team left Norway early in May and arrived at the small airport at Chitral town on May 16. We were greeted most touchingly by old friends from 1949 and 1950.

Abdul Karim, our youngest porter in 1950—he was then only 17 years old—undertook to administer our travel to the mountain from Chitral town; our wise old friend Government Treasurer Wazir Ali Shah helped us in innumerable ways; and Prince Burhanuddin entertained us in his royal, cordial way.

Base Camp was placed at Shokor Shal (“sugar shed”) at 10,000 feet, just

below the tip of South Barum Glacier. All through July we helped the porters carry equipment and provisions to Advance Base, 17,200 feet, directly under the Southeast Ridge, and scaled seven peaks surrounding South Barum Glacier. There are still some left over! Our aim was to obtain maximum physical fitness, so that we could hope to negotiate the wall without reaching complete exhaustion. It was evident that the climbing would be of a technical kind that would demand perfect balance—also on the way down—so it was a “duty” to store up reserves of strength.

The most beautiful peak we climbed during our training period we named Owir VII (about 18,700 feet), or better, Nidaros Cathedral, after Norway’s most famous cathedral. Ralph and Anders climbed it by moonlight and discovered that what seemed to be a summit snow cone was mainly a cone of steely-hard blue ice with a sprinkling of sugar snow.

The peaks south of South Barum Glacier we named Owir I–IX. Owir I has an old name, Ausher (17,333 feet), and had been climbed before. The peaks and spires along the ridge north of the glacier we named Utshanzo I–V. We did not get beyond the first one in this rocky chain!

Skiing was excellent and our young, very sports-minded liaison officer, Lieutenant Sabir Kamal, was introduced to the enjoyments of downhill racing. We were lucky to have in our company this faithful, well-balanced, kind companion, who was looked up to and respected also by all our Chitral porters, including our dangerously intelligent and strong cook, Mohammed Hussein.

Our belief that we could successfully climb the South Wall was based on three postulates: (1) All through July there would be only scant snowfall on the wall. Our fingers would rest on dry holds. (2) The lower half of the wall, from 17,200 to 21,000 feet, would be less steep than the upper, permitting the climbers to bring six hundred pounds of equipment and food halfway in a week’s climb. (3) The “explosion avalanches” would not reach the gigantic scale of 1950, but be of the more moderate 1949 volume and speed. We knew very well that some or all of these postulates might turn out to be false, making the plan impossible to carry out or too risky (that is, beyond the range of “good sport”).

The first postulate was undermined by Abdul Karim, who could tell us that in 1962 an American expedition led by Professor Knauth had been

forced to turn back because of great snowfall lasting a whole week in the middle of July. They had tried a second ascension of Tirich Mir West along the route we had used in 1950. Abdul Karim could point out the highest camp (at about 20,500 feet) where he had stayed several nights alone with his sahib. The porters could also point out the spot from which Fritz Stammerger, who tried for the summit alone, was helped down. It is quite clear that the East Ridge *may* yield to a solitary well-experienced climber, but the ridge is long and requires many well-equipped camps. To have reached 21,000 feet on the South Ridge is quite a feat, but using skis—as Stammerger apparently was trying to do—on the ridge (without crampons underneath!) seems out of the question or at least pointless.

The postulate about excellent weather in July rested on “all available data,” but, alas, little had been available even in the old reports of the Indian Survey. One week of snow was enough to turn the odds against us.

To keep our nerves cool and to prevent us from starting the climb of the South Wall before the July sun had made snow on holds and in cracks evaporate, all through June we observed a “no entrance” order: we did not permit ourselves to go near the wall or touch it.

I broke this (self-made) order on June 30 when I was alone in Advance Base Camp, tested the second postulate, and learned that it was false. The lower half of the wall proved very steep indeed, starting with excellent hard, smooth rock. One might for the sake of beauty and elegance start to climb straight up the rocks—but a less time-consuming transport route had to be found.

On July 2—alone again—I made a discovery very much relevant to postulate 3, until then verified most encouragingly.

On the morning of July 2, I discovered a thin layer of chalk-white new snow all over the glacier—a sure sign that a big explosion avalanche had occurred. A few words must be said about some of the special features of Tirich Mir that make it necessary to keep a considerable distance from the lower half of a line drawn from the Col between the West and East summits.

Snow from fields just west of the wall, many square miles in size, tends to avalanche into a tremendous trough, over the brink of a great hanging glacier and farther down between windswept cliffs. Long before reaching the surface of South Barum Glacier, the advancing masses become airborne and turn into a snowstorm radiation 360° from a center. Exact measure-

ments in the Alps of such storms give the values 70–100 kilometers per hour as the speed of turbulent snow particles inside the widening ball of the storm. People are killed by the air pressure at an appreciable distance from the center of the “explosion.” In 1950 tremendous avalanches of this kind flattened our tents, which were placed far away from the explosion center.

The thin layer of powdery snow that had settled over the area on July 2 suggested that the “season” of big explosion avalanches had started. This meant that postulate 3 might turn out to be a half-truth.

The conclusion was inevitable. There could be no more lighthearted mountaineering on surrounding peaks. It was time for an immediate assault on the wall itself.

From July 7 to July 10 we managed to carry about five hundred pounds up the “Diagonal,” a steeply rising system of ledges and cracks, partly packed with snow, to the magnificent site of a first camp on the wall, at about 19,600 feet. It was sheltered by overhanging rock, carved out of the snow, and just wide enough so that small tents might be placed in a row. With fixed ropes all the way, we thought it justifiable to have Abdul Karim and another very good, cheerful porter, Safdul Karim, with us.

Three times during our struggles under heavy loads on the Diagonal, explosion avalanches reached us. Secured with our ice axes, we flattened ourselves on the snow. Mouth and nose were covered with our mittens to prevent ice dust from penetrating the lungs. We waited in the screaming inferno, ice- and snow-crystals clogging us down. The whole thing lasted only a few seconds, and then it was over. Shouted questions and answers soon established that no one was hurt. Only a few pairs of sunglasses were blown away. The shock waves did not reach as far as the tents. Clearly, the “explosion season” was under way, but we concluded that the dimensions of the avalanches were still not such that further advance was inadvisable.

After some days of reorganization and recuperation, we were on July 15 ready to start on the next stage of the South Wall, from Camp 5 up to the “Integral,” an S-shaped snow formation where we considered Camp 6 should be placed. Meanwhile, Camp 5 was now complete, with two two-man tents and ample provisions. Climbing above Camp 5 was magnificent, mostly of degree III or IV, but with two five-degree chimneys. Ropes were

fixed for about three hundred yards above the camp. This was exactly the kind of work we had asked for: real rock climbing on excellent hard rock.

Alas, the sky clouded over and large snowflakes began to fall, covering everything—our equipment, our tents, ourselves. As though in response to a shouted order, a new world now sprang into life: avalanches of dry snow thundered or rushed past us in every direction. Thick clouds of dust enveloped us, rendering visibility still worse. Only ten yards away a *continuous* river of dry snow flowed down. It was like the sound of an endless freight train rumbling by.

Retreat from above Camp 5 was a little too exciting. Kjell and Ralph played a sort of hide-and-seek with the avalanches. After a while they realized that certain types of small avalanches could be expected at regular intervals. Now and again they stood still, waiting till “the next avalanches” had passed. This worked excellently, but afterward they made no bones about the nerve-racking moments they had endured.

Just before they arrived, Kjell, who had moved up diagonally across a ravine, saw a new snow avalanche heading straight for them. He let out a warning yell, and Ralph, who was at the bottom of the ravine, flattened himself against the side. The snow poured over him, but he managed to hang on, and they were able to continue the last few yards down to the tents of Camp 5.

Next day we made a general retreat. There was plenty of food in Camp 5, but the main point was to ensure that no one stayed on in Camp 5, merely consuming its stocks of food needlessly. We just had to get down to Advance Base, Camp 4.

Finally, on July 20, the fifth consecutive day of snow, the overcast split up. Climbing was impossible, however, until the snow had settled a little and most of it had slithered off.

We knew from experience that the South Wall lacks the kind of system of ribs and corners that makes avalanches select definite courses, which climbers can then avoid during heavy snowfalls. A second fall of snow would have far worse consequences than the five-day snowfall we had just witnessed, as it would surprise us while we were making our assault on the summit, thousands of feet above sheltered camps. Would the only safe solution be to leave the South Wall, carry the most vital of our four hundred pounds of equipment from Camp 5, and set about establishing camps on

the Southeast Ridge as an alternative? Certainly, this choice would not provide us with an easy access to the top, in fact, the route had some steep rock faces between 20,000 and 21,300 feet. Higher up, on the other hand, it looked as if we should literally have to wade in snow.

There seemed to be an obvious either-or: to continue scaling the South Wall despite the danger, or to accept the much longer, but probably comparatively safe, climb along the Southeast Ridge.

After all the work on the South Wall, it was terribly tempting to continue here. It was obvious that this was the more popular alternative with all members of the party. Would it be possible to find a plan, a method of carrying it out, that would be defensible? I, who to a certain extent had the greatest responsibility, found it difficult to reach a decision, but after long and careful deliberation I decided that if an assault on the summit were undertaken in such a manner that the smallest possible number of climbers remained, for as short a time as possible, on the stretches where avalanching was likely to occur, then it could be defended. Briefly stated, this would involve every member of the party starting from Camp 4 (17,200 feet), two without any loads, and the other three with the maximum possible loads. (Sabir Kamal, Abdul, and Safdul could not be included.) At 21,000 feet (Camp 6) the two who had climbed without loads and so had energy to spare would spend the night, leave a depot behind, and then continue on up, heavily laden, the next day. The other three would simply deposit their loads in Camp 6 and then descend as quickly as possible to the rest station, where they would be ready to come to the assistance of the two making the assault, should misfortune befall them.

Even though everyone was considered capable of making the final assault, the choice was not difficult. During the last few weeks Anders and Ralph had shown just that extra degree of enthusiasm, and both had made themselves go through special training to perfect a technique for advancing *as quickly as possible*. Whatever might be said to advance the claims of the others, the conclusion was never in doubt: Anders and Ralph were to constitute the "top team," and the other three would act as their slaves.

The five days of blitz attack—three days to the summit from Advance Base, two days down—were without a dull moment.

The first day we reestablished Camp 5. Masses of snow had buried it just as surely as Pompeii was buried by the disastrous eruption of Vesuvius.

The "summit princes" neither carried anything nor exhausted themselves at the task of working up the path through the sea of powdery snow.

The second day started at 4 A.M., when I carried additional rope from Advance Base to Camp 5. The next stage started at 9 A.M., when we all climbed from Camp 5 to the Integral, Camp 6, where the summit team was placed in a tent and the rest of us went down to Camp 5, arriving late at night. This day's effort resulted in a well-stocked camp at 21,000 feet, harboring two men who so far during "the blitz" had no days of extreme exertion behind them.

The three of us who were acting as slaves were happy, but exhausted from tremendous rucksacks with food and clothing for the "privileged." We had done our indispensable share.

On the third day, the summit team worked their way up ice fields. The ice being very hard, they discovered that ordinary belaying would make it impossible to reach 23,000 feet in less than two days. They, therefore, advanced unroped, ascending for the most part through kicking the front pair of the crampon spikes into the ice, but sometimes "walking French" to relieve the strain on the leg muscles. At 23,000 feet they camped, "weighted down with a sense of paralyzing weariness" according to their report.

Considering the requirements of both happiness and balance, this state of mind and body meant that our rules had been broken, but the report also reveals their tremendous consumption of food of all sorts. My conclusion is that they, after all, could not have been too tired.

They had brought with them fifty pounds each (plus extra rope), which should make it possible for them to stay covered and to eat for ten days in the event of a prolonged snowstorm. The fact that they managed this load well somewhat balances the negative impression that their unropedness must leave in our mind.

On the fourth day, because of the time factor, they continued along ice grooves instead of switching to rock climbing. Five days on the wall had been put down as a maximum stay considering the threat of more snowfalls. This consideration then, in the end, precluded the realization of our main mountaineering aim: a more or less continuous rock climb from 17,200 to 25,200 feet.

Having "gone all out," the summit team arrived at the Southeast Ridge at 2 P.M., and at the summit itself at 3 P.M. The ridge proved in part

to be extremely narrow, but they encountered no technical difficulties. At 7 P.M. they were back in their well-stocked camp at 23,000 feet, firing green rockets, one of which was seen among the clouds by our two valiant porters at the foot of the wall.

Having observed the summit team descend, we who had remained below at once started stocking a depot of food and ropes on the Southeast Ridge above Advance Base, with a view to helping those of us who had not yet had the chance of reaching the summit try for it along this relatively safe and broad ridge. Again, time prevented us from doing what we most wished. We found that we would have to return as soon as possible to our native country, keeping dates set by our professional duties, developing films, writing the book promised our creditors, and so on. This decision was a great disappointment first of all to our magnificent, fruitful companions Sabir Kamal and Abdul Karim. It is our hope that they soon get the opportunity with another expedition to go "all the way."

Our conclusion might be formulated thus: the severe norm "You should be happy and have peace of mind" may easily lead to returns without reaching a summit, but it does not rule out great efforts being made and, if sufficient time for training and slow altitude acclimatization is secured, does not preclude the successful climbing of walls of rock and ice of the South Wall dimension. As regards this particular wall, however, one must have a July with weather as it was in 1949 and 1950—practically cloudless. Only then might one peacefully negotiate cliff after cliff from the glacier level to the summit rocks. We wish good luck to those who feel they would like to try.

VI

SPINOZA AND GANDHI AS
INSPIRATION FOR DEEP ECOLOGY

Spinoza and Attitudes Toward Nature

This paper is not a report on pure research but on research in the service of the deep, philosophically oriented international ecology movement. More specifically, it takes seriously the thesis that in the long run our strange human species can avoid major crises only if the attitudes toward nature prevalent in the industrial states are changed. A key term today in so-called green philosophy and politics is *society in dynamic ecological equilibrium*. This thesis maintains that one of the necessary conditions of ensuring a “soft landing” in such a society is change of dominant attitudes.

I am concerned with how to achieve a soft landing without dictatorship or other immense catastrophes. Near-equilibrium might be obtainable through harsh dictatorship, by using ecological experts and *forcing* changes of economic and other policies upon a world populace that has no regard for nature except as a realm of resources for human beings.

A salutary change might develop without much philosophical reflection. There is, however, a chance that some of us, in our capacity as academic philosophers, might contribute in a modest way to such a change by pointing to *philosophies of nature that are in harmony with a sane ecopolitical outlook*.

Some have pointed to Friedrich Schelling, others to other philosophers. I point to Spinoza.¹ This is not because I think his extremely complex views can be conveyed to large numbers of people today, or even be thoroughly understood by a small, learned minority. The availability of Spinoza's thought is limited today, but his personal appeal is immense and practically universal among all who study philosophy.

This article was reprinted with permission from *Spinoza: His Thought and Work* (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1983), 160–75.

I shall try to formulate how I conceive our historical situation in relation to nature.

In the Hellenic period a religious movement toward inwardness eventually had the effect of downgrading the status of the physical universe, including the human body. In Europe in the Middle Ages there was a dominating tendency to concentrate value in God and the Spirit *at the cost of* the body and the physical universe. The attitude of a Francis of Assisi did not prevail.² An overly lofty estimation of "the world" was generally considered a temptation, and one had to fight the flesh. Naturalness tended to be identified with sinfulness and crudeness; everything natural came under suspicion. Individuality or, in the terminology of Spinoza, particular things were downgraded in their ontological and axiological status. All value was absorbed in God, the creation only imperfectly reflecting the qualities of a *spiritual* world order.

The Renaissance and the new natural science eroded God and Spirit as the mansions of all value *but did not reinvest nature*. On the contrary, nature was given the rather passive, profane job of serving as stuff and machinery. Holy places, the closeness and the religious veneration of nature were not restored.

The situation is now one of indifference and poverty: the transcendent God is gone, and nature is divested of any attribute that could foster a natural, deep reverence or fruitful personal interaction. (The hunter-gatherer interaction is today considered technically backward. There is also less and less to hunt and gather!)

What is left of nature is seen as *materials* for satisfying human needs or, in the industrial states, for the proliferation of wishes. Nature is seen as something neutral or hostile that has been largely, but not yet completely, subdued and conquered. What is left of comparatively untouched nature is the subject of superficial aesthetic or recreational attitudes. Life and work in and with nature is a rare privilege. So much for a nutshell formulation of our predicament.

In this situation, the philosophy of Spinoza provides a potentially vast source of inspiration. The following enumeration of traits does not presume to convince those who feel comfortable in the present era of rapid and vast changes on the surface of the Earth, or those who feel at home with the so-called modern lifestyle. It is, however, aimed at mobilizing those who

feel otherwise, and inducing them to make themselves better heard in social and political debates.

1. The completely immanent God: *Deus sive Natura*. One of Spinoza's very basic ideas is the immanence of God in Nature. "God is the immanent, not the transcendent cause of all things" (*Ethics* IP18).³ God's role as the cause of all things does not preclude the infinite number of particular things themselves from causing infinitely many things. God as cause cannot be distinguished, except conceptually, from what the particular things themselves cause. He is, in a sense, helpless without essences of particulars! Without our essence there is no God; without God we are nothing. Although Spinoza stresses the second part of this assertion, the first is also implied in his philosophy of immanence.

The Spinozic *identification* on the level of denotation or extension or reference (not on the conceptual or connotational level) of God with Nature means reinvesting Nature with perfection, value, and holiness. Spinoza explicitly rejects degrading nature in the way that some of his contemporaries did.

The expression *Deus sive Natura*, God or Nature (with a capital N), occurs twice in the preface to part IV of the *Ethics*. Here Spinoza talks about "the entity which we call God or Nature" and of the "actions" of God or Nature. The expressions *Deus sive Natura* and *Deus seu Natura* also occur in the proof of part IV:

The power through which particular things, and as a consequence, man, preserve their essence, is God's, or Nature's power, not in the role of (*quatenus*) being infinite; but in the role of being explicable (*explicari potest*) through the actual human essence. The power of man, in the role of being explicated through his own actual essence, is part of God's or Nature's infinite power, that is, essence.

(*Ethics*, IVP₄)

As individuals we, like all other particular things, are invested with part of God's or Nature's infinite power.

If the idea of God's immanence is taken seriously, the two roles of God or Nature are equally basic: the role of being infinite and nonexplicable through particular finite things and the role of being thus explicable. Part I

of the *Ethics* speaks about *Deus quatenus infinitus*; the other parts, mainly about *Deus quatenus non-infinitus*. These other parts are as genuine an expression of Spinoza's system as is part I.⁴

I have translated the central but little-studied term *quatenus* as "in the role of." Other translations are of interest, for example: "in the capacity of"; "functioning as"; "as"; and the very common translation "insofar."

Using the extensional equivalence of "god" and "nature," we obtain an intuitively acceptable theorem: Nature does not exist apart from particular finite things. Nature or *natura naturans* is immanent in nature as *natura naturata*. It is immanent in particulars: particularity and divinity may perhaps be said to be equally basic aspects of "The Whole."

Let us go back to the four occurrences of *Deus sive* (or *seu*) *Natura* in the *Ethics*. In these occurrences one might plausibly interpret the terms *Deus* and *Natura* as having identical intension or connotation. If that were so in the rest of the *Ethics*, we should, without disturbing the meaning, be able to substitute one for the other in the text. However, while such a substitution leads to an interesting new Spinoza text, well worth considering today, it can sometimes lead to theorems that Spinoza himself would hardly have subscribed to.

If *Natura* is substituted for *Deus* in part V, we get, among others, the following theorems:

- Proposition 15N: He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects, loves Nature, and the more he understands himself and his affects.
- Proposition 18N: Nobody can hate Nature.

When we contemplate God, that is, Nature, says Spinoza in his proof, we are active (and enjoying an active affect), and this excludes hating.

(When dragged along on still another botanical excursion by her parents—both botanists—a very young Norwegian girl exclaimed "I hate nature." How are we to interpret this?)

The introductory passage to the proof of proposition 20 in part V, is worth quoting:

This love of Nature is the highest good we can strive for in harmony with the dictate of reason, and is common to all human beings, and we wish all would enjoy it. As a consequence it cannot be polluted through jealousy.

Proposition 24 of part V is basic concerning particulars:

- Proposition 24N: The more we understand the particular things, the more we understand Nature.

This proposition regarding the (qualitative) increase of our understanding of God seems to be intuitively obvious to Spinoza: he offers no extended proof but merely refers to the corollary to proposition 25 in part I, a rather flimsy basis for such an unconventional conception. Presumably he would accept the reverse of 24N:

- The more we understand Nature, the more we understand the particular things.⁵

Clearly we cannot identify Nature (with a capital *N*) simply with the (infinite) set of particular physical and nonphysical things. Such an atomistic view is scarcely consistent with Nature as a whole being an individuum.

Gestalt thinking and the concept of “inner relations” are useful in making precise the interconnectedness of parts and whole.

We can now get a feeling of how the propositions of the *Ethics* read when the term *God* is replaced with the term *Nature*. Let us inspect the relation between our highest aims in life and God or Nature.

In the following quotation from part V, proof of proposition 27, “God or Nature” is substituted for God:

- The highest virtue of the mind is to understand God or Nature, or to understand things in the third way.

The “or” (*sive*) directly connects understanding God with understanding things. For validity Spinoza refers to the previously mentioned proposition 25 in part I. If we focus on God rather than on Nature, the lofty status of understanding particulars seems to reveal an inconsistency.

According to the *Ethics* the highest good to which the intuitive way of cognition can lead us is the understanding of particular things in the light of God or Nature. In section 13 of Spinoza’s work on understanding (1955), he identifies the highest good with the understanding of the unity of mind

with total Nature (*cum tota Natura*). The difference in formulation is instructive. The latter refers to Nature, not to God, but achieves the same as the first through the terms *unity* and *total*.⁶ According to the interpretation of Spinoza's system suggested in the foregoing pages, it is beyond the scope of our reason or language to describe *exactly* what the relation *is* between God, perfection, Nature, and individual things, e.g., living beings.

Nevertheless, the interpretation clearly has affinities with an attitude toward nature found among a significant subgroup of researchers, poets, and people with no special status. Here we are concerned with ecology.

The philosophical aim of the deep ecology movement may be formulated in a way not very different from that of Spinoza when he speaks about God or Nature and the role of particulars. Quite central to both is Spinoza's pronouncement, just referred to:

This is the goal I seek (*tendo*), namely to acquire such a nature⁷ [i.e., a nature that involves the understanding of the unity of the mind with total Nature] and to strive that many with me acquire it. . . . To do this it is necessary to understand so much of nature as is sufficient to acquire such a nature; and then to form a kind of community (*societas*) that is required in order that as many as possible in the easiest way can safely reach it.

(*Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding*, Sect. 14).

There is a wide gap between Spinoza's credo, strictly interpreted from a historical point of view, and that of the deep ecology movement. Yet, although man's predicament today differs from that in the seventeenth century, there are some similarities that suggest a basic continuity through the centuries.

Nature as conceived by field ecologists is not the passive, dead, value-neutral nature of mechanistic science but is akin to the active, perfect *Deus sive Natura* of Spinoza. It is all-inclusive, creative (as *natura naturans*), infinitely diverse, and alive in the broad sense of Spinozic panpsychism. It manifests structure, namely the laws of nature, but, because "all things hang together," we cannot predict the long-range effects of our particular actions and policies. This is in harmony with Spinoza's warning that we should not think man capable of ever fully understanding the "common order" of Nature.

Nature (with a capital *N*) is *intuitively* conceived as perfect in a sense

that Spinoza and ecologists hold more or less in common: it is not a narrowly moral, utilitarian, or aesthetic perfection. Nature is perfect "in itself" and not insofar as it serves specifically human needs. Spinoza does not argue in favor of Nature's perfection.

"Perfection" has to do with *per* and *factum*, something already accomplished and completed. Perfection for Spinoza means completeness and realness (cf. *Ethics*, part IV, preface) of some sort when applied in general, and not just to specifically human achievements.⁸

In the latter case it means reaching what has been consciously intended. The concept of completeness is related to the concept of a *mature ecosystem*. Completeness suggests maximum diversity, maximum self-reliance, maximum dynamic equilibrium.⁹

2. The value dualism spirit and matter, soul and body, is eliminated in the *Ethics*. The same is true of the basic attitude of field ecologists. Perfection characterizes both realms.¹⁰

In view of the tendency to look upon the body as something more crude than the spirit, both field ecologists and Spinoza oppose most forms of spiritualism and, of course, moralism. Their realism does not, however, exclude the possibility of future societies characterized by generosity, justice, and nonviolence.

3. According to Spinoza, Nature (with a capital N) is not *in* time. As an *absolutely* all-embracing reality, Nature has no purpose. If it had a purpose, it would have to be part of something still greater, for example, a grand project. Time and, therefore, purpose are definable only *within* the network of relations of Nature; therefore, Nature as a whole cannot have aims or goals that refer to time. There is no all-embracing *progress* from the point of view of eternity or timelessness.

In ecological thought, too, there is a marked reaction against facile finalism. The development of "higher" forms of life does not make field ecologists less impressed with the "lower" forms, some of which have flourished for countless millions of years and are still going strong.

In time there is no "purpose" of the type that would eradicate the function or value of bacteria after "higher" forms have developed.

4. There is no established moral world order. Human justice is not a law of nature. Concurrently *there is no natural law limiting the endeavor to extend indefinitely the realm of justice and mercy as conceived in a society of free human beings*.

These Spinozic thoughts are important for striking a balance between the submissive, amoral attitude toward all kinds of life struggles and the shallow, moralistic, antagonistic attitude. Future societies in ecological equilibrium presuppose such a "third way." Human beings have a right to self-fulfillment, but when free and rational, they desire the same for all life-forms.

5. Good and evil are predicated in relation to beings *for* whom something is good or evil, and *for* a purpose. Something is good or bad in the sense of its being useful or detrimental. When the terms are not related to subjects and purposes, they are meaningless.¹¹ Thus interpreted, one may say that for the utilitarian Spinoza the expression "x is useful for y" is equivalent to "x causes an increase in y's power," "x causes an increase of y's freedom," and "x causes an increase of y's perfection."

This accords well with the effort of field ecologists in general and social anthropologists in particular to understand each culture from within, as well as with mild forms of sociological functionalism. It contrasts with absolutistic moralizing on the basis of an unquestioned value code such as predominates in some (mostly industrial) societies. It does not *exclude* that some states of affairs are better than others for all persons or sentient beings, and that some purposes define goals with the status of autotelic value.

For Spinoza the "in itself" predicates express such values: "in itself," "free," "virtuous," "powerful," "self-caused," "active."¹² In *general* social anthropology, I suspect similar values are recognized or will be increasingly recognized.

6. Every thing is connected with every other thing. There is a network of cause-effect relationships connecting everything with everything else.

The ecologist Barry Commoner has called "All things are connected with all others" the first principle of ecology. Interconnectedness in the sense of internal rather than external relations characterizes ecological ontology. The maxim is misleading except when things are ultimately conceived as gestalts.

7. Nothing is causally completely inactive; nothing is wholly without an essence that it expresses through being a cause. In a limited sense, the whole of Nature is alive and one individuum (one gestalt).

Every being strives to preserve and develop its specific essence or nature. Every essence is a manifestation of God or Nature. There are infinite

ways in which Nature thus expresses itself, and there are infinite kinds of beings expressing God or Nature.

The pervasive basic striving is no mere effort to adapt to stimuli from the outside. It is an active shaping of the environment. Successful acts create new, wider units of organism/environment. The basic urge is to gain in extent and intensiveness of self-causing. The term *self-realization* is therefore better than *self-preservation*, as the former suggests activeness and creativity, whereas the latter denotes a passive conservative or defensive attitude.¹³

8. Another name for the ability to act out one's nature or essence is power (*potentia*), the substantivation of the verb *to be able* (*posse*). It is widely different from "to coerce others."

The power of each thing is part of God's power. God or Nature has no other powers than ours. "Each and every existing thing expresses God's nature or essence in a certain determinate way . . . that is, . . . each and every thing expresses God's power . . ." (*Ethics*, IP36Pr). Without particulars, Nature's essence or power is not expressed. Nature is totally dependent upon the particulars. The above may be said to go against any hierarchical conception of existence. No subgroup of particulars expresses more of God's essence than any other. This is perhaps somewhat misleading, as Spinoza considers men to have more power than animals, and therefore they may be said to express more of God or Nature's power. Nature's power being infinite, however, the distance remains the same, namely infinite, for all particular things.

All beings strive to maintain *and gain* power. This need not be a striving to dominate, subdue, or terrorize. The establishment of symbiosis, "living together," rather than cut-throat competition marks a gain in power. At higher levels of self-realization, the self in some ways encompasses others in a state of increasing intensity and extension of "symbiosis."¹⁴ The freedom of the individual ultimately requires that of the collectivity.

9. If one insists upon using the term *rights*, every being may be said to have the right to do what is in its power. "Everybody exists through Nature's highest right (*summo naturae jure*), and consequently everyone, through Nature's highest right, does that which follows from the necessity of his Nature . . ." (IVP37Sch2).

"Ethics of ecosystems" and "environmental ethics" as proposed by ecol-

ogists tend toward the acceptance of a philosophy of Natural Right. The same holds of the movement among jurists to accept "legal rights for natural objects." Justice William O. Douglas of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote in a dissenting opinion that legal standing should be accorded to "valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modern life" (Stone 1974: 74–75).

Animals have the same kind of right to self-expression that we have. "That right which they have in relation to us, we have in relation to them" (*Ethics*, IVP₃₇Sch1).¹⁵ Rights as part of a separate moral world order is a fiction.

Field ecologists tend to accept a general "right to live and blossom." We have no *special* right to kill and injure. *Nature does not belong to human beings or their states.*

10. There is nothing in human nature or essence, according to Spinoza, that can *only* manifest or express itself through injury to others.

The human attitude of violence and hostility toward some species of animals has made it impossible to study realistically their life and function within the whole. The field ecologist who deeply identifies with the species studied is able to live peacefully with any kind of "wild" animal—even with vicious sharks! This attitude harmonizes with Spinoza's view concerning the free man (*homo liber*). His doctrine on the development of affects (parts III and IV of the *Ethics*) makes the field ecologist's symbiotic attitude inevitable if the development proceeds far enough. It is prescribed in the very nature of human beings.

In what follows, I mention other Spinozistic thoughts that harmonize with those of field ecologists, even if the latter do not often develop them consciously.

11. The realization of union with the whole of Nature is made through the understanding of the particular things as a manifold of expressions or manifestations of Nature.

Ecological thinking presumes an identification with particulars in their internal relations, or gestalt relations, to others. The identification process leads deeper into Nature as a whole, but also deeper into unique features of particular beings. It does not lead away from the singular and finite. It does not lend itself to abstract thinking or contemplation, but to *conscious, intuitive, intimate interaction.*

Many astonishing discoveries by field ecologists owe to intensive studies of *individual* animals, which they give names to and in many ways perceive intuitively as individuals. Those who hire ecologists and those who use their publications have little interest in these individuals, unfortunately. Judged on the basis of *publications*, field ecologists seem on the whole to be contributors to nomothetic science and to concentrate on narrow “environmental” problems and “nature management.” In this respect field ecologists can be compared to artists who, for the sake of earning a living, are part-time art dealers. They are perhaps only quoted when talking about prices.

12. “Rationality” is wise conduct maximizing self-realization. It cannot be separated from perfection, virtue, and freedom. “Since reason does not demand anything contrary to Nature, it demands that everyone love himself, look for what is useful, . . . and that he strives to obtain all which really leads man to greater perfection . . .” (ibid., IVP18Sch). Since self-realization implies acts of understanding with increasing perspective, rationality and virtue increase with the development of understanding. The maximum is “an understanding love of Nature,” *amor intellectualis Dei*. This implies acts of understanding performed with the maximum perspective possible, or loving immersion in and interaction with Nature.¹⁶

An attitude toward nature as judged in terms of the behavior of industrial nations is rational in a very different sense. It is cleverness relative to extremely shortsighted, narrow interests. Many people assume that rationality is cold calculation in the service of such ends. Acquaintance with Spinoza’s conception means an immense widening and deepening of the conception of rationality.

13. Because of the interaction of things and understanding, things cannot be separated. The units of understanding are not propositions but acts. To the content of ideas in the “attribute of non-extension” there corresponds an act in the “attribute of extension.” Ultimately these attributes are attributes of the same thing, but the human way of understanding is such that we have to treat them separately.

The increase of rationality and freedom is, according to Spinoza, proportional to the increase of activeness, each action having the aspects of understanding and of a behavior of interaction. Relations to Nature are interactions; doing ethology or social anthropology exemplifies active relations on the level of cognition.

14. Since to gain in understanding expresses itself as an act, it is in its

totality a process within the extended aspect of Nature and can be studied as such.

This point is of prime importance to the methodology of ethology: the “world” of a living being is investigated through study of its manifest (“molar” and “molecular”) behavior. Spinoza furnishes ethology with a frame of reference completely devoid of the kind of uncritical mentalism and introspectionism that has often obstructed the study of cognition in animals and human beings.

The framework of relating Spinoza to general ethology is also suited to counteracting the tendency to conceive human knowledge as something existing independently of acts of particular human beings in particular situations—and stored wholesale in libraries.

The formulation of Spinoza does not point to any definite form of “behaviorism.” We are free to inspect critically any contemporary version. There is no reason to identify the concept of behavior with the versions put forth by J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner, versions that leave out intentionality. Behavior cannot be photographed!

15. Most of the basic concepts used in the *Ethics* to characterize the human predicament are such as can be used whatever the cultural context. They are, furthermore, adapted to general characterizations covering smaller or greater parts of the animal, plant, and mineral kingdoms. Some of these concepts have already been mentioned.

Spinoza rarely touches on questions concerning animals, but when he does, he shows that his main concepts are not intended to apply only to human beings.¹⁷ He warns, however, against thinking that the joys of insects are the same as those of human beings. Each kind of living being is content with and delights in what corresponds to its nature or essence. Each kind has joys and, therefore, presumably also sorrows.

Among the important concepts that have an application wider than to the human species, one may note the following:

- perfection (cf. point 1)
- good and evil (cf. points 4–5)
- striving to express one’s nature or essence (cf. points 7–8)
- self-preservation, self-realization (cf. points 7–12)
- power (cf. points 8–10)

- rationality (cf. points 12–13)
- rights (cf. point 9)
- virtue (cf. point 12; cf. the expression *potentia seu virtus*)
- freedom (cf. points 12–13)
- understanding (cf. points 13–14)
- feeling (see *Ethics*, IIP57Sch)
- emotion (the passive ones are confused ideas)
- confused idea (see General Definition of Affects, *Ethics*, part III)

For all these terms it is true that the extent to which Spinoza's definitions apply is open to interpretation.¹⁸ Some are clearly intended to apply to at least a major part of the animal kingdom. Because of equivalences between many of them, the range of all of them can, without doing violence to Spinoza's texts, be made as large as suitable within ecology and the theory of evolution.

The wide applicability of Spinoza's *concepts* does not imply uncritical *statements* about similarities between human beings and other living beings. It ensures a broad continuity of outlook and the possibility of fighting human arrogance and cruelty.

These are my main conclusions:

1. Spinoza's fundamental conception of an all-embracing reality and humanity's place within that reality is today the most adequate conception in the light of ecological research.
2. It is congenial to the basic attitude of field ecologists toward forms of life and the various species.
3. Its wide acceptance, or the acceptance of conceptions consistent but not necessarily identical with it, could promote the aims of the ecology movement.

These conclusions are, of course, in need of some warnings against uncritical enthusiasm:

First, Spinoza's system with its complicated details is scarcely thoroughly comprehensible to anybody today and has no chance of being accepted by any substantial group of people.

Second, some of his opinions on animals and on other subjects of eco-

logical concern are neither in agreement with research nor congenial to basic ecological attitudes.

Third, his texts lend themselves to various interpretations. They can be used in a variety of reconstructions of his systems, some of which might go against or be indifferent to basic conceptions and attitudes of field ecologists.

Finally, there is no complete consistency of attitudes among field ecologists. This paper cannot speak for all, although it speaks for a substantial subgroup.

Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement

One of the strangest tasks in which a professor of philosophy can engage—voluntarily or more or less involuntarily—is to write a history of philosophy. My own, about 1,000 pages, is “neither fish nor fowl” because I could never solve the question of how to combine *history* of philosophy and *philosophy* of history.

Methodology of historical research is an entertaining subject. One learns, for example, how a historian’s account of a happening based on only one eyewitness account is more detailed and written with more confidence than the account of a happening covered by two or more witnesses. What the witnesses have said or written *normally* differs so much that a highly responsible historian’s account renounces some interesting details and is heavy reading because of “if,” “perhaps,” “perhaps not,” “unclear,” “contradictory,” “uncertain,” and a host of more complicated *reservations*.

Philosophy of history is a discipline of another character. It has no definite methodology, consisting of abstract discussion on the essence of history, of time and change, but also discussion about the dependence of philosophy of history on general philosophy. Good historians often repeat that they somehow must avoid being influenced by any definite philosophical system. That is impossible. In this century the vast discussions on the relation of dialectical materialism to philosophy of history and to actual historiography (the writings describing historical development) are at least as interesting and important as *historical* material on the metalevel persua-

This article was written in 1982 and was revised in 1991. It is being published here for the first time.

sively manifesting the general philosophical positions of, say, Aristotle, Shankara, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, or Marx.

Established historians tend to say something like the following: the historical works by the ablest historians, who are from a general point of view more or less convinced dialectical materialists, do not reveal their doctrinal adherence to any definite general philosophical system. As one historian (Sverre Steen) said to his colleagues in a great humanist faculty, "You are fortunate: you can use your different and complicated professional jargons, and you even improve your standing by sticking faithfully to them. We historians (*id est*, historiographers) must somehow renounce all that."

The historian of *philosophy*, focusing on general philosophy, *not* on history of ideas as a part of the historiography of ideas, cannot or should not avoid asking himself or herself, When writing an account of the history of philosophy, from the point of view of which kind of general philosophy do I write? In particular, what kind of a philosophy of history, as a genuine part of general philosophy, do I subscribe to?

Obviously, my account of a philosophy, say that of Spinoza, will depend upon my own philosophy and my own general philosophy of history, my view of historical causality, and so on. As a philosopher, not a professional historian, I am not interested in hiding the dependence of my interpretation of the *Ethics* on my general philosophy, including my philosophy of history.

If there ever were a tendency of textbooks of history of *philosophy* toward agreement, not to speak of an asymptotic nearness of accounts, it would signify the disappearance of deep cultural differences, of deep differences in *Weltund Lebensanschauungen*. (I cannot avoid the German words for this. The English "differences in worldview and outlook on life" makes what is meant not serious, dramatic, and world-shaking enough.)

Because of the plurality of the basic views about what history *is*, and because these views are part of philosophy, there can be no definite history of philosophy. We easily get into interesting logical paradoxes if we proclaim that such and such is the only correct interpretation of Spinoza's texts, because one needs a solution of the problems in the philosophy of history. There are different fundamental premises of what history is, and hermeneutics or the philosophies of interpretation are many. Only if you say that only *your* philosophy is correct, without reasons at all, can you pro-

ceed to offer the “correct” view of what Spinoza intended to say in the *Ethics*. A different way of saying this: philosophy has no definite history.

Which philosophers of the past deserve to be called great? This question leads to another: who is competent to judge? Which philosophy do we use as a frame when answering? I am among those who do not feel competent even to answer what the question means, but let me use two possible indicators of greatness.

One indicator is that of being rediscovered and highly appreciated by successive generations of philosophers in different cultures. Another indicator is the persistent richness and diversity of interpretations of their texts. Spinoza’s texts are constantly reinterpreted by philosophers, poets, scientists, and others. Among the nineteenth century’s well-known influential interpretations we may mention those of Goethe and Hegel. I do not feel competent to pick out anyone in particular among the many distinguished interpreters in the twentieth century, but there is an encouraging variety—encouraging in spite of a certain tendency to appreciate conformity. Of course, we would all like to avoid textual and purely factual, historical disagreement, but by interpretation, I mean philosophical agreement.

In what follows I speak as a life philosopher, not as a historian. Study of the life and time of Spinoza is essential for any close study of the textual material, but for my purpose it can only be a necessary instrument. Also, strict systematization of Spinoza’s formulations in the *Ethics*—for example, sentences such as “. . . means the same as . . .”—can only be an instrument, a methodological technique, but my background is such that I find it natural to work systematically.

The history of interpretations of Spinoza’s texts shows the intimate relations to changing traditions. The religious character of his philosophy makes the history comparable to what Albert Schweitzer tells us in his *History of the Research on the Life of Jesus* (*Geschichte der Leben Jesu Forschung*). Four periods are fairly clear. The first, the time soon after Spinoza’s death, focuses on his atheism and his critique of the historicity of the Bible—the work of a pioneer in this field. Then we have the wonderful period when “everybody” declared themselves Spinozists—with Goethe as the greatest luminary. In the history of ideas, that period is usually called Romantic, but from an ecosophical point of view it should be called realistic. The Kantian inter-

pretation, heavily colored by its distinction between dogmatic and critical, should be mentioned. It was a useful distinction within professional philosophy at the time, but later it became clear that Kant had introduced, as all great philosophers do, a new form of "dogmatism" in the sense of proceeding from sets of unquestioned assumptions—presuppositions in the sense of Collingwood. Spinoza's metaphysics was interpreted by Kantians as based on illusions. I do not think it is proper to speak of a Kantian tradition in interpreting Spinoza. A new, third period of interpretations, alive even today, started with Hegel and tended to find that, for Spinoza, the single, particular beings somehow drowned in the mighty substance. The long series of modern attacks on substance started with interpreting Spinoza as a substance-philosopher rather than a process-philosopher, like Whitehead. "The real is unchangeable, no dynamism, no time."

A fourth tradition made headway early in the twentieth century with "the immanence of God (and substance)" as a key expression.¹ This is the tradition to which I belong. The most radical version might be thus formulated: "Without modes (singular beings) no God nor Substance." Of course, a tradition of interpretation includes much more than interpretation of the first part of the *Ethics*, but unfortunately, I think, that part has been by far the most thoroughly studied within professional philosophy.

What is the major thing to be learned from history in this case? What can we learn from the wealth of significantly different interpretations by intensely engaged, learned Spinoza researchers? For me, it primarily suggests that new interpretations will occur in the future and that my own will be only one of a long series—forgotten in due time. What also seems to be learned from this history is that the interpretations ostensibly expressing "what Spinoza really meant," or at least suggesting this, can be viewed as interesting *reconstructions* of his philosophy—interesting because they make his texts meaningful for contemporaries of the authors of the interpretations. Reconstructions, as here understood, take the texts, sentence for sentence, as seriously as does the historian, and the reconstructor is supposed to use all historical materials, but he or she need not take seriously the question, If Spinoza could read the construction, what would he think of it?

Many people who are engaged in the ecological crisis have been in-

spired “by Spinoza.” They read some of Spinoza’s texts or his comments on those texts. Some even read about Spinoza himself, but this does not mean that they try to find out exactly what Spinoza meant. Why should they? They make use of his image and his texts in their lives. What more could or should Spinoza expect of them?

Spinoza does not write about the beauty of wild nature. Perhaps he never talked about it—the coastline of the Netherlands, the storms, the varieties of light and darkness, the seabirds. There were people around him, Dutch landscape painters, who appreciated all this. Maybe he did also, but it scarcely influenced what he says in the *Ethics*. What he says about animals does not suggest he had any wide or deep sense of identification with any of them. Nevertheless, his *kind of* philosophy of life, its structure, is such that he inspires many supporters of the deep ecology movement.

One of the most inspiring aspects of the text *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* is this: it outlines a total view. It outlines a set of ultimate premises in our thinking about ourselves and of the greater reality of which we are a part, and he applies it to concrete situations. There are other great thinkers who try to do the same: Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes. Spinoza remains a unique source.

What is a total view? Here I speak of what might be called a general orientation with concrete applications. The general orientation will include basic attitudes, and the applications are at its most important level decisions to act in a certain way in concrete situations. It is *not* a philosophy in an academic sense. Any verbal articulation of a total view must inevitably be fragmentary, but include praxis.

The term *premise* is important. The relation of premises to conclusion, in order to be valid, must be logical at least in a broad sense of that very ambiguous word. For reasons and through motivations historians do not quite agree about, Spinoza chose an exposition of his total view with great stress on the relation premise-conclusion—analogue but not very similar to Euclid’s exposition of geometry.

In the *Elements* of Euclid, important and interesting theorems occur far from the axioms. These can be modified—like ultimate premises in systems of formal logic. There are many options. One need not start with a

principle of contradiction. The same applies to the *expositions* of the *Ethics*. If there seem to be inconsistencies between a sentence in part *x* and one in part *y*, a modification of the interpretation of the sentence in *x* is as relevant as that of the sentence in *y* even if *x* has formal logical priority over *y*, that is, even if *x* may be part of the system of premises from which *y* is derived. In what I have to say, this way of looking at formal priority and relevance is often made use of. We must not succumb to any irrational reverence for what is chosen as a premise. There is a metalogical theorem that is generally underestimated: a given conclusion *y* can always be derived from different sets of premises, even rather odd ones. For example, the conclusion "All whales are warm-blooded" can be derived from the premises "All whales are fish" and "All fish are warm-blooded."

Increasingly, academic philosophers are reflecting the ecological crisis in their writings. The sources of philosophic inspirations are many: the works of Aristotle, Spinoza, Bergson, Heidegger, Whitehead. . . . Since I was seventeen years old I have had a special relation to Spinoza's *Ethics*, but that does not imply that I believe his work can be of help to all who wish to articulate their basic attitudes. I believe there is need for deeply different verbal articulations of a total view, including the poetic.

Several terms in the *Ethics* are to my mind extraordinarily helpful when we try to express the fundamental views that have motivated the environmental activism of some of us. I shall in the next sections focus mainly on one of those terms, namely *amor intellectualis Dei*, "the understanding love of God." The verb *intelligere* I translate as "understand." The adjective *intellectualis* should not be translated as "intellectual"—a too intellectual term today.

The term *amor intellectualis Dei* and closely related terms had for centuries been theological terms within the rich tradition Spinoza modified in his own particular direction.

Among the wise historians who have studied Spinoza, I wish to point to Harry Austryn Wolfson. His account of the spiritual genesis of the famous fifth part of the *Ethics*, "on the power of the understanding or on human freedom," is so far unsurpassed, as far as I know. He mentions many authors studied by Spinoza and presumably influencing him. Among them were Saint Thomas Aquinas and Leo Hebraeus. Wolfson says:

A model classification of love in which intellectual love is included is given by Thomas Aquinas. He distinguishes between (a) natural love (*amor naturalis*) which exists even in inanimate objects, (b) sensitive or animal love (*amor sensitivus animalis*), and (c) intellectual, rational, or spiritual love (*amor intellectualis, rationalis, spiritualis*). It is this classification of Thomas Aquinas which seems to be the origin of Leo Hebraeus' three-fold classification of love into natural, sensitive, and rational and voluntary (*naturale, sensitivo, et rationale voluntario*). The last kind of love is also called by him mental love (*l'amore mentale*), or, as in Thomas Aquinas, intellectual love (*l'amore intelletivo, intellettuale*).

(Wolfson 1958: 303–04)

Love of God being the highest goal in the religious life of man, Spinoza—carefully following the old tradition—furnishes this love with an appropriate place in part V of his *Ethics*. We might ask, though, if the so-called rationalist system invented by Spinoza allow him to put so much “theology” into it? His supreme intention seems to have been to stick firmly to reason but nevertheless to furnish his religious contemporaries with a strong faith as satisfactory, or more satisfactory, than theirs. This was a project that was unlikely to succeed as far as I can see. The result: a use of the term *amor Dei* that certainly admits various interpretations (see Naess 1986d). I shall stick to my consistently immanent interpretation of *Deus* and hold that *amor intellectualis* is directed toward “God, *not* as infinite” (*Deus non quatenus infinitus*, as in *Ethics*, VP36.) It is directed toward individual finite beings. My minimum thesis here is that at least for one hermeneutically justifiable interpretation, the understanding of God, as part of the third and highest way of cognition, is directed toward individual finite beings. This position requires discussion of the term *Deus*. I shall need to discuss the thesis of immanence before returning to the *amor intellectualis*.

The *Ethics* is full of occurrences of the term *Deus*. How is it that Spinoza was conceived as a diabolically clever atheist? It is very understandable. It was at his time inevitable.

God is said to be maximally perfect (*perfectissimus*). God is the cause of everything, even himself. Nothing at all can be conceived except through God. This might be thought to be enough to calm the theologians, but they were not led astray by Spinoza's terminology. They knew, for example,

that Spinoza was using the adjective *perfect* (*perfectus*) in an old way in which it basically meant “complete” (from Latin *per*—and *FAC*; see *Ethics*, part IV, preface). Wolfson (1958: 222–23) mentions “the original use of the term ‘perfection’ in the sense of ‘completeness’ and of not lacking anything required by one’s own particular nature.” The nature or essence or power of Spinoza’s God is complete to the greatest possible extent—by sheer definition. (However, Spinoza does not say anywhere that “He” is good, and there is nothing personal about “Him”!)

Perfection is not a term that is introduced in the *Ethics* by means of a separate definition. When not applied to Nature, it admits of degrees. Joy is an emotion through which mind is said to become “more perfect” (IIIPII Sch), more whole through more activeness and power. Whatever its connotation, “more perfect” cannot be separated in denotation from “more powerful.” Compare the proof of proposition 61: “Joy . . . is the emotion through which the power of the body to act, increases or is furthered.” The relation to activeness, and to understanding, is not only intimate, it is internal. The more perfect, the more active and the less passive (VP40). In short, “more perfect than” cannot, in denotation, be completely separated from a number of other basic “in itself” relations. Among basic kinds of sentences that Spinoza used to express his system in the sense of an inter-connected set of expressions—sentences such as “x is in itself,” “x is conceived through itself,” “x causes y, partially or totally,” and “x is more perfect than y”—there is no place, so far as I can see, for a God that has completely different properties from those of the “in itself” family. On the other hand, the theorems 5P32–5P35 seem to me difficult to understand from the point of view of immanence. They are too close to transcendental religious views entertained by Spinoza in his younger years. The *Ethics* is not a finished work, not a crystal.

There is an expression that more than any other has supported the concept of the immanent God: “God or Nature” (*Deus sive Natura*).

Some Spinoza students have supposed that Spinoza simply identified God with nature in a modern sense. This is clearly untenable, but the expression needs discussion, which will be offered in a later section. Suffice it here to mention a conclusion: the God of the *Ethics* may be identified essentially with Nature-as-creative (*natura naturans*)—the creative aspect of a supreme whole with two aspects, the creative and the created (*natura natu-*

rata). The latter are the existing beings in their capacity of being there, temporarily. There is creativity but not a creator. The verb “to nature” (*naturare*) covers both forms in its dynamic aspect. A comparable verb today would be “Gaia-ing,” a term suitable for those who accept the most radical versions of the Gaia hypothesis: that the planet Earth is a self-regulating living being. Clearly, such ideas are inspiring for radical environmentalists.

Immanence of God was, of course, unacceptable to the theologians of Spinoza’s time. The term *atheist* referred to the denial of the God of the Old and New Testaments, not of every kind of God, and Spinoza was correctly classified in their terminology as an atheist, and a diabolical one insofar as his constant eulogy of God masked his basic terrifying aberrations.

When I contemplate the life of Spinoza I have, like many others, a suspicion that he never completely gave up his Jewish faith, the transcendent God he loved in his youth. As a result, he may not have managed to develop a system in which God clearly and consistently occurs as immanent in the particular beings we meet in our daily experience.

From God’s essence follows his existence, but *only* “existence” as essence: “. . . God’s power is nothing except God’s active essence” (*Ethics*, IIP3Sch). Its manifestations are the “modes,” the individual beings. This is implied by his system, but sometimes Spinoza seems to feel he needs more of God’s power than mere essence, however eternal. The transcendent God of religion seems to appear from time to time in his texts and threatens the consistency of his consistently philosophical thinking and articulation. The threat is most conspicuous in part V of the *Ethics*.

It is in accordance with the immanence theory that every actually existing being partakes in the infinite power of God. This power, the only power that exists, is distributed unequally among natural beings, with human beings having the most power. As we shall see, this inequality plus the theorem of equivalence between power and right implies inequality of right (or rights), with human beings having “more right” than other beings. Without careful delimitation of the terms *potentia* and *ius*, there is a source here of incompatibility with certain radical environmental views.

The textual basis of the theory of immanence may be said to start in part I, with IP25 and IP26. According to IP36 nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow. The proof of IP36 relates every single

thing to God. "Whatever exists expresses in a definite and determined way (P25Cor) God's essence or nature, that is (IP34), whatever exists expresses in a definite and determined way the power of God. . . ."

The texts of the *Ethics* furnish no basis for assuming that God expresses a nature, essence, or power in any other way than through each existent being.² From this, and what has already been said, I draw the following conclusion: *amor intellectualis Dei* is a kind of love of the existent particular beings, that is, parts of the total richness and diversity of life-forms on Earth, and in other regions of the universe.

In a sense, God as *natura naturans* is nothing else than a term expressing the unequally distributed, intimately interrelated creativity manifested by particular beings. The creativity of these beings, however modest, justifies calling them living beings. Spinoza's so-called panpsychism does not say much more, as I see it.

Would not the above interpretation render God finite, and would it not go directly against a way Spinoza would accept? No, because of the infinite creative aspect of the whole, which embraces *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Most students of Spinoza would presumably answer in the affirmative, but then they overlook a number of statements in the text of the *Ethics*. In IIP9, Spinoza talks about God "not as infinite" (*non quatenus infinitus*). If finite, however, God will have an aspect of "modes"? Surely Spinoza talks of the modified God (*Deus modificatus*), of God being affected (cf. Naess 1981). (See especially IIP9 and IIP11Cor.) God as *natura naturans* does not exist as something separate from *natura naturata*.

In short, the term *Deus* in the *Ethics* has two functions. One is to point toward an infinite whole with infinite dimensions of creativity, not *in* time, but making time possible. The second function is to point to the manifold of finite creative beings manifesting and expressing the parts of that whole. At least, this is one way to conceive and feel what the text of the *Ethics* suggests. The finite, temporal beings are creative, *causa adequatae*, insofar as they are in themselves, *in se*.

By definition—or better, almost by definition—those who support the deep ecology movement are, like Spinoza, in part motivated by basic premises of philosophical or religious kinds and feel that all living beings have intrinsic value. It makes sense to care for these beings for their own

sake, as creative beings. Clearly, the supporters may appreciate something like the above verbal articulations of deep attitudes.

Acting with part of the power of the immanent God, and knowing their own action, human beings know God adequately. "The human mind has an adequate knowledge (*cognitio*) of the eternal and infinite essence of God." Interpreters have difficulty here. What is "adequacy"? If God is the creative power completely distributed among living beings, and human beings know, are conscious of, this creativity itself, one may say that their knowledge of God is adequate (cf. IP34). Since the only things to be known as actual existing beings are the finite particular things, "the more we understand (*intelligimus*) individual things, the more we understand God" (VP24).³

From the point of view of immanence, human understanding of the highest "third, intuitive kind" not only has a cognitive aspect but is more specially a relation of love. It is a special kind of intuitive understanding of particular things that involves an internal love relation. The second kind, culminating in scientific knowledge, does not have that relation to love, at least not as an internal rather than an external relation.

In his eagerness to convince his contemporaries that his philosophy furnishes all the satisfaction of the Jewish and Christian faiths, Spinoza perhaps stretches too far. The reader easily gets the impression that a life centered around the love of God must be a life of unworldly contemplation, a life different from one centering around the loving understanding of particular things, as was, for example, the life of Rachel Carson. *Amor intellectualis Dei* implies active loving concern for all living beings.

Spinoza was a socially and philosophically active person. One need not, of course, be interested, as Rachel Carson was, in every living being along the shoreline. One may concentrate on human beings, as Gandhi did. The essential point is that the third kind of knowledge concerns particular beings, and that every one of them in a basically egalitarian way is an expression of the immanent God, part of *natura naturans*, Nature with a capital N, as well as of *natura naturata*.

One may say that the understanding love of God, and the third (intuitive) way of cognition, concentrates on the content of reality, not its abstract structure.⁴ The abstract structure is investigated through the second

way of cognition. Einstein and others obviously delight in God's thoughts in the form of abstract, but beautiful, laws of nature. Mathematicians delight in still more abstract structures. Spinoza, presumably, was delighted to study Euclid. In all this, reason operates, but it is also a form of reason that leads us inevitably to the third kind of cognition (VP28): the third way is rational in the sense that reason and reason alone leads us to this third way.

A supremely important rule, which fits neatly with the deep ecology slogan "Rich life with simple means!" has to do with the function of reason as a servant of the third way: what is done that is not in harmony with ultimate goals of life cannot be reasonable. It is not enough to be reasonable and effective as means toward a subordinate goal. One must ask, Is this subordinate goal consistent with, or better, conducive to, the realization of ultimate goals—situations with meaning in themselves?

Love of the immanent God is love of God's expressions, not of a separable God. A being expresses God's nature or essence; therefore, love of God cannot be different from love of such a being. What, though, is God's nature or essence? Proposition 34 in part I answers: "God's power is God's essence itself"—as already said. In the proof Spinoza says that through God's power God and every being exist and act more or less freely. Because God is not separate from God's expressions, causality from God to God's expressions is immanent, not the causality of our natural science. When a human being loves God "intellectually," it cannot but be a love of one expression directed toward another expression as an expression of God, and as such of intrinsic value.

There is a basis for assuming that the particular beings understood the third way are understood in the light of a great, infinite whole, the creative aspect of that whole. The general structure of the *Ethics* is such that what is said about human beings basically applies to what is said about beings in a fairly general sense. Note the use of "consequently" (*consequenter*) in the proof of IVP4: "The power through which particular beings, and consequently human beings, conserve their being, is God or Nature's power itself, not in so far [God or Nature] is infinite, but in so far [God or Nature] can be made explicit through human actual essence."

Supporters of the deep ecology movement like to say that they support ecocentrism, not anthropocentrism, and Spinoza certainly offers high-level

premises for what has sometimes been labeled biocentric or ecocentric egalitarianism. I think these Latin and Greek terms are useless in serious discussions, but they may be helpful in offering some vague idea of a kind of basic attitude. Spinoza tried something immensely difficult, namely, to articulate with some preciseness certain basic attitudes.

Spinoza's holism, implied—vaguely implied?—all through the *Ethics*, is secured through his use of the term *God*, and by the generality of his theorems. There is a sentence in his work *On the Improvement of the Understanding* that many people try to use as a key to understanding Spinoza's system: he says explicitly that he strives to attain a stable mental state characterized by the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of nature. This is together with others, not alone: "to strive that many acquire it with me." He envisages a society conducive "to the attainment of this character (state) by the greatest number with the least difficulty and danger." It necessitates a healing of the way we understand things. A way of caring understanding? In a sense, a movement toward "green communities"? His statements are not incompatible with such a movement. Of course, if supporters do find something inspiring here, it is not in the belief that Spinoza as a person would be supporting what they do, but rather that a kind of philosophy like his could support them.

Is the foregoing the *most plausible* interpretation of the text of the *Ethics*?

There cannot be any *most* plausible interpretation of the *Ethics*. Hermeneutics, as I understand it, precludes that. My job amounts to a reconstruction of parts of the system rather than to finding out exactly what the complex person Spinoza in a certain period of his life intended his words and sentences to mean. The development and structure of the *Ethics* are very complicated, to say the least. We get a good impression of this by reading the excellent, but formidable volume by M. Gueroult (1968) on how to interpret part I—one-fifth of the *Ethics*. It is difficult for the reader to "feel at home" with Spinoza at such a level of complication. The whole is lost. The level of complication of some of Bach's fugues does not destroy the possibility of their being experienced as an integrated whole. Bach was a genius, as was Spinoza. The fugues are short; the *Ethics* is short. (Written in terms of Gueroult, the *Ethics* would be at least ten times as long.)

A question arises here: when do we write about Spinoza as professors of

academic philosophy and when do we write as philosophers on our own—however modest in our pretensions of originality? The great philosophers we write about in our textbooks on the history of philosophy inspired each other, often in a negative way: they felt a contrast and a need to articulate their own vision. Their freedom, or license, of interpretation of the others is astonishing from an academic point of view. The way leading Stoics interpreted Epicureans and vice versa, the way Hegel interpreted Hume, Marx and Kierkegaard interpreted Hegel, Kant interpreted Hume, Heidegger interpreted metaphysics—do scarcely bear pedestrian academic scrutiny. Kant would probably have flunked any current university examination on Hume. He read very little, and he ignored the *Treatise of Human Nature*. Undergraduates could have corrected him.

I am not defending one-sidedness and wildly implausible interpretations, but I am insisting on the supreme value of working out things *under the inspiration of the texts*. As philosophers, it is our obligation to try out tentative answers to the questions we find urgent and inevitable to answer. This means ultimately to work out reconstructions rather than detailed interpretations of the great philosophers. Gueroult should be studied carefully, but he cannot function as a guru.

Philosophical and religious sources have played and will continue to play a role in environmental activism. The close relation to decision in concrete conflict situations precludes highly technical and complicated interpretations. One of the most characteristic, short answers to “Why is it so important to protect such and such from extinction here in your neighborhood?” runs like this: “They belong here.”

In the deep ecology movement, as in the other two great contemporary movements, the peace movement and the social justice movement, progress in part depends on the active participation of a minority able to use part of their time and energy to serve a great cause. Reliable news about the ecological crisis is nearly always bad. It is difficult not to become frustrated and join the many who passively deplore the ongoing destruction. Among the many sources of inspiration to enter and continue *activism* we have at our disposal the teaching of Spinoza.

Activeness—a better term than *activity*—makes for joy, according to Spinoza. It expresses the nature of the active being, the being as far as it is

in itself (*in se*), and the more directly it expresses its unique nature, the greater the joy. Sorrow comes from passivity, *lack of* active expressions. There is an accident, you spontaneously engage all of yourself, wholeheartedly, and your own pain is not felt; there is a joy if the activeness is intense and comprehensive. The grave frustration and sorrow that millions feel today concerning the ecological situation can be overcome, and is being overcome, by jointly entering into active relations, taking part each according to his own capacity and special interest. In the deep ecology movement the activeness is supposed to be directly motivated by our *ultimate* attitudes toward life and meaningfulness ("level 1"), an activeness that follows *from our very nature as a whole*.

Crucial here from a systematic point of view is the definition of activeness in part III of the *Ethics*: "I say we act, when something in us or outside us happens, of which we are adequate cause, that is (according to the foregoing definition) when something follows in us or outside us from our nature, something that can only be understood clearly and distinctly from it alone. . . ."

The term *alone* is crucial here. It is a supreme manifestation of freedom and creativeness. When we are active and free (*liber*) in this way, we are determined in our action by our (innermost) nature. We do something that is determined, completely determined, but freely, because determined by our *own* particular, unique nature. We do it exercising part of the power of God or Nature, and we *cannot escape* being joyful, whatever the tragic circumstances. The whole of part V centers on how this activeness or freedom can be expanded, increased, and deepened. There is no freedom without activism, no activism without freedom.

In the expression *Deus sive Natura*—Nature written with a capital *N*—the connotation of the two words is not the same, but the denotation is. There are not two separate entities, two existent somethings, not even one. Sameness of denotation does not imply general substitutability of the two terms, but sometimes substitution offers new insights. Let us substitute "Nature" for "God" in VP15: "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affects, loves Nature, and the more so the more he understands himself and his affects." It is the passive affects—hatred, jealousy, baseless hope, mindless anger or sorrow (*tristitia*)—that are the obstacles, the immaturity of human beings.

The same substitution makes the introductory passage of the proof of proposition 20 run as follows: "This love of Nature is the highest good we can strive for in harmony with the dictate of reason, and it is common to all human beings, and we desire that all would enjoy it."

We cannot, of course, identify Nature (with a capital N) with the set of particular physical and nonphysical things, including suffering human beings and animals. Such an atomistic view forgets that *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* together make an integral whole: the creative and the created are internally (insolubly) related. We are not invited to love the cruelty in nature.

Gestalt thinking and the concept of "internal relations" are useful in making precise the interconnectedness of parts and whole. However, I cannot go into that here.

Every single being deserves understanding love—this can be plausibly inferred from theorems in the *Ethics*. Spinoza, like other great philosophers, changed attitudes and terminology through the years, however, and there are still passages in the *Ethics* suggesting that the unchanging, permanent, eternal is the supreme and most satisfactory object of love and veneration. Thus, a sequence of theorems in part V, beginning with theorem 17, seems to belong to a fairly early period of Spinoza's thinking. Love of God was in the early periods probably seen in contrast to love of finite, "mortal" particulars. In some sections of part V, love of God is still somewhat similar to the love of a transcendent God, a God that has a power of his own, beyond and apart from the limited power of individual beings.

Let us substitute "God or Nature" for "God" in the proof of VP17: "The highest virtue (*virtus*) of the mind is to understand God or Nature, or to understand beings in the third way." The translation of *virtus* as "virtue" is today misleading, but there are no one-word translations available. The term has to do with capacity, like the Greek *areté*. Spinoza shunned moralizing.

Some might say: Spinoza wishes to contribute, as a green activist, to organizing people and to contribute, using nonviolent means, to the establishment of a green society. The consciousness of the members will be characterized by awareness of their unity with nature, and they will live according to that insight.

This is going too far, but clearly the words of Spinoza do not diminish the feeling that a total view having important analogies to his own is com-

patible with contemporary total views in part inspired by the ecological crisis—that is, analogous to an ecosophy. What would Spinoza in heaven say to this? Perhaps he would make a scornful remark. His personal applause, however, is not *necessary* for us.

The very famous passage in his early work on human understanding, specifically his utterance about the union of the mind with nature as a whole, has led many to interpret Spinoza as an advocate of *unio mystica*, that is, as a “mystic.” In the *Ethics*, on which I am focusing, there are no similar utterances. I find it plausible that in his later years he experienced less mystical nearness to a supreme whole.

Nature as conceived by many ecologists, and expressed philosophically by James Lovelock and others, is not the passive, dead, value-neutral nature of mechanistic science but is akin to the active, “naturing” nature of Spinoza. It is all-inclusive, creative (as *natura naturans*), infinitely diverse, and alive in the broad sense of Spinozistic so-called panpsychism. It manifests abstract structure, namely the laws of nature, simulated by such models as Einstein’s field equations. Goethe reaches deeper, perhaps, when he warns us: “Die Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale, alles ist auf einem Male.”

Because “everything affects every other thing,” we cannot predict the long-range effects of our particular actions and policies. This is in harmony with Spinoza’s warning that we should not think human beings capable of ever fully understanding the “common order of nature.” Very much less is needed to appreciate the overwhelming creativity of Nature. The *practical* importance of the intrinsic-value principle of deep ecology owes mainly to the imperfection and fragmentariness of our knowledge of the common order of nature. Calculations of “usefulness” are uncertain.

Nature (with a capital *N*) is intuitively conceived as perfect in the sense that Spinoza and ecologists hold more or less in common. It is not a narrowly moral, utilitarian, or aesthetic perfection. Nature is perfect “in itself” and not insofar as it serves specific human needs. Nor is it moral or immoral. It is amoral.

“Perfection” in Spinoza’s medieval Latin means *completeness* of some sort. Does this include suffering in nature? There is no reason to deny or underestimate suffering, but neither should its relation to perfection be overestimated. Stephan Lackner (1984) has published a highly stimulating

book concerning that. Some ecologists seem to ask us to refrain completely from intervening to help needlessly suffering animals. As human beings, however, we have obligations, primarily toward suffering human beings, but also toward nonhuman beings. There are, of course, inevitable clashes of norms in this area, but some norms in the sense of general guidelines are fairly clear. We may refuse to passively witness what we consider unnecessary suffering. The predators kill, but we are free to intervene in some cases.⁵ I don't know how the text of the *Ethics* may lend itself to this question of the deep ecology movement.

Spinoza made use of all the central philosophical terms of his time but defined them in his own way, and he has the tendency to relate each of them to each of the others in a characteristic way. Without studying that very special way, I do not think that one can form an adequate picture of his *system*. To act in the sense of expressing one's own nature is to act freely, determined only by one's own nature and not arbitrarily or by chance—but of course not determined in the sense of fatalism.

An act causes something adequately, and every being causes something this way. That is, every being shares, as we have pointed out earlier, in the creativity of God or Nature. Every being is not wholly in something other (*in alio*) in the terminology of Spinoza. Power is power to act, that is, cause adequately, and an increase of this cannot but increase the level of virtue. (Here Spinoza fundamentally differs from Hobbes.) The relation of *virtus* to other key terms is fixed through seventeen equivalences.⁶

In contemporary philosophy of politics, a distinction is often made between "power over" (coercive power) and "power to." Spinoza's term clearly refers to a kind of "power to."

To be, and therefore to act, in oneself (*in suo esse*) is one of the basic notions in the *Ethics*. It has a clear connection with self-preservation, but for important reasons Spinoza prefers a different term, *perseverare in suo esse*. The relation of the ecosophically important notions of self-realization to the Spinozist *perseverare* justifies a closer inspection of terminology and the significantly different concepts at hand.

The principle of self-preservation as exemplified and as defined by philosophers and biologists at least since the Stoics had a main component

of defense against external threats. However, it also covers behavior and structure adopted to maintain inner equilibrium under changing environmental conditions. Conceived in this way, the principle has acquired renewed importance through the deep ecology movement.

The notion of "persevere in one's (particular) being" is useful in argumentation against arbitrary manipulation of genes in animals and human beings. The more or less "instinctive" reluctance, developed through millions of years, to interfere with the particular beings may find philosophical justification at this point. Affinities between Stoic philosophy and deep ecology attitudes have often been noted, but the differences are clear: the latter implies social and political activism directed toward conditions significantly different from those in all or most countries. There is no quietism, and no lack of passion in the deep ecology movement. Insofar as it has affinities with Spinoza, it favors the strong positive emotions required to advance in the level of freedom. Of course, most supporters of the movement have never heard about Spinoza, and some might dislike what they hear.

The increased *level of* perseveration seems to be proportional to the increase in the eight or more *in se* predicates: power, freedom, virtue, and so on. The expression *quantum in se est*, "in so far (the being is in itself)," is central, not only in the *Ethics*, but also in the *Theological-Political Treatise* (cap. 16): "It is a law of all nature (or: a highest law . . .) that every being endeavors (*conatur*) to persevere in its state, in so far as it is in itself." The translation "to preserve" is misleading.

Wyld (1932) has formulated the dictionary meaning of the English term *persevere* as follows: "to persist doggedly and with determination, diligence and patience, with the object a) of completing a task; b) of overcoming difficulty or opposition; c) of attaining a purpose, securing an aim, etc." C. T. Lewis (1951) translates the classic Latin term *perseverare* as "to abide, adhere strictly, continue steadfastly, persist, persevere." An example is *navis perseveravit*, "the ship kept on its course." We choose a course and persevere.⁷

The term *perseverare* in the *Ethics* must, of course, be conceived more abstractly and generally, but I think the English term furnishes an adequate basis. The dynamic character of Spinoza's thinking is better served than by use of, for example, *preservation* or *conservation*.

Human power to act is proportional to the extent to which we are the adequate cause of something, which again, according to the definition of adequate causation, is *proportional to the extent* to which what is done follows from our nature or essence *alone*, and not from any *pressure* upon us. When we act in the sense introduced, we persevere in our being or essence. A thing that perseveres in its being “in so far as it is in itself” perseveres in its essence.

“To persevere in one’s being” is the same as “to persevere in one’s essence” and not to persevere in someone else’s essence, says Spinoza. Altruism in the sense of caring for others or doing things for the sake of others does not imply shedding one’s essence and jumping into the essence of something else. A being is freer the more it acts out of, or is caused by, *its own nature alone*. It is a question of maintaining identity, not of strengthening ego or egocentricity. Spinoza’s doctrine at this point, with its undermining of the standard conception of altruism, furnishes an excellent *kind of* basis for a deep ecology concept of identification with every living being. I say “kind of” because of the opportunity for a variety of conceptualizations.

The term *perseverare* acquires its function from its position within a structure that is unique to Spinoza’s system and different from the function of related terms in other philosophers’ systems. It would lead us astray, though, if we adopted *self-perseverance* as a fundamental term of Spinoza’s system. No single term is fundamental in his system. There are at least a dozen that are ultimates from a systematic point of view. Therefore, we cannot overemphasize the importance of keeping the internal relations of a manifold of terms in mind. If we do not, the system falls apart and becomes a disorderly heap of postulates.

Taken at its crudest, the endeavor to continue somehow to survive is of little systematic interest. Moreover, taken to imply a resistance to change—a striving to keep on just as one always has done, it is clearly un-Spinozistic. There is an urge for change. Human beings, and others being, are always “on the way”—without change of essence. The dynamic, interactionist view of the self makes it inevitable to interpret a basic principle of *conatus* as a striving for self-causingness, activeness, power. We might connect it more specifically with the striving for perfection, for wholeness, completeness, self-madeness, as suggested by the special use of the term in

the *Ethics*. The use of *conatus* in VP28 is instructive: “the *conatus* or desire to understand things in the third way of cognition.” Love of particular beings, *amor intellectualis*, is not a luxury indulged by the few, but a bone-hard human reality.

The proof of proposition 20 in part IV offers an excellent occurrence of grading *conatus*, perseverance, conservation, power, and virtue:

Virtue is the very power of man, and is defined solely by the essence of man, that is, which is defined through solely the striving by which man strives to preserve in his being. Therefore, the more each strives to conserve his being, and is able to do so, the more he is endowed with virtue. And as a consequence, to the extent a man neglects to conserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

And, of course, wanting in virtue. One is reminded of the Greek term *areté*, conventionally translated “virtue” but lacking the specific moral atmosphere of “virtue.” Spinoza’s antimoralistic attitude may remind one of that of Hobbes, but not the general gentleness and, in a broad sense, his ethical approach. In the ecosophy I feel at home with, a fundamental norm can be formulated using one word, “self-realization!” The nearest term in the terminology of the *Ethics*, *to persevere in one’s self*, can be interpreted in the direction of “express one’s self,” “self-fulfillment,” “realizing one’s potentials” — “self-realization.”

The self can be said to comprise that with which one identifies. The identification may be superficial or deep, the scope of identification narrow or broad. The person, I suggest, who is “all-round” mature cannot avoid identifying with every living being—seeing himself or herself in every being. If the two persons are Anne and Tom Taylor, clearly they do not see Anne and Tom in every being. There is *something* they see in themselves *and* in any other being. What something? It is tempting to mention one particular metaphysical theory specifying the *x*. I refer to the Bhagavad Gita’s announcement: “Those who are equipped with *yoga* look on all with an impartial eye, seeing *Ātman* (the Self) in all beings and all beings in *Ātman*” (chap. 6, v. 29; Gandhi’s translation).

Nine out of ten news items about the ecological crisis are potentially discouraging. It is understandable that some young supporters of the deep ecology movement despair, grow pessimistic and increasingly passive—

this in spite of their feeling of certainty that the goal of the deep ecology movement is in harmony with what they fundamentally and intuitively stand for. They try to “persevere in their being, in so far as they are in themselves,” that is, insofar as they are able to act as integrated, powerful people—in the Spinozistic sense of “power.”

People motivated by the positive (active) affects and not the negative (passive) ones have the same ultimate aim, taking part in the same highest virtue of the mind (VP25, proof), and are therefore capable of joining together in *peaceful communities*. The stronger these joyful affects are, the better. Spinoza is a rare bird among philosophers: he makes a significant advance along the road to freedom by relying on the strength of positive feelings! Reason points out the way to go, but only the strength of the feelings can do the job, as we travel along a long, difficult trail, each on a separate trail (*svamarga*), the way of one's own self.

There are—perhaps I should add “of course”—some sentences in the *Ethics* that are difficult for supporters of the deep ecology movement to digest. A passage in part IV (P37Sch) seems to rely on a curious theorem: the less the nature of people is similar, the less easy it is to live together, and the less they are useful to each other. This, I think, can be inferred from what he says about the nature of different living beings. From such a point of view he talks about animals that have feelings but, he says, have such a very different nature from ours that they cannot be our friends and members of our communities. He does not say that they cannot be our friends because they are inferior or lower. Their nature is too different.

Part of what Spinoza says in this connection is different from what supporters of the deep ecology movement tend to say. What I refer to is Spinoza's statement that animals have the *same* right in relation to human beings as human beings have in relation to animals, but that human beings have *more* right than animals. Many supporters of the deep ecology movement say that animals have as much right as human beings. There is an equality of right.

I tend to disagree with any quantification here. Animals and human beings may be said to have at least *one kind of right* in common, namely, the right to live and blossom. The concept I prefer if I use the term *right* in this

connection is such that it does not warrant quantification. If I intentionally kill a mosquito, I violate its right, but not because I, as a human being, have more right. If Spinoza relates to another being with *amor intellectualis*, can he nevertheless deny doing things for *their own sake*? In modern terminology, *intellectual* love would not imply attributing intrinsic value, but that is irrelevant here. Spinoza does not use the term *right* in such a way and he cannot avoid quantification.

I find it strange that some people seem to think it paradoxical that theorists of the deep ecology movement tend to cherish Spinoza. He talks about animals with so little respect, they say. The inspiration does not depend, though, on reading his texts as a holy scripture. We do expect him to be influenced by at least some of the dominant opinions among his contemporaries. We have the right to treat animals "as is most convenient for us," he writes in one of his "notes," not as part of a theorem. If, however, some of us have advanced farther than others on the way to the application of the third way of knowledge, *amor intellectualis*, the third way will have priority over conveniences. Animal factories that violate the dignity of animals cannot be operated in conformity with the active affect.

There is among Spinoza's *terms* none that corresponds to the important term (*process of*) *identification* by which human beings attribute intrinsic or inherent value to every human being and to many, or all, categories of non-human beings. The structure of his system is such that all beings take part in the power of God. Because of the equivalences joining *power* with other terms, *the structure* is compatible with the intrinsic value and the self-realization views. The *content* of the note attached to IVP₃₇ is not. For my use of this note in Spinoza's text, it is enough to add to it: what partakes in the creative power of God has intrinsic value and this applies to the total manifold of creatures. In this way the passage from the basic ("level 1") announcements of Spinoza to the ("level 2") eight points of my proposed Eight Points of the Deep Ecology Movement is not difficult (Devall and Sessions 1985: 70).

Supporters of the deep ecology movement have been increasingly involved in social and political conflicts. Since the controversies on pesticides, the pervasiveness of social and political obstacles has made supporters more pessimistic about the near future. The question must here be

raised, Can something be learned from seventeenth-century Spinoza about the frustrating political situation in the twentieth century? Not very much, I am afraid.

An understanding of Spinoza's political opinion is clearly dependent on what he says in the *Ethics* and other works, and on the special social and political conditions in the Netherlands at that time. I shall here limit myself to some remarks on the relations between the *Ethics* and his social philosophy insofar as they are fairly independent of the special conditions in his time. They concern primarily some of the central terms mentioned in the foregoing.

Adequate ideas are available only through the second and third kinds of cognition, the rational and the intuitive. These two kinds do not conflict, but the rational teaches us only what is required in our quest to understand in the third way, that is, ultimately what is necessary individually, socially, and politically to reach a peaceful community.⁸

The social situation shows how far from reaching utopia we are: most people are, according to Spinoza, led by passive rather than active affects, and they choose leaders who seem to help them reach goals derived from these passive affects. This means that even a democracy may fail to change policies.

Spinoza grew increasingly pessimistic, and his opinions changed over the long period in which he worked on the manuscript of the *Ethics*. The last time was in 1674, two years after the politically catastrophic year of the assassination of Jan de Witt. Spinoza was politically active, and the depressing events of 1672 may have changed some of his ideas—he was led toward general pessimism about the future. It did not, however, influence the main structure of the *Ethics*, the propositions and their proofs. It is more likely that it affected some of the notes (*Scholiae*) put in between the propositions.

It is not the personal opinions, but the main body (and the general structure) of the *Ethics* that has inspired, and will in the future inspire those who, on the basis of their fundamental beliefs and attitudes, try to contribute, however modestly, to the solutions of the ecological crisis. It is clear to those who teach Spinoza at the universities that the appeal of Spinoza is close to universal. It is not astonishing that he is sometimes called THE philosopher.

Spinoza had a vision, a small set of intimately connected deep intuitions. He clearly saw that conveying the content of his vision, and of all main views dependent on it, would not be possible in a small number of words. The argumentation in the *Ethics* uses many words and many levels of the premise-conclusion relation. The intimacy of the relation between the key terms enables the careful reader to get a feeling of the basic intuitions Spinoza tried to elicit in us.

A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

Introductory Remarks

Since 1947 a great number of publications in the social sciences (taken in a broad sense) and in philosophy have had peaceful cooperation between today's major power constellations as a main or subsidiary topic. Various surveys, such as the UNESCO publication *The Nature of Conflict*, show a reassuring richness in aspects and approaches. Little has been done, however, to utilize the vast potential of those attitudes of nonviolence that have crystallized in more or less explicit ethical doctrines. Comparatively few publications attempt a synthesis of philosophical and social science approaches. In this paper an example of such a synthesis will be offered.

Any normative, systematic ethics containing a general norm against violence will be called an ethics of nonviolence. (The norm must, of course, exclude war for defensive purposes.) The term *violence* must cover not only open, physical violence but also injury and psychic terror. The term *hostility* would, perhaps, give rise to more adequate associations. In the following an instance of such an ethics of nonviolence, that of Gandhi, will be given in a condensed, systematized form. This has not been attempted before. The task is important in part because it makes it easier to distinguish essentials from nonessentials, and features owing to particular historical situations from features of general, timeless, or at least very permanent validity or applicability.

This article was reprinted with permission from *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.) 2 (1958): 140–55. Sources cited here appear in the selected bibliography following this article.

Systematization D of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

This part of the paper has a definite, very limited purpose: to give a brief and highly condensed exposition of one part of Gandhi's ethics of conflict.

In the realm of political action, Gandhi's views and precepts were usually explicit. According to his ethics, explicitness is a duty. His politically relevant actions were innumerable, and he made running comments on them in terms of ethical appraisals. This makes it practicable to work out broad, interrelated groups of sentences representing *rational reconstructions* or *models* covering Gandhi's ethically relevant verbal behavior.

The primary sources for this kind of inquiry are historical documents and other materials concerning Gandhi's activities, his own systematic writings, and his correspondence, conversations, speeches, and so on, which were recorded or summarized by Mahadev Desai and others. Much of this material has already been printed and is easily available.

If I were to mention a publication that has particularly high value for rational reconstructions, I would choose the first volume of Gandhi's *Non-violence in Peace and War*. It was not written completely by Gandhi himself. It includes not only a collection of newspaper articles and letters but also recordings of conversations. They are all dated, and most of them refer to well-known political actions going on at the time. The concrete nature of the problems at issue does not reduce the philosophical value of the material; rather, it enhances it. The interpretation of professional philosophers' ethical texts is usually hindered by an almost complete lack of reference to application in concrete situations. This holds for Plato, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and others. Even constructed examples are sometimes lacking. Without abundant application to concrete and well-known situations, ethical doctrines are almost impenetrable to analysis.

In the following, one particular version, "D," of one particular rational reconstruction in the form of a normative system will be outlined. The system belongs to the class of systems that outline, reflect, or portray, not all Gandhian thought, but Gandhi's *ethics of group struggle between 1906 and 1934*. It does this, as far as I can judge, sufficiently closely and extensively to be considered an adequate rational reconstruction.

The version D is a condensed and, therefore, to some extent rough exposition of the system. Concerning the adequacy of systematization D, the following should be added: The norms N1–N25 and most of the hypotheses are

selected on the basis of a survey of norms and hypotheses in Gandhi's writings. Some of our formulations are rather close to those of Gandhi; others are only indirectly or in part derived from him. Our main concern has been to assure that all norms of group ethics necessary to justify and explain *satyāgraha* (as described by Gandhi) are included, in a rough way, in N1–N25 and that no norm is contrary to the spirit of the formulations found in Gandhi's texts. Thus, completeness or comprehensiveness has ranked high in our choice of D as a first approximation to an optimal version of the system.

The (necessary) documentation in testing the degree of material adequacy of the systematization D requires a separate article. Most of the quotations and comments required in such documentation are already published (in Norwegian) (Galtung and Naess 1955).

We will not raise the question of the extent to which systematizations and systems may differ and still belong to the class of adequate rational reconstructions. Presumably, considerable changes in content might be made without doing violence to the available observational material.

The ethics of group struggle is conceived in this article as a part of ethics in general, but with a certain amount of independence: the total set of its norms is derived from a small number of norms that concern group struggle and a set of (nonnormative) hypotheses.

The dependence of the part upon the whole of ethics is structurally shown by the derivation of the basic norms concerning group struggle from norms of other parts of ethics. This dependence is also indicated by the fact that some of the norms of the particular version of the ethics of group struggle outlined here (systematization D) can be derived from norms of other parts of ethics by processes of inference that do not include the basic norms of the ethics of group struggle. The norm N8, "Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent," in systematization D is derived from norm N4 and hypothesis H9, that is, from "If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency to violence in the participants in the struggle" and "You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating and provoking him." Norm N8, however, might just as well be derived from a code of conduct concerning behavior toward others, whether participants in a struggle or not. The historical data permit (of course) a number of different explanations of the derivation of the top norm N1 of systematization D from top

norms of general ethics. Here is one possibility, the *D systematization. It is expressed in terms that certainly require much commitment but that may be good enough for the present purpose of illustrating the dependence of the ethics of group struggle upon other parts of ethics.

*N1. Seek complete self-realization.

*H1. Complete self-realization presupposes that you seek truth.

*H2. All living beings are ultimately one.

*H3. Violence against yourself makes complete self-realization impossible.

*H4. Violence against any living being is violence against yourself (derived from *H2).

*H5. Violence against any living being makes complete self-realization impossible (derived from *H3 and *H4).

*N2. Realize nonviolence and seek truth (derived from *N1, *H1, and *H5).

N1. Act in group struggle and act, moreover, in a way conducive to long-term, universal, maximal reduction of violence.

The derivation of N1 from the basic general norm of self-realization permits us to picture the ethics of group struggle as an application of that norm to particular situations. It should be noted that N1 is not characteristic of consistent (or rather extreme) pacifist positions, since it may be argued, without attacking N1, that killing in a group struggle may in some situations be more conducive to the long-term, universal reduction of violence than nonkilling.

Systematization D

N1. Act in group struggle and act, moreover, in a way conducive to long-term universal reduction of violence.

Sentence N1 is intended to express *the* top norm of the system. All other norms are conceived to be derivable from this norm plus hypotheses.

The normative power of the system rests with N1 and N1 alone. Instead of using the phrase “hypotheses and norms of the system,” we might as well have the phrase “descriptions and prescriptions.” The term *hypothesis* is used because it suggests that we wish to emphasize the empirical, a posteriori character of the statements. Since all norms of the system except N1 are prescribed only under the condition that certain hypotheses are true, the whole system except N1 is, in principle, open to scrutiny from a scientific point of view. That is, the validity of every single statement of the ethics of group struggle depends upon the truth and tenability of a set of empirical hypotheses, *testable only by the techniques of the social sciences*. This is asserted here in relation to systematization D only, but other systematizations would show a similar implicit dependence on social science.

The top norm N1 is preferred to a norm simply saying “Do not use violence” because, among other things, the latter would be too narrow. N1 envisages a reduction of violence, not just the reduction of one’s own violence. Gandhi demands not only personal abstention from violence but a conduct that does not provoke violence by the opponent or anybody else affected by our conduct. Thus, we should not humiliate him by certain kinds of passive resistance, because this is likely to produce hatred, which, in turn, may strengthen his disposition toward future use of violence.

There is another important aspect of N1: it requires that we act in group struggles and not run away from the area of conflict. Here the basic attitude of the *karamayogi* reveals itself: one cannot retreat to the solitude of the Himalayas in order to follow N1, because nonviolence by mere isolation from others is not likely to induce nonviolent behavior in others. It is by personal interaction in conflict situations that we can best reduce violence.

The use of the term *violence* in Gandhian texts is such that sometimes rather narrow and sometimes rather broad concepts can be made to fit the occurrence of the term. On the whole, *violence* is used to include much more than physical violence and injury. In this article we shall leave much of the ambiguity and vagueness untouched. For the purpose of systematization of a somewhat higher level of verbal precision than D, the following definition may suffice:

Definition 1: “The person *P* is violent toward the person *Q* in a given situation *S* (or at a given time *T*)” shall mean the same as “The person *P* is injuring or coercing, or he intends to injure or coerce, or he would, if given

opportunity (in that situation), injure or coerce the person *Q* in the situation *S* (or at the time *T*)."

The person *Q* may be *P* himself. In a next approximation to an adequate systematization, the terms *injure* and *coerce* would either have to be carefully introduced or other terms substituted for them.

H1. The means determine the results.

Gandhi formulated his view on this point in a most categorical way. For example, he wrote: "Means and ends are convertible in my philosophy of life. They say 'means are, after all, means.' I would say 'means are, after all, everything.' As the means, so the end." He also expressed his idea in this way: "The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree." *H1* might also be thus formulated: The character of the means determines the character of the results.

Hypotheses *H2* and *H3* below are derived from *H1*. They may, however, be considered separately; those who hesitate to accept Gandhi's strong view of means and ends should not make their evaluation of *H2* and *H3* wholly dependent on *H1*. The latter is difficult to confirm in its extremely general form.

H2. In a group struggle you can keep the goal-directed motivation and the ability to work effectively for the realization of the goal stronger than the destructive, violent tendencies and the tendencies to passiveness and despondency only by making a constructive program part of your campaign and by giving all phases of your struggle, as far as possible, a constructive character.

A quotation from Gandhi's newspaper *Harijan* (Dhawan 1946) indicates how important he found this hypothesis: "By hammering away at it through painful years," replied Gandhi, "people have begun to see that there is a potency in non-violence, but they have not seen it in all its fullness and beauty. If they had responded to all the steps that had to be taken for the effective organization of non-violence and carried out in their fullness the various items of the eighteen-fold constructive programme, our movement would have taken us to our goal. But today our minds are confused because our faith in constructive work is so weak."

We assume tacitly that the goal is acceptable from the point of view of Gandhi's ethics as a whole. This assumption is used in relation to other hypotheses and norms of systematization D. The system is conceived as a part of a general system of ethics, and directives as to how to fight for a bad cause are irrelevant. This note is important because otherwise one cannot assume, as in H2, that there is an incompatibility between goal-directed motivation and destructive, violent tendencies.

H3. Being violent counteracts long-term, universal reduction of violence.

The qualification "long-term, universal" is used in order to provide a basis for the argument that, even if the short-term result of a war or of a minor violent act may be complete suppression of a large-scale violence that at the moment is threatening, the long-term effects of the violence are likely to result in more violence than was avoided as an immediate result.

N2. Make a constructive program part of your campaign and give, as far as possible, all phases of your struggle a constructive character.

Norm N2 is conceived to be derivable from N1 and the hypothesis H2.

N3. Never resort to violence against your opponent.

Norm N3 is conceived to be derivable from N1 and H3. Actually, as formulated above, no derivation is, of course, possible in any strictly logical sense. Such derivation would require complete formalization of the system. Here we can only offer a point of departure for explications with adequate logical relations. Remarks similar to this are called for in many other instances in the following where the terms *derive* and *derivable* are used.

N4. If you are not able to subsume any of a group of relevant actions or attitudes as in themselves violent or constructive, then choose that action or attitude that most probably reduces the tendency toward violence (i.e., violent actions or attitudes) in the participants in the struggle (partisans as well as opponents).

Norm N4 is derived from N1 as a specification of it (it might also be conceived as derived from N1 and H1).

The next norms are derived from norms N₂, N₃, and N₄ with the aid of further hypotheses. To facilitate surveying the systematization as a whole, we shall write it out in a somewhat schematic way.

A norm is said to be on level k , $k > 1$, if it is directly derived from a norm of level $k-1$ together with certain hypotheses or as a specification of it. A hypothesis is said to be of level k if it is used in the direct derivation of level $k+1$.

First-level norms and hypotheses

N₁, H₁, H₂, H₃.

Second-level norms and hypotheses

N₂. Derived from N₁ and H₂.

N₃. Derived from N₁ and H₃.

N₄. Derived from N₁ or from N₁ and H₁.

H4. You can give the struggle a constructive character only if you conceive it and carry it through as a struggle *in favor of* human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists.

H5. It will have a constructive effect on you yourself and on those for whom you struggle if you live together with them and do constructive work for them.

H6. It will create a natural basis for confidence in you among those for whom you struggle if you live together with them and do constructive work for them.

H7. All human beings have interests—at least long-term interests—in common (derivable from *H₂).

H8. Cooperation on common goals reduces the chance that the actions and attitudes of the participants in the conflict will become violent.

H9. You invite violence from your opponent by humiliating or provoking him.

Thus, if as part of a boycott of a university or a shop you lie down in the corridors so as to make it impossible for those opposed to the boycott to avoid stepping on you, your opponent is humiliated. He may refrain from entering the building for respectable ethical reasons, or he may do it with resentment and anger. He is not likely to be won to your case, but, on the contrary, he will be more willing to use extreme measures in the conflict.

H10. Thorough knowledge of the relevant facts and factors increases the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goal of your campaign.

Gandhi always acquired a thorough knowledge of relevant circumstances before he acted, and he warned his adherents against advocating his cause before they knew well the various aspects of the problems of concern.

H11. Secrecy and distortion or avoidance of truth reduces the chance of a nonviolent realization of the goal of your campaign.

As was indicated above, in the *D systematization, the demand for truth was central in Gandhi's ethics.

It might be pointed out here as a subhypothesis that the intention to keep certain plans, moves, motives, and objectives secret influences our behavior so that we cannot face our opponent openly; such an intention is also more easily revealed to the opponent than we are likely to believe.

H12. The better you make clear to yourself what the essential points are in your cause and your struggle, the less likely you are to take a violent attitude.

H13. The better your opponent understands your conduct and your case, the less likely he is to use violent means.

On the whole, Gandhi would insist that we inform our opponent more completely—and especially by action, not mere proclamations.

H14. There is a disposition in every opponent such that wholehearted, intelligent, strong, and persistent appeal in favor of a good cause is able ultimately to convince him.

Gandhi tended to include any normal person in the intended field of validity of this hypothesis, interpreting "normal" broadly enough to cover

Hitler. A person's capacity to convince the opponent may be inadequate, but it can be developed.

H15. Mistrust stems from misjudgment, especially of the disposition of your opponent to answer trust with trust and mistrust with mistrust.

There are many examples in Gandhi's writings of this conception of trust and mistrust. His life likewise offers examples of the way he trusted people strongly opposed to him and the courage he thus proved. He repeatedly risked his own life by believing that he could trust his opponents when he met them personally.

H16. The tendency to misjudge our opponent and his case in an unfavorable direction increases his and our tendency to resort to violence.

H17. You can win most thoroughly with nonviolent means by turning your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your cause.

No effort has been made to derive some of the hypotheses from others. By suitable modifications, H15 and H17 might be derived from H14.

Third-level norms and hypotheses

N5 (derived from N2 and H4). Conceive your struggle and carry it through as a positive struggle in favor of human beings and certain values, thus eventually fighting antagonisms, but not antagonists.

It may be mentioned, as an example, that Gandhi in his most famous campaign supported the people in making salt rather than instigating them against the empire salt producers and their factories. The situation desired was anticipated. One should fight the antagonism, not the antagonists.

N6 (derived from N2 and H5 or from N4 and H6). Live together with those for whom you struggle and do constructive work for them.

N7 (derived from N2 and H7 or from N4 and H7 and H8). Try to

formulate the essential interests that you and your opponent have in common and try to establish a cooperation with your opponent on this basis.

N8 (derived from N3 or from N4 and H9). Do not humiliate or provoke your opponent.

N9 (derived from N4 and H10). Acquire the best possible knowledge of the facts and factors relevant to the nonviolent realization of the goal of your cause.

N10 (derived from N4 and H11). Do your utmost to be in full accordance with the truth in your description of individuals, groups, institutions, and circumstances relevant to the struggle.

N11 (derived from N4 and H11). Do not use secret plans or moves or keep objectives secret.

N12 (derived from N4 and H12 and H13). Announce your case and the goal of your campaign explicitly and clearly, distinguishing essentials from nonessentials.

N13 (derived from N4 and H13). Seek personal contact with your opponent and be available to him.

N14 (derived from N3 or from N4 and H16). Do not judge your opponent harder than yourself.

N15 (derived from N4, H14, H15, and H16). Trust your opponent.

N16 (derived from N4, H14, and H17). Turn your opponent into a believer in and supporter of your case.

H18. You provoke your opponent if you destroy his property.

H19. Adequate understanding of your opponent presupposes personal *Einfühlung*.

H20. Avoidance of misjudgment of your opponent and his case presupposes understanding him and his case.

H21. If one keeps in mind one's own fallibility and failures,

opponents are less likely to be misjudged in an unfavorable way, and their case underestimated intellectually or morally.

H22. Every political action, your own included, is likely to be based, in part, on mistaken views and to be carried out in an imperfect way.

H23. You make it difficult for your opponent to turn to support of your case if you are unwilling to compromise on nonessentials.

H24. It furthers the conversion of your opponent if he understands that you are sincere.

H25. The best way of convincing your opponent of your sincerity is to make sacrifices for your cause.

H26. During a campaign, change of its declared objective makes it difficult for opponents to trust your sincerity.

With regard to H26, Gandhi had in mind the expansion of objectives at moments of weakness in the opponent, and contraction when it seems that the strength of the opponent has been underrated.

Fourth-level norms

N17 (derived from N8 and H18). Do not destroy property belonging to your opponent.

N18 (derived from N14 and H19 and H20). Cultivate personal *Einfühlung* with your opponent.

N19 (derived from N10 or from N14 and H20). Do not formulate your case and the goal of your campaigns and that of your opponent in a biased way.

N20 (derived from N14 and H21). Keep in mind and admit your own mistakes and weaknesses.

N21 (derived from N14 and H21). Keep in mind and admit the possibility that you are factually or morally mistaken, even when you sincerely believe that you are not.

N22 (derived from N16 and H22 and H23). Always be willing to compromise in nonessentials.

N23 (derived from N16 and H24). Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent.

N24 (derived from N16 and H24 and H25). Be willing to make sacrifices for your cause.

N25 (derived from N16 and H24 and H26). During a campaign, do not change its objective by making its goal wider or narrower.

Exemplification and Elaboration

In this section I shall illustrate how the meager outline can be taken as a starting point for a more substantial presentation. Something will be said about two of the norms of the system, N2 and N23, just to make them more understandable and also more subject to criticism.

The importance in systematization D of norm N2, "Make a constructive program part of your campaign," stems in part from Gandhi's conviction that, if it is ignored by some sections of the supporters of *satyāgraha*, the strongest nonviolent methods in the fight for political freedom are rendered inapplicable. Only those who are able to take upon themselves the tasks of constructive community service are sufficiently mature for intense nonviolent struggle. In 1930 Gandhi stressed that he could not advise civil disobedience campaigns because N2 was unlikely to be fulfilled. Insufficient constructive content in the fight for freedom would make it overwhelmingly probable that there would be violence. Gandhi was determined to stop a civil disobedience campaign in case of violence, such as happened at Chaura Chauri, where some British policemen were murdered.

Gandhi insisted on constructive definitions of goals and subgoals and demanded that Indians should work together on peaceful economic and other projects, thereby acquiring a spirit of mutual trust and a habit of sacrifice in the interest of the wider goals. In India such work was organized and planned under the name of "The Constructive Programme." The norms saying that one should contribute to the implementation of the con-

structive program make up an integral part of the Gandhian ethics of group struggle. It is not a mere accessory.

A couple of quotations will make the point clearer. In his argumentation in January 1930 that the atmosphere is not such that a mass civil disobedience campaign can be started, Gandhi says among other things:

Constructive program is not essential for local civil disobedience for specific relief as in the case of Bardoli. Tangible common grievance restricted to a particular locality is enough. But for such an indefinable thing as Swaraj [freedom], people must have previous training in doing things of All-India interest. Trust begotten in the pursuit of continuous constructive work becomes a tremendous asset at the critical moment. Constructive work therefore is for a nonviolent army what drilling etc., is for an army designed for bloody warfare. Individual civil disobedience among an unprepared people and by leaders not known to or trusted by them is of no avail, a mass civil disobedience is an impossibility. The more therefore the progress of the constructive program, the greater is the chance for civil disobedience. Granted a perfectly nonviolent atmosphere and a fulfilled constructive program, I would undertake to lead a mass civil disobedience struggle to a successful issue in the space of a few months.

(*Young India*, January 9, 1930)

In the booklet *Constructive Programme* Gandhi even says that mass civil disobedience might be dispensed with if the constructive program were taken seriously by all concerned:

Civil disobedience is not absolutely necessary to win freedom through purely non-violent efforts, if the cooperation of the whole nation is secured in the constructive programme. . . . My handling of civil disobedience without constructive programme will be like a paralysed hand attempting to lift a spoon.
(Diwakar 1946: 187)

The constructive work is of various kinds. Here are a few items in a long list: work for removal of untouchability, for spread of hand-spun and hand-woven cloth, for other village industries, for village sanitation, for basic education through crafts, for literacy.

Gandhi also had in mind the effect upon the opponent. In the eyes of the opponent, the revolutionary seems mainly to have destruction in view.

Gandhi requires methods whereby the constructive intent is made completely clear and trustworthy to the skeptical opponent.

As a demonstration against the British salt tax and salt monopoly, considered to be profoundly unjust, Gandhi and a mass of poor people marched to the sea to make salt (illegally). *While the campaign was going on*, Gandhi used much time for other tasks, such as instigating house industry and cleaning up slum quarters. The latter activity was part of the campaign and part of the struggle for *swaraj* as a whole. It was a demonstration *ad oculos* and helped both followers and opponents fix their attention upon the positive goals rather than upon the means and the inevitable destructive components, that is, disabling the British administration and so on.

One may say that the norm to partake in a constructive program is the supreme anti-antimovement norm in the system: those tendencies in organizations or groups that favor the destruction of something (the organized anti-Semites, anticommunists, antifascists, etc.) are denounced; every action should have a clear positive or pro-character.

I have used the norm "Give your campaign a constructive content" to illustrate the rich, scarcely surveyable material that must be studied in order to proceed from a mere diagram toward a full presentation of Gandhi's political ethics. It should be clear from the comments and quotations that constructivity of main goals, constructivity of subgoals, and the so-called Constructive Programme are means by which Gandhi tried to contribute to the implementation of *many* norms. It should also be clear that some norms may be viewed as occupying a lower position in relation to the norm requiring constructive work. Actually, the constructive work was a kind of partial anticipation of the condition Gandhi called *purna swaraj*, *real* independence, an ideal state of society. The political independence was not, as such, a constructive goal for him, since it was defined as *absence* of British domination.

Let us elaborate upon another norm, N23, "Do not exploit a weakness in the position of your opponent," in case it owes to factors not relevant to the struggle.

A campaign is not clearly subservient to the goal of converting the opponent, if victory in the sense of bringing the opponent to accept the conditions for terminating the *satyāgraha* is caused by some misfortune he has experienced that makes it necessary for him to call off his struggle with the

satyāgrahi. In short, if by factors irrelevant to the struggle and therefore unrelated to the conversion of the opponent, the *satyāgrahi* are able to get what they desire *in terms of conditions*, they should desist from asking for those conditions.

As an example, we may take what happened at the last stage of the *satyāgraha* campaign in South Africa.

Gandhi fought against certain laws that he considered discriminatory against the Indians. Their repeal was the condition for bringing the *satyāgraha* campaign to a stop. The Indian leaders were planning a march as part of the *satyāgraha*. When a railway strike broke out among the white employees, the government was in a dangerous position and might well have been willing to settle the conflict with the Indians in order to meet the situation created by the strike. Let me quote what Gandhi (1927) says in his narrative. Its reliable character is not contested by his adversary—and great admirer—General Smuts.

Just at this time there was a great strike of the European employees of the Union railways, which made the position of the Government extremely delicate. I was called upon to commence the Indian march at such a fortunate juncture. But I declared that the Indians could not thus assist the railway strikers, as they [the Indians] were not out to harass the Government, their struggle being entirely different and differently conceived. Even if we undertook the march, we would begin it at some other time when the railway trouble had ended. This decision of ours created a deep impression, and was cabled to England by Reuter.

When the Second World War broke out, pressure was brought upon Gandhi to intensify the fight against the British. He declined to take up mass civil disobedience during the war. He said: "There is neither warrant nor atmosphere for mass action. That would be naked embarrassment and a betrayal of non-violence. . . . By causing embarrassment at this stage, the authorities must resent it bitterly, and are likely to act madly. It is worse than suicide to resort to violence that is embarrassment under the cover of non-violence."¹

The argumentation and also the behavior of Gandhi in these two instances are in conformity with a norm such as N23. Later, during the Second World War, Gandhi intended to start a mass movement. This plan cre-

ates a problem for our systematization. It requires (1) a hypothesis that the British then, in the autumn of 1942, were no longer in a temporarily weak position, or (2) a decision that Gandhi violated his own norms, or (3) a decision to modify systematization D so as to make Gandhi's behavior in both 1920 and 1942 conform to the explication of his ethics. We tentatively take the view that Gandhi in 1942 violated his own norms and are consequently able to retain systematization D as adequate.

Application to Efforts of Peaceful International Cooperation

The foregoing system of norms formidably restricts the field of justifiable forms of conflict resolution. It is, however, the claim of the proponents of ethics of nonviolence *that such a system does not leave out any effective form of conflict resolution*. It is presupposed that the goal is justifiable from the point of view of general ethics. It is claimed, therefore, that no effective (powerful, adequate) form is excluded for those who fight for a bad cause. The criteria of goodness offered by Gandhi and others are such that no statesmen of today would openly reject them. That is, contemporary men in power would proclaim their goals to be good in the sense required.

In view of this, the ethics of nonviolence claims to give the effective means of reaching at least one of the goals of the major powers in present-day international politics, namely, that of peaceful cooperation in the minimum sense.

Grave questions arise immediately, however, when this common goal is seen in combination with other goals of more traditional kinds, such as ideological or economic domination or leadership. Here the antagonists impute to each other the most sinister designs. However, the possibility that the antagonist is fighting also for bad causes, according to each of the participants, does not, according to the above, make the nonviolent forms of struggle less effective. It reduces the chances that nonviolent methods are wholeheartedly adopted, but not the chances that they will succeed, if adopted.

Which are now the main forms of struggle that satisfy the nonviolence norms? In a general way, and using a powerful slogan, we may characterize them as forms *effecting a liquidation of antagonism, not antagonists*. Lest we lose contact with the forms that have actually been tried out with a fair de-

gree of success, we will take the techniques of Gandhi as representative examples. His field of action was threefold: international politics (South Africa and India versus the British Empire), interracial, interideological conflicts (Hindu-Moslem riots, etc.), and economic conflicts (management versus labor, village industry and agriculture versus mechanization, etc.).

The more extreme forms of struggle (strikes, fasting, etc.) will here be called Gandhian *satyāgraha* and will be considered to make up a subclass of forms satisfying the norms and hypotheses of version D. Before Gandhi resorted to *satyāgraha*, his activity would go through five interrelated phases:

1. Accumulation and analysis of factual information concerning the conflict (on the spot). Unbiased exposition of the main facts relating to the conflict, with extensive use of the opponents as judges (*audi alteram partem*).
2. Clarification of essential (long-range) interests in common with the antagonists (*presupposition*: there are always common interests).
3. Tentative formulation of a limited goal for immediate action acceptable to both parties in terms of common interests and in accordance with the ultimate norm of self-realization.
4. Discussion of the tentative formulations, person to person and face to face, and not merely via negotiators or representatives. Clarification of the instrumental value of the limited goal in resolving a part or aspect of the struggle.
5. In case of persistent resistance from one of the parties concerned, search for a compromise without giving up essentials—that is, search for a compromise affecting limited interests, not basic values.

If, *and only if*, these activities did not bear fruit, Gandhi would consider it justifiable (and effective) to resort to *satyāgraha*.

The different forms of *satyāgraha* planned and used by Gandhi were adapted to a very different situation from that confronted by someone who intends to contribute to conditions of peaceful cooperation between the major power constellations today. There are two major differences of situations: (1) Personal contacts between the opposing groups (Indian-English, Moslem-Hindu) were very extensive and intensive in India (and South Africa). The present problem relates to groups with very few personal con-

tacts. Further, (2) in India it was mainly a question of relations between a physically mightier and a physically weaker group, whereas today there is roughly an equilibrium, with both sides being eager not to let the other become physically stronger.

Gandhi's forms of *satyāgraha* will, therefore, not be described in this paper. Gandhi himself stressed that, for him, the basic tenets of nonviolence were central, not *satyāgraha* as developed by him or others.

It is our contention that a renewed scrutiny of the nonviolence norms, independent of Gandhian *satyāgraha*, will lead to important considerations as to the attitudes and measures to be taken in international politics. It is characteristic of this situation that the five conditions necessary to justify extreme forms of struggle are not, or are only in part, fulfilled.

The basic norm of the ethics of group struggle does not permit a mere personal avoidance of violence but requires us to take part in struggles and in such a way as to reduce the chances of violence in general. Applied to problems of cooperation between East and West, this means that it is the duty of all concerned to partake in solving them.

According to hypotheses H2 and H4 and norms N2 and N5 (we refer consistently to systematization D), the struggle between Soviet-oriented and NATO-oriented powers must be given a positive content. This has, for example, the implication that one should avoid any step merely dictated *against* an institution (anticommunism, anti-imperialism) or, even worse, *against* an individual or a group of people. One's actions should have the character of being *in favor* of positive values and principles *in support* of human beings. It is, furthermore, in accordance with these hypotheses and norms if one cooperates on what are considered to be common objectives and tasks, possibly on the common tasks and objectives of humankind, both in the relation between power groups and in other areas—for example, in technically underdeveloped countries.

Hypothesis H3 is applicable to the idea of preventive war, preventive terror, or any other violence engaged in in order to reduce a greater amount or a greater intensity of violence.

It is not possible here to examine each norm and hypothesis separately. N9, which stresses the importance of a thorough knowledge of the facts and factors relevant to the struggle, is of considerable importance, however. This applies not only to statesmen but also to the people at large. Enduring ef-

forts to create, in all countries, a first-class research and information service and education dealing with international relations are highly important.

N₁₃ and also other norms and hypotheses stress the necessity of maximum personal contact between those engaged in the struggle. The evident consequence of this is a policy of opening borders. Norm N₁₃ is broken when one side uses a social boycott to mark moral indignation (e.g., stopping student exchanges between two countries in order to mark moral indignation concerning an action undertaken by one of these countries) or refuses entrance into the country until certain conditions are fulfilled. According to Gandhi, there are no conditions under which one can refuse to meet one's opponent, and, as this refers to all participants, it is not a norm affecting contact only between politicians.

The personal contact norms and hypotheses go against the assumption that real understanding of the struggle can be reached on the verbal plane. That is, the mass-communication media are insufficient vehicles of information. The understanding at present between Eastern and Western Europeans must, according to this, be largely illusory, since personal contacts are at near-zero. According to H₁₁ and other norms and hypotheses, on the other hand, the good effects of personal contacts will be reduced or impeded if they are exploited (e.g., for propaganda purposes), that is, if the truth norm is not respected.

The above shows that even if the already developed forms of *satyāgraha* will be applicable only after an increase in international personal contacts, the ethics of nonviolence has considerable bearing upon the problems of coexistence.

The prescriptions resulting from application of the norms of nonviolence are, on the whole, such as are put forward as recommendations from various groups of researchers in social science. The chief differences are found in relative priorities and in the ultimate justification of the actions prescribed.

Research Suggestions

Much research has already been done that throws light on the tenability of the hypotheses implicit in the ethics of nonviolence, and also on the chances of the ethics of nonviolence being applied. Thus the tremendous

literature on the nature and consequences of prejudice, national images, and black-and-white thinking in mass communication, patriotic history textbooks, and pressure groups against world organizations is directly relevant.

In the following, some research topics are listed that concern current international conflicts:

1. Which interests do the Soviet and the NATO powers have in common, and which of these are generally acknowledged to be common interests?

We have already mentioned one common interest satisfying these criteria—the elimination of threats of annihilation. There are others, presumably, and it is of importance to know their interdependence and their status in relation to interests not held in common.

Concerning research on threats see, for example, Gladstone 1962: 14 ff.

2. What kinds of actions could institutions or individuals from the antagonistic powers perform together in an atmosphere of cooperation in order to satisfy common interests? What kinds of actions through international organizations (UN, UNESCO, etc.) fit into this context? What conditions of work are favorable to their success?

3. How can these kinds of actions be used to give a positive content, if not to the total struggle, then at least to part of the struggle between the rival powers?

4. Especially, what role can personal contacts across the frontiers play in this context? Which kinds of contacts—professional, tourist, student, religious, artistic, athletic—are most successful in reaching stated objectives? See Allport 1947; Ascher 1950; Smith and Casagrande 1953.

Then there are questions related to the capacity of people of goodwill to elicit the best from an antagonist.

5. Which factors determine to what extent a person is able to react to an antagonist as a fellow being and to avoid reacting to him as a symbol of an institution or a representative of a doctrine?

6. Which factors determine to what extent a person is reacted to as a symbol or representative of an institution?

We also need research on which of the factors that operate to minimize the institutional or functional perception and conception can most easily be strengthened.

7. How are we to strengthen loyalties toward institutions favoring per-

son-to-person meetings (not persons-as-symbols meetings)? See Guetzkow 1955.

8. What are the factors favoring individuals acting from personal responsibility for world conflicts? See Kelman 1954: 34 ff.

The positive role of education has been shown in countless studies that correlate level of education with attitudes of internationalism. There may, however, be opposite factors at work that make the educated more likely to let knowledge interfere with the human approach to antagonists.

9. What factors encourage broad conceptions of the self, conceptions that favor identification with the interests of outgroups? See Angell 1957; Cooley 1964; Mead 1934; Wagenen 1952.

10. What factors favor the distinction between appreciation and friendliness, making strong disapproval consistent with consistent friendliness on the personal level?

11. What is the role of faith in the validity of fundamental norms of non-violence for active cooperation in a hostile environment? See Yinger 1946.

12. What is the role of a personality-based hostility in attitudes of cooperation and conflict toward other groups? See Adorno et al. 1950; Christiansen 1959; Levison 1957.

13. What are the factors favoring truthful, nonpartisan descriptions of the political activities of the rival major powers?

14. What are the effects of secrecy upon meetings of antagonists? To what extent does it interfere with personal trust? See Guetzkow 1955.

There are, finally, important problems with regard to the political ethics being practiced.

15. To what extent, in different countries, are nonviolence norms adhered to and practiced in political life on the local and national levels? To what extent is there a correlation in this respect with the attitude toward the great tensions in world politics?

16. What have been the effects of concrete nonviolence policies, compared with the probable results if other policies had been followed? To what extent and in what direction has the attitude to nonviolence in general among the people concerned been influenced by these effects? See Murphy 1953.

17. To what extent is the favorable attitude to nonviolence in the in-

stances found rooted in a profoundly nonviolent attitude in accordance with Gandhi's ethics? To what extent is it limited to particular phenomena such as military warfare? To what extent does it depend on particular political sympathies or loyalties?

18. On which norms and on what kinds of political actions can conscious adherents of a nonviolence ethics and others agree? On what tasks can they cooperate? How can political ethics be brought into the focus of political life, research, and education?

Research aimed at answering these questions inevitably leads not only to questions of sociology, social psychology, and education but also to background questions of economics; for example, the effect of certain economic systems upon the ability or willingness to let those attitudes of cooperation grow that favor a settlement of the most threatening conflicts in the history of humankind.

Selected Bibliography

Political Ethics of Nonviolence

- Dhawan, Gopi N. 1946. *The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*. Bombay: Popular Book Depot.
- Diwakar, Ranganath R. 1946. *Satyāgraha: The Power of Truth*. Bombay: Hind Kitabs.
- Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. 1955. *Gandhi's politiske etikk* (Gandhi's political ethics). 2nd ed. 1968. Oslo: Johann Grundt Tanum.
- Gandhi, Mohandas K. 1927. *The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, vol. 1. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- . 1942–49. *Non-Violence in Peace and War*, vols. 1, 2. Ahmedabad: Navajivan.
- , ed. 1981. *Young India: 1919–1931* (in 3 vols.). Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, Krishna Kripalani, Ralph J. Bunche, Boyd Orr, Martin Niemöller, and others. 1953. *Gandhian Outlook and Technique*. New Delhi: Ministry of Education, Government of India.
- Mühlmann, Wilhelm E. 1950. *Mahatma Gandhi: Eine Untersuchung zur Religionssoziologie und politischen Ethik*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Shridharani, Krishnalal. 1939. *War Without Violence: The Sociology of Gandhi's Satyāgraha*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Tolstoy, Leo. 1961. *The Kingdom of God Is Within You*. New York: Noonday Press.

*Social Science Contribution to Questions of Peaceful Cooperation:
Topics Touched on in the Present Paper*

- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levison, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Bros.
- Allport, Gordon W. 1947. "Guideline for research in international co-operation." *Yearbook of Social Issues* 3.
- . 1950. "The role of expectancy." In *Tensions That Cause Wars*, edited by H. Cantril. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Angell, Robert Cooley. 1957. "Discovering paths to peace." In *The Nature of Conflict*. New York: UNESCO.
- Ascher, Charles S. 1950. "The development of UNESCO's program." *International Organization* 4.
- Christiansen, Bjørn. 1959. *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*. Oslo: University of Oslo Press.
- Cooley, Charles Horton. 1918. *Social Process*. New York: Scribner.
- . 1964. *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Schocken.
- Dunn, Frederick S. 1950. *War and the Minds of Men*. New York: Harper.
- Gladstone, A. I. 1962. "Relationship orientation and processes leading to war." *Background* 6: 13–25.
- Guetzkow, Harold. 1955. *Multiple Loyalties*. Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University.
- . 1957. "Isolation and collaboration: A partial theory of international relations." *Conflict Resolution* 1.
- Jackson, Elmore. 1952. *Meeting of Minds*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 1954. "Relevance of social research in war prevention: A symposium." *Journal of Human Relations* 2(3).
- Klineberg, Otto. 1950. *Tensions Affecting International Understanding: A Survey of Research*. Social Science Research Council bulletin 62. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Levison, David J. 1957. "Authoritarian personality and foreign policy." *Conflict Resolution* 1.
- McKeon, Richard, and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1951. *Democracy in a World of Tensions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. See answers to questions 29 and 30 concerning the value foundations of the world conflict.
- Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

A Systematization of Gandbian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

- Murphy, Gardner. 1953. *In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behavior and Tensions in India*. New York: Basic Books.
- Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalo. 1956. *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity*. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. See, especially, chapter 3.
- Newcomb, Theodore M. 1947. "Autistic hostility and social reality." *Human Relations* 1.
- Pool, Ithiel de Sola. 1952. *Symbols of Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Smith, M. B., and J. B. Casagrande. 1953. "The Cross-cultural education projects: A program report." *Social Science Research Council Items*, no. 3.
- Wagenen, Richard W. van. 1952. *Research in the International Organization Field*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
- Wright, Quincy. 1955. *The Study of International Relations*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. See "International Ethics" chapter.
- Yinger, J. Milton. 1946. *Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

VII

UNDERSTANDING NAESS'S UNIQUE APPROACH TO DEEP ECOLOGY

The World of Concrete Contents

In this paper, an attempt is made to find a coherent verbal expression of the intuition that reality is a manifold of more or less comprehensive wholes (gestalts), all discernible in terms of qualities. Quantitative natural science is thought to describe abstract structures of reality, not contents. The qualities are neither subjective nor objective; they belong to concrete contents with structures comprising at least three abstract relata: object, subject, and medium. Their status is that of *entia rationis*, not content of reality. Recent developments in physics suggest that we shall look in vain for physical “things” of which reality is composed. Adequate expressions of concrete contents form designations rather than declarative sentences. They may obviously contain value terms. The attempt to formulate an ontology along the suggested lines seems to be closely related to phenomenology of a Heideggerian rather than Cartesian kind. It serves the endeavor to change the conception of the humanity-nature relationship.

The Neither-nor and the Both-and Answers

In environmental debate there is a constant complaint against those who fight to “save” a natural being (a river, a wood, a sea, a kind of animal or plant, a landscape) that they mainly express feelings and subjective likes and dislikes. They are said to lack a sense of objectivity, and ultimately to lack adequate reference to reality as it is in fact and not just as they feel it.

Effective counterarguments need to be of a philosophical kind. They

This article was reprinted with permission from *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group) 28 (1985): 417–28.

may, for example, be of a psychological or political nature. Those who happen to be at home with epistemology, and related more or less abstruse subjects, may use this to their advantage.

Suppose we put our right hand, which has been exposed to cold air, into a pot of water, and we exclaim "Warm!" We then put our left hand, which has not been exposed, into the same pot and exclaim "Cold!" Is the water warm or cold?

Galileo's kind of answer is: neither warm nor cold. The water as such, in reality, or in itself, is neither warm nor cold. These are "secondary" qualities. The water as such has only "primary" qualities.¹

Protagoras's answer according to Sextus Empiricus was: both warm and cold. The water has both qualities, but the condition of the hands has the effect that one of them registers only the warmth, the other only the cold.²

So much about secondary qualities of water in a pot.

Suppose we put our right foot, which has been exposed to cold air, into the calm sea, and we exclaim "Delicious!" or "Encouraging!" or "Cheering!" We then put our left foot, which has not been thus exposed, into the sea at the same spot, and we exclaim "Detestable!" or "Discouraging!" or "Abominable!"

Protagoras's opinion, according to Sextus's interpretation, might also be that the sea is both encouraging and discouraging, and both delicious and detestable. Consequently, according to Protagoras as interpreted by Sextus, as interpreted by me, water has all kinds of qualities, but a sensitive being is only able to experience a limited number of them. What it will experience depends on its state.

In what follows I shall maintain that Galileo's neither-nor position leads to absurdities. The position of Protagoras is deeply problematic but can be saved from absurdity if very freely interpreted. Furthermore, I shall suggest that it is philosophically tenable to maintain that the world we live in (the *Lebenswelt*) has secondary and tertiary qualities. What we feel about something belongs to the qualities of the world as we know it. What does not have such qualities is the abstract structure of the world we live in.

When environmentalists talk in terms of feelings, they talk about reality as it is in fact.

Rejection of Absolutist *Ding-an-sich* Conceptions

The Galileo type of answer employs a distinction that is useful within limits but breaks down if absolutized. It is the famous distinction between things in themselves and things in relation to other things (the term *thing* taken in a very broad sense).

Essential to ecological thinking, and also to thinking in quantum physics, is the insistence that things cannot be separated from what surrounds them without smaller or greater arbitrariness. Thing *A* cannot be thought of in and of itself because of internal relations to thing *B*. Neither is thing *B* separable, except superficially, from *C*, and so on.

As we know them, things have properties referring to sensing, action, and comprehension. Such primary qualities as the shape of a thing vary with the perspective. There is no absolute shape of the thing-in-itself. No quality of a thing is such that it is separable from others. General relativity excludes even movement or rest. There are no primary qualities. A triangle is either without extension as in axiomatic, formal geometry, or it has a color, for example, black.

In thought and communication we need to separate; otherwise, orientation becomes impossible. The utterance “arm” relates to a whole set or constellation, but nominally and grammatically the utterance refers in our example just to “water.” More precisely and specifically, it refers to water in relation to a complex set or constellation of *relata*, of which the most obvious are the hand, the water, the medium, and the subject uttering “Warm!”

These *relata*, individually or collectively, are not things or entities in themselves, in spite of the existence of words and phrases suggesting the possibility of isolating each of them. The relations between the *relata* are internal.

There is a similarity between this view and those expressed by the Buddhist formula *Sarvam dharmaṃ niḥsvabhavam*. Every element is without “self-existence.” The views I defend need no support from Buddhist philosophy, however; Western traditions suffice.

In short, the both-and answer may be formulated thus: There are no completely separable objects, therefore no separable water or medium or or-

ganism. A concrete content can only be related one-to-one to an indivisible structure, a constellation of factors. Concrete contents and abstract structures make up reality as it is in fact. It is misleading to call it real only as felt by a subject.

The notion of irreducible constellations eliminates both objectivist and subjectivist views as characterized, for example, by J. J. C. Smart in relation to color (Smart 1961: 128). On the other hand, Protagoras's view as interpreted by Sextus is an objectivist view. Water as a piece of matter is cold. Both answers can be saved, however, by expanding the basis: the description should be related, not to water as a separable object, but to constellations corresponding to concrete contents.

Secondary and Tertiary Qualities and the Theory of Projection

As late as the latter part of the nineteenth century, mechanical conceptions of warmth and coldness were thought to imply the neither-nor answer. The experienced warmth or coldness is not a property of the water itself. To different temperatures of the water itself correspond certain levels of intensity of motion of its molecules. The motion in its capacity of being a primary quality is a property of the water in itself. Primary qualities, intrinsic or in the objects themselves, were conceived to be part of reality itself. The felt warmth was considered to have only a strange kind of subjective existence: not in the brain, not in space. General relativity and quantum physics undermined the thing-in-itself conception but did not cause any widespread major change of opinion.

Concrete contents have a one-to-one correlation with constellations; there is an isomorphism between the concrete and the abstract. When we say that the sea is now gray, the water of the sea is only one part of the constellation. Nevertheless, it is somehow the dominant part. We would not say that the air between the sea and us is gray, nor that we are gray. The sea has thousands of individual color hues as inherent properties, but not as an isolated thing. One must take the color of the heavens, the color of the plankton, the waves, the senses of observers into consideration. The colors of the sea are parts of innumerable gestalts.

According to the traditional doctrine of primary, secondary, and ter-

tiary qualities or properties, color is the projection upon the surfaces of things of color sensations generated by the senses. Only as a consequence of this projection do things look green, white, black, and so on. The perception of greenness in the mind is projected onto the external world.

The identification of primary properties with those of objects themselves leads to a conception of nature without any of the qualities we experience spontaneously. Now there is no good reason why we should not look upon such a bleak nature as just a resource. Every appeal to save parts of nature based on reference to sense qualities of any kind becomes meaningless. Every passionate appeal that reveals deep feelings, empathy, and even identification with natural phenomena must then be ruled out as irrelevant. The sphere of real facts is narrowed down to that of mechanically interpreted mathematical physics.

Worse still, the question of how secondary and tertiary qualities come into being is often answered by pointing to a (verily miraculous) capacity of the human senses and the human mind to create the colors and the beauty. A poet, says A. N. Whitehead ironically, should not praise the roses by himself who makes the roses red and beautiful. (Whitehead is, incidentally, one of the few Western philosophers clearly opposed to the doctrine of primary qualities.)

With these aberrations in mind I think it might be of value in deep ecology to suggest ontologies in which secondary and tertiary qualities are at least on a par with the primary; the former make up the contents of reality, the latter furnish models of its abstract structure.

The ontology I wish to defend is such that the primary properties (in a narrow sense) are *entia rationis* characteristic of abstract structures, but not contents of reality. Structures may be both, namely structures of gestalts, but not the ones to which I now refer. The geometry of the world is not a geometry in the world.

The both-and answer as elaborated here emphatically rejects the theory of projection. There is no such process as projection of sense qualities. The theory is a clever invention that makes it possible to retain the notion of things in themselves retaining their separate identity in spite of the bewildering diversity of secondary and tertiary qualities, but the price of this conservation of the Galilean ontology is high: there is no evidence whatsoever of a process of projection.

The Subject-Object Distinction and the Theory of Duplication

Suppose three people are said to point to the same tree but to attribute to the tree three completely different sets of secondary and tertiary qualities. How should we deal with the contradiction?

At a superficial level, contradictions are avoided by certain ways of talking: "The tree looks such and such to me," "I feel the tree to be such and such." A mere diversity of conscious experience is acknowledged; therefore, no contradiction arises on this level: Inside the consciousness of person P_1 there is an experience or image E_1 of a tree with the following characteristics . . . ; in P_2 there is E_2 , in P_3 , E_3 —with E_1 , E_2 , and E_3 all being different. The tree in the external world confronting P_1 , P_2 , and P_3 may be the same, and its properties are the primary ones, most adequately described by contemporary physics. Consequences: (1) in the example we get as many as four trees, one external and three internal; (2) when nobody looks at the tree, the three internal trees disappear and the external one is left by itself.

This way of avoiding contradictions between two or more observers results in a notorious duplication: there is a tree outside in the external world and a tree inside in the mind of the observer. Because of the development of physics, the tree outside is today conceived in extremely abstract form as a structure bearing no similarity to the internal trees. In the 1890s the external tree still had some perceptual (*anschauliche*) properties. Since Einstein and Heisenberg, though, these are gone, although Bohr has shown how this disappearance brings us back to the reality of laboratory constellations with secondary qualities.

The tree in the mind no longer has the character of an image or a copy, because the external tree of physics bears no similarity to the internal one. Furthermore, the internal tree is in the mind in a nonspatial sense. It is not in the brain, because then it would have been seen long ago by doctors. It is not even near the brain. If the external tree and the body of the observer are in Rome, this does not imply that the tree in the observer's mind is in or near Rome. It is no nearer Rome than the Andromeda nebula. It is not in physical space at all. Where is it?

The tree in the mind is private in principle, belonging to a specific per-

son or animal; it is "subjective." The tree outside is "objective," supposedly completely independent of any perceivers, a thing-in-itself.

All this is rather confusing. No one seems to understand the duplication theory. Nevertheless, if we take the neither-nor answer as a basic assumption, it is difficult to avoid a kind of duplication theory and a sharp, pervasive subject-object dualism. The both-and answer is also far from intuitively obvious, at least in our culture, but I think it can be effectively defended.

Spontaneous Experience Without Subject-Object Cleavage: Abstract Structures

When one is absorbed in contemplation of a concrete, natural thing there is no experience of a subject-object relation. The same is true when one is absorbed in vivid action, whether in movement or not. There is no epistemological ego reaching out to see and understand a tree, or an opponent in a fight, or a problem of making a decision. A tree is always part of a totality, a gestalt. Analysis may discover many structural ingredients. Sometimes there is an ego relation, sometimes not. The gestalt is a whole, self-contained and self-sufficient. If we call it *experience of the gestalt*, we are easily misled in a subjectivist direction.

When we describe a constellation of gestalt relations, it is important not to let the usual stress on the epistemological subject-object distinction dominate the expression. In spontaneous experience there may or may not be any ingredient corresponding to that distinction.

"Tiny me looking into the eye of a big whale" may be a concrete content with an ego relation as a genuine part. It is different from the previous examples because the qualities are not all sense qualities. The unity of this concrete content is best understood by stressing its gestalt character. The example refers to a gestalt of a fairly high order, that is, having lower-order gestalts as "parts."

If "cheerful tree" and "dark and threatening tree" are two spontaneous expressions, analysis in terms of relations may lead one to conclude that they refer to "the same" tree. This sameness is definable, however, only in terms of an abstract structure, whereas utterances refer to two concrete contents.

The structure referred to is abstract and not to be confused with

gestalt structures within the concrete content: the tree may have branches and its color may contrast with a dark background. This reveals a structure within the total gestalt. The structure is given "phenomenologically," as structure within the concrete content. The sameness of the tree defined through abstract structures presupposes location in space of a kind that cannot be conceived as structure of a gestalt. Its space is an abstract structure, an *ens rationis*, and as is true of every theory, including that of gravitation, it is man-made.

My analysis at this point presumably implies a rather radical form of nominalism. I shall not try to make it explicit but merely mention that it is closely related to the view that relations between things, or more specifically, concrete contents, are not part of the world. Primary qualities—for example, shape—do not occur in our life-space except as contrasts between colors, for example, a black circle on a white background. According to the above, the concept of "circle" as abstracted from this concrete content is an *ens rationis*. The nominalism implied here is a nominalism of abstract relations. Problematic is the place of *entia rationis* "themselves" within gestalts of high order. A discussion of this is important, as is the more general question of intentional entities and intentionality, but it is not feasible to pursue those topics in this article.³

From Ethics to Ontology and from Ontology to Ethics⁴

Confrontations between developers and conservers reveal differences in experiencing what is real. What a conservationist sees and experiences as reality, the developer typically does not see—and vice versa. A conservationist sees and experiences a forest as a unity, a gestalt, and when speaking of the heart of the forest, he or she does not mean the geometric center. A developer sees quantities of trees and argues that a road through the forest covers very few square kilometers, so why make so much fuss? If the conservers insist, he will propose that the road not touch the center of the forest. The heart is then saved, he may think. The difference between the antagonists is one of ontology rather than ethics. They may have fundamental ethical prescriptions in common but apply them differently because they see and experience differently. They both use the term *forest* but refer to different realities.

The gestalts “the heart of the forest,” “the life of the river,” and “the quietness of the lake” are essential parts of reality for the conservationist. To the conservationist the developer seems to suffer from a kind of radical blindness. In turn, the latter’s ethics in environmental questions is based largely on how he sees reality. There is no way of making him eager to save a forest as long as he retains his conception of it as a set of trees. His charge that the conservationist is motivated by subjective feelings is firmly based on his view of reality. He considers his own strong positive feelings toward development to be based on objective reality, not on feelings. Moreover, as long as society is largely led by developers, he need not be passionate in his utterances. It is the struggling minorities who tend to be passionate rather than those who travel in the mainstream.

It is, I think, important in the philosophy of environmentalism to move from ethics to ontology and back. Clarification of differences in ontology may contribute significantly to the clarification of different policies and their ethical basis. One of the first things to do might be to get rid of the belief that humankind is something placed in an environment!

In an analysis that begins with concrete contents, the is-, ought-, and fact-value dichotomies do not look quite as they did from where Hume started, namely, at factual and value affirmations. Expressions of concrete contents are designations, not declarative sentences.

Expressions of the kind “object x has value y ” immediately lead to the question, Given an object x , how do I assess its value y ? If we start with designations of concrete contents—for example, “delicious red tomato to be eaten at once!” or “repugnant rotten tomato”—the evaluative terms are there from the very beginning of our analysis, and there is no separable tomato to value!

In “The is/ought dichotomy and environmental ethics,” David Bennett (1984) says that John Passmore and Aldo Leopold “agree on the basic ecological fact, but differ on how to value this fact. Passmore imports a restricted sense of obligation and maintains the fact/value dichotomy. Leopold accepts the community as both a descriptive and prescriptive statement.”

Perhaps Leopold’s point of view could be explicated by starting with designations of concrete contents of various sorts expressing what Leopold sees and experiences as community. The terms of the designations will in-

evitably include valuations. There would then, strictly speaking, be no fact upon which they agree and no value about which they disagree. Bennett seems to take an ontological point of view, close to that of Callicott: "[E]cology changes our values by changing our concepts of the world and of ourselves in relation to the world. It reveals new relations among objects which, once revealed, stir our ancient centers of moral feeling" (Callicott 1982: 174). The stirring is part of a gestalt, and as such not to be isolated from the "objects." What I have done is try to explicate what kind of change in concept of the world and status of the subjects is at issue.

I propose to identify the world with the set of contents, not with structures.

Between the items of the world conceived as contents in the form of gestalts, there are internal structural relations, but they do not add to the set of contents, and we are free to conceptualize them in different ways. The physicist's "world of science" is entirely one of abstract structure. Even color hues are defined structurally through places in color atlases. The ecosystem concept is used to describe abstract structures, and the deep ecology movement is to a large extent concerned with abstract structures. The importance of abstract structural considerations cannot be overestimated, but they are like maps: their function is not to add to the territory, the contents. Abstract structures are structures of the world, not in the world.

Appearance and Reality: Perspectivism

What, then, about the distinction between appearance and reality? Does the stress on contents favor appearance? If it did, something in the above argumentation would have gone wrong.

We have useful kinds of expressions such as "It appears to be such and such but isn't really such and such." If I express a content by the words "cheerful tree" and add, "Let us put it in our window!" my friend may say, "The tree is really very big and cannot be put in our window. You are deceived by the great distance." Or someone standing on the southern rim of the Grand Canyon may point toward the northern side and say, "Why is it that there is just moss on the northern rim?" His friend may not agree: "You are mistaken. The 'moss' is really a woods. The distance deceives

you.” The appearance-reality distinction in the above examples relates to statements that are true or false, not to designations of concrete contents.

If by “appearance” we mean something that is by definition or intrinsically an appearance to someone, we have presumed a subject-object distinction that cannot be generalized and adapted to a description of the world as concrete contents.

The rhetorics of environmentalism favor positive evaluation of natural phenomena, but, of course, concrete contents may include negatives. Someone marooned on Dawson Island in the Antarctic in 1977 said, “Sun, cold and unfriendly,” and similar expressions are common in any climate. The ontological emancipation of tertiary qualities does not imply uniformly positive evaluations of natural phenomena. In the terminology of *gestalts*, one may say that religion has tried to conceive the most comprehensive *gestalt* to be (intrinsically, of course) good, and Spinoza uses the term *perfect* to characterize *Deus sive Natura*. The problem of evil is still open, however. Nietzsche and others have used the term *perspective* much as we used the term *content* above: the world is the total set of perspectives. Usually, though, we find that the subject-object distinction is implied. The world is seen by subjects from different perspectives. The tree looks different according to the perspective of the observer. By walking around, we see the tree from different angles. Thus, “perspectivism” may mislead.

Similar reflections apply to Dewey’s and others’ terminology of “experience.” It is too natural to say “experience of whom?” “my experience,” “your experience,” and so on. The term *content* does not so easily lend itself to the introduction of a subject-object division. If used carefully, however, the term *experience* need not mislead.

In a metaphysically courageous article, T. L. S. Sprigge appears to work from intuition not very different from mine, but he seems to experience at least as many difficulties in articulating his views as I do in articulating mine. He encourages us, in the spirit of Heidegger, to think of the point of our consciousness as being that it supplies a home in which objects can enter into actuality, so that we as consciousness are to be thought of as existing for the sake of the objects that need us in order to exist—rather than its being the objects that exist for our sake (Sprigge 1984: 455).

This way of seeing our peculiar human “condition” is one of the appropriate ways of learning to appreciate “natural” intrinsic values. I consider it

indispensable, and I am grateful that Sprigge reminds us of that way. Here I shall only suggest two differences between his approach and gestalt ontology. First, the point of view of gestalt thinking dispenses with a concept of consciousness, at least of a kind that implies a duplication theory. (Perhaps Sprigge's concept does not imply such a theory because of his "absolute" idealism?) Second, by expressing valuation as inherent in the gestalt, the gestalt approach suggests less passivity than the Heideggerian-Sprigge approach toward "objects." Since Sprigge's examples often refer to beauty, I shall exemplify the expression of a concrete content, gestalt, or scenario that covers beauty and something else: "Beautiful acacias and grasses. A couple of beautiful carnivores slowly eat part of the leg of a herbivore whose beautiful eyes express measureless pain and a cry for help."

If the carnivores don't look too dangerous, the next scenario may well depict a scene of help being offered. In the terminology of concrete contents or gestalts, there is no need for references to consciousness and therefore no need to transcend a sort of neutral monism. Or should I more modestly say that, according to the gestalt project (in the sense of Sartre), there should not be any such needs?

Gestalt Ontology and the Deep Ecology Movement

Our starting point has been the neither-nor and both-and answers to questions of whether a thing has a definite quality. As already mentioned, elaborating the answer may lead in different directions. I am not maintaining that my elaboration is the only consistent one. The situation in epistemology and ontology is fundamentally problematic. What I maintain is that the framework of gestalt ontology is adequate, but scarcely the only adequate one, in attempts to give deep ecology a philosophical foundation: the world of concrete contents has a gestalt character, not an atomic character. I do not know of any better frame of reference than that of gestalts.

This account does not, as mentioned, minimize the importance of abstract structures such as ecosystems (with stress on *system*). Clearly, though, the theoretical debate centering on such concepts as "mature ecosystem" elucidates the man-made character of the conceptual world. When some ecologists negate the existence of mature systems, this does not imply the negation of any content of the world we live in.⁵

Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking

In what follows I shall try to explain a way to conceptualize human spontaneous experience of reality. How are things (in the widest sense) related to one another in spontaneous experience?

The term *spontaneous* needs a couple of comments. If I say “The water looks yellow” or “The water seems yellow,” I mostly imply that perhaps it is not really yellow. As the basis of the utterances, there has been a spontaneous experience expressible by “yellow water” or “yellow water!” or “surprising yellow water!” The use of *looks* or *seems* tends to reveal a moment of reflection, doubt, inquiry. This is a criterion of nonspontaneousness. Instead of spontaneous one may say *immediate*, but the latter term is heavily burdened with philosophical theories, which might reduce the value of a spontaneous interpretation of “spontaneous.”

We need to add the term *gestalt ontology* to contemporary gestalt vocabulary. The terms *gestalt perception* and *gestalt apperception* have their own jobs. There is a different job to be done by the term *gestalt ontology*.

Roughly speaking, the term *gestalt ontology* is introduced to take better care of some important phenomena usually denoted by terms such as *holistic thinking*. The usages of *systems thinking* are farther away, but not every use of that term. The most important job is to suggest a different way of conceiving the relevance of mathematical physics to descriptions of reality. It is suggested that mathematical physics aims at creating models for how to conceive and explain the abstract structures of reality, leaving its content untouched.

The following characterize gestalt:

This article was written in 1989. It is being published here for the first time.

1. Units of reality as human beings have the chance to know them are units with three aspects, the subjective, the objective, and the mediational.¹ The aspects are not parts, not subunits.

2. In discourse, thinking, and communication, separation of the three aspects is necessary. The contents of reality are not thereby split in three. They are indivisible.

3. The gestalts are more or less comprehensive. The more comprehensive includes the less, but a less comprehensive gestalt as a unit differs from the same gestalt when it is integrated into a more comprehensive gestalt.

Consider the two first measures of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony (*da da da dab, da da da dab*). The second measure expresses a gestalt that is less comprehensive and contained in the gestalt covering both measures. As an independent gestalt (played in isolation) "it" is different from when it is integrated in the more comprehensive gestalt. ("It" is written with quotation marks because we now imply abstract structures, the measures and their relations.) We may talk of lower- and higher-order gestalts, a higher-order gestalt "including" a lower-order gestalt.

4. The gestalts make up reality in the sense of contents of reality. The content is neither a set of things nor a set of states of affairs (*Tatsachen*).

A definite waterfall at a definite time, including its musical modifications owing to winds, has gestalt character but is neither a thing nor a state of affairs. We may say that the content of reality is all that is the case.

5. What is real is more than the content of reality. There are abstract relations between gestalts, and these are on different levels of abstractness. They may be said, by more or less freely constructed concepts, to suggest abstract structures of reality as opposed to contents. Examples are the physical theory of color hues and the relation connoted by π .

6. Physical theory since Galileo and Newton studies structures on the level of abstractness. It is a study of relations, not *relata*. That is, *relata* are always defined through further relations, never through contents of reality.

7. Reality cannot properly be said to *consist* of atoms, or electrons, or particles and waves, or any other set of entities that mathematical physicists need in their creative search for basic and general structures.

8. Abstract structure descriptions at a low level are needed to "locate" in terms of space and time, for example, to locate and define "a tree," one person seeing a joyful content of reality, a different person seeing a sad one.

9. From confusing structures with content there results a wrong kind

of question: Is *that tree* really sad or joyful? How can the same tree be both, if one person says sad and the other joyful? What is happening is that two gestalts are being compared. Because they are two different contents of reality, sad may be an appropriate adjective for expressing one of the gestalts and joyful an appropriate adjective for expressing the other.²

The term *gestalt thinking* may now be defined as thinking in conformity with the above nine characteristics of gestalt ontology. The above makes the following dialogue understandable:

A: The birch is smiling!

B: Not really smiling.

A: Yes, really smiling. I describe experienced reality as best as I can. I do not make inferences.

B: I propose a test. Ask why it smiles. Does it answer?

A: No, but from "x is really smiling" it does not follow that "x answers or can answer questions." The structure of reality is not that simple. I describe contents, not abstract structures.

B: Another test: Let us walk to the birch. Point out the left and right corners of the smile, touch the outline of the smile.

A: I have not made predictions. We may walk as you say and acquaint ourselves with other parts of reality. Then we can come back and see whether "the birch is smiling" is still a valid description.

Heidegger rightly denied being an existentialist, wishing to separate his philosophy sharply from that of Sartre. In a somewhat wider sense, however, both Heidegger's thinking and gestalt thinking are existentialist. "Existence has ontological priority over essence, content has ontological priority over abstract structure." As with all fruitful notions in the history of ideas, the idea of existential thinking is rather vague, and I shall not try to change that character.

Literature and Painting

In southern Norway there is a mountain, Andersnatten, much painted by artists said to belong to the Norwegian Romantic school. A broad smiling

valley leads up to the dark, nonsmiling mountain, which protrudes into it, cutting out the view of the continuation of the valley.

In a famous picture by the painter Kittelsen, the mountain is presented as a huge troll. The trees constitute the troll's hair. To those who find the presentation of the mountain as a troll meaningful and adequate, there are, somehow, other features that make the troll "resemble" the mountain. The conception of a troll clarifies what they experience when looking at the mountain. Asked for words characterizing the mountain and connecting it with a troll, people offer words and expressions like the following: uncanny, mysterious.

These terms express *spontaneous experience of a reality*. The artist, using his artistic imagination and influenced by a definite cultural tradition, pictures the mountain as a troll. He thereby transcends the spontaneous experience.

Where do we trace the line between the full artistic creation and the experienced reality? There is a difference here, but the importance of it does not depend on its being sharp.

According to social or conventional epistemology, the pines on top of Andersnatten have green leaves ("needles"), light green in springtime, darker in autumn. Changes of color due to darkness in the evenings or to intense sunlight are changing how the trees "look," not "the real" color. Thus, for good practical reasons, the conventional epistemology separates the objective, real colors—properties of the leaves *themselves*—and the more or less subjective *appearances*. The beauty or the ugliness is sometimes thought of as being on a still higher level of subjectivity.

Whatever its practical usefulness, conventional epistemology is highly problematic. The subjectivity of colors in general has long been taught in schools: the colors appear somehow "in" the brain or "in" the consciousness. Trees are considered really to be colorless, which then is confused with a gray color—but here is not the place to go into these problems.

The gestalt conception of reality turns analysis in the opposite direction—from stripping the things of more and more qualities to admitting not only secondary but also tertiary qualities as genuinely real, as much "in" the object as "in" the subject—and, more exactly, "in" neither. The gestalts have three aspects, distinguishable only in thought.

The mountain Andersnatten is a knot in a web of realities geographi-

cally definable only through abstract structures. For those of us who have often seen Andersnatten, stayed in its neighborhood, and climbed it, there is a richness of experiences associated with it that cannot be expressed adequately. To say that experiences are subjective is a bad habit. That is, if the intention is that of describing reality, it leads away from content toward abstract structure. Among the painters, those said to belong to the nineteenth-century Romantic school are best able to convey the realities of a landscape. It would be better to call them realists rather than romanticists. The colors are not the conventional ones but convey the spontaneous, uncensored experience of hues. The painters seek neither the subjective nor the objective but, as far as they can, seek the real as a whole, the high-order gestalts.

Literary style makes uninhibited use of spontaneous experiences and terms for tertiary qualities. Denis Diderot, the great rationalist, talks about the majesty of oaks, the coquetry of roses, the prudery of daisies, the proudness of lilies, and the humility of violets. This is an example of rational and realistic language. If somebody says "This rose is majestic and that oak is coquettish" as a description of a spontaneous experience of a couple of realities, this does not contradict Diderot. Mistakes enter when we assume structures and predict or explain. Although professional botanical writers severely limit such vocabulary, it is practically never entirely absent. Of course, not all so-called metaphors of nature-loving authors are faithful to spontaneous experience of reality, but even Western culture allows the artist to describe realities uncensored and as an end in itself.

Gestalt and the Process of Identification

How is the relation to be understood between the concept of identification with living beings and that of gestalt?

When we experience a strong identification with an animal—for example, in a situation of great danger to the animal—the situation has a character of unity, with certain negative traits dominating. Everything, including the animal, changes. The process of variation or fluctuation of degrees of danger affects the whole situation, including traits that have nothing to do with the animal.

This kind of irradiation of danger affects our access to spontaneous ex-

perience of a wider reality: the strong personal gestalt experiences focusing on danger occur not only when the egocentric self is threatened but also with threats to a more or less wide class of living beings, including landscapes. The gestalt character functions to widen and deepen the effect of identification. The concrete contents of experience become richer through the I/Thou relations with living beings.

Suppose my pleasant work at a certain place requires of me repeatedly to pass a mat of flowers of a certain kind. I notice that they turn toward the sun, pointing in a different direction as the sun moves. The process of identification with the flowers makes me see them as seeking and appreciating the rays and warmth of the sun, and being at work to satisfy a vital need. Being myself pleasantly at work, the total situation is that of working together.

Now suppose instead that my work is unpleasant and hard. The usual way of talking is to say that the mat of flowers as part of reality is the same, but our subjective impressions and experiences are different because we feel differently owing to the unpleasant work. We never escape from our world of subjective feelings, it is said, but science and common sense can teach us about objective reality, a reality in which trees are neither joyful nor sad. There is, I would rather say, both a common sense and a common lack of sense. Mathematical physics can lead us to know more contents of reality, but the strict requirement of intersubjective testability precludes scientific knowledge of contents.

Reflections About Total Views

This article is written under the impression that broad philosophical systems (like Spinoza's) are of great value insofar as they articulate the deepest insights of which human beings are capable. Such systems, in the form of total views, are therefore of great importance in philosophical thinking. This article does not seek to substantiate that position, however. Rather, it points to the absurdity both of explicit total views themselves and of presuming to criticize such views without, at least implicitly, adopting one.

How Far Can I Extend the Area of My Own Ignorance?

Most of us can achieve greater modesty by changing in certain well-defined directions. There are limits, however, such that further steps in those directions no longer increase our modesty. If a person demands less and less attention from others, he soon gets into conflict with his environment. For example, if in some dramatic way he rescues a child from a fire, deliberate and systematic efforts to avoid subsequent favorable attention will tend to generate immodesty in the form of moral ambitiousness or uppishness. The net result of his efforts may thus ultimately be negative, owing to a lack of moral sensitivity and an uncritical persistence in assuming that a certain kind of change will guarantee an increase of modesty, whatever the amount.

It is not, however, the ethics of modesty in claims about one's own ig-

This article was reprinted with permission from *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (Brown University) 25 (1964): 16–29.

norance that I am concerned with here. Rather, my concern is with the epistemological problem of how much—given a definite but gradually widening universe of discourse—one can explicitly claim not to know without making the mistake of underrating one's knowledge.

If I say with due humility that there is something most people know about but I know nothing about, this may be a genuine expression of modesty on my part, but if I say that I know less than anyone else or that I know nothing whatsoever, this involves not a further reduction but a startling increase in the boldness of my claims to knowledge. Modesty, whether moral or cognitive, seems to require abstention from any spectacular deviation from average behavior. Let me take an extreme example of a claim to know very little that would seem to require vast knowledge in order to be justified. Suppose I confidently declare myself the most ignorant man in the world. In doing so, I succumb to the gross immodesty of professing to know something very difficult indeed to know. (Socrates had to take the oracle's word for it; he did not find out for himself.) My claim concerns the world and all human beings, including Socrates and myself. Thus, a vast conceptual framework is taken for granted. If the declaration is made as a serious statement in a dialogue, the author will find himself in an awkward position. ("You know less than I?" "Certainly." "I didn't know that; so you knew something that I didn't." Or "Socrates knew more than you?" "Yes." "Then you know something Socrates did not." This kind of conversation might cover any subject.)

So much, then, for knowing about one's own ignorance.

There is, though, another set of problems about increasing the area of one's ignorance. How complete can this ignorance become? How little can we knowingly or unknowingly assume to be true? Does what we assume to be true tally with the claims we make about our own ignorance? Now, it seems clear that even if we do not affirm our ignorance about something, we will nevertheless, in more or less subtle ways, reveal how we would classify and describe that of which we profess to be ignorant. Rather in the way that ignoring something implies the possibility of eliciting from us a description or classification of whatever it is we are intent upon not attending to, so a description or classification can be part of the "sense" of our actions in regard to that about which we claim to know nothing.

Suppose that I discover in a burning house some meteorologists who

say they are studying typhoon tracks—a subject about which I have honestly claimed to know nothing—and suppose that I urge them to run out before it is too late. I shall thereby implicitly claim to know that the study of typhoon tracks or the tracks themselves will not put out the fire. Then how is the claim to know or to presume absolutely nothing about typhoon tracks to be understood? How could my ignorance of the phenomenon be increased beyond, say, my being able to give the sketchiest classification of it? Is the implicit claim about knowledge of typhoon tracks to be understood as just an isolated item in my knowledge, having no connection with what I already know, for example, about burning houses? I still treat the meteorologists as if I know that their knowledge cannot reveal my behavior in that particular situation, my effort to get them out, to rest on a set of mistakes. Moreover, if the meteorologists demand explanations for how I can presume their study to be irrelevant, if I really know nothing about typhoon tracks, I may start arguing in support of my claim about the irrelevancy, and in that case I shall almost certainly show that I think I know a great deal about typhoons.

Tentatively I conclude, then, that any articulate *docta ignorantia* or agnosticism is embedded in gnosticism or dogmatism. If this were not so, my ignorance could hardly be experienced as ignorance about something. As soon as it is about something, a piece of ignorance is like a hole in a Swiss cheese—it is only there because of the cheese around it. If you want a colossal hole, you must provide a colossal cheese.

An increase in claimed knowledge, a beautiful analogy tells us, is like the increasing light from a torch in the vast darkness. The larger the pool of light, the greater the periphery of the darkness surrounding it, that is, of admitted ignorance. However, some “child of darkness and doubt,” eagerly increasing the reign of darkness, may make the converse discovery, that the more he expands the sphere of darkness, that is, of known ignorance, the greater the expanse of enveloping light, that is, of knowledge.

On the articulate and neatly conceptual level—the level I am solely interested in here—the character of ignorance as ignorance about something reveals itself in statements within a conceptual structure, a set of categories. Moreover, the responsible use of the conceptual structure presupposes, or at least seems to presuppose, more or less extensive knowledge. Nor is the knowledge merely of greater or lesser extent; it is also system-

atic; a character of totality is implicit in most of our everyday reasoning and action, even if this does not show itself as an explicit total view about the world. Such an assumed unity seems to be a prerequisite if a person's particular arguments and acts are not to seem meaningless and pointless. There must be this connection with other mutually supporting arguments, beliefs, and attitudes, even though the person himself may be unaware of the implicit unity and perhaps quite unable to verbalize the intricate web of mutually supporting elements. This emerges from the fact that withdrawals of claims to knowledge can go only so far. The attempt to extend and multiply disclaimers reveals and comes up against an underlying structure of unquestioned assumptions.

When we deal with limits of ignorance or known lack of knowledge, it is tempting to introduce the terminology of *frames of reference*, saying something to the effect that the necessity of an implicit frame of reference makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to justify or even formulate the claim that there is at least one thing about which one knows nothing at all. So that, in professing ignorance, Socrates placed himself and his ignorance within a total or comprehensive framework, which he implicitly presumed to be adequate. That which is not known is adequately classified as unknown only by virtue of what is assumed not to be unknown. Our search for truth, and our belief or disbelief in finding it, can only operate within a frame of reference, or at least within a succession of such frames, but then how do these frames stand with regard to knowledge, once they are discovered and made objects for inquiry?

Explication of Fundamental or Total Frames— Higher-order Scepticism

In the history of philosophy, the system builders have proposed solutions of all problems that are not taken to be questions of detail. The conventional classifications of the problems comprise logic, ontology, epistemology, methodology, ethics, and aesthetics.

Suppose our child of darkness and doubt now devotes himself to disclaiming knowledge within these higher-order categories?

Applied to a set of fundamental ontological beliefs or basic premises, whether they are true or false, tenable or untenable, professed ignorance in-

volves a claim to know something that is true of the whole world, or of whatever is most fundamental within a certain area of it. The vastness of the pretension is of the same order whether it is in the belief in knowing or in the belief in ignorance. If I maintain it to be true that I do not know, for example, whether the ultimate source of knowledge is experience, I must regard myself as already acquiescing in the use of a conceptual framework that includes such terms as *knowledge*, *experience*, and *ultimate source*. If I know that I ignore the question of whether Aristotle's ontology is tenable, I must know what it is that I ignore. (I must also be informed about what knowledge is.)

If I claim not to know whether a definite comprehensive ontology—Spinoza's, say—or set of basic principles—Aristotle's, say—is tenable or untenable, my explicit or implicit frame of reference is itself total, comprising all the world, whatever that is, encompassing even the horizons of great philosophers.

The effect of assuming one framework rather than another makes itself felt, or is shown, over the whole area of reasoning or action covered by the categories in the framework. A conscious modification of a formerly implicit frame of reference may result in modifications not only of what we conceive to be true or false, but even of what we conceive to constitute a search for truth. This happens, for example, when our attention is directed to research itself as an object of research and to forms of agnostic or sceptical conclusions as a particular instance of a possible result of research about research.

Suppose we develop a very strong form of epistemological scepticism, avoiding the classical inconsistency attributed to extreme scepticism by only a hair's breadth. Once having developed this scepticism, we might start to reflect upon our own developments and try to make explicit some of the implicit assumptions, rules, and premises used in arriving at our scepticism. Thus, we might succeed in grasping a fragment of the frame within which we were working as we developed our sceptical epistemology. Our explicit scepticism brings to light the "animal faith" we had in the conceptual structure and the fundamental assumptions underlying the arguments for our scepticism and the statements expressing it.

Thus, we may grow to doubt our sceptical methodology, once its principles have come to light. To what extent, then, is it possible for us to shun

successively the enjoyment (or assumption) of truth with regard to total views, which we come to glimpse? How far back can we consistently go toward "knowing nothing"?

It is usually assumed that a total viewpoint, taken up in the neighborhood of "I know nothing," is at least in part attributable to the choice of an "I know" concept in the neighborhood of "I have incorrigibly true knowledge." This results from a frame of reference that, once incorrigibility is granted, allows any belief backed by standard evidence in the field automatically to become knowledge; all we need is enough evidence. At least some powerfully sceptical attitudes, however, are characterized not by a localized doubt concerning some mathematical or perceptual statements usually classed as absolutely certain, but by an all-pervading, diffuse feeling of questionableness relating to all conceptualizations, all positions whatsoever. Here, the very act of saying or thinking that anything is such and such rather than anything else, is not intimately accompanied by clear and articulate questioning but is done in a mode of general questionableness. Reflections in this sceptical attitude may find expression, but not directly as assertions.

Here, of course, an important point arises: if the sceptic does not assert anything, if he fails even to pose an articulate question (based on the acceptance of a definite conceptual framework), then his scepticism hardly amounts to anything that philosophers can dispute. Perhaps they may be influenced by his behavior, but only in the way their moods and tempers are affected by the weather. This may be conceded, but it should be borne in mind that important parts of philosophical literature are writings thrown into our discussion that, taken as wholes, may not be expressive of anything so determinate as a position. I think here of Plato's early dialogues and of Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Within such writings we can recognize strings of reflections, but scarcely a position or conclusion consistent with every reflection in the work. The author's intention may not have been to impart an opinion on any subject at all. There are certainly many advantages in thinking of philosophy as an articulated search for something, giving rise, at its best, to the establishment of conclusions concerning some sorts of clearly formulated questions. On the other hand, it might not be inappropriate to view it as an essentially aimless activity, its reflections occurring in strings that now and then and for

certain stretches of time condense into definite sets of opinions but mostly go beyond such products, disengaging the thinker from his work.

Naturally, if the published works of philosophers (of the Western tradition) are taken to reveal the essence of philosophy, one inevitably gets the impression that a philosophical achievement consists mostly in arriving at conclusions in an orderly fashion. To look at it in this way, though, involves ruling out those philosophers who are capable of *epoché* or abstention from commitment to any position, in spite of being clearly aware of the arguments for and against.

To conclude this note about sceptical attitudes or general *epoché*, I would say that the articulate sceptic need not be thought of as choosing a set of strong requirements (e.g., “incorrigibility”) for “knowing”; he may choose any among a variety of requirements, including extremely weak ones. Even then, “knowing” is a kind of achievement, not yet brought about when one starts the search. That it has been brought about is something that must be believed before the unbeliever is to be disputed—and that is the important point.

Does Explication of a Frame of Reference Involve the Introduction of Another?

If we have an inclination to study the foundation rather than the superstructure, the presuppositions and assumptions rather than the conclusions of a system of beliefs, our interest inevitably turns from the explicit to the implicit. If we study an argument and end up with a strongly sceptical conclusion in terms of requirements, this indicates that our attention is turned toward the stringent requirements for “knowledge” that are implicitly assumed in arriving safely at the conclusion. Then our attention is apt to shift toward the question of how one is able to find out what concepts a sceptic implicitly uses. What are the methodological beliefs in this case? Once they are explicated, are we prepared to accept these formerly implicit assumptions? Quite possibly, a shift to a wider or deeper frame (n) makes us sceptically uneasy about our former sceptical uneasiness—or perhaps just no longer interested in what those (n–1) methodological beliefs led us to conclude.

Those writers who in a few sentences prove that scepticism is incoher-

ent usually presume a very weak concept of knowledge, a concept such that we practically cannot open our mouths without claiming to know something.¹ There is no good reason, however, why a person inclined toward scepticism should incline toward an unusually weak concept of knowledge.

The shifting of attention from one frame *A* to another frame *B* in which *A* has been conceived proceeds within a new implicit framework in which both *A* and *B* can be conceived and explicated. As we move back, we step immediately and inevitably from one frame to another in a regressive series. In this predicament it is tempting to try to do without this talk of frames. Can we not dispense with it and the predicament together? Do we really use or have an implicit frame of reference? How did we manage to get this idea involved in our reflections? What presuppositions did we use here? This kind of reflection about our frame-of-reference thinking is also a case of making our own assumptions explicit. As an assumption, this thinking is itself a proper object for study. Moreover, since it is only an assumption about the nature of our methodological beliefs in general, it would seem to be dispensable even if they are not. Nevertheless, dropping this terminology does not seem to help us answer the questions that gave rise to it.

It seems that we are caught in a trap, unable to free ourselves and make a fresh start; we can inspect all the beliefs we have had until the moment of critical inspection, but we never reach the critical inspection itself. We may here quote some acute reflections of Kierkegaard concerning the System—that is, in our context, any attempt to explicate a fundamental frame of reference:

The System begins with the immediate, and hence without any presuppositions, and hence absolutely; that is, the beginning of the System is the absolute beginning. This is quite correct, and has also been sufficiently admired. But before one started with the System, why is it that one did not raise the second, equally, aye, precisely equally, important question: How does the System begin with the immediate? That is to say, does it begin with it immediately? The answer to this question must be an unconditional negative.

(Kierkegaard 1941: 101)²

We have referred above to the intended global character of a framework explicated as a set of fundamental beliefs or assumptions. The unavoidable slip into higher-order frames and the resulting infinite regresses suggest

that it is in principle impossible to formulate a set that has the intended character. The character of wholeness refuses to reveal itself in what we grasp and formulate in discursive thinking. The impossibility of formulating a set of fundamental principles that is global, suggested by the inspection of beliefs, itself involving uninspected methodological principles, is analogous to that of blowing up a balloon from the inside. To inspect the set one must do something analogous to blowing new air in from the outside. Then, to inspect that process one has to regard the outside air as itself enveloped by another layer, and so on. This illustrates the regressive character of explicating frames of reference.

This reasoning and the conclusion itself can, however, be made the object of critical inspection. Pieces of its frame of reference can be brought to light, tacit assumptions can be made explicit. This activity, though, even if highly successful, does not necessarily furnish a basis for rejecting that reasoning or its conclusion. It may be left suspended in the air, because the rejection is itself only an example of the kind of thing rejected.

There is still another aspect of the (assumed) impossibility of settling on a fundamental set of principles, and that emerges not in the question of attempts at increasing our ignorance, but rather in the closely related attempts to increase and multiply our doubts with a view to establishing a platform, however small, of truth that no sane man could dispute. It will be seen that differences of procedure determine extreme differences in the resulting platforms and that differences in fundamental orientation or vision seem to determine the procedures.

Descartes doubted, using his maxim "Do omnibus dubitandum est," but he conceived himself, René, born 1596, to be inspecting beliefs that he, René, had cherished. This egocentric frame of reference his doubt did not touch. There is nothing very strange in this situation as long as we take "all" (*omnibus*) as it is often used in everyday situations, as an expression of less than strict universality. If "all" is successively widened in scope, there will still be some frame of reference that is untouched by doubt. For Descartes, it was natural to persist in retaining himself, or his thinking, or his doubting, as something that breasts the waves of critical inspection. This fundamental orientation gave a frame that was inconsistent with a doubt that he was there all the time, doubting. Thus, as a consequence of his particular orientation, he grasped a first indubitable truth.

What I should like to stress here is the intimate relation between the conscious, explicit conviction that he, René, was doubting and therefore, of course, existing, and the conception of the task: that he, René, should doubt. As long as René's conception of his task is not challenged, the result follows. All the conceptualizations, points of view, and beliefs inherent in the egocentrically conceived task and its implementation are then left untouched by doubt. The consequences of the conceptualizations are experienced by René as absolute truths and therefore as a starting point for system building.

Let us turn now to Baruch de Spinoza, who as an admirer of Descartes in his youth presumably had the same idea of radical doubt and egocentric introspection. Let us speak of Baruch rather than of the Benedict of Wolff's (1963) terminology, stressing the Jewish religious core of Spinoza's thinking rather than his relations to Descartes and the Renaissance. Baruch seems to have had a personality and background somewhat different from that of René. With Baruch they lead to a critical inspection of concepts of the ego, especially in its relation to God. Baruch could not be Baruch and doubt without God, and critical inspection of the task of doubting was quite possible within the God-centered frame. Philosophical mysticism was so deeply seated in Baruch that everyday pursuits were strange except within a definite framework—but not one in which God was sought from somewhere outside God. Rather, the framework was one that encompassed God and contained the possibility of explaining Spinoza himself and his capacity to doubt. His starting point is deocentric, not egocentric like Descartes's, and consequently such formulations as "I doubt therefore I exist" must have been foreign to him as a basic conceptualization or self-evident truth.

The highest kind of knowledge, the "third," is conceptualized by Baruch in terms of "eternal things," and it would be rash to identify the relation here of the subject knowing to the object known with the relation between a concrete person or an ego and an empirical or, more generally, natural object of some sort.

In some sense it is justifiable to say that the third kind of knowledge can *be* without *being held* by any person at all. "Baruch" cannot "have" the third kind of knowledge in any ordinary, naturalistic sense of having Descartes and Spinoza within the framework of a (roughly suggested) the-

ory of ultimate orientations. I doubt the adequacy of this framework, however. When one goes deep into the philosophy of Descartes, it seems that one's acceptance of the theory of ultimate orientation is itself affected. It acquires a Cartesian quality and is no longer suitable as a neutral frame within which both systems, Descartes's and Spinoza's, can be understood. On the other hand, going deep into the philosophy of Spinoza tends to produce the same effect: Descartes gradually getting absurd or incomprehensible. My conclusion, therefore, is that the framework accommodates both the views only at a very superficial level and that, in fact, the views are incomparable.

The experience of inspecting and judging the truth-claims of explicit basic views, and of going through a series of steps from the inspection and judging of these basic views already enjoyed to an examination of the set of views implicit in our first-order inspection, and then from the explicated first-order views to an examination of the second-order ones, and so forth, turns the notion of "fundamental" or "basic" into a relational concept: *B* is fundamental or basic in relation to *A*, *C* is fundamental in relation to *B*, and so on. The hunt for any natural resting point is as unrealistic as to reach out for the horizon. Maybe what we have tried to do is to make explicit what by its very nature cannot be made so, and perhaps all the explicit frames of reference from the first to that of the *n*th order are on the same level in relation to a kind of perpetual implicit total view. Maybe we "have" a kind of preconscious total view or frame—so total that all the higher-level reflections are in some way placed within it.

Our Preconscious Total View: A Fiction? Paradoxes of Total Views

If the preconscious view is a kind of matrix within which all attempts to unravel or bring to light the concepts and categories of any implicit frame of reference are to proceed, it cannot be identified with a philosophy like naturalism, naive realism, or any other intended systematization of common sense. These are explicit and verbalized and are defenseless when attacked by means of frame-of-reference dialectics. Is it, then, a *view*? The term suggests something that can be grasped and therefore inspected. This, in turn, implies the possibility of making it explicit.

Conceptions of explicit total views as found in the history of philosophy are riddled with paradoxes. Either a view is explicit but fragmentary or it is total but implicit. An analogous conclusion can be reached concerning the ordinary use of the term *view*. Views are of something from somewhere. This somewhere is not part of that something. So we cannot have a total view in this sense, made up of viewed and viewpoint. Admittedly, it would be misleading in ordinary situations to call a view fragmentary because it did not include the viewpoint, but then reflections on total views are themselves extraordinary.

It is perhaps only after studying attempts by philosophers and others to elaborate vast systems that we are led to ask what makes systematizers with "totalitarian" aspirations believe in the possibility of reaching their goal. Further, it is only after considering what seem to be the unavoidable paradoxes, or contradictions, that we are led to talk about and imagine a kind of view, or rather disposition, that we have before making philosophical inquiries—a "totalitarian" disposition that makes it appear reasonable and even important to elaborate an explicit total view. We may refer to such an initial view as preconscious in the sense that parts of it, perhaps any part whatever, can be made the object of our concentrated attention and will then appear to us as fresh, verbal expressions of something we had expressed already in indirect or nonverbal ways.

Given the paradoxes inherent in conceptions of explicit total views, it is important to inquire whether any of the great philosophers really intended to elaborate such views. Aristotle's doctrine of absolute and final principles (e.g., the principle of contradiction) is an attempt to base all his thinking and the resulting all-embracing system upon an intuitively certain foundation. It testifies to his greatness that he knows he cannot argue in favor of his own first principles, because this would imply the existence of a layer of principles still deeper than the first principles. That is, it would involve a contradiction: first principles as secondary, ultimates as penultimates. Recently, Neothomists have tried to elaborate a total view consistent with basic Aristotelian views and modern scientific knowledge, but perhaps the most famous undertaking since medieval times in the field of all-embracing, supreme synthesis is that of Spinoza in his *Ethics*. This book together with his *Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding*, in which some of the methodology of the *Ethics* is stated, represents a system

that plainly intends to answer all the main questions, including questions of framework.

The supreme systematizers have always omitted details, relegating that work to the formal and empirical sciences and working within a fixed ultimate framework.

In the conception of the *Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (by O. Neurath and others), the vision of a scientific total view and that of an encyclopedia are merged into one. Adopting a so-called onion structure, that is, starting with two volumes on basic fields, and adding sets of volumes treating the same fields in greater and greater detail, the creators of the *Encyclopedia* conceived it as a total system.

The difference between a total view and an encyclopedia, as here conceived, is that in the encyclopedia there must be details, whereas no single detail is necessary to make a total view complete. In a total view just enough is said to cover the essentials or principles. How much this is, we leave open.

Jeremy Bentham (e.g., 1973) tried to formulate all-embracing general views, and also to elaborate some of them in the greatest detail. His total view would not have been less complete, however, if he had not prescribed a definite color for ballot boxes.

Whatever our views regarding the “depth” of particular philosophers, we may safely assume that most of the great philosophical systematizers intended to form explicit total views. The question of the genesis of those views is therefore a very real one.

The Genesis of the Belief in the Possibility of Total Views

How might it be explained from the point of view of psychology or social science that man has started to talk, or started to believe he has been talking or can talk intelligibly, even intelligently, about his total view—his logic, ontology, epistemology, value system—in general? How is it that he has come to conceive of the possibility of regarding his own total view as one explicable view among others?

Perhaps the belief has developed in this way: It may strike us that a person always thinks and believes in some definite way, that is, in only one of the many possible ways we can envisage, the range of possibilities being

implicitly determined by our own (observer's) frame of reference. To articulate clearly and succinctly what distinguishes our own view from that of the other, we proceed to make explicit not only the other's view but also our own; and we set about the latter job as if it were of the same kind as the first, that is, as the job of describing the other's view, something already accommodated well within our own framework. However, we ourselves are not accommodated within our own framework, and this makes the second job totally different from the first. To carry it through seems to me to be of the same order of difficulty as to eat not only part of oneself, but all. The analogy that generates the belief in the possibility of such an explication is spurious. A view that comprehends other views does so by pinning the various views it comprehends to something else, the accommodating viewpoint. However, this latter can be explicated in its own turn only by being accommodated in the same way, by being pinned down to something else, and so on.

Since our views about the other person's views are conceptualized well within our own frame of reference, our own views as contrasted with his are also thus placed. Being primarily interested in contrasts, we take the part for the whole. That is to say, one's own ultimate frame is overlooked.

The same goes for another possible way in which this belief is fostered, namely, when we look back to examine earlier phases of our own lives. Koestler (in Crossman 1949: 68) says that "My particular education has equipped my mind with such elaborate shock-absorbing buffers and elastic defenses that everything seen and heard became automatically transformed to fit a preconceived pattern."³ From the belief in an all-embracing knowledge of one's own mind as it was at a previous stage of development, only one small but errant step is required to conceive oneself as having at the present moment, and knowing, a definite general outlook that can be made verbally explicit as one outlook among others.

In psychology, as in other sciences of human beings, concepts of total views have been introduced, and it has apparently been taken for granted that they can be used in research to make neutral, adequate classifications of individuals or groups. Let me quote some words from a strong believer (Walsby 1947) in total views: "Our revised, more dynamic and concrete conception of an ideology may now be defined as the complete system or

cognitive assumptions and affective identifications which manifest themselves in, or underlie, the thought, speech, aims, interests, ideals, ethical standards, actions—in short, in the behavior—of an individual human being.” Walsby’s belief in an underlying ideology is strikingly similar to the belief in a God that manifests itself in all that happens in the world. It seems that there is a strong Hegelian trend in research about ideology, much influenced by the sweeping concepts of Karl Mannheim. In his *Ideology and Utopia* Mannheim (1952: 49) writes: “Here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.”

The ideology of a person observed by Walsby would have to be described and classified in relation to a framework that has to be so comprehensive as to embrace completely that of the observed person. The ideology of an age or of a historico-social group observed by Mannheim must be transcended in every respect by that of the group or age of Mannheim. The “total structure of the mind” of Professor Mannheim himself must, in the way of divine intellects, furnish a frame of reference and conceptual structure of a most comprehensive or value-neutral kind.

Concepts such as these are potent factors in building up images of “the fascist,” “the communist man,” and other creatures, images that cannot be reached by ordinary total views from the total view of the observer. One cannot argue with them, but they understand the language of power.

Imre Hermann, Levy Bruehl, Mannheim, Walsby, and many others do not seem to doubt for a moment that the fundamental beliefs and attitudes of others—for example, their logic—can be described and compared with one another, irrespective of how different they are from those of the investigator.⁴ When the victims of a total description are so-called primitives, the observer is rarely confronted with a reversal of roles—the victim describing the total view of the scientist. If, however, the social scientist is faced with appreciative and verbally nonprimitive proponents of the systems, whether critical or indignant, he is apt to become acutely aware of at least some of his own assumptions, and he is led to talk—or believe he could talk—about his own general frame of reference. He thus may be led to believe he has a total view (capable of being verbalized) during the process of

UNDERSTANDING NAESS'S UNIQUE APPROACH

rationalizing his implicit assumption that he is able to discover and adequately describe the total views of others. What he more or less uncritically has imputed to others, he now feels compelled to impute to himself also; he insists he has a total view and is willing to verbalize it, using words such as "the world," "man," "society," "liberty," and "progress."

It is not my aim here to develop in detail hypotheses about the genesis of belief in the possibility of explicit total views. The aim is the more modest one of suggesting that such views have certain paradoxical characteristics, which makes it highly interesting that they are believed in.

Notes on the Methodology of Normative Systems

Hard and Soft Methodology

Historically, interest in general methodological questions has concentrated upon highly technical and prestigious sciences like theoretical physics. One expects to hear about Einstein and quantum physics rather than about the methodology of questionnaires. The author of these notes belongs to those who relish reading about the wonderful achievements in physics, cosmology, and related very “hard” fields of natural science. In the last five years, however, an increasing number of methodological admirers of hard science have tried to do something meaningful in soft science, more particularly, in chaotic areas where science and politics meet; areas such as how to save some unpolluted nature and reserve some possibilities of graceful and dignified life for our grandchildren. In these areas, such humble research instruments as questionnaires are important. Ordinary, decent *pro et contra dicere* gets to be important. Methodology loses here much of its scientific charm. There are, however, a vast number of important questions for the soft research methodologist to tackle.

The following notes are formed in close connection with a definite example of a research project involving the development of a system of norms and hypotheses¹ and also with a commitment to a social and political activity, the deep ecology movement.²

It is my contention that tentative formulation of normative systems is highly desirable in many kinds of activity, both purely theoretical and

This article first appeared in *Methodology and Science* 10 (1977): 64–79.

mixed theoretical, and pedagogical, ethical, or political. They have so far received little attention.

“Norms” and “Hypotheses”

The sentences of normative systems are conveniently divided into two classes, those ending with an exclamation mark, suggesting inducements to think or act in certain ways, and those ending with a period, suggesting affirmations. The first I call norms, the second hypotheses. The latter name is chosen primarily to suggest testability, not uncertainty. Secondly, the name suggests a certain tentativeness or revisability. These characteristics hold also for norms, as we shall see for the methodology suggested in what follows. Even basic norms are revisable. It has been objected that the term *norm* and the exclamation mark make the norm-sentences seem absolutistic and rigid. Actually, their main function is that of proposing tentative guidelines. Little is gained by a mere complicated, relativistic terminology. Decisions—the aim of normative thinking—are absolutistic in the sense of being either carried out or sabotaged.

To avoid unnecessary abstractness I shall permit myself to introduce and elaborate in some detail a definite example (see figure 8). Explanations will follow in successive steps, not all at once.

Figure 8 expresses a tentative synopsis, or condensed survey, of a philosophy inspired by the ecological movement. I call such a philosophy an ecosophy. My relation to this philosophy is complex: on the one hand, I am an adherent and contributor to its development; on the other hand, I am a researcher interested in critical thinking about systems and interested in methodology as such.

My suggestion that figure 8 “expresses” a synopsis must be understood elliptically. As a drawer of the diagram I intend to express the synopsis through certain sentences, but it is, of course, more or less unlikely that the sentences convey exactly the same thing to each reader. Certain approximations are all that can be expected.

Modern ecology has been an inspiration to many ecologists and philosophers, and they, of course, do not arrive at the same results. To stress the possibility and even desirability of a diversity of tentative philosophies inspired by ecology, I have named the system outlined in figure 8 Ecosophy




Figure 8. Ecosophy T (repeated)

T. Here again I use a shorthand expression: strictly speaking, no absolutely definite system is outlined. A set of sentences is offered, but plausible interpretations make up a class with more than one number — and my “definiteness of intention” is limited and constantly in flux.

A philosophy may be systematized in many ways. There is no single, definite way of tracing lines of derivation. It is to some degree arbitrary which norms and hypotheses are chosen as ultimate in the sense of not derivable. Moreover, even if the norms and hypotheses are arranged in a definite, authorized way, there is still room for differences in wording. Four

sentences can be arranged in twenty-four ways through simple permutations. The classes of meaningful sequences of formulations of a single systematization I call versions.³ Figure 8 shows only one version. In what follows it is important to have the trichotomy system, systematization, and version in mind. There is a one-many relation among the three items.

Lower Norms in the Sense of Derived Norms

The lines going from the top toward the bottom of the diagram are meant to indicate derivations. The sentences lower down are meant to follow from those higher up. The higher norms are not meant to have ethical or otherwise normative priority; they are not meant as more valid. The relations of levels are not axiological, but logical in a fairly wide sense—let us say as wide as in Spinoza's "proofs." The relation of higher to lower is often the rather trivial one of a more general to a less general norm or hypothesis.

Use of Vagueness and Ambiguity to Achieve Multiple Interpretability

The terms and sentences (including the many one-word sentences) are strikingly vague and ambiguous. They are purposely open to a variety of interpretations.

There are serious methodological considerations that favor multiple interpretability. The highly tentative, "heuristic," character of the survey has the character of an instrument of research, not a codification of results. It is made along the way and modified along the way.

Instead of tentatively rejecting one of the norms or hypotheses in favor of a completely different one, it is often better to introduce alternative interpretations of the initial or point-of-departure wording. The initial vague and ambiguous sentence expressing the hypothesis or norm may tentatively be given more precise meanings, resulting in new formulations called precizations. Precization is one of the central concepts of a semantical subsystem often called empirical semantics.⁴ Roughly, a sentence, s_1 , is more precise than another, s_0 , if, and only if, the latter (s_0) permits all interpretations of the former, whereas the former (s_1) does not permit all the interpretations of the latter (s_0) and does not permit any interpretations that the latter does not permit. In short, the set of interpretations of the more precise sentence is a genuine subset of that of the less precise. The choice of

a rather indefinite and ambiguous sentence in the most elementary survey makes it fairly short and easily understandable and opens a large variety of possibilities of more definite character. Instead of more or less arbitrarily insisting that a sentence is to be interpreted, say, in the way expressed by No. 249, and in no other way, we keep the options open as long as this is heuristically convenient. Strictly speaking, the change of usage of words in No. 249 makes its meaning fluctuate in time and place. Openness is unavoidable.

Function of One-Word Sentences and Other Primitive Utterances.
"No Exploitation!"

A striking feature of the survey are the many one-word sentences. We encounter a problem deciding just who are considered the senders and who are the intended receivers of the survey considered as a means of communication. If it is considered to be a kind of blueprint for a general utopia of self-realization, the intended receiver is humankind at large. Humankind does not read, however. More concretely, the intended receivers may be conceived as "the economically well-to-do in the industrial societies," and the sentences announce to them which norms should be followed and which goals (values) should be attempted or realized in and through changes of their society.

Thus conceived, the wording of one of the norms can be made more precise as follows. T_0 : No exploitation! T_1 : You (economically well-to-do in the industrial societies) work toward, or support attempts at, eliminating economic and other kinds of exploitation. T_1 is more precise than T_0 in one direction of precization—namely, the receiver who is directed—but the ambiguous term *exploitation* is still made use of.

What is exploitation? Obviously there is room for further precization, but a highly precise sentence of the kind needed in a fairly abstract and general survey is apt to be very long and very complicated. Therefore, it cannot perform the special function of the less precise. The elaboration of the more definite, less vague and ambiguous surveys of a system does not make the less definite and more vague and ambiguous valueless. We have to work continuously at various levels of preciseness. Various degrees of multiple interpretability are needed.

The survey has six vertical levels, and at the top there is only one norm.

With only one top norm we eliminate the complication of rules of priority in case of norm collisions among any larger set of top norms. On the other hand, the choice of only one norm that is not derivable from other norms involves a fair amount of word magic or more or less arbitrary rules of interpretation. The term *self-realization* carries an inordinately heavy burden.

If we put up, let us say, ten top norms, this makes it necessary to decide upon a great number of rules of priority. In general, the maximum realization of n_i is not compatible with maximum satisfaction of n_j , i and j taking the values 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10. Or the maximum effort to realize n_i is not compatible with the maximum effort to realize n_j . To regulate the relations between n_i and n_j a vast number of rules may be needed.

Some Interpretations of "Self-Realization"

Given different interpretations (in the sense of precization) of the term *self-realization*, the whole survey acquires different meanings. Some derivations will not hold for some interpretations. In spite of this dependence upon a single term, it would not be wise to assign to it a definite meaning. The choice must to some extent depend upon which derivations are considered valid and important. Thus, the interpretation of the top-norm sentences and of the others of the version is a continuous process, wherein tentative modification at one level interacts with tentative semantical modifications at others.

The main semantical device for adapting the term *self-realization* to Ecosophy T is to distinguish the following concepts:

- T_0 —self-realization
- T_1 —ego-realization
- T_2 —self-realization (with lowercase *s*)
- T_3 —Self-realization (with capital *S*)

The last kind of concept is known in the history of philosophy under various names: the universal self, the absolute, *ātman*, and so forth. Many Indo-European languages use terms corresponding to the English "self" in analogous ways. Thus, the Sanskrit *ātman* is used for all three concepts, but mostly as a simple reflexive pronoun.

In prevalent individualistic and utilitarian political thinking in modern Western industrial states, the terms *self-realization*, *self-expression*, and *self-interest* are used for what is above called ego-realization and self-realization. One stresses the ultimate and extensive incompatibility of the interests of different individuals. In opposition to this trend is another based on the hypothesis of increased compatibility with increased maturity of the individuals. The compatibility is considered to have an ontological basis—compare the “illusion” of a separable ego. Ecosophy T leans heavily on such ideas, excellently developed in the *Ethics* of Spinoza. Self-preservation, or in our terminology, self-realization, cannot develop far without sharing joys and sorrows with others or, more fundamentally, without moving beyond the narrow ego of the small child into the comprehensive structure of a Self that comprises all human beings. The ecological movement—like many earlier philosophical movements—takes a further step and asks for a development such that there is a deep identification of individuals with all life.

The development of life-forms, especially since the Cambrian period, shows an extreme degree of expansion of life space and a corresponding diversity of forms making use of different climatic and other conditions. There is no merely passive adaptation, no mere self-preservation in any narrow sense. Thus, the term *self-expression*, or *-realization*, is better suited than self-preservation. If the term *self* is felt to be unfitting, we can use *life-unfolding* or *life-expansion*.

Whereas the top sentences, both norms and hypotheses in our survey, are somewhat metaphysical, the next levels introduce crucial ecological terms: diversity, complexity, symbiosis. If a particular way of life is such that different species or different communities must compete and struggle with each other merely to survive, conditions are worse than if they somehow can specialize, making use of each other's activities, and thus exemplifying “Live and let live”—that is, practicing symbiosis. Symbiotic coexistence as conceived in modern ecology does not exclude killing—elk and wolf have lived in symbiosis, the wolves keeping the population of elks within a limit necessary to uphold good, not-too-competitive life conditions and stable elk communities.

Other terms, of course, also need elucidation. The main point, however, is that from the top norms and hypotheses, general ecological and ecopolitical principles are derived. Thanks to the normative aspect of the

system, it does not merely describe, it prescribes. Thus, we are able to take care of the social and political views within the international ecological movement, of which environmental concerns are only a part.

Conclusions

I have used whatever words came to mind to render some of the hypotheses of the survey understandable. I am not trying to persuade anybody of the tenability of the hypotheses!

The main conclusions I wish to emphasize are these.

1. Systematization of norms and hypotheses is needed in research motivated by pedagogical, ethical, political, or other large-scale movements.
2. The systematizations visualize complicated logical, or more generally cognitive, relations between important clusters of prescriptions and descriptions. They bring into focus the basic premises and fundamental norms that guide concrete actions and minor research units that have meaning only, or mainly, within a major normative framework. They help to unify and coordinate enterprises involving diverse groups and numerous people.
3. Systematizations as research instruments must be flexible. They are best expressed at various levels of preciseness and in alternative terminologies. A multiplicity of versions is needed, each version adapted to special functions.
4. Modifications can be carried out through reinterpretation of terms and sentences as well as through negating or modifying propositions.
5. Whereas the simple categorical way of announcing norms and hypotheses makes survey and derivation simplest, assessment of degrees of uncertainty and qualifying phrases should be attached as notes and comments.

Normative Systems: Role in Social and Political Context

Let us now turn to the extrinsic use of a survey or synopsis in social contexts, where it has pronounced multiple uses. Our example will continue to be the survey used in the deep ecology movement.

The destruction of ecosystems because of the human population explosion, heavy industry, and other factors has made it necessary to reform laws and regulations of many kinds. For example, laws that until recently speci-

fied exceptions to a general permission to kill wild animals are now specifying exceptions to a general prohibition against killing or injuring. A corresponding development is going on in relation to wild plants.

The reasons given for all these prohibitions usually stress narrow utilitarian aspects of the crisis, or they may stress in more general terms the interconnection of human life conditions with those of other life-forms. Among the most prominent advocates of a new attitude toward nature and its ecosystem, however, the strongest motivation has been more philosophical. Those advocates have struggled for recognition of the intrinsic value, the value-in-itself, of the various life-forms, and the right, in principle, of all of them to blossom. The ecological movement in the West from the time of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962) has been inspired by philosophy, and this is still so. The survey is a crude instrument by means of which the main outline of this philosophy can be codified—not that all participants in the movement need to subscribe to the hypotheses and norms, but so that they can verbalize their own convictions in relation to the survey. Very few of the active participants have any special training in systematic expositions of a combined philosophical and scientific character, and the methodology of normative systems certainly is not included in the curriculum of traditional schools. Thus, the survey facilitates reasoning and argumentation from first principles within the ecological movement—and, of course, as a reaction within the groups that fight what they call the prophets of doom.

Role of Arguing from First Principles in Technocracies

Why is it so important in some Western industrialized states to reason and argue from first principles?

One reason is the alternative of depending on the value judgments of technical experts. I wish, therefore, *not* to mention it as a universally valid reason for argument from first principles.

The vast majority of experts with influence on the policies of Western industrial states avoid argumentation from fundamentals. Instead, they prefer to state the preferences of the majority, to harmonize their responses with the stated goals of the democratically elected government. The goals are in part vaguely formulated through slogans such as “Welfare,” or more

specifically defined as "Continued economic growth," "Less than 4 percent unemployment," and so forth. In any case, experience shows a marked unwillingness, perhaps sometimes combined with an inability, to argue from fundamentals.

Confronted with people in the ecology movement who use argumentation from fundamentals, the experts are induced to do the same. This nearly always results in conclusions favorable to the movement. Shortsighted, unecological policies have as a necessary condition absence of argumentation from fundamentals. When such argumentation is introduced, inconsistencies between basic norms and hypotheses and current policies are laid bare. Very often, the experts have the same basic personal value commitments as those in the ecology movement, but their public function is primarily to help realize goals not stated by them but by some authority backed by powerful special interests. Less powerful interests cannot afford to hire the experts.

Through argumentation from fundamentals the experts are pushed into controversial issues and are led to criticize unecological policies and their own bosses. Thus, the more clear and explicit the argumentation from fundamentals among supporters of responsible ecological policies, the greater the possibilities of introducing such argumentation among policy makers.

These hypotheses about the enlargement of possibilities do not imply any definite level of influence. It is easy to overestimate the influence of arguments in politics. The impact of ecological thinking upon policies has been slight compared to what ecologists think is necessary to prevent catastrophic conditions within a century of the present moment.

If such argumentation is introduced, it favors on the whole the goals of responsible ecological policies. However, this may be too much talk about the ecology movement—and too much use of unclarified value-laden expressions such as "responsible" ecological policies! Let us inspect the survey considered as a point-of-departure formulation (a T_0 formulation) of the uppermost levels of a normative system.

Preponderance of Nonnormatives in a Normative System

We begin with certain elementary observations:

1. A normative system never consists only of norms. Most codifications of normative views show a marked preponderance of nonnormative sentences.

2. Norms are in general derived from other norms and hypotheses, not merely from norms.

3. The existence of at least one hypothesis as a premise for the inference of a norm establishes the hypothetical character of derived norms. Their validity depends upon the validity of nonnormative assumptions, postulates, theories, and observations.

Methodologically, the last point is of decisive importance in argumentation: when the intricate interconnections between norms and hypotheses are left unarticulated, each norm tends to be taken as absolute or ultimate. This reducer eliminates the possibility of rational discussion. In harmony with the methodology here proposed, it is always appropriate, when norms are opposed in debate, to ask the opponent, "Which hypotheses do you think are relevant to the adoption of your norm?"

If experts refer to public opinion in support of a norm, it is today important to ask both for evidence in the form of published investigations of opinions and for norms justifying the derivation of a norm from descriptions of opinions, whether they are those of a majority or of an authoritative minority. Opinions are unfortunately reported as if they can be isolated from (implicit) normative systems. A Norwegian survey concluded that three out of four Norwegians think their standard of living is too high, 28 percent even "much too high," and only 1 percent too low. Supporters of economic growth contended that a different way of asking would show that a lesser majority is against the current average high standard of living. Subsequent surveys proved this. It is plausible, though, that a "deep interview" covering fundamental norms and hypotheses would indicate that more than three out of four think the standard is too high. What is needed for methodological purposes is the use of a substantial number of differing systemic contexts. As it is now, various political parties use only one questionnaire for each survey and formulate the questions in a way that is not unfavorable to the party line.

Ultimate Norms: The Equal Right to Live and Blossom

The term *ultimate norm* is used mainly in two senses: (1) a norm not derived from any other norm and (2) a norm of highest priority (or of absolute, unconditioned priority). In normative systems of the kind envis-

aged, only the first sense is used. In that case there is a rational methodology for changing an ultimate norm. Any proposal for ultimateness will fundamentally have the character of a working hypothesis.

Given a consistent set of norms and hypotheses, there is in principle a plurality of possibilities for deriving them from a less numerous set. This primarily involves a process of generalization. If the ultimate norm concerns adult human beings, it may be generalized to make it concern all living beings with certain characters, with the traits determined such that one can infer that all adult human beings possess them within the range of intended validity, but that other living beings also might possess them within the same range. Whether we believe that there actually are such beings (e.g., angels, Martians) is not relevant to the question of derivation. We would get an ultimate norm from which the previous ultimate norm concerning adult human beings is derived.

A more frequent source of change of an ultimate norm is, however, the derivation of a (nonultimate) norm that we are certain we will not accept as valid. It must be remembered that a systematization is a methodological divide made by certain persons for certain purposes. It has no independent authority.

If, for example, "All living beings have an equal right of self-realization" is taken to be derivable from the ultimate norm "Complete self-realization," and if "Your little daughter has an extreme hunger, and food can only be brought to her by killing the last tiger, nevertheless do not kill it" can be derived from "All living beings have equal rights" (plus some hypotheses of unquestioned validity), then some of us would tend to reject the ultimate norm. That is, we might say, It is my duty to rescue my child, whatever the consequences for the tigers (but not whatever the consequences for my human neighbor; i.e., it is not my duty to kill him, even if he were the only food available for my daughter). The rejection of an ultimate norm usually has a kind of intuition as one of its presuppositions.

The principle of the equal right of all living beings to blossom is at the moment controversial, but there seems to be a rising opinion in its favor. In order to avoid undesired injuring and killing, animals for food must be admitted through special hypotheses and norms. These have to do with mutual aid among beings of the same or a similar kind. There are obvious ad-

vantages for a species whose parents take special care of the offspring, and in which kindred beings take special care of one another, but egalitarianism sets limits on kinds of special care that are obnoxious to the outgroups. Exactly where is the line to be drawn? Obviously, there cannot be general agreement here, and attempts to codify detailed norms covering all sorts of norm collisions are unrealistic and methodologically unjustified. There is, however, a movement toward establishing a norm against inflicting unnecessary pain or injury to animals. What is meant here by *necessary*? It obviously depends on a complex structure of norms and hypotheses.

Clarification of concepts of "natural right" has never been very successful. As an aid to clarifying the egalitarian norm under consideration, I propose that a stipulation of definitional rule be added: "The right of *A* to live and blossom does not automatically exclude the justification of *B* to injure or kill *A*." To avoid confusion, I would not say that *B* may have the right to kill; there are many kinds of justification other than through a so-called natural right.

De Principiis Est Disputandum

We now return to our consideration of norms placed as ultimate in a normative systematization. From the above discussion it follows that the rule of *de principiis non est disputandum* does not hold. Every proposal of ultimate norms is open to discussion. Moreover, the critical assessment can take many forms: nonacceptance of consequences, invocation of norms from which the proposed ultimate norm can be derived, and other argumentational moves.

Teamwork and Action Research

Hypotheses of central importance in an ecosophy exhibit an extremely wide range of subject matter—from quantum mechanics to political science and communication theory. Teamwork is therefore essential in every ecosophical research project, however modest. There are no specialists in ecophilosophy. The research project in which the systematization illustrated in this paper figures has involved teamwork. The project members

are in constant touch with a wide circle of researchers and participants in political and social struggles. To some extent this gives the research the character of action research.

Action research has acquired a bad reputation among stern methodologists favoring the hard natural sciences. This is unfortunate because an increasing number of high-quality research problems have time limitations. The researchers get to know the dates—say d_1, d_2, \dots, d_{10} —as approximate dates of social and political decisions with grave ecological consequences. The researchers are asked to furnish evidence for or against certain crucial hypotheses before definite dates. Genuine questions of scientific methodology are specific to this “unfortunate” situation: the researcher has to solve the maximization problem—how to arrive at a maximum of evidence for or against a hypothesis given limited resources, the severest limit being that of time available. Furthermore, the researchers have to accept modifying or reshaping the project after each political decision. Teamwork is essential because of the many shifts of relevance from one kind of subordinate problem to another.

The ecologically relevant investigations of atomic energy installations are typical. Safety investigations require atomic physicists, chemists, and engineers in the hard sciences. Assessing consequences for vegetation, fisheries, and so forth, requires soft natural science participants; the human-error factor, social and psychological competence; and the political implications (plutonium “in the hands of” an increasing number of governments, increased centralization, etc.), researchers in many social and humanistic fields. Therefore, all are subject to merciless requirements of priorities. Every relevant question may open interesting investigations that could take 100 years and require the total material resources available.

The bad reputation of action research results mainly from two defects and one good thing: (1) the uncertain character of certain hypotheses is not formulated with sufficient emphasis in research reports or in popularized forms in mass communication; (2) the researcher pleads a cause in a way that hampers the utilization of his information by people of different opinion; and (3) action research sometimes hits narrow vested interests, which then hit back, trying to discredit action research as a whole.

Whereas military action research in established sciences of nature has been going on for a long time without the name being used, social science

action research is new and must be expected to meet opposition. It is of great importance that it be led by researchers with some experience; otherwise, valuable contributions can be misused or neglected because of flaws in the way they are presented to the public. One example will suffice. A government institution involved in the effort to protect forests hired scientists to report on various topics, one of which was recreation. A young team investigated the conception that people have of a forest: what they expect and wish to experience in the forest. The public clearly expected and wished for diversity in the ecological sense. Those, however, who have overarching economic interests favor no traditional cultures, broad highways for transportation, and other features that are ecologically undesirable. A hot public debate resulted, and the papers written by the young scientists were heavily criticized. Some of the criticism could have been avoided if they had foreseen the clash between opposing interests. In short, in action research the participants should be generalists, with a field of study covering the question of how a scientific report is likely to be read and made use of or attacked by various power groupings. Communication theory and political science are relevant, whatever the special topic of an action research project.

It is my hope that this paper may inspire some friends in the field of "hard" methodology to shift toward the broad fields of "soft" methodology. Their general attitude of concern for "objectivity" may contribute to the fairness and lack of bias so important in the hot conflicts surrounding present-day social and political problems.

Paul Feyerabend—A Green Hero?

Mild and Green?

It is not without a certain feeling of guilt that some of us admit to finding great pleasure in reading Feyerabend, including his many digressions and footnotes. Speaking of footnotes, who else has managed to place a footnote on his title page that refers to yet other footnotes? (See the title page of *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*.)

The feeling of guilt occurs when reading the serious criticism of Feyerabend's manners, his "offensive and wounding comments," his limited "respect for truth," and his relentless attacks on the reading abilities of his colleagues.

Feyerabend sees himself as mild and considerate, but in the very footnote in which he defends his innocence he says that he wants "to remove the ideological and financial exploitation of common citizens by a small gang of power- and money-hungry intellectuals" (Feyerabend 1975: 131). The reader may easily interpret this as an even harsher attack upon his colleagues than that concerning their lamentable literacy. Without getting into further analysis of a personal nature, I conclude that Feyerabend's mildness is genuine and that even his monumental stylistic arrogance is nonviolent.

This article was reprinted with permission from *Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy*, edited by N. Witoszek and A. Brennan (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 57–68. It first appeared in *Beyond Reason: Essays on the Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend*, edited by G. Munévar (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 403–16.

This unexpected conclusion makes me wonder to what extent the arrogant style of Renaissance scientists was combined with smiling mockery. Luigi Ferrari expresses his pleasure in the belief that his writings against Tartaglia have broken the back of the latter and made him scarcely able to move his tail, and so on. Perhaps scientists at that time enjoyed themselves immensely, not only *talking* to each other in this way, but making scathing personal criticisms as widely known as possible by means of the newly invented printing press.

At any rate, Feyerabend's exuberance has elicited many rhetorical jewels. Ernest Gellner's "Beyond Truth and Falsity" is a case in point. Perhaps we shall witness the rise of a new tradition of scientific rhetoric in the near future. There are illustrious precedents. Pascal expressed *rhetorically* the theorem that "the arc length of an arch of the generalized cycloid" is equal to "the semicircumference of the ellipse" (Boyer 1968: 400). However, those of us whose rhetorical talents are rather modest should, I think, stick to our old pedantic ways. That, at least, is what I shall do in the following.

What I would like to do is suggest a qualified positive answer to the questions "May we, who are proponents of green philosophy and politics, count Feyerabend as one of our heroes?" and "Does he support the idea of a green policy of science?"

The use of the term *green* in the above sentences certainly needs some clarification. It refers to general views and attitudes in the main inspired by the international environmental ecological movement. Some well-known authors of this movement are Gregory Bateson, Kenneth Boulding, Rachel Carson, William O. Douglas, Rene Dubos, Jacques Ellul, Tehan Galtung, Clarence Glacken, Edward Goldsmith, Ivan Illich, Sigmund Kvaloy, Aldo Leopold, Ian McHarg, Joseph Meeker, E. J. Mishan, Roderick Nash, John Rodman, Theodore Roszak, Marshall Sahlins, E. F. Schumacher, Paul Shepard, and Lynn White.¹ These authors do not always agree, and they have different styles, but important overlappings manifest themselves in similar political and general cultural postures in some of their publications. It is a case of Wittgensteinian family resemblance.

Traditions and Rationality

From a rather narrow point of view, green policies are characterized only in terms of pollution, resources, and population control. As far as I know Feyer-

abend has at least not published anything *contrary* to green policies in these fields. Pointing to his new car (his first) he remarked, “I have joined the eco-criminals!” I leave it to the readers to find the most plausible interpretation.

The philosophically central green issues concern human ecology, which today covers much of social and cultural anthropology. The term *tradition* belongs to the central ones. Feyerabend says something about the function of rationality in relation to traditions that deserves further development.

There are furthermore at least *two different ways of collectively deciding an issue* which I shall call a *guided* and *open exchange* respectively.

In the first case some or all participants adopt a well specified tradition and accept only those responses that correspond to its standards. If one party has not yet become a participant of the chosen tradition he will be badgered, persuaded, “educated” until he does—and then the exchange begins. A *rational debate* is a special case of a guided exchange. If the participants are rationalists then all is well and the debate can start right away. If only some participants are rationalists and they have power (an important consideration!) then they will not take their collaborators seriously until they have also become rationalists: a society based on rationality is not entirely free; one has to play the game of the intellectuals.

An open exchange, on the other hand, is guided by a pragmatic philosophy. The tradition adopted by the parties is unspecified in the beginning and develops as the exchange goes along. The participants get immersed into each other’s ways of thinking, feeling, perceiving to such an extent that their ideas, perceptions, world views may be entirely changed—and they become different people participating in a new and different tradition. An open exchange respects the partner whether he is an individual or an entire culture, while a rational exchange promises respect only within the framework of a rational debate.

(Feyerabend 1978)

The outcome of seemingly friendly interactions between nonindustrial and industrial traditions or cultures is largely determined by the superior power of the latter. The kind of rational debate and decision making characteristic of the powerful prevails. It cannot be expected that the Lapps of northern Scandinavia will be able to fight effectively for their “rights” when invited to play the decision-making game of their powerful opponents. The same holds for the hopeless fight of the Buddhist Sherpas to maintain their cultural integrity in a land ruled by Hindu bureaucracy. In both cases, the decision-making processes of the weaker side are different

from those of the stronger. If more or less forced to adopt the ways of the stronger, the weaker side is doomed to be dominated by the stronger. Today there is scarcely any *intention* to dominate or exploit the Lapps, or to weaken what remains of their culture, yet the interaction or exchange is a "guided" one in Feyerabend's terminology, and the stronger party wins. That is, it wins in the short run—but it loses in the long run, according to green philosophy: the absence of contact with a genuinely different culture makes the winner poorer.

Feyerabend's terminology does not seem to me very wise, however. The decision-making process in nonindustrial traditions may not be less rational than in our traditions, if the term *rational* is taken in a wide sense adapted to *general* cultural anthropology. When the Sherpas say that Tseringma (Gauri Shankar) is a mountain, a princess, and a kind of mother—of course, all at the same time—this is irrational only when integrated in a rather superficial way with our thinking and in our language. Rationality in a wider sense does not imply that one has to "play the game of the intellectuals." In short, I think it unwise to restrict the term *rational*, and even *rationalism*, in such a way that industrial societies acquire a monopoly.

This terminological remark does not alter the view that when two (widely different) cultures or traditions interact, the resulting changes cannot be adequately understood as a rational interchange even in a wide sense.

Maximum Diversity

One of the fundamental or key terms of green philosophy and politics is *diversity*. Diversity of life-forms, diversity of functions, environments, niches, traditions, practices, is basic to change and particularly to the evolution of new life-forms and cultures.

Respect and tolerance for diversity on a more and more crowded planet, therefore, get to be an increasingly urgent political matter. The view is gaining credence that the "cultural" diversity seemingly manifest in great industrial cities is only a superficial variation. Basic attitudes are increasingly standardized, in part owing to the centralization of technologies and communication.

Cognitive diversity is an integral part of cultural diversity. If, therefore, education is increasingly stereotyped through the adoption of world-

wide criteria of learning, the path toward monoculture is made smoother. That is, the contemporary stereotyped institutions of learning undermine the possibility of escape from cultural stagnation on this planet.

These are pessimistic but rather common views. Nevertheless, to change the schools and universities, political changes are necessary that today seem unlikely. The chances of change increase somewhat if more and more teachers boldly introduce changes based on an epistemological pluralism (Feyerabend: anarchism; my term: possibilism²) that cannot easily be refuted, if at all. A great impact cannot be expected, but the work in favor of a deep change must itself be of a diverse kind. Education is one field of struggle.

Minimum Interference

One cubic foot of good soil contains hundreds of species of organisms, each represented by hundreds, millions, or even billions of specimens. They interact with nonorganic ingredients in a more complex way than can be grasped in detail. Nevertheless, details, or specialized complex functions, are often decisive for the function of the whole as "good soil." Field ecologists hired to effect this or that change in a natural environment, or asked about what short- or long-range effect an interference will produce, are often brought to the limits of desperation: neither technical experts nor politicians seem to appreciate the basic ignorance of today and tomorrow about practically any concrete processes in nature. I say "concrete" because abstract knowledge of "laws" may increase exponentially without much influence on our ignorance in matters of field ecology. Therefore, *docta ignorantia* is a new key term of green philosophy.

Field ecologists, when asked about a new plan to interfere in nature, tend to answer "Better not to interfere" because of ignorance of effects, not because of proclaimed insight into negative effects.

What holds good about interference in nature holds also about nonindustrial cultures. Much of the benevolent interference in these cultures, offering them help in the form of food, dams, or books, have had deplorable effects. Often, noninterference seems to be the most responsible policy. The theme is complicated and the state of affairs rather depressing, with cultures dying at an alarming rate.

A principle of minimal interference applies to subcultures within industrial societies. Feyerabend says provoking things about this:

The possibilities of Mill's liberalism can be seen from the fact that it provides room for any human desire, and for any human vice. There are no general principles apart from the principle of minimal interference with the lives of individuals, or groups of individuals who have decided to pursue a common aim. For example, *there is no attempt to make the sanctity of human life a principle that would be binding for all*. Those among us who can realize themselves only by killing their fellow human beings and who feel fully alive only when in mortal danger are permitted to form a subsociety of their own where human targets are selected for the hunt.

(Feyerabend 1978: 132)

In any crowded society a subculture with a lot of killing going on interferes too heavily with outsiders. In the Valhalla of the Vikings, those who did not relish fighting and killing stayed home having a good time. They were never intentionally or accidentally molested by the enthusiastic fighters. In the evenings they got as much beer as the heroes. Unfortunately, there are today geographical limitations that make the practical application of very broad tolerance of cultural diversity difficult. The Valhalla model is inapplicable.

In green politics the protection of animal societies, not just the protection of individual human beings against undue interference, is a key issue. The matter is complex, however, and the maxim of "Maximizing life potentials" clearly sometimes makes it justifiable for human beings to interfere in the animal world, protecting one animal society against another. I do not see why we should not gently assist the golden trout (*Salmo aquabonita*) if it is threatened with complete extinction through weakness in its competition with the brown trout.

Westerners since Descartes and Bacon, fortified by the labor theory of value, have often regarded interference as a criterion of efficiency. What proceeds naturally tends to be classed as valueless or indifferent. It is characteristic of green policies to minimize interference, and we find the same point expressed by Feyerabend:

As far as science is concerned, I am as fit as a fiddle. Not being restricted by an undying loyalty to science I started looking for other kinds of healers and I found there are lots of them. Herbalists. Faith healers. Acupuncturists. Masseurs. Hypnotists. All quacks, according to the established medical opin-

ion. The first thing that caught my attention was their method of diagnosis. No painful interference with the organism. Many of these people had developed efficient methods of diagnosing from pulse, color of eye, of tongue, from gait, and so on. (Later on, when reading the *Nei Ching* which develops the philosophy behind acupuncture, I found that in China this was intentional: the human body must be treated with respect which means one has to find methods of diagnosis that do not violate its dignity.)

(Ibid., p. 137)

The use of the term *dignity* is instructive. Green politics is concerned about dignity as much as about material standard of living. Dignity is essential to life quality, and it is extended to animals. Animal factories interfere with the *dignity* of pigs.

On the whole, the green philosophy of nature is inspired by a broader appreciation of life-forms than is usual. One would agree with Feyerabend: "As far as I am concerned, a world in which a louse can live happily is a better world, a more mature world than a world in which a louse must be wiped out" (ibid., p. 133).

Fundamental Philosophies, Ecosophy T

In general, I think a basic norm of "Live and let live" is characteristic of green philosophy. In terms of traditional Western philosophy, it corresponds to a norm of "Maximum fulfillment of life potentials." This norm implies norms of diversity, of complexity (of structure and function), and of maximum symbiosis, that is, arrangement of life-forms and lifestyles with minimum negative interference among them. An interaction counts as negative if it decreases the potentialities of life fulfillment of the participants.

Being fond of neat systematization, I have worked out several versions of a particular kind of green philosophy and politics, which I call Ecosophy T (Naess 1989: 64–79). One version of its key slogans is formulated in figure 2 (page 76), with lines of derivation pointing downward from the top of the normative pyramid. Only the "highest" norms and hypotheses are given in the diagram. Serious normative argumentation presupposes that the formulations are made more precise in various directions.

The system Ecosophy T is in Feyerabend's terminology a *Gedankenlaborat* (Feyerabend 1978: 135) and should not be forced upon anybody, includ-

ing green philosophers with different philosophical tastes or convictions. Because philosophies as I see them concern fundamentals, no philosopher can refute any other. Basically there is room for several, and efforts even to describe the differences may founder because of specific presuppositions necessary in descriptions (rational incomparability of fundamental systems). To be rational, if it is something desirable, seems to require the realization of an essential philosophical pluralism that cannot be rationally verified.

What does Feyerabend write on this matter?

Philosophical relativism is the doctrine that all traditions, theories, ideas are equally true or equally false or, in an even more radical formulation, that any distribution of truth values over traditions is acceptable. This form of relativism is nowhere defended in the present book. It is not asserted, for example, that Aristotle is as good as Einstein; it is asserted and argued that "Aristotle is true"; as a judgement that presupposes a certain tradition, it is a relational judgement that *may* change when the underlying tradition is changed.

(Feyerabend 1978: 83)

This is completely compatible with Ecosophy T. Feyerabend's "political relativism" is also compatible, although I find the term *relativism* misleading. The more authentic our search for truth, the more firm is our membership in a particular philosophy or kind of "practice" or kind of "tradition." Insofar as there is any meaning or validity attached to announcements of the kind "x is a right," it is not relative, but relational, that is, basically related to a philosophy or practice. This relationalism, rather than relativity, is implied in Feyerabend's own unqualified, nonrelativist affirmation of equal rights:

Political relativism affirms that all traditions have equal *rights*: the mere fact that some people have arranged their lives in accordance with a certain tradition suffices to provide this tradition with all the basic rights of the society in which it occurs.

(Ibid., p. 82)

As an example of something that is *not* a philosophy in the above sense, *anarchism*, in the terminology of Feyerabend, may be mentioned. "Even here I don't defend anarchism as an 'eternal philosophy' but as a 'medicine' that may have to be withdrawn when conditions change" (Feyerabend 1975: 22). On the basis, though, of which norms and hypotheses will it be

withdrawn? Their formulation will reveal deeper issues and take us a step in the direction of articulation of a philosophy. However, I do not see why anybody like Feyerabend, who is inspired by Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, should formulate any systematic philosophy. Kierkegaard did not, and we are thankful that he didn't.

The Web of Communities and Its Administration

It is common in green politics to regard local communities as the basic political unit. In large urban areas the term *local* has to be taken in a rather wide sense so that mobile groups with a common lifestyle and high degree of cohesion are included.

Ever more comprehensive units of people are conceived as basically administrative, even if termed societies or nations. There are many reasons for this stress on small units. In political theory, its history is joined with that of the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society)—between fairly autonomous groups with genuine personal bonds, a strong sense of belonging, and locally manageable technology, and the vast structures of states and nations.

Feyerabend announces that a "free society is a society in which all traditions are given equal rights, equal access to education and other positions of power" (Feyerabend 1978: 30).

Let us take an example. In arctic Norway there is among the Lapps a nomadic tradition, very different from the traditions of the now sedentary Germanic tribes in other parts of Norway. The latter think it is important to have a lot of big roads, and they love building extensive dams in order to increase the production of electricity. This "progress" is incompatible with the lifestyles of reindeer and their owners. Those Lapps who deeply want to maintain and further develop their culture cannot in any genuine way live together with urbanized people. What is needed for coexistence is a common administration, the state structure called Norway. I think the use of the term *society* in Feyerabend's utterances about free society might be a little misleading. Norway as an administration for two cultures is not a society. If *deeply different* traditions are to be defended, this requires of us that we do not take the bigger units of humanity too seriously as societies. They are, rather, administrative structures.

Some will feel that this goes against world solidarity, but one green policy toward "developing nations" is that of mutual aid (Kropotkin 1955) from community to community. Communities within industrial states (not "societies") try, for example, to cooperate with communities in Africa and other places without too much interference from higher administrative levels.

What Feyerabend primarily has in mind is probably the varieties of traditions, or lifestyles, of groups *within* a state or federation. Here I suppose that differences in ways of living (technologies, language, willingness to pay taxes) are in some respects rather limited. Feyerabend mentions equal access to education. This suggests a similarity in appreciation of (formal?) education. Some traditions, such as those of the culturally conscious Lapps, go contrary to this. They might ask for the right *not* to be "educated," preferring communities without formal education (schools, etc.) but, of course, communities in which a lot of teaching goes on, the older teaching the younger. It is hoped that in the future (at least before the year 3000) it will be practicable to maintain and develop *deeply* different traditions even within fairly small areas. This evidently implies that the interchange between the traditions, the dealings between members of deeply different groups, functions without undue interference from those who monopolize scientific or expert "reason." "[T]he exchange between traditions is an open exchange, not a rational change" (1978: 85). There must, however, be a kind of top-level administration, I am inclined to think, in order to avoid exploitation by groups that resemble certain well-known ones in our own century.

How does Feyerabend propose to solve these problems? Strange question. Did Kierkegaard propose to solve *anything*?

Self-determination is a key word in green philosophy, and it includes finding out things for oneself and by oneself: cognitive self-determination. Feyerabend has said things about expertise that fit in very well here, and he asks that "people" be allowed to solve problems (Feyerabend 1977: 138). A scientist or technician placed in the so-called center may have *the* solution of a problem, but mostly problem-solving is part of greater units or *gestalts* of action. The expert may help by offering fragments, but this often spoils the development of the greater wholes of action and living. Ivan Illich has

said things worth considering in this area. His main point is that science undermines the capacity of people to think for themselves.

There Are No Scientific Worldviews

Freedom is regained, old traditions are rediscovered, both among the minorities in Western countries and among large populations in non-Western continents. *But science still reigns supreme.* It reigns supreme because its practitioners are *unable to understand*, and *unwilling to condone*, different ideologies because they have the *power* to enforce their wishes, and because they *use* this power just as their ancestors used *their* power to force Christianity on the people they encountered during their conquests. Thus, while an American can now choose the religion he likes, he is still not permitted to demand that his children learn magic rather than science at school.

(Feyerabend 1975: 299)

Some pedantic comments are inevitable.

When one has lived with science as a naturalist, it means something different from what it means to Feyerabend. The “soft” sciences, like geography of plants and taxonomy of butterflies, invite us to join a practice and style of life very different from that of a particle physicist at Geneva or a mathematician at Princeton. The “soft” scientist need not “play the game of intellectuals.”

The discoverer of the pecking-order law, Schjelderup-Ebbe, the only world-famous Norwegian psychologist and ethologist, was early in life inordinately fond of watching the sexual and general social behavior of hens. He *could*, of course, have avoided discovering or inventing the law, but his discovery did not require anything like intellectual games or games of intellectuals. In debate, his arguments were often of a kind that made the occasion more charming than brainy—for example, “But what you say only shows that you do not *really* know the hen Marie.” His insect poems are less well known than his law but were closer to his heart. Nobody would insinuate that he ever considered joining a so-called scientific worldview. As a researcher, why bother? Philosophy and religion offer worldviews.

For the naturalist, there is no reason to reject magic if one is raised with it. Most kinds of genuine research do not interfere violently with tra-

ditions in nonindustrial cultures. In some of them, Western medicine is adopted in a way that does *not* imply rejection of myths. Superficially, "hard" science and a so-called scientific worldview dominate the people's minds, but careful scrutiny often reveals nonconformity. Earlier people doing research on extinct animals were struck by the beauty of those organisms and their immense diversity of forms. They tended to be conceived of as divine creatures. At that time, though, it was difficult to make enough money to continue such research indefinitely. Then came the discovery of the close connection between certain genera of fossil forms and the presence of oil. Suddenly there was plenty of money around. The "soft" researchers continued much as before, sometimes doing a little bit of "hard" science, but only enough to placate the boss. Their minds are unruffled, not dominated by (hard) science.

In short, I think children could learn both magic and science. There is no necessary conflict. It all depends on how things are introduced. Or more generally: research can be explained and exemplified without interfering with the basic beliefs of nonindustrial cultures. This holds true even of theoretical physics. A physicist who today adheres to beliefs generally classed as mythological, and who is firmly convinced of the superiority of mythological thinking, translates the crucial parts of the language of contemporary physics into his own language. It is not easy, one of them told me, but it works.

Because of the considerable freedom in choice of theoretical constructs, and also because of the intimate link between the scientific vocabulary and empirical procedures (that is, actions, practices), forcing science on people is rather different from forcing upon them a definite dogmatic religious worldview. What is happening today in schools and universities may be understood in part as a forceful adaptation of science to suit the basic goals of centralized industrial societies. Science may thus function as an ideology, but not eternally and not out of any historical or other kind of necessity.

In light of the above, I would like to modify one of Feyerabend's formulations. Whereas an American can now choose the religion he likes, he is unfortunately not permitted to choose the kind of science he likes. If he likes science along the lines of green science and teaching policy, his offspring should be treated as child naturalists, enjoying backyard zoology and other marvelous experiences.

Conclusion

In regard to both rationality and its special expression, science, I differ at least in terminology from Feyerabend. However, some eminent green philosophers—Ivan Illich among others—favor a view closely similar to Feyerabend's.

Feyerabend has not, as far as I know, taken on certain central green issues such as self-reliance and decentralization. They have important implications for scientific policy. When he does take up central issues, they belong, broadly speaking, within the sphere of green philosophy and politics.

Hero worship or advocacy of the dichotomy hero-nonhero is not characteristic of green philosophy. It suggests a kind of competition and subservience that limits self-realization. If Feyerabend rejects the thought of being a green hero, or finds it contradictory, that is a good sign.

My ultimate conclusion might be thus formulated: Feyerabend writes as if he maintains many views that are characteristic of green philosophy and politics, and he applies those views to science, education, and rationality in an original way.

VIII

THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF DEEP
ECOLOGY AND ECOSOPHY T

Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World

Humanity has struggled, for about twenty-five hundred years, with basic questions about who we are, where we are headed, and the nature of the reality in which we are included. This is a short period in the lifetime of a species, and an even shorter time in the history of the Earth, to which we belong as mobile beings. I am not capable of saying very new things in answer to these questions, but I can look at them from a *somewhat* different angle, using somewhat different conceptual tools and images.

What I am going to say, more or less in my own way and in that of my friends, can be condensed roughly into six points:

1. We underestimate our self, and I emphasize *self*. We tend to confuse our self with the narrow ego.
2. Human nature is such that, with sufficient comprehensive (all-sided) maturity, we cannot help but “identify” our self with all living beings: beautiful or ugly, big or small, scientific or not.

The adjective *comprehensive* (“all-sided”) as in “comprehensive maturity” deserves a note: Descartes seemed to be rather immature in his relationship with animals; Schopenhauer was not very advanced in his relationship to his family (kicking his mother down a staircase?); Heidegger was amateurish—to say the least—in his po-

This essay was originally given as a lecture on March 12, 1986, at Murdoch University, Western Australia, sponsored by the Keith Roby Memorial Trust. Reprinted with permission from *Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings*, edited by John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess (Canada: New Society Publishers, 1988), and from *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1995), 225–39. It was also published in *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 4 (1987): 35–42.

litical behavior. Weak identification with nonhuman life-forms is compatible with maturity in some major sets of relationships, such as those toward one's family or friends. Therefore, I use the qualification *comprehensive* to mean "being mature in *all* major relationships."

3. Traditionally, the *maturity of the self* has been considered to develop through three stages: from ego to social self (including the ego), and from social self to a metaphysical self (including the social self). In this conception of the maturity of the self, Nature is largely left out. Our immediate environment, our home (where we belong as children), and the identification with nonhuman living beings are largely ignored. Therefore, I tentatively introduce, perhaps for the very first time, the concept of *ecological self*. We may be said to be in, and of, Nature from the very beginning of our selves. Society and human relationships are important, but our self is much richer in its constitutive relationships. These relationships are not just those we have with other people and the human community. (I have elsewhere introduced the term *mixed community* to mean those communities in which we consciously and deliberately live closely with certain animals.)
4. The meaning of life, and the joy we experience in living, is increased through increased self-realization; that is, through the fulfillment of potentials that each of us has but that are never exactly the same for any two living beings. Whatever the differences between beings, increased self-realization nevertheless implies a broadening and deepening of the self.
5. Because of an inescapable process of identification with others, with increasing maturity the self is widened and deepened. We "see ourselves in others." Our self-realization is hindered if the self-realization of others, with whom we identify, is hindered. Our love of our self will fight this hindering process by assisting in the self-realization of others according to the formula "Live and let live!" Thus, everything that can be achieved by altruism—the *dutiful*, *moral* consideration for others—can be achieved, and much more, by the process of widening and deepening our selves. Following Kant, we then act *beautifully*, but neither morally nor immorally.
6. One of the great challenges today is to save the planet from further ecological devastation, which violates the enlightened self-interest

of both human and nonhuman life and decreases the potential of joyful existence for all.

Now, proceeding to elaborate these points, I shall start with the peculiar and fascinating terms *ego* and *self*.

The simplest answer to the question of who or what I am is to point to my body. Clearly, though, I cannot identify my self, or even my ego, with my body. For example, compare:

I know Mr. Smith.	My body knows Mr. Smith.
I like poetry.	My body likes poetry.
The only difference	The only difference between
between us is that	our bodies is that your body
you are a Presbyterian	is Presbyterian whereas
and I am a Baptist.	mine is Baptist.

In the above sentences, we cannot substitute "my body" for "I." Nor can we substitute "my mind" or "my mind and my body" for "I." More adequately, we may substitute "I as a person" for "I," but this does not, of course, tell us what the ego or the self is.

Several thousand years of philosophical, psychological, and social-psychological thinking has not brought us any adequate conception of the "I," the "ego," or the "self." In modern psychotherapy these notions play an indispensable role, but, of course, the practical goal of therapy does not necessitate philosophical clarification of these terms. It is important to remind ourselves about the strange and marvelous phenomena with which we are dealing. Perhaps the extreme closeness and nearness of these objects of thought and reflection add to our difficulties. I shall offer only a single sentence that resembles a definition of the "ecological self." The ecological self is a person's "process of identification."

I shall continue to concentrate on the "ecology of the self" but will first say some things about identification.

What would be a paradigm situation involving identification? It would be a situation that elicits intense empathy. My standard example involves a nonhuman being I met forty years ago. I was looking through an

old-fashioned microscope at the dramatic meeting of two drops of different chemicals. At that moment, a flea jumped from a lemming that was strolling along the table and landed in the middle of the acid chemicals. To save it was impossible. It took many minutes for the flea to die. Its movements were dreadfully expressive. Naturally, what I felt was a painful sense of compassion and empathy, but the empathy was *not* basic; rather, it was a process of identification: that "I saw myself in the flea." If I had been *alienated* from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything even resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me feeling indifferent. So there must be identification in order for there to be compassion and, among human beings, solidarity.

One of the authors contributing admirably to a clarification of the study of the self is Erich Fromm. He writes:

The doctrine that love for oneself is identical with "selfishness" and an alternative to love for others has pervaded theology, philosophy, and popular thought; the same doctrine has been rationalized in scientific language in Freud's theory of narcissism. Freud's concept presupposes a fixed amount of libido. In the infant, all of the libido has the child's own person as its objective, the stage of "primary narcissism," as Freud calls it. During the individual's development, the libido is shifted from one's own person toward other objects. If a person is blocked in his "object-relationships," the libido is withdrawn from the objects and returned to his or her own person; this is called "secondary narcissism." According to Freud, the more love I turn toward the outside world the less love is left for myself, and vice versa. He thus describes the phenomenon of love as an impoverishment of one's self-love because all libido is turned to an object outside oneself.

(Fromm 1956: 58)

What Fromm attributes here to Freud we can now attribute to the shrinkage of self-perception implied in the fascination for ego trips. Fromm opposes such a shrinkage of self. The following quotation from Fromm concerns love of persons but, as "ecosophers," we find the notions of care, respect, responsibility, and knowledge applicable to living beings in the wide sense.

The nature of unselfishness becomes particularly apparent in its effect on others and most frequently, in our culture, in the effect the "unselfish" mother

has on her children. She believes that by her unselfishness her children will experience what it means to be loved and to learn, in turn, what it means to love. The effect of her unselfishness, however, does not at all correspond to her expectations. The children do not show the happiness of persons who are convinced that they are loved; they are anxious, tense, afraid of the mother's disapproval, and anxious to live up to her expectations. Usually, they are affected by their mother's hidden hostility against life, which they sense rather than recognize, and eventually become imbued with it themselves. . . .

If one has a chance to study the effect of a mother with genuine self-love, one can see that there is nothing more conducive to giving a child the experience of what love, joy, and happiness are than being loved by a mother who loves herself.

(Ibid., pp. 59, 62)

We need environmental ethics, but when people feel that they unselfishly give up, or even sacrifice, their self-interests to show love for nature, this is probably, in the long run, a treacherous basis for conservation. Through identification, they may come to see that their own interests are served by conservation, through genuine self-love, the love of a widened and deepened self.

At this point, the notion of a being's interests furnishes a bridge from self-love to self-realization. It should not surprise us that Fromm, influenced as he is by Spinoza and William James, makes use of that bridge. "What is considered to constitute self-interest?" Fromm asks. His answer:

There are two fundamentally different approaches to this problem. One is the objectivistic approach most clearly formulated by Spinoza. To him self-interest or the interest "to seek one's profit" is identical with virtue.

"The more," he says, "each person strives and is able to seek his profit, that is to say, to preserve his being, the more virtue does he possess; on the other hand, in so far as each person neglects his own profit he is impotent." According to this view, the interest of humans is to preserve their existence, which is the same as realizing their inherent potentialities. This concept of self-interest is objectivist inasmuch as "interest" is not conceived in terms of the subjective feeling of what one's interest is but in terms of what the nature of a human is, "objectively."

(Ibid., p. 63)

"Realizing inherent potentialities" is one of the good, less-than-ten-word clarifications of "self-realization." The question "What are the inher-

ent potentialities of the beings of this specimen X of the species Y?" obviously leads to reflections about, and studies of, X and Y.

As human beings we cannot just follow the impulses of the moment when asking what our inherent potentialities are. It is something like this that Fromm means when he calls an approach "objectivistic" as opposed to an approach "in terms of subjective feeling." Because of the high estimation of feeling and a correspondingly low estimate of so-called objectivization (*Verdinglichung*, reification) within deep ecology, Fromm's terminology is not adequate today, but what he means to say is appropriate. Moreover, it is obviously relevant when we deal with species other than our own: animals and plants have interests in the sense of ways of realizing inherent potentialities, interests that we can study only by interacting with them. We cannot rely on our monetary impulses, however important they are in general.

The expression "preserve his being," in the quotation from Spinoza, is better than "preserve his existence," since the latter is often associated with physical survival and a "struggle for survival." An even better translation, perhaps, is "persevere in his being" (*perseverare in suo esse*). This has to do with acting from one's own nature. Survival is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition of self-realization.

The concept of self-realization as dependent on insight into our own potentialities makes it easy to see the possibilities of ignorance and misunderstanding in terms of what these potentialities are. The "ego-trip" interpretation of the potentialities of human beings presupposes a major underestimation of the richness and broadness of our potentialities. As Fromm puts it, "man can deceive himself about his real self-interest if he is ignorant of his self and his real needs" (Fromm 1956: 63).

The "Everything hangs together" (or "Everything is interrelated") maxim of ecology applies to the self and its relation to other living beings, ecosystems, the ecosphere, and the Earth itself, with its long history.

The existence and importance of the "ecological self" are easy to illustrate with some examples of what has happened in my own country, Norway.

Scattered human habitation along the arctic coast of Norway is uneconomical and unprofitable from the point of view of the current economic policy of our welfare state. Welfare norms require that every family should be connected by telephone (in case of illness); this costs a considerable

amount of money. The same holds for the mail and other services. Further, local fisheries are largely uneconomical, perhaps because a foreign armada of big trawlers of immense capacity is fishing just outside the fjords. As a result, the availability of jobs is crumbling.

Therefore, the government heavily subsidized the resettlement of people from the arctic wilderness, concentrating them in so-called centers of development (small areas with a town at the center). The people, as persons, are clearly not the same now that their bodies have been thus transported. Their social, economic, *and natural setting* is now vastly different. The objects with which they work and live are completely different. There is a consequent loss of personal identity. They now ask, *Who am I?* Their self-respect and self-esteem have been impaired. What is adequate in the so-called periphery of the country is different from what is important in the so-called centers.

If people are relocated or, rather, transplanted from a steep mountainous place to the plains below, they also realize (but too late) that their home-place was a part of themselves and that they *identified* with features of that place. The way of life in the tiny locality, with the intensity of social relations there, has formed their personhood. Again, they are now not the same as they were.

Tragic cases of this can be seen in other parts of the Arctic. We all regret the fate of the Eskimos: their difficulty in finding a *new identity*, a new social self, and a new, more comprehensive ecological self. In addition, the Lapps of arctic Norway have been hurt by interference with a river for the purpose of developing hydroelectricity. Accused of an illegal demonstration at the river, one Lapp said in court that the part of the river in question was "part of myself." This kind of spontaneous answer is not uncommon among people. They have not heard about the philosophy of the wider and deeper self, but they talk spontaneously as if they had.

We may try to make the sentence "This place is part of myself" intellectually more understandable by reformulations—for example, "My relation to this place is part of myself"; "If this place is destroyed something in me is destroyed"; "My relation to this place is such that if the place is changed, I am changed."

One drawback of these reformulations is that they make it easy to con-

tinue thinking of two completely separable, real entities: a self and the place, joined by an *external* relation. The original sentence rather conveys the impression that there is an *internal* relation of sorts. I say "of sorts" because we must take into account that the relation may not be reciprocal. If I am changed, or even destroyed, the place would be destroyed, according to one usual interpretation of "internal relation." From the standpoint of phenomenology and the "concrete contents" view, the reciprocity holds, but that is a special interpretation. We may use an interpretation such that if we are changed, the river need not be changed.

The newborn, of course, lacks any conceptions, however rudimentary, corresponding to the tripartition subject, object, and medium. Probably the conception (not the concept) of one's own ego comes rather late, say after the first year. First, there is a vague net of relations. This network of perceived and conceived relations is neutral, similar to what in British philosophy was called neutral monism. In a sense, we are trying to work out this basic sort of crude monism anew, not by trying to become babies again, but by better understanding our ecological selves. This understanding has not had favorable conditions for development; we have glorified our ego by placing it in opposition to the rest of reality since before the Renaissance.

What is the practical importance of this conception of a wide and deep ecological self? When we attempt to defend Nature in our rich industrial societies, the argument of our opponents is often that we are doing it to secure beauty, recreation, and other nonvital interests for ourselves. Our position is strengthened if, after honest reflection, we find that the destruction of Nature (and our place) threatens us in our innermost self. If so, we are more convincingly defending our vital interests, not merely something "out there." We are engaged in self-defense. To defend fundamental *human* rights is vital self-defense.

The best introduction to the psychology of the self is still to be found in William James's excellent and superbly readable *Principles of Psychology* (1890). His 100-page chapter on the consciousness of self stresses the plurality of components of the wide and deep self as a complex entity. (Unfortunately, he prefers to talk about a plurality of selves. I think it may be better to talk about the plurality of the components of the wide self.)

If we say about somebody that he is not himself today, we may refer to

a great many different *relations* to other people, to material things, and certainly, I maintain, to what we call his environment: the home, the garden, the neighborhood, and so on.

When James says that these relate *belong* to the self, of course it is not in the sense that the self has eaten the home, the environment, etc. Such an interpretation would mean that the self is still identified with the body. Nor does it mean that an *image* of the house *inside* the consciousness of the person belongs to the self. When somebody says about a part of a river-landscape that it is part of himself, we intuitively grasp roughly what he means, but it is difficult, of course, to elucidate this meaning in philosophical or psychological terminology.

A last example from William James: we understand what is meant when someone says "As a man I pity you, but as an official I must show you no mercy." Obviously the self of an official cannot empirically be defined except as relationships in a complex social setting. Thus, the self cannot possibly be inside the body, or inside a consciousness.

Enough! The main point is that we do not hesitate *today*, being inspired by ecology and a revived intimate relationship to Nature, to recognize and accept wholeheartedly our ecological self.

The next section is rather metaphysical. I do not *defend* all the views presented here; rather, I primarily wish to inform you about them. As a student and admirer of Gandhi's nonviolent direct actions in bloody conflicts since 1930, I am inevitably influenced by his metaphysics, which personally furnished him with tremendously powerful motivation and contributed to keeping him going until his death. His ultimate aim was not India's *political* liberation. He, of course, led a crusade against extreme poverty, caste suppression, and terror in the name of religion. This crusade was necessary, but the liberation of the individual human being was his supreme aim. It is strange for many to hear what he himself said about his ultimate goal:

What I want to achieve—what I have been striving and pining to achieve these thirty years—is self-realization, to see God face to face, to attain *Moksha* (Liberation). I live and move and have my being in pursuit of that goal. All that I do by way of speaking and writing, and all my ventures in the political field, are directed to this same end.¹

This sounds individualistic to the Western mind—a common misunderstanding. If the self about which Gandhi speaks were the ego or “narrow” self (*jīva*) of egocentric interest (“ego trips”), why then would he have worked for the poor? For him, it was the supreme or universal Self—the *ātman*—that was to be realized. Paradoxically, it seems, he tried to reach self-realization through “selfless action”; that is, through a diminishment of the dominance of the narrow self or ego. Through the wider Self every living being is intimately connected, and from this intimacy follows the capacity of *identification* and, as a natural consequence, the practice of nonviolence. No moralizing is needed, just as we do not need morals to make us breathe. Rather, we need to cultivate our insight: “The rock bottom foundation of the technique for achieving the power of non-violence is belief in the essential oneness of all life.”

Historically, we have seen that Nature conservation is nonviolent at its very core. Gandhi says:

I believe in *advaita* (nonduality). I believe in the essential unity of man and, for that matter, all that lives. Therefore I believe that if one man gains spirituality, the whole world gains with him and, if one man fails, the whole world fails to that extent.

Surprisingly enough, Gandhi was extreme in his personal concern for the self-realization of nonhuman living beings. When traveling, he took a goat along to satisfy his need for milk. This was part of a nonviolent demonstration against certain cruel Hindu ways of milking cows. Some European companions who lived with Gandhi in his ashrams were taken aback that he let snakes, scorpions, and spiders move unhindered into their bedrooms—as animals fulfilling their lives. He even prohibited people from keeping a stock of medicines against poisonous bites. He believed in the possibility of satisfactory coexistence and he was proved right. There were no accidents. Ashram people would naturally look into their shoes for scorpions before using them. Even when moving over the floor in darkness, one could easily avoid trampling on one's fellow beings. Thus, Gandhi recognized a basic common right to live and blossom, to self-realization in a wide sense applicable to any being that can be said to have interests or needs. Gandhi made manifest the internal relationship between self-realization, nonviolence, and what has sometimes been called biospherical egalitarianism.

In the environment in which I grew up, I heard that what is important in life is to get *to be* someone—to outdo others in something, to be victorious in comparing one's abilities with those of others. The ability to cooperate, to work with people, to make them feel good, of course, “pays” in a fiercely individualistic society, and high positions may require that—but only to the extent to which they are ultimately subordinated to one's career, to the basic norms of the ego trip, not to a self-realization worthy of the name. To identify self-realization with ego trips manifests a vast underestimation of the human self.

According to the usual translation of Pali or Sanskrit, Buddha taught his disciples that the human mind should embrace all living things as a mother cares for her son, her only son. Some who would never feel it to be meaningful or possible that a human *self* could embrace all living things, might stick to the usual translation. We shall then ask only that your *mind* embrace all living beings, together with your good intentions to care, feel, and act with compassion.

If the Sanskrit word translated into English is *ātman*, it is instructive to note that this term has the basic meaning of “self,” rather than “mind” or “spirit” as one usually sees in the translations. The superiority of the translation using the word *self* stems from the consideration that *if* your self (in the wide sense) embraces another being, you need no moral exhortation to show care. Surely you care for yourself without feeling any moral pressure to do it—provided you have not succumbed to a neurosis of some kind, developed self-destructive tendencies, or hate yourself.

Incidentally, the Australian deep ecology supporter and ecofeminist Patsy Hallen (1987) uses a formula close to that of Buddha's: we are here to embrace rather than conquer the world. It is of interest to notice that the term *world* is being used here rather than *living beings*. I suspect that our thinking need not proceed from the notion of living being to that of the world, but we will conceive reality, or the world we live in, as alive in a wide, not easily defined, sense. There will then be no nonliving beings to care for.

If “self-realization” (or “self-fulfillment”) is habitually associated today with lifelong ego trips, then is it not stupid to use this term for self-realization in Gandhi's widely different sense or (in a less religiously loaded context) as a

term for widening and deepening the “self” so that it embraces all life-forms? Perhaps it is. On the other hand, the very popularity of the term makes people feel safe, and they listen for a moment. In that moment, the notion of a greater “self” should be introduced, and it should be pointed out that if they equate self-realization with ego trips, then they seriously *underestimate* themselves. “You are much greater, deeper, generous, and capable of more dignity and joy than you think! A wealth of noncompetitive joys is open to you!”

I have still another important reason for inviting people to think in terms of deepening and widening their selves, *starting* with the ego trip as the crudest, but inescapable, zero point. It has to do with a notion usually placed as the opposite of the egoism of the ego trip—namely, the notion of *altruism*. The Latin term *ego* has, as its opposite, the term *alter*. Altruism implies that the *ego* sacrifices its interests in favor of the other, the *alter*. In the latter case, one is motivated primarily by duty: it is said that we *ought* to love others as strongly as we love ourselves.

Unfortunately, what humanity is capable of loving from mere duty or, more generally, from moral exhortation, is very limited. From the Renaissance to the Second World War about 400 cruel wars were fought by Christian nations for the flimsiest of reasons. It seems to me that in the future more emphasis has to be given to the conditions under which we most naturally widen and deepen the “self.” With a sufficiently wide and deep “self,” *ego* and *alter* are, in a way, transcended.

Early in life, the social “self” is sufficiently developed that we do not prefer to eat a big cake all by ourselves. We share the cake with our friends and our nearest. We identify with these people sufficiently to see our joy in their joy, and our disappointments in theirs. Now is the time to *share* with all life on our maltreated Earth through a deepening identification with all life-forms and the greater units: the ecosystems and Gaia, this fabulous old planet of ours.

Moral acts are acts motivated by the intention to follow the moral laws at whatever cost; that is, to do our moral duty solely out of respect for that duty. Therefore, the supreme *test* of our success in performing a pure moral act is that we do it completely against our inclination: we, so to speak, hate to do it but are compelled to do it by our respect for the moral law. Kant

was deeply awed by two phenomena: "the heaven with its stars above me and the moral law within me."

If we do something, we should do it according to the moral law, but if we do something out of inclination and with pleasure—what then? Should we abstain from performing the act, or try to work up some displeasure? Not at all, according to Kant. If we do what the moral law says is right on the basis of positive inclination, then we perform a *beautiful* act. Now, my point is that, in environmental affairs, perhaps we should try primarily to influence people toward performing beautiful acts. We should work on their inclinations rather than their morality. Unhappily, the extensive moralizing within environmentalism has given the public the false impression that we primarily ask them to sacrifice, to show more responsibility, more concern, better morality. As I see it, we need to emphasize the immense variety of sources of joy that are available to people through an increased sensitivity toward the richness and diversity of life and the landscapes of free nature. We can all contribute to this individually, but it is also a question of local and global politics. Part of the joy stems from the consciousness of our intimate relation to something bigger than our ego, something that has endured for millions of years and deserves continued life for many more millions of years. The requisite care flows naturally if the "self" is widened and deepened so that protection of free nature is felt or conceived as protection of ourselves.

Academically speaking, what I am suggesting is the supremacy of environmental ontology and realism over environmental ethics as a means of invigorating the environmental movements in the years to come. If reality is as it is experienced by the ecological self, our behavior *naturally* and beautifully follows strict norms of environmental ethics. We certainly need to hear about our ethical shortcomings from time to time, but we change more easily through encouragement and through a deepened perception of reality and our own self—that is, a deepened realism. How can that be brought about? The question needs to be treated in another paper! It is more a question of community therapy than community science: a question of healing our relations to the widest community, that of all living beings.

The subtitle of this paper is "An Ecological Approach to Being in the World." I now want to speak a little about "Nature," with all the qualities

we spontaneously experience as being identical with the reality we live in. This means a movement from being in the world to being in Nature. Then, finally, I shall inquire into the goal or purpose of being in the world.

Is joy *in* the subject? I would say no. It is just as much, or as little, *in* the object. The joy of a joyful tree is primarily “in” the tree, we should say—if pressed to choose between the two possibilities. We should not be pressed, though, because there is a third position. The joy is a feature of the *indivisible*, concrete unit of subject, object, and medium. In a sense, self-realization involves experiences of the infinitely rich joyful aspect of reality. It is misleading, according to my intuitions, to locate joys inside my consciousness. What is joyful is something that is not “subjective”; it is an attribute of a reality wider than a conscious ego. This is philosophically how I contribute to the explanation of the internal relations between joy, happiness, and human self-realization. However, this conceptual exercise is of interest mainly to academic philosophers. What I am driving at is probably something that may be suggested with less conceptual gymnastics, namely, that it is unwarranted to believe that how we feel Nature to be is not how Nature really is. Rather, it is a reality so rich that we cannot see everything at once; we see separate parts (or aspects) in separate moods. The joyful tree I see in the morning light is not the sorrowful one I see that night, even if they are the “same” tree in terms of their abstract (physical) structure.

It is very human to ask about our ultimate goal or purpose for being in the world. This may be a misleading way of putting the question. It may seem to suggest that the goal or purpose must somehow be outside of, or beyond, the world. Perhaps this can be avoided by using the phrase “living in the world.” It is characteristic of our time that we subjectivize and individualize the question asked of each of us, What do *you* consider to be the ultimate goal or purpose for *your* life? Or we leave out the question of priorities and simply inquire about goals and purposes.

The main title of this paper is motivated partly by the conviction that *self-realization* is an adequate key-term expression that one would use to answer the question of the ultimate goal in life. Of course, it is only a key term. An answer by a philosopher could scarcely be shorter than the little book *Ethics* by Spinoza.

To understand the function of the term *self-realization* in this capacity, it

is useful to compare it with two other terms—*pleasure* and *happiness*. The first suggests hedonism; the second, eudaemonism, in professional philosophical (but just as vague and ambiguous) jargon. Both terms connote states of feeling (in a broad sense of the term). Experiencing pleasure or being happy is to *feel* well. One may, of course, find that the term *happiness* connotes something different from this, but the way I use *happiness*, one standard set of replies to the question “How do you feel?” would be “I feel happy” or “I feel unhappy.” The following set of answers to the question would be rather awkward: “I feel self-realized” or “I do not feel self-realized.”

The most important feature of self-realization, as compared with pleasure and happiness, is its dependence on a certain view of human capacities (or better, human potentialities). Again, this implies a particular view of human nature. In practice, it does not imply a general doctrine of human nature. That is the work of philosophical fields of research.

An individual whose attitudes reveal that he or she takes self-realization to be the ultimate or fundamental goal in life has to have a view of his or her nature and potentialities, and the more one's nature and potentialities are realized, the more self-realization there is. The question “How do you feel?” may honestly be answered in the positive or negative, whatever the level of self-realization. If one has attained a certain level of self-realization, the question may in principle be answered in the negative, but at this point, following Spinoza, I take the valid way of answering the question “How do you feel?” to be positive, because the realization of the fulfillment (using somewhat less philosophical jargon) of one's potentialities is *internally* related to happiness. It is not, however, related in such a way that by *deliberately seeking* happiness, one thereby realizes one's self. John Stuart Mill makes this point clearly in his philosophy: you should not deliberately go looking for happiness (“Happiness, to be got, must be forgot”). That is a bad way to proceed even if, with Mill, you take happiness to be the ultimate goal in life. I think that it is much better deliberately to seek self-realization, to develop your capacities—using a rather dangerous word because it is easily interpreted in the direction of interpersonal rather than intrapersonal competition. Even the striving implied in the term *competition* may mislead. Dwelling in situations of intrinsic value, spontaneous nondirected awareness, relaxing from striving, are all conducive to self-realization as I understand it. Of course, there are infinite variations among human beings, depending on cultural,

social, and individual differences. This makes the key term *self-realization* abstract in its generality; nothing more can be expected when the question is posed as it is: "What might deserve the name of the ultimate or fundamental goal in life?" We may reject the meaningfulness of such a question (I don't), but for those of us for whom it has meaning, an answer using few words is bound to be abstract and general.

The third of the three key terms—*self-realization*—has the merit of being clearly and forcefully applicable to any being with a specific range of potentialities. I limit this range to living beings, using "living" in a rather broad sense. I do not feel that the terms *pleasure* and *happiness* are so easily generalized. Having already introduced the rather general concept of ecological self, I feel that the concept of self-realization naturally follows.

Let us consider the praying mantises, a formidable group of voracious insects. They have a nature that fascinates many people. Mating is part of their self-realization, but some males are eaten while performing the act of copulation. While being devoured, is he happy, is he experiencing pleasure? We do not know—but well done if he does! Actually, he feeds his partner so that she has strong offspring. It does not make sense to me, though, to attribute happiness to these males. Self-realization, yes; happiness, no. I maintain that there is an internal relation between self-realization and happiness among people, and among some animal groups. As a professional philosopher, I am tempted to add a point inspired by Zen Buddhism and Spinoza: I agree that happiness is a feeling, but the act of realizing a potential is always an interaction involving, as a single concrete unit (one gestalt, as I would say), three abstract aspects: subject, object, and medium. Moreover, what I have said about joyfulness in Nature holds as well for happiness in Nature; they should not be conceived as merely subjective feelings.

The richness of reality is becoming even richer through our specific human endowments; we are the first kind of living beings we know of that have the potentialities of living in community with all other living beings. It is our hope that all these potentialities will be realized—if not in the immediate future, then at least in the somewhat near future.

The Connection of “Self-Realization!” with Diversity, Complexity, and Symbiosis

“Self-realization!” with a capital *S* is a norm formulation inspired by the part of philosophy traditionally called metaphysics. The terms *diversity*, *complexity*, and *symbiosis*, on the other hand, are all taken from ecology. There is a kind of terminological tension. The function of “self-realization!” is in part to take care of human ethical commitments essential to avoid the uncritical cult of life characteristic of some philosophies of great impact early in the twentieth century.

The conceptual bridge from self-realization to positive evaluation of diversity, complexity, and symbiosis is furnished by a concept of self-realization potential, and the idea that the overall self-realization in our world is increased by *realization* of such *potentials*.

The plural of *potentials* is crucial: it introduces plurality in unity. The term *self-realization* by itself does not immediately suggest plurality, nor does the intuition urging “self-realization!” involve any plurality. *Self* with a capital *S* is a term connected with such metaphysical terms as *Ätman* and *the supreme whole*.¹ These are cognitively obscure, but essential terms.

In the last 2,500 years the relation between unity and plurality has been one of the main issues in philosophy, starting with Parmenides in the West. There is little chance, I happen to think, that any ecosophy *X* could significantly contribute to the *solution* of the *conceptual* problems involved. In the twentieth century there has been more search for “unity in plurality” than for “plurality in unity.” If, however, one chooses to start with “self-realization!” it is the problem of transition to the manifold of nature that is most urgent.

In the (T₀) formulations of Ecosophy T this is done by means of the

This article was reprinted with permission from *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy* by Arne Naess, translated by David Rothenberg (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 200–204.

term *self-realization potentials*. A closely related idea is that of microcosms mirroring macrocosms, an idea especially potent during the Renaissance. Each flower, each natural entity with the character of a whole (a gestalt) somehow mirrors or expresses the supreme whole. An essential characteristic is that the macrocosm is not apart. The relation is not like that between a big elephant and a small mouse. Microcosm is essential for the existence of macrocosm. Spinoza was influenced by the idea when demanding an immanent God, not a God apart.

Of course, the relation of the self-realization potentials and "self-realization" is not quite like that of macrocosm to microcosm. Every living being ("living" taken in a wide sense, as we know life today in some detail since Cambrian times) is taken to exemplify a genuine realization of a self-realization potential. (An aspect of biospherical egalitarianism!) There can be self-realization only through realization of self-realization potentials. By substituting "Complete self-realization!" or "Maximum self-realization!" for "self-realization!" we open the door for positive evaluation of an increase of the realization of potentials, that is, of more potentials being realized. This is made to imply continued evolution at all levels, including that of human culture. The realizations must be qualitatively different.

Numerical abundance as such does not count (that is, multiplication of entities so similar that they can be distinguished only by attaching different numbers to them or by putting them at different places in a coordinate system). One way of suggesting this distinction is to distinguish diversity from (mere) plurality. The term *diversity* is well established in biology, where it is used primarily to talk about diversity of species or of other qualitatively different living beings.

Further elaboration of the conception of diversity, and the introduction of concepts of complexity and symbiosis, clearly requires the support of hypotheses (or factual assertions) about the kind of universe we live in. Such support was, strictly speaking, necessary even when we began talking about self-realization, but only now is explicit mention of such support clearly needed. The "universe" we shall limit ourselves to is our planet, the Earth. We may also call it Gaia, and say it is alive, using "living being" in a wide sense.

In what follows I make a lot of implicit assumptions about life conditions on Earth, especially about their limitations.

Diversity may be defined so as to be only a *necessary* condition of the growth of realization of self-realization potentials. Then "maximum diversity" does not make sense, because many differences may not involve self-realization. To imply qualitative difference as mentioned above, it is better to introduce concepts of difference that distinguish it from mere plurality. The ambivalence of plurality stems in part from the finiteness of the planet as a whole. In some versions of Ecosophy T, the adjective *maximum* is added to "diversity!" The intention is to proclaim that there is no inherent limit to the positive character of growth of diversity. It is not intended that an increase is good even if it reduces the conditions for realizing other norms. So if the adjective *maximum* is retained, it must, in a more precise version (a T₁ version), be taken as an abbreviation for "maximum, without counter-acting the realization of other norms of the system."

Complexity as opposed to complication is (in Ecosophy T) a quality of organisms and their relation to their environment. It is characterized by intimate interrelations, deep interdependence of manifold factors or elements. After death a rhinoceros is a tremendously complicated part of nature inhabited by trillions of other, mostly less complex organisms. A victim of African sleeping sickness manifests the intimate interrelations between a human individual and colonies of the flagellate *Trypanosoma gambiense*. Each of the flagellates has an unfathomable complexity of structure, but we recognize the human being as of a still higher order of complexity.

In a diabolic world, evolution might have proceeded in many ways like in ours except that parasitism might have made every being capable of conscious pain, suffering from birth to death. The increase of the amount and the intimacy of interrelations and interdependencies might in the world of diabolic parasitism have resulted in a level of intensity of hellish suffering. Therefore, complexity of organisms as such and complexity of interdependencies would not in Ecosophy T be taken as an intrinsic value. I say "would" not, because the term *complexity* in that philosophy is taken in a somewhat broader sense such that it can be applied to *how* living beings spend their lives. From the point of view of biology, it comprises behavior and, at least in mammals and birds, gestalt processes whereby increasing complexity of consciously experienced wholes can be realized. There also, though, mere complexity as such cannot yield an increase of Self-realization. Here a concept of symbiosis, of life together, enters the framework. The slo-

gan "Live and let live!," referring to the interdependencies whereby both partners in a relationship are enriched or at least not hampered, furnishes a crucial idea in addition to diversity and complexity.

If complexity is defined in the direction of the opposite of simplicity, "Maximum complexity!" cannot support Self-realization. Only if, as in the case of "Diversity!," some restraining clause is inserted does maximizing make sense.

If we proceed from nonhuman to human ecology, and from there to cultural anthropology, the symbiosis idea may be illustrated in relation to various ways of realizing a caste system. When Gandhi talked positively about a caste system, he had an ideal system in mind—never realized. Parents were to instruct their children and work together with them as they grew up. Their useful occupation would be interrelated with and interdependent with those of families specializing in other kinds of services to the total community. Mobility between castes of this kind was to be discouraged, not prohibited. Status in the sense of dignity, respect, and material standard of living should be the same: an egalitarianism between castes, an illustration of symbiosis between groups in a community.

Obviously, Gandhi fought the actual state of affairs in India's caste system. In any kind of culture known to anthropology, in any kind of community we know of, there have been conflicts and strife, but in varying degrees. The norms of Ecosophy T are guidelines, and if elaborated into a comprehensive system, the system would have to include norms for conflict solutions. It is unrealistic, I think, to foresee full termination of deep conflicts or even to wish for such termination. The conditions of life on Earth are such that increase of self-realization is dependent on conflicts. What counts is the gradual increase of the status and application of nonviolence in group conflicts.

The *codification* of Ecosophy T is an action within the context of a conflict: it is my belief that many of the regrettable decisions in environmental conflicts in Norway and other places are made in a state of philosophical stupor. In that state, people in power confuse narrow, superficial goals with fundamental, broad goals derived from fundamental norms. The codification of our own visions and intuitions of ultimate values makes it possible always and repeatedly to ask, *Where do you stand?* What is the relation between your decision and your fundamental views?²

Integration of the “Eight Points” into Ecosophy T

Ecosophy T can be integrated with the Eight Points of the deep ecology platform in several ways. One of the simplest, but also crudest, is to extend the upper levels of the Ecosophy T diagram (see figure 1, page 53).

Starting from the left, the extensions may be diagrammatically suggested as shown in figure 9.




Figure 9. Integration of the Eight Points into Ecosophy T.

This article was written in 1989. It is being published here for the first time.

A Note on Definition, Criteria, and Characterizations

It is good that theorists of the deep ecology movement have different backgrounds, but this inevitably leads to different terminological idiosyncrasies, which, in turn, lead to pseudo-agreements and pseudo-disagreements. The situation is not serious and perhaps does not deserve much paperwork. With some hesitation I humbly admit that I am stuck with certain distinctions being expressed by certain words.

The word *criterion* I tend to use as follows:

x is a criterion of y if (1) x is a necessary and sufficient condition of y
and if (2) it is testable whether or not x is at hand.

If x_1 is a criterion of y , this does not imply that there are other criteria of y . On the contrary, in empirical investigations one may normally work with a variety of criteria of the same kind.

The history of the term *criterion* is long and complicated. We find an early use and early conceptual analysis in Sextus Empiricus's *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (1933). He discusses whether there are criteria of truth and says that the Stoics and others believed in the existence of such a criterion. The Academic Sceptics denied its existence, whereas the Pyrrhonic Sceptics were "still inquiring whether any criterion exists" (*Outlines*, bk. 2, chap. 4).

In certain ecosophies it will be important to discuss and use criteria of the following sorts: " x is a criterion of N. N. gaining (losing) quality of living through the process P "; " x is a criterion of N. N. gaining (losing) standard of living through the process P ." The criterion of the first sort may roughly be said to concern how N. N. feels at the start compared to at the

This article was written in 1989. It is being published here for the first time.

end of the process *P*. That of the second sort analogously concerns how N. N. feels about his general situation.

A third sort of criterion is "x is a criterion of N. N. gaining (losing) level of self-realization through the process *P*." An idea in Ecosophy T is that with widening and deepening of the self, the criterion changes. If N. N. gains in *power over* something or somebody through *P*, it may have increased his self-realization as long as his self was rather narrow, whereas it would not have increased it after N. N. had widened it (through a process *Q*).

Criteria are not definitions. Or, more clearly, the concept of a criterion is different from that of a normal rule giving a descriptive account of how a term is to be, or is used.

Let us consider a very unlikely example of pseudo-disagreement. Three slightly smiling persons heard Paris mentioned and each said something about Paris, but disagreed vehemently. Soon it transpired that the first meant Paris in France, the second meant Paris in Kentucky, and the third, living in Texas, meant Paris in Texas. They agreed when clear about the three usages of the term *Paris*. A descriptive account of what the term stands for, what it means in different situations or for different people, furnishes so-called descriptive definitions. (Requirement: the definiens expression must in principle be capable of taking the place of the definiendum expression ("Paris," "deep ecology," etc.) without changing meaning.

If a person N. N. is known to use the term *deep ecology* in three mutually independent meanings (connotations), N. N. cannot be said to have a theory or give an account of something he calls deep ecology. One may, however, describe what he says about three different topics. If *p*, *q*, and *r* are three sentences, each being a concise rendering of what N. N. says about one of the topics, eight judges who are asked to declare which assertions are true and which are false may come to eight different conclusions: true, true, true, . . . false, false, false.

A different situation is at hand if N. N. seems to use the term *deep ecology* in one way but has three rather different, perhaps not completely compatible ideas or opinions about the topic. The question of mutual consistency or compatibility does not in general arise when judging *p*, *q*, and *r*. If *p* concerns Paris in France, *q* Paris in Kentucky, and *r* Paris in Texas, incompatibility may be very rare. (A rare example: *p*—Paris in France is the most exciting city in the world; *q*—Paris in Kentucky is the most exciting city

in the world; . . .). If, however, p , q , and r are ideas or opinions about one topic, namely what N. N. means by "deep ecology," consistency and compatibility are routine matters of concern.

As a special case p , q , and r are three proposed *criteria* whether a point of view can be said to express a deep ecology stand or is incompatible with deep ecology. In that case, the questions of testability, subsumability, and other questions arise that are rather complicated and need extensive discussion.

A third and last term needs to be mentioned in this connection: *characterizations*.

There are many characterizations of "the Age of Enlightenment," "the Romantic period in German literature," "the European Middle Ages." No exact delimitations are required, no definitions, no criteria. One may feel it necessary for the sake of courses and exams to define the Middle Ages in Europe as the period between A.D. 500 and 1400 or 1500, but it is obviously a very crude definition. The adequacy of characterizations is testable, but only imperfectly. If someone finds that a characterization of the Middle Ages is rather inadequate because it is not valid for the period 1300–1450, it will be tolerated better than if it is felt to be inadequate in relation to 1100–1250.

My characterization of the deep ecology movement is of a peculiar kind insofar as I have invented the name of the movement. Therefore, a natural and valid question is, Is there really a movement—a fairly definite phenomenon—with the characterization I offer? Because of the just-mentioned peculiarity, the characterization tends to function also as a normative (rule-giving) definition. There is little sense in objecting that the deep ecology movement has a very different character. This happens, but only by considering aspects of the behavior of those who use *deep ecology* or *deep ecologists* as a positive term. Some critics or rival groups may then come to the conclusion that the deep ecology movement *really* is very different from the characterization offered by the chief theorists of the movement. This is an interesting development found in every social movement that touches contemporary burning social questions. *Freedom* is a term used positively by very large groups, but it has also elicited many strong negative reactions: "What is called freedom by . . . is only the unhindered exploitation of the weak," and so on.

Complications of this kind make communication more difficult, but

they do not constitute a decisive obstacle or make it advisable to change terminology.

Characterizations, however imperfect in their indefiniteness, are indispensable tools. They are not replaceable by definitions or criteria.

The practical value of the above distinctions is mainly that of reducing the frequency and seriousness of pseudo-agreements and pseudo-disagreements. What does my colleague (or opponent) intend to assert? Does he or she define? characterize?

Imagine a new kind of rules in playing bridge: "If somebody says 'three hearts!' it may mean what is traditionally meant by 'two spades!' You cannot know, and to ask is not permitted!" Only when they are playing will it transpire what each player has meant. With a number of such admissions of ambiguity, the play gets very complicated and even indecisive—like a confusing debate.

Docta Ignorantia and the Application of General Guidelines

What follows assumes acquaintance with the Eight Points and other condensed sets of formulations by George Sessions and myself.

The general formulations of levels 1 and 2, even 3, *sound* dogmatic at the T_0 level—even if they are not meant to be. This is a rather common feature of T_0 -level formulations. For example, the operators “Tentative conclusions!” and “Suggested guidelines:” or other colon-operators complicate unnecessarily the relations between sets of formulations. The T_0 level is by definition a point-of-departure level and requires a departure for preciseness and elaboration. If that is not forthcoming, little or nothing is gained. Unfortunately, more precise formulations and the necessary elaborations (explanations, comments) are likely to be published in little-known periodicals, if published at all.

Communication at the T_0 level makes it natural for some people to complain about crudeness, arrogance, delusions, and overestimation of the status of insight on the part of the sender of the formulations. Some people tend to complain about slogan thinking as well.

All these negative reactions can be fairly well understood and illustrated by an example, a normative T_0 formulation at the third level: “Decentralization!” Its slogan function during the time of the first green wave was clear and strong. It functioned, and still functions, as a guideline in thousands of situations of concrete decision, but the string of derivations from the very general guideline-utterance to a concrete decision was long in the early 1970s, and it will be longer and more complicated in the 1990s. One large field of application of the decentralization norm within the area

This article was written in 1989. It is being published here for the first time.

of green thinking in Norway had to do with the tendency of the power centers around the inner Oslo fjord to coerce the lesser local and district centers in arctic Norway. In general, the problem is that of (geographical) power center versus (geographical) power periphery. Within this large field one may specify a hundred lesser fields, "subfields of the first order"—for example, guidelines for building houses, disposal of trash, organization of university exams. Should a student in arctic Norway who wants to obtain a certain degree as it is offered in Oslo be compelled to undertake the long and costly trip to Oslo in order to pass an exam? "Decentralize the research facilities!" The establishment of a university at Tromsø, the world's northernmost university at about 70° north latitude, was in part motivated by the decentralization norm. It is now a flourishing university. What I am trying to indicate is the *very limited but at the same time powerful* function of a seemingly dogmatic, arrogant, crude, short T_0 formulation such as "Decentralization." We may point to the slogan function of "Decentralization!" but it also has a function in serious thinking within the general efforts to introduce wise policies.

From a systematic point of view, each normative T_0 -level formulation has an intrinsic relation to others at the same level in the negative sense that it is not synonymous with an absolutist norm " $T_0!$ "—at any cost, regardless of any other norm of the total systematizations!"

It is beyond anyone's capacity to be competent in formulating complete subguidelines of decentralization with a great field of application such as the one just mentioned. Needless to say, it is a task for hundreds, if not for thousands, to hammer out policy guidelines and more precise formulations covering large geographic or administrative areas within the borders of a state like Norway.

It should be, but unhappily is not, unnecessary to add that the *docta ignorantia* theme applies strongly to the ecophilosophers. In Europe, what is sometimes called political ecology is heavily criticized. "The social and political thinking of the ecologists is marred by blindness and naïveté," wrote the left-wing author Hans Magnus Enzenberger (1973), and a continuous stream of criticism, moral indignation, and ridicule has been directed at ecologists who propose formidable changes of society without any deep knowledge about history and social forces, local or global. Despite his criticisms, Enzenberger does express the belief that a strong movement is

needed to “restore the North American continent and to *de-develop the United States*.”

Some criticism has also been directed at “the main writers who have been devoted to elaborating the ideas of deep ecology and defending them over the last few years” (Fox 1990: 70). Warwick Fox lists six main writers but, as he himself emphasizes, there are many more who announce very general points of view using deep ecology terminology. There is good reason to believe that this will continue in the 1990s, much of it being constructive and eagerly studied by all concerned. Here I shall only emphasize that *docta ignorantia* implies for theorists of the deep ecology movement occasional but not unnecessarily repetitive admissions of ignorance and incompetence relative to certain social problems and practical tasks. Perhaps the frequency and intensity of such admissions have been too small.

Point 3 of the Eight Points says something of gigantic scope seen from the point of view of any student of human societies: that human beings have no right to decrease the richness and diversity of (human and) nonhuman forms of life except to satisfy vital needs.

The vast philosophical literature and quarrels on rights are presumably more or less unknown and will presumably remain unknown to most of these theoreticians, because it takes much time to acquaint oneself with them. The literature on needs and criticisms by social psychologists and others is very difficult to survey. Nevertheless, the “social indicators” research is certainly relevant.

It staggers the imagination to think of the millions of questions involved in *any* large-scale undertaking to halt or reverse the trend toward decreased richness of nonhuman life-forms as the term *richness* is supposed to be interpreted here: the rich diversity locally all over the globe, not just populations big enough to avoid threats of extinction and geographically severely limited habitats.

When we move to point 6, the ignorance and incompetence of the deep ecology movement theories may be said to be, if possible, even more staggering—relative to the tasks implied.

Critics say that it sometimes sounds as if the theorists believe they have clear awareness of what it takes to realize the norms of the deep ecology movement and, even worse, that to go on talking in very general, vague terms is the main job in solving the ecological crisis. Why, the critics won-

der, do not they take up specific, practical problems when clearly what they announce implies such tasks?

From what I have seen of these theorists, including myself, I think the criticism is largely but not wholly misdirected. Admissions of ignorance or incompetence relative to certain tasks may occur too rarely, but it is, as far as I can judge, not tenable to assert that they overestimate their knowledge, competence, or capacities.

As for practical problems, one may expect that the theorists' general outlook colors their lifestyle and their interactions in their local communities. It is no basis for general complaints. The consistency of ecological responsibility is often discussed. It is clear that the ethical and general norms of consistency are a large area of ethical and practical thinking. Here a norm against undue moralizing is relevant. The pronouncement of an American Indian is often quoted: "Great Spirit, grant that I may not criticize my neighbor until I have walked a mile in his moccasins."

So much about the tasks the theoreticians of the deep ecology movement cannot perform. What *can* they do? There are three kinds of tasks that they perform and will continue, I hope, to perform in the 1990s: the verbal articulation of *intuition*; the *synthesis* of the intuitions with general insights, ecological knowledge, and informed guesses about the future; and logical, semantical, and general analytical work to bring the synthesis into a rational form (different both from the important poetic form and from the socially necessary form of preaching).

An example may be useful here. I have articulated one of my intuitions with the help of old philosophy—using the six words "All living beings are ultimately one." Sir Alfred Ayer was highly dissatisfied with this formulation (Elders 1974: 31 ff.), but I could not help much in finding a more precise sentence to express the same intuition. As a theorist I should either find such a sentence or find a way to convey some of its meaning through sets of sentences independent of the six-word articulation. That is done through my talk about the process of identification and self-realization. The theoreticians of the *deep* movement naturally use philosophical and religious traditions, or rather feel at home or belong within such a tradition.

The three tasks are important because people, including scientists and technicians, are not generally trained in a combination of those tasks. After a lecture or speech in which I present some of the theoretical articulations,

people often react by saying, "That's exactly what I have felt for many years but did not find ways to express!" Essentially nothing new was being conveyed, but people were made more conscious of their basic attitudes. They have become better equipped to take an active, self-confident part in the conflicts of their day. They joyfully communicate to others how they feel about society, about nature, about everything fundamental in their lives in terms of their intuitions and insights.

In professional philosophy the theorists may contribute within the venerable traditions of philosophy of nature (*Naturphilosophie*) and otherwise.

In short, there are great tasks to be performed, but they are severely limited and can only bring about social and political changes when performed in close cooperation with theorists, students, and participants in social and political life.

We must not underestimate the importance of appealing to people, whatever their level of formal education, to express what they think of the proposed more or less general guidelines, whether relevant or not at their own workplace, in their own community, and in their own political activity, if they are so inclined. There is no reason whatsoever for the theorist to feel that the theoretical reflections, including the historical, can somehow do the jobs that give practical meaning to the generalizations. The theorist invites cooperation in the many cases in which people respond positively, and he modifies his own message in the light of the experience of others.

There is nothing new in this. The great social movements of today depend upon grassroots participation, and the ecology movement more than any other.

Ranking, Yes, but the Inherent Value Is the Same: An Answer to William C. French

In the Spring 1995 issue of *Environmental Ethics*, William C. French published an excellent article called "Against biospherical egalitarianism." After noting that "Arne Naess and Paul Taylor are two of the most forceful proponents" of such egalitarianism, French asks for a moderation:

[T]he expansion of what counts as the moral community far beyond the borders of the human community is, I believe, correct. What I find problematic, however, is the egalitarian view that not only do all living entities have inherent moral value, but that they all have *equal* inherent value.

(French 1995: 39)

It is unfortunate that I waited until the 1990s to change "equal" into "the same," avoiding as well as I could the question of grading. My position may be formulated as follows: "Living beings have in common a same sort of value, namely inherent value." It makes sense to do something strictly for their own sake. I do not like the grading of this value, but some supporters of the deep ecology movement introduce grading and I see no reason to try to make them feel as I do about this. The deep ecology movement is not a sect.

Very few supporters use the term *biospherical egalitarianism*, and this is good because it is natural to interpret the word *egalitarianism* in an absolutist sense, as absolute equality or value in every respect, a sense that I never had in mind and one that must make everybody inconsistent sinners.

A slightly different version of this article appears in *Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy*, edited by N. Witoszek and A. Brennan (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 146–49.

The sense I tried to give the expression refers to points 1 and 2 of the Eight Points. It relates to the (for me) fundamental question "Inherent or *merely* instrumental value?" Inherence does not (logically) imply absence of ranking, for example, species ranking of various sorts. I use a kind of ranking with a level of consistency compatible with a moderate (ethical) latitudinarian attitude as opposed to a rigorist one. (These terms I borrow from the history of theology.) In short, I do not know of any very helpful general ranking, but the ecologist Ivar Mysterud and I have tried to systematize norms of ranking that are highly controversial but of vital concern for the continued existence of certain communities: the "mixed" communities of sheep, sheep owners, bears, and wolves (Naess and Mysterud 1987 [chapter 29 in this volume]) in Norway. The small-scale sheep owners are at the same time agriculturists, foresters, hunters, and gatherers—ecological aristocrats!

To systematize a set of prescriptions and descriptions closely adapted to the situation in these areas of Norway is a herculean task. The contribution worked out together with Mysterud (who has spent more than ten years on the relevant questions) stresses, among other things, the special *responsibility* of sheep owners in relation to *their* sheep (ibid.). When Norway was poor, the owners nevertheless hired shepherds; now that Norway is rich, it costs too much for sheep owners to hire shepherds. My proposal is that for the next ten years the district authorities and the sheep owners pay for shepherds. It is a clear obligation to protect our sheep against wolves. Within ten years Norway is likely to be part of a gigantic free market (the European Union), and the culturally small but ecologically high-level communities will scarcely be able to compete. There may be no small-scale sheep owners left. The point I am trying to make here is that it is necessary to refer to the complexity and the local character of the problems involved, such as when saying yes to sheep and to wolves and bears.

Ranking is a complex affair. How do I, for example, rank insects? Should they all have the same rank? Where I have lived for many years, the climate is so tough that some species appear there only because the wind has carried them upward too high for them to live more than a short time. It feels natural for me to take special care of certain species of butterflies. I see them on the snow patches more or less weakened. My attempts to revive them, using my own methods, are successful in less than 50 percent of the cases. Although I feel that I ought to make these efforts, I do not find that I

(ethically speaking) *ought to* use more refined, time-consuming methods. Ranking is not wholly an ethical affair.

Specimens of other families of insects do not receive careful treatment; they are mostly ignored. In some cases, I find my behavior ethically not quite as it should be; in other cases, despite the obvious practical possibility of being helpful, I do nothing. I let them slowly die on the snow. I use the term *feel* extensively in discussing these matters because the ethical analysis of the many situations would be much too complex for me to handle if I referred only to thinking.

Those who find they are able to introduce a sophisticated grading of inherent value perhaps use the term as a technical expression capable of being made fairly precise. As I define it, it is the expression of something largely intuitive. The moment I perceive something as alive, it is apperceived as something with a *kind of* value or standing that I myself have. Ranking does not quite have the same sort of intuitive evidence because it has to do with an act of comparing. Ranking for me has primarily to do with differences of obligation. In wintertime my cottage receives mice and men as guests, but my obligations are enormously greater toward the human guests than toward the mice. The latter are absolutely forbidden to enter more than one outer room, but considering the terrific climate, their braveness calls for *some* recognition. They are acceptable in one of the rooms. It *feels absurd* for me to think, You are mere mice, I have higher inherent value because (1) I am much more intelligent, (2) I am much more complex, (3) I am much higher on the evolutionary ladder, (4) I am capable of profound sorts of spiritual suffering, (5) I am self-reflecting, you do not even know yourself, and (6). . . .

I cannot see that the principle of sameness of inherent value of all living beings makes it difficult to introduce a rank consideration in mixed communities. The members of the communities feel obligations of various kinds and intensities, but it is hazardous to integrate them into a system with a set of basic norms, and more so to extend the intended field of validity in favor of a global environmental ethics. A sheep owner cried out to his children "Come and look out the window!" A big brown bear was coming straight up to the farm, but the sheep were out of reach of the bear. Marvelous sight! Full respect for the bear—its inherent value, its right to eat the sheep, but also the right of the sheep owner to chase the bear away if it,

against expectation, tried to break down the door protecting the sheep. He furthermore accepted fully the rule that he was not supposed to kill the bear if he met it in the woods, except when it attacked. Extremely complex moral and nonmoral questions for people whom it concerns!

French writes, "My view is that without some notion of species ranking—critically formulated and compassionately and contextually applied—it may well be impossible to provide the moral justification that Naess admits his position seems to lack" (French 1995: 45). This is very well formulated and I *completely* agree. Ranking, though, does not *imply* quantification of inherent value.

Suppose French proposes a definite ranking system and applies it compassionately and contextually. Has he given me and the sheep owners a moral basis? A fundament? I do not know. A system may seem to be too much to ask for as an ultimate basis.

French finds Lawrence Johnson's species-ranking scheme helpful: "[A] human by virtue of his or her greater 'complexity' than a dandelion has a 'greater interest in life and a higher moral status' (ibid., p. 54). French uses "range of vulnerability and need" (ibid., p. 55) as a basic criterion: "[O]ur moral priority lies to defend those [species] who have the greatest range of potential vulnerability," as "generated by broader ranges of complexity and capacities" (ibid., p. 56).

French's proposal, I feel, is very considerate. Even the tremendous expansion, domination, and vitality of the human species is, I grant, not a sign that it is *not* the most vulnerable. If I act according to his ranking, though, I am not sure it furnishes me with a general moral *basis*. I shall be on the outlook for something that to me is more intuitively convincing, and perhaps I am not sure how important morally it is in practice to find a *general* ranking scheme.

The Heart of the Forest

Many cultures express awe of the heart of the forest. To be in the heart of the forest has been, and still is, considered something very special, something quite different from merely walking along its outskirts or knowing or feeling the direction in which you should walk to reach the edge of the forest.

A forest that is not deep has no heart. To have a heart, it has to have depth, but that is not enough. Sometimes we may feel it is adequate to say we are deep in the forest, but we may lack the feeling or experience of being at its heart.

Development at or in the heart of a forest obviously changes everything. A *poster* saying “Now you are in the heart of the forest” is ridiculous at best. We who have been brought up in an industrial country may, of course, with some justice be said to be oversensitive when we react negatively even to a little poster or to the cottage of a ranger—well hidden and built with exquisite ecological care—but painful experiences again and again have made us sore.

It is encouraging that people who endorse “progress” and continued economic “progress” and continued economic growth often retain the heart metaphor along with the respect it entails. They react against utterances that seem to imply absence of any idea of the heart whatsoever and then compare it with the square kilometers of the whole forest: “You will understand that the road makes practically no difference. You say the road goes

This article was reprinted with permission from *Ecoforestry: The Art and Science of Sustainable Forest Use*, edited by Alan Drengson and Duncan Taylor (Canada: New Society Publishers, 1997), 258–60.

through the heart of the forest. You mean the center? We may let the road avoid the center if you are happier that way." Even enthusiastic developers reject this kind of crude talk.

We who sense the heart clearly see that a forest with such a road really is divided into two forests: The "roadiness" area is broad: hundreds of times that of the road itself. The forest changes into two smaller ones.

To be in the heart of the forest *implies* distance from the road but does not *mean* just "to be at a distance." To be there and be conscious about it is to spontaneously experience (and understand) a kind of quality or set of qualities that is unique. It transcends awareness of distance as such.

"How great a distance do we need?" In a practically impenetrable forest: a small distance. In an open, subarctic forest with small trees: a much greater distance. It would be a mere scholastic exercise to go into details because "distance" here has much to do with our imagination: you look one way, forest, forest, forest . . . ; you look another way, forest, forest, forest, FOREST. The forest *fills* your mind; you are not a subject and the forest is not an object. The dualism is overcome.

To meet a big, wild animal in its own territory may be frightening, but it gives us an opportunity to better understand who we are and our limits of control: the existence of greatness other than the human. The same applies to meeting the greatness of the forest. We are not in control. Our eminent ecoanarchist Kropotkin in his little *Mutual Aid* (1955) tells us that people working in the vast Siberian forests have a tradition of shouting loudly and repeatedly before starting to eat their lunch brought from home: there may be a fellow human being who has lost his way and would need the food more urgently (an example of mammalian broad empathy or identification as an evolutionary force).

A spontaneous experience of terror of being alone in a great forest is an experience of something real, the-terror-alone-in-a-great-forest. We don't cherish terror, however, so it is better to reduce acquaintance with that part of reality. We should prepare ourselves, become informed, as we do before going out on a glacier, for example. The point I am trying to make is that spontaneously experienced negative characteristics of nature refer to something real, just as positive ones do. It is a task of wilderness enthusiasts to express their positive experiences.

Do contemporary forests in Europe have no heart? It would be mislead-

ing to answer yes, but the rate of destruction has been heartbreaking and, even if it is slowing down, invasion and fragmentation of undeveloped areas continue.

When a new road made for big vehicles is constructed where a week ago one had a path for walking and skiing, a new path through the woods is often carefully prepared, but ridiculously near the gigantic monster of a road. The preparation of the alternative path presumes that there is no loss of deepness of the forest as long as developments are out of sight.

How old must we be to spontaneously experience being at the heart of a forest? Small children growing up in a forest, even in small patches around their homes, may sometimes wander off straight into the "wild." They turn from time to time, looking back. Is Mommy still in sight? Is big brother there? When they trust enough to go farther into the woods, little boys or girls, I suppose, may feel the greatness and independence of the wild, independence even of the power of parents and big brother. Their body language tells a lot. They have, but they don't know they have, no control over the big world all around them. Don't underrate children!

The outlook for the near future is grim, but I feel it impossible to believe that destruction will continue until there is no forest with a heart.

Metaphysics of the Treeline

In many parts of the world, but perhaps most clearly in the far north, the treeline is full of symbolic value: enigmatic, mystical, threatening, liberating, alluring—and repulsive and ominous. No single person or animal has the capacity to experience all these tertiary qualities of the treeline. The same holds true for the drama of crossing the treeline, either from above or from below.

The term *treeline* is misleading. There is actually no line but rather a narrow or wide border area. If the terrain is nearly horizontal, the area is wide—perhaps miles wide. If the terrain is steep, the line is narrow but never sharp. Thus it is a shock to see an artificial forest, actually a “tree farm,” covering a slope high on the side of a valley and then suddenly coming to a halt.

Suddenly, there is not a single tree! From full-grown trees to nothing: an abnormality, an experience of something utterly valuable having been destroyed, the landscape desecrated, a personal loss even if one has never been near the place.

Here I shall relate the immensely rich reality that a certain group of people has experienced, a group that includes millions of people. I shall start with the simple, obvious experiences.

As one moves up toward the treeline, there are signs of new challenges being met by the trees. In the strong winds and thinning soil, trees become smaller and take on gnarled and fantastic shapes. Some have fallen over. They tend to clump together, as we would do. Sometime there are only clus-

This article was reprinted with permission. It was originally published in *Appalachia* (June 15, 1989): 56–59, and in *Edge 2* (1989): 25–26. It was also published in *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1995), 246–48.

ters of trees at particular spots, or single trees that are altogether isolated. They may be courageous, haughty, even triumphant, but also miserable.

These characteristics of trees, however, are subordinate *gestalts*, lesser forms of what is real. The higher-order *gestalts* predominate. One *gestalt* is that of upward movement, as far as possible, overcoming obstacles, trying to "clothe the mountain."

Some trees succeed in clothing the mountain. Compared with lowland trees, they resemble tiny bushes. They may be only a few feet tall, whereas their lowland kin soar 50 to 100 feet or more. Yet call them stunted and they ask, What am I lacking? These trees have produced cones. They've realized all their possibilities; they've fulfilled essential functions. Mere size has nothing to do with the quality of life.

Others merely survive, stunted and deformed. No cones, no expression of fulfillment, half-dead from exposure to winter after winter, and summers that alternate from drenching rain to dry.

Each tree has a different life experience from birth. Still others thrive in small ways by managing merely to survive. The rough terrain and numerous variations in conditions have obvious consequences—no tree is identical to any other. Each tree is a mighty presentation of the drama of life. To some you feel near, others you feel farther from.

A few people have the background to enlarge the high-order *gestalts* in the time dimension. These people will see the waves of cold and warm climates after the last ice age. They see waves of trees further clothing the mountain, or in retreat, leaving broken trunks clinging high on the open slopes. The treeline is seen as constantly moving up or down, never resting.

People living near thick spruce forests may see the forest density as a protective wall. Others feel that these trees block the view, or even one's existence, hindering free expression of life and thought. If the trees are old with drooping branches, they may communicate resignation, sorrow, melancholy. Swayed by the wind, large trees move in slow rhythms, and the music can have the heartbreaking feel of a funeral march. Or they may express slowly something like "doomed, doomed, doomed . . ." Through the dimness of night, the wall of trees may invite merciful death. The existence of the treeline somewhere high—reachable, but far away—then inevitably becomes a promise of freedom, a proof of limits to any sorrow, any prison, any doubt or guilt. As one approaches the treeline, walls disappear. Trees

shrink, gaps enlarge, light shines between them and between their branches. It has been my privilege to see all this.

When rich, high-order gestalts contrast low and high, dark and light, they are apt to acquire metaphysical dimensions. Movement from low and dark toward high and light treeline strengthens this contrast. Lightness is further strengthened by the ease of movement at treeline. Being at treeline becomes an experience of reaching supreme freedom. For some, a change from a tragic to a more cheerful outlook on life occurs.

Those who live in the forest, or feel at home there, may have experiences that vary even more. The upper limit of the forest marks the end of security, the end of the world we master, the beginning of the harsh world of wind-driven snow, dangerous precipices, useless expanse.

Above treeline it is cold and hostile; below is warm and friendly. Even in these negative experiences there is a contrast of metaphysical dimensions. The positive and negative gestalts attest to the supreme gestalt of Janus-faced existence, comprising good and bad on an equal footing, or emphasizing one aspect more than the other.

How is this metaphysical aspect to be understood? What insight can it offer? This is a meta-metaphysical question that cannot be entirely answered here, or anywhere, although certain essentials can be gleaned from three approaches.

1. *The Homocentrist.* The power of human imagination is overwhelming. There is no limit to what human genius is able to *project into* nature. The richness of treeline symbols attests to this. Flights of imagination soar from the plane of brute facts: the leaves are green, stems grow upward. . . . The rest is a wonderful projection of the human mind.
2. *The Idealist Philosopher.* Strictly speaking, the leaves are not green. Their atoms are colorless, not even gray, and the stems' electromagnetic waves or particles do not grow upward. There is a realm beyond the material world. The new physics confirms it—a spirit world beyond space and time, a spiritual realm. The human mind is in direct touch with this realm and “spiritualizes” nature.
3. *The Ecosopher.* The richness and fecundity of reality! How overwhelming! The treeline's abstract geographical structure points to a

THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF DEEP ECOLOGY

seemingly infinite variety of *concrete* contents! More is open to the human ecological self than can be experienced by any other living being.

The metaphysics of the treeline is a serious affair for ecosophers. It lets us understand the spontaneous immediate experience of the treeline as an experience of reality, beyond the divisions between subject and object, between spiritual and material.

One of today's most chilling realizations is that "reforestation" projects do not really restore a *forest*. Artificial tree plantations lack the immense biological richness and diversity of ancient forests, together with their metaphysical intensity and richness. With so many people now reacting negatively to sham reforestation, the time is ripe for a change in policy.

Avalanches as Social Constructions

Having been taken at least twice by avalanches, I have never felt them to be social constructions, but every word I utter about them may have social origins, and the same applies to the meanings of these words. As regards the meanings, they also have individual components in the sense that the conceptions people have who study or experience avalanches show marked individual differences. I say I have been taken at least twice because a third one was so tiny that most people would reject using that term. Had I been carried 20 feet farther, however, I might have perished because my skis had got into an awkward and painful position under very deep snow.

Every word in this narrative, including the word *avalanche*, has of course social and individual shades of connotation, but they do not affect corresponding connotation. I have not used the word *nature* here, but what I have just said holds also for that word. In the last hundred years the great diversity of usages of the word *nature* has been discussed, especially in the context of research in the history of ideas. Some people prefer to talk about nature as “social constructions,” but I do not think the more traditional way, the talk about various conceptions and ideas of nature, is inferior. The use of the term *deconstruction* has elicited much discussion, including a debate on the positive value of deconstructing construction.

Curiously enough, the assertion by supporters of the deep ecology movement that every living being has intrinsic or inherent value has elicited complaints that this implies a rejection of the 100 percent social (and individual) nature or essence of everything uttered about living beings

This article was reprinted with permission from *Environmental Ethics* (Denton, Texas: Center for Environmental Philosophy) 22 (2000): 335–36.

as beings in nature, and complaints that it neglects the vast sufferings of fellow human beings. The view that we have particular duties toward suffering fellow human beings does not conflict with the view that it is meaningful to do things for nonhuman beings strictly for their own sake. Extended care for life on Earth deepens care for human beings!

Mick Smith (1999: 360) has written:

While all would agree that "nature" is a prerequisite for social life, to speak of "nature" as being valuable in itself is still symptomatic for many on the left of a moral failure to prioritize the compelling immediacy of human suffering over our maltreatment of the environment.

He writes "nature" in inverted commas, as if he writes about the *word*, but perhaps he does not. If not, does he speak about nature? Anyhow, supporters of the deep ecology movement need not consider nature to have inherent value. Especially when we use the word *nature* as a near-synonym for the cosmos, I certainly do not apply the term *inherent value* to it. It is not empirically correct, I think, to suspect that certain supporters of the deep ecology movement downplay efforts to relieve human suffering. It is not uncommon to criticize people who work, for example, for less painful transport of pigs, suggesting that they neglect human suffering, but I think we agree that there are limits to what we can tolerate when it comes to such transport. Analogously, we may think that it is morally justifiable to use a very small part of 1 percent of what is spent on diminishing vast human suffering on the defense of richness and diversity of life on this planet. In strange contrast to the usual view among researchers that there are immense differences of conceptions of nature and of ways of relating to nature, Smith concludes:

Almost inevitably, the conclusion of such studies is "that there is no singular 'nature' as such, only a diversity of contested natures; and that each such nature is constructed through a variety of sociocultural processes."

(Ibid., 361)

Basically, it is philosophically rather trivial whether there is only one conception of what is called nature or a thousand. Most conceptions have been heavily determined by important magical views, or by manifestations of the activity of gods. Fossils are sometimes considered to be made by the play of the devil. None of these views are *disproved* by modern natural science. Proofs belong in mathematics.

IX

DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE FUTURE

Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology

Nonindustrial cultures insist upon the meaningfulness of life. A large part of their mental and physical energy is devoted to religious and other practices supporting this belief. Behavior must conform to it. This pressure toward conformity is often immense, and it is sometimes resented by the young.

The rich, industrial cultures make it appear possible to skip the labors that support the meaningfulness of life. What is left of nonindustrial cultures today is threatened by the nearly irresistible lure of the “free,” “unconcerned” way of life manifested by tourists, economic development experts, and other visitors from rich nations. To the young, these strange beings seem to have been able to get rich while remaining free of onerous social duties. The cultural cost of economic growth within rich nations is rarely considered. The ecological cost is incalculable.

If one shifts from being an observer of cultures to being a student of the history of ideas, one may trace a line of thinking that roughly suggests a movement from the ideal of “progress” to that of “development” and “economic growth,” and from these ideas to that of “unsustainable development.” Some of us hope for farther steps along this line, from “sustainable development” to “ecological development” to long-range “ecosophical development”—with an emphasis on the need for wisdom (*sophia*) as much as on the need for science and technology. If this line is to be followed, it will entail our studying the loss of beliefs and cultural identities now oc-

This article was excerpted from *Ethics of Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response*, edited by R. J. Engel and J. G. Engel. Tucson: University of Arizona Press (1990): 87–96. Reprinted with permission from John Wiley & Sons Limited.

curing because of the tremendous impact of the economy and technology of the big, powerful, rich industrial societies. As members of these societies, we are largely responsible for this impact and the resulting cultural shock. Any model of ecologically sustainable development must suggest ways to avoid furthering the thoughtless destruction of cultures, or the dissemination of the belief in a glorious, meaningless life.

The above goal may be expressed in shorter form by asking for ecologically sustainable development. Every decision in every country in the world has an ecosophical aspect. The centers of philosophical and religious thinking have to be mobilized as energetically as the centers of ecological, economic, and technological learning.

The term *developing country* should either be avoided or applied to rich countries as well as to poor, for practically every country today is developing in a way that is ecologically unsustainable. It ought to be a goal of the rich countries to change policies in such a way that they eventually reach a level of sustainability of development.

Because of the wide range of cultures deeply affected by unsustainability, the philosophical and religious underpinning of changes toward sustainability must differ. There must be a marked pluralism of ultimate conceptions of meaningfulness. I place these philosophical and religious conceptions on "level 1" of any development systematization. From this basic level of norms one should be able to derive ecosophically important views furnishing guidelines for change. The important thing is to recognize that if we hope for rich cultural diversity on Earth in the future, there can be no completely general blueprint for development. Development must differ to assure cultural continuity. Cultures will not be lost along the way, as they are today, if we insist on the relevance of level-1 norms and if concrete plans are tested to make sure proposed changes allow for the persistence of deep cultural diversity on Earth.

Deep Ecology and the World Conservation Strategy

The ecophilosophically important general views I discuss in what follows are characteristic of a great number of active people from many nations, and they are open to different articulations. The set of tentative formulations I shall use, the so-called deep ecology platform,¹ comprises eight points:

1. The flourishing of human and nonhuman beings has value in itself. The value of nonhuman beings is independent of their usefulness to human beings.
2. Richness of kinds of living beings has value in itself.
3. Human beings have no right to reduce this richness except to satisfy vital human needs.
4. The flourishing of human life is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
5. Current human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must be changed in view of points 1–5. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of human affairs will be greatly different from the present.
7. The appreciation of a high quality of life will supersede that of a high standard of life.
8. Those who accept the foregoing points have an obligation to try to contribute directly to the implementation of necessary changes.

Let me compare the deep ecology platform to the view of sustainable development that has been formulated in the *World Conservation Strategy* (IUCN 1980). Although it is difficult, and for present purposes unnecessary, to determine exactly the nature of agreements and disagreements between the *World Conservation Strategy* (WCS) and the deep ecology platform, this analysis suggests areas of tension. Three quotes from the exceptionally careful formulations in chapter 1 of the WCS point to an initial difference.

1. The term *development* is defined in the WCS as “the modification of the biosphere and the application of human . . . living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human life.”
2. Development’s close relation to the term *conservation* is made clear in the definition of conservation as “the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations.”
3. The term *sustainable* is not defined, but that it is meant to imply the

long-term support of life on Earth is clear from the two opening sentences of chapter 1: "Earth is the only place in the universe known to sustain life. Yet human activities are progressively reducing the planet's life-supporting capacity at a time when rising human numbers and consumption are making increasingly heavy demands on it."

These quotes reveal a significant difference between the deep ecology platform and the WCS view of development in their bases for valuing nonhuman life. The question arises of whether nonhuman life is, in the WCS, of intrinsic or of only utilitarian value.

It is true that expressed concern for nonhuman life *for its own sake* is not completely absent from the WCS. In the third quotation above, "the planet's life-supporting capacity" is used, not the "planet's human-supporting capacity," and when "a new environmental ethics" is asked for, also in chapter 1, this may plausibly be interpreted as referring to an ethics wherein nonhuman life is conserved for its own sake. Furthermore, the title World Conservation Strategy suggests something wider than conservation solely for the sake of human beings.

Nevertheless, the WCS leaves little doubt that the ultimate concern is for human beings: "Conservation, like development, is for people" (IUCN 1980: chap. 1). In the second WCS quotation above, the reference to generations, taken in isolation, may be interpreted to cover all living beings, but that is not possible when reading the quotation in context.

In contrast, the deep ecology platform makes it clear that nonhuman life is valued independently of human life. Moreover, the deep ecology formulation expressly supports a policy of noninterference with continuing evolution, for example, the evolution of mammals demanding vast territory, and of highly different landscapes with their special organisms.

From the narrow definition of development in the WCS, it follows that satisfaction of nonhuman needs and the improvement of the life quality of any nonhuman being cannot possibly be a part of development in a *direct* way. There is, however, at least one possibility for making the above three quotations on development compatible with points 1 and 2 of the deep ecology platform. This possibility leans heavily on two hypotheses: first, that mature human beings believe at least implicitly in the intrinsic value of nonhuman life and in the diversity of life, and second, that they accordingly experience a strong need to oppose actions and policies incompatible with these beliefs. If

the two hypotheses are accepted, one may assert that there is a human need to protect nature for its own sake. This protection of the full richness and diversity of nonhuman life on Earth for its own sake acquires the status of usefulness for human beings and is fully compatible with important forms of utilitarianism. I personally accept the hypotheses when “maturity” is taken in the strong sense of all-sided (German *allseitige*) maturity.

This admission of a utilitarianism of sorts may be important for those supporters of the deep ecology movement who tend to conceive of themselves as utilitarians and who do not feel at home with valuations seemingly “totally independent” of human valuation.

The firm acceptance of the two first points of the deep ecology platform is of considerable social and political importance. As long as major efforts to protect, and to restore, the richness and diversity of life on Earth are supported solely on the basis of human need narrowly defined, they will be piecemeal, not holistic. They will not concern whole ecosystems and will not be carried out with maximal perspective in time and space. Without a respect for the ecosphere as a whole, efforts will continue to be focused on special spectacular items—pandas, wolves, acid rain, the ozone layer, carbon dioxide. Respect for the welfare of all facilitates acceptance of long-range efforts, including changes within human societies. Ecologically sustainable development will automatically refer to the whole planet and not to ecologically arbitrary boundaries of nations.

Another way of conceptually closing the gap between the two documents is to look at the meaning of “life” and “living.” When a campaign to protect a river against so-called development is launched, the slogan “Let the river live” does not concern just the water of the river, but a somewhat vaguely conceived ecosystem as a whole—a “living whole.” In some cases, it includes people who live along the river or use the river in an ecologically appropriate way. It is clear that most campaigners for the protection of the river against major interference feel that the interference reduces the meaning of their own lives. People have a vital need for meaning when they try to protect. We are again led to a concept of sustainable development for the satisfaction of human needs that also protects the planet for its own sake. The Gaia hypothesis has shown its value not only as a working hypothesis, but also as a way for people within cultures imbued with Western science to experience the Earth as something living, as alive in a broad sense.

Rights and Vital Needs

Point 3 of the deep ecology platform, that human beings have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of life on Earth except to satisfy vital human needs, engenders controversy about the terms *rights* and *needs*. Philosophers who are dubious about the notion of "right" propose the phrase "human beings should not" instead of "human beings do not have the right to." However, the postulation of certain "human rights" has a positive influence today. As long as the term is used in this connection, it might also be used to refer to nonhuman beings. Some say that human beings can have rights because they have obligations but that animals, having no obligations, have no rights. Such a limitation of the meaning of *rights* is not found in our everyday language, however, as when we speak of the rights of lunatics or the rights of small children.

Indeed, formal "declarations of rights of animals" are being codified. A Norwegian version was signed by thousands of people. A pilot study of answers to questions about whether animals and plants have rights revealed a great majority of positive views (Naess 1987 [chapter 18 of this volume]). Not included in the Eight Points, but quite expressive of opinions among supporters of the deep ecology movement, is the following formulation: "Every living being has the right to live and flourish."

Strictly speaking, however, acceptance of point 3 does not depend on the acceptance of the existence of rights of human beings and nonhuman beings. If a mother says to her son, "You have no right to prevent your little sister from eating all her birthday cake," this does not imply any doctrine of rights of sisters to eat. There is an important everyday usage of the expression "no right to" that has to do with injustice and related phenomena, and the same holds of "no right to" in the formulation of point 3.

In the area of needs, point 3 is not meant to imply that there should be no extravagance. It does not, for example, condemn the extraordinary richness of occasional feasts within nonindustrial cultures. Nor does it necessarily imply that the few people for whom producing a lot of children is a deep and intense joy should be discouraged. When there is already a vast population of human beings, however, an increase has detrimental consequences for both human beings and nonhuman beings.

The intention of using the strong term *vital need* is to announce a limit

of justifiable interference. Not every demand on the market proves that there is a corresponding need. Hundreds of millions of people have unsatisfied vital needs of the most pressing kinds; hundreds of millions of others are wasting the resources of the planet for purposes generally considered trifling and unworthy (although more or less unavoidable as things are). The gigantic gross national products of the rich industrialized states are a measure of pollution and waste, with doubtful gains for human life quality. As early as the 1960s, GNP was being dubbed the Gross National Pollution. Unfortunately, an increase in GNP does not guarantee an increase in the satisfaction of vital needs, a fact painfully obvious in poor countries where increases so far have had little effect on the desperately poor.

Where to draw the limit between vital and nonvital is a question that must be related to local, regional, and national particularities. Even then, a certain area of disagreement must be taken as normal.

The Population Factor

What is the carrying capacity of the Earth? This question has often been raised within a narrow frame of reference, with certain premises attached.

- Premise 1: Nature has no intrinsic value, so we need not have any animals or plants other than those that science or tradition tells us are useful for human beings. Carrying capacity therefore refers to carrying capacity for human beings, not carrying capacity for human and nonhuman beings.
- Premise 2: If there is a conflict between the human urge for space for more human settlements and the urge of other species for more territory, human beings have a priority and may even reduce the habitats of other life-forms.

Generally, it has also been taken for granted, with some justification, that new technologies will be discovered that will make increases of population manageable—for example, that there will be new “green (red, blue) revolutions” relying heavily on chemicals and on a transition from small-scale family agriculture to agribusiness.

Today, the old debate on “carrying capacity” seems rather odd. Now at stake are the freedom, richness, and diversity of life on this planet, includ-

ing the life quality and cultural diversity of human beings. Accordingly, for an increasing number of people, these two goals of life quality and cultural diversity are not in conflict.

Point 4 of the deep ecology platform contains two rather different propositions. The first, the positive effect of population decrease, is arguable from human history. The history of humanity is of a vast diversity of cultures with rather modest populations. Contemporary destruction of cultures does not proceed because of lack of human beings. Admittedly, this point is rather abstract, but it allows for an important long-range, global perspective: the goal of a human population small enough to avoid gigantic bureaucracies and insufferable crowding, with easy access to free nature and spacious room for every activity consistent with "Live and let live."

What the first proposition of point 4 does not mention is the transition period—how to go from, let us say, 8,000 million to substantially fewer people than there are today. Perhaps a transition period of a thousand years is needed, or perhaps much less. In any case, the long perspective is liberating for our minds and of practical importance for long-range planning of cities and areas of free nature. Furthermore, the prospect of a period with comparatively few small children should stimulate us to think how to make it possible for all child-loving adults to enjoy throughout their lives the company and care of small children. The dominance of the nuclear-family concept in rich countries largely excludes this.

The presentation of a vision of a stabilization-reduction-stabilization process rarely meets objections among deep ecology supporters, but it cannot be said to be a favorite theme. More old people and fewer children—this is an unpalatable thought! Moreover, how are people to be persuaded to limit child production? Cruelty and injustice must by all means be avoided.

Against the second proposition of point 4—that maintaining (and I am tempted to add, restoring) the richness and diversity of life on Earth require a significantly smaller population than 5,000 million—it may be posited that if ecologically responsible policies were substituted for the present nonresponsible ones, human interference would no longer be a problem, and therefore ecologically responsible policies rather than population decrease should be the focus. It seems to me, though, that this

process may prove to have as many obstacles as the reduction of the population. Very large populations create very large problems of freedom and organization. Centralization, giantism, and reduction of cultural diversity seem unavoidable features of life with a population of 5,000 million.

Plans for sustainable development often neglect the population issue. For example, this neglect compromises the adequacy of the Brundtland Report (United Nations 1987). The subject is a touchy one. Several assumptions and attitudes make responsible and energetic population policy difficult:

1. It is unreasonably assumed that because a humane and otherwise acceptable population reduction will take a long time, perhaps many centuries, it is unimportant to discuss or prepare for it.
2. As long as rich nations, which account for a large part of the degradation of life conditions on Earth, try to uphold their present population, they will have little credibility when they try to push poor nations toward rapid stabilization.
3. It is unreasonably presumed that the economy, and therefore the life quality, of rich nations will necessarily be adversely affected, at least in the period of transition to a lower population.
4. Global competition for power and military strength are considered inevitable and are thought to favor big populations.
5. It is unreasonably assumed that successful population reduction policies must make it difficult for people who deeply love children (for their own sake) to have four or more of them.

A good meal in the rich countries may require, directly and indirectly, about forty times as much energy as a first-rate dinner in a Third World country. This means that, for example, in Norway, with about 4.5 million people, the energy consumed when eating compares to that used by 160 million in a sustainable-energy economy. Cleaning operations in a rich country, because of the chemicals used, may result in eighty times as much pollution. Planetary stress would be more significantly reduced with one million fewer Norwegians than with one million fewer people in Calcutta.

A simple conclusion is that sustainable development of populations is a subject of importance in every country, and the greatest responsibility

rests with the richest. We must expect an increase of population during most of the twenty-first century. Subsequent reduction must be part of the scenario of sustainable future development. Policies based on expectations of great Earth-saving technological revolutions are irresponsible.

From points 1–5 of the platform it follows that those who support the deep ecology movement envisage not only deep political, social, and economic changes but also changes in personal lifestyle (point 6 of the platform). This decrease is inevitable if one follows the rule of universalizability: one cannot favor a standard-of-living level for oneself that depends on others not reaching that level.

The term *standard of living* is preferred to *material standard of living* because the latter suggests “spiritual standard of living” as the opposite. Although there need not necessarily be a shift toward spirituality when people attain a higher life quality combined with a stable or lower standard of living, the members of a community with good, intimate interpersonal relations may find that they use more time together in a relaxed way instead of “going shopping.” As Mother Teresa said privately when receiving the Nobel Prize: “It is not we but you who are poor.” We, the rich, are poor in deep satisfactions requiring simple means, the means being material, or spiritual, or perhaps beyond those somewhat arbitrary distinctions.

Sustainable Development, Cultural Diversity, and Social Justice

Any general view inspired by ecology includes reverence for the richness and diversity of human cultures and subcultures. Reverence for life implies it.

Traditional societies before the great cultural shock of the modern industrial era were always changing, but very slowly. The tremendous speed of change resulting from the influence of dominating industrial states has severely damaged cultural identity, self-reliance, and even self-respect in many cultures. The introduction of life-saving medicines and life-destroying weapons produced in the industrial countries has severely undercut the status of traditional leadership. Development tends to be conceived by the new leaders as a matter of increase in industrial activity and consumption.

The uncritical imitation of Western ways by Third World leaders now appears to be on the decrease. A growing trend is to look for the assistance

of traditional medicines, traditional ways of stabilizing population, traditional ecological insights, and in general to support customs that still have some authority and that clearly favor sustainable development, including sustainable cultural identity and a population proportional to resources.

Modern cultural and anthropological studies show that peoples of great material poverty nonetheless have maintained extremely rich cultural traditions. For example, the Sherpa village of Beding (Peding), 3,700 meters above sea level in Nepal, had only about 150 people in the 1970s. Statistics show that they were among the world's poorest. Nevertheless, their monastery was beautiful and well kept by their numerous monks and nuns. Much work had an artistic or religious significance. Feasts were sometimes of overwhelming richness and might go on for a week, starting before sunrise with music performed by the monks in honor of their great mountain Tseringma (Gauri Shankar, 7,149 meters high). Asked whether they would prefer the money from foreign expeditions to their unclimbed mountain, or the mountain preserved as it was, all forty-seven families cast their votes for protection. The central government of Nepal and the world's mountaineering associations, however, had no sympathy for such a strange idea: protection of a *mountain*? The government thought of "progress," the mountaineers of "conquests," and in the end the cultural needs of the community did not count (Naess 1979a: 13–16 [see chapter 35 in this volume]).

In the 1960s, a new generation of students of social and cultural anthropology and a number of critical researchers described nonindustrial cultures in such a way as to indicate that rich industrial societies had as much to learn from the nonindustrial as the other way around. Increased respect for nonindustrial cultures made itself felt at about the same time as the sudden internationalization of the ecology movement with nature as its focus. Aspects of culture were reexamined. While some anthropologists described Stone Age tribes so as to convey the message that their essential life quality could not be lower, others recognized that within these cultures some fundamental aspects of life quality were at a high level—such as economic security, absence of stressful work, and lots of time for meaningful togetherness bridging the generations (see, e.g., Sahlins 1972).

Among the many aspects of nonindustrial cultures that attracted attention were their relations to nature. Their relation to resources were mostly sustainable. One obvious reason was that moderate population and

adequate distance between tribes permitted sustainable development. The former view that traditional societies did not develop but were completely inert has been rejected as the result of an explosive increase of knowledge about the history of nonindustrial cultures.

Sustainable development today means development along the lines of each culture, not development along a common, centralized line. When we are faced with hungry children, however, humanitarian action is a priority whatever its relation to developmental plans and cultural invasion.

As has already been shown, ecology has a social justice side. The degree to which the life conditions of the planet are degraded per capita is highly dependent upon the social lifestyle of the individual. The lifestyle depends upon class, upon social stratification, and upon social services and protection received. The great future effort to reduce per capita degradation of conditions of life on Earth will demand discipline and changes of life habits. Moral resentment will attain dangerous intensities if there are not increases in levels of social justice at local, group, national, and international levels. If their lifestyle does not change, the rich power elites in poor countries will be judged to be ecological and ethical misfits. Violent reactions must be expected.

A world conservation strategy implies an acceptance of sustainable development. Such development is—or should be—explicit in the programs of green parties and the visions of green societies. The main relation between the deep ecology movement and the ideals of green societies is simple: the establishment of a green society *presupposes* the implementation of the necessary changes suggested in the deep ecology platform formulation. This declaration remains, however, on a rather abstract conceptual level. If it is posited as a goal that all human societies should be green, it is pertinent to ask, What about deep cultural and subcultural diversity? The blueprints of green societies have so far been the work of industrial Westerners, a rather specialized fragment of humanity. It is to be hoped, but it cannot be taken as a certainty, that development consistent with the guidelines of deep ecology movements admits and even encourages such a manifold.

From the very beginning, the international deep ecology movement has been nonviolent to a high degree, and general Gandhian viewpoints have been common among its supporters. The arms race, with all its grave consequences, is incompatible with a high level of sustainable develop-

ment. This has consequences not only for the programs of green parties, but for all realistic sustainable development plans.²

The broadness and deepness of sustainability guidelines demand a global perspective. The rich countries are now rightly expected to see themselves as developing. Their current lack of sustainability is grave, and the challenge is formidable. For the poor countries, the outlook is different. They may avoid the one-sided industrial phase with its consumerism and enter a green postindustrial stage at a higher level of sustainability. For both rich and poor, the obstacles are formidable, and all sorts of conflicts, including wars, may occur along the road. Nevertheless, long-range global sustainability as a central concern may also bring societies together in a more peaceful and joyful endeavor than ever before.

Today there are few or no communities, societies, or cultures that show clear long-range sustainability, which I define as long-range ecological sustainability combined with a satisfactory life quality. A development or general pattern of change within and among communities, societies, or cultures is ecologically sustainable if it is compatible with restoring and maintaining the richness and diversity of planetary life (in the broadest sense). What is "satisfactory"? We scarcely need to quarrel about it as long as we agree that hundreds of millions of children live at an unsatisfactory level.

Present or future research will not be able to point unambiguously to any one particular way to begin such a development. In practice, we shall have to fight obviously unsustainable kinds of development for a long time while implementing changes that lead toward sustainable development. The industrial countries will be developing countries during this phase, but unsustainable to a diminishing degree. Yet, from the point of view of the deep ecology movement, the victory of the notion of "sustainable development" over the postwar notion of "economic development" or "economic growth" and the simplistic "development" is itself the sign of an awakening from ecological slumber and should be greeted with joy and expectation.

Industrial Society, Postmodernity, and Ecological Sustainability

The Human Condition

It is a trait that belongs to human beings, and only human beings as far as we know, to try to make a kind of survey of their existence, to sort out what is of primary value and what they regard more or less with indifference; what they basically need and what are just whimsical wishes.

On their way to decreasing their own whimsicality and thoughtlessness, people in industrial societies like to learn about the problems that other people in other kinds of cultures have grappled with. This leads inevitably to rather broad and general talk, not just “small narratives”—a much-cherished term in deconstructive postmodernist literature. It leads to investigations that are immense in their breadth of perspective and to results that are always open to doubt and correction.

What follows reflects some thoughts by two sorts of human beings, those who for many years lived in a nonindustrial country and those who have spent many years together with tiny living creatures in grand mountains. Both are, in a sense, products of modern Western industrial societies—but not mere products. Because the reflections cover a vast terrain, they lack the elaboration and concreteness that we need in our attempts to understand and modify our behavior in concrete situations.

Comparing nonindustrial with industrial societies, including the fate of local communities, one sees that many of the nonindustrialized societies have shown a continuity and strength that the industrialized societies can-

This article was reprinted with permission from *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* (Arcata, CA: Humboldt State University) 21 (1995): 131–46.

not hope to achieve, because industrial societies are unsustainable ecologically. Industrialized societies also seem unable to stop ethical erosion and increased criminality, including among the eight to sixteen age group.

Surveying the situation today, one sees also that the attraction of the industrial societies' *material* richness and technical acumen is overwhelming among the young people in nonindustrial societies. This situation is tragic for at least two reasons. First, it would be ecologically catastrophic to have five billion people behaving as people in the industrial societies behave. Second, it is unrealistic to expect that substantial increases in material affluence can be reached in nonindustrial societies without unacceptable levels of criminality and the erosion of feelings of fellowship and mutual dependence.

Using the term *modern* to relate to the emergence of the culture of the industrial countries, one may still hope that today's nonindustrial societies will make *a development from premodern to postmodern* cultures. The development of the industrial societies has brought humanity into a blind alley. The postmodern state of affairs implies satisfaction of the vital economic needs of the total population, but not affluence. The key slogan would be "Enough is enough." When vital economic needs are satisfied, there is *enough* in terms of material richness. Of course, there are other forms of richness—in principle, limitless richness.

The near future of the industrial countries, let us say the period 1995–2045, should emphasize reducing the use of energy, and of material production, until a level is reached that might be reached by the total human population without the danger of gigantic catastrophes. The next step would be to reach *full* ecological sustainability.

In the years after the Second World War, a mighty slogan asked for a vast increase (mostly material) in production. When production and productivity in the richest countries soared as never before, a new powerful slogan appeared: "Consume! Consume!" because of overproduction. Today, this reason is replaced by an appeal to consume in order to overcome unemployment. The notorious appeal of the retail analyst Victor Lebow promoted consumption to relieve overproduction, but otherwise it provides an amusing picture of the strange sort of economy prevalent in the highly industrialized countries. Lebow asserted, "Our enormously productive economy . . . demands that we make consumption our way of life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual satisfaction, our ego satisfaction, in consumption . . . we need things con-

sumed, burnt up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever increasing rate" (Durning 1991).

The contribution to the ecological crisis by a minority of half a billion people has been such that an acceptable level of interference in the ecosystems by ten times as many people must be very much smaller per half billion. In the near future, "the total unecological product" created yearly by the industrial countries should be of an order such that multiplied by ten it would not point toward gigantic catastrophes. If we call the per capita sum total of unecological consequences by production for a given community or country ΣP_u and that of consumption ΣC_u and the number of people in the community or country N , the total unecological consequences of policies ΣU may be put into a form looking like an equation:

$$\Sigma U = (\Sigma P_u + \Sigma C_u) \times N$$

The sum U may represent a local community, a region, a country, or that of humanity in general.

For industrial societies, their ΣU_1 should not be greater than 10 percent of the total ΣU_T . Without substantial progress toward that goal occurring each year in the industrial societies, this will be difficult to accomplish (see Daily and Ehrlich 1992).

As a firm supporter of the deep ecology movement, I hold that a decrease in consumption and a slow decrease in population will *not* necessarily result in a decrease in quality of life. There will be a transition period during which some people living according to the slogan "Enough is never enough" will have difficulties, but provided the downscaling is effectuated with a strong sense of justice, major uprisings may not occur.

It is an indication of narrow time perspective when people reject the idea of a slow decrease in population because there will be too many old, unproductive people compared to younger, productive ones. The undesired ratio will make itself felt only for a short transition period, and the perspective we need covers hundreds of years.

Disrespect of One's Own Nonindustrial Cultures

Since the Second World War, the general disrespect *in the West* of nonindustrial cultures has changed into a deep and serious respect among an increas-

ing minority. In the same period, disrespect in the nonindustrial cultures of *their* own culture seems to have increased formidably, especially among the young. Among the factors contributing to this are an equally formidable increase in tourism and smart sales campaigns.

Depreciation is often expressed in front of representatives of the West. In Beding and other Sherpa communities of Garwal Himalaya, monks had libraries of old Tibetan scripts, for example, prayers directed to Tseringma ("the long good life's mother"), a formidable 7,146-meter-high peak directly above the village. The villagers in the 1950s and 1960s showed reluctance to admit that they had such things. People hid such documents as shameful signs of backwardness. They were ashamed of their tradition of a cult of holy mountains going back many hundreds (or thousands?) of years. Their daily prayers to the mountain were beautifully written down and, until this century, regarded as treasures. How were scholars able to obtain such old documents? By buying them? No—by living among the families and showing *respect*. Then they could get the old scrolls as gifts. Otherwise, the scrolls might be destroyed.

Depreciation of one's own local or regional culture may be a worldwide phenomenon among young people, but nothing known in human history can be compared to what is happening in our time. Traditional cultures everywhere are under severe pressure—mostly with fatal results.

Disrespect of one's own culture includes disrespect of the land. In the Beding area and other Sherpa areas of Nepal, the forest was respected and no living trees were cut down for fuel. Each tree was looked upon as something that had its own life, its own interest, its own dignity. With the breakdown of customs, this deep ecology attitude vanished. The enormous mountaineering expeditions increased the mobility of the Sherpas who were hired in the thousands to carry water—and often to heat it using wood—for daily hot showers for the sahibs. These practices generated completely different attitudes toward mountains and forests: disrespect of holiness, purely instrumental attitudes toward "timber," "wood," and "fuel." Deforestation above 9,000 feet began in earnest. Without trees as cover, erosion started on a grand scale. Now practically nothing is left. Nepal became an "export country": exporting hundreds of millions of tons of soil to India. The rivers brought much of the soil to the giant Indian dams built largely through misguided efforts at "development," filling them with silt.

With no cultural restraints and little Western scientific knowledge, the destruction of Nepal gradually reached gigantic proportions. Immigration from the countryside to the city of Kathmandu accelerated. The young were not willing to walk all day for fuel. They would rather live without dignity in Kathmandu.

A young, exceptionally gifted Sherpa who had been with many expeditions got the opportunity to start a sports shop in Canada, but he returned to his own country after a while. He expressed in a few words his reason for going back: "Here we enjoy peace with ourselves." So many of the people he met on expeditions, and in Canada evidently, had no peace within themselves. They wished to be different from what they were; they worked hard to develop, achieve, succeed, and be better. They could not let time flow. Unfortunately, very few young people have the necessary faculty of *independent* judgment, nor do they have the opportunity to compare Western quality of life with their own in their "poor" countries. I am not referring here to the half billion people in nonindustrial countries who are desperately poor, who lack the most basic means to live a decent life.

Western Belief That We Project Personal Traits into Natural Objects

In traditional, nonindustrial societies we find more and stronger "personification" of natural forces and nonhuman living beings. The tendency to personify is often said to be "archaic," meaning that it precedes the great religions and cultures. The term *anthropomorphism* is often used in a pejorative sense for the erroneous attribution of specifically human traits to entities that are not human, or not even capable of sense experience. Before starting to drink beer together, the Sherpas threw a little beer in the direction of Tseringma—beer for *ber*.

If a big mountain precipice may be spontaneously experienced as dark and evil, it *is*, in an important sense, dark and evil. If this experience motivates us in the West to throw a stone at the mountain as a punishment for being evil, we have succumbed to a mistake. In a nonindustrial culture throwing beer or a stone is meaningful—or was meaningful—but not within *our* conceptual framework.

Animals, plants, and some nonliving things may be experienced as evil

or good. They may be experienced as arrogant, proud, insolent, self-dominating or humble, sheepish, crestfallen, and so on. Education in industrial countries is strongly centered on a subject/object cleavage: some traits of animals are real and objective attributes, others are said to be *projected* onto the animals. They are merely subjective.

In practical life, application of the distinction is a plus, but it downplays spontaneous experience with its richness, intensity, and depth. It favors thinking in terms of abstract relations and structures of reality, not in terms of content. When we depart and decide to meet again on a mountain, the mountain must be defined in terms of our society and culture, defined as an *object* we have *in common*. This, however, does not identify the mountain as an object "in itself."

Our vast abstractions are momentous cultural achievements specific to Western culture. Contemporary mathematical physics is an example. Here the link to spontaneous experience is extremely indirect and spotty, but strong because of the high level of mathematical deduction. Because of its severe limitation of modeling abstract structure, it expresses an intercultural type of knowledge, that is, intercultural if one does not rely on popularization but sticks to the severe mathematical form of what is asserted. In that case, the cultural background disappears! The equations are intercultural, but any *interpretations* in terms we are acquainted with in our daily life depend on specific cultures. Communication among experts is compatible with deep cultural differences among the participants.

There is no physical *world* with specifically physical *content*. There is a reality, the content of which we have direct contact with only through and in our spontaneous experiences. It is a reality of infinite richness.

No dichotomies of fundamental character seem adequate to describe it. Distinctions between physical and mental "worlds," or between subjective and objective worlds, are not adequate for describing reality. The philosophical reaction against taking the latter distinction as fundamental has increased in strength since the 1890s. Should we, mused A. N. Whitehead, stop admiring the beauty of a rose and instead admire the poet who admirably sings about it? Would not that be reasonable if the rose *in itself* is neither beautiful nor ugly? Is there "objectivity" only in electrons and similar colorless items? The beauty of the rose itself is spontaneously experienced and is as real as anything can be.

Western Schools and European Unity

The school systems of the industrial states are all adapted to the common, very special way of life in those states. Unawareness of this makes difficult reforms that would widen the perspective: schools remain provincial.

A main concern in schools that try out less one-sided perspectives is for the future of the children: how will they get jobs when their knowledge does not fit in with the established order? If the parents are economically rich, they can help the young get along in the unique and strange world of the industrial-growth societies in spite of their “far out” schooling—but otherwise the young tend to get into trouble. Therefore, educators often give up the most radical sorts of reforms.

Let us look at some of the curricula children now have to learn, starting with mathematics. Mathematical instruction today is completely Westernized and utilitarian, and it reflects the typical Western emphasis on proof. There is no trace of Chinese or Indian old mathematical culture. Little is taught about bold mathematical conjectures such as those in number theory; little is taught about endless fractions and orders of the infinite. With more adequate education in mathematics, children are encouraged to love the subject and tend to continue to relish it after leaving school. Mathematics is an ecologically very innocent hobby! Masses of excellent paper are wasted every day in schools, but some could be used to build geometrically interesting buildings.

Proper mathematics should, of course, not lack instruction about the existence of proofs and, in later years, of axiomatic or formal systems in general—but only basic notions, “axiomatic thinking,” not complicated applications. Perhaps three or four different proofs of the Pythagorean Theorem and a couple of other simple proofs would suffice to help students understand the miracle of proofs and—later—allow them grasp the *essentials* of deductive systems.

What about chemistry? Children love to play with (more or less) innocent chemicals. Let them see miracles, such as how two “colorless” liquids, brought together, may create fantastic colors! In organic chemistry they may learn about the long series, like CH_4 , C_2H_5 , C_3H_8 , . . . , and enjoy building molecules. Isomers of C_4H_{10} ! Very inexpensive and elegant colored tools are available today. They may learn about colors used by Rem-

brandt and others. Children appreciate crystals, and with a magnifying glass they may enjoy learning about some of the most beautiful forms. They can combine this with some mineralogy and petrology: the joy of finding stones, learning to enjoy natural things of which there are enough for all. At the university level, there should be an opportunity to go deeply into modern, theoretical "hard" chemistry.

Let me now mention history. A main guideline is to focus on the local (bioregional) and the global, with less emphasis on the national. There should be more about interlocal movements, less about internationalism, more emphasis on cultural diversity and on the Fourth World.

The distinction between "global" and "international" is important for many reasons. One of them is that few nations have much power, while the great global corporations have more than most nations, shaping economic life everywhere.

It has now been more than half a century since the school textbooks of the Scandinavian countries were "adjusted" to be compatible with one another. Until then, a war between them was, as a matter of habit, described systematically, with each participant reporting and ethically judging what happened according to that participant's own extremely one-sided propaganda.

There is no hope of establishing peaceful, green societies as long as conflicts are described in a way that fosters prejudice and hatred. Equally pernicious is the underestimation of social and political calamities attributable to the destruction of one's own land. The tentative *history* of ecological calamities is now available, and the material should be integrated into school textbooks (Ponting 1992).

Until recently "world history" for children—at least in Europe—has been atrociously anthropocentric. History of the planet, and history of life, should be in focus, as part of the global perspective. History of bioregions takes care of the local perspective.

Social and cultural anthropology cannot be completely absorbed into textbooks of history, but there is room for some material on these subjects. The outlook of economic anthropology is relevant: children should know that the economic system they are part of in the West is an extremely special kind. In the long view, general cultural and, especially, religious institutions have been stronger in comparison to the economic. In the industrial

countries the history of capitalism since the fifteenth century tells us a lot about our successes and our failures.

Here is not the place to go through the curriculum of schools and colleges. Wide differences of approach are needed, but the state of affairs today is deplorable: pupils aged six to sixteen (what I call children herein) in the rich industrial societies are, on the whole, imbued with ways of thinking adapted to a kind of society that hopefully will disappear in their own lifetime. As has always been the case, though, schools mirror society, and the transition to green societies must occur simultaneously at many sections of the long frontier of change.

When our children and grandchildren learn history in the schools of the twenty-first century, they may be confronted with sentences like the following: "The productivity of industry and agriculture increased exponentially in the richest industrial countries in the last half of the twentieth century. A wild consumerism not only threatened the conditions of life on our planet but was accompanied by an impoverishment of relations between people, a degradation of fellowship, and an increase of asocial attitudes. (New phenomenon: criminal careers for children between eight and sixteen years of age.) The economy of a country was not expected to adapt to its culture, but the culture to the economy."

People in the Third World do not seem to realize that the consumerism of the West is doomed. They do not have the chance to see that there is no future for the kind of life they observe the tourists living. Here is one of the great challenges in the years to come. What can be done to change the picture those people have of our common future? What can be done to assist a transition from the preindustrial to the postindustrial?

A combined focus on the local and the global is impossible under conditions of *economic* globalization, as the latter term is now used. "Economic globalization" is to some extent misleading. A better term might be "globalization of the four freedoms," referring to the so-called four freedoms of the Treaty of Rome, which was the basis for the European Common Market and *is still* at the core of the present-day European Union. The document's style of globalization implies successive expansion of its "four freedoms" until it also covers trade among the three giants, the European Union, the United States (and Canada), and Japan, and reluctantly over the rest of the globe. The term *four freedoms* refers to free (duty-free) crossing of goods and

materials through borders, free flow of services, freedom to compete for jobs anywhere (people), and freedom of capital to flow across any borders. The four freedoms *imply four prohibitions*, the violation of which will be punished by the authorities, namely strong, adequate *protection* for social, medical, ecological, or other reasons of cultural relevance, against import of certain goods or services, or against certain kinds of flow of foreign capital into a local, regional, or any other limited area, for example, the arctic coast of Norway.

Representatives of the EU tempt politicians and the public in the four new countries that now (1994) have expressed a wish to join by emphasizing transition periods with less-strict negative rules. In the long run, though, the overall tendency is to prepare for tighter and tighter economic unions—like that of the United States of America. The outlook is a world of *consumers* getting more products more cheaply than ever before through wider mobility. The only diversity of cultures here is one compatible with the supreme rules of a free world market!

Norway is the only Nordic country with family farms, and there is a definite agriculture, not just agribusiness. To protect this culture, and also to make it economically possible for its practitioners to survive, Norway “subsidizes” her agriculture. That is, there is a *transfer of income* so that the farmers can offer the public their products at low prices, prices that are not high enough to cover farm expenses. In an important sense, it is not the farmer, but the public that is subsidized, and also protected against further increases of urbanized youth. The public has to pay more for milk, bread, and other agricultural commodities than it would on the *world market*. We are asked to destroy the farm culture in favor of city culture.

The Norwegian market today is not completely a part of the cheap world market. Nevertheless, what Norwegians pay for their food is absurdly little, usually about 15 percent of their average income. That is, expenses for transport (private car, etc.) and other expenses are much greater. We must expect that in future green societies food calculated as a percentage of income will cost us substantially more than it does today. One may say, in general, that the cost today to satisfy vital *needs* is, on the average, only a small fraction of the cost of satisfying *wants*—or to be more exact, a small fraction of the cost of satisfying wants that are “normal” in the rich

industrial countries. The economy of Norway is capitalist, but closer to a mixed economy than that of, say, the United States.

One may, very roughly, class as a mixed economy an economic system with a free market within a framework that permits fairly strong rules governing the operation of the market. Such rules make Norway, for example, capable of protecting certain activities—agricultural, industrial, or others—from foreign competition and, ultimately, from the world market. The government has recently said yes to GATT, and this turns Norway into a more streamlined capitalist country, distancing herself from the ideals of a mixed economy. (Unhappily, the term *mixed economy* is sometimes used for any capitalist system having one or more rules protecting the environment. This makes the United States and every other industrial state mixed-economy countries. It is hoped that this erosion of the terminology will not continue.)

What is the current status of efforts to promote *green* economies in relation to all this? If a country can sell products more cheaply than certain others because it has a higher degree of irresponsible ecological policy, the four freedoms prevent the more responsible countries from keeping the products out. Consumers cannot be expected to keep track of the ecological atrocities in other countries. It is therefore unlikely that a green economy, at least in the near future, will suddenly be established in a single country. In the short run, countries with the most irresponsible policies will profit from export, but in the long run, other states will presumably introduce economic sanctions in favor of their own exports.

From the point of view of the Treaty of Rome, the individuality, or “personality,” of local economic activity cannot be ideal because of the lack of fierce competition and the failure to emphasize maximization of profits. The machinery of economic activity as conceived by supporters of the Treaty of Rome is taken to be universalizable, common to all possible cultures. That is, the introduction may always take place, and it will change the culture. This way of describing the treaty is, however, too simple for serious debate. Minor differences in an economic system may be tolerated, even supported—for example, because a difference favors tourism or because it belongs to simple cultural traits of which the population is particularly proud.

At the moment, applicants for membership in the European Union

will, as mentioned, be permitted to continue *for a time* particular activities inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome. The time is mostly longer than the interval between political elections. This makes it easier for particular governments to join the EU because many negative and controversial consequences of membership will not manifest themselves until after the government's time in power.

In concluding, I wish to admit that centralization of power today is furthered by more benevolent people than ever before—people and institutions interested in fostering more trade, in letting people consume and travel more than ever.

Until recently, it was widely held that capitalist competition leads to war. Today it may lead instead to systems of tacit and explicit agreement between corporations in order to keep this system from failing. In Japan and the United States, it is now widely held that wars of trade between the two giants are not, in the long run, in the interest of industry. It would be better, it is said, for both to have a free market comprising Japan, the United States, and Europe, but with mutual agreements between leaders of the corporations aimed at avoiding undesirable kinds of competition. We might end up with a culture, including education, that is adapted to the world market rather than the other way around.

Because of the central idea of “the more trade the better,” combined with a vastly increased mobility of people and goods, ecological problems can only increase.

Our Way Is Back to Sustainability, Not to Old Forms of Society

It is tempting to see “us”—members of the rich industrial countries—as “moderns,” more or less disregarding nine-tenths of humanity. They also live today, they belong to the contemporary scene but are considered relics of the past.

As to the exact delimitation of modernity in terms of age, one proposal is to think of the time from the European Renaissance to the present; another proposal is to include only the period from the start of the Industrial Revolution, covering about two centuries at least. Not without some arrogance, many of us now look forward to the creation of “postindustrial” societies.

The reflections that follow are colored by personal experiences. They result from an urge to examine industrial society in the light of values established in nonindustrial, "traditional" societies, and in light of life ways that are, ecologically, fully sustainable.¹ Such has been the life of human beings for long periods of time. Alaska was inhabited for thousands of years by people with ecologically sustainable, diverse cultures. In Norway, people followed the retreat of the ice 8,000 years ago. As soon as reindeer could prosper, human beings prospered.

Ecological sustainability was only one characteristic of traditional societies, and it did to some extent reflect the small numbers of people. Many of those societies we would class as ecologically unsustainable if they had had millions of members. The reindeer-based, very loose societies were dependent to some extent upon the ratio between the number of reindeer and the number of human beings.

Of course, there is "no way back" in general, but it is important to remember that global unsustainability is something very new and that for a wide variety of stable cultures our planet was a tremendously big, rich, eminently hospitable and benign world. Difficulties had to arise only when human beings were pressed away by other human beings from the areas where life was easiest, or at least not a greater challenge than desired.

It is to be hoped that an ever-increasing minority will view unsustainability as an undignified, stupid—if not plainly ridiculous—state of affairs. It is also hoped that an increasing minority will express this attitude with increasing boldness—but without arrogance, since few activists can avoid making use of the facilities offered in the industrial societies.

In short, there is no way back to societies that belong to the past, but there is a way back to ecological sustainability. In fact, there is not just one way but many ways resulting in widely different sustainable cultures. Valuable contributions to the study of these ways are not lacking, but they are, on the whole, unknown to the public. Unavoidably, large segments of the public have the feeling that "environmentalists" want to turn back time. When some of them announce "Back to the Pleistocene!" that suspicion is well founded. The indication of ways to go does not, of course, amount to elaborate plans and blueprints. Such absence of detail has been the rule, not the exception, in all new major human undertakings. It has never stopped those who have the proper motivation to work for change.

There are not only rough plans of how to solve some of the most serious ecological problems; there are even tentative—very tentative—estimates of the costs in money and labor. A dollar estimate was published in *State of the World*, 1988 (see Brown and Wolf 1988). An updated 1994 rough estimate could be—let us say—\$250 billion annually. Here I shall only mention some theoretical aspects of such an estimate.

Owing to the current lack of institutional infrastructure necessary to use such a large sum rationally, the \$250 billion per year expenditure may not be reached until ten years from now, that is, from 2005 onward. The sum, both in money *and in work*, would be paid almost entirely by the rich countries. The vast activity *within* the rich countries *in preparation for* the undertaking would demand workers in great numbers with a great variety of skills. Given present levels of unemployment, there is no doubt that the necessary number could not be mobilized. Production, in the wide sense of theoretical economics, would increase. It would be registered as increased gross domestic product (GDP).

Carrying through the undertaking, mostly inside nonindustrial countries by people in those countries, but in close cooperation with people from the industrial countries, would be accomplished only through substantial mobilization of people and capital. As an example, consider reforestation. Today, several hundred million people lack fuel for cooking their food or cleaning their drinking water—the distance to the nearest wood is simply too far. Under such circumstances, planted trees are normally used for fuel as soon as they reach the size of bushes. Therefore, the people must be offered other kinds of fuel for at least twenty years. Even then, a great number of honest people must act as protectors of the growing plants. In short, reforestation is a *socially* complex, labor-intensive undertaking, and the economics of both the industrial and nonindustrial countries would be highly stimulated.

Inevitably the consumption, not the production, of the rich countries would decrease. The increased consumption would be in the nonindustrial countries and would not interfere with the increase of GDP in rich countries. GDP is *not* a measure of domestic consumption, as is often thought to be the case. If Norway produces a thousand tiny hydroelectric plants for use in poor countries, it decreases its unemployment and reduces poverty among others.

Global reforestation will not, of course, mean complete reforestation, but reforestation insofar as it both ensures ecological sustainability and meets the vital needs of the people. As already mentioned, however, not much could be done in the next few years even if money and a work force were available. It is not like mobilizing in times of war in a country where military institutions have been prepared well in advance. Large-scale rational and ethically responsible reforestation is a new sort of undertaking that requires highly educated, corruption-resistant people. It will take a long time. One generation? Three generations? Nobody knows. There is, however, no "point of no return." Compared to the investment of life, work, and money in a great war, the investment needed to overcome the ecological crisis is very small. Moreover, the work of a determined minority could get the work started in earnest.

An Outline of the Problems Ahead

Introduction

After sixty years' participation in international conferences, most of which have been rather unsuccessful, it astonishes me that I feel that this one will make a difference. One reason I feel this way, I guess, is because of the great areas of agreement among us.

One of the remarkable agreements seems to be that it makes sense to speak of unfair or unjust policies in relation to nonhuman beings. There are also many other areas in which agreements or near-agreements were small twenty or thirty years ago.

From the point of view of the methodology of conferences, there is an important consequence: we face an overwhelming danger of preaching to the converted. It is essential, being close together here, to get clear about our disagreements. We shall then have a better chance of standing together in the ugly social and political conflicts ahead. We shall know better to what extent we can firmly rely on each other in those conflicts.

Environment and Development

First, I wish to consider some terminological and conceptual recommendations.

This article was presented as the opening keynote address at the Conference on Environmental Justice and Global Ethics for the Twenty-first Century, October 1–3, 1997, Melbourne, Australia. It was reprinted with permission from *Global Ethics and the Environment*, edited by Nicholas Low (New York and London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 1999), 16–29.

Some conflicts are called conflicts between development and environment.

In the 1950s and 1960s the question was asked, How can undeveloped countries change into developed ones? Can and should the developed countries play a positive role in this process? The underdeveloped countries were defined in terms of unsatisfied needs among the vast majority of their populations, especially material needs—not, for example, the need not to be harassed by the brutal state police of an authoritarian government. From the point of view of the people in both the so-called underdeveloped and the developed countries, the needs were rightly considered real ones, not mere wants and desires. The use of the word *needs* for the latter creates confusion. A minority in the so-called developed countries considered it a question of justice to try to help the underdeveloped countries become developed, but developed only in the sense of satisfying the obvious needs of the large majority. Aid was proposed and carried out on a minor scale, often misguided. We learned that to reach the desperately poor was more difficult than expected, and that different means than the humanitarian ones were necessary. Then a new maxim was created: “Trade, not aid!”

Articles were imported from poor countries, and shoppers found shelves marked “products from . . .” where the name of the so-called underdeveloped country could be seen. The volume of such goods was small compared with what was expected. This strategy too failed to have the hoped-for great impact.

Despite the fact that the Norwegian U-Help (help to underdeveloped nations) reached 1.17 percent of GDP, a minor but well-established party agreed with me that the goal should be 2 or 3 percent and that the projects should be more professional, including, for example, extensive studies of local sociocultural conditions and prolonged in-country stays by experts. Years, not months, were needed. I succeeded in broadening the India projects: India ought to send people to us in Norway, with Norway of course paying the expenses, because we certainly also need help, although not of the material kind. Mutual help! India, however, sent only one person, a professor! Our social and spiritual needs were certainly not properly covered!

The efforts to create vigorous trade did not succeed, and we got a new trend—or new “discourses” as they are called today—those of underdeveloped countries being assisted through huge loans to reach industrializa-

tion, it being taken for granted that their economic advance should be measured by economic growth and GDP. In my view, a terrifying vision was created: that of a global search to reach the level of consumerism and waste characterizing the rich, industrial states, as if both environmental sustainability and life quality—the way you feel your life—can be ignored. They are clearly not proportional to consumption and waste, and neither is economic advance proportional to economic growth and GDP. As to the loans, justice requires them to be annulled.

If we wish to retain the general term *development*, we should class the rich industrial countries as overdeveloped. I think it advisable, though, only to use the complex term *ecologically unsustainable development*, here defining development as volume and direction of *change*. This makes development a kind of vector, which by definition has the properties of magnitude and direction.

A slogan used in the deep ecology movement is relevant here: "Full richness and biodiversity of life on Earth." The term *richness*, or *abundance*, as added to biodiversity, is essential because we should not often degenerate into ecotourists. We need life all around us. The large Tysfjord in Norway is yearly invaded by about 400 *Orca orca* whales—a bad name for them is killer whales. Norwegians living along the fjord enjoy whale safaris in their neighborhood, but not as mere tourists. All the *Orca orca* families and many old specimens have proper names. One hears cries such as "Where is the so-and-so family?" "I have not seen uncle so-and-so this year!" The thought of killing them is abhorrent, although most people along Tysfjord loudly support the two hundred or so whalers who hunt minke whales. Their culture is in many ways a hunter-gatherer culture, and locals and experts agree that there are about 80,000 minke whales. The point I want to emphasize here is that in the next century the norm will be abandoned that we human beings have the right to go on killing as long as the existence of a species of marine mammals is not threatened. Abundance, please! Marine mammals might be the first wide class of mammals the abundance of which will be well protected through international regimes.

Two kinds of conflicts emerge: when a concept of ecological sustainability is introduced, to what extent can it be expected that countries with grave unfulfilled material needs will follow a course of ecologically sustainable development? The answer by economic and political theorists has of-

ten been that fulfilling the grave needs must have a priority: first development, then environmental regulations. Others have answered that both must be seriously considered together. I agree. Evidently, though, some of the "expensive" rules that the rich countries can afford to introduce cannot be exported to the economically poor countries. We need strong measures to moderate the increasing ecological unsustainability, yes, but together with serious attention to other problems. If a father can rescue his children from starvation only by killing the last tigers, it is, in my view, his duty to kill the tigers, provided he has the necessary (exceptional) power to do so—but shame on the government of his country, and shame on us!

The interference of the materially richest countries in the ecosystem takes place in a per capita excessive and unfair way. Since the governments of these countries do not intend to support (in ethically fully acceptable ways) a slow decrease of population, they must significantly reduce the standard of living. I do not narrow this down to "material standard of living," because even in nonmaterial areas there is significant waste, often institutional waste, for example, when teaching chemistry students. How can people in the poor countries believe in the importance of ecologically sustainable development when they see how the rich live, and intend to continue living?

It is said that pollution knows no borders. Nevertheless, the rich countries may perhaps continue their unecological policies for several generations, and also profit in terms of long-distance trade from a destructive global free market, at the same time that ecological conditions in the poorest countries become desperate. Unfortunately, before the powerful rich countries are hit by tragedies far greater than that of Chernobyl, conditions are likely to worsen. When I am asked whether I am an optimist or a pessimist, I answer "An optimist!" but I add "on behalf of the twenty-second century." If there is a large audience, I point to individuals and shout, "How far down we go in the next century depends on YOU, YOU, YOU!"

How can it depend on each of us? I shall answer with one of my favorite slogans: "The frontier is long!" By this four-word formulation I refer to the very great diversity of jobs available for those who wish to be "activists." There is a tendency of activists to say, What *you* are doing cannot have the highest priority (or does not hit the core of the problems); come over to where I work. This is mostly countereffective. We should help people find

what is most interesting to them, pointing to very different, but important issues. We should also insist that they stand up and talk and write and perhaps, or perhaps not, occasionally take part in direct actions. Personally, I have only been arrested and carried away by the police twice, but I cherished my close contact with them. After all, green societies will presumably also have police.

A factor that is sometimes underrated is the tone of the communication between conflicting groups. The heat of the debate tends to reduce the value of the communication. To avoid this reduction, it is important first of all not to distort the opponent's views. We have to shorten and simplify the views of opponents as well as our own, but when the opponent's views are rendered in a way that makes them less tenable or less ethically justifiable, or when we attribute views to the opponent that the opponent does not have, or if consequences are invented that do not strictly follow, then no agreement can arise. Moreover, the atmosphere of the debate is poisoned, and it becomes impossible to resolve the conflict or to reach an understanding about it.

Nonviolence in debate today is more relevant than ever because of the ever-increasing role of communication between an increasing number of people about an increasing number of crises. This is why I have mentioned the role of nonviolent communication in environmental ethics. There is a second reason: we ought to talk much more to people who despise what we are doing, or to businesspeople who find the usual pictures of green societies unbearably boring. Task-mindedness requires less contact with the in-group, more contact with outgroups, businesspeople tell me.

Fair Distribution and Fair Profit from Nonrenewable Resources

From the point of view of the rich industrial countries (sometimes abbreviated to the "R's"), there are a number of areas of concern, all of which have philosophical relevance:

1. The R's maintain a standard of living that is unsustainable on a global scale.
2. The R's profit unduly from trade with the countries having a low

material standard (the L's), and especially through the behavior of corporations, they induce the L's to try to copy the unsustainable way of life in the rich countries.

3. It is an obligation of the R's to cooperate with the minority in the L's who are aware of the dangers of uncritical development and who try to rectify its direction. The cooperation must be based on an attitude of self-criticism on the part of the R's, and without the slightest tone of arrogance.
4. The huge old loans that the R's furnished for development of the L's served only in part the long-range independent line of development of the L's. The interest that the L's pay on those loans today is a burden and must be eliminated.
5. Until the R's adopt a globally sustainable way of production and consumption *per capita*, it is their obligation to leave the industrial utilization of the natural resources of the L's for *their* sustainable development mainly in their own hands. This implies a control of the way in which the R's take over an unduly large fraction of the industrial processing.
6. The technical questions mentioned in the foregoing sections are very moderate compared with the political, both in the R's and in the L's. The present trend is toward *centralization* of trade, that is, inventing a global liberalization of trade, constructing an immensely strong global market. In some R's, such as the Scandinavian countries, the governments in the last half of the twentieth century have proclaimed support for economic decentralization and therefore local markets. The price of milk in Norway, to mention a concrete example, is much higher than in the world market. This is done to protect what is left of the fairly sustainable agricultural culture, to avoid large-scale industrialization of the production of life necessities. A free market is combined with ecological protectionism!

Fortunately, there are no strong opinions in the R's favoring authoritarian regimes, or belief that such regimes could ensure a responsible economic development. The main problems will have to be solved within the framework of democracies. The outlook today is grim because the public is interested in short-range problems, whereas environmental justice is a

long-range issue. Injustice may not result in any violent crisis seriously affecting the R's. The very few doomsday prophets evidently have been wrong in their predictions of big-headline catastrophes.

As an example of problems of environmental justice, let us inspect the distribution of sources of oil and natural gas. By chance England and Norway are placed near enormous oil and gas resources. In the early 1960s these countries had the necessary scientific and technical know-how to make large-scale use of these resources. The international rules at that time allowed them to have a complete monopoly. They could do what they wanted: "produce" millions of barrels of oil a day and a comparable amount of natural gas. Private and state corporations could make gigantic profits from selling the oil and gas, within their own market, but preferably by exporting it.

In Norway, a minority in the 1960s found this arrangement unjust: unfair to the economically poor countries and unfair to future generations. Their view was that we ought to hand over a part of it to the Third World and that we ought to limit the extraction of oil and natural gas so that future generations could have a fair amount at their disposal, or if necessary, simply leave the gas and oil untouched. The industrial extraction causes great carbon dioxide pollution. The fair-play supporters have not changed their position.

Ecologically, the use of oil and gas for heating and transport should and probably will decrease, but as long as the price is very low, other means cannot compete. The pressure to use very large amounts is great within current nonecological economies. The Norwegian production might within one generation (thirty years) be cut down by about 80 percent, and some of the reduced volume should be available to those countries that need the resources today. If—and this is a guess—the technology of renewable energy sources predominates all over the planet within one or two generations, the consumption of oil and gas resources would and should be able to reach a level that makes them available practically indefinitely.

To decide the policies, an international energy commission is required, and today it might be set up by the United Nations. The technology required is "advanced" and costly, and it should not be necessary for users of oil and gas to build the great platforms and do the extraction themselves. The main thing is to view the resources of oil and gas, and primarily those

in the oceans, as common resources for humanity, to avoid obviously unecological ways of using them, and especially to avoid the use of oil and gas for heating and transport. The present-day situation is ethically, ecologically, and politically irresponsible. Although a fully satisfactory solution to the problems involved cannot be expected to materialize within ten years, perhaps not even within a generation or two, something could be done immediately to propose practical changes on a minor scale. It is not my job in this opening keynote speech to suggest steps to be taken, but the access to sources of energy today seems to me an issue requiring immediate action on the level of the United Nations.

Most of the products we buy today have a very complicated genesis. The necessary natural resources have been collected and then a long series of processes, let us say ten processes, have been involved, ending with a "finished" product to be sold at a definite place at a definite time. The poor countries do not take part in, say, the last eight processes. The rich take over, and the corporations take over the 80 percent *profit*. The more processes of the industrial kind, the higher the profit—roughly speaking, of course. How could this be changed? Some but not enough people are trying to find out how to proceed. I cannot do more than remind us of the existence of the problems that fairness implies.

From what I have said, it does not follow that there should be the same level of material production and consumption per capita in every country. However, the difference today between rich and poor—inside countries and among countries—is clearly unacceptable and may cause future violent conflicts if the gap continues to widen.

Perhaps I have preached too much to the already converted. I shall, in my survey, mention an area that is rather touchy emotionally. It is generally conceded among fairly well informed people that any population increase in the rich consumerist and wasteful countries gravely contributes to the ecological crisis. We in the rich countries should in the near future be able to tell the rest of the world that our governments and public institutions do nothing to maintain the population level. We should be able to talk about how much we try to inform our people of the grave responsibility we incur as the situation is today. With a half percent fewer births a year, that is, 199 instead of 200 births in an area, a process would start that with time would eliminate serious population pressure on areas in which people pre-

fer to live—for example, certain coastlines. As it is now, such areas tend to lose their special qualities because of overcrowding. Of course, the main problem is perhaps not the unpleasant population pressures in the rich countries but the unwarranted signals the rich countries send to the Third World: try to reach our level of material standard of living and waste; we see nothing wrong about continuing to increase our population without changing our way of life.

As long as countries such as the United States do not work to stabilize or reduce their population, it is completely unacceptable to ask the poor countries to do so. In any case, to talk about “overpopulation” is unnecessary. People tend to interpret this as a violent threat, and they tend to forget that we are talking about a time span of perhaps hundreds of years. Our goal is to secure a sustainable high quality of life for everybody and with free choice decide where to live. This implies reduction of population pressures.

Some people are active within environmentalism on the basis of, or are strongly motivated by, their life philosophy. I would, as a supporter of the deep ecology movement, say they act in part on the basis of their “ecosophy.” Others call themselves supporters of the social ecology movement (Bookchin 1980, 1982). The latter tend to think that the domination over nature (as a goal) is caused by man’s domination over man. Environmental justice may from this point of view be realized through giving up hierarchical thinking of every kind. In Uruguay, social ecologists have tried to empower and emancipate fishermen and help them preserve old ecologically sustainable methods, rejecting the destructive new methods of the industrial societies. Domination implies injustice. Applied to man’s domination over other beings, a generalized Rawlian fiction is relevant: forget completely who and what kind of being you are, and ask, What social and interspecies relation would you consider just? (Rawls 1971 cf. “veil of ignorance”). If you think of yourself as a rattlesnake, you would find it unjust of human beings to kill you. You are dangerous only to people who walk carelessly and hastily within your territory. You would tell human beings: As a rattlesnake, I am entitled to live where I was born. Human beings can scarcely maintain the view that there is an overpopulation of rattlesnakes.

Opinion surveys of how people feel about environmental justice and, more generally, about environmentalism, suggest marked positive attitudes. When they vote, though, people tend to give their votes to the

politicians and political parties they criticize for unsatisfactory and weak environmental policies. The strong term *schizophrenia* is often used in this connection. People feel an environmentally deep commitment, but they also have a deeply seated habit of choosing politicians who do not have any concrete proposals. Under these circumstances, politicians claim that they cannot propose strong ecological measures without losing votes. They must get a minimum of feedback from the voters. In Norway, two attempts by established parties to put strong measures into their programs clearly resulted in a loss of votes. It is obvious that environmental justice proponents must hail any courageous initiative by any leaders of a political party—by fan mail and otherwise. I am speaking about the situation in democracies, where the attitudes of individual voters are said to have some influence, however small. Surveys suggest complete agreement with the proposition that if democratic governments are unable to realize environmental justice, authoritarianism or dictatorships will not have a chance either. On the other hand, it is an open question whether or not undemocratic regimes will appear in the next century if the environmental situation becomes much more threatening. It is unreasonable to believe, though, that authoritarians would be highly motivated by a consideration of justice as fairness.

The Europeans have had the supreme “advantage” to colonize the world. I place advantage in inverted commas because, in the long run, this advantage may prove to have been a disadvantage, not only for the rest of the vast population of the world, but even for the Europeans. Now they fear the increasing global economic competition and feel compelled to unify within one immense market, the European Union, with “free flow” of international capital and a vast increase of long-distance trade. Ecological protectionism is prohibited—protection, for example, against import of cheap products made cheaply by disregarding the resultant pollution and energy waste. The increasing waste helps economic growth, and the EU is in part motivated by belief in such growth. It is a bad sign that opinion in the United States about a “closer and closer” European Union is very favorable. (Throughout the twentieth century, Americans have tended to say to us Scandinavians, “Your countries are too small, much too small! Integrate! It is very harmful not to have a common market. You will soon be unable to compete!” Competition is not everything, however, and “Big is beautiful” has only limited applicability.)

The European Union represents a formidable step toward globalization of a definite kind of liberal economy. The Foundation for Deep Ecology in San Francisco arranged in New York the first international conference against this globalization. It is increasingly being realized in the United States that the liberal economy favors the strongest—that is, the United States—but not the weakest.

The popularity of a gradual decrease of environmental injustice is today moderate in the R's, and knowledge about what is going on is also moderate. Nevertheless, the activism of a small minority may ultimately have a sufficient impact to change policies. Slavery and certain other major evils were eventually eliminated from large areas through the persistent work of small minorities. The majority feel the rightness of the cause, but it takes time before they join.

Tens of thousands of young people in the R's would gladly cooperate with the small, environmentally active minority in the L's, but they must be assured that they can obtain jobs in the R's after having spent one or more years in the Third World. As it is now, they are threatened with unemployment, and they cannot take the risk of "losing" time by doing the very important and meaningful work abroad. Many of those who come back to their R's have indispensable knowledge, including proficiency in one or more languages of the Third World. It would be a crime to let them go unemployed or consign them to jobs in advertising or other flourishing industries. They are needed in the institutions in the First World dealing with relations to the Third World, and to the Fourth. (I am sorry about using these misleading numbers, but the First World is the first that must change its unsustainability!)

The ethically unacceptably high level of unemployment in the European Union may be lowered if green economics and green political theory are taken more seriously. What do politicians tend to answer when they are told this? They tend to say, at least in Scandinavia, that they largely agree with the greens but that they are dependent on the voters. Again and again, it is clear that the public is not ready to accept the "burdens" it thinks are implied by responsible environmental policies. The public resists any major political move.

We could read, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, about environmentalists who *predicted* vast environmental catastrophes. They were called eco-

logical doomsday prophets. Who were they, and who are they today? A great many professional ecologists have asserted that *if* such and such trends continue unhindered, the state of affairs will approach a major catastrophe—but they are evidently not doomsday prophets. The usefulness of their warnings is clear: something must be done, and the sooner the better. The last words are important. Unsustainability does not increase linearly, but exponentially—I would guess roughly between 0.5 and 3.0 percent annually. If it is 3 percent, then unsustainability doubles within twenty-three years. Quantification, however, is rather unsuitable here.

Unhappily, some serious ecologists in their publications have greatly underrated the richness of the Earth's resources. The most powerful countries might continue their long-term unsustainable lifestyle for many years after there are very serious crises elsewhere, for example, lack of clean water and a high frequency of environmentally induced illnesses. In certain areas, at least 20 percent of illnesses are today considered to be environmentally caused. No prominent ecologists are doomsday prophets, however. The term is now used mainly in the literature characteristic of the international ecological backlash: the worldwide attempt to discredit environmental movements.

Less talk should have been devoted to discussions about resources and more devoted to environmental justice as fairness. Until about twenty years ago, fair distribution and fair access to *appropriate* technology could have assured satisfaction of the vital needs of a rapidly increasing population. Toward the end of this century, the general level of material aspiration has increased significantly, and consequently what was in 1970 considered adequate to satisfy vital needs is now considered unsatisfactory. Here we are touching on a very complex and delicate situation: environmental justice cannot be defined in terms of a global approximation to the production and consumption pattern of the rich industrialized countries. That pattern cannot be universalized. Simply to continue that pattern in the rich countries is in itself unjust, unfair. It violates the high-ranking norm of universalizability, it accelerates the rate of decrease of life conditions of the planet, and it neglects future generations.

The impact of the maxim "Increase environmental justice!" depends on how the sufferers of unfair arrangements *define* the status of satisfactory environmental justice. It must not be defined in terms of material standard

of living, but in terms of access to resources, access to a level of technology that makes industrial and other use of the resources practicable. At all times, a concept of vital *need* is relevant: the ocean of human desires seems never to diminish, whatever the level reached. However, the mere existence of a group that suffers from lack of satisfaction of vital needs does not entitle this group to claim environmental unfairness. There must be other groups or countries that have been unfair in their relation to the sufferers.

Green Economics and Political Theory

Since the 1960s there has been a mounting stream of publications conveniently called contributions to Green economics and Green political theory. The capital *G* indicates that not only selected practical reforms are considered, but also significant, substantial theoretical changes involving changes of attitudes among people. It is a difference comparable to that between the “shallow” and the “deep” ecology movements. It is not my task to express any opinions within this extended field of economic and political discourse, but a few points may be tentatively formulated.

Today's strict market economy makes it extremely difficult to avoid substantial unemployment. Highly competent economists who are at the same time active within environmentalism are often called Green economists with the use of the capital *G*. They differ from green economists—with an ordinary *g*—much as supporters of the deep ecology movement differ from the movement that does not envisage substantial changes of a social and political kind. The fundamental point I wish to make may be thus formulated: Green economics envisions a labor-intensive economy. The kind of liberal economy today is capital-intensive, and unemployment is difficult to keep down. It is a formidable case of injustice to deprive people of jobs that enable them to support themselves. Green economists warn against just closing a factory here and there because of clearly unacceptable levels of pollution. There must be a consistent Green economy in order to significantly reduce ethically unacceptable unemployment.

Corporations calculate what it costs for them to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent or more. Governments must somehow arrange “the rules of the game” so that it becomes profitable to change ways of production in a Green direction. Green economic principles require free markets,

but also a kind of ecological "protectionism" such that ecological costs are included in prices. People look for "green products," but deeper green, that is, Green products seem to require an economic system that relies on *incentives* provided by public institutions.

The so-called green political theorists all work within a democratic framework. This is compatible with a critical attitude toward the operation of present-day democracies. How can it be avoided that there are pressure groups so powerful that it is in practice more or less impossible not to submit to their special interests? There are many other areas in which critical discussion is lively, and hopefully creative.

These remarks on economics and politics have centered on conditions in the "overdeveloped" countries. It is clear that the kinds of Green, or even green, policies under discussion in the rich countries are in part out of reach for the economically poor countries. Must we conclude: "Development first, then environment!"? Is it a form of environmental injustice to advise economists and politicians in the Third World to ask for Greenness? On the contrary. To protect resources for future generations *and* develop profitable use of resources, a multitude of ecologically motivated policies *within* their economic reach must be realized. Cooperation with well-trained, well-educated Westerners is also a must within a number of fields of economic production. There is work to be done by young Westerners with knowledge of relevant local languages who will stay where they can cooperate for a whole year, and preferably many more years. The Third World's relations with the rich nations suffer seriously from the tendency of people to stay for some months or a year. Much more would be accomplished if people stayed more years to establish trust and acquire deeper knowledge of the relevant social and cultural affairs. Young people with specialized competence must be guaranteed that they will not come home to problems of unemployment. This can be avoided in the most satisfactory way by using their competence within permanent institutions of international cooperation.

All this requires political goodwill and informed opinions. So we are back to the problem of how to increase people's awareness of the environmental justice challenges. How do we activate the constructive imagination of young people, appealing to their taste for great, global questions? One way is to help more people who travel as tourists combine their travels with study of the relevant cultures, and to encourage them to report on

how people there tend to experience themselves and the world—in short, a concentration on feelings and attitudes. More travelers could be induced to write about their experiences, articulate reflections that can be useful for those who seriously wish to take active part in the great movements of the next century, the movement for peace, the movement to eradicate completely unacceptable poverty, and the movement to establish ecological sustainability and justice.

In some rich countries, including Norway, the government seems to avoid taking environmental justice seriously by telling us that *first* the rich countries must help the rest of the world get rid of poverty, and only *then* should ecological unsustainability receive a high priority. “There can be no green society of poor people.” Yes, we may answer, but to eradicate poverty will take a lot of time, and we must not neglect the yearly environmental degradation and the injustices. We shall have to spend time, work, and money on both factors *now*.

Unfortunately, the reason that governments propose the elimination of poverty *first* is politically a very strong one: to spend, say, 0.5 percent of GDP on poverty is politically very much easier than to get voters to accept a substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. “People are not ripe for such new policies.” They feel virtuous spending a little more on poverty, and it does not harm business.

The relation of population increase to environmental concerns has to be discussed. There are serious population pressures of different kinds in specific areas, but many people tend to feel that the word *overpopulation* suggests a threat to existing human beings. “You are the ones who are too many!” Fortunately, there is no need to introduce the term *overpopulation*.

Small children’s easy and safe access to patches of free nature not dominated by human beings has decreased drastically in many urban areas. Until recently, such access played an important role in children’s lives, but pressures to “develop” the patches—for example, turning them into commercial areas—have been immensely strong, and these pressures grow with population growth. The astonishing argument that the “value” of the patches is too great to leave them to children has been used implicitly or even explicitly. This is clearly environmental injustice toward children, and destructive use of *value* as a synonym for “market value.”

“Population pressure” may for some people sound misanthropic (“Do

people press me?”), but even in Norway with only 4.5 million people (in 2003) on 325,000 square kilometers—fewer than ten people per square kilometer—there are population pressures. People relish living along the fjords, but there are “too many” competing for the beautiful areas. Prices of real estate are sky-high, and it has been necessary to introduce laws defending the right to walk along the shoreline: no private property that extends all the way down to the edge of the water!

People who have a desire or need for elbow room may try to escape to a roomier environment, even leaving a place they love if this place has “develoed” into what they experience as an anthill-like area. On the other hand, a family of six living in one small room in a skyscraper in downtown Hong Kong may prefer to stay there even if they have the opportunity to exchange it for a two-bedroom apartment in a much less crowded area, but one with not nearly as good access to their workplace. The term *crowding* is often used, but some people are perfectly adapted to what others call insufferable crowding. In short, by *population pressure* should be meant a situation in which pressures are *felt* because of the density of people; it should not be used as a term for mere situations of very high density. Fortunately, many people love high density.

When it is argued that a smaller population might in some areas make it less difficult to decrease environmental injustice, including that toward children, people tend to think in terms of significant population reduction within 100 years or even within a smaller time limit. It seems to be forgotten that even half a percentage annual reduction makes a significant difference in the long run, say in 500 years. To many people the very word *reduction* feels threatening, but mainly because they think in terms of ethically unacceptable measures such as those in China.

I mention population mainly to remind us of the need to debate population calmly and not pay much attention to extreme theoretical views, or extreme proposals. Personally, I am interested in the creative imagination fostered in children with easy and safe access to patches of free nature. These children need fewer gadgets made by adults. Every development restricting their free movement and play is misused, making them more dependent on objects bought on the market.

A generally accepted norm is severely violated in the rich countries: “Do not live in such a way that you cannot seriously wish that others would

also live that way, should they wish to do so." This is the ethical norm of universalizability. Because of the seriously aggravated environmental conditions that would result if 1,000 million Chinese and 1,000 million Indians turned to the American (or Norwegian) way of life, we cannot seriously wish them to do so. We, of course, grant their right to live as we do, but it will not be possible without very grave consequences.

The above discussion of population problems does not imply that I consider those problems to have a high priority, only that they should not be neglected when speaking about environmental justice. We also have to look at the influence of various economic systems and ask, for example, whether a liberal, capitalist global economy is an asset or an obstacle, or neither—and how can indigenous cultures be protected economically?

All the areas we touch on have in common that we need high-quality mediators to soften polarization of conflicting points of view. We are all here as fallible human beings, with more or less strong convictions—but nevertheless fallible. Now I am full of anticipation.

I shall close with the formulation of two maxims or slogans:

The first is "The frontier is long." What I mean is that the problems we face are so numerous, and the kinds of activity required of so many kinds, that there is room for everyone, whatever his or her inclinations and interests. You will all find something meaningful to do. Do not, however, pressure others to do the same thing you do; do not insist that a definite problem or kind of activity is *the* most essential.

The other maxim is "Concepts of justice are very similar around the world, but opinions on matters of fact differ widely." Optimism to a large extent depends on the similarity of concepts, because people can more easily be persuaded to change their opinions about facts than their basic views about what constitutes justice. Here is an extreme example: millions of young Austrians and Germans supported Hitler in the early 1930s because Hitler convinced them that the treason of communists and Jews had caused Germany's defeat in the First World War; that the terrible economic crisis of the 1920s, when it cost millions of marks to mail a letter, was due to the perfidy of the Jews; and that the biological makeup of the Aryans was superior and that of the Jews sinister. We all agree that these *factual* views were wrong, but we must concede that if they were right, some discrimination of Jews could not be classed as unjust. The young Nazis in the early

DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE FUTURE

1930s did not have a remarkably different concept of justice from us, but they were convinced about certain wrong factual matters. Few people tried to convince them that they were wrong.

In short, there is an immense need to patiently disseminate information, to dwell repeatedly on the concrete cases of injustice and on the concrete cases of ecological unsustainability. Do not hurry to complain about a basically different concept of justice! Remember the two maxims.

Deep Ecology for the Twenty-second Century

The title of this paper is not my title! Why did my friends insist on this title? Because of the many conversations I've had on the following lines:

NN: Are you an optimist or a pessimist?

Arne Naess: I'm an optimist!

NN (astonished): Really?

Naess: Yes, a convinced optimist—when it comes to the twenty-second century.

NN: You mean, of course, the twenty-first century?

Naess: No, the twenty-second! The lifetime of the grandchildren of our grandchildren. Aren't you interested in the world of those children?

NN: You mean we can relax because we have a lot of time available to overcome the ecological crisis?

Naess: Not at all! Every week counts. How terrible and shamefully bad conditions will be in the twenty-first century, or how far down we fall before we start back up, *depends upon what YOU* and others do today and tomorrow. There is not a single day to be lost. We need activism on a high level immediately.

This article was reprinted with permission from *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions (Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1995), 463–67. An earlier version of the article was published in *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9 (1992).

The answer that I am an optimist is a reaction to the so-called doomsday prophets: people who talk *as if* nothing can be done to straighten things out. They are few in number, but they are heavily exploited by people in power who speak soothingly of the task ahead as not very formidable and assure us that government policies *can* turn the tide for the better. A telling example was on the cover of the influential *Newsweek* magazine just before the Rio conference: the headline read "The End Is Not Near." Inside, in the article, there was no pep talk, not even an admission that we are in for a great task that will require new thinking. This is just the opposite of what we hear when big corporations are in trouble; then the headlines proclaim "Greater Efforts Are Needed! New Thinking! New Leadership!" No slogans were offered like that of Churchill in 1940: "Of course we will win, but there will be many tears and much sweat to be shed."

In short, there is no time for overly pessimistic statements that can be exploited by passivists and those who promote complacency.

The realization of what we call *wide* ecological sustainability of the human enterprise on this unique planet may take a long time, but the more we *increase* unsustainability this year, and in the years to come, the longer it will take. How much is left of nature obviously depends on what we do today and tomorrow. The appropriate message is of a simple, well-known kind: the recovery from our illness will take time, and for every day that we neglect *seriously* trying to stop the illness from getting worse, the more time it will take. Policies proposed today for attempting to heal the planet are not serious. The deep ecology movement is concerned with what can be done *today*, but I foresee no definite victories much before the twenty-second century.

Roughly, I call ecological sustainability *wide* (or "broad") if, and only if, the change ("development") in life conditions on the planet is such that it ensures the full richness (abundance) and diversity of life-forms on the Earth (to the extent, of course, that human beings can ensure this). Every key word of this criterion, of course, needs clarification, but "wide" sustainability is obviously different from the "narrow" concept of ecological sustainability that is increasingly accepted politically: that is, the existence of short- and long-range policies that most researchers agree will make ecological *catastrophes* affecting narrow *human* interests unlikely. This kind of narrow sustainability is politically acceptable today as a *goal* for "global de-

velopment.” In contrast, broad ecological sustainability is concerned with overall ecological conditions on the Earth, not just with the interests of humanity, and the dangerous concept of development is avoided. By “development” is still meant something like an increase in gross national product, not an increase in the quality of life.

So the big, open question is, How far down are we going to sink before we start heading back up in the twenty-second century? How far must we fall before there is a clear trend toward *decreasing* regional and global ecological unsustainability? It may be useful, in this connection, to consider some possible scenarios.

1. There is no major change in ecological policies and in the extent of worldwide poverty. Major ecological catastrophes occur as the result of the steadily accumulating effects of a century of ecological folly. This dramatic situation forces new ecologically strict policies, perhaps through undemocratic, even brutal, dictatorial military means used by the rich countries.

2. The same development continues except for a major change in the poor countries, where there is considerable economic growth of the Western kind. Now there are five times as many people living unsustainably. A breakdown occurs very soon, and harsh measures are taken to fight chaos and to begin a decrease in unsustainability.

3. Several similar developments end in catastrophic and chaotic conditions, and subsequent harsh brutal policies are implemented by the most powerful states. A turn toward sustainability occurs, but only after enormous ecological devastation.

4. Ecological enlightenment develops: a realistic appreciation of the drastic reduction in the quality of life, increasing influence of the deep ecological attitude, and a slow decrease of the sum total of unsustainability. A trend toward decreasing unsustainability is discernible by the year 2101.

Our hope must be the realization of the rational scenario, one that guarantees the least strenuous path toward sustainability by the year 2101.

The three great contemporary worldwide movements that call for grassroots activism are extremely important here.

First, there is the *peace movement*; it is the oldest of the three and, at present, is remarkably dormant. I expect it to revive, however, if military expenditures do not rapidly decrease from the current level (1993) of about \$900 billion USD per year. Then, there are many movements, among them

the feminist movement and part of the social ecology movement, that I include as part of the *social justice movement*. We might refer to the third movement by the vague term *radical environmentalism*, because use of the specific terminology of deep ecology will, sooner or later, elicit boredom and aggression. A problem with the word *environmentalism*, though, is that it smacks of the old metaphor suggesting that humanity is *surrounded* by something outside: the so-called environment of human beings. Moreover, it will take a long time before *radicalism* ceases to be associated with the political red-blue axis (see figure 4, page 204).

Broad ecological sustainability may be compatible with a variety of social and political structures, provided they all point toward the green pole. Unfortunately, there is now (1993) a strong belief in Eastern Europe that policies must be blue (for example, participation in world economic markets) *before* they point toward the green pole.

It is not easy to be personally active in more than one of the three grassroots movements, but cooperation among the movements is essential. The ecological threat is not only one of war, but also of the immense military operations and associated industrial activity during peacetime. Cooperation between the ecological and the peace movements has been excellent for a long time. It is taking longer to establish close cooperation with all of the social justice movements, but because care, and the capacity to identify with all living beings, is so prominent in the deep ecology movement, injustice is taken seriously.

The small minority of supporters of the deep ecology movement who write in periodicals, talk in public, and organize conferences, meet people who are sometimes skeptical about their ethical concerns: is it true that they are much fonder of animals than of human beings? The answer is that, whatever the intensity of their fight for animals (or wilderness), they recognize the very special obligations we have toward our fellow human beings. What we propose is not a shift of caring away from human beings and toward nonhuman beings, but rather an extension and deepening of overall caring. It is unwarranted to assume that the human potential for caring is constant and finite, and that an increase of caring for some creatures necessarily reduces caring for others. The next century will see a general increase in caring if the ecofeminists are at least partially right.

The societies developing in the twenty-second century, at the earliest I

suspect, will not all look like the ideal green societies envisioned since the 1960s. Many will have traits more in common with what we have today. Will there be conspicuous consumption? Of course! What is conspicuous, however, and what will secure prestige and wonder in that century, will require only moderate physical energy to achieve. Several tremendously important things will be different: there will be no political support of greed and unecological production, and a tolerance of severe social injustice based on differences in levels of consumption will have disappeared.

To fight the *dominance* of something should be clearly distinguished from trying to *eliminate* something. We shall always need people who insist that their main goal in life has not been to amass money but to create something useful in a world in which money is a measure of success and creative power. In sociology, we often talk about entrepreneurs in the wide, important sense of socially energetic, creative, influential people. Their work is often controversial, sometimes clearly destructive, but they are required in any dynamic society.

I envision big, but not dominating, centers of commerce, learning, and the arts, and big buildings and vast machinery for continued explorations in physics and cosmology. To do something analogous to driving long distances in a conspicuous luxury car, however, a family would have to renounce many goods that other people could afford. A good deal of the family's "Gaia gift" would be spent on traveling in its prestigious car.

Rich people who work in the world of business and are supporters of the deep ecology movement sometimes ask in all seriousness whether green utopian societies *must* look so dreary. Why portray a society that seemingly needs no big entrepreneurs, only organic farmers, modest artists, and mild naturalists? A capitalist society is, in a certain sense, a rather *wild* society! We need some degree of wildness, but not exactly of the capitalist sort. The usual utopian green societies seem so sober and tame. We shall need enthusiasts of the extravagant, the luxurious, and the big—but they must not dominate.

In short, I do not envisage the *necessity* of any sudden, dramatic turnaround in the sociopolitical realm when I envisage things from the limited point of view of *overcoming the still-increasing ecological crisis*. As mature human beings (I imagine that some of us are mature or on the way to becoming mature), we are also concerned about nonviolence and social justice. It

DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE FUTURE

is not necessary for me to say anything more definite at this point about these broad social and ethical issues. I do see the value, though, of expressing vague ideas concerning how one's own ideal green societies might look. A green society, in my terminology, is one that to some extent not only has solved the problem of reaching ecological sustainability, but has also ensured peace and a large measure of social justice. I do not see why so many people find reasons for despair. I am confident that human beings have what is demanded to turn things around and achieve green societies. This is how I, as a supporter of the deep ecology movement, feel today: impatient with the doomsday prophets and confident that we have a mission, however modest, in shaping a better future that is *not remote*.

Notes

Chapter 4: Deepness of Questions and the Deep Ecology Movement

1. This is a revised and shortened version of an unpublished manuscript, "Deepness of Questions," written in the 1970s and distributed to only a few people because of its manifest weaknesses. I have revised it because some interest in it persists, and because of the prominent place it received in Warwick Fox's important book, *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology* (1990).
2. The term *chain* is important. The structure of systematization may be schematized as follows: from premises *A* and *B*, conclusion *C* is drawn. From premises *C* and *D*, conclusion *E* is drawn. From premises *E* and *F*, conclusion *G* is drawn. Thus, a chain of premise-conclusion relations is asserted. The rules of inference that are applied are rough. Requirements of logical validity lead to vast unnecessary complications for people other than professional logicians.
3. The study is reprinted in this SWAN volume; see chapter 18, "Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature."

Chapter 5: The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects

1. For more about interspecific community relationships, see my "Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves" (1979b [in this volume]).
2. I cannot here do justice to the many authors who have contributed to the understanding of the emerging deep ecology movement. Only three will be mentioned. The newsletters written by George Sessions, Department of Philosophy, Sierra College, Rocklin, CA, are indispensable. There are six letters, April 1976, May 1979, April 1981, May 1982, May 1983, and May 1984, about 140 pages in all. The significant contributions by poets and

artists are fully recognized. Most of these materials are summarized in Sessions 1981. Bill Devall provides a short survey, in part historical, in his potent article “The deep ecology movement” (1980). See also Devall and Sessions 1985. Finally, *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* was started in 1983 by Alan Drengson. It was published as a print journal for fourteen years and is now an online journal.

3. I proposed the name Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement in a lecture at the Third World Future Research Conference (Bucharest, September 1972). “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement” (Naess 1973 [this volume]) is a summary of that lecture. Adherents of the deep ecology movement fairly commonly use the term *deep ecologist*, whereas *shallow ecologist*, I am glad to say, is rather uncommon. Both terms may be considered arrogant and slightly misleading. I prefer to use the awkward but more egalitarian expression “supporter of the deep (or shallow) ecology movement,” avoiding personification. Also, it is common to call deep ecology consistently antianthropocentric. This has led to misconceptions: see my “A defense of the deep ecology movement” (1983). It is better described as nonanthropocentric.
4. The technical term *biospheric* should perhaps be avoided because it favors the scientifically fruitful distinction between biosphere and ecosphere. I use the term *life* in a broad sense common in everyday speech, and may therefore speak of landscapes and larger systems of the ecosphere as “living”—ultimately speaking of the life of the planet. The biospheric point of view referred to in the text is not a narrower point of view than the ecospheric because *bios* is used in a broad sense.
5. Many authors take some steps toward derivational structures, offering mild systemizations. The chapter on environmental ethics and hope in G. Tyler Miller’s *Living in the Environment* (1983) is a valuable start, but the derivational relations are unclear. The logic and semantics of simple models of normative systems are briefly discussed in my “Notes on the Methodology of Normative Systems” (1977a [this volume]). For defense of the thesis that as soon as people assert anything at all we assume a total view, implicit with ontology, methodology, epistemology, and ethics, see my “Reflections About Total Views” (1964 [this volume]). The best and wittiest warning against taking systematizations too seriously is to be found in Søren Kierkegaard’s *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (1941).
6. Trusting Bill Devall, one may say that “Muir is now understood as the first Taoist of American ecology” (Devall 1982); see also Cohen 1984.
7. For empirical studies of attitudes of “Wilderness-users,” see the survey by

Chris. R. Kent in his thesis *The Experiential Process of Nature Mysticism*, Humboldt State University, 1981.

8. The term *ātman* is not taken in its absolutistic senses, not as a permanent indestructible “soul.” This makes it consistent with those Buddhist denials (the *avātman* doctrine) that the *ātman* is to be taken in absolutist senses. Within the Christian tradition, some theologians distinguish “ego” and “true self” in ways similar to these distinctions in Eastern religion. See, e.g., the ecophilosophical interpretation of the Gospel of Luke in Verney 1976: 33–41.
9. For criticism and defense of this fundamental norm, and my answer, see *In Sceptical Wonder: Essays in Honor of Arne Naess* (Gullvag and Wetlesen 1982). My main exposition of Ecosophy T was originally offered in the Norwegian work *Økologi, samfunn og livsstil* (1976), later published in English as *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle* (1989). Even there, the exposition is sketchy.

Chapter 6: The Deep Ecology “Eight Points” Revisited

1. The eighteen points of my 1973 paper “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movements” (in this volume) smacked too much of the special metaphysics of a younger Naess, as I soon found out. They were discarded in favor of the Eight Points, to the regret of some readers (e.g., Richard Sylvan, among ecophilosophers). The 1973 paper, for example, claimed the ego to be like “knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations.” I still may use the sentence “All living beings are ultimately one,” which embarrassed Sir Alfred Ayer in our one-hour debate (see Elders 1974: 31).

Chapter 7: Equality, Sameness, and Rights

1. For more about the relevance of tradition and culture, see my “Self-Realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves” (1979b [in this volume]); see also Naess and Mysterud 1987.

Chapter 11: A Note on the Prehistory and History of the Deep Ecology Movement

1. See, e.g., Rohrer 1920. For areas outside Europe, see several articles in Tobias 1985. There is, of course, nothing “Aryan” about the cult of mountains.
2. From Henri Frankfort’s “The Birth of Civilization in the Near East” (1959), as quoted in Tobias and Drasdo (1979: 201).

Chapter 12: Antifascist Character of the Eight Points of the Deep Ecology Movement

1. The distinction Green/green corresponds roughly to deep/shallow, deep/reform, interpersonal/nonpersonal ecology (W. Fox 1990). There are several other terminologies closely resembling the above. In short, roughly speaking, a distinction similar to that between a deep and a shallow movement—or better, a reform movement—is widespread within the total ecology movement. This means that we have (descriptive) data to refer to in changing the formulation of the Eight Points. Or, of course, we can propose a different set of points. As reformers of the terminology, we are not working in thin air.

Chapter 16: Should We Try to Relieve Clear Cases of Suffering in Nature?

1. The language of norm 1 (Self-realization!) and hypothesis 1 (The higher the self-realization attained by anyone, the more its increase depends on an increase of the self-realization of others) is introduced in Ecosophy T in order to avoid the more usual unconditional, unrestricted “Yes to life,” whatever its manifestations. Higher self-realization does not mean here anything different from the more complete realization of potentialities related to the self, the specific characteristic of each living being. The world of potentialities of a living being has no very definite borders but may be in continuous or discontinuous development. The conceptual framework is not very different from that of J. von Üexküll as described in my *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten* (1936).
2. This is according to point 5 of the proposed theoretical platform of the deep ecology movement.
3. See note 2.

Chapter 17: Sustainability! The Integral Approach

1. Among many other statements the following, using only fifteen words, should be mentioned: the requirement that “present [vital] needs must be covered without endangering the capacity for meeting future [vital] needs” (Research Policy Conference 1988: 17; I added the word *vital*).

Chapter 18: Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature

1. The Mardøla River in Sogn and Fjordane counties and the Alta River in Finnmark County were regulated to build electricity works in 1970 and 1980.

Both projects were supported by the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Administration. The author participated in the heated debates on both of these projects.

2. Minister Kåre Kristiansen was a representative for the Christian Democratic Party. Its Norwegian name is Kristelig Folkeparti.
3. The Norwegian name of the movement is Samling om skaperverket.
4. Røros, in southeastern Norway, was once an economically important mining town.
5. The largest lake in Norway; it has been heavily polluted by agricultural and household chemicals.
6. Since 1985, when my questionnaire was distributed, the term *quality of life* (livskvalitet) has undergone a remarkable change of status. It is now a mainstream word, and this may be considered quite an achievement of the environmental movement.
7. These Scandinavian environmental organizations are in Norwegian named Fremtiden i våre hender and Alternativ Norden. They are concerned, to a large extent, with the nuts and bolts of how to achieve an ecologically sound way of life in Western societies.
8. This is another Norwegian environmental organization, called Folkevevt in Norwegian. Common Sense is particularly well known for its pacifist program and the number of lawsuits brought against some of its members for publishing sensitive military information.
9. The author received much mass-media attention after being carried away by policemen from demonstrations protesting the regulation of the Mardøla and Alta rivers in 1970 and 1980.

Chapter 20: Politics and the Ecological Crisis: An Introductory Note

1. See “The eight points,” one of the suggestions for formulating a (general, more or less abstract) platform for supporters of the deep ecology movement, in Devall and Sessions 1985: 70–73.
2. For a discussion of the principles of ecological diplomacy, see Carroll 1988.

Chapter 21: The Politics of the Deep Ecology Movement

1. Portions of this paper, written in 1985, were incorporated into the English edition of my *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle* (1989).
2. Note that the Ecology party in Britain has since changed its name to the Green party.

Chapter 22: The Three Great Movements

1. The term *deep ecology* is said here to be used in a loose way in order to emphasize that my own efforts to formulate a platform of the deep ecology movement in eight points requiring about 200 words should not be taken too seriously. There are thousands of people who might be unmoved by one or more of the points I formulated but who nevertheless support the third movement as I conceive it. It would be arrogant and pretentious of me to compare the deep ecology movement with the historically tremendously important and strong movements against war, exploitation, and suppression *if* the term were to be closely associated with my modest effort in the way of terminology.

For examples of characterizations other than the eight points that George Sessions and I have proposed, see the chapter “Deep Ecology” in Schwarz and Schwarz (1987), where Michael McCloskey, Donald Worster, Neil Evernden, Frithjof Capra, and others are quoted.

Chapter 23: The Encouraging Richness and Diversity of Ultimate Premises in Environmental Philosophy

1. My own interpretation of Spinoza in its relations to the deep ecology movement is suggested in “Spinoza and ecology” (1977b). A combined interpretation and reconstruction may be found in Naess 1975 (SWAN VI). “Self-subsistence” here refers to the dynamic development of the Self, the subsistence or perseverance *in se* (in itself) as opposed to *in alio* (in other). Other interpretations are also in harmony with the main positions within radical environmentalism, such as those of B. Russell and G. Sessions (main feature: God is *completely immanent*).
2. I have discussed Lloyd’s interpretation in detail in Naess 1980: 313–25.
3. The conception of “determined in its essence” is elaborated in Naess 1974c. Are there other plausible or interesting interpretations of the term *determinare*? There are, of course, and I hope the number will not decrease. A list of close connotations (“equivalences”) between terms appears in Naess 1974a, obtainable from the Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.
4. Gandhi laments deforestation and its possible influence on climate, advocates a religious foundation of the man-nature relation, and defends animal rights. See Power 1990.
5. In Davidson’s text, the expression “a language” is of importance. I do not feel that I understand well enough what he means by the expression to declare agreement or disagreement with members of the set of sentences in

which he uses the expression. I am puzzled. This admission is made without any feeling of shame, perhaps because it is a prevalent feeling when I try to compare what at least *prima facie* seem to be deeply different total views. (Probably I should feel a little ashamed because of a belief that if Davidson may be said to “have” a total view, it will not be deeply different from mine.)

Chapter 24: The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology

1. See Greenpeace 1989–90: 53. Waste disposal procedures have improved, but “many more changes are still needed if stations are to comply with the new waste disposal guidelines contained in ATCM Recommendation SV<i>i–3</i>. Indeed, most stations have not even met the minimal guidelines agreed to by the treaty States in 1975.”
2. Quoted from a valuable survey of the wilderness issues by George Sessions (1992).
3. “In contrast to the conventional lobbying efforts of environmental professionals based in Washington, [Earth First!] proposes a militant defense of ‘Mother Earth,’ and unflinching opposition to human attacks on undisturbed wilderness” (Guha 1989: 74).

Chapter 25: Cultural Diversity and the Deep Ecology Movement

1. There is an unfortunate confusion of terminology surrounding the term *cultural anthropology*. In continental Europe what in this article is called cultural anthropology is usually called *ethnology* and in Great Britain *social anthropology*. In Europe the term *ethnography* is sometimes used to describe subject matter clearly falling under the American usage of *cultural anthropology*. Its antonym is *physical anthropology*. In continental Europe the term *philosophical anthropology* covers many subjects of cultural anthropology and also subjects of ecosophy in general, such as the debate about essential differences between human beings and animals. G. P. Gusdorf (1998) furnishes an excellent survey of the terminological developments until about 1970.
2. The distinctions between deep and shallow cultural differences, and the importance of articulated total views as expressions of the deep differences, are elaborated in my *Which World Is the Real World?* (2004 [SWAN III]). Cultural anthropology should, I think, be distinguished from less comprehensive units of research: economic, technological, social, and (the central European) philosophical anthropology. In my terminology, a culture is the largest hu-

man unit and corresponds in a certain very moderate way to the unit of species in biology.

Before the 1960s, discussions about cultures were considered unscientific within certain scientific communities. Expressions such as “the peoples of the world” were favored. Expressions such as “the consumerism people” do not, however, mean the same as “the consumerism culture” (cf. Fox and Lears 1983).

3. Some works of interest when we approach the new cultural anthropology and problems of deep diversity are Bateson 1972; Geertz 1973; Goodenough 1964; Keesing 1974, 1976; and Sahlins 1972.
4. The eight-point list of 1984 published in Devall and Sessions (1985) naturally needs revision. The list is, nevertheless, convenient for a short survey of complex materials.
5. Sometimes, for example, when formulating point 4 of the Eight Points, I neglected to consider in a realistic way what would be *common* views about population within the deep ecology movement. The first part is found to be acceptable, “The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population,” but scarcely the second, “The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.” In my experience, few supporters of the deep ecology movement have clearly thought about this, and if they have, they have either hoped for a way to give more room to other living beings or felt that there are no mild, acceptable policies for reducing the human population. Reluctantly, they see the decrease of the *richness* of nonhuman life as inevitable, the diversity as maintainable. In any case, point 4 should be reformulated.

What holds for the 1985 version of the Eight Points holds also for the 1971 version of the Eighteen Points: the characteristics of the deep ecology movement are not consistently separated from views within Ecosophy T.

Chapter 26: Population Reduction: An Ecosophical View

1. The all-sided, mature human being has a need to “combine argumentation” regarding the richness and diversity of Earth. That is the reason for adding the word *narrow*.
2. For more about this classification, see Naess 1989: chap. 3.
3. *Perfection* (from Latin *per-facere*) does not necessarily imply something absolute-in-its-perfection, but rather wholeness, a practically attainable level of performance and state of being.
4. “In my opinion, the most serious aspect of a population decline is the regional one. Some production and consumption capital will be idle (at least temporar-

ily) if the population decline is spread out too unevenly, or if it hits communities which are so small that the economic disadvantages of a further population decline can be disastrous. In other areas or cities, the economic gains by a reduced population could be considerable. This is a very important area for economic research and possibly for policy action" (Thonstad 1982: 21).

5. I have profited most from Tore Thonstad's "Perspectives of European Demographic Evolution: Expected Major Economic Consequences" (1982).

Chapter 28: Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Human Beings, Bears, Sheep, and Wolves

1. From the above use of "realization of potentialities" it is clear that the concept is wider than most concepts of self-realization in Western philosophy and psychology—for example, that of Maslow. It is more closely linked to concepts of life fulfillment and Eastern conceptions, among them Gandhi's concept of self-realization. For more about this, see my *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (1974b [SWAN VI]) and *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle* (1989). The concept used in *T* is also close to Spinoza's "increase in power," wherein *potentia* is linked to capability (*posse*), that is, capacity to act with *oneself* as adequate cause. I do not pretend that these remarks are more than initial formulations in a dialogue on self-realization.
2. "Two Factor Egalitarianism assumes the relevance of two matters: (1) level or importance of interests to each being in a conflict of interests, and (2) the psychological capacities of the parties whose interests conflict" (VanDeVeer 1979: 68).
3. What follows is inspired by the practical work of the bear inspector, and ecophilosopher, Ivar Mysterud.

Chapter 29: Philosophy of Wolf Policies I: General Principles and Preliminary Exploration of Selected Norms

1. Different cultures at different times have held significantly different attitudes toward nature, and within each culture, each nation, and each community there are differences of philosophic importance. On identification, see Naess 1985b: 256–70. On changes of attitude toward nature as evidenced in the new environmental movements, see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980: 181–97; Dunlap and Van Liere 1984. Collicott (1983) provides one of the best overviews of attitudes toward nature in American Indian cultures. Different cultures have had different concepts of nature, and some have not had any concepts similar to the one we are talking about, the conservation of nature.

2. Accounts of wolves in broad perspective may be found in Fiennes 1976; Lopez 1978; Hall and Sharp 1978; and Allen 1979.
3. This concept of “mixed community” was introduced in Naess 1979b: 231–41 (in this volume).
4. For accounts of plant and animal community concepts, refer to Cody and Diamond 1975; Strong et al. 1984.
5. For population estimates, see Myrberget 1969; Heggberget and Myrberget 1979. The most recent survey is reported by Sørensen et al. 1984.
6. The authors have another paper in preparation exploring these fields (Mysterud and Naess 1990).
7. Norm conflicts very similar to the one seen in Norwegian wolf ranges are found wherever white people settled in North America with herds of husbandry animals. Even in areas with no husbandry, but where locals depend on cervid hunting, conflicts may arise—for example, in Alaska (see Carbyn 1983: 1–135).
8. For preliminary discussions of economy-enhancing animal survival, see Mysterud 1985.
9. Properly expressed, they form sentences with exclamation marks. Priorities behind “wise actions” in wildlife management should be ecologically correct, socially and politically acceptable, and economically profitable. In management procedures based on such diverse strategies, the landscape will profit most.
10. Details about the concept of normative system as conceived here may be found in Naess 1977a: 64–79 [in this volume].
11. The term *suffering* is ambiguous, of course. Sometimes it is made to cover complex states of affairs—for example, the suffering of a thwarted ambition—but in *A*₁ we think of rather more narrow notions, with simple pain as a core connotation.
12. For discussion of how carnivore attacks affect sheep herds and sheep-holder activity, see Mysterud 1979:123–61, 1980: 233–41.
13. For a valuable bibliography of life-quality research, see Chamberlain 1985: 345–401. The term *self-realization* is a somewhat more general and derivationally more basic term than *life quality*, but, of course, it is an intimately related one.
14. On the causes of researchers in conservation biology not announcing their value priorities, see Naess 1986c: 512–13.
15. In what follows we do not consistently distinguish a sentence from its meaning. The term *statement* has a convenient degree of ambiguity, sometimes referring to meaning, sometimes being used as a near synonym for *sentence*. This

holds true for all sciences, including mathematics and logic. Their sentences (expressing the statements) can, just as in the case of normative systems, be divided into two kinds: sentences ending in a period and sentences, such as rules, ending with an exclamation mark.

16. For a survey of sheep-holding and its implications for carnivore management planning in Norway, see Vaag, Haga, and Granstuen 1986: 1–162.
17. The opposition to letting wolves live where they now are in Norway is for natural reasons fiercely fought in many local communities. A well-developed “No to wolf” campaign is being organized locally in Hedmark in southern Norway and in adjacent Värmland in southern Sweden. If local communities within parts of the present-day wolf range were given the right to decide, all wolves might be exterminated, provided there were enough able hunters.
18. A basic problem in human environments is maintenance of animal and plant populations of species that now have low, no, or negative economic value (e.g., pests and predators). We are, therefore, concerned about creating an economy on endangered species (conservation capitalism) to increase the probability of their survival, which we plan to discuss in another paper, “Philosophy of wolf policies III: Emergency wolf management, applications and conclusions” (Mysterud and Naess [never written]).
19. Norms A_7 to A_9 are special applications of the first three general norms, a set of eight points. The eight points with comments were originally published in the newsletter *Ecophilosophy* (May 1984) but are now to be found also in Soulé 1980.
20. People in the materially richest countries cannot be expected to reduce overnight their excessive interference with the nonhuman world to a moderate level. The stabilization and reduction of the human population will take time. Interim strategies must be developed; but this in no way excuses the prevailing complacency—the extreme seriousness of our current situation must first be realized. The longer we wait, the more drastic will be the measures needed.
21. For more about Ecosophy T, refer to appendix A in *Deep Ecology* (Devall and Sessions 1985).
22. For more on self-realization as a fundamental norm, see Naess 1986e (in this volume).
23. See note 2.
24. In some Canadian national parks, field trips are being provided so that people can listen to and see wolves in the wild. This is part of a management strategy to improve people’s image of wolves. See Stardom 1983.

25. The philosophically interesting area of self-verifying and self-refuting hypotheses is also relevant. The local population that feels threatened by wolves knows that people with power to impose wolf protection entertain conflicting hypotheses about the seriousness of antiwolf sentiments locally. It is, of course, in the interest of locals, as conceived by them, to convince others that the hypothesis of a very high degree of seriousness in antiwolf attitudes is verified. Prowolf people are therefore silenced. It is not difficult to see how this can influence the behavior of locals and result in verification of the hypothesis of universal, intense opposition to wolves. This state of affairs must be considered if and when central authorities plan to investigate public opinion in the affected regions.

Chapter 32: Letter Sent October 1971 to the King of Nepal

1. Naess and his fellow climbers did not go to the summit of Gauri Shankar. They stopped at about 6,000 meters. In so doing, they were observing the letter as well as spirit of the message that Naess sent to the King of Nepal.

Chapter 33: An Example of a Place: Tvergastein

1. See, e.g., articles in Tobias and Drasdo 1979; LaChapelle 1978.
2. For a *theory* of the world as concrete contents, see Naess 1985c (in SWAN X).

Chapter 36: The South Wall of Tirich Mir East

1. The figures 25,263 feet and 25,237 feet have been taken from what is easily the most detailed map (1:126,720) available of this district, that of Brigadier R. H. Thomas, Surveyor-General of India, published in 1931. On other maps, different heights are to be found. The Polish expedition had only two maps, both produced by the Survey of India, and to a scale of 1:1,000,000. One of them is described by the Geographical Section General Staff, War Office, London, edition 1956, and gives the height 25,426 feet. We consider it correct to retain the figures from the survey map through the General Staff in 1949, viz., 25,263 feet for the West Peak and 25,237 feet for the East Peak.
2. An account of the Norwegian expedition in 1950 was published as *Tirich Mir* (1952); it has been out of print since 1953. A short account may be found in *Alpine Journal* 58 (May 1951).
3. An early development in downhill ski-racing was based on similar considerations. In the beginning no gates were used, but after a while this way of pre-determining a certain racecourse was introduced to prevent the undue and

very dangerous risks that some were taking as competition got stiff. It was my wish to impose such “gates” on our expedition strategy.

Chapter 37: Spinoza and Attitudes Toward Nature

1. Some may judge what I say unhistorical, or claim that I make Spinoza modern, but I look at a text by Spinoza as I look at a score by Bach—open to many interpretations. In all humility I will say that although my interpretations of the text of the *Ethics* can be upheld, they are certainly not the only plausible interpretations. I make a distinction between talking about the historical Spinoza as a person and presenting an interpretation of one of his texts. This, again, is different from presenting a reconstruction inspired by Spinoza.
2. Even Francis of Assisi (1968: 118), the saint of ecology, was no friend of the body: “*Nous devons avoir en baine nos corps, avec les vices et les peches. . . .*” As used by Spinoza, the term *corpus* permits one to ask Francis, What about the corporeal events corresponding to your faith? and what about “*les vices et les peches*” of your spirit?
3. The medieval users of the distinction *natura naturans/natura naturata* and *naturare/naturari* may be said, with Gueroult and others, to have introduced the concept of immanence of the divine cause in its effect. Characteristic of Spinoza is that he uses the distinction “to express his concept of absolute immanence, which those terms never had signified” (Gueroult 1968: 567). Speaking about the immanence of God in Nature (and Nature in God) as a Spinozic conception, I take it to be absolute at the level of denotation or extension. At the narrower level of connotation or intention, immanence—if the term can be used at this level at all—is not absolute. If it were, we would have general substitutability of *Deus* and *Natura* in the *Ethics*. This is hardly Spinozic.
4. Some researchers seem to attribute to Spinoza the logical superstition that the content of parts II–IV of the *Ethics* can be deduced from part I, but all the way through the *Ethics* new insights are communicated:
 The definition of God in part I does not refer to the noninfinite aspect of God. This aspect is something new, although it does not contradict what is said in part I. Its heading may be read *De Deo quatenus infinito*.
 In general, a certain freedom in our attitude toward the *exposition* of Spinoza’s system is called for, as long as we do not postulate that every one of its formulations and its order of presentation directly express insights of the third kind. G. Fløistad (1986) warns against any such assumption.
5. Proposition 24 may be interpreted in a quantitative manner (more things are understood), in a qualitative manner (a higher degree is intended: things are

understood in the third way), or in a way that combines both aspects. The second sentence of the proof of proposition 25 provides evidence for a qualitative interpretation. On the other hand, Spinoza stresses *multiplicity and diversity*, especially in connection with the many parts of the body and the many (more than eighty) classes of emotions. It is also important that understanding God or Nature includes understanding of the third kind, intuitive understanding of *particular* things. It is implausible that it is equivalent to a qualitatively more and more perfect understanding of one particular thing.

6. The adjective *totus* is perhaps better rendered by “totality” than by “whole,” if we wish to stress that the third way of understanding is that of seeing single particular things from the point of view of the whole. If we wish to stress the unity of the mind with a whole that has an aspect of indivisibility and changelessness, then “whole” may be a better translation than “totality.”
7. Is “*natura*” here identical extensionally with “essence”? That would imply that one’s essence may be changed through self-causation.
8. *Perfection* is not a term introduced in the *Ethics* by means of a separate definition. When not applied to Nature, it admits of degrees. Joy is an emotion through which mind is said to become *more* perfect (IIIP11Sch). Whatever its connotation, “more perfect” cannot be separated in denotation from “more powerful.” Compare the proof of proposition 41: “Joy . . . is the emotion through which the power of the body to act, increases or is furthered.” The relation to action, and therefore to understanding, is intimate. The more perfect is the more active and the less passive (VP40). In short, “more perfect than” cannot, in denotation, be separated from a number of other basic relations. The application of the term to Nature or God clearly is on par with the application to God of terms like *love* (*amor*), *intellect*, and *mind*. That is, it cannot be taken in any precise sense known from phenomena in Nature.
9. The term *maximum* rather than *optimum* diversity presupposes a concept of diversity that is common, but not universal, among ecologists.
10. Unconditional acceptance of the axiom of perfection is not possible for me. Or, more precisely, it is possible only through dubious interpretations of the terms *perfection* and *Nature*. Spinoza helped himself with his theory of nonexistence of *adequate* ideas about evils. Although I find that theory dubious as well, I have not come across a better one. What follows in this essay is a thoroughly revised version of parts of my article “Spinoza and ecology” (1978).
11. The occurrences of the words *bonus* and *malus* in the *Ethics* admit to various conceptualizations. According to part IV, definition 1, “x is good for y” does

not mean more than “*x* is useful for *y*” or “*x* is known by *y* to be useful for *y*.” Spinoza does not *say* anything to the effect that freedom, perfection, and the other “in itself” states are good. They enter the system both as something that things actually or in fact or with necessity strive to realize and as unquestioned desirables.

An extreme naturalism is consistent with one particular well-known set of equivalences: “. . . we strive after nothing because it is good, but on the contrary we call that good which we strive for” (IIP39Sch). It is to be noted, however, that Spinoza does not say that we call something good *because* we strive for it. Good is not an effect caused by striving, and the striving is not just for self-preservation in the narrow sense, but for freedom, virtue, and power. See also note 13, below.

12. For a detailed exposition of the equivalence of these terms, see Naess 1974a, 1975 (SWAN VI).
13. According to part III, proposition 6, *every* thing, as far as it is in itself, strives to preserve its being. I take the term *perseverar*, translated as “preserve,” to mean something much more active than just to survive. Therefore, I accept as equivalent “*x* increases in power” and “*x* increases in level of self-preservation.”
14. Good relations to others are obtained, inter alia, through generosity and other forms of noninjury (*abimā*) (*Ethics*, IVP46Sch1; IVP72). “Hatred can never be good” (IVP45); that is, it can never be useful to us (IVDefi). Therefore, it cannot cause an increase in power or understanding.
15. It must be conceded that Spinoza holds that we cannot be the friends of animals or include them in our society. Only human beings can be friends of human beings and be members of our societies (see *Ethics*, part IV, AppCh26). Because we are more powerful than animals, we have in a sense more rights. We are able to use animals as we see fit, and one cannot issue laws against killing them. Most animals lack the power to use us (cf. IVP37Sch1 and AppCh26).
16. The basic position of “understanding” (*intelligere*) in Spinoza’s system is seen from its relation to “causing.” If something is caused adequately through something else, it is adequately understood through that something, and vice versa. Activeness is internally related to understanding because the specific activity of the mind is understanding. It is also related to increases in power and freedom. In this way, not only intuitive understanding of the highest (third) kind, but also the understanding of nature, promotes power, freedom, joy, and perfection.
17. The panpsychism of Spinoza is expressed in the *Ethics* (see IIP13Sch). Individuals other than human beings are animated (*animata*), but in different degrees (*diversis gradibus*). Spinoza even (in the proof of IIP1) uses the expression “the minds of other things” (*aliorum rerum mentes*). About the dif-

ference in appetites and joys between various kinds of animals, see IIP57Sch.

18. Spinoza does not say so directly, but I think he would deny rationality of any kind to beings other than human beings. He speaks, however, about the “virtue or power” of animals, and he more or less identifies virtue with rationality: “. . . to act virtuously is nothing else than to act according to reason” (*Ethics*, IVP56 proof). Although Spinoza may be interpreted in various ways regarding the relation of animals to man, we have been interested in the main trend of his reasoning.

Chapter 38: Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement

1. Spinoza uses the term *causa immanens* only twice, in part I of the *Ethics* (IP18) and in Letter 73, where there is a positive reference to Saint Paul.
2. One may speak about the finite God (*Deus modificatus*) of Spinoza as well as about the infinite (see Naess 1981: 120–26) [in SWAN IX]. Researchers mostly take the first part of the *Ethics* more seriously than the last—the account of human freedom and power as genuine parts of God’s. Doing this, they seem not to be aware of the limitation of mere formal logical priority. They ignore *Deus modificatus* because it occurs only in the later parts. Deep ecology theorizing neither thrives on Man apart, nor on God apart.
3. It is important that Spinoza adds that VP24 follows from IP25Cor, that is, from the thesis of modes *expressing* God’s attributes. It supports a radically immanent interpretation of *Deus*.
4. The distinction between content and abstract structure is worked out in Naess 1985c: 417–28 (in SWAN IX).
5. For more on human intervention to decrease suffering, see Naess 1991 (in SWAN X).
6. In Naess 1974a, I quote 243 relations of equivalence among key terms.
7. I have commented on *perseverare* and its relation to Hobbes in Naess 1980. In what follows, some formulations are borrowed from that article. In part IV of the *Ethics*, the term *conservare* is sometimes used as a synonym for *perseverare*. (IVP18Sch: reason demands [*postulat*] that everyone endeavors to conserve its being [*esse*], in so far as it is in itself.) I think “conserve” is too passive; I shall accordingly write and talk as if *perseverare* were used consistently by Spinoza.
8. Some central places in the *Ethics* show the way from Spinoza’s *Ethics* to his political writings. Concerning reason, see IIP40Sch2. From the terminology there, IVP35 follows: “In so far men live under the guidance of reason, to that extent only do they always agree in nature.” This is queer if one does not take

into account Spinoza's somewhat special use of the term *ratio*. Concerning freedom, reason, mutual aid, peace, and friendship, he says: "Only free men are truly advantageous (*invicem utilissimi*) to one another and united by a maximally close bond of friendship" (IVP71, proof). Here the term *freedom* must be interpreted in accordance with what is said about adequate causation and activeness (IIIDef2) and the resulting close relation between the terms *freedom* and *reason*: "a free human being, that is, a man who lives under the guidance of reason" (IVP67Dem).

From these indications it is fairly clear that *a Spinozistic social utopia* is one conceived to furnish the best conditions of freedom for everybody—"freedom" being interpreted in his way. What, then, is the best kind of practical politics? The question is open. I do not think Spinoza's political work can offer much here.

Chapter 39: A Systematization of Gandhian Ethics of Conflict Resolution

1. Declaration published in all Indian newspapers, October 30, 1940.

Chapter 40: The World of Concrete Contents

1. I take Galileo as representative of the neither-nor answer because of his crucial position in the development of modern physics. There are, of course, a number of slightly or significantly different concepts of primary and secondary qualities. In the context of this paper, the essential aspect of primary qualities is their status as inherent in the objects themselves. Locke elaborates the "neither warm nor cold" answer in his *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*.
2. The crucial passage concerning Protagoras in Sextus's *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I, chapter 32, runs as follows:

Now, this man says that matter is a state of flux. As it flows, continuous additions may arise to take the place of the effluxions, and the senses undergo transformation and alteration in accordance with one's age and with other conditions of the body. He says also that the grounds of all appearances lie in the matter, so that in itself its power enables it to be all those things which appear to all beings capable of apprehension. And men apprehend different things at different times because the conditions they are in differ. The man who is in a natural state, he says, apprehends those material substances which can appear to those who are in a natural state, and a person who is in an unnatural state apprehends those things which can appear to those in an unnatural state. And the same reasoning applies as well to differences depending on one's age, one's sleeping or waking state, and every kind of condition.

The most interesting interpretation of “matter,” as far as I can see, is such that it comprises all that man or any other being ever can experience in any state. The possibility is not excluded that other sensitive beings can experience what human beings cannot. This interpretation of the passage is, unfortunately, not consistent with what comes next in chapter 32:

Therefore man becomes, according to him [Protagoras], the criterion of the existence of things. For all things, in so far as they appear to men, also exist, while those things that appear to no man do not exist at all.

Strangely enough, “matter” seems, if not dependent upon, at least extensionally equivalent to the potential states of human beings; matter cannot comprise anything that cannot be apprehended by man, and vice versa.

3. The nominalism I subscribe to is a consequence of the philosophy of hypothetical-deductive systems formulated in Naess 1972 (SWAN IV).
4. The term *ontology* is useful for naming that part of one’s philosophy or science that tells “what there is.” In the sciences of physics and astronomy a hundred years ago, there were atoms, ether, planets, stars, and forces acting upon these so-called objects. Today, the ontology proposed by astronomers and physicists is more complicated, and they are constantly modifying it. It is usually called a classification of objects, not ontology, but the function is clearly to classify what there is according to their sciences.

Ontology as part of a philosophy, and not just a group of sciences, is of course a much more controversial affair. It must somehow accommodate the objects that the sciences talk about, or give reasons for their nonexistence. What are the criteria of “existence”? Different views are open for discussion.

Until recently the (basic) ontology of physics could be understood by nonphysicists. Now this is scarcely the case. The popularizations are wonderfully well written, but they do not furnish adequate understanding. Some would lament this situation, but I think it is the most positive thing that has happened for a long time: it makes it clearer to all concerned that any account we offer about the world we live in (*Lebenswelt*) must be independent of the ontology of modern physics.

5. The author is grateful to the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University for giving him the opportunity to be a Visiting Fellow, and to discuss and rewrite (in September 1984) what he has thought about the relation of the *Lebenswelt* to “objective” reality.

Chapter 41: Gestalt Ontology and Gestalt Thinking

1. It may be questioned whether the third factor, the mediational, really deserves placement as something as fundamental as the subjective and objective.

If we use a sunrise as an example of an object, the colors are said to depend very much on the medium, the air. If colored glasses are used, new complications are introduced. At this point it is advisable to distinguish two factors: the object intended when talking about “the sun when rising,” and the medium “between the sun and the subject” used to explain changing colors of the sun as experienced by the subject.

2. What is said here is based on a version of the “both-and” theory of Protagoras as interpreted by Sextus Empiricus. Compare Naess 1985c (in SWAN X).

Chapter 42: Reflections About Total Views

1. Thus, Lonergan (1992: 329) writes:

“Am I a knower?” The answer, “Yes,” is coherent, for if I am a knower, I can know that fact. But the answer, “No,” is incoherent, for if I am not a knower, how could the question be raised and answered by me? No less, the hedging answer, “I do not know,” is incoherent. For if I know that I do not know, then I am a knower; and if I do not know that I do not know, then I should not answer. Here, the answer “no” is construed as being equivalent to “I know I am not a knower”—and the answer “I do not know” as being equivalent to “I know that I do not know.” Such an equivalence would only hold, however, provided nothing, or next to nothing, is added cognitively by adding “I know that—” to a sentence.
2. I have changed the translation at some points.
3. This quotation is used by Polanyi in a similar context in “The stability of beliefs” (Polanyi 1952: 218).
4. For criticism of the doctrine that different logics can be described in the way attempted by some social scientists, see Naess et al. 1954: 203 ff.

Chapter 43: Notes on the Methodology of Normative Systems

1. Norwegian National Research Council, Project A79.24-15.
2. Some authors of central importance to the deep ecology movement are: Gregory Bateson, Kenneth Boulding, Ottar Brox, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Erik Dammann, Rene Dubos, Paul R. and Anne H. Erlich, Clarence J. Glacken, Edward Goldsmith, Ivan Illich, Sigmund Kvaloy, Ian McHarg, Joseph Meeker, E. J. Mishan, Ivar Mysterud, Marshall Sahlins, E. F. Schumacher, Hartvig Saerta, and P. W. Zapffe.
3. What holds of theories in science holds of normative systems. For elaboration of the trichotomy theory/systematization/version terminology used in this article, see Naess 1972 (SWAN IV): chap. 3. On definiteness of intention, see Naess 1966 (SWAN VII): 34 ff.

4. For a short exposition, see Naess 1966 (SWAN VII); for a more technical treatment, see Naess 1953 (SWAN I).

Chapter 44: Paul Feyerabend—A Green Hero?

1. For recent literature see Fox 1990.
2. Feyerabend's characterization of Imre Lakatos as a "fellow anarchist" caused some indignation and protest. Lakatos's views, however, were basically rather close to those labeled "anarchist" by Feyerabend (and perhaps by nobody else). As an argument in favor of this interpretation I shall quote Lakatos's conclusion in reference to the pluralist and possibilist views in my work referred to above: "I did not previously realize how far our philosophical views coincided and it was a great pleasure for me that we are close allies" (Letter of November 4, 1968). The possibilist approach I take to be a little more "anarchist" in Feyerabend's terminology than in Lakatos's own.

Chapter 45: Self-Realization: An Ecological Approach to Being in the World

1. This and the following quotations from Gandhi are taken from my *Gandhi and Group Conflict* (1974b [SWAN VI]), where the metaphysics of self-realization is treated more thoroughly. For further detailed discussions of identification, see my "Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes" (1985b) and "Man apart and deep ecology: A reply to Reed" (1990).

Chapter 46: The Connection of "Self-Realization!" with Diversity, Complexity, and Symbiosis

1. "Oneness with Nature," "nature mysticism."
2. The above is not intended to make others support Ecosophy T, and especially not to make a definite sketchy, diagrammatic version of Ecosophy T acceptable to others. That would be counterproductive. Insofar as others study figure 8 (page 485), however, I am interested in profiting from their interpretations. If, against my expectation, time-consuming study is undertaken, I should point out that my methodology is heavily dependent on three factors: a peculiar semantics popularized in my *Communication and Argument* (1966 [SWAN VII]); a life strategy pointing out that as human beings we implicitly presume we have a total view, including a fundamental value-priority strategy, every time we make a decision, day or night (1964 [in SWAN XI]); and use of the natural science idea of models (and simulations) as a purely heuristic instrument when dealing with insurveyably complex phenomena

such as worldviews (*Leben und Weltanschauungen*). Although the diagrammatic presentation of Ecosophy T does not have the form of a hypothetical-deductive system, it shares with that system a common characteristic, that of a model.

Chapter 54: Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology

1. On the so-called deep ecology movement, see Devall and Sessions 1985; Naess 1986b (in this volume).
2. For an ecologically inspired proposal for unilateral disarmament, see Naess 1986a: 425–36 (in SWAN IX).

Chapter 55: Industrial Society, Postmodernity, and Ecological Sustainability

1. The word *sustainable* has been used in many senses, some of which are remote from that of “ecologically sustainable.” Therefore, we shall not drop the reference to ecology.

References

Books or articles appearing in the *Selected Works of Arne Naess* are identified by (SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volume number.

- Adorno, Theodor W., Else Frenkel-Brunswick, D. J. Levison, and R. N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Bros.
- Allen, D. L. 1979. *Wolves of Minong: Their Vital Role in a Wild Community*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Allport, Gordon W. 1947. "Guideline for research in international co-operation." *Yearbook of Social Issues* 3.
- Angell, R. C. 1957. "Discovering paths to peace." In *The Nature of Conflict*. New York: UNESCO.
- Armstrong-Buck, Susan. 1986. "Whitehead's metaphysical system as a foundation for environmental ethics." *Environmental Ethics* 8: 241–59.
- Ascher, Charles S. 1950. "The development of UNESCO's program." *International Organization* 4.
- Auxter, Thomas. 1979. "The right not to be eaten." *Inquiry* 22: 221–30.
- Barney, Gerald. 1981. *Global 2000 Report to the President of the United States*. Charlottesville, VA: Blue Angel.
- Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Balantine Books.
- Bennett, David H. 1984. "The is/ought dichotomy and environmental ethics." Paper read at Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Canberra, Australia.
- Bentham, Jeremy. 1973. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals*. New York: Hafner.
- Bookchin, Murray. 1980. *Toward an Ecological Society*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

REFERENCES

- . 1982. *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*. Palo Alto, CA: Cheshire Books.
- Bookchin, Murray, Dave Foreman, and Steve Chase. 1991. *Defending the Earth: A Dialogue Between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Boyer, Carl B. 1968. *A History of Mathematics*. New York: Wiley.
- Brown, Lester, and Edward Wolf. 1988. "Reclaiming the future." In *State of the World, 1988*. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, p. 186.
- Callicott, J. Baird. 1982. "Hume's is/ought dichotomy and the relation of ecology to Leopold's land ethic." *Environmental Ethics* 4: 163–74.
- . 1993. "The search for an environmental ethic." In *Matters of Life and Death*, 3d ed., edited by Tom Regan. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Capra, Fritjof, and Charlene Spretnak. 1984. *Green Politics: The Global Promise*. New York: Dutton.
- Carbyn, L. N., ed. 1983. "Wolves in Canada and Alaska." *Canadian Wildlife Service Report Series* 45: 1–135.
- Carroll, John E., ed. 1988. *International Environmental Diplomacy*. Cambridge: The University Press.
- Carson, Rachel. 1962. *Silent Spring*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Chamberlain, K. 1985. "Value dimensions, cultural differences, and the prediction of perceived quality of life." *Social Indicators Research* 17: 345–401.
- Christiansen, Bjørn. 1959. *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*. Oslo: University of Oslo Press.
- Clark, Stephen R. L. 1979. "The rights of wild things." *Inquiry* 22: 171 ff.
- Cody, Martin L., and Jared M. Diamond, eds. 1975. *Ecology and Evolution of Communities*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press.
- Cohen, Michael. 1984. *The Pathless Way: John Muir and American Wilderness*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Collicott, J. D. 1983. "Traditional American Indian and traditional Western European attitudes toward nature: An overview." In *Environmental Philosophy*, edited by R. Elliot and A. Gare. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Collingwood, Robin G. 1948. *An Essay on Metaphysics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cooley, Charles Horton. 1964. *Human Nature and the Social Order*. New York: Schocken.
- Crossman, Richard H., ed. 1949. *The God That Failed*. New York: Arno Press.
- Daily, Gretchen C., and Paul R. Ehrlich. 1992. "Population, sustainability, and Earth's carrying capacity." *Bioscience* 42: 761–71.

REFERENCES

- Davidson, Donald. 1984. "On the very idea of a conceptual scheme." In *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Devall, Bill. 1980. "The deep ecology movement." *Natural Resources Journal* 20.
- . 1982. "John Muir as deep ecologist." *Environmental Review* 6.
- Devall, Bill, and George Sessions. 1985. *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered*. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books.
- Diwakar, Ranganath R. 1946. *Satyāgraha: The Power of Truth*. Bombay: Hind Kitabs.
- Dobson, Andrew. 1990. *Green Political Thought*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Drengson, Alan. 1989. *Beyond Environmental Crisis*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Dryzek, John S. 1987. *Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy*. New York: Blackwell.
- Dunlap, Riley E., and Kent D. Van Liere. 1984. "Commitment to dominant social paradigm and concern for environmental quality." *Social Science Quarterly* 65: 1013–28.
- Durning, Alan T. 1991. "Asking how much is enough." In *State of the World, 1991*. Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute, pp. 153–69. Republished as *How Much Is Enough?* New York: Norton, 1992.
- Eckersley, Robyn. 1992. *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Elders, Fons, ed. 1974. *Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Enzenberger, Hans Magnus. 1973. "Zur Kritik der politischen Ökologie." *Kursbuch* 33.
- Farvar, M. Taghi, and John P. Milton, eds. 1972. *The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development*. New York: Natural History Press.
- Feyerabend, Paul K. 1975. *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge*. London: Thetford Press.
- . 1977. "Expert in a free society." In *Unter dem Pflaster liegt der Strand* (Under the plaster is the beach), vol. 3. Berlin: Karin Kramer.
- . 1978. *Science in a Free Society*. London: NLB.
- Fiennes, Richard. 1976. *The Order of Wolves*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Fløistad, Guttorm. 1986. "Reality as perfection: Some remarks on Spinoza's concept of lifeworld." In *Studia Spinozana*, vol. 2: *Spinoza's Epistemology*, edited by W. Klever et al. Alling: Walther and Walther.
- Fox, Richard Wightman, and T. J. Jackson Lears, eds. 1983. *The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880–1980*. New York: Pantheon Books.

REFERENCES

- Fox, Stephen. 1981. *John Muir and His Legacy*. Boston: Brown and Co.
- Fox, Warwick. 1990. *Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Francis of Assisi, Saint. 1968. *Documents, écrits et premières biographies*, edited by Theophile Desbonnets and Damien Vorreux. Paris: Editions Franciscaines.
- French, William C. 1995. "Against biospherical egalitarianism." *Environmental Ethics* 17: 39–57.
- Fromm, Erich. 1956. "Selfishness, self-love, and self-interest." In *The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth*, edited by Clark E. Moustakas. New York: Harper Colophon Books.
- Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. 1955. *Gandhis politiske etikk* (Gandhi's political ethics). 2nd ed. 1968. Oslo: Johann Grundt Tanum.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. London: Hutchinson.
- Glacken, Clarence J. 1967. *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Gladstone, A. I. 1962. "Relationship orientation and processes leading to war." *Background* 6: 13–25.
- Goldsmith, Edward. 1972. *Blueprint for Survival*. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
- Goodenough, Ward H., ed. 1964. *Explorations in Cultural Anthropology*. London: McGraw-Hill.
- Goodin, Robert E. 1992. *Green Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press.
- Greenpeace. 1989–90. *Greenpeace Antarctic Expedition 1989/90*. Washington, D. C.: Greenpeace.
- Guerot, Martial. 1968. *Spinoza*, vol. 1: *Dieu*. Paris: Aubier.
- Guetzkow, Harold. 1955. *Multiple Loyalties*. Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University.
- Guha, Ramachandra. 1989. "Radical American environmentalism and wilderness preservation: A Third World critique." *Environmental Ethics* 11.
- Gullvag, Ingemund, and Jon Wetlesen, eds. 1982. *In Septical Wonder: Essays in Honor of Arne Naess*. Oslo: Oslo University Press.
- Gusdorf, Georges P. 1998. "Anthropology." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., *Macropedia*, vol. 1.
- Hall, R. L., and H. S. Sharp. 1978. *Wolf and Man: Evolution in Parallel*. New York: Academic Press.
- Hallen, Patsy. 1987. "Making peace with nature: Why ecology needs ecofeminism." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 4(3): 3–14. Reprinted in *The Deep Ecology*.

REFERENCES

- ogy Movement: An Introductory Anthology*, edited by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995, pp. 198–218.
- Hargrove, Eugene C. 1985. "The role of rules in ethical decision making." *Inquiry* 28.
- . 1989. "Callicott and the foundations of environmental ethics." *Environmental Ethics* 11.
- Heggberget, T., and S. Myrberget. 1979. "The status of bears, wolverines, wolves and lynxes in Norway during the 1970s." *Viltrapport* 9: 37–45.
- Henderson, Hazel. 1981. *The Politics of the Solar Age*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday/Anchor.
- Ibsen, Henrik. 1959. *John Gabriel Borkman*. In *Henrik Ibsen: The Last Plays*, introduced and translated by William Archer. New York: Hill and Wang.
- International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). 1980. *World Conservation Strategy: Living Resource Conservation for Sustainable Development*. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.
- James, William. 1890. *The Principles of Psychology*. London: Macmillan.
- Kant, Immanuel. 1949. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
- . 1963. *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's.
- . 1992. *Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus* (An attempt at some reflections on optimism). In *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*. Cambridge, UK: The University Press, pp. 71–83.
- Katzner, Kenneth. 1977. *The Languages of the World*. London and New York: Routledge, chaps. 4-1, 4-3. (Revised 1986.)
- Kaufman, A. S. 1971. "Wants, needs and liberalism." *Inquiry* 14: 191–206.
- Keesing, Roger M. 1974. "Theories of culture." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 3.
- . 1976. *Cultural Anthropology*. New York: Holt.
- Kelman, Herbert C. 1954. "Relevance of social research in war prevention: A symposium." *Journal of Human Relations* 2(3).
- Kent, Christopher R. 1981. *The Experiential Process of Nature Mysticism*, master's thesis. Humboldt State University, Arcata, CA.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, translated by David Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Knutsen, Kåre. 1974. *Dyrenes rettigheter* (The rights of animals). Oslo: Dreyer.
- Kropotkin, Peter A. 1955. *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*. Boston: Extending Horizon Books.

REFERENCES

- Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- LaChapelle, Dolores. 1978. *Earth Wisdom*. Silverton, CO: Guild of Tutors Press.
- Lackner, Stephan. 1984. *Peaceable Nature: An Optimistic View of Life on Earth*. San Francisco: Harper and Row.
- Leopold, Aldo. 1966. *Sand County Almanac and Other Essays*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1987 (originally 1949). *A Sand County Almanac, and Sketches Here and There*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levison, David J. 1957. "Authoritarian personality and foreign policy." *Conflict Resolution* 1.
- Lewis, Charlton T. 1951. *A Latin Dictionary for Schools*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Lloyd, Genevieve. 1980. "Spinoza's environmental ethics." *Inquiry* 23: 213–25.
- Loneragan, Bernard J. 1992. *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, edited by F. E. Crowe and R. M. Doran. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Lopez, B. H. 1978. *Of Wolves and Men*. New York: Scribner.
- Malthus, Thomas. 1872. *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, 7th ed. London: Dent.
- Mander, Jerry, and Edward Goldsmith, eds. 1996. *The Case Against the Global Economy, and for a Turn Toward the Local*. San Francisco: Sierra Books.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1952. *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Maslow, A. H. 1970. *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Marx, Karl. 1970. *The German Ideology*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Masson-Oursel, Paul. 1926. *Comparative Philosophy*. London: International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.
- McCloskey, Henry John. 1979. "Moral rights and animals." *Inquiry* 22: 25–54.
- . 1983. *Ecological Ethics and Politics*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Mead, George Herbert. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Milbrath, Lester W. 1984. *Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New Society*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Miller, G. Tyler. 1983. *Living in the Environment*, 3d ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Mills, C. Wright. 1967. *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, edited by Irving L. Horowitz. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

REFERENCES

- Murphy, Gardner. 1953. *In the Minds of Men: The Study of Human Behavior and Tensions in India*. New York: Basic Books.
- Myrberget, Svein. 1969. "The Norwegian population of wolf." *Meddelelser fra Statens Viltundersøkelser* 32(2): 1–17.
- . 1970. "The Norwegian population of wolverine and lynx." *Meddelelser fra Statens Viltundersøkelser* 2(33): 1–35.
- Mysterud, Ivar. 1979. *Viltrapport* 9: 123–61.
- . 1980. "Bear management and sheep husbandry in Norway." *Bear Biology Association Conference Series* 3:233–41.
- . 1985. "Economic and philosophical considerations on wolf survival." Paper read at CIC Symposium, Lisbon, March.
- Mysterud, Ivar, and Arne Naess. 1990. "Philosophy of wolf policies II: Selected aspects of wolf-human relationships." Unpublished ms.
- Naess, Arne. 1936. *Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten*. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences, Inaugural Dissertation.
- . 1953. *Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to a Theory of Communication*. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Science and Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I)
- . 1964. "Reflections about total views." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X)
- . 1966. *Communication and Argument*. London: Allen and Unwin (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1966). (SWAN VII)
- . 1972. *The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget (London: Allen and Unwin). (SWAN IV)
- . 1973. "The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary." *Inquiry* 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X)
- . 1974a. *Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza's "Ethics"*. Oslo: Institute of Philosophy, University of Oslo.
- . 1974b. *Gandhi and Group Conflict*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN V)
- . 1974c. "Is freedom consistent with Spinoza's determinism?" In *Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom*, edited by J. G. van der Bend. Assen: Van Gorcum. (in SWAN IX)
- . 1975. *Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's "Ethics"*. Oslo: University of Oslo Press. (SWAN VI)
- . 1976. *Økologi, samfunn og livsstil: Utkast til en Økosofi*, 5th ed. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- . 1977a. "Notes on the methodology of normative systems." *Methodology and Science* 10: 64–79. (in SWAN X)

REFERENCES

- . 1977b. "Spinoza and ecology." *Philosophia* 7: 45–54.
- . 1978. "Spinoza and ecology." In *Speculum Spinozanum 1677–1977*, edited by S. Hessing. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- . 1979a. "Modesty and the conquest of mountains." In *The Mountain Spirit*, edited by Michael C. Tobias and H. Drasdo. New York: Overlook Press. (in SWAN X)
- . 1979b. "Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves." *Inquiry* 22: 231–41. (in SWAN X)
- . 1980. "Environmental ethics and Spinoza's *Ethics*: Comments on Genevieve Lloyd's article." *Inquiry* 23: 313–25.
- . 1981. "Spinoza's finite God." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 135: 120–26. (in SWAN IX)
- . 1983. "A defense of the deep ecology movement." *Environmental Ethics* 5.
- . 1985a. "Holdninger til mennesker, dyr og planter (Attitudes toward men, animals, and plants)." *Samtiden* 94: 68–76.
- . 1985b. "Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes." In *Deep Ecology*, edited by M. Tobias. San Diego: Avant Books. (Reprinted in *Radical Environmentalism*, edited by Peter List. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1993).
- . 1985c. "The world of concrete contents." *Inquiry* 28: 417–28. (in SWAN X)
- . 1986a. "Consequences of an absolute *no* to nuclear war." In *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions*, edited by Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Totowa, NJ: Rouman and Allanheld. (in SWAN IX)
- . 1986b. "The deep ecology movement: Some philosophical aspects." *Philosophical Inquiry* 8: 10–31. (in SWAN X)
- . 1986c. "Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise?" In *Conservation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity*, edited by M. E. Soulé. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
- . 1986d. "Limited definiteness of 'God' in Spinoza's system: Answer to Heine Siebrand." *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 28: 275–83.
- . 1986e. "Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world." Keith Roby Memorial Lecture in Community Science, Murdoch University, Australia, March 12. Reprinted in *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 4(3). (in SWAN X)
- . 1987. *Ekspertenes syn på naturens egenverdi*. ("Expert Views on the Inherent Value of Nature.") Trondheim, Norway: Tapir Forlag. (in SWAN X)
- . 1989. *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

REFERENCES

- . 1990. "Man apart and deep ecology: A reply to Reed." *Environmental Ethics* 12: 185–92.
- . 1991. "Should we try to relieve clear cases of extreme suffering in nature?" *Pan Ecology* 6, (in SWAN X)
- . 1993. "Beautiful action: Its function in the ecological crisis." *Environmental Values* 2, (in SWAN X)
- . 2004. *Which World Is the Real World?* (original in Norwegian). Amsterdam: Kluwer. (SWAN III)
- Naess, Arne, K. Kvaløe, and J. Christophersen. 1954. *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy*. Oslo: University of Oslo Press (Oxford: Blackwell, 1956).
- Naess, Arne, and Ivar Mysterud. 1987. "Philosophy of wolf policies I: General principles and preliminary exploration of selected norms." *Conservation Biology* 1: 22–34. (in SWAN X)
- Neurath, Otto, et al., eds. 1936. *Philosophy of Science*, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Republished 1938 as *Encyclopedia of Unified Science*.
- Norton, Bryan G. 1991. "Thoreau's insect analogies: Or, why environmentalists hate mainstream economists." *Environmental Ethics* 13.
- Nuyen, A. T. 1991. "A Heideggerian existential ethics for the human environment." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 25.
- Oelschlaeger, Max. 1991. *The Idea of Wilderness*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Passmore, John. 1974. *Man's Responsibility for Nature*. London and New York: Duckworth and Scribner.
- . 1975. "The treatment of animals." *Journal of History of Ideas* 26, no. 2: 195–218.
- Pauhlke, Robert C. 1989. *Environmentalism and the Future of Progressive Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Pimlott, D. M. 1975. "Wolves." *Proceedings of the First Working Meeting of Wolf Specialists and First International Conference on Conservation of the Wolf*. Morges, Switzerland: IUCN.
- Polanyi, Michael. 1952. "The stability of beliefs." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 3: 217–32.
- Ponting, Clive. 1992. *The Green History of the World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Porritt, Jonathon. 1984. *Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Power, Shahed Amed. 1990. *Gandhi and Deep Ecology*, Ph.D. diss., Salford University, England.

REFERENCES

- Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
- Regan, Tom. 1979. "An examination and defense of one argument concerning animal rights." *Inquiry* 22: 189–219.
- . 1981. "The nature and possibility of an environmental ethics." *Environmental Ethics* 3: 19–34.
- Research Policy Conference on Environment and Development. 1988. *One Earth—One World*. Oslo: Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities.
- Rohrer, Max. 1920. "Die Berge in Mythos, Kult und Dichtung der arischen Inder." *Deutsche Alpen Zeitung*.
- Sahlins, Marshall. 1972. *Stone Age Economics*. New York: Aldine.
- Schilpp, P. A., ed. 1949. *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*. Evanston, IL: Library of Living Philosophers.
- Schwarz, Walter, and Dorothy Schwarz. 1987. *Breaking Through*. Dartington, UK: Green Books.
- Sessions, George. 1981. "Shallow and deep ecology: A review of the philosophical literature." In *Ecological Consciousness*, edited by Robert C. Schultz and J. Donald Hughes. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, pp. 391–462.
- . 1992. "Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection." In *The Wilderness Condition: Essays on Environmental and Civilization*, edited by Max Oelschlaeger. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Sextus Empiricus. 1933. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, translated by R. G. Bury. London: Loeb Classic Library, Heinemann.
- Sinclair, A. R. E., and M. Norton-Griffiths, eds. 1979. *Serengeti: Dynamics of an Ecosystem*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smart, J. J. C. 1961. "Colours." *Philosophy* 36: 128–42.
- Smith, M. B., and J. B. Casagrande. 1953. "The Cross-cultural education projects: A program report." *Social Science Research Council Items*, no. 3.
- Smith, Mick. 1999. "To speak of trees: Social constructionism, environmental values, and the future of deep ecology." *Environmental Ethics* 21: 359–76.
- Snyder, Gary. 1990. *The Practice of the Wild*. San Francisco: North Point Press.
- Sørensen, O. J., P. Wabakken, T. Kvan, and A. Landa. 1984. *Viltrapport* 34: 54–59.
- Soulé, Michael E. 1980. "Thresholds for survival: Maintaining fitness and evolutionary potential." In *Conservation Biology*, edited by M. E. Soulé and B. A. Wilcox. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
- . 1985. "What is conservation biology?" *BioScience* 35: 727–34.
- . 1992/93. "A vision for the meantime." In *Wild Earth*, special issue: 7–8.

REFERENCES

- , ed. 1986. *Conservation Biology: The Science of Scarcity and Diversity*. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
- Soulé, Michael E., and Bruce A. Wilcox, eds. 1980. *Conservation Biology: An Ecological-Evolutionary Perspective*. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
- Spinoza, Baruch. 1955. *Ethics*. (Includes *Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding*.) New York: Hafner.
- . 1989. *Theological Political Treatise*, translated by S. Shirley. Leiden: Brill. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001).
- Sprigge, T. L. S. 1979. "Metaphysics, physicalism, and animal rights." *Inquiry* 22: 101–43.
- . 1984. "Non-human rights: An idealist perspective." *Inquiry* 27: 439–61.
- Stardom, R. R. 1983. *Canadian Wildlife Service Report Series* 45: 30–34.
- Scherbatsky, F. Th. 1974. *The Central Conception of Buddhism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Stone, Christopher D. 1974. *Should Trees Have Standing?* Los Altos, CA: William Kaufmann.
- Strong, D. R., D. Simberloff, L. G. Abele, and A. B. Thistle, eds. 1984. *Ecological Communities: Conceptual Issues and the Evidence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thonstad, Tore. 1982. "Perspectives of European Demographic Evolution: Expected Major Economic Consequences." In *European Population Conference 1982*. Council of Europe, Strasbourg, EPC (82) 10-E.
- Thoreau, Henry. 1949. *The Journal*, vol. 13, edited by B. Terrey and F. H. Allen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- . 1971. *Walden*, edited by J. L. Sharley. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tobias, Michael C., ed. 1985. *Deep Ecology*. San Diego, CA: Avant Books.
- Tobias, Michael C., and Harold Drasdo, eds. 1979. *The Mountain Spirit*. New York: Overlook Press.
- United Nations. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. *Our Common Future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- United Nations (UNESCO). 1978. *Universal Declaration of Animal Rights*. (Proclaimed in Paris on October 15, 1978 at UNESCO Headquarters.)
- Vaag, A. B., A. Haga, and H. Granstuen. 1986. *Forslag til Landsplan for Forvaltning av Bjorn, Serv og Ulvi Norge. Viltrapport* 39: 1–162.
- Vaihinger, Hans. 1935. *The Philosophy of "As If"*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

REFERENCES

- VanDeVeer, Donald. 1979. "Interspecific justice." *Inquiry* 22: 55–70.
- Van Liere, Kent D., and Riley E. Dunlap. 1980. "The social bases of environmental concern: A review of hypotheses, explanations, and empirical evidence." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44: 181–97.
- Verney, Stephen. 1976. *Into the New Age*. Glasgow: Collins.
- von Uexkull, J. 1909. *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere*. Berlin.
- . 1920. *Theoretische Biologie*. Berlin. (English translation, New York, 1926.)
- Wagenen, Richard W. van. 1952. *Research in the International Organization Field*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
- Walsby, Harold 1947. *The Domain of Ideologies*. Glasgow: W. MacLellan.
- Watson, Richard A., and Philip M. Smith. 1970. "The limit: 500 million." *Focus Midwest* 8(52): 25–28.
- Wendelbo, Per. 1952. *Tirich Mir: The Norwegian Expedition*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Wilson, Edward O. 1975. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Witoszek, N. and A. Brennan, eds. 1999. *Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Philosophy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Wolff, Robert Paul. 1963. *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1958. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, vol. 2. New York: Ridian Books.
- Wyld, Henry Cecil Kennedy. 1932. *The Universal Dictionary of the English Language*. New York: Dutton.
- Yinger, J. Milton. 1946. *Religion in the Struggle for Power: A Study in the Sociology of Religion*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Comprehensive Bibliography of Arne Naess's Works in English

This bibliography is based on information compiled by Harold Glasser and Kit-Fai Naess. It is a fairly complete record of Naess's works published in English, including some that were coauthored. For a more complete list of his work published and unpublished, see the website of the Center for Development and the Environment (SUM) associated with the University of Oslo.

By Arne Naess

- 1936. *Erkenntnis und Wissenschaftliches Verhalten* (Knowledge acquisition and science as behavior). Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences, Inaugural Dissertation.
- 1938a. "Common sense and truth." *Theoria* 4: 39–58. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1938b. "Contribution to the discussions of the International Kongres für Einheit der Wissenschaft." *Erkenntnis* 7 (1937/38): 369–70 (D. C. Williams); 370 (J. H. Woodger); 371 (K. Grelling, P. Oppenheim); 382 (M. Kokoszynska); 384–86 (Walter Hollitscher).
- 1938c. *Truth as Conceived by Those Who Are Not Professional Philosophers*. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences and Jacob Dybwad.
- 1947a. "Abstracts of work by Georg Hygen, Ole Koppand, and Peter Wessel Zapffe." *Philosophic Abstracts* 7: 6–7.
- 1947b. "Citizenship as a subject!" *Universitas* (special issue) 2: 1–2.
- 1948a. *Notes on the Foundations of Psychology as a Science*, vol. 9, Stencil. Filosofiske Problemer, edited by Arne Naess. Oslo: Oslo University.
- 1948b. *Objectivity of Norms: Two Directions of Precization*, vol. 9, Stencil. Filosofiske Problemer, edited by Arne Naess. Oslo: Oslo University.
- 1949. "Towards a theory of interpretation and preciseness." *Theoria* 15: 220–41.
- 1950a. "The function of ideological convictions." In *Tensions That Cause Wars* (Common statement and individual papers by a group of social scientists brought to-

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- gether by UNESCO), edited by H. Cantril. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 257–98. (in SWAN IX)
- 1950b. "Norwegian mountaineers in Chitral." *Pakistan Horizon* 3: 3,5.
- 1951a. "Appendix I: The UNESCO questionnaire on ideological conflicts concerning democracy." In *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, edited by Richard McKeon with the assistance of Stein Rokkan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 513–21.
- 1951b. "The Norwegian expedition to Tirich Mir, 1950." *Alpine Journal* (London) 58 (May): 6–15.
1952. "Towards a theory of interpretation and preciseness." In *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*, edited by Leonard Linsky. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 248–69.
- 1953a. *An Empirical Study of the Expressions 'True,' 'Perfectly Certain,' and 'Extremely Probable.'* Oslo: Jacob Dybwad.
- 1953b. *Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communication.* Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I)
- 1953c. "Philosophers and research in the soft sciences." In *Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy, Volume VI: Philosophy and Methodology of the Sciences of Nature, Brussels, 20–26 August, 1953.* Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 255–59.
1954. "Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws." *Theoria* 20: 53–63. (in SWAN VIII)
1956. "Synonymity and empirical research." *Methodos* 8: 3–22.
- 1957a. "Synonymity as revealed by intuition (Discussion of B. Mates's *Synonymity*)."
Philosophical Review 66: 87–93.
- 1957b. "What does 'testability' mean? An account of a procedure developed by Ludvig Løvestad." *Methodos* 9: 229–37.
- 1958a. "Editorial Statement." *Inquiry* 1: 1–6.
- 1958b. "Logical equivalence, intentional isomorphism and synonymity as studied by questionnaires, sacred to the memory of Gerrit Mannoury." *Synthese* 10a (1956–58): 471–79. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1958c. "Systematization of Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2: 140–55. (in SWAN X)
- 1959a. "Do we know that basic norms cannot be true or false?" *Theoria* 25: 31–55. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1959b. *Philosophy Within a World University* (a memorandum drawn up for the Conference at Brissago, Switzerland, September 1959). Stuttgart: International Society for the Establishment of a World University.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1960a. "Empiricism and freedom in theorizing (Notes on P. K. Feyerabend's mimeographed manuscripts *How to Be a Good Empiricist and Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism*)." Unpublished manuscript: 11 pages.
- 1960b. "Typology of questionnaires adapted to the study of expressions with closely related meanings." *Synthese* 12: 481–94. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1961a. "Can knowledge be reached? (Lecture delivered at Oxford University, October 1960)." *Inquiry* 4: 219–27. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1961b. "The inquiring mind. Notes on the relation between philosophy and science (prepared in close cooperation with Eivind Storheim)." *Inquiry* 4: 162–89.
- 1961c. "The inquiring mind. Notes on the relation between philosophy and science (prepared in close cooperation with Eivind Storheim)" (reprint of 1961b). *Philosophy Today* 5: 185–204.
- 1961d. "Metaempirical reflections." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1961e. "A study of 'or'." *Synthese* 13: 49–60. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1962a. *Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza's "Ethics"*. Oslo: Filosofisk Institutt, Universitet i Oslo.
- 1962b. "Nonmilitary defense." In *Preventing World War III*, edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan, and Morton Deutsch. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 123–35. (in SWAN IX)
- 1962c. "Typology of questionnaires adopted for the study of expressions with closely related meanings" (reprint of 1960b). In *Logic and Language: Studies Dedicated to Rudolf Carnap on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*, edited by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel et al. Dordrecht: Synthese Library, pp. 206–19. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1962d. "We still do not know that norms cannot be true or false: A reply to Dag Österburg." *Theoria* 28: 205–09. (in SWAN VIII)
1963. "Knowledge and definiteness of intention." Unpublished manuscript: 10 pages.
- 1964a. "Definition and hypothesis in Plato's 'Meno'." *Inquiry* 7: 231–34.
- 1964b. "Nonmilitary defense and foreign policy." In *Civilian Defense*, edited by Adam Roberts. London: Peace News Pamphlet, pp. 33–43.
- 1964c. "Pluralistic theorizing in physics and philosophy." *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy* 1: 101–11.
- 1964d. "Reflections about total views." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X)
- 1964e. "Was it all worth while? Review of P. de Vomécourt: *Who Lived to See the Day: France in Arms, 1940–1945*." *Peace News* (March 6).

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1965a. *Gandhi and the Nuclear Age*, translated by Alastair Hannay. Totowa, NJ: Rowman.
- 1965b. "Nature ebbing out." Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1965c. "Science as behavior: Prospects and limitations of a behavioral metascience." In *Scientific Psychology: Principles and Approaches*, edited by B. Wolman and E. Nagel. New York: Basic Books, pp. 50–67. (in SWAN IX)
- 1965d. "The south wall of Tirich Mir East." *Himalayan Journal* 26: 97–106. (in SWAN X)
- 1966a. *Communication and Argument: Elements of Applied Semantics*. Second printing 1981. Translated by Alastair Hannay. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN VII)
- 1966b. *Elements of Applied Semantics*, translated by Alastair Hannay. London: Allen and Unwin.
- 1966c. "Psychological and social aspects of Pyrrhonian scepticism." *Inquiry* 9: 301–21.
- 1967a. "Civilian defense and foreign policy." In *Civilian Defense: An Introduction*, edited by T. K. Mahadevan et al. New Delhi: Gandhi Peace Foundation, pp. 102–16.
- 1967b. "Notes on some similarities between Spinoza on the one hand and Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre on the other." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1967c. "Physics and the variety of world pictures." In *Grundfragen der Wissenschaften, und ihre Wurzeln in der Metaphysik*, edited by P. Weingartner. Salzburg: Pustet, pp. 181–88.
- 1967d. *Sanskrit for Generalists* (Sanskrit for generalists). Institute for Philosophy, mimeograph.
- 1968a. *Four Modern Philosophers: Carnap, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre*, translated by Alastair Hannay. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 1968b. "Kierkegaard and the values of education." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 12: 196–200. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1968c. *Scepticism*. London and New York: Humanities Press. (SWAN II)
- 1969a. "Freedom, emotion, and self-subsistence: The structure of a small, central part of Spinoza's *Ethics*." *Inquiry* 12: 66–104.
- 1969b. *Hvilken Verden er den Virkelige?* (Which world is the real one?), vol. 37. Filosofiske Problemer. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN III)
- 1970a. "Can violence lead to non-violence: Gandhi's point of view." In *Gandhi, India and the World: An International Symposium*, edited by Sibnarayan Ray. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 287–99. (in SWAN IX)
- 1970b. "The conquest of mountains: A contradiction." *Mountain* 14: 28–29.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1970c. "Language of creative research and language of science: A contrast." In *Linguaggi nella società e nella tecnica. Convegno promosso dalla Ing. C. Olivetti & C., S.p.a. per il centenario della nascita di Camillo Olivetti*. Milano: Edizioni di Comunità.
- 1970d. "A plea for pluralism in philosophy and physics (and discussions)." In *Physics, Logic, and History: Based on the First International Colloquium Held at the University of Denver, May 16–20, 1966*, edited by Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck. Denver: Plenum Press, pp. 129–46. (in SWAN IX)
- 1970e. "Rudolf Carnap." *Inquiry* 13: 337–38.
- 1971a. "Kierkegaard and the educational crisis." *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy* 8: 65–70.
- 1971b. "Letter to the king of Nepal." In *The Autobiography of a Shipping Man*, edited by Erling D. Naess (author). Oslo: Seatrade Publications, pp. 252–53. (in SWAN X)
- 1972a. "The Place of normative ethics within a biological framework." In *Biology, History, and Natural Philosophy*, edited by Allen D. Breck and Wolfgang Yourgrau. New York: Plenum, pp. 197–206.
- 1972b. *The Pluralist and Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN IV)
- 1972c. "Pyrrhonism revisited." In *Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia*, edited by Raymond E. Olsen and Anthony M. Paul. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 393–403. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1973a. "Attitudes towards nature and interactions with nature (Three lectures given in Hong Kong)." Unpublished manuscript: 20 pages.
- 1973b. "Comments on 'Knowledge versus survival'." *Inquiry* 16: 415–16.
- 1973c. "The place of joy in a world of fact." *North American Review* (Summer): 53–57. (in SWAN X)
- 1973d. "Secondary qualities in the light of Sextus Empiricus' interpretation of Protagoras." Unpublished manuscript: 19 pages.
- 1973e. "The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A summary." *Inquiry* 16: 95–100. (in SWAN X)
- 1974a. "The ecopolitical frontier: A case study." *Intercollegiate Bulletin* 5: 18–26.
- 1974b. *Equivalent Terms and Notions in Spinoza's "Ethics"*. Oslo: Filosofisk Institutt, Universitet i Oslo.
- 1974c. *Gandhi and Group Conflict: An Exploration of Satyāgraha*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN V)
- 1974d. "Is freedom consistent with Spinoza's determinism?" In *Spinoza on Knowing, Being, and Freedom: Proceedings of the Spinoza Symposium, Leusden, 1973*, edited by J. G. van der Bend. Assen: Van Gorcum, pp. 6–23. (in SWAN IX)

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1974e. "Martin Heidegger." In *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed., pp. 738–41.
- 1975a. "The case against science." In *Science Between Culture and Counter-culture*, edited by C. I. Dessaur. Nijmegen, Netherlands: Dekker and Van de Vegt, pp. 25–48. (in SWAN IX)
- 1975b. *Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's Ethics*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN VI)
- 1975c. "Possibilism." Unpublished manuscript: 16 pages.
- 1975d. "Why not science for anarchists too? (A reply to Feyerabend)." *Inquiry* 18(2): 183–94. (in SWAN IX)
- 1977a. "Friendship, strength of emotion, and freedom." In *Spinoza Herdacht: 1677, 21 Februari 1977*. Amsterdam: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, pp. 11–19.
- 1977b. "Husserl on the apodictic evidence of ideal laws." In *Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations*, edited by J. N. Mohanty. Reprinted from *Theoria* 20 (1954): 53–63. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 67–75. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1977c. "The limited neutrality of typologies of systems: A reply to Gullvag." *Inquiry* 20: 67–72.
- 1977d. "Notes on the methodology of normative systems." *Methodology and Science* 10: 64–79. (in SWAN X)
- 1977e. "Spinoza and ecology." *Philosophia* 7(1): 45–54.
- 1977f. "Spinoza and ecology." In *Speculum Spinozanum, 1677–1977*, edited by S. Hensing. London: Routledge, pp. 418–25.
1978. "Through Spinoza to Mahāyāna Buddhism, or through Mahāyāna Buddhism to Spinoza?" In *Spinoza's Philosophy of Man: Proceedings of the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium, 1977*, edited by J. Wetlesen. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 136–58. (in SWAN IX)
- 1979a. "Modesty and the conquest of mountains." In *The Mountain Spirit*, edited by Michael C. Tobias and H. Drasdo. New York: Overlook Press, pp. 13–16. (in SWAN X)
- 1979b. "Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves." *Inquiry* 22: 231–41. (in SWAN X)
- 1979c. "Towards a theory of wide cognitivism." In *Theory of Knowledge and Science Policy*, edited by W. Callebaut, M. De Mey, et al. Ghent: Communication and Cognition, pp. 111–18.
- 1980a. "Environmental ethics and Spinoza's *Ethics*: Comments on Genevieve Lloyd's article." *Inquiry* 23: 313–25.
- 1980b. *Filosofiens Historie I: Fra Oldtiden til Renessansen* (History of philosophy I). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1980c. *Filosofiens Historie II: Fra Renessansen til vår Tid* (History of philosophy II). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- 1980d. "Ideology and rationality" (revised and abbreviated version of 1978b). In *Ideology and Politics*, edited by Maurice Cranston and Peter Mair. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff, pp. 133–42. (in SWAN IX)
- 1980e. "Whole philosophies as data and as constructs." In *Social Science for What? Festschrift for Johan Galtung*, edited by H. H. Holm and E. Rudeng. Oslo: Oslo University Press, pp. 182–88.
- 1981a. "The empirical semantics of key terms, phrases and sentences." In *Philosophy and Grammar: Papers on the Occasion of the Quincentennial of Uppsala University*, edited by Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 135–54. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1981b. "The primacy of the whole." In *Holism and Ecology*, edited by Arne Naess and Danilo Dolci. Tokyo: United Nations University (HSDRGPID-61/ UNEP-326), pp. 1–10.
- 1981c. "Spinoza's finite God." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (135): 120–26. (in SWAN IX)
- 1982a. "An application of empirical argumentation analysis to Spinoza's 'Ethics.'" In *Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation*, edited by E. M. Barth and J. L. Martens. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 245–55. (in SWAN IX)
- 1982b. *Forward*, Henryk Skolimowski, *Ekofilosofi*. Stockholm: Akademilitteratur.
- 1982c. "A necessary component of logic: Empirical argumentation and analysis." In *Argumentation: Approaches to Theory Formation*, edited by E. M. Barth and J. L. Martens. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 9–22. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1982d. "Scepticism as the result of sufficiently deep and comprehensive inquiry: An answer to Nicholas Rescher." Unpublished manuscript: 12 pages.
- 1982e. "Simple in means, rich in ends: A conversation with Arne Naess." *Ten Directions* (Summer/Fall): 7–12.
- 1983a. "Einstein, Spinoza, and God." In *Old and New Questions in Physics, Cosmology, Philosophy, and Theoretical Biology: Essays in Honor of Wolfgang Yourgrau*, edited by A. van der Merwe. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 683–87. (in SWAN IX)
- 1983b. "How my philosophy seemed to develop." In *Philosophers on Their Own Work*, edited by Andre Mercier and Maja Svilar. Bern: Peter Lang, pp. 209–26. (in SWAN IX)
- 1983c. "Spinoza and attitudes towards nature." In *Spinoza: His Thought and Work*. Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, pp. 160–75. (in SWAN X)
- 1984a. "The arrogance of anti-humanism." *Ecophilosophy* 6 (May): 8–9. (in SWAN X)

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1984b. "Cultural anthropology: A new approach to the study of how to conceive of our own future (Fifteen lectures given in Vienna)." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1984c. "Deep ecology and lifestyle." In *The Paradox of Environmentalism: Symposium Proceedings in Downsview, Ontario*, edited by Neil Everndon. Downsview, Ontario: Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, pp. 57–60. (in SWAN X)
- 1984d. "A defense of the deep ecology movement." *Environmental Ethics* 6: 265–70.
- 1984e. "The green utopia of 2084 (A paper presented at the University of Minnesota)." Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages.
- 1984f. "Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes." In *Deep Ecology*, edited by Michael Tobias. San Marcos, CA: Avant Books, pp. 256–70.
- 1984g. "Intuition, intrinsic value and deep ecology: Arne Naess replies." *The Ecologist* 14 (5–6): 201–03.
- 1984h. "The politics of the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1984i. Review of *Warriors of the Rainbow: A Chronicle of the Greenpeace Movement*, by Robert Hunter. *Rigen Var Verden* (34): 10–15.
- 1984j. *A Sceptical Dialogue on Induction*. Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum.
- 1985a. "Ecosophy T." In *Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered*, edited by Bill Devall and George Sessions. Salt Lake City: Gibbs Smith, pp. 225–28.
- 1985b. "Gestalt thinking and Buddhism." Unpublished manuscript: 9 single-spaced pages. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1985c. "The world of concrete contents." *Inquiry* 28: 417–28. (in SWAN X)
- 1986a. "The connection of 'Self-realization!' with diversity, complexity, and symbiosis." Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1986b. "Consequences of an absolute *no* to nuclear war." In *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions*, edited by Avner Cohen and Steven Lee. Torowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, pp. 425–36. (in SWAN IX)
- 1986c. "Deep ecology in good conceptual health." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 3(4): 18–22.
- 1986d. "The deep ecology movement: Some philosophical aspects." *Philosophical Inquiry* 8: 10–31. (in SWAN X)
- 1986e. "Intrinsic nature: Will the defenders of nature please rise?" In *Conservation Biology: The Science and Scarcity of Diversity*, edited by Michael E. Soulé. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, pp. 504–15.
- 1986f. "Limited definiteness of 'God' in Spinoza's system: Answer to Heine Siebrand." In *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie*, edited by Oswald Bayer. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 275–83.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1986g. "Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world." Keith Roby Memorial Lecture in Community Science, Murdoch University, Australia, March 12. (in SWAN X)
- 1987a. "Ecosophy, population, and free nature." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1987b. *Eksperienes Syn På Naturens Egenverdi* (Expert views on the intrinsic value of nature). Trondheim: Tapir Forlag. (in SWAN X)
- 1987c. "For its own sake." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 4(2): 28–29.
- 1987d. "From ecology to ecosophy, from science to wisdom." Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages.
- 1987e. "Green society and deep ecology" (Schumacher Lecture). Unpublished manuscript: 14 pages.
- 1987f. "Notes on the politics of the deep ecology movement." In *Sustaining Gaia: Contributions to Another World View*, edited by Frank Fisher. Glen Waverly, Victoria, Australia: Aristoc Offset, pp. 178–98.
- 1987g. "Notes on the term 'anthropocentrism'." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1987h. "Population reduction: An ecosophical view." Unpublished manuscript: 8 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1987i. "Scientific and technological biomedical progress as cultural concepts (Colloque de l'Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, organisé à Bruxelles, du 23 au 28 avril 1984)." In *La responsabilité éthique dans le développement biomedical*. Louvain-la-Neuve, France: CIACO, pp. 199–203.
- 1987j. "Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 4(3): 35–42. (in SWAN X)
- 1987k. "Solidarity, money, and the well-to-do." *Pan Ecology: An Irregular Journal of Nature and Human Nature* 1(3): 1–4.
- 1988a. "The basics of deep ecology." *Resurgence* (January/February): 4–7. (in SWAN X)
- 1988b. "Cultural diversity and the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript: 10 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1988c. "Deep ecology and ultimate premises." *The Ecologist* 18 (4/5): 128–31.
- 1988d. "The deep ecology movement." In *Problems of International Justice*, edited by S. Luper-Foy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 144–48.
- 1988e. "Ecosophy, population, and free nature" (revision of 1987a). *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 5(3): 113–19.
- 1988f. "Environmental activism and Spinoza's *amor intellectualis dei*." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1988g. "Environmental ethics and international justice." *Ecospirit* 4(1).

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1988h. "A European looks at the North American branches of the deep ecology movement." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 5(2): 75–76.
- 1988i. "Green politics, green parties, deep ecology. How related?" Unpublished manuscript.
- 1988j. "Norway—A developing country with good prospects." In *One Earth—One World*. Oslo: Ministry of Environment.
- 1988k. "Note concerning Murray Bookchin's article 'Social ecology versus deep ecology.'" Unpublished manuscript.
- 1988l. "On the structure and function of paradigms in science." In *Theories of Carcinogenesis*, edited by Olav Hilmar Iversen. Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere Publishing, pp. 1–9. (in SWAN IX)
- 1988m. "Self-realization: An ecological approach to being in the world" (excerpted from the Keith Roby Memorial Lecture, March 12, 1986, and from 1987j). In *Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings*, edited by John Seed, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, pp. 19–30. (in SWAN X)
- 1988n. "Sustainable development and the deep long-range ecology movement." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 5(4): 138–42.
- 1988o. "What is gestalt thinking? A note." Unpublished manuscript: 5 pages.
- 1989a. "Arne Naess gives his support to Edward Goldsmith's 'The Way.'" *The Ecologist* 19(5): 196–97.
- 1989b. "The basics of deep ecology." In *Actual English*. Kyoto: All English General Information Society. (in SWAN X)
- 1989c. "Deep ecology, wilderness, and the third world." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1989d. "The deepness of deep ecology." *Earth First!* (December): 32.
- 1989e. "*Docta ignorantia* and the application of general guidelines." Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1989f. "Ecology and ethics (Goteborg paper, 28th September)." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1989g. *Ecology, Community, and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy*, translated and revised by David Rothenberg. Cambridge, UK: The University Press.
- 1989h. "Ecosophy and gestalt ontology." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 6(4): 134–37.
- 1989i. "Ecosophy: Beyond East and West" (an interview with Richard Evanoff). *Kyoto Journal* (Summer): 40–44.
- 1989j. "Ecosophy, population, and sustainable development." Unpublished manuscript: 15 pages.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1989k. "The essence of the philosophy of Peter Wessel Zapffe." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1989l. "Finding common ground." *Green Synthesis* (March): 9–10.
- 1989m. "Gestalt ontology and gestalt thinking" (revised version of 1988o). Unpublished manuscript: 5 single-spaced pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1989n. "Metaphysics of the treeline." *Appalachia* (June 15): 56–59. Also in *Edge* 2(4): 25–26. (in SWAN X)
- 1989o. "A note on definition, criteria, and characterizations." Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1989p. "A note on the function of the 'Eight Points' of deep ecology." Unpublished manuscript: 8 pages.
- 1989q. "Quality of life research." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1989r. "Integration of the 8 points of ecosophy T." Unpublished diagram. (in SWAN X)
- 1990a. "The basics of deep ecology" (summary of 1987 Schumacher Lecture; reprint of 1988a). In *The Green Fuse*, edited by John Button. London: Quartet Books, pp. 130–37. (in SWAN X)
- 1990b. "Deep ecology and conservation biology." *Earth First!* (March 20): 29. (in SWAN X)
- 1990c. "The deep ecology movement and ecologism." *Anarchy* (Summer): 33.
- 1990d. "Deepness of questions and the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1990e. "An intramural note on transpersonal ecosophy." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1990f. "Is freedom consistent with Spinoza's determinism?" (revision of 1974d). In *Spinoza*, edited by Martin Schewe and Achim Engstler. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 227–47. (in SWAN IX)
- 1990g. "Japan's second and last mistake." *Japan Environment Monitor* 3(2): 6–7.
- 1990h. "'Man apart' and deep ecology: A reply to Reed." *Environmental Ethics* 12 (Summer): 185–92.
- 1990i. "Peter Wessel Zapffe, obituary." *Aftenposten* (October 15).
- 1990j. "Pushing for a deep change" (interview). *English Journal* 4 (April).
- 1990k. "Spinoza and attitudes towards nature" (revised version of 1983c). Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1990l. "Sustainable development and deep ecology." In *Ethics of Environment and Development: Global Challenge, International Response*, edited by R. J. Engel and J. G. Engel. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, pp. 87–96. (in SWAN X)

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1991a. "The connection of 'Self-realization!' with diversity, complexity and symbiosis." Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1991b. "Freedom, self, and activeness according to Spinoza." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1991c. "An interview with Arne Naess." *New Renaissance* 2: 4–5.
- 1991d. "Is it a plus to have definite metaphysics in common? (Regarding Max Oelschlaeger's book, *The Idea of Wilderness*)." Unpublished manuscript: 2+ pages.
- 1991e. "A memorial tribute to Peter Wessel Zapffe." *Norwegian Literature* 1991.
- 1991f. "A note on the prehistory and history of the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1991g. "Paul Feyerabend—A Green hero?" In *Beyond Reason*, edited by Gonzalo Munévar. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 403–16. (in SWAN X)
- 1991h. "Politics and the ecological crisis: An introductory note." *ReVISION* 13(1): 142–46. (in SWAN X)
- 1991i. "Should we try to relieve cases of extreme suffering in nature?" *PanEcology* 6(1): 1–5. (in SWAN X)
- 1991j. "The Spectacular—enemy?" Unpublished manuscript.
- 1991k. "Spinoza and the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1992a. "Architecture and the deep ecology movement (Stockholm lecture)." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1992b. "Arguing under deep disagreement" (an abbreviated version of 1992i). In *Logic and Political Culture: Proceedings of the Colloquium "Logic and Politics," Amsterdam, 19–22 February 1990*, edited by E. M. Barth and E. C. W. Krabbe. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 123–31.
- 1992c. "Ayer on metaphysics: A critical commentary by a kind of metaphysician." In *The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 329–40.
- 1992d. "Deep ecology and potters in our planet." *The Studio Potter* 20: 38–39.
- 1992e. "Deep ecology for the twenty-second century." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9(2): 86–88. (in SWAN X)
- 1992f. "Ecology and ethics." In *Ecology and Ethics*, edited by A. Øfsti. Oslo: Norland Akademi for Kunst og Vitenskap.
- 1992g. "The encouraging richness and diversity of ultimate premises in environmental philosophy." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9(2): 53–60. (in SWAN X)

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1992h. "To grow up or to get to be more mature?" *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9(2): 80–81.
- 1992i. "How can the empirical movement be promoted today? A discussion of the empiricism of Otto Neurath and Rudolph Carnap." In *From an Empirical Point of View: The Empirical Turn in Logic*, edited by E. M. Barth, J. Vandormael, and F. Vandamme. Gent, Belgium: Communication and Cognition, pp. 107–55. (The original German version, *Wie fördert man heute die empirische Bewegung? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Empirismus von Otto Neurath und Rudolph Carnap*, was written during 1937–39. It appeared in Oslo University's Filosofiske Problemer 19, 1956). (in SWAN VIII)
- 1992j. "Introductory biology and 'life appreciation' courses." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9(3): 126.
- 1992k. "Maturity, adulthood, boxing, and playfulness." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1992l. "Mountains (revised from original 1991 manuscript)." Unpublished manuscript: 6 double-spaced pages.
- 1992m. "The principle of intensity." Unpublished manuscript (article originally written in the 1940s): 4 pages. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1992n. "Radical thinking for desperate times." *The Independent* (January).
- 1992o. "Spinoza and the deep ecology movement" (Michigan lecture, revised from 1991k). Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1992p. "Sustainability! The integral approach." In *Conservation of Biodiversity for Sustainable Development*, edited by O. T. Sandlund, K. Hindar, and A. H. D. Brown. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, pp. 303–10. (in SWAN X)
- 1992q. "Third world, deep ecology, socialism, and Hitlerism: An open letter." *The Deep Ecologist* 43: 4–5.
- 1992r. "The three great movements." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 9(2): 85–86. (in SWAN X)
- 1992s. "Tvergastein: An example of place." Unpublished manuscript: 18 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1992t. "What about science in ecologically sustainable societies?" Unpublished manuscript.
- 1993a. "Beautiful action: Its function in the ecological crisis." *Environmental Values* 2(1): 67–71. (in SWAN X)
- 1993b. "The breadth and the limits of the deep ecology movement." *Wild Earth* 3: 74–75. (in SWAN X)
- 1993c. "Culture and environment." In *Culture and Environment: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Nina Witoszek and Elizabeth Gulbrandsen. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, pp. 201–09.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1993d. "The deep ecological movement: Some philosophical aspects." In *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence*, edited by Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 411–21. (in SWAN X)
- 1993e. *Deep Ecology and Politics* (a revision of three articles, "The three great movements," "Comments on the planned official Norwegian presentation in Rio, April 1992," and "Politics and the ecological crisis: An introductory note"). Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, working paper 1993.7. (in SWAN X)
- 1993f. "The deep ecology 'Eight Points' revisited." Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1993g. "Everything really important is dangerous" (an interview with Arne Naess by David Rothenberg). In *Wisdom and the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology*, edited by Peter Reed and David Rothenberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 99–111.
- 1993h. "Fundamentalism, Rawls, and the Eight Points of the deep ecology movement: A note." Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages.
- 1993i. "Gandhian nonviolent verbal communication: The necessity of training." Unpublished manuscript: 9 pages.
- 1993j. "How should supporters of the deep ecology movement behave in order to affect society and culture?" *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 10(3): 98–100.
- 1993k. "In praise of books of the big outside." *Wild Earth* 3: 88–89.
- 1993l. "Logical empiricism and the uniqueness of the Schlick seminar: A personal experience with consequences." In *Scientific Philosophy*, edited by Friedrich Stadler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 11–25. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1993m. "Migration and ecological unsustainability." Unpublished manuscript: 5 pages.
- 1993n. "Mountains and mythology." Unpublished manuscript: 2 pages.
- 1993o. "The politics of the deep ecology movement." In *Wisdom and the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology*, edited by Peter Reed and David Rothenberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 82–99. (in SWAN X)
- 1993p. "Simple in means, rich in ends" (an interview with Arne Naess by Stephan Bodian). In *Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology*, edited by Michael E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, George Sessions, Karen J. Warren, and John Clark. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 437 ff.
- 1993q. *Spinoza and the Deep Ecology Movement*. Delft: Eburon. (in SWAN X)
- 1993r. "Theory, practice, and its synthesis within a movement." Unpublished manuscript: 1 page.
- 1993s. "The tragedy of Norwegian whaling: A response to Norwegian environ-

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ment group support for whaling." *North Sea Monitor* (December): 10–12. (in SWAN X)
- 1993t. "'You assert this?' An empirical study of weight-expressions." In *Empirical Logic and Public Debate: Essays in Honour of Else M. Barth*, edited by Erik C. W. Krabbe, René José Dalitz, and Pier A. Smit. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rudopi, pp. 121–32. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1994a. "Climbing and the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript: 3 pages.
- 1994b. "Creativity and gestalt thinking." *The Structuralist* 33/34: 51–52. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1994c. "Culture and environment" (reprint of 1993c). *International Journal of Ecoforestry* 10(4): 158–161.
- 1994d. "From psychology to ontology (Ireland lecture)." Unpublished manuscript: 6 pages.
- 1994e. "A green history of the world (Lecture for Schumacher College, July)." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1994f. "The heart of the forest." *International Journal of Ecoforestry* 10: 40–41. (in SWAN X)
- 1994g. "How my philosophy seemed to have developed: 1983–1994." Unpublished manuscript: 7 pages. (in SWAN IX)
- 1994h. "The Norwegian roots of deep ecology." In *Nature: The True Home of Culture*, edited by Børge Dahle. Oslo: Norges Idrettshøgskole, pp. 15–18.
- 1994i. "Trust and confidence . . . An answer to Rescher's reappraisal of scepticism." Unpublished manuscript: 16 pages. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1994j. "What do we as supporters of the deep ecology movement stand for and believe in?" Unpublished manuscript: 9 double-spaced pages. (in SWAN X)
- 1995a. "The apron diagram." In *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology*, edited by Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue. Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, pp. 10–12. (in SWAN X)
- 1995b. "Deep ecology for the twenty-second century." In *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 463–67. (in SWAN X)
- 1995c. "Deep ecology in the line of fire." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 12(3): 146–49.
- 1995d. "Deepness of questions and the deep ecology movement." In *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmental-*

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ism*, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 204–12. (in SWAN X)
- 1995e. "The 'Eight Points' revisited." In *Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions. Boston and London: Shambhala, pp. 213–21. (in SWAN X)
- 1995f. Foreword to *The Interconnected Universe*, by Irvin Laszlo. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. v–vii.
- 1995g. "Industrial society, postmodernity, and ecological sustainability." *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 21: 131–46. (in SWAN X)
- 1995h. "Mountains and mythology." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 12(4): 165.
- 1995i. "Notes on gestalt ontology." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1995j. "Ranking, yes, but the inherent value is the same: An answer to William C. French." Published in Witoszek 1999 (see references). (in SWAN X)
- 1995k. "Seven point ecology (Some attitudes and convictions held by supporters of the deep ecology movement)." *Resurgence* (January/February): 26–27.
- 1995l. "The Third World, wilderness, and deep ecology." In *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions. Boston: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 397–407. (in SWAN X)
- 1995m. "Antifascist character of the eight points of the deep ecology movement." Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1995o. "Ecology, sameness & rights." In *Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism*, edited by George Sessions. Boston and London: Shambhala Publications, Inc., pp. 222–24.
- 1996a. "The Arctic dimension outside and inside us." In *Deep Ecology in the High Arctic: Proceedings of the 1994 International Ecophilosophical Symposium, Svalbard, Norway, 29th August–2nd September*, edited by Elisabeth Stoltz Larsen and Robin Buzza. Longyearbyen: Norwegian Polar Institute, pp. 13–16.
- 1996b. "Comments on Harold Glasser's 'Deep ecology approach' (DEA)." In *Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the Progress of Ecophilosophy*, edited by Nina Witoszek and Andrew Brennan. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, pp. 399–401.
- 1996c. "Deep ecology in the line of fire." In *Rethinking Deep Ecology: Proceedings from a Seminar at SUM, University of Oslo, 5 September 1995*, edited by Nina Witoszek. Oslo: Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, pp. 107–15.
- 1996d. "Does humanity have a cosmic role? Protecting and restoring the planet." *Environment Network News* (May/June).

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1996e. "Ecosophy, community, and lifestyle." In *Humanism Toward the Third Millennium*, edited by Fons Elders. Amsterdam: VUB Press, pp. 83–93.
- 1996f. "Heidegger, postmodernism theory, and deep ecology." Unpublished manuscript: 4 pages.
- 1996g. "Living a life that reflects evolutionary insight." *Conservation Biology* 10: 1557–59.
- 1996h. "A response to Rowe's 'From shallow to deep ecological philosophy'." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 13(1): 32.
- 1996i. "Vagueness and ambiguity." In *Philosophy of Language*, edited by A. P. Martinich. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 407–17.
- 1997a. "Conquest of mountains." *Resurgence* (July/August): 24–25.
- 1997b. "'Free nature': An interview with Ian Angus." *Alternatives Journal* 23(3): 18–21.
- 1997c. "Heidegger, postmodern theory, and deep ecology." *The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy* 14(4): 181–83.
- 1997d. "Insulin shock method and the economic crisis in Vienna in 1934." In *Some Notes on Madness*, edited by Tarja Heiskanen. Helsinki: Finnish Association for Mental Health, SMS Publishers.
- 1997e. "An outline of problems ahead" (talk given at Environmental Justice Conference, Melbourne, October 1997). Unpublished manuscript. (in SWAN X)
- 1998a. "All together now: A review of E. O. Wilson's *Consilience*." *New Scientist* (22 August): 42–43.
- 1998b. "Arne Naess speaks about ecophilosophy and solidarity." *Ragtime* 5: 16–17.
- 1998c. "Interview of Arne Naess by Casey Walker." *Wild Duck Review* 4(1): 18–20.
- 1998d. "The spirit of the Vienna Circle devoted to questions of *Lebens- und Weltauffassung*." In *Game Theory, Experience, Rationality*, edited by W. Leinfellner and E. Köhler. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, pp. 359–67. (in SWAN VIII)
- 1998e. "The term 'development' today." *Development Today* 8(1): 10–11.
- 1999a. "Articulation of normative interrelation: An information theoretical approach." Unpublished manuscript.
- 1999b. "Ecoforestry and the deep ecology movement." In *Proceedings of the Fourth Biannual Conference of the Taiga Rescue Network, October 5–10*, edited by Rein Ahas, Taime Puura, Anne Janssen, and Elisa Peters, pp. 72–73. Tartu, Estonia: Estonian Green Movement.
- 1999c. "An outline of the problems ahead." In *Global Ethics and the Environment*, edited by Nicholas Low. London and New York: Routledge. (in SWAN X)

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1999d. "The principle of intensity." *Journal of Value Inquiry* 33: 5–9. (in SWAN VIII)
2000. "Avalanches as social constructions." *Environmental Ethics* 22 (Fall): 335–36. (in SWAN X)

By Arne Naess and Coauthors

1951. Naess, Arne, and Stein Rokkan. "Analytical survey of agreements and disagreements." In *Democracy in a World of Tensions*, edited by Richard McKeon with the assistance of Stein Rokkan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 447–512. (in SWAN IX)
1955. Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. *Gandhis Politiske Etikk* (Gandhi's political ethics). 2d ed. 1968. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum.
1956. Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalø. *Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
1960. Naess, Siri, and Arne Naess. "Psychological research and human problems." *Philosophy of Science* 27: 134–46.
1964. Austin, John L., and Arne Naess. "On Herman Tønnessen's 'What should we say'." In *Eighteen Papers on Language Analysis and Empirical Semantics*, edited by Herman Tønnessen. Edmonton, Alberta: University of Alberta, pp. 143–49.
1967. Naess, Arne, and Jon Wetlesen. *Conation and Cognition in Spinoza's Theory of Affects: A Reconstruction*. Oslo: University of Oslo.
1969. Naess, Arne, and Sigmund Kvaløy (translator). "Some ethical considerations with a view to mountaineering in Norway." *American Alpine Journal* (London: *The Alpine Club*): 230–33. (in SWAN X)
- 1972a. Naess, Arne, and Alastair Hannay. "An appeal to the cramped scholar by way of a foreword." In *An Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies*, edited by Arne Naess and Alastair Hannay. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. vii–xv.
- 1972b. Naess, Arne, and Alastair Hannay, eds. *An Invitation to Chinese Philosophy: Eight Studies*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
1974. Naess, Arne, and A. J. Ayer. "The glass is on the table: An empiricist versus a total view" (a debate between Ayer and Naess). In *Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind*, edited by Fons Elders. London: Souvenir Press, pp. 11–68. (in SWAN VIII)
1980. Naess, Arne, and Jon Helleenes. "Norway." In *Handbook of World Philosophy Since 1945*, edited by John Burr. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, pp. 159–71.
1984. Naess, Arne, and George Sessions. "Basic principles of deep ecology." *Eco-philosophy* 6 (May): 3–7.

COMPREHENSIVE NAESS BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1987a. Naess, Arne, and Ivar Mysterud. "Philosophy of wolf policies I: General principles and preliminary exploration of selected norms." *Conservation Biology* 1: 22–34. (in SWAN X)
- 1987b. Naess, Siri, Arne Naess, and Torbjørn Moum and Tom Sørensen with the cooperation of Arne Mastekaasa. *Quality of Life Research: Concepts, Methods, and Applications*. Oslo: Institute of Applied Social Research.
1988. Seed, John, Joanna Macy, Pat Fleming, and Arne Naess, eds. *Thinking Like a Mountain: Towards a Council of All Beings*. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.
1989. Naess, Arne, Liu Shiao-Ru, and Nicholas Gould. "Deep ecology (A conversation on 'deep ecology' and Taiwan's environmental problems)." *Issues and Options* 1(44): 1–6.
1990. Mysterud, Ivar, and Arne Naess. "Philosophy of wolf policies II: Supernational strategy and emergency interim management." Unpublished manuscript: 14 pages.
1995. Naess, Arne, and Johan (Bilder) Brun. *Det Gode Lange Livs Far: Hallingskarvet sett fra Tvergastein* (The good, long life's father: Hallingskarvet from Tvergastein). Oslo: N. W. Damm and Son.
1996. Gullvåg, Ingemund, and Arne Naess. "Vagueness and ambiguity." In *Philosophy of Language*, edited by Marcelo Dascal, Dietfried Gerhardus, Kuno Lorenz, and Georg Meggle. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 1407–17.
1997. Naess, Arne, and Helena Norberg-Hodge. "Self-realization and society." *Resurgence* (January).
- 1998a. Grøn, Øyvind, and Arne Naess. *Introduction to General Relativity and Its Mathematics*. Oslo: Høgskolen i Oslo.
- 1998b. Naess, Arne, and Per Ingvar Haukeland. *Livsfilosofi: et personlig bidrag om følelser og fornuft / Arne Naess med Per Ingvar Haukeland*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
2000. Naess, Arne. "Deep ecology and education: A conversation with Bob Jickling." *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 5: 48–62. (in SWAN IX)
2002. Naess, Arne, with Per Ingvar Haukeland. *Life's Philosophy: Reason and Feeling in a Deeper World*. Translated by Roland Huntford. Foreword by Bill McKibben. Introduction by Harold Glasser. Athens and London: University of Georgia Press.

Index

- absolute and final principles, Aristotle's doctrine of, 478
- absolutist *ding-an-sich* conceptions, rejection of, 451–52
- abstract structures (of reality), 449, 453, 455–56, 458, 462, 465
- abundance, 595
- “acceptance of life,” 134
- acting, from inclination vs. from duty, 124
 - See also* duty
- action research, 496–97
- activeness, 112, 113, 408–09
- activism, 73, 87, 88, 408
 - fighting the dominance of something vs. trying to eliminate it, 615
 - See also* deep ecology movement supporters; movements
- activists, 98, 255, 596
- agricultural commodities and economics, 586
- AIDS, 164, 165
- “alternative (future)” movements, 64, 88
 - See also* movements
- altruism, 52, 53, 519
- Amnesty International, 223, 288
- amor intellectualis*, 417
- amor intellectualis Dei*, 400–401
- anarchism, 216, 506
- Andersnatten, 463–65
- animal rights, 214, 291, 292, 298–99, 329–30
 - compared with human rights, 416–17
 - declarations of, 568
 - Gandhi on, 243
 - moral capacity as necessary for rights, 299–300
 - obligations as requirement for rights, 62, 614
 - point 3 of Eight Points and, 62
 - right to self-expression, 390
 - See also* life, right to
- animal welfare and animal cruelty, Gandhi and, 524
- animals
 - classes, 293
 - condemned to death for “crimes” committed, 296–97
 - death, 131
 - dignity, 505
 - identification with, 143, 302, 518–19
 - intrinsic/inherent value, 95, 330
 - See also* value (inherent/intrinsic)
 - killing (*see* animal rights; whaling)
 - “mere,” 330
 - mixed communities with wolves, sheep, and sheep owners, 303–06
 - norms about fairness toward, 95–96
 - suffering, 131, 132
 - viewing humans as, 265
 - wild-animal “management,” 296–97
 - See also* under self-realization; *specific topics*
- anthropocentric arguments, 46
- anthropocentrism, 47, 72, 186, 244, 406
- anthropology, philosophical, 623n1
- anthropomorphism, 581–82
- anticlass posture, 8–9
- antihumanism, arrogance of, 185–87
- antinuclear campaign, 215–16
- appearance vs. reality, 458–60
- apron diagram, 75–81
- areté* (virtue), 267, 415
- arguing from first principles, role of, 491–97
- argumentation and debate, 16, 80, 281, 501, 597
 - See also* deep ecology, on the defensive; non-violence, Gandhian form of
- argumentation patterns, 192
- Aristotle, 146–47, 478
- Armstrong-Buck, Susan, 237–39

INDEX

- ātman*, 488, 524, 525, 531, 619n8
- attributes of extension and non-extension, 391
- Australia, 15
- authoritarian policies, 100
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement, antifascist character
- Auxter, Thomas, 294
- avalanches as social constructions, 559–60
- axioms, 399–400, 583
- Ayer, Alfred, 544
- Baastad, Kjell Friis, 371, 375
- Barents Sea, 196, 261, 331
- Barth, Fredrik, 269, 272
- bears, 295, 296–300
- beautiful action
 - function in ecological crisis, 121–27
 - See also* under Kant; “moral acts”
- behaviorism, 392
- beliefs, level-1 through 4, 77–79
- Bennett, David, 457, 458
- Bentham, Jeremy, 30, 479
- Bergland, Trygve, 169
- Bhagavad Gita, 242–43, 415
- biocentric vs. ecocentric, 18
- biodiversity, 148, 193, 595
 - See also* diversity
- “biospheric,” 618n3
- body, 113
- Bookchin, Murray, 100
- Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 143
- Brundtland Report, 140, 143, 144
- Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), 525
- Buddhism, 50, 116, 242, 245
- budgets, private vs. public, 280
- bureaucracy, 4
- Callicott, J. Baird, 59, 60, 242, 458
- Cameron, Mr., 4
- Canada, 15
- capitalism, 216, 587
 - See also* free market
- Capra, Fritjof, 59
- carbon dioxide production, 196
- Carson, Rachel, 27, 89, 191–92, 405, 491
- caste system, 534
- causa*, 239–40
- centers of development, 521
- centralization of power, 588
 - See also* decentralization; globalization chain, 617n2
- change, deepness of, 30
- characterizations, 539–40
- chemistry, teaching, 583–84
- children, teaching
 - about environment, 125–26
 - See also* education; schools
- Christianity, 50
- civil disobedience campaigns, 433–36
 - See also* Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution
- Clark, Stephen R. L., 297
- class differences, elimination of, 210
- class suppression, 210–11
- cognitive self-determination, 508
- collectives, 94, 112
- commiseration, 117
- Commoner, Barry, 388
- communication
 - between conflicting groups, 597
 - nonviolent, 597
- communism, 109, 216
- communities
 - mixed, 304, 516
 - vs. societies, 253, 303, 507
 - web of, and its administration, 507–09
- “compassion priority norm,” 132–33
- complexity, 9–10, 37–39, 293, 295, 534
 - vs. complication, 533
- conflict resolution
 - research suggestions in area of, 440–43
 - See also* Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution
- conformity, cultural, 235–36
- consciousness, 105, 460
- conservation, defined, 565
- conservation biology, deep ecology and, 325–28
- conservation efforts, 276
 - See also* wolf policies; *specific topics*
- conservation strategy, 36
- conservatism, 22
- conseure*, 632n7
- “Constructive Programme, The,” 433–34
- consumerism, 585
- consumption, 578–79
 - of natural resources, 167, 217
- criteria/criterion, 537–40
 - history of the term, 537
 - types of, 537–38
- critical philosophy, 121
- crowding, 8, 608
 - See also* overpopulation and overcrowding; population
- “cult of life,” 134

- “cult of nature,” 134
- cultural anthropology, 91, 623–24nn1–2
- the new, 263–65
- cultural differences, deepness of, 265–69
- cultural diversity, 238, 272, 502
 - deep ecology platform and, 269–73
 - deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 44
 - social justice, sustainable development, and, 572–75
- cultural evolution, 265
- cultural systems and suffering, 135
- cultures
 - development from premodern or postmodern, 578
 - disrespect in the West of nonindustrial, 579–81
 - extinction, 270–71
 - peaceful coexistence of different, 233
 - richness (*see* cultural diversity)
- Darwin, Charles, 136
- Davidson, Donald, 244, 245, 247, 623n5
- de principiis non est disputandum*, 495
- death and dying, 131
- debate. *See* argumentation and debate; mediators
- decentralization, 10–11, 197, 258, 317, 541–42
 - See also* centralization of power
- decision making, 10–11, 501
 - See also* argumentation and debate
- deconstruction, 559
- deep ecological questioning. *See* questioning
- deep ecologists, 90, 618n3
 - what they have in common, 18–20, 57
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement
- deep ecology, 90
 - a call to speak out, 35–37
 - on the defensive, 33–35
 - definitions and meanings, 538–39, 622n1
 - goals, 14
 - illustrated as a derivational system, 48–49
 - for the 22nd century, 611–16
 - possible scenarios, 613
 - principles, 13–20, 48
 - multiple roots of, 49–50
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement
 - reasons for a, 46–47
 - terminology, 64, 187
 - See also specific topics*
- deep ecology approach, aspects of, 14–15
- deep ecology movement, 14
 - alternate names for, 41
 - attitudes and tendencies characteristic of, 105–07
 - authors who have contributed to, 617–18n2
 - breadth and limits, 71–74
 - defining, 37, 58, 220, 230
 - fascist tendencies, 100
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement, antifascist character
 - four-level conception of (*see* apron diagram)
 - historical perspective, 21–22
 - history and prehistory/forerunners of, 89–92
 - key slogans, 201–03
 - persistent “whys” and “hows,” 23–31
 - plurality and unity, 77
 - politics, 194
 - role in political life, 200
 - supporters, 72
 - terminology, 618n3
 - vision of reality, 16
 - See also specific topics*
- deep ecology movement supporters
 - what they stand for and believe in, 83–88
- deep ecology platform, 275
- apron diagram, 75–81
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement
- deepness, 21–22, 26, 42, 79
 - See also* shallow ecology movement
- “deepness and broadness of attitude” approach, 21–22
- definition, 538–40
- deforestation. *See* forest(s), depletion of
- Dahlin, Knut, 161
- demand, 140, 141
- democracy, 99–100
- depreciation, 580
- Descartes, René, 475–77
- “determined in its essence,” 622n3
- determinism and determination, 240
- deus* (god), 267
- Devall, Bill, 230
- developed and undeveloped countries, 141–42, 266, 270, 594–96, 600
 - See also* low material standard, countries with; poor countries; rich industrial countries
- developers and conservers, confrontations between, 456–57
- developing countries, 141, 508, 564
- development, 266
 - centers of, 521

INDEX

- development (*continued*)
 - defined, 565, 566
 - ecologically unsustainable, 141–42, 563–64, 595
 - See also* sustainability
 - environment and, 599, 603, 606
 - conflicts between, 594
 - terminological and conceptual recommendations regarding, 593–98
- Diderot, Denis, 465
- dignity, 505
- Diogenes of Sinope (Diogenes in the Barrel), 139, 140
- diversity, 8–9, 270
 - of life forms, 18, 37–39, 99, 153, 154
 - maximum, 502–03, 533, 534
 - vs. plurality, 532, 533
 - and realization of potentials, 292–93
 - vital needs and right to reduce, 568
 - See also* biodiversity; cultural diversity
- "diversity norm," 61–62
- Diwakar, Ranganath R., 434
- docta ignorantia* (conscious ignorance), 17, 503, 542, 543
- doomsday prophets. *See* ecological doomsday prophets; pessimism
- Douglas, William O., 390
- dread, 111
- Drengson, Alan, 328
- duplication, theory of, 454–55, 460
- duty, 122–23, 125
 - acting from inclination vs. from, 124, 127
 - as relational, 125
 - See also* obligations
- "Earth First!," 201
- ecocentrism, 406–07
- ecofeminism, 80, 222
- ecological consciousness, 86, 105
- ecological crisis, 98, 398–400, 411, 612, 615
 - positive function, 92
- See also under* beautiful action; politics
- ecological doomsday prophets, 207, 603–04, 612
 - See also* pessimism
- ecological egalitarianism. *See* egalitarianism
- ecological questioning. *See* questioning
- ecological self, 516, 517, 520, 522, 523
- ecologism, 12
- ecologists, 9, 207
- ecology, science of, 95
- economic globalization, 585
 - See also* globalization
- economic growth, 171
 - if-statements and exponential growth, 207–08
 - sustainable, 40, 65, 141, 563–64
- economy, mixed, 587
- ecophilosophical aspect of deep ecology movement, 89–90
- ecophilosophy, 41, 203
 - See also* ecosophy
- ecopolitical issues, checklist of, 208–12
- ecopolitics, 203
- ecosophers, 518, 557–58
- ecosophical development, 563
- Ecosophy T, 51–54, 59, 320, 636–37n2
 - codification of, 534
 - diagrams of, 53, 484–85
 - diversity, complexity, and, 533
 - fundamental norm, 52
 - hypothetical assumptions of, 134
 - integration of Eight Points into, 535
 - motivations for developing, 134
 - norms in, 310
 - See also under* Self-realization
 - population issues and, 275
 - relieving suffering and, 135
 - self-realization and, 488, 489
 - See also* self-realization
 - See also under* Feyerabend
- ecosophy(ies), 11–12, 17, 59, 96–99, 232, 601
 - See also* total view(s)
- ecosystemic knowledge, 96
- ecosystemic rights, 214
 - See also* rights
- ecosystems, 222
 - mature, 387
 - respect for, 96
 - noninterference with, 38–40
 - preserving, 129–30
 - theory of, 9–10
- education, 210
 - deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 45–46
- education campaigns, environmental, 36–37
 - See also* schools
- egalitarianism (biospherical), 296
- "Against biospherical egalitarianism" (French), 547
 - applications of the term, 187
 - biospherical egalitarianism in principle, 68
 - deep ecology movement and, 7–9

- equal rights (in principle) and, 292
- Gandhi and, 524
- "human lot" and, 186
- shallow-deep ecology spectrum and, 47
- species egalitarianism in principle, 300
- Spinoza and, 407
- two-factor, 295
- ego, 526
- ego-realization, 488
- ego trips, 525, 526
- egocentrism. *See* frames of reference
- Eight Points of deep ecology movement, 37–42, 220, 270, 564–65, 621n1
 - antifascist character, 93–101
 - elaboration and examples, 77–78
 - integration into Ecosophy T, 535
 - revisited, 57–66
 - World Conservation Strategy and, 565–67
- Einstein, Albert, 356
- elections, 206
- elitism, 327–28
- empathy, 517–18
 - See also* identification
- empowerment, 73
- Encyclopedia of Unified Science* (Neurath et al.), 479
- energy consumption, 217
- energy resources, 196–97, 599–600
- environment, 202
 - economics, measurement, and, 4
 - problems of protecting, 3–5
 - relationship with, 14–15
 - See also specific topics*
- environmental, peace, and social (justice) movements, 72–73, 88, 193–94, 219–24, 236, 613–14
 - See also* peace movement
- environmental decisions, philosophical position
 - of persons who influence, 149–51
- "environmental fascism," 94, 100
- environmental ontology vs. environmental ethics, 527
- environmental philosophy
 - main problem of, 237–38
 - richness and diversity of ultimate premises in, 229–49
- environmentalism, 240
 - philosophical premises, 118–19
 - problems with the word, 614
 - radical, 253, 614
- environmentalists, 3–4, 450
 - who predicted environmental catastrophes (*see* ecological doomsday prophets)
 - See also* experts
- Enzenberger, Hans Magnus, 542–43
- epistemology, 464
 - See also* ignorance; scepticism
- epoché*, 473
- equal right to live and blossom, 494–95
- equal rights, 506
- equality, sameness, and rights, 67–70
 - See also* egalitarianism
- equity, 97
- essence, 630n7
- ethical obligations, 97, 98
- ethical rules and ethical views, 311–12
- ethics, 234, 241, 242
 - ecosystems and, 129–30, 389–90
 - ontology and, 456–58
 - See also* Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution; justice; "moral acts"; *specific topics*
- Ethics* (Spinoza). *See under* Spinoza
- ethnography, 623n1
- ethnology, 623n1
- ethology, 392
- Euclid, 399
- European Common Market (EEC), 210
- European philosophy and religion, 90–91
- European Union (EU), 585–88, 602–03
- evil, 112, 388, 459, 581
- evolution, 136
- exclusivity, relations of, 292
- existentialist thinking, 463
- experience, 459, 471
- experts
 - attitudes of, 151
 - role of, 178–80
 - See also* environmentalists
- exploitation, 487
- external relation, 522
- extinction, 270–71, 305–06, 330
- facts, 18
- farms, family
 - in Norway, 586
- fascism, 93–95, 100
 - See also* Eight Points of deep ecology movement, antifascist character; Mussolini; Nazi Germany
- fascist ideas, popularity of, 24

INDEX

- feminism. *See* ecofeminism
- Feyerabend, Paul, 511
 - fundamental philosophies, Ecosophy T, and, 505–07
 - on Lakatos, 636n2
 - as mild and green, 499–500
 - principle of maximum diversity and, 503
 - principle of minimum interference and, 503–05
 - scientific worldviews and, 509–10
 - traditions and rationality, 500–02
 - and the web of communities and its admiration, 507–09
- first-order comments, 99
- fisheries, policies for, 126–27
- Foreman, Dave, 100
- forest(s)
 - depletion of, 194, 255–56, 580
 - heart of the, 551–53
 - See also* treeline; trees
- Foundation for Deep Ecology, 603
- Fox, Warwick, 26, 60, 543
- frames of reference, 470
 - explication of one as involving introduction of another, 473–77
 - See also* total/fundamental frames; total view(s)
- France, 15
- Francis of Assisi, St., 382
- free market, 585–87
- “free nature,” 259–60
- free nature, darker side of, 131
- free society, 507
- freedom, 238, 296, 391, 409, 539, 633n8
 - economic, 585–87
 - See also* self-realization
- French, William C., 547, 550
- Freud, Sigmund, 118, 518
- Fromm, Erich, 518–20
- fundamental frames. *See* total/fundamental frames
- fundamentalists vs. realists, 16
- Future in Our Hands, The, 174, 177
- Gaia hypothesis, 403, 567
- Galtung, Johan, 73
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 60, 96, 111, 242–43
 - on animal welfare, 243, 524
 - biospherical egalitarianism and, 524
 - metaphysics, 523–25
- Gandhi and Group Conflict* (Naess), 636n1
- Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution, 422
- systematization D of, 422–28
 - application to efforts of peaceful international cooperation, 437–40
 - exemplification and elaboration, 433–37
 - norms and hypotheses, 428–33
- gas. *See* natural gas
- Gathering for the Creation, 168
- Gauri Shankar, 335–36
- Gautvik, Morten, 179
- genetic relations, defined, 75
- Germany, 15
 - See also* Nazi Germany
- gestalt apperception, 461
- gestalt ontology
 - deep ecology movement and, 460
 - and gestalt thinking, 235, 386, 410, 455–63
- gestalt perception, 461
- gestalt principles, 9–10, 202
- gestalt thinking
 - defined, 463
 - See also* gestalt ontology
- gestalt(s)
 - higher-order and subordinate, 556
 - and the process of identification, 465–66
- global action, 40, 258–59
- global attitudes. *See* place-corrosive process
- global community, 198
- global ecology movement, 141
- “global” vs. “international,” 584
- globalization, 585, 602–03
 - See also* centralization of power
- God, 382
 - as finite vs. infinite, 404
 - functions of, in Spinoza’s *Ethics*, 404
 - See also* Spinoza, *Ethics*
 - identified with Nature, 383–86, 388, 389, 402–04, 406, 629n3
 - See also under* Spinoza, *Ethics*
 - immanence, 383–87, 398, 401–06
 - love of, 401, 405–06, 410
 - power of, 389
 - See also* *deus* (god)
- Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 235, 397, 411
- Goldsmith, Edward, 65
- goodness, 129–33, 388, 581–82
- Gran, Finn, 174–75
- Grand Canyon, 3–4
- grassroots activism, 613–14
 - See also* activism
- Great Britain, 15
 - See also* Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution

INDEX

- green communities, 407
 Green economics and political theory, 605–10
 green economies, 587
 Green movement, 64, 65
 Green party program, Norwegian, 198
 basic tenets, 198
 green philosophy and politics, 41
 green political parties, fundamental vs. pragmatist positions in, 197
 green political party programs, 30
 from day to day, 217–18
 Green political theory, 95
 vs. green political theory, 100–101
 green politics, 197–200, 203–06
 green-red alliances, 211
 green society, 65, 83–85, 236, 256–57, 574, 616
 goals and characteristics, 14–15, 193–94
 “green utopias,” 256–57
 Green vs. green distinction, 100–101, 620n1
 Green vs. green economists, 605
 Greens. *See* Green party program, Norwegian
 gross domestic product (GDP), 590
 gross national product (GNP), 569
 group struggle, ethics of. *See* Gandhian ethics of
 conflict resolution
 Grue, Per Harald, 161, 165, 172
 Guerout, M., 407
 Guha, Ramachandra, 254, 255, 261
 guided exchange, 501

 Hallen, Patsy, 525
 Hallingskarvet, 340–41
 happiness, 22, 277, 529, 530
 See also joy
 Hargrove, Eugene C., 241, 243
 healers, 504–05
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 235, 397, 398
 Heidegger, Martin, 26, 235, 240, 244–46, 463
 historical research, methodology of, 395
 history
 philosophy of, 395–96
 teaching, 584
 Hitler, Adolf, 135, 609
 Høibakk, Ralph, 370–72, 375, 376
 holistic medicine, 504–05
 holistic thinking, 461
 See also wholism
 “home,” and global place-corrosive process,
 339–40
 homocentrism, 47, 186
 homocentrists, 557

 human beings, intrinsic value of. *See* value
 human chauvinism, 47
 human condition, 577–79
 human-in-environment concept, 7
 human rights, 96, 214, 223
 humankind, goals for, 277, 322
 humility, 116
 Huxley, Julian, 265
 Hveding, Vidkun, 171–72, 176
 hypocrisy. *See* “schizophrenia”
 hypotheses, 425

 “I,” 517
 idealist philosophers, 557
 identification, 417, 517, 524
 with animals, 143, 302, 518–19
 gestalts and the process of, 465–66
 with others, 142–43, 302, 516
 ideology, 480–81
 ignorance
 extending the area of one’s, 467–70
 awareness of one’s, 468
 See also *ducta ignorantia*
 immigration
 ethical aspect, 284
 See also migration
 India, 260
 See also Gandhi
 inherent value/worth. *See* value
 Innerdalen, 5
 integration, 115
 and maturity of philosophers, 111
 of personality, 114
 See also wholism
 intensities vs. quantities, philosophical problem
 of, 286–87, 313–15
 interference, 503–05
 internal relation, 522
 international conflict resolution. *See* Gandhian
 ethics of conflict resolution
 international trade, 588
 International Union for Conservation of
 Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 36,
 39, 46
 internationalism, 584
 interpretability, multiple
 use of vagueness and ambiguity to achieve,
 486–87
 intrinsic value/worth. *See* value
 intuition(s), 68–70, 147, 311, 405, 449, 544
 intuitively based announcements, 147

INDEX

- isolation and elitism, 328
- Iverson, Olav Hilmar, 176

- James, William, 522–23
- Janzen, Daniel H., 145
- Johnson, Lawrence, 550
- joy, 110, 402, 528
 - according to “pessimistic” philosophers, 111–12
 - self-realization and, 293
 - Spinoza on, 112–18, 402
 - See also* happiness
- justice, 95
 - opinions about facts vs. opinions about, 609–10

- Kamal, Lieutenant-Sabir, 372
- Kant, Immanuel, 233–35, 245, 246, 397–98, 527
 - on beautiful acts/actions, 54, 61, 121–27, 516
 - critical philosophy of, 121
 - ethics, 248
- Kantian interpretation of Spinoza, 397–98
- karamayogi*, 425
- Karim, Abdul, 371–74, 378
- Karim, Safdul, 374, 378
- Kāsa, Erik, 169, 170, 173–74
- Kathmandu, Nepal, 581
- Katzner, Kenneth, 248–49, 268, 269
- Kiër, Johan, 357
- Kierkegaard, Søren, 105, 111, 145, 241, 472, 474, 507
- Knauth, Professor, 372
- knowing, 473
 - See also* ignorance
- knowledge, 16–17, 112, 471
 - See also* ignorance
- Koestler, Arthur, 480
- Kristiansen, Kåre, 167, 169, 171
- Kropotkin, Peter, 95, 552
- Kuhn, Thomas S., 229
- Kvaloy, Sigmund, 41

- L*-formulation, 129–30
- Lackner, Stephan, 133, 411–12
- Lakatos, Imre
 - as fellow anarchist, 636n2
- lamentation, 272
- land and sea ethics, deep vs. shallow ecological
 - approach to, 45
- language(s), 246–48, 268–69, 623n5
 - See also* translation
- Lapps, 507, 521
- Lebow, Victor, 578–79

- Leopold, Aldo, 129, 328, 457–58
- Leopold formula, 230, 231
- liberation. *See* freedom; self-realization
- life, 8, 133, 134, 214, 567
 - happy, 277
 - (intrinsic) value of (*see* value)
 - reverence for, 14, 37, 38, 133, 172
 - right to, 67, 214, 299, 416–17
 - See also* animal rights
- life community, 304
- life-forms, 94–95, 187, 320
 - interdependence and interference between, 292
- life quality. *See* quality of life
- life unfolding/life expansion, 489
- lifestyle
 - deep ecology and, 105–08
 - of environmentalists, 110
- linguistics, 248
 - See also* language(s)
- listening to opponent’s argument, 16
- Little Hans, 3
- “Live and let live,” 136, 185, 302–03, 329, 489, 505
- living beings, 309, 567
 - See also specific topics*
- Lloyd, Genevieve, 238
- local autonomy, 10–11
- logic, 18
- logical relations, defined, 75
- Longergan, Bernard J., 635n1
- love, 417
 - of oneself, 518
 - types of, 400–401, 405
- low material standard, countries with (Ls), 270, 597–98, 603
 - See also* developed and undeveloped countries; Third World

- Malinowski, Bronislaw, 247–48
- Malthus, Thomas Robert, 212–13
- Malthusianism, 212–13
- Mannheim, Karl, 481
- Marx, Karl, 109
- Masai, 260–61
- masculinity, power, and conquest, 278
- Masson-Oursel, Paul, 246
- mathematics, 583
- matter, 633–34n2
- maturity
 - comprehensive, 515–16
 - of the self, 516

INDEX

- "Maximum fulfillment of life potentials," 505
- McCloskey, Henry John, 214, 299–300
- means and ends, 426
- mediators, need for, 609
- medicine, natural, 504–05
- Mediterranean, 15
- Meeker, Joseph, 41
- metaphysics, 320
- methodology
 - hard and soft, 483–84, 497
 - of historical research, 395
- mice, mountain, 345–46
- migration
 - and ecological unsustainability, 283–89
 - from poor to rich countries, how to reduce, 287–88
- Milbrath, Lester W., 150
- Miller, G. Tyler, 41, 51
- minimal interference, principle of, 503–05
- minorities, 272
- modern cultures, 578
- modesty, intellectual, 467–68
- monism, 239, 242
- "moral acts"
 - vs. "beautiful acts," 61, 121–22, 527
 - moral law and, 526–27
- moral world order, 387
- Mount Saint Helens, 196
- mountaineering in Norway
 - ethical considerations with a view to, 361–64
 - See also* Tvergastein, climbing
- mountains, 335–36, 573
- modesty and the conquest of, 365–68
- movements, 613–14
 - See also* "alternative (future)" movements; environmental, peace, and social (justice) movements
- Müller, Oluf C., 180
- Mussolini, Benito, 277–78
- mutual aid, 95
- Mysterud, Ivar, 130, 231, 548
- Naess, Arne Dekke Eide
 - lifestyle, 350–51
 - as optimist, 596, 611–12
 - psychological and social determiners of his philosophy, 350–51
 - writings
 - "Deepness of Questions," 617n1
 - Gandhi and Group Conflict*, 636n1
 - "Self-realization," 60
 - "Spinoza and Ecology," 622n1, 631n10
 - "The deep ecology movement," 22
- national identity, 210
- natural gas, 196–97, 599–600
- "natural greens," 15
- natural law, 164, 387–88
- natural medicine, 504–05
- natural objects, projection of personal traits onto, 581–82
- natural resources. *See* energy resources; resources
- Natural Right, philosophy of, 390
- Nature, 134, 527–28
 - perfection of, 386–87, 411
 - See also under* God; Spinoza
- nature, 3, 155, 559–60
 - "cult of nature," 134
 - getting people to see reality in relation to, 16
 - inherent value of, 134, 152–55, 244, 560
 - experts' views on, 156–77
 - See also* value
- man-nature relations, 90
- philosophies of, in harmony with sane ecopolitical outlook, 381
- principle of minimal interference with, 503–05
- projection into, 557
- respect for, 14, 37, 38, 134, 150
- "romantic attitude" toward, 162–63
- suffering and, 134–35
- See also specific topics*
- Nature-as-creative, 402–03
- nature mysticism, 50, 59
- Nazi Germany, 223, 265, 609–10
- Nazi occupation of Norway, 288
- need(s), 140–41
 - vs. demand, 140, 141, 206
 - See also* vital needs
- neither-nor and the both-and answers, 449–50
- neocolonialism, 271
- Nepal
 - destruction of, 580–81
 - letter to king of, 335–36
- Nirvana, 116
- nobility, 123
- nominalism, 456
- nonviolence, 100, 421, 597
 - ethics of, 421, 437
 - research suggestions regarding application of, 440–43
 - writings on, 443

INDEX

- nonviolence (*continued*)
 - Gandhian form of, 16, 100
 - See also* Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution; *satyāgraha*
- Nonviolence in Peace and War* (Gandhi), 422
- normative systems, 490
 - preponderance of nonnormatives in, 492–93
 - role of social and political contexts, 490–91
- norms, 135, 232–33, 241, 271
 - in Ecosophy T, 310
 - "hypotheses" and, 484–90
 - internalization of, 125
 - lower (derived), 486
 - ultimate, 493–95
 - rational policies rest on, 310–13
 - values and, 181–82
 - See also* "compassion priority norm"
- North American Treaty Organization (NATO), 215
- Norton, Bryan G., 231
- Norum, Kaare R., 165
- Norway
 - consumption of natural resources, 167
 - Nazi occupation, 288
 - oil and gas resources, 599
 - wild-animal "management," 296–97
 - See also specific topics*
- Norwegian policies, as hostile toward environment, 149
- Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature (NNV), 331–32
- Norwegians, 595
 - attitudes toward environment, 595
- nuclear power. *See* antinuclear campaign
- Nuyen, A. T., 244
- objectivity, 449
- obligations, 141
 - See also* duty
- oceanic feeling, 94
- Ødegaard, Hans Chr., 157–59, 180
- Oelschlaeger, Max, 230
- Ofstedal, Per, 159, 164, 166, 168, 173, 178
- oil, 599–600
- Økland, Jan, 166
- oneness. *See* oceanic feeling; symbiosis
- ontology, 634n4
- Opdal, Anders, 370–72, 376
- open exchange, 501
- opinions, 493
 - See also* norms
- optimism, 27, 87, 609
- overpopulation and overcrowding, 214, 601, 607
 - See also* population
- Øye, Ivar, 173
- Paasche, Eystein, 162
- pain. *See* suffering
- parasitism, 130, 131, 533
- passivity, 112, 113, 409
- Passmore, John, 297, 457
- peace movement, 202
 - campaigns of deep ecology movement and, 214–16
 - See also* environmental, peace, and social (justice) movements; Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution; nonviolence
- peace organizations, 223
- peaceful communities, 416
- peaceful cooperation, social science contributions
 - to questions of, 443–45
- pecking-order law, 509
- perfection, 115, 277, 278, 402, 459, 630n8, 631n10
 - of God, 401–02
 - of Nature, 386–87, 411
 - See also* integration
- perseveration/perseverare, 412–14, 520, 632n7
 - See also* self-preservation
- Personal Place and Person-Place, 352
- personification of natural objects, 581–82
- perspectivism, 458–60
- pessimism, 27, 87, 612
- pesticides, 28
- philosophers, 146
 - idealist, 557
 - maturity and integration, 111
- philosophical approaches
 - deep ecologists with different, 18
 - points agreed upon by various, 18–20, 57
- philosophical relativism, 506
- philosophical schools, 121, 221
- philosophy
 - history of, 395–97, 408
 - vs. movement, 42
 - origin of the term, 306
- pity, 117
- place-corrosive process, global, 339–40
- Plato, 180, 472
- pleasure, 277, 529, 530
- pluralism, 242

- plurality, 263, 531, 532
 - vs. diversity, 532, 533
- polarization of conflicting views, 609
- policies, ecological
 - universalizability, 30
 - See also* environmental decisions
- policy change, need for, 19, 38, 40
- political decisions, green relevance of all, 206
- political issues, deep ecology and big, 216–17
- political relativism, 506
- political triangle, poles of
 - and limitations of triangular analysis, 203–06
- political voluntarism, 217
- politics, 29
 - and the ecological crisis, 191–200
- pollution, 9, 17
 - deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 42–43
 - politics of, 209, 210
 - See also* carbon dioxide production
- poor countries, 572, 594–96, 599
 - emigration from rich countries to, 283
 - See also* developed and undeveloped countries; low material standard, countries with (Ls)
- population, 201, 608–09
 - carrying capacity of Earth and, 569–70
 - deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 43–44
 - flourishing of life and, 19, 270, 624n5
 - if-statements and exponential growth, 207–08
 - See also* Malthusianism; overpopulation
- population factor, 569–72
- population pressure, 600–601, 607–08
- population reduction, 62, 154–55, 201, 270
 - ecosophical view of, 275–79
 - period of transition in rich countries, 279–81
 - “productive” and “unproductive” people, economics, and, 280
- postindustrial societies, 588
- postmodern cultures, 578
- potentialities of realization, 292–93, 295, 505
 - See also* self-realization potentials
- potentials, 531
- poverty, 572, 607
 - See also* poor countries
- power, 115, 389, 412, 416
 - See also* perseverance/perseverare
- precipitations, 99, 486–87
- premises
 - and conclusions, 399–400
 - deepness of, 21
- primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities, 452–54
- problematicizing, 22, 28–29
- “profound,” 22
- projection, theory of, 452–53
- proof, 18
- proofs, teaching mathematical, 583
- property. *See* land and sea ethics
- Protagoras, 450, 633–34nn2
- psychoanalytic theory, 518
- public opinions, 493
 - See also* norms
- purna swaraj*, 435
- quality of life, 19–20, 38, 39, 41, 310
 - vs. self-realization, 137, 626–27n13
 - vs. standard of living, 153, 173–76, 179–80, 202
 - See also* value (inherent/intrinsic)
- quantities vs. intensities, philosophical problem of, 286–87, 313–15
- questioning, 22–26, 28–29
 - deep, 38, 49
- questionnaires, methodology of, 483
- questions, deep, 23–26, 29
- radicalism, 614
- ranking, 548
- rational grounding, 182
- rationalism, 117, 502
- rationality, 49, 391, 502
- Rawls, John, 95, 601
- realism, 91, 527
- reality. *See* abstract structures (of reality)
- reason, 406
- Reed, Peter, 177
- “reforestation” projects, 558, 591
- reform ecology movement. *See* shallow ecology movement
- reform vs. revolution, 216
- refugees, 284, 287–89
- Regan, Tom, 298–99
- relata, 451, 523
- relationalism, 506
- relativism, 506
- religions
 - of deep ecologists, 18, 50
 - points agreed upon by various, 18–20, 57
 - See also* apron diagram
- religious leaders and the environment, 29

INDEX

- research and researchers, 16–17
- resource depletion, 9
- resources
 - deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 43
 - fair distribution and profit from nonrenewable, 597–605
- respect, 97
- responsibility, ethics of, 9
- rhetoric, 80
 - See also* argumentation and debate; deep ecology, on the defensive; nonviolence, Gandhian form of
- rich industrial countries (R's), 270, 597–99, 603
 - See also* developed and undeveloped countries
- "Rich life with simple means!", 406
- rich-to-poor emigration, 283, 288
- richness, 127, 153, 154, 196, 543, 568, 595
 - See also* cultural diversity
- rights, 62, 389–90
 - ecosystemic, 214
 - of living beings, 213
 - moral capacities and, 299–300
 - moral capacity as necessary for, 299–300
 - natural, 495
 - nature of, 329
 - "no right to," 62
 - obligations as requirement for, 62, 614
- Rodman, John, 41
- role models. *See* lifestyle, of environmentalists
- Romanticism, European, 90, 91
- Rothenberg, David, 26
- rules
 - fundamental, 311–12
 - types of, 311–12
- Sahlins, Marshall, 91–92, 264
- Sami language, 268
- Sami people, 259, 267
- Sarvam dbarmam nibhvabhavam*, 451
- satyagraha*, 423, 435–36, 438–40
- Scandinavia, 15
- scepticism, 473–74
 - higher-order, 470–73
- Schilling, Friedrich, 381
- Schilpp, P. A., 356
- "schizophrenia," 330–31, 602
- schools
 - green, 210
 - teaching about environment, 125–26
 - Western, and European unity, 583–88
- Schreiner, Per, 164, 170, 174, 181
- Schweitzer, Albert, 397
- science, 449
 - political function, 211
- scientific enterprise, deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 45–46
- scientific influence, factors in ecopolitics operating against, 211–12
- scientific worldviews, absence of any, 509–10
- scientists, earth
 - why they avoid propagating their views, 327
- Self, 524, 531
 - See also* *ātman*
- self, 515
 - internal and external relations, 521–23
 - psychology of the, 521–23
 - See also* "I"
- self-acceptance and self-respect, lack of, 113–14, 116
- self-defense, 522
- self-destructiveness, convergence of three areas of, 219–20
- self-determination, 293–94, 508
- self-expression, 390, 489
- self-interest, 489, 519
- self-love, 518, 519
- self-preservation, 272, 389, 412–13, 489
 - See also* perseverance/perseverare
- Self-realization, 320, 488
 - diversity, complexity, symbiosis, and, 531–34
 - maximum, 52, 620n1
 - as norm of Ecosophy T, 52, 53, 137, 222, 231
 - as ultimate goal, 278
- self-realization, 135, 320
 - an ecological approach to being in the world, 516, 519–30
 - complete/maximum, 532, 533
 - concept of self and, 172, 320
 - exploitation, coercion, and, 8, 119
 - Gandhi on, 523–26
 - and identification with others, 52–53
 - interpretations of, 488–90
 - joy, suffering, and, 293
 - levels of, 222–23, 389
 - in self and others, 137
 - vs. life quality, 137, 626–27n13
 - in mixed communities of humans and animals, 291–300
 - pleasure, happiness, and, 528–30
 - rationality and, 391
 - right to, 119, 494

INDEX

- self-preservation and, 389
- self-realization potentials, 531–33, 620n1
 - See also* potentialities of realization
- self-subsistence, 622n1
- sentences
 - function of one-word sentences and other utterances, 487–88
 - understanding their meaning, 627n15
- Sessions, George, 230, 541
- Sextus Empiricus, 450, 537, 633–34nn2
- Shah, Wazir Ali, 371
- shallow ecologist, 618n3
- shallow ecology movement, 170
 - anthropocentrism/homocentrism, 186
 - vs. deep ecology movement, 7–11, 16, 17, 28–30, 89, 155, 192, 202–03, 620n1
 - See also* Green vs. green distinction; shallow vs. deep ecology
 - impact on governmental level, 220
 - main complaint against, 51
- shallow vs. deep ecology, 42–47
 - See also* shallow ecology movement, vs. deep ecology movement
- sheep, 295, 296–98, 301–02, 548–50
 - See also* under animals
- skepticism. *See* scepticism
- Smart, J. J. C., 452
- Smith, Mick, 560
- Smuts, General, 436
- snakes, 317–18
- Snyder, Gary, 230, 242, 245, 251–53
- social Darwinism, 295
- social ecology movement, 601
 - See also* ecosophy(ies)
- social economics, 160–61
- social epistemology, 464
- “social greens,” 15
- social injustice as violence, 73
- social justice, 193–94
 - sustainable development, cultural diversity, and, 572–75
- social (justice) movement(s). *See* environmental, peace, and social (justice) movements
- social justice organizations, 223
- social science action research, 496–97
- socialism, 216
- society
 - in dynamic ecological equilibrium, 381
 - “no way back” to old forms of, 588–91
- sociobiology, 265
- Socrates, 52, 470
- Somalis, 283–84
- sorrow. *See* commiseration
- Soulé, Michael, 224, 316–17, 325–27
- species, 95
 - ranking, 548
- species egalitarianism. *See* egalitarianism (biospherical)
- Spinoza, Benedict de, 76–77, 293, 476–78, 530, 629n3, 631n6
 - accounts of human nature, 295–96
 - on animal rights, 416
 - on animals, 631n15
 - antimoralist attitude, 415
 - and attitudes toward Nature, 381–94, 411
 - on *causa*, 239–40
 - and deep ecology movement, 239, 396–419, 622n1
 - environmental ethics and, 239
 - ethics, 300
 - Kant’s ethics and, 248
 - Ethics*, 248, 392, 406, 416, 418, 629nn1–4, 631n11, 632nn17–2, 633n8
 - account of free human beings, 296
 - apparent inconsistencies in, 400
 - argumentation in, 419
 - conservare* and *perseverare*, 412, 413, 632n7
 - Ecosophy T and, 489
 - English translations of, 246
 - “God or Nature,” 137, 383, 385, 402–06
 - methodology, 478
 - nature and, 399
 - spiritual genesis of fifth part of, 400–403
 - as supreme synthesis, 478
 - terminology, 400–402, 414–15, 419
 - total view outlined in, 399
- on God, 383–86, 400–402, 406
- interpretations of, 235, 238–39
 - history of, 397–98
- Jewish faith, 403
- on joy, 112–18, 402
- on lamentation and emotional epistemology, 272
- metaphysics, 238–39
- total view, 247, 399, 410–11
- Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding*, 478
- “Spinoza and Ecology” (Naess), 622n1, 631n10
- Spinozist, Kantian, Heideggerian, and Whiteheadian character (S-K-H-W) premises, 245, 246

INDEX

- Spinozistic social utopia, 633n8
 Spirit, 382
 spiritual world order, 382
 spontaneous experience, 461, 464–66
 forests and, 552, 553
 Sprigge, T. L. S., 300, 459–60
 Stammberger, Fritz, 373
 standard of living, 572
 vs. quality of life, 153, 173–76, 179–80, 202
 “statement,” 627n15
 stress, 123
 structural violence, 73
 subcultures, 272, 504
 See also communities
 subject-object cleavage, spontaneous experience
 without, 455–56
 subject-object distinction, 454–55
substantia (substance), 239–40, 246, 247
 suffering, 285, 287, 293, 626n11
 in nature, whether or not to relieve, 129–37
 norms about, 308–10, 313–14
 of other, identification with, 302–03
 quantity, quality, and experience of, 313–14
 Sundby, Per, 181–83
 superego, 352
 sustainability, ecological, 83, 84, 595–96, 612–14
 classes of unsustainability, 195–97
 goal of full, 578
 integral approach, 139–48
 meaning, 565–66
 “narrow” vs. “wide,” 65, 257–58
 as our “way back,” 588–91
 politics and, 193–95
 poverty and, 607
 promoting beautiful actions in the fight for,
 125–26
 soft technologies and, 85
 See also development, ecologically unsustainable
 sustainable development, 140, 141, 563–64
 See also under social justice
 sustainable economic growth and progress, 40,
 65, 141, 563–64
swaraj, 435
 Sweden, 288
 symbiosis, 8, 9, 52, 53, 389, 489, 533, 534
 See also oceanic feeling
 System, 474
 systems thinking, 12, 461
 See also ecosystems, theory of
 Taoism, 50
 Tasmanian devil, 303
 Taylor, Paul, 547
 teamwork, 495–96
 technocracies. *See* arguing from first principles
 technology(ies), 41, 83–86
 deep vs. shallow ecological approach to, 44
 soft, 85
 See also quality of life, vs. standard of living
 Tennyson, Alfred, 136
 “Think globally, act globally,” 259
 Third World, 98, 142, 145, 327, 603, 606
 migration problems, 286
 wilderness, deep ecology, and, 251–62
 See also low material standard, countries with;
 migration
 Third World communities, environmental
 concerns of, 260
 Thonstad, Tore, 625n4
 Thoreau, Henry David, 134
 Tirich Mir East, 369–72
 South Wall of, 369–78
 torture, 97
 total-field image, 7
 total/fundamental frames
 explication of, 470–73
 genesis of the belief in the possibility of,
 479–82
 paradoxes of, 477–79
 See also frames of reference
 total view(s), 17, 51, 59, 200, 231, 472
 ecosophies as, 97, 238
 inspired by ecological crisis, 411
 nature of, 399
 population issues and, 275, 279
 preconscious, 477–79
 of Spinoza, 247, 399, 410–11
 See also ecosophy(ies); wolf policies
 “totalitarian” disposition, 478
 totalitarianism. *See* Eight Points of deep ecology
 movement, antifascist character
 totus, 630n6
 trade, international, 588
 translation, 246–47, 267–68
 trash, disposal of, 352–53
 treeline, metaphysics of the, 555–58
 trees, relationship with, 14–15
 trust and mistrust, 430
 truth, 429
 Tveit, Jon, 160, 163, 173, 176–77, 179
 Tvergastein, 340
 amateur research at, 355–59

INDEX

- animals, 345–47
- climbing, 354–55
- flowers, 342–45
- genesis of a place-person, 347–48
- geography, 340–42
- human life at, 349–54
- ultimate norms, 310–13
- ultimate premises, 79
 - See also under* environmental philosophy
- ultimate source, 471
- understanding, 411, 631–32n16
- unemployment, 605
- United Nations, 599–600
- United States, northwestern, 15
- unity. *See* oceanic feeling; symbiosis
- universalizability, norm of, 195
- urban areas and nonurbanized personal places, 350
- urbanization, 254
- utilitarianism, 293, 567
- utopia(s)
 - green, 256–57
 - Spinozistic social, 633n8
- Vaihinger, Hans, 243
- Valhalla of the Vikings, 504
- value (inherent/intrinsic), 18, 37, 38, 95
 - of all human beings, 97, 99
 - of all living beings
 - Norwegians on, 330
 - as self-evident, 80
 - conservation efforts and, 276
 - gradations of, 97–98
 - identification and attribution of, 417
 - intolerance, discrimination, and, 99
 - intrinsic value vs. inherent value/worth, 61
 - justifiability of views on, 181–83
 - of natural world, 237
 - vs. nonliving entities as having value only as means, 4–5, 202
 - ranking and grading of, 549
 - See also* animals; quality of life
- value priorities, 114, 308
- VanDeVeer, Donald, 295
- views, 478
 - See also* frames of reference; total view(s)
- Vigerust, Per, 370–71
- violence
 - definitions and meanings of, 425–26
 - See also* nonviolence
 - effects of, 427
- virtue, 267, 410, 412, 415
- vital needs (and vital interests), 62, 67–68
 - vs. “needs,” 140–41, 154, 161–62, 319
 - rights and, 567–69
 - satisfying “wants” vs., 586
 - vagueness regarding the term, 39
- voting, 206
- Walsby, H., 480–81
- war. *See* peace movement
- Watt, James, 79–80
- whales, 595
- whaling, response to Norwegian environmental group’s support for, 331–34
- Whitehead, Alfred North, 237, 240, 245, 246, 453, 582
- wholism, 94
 - See also* integration
- Whorfian approach, 246
- wilderness areas, 109–10
- Wilson, E. O., 265
- Wingård, Bo, 163, 166–67, 173, 174, 177
- wisdom, 306, 563
- wolf policies, 301–02
 - norms, 310–13, 317–19
 - about suffering, 309–10, 313–14
 - protection of sheep against suffering, 313–15
 - protection of wolves as members of mixed communities, 315–21
 - reflect philosophies as total views, 306–08
 - respect for international agreements, 321–23
 - ultimate norms and, 310–13
- Wolff, Robert Paul, 476
- Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 400–401
- wolves, 548–50, 627n17, 628n25
 - danger of extinction, 305–06
 - dignity, 321
- world conservation strategy, 574
- World Conservation Strategy*, 36, 39, 46, 158, 216
- World Conservation Strategy (WCS)
 - deep ecology and, 564–68
- World Ecological Strategy*, 283
- world order
 - moral, 387
 - spiritual, 382
- Wyld, Henry Cecil Kennedy, 413
- Yellow Cheese (*Gulsten*), 223
- Zapffe, Peter Wessel, 133
- zoning and protection zones, 256

BERSERKER

BOOKS

